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Willie Lewis Brown, Jr.

FIRST AMONG EQUALS:
CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE LEADERSHIP, 1964-1992

With an Introduction by
John De Luca

Interviews Conducted by
Gabrielle Morris
in 1991 and 1992

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
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Willie Brown as Mayor of San Francisco, 1996.

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Cataloguing information

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Lawyer, legislator

First Among Equals: California Legislative Leadership, 1964-1992, 1999, ix, 331 pp.

Boyhood in Texas; education: San Francisco State University, 1951-1955, Hastings Law School, 1955-1958; early Democratic party activities; election to state assembly, 1964; legislative issues and politics, 1965-1992; Ways and Means Committee chairmanship, 1969-1974; state assembly speaker, 1980-1993, leadership concerns: government organization, revenue and taxation, African American equity; managing Jesse Jackson's presidential campaign, 1988; working with Phillip Burton, Jesse Unruh, Robert Moretti, Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and other political leaders of the era.

Interviewed 1991-1992 by Gabrielle Morris.

Introduction by John De Luca, President and CEO, Wine Institute.

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INTRODUCTION by John De Luca

I've known Willie Brown for more than thirty years, since early 1968 when I became chief of staff (and later deputy mayor) to Joe Alioto, who had just been elected mayor of San Francisco. As I was getting acquainted with the significant players in the political arena, Willie was in his second term representing the city in the California Assembly, on his way to several decades of exceptional influence in reshaping our state's political and economic landscape.

To me, it is fitting that he has crowned his distinguished fourteen-year career as Speaker of the Assembly, the second most powerful position in state government, by becoming mayor of San Francisco himself. As mayor at the turn of a new century, his great contribution has been to keep before the American public the extraordinary needs of our urban communities.

As soon as I met Assemblyman Brown, I discovered that he was a man of uncommon intelligence. He was a pleasure to work with because he was, like Alioto, colorful, a gifted orator, and a quick study. Willie Brown could, and still does, pick up on any issue and take one thread of a sentence and give a press conference for an hour, and people will think, with awe, he really knows his subject matter!

There were many issues in those days that required that Mayor Alioto and I meet with a variety of legislators and congressmen, including Jesse Unruh, then an equally notable Assembly Speaker. In fact, after initial differences, Jesse became one of Willie's great admirers. One time, I was driving Unruh in from the airport to see Alioto, and all Jesse wanted to talk about was how bright Willie was and what a future he had.

After 1975, when I became head of the Wine Institute and thus of the California wine industry, I would meet with Willie on questions related to agriculture and tourism--the two leading industries of the state--and, although he was an urban legislator, I found him to be very open to farm and rural issues. He was genuinely interested in the whole state and became increasingly knowledgeable about its many complex issues, including the most important matters of tax and finance, which you will read about in this oral history. During his years as speaker, he also became a seasoned administrator, learning executive skills that have been valuable preparation for the responsibilities of the mayor's office.

But to understand the true significance of Willie Brown and his impact on our politics and government, one needs to consider his

relation to the issues that have faced the cities of America in their walk through the twentieth century.

You cannot be ideological when it comes to solving problems in the American political system. You do need leaders who are visionaries, but at the same time can face real-life problems in day-to-day governance: the garbage must be collected, the buses must run on time, the city must be kept safe. Our system of government is very demanding, putting the emphasis on people who, while pursuing missions and goals, have also learned to build coalitions and, through them, to reach consensus. Willie Brown has been a consummate performer in how to put people together and how to get at a problem and move forward on it, not only in city and state government, but also at the national level.

To begin with, San Francisco has been blessed that, out of a small population compared to the rest of the state, we have contributed a remarkable number of dynamic leaders in both Sacramento and Washington--certainly Joe Alioto and Dianne Feinstein, Phil Burton and his brother John Burton, George Moscone, and Leo McCarthy, to name a few; and more recently, such notable individuals as Nancy Pelosi and Barbara Boxer. As capable as any of them and as expert at working with and resolving differences among them is Willie Brown.

His early years in local politics coincided with a crucial period in our times, during which he was (and continues to be) a tireless and fearless advocate for the black community and all minorities. He was committed to the traditional political arena in which you came to power by running for office and being elected, or by being appointed to administrative bodies, from which positions you then shared in the city's decisionmaking. There were those in the black community who talked of violence and or revolution as the way to bring about change, but Willie Brown, while tough, was not nihilistic. Instead, he reflected a new set of political values.

In the 1960s, an emerging leader like Willie could not divorce himself from the civil-rights struggle that was happening in Selma, Alabama and elsewhere, nor from the rhetoric of the times. He was constantly being pressured to be more adversarial at the same time that he was working within the system of votes and hearings and consensus. Although there was an unofficial timetable for progress, it was too slow for the most belligerent of his constituents. So he was really torn between those who wanted him to denounce the most radical minority groups and those who felt he wasn't going far enough for them.

It was an extraordinary era. Within months of each other in 1968, we had the assassinations of Martin Luther King, Jr. and Bobby Kennedy. Previously, in 1964 and 1965, the Watts riots in Los Angeles and the Hunters Point and Auto Row minority-employment demonstrations in San Francisco had shaken the city, which was again shaken in 1978 by the

shootings of Mayor George Moscone and Supervisor Harvey Milk. Keeping people from taking to the streets was not a hypothetical thing; it was happening in other parts of America. Willie Brown and the other leaders I've mentioned exerted their personal influence throughout the community, working together to make sure that, whatever our differences, we would work them out through the democratic process and not through violence.

That leadership included remarkable figures in the black community--Terry Francois, Judge Willie Kennedy, Hamilton Boswell, Carleton Goodlett, Joe Williams, Bill Chester, and many others whom Willie mentions in his oral history. Among them were men like Leroy King and Dr. Washington Garner, who spoke with authority as members of the Redevelopment Agency and Police Commission, respectively. All these people were senior in age to Willie yet, through the grid of personal politics that he cultivated, he could speak from an understanding of their thinking, and they understood his loyalty to the importance of their concerns.

The personal politics practiced in San Francisco has few parallels in the nation. Because of the city's size and compactness, you can interact with people in all neighborhoods if you have the energy and desire. It is a face-to-face city that has many civic and fraternal and ethnic groups. And Willie Brown would meet with them in North Beach, in Chinatown, in the Western Addition, in Hunters Point, the Bayview, in every street and quarter; and he would encourage everybody to think that if they had an occasion and they felt he should be invited, he'd accept. He'd take in several of these meetings a night, and to each one he'd give a talk that you'd think was the only event he'd prepared for, and then he'd go on to the next one and the next one. And Joe Alioto and George Moscone and Phil Burton and Dianne Feinstein were all doing the same thing.

At all these meetings, people would ask Willie, and the other elected representatives who showed up, to take positions on land issues, rent issues, fire, airport, housing, redevelopment, transportation, whatever. And in some cases, he would carry their concerns to the Board of Permit Appeals, the Housing Authority, the Redevelopment Agency. I can't begin to recount all the arguments that went on before the Redevelopment Agency, for example, over putting together what later became Moscone Center. Some of them so hot and heavy they ended up in a stream of lawsuits. In some ways it seems to go with the nature of San Francisco, like all the controversy recently over the downtown ballpark and the new 49er football stadium, or what to do about the deYoung Museum, all of which Willie is in the midst of as mayor. Some of these issues are of concern far beyond the limits of the city itself, like the city-states of ancient Greece that also influenced the commerce, culture, sports, and philosophy of regions much greater than themselves.

Some people thought that Willie, as an assemblyman, shouldn't be speaking before the board of supervisors on those questions. But it was not uncommon to have elected officials presenting positions before these bodies. I remember one important moment when a question dealing with the Police Officers Association (POA) and Officers for Justice (OFJ), a group formed of black officers, was before the board of supervisors. And the board passed a resolution 11 to 0 that favored the POA to the detriment of OFJ.

Willie Brown called me and said, "This is not right. I think it should be vetoed by the mayor." I said, "We don't usually veto an 11 to 0 decision, but if you will give me the substance of your views, I'll bring them to Mayor Alioto's attention."

When I got the details to the mayor later that day, he said, "Willie is absolutely right. This is an injustice," and Alioto vetoed the measure and was sustained in a subsequent vote. Over the years, Willie has said that was a defining moment when he understood that he could work with the mayor, regardless of their political differences.

I think one of the important stories of our time is that Willie Brown was able to walk a very difficult tightrope and fulfill the vision which he embodies for all Americans, that minorities can come to power and have an impact on public policy through the elective process. Even when it didn't look as if he would ever move into positions of power in the assembly, he persevered to become the leader of the assembly and held that post longer than anyone else in the history of the state. An indication of his role in California's political life can be found in Lieutenant Governor Gray Davis's recent statement that Willie Brown's endorsement in the 1998 primary election was the turning point in Davis's successful campaign for the Democratic gubernatorial nomination.

There were a number of us in San Francisco who felt that, at a certain time, Willie should run for mayor as a natural progression for his talents and experience. Because of his significant role in state and national Democratic party politics, as well as in the legislature, he was wise not to consider the possibility prematurely and thereby limit his authority and effectiveness.

I don't believe he had any burning ambition to be anything other than the top legislative leader of the state. He would always say, "I enjoy what I'm doing." But when term limits forced the issue, he did respond to his constituents who, in a sense, quasi-drafted him to run for mayor, in recognition of his ability to do more in the public arena.

Through all these years, I have been a strong supporter of Willie Brown and consider him a dear friend. There are others who are certainly closer to him, such as John Burton, who might write a more personal introduction to this memoir going back to their days together

in student politics at San Francisco State. But it continues to be instructive for me to observe and enjoy Da Mayor's bubbling energy and vivid oratory on the critical issues of the day. To say nothing of the numerous fashion shows, fundraisers, and other celebrations choreographed by Willie Brown in which my wife, Jo, and I have taken part.

It was at one of these events that I gave a surprise toast to then-Speaker Brown announcing that Henry Berman and I and a group of friends had arranged for The Bancroft Library at the University of California to record his oral history, providing an opportunity for him to recount some favorite occurrences in a remarkable career his way, without interruption or interpretation. This volume is the result.

John De Luca
President and CEO, Wine Institute

San Francisco, California
June 1998

INTERVIEW HISTORY--Willie L. Brown

Willie Lewis Brown, Jr., has been a legendary figure in California politics since he was named the outstanding freshman legislator of 1965 by journalists covering the state capitol. The Regional Oral History Office has looked forward to documenting his classic American success story: the experiences of a poor boy from a small town in Texas who made his way to San Francisco as a teenager, gained a college education and a law school degree, and became a leader in the public life of the city and state, and in the Democratic party nationally. This oral history seeks to capture the remarkable vitality and accomplishment of Brown's career through his years as speaker of the California Assembly and is vital to understanding his later role as mayor of the City and County of San Francisco (1994-).

As a student at San Francisco State College and Hastings School of Law (1951-1958), Willie Brown's hard work and cheerful disposition won him recognition in church and civic organizations. He went on to become active in the early years of the civil rights movement, defending many another poor person and speaking out for social justice in employment and housing and an increased role for black people in San Francisco's civic affairs.

Brown's activities and eloquence won him a seat in the state assembly in 1964, the first African American to represent San Francisco; he quickly mastered the intricacies of legislative life and, in 1980, was chosen speaker of the assembly, second only to the governor in authority. He held this position for a record fourteen years, during a challenging period in California government, and became an influential figure in state and national Democratic politics, including chairing Jesse Jackson's 1988 presidential campaign.

The interviews in this volume were recorded while Brown was still speaker, looking at the prospect of legislative term limits and a veteran of several unsuccessful challenges to his office. He described these and other contentious events with gusto, obviously having enjoyed the matching of wits and demonstration of his skill. Five interviews were conducted on Saturday or Sunday mornings between October 1991 and January 1992.

Always stylishly dressed in well-cut sport coat and slacks appropriate to a weekend appointment (with a departure into a Forty-Niners warm-up jacket on the day of the Super Bowl, for which he was to host a pre-game party), Brown was ready to begin the interview as soon as we sat down at the polished conference table in the library of his San Francisco law office. As one of the most-interviewed public figures of the day, his attitude was a relaxed "What shall we talk about today?" In spite of his frequent and well-documented (see Chapter XV) annoyance with the media, he was a responsive and engaging interviewee.

The oral history followed a chronological outline with topical focus in the sessions on his assembly years on governmental issues with which Brown was particularly identified. Given his crowded schedule and vision difficulties, it is not likely that he personally read over the day's interview queries submitted before the session nor reviewed the subsequent edited transcript.

Most of the topics were familiar territory, including stories the speaker likes to tell, on himself as well as starring himself: being raised on beans and vegetables, long before organic food became a buzzword, under the vigilant eye of Mo'dear, his tough and devoted grandmother; how he learned grassroots politicking in the San Francisco State College student NAACP and from legendary vote-counter Phil Burton; how he voted against Jesse Unruh for speaker in 1965; how he was banished to the smallest office in the capitol by Speaker Bob Moretti and returned to chair the mighty Assembly Ways and Means Committee, where he dazzled the faithful and irritated the opposition by his quick grasp of legislative detail and finance; how he won the speakership in 1984; how he pushed for broader public policy initiatives in health care, affordable housing, and growth management while tending to assembly members' wants; how he put down challenges from young Turks and old conservatives.

If Brown's time and the project budget had allowed, the oral history could have continued indefinitely following the many byways of his career, accounts of which are widely available. Speaker Brown's own telling of the events discussed provide a unique view of his broad and deep understanding of the complex processes and unrelenting effort required to maintain effective government, responsive to the changing needs of the citizens of the state.

Throughout the interview, Brown's gift for enjoying life and for friendship is evident. Especially interesting are his accounts of advice and sociability shared over the years with Herb Caen, whose daily column in the *San Francisco Chronicle* shaped the Bay Area discourse on many public issues, and Wilkes Bashford, whose high-fashion men's clothing shop is frequently patronized by Brown. Brown's loyalty to causes as well as people is also evident, as described in Chapter VIII, in which the interviewer accompanies him on his regular Sunday visit to St. Anthony's Dining Room for the indigent, where he joshes with numerous regular customers while filling up their coffee cups.

It is also loyalty that made this oral history possible, through the warmth of spirit of John De Luca, president of the Wine Institute. Looking for an unusual toast for the Speaker's birthday in 1990, he announced at the party that friends of Willie Brown's were chipping in to sponsor his participation in an oral history to be conducted by The Bancroft Library. Sponsors are listed at the front of the volume.

Additional information on Brown's impact on the assembly and on Democratic politics is available in *Willie Brown: A Biography*, by James Richardson (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996) and numerous articles in the *California Journal*, as well as in the state's metropolitan newspapers.

In preparing for the oral history, several of Brown's chief aides provided the interviewer with helpful insights, among them Bob Connelly, chief administrative officer of the assembly and veteran legislative strategist; John Mockler, education policy specialist; Joanne Murphy, research and speech consultant; Steve Scott, health policy specialist; and Brown's chief administrative assistant, Michael Galizio, whose office made the initial arrangements for the oral history. Tapes of informal background conversations recorded in Sacramento with several of these aides are deposited in The Bancroft Library with Brown's own tapes.

The transcripts of the interviews were lightly edited by the interviewer and, in 1992, sent to Ms. Murphy for review as arranged by Mr. Brown. Subsequent conversations with Ms. Murphy indicated that only minor revisions were needed, although the transcript was not returned to the Regional Oral History Office. After Mr. Brown became mayor of San Francisco and interest in completion of the transcript became urgent, it was learned that the edited transcript had been returned to Brown in Sacramento and subsequently lost. Processing of the oral history was completed using The Bancroft Library file copy under the agreement signed by Willie Brown on January 26, 1992.

The appendix to the volume includes lists of summaries of bills introduced by Brown, 1973-1990; speeches made by Brown as speaker, 1984-1990; videos of Brown's television appearances, 1984-1990; and a few selections from the numerous comments on Brown's activities that appeared in Herb Caen's columns in the *Chronicle*.

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Gabrielle Morris, Interviewer/Editor
Regional Oral History Office

The Bancroft Library
Berkeley, California
July 1998

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

(Please write clearly. Use black ink.)

Your full name Willie Lewis Brown, Jr.

Date of birth March 20, 1934 Birthplace Mineola, Texas

Father's full name Willie Lewis Brown

Occupation bartender, porter Birthplace _____

Mother's full name Minnie Boyd Collins

Occupation housekeeper Birthplace Mineola, Texas

Your spouse Blanche Vitero Brown

Occupation dancer Birthplace _____

Your children son Michael, daughters Susan and Robin

Where did you grow up? Mineola

Present community San Francisco

Education San Francisco State College, 1951-55;

Hastings College of Law, 1955-1958

Occupation(s) attorney, California State Assemblyman, 1964-93

Speaker of the Assembly, 1980-1993; Mayor of San Francisco, 1994-

Areas of expertise public administration, Democratic party

Other interests or activities _____

chaired Jesse Jackson 1988 presidential campaign

Organizations in which you are active numerous

I GROWING UP IN MINEOLA, TEXAS

[Interview 1: October 19, 1991] ##¹

Memories of Mo'Dear

Brown: Let's go!

Morris: Where we would like to start is, tell us a little bit about growing up in Mineola.

Brown: Oh, I saw that list of topics.

Morris: Yes, that's a reminder sheet of some of the points we would like to touch on about how Willie Brown got started and his early ideas about the world and interests.

Brown: How far do you want to go back?

Morris: Mineola.

Brown: Yes, but I mean, how far back in Mineola?

Morris: Well, your grandmother is referred to but she doesn't have a name. The kind of lessons she taught you. Early influences is what this category is.

Brown: I was raised along with three sisters and a brother by my grandmother. Her name was Anna Lee Collins. She was my grandmother. She was literally the center of the family. She had four sons, three of whom were still alive and whom I knew and met and associated with, and one daughter, my mother, Minnie. None of

¹## This symbol indicates that a tape or tape segment has begun or ended. A guide to the tapes follows the transcript.

those lived in the home with us. They were all in various locations earning money to send back home to take care of the children. My mother was the only one of the offspring of my grandmother who had any children, so to speak. Her son, Itsy, currently the only surviving other member from that brood, had a son named Maurice, but he did not live with us. So it was the five of Minnie's children.

All of the resources that were forwarded back to the grandmother were used to raise the three of us. Each of us had an assigned responsibility and that is, frankly, the first of my real memories of living in Mineola at 511 Baker Street. Each one of us had a duty. I think my first job was to feed the chickens and get water. There were no indoor plumbing facilities. There was no running water. We didn't have a well on our property. The well was on Jim Hunter's property which was maybe a block or a block and a half away. You had to get buckets of water for purposes of maintaining the family, whether it was to cook, whether it was to wash dishes or whether it was to do baths. You had to--.

Morris: Haul water.

Brown: --tote water. We called it "tote water."

Morris: Tote, yes. You toted the water for the whole family?

Brown: Correct. I was the water man, so to speak.

Morris: That will develop stamina at an early age.

Brown: Then we bought ice from a traveling truck that sold ice about once or twice a week. You had a little icebox in which you put this ice. You put your water and you put everything else in there to keep it cold. The chunk of ice--twenty-five pounds of ice--would maybe take two or three days to melt. In between, sometimes it would melt sooner. When it melted sooner, then we had to go all the way over to the ice house and buy a twenty-five-pound chunk of ice and lug it back for the icebox.

But you all had assignments. Everybody had an assignment. One of my sisters, her job was to clean one day, the other one was to wash dishes, and the other one was to cook. So everybody had something to do. My grandmother--we called her Mo'dear.

Morris: Mo'dear?

Brown: Short for Mother Dear.

Morris: That's nice.

Brown: But we called her Mo'dear. All she did was run the house. She didn't do anything else. She would supervise the cooking and give directions on the cooking, but she mainly operated as the supervisor. Everybody else had to perform a task.

Morris: Had she been a teacher herself early on?

Brown: No. I don't even think she graduated from high school. I don't think she graduated from grammar school, as a matter of fact. She clearly, though, could read and write and was very well aware and had a great sense about her of how things should be done and would not hesitate to administer punishment if she deemed it appropriate to do so. She was real strict on discipline. You had to maintain excellent grades. Everybody had to get good grades; if you didn't get good grades, you were totally unacceptable. Everybody had to go to church every Sunday. Except my grandmother. My grandmother didn't do any of that. She didn't go to church. [chuckles] She went over to the school to argue with them about anything. She just made you do it all and you had to do it at every step of the way. You literally had to do it.

Morris: If there was a problem at school, you had to go talk to the teacher about it.

Brown: Hopefully, your problem would not get back to your grandmother's ears, because if it did you were disciplined at home without a hearing. Then you had to straighten it out when you got back in school; so it wasn't one of these deals where there were any negotiations or mitigation. She just assumed that you were wrong if somebody said something. That caused you to always be absolutely perfect, or you'd attempt to be perfect, in everything you did.

One of my assignments, after I grew up a little bit and managed to acquire a bicycle--. I had a luggage rack on the rear of my bicycle. That luggage rack was for the purpose of giving my grandmother a ride down to the Sabine River to fish. She loved to fish and she would fish every day of her life if she could, if she was healthy enough. But there were no cars or wagons; we didn't have horses or those kinds of things to carry her. There were no other men in the family except me and my little brother. So it became my job to get my grandmother down to the fishing hole, down to the Sabine River, which is maybe two or three miles away from the house.

She would climb up on the luggage rack, on the carriage on the back of my bicycle, put her fishing pole up, put her hat on, and I would pedal her down to the river. She always walked back. Her exercise was to walk back home on her own.

Morris: She would walk both ways until you acquired the bicycle?

Brown: I have no independent memory of how she got to the hole prior to my acquiring the bicycle; but I assume she did because she had some other people in the community who went fishing as well, and I think they would hike to wherever they were to go fishing--.

Morris: Together.

Brown: Right. And then hike back. But she always hiked back. I took her down to the fishing hole on my bicycle, but she never required me to come back to pick her up.

The rules were set out; you knew what time dinner was, you knew what time everything was, you knew what time you were supposed to go to school, you knew what time you were supposed to go to church, you knew how long you could stay out and play.

Morris: There was time for play? She made it fair.

Brown: Absolutely, as long as you did your work. As long as you did your homework and your chores, you could play forever. She invited our house to be the playground for all the kids, so we built the high-jump pit and the pole-vault pit in her yard. We had one of the few pianos where kids would be allowed to play at the piano, so everybody in the neighborhood would show up there to play and to play around the piano.

We usually owned the only football or the only basketball. We had a basketball goal that I had built on the back of the wood house where we stored wood. We had to cut wood and store the wood and stack the wood, all that business, and then behind the wood house we had the chicken coop where we raised the chickens and got the eggs and those kinds of things. Then we had a pig pen where we raised the pigs and the hogs for purposes of food. None of this was for sale; all this was for food. Then we had a field where we raised corn and beans and tomatoes. Then she had a private garden of her own that was fenced in, and we were not allowed in her garden. In her garden she would raise specialty beans--now I know they were specialty beans and things of that nature--and we raised the general crops.

We had a cellar that we were never allowed to go down in. She stored the canned fruits in the cellar. She would buy peaches, she would buy plums, she would buy strawberries, she would buy all those kinds of things and can them for preserves, jellies and jams. She would even can greens and can corn in Mason fruit jars. Our job was always to wash the fruit jars, get them

ready, and screw the tops on. She did all the canning, all the cooking for the canning and what have you.

So it was really a very well-organized household as I think about it. The resources that kept the household going must have been her pension. She must have had some form of Social Security or some pension or something from her husband, whom I never knew. Grandfather was long since passed before the kids came along.

Morris: Had Grandfather worked for the railroad?

Brown: No. Only my dad worked for the railroad. I don't know what my grandmother's husband did. No one ever told me what he did. But let me go back to the cellar. The cellar under the house was where we stored the canned fruit because it was cool down there. What I did not know for a long time is that Texas was a dry state and my grandmother and her sons were bootleggers. [laughter] They stored the booze in the cellar. That's where they stored much of the booze.

Morris: Did they make it or were they just the distributors?

Brown: They were distributors and she made some of it. She made what she called "chalk". That was some alcoholic beverage derived from fruits.

But my grandmother was also in what you would call the night club business but we called the honky-tonk business. She and her sons had a joint around the corner from the house where they sold food and drinks and had bands come in, all those kinds of things, long before we came along. About the time we came along, the town was beginning to deteriorate and everybody was beginning to move out. So her sons moved out and that closed the place of business and left her without any basis of income except what they sent her and whatever she got from Social Security. But she had some check that came in every month, small as it was.

When the kids were old enough, they would acquire some kind of jobs. They would acquire jobs, sometimes, in the white restaurants downtown or, for example, I shined shoes and mowed lawns and harvested crops. All the kids participated, but you kept your own money.

Morris: Did you?

Brown: You did not have to give any of your money as part of the family operation. You could if you chose to, but you were required to spend your money for necessities of life. If you knew you needed shoes, and you had earned money, you couldn't wait for a

distribution to come from the grandmother from other sources or from an uncle who might buy you shoes. If you were in the money, you were expected to buy the shoes. That's how I happened to end up buying my own bicycles. Every bicycle I have bought. As a matter of fact, all of the frivolous toys, so to speak, that were not considered necessities of life, you literally had to acquire on your own because we were unusually poor. We were really poor.

I do not know, but I suspect that the quality of our health is in direct relationship to the diet that we had and the foods that we consumed. We ate red meat maybe once a week. We ate mostly chicken and fish. Chickens we raised and killed and the fish my grandmother caught. That was the extent of the meat. Otherwise it was always vegetables. To this day, that has probably been the thing that reflects itself more in our physical makeup.

Morris: That is now considered the proper diet.

Brown: Correct. For us it was a staple. It was the way we lived. We ate lots of rice. We ate lots of beans. We made our own bread. We made whole cakes. As I said, we ate chicken. When we had meat, we ate chicken once a week and fish maybe twice a week based upon what she caught. They were always freshwater fish. That was it. I didn't know what a steak was.

Morris: Even in Texas, a big steak state.

Brown: No. Not that part of the country. There were no cows in my part of the country for steak purposes. It was rare to have milk, frankly. Milk and orange juice, that was just unheard of to have that kind of stuff. Those were all luxuries. Those were the kinds of things you had to buy in stores mainly. We did not have milk cows. We had cousins who lived further out in the country who had cows. When they would milk their cows, we could pick up fresh milk from them. That fresh milk may not have lasted but one or two days based upon the fact that you couldn't keep it. The milk that we had to drink and that we used for cereal--and we always ate corn flakes--was Carnation canned milk which we would take and dilute with water in order to make it appropriate for use, because it was just too thick.

But we always had dessert. I can remember so clearly that one thing she did was bake. She would bake sweet potato pies and she would make lemon pies and she would make bread puddings and she would make banana pudding and cobblers--berry cobblers in season, peach cobblers in season, and pear cobblers. We had a pear tree so she would make pear cobblers in season. It would be

very rare to ever have an apple cobbler because you had to buy the apples. Nobody raised apples.

But I now reflect on how people eat and notice that that is the way I ate most of my life; all through seventeen years I never developed a taste for steaks. As a result of that, to this day I can eat a steak, but it isn't something that I crave. Some people say, "I've just got to have a steak."

Hamburgers, however, were the order of the day. Any time you could get a hamburger, you had it made.

Morris: That was a special treat.

Brown: That was a special treat. The way you got addicted to or acquainted with hamburgers was when either you or some of your friends went to work as fry cooks or dishwashers in these little roadhouses and these little places of that nature. They were usually hamburger joints. So invariably a hamburger and milkshake became a staple. That was considered what you ate if you went out. You wanted a hamburger. Now I hate hamburgers. But that was what you would eat if you went out. You'd want the perfect hamburger. You'd want to toast the bun and do all that kind of stuff.

But those were the early years in Mineola. Part of my grandmother's instructions were: you have to do your chores, you have to do all your work before you can play, you must be home at night, you literally must be home at night, you had to always be clean. You had to always clean your clothes, you had to wash your clothes. One of the daughters had the responsibility for washing; one had the responsibility for ironing. It was always a participatory process. You absolutely had to always be clean. No matter what you did, you had to put on clean clothes. You had to always have on good clean clothes to go to church on Sunday. You had to go to Sunday school.

School Days; Looking After Folk

Morris: What church?

Brown: C.M.E. Colored Methodist Episcopal. They now call it Christian Methodist Episcopal, but it was the C.M.E. Church. You walked everywhere too. I didn't realize that that was part of your health. In this day and age, that's now part of your health activities. But you walked everywhere. You walked to work, you

walked home, you walked to school, you walked to church. Whether it was raining or not, you walked. Whether it was cold or not, whether there was snow on the ground. There was no such thing--.

Morris: Did it snow in Mineola?

Brown: Absolutely. It snowed. You walked. I couldn't understand why people objected to busing when I got to California in 1954. Of course, by 1956, 1958, busing had become a big issue. For a while I couldn't understand: What's objectionable about riding on a school bus? I always wanted to ride on a school bus. The kids who lived way out in the country got the chance to come in by the school bus into the rural school.

Morris: And drive past you and you had to hike.

Brown: That's right. They would come in by school bus. We were envious of folk who were on school buses. We thought that was just the best thing that could ever happen to you, where you could get a ride to school. A matter of fact, we used to go to the highway-- because both schools were on the other side of town--and time it when the bus was coming by. We would work out a deal with the bus driver, and he would pick us up when he brought the other kids in.

Morris: That's a real irony, because busing was the way country kids got to school for two generations.

Brown: Listen. If you remember all of those great posters in the Saturday Evening Post, it was always a kid running down and the dog following the kid and the kid with his lunch pail down the little country lane. Those [Norman] Rockwell pictures all with a big yellow school bus and a cheerful fellow driving the bus. So I had an image of a school bus that was very positive until I got to California. Now it has become absolutely unacceptable to ever ride a school bus.

Well, we didn't ride school buses. We walked to school. As I reflect upon it, we lived furthest away than any other family. We lived at the end of the town. There was nothing beyond us except the trash dump and the railroad tracks. You go out our house, through our back yard, and it was a railroad track. That was the boundary for the little town of Mineola. Nobody lived on the other side behind the railroad tracks. The woods were behind the railroad tracks and then down here was the garbage dump. Nobody lived beyond the garbage dump.

So we lived on the last street. Baker Street was the very last street before the railroad track. That means that we lived furthest away, which means we started earliest for purposes of

walking to school. Invariably as you walked to school you would pick people up, and by the time you got to school, there would be a crowd of people walking about the same time. So it was always great sport. Going home, it was the same way. You would start out walking with a whole group of kids, and kids would drop off based on where they lived. We would obviously be the very last people home from school. There were never any fights in the morning going to school. The fights always occurred in the afternoon after school. There were always fights.

Morris: Really?

Brown: Oh, yes. Kids always would fight. They would play, throw mud on each other, rocks on each other, got the clothes dirty, and you got a whipping when you got home. You had to go to school and keep your clothes clean while you were in school. There was a requirement.

Neighborhood Social Contract; Segregation

Morris: All the kids in town had the same rules?

Brown: All of them. A few came from families where they didn't have as strict rules as our family. But most families had essentially the same rules.

There was no such thing as homeless people. The system we now have is a little crazy. Everybody had some place to live. People would take in cousins. People took in almost strangers. Nobody was permitted to be a bum. A bum was a hobo who went from place to place by train. He would hook a ride on the train and roam around. But there was no such thing as people being homeless. There was no such thing as kids being without some parental guidance. There were no outlaw kids. There were no kids living in the streets in that little town. And there was a system of everyone participating in raising the kids. Everybody knew what the rules were for everybody. They would say, "I'm going to tell your mama."

You couldn't curse. "It's time for you to go home. Your mama says you're supposed to be home by five o'clock, boy." You had to leave. Or if you engaged in some improper activity, you got whipped by whomever the adult was, wherever you were. Then your parents were told, or your guardian, whomever was in charge of you, was told that you did something wrong and you got whipped a second time. There was no problem. Kids concealed improper

conduct. You actually learned that to break a window or do any damage to anybody's property was really forbidden, I mean absolutely forbidden. Stealing was almost a capital offense.

Morris: Really?

Brown: Oh, yes. The rules were very, very clear. The only thing that people didn't look down their nose at was drinking. Kids were not supposed to drink but it was okay for adults to drink, so you saw a lot of folks drunk. Every Saturday night, people got drunk partying and all that kind of stuff, but they all showed up for church Sunday morning. No matter who they were. Adults and children. Everybody went to church. Everybody had to dress and go to church.

Morris: Bad headache or not.

Brown: That's right. Everybody went to church and what have you. Stealing was totally unacceptable. Any other antisocial contact was unacceptable, except fights between people. People did have physical fights to settle disputes.

Morris: Was this white kids and black kids having fights?

Brown: No. This was black kids only. I lived in a community--. Mineola was totally and completely segregated. All the black people lived on one side of town and the white people lived on the other side of town. There was no mixing at all. Black people had to buy everything that they consumed and got from white people. But blacks had no stores. The only businesses blacks had were that they cut people's hair and did beauty work on people's hair. They ran little joints like the night club-café and honky-tonks such as my relatives had.

Morris: What about a doctor or lawyer?

Brown: No such thing. You had to go to white folks for all those things which meant that you got almost no medical care and you got almost no dental care. Dental care was not accessible. If you had a tooth problem, you put a string around it and tied it to the door and pulled it out, or you treated it with home remedies. I don't remember the name of the medical book but there used to be a standard medical book out of which all kinds of suggestions were made. For example, you wore a bag of camphophenique around your neck all winter and that was supposed to keep you from catching cold. If you caught a cold, you took castor oil to clear it up. For almost everything else you take black draw, I think they called it. But you had all kinds of remedies of that nature.

My grandmother--now I know what her medical problem was--had a very, very bad heart and she had high blood pressure. She would have spells regularly where she couldn't breathe and where she would be under siege. We had to care for her. We all knew how to care for her when she would get that way. But I can remember over a ten- or fifteen-year period her being that way, although she lived to be about eighty-five.

Morris: That's amazing.

Brown: But she clearly had a very bad heart. She would lie down for hours as a result of those attacks. But she never let any of that stop her. She never had a doctor ever in the whole time that I lived with her until 1951, when I left. Then my brother lived with her until 1957 and she died.

Morris: Was there somebody in the neighborhood who was especially good at coming up with suggestions when somebody got sick?

Brown: No. It was pretty much Grandmother who had the theory on how you treat people who are sick. I don't remember getting advice from anybody else. I remember her giving a lot of medical advice to neighbors. I just can't think of the name of the medical book that she had that she always looked at. I never asked my mother about my grandmother's schooling, but it was clear that she knew how to read and write and count. She read a lot. She read the Bible, she read books, she read everything.

Morris: Had she been born and raised in Texas?

Brown: Yes. She had been born and raised in Texas. She was the daughter of a slave and had lived there all her life.

Morris: In Mineola?

Brown: In Mineola.

Morris: Somebody said that she was also of the opinion that her grandchildren should get out of Mineola. She wanted you to go on to better things. Is that true?

Brown: She required of us, as I said earlier, to obey all those rules but on reflection I see that in the process we developed the survival skills that would take us to wherever we needed to go and where she thought we should go. She had the vision that we all ought to go to college, that we all had to go to college. She did not want us going to college anywhere near Mineola. Although she was unable to afford to send us any place except that. Only my brother, the two of us, went further away than the Mineola area.

All of my sisters went to college in a place entirely Texas, Texas College, which is twenty-five miles away. It was the college of the church that we were a part of.

But everybody had to go to college. Everybody absolutely had to go to college and that was my grandmother's goal. My grandmother's goal was to get you out of Mineola and to get you into college. I never had this conversation either, but the way in which she treated us led me to understand that this is what she expected.

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Morris: Did you see your mother and uncles often?

Brown: All her children went away as they grew up, but they always came back once a year at least. My mother came back a lot more often than that because my mother's children were there. My mother was just up in Dallas. They didn't have a high school; they didn't have a twelfth grade in Mineola. You go only through the tenth grade in Mineola. My grandmother sent my mother to another little town where they did have an eleventh and twelfth grade and my mother lived with a family there who had a daughter about the same age. So she graduated from high school in that little town.

The woman who befriended her and the family who took her in, that woman, her girlfriend, now lives in Los Angeles. Whenever she comes out here to visit, Miss Gertride comes up here or my mother goes by there to visit. These two old ladies are in their eighties now and they were girlfriends who graduated from high school together. That's kind of an interesting story.

Morris: That's nice to have that kind of a friendship.

Brown: Yes.

Mother's Treats

Morris: Did your mother have any ideas of her own that she added to your upbringing?

Brown: Not until my grandmother died. When my grandmother died, then my mother became in charge. But my mother literally echoed whatever my grandmother said. She always wanted us to follow the rules that my grandmother laid down. We were never permitted to say as some kids would do--. Most of the kids in the community, by the

way, were raised by grandmothers because their mothers had to go to work someplace. So most were raised by grandmothers. Many of them would be able to argue with their grandmothers and say they were going to tell their mother. We could never say we were going to tell our mother because our mother was on our grandmother's side in any argument, period. That was just the way it was. My mother was like another one of my grandmother's grandchildren when it came to events of that nature.

So we never had a higher authority to whom we could appeal. If there was something that we wanted to do, like when I wanted to move to Dallas--. My grandmother let one of my sisters move to Dallas to get a job and live with my mother.

Morris: After high school?

Brown: Yes. Near the end of high school. She actually ended up graduating from high school in Dallas. She was the only one. All the rest of us graduated from high school in Mineola. She is the second daughter. My mother allowed her to move up and live with her.

My mother moved to Dallas and she lived up over the garage. In those days in Texas, when you worked in somebody's house as their maid or their cook, you lived in service. Living in service was to live in a small, what we would now call, mother-in-law's unit above the garage. The garages were detached and it was a nice place. It was usually like a studio that people could live in. My mother lived in that facility for many, many years.

Morris: It also meant she was on call seven days a week.

Brown: Oh, yes. She was like part of the family. She totally ran the house. It was always a great treat for us when we knew she was coming because she would always bring extra food. She would bring the kind of food that we didn't ever get. But she could bring it from her white people's house. She had a relationship where they taught her to drive an automobile and she got a license. She needed to drive their kids around and she could use their car to come home. So she was very much a part of the family. Eventually they gave her a car. They gave her the old car when they bought a new car.

My mother lived there for a long time, saved her money and with their support, eventually rented her own place to live over in the black part of town. Otherwise, she lived in the white part of town. There was a whole group of black maids who lived in the white part of town. They were the only black people living in the white neighborhoods and they were all maids. They all knew each

other; they all talked to each other. It was a social set among all the black maids living in service. Every time one of them would quit or move some other place, the group would find somebody else for the white people who didn't have somebody to replace them.

We would occasionally be allowed to go visit my mother. There was never any room to stay overnight or anything but we would go up to visit our mother. It was always pleasant to see these big expansive yards.

Morris: Some Dallas neighborhoods are very fancy.

Brown: Oh, yes. Highland Park was where my mother worked and lived. It was quite an experience to do that. But my mother would always come for every graduation, every serious school exercise--if you did plays or presentations or anything of that nature, she was always there. She was always there on every holiday. Easter Sunday, she got those days off. So she would come on Easter Sundays or she would come on our birthdays. She would always bring gifts with her, so we remember her more as a person who always had a treat for us. She would always slip us fifty cents or something that we were forbidden to tell our grandmother about although I'm sure our grandmother knew that she was doing that. But it was always a great secret that you wouldn't tell, an extra quarter or whatever it was. Each of us had an allowance.

Morris: Did that come from Mom?

Brown: No, Grandmother. She ran everything. You had an allowance. Everybody had an allowance. It could get to as much as twenty-five cents a week. It could get to be that much. But only if you got good grades, did your homework. And you had to attend every class, by the way. You could not be absent from school. You didn't need a truant officer in that town. You could not be absent from school. You couldn't play hookey; you couldn't be late to class. Any of those things, it was on your report card. That was part of the discipline. You had deportment, and attendance was listed right on the report card. That was all part of the process all the way through the twelfth grade, not just the low grades. This was all the way through the twelfth grade.

Morris: We need a few grandmothers like that around in the schools nowadays.

Brown: Yes. So the schools had a whole different attitude and a whole different view about things. My mother would always come back and the community would always show up if there was a play. Everybody's family showed up for the play in the school

auditorium. If there was a graduation exercise, everybody went to the graduation, whether you had a kid graduating or not. It would be unusual for the whole town, all the black community, not to show up. There were only 254 kids in twelve grades.

Morris: In the whole school.

Brown: In the whole school. By the time I consciously remember school, there were twelve grades. I think my sister just ahead of me was the first to graduate from twelve grades in that town. Before that, as I said, my mother only went to the tenth grade and they had no other arrangement. By the time my older sister came along, you could go to the county seat and they had a bus in between Mineola and Whitman and it was ten miles away. So every day, my older sister, for the eleventh and twelfth grade, had to get on the bus and go up to Whitman, which was the county seat for Wood County, in order to be able to graduate from high school. So she graduated from Whitman High.

My second sister ended up going to Dallas and living with my mother to graduate from high school. My third sister, Gwen, by the time she was ready to graduate, we had gotten the eleventh and twelfth grade in Mineola. So she was in the first class to graduate from the eleventh and twelfth grade. Then I came along, of course, two or three years later and graduated from eleventh and twelfth grade. But there were only 254 kids and that was as big as school ever got. By the time I graduated, it started going down in size in terms of total student body.

High School; Civic Activities

Morris: Was this high school run by the county or was this a local tax-supported school?

Brown: It was the Mineola School District.

Morris: Mineola.

Brown: Yes.

Morris: Did they have black history?

Brown: Negro history. We didn't have black history. You had Negro history before you had world history. You had four histories. You had four histories: you had Negro history, Texas history, U.S.

history, and then world history. So in your high schools, in one of those years, you would have a separate kind of history.

Morris: How about politics? There has been a lot of discussion lately about Texas politics in the Lyndon Johnson era.

Brown: We knew nothing about it. As kids in school and as black folk, there was never any discussion about politics. I had no clue about what politics really were until I got to California. I did not know of any politicians. I didn't know that the sheriff had to run for office. I didn't know what that was. Nobody voted in Mineola. My grandmother never voted in her life; not in her life did she ever cast a vote. There were no such thing as voting or registering to vote in that little town. There was a mayor but we had no clue as to how he got elected. He was not relevant at all. There was a police chief; we had no clue how he or she got appointed. He was the only policeman in the town. Then there was a sheriff for the county and we had no idea how that went about.

I don't think there was anything like a city council but there must have been something of a town-elder group. But I have no independent recollection of anything of that nature. There was one little newspaper. Two as a matter of fact. There was a Wood County Record, which was the county's main newspaper. And the Mineola Monitor. The Mineola Monitor was just a local weekly paper. Then, of course, we got the papers once a week. We got the Houston Informer or the Kansas City Call or the Pittsburgh Courier. Those were the black newspapers. Those were the Negro newspapers. There was a blind man named B.C.--I don't remember B.C.'s last name--but B.C. had the newspaper concession. I didn't know until many years later that B.C. was not born blind. B.C. was blind because one of my uncles took a shotgun and blew his eyes out.

Morris: Oh, dear.

Brown: In a dispute. B.C. had been the meanest person in the community, dangerously mean. He apparently messed around with my uncle or something, my uncle took a shotgun and blew his eyes out. Nothing ever happened to my uncle as a result, but B.C. was blind for the rest of his life. B.C. got, I guess you would now call it, the newspaper franchise. One of us, for a fee, would walk B.C. around the entire area of the black community of Mineola to sell the newspapers.

He would have the sack on his back with the various newspapers. He actually could get around by himself. He learned the streets; they had not that many streets. So he learned the streets; he knew how to stay on the gutter side of the street or

just off the streets. He would hear the cars, and he could get around pretty much on his own. But he would always give us a nickel or so to go with him, so we would race to see who would accompany B.C. on his paper route.

Morris: He didn't have any hard feelings for the loss of his eyesight?

Brown: No. I think he was probably wrong. I think he was maybe in the process of killing somebody, or about to kill somebody. He used to be very good with a knife. I think my uncle did the community a favor. My family, on reflection, turned out to be kind of--. I don't want to say the rulers, but kind of the judge and the jury of what went on.

Morris: Conscience of the town?

Brown: Not so much conscience, but I don't know if they had a conscience either [chuckles]. But they certainly refereed and settled more disputes and were known for their fairness, apparently, in dealing with people.

Morris: More so than the minister?

Brown: Oh, the ministers were not relevant at all.

Morris: Really?

Brown: As a matter of fact, the one minister was also a school teacher. I. W. Whitmore was the principal of school. He was also the pastor of the local church. His authority and respect came from being principal. But they didn't have a lot going for them. The people in the streets had more going for them in terms of relationships than the teachers and the preachers. It was not a community that was preacher-dominated.

II COMING TO SAN FRANCISCO, 1951

Uncle Itsy Collins; Family Card Games

Morris: Interesting. Now is it time to tell me about your uncle, Itsy [Rembert] Collins?

Brown: Well, there were three sons. Four actually--one I never knew because he had died early on. The three that I did know were Richard, Son, and Itsy. Richard got drafted, or volunteered, for the military. Son and Itsy moved to California at the start of the war [World War II] for the purpose of working in the defense industry.

Morris: That is "Sun" as in the sun shines?

Brown: S-O-N.

Morris: Yes. Okay.

Brown: That was his only name. His name was Son Collins. Itsy Collins. Richard was called Baby Collins. Then the other son whom I did not know was Q Trick[?]. Richard, or Baby, Collins, who moved to Dallas and married a school teacher, either volunteered or got drafted for the military service. My grandmother used to tell the tale that they were trying to find my Uncle Itsy to draft him. But they found her baby son Baby instead, thought he was Itsy and drafted him.

Itsy and Son came to San Francisco to go to work in the shipyard. Son actually took a job in the shipyard. When he died, he was still an employee in the shipyard. He died of old age but he died as an employee of the federal government working in the shipyard.

Morris: Down at Hunter's Point.

Brown: Hunter's Point, yes. Itsy came, as I said, with Son. They came out here together. Itsy took one look at the people working in the shipyard and decided it made no sense for him to work. He would be better off if he set a game of chance for them to enjoy themselves in. He did just that. He never had a job in his life. He is eighty-seven now, I guess, and he has never worked a day in his life. He has been a gambler, and a great gambler. He was very wealthy at one time. He owned lots of real estate here in San Francisco and had a good wife who managed his money well.

He was the star of the family, so to speak. He was the most handsome of Mo'dear's boys and clearly the most fun-loving and the most risk-taking and the most socially acceptable, kind of a lady's man. He always had very fancy cars, very fancy clothing, he was always physically in better shape than any of the other boys. He was always more generous to people generally and particularly to the family than any of the other boys. So he turned out to be everybody's favorite uncle and, I think, my mother's favorite brother.

Morris: Sounds as if he is a very colorful fellow.

Brown: Oh, yes. He is still as crazy as all hell.

Morris: Had he been a card player in Mineola?

Brown: All his life.

Morris: Was that part of the family income?

Brown: Everybody in the family had to know how to play cards. The recreation of the family was playing cards. My grandmother played cards full-time. She is the one who taught everybody how to play cards.

Morris: Aha! What were the favorites games?

Brown: Bid whist is what we played more than anything else. Bid whist is a form of gin rummy. I think white people call it gin rummy more than--.

Morris: I thought whist was sort of an ancestor of contract bridge.

Brown: It is, same as contract bridge. Or gin rummy, because of the making of the books. Then whist is probably closer to bridge, except you don't have a dummy in whist. Everybody is a participant in whist. Bid whist is similar to bridge in that regard. But everybody had to play whist. There were whist tournaments in that town. You played whist almost every day. You

would play cards almost every day. You would play hearts, you would play coon cane[?], you played poker, you played whatever had to be played. And my grandmother played with you. She taught you how to do it and constantly, always, was looking for somebody to play cards with. And she could order you to do it, so you usually had no choice.

Morris: At what age did you start learning these games?

Brown: Oh, I bet I was playing whist at seven or eight years of age.

Morris: That's wonderful.

Brown: Absolutely. I was into card playing. And so were most of the other kids in the town. You played cards. You played cards and dominoes. My grandmother played dominoes as well. She would tell you that you were learning to count playing dominoes. That was how you learned to count because you had to build the numbers. So those were the games of chance.

And it didn't take any wealth to be able to play those two things. I'm sorry she didn't understand Scrabble and all that kind of stuff, because just think of the kind of vocabulary kids could have really developed if they had been so exposed. But you knew how to count. You learned how to count in both of those games. And you learned strategy because you had to remember what cards had gone and try to remember how many trumps had already been played and you had to try to figure out how to set up a situation where you controlled the game by the resources in your hands. It was all those kinds of things.

Yes, you were definitely a big-time card player with my grandmother.

Morris: That's wonderful.

Brown: Itsy played a card for a living, and believe it or not, still does.

Morris: In his eighties.

Brown: Still. Right now. I bet you this morning Itsy is in a game some place here in the Fillmore where he lives.

Morris: Really? Are there card rooms over here?

Brown: He ran illegal card rooms. There are no legal card rooms. They are all illegal card rooms over here in San Francisco. Like in

Emeryville, there are legal card rooms. I don't think he has ever played in Reno or Vegas or any other place where it was legal.

Morris: That is no fun? Or how does it work?

Brown: I think he likes to be the house man. He likes to run the game because his theory always is, because the house gets a cut of every pot, there is no way you can ultimately not make some money gambling. Because it is not a gamble for you, it is a gamble for everybody else. And if you play long enough, the house will get all the money. If you keep cutting the pot one percent on each hand, or you cut the pot a set fee, only fifty cents on each hand, you just drop it in to manage the house.

Morris: You had to really keep an eye on what's going on to make sure you get your fifty cents.

Brown: No, you just take it out.

Morris: Really.

Brown: You just take it out. He plays in the game. He is part of the game because it is his house. He is running the game. As he runs the game, when everybody antes up, he then takes fifty and drops it in the pot. His problem is sometimes he starts drinking too much Rimini and starts playing out of the cup.

Summer Jobs; Thoughts of Stanford

Morris: So did you plan on coming to San Francisco with him for a long time?

Brown: No. I graduated from high school in May of 1951. I graduated second in the class. Frank Crawford was first in the class. I got a scholarship to Prairie View A&M College. That's a little college in Hempstead, Texas, just outside of Houston. I went down to Prairie View for a summer program of some sort. I don't even remember the details of the summer program. I was down there for a brief period of time and I clearly did not like Prairie View. They had a deal where you participated in raising some of the food that the students consumed. They had a deal where you ate family style, you and seven other people around the same table, and that was your table for the whole year. Those were your dining companions for the whole year. They served the food family style by putting it in big bowls and putting on the table and you passed it around.

I had the misfortune, if it was eight people, I had seven football players, if it was six people, five football players, and me. I think it was seven, as I remember. Eight people per table. Whenever it got to me, there was almost nothing left.

Morris: And you are not going to argue with a football player.

Brown: No. There was almost nothing left. I, of course, always had a mouth. I was always told to speak up. My grandmother always said, "You speak up. You speak up. Don't let anybody tell you. If you've got something to say, you say it." You couldn't mumble and get mad under your breath with my grandmother. You had to tell her exactly what you thought. Before she beat you to death.

Morris: Did she really punish you frequently, fiercely?

Brown: No. She punished fiercely as often as you needed it. But I don't remember any real monthly pattern or daily pattern. One of my sisters she never even touched, as a matter of fact. I got more whippings than anybody else. I got more whippings than everybody else, I bet you, combined. Because I was always protesting. I was always protesting for some reason.

Morris: Protesting?

Brown: Protesting. She would say I was always defying her orders. I remember one time I had dropped her off at fishing. She had told us not to play the piano. Well, I not only was playing the piano, I had taken the bottom of the piano off. I was down there stroking the strings as if it were a harp. I mean it was loud! My grandmother apparently decided to cut her fishing trip short and walk back home. Apparently, one or two of the kids who were out there having fun saw her and turned and split, and I'm still there stroking things. She took her fishing cane--. It felt as if she were a block away. She rapped me, really rapped me.

But no, I didn't plan on coming to California. I went home after about two weeks, after this summer program, and told my mother I didn't like that. I wasn't going to go to school yet; I was going to go to work. My mother, through her white people's contacts, got me a job at Founder's Library at SMU [Southern Methodist University]. I worked at the library for a couple of weeks and then I got a better job as a janitor over at the football player's dormitory, where they had Doke[?] Walker and Cal Rote[?] and Fred Bennett, all those people, Gilbert Johnson. That was when SMU was number one in the nation in football.

And football was the biggest thing going in Texas. The rules didn't require you to be able to read or write after four

years in school. So they were paying them under the table and all that business and so forth. I got a job in Founder's Library and a room over at the dormitory at SMU. I did not have any discussion with my mother or my grandmother, but I know now that my grandmother went nuts when she heard that my mother had even considered not following through with putting me in college. My mother began to talk to me about it and told me to save my money up and she would let me do what I wanted to do, which was to go to this school called Stanford because I wanted to major in math.

Morris: Where did you hear about Stanford?

Brown: I read about Stanford as being a math facility and a math school. I think one of my teachers told me something about it. I became fascinated for a long time with going to Stanford. Some of the kids were wanting to go to LACC [Los Angeles City College]. Some of the kids wanted to go to CCNY [City College of New York]. We all had big dreams. None of us knew anything about Harvard and Yale, Princeton and Georgetown. We heard about these schools.

Morris: Because somebody else from Mineola had gone?

Brown: Not somebody from Mineola but folk who had left Mineola knew people who had gone to those schools because, you see, if you went to LACC that was considered a real glamorous thing for blacks to do. Blacks were not going to UCLA [University of California, Los Angeles] in numbers then; they were going to the city college. But we didn't know that. We just heard LACC, and that was just something glamorous. Or NYCC, and that was something glamorous to do. Well, I had no hope of ever getting to New York. I didn't know anyone who had ever been to New York. So New York wasn't on my list at all. I had read what Langston Hughes had said about New York and all that business in all those black textbooks that I read, but none of my teachers had ever been to New York. I had one teacher who was from Illinois and had talked about going to the University of Illinois, but no one else had said anything about any great schools. So I was pretty much set on not going to LACC or NYCC. CCNY it was called. I was set on going to this place called Stanford.

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Morris: Why were you set on not going to CCNY?

Brown: I really wanted to be better than everybody else. I really had a need, for my ego more than anything else I guess, to be better than everybody else. When people were talking about going to these other schools, I wanted to go to Stanford. I had no idea what Stanford was, but it was better than anybody else, Stanford

[was], because nobody else was wanting to do it. So I wanted to go to Stanford.

Stanford was San Francisco. So I thought. And that's what we agreed upon, so I worked that summer at SMU until my mother made the arrangements with my uncle to let me come to San Francisco. Then I quit my job in August, first or second of August, and my mother put me on the train. I didn't go down to Mineola to say goodbye to my grandmother. My mother put me on the train and I headed for California. I headed for San Francisco and I arrived here on August 4, 1951.

III SAN FRANCISCO STATE COLLEGE, 1951-1955

Duncan Gillies' Encouragement

Morris: Had Itsy gone down to take a look at Stanford?

Brown: No, he didn't know any of that. Except that he may have done some checking; but when I got here, it was clear that Stanford was not in the cards. I don't remember how that determination was made. They didn't take me; they told me where the school was.

Morris: "They" being Stanford?

Brown: No, my uncle and my aunt, Itsy and Ruby, told me where the school was and I went up to the school that they told me, this college. And it was San Francisco State College. At that time, San Francisco State College was on 8th and Buchanan and Laguna. It was bordered by Buchanan-Laguna and it was that little cluster of buildings that is now the University Extension center here in San Francisco. That was all of state college, the whole state college, those three little buildings.

So I walked up to that school and went into where you registered, talked with those people and they told me I had to take an entrance exam to get in. So I could get in; it wasn't one of these deals where you had to file months or a year in advance as you do now. They would take anybody. So I showed up, took the exam and didn't pass it, because it was an exam that covered subject matters that my high school had not prepared me for: the science portion of the examination as well as the math portion of the examination. I was good in math but my demonstration of goodness in math had been to commit to memory the theorems, for example, in geometry. I never understood the process and the reasoning because the person who taught it in my high school didn't know it himself. He was the coach and it was just one of the assignments he undertook since nobody else would do it. He

didn't know anything about geometry so all he did was to require us to memorize, and we memorized.

But to this day, I really appreciate what Coach Gregory did because it equipped me literally for the law. The fact that he required us to develop memorization skills and that was essentially what we were measured on in geometry. But when tested in geometry, I had no clue how to do the figures and do the computations and come up with the equations.

Morris: To get from A to B and from B to C.

Brown: I had no clue. I could memorize it all but I didn't have any understanding of it. This person giving the exam noted my previous performance in high school and noted my test result and suggested that he would recommend that I be permitted to enter on a probationary status. He said, "If you can perform college work, and I assume you can, you will be able to stay here, but you really got to be able to do it." His name was Duncan Gillies. I also had a conversation with him about Stanford. He was a psychologist who taught at Stanford as well. He was just up at San Francisco State, I suppose, on a short professorship relationship where he didn't have full-time faculty status at Stanford.

But he recommended that I accept the offer and he said, "I really think you can do the work and I will assume the responsibility to be your counselor."

Morris: That was decent.

Brown: Yes. That's exactly where I got the shot. He did that. Then I got what they called in those days cinch notices. After the first six weeks, there were examinations six weeks from the time you entered. Well, all this language was foreign to me. All these words were foreign to me. I was literally having to take the dictionary in order to do my homework, in order to read and understand what I was doing. I had to take the dictionary and look up almost every word because many of those words I had no familiarity with.

That too caused a level of training skills to be acquired.

Morris: But you had been reading Langston Hughes and other notable authors.

Brown: I had a literature instructor who I thought was the finest person in the world because she used to let me get up and recite The Merchant of Venice and Chaucer's stuff. I mean, she was a

fabulous woman. But she never took us through--we did all the Shakespeare but she never took us through the reasoning and what was happening and what have you. It was just another one of those things where it was almost entertainment rather than understanding. The only thing I could do was sentence structure. She understood how to do subject--.

Morris: Parse the sentence.

Brown: Absolutely. She would break it down and you had to do it on stick figures and all that business. So I was very good at that, but the rest of it I was in trouble with. No science. As a result of that, I was not competitive as a college-prepared freshman. In the first six weeks, I think I got cinch notices in half of my classes, if not more.

Morris: That is a kind of a warning?

Brown: Yes. But by the end of the term, as a matter of fact, by the second time--every six weeks you had examinations--by the second six weeks, I was performing at an acceptable level. By the end of the semester I was already trying to figure out how to do something other than just school. From that point on, it's just history. I went on through with no trouble at all.

Social and Family Connections

Brown: But that is what gave me my shot. I came to enjoy San Francisco State. It had so few black students in attendance that we immediately all met each other and developed a kinship and a social relationship. So within sixty days from my arrival here in San Francisco, I was already somewhat connected socially by virtue of my college program. I joined a fraternity in college and all that business, a black fraternity. So I immediately glommed on, so to speak, to a network of people that eliminated the loneliness and isolation that would have visited itself, particularly in view of the fact that this was a streetcar college, not a resident college. In a resident college, you can probably develop those relationships quickly because you are locked in twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, you eat at the same place and what have you. While in a streetcar college, you come to class and leave. I walked every day to school.

But because there were so few blacks, we would actually sit at the same table in the cafeteria. We would hang out at the same table in the lounge. We played the same games: we played whist

and we played that kind of stuff among us. We didn't play chess because we played checkers and dominoes. We didn't know about chess, and we didn't know about those things yet because you were still basically from a black world.

We all had something in common. We were either just one generation removed from the South, or we had just come up from the South maybe a year or two years before. Most had not graduated from California high schools.

Morris: Really? They weren't part of the old black community in the Bay Area?

Brown: No, no. The old black community in the Bay Area went to Cal.

Morris: There weren't very many of them either.

Brown: No, almost none. But they would send their kids to Cal. They wouldn't send them to a teacher's college. It was San Francisco Normal before it changed its name to San Francisco State.

Morris: Well, it was just beginning to move.

Brown: Just going through the transition. As a matter of fact, I was there for the movement out to the new campus. I was in the first class to graduate from the new campus. The class of 1955 was the first class to graduate from the new campus.

Morris: Did students help with the move? At Berkeley there are tales about moving the books into the library back in the twenties.

Brown: I didn't participate in any of that and I don't know of any students who did. But yes, I entered San Francisco State College with the assistance of Dr. Duncan C. Gillies.

Morris: Did you stay in touch with him?

Brown: All the way through my career. He ended up being a full professor on the faculty at Sonoma State many years later. I have gone back to make speeches and do lectures for his classes over the years.

Morris: Was that affirmative action for its time or was it more just that he was a good counselor?

Brown: No. I've got to assume that I was not the first person to whom he had extended a helping hand. I don't think his extending an open hand at that moment was based on race; I think it was strictly

based on the desire to give students a shot. At one time in this state, we must have had that kind of activity for all students.

Morris: Well, it's a good teacher's instinct.

Brown: That's exactly right. It had nothing to do with race. At that moment, it had nothing to do with race. But now we have an organized program for the purpose. It clearly was not an organized program then.

San Francisco State had very few teenaged students. San Francisco State was an adult student campus. You had lots of veterans who were returnees. Most of the people who attended school there, I'll bet you 80, no, maybe 70 percent of the students who attended school there worked somewhere. They had jobs: post office, stores, police department, sheriff's department, Muni [San Francisco Municipal Railway] drivers. Everybody there. It was like they went to school part-time. It was as if they would go to school for three hours in the morning and then you wouldn't see them in the afternoon because they were not on campus.

I was one of the few people who stayed on campus all day. I didn't have anything else to do. The first semester actually, not the first year. My Uncle Itsy and his wife Ruby allowed me to live at their place until I could get my feet wet and until I could get a job. They offered that assistance. I started working a little bit right away. I started working as a shoe-shine boy on Fillmore Street to make my money, spending money. My uncle bought me a suit. He bought me a suit of clothes which I did not have; he bought me a shirt and a tie. I remember a double-breasted blue suit from Howard's and a light blue shirt and a yellow tie and some black shoes. I thought I was the hottest thing. I wore that every Sunday. Every Sunday of my life.

My grandmother had said, "You must belong to a church." So the first week here, I joined a church. I joined Jones Methodist Church over on Post Street. I found out that my uncle had not gone to church since he had left home, nor had my aunt. They were totally non-church people. Period. They just did not go to church. I ended up every week going to church by myself. I went to church every Sunday by myself. I met people connected with the church as a result of that and developed friends. Then my mother had some cousins who lived up the street from the church with three daughters. I would go over to their house after church. After I finished church on Sunday, I would go over to their house to visit with them.

My second uncle who lived here, who lived in the public housing projects, had an agreement with my mother that he would take me for the second half of the first year. Everybody anticipated that I would work my way out of having to live with any relatives. I lived at his place. And as soon as I turned a little money, I started offering to pay. Or in some cases, buying stuff. I would buy the milk and the bread, stuff of that nature, because I had always been taught--.

Morris: Been brought up to contribute.

Brown: Absolutely. I had always been taught that you had to pay your own way. That was one other thing that we were told: You have to carry your own weight. Nobody is ever going to assist you. My guess is the family would have if I had ever demonstrated a great need for it, but it was clear that you were not anticipating that you would get a scholarship from the family. You had to do that stuff on your own.

So by that time I moved in with my second uncle for the second semester, and he really didn't have much room. I had to sleep on the couch, which was a fold-down. He had one bedroom and then a couch in the living room, so I would fold it down and that was my bed. Except that he ran a gambling game on weekends. He ran a gambling game that started Friday night and then it went to Sunday night. So from Friday to Sunday, I didn't have a place to sleep. So I would either end up sitting up watching the game or working the game. I could work the game because I could cook food for the people and sell it to them right there. Or I could go get the beer or things of that nature.

So I discovered the YMCA. For a dollar a night, you could stay at the YMCA. So I started in part staying at the Y on Turk Street for a dollar a night when I was faced with that business. Eventually I segued out of his house to the Y because by now I had begun to work. I began to sell shoes. I began to do things of that nature.

Student Housing; Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity Leadership

Morris: Your fraternity did not have a residence?

Brown: Not at all. Everybody was either living at home with their parents and commuting to school every day. Nobody lived on campus. I may have been one of the first students to live on campus. And I did. The second year, I moved to school. It

wasn't on campus. The school, to comply with all the rules involving veterans, had bought a big old Victorian-type structure at 2255 Mariposa. For thirteen dollars a month, you could live there and share a room. I shared a room with a guy named A.B. Butler, a veteran, a kid from Texas who had a couple hundred bucks a month coming in from his G.I. Bill. He dressed well, had it all going. He was my roommate. I slept on the top bunk and he slept on the bottom. It was thirteen dollars a month for rent and a dollar a day for food. So for forty-three dollars a month, you had room and board. But you had to cook your own food and make your own lunch. It was a cooperative food program, with nobody to do the cooking. They had a central buying source, the food was there, and they would keep it stocked. So you continued the process that had almost begun in my home.

They had a rec room there, ping pong table and all that kind of stuff. So the second year I lived at 2255 Mariposa and I worked as a shoe salesman to send myself to school.

Morris: Was the Alpha Phi Alpha chapter the same one students at Berkeley belonged to?

Brown: No, they were two different chapters. Alpha Epsilon was the one at Cal and Delta Omicron was the one at San Francisco State.

Morris: Were there some people who are still friends there or some things in the fraternity that were particularly helpful to you personally?

Brown: Well, the fraternity afforded me, again, an opportunity for a wider range of acquaintanceships and friendships and the developing of my leadership skills. I was made national vice-president. There were five undergraduate vice-presidents. I got elected one of the five undergraduate vice-presidents. We always threw social events, we had study programs, we had a lecture series, we had our role models of Alpha brothers nationally who, if they were in the area, would come visit. We had a graduate chapter of Alpha brothers who would offer assistance and guidance to the undergraduate brothers.

Morris: Here in San Francisco?

Brown: Here in San Francisco, right. I am still a member of the graduate chapter here: Gamma Phi Lambda. That process, as I said, more than anything else, helped me to hone my skills from a leadership standpoint. It gave me an opportunity and gave people the opportunity to see me in a leadership role. That's what the fraternity did for me more than anything else.

- Morris: Who were some of the people in the graduate chapter when you were an undergraduate?
- Brown: The grad chapter members were a guy who is now dead, a judge named Joseph Kennedy; a judge named John Bussey was an Alpha; Granville Jackson was an Alpha; T.W. Washington was the major real estate mogul here in San Francisco--he was the permanent treasurer of the Alphas; Byron Rumford, the assemblyman of Berkeley, the first [black] assemblyman from that side of the bay; Lionel Wilson, who was a judge, was an Alpha [later mayor of Oakland].
- Morris: So the graduate chapter was throughout the area.
- Brown: Yes, it was the luminaries of the Bay Area. At one time, there was only one graduate chapter. There are now two, one in the East Bay and one in the West Bay. But there were so few graduate chapter members that they had one chapter and it covered both sides of the Bay. So we had access to them and they had access to us. They were part of what we maintain were the great network of black community leadership.

Student Politics

- Morris: Did you become interested in politics as an undergraduate?
- Brown: I became a participant in politics from the first day I got there. Virtually. Student politics.
- Morris: Fall of 1951?
- Brown: Absolutely. I was into student government activities literally from day one. I was recruited, frankly. I can't remember who, but I distinctly remember John Burton being part of the school at that time. Charlie Warren; Bob Burton, John's brother; Burt Phillips; Don Johnson, who is now I think superintendent of schools over in Marin County someplace. But student activists were part of what San Francisco State was about. I remember going to some of the student council meetings and listening to what was going down. I mean to say, I can do that. I started messing around with student government.

I was on the council for a period, helped to run campaigns for two guys who won the presidency of the student body.

IV SAN FRANCISCO DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN THE 1950S AND 1960S

Phil Burton Challenges the Old Order

- Brown: So I got in the swim of student politics quickly. That led directly in 1952 to participating in Democratic politics.
- Morris: That fast?
- Brown: That fast. I was messing around and looking at Democratic--. As a matter of fact, it was a little more left than that. It was really the left wing of the Democratic party that was trying to organize on campus. I did not formally join until 1954 or 1955 but I was clearly involved in student politics as well as organized politics.
- Morris: This was an effort to organize Democrats on the student campus?
- Brown: On campus. Absolutely.
- Morris: For any particular candidate or just to get you out as foot soldiers?
- Brown: In 1952 I think it was [Adlai] Stevenson in 1952 and in 1956 it was [Estes] Kefauver.
- Morris: At that point there were people like Bill Malone--.
- Brown: He was running the city. We didn't know anything about any of that.
- Morris: I see. This was on beyond you.
- Brown: That was beyond me. Not until Phil Burton lost to the dead man in 1956 did we even begin to look at the county committee. Bill Malone was the head of the county committee. No. I'm sorry. It was 1954 Phil Burton lost to Cliff Berry. Then I think he won; in

1956 he beat Tommy Maloney, I think, in the district that his brother [John] now represents. That's when I began to become conscious of city and state politics.

Then we started running people for the county committee as early as 1958. Then they ran me for the county committee in 1960, and I won.

Morris: That was your first seat?

Brown: First elected office. I got elected to the county committee in 1960 and I think it took us until 1964 to throw the Malone people out and put Jack Morrison in as county chair.

Morris: What was the problem with Bill Malone?

Brown: They were just too conservative and were holding on to everything. They showed zero interest in the problems of old people, zero interest in the problems of racial minorities and clearly were indifferent to students. They were just too conservative. The left wing of the labor movement headed by Harry Bridges and the Hallinans were at odds with the county committee, as well, because they were obviously socially unacceptable to the county committee. Anyone who was considered even close to being a red would be unacceptable.

Morris: But were there splits within the labor movement?

Brown: Absolutely. It was a very conservative labor movement. The building trades and those people were very conservative and the ILWU and the SEIU, the hospital workers and people like that, mainly racial minorities, were all very liberal. They were the followers of Phil Burton, so to speak, or the cooperative person was Phil Burton and that's why I naturally gravitated to them.

Morris: All three of the Burton brothers were involved in politics?

Brown: Absolutely. All of the Burtons were involved. All the relatives, all the cousins, everybody connected with the Burtons were involved in politics in one manner or another. It was frankly fun.

Morris: I can believe it, if there were enough of you younger fellows to make a dent in that short of time. Was it because of the numbers of young people in the post-war era that there were enough of you to make change?

Brown: I think it was enough of us willing to invite the old people living in the flop house hotels in under our umbrella, enough of

us to invite the black community to come under our umbrella and enough of us to invite and understand the need to have the labor movement, which had the only resources. Because we had no money and we couldn't raise any money, but the labor resources had the personnel and the machinery and the xerox machine. It wasn't even a xerox machine; it was a mimeograph machine.

Morris: Mimeo and ditto.

Brown: Ditto.

Morris: It had that purple stuff that came off on your clothes.

Brown: That's right. Those two machines. They had those. In those days we had to do duplistickers by hand. We typed them by hand.

Morris: For the labels.

Brown: Right. For the labels. And it was a labor-intensive operation for politics rather than all this computer system. We put that combination of people and resources together. It wasn't that we were outnumbered; you could literally count us. There was the late Frank Brand, the late Phil Burton, the late Sala Burton, Jack and Jane Morrison, the late George Moscone, Frank Kailatha[?], Joe Beeman, John Burton, John Dearman, Doug and Rosemary what are there names? Bob Erickson, his late wife Betty, Susan Kennedy--.

Morris: Is she related to Joe Kennedy?

Brown: No, she was related to George Hardy, the ex-head of SEIU. Her name was actually Susan Kennedy Kelly. Who else by name? Oh, Sue Bierman. And some people had a little bit of money. Doris Kahn was married to Jacob Kahn, who was a doctor. They had a few resources. There were some people really dedicated to maintaining the old ships and they still are connected, Karl Kortum and Jean Kortum. They were part of our crowd. So we had an interesting combination--.

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Brown: They were major players in San Francisco politics. The town was still literally divided between Italians and Irish. It was still owned by the Italians and the Irish and it was run that way. That was the division. Not until [George] Christopher introduced the

process.¹ But the town was pretty much divided. The school board was appointed. They always had a Catholic priest on the school board; that was one seat. Then they had a labor seat. It was incredible. They had an Irish seat. They had an Italian seat on the school board. There was no room for blacks, hispanics and Asians on that school board.

Our politics led us to lobby and get that changed. Zu [Zuretta] Goosby was the first black to serve on the school board in this town. He got that through our leverage.

Morris: What did you do to bring that into focus?

Brown: I think we had Mayor [John] Shelley. We helped Shelley become mayor [in November 1963] so that Burton could become a congressman and then Burton and Brown could become members of the assembly. George Moscone we put on the board of supervisors. Jack Morrison we put on the board of supervisors.

Morris: Was this a master plan that you folks had sat down and worked out?

Brown: Phil Burton's master plan, not our master plan. We didn't have anything to do with it. Phil Burton occupied the same role as my grandmother. Phil Burton ran the whole operation. He just ran the whole operation. He did all the thinking and didn't suffer from the need for advice or counsel. He made the decisions and sold them to us as the proper way in which to do it.

Morris: As kind of a chess strategy that he had in mind?

Brown: Yes. Absolutely.

Morris: And it was the school board first?

Brown: No. The school board just happened to be one of the entities that we needed to get action on. That was only appointed, not elected, as it is now. From our constituency standpoint, that had to be a part of the matrix; otherwise, you were just being grossly political. We didn't want to be viewed as just grossly political. And obviously, somebody needed to be on the school board because the school system from a student population standpoint was slowly but surely edging over toward being dominated by racial minorities. There was in fact some discrimination clearly, based

¹George Christopher [Christopheles] began his political career with election to the board of supervisors in 1945 and went on to be elected mayor in 1955. In the 1962 Republican primary he ran for lieutenant governor, and in the 1966 primary for governor.

minorities. There was in fact some discrimination clearly, based on where you went to school, tracking and all those kinds of things, so you needed some representation on the school board. Phil understood that and that was a good way to appeal and develop loyalty among blacks for vote-getting purposes, while serving the public good as well. It was an easy kind of thing to do.

Early Black Political Figures

Morris: How did you get black folks interested in politics if a lot of them came from areas where they were not participating and not voting?

Brown: Apparently, it must have been relatively easy, because in the late forties or early fifties, long before I paid any attention to city politics, a black man ran for the board of supervisors, a preacher--a fellow named F.D. Haines. The board of supervisors were elected city-wide at that time. The way you got on the board, I don't think there was ever anybody directly elected to the board in anybody's memory. You got appointed to the board and then you would run for reelection and win.

Morris: As an incumbent.

Brown: The Downtown Association ran the campaign, and they ran a slate. That slate would be embraced by the Chronicle and the Examiner and the News and the Call-Bulletin. There were four newspapers at that time in this town. It was just almost an agreement that those would be the people who would get elected to the board. Labor had almost no voice in determining who would get elected to the board of supervisors. And certainly none on who would be elected to the mayorship. That was a sweetheart arrangement that they had.

But as early as 1948 or 1949, they ran Dr. Frederick Douglass Haines. Dr. Haines didn't win but he set the stage for future candidacies. Every four to six years thereafter, there was always somebody talked about as a possible candidate for the board of supervisors. They also talked about running somebody for the state assembly. They did in fact run Joe Kennedy, the name that I spoke about earlier. They ran him for the state assembly. They ran a guy named John Adams, another lawyer, for the state assembly. Neither one of those guys won but they did make a little bit of an impression. Joe Kennedy did, in the fifties, get appointed to--.

Morris: Municipal court?

Brown: No. He got appointed a public defender. He was a chief trial public defender. Cecil Poole got appointed by Pat Brown in the forties and early fifties to the district attorney's office. So we had a black in the D.A.'s office and we had one black in the public defender's office. We thought we were moving.

Voting Trends and Constituencies; Regulation in the 1980s

Brown: Out of that, though, came an understanding of how to elect folk to public office. Clearly, when Phil got himself elected and went off up there [to Sacramento] to help draw the lines, he drew the lines for the new districts in the sixties with me in mind. He drew the lines to give me a shot at an assembly seat.

Morris: How did that work? Had he already begun to analyze voting districts and voting patterns?

Brown: Absolutely. He knew the voting habits and voting patterns and the voting trends like you know the palm of your hand.

Morris: Back in the San Francisco State era?

Brown: No, in the late fifties. 1956 to, say, 1960, he developed that ability that stood him in good stead until the day he died for reading voting trends and population shifts, et cetera. So he was a master at that process as early as 1961.

Morris: Did he ever talk about how he developed these ideas and where?

Brown: No, he did not. He did not talk much. Phil gave orders more than talk. He gave directions more than shared insight on what his thought processes were. He would tell you the end result. He would seldom ever permit you to know what he went through, how he synthesized information, what signposts one should observe in order to get the right perspective on what the trends will be.

Morris: Did you have trouble with that since you had been raised to ask questions?

Brown: It didn't keep me from asking questions. Sure, I asked questions. But I also knew that if I heard his answer and his explanation, nothing flattered me more than to be able to figure out without having to ask why he said what he said. I delighted in trying to read his responses before he gave them, trying to read what he

would do before he did it. I must say that I did develop some skill at being able to do that.

Morris: So that early on, you also got a sense that it's not just the candidate but it's the constituency.

Brown: It is the defined constituency. You can have the best candidate in the world and if he is running in a gun owner's district, that single issue could be the cause of his or her defeat. I figured that early on.

Morris: Was Phil already practicing law when you and John were at San Francisco State? How much ahead of you was he?

Brown: My first conscious knowledge of Phil was in the late 1950s. I was out of San Francisco State in 1955 and into law school. I went to law school with Johnny Burton as well. So we were fellow students at Hastings in 1955 and I do remember by then Phil was already active in the field of politics. I have never known him really to be active in the field of law. That was just his handle.

He never really practiced law because Phil had no interest in making money. Phil was about exercising power.

Morris: But you need to have a certain level of income to support your power plans.

Brown: Except Phil had a different lifestyle. It was a very modest lifestyle. As a result of his having such a modest lifestyle, he didn't own anything. He didn't own any place to live. He was a renter. Maybe he had one or two suits and didn't care about those kinds of things, or one or two pairs of shoes and didn't carry more than that. So what he earned from his public service jobs was sufficient to maintain him. He didn't need any more. In those days, the labor movement could pick up your tabs. My guess is that Phil Burton's dining was paid for more often by the union. He had no other overhead.

Morris: That was for the period when labor was organizing its own political--?

Brown: Absolutely. And when the rules were different. The rules are now quite different on what you can do for politicians and that's only been with the last sixteen or seventeen years. Before that, you could, business and contribution-wise, give anything you wanted to a person seeking public office. There were no reporting requirements. You didn't have to report anything. And there was no direction on what you [a candidate or elected official] could

spend your campaign money for. If you chose to spend it to buy yourself a house, you did so. It was nobody's business but yours.

Morris: Did you see any problems with that at the time?

Brown: Well, we didn't do that because we never had the resources to even consider doing that. We were never into money. None of Phil's political descendants were ever into making money from politics or doing anything except using the resources to get yourself elected and to get your friends elected. It was a sharing process. We literally shared our resources with each other for our mutual success purposes. So we never had to face those questions. By the time people start running those questions out there, we had no trouble obviously complying with them, dealing with them, or supporting them except that most of us did resent the assumptions that go behind those rules and regulations. The assumption is that politicians are dishonest people and that you need to do these kinds of things to protect and insure their honesty.

We knew that was, in fact, not the case. You don't need limits on what people can or cannot receive as contributions. There clearly is a value in reporting what people receive and requiring them to report various sources, et cetera. There is a value in that. The public ought to have a right to know how you got elected and who provided you with resources and what you have used those resources for. But beyond that, it is silly to have all these dumb rules.

You have no idea how stupid these rules are. For example, two or three years ago a rule passed that the campaign could only have one credit card. So wait a minute, I'm in Sacramento doing some business connected with my operation and my campaign that I don't want the state to pay for, I'm going to pay for it out of my campaign. Except that the credit card is here in San Francisco because the people need it here who are doing the business of running the operation here. You can only have one credit card. I said, "The hell with that noise. Let them accuse me." I think what is the theory of the law, and clearly the reality of the law, is you ought to report every transaction involving your campaign, regardless of how it was paid. They said, "Not only can you not have but one credit card, you can't use your own personal credit card and get reimbursed."

I said, "Wait a minute. I can't have but one credit card and I can't use my own personal credit card?" "Yes, because if you do that, that's a loan." I said, "What's a loan?!?" "When you use your credit card to buy something, that is considered a loan to your campaign and you have to report it as a loan." I

said, "I won't do that." They said, "Why not?" "Because I'm going to have my campaign pay the Bank of America directly."

So the Bank of America never lent me any money. The Bank of America, until they are ready to collect, is making the loan and if it is paid before they collect--. We finally had them to at least modify the regulation to correct that stupidity. But you would have had a million transactions involving people who use their own personal credit card for \$2.80 worth of paper. That becomes a loan to the campaign. Then you have to report it as a loan and then you have to report a payback.

Now, if someone's running against you and they simply go back and on an isolated basis, simply usurp and take out of your report all of the paybacks, they can safely say in a piece of campaign literature, "Willie Brown took from his campaign last year \$6,485." They don't bother to say those were reimbursements for advances made to the campaign. But it is in fact the truth that I did get \$6,485 from my campaign last year. No question. That's exactly what I got. But how do I explain that to a voter who doesn't give me the chance to do it because I don't know he has gotten a little item in the mail from my opponent, and he has read that, and he says, "Hey, the cat's using this money wrong. He solicited that money to run for reelection. He didn't do it to use on his own." It's crazy, crazy. Absolutely crazy.

So while we would have been ordinarily the people who would be advocating all of these reforms, we would have been doing so in a fashion consistent with your, as a candidate, exercising good judgment. We give you the guidelines to exercise good judgment. It's up to you to exercise good judgment and it is up to your voters to evaluate whether or not you have exercised good judgment. But all these silly rules. You can't imagine how really silly all this stuff is now.

Morris: It seems to have sort of snow-balled over the years.

Brown: It's a whole industry. You now have to have full-time an accountant on a monthly basis, plus a lawyer, if you are a candidate. I pay probably \$150,000 a year to professionals to make sure my filing process and what I do with campaign-related funds and things of that nature are reported correctly.

Morris: This is the speaker's election fund?

Brown: Yes, because I run through probably \$4 million on an election cycle. I bet I spend \$150,000, maybe as high as \$200,000 in professional services to make sure I obey these silly rules. Because one of the things I have to do is I have to make sure I

have a representative, not on the state payroll, at every hearing where regulations are being considered when you are allowed to testify because some of the regulations are so silly. So I have to have somebody at every meeting where they are discussing regulations, just to make sure they don't go helter-skelter as they go about putting these things in place.

Morris: That is a question I would like come back to.

V HASTINGS LAW SCHOOL, 1955-1958

Morris: If you have got some more time this morning, could we talk about law school? Did you decide to go to law school because you were already active in politics?

Brown: Believe it or not, law school was an accident.

Morris: Oh, really? [chuckles]

Brown: I graduated from San Francisco State, and I had to move out of the dormitory because I had graduated. You could stay for the remainder of the summer but you couldn't stay beyond that. A friend of mine from New York who had attended San Francisco State was, I guess, almost near graduation; he hadn't graduated yet. But a brilliant guy, discharged from the air force. He was a veteran. He is now a judge in Alameda County. His name is Benjamin Travis. Benny Travis had always wanted to go to law school. Ben Travis invited me to go down to Hastings with him in the summer of 1955 so he could check on enrolling in Hastings. I went down with Benny and while Benny was considering enrolling, I decided that I would do that too.

Morris: What the heck.

Brown: What the heck. It was also a way in which to avoid having to go into military service, because as a ROTC person, you had to either accept a commission and go in the service for two or three years, if you were appropriately qualified, or end up getting drafted. Well, I didn't want to be drafted. You could go to grad school and you could get a deferment. So I had been too late to make up my mind as to what I wanted to do for grad purposes. Benny went down. I had always kind of fancied myself a lawyer from what I had seen on television and things of that nature anyway. So when Benny went down to enroll in Hastings, I decided to do the same thing. When I found out how simple it was, when I got down there that one day, I actually enrolled just by accident and only because Benny had gone down to check it out.

Morris: You didn't have to take the LSAT?

Brown: No. They let you do all that after you were in. In those days, they wanted people to come to law school. It wasn't all these deals you have to go through now. I couldn't get in these days.

Morris: Nobody's going to believe you.

Brown: But we went down there that one day and we enrolled. We enrolled in law school and he got assigned to one section and I got assigned to another. We went over to the law school, and there was John Burton. I had no clue that Burton was thinking about going to law school.

It was frankly fun. The three of us were the only three students from S.F. State to--.

Morris: Travis had also gone to San Francisco State?

Brown: Yes, that's where I met him. He was living in the same dormitory. We became good buddies. A matter of fact, Benny became in charge of the food plan. He was the guy who had all the money to go buy the food so you could eat. But let me tell you what Benny did.

Benny was so happy he got elected food chairman that he went out and celebrated and got really drunk. He always thought he had a cousin or something in Fresno. He got so drunk he got on a bus and we didn't see him for three days. We thought he had stolen our money. He was lost, drunk, for three days. But he had obviously deposited and secured our money. We threw him off the food plan when he got back. We fired him because we didn't eat for three days. [laughter]

That's one of the great stories that all the people who lived in the dormitory tell about Benny Travis. But we threw Benny Travis out as a food chairman.

Morris: You didn't fuss when he went on to be a judge?

Brown: No. As a matter of fact, I helped him get the judgeship. I actually got the judgeship for him. But those were the good old days, fun, fun days.

I went to law school out at Hastings based upon that accident of entering. It was a great experience, just a great experience. It moved me quickly into a whole new realm of people because at Hastings were a number of kids who had gone to Cal and graduated from the university but didn't go to Boalt for whatever reasons--they had to work or what have you. Again, Hastings was

an all-work school. Everybody who went to Hastings had a job. Classes were only taught at Hastings from 8:30 to 11:30 a.m. Then everybody had a job in the afternoon.

[telephone interruption]

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Morris: You were speaking of the kinds of new horizons that Hastings College offered to you.

Brown: Yes, afforded me. Hastings gave me the opportunity to meet all these people from all these different universities and all these different colleges. There were 250-260 of us in the first year class, including four African Americans. A fellow named Al Brown, Benny Travis, Willie Brown and one other, Gabe Solomon.

Morris: Any in the upper classes?

Brown: Yes. A guy who is a federal judge now was in the class ahead of me. His name is Earl Gilliam. He is a federal judge in San Diego. Then there was a fellow, a black supreme court justice, who died.

Morris: Wiley Manuel.

Brown: Wiley Manuel, right. He was ahead of me at Hastings. Who else was there? There was some other African American. But that was it. We were limited. Very few people. Of the 250-260, seventy-one graduated.

Morris: Is that about right for law school?

Brown: They said two-thirds of the people don't make it. Not any more. They now graduate everybody. But in those days, when you came out of law school, you were a lawyer in every sense of the word. They had put you through the crucible to get there. It was a tougher screening process.

At any rate, I met people who are to this day are still friends and still acquaintances and it has afforded me both in my political world and in my law-practice world just the best of opportunity. There is almost no county in this state in which I don't know somebody on that county's superior court, usually connected with my old school days at Hastings. Or there isn't any major law office in the state that doesn't have somebody with whom I was connected because not only did I know all the people in the class that started with me, but I knew the people in the two classes ahead of me, and I knew the people of the two behind me.

Plus, I worked for a year at the school after I left as a teaching assistant.

Morris: Did you?

Brown: Yes, I worked for a year. After I graduated, I elected [to stay on] for a year as a teaching assistant in the field of torts. As a result of that--.

Morris: That gives you six years of legal graduates.

Brown: Almost seven, of acquaintanceships. So it was not just my class that I referenced when I say I know that on occasion many students who are on the bench, I graded their papers. One guy reminded me that I flunked him. I gave him a bad grade. [chuckles]

Morris: Am I right that Hastings' faculty is largely older, retired--?

Brown: They were all sixty-five. That's how I got the job. I got the job because those old guys can't really do all the work, particularly when you have some guy like eighty years of age. He might not be able to do totally the work so he may want a teaching assistant to conduct his class when he's not there, to do all the grading of the papers, to do all of the work, to develop the test, to do the counseling that is required. That's what I did at Hastings for Leon Green, who was a professor they brought out here from Texas. He got sick in the middle of the year a couple of times, and they knew he had health problems, so they hired me to be a teaching assistant for that purpose. It was fun.

VI PRACTICING LAW, 1959-1964

Independence, Friendships, Testing One's Skills

Brown: Then I taught night law school for a couple of years at Lincoln College just to supplement because I did not want to work for any law firm. I really wanted to practice law. I wanted to start my own law office. I rented space from a guy named Terry François. Again, the old school contacts stood me in great stead because some of my classmates who couldn't find jobs practicing law became insurance adjusters. In those accident cases, it's always helpful if you know the insurance adjuster. So I would invariably end up knowing the insurance adjuster at Allstate or State Farm or any of those kinds of places. That stood me in good stead and helped tremendously in developing my practice. I decided I was going to practice law and mess around in politics which meant that I couldn't take a job from anybody and which also meant that I couldn't get myself obligated for a whole lot of debt because you can't really do politics with a burden, with a great debt, on your back.

Morris: Why is that?

Brown: Because you don't have time to earn the money to pay. And politics doesn't pay enough. I think the salary at the time I got elected to the state assembly was six thousand dollars a year, five hundred dollars a month.

Morris: That was still a "part-time" legislature.

Brown: Yes. Five hundred bucks a month is what they paid you. Five hundred dollars a month!

Morris: Those dollars were worth a little more than they are now.

Brown: Well, it was 1964. They were worth a little more but not much! Not that much. Five hundred bucks a month.

- Morris: What was there, or what is there, about the law that you enjoyed?
- Brown: Independence. And the ability to be your own master. The ability to have a referee determine when you pit your skills and your knowledge, your interpretation and your twist on the rules and regulations, and to have a referee called a judge rule, and to have kind of a finality to that ruling. And it is, in part, theatre. You are a performer before juries making your argument.
- Morris: To give some structure to human conflicts?
- Brown: Absolutely. To the resolution process at least. And my memory ability and my verbal skills are great tools for the profession of the law. That is why I love the profession of the law. Then you can sometimes actually have fun doing your job as a lawyer.

Eyewitness in the Courtroom

- Morris: Any particular examples that you recall in the practicing of the law that were fun?
- Brown: On reflection they turned out to be funny. I represented a guy once who had used a credit card extensively to buy clothing at Robert Kirk's in San Francisco. In those days you could continue a case for several months. A speedy trial wasn't part of the process. You kind of continued your case until you were paid; or until you either got a good negotiated plea out of the prosecution or got to allow your client to develop the resources to be able to defend himself if you needed expert witnesses and all that kind of stuff. Or, an alternative, just delay how long before he has to go to jail. All of those are factors that you mixed into your strategy.

In this case I in part decided, well, he couldn't afford to pay the fee right away anyway. Then secondly, I figured it was a case of pure eyewitness identity. Months could dull the sight and the sound and the ability to recall. Six months or so later, we finally got the hearing on this case. I had instructed my client as all lawyers do, "You must make a very good appearance. So make sure you are shaved and your hair is combed and your clothing is properly pressed, your shoes are shined, shirts cleaned, good tie. Make sure you look totally respectable. You've got to make a good impression in court."

Sure enough, my client came in and you could not tell he was a client. He just looked like any other well-dressed ordinary

citizen on his way to work at a business office on Montgomery Street. We are in court and I'm seated next to him and the little fellow on the witness stand is testifying--a clerk. I'm listening closely, and the prosecutor takes him through and he identifies my client. I then go back and say it's March when the incident actually occurred and it is now September when we were finally in court. I talked about the number he has waited on in that period in between, how many transactions. Then I select individual days, one or two on each one of the months. I said, "Now tell me, who did you wait on those days?" "I don't remember." "You don't remember anything about those days?" "No, I do not." Do you remember anything about what you sold on those days?" "No, I do not."

I established over a six-time demonstration of this that he really did not have a good memory. "Now, you say my client came in March and bought these items." "Yes." "You distinctly remember my client." "Yes." "Is there anything about my client that is unique?" "No." "Nothing about his hair? Nothing about his height?" "No, No." "And you acknowledge that you have no memory of all these other people, thousands of people who you waited on, et cetera?" "No, I have no memory of those people. All I know is that I did wait on them but I couldn't identify them if they walked in the courtroom." "Well, why did you identify my client." "He's wearing the suit he bought with the credit card." [laughter]

I turned to my client and I said to him, whispered obviously, "Are you wearing the suit you bought with the credit card?" Instead of answering me verbally, he nodded his head. With that the judge went off the bench [laughter] and asked if I needed a continuance, or at least a recess. Of course, I said, "A recess."

Oakland Raiders: Suit and Countersuit

Brown: Then on another occasion, I was trying a case for the Oakland Raiders. I represented two members of the Oakland Raiders football team who had been identified by Chuck Noll, the coach of the Pittsburgh Steelers. He called them the criminal element in the NFL. They were really great football players but they were also really mean football players. They would on the first or second play of every game just to let the wide receiver know that they are there, whether the ball was thrown in his direction or not, they would clobber the wide receiver. So from that point on,

the wide receiver would come out and he's looking around to see where these really bad guys were.

On this occasion, my client, George Atkinson, hit Lynn Swann like you would not believe. Lynn Swann comes out and crosses this way [demonstrates], the ball is being thrown over here. My client is here, he follows Lynn Swann, the ball is going this way, Swann is going this way, another receiver is going. He does not go to that receiver. He follows Lynn Swann who is not paying any attention because he is running the decoy. My client stalks him and hits him with a forearm in the back of the neck and put him out of the game for two or three additional games.

Chuck Noll, the coach of the Pittsburgh Steelers, in the interview after the game after they had lost and the damage to his players has been recounted, proceeds to say that the Oakland Raiders play a criminal element of players in the league and that my client and Jack Tatum are the people who represent or who are the criminal element or something to that effect.

My client decided, in conversation with me, to sue Chuck Noll for slander. The Raiders joined him in that effort and the Steelers were sued as well. I don't practice that kind of law, libel and slander law, but a guy named Fred Furth does. Fred Furth is a relatively famous lawyer at this business, libel and slander.

Fred Furth filed a lawsuit and I was co-counsel on the case, with Furth being the person who would ultimately try. Furth's office developed it and all that business and they were ready to try it. Furth becomes ill and he can't try it. The only other person in his office was a young guy who he just had assisted who couldn't try it either. Well, I had to try my first libel and slander case. And it is in federal court with a jury. It is a two-month trial. I am in federal court examining Chuck Noll; I've got Chuck Noll on the stand. Chuck Noll is a witness worse than Clarence Thomas. He will answer no questions. He does it with a degree of dignity that you just get angrier, angrier and angrier and angrier.

I was just going nuts through this hour of examination. I was doing the best job you could do on Chuck Noll but you really can't shake him. The judge was watching this whole thing with great amusement because he has seen me often enough in court and he knows how I--.

Morris: You were really getting a workout?

Brown: He knows he's taking me through it. We had already agreed upon the time schedule and all that business. So I was hammering away, hammering away and I am getting no place in making the points with Chuck Noll. I finally just kind of looked, gave the judge a glance [recreates face of the judge] He was asking me if I wanted to take a recess. [laughter] But that's the way he did it, with the coach there and what have you. Only the two of us saw that. I'll never forget that little experience.

The Missed-Nose Defense

Brown: Then the day [Mayor George] Moscone was killed, I was trying a case in city hall, the morning Moscone was assassinated. It was a drunk-driving case involving a high official in the federal mint here on 5th and Mission. That's where the mint is located. It was a high official and those high officials sometimes have those parties after work. They had had one of those parties and this guy had actually been designated as the driver long before people started designating drivers. The other people were just going to be the passengers so they could drink and he couldn't and they actually did that.

Coming back from down on the Peninsula where this party had been held, he was trying to make up his mind to either do 280 or 101 coming into San Francisco and he's unfamiliar because he actually lives in Sacramento. He couldn't make up his mind; both signs talked about Bay Bridge. He kept weaving back and forth and he finally took 280. The Highway Patrol pulled him over, it was late at night, they saw all these drunk people in the car, puts my client through a sobriety test with the bright lights shining, arrested my client and charged him with drunk driving. He loses his job if he is convicted of drunk driving.

So the federal people got a hold of me and said, "Would you handle the case?" I was trying the case for the jury in the city hall before Judge [Charles E.] Goff. In that trial, the only thing you could do obviously was destroy the credibility of the highway patrolman. I was really getting no place in this case because it was his word against my client's and my client's drunk friends. Their credibility is somewhat questionable because they were drunk and they acknowledged that they had been drinking. But this jury I'm not sure is buying the story.

I finally get the highway patrolman on the witness stand and I just decided on the tedious basis to take him through the examination that he gave my client. Because it just dawned on me,

most people probably at 2:30 or 3:00 in the morning when they have been working all day, may not really be able to put on the best act out there on the side of the freeway where you are being examined with a light shining in your face and what have you. So I take this highway patrolman through the test and I'm having him do the test and I have him stand up and show me what he was doing, how he had the guy spread his arms and put his head back like this and then try to walk a straight line, that kind of stuff. I said, "Tell me where you had him do it." He told me about him walking the straight line. I said, "Then, what did you happen to do next?" He said, "I had him point to his nose." I said, "Do it. Show me what you were doing." He missed his nose. He missed his nose! [laughter] I of course leapt up and said, "He missed. He missed." The jury just started laughing like hell.

The judge of course chided. He said, "Mr. Brown, you can't have those demonstrations." I said, "No more questions, your honor." We sat down, we rested and I argued and talked about how obviously first, he couldn't walk right and secondly he couldn't touch his nose. The highway patrolman turned beet red because that actually happened. He missed his nose with his eyes closed. You really have to kind of concentrate to go directly to your nose and then you have to kind of guide it once you get there. But he didn't. He missed it. That won me that case.

For a while around the court house they were talking about the missed nose. "That's the missed-nose defense." All the lawyers tried to use it but by then the cops had passed the word.

Morris: And they had been out practicing.

Brown: They had to be careful on examination.

Defending Prostitutes

Brown: I remember another case when I changed the whole operation as to how you prosecute prostitutes in this town. I represented one or two prostitutes and kept them out of jail. That is the only requirement. They passed the word to all the other prostitutes.

Morris: Was this before there was a prostitute's organization? What is it, COYOTE [Cast Off Your Old Tired Ethics]?

Brown: No. COYOTE hadn't started yet. They passed the word on the streets: Willie Brown is the best lawyer. He keeps you out of jail. They pass the lawyer recommendations on. I go in and I got

six or eight prostitutes every morning in the same court. There was only one court then that handled prostitutes. Clayton Horn was the judge. He was getting tired of dismissing these cases and not doing the cases. I went in one day and said, "I want to propose a constitutional argument, equal protection under the law." He said, "What do you mean, equal protection of the law?" "Very simple. It takes two people to engage in an act of prostitution. That's what these people are charged with. I only see one person here. Do you know why I only see one person here? Because your police department has elected to take the john, the person buying the favor, and use him as a witness so it gives him immunity from prosecution, uses him to prosecute against her. Judge, that's the way it's been since day one. They can't exercise that kind of discretion."

He said, "You know, I think you're right. Mr. District Attorney, what do you have to say about that?" The district attorney went nuts. "We can't be arresting--those are fine upstanding citizens." That made the judge mad. When he said that those are fine upstanding citizens and these are just street women, the judge said, "Wait a minute. Mr. Brown is right. I'm dismissing all these cases."

Changed the whole nature of prostitution cases. Now they literally have to nail the person for soliciting rather than engaging in. If there is an engaging in as a result of solicitation, the second participant is disqualified from being able to testify because a participant can't corroborate the story. So we changed the whole nature of prosecuting people. Then I stopped representing prostitutes because I went off to the legislature. I wasn't here every day and if you're not here every day, you can't continue to represent the prostitutes.

Partner and Friend John Dearman: Pro Bono Work

Morris: I came across a reference that at some point you had a partner, John Dearman?

Brown: Dearman. He's a judge. He's a superior court judge. Yes, he was my law partner here. Not in this office, in the office on Vallejo Street and in the office on Octavia Street. At 666 Octavia and 1515 Vallejo, John Dearman was my law partner.

Morris: Before you went to the legislature?

Brown: Absolutely.

Morris: Was he part of the Hastings and San Francisco State?

Brown: No, he graduated from Wayne University in Detroit, Michigan. He came out to California as a social worker. I met him in an automobile showroom looking at cars. I had seen him at a Young Democrats meeting and I subsequently saw him on a Saturday looking at cars. I used to go look at cars every Saturday. Before I could afford them, a form of my enjoyment was to go to auto showrooms and just look at beautiful cars. He had the same tendency. It turned out that he was also from Texas originally and had moved to Detroit to go to school. He had gone to Wiley, graduated and then went to Wayne State to get his law degree and practiced law briefly in Michigan and then decided to move to California, became a social worker and a Burns guard out at the ball park while waiting to become a lawyer in the state of California.

We met each other and turned out to be friends. He was dating a classmate of mine from San Francisco State and a fellow church member--the woman in mind--and we turned out to be friends. The friendship blossomed through the political world from about 1960 on into a law partnership. He was the only real law partner I ever had.

Morris: Interesting. He got social work training after he already had his legal training?

Brown: Correct.

Morris: Does that say something about the way the two of you practice law? The social work component?

Brown: We probably did more free work than any other collection of lawyers. We never overcharged anybody. We never had a client complain or take us to the state bar about any action that we had done. We never have run cases, like hiring doctors and ambulance chasers to bring us cases. So we were never really successful money-wise. We never made any real money practicing law. But we had a real good time and developed great reputations in the community. Mine has obviously contributed to my success in the field of politics.

In 1977, I got John Dearman appointed a judgeship by then Governor [Edmund G., Jr.] Brown and then Governor Brown elevated him a year or so later to the superior court. He just finished a stint as the presiding judge of the superior court. Over the last year he has been the presiding judge of the superior court. He has just a great reputation as a trial judge. Almost every good law firm in the city attempts to get their cases in his court.

He has a daughter who graduated from Hastings last year and she is now a lawyer with one of the big firms in this town, Morrison & Foerster or somebody like that. There is another daughter who graduated from Santa Clara with an MBA. And he has two sons, both of them still in school, still messing around. His wife was diagnosed with MS twenty-five years ago and she is on and off confined to a wheelchair.

We lived around the corner from each other all those years. We still are the best of friends, I had lunch with him yesterday. We are still the best of personal friends and family friends.

Morris: That's a nice kind of partner to have.

Brown: Yes. We travel together, go to jazz festivals together, we drink together. We've had football tickets together for thirty years. We have season tickets to the 49ers' games right next to each other. They still come in my name and he just pays for his share.

Morris: Yes. Did you take a special interest, either of you or together, in civil rights cases and affirmative action complaints?

Brown: Oh, yes. We did all that. As a matter of fact, he tried the first of the cases involving the sit-in demonstrations in San Francisco in the middle sixties. We had to recruit lawyers to try all those cases. Hundreds of people were arrested. They were tried in units of ten and twenty each. John Dearman was one of the team. I think it was he and Vince Hallinan who tried the very first case. I was the coordinating lawyer for all the lawyers on the case. He tried the first of the cases. I assigned him to try the first of the cases. So yes, we took a great interest in all civil rights issues.

In 1961, I did the first sit-in demonstration in San Francisco. We blocked the housing development called Forest Knolls. It resulted in the Fair Housing Ordinance being enacted in San Francisco. That was more years ago than I care to remember.

Morris: I came across a press clipping that said you were looking to buy a house yourself.

Brown: Correct.

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Brown: My wife went to look at this new subdivision, and they wouldn't show her the house. The people who were showing the model home abandoned the property the minute she and her girlfriends showed

up. They told me about it when I arrived home. As a matter of fact, I called home from the ballpark to see what was happening and she told me about it. I told my buddies. They said, "Well, if that's the case, let's go see what they'll do with us."

So instead of going home from the ball game, we went by the housing development.

Morris: This is you and Mr. Dearman?

Brown: Dearman and a fellow named Everett Brandon. We went by the housing development and at the housing development, likewise, they bailed out of the house. Well, we didn't leave.

Morris: These were the people holding the house open?

Brown: Yes. We decided that all the sales people and the personnel that handles that, the hell with them. The telephone works, the television works, the refrigerator has some beer in it, why don't we wait for them to come back? [laughter] That's how the demonstration started. At 5:00 or whatever time it was scheduled to close, they did not come back. They sent a guard to close it up, as they would normally do, I guess. We said, "Fine. We'll be back tomorrow." One of the enterprising ones of us, I think it was Brandon, said, "Why don't we call the newspapers and let them know that these people won't let you rent this house and that we are going to sit in."

Sure enough, we called. The next day the television cameras and the newspapers were out there. We decided we would really up the ante a little bit because that was on Sunday. We decided we would come by there after church. I got my wife and the kids up and we came by as a family after church, which made it even more dramatic.

Morris: Oh, wonderful. Everybody all in their church clothes.

Brown: Yes. Everybody all dressed up. We started a demonstration that lasted about two weeks in San Francisco. The mayor finally stepped in and convinced the developer that he should in fact show us that house. I was interviewed on television and friends from around the nation saw that because it was good news. A couple of them called and said, "Listen, I've always known you to be far more definitive than you are in this interview. Is there something you are not telling us about this deal?" I said, "Yes, they keep saying I want to buy the house. No, no. I don't have any money to buy the house. I just want to see it." [laughter]

So a couple of friends picked up that I wasn't being as normally definitive. They said, "Listen, Willie Brown. You can't embarrass black America. If that cat offers to sell you the house, all of us are just going to have to chip in. So you go ahead and say you want to buy that house."

Morris: Good. Did you take them up on that?

Brown: No, no. I didn't really want to buy that house. My wife didn't want that house either after we saw it. It was made out of cardboard almost. But we did get the housing ordinance enacted as a result of that demonstration in San Francisco. Over the years--.

We were actually at the start of the riots in '66 out at Hunter's Point. When those riots started, we were in that building where they started. They decided to burn it down. We had to go out the back door, over the back fence and race down the street to get away from there. Again, Dearman and Brown.

Morris: Oh my goodness. Were you out there trying to negotiate with the residents?

Brown: Yes, that was exactly what we were doing.

Morris: How did the Hunter's Point community in the 1950s and 1960s differ from the Fillmore?

Brown: They were poor. Totally and completely poor black people with no jobs, living in public housing projects. This side of town, you had whatever black professionals there were and you had whatever blacks of substance with regular employment there were. Also you had the new living units being built; the ILWU and the Maritime Union had built that unit over there next to Japantown and there were other units being built where people were in fact actually living. The people who moved out of the Fillmore, they moved out only when they could afford it. And when they did that they moved to Ingleside. But they still did their church in the Fillmore, they still did their barbecue pits in the Fillmore, they still did their recreating in the Fillmore. Hunter's Point was considered kind of the ghetto.

Morris: Interesting. Well, we've covered a lot of territory this morning. This seems like a good place to stop and pick up in a couple of weeks.

Brown: Perfect. All right. Because I've got a 1:00.

Remembering Adolph Schuman

[Interview 2: November 12, 1991] ##¹

Brown: As a part of his will, Adolph Schuman left some money to St. Anthony's Dining Room, so some of us go back with some regularity and work as part of Adolph's team, one, two, three, four hours. I have become one of the coffee servers for Adolph. We try to set a date when we all can do it. They set this date.

Morris: When you say Adolph's team, what--?

Brown: That's just a group of friends of Adolph's who go back and make sure that he is remembered because that's what he used to do when he was living. He used to go down and serve. So we go back periodically and serve coffee. It turns out to be just lots of fun.

Morris: Had St. Anthony's become as big a meal program before Mr. Schuman became interested in it?

Brown: No, it's always been, at least as far back as I know and can remember. I don't think Adolph's existence was a key to their becoming as successful as they are in what they do. I don't think that. I think he's just one of the many people that has consistently assisted, but he was not primarily responsible.

Morris: How did Willie Brown and Adolph Schuman get to be buddies?

Brown: In the world of politics, Adolph was a Green Book Democrat. He was part of the Green Caucus.

Morris: Oh, I see. One of the ones who provide the faces of all those fine Americans.

Brown: The money, right. Adolph happened maybe to be the most liberal of the Green Caucus. Traditionally, people who hold membership in the Green Caucus would be extraordinarily conservative and interested in maintaining the status quo. Adolph was not like that. Adolph was very much into tomorrow and the future of the Democratic party. So he invested aggressively in the newcomers rather than in the oldtimers. By dint of his own resources, he

¹This and the following page were recorded en route to St. Anthony's meal program in San Francisco's Tenderloin district for Brown's regular monthly visit to pour coffee and greet patrons, assisted on this occasion by the interviewer.

would force the Green Caucus to be of great assistance to liberals.

He would do things that were unbelievable for zero credit. When we were in Miami in 1972 for an example, as I'm recalling, we were part of the [George] McGovern delegation. I think Adolph was part of some other delegation.

Morris: Was he?

Brown: Could have been. I don't remember exactly, but probably [Hubert] Humphrey. We won the right to represent California in a debate and in a vote before the full convention. And the people we had with us obviously were the newcomers to the Democratic party. They couldn't afford to be all the way down in Miami staying at a country club resort and paying that enormous amount of money. This was when they first really opened the delegate status up to people other than professionals.

Adolph every day gave cash money to the leadership of the California delegation to feed these newcomer delegates. He never requested anything for it. He just said, "I know this is going to help." It was like four hundred or five hundred bucks a day. In cash money he would supply it so we could pick up the tab for the food for the masses. But that's the kind of person he was. So we remember him fondly for that and for many other reasons. St. Anthony's was so important for him. We go back.

VII SOME PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES

Legislators' Role in an Emergency [1991]

Morris: While we are on the subject of the here and now, I saw you very visibly on the television in Oakland right after the huge fire in the hills. I wondered how you got over there and what the speaker of the assembly can do when there is a major disaster like that.

Brown: Any disaster in which the state of California becomes a player or a party, we're usually invited in by the local elected officials-- in this case, it was the mayor--just the question of what happens to the property tax base of a community devastated by any natural phenomenon, in this case a fire, just that tax base is so eroded that the locals become really strapped for resources to address the ongoing problems, let alone the problems created by virtue of that natural disaster. In this particular case, Mayor [Elihu] Harris invited the governor as well as the legislative leadership to come down for first-hand inspection. The individual legislators there called upon us and petitioned us to call a special hearing and provide whatever resources the state has set aside [for emergencies]--fire protection resources, rebuilding resources, et cetera.

There has also been the request made that we change some of the laws to facilitate the recovery. So I was there as part of the legislative leadership to address that issue.

Morris: Not everybody takes the time to actually go walk around seeing as you did.

Brown: That's true, but there really isn't any way, in my opinion, to fully understand and appreciate, other than either to live it or come as close to living it as you possibly can. I am telling you that there is nothing I have ever seen that compares. The quake damage doesn't even come close to what that fire did. It looked like Hiroshima must have looked like after the firestorm created

by the [atomic] bomb. It looked like a firestorm that would have accompanied a bomb. It looked as though somebody had figured out scientifically how to have a fire reach its maximum intensity in the shortest period of time and cover the widest area and to do that much damage. That fire was so hot, it melted the sidewalk.

Morris: My lord.

Brown: I'm telling you, it's just unbelievable. It's unbelievable. There is nothing left. It's got to have been the only type of fire that was capable of destroying fire places. There are some fireplaces that are still standing, but most are not. The fire was so hot, the mortar in the bricks melted.

Morris: Are there some public safety ideas that have been around that you've been interested in that maybe could be addressed?

Brown: There is no question. The nature of the materials that are used for building purposes, the grid system that is designed in and around the building operation and the location of structures, the whole business of whether or not you leave certain kinds of trees in close proximity to buildings without some great fire design protections; all of those things have been addressed. Plus the whole business of urban-based, closely located facilities of that nature--they really ought to have an internal sprinkler system. Public dollars could be used to run [sprinkler systems], just as we do along the freeways. When we landscape freeways now, we run a sprinkler system all through it for the vegetation. We clearly could, for safety purposes, develop a sprinkler system along the hillsides et cetera that are in close proximity and that at even the hint of fire, at least you would confine it to a certain area by virtue of the existence of those sprinkler systems. All of those things.

Morris: Largely landscape sprinkling.

Brown: Absolutely. All of those things. You can reclaim desert land by the use of certain kinds of irrigation systems. You clearly can design a safety system in and around urban areas where you still have the open space but you also have the ability, on a moment's notice, even computerized, to reduce the potential for damages. All public buildings in San Francisco are now to have sprinkler systems in them. That is for the purpose of reducing the damage that could be done by virtue of a fire. You don't save the books, maybe, but you certainly reduce the potential for this building creating a block fire, rather than just the one building fire. All those kinds of programs have been known and made available.

Impact of Prop. 13 [1978]; Code Compliance

Brown: You can see the impact of Proposition 13 (1978) in what happened up there, as it will happen a number of other places throughout California. When Proposition 13 passed, Proposition 13 removed from public use, on an annual basis, somewhere in the neighborhood of \$12 to \$14 billion. That \$12 to \$14 billion was being used to provide services. It was not being stolen. It was used to insure the quality of life for Californians. Without that investment to sustain us for the last ten or twelve years, without anything supplementing our resources, we have been without real maintenance dollars available to even keep the infrastructure system going. While we have grown by about twelve million people since the last time we had those dollars available to us, it's beginning to directly reflect itself in our safety programs, in our maintenance programs.

You go into almost any public building, except in the brand-new communities, and you clearly see that there is a difference in the quality of that structure, even though it is as magnificently designed as our city hall, the interior looks like a dump because when they did the cuts, they cut maintenance. They went from maybe three janitorial crews to two janitorial crews the first cut. The next cut they went to one janitorial crew. Now they may be down to a skeleton janitorial crew to maintain the facility. So now you are reduced to sweeping floors. You no longer have people who do nothing except polish the interior of the elevator. You no longer have people whose job it is to simply go around and make sure that every nick in every wall is immediately repaired and repainted. You do not have a crew whose job it is around the year to start in the basement and paint to the top and then when they are at the top, go back to the basement and start the paint process all over again.

You don't have any of that any more. You don't have the people on a five-year schedule to change the carpet in every public building. And the public buildings are beginning to show that, and it is all related to the absence of dollars. You use the restricted number of dollars you had to continue to maintain those things that are directly related to the service delivery system. Those things that are indirectly related, you have eliminated.

Morris: What do you do about things like the various parts of the building industry that have avoided putting in fire-resistant roofs?

Brown: You lift their certificate of habitation. It cannot be inhabited if it does not have that. That's what you should do, that's what you should do, and that's the way you ought to play at it.

Morris: Is that a political matter of discussion with building organizations?

Brown: Absolutely. It's totally political. Just the business of shake roofs versus shingle roofs, we would never have been able to pass that legislation because we have never been able to dramatically demonstrate the safety to the extent that those of us who are elected officials would overcome the residual downside in loss of support from the building industry.

Morris: Is something like this fire bad enough that they will accept the political necessity of complying with safety statutes?

Brown: They have panicked. Absolutely. They are now talking positively about some limited, grudging acceptance of a fire retardant standard required for the construction of every building.

Lobbying in the Public Interest

Morris: Do lobbyists from one part of the economy sometimes help in convincing people from other parts of the economy that something is needed for the rest?

Brown: Absolutely. As a matter of fact, the best advocates and the best lobbyists are those who assess what is in the public interest and then sell that, not only to the legislators but to their fellow participants, and to prove to them that it is in fact profitable. An example, for many years in the sixties, the AMA [American Medical Association] and our own version, the CMA [California Medical Association], were adamantly opposed to public assistance on medical care. Then of course, at the national level, we created the Medicare program. Then we supplemented the Medicare program in California with Medi-Cal. Suddenly doctors discovered that they were being paid for services they formerly were giving away. Suddenly they discovered that they could put together a clinic operation and use lesser medical personnel than fully trained and fully staffed doctors and be reimbursed at a rate where their profit would be greater than if they were using a fellow professional.

As a result of all that, the greatest advocates for Medi-Cal and for Medicare now are the organized units of medicine, whereas in the past they didn't want any government regulating them and

telling them what they could or could not do. They discovered that it was good public policy, i.e., expanded medical care, while at the same time, it benefitted them handsomely.

Under all circumstances, dentistry has always had that attitude. Dentistry had been trying to convince medicine for years and years that they really ought to be advocates for publicly assisted, medically funded programs, because dentistry genuinely believed it. So you ask me, are there certain units in the private sector in the economy that have advocated and led its brethren, I think dentistry kind of led medicine but now medicine is more enthusiastic about it. It is obviously a benefit to the public.

Then there is also the incidence of safety devices in automobiles. Most auto manufacturers in the past have opposed safety devices. One or two auto manufacturers used the existence of safety devices as a sales pitch, as a marketing tool. Now all of a sudden, every ad you see says, "We have an airbag, we have involuntary restraints." They are using crash tests to show that the interior of an automobile doesn't collapse in an accident at certain speeds. Until two years ago the auto industry absolutely opposed the mandate for five-mile-an-hour bumpers, they opposed mandating the use of seat belts, they opposed air bags, [even though] the consumer organizations supported that and advocated it and so did one auto manufacturer and I don't even remember which one it was. Luxury cars.

Morris: Was it Volvo?

Brown: Could have been Volvo. One of the luxury car people have at all times taken every safety device you could think of, they would charge you for it and they would sell it. The auto manufacturers didn't want to do that because they didn't want to drive the price of the car up.

Same as when it was a question of pollution. They didn't want to build pollution-free engines. Now they are opposing the mandating of, as the fuel of choice, natural gas; they don't want to build cars that can in fact use that. Some segments of the industry do. Sometimes they bring along other parts of the industry as a result of that advocacy.

Morris: That sounds as if the citizen organizations maybe convinced some of the professional lobbying groups.

Brown: Listen, many times a consumer-based organization becomes the leader.

VIII EARLY POLITICAL CAREER

Fair Housing Legislation Campaign, 1956-1959

Morris: That brings me back to what I wanted to ask you about in your own career. When you first were involved in local politics in San Francisco, did you have some special concerns as a black person for the black community or other ethnic and minority groups in San Francisco?

Brown: People would like to tell you that they start out with a great vision and a great mission. But that's not the way I started out. When you really start out, it is a day-to-day operation. I knew that you couldn't get housing. I knew that you couldn't get jobs. I knew that you were not being paid well or as well as your counterpart. I knew that you could not enjoy the benefits of this democracy. My goal was simply to try to relieve us of that misery and make things kind of available to folk. I didn't have any great grand design long-range as such. Mine was that if I could see my way to get a bill passed that would result in fair housing or fair employment practices, that was it.

Morris: To what extent were people in the San Francisco black community involved in getting the first fair employment and fair housing legislation passed?

Brown: The black community probably supplied one half of the effort and resources. The Jewish community supplied the other half. There was something called the Council for Civic Unity that was made up of a group of people; Ed Howden, Frank Quinn, and people like that put that organization together with old people like Terry François, Carleton Goodlett and Frederick Douglass Haines, the pastor of 3rd AME Church and Jefferson Beaver--that crowd; they all put that organization together and that organization's quest and goal was to get a fair housing ordinance passed in San Francisco.

Morris: Fair housing first?

Brown: Yes.

Morris: Was that already underway when you were a student at San Francisco State?

Brown: Yes. They were advocating that. They had an agenda to pursue with the NAACP and the other organizations. That was my exposure to it as a matter of fact.

Morris: Did you find that there was less discrimination in San Francisco?

Brown: A lot less than in Texas. There was not a separation of the races. But there was clearly evidence of racism.

Morris: How about in relation to other groups like Chinese Americans and Japanese Americans?

Brown: There was not a lot of contact. The Japanese had been relocated out of the black community into the camps and they were really just coming back. But the black community owned or occupied the space that the Japanese had previously occupied. Now the Japanese have gotten it back. They've slowly but surely gotten it back. But there was not a lot of contact. There was almost no contact with the Chinese community, I mean almost none. At anything below the top leadership level. There were one or two Chinese who knew one or two blacks, but that was about it. There were no common meetings. The only coalitions that you could point to that existed were those that were rooted in either organized labor, the Jewish community or the black community. There wasn't anybody else involved.

Morris: The coalitions recruited those three: labor, the Jewish groups and the black groups.

Brown: Yes.

Morris: Was the fair housing a matter of talking before the board of supervisors or was it more activist, pickets and that kind of thing?

Brown: It was a combination. There were examples that would be made of clear landlords who were discriminating. The picket line, in which I participated, was directed at the Gillick Brothers, a group of home builders up in an area behind the University of California Medical Center called Forest Knolls. They were the culprits so there were demonstrations around their corporate headquarters as well as demonstrations to block entry and exit

from their housing project up on the hill. There were other persons, other realtors, who were similarly demonstrated against, both rental realtors as well as ownership realtors.

Morris: Were there sizable areas of San Francisco where you weren't welcome?

Brown: Absolutely. The Sunset was considered off limits. As a matter of fact, there were only two or three communities in which the welcome mat was there. The real estate people would only show in certain areas of San Francisco. You still had to buy through a dummy buyer. The Council for Civic Unity supplied some of those dummy buyers. We were still where you would have a white person go look at and acquire a house for you and then transfer the title to you. There was a program put together by the Council for Civic Unity and by the Peninsula Housing Coalition and organizations of that nature. You could buy in the Fillmore, in the Haight, in Hunter's Point/Bayview and in Ingleside and that was it. You couldn't buy any other place in San Francisco. Not directly. You would have to do it through somebody.

Morris: Did it take state legislation before it began to noticeably open up?

Brown: Yes, it did take state legislation.

Morris: Would you have worked on that campaign on the state legislation?

Brown: I did. Absolutely.

Morris: That was one of the things that Pat Brown campaigned on.

Brown: Pat Brown campaigned on it. Democrats campaigned on it statewide for legislation as well. We all were part of that.

Morris: Was that a matter of going through the Democratic state convention to get it into the platform?

Brown: The Democratic party was pretty much of that attitude as I recall. You did not need to lobby the convention. That was one of the tenets of the program. Fair employment practices, fair housing, admission of Red China to the U.N., they were all standard pieces of the Democratic platform.

Morris: The Democratic party or the Council of Democratic Clubs?

Brown: Both. The Democratic party didn't go totally liberal and ask for the admission of Red China to the U.N. but all the other facets of

what CDC was about were pretty much standard Democratic party material.

Morris: Did you have any chance to see Pat Brown in operation? Did you feel that he was seriously campaigning for this?

Brown: Absolutely. He was seriously campaigning for it. As a matter of fact, he even talked about the time schedule in which he would sign such matters into law, and he so did.

Starting a Family

Morris: With all these grass roots political things you had going, how did you find time to get married and start a family? You were finishing law school--.

Brown: Actually it was easy. The woman whom I married [Blanche Vitero] was the woman whom I had dated all during my college life. As a matter of fact she was easily the one that I spent the most time with consistently, so that was an easy transition from pure student to student husband. She was still in college and all of our mutual friends were getting married or had gotten married and that environment created the dynamics that contributed to the marriage.

Morris: It gets to be the time to do that and the people are the right match.

Brown: If I had gone away to school, if I had gone some distance, I probably would not have gotten married, because I would not have had that kind of a relationship on a constant basis. Day in and day out. The only people I associated with were that crowd.

Morris: Interesting. Did the girlfriends who became the wives share the interest in politics?

Brown: No. Most did not. As a matter of fact, most of my friends did not share it on that side. Beyond my buddy who is now a judge, John Dearman, whom I met after college and after law school, I guess maybe John Burton was the only one who went through the wars of college and law school and stayed in the field of politics. On the wives' side, none followed that.

Women and Minority Leaders

Morris: So Sala Burton's interest in politics was kind of unusual?

Brown: Yes.

Morris: There weren't too many teams?

Brown: There were teams, but there were usually teams that were created in politics, not before politics and then graduated into politics. Some guys would end up marrying some person whom they met in the political world or some woman would marry somebody they had met in the political world. But seldom, if ever, did they transition from law school together on into politics.

Morris: Right. But was there equal representation of woman in the political organizations, would you say? The Young Democrats?

Brown: No, not an equal representation. There were an equal number of women; in some cases there was a superior number of women. But in terms of control, power and authority, it was still pretty much a man's world.

Morris: Do you remember any women who did stand out in either the CDC or the Young Democrats?

Brown: There were a number of women who did good things.

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Brown: [Some names lost when tape was changed.] ...and people like Marlene Bane and Maudelle Watson. Later on, there was Nita Wertner on the PERS [Public Employees Retirement System] board. Spectacular in the field of politics, did just an excellent job. So there are some notable examples of women.

Vaino Spencer, who is now an appellate court justice in Los Angeles County. There are some notable exceptions.

Morris: Was there a statewide organization of black political leadership?

Brown: There was a loose federation that several times tried to create a black statewide organization, but they were never successful until 1978 or 1979, I guess, when we created BAPAC. We founded BAPAC. BAPAC is now thirteen years old and in great shape. It has probably twenty-five or thirty chapters statewide. It has its

annual convention, it has an office with paid personnel, and it does a newsletter.

Morris: I've heard people in the East Bay speak highly of an organization called Men of Tomorrow. Is that something that you are aware of?

Brown: Yes, I was aware of it, but I never really fully participated. The Men of Tomorrow are a group of black men that replicated Men of Tomorrow organizations existing in other states and in other cities. They are a group of civic-minded professionals. They are all professionals. It is like the Commonwealth Club without the benefit of speeches every week, or every month, and with a service component to it, the service component being one that did scholarships and one that did tutorial programs and things of that nature directed at blacks.

County Central Committee

Morris: Since we met last time I have done some reading on the county central committee. You were elected to that in 1960?

Brown: 1960.

Morris: It sounded as if there were constant factional disputes there.

Brown: Yes, there were the conservative Democrats and the liberal Democrats. The conservative Democrats were headed by a guy named Bill Malone and Don King, who was a young version of Bill Malone. Don King is now an appellate court justice here in San Francisco and Mr. Malone is long since expired. As part of that group of people who controlled the county committee, there was definitely an Irish Catholic flavor to it. Leo McCarthy and John Foran were all part of that collection of people. As a matter of fact, King, Foran and McCarthy practiced law together. They were a law firm. Then they had the building trades with them on the labor side. They had members on the board of supervisors whose names I can't remember, Bill Blake and a few other people, who were part of their operation. They invariably controlled the county committee until we began to flex our political muscles by electing people to office in the 1960s.

Morris: What were you able to accomplish as a member of the county central committee?

Brown: Just to oust the old guard and install our own people. Our people's jobs were to do a voter-registration operation and a get-

out-the-vote operation to elect our kind of candidates to office. They achieved that handsomely.

Morris: Did you develop some working cooperation with McCarthy and Foran?

Brown: Only after we defeated them badly. We had contests against them for office. Moscone ran for state senate against and defeated Leo McCarthy [in 1966].

Morris: Moscone was one of your--?

Brown: Moscone was us.

John Burton actually ran Moscone's first campaign. Moscone ran for the state assembly against Milton Marks, then a Republican, and he lost. He promptly turned around and ran for the board of supervisors and won [1963]. Then while serving on the board, he and McCarthy challenged each other for the state senate seat that was being vacated. As a matter of fact, being created by reapportionment, not vacated. Moscone won that state senate seat.

Morris: McCarthy also went on the board of supervisors.

Brown: Yes, Moscone and McCarthy actually got elected simultaneously to the board of supervisors.

Running for the State Assembly, 18th District, 1962

Morris: Okay. Then how was the decision made that it was time for Willie Brown to run for the assembly in 1962?

Brown: It was actually a decision that Phil Burton pretty much made in coordination with the black community. The black community had run a fellow named Joseph Kennedy the first time and he lost. Then a fellow named John Adams ran, another black man, and he lost. The community increasingly was beginning to identify its political muscle and to do so in conjunction with the ILWU, with the liberal wing of the Democratic party, headed by Phil Burton, and with the SEIU, which is the Service Employees International Union, which is made up mainly of nurses' aides, janitors and people of that nature. Most of them were racial minorities.

Morris: Was that George Hardy's organization?

Brown: That's George Hardy's organization. So in the process we would begin obviously to reflect a need for direct political representation. Phil Burton as a member of the California State Assembly participated in the reapportionment of the 1960s. On the last day of the reapportionment of the 1960s, when they counted up, they only had seventy-nine seats. Phil had a map dividing San Francisco for the eightieth seat. In those days, you didn't have to do one person, one vote. Not until the middle sixties did Baker v. Carr get decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. That required one person, one vote.

So you divided, I assume, on lines of interest, parish lines and other kinds of things that determined whether or not you would be elected. The result of that was that Phil showed up with the eightieth seat being located in San Francisco by division between existing seats in San Francisco. At that time, there was a seat that Phil held, there was a seat that Milton Marks held and there was a seat that a fellow named John O'Connell held and there was a seat that a fellow named Ed Gaffney held. That's how Phil got that seat. And he had me in mind when he did that. He had me along with several other blacks who were interested. We were able to convince them not to run. I was the only one.

Morris: Really. Who were the other fellows?

Brown: A fellow named Herman Griffin and I don't frankly remember what the third name was. Al Hicks, I think it was.

Morris: I would think that would be a tough job, to convince people that they shouldn't run for office. How do you go about it, if you have three people who are interested?

Brown: It's a very tough job. But you can usually succeed at doing it if, one, you already know that they are not personally very strong; two, that they are without the resources to run and they always seek comfort from somebody else in telling them what to do and how to do it and you can demonstrate to them that their numbers do not work.

Morris: So you steer them in another direction.

Brown: Absolutely.

Morris: Were you able to keep the other fellows in the camp to help work for you if they weren't going to be able run themselves?

Brown: Absolutely. By all means, that is exactly what you do. You convince them, you talk to them about their taking a back seat and

maybe being the chair of your choice, whoever the choice is of that person's campaign. You definitely do it that way.

Morris: Was this tried with Mr. Gaffney?

Brown: No, Gaffney was a lost cause. I don't think Burton even attempted that because Gaffney was supported by Jesse Unruh. Gaffney was a twenty-two year incumbent. Gaffney chaired a committee at that time in the legislature. Gaffney was a member of the painter's union, so Gaffney was not likely to be talked out of something. And this was not a black district. This district had fewer than 15 percent black voters in it.

Morris: At that time? Really?

Brown: Absolutely. It has fewer than 10 percent now. But it was fewer than 15 percent, so you were not talking about a person running for office who is white in a black ghetto. You're talking about a person running for office in a Democratic ghetto.

Morris: Were there enough black voters in San Francisco in the sixties for there to be a district that was primarily--?

Brown: There have never been enough black voters in San Francisco to control any district.

Morris: Really?

Brown: There are only 80,000 black folk now in San Francisco and if you just say half of them would be registered to vote, that's not even a third of the numbers for any district in any year.

Morris: All right. That's interesting. I thought maybe it had to do with the way people were spread out.

Brown: No. They are located in three distinct communities, but even if put into one community, they would still not be sufficient in numbers and would not have been sufficient in numbers to elect anybody then. You would have to come down to real small numbers of people to make the black community dominant in any district.

Attitudes of Jesse Unruh and the Media

Morris: Had Unruh spent much time in San Francisco talking with San Francisco political folk?

Brown: No. Unruh didn't spend any time anywhere talking to anybody. Unruh was very powerful and pretty much indifferent as to what people thought at the local level.

Morris: Really?

Brown: Absolutely. You didn't have to be in those days. You didn't have to be any kind of politician you have to be today. You really kind of have to be a hands-on, people-contact politician. In those days, you defined what that contact would be, you defined what the issues were, and you delivered the message.

Morris: You, the in-person, the already-elected guy.

Brown: The politician, absolutely. The newspapers didn't have the width and breadth of people covering you. They didn't have five people for each story. There was very little pack journalism. There was a mutual respect. They didn't invade your private life at all. A drunk politician was not held up to public ridicule. Fixing parking tickets was not a crime. It was not a socially unacceptable thing. Utilizing campaign funds for personal purposes was not unacceptable, so you didn't have people pursuing Pulitzer prizes as journalists by destroying politicians.

Now you do. I guess you graduate from journalism school and your goal is to destroy somebody, preferably higher elected officials, and that thereby enhances you. You didn't have that mentality then. So you didn't have the Chronicle defining Phil Burton. Phil Burton defined Phil Burton to Phil Burton's constituency. And Phil Burton's shortcomings were never demonstrated: the fact that you owed somebody money, or you borrowed money from somebody, or the fact that you got an advantage by virtue of being a politician, a courtesy was extended to you that did not extend to the general public. None of that was anything except business as usual.

Morris: In the media.

Brown: The fact that you could say you had a law firm and you represented people doing business with the government, it was not a crime. It was not socially unacceptable and it was not subject to criticism.

Morris: Ten years earlier, I have heard it reported that the major newspapers' endorsements and slate cards in the paper were considered extremely important.

Brown: Newspapers named the elected officials in many cases. In many cases we were the first group to come along and defy that.

Morris: What did you use to balance the weight of the local newspapers' endorsements?

Brown: Foot soldiers, and we printed our own newspaper.

Morris: Did you?

Brown: Oh, sure. We print the 17th District Reporter or the 24th District Reporter. We publish it maybe four times during a campaign. Every weekend in October before the general election. We will have identified by virtue of doorbell ringing our base constituency, we would synthesize it down to the exact number of votes we thought we needed and we would gear all of our marketing to that collection of voters. All of our campaign would be to that end.

Morris: Not the whole district?

Brown: No, we did target voting. I would hope some of those people wouldn't show up until the day after the election. They would have the wrong day. What little mail we did, we did targeted mail. We did targeted contact and developed our own slate card. We actually developed a slate card that mirrored the ballot. People would go to the polls with our slate card in their hands and mark right from our slate card. That's how we broke the backs of the influence that the newspapers had on it.

Morris: Did you go to the Examiner and the Chronicle?

Brown: Oh, yes. We did all of that. I did. Some of the either guys wouldn't, like Phil. I don't think Phil cared about what the papers said. He just assumed that since they had never endorsed him in the past, there wasn't any reason for him to suspect that they would. Since the editorial policy was so distant from anything we believed in and anything we were about--.

Morris: Even the News and the Call-Bulletin?

Brown: Absolutely. They were just as alienated. We only had the ethnic language newspapers and one of the black papers. We had the Sun-Reporter.

Morris: Was that a major part of your campaigning?

Brown: Absolutely. A major part. As a matter of fact, the guy who owned the Sun-Reporter was one of the co-signers for a loan in my first campaign. He was one of the co-signers. There were five people who co-signed for a \$7,500 loan to get my campaign going.

Morris: Who were the other four?

Brown: It was Carleton Goodlett, Joseph Williams, Terry François, Zu Goosby. Who was the fourth?

Morris: Phil?

Brown: No. Phil didn't have any money, couldn't get any credit. [laughter] These had to be people who--.

Morris: Substantial.

Brown: Yes. I think it was Jefferson Beaver. I can't remember. I think it was Jefferson Beaver.

Carleton Goodlett and His Support

Morris: How did Carleton Goodlett find time to practice medicine, run the paper and be sort of--?

Brown: Carleton Goodlett may very well be one of the best doctors who have ever been produced in this country. There was nobody who could diagnose as Carleton could. Carleton really ran his medical practice. That's how he sponsored and financed all of his other things.

Morris: Right. I wondered about that.

Brown: He subsidized everything right out of his newspapers. Carleton Goodlett was also a hell of an entrepreneur too. He owns lots of papers across the nation. He built homes. He really understood how to make money. He was a capitalist of the worst order.

Morris: Of the worst order?

Brown: Of the worst order. He didn't believe in union personnel working in his office. He did not pay top dollar to people. But he clearly understood economics and economic development.

Morris: Did he start the paper as a part of this capitalist dynamic or was it to get information to the black community?

Brown: I really don't know because he owned the paper by the time I got to San Francisco and he owned this little paper. There was a Sun and there was a Reporter, and they finally merged. I think he

owned the Sun and then he bought the people out who owned the Reporter and he ended up owning it exclusively.

Morris: There was a man named Tom Fleming.

Brown: Tom Fleming is his editor, his guru and his everything. Tom Fleming was a highly trained, educated black man, trained at the white universities. I guess he must have come out of the University of California.

Morris: He studied there for a while.

Brown: Yes. Tom was an economist, I think, and just a good friend of Goodlett's, very intellectually oriented. Goodlett was above all else an extreme intellectual, extremely well-read, well-informed. Goodlett had his Ph.D. at twenty-two or twenty-three years of age, and then went to medical school.

Morris: Then went to medical school. That's pretty remarkable.

Brown: Then went to medical school. And he was a straight-A student under all those conditions. He got his Ph.D. from Cal. They wouldn't let him into medical school at Cal. So he got his Ph.D. at Cal in psychology and then went to Meharry to get his medical license.

Morris: Was he out there on the liberal frontier with you and your friends?

Brown: No, no. He was further left. Further left! Carleton was up there with the independent progressive types. He was really a left-winger.

Morris: Even as a capitalist? How did he--?

Brown: Extreme capitalist! It was never a conflict for him.

Morris: How did he reconcile it to you?

Brown: I never had any great discussions with him, any detailed discussions. We teased him, though, full-time about paying minimum wage to his employees.

Morris: I've heard the same thing about the Bay Guardian.

Brown: Same way. Bruce Brugmann is the same.

Morris: That they are radical on the front page and tight-fisted in the office?

Brown: In the board room, right. Well, Goodlett was the same identical way. But Tom Fleming was Goodlett's good friend. He took care of Tom. That's the only job Tom's ever had, working for Goodlett.

Morris: Keeping the Sun-Reporter going.

Brown: Keeping the Sun-Reporter going, wrote a column for the Sun-Reporter. He was Goodlett's police reporter. He hung out at the crime beat, developed great friendships. Tom just fit the mode for Carleton extremely well.

Morris: Would the two of them want to talk to all of these young fellows and make some decisions themselves as to who might run and who maybe should wait?

Brown: No, only Carleton. Tom wasn't a part of any of that. Tom was a true intellectual. Tom was an observer of the activities and almost a consultant type. Goodlett was a hands-on participant. You would find Goodlett ringing doorbells. You would find Goodlett in headquarters addressing envelopes.

Morris: Really?

Brown: Yes. You would find Goodlett raising the money. You would find Goodlett appearing on the platform with you. You even found Goodlett running for office. Goodlett ran for governor.

Morris: Did he? When?

Brown: 1974 maybe? Either 1970 or 1974. [1966 primary]

Morris: How did he do?

Brown: Poorly. But he made a dent. He made a major dent. [95,476 votes--against Pat Brown and Sam Yorty]

Morris: Did you get out and ring doorbells for him and make speeches for him?

Brown: Oh, yes. I was a Goodlett person. But he didn't run that kind of campaign. He ran basically a media campaign.

1962 Campaign Team

Morris: So what things particularly stick out in your head about your 1962 campaign?

Brown: The 1962 campaign was a marvelous campaign. The people who were the geniuses in the 1962 campaign were Frank Brand, a Jewish lawyer who had been a candidate in the 22nd Assembly District against one John Busterud and had lost to Busterud earlier in the decade; Joe Williams, who was then an inheritance-tax referee and a lawyer, Phil Burton's law partner, black; Rudy Nothenberg, who was an employee of Joe Williams; and Jackson Hu, who was an inheritance referee, or an inheritance-tax appraiser.

Morris: Was that a Chinese Hu?

Brown: Yes, Chinese. Hu. His widow is currently the inheritance-tax referee. Their son is the chairman of the planning authority. Wayne Hu. All derivative of Phil Burton. At any rate, Rudy worked for those two persons and Rudy ran the campaign. Rudy was the guy who ran the campaign. There was also Frank's eventual wife, a woman named Joan Finney who became Joan Brand. Joan Brand is now my appointee and has been for the last ten years to the Medi-Cal commission. I literally take care of Joan. Frank committed suicide.

Morris: Oh, dear.

Brown: He was Moscone's executive director of the PUC, and whatever overcame him, he put the hose in his car and sat and read until he died.

Morris: Was this after Moscone was killed?

Brown: No, before Moscone was killed. Frank died probably in 1975 or 1976. He just became overwhelmed by virtue of the social responsibility and the accusations about his law practice. Not crookedness, he just became indifferent to his law practice and wouldn't do the work. He was a very sensitive man and then he killed himself. Their son hijacked a plane to Cuba. So these were really radical people.

Morris: I should say.

Brown: Really radical, very colorful, very good, strong people in terms of their social commitment. In that 1976 campaign, a fellow named Niles Garrett was the alleged campaign director. He was a law student at Hastings and a good friend of ours. He practices (I think he has been disbarred) but he is in Pasadena. He was from down that way and he came up here to law school. He was a good friend, smart. We had him running the campaign.

My wife, Blanche, put together the typists. She and her sisters were the fastest known typists of human beings. They

could all do 100-120 words per minute, and you had to type stick-on labels in those days. So they ran the typing pool; they ran the stick-on program along with Sue Bierman who is now on the planning commission. She was the wife of the professor of philosophy at the S.F. State College then, Dr. Arthur Bierman.

Jane Morrison and Jack Morrison. Jack Morrison was the chair of the county committee and Jane worked with KNBR in that campaign. The late Doris Kahn, who was married to Jacob Kahn, a welcome physician. She was our only Pacific Heights contact. That was the 1962 campaign. Karl Kortum and Jean Kortum, Bob Erickson from Kaiser. He is now probably president or something of Kaiser.

Morris: Kaiser is a pretty conservative outfit too.

Brown: Yes, but they had some people working for them who were not. There was a guy named Bill Porter who was a descendant of the Roger Kent fortune. He was part of our team in the 1962 campaign. Roger Kent was too. He came to visit with us, an old, revered, respected man. There was a guy named Hal Dunleavy who was a political consultant, one of the first political consultants that anybody knew. He did mostly labor organization.

Morris: Was he one of the early polling people?

Brown: Yes, he was. Dunleavy Polls, you've got it. But Dunleavy was part of that 1962 campaign. Bill Honig was my driver in the 1962 campaign. The current Bill Honig. His job was to get me up every day, walk precincts with me and put me to bed at night.

Morris: Was this before he went into education?

Brown: He was thinking about going into education at that time. He was still a lawyer. Then he went to work for the Brown administration in their office of planning. He ultimately segued into being an educator. But this was middle-sixties, early-sixties. You asked about the notables and the activities I remember.

The campaign headquarters were at 846 Divisadero--.

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Brown: --which was the address of a place called the Playpen. The Playpen was owned by a guy by the name of Bunny Simon who was maybe the only black Republican, or one of the few black Republicans we knew, but he was a great supporter of Willie Brown. But the campaign was literally run from, and you would finish up

in the evening by drinking at the Playpen. We lost that campaign by fewer than 1,000 votes as you will recall.¹

Morris: That was pretty close!

Brown: We were really close. We published our own newspaper. I don't think we got the county committee endorsement. We got the Democratic Club endorsements of course. We got the endorsement of the ILWU and the pension people. And we got the endorsements of some community activist organizations, particularly the environmental movement organizations.

Morris: Like the Sierra Club?

Brown: Well, the Sierra Club wasn't endorsing in those days, but whatever the environmental groups were at that time, we got them. Because the big issue was, of course, a freeway through Golden Gate Park. That issue stayed with us for a long time. Through my 1964 campaign, which was how I won it.

We ran a good campaign in 1962, but we didn't do any voter registration unfortunately. Or we didn't do enough voter registration. We were not terribly sophisticated. We didn't run a good get-out-the-vote operation. But the 1962 campaign became the seed for the 1964 campaign. We campaigned for two years thereafter.

Morris: You just kept your organization together?

Brown: Kept the remnants of the organization together and became even better known throughout the district.

Visit to the Tenderloin District, 1992

Morris: Do you want to go down to check in with St. Anthony's?

Brown: We ought to go down and do at least thirty minutes. We break at twelve because they stop feeding at twelve.

Morris: I don't want to keep you from that commitment.

Brown: Come on. Go down there with me.

¹Legislative publications report that the count was Gaffney 10,968 votes and Brown 10,052 votes.

Morris: Yes, I would like that. [tape interruption] [Conversation continues in car on the way to the St. Anthony's Dining Room]

Brown: That's where I live.

Morris: In this tower right on top of the hill?

Brown: Yes, straight ahead. When I first ran for office in 1962, I took a photograph on that spot before the tower was built.

Morris: Of what San Francisco looked like then?

Brown: Yes. What San Francisco looked like. As a matter of fact, I was talking to some of the landscape workers, people who were developing the site, like that site that is being developed there. They were doing that work on that site. That is now St. Mary's Cathedral. None of this was here, nothing. All this was housing.

Morris: This whole area was just getting ready to be redeveloped.

Brown: Redeveloped. Correct.

Morris: What did you think at that point? That they were going to move people out?

Brown: I knew that they were moving people out. But the people wanted to be moved out. They didn't like those old Victorians. No one at that time really appreciated what they had. So you lived in an old house. This was a chance to get some money and go live in a new house out in Ingleside. You took it.

What did we replace it with? Look at it. Look at that stuff.

Morris: They don't seem to do justice to the site.

Brown: No way. Not even close.

Morris: Were there any social planners in the design of those buildings?

Brown: No, not at all. They were utility buildings literally designed primarily pursuant to federal guidelines, strangely enough.

Morris: For what? Temporary wartime housing? Army barracks?

Brown: No, the design is determined by virtue of their lending practices. Their guaranteed loan practices. They determine what you could put in there. They wanted it strictly to be, every square inch, living space. Very little socially useful space. No open space

for gardens and yards, things of that nature. That was not big at all, not demanded. Today you couldn't build structures without first addressing the amenities.

Morris: I haven't taken the time to go look at the Delancey Project.

Brown: You ought to see it. It's awesome.

Morris: You like it. You think it works?

Brown: Absolutely. Mimi [Silbert] did an incredible job, just one superb job.

All this is Hastings, that whole block straight ahead. St. Anthony's is all the way down there. You'll see when we get down there all those homeless people. It's on Jones Street. This will be the last shift.

Morris: Every day they have food available?

Brown: Yes. Oh, sure. I think two or three meals a day. Most of these people have been fed once already.

[Background noise as Brown talks to men in line getting a meal on a tray.]

Brown: Do you want to pour?

Morris: Yes, I can do something useful.

Brown: You pour and I'll serve.

[Tape interruption. Resumes outside St. Anthony's]

Brown: This used to be the old IRS building. Some partners and I converted it to a residence for Hastings students.

Morris: What a good idea. How many kids who go to the law school are from out of town and need housing?

Brown: About 85 percent. There is a BART station right there, Civic Center, where they can walk to, three blocks.

When the boat people started coming, the first wave, there were some immigrants who stayed in the building. There are other communities in San Francisco where the ones who have been here for two or three years or five or ten years, where the better restaurants are, better Thai restaurants, better Vietnamese restaurants. But the newcomers, the immigrants, stop here.

Morris: Most of the people who come already know somebody here in San Francisco?

Brown: They have a contact. They may not know them but they know that there is a center, they know that there is something that gives them at least transition assistance, off-boat assistance. Very few come blind. Even though they may have no system of communication. "Where you all going?" "San Francisco."

You know, I haven't a vote among that crowd at St. Anthony's.

Morris: They don't register or they don't vote?

Brown: They don't have a residence. You can only register at an address.

Morris: Do they use St. Anthony's as a--?

Brown: No. They don't let them do that. From a voter-registration viewpoint, that would be one of the ideal ways.

[tape interruption]

Brown: When Adolph died he was seventy-six. He died in 1984. Jo must have been forty at that maybe. She is still under fifty. He left everything to her and she has not violated it at all. She does not live like a rich woman. She lives in the same apartment that they lived in when he was alive. She has not changed her own style. She doesn't have a limo with an attendant or any of that kind of stuff. Still shops for herself. Works every day in the business.

Morris: Nice woman. Comes down to St. Anthony's to--.

Brown: Every week. And on occasions [she] will provide the specialty. After they are sick and tired of what they'd been feeding them, she decided to give them chicken and dressing.

Morris: It's pretty much the same thing every week?

Brown: No. They rotate the meals. They have a standard menu, but they rotate it. They'll have corned beef and they'll have lots and lots of pasta, lots of meatloaf, lots of turkey, because that's what they can afford. More turkey than you ever want to dream about. So Thanksgiving day is ham for them. That's a good deal. But those homeless people are amazing. They know exactly the four or five places, and they know what the menu is, or they pass the word. "Hey, man, they having barbecue chicken today or they having ribs," then you'll get a run on your place for food.

Morris: By and large, they are pretty with it. They are bright-eyed and know who you are and take an interest in what's going on.

Brown: Oh, yes. They're not whacked-out people. They are people who genuinely would work if there was in fact a job. You know, your life can become screwed up overnight. Let's say that you were two wage earners and you were each earning \$50,000-60,000 and you were living like people who are earning \$200,000 because if you earn \$50,000-60,000 a year, you do live at the \$200,000 level. You've got teenage kids, maybe one about to go off to college or went off to college. You start having a little problem with the kid or something. Suddenly, the old man loses his job and, in a year, the house is gone. Now you are renting. The car is gone. The old man is still looking for work and can't find it. He's forty-two, forty-four years of age. The family situation starts really to go sour then because the interpersonal relationships go badly. Then the mother loses her job.

Then she has to find a job. She has less problems with dignity than the father, so she takes a minimum-wage job. She takes a job at \$8.00 an hour as a desk clerk at Marriott (and that's about all they pay). Now, that's not enough to sustain anybody with anything so what you were renting suddenly goes and now you are renting something a lot smaller, you're drinking and you are really going to the tank badly. The wife-abuse process starts, she ends up losing her job because she can't keep up the personal appearance that she needs to keep up to be a desk clerk at a hotel. She can't get to the hotel because it is so distant-- she no longer has a car, can't drive and all that business. Suddenly there is no shelter. You are in the streets. That's the life cycle for many of those people.

Morris: Are those the kind of personal stories that you've heard?

Brown: Absolutely. I bet you one out of every two has a similar story to tell. Four years ago they were working and now have not worked since.

Morris: Were there people in that same kind of predicament in the sixties?

Brown: No. I do not remember the people who were considered or in need of assistance being anything other than mental cases or ex-alcoholics or people who for whatever reasons just absolutely have chosen not to be a part of any organized living system. They were bums, real bums. They were there in most cases by choice rather than circumstance.

Now, in the late eighties and nineties, it's totally changed. There are people there totally by circumstance,

dominated by circumstance. We had a system that administered to people's needs in those days. We had an outpatient service-- community mental-health programs were funded and they had good counselors. You just don't have the same now. And you actually had employment offices that found people jobs. There were want ads in the paper that represented jobs, not situations in which one announcement brings 5,000 applicants for ten positions.

IX ELECTION TO THE ASSEMBLY, 1964

Observations of Speaker Jesse Unruh

- Morris: We'd just been talking about the 1962 campaign and you said you kept the organization going?
- Brown: Absolutely. Kept the organization going with all the people who burned their bridges with the organized element of this Democratic party like Unruh; they burned the bridges by virtue of supporting me against an incumbent, so they were the outs anyway. The outs, when they know they are totally out, tend to do a good job organizing themselves for purposes of survival. That is essentially what we did. We stayed together in the Young Democrats, we stayed together in CDC, and we continued the struggle as best we could politically.
- Morris: Did you make Mr. Gaffney, the incumbent, nervous?
- Brown: No. He was so old and so indifferent that he was out of contact totally. There was no structure surrounding his operation. It had deteriorated to the point where we should have beaten him in 1962.
- Morris: Right. But Unruh was not aware or didn't care about that seat?
- Brown: No, you didn't have the same kind of attention given by the speaker's office to the survivability of individual members. They were pretty much on their own.
- Morris: So he didn't take a look and see that you had run a good campaign in 1962 and think that you were a good probability?
- Brown: No, not at all. There was just such a luxury of an excessive number of Democrats and the power, and he was so singularly focused on becoming governor that he was almost indifferent to what happened to individual members of the legislature. He was

still dominant in the legislature on the policy side, but that was all geared for high visibility for gubernatorial purposes.

Morris: Because he had made a big thing about the public accommodations bill?

Brown: Yes, the Unruh Civil Rights Act.

Morris: Right. But he didn't follow that through by thinking it would be a good thing to have more minority people in the assembly?

Brown: No, he was far more practical than that. Unruh played the traditional war-type politics, and loyalty was the most important of the principles. He was not a hands-on, day-to-day executor of marketing candidacies. He just didn't do that. That wasn't his schtick.

Morris: Was he already building and dispensing a campaign fund?

Brown: Totally. That is exactly what he would do. But that was all he did.

Party Caucus District Services Then and Now

Morris: What you did with the money was your business?

Brown: Correct. He didn't send anybody in, he didn't run a program year round. He didn't run a maintenance program. He didn't encourage you to do or monitor your doing x number of newsletters, x number of community forums or town hall meetings, blind calls on weekends. He didn't monitor how many times you served at St. Anthony's, how many times you went to public affairs programs, how many youth organizations you visited with or resolutions you passed out, how many parades you rode in. He didn't do any of that. He didn't monitor any of that.

Morris: And all those things have now been the kind of thing you keep an eye on?

Brown: For the decade of the eighties, since I became speaker, we have a whole unit of some forty people, professionals, whose job it is to render services to the majority caucus. The Republicans have a counterpart called minority services. They do the job. They do radio feeds they do video conferencing. They do recorded television programs, they do public service announcements, they do directories, they do town hall forums. They do small business

conferences. They do women conferences. They do child abuse conferences. They do health promotions. They do home owners assistance programs. They do some of everything. Every month, we try to have in every district, particularly in those of members whom we think are at risk, some activities addressed to the constituencies.

At one time, we had newsletter capacity so we would allow you to send four newsletters or five newsletters in your two-year cycle so every three months you could send a newsletter to every voter; every registered voter in your district would get a newsletter from you.

Morris: They are a fine art form. I find them very useful and we keep them in the library.

Brown: We've perfected that. [Proposition] 140 wiped out newsletters.

Defending Golden Gate Park; Freeway Issues

Morris: So what do you think made the difference in 1964? Your two years of building your contacts with the constituencies?

Brown: Yes.

Morris: Were there any things different?

Brown: One great issue. The freeway through the park. He [Gaffney?] was for it and we were against it.

Morris: This was through Golden Gate Park?

Brown: Correct.

Morris: Who had proposed that?

Brown: Caltrans. They wanted the Central freeway [to tie in to the Golden Gate Bridge?]. If you've noticed the stubs on all of our freeway offramps in and about San Francisco, that freeway was planning to go someplace. We stopped them.

Morris: What was the coalition? Were people coming to you in that two-year period saying there is a freeway issue?

- Brown: I don't actually remember how we wandered into it but what we did is I established a collection of advisers in different subject matter areas--professionals, planners, landscape people, housing people. No one had ever thought to utilize the talent of unelected types. They all volunteered.
- Morris: Professional technicians?
- Brown: Correct. They would come together and would chat with you and give you an idea about a program. One of the issues in the program was, of course, the freeway.
- Morris: By then, there was already the Embarcadero Freeway, wasn't there? Had there been a debate about whether that should have been built?
- Brown: Yes, but it was not as intensive as it came to be with going through Golden Gate Park. Golden Gate Park was just totally and completely unacceptable. There is no way anybody in his right mind would have proposed running a freeway through that beautiful place.
- Morris: Would it be elevated to go over the park?
- Brown: We didn't let them get that far.
- Morris: Do you remember how you first heard that this was on the Caltrans agenda?
- Brown: I think Sue Bierman may have called it to my attention. All I can remember is that I announced my campaign in front of the biggest tree in the Panhandle; I said that tree would go with the park. I don't even remember if that was the route but we charged it with being the route.
- Morris: Did the Caltrans people come in and say, "That's not what we had in mind?"
- Brown: No, they were pretty faceless. And we stopped them cold, just as they were forced to tear down the Embarcadero, just as they are now forced to tear down the Central Freeway which is right here in our own [Western Addition] community. They really are a faceless group of bureaucrats that did not want to fight anywhere when anyone has opposed their location of a freeway. They lost the Cypress thing badly.¹

¹Due to neighborhood protests, the elevated Embarcadero and Central freeways in San Francisco and Cypress Freeway in Oakland were dismantled in 1991 and 1992 instead of rebuilt after the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake.

Morris: On their plans to reroute it?

Brown: Yes, they wanted to decide which way it would go. First they wanted, obviously, to rebuild in the same roadway that they already had. But the community didn't want them to do that and they lost that fight. They are just so illogical and so without any clout and without any equity from anybody, and so indifferent, usually, in their initial planning, to the community's interest.

Ordinarily what they ought to do is say, "We need to move traffic through your community. We are going to conduct a group of community forums and let you tell us what you want us to do and then we are going to put the planners to work." That isn't what they do. They do it just the opposite way. They decide in secret what they want to do and then they publish their plan. Then they are bullheaded enough to go ahead and build anyway, to the extent that they can, on the theory that if they stop it right here--.

Morris: You won't make them quit?

Brown: Yes, you'll let them go all the way. They end up building just stumps. There are enough stumps around in our town to know that they can't build anywhere.

Morris: Does that have to do with the fact that they are under the Highway Commission?

Brown: They are an independent entity. They don't report. Only the commission reports to the governor. They have their own special funding source, i.e., the gas tax. If they had to come through the legislature as almost every other agency has to do, including the University of California to a limited extent, they would be a bit more responsive and a bit more sensitive to constituent needs and constituent demands.

Morris: Was that anything that you and John and Phil Burton discussed in the process of mapping a campaign against the freeway?

Brown: No. It wasn't really mapped in that fashion. It was almost helter-skelter. We said we were going to oppose it and then what we discussed were techniques by which to oppose it. What did we do? Do we do a march this way? Do we do a rally in the park with thousands of people saying "Save the trees." Do we go to the next Caltrans hearing and dominate the speakers at the hearing?

Morris: Did you do all of them?

Brown: We did everything. So we spent time programming that.

Morris: Did John Burton use the same issue in his campaign?

Brown: No. He didn't have to. John was running for the seat that Phil had abandoned to run for Congress. That seat was inheritable.

Morris: So all he had to do was go and--.

Brown: And announce he was a Burton. And he won by 70 percent.

Party Appointments; Slate Cards

Morris: Did Phil have enough time while he was off there in Congress to do some strategizing?

Brown: Absolutely. Phil was a hands-on person. Every weekend when he came home, he dominated our schedules and as he was in Washington he would call back regularly, even down to the extent of wanting to name whom we could put on the Democratic State Central Committee. We would have to pool a lot of resources so that we could get the maximum amount of coverage for what we believed to be the people we needed to reward and who were part of our coalition. We wanted total representation. The way you did that was that three of us had appointments. We each had five (in this case Moscone was in the pot with us because he had been the nominee for the state assembly) and so we had enough appointments, then maybe twenty, and every once in a while, Phil could borrow one from Stanley Mosk or somebody who had one statewide. He convinced them that they needed to appoint x and it would be the most high-profile Democrat that we needed to get appointed.

Like an Adolph Schuman we would need to appoint to the state central committee. We could get a person like Stanley Mosk to appoint Adolph. Adolph knows we got him the appointment but that reduced the call upon our pool by one so that we could give our appointment to a lesser-profile Democrat whom Stanley Mosk would never touch. So those are the kind of decisions we made by virtue of pooling.

Morris: Am I right that there is more prestige in an appointment by somebody at Stanley Mosk's level? He was then attorney general, am I right?

Brown: Yes.

Morris: That is a better appointment than an appointment from an assemblyman?

Brown: No, the appointments are the same, but for Stanley Mosk's purposes it is a better appointment.

Morris: For him to make more high profile--.

Brown: Correct. And people who may be great contributors to him, than to appoint some senior citizen from the Korean Center, for example, who is less well known.

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Morris: --delicate negotiations as to whom do you need to appoint.

Brown: Very [delicate]. That's why Phil was always in charge of the pool.

Morris: Right. So if there were four of you, two Burtons, a Moscone and a Brown, that gave you twenty appointees?

Brown: That would give us twenty appointees.

Morris: Could you keep everybody happy?

Brown: Oh, yes, we would come close to keeping everybody happy because we'd not only hook one from Stanley Mosk, we may borrow one from our more conservative types. Phil was always into, "I'll put you on the slate card if you'll do thus and so," so we would occasionally get one or two from some more conservatives.

Morris: How widely did that slate card go? It sounds as if it wasn't just San Francisco candidates.

Brown: Yes, it was. It was San Francisco County only. That was our only area of jurisdiction. We would do some in Chinese, so it was geared to the Asian community. It was geared to the black community, it was geared to the Hispanic community, it was geared to senior citizens and it was geared to families of organized labor and what we could loosely identify as the liberal left, social activists, environmentalist groups--.

Morris: That's quite a coalition.

Brown: Yes. It was not always a majority. It eventually became a majority but it was not always a majority. [Phone interruption]

Finances; Polling

Morris: So did John have time to come and help in your campaign or were you active in his campaign?

Brown: No, he had time to help in mine. His was not much of a campaign. His was a paper campaign. All the personnel, all the volunteers, including his wife, were over in my campaign, working full-time in my campaign.

Morris: Really? And you did do voter registration and get out the vote?

Brown: We did voter registration. The next time around we did voter registration. We went door to door and we did card tables in front of the supermarkets and on the streets.

Morris: Did it cost more than the \$7,500 of the 1962 campaign?

Brown: No, that was the 1964 campaign. I didn't have any money in the 1962 campaign.

Morris: Really?

Brown: None. This was the 1964 campaign where the \$7,500 was borrowed.

Morris: And you did it on \$7,500?

Brown: No, it cost more than \$7,500. We raised a little money. There were all kinds of fundraisers given on our behalf. The Morrisons gave a \$25-a-head dinner at their home. We gave a \$25-a-head dinner at my home. We took all the furniture out of the house and we used all four of the floors and put card tables in. We all cooked a dinner; it was a potluck dinner.

Morris: Oh, great.

Brown: It was that kind of a thing. People would give a ten-dollar event at their home. Friends in Los Angeles gave a \$25-a-head outdoor party. People I had gone to school with. So we raised money from other sources as well.

Morris: You said you had Mr. Dunleavy in your campaign. Did he do some polling for you?

Brown: He did polling full-time.

Morris: What kind of polling do you do in an assembly district?

Brown: We did it more to determine what issue would sell. We knew that I had almost as much name recognition as the incumbent. But we knew the word incumbent had more name recognition than I had. If your name was Incumbent Brown, you win. Incumbent was the key word in this district. So we had to try and figure out what kinds of things people would want done. We were at that level of addressing the voters and that's what we did.

The freeway was the biggest issue.

Morris: That came through in the polling too.

Brown: Absolutely.

Morris: What about negative aspects about Mr. Gaffney?

Brown: No. We wouldn't do any of that. We didn't even test it.

Morris: Really?

Brown: No, because negative campaigning wasn't part of what anybody had ever heard about. You really sold yourself. In the selling of yourself, you said, "He disagrees with me on the issues," but you didn't attack him on the basis of his age. You didn't attack him on the basis of his drinking habits. There was none of that. Nobody attacked any politician for that.

Morris: Anything besides the freeway that really stuck out as an issue?

Brown: Nothing else. Absolutely nothing.

Auto Row and Free Speech Demonstrations

Morris: What about the civil rights movement?

Brown: But there was no difference in the views on that issue. All San Franciscans were pretty much locked into that, although we were conducting in the middle of my campaign the auto row demonstrations and the hotel demonstrations to get black folk working on auto row and get black people jobs in the hotels. We had those massive demonstrations. I was a lawyer for those 775 students or so who got arrested. I recruited the legal teams that tried those cases. They were tried in lots of ten or twenty persons per lot.

Morris: Was that the first time, or one of the first times, that that kind of mass trial, or group trial, was used?

Brown: Yes. The only other time that I recall it being used was when they had the city hall demonstrations when the House Un-American Activities Committee met in San Francisco.

Morris: How does that strike an attorney?

Brown: We always consider it that you're unable to get a fair trial as an individual because the conduct that is being described can be absolutely considered outrageous, but you may not have been in it except as a passive participant and what they are describing is a group conduct and not your individual conduct. If they were forced to identify you as having thrown the chair or the newsrack that broke the window, they couldn't do that. They couldn't identify who did it. So they would try you as a crowd.

Morris: What can you do as an attorney?

Brown: Well, you use the same rules of evidence and the same techniques that you employ in other situations. And you try to force them into having to identify your client. That's why they use mass photographs and they show you were in the crowd.

Morris: But those courtroom techniques were just being developed at that period?

Brown: Correct. Many of my campaign workers who had worked for me on election day, were the people whom we were representing, the students whom we were representing. Those trials were going on simultaneously.

Morris: How many of them had also been involved in the HUAC demonstration?

Brown: I have no idea but I assume some because it was just four years before.

Morris: Had those demonstrations made a major impression on you?

Brown: Oh, yes. Being washed down the steps at the city hall was probably the last time city hall was cleaned [laughter]. But, yes, it did make an impression. Some of the lawyers from those cases, particularly Charlie Garry, tried two sets of cases for me. Jack Berman tried two sets of cases for me. Those two were lawyers in the HUAC trials.

Morris: Did you feel that the trials of the auto row demonstrators and the hotel demonstrators--? Did you end up getting them dismissed?

Brown: No, no. Some of those kids spent time in jail. Some received probation; some paid modest fines. Very few were acquitted. Some were acquitted but very few. You really had to be in a good courtroom to get acquitted. We tried them all by jury.

Morris: By different judges?

Brown: Different judges, different lawyers, and different courtrooms. On any given day, we would have ten cases going. All the courts would be taken up. We refused to waive time because you have to be tried. It forced them to try.

Morris: Good heavens. So you were kind of stage-managing all this.

Brown: Exactly.

Morris: How did you decide which group of people, or did the judge decide which group of people were going to be tried together?

Brown: They did it alphabetically. They just started at the top of the list and the first ten people, fifteen people, whatever the numbers are, were tried together.

Morris: That must have been quite something to do.

Brown: Oh, yes.

Morris: My question was what happened to your law practice while you were campaigning but it sounds as if your law practice was also going full speed ahead.

Brown: Right after that, in October, came the Cal Free Speech demonstration. So I went from the Auto Row/Sheraton Palace sit-in demonstrations in San Francisco right into the demonstrations at the University of California.

Morris: You were over there as a fellow protester or were you there as an attorney for the protesters?

Brown: No, I got invited over there to give them credibility since they needed now people with titles and that kind of stuff, so I was invited over to speak and be an inspirational part of the Free Speech Movement and all that business.

Morris: What did you think? How did the free speech demonstrations compare with auto row?

Brown: They were far more intense. They were far less geared to relieving general social misery than they were to satisfying student needs and student desires and student ambition.

Morris: Interesting. More political rather than practical?

Brown: Correct.

Morris: Again from a legal point of view, how did you feel the university and the county handled them?

Brown: I don't think they had any choice. Once these demonstrations get to the level where they are a significant disturbance, I think you have to employ the civil obedience rules, not in a harsh and hostile fashion and not where you hopefully become the object. Rather than the initial issue the students were protesting, the issue switched to the law enforcement authorities who are simply trying to do their jobs. But I do think for peace and order, you have to obey the rules.

Morris: Did you end up defending some of those folks?

Brown: No, I did not participate in the defense of any of those kids.

Morris: You just came and made the speeches.

Brown: Made the speeches and enjoyed the ambience.

Morris: Yes, it was pretty colorful.

Brown: Yes, it was awesome.

X FRESHMAN LEGISLATOR OF THE YEAR, 1965

Brown's Issue Agenda

Morris: What were you doing to prepare for being an assemblyman? That was going to be a part-time job still.

Brown: Nothing. I didn't do anything to prepare. Nothing.

Morris: You just waited to be sworn in.

Brown: Right.

Morris: After you were elected and had demonstrated your political skill, did Unruh or any of his people want to meet with you and talk about you coming in as a freshman assemblyman?

Brown: No, there were one or two people who came in from the Democratic Caucus. But I think they were strictly volunteers. They clearly had no clout, no contact, and minor ability, I must say.

Morris: What did the caucus staff consist of in those days?

Brown: A secretary and an aide.

Morris: To deal with all the Democratic assemblymen?

Brown: Right.

Morris: So it was more on paper at that time.

Brown: Totally. They had no real interest in what you did. You used your own staff for whatever purposes you wanted to use your staff. But nobody bothered to check on you.

Morris: So now that you were elected, did you have some things that you wanted to accomplish?

Brown: Oh, yes. I introduced a whole series of bills that we had talked about from my task force, the task forces that I had established, and from our own personal experiences. And from recommendations provided us by people who were running nonprofits and other kinds of agencies with whom we were associated.

Morris: Oh really? Like what?

Brown: Well, there were people who came to us about curbing Caltrans, trying to block Caltrans from holding property.

Morris: Keeping the freeway issue going.

Brown: Yes, holding on to property. Caltrans would go acquire property without getting any authority to do it and any agreement from the local agency. Then once they had acquired the property in a certain corridor, they would then come back to the local agencies and say, "We already own the property." So Caltrans was a big-time landlord.

Then there was the question of what happens to the property once they've taken it and if we stop them from building the freeway, to whom are they allowed to sell their property. Should it be returned to the people who owned it or should it be kept in the public arena. We, of course, wanted to keep it in the public arena.

We also wanted to regulate auto insurance companies from arbitrary cancellation of people driving automobiles.

Morris: Was that a big issue in the sixties?

Brown: A major issue, because if you had an accident, your policy was cancelled automatically. You had no rights, no hearings, no nothing. There was no fair play by insurance companies. So we had that experience and so we addressed that issue in that fashion.

We knew about child care from the child care advocates. We put in legislation to create more child care slots.

Morris: At that point, there were repeated efforts to discontinue the state support of child care.

Brown: That's right. Well, we carried that legislation to keep it going. We carried an increase in the minimum-wage law. We carried legislation for public employees to collectively bargain and organize. They didn't have that option then. So we had an

agenda. It was basically a liberal-left agenda, but we had an agenda.

Voting Against Unruh

Morris: How much contact did you have with Mr. Unruh?

Brown: The first vote I ever cast was against Unruh. The first day, the very first day.

Morris: Would this be in December?

Brown: No, this was January. In those days you were sworn in in January. The constitution was changed in, I don't know, 1966, when they changed when you were coming back to work. But it was January when you would come to work.

Morris: Why did you decide not to support him for speaker?

Brown: He had supported my opponent.

Morris: He had continued to support Gaffney; he didn't just stay out of it?

Brown: In 1964, he financed the Gaffney campaign.

Morris: Did he know that you were going to oppose him?

Brown: No. I didn't know I was going to oppose him. It was not planned. We hadn't even thought about it. We didn't even understand frankly what we were doing. I just reacted to Unruh's name and I knew I couldn't vote for him. When I did that Burton, who thought I had a game plan, just blindly followed. Then there was a third guy named {William F.} Stanton who absolutely hated Unruh and who just assumed that we really had something going, so when they got to his name (you do it alphabetically, so Brown was before Burton), he joined us. So at the end of the roll call, Unruh had all the votes except our three and the presiding officer asked if there was anybody who wanted to change their votes.

By now I realized that I was getting a lot of attention by having apparently cast a vote against Jesse Unruh.

Morris: This was in the Democratic caucus?

Brown: No, this was on the floor.

Morris: This was on the floor. I see. There wasn't a caucus before?

Brown: No, you didn't do any caucusing in those days.

Morris: It was just straight up or down?

Brown: Right. They had maybe two caucuses the whole time Unruh was speaker when I was there. At the most. He just gave orders, or his staff passed the order, and you did what you were told. Those of you who followed Unruh. Those of us who were Pat Brown's people followed Pat Brown's leadership.

Morris: Did you make that distinction? That you were a Pat Brown person rather than a--?

Brown: Quickly. Pat Brown was on the liberal side and Unruh was a conservative, so it was an easy number.

Morris: Did Pat have much time to talk to--?

Brown: No, no. He didn't talk to us at all, not at all. But his public pronouncements and his programs were automatically opposed by Unruh because Unruh wanted to run against him for governor, if you remember.

Morris: So that Unruh was already beginning to use a negative politics.

Brown: Negative attacks and hits. Yes.

Morris: So what happens when you are a brand-new freshman and you oppose the incumbent speaker who is swept in as speaker again? Do you get punished?

Brown: You get the worst committee assignments, the ones nobody else wants. And you get the worst physical accommodations on the floor, as well as office space. And you get the worst parking stall. That's all they can do to you.

Morris: I see. What's the worst seat on the assembly floor?

Brown: They put me with a racist. Ike [Carl F.] Britschgi. I straightened him out though.

Morris: How did you do that?

Brown: I just began to expose him to the real world of who blacks are. He had never met a black as such. He was a very conservative Republican from San Mateo County whom Unruh hated, so Unruh put us together. He did the same thing in my office space; he put me in

an office with a very conservative Democrat who didn't have anything going. What he did was he created the opportunity for the greatest friendship until this day, a fellow named Jack Fenton.

Morris: Because you felt mutually on Unruh's bad list?

Brown: He defeated one of Unruh's incumbents too. He ran against a Hispanic named Johnny Marino who constantly was getting drunk and didn't get any notoriety until he got drunk outside of his own county. He ran into a couple of cars in Marin County and got busted for drunk driving. When the cops arrested him, he informed them of who he was and whom he knew and what he would do to them if they did anything to him. As a result of that, Fenton was able to beat him in a Hispanic district. And that was an Unruh person. So Unruh didn't like either one of us.

Fellow Freshmen; Bob Moretti's Ambitions

Morris: In addition to you, that freshman class was John Burton and Jack Fenton, Craig Biddle, Eugene Chappie, Gordon Duffie, Newton Russell, Ray Johnson--.

Brown: Wayne Shumaker.

Morris: Wayne Shumaker, okay. And Bob Moretti.

Brown: Correct. Ten persons, five Dems, five Reps [pronounced "Reaps"].

Morris: Yes. So that you didn't change the balance in the legislature?

Brown: Didn't come even close because just two years before there had been a huge class of freshman. There must have been forty freshman in the class before us, because of reapportionment.

Morris: So that there weren't that many old guard people to challenge Unruh, were there?

Brown: No, none. Nobody ever challenged Unruh.

Morris: And nobody else even raised their head, the Republicans didn't even--?

Brown: No. The Republicans were not an organized group as such. There were maybe two, three conservative Republicans at the most and they were not organized into a clique as they are today. You were

seated on the floor, Democrats and Republicans with each other, and it was more based on friendship and locations from which you were elected than it was on partisan politics.

Morris: Did the freshman function as a unit at all?

Brown: Yes, we met maybe once or twice and then we got double-crossed by Biddle on a vote and I don't think we ever met again after that.

Morris: Really. What was the vote?

Brown: I don't know. Just some simple vote. Biddle was supposed to vote with us. As a matter of fact, I think he was supposed to second the motion, and he didn't and not to this day have we forgiven him.

Morris: So that it diluted the freshman power as a result.

Brown: As a unit, yes. That's really where we started a friendship with Moretti. Moretti was Unruh's chosen pet. He had elected Moretti, Moretti had worked for him before, he gave Moretti all the best assignments and the best office accommodations, put him on ways and means, all that kind of stuff, as a freshman. Moretti recognized that his future was not with Unruh; his future was with the young guys who were starting out with him. Because he wanted to be speaker and then governor. He had that dream.

Morris: Starting and coming in in 1965?

Brown: Absolutely. He had that dream. The rest of us were just glad to be there. But Moretti had an agenda. He started lining up support for his agenda, i.e., people like Willie Brown. He recognized right off that those were great friendships, so he grabbed on to Burton and Brown overnight.

Morris: It was clear to everybody else that you and Burton already had worked together a lot?

Brown: Totally. Everybody just conceded that we were Phil Burton's kids.

Morris: Was that a good thing to be or was that a liability?

Brown: No, that was a good thing to be because it meant that we had a heavyweight brother at home that if you messed with us--.

Morris: He would come in and lean on you.

Brown: Right.

Morris: And those were the terms in which it was done?

Brown: That's the way they perceived it. Then we considered ourselves fairly smart. We read everything and understood most of it and were totally nervy and could vote anyway we wanted to vote. So we began to give people votes that they thought they would never get from us. They thought they would only get real radical flaming left-wing pinko stuff. They put Burton on the agriculture committee. He became the best vote to subsidize the dairies of the state.

Morris: Really?

Brown: Yes. The best vote.

Morris: They were having a big flap about marketing.

Brown: Marketing and milk prices, and Burton became their best ally. And he made it respectable for the other liberals to be a part of that. To this date, the ag committee keeps asking, "Can we have Burton back?" [laughter]

Morris: Is he interested?

Brown: No.

Republicans with Social Conscience

Morris: He's got other fish to fry. That's wonderful. There was a group of Republicans then who thought of themselves as young Turks-- [John] Veneman and [William] Bagley and those guys.

Brown: Veneman, Bagley, [Huston] Fluornoy, [Robert] Monagan, to a lesser extent, Pete Wilson. Who else was a part of that crowd? Ashcraft. Hale Ashcraft. Frank Murphy. One or two others. I just can't think who they are. They were the bright Republicans. They were not the old war-horse Republicans. They were aggressive Republicans. They were the true conservatives. Conservatives now, the word means more religious right. Conservatives in those days meant people who really had great respect for the law, great respect for the rules and the regulations and played by that. And they had a social conscience. They voted for automatic COLAs (Cost of Living Adjustments); they voted for senior citizens programs; they voted for a tax system that was progressive. So you could not say they were conservative by today's standards. They would have been liberals by today's standards. But they were

the brains of the Republican operation. Unruh owned the Republican operation, lock, stock and barrel.

Morris: How did he do that?

Brown: Just by virtue of dispensing campaign contributions, by virtue of tight controls on staff and perks and the legislative level. It was a reward for people who cooperated, and you would punish people who didn't. There was no criticism of his managing the system that way. The press did not take him on at all. They just didn't in those days.

Morris: And the Republican leadership didn't take him on?

Brown: They couldn't. They were inept. And things were a bit more dignified in those days. The debates were really great debates.

Morris: And the governor didn't take him on?

Brown: Yes. He and Pat Brown were at each other's throats full-time.

Morris: By 1965 and 1966, weren't there a couple a celebrated money bills that Pat Brown's people just desperately wanted to fund the state operations, and the mythology is that Unruh did not want them passed because they were the governor's bills?

Brown: I don't remember specifically of those bills. But Unruh's entire agenda was never to move anything that Pat Brown would get credit for.

Morris: Did that make it difficult to be an assemblyman trying to get some specific legislation passed?

Brown: Not really.

XI LEARNING FROM PHIL BURTON AND JESSE UNRUH

New Democratic Talent in 1966; Full-time Legislature

- Morris: Did you join forces at all with the Republican young Turks?
- Brown: No, because by 1968, Unruh had become conscious of the value of friendship with Burton and Brown, in part because Moretti had so interpreted for him, in part because he was handicapped by the quality of the people with whom he was associated. The more conservative Democrats were not distinguishable from the non-performing Republicans. The newcomer Democrats were really the bloods because with 1966, [John] Vasconcellos was elected, [David] Roberti was elected. There was a whole new collection of quality Democrats who got elected. They were more like the Browns of the world.
- Morris: In 1966 you also lost a bunch of people who went over to the senate.
- Brown: You did, and that was all Unruh's old group. That was part of Unruh's old group that moved over to the senate. We had people who came in like Wally Karabian. We had a whole collection of really talented new Democrats in 1966.
- Morris: That's interesting. Where did they all come from?
- Brown: Reapportionment. Baker v. Carr was decided by the Supreme Court in 1965. The first elections conducted under the requirement for one person, one vote, was 1966. So it was a mid-decade reapportionment that had to be put in place. That was put in place and accepted and districts were made. The most radical change was that senate districts had to be equal population as well, which--.

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Brown: --we shifted from northern California to southern California because in northern California, they had been designated by counties and people represented territory rather than people. But the state senator from Los Angeles County represented as many people in his single senate district as did fifteen other state senators combined. So when they went to one person, one vote, almost twelve districts showed up in Los Angeles County. Twelve senate districts ended up being in Los Angeles, or some other similar figure. That meant obviously that many members of the assembly had a chance to run for the state senate, and they did.

Morris: Onward and upward.

Brown: Onward and upward, thereby making districts available for people to run for the state assembly. So you had people like Yvonne Burke getting elected in 1966. You had Bill Greene getting elected in 1966. You had John Miller getting elected in 1966. You had David Roberti, you had John Vasconcellos, you had Walt Karabian. Who else got elected in 1966? Ken Meade out of Alameda. You just had a whole collection of fabulous people.

Morris: It's the quality of them that I'm interested in.

Brown: They were all great.

Morris: Because it sounds as if you didn't have a great opinion of a lot of the assemblymen that were there when you arrived.

Brown: I had a great opinion of the Ed Elliotts, the Tom Carrolls, the Alan Pattees, the Charlie Chappells, the Don Allens. But they had all been there for twenty or more years and they were not really connected to things like the Free Speech Movement at Berkeley or to the black power movement on the various campuses, to the [Black] Panthers and organizations of that nature. They did not seem conversant with the change in the population of California that was taking place on a daily basis, the diversity of that.

So you had old-line politicians doing old-line kinds of things in a new world. So when reapportionment came along and sent all those persons over to the state senate, the new crop of legislators was just absolutely fabulous. Simultaneously with that the salary went from \$6,000 a year to \$16,000 a year based on constitution amendments also passed in 1966; Proposition A and then 1A. They had been co-chaired by [Pat] Brown and [Ronald] Reagan, who were running against each other at that time. So there was just a whole new generation of politicians to come aboard, many of whom are still holding significant positions now in the legislature.

Black Candidates; Attorneys as Legislators

Morris: You mentioned Yvonne Burke, Bill Greene and John Miller. Was there a concerted effort statewide to look for and encourage black candidates?

Brown: Not really. No one was sensitive to that except some of us in the black community.

Morris: I was wondering if you particularly had been interested in that.

Brown: Yes. We had a Black Caucus and when Merv [Mervyn Dymally] was moving up to the senate (he went to the senate in 1966), he reached back for and gave his slot to Bill Greene. Byron Rumford sought the senate seat in Alameda County. He lost that senate seat but in the process John Miller emerged as the new assemblyman in what had been Byron Rumford's seat. That is the process. Unruh supported a young black man named Leon Ralph for a seat that was being abandoned by a black man named Douglas Farrell, a minister in southern California. But that was a black seat for a black seat. That was not expansion of the number.

Morris: So it was more a matter that the assembly became a more appealing place career-wise, with full-time--.

Brown: Yes, because you had talented people on the Democratic side and talented people on the Republican side.

Morris: So that people with more ability came out to run for--.

Brown: Had sought public office and won. The legislature was made up of more lawyers than ever before. I think there were thirty-one lawyers out of the eighty in our house. Thirty-one of them were lawyers.

Morris: Some people say that that has now become a problem.

Brown: Well, I think lawyers can still get elected easier than most other people because they are already experienced at public speaking; they already have the ability to quickly synthesize the large volume of information and make some sense out of it, sometimes in relatively simple terms, which is the way in which you have to address voters. They are usually in need of public exposure for their business purposes so they tend to invest a little bit more effort in it. In any community in which they have been a part, they usually have developed some followership because they are lawyers for public organizational purposes, volunteer public

organizational purposes. They always tapped a lawyer to do the work.

Morris: You say followership. They connected themselves with a leading figure in the community?

Brown: No, no, no. They have developed people who are connecting themselves with them, people who are following them.

Morris: Are there people in San Francisco, say, as well as statewide who are looking for able young people to encourage to become interested in public service?

Brown: I would say almost none, except maybe the colleges and universities that have those programs and are doing the intern stuff. Beyond that, there are very few. Coro Foundation, maybe. Junior Achievement, they'll go through that. That's not really what you're talking about, I don't think.

Morris: No, I'm talking about officeholders and party leaders.

Brown: No, very few of them are looking around to build a generation of people to perform the task of public service.

Burton's Political Skills

Morris: Did you have a sense that Phil Burton was kind of keeping an eye on you and his brother and some of these others?

Brown: Absolutely. It was not "kind of." He was full time devoted to that. He was always looking for the next open slot so that we could put somebody in it. Or he was looking for the person who might eventually replace me or the person who might eventually replace his brother. He really had a sense of purpose when it came to trying to perpetuate the dynasty so to speak.

Morris: What did he do about human ego--?

Brown: He ran roughshod over it. Ego could not play a role in Phil's life. He would not let your anger and your personal displeasure with something you're not qualified to do cease the desire not to have you do it and have someone else do it. He wouldn't let your ego screw up the operation.

Morris: Really. What about his ego?

- Brown: He maintained he didn't have an ego. [laughter] Which is the ultimate in ego.
- Morris: That's true. Did he insist that you do things that were really against your personal principles?
- Brown: No, he would argue it through and make you feel like an idiot if you really had no real basis for the argument. But he was smart enough to yield if you made a good case.
- Morris: That's interesting. He would find somebody to do the task that he thought needed doing.
- Brown: He always had a backup name. You knew that when he was chatting with you about it, there was somebody else he had in mind too. You just happened to be first.
- Morris: That's an interesting theory. So you always have somebody else to put into the game if somebody gets--.
- Brown: It's not ideal, but we go with it.
- Morris: Is the sports analogy a legitimate analogy, since he played a lot of basketball as a boy?
- Brown: Yes, and college.
- Morris: People use sports terms a lot and I always wondered whether sports applies to politics or whether--?
- Brown: Very much so. You always have to field a full team. You ought to put your best team on the field. You should never have somebody trying to be chairman of the Ways and Means [Committee] who can't read or write. That's a mistake for your team. You don't succeed ultimately in doing what you need to do.
- Morris: You developed the sense working with Phil that this was the way things are run?
- Brown: Absolutely. I am not as tough as Phil was. He would not let people persuade him if in fact he wasn't convinced. I sometimes will yield. Even though I'm personally not convinced you ought to do it. An example is Pete Wilson's EPA [Environmental Protection Agency] last July [1991]. We allowed him to create an EPA Agency by executive order and we could have dumped it. The Republicans wanted to dump it but I couldn't intellectually come to the conclusion. [Phone interruption]

Morris: Maybe we could round this out with how Burton and Unruh contrasted in the ways that they looked at the political scene and what ought to be done in California.

Brown: Burton's entire agenda was to elect public policy makers who would address the needs of people. Unruh's agenda was to elect policy makers who would follow Unruh's lead and assist Unruh in his pursuits of public policy regardless of what they may be.

Morris: Did they differ in the goals of what the public policies should be?

Brown: Absolutely. Unruh was comfortable making some accommodations to the business community. Burton wouldn't stay in the room with anybody from the business community. Burton was comfortable being the handmaiden and the tool of organized labor. Unruh was many times the enemy of organized labor.

Unruh's Weaknesses

Morris: Were there useful lessons to be learned from Jesse Unruh?

Brown: Yes. As a matter of fact, the speakership that I won was crafted at the knees of Jesse Unruh. The maintenance of that speakership in many ways reflects some of Unruh's techniques, particularly the ability to raise the money.

Morris: Phil Burton was not comfortable with the business community?

Brown: He didn't like them. It wasn't a matter of being comfortable. He did not like them. He just figured that they were exploiters and mean people and evil people and stupid people and he treated them that way.

Morris: Even when he needed to tap somebody or when he was out looking for campaign money?

Brown: He didn't tap them. They either gave or he didn't give a damn. He was not a fundraiser.

Morris: That's interesting. How did he achieve all he did policy-wise without a source of funding?

Brown: All organized labor money. He had a source of funding. All organized labor money. He totally controlled national labor political money. In those days, you could use labor money, before

the federal election law changed. Burton used it just as effectively as Unruh used money from the other side, plus Burton was so much smarter politically at electing people than anybody else. He knew every district in this country almost as well as he knew his own.

Morris: Nationally as well as here?

Brown: Nationally. Absolutely. That's all he was interested in.

Morris: But Burton had gone to Washington by the time you got to Sacramento. What about how he and Unruh got along in the legislature while they were here?

Brown: We brokered the two. Burton and Brown. John and Willie brokered the relationship between Phil and Jesse.

Morris: Even when he was in Washington.

Brown: Correct.

Morris: They continued to have to negotiate with each other?

Brown: Occasionally. But by 1970, when the reapportionment process started again, Unruh was already out. He didn't run for reelection in 1970; he ran for the governorship and lost. So in 1971, when the reapportionment came, he wasn't here. Moretti--.

Morris: Did you sense that he was not going to make it in the governor's race?

Brown: Absolutely.

Morris: Because of the strength of then-Governor Reagan?

Brown: No, because of the weakness of Unruh with Democrats. There were Democrats who sat on their hands because Unruh had been mean to Pat. Unruh came closer than anybody in the history of Reagan of ever beating him. Half a million votes was all he lost to Reagan by.

Morris: Would money have made the difference?

Brown: No, it wasn't money. It was the indifference of the Democrats. They never forgave Unruh, even in his death. They believe that Unruh defeated Pat Brown. They believed that the kind of obstacles that he established in the legislature, plus his indifference to Brown's candidacy in 1966, the combination of the two defeated Pat Brown.

Morris: Do you think that is a reasonable assessment? Would you say that is true?

Brown: In part, but I think the defeat of Pat Brown was rooted more in the misunderstanding of Reagan and the quality of his candidacy. We just flat out missed it. We misread him. We didn't take him seriously. We absolutely thought George Christopher was going to be the nominee. So we spent our time trying to keep Christopher from getting the nomination in the primary. He didn't get the nomination in the primary, and we thought this grade B actor who didn't have a clue about government and was relatively empty-headed, at least he demonstrated empty-headedness, we thought we could take him.

Some Reagan and Brown Technical Experts

Morris: Did you have any knowledge or had you had any contact with people like his campaign management professionals, Stu Spencer and Bill Roberts?

Brown: No. None. We didn't know how good they were. We had experienced that kind of campaigning in the Helen Gahagan Douglas defeat in 1950, or others had in the Nixon effort. But keep in mind we had beaten the crap out of those same people in 1962, Brown versus Nixon. We had won just by the skin of our teeth [John F.] Kennedy versus Nixon in 1960. And [Lyndon] Johnson had walloped the man whom Reagan nominated and became the spokesperson and the symbol for, Barry Goldwater, in 1964. So by 1966, there was no reason to assume anything negative about the strategy that was employed. You wanted Reagan; you didn't want Christopher. You wanted Reagan to be the opponent. But no one really understood what a great communicator Reagan was and how much of a darling of the religious conservative movement that we didn't even know existed that he had become.

Morris: I'm told that polling played a very important part in Reagan's 1966 campaign, that they were developing all kinds of focus groups and tracking and all of that.

Brown: We didn't understand any of that.

Morris: Isn't that interesting because you were saying that you were putting together a lot of pretty sophisticated constituent attending--.

Brown: We did that at the district level but we were not part of the leadership. We didn't have any influence. We didn't know whether or not what we had done meant anything. We only now know that it meant something.

Morris: Right. And it was what the Republicans were doing--.

Brown: In a sophisticated way. We did it by accident.

Morris: You wonder if they were surprised at their success.

Brown: No, I think it was a science. I think that Bush is currently doing that. I think Bush's switch on civil rights, he had to. I think Bush's pushing of Clarence Thomas [for appointment to the U.S. Supreme Court], he had to. I think he had become convinced from his focus groups and what have you that his clear racist label, by which he was tagged from the Willie Horton experience, could very well sink him with his very weakened domestic program and domestic policy. He had to get rid of that tag as a liability without giving up anything for it.

Morris: But there are those who think of the Clarence Thomas event as it has played out has these kinds of mixed messages.

Brown: Bush will be able to avoid the racist tag because he did both Clarence Thomas and he is signing what used to be the quota bill and is now the civil rights bill. So it will be not easy for a Willie Brown to stand up and use the old Willie Horton and his refusal to sign the civil rights bill as clear evidence that, from a race perspective, you've got to get rid of him.

Morris: Why don't we stop there for today? That's been very useful. I thank you.

Brown: Joanne [Murphy] told me that she spent some time with you.

Morris: She did. She is a very talented speechwriter and researcher.

Brown: Then Steve Thompson told me that you had chatted with him briefly to set an appointment and that he had dinner with [John] Mockler and Mockler said he didn't want Steve in the room when he was talking to you.¹

¹Supporting materials for this memoir in the Bancroft Library include tape recordings of background interviews with Murphy, Thompson, Mockler, and Robert Connelly, chief administrative officer of the Assembly Rules Committee.

Morris: Mockler said that he was with you earlier.

Brown: He said he has known me the longest.

Morris: Right. I don't want to come between all those guys. I just want--.

Brown: You just want information.

Morris: Yes.

Brown: They are the best of friends but they are extremely competitive. I mean, you will not see two friends more competitive than Mockler and Thompson. They are both probably near genius I.Q.-wise.

Morris: Do you draw on the two of them for different kinds of things?

Brown: Make them compete.

Morris: Make them compete.

Brown: I make them compete.

Morris: Get the best from both?

Brown: Absolutely. I force each one of them to comment on each other's subject matter. They delight in getting in each other's business. Steven has primarily helped Mockler on education. Occasionally they have cooperated. They cooperated on one major bill, to combine children's services. It is the prototype of what people are now doing. They did that seven or eight years ago. That is the only time they really combined an issue. All the other times they were at war with each other because Steven wants some money for health, John wants some money for education, and there are limited resources.

There are two other people who are their peers: Phil Isenberg, who was their boss in the Ways and Means days, and Rudy Nothenburg who inherited Phil's job and became their boss when Phil went off to be on the city council of Sacramento. Rudy is maybe brighter than all three of them. But they were all extremely extraordinarily able people.

Morris: Right. You've all stayed in the same orbit now for twenty years?

Brown: Still. We cooperate virtually full--. Actually, Phil goes back to 1961. Phil and Rudy are the two longest in terms of contact. Mockler is the longest in terms of staff relationship.

Morris: Phil has changed venues, as it were, but they all continue to have their interest in public policy issues.

Brown: Phil hasn't changed. He has done the same thing. He was staff public policy. Then he went to city council. Then he was mayor of Sacramento and now he is in the state assembly. So he has stayed involved.

Morris: But he has moved around more.

Brown: Well, Mockler has too. He has been in staff, private, L.A. school person. He was their analyst--.

Morris: Consultant.

Brown: No, he was the analyst. He went down there and became their guru for a while. He left there, came back to staff when I became speaker, stayed for a year or a couple of years and then went back in the private sector. Steven has been directing health programs, including one here in San Francisco for a brief period of time. He put together a state-wide HMO for mental health and psychiatric services. He did that privately. He came back as chief of staff and then left again and came back as director of the Assembly Office of Research. So they have all been in and out. They go in and out.

Rudy left when he went to work as the first person for the Fair Political Practices Commission. He actually put the rules and regulations together following the reform act.

Morris: The 1974 measure?

Brown: Yes. Then he left there and when Moscone won the mayorship he came in as Moscone's director of finance and deputy mayor for that purpose. He stayed with [Mayor] Dianne [Feinstein] and then he became the CAO and he has been CAO since that time. But everybody has stayed in public policy.

Morris: They are confirmed political junkies, as they say.

Brown: Totally. And you see them all--if I gave a fundraiser today, and you have to have reservations and all that kind of stuff, you would come to my event, you would see Rudy behind the desk with his wife, doing all the reservations. Even though he is a CAO, he comes back to volunteer to do that. You would see Steve Thompson and Mockler ushering and seating people on the floor.

Morris: That's neat.

Brown: They have stayed forever.

Morris: When I have talked to them I will feel more confident to ask you to talk about the ideas in education and how they have developed and then how you've paid for them.

Brown: Yes. They were the people.

Morris: You seem to have, from the beginning, gravitated toward financial committees.

Brown: Yes. All right.

Morris: Thank you.

Brown: You are welcome.

XII BOB MORETTI AS SPEAKER

[Interview 3: November 16, 1991] ##

Brown Chairs the Government Efficiency Committee

Morris: I had a very, very lively briefing from your associates in Sacramento last week. Mr. Thompson and Mr. Mockler.

Brown: [Laughter] The twins.

Morris: They both said the place to start was with your work on the Government Efficiency Committee, that that was where you really began to get your teeth into the legislative process. You and Jesse Unruh had had some disagreements when you were a freshman. How did you and he come to the point where he wanted to make you chairman of the committee?

Brown: Actually, in the second term in the legislature, most members move up in stature, but it's usually a very small step. In the second term, for those of us elected in 1964, the opportunity was even greater because one person, one vote had gone into place in California following that Baker v. Carr decision in the U.S. Supreme Court. There were some thirty or more new members of the California State Assembly. The state senate had become one person, one vote. Many existing assembly members had moved over to the senate, people like [Nicholas] Petris and [Alfred] Alquist and that whole crowd had moved over simultaneously. They left a whole lot of vacancies in the California State Assembly.

That also meant a number of the chairpersons had moved on to newer, better, higher grounds by their standards. So there were clear opportunities for members of my class to move up. Only five of us were Democrats in my class, five of the ten new members. Each of the other four were given some respectable assignment but two of us were not, so to speak. One worse than the others was Willie Brown. But Unruh couldn't bring himself not to show some evidence of interest in my career, so he appointed me to some

nondescript little committee called Legislative Representation. It was a committee that had never met. It was a committee that received no bills.

It turns out that it was a statutory committee, however. It was a committee that had the responsibility to regulate and control lobbyists who represented special interest groups. I went back to the statutes, discovered the authority and the power contained in that committee and immediately commenced to exercise that authority and power. That absolutely annoyed the hell out of lobbyists. I started the process of their having to register. I started the process of their having to report what they were expending on people, long before Proposition 9. Under my committee chairmanship, I commenced to do that.

Morris: Way back in--?

Brown: 1967. 1967 was when this all started. Of course, the lobbyists went nuts. They thought they were going to have to wear badges and the badges were going to have to list who they represented. They were going to have to say who they had dinner with and what they discussed at dinner. I had all kinds of outrageous ideas. Unruh, of course, was somewhat annoyed. He looked at the statute and discovered that he could appoint the members to that committee. So he put all of the leadership people, himself as well as the speaker pro tem[pore], the minority leader, the caucus chairman--there was nothing on that committee except senior leadership people. And Willie Brown, the chairperson.

Morris: [Laughter] You were the chair. Pretty good.

Brown: I am the chairperson. Well, that would have obviously stymied whatever I may have wanted to do, except that I could call a meeting every day if I so chose. So I commenced to terrorize Unruh by my public announcements and my calling of the committee meetings at any time I chose to call a committee meeting and my threats to inspect and require reports to be filed by third house people. Of course, I was the darling of the press for doing all this because here was a gnat annoying the hell out of the elephant who was running the place.

That prompted Unruh into trying to reach an accord. He discovered that the civil rights committee and the committee that had all of the responsibility for much of the consumer actions was chaired by a fellow named Lester McMillan out of Los Angeles. He was having a squabble with Lester McMillan because Lester McMillan was not doing what Unruh wanted him to do as it relates to consumer matters and things of that nature. That really annoyed Jesse Unruh. Jesse Unruh decided that he--.

Morris: What did Unruh want done in consumer action?

Brown: I can't exactly remember what he wanted done. But whatever it was, McMillan was not doing it. [Phone rings] Do you want to hold that one second? That's got to be somebody who knows I'm here. [Phone interruption]

Morris: So Lester McMillan--

Brown: Lester McMillan. He and Unruh were having a little bit of a dispute. About that time Unruh had decided to take somebody's advice and shift the chairmanship of the Public Utilities and Commerce Committee. That was a more natural place for Lester McMillan to chair anyway. He was more into utilities and things of that nature. So Unruh went to him and said he would like to save himself from the trouble that I was causing him and the only way he could do that was to give me the chairmanship that would handle all the civil rights legislation and the consumer affairs legislation. But he would in turn give Lester McMillan the chairmanship of the Public Utilities and Commerce Committee. And Lester agreed to that switch.

So he did that, moved me to GE&E, moved Lester to Public Utilities and Commerce and abolished the Committee on Legislative Representation so he would never again be harassed by some upstart. That's how I got the chairmanship of that committee.

Morris: I see. Was that one of the committees you were interested in?

Brown: Not really. I served on that committee but I had no unusual interest in it. I had been assigned to that committee because Unruh wanted to get rid of his critics and he dumped all of his critics on committees of no great substance to him. And then suddenly consumer protections and consumer interest became a lively area for legislative consideration. It regulated the contractors and it regulated people like the people who told fortunes. It was the licensing committee. It was the committee in which all of these little unusual professions got their license, all except the medical people.

Morris: This is the period when the Reagan Administration were doing a lot of reorganizing. They made a bigger consumer affairs department. Pat Brown had begun it and then Reagan made more of it. Was that anything that interested you and your committee?

Brown: No, not really. It had no relevance whatsoever.

Morris: The thing that Thompson and Mockler both remember vividly is a medical licensing bill, something to do with increasing access of

people to health careers, licensed vocational nurses and things of that sort.

Brown: There was a whole series of bills that came through that committee, some of which I authored in that area. The whole question of whether foreign-trained doctors and foreign-trained dentists particularly would be able to practice in the state of California. That was in the jurisdiction of that committee and we took care of that issue. The whole question of what kind of educational requirements and whether or not you could become an LVN, licensed vocational nurse, and whether or not you could use a portion of that licensed vocational nurse's training to ultimately become an RN. All of that came through that committee. We also had all of the semi-medical type licensing provisions that are now in the statute in the committee. Those were all the work products of when we chaired that committee and when we had jurisdiction over that committee.

Morris: Were they part of some overall policy interest of yours or just they were government progress issues?

Brown: No, they were actually prompted by complaints from constituencies and from some individuals whom I knew, particularly with the Filipino, foreign-trained dentists. I had been approached by a couple of Filipinos here in San Francisco who had graduated and they had been practicing dentistry in the Philippines. When they came here, the best they could be were bedpan persons. Although they were clearly well-educated and well-informed, they had not graduated from a recognized school of dentistry and there was no access route for those persons to qualify to take the same exam that you take if you graduate from the University of California or from any of the other dental schools in this state.

I thought that wrong. Based on that brief exposure, I set about to change that. I absolutely succeeded in changing it. It is also interesting that at about that same time, Quentin Kopp who is a practicing lawyer in San Francisco came in to visit with me. His dad was a pharmacist; however, his dad had been trained in a school which was not recognized by the admission officers for the state of California because it wasn't on the approved list. His dad was Jewish and, of course, Jews couldn't go to the approved schools with any great regularity during that period of time. He came to me about that and I put it in the bill to change that rule as well, to allow Quentin Kopp's father to become a pharmacist and to practice in the state of California. His father ultimately became a pharmacist based upon the legislation which I passed long before Quentin was a candidate for public office.

Morris: Does that mean it started an acquaintance between you and Kopp that has continued?

Brown: Well, that's where I actually met him. We have never been political cellmates. We have cooperated on some issues over the years. But he is far more of a conservative, less sensitive to the kinds of things that I am interested in.

From the Bipartisan Sixties to the Cavemen of Proposition 13, 1978

Morris: I get the feeling that in the 1960s there was more of a bipartisan feeling in the legislature than there has come to be? Is that your recollection?

Brown: We did not have in the 1960s and even the early 1970s, not until the late 1970s, did there develop a real difference between Democrats and Republicans on party issues. It had been in the 1960s a place that was dominated by subject-matter interests, regardless of political party and regardless of how you were registered. There was no such thing as a real conservative Republican unit. There were maybe two Republicans, Charlie Conrad and one other, and I don't even recall who the second Republican would have been. But Republicans voted for things like child care. Republicans voted for things like compensatory education. Republicans voted for the business of automatic cost of living increases for welfare recipients. Republicans voted for matters that protected the environment. A Republican was the father of the community mental health program for the state of California--the Lanterman-Short. Frank Lanterman is a Republican; Alan Short is a Democrat. Petris, of course, is a Democrat. But Lanterman was always the lead author, whether it was Lanterman-[Jerome] Waldie or Lanterman-Petris or Lanterman-Short, Lanterman was the author of all of the mental health legislation.

So you have Republicans who were really into being relatively aggressive about the issues that effect human beings. Not until 1978 did that attitude change when Proposition 13 came along and all these caveperson types, all these individuals who were rooted, committed to the idea that government shouldn't exist and had no reason to exist. They were anti-tax types. You didn't have that attitude in the 1960s and the early 1970s.

Morris: Even though you had had Ronald Reagan as governor, who made a big thing about there was too much government?

Brown: Absolutely. If you recall in 1973 or so, Reagan put on the ballot Proposition 1, on a special election, which was a forerunner to Proposition 13. The voters rejected it handily. Reagan was the spokesperson and the leader for that issue. It was a vote which was taken in an off year--1973 was not a regular election time.

Morris: There was only one other tiny item on the ballot.

Brown: Correct, and we defeated it. Bob Moretti and the Democrats were the leading spokespersons in that debate around the state against Proposition 1. That would have limited the amount of taxes that could be collected, et cetera. Reagan was five years ahead of his time in terms of Proposition 13 in that regard, but nevertheless we did defeat it.

Moretti's Background

Morris: When did you and Bob Moretti start talking about the possibility of his running for the speakership?

Brown: 1965 [laughter], when we were first elected.

Morris: That possibility manifested itself that far back.

Brown: Yes. We had been gearing ourselves toward one day when Moretti would become speaker. We had zeroed in on that early on.

Morris: Did Unruh think that was a good idea?

Brown: Oh, yes. Bob Moretti was Unruh's favorite newcomer to the halls of the legislature. When Bob first took office with us in 1965, Bob was given the best assignment, Bob was given the best committee assignment, Bob was nurtured and directed by Unruh in every respect. Bob served on the Rules Committee as a freshman, Bob served on Ways and Means as a freshman, so Bob had all of the options that a newcomer would have.

Morris: What was there about Moretti that made him the pick of the litter for Unruh?

Brown: He had been an employee of Tom Bane's, who was Unruh's Rules Committee chair. Unruh knew him. He had done Unruh's bidding against the liberals in all of the struggles in CDC. He had been just one of Unruh's operatives for a long time.

- Morris: Moretti was active in CDC to carry the Unruh message to the Democratic clubs?
- Brown: Absolutely. He was the opposition. He represented the opposition. He was not really much of a CDCer. But he was the conservative wing of the Democratic party that showed up on occasion at Unruh's behest to do Unruh's bidding, and Moretti was part of that group.
- Morris: To stop a motion?
- Brown: Absolutely. Whatever needed to be done, including endorsing candidates and not endorsing candidates. It was the same in the YDs. He was one of Unruh's operators in the Young Democrats as well. He and Bill Greene and Merv Dymally, they were all part of the Unruh clique. We, of course, were part of the liberal, left-wing clique. It was the Bermans and Burtons and the Phil Isenbergs and that group.
- Morris: I see. How did you and Moretti, representing opposite factions as it were, get to join forces?
- Brown: From the first day we were elected, Moretti was smart enough to know that he could never be speaker unless he could carry with him some of the people Unruh didn't have. So he deliberately set out to make friends with Willie Brown and John Burton who were the two liberal new members. Of the five Democrats elected, we were the two new liberals. He introduced himself and we immediately struck up a friendship because we were interested in the same kinds of activities. We were not drinkers; we were not part of the good old boys. He was twenty-eight and I was thirty so we were really on the youngish side. Almost every other person was over forty in the halls of the legislature except the three of us. So we set out immediately on the basis of commonality of interest.
- We began to look out for each in the various committees on which we served. We would make sure our freshman class and our freshman group got a fair shake by banding together. That was how the relationship started.
- Morris: That sounds as if Moretti might have personally had more liberal interests than Unruh, even though Unruh was his mentor.
- Brown: Very much so. He was not a conservative by any stretch of the imagination. He came from a conservative background, from an Italian family. He was second generation. He was the only one to ever graduate from college, maybe even the first to graduate from high school. He was the oldest son. His mom and dad were just common, ordinary working people. He really understood the need

for health and he understood the need for insurance and he understood the need for all of those things. And he had a natural instinct for fairness on race, almost an aggressive instinct for fairness on race, for which I didn't understand the source until after I had known him for a couple of months. It turns out that he was raised in Detroit and he was raised in the black section of Detroit. Black kids had been the only kids who were really his pals and his buddies in his early life. In the street activities, they had been his allies and his friends and he had dated black girls. So he had a natural affinity on the race issue.

That, in part, had played a great role in his commitment to fair housing, fair employment practices and all those things without even knowing the philosophy of why. It was just natural with him.

Morris: Because of his personal experience.

Brown: His experience and the environment in which he was raised. Hastings Street in Detroit was where he was raised.

Morris: So it was when Unruh decided to run for governor that you fellows decided it was time to make your move and you began to--?

Brown: That is when we formally decided to do it. Actually we lost control of the house in 1968 by one vote. It was forty-one Republicans and thirty-nine Democrats, so Unruh lost the speakership. Unruh became the minority leader and, I believe, [George] Zenovich became the caucus chair. Then, of course, Unruh showed a decided disinterest in what would happen to the caucus. He didn't use any of the time and talent to try to get the majority back in the next election.

Electing a New Minority Leader, 1969

Morris: Why was that?

Brown: Well, he had already zeroed in on his candidacy for governor. With that in mind, we kept encouraging him to leave the minority leadership job and let some of us take it over so we could in fact survive as a house. He was not prone to do that because after all a minority leader still had some leverage in terms of resources.

But some time in late 1969 he indicated to Moretti that he would be stepping down as minority leader and we set about at that stage of the game to make me the minority leader in place of Jesse

Unruh because by then, it had become pretty clear that in terms of organizational activities and in terms of subject matter, from our group I was easily the most comprehensive. My chairmanship of the GE&E committee had demonstrated that for everybody. As a result of that we decided, without a whole lot of discussion, that I would run and become the minority leader and that that was the practical thing to do, and that Bob Moretti would chair the committee to reelect Democrats and to gain control. He would assume the responsibility to raise the money and all kinds of things, mainly because he had gotten the chairmanship from the Republicans.

The Republicans genuinely loved Bob. In a Republican speakership, he had been given the chairmanship of the GO [Government Organization] Committee. The GO committee was the horse-racing committee, the liquor committee; it was the committee of substance for campaign contributions. The Republicans had made the mistake of giving that to Bob Moretti. Bob Moretti used that committee and that chairmanship and those resources to get campaign contributions to get the house back.

Well, we couldn't let Bob Moretti leave that job and become minority leader, so the next best thing to do with Unruh on the way out was to make Willie Brown, the most trusted lieutenant of Bob Moretti's, the minority leader. Then there would be no competition because Willie Brown would not be the candidate for speaker; it would be Moretti who would be the candidate for speaker, from the chairmanship of the GO Committee. That was a deliberate decision that we made. That was cold-blooded and deliberate.

However, we discovered that I had offended so many of our liberal friends that five of them would not vote for me. The five were: Charlie Warren, John Dunlap, Alan Sieroty, Jack Knox, and Bob Crown. None of those five could bring themselves to vote for me.

Morris: What had you done to offend them?

Brown: I hadn't done anything to offend them individually. I did offend one or two and they used that group mentality to suggest that I was too immature, too caustic, too volatile, and they were not comfortable.

Morris: Because one of them wanted that job?

Brown: Absolutely. Bob Crown was running for the job. Bob Crown was one of the people running for the job. In the first vote, Crown got five votes, I got, I don't know, seventeen votes, and Joe

Gonsalves, the conservative candidate--there was a conservative Democrat candidate named Joe Gonsalves--got seventeen votes.

So it was seventeen-seventeen-five, or some other combination thereof, that reaches the total of thirty-nine. With that in mind, we postponed a new vote until the following Monday when we would return. Over the weekend, we concocted a scheme. I had all the racial minorities, so it was literally--. I had Yvonne Burke who was voting for me. So we were in good shape because we knew those liberals could never vote for that conservative Joe Gonsalves. This was a chance to move a black up in the leadership role and we figured that they just absolutely had to do it.

But we decided to do an exclamation point on our effort. We knew that Knox and Crown were from this region so we called up the black radio stations in this area--.

Morris: KDIA?

Brown: KDIA and KSOL. We had them over the weekend really do a number on Willie Brown's behalf about these white liberals who wouldn't vote for a black. They didn't call me by name; they just said that they would not vote for a black. We did the same thing in southern California. Well, that was a tactical error because when we got back on Monday, they informed us that they would vote for any other black, but not Willie Brown. We could take our votes plus their votes and elect a minority leader, but it would never be Willie Brown. It could be any other black. The other blacks were militant enough to know and so fed up that they would not agree to be a candidate and thereby stop what was rightfully Willie Brown's place.

Morris: So they stayed loyal to you.

Brown: Except one. A fellow named John Miller from Berkeley. John J. Miller from Berkeley finally said he would accept the role of the minority leader. We thought about it for a while because we were not very trustful of Mr. Miller, so we sat Mr. Miller down in Moretti's office and we had five of our people there. We had Burton, we had Fenton, Yvonne Burke, Bob Moretti and Willie Brown. We extracted out of Miller [that] if we gave him the votes to become the minority leader, number one, he would do what we told him to do as minority leader. He wouldn't mess around with the campaign committee that Moretti headed to get reelected. He would stay out of all of that. He would just be the spokesperson on the floor, plus he would support Moretti for speaker if we won the house back.

He agreed to all those things. He did not keep the promise not to run for speaker because as soon as we used the resources that Moretti put together and all of the resources that we had, we elected forty-three Democrats. In that forty-three were Peter Chacon whom we elected with black votes mainly in San Diego; we elected Lou Papan here in--.

Morris: South San Francisco area.

Brown: --the South San Francisco area. We really elected people to get this thing together. We did and we won. So Moretti became the candidate for speaker. However--.

Morris: You can do that in a campaign? You can say, "We'll put some money into your campaign if you back our candidate for speaker."

Brown: Of course. We wouldn't do that otherwise. So we thought we had the speakership won. But lo and behold, John Miller decided he wanted to be a candidate because Moretti was too conservative. So the liberals who didn't like Moretti didn't want to vote for Moretti. A guy named Cory--.

Morris: Ken Cory?

Brown: --talked about becoming a candidate as well. So now we had to go to the people we defeated for the minority leadership, the conservative Democrats, cut a deal with them to get the votes, and we did. We cut a deal and we got the votes to elect Moretti speaker without the liberals coming aboard. So now we were in a position where we didn't have to give the so-called liberals anything. But we were smart enough not to let that bug us. We proceeded to organize the house in a way that reflected what we thought was good judgment. I became chair of Ways and Means; John Burton took over as chair of Rules; Wally Karabian took over as the majority leader; Jack Fenton took over as the chair of the F&I [Finance and Insurance] Committee; I think we kept Carlos Bee for a short period of time as speaker pro tem and I don't remember who else we made speaker pro tem.

Morris: What did you do about the conservative Democrats that you--?

Brown: We gave them the chairman of the water committee, we gave them the chairman of the ag committee. They all had assignments. We gave Joe Gonsalves chairman of Rev[enue] and Tax[ation]. So we took care of everybody. We really genuinely took care of everybody. To get Cory's vote, we even made him caucus chair. We took staff away from him but we made him caucus chair. So we took care of everybody.

Morris: Did he like the move?

Brown: Absolutely. We took care of everybody. We had to put the speakership together so we put the speakership together the best way we could. Miller still hung out--.

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Morris: Did Miller have some special talents that made him somebody that you would deal with as the Moretti and Unruh people had found a place for you?

Brown: No, Miller did not. Miller was a talented human being intellectually but he had no social skills, he had no organizing skills, he was not attentive, no follow-through, none of the above. So he didn't have any of the talent that you would utilize as a legislator. He would be a good person to read the bills and to speak on the bills and to carry a fight on the floor because he could debate, but that was the limit, that was the total boundary, the total height of his skills.

Morris: As a person from the East Bay, would he have had working relationships with [Congressman] Ron Dellums' people the way you did with Phil Burton?

Brown: There were no such Dellums people. We literally assisted in starting that. You remember that the East Bay was organized politically by D.G. Gibson and Byron Rumford and that crowd. They were the more conservative Democrats. The radicals coming out of the student-protest movement in the last 1960s and early 1970s were just beginning to see electoral politics as a means by which to achieve things. So they began to talk about candidates for the Berkeley city council, et cetera. Dellums was a candidate for the city council from Berkeley. Dellums got elected to the city council of Berkeley.

So there were no Dellums people. The radicals were there but they were not at that stage of the game following the leadership of Dellums; they were still following the leadership of the radical whites. The blacks had not yet emerged as a significant force in the radical movement. The blacks were still the more conservative. So Miller represented the more conservative blacks. Miller was on the conservative black side, not the radical side.

Morris: I see. The older political organization, the D.G. Gibson--.

Brown: Correct. He had been from that school. He had been from the elitist side of that school. He had not even been from the street

side; he hadn't been from the Pullman porter side. He had been from the intellectual, elitist side.

Morris: Right. He had moved northside.

Brown: Correct. He had been on the school board. He had been elected by the intellectual white liberals, not the radical white liberals, to the school board. Then he had come to the legislature.

XIII WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE CHAIR, 1969-1974

Foundation for a Good-Government Career; Reagan Oversight

Morris: I gathered that it caused somewhat of a ripple to have you become chairman of Ways and Means? The tradition was you were supposed to have served on Ways and Means.

Brown: I had never served on Ways and Means. I had never served on any significant committee beyond the GE&E Committee. I had been assigned to committees on education, committees on judiciary, committees on health. In those days none of those were considered significant committees because they were not committees that generated any interest for contribution purposes. Unruh would consign to those committees his subject-matter people, mainly because his subject-matter people would not create a burden for him. He understood that and we understood it too so it was a good arrangement.

It was a good arrangement. We dominated the good-government subject-matter stuff.

So I had never been assigned to any committee of any great substance. I wanted to be majority leader. I did not want to be chair of Ways and Means. I did not know anything about ways and means, I wasn't interested in that kind of work, I didn't want to work that hard and certainly didn't want to have responsibility totally for the whole program of the legislature.

Moretti was wiser than Willie Brown at that moment because he kept saying, "If you really want to ultimately be speaker, and I think you should ultimately be speaker, you have got to show that you are the smartest guy here. And you aren't going to do that as majority leader. You are going to come off as being brazen and offensive because you are going to cut people to ribbons on the floor and you are not going to be doing anything

for them. It will be a glamorous position and you'll get a lot of press, but it will not be the foundation for a long-range career.

"They aren't going to give you the time of day. A white guy can get away with doing it, Willie Brown, but you can't do that. You've got to show that you are the smartest guy here. I want you to be chair of Ways and Means and besides that, I can't have a successful speakership if you don't chair Ways and Means because there is nobody else I can trust to do what needs to be done politically to the stuff that comes through there. I can't trust anybody else to do that and I don't want to have to watch people."

This was Moretti. Finally the team with Moretti, Burton, Karabian, Fenton--we were all in the team, and it was a team leadership operation--decided that, yes, I would go ahead and take Ways and Means. Well, it only took me twenty-four hours to realize how stupid I had been. I should have been petitioning for Ways and Means because overnight, the Ways and Means slot got a hell of a lot more attention than anything I could have ever dreamed of. Certainly I would have been the great debater on the floor. But that would have been limited to the times you were on the floor. The first day I became chairman of Ways and Means, immediately I met with the Legislative Analyst's Office and that was Alan Post.

This was November [that] we announced I was going to chair Ways and Means. So by Thanksgiving I was already into the process of learning my job and the first thing I did was meet Alan Post. Never a more delightful person I was ever to meet. It was really a decided change in my whole career in the legislature because all of a sudden, I was talking to a guy who really knew the subject matter, knew state government, and for the first time had found himself a student whom he thought he had an affinity with. With that we started the number on Reagan. [laughter] That's where the real criticism of Reagan began. That's where the oversight of Reagan began because I asked him, "What am I supposed to do as chair of Ways and Means?" I didn't know. He couldn't believe anybody would really be asking those questions.

Morris: That they didn't know?

Brown: They didn't know and were really serious about listening. Then he started telling me what to do and I would go out and do it, check this and check that, read this and read that and come back. And he was the person who actually appeared on behalf of the analyst's office before Ways and Means. He testified at every Ways and Means hearing. I am telling you that it was an absolute delight to have Alan Post sitting there offsetting the Department of Finance.

Procedural Flourishes

Brown: I had never enjoyed anything more because I was prepared better than any person presenting a bill. I was prepared better than any agency head. I was prepared better than any member. You are the author of the bill. You step up and I say it's [A.B.] 8605. I tell you, 8605 does the following five things. These are the following people who support it. These are the people who are against it. There have been the suggested following amendments and I do so without any notes or without anything else.

I said, "The Department of Finance's analysis shows thus, the analyst's people have said thus and so. Do you want to say anything on it?" [laughter] Then I would direct it. I would say, "Now if this witness would testify, this witness would say thus and so--." It became the show of all shows. There was no empty seat in the Ways and Means hearing room. I changed the meeting of the Ways and Means. Ways and Means used to meet on Tuesday in the morning. I changed the meeting to Wednesdays because every Monday night we played poker all night, so we were in no shape to be showing up at eight o'clock in the morning at a Ways and Means hearing. So we changed the Ways and Means hearing, based upon our poker game, until Wednesday. Ways and Means still meets on Wednesday. We also changed the time. It used to start at ten o'clock in the morning. We moved it back to eight in the morning. I am the person who started the eight a.m. meeting.

Morris: That must have been a strain on some of your colleagues.

Brown: Only the first week. Because in those days you did not have roll call votes. There were no roll call votes. Nobody questioned the existence of a quorum. So at eight-ten, I would start the committee. It was just Willie Brown alone and I would start passing out whatever I wanted to pass out and killing whatever I wanted to kill.

Morris: You were the committee in toto.

Brown: That's right. I had one or two people like John Vasconcellos would always show up. I would have Ms. Pauline Davis who would always be there. Frank Lanterman, my vice chair, would always be there. Jack Knox would always be there. Bud Collier would always be there. I had a few people who absolutely would show up. I had Bill Bagley seated on the far left. I had all these people who had the same assigned seats. I had John Burton on the far right, on the upper dais.

Any time I needed a debate between Democrats and Republicans, each of those guys were sharp enough and read the subject matter to do the debate. Bagley and Burton were my debaters.

Morris: Would you pass the word if you would like a little--?

Brown: No, I would just call on them. I would call on them, "Mr. Bagley, this is something you have an interest in." Any time anybody would question it I would say, "This bill goes out sixteen to five." "How do you know it was sixteen to five?" I said, "Sixteen to five. These are the five people who would vote no," and I would cite the five. "And the other sixteen don't really care. So it is sixteen to five." And the bill would pass. Or I would say, "This bill is dead. There are ten votes for it and eleven votes against it on the twenty-one person committee."

It became kind of an incredible experience to just come to Ways and Means and watch us do the Ways and Means Committee work, and watch me chair the Ways and Means Committee. It was something to see. And it was the most enjoyable experience I had in the legislature. It was more enjoyable than the speakership.

Policy Innovations; the Speaker's Political Chores

Morris: Really? Because you were directing policy?

Brown: Absolutely, because I was doing policy and because it was still really new to me.

Morris: What kinds of things did Alan Post suggest that you should take a look at?

Brown: I can't frankly remember, but it was my introduction to subject matter. At the same time, by the way, I hired Phil Isenberg to be the chief of the Ways and Means staff.

Morris: What was he doing at the time?

Brown: He was a practicing lawyer in Sacramento. Phil Isenberg then hired Steve Thompson to do health, John Mockler to do education, Bob Connelly to do the environment, Ray Sullivan to do taxes. [Phone interruption]

Morris: Were you looking for something in particular with these young policy wizzes that you hired?

Brown: We just decided that we were going to be the cutting edge of public policy in California in the Reagan years. So we set out to put together the best set of brains that we could find at the staff level. And that's how all this started. That's how all of this started. We even decided where our office would be. We reorganized that place like you would not believe. We really used the leverage of the Ways and Means chairmanship and the total trust and confidence that Moretti had in me. Moretti went about being speaker by doing all of the social things that the speakership requires you to do. He left the running of the house literally to his lieutenants, to John Burton to do the rules and to do all the house administration, and he left public policy to me.

So it was a very good arrangement. He assumed the responsibility to be the politician and to balance the relationships between all the parties.

Morris: What does it mean to do the social stuff?

Brown: It means to hold the members' hands, to respond to the members' demands, to the members' needs, to the job requirements have for their friends and relatives, all those things. To put the dinners together for the members, to put the trips together for the members.

Morris: Sort of a super-caucus chair?

Brown: Yes. Because Cory was out of the loop. Cory was not on our team so he was not considered a trusted lieutenant.

Morris: That's what I wondered. That was kind of a curious situation. So Cory was incidental.

Brown: He had the title but he did not have the responsibilities. We ran the place.

Morris: Okay. Was Cory also shooting for speaker or governor?

Brown: We couldn't tell. Cory was kind of an independent Unruh original person who was very smart but didn't generate great fellowship.

Morris: What about policy goals? I assume that you and Moretti and John Burton had some conversation about policy-wise where you wanted to take it.

Brown: Oh, yes. We wanted to do automatic COLAs. We wanted to get the abortion stuff through. We wanted to change the school formula to

include urban-impact contributions. So we had some genuine kinds of policies and programs that we were pursuing.

Morris: Well, were these ideas coming from Isenberg?

Brown: Absolutely. They came from Steve Thompson. The childhood disability screening and prevention bills came out of him. Some of the childcare came from him plus constituents. All of that flowed primarily from staff people. The first urban park ever was Bob Connelly's and it was right here at Hunter's Point. We traded that to Reagan one year.

Medi-Cal Program Evolution

Morris: Could we talk a little bit about the Medi-Cal/welfare reform bills in 1971, which is something that has had a lot of attention from the Reagan side? He said his feet were cast in concrete and he wasn't going to sign a bill for withholding. That Medicare costs were rising exponentially and were going to ruin the state. How did you folks in the assembly go about responding to that?

Brown: Well, Reagan was still a novice governor.

Morris: Even in his second term?

Brown: Even in his second term. He was without the political clout that he ultimately developed with the right-wing movement. The right-wing movement was still a relatively insignificant, not terribly recognizable unit. It certainly had very little influence on elected officials. So Reagan's ideas were considered cockamamie ideas. They were considered cock-eyed. We still had people like Jack Veneman, a Republican from Modesto, who was as keen on what the medical policies ought to be and what the medical programs ought to be as was Phil Burton. We still had the Bagleys of the world who believed that the tax system should be designed to be for the ability to pay. We didn't have this business of trying to skew it to big business or trying to skew it to the wealthy side. We still had people who were conservative so-called, but they were the classic conservatives, not this religious right.

So Reagan was almost without a constituency and without a followership on those crazy ideas that he was espousing. After all, he was Goldwater's spokesperson and Goldwater went down to a smashing defeat. The legacy of that was still out there. The Rockefeller-type mentality for Republicans was still in vogue, even in California. [Thomas] Kuchel was still a U.S. Senator in

California. So you had that kind of thing going down in this state. Even Richard Nixon was pushing some form of universal health insurance.

So you had a whole different environment and different attitude. So it wasn't unusually difficult to succeed in defeating Ronald Reagan and keep him from putting into place any of the crazy things that he talked about. As a matter of fact, the early seventies actually started the period of incredible expansion of coverage of the Medi-Cal program. After four or five years of the medical providers in California experiencing that they would be rewarded handsomely for their low-income practice, they saw it as a means by which to get rich. So they really jumped into this business of trying to gain control of the Medi-Cal monies. They attempted to do so with all these prepaid health plans and all those kinds of things that represented great respectability for them to secure dollars.

They also had a guy named Earl Brian, who was an M.D. Brilliant. Thirty-two or so. He was Reagan's main guy on the health issue and he was oriented toward systems and delivering services and having government pay for them for medical purposes.¹ So it was not a difficult task for us to develop good programs from our philosophical standpoint because we had willing participants hidden in the Reagan administration, some hidden and some very visible. In Earl Brian's case, very visible. We also had a novice governor who genuinely would back down when leveraged.

Morris: When leveraged by the legislature?

Brown: By superior numbers, yes.

Relations with Reagan Staff

Morris: Was this because his legislative staff people understood and got along with the legislative position?

Brown: Absolutely. Bob Moretti had a good working relationship with all of those young guys in the Reagan Administration at the state level. They were guys whom he played tennis with or he played golf with or he recreated with. They were guys who told the same

¹Dr. Brian was director of Health Care Services and later of the Health and Welfare Agency. See his interview in Governor Reagan's Cabinet and Agency Administration, Berkeley: Regional Oral History Office, 1986.

kinds of dirty jokes that he told. So there was a kinsmanship. Some were from [U]SC and some were from Notre Dame. They were the young "Good Old Boys." Some of the Reagan people were people we went to college with, like Donald Livingston who was part of the Reagan administration. He had been a collegiate friend.

Morris: Of yours?

Brown: Of mine, yes. From San Francisco State. So there were all kinds of angles into the Reagan administration. Jack Kemp had been part of the Reagan administration. So there were all kinds of connections that people had unrelated to the traditional kinds of things now that infect the political system. You just didn't have people coming from the right-to-life movement. You had people who really got there by the traditional political process rather than the religious right.

Morris: Got there by working on campaigns?

Brown: Or in corporations where they were assigned to go assist in government.

Morris: In public affairs. That was what Don Livingston had done.

Brown: Correct. Absolutely.

Morris: So when you saw him turning up in the governor's office, you renewed your friendship.

Brown: I knew I had contact. Absolutely. And he renewed his friendship with me because, after all, they needed that since I was the chair of Ways and Means and the author of Reagan budgets. They had to deal with me on almost a full-time basis.

Morris: At one point, Livingston was head of something called the program and policies unit in the governor's office.

Brown: Correct.

Morris: How different were his ideas for shaping programs and policies from the governor's point of view and your ideas and Moretti's for shaping it from the legislature's point of view?

Brown: I don't remember a great distinction between what we ultimately did and what the Reagan administration embraced. Reagan's speeches were quite different but the policy initiatives were seldom if ever different because the authors of those policy initiatives were the Venemans, the Bagleys, the Houston Fluornoys and people in that category. The Bob Monagans. The only

conservative Republicans were people like Charlie Conrad. Nobody paid any attention to Conrad. Certain the Reagan administration didn't. You had the Pat McGees, you had the Charlie Chapells. You had the Hale Ashcrafts. You had real tough Republicans. Frank Lanterman was the leading spokesperson for Republicans on all social welfare issues and health issues. He was as liberal as any Democrat on those issues.

Learning Budgeting from Frank Lanterman; John Knox's Leadership on Local Government

Morris: How did you and he strike each other? It looks like an odd combination.

Brown: He was my vice-chair, one of the best.

Morris: I know, that's why I'm asking. How did you guys get along?

Brown: I was his student.

Morris: Really?

Brown: I was his student. He really knew the subject matter and he trusted me and he trusted my judgment, embraced whatever I did. Usually what I did we had consulted about and we had made the decision on and it was the only time that we would ever get seventy-two, seventy-five votes for the budget first time out.

Morris: Really?

Brown: Yes, because he had helped to write the budget. His staff had interacted with my staff in producing the budget.

Morris: How much different was it from the budget that the Reagan people would have introduced at the beginning of the year?

Brown: Sometimes substantially different because sometimes they put in some of the crazy ideas that Reagan had. But that's all they would ever do. They would never go beyond that. We would proceed to do the Ways and Means work we needed to do on the budget. We would usually do so with the blessings of the administration so when the budget finally got there, he didn't blue-pencil a whole lot of stuff. Reagan was not a great guy on vetoing.

Morris: Really?

- Brown: No. Did not. The blue-pencilling business started when Deukmejian came along. Previous governors had used the blue pencil sparingly, including Jerry Brown.
- Morris: Because they were comfortable with the negotiating process of the hearings and things like that?
- Brown: Yes. Absolutely.
- Morris: Did Lanterman go about things differently than Moretti? He had been there a long, long time.
- Brown: Moretti was not interested in subject matter, so you are comparing apples and oranges.
- Morris: But Lanterman had been around for a long time--.
- Brown: About 100 years.
- Morris: At least. Did he have any problems with these young guys?
- Brown: Oh, no. Lanterman was as young in his approach to public policy as any of the membership on the floor. His great, mammoth, legendary debates were with Jack Knox over local governmental issues. Lanterman was a real comprehensive student. He and Knox would be at loggerheads over things like local agency formation commissions, charter amendments, city and county boundaries and jurisdiction of local governments for regional purposes and what have you. There were legendary fights.
- Morris: Who was on which side?
- Brown: Knox was always on the side of trying to move towards regionalization. Lanterman was a local control person.
- Morris: In your view, which side determined the outcome of events?
- Brown: Sometimes Knox won and sometimes Lanterman won. Knox had an uphill battle always because his ideas were future ideas. Lanterman was pretty much comfortable in the world in that area as it existed.
- Morris: How about from a point of view of your folks? We are talking about things like San Francisco Bay conservation and development.
- Brown: We followed Knox.
- Morris: Were there similar efforts in southern California, in Los Angeles or San Diego, to regionalize transportation?

Brown: Oh, sure. You had the air quality districts, you had South Coast Air Base district, you had all those kinds of things going on. Everybody at one level or another recognized the need for a larger unit of government for certain kinds of things. But everybody understood turf and turf protection.

Morris: So, would Knox and Lanterman have some territory that they could agree upon?

Brown: I suppose. I didn't pay real close attention to the finite details. I just remember the great battles between the two giants. Each of them were considered maybe the best floor jockeys for managing legislation of any of us.

Morris: That was out of their own interest--?

Brown: Out of their own interest.

Morris: --rather than that they would assign them to this or that?

Brown: No. Out of their own interest.

Morris: Would your subject matter people go over and work with Knox?

Brown: We didn't pay a whole lot of attention to that area of the law. We pretty much left that to Knox and to the Local Government Committee.

Morris: Local government was not something that Ways and Means cared terribly much about?

Brown: We didn't deal with it much.

Morris: Even in terms of its budget?

Brown: No, not in terms of its budget. We literally followed Knox. He was literally our point person on that issue. So we would always be on his side but we didn't do a whole lot of assisting in the formation of his views.

Morris: So what they developed in the way of programs, and their budget recommendations, would go into the Ways and Means--?

Brown: Usually was supported by the Ways and Means Committee.

Taking the Budget on the Road

Morris: I am told that you took the Ways and Means hearings on the road, which hadn't been done before?

Brown: We changed the whole nature of how things were done around there. We literally decided to take ways and means on the interim hearings. We decided we were going to do interim hearings. Then someone came up with, "No, let's not do just interim hearings. Let's actually take the budget to the local level." We did some of those hearings. We actually had budget hearings before we adopted the budget. We had budget hearings in Los Angeles and places of that nature.

Morris: What kinds of people would turn up for the hearings?

Brown: All kinds. The same kinds that turn up for city council and the board of supervisors meetings. Mostly, however, the people who were directly affected: the heads of the schools at the local level, the heads of the various agencies that we were subventing funds directly to, social service agencies and people like that. People representing special districts. They were most effective because they were best prepared. Citizens were kind of just--.

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Morris: Did you get some new ideas for legislation?

Brown: No, I don't think we really did. What I think we did is I think we gave the membership a chance to hear people reactions to what we were doing. Very few if any new ideas came from the hearings.

Morris: Is that true in general that there aren't too many new ideas on local government out there amongst the citizenry?

Brown: I would say, yes, that's true.

Education and Health Program Challenges

Morris: What about the field of education? You also had to deal with the Serrano-Priest decision which at the time was supposed to make a major change in how education was funded.

Brown: It was not, frankly, a difficult task. For a long time we had known that the school finance formula was not perfect and not

effective. That's why when John Mockler came up with the idea of urban impact aid, that was just a new factor installed in the school formula to try to equalize the support to urban areas and to people who actually needed the money. So we knew that there was something wrong with the school finance formula. It was not difficult ultimately to deal with that issue.

Morris: Was the urban-impact aid idea introduced as a result of the Serrano-Priest or Serrano-Priest provided an opportunity--?

Brown: No. Actually urban impact aid came just out of Mockler's head. It came out of Mockler's head and out of our experience of need. We knew that a formula that generated so many dollars in Tulare for each student, for example, was not giving the same amount of learning dollars to the San Francisco student because the cost of janitors were higher in San Francisco. The cost of the capital outlay and other kinds of things associated therewith was greater in San Francisco than it was in Tulare. So we had to try to figure out some solution. And, in San Francisco you had language problems that were not evident in Tulare.

See, you had a different kind of student coming. You had a poorer student coming. You had students coming in who were hungry, and the disciplinary problems associated with students in San Francisco were different from Tulare. Understanding that, a school formula that distributed money as if both situations were equal clearly would end up being unequal in a place like San Francisco where the cost was greater.

So Mockler came forward with indicators that would prompt money from a separate pot, in addition to the regular categories and all the other things; so we came up with urban impact aid. That was considered to be part of the equalization process. That's how that came about. That was not in direct response to Serrano v. Priest.

Morris: In those days, did the legislature feel as if the judiciary was into its territory, that this was not a separate--?

Brown: No, we didn't react that way at all. That attitude did not develop and take hold until the late seventies, about the courts invading and doing legislative work. Some more conservative Republicans like Reagan had always mouthed those words, that the court was trying to be the legislature, but we didn't pay a whole lot of attention to those words. Not until the cavepeople came along did you begin to have that attitude holding its sway.

Morris: What about the business of the state revenues being able to pay for the kinds of programs that the activist folks in the legislature were interested in producing?

Brown: In the sixties, under Pat Brown's governorship, the process of people programs being financed with state appropriations became a comfortable method by which to address problems. The most dramatic evidence of that would have been Comp ed [compensatory education], when [State Senator Eugene] McAteer and that crowd put together the Comp ed monies, they were in fact using federal government and state general fund monies to directly address a problem at the local level. That was the start of our doing those kinds of things, as far as I remember. And that has continued to the present day, so we have never been without some comfort by legislators in appropriating money at the state level to address the local problem.

Morris: I was thinking of it more in terms of the elasticity of state revenues. When did there begin to be a concern which one hears now that we may not be able to raise enough money to pay for all the kinds of programs that the legislature would like to provide.

Brown: The late seventies. Not until the late 1970s did the attitude reverse itself. We raised taxes in 1971 under Reagan's leadership and it was the most massive tax increase until this time. There had not been ever a tax increase of that nature in my time in state government. So we did not really concern ourselves with the inability of the state to continue to finance all of those local assistance programs, whether they be the community mental health facilities that Lanterman put together and so enriched over the years, whether it be the child health screening and disability prevention program that I put together and financed, whether it be the urban impact aid that I talked about earlier, whether it be the assistance that was given to some of the senior programs in the state. All of those were things that we did and we didn't even concern ourselves with the inability of the state to pay just as we didn't concern ourselves terribly much and didn't listen at all to Reagan's comments when we continued to expand the Medi-Cal benefits.

And we did. Every year we would look for new additions that were not federally funded for the Medi-Cal program. By the time Jerry Brown turned his attention to it in the middle eighties, when we really came face to face with the idea that maybe we can't afford an unlimited amount of money in this category, there were I think thirty-one extra programs. And I think in the room there were thirty-one people. As we talked about what we would cut out and what we would eliminated in the Medi-Cal assistance, there was

an advocate for each one of those programs except one, and that was acupuncture.

We all said, "Hey, that's absolutely perfect. That's the one we will dump." Then Jerry Brown said, "Gentlemen, there is only one I care about." [laughter] And it was acupuncture. So none of the programs could be cut. There was just no hesitancy by any of us. If it seemed as if it was something we ought to do, we did it. We expanded the coverage. We never even thought that there would be a day when we could not afford it.

My guess is that there would not have come a day when we couldn't afford it, believe it or not. If we had never gone in for the indexing, which took lots of money away from the general fund, and if we had never gone in to bail the locals out under Proposition 13, we would not now be facing the budget deficit.

The tax system which we put in place in 1971 was a system designed to grow as the economy of California grew and it would have produced eons of revenue far greater than anything we would have needed now or in the foreseeable future. But when we start giving it away by way of the indexing, when we start giving it away by all the other tax exemptions that we provided, we literally through the tax expenditure process almost reversed the progressivity of the original tax proposal in 1971.

Morris: Is that what they call the law of unexpected consequences?

Brown: I would suspect that that is a good example.

Morris: I would like to come back to this a little bit more when we get to the Revenue and Taxation Committee.

XIV FIRST TRY FOR THE SPEAKERSHIP, 1974

Morris: Trying to proceed in an orderly fashion, we then come to 1974 when Bob Moretti decided to have a try for the governorship and that then led to you making a try for the speakership?

Brown: Yes.

Morris: How did it come about that so many talented people all decided to run for governor in 1974?

Brown: Reagan decided he wasn't going to run for reelection. Every one of those individuals had harbored a dream of being the governor of the state of California. They all jumped in. They assumed that there would not be a quality candidate running on the other side of the aisle. That prompted their great interest. It was post-Watergate, Republicans were in total disarray, and it seemed like such an ideal time for a Democrat to win.

Morris: At the governor's level, is there the kind of mechanism that you hear about at the local level where party bigwigs do some trade-offs and decide who is the best candidate so everybody can back that person?

Brown: No. That doesn't happen. That's the mature way in which it should be done. But that never happens on the Democratic side of the aisle. They flirt with it on the Republican side of the aisle and they succeed sometimes. Sometimes they don't succeed. But on the Democratic side of the aisle they don't even flirt with it. They actually embarrass those of us who would advocate it. If you would advocate it, you would be accused of being the kingmaker, trying to block the process of primaries. It's crazy because you sap resources and literally reduce the chance for your candidate to win in a general election. But that doesn't seem to annoy too many people.

Morris: Did you spend a lot of time on Bob Moretti's campaign for governor?

Brown: I spent hours, days, weeks and months on Bob Moretti's campaign. What we did not do is that we didn't apply the lesson that we learned and the rule that we imposed on Unruh. When Unruh finally announced that he was in fact going to run for governor in 1970, we went to him and informed him that we would vote him out as minority leader if he did not resign. He said, "I was getting ready to resign anyway."

Well, when Moretti said he was going to run, we didn't impose that same rule. Had we imposed that same rule, I would have been elected speaker in 1974. Because in February of 1974 I had the votes. I had all of my good friends, [Henry] Waxman and [Howard] Berman and Ray Gonsalves and Barry Keene, I had them all under my umbrella. But in the several months that elapsed between Moretti's announcement and Moretti's candidacy (which proved to be ill-timed), and his daily loss of influence as the campaign unfolded and his absence--.

Morris: He was trying to be speaker as well as a candidate?

Brown: Correct. All of that combined to make it difficult for me to pursue the speakership. I lost it by one vote.

Morris: That must have been maddening.

Brown: It was. It was.

Black Caucus Defection; Waxman and Berman Maneuvers

Morris: You have had a lot of press over the years so that your campaign for speaker in 1974 has been pretty covered. What happened amongst the Black Caucus, that they didn't stay with you? That seemed to be one of the deciding points.

Brown: That was the deciding point. Our opposition, the conservative wing of the Democratic operation up there [in Sacramento in the legislature], knew that they could not win; they couldn't put the combination together. They would have to break into the liberal side. They did so through political promises. They made the commitment to make a freshman majority leader, Howard Berman, speaker. They made a commitment to give chairmanships to anybody who would vote for them. So they made Barry Keene chair of health, they made the late--. [John Quimby?] from San Bernardino County; [they] made him chairman of Transportation. They made Ray Gonsalves chairman of Education. All of those committees already had incumbent chairmen who were already voting for Willie Brown so

it was easy to give those chairmanships away. If you vote for McCarthy and McCarthy succeeds, you get that chairmanship.

Morris: Who was steering this group?

Brown: Waxman. Henry Waxman.

Morris: I thought he had been part of your votes back in February?

Brown: He was. That offer was never extended to me, and I clearly would not have been able to make that deal because that means I would have to fire folk who already held the chairmanships and who were doing a good job and didn't deserve to be fired.

Morris: With whom you already had allegiances.

Brown: Who had already announced publicly that they were voting for me for speaker. On merit they were voting for me. I was chair of Ways and Means; there was no way they would not be voting for me. And they had been part of the Moretti administration, I had helped select them as the chairmen of those committees. So it was an easy task for Waxman to promise the chairmanship to somebody else.

Henry Waxman, whom we had named as the chair of the Reapportionment Committee, whom we had stuck by in spite of the great criticism from Hispanics that he was looking out only for the West Los Angeles crowd, Henry Waxman whom we had helped elect to the state assembly; plus Howard Berman whom we had defied scripture and helped elect to the state assembly. We would never suspect that after almost fifteen years of friendship, programming together, opposing and defeating a whole lot of conservative Democrats, would they ever be a source of disloyalty. You would never even suspect that.

But even given that source of disloyalty, that still would not add up to a sufficient number of votes to defeat me. There had to be a black component.

Morris: That's very disloyal. What was that all about?

Brown: The black component?

Morris: Right.

Brown: Simple. My roommate and best friend, [Leon Ralph], the man scheduled to nominate me, unbeknownst to me, wanted desperately to be chair of the Rules Committee immediately. He could not be chair of the Rules Committee immediately because Burton was the

chair of the Rules Committee. Burton intended to go to Congress
--.

Morris: John, too? Yes.

Brown: So he would have been chair of the Rules Committee as soon as Burton was out of there, which was six to eight months later. But when offered the chairmanship immediately of the Rules Committee, he double-crossed me and never told me. He did it on the morning of the vote. He walked into the room scheduled to nominate me, was offered the chairmanship of the Rules Committee--.

Morris: On the way into the room?

Brown: --and sat on his hands and never nominated me. With that, [John] Knox stepped in as a pinch-hit nominator because he is talented enough and nominated me. But at that stage of the game we knew that it was over. We still had one outside shot because it was a one-vote decision. [Ken] Cory had not publicly committed, but we had not solicited Cory either because we always thought his price was too high. It was too late for us to then try and make a deal with Cory. Cory was going to run for the controller for the state of California at that stage of the game.

Morris: And he wanted your backing for controller?

Brown: No, no. We don't know what his price would have been but we knew that in the early days, his prices had always been too high. So we had just isolated him and never dealt with him. That was a mistake as well, because we should have been about taking out insurance against the possibility of a double-cross. But when you think the double-cross could only come from the liberals and not from your soulmates from the Jewish community or your brothers from the black community and you were not looking at either one of those areas for a possible defector, nothing comes as a greater shock than to have--. It's like your mother not voting for you.

Morris: Had you and the roommate discussed his ambitions for the Rules Committee?

Brown: No, no. The wonderful thing about my speakership campaign then was that it was such a foregone conclusion that no one even asked what their assignments would be. The assumption would be that since I had operated so beautifully as chair of Ways and Means, I had always made sure that the proper bases were touched, the Moretti machine had been so efficient and effective at appointing people and taking care of people, you would just automatically assume that they would continue to exist, that it would never sunset.

But you never know how greed and ego and ambition could cause people to make assumptions. The assumptions that were made and sold to my buddy, Leon Ralph, were very simple. They simply said, "Leon, if Willie Brown is the speaker, there can only be one black chief. He cannot name any other black to any important position. You blacks are better off if you take the chair of Rules, if Julian Dixon takes the caucus chair and John Miller takes the chair of the Judiciary Committee, that's more blacks in the leadership. Although you don't have the speakership, that's more important for the black community and it's more important for you personally because, believe me, Willie Brown's standards are so much higher than what you would ever be able to meet, he'll never seriously move you up in his administration. He will always look to the most competent and talented person."

Morris: And you guys are not that talented?

Brown: That's the conclusion you would have to reach. That's the conclusion you would have to come to in order to buy that argument. But that is the argument that was bought.

Morris: Didn't John Miller also make an eleventh-hour move for the speakership?

Brown: No, no. That was 1971 when he made his move. But because he reneged on his commitment to us, we squelched Miller and never had anything else to do with Miller. So Miller had a legitimate beef with me. [Phone interruption] We had not done anything for Miller. He had become a back-bencher in our administration because he had double-crossed us. We had consigned him to the scrap heap. He had been waiting for years to get even, so we didn't even ask Miller to vote for me. There was no reason to. He announced to the world that he was for the other guy and that he was going to nominate the other guy.

Morris: So you knew there was going to be a split in the black caucus?

Brown: Right. Miller. All the other persons were either publicly committed or so close to us that there was no need to solicit their commitment. It would be like me saying I'm going to run for mayor; I would not assume my son is for Frank Jordan.¹ There is no reason we would even ask him. I should go and assign him a job of getting his friends to vote for me.

Morris: You hadn't read ancient Celtic and Greek lore.

¹At the time of this interview, Frank Jordan was running for mayor of San Francisco, to which he was elected.

Brown: I obviously had not.

Morris: Those guys were forever doing in their brothers and uncles.

Brown: Yes, but I didn't remember that.

Morris: I'm sorry. That's unkind of me to mention it.

Brown: No, it is not. It was accurate. I learned though. Let me tell you. You don't have to run it by me but once.

The Berman Brothers; 1971 Reapportionment

Morris: Why was it against scripture for you and the Moretti folks to back Berman for the assembly back in 1972?

Brown: Why?

Morris: I thought you said you had defied scripture in helping Howard Berman get elected?

Brown: Because there were nine people in the race. They were all nine good-quality liberals. They were all Jews.

Morris: In one assembly district?

Brown: For one assembly district.

Morris: Good gracious.

Brown: There were nine of them. They were all good people. They were all quality people, really quality people. When you have a contest like that, you always have three or four friends. There wasn't any reason to take one over another because any one of them would be a good colleague if he got elected.

Morris: And if you back one, you will make enemies of all the others.

Brown: If you decide to help just one. If you go in there, you became a heavyweight. And they are all about equal in their abilities, so it is going to be who the voters like. If we come in there with this huge infusion of money and resources, we skew the scale to one person. We did that on Howard Berman's behalf.

Morris: Why?

Brown: Because Burton and Brown knew Waxman well. Waxman had always been our guy whom we sent to the back room to count the votes. He would always come out with the right count no matter what the ballots that were cast. So he was a trusted lieutenant and if he made a request of us, it was like me making a request to John Burton. There just wouldn't be any hesitancy. He wouldn't question whether or not he'd do it. He'd do it because it was the right thing to do and it is comradeship. That's why we went for Howard Berman. You just assumed that Howard Berman would kill himself to help Willie Brown.

Morris: Had Mr. Waxman and Mr. Berman already developed the campaign skills that have since been marketed around the state?

Brown: No. That all started with us. We gave Michael Berman, the little brother, his first real reapportionment job. He learned reapportionment in 1971 and that's when we controlled him. We had Henry Waxman as our reapportionment chairman. That was a Brown-Burton selection. Moretti didn't know Henry Waxman from Adam. We told Moretti that this was the best guy to draw the lines. Then of course, we staffed it with Rudy Nothenburg from our office here in San Francisco and their little brother Michael, who was considered to be kind of a wizard in mathematics. That's how all this started.

Morris: Okay. Because by then we were into the wonders of the computer age?

Brown: We were on the threshold. Computers were not there yet. When the reapportionment plan was done in 1971 and 1972, they were still doing it mechanically.

Morris: Was it computers that made the little brother a good choice?

Brown: No. He was just a smart kid. He was like Rudy. They were really smart guys; they would work twenty-four hours a day; they didn't need bread or water on which to exist. [laughter]

Morris: How did they get along with Phil Burton?

Brown: They were under Phil Burton's leadership. Phil was the leader.

Morris: Did they learn from Phil?

Brown: Absolutely. They learned everything they know from Phil.

Morris: He didn't do it all himself in the 1970s? He needed some help.

Brown: He gave them directions and told them what to look for and how to look for it. They had some ideas about voting trends and all that business because they had been involved in trying to run the elections, and we had been successful in some of them. But it was not the science that it is today. The Bermans hadn't yet put together their dictionary, i.e., their Jewish surname dictionary, their Italian surname dictionary, their Asian dictionary, their Armenian dictionary. They had not done all that. That's a process that has evolved over the last fifteen to twenty years. All that was not in place when we were doing this. When I was first defeated for speaker, none of that was in place.

Morris: Amazing technological advances.

Brown: Absolutely.

Banishing of Willie Brown

Morris: The reports are that after losing the speakership in 1974, it took a while for you and Leo McCarthy to come back to speaking terms. Had you been particularly aware of what he was doing since he is also a San Francisco boy?

Brown: Leo McCarthy had always been our opposition. In San Francisco, he had been our opposition. We defeated Leo McCarthy in a state senate fight with Moscone. Moscone won it and we supported Moscone. Leo then ran for the board of supervisors and got elected. He was always our opposition for the county committee chairmanships and things of that nature. He was always with the Irish Catholic, old boys, conservative Democratic crowd.

So when McCarthy defeated me for speaker, there was no love lost. But when I learned that we didn't have the votes, I supported him.

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Morris: That was very nice of you.

Brown: Absolutely. Not only that. I held a press conference and informed the press that McCarthy had won the nomination of the caucus and that I would be supporting his candidacy. There was no speakership open.

Moretti ran for governor and he lost the nomination. The day after he lost the nomination, there was a motion made to

vacate the chair. One Ed Z'berg from Sacramento moved to vacate the chair. Now, Moretti lost his nerve at that stage. The Republicans would not have voted to vacate the chair. There were not forty-one Democrats ready to throw Moretti out. But Moretti was so humiliated and so embarrassed and his expectations had been so high, he had really lost that marvelous ability to strategize that had characterized his speakership. He was just a shattered man.

Morris: Really? Because of losing the primary?

Brown: Yes. Losing the primary so badly. So when they stood up on the floor without warning and moved to vacate the chair on Moretti, he recessed the house over my objections. I said, "No way. Force them to a vote." I'm a great believer that if you know that they don't have the numbers and that they are bluffing, and we immediately check with our Republican friends, and Moretti was very close to Priolo and Beverly and Maddy--he was very close to that whole crowd--they would not have thrown Moretti out. Moretti however yielded and went to a caucus. In the caucus, Moretti got up and said that he intended to resign in two weeks anyway so there isn't a reason to pursue this motion. I said, "Moretti, don't do that because if you say you are going to resign within two weeks, that's not time for us to put together the votes with the Republicans for a bipartisan speakership. We'll be locked into this crazy business of Democrats only. We obviously are not in a position at this moment to do anything about it. Don't do it."

Morris: For my sake, Willie Brown's sake?

Brown: But he had lost his nerve. He had just lost his nerve. We did not know even at that stage of the game that I was right. Leon Ralph was with me telling Moretti not to do it. At that stage he hadn't been bought off. So Moretti counted over the ten days or so that elapsed between that historical caucus and the date scheduled for the vote and we continued to believe that we had just barely enough to hold on and that I would be elected to the speakership. Then of course, the number came about that that was not the case.

Following that, I made the announcement that McCarthy would be elected to the speakership and that Moretti would be stepping down and that I would be supporting McCarthy's candidacy. I sought out from McCarthy the commitment that the Ways and Means chairmanship would be passed on to John Foran, his law partner, also from San Francisco, and Foran was a competent person. I left membership on the Ways and Means Committee so that there would be no interference or assumed interference by me in the process.

McCarthy I think considered naming me chair of the Social Welfare Committee. Then his people wouldn't even let him do that. They were really mean: the Boatwrights, the Lou Papan and that crowd and the John Millers so hated me--.

Morris: This is still the old San Francisco conservative Democrat crowd?

Brown: No. Beyond that.

Morris: This is spread out into the--.

Brown: McCarthy understood that he couldn't and shouldn't dump all over Willie Brown because just as Willie Brown lost the opportunity, he was offending enough people by terminating people to pay his debts that somewhere down the line may become a majority and Willie Brown might be back. But his people around him wouldn't let him do that. They really pressed him to isolate me.

Morris: I understand Miller carrying a grudge, if you want to define it that way. How about Boatwright and Papan?

Brown: Well, Papan was just Leo McCarthy's clone so that was an enemy on the natural. We had supported someone against him in the primary.

Morris: In the district?

Brown: In his district. Yes. I had supported a Burton candidate actually, not my candidate. It was a John Burton candidate. I don't remember the guy's name but he was obviously a stiff because he didn't win. So that made an enemy out of Papan.

I had insulted Boatwright at some point, so Boatwright says, in some thing I did in the Ways and Means Committee. I don't know what I did, but I did something. At any rate, Boatwright wasn't ready to forgive me for that. There had also been a fistfight early in the year between Lou Papan and Ken Meade. Ken Meade was a Willie Brown supporter. Lou Papan had busted Ken Meade's eye, and we had to carry Ken Meade to the hospital on a stretcher and all that business. So there had been some real bad blood between the McCarthyites and the Brownites and that spilled over into banishment of Willie Brown.

So they took my office, they took my committee memberships, all of them. They took my staff and they consigned me to the smallest office that they could find.

Morris: On the fourth floor?

Brown: No. I don't remember which floor. I think it was maybe the third floor. But it was a staff office. They didn't even give me a member's office and the office was so small that there was only room in the front part of the office for the secretary and her desk. No visitor chairs. The visitor chairs had to be set in the hallway. So if you came to see me, you had to sit in the hallway. That's how they tried to humiliate me. Did not even bother me. I never complained. I never blinked an eye. I went back to San Francisco to practice law and I only came to the capital on the days when we were on the floor, or the days on which I was eventually assigned to some committee memberships.

Morris: You're saying that Leo did not take command of his own speakership. If Leo didn't bear you a grudge--.

Brown: I think he bore me a grudge but I don't think he would have been stupid enough to be as vindictive as he was towards Willie Brown and Willie Brown supporters.

Morris: But what you are saying is that Leo's lieutenants prevailed over Leo's instincts.

Brown: Encouraged. I've just got to believe that Leo was wanting to do something in the future politically. Knowing how cautious he is, I don't believe that he would have naturally banished a Willie Brown to the scrap heap knowing that I had a life expectancy politically in perpetuity. [laughter] And if he was ultimately going to be something in this state, it didn't make any sense to make a permanent enemy out of me.

Return Via the Revenue and Taxation Committee

Brown: They consigned me to the scrap heap and it didn't bother me too much. But there was one person who actually asked for me to serve on his committee after a couple of conversations. It was Dan Boatwright.

Morris: Really?

Brown: He brought me onto his committee. He brought me onto Rev and Tax.

Morris: Now what do you suppose led to his change of heart?

Brown: I really don't know. It may be that he discovered that I had not insulted him in the way in which he thought I insulted him. The insult turned out to have been a bill that I killed. He thought

he had the votes, and in those days you didn't have roll calls. He thought I had been arbitrary. He subsequently discovered, however, that many members will tell the authors of the bill they are for it, but they quietly tell me, "Don't you let this bill out of committee." He discovered that I had really been true to what I should have been as chairman and that's protecting the word of any member who gave me his word privately. I think he must have discovered that some place. He certainly determined that it was not malice to Boatwright from Brown that prompted Brown's conduct.

He came out of the Richmond community. He was very close to all of my black friends in Richmond and I think he wanted to somewhat make amends with them as well. That's my speculation. I never had any personal knowledge but I can tell you the pattern would be that. I struck up a friendship with Boatwright. I ultimately ended up representing Boatwright as Boatwright's lawyer.

Morris: Really?

Brown: I was Boatwright's lawyer for many years in several of his transactions. At any rate, Boatwright apparently put in a word and I got onto Rev and Tax. I didn't even want to be on Rev and Tax but it was the only decent committee that meets on Monday and I was only in the capitol on Monday and Thursday. I was not in the capitol any other time. So it didn't make any sense to assign me to any other committee.

Morris: Okay. So your celebrated speedy trips from Sacramento to San Francisco were not five days a week.

Brown: Two days a week. Mondays and Thursdays. I would go up early Monday morning. I would come back Monday afternoon. I would either go up late Wednesday afternoon or early Thursday morning, and I was back here by noon on Thursday. I wasn't even there to vote on Thursday. I would just put my key in and leave. I would make roll call and leave. Then I practiced law full-time.

XV RELATIONS WITH THE MEDIA AND THE PEOPLE

Maintaining a Law Practice

Morris: Did the fact that you were in the assembly and in and out of very visible positions affect what kinds of clients came to you for legal advice?

Brown: No. I have never had clients connected with the legislature at all. I have never had the opportunity, frankly, to represent insurance companies and to represent banks and to represent S and L's [savings and loan companies]. I have never done any of that. I have never represented trade associations. I've always had the same basic kind of clientele. They were people who were based in San Francisco doing business in and about San Francisco with both government and non-government. That's all I've ever represented. That's been consistent throughout the thirty-plus years of my law practice.

So my law practice didn't change. It's just that I did more court work. I actually tried drunk driving cases. I actually tried divorce cases. I tried criminal defense cases involving controlled substances. I made appearances before boards and agencies for licensing here in the city. I represented people who had problems with the police department for dance permits. I did all those kinds of things. You can only do those if you are actually here because those hearings occur on days that the legislature meets.

Morris: And you have to sit around a lot--.

Brown: And wait to be heard. That's right. And you have to go in on Monday morning and--.

Morris: --to get continued.

Brown: Yes, and get your case announced. The courts were very cooperative. Every judge knew me personally and most of them liked me, so they were really accommodating. They knew that some of my criminal clients would come in on Monday morning, and the judge would say, "Mr. Brown is your lawyer?" "Yes." "Mr. Brown's day in court is tomorrow." [chuckling] And they would continue it without my being there. They don't do that kind of stuff any more.

But they used to continue my matters without me being there. And I practiced all over northern California. I would go as far down as Monterey to represent people. I would go as far in the valley as Modesto or actually Fresno to represent people. I would go as far as Chico to represent people, up in Butte County, Marin County, Santa Rosa. So I went all over. Judges became knowledgeable, kind of, about my whereabouts. Like, for example, if I had to be in Santa Rosa on Tuesday, I would try to make it Tuesday morning in Santa Rosa. Then I would have my office call the courts in San Francisco and say, "He's in Santa Rosa this morning. He can be there at two o'clock." And they would continue my matter at two o'clock in the afternoon. So I had really great cooperation from the court system for my appearances. And it was good.

Including the federal court. I tried federal court cases. I represented the then Oakland Raiders. I represented Nate Thurman and the [Golden State] Warriors. I represented a lot of people.

Morris: Really.

Brown: Yes, I had a good clientele.

Morris: That must have been kind of fun.

Brown: It was.

Morris: Some major groups there.

Brown: I even went to Japan and tried a case for three weeks, with Cecil Poole. We went over to Japan and tried a heroin smuggling case.

Morris: In the Japanese courts?

Brown: No, it was actually under the military. We had these persons who had been accused by the military of doing it.

Morris: People in the service?

Brown: Yes.

Morris: So you were trying somebody in a military court?

Brown: In a military setting.

Morris: You were representing somebody in a military court.

Brown: In a military setting, right.

Morris: Is that unusual? I thought usually you were represented by somebody from the judge advocate's--?

Brown: No. You have your choice. You can have a private counselor or you can have someone else represent you. But because this was civilly related--.

Morris: Getting to know all the judges in northern California must be a useful ear to the ground of what's going on in all those different counties.

Brown: Oh, yes. And they loved to have me come in. They loved to have me drop by. They would always invite me for coffee. They would interrupt the proceedings to take my matters, so I really had a good working relationship with most of the judges and most of the benches. They served me well. They never cut any corners and did any rulings but they were courteous enough and cooperative enough. My guess is that they treated other lawyers similarly. It just wasn't the same formalized, rigid distant process that it is today.

Morris: Well, you would get to know what's going on in the courts too.

Brown: You get to know what's going on in the courts too. And the judges were connected. In the political world they were really connected folk. You would go into Fresno and you would end up spending the morning in the chambers. They would call the other judges down to visit with you. It was kind of fun.

Morris: Did those turn out to be useful as contacts and information later on?

Brown: No, it turned out to be more useful for them. Even to this day, there are judges who call me directly about matters pending in the legislature and about their retirement benefits and about court proceedings. That's why, if you go through my record, you will see that I carried legislation to reform the court system. That came because of my close working relationship with judges. I carried the trial court speedup measure. I carried the experiment

measure. I carried the judge's salaries bills, all caused by my long history being a practicing lawyer who happened to have been a legislator.

Morris: Or who happened to still be a legislator. It was part of his attention.

Brown: Correct.

Morris: You took some flak in the press about representing businesses who wanted permits or had other matters before city and county boards.

Brown: Yes, they wanted to change the rules. The press wanted desperately to figure out how to change the rules. It all started with an organization called the Bay Guardian. They say that the rules ought to be that I as a state elected official can't appear before local boards and commissions. That is not the law, it never has been the law, and it never will be the law. Unless, of course, you change the method of compensation and redefine the duties of state elected officials. Just like local elected officials who happen to be lawyers, like Quentin Kopp, can, and when he was a member of the board of supervisors did with regularity represent folk before state boards and agencies because there is no disability from that.

But the press wanted so desperately to impact upon me and who Willie Brown happens to be that they've always had that standard and they have always tried to make it such that locals would somehow defer to Brown because of his stature. When in effect locals require more of Brown and more of Brown's clients. I have to literally tell my clients, "Listen, you've got a problem. If I am going to represent you, you better understand that it is going to be in the newspaper and that if you were going to get any kind of a break, you probably are not now because no local judge is going to take the hit for having given a favor to somebody who was represented by Willie Brown. So if that's a problem you ought to hire somebody else."

Morris: Do you divide up the chores with your law partners on that basis, that somebody else might represent this client better--?

Brown: I don't have any law partners.

Morris: You are a sole practitioner?

Brown: As of 1977, I became a sole practitioner. When Proposition 9 [June 1974] went into effect, you began to have different standards for what is a conflict of interest. You can accidentally end up with a conflict of interest, something you

have no knowledge of, because your partners may be representing somebody and you never know who your partners are representing, like your partners never will know whom you are representing. You produce a share of the income, they produce a share of the income, you share the bills--.

Morris: You share the income.

Brown: Yes, it goes into a pot. Seldom if ever do you sit around in a room and discuss every case and every nuance of every case. Only if it is a real complicated one and you are looking for help. Otherwise everybody carries his own files. I have no clue what's in his files. So with that in mind, you run the distinct risk of an inadvertent conflict that could be terribly embarrassing if you don't stay on top of it. The only way to stay on top of it is don't do it at all.

So I became a sole practitioner. I own the lease on this place; all these people in this office rent from me. They are my tenants. I have absolutely nothing to do with their practice. Whatever clients they have, I don't even know who their clients are. I am not interested in knowing who their clients are. If I have a client that I want to associate them on, I hire them to participate with me, but it is my client and I know everything that is being done on behalf of that client. I collect the money and I pay them so that if there is any heat to be taken, any mistake to be made, I made it. It is not inadvertent; it didn't come by accident. So I try to take the responsibility as well as the benefits derivative therefrom.

I do that with all of my law situations. I regularly refer cases out of the office completely. If I think there is any hint of a possible conflict with my state duties, I refer the case out. I do so in writing so there is no question.

Morris: There is a paper trail.

Brown: Yes. I still get criticized.

Morris: Because you are a public figure, the rules of libel are different for you than they are for me.

Brown: Totally.

Observations on the Press; Quality of Information

Morris: The business of the press coverage is really interesting because you were named by the press the outstanding freshman legislator back in 1965. They loved you then but there seems to have developed some tensions in your relationship with the press. What's happened in the nature of the media coverage?

Brown: I invariably challenge everybody. If I think you are wrong, I tell you you're wrong. And I tell you at the top of my voice from the highest peak in the world. I do not tell you subtly; I do not tell you quietly and I tell you sometimes in terms that are considered derogatory and sometimes even personally insulting. You don't forget that and you jump at the opportunity to return the favor. That escalates sometimes.

Then there are others in the press who are really stupid. There is nothing that offends me more than stupidity. If you are in a press situation where there are thirty of your colleagues and you ask me a stupid question, I will characterize it as a stupid question, tell you why, tell you why you don't know your facts, and what you ought to do is read the damn bill and then ask your questions. There is no reason for me to humiliate people like that but, you know, what the hell? You only live once.

That has developed a trail of detractors who are just waiting. And then there has been a change in the journalistic standards since Woodward and Bernstein.¹ There is now the unidentified source and there is now the rat-pack-journalism type activity. There are now the persecutorial journalistic types who assume rules and regulations of what the standards ought to be and want to hold you to compliance with those bogus standards.

There is an incredible wealth of material for journalists to write about concerning people who hold public office. In the old days, there was no requirement that you reveal who contributed to you. In the old days, there was no requirement for you to reveal what you did with the money that was contributed to you. There were no prohibitions against personal use. There was no requirement that you reveal who your clients are and what you earned per year and what you owned. All of that new information has changed the nature of a journalist's attitude about elected officials. They look now to try and tie any of those factors to

¹Washington Post reporters Robert Woodward and Carl Bernstein collaborated on numerous articles detailing the 1972 Democratic party office break-in and subsequent Watergate scandals.

your duties. If you vote for things that affect lawyers, they go and see if lawyers made contributions to you. If they did, they make the jump from the contributions to your performance. They refuse to believe that you had the attitude that you exhibited by that performance long before anyone gave you any contribution. They would rather take the cynical tack.

When it is pointed out to them that that is what they are doing and how it is just as logical to do it the other way, then you are a smart aleck. They will then begin the watch. The watch is to wait for an opportunity to ding. That is a part of my relationship with the press.

The second part of my relationship with the press is one of my duties as speaker. I am the spokesperson and the heat taker for the house. Decisions that individual members make--. For an example, if a member comes to me and says, "You've got to get me off of this committee. I want to run for x and on this committee I will have to vote against my best interests for that candidacy. So you've got to take me off the committee. But the constituency that wanted me to go on the committee is going to be mad if it is known that I asked you to take me off. So just take me off."

Morris: So you have to throw them off with a big flash?

Brown: I have to throw them off; not with a big flash, I just remove them from the committee. They then say, when they're asked why they were removed, "I have no idea. It's the speaker's choice. The speaker makes the assignments." When they come to me, I have to keep--.

Morris: Mum on it.

Brown: --mum on it. I have to say, "We're reorganizing," or, "It's a better delivery system." They know I'm bullshitting. So they say that I threw him off because he was voting differently from what I wanted him to vote, because that's what his sponsors would say when he tells them, "I don't know why he threw me off. I was there to vote and he replaced me with somebody who's voting differently." Then the sponsors proceed to ding me for having done that. That becomes cumulative.

Common Cause will come in with some cockamamie idea about who ought to do what to whom and I will tell them to go jump in a lake. They would not accept my philosophical views when I met with them on the issue. They will try to maintain that because they consider themselves right and me wrong, they are moral and I'm immoral and they try to figure out some reason why I'm immoral. I'm immoral because I accept the contributions. So I

become the hate object of that crowd. They are the favorites of the press because the press loves anybody who will ding us. And they get good press. Part of my official duty was to say no to that cockamamie idea because it would adversely affect the membership. Then I have to take the heat.

Then, in addition thereto, I do generate tremendous campaign contributions, probably five, six, seven, ten times greater than any other member. But every other speaker has done and had the same privileges. It's just now that is more visible.

Morris: More so than the caucus chairs?

Brown: The caucus never raises the money. It's the speaker who has to get reelected to the speakership, so he is not about to allow the caucus chairman to do that because the caucus chairman may be his opponent. So why would the speaker transfer that responsibility to the caucus chair. It would be dumb to do that. You are building in the seeds of your own destruction if you do that. So you don't do that. You don't do that. It's just illogical to assume that that would happen. There is no caucus chairman whom you would ever trust that much, particularly after the bad experiences we had with loyalty.

Collecting all those contributions obviously leads to potential criticism for when you cast your votes or when you intercede on behalf of a policy issue, you can legitimately be accused. They write those great stories. I get angry when they write those stories because I know they are not true. There are just as many people on the opposite sides and on the losing side of the issue who contributed, because everybody contributes to the speaker. But when you read it in the press, you would think only one collection of characters are contributing. Those are the characters who won. That's bullshit. When the trial lawyers win, they have their part of the group that contributed, but the doctors lost. The doctors equal the trial lawyers in contributions.

Morris: That's a very interesting point.

Brown: And people never know that because the press never prints it. I get pissed. I said, "Hey, if you are going to print the contributions I got from the winners, simultaneously print the contributions I got from the losers." They say, "But the losers didn't have any influence over you. Their contributions didn't work." I say, "Oh. So if the trial lawyers had lost, you would say the doctors bought it. If the trial lawyers win, you say the trial lawyers bought it. That's illogical. If monies have an influence and it's the same amount of money, then there must have

been some other factor that prompted the decision to go with the trial lawyers." But they don't print it that way. And they do it with reference to the entire membership. So I have a running battle with them on that score.

Finally there are some genuine right-wing conservative reporters whose agenda it is to eliminate liberals. They reflect that in their writings and their editorials.

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Brown: You talked about how I was rated in my early years. I'm still rated at the same level by the press today. On any scale of evaluating members of the legislature, if you go back and take a look, the only place they ding me is on integrity. They still say there is nobody brighter, nobody who works harder, nobody more sensitive, nobody more comprehensive, no one more dedicated and no one more effective. But they then say, "We question his motives."

Morris: What about the aspect of the press as conveyers of information to the public, the voters?

Brown: They will not assume any responsibility for that. I maintain that the press is the fourth branch of government. They are unelected but they have just as much influence as any person voting on the floor of the legislature. Members invariably will say to me, "How will this play in the press? What will the L.A. Times say about it? What did the Chronicle say about it?" They are concerned about how it is played. The press knows that and the press uses it to the hilt. The press will repeat for days, print one story after another, one angle after another, on something they are really interested in. Then as soon as it is done, they then take credit for having influenced it. But when you say to them, coupled with that awesome power is a responsibility to print the truth, there is a responsibility to be objective, there is a responsibility to be balanced, they bridle at my invading their First Amendment prerogatives that they jealously guard.

You don't get factual reporting any more. They don't even make a pretense that it is factual. They write news analysis for straight reporting. That is doing a disservice to this democracy. This democracy survives and has to survive on the basis of the quality of information and the accuracy of that information. Otherwise, good decisions can't be made. But that is not happening.

I'm telling you, twenty-five or thirty or forty years ago, when there was competition among the news sources and the news-gathering sources and the news-delivering sources, that

competition kept them honest. One newspaper would point out the inaccuracies and the opinions and the stupidity of their fellow newspapers. There were major wars between the newspapers in any given city and there were always three or four of those newspapers out there. They spent a lot of time dinging each other.

Morris: Right. There is the L.A. Times, the Oakland Tribune and the San Francisco Chronicle.

Brown: They fought each other.

Morris: They were the kingmakers in the forties.

Brown: Yes. And they really fought each other. If one printed a story that was not truthful, the other delighted in pointing out the inaccuracies. You don't get that any more. It's almost a rewrite. They are all almost as if they were one newspaper. They, the editorial boards, allegedly have not pooled their news reporting sources but they have pooled their commercial side. I maintain that the commercial side now drives what happens with the news.

I challenged them once when I carried a bill involving mandatory seat belts. It was opposed by the auto manufacturers, the auto dealers. The newspapers wrote editorials against my seat-belt bill. I said those newspapers were getting their inspiration off of the ads. Because if you take a look, there are a million dollars' worth of ads every day for the sale of automobiles. It shouldn't surprise anybody that on the editorial page they would take the position of the car dealers.

They went nuts. "The editorial page has nothing to do with the commercial side. They don't even talk to each other," they said. I said, "Then why would you say to me that because auto dealers gave me a million bucks, I am voting with the auto dealers and that there is a direct connection? Yet you get a million dollars a day from the auto dealers and you are telling me there is no connection. I am willing to accept your word but henceforth, goddammit, you accept mine." Not to this day have they forgiven me for that challenge.

I do it regularly with them now. I question the editorial policy and how it relates to the contents of the ad page. And apparently it's beginning to reveal itself in terms of my accuracy. There are some reporters who are beginning to say that they get a call from their editor saying, "Listen, I got a call from Macy's who buys a page every time. They are concerned about your position on retail credit." We had a bill in the legislature this last session on that.

I said to one of my reporter friends, "You guys are missing a great trick. There is a bill moving through the legislature that will increase credit card rates above 19 percent when in fact prime rate is below nine. Don't you think we ought to carry a little bill that will restrict them to what the feds are now restricting them to? If you guys get a newspaper thing going, I think we can do that." One of my guys came back and he said, "Listen, we talked to our people about that and they say that's a problem because all of those stores that you are talking about advertise with us, but they make a fairly good case of why credit won't be available unless the interest rates are high and they can cover all their losses and what have you." I said, "That's a conflict." "Yes, it is, probably. But we can't really do it."

So I got no editorial support on trying to kill the bill that took the lid off the interest rates at the state level. You as the public don't even know we did that. We did that at this last session. We took the lid off. That could go up to 25 [percent].

Well, California retailers got that done and the newspapers stayed silent. That should have been a major campaign.

Morris: The days of the muckraking crusading newspapers are over.

Brown: Over.

Morris: Yet, this morning's paper has, I thought, a very nice article, brief and to the point about a Willie Brown-backed health initiative.¹

Brown: Yes, that was yesterday when I made a speech in Los Angeles. I made a good speech, and this guy happened to be a fairly decent reporter. But I'm telling you, there won't be any editorial policy following that. They will not now follow up every day and begin to help lead a campaign that would persuade my membership to vote in that direction. They won't do that.

Morris: Do you have any sense that the media picks and chooses? Some papers are for better transportation and others are for better--.

Brown: No, it is usually based on whether or not there are ad buyers.

¹"Willie Brown Backs Health Initiative," Sabin Russell, San Francisco Chronicle, November 16, 1991, A16.

Speechmaking, Image; Friendships with Herb Caen and Wilkes
Bashford

Morris: Right. But you do a healthy schedule of speechmaking.

Brown: Oh, sure.

Morris: To get the word out to the media and to the public about policy issues?

Brown: To everybody. I believe that if I'm given an opportunity to chat with you, you will become a permanent admirer or at worst you will respect Willie Brown, and you certainly will not let the mythical Willie Brown invade your judgment and control your judgment about who he is. That's why I will go everywhere every chance I get to make every public appearance I can. It has been basically the cornerstone of my success as speaker. I would have long since been out as speaker if my membership believed all the stuff that has been written about me in the newspapers. My membership knows that 98 percent of that stuff is either wrong or not relevant. My membership knows that the cars and the clothes have nothing to do with the quality of my work. So they don't even pay any attention to that. Most people think, "Well, doesn't that offend them?" Newspaper guys: "Don't you think that's the wrong image." I say, "What are you talking about. Image? Give me a break. There is nobody who can lead the house like Brown and they will tell you that. Image? We're not concerned about Willie Brown's image."

Morris: By and large, my observation of the people in the legislature is that they are quite well turned out.

Brown: More of them want to be like Willie Brown. They want to be like Willie Brown. They would like to be as well-dressed as Willie Brown. They make an effort. They really make an effort. Very few people come in there without their shoes shined, without their shirts laundered. Very few come in with stains on their ties because it's not just Willie Brown who points out there are stains on their tie. Everybody in the room is checking it.

Morris: Even Tom Bates has given up wearing plaid sport shirts to the assembly and he wears a suit now and then.

Brown: He wears a suit and a tie. Absolutely. And he looks decent. He asks me, "How do I look?"

Morris: Does he? [laughter]

Brown: Absolutely.

Morris: While we were here, I wanted to ask, because your readers are going to want to know, about Wilkes Bashford and Herb Caen, speaking of the media and how one dresses.

Brown: Let's take Herb first. Herb is an old, dear and trusted friend. I think Herb adopted me somewhere in the sixties. He decided that I was his kind of person first and, secondly, his kind of elected official. That has never varied. He criticizes me; he takes me on when he thinks I'm wrong; he treats me not with friendship or deference, if there is something I ought to be shot at for. He praises me, he laughs with me, he enjoys me and we talk to each other four or five times a week. We see each other probably over the year on an average of once a week, if not twice a week. He is intimately involved with my public celebrations. He attends every one; he sometimes MCs them. I am intimately involved in all of his birthday parties and all those kinds of events. We go to baseball games together, football games together, and we do charity stuff together. Like, in two weeks, we are going to co-MC Moe's Kitchen; that's the Cecil Williams food program.

We do lots of things personally together. We always spend New Year's together in Paris. We love clothing, we love music and we share those respective kinds of things. We love good food, great conversation and a good joke. We invariably call each other up. I get the funny stuff in his column before you get it because he calls to tell me. He calls to tell me, "Listen, let me tell you what just occurred." Or he calls to read something to me or he sends me a copy of something somebody sent him, a clipping of something somebody sent him. I likewise call him up and tell him the stuff I heard that is funny and the stuff that I heard that is about to break or some insider gossip. I call him up and deliver that information.

So we have a good working friendship. We have a personal friendship. I think we generally like each other. And we'll call each other up to say, "I'll go if you go. I'm not going to go if you don't go." To an event, because it's going to be boring. We'll say up front it's going to really boring. But if we're there we end up talking about everybody.

Morris: And because you're there you add a little liveliness to the event.

Brown: That's right. Last Saturday night, for example, we were blackjack dealers at a charity event for the Jewish Community Center, and it was a riot. Then Wilkes became a friend of ours because we both ended up shopping in his store. We became acquainted with him by virtue of that relationship. We found him interesting enough to

talk to. He found us interesting enough. That friendship ensued and it has continued to the present day.

Morris: Was Mr. Bashford something different in gentleman's clothing in San Francisco?

Brown: Radically different. It was classic with a unique flair and an attention to detail, fabric, and well-coordinated. He was in a little dinky place in the parking garage on Sutter Street when we discovered him.

Morris: Right next to where the World Affairs Center is now?

Brown: Correct. Exactly. Right. He had only that first little store. He didn't have where you come out of that walkway. He had that first little space and that's all he had. It was just himself and one other guy. He farmed out his tailoring, et cetera.

Morris: How did you happen to find him?

Brown: We used to wander around town twice a week. I would meet Herb for lunch and we would walk and we would look at the town. We lunch in different places, just the two of us. We would lunch at the St. Francis [Hotel] one time; we would lunch at Bardelli's the next time. We would lunch at Sam's the next time. We would lunch at the French Room. We would just go to different places.

Morris: The old reliables.

Brown: Yes, absolutely. Then sometimes we would venture out and we would do some experimenting, but we decided we didn't want to be driving to different locales because he had to get back to work. We would do those on weekends. Then we would do nightlife together. In the process of wandering around--we were both into clothing, and I mean heavy into clothing. [phone interruption]

Morris: You said that Herb Caen decided that you were his kind of politician. That suggests that Herb Caen has a great interest in politics and government.

Brown: Very keen. Full time. He could have very easily been a political columnist. He is very opinionated, really liberal, aggressive. Some of the great columns that Caen has written--. If you go back to the middle seventies, you'll see his anti-war columns, his pro-civil rights columns. He would do a whole column on the subject matter. Those were some of his finest moments, where he genuinely expressed himself politically. It was well-thought-out and well-framed. That has continued to this day. He talks about politics every day, every time I talk to him.

We would make bets on elections. We've got a bet right now. He's got Jordan and I've got [then Mayor Art] Agnos.

Morris: What are the odds?

Brown: Well, I don't know because I discovered from his girlfriend the other night that he's covering his bet. He went out and he bet the same amount on Agnos and had somebody else take Jordan, so he's going to break even. [laughter] So I'm going to tease him next week when I see him. I'm going to really give him the business. He's covering his bet.

Polling vis-a-vis Constituent Contact

Morris: How about the guy who runs the California Poll?

Brown: Mervyn Field.

Morris: Is he part of any of these walkaround lunches?

Brown: No. We see Mervyn occasionally but he's not part of any of that. We have interacted with Mervyn over the years. As a matter of fact, the legislature retains Mervyn to do some survey work for us through the office of research and has for a long time. It's a token amount. As a professional, he just wishes to be paid. Most of it is his doing pro bono work. But to keep the integrity of the information proper, we pay him. It's just a small step.

Morris: You keep touch with several polling people to get a different view of things?

Brown: No, I don't. I really don't. I don't play close attention to any of the polling people. Some of my colleagues live by polls. I think Pete Wilson does a poll every week. He does a telephonic poll. I have not had a great amount of confidence in polls. I have a lot more confidence in focus groups. I like the idea of taking a cross-section of the citizens and spending two or three hours with them and observing what they say and giving them all the nuances and all the choices. I think you get a better perspective. You get a better idea of what the body politic is really like rather than those snap-judgment telephone calls.

Morris: Even though what you described for Pete Wilson sounds like the rolling poll that the Reagan people kept going?

Brown: Bush is the one who has perfected it. They have perfected it. They do [it] weekly if not daily. When the issue is really hot, they do daily snap counts and testing. They make their decisions based upon that process. I have never been a student of polls. Probably only within the last half dozen years have I come to even agree to finance polls. In the past I was anti-polls.

Morris: Feeling that you and the people you are close to have more reliable information among your contacts with people?

Brown: Instincts, yes. Absolutely. I think the membership of the legislature, being that it is the lowest common denominator of an electoral district in the state of California, and if you work it the way you should work it, which means you go out every day or however often you are there and if you talk to enough people, they can get the feeling of what people think.

Morris: How many of your colleagues in the assembly over the years do you feel have actually done that?

Brown: A hell of a lot more today than were doing it yesterday. They were far more distant. But the younger, newer members have gotten elected by being visible politically in their districts. They actually do town hall meetings. We even have got some members who do once a week coffee calls. They just go ring somebody's doorbell until they find someone who will invite them in for coffee. Once a week, on a blind shot. They do it with businesses; they do it with all kinds of people. And they get a good handle. I guess [Tom] Hannigan does it best, but they get a good handle on who and what the people are really thinking in the district.

We all talk to the service clubs and the service organizations and we visit with local elected officials and appointed officials and individuals in that category. But some of us really do an outreach. Then you have your staff whose job it is to do cold calls once or twice a month. That's just getting on the telephone and getting the telephone book with an address in the district and just call until you get somebody on the telephone and say, "I'm calling from Speaker Brown's office. This is not a survey but the speaker has us just selecting a name at random and calling to ask if you would chat with us about what you think government is doing and should be doing and what you think is happening in the district." And they make notes.

Morris: What kinds of response does that have?

Brown: All kinds. First they are ecstatic that somebody called them. And they are most polite and sometimes very helpful in some of the

suggestions that they make and some of the observations that they make.

Morris: Really. Can you think of any offhand?

Brown: Yes. When I was getting a bad time about the so-called tobacco stuff this past summer,¹ we just decided to increase the number of cold calls. The reason there was never any need for me to try to explain or apologize or what have you, was that in about 80 percent of the cold calls, the people knew that the press was BS-ing. "Yes. We don't like smoking either but we know that's bullshit. Why shouldn't he talk to those people? He talks to everybody else. He ought to talk. That's what we want him to do. We want him to talk to people."

Morris: Isn't that amazing.

Brown: Totally. Just blew me away, absolutely blew me away. It offended the Examiner. The Examiner took a poll thinking they were going to be able to print--.

Morris: Public outrage?

Brown: Right. Instead, they found just the opposite.

Morris: It's amazing what people will say on the telephone, I've found. They have been just waiting for somebody to ask them.

Brown: To call them up. Sometimes some of my cold callers will say, "We'll put Mr. Brown on," and I'll get on. If I walk in and you're on the phone, they'll say, "Why don't you sit down and talk with Miss X." So I get on the telephone and she says, "Hello, is this really you, Willie?" "Yes, it is." "I saw you on television. I read about what they said about you in the newspaper. You're doing right. They wouldn't be writing about you unless you were doing right."

Then you would have somebody who has difficulty with English, [affects accent] "Oh, Mr. Brown, Mr. Brown, you're so wonderful. My kid told me you were at his school and you speak so good, we always vote for you, Mr. Brown." Well, that person will

¹The Fair Political Practices Commission in November 1991 ruled that Brown, and three other lawmakers, had broken no state laws after investigating allegations that the four had improperly received gifts from the Smokeless Tobacco Council, which opposed a bill to prevent local jurisdictions from adopting conflicting anti-smoking ordinances.

forever be a Willie Brown voter no matter what the world says. So many of my members are doing those kinds of things.

We're also doing things like small business conferences. About once every quarter there will be a small business conference. There will be a women's conference on women's rights or women's business opportunities. There will be a renters' information conference. All those kinds of things members are doing. They are organizing and orchestrating.

Demise of Newsletters

Brown: At one time we had the authority to send newsletters. That ended three or four years ago. So now, this outreach stuff has increased because there is no way to reach the constituency. There is no substitute now. When you had a newsletter, you could actually hit the constituency in total about four times in a given two-year cycle. That was almost a million pieces of mail, saying anything you wanted to say, giving any kind of reports you wanted to give as long as it wasn't a pitch for your reelection. That was a good tool and a good vehicle and many members used that.

Now that we don't have that kind of stuff any more, we have to do it on our own. We do another thing. Most of us do radio feeds. Once a week I do a radio feed. It's now taken statewide and it's just a commentary by Willie Brown.

Morris: Like the broadcasts that Reagan used to do when he set up a radio studio for the governor's office?

Brown: Right. I have that same thing. We also have for those areas where there is a reduced amount of competition for program material on television, we actually do a three-minute television feed with our members.

Morris: For some of the public access cable channels?

Brown: Absolutely. And many of our members use it. I don't do a television feed because Viacom would never take it.

Morris: Do you have any statistics on how well used those are? How many stations carry them?

Brown: I don't personally but you could call the majority services and they would have. They keep a running weekly snap count. They keep a count of how many radio stations take my radio feed. They

take a count of how many television stations take collectively the television feeds that we provide.

Morris: Do they run them as public service or do they cut them into their regular news broadcasts?

Brown: Some of them use them both ways. Some of them use them as a regular feature. If you agree to do it every week at a certain time, you'll know that--.

Morris: They'll schedule you?

Brown: Yes. You'll know that at 12:03 there will be that feature.

Morris: Was the newsletter discontinued because of budget?

Brown: No, no, no. The newsletter was an initiative. One of those reformed-minded right-wingers named Ross Johnson. Quentin Kopp and Joe Montoya put that in as part of Proposition 73 and they abolished the newsletter.¹ No, it didn't have anything to do with budget. They didn't even take the money away. The money is still there. We now use the money for radio fees and we use the money for television. You just can't write to your constituency. Real stupid!

Morris: Amazing. We're at twenty past twelve. Shall we wrap up now? Next time we meet I would like to ask about you and Leo McCarthy coming to terms.

Brown: You want to start there? Well, let's start there next time. All right. Let's stop then.

¹June 1988 campaign spending reform initiative.

XVI ISSUES AND LEGISLATION, 1975-1978

[Interview 4: December 17, 1991] ##

Prestige vs. Public Policy Committee Assignments

Morris: We had gotten up to 1974 and we had gotten Leo McCarthy into the speakership. It's reported that you spent a while not paying much attention to what was going on in the legislature. It sounded as if you were regrouping your forces and maybe even deciding whether you wanted to stay in the legislature after you lost the speakership the first time?

Brown: That's not accurate. There's no question about whether or not I would stay in the legislature, none whatsoever. My services were not utilized and my time was not utilized by Mr. McCarthy. But you assumed that would be the case, where your opponent wins. I appropriately respected that kind of a rule and absented myself from the arena so as not to be a problem for his administration. That only lasted for a couple of years. By 1976 or so, his troops had leaned on him to make sure he understood that he couldn't exist without utilizing all the talent in the place and that I was at least a part of that. So I got an assignment.

Morris: Who was it amongst his troops who was saying that you really needed to get Willie Brown back on the team?

Brown: I would assume that Dan Boatwright would have been the leader of that group. But there were probably some others. But Boatwright was most vocal about it.

Morris: How did you and Boatwright come to be close enough for him to speak up for you like that?

Brown: We were not close as such. Boatwright just happened to have been, is, and was a very independent, fairly savvy Democrat who represented a portion of Richmond which had lots of my friends, still has lots of my friends in that constituency. I assume that

a combination of his own intelligence plus their lobbying may have caused him to become the spokesperson for utilizing Willie Brown's talents.

Morris: Yes. By 1976 you were not only the chairman of the Rev and Tax Committee but you were also on the Housing and Community Development, Human Resources, and Transportation Committees. That's a heavy load.

Brown: Yes, but keep in mind that we had had a major election in 1974, bringing in all of these new people. There must have been twenty-five or thirty or more new members as a result of reapportionment and Watergate. So there were just lots of rookies on the Democratic side of the aisle and all of the oldtimers had to undertake greater assignments and a greater number of assignments than they otherwise ever would have.

Morris: Could you explain that a little bit?

Brown: The place operates kind of on an institutional memory. Not kind of, it operates on the basis of institutional memory. There has to be a point person or some point persons on each one of the committees just to offset the enormous power that bureaucrats accumulate by years in place, just to offset the enormous power that special-interest organizations and their representatives accumulate by longevity and by resources and by being similarly directed at their issue. That creates a serious imbalance unless there is somebody equal in stature, equal in ability and equal in memory of what has gone before them and what has been traditionally a ripoff of the public, so to speak, an exploitation of the public.

So any time you have a whole new collection of members come into the legislature, the first decision the leadership makes is to determine how we use the returning members more appropriately. Each of us who were considered seniors had to undertake assignments that we may never have been previously exposed to, but because of our ability and skill and knowledge of the system, we could in fact be the point leader. And both parties do that.

Morris: So that you've got somebody who remembers when that kind of bill came up before.

Brown: When it came up before, what the advocacy was, whether or not it's two economic interests competing against each other with no public benefit derivative therefrom, whether or not it is a bill that Republicans traditionally carry for their resource-producing purposes, whether or not it is something that organized labor desperately needs, whether or not it is something that ought to be

a chip left to be played as a part of a bargaining process involving the budget. All of those things come from previous exposure to the system, not from any immediate knowledge.

Morris: Housing and Urban Development, Human Resources, and Transportation have some similarities. I was wondering if you saw some concerns that you had running through those committees?

Brown: No, I didn't really ask for those committees. I kind of left it up to McCarthy. I was not a part of his team. I had not been of assistance in his election and in fact had opposed his election. So I simply made myself available to accept any assignment that he gave me. Those assignments that you identified, except the transportation, were not considered choice assignments. He had no great interest in human resources and human services. He had no great interest in housing and community development; neither one of those were considered to be prestigious spots. They were considered to be good public-policy spots but not prestigious spots. Most leadership politicians are far more concerned about satisfying their members' desire for prestige than they are about pushing public policy. I don't think McCarthy was any different in his speakership in that regard.

Transportation, Rev and Tax Matters

Brown: The Transportation Committee in the middle seventies was not considered an A committee, like A-B-C, committee.

Morris: Oh, yes. Top.

Brown: Yes. Top of the line. Since the early eighties it has begun to be an A committee with the advent of light rail and the reemphasis on public transportation, whether water-based or otherwise. It has become a very exotic committee. It's become even more exotic in the latter part of the eighties because it became the beneficiary of monies provided through a ballot measure. It became the vehicle by which you address seismic safety for freeways and things of that nature. It also developed an interest around the bullet train and high speed systems of transportation. So it has become really a number-one committee.

But in the early seventies that was not the case. It was considered a second-tier committee. In McCarthy's eyesight, that was exactly where he thought he was in fact assigning me, where you did good public policy work but it wasn't glamorous, it wasn't attention-getting.

Morris: It wouldn't compete with Rev and Tax in visibility?

Brown: Absolutely. Whereas the Rev and Tax Committee was in the late seventies not terribly politically popular but it was in fact the workhorse committee. The assault on the property tax structure, the whole question of indexing of income taxes, renter's tax relief, all of those are subject matters to be dealt with in the late seventies. I chaired the Rev and Tax Committee through all of that, through Proposition 13, through the compliance, through the bailout afforded to local governments as a result of Proposition 13, the renter's tax credit which was Mike Roos' bill, written in my committee. All of that occurred in Rev and Tax. And it was not a terribly glamorous place in which to be but it was the workhorse committee of the late seventies.

Morris: I would like to come back to that but before we do, transportation in the mid-seventies--wasn't that the era when Governor Jerry Brown was taking a lot of heat for not building highways and there were policy differences with the legislature? Would you have been involved in that?

Brown: Yes. He had a woman named Gianturco. Whatever her name was.

Morris: Adriana.

Brown: Yes, Adriana Gianturco, who was his person in the field of transportation. They set out to dump the freeway building program in the state of California, or at least make it difficult. Only because of her existence and that policy was there any real attention given to the question of transportation. But it didn't reach the level of real confrontation until the very late seventies and at the start of the eighties. He got reelected in 1978 with minimal opposition; the anger had not yet crystallized. The anger, the frustration and the annoyance, and the symbol of Jerry Brown, had not yet crystallized.

Morris: Why did it crystallize as a controversial issue when a minute ago you were saying that transportation became an exotic subject with alternatives to freeways? In a way isn't that what Gianturco and Jerry Brown were suggesting as a policy direction?

Brown: Yes. They may have been just ahead of their time but they were doing their advocacy at the expense of freeways. In the early eighties, it was not at the expense of freeways. When you advocated the bullet train, you did not suggest that Interstate 5 shouldn't be built and that instead a bullet train ought to be built. Gianturco and Jerry Brown were pitting freeways against other means of transportation. The subsequent architects of the transportation policy for the state of California have been

integrating surface road systems with other means of transportation.

Morris: Transportation has also been traditionally a big special interest area.

Brown: Still is. It will always be.

Morris: Truckers and fuel people.

Brown: Truckers, fuel people, auto dealers, auto manufacturers, driving schools, concrete makers, operating engineers, the heavy industrial unions; it's always been a major area of special interest. It has consistently been the public works program that is in perpetuity. There is probably a greater growth in the number of employees of Caltrans than in any other unit of government, on a consistent basis, except maybe the prison system.

Morris: As a growth area in state employees as well as in the business world?

Brown: Yes, in the total number of [state] employees. Yes, maybe the business world, but I know it from the standpoint of state employees. My guess is that there are probably 50 percent or more of the people working for Caltrans who consistently post sixty hours a week, twenty hours of overtime on average. Absolutely.

Morris: So that it is consistently a heavy item in the state budget?

Brown: Well, no. You remember, the gas tax is a special tax that is dedicated to road systems. That's it. That's where their money comes from. Very little money comes from the General Fund. There may be some maintenance money or something of that nature. But the budget of Caltrans is beyond our ability to affect. Constitutionally, the transportation commission takes care of that. CTC, the California Transportation Commission.

Morris: Right. Their legislation doesn't seem to be something that you were particularly interested in. You didn't usually carry very many transportation bills.

Brown's Constituencies

Brown: No, never did. And still don't have a great interest in the transportation subject matter as a personal vehicle for Willie

Brown's expression of public policy. There are other things that have greater priority with me: health care, auto insurance.

Morris: Because they are the issues that relate to the concerns of people in San Francisco?

Brown: They relate to my district. They related to the constituency in San Francisco and they relate to that base constituency state-wide that I have an affinity with. In addition thereto, there are a lot more talented people in the area of transportation in the legislature than Willie Brown.

Morris: So that you feel comfortable leaving it to them?

Brown: Absolutely. Leaving it to Richard Katz and to Jerry Eaves and to Rusty Areias and people like that.

Morris: I have got here a couple of legislative packets by years that Joanne Murphy pulled out for me.¹ By 1977, 1978, you introduced seventy-five or eighty bills. Is that a large number for a legislator?

Brown: Absolutely.

Morris: How do you keep track and how do you decide which topics you will follow?

Brown: That's a decision made usually at a retreat with the staff or at some staff get-together, staff meetings or things of that nature, before the commencement of the session. You will have many, many options. Each one of your staff people will usually have one or two subject-matter areas that they direct and control. They will come forward with and propose solutions to problems, many of which have been called to their attention by the constituency. Let's say that the Filipino Dental Association comes to visit with the staff and lays out to them what the problems are surrounding the admission and the practice and the discipline process involving Filipino dentists. There would be women who would come in and request, from the women's movement standpoint, certain pieces of legislation that they believe to be most appropriate.

Sometimes there are meetings with special-interest organizations like the environmental movement. We'll have a meeting with the environmental movement--twelve or fourteen representatives of the environmental movement at every segment: the Sierra Club, the Conservation League, across the board. They

¹See appendix.

will outline their legislative package for the year or their proposals for the year and make in many cases specific requests for you or me or whomever to carry certain pieces of legislation.

Then you will have the single special-interest organizations like the medical society, which will come in and have a packet of bills and legislative proposals. Then organized labor will come in, teachers will come in, trial lawyers will come in, appellate lawyers will come in, the defense bar will come in.

Morris: This is as speaker or just from early on way back then?

Brown: No, just as a member. They come in from every discipline, every walk of life. They'll come and chat about their problems and how they think they can be solved and would you be interested in being of assistance. They know of your background. The church lobby comes in.

Morris: Really.

Brown: Oh, yes.

Morris: What kinds of things does a church lobby pursue?

Brown: A dram-shop act. They want to make sure that people aren't permitted to drink alcoholic beverages. They will be concerned about what people read, about what people can observe on the stage. They'll address the abortion issues, those kinds of things. They will be lobbying to have certain bills authored by you or me or some other person.

So every discipline comes in. Out of all of this and your staff recommendations, you may end up with a huge volume of bills.

Lobbying Fellow Assemblymen

Morris: Are some of those groups that come and talk to you also going to talk to other members too?

Brown: They are going to those members whom they consider subject matter-oriented members and members who are bright enough and able enough and have the respect of their colleagues to be authors of legislation. You do not go find a legislative jockey who can't carry a bill. You have some of those. You have people who are not able to explain a bill, cannot understand it, won't do the work. After all, as a member carrying a bill, you literally have

to become the lobbyist with each of your fellow members. You go to their offices before the meeting and before the public hearing and you lay out your bill. You send them a copy of it first.

Morris: Then the constituency organizations.

Brown: No. This is you go to your individual members. Once I have introduced a bill, once that bill is introduced, when that bill is assigned--let's say I assign it to the Committee on Housing and Urban Development--I will then scope the membership of the Committee on Housing and Urban Development. I will go talk to the chairperson first, the vice chairperson, and then I will talk to the most influential member beyond those two on that committee. I will talk to the staff and make sure the bill analysis is done properly, et cetera, see if any of those people have any objections and try to get them committed early. Then I will speak to every member of the committee. When the public hearing is done, I will then make the same or similar presentation, respond to any unreadiness, questions raised that either one of them had, when I visited with them privately, identify the people who support it, identify the opposition, try to destroy the opposition's argument before the opposition presents its argument, and then hopefully move the bill out of the committee.

Morris: Roughly could you hazard a percentage or number of people in the assembly who are functioning at that level, who are able to do that kind of--?

Brown: About half.

Morris: Is that consistent over the years?

Brown: Absolutely.

Morris: How much of that do you have to do yourself and how much can you delegate to the staff?

Brown: Member contact, you can delegate none of it to the staff. You must make the member contact. You must either do it by telephone, you must do it on the floor, or you must do it in your offices, or you must do it during the course of some social gathering. To send staff to represent you, unless it's a good friend--. If John Burton had a vote on the committee, a bill on public safety, I would not hesitate to have my staff guy chat with Burton and see if the bill has any problems. Burton will not feel ignored because my staff guy spoke with him. And the same for his. His staff can call me up and say, "John has got this bill and he needs your help." I say, "He's got it. What does the bill do."

So that's staff-to-staff contact. But if I was contacting, let's say, Byron Sher, I would not have my staff contact Byron Sher. If I was contacting Tom Bates, I wouldn't have my staff contact Tom Bates.

Morris: Do you spend more time with Republicans?

Brown: No. You spend more time with wherever the votes are. You don't designate them as Republicans or Democrats at that stage of the game. You go for votes. If you, nevertheless, have a mental health bill, you may talk to Frank Lanterman, who is a very respected Republican, before you talk to the chairman, because you would like to get Frank's perspective on whether or not the bill makes sense or if you are doing any damage to existing law and the existing delivery system, is there any possibility of improvement, and then finally will he coauthor it. Frank coauthors it and suddenly you have instant credibility on the mental-health issues. So you don't designate them just as Republicans or Democrats.

Handling Controversial Issues: Abortion

Morris: It's the issue, yes. In a given year, like 1977-78, how many of those seventy-five or so bills that you authored had co-authors?

Brown: Oh, I have no clue. I have no idea. There is no way to remember back that far.

Morris: Well, there is another question I was interested in. A lot of them seem to be technical matters and a lot of them seem to get dropped and held in committee or they reappeared as some other legislator's bill in the course of the year. Is that part of the process usually?

Brown: Oh, sure. That's standard. You would be lucky to move a third of the pieces of legislation that you introduce. You would be really lucky to move a third of the pieces of legislation that you introduce because, invariably, you are not unique. There are other people who have approaches to the same issue in their districts. And they may have a superior approach. Or they may be the chairman of the committee to which this bill is addressed.

Morris: To which it is referred?

Brown: Right. You are clearly not going to be the author of the bill that the committee chairman is the author of. You may become a co-author of his bill. So that's all part of precedent.

- Morris: One that we might talk about in a little bit of detail. There are several bills relating to Medi-Cal. One of them is an urgency statute to appropriate \$70 million to cover the anticipated deficit for that program. It died on the floor but I assume that a deficit of that size was suppressed in some way.
- Brown: It was probably handled some other place. That would have been bill that would have been requested by the administration. It would have been carried by me or by some other designated member. I don't remember the bill but if it was mine, it would be at the request of the administration. I would have no way of knowing about any deficit. It would have to be verified by the administration. Somewhere down the line we may find a way in which to take care of that deficit problem. It may be through some other vehicle; it may be through the budget. Let's say we carry it in a huge deficit appropriation bill. That may have been just one line item in a larger deficit-appropriation bill. I really don't remember.
- Morris: It would be worked out in the process of the joint reconciliation committee at the end of the legislative session?
- Brown: No, it wouldn't wait until the end of the legislative session. A deficit measure is always an urgency measure and it would move ahead of everything else.
- Morris: I noticed that at this point the bill "Prohibits the use of funds to pay for abortions after the first trimester of the pregnancy." Does that indicate that the abortion legislation had already begun to be controversial?
- Brown: The abortion legislation has been controversial since day one. It has never not received the glare of the spotlight and great scrutiny and public attention. In many cases, they are political responses rather than principle responses. So, yes, it would have been one of the highlights of the issues in that legislation.
- Morris: Even though it was a fairly routine measure that Reagan had originally signed back in the sixties?
- Brown: From the time he signed it to the present day, there has always been a cadre of anti-abortionists who consistently looked for an opportunity to highlight the issue and to make the issue determinative of their vote. They had been, in those years, few in number. And they have grown in greater numbers because the issue has become more visible with presidents taking positions on it and with supreme court decisions and those kinds of things.

Morris: What makes an issue like that? I assume it was originally decided that the public policy had been made. The governor of California had signed the bill and the supreme court eventually upheld it. Why and how does a public policy position like that become challenged and so divisive?

Brown: It becomes challenged because people feel really strongly about it. There are just absolute divided views. That's the one issue on which people will change their political affiliation as a result of one's position on it. It is an issue that generates strongly held views and strongly held expressions. That's what elevates it to the level of great controversy.

Morris: Did you have to campaign on that or address that issue in dealing with your various constituencies?

Brown: Not so much in San Francisco. San Francisco is pretty much a pro-choice town. You're expected to be pro-choice. The issue for me was addressed more often at the legislative level in my attempting to assist in perfecting the pro-choice position, lobbying other legislators who may be lukewarm or in some cases who may be even hostile to that position. But it was never a great issue among my constituents. One would assume that anybody running for public office in San Francisco would be pro-choice.

Morris: From a public health standpoint, is it considered a routine thing to have abortion accessible as you would have vaccination for children?

Brown: In San Francisco, yes. But not statewide.

Morris: You have done quite a lot of work on health care over the years. Is abortion just part of that or is it dealt with separately?

Brown: It is dealt with separately.

XVII RACIAL MINORITY NETWORK

United Political Action Statewide

Morris: You said that you had on some things worked with Boatwright because you had a constituency over in Richmond. How did your constituency begin to develop outside your district in San Francisco?

Brown: Almost every racial minority official elected in the state, regardless of the district from whence they are elected, assumes some responsibility for representing racial minorities in every community. You are called upon by those racial minorities in communities where they are not represented to be their spokesperson, to be their personality at their NAACP [National Association for the Advancement of Colored People] banquets, at their Urban League events or at their CORE events. If a discrimination problem exists--.

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Brown: --of their problem and their plight and their effort. So almost overnight, if not instantly, you become a part of the image and the symbol of an emerging, struggling racial minority. That goes beyond the confines of your district. In many cases, because of the limited number of racial minorities at the electoral level, you tend to know each other. You tend to at least be acquainted with each other. You circulate in the same setting politically. If you are a Democratic member of the assembly, invariably you will be at the state conventions, invariably you will be at the national conventions, invariably you will be at the county meetings, and there may be one other racial minority there and almost naturally you would say hello to each other and strike up a friendship with each other, or an acquaintanceship. All that spills over into being representative of the racial minority constituency throughout the state, if not the nation, as well as your individual constituency that elected you.

Morris: Does that mean that you would have been involved in electing Merv Dymally for instance and then Tom Bradley?

Brown: Absolutely. There is not a black holding office in this state of any significance that I didn't have some involvement with, just as they have had involvement with my career. It may not have been at the outset of their career because I may not have known them and they may not have known me if we were both relatively anonymous as persons seeking public office.

But once we are elected it becomes a process. It usually actually begins before because of the Democratic party connections or the Republican party connections. But if that is not the case, certainly upon the election it is almost instant association.

Morris: Does this expand to include nonpartisan people like [Superintendent of Public Instruction] Wilson Riles?

Brown: Absolutely. All racial minorities elected to office anywhere in the state invariably become a part of the racial minority network representing their ethnic stock regardless of the jurisdiction or the geography of their electoral base.

Morris: What kinds of things could you do as a group that the Democratic party couldn't or didn't do in the seventies?

Brown: Well, the Democratic party would not make the fair housing issue their issue. Some Democrats would support it. But a Democrat in Orange County may not want to support it because Proposition 14 of some previous years had been on the ballot and had been rejected and the courts finally threw it out. So you have a difference there. You do not have a difference among racial minorities on that issue. So you would have unanimous involvement and unanimous participation on that issue.

Likewise, if there was an effort to get a change in the admission policies at the University of California, you would not just do that for that the Med Center in San Francisco or for U.C. Berkeley; you would do that for the U.C. system statewide. In some cases, the Democratic party may be of assistance; in other cases they would not be because some of them may not share your view in that regard. But all the racial minorities would clearly share your view and be involved and committed to that program.

Higher Education: Admissions Equity

Morris: We haven't really talked about higher education. How much of an effort did you need to put into getting the university and the state colleges to take a look at their admission policies or their hiring policies?

Brown: That effort is still being made. It was still being employed this last session. A bill of mine was vetoed by the governor that we identified as an education equity bill. It was a bill designed to say there shall not be quotas but there shall be goals and there shall be evaluations as to whether or not you achieve these goals in terms of hiring practices among faculty, in terms of number of students being admitted to the institutions, in terms of the numbers of students being retained in the institutions, the quality of the choices of the graduates and the type of graduates who are coming out of the institution, the use of the resources on behalf of the students and the institution and the distribution of those resources as it relates to racial minorities.

Pete Wilson vetoed it on the basis that it was a quota bill. Some parts of the system of higher education opposed it on the basis that it could be construed as a quota bill. So how much effort? It is an ongoing effort. We over the last several years have had a major fight with the university over its admission policies and the attempt to change those admission policies because they were concerned with an excess number of Asians gaining admission to the University of California. They wanted to somehow slow that down. So they wanted to reduce the emphases and the weight given to academic performance as a prerequisite to enter the University of California and add some other factors.

The Asian community, of course, violently opposed that. I represented a large segment of the Asian community and participated in their objections to it.

Morris: San Francisco district Asians or, again, was that a larger coalition?

Brown: Yes. Well, they put together a larger coalition. It started with the San Francisco district Asians.

Morris: In your own mind, how do you work that out? I have heard people say that the black community has been working long and hard to get more black kids into college and do well. Then it seems as if all of a sudden Asians and Hispanics appear in larger numbers and come past us in enrollment and employment. How do you deal with that kind of feeling?

Brown: Well, you must open the doors and establish guidelines and steps to secure equality. If others use those guidelines and steps and those steps are in fact positive for racial minorities and particularly African Americans, whether they use them or not, those are the proper steps and you have just got to protect them and you've got to keep them in place and you've got to enhance upon them, regardless of who uses the ladder to get there. I'm not terribly concerned if there is a greater number of Asians who use the techniques that blacks have devised for equality and it turns out a greater number of Asians benefitted from it. I would not abandon my advocacy for those techniques based on that.

Morris: Does that mean that earlier groups have to work harder or challenge--?

Brown: I don't know if the earlier groups have to work harder but somebody has to put the guidelines in place. I would hope that everybody who understands that, whether they are from the majority side or the minority side, would participate in trying to help put those guidelines in place. Then I would hope that there would be services and resources made available to all the racial minorities who need them and there would be help for them to utilize those guidelines to gain a measure of equality. The university system is supposed to do exactly that. We argued for years on a fair admission policy, and they got a fair admission policy, so to speak. Asians are now utilizing it and consider it more competitive than most because of a strong academic commitment that comes with the culture, within the framework of the Asian community.

Now they talk about changing that. Although blacks have not utilized it as handsomely and benefitted from it as handsomely, I'm struggling to make sure that the change, if change comes, does not slow down the number of Asians. I would not ever support and would violently oppose any effort to deliberately change the system so that Asians would be disadvantaged. I do not believe that their numbers are such that their success is automatic. As long as I don't believe that, there isn't any reason to change the rules and regulations that seem to give them a greater opportunity.

Morris: Is the equity question one that you use as a bargaining chip when talking, say, to the University of California at San Francisco people who are right smack in your constituency about their concerns for other things, like building programs and staffing budget?

Brown: No, because that is a whole different level. The equity educational policy issue is a statewide issue. That is something

that has to be addressed by the trustees, the regents, and the president. At the local college level, they have very little to do with deciding who ultimately gets into that institution. The standards are set by the Board of Regents. They simply become the persons who actually administer them. There is very little discussion about who gets admitted.

There is a tremendous amount of discussion on their employment practices and policies. So you can lobby specifically for equity in employment and things of that nature, but as it relates to professorships that is still the university state-wide level.

Morris: That is an academic issue?

Brown: Absolutely. So you can't use the leverage to give them assistance on local building projects in return for education equity.

State Contract Preference

Morris: Again, I find these packets of legislation you introduced by year extremely interesting. The consistency of the issues. In 1978 there was A.B. 3694 which initiates a state contract preference for minority companies in urban areas with high concentrations of unemployed welfare recipients and disadvantaged persons. So you get contract provisions that the state has been suggesting for years too: if you are going to have state contracts, you would have some more equity and you would get economic concerns of individuals. Has that been a successful program in increasing job opportunities for minorities?

Brown: In part. In part, there have been greater opportunities that have been forthcoming to racial minority communities as a result of that kind of legislation. But it has not solved the problem, not by a long shot. As a matter of fact, in the mid-eighties, we did A.B. 1933 that Maxine Waters authored that moved it up to about 20 percent. You had to show there was 20 percent of women, WBE and MBE, 5 percent women and 15 percent WBE and MBE, and it was even imposed on Caltrans and other agencies. Now that's being tested as to whether or not it is legal because the supreme court has changed its view as to what is appropriate to remedy previous acts of discrimination, whether passive or not. As a result of that new attention by the supreme court, we are having to undergo some modifications of our legislative and statutory authority.

There is also always the advocacy role that we absolutely must play with agencies of state government that have the responsibility to administer the set-aside programs and the affirmative-action programs. Sometimes you introduce legislation to get that ball rolling and to get that dialogue going.

Morris: And you don't really expect the legislation to pass. You just want to lean upon a particular department?

Brown: Correct. You want to force them into a hearing and sometimes even under oath, to tell the truth about what they are doing or not doing.

Morris: Eternal vigilance and all that kind of thing.

Brown: Yes.

Developing Candidates; Ongoing Contacts

Morris: Was part of what you were doing in networking with other black legislators looking for candidates and encouraging people to think of running for office?

Brown: The only time you do that is when circumstances present an opportunity for that to happen. You usually do not initiate that process. You usually are invited in to comment, to evaluate and to participate in that community's efforts. You pretty much leave the choice to the individual communities. As a matter of fact, you have no option. You have to leave the choice to individual communities. So, no, you do not go doing candidate development, as such. Or candidate identification as such.

We do, through the organizations that we put together statewide, provide a think-tank for folk who say they want to run for public office. We tell them how, when, where, how to raise money, how to access the constituency, how to utilize the media, et cetera. But you seldom if ever go out and do candidate solicitation.

Morris: Even though I have heard that one of the things one is doing in the reapportionment process is looking for new, electable candidates, people who will then support you when you want to run for speaker again?

Brown: That's a process that you don't really initiate. There are very few districts that have a winning edge clearly identifiable for

one party or the other where, if it's an open seat, there aren't more than a half a dozen people who are beating your door down to ask for your blessings and ask for your assistance. So you don't really go out looking for candidates. The only time you really go looking for candidates is in hopeless situations where you are trying to create a diversion in some cases [laughter] or in other cases get control of the state central committee appointments for party head purposes or things of that nature. That's where you have to go look for a candidate. To find a Democrat in Newport Beach to run against Marian Bergeson is a thankless task. Most know that it's a district that is 60, 65 percent Republican and it votes always in favor of the Republican four or five points ahead of registration. Nixon won it consistently when he was on the ballot; Reagan has won it consistently. There has never been a Democrat elected to anything in that area. Well, you're not going to find too many Democrats out there running in that area. So you may go looking for a candidate there.

Just next door, where Mr. [Tom] Umberg is a candidate and it's a 55, 56 percent Democratic district, it has every racial minority in the world in it, every ethnic stock and it has the only poor people in Orange County, you'll have twenty people running, so you don't have to go looking for candidates at all.

Morris: Is that sometimes a case of trying to discourage people so that you can get all your black votes behind--?

Brown: Oh, you absolutely discourage people. With regularity you discourage people. Some persons come in and they've got no prayer. Some person comes in and they are not even registered but they just decided they wanted to run for public office. "Well, do you know anybody?" "No." "How long have you lived in the community?" "I just got here yesterday." You would discourage them.

Morris: Do they listen?

Brown: I don't know whether they listen or not, but the practicality of running for public office and the enormous expense attached to it sometimes forces people not to pursue their original dream. They may come back to you and say, "Well, I'm not going to do it because you asked me to," to try to pick up a chit with you. But you have to be smart enough to know whether or not they had the resources. If they really didn't have an option, then they don't have a chit. Angela Alioto being talked out of the race against Agnos would have given Angela Alioto a chit. But Cesar, who owns that nightclub out in the Mission and who runs every time there is a mayor's race and he has for the last twenty years, asking him to get out and having him get out, you don't owe him anything.

Because in a ten-person race, he's going to finish eleventh. "None of the above" finishes ahead of him.

Morris: But somebody like that, are they a real factor in a race?

Brown: No. The person who is going to run tenth or eleventh is not a factor. The person who is going to run second or third is a major factor.

Morris: Did you have somebody on your staff who looked after the political aspect of the various groups that you worked with, including the black political leaders movement?

Brown: No. Not really. You usually refocus your contact and your communication relationships based upon subject matter content rather than just pure unadulterated politics. You switch back into that mode when you are running for office again. But from the time you are elected, you tend to deal with the child-care mothers around child-care issues. There may be some black women in that child-care movement who, during the course of the elections, you may be dealing with as a member of the Black Leadership Forum. When the election is over, you'll be dealing with that same person in her capacity as the child care mother agency.

Morris: That's interesting. So you're dealing with people in two roles.

Brown: Absolutely. In between elections, pretty much program and policy. During the electioneering time, purely electioneering. It's the same with the gays. You may be dealing with the director of the AIDS Foundation around research grant money for the AIDS issues, et cetera, during the course of the year and the course of public policy. Come election time, that person may very well be the chair of the Alice B. Toklas Political Action Committee. It's a whole different mindset. Some of the people who worked with the two of you on the AIDS Foundation research projects may not even be members of Alice; they may not even be involved with Alice at all.

XVIII WORKING WITH JERRY BROWN; ADVANCING EQUITY ISSUES

The Governor and the Regents

Morris: Let's go back to the higher education question. When did Jerry Brown suggest to you that he might appoint you to the regents? Is that something that you talked about?

Brown: No. He did that blind.

Morris: What did he have in mind, do you think?

Brown: I'm not sure what he had in mind, but I can only speculate that he was looking to shake up the board of regents. He was looking to put what he considered to be a qualified racial minority on the board of regents.

Morris: Even though there was already an assemblyperson? It was the racial component rather than--?

Brown: Absolutely. And then, he and Leo [Speaker Leo McCarthy] were at each other's throats. I don't think when he appointed me he had in mind trying to offset Leo's public policy with the board of regents. That was not what prompted him to do that. I think it was purely the benefit derivative to him as governor, having appointed, one, someone whom he considered qualified, two, a person who was black. I think that was key in his mind.

Morris: At that point, he identified you as having a statewide reputation and visibility?

Brown: National reputation. By 1980, national.

Black Panthers' Social Advocacy

Morris: Yes, indeed. I came across a reference in, I think it was Dan Walters' column in the Sacramento Bee, ten years earlier when you came into the legislature, he saw you as having a militant black-power kind of approach to politics. Was that an accurate reflection of your thinking back in the sixties?

Brown: Well, I think I have always had and still have an absolute commitment to using government power in effecting public policy in a way that gives racial minorities, and particularly African Americans, a fair shot. I have always had that and I have never been other than vocal about that. In the sixties, when I was first elected, the identifiable barriers were there and easily seen by everybody and therefore assaulted consistently.

There was also the advent of the black-power movement, the business of racial pride and all the kinds of stuff that went with that in the late sixties. All of that prompted a different kind of public presentation by me to be one of the windows to see that and to see it from the positive side. By the middle seventies that had pretty much abated. Many of the identifiable barriers had been removed. There were in place many statutory protections beyond anyone's belief, the swiftness with which they had come. The Voting Rights Act and the Civil Rights Act of the middle sixties were being heavily employed by the middle seventies.

There were also all of the set-asides. Even the Reagan administration, in yielding to an urban impact aid factor in the school finance formula and all the things that Wilson Riles had put into place on Comp ed, all those were things. Then you would get into bilingual education. So we were moving, not away from the black-power advocacy but toward an implementation of the public policy that had flowed from that advocacy. So you had ceased being the so-called speechmaker and the rally person because you are now inside where the decisions are to be made and you have to hunker down and see that those decisions reflect that advocacy role that you formerly played but now in a different way. That may very well describe the differences between the Willie Brown allegedly identified as the black-power advocate and activist in the late sixties and the Willie Brown of 1991 who is the speaker. The pursuit of public policy on the issues of equality has not changed at all.

Morris: You were saying that you saw yourself as a window to view the positive side, say, of the Black Panthers while their activities in Oakland were alarming many people?

Brown: Yes. To see the programs and policies and things they were pushing stripped of the guns and the alleged hate and the offensive language, feeding people was really important. Trying to reach kids to develop an educational foundation for every kid, and a solid one at that, was very important. To restore pride in the heritage of the community in which you lived was very important and somebody needed to be a window for the world to see that side of it.

Morris: Am I right that a couple of times, as an attorney, you defended one of the Panthers?

Brown: Oh sure. I've defended the Panthers. I've defended individual members on various charges. I've defended [Black] Muslims. I've defended almost every unit that you can think of that has ever participated in the civil rights struggle. I was general counsel to all the auto row and the hotel demonstrations in the sixties.

Morris: You mentioned that.

Brown: I was likewise one of the lawyers representing the kids at San Francisco State College in their struggle for a greater say and a greater participation on that college campus. I was one of the warriors who attempted to defend some aspects of the free speech kids at Cal. So I've done it all from the standpoint of being a lawyer. I've represented folk at every single community level.

Conservative Response in Sacramento

Morris: Did you have some dealings with Ed Meese? He was in the Alameda County district attorney's office when the Panthers were first active, before he went to Sacramento with Governor Reagan.

Brown: I had dealings with Ed Meese until he left the U.S. Attorney Generalship. I was on a first-name basis, "We'll take your telephone call" basis with Ed Meese. I could call Ed Meese during the course of this interview, were he available in Washington. He would, one, know the name and, two, take the call. He would usually get back to me trying to respond to my request.

Morris: How did you find him to work with?

Brown: I found him comfortable to work with on the individual things about which I would contact him. His public-policy positions were always at odds with everything I was about, but that did not interfere with our both doing our jobs, me as an elected official

and him in his appointed capacity. There was also a mutual respect, even maybe a fledgling friendship. Even to this day, I think it is still there.

It is kind of an amazing thing, with more conservative non-racial minorities, racial minorities tend to have less of a problem having those persons relate to them on an individual basis. I suspect there is still a condemnation of black folk generally, a skepticism about black folk generally, or in some cases even a standoffishness about black folk generally, but there is clearly a definite, singularly directed level of respect and appreciation and, in some cases, affection that flows from those conservatives. It never changes their view on public policy! Never changes their conduct with reference to the general group, but individually there tends to be great respect.

Morris: One of the arguments in the sixties for things like school busing was that if white kids and black kids went to school together, they would get to be friends on a one-to-one basis over the ball games and things like that and that would help people who had no contact with other races to realize that they were not all that different and therefore to change their view.

Brown: That's a good solid theory and I believe it.

Morris: But you're saying that in your experience, it hasn't worked.

Brown: No, no. It starts at that level, yes. But I'm talking about at the level one would initially interact with me. An Ed Meese interacting with Willie Brown can develop an acquaintanceship and friendship just for Willie Brown, but it doesn't change his views on affirmative action.

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Brown: Ed Meese may never have become the conservative that he is, at least on equal-justice issues, because he would have been an observer of what the system was doing to Brown. He would have been an observer of the same kind of human qualities he possesses, Brown possesses. The accident of birth in terms of skin color has had nothing to do with it. Ed Meese may have avoided being a victim of his environment and the racist attitudes that exist within that environment.

Morris: On the business of criminal justice, did the two of you ever have a chance to talk about your ideas about civil disobedience?

Brown: No, not really. It was never at that level. If we had those kinds of discussions, they were all rooted in some piece of

legislation that would be moving or some issue that had come up, let's say, the Panthers invading the capitol with weapons, the issue and all the things surrounding that would be addressed, but they would be prompted by that incident. It would not be, "Let's have a cup of coffee and discuss the philosophy of civil disobedience."

Morris: When the Panthers visited Sacramento, was the governor's reaction fear for his safety, or was it seen as a political-type statement?

Brown: No. The legislators who were in close proximity dived under the seats and the desks. They feared for their safety, but beyond that the reaction was one of just utter disgust with anybody who would show up with weapons in the capitol. So no one really ever focussed on that the reason for the weapons was to cause you to react and get attention and then address the issues of lack of food or lack of food stamps or lack of adequate housing, lack of health care for their base constituency in West Oakland. Well, the membership didn't make that transition and I don't think the governor did either because the reaction was strictly to changing the statutes as it relates to whether or not you can enter the capitol with a firearm.

Morris: Did the National Rifle Association folks uphold the Panthers right to bear arms?

Brown: They went strangely silent on the question of whether or not the Panthers could walk into the capitol onto the floor or into the gallery area of the legislature with rifles or with other weapons. Even the [National] Rifle Association didn't evidence an objection to restrictions and limitations on that.

Morris: Was Mr. [Assemblyman H. L.] Richardson then in the legislature?

Brown: No.

Morris: He came later?

Brown: He was subsequent, yes.

Morris: Certainly an interesting era. Did you counsel them to leave their weapons at home?

Brown: No, I didn't even know they were coming. I just happened to be at the rear door when they arrived and knew two or three of them by first name and they knew me. I suggested to them that there was going to be a problem if they stayed in there. I said, "Somebody really may get hurt. Perhaps some of you guys won't do it but you've now made your point so maybe you ought to let the news

world carry on henceforth." They stayed for a few minutes, they left, put the guns in the trunk of their cars and got arrested buying gasoline some place on the way out of Sacramento.

Morris: Oh, dear. Because they had been at the capitol?

Brown: Yes, they tried to charge them with disturbing the peace because at that time there were no restrictions on where you could carry weapons as long as they were exposed. Concealed weapons were the only things that had any great restrictions upon them. So they were smart enough not even to come close to having concealed weapons and, in addition thereto, they were unloaded. They were not loaded weapons. So a combination of those factors caused them, I don't think, to have much of a legal problem, if any. But they were arrested.

Morris: You did not provide legal services for them?

Brown: No. They were arrested though; but I don't even think they were ever really charged. I may be wrong but I don't think so.

The Governor and the Legislature

Morris: Along with Jerry Brown appointing you to the regents, did you take up your seat and talk with him about higher education and regents issues?

Brown: No. Not at all. He appointed the board of regents and I went about doing my work.

Morris: As a regent?

Brown: As a regent, yes. We were both pretty much right on the job of trying to democratize higher education. But we didn't have any meetings where we sat down and engaged in dialogue about how best to do that, et cetera. I think he pretty much left my contact to my own discretion based upon his knowledge and reputation of me. I was very close to Jerry Brown in the last two or three years of his governorship. I may have been one of the closest legislators to him. He didn't have a whole lot of friends.

Morris: Yes, I have heard that. What kinds of things brought the two of you together?

Brown: Just a common interest in public policy. My desire to make sure that he wasn't just completely trashed because he was in fact the

governor. McCarthy and his forces were pretty much committed to the idea of doing what Unruh attempted to do to Jerry's father, and that was to make themselves supreme over their own incumbent governor. They overrode his veto with some regularity, joined by Republicans who were gleeful at the prospect of overriding somebody's veto.

Morris: Any governor's veto or particularly Jerry Brown?

Brown: Any Democratic governor's veto. There was absolutely no programming between the governor's office and the speaker's office under Leo McCarthy. As a matter of fact there was outright hostility. Some of us kind of felt that that should not be the case, that we really ought to be on base with the governor in his public-policy-making, and he particularly responded in kind to my needs and to my desires. I was majority leader by then and so I did provide him with some respectability inside the legislature.

Morris: Is that a philosophical point with you, that any governor--?

Brown: No, any Democratic governor.

Morris: Any Democratic governor, there should be some uniformity of approach with the legislature?

Brown: Yes. I would think in a sense you can really make public policy then. If you have both the executive and the legislative branch under your philosophical control then you ought to go ahead and do it. And you ought to assume the responsibility to do it which means you ought to program together and then in effecting the program you clearly want to be in a position where you protect the governor's backside. In return the governor protects your backside and signs your bills as you move them through the legislature.

Morris: How do you decide or determine who gets the glory in a case like that?

Brown: You ignore that. Who gets the political benefit you absolutely have to ignore. Hopefully you will fashion the legislation and ultimately hand it to the individual who spent more time working on it than anyone else. If you are leadership you always hand the ball off; you never take personal credit. If you start taking credit, it will not be long before the membership will find someone who is not so interested in feathering his own nest and satisfying his own ego and building his image but in building the image of the team and allowing each member of the team to have his one time to carry the ball.

Leo McCarthy's Leadership

Morris: Was this because Leo was shooting for the governorship or was there some personal animosity between those two Irish--?

Brown: No. He was shooting for the governorship. He was definitely shooting for the governorship. As a matter of fact, what prompted the challenge to his speakership was his clear gubernatorial ambition that revealed itself in November, 1979, at a fundraising event at the convention center in Los Angeles where Ted Kennedy was the speaker.

Morris: And Kennedy said to the group, "Here's your next governor?"

Brown: No. The money that was raised, McCarthy announced that it was going into a special account to be used in the near future for his other office pursuits.

Morris: Had he conferred with any of the leadership on that matter?

Brown: I have no clue. I was not part of the leadership in 1979.

Morris: Was this the point that there was a vote of no confidence in Leo as speaker?

Brown: Yes. That's what prompted it.

Morris: It was an official vote?

Brown: Well, it was a vote in the caucus and then the subsequent vote to vacate the chair on the floor. That vote never succeeded. That vote never succeeded but nevertheless, it was a clear indication that a majority of the Democrats did not want Leo to continue as the speaker. The Republicans decided to stay out of the fight.

Morris: And enjoy the sight of the--?

Brown: The bloodbath, absolutely.

Morris: Even Jack Knox referred to it as a bloodbath. He was a senior Democrat.

Brown: It was a bloodbath. It was terrible because every day the entire program was geared to attacking Leo McCarthy on every issue and they were very good at it. The Republicans, of course, just sat on the sidelines. If either one of them appeared to be running out of gasoline they would always deliver an extra can to keep the fire going.

Morris: Oh, really? In what way?

Brown: They would give a vote here or there. To criticize Leo. Or if it appeared as if the anti-Leo forces were getting too much going, they would occasionally give Leo a vote in order to--.

Morris: I see. At what point was it that Howard Berman resigned as majority leader?

Brown: He resigned as majority leader the day that he informed Leo he was going to challenge him.

Morris: Was that in a caucus meeting in public?

Brown: No, no. A private conversation.

Morris: Just the two of them one on one?

Brown: I think Art Agnos was in and out of that meeting but it was just the two of them.

Morris: What was Agnos' position at that point?

Brown: He was the caucus chairman. He was a member of the assembly and the caucus chairman. So he was third in command of the house.

Morris: It's interesting that in the north-south political rivalries, northern California seems to have done pretty well in holding its share of leadership positions.

Brown: In part because of longevity and in part because of skill. A combination of the two. The south constantly is always turning over. And the south tends to be a bit more conservative than the north. So it has been easy--. Not easy, but it has been not so difficult with institutional memory playing such a great role and having such a great value, plus the philosophy of the north. You pick up a third or more of the south just based upon that philosophy and if you have that plus you have all the north, you've got the combination that is the winner.

That's been the case in the assembly consistently, not in the senate. The senate has never been under control of northern Californians. The closest we came was Hugh Burns down in Fresno, but following Burns--.

Morris: And that's where the border lies.

Brown: Yes. Following Burns was Howard Way; following Howard Way was Jack Schrade; following Jack Schrade was Jim Mills; following Jim

Mills was David Roberti. Schrade was San Diego, Way was Exeter, Burns was Fresno, Mills was San Diego, and Roberti is Los Angeles. So in the entire history of my being in the legislature, there has never been a northern Californian in charge of the state senate, whereas in the speakership, the speakership moved from Jesse Unruh in the south to Bob Monagan in the north (over here in Tracy), from Monagan in the north to Moretti in the south, from Moretti in the south to McCarthy in the north, and from McCarthy in the north to Brown in the north. So the speakership has literally been a San Francisco product since 1974.

Morris: Does that mean, in relation to what you said about more advanced-type social thinking, that the assembly tends to be more liberal by nature or is that a historical--?

Brown: It's more liberal by nature. It's the constituency. You are elected from the smallest-base electoral unit in the state of California. For legislative purposes there is the assembly district, 372,000 people. The next is Congress. Congress is at about 600,000 people. Then the state senate is about 744,000 people. So the assembly remains the smallest base constituency.

To the extent that you have that small base constituency, you have a lot more people input. Where you have a lot more people input and where people can elect you from districts, you don't have to worry about the huge number of voter participants. Like in East L.A., you can have a district of 372,000 people and 40,000 voters. Whereas in Orange County, you have a district of 372,000 people and you have almost 200,000 people who are registered to vote. In that 40,000-vote constituency, 8,000 votes wins the election. In that 200,000-vote constituency, it would take about 120,000 votes to win the election. Yet each one of those members has the same power inside the halls of the legislature.

Morris: Once there.

Brown: Correct. So that mass of people participating on the conservative side of the aisle becomes neutralized for influence purposes. Thereby you have liberals who are fewer in number having, in many cases, just the same kind of voice as the conservatives have.

Morris: That's fascinating. It is a matter of numbers.

Brown: Totally a matter of numbers.

Morris: Were there other things besides saying he was going to run for governor that alienated the membership from Leo?

Brown: His personality. An example was on that given occasion, when it came time to introduce the members, he simply said, "Will all of the members of the assembly stand up and please give them a round of applause."

Morris: This would be a party function?

Brown: Yes. A party thing for a thousand people. He didn't identify any of them. He just said, "Would all the members of the assembly stand up and we'll applaud them." Instead of saying, "This is Tom Bates, who is the chairman of the Human Services Committee from Berkeley, California. This is Robert Lee, a new member of our house from Oakland, California. His area of interest is thus and so." He didn't do any of that. As they interpret it, he kept all the glory unto himself.

Secondly, he did not see members. Members could not see the speaker. The speaker was too busy. You saw the speaker's chief of staff and you only talked to the speaker's chief of staff.

Morris: That's not very polite.

Brown: No, not at all. And the membership resented that. When given the opportunity, they got together and ousted him.

XIX BECOMING SPEAKER OF THE ASSEMBLY

Brown as Majority Leader; 1980 Primary Campaign

- Morris: At what point did you see an opening for yourself in that Berman challenge?
- Brown: November of 1980. Not until after the election.
- Morris: A year later?
- Brown: Yes. Not until after the election.
- Morris: What was Berman doing from 1979 until the election?
- Brown: Waging major battles in Democratic primaries to try to win the nomination for people who would be favorably disposed to him in seats that were surely to be Democratic.
- Morris: Did you help with that activity?
- Brown: I was helping Leo.
- Morris: Here in San Francisco?
- Brown: No, statewide. All of my resources went to help Leo maintain the speakership. After all, I was the majority leader at that time. So I was on the same side with Agnos and all of the people who come from northern California against those southern California types.
- Morris: Was your heart in that?
- Brown: Oh, sure. When I get involved in a race, I become emotional about it and I try to win it.
- Morris: Do you?

Brown: Absolutely.

Morris: So you've got Democrats in effect campaigning against each other in districts that looked like they were winnable?

Brown: Oh, sure. Charlie Santana over in the East Bay, the late supervisor, ran against Floyd Mori, who was the assemblyman from that area. He didn't defeat Floyd Mori but we spent a lot of money to protect Floyd. But it exposed Floyd where he was knocked off in the general election in what should have been a safe Democratic seat. Gil Marguth beat him in that particular race.

Leroy Greene was under siege by a Berman-backed candidate, a woman, and was losing for the last ten days. Somebody hit upon the theme that this woman was a representative from Sacramento who will be wholly beholden to the southern California interests and therefore will vote to get the water from the north to the south. I think somewhere somebody asked her the question about the Peripheral Canal and she indicated a favorable attitude on the canal. Well, from that moment on, it was all over.

Morris: So you saved that seat.

Brown: Absolutely. As a matter of fact, it was my responsibility. We would assign an individual member to a seat. That seat was one of the things that I had a job to do. We won that seat.

Morris: Do I hear you saying that if you have a really rough fight in a primary, the fallout from that can be--?

Brown: Can be the source of defeat, because all your opponent has to do in the general [election] is just collect all the things that were said about you by your fellow Democrat. Then in the general election, simply say, "This isn't what I say about Willie Brown. This is what his fellow Democrats say about him." So those fellow Democrats who voted against Willie Brown in the primary plus those disciplined Republicans who always vote for a Republican candidate whether he's competent or not, the combination of the two hopefully will be enough to defeat you.

Morris: It sounds as if that approach contributes a lot to the financial benefit of advertising agencies and political consultants and media revenues.

Brown: That's if you use those people exhaustively. In some areas we do and in other areas we don't. In some areas, we used amateurs to run the campaigns.

- Morris: That was one of the campaigns in which the Waxman-Berman slate cards were being used. People were buying and using those?
- Brown: Yes. Being employed. Yes.
- Morris: That looks as if that was an innovation in campaigning that also involved a lot of money. Am I right?
- Brown: That generates a lot of money for them.
- Morris: As a profit-making venture.
- Brown: Oh, yes. I'll bet you they make a half million dollars a year on that.
- Morris: Yes. But it's also an expense for a candidate.
- Brown: For a candidate. A major expense.
- Morris: And it's an expense that didn't exist before a candidate could buy space on a slate card organized by a campaign-management firm?
- Brown: No. That was an expense that was always there. Actually, Phil Burton perfected the slate card concept here in San Francisco. He did so as a voter assistance guide to people who may not read the candidate's material. He encouraged unions to publish their slate card; he encouraged ministerial organizations to publish their slate card. What he tried to do was try to make all the slate cards consistent. The Bermans saw it maybe in San Francisco (and they usually keep their slate card out of San Francisco). You may have your own operation going in San Francisco but nobody else in other parts of the state are using this same technique. So let's use this technique.
- They have had tremendous success with it, particularly in races where there was not a lot of attention given to the race. In judicial contests, people tend to go in and they take the voter guide and use it if they trust the senders of the voter guide and those who embrace and endorse that voter guide. So Berman and [Carl] D'Agostino really figured that out and became a profit-making center as a result of their having figured it out.
- Morris: In some districts, the matter of selling the space for the local races caused some controversy because it looked as if they were selling space to the highest bidder, not necessarily interested in which poor soul who was running for the city council--.
- Brown: Yes, they have to guard against that. I'm sure they are not always successful. But I think they try to keep the integrity of

the card geared to supporting Democratic candidates and being a benefit to Democratic candidates. They are not above making money, but I think that they would not consciously put David Duke on their slate card, so to speak. At the local level, you don't know who the David Dukes are, you may get bad advice and people would accuse you of having sold space without reference to philosophy.

Conversations with Berman and McCarthy

Morris: So in the process of working those districts in 1980, did you pick up some allies for your candidacy for speaker?

Brown: No, not really. The people who were McCarthy supporters were always Willie Brown supporters. I didn't get one supporter of Berman that was not already a Willie Brown supporter. I got [Art] Torres and [Richard] Alatorre, both of whom were Berman supporters, to come to Brown. I got Curtis Tucker to come to Brown, I got Waddi Deddeh to come to Brown, I got John Thurman to come to Brown; and they had been in some parts supporters of Berman. But those were ten, fifteen-year personal friendships.

Morris: If they were personal friendships, how come they were Berman supporters?

Brown: That personal friendship didn't translate into following my directions on McCarthy. They had their own beef with McCarthy. McCarthy had alienated people similar to Agnos' alienating people under the mayorship. So I couldn't translate that. But the minute I became a candidate, they dropped Berman. That was the difference.

Morris: I see. What kinds of conversations were there with Leo? Was there some matter of timing or something like that? Did he give his blessing to you?

Brown: Leo had the roll of the dice in the contest with Berman. He had said that he would never continue as the speaker if he didn't have a majority of the Democrats supporting him. In other words, he wanted the Democratic caucus to make the speakership decision. The speakership decision is made on the floor with forty-one votes. Leo McCarthy did not want to win the speakership for his own partisan purposes with any Republican votes. He wanted a majority of the Democrats to be for him.

When the election was over in November, he and Berman had divided the house almost equally, twenty-three, twenty-three, and one abstention.

Morris: Did one of them roll the dice or was that figurative?

Brown: No, no. Figuratively. When he saw that he didn't have forty-one Democrats supporting him, he announced that he wouldn't be a candidate and he recommended that we look out for ourselves, which was not a pleasant thought after having engaged in the Battle of Berman for a year and then suddenly be told by the guy who was the leader that--.

Morris: That he wasn't going to back you?

Brown: No, not me. That he was now no longer operating as the spokesperson for our group. With that in mind, our group asked if I would assume the responsibility for being the spokesperson and to meet with Berman and see what kind of arrangement could be made. After all, Leo in his role as speaker had named John Vasconcellos chairman of Ways and Means. All the senior positions and the most important committee chairmanships were in the hands of Leo McCarthy supporters, not Berman supporters. Clearly Berman would be dumping many of those persons from their lofty positions. These were people who had ten or twelve years invested and they were not about to be just dealt out as Leo was dealing them out by saying look out for yourselves.

So we put together a negotiating group to go visit with Berman and to tell Berman that none of these people would vote for him unless they understood what he proposed to do, specifically with reference to the following twelve, fourteen items. He refused to answer.

Morris: Were those items mostly chairmanships?

Brown: Chairmanships, memberships, how you are going to run the house, are you going to be fair, are you going to include everybody. He flunked on all of those answers. The meeting was held in my legislative office here in San Francisco on Van Ness Avenue. He did not do well in his answers, so the members became enraged and at that point suggested that maybe we ought to see if we could put the speakership together with someone else. That's when I emerged.

Morris: Had you some thoughts that you might emerge?

Brown: On Thursday after the election, Elihu Harris, Maxine Waters and Mike Roos came into my law office [then] over on Vallejo Street

and asked if they could have an hour of my time, they wanted to talk to me about something. They laid out to me how yesterday's meeting had been a disaster because Leo had said he was quitting --.

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Brown: --members together and that the Republicans had great respect for me and that I ought to try.

Morris: They had done some soundings over on that side of the aisle.

Brown: Well, they did some telephonic soundings before they came in to see me. I listened to it for an hour and told them I already agreed with them but I thought it would be key as to whether or not Leo McCarthy would support such a coalition. I sent them off to the state building where Leo McCarthy was in his office for purposes of having a conversation with Leo. They invited me to join them after a brief spell and I did, but I said nothing. I let them talk to Leo. I had pretty much primed them since they were young and inexperienced. I pretty much primed them on the kind of conversations you needed to have.

They had that conversation and they finally backed Leo into the corner. He was reluctant to do it and they pointed out to him how they had stood with him all these years, et cetera, and how it saved his speakership and maybe even his career and that he owed it to the membership to be supportive. He finally said yes he would but he needed to chat with Art Agnos. They came back to my office to report the final comments to me because I left before the meeting ended. And they were headed back to Sacramento as well.

While they were in my office, the telephone rang and it was Art Agnos calling from Leo's office to say that he wanted to ride back to Sacramento with them. He needed to hitch a ride; he lived in Sacramento.

Morris: With them or with you?

Brown: With them. I was not going back to Sacramento. They rode back to Sacramento and they called me at the end of that ride to inform me that Agnos was trying to talk them out of it and that obviously he and McCarthy had discussed it and talked about how he couldn't be successful. But fortunately for us, Agnos was leaving the next morning for Florida for the Thanksgiving holidays with his family and he would be gone, out of touch with them, for the next several days. We figured that we had just about seven days in which to put the thing together. So we got on the telephone to the four or

five Berman supporters and informed them that we were going to run and thought we could put it together and needed their help.

They immediately said, "If you announce, we will announce for you. Whether or not you are going to win it, we don't care. You are a good enough friend and we don't have anything going with Berman except we don't like McCarthy."

Negotiating Republican Support

Morris: Was Agnos thinking that he might try?

Brown: No, not at all. There was no competition to put it together. They just didn't like the idea of doing something with the Republicans. They thought long-range it would inure to everybody's detriment to do something with Republicans. We paid no attention to that and put the thing together with the Republicans. We gave Berman the second meeting opportunity. At the second meeting he failed even more miserably. So we went ahead and stopped those meetings with Berman and we stepped off into the Republicans.

I had about five or six good friends on the Republican side of the aisle by then.

Morris: Was Carol Hallett somebody that--?

Brown: She was the leader.

Morris: She was the leader you had already had working relations with?

Brown: No. I had good working relationships with her but not to the extent that I had anything going with her. A fellow named Curtis Tucker, who died in 1988, a member of the assembly, was a very close personal friend of Carol's and he went to work on Carol. Ross Johnson, who was just recently deposed as the Republican leader, was a part of that. But the key guy was a guy named Ed Rollins. Ed Rollins was a staff guy. He was Carol Hallett's chief of state. He subsequently worked for Reagan in the White House and for Bush and still heads the Republican campaign operation.¹ You see him on CNN and what have you.

¹In June 1992, Rollins was a key strategist for Ross Perot's independent campaign for president.

Well, Ed Rollins was an admirer of Willie Brown's, a man I hardly knew; but he was just literally enamored with Willie Brown's leadership potential. Knowing that Republicans wouldn't dominate the house and could not elect anybody speaker, he thought the next best thing would be to elect Willie Brown and he thought Willie Brown would give the Republicans their place in the sun. So they put together a series of requests of me at a meeting in Carol Hallett's office. Present at that meeting were Bob Naylor, Ross Johnson, Carol Hallett and Ed Rollins. A deal was made with those three. It included vice-chairmanships, it included a budget for reapportionment and in return for that they pledged twenty-eight of the thirty-three Republican votes. You only need forty-one to win so we only needed thirteen Democrats to win this. We got twenty-three Democrats.

Morris: The twenty-three that you had originally counted stayed with you throughout?

Brown: Correct.

Morris: What did Leo and Art Agnos do?

Brown: They were part of the twenty-three.

Morris: They did stay with you even though they wouldn't say that we think Willie Brown should be the next speaker?

Brown: No. They finally came around to that. It was just the reality of numbers. And particularly when I recommended to Leo, in view of the fact that I knew he was going to run for lieutenant governor in 1982, I recommended that he would be the speaker pro tem, the presiding officer in the house, since he knew the rules. And he did. He accepted the lesser role.

Morris: What kinds of personal concerns did the Republicans have aside from the vice-chair and reapportionment?

Brown: That was it.

Morris: No policy?

Brown: No. They were not concerned about policy because they knew that no one could be hammered into a pre-arrangement on capital punishment, of pre-arrangement on choice, or pre-arrangement on health insurance, from the speakership standpoint. The speakership is the chief administrative operator of the assembly. The person who occupies that job has to be a pencil-pusher, has to be a landlord, has to be a supply sergeant, has to talk about the parking spaces in the basement. You really don't want then to

have the parking space in the basement determined by how you voted on abortion because if you hammer the guy to get his speakership vote based on some philosophical view, invariably then all decisions are going to be made on that basis.

So office assignments are going to be made on how you voted on the tax bill and they should not be.

Morris: Occasionally you hear that so and so lost his office because he didn't back the speaker on such and such an issue.

Brown: No, he didn't back the speaker. Forget the issue. If there is a challenge to the chair and you support the challenge to the chair, you are not backing the speaker. That way, you are no longer on the team.

Morris: That's how you lose the office?

Brown: You could lose everything. If somebody made a motion to vacate and that motion failed and you voted for the motion, why should you continue to enjoy the prerogatives of the winning side. You are now the loser.

Morris: Is that the way Leo had run the speakership?

Brown: Yes. Except he dealt only with Democrats.

Morris: What was Berman's approach going to be? Was he also going to not deal with Republicans?

Brown: Well, the Republicans wouldn't touch Berman anyway. He was a blatant partisan person, I mean grossly partisan. They feared Berman; they didn't fear Brown. In their opinion, Berman would never keep his word even if given. So a combination of those factors led them to the conclusion that they were better off for fair play with Brown. They had some evidence of that when I chaired the Ways and Means Committee for four years, gained great respect and stature as a fair shooter regardless of philosophy.

Then the Rev and Tax Committee even more graphically demonstrated it because on that committee were all of the Proposition 13 babies. Everybody who had been supportive of Proposition 13 and elected as a result of Proposition 13 signed up to protect the taxpayer. Even though my philosophy was different from theirs, they found me to be extraordinarily fair, fair at hearings, fair in sharing resources information and permitting their bills to go out. A chairman can be a tyrant if one chairman chooses to do so. I never used the chairmanship in that way. I would vote against your bill even if I was the only vote and I

would let still your bill go out. I would vote against your bill if I was the final swing vote.

Morris: But you wouldn't just bottle it up in committee.

Brown: Wouldn't bottle it up. I always gave you a fair hearing. I was always courteous, I always assisted you in finding the witnesses and insisted upon my staff being objective in their analysis. They would write a cheat sheet for me but they could not ding your bill in the analysis. That became my standard.

Morris: Even offhandedly they would say to you--.

Brown: They would tell me. They would give me a separate recommendation. But they had to be totally pristine in their presentation, and that has followed me to this day.

Putting the House in Order; Reapportionment

Morris: What were your expectations when you took office as speaker? What you would be able to accomplish and what you wanted to accomplish?

Brown: Well, first and foremost, I wanted to bring the house back together as a house. I did not like the year of incredible divisiveness and disunity and zero attention to public policy. So I set as my first order of business to put the house in order. And I did that in a very short period of time.

Secondly, I wanted to have a fair reapportionment plan that did not gratuitously reduce a sitting incumbent's chances of winning. I didn't worry about trying to enhance, but I did not want to be in a position where I was deliberately trying to undo what the voters had done when they sent you up to represent us.

Morris: How does protecting incumbents come up against the very strong concern for finding a way to elect a few more Hispanics and a few more African American candidates?

Brown: Wherever population dictated that, I was the first to call for it. But I would not twist the system just to pursue that goal. I thought it unfair to twist the system to do that. That would be quotas and I am not a quota person.

Morris: Your observation was that there was enough change in demographics to make some logical openings.

Brown: Right, and that's why I named a Hispanic chair of the reapportionment committee, Richard Alatorre, so that the quality of the committee's work would never be subject to attack on a racial basis. His successor was a black woman, Maxine Waters, so I always kept the reapportionment operation under the leadership of people whose questions and commitments to increasing racial minority participation would stand the test of time.

Morris: You had found that the 1970 reapportionment was not handled well?

Brown: No, not at all. I thought the reapportionment in the 1970s was handled very well. But this was 1981 and we had to do it again. The masters did it in 1972. They were not available. We didn't need them since we had Jerry Brown's signature. As a result of that it was a far easier reapportionment plan.

Morris: Did you find that Jerry was responsive to your ideas about--?

Brown: More than responsive. He simply said, "Do it and I'll sign it."

Morris: Really! The mechanics of it didn't interest him, things like that?

Brown: No.

Supreme Court Appointments

Morris: Did you have any talk at all about appointments other than your own?

Brown: Absolutely. Full time. Every time he had an appointment to make, practically, he asked for my input. Judgeships. Everything. Didn't always take my advice but anything I genuinely wanted I got. If I said desperately, "Listen, I need this judgeship," I got it, including Allen Broussard on the supreme court. That was my appointment.

Morris: What was there particularly about Allen Broussard, and Wiley Manuel before him? Were they people that you had been interested in seeing elevated?

Brown: I helped get Wiley Manuel to the supreme court, but Allen Broussard was my appointment. I convinced Jerry to take Allen Broussard. He initially offered it to Sam Williams. Sam Williams was in the Hufstetler firm in Los Angeles and Sam did not want to move to San Francisco and didn't want to leave the private

practice of law. Sam had great credentials. Sam had been a good scholar, quarterback of the University of California, one of the first blacks to gain, I suppose, partnership in a major law firm. He had been, I think, the chair of that committee appointed by [Mayor Tom] Bradley to look at the Watts riots, whatever that committee was called. He had really distinguished himself and he had become the president of the state bar. Sam Williams was president of the state bar, so he had all the credentials. Jerry asked him to go on the supreme court. He finally reluctantly turned Jerry down.

Morris: Did you talk to Williams too? Were you helpful there?

Brown: Oh, sure, absolutely. I was asked to help and I did. I came back and started on Jerry Brown to appoint Allen Broussard. When I got the commitment from Jerry, I called Allen's home, he was on his way to Minnesota for some kind of a judges' convention. I got a-hold of him at the airport and said, "Listen, I would recommend to you that you get off the airplane, go home and sit by your telephone. I have reasons to believe that you may receive a call for an appointment to the supreme court." He cancelled his trip and went home and he did get the call.

Morris: You didn't give him any more advance warning?

Brown: No, he understood what I was talking about, at that stage, because he had gone through the clearance process by then. He was one of the people who had walked the clearance process.

Morris: I see. So he was on the short list, as they say?

Brown: Correct.

Morris: Did he have some reluctance to go on the supreme court at that point?

Brown: No. That was not a factor in anybody's mind except Sam Williams. His wife did not want to move to San Francisco and the court is based here in San Francisco. He didn't want to have to commute as Malcolm Lucas and some of the other people are currently doing. You notice that in the last several years, several people have gotten off the court long before they reach any age of retirement. Broussard has now gotten off the court. [John] Arguelles got off the court recently. Otto Kaus got off the court and went back to practicing law. All these were appointments made by Deukmejian and Jerry Brown; the people quit.

Morris: Is part of that that there has also been continuing controversy about the supreme court since Rose Bird's time?

Morris: Is part of that that there has also been continuing controversy about the supreme court since Rose Bird's time?

Brown: Yes, there has.

Morris: As a practicing attorney, does that make the supreme court a less viable body than it was?

Brown: I think it is a less-respected body. I think that the voters throwing Bird and her court out, that was a political act; I think the subsequent appointments have been rooted in politics and I think the court has now the reputation of being a political court rather than a Donald Wright court or rather than an Earl Warren court or rather than any similar court.

Morris: Is this something that the legislature has talked about?

Brown: Yes, very much so. Many members of the legislature look at the court as being a political court. And that is not good for a court.

Morris: Were there some concerns or conversations with Jerry Brown that maybe he was moving too far too fast in either opening up the court or in challenging some conservative assumptions?

Brown: No, I don't remember any conversations of that nature. I think no one ever envisioned that there could be an organized effort to dump the court. Cruz Reynoso, first Hispanic, you would think that is not a problem. Allen Broussard, second black, you would think that is not a problem. Rose Bird, the first woman, you would think that is not a problem; just as you would assume the combinations could never be put together to dump those people.

There had not been any evidence of that in the past history of the supreme court. So I don't think anybody talked to Jerry Brown about the practicality of his appointments and their retention ability. I don't think there was ever a conversation. Not until Rose and Joe Grodin and Reynoso were thrown off the court did anyone come to the conclusion that maybe you should consider electability when you select a chief justice or a justice.

Morris: Was the electability problem related to the fact that under Jerry Brown the supreme court became a much more varied group of people in terms of ethnicity and maybe social outlook?

Brown: Yes. I think a combination of those symbols plus their performance on the court. They became protective of the consumer. They became great respecters of individual liberties. They

types. It's a combination of all those factors that has made the court seriously at risk.

Law-Enforcement Concerns

Morris: In your capacity as speaker and also as a practicing attorney, did you have any problems with the law-enforcement people in the state?

Brown: No, not at all. I've always got along with them. Some of my greatest supporters are the law enforcement personnel. When I represent clients, they know that I represent them fairly and appropriately.

Morris: You've also carried some bills for the Highway Patrol.

Brown: And I carried lots of their health and welfare legislation. I don't carry any of their legislation to increase their ability to violate the constitution. I oppose all of that and oppose it vehemently. But on the questions of early retirement, stress claims, uniform allowance, educational systems, survivor benefits, I am their champion. Working conditions, the right to bargain collectively, organize, I'm their champion.

Morris: Were there specific issues in relation to the courts that bothered the law-enforcement people?

Brown: All the death-penalty overturns specifically bothered them. All of the Miranda rights restrictions bothered them. The admissibility of evidence secured by questionable means or the failure to permit it not to be introduced bothered them. The judiciary going beyond the strict interpretation of the statutes bothered them, as it relates to criminal matters. So a combination of all those things bothered them.

What really rankled them however was the reduced sentencing that seemed to follow the environment created by this court. People getting probation where previously they would have gone to county jail, people getting county jail where they otherwise would have gone to state prison, all of that caused the law enforcement people to believe that they were fighting a hopeless battle and the enemy was being supported by the leadership in government.

Morris: Anybody in particular in law enforcement who spearheaded this?

Brown: No. I couldn't identify them. Or I don't remember.

Morris: Anybody in particular in law enforcement who spearheaded this?

Brown: No. I couldn't identify them. Or I don't remember.

Morris: They didn't come to the legislature to revise the law?

Brown: Oh, yes, they came to the legislature but the committee structures would never permit those kinds of bills to move. That's been an ongoing criticism of the so-called Criminal Justice Committee. That's the committee that allegedly kills everything and is a graveyard; that is a committee that Burton chairs.

Morris: So John Burton was part of this reason for being upset with the state of criminal justice in California?

Brown: Well, he is now. He wasn't then because he wasn't holding office in California at that time. No. It was Byron Sher. Before that it was Terry Goggin. So there was a whole series of Democrats and Republicans. Ken Maddy chaired the committee at one time. None of them would do the kinds of things that law enforcement wanted to do. Law enforcement wanted to be able to break your door down and the only thing they would be required to do is pay for your door if they didn't find something. [Their view was that] if they found something, even though they broke your door down just to search and they had no probable cause, what they found justified the original entry.

That was the kind of policy that they wanted to put in place. They wanted to put in place that it was a death-penalty case to strike a police officer whether you knew it was a police officer or not. So all of those things were stopped by the various heads of the Criminal Justice Committee. I was, of course, as the speaker ultimately charged with having named that person head of the committee and therefore not likely to provide any relief to law-enforcement folks.

Morris: This sounds like a good place to stop for today.

Brown: All right.



XX ONGOING CRITICAL POLICY ISSUES, 1981-1991

[Interview 5: January 26, 1992]##

Health Care, Growth Management, Affordable Housing, Environmental Protection

Morris: Did you have a good holiday in Paris?

Brown: It was a fun trip.

Morris: Good. You're all prepared for the battles ahead this election year?

Brown: I'm ready for them.

Morris: What I wanted to ask you about today is the changing politics in the last ten years since you've been speaker.

Before we began taping, you said that there were some themes that you had been interested in developing as speaker that sometimes got lost in the shuffle of day-to-day passing of the budget and things like that. What are some of these important issues on which you've tried to educate the public?

Brown: There were three or four major issues that are still out there and still pending and still requiring public attention, and more public attention than when I initially fell upon them.

Morris: They've become more important.

Brown: They are universal health care (for lack of a better one-line description); growth management, that translates initially into regional government--the business of trying to make some sense out of the crazy patchwork quilt we have of local governments and local jurisdictions and special districts and single-purpose regional agencies and multi-purpose regional agencies or dual-

purpose regional agencies and competing transportation systems and the multiplicity of bridges. All of those things are part of the growth-management process, as well as the location of the public facilities that no one wishes to have located in their jurisdiction or in their area, like jails and toxic dumps and sewer-treatment plants. Nobody wants those things in their area, yet they are absolutely necessary for the comfort level that human beings wish to enjoy. That's all part of the growth-management issue.

That spills over into the affordable-housing issue. Then, of course, the whole question of how much effect do growth-management issues have on protecting the environment and how they interrelate. Those are some of the issues that I envisioned needed addressing at the outset of my speakership that still have only been addressed, if at all, in a hesitant manner and certainly not in a comprehensive manner, certainly not in a visionary manner and certainly not in a manner that addresses the future growth needs and the future growth patterns of California.

Morris: Why is it that there has been such a hesitant response?

Brown: Well, on the health issue, it is mainly because of cost. The American system of health coverage is an employer-based system. Normally the employer pays the benefit. Most employers, probably 75 to 80 percent of the employers in this nation, as well as this state, provide health-care coverage as a part of the employment package to their employees. The 20 percent who do not and their employees' dependents constitute, I don't know, about four to six million people in the state of California who are without health coverage. That translates into an increased health cost for those who are covered because the providers of the service factor in all of their ancillary costs, including their share of the uncompensated care costs. That's spread across the board. Employers are now becoming more sensitive to the increased health-care cost rates. Some are even pulling out of the coverage.

As a result of that, when you attempt to have legislation moved that would mandate coverage, you run smack into this alarm about the increased costs and the unwillingness of that 20 to 25 percent of the employers to pay at all. Those employers are usually small-business persons. Or a definition of an employee not covered is usually a counter person at some [low-paying fast-food kind of] place. They are a very tough collection of folk.

Morris: Is that because of their political persuasion or their economic situation?

Brown: It's because of their political persuasion more than anything else. As a result of their efforts, we have not been able to get

mandated coverage. We've just not been able to get any mandated coverage.

Individual and Agency Resistance to Integrated Services

Brown: On the question of regionalization or growth management of regional government, it is similarly the politics that bar us from achieving it. The clout of the single-purpose districts, the counties, the cities, all of those little jurisdictions that know that they are out of business, possibly. If the decision-making and enforcement powers are transferred to a regional body, there would be no reason for them to exist. There would be no reason for their overlapping bureaucracies to exist. There would be no reason for their overlapping capital-investment advisers to exist. They are literally in place hiding behind something called local control. They make a great case for blocking any efforts to intelligently manage the process.

An example of that would be the Bay Vision 2020 that has been working for a couple of years to put together just a modest proposal to create a commission to talk about it. That was killed. That's the latest example. All during the eighties, legislation was introduced, mostly by me, and it could seldom, if ever, get out of the first committee.

Morris: Really. But further back, all those special districts were set up by legislation.

Brown: Most were established by legislation, some by virtue of local power authorities in between the groups. At that time, people envisioned that that was a good idea. Establishing BART [Bay Area Rapid Transit], that was an option for the counties that were involved. Only three counties opted to go into BART in the nine-county Bay Area, San Francisco County, Alameda County and Contra Costa County when, in fact, if we had created a state agency and superimposed a rapid transit district on the nine-county Bay Area and at the time of that process, you would have charged the cost of that and spread it through all nine counties, you would now have a marvelous system that would rival whatever they have in Europe, whatever they have in Asia for the purpose of moving people around--particularly in Japan.

But no, you went into this little truncated system where you have only three counties involved. Now you have SamTrans down in San Mateo County, you have some other system in Santa Clara County, you've got the Golden Gate Transit System coming out of Marin County. None of these interlock with BART. Then you've got

Muni Metro [S.F. Municipal Railway] and you still have AC Transit [Alameda-Contra Costa County Transit District]. Then you've got several bridges that are under different bridge authorities. You absolutely have nothing. When we put BART together, not only could we not get BART to be a multiple agency, we couldn't even get it to be a single-purpose transportation agency for the nine-county Bay Area. It turned out to be only for three counties. And it's still plagued with that deficiency.

People were resisting even then to establish the Association of Bay Area Governments [ABAG]. That turned out to be a planning and information system, not even a clearinghouse. We established the Bay Conservation and Development Commission (BCDC) and its jurisdiction was relatively limited.

We established the Air Quality Control District. It has relatively limited powers because it is not connected to the development and planning of transportation systems. It can only set standards for air pollution but really has nothing else to do with patterns of where people live that clearly could contribute substantially to reducing how much travel time people actually do, therefore how many vehicles are required and therefore how many pollutants are in the air. They don't have anything to do with any of the land-use patterns of where you locate manufacturing facilities and what-have-you. Yet they are called the Bay Area Pollution Control District. How can they be that without having that necessary kind of clout?

Then we had MTC, the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, that is, I guess you would best describe it, as a clearinghouse for transit money distribution.

Morris: Mostly federal?

Brown: Mostly federal, but without any real control over transportation systems as such. The amount of money that they have control over and can participate in distributing or directing is not substantial enough for them to have real influence. Then you have PUC [Public Utilities Commission], still out there messing around with what you do with the ferry-boat systems.

Morris: That's the local PUC?

Brown: No, that's the state PUC. The state PUC makes the determination. The Public Utilities Commission of the state of California determines what you can put on the bay, in addition to BCDC. So you have all this multiplicity of agencies trying to mess around with growth measures. Then you have, of course, your individual county waste systems. Every county has its own waste authority or some combination thereof. In a county like San Francisco, it will

not allow you to dump garbage in the city. [Phone interruption] San Francisco does not permit dumping of garbage. So San Francisco shops around to see which one of the adjacent counties will accept San Francisco garbage. They have a contract with Solano County to dump garbage. They have a contract with Alameda County to dump garbage.

Morris: I think Alameda is shipping some of its own garbage out of the county too.

Brown: Yes, they may be. San Francisco originally had a contract with San Mateo County to dump garbage. San Francisco now has a contract with San Mateo County to locate its jail. San Francisco doesn't want any county jails. So we contract on land and we put the county jail down there. We would love to contract out the sewer-treatment system. We just can't find anybody to take the refuse. So we're having to build our own.

Every other place is similarly situated. Many times you can't build any housing in Marin County because you can't get any water connection since the system is so limited. Each one of the local jurisdictions do not wish to give up any of their authority to try to correct it. That constitutes formidable political clout that bars us at the state level from doing anything except tinkering.

Local-State Confrontations; Permit Complications

Morris: What you're describing is the situation where one level of political leadership is in direct confrontation with another level of political leadership.

Brown: Where that happens and it's local, locals always win.

Morris: Why is that?

Brown: Simply because there are more of them. Simply because the argument is easier to make. No one wishes San Francisco dictating what you can do in Alameda County. All Alameda Countians have a common interest. And they are more than there are San Franciscans, just in the port authorities alone, for example. Each one of these damn ports compete with each other. That's crazy. Each one of those ports ought to be assigned a function that they do best and the revenues ought to be then shared regardless of where those revenues are taken in.

One example. The storage facility for automobiles may very well be Richmond. The headquarters facility where all those executive types like to live and recreate may very well be San Francisco, and the pleasure crafts may come into San Francisco. The container facilities may very well offload in the Oakland port. The revenues and the cost of developing and maintaining, that ought to be shared and at the end of the year, it ought to be divided on a per capita basis or something.

Morris: Yes. Have you ever raised that point?

Brown: Absolutely. I introduced a bill to merge the ports.

Morris: Did you? A brave fellow.

Brown: I introduced a bill to merge the ports and almost got ran out of town by the various port authorities. Only San Francisco Port supported my effort.

Morris: Because they figured that they would be the chief honcho?

Brown: Not at all. They are just more conscious of the need for regionalization, and I suppose their tonnage is down lower than most of the others anyway and so there is obviously no great potential loss in tonnage for them.

Morris: And all those overlap? All those local districts have environmental protection aspects too, it sounds like.

Brown: Absolutely. If you were trying to develop something in this area, say you were trying to do housing in Solano County as is the case for lots of people these days, if you were water-related at all, there may be as many as forty different agencies you would have to go through. As you go through each one of those forty agencies, seldom if ever are the review processes of one agency applicable to the next agency. So you may have to start the wheel all over again. The carrying costs for that, ultimately imposed upon the price of the housing, drives the price beyond most people's affordable level.

Morris: What about the idea of "going to the people," over and around the intervening local governmental bodies? Is that something that your speeches have been designed to do?

Brown: No, not really, because the decisions are made literally within the legislature and there are no initiatives that the people could directly participate in that would drive or influence that decision.

Educating Local Decisionmakers

Morris: You seem to have a very heavy schedule of speechmaking addressing these issues and other issues. Joanne Murphy gave me a roster of the speeches you've made which looks as if there are fifteen or twenty major speeches going on at a time, being presented to different bodies.¹

Brown: Those bodies are usually populated with the local elected types, the local appointed types, of these boards and agencies in an effort to remove their fears and in some cases illuminate their thought processes on the issue. Most of them are without real facts and without real information. They tend to react as if there is a potential invasion. So I've spent lots of time trying to educate them.

Morris: Have you made any progress?

Brown: Very little. Very little. The fact that many academicians and many planning types have over the last five years embraced the concept is a great step forward. The journalists have pretty much embraced the concept as well, so we are getting a wider audience now and we are getting a lot more attention than we got five or six years ago. Bay Vision 2020 is an academician/business-driven group of thinkers who put that report together with some participation by elected officials but not at the local level, but not enough so that when they went back for the appropriate approval from all of the constituent organizations who had contributed membership to Bay Vision 2020, they couldn't get it passed. Here the people, the subgroup, who were assigned the responsibility to do the evaluation and come forward with a recommendation, unanimously recommended it. The bigger group dumped it.

Morris: Within Bay Vision 2020?

Brown: Within Bay Vision 2020. Then there is a group out of Southern California, out of Los Angeles, called L.A. 2000, that is really on target. They are supportive of the kinds of efforts that I've been making. There is a group in San Diego called Measure C that has attempted to do something similar to this on a voluntary basis and have had some success. I'm not sure what the incentives have been for those local agencies to participate fully but they have had some success. Even Orange County has now put together a group of citizens plus elected officials who are talking for the first time in the last twelve months; they began to talk about

¹See listing in Appendix.

regionalization or some multi-purpose forms of government to address the issues that are regional in nature rather than local in nature.

Then there is a group working out of, and I think under the directions of someone at, Sacramento State University. They have and will be producing a plan or a proposal or some report within the next several weeks. Then, of course, the governor appointed a group of folk, a task force as he called it, for the purpose of addressing growth management, and they too will be giving their report within the next week.

Morris: That sounds as if it's become a trendy issue.

Brown: Very trendy issue. That's what I meant by over the last five years, getting the attention of the academicians as well as some of the business people and a few of the governmental appointees, at least to the extent that they are discussing it.

Morris: Does the fact that San Diego and Orange County have fairly close agreement between the business leaders and the political leadership make a difference in getting an idea like this accepted?

Brown: It would have. San Diego actually has some form of regionalization in place as a result of voluntary participation. It's interesting how they did it. They put together a proposal called the Measure C, put it on the ballot to get the approval of the voters for what they said they wanted to do. The voters gave a thumbs up to their assent to such a proposal. It wasn't mandated within Measure C; it was just an indication of what they would do on a voluntary basis in order to test whether or not it was acceptable to the public. They put it up as a public question. It was overwhelmingly supported. So they have been plodding along. Orange County is just beginning to think about it.

First Funds for AIDS Research; Finding Resources for New Programs in a Tight Budget

Morris: Could we go back a little back to where you started on health care. The record indicates that you had a lot to do with some of the revisions in state policy. Joanne Murphy was telling me about your efforts to get some research money for AIDS [Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome] into the budget when it had not been proposed by the research units of the medical school--.

Brown: And we succeeded. We succeeded in doing that.

Morris: Could you tell me that story?

Brown: In the early eighties, when George Deukmejian became the governor of the state of California--in 1983 to be exact--people in San Francisco at the university medical center told me about this new virus that could threaten all of humankind, that people knew very little about. It destroyed the immune system and they really wanted to get into doing some research. They told me about persons at other University of California-related medical facilities throughout the state who had been at least informally chatting about it. There was no such research proposal either by the board of regents at the University of California or by the president's office at the University of California and certainly not by the state Department of Health.

Morris: Had the research people gone to those types of channels?

Brown: I don't know. I would assume that they had at least had the same kind of discussions they were having with me but I was not privy to that. When I learned of this, I asked Marcus Conant if he would pull the people together whom he knew could do a definitive proposal for me. We put together, I guess you would call it a retreat, but it was actually in the downtown speaker's office in the state building in Los Angeles. We brought all these scientists into the conference room and I think they sat there for a couple of days with Joanne Murphy doing the writing and the scientists supplying the info[rmation], we wrote the research grant proposal that we translated into budgetary language and budgetary appropriations and then made the appeal to the governor with the scientists' supporting facts and documents, and the governor assented to it as one of the trade items that was mine. That became the first state anywhere in the nation to appropriate money for AIDS research.

Morris: When you say trade items?

Brown: Well, during the course of any legislative movement, in particular the budget, the governor always has a list of priority items that he would like to have us include, and on merit they probably would be included if you had all the resources that you ever wanted to have; but you usually do not have the resources so you have to make some determinations of priority. He sets his priorities; then he will request of us, "What are your priorities?" If there is a mutuality of agreement on priorities, then there is no reason for dialogue. If there is a difference on priorities, then the trade-off process comes. Can you delay yours and let me have mine or can I delay mine and let Roberti have his, et cetera. That's why I call them trade items [phone interruption].

Say there are five such items that I had an overwhelming interest in, like the child health screening-disability prevention program or the AIDS research money, Roberti may have homeless-shelter money that he would like to see definitely in the budget, those are all things that would be foreign to the governor. The governor may have in his proposal something to do with the World Trade Commission or one of those Republican-type proposals [phone interruption], something that we would never even leave in the budget as a priority item. With that process, he'll come to us and give us his laundry list, we'll give him ours and if we dig his kind of jive, we will then proceed with just those twelve or thirteen items as being off the table and the other four hundred items in the budget will be subject to sacrifice in order to finance the remainder of the programs.

Morris: With this AIDS research bill in 1983, weren't we also in a budget crunch in the state at that time?

Brown: Absolutely. When Deukmejian came aboard, he inherited a billion-dollar deficit, a billion two or so deficit from the Jerry Brown administration. Within sixty days, warnings were sent out by [director of Finance] Jesse Huff and others that we would be issuing warrants because we were running out of cash for the state. That's when we created the trigger tax proposal. As a matter of fact, it was my proposal. Deukmejian held a press conference and announced that he had failed because he couldn't reach an agreement with the senate. We took joint leadership of the assembly at that time, Republicans and Democrats, with good people running the Republican side of the aisle, and we put together a proposal that created a standby tax. A tax that we said would be imposed only if the economy performed in a certain way and the general fund performed in a certain way or the expenditure programs performed in a certain way.

Although Mr. Deukmejian had pledged not to raise taxes when he ran in 1982 and we were in a tax-reduction environment as fostered by the 1981 Tax Reduction Act that Reagan put in place in Washington we were literally at the stage where we had to do something. He knew that, so he agreed to a proposal called a trigger tax. That proposal became what we used to get ourselves out of the doldrums economically speaking. But in spite of what clearly was a bleak period for funding for programs, the AIDS research proposal had developed sufficient clout from the scientific information supplied, plus the advocacy of my office, and the combination of the two got it on the table as a new program.

Morris: How about the community groups?

Grassroots Politicking Pro and Con; Public Schools and Property Taxation ##

- Morris: How much impact did they have in keeping the AIDS question before the public?
- Brown: Community groups can be very, very important. The best example of how community groups work is to watch the education establishment.
- Morris: [laughter]
- Brown: That is singularly the best place you can look at what you call grass roots participation. The teacher movement throughout the state of California, if not the nation, has mastered the art of public persuasion with numbers. They more than any other single group have caused the issue of public education to become a non-political issue in that it crosses party lines. You've got as many Republicans advocating for public education funding and for protecting public schools as you do Democrats. The issue around education is not whether or not you will do it, it is only how you will do it. Some would insist that the public school system remain in the frame and the model that we currently have. Others would suggest some form of voucher, of choice, or what-have-you. but they all are advocating constant, ongoing, committed support for education.

Almost nobody recommends cuts in education. You don't see candidates running for public office promising to cut back on education. Not even a Republican runs on that basis.

- Morris: What about the recurrent comment whenever there is a budget crunch that there are too many administrators in the schools?
- Brown: Well, that's the administrator side. The teachers usually say that. But that's not cutting education as such. No one believes that cutting an administrator interferes with the quality of learning that goes on in the classroom.

But there are no politicians--as they do on welfare, as they do on all the other areas--nobody stands up and makes speeches about how they are going to cut back on the dollars spent or given to public education. Nobody says that. [Governor Pete] Wilson attempted to hold that kind of discussion and he couldn't even get the proposal introduced into the legislature. No one would introduce in the legislature a proposal to suspend [Proposition]

98.¹ Wilson talked about it last year and then this year, when he came in with his proposal, even though we still have a budget crisis, he didn't even suggest it. He said, "Let's protect 98." So all of a sudden he's on time too.

That comes as a result of the grassroots community-based effective politicking that the teachers have caused to occur on public education questions. Parents are involved in it, students are involved in it, business persons are involved in it. Business Roundtable is constantly holding a task force, or a team, on education, or coming forward with new proposals in the field of education. They all require money. No one is insensitive about that.

So when you ask me, "Are community groups effective?" Yes. Community groups are also effective on things like saving the coast. Everybody wants in some manner or another to save the coast and to save trees and to save mountain lions. Those are all community-driven kinds of public participation policymaking. It is very effective. But those are about the only things that are effective by virtue of the existing ongoing community group participation. There are some isolated single-purpose and single-issue and single-shot community based groups that have some influence.

On the negative side, there are probably two or three groups, negative from my political standpoint. The pro-life group--.

Morris: Pro-life?

Brown: Anti-abortion people. They are fairly effective but only in limited jurisdictions. They do so only through the fear of intimidation in people who pursue public office. The gun operators or the NRA or whatever their state constituent organization or subsidiary may be, they too have some clout routed in community-type expressions and community-type activities. But they are very limited as well. There are just a few isolated politicians who yield to their demands and to their influence. But they are in fact out there.

The pro-choice people on the other hand are a fairly respected group but seem only to be handsomely energized when the issue is actually upon us. Seldom are they involved in between.

¹ November 1988, a measure to guarantee a fixed percentage of the state budget be spent on public school education.

Morris: In between, yes. Is the success of the community groups related to the kind of professional assistance and guidance?

Brown: Not really. It's more the issue.

Morris: Because I was thinking that the teachers have for years retained Whitaker and Baxter [Inc.] who are known as some of the best political campaign people in the business.

Brown: Yes, but that isn't where it comes from. It comes from their figuring out a long time ago how to actively involve the community-based residential teachers in every school-related issue.

Morris: So then it has a career implication for the teachers?

Brown: Absolutely. It is a network that teachers really employ, use and relate to. They keep the issue focused not on teachers but on schools. If it got down to teachers, they might lose that one if the issue of just merit pay for teachers was put, if the issue was work hours of teachers, just teachers, not related necessarily to education. Every teacher-related issue has been carefully structured so that it becomes a schools issue rather than just teachers. They always refer to it as schools or education. Pete Wilson tried to make it as if teachers were responsible for the debacle in Richmond that resulted in the Richmond school district virtually going bankrupt. The teachers were smart enough not to let that confrontation occur.

Morris: On the evidence, it didn't have much validity.

Brown: Very little efficacy. In southern California, in the L.A. school district, which is a world into itself, the teachers this year were smart enough to take a voluntary 3 percent cut in pay, which thereby removed the issue when it came to the question of funding the L.A. school system and the shortage of funds and where do you get new funds. The teachers stepped up to the plate and smartly removed themselves as a bone of contention by doing a voluntary 3 percent cut, which means that they may have saved themselves 2 percent because they may have had imposed upon them out of circumstances 5 percent. But they removed it as an issue.

Morris: They pre-empted.

Brown: Pre-emptive strategy.

Morris: How about the effect of the single-issue organization in terms of things like the Gann Amendment and the whole series of amendments that followed on Proposition 13?

Brown: Those were single time, single-shots where they pushed the hot button in the system. They were really not organized as such. That was an apartment house owner-driven and financed scheme to benefit apartment house owners.

Morris: Right. But the voters bought the presentation year after year.

Brown: That is correct, and I think in many cases they continue to buy the presentation, although I think they are getting a little sour on it now because they have suddenly discovered that the real benefit over the decades of Proposition 13 has turned out to be the commercial properties in this state that never change hands or if they do change hands they change hands in such a way that there is no reassessment. As a result of that, the contribution that the commercial side of the roll makes to the total property tax roll has consistently gone down and the contribution that the home owner side of the roll has consistently gone up. That's why you have incredible discrepancies between people living next door to each other and how much taxes they pay on residences. Someone who bought a home in 1991 is paying 1991 market prices for tax-determination purposes whereas if someone had that house in 1978 when Proposition 13 passed, it could be the same identical house worth the same "market value" but the guy who paid market value today pays taxes on what he paid and the guy who bought in 1978 pays taxes on the 1978 level.

That has created just a terrible disquietude among people. That issue is now before the supreme court for a determination. But there is a consistent vote for protecting property taxes and property taxpayers in this state, all generated originally from Proposition 13's efforts.

Morris: Is that another example of the local-control issue?

Brown: No, that's not local control at all. That is just homeowners not wanting to pay any more real property taxes. All those real property taxes go to the locals; they don't go to the state. There were no property taxes paid to the state.

Morris: Right. And you hear people say that if I have to pay a larger local property tax, then that will reduce the amount that I will have to pay to the state income tax people.

Brown: Proposition 13 is just the reverse of that because if Proposition 13 takes your taxes down, that means that you can't deduct your property taxes at the same level from the state amount. So you end up paying more state taxes as a result of the reduced deductibility of the amount of the deductibility.

Morris: Did that provide a windfall of revenue for the state?

Brown: No, not really.

Morris: It wasn't sufficient?

Brown: No, not even close. As a matter of fact, the state out of its surplus bailed out locals when Proposition 13 passed. We stepped up to the plate and held locals harmless at about a 90 percent level of their current budget for their budgets at that time. That's how we bailed out Proposition 13 and barred the severe adverse impact that Proposition 13 would have had the day after it was enacted into law.

XXI THREATS TO DEMOCRATIC PROCESS AND INSTITUTIONS

Negative Campaigning; Campaign Reform Measures

Morris: Just going on with the list of your speeches that I've been reading, you've made a number of speeches on the increase in negative campaigning and the need to provide for some voluntary standards for campaign behavior?

Brown: Over the years, the perception of public office holders individually has declined, favorable to unfavorable. The perception of the institution, favorable to unfavorable, whether it be the legislature or the executive branch, Congress, the Senate, has dramatically declined. Part of that decline is rooted in the utterances by politicians running against the institutions. But a substantial proportion of it has been by the technique of getting elected to public office by attacking your opponent in the campaigns and in most cases on a non-substantive basis, or on a half-truth basis. Or sometimes on a total lie basis.

And that is an absolute article of faith for most political consultants in what they use. They do negative research. They invest as much on negative research of the opponent as they do on positive research on their candidate. They spend a little more on positive research. Again, they may discover the negatives on their candidate too.

But they spend lots of money on negative research in an effort to figure out how to define in the most unfavorable way their opponent to the constituency that they are both competing for. That has contributed substantially to the decline in favorable perception of the government as an institution and particularly for the individuals. I don't think that is healthy for the system.

Morris: Why has that kind of campaigning become so much more extensive?

Brown: In part because of the change in the nature of campaigning. Campaigning was done strictly by amateurs, by people who did not use Madison Avenue techniques and marketing techniques. The science of marketing has only within the last twenty, twenty-five years been applicable to political campaigns on a wholesale basis. There were no great political consultants before then, certainly not as many as there are now. Every unemployed journalist is a political consultant.

Morris: But there used to be people like Don Bradley who may not have had the professional training that some folks do now but who certainly had many years of experience.

Brown: Except that they just kind of ran campaigns. They didn't spend a lot of time investing efforts to determine what your problems were. People didn't talk about your age. People didn't campaign on the basis of your health. People didn't campaign on the basis of whether or not you might play around. Those things were not utilizable. The media didn't print that kind of stuff either. It was not an acceptable way in which to evaluate the appropriateness of a person holding public office. The anonymous source was not a great place in which to read a story.

There was, I think, kind of a same-club relationship between members of the Fourth Estate and those seeking public office. A combination of those things just literally eliminated the kind of negative campaigning that has come with the growth in the number of and the quality of the political consultants and the technique of reaching the public for political purposes.

Morris: Is some of that a factor of now we have computerized data banks? There is a lot of data you can now get at.

Brown: Absolutely. You have information systems. Just the ability to go to a newspaper morgue and in thirty seconds scan thirty years of news coverage. The fact that it is catalogued alphabetically under Morris or Brown or whomever and you just go in and you hit a button and all of a sudden every clipping that's ever been done and every story that's ever been written is in front of you. You couldn't do that easily twenty-five, thirty, thirty-five years ago. It just wasn't fair. The fact that you can do it in your own home now using your own PC [personal computer] is even more frightening. And it provides for the application of every technique of propaganda to be employed in a political campaign.

It is being in fact employed and that in part has contributed to the nature of negative campaigns.

Morris: Were you in support of Jerry Brown's political reform initiative¹?

Brown: No, I was not. In 1974 Jerry Brown ran and caused Proposition 9 to be enacted into law. I think there were maybe two politicians in the state of California who opposed Proposition 9, or at least two state officials: Willie Brown and Jack Knox. We were the two people who said that proposition has no place because of its incredible potential for mischief and abuse, because it was not designed frankly, not effectively at least, to regulate and keep out those persons who should not be public office holders. The nature of the information it supplied is strictly subject to being used in only one fashion.

The fact that you file your statement of economic interest annually if you are an elected official in this state, and all of that information is excerpted for First Amendment-protected attacks or stories and the results are that it causes questions to be raised about the appropriateness of your holding public office, yet your record clearly reflects that your decisions have always been in the public interest, your votes have always reflected that, there is no evidence whatsoever that there has ever been crossing of the lines of any conflicts or what-have-you. Yet politicians are held up to suspicion and ridicule based upon information they supplied.

It's gotten so gross now under the Proposition 9 requirements, no one ever says when they print the story, that the information comes from your under-oath revelations required by Proposition 9. They don't say that any more. They don't even tell the source, which would obviously place a different light on any negative interpretation if a reader knew that the place where this information came from was you.

Morris: The candidate himself, herself?

Brown: Correct. If you say, "I own 3,000 shares of IBM and I have consistently disqualified myself from any votes on matters affecting IBM"--well, that isn't the way it is written. You have supplied that information under Proposition 9 requirements. The news story talks about how you own 3,000 shares of IBM and how IBM is the biggest contract supplier of computer equipment and digital equipment and data equipment to the state legislature, a body of which you are a member.

Now your voter reads that and concludes--

¹Proposition 9, June 1974, creating the Fair Political Practices Commission.

Morris: Says, "Oh, my goodness."

Brown: Proposition 9 clearly should have simply said, "Under penalty of perjury, you must declare that you have no conflict and that where you do have a conflict, as defined by the statutes, you will recuse yourself." Then the responsibility becomes [the legislator's]. If someone wishes to accuse you of having failed to recuse yourself, you have to provide all the factors that should [disprove a] conflict; that's one method.

But when you have to reveal all the information [in advance], and then that information is used to suggest the possibility of conflict, without any supporting data and without any conduct triggering that story, it creates a perception problem and it creates fuel for a negative perception problem. And that was in part the basis on which I opposed Proposition 9.

I also opposed Proposition 9 because I thought it absolutely inappropriate to dictate what people can or cannot spend, how people can or cannot spend their money. If you, the University of California, wish to have a series of seminars on the issues affecting fees--you want to bring those elected officials in for a weekend to roll through all of the things that drive the fee decision, and an elected official wishes to accept that--you should be able to do that. It should not be a requirement that you can't spend more than ten dollars on that official. The question ought to be that if that official wishes to expose himself for whatever you've expended, he ought to have to take the heat. All that should be required is that you have got to report on what you spent and on whom you spent it and let the public draw its own conclusions about whether or not that was appropriate. But to put an artificial limit on that on the basis that somehow you're not influenced if it is \$10 but you are influenced if it is \$11, there seems to be something wrong with that.

Morris: Did you talk to Jerry Brown and his folks when they were writing that?

Brown: No, they didn't talk to anybody.

Morris: Really?

Brown: No.

Morris: Wasn't the word going around that that was what he was working on?

Brown: Yes. But Jerry Brown was holier than thou. Jerry Brown was above the mere conversing with mortal human beings. As a result of that Jerry talked only to Mother Teresa or whomever. [laughter]

Morris: That's the way people felt about him then, in 1974, when he was secretary of state and running for governor?

Brown: Yes. Because he had run for the secretary of state's office by running against politicians, the same way he is doing for the presidency now. In 1974 he got elected to the governorship on that basis. He had run against politicians consistently. Over the next eight years, the public went from being fascinated with this man of moral persuasion, with this man of standards that no other public official could meet or wished to meet; they had become disenchanted because of his lack of clear administrative skills, lack of handling major issues, like the Medfly [Mediterranean Fruit Fly], on a rational basis, the transportation system with Gianturco doing whatever she was doing with Caltrans, all of those things contributed to the public's disenchantment with what originally had been a fascinating standard-bearer for a new standard for public trust.

They had become disenchanted with him and were more critical of those things that he advocated. If that had been the case in 1974, almost every elected official would have been where I was on the issue. But most so feared being accused of trying to protect their ability to exploit the system for personal gain that they were unwilling to speak up.

Morris: To exploit the campaign situation for personal gain?

Brown: They feared being accused of opposing reforms that would throw out the thieves in the political arena, in the public policymaking arena. They didn't want to be on the side of someone suggesting that you didn't need a limit on what someone could spend on behalf of a politician. They didn't want to be on the side of opposing all of these absolutely ludicrous reporting requirements; the reforms, so to speak, as advocated by Jerry Brown indicating that you were honest and if you were opposed, then you were dishonest. You were trying to protect your ability to keep making a buck at the expense of the public.

From 1974 on, more politicians began to develop courage to speak out against such proposals. Whenever they put the next one on--I think it was [Assemblyman] Ross Johnson who put the next one on, it was defeated in a vote statewide. It was one that would have restricted spending; it would have done some public financing; it would have done a number of things that the public was unwilling to accept. Most politicians were negative on that proposition.

Then I think Mr. [State Senator Joseph] Montoya (who is currently in jail on a political corruption probe in Sacramento),

Quentin Kopp and Ross Johnson put something together called Proposition 73.¹ [Attorney General John] Van de Kamp and his friends put together something called Proposition 68. Both of those propositions were designed to amend the original Proposition 9 that Jerry Brown had put in place, expanding the duties of that commission created by Proposition 9 and placing some spending limits and some definitions of trust on what politicians could do with the money they had collected for campaign purposes and new reporting requirements, all those things were there. Proposition 68 was soundly defeated. Proposition 73 barely passed. Proposition 73 has since been tested in the courts and has been found to be unconstitutional and it has been thrown out within the last two years.

So the modification by popular vote has either been defeated at the polls or has been thrown out by court interpretation. That was not the case with Proposition 9. When Proposition 9 came down, the courts sustained it; the Rose Bird court sustained the constitutionality of the key provisions of Proposition 9 and the politicians were unwilling to join in a concerted effort to block its passage.

- Morris: Did the court's action in upholding that have anything to do with Rose Bird's also falling from public esteem?
- Brown: No. The fact that she, or her court, upheld the challenges to Proposition 9 in most cases had nothing to do with her own confirmation problems.

Anti-Government Legislative Cavemen

- Morris: A couple of times, you've mentioned the coming of the caveman to California politics. I wondered if you could define that; maybe what you see as the hazards of the caveman mentality.
- Brown: Well, the cavemen were a group of politicians elected to office as part of the Proposition 13 swing in 1978. They were all Republicans, all conservative, reactionary Republicans, and they were Republicans who basically were running against government. They were people like Ross Johnson, Pat Nolan, Phil Wyman, Richard Mountjoy. They were really conservative people.

¹Propositions 73 and 68, June 1988, both passed, providing conflicting messages on the subject of campaign spending.

Bill Baker. They all had one thing in common: they were anti-government.

As a matter of fact, they had many things in common. They were anti-choice. They were anti-racial minority programs. They were anti-environmentalists. They were pro-business from the pure free-enterprise standpoint.

Morris: What's good for business is good for--.

Brown: The world. They set about to vote only in a manner consistent with those positions. Over the years, because of this two-thirds vote requirement for things like budgets and taxes and appropriations, they have consistently held the whip hand as minority elected types. That has cost the state of California dearly in its previous role as number one in almost everything. The deterioration that we are still experiencing is directly related to the advent of the cavemen and Proposition 13 and their protection of Proposition 13.

Morris: They campaigned on Proposition 13?

Brown: They campaigned for Proposition 13 and took good credit for Proposition 13. They believed in the two-thirds vote requirement for any new taxes at any level and for the passage of bonds. You know that a two-thirds vote requirement strictly places the majority at the mercy of an organized minority. They are an organized, effective minority.

Morris: That was supposed to be part of the checks and balance system that was supposed to be good for the American political system.

Brown: No, it wasn't then and it isn't now.

Morris: Not?

Brown: Not good for the system. A majority ought to work by majority vote. Period. That means everybody's vote is equal. Now you have a two-thirds requirement. You have an imbalance in the equality of my vote and their vote.

Morris: That gets into the property connotations, doesn't it?

Brown: Absolutely.

Morris: That it looks after the interests of those who--?

Brown: Already have.

- Morris: From your position, working on a lot of campaigns and keeping an eye on the political structure, was this caveman group part of some kind of a statewide effort? Was there some coordination of their campaigns or backers or financiers?
- Brown: I don't think so. Not at that time. I think that they did subsequently develop a statewide network but at the time, there was no such thing. At the time, there was no such thing. Reagan had tried a similar tax proposal in 1973 and had been defeated. The Jarvis-Gann cells were not organized, didn't exist until after Proposition 13.
- Morris: I'm thinking more of the kind of organization that was put together that elected Reagan governor.
- Brown: That had nothing to do with it.
- Morris: Not a Republican party effort?
- Brown: No. As a matter of fact, the Republican party has consistently found it difficult to accept the caveman mentality. That's been the internal struggle within the Republican party for control of the Republican party. They have invariably attempted to elect those conservatives as party leaders and they have been unsuccessful. In many cases, they are so rooted in just doing their own thing that it contributes to the ability of Democrats to dominate both houses of the legislature, because invariably they will nominate one of these right-wing nothings in the Republican primary and that doesn't sell in the general election. True conservative Republicans and moderate Republicans will tend either not to vote for that right-wing zealot or they will vote for the Democrat.
- Morris: This is in legislative races?
- Brown: In legislative races.
- Morris: Has the same kind of behavior happened within the legislature? In other words, have they proposed really conservative people perhaps as a challenge to you as speaker?
- Brown: No. Strangely enough, the conservatives are such purists that they really don't want to pursue the leadership slot unless they have a majority. They would rather cut a deal with whoever has the majority, in this case Democrats. That's how I got elected. It was the conservatives who stepped up and supported me for speaker.
- Morris: So there is some practical political know-how?

Brown: Absolutely. They are very skilled. They don't vary from their philosophy. But they are very skilled at insider politics and so they have consistently controlled the leadership role and the leadership slots on the Republican side of the aisle. Pat Nolan took the crown away from Bob Naylor in 1984. They kept it until 1991. It went from Pat Nolan to Ross Johnson. So in the history of my speakership, from 1980 to the present day, the conservatives on the opposition side have controlled the Republican operation from 1984 until 1991, so seven of the twelve years, it has been in the hands of the conservatives.

Insider Politics; FBI Corruption Investigation, 1985-1988

Morris: If they were anti-government candidates, how did they get to be so skillful in the internal workings of the--?

Brown: They are political survivors and they love to use the resources of government. They hire their own; they do everything. They use it to the max[imum]. In the investigations in our house involving political corruption, it was the conservatives who have developed the computer--comparative relationships, contributions between the Republicans and Democrats, and publish it and say to contributors, "You have to give me the same thing you gave to the Democrats." That's the way they allegedly would start out discussing legislation with special-interest groups.

That resulted in the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] being able to tape those conversations. Where they may have thought they were going after Democrats and particularly Democratic leadership, they bagged in our house the Republican leader and two of his counterparts. The only person on the Republican side of the aisle indicted so far has been the chief of staff of the Republican leader Pat Nolan, and she has pleaded guilty and agreed to turn state's evidence. But because this is a Republican-controlled investigation, that's been put on the back burner. This woman two years ago pleaded guilty in return for turning state's evidence against her superiors. You've not heard of her since. She is in a witness protection program some place. She clearly cannot testify against Democrats. The only people they've been prosecuting are Democrats.

Just an interesting little corollary and I think it's eventually going to make for a good movie. I can see Oliver Stone in years downstream coming back to the political sting operations inspired in the sixties under the leadership of the U.S. Attorney General, and I think you will find they were singularly directed

at Democratic officeholders all over the country and that they were literally orchestrated the same way that Stone suspects that the Kennedy assassination was orchestrated.

Morris: When did you become aware that there was a corruption investigation being mounted?

Brown: When they swooped in and went into the capitol offices. They went into the capitol offices of the Republican leader Nolan. They went into capitol offices of the Republican leader [Frank] Hill. They did so after they had had seven hours of inquisition--they call it questioning; I call it a seven-hour inquisition--with Nolan's chief staff person.

Morris: But they didn't come to your office?

Brown: No. There is no reason to come to my office. She was telling them about Nolan. Their investigation had led to Nolan and their sting operation.

Morris: The preliminary investigations, no word of that going around the capitol?

Brown: No. This was the third year of their effort before it became public that they were doing it. They had come into the capitol back in 1985. They had caused a phony bill to be introduced in 1985. They had allowed all of us to vote on that phony bill. They had taken George Deukmejian into their confidence.

Morris: Really?

Brown: Yes. Let me tell you something. There is a story that defies description. Who in Washington participated in the discussion about how we go into the state capitol in California, we put in a totally phony bill, we set up this whole phony operation, we create the bill, we take the governor in our confidence, a Republican governor, and we tell him what we are doing. We hire lobbyists, we make campaign contributions and we take a bill that people would ordinarily be for. Then we have them all to vote on it. We take it through both houses of the legislature, through all the committees, and we put it on the governor's desk. Who made that decision and based upon what previous factors that would have prompted that operation? When you don't in a certain measured period of time succeed in coming up with anyone who was making their decisions based upon your sting operation, you continue it for three years.

Morris: Because you want to catch somebody?

Brown: You want to create the opportunity for somebody to become crooked. Who made the decision to do that and what were the factors that were so overwhelming that you didn't go in just on a straight investigation? You do not start to investigate Gabrielle Morris on somebody's allegation that she is dealing dope. You don't do that in this so-called system. You don't come into The Bancroft Library and set up a whole operation, tell the president of the University of California, "We are going to set up a sting project. We are going to set up a phony oral history project. We are going to solicit contributions for this oral history project because we are trying to trap Gabrielle Morris whom we believe--"

Morris: Is up to bad things.

Brown: Correct. When we have done this for three years, and there is no evidence that Gabrielle Morris has done anything wrong, now we see there are hundreds of other people connected with The Bancroft Library; we now decide we are going to check them all. We are going to give each one of them the opportunity to become corrupt based on the government's decision to make the offer.

Morris: That there is some corruption.

Brown: Correct.

Morris: Is this the kind of thing that could tie into the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration?

Brown: Could very well, but we don't know where it comes down because no committee of government has ever held a hearing.

Morris: At the federal level.

Brown: On the federal level or the state level. Unlike the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] that has some oversight, who is the oversight? Who is the civilian oversight? Who do they go to? What collection of elected officials do they go to and make their case. You can't even get a search warrant without making a case to somebody. If you are the local district attorney, you cannot initiate an investigation of the archdiocese on your own. You can't create a phony cardinal. You can't create a phony papal paper and you cannot get the Vatican to sign off on this phony papal paper because you are trying to find out which ones of the priests are not following their sacraments. You can't do that without some civilian control.

But that is what has in fact occurred. Then when it develops a partisan flavor, a decidedly partisan flavor--.

Morris: But it sounds as if it boomeranged?

Brown: Absolutely. You see, what they did is they clearly focused on racial minorities, officeholders. The bill that they created would address the question of assistance to minority-based business firms for economic development. They went to units of government similarly situated. The bill they drafted did exactly that. The idiots didn't understand that on principle racial minorities would be supporting that bill. So you don't need to give them campaign contributions for that purpose. They are already for that bill.

The entire history of racial minorities holding office has been for those set-asides, for those programs. If you were trying to trap racial minorities into doing something that was not naturally their bent, you ought to be out there with an S&L [savings and loan] package. We don't do S&L stuff. So you ought to be going to racial minorities to get them to support exempting S&Ls in certain categories. Or authorizing junk bonds. We don't do that stuff either. Then we would be on unnatural turf, and maybe you could convince us to do it by some contribution-related [thing].

But no, they went for what was a natural thing for racial minorities to do. They found it almost impossible to get sufficient facts to go after a racial minority on that basis. What they did find was Republicans opposed it, and the way to get it through, since it was an appropriation, you had to get those who opposed it. And that's who they had given the money to. And it turned out to be the Republicans.

So now they've got a real problem. That's not who they wanted. They aren't going to get the authority in Washington to prosecute a Republican if they have to get a sign-off. So now they have to go back and start all over. Lo and behold, what they found were people who were not naturally supportive of those programs, those were the only ones they could bribe or attempt to bribe, or those were the only ones that would extort them.

So they investigated one racial minority in that sting operation, [Assemblywoman] Gwen Moore, and they have already announced that she is clean. They have already announced that she is clean.

Morris: So it is just going to vanish.

Brown: No, I don't think so. I think they will spend the rest of their lives just to find--. They must have spent millions of dollars. And they normally don't back off until they somehow justify those

millions of dollars in budgetary appropriations that have no oversight. Some congressional committee over the last six or seven years should have stepped in, but the fear of being investigated, if you initiate--.

It's almost like the [Senator Joseph] McCarthy years. The reason that it took so long for any congressional voice to be heard in the McCarthy era was because of the reprisals generated against you by McCarthy and by the McCarthy mentality. If you said, "Wait a minute. Shouldn't McCarthy show us the documentation?" your name went on the list of being a suspected communist.

Morris: He used to wave a paper and say, "I have a list here with 187 communists."

Brown: Correct. And no one would say, "Let's see the list." Because if you said, "Let's see the list," you automatically went on the list allegedly and the press carried it and everybody carried it. You were suspected and your voters would turn you out because we were at the outset of the cold war. We are now similarly situated on the corruption probe side. If you raise questions about whether or not the authorities ought to be doing this, the IRS [Internal Revenue Service] pulls your return, the Fair Political Practices pulls your return. It's just one after another of public agencies that have law enforcement power.

In the process, they leak to the press. The press gets the story of you being investigated. Then you are held up to ridicule for being investigated. No charges, no allegation, but "sources say". Then you have to explain that. It is a terrible thing that has occurred.

Morris: Going back to your comment that there has been a growing feeling that government is not what we want it to be and our elected officials are not what we want it to be. Recalling the saying about "where there is smoke there is fire", how does one determine where there is wrongdoing, or is it purely a matter of perception? With all the elected officials there are, how does one know that there isn't somebody lining his or her own pocket?

Brown: People are not perfect. In every facet of our lives, there is always somebody who is trying to cut corners.

Morris: Yes. Or cut a deal.

Brown: But to assume that elective office is an automatic deal-cutting arrangement and then to use the police services to prove it is inconsistent with a democracy. There ought not to be any

investigation of anybody without an under-oath allegation of specific acts of misconduct. There should be absolutely no public revelation. The penalty for revealing the existence of such an investigation should be equal to the penalty for the substantive results of that investigation on the negative side, and there must be absolute, strict review and control. Only if you had those standards--because no person's career should be tarnished if there is no justification and no charge imposed. Dwight Eisenhower warned this nation about the power of the military-industrial complex exceeding that of the elected authorities. Here was the personification of a product of the military-industrial complex warning this nation.

Well, I'm telling you that this nation must add to that collection of folk the prosecutorial complex. The law enforcement authorities in this nation are threatening democracy. The absolute abuse and misuse of that authority that goes on on a daily basis. There are very, very few folk in the prosecutorial system who would sit around the table and say, "Wait a minute, the First Amendment requires us to do this; the Fourth Amendment requires this; the Fifth Amendment requires this; the Sixth Amendment requires us to do this. The Thirteenth and Fourteenth require us to do this and we aren't doing it."

You cannot start out with the assumption that Gabrielle Morris is a crook and we are going to prove it. You cannot start out using the prosecutorial arm to examine Gabrielle Morris' conduct without a sworn allegation. Then you take that sworn allegation to a referee, i.e., a judge who has been examined by his colleague as being the most fearless, as having the best grasp and understanding of the Constitution and the protection of individual rights. That person has absolute authority to say yes or no [as to] whether you proceed with the investigation, and there must be measured time to report. That investigation must be aborted at any time those steps are not leading toward--.

We aren't talking about a crime that has been committed. There is a difference in an investigation where there is a crime that has been committed--.

Morris: A body exists.

Brown: That's right. Or there is an allegation of crime that has been committed and you check the allegation out, including the allegator, before you proceed to pursue the facts, and you only do so under those very controlled circumstances. That's really the way the prosecutory arm ought to be employed.

Morris: You mentioned the courts too. There has been some literature in recent years suggesting that the courts may not be as objective as one thought they once were.

Brown: That is correct. That literature is accurate. In Sacramento, it's a very small town so people in and about the capitol, in and about the downtown area, with a few places to eat, invariably will end up in the same restaurants. Three federal judges were in a restaurant and a guy who delivers packages from one building to another stopped in the same place to get some food. He is seated at the counter and at the table just opposite the counter are these three guys. He has no clue who they are. They are sitting there discussing what an awful person a certain member of the legislature is, that he has this terrible reputation, et cetera, et cetera. No facts. These are three judges discussing. He overhears the name Garcia and one other and he comes back and reports to me and says, "This is what I overheard these guys saying. I don't know who they are but one of them named was Garcia and the other one's named--."

So I said, "Give me the description. No. Let me give you the description." I described Garcia, I described the guy Lee and I described Friedman. I knew who were the three guys who go to lunch together. He said, "How did you know those guys?" I said, "Those are three federal judges. Now, tell me exactly what they said." These guys sitting on a case, they are supposed to do objective judgment.

Morris: They are a three-judge panel?

Brown: No. They are sitting in three different cases, and there they are discussing the cases. Talking about the folk and how much we've got to get those guys. "We've got to get those guys. They do those things. If they didn't do them, nobody would accuse them." These are three federal judges! He said, "Hey, you know, if you want to do something about it, I would be prepared to testify." I said, "Well, no, you can't." "Why?" "Because you would lose your job. I wouldn't be able to protect your job. Nothing would happen with these three bastards. They would be three words against yours. Their word against you, and they would swear that they were discussing--."

Morris: And that's hearsay, isn't it?

Brown: Yes, they would swear they were discussing cases that have already been decided and they were referencing previous opinions. They were just shop-talking and not talking about anything actively out there. And no, they don't have any opinion about people in the capital. They don't have an opinion about particular legislators.

They should have to disqualify themselves for sitting in judgment. Ordinarily, that kind of thing would get them disqualified. They couldn't sit in judgment. But they are so dishonest.

Morris: As the speaker, do you have a role or an opportunity to comment on this kind of behavior?

Brown: I do, and I do it full-time. I don't know why they haven't taken me out, because I am highly critical. I don't base the criticism on emotion. I cite them the facts. I say, "Why did George Deukmejian get taken into the confidence of the Justice Department? Was he so clean?" "Well, you know--." "Wait a minute. At the time you went to him, Fair Political Practices was investigating George Deukmejian for contributions connected with some solid waste facilities in Southern California." The L.A. Times had printed a major story. [chuckles] "And you elected to go confide in him about a sting operation you were about to initiate."

Then I raised questions about how could they violate the law of contributions. "You the giver are supposed to give me your correct name, your correct occupation--."

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Brown: "And you know I'm going to use that to file a document under oath and you deliberately did that. You have violated the law. And you have put me in a position where I too have violated the law. I say that that is absolutely wrong." "No. That's the only way we could get this thing going. That's the only way we could do good law enforcement." "So now, when I discover who you are and that you gave me phony information, I have to amend my returns to reflect that. So my opponents who want to criticize me for having failed to comply with the Fair Political Practices requirement can cite this circumstance as an example. I'll have to explain it and it's a good explanation, but in the meantime, the damage is done."

So how did we get in a system where you can violate the law in pursuit of a catching a lawbreaker? You can't do that. You can never violate the law to catch a lawbreaker. You shouldn't be permitted to violate the law to catch a lawbreaker. You shouldn't be permitted to violate the law to catch a lawbreaker.

Morris: That's the end justifies the means.

Brown: Totally. And you know how easy it is to slip over into gross violations of the law. That's a minor violation of the law. But it's easy to slip. You take the next step and the next step and

the next step because it's all justified on the basis that I will eventually get this person who is so destructive.

Morris: Did that same process of one step leads to another sometimes indeed catch legislators unaware?

Brown: I'm sure it does. I'm sure that Joe Montoya who was convicted, or Paul Carpenter who was convicted, or Alan Robbins who pleaded guilty, didn't start out with a major step. I don't think they started out by saying give me a bribe. I think they found it comfortable to ease in that direction. I don't even think they realize they were going there. I just think they kept carefully coming close to the edge and then the edge kept shifting.

1991 Reapportionment; Privacy of Court Deliberations

Morris: One more question on the matter of the courts. Since we are again in a reapportionment mode and this will be the third reapportionment that's been decided by the courts. If the panel of judges is appointed by a court which is seen to have a more conservative tone than the court ten years ago, is that likely to effect how the panel of judges will see the reapportionment?

Brown: Absolutely. In the 1970s, Donald Wright was the chief justice. He had on that court several carryovers who had been appointed by Pat Brown. That may have been the most objective time on any reapportionment issue.

Morris: Objective?

Brown: Objective, handled by the courts, because you had the chief justice appointed by a Republican and one other justice on the court at that time who was steeped in Republican lore, and you had two Democrats serving on that same panel. So the combination of those four of the seven justices made the majority and they had a balanced reapportionment plan.

In 1982, when the reapportionment was done, that which was done by the legislature was sustained by the courts. You could contend that because it was a Rose Bird-dominated court, there were mostly Democrats on that court and you could be subject to the criticism of having embraced their views. I don't think it was, because subsequently Republican federal courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, tested it and found it to be consistent with all the rules and regulations, whether the Constitution, state constitution, or the Voting Rights Act. And it was tested during

the entire decade of the eighties. The Republicans stayed in court all the way through 1989 trying to get that reapportionment program thrown out.

Now we are in 1992 and this court is clearly a decisively Republican-dominated court and a conservative Republican-dominated court and a court that is not held in high esteem by legal scholars. The court is beginning to reflect the political winds. The first thing the court did when Malcolm Lucas and his group took over, within thirty days, they literally moved to reconsider a whole host of decisions previously made by the Bird Court. Without any allegations of new evidence, without any allegations or any of those things, they just unilaterally and [in an] almost self-generated [manner] moved to reconsider many of those decisions. Ordinarily you wait for the next opportunity or challenge--.

Morris: Figuring that somebody will bring it up.

Brown: Correct. They moved--and it is a story that was not even covered by the press. That court has consistently continued down that political road since its first seating. We're now down to one Democrat on the court, Stanley Mosk. Most of the decisions are six to one.

In our system of government one of the most amazing things, that no one ever seems to address, the legislative body, and all legislative bodies are required to do their entire business in public. You cannot hold any private hearings. You cannot have any secret sessions. You cannot have any unnoticed sessions. The courts, however, are permitted to do all of their deliberations in secret. They offer no explanation for why they did what they did. There are no opportunities--.

Morris: Their written opinions?

Brown: There are written opinions, but that's the same thing that we do in terms of a bill. But we have to explain to you, the public, why we voted. I have to explain every vote that I cast. If anyone asks me about it, I have to explain it. No judge is required to explain any vote. No vote at all. No judge is required to reveal the deliberations that judges engaged in in the room. As a matter of fact, juries are discouraged to discuss the deliberations in the jury room. The deliberations in the jury room are in secret. The grand jury is in secret.

Morris: They are privileged.

Brown: In secret! How is the privileged relationship there any different from the privileged relationship in the committee where we are

deliberating the same way. We deliberate on whether or not a particular law ought to be passed that may ultimately be interpreted by the court. We have to do our deliberations in the fishbowl. They do their interpretations in private. They aren't required to report who participated in those deliberations. They aren't required to report anything, who said what, what supporting information was supplied, what analysis a particular staff person working for the court gave them, they are not required to do any of that. None of that.

The only branch of government that is people-driven and people-exposed is the legislative branch of government.

Morris: What do judges say when you ask them that question?

Brown: "That would impede our honesty. That would impede our candor. That would make us like you, the peoples' elected representative. We don't want to be like you."

Now, also, the executive branch is similarly protected. The president can hold all of his cabinet meetings in secret. What is said in a cabinet meeting is embargoed. Even participants aren't permitted to be interviewed. If they are, they are ostracized. They are kicked out of the cabinet.

Morris: Except that the planned leak has become a significant part of--.

Brown: Planned leak! Why planned leak? I can do planned leak too. I would love nothing better than to have our legislative deliberations secret and let me do the leaking. Then you would never get any criticism of me. You would never get an objective view, or a different view of the program. But we are the only branch of government that is subject to open and complete inspection at every stage of the development, cannot cast one vote in secret, period. It must supply explanations as to why and must stand to be investigated. All of our papers, all of our documents are subject to inspection.

You cannot under the Freedom of Information [Act] get any of the recommendations made by the clerk to the judge. You cannot get the analysis supplied. I cannot even do it under discovery motions. I have to make a motion in court to seek documents and I'm barred from most documents. Internal documents by agencies I'm barred from.

Morris: Really?

Brown: Absolutely.

- Morris: Then as a defense attorney you don't have access to all the relevant information in the case?
- Brown: Absolutely. Information that I maintain could or could not be relevant. I don't know. I don't have that information. I don't know whether it's relevant until I see it.
- Morris: If you consider that the attorney population in California is probably reasonably balanced between Republicans and Democrats, does the bar association speak to these questions of the court?
- Brown: Very few of us really have, or are willing to participate in the Founding Fathers' original dialogue on establishing this democracy. Most of us just kind of go along with the program.
- Morris: But over the years, hasn't the bar association sought fairly vigorously an increasing say in how judges are screened and selected for nomination?
- Brown: Not really. Not really.
- Morris: Really? Because it used to be that the governor did it, as you say, under his hat.
- Brown: It was not the bar association that changed that. It was politicians who changed that. The politicians are the ones who wanted to get in on it. So they began to set up all these standards. It was usually the opposition politician saying that you were appointing your relatives and your friends and people who are not qualified, so we are going to--.
- Morris: Because we legislators might wish to be--.
- Brown: Right. The bar would tell you you got a better quality judge under the old system.
- Morris: Really?
- Brown: You got a better quality judge under the old system. Invariably, you selected a political supporter or political friend, which means that individual had participated in the process. Now you get only prosecutors. You get only persons from big law firms with these steps, the Jenny [Judicial Nominees Evaluation Commission] commission and all the approval process, all the evaluation, all the inspection and all the recommendations you have to get. You can only become a judge if you've played the game.
- Morris: But you still also have to meet whatever the governor's litmus test is this year.

Brown: Of course you do, but the governor does not look among those individuals who maybe cannot get through the commission. So he starts with predeterminations that he is not going to be second-guessed by a collection of people. So already you have restricted the number of people. Whereas before, he could have just appointed a supporter and a crony, [now] a supporter and a crony may not hold membership in the country club, a supporter and a crony may not have been on the bar association board of directors, a supporter and a crony may not have been a prosecutor in San Francisco, so he can't appoint them.

Morris: Contribute to my party.

Brown: That's right.

Morris: But the observable evidence at the moment is, as you said, we have six out of seven supreme court justices who have been appointed by--.

Brown: Republicans.

Morris: Yes. Two relatively conservative Republicans.

Brown: Correct.

Morris: So the effect is a fairly strong ideological bent.

Brown: Correct.

Morris: Would they have been more conservative or less if Pete Wilson and Deukmejian could just have appointed their old law school buddies?

Brown: They probably would have been less.

Morris: Really?

Brown: Because they would have tapped old friends who had been helpful to them and neither one of those two guys were from the conservative wing of the party. They were from the moderate to liberal wing of the party. Pete Wilson was not a caveman; George Deukmejian was not a caveman.

Morris: Even though he had a reputation in the state senate of carrying fairly strong law-and-order legislation?

Brown: He was a death-penalty person. Remember, this was the guy who signed the anti-apartheid legislation. This is the guy who signed the AIDS-research legislation. So you are not talking about somebody who is so right-wing. This is a guy whom the right wing

criticizes. This is the guy who signed the gun-control bill, the Mike Roos automatic-weapons bill. See, you are not talking about a real right-winger. Pete Wilson is not a real right-winger.

Morris: But as governors they both have been--.

Brown: More conservative in their court appointees than they would have been. George Deukmejian did appoint his law partners. Malcolm Lucas was his law partner. [Marvin R.] Baxter was one of his first campaign supporters when he lost the governorship on two previous occasions. And he is also Armenian: Baxtersarian. He changed it to Baxter. Armand Arabian may be the only right-winger George appointed directly to the court as a result of the right-wing faction. This woman [Joyce L. Kennard], she may not be a right-winger. She votes like a right-winger but she may not be a true right-winger. She comes out of San Diego. That may have been his concession to the women's movement. [Edward J.] Panelli is not a right-winger; he is a moderate Republican out of Santa Clara County, and he was a fairly decent appellate judge. This Jewish guy [Ronald M. George] that just got put on was a big contributor to the Republican party. His family may be the major Jewish contributors to the Republican party in the state.

Morris: That sounds like, individually, the present people on the court may not be as conservative as some of the decisions coming down?

Brown: That's not true. No, they are as conservative as their decisions. But what's more important, they are political, which means that they would interpret the current winds of change on the conservative side and they vote that way.

Morris: Are you affected by the conservative winds of change? Do you feel like you've lowered some of your expectations of the political process?

Brown: No, I may be the victim ultimately of it but none of my views are altering themselves or adjusting themselves to reflect the existence of that wind.

Morris: So some of the things that you say may be more affected by conservative issues out there.

Brown: May prompt my having to say them.

Morris: I see. Very instructive.

XXII PUTTING DOWN THE GANG OF FIVE, 1988-1989Ambition and Expediency

Morris: I would like to go back to some of the challenges that you've dealt with within the Democratic party. I think most noticeably the Young Turks of the Gang of Five.

Brown: They were not so young. That's a misconception that most people have. These were people we elected in 1982. I guess maybe the oldest of the group was maybe fifty-five, fifty-eight, and the youngest of the group was probably thirty-eight. So they were not Young Turks. The Young Turks were the people like those guys under thirty-five. The guys under thirty-five were all for Willie Brown.

This was just a group of ambitious members of our house who were more conservative than most of the members of the Democratic caucus and who were disappointed in their own lack of dominating me personally. They all had great titles and great jobs but wanted more. They wanted somehow for me to forego and dump Vasconcellos. They wanted me to change the chairmanship of the Rules Committee. They wanted me to change the chairmanship of the Health Committee. They had an agenda that defied description. They wanted me to change the chairmanship of the Committee on Finance and Insurance to one of them. They were not overly talented. It was not like they were the second coming and being shunted aside for a lesser breed. In many cases, the people who held the jobs were equal if not better.

Morris: I was wondering what their objection was to John Vasconcellos?

Brown: They don't like John Vasconcellos, period. They just dislike John Vasconcellos personally.

Morris: Even though he has got seniority on--.

Brown: Doesn't mean anything to them. They wanted that job. One of them wanted that job.

Morris: Why did he think he was entitled to it?

Brown: He just thought he had a better understanding of where the body politic was in the state of California. He thought John Vasconcellos was out of step. He thought John Vasconcellos was still rooted in the hippie era and as a result of that he wanted to move the Democratic party to the mainstream and he thought the best way to do that was to replace the Neanderthals who were the problem. And that John was one of them.

Morris: What was it about the hippie idea that should not be advanced?

Brown: They didn't like the idea that John would concentrate on the pursuit of the self-esteem initiative versus trying to expand the death penalty.

Morris: They were conservative in their--.

Brown: Not philosophically. It was practical with them. They thought that the Republicans had been dominating the airwaves (not winning elections because it was clear that they hadn't been winning elections) but they thought the Republicans had been dominating the airwaves because they thought the Republicans better interpreted what the public mood was, and that the public mood was for increasing the death penalty. They would show you the polls to evidence that. Getting hard on drug dealers, expanding the number of crimes you could put people to death for, that's the attitude that they exhibited.

Morris: In other words, it was a matter of expediency rather than their personal convictions?

Brown: Absolutely. They thought that my letting a bill like A.B. 101 out of committee was burdensome for reelection purposes. They were of the opinion that protecting the welfare recipients as they described it was burdensome for reelection purposes and that the Democratic party ought to be headed in a different direction. And that while I was not personally the problem, not at the moment, anyway, my lieutenants were and they wanted me to change my lieutenants.

Morris: Am I right that you would have had some personal, noisy discussions in your office or offstage before this reached the media? Or did they challenge you on the floor of the house?

Brown: No, it went just as you said in the first part of your question--. They came to see me on two occasions, all five of them, and I informed them. They had had challengers all during the course of the year, first and foremost.

Morris: They had challenged you?

Brown: No, not me. In caucus, they challenged the membership. They became abusive to some of the members, and the membership was about to go into revolt to do something about these five guys. I'm one for believing you can take care of yourself in the competition place on public policy. They could never dominate it. They wanted to give back rebates and they wanted to do all those kinds of things. Most of the Democrats in the caucus didn't want to do that. So there were major debates, major confrontations inside of the caucuses.

They had become unpopular, unacceptable to many members of the caucus just by virtue of their conduct. So much so that collections of caucus members had come to me to say, "You are really showing favoritism to this collection of assholes. You really ought to do something about it. You've got to crack down. We know you don't like to do it."

Morris: In other words, you thought that the members should fight these things out--.

Brown: At peer level. That's right. Peer-level control. I finally sat them down near the end of the year and informed them they had pretty much overstepped the bounds and they really ought to back off, et cetera, that I don't want to have to get involved, I don't want to have to discipline anybody or attempt to discipline anybody. That was foolish because once you do that, you exercise the ability to throw somebody off. All you're doing is seeding discontent among some person who maybe can be straightened out and become a good contributor to the process.

Well, they didn't take that too kindly. They had a golf tournament for one of them, a fundraising golf tournament in Riverside. They invited me to fly down and they had a summit meeting, the five of them and me. I did not know I was going to a summit meeting. But they laid down the gauntlet: "You get rid of these guys, you get rid of these guys and this is the way you do it. If you don't and there are reprisals on us, you attempt to discipline us, you are going to have to do it for all of us. We're not going to let you just pick one of us."

"So, I see. I'll think about what you guys said," and I went home back to San Francisco.

Power of the Speaker

Morris: Did you have somebody with you?

Brown: No. I never travel with anybody [except my driver]. I chatted with one or two of our members and told them about the incident and kind of chuckled about it. Then I scheduled an appointment with these fellows for my Sacramento office in January.

Morris: As a group.

Brown: All five of them. They came in and I informed them that I had listened to what they said and that I was impressed and I know that they thought it true, et cetera. But I wasn't going to do any of what they said and, as a matter of fact, I was considering doing just the opposite, that one or two of them, their assignments were going to be changed if they did not straighten out and that I was going to have to do it that way. Otherwise the membership was going to revolt.

They said, "You know if you do that, we will have to reply in the same way. We will reply with reference to you."

So I said, "Will you excuse me for a moment? Just a minute, guys. I need to delay these other people that I need to see because I only thought this was going to be a ten- or fifteen-minute meeting. Now that you've said what you've said, we are going to take a little time to talk about this." So I left them in my office, I walked out and I called my chief of staff [Bob Connelly] over and I said, "Go to the desk and terminate [Gary] Condit as chairman of this." I went right through the list. "Take x, y off of Ways and Means, et cetera, and get it done immediately."

These were the guys who were sitting in the room. I'm giving the orders to take all their jobs and what have you.

Morris: You can just do that by sending out the word?

Brown: Oh, yes. That's my authority. That's right. I name a new chairman of this committee, a new chairman of that committee. I took people off of Ways and Means or whatever, didn't even tell them. Then I came back in, closed the door, and I sat there and talked to them for an hour. Of course, at the end of the hour, they said, "Well, what are you going to do?" I said, "You'll get notice." "Okay, just remember what we said." "Fine." I got up, they opened the door and every press person in the world was standing there because when we make changes, it immediately goes to the speaker's desk. And any action at the desk is immediately

picked up by the press. And the press, of course, had known of this simmering displeasure--. Members of my caucus had been talking to the press over the last several months telling them about these bad guys and that I wasn't doing anything about it. When the press saw that I had taken all of these steps to eliminate people, throw people off of Rules, throw people off of Ways and Means and what-have-you, they knew there was obviously going to be a major war. So when these guys got up to leave my audience, all the press people in the world were standing out there.

Efforts to Vacate the Chair

Brown: What they didn't know is that I knew that they had had a meeting before coming to my office with the Republican leadership. They went to the Republican leadership and said, "Are you guys interested in a deal? Either one of us for speaker?" They said, "No, we're not interested in either one of you for speaker." "How about, let's just move to vacate the chair? Will you support a motion to vacate the chair?" The Republican leadership said, "Well, you know, I don't think we could get all of our people to support that and we clearly would need all of our people to support that. But we'll check around."

The next appointment these guys had was to be in my office. As they were leaving the Republican leadership, the Republican leader called me and said, "You have five guys who came to us to try to get us to support a motion to vacate the chair. We will not support such a motion."

Morris: Well, well.

Brown: "We have a commitment to you. We will not support such a motion and you ought to be warned." So when they got there I already knew and I had already begun to formulate what I proposed to do. Mine was all a sham. Now they were a sham too, but they didn't know I knew what their real game plan was. So when I did what I did, it was not my initiating the action. I dropped a nuclear bomb on someone who had gone to try to buy one.

Morris: The Republican leader then was--?

Brown: Pat Nolan was the Republican leader at the time.

Morris: And the two of you were on good enough terms that you would each honor a commitment?

Brown: Totally. So this was January. I did what I did like that. They were just out. They were clean. Fired the staffs. I mean, I wreaked havoc.

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Brown: So the reporters are there asking, "What's your reaction to your being kicked off Ways and Means?" They turned to me and I just shrugged my shoulders, closed my door and called my caucus, called all the other Democrats together in the caucus and informed them that the war was on, that these guys are going to the Republicans for purposes of trying to dump me and that the Republicans have turned them down, that I didn't know how long the Republicans would be able to take the heat because there were two or three Republicans who would like to dump me and that I'm sure these guys are smart enough to go organize, these Republicans, to make the motion on the floor.

Morris: Go beyond the Republican leadership.

Brown: Of course, make the motion on the floor. Then P.R.-wise, in individual Republican districts, since they have been running against Willie Brown for years, this becomes a problem politically in that we had to change our whole method and mode of operating and that I had to make sure that I had my four or five Republican votes permanently who would never vote against me because I knew the Republican leadership would eventually cave.

Morris: If there was enough noise from the members of their caucus?

Brown: No, if there was enough from their constituency out there, they would have to cave. A chance to get rid of Willie Brown, the most-hated Republican basher in the state, et cetera, so this is it. This is where we go after him. I knew we would escalate to that because I wouldn't get to the press. The Dan Walterses of the media had been waiting to get Willie Brown for years.

Well, lo and behold, we did go to war and they did get up on the floor and they found a Republican named Trice Harvey from Kern County who had been maybe one of the biggest Willie Brown-bashers. He stands up on the floor as a freshman and makes a motion that the chair be vacated. He got maybe four votes other than the members of the Gang of Five.

Morris: They didn't make the motion themselves?

Brown: No, they didn't have the courage to make the motion. But they made a motion to vacate. Trice Harvey made the first motion to vacate and that obviously went down the tubes because Ross Johnson

pulled up his mike and opposed it. Periodically they would remake that motion. They finally gave up after a few weeks of trying to make that motion and they started making motions to pull bills out of committees, bills that Republicans would want to vote on like death-penalty measures, choice measures, parental consent on abortions, things of that nature, because the Republicans would have to vote for those. They knew that it was unacceptable by me for anybody to vote for a motion to withdraw. That was tantamount to a motion to vacate.

I said, "Hey, you're right. That is tantamount to a motion to vacate but only when I have the majority. When I no longer have the majority it is not tantamount to a motion to vacate. A motion to vacate will rise or fall on its own. I'm not going to hang my membership out on these phony motions to withdraw. Any member who wants to vote for the bill, let's not vote for the motion to withdraw. Let's find a vehicle on the floor and you Republicans amend the vehicle on the floor. I won't send it back to committee."

So I devised a method by which to spike that challenge. It was consistent. Every session I had to outsmart them. And I did. Finally, by June--this was a six-month thing on the floor of the legislature in 1988--the Republicans had arrived at the point. I knew that the Gang of Five couldn't bring themselves to vote for a Republican for speaker. I devised a method by which Republicans no longer had to oppose the motion to vacate. They would amend it to elect a Republican as speaker. So they started amending it or making a substitute motion and the Gang of Five, because they came from Democratic districts, would be thrown out if they voted for a Republican speaker. So they couldn't vote for a Republican speaker.

Primary Election Skirmishes; Republican Disharmony

Brown: But I knew that also was going to evaporate eventually because there were some primary challenges. Democrats lined up to oppose one of those guys in his primary. We could have beaten him but we had the wrong Democratic candidate. We had a Mexican candidate in a white district in a primary. We came within a hair's-breadth of defeating this guy. But I wasn't involved. It was not an organized district, except maybe six or seven, or ten of our members helped out, trial lawyers helped out and a few other people because this was--.

Morris: Going into the districts where these guys were running?

Brown: Yes, in the primary. Going into the district after this guy in the primary. That clearly would give them license now to step over if they won. They won that primary and they then started calling the Republicans on the primary day, knowing that they were going to win, to say, "I think we would be prepared tomorrow to vote for a Republican for speaker."

So now the Republicans are in the position where--. They don't know but I still have four Republicans who will never vote for a Republican for speaker, for their guy for speaker. Never. But it would create a real problem because all of a sudden it would be thirty-six or thirty-seven people saying Willie Brown ought to go. Lo and behold, on the morning after the primary in Sacramento, 8:05 or so a.m., I get a call at my home. It is the wife of a very conservative Republican from Orange County who informs me that her husband died ten minutes ago.

Morris: Oh, my heavens.

Brown: There is no way they can get to forty-one now matter what they do. So that death destroyed any effort that they could make at doing anything. So they ceased to make motions to vacate. They ceased to do any of that. They ceased to make motions to withdraw because they could not succeed anymore. They couldn't get forty-one votes for anything. Nor did we have forty-one votes at that stage of the game. But we don't need forty-one because we already have the job. You can only throw me out with forty-one but we are looking at November. In November, we've got to have forty-one votes to win the speakership back. I'm not going to get any one of their five. So I now have to get a minimum of forty-six Democrats elected so that I can be sure I have forty-one. If I don't have forty-one, somebody else may win the speakership. We had to win a net of three new seats. No, we had to win a net of two new seats at the outset.

Morris: You had already one that special election after the guy died?

Brown: No, that election had not been held. We had to win two seats because there were forty-seven Democrats. October 10, one of my votes died which means now I have to win three seats because there will now only be forty-six, forty-five Democrats, whatever the numbers were. Anyway I was going to be down by one. So we had to win three seats. We won exactly a net of three seats. We won the Willie Murray seat, the Ted Lempert seat and the Bob Epple seat. We won the Epple seat on a recount. We won the speakership by exactly the required number of votes.

The Republicans ran Ross Johnson; they ran Chuck Calderon-- they actually nominated Chuck Calderon. My Republicans wouldn't

vote for Chuck Calderon. It was a major confrontation on the floor. The Republicans put together a recall operation against Norm Waters. It really got bitter. It really turned into a very bitter dispute. The Republicans got really angry because we had netted three Republican seats, of Republicans who had been helpful for keeping the Gang of Five from succeeding. I beat three of them and so now the Republican leadership was madder than hell because they were embarrassed.

Morris: This is what we get for helping you.

Brown: The Republicans dumped Pat Nolan because it had been Pat who had been of assistance to me. They didn't really dump him; Pat voluntarily stepped down because he lost a net of three seats. He stepped down. Ross Johnson stepped up to the plate and became the new leader. He was on the conservative wing as well and the war was on. They tried everything in the world to figure out how to keep me from being speaker again.

We retaliated in kind. We dumped all the Republican vice-chairs. We stripped them of staff. We did very nasty things to the Republicans. They tried to engage in [the unbecoming] conduct of recalling members of our caucus. It got to be really ugly for three or four months. Then it settled down. The members of the Gang of Five gave up. They knew they could never succeed in dumping me and the war was all over. It lasted maybe a period of fourteen months.

Morris: Calderon had been part of the Gang of Five.

Brown: Charles Calderon, Gary Condit, Steve Peace, Gerald Eaves, and Rusty Areias.

Morris: Condit and Calderon left the legislature.

Brown: In the fall of 1989, Condit got elected to the Congress. Shortly thereafter, Condit's replacement got elected and he was a supporter of Willie Brown's. Calderon got elected to the state senate.

Morris: So they didn't leave politics. They were not--?

Brown: Joe Montoya got convicted and resigned. Calderon ran and got elected for the state senate seat. So two of them departed.

Morris: With your blessing.

Brown: Oh, yes. With my blessings. They had been punished. We had moved them over to the Republican side, gave them seats on the

Republican side in the back of the room, stripped them of all their committee assignments, took their offices. We didn't treat them kindly. We treated them like traitors should be treated.

Morris: All of that takes an awful lot of time.

Brown: A lot of energy and a lot of time. But we did it right. My membership stayed together. When we won the net of three seats, we were in better shape than we had ever been. They knew that and that ended it. The Republicans knew it and it was over. Many Republicans started making book with us. That was about the time that we started fomenting disharmony with the Republicans.

Morris: Did you?

Brown: Yes, to help them change their leadership. And they ultimately did. So it's payback. But all of that was part of the process. We finally settled the house down in mid-1989. Since then, there has been nothing except peace and harmony. All of the disagreements have been rooted in philosophy, not membership politics. Proposition 140 came along; we settled 140 without any rancor. You didn't see partisan confrontations over 140. All of that was done in the spirit pre-1988. Until 1988, things ran the way they are running now.

Morris: Now it is troublesome again?

Brown: No, not at all. There are disagreements with the governor and that sort of thing, but that doesn't have anything to do with anybody challenging the speaker. No one is challenging the speaker.

Morris: Within the legislature.

Brown: Reapportionment obviously presents a problem because if they win the majority, we lose. So we are at war with that. But that is not internal politics. There are no daily disruptions. There are no motions to vacate. There is no withholding of consent. There is no withholding of fifty-four votes.

XXIII NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC POLITICS; RUNNING JESSE JACKSON'S 1988
CAMPAIGN

Early Acquaintance

Morris: You were at war with the Gang of Five at the same time that you were chairman of Jesse Jackson's presidential campaign, weren't you?

Brown: Correct.

Morris: How did you manage the two?

Brown: There was no problem, no problem. They tried to suggest that I was not focused on reelecting the membership of my house. The results proved to be just the opposite. I picked up a net of three seats. Then the Jackson operation provided great resources for voter registration and get-out-the-vote campaigns.

Morris: In the state of California.

Brown: And [Michael] Dukakis came within 2 percentage points of defeating George Bush in California. All of those resources assisted us mightily in getting the house back under my total control.

Morris: How did you and Jesse Jackson get to be close enough that you became chairman?

Brown: We were friends since 1962.

Morris: Really?

Brown: Oh, sure. Friends and good confidantes since 1962.

Morris: Okay. At a convention?

Brown: Young Democrats convention.

Morris: Tell me what happened.

Brown: It was 1962 or 1963, I can't remember which. But there were only about five black Young Democrats attending. This was before it was politic to be doing that stuff. Jackson came in as part of the South Carolina group, I think. Harold Washington came in as part of the Chicago group. The only other group were the Californians, two Californians. So there were five or six of us there and we naturally got to know each other. We supported the resolutions and the things that each of us were doing. That started a friendship. So few of us were operating in the political world.

That started a friendship that has lasted to today. Jesse Jackson is coming in here. I am going to open my campaign operation this coming Friday and Jackson is coming in to do it.

Morris: And make an announcement that he is for Willie Brown?

Brown: Oh yes. Sure.

Morris: He was a preacher at that point, in 1962?

Brown: No, he was just a kid. He was still in college. I was out practicing law but he was still in college. So he became a minister while working under [Martin Luther, Jr.] King's direction and he just graduated into the ministry.

Morris: Political life was something that he saw as important?

Brown: Absolutely. Martin saw it as important.

Morris: And was grooming Jesse to run for office at some point?

Brown: I can't tell you that. I don't know that part of it. If he did, it certainly wasn't the presidency. And that's what Jackson ran for. He has never run for anything else.

Primary Strategies

Morris: How did your strategy develop to the point where you and he thought it was time for him to run for the presidency?

Brown: He made that decision himself in 1984. I was not a supporter of his in 1984. I was the chair of the [Alan] Cranston campaign for president, along with Harrison Wofford, the current U.S. Senator.

We were the two national co-chairs of the Cranston campaign in 1984. That campaign obviously hit rough seas early on, I think in New Hampshire, and Cranston pulled out. I did not embrace any other candidacy. I started pumping Mario Cuomo in 1984 by the time of the convention but I didn't push any other candidacy. I didn't endorse Gary Hart, I didn't endorse Walter Mondale and I didn't endorse Jesse Jackson.

From 1984 to 1988, there were lots of conversations with Jackson and many other people. I became convinced that the Jackson candidacy was a viable one and that it would serve the Democratic party well because it would bring lots of new voters and that it needed the respectability of a main-line, prominent Democrat at its helm. Jackson sought my chairmanship for that purpose. And not co-chairmanship. He asked me to be the chairperson for his campaign. I accepted that assignment in October of 1987 and put together a group of people in October of 1987 in Los Angeles. It was the day after the [stock market] crash on the 19th of October. The 18th was the crash, I believe, or the 19th, whatever it was. The day after the crash we put together that meeting.

We starting looking for a campaign manager. I found Jerry Austin in Ohio and had Jerry Austin meet me in Tampa. I was making a speech in Tampa a month or so later and I signed him up. Actually, the contract was written in my handwriting. It signed Jerry Austin to run Jesse Jackson's campaign. We put the operation together and proceeded to have monthly meetings of the committee. We had a committee made up of twelve or fourteen people, all of whom had prominent status in some state: Percy Sutton in New York; Ron Brown out of D.C. was on the committee; Reggie Lewis, the financier, was on the committee; Maxine Waters, of course, was on the committee--she was the state chair of California for the Jackson campaign. We had people in all connections on that committee. Prominent people.

Morris: People you had already worked with before in other--?

Brown: Or I knew. We tried to meet often at the Hyatt at the airport in Chicago because every one of us could get in there from all over the country. We would meet at the Hyatt. Sometimes Jackson would attend those meetings; sometimes he would not. We gave general direction to the campaign, money raising. Austin would attend those meetings and the field directors would attend those meetings.

We really ran a very good campaign, a real good campaign. On occasions I would get on the plane and fly with Jackson. We leased a plane. We had a real first-class campaign. We had a

real first-class campaign. We had an entire press corps travelling with us on the airplane. It was a fun campaign.

Morris: Where were the resources coming from?

Brown: We raised the money.

Morris: But where was the money--?

Brown: All kinds of people. We had lots of labor organizations assisting Jackson. We had lots of stars assisting Jackson. The farm aid people were of great assistance to Jackson. The peace movement was of assistance to Jackson. The women's movement--the feminist movement--was of assistance to Jackson. So we had lots of money resources. Blacks really donated to Jackson's campaign.

Morris: More than they had been asked to do--.

Brown: Absolutely.

Morris: Had they donated in previous campaigns?

Brown: No. People come and participate in most cases based on the personality and their commitment to the candidate. They don't participate generically.

Morris: I know there is a lot of money that comes in related to a specific candidate, but sometimes it stays. Was it Austin or the committee as a whole that came up with the Rainbow Coalition?

Brown: No, it was Jackson himself. Austin had nothing to do with the Rainbow Coalition. That preceded us both.

Morris: It was already--.

Brown: In place.

Morris: What was the possibility that he would have gotten the nomination instead of Dukakis?

Brown: It was a long shot. We played it well, but the campaign--. We didn't get an operation going in Ohio like we needed. We didn't get the operation going in Pennsylvania like we needed. New York was not as good as it should have been. We should have beaten Dukakis in New York. So we had some rough spots that didn't pan out well.

Morris: Was Cuomo not coming along--?

Brown: No, he did not. We were great in Michigan, as you will recall. We were great in Wisconsin, we were great in Minnesota. We had some great places. We didn't fare as well in the South as we wanted to. We won portions of it, but we should have done better in Texas, three or four other places. We should have been the favorite son of the South.

Morris: What got in the way of that?

Brown: Racism more than anything else.

Morris: Even though you were bringing lots more minority people into the coalition, into the campaign?

Brown: Absolutely. But still the Democratic party didn't want to really embrace us and the news media never did give Jackson the full benefit of being a true contender. No matter how much we would win, they would still say, "What does Jackson really want?" We kept responding, "He wants the nomination." "No, that's not really what you want. What do you really want."

Morris: What did the media think he wanted?

Brown: I don't know. They never said. They just kept running those stories, and that created lots of discontent in our operation. They would always ask, "Practically, he can't win it. You know he can't win. Why don't you tell us what your real agenda is? What will you settle for." We kept pressing, "This guy is trying to get the nomination. He is just like everybody else."

Dukakis's Fall Campaign

Morris: What kind of impact do you think that Jackson's candidacy had on Dukakis as the final nominee? Were there some ideas that carried over into the fall campaign?

Brown: No. Dukakis' operation never--. They blew a seventeen-point lead in thirty-five days. That operation never got on track.

Morris: So that none of your organization went into the Dukakis organization?

Brown: Some of the people who worked for Jackson went to work for the Dukakis operation. But that was a sop. It was not where they could do what they could do effectively.

Morris: In other words, the Dukakis people didn't welcome them in after the convention?

Brown: Or take the structure in those places where Jackson dominated. I would have just said to my people, "You have to join the Jackson people in Michigan, you have to join the Jackson people in California." That's what I would have done had I been Dukakis. Instead, he tried to do the reverse. He tried to set up an operation in Michigan. Well, why do you want to set up an operation if you've lost Michigan?

Morris: It's already going.

Brown: You lost Michigan! Handsomely! So clearly you aren't talented enough to win it and your people weren't. But that isn't what they did. They did just the opposite. They hated the Jackson people, they hated Jesse, they didn't want to use Jesse and they didn't use Jesse effectively.

Morris: They did not?

Brown: No, no. And Jesse made some demands. Jesse wanted a full contingent of presidential apparatus as if he were still a candidate. He wanted to move around the country and select his spots, and he was right. He should have been able to select his spots.

He wanted to help out in that regard. No way. They wanted it differently, so they kind of put him on ice and sent him to the out-of-the-way places. They tried to make sure he was never on prime-time coverage and they didn't have him as one of the focal points, because the Willie Horton stuff was out there. They really feared the racial backlash in this country instead of recognizing that the racial backlash was there and the only way to offset was to excite new people to participate in numbers sufficient to offset the backlash and only Jackson could do that. They didn't fully understand and appreciate that and did not utilize it.

And then the campaign was never focused. Dukakis' campaign never got focused. He never defined Dukakis or any of that kind of stuff. So the results were a disaster, a disaster. We in California virtually overcame that. We came very close to knocking Bush off in California. A few more days and we could of. This was the kind of campaign that should have been conducted everywhere in the country. But it wasn't and we lost. We lost, and Jackson wasn't handsomely utilized.

1986 Senate Victories

Brown: Jackson's worth was proven by virtue of the fact that in 1986 we won the U.S. Senate back. And we won the U.S. Senate back directly because of the Jackson vote from 1984. The people we put on the rolls showed up in 1986 and voted in Alabama for Richard Shelby. They voted in North Carolina for Terry Sanford. They voted in Georgia for Wyche Fowler. They voted in Louisiana for John Brough. There was one other place in the South where they voted and the margin was about 38 percent white vote and about 80-85 percent black vote for those candidates. That turned out to be the margin of victory and that also turned out to be what turned the Senate back to being Democratically controlled. The only white candidate that came close like that was Cranston in California and he won by just over 100,000 votes against Ed Zschau, and he will personally tell you that the voter-registration campaign he conducted and Jackson conducted was the difference in his being a U.S. Senator.

Morris: Really? He might have done better to have--.

Brown: To have lost.

Morris: --retired gracefully before--.

Brown: --the long knives got him.

Morris: There was some talk that you were being considered for chairman of the Democratic National Committee.

Brown: No. Not so.

Morris: Not true. Why did the rumor float?

Brown: Well, they just said, "Brown," and they naturally thought Willie Brown because he was the chairman of the Jackson campaign, when in fact, it was Ron Brown who managed the campaign at the convention. Austin managed the campaign up to the time Jackson didn't get the nomination. The Jackson convention activities were managed by Brown. I gave the speech to make the nomination of Dukakis unanimous. You don't remember that but I was on that cellular telephone number--.

Morris: Actually it was Jesse's speech I remember.

Brown: Jesse's speech was made two nights before.

Morris: And that was very dazzling. Did you stay involved with Harrison Wofford?

Brown: Yes, I did. I helped Harrison.

1992 Campaign Preliminaries

Morris: Has the group that worked with Jesse stayed together since 1988?

Brown: No, not really. I tried to get Tom Harkin to endorse Jesse in 1988. I sat in his office for two hours trying to convince him to endorse Jesse Jackson. It would be standing him in good stead today. He didn't do it.

Morris: Therefore Jesse has lost interest in who runs for president?

Brown: Jesse hasn't lost interest, but he doesn't owe a debt and he would have owed a debt to Tom Harkin and his supporters would have owed a debt to Tom Harkin.

Morris: Were those obligations useful to Mr. Wofford in his Senate campaign? Did he call in some of his chits?

Brown: No. Wofford was not the co-chair of the campaign. It was Cranston I co-chaired the campaign with for Wofford back in 1984 when he wanted me to do that. But, yes, Wofford does have a call on that relationship. That's how he got me.

Morris: Where did he get this James Carville, who I gather has hit the ground running as a political consultant?

Brown: I have no idea. But James has been around a long time. He's lost a lot of elections.

Morris: He's lost a lot of elections?

Brown: Oh, yes, and he'll tell you he's lost a lot of elections.

Morris: But he won this one or events were right?

Brown: He says events were right. Many of us think it was his strategy.

Morris: Am I right that you brought him out to California?

Brown: Twice.

Morris: Does he have some ideas that apply to California politics?

Brown: Good training of the people who are going to run our campaigns. He told them so--.

##

Morris: Would you care to share some of those ideas?

Brown: He just talked about how basic you really have to be. For an example, he says that we get hung up on playing around with the budget, that we really ought to get the budget out of the way so that is not an issue. Hence we are trying to fast-track the budget. He says that the business of defending welfare is stupid. You ought to defend people, not welfare. When somebody accuses you of being soft on welfare, say, "No, I'm not soft on welfare. What I do bleed for, there is this woman with three kids, one of whom is blind and one of whom is lame and what have you, and I'll always vote to help her out." At that stage of the game, your opponent who is accusing you of protecting welfare is reduced to saying, "Well, yes, I want to help her but..." But he says by then it's gone, he's lost the argument. So those are the kinds of things. They are very simple things, they are obviously not earth-shaking.

Morris: In terms of visualization and--.

Brown: Absolutely, and reaching the constituency. He cited examples of campaigns that accuse people of doing certain things and how the person who was accused simply ripped the heart right out of his accuser in a manner that turned it around and caused it to be either a non-issue, caused it to be an issue that required further explanation for it to work. He said that any time you can force your opponent to have to come back and explain further why it's a negative, you've already got him on the run.

Morris: Is this somebody with a lot of technical training in political management or is he just a seasoned hand?

Brown: I really don't know. I would suspect that most people you think are seat-of-the-pants are better prepared than the best-prepared professional person you've ever met. Because I would love people to think I do everything off the seat of my pants when I don't do any of it that way.

Morris: Are you saying that it's instinct or that it's careful preparation?

- Brown: No, it's adequate and careful accumulation of facts and evidence and an understanding of previous history and previous positions and then formulating. What I may say may come instantly, but it is rooted in a thorough understanding of the issues and the problems and the facts surrounding it.
- Morris: That sounds like a very good rule one for political success. How come somebody from out of state like Carville can get a hearing for these ideas instead of going with somebody like Richie Ross who's been presumably grounded in California campaigns and has worked with you--?
- Brown: Because the nature of appealing to the voters is no longer limited by geography. A concept applicable in New York is equally as applicable in California, in many cases. You love to hear those concepts because the public-opinion polling shows that voters are reacting in a similar fashion. Voters rejected David Duke, but the same utterances that David Duke used to communicate are being used by Pete Wilson. Same words, same concepts. Blaming the problem on immigrants; blaming the recession on the unemployed and the poor. That's the stuff David Duke talked about; same stuff Pete Wilson is talking about.
- Morris: Doesn't sound like Pete Wilson.
- Brown: What doesn't sound like Pete Wilson?
- Morris: He comes from San Diego where they have been dealing with population from across the border for generations.
- Brown: But his public-opinion polls show that it is a good idea. He is living on those polls.

XXIV TRACKING SOLUTIONS AND PROBLEMS

Voter Responses Nationwide; Welfare & Job Linkages

- Morris: So the California problems are the same as they are elsewhere?
- Brown: New Jersey has got the same--. With the recession, you tend to have a similarity of issues facing government. When you have a recession as broad-based as it currently is and as deep as it currently is, it tends to affect areas in a similar fashion.
- Morris: Are there some new ideas, aside from suggesting that it is the fault of all these immigrants, for getting a handle on providing the human services that are needed?
- Brown: No, there are no new ideas. The government lost a great opportunity a long time ago to address the welfare issue when they came up with the idea of GAIN, the employment program that would be associated with welfare. Everybody said, "Yes, that's a great idea," then nobody supplied the resources. Tom Bates pointed out to me the other day that welfare offices really ought to have been right next to the employment offices. The person who comes in who is able-bodied, what-have-you, you ought to divert him immediately to the employment office, but you ought to give them an incentive. You ought to say, yes, you are certainly eligible but the only thing we are going to give you until you exhaust the employment opportunities is we are going to give you health care and we are going to give you child care. We are going to pay that directly to the vendors in each case. But only if you go over here and register and enroll and get a job. We don't care what the job pays. Then we are going to the employer and tell the employer we will carry your health-care costs for a year and your child-care costs for a year. It is a hell of a lot less costly to us than giving you a whole grant. In the meantime, you become a working taxpayer. That's a diversion program.

That ought to be part of the welfare operation. And the same application you fill out for welfare could be the application that also is for a job. And it just goes immediately into the computer and the job office picks it up and starts dogging you for employment purposes. If they in fact have a job to offer you and you don't take it, then you ought to be disqualified. Those are the kinds of things we ought to be doing; but we don't do that.

Morris: That sounds as if it is related to Assemblyman [Bruce] Bronzan's integrated services concept?

Brown: Correct. It is. No question about it.

Morris: Is that looking favorable enough for the legislature that you are going to encourage it to expand or continue?

Brown: Yes.

Morris: It's getting some reasonable responses?

Brown: It is. It is getting some reasonable attention.

Morris: That seems to have evolved from some of the works that Art Bolton has done over the years?

Brown: Art Bolton, Art Agnos, Delaine Eastin.

Morris: Are the Delancey Street Foundation people part of the idea too?

Brown: Yes.

Morris: So there is some input from out in the nonprofit community. Do you think that approach is something that is going to politically fly?

Brown: I think in this environment, yes. We will be able to substitute legitimate, workable, humane proposals for all of this hostility, because we won't vote for the hostility and they won't vote to maintain the status quo. If we can step forward with what is a product that has predictable results and measurable results, I think that will be a good place to land on a compromise.

Tieing Health-Care and Worker-Compensation Coverage; S.F. Mayor's Race, 1992

Morris: That sounds as if it feeds into the health-insurance problem too.

Brown: Correct. And the workers' comp[ensation] problem, because you could take the workers' comp and make the treatment portion of the workers' comp covered by the universal health insurance coverage. If you mandate the universal health insurance coverage or put it in such that everybody has the coverage, at least everybody who has an employment relationship because those are the only people connected under workers' comp--if you eliminate the separate dual medical coverage under workers' comp and say, "If you are hurt or injured or you're sick, everybody gets treated under the same health insurance policy," you will cut the cost of workers' comp 35-40 percent. You could begin to finance lots of things and it could become a very attractive alternative if you did that. That is a major workers' comp reform.

Morris: It is going to fly?

Brown: Oh, yes. It will fly eventually.

Morris: Yes. Eventually. I've heard it said that most major legislation takes two or three times to get passed. Is that--?

Brown: With term limits, I think we'll shorten it. Because you won't be around by the time that it incubates. It would have to start all over so no major legislation would ever be passed if you stayed on the same time line that we previously had.

Morris: Does Frank Jordan's election as mayor make a difference in terms of your own strategies?

Brown: No, not at all. Who's mayor doesn't have anything to do with what we do at the state level.

Morris: Well, does it say something about politics in San Francisco--?

Brown: Not at all.

Morris: --that relates to, "You have to run for reelection like everybody else."

Brown: Not at all. Agnos' defeat was a personal defeat. Simultaneously when Agnos was being defeated, I put a measure on the ballot in this town to impose a quarter-cent increase in the sales tax for schools. Fifteen hundred more people voted in that tax measure than voted in the mayor's race.

Morris: In the mayor's race? That's unusual.

Brown: Thank you. And it passed, handsomely.

Morris: Yes.

Brown: Which means that that was a liberal progressive issue on the same ballot. Where they were giving Frank Jordan plurality by 6500 votes, we won the tax measure by about 25,000 votes.

Morris: That's fascinating. There has been some heat on the subject of, if Agnos got dumped as mayor, how come he got such a handsomely paid appointment to a state board?

Brown: Politicians tend to appoint their qualified friends to positions. Just as Pete Wilson names Bill Duplissea to a state board, just as he names Chuck Imbrecht to the Energy Commission, just as he gave Matthew Fong Paul Carpenter's job. Matthew Fong lost to Gray Davis and he surfaces with a \$95,000 a year appointment to the State Board of Equalization. There isn't a difference. The difference is, however, that Willie made the appointment. Willie is subject to criticism where all the other politicians are not. Frank Jordan is appointing people to jobs at city hall who were his campaign workers: Hadley Roff, deputy mayor; Gene Harris, political activist to a \$95,000 a year job as his representative and liaison to the gay community. Nobody criticized Frank Jordan for giving the jobs to those people. Why criticize Willie Brown? It's a double standard.

Morris: Is there more heat on that subject in the current economic hard times when \$90,000-plus looks like an awful lot of money to people who are making a lot less, if they're lucky enough to have a job?

Brown: No, it's only directed at me. Because Jordan is doing the same thing. Jordan is appointing people to \$95,000-a-year jobs, \$100,000-a-year jobs. Pete Wilson is naming people to judgeships that pay \$100,000. And nobody is saying a word.

Morris: I've got about fifteen minutes left on the tape. What I would like to ask you is what kinds of issues have been important to you that we haven't talked about?

Brown: Can't think of any.

Hazards of Term Limits

Morris: We've covered an awful lot of California government and politics. You've been right in the middle of it. What do you see happening next?

Brown: Well, the business of term limits is going to place a different view on what we do and how we do business in California. What next? How do we structure government made up of two kinds of people: newcomers and lame ducks. How do we structure government dominated by the bureaucracy and the special interest organizations plus the influence of the news media. The only people who will be at risk and at a distance will be the elected representatives.

There are no limits on how long you can keep your lobbyists, no limits on how long a bureaucrat can stay in place, and no limits on how long a particular reporter can cover the legislature. Those three categories of people are three-fourths of the decision-making process, formally and informally. The elected representatives are the one collection of people who are now totally and completely handicapped by virtue of no institutional memory and limited experience and no opportunity for career options to be exercised based on performance or desire or luck; everybody in there is on his way out. From the day they get there, they are on their way out.

As a result of that, there is going to be a different blend and a different thrust. That is going to play havoc, in my opinion, with public-policymaking in California, particularly when it's a life-time ban. If you are thirty years old and you get elected to the state assembly, you are allowed to serve six years. Then you are banned for life. You could go become a U.S. Senator, a governor, a president, and at fifty-eight years of age decide you want to run for the state assembly again because you've completed all that other work. You are not eligible.

Morris: Can you run for the state senate?

Brown: You can run for the state assembly for six years and you can serve eight years in the state senate, and then you're life-time banned. But that's not an option.

Morris: Could you run for state treasurer?

Brown: You can run for any other office.

Morris: You could go on the bench.

Brown: You could run for any other office but those are not practical options. If you learn, as Byron Sher has learned, to be the best person on the environment handling the timber issue, that doesn't translate into being the treasurer of the state of California necessarily. The opponent for you for treasurer could be the president of Coopers and Lybrand or could be the professor of

economics from Stanford who came up with the new theory that replaces Milt Friedman's ideas. So you are not in a world where your experience and your skills that have been honed by figuring out answers to environmental problems can ever be used again and you've only been there for six years. You may not want to ever do it. That's my fear. You may never want to do it. If you are forty years of age and you are in the middle of a cycle that gets you on a career ladder and you are raising a family, why would you stop and go for six years to be a member of the state assembly? At forty-six you start looking for a new profession, a new job, a new opportunity? How many forty-six year-old professionals are people looking for these days?

Morris: Forty-six is when you've got lots of energy, intelligence and dynamics. A lot of people at forty-six have a mid-life crisis and exactly what they want to do is to pick up and do something else.

Brown: That may be their option. It should not be forced. There are also those who might want to continue doing what they are doing. As a matter of fact, I would guess that there are more who want to continue what they are doing than there are who want to pick up. That's just my guess.

Morris: Your judgment is that the review of the term-limit initiative that has been passed is going to be upheld.

Brown: Probably, and I have to get out of here because I'm hosting a Super Bowl party.

Morris: I'm leaving right now. Okay. What do you think?

Brown: I would think that the political court will not overturn term limits. If it becomes a true evaluation of the issue in this democracy, I do not believe you could ever sustain a life-time ban for public office unrelated to something morally wrong with the applicant.

Morris: Do you see yourself going on the bench? Running for the Senate?

Brown: No, no, no. I don't know what I'm going to do after 1996. It's too far distant.

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SPEECHES BY ASSEMBLY SPEAKER WILLIE BROWN, JR. AND
RELATED MATERIALS, MAY 1984-OCTOBER 1991

As background for interviewing Willie Brown, his speechwriter and researcher, Joanne Murphy, in August 1991 provided a number of helpful materials that illustrate the varied responsibilities of a legislative leader. These include summaries of all bills introduced by Brown, by Assembly session, from 1973-1974 through 1990, and a list of speeches the Speaker made between 1984-1991, noting organizations addressed and date delivered. A listing of videos of Brown taped from local and network television between 1984 and 1990 was also provided by Michael Reese, then the Speaker's press officer.

In addition, Murphy provided copies of seventeen speeches she felt were particularly important for which duplicates were available, many of which were her own work. Some were fully written texts, others were notes in outline form; often information on the audience, sensitive aspects of the topic discussed, and sources of data and ideas presented are included. They are interesting for the consistency of the ideas expressed with Brown's comments on similar topics in the oral history and the indications that Murphy and other members of his staff were fully conversant with Brown's position on the matters at hand.

The list of speeches is included here and suggests the range of groups that the Speaker addressed during this period as well as the topics on which he focused. AIDS, Black empowerment, Black-Jewish relations, California 2000 plans and problems, freedom of choice, health care, and other title recur often enough to suggest that a basic speech would have been reworked and adapted to appeal to various audiences, and updated as the dialogue on the issue developed.

Titles marked with a star are available in The Bancroft Library; they are catalogued separately from this oral history and may be found under Willie L. Brown, Jr., along with Brown's legislative bill summaries. Although not included in this list, the following items provided by Murphy are also deposited in The Bancroft Library: notes for Brown's acceptance speeches for reelection as speaker in 1986 and 1990, a raw transcript of a press availability session and three separate question-and-answer periods on January 3, 1991, the opening day of the new session; and notes for a speech on "The Public in Politics" given to the City Club of San Diego on October 3, 1991.

Gabrielle Morris
Interviewer/Editor

8/19/91

SPEECH GIVEN TO:(First Column is Alphabetized)

* Starred titles are available in The Bancroft Libr

A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to 1988	A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to 1988	?
A Lurch to the Right (speech only)	A Lurch to the Right (speech only)	?
AB 1173 - Summary of Provisions	AB 1173	?
AB 2200	AB 2200 Testimony	5/25/87
AB 2200 - Summary of Provisions	AB 2200 - Summary of Provisions	1987
Abbott Laboratories	HIV Symposium	10/23/87
Acceptance Speech for New Term as Speaker	Acceptance Speech for New Term as Speaker	?
ACLU Pro-Choice Rally	* California--The Brightest Point of Light	1/22/90
AFL-CIO	Post-Industrial Age: Will Organized Labor Survive?	12/7/85
AFL-CIO	1988: The Year of Labor	10/26/88
AFL-CIO	1988: The Year of Labor	10/11/88
AFL-CIO	Cal-OSHA	2/10/87
AFL-CIO Rally	1988: The Job is Not Done Yet	10/22/88
African Student Assn.	Next Step: Putting the Pieces Together	9/2/88
AFSCME Conference	1989 - Year of Challenge	5/22/89
AFSCME Conference	Political Climate of California	3/21/88
AFSCME, Michigan Council 25	King's Legacy and the Future of Black America	1/13/89
AIDS Antibody Testing	AIDS Antibody Testing	1988?
AIDS Informational Hearing	AIDS Informational Hearing	?
AIDS and Minorities	AIDS and Minorities	1987

AIDS: A National Agenda	AIDS: A National Agenda	1988?
AIDS: The Public Policy Imperative	* AIDS: The Public Policy Imperative	1988
AIDS Task Force	AIDS Issues/Legislation	5/12/88
Alamo Park High School Commencement	"Perspectives on Youth: Peace and Justice Nationally and Internationally	6/16/88
Alaska Black Caucus	Alaska: Land of the Midnight Sun	6/20/87
Alpha Phi Alpha	Rebellious Dreamer	1/13/85
Alpha Phi Alpha	* Rebellious Dreamer	1/15/87
Alpha Phi Alpha Convention (cover only)	Constitution of Black America	7/26/87
Alpha Phi Alpha, Zeta Beta Lambda Chapter	Two Black Americas (cover only)	3/8/87
American Association of Port Authorities (cover only)	Ports	9/12/88
American Council of Life Ins. (cover memo only)	Insurance Reform	11/17/86
American Electronics Assn.	Environment, Taxes, etc.	3/10/87
American Electronics Assn.	Environment, Taxes, etc.	2/3/88
American Hotel & Motel Assn.	The California Phenomenon: A Profile of the Golden State	6/23/87
American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers	* Legislation: The Art of Lasting Compromise	10/19/90
American Israel Public Affairs Committee	* Black Jewish Relations	3/7/85
American Jewish Conf. Dinner	Black Jewish Relations	10/23/84
American League of Financial Institutions (ALFI)	Politics in America: The Fairness Doctrine	11/10/90
Analysis of Proposition 73	Analysis of Proposition 73	6/9/88
AP Editors Meeting	Calif. 2000: Gridlock in the Making	3/14/88
AP Managing Editors	Mass Media and Politics	10/29/86
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Apartment Assn of LA	Rent Control	11/3/86
ARCO Employees Civic Action Program	Calif. 2000: (cover only)	2/29/88
ARCO Management Meeting	Summary of 1987 Legislative Session	10/12/87
ARCO Products	Not While I'm Here	10/16/89
Arthur Page Society/AT&T	In Whose Interest?	9/26/89
Asian-Pacific Bar (cover only)	California 2000	9/24/88
Asian-Pacific Bar	Growing Political Force	6/8/88
Asian-Pacific Demo Caucus	Prop 63 - AB 2813	9/14/86
Assembly Democrats' Campaign Seminar	Assembly Democrats' Campaign Seminar	9/88
Assn of Black Women Physicians	Two Black Americas: Separate and Unequal	10/11/86
Association of California Community College Administrators	Background Data	3/1/91
Association for CA Tort Reform	Tort Reform	1/27/88
Association of California Insurance Companies	Insurance Initiatives	10/12/88
Association of Physical Fitness Centers	The California Phenomenon	2/16/89
Association of Trial Lawyers	Campaign Reform	7/12/87
Atlanta University Commencement	Honorary Degree	5/23/88
Austria	Briefing Memo	8/9/87
Baker & McKenzie	Pacific Rim Real Estate Conf.	2/7/90
BAPAC	Empowerment in the 1990s and Beyond	1988?
BAPAC Convention	Empowerment in the 1990's and Beyond	10/15/88
BAPAC - Long Beach	Unity and Victory in '88	4/8/88
BAPAC - L.A. Awards Dinner	Empowerment in the 1990's and Beyond	9/24/88

BAPAC - Monterey	Calif. Politics -- Planning for the Year 2000	6/26/88
BAPAC - San Diego	Empowerment in the 1990s and Beyond	9/9/88
BAPAC - San Fernando Valley	Unity and Victory in 1988	5/28/88
BAPAC Convention	Black America: Public Policy, Public Consensus	10/17/87
BAPAC State Convention	Black America - At the Crossroads of Political Empowerment	10/7/89
Bay Area Coalition for Soviet Jews	Black Jewish Relations	12/6/87
Bay Area Council for Soviet Jews (cover only)	Black Jewish Relations	10/21/84
Bay Area MLK Celebration	King's Legacy in a World of Peace	1/15/90
Bay Area Nonpartisan Alliance	AIDS: The Politics of an Epidemic	1/31/86
Bay Area Pro-Choice Coalition Rally	Freedom of Choice: It must Be Our Right	4/2/89
Bay Area Public Affairs Council (cover only)	California 2000	3/11/87
Beverly Hills/Hollywood NAACP	The Power of Expectations	2/23/91
Beyond the 1990s: A Look at California's Future (four versions)	Beyond the 1990s: A Look at California's Future' (four versions)	1988
Black Advocates in State Service (BASS)	Welcoming Remarks	10/11/90
Black Alumni of Loma Linda University	Empowerment in the 1990's and Beyond	2/16/89
Black Culture Day VIP Event	Black Culture: A Legacy For All Americans	9/3/88
Black Jewish Relations (speech only)	Black Jewish Relations (speech only)	?
Black Prosecutors Assn	* Violent Crime in America	8/3/89

Black Radio Exclusive Convention	The State and Future of Black America	5/28/88
Black Student Alliance, CSUS	Black Empowerment and American Foreign Policy	2/1/89
Black Methodists for Church Renewal	* Enduring Institutions: Black Family, Black Church	3/18/88
Black Women's Forum	Impact of Budget on Blacks	1/24/87
Black/Jewish Clergy	Black Jewish Relations	9/18/84
Blue Cross of CA & The King's Fund, London Int'l Conference	* Health Care in CA: Our Crisis —Everyone's Future	9/27/90
Booth, Alan (Time Magazine article)	Continuity and Change	4/21/86
Boston's 19th Annual MLK Breakfast	King's Legacy and the Future of Black America	1/16/89
Breakdown of Insurance Initiatives (fact sheet only)	Breakdown of Insurance Initiatives (fact sheet only)	1988
Bronzan, Bruce, Insurance Forum	Solutions to Uncompensated Care	3/8/89
Brookins Community AME Church	* Caring for Our Own: Black Institutions, Black Strengths	9/16/88
Brown, Willie L.	Nelson Mandela and the Divestment Movement	6/28/90
Brown, Willie L., Introduction	Introduction for Speaker	12/5/88
Brown, Willie L., Toxics Reorganization Bill Facts Sheet	Brown, Willie L., Toxics Reorganization Bill Facts Sheet	?
Caen, Herb	Roast of Herb Caen	9/21/90
CAL-PAC North Scholarship Fund Banquet (cover only)	Background memo	5/29/87
CAL-PAC South Scholarship Fund Banquet (cover only)	Background memo	5/15/87
CAL-PAC State Convention (cover only)	Constitution and Black America	8/27/87
California Administrative Service Organization	Involvement Revisited	6/30/89
California Applicants' Attorneys	Workers' Comp	7/8/88

California Applicants' Attorneys	Workers' Compensation: A System in Need of Reform	6/28/86
California Applicants' Attorneys	Transcript, WLB	12/12/86
California Applicants' Attorneys	Labor and the Legislature: The View from 1987	8/21/87
California Applicants' Attorneys Seminar	Labor	12/12/86
California Assn of Bilingual Education	AB 37	1/30/87
California Association of Black Correctional Workers	Enduring Institutions: Black Family, Black Church	6/11/88
California Assn of Black Lawyers	AIDS and the Minority Community	4/25/87
California Assn of Collectors	Involvement Revisited	3/13/90
California Assn of Highway Patrolmen	Historical on CHP	10/17/90
California Assn of Life Underwriters	Health and Life Insurance -- Sheltered from the Storm	5/30/87
California Assn of Rehab Professionals	History of Workers' Comp	9/18/86
California Assn of Tobacco & Candy Distributors	Litter	11/15/86
California Association of Black Correctional Workers	Enduring Institutions: Black Family, Black Church	6/11/88
California Attorneys for Criminal Justice	Reality: Therapy from Sacramento	9/24/88
California Automatic Vendors Council	Litter (cover only)	3/7/87
California Bankers	1987 Legislation	2/19/87
California Beer Industry	Excise Taxes	4/27/89
California Beer and Wine Wholesalers	AB 1500	4/30/87
California Broadcasters Assn.	Politics and the Press	2/18/87
California Center for Education in Public Affairs	Sandel article	2/26/88

California Chamber of Commerce	Medina's Speech Notes	2/22/89
California Clean Air & New Technology	Remarks	10/16/90
California Coalition for	Trucking Deregulation Trucking Deregulation	11/18/87
California Coin Dealers	AB 2557 (Pawnbrokers)	6/19/87
California Conference of Machinists	Reapportionment — Is There Need for Reform?	4/23/90
California Conference of Machinists	Labor Issues (cover only)	3/11/88
California Correctional Peace Officers Assn	November Election/December Session	12/2/88
California Council for International Trade	Omnibus Trade Legislation	4/8/87
California Demo Council Endorsement Convention	Future of the Democratic Party	3/15/86
California Demo Party Convention Lunch	Future of the Democratic Party	1/26/85
California Demo Party Legislative Leadership Luncheon	Reapportionment: Is There a for Reform?	4/7/90
California Demo Party '88 Victory Committee	Unity and Victory in '88	5/6/88
California Demo Party Convention	Unity and Victory in '88	3/19/88
California Demo Party Convention	1986 Elections	1/31/87
California Demo Party Convention	Countdown to Victory	1/11/89
California Democratic Council	1986 Elections	4/24/87
California Dept of Forestry Employees Assn	CDFEA Background	12/5/86
California Disposal Assn	Roast of Sam Arakalian	12/2/87
California Focus	Ross Johnson Roast	1/23/90
California Grocers Assn	The Legislative Session: Reflections of Popular Concern	3/15/89
California Hotel & Motel Assn	California 2000 (cover only)	6/16/87

California Hotel & Motel Assn	Search for Excellence	10/27/86
California Hotel & Motel Assn	Legislative Accomplishments for 1987 (cover only)	3/1/88
California Hotel & Motel Assn	Beyond the 1990's -- A Look at California's Future	10/7/88
California Housing Council	Housing Issues	6/30/89
California Junior State Convention	The American Dream: Illusion or Reality?	4/17/88
California Labor Federation Conference	Health Insurance for All Cali- formians: Our Plan for the Future	4/25/90
California Labor Federation	1989 - Year of Challenge	5/22/89
California Manufacturers	Calif. 2000: Gridlock in the Making	4/21/88
California Manufacturers Assn	Involvement Revisited	6/13/89
California Market Data Cooperative (Real Estate Appraisers)	Legislation: The Art of Lasting Compromise	3/6/89
California Medical Assn Conf.	AIDS Testing	4/6/88
California Medical Assn PAC (CALPAC Reapportionment)	Reapportionment: The Ultimate Dividing Line	3/2/90
California Municipal Utilities Convention	Calif. 2000	2/24/88
California Optometric Assn	Future of Health Care in California	2/17/90
California Phenomenon: A Profile of the Golden State	California Phenomenon: A Profile of the Golden State	1987?
California Politics: Planning for the Year 2000	* California Politics: Planning for the Year 2000	1988?
California Professional Firefighters	History and Background	10/13/88
California Radio and TV News Directors	California Politics -- Summer of '88	6/22/88
California Retailers Assn	Retailer Legislation	9/9/87
California Seniors Legislative	Long-Term Care: A Public	5/17/89
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Rally	Policy Imperative	
California Senior Legislature	California Senior Legislature	10/5/88
California Sheet Metal & Air Conditioning Assn	1987 Session/Tort Reform (cover only)	11/11/89
California Special Districts Association	Local Government and the Challenge of Growth	9/21/90
California Society of Certified Accountants	Involvement Revisited	5/31/89
California State Conference of Painters	Reapportionment -- Is There A Need for Reform?	5/24/90
California State Council of Machinists	A Full Agenda	4/1/91
California State Council Service Employees Intl. Union	The 1990's: Labor Renaissance	3/14/89
Calif. State University Fresno	Academe: Crucible for Cultural Diversity	4/5/90
California State University, Long Beach	Commencement Speech	5/28/87
California Teachers Assn Staff Meeting	1988 Ballot Initiatives	12/8/86
Calif. Teamsters/Mtg of State-wide Officials	Reapportionment: Is There a Need for Reform?	4/6/90
California Trucking Assn	California 2000: Gridlock in the Making	11/17/88
California 2000	California 2000	?
California 2000: Briefing Memo	Transportation	3/14/88
California 2000: The Elderly	The Elderly (speech only)	?
California 2000: Preschool Recommendations	California 2000: Preschool Recommendations	?
California 2000: Press Conf.	California 2000: Press Conf.	6/17/86
California 2000: Toxic Dump Sites	California 2000: Toxic Dump Sites	8/4/86
California: A Changing Political Climate, a New Century	California: A Changing Political Climate, a New Century	?

California: The Emerging Superpower	California: The Emerging Superpower	?
California YMCA Model Legislative & Court	Young Leadership & California's Future	2/16/90
California Young Democrats	Young Democrats -- California's Tomorrow	4/29/89
Campaign Finance Reform	White Paper	1987
Can Out-of-State Attorneys Appear in CA Courts?	Can Out-of-State Attorneys Appear in CA Courts? (no cover)	?
CEEB Annual Meeting	Air Quality--The Next Environmental Hurdle	12/10/89
Celebrity Introductions	Misc. Celebrities	1988
Center for Real Estate & Urban Economics	California - An Uncertain Future	10/13/89
Central California BAPAC	The Power of Expectations	3/1/91
Central City Assn of LA	Election Results, etc.	6/15/88
Cerrell's Political Science Class	Mass Media and Politics	4/30/85
Cerrell's Political Science Class	Raising Money for California Politics	10/27/87
Cerrell's Political Science Class (cover only)	Mass Media and Politics	4/21/87
Cerrell's Political Science Class	1988 Elections: A New Low?	11/1/88
Cerrell's Political Science Class	Analysis of the 1986 Elections	?
Cerrell's Political Science	Political Parties, Campaigns, and Elections	12/12/89
Chamber of Commerce Convention	Health Insurance/Workers Compensation	3/28/89
Chart of Institutional Characteristics for Major California Ports	Chart of Institutional Characteristics for Major California Ports	?
City of Seattle	The California Experience: Managing Growth, Adapting to Change	2/23/90

Claremont University	Foreign Policy and Black America	2/25/88
Coalition of Medical Providers	Worker's Compensation: The Aftermath of Reform	2/21/90
Colorado Civil Rights Commission	King's Legacy and the Future of Black America	1/20/89
Community College of Jewish Studies	Black Jewish Relations	5/24/84
Concordia Argonaut Forum	1987-88 Session	9/13/88
Conflicts of Interest/ Legislative Ethics	Campaign Reform	?
Congregation Beth Shalom	Independence of the Judiciary	9/6/86
CONPAC "48 Hours in Motion"	Beyond the 1990's — A Look at California's Cloudy Future	9/14/88
Constitution and Black America (three versions)	* Constitution and Black America (three versions)	1987?
Cooperative of American Physicians	Health Care in California— A Status Report	11/3/90
C.O.P.S. Endorsement Convention	Law Enforcement Issues	4/28/88
Coro Fellows	California's Political Climate/ The Year 2000	3/21/88
Corporate Counsels of California	Tort Reform	10/21/86
Corporate Counsels of California	Insurance Crisis	10/21/86
CSAC	Trial Court Funding, etc.	4/13/88
CSEA Board of Directors Meeting	Involvement in Political Process	9/12/87
CTLA	Tort Reform	11/7/86
CTLA Convention	California 1988: Initiative Warfare	11/12/88
CTLA Convention	Tort Reform	11/8/87
CTLA Initiative (no cover)	CTLA Initiative	?
CTLA Reception	Tort Reform	3/11/87
Data Processing Management Assn	Information and Automation:	5/2/86

	a Future of Mixed Blessings	
Davis, Sammy Jr.	Eulogy	5/17/90
Delta Sigma Theta	Background Memo	7/9/88
Delta Sigma Theta (cover only)	Constitution of Black America	3/16/87
Demo Club - Various	Campaigns	6/87
Demo Foundation of San Diego Co. (cover only)	1988 Elections	9/9/88
Demo Women's Assn of the Desert (cover only)	California 2000	10/30/87
Democratic Convention - Orange County (covers only)	1988 Campaigns	1/30/88
Democratic Leadership Dinner	The Importance of Partisanship	9/10/89
Democratic National Committee — Democratic Business Council	1992 - Business as Usual?	8/2/91
Deputy Legislative Counsel Assn	Leg Counsel Deputies' Role in the Legislature	3/4/87
Detroit Assn of Black Organizations	The Condition of Black America Today	2/23/86
Desert Demo Club/Antelope Valley	Demographics/Background	6/28/87
Dia De La Bi-National Conference	The New Horizon	10/13/89
Donahue, Phil Appearance	"For Women Only"	10/25/85
Drew, Charles R. School of Medicine	Commencement Speech	6/3/90
Effects of Governor's Proposed 1987-88 Budget	Effects of Governor's Proposed 1987-88 Budget	1987
18th Annual Seniors Rally	Long-term Care and AARP	5/25/88
Elks Club (cover only)	America in the 1980s	5/11/85
Elmhurst United Methodist Church	Enduring Institutions: Black Family, Black Church	8/14/88
Empowerment in the 1990s and Beyond (speech only - two versions)	Empowerment in the 1990s and Beyond (speech only - two versions)	

Energy in the Year 2000	Energy in the Year 2000	1987?
England, Ireland, Spain Overview	England, Ireland, Spain Overview	2/4/88
Ervin, Cohen & Jessup	The Business of California Is . . . ?	11/7/89
Essence Magazine Awards Dinner	Essence Magazine	11/21/87
Eta Phi Beta	Unity and Victory in '88	4/16/88
Fat, Wing	Coro Roast of Wing Fat	3/13/90
Federal Tax Reform Act of 1986 (speech only)	Federal Tax Reform Act of 1986 (speech only)	?
Federalism in Insurance Reform	Federalism in Insurance Reform	11/10/86
Federalism: A New Dimension (speech only - five copies)	Federalism: A New Dimension (speech only - five copies)	?
Federalism: The New		?
Ferrari Owners Club/Bay Area	History of Ferrari Automobiles	3/14/87
54th Assm Dist/OC Demo Club	1986 Elections	1/29/88
Filipino Demo Clubs	1986 Elections	1/24/87
Flexible Packaging Institute	California: Politics on a Grand Scale	6/10/87
Florida Demo Party Conference	Future of the Democratic Party	11/16/85
Florida Demo Party Conference	The Winning Team	12/2/89
Floyd, Dick	Leg. Counsel Opinion, etc.	6/18/88
Foreign Policy & Black America (speech only)	Foreign Policy in Black America (speech only)	1988?
Foreign Policy, International Trade and the Budget Deficit (speech only)	Foreign Policy, International Trade and the Budget Deficit	?
Federation of Retired Union Members (F.O.R.U.M.)	Retirees: The Key to Politics in the 1990's	2/27/90
FOXPAC	Involvement Revisited	2/9/90
Friedman, Murray	Black and Jewish Relations: The Civil Rights Revolution	?

Freilich, Stone, et. al.	Local Government and the Challenge of Growth	10/5/90
Friends of Richard Polanco	Polanco Labor Breakfast	2/2/90
Gandhi Memorial International Foundation	Gandhi Background	10/3/88
Gang Violence in California: An Overview	Gang Violence in California An Overview	1988
Gangs and Drugs -- an Overview	Gangs and Drugs -- an Overview	1988
General Electric Govt Relations Seminar	Workers compensation, etc.	4/20/88
General Instrument Corp.	Lottery	12/15/86
Gilliam, Earl B. Bar Assn of San Diego	Keynote Speaker	11/3/90
Glass Packaging Institute	Toxics/Recycling	7/12/87
Glass Packaging Institute	Recycling/Waste Management	3/12/89
Golden State Minority Foundation	Pursuit of Excellence	1/29/87
Golden West Nutritional Foods Assn.	Effectiveness in the Legislative and Political Arena	2/14/88
Good Morning America Interview	The Reagan Civil Rights Record	8/11/88
Governor's Budget Response	Governor's Budget Response	7/9/87
Greater Erie Community Action Committee	Lost Causes: Black and Poor, Reagan's America	9/4/87
Greater San Diego Chamber of Commerce	Ports/Trade	3/16/85
Hannigan's Capital Forum Breakfast	California 2000: Gridlock in the Making	5/12/88
Harlem Renaissance Cultural Event	Art in Black America	1/20/88
Harris County Black Caucus	Black America: Public Policy, Public Consensus	10/8/87
Harvard Law School Forum	* Politics and the Press	10/2/86
Hastings College of Law	African-Americans: Meeting the Challenges of a New Decade	2/1/90

Hawthorne Elementary School	Legislative Process	8/3/88
Hayes, Thomas W.	Memo re Thomas Hayes	9/15/88
Heron, Burchette	1988 Elections	8/18/88
Hispanics Organized for Political Party Equality	1990 -- The Year of the Woman	11/2/90
History of Legislative Reform and Reorganization in California (briefing paper only)	Legislative Reorganization	1988
Honda Executives	1987 Legislative Accomplishments (cover only)	1/21/88
House Rules & Administration	Legislative Reorganization	1988
Howard University	Black Executives: A Triple Challenge	11/20/87
Howard University	Charter Day Award	4/1/89
Hundred Black Men of America	State & Future of Black America	5/28/88?
ILWU Joint Legislative Conf.	CAL-OSHA	5/4/87
ILWU Legislative Conference	1989 - Year of Challenge	5/8/89
ILWU Dedication Ceremony	Harry Bridges	7/29/89
Independent Insurance Agents	Insurance Reform	11/11/86
Independent Insurance Agents of San Francisco	Public Policy and the Business of Insurance	5/19/89
Indian-American Business Leaders Function	Involvement Revisited	4/7/90
Indian Dental Assn of CA	Involvement Revisited	3/10/90
Industry Manufacturers Council	1987 Session Summary	9/16/87
Information Industry Assn	California's Future: Growth vs. Green	5/9/90
International Academy of Trial Lawyers	California Legislative Agenda	2/20/87
International Association of Credit Card Investigators	California--Recession Proof?	8/8/90
International Assn of Political Consultants	Jackson Candidacy and the Future of Ethnic Politics	11/12/88

International Assn of Wiping Cloth Manufacturers	Pursuit of Excellence	3/9/87
International Council of Shopping Centers	Involvement Revisited	6/15/89
International Fitness Consultants	The California Phenomenon	5/19/90
International Trade & Industrial Development: The Role of the (two versions)	International Trade & Industrial Development: The Role of the States (two versions)	
Ireland Trip Briefing Memo	Ireland Trip Briefing Memo	4/7/87
Irvis, K. Leroy, Retirement Dinner	The Reagan Years: Retreat from Civil Rights	10/24/87
Isenberg Capitol Breakfast Club	Beyond the 1990s: A Look at California's Future	12/6/88
Jackson, Jesse, 1984 Election Results	Jackson, Jesse, 1984 Election Results	4/9/87
Japan/Hong Kong Briefing Book	Japan/Hong Kong Briefing Book	9/24/87
Japanese-American Bar Assn. (cover only)	Tort Reform	1/15/88
Japanese-American Citizens League	Internment Background	6/30/88
Jewish National Fund of America	Tree of Life Award	9/19/87
Jewish Public Affairs Committee	Budget Shortfall	5/24/88
Joint Council of Teamsters No. 42	Reapportionment: Is There a Need for Reform?	3/30/90
Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue	Tort Reform/Insurance Crisis	9/16/87
Jones Memorial Church "Laity Sunday"	The Fire of the Spirit; Zeal of the Faithful	6/17/90
Jones Memorial Church	The Plight of Black Children - 35 Years After	5/21/89
Jordan, Barbara, Demo Women's Caucus	Future of the Democratic Party	10/17/85
Judicial System - Historical Perspective	Judicial System - Historical Perspective	?

Junior Statesmen Summer School	Public Service/Career Options	8/2/88
Kantor Luncheon (cover only)	Tort Reform	11/24/87
Karabian Group	Search for Excellence	1/9/87
Karabian, Wally	Bachelor Party	5/18/88
Kronick, Moskovitz, Workshop	Implications of Prop 63	11/17/86
Langston Bar Assn (cover only)	Constitution and Black America	2/28/87
Langston Bar Assn	Renewing the Struggle: Black Men and the Law	7/8/89
Langston Bar Assn	Racial Equality and the Changing Role of the Judiciary	4/7/90
Leadership America	Leadership in a Frontierless Society	11/1/90
Leadership Visalia	Making Policy, Making Law	4/20/89
Legislative Reorganization Memo	Legislative Reorganization Memo	9/27/88
Legislative Reorganization	Legislative Reorganization Memo	11/18/88
Legislative Task Force Memo	Legislative Reorganization	8/17/88
Legislative Speakership	Historical Overview	1988
Leslie's Representatives Roundtable	Campaign Finance Reform	8/25/87
Life Magazine	History of the Civil Rights Movement	11/18/87
Life Magazine	Voters in the New South	3/2/88
Life on the Water Drama Presentation	Zora Neale Hurston	4/9/88
London Trip Briefing Memo	London Trip Briefing Memo	8/9/87
Long-Term Care: A Public Policy Imperative (speech only)	Long-Term Care: A Public Policy Imperative (speech only)	1988
Los Angeles County Bar Assn, Corporate Law Dept Section	Local Government & the Challenge of Growth	11/2/90
Lost Causes: Black and Poor in Reagan's America	Lost Causes: Black and Poor in Reagan's America	?

Louisiana-Pacific	California's Timber Industry	12/15/88
MALDEF Press Conference	English as Official Language	5/11/88
Marin County Democrat Lawyers	New York Primary Results	4/21/88
Martin Luther King Awards Luncheon	Rebellious Dreamer	1/10/86
Martin Luther King's Birthday	Martin Luther King's Birthday	1/15/88
Martin Luther King's Birthday Celebrations	Review of Parting the Waters; Mississippi Burning	1/13/89
McDonald's Restaurant Operators	Involvement Revisited	6/6/89
MECLA 10th Anniversary	AIDS: The Politics of an Epidemic	5/9/87
Memorial Day Speeches Table of Contents (cover memo)	Table of Contents (Cover Memo)	5/28/88
Memorial Health Services	Budget Issues	6/9/89
Merritt College	Commencement address	6/13/86
Mid-Cities Independent Insurance Agents	Public Policy and the Business of Insurance	4/13/89
Milwaukie Times "Black Excellence" Awards	Empowerment in the 1990s and Beyond	2/17/89
Minority Area Metro Employees	Empowerment in the 1990s and Beyond	7/30/88
Minority Economic Resources Corp	Rebellious Dreamer	1/12/85
Mission National Bank	Involvement Revisited	6/2/89
Moore, Gwen - Black History Month	Foreign Policy and Black America	2/25/88
Morrison, Toni	Review of "Beloved"	4/6/88
Multicultural Prevention Resources Center	AIDS Interview	1987
Municipal Bond Ins. Assn.	Reagan's Fiscal Policy	11/12/85
NAACP - CA State Conference	Beyond the 1990s: A Look at California's Future	10/29/88
NAACP - Elmira Corning Branch	* Two Black Americas: Separate	11/8/85

and Unequal

NAACP - Ennis Branch	Two Black Americas: Separate and Unequal	11/28/86
NAACP - St. Paul	Bork, Robert	10/15/87
NAACP - 35th Anniversary Brown vs. Board of Education	Anniversary - Brown vs. Board of Education	5/17/89
NAACP - West Coast Region	Equality Through Unity	12/3/87
NAACP Salt Lake City	Two Black Americas: Separate and Unequal	10/18/85
Naral Rally	California -- The Brightest Point of Light	11/12/89
National Assn of Fleet Administrators	California Opportunities	5/2/88
National Assn of Hispanic Publishers	The Changing Face of CA	8/3/88
National Assn of Minority Engineering Program Admin.	Educational Equality - The Equality Imperative	11/17/89
National Assn of Real Estate Brokers	The Power of Expectations	2/22/91
National Bar Association (cover only)	Two Black Americas	3/28/87
National Bar Assn	* Racial Equality and the Changing Role of the Judiciary	8/2/89
National Black Caucus of State Legislators	November 7th...Black Tuesday?	12/1/89
National Black Staff Network	Reagan Years: Retreat from Civil Rights	2/26/88
National Conference of Black Mayors	Black Mayoral Races	4/7/89
National Conference on State Legislatures	Insurance Reform	12/12/86
National Council of Negro Women	Enduring Institutions: Black Family, Black Church	4/30/88
National Council of Negro Women	Caring for Our Own: Black Institutions, Black Strengths	3/11/89

National Council of Teachers of College English	American Education: Neglect of Literacy	11/21/87
National Hampton Alumni Assn. (cover only)	Constitution and Black America	8/1/87
National Medical Enterprises	Health Care Issues	1/22/88
National Nutritional Foods Assn	Diet and Health Issues/ Legislative Involvement	7/15/89
National Review Article	Federal Deficit/World Peace	12/14/88
National Urban League Conference	Speech Notes	7/23/86
New York Stock Exchange Briefing Memo	Governmental Use Bonds and Private Use Bonds	2/18/88
Newsday	Voter Participation	1988
Newsweek	Campaign Reform Fraud	7/13/87
Nolan's 41st District Club	Education Reform Movement	8/10/88
Nolan's 41st District Club	Challenges to California	9/1/87
Northern California Black Women's Physicians	Black Women's Physicians Resolution	11/13/87
Northern California Psychiatric Society	Mental Health Legislation	3/14/87
Ohio Black Caucus	* 1988: Our Diversity is Our Strength	6/17/88
Op-Ed for LA Times	Campaign Reform Initiatives	5/11/88
Operating Engineers Local 3	Reapportionment -- Is There a Need for Reform?	5/19/90
Orange Co/Gardena Valley Demo Club	Demographics/Background	6/25/87
Oregon State Party Dinner (cover only)	Future of the Democratic Party	1/26/85
Overseas Educational Foundation	Chalker, Maryann	4/17/88
Pacific Merchant Shipping Assn	California: The Importance of Trade	2/26/88
Pacific Presbyterian Medical Center Video Conference	Medical Issues	4/22/88
spch		8/19/91

Pacific Telesis Group	Election Issues (Nov. 6, 1990 Election)	10/19/90
Pasadena City College	View From the Summit	10/11/89
Penn Workshop on Litter/ Recycling	Litter	5/21/86
Peninsula Sun Times - OPED	Initiative Process	9/14/89
Personnel and Industrial Relations Assn.	Involvement Revisited	6/1/89
Phi Alpha Delta	Courts and Public Opinion	9/24/87
Phi Delta Epsilon	Health Care Issues	1/19/88
Phi Delta Phi	Supreme Court Elections	4/23/87
Phi Delta Phi	California's Confirmation System	4/23/87
Politics and the Press (speech only)	Politics and the Press (speech only)	?
Port Report - Conclusions	Port Report - Conclusions	1988
Professional Insurance Agents of California	Art of Lasting Compromise	2/8/87
Proposed Recommendations of the the Assembly Select Committee on Insurance (fact sheet only)	Proposed Recommendations of Assembly Select Committee on Insurance (fact sheet only)	?
Proposed California Legislative Approach to Combat Gang Violence and Drugs	Submitted to the House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control	(?)
Public Policy Forum	Prevention of Substance Abuse	5/3/86
Raising Money for California Politics: The Argument for Campaign Reform	Raising Money for California Politics: The Argument for Campaign Reform	?
Randolph, A. Phillip (cover only)	1986 Elections	5/7/87
Randolph, A. Phillip, Institute Dinner	Unity and Victory in '88	9/17/88
Randolph, A. Phillip Institute	Hail to the Chief: The Life and legacy of A. Phillip Randolph	3/18/89

Rather, Dan, Panel	Press and the Presidency	5/13/87
Reagan Years: Retreat from Civil Rights	Reagan Years: Retreat from Civil Rights	?
Reapportionment Conf., Laguna Niguel	Reapportionment	7/16/89
Redwood City Rotary Club	Close of '88 Session	9/20/88
Reelection to the Speakership	* Reelection to the Speakership (1986 & 1990 ACCEPTANCE SPEECHES ALSO)	12/5/88
Rent-A-Judge Program	Memo re Rent-A-Judge Programs	1988
Request for NCSL Funding	Logitudinal Bilingual Study	5/1/86
Resources for Independent Living — Comedy Night	Jokes	4/4/88
Retinitis Pigmentosa Dinner	Retinitis Pigmentosa History and Treatment	9/8/88
Robinson-Swartz Marriage	Marriage Ceremony	10/4/89
Rose Institute	* A Rose by Any Other Name (LATINO POWERMENT)	6/3/89
Rotary Club of IA	California 2000	1/30/87
Rules of the US House of Representatives	Legislative Reorganization	2/17/88
Russell, Mark, Introduction	Russell, Mark, Introduction	1/6/87
Sacramento Black Chamber of Commerce	Empowerment in the 1990s and Beyond	5/24/89
Sacramento City College Commencement	Learning to be Free	6/9/89
Sacramento County Day School	Pursuit of Excellence	2/9/87
Sacramento Democratic Coalition (cover only)	1986 Election Results	5/31/87
Sacramento Seminar Luncheon	Health Insurance, Prop 103, etc.	3/3/89
Sacramento Press Club Luncheon	California: The Importance of Trade	2/25/88
San Bernardino Black Culture Foundation	Small Things; Close to Home	8/23/90
San Diego Appearances	Health Insurance, Prop 103, etc.	3/10/89

San Diego Chamber of Commerce	California: The Importance of Trade	3/16/88
San Diego Gas & Electric	Close of '88 Session	9/9/88
San Francisco Co. Demo Party	Federalism & American Politics	4/28/89
San Francisco Links	1988 Elections	11/6/88
San Francisco Press Club	Campaign Reform	4/23/87
San Francisco Rotary Club Election Day Luncheon	1990 Elections (Nov)	11/6/90
San Francisco Rotary Club	1986 Elections	11/4/86
San Francisco Society of Professional Journalists	Politics & the Press: A Critique	4/19/90
San Joaquin Bar Assn.	Access to Justice	5/1/89
San Mateo County Economic Development Assn, Inc.	Regional Issues Require Thinking: Seven Reasons Why	4/4/90
Sandel, Michael J.,	"A Public Philosophy for American Liberalism"	?
SB 241 Agreement	SB 241 Agreement	?
Search for Excellence (speech only)	Search for Excellence	?
Send the Families to Korea	Olympic Press Event	9/3/88
Shiley Management	California 2000	10/20/88
Should English be the Official Language of the US? (article)	Should English be the Official Language of the US? (article)	?
SHOW Coalition	Calif. Politics - The Action is Here	9/19/89
Smokeless Tobacco Council	What's Going on in California	11/8/89
Society of Insurance Brokers	Public Policy and the Business of Insurance	2/23/89
Society of the Plastics Industry	California 2000	3/25/87
Software consultants & Brokers	Federal Tax Laws	5/7/87
Solano County "Friends for Jackson"	1988: Our Diversity is Our Strength	5/20/88

South Carolina Black Caucus	South Carolina Politics	4/23/88
Southern California Rehabilitation Exchange	Survival of Rehabilitation: Impact on Society?	?
St. Paul Men's Day	The Plight of Black Children -- 35 Years Later	6/18/89
St. Phillips College (cover only)	Constitution and Black America	2/26/87
State Bar Board of Governors (cover only)	Overview of California Politics	3/7/88
State Board of Education	Education issues	3/9/88
State of the State	State of the State	1/2/86
State Legislative Leaders Foundation	Risk Assessment v. Risk Free Society	10/5/89
Sterling's Capital Caucus Luncheon	California: A Cloudy Future	9/9/88
Stephen Wise Temple School	Legislative Membership Info	5/10/88
Stern, Robert M.	The Birth of a Loophole: Why the 1974 Ethics Law Exempted Legislators	7/18/89
Stockton-San Joaquin Black Chamber of Commerce	Black America in the 1990s -- A Deadlilne Decade	1/20/90
Stonewall Gay Demo Club	The AIDS Epidemic Policy vs. Politics	10/3/88
Sutter Community Hospital (cover only)	Medical Issues	2/2/88
Summary of 1987 Leg Session	Summary of 1987 Leg. Session (speech only/two copies)	1987
Super Conducting Super Collider	Super conducting Super Collider	?
Supreme Court Decision Memo	Abortion	7/10/89
Tacoma City Assn of Colored Women's Clubs (cover only)	Two Black Americas	5/8/87
Task Force House Rules and Administration	Legislative Reform	?
Taxi Cab-Paratransit Assn of California	California: A Changing Political Climate, a New Century	11/4/88

Technologylinic Symposium	High Tech Legislation	9/16/87
Temple Isaiah	Jesse Jackson	5/23/84
Therapeutic Communities Convention	Substance Abuse	9/6/85
Time Magazine	Interview with Toni Morrison	5/22/89
Time Newsmaker Luncheon Series	California 2000	3/6/87
Tobacco Institute	Risk, Fear and American Public Policy	8/8/89
Tort Reform/Insurance Crisis	Tort Reform/Insurance Crisis (speech only)	?
Town Hall of California	California 2000: A Look to the Future	4/27/90
Town Hall of California	South African Divestment	7/21/87
Toxics (speech only)	Toxics	?
TransAfrica Forum	Black Foreign Policy	6/5/87
True Vine Missionary Baptist Church	The Power of Expectations	2/17/91
Tucker, Curtis	Eulogy	1988
Tulane University & Amistad Research Center Civil Rights Conference	Racial Equality and the Changing Role of the Judiciary	11/13/89
Turner, J. L. Legal Association	Racial Equality and the Changing Role of the Judiciary (8/2/89 spch to National Bar Assn)	5/4/91
Two Black Americas: Separate and Unequal (six versions)	Two Black Americas: Separate and Unequal (six versions)	1987?
Tyson, Mike, and King, Don	Biographical info	4/4/89
U.C. AIDS Briefing	AIDS	1/16/85
UC Berkeley	A Changing World: No One Escapes the Impact	9/7/85
U.C. Berkeley	Political Science Graduation —Speech Notes	6/20/?
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UC Davis African-American Graduation	"Harambee -- Making the Journey"	6/17/89
UC Davis, Public Policy Forum/Prevention of Substance Abuse	Public Policy Forum/Prevention of Substance Abuse	5/3/86
UC Santa Barbara Minority Scholarship Luncheon	Uniformity in Education	9/17/88
UC San Francisco	King's Legacy in a World of Peace	1/19/90
UC Student Association	Educational Equity For All -- University in Crisis	4/23/90
UCLA Center for Afro-American Studies (cover only)	Foreign Policy Speech	4/8/88
UCLA School of Law: Seminar on Law and the Political Process	Proposition 140: Politics and the Constitution	2/22/91
United Black Men of Fresno Awards Banquet (cover only)	United Black Men of Fresno Background memo	4/25/87
United Democratic Campaign Headquarters	Campaign Kickoff	9/15/88
United Democratic Club of Inglewood	1992: Year of Challenge	3/30/91
United Domestic Workers Union	Home Health Care	3/11/87
United Domestic Workers Union	California: A Changing Political Climate, a New Century	3/16/88
United Food & Commercial Workers	Labor Into the 1990s	?
United Transport. Union Board	CAL-OSHA, etc.	4/12/88
Unity and Victory in 1988 (two versions)	Unity and Victory in 1988 (two versions)	?
University of CA Student Affirmative Action Conf	Educational Equity - The Equality Imperative	9/7/89
University of Michigan MLK Symposium	King's Legacy and the Future of Black America	1/15/89
University of Nevada, Black Student Organization (cover only)	Two Black Americas	2/28/87
University of Nevada -- Reno	The Changing Role of the American University	1/19/89

University of the Redlands	Black Foreign Policy	2/18/88
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Urban Land Institute	The National Political Outlook and California's Future	11/4/88
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Vallejo-Benicia Demo Club	The Knights of the Rose and the Dreaded Gerrymander	5/26/89
Valley Industry & Commerce Association	Health Care in CA -- A Status Report & Article	10/18/90
Viewpoint Interview	AIDS	10/24/85
Voters in the New South (speech only)	Voters in the New South	?
Washington, DC Briefing Book	Washington, DC Briefing Book	4/87
Washington, DC Briefing Book	Washington, DC Briefing Book	4/21/89
Water Resources Issue Paper	Water Resources Issue Paper	?
Water: Summary of Recommendations	Water: Summary of Recommendations	?
Waters, Maxine, Black Women's Forum	The Jackson Candidacy and the Future of Black Politics	12/16/88
Waters, Maxine, Champions Dinner	Celebrity Background	4/25/90
Waters, Maxine, Champions Dinner	Celebrity Background	4/13/88
Weber State College	America in the 1980s	5/9/85
Wesley United Methodist Church	Do All the Good You Can	1/10/88
West Coast Black Publishers	Black America: Public Policy, Public Consensus	10/22/87
Western Assn of Educational Opportunity Personnel	The California Phenomenon	3/6/89

Western Burglar and Fire Alarm Assn.	1987 Legislative Accomplishments (cover only)	12/18/87
Western Burglar and Fire Alarm	California's Changing Political Process/Involvement Revisited	12/1/89
Western Mobilehome Assn.	Summary of 1987 Session	11/10/87
Wilberforce University	Education and Black America	8/5/88
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Wilson, William Julius, Briefing Memo	The State and Future of Black America	3/7/89
Women In Action	Dreaming the Dream	6/4/89
Women's Political Summit	Reapportionment--Is There a Need for Reform	3/17/90
Women's PAC Summit Meeting	1990--The Year of the Woman	8/18/90
Workers' Compensation Memo	Workers' Compensation Memo	8/11/86
Workers' Compensation Update (no cover)	Workers' Compensation Update	7/8/88
World Federation of Right-to-Die Society	Right-to-Die Initiative	4/8/88
World Trade Commission	California: The Emerging Superpower	?
Wrong Tribe (speech only)	Wrong Tribe (speech only)	?
Yolo County Demo Club	Future of the Democratic Party	10/11/85
Young Presidents Organization (cover only)	California 2000	5/19/88
Youngstown Area Urban League (cover only)	Two Black Americas	3/28/87
33rd District PTA	CA 2000	3/12/87
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1988: Our Diversity is our Strength (speech only - two versions)	1988: Our Diversity is Our Strength (speech only - two versions)	?
spch		8/19/91




Illustration by Sandra Hoover

One-on-one with Willie Brown

San Francisco's mayor has been on the job now for two years. How does he size up his performance?

Editor's note: He served as speaker of the Assembly longer than any other legislator in history. But that was another life. Now, as mayor of San Francisco, Willie Brown must call upon a whole different set of management skills. It hasn't been a smooth ride, and he hasn't been as roundly beloved as he might have wished. Let's just say that, in the City By the Bay, with its informed and savvy electorate, the kind of deal-making Brown indulged in as Top Cat of the Capitol doesn't go down so well.

As ruler of The Dome, for example, Brown may have tucked dozens of feathers like Treasure Island into his natty cap. But in San Francisco, try a simple thing like build a power monopoly and take care of your friends and what do you get? Exposés, outrage, backlash, barbs from the press and, of all things, a wrist-slap from a civil grand jury that says the mayor needs more oversight. Such a display of blasphemy would have been unimaginable in Sacramento. But enough about that. On this particular day, in a sit-down interview with biographer James Richardson, Hizzoner discusses the less treacherous aspects of his relatively new role in government.

In a wide-ranging chat, Brown talks about his city, his role in the Bay Area region, his relationship with Dianne Feinstein and his disdain for campaign financing reform. The interview took place in May 1998 in Brown's temporary office across the street from City Hall. It was interrupted once—by a visit from Arnold Palmer.

James Richardson: *How do you like being mayor? Can you compare it to what it was like to be speaker?*

Willie Brown: It's far easier being speaker of the Assembly than being mayor of this city, and I suspect of almost any other city. But particularly this city. The level of political involvement by every person who takes a breath of life in this city is just incredible. I suspect that at birth, instead of receiving a Social Security number, newborns receive membership in a political organization or neighborhood club. And they are expected to begin to participate when they enter their first organized school activities. And it makes for a great, great challenge. Your skills and management and cajoling people into consensus is much more difficult and much more challenging in San Francisco than it ever was in the legislature.

You also have a lot less flexibility budget-wise. You cannot pay people

by James
Richardson



what they're worth, and you cannot reduce people who are not worth it if they are already at a certain level. You cannot assign people to jobs that are comparable and consistent with their talent, nor can you remove people who, if they preceded you, are not talented. Tenure is the most important factor for consideration in assignments and employment in city government. And so that presents a major challenge, because many times you are operating or attempting to operate government and do jobs and services with the wrong players in positions. And that makes for a great challenge. So overall, it is a far more difficult task, it is a far more challenging task. But it is also equally as enjoyable.

JR: *Are you frustrated with it?*

WB: On some days, of course you're frustrated. When you see things that you ought to be able to change overnight and you cannot, it is annoying as hell.

One example: the municipal transportation system. You would want to ... correct it overnight, but it takes three years to get one new rolling stock, one new bus. That's how long the production process takes. It's not like there's a bus parking lot down in San Mateo County where you can go bring them right in. Nobody carries an inventory of buses, so if the bus system has been denied its replacement on a regular basis, you inherit that and it could take up to three years to replace just one of

those vehicles. In the meantime, you have to live with this inadequate, old, antiquated, unreliable equipment as you go about trying to change the system. And that's very frustrating.

It's the same when you attempt to change the personnel, the training mechanisms, just the selection process. It takes sometimes up to six months to get people through the labyrinth of the civil service system, to get people on for employment. It's no wonder [that] you carry more than a hundred vacancies in the public transportation system alone, simply because you can't fill [them]. And when you do commence to fill, you can only do "x" number

of persons for training purposes at a time. That makes for an annoyance.

And the same goes in almost every other category of city government. But again, if you really are in this business to be a problem-solver, you know that it was a cakewalk at the state level versus almost impossible at the city level.

JR: *As I watch from afar, it almost seems like death by a thousand cuts, with welfare recipients screaming, as you mention, everyone is politicizing the city ...*

WB: It could be if you would let it. If you would commence to bleed on each one of these disappointments ... you would have a problem. But I don't take that stuff with me, and as a result, it's of no great concern to me that the welfare folk would be out there screaming, because they're wrong. And as long as I'm comfortable that they're wrong, I'm prepared to debate with them on any circumstances.

Just as challenging, for example, the taxi cab drivers will be around screaming today. They don't want any more taxis on the streets when obviously, everybody alive knows that you do need more taxis on the streets of San Francisco.

JR: *You still have a lot of friends in the Legislature. John Burton's the Senate president pro tem. Seems that you still have a lot of influence.*

WB: I talk to them almost every

day. I talked to John yesterday, I talk to [Assembly Speaker] Antonio [Villaraigosa]. I talk to everybody up there. I talk to [Assemblyman] Kevin Shelley [D-San Francisco]. I even talk to Republicans. I owe [Assemblyman] Peter Frusetta [R-Tres Pinos] a return call from Friday. I talk to [Assemblyman] Curt Pringle [R-Garden Grove], I talk to [Senate Minority Leader] Ross Johnson [R-Fullerton]. I talk to [Senator] Jim Brulte [R-Rancho Cucamonga]. I talk to members regularly. Because the city has issues in Sacramento that have to be dealt with. I talked to [Senator Charles] Calderon [D-Whittier] yesterday.

JB: *How are you using your influence as a major state leader?*

WB: I'm doing the best I can on behalf of my city. I'm not doing anything else, frankly, statewide. Occasionally the League of California Cities will ask me to become involved in something, and I readily agree. But otherwise, I'm really confining my activity to the needs of this city and the region.

JR: *What are you doing in the region?*

WB: Well, because of all the transportation issues yesterday I spent two hours with CalTrans discussing the Bay Bridge design and the timetable for implementation. I had [Metropolitan Transportation Commission] here as well. Two weeks ago, I journeyed down to San Jose to participate in a regional conference about water transportation and about the prospects for ferry systems. Last week, I met with some representatives of Bay Trade and the Bay Council on the question of petitioning the Department of Commerce for some additional money to be used on a regional basis for international trade. So I'm very much involved in regional activities.

JR: *Is San Francisco resented by the rest of the region? Do you have to cut through a certain amount of static to be able to be present, or is being Willie Brown enough?*

WB: You got to do the politics. And I've been doing the politics, particularly with [Oakland Mayor] Elihu [Harris] and [San Jose Mayor] Susan Hammer and the mayor of Half Moon Bay. In Millbrae, I do the outreach. I spend time with the BART Board of Directors, doing what I used to do in Sacramento. I talk to them

colleague-to-colleague. I'm not yet as successful as I want to be, because I've not yet gotten the ports really talking to each other about what ought to be common for them. I haven't gotten the airports really talking to each other about what ought to be common to them. But you do have to ... remove some of the crust of opposition to San Francisco that's been there for a very long time.

We also have persons who represent both Marin County and San Francisco in the Legislature and persons who represent San Mateo County and San Francisco in the Legislature. And many times those agendas conflict and confuse them. Particularly on transportation issues, and that makes for tension when you don't have your legislative delegation on the same page because of their need to be independent on behalf of others they represent.

JR: *Are you able to bridge some of that?*

WB: So far, yes. I've been successful at it.

JR: *Is San Francisco, by virtue of its history, its economic engine, is it really the place that has to lead the Bay Area for the Bay Area to get somewhere?*

WB: In some things, but I don't think San Francisco, with its small population base, can command that. I think performance may entitle us to it on some occasions, particularly with reference to the current makeup of the White House. San Francisco has a little more clout because both Dianne Feinstein and Barbara Boxer make San Francisco the center of their activities. And when the president and vice president come in, they literally go only two places — San Francisco or Silicon Valley. And in many cases, the Silicon Valley people actually live in San Francisco.

JR: *Speaking of Dianne Feinstein, you had some tension with her in the last couple of years. Has that cleared up?*

WB: I try to work with Dianne Feinstein. She is still a little bit distant because she supported my opponent [Frank Jordan], and I think she would have preferred the opponent and I'm not sure she's changed her mind in that regard. This office works closer though with Barbara Boxer simply because there's a commonality of philosophy

and activities. But we don't take a backseat to anyone in Dianne's office.

We've [also] got Nancy Pelosi, who is like a dynamo, period. We have almost like a staffer in Nancy, whether it's the new federal building or money for the light-rail system on Third Street or for the ramps and the transbay terminal. Nancy has been the point person doing all of that. Barbara has been the point person trying to get ... a legitimate amount of money for [repair of earthquake damage at] City Hall.

JR: *I find your current relationship with Feinstein interesting in that she really started on your ticket. You were with her in her governor's race ...*

WB: The very first. I was the very first person holding an elective office to have endorsed Dianne Feinstein [in] 1969, and she won the right to head the Board of Supervisors with my system. And when Clint Reilly dumped her ... while she was still in the hospital when he was her campaign manager in the 1990 governor's race, in a meeting held with the late Duane Garrett, Dick Blum, Dianne Feinstein and me at Harris' Steak House on Van Ness Avenue, we talked her back into the race, and then I proceeded to get every one of the members of the Legislature except maybe two or three to endorse her candidacy against [then-Attorney General John] Van de Kamp. I got the trial lawyers to buy Dianne Feinstein's candidacy.

In 1992, I was equally as involved in Dianne's race. I'm the one that put together that statewide group of [house] parties. We tried to put a thousand house parties together throughout the state of California all at the same hour on the same day for the purpose of raising money and raising consciousness of Dianne Feinstein's existence. I don't frankly know why at this stage of our political careers, we're not as close.

JR: *What do you think of the recent primary?*

WB: Politics is becoming the place where a young person coming out here from Texas seeking public office could not run if this were 30 years ago with the same set of circumstances; I could not run. The combination of all this political reform on the fund-raising side and the caps on expenditures and the justifiable suspicions about anybody who takes great dollars from any single

source — all that has contributed to the poisoning of contributions. The Clinton 1996 campaign didn't help matters at all, the stuff they did to collect money and the aftermath of that and all the investigations. It's destroyed giving to candidates as a proper way to participate in the political process. We evolved to where only Bill Gates and Bill Gates types can run for public office. And that's a scary thought.

Gray Davis was the best prepared candidate in the [gubernatorial] primary, including Lungren. Yet, he was the least-financed candidate. He has no money of his own. He has never done anything in life but run for public office or hold a public office or work in the public capacity. He has not married [wealthy], and he didn't put together a merger of some airlines and walk off with stock options. People who ... are able to spend [millions from their own pockets] obscure the process and the images so badly that they become the only eligible, viable candidates. I'm praying that Gray reversed that.

JR: *Do you think campaign-finance laws need to kind of be repealed?*

WB: They ought to be scrapped. The requirement ought to be you, Willie Brown, a candidate for public office, have to report every nickel you receive and report how you spent every nickel. And it should be a forfeiture of office if one nickel of that is spent for personal purposes or inaccurately reported.

JR: *And just leave it at that?*

WB: And leave it at that and let the public draw conclusions about you taking huge sums of money.

JR: *One final question. You told California Journal some years back that Willie Brown is like a cat, and a cat never jumps higher than a cat can jump. How high are you going to jump?*

WB: You may write the second version of your book. And it would be called "The Mayor."

James Richardson covered Capitol politics in Sacramento for The Riverside Press Enterprise and The Sacramento Bee. His unauthorized biography of Willie Brown was published by The University of California Press in 1996. He currently is a divinity student at the University of California, Berkeley. You may e-mail Mr. Richardson @ editor@statenet.com. 🏠

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