% mk?*% (^ ^H 1^ 2^1 j^^^K@S- ^ ^M Mr R^ j -ton 3c Co. FIRST PRINCIPLES BY HERBERT SPENCER AUTHOR OF SOCIAL STATICS, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY, ESSAYS : SCIENTIFIC, POLITICAL AND SPECULATIVE, EDUCATION, ETC. NEW YORK D. APPLETON AND COMPANY I Copyright, 1864, By D. APPLETON AND COMPANY. PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION. To the first edition of this work there should have been prefixed a definite indication of its origin ; and the misappre- hensions that have arisen in the absence of such indication, ought before now to have shown me the need for supply- ing it. Though reference was made in a note on the first page of the original preface, to certain Essays entitled " Progress: its Law and Cause," and " Transcendental Physiology," as containing generalizations which were to be elaborated in the " System of Philosophy " there set forth in programme, yet the dates of these Essays were not given ; nor was there any indication of their cardinal importance as containing, in a brief form, the general Theory of Evolution, Xo clear evidence to the contrary standing in the way, there has been very generally uttered and accepted the belief that this work, and the works following it, originated after, and resulted from, the special doctrine contained in Mr. Darwin's Origin of Species. The Essay on " Progress: its Law and Cause," coexten- sive in the theory it contains with Chapters XV., XVI., XVII. , and XX. in Part II. of this work, was first published in the Westminster Review for April, 1857; and the Essay in which is briefly set forth the general truth elaborated in Chapter XIX., originally appeared, under the title of " The Ultimate Laws of Physiology," in the National Review for October, 1857. Further, I may point out that in the first vi PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION. edition of the Principles of Psychology, published in July, 1855, mental phenomena are interpreted entirely from the evolution point of view; and the words used in the titles of sundry chapters, imply the presence, at that date, of ideas more widely applied in the Essays just named. As the first edition of The Origin of Species did not make its appear- ance till October, 1859, it is manifest that the theory set forth in this work and its successors, had an origin independ- ent of, and prior to, that which is commonly assumed to have initiated it. The distinctness of origin might, indeed, have been in- ferred from the work itself, which deals with Evolution at large — Inorganic, Organic, and Super-organic — in terms of Matter and Motion; and touches but briefly on those particular processes so luminously exhibited by Mr. Dar- win. In § 159 only (p. 447), when illustrating the law of " The Multiplication of Effects," as universally dis- played, have I had occasion to refer to the doctrine set forth in the Origin of Species pointing out that the general cause I had previously assigned for the production of diver- gent varieties of organisms, would not suffice to account for all the facts without that special cause disclosed by Mr. Darwin. The absence of this passage would, of course, leave a serious gap in the general argument; but the remainder of the work would stand exactly as it now does. I do not make this explanation in the belief that the prevailing misapprehension will thereby soon be rectified; for I am conscious that, once having become current, wrong beliefs of this kind long persist — all disproofs notwithstand- ing. Nevertheless, I yield to the suggestion that un- less I state the facts as they stand, I shall continue to countenance the misapprehension, and cannot expect it to cease. With the exception of unimportant changes in one of the notes, and some typographical corrections, the text of PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION. vn this edition is identical with that of the last. I have, how- ever, added an Appendix dealing with certain criticisms that have been passed upon the general formula of Evo- lution, and upon the philosophical doctrine which pre- cedes it. May, 1880. PREFACE TO THE AMERICAN EDITION. The present volume is the first of a series designed to un- fold the principles of a new philosophy. It is divided into two parts: the aim of the first being to determine the true sphere of all rational investigation, and of the second, to elucidate those fundamental and universal principles which science has established within that sphere, and which are to constitute the basis of the system. The scheme of truth de- veloped in these First Principles is complete in itself, and has its independent value; but it is designed by the author to serve for guidance and verification in the con- struction of the succeeding and larger portions of his philo- sophic plan. Having presented in his introductory volume so much of the general principles of Physics as is essential to the devel- opment of his method, Mr. Spencer enters upon the subject of Organic nature. The second work of the series is to be the Principles of Biology — a systematic statement of the facts and laws which constitute the Science of Life. It is not to be an encyclopedic and exhaustive treatise upon this vast subject, but such a compendious presentation of its data and general principles as shall interpret the method of nature, afford a clear understanding of the questions in- volved, and prepare for further inquiries. This work is now published in quarterly numbers, of from 80 to 96 pages. Four of these parts have already appeared, and some viii PREFACE TO THE AMERICAN EDITION. ix idea of the course and character of the discussion may be formed by observing the titles to the chapters, which are as follows : Part First: I. Organic Matter; II. The Actions of Forces on Organic Matter; III. The Reactions of Organic Matter on Forces; IV. Proximate Definition of Life; V. The Correspondence between Life and its Circumstances; VI. The Degree of Life varies with the Degree of Corre- spondence; VII. Scope of Biology. Part Second: I. Growth ; II. Development ; III. Function ; IV. Waste and Repair; V. Adaptation; VI. Individuality; VII. Genesis; VIII. Heredity; IX. Variation; X. Genesis, Heredity, and Variation; XL Classification; XII. Distribution. The Principles of Biology will be followed by the Princi- ples of Psychology; that is, Mr. Spencer will pass from the consideration of Life to the study of the Mind. This subject will be regarded in the light of the great truths of Biology previously established ; the connexions of life and mind will be traced ; the evolution of the intellectual faculties in their due succession, and in correspondence with the conditions of the environment, will be unfolded, and the whole sub- ject of mind will be treated, not by the narrow metaphysical methods, but in its broadest aspect, as a phase of nature's order which can only be comprehended in the light of her universal plan. The fourth work of the series is Sociology, or the science of human relations. As a multitude is but an assemblage of units, and as the characteristics of a multitude result from the properties of its units, so social phenomena are conse- quences of the natures of individual men. Biology and Psy- chology are the two great keys to the knowledge of human nature; and hence from these Mr. Spencer naturally passes to the subject of Social Science. The growth of society, the conditions of its intellectual and moral progress, the de- velopment of its various activities and organizations, will be here described, and a statement made of those principles x PREFACE TO THE AMERICAN EDITION. which are essential to the successful regulation of social affairs. Lastly, in Part Fifth, Mr. Spencer proposes to consider the Principles of Morality. The truths furnished by Biolo- gy, Psychology, and Sociology will be here brought to bear, to determine correct rules of human action, the princi- ples of private and public justice, and to form a true theory of right living. The reader will obtain a more just idea of the extent and jjroportions of Mr. Spencer's philosophic plan, by consulting his prospectus at the close of the volume. It will be seen to embrace a wide range of topics, but in the present work, and in his profound and original volumes on the " Principles of Psychology " and " Social Statics," as also throughout his numerous Essays and Discussions, we discover that he has already traversed almost the entire field, while to elabo- rate the whole into one connected and organized philosoph- ical scheme, is a work well suited to his bold and comprehen- sive genius. With a metaphysical acuteness equalled only by his immense grasp of the results of physical science — alike remarkable for his profound analysis, constructive ability, and power of lucid and forcible statement, Mr. Spencer has rare endowments for the task he has undertaken, and can hardly fail to embody in his system the largest scientific and philosophical tendencies of the age. As the present volume is a working out of universal prin- ciples to be subsequently applied, it is probably of a more ab- stract character than will be the subsequent works of the series. The discussions strike down to the prof oundest basis of human thought, and involve the deepest questions upon which the intellect of man has entered. Those unaccus- tomed to close metaphysical reasoning, may therefore find parts of the argument not easy to follow, although it is here presented with a distinctness and a vigor to be found perhaps in no other author. Still, the chief portions of the book may be read by all with ease and pleasure, while no one PREFACE TO THE AMERICAN EDITION. xi can fail to be repaid for the persistent effort that may be re- quired to master the entire argument. All who have sufficient earnestness of nature to take interest in those transcendent questions which are now occupying the most advanced minds of the age, will find them here considered with unsurpassed clearness, originality, and power. The invigorating influence of philosophical studies upon the mind, and their consequent educational value, have been long recognized. In this point of view the system here pre- sented has high claims upon the young men of our country, — embodying as it does the latest and largest results of posi- tive science ; organizing its facts and principles upon a natu- ral method, which places them most perfectly in command of memory ; and converging all its lines of inquiry to the end of a high practical beneficence, — the unfolding of those laws of nature and human nature which determine personal wel- fare and the social polity. Earnest and reverent in temper, cautious in statement, severely logical and yet presenting his views in a transparent and attractive style which com- bines the precision of science with many of the graces of lighter composition, it is believed that the thorough study of Spencer's philosophical scheme would combine, in an un- rivalled degree, those prime requisites of the highest educa- tion, a knowledge of the truths which it is most impor- tant for man to know, and that salutary discipline of the mental faculties which results from their systematic acquisition. We say the young men of our country, for if we are not mistaken, it is here that Mr. Spencer is to find his largest and fittest audience. There is something in the bold han- dling of his questions, in his earnest and fearless appeal to first principles, and in the practical availability of his conclu- sions, which is eminently suited to the genius of our people. It has been so in a marked sense with his work on Education, and there is no reason why it should not be so in an equal xii PREFACE TO THE AMERICAN EDITION. degree with his other writings. They betray a profound sympathy with the best spirit of our institutions, and that noble aspiration for the welfare and improvement of society which can hardly fail to commend them to the more liberal and enlightened portions of the American public. PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. When the First Edition of this work was published, I sup- posed that the general theory set forth in its Second Part, was presented in something like a finished form; but sub- sequent thought led me to further developments of much importance, and disclosed the fact that the component parts of the theory had been wrongly put together. Even in the absence of a more special reason, I had decided that, on the completion of the Principles of Biology, \t would be proper to suspend for a few months the series I am issuing, that I might make the required re-organization. And when the time had arrived, there had arisen a more special reason, which forbade hesitation. Translations into the French and Russian languages were about to be made — had, in fact, been commenced ; and had I deferred the re- organization the work would have been reproduced with all its original imperfections. This will be a sufficient ex- planation to those who have complained of the delay in the issue of the Principles of Psychology. The First Part remains almost untouched: two verbal alterations only, on pp. 43 and 99, having been made to prevent misconceptions. Part II., however, is wholly trans- formed. Its first chapter, on " Laws in General," is omitted, with a view to the inclusion of it in one of the latter volumes of the series. Two minor chapters disappear. Most of the rest are transposed, in groups or singly. And there are nine new chapters embodying the further developments, and XIV PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. serving to combine the preexisting chapters into a changed whole. The following scheme in which the new chapters are marked by italics, will give an idea of the transforma- tion : — First Edition. Second Edition. Laws in Qcnoral. The Law of Evolution. The Law of Evolution (continued). Philosophy Defined. The Data of Philosophy. Space, Time, Matter, Motion, and Force. The Indestructibility of Matter. The Continuity of Motion. The Persistence of Force. The Correlation and Equivalence of Forces. The Direction of Motion. The Rhythm of Motion. The Conditions essential to Evolu- tion, The Instability of the Homoge- neous. The Multiplication of Effects. Differentiation and Integration. Equilibration. Summary and Conclusion. Space, Time, Matter, Motion, and Force. The Indestructibility of Matter. The Continuity of Motion. The Persistence of Force. The Persistence of Relations among Forces. The Transformation and Equiva- lence of Forces. The Direction of Motion. The Rhythm of Motion. Recapitulation, Criticism, and Re- commencement. Evolution and Dissolution. Simple and Compound Evolution. Re-ar- ranged with ad- ditions. The Law of Evolution. The Law of Evolution (continued). The Law of Evolution (continued). The Law of Evolution (concluded). The Interpretation of Evolution. The Instability of the Homoge- neous. The Multiplication of Effects. Segregation. Equilibration. Dissolution. Summary and Conclusion (Re- written). Of course throughout this re-organized Second Part the numbers of the sections have been changed and hence PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. xv those who possess the Principles of Biology, in which many references are made to passages in First Principles, would be inconvenienced by the want of correspondence between the numbers of the sections in the original edition and in the new edition, were they without any means of identifying the sections as now numbered. The annexed list, showing which section answers to which in the two editions, will meet the requirement : — First Second Edit. Edit. §43 §119 44 117 45 118 46 120 47 121 48 122 49 123 50 124 51 125 52 126 53 128 54 129 fl30 131 132 55 < 133 134 135 136 [137 First Second Edit. Edit. fl07 108 109 110 §56^ 111 112 113 114 115 61 46 62 47 63 48 64 49 65 50 66 52 67 53 68 54 69 55 70 56 71 57 First Edit. §72 73 Second Edit. §58 59 74 60 75 61 76 62 77 66 78 67 79 68 80 69 81 70 82 71 83 72 84 73 85 74 86 75 87 76 88 77 89 78 90 79 91 80 First Second Edit. Edit. 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 §92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 88 109 149 110 150 111 151 112 152 113 153 114 154 115 155 116 156 117 157 118 158 119 159 120 160 First Second Edit. Edit. §121 §161 122 162 123 163 124 164 125 165 126 166 127 167 128 168 129 169 130 170 131 171 132 172 133 173 134 174 135 175 136 176 177 '183 144 193 145 194 The original stereotype plates have been used wherever it was possible ; and hence the exact correspondence between the two editions in many places, even where adjacent pages are altered. London, November, 1867. PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION. This volume is the first of a series described in a prospectus originally distributed in March, 1860. Of that prospectus, the annexed is a reprint. A SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY. Mr. Herbert Spexcer proposes to issue in periodical parts a connected series of works which he has for several years been preparing. Some conception of the general aim and scope of this series may be gathered from the following Programme. FIRST PRINCIPLES. Part I. The Unknowable. — Carrying a step further the doctrine put into shape by Hamilton and Mansel; pointing out the various directions in which Science leads to the same conclusions; and showing that in this united belief in an Ab- solute that transcends not only human knowledge but human conception, lies the only possible reconciliation of Science and Religion. Part II. Laws of the Know able. — A statement of the ultimate principles discernible throughout all manifestations of the Absolute — those highest generalizations now being disclosed by Science which are severally true not of one class of phenomena but of all classes of phenomena; and which are thus the keys to all classes of phenomena.* * One of these generalizations is that currently known as " the Conser- vation of Force ; " a second may be gathered from a published essay on " Progress : its Law and Cause ; " a third is indicated in a paper on " Transcendental Physiology ; " and there are several others. PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION. xvii [In logical order should here come the application of these First Principles to Inorganic Nature. But this great division it is proposed to pass over : partly because, even without it, the scheme is too extensive ; and partly because the interpretation of Organic Nature after the proposed method, is of more im- mediate importance. The second work of the series ivill there- fore be — ] THE PKINCIPLES OF BIOLOGY. Vol. I. Pakt I. The Data of Biology. — Including those general truths of Physics and Chemistry with which rational Biology must set out. II. The Inductions or Biology. — A statement of the leading generalizations which Naturalists, Physiologists, and Comparative Anatomists, have established. III. The Evolution of Life. — Concerning the specula- tion commonly known as " The Development Hypothesis " — its a priori and a posteriori evidences. Vol. II. IV. Moephological Development. — Pointing out the relations that are everywhere traceable between organic forms and the average of the various forces to which they are sub- ject; and seeking in the cumulative effects of such forces a theory of the forms. V. Physiological Development. — The progressive dif- ferentiation of functions similarly traced; and similarly in- terpreted as consequent upon the exposure of different parts of organisms to different sets of conditions. VI. The Laws of Multiplication. — Generalizations re- specting the rates of reproduction of the various classes of plants and animals; followed by an attempt to show the de- pendence of these variations upon certain necessary causes.* * The ideas to be developed in the second volume of the Principles of Biology the writer has already briefly expressed in sundry Review-Arti- cles. Part IV. will work out a doctrine suggested in a paper on " The 2 xviii PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION. THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. Vol. I. Paet I. The Data of Psychology. — Treating of the general connexions of Mind and Life and their relations to other modes of the Unknowable. II. The Inductions of Psychology. — A digest of such generalizations respecting mental phenomena as have already been empirically established. III. General Synthesis. — A republication, with addi- tional chapters, of the same part in the already-published Prin- ciples of Psychology. IV. Special Synthesis. — A republication, with exten- sive revisions and additions, of the same part, &c. &c. V. Physical Synthesis. — An attempt to show the man- ner in which the succession of states of consciousness con- forms to a certain fundamental law of nervous action that follows from the First Principles laid down at the outset. Vol. II. VI. Special Analysis. — As at present published, but further elaborated by some additional chapters. VII. General Analysis. — As at present published, with several explanations and additions. VIII. Corollaries.- — Consisting in part of a number of derivative principles which form a necessary introduction to Sociology.* Laws of Organic Form," published in the Medico-Chirurgical Review for January, 1859. The germ of Part V. is contained in the essay on " Transcendental Physiology : " See Essays, pp. 280-90. And in Part VI. will be unfolded certain views crudely expressed in a " Theory of Popula- tion," published in the Westminster Review for April, 1852. * Respecting the several additions to be made to the Principles of Psychology, it seems needful only to say that Part V. is the unwritten division named in the preface to that work — a division of which the germ is contained in a note on page 544, and of which the scope has since been more definitely stated in a paper in the Medico-Chirurgical Review for Jan. 1859. PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION. xix THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY. Vol. I. Part I. The Data of Sociology. — A statement of the several sets of factors entering into social phenomena — human ideas and feelings considered in their necessary order of evo- lution; surrounding natural conditions; and those ever com- plicating conditions to which Society itself gives origin. II. The Inductions of Sociology. — General facts, struc- tural and functional, as gathered from a survey of Societies and their changes: in other words, the empirical generaliza- tions that are arrived at by comparing different societies, and successive phases of the same society. III. Political Organization. — The evolution of gov- ernments, general and local, as determined by natural causes; their several types and metamorphoses; their increasing com- plexity and specialization; and the progressive limitation of their functions. Vol. II. IV. Ecclesiastical Organization. — Tracing the dif- ferentiation of religious government from secular; its suc- cessive complications and the multiplication of sects; the growth and continued modification of religious ideas, as caused by advancing knowledge and changing moral character; and the gradual reconciliation of these ideas with the truths of abstract science. V. Ceremonial Organization. — The natural history of that third kind of government which, having a common root with the others, and slowly becoming separate from and sup- plementary to them, serves to regulate the minor actions of life. VI. Industrial Organization. — The development of productive and distributive agencies, considered, like the fore- going, in its necessary causes: comprehending not only the progressive division of labour, and the increasing complexity of each industrial agency, but also the successive forms of XX PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION. industrial government as passing through like phases with political government. Vol. III. VII. Lingual Progress. — The evolution of Languages regarded as a psychological process determined by social con- ditions. VIII. Intellectual Progress. — Treated from the same point of view: including the growth of classifications; the evolution of science out of common knowledge; the advance from qualitive to quantative prevision, from the indefinite to the definite, and from the concrete to the abstract. IX. ^Esthetic Progress. — The Fine Arts similarly dealt with: tracing their gradual differentiation from primitive in- stitutions and from each other; their increasing varieties of development; and their advance in reality of expression and superiority of aim. X. Moral Progress. — Exhibiting the genesis of the slow emotional modifications which human nature undergoes in its adaptation to the social state. XL The Consensus. — Treating of the necessary inter- dependence of structures and of functions in each type of so- ciety, and in the successive phases of social development.* * Of this treatise on Sociology a few small fragments may be found in already-published essays. Some of the ideas to be developed in Part II are indicated in an article on " The Social Organism," contained in the last number of the Westminster Review ; those which Part V. will work out, may be gathered from the first half of a paper written some years since on " Manners and Fashion ; " of Part VIII. the germs are contained in an article on the " Genesis of Science ; " two papers on " The Origin and Function of Music " and " The Philosophy of Style," contain some ideas to be embodied in Part IX. ; and from a criticism of Mr. Bain's work on " The Emotions and the Will," in the last number of the Iledico-Chirur- gical Review, the central idea to be developed in Part X. may be inferred. PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION. xxi THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY. Vol. I. Part I. The Data of Morality. — Generalizations fur- nished by Biology, Psychology and Sociology, which underlie a true theory of right living: in other words, the elements of that equilibrium between constitution and conditions of ex- istence, which is at once the moral ideal and the limit towards which we are progressing. II. The Inductions of Morality. — Those empirically- established rules of human action which are registered as es- sential laws by all civilized nations: that is to say — the gen- eralizations of expediency. III. Personal Morals. — The principles of private con- duct— physical, intellectual, moral and religious — that follow from the conditions to complete individual life: or, what is the same thing — those modes of private action which must result from the eventual equilibration of internal desires and external needs. Vol. II. IV. Justice. — The mutual limitations of men's actions necessitated by their co-existence as units of a society — limita- tions, the perfect observance of which constitutes that state of equilibrium forming the goal of political progress. V. Negative Beneficence. — Those secondary limita- tions, similarly necessitated, which, though less important and not cognizable by law, are yet requisite to prevent mutual destruction of happiness in various indirect ways: in other words — those minor self-restraints dictated by what may be called passive sympathy. VI. Positive Beneficence. — Comprehending all modes of conduct, dictated by active sympathy, which imply pleasure in giving pleasure — modes of conduct that social adaptation has induced and must render ever more general; and which, xxii PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION. in becoming universal, must fill to the full the possible meas- ure of human happiness.* In anticipation of the obvious criticism that the scheme here sketched out is too extensive, it may be remarked that an exhaustive treatment of each topic is not intended; but simply the establishment of principles, with such illustrations as are needed to make their bearings fully understood. It may also be pointed out that, besides minor fragments, one large divis- ion (The Principles of Psychology) is already, in great part, executed. And a further reply is, that impossible though it may prove to execute the whole, yet nothing can be said against an attempt to set forth the First Principles and to carry their applications as far as circumstances permit. The price per Number to be half-a-crown; that is to say, the four Numbers yearly issued to be severally delivered, post free, to all annual subscribers of Ten Shillings. * Part IV. of the Principles of Morality will be co-extensive (though not identical) with the first half of the writer's Social Statics. This programme I have thought well to reprint for two reasons: — the one being that readers may, from time to time, be able to ascertain what topics are next to be dealt with; the other being that an outline of the scheme may remain, in case it should never be completed. The successive instalments of which this volume consists, were issued to the subscribers at the following dates : — Part I. (pp. 1—80) in October, 1860; Part II. (pp. 81—176) in January, 1861; Part III. (pp. 177—256) in April, 1861; Part IV. (pp. 257—334) in October, 1861; Part Y. (pp. 335—416) in March, 1862; and Part VI. (pp. 417—504) in June, 1862.* London, June 5th, 1862. * These dates and pagings of the divisions as originally issued, of course do not apply to the volume as it now stands, beyond page 123. CONTENTS. PAET I.— THE UNKNOWABLE. CHAP. I. RELIGION AND SCIENCE II. ULTIMATE RELIGIOUS IDEAS III. ULTIMATE SCIENTIFIC IDEAS IV. — THE RELATIVITY OF ALL KNOWLEDGE V. THE RECONCILIATION .... PAGE 3 26 49 70 100 PAET II.— THE KNOW ABLE. I. — PHILOSOPHY DEFINED 129 II. — THE DATA OF PHILOSOPHY . . . ,137 III. — SPACE, TIME, MATTER, MOTION, AND FORCE . 161 IV. THE INDESTRUCTIBILITY OF MATTER . . .176 V. THE CONTINUITY OF MOTION . . . .184 VI. THE PERSISTENCE OF FORCE . . . .194 VII. THE PERSISTENCE OF RELATIONS AMONG FORCES. 201 VIII. THE TRANSFORMATION AND EQUIVALENCE OF FORCES 205 IX. THE DIRECTION OF MOTION . . . .232 X. THE RHYTHM OF MOTION 259 xxiii XXIV CONTENTS. CHAP. XI.- XII.- XIII, XIV XV, XVI XVII XVIII XIX, XX XXI XXII XXIII XXIV, — RECAPITULATION, CRITICISM, AND RECOMMENCE- MENT 282 —EVOLUTION AND DISSOLUTION . . . .288 SIMPLE AND COMPOUND EVOLUTION . . .297 , THE LAW OF EVOLUTION . . . . .317 — THE LAW OF EVOLUTION CONTINUED . .339 , THE LAW OF EVOLUTION CONTINUED . .372 THE LAW OF EVOLUTION CONCLUDED . . 392 — THE INTERPRETATION OF EVOLUTION . .408 — THE INSTABILITY OF THE HOMOGENEOUS . .412 THE MULTIPLICATION OF EFFECTS . . . 442 , SEGREGATION : 471 , EQUILIBRATION 496 DISSOLUTION 531 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION . . . .551 PART I. THE UNKNOWABLE, CHAPTEE I. RELIGION AND SCIENCE. § 1. We too often forget that not only is there " a soul of goodness in things evil," but very generally also, a soul of truth in things erroneous. While many admit the abstract probability that a falsity has usually a nucleus of reality, few bear this abstract probability in mind, when passing judgment on the opinions of others. A belief that is finally proved to be grossly at variance with fact, is cast aside with indignation or contempt; and in the heat of antagonism scarcely any one inquires what there was in this belief which commended it to men's minds. Yet there must have been something. And there is reason to suspect that this some- thing was its correspondence with certain of their expe- riences: an extremely limited or vague correspondence perhaps; but still, a correspondence. Even the absurdest re- port may in nearly every instance be traced to an actual oc- currence; and had there been no such actual occurrence, this preposterous misrepresentation of it would never have existed. Though the distorted or magnified image trans- mitted to us through the refracting medium of rumour, is utterly unlike the reality; yet in the absence of the real- ity there would have been no distorted or magnified image. And thus it is with human beliefs in general. Entirely wrong as they may appear, the implication is that they germinated out of actual experiences — originally contained, and perhaps still contain, some small amount of verity. More especially may we safely assume this, in the case 3 4 RELIGION AND SCIENCE. of beliefs that have long existed and are widely diffused; and most of all so, in the case of beliefs that are perennial and nearly or quite universal. The presumption that any current opinion is not wholly false, gains in strength accord- ing to the number of its adherents. Admitting, as we must, that life is impossible unless through a certain agreement be- tween internal convictions and external circumstances; ad- mitting therefore that the probabilities are always in favour of the truth, or at least the partial truth, of a conviction; we must admit that the convictions entertained by many minds in common are the most likely to have some foundation. The elimination of individual errors of thought, must give to the resulting judgment a certain additional value. It may indeed be urged that many widely-spread beliefs are received on authority; that those entertaining them make no attempts at verification; and hence it may be inferred that the multitude of adherents adds but little to the proba- bility of a belief. But this is not true. For a belief which gains extensive reception without critical examination, is thereby proved to have a general congruity with the various other beliefs of those who receive it; and in so far as these various other beliefs are based upon personal observation and judgment, they give an indirect warrant to one with which they harmonize. It may be that this warrant is of small value; but still it is of some value. Could we reach definite views on this matter, they would be extremely useful to us. It is important that we should, if possible, form something like a general theory of current opinions; so that we may neither over-estimate nor under- estimate their worth. Arriving at correct judgments on dis- puted questions, much depends on the attitude of mind we preserve while listening to, or taking part in, the contro- versy; and for the preservation of a right attitude, it is needful that we should learn how true, and yet how untrue, are average human beliefs. On the one hand, we must keep free from that bias in favour of received ideas which RELIGION AND SCIENCE. 5 expresses itself in such dogmas as " What every one says must be true/' or " The voice of the people is the voice of God." On the other hand, the fact disclosed by a survey of the past, that majorities have usually been wrong, must not blind us to the complementary fact, that majorities have usually not been entirely wrong. And the avoidance of these extremes being a prerequisite to catholic thinking, we shall do well to provide ourselves with a safe-guard against them, by making a valuation of opinions in the ab- stract. To this end we must contemplate the kind of rela- tion that ordinarily subsists between opinions and facts. Let us do so with one of those beliefs which under various forms has prevailed among all nations in all times. § 2. The earliest traditions represent rulers as gods or demigods. By their subjects, primitive kings were regarded as superhuman in origin, and superhuman in power. They possessed divine titles; received obeisances like those made before the altars of deities ; and were in some cases actually worshipped. If there needs proof that the divine and half- divine characters originally ascribed to monarchs were as- cribed literally, we have it in the fact that there are still existing savage races, among whom it is held that the chiefs and their kindred are of celestial origin, or, as elsewhere, that only the chiefs have souls. And of course along with beliefs of this kind, there existed a belief in the unlimited power of the ruler over his subjects — an absolute possession of them, extending even to the taking of their lives at will : as even still in Fiji, where a victim stands unbound to be killed at the word of his chief; himself declaring, " what- ever the king says must be done." In times and among races somewhat less barbarous, we find these beliefs a little modified. The monarch, instead of being literally thought god or demigod, is conceived to be a man having divine authority, with perhaps more or less of divine nature. He retains however, as in the East to the 6 RELIGION AND SCIENCE. present day, titles expressing his heavenly descent or rela- tionships; and is still sainted in forms and words as humble as those addressed to the Deity. While the lives and prop- erties of his people, if not practically so completely at his mercy, are still in theory supposed to be his. Later in the progress of civilization, as during the mid- dle ages in Europe, the current opinions respecting the rela- tionship of rulers and ruled are further changed. For the theory of divine origin, there is substituted that of divine right. !N"o longer god or demigod, or even god-descended, the king is now regarded as simply God's vice-gerent. The obeisances made to him are not so extreme in their humility; and his sacred titles lose much of their meaning. Moreover his authority ceases to be unlimited. Subjects deny his right to dispose at will of their lives and properties; and yield allegiance only in the shape of obedience to his com- mands. With advancing political opinion has come still greater restriction of imperial power. Belief in the supernatural character of the ruler, long ago repudiated by ourselves for example, has left behind it nothing more than the popular tendency to ascribe unusual goodness, wisdom, and beauty to the monarch. Loyalty, which originally meant implicit submission to the king's will, now means a merely nominal profession of subordination, and the fulfilment of certain forms of respect. Our political practice, and our political theory, alike utterly reject those regal prerogatives which once passed unquestioned. By deposing some, and putting others in their places, we have not only denied the divine rights of certain men to rule ; but we have denied that they have any rights beyond those originating in the assent of the nation. Though our forms of speech and our state-docu- ments still assert the subjection of the citizens to the ruler, our actual beliefs and our daily proceedings implicitly assert the contrary. We obey no laws save those of our own mak- ing. We have entirely divested the monarch of legislative RELIGION AND SCIENCE. 7 power; and should immediately rebel against his or her ex- ercise of such power, even in matters of the smallest con- cern. In brief, the aboriginal doctrine is all but extinct among us. Nor has the rejection of primitive political beliefs, re- sulted only in transferring the authority of an autocrat to a representative body. The views entertained respecting governments in general, of whatever form, are now widely different from those once entertained. Whether popular or despotic, governments were in ancient times supposed to have unlimited authority over their subjects. Individuals existed for the benefit of the State; not the State for the benefit of individuals. In our days, however, not only has the national will been in many cases substituted for the will of the king; but the exercise of this national will has been restricted to a much smaller sphere. In England, for instance, though there has been established no definite the- ory setting bounds to governmental authority ; yet, in prac- tice, sundry bounds have been set to it which are tacitly rec- ognized by all. There is no organic law formally declaring that the legislature may not freely dispose of the citizen's lives, as early kings did when they sacrificed hecatombs of victims; but were it possible for our legislature to attempt such a thing, its own destruction would be the consequence, rather than the destruction of citizens. How entirely we have established the personal liberties of the subject against the invasions of State-power, would be quickly demon- strated, were it proposed by Act of Parliament forcibly to take possession of the nation, or of any class, and turn its services to public ends; as the services of the people were turned by primitive rulers. And should any statesman sug- gest a re-distribution of property such as was sometimes made in ancient democratic communities, he would be met by a thousand-tongued denial of imperial power over in- dividual possessions. ~Not only in our day have these fundamental claims of the citizen been thus made good 8 RELIGION AND SCIENCE. against the State, but sundry minor claims likewise. Ages ago, laws regulating dress and mode of living fell into dis- use; and any attempt to revive them would prove the cur- rent opinion to be, that such matters lie beyond the sphere of legal control. For some centuries we have been asserting in practice, and have now established in theory, the right of every man to choose his own religious beliefs, instead of re- ceiving such beliefs on State-authority. Within the last few generations we have inaugurated complete liberty of speech, in spite of all legislative attempts to suppress or limit it. And still more recently we have claimed and finally ob- tained under a few exceptional restrictions, freedom to trade with whomsoever we please. Thus our political beliefs are widely different from ancient ones, not only as to the proper depositary of power to be exercised over a nation, but also as to the extent of that power. Xot even here has the change ended. Besides the aver- age opinions which we have just described as current among ourselves, there exists a less widely-diffused opinion going still further in the same direction. There are to be found men who contend that the sphere of government should be narrowed even more than it is in England. The modern doctrine that the State exists for the benefit of citizens, which has now in a great measure supplanted the ancient doctrine that the citizens exist for the benefit of the State, they would push to its logical results. They hold that the freedom of the individual, limited only by the like freedom of other individuals, is sacred ; and that the legislature can- not equitably put further restrictions upon it, either by for- bidding any actions which the law of equal freedom permits, or taking away any property save that required to pay the cost of enforcing this law itself. They assert that the sole function of the State is the protection of persons against each other, and against a foreign foe. They urge that as, throughout civilization, the manifest tendency has been continually to extend the liberties of the subject, and re- RELIGION AND SCIENCE. 9 strict the functions of the State, there is reason to believe that the ultimate political condition must be one in which personal freedom is the greatest possible and governmental power the least possible: that, namely, in which the free- dom of each has no limit but the like freedom of all ; while the sole governmental duty is the maintenance of this limit. Here then in different times and places we find concern- ing the origin, authority, and functions of government, a great variety of opinions — opinions of which the leading genera above indicated subdivide into countless species. What now must be said about the truth or falsity of these opinions? Save among a few barbarous tribes the notion that a monarch is a god or demigod is regarded throughout the world as an absurdity almost passing the bounds of human credulity. In but few places does there survive a vague notion that the ruler possesses any supernatural at- tributes. Most civilized communities, which still admit the divine right of governments, have long since repudiated the divine right of kings. Elsewhere the belief that there is anything sacred in legislative regulations is dying out : laws are coming to be considered as conventional only. While the extreme school holds that governments have neither in- trinsic authority, nor can have authority given to them by convention; but can possess authority only as the adminis- trators of those moral principles deducible from the condi- tions essential to social life. Of these various beliefs, with their innumerable modifications, must we then say that some one alone is wholly right and all the rest wholly wrong ; or must we say that each of them contains truth more or less completely disguised by errors? The latter alternative is the one which analysis will force upon us. Ridiculous as they may severally appear to those not educated under them, every one of these doctrines has for its vital element the rec- ognition of an unquestionable fact. Directly or by impli- cation, each of them insists on a certain subordination of individual actions to social requirements. There are wide 3 10 RELIGION AND SCIENCE. differences as to the power to which this subordination is due ; there are wide differences as to the motive for this sub- ordination; there are wide differences as to its extent; but that there must be some subordination all are agreed. From the oldest and rudest idea of allegiance, down to the most advanced political theory of our own day, there is on this point complete unanimity. Though, between the savage who conceives his life and property to be at the absolute dis- posal of his chief, and the anarchist who denies the right of any government, autocratic or democratic, to trench upon his individual freedom, there seems at first sight an entire and irreconcilable antagonism; yet ultimate analysis dis- closes in them this fundamental community of opinion; that there are limits which individual actions may not trans- gress— limits which the one regards as originating in the king's will, and which the other regards as deducible from the equal claims of fellow-citizens. It may perhaps at first sight seem that we here reach a very unimportant conclusion; namely, that a certain tacit assumption is equally implied in all these conflicting politi- cal creeds — an assumption which is indeed of self-evident validity. The question, however, is not the value or nov- elty of the particular truth in this case arrived at. My aim has been to exhibit the more general truth, which we are apt to overlook, that between the most opposite beliefs there is usually something in common, — something taken for granted by each; and that this something, if not to be set down as an unquestionable verity, may yet be considered to have the highest degree of probability. A postulate which, like the one above instanced, is not consciously asserted but unconsciously involved; and which is unconsciously in- volved not by one man or body of men, but by numerous bodies of men who diverge in countless ways and degrees in the rest of their beliefs ; has a warrant far transcending any that can be usually shown. And when, as in this case, the postulate is abstract — is not based on some one concrete ex- RELIGION AND SCIENCE. H perience common to all mankind, but implies an induction from a great variety of experiences, we may say that it ranks next in certainty to the postulates of exact science. Do we not thus arrive at a generalization which may habitually guide us when seeking for the soul of truth in things erroneous? While the foregoing illustration brings clearly home the fact, that in opinions seeming to be abso- lutely and supremely wrong something right is yet to be found; it also indicates the method we should pursue in seeking the something right. This method is to compare all opinions of the same genus; to set aside as more or less discrediting one another those various special and concrete elements in which such opinions disagree; to observe what remains after the discordant constituents have been elimi- nated; and to find for this remaining constituent that ab- stract expression which holds true throughout its divergent modifications. § 3. A candid acceptance of this general principle and an adoption of the course it indicates, will greatly aid us in dealing with those chronic antagonisms by which men are divided. Applying it not only to current ideas with which we are personally unconcerned, but also to our own ideas and those of our opponents, we shall be led to form far more correct judgments. We shall be ever ready to suspect that the convictions we entertain are not wholly right, and that the adverse convictions are not wholly wrong. On the one hand we shall not, in common with the great mass of the unthinking, let our beliefs be determined by the mere acci- dent of birth in a particular age on a particular part of the Earth's surface; and, on the other hand, we shall be saved from that error of entire and contemptuous negation, which is fallen into by most who take up an attitude of independ- ent criticism. Of all antagonisms of belief, the oldest, the widest, the most profound and the most important, is that between Ee- 12 RELIGION AND SCIENCE. ligion and Science. It commenced when the recognition of the simplest uniformities in surrounding things, set a limit to the once universal superstition. It shows itself every- where throughout the domain of human knowledge: affect- ing men's interpretations alike of the simplest mechanical accidents and of the most complicated events in the histories of nations. It has its roots deep down in the diverse habits of thought of different orders of minds. And the conflicting conceptions of nature and life which these diverse habits of thought severally generate, influence for good or ill the tone of feeling and the daily conduct. An unceasing battle of opinion like this which has been carried on throughout all ages under the banners of Relig- ion and Science, has of course generated an animosity fatal to a just estimate of either party by the other. On a larger scale, and more intensely than any other controversy, has it illustrated that perennially significant fable concerning the knights who fought about the colour of a shield of which neither looked at more than one face. Each combatant see- ing clearly his own aspect of the question, has charged his opponent with stupidity or dishonesty in not seeing the same aspect of it; while each has wanted the candour to go over to his opponent's side and find out how it was that he saw every tiling so differently. Happily the times display an increasing catholicity of feeling, which we shall do well in carrying as far as our na- tures permit. In proportion as we love truth more and vic- tory less, we shall become anxious to know what it is which leads our opponents to think as they do. We shall begin to suspect that the pertinacity of belief exhibited by them must result from a perception of something we have not per- ceived. And we shall aim to supplement the portion of truth we have found with the portion found by them. Mak- ing a more rational estimate of human authority, we shall avoid alike the extremes of undue submission and undue re- bellion— shall not regard some men's judgments as wholly RELIGION AND SCIENCE. 13 good and others as wholly bad ; but shall rather lean to the more defensible position that none are completely right and none are completely wrong. Preserving, as far as may be, this impartial attitude, let us then contemplate the two sides of this great controversy. Keeping guard against the bias of education and shutting out the whisperings of sectarian feeling, let us consider what are the d priori probabilities in favour of each party. § 4. When duly realized, the general principle above illustrated must lead us to anticipate that the diverse forms of religious belief which have existed and which still exist, have all a basis in some ultimate fact. Judging by analogy the implication is, not that any one of them is altogether right ; but that in each there is something right more or less disguised by other things wrong. It may be that the soul of truth contained in erroneous creeds is very unlike most, if not all, of its several embodiments; and indeed, if, as we have good reason to expect, it is much more abstract than any of them, its unlikeness necessarily follows. But how- ever different from its concrete expressions, some essential verity must be looked for. To suppose that these multi- form conceptions should be one and all absolutely ground- less, discredits too profoundly that average human intel- ligence from which all our individual intelligences are inherited. This most general reason we shall find enforced by other more special ones. To the presumption that a number of diverse beliefs of the same class have some common founda- tion in fact, must in this case be added a further presump- tion derived from the omnipresence of the beliefs. Reli- gions ideas of one kind or other are almost universal. Ad- mitting that in many places there are tribes who have no theory of creation, no word for a deity, no propitiatory acts, no idea of another life — admitting that only when a certain phase of intelligence is reached do the most rudimentary 14 RELIGION AND SCIENCE. of such theories make their appearance; the implication is practically the same. Grant that among all races who have passed a certain stage of intellectual development there are found vague notions concerning the origin and hidden na- ture of surrounding things; and there arises the inference that such notions are necessary products of progressing intelligence. Their endless variety serves but to strengthen this conclusion: showing as it does a more or less inde- pendent genesis — showing how, in different places and times, like conditions have led to similar trains of thought, ending in analogous results. That these countless different, and yet allied, phenomena presented by all religions are accidental or factitious, is an untenable supposition. A candid examination of the evidence quite negatives the doc- trine maintained by some, that creeds are priestly inven- tions. Even as a mere question of probabilities it cannot rationally be concluded that in every society, past and pres- ent, savage and civilized, certain members of the commu- nity have combined to delude the rest, in ways so analogous. To any who may allege that some primitive fiction was de- vised by some primitive priesthood, before yet mankind had diverged from a common centre, a reply is furnished by philology; for philology proves the dispersion of mankind to have commenced before there existed a language suffi- ciently organized to express religious ideas. Moreover, were it otherwise tenable, the hypothesis of artificial origin fails to account for the facts,. It does not explain why, under all changes of form, certain elements of religious be- lief remain constant. It does not show us how it happens that while adverse criticism has from age to age gone on destroying particular theological dogmas, it has not de- stroyed the fundamental conception underlying these dog- mas. It leaves us without any solution of the striking circumstance that when, from the absurdities and corrup- tions accumulated around them, national creeds have fallen into general discredit, ending in indifferentisni or positive RELIGION AND SCIENCE. 15 denial, there has always by and by arisen a re-assertion of them: if not the same in form, still the same in essence. Thus the universality of religious ideas, their independent evolution among different primitive races, and their great vitality, unite in showing that their source must be deep- seated instead of superficial. In other words, we are obliged to admit that if not supernaturally derived as the majority contend, they must be derived out of human experiences, slowly accumulated and organized. Should it be asserted that religious ideas are products of the religious sentiment, which, to satisfy itself, prompts imaginations that it afterwards projects into the external world, and by and by mistakes for realities; the problem is not solved, but only removed further back. Whether the wish is father to the thought, or whether sentiment and idea have a common genesis, there equally arises the question — Whence comes the sentiment? That it is a constituent in man's nature is implied by the hypothesis; and cannot in- deed be denied by those who prefer other hypotheses. And if the religious sentiment, displayed habitually by the ma- jority of mankind, and occasionally aroused even in those seemingly devoid of it, must be classed among human emo- tions, we cannot rationally ignore it. We are bound to ask its origin and its function. H3re is an attribute which, to say the least, has had an enormous influence — which has played a conspicuous part throughout the entire past as far back as history records, and is at present the life of numer- ous institutions, the stimulus to perpetual controversies, and the prompter of countless daily actions. Any Theory of Things which takes no account of this attribute, must, then, be extremely defective. If with no other view, still as a question in philosophy, we are called on to say what this attribute means; and we cannot decline the task without confessing our philosophy to be incompetent. Two suppositions only are open to us: the one that the feeling which responds to religious ideas resulted, along 16 RELIGION AND SCIENCE. with all other human faculties, from an act of special crea- tion; the other that it, in common, with the rest, arose by a process of evolution. If we adopt the first of these alterna- tives, universally accepted by our ancestors and by the im- mense majority of our contemporaries, the matter is at once settled: man is directly endowed with the religious feeling by a creator; and to that creator it designedly responds. If we adopt the second alternative, then we are met by the questions — What are the circumstances to which the genesis of the religious feeling is due ? and — What is its office ? We are bound to entertain these questions; and we are bound to find answers to them. Considering all faculties, as we must on this supposition, to result from accumulated modifi- cations caused by the intercourse of the organism with its environment, we are obliged to admit that there exist in the environment certain phenomena or conditions which have determined the growth of the feeling in question; and so are obliged to admit that it is as normal as any other faculty. Add to which that as, on the hypothesis of a development of lower forms into higher, the end toward which the pro- gressive changes directly or indirectly tend, must be adapta- tion to the requirements of existence ; we are also forced to infer that this feeling is in some way conducive to human welfare. Thus both alternatives contain the same ultimate implication. We must conclude that the religious sentiment is either directly created, or is cieated by the slow action of natural causes; and whichever of these conclusions we adopt, requires us to treat the religious sentiment with re- spect. One other consideration should not be overlooked — a consideration which students of Science more especially need to have pointed out. Occupied as such are with estab- lished truths, and accustomed to regard things not already known as things to be hereafter discovered, they are liable to forget that information, however extensive it may be- come, can never satisfy inquiry. Positive knowledge does RELIGION AND SCIENCE. 17 not, and never can, fill the whole region of possible thought. At the uttermost reach of discovery there arises, and must ever arise, the question — What lies beyond? As it is im- possible to think of a limit to space so as to exclude the idea of space lying outside that limit; so we cannot conceive of any explanation profound enough to exclude the question — What is the explanation of that explanation? Regarding Science as a gradually increasing sphere, we may say that every addition to its surface does but bring it into a wider contact with surrounding nescience. There must ever re- main therefore two antithetical modes of mental action. Throughout all future time, as now, the human mind may occupy itself, not only with ascertained phenomena and their relations, but also with that unascertained some- thing which phenomena and their relations imply. Hence if knowledge cannot monopolize consciousness — if it must always continue possible for the mind to dwell upon that which transcends knowledge ; then there can never cease to be a place for something of the nature of Religion ; since Religion under all its forms is distinguished from everything else in this, that its subject matter is that which passes the sphere of ex- perience. Thus, however untenable may be any or all the existing religious creeds, however gross the absurdities associated with them, however irrational the arguments set forth in their defence, we must not ignore the verity which in all likelihood lies hidden within them. The general probabil- ity that widely-spread beliefs are not absolutely baseless, is in this case enforced by further probability due to the omni- presence of the beliefs. In the existence of a religious sen- timent, whatever be its origin, we have a second evidence of great significance. And as in that nescience which must ever remain the antithesis to science, there is a sphere for the exercise of this sentiment, we find a third general fact of like implication. We may be sure therefore that re- 18 RELIGION AND SCIENCE. ligions, though even none of them be actually true, are yet all adumbrations of a truth. § 5. As, to the religious, it will seem absurd to set forth any justification for Religion; so, to the scientific, will it seem absurd to defend Science. Yet to do the last is cer- tainly as needful as to do the first. If there exists a class who, in contempt of its follies and disgust at its corruptions, have contracted towards Religion a repugnance which makes them overlook the fundamental verity contained in it; so, too, is there a class offended to such a degree by the de- structive criticisms men of science make on the religious ten- ets they regard as essential, that they have acquired a strong prejudice against Science in general. They are not pre- pared with any avowed reasons for their dislike. They have simply a remembrance of the rude shakes which Sci- ence has given to many of their cherished convictions, and a suspicion that it may perhaps eventually uproot all they regard as sacred; and hence it produces in them a certain inarticulate dread. What is Science? To see the absurdity of the prejudice against it, we need only remark that Science is simply a higher development of common knowledge; and that if Science is repudiated, all knowledge must be repudiated along with it. The extremest bigot will not suspect any harm in the observation that the sun rises earlier and sets later in the summer than in the winter; but will rather consider such an observation as a useful aid in fulfilling the duties of life. Well, Astronomy is an organized body of similar observations, made with greater nicety, extended to a larger number of objects, and so analyzed as to disclose the real arrangements of the heavens, and to dispel our false conceptions of them. That iron will rust in water, that wood will burn, that long kept viands become putrid, the most timid sectarian will teach without alarm, as things use- ful to be known. But these are chemical truths: Chemis- RELIGION AND SCIENCE. 19 try is a systematized collection of such facts, ascertained with precision, and so classified and generalized as to enable us to say with certainty, concerning each simple or com- pound substance, what change will occur in- it under given conditions. And thus is it with all the sciences. They sev- erally germinate out of the experiences of daily life; insen- sibly as they grow they draw in remoter, more numerous, and more complex experiences; and among these, they as- certain laws of dependence like those which make up our knowledge of the most familiar objects. Nowhere is it pos- sible to draw a line and say — here Science begins. And as it is the function of common observation to serve for the guidance of conduct; so, too, is the guidance of conduct the office of the most recondite and abstract inquiries of Science. Through the countless industrial processes and the various modes of locomotion which it has given to us, Physics regulates more completely our social life than does his acquaintance with the properties of surrounding bodies regulate the life of the savage. Anatomy and Physiology, through their effects on the practice of medicine and hy- giene, modify our actions almost as much as does our ac- quaintance with the evils and benefits which common en- vironing agencies may produce on our bodies. All Science is prevision; and all prevision ultimately aids us in greater or less degree to achieve the good and avoid the bad. As certainly as the perception of an object lying in our path warns us against stumbling over it; so certainly do those more complicated and subtle perceptions which constitute Science, warn us against stumbling over intervening ob- stacles in the pursuit of our distant ends. Thus being one in origin and function, the simplest forms of cognition and the most complex must be dealt with alike. We are bound in consistency to receive the widest knowledge which our faculties can reach, or to reject along with it that narrow knowledge possessed by all. There is no logical alternative between accepting our intelligence in its entirety, or re- 20 RELIGION AND SCIENCE. pudiating even that lowest intelligence which we possess in common with brutes. To ask the question which more immediately concerns our arguments- whether Science is substantially true? — is much like asking whether the sun gives light. And it is be- cause they are conscious how undeniably valid are most of its propositions, that the theological party regard Science with so much secret alarm. They know that during the two thousand years of its growth, some of its larger divisions — mathematics, physics, astronomy — have been subject to the rigorous criticism of successive generations; and have not- withstanding become ever more firmly established. They know that, unlike many of their own doctrines, which were once universally received but have age by age been more frequently called in question, the doctrines of Science, at first confined to a few scattered inquirers, have been slowly growing into general acceptance, and are now in great part admitted as beyond dispute. They know that men of sci- ence throughout the world subject each other's results to the most searching examination; and that error is mercilessly exposed and rejected as soon as discovered. And, finally, they know that still more conclusive testimony is to be found in the daily verification of scientific predictions, and in the never-ceasing triumphs of those arts which Science guides. To regard with alienation that which has such high credentials is a folly. Though in the tone which many of the scientific adopt towards them, the defenders of Religion may find some excuse for this alienation ; yet the excuse is a very insufficient one. On the side of Science, as on their own side, they must admit that short-comings in the advo- cates do not tell essentially against that which is advocated. Science must be judged by itself: and so judged, only the most perverted intellect can fail to see that it is worthy of all reverence. Be there or be there not any other revelation, wTe have a veritable revelation in Science — a continuous dis- RELIGION AND SCIENCE. 21 closure, through the intelligence with which we are en- dowed, of the established order of the Universe. This dis- closure it is the duty of every one to verify as far as in him lies; and having verified, to receive with all humility. § 6. On both sides of this great controversy, then, truth must exist. An unbiassed consideration of its general as- pects forces us to conclude that Religion, everywhere pres- ent as a weft running through the warp of human history, expresses some eternal fact ; while it is almost a truism to say of Science that it is an organized mass of facts, ever grow- ing, and ever being more completely purified from errors. And if both have bases in the reality of things, then be- tween them there must be a fundamental harmony. It is an incredible hypothesis that there are two orders of truth, in absolute and everlasting opposition. Only on some Manichean theory, which among ourselves no one dares openly avow however much his beliefs may be tainted by it, is such a supposition even conceivable. That Religion is divine and Science diabolical, is a proposition which, though implied in many a clerical declamation, not the most vehe- ment fanatic can bring himself distinctly to assert. And whoever does not assert this, must admit that under their seeming antagonism lies hidden an entire agreement. Each side, therefore, has to recognize the claims of the other as standing for truths that are not to be ignored. He who contemplates the Universe from the religious point of view, must learn to see that this which we call Science is one constituent of the great whole ; and as such ought to be re- garded with a sentiment like that which the remainder ex- cites. While he who contemplates the universe from the scientific point of view, must learn to see that this which we call Religion is similarly a constituent of the great whole; and being such, must be treated as a subject of science with no more prejudice than any other reality. It behoves each party to strive to understand the other, with the conviction 22 RELIGION AND SCIENCE. that the other has something worthy to be understood; and with the conviction that when mutually recognized this something will be the basis of a complete reconciliation. How to find this something — how to reconcile them, thus becomes the problem which we should perseveringly try to solve. Not to reconcile them in any makeshift way — not to find one of those compromises we hear from time to time proposed, which their proposers must secretly feel are artificial and temporary; but to arrive at the terms of a real and permanent peace between them. The thing we have to seek out, is that ultimate truth which both will avow with absolute sincerity — with not the remotest mental reser- vation. There shall be no concession — no yielding on either side of something that will by and by be reasserted; but the common ground on which they meet shall be one which each will maintain for itself. We have to discover some fundamental verity which Eeligion will assert, with all possible emphasis, in the absence of Science; and which Science, with all possible emphasis, will assert in the absence of Eeligion — some fundamental verity in the defence of which each will find the other its ally. Or, changing the point of view, our aim must be to co- ordinate the seemingly opposed convictions which Religion and Science embody. From the coalescence of antagonist ideas, each containing its portion of truth, there always arises a higher development. As in Geology when the igne- ous and aqueous hypotheses were united, a rapid advance took place; as in Biology we are beginning to progress through the fusion of the doctrine of types with the doctrine of adaptations; as in Psychology the arrested growth re- commences now that the disciples of Kant and those of Locke have both their views recognized in the theory that organized experiences produce forms of thought; as in So- ciology, now that it is beginning to assume a positive charac- ter, we find a recognition of both the party of progress and the party of order, as each holding a truth which forms a RELIGION AND SCIENCE. 23 needful complement to that held by the other; so must it be on a grander scale with Religion and Science. Here too we must look for a conception which combines the conclu- sions of both; and here too wTe may expect important re- sults from their combination. To understand how Science and Religion express opposite sides of the same fact — the one its near or visible side, and the other its remote or invisi- ble side — this it is which we must attempt; and to achieve this must profoundly modify our general Theory of Things. Already in the foregoing pages the method of seeking such a reconciliation has been vaguely foreshadowed. Be- fore proceeding further, however, it will be well to treat the question of method more definitely. To find that truth in which Religion and Science coalesce, we must know in what direction to look for it, and what kind of truth it is likely to be. § 7. We have found a priori reason for believing that in all religions, even the rudest, there lies hidden a funda- mental verity. We have inferred that this fundamental verity is that element common to all religions, which re- mains after their discordant peculiarities have been mu- tually cancelled. And we have further inferred that this element is almost certain to be more abstract than any cur- rent religious doctrine. Now it is manifest that only in some highly abstract proposition, can Religion and Science find a common ground. Neither such dogmas as those of the trinitarian and unitarian, nor any such idea as that of propitiation, common though it may be to all religions, can serve as the desired basis of agreement; for Science cannot recognize beliefs like these: they lie beyond its sphere. Hence we see not only that, judging by analogy, the essen- tial truth contained in Religion is that most abstract element pervading all its forms ; but also that this most abstract ele- ment is the only one in which Religion is likely to agree with Science. 24 RELIGION AND SCIENCE. Similarly if we begin at the other end, and inquire what scientific truth can unite Science and Religion. It is at once manifest that Religion can take no cognizance of special scientific doctrines; nor any more than Science can take cognizance of special religious doctrines. The truth which Science asserts and Religion indorses cannot be one fur- nished by mathematics; nor can it be a physical truth ; nor can it be a truth in chemistry; it cannot be a truth belong- ing to any particular science, ^o generalization of the phenomena of space, of time, of matter, or of force, can be- come a Religious conception. Such a conception, if it any- where exists in Science, must be more general than any of these — must be one underlying all of them. If there be a fact which Science recognizes in common with Religion, it must be that fact from which the several branches of Sci- ence diverge, as from their common root. Assuming then, that since these two great realities are constituents of the same mind, and respond to different as- pects of the same Universe, there must be a fundamental harmony between them; we see good reason to conclude that the most abstract truth contained in Religion and the most abstract truth contained in Science must be the one in which the two coalesce. The largest fact to be found within our mental range must be the one of which we are in search. Uniting these positive and negative poles of human thought, it must be the ultimate fact in our intelligence. § 8. Before proceeding in the search for this common datum let me bespeak a little patience. The next three chapters, setting out from different points and converging to the same conclusion, will be comparatively unattractive. Students of philosophy will find in them much that is more or less familiar ; and to most of those who are unacquainted with the literature of modern metaphysics, they may prove somewhat difficult to follow. Our argument however cannot dispense with these chap- RELIGION AND SCIENCE. 25 ters; and the greatness of the question at issue justifies even a heavier tax on the reader's attention. The matter is one which concerns each and all of us more than any other mat- ter whatever. Though it affects us little in a direct way, the view we arrive at must indirectly affect us in all our rela- tions— must determine our conception of the Universe, of Life, of Human Nature — must influence our ideas of right and wrong, and so modify our conduct. To reach that point of view from which the seeming discordance of Religon and Science disappears, and the two merge into one, must cause a revolution of thought fruitful in beneficial consequences, and must surely be worth an effort. Here ending preliminaries, let us now address ourselves to this all-important inquiry. CHAPTEE II. ULTIMATE RELIGIOUS IDEAS. § 9. When, on the sea-shore, we note how the hulls of distant vessels are hidden below the horizon, and how, of still remoter vessels, only the uppermost sails are visible, we realize with tolerable clearness the slight curvature of that portion of the sea's surface which lies before us. But when we seek in imagination to follow out this curved surface as it actually exists, slowly bending round until all its meridians meet in a point eight thousand miles below our feet, we find ourselves utterly baffled. We cannot conceive in its real form and magnitude even that small segment of our globe which extends a hundred miles on every side of us; much less the globe as a whole. The piece of rock on which we stand can be mentally represented with something like com- pleteness: we find ourselves able to think of its top, its sides, and its under surface at the same time ; or so nearly at the same time that they seem all present in consciousness to- gether ; and so we can form what we call a conception of the rock. But to do the like with the Earth we find impossible. If even to imagine the antipodes as at that distant place in space which it actually occupies, is beyond our power; much more beyond our power must it be at the same time to imagine all other remote points on the Earth's surface as in their actual places. Yet we habitually speak as though we had an idea of the Earth — as though we could think of it in the same way that we think of minor objects. What conception, then, do we form of it? the reader 26 ULTIMATE RELIGIOUS IDEAS. 27 may ask. That its name calls up in us some state of con- sciousness is unquestionable; and if this state of conscious- ness is not a conception, properly so called, what is it ? The answer seems to be this : — We have learnt by indirect meth- ods that the Earth is a sphere; we have formed models ap- proximately representing its shape and the distribution of its parts; generally when the Earth is referred to, we either think of an indefinitely extended mass beneath our feet, or else, leaving out the actual Earth, we think of a body like a terrestrial globe ; but when we seek to imagine the Earth as it really is, we join these two ideas as well as we can — such perception as our eyes give us of the Earth's surface we couple with the conception of a sphere. And thus we form of the Earth, not a conception properly so called, but only a symbolic conception.* A large proportion of our conceptions, including all those of much generality, are of this order. Great magni- tudes, great durations, great numbers, are none of them ac- tually conceived, but are all of them conceived more or less symbolically; and so, too, are all those classes of objects of which we predicate some common fact. When mention is made of any individual man, a tolerably complete idea of him is formed. If the family he belongs to be spoken of, probably but a part of it will be represented in thought: under the necessity of attending to that which is said about the family, we realize in imagination only its most important or familiar members, and pass over the rest with a nascent consciousness which we know could, if requisite, be made complete. Should something be remarked of the class, say farmers, to which this family belongs, we neither enumerate in thought all the individuals contained in the class, nor be- lieve that we could do so if required; but we are content with taking some few samples of it, and remembering that these could be indefinitely multiplied. Supposing the sub- * Those who may have before met with this term, will perceive that it is here used in quite a different sense. 28 ULTIMATE RELIGIOUS IDEAS. ject of which something is predicated be Englishmen, the answering state of consciousness is a still more inadequate representative of the reality. Yet more remote is the like- ness of the thought to the thing, if reference be made to Europeans or to human beings. And when we come to propositions concerning the mammalia, or concerning the whole of the vertebrata, or concerning animals in general, or concerning all organic beings, the unlikeness of our con- ceptions to the objects named reaches its extreme. Through- out which series of instances we see, that as the number of objects grouped together in thought increases, the concept, formed of a few typical samples joined with the notion of multiplicity, becomes more and more a mere symbol; not only because it gradually ceases to represent the size of the group, but also because as the group grows more hetero- geneous, the typical samples thought of are less like the average objects which the group contains. This formation of symbolic conceptions, which inevita- bly arises as we pass from small and concrete objects to large and to discrete ones, is mostly a very useful, and indeed ne- cessary, process. When, instead of things whose attributes can be tolerably well united in a single state of conscious- ness, we have to deal with things whose attributes are too vast or numerous to be so united, we must either drop in thought part of their attributes, or else not think of them at all — either form a more or less symbolic conception, or no conception. We must predicate nothing of objects too great or too multitudinous to be mentally represented ; or we must make our predications by the help of extremely inadequate representations of such objects — mere symbols of them. But while by this process alone we are enabled to form general propositions, and so to reach general conclusions, we are by this process perpetually led into danger, and very often into error. We habitually mistake our symbolic con- ceptions for real ones; and so are betrayed into countless false inferences. Xot only is it that in proportion as the ULTIMATE RELIGIOUS IDEAS. 29 concept we form of any thing or class of things, misrepre- sents the reality, we are apt to be wrong in any assertion we make respecting the reality ; but it is that we are led to sup- pose we have truly conceived a great variety of things which we have conceived only in this fictitious way ; and further to confound with these certain things which cannot be con- ceived in any way. How almost unavoidably we fall into this error it will be needful here to observe. From objects readily representable in their totality, to those of which we cannot form even an approximate repre- sentation, there is an insensible transition. Between a peb- ble and the entire Earth a series of magnitudes might be in- troduced, each of which differed from the adjacent ones so slightly that it would be impossible to say at what point in the series our conceptions of them became inadequate. Similarly, there is a gradual progression from those groups of a few individuals which we can think of as groups with tolerable completeness, to those larger and larger groups of which we can form nothing like true ideas. Whence it is manifest that we pass from actual conceptions to symbolic ones by infinitesimal steps. Note next that we are led to deal with our symbolic conceptions as though they were ac- tual ones, not only because we cannot clearly separate the two, but also because, in the great majority of cases, the first serve our purposes nearly or quite as well as the last — are simply the abbreviated signs we substitute for those more elaborate signs which are our equivalents for real objects. Those very imperfect representations of ordi- nary things which we habitually make in thinking, we know can be developed into adequate ones if needful. Those con- cepts of larger magnitudes and more extensive classes which we cannot make adequate, we still find can be veri- fied by some indirect process of measurement or enumera- tion. And even in the case of such an utterly inconceivable object as the Solar System, we yet, through the fulfil- ment of predictions founded on our symbolic conception of 30 ULTIMATE RELIGIOUS IDEAS. it, gain the conviction that this symbolic conception stands for an actual existence, and, in a sense, truly expresses cer- tain of its constituent relations. Thus our symbolic concep- tions being in the majority of cases capable of development into complete ones, and in most other cases serving as steps to conclusions which are proved valid by their correspond- ence with observation, we acquire a confirmed habit of deal- ing with them as true conceptions — as real representations of actualities. Learning by long experience that they can, if needful, be verified, we are led habitually to accept them without verification. And thus we open the door to some which profess to stand for known things, but which really stand for things that cannot be known in any way. To sum up, we must say of conceptions in general, that they are complete only when the attributes of the object conceived are of such number and kind that they can be represented in consciousness so nearly at the same time as to seem all present together; that as the objects conceived be- come larger and more complex, some of the attributes first thought of fade from consciousness before the rest have been represented, and the conception thus becomes imper- fect ; that when the size, complexity, or discreteness of the object conceived becomes very great, only a small portion of its attributes can be thought of at once, and the concep- tion formed of it thus becomes so inadequate as to be a mere symbol; that nevertheless such symbolic conceptions, which are indispensable in general thinking, are legitimate, pro- vided that by some cumulative or indirect process of thought, or by the fulfilment of predictions based on them, we can assure ourselves that they stand for actualities; but that when our symbolic conceptions are such that no cumu- lative or indirect processes of thought can enable us to ascer- tain that there are corresponding actualities, nor any predic- tions be made whose fulfilment can prove this, then they are altogether vicious and illusive, and in no way distinguish- able from pure fictions. ULTIMATE RELIGIOUS IDEAS. 31 § 10. And now to consider the bearings of this general truth on our immediate topic — Ultimate Religious Ideas. To the primitive man sometimes happen things which are out of the ordinary course — diseases, storms, earth- quakes, echos, eclipses. From dreams arises the idea of a wandering double; whence follows the belief that the dou- ble, departing permanently at death, is then a ghost. Ghosts thus become assignable causes for strange occur- rences. The greater ghosts are presently supposed to have extended spheres of action. As men grow intelligent the conceptions of these minor invisible agencies merge into the conception of a universal invisible agency; and there result hypotheses concerning the origin, not of special incidents only, but of things in general. A critical examination, however, will prove not only that no current hypothesis is tenable, but also that no tena- ble hypothesis can be framed. § 11. Respecting the origin of the Universe three ver- bally intelligible suppositions may be made. We may as- sert that it is self -existent ; or that it is self -created ; or that it is created by an external agency. Which of these suppo- sitions is most credible it is not needful here to inquire. The deeper question, into which this finally merges, is, whether any one of them is even conceivable in the true sense of the word. Let us successively test them. When we speak of a man as self-supporting, of an ap- paratus as self-acting, or of a tree as self -developed, our ex- pressions, however inexact, stand for things that can be realized in thought with tolerable completeness. Our con- ception of the self -development of a tree is doubtless sym- bolic. But though we cannot really represent in conscious- ness the entire series of complex changes through which the tree passes, yet we can thus represent the leading fea- tures of the series; and general experience teaches us that by long continued observation we could gain the power to 32 ULTIMATE RELIGIOUS IDEAS. realize in thought a series of changes more fully represent- ing the actual series: that is, we know that our symbolic conception of self-development can be expanded into some- thing like a real conception; and that it expresses, however inaccurately, an actual process in nature. But when we speak of self -existence, and, helped by the above analogies, form some vague symbolic conception of it, we delude our- selves in supposing that this symbolic conception is of the same order as the others. On joining the word self 'to the word existence, the force of association makes us believe we have a thought like that suggested by the compound word self-acting. An endeavour to expand this symbolic concep- tion, however, will undeceive us. In the first place, it is clear that by self -existence we especially mean, an exist- ence independent of any other — not produced by any other : the assertion of self -existence is simply an indirect denial of creation. In thus excluding the idea of any antecedent cause, we necessarily exclude the idea of a beginning; for to admit the idea of a beginning — to admit that there was a time when the existence had not commenced — is to admit that its commencement was determined by something, or was caused; which is a contradiction. Self-existence, there- fore, necessarily means existence without a beginning; and to form a conception of self-existence is to form a concep- tion of existence without a beginning. Now by no mental effort can we do this. To conceive existence through infinite past-time, implies the conception of infinite past-time, which is an impossibility. To this let us add, that even were self-existence conceivable, it would not in any sense be an explanation of the Universe. Xo one will say that the existence of an object at the present moment is made easier to understand by the discovery that it existed an hour ago, or a day ago, or a year ago ; and if its existence now is not made in the least degree more comprehensible by its existence during some previous finite period of time, then no accumu- lation of such finite periods, even could we extend them to ULTIMATE RELIGIOUS IDEAS. 33 an infinite period, would make it more comprehensible. Thus the Atheistic theory is not only absolutely unthink- able, but, even if it were thinkable, would not be a solution. The assertion that the Universe is self-existent does not really carry us a step beyond the cognition of its present ex- istence; and so leaves us with a mere re-statement of the mystery. The hypothesis of self-creation, which practically amounts to what is called Pantheism, is similarly incapable of being represented in thought. Certain phenomena, such as the precipitation of invisible vapour into cloud, aid us in forming a symbolic conception of a self -evolved Universe; and there are not wanting indications in the heavens, and on the earth, which help us to render this conception tolerably definite. But while the succession of phases through which the Universe has passed in reaching its present form, may perhaps be comprehended as in a sense self-determined ; yet the impossibility of expanding our symbolic conception of self-creation into a real conception, remains as complete as ever. Really to conceive self -creation, is to conceive poten- tial existence passing into actual existence by some inherent necessity; which we cannot do. We cannot form any idea of a potential existence of the universe, as dis- tinguished from its actual existence. If represented in thought at all, potential existence must be represented as something, that is as an actual existence ; to suppose that it can be represented as nothing, involves two absurdities — that nothing is more than a negation, and can be positively represented in thought; and that one nothing is distin- guished from all other nothings by its power to develope into something. Nor is this all. We have no state of conscious- ness answering to the words — an inherent necessity by which potential existence became actual existence. To ren- der them into thought, existence, having for an indefinite period remained in one form, must be conceived as passing without any external or additional impulse, into another 34 ULTIMATE EELIGIOUS IDEAS. form; and tins involves the idea of a change without a cause— a thing of which no idea is possible. Thus the terms of this hypothesis do not stand for real thoughts; but merely suggest the vaguest symbols in- capable of any interpretation. Moreover, even were it true that potential existence is conceivable as a different thing from actual existence; .and that the transition from the one to the other can be mentally realized as a self-deter- mined change; we should still be no forwarder: the prob- lem would simply be removed a step back. For whence the potential existence? This would just as much require ac- counting for as actual existence; and just the same difficul- ties would meet us. Respecting the origin of such a latent power, no other suppositions could be made than those above named — self-existence, self-creation, creation by external agency. The self-existence of a potential universe is no more conceivable than we have found the self-existence of the actual universe to be. The self-creation of such a poten- tial universe would involve over again the difficulties here stated— would imply behind this potential universe a more remote potentiality; and so on in an infinite series, leaving us at last no forwarder than at first. While to assign as the source of this potential universe an external agency, would be to introduce the notion of a potential universe for no pur- pose whatever. There remains to be examined the commonly-received or theistic hypothesis— creation by external agency. Alike in the rudest creeds and in the cosmogony long current among ourselves, it is assumed that the genesis of the Heavens and the Earth is affected somewhat after the manner in which a workman shapes a piece of furniture. And this assumption is made not by theologians only, but by the immense ma- jority of philosophers, past and present. Equally in the writings of Plato, and in those of not a few living men of science, we find it taken for granted that there is an analogy between the process of creation and the process ULTIMATE RELIGIOUS IDEAS. 35 of manufacture. Now in the first place, not only is this conception one that cannot by any cumulative process of thought, or the fulfilment of predictions based on it, be shown to answer to anything actual ; and not only is it that in the absence of all evidence respecting the process of crea- tion, we have no proof of correspondence even between this limited conception and some limited portion of the fact; but it is that the conception is not even consistent with itself — cannot be realized in thought, when all its assumptions are granted. Though it is true that the proceedings of a human artificer may vaguely symbolize to us a method after which the Universe might be shaped, yet they do not help us to comprehend the real mystery ; namely, the origin of the material of which the Universe consists. The artizan does not make the iron, wood, or stone, he uses ; but merely fashions and combines them. If we suppose suns, and plan- ets, and satellites, and all they contain to have been simi- larly formed by a " Great Artificer," we suppose merely that certain pre-existing elements were thus put into their present arrangement. But whence the pre-existing ele- ments? The comparison helps us not in the least to under- stand that; and unless it helps us to understand that, it is worthless. The production of matter out of nothing is the real mystery, which neither this simile nor any other enables us to conceive; and a simile which does not enable us to conceive this, may just as well be dispensed with. Still more manifest does the insufficiency of this theory of crea- tion become, when we turn from material objects to that which contains them — when instead of matter we contem- plate space. Did there exist nothing but an immeasurable void, explanation would be needed as much as now. There would still arise the question — how came it so? If the the- ory of creation by external agency were an adequate one, it would supply an answer; and its answer would be — space was made in the same manner that matter was made. But the impossibility of conceiving this is so manifest, that no 36 ULTIMATE RELIGIOUS IDEAS. one dares to assert it. For if space was created, it must have been previously non-existent. The non-existence of space cannot, however, by any mental effort be imagined. It is one of the most familiar truths that the idea of space as surrounding us on all sides, is not for a moment to be got rid of — not only are we compelled to think of space as now everywhere present, but we are unable to conceive its ab- sense either in the past or the future. And if the non-ex- istence of space is absolutely inconceivable, then, neces- sarily, its creation is absolutely inconceivable. Lastly, even supposing that the genesis of the Universe could really be represented in thought as the result of an external agency, the mystery would be as great as ever; for there would still arise the question — how came there to be an ex- ternal agency? To account for this only the same three hypotheses are possible — self-existence, self-creation, and creation by external agency. Of these the last is useless: it commits us to an infinite series of such agencies, and even then leaves us where we were. By the second we are prac- tically involved in the same predicament; since, as already shown, self-creation implies an infinite series of potential existences. We are obliged therefore to fall back upon the first, which is the one commonly accepted and commonly supposed to be satisfactory. Those who cannot conceive a self -existent universe; and who therefore assume a creator as the source of the universe; take for granted that they can conceive a self-existent creator. The mystery which they recognize in this great fact surrounding them on every side, they transfer to an alleged source of this great fact; and then suppose that they have solved the mystery. But they delude themselves. As was proved at the outset of the argument, self -existence is rigorously inconceivable; and this holds true whatever be the nature of the object of which it is predicated. T\ Tioever agrees that the atheistic hypo- thesis is untenable because it involves the impossible idea of self-existence, must perforce admit that the theistic ULTIMATE RELIGIOUS IDEAS. 37 hypothesis is untenable if it contains the same impossible idea. Thus these three different suppositions respecting the origin of things, verbally intelligible though they are, and severally seeming to their respective adherents quite ra- tional, turn out, when critically examined, to be literally unthinkable. It is not a question of probability, or credibil- ity, but of conceivability. Experiment proves that the ele- ments of these hypotheses cannot even be put together in consciousness ; and we can entertain them only as we enter- tain such pseud-ideas as a square fluid and a moral sub- stance— only by abstaining from the endeavour to render them into actual thoughts. Or, reverting to our original mode of statement, we may say that they severally involve symbolic conceptions of the illegitimate and illusive kind. Differing so widely as they seem to do, the atheistic, the pantheistic, and the theistic hypotheses contain the same ultimate element. It is impossible to avoid making the assumption of self -existence somewhere; and whether that assumption be made nakedly, or under complicated dis- guises, it is equally vicious, equally unthinkable. Be it a fragment of matter, or some fancied potential form of mat- ter, or some more remote and still less imaginable cause, our conception of its self -existence can be formed only by join- ing with it the notion of unlimited duration through past time. And as unlimited duration is inconceivable, all those formal ideas into which it enters are inconceivable ; and in- deed, if such an expression is allowable, are the more incon- ceivable in proportion as the other elements of the ideas are indefinite. So that in fact, impossible as it is to think of the actual universe as self -existing, we do but multiply impossi- bilities of thought by every attempt we make to explain its existence. § 12. If from the origin of the Universe we turn to its nature, the like insurmountable difficulties rise up before us 3g ULTIMATE RELIGIOUS IDEAS. on all skies — or rather, the same difficulties under new as- pects. We find ourselves on the one hand obliged to make certain assumptions; and yet on the other hand we find these assumptions cannot be represented in thought. When we inquire what is the meaning of the various effects produced upon our senses — when we ask how there come to be in our consciousness impressions of sounds, of col- ours, of tastes, and of those various attributes which we as- cribe to bodies; we are compelled to regard them as the ef- fects of some cause. We may stop short in the belief that this cause is what we call matter. Or we may conclude, as some do, that matter is only a cer- tain mode of manifestation of spirit; which is there- fore the true cause. Or, regarding matter and spirit as proximate agencies, we may attribute all the changes wrought in our consciousness to immediate divine power. But be the cause we assign what it may, we are obliged to suppose some cause. And we are not only obliged to sup- pose some cause, but also a first cause. The matter, or spirit, or whatever we assume to be the agent producing on us these various impressions, must either be the first cause of them or not. If it is the first cause, the conclusion is reached. If it is not the first cause, then by implication there must be a cause behind it; which thus becomes the real cause of the effect. Manifestly, however complicated the assumptions, the same conclusion must inevitably be reached. We can- not think at all about the impressions which the external world produces on us, without thinking of them as caused; and we cannot carry out an inquiry concerning their causa- tion, without inevitably committing ourselves to the hypo- thesis of a First Cause. But now if we go a step further, and ask what is the na- ture of this First Cause, we are driven by an inexorable logic to certain further conclusions. Is the First Cause finite or infinite? If we say finite we involve ourselves in a di- lemma. To think of the First Cause as finite, is to think of ULTIMATE KELIGIOUS IDEAS. 39 it as limited. To think of it as limited, necessarily implies a conception of something beyond its limits : it is absolutely impossible to conceive a thing as bounded without conceiv- ing a region surrounding its boundaries. What now must we say of this region? If the First Cause is limited, and there consequently lies something outside of it, this some- thing must have no First Cause — must be uncaused. But if we admit that there can be something uncaused, there is no reason to assume a cause for anything. If beyond that finite region over which the First Cause extends, there lies a region, which we are compelled to regard as infinite, over which it does not extend — if we admit that there is an infi- nite uncaused surrounding the finite caused; we tacitly abandon the hypothesis of causation altogether. Thus it is impossible to consider the First Cause as finite. And if it cannot be finite it must be infinite. Another inference concerning the First Cause is equally unavoidable. It must be independent. If it is dependent it cannot be the First Cause; for that must be the First Cause on which it depends. It is not enough to say that it is partially independent; since this implies some necessity which determines its partial dependence, and this necessity, be it what it may, must be a higher cause, or the true First Cause, which is a contradiction. But to think of the First Cause as totally independent, is to think of it as that which exists in the absence of all other existence; seeing that if the presence of any other existence is necessary, it must be partially dependent on that other existence, and so cannot be the First Cause. Not only however must the First Cause be a form of being which has no necessary relation to any other form of being, but it can have no necessary rela- tion within itself. There can be nothing in it which deter- mines change, and yet nothing which prevents change. For if it contains something which imposes such necessities or re- straints, this something must be a cause higher than the First Cause, which is absurd. Thus the First Cause must be 40 ULTIMATE RELIGIOUS IDEAS. in every sense perfect, complete, total : including within it- self all power, and transcending all law. Or to use the es- tablished word, it must be absolute. Here then respecting the nature of the Universe, we seem committed to certain unavoidable conclusions. The objects and actions surrounding us, not less than the phe- nomena of our own consciousness, compel us to ask a cause; in our search for a cause, we discover no resting place until we arrive at the hypothesis of a First Cause ; and we have no alternative but to regard this First Cause as Infinite and Ab- solute. These are inferences forced upon us by arguments from which there appears no escape. It is hardly needful however to show those who have followed thus far, how illusive are these reasonings and their results. But that it would tax the reader's patience to no purpose, it might easily be proved that the materials of which the argument is built, equally with the conclusions based on them, are merely symbolic conceptions of the illegitimate order. Instead, however, of repeating the disproof used above, it will be desirable to pursue another method; showing fallacy of these conclusions by disclosing their mutual contradic- tions. Here I cannot do better than avail myself of the demon- stration which Mr Mansel, carrying out in detail the doc- trine of Sir William Hamilton, has given in his " Limits of Religious Thought." And I gladly do this, not only be- cause his mode of presentation cannot be improved, but also because, writing as he does in defence of the current Theolo- gy, his reasonings will be the more acceptable to the major- ity of readers. § 13. Having given preliminary definitions of the First Cause, of the Infinite, and of the Absolute, Mr Mansel says : — " But these three conceptions, the Cause, the Absolute, the Infinite, all equally indispensable, do they not imply ULTIMATE RELIGIOUS IDEAS. 41 contradiction to each other, when viewed in conjunction, as attributes of one and the same Being? A Cause cannot, as such, be absolute : the Absolute cannot, as such, be a cause. The cause, as such, exists only in relation to its effect: the cause is a cause of the effect; the effect is an effect of the cause. On the other hand, the conception of the Absolute implies a possible existence out of all relation. AVe attempt to escape from this apparent contradiction, by introducing the idea of succession in time. The Absolute exists first by itself, and afterwards becomes a Cause. But here we are checked by the third conception, that of the Infinite. How can the Infinite become that which it was not from the first? If Causation is a possible mode of existence, that which ex- ists without causing is not infinite; that which becomes a cause has passed beyond its former limits." * * * " Supposing the Absolute to become a cause, it will fol- low that it operates by means of freewill and consciousness. For a necessary cause cannot be conceived as absolute and infinite. If necessitated by something beyond itself, it is thereby limited by a superior power; and if necessitated by itself, it has in its own nature a necessary relation to its effect. The act of causation must therefore be voluntary; and volition is only possible in a conscious being. But con- sciousness again is only conceivable as a relation. There must be a conscious subject, and an object of which he is conscious. The subject is a subject to the object; the ob- ject is an object to the subject; and neither can exist by it- self as the absolute. This difficulty, again, may be for the moment evaded, by distinguishing between the absolute as related to another and the absolute as related to itself. The Absolute, it may be said, may possibly be conscious, pro- vided it is only conscious of itself. But this alternative is, in ultimate analysis, no less self -destructive than the other. For the object of consciousness, whether a mode of the sub- ject's existence or not, is either created in and by the act of consciousness, or has an existence independent of it. In the 42 ULTIMATE RELIGIOUS IDEAS. former case, the object depends upon the subject, and the: subject alone is the true absolute. In the latter case, the subject depends upon the object, and the object alone is the true absolute. Or if we attempt a third hypothesis, and maintain that each exists independently of the other, we have no absolute at all, but only a pair of relatives; for co- existence, whether in consciousness or not, is itself a re- lation." " The corollary from this reasoning is obvious. Xot only is the Absolute, as conceived, incapable of a necessary relation to anything else; but it is also incapable of con- taining, by the constitution of its own nature, an essential relation within itself; as a whole, for instance, composed of parts, or as a substance consisting of attributes, or as a con- scious subject in antithesis to an object. For if there is in the absolute any principle of unity, distinct from the mere accumulation of parts or attributes, this principle alone is the true absolute. If, on the other hand, there is no such principle, then there is no absolute at all, but only a plural- ity of relatives. The almost unanimous voice of philosophy, in pronouncing that the absolute is both one and simple, must be accepted as the voice of reason also, so far as reason has any voice in the matter. But this absolute unity, as in- different and containing no attributes, can neither be distin- guished from the multiplicity of finite beings by any char- acteristic feature, nor be identified with them in their multi- plicity. Thus we are landed in an inextricable dilemma. The Absolute cannot be conceived as conscious, neither can it be conceived as unconscious: it cannot be conceived as complex, neither can it be conceived as simple : it cannot be conceived by difference, neither can it be conceived by .the absence of difference: it cannot be identified with the uni- verse, neither can it be distinguished from it. The One and the Many, regarded as the beginning of existence, are thus alike incomprehensible." " The fundamental conceptions of Rational Theology ULTIMATE RELIGIOUS IDEAS. 43 "being thus self-destructive, we may naturally expect to find the same antagonism manifested in their special applica- tions. * * * How, for example, can Infinite Power be able to do all things, and yet Infinite Goodness be unable to do evil? How can Infinite Justice exact the utmost penalty for every sin, and yet Infinite Mercy pardon the sinner? How can Infinite Wisdom know all that is to come, and yet Infinite Freedom be at liberty to do or to forbear? How is the existence of Evil compatible with that of an infinitely perfect Being; for if he wills it, he is not infinitely good; and if he wills it not, his will is thwarted and his sphere of action limited? " * * * " Let us, however, suppose for an instant that these difficulties are surmounted, and the existence of the Abso- lute securely established on the testimony of reason. Still we have not succeeded in reconciling this idea with that of a Cause: we have done nothing towards explaining how the absolute can give rise to the relative, the infinite to the finite. If the condition of causal activity is a higher state than that of quiescence, the Absolute, whether acting vol- untarily or involuntarily, has passed from a condition of comparative imperfection to one of comparative per- fection; and therefore was not originally perfect. If the state of activity is an inferior state to that of quiescence, the Absolute, in becoming a cause, has lost its original perfection. There remains only the supposition that the two states are equal, and the act of creation one of complete indifference. But this supposition annihilates the unity of the absolute, or it annihilates itself. If the act of creation is real, and yet indifferent, we must admit the pos- sibility of two conceptions of the absolute, the one as pro- ductive, the other as non-productive. If the act is not real, the supposition itself vanishes." * * * " Again, how can the relative be conceived as coming into being? If it is a distinct reality from the absolute, it must be conceived as passing from non-existence into exist- 44 ULTIMATE RELIGIOUS IDEAS. ence. But to conceive an object as non-existent, is again a self-contradiction; for that which is conceived exists, as an object of thought, in and by that conception. We may ab- stain from thinking of an object at all; but, if we think of it, we cannot but think of it as existing. It is possible at one time not to think of an object at all, and at another to think of it as already in being; but to think of it in the act of be- coming, in the progress from not being into being, is to think that which, in the very thought, annihilates it- self." * * * " To sum up briefly this portion of my argument. The conception of the Absolute and Infinite, from whatever side we view it, appears encompassed with contradictions. There is a contradiction in supposing such an object to exist, whether alone or in conjunction with others; and there is a contradiction in supposing it not to exist. There is a contradiction in conceiving it as one ; and there is a con- tradiction in conceiving it as many. There is a contradic- tion in conceiving it as personal; and there is a contradic- tion in conceiving it as impersonal. It cannot, without contradiction, be represented as active; nor, without equal contradiction, be represented as inactive. It cannot be con- ceived as the sum of all existence; nor yet can it be con- ceived as a part only of that sum." § 14. And now what is the bearing of these results on the question before us? Our examination of Ultimate Ke- ligious Ideas has been carried on with the view of making manifest some fundamental verity contained in them. Thus far however we have arrived at negative conclusions only. Criticising the essential conceptions involved in the different orders of beliefs, we find no one of them to be logically defensible. Passing over the consideration of credibility, and confining ourselves to that of conceivabil- ity, we see that Atheism, Pantheism, and Theism, when rig- orously analyzed, severally prove to be absolutely unthink- ULTIMATE RELIGIOUS IDEAS. 45 able. Instead of disclosing a fundamental verity existing in each, onr investigation seems rather to have shown that there is no fundamental verity contained in any. To carry away this conclusion, however, would be a fatal error; as we shall shortly see. Leaving out the accompanying moral code, which is in all cases a supplementary growth, a religious creed is defin- able as a theory of original causation. By the lowest sav- ages the genesis of things is not inquired about : anomalous appearances alone raise the question of agency. But be it in the primitive Ghost-theory which assumes a human personality behind each unusual phenomenon ; be it in Poly- theism, in which these personalities are partially general- ized ; be it in Monotheism, in which they are wholly gener- alized ; or be it in Pantheism, in which the generalized per- sonality becomes one with the phenomena ; we equally find an hypothesis which is supposed to render the Universe comprehensible. Nay, even that which is commonly re- garded as the negation of all Religion — even positive Athe- ism, comes within the definition ; for it, too, in asserting the self-existence of Space, Matter, and Motion, which it re- gards as adequate causes of every appearance, propounds an a priori theory from which it holds the facts to be deducible. Now every theory tacitly asserts two things: firstly, that there is something to be explained; secondly, that such and such is the explanation. Hence, however widely dif- ferent speculators may disagree in the solutions they give of the same problem ; yet by implication they agree that there is a problem to be solved. Here then is an element which all creeds have in common. Religions diametrically op- posed in their overt dogmas, are yet perfectly at one in the tacit conviction that the existence of the world with all it contains and all which surrounds it, is a mystery ever press- ing for interpretation. On this point, if on no other, there is entire unanimity. Thus we come within sight of that which we seek. In 46 ULTIMATE RELIGIOUS IDEAS. tlie last chapter, reasons were given for inferring that human beliefs in general, and especially the perennial ones, contain, under whatever disguises of error, some soul of truth ; and here we have arrived at a truth underlying even the grossest superstitions. AVe saw further that this soul of truth was most likely to be some constituent common to con- flicting opinions of the same order ; and here we have a con- stituent which may be claimed alike by all religions. It was pointed out that this soul of truth would almost certainly be more abstract than any of the beliefs involving it ; and the truth we have arrived at is one exceeding in abstractness the most abstract religious doctrines. In every respect, there- fore, our conclusion answers to the requirements. It has all the characteristics which we inferred must belong to that fundamental verity expressed by religions in general. That this is the vital element in all religions is further proved by the fact, that it is the element which not only sur- vives every change, but grows more distinct the more high- ly the religion is developed. Aboriginal creeds, though per- vaded by the idea of personal agencies which are usually unseen, yet conceive these agencies under perfectly concrete and ordinary forms — class them with the visible agencies of men and animals; and so hide a vague perception of mys- tery in disguises as unmysterious as possible. The Poly- theistic conceptions in their advanced phases, represent the presiding personalities in greatly idealized shapes, existing in a remote region, working in subtle ways, and communi- cating with men by omens or through inspired persons; that is, the ultimate causes of things are regarded as less familiar and comprehensible. The growth of a Monotheistic faith, accompanied as it is by a denial of those beliefs in which the divine nature is assimilated to the human in all its lower propensities, shows us a further step in the same direction; and however imperfectly this higher faith is at first real- ized, we yet see in altars " to the unknown and unknow- able God," and in the worship of a God that cannot by any ULTIMATE RELIGIOUS IDEAS. 41 searching be found out, that there is a clearer recognition of the inscrutableness of creation. Further developments of theology, ending in such assertions as that " a God un- derstood would be no God at all," and " to think that God is, as we can think him to be, is blasphemy," exhibit this recognition still more distinctly ; and it pervades all the cul- tivated theology of the present day. Thus while other con- stituents of religious creeds one by one drop away, this re- mains and grows even more manifest ; and so is shown to be the essential constituent. Nor does the evidence end here. Not only is the omni- presence of something which passes comprehension, that most abstract belief which is common to all religions, which becomes the more distinct in proportion as they develope, and which remains after their discordant elements have been mutually cancelled; but it is that belief which the most unsparing criticism of each leaves unquestionable — or rather makes ever clearer. It has nothing to fear from the most inexorable logic ; but on the contrary is a belief which the most inexorable logic shows to be more profoundly true than any religion supposes. For every religion, setting out though it does with the tacit assertion of a mystery, forth- with proceeds to give some solution of this mystery ; and so asserts that it is not a mystery passing human comprehen- sion. But an examination of the solutions they severally propound, shows them to be uniformly invalid. The analy- sis of every possible hypothesis proves, not simply that no hypothesis is sufficient, but that no hypothesis is even think- able. And thus the mystery which all religions recognize, turns out to be a far more transcendent mystery than any of them suspect — not a relative, but an absolute mystery. Here, then, is an ultimate religious truth of the highest possible certainty — a truth in which religions in general are at one with each other, and with a philosophy antagonistic to their special dogmas. And this truth, respecting which there is a latent agreement among all mankind from the 48 ULTIMATE RELIGIOUS IDEAS. fetish-worsMpper to the most stoical critic of human creeds, must be the one we seek. If Religion and Science are to be reconciled, the basis of reconciliation must be this deepest, widest, and most certain of all facts — that the Power which the Universe manifests to us is utterly inscrutable. CHAPTER III. ULTIMATE SCIENTIFIC IDEAS. § 15. What are Space and Time? Two hypotheses are current respecting them: the one that they are objective, and the other that they are subjective — the one that they are external to, and independent of, ourselves, the other that they are internal, and appertain to our own conscious- ness. Let us see what becomes of these hypotheses under analysis. To say that Space and Time exist objectively, is to say that they are entities. The assertion that they are non- entities is self -destructive : non-entities are non-existences; and to allege that non-existences exist objectively, is a con- tradiction in terms. Moreover, to deny that Space and Time are things, and so by implication to call them nothings, in- volves the absurdity that there are two kinds of nothing. Neither can they be regarded as attributes of some entity; seeing, not only that it is impossible really to conceive any entity of which they are attributes, but seeing further that we cannot think of them as disappearing, even if every- thing else disappeared; whereas attributes necessarily dis- appear along with the entities they belong to. Thus as Space and Time cannot be either non-entities, nor the attri- butes of entities, we have no choice but consider them as entities. But while, on the hypothesis of their ob- jectivity, Space and Time must be classed as things, we find, on experiment, that to represent them in thought as 49 50 ULTIMATE SCIENTIFIC IDEAS. tilings is impossible. To be conceived at all, a thing must be conceived as having attributes. "We can distinguish something from nothing, only by the power which the something has to act on our consciousness; the several affections it produces on our consciousness (or else the hypothetical causes of them), we attribute to it, and call its attributes; and the absence of these attributes is the absence of the terms in which the something is conceived, and involves the absence of a conception. What now are the attributes of Space? The only one which it is possible for a moment to think of as belonging to it, is that of exten- sion; and to credit it with this implies a confusion of thought. For extension and Space are controvertible terms : by extension, as we ascribe it to surrounding objects, we mean occupancy of Space; and thus to say that Space is ex- tended, is to say that Space occupies Space. How we are similarly unable to assign any attribute to Time, scarcely needs pointing out. Nor are Time and Space un- thinkable as entities only from the absence of attributes; there is another peculiarity, familiar to readers of meta- physics, which equally excludes them from the category. All entities which we actually know as such, are limited; and even if we suppose ourselves either to know or to be able to conceive some unlimited entity, we of necessity in so classing it positively separate it from the class of limited entities. 'But of Space and Time we cannot assert either limitation or the absence of limitation. We find ourselves totally unable to form any mental image of unbounded Space; and yet totally unable to imagine bounds beyond which there is no Space. Similarly at the other extreme: it is impossible to think of a limit to the divisibility of Space; yet equally impossible to think of its infinite divisi- bility. And, without stating them, it will be seen that we labour under like impotencies in respect to Time. Thus we cannot conceive Space and Time as entities, and are equally disabled from conceiving them as either the attri- ULTIMATE SCIENTIFIC IDEAS. 51 butes of entities or as non-entities. We are compelled to think of them as existing; and yet cannot bring them within those conditions under which existences are repre- sented in thought. Shall we then take refuge in the Kantian doctrine? shall we say that Space and Time are forms of the intellect, — " a priori laws or conditions of the conscious mind " ? To do this is to escape from great difficulties by rushing into greater. The proposition with which Kant's philoso- phy sets out, verbally intelligible though it is, cannot by any effort be rendered into thought — cannot be interpreted into an idea properly so called, but stands merely for a pseud-idea. In the first place, to assert that Space and Time, as we are conscious of them, are subjective condi- tions, is by implication to assert that they are not objective realities: if the Space and Time present to our minds be- long to the ego, then of necessity they do not belong to the non-ego. Now it is absolutely impossible to think this. The very fact on which Kant bases his hypothesis — namely that our consciousness of Space and Time cannot be sup- pressed— testifies as much; for that consciousness of Space and Time which we cannot rid ourselves of, is the conscious- ness of them as existing objectively. It is useless to reply that such an inability must inevitably result if they are sub- jective forms. The question here is — What does conscious- ness directly testify? And the direct testimony of con- sciousness is, that Time and Space are not within but with- out the mind ; and so absolutely independent of it that they cannot be conceived to become non-existent even were the mind to become non-existent. Besides being posi- tively unthinkable in what it tacitly denies, the theory of Kant is equally unthinkable in what it openly affirms. It is not simply that we cannot combine the thought of Space with the thought of our own personality, and contemplate the one as a property of the other — though our inability to do this would prove the inconceivableness of the hypo- 52 ULTIMATE SCIENTIFIC IDEAS. thesis — but it is that the hypothesis carries in itself the proof of its own inconceivableness. For if Space and Time are forms of thought, they can never be thought of; since it is impossible for anything to be at once the form of thought and the matter of thought. That Space and Time are ob- jects of consciousness, Kant emphatically asserts by saying that it is impossible to suppress the consciousness of them. How then, if they are objects of consciousness, can they at the same time be conditions of consciousness ? If Space and Time are the conditions under -which we think, then when we think of Space and Time themselves, our thoughts must be unconditioned; and if there can thus be unconditioned thoughts, what becomes of the theory ? It results therefore that Space and Time are wholly in- comprehensible. The immediate knowledge which we seem to have of them, proves, when examined, to be total ignorance. While our belief in their objective reality is in- surmountable, we are unable to give any rational account of it. And to posit the alternative belief (possible to state but impossible to realize) is merely to multiply irration- alities. § 16. Were it not for the necessities of the argument, it would be inexcusable to occupy the reader's attention with the threadbare, and yet unended, controversy respecting the divisibility of matter. Matter is either infinitely divisible or it is not: no third possibility can be named. Which of the alternatives shall we accept? If we say that Matter is infinitely divisible, we commit ourselves to a supposition not realizable in thought. We can bisect and re-bisect a body, and continually repeating the act until we reduce its parts to a size no longer physically divisible, may then mentally con- tinue the process without limit. To do this, however, is not really to conceive the infinite divisibility of matter, but to form a symbolic conception incapable of expansion into a real one, and not admitting of other verification. Really ULTIMATE SCIENTIFIC IDEAS. 53 to conceive the infinite divisibility of matter, is mentally to follow out the divisions to infinity; and to do this would require infinite time. On the other hand, to assert that mat- ter is not infinitely divisible, is to assert that it is reducible to parts which no conceivable power can divide; and this verbal supposition can no more be represented in thought than the other. For each of such ultimate parts, did they exist, must have an under and an upper surface, a right and a left side, like any larger fragment. Now it is impossible to imagine its sides so near that no plane of section can be conceived between them; and however great be the as- sumed force of cohesion, it is impossible to shut out the idea of a greater force capable of overcoming it. So that to human intelligence the one hypothesis is no more accept- able than the other; and yet the conclusion that one or other must agree with the fact, seems to human intelligence unavoidable. Again, leaving this insoluble question, let us ask whether substance has, in reality, anything like that extend- ed solidity which it presents to our consciousness. The por- tion of space occupied by a piece of metal, seems to eyes and fingers perfectly filled: we perceive a homogeneous, resist- ing mass, without any breach of continuity. Shall we then say that Matter is as actually solid as it appears? Shall we say that whether it consists of an infinitely divisible element or of ultimate units incapable of further division, its parts are everywhere in actual contact? To assert as much en- tangles us in insuperable difficulties. Were Matter thus absolutely solid, it would be, what it is not — absolutely in- compressible; since compressibility, implying the nearer ap- proach of constituent parts, is not thinkable unless there is unoccupied space between the parts. Nor is this all. It is an established mechanical truth, that if a bodv, moving; at a given velocity, strikes an equal body at rest in such wise that the two move on together, their joint velocity will be but half that of the striking body. Now it is a law of 54 ULTIMATE SCIENTIFIC IDEAS. which the negation is inconceivable, that in passing from any one degree of magnitude to any other, all intermediate degrees must be passed through. Or, in the case before us, a body moving at velocity 4, cannot, by collision, be re- duced to velocity 2, without passing through all velocities between 4 and 2. But were Matter truly solid — were its units absolutely incompressible and in absolute contact — this " law of continuity," as it is called, would be broken in every case of collision. For when, of two such units, one moving at velocity 4 strikes another at rest, the striking- unit must have its velocity 4 instantaneously reduced to ve- locity 2 ; must pass from velocity 4 to velocity 2 without any lapse of time, and without passing through intermediate velocities; must be moving with velocities 4 and 2 at the same instant, which is impossible. The supposition that Matter is absolutely solid being untenable, there presents itself the Newtonian supposition, that it consists of solid atoms not in contact but acting on each other by attractive and repulsive forces, varying with the distances. To assume this, however, merely shifts the difficulty: the problem is simply transferred from the ag- gregated masses of matter to these hypothetical atoms. For granting that Matter, as we perceive it, is made up of such dense extended units surrounded by atmospheres of force, the question still arises — What is the constitution of these units? AVe have no alternative but to regard each of them as a small piece of matter. Looked at through a mental microscope, each becomes a mass of substance such as we have just been contemplating. Exactly the same inquiries may be made respecting the parts of which each atom con- sists ; while exactly the same difficulties stand in the way of every answer. And manifestly, even were the hypothetical atom assumed to consist of still minuter ones, the difficulty would re-appear at the next step ; nor could it be got rid of even by an infinite series of such assumptions. Boscovich's conception yet remains to us. Seeing that ULTIMATE SCIENTIFIC IDEAS. 55 Matter could not, as Leibnitz suggested, be composed of un- extended monads (since the juxta-position of an infinity of points having no extension, could not produce that exten- sion which matter possesses) ; and perceiving objections to the view entertained by Newton; Boscovich proposed an in- termediate theory, uniting, as he considered, the advantages of both and avoiding their difficulties. His theory is, that the constituents of Matter are centres of force — points with- out dimensions, which attract and repel each other in such- wise as to be kept at specific distances apart. And he argues, mathematically, that the forces possessed by such centres might so vary with the distances, that under given conditions the centres would Temain in stable equilibrium with definite interspaces; and yet, under other conditions, would maintain larger or smaller interspaces. This specu- lation however, ingeniously as it is elaborated, and eluding though it does various difficulties, posits a proposition which cannot by any effort be represented in thought: it escapes all the inconceivabilities above indicated, by merging them in the one inconceivability with which it sets out. A centre of force absolutely without extension is unthinkable: an- swering to these words we can form nothing more than a symbolic conception of the illegitimate order. The idea of resistance cannot be separated in thought from the idea of an extended body which offers resistance. To suppose that central forces can reside in points not infinitesimally small but occupying no space whatever — points having position only, with nothing to mark their position — points in no re- spect distinguishable from the surrounding points that, are not centres of force; — to suppose this, is utterly beyond human power. Here it may possibly be said, that though all hypotheses respecting the constitution of Matter commit us to incon- ceivable conclusions when logically developed, yet we have reason to think that one of them corresponds with the fact. Though the conception of Matter as consisting of dense in- 56 ULTIMATE SCIENTIFIC IDEAS. divisible units, is symbolic and incapable of being complete- ly thought out, it may yet be supposed to find indirect veri- fication in the truths of chemistry. These, it is argued, necessitate the belief that Matter consists of particles of spe- cific weights, and therefore of specific sizes. The general law of definite proportions seems impossible on any other condition than the existence of ultimate atoms; and though the combining weights of the respective elements are termed by chemists their " equivalents," for the purpose of avoid- ing a questionable assumption, we are unable to think of the combination of such definite weights, without supposing it to take place between definite numbers of definite parti- cles. And thus it would appear that the Newtonian view is at any rate preferable to that of Boscovich. A dis- ciple of Boscovich, however, may reply that his master's theory is involved in that of Newton ; and cannot indeed be escaped. " What," he may ask, " is it that holds together the parts of these ultimate atoms? " " A cohesive force," his opponent must answer. " And what," he may continue, " is it that holds together the parts of any fragments into which, by sufficient force, an ultimate atom might be broken?" Again the answer must be — a cohesive force. " And what," he may still ask, " if the ultimate atom were, as we can imagine it to be, reduced to parts as small in pro- portion to it, as it is in proportion to a tangible mass of matter — what must give each part the ability to sustain it- self, and to occupy space? " Still there is no answer but — a cohesive force. Carry the process in thought as far as we may, until the extension of the parts is less than can be im- agined, we still cannot escape the admission of forces by which the extension is upheld; and we can find no limit until we arrive at the conception of centres of force without any extension. Matter then, in its ultimate nature, is as absolutely in- comprehensible as Space and Time. Frame what suppo- sitions we may, we find on tracing out their implications ULTIMATE SCIENTIFIC IDEAS. 57 that they leave us nothing but a choice between opposite absurdities. § 17. A body impelled by the hand is clearly perceived to move, and to move in a definite direction : there seems at first sight no possibility of doubting that its motion is real, or that it is towards a given point. Yet it is easy to show that we not only may be, but usually are, quite wrong in both these judgments. Here, for instance, is a ship which, for simplicity's sake, we will suppose to he anchored at the equa- tor with her head to the West. When the captain walks from stem to stern, in what direction does he move ? East is the obvious answer — an answer which for the moment may pass without criticism. But now the anchor is heaved, and the vessel sails to the West with a velocity equal to that at which the captain walks. In what direction does he now move when he goes from stem to stern? You cannot say East, for the vessel is carrying him as fast towards the West as he walks to the East; and you cannot say West for the converse reason. In respect to surrounding space he is stationary; though to all on board the ship he seems to be moving. But now are we quite sure of this conclusion? — Is he really stationary? When we take into account the Earth's motion round its axis, we find that instead of being stationary he is travelling at the rate of 1000 miles per hour to the East ; so that neither the perception of one who looks at him, nor the inference of one who allows for the ship's motion, is anything like the truth. Nor indeed, on further consideration, shall we find this revised conclusion to be much better. Eor we have forgotten to allow for the Earth's motion in its orbit. This being some 68,000 miles per hour, it follows that, assuming the time to be midday, he is moving, not at the rate of 1000 miles per hour to the East, but at the rate of 67,000 miles per hour to the West. !N"ay, not even now have we discovered the true rate and the true direction of his movement. With the Earth's progress 6 58 ULTIMATE SCIENTIFIC IDEAS. in its orbit, we have to join that of the whole Solar system towards the constellation Hercules; and when we do this, we perceive that he is moving neither East nor West, but in a line inclined to the plane of the Ecliptic, and at a velocity greater or less (according to the time of the year) than that above named. To which let us add, that were the dynamic arrangements of our sidereal system fully known to us, we should probably discover the direction and rate of his actual movement to differ considerably even from these. How illusive are our ideas of Motion, is thus made sufficiently manifest. That which seems moving proves to be station- ary; that which seems stationary proves to be moving; while that which we conclude to be going rapidly in one direction, turns out to be going much more rapidly in the opposite direction. And so we are taught that what we are conscious of is not the real motion of any object, either in its rate or direction; but merely its motion as measured from an assigned position — either the position we ourselves oc- cupy or some other. Yet in this very process of concluding that the motions we perceive are not the real motions, we tacitly asuine that there are real motions. In revising our successive judgments concerning a body's course or velo- city, we take for granted that there is an actual course and an actual velocity — we take for granted that there are fixed points in space with respect to which all motions are abso- lute ; and we find it impossible to rid ourselves of this idea. Nevertheless, absolute motion cannot even be imagined, much less known. Motion as taking place apart from those limitations of space which we habitually associate with it, is totally unthinkable. Eor motion is change of place ; but in unlimited space, change of place is inconceivable, because place itself is inconceivable. Place can be conceived only by reference to other places; and in the absence of objects dis- persed through space, a place could be conceived only in relation to the limits of space; whence it follows that in unlimited space, place cannot be conceived — all places must ULTIMATE SCIENTIFIC IDEAS. 59 be equidistant from boundaries that do not exist. Thus while we are obliged to think that there is an absolute mo- tion, we find absolute motion incomprehensible. Another insuperable difficulty presents itself when we contemplate the transfer of Motion. Habit blinds us to the marvelousness of this phenomenon. Familiar with the fact from childhood, we see nothing remark- able in the ability of a moving thing to generate movement in a thing that is stationary. It is, how- ever, impossible to understand it. In what respect does a body after impact differ from itself before impact? What is this added to it which does not sensibly affect any of its properties and yet enables it to traverse space? Here is an object at rest and here is the same object moving. In the one state it has no tendency to change its place ; but in the other it is obliged at each instant to assume a new position. What is it which will for ever go on producing this effect without being exhausted? and how does it dwell in the object? The motion you say has been communicated. But how? — What has been communicated? The striking body has not transferred a thing to the body struck ; and it is equally out of the question to say that it has transferred an attribute. What then has it transferred? Once more there is the old puzzle concerning the con- nexion between Motion and Rest. We daily witness the gradual retardation and final stoppage of things projected from the hand or otherwise impelled ; and we equally often witness the change from Rest to Motion produced by the application of force. But truly to represent these transi- tions in thought, we find impossible. For a breach of the law of continuity seems necessarily involved; and yet no breach of it is conceivable. A body travelling at a given velocity cannot be brought to a state of rest, or no velocity, without passing through all intermediate velocities. At first sight nothing seems easier than to imagine it doing this. It is quite possible to think of its motion as diminishing in- 60 ULTIMATE SCIENTIFIC IDEAS. sensibly until it becomes infinitesimal ; and many will think equally possible to pass in thought from infinitesimal motion to no motion. But this is an error. Mentally follow out the decreasing velocity as long as you please, and there still remains some velocity. Halve and again halve the rate of movement for ever, yet movement still exists; and the smallest movement is separated by an impassable gap from no movement. As something, however minute, is infinitely great in comparison with nothing ; so is even the least con- ceivable motion, infinite as compared with rest. The converse perplexities attendant on the transition from Rest to Motion, need not be specified. These, equally with the foregoing, show us that though we are obliged to think of such changes as actually occurring, their occurrence cannot be realized. Thus neither when considered in connexion with Space, nor when considered in connexion with Matter, nor when considered in connexion with Rest, do we find that Motion is truly cognizable. All efforts to understand its essential nature do but bring us to alternative impossibilities of thought. § 18. On lifting a chair, the force exerted we regard as equal to that antagonistic force called the weight of the chair; and we cannot think of these as equal without think- ing of them as like in kind; since equality is conceivable only between things that are connatural. The axiom that action and reaction are equal and in opposite directions, commonly exemplified by this very instance of muscular effort versus weight, cannot be mentally realized on any other condition. Yet, contrariwise, it is incredible that the force as existing in the chair really resembles the force as present to our minds. It scarcely needs to point out that the weight of the chair produces in us various feelings according as we support it by a single finger, or the whole hand, or the leg; and hence to argue that as it cannot be like all these ULTIMATE SCIENTIFIC IDEAS. 61 sensations there is no reason to believe it like any. It suf- fices to remark that since the force as known to us is an affection of consciousness, we cannot conceive the force ex- isting in the chair under the same form without endowing the chair with consciousness. So that it is absurd to think of Force as in itself like our sensation of it, and yet neces- sary so to think of it if we realize it in consciousness at all. How, again, can we understand the connexion between Force and Matter? Matter is known to us only through its manifestations of Force: our ultimate test of Matter is the ability to resist: abstract its resistance and there remains nothing but empty extension. Yet, on the other hand, re- sistance is equally unthinkable apart from Matter — apart from something extended. Not only, as pointed out some pages back, are centres of force devoid of extension unimag- inable; but, as an inevitable corollary, we cannot imagine either extended or unextended centres of force to attract and repel other such centres at a distance, without the inter- mediation of some kind of matter. We have here to remark, what could not without anticipation be remarked when treating of Matter, that the hypothesis of Newton, equally with that of Boscovich, is open to the charge that it supposes one thing to act upon another through a space which is abso- lutely empty — a supposition which cannot be represented in thought. This charge is indeed met by the introduction of a hypothetical fluid existing between the atoms or cen- tres. But the problem is not thus solved : it is simply shift- ed, and re-appears when the constitution of this fluid is in- quired into. How impossible it is to elude the diffi- culty presented by the transfer of Force through space, is best seen in the case of astronomical forces. The Sun acts upon us in such way as to produce the sensations of light and heat ; and we have ascertained that between the cause as ex- isting in the Sun, and the effect as experienced on the Earth, a lapse of about eight minutes occurs: whence unavoidably result in us, the conceptions of both a force and a motion. 62 ULTIMATE SCIENTIFIC IDEAS. So that for the assumption of a luminif erous ether, there is the. defence, not only that the exercise of force through 95,000,000 of miles of absolute vacuum is inconceivable, but also that it is impossible to conceive motion in the ab- sence of something moved. Similarly in the case of gravi- tation. Newton described himself as unable to think that the attraction of one body for another at a distance, could be exerted in the absence of an intervening medium. But now let us ask how much the forwarder we are if an intervening medium be assumed. This ether whose undulations ac- cording to the received hypothesis constitute heat and light, and which is the vehicle of gravitation — how is it consti- tuted ? We must regard it, in the way that physicists do re- gard it, as composed of atoms which attract and repel each other — infinitesimal it may be in comparison with those of ordinary matter, but still atoms. And remembering that this ether is imponderable, we are obliged to conclude that the ratio between the interspaces of these atoms and the atoms themselves is incommensurably greater than the like ratio in ponderable matter; else the densities could not be incommensurable. Instead then of a direct action by the Sun upon the Earth without anything intervening, we have to conceive the Sun's action propagated through a medium whose molecules are probably as small relatively to their in- terspaces as are the Sun and Earth compared with the space between them: we have to conceive these infinitesimal molecules acting on each other through absolutely vacant spaces which are immense in comparison with their own di- mensions. How is this conception easier than the other? "We still have mentally to represent a body as acting where it is not, and in the absence of anything by which its action may be transferred ; and what matters it whether this takes place on a large or a small scale ? We see therefore that the exercise of Eorce is altogether unintelligible. We can- not imagine it except through the instrumentality of some- thing having extension; and yet when we have assumed ULTIMATE SCIENTIFIC IDEAS. 63 this something, we find the perplexity is not got rid of but only postponed. We are obliged to conclude that matter, whether ponderable or imponderable, and whether aggre- gated or in its hypothetical units, acts upon matter through absolutely vacant space ; and yet this conclusion is positively unthinkable. Yet another difficulty of conception, converse in nature but equally insurmountable, must be added. If, on the one hand, we cannot in thought see matter acting upon matter through a vast interval of space which is absolutely void ; on the other hand, that the gravitation of one particle of matter towards another, and towards all others, should be absolutely the same whether the intervening space is filled with matter or not, is incomprehensible. I lift from the ground, and continue to hold, a pound weight. .Now, into the vacancy between it and the ground, is introduced a mass of matter of any kind whatever, in any state what- ever— hot or cold, liquid or solid, transparent or opaque, light or dense ; and the gravitation of the weight is entirely unaffected. The whole Earth, as well as each individual of the infinity of particles composing the Earth, acts on the pound in absolutely the same way, whatever intervenes, or if nothing intervenes. Through eight thousand miles of the Earth's, substance, each molecule at the antipodes affects each molecule of the weight I hold, in utter indifference to the fulness or emptiness of the space between them. So that each portion of matter in its dealings with remote por- tions, treats all intervening portions as though they did not exist ; and yet, at the same time it recognizes their existence with scrupulous exactness in its direct dealings with them. We have to regard gravitation as a force to which every- thing in the Universe is at once perfectly opaque in respect of itself and perfectly transparent in respect of other things. While then it is impossible to form any idea of Force in itself, it is equally impossible to comprehend its mode of exercise. 64 ULTIMATE SCIENTIFIC IDEAS. § 19. Turning now from the outer to the inner world, let us contemplate, not the agencies to which we ascribe our subjective modifications, but the subjective modifications themselves. These constitute a series. Difficult as we find it distinctly to separate and individualize them, it is never- theless beyond question that our states of consciousness oc- cur in succession. • Is this chain of states of consciousness infinite or finite? We cannot say infinite ; not only because we have indirectly reached the conclusion that there was a period when it com- menced, but also because all infinity is inconceivable — an infinite series included. We cannot say finite; for we have no knowledge of either of its ends. Go back in memory as far as we may, we are wholly unable to identify our first states of consciousness: the perspective of our thoughts vanishes in a dim obscurity where we can make out nothing. Similarly at the other extreme. "We have no immediate knowledge of a termination to the series at a future time; and we cannot really lay hold of that temporary termination of the series reached at the present moment. For the state of consciousness recognized by us as our last, is not truly our last. That any mental affection may be contemplated as one of the series, it must be remembered — represented in thought, not presented. The truly last state of conscious- ness is that which is passing in the very act of contemplating a state just past — that in which we are thinking of the one before as the last. So that the proximate end of the chain eludes us, as well as the remote end. " But," it may be said, " though we cannot directly know consciousness to be finite in duration, because neither of its limits can be actually reached; yet we can very well conceive it to be so." Xo : not even this is true. In the first place, we cannot conceive the terminations of that conscious- ness which alone we really know — our own — any more than we can j9rces on the complication previously existing. Indeed, the now accepted doctrine of epigenesis necessitates the conclusion THE MULTIPLICATION OF EFFECTS. 455 that organic evolution proceeds after this manner. For since it is proved that no germ, animal or vegetal, contains the slightest rudiment, trace, or indication of the future or- ganism— since the microscope has shown us that the first process set up in every fertilized germ is a process of repeat- ed spontaneous fissions, ending in the production of a mass of cells, not one of which exhibits any special character; there seems no alternative but to conclude that the partial organization at any moment subsisting in a growing embryo, is transformed by the agencies acting on it into the succeed- ing phase of organization, and this into the next, until, through ever-increasing complexities, the ultimate form is reached. Thus, though the subtlety of the forces and the slowness of the metamorphosis, prevent us from directly tracing the genesis of many changes by one cause, through- out the successive stages which every embryo passes through; yet, indirectly, we have strong evidence that this is a source of increasing heterogeneity. We have marked how multitudinous are the effects which a single agency may generate in an adult organism; that a like multiplica- tion of effects must happen in the unfolding organism, we have inferred from sundry illustrative cases; further, it has been pointed out that the ability which like germs have to originate unlike forms, implies that the successive transfor- mations result from the new changes superinduced on pre- vious changes; and we have seen that structureless as every germ originally is, the development of an organism out of it is otherwise incomprehensible. Doubtless we are still in the dark respecting those mysterious properties which make the germ, when subject to fit influences, undergo the special changes beginning this series of transformations. All here contended is, that given a germ possessing these mysterious properties, the evolution of an organism from it depends, in part, on that multiplication of effects which we have seen to be a cause of evolution in general, so far as we have yet traced it. 45G THE MULTIPLICATION OP EFFECTS. "When, leaving the development of single plants and ani- mals, we pass to that of the Earth's flora and fauna, the course of the argument again becomes clear and simple. Though, as before admitted, the fragmentary facts Palaeon- tology has accumulated, do not clearly warrant us in saying that, in the lapse of geologic time, there have been evolved more heterogeneous organisms, and more heterogeneous assemblages of organisms; yet we shall now see that there must ever have been a tendency towards these results. We shall find that the production of many effects by one cause, which, as already shown, has been all along increasing the physical heterogeneity of the Earth, has further neces- sitated an increasing heterogeneity in its flora and fauna, individually and collectively. An illustration will make this clear. Suppose that by a series of upheavals, occur- ring, as they are now known to do, at long intervals, the East Indian Archipelago were to be raised into a continent, and a chain of mountains formed along the axis of elevation. By the first of these upheavals, the plants and animals inhabit- ing Borneo, Sumatra, Xew Guinea, and the rest, would be subjected to slightly-modified sets of conditions. The cli- mate in general would be altered in temperature, in humid- ity, and in its periodical variations; while the local differ- ences would be multiplied. These modifications would af- fect, perhaps inappreciably, the entire flora and fauna of the region. The change of level would produce additional modi- fications; varying in different species, and also in different members of the same species, according to their distance from the axis of elevation. Plants, growing only on the sea- shore in special localities, might become extinct. Others, living only in swamps of a certain humidity, would, if they survived at all, probably undergo visible changes of appear- ance. While more marked alterations would occur in some of the plants that spread over the lands newly raised above the sea. The animals and insects living on these modified plants, would themselves be in some degree modified by THE MULTIPLICATION OF EFFECTS. 457 change of food, as well as by change of climate; and the modification would be more marked where, from the dwin- dling or disappearance of one kind of plant, an allied kind was eaten. In the lapse of the many generations arising be- fore the next upheaval, the sensible or insensible alterations thus produced in each species, would become organized — in all the races that survived there would be a more or less complete adaptation to the new conditions. The next up- heaval would superinduce further organic changes, imply- ing wider divergences from the primary forms; and so repeatedly. Now however let it be observed that this revo- lution would not be a substitution of a thousand modified species for the thousand original species; but in place of the thousand original species there would arise several thousand species, or varieties, or changed forms. Each species being distributed over an area of some extent, and tending con- tinually to colonize the new area exposed, its different mem- bers would be subject to different sets of changes. Plants and animals migrating towards the equator would not be affected in the same way with others migrating from it. Those which spread towards the new shores, would undergo changes unlike the changes undergone by those which spread into the mountains. Thus, each original race of or- ganisms would become the root from which diverged sev- eral races, differing more or less from it and from each other; and while some of these might subsequently disap- pear, probably more than one would survive in the next geologic period: the very dispersion itself increasing the chances of survival. Not only would there be certain modi- fications thus caused by changes of physical conditions and food; but also in some cases other modifications caused by changes of habit do take place in animals; and we know by step, the newly-raised tracts, would eventually come in contact with the faunas of other islands ; and some members of these other faunas would be unlike any creatures before seen. Herbivores meeting with new beasts of prey, would, 31 458 THE MULTIPLICATION OF EFFECTS. in some cases, be led into modes of defence or escape differ- ing from those previously used; and simultaneously the beasts of prey would modify their modes of pursuit and attack. We know that when circumstances demand it, such changes of habit do take place in animals; and we know that if the new habits become the dominant ones, they must eventually in some degree alter the organiza- tion. Observe now, however, a further consequence. There must arise not simply a tendency towards the differ- entiation of each race of organisms into several races; but also a tendency to the occasional production of a somewhat higher organism. Taken in the mass, these divergent varie- ties, which have been caused by fresh physical conditions and habits of life, will exhibit alterations quite indefinite in kind and degree; and alterations that do not necessarily con- stitute an advance. Probably in most cases the modified type will be not appreciably more heterogeneous than the original one. But it must now and then occur, that some division of a species, falling into circumstances which give it rather more complex experiences, and demand actions somewhat more involved, will have certain of its organs further differentiated in proportionately small degrees — will become slightly more heterogeneous. Hence, there will from time to time arise an increased heterogeneity both of the Earth's flora and fauna, and of individual races included in them. Omitting detailed explanations, and allowing for the qualifications which cannot here be specified, it is suffi- ciently clear that geological mutations have all along tended to complicate the forms of life, whether regarded separately or collectively. That multiplication of effects which has been a part-cause of the transformation of the Earth's crust from the simple into the complex, has simultane- ously led to a parallel transformation of the Life upon its surface.* * Had this paragraph, first published in the Westminster Review in 1857, been written after the appearance of Mr. Darwin's work on The Origin of THE MULTIPLICATION OF EFFECTS. 459 The deduction here drawn from the established truths of geology and the general laws of life, gains immensely in weight on finding it to be in harmony with an induction drawn from direct experience. Just that divergence of many races from one race, which we inferred must have been continually occurring during geologic time, we know to have occurred during the pre-historic and historic periods, in man and domestic animals. And just that niultiplication of effects which we concluded must have been instrumental to the first, we see has in a great measure wrought the last. Single causes, as famine, pressure of population, war, have periodically led to further dispersions of mankind and of dependent creatures: each such dispersion initiating neAv modifications, new varieties of type. Whether all the human races be or be not derived from one stock, philology makes it clear that whole groups of races, now easily dis- tinguishable from each other, were originally one race — that the diffusion of one race into different climates and conditions of existence has produced many altered forms of it. Similarly with domestic animals. Though in some cases (as that of dogs) community of origin will perhaps be disputed, yet in other cases (as that of the sheep or the cattle of our own country) it will not be questioned that local differences of climate, food, and treatment, have trans- formed one original breed into numerous breeds, now be- ?, it would doubtless have been otherwise expressed. Reference would have been made to the process of " natural selection," as greatly facilitating the differentiations described. As it is, however, I prefer to let the passage stand in its original shape : partly because it seems to me that these succes- sive changes of conditions would produce divergent varieties or species, apart from the influence of " natural selection " (though in less numerous ways as well as less rapidly) ; and partly because I conceive that in the absence of these successive changes of conditions, " natural selection " would effect com- paratively little. Let me add that though these positions are not enunciated in The Origin of Species, yet a common friend gives me reason to think that Mr. Darwin would coincide in them ; if he did not indeed consider them as tacitly implied in his work. 460 THE MULTIPLICATION OF EFFECTS. come so far distinct as to produce unstable hybrids. More- over through the complication of effects flowing from single causes, we here find, what we before inferred, not only an increase of general heterogeneity, but also of special het- erogeneity. While of the divergent divisions and subdi- visions of the human race, many have undergone changes not constituting an advance; others have become decid- edly more heterogeneous. The civilized European departs more widely from the vertebrate archetype than does the savage. § 160. A sensation does not expend itself in arousing some single state of consciousness; but the state of con- sciousness aroused is made up of various represented sensa- tions connected by co-existence, or sequence with the pre- sented sensation. And that, in proportion as the grade of intelligence is high, the number of ideas suggested is great, may be readily inferred. Let us, however, look at the proof that here too, each change is the parent of many changes; and that the multiplication increases in proportion as the area affected is complex. Were some hitherto unknown bird, driven say by stress of weather from the remote north, to make its appearance on our shores, it would excite no speculation in the sheep or cat- tle amid which it alighted: a perception of it as a creature like those constantly flying about, would be the sole inter- ruption of that dull current of consciousness which accom- panies grazing and rumination. The cow-herd, by whom we may suppose the exhausted bird to be presently caught, would probably gaze at it with some slight curiosity, as being unlike any he had before seen — would note its most con- spicuous markings, and vaguely ponder on the questions, where it came from, and how it came. The village bird- stuffer would have suggested to him by the sight of it, sun- dry forms to which it bore a little resemblance; would re- ceive from it more numerous and more specific impressions THE MULTIPLICATION OF EFFECTS. 461 respecting structure and plumage; would be reminded of various instances of birds brought by storms from foreign parts — would tell who found them, who stuffed them, who bought them. Supposing the unknown bird taken to a natu- ralist of the old school, interested only in externals, (one of those described by the late Edward Forbes, as examining animals as though they were merely skins filled with straw,) it would excite in him a more involved series of mental changes: there would be an elaborate examination of the feathers, a noting of all their technical distinctions, with a reduction of these perceptions to certain equivalent written symbols; reasons for referring the enw form to a particular family, order, and genus would be sought out and written clown; communications with the secretary of some society, or editor of some journal, would follow; and probably there would be not a few thoughts about the addition of the ii to the describer's name, to form the name of the species. Lastly, in the mind of a comparative anatomist, such a new species, should it happen to have any marked in- ternal peculiarity, might produce additional sets of changes — might very possibly suggest modified views respecting the relationships of the division to which it belonged; or, perhaps, alter his conceptions of the homologies and devel- opments of certain organs; and the conclusions drawn might not improbably enter as elements into still wider inquiries concerning the origin of organic forms. From ideas let us turn to emotions. In a young child, a father's anger produces little else than vague fear — a .dis- agreeable sense of impending evil, taking various shapes of physical suffering or deprivation of pleasures. In elder chil- dren, the same harsh words will arouse additional feelings: sometimes a sense of shame, of penitence, or of sorrow for having offended; at other times, a sense of injustice, and a consequent anger. In the wife, yet a further range of feel- ings may come into existence — perhaps wounded affection, perhaps self-pity for ill-usage, perhaps contempt for ground- 402 THE MULTIPLICATION" OF EFFECTS. less irritability, perhaps sympathy for some suffering which the irritability indicates, perhaps anxiety about an unknown misfortune which she thinks has produced it. Xor are we without evidence that among adults, the like differences of development are accompanied by like differences in the number of emotions that are aroused, in combination or rapid succession — the lower natures being characterized by that impulsiveness which results from the uncontrolled action of a few feelings; and the higher natures being char- acterized by the simultaneous action of many secondary feel- ings, modifying those first awakened. Possibly it will be objected that the illustrations here given, are drawn from the functional changes of the nerv- ous system, not from its structural changes; and that what is proved among the first, does not necessarily hold among the last. This must be admitted. Those, however, who rec- ognize the truth that the structural changes are the slowly accumulated results of the functional changes, will readily draw the corollary, that a part-cause of the evolution of the nervous system, as of other evolution, is this multiplication of effects which becomes ever greater as the development becomes higher. § 161. If the advance of Man towards greater hetero- geneity in both body and mind, is in part traceable to the production of many effects by one cause, still more clearly may the advance of Society towards greater heterogeneity be so explained. Consider the growth of an industrial or- ganization. When, as must occasionally happen, some in- dividual of a tribe displays unusual aptitude for making an article of general use (a weapon, for instance) which was before made by each man for himself, there arises a tend- ency towards the differentiation of that individual into a maker of weapons. His companions (warriors and hunters all of them) severally wish to have the best weapons that can be made; and are therefore certain to offer strong in- THE MULTIPLICATION OF EFFECTS. 463 clucements to this skilled individual to make weapons for them. He, on the other hand, having both an unusual faculty, and an unusual liking, for making weapons (the capacity and the desire for any occupation being commonly associated), is predisposed to fulfil these commissions on the offer of adequate rewards: especially as his love of distinc- tion is also gratified. This first specialization of function, once commenced, tends ever to become more decided. On the side of the weapon-maker, continued practice gives increased skill — increased superiority to his products. On the side of his clients, cessation of practice en- tails decreased skill. Thus the influences that deter- mine this division of labour grow stronger in both ways: this social movement tends ever to become more decided in the direction in which it was first set up; and the incipient heterogeneity is, on the average of cases, likely to become permanent for that generation, if no longer. Such a process, besides differentiating the social mass into two parts, the one monopolizing, or almost monopolizing, the perform- ance of a certain function, and the other having lost the habit, and in some measure the power, of performing that function, has a tendency to initiate other differentiations. The advance described implies the introduction of barter: the maker of weapons has, on each occasion, to be paid in such other articles as he agrees to take in exchange. Now he will not habitually take in exchange one kind of article, but many kinds. He does not want mats only, or skins, or fishing-gear; but he wants all these; and on each occa- sion will bargain for the particular things he most needs. What follows? If among the members of the tribe there exist any slight differences of skill in the manufacture of these various things, as there are almost sure to do, the weapon-maker will take from each one the thing which that one excels in making: he will exchange for mats with him whose mats are superior, and will bargain for the fishing- gear of whoever has the best. But he who has bartered away 464 THE MULTIPLICATION OP EFFECTS. his mats or his fishing-gear, must make other mats or fish- ing-gear for himself; and in so doing must, in some degree, further develop his aptitude. Thus it results that the small specialities of faculty possessed by various members of the tribe will tend to grow more decided. If such transactions are from time to time repeated, these specializations may become appreciable. And whether or not there ensue dis- tinct differentiations of other individuals into makers of particular articles, it is clear that incipient differentiations take place throughout the tribe : the one original cause pro- duces not only the first dual effect, but a number of second- ary dual effects, like in kind but minor in degree. This process, of which traces may be seen among groups of school-boys, cannot well produce a lasting distribution of functions in an unsettled tribe; but where there grows up a fixed and multiplying community, such differentiations become permanent, and increase with each generation. An addition to the number of citizens, involving a greater de- mand for every commodity, intensifies the functional activ- ity of each specialized person or class; and this renders the specialization more definite where it already exists, and establishes it where it is but nascent. By increasing the pressure on the means of subsistence, a larger population again augments these results; since every individual is forced more and more to confine himself to that which he can do best, and by which he can gain most. And this industrial progress, by aiding future production, opens the way for further growth of population, which reacts as be- fore. Presently, under the same stimuli, new occu- pations arise. Competing workers, severally aiming to pro- duce improved articles, occasionally discover better processes or better materials. In weapons and cutting-tools, the sub- stitution of bronze for stone entails on him who first makes it, a great increase of demand — so great an increase that he presently finds all his time occupied in making the bronze for the article he sells, and is obliged to depute the fashion- THE MULTIPLICATION OF EFFECTS. 465 ing of these articles to others; and eventually the making of bronze, thus gradually differentiated from a pre-existing occupation, becomes an occupation by itself. But now mark the ramified changes which follow this change. Bronze soon replaces stone, not only in the articles it was first used for, but in many others; and so affects the manufacture of them. Further, it affects the processes which such improved utensils subserve, and the resulting products — modifies buildings, carvings, dress, personal decorations. Yet again, it sets going sundry manufactures which were before impos- sible, from lack of a material fit for the requisite tools. And all these changes react on the people — increase their ma- nipulative skill, their intelligence, their comfort — refine their habits and tastes. It is out of the question here to follow through its succes- sive complications, this increasing social heterogeneity that results from the production of many effects by one cause. But leaving the intermediate phases of social development, let us take an illustration from its passing phase. To trace the effects of steam-power, in its manifold applications to mining, navigation, and manufactures, would carry us into unmanageable detail. Let us confine ourselves to the latest embodiment of steam-power — the locomotive engine. This, as the proximate cause of our railway-system, has changed the face of the country, the course of trade, and the habits of the people. Consider, first, the complicated sets of changes that precede the making of every railway — the provisional arrangements, the meetings, the registra- tion, the trial-section, the parliamentary survey, the litho- graphed plans, the books of reference, the local deposits and notices, the application to Parliament, the passing Stand- ing-Orders Committee, the first, second, and third read- ings: each of which brief heads indicates a multiplicity of transactions, and the further development of sundry occu- pations, (as those of engineers, surveyors, lithographers, par- liamentary agents, share-brokers,) and the creation of sun- 466 THE MULTIPLICATION OF EFFECTS. dry others (as those of traffic-takers, reference-takers). Con- sider, next, the yet more marked changes implied in railway construction — the cuttings, embankings, tunnellings, diver- sions of roads; the building of bridges and stations; the lay- ing down of ballast, sleepers, and rails; the making of engines, tenders, carriages, and wagons: which processes, acting upon numerous trades, increase the importation of timber, the quarrying of stone, the manufacture of iron, the mining of coal, the burning of bricks; institute a variety of special manufactures weekly advertised in the Railway Times; and call into being some new classes of workers — drivers, stokers, cleaners, plate-layers, &e. &c. Then come the changes, more numerous and involved still, which rail- ways in action produce on the community at large. The organization of every business is more or less modified ; ease of communication makes it better to do directly what was before done by proxy; agencies are established where pre- viously they would not have paid; goods are obtained from remote Avholesale houses instead of near retail ones; and commodities are used which distance once rendered inacces- sible. The rapidity and small cost of carriage, tend to spe- cialize more than ever the industries of different districts — to confine each manufacture to the parts in which, from local advantages, it can be best carried on. Economical distribu- tion equalizes prices, and also, on the average, lowers prices : thus bringing clivers articles within the means of those be- fore unable to buy them, and so increasing their comforts and improving their habits. At the same time the practice of travelling is immensely extended. Classes who before could not afford it, take annual trips to the sea ; visit their dis- tant relations ; make tours ; and so we are benefited in body, feelings, and intellect. The more prompt transmission of letters and of news produces further changes — makes the pulse of the nation faster. Yet more, there arises a wide dissemination of cheap literature through railway book- stalls, and of advertisements in railway carriages: both of THE MULTIPLICATION OF EFFECTS. 467 them aiding ulterior progress. And the innumerable changes here briefly indicated are consequent on the inven- tion of the locomotive engine. The social organism has been rendered more heterogeneous, in virtue of the many new occupations introduced, and the many old ones further specialized; prices in all places have been altered; each trader has, more or less, modified his way of doing business; and every person has been affected in his actions, thoughts, emotions. The only further fact demanding notice, is, that we here see more clearly than ever, that in proportion as the area over which any influence extends, becomes heterogeneous, the results are in a yet higher degree multiplied in number and kind. While among the primitive tribes to whom it was first known, caoutchouc caused but few changes, among ourselves the changes have been so many and varied that the history of them occupies a volume. Upon the small, homogeneous community inhabiting one of the Hebrides, the electric telegraph would produce, were it used, scarcely any results; but in England the results it produces are multitudinous. Space permitting, the synthesis might here be pursued in relation to all the subtler products of social life. It might be shown how, in Science, an advance of one division presently advances other divisions — how Astronomy has been immensely forwarded by discoveries in Optics, while other optical discoveries have initiated Microscopic Anato- my, and greatly aided the growth of Physiology — how Chemistry has indirectly increased our knowledge of Elec- tricity, Magnetism, Biology, Geology — how Electricity has reacted on Chemistry and Magnetism, developed our views of Light and Heat, and disclosed sundry laws of nervous ac- tion. In Literature the same truth might be exhibited in the still-multiplying forms of periodical publications that have descended from the first newspaper, and which have severally acted and reacted on other forms of literature and 468 THE MULTIPLICATION OF EFFECTS. on each other ; or in the bias given by each book of power to various subsequent books. The influence which a new school of Painting (as that of the pre-Kaffaelites) exercises on other schools; the hints which all kinds of pictorial art are deriving from Photography ; the complex results of new critical doctrines ; might severally be dwelt on as displaying the like multiplication of effects. But it would needlessly tax the reader's patience to detail, in their many ramifica- tions, these various changes: here become so involved and subtle as to be followed with some difficulty. § 162. After the argument which closed the last chap- ter, a parallel one seems here scarcely required. For sym- metry's sake, however, it will be proper briefly to point out how the multiplication of effects, like the instability of the homogeneous, is a corollary from the persistence of force. Things which we call different are things which react in different ways; and we can know them as different only by the differences in their reactions. "When we distinguish bodies as hard and soft, rough and smooth, we simply mean that certain like muscular forces expended on them are followed by unlike sets of sensations — unlike reactive forces. Objects that are classed as red, blue, yellow, &c., are objects that decompose light in strongly-contrasted ways; that is, we know contrasts of colour as contrasts in the changes produced in a uniform incident force. Manifestly, any two things which do not work unequal effects on con- sciousness, either by unequally opposing our own energies, or by impressing our senses with unequally modified forms of certain external energies, cannot be distinguished by us. Hence the proposition that the different parts of any whole must react differently on a uniform incident force, and -must so reduce it to a group of multiform forces, is in essence a truism. A further step will reduce this truism to its lowest terms. THE MULTIPLICATION OF EFFECTS. 469 When, from unlikeness between the effects they produce on consciousness, we predicate unlikeness between two ob- jects, what is our warrant? and what do we mean by the unlikeness, objectively considered? Our warrant is the per- sistence of force. Some kind or amount of change has been wrought in us by the one, which has not been wrought by the other. This change we ascribe to some force exercised by the one which the other has not exercised. And we have no alternative but to do this, or to assert that the change had no antecedent; which is to deny the persistence of force. Whence it is further manifest that what we regard as the objective unlikeness is the presence in the one of some force, or set of forces, not present in the other — something in the kinds or amounts or directions of the constituent forces of the one, which those of the other do not parallel. But now if things or parts of things which we call different, are those of which the constituent forces differ in one or more re- spects; what must happen to any like forces, or any uniform force, falling on them? Such like forces, or parts of a uni- form force, must be differently modified. The force which is present in the one and not in the other, must be an element in the conflict — must produce its equivalent reaction; and must so affect the total reaction. To say otherwise is to say that this differential force will produce no effect; which is to say that force is not persistent. I need not develop this corollary further. It manifestly follows that a uniform force, falling on a uniform aggre- gate, must undergo dispersion; that falling on an aggregate made up of unlike parts, it must undergo dispersion from each part, as well as qualitative differentiations ; that in pro- portion as the parts are unlike, these qualitative differentia- tions must be marked; that in proportion to the number of the parts, they must be numerous ; that the secondary forces so produced, must undergo further transformations while working equivalent transformations in the parts that change them; and similarly with the forces they generate. Thus 470 THE MULTIPLICATION OF EFFECTS. the conclusions that a part-cause of Evolution is the multi- plication of effects; and that this increases in geometrical progression as the heterogeneity becomes greater; are not only to be established inductively, but are deducible from the deepest of all truths. CHAPTER XXI. SEGREGATION. § 163. The general interpretation of Evolution is far from being completed in the preceding chapters. We must contemplate its changes under yet another aspect, before we can form a definite conception of the process constituted by them. Though the laws already set forth, furnish a key to the re-arrangement of parts which Evolution exhibits, in so far as it is an advance from the uniform to the multiform; they furnish no key to this re-arrangement in so far as it is an advance from the indefinite to the definite. On studying the actions and re-actions everywhere going on, we have found it to follow inevitably from a certain primordial truth, that the homogeneous must lapse into the heterogeneous, and that the heterogeneous must become more heterogene- ous ; but we have not discovered why the differently-affected parts of any simple whole, become clearly marked off from each other, at the same time that they become unlike. Thus far no reason has been assigned why there should not ordi- narily arise a vague chaotic heterogeneity, in place of that orderly heterogeneity displayed in Evolution. It still re- mains to find out the cause of that local integration which accompanies local differentiation — that gradually-completed segregation of like units into a group, distinctly separated from neighbouring groups which are severally made up of other kinds of units. The rationale will be conveniently in- troduced by a few instances in which we may watch this segregative process taking place. 471 472 SEGREGATION. AVlien towards tlie end of September, the trees are gain- ing their autumn colours, and we are hoping shortly to see a further change increasing still more the beauty of the land- scape, we are not uncommonly disappointed by the occur- rence of an equinoxial gale. Out of the mixed mass of foliage on each branch, the strong current of air carries away the decaying and brightly-tinted leaves, but fails to detach those which are still green. And while these last, frayed and seared by long-continued beatings against each other, and the twigs around them, give a sombre colour to the woods, the red and yellow and orange leaves are collected together in ditches and behind walls and in corners where eddies allow them to settle. That is to, say, by the action of that uniform force which the wind exerts on both kinds, the dying leaves are picked out from among their still living companions and gathered in places by themselves. Again, the separation of particles of different sizes, as dust and sand from pebbles, may be similarly effected ; as we see on every road in March. And from the days of Homer downwards, the power of currents of air, natural and artificial, to part from one another units of unlike specific gravities, has been habitually utilized in the winnowing of chaff from wheat. In every river we see how the mixed ma- terials carried down, are separately deposited — how in rap- ids the bottom gives rest to nothing but boulders and peb- bles ; how where the current is not so strong, sand is let fall ; and how, in still places, there is a sediment of mud. This selective action of moving water, is commonly applied in the arts to obtain masses of particles of different degrees of fine- ness. Emery, for example, after being ground, is carried by a slow current through successive compartments; in the first of which the largest grains subside; in the second of which the grains that reach the bottom before the water has es- caped, are somewhat smaller; in the third smaller still; until in the last there are deposited only those finest particles which fall so slowly through the water, that they have SEGREGATION. 473 not previously been able to reach the bottom. And in a way that is different though equally significant, this segre- gative effect of water in motion, is exemplified in the carry- ing away of soluble from insoluble matters — an application of it hourly made in every laboratory. The effects of the uniform forces which aerial and aqueous currents exer- cise, are paralleled by those of uniform forces of other orders. Electric attraction will separate small bodies from large, or light bodies from heavy. By magnetism, grains of iron may be selected from among other grains; as by the Sheffield grinder, whose magnetized gauze mask filters out the steel-dust wdiich his wheel gives off, from the stone-dust that accompanies it. And how the affinity of any agent act- ing differently on the components of a given body, enables us to take away some component and leave the rest behind, is shown in almost every chemical experiment. What now is the general truth here variously presented? How are these several facts and countless similar ones, to be expressed in terms that embrace them all? In each case we see in action a force which may be regarded as simple or uni- form— fluid motion in a certain direction at a certain veloc- ity; electric or magnetic attraction of a given amount; chemical affinity of a particular kind : or rather, in strictness, the acting force is compounded of one of these and certain other uniform forces, as gravitation, etc. In each case we have an aggregate made up of unlike units — either atoms of different substances combined or intimately mingled, or fragments of the same substance of different sizes, or other constituent parts that are unlike in their specific gravities, shapes, or other attributes. And in each case these unlike units, or groups of units, of which the aggregate consists, are, under the influence of some resultant force acting indis- criminately on them all, separated from each other — segre- gated into minor aggregates, each consisting of units that are severally like each other and unlike those of the other minor aggregates. Such being the common aspect of these 32 474 SEGREGATION. changes, let us look for the common interpretation of them. In the chapter on " The Instability of the Homogene- ous/7 it was shown that a uniform force falling on any aggre- gate, produces unlike modifications in its different parts — turns the uniform into the multiform and the multiform into the more multiform. The transformation thus wrought, consists of either insensible or sensible changes of relative position among the units, or of both — either of those molecular re-arrangements which we call chemical, or of those larger transpositions which are distinguished as mechanical, or of the two united. Such portion of the per- manently effective force as reaches each different part, or differently-conditioned part, may be expended in modify- ing the mutual relations of its constituents ; or it may be ex- pended in moving the part to another place; or it may be expended partially in the first and partially in the second. Hence, so much of the permanently effective force as does not work the one kind of effect, must work the other kind. It is manifest that if of the permanently effective force which falls on some compound unit of an aggregate, little, if any, is absorbed in re-arranging the ultimate components of such compound unit, much or the whole, must show itself in motion of such compound unit to some other place in the aggregate ; and conversely, if little or none of this force is ab- sorbed in generating mechanical transposition, much or the whole must go to produce molecular alterations. What now must follow from this? In cases where none or only part of the force generates chemical re-distributions, what physical re-distributions must be generated ? Parts that are similar to each other will be similarly acted on by the force; and will similarly react on it. Parts that are dissimilar will be dissimilarly acted on by the force; and will dissimilarlv react on it. Hence the permanently effective incident force, when wholly or partially transformed into mechanical motion of the units, will produce like motions in units that SEGREGATION. 475 are alike, and unlike motions in units that are unlike. If then, in an aggregate containing two or more orders of mixed units, those of the same order will be moved in the same way, and in a way that differs from that in which units of other orders are moved, the respective orders must segre- gate. A group of like things on which are impressed mo- tions that are alike in amount and direction, must be trans- ferred as a group to another place, and if they are mingled with some group of other things, on which the motions im- pressed are like each other, but unlike those of the first group in amount or direction or both, these other things must be transferred as a group to some other place — the mixed units must undergo a simultaneous selection and separation. In further elucidation of this process, it will be well here to set down a few instances in which we may see that, other things equal, the definiteness of the separation is in propor- tion to the definiteness of the difference between the units. Take a handful of any pounded substance, containing frag- ments of all sizes ; and let it fall to the ground while a gentle breeze is blowing. The large fragments will be collected together on the ground almost immediately under the hand; somewhat smaller fragments will be carried a little to the leeward; still smaller ones a little further; and those minute particles which we call dust, will be drifted a long way before they reach the earth : that is, the integration is indefinite where the difference among the fragments is indefinite, though the divergence is greatest where the difference is greatest. If, again, the handful be made up of quite distinct orders of units — as pebbles, coarse sand, and dust — these will, under like conditions, be segregated with comparative definiteness: the pebbles will drop almost verti- cally; the sand will fall in an inclined direction, and deposit itself within a tolerably circumscribed space beyond the pebbles; while the dust will be blown almost horizontally to a great distance. A case in which another kind of force comes into play, will still better illustrate this truth. 476 SEGREGATION. Through a mixed aggregate of soluble aud insoluble sub- stances, let water slowly percolate. There will in the first place be a distinct parting of the substances that are the most widely contrasted in their relations to the acting forces: the soluble will be carried away; the insoluble will remain behind. Further, some separation, though a less definite one, will be effected among the soluble substances; since the first part of the current will remove the most solu- ble substances in the largest amounts, and after these have been all dissolved, the current will still continue to bring out the remaining less soluble substances. Even the undis- solved matters will have simultaneously undergone a certain segregation; for the percolating fluid will carry down the minute fragments from among the large ones, and will de- posit those of small specific gravity in one place, and those of great specific gravity in another. To complete the elucidation we must glance at the obverse fact ; namely, that mixed units which differ but slightly, are moved in but slightly-different ways by incident forces, and can therefore be separated only by such adjustments of the incident forces * as allow slight differences to become appreciable factors in the result. This truth is made manifest by antithesis in the instances just given; but it may be made much more mani- fest by a few such instances as those which chemical analy- sis supplies in abundance. The parting of alcohol from water by distillation is a good one. Here we have atoms con- sisting of oxygen and hydrogen, mingled with atoms consist- ing of oxygen, hydrogen, and carbon. The two orders of atoms have a considerable similarity of nature: they similar- ly maintain a fluid form at ordinary temperatures; they similarly become gaseous more and more rapidly as the tem- perature is raised ; and they boil at points not very far apart. Xow this comparative likeness of the atoms is accompanied by difficulty in segregating them. If the mixed fluid is unduly heated, much water distils over with the alcohol: it is only within a narrow range of temperature, that the one SEGREGATION. 477 set of atoms are driven off rather than the others; and even then not a few of the others accompany them. The most interesting and instructive example, however, is fur- nished by certain phenomena of crystallization. When several salts that have little analogy of constitution, are dissolved in the same body of water, they are separated without much trouble, by crystallization: their respective units moved towards each other, as physicists suppose, by polar forces, segregate into crystals of their respective kinds. The crystals of each salt do, indeed, usually con- tain certain small amounts of the other salts present in the solution — especially when the crystallization has been rap- id: but from these other salts they are severally freed by repeated re-solutions and crystallizations. Mark now, how- ever, that the reverse is the case when the salts contained in the same body of water are chemically homologous. The nitrates of baryta and lead, or the sulphates of zinc, soda, and magnesia, unite in the same crystals ; nor will they crys- tallize separately if these crystals be dissolved afresh, and afresh crystallized, even with great care. On seeking the cause of this anomaly, chemists found that such salts were isomorphous — that their atoms, though not chemically identical, were identical in the proportions of acid, base, and water, composing them, and in their crystalline forms : whence it was inferred that their atoms are nearly alike in structure. Thus is clearly illustrated the truth, that units of unlike kinds are selected out and separated with a readi- ness proportionate to the degree of their unlikeness. In the first case we see that being dissimilar in their forms, but sim- ilar in so far as they are soluble in water of a certain tem- perature, the atoms segregate, though imperfectly. In the second case we see that the atoms, having not only the like- ness implied by solubility in the same menstruum, but also a great likeness of structure, do not segregate — are sorted and parted from each other only under quite special con- ditions, and then very incompletely. That is, the incident 478 SEGREGATION. force of mutual polarity impresses unlike motions on the mixed units in proportion as they are unlike ; and therefore, in proportion as they are unlike, tends to deposit them in separate places. There is a converse cause of segregation, which it is needless here to treat of with equal fulness. If different units acted on by the same force, must be differently moved ; so, too, must units of the same kind be differently moved by different forces. Supposing some group of units forming- part of a homogeneous aggregate, are unitedly exposed to a force that is unlike in amount or direction to the force acting on the rest of the aggregate; then this group of units will separate from the rest, provided that, of the force so acting on it, there remains any portion not dissipated in molecular vibrations, nor absorbed in producing molecular re-arrange- ments. After ail that has been said above, this proposition needs no defence. Before ending our preliminary exposition, a comple- mentary truth must be specified ; namely, that mixed forces are segregated by the reaction of uniform matters, just as mixed matters are segregated by the action of uniform forces. Of this truth a complete and sufficient illustration is furnished by the dispersion of refracted light. A beam of light, made up of ethereal undulations of different orders, is not uniformly deflected by a homogeneous refracting body; but the different orders of undulations it contains, are deflected at different angles: the result being that these different orders of undulations are separated and integrated, and so produce what we know as the colours of the spectrum. A segregation of another kind occurs when rays of light traverse an obstructing medium. Those rays which consist of comparatively short undulations, are absorbed before those which consist of comparatively long ones; and the red rays, which consist of the longest undulations, alone pene- trate when the obstruction is very great. How, conversely, there is produced a separation of like forces by the reaction SEGREGATION. 479 of unlike matters, is also made manifest by the phenomena of refraction: since adjacent and parallel beams of light, falling on, and passing through, unlike substances, are made to diverge. § 164. On the assumption of their nebular origin, stars and planets exemplify that cause of material segregation last assigned — the action of unlike forces on like units. In a preceding chapter (§ 150) we saw that if matter ever existed in a diffused form, it could not continue uni- formly distributed, but must break up into masses. It was shown that in the absence of a perfect balance of mutual at- tractions among atoms dispersed through unlimited space, there must arise breaches of continuity throughout the ag- gregate formed by them, and a concentration of it towards centres of dominant attraction. "Where any such breach of continuity occurs, and the atoms that were before adjacent separate from each other; they do so in consequence of a difference in the forces to which they are respectively sub- ject. The atoms on the one side of the breach are exposed to a certain surplus attraction in the direction in which they begin to move; and those on the other to a surplus attrac- tion in the opposite direction. That is, the adjacent groups of like units are exposed to unlike resultant forces; and ac- cordingly separate and integrate. The formation and detachment of a nebulous ring, illus- trates the same general principle. To conclude, as Laplace did, that the equatorial portion of a rotating nebulous spheroid, will, during concentration, acquire a centrifugal force sufficient to prevent it from following the rest of the contracting mass, is to conclude that such portions will remain behind as are in common subject to a certain differ- ential force. The line of division between the ring and the spheroid, must be a line inside of which the aggregative force is greater than the force resisting aggregation; and outside of which the force resisting aggregation is greater 4:80 SEGREGATION. than the aggregative force. Hence the alleged process con- forms to the law that among like units, exposed to unlike forces, the similarly conditioned part from the dissimilarly conditioned. § 165. Those geologic changes usually classed as aque- ous, display under numerous forms the segregation of unlike units by a uniform incident force. On sea-shores, the waves are ever sorting-out and separating the mixed materials against which they break. From each mass of fallen cliff, the rising and ebbing tide carries away all those particles which are so small as to remain long suspended in the water; and, at some distance from shore, deposits them in the shape of fine sediment. Large particles, sinking with comparative rapidity, are accumulated into beds of sand near low-water mark. The coarse grit and small pebbles collect together on the incline up which the breakers rush. And on the top lie the larger stones and boulders. Still more specific segregations may occasionally be observed. Flat pebbles, produced by the breaking down of laminated rock, are sometimes separately collected in one part of a shingle bank. On this shore the deposit is wholly of mud; on that it is wholly of sand. Here we find a sheltered cove filled with small pebbles almost of one size; and there, in a curved bay one end of which is more exposed than the other, we see a progressive increase in the massiveness of the stones as we walk from the less exposed to the more exposed end. Trace the history of each geologic deposit, and we are quickly led down to the fact, that mixed fragments of matter, differing in their sizes or weights, are, when ex- posed to the momentum and friction of water, joined with the attraction of the Earth, selected from each other, and united into groups of comparatively like fragments. And we see that, other things equal, the separation is definite in proportion as the differences of the units are marked. After they have been formed, sedi- SEGREGATION. 481 mentary strata exhibit segregations of another kind. The flints and the nodnles of iron pyrites that are found in chalk, as well as the silicious concretions which occasionally occur in limestone, can be interpreted only as aggregations of atoms of silex or sulphnret of iron, originally diffused al- most uniformly through the deposit, but gradually collected round certain centres, notwithstanding the solid or semi- solid state of the surrounding matter. What is called bog iron-ore supplies the conditions and the result in still more obvious correlation. Among igneous changes we do not find so many exam- ples of the process described. When distinguishing simple and compound evolution, it was pointed out (§ 102) that an excessive quantity of contained molecular motion, prevents permanence in those secondary re-distributions which make evolution compound. Nevertheless, geological phenomena of this order are not barren of illustrations. Where the mixed matters composing the Earth's crust have been raised to a very high temperature, segregation habitually takes place as the temperature diminishes. Sundry of the sub- stances that escape in a gaseous form from volcanoes, sub- lime into crystals on coming against cool surfaces; and so- lidifying as these substances do, at different temperatures, they are deposited at different parts of the crevices through which they are emitted together. The best illustration, however, is furnished by the changes that occur during the slow cooling of igneous rock. When, through one of the fractures from time to time made in the solid shell which forms the Earth's crust, a portion of the molten nucleus is extruded ; and when this is cooled with comparative rapidity, through free radiation and contact with cold masses; it forms a substance known as trap or basalt — a substance that is uni- form in texture, though made up of various ingredients. But when, not escaping through the superficial strata, such a portion of the molten nucleus is slowly cooled, it becomes what we know as granite: the mingled particles of quartz. 482 SEGREGATION. feldspar, and mica, being kept for a long time in a fluid and semi-fluid state — a state of comparative mobility — un- dergo tliose changes of position which the forces impressed on them by their fellow units necessitate. Having time in which to generate the requisite motions of the atoms, the differential forces arising from mutual polarity, segregate the quartz, feldspar, and mica, into crystals. How com- pletely this is dependent on the long-continued agitation of the mixed particles, and consequent long-continued mobil- ity by small differential forces, is proved by the fact that in granite dykes, the crystals in the centre of the mass, where the fluidity or semi-fluidity continued for a longer time, are much larger than those at the sides, where contact with the neighbouring rock caused more rapid cooling and solidifica- tion. § 166. The actions going on throughout an organism are so involved and subtle, that we cannot expect to identify the particular forces by which particular segregations are effected. Among the few instances admitting of tolerably definite interpretation, the best are those in which mechani- cal pressures and tensions are the agencies at work. We shall discover several on studying the bony frame of the higher animals. The vertebral column of a man, is subject, as a whole, to certain general strains — the weight of the body, together with the reactions involved by all considerable muscular efforts; and in conformity with this, it has become segre- gated as a whole. At the same time, being exposed to differ- ent forces in the course of those lateral bendings which the movements necessitate, its parts retain a certain separate- ness. And if we trace up the development of the vertebral column from its primitive form of a cartilaginous cord in the lowest fishes, we see that, throughout, it maintains an inte- gration corresponding to the unity of the incident forces, joined with a division into segments corresponding to the SEGREGATION. 4§3 variety of the incident forces. Each segment, con- sidered apart, exemplifies the trnth more simply. A verte- bra is not a single bone, but consists of a central mass with sundry appendages or processes; and in rudimentary types of vertebrae, these appendages are quite separate from the central mass, and, indeed, exist before it makes its appear- ance. But these several independent bones, constituting a primitive spinal segment, are subject to a certain aggregate of forces which agree more than they differ: as the fulcrum to a group of muscles habitually acting together, they per- petually undergo certain reactions in common. And ac- cordingly, we see that in the course of development they gradually coalesce. Still clearer is the illustration furnished by spinal segments that become fused together where they are together exposed to some predominant strain. The sacrum consists of a group of vertebrae firmly united. In the ostrich and its congeners there are from seventeen to twenty sacral vertebrae; and besides being confluent with each other, these are confluent with the iliac bones, which run on each side of them. If now we assume these vertebrae to have been originally separate, as they still are in the em- bryo bird ; and if we consider the mechanical conditions to which they must in such case have been exposed; we shall see that their union results in the alleged way. For through these vertebrae the entire weight of the body is transferred to the legs : the legs support the pelvic arch ; the pelvic arch supports the sacrum; and to the sacrum is articulated the rest of the spine, with all the limbs and organs attached to it. Hence, if separate, the sacral vertebrae must be held firmly together by strongly-contracted muscles; and must, by implication, be prevented from partaking in those lateral movements which the other vertebrae undergo — they must be subject to a common strain, while they are preserved from strains which would affect them differently; and so they fulfil the conditions under which segregation occurs. But the cases in which cause and effect 484 SEGREGATION. are brought into the most obvious relation, are supplied by the limbs. The metacarpal bones (those which in man sup- port the palm of the hand) are separate from each other in the majority of mammalia: the separate actions of the toes entailing on them slight amounts of separate move- ments. This is not so however in the ox-tribe and the horse-tribe. In the ox-tribe, only the middle metacarpals (third and fourth) are developed; and these, attaining mas- sive proportions, coalesce to form the cannon bone. In the horse-tribe, the segregation is what we may distinguish as indirect: the second and fourth metacarpals are present only as rudiments united to the sides of the third, while the third is immensely developed; thus forming a cannon bone which differs from that of the ox in being a single cylinder, instead of two cylinders fused together. The metatarsus in these quadrupeds exhibits parallel changes. Isow each of these metamorphoses occurs where the differ- ent bones grouped together have no longer any differ- ent functions, but retain only a common function. The feet of oxen and horses are used solely for locomotion — are not put like those of unguiculate mammals to purposes which involve some relative movements of the metacarpals. Thus there directly or indirectly results a single mass of bone where the incident force is single. And for the inference that these facts have a causal connexion, we find confirma- tion throughout the entire class of birds; in the wings and legs of which, like segregations are found under like conditions. While this sheet is passing through the press, a fact illustrating this general truth in a yet more remarkable manner, has been mentioned to me by Prof. Huxley; who kindly allows me to make use of it while still unpublished by him. The Glyptodon, an extinct mammal found fossilized in South America, has long been known as a large uncouth creature allied to the Armadillo, but having a massive dermal armour consisting of polygonal plates close- ly fitted together so as to make a vast box, inclosing the body SEGREGATION. 485 in such way as effectually to prevent it from being bent, laterally or vertically, in the slightest degree. This bony box, which must have weighed several hundred-weight, was supported on the spinous processes of the vertebrae, and on the adjacent bones of the pelvic and thoracic arches. And the significant fact now to be noted, is, that here, where the trunk vertebrae were together .exposed to the pressure of this heavy dermal armour, at the same time that, by its rigidity, they were preserved from all relative movements, the entire series of them were united into one solid, continuous bone. The formation and maintenance of a species, considered as an assemblage of similar organisms, is interpretable in an analogous way. We have already seen that in so far as the members of a species are subject to different sets of inci- dent forces, they are differentiated, or divided into varieties. And here it remains to add that in so far as they are subject to like sets of incident forces, they are segregated, or reduced to, and kept in, the state of a uniform aggregate. For by the process of " natural selection," there is a continual purifica- tion of each species from those individuals which depart from the common type in ways that unfit them for the con- ditions of their existence. Consequently, there is a contin- ual leaving behind of those individuals which are in all re- spects fit for the conditions of their existence ; and are there- fore very nearly alike. The circumstances to which any species is exposed, being, as we before saw, an involved com- bination of incident forces; and the members of the species having mixed with them some that differ more than usual from the average structure required for meeting these forces; it results that these forces are constantly separating such divergent individuals from the rest, and so preserving the uniformity of the rest — keeping up its integrity as a spe- cies. Just as the changing autumn leaves are picked out by the wind from among the green ones around them, or just as, to use Prof. Huxley's simile, the smaller fragments pass through the sieve while the larger are kept back; so, the 4S6 SEGREGATION. uniform incidence of external forces affects the members of a group of organisms similarly in proportion as they are simi- lar, and differently in proportion as they are different; and thus is ever segregating the like by parting the unlike from them. Whether these separated members are killed off, as mostly happens, or whether, as otherwise happens, they sur- vive and multiply into a distinct variety, in consequence of their fitness to certain partially unlike conditions, matters not to the argument. The one case conforms to the law, that the unlike units of an aggregate are sorted into their kinds and parted when uniformly subject to the same incident forces ; and the other to the converse law, that the like units of an aggregate are parted and separately grouped when sub- ject to different incident forces. And on consulting Mr. Darwin's remarks on divergence of character, it will be seen that the segregations thus caused tend ever to become more definite. § 167. Mental evolution under one of its leading as- pects, we found to consist in the formation of groups of like objects and like relations — a differentiation of the various things originally confounded together in one assemblage, and an integration of each separate order of things into a separate group (§ 153). Here it remains to point out that while unlikeness in the incident forces is the cause of such differentiations, likeness in the incident forces is the cause of such integrations. For what is the process through which classifications are established? At first, in common with the uninitiated, the botanist recognizes only such conven- tional divisions as those which agriculture has established — distinguishes a few vegetables and cereals, and groups the rest together into the one miscellaneous aggregate of wild plants. How do these wild plants become grouped in his mind into orders, genera, and species ? Each plant he exam- ines yields him a certain complex impression. Every now and then he picks up a plant like one before seen; and the SEGREGATION. 437 recognition of it is the production in him of a like connected group of sensations, by a like connected group of attributes. That is to say, there is produced throughout the nerves con- cerned, a combined set of changes, similar to a combined set of changes before produced. Considered analytically, each such combined set of changes is a combined set of molecular modifications wrought in the affected part of the organism. On every repetition of the impression, a like combined set of molecular modifications is superposed on the previous ones, and makes them greater: thus generating an internal idea corresponding to these similar external objects. Meanwhile, another kind of plant produces in the brain of the botanist another set of combined changes or molecular modifications — a set which does not agree with and deepen the one we have been considering, but disagrees with it; and by repeti- tion of such there is generated a different idea answering to a different species. What now is the nature of this process expressed in general terms? On the one hand there are the like and unlike things from which severally emanate the groups of forces by which we perceive them. On the other hand, there are the organs of sense and percipient centres, through which, in the course of observation, these groups of forces pass. In passing through these organs of sense and percipient centres, the like groups of forces are se- gregated, or separated from the unlike groups of forces; and each such series of groups of forces, parted in this way from others, answering to an external genus or species, constitutes a state of consciousness which we call our idea of the genus or species. We before saw that as well as a separation of mixed matters by the same force, there is a separation of mixed forces by the same matter; and here we may further see that the unlike forces so separated, work unlike struc- tural changes in the aggregate that separates them — struc- tural changes each of which thus represents, and is equiva- lent to, the integrated series of motions that has produced it. By a parallel process, the connexions of co-existence and 488 SEGREGATION. sequence among impressions, become sorted into kinds and grouped simultaneously with the impressions themselves. When two phenomena that have been experienced in a given order, are repeated in the same order, those nerves which before were affected by the transition are again af- fected; and such molecular modification as they received from the first motion propagated through them, is increased by this second motion along the same route. Each such mo- tion works a structural alteration, which, in conformity with the general law set forth in Chapter IX., involves a diminu- tion of the resistance to all such motions that afterwards occur. The segregation of these successive motions (or more strictly, the permanently effective portions of them expend- ed in overcoming resistance) thus becomes the cause of, and the measure of, the mental connexion between the impres- sions which the phenomena produce. Meanwhile, phenom- ena that are recognized as different from these, being phe- nomena that therefore affect different nervous elements, will have their connexions severally represented by motions along other routes; and along each of these other routes, the nervous discharges will severally take place with a readiness proportionate to the frequency with which experience repeats the connexion of phenomena. The classification of relations must hence go on pari passu with the classification of the re- lated things. In common with the mixed sensations received from the external world, the mixed relations it presents, cannot be impressed on the organism without more or less segregation of them resulting. And through this continu- ous sorting and grouping together of changes or motions, which constitutes nervous function, there is gradually wrought that sorting and grouping together of matter, which constitutes nervous structure. § 128. In social evolution, the collecting together of the like and the separation of the unlike, by incident forces, is primarily displayed in the same manner as we saw it to be SEGREGATION. 489 among groups of inferior creatures. The human races tend to differentiate and integrate, as do races of other living forms. Of the forces which effect and maintain the segregations of mankind, may first be named those external ones which we class as physical conditions. The climate and food that are favourable to an indigenous people, are more or less detrimental to a people of different bodily constitu- tion, coming from a remote part of the Earth. In tropical regions the northern races cannot permanently exist: if not killed off in the first generation, they are so in the second; and, as in India, can maintain their footing only by the artificial process of continuous immigration and emigration. That is to say, the external forces acting equally on the in- habitants of a given locality, tend to expel all who are not of a certain type ; and so to keep up the integration of those who are of that type. Though elsewhere, as among Euro- pean nations, we see a certain amount of permanent inter- mixture, otherwise brought about, we still see that this takes place between races of not very different types, that are naturalized to not very different conditions. The other forces conspiring to produce these national segrega- tions, are those mental ones which show themselves in the affinities of men for others like themselves. Emigrants usually desire to get back among their own people; and where their desire does not take effect, it is only because the restraining ties are too great. Units of one society who are obliged to reside in another, very generally form colo- nies in the midst of that other — small societies of their own. Races which have been artificially severed, show strong tendencies to re-unite. Now though these segrega- tions that result from the mutual affinities of kindred men, do not seem interpretable as illustrations of the general principle above enunciated, they really are thus interpret- able. When treating of the direction of motion (§ 80), it was shown that the actions performed by men for the satisfaction of their wants, were alwavs motions along lines 33 490 SEGREGATION. of least resistance. The feelings characterizing a member of a given race, are feelings which get complete satisfaction only among other members of that race — a satisfaction partly derived from sympathy with those having like feel- ings, but mainly derived from the adapted social conditions which grow up where such feelings prevail. When, there- fore, a citizen of any nation is, as we see, attracted towards others of his nation, the rationale is, that certain agencies which we call desires, move him in the direction of least resistance. Human motions, like all other motions, being determined by the distribution of forces, it follows that such segregations of races as are not produced by incident external forces, are produced by forces which the units of the races exercise on each other. . During the development of each society, we see analo- gous segregations caused in analogous ways. A few of them result from minor natural affinities; but those most impor- tant ones which constitute political and industrial organiza- tion, result from the union of men in whom similarities have been produced by education — using education in its widest sense, as comprehending all processes by which citizens are moulded to special functions. Men brought up to bodily labour, are men who have had wrought in them a certain likeness — a likeness which, in respect of their powers of ac- tion, obscures and subordinates their natural differences. Those trained to brain-work, have acquired a certain other community of character which makes them, as social units, more like each other than like those trained to manual occu- pations. And there arise class-segregations answering to these superinduced likenesses. Much more definite segrega- tions take place among the much more definitely assimi- lated members of any class who are brought up to the same calling. Even where the necessities of their work forbid concentration in one locality, as among artizans happens with masons and bricklayers, and among traders happens with the retail distributors, and among professionals happens SEGREGATION. 491 with the medical men; there are not wanting Operative Builders Unions, and Grocers Societies, and Medical Asso- ciations, to show that these artificially-assimilated citizens become integrated as much as the conditions permit. And where, as among the manufacturing classes, the functions discharged do not require the dispersion of the citizens thus artificially assimilated, there is a progressive aggregation of them in special localities; and a consequent increase in the definiteness of the industrial divisions. If now we seek the causes of these segregations, considered as results of force and motion, we find ourselves brought to the same general principle as before. This likeness generated in any class or sub-class by training, is an aptitude acquired by its members for satisfying their wants in like ways. That is, the occupation to which each man has been brought up, has be- come to him, in common with those similarly brought up, a line of least resistance. Hence under that pressure which determines all men to activity, these similarly-modified social units are similarly affected, and tend to take similar courses. If then there be any locality which, either by its physical peculiarities or by peculiarities wrought on it during social evolution, is rendered a place where a certain kind of industrial action meets with less resistance than else- where; it follows from the law of direction of motion that those social units who have been moulded to this kind of industrial action, will move towards this place, or become integrated there. If, for instance, the proximity of coal and iron mines to a navigable river, gives to Glasgow a certain advantage in the building of iron ships — if the total labour required to produce the same vessel, and get its equivalent in food and clothing, is less there than eleswhere; a con- centration of iron-ship builders is produced at Glasgow: either by keeping there the population born to iron-ship building; or by immigration of those elsewhere engaged in it; or by both — a concentration that would be still more marked did not other districts offer counter-balancing facili- 492 SEGREGATION. ties. The principle equally holds where the occupation is mercantile instead of manufacturing. Stock-brokers cluster together in the city, because the amount of effort to be severally gone through by them in discharging their func- tions, and obtaining their profits, is less there than in other localities. A place of exchange having once been estab- lished, becomes a place where the resistance to be overcome by each is less than eleswhere ; and the pursuit of the course of least resistance by each, involves their aggregation around this place. Of course, with units so complicated as those which con- stitute a society, and with forces so involved as those which move them, the resulting selections and separations must be far more entangled, or far less definite, than those we have hitherto considered. But though there may be pointed out many anomalies which at first sight seem inconsistent with the alleged law, a closer study shows that they are but subtler illustrations of it. For men's likenesses being of various kinds, lead to various orders of segregation. There are likenesses of disposition, likenesses of taste, likenesses produced by intellectual culture, likenesses that result from class-training, likenesses of political feeling; and it needs but to glance round at the caste-divisions, the associations for philanthropic, scientific, and artistic purposes, the re- ligious parties and social cliques; to see that some species of likeness among the component members of each body determines their union. Xow the different segregative pro- cesses by traversing one another, and often by their indirect antagonism, more or less obscure one another's effects; and prevent any one differentiated class from completely inte- grating. Hence the anomalies referred to. But if this cause of incompleteness be duly borne in mind, social segre- gations will be seen to conform entirely to the same principle as all other segregations. Analysis will show that either by external incident forces, or by what we may in a sense regard as mutual polarity, there are ever being produced in SEGREGATION. 493 society segregations of those units which have either a natural likeness or a likeness generated by training. § 169. Can the general truth thus variously illustrated be deduced from the persistence of force, in common with foregoing ones? Probably the exposition at the beginning of the chapter will have led most readers to conclude that it can be so deduced. The abstract propositions involved are these: — First, that like units, subject to a uniform force capable of produc- ing motion in them, will be moved to like degrees in the same direction. Second, that like units if exposed to unlike forces capable of producing motion in them, will be differently moved — moved either in different directions or to different degrees in the same direction. Third, that unlike units if acted on by a uniform force capable of producing motion in them, will be differently moved — moved either in different directions or to different degrees in the same direction. Fourth, that the incident forces themselves must be affected in analogous ways: like forces falling on like units must be similarly modified by the conflict; unlike forces falling on like units must be dissimilarly modified ; and like forces fall- ing on unlike units must be dissimilarly modified. These propositions admit of reduction to a still more abstract form. They all of them amount to this: — that in the actions and reactions of force and matter, an imlikeness in either of the factors necessitates an imlikeness in the effects ; and that in the absence of imlikeness in either of the factors the effects must be alike. When thus generalized, the immediate dependence of these propositions on the persistence of force, becomes obvi- ous. Any two forces that are not alike, are forces which dif- fer either in their amounts or directions or both; and by what mathematicians call the resolution of forces, it may be proved that this difference is constituted by the presence in the one of some force not present in the other. Similarly, 49± SEGREGATION. any two units or portions of matter which are unlike in size, weight, form, or other attribute, can be known by us as un- like only through some unlikeness in the forces they impress on our consciousness; and hence this unlikeness also, is constituted by the presence in the one of some force or forces not present in the other. Such being the common nature of these unlikenesses, what is the inevitable corollary? Any unlikeness in the incident forces, where the things acted on are alike, must generate a difference between the effects; since otherwise, the differential force produces no effect, and force is not persistent. Any unlikeness in the things acted on, where the incident forces are alike, must generate a dif- ference between the effects; since otherwise, the differential force whereby these things are made unlike, produces no ef- fect, and force is not persistent. While, conversely, if the forces acting and the things acted on, are alike, the effects must be alike; since otherwise, a differential effect can be produced without a differential cause, and force is not per- sistent. Thus these general truths being necessary implications of the persistence of force, all the re-distributions above traced out as characterizing Evolution in its various phases, are also implications of the persistence of force. Such por- tions of the permanently effective forces acting on any ag- gregate, as produce sensible motions in its parts, cannot but work the segregations which we see take place. If of the mixed units making up such aggregate, those of the same kind have like motions impressed on them by a uniform force, while units of another kind are moved by this uniform force in ways more or less unlike the ways in which those of the first kind are moved, the two kinds must separate and integrate. If the units are alike and the forces unlike, a division of the differently affected units is equally necessi- tated. Thus there inevitably arises the demarcated group- ing which we everywhere see. By virtue of this segregation that grows ever more decided while there remains any possi- SEGREGATION. 495 bility of increasing it, the change from uniformity to multi- formity is accompanied by a change from indistinctness in the relations of parts to distinctness in the relations of parts. As we before saw that the transformation of the homegene- ous into the heterogeneous is inferable from that ultimate truth which transcends proof; so we here see, that from this same truth is inferable the transformation of an indefinite homogeneity into a definite heterogeneity. CHAPTEE XXII. EQUILIBRATION. § 170. And now towards what do these changes tend? Will they go on for ever? or will there be an end to them? Can things increase in heterogeneity through all future time? or must there be a degree which the differentiation and integration of Matter and Motion cannot pass? Is it possible for this universal metamorphosis to proceed in the same general course indefinitely? or does it work towards some ultimate state, admitting no further modification of like kind? The last of these alternative conclusions is that to which we are inevitably driven. Whether we watch concrete processes, or whether we consider the question in the abstract, we are alike taught that Evolution has an im- passable limit. The re-distributions, of matter that go on around us, are ever being brought to conclusions by the dissipation of the motions which effect them. The rolling stone parts with portions of its momentum to the things it strikes, and finally comes to rest; as do also, in like manner, the various things it has struck. Descending from the clouds and trickling over the Earth's surface till it gathers into brooks and rivers, water, still running towards a lower level, is at last arrested by the resistance of other water that has reached the lowest level. In the lake or sea thus formed, every agitation raised by a wind or the immersion of a solid body, propagates itself around in waves that diminish as thev widen, and gradually 496 EQUILIBRATION. 497 "become lost to observation in motions communicated to the atmosphere and the matter on the shores. The impulse given by a player to the harp-string, is transformed through its vibrations into aerial pulses; and these, spreading on all sides, and weakening as they spread, soon cease to be per- ceptible ; and finally die away in generating thermal undula- tions that radiate into space. Equally in the cinder that falls out of the fire, and in the vast masses of molten lava ejected by a volcano, we see that the molecular agitation known to us as heat, disperses itself by radiation; so that how- ever great its amount, it inevitably sinks at last to the same degree as that existing in surrounding bodies. And if the actions observed be electrical or chemical, we still find that they work themselves out in producing sensible or insensible movements, that are dissipated as before ; until quiescence is eventually reached. The proximate rationale of the process exhibited under these several forms, lies in the fact dwelt on when treating of the Multiplication of Effects, that motions are ever being decomposed into divergent mo- tions, and these into re-divergent motions. The rolling stone sends off the stones it hits in directions differing more or less from its own ; and they do the like with the things they hit. Move water or air, and the movement is quickly resolved into radiating movements. The heat produced by pressure in a given direction, diffuses itself by undulations in all direc- tions; and so do the light and electricity similarly generated. That is to say, these motions undergo division and subdivi- sion ; and by continuance of this process without limit, they are, though never lost, gradually reduced to insensible mo- tions. In all cases then, there is a progress toward equilibra- tion. That universal co-existence of antagonist forces which, as we before saw, necessitates the universality of rhythm, and which, as we before saw, necessitates the de- composition of every force into divergent forces, at the same time necessitates the ultimate establishment of a balance. 498 EQUILIBRATION. Every motion being motion under resistance, is continually suffering deductions; and these unceasing deductions finally result in the cessation of the motion. The general truth thus illustrated under its simplest aspect, we must now look at under those more complex aspects it usually presents throughout Nature. In nearly all cases, the motion of an aggregate is compound; and the equilibration of each of its components, being carried on in- dependently, does not affect the rest. The ship's bell that has ceased to vibrate, still continues those vertical and lateral oscillations caused by the ocean-swell. The water of the smooth stream on whose surface have died away the undu- lations caused by the rising fish, moves as fast as before onward to the sea. The arrested bullet travels with un- diminished speed round the Earth's axis. And were the rotation of the Earth destroyed, there would not be implied any diminution of the Earth's movement with respect to the Sun and other external bodies. So that in every case, what we regard as equilibration is a disappearance of some one or more of the many movements which a body possesses, while its other movements continue as before. That this process may be duly realized and the state of things towards which it tends fully understood, it will be well here to cite a case in which we may watch this successive equilibration of combined movements more completely than we can do in those above instanced. Our end will best be served, not by the most imposing, but by the most familiar example. Let us take that of the spinning top. When the string which has been wrapped round a top's axis is violently drawn off, and the top falls on to the table, it usually happens that be- sides the rapid rotation, two other movements are given to it. A slight horizontal momentum, unavoidably impressed on it when leaving the handle, carries it away bodily from the place on which it drops; and in consequence of its axis being more or lees inclined, it falls into a certain oscillation, described by the expressive though inelegant word — EQUILIBRATION. 499 " wabbling." These two subordinate motions, variable in their proportions to each other and to the chief motion, are commonly soon brought to a close by separate processes of equilibration. The momentum which carries the top bodily along the table, resisted somewhat by the air, but mainly by the irregularities of the surface, shortly disappears; and the top thereafter continues to spin on one spot. Meanwhile, in consequence of that opposition which the axial momentum of a rotating body makes to any change in the plane of rota- tion, (so beautifully exhibited by the gyroscope,) the " wab- bling " diminishes; and like the other is quickly ended. These minor motions having been dissipated, the rotatory motion, interfered with only by atmospheric resistance and the friction of the pivot, continues some time with such uni- formity that the top appears stationary: there being thus temporarily established a condition which the French mathematicians have termed equilibrium mobile. It is true that when the axial velocity sinks below a certain point, new motions commence, and increase till the top falls; but these are merely incidental to a case in which the centre of gravity is above the point of support. Were the top, having an axis of steel, to be suspended from a surface adequately magnetized, all the phenomena described would be dis- played, and the moving equilibrium having been once ar- rived at, would continue until the top became motionless, without any further change of position. iSTow the facts which it behoves us here to observe, are these. First, that the various motions which an aggregate possesses are separately equilibrated : those which are smallest, or which meet with the greatest resistance, or both, disappearing first; and leaving at last, that which is greatest, or meets with least resistance, or both. Second, that when the aggregate has a movement of its parts with respect to each other, which en- counters but little external resistance, there is apt to be es- tablished an equilibrium mobile. Third, that this moving equilibrium eventually lapses into complete equilibrium. 500 EQUILIBRATION. Fully to comprehend the process of equilibration, is not easy; since we have simultaneously to contemplate various phases of it. The best course will be to glance separately at what we may conveniently regard as its four different orders. The first order includes the comparatively simple motions, as those of projectiles, which are not pro- longed enough to exhibit their rhythmical character; but which, being quickly divided and subdivided into motions communicated to other portions of matter, are presently dis- sipated in the rhythm of ethereal undulations. In the second order, comprehending the various kinds of vi- bration or oscillation as usually witnessed, the motion is used up in generating a tension which, having become equal to it or momentarily equilibrated with it, thereupon produces a motion in the opposite direction, that is subsequently equili- brated in like manner: thus causing a visible rhythm, that is, however, soon lost in invisible rhythms. The third order of equilibration, not hitherto noticed, obtains in those aggregates which continually receive as much motion as they expend. The steam engine (and especially that kind which feeds its own furnace and boiler) supplies an example. Here the force from moment to moment dissipated in over- coming the resistance of the machinery driven, is from mo- ment to moment re-placed from the fuel ; and the balance of the tv\To is maintained by a raising or lowering of the ex- penditure according to the variation of the supply : each in- crease or decrease in the quantity of steam, resulting in a rise or fall of the engine's movement, such as brings it to a bal- ance with the increased or decreased resistance. This, which we may fitly call the dependent moving equilibrium, should be specially noted; since it is one that we shall commonly meet with throughout various phases of Evolution. The equilibration to be distinguished as of the fourth order, is the independent or perfect moving equilibrium. This we see illustrated in the rhythmical motions of the Solar System: which, being resisted only by a medium of inappreciable EQUILIBRATION. 501 density, undergo no sensible diminution in such periods of time as we can measure. All these kinds of equilibration may, however, from the highest point of view, be regarded as different modes of one kind. For in every case the balance arrived at is relative, and not absolute — is a cessation of the motion of some par- ticular body in relation to a certain point or points, in- volving neither the disappearance of the relative motion lost, which is simply transformed into other motions, nor a dimi- nution of the body's motions with respect to other points. Thus understanding equilibration, it manifestly includes that equilibrium mobile, which at first sight seems of an- other nature. For any system of bodies exhibiting, like those of the Solar System, a combination of balanced rhythms, has this peculiarity: — that though the constitu- ents of the system have relative movements, the system as a whole has no movement. The centre of gravity of the entire group remains fixed. Whatever quantity of motion any member of it has in any direction, is from moment to mo- ment counter-balanced by an equivalent motion in some other part of the group in an opposite direction ; and so the aggregate matter of the group is in a state of rest. Whence it follows that the arrival at a state of moving equilibrium, is the disappearance of some movement which the aggre- gate had in relation to external things, and a continuance of those movements only which the different parts of the aggregate have in relation to each other. Thus generaliz- ing the process, it becomes clear that all forms of equilibra- tion are intrinsically the same; since in every aggregate, it is the centre of gravity only that loses its motion: the constituents always retaining some motion with respect to each other — the motion of molecules if none else. Every equilibrium commonly regarded as absolute, is in one sense a moving equilibrium; because along with a motionless state of the whole there is always some relative movement of its insensible parts. And, conversely, every moving 502 EQUILIBRATION. equilibrium may be in one sense regarded as absolute; be- cause the relative movements of its sensible parts are accom- panied by a motionless state of the whole. Something has still to be added before closing these somewhat too elaborate preliminaries. The reader must now especially note two leading truths brought out by the foregoing exposition: the one concerning the ultimate, or rather the penultimate, state of motion which, the processes described tend to bring about ; the other concerning the con- comitant distribution of matter. This penultimate state of motion is the moving equilibrium; which, as we have seen, tends to arise in an aggregate having compound mo- tions, as a transitional state on the way towards complete equilibrium. Throughout Evolution of all kinds, there is a continual approximation to, and more or less complete main- tenance of, this moving equilibrium. As in the Solar Sys- tem there has been established an independent moving equilibrium — an equilibrium such that the relative motions of the constituent parts are continually so counter-balanced by opposite motions, that the mean state of the whole aggre- gate never varies; so is it, though in a less distinct manner, with each form of dependent moving equilibrium. The state of things exhibited in the cycles of terrestrial changes, in the balanced functions of organic bodies that have reached their adult forms, and in the acting and re-acting processes of fully-developed societies, is similarly one char- acterized by compensating oscillations. The involved com- bination of rhythms seen in each of these cases, has an average condition which remains practically constant during the deviations ever taking place on opposite sides of it. And the fact which we have here particularly to observe, is, that as a corollary from a general law of equilibration above set forth, the evolution of every aggregate must go on until this equilibrium mobile is established; since, as we have seen, an excess of force which the aggregate possesses in any direc- tion, must eventually be expended in overcoming resist- EQUILIBRATION. 503 ances to change in that direction : leaving behind only those movements which compensate each other, and so form a moving equilibrium. Kespecting the structural state simultaneously reached, it must obviously be one pre- senting an arrangement of forces that counterbalance all the forces to which the aggregate is subject. So long as there remains a residual force in any direction — be it excess of a force exercised by the aggregate on its environment, or of a force exercised by its environment on the aggregate, equilibrium does not exist ; and therefore the re-distribution of matter must continue. Whence it follows that the limit of heterogeneity towards which every aggregate progresses, is the formation of as many specializations and combina- tions of parts, as there are specialized and combined forces to be met. § 171. Those successively changed forms which, if the nebular hypothesis be granted, must have arisen during the evolution of the Solar System, were so many transitional kinds of moving equilibrium ; severally giving place to more permanent kinds on the way towards complete equilibration. Thus the assumption of an oblate spheroidal figure by con- densing nebulous matter, was the assumption of a temporary and partial moving equilibrium among the component parts — a moving equilibrium that must have slowly grown more settled, as local conflicting movements were dis- sipated. In the formation and detachment of the nebulous rings, which, according to this hypothesis, from time to time took place, we have instances of progressive equilibration ending in the establishment of a complete mov- ing equilibrium. For the genesis of each such ring, implies a perfect balancing of that aggregative force which the whole spheroid exercises on its equatorial portion, by that centrifugal force which the equatorial portion has acquired during previous concentration: so long as these two forces are not equal, the equatorial portion follows the contracting 504 EQUILIBRATION. mass ; but as soon as the second force has increased up to art equality with the first, the equatorial portion can follow no further, and remains behind. While, however, the resulting ring, regarded as a whole connected by forces with external wholes, has reached a state of moving equilibrium; its parts are not balanced with respect to each other. As we be- fore saw (§ 150) the probabilities against the maintenance of an annular form by nebulous matter, are immense : from the instability of the homogeneous, it is inferrable that nebu- lous matter so distributed must break up into portions; and eventually concentrate into a single mass. That is to say, the ring must progress towards a moving equilibrium of a more complete kind, during the dissipation of that motion which maintained its particles in a diffused form: leaving at length a planetary body, attended perhaps by a group of minor bodies, severally having residuary relative motions that are no longer resisted by sensible media; and there is thus constituted an equilibrium mobile that is all but absolutely perfect.* Hypothesis aside, the principle of equilibration is still perpetually illustrated in those minor changes of state which * Sir David Brewster has recently been citing with approval, a calculation by M. Babinet, to the effect that on the hypothesis of nebular genesis, the matter of the Sun, when it filled the Earth's orbit, must have taken 3181 years to rotate ; and that therefore the hypothesis cannot be true. This calculation of Iff. Babinet may pair-off with that of M. Comte, who, contrariwise, made the time of this rotation agree very nearly with the Earth's period of revolu- tion round the Sun ; for if M. Comte's calculation involved a petitio principn, that of M. Babinet is manifestly based on two assumptions, both of which are gratuitous, and one of them totally inconsistent with the doctrine to be tested. He has evidently proceeded on the current supposition respecting the Sun's internal density, which is not proved, and from which there are reasons for dissenting ; and he has evidently taken for granted that all parts of the neb- ulous spheroid, when it filled the Earth's orbit, had the same angular velocity ; whereas if (as is implied in the nebular hypothesis, rationally understood) this spheroid resulted from the concentration of far more widely-diffused matter, the angular velocity of its equatorial portion would obviously be immensely greater than that of its central portion. EQUILIBRATION. 505 the Solar System is undergoing. Each planet, satellite, and comet, exhibits to us at its aphelion a momentary equi- librium between that force which urges it further away from its primary, and that force which retards its retreat; since the retreat goes on until the last of these forces exactly counterpoises the first. In like manner at perihelion a con- verse equilibrium is momentarily established. The varia- tion of each orbit in size, in eccentricity, and in the position of its plane, has similarly a limit at which the forces pro- ducing change- in the one direction, are equalled by those antagonizing it; and an opposite limit at which an opposite arrest takes place. Meanwhile, each of these simple per- turbations, as well as each of the complex ones resulting from their combination, exhibits, besides the temporary equilibra- tion at each of its extremes, a certain general equilibra- tion of compensating deviations on either side of a mean state. That the moving equilibrium thus constituted, tends, in the course of indefinite time, to lapse into a com- plete equilibrium, by the gradual decrease of planetary mo- tions and eventual integration of all the separate masses com- posing the Solar System, is a belief suggested by certain observed cometary retardations, and entertained by some of high authority. The received opinion that the appreciable diminution in the period of Encke's comet, implies a loss of momentum caused by resistance of the ethereal medium, commits astronomers who hold it, to the conclusion that this same resistance must cause a loss of planetary motions — a loss which, infinitesimal though it may be in such periods as we can measure, will, if indefinitely continued, bring these motions to a close. Even should there be, as Sir John Herschel suggests, a rotation of the ethereal medium in the same direction with the planets, this arrest, though im- mensely postponed, would not be absolutely prevented. Such an eventuality, however, must in any case be so incon- ceivably remote as to have no other than a speculative inter- est for us. It is referred to here, simply as illustrating the 34 506 EQUILIBRATION. still-continued tendency towards complete equilibrium, through the still-continued dissipation of sensible motion, or transformation of it into insensible motion. But there is another species of equilibration going on in the Solar System, with which we are more nearly concerned — the equilibration of that molecular motion known as heat. The tacit assumption hitherto current, that the Sun can con- tinue to give off an undiminished amount of light and heat through all future time, is fast being abandoned. Involv- ing as it does, under a disguise, the conception of power pro- duced out of nothing, it is of the same order as the belief that misleads perpetual-motion schemers. The spreading recognition of the truth that force is persistent, and that con- sequently whatever force is manifested under one shape must previously have existed under another shape, is carry- ing with it a recognition of the truth that the force known to us in solar radiations, is the changed form of some other force of which the Sun is the seat; and that by the gradual dissipation of these radiations into space, this other force is being slowly exhausted. The aggregative force by which the Sun's substance is drawn to his centre of gravity, is the only one which established physical laws warrant us in sus- pecting to be the correlate of the forces thus emanating from him : the only source of a known kind that can be assigned for the insensible motions constituting solar light and heat, is the sensible motion which disappears during the progress- ing concentration of the Sun's substance. We before saw it to be a corollary from the nebular hypothesis, that there is such a progressing concentration of the Sun's substance. And here remains to be added the further corollary, that just as in the case of the smaller members of the Solar Sys- tem, the heat generated by concentration, long ago in great part radiated into space, has left only a central residue that now escapes but slowly; so in the case of that im- mensely larger mass forming the Sun, the immensely greater quantity of heat generated and still in process of EQUILIBRATION. 507 rapid diffusion, must, as the concentration approaches its limit, diminish in amount, and eventually leave only an in- appreciable internal remnant. With or with- out the accompaniment of that hypothesis of nebular condensation, whence, as we see, it naturally follows, the doctrine that the Sun is gradually losing his heat, has now gained considerable currency; and calcula- tions have been made, both respecting the amount of heat and light already radiated, as compared with the amount that remains, and respecting the period during which active radiation is likely to continue. Prof. Helm- holtz estimates, that since the time when, according to the nebular hypothesis, the matter composing the Solar System extended to the orbit of Neptune, there has been evolved by the arrest of sensible motion, an amount of heat 454 times as great as that which the Sun still has to give out. He also makes an approximate estimate of the rate at which this remaining ^f^th is being diffused: showing that a diminution of the Sun's diameter to the extent of l0^00, would produce heat, at the present rate, for more than 2000 years; or in other words, that a contraction of ^oyotovtjott of his diameter, suffices to generate the amount of light and heat annually emitted ; and that thus, at the present rate of expenditure, the Sun's diameter will diminish by some- thing like -^ in the lapse of the next million years.* Of course these conclusions are not to be considered as more than rude approximations to the truth. Until quite recent- ly, we have been totally ignorant of the Sun's chemical composition; and even now have obtained but a superficial knowledge of it. We know nothing of his internal struc- ture; and it is quite possible (probable, I believe,) that the assumptions respecting central density, made in the forego- ing estimates, are wrong. But no uncertainty in the data on * See paper " On the Inter-action of Natural Forces," by Prof. Helmholtz, translated by Prof. Tyndall, and published in the Philosophical Magazine, supplement to Vol. XI. fourth series. 508 EQUILIBRATION. which these calculations proceed, and no consequent error in the inferred rate at which the Sun is expending his reserve of force, militates against the general proposition that this reserve of force is being expended ; and must in time be ex- hausted. Though the residue of undiffused motion in the Sun, may be much greater than is above concluded ; though the rate of radiation cannot, as assumed, continue at a uni- form rate, but must eventually go on with slowly-decreasing rapidity; and though the period at which the Sun will cease to afford us adequate light and heat, is very possibly far more distant than above implied; yet such a period must some time be reached, and this is all which it here concerns us to observe. Thus while the Solar System, if evolved from diffused matter, has illustrated the law of equilibration in the estab- lishment of a complete moving equilibrium ; and while, as at present constituted, it illustrates the law of equilibration in the balancing of all its movements; it also illustrates this law in the processes which astronomers and physicists infer are still going on. That motion of masses produced during Evo- lution, is being slowly re-diffused in molecular motion of the ethereal medium; both through the progressive integration of each mass, and the resistance to its motion through space. Infinitely remote as may be the state when all the motions of masses shall be transformed into molecular motion, and all the molecular motion equilibrated ; yet such a state of com- plete integration and complete equilibration, is that towards which thp changes now going on throughout the Solar Sys- tem inevitably tend. § 172. A spherical figure is the one which can alone equilibrate the forces of mutually-gravitating atoms. If the aggregate of such atoms has a rotatory motion, the form of equilibrium becomes a spheroid of greater or less oblateness, according to the rate of rotation ; and it has been ascertained that the Earth is an oblate spheroid, diverging just as much EQUILIBRATION. 509 from sphericity as is requisite to counterbalance the centrif- ugal force consequent on its velocity round its axis. That is to say, during the evolution of the Earth, there has been reached a complete equilibrium of those forces which affect its general outline. The only other process of equili- bration which the Earth as a whole can exhibit, is the loss of its axial motion; and that any such loss is going on, we have no direct evidence. It has been contended, however, by Prof. Helmholtz, that inappreciable as may be its effect within known periods of time, the friction of the tidal wave must be slowly diminishing the Earth's rotatory motion, and must eventually destroy it. Xow though it seems an oversight to say that the Earth's rotation can thus be de- stroyed, since the extreme effect, to be reached only in infi- nite time by such a process, would be an extension of the Earth's day to the length of a lunation, yet it seems clear that this friction of the tidal wave is a real cause of decreasing rotation. Slow as its action is, we must recognize it as ex- emplifying, under another form, the universal progress to- wards equilibrium. It is needless to point out, in detail, how those move- ments which the Sun's rays generate in the air and water on the Earth's surface, and through them in the Earth's solid substance,* one and all teach the same general truth. Evidently the winds and waves and streams, as well as the denudations and depositions they effect, perpetually illustrate on a grand scale, and in endless modes, that grad- ual dissipation of motions described in the first section; and the consequent tendency towards a balanced distribution of forces. Each of these sensible motions, produced directly or * Until I recently consulted his " Outlines of Astronomy " on another ques- tion, I was not aware that so far back as 1833, Sir John Herschel had enunci- ated the doctrine that " the sun's rays are the ultimate source of almost every motion which takes place on the surface of the earth." He expressly includes all geologic, meteorologic, and vital actions ; as also those which we produce by the combustion of coal. The late George Stephenson appears to have been wrongly credited with this last* idea. 510 EQUILIBRATION. indirectly by integration of those insensible motions commu- nicated from the Sun, becomes, as we have seen, divided and subdivided into motions less and less sensible ; until it is final- ly reduced to insensible motions, and radiated from the Earth in the shape of thermal undulations. In their totality, these complex movements of aerial, liquid, and solid matter on the Earth's crust, constitute a dependent moving equilibrium. As we before saw, there is traceable through- out them an involved combination of rhythms. The unceas- ing circulation of water from the ocean to the land, and from the land back to the ocean, is a type of these various compen- sating actions; which, in the midst of all the irregularities produced by their mutual interferences, maintain an aver- age. And in this, as in other equilibrations of the third order, we see that the power from moment to moment in course of dissipation, is from moment to moment renewed from without: the rises and falls in the supply, being bal- anced by rises and falls in the expenditures; as witness the correspondence between the magnetic variations and the cycle of the solar spots. But the fact it chiefly concerns us to observe, is, that this process must go on bring- ing things ever nearer to complete rest. These mechanical movements, meteorologic and geologic, which are continu- ally being equilibrated, both temporarily by counter-move- ments and permanently by the dissipation of such move- ments and counter-movements, will slowly diminish as the quantity of force received from the Sun diminishes. As the insensible motions propagated to us from the centre of our system become feebler, the sensible motions here produced by them must decrease ; and at that remote period when the solar heat has ceased to be appreciable, there will no longer be any appreciable re-distributions of matter on the surface of our planet. Thus from the highest point of view, all terrestrial changes are incidents in the course of cosmical equilibration. It was before pointed out, (§69) that of the incessant altera- EQUILIBRATION. 511 tions which the Earth's crust and atmosphere undergo, those which are not due to the still-progressing motion of the Earth's substance towards its centre of gravity, are due to the still-progressing motion of the Sun's substance towards its centre of gravity. Here it is to be remarked, that this continuance of integration in the Earth and in the Sun, is a continuance of that transformation of sensible motion into insensible motion which we have seen ends in equilibration ; and that the arrival in each case at the extreme of integra- tion, is the arrival at a state in which no more sensible mo- tion remains to be transformed into insensible motion — a state in which the forces producing integration and the forces opposing integration, have become equal. § 173. Every living body exhibits, in a four-fold form, the process we are tracing out — exhibits it from moment to moment in the balancing of mechanical forces ; from hour to hour in the balancing of functions ; from year to year in the changes of state that compensate changes of condition; and finally in the complete arrest of vital movements at death. Let us consider the facts under these heads. The sensible motion constituting each visible action of an organism, is soon brought to a close by some adverse force within or without the organism. When the arm is raised, the motion given to it is antagonized partly by gravity and partly by the internal resistances consequent on structure; and its motion, thus suffering continual deduction, ends when the arm has reached a position at which the forces are equilibrated. The limits of each systole and diastole of the heart, severally show us a momentary equilibrium between muscular strains that produce opposite movements ; and each gush of blood requires to be immediately followed by an- other, because the rapid dissipation of its momentum would otherwise soon bring the mass of circulating fluid to a stand. As much in the actions and re-actions going on among the internal organs, as in the mechanical balanc- 512 EQUILIBRATION. ing of the whole body, there is at every instant a pro- gressive equilibration of the motions at every instant pro- duced. Viewed in their aggregate, and as forming a series, the organic functions constitute a dependent mov- ing equilibrium — a moving equilibrium, of which the motive power is ever being dissipated through the special equilibrations just exemplified, and is ever being renewed by the taking in of additional motive power. Food is a store of force which continually adds to the momentum of the vital actions, as much as is continually deducted from them by the forces overcome. All the functional move- ments thus maintained, are, as we have seen, rhythmical (§ 85) ; by their union compound rhythms of various lengths and complexities are produced; and in these simple and com- pound rhythms, the process of equilibration, besides being exemplified at each extreme of every rhythm, is seen in the habitual preservation of a constant mean, and in the re-estab- lishment of that mean when accidental causes have produced divergence from it. When, for instance, there is a great ex- penditure of motion through muscular activity, there arises a re-active demand on those stores of latent motion which are laid up in the form of consumable matter throughout the tis- sues : increased respiration and increased rapidity of circula- tion, are instrumental to an extra genesis of force, that coun- terbalances the extra dissipation of force. This unusual transformation of molecular motion into sensible motion, is presently followed by an unusual absorption of food — the source of molecular motion; and in proportion as there has been a prolonged draft upon the spare capital of the system, is there a tendency to a prolonged rest, during which that spare capital is replaced. If the deviation from the ordinary course of the functions has been so great as to derange them, as when violent exertion produces loss of appetite and loss of sleep, an equilibration is still eventually effected. Pro- viding the disturbance is not such as to overturn the balance of the functions, and destroy life (in which case a complete EQUILIBRATION. 513 equilibration is suddenly effected), the ordinary balance is by and by re-established: the returning appetite is keen in proportion as the waste has been large; while sleep, sound and prolonged, makes up for previous wakefulness. Kot even in those extreme cases where some excess has wrought a derangement that is never wholly rectified, is there an exception to the general law; for in such cases the cycle of the functions is, after a time, equilibrated about a new mean state, which henceforth becomes the normal state of the individual. Thus, among the involved rhythmical changes constituting organic life, any disturbing force that works an excess of change in some direction, is gradually diminished and finally neutralized by antagonistic forces; which thereupon work a compensating change in the oppo- site direction, and so, after more or less of oscillation, restore the medium condition. And this process it is, which constitutes what physicians call the vis medicatrix na- turce. The third form of equilibration displayed by organic bodies, is a necessary sequence of that just illustrated. When through a change of habit or circumstance, an organ- ism is permanently subject to some new influence, or differ- ent amount of an old influence, there arises, after more or less disturbance of the organic rhythms, a balancing of them around the new average condition produced by this addi- tional influence. As temporary divergences of the organic rhythms are counteracted by temporary divergences of a re- verse kind; so there is an equilibration of their permanent divergences by the genesis of opposing divergences that are equally permanent. If the quantity of motion to be ha- bitually generated by a muscle, becomes greater than before, its nutrition becomes greater than before. If the expendi- ture of the muscle bears to its nutrition, a greater ratio than expenditure bears to nutrition in other parts of the system; the excess of nutrition becomes such that the muscle grows. And the cessation of its growth is the establishment of a bal- ance between the daily waste and the daily repair — the 514 EQUILIBRATION. daily expenditure of force, and the amount of latent force daily added. The like must manifestly be the case with all organic modifications consequent on change of climate or food. This is a conclusion which we may safely draw without knowing the special re-arrangements that effect the equilibration. If we see that a different mode of life is followed, after a period of functional derangement, by some altered condition of the system — if we see that this altered condition, becoming by and by established, continues with- out further change; we have no alternative but to say, that the new forces brought to bear on the system, have been compensated by the opposing forces they have evoked. And this is the interpretation of the process which we call adaptation. Finally, each organism illustrates the law in the ensemhle of its life. At the outset it daily absorbs under the form of food, an amount of force greater than it daily expends; and the surplus is daily equilibrated by groAvth. As maturity is approached, this surplus dimin- ishes; and in the perfect organism, the day's absorption of potential motion balances the day's expenditure of actual motion. That is to say, during adult life, there is continu- ously exhibited an equilibration of the third order. Even- tually, the daily loss, beginning to out-balance the daily gain, there results a diminishing amount of functional ac- tion; the organic rhythms extend less and less widely on each side of the medium state ; and there finally results that complete equilibration which we call death. The ultimate structural state accompanying that ulti- mate functional state towards which an organism tends, both individually and as a species, may be deduced from one of the propositions set down in the opening section of this chap- ter. AVe saw that the limit of heterogeneity is arrived at whenever the equilibration of any aggregate becomes com- plete— that the re-distribution of matter can continue so long only as there continues any motion unbalanced. Whence we found it to follow that the final structural ar- EQUILIBRATION. 51 5 rangements, must be such as will meet all the forces acting on the aggregate, by equivalent antagonistic forces. What is the implication in the case of organic aggregates; the equi- librium of which is a moving one? We have seen that the maintenance of such a moving equilibrium, requires the habitual genesis of internal forces corresponding in number, directions, and amounts to the external incident forces — as many inner functions, single or combined, as there are single or combined outer actions to be met. But functions are the correlatives of organs; amounts of functions are, other things equal, the correlatives of sizes of organs ; and combi- nations of functions the correlatives of connections of or- gans. Hence the structural complexity accompanying functional equilibration, is definable as one in which there are as many specialized parts as are capable, separately and jointly, of counteracting the separate and joint forces amid which the organism exists. And this is the limit of organic heterogeneity; to which man has approached more nearly than any other creature. Groups of organisms display this universal tendency to- wards a balance very obviously. In § 85, every species of plant and animal was shown to be perpetually undergoing a rhythmical variation in number — now from abundance of food and absence of enemies rising above its average; and then by a consequent scarcity of food and abundance of ene- mies being depressed below its average. And here we have to observe that there is thus maintained an equilibrium be- tween the sum of those forces which result in the increase of each race, and the sum of those forces which result in its de- crease. Either limit of variation is a point at which the one set of forces, before in excess of the other, is counterbalanced by it. And amid these oscillations produced by their con- flict, lies that average number of the species at which its expansive tendency is in equilibrium with surrounding re- pressive tendencies. ^Nor can it be questioned that this bal- ancing of the preservative and destructive forces which 516 EQUILIBRATION. we see going on in every race, must necessarily go on. Since increase of number cannot but continue until increase of mortality stops it; and decrease of number cannot but con- tinue until it is either arrested by fertility or extinguishes the race entirely. § 174. The equilibrations of those nervous actions which constitute what we know as mental life, may be classi- fied in like manner with those which constitute what we dis- tinguish as bodily life. AVe may deal with them in the same order. Each pulse of nervous force from moment to moment generated, (and it was shown in § 86 that nervous currents are not continuous but rhythmical) is met by coun- teracting forces; in overcoming which it is dispersed and equilibrated. When tracing out the correlation and equiva- lence of forces, we saw that each sensation and emo- tion, or rather such part of it as remains after the exci- tation of associated ideas and feelings, is expended in working bodily changes — contractions of the involuntary muscles, the voluntary muscles, or both; as also in a cer- tain stimulation of secreting organs. That the movements thus initiated are ever being brought to a close by the oppos- ing forces they evoke, was pointed out above ; and here it is to be observed that the like holds with the nervous changes thus initiated. Various facts prove that the arousing of a thought or feeling, always involves the overcoming of a cer- tain resistance : instance the fact that where the association of mental states has not been frequent, a sensible effort is needed to call up the one after the other; instance the fact that during nervous prostration there is a comparative in- ability to think — the ideas will not follow one another with the habitual rapidity; instance the converse fact that at times of unusual energy, natural or artificial, the friction of thought becomes relatively small, and more numerous, more remote, or more difficult connections of ideas are formed. EQUILIBRATION. 517 That is to say, the wave of nervous energy each instant gen- erated, propagates itself throughout body and brain, along those channels which the conditions at the instant render lines of least resistance; and spreading widely in proportion to its amount, ends only when it is equilibrated by the resist- ances it everywhere meets. If we contemplate men- tal actions as extending over hours and days, we discover equilibrations analogous to those hourly and daily estab- lished among the bodily functions. In the one case as in the other, there are rhythms which exhibit a balancing of opposing forces at each extreme, and the maintenance of a certain general balance. This is seen in the daily alterna- tion of mental activity and mental rest — the forces expend- ed during the one being compensated by the forces ac- quired during the other. It is also seen in the recurring rise and fall of each desire: each desire reaching a certain intensity, is equilibrated either by expenditure of the force it embodies, in the desired actions, or, less completely, in the imagination of such actions: the process ending in that sa- tiety, or that comparative quiescence, forming the opposite limit of the rhythm. And it is further manifest under a two- fold form, on occasions of intense joy or grief: each parox- ysm of passion, expressing itself in vehement bodily actions, presently reaches an extreme whence the counteracting forces produce a return to a condition of moderate excite- ment; and the successive paroxysms finally diminishing in intensity, end in a mental equilibrium either like that be- fore existing, or partially differing from it in its medium state. But the species of mental equilibration to be more especially noted, is that shown in the establishment of a correspondence between relations among our states of con- sciousness and relations in the external world. Each outer connection of phenomena which we are capable of perceiv- ing, generates, through accumulated experiences, an inner connection of mental state; and the result towards which this process tends, is the formation of a mental connection 518 EQUILIBRATION. having a relative strength that answers to the relative con- stancy of the physical connection represented. In conform- ity with the general law that motion pursues the line of least resistance, and that, other things equal, a line once taken by motion is made a line that will be more readily pursued by future motion; we have seen that the ease with which nervous impressions follow one another, is, other things equal, great in proportion to the number of times they have been repeated together in experience. Hence, corresponding to such an invariable relation as that between the resistance of an object and some extension possessed by it, there arises an indissoluble connection in conscious- ness; and this connection, being as absolute internally as the answering one is externally, undergoes no further change — the inner relation is in perfect equilibrium with the outer relation. Conversely, it hence happens that to such uncer- tain relations of phenomena as that between clouds and rain, there arise relations of ideas of a like uncertainty; and if, under given aspects of the sky, the tendencies to infer fair or foul weather, correspond to the frequencies with which fair or foul weather follow such aspects, the accumulation of experiences has balanced the mental sequences and the physical sequences. When it is remembered that between these extremes there are countless orders of external connec- tions having different degrees of constancy, and that during the evolution of intelligence there arise answering internal associations having different degrees of cohesion; it will be seen that there is a progress towards equilibrium between the relations of thought and the relations of things. This equilibration can end only when each relation of things has generated in us a relation of thought, such that on the occurrence of the conditions, the relation in thought arises as certainly as the relation in things. Supposing this state to be reached (which however it can be only in infinite time) experience will cease to produce any further mental evolu- tion— there will have been reached a perfect correspondence EQUILIBRATION. 519 between ideas and facts; and the intellectual adaptation of man to his circumstances will be complete. The like general truths are exhibited in the process of moral adaptation; which is a continual approach to equilibrium between the emotions and the kinds of conduct necessitated by surrounding conditions. The connections of feelings and actions, are determined in the same way as the connections of ideas: just as repeating the association of two ideas, facili- tates the excitement of the one by the other; so does each discharge of feeling into action, render the subsequent dis- charge of such feeling into such action more easy. Hence it happens that if an individual is placed permanently in condi- tions which demand more action of a special kind than has before been requisite, or than is natural to him — if the pres- sure of the painful feelings which these conditions entail when disregarded, impels him to perform this action to a greater extent — if by every more frequent or more length- ened performance of it under such pressure, the resistance is somewhat diminished; then, clearly, there is an advance to- wards a balance between the demand for this kind of action and the supply of it. Either in himself, or in his descend- ants continuing to live under these conditions, enforced repetition must eventually bring about a state in which this mode of directing the energies will be no more repugnant than the various other modes previously natural to the race. Hence the limit towards which emotional modifica- tion perpetually tends, and to which it must approach indefi- nitely near (though it can absolutely reach it only in infinite time) is a combination of desires that correspond to all the different orders of activity which the circumstances of life call for — desires severally proportionate in strength to the needs for these orders of activity; and severally satisfied by these orders of activity. In what we distinguish as acquired habits, and in the moral differences of races and nations produced by habits that are maintained through suc- cessive generations, we have countless illustrations of this 520 EQUILIBRATION. progressive adaptation; which can cease only with the estab- lishment of a complete equilibrium between constitution and conditions. Possibly some will fail to see how the equilibrations de- scribed in this section, can be classed with those preceding them; and will be inclined to say that what are here set down as facts, are but analogies. Xevertheless such equili- brations are as truly physical as the rest. To show this fully, would require a more detailed analysis than can now be entered on. For the present it must suffice to point out, as before (§ 71), that what we know subjectively as states of consciousness, are, objectively, modes of force; that so much feeling is the correlate of so much motion ; that the perform- ance of any bodily action is the transformation of a certain amount of feeling into its equivalent amount of motion ; that this bodily action is met by forces which it is expended in overcoming; and that the necessity for the frequent repeti- tion of this action, implies the frequent recurrence of forces to be so overcome. Hence the existence in any individual of an emotional stimulus that is in equilibrium with certain ex- ternal requirements, is literally the habitual production of a certain specialized portion of nervous energy, equivalent in amount to a certain order of external resistances that are habitually met. And thus the ultimate state, forming the limit towards which Evolution carries us, is one in which the kinds and quantities of mental energy daily generated and transformed into motions, are equivalent to, or in equilib- rium with, the various orders and degrees of surrounding forces which antagonize such motions. § 175. Each society taken as a whole, displays the pro- cess of equilibration in the continuous adjustment of its population to its means of subsistence. A tribe of men liv- ing on wild animals and fruits, is manifestly, like every tribe of inferior creatures, always oscillating about that average number which the locality can support. Though EQUILIBRATION. 521 by artificial production, and by successive improvements in artificial production, a superior race continually alters the limit which external conditions put to population ; yet there is ever a checking of population at the temporary limit reached. It is true that where the limit is being so rapidly changed as among ourselves, there is no actual stoppage: there is only a rhythmical variation in the rate of increase. But in noting the causes of this rhythmical variation — in watching how, during periods of abundance, the proportion of marriages increases, and how it decreases during periods of scarcity ; it will be seen that the expansive force produces unusual advance whenever the repressive force diminishes, and vice versa; and thus there is as near balancing of the two as the changing conditions permit. The internal actions constituting social functions, exem- plify the general principle no less clearly. Supply and de- mand are continually being adjusted throughout all indus- trial processes; and this equilibration is interpretable in the same way as preceding ones. The production and distribu- tion of a commodity, is the expression of a certain aggregate of forces causing special kinds and amounts of motion. The price of this commodity, is the measure of a certain other aggregate of forces expended by the labourer who purchases it, in other kinds and amounts of motion. And the varia- tions of price represent a rhythmical balancing of these forces. Every rise or fall in the rate of interest, or change in the value of a particular security, implies a conflict of forces in which some, becoming temporarily predominant, cause a movement that is presently arrested or equilibrated by the increase of opposing forces ; and amid these daily and hourly oscillations, lies a more slowly-varying medium, into which the value ever tends to settle ; and would settle but for the constant addition of new influences. As in the individual organism so in the social organism, functional equilibrations generate structural equilibrations. When on the workers in any trade there comes an increased demand, 35 522 EQUILIBRATION. and when in return for the increased supply, there is given to them an amount of other commodities larger than was before habitual — when, consequently, the resistances overcome by them in sustaining life are less than the resistances overcome by other workers; there results a now of other workers into this trade. This flow continues until the extra demand is met, and the wages so far fall again, that the total resistance overcome in obtaining a given amount of produce, is as great in this newly-adopted occupation as in the occupations whence it drew recruits. The occurrence of motion along lines of least resistance, was before shown to necessitate the growth of population in those places where the labour re- quired for self -maintenance is the smallest; and here we fur- ther see that those engaged in any such advantageous local- ity, or advantageous business, must multiply till there arises an approximate balance between this locality or business and others accessible to the same citizens. In determining the career of every youth, we see an estimation by parents of the respective advantages offered by all that are available, and a choice of the one which promises best; and through the consequent influx into trades that are at the time most profitable, and the withholding of recruits from over-stocked trades, there is insured a general equipoise between the power of each social organ and the function it has to per- form. The various industrial actions and re-actions thus con- tinually alternating, constitute a dependent moving equi- librium like that which is maintained among the functions of an individual organism. And this dependent moving equilibrium parallels those already contemplated, in its tendency to become more complete. During early stages of social evolution, while yet the resources of the locality in- habited are unexplored, and the arts of production undevel- oped, there is never anything more than a temporary and partial balancing of such actions, under the form of accelera- tion or retardation of growth. But when a society ap- EQUILIBRATION. 523 proaclies the maturity of that type on which it is organized, the various industrial activities settle down into a compara- tively constant state. Moreover, it is observable that advance in organization, as well as advance in growth, is conducive to a better equilibrium of industrial functions. While the diffusion of mercantile information is slow, and the means of transport deficient, the adjustment of supply to demand is extremely imperfect: great over-production of each com- modity followed by great under-production, constitute a rhythm having extremes that depart very widely from the mean state in which demand and supply are equilibrated. But when good roads are made, and there is a rapid diffusion of printed or written intelligence, and still more when rail- ways and telegraphs come into existence — when the periodi- cal fairs of early days lapse into weekly markets, and these into daily markets ; there is gradually produced a better bal- ance of production and consumption. Extra demand is much more quickly followed by augmented supply ; and the rapid oscillations of price within narrow limits on either side of a comparatively uniform mean, indicate a near approach to equilibrium. Evidently this industrial progress has for its limit, that which Mr. Mill has called " the sta- tionary state." When population shall have become dense over all habitable parts of the globe ; when the resources of every region have been fully explored; and when the pro- ductive arts admit of no further improvements; there must result an almost complete balance, both between the fertility and mortality of each society, and between its producing and consuming activities. Each society will exhibit only minor deviations from its average number, and the rhythm of its industrial functions will go on from day to day and year to year with comparatively insignificant perturbations. This limit, however, though we are inevitably advancing towards it, is indefinitely remote ; and can never indeed be absolutely reached. The peopling of the Earth up to the point sup- posed, cannot take place by simple spreading. In the fu- 524 EQUILIBRATION. ture, as in the past, the process will be carried on rhythmical- ly? by waves of emigration from new and higher centres of civilization successively arising; and by the supplanting of inferior races by the superior races they beget; and the process so carried on must be extremely slow. Xor does it seem to me that such an equilibration will, as Mr. Mill suggests, leave scope for further mental culture and moral progress; but rather that the approximation to it must be simultaneous with the approximation to complete equilib- rium between man's nature and the conditions of his ex- istence. One other kind of social equilibration has still to be com sidered : — that which results in the establishment of govern- mental institutions, and which becomes complete as these institutions fall into harmony with ihe desires of the people. There is a demand and supply in political affairs as in in- dustrial affairs; and in the one case as in the other, the antag- onist forces produce a rhythm which, at first extreme in its oscillations, slowly settles down into a moving equilibrium of comparative regularity. Those aggressive impulses in- herited from the pre-social state — those tendencies to seek self-satisfaction regardless of injury to other beings, which are essential to a predatory life, constitute an anti-social force, tending ever to cause conflict and eventual separation of citizens. Contrariwise, those desires whose ends can be achieved only by union, as well as those sentiments which find satisfaction through intercourse with fellow-men, and those resulting in what we call loyalty, are forces tending to keep the units of a society together. On the one hand, there is in each citizen, more or less of resistance against all restraints imposed on his actions by other citizens: a re- sistance which, tending continually to widen each indi- vidual's sphere of action, and reciprocally to limit the spheres of action of other individuals, constitutes a repul- sive force mutually exercised by the members of a social aggregate. On the other hand, the general sympathy of EQUILIBRATION. 525 man for man, and the more special sympathy of each vari- ety of man for others of the same variety, together with sundry allied feelings which the social state gratifies, act as an attractive force, tending ever to keep united those who have a common ancestry. And since the resistances to be overcome in satisfying the totality of their desires when living separately, are greater than the resistances to be over- come in satisfying the totality of their desires when living together, there is a residuary force that prevents their sepa- ration. Like all other opposing forces, those exerted by citizens on each other, are ever producing alternating move- ments, which, at first extreme, undergo a gradual diminu- tion on the way to ultimate equilibrium. In small, unde- veloped, societies, marked rhythms result from these con- flicting tendencies. A tribe whose members have held together for a generation or two, reaches a size at which it will not hold together ; and on the occurrence of some event causing unusual antagonism among its members, divides. Each primitive nation, depending largely for its continued union on the character of its chief, exhibits wide oscilla- tions between an extreme in which the subjects are under rigid restraint, and an extreme in which the restraint is not enough to prevent disorder. In more advanced nations of like type, we always find violent actions and reactions of the same essential nature — " despotism tempered by assas- sination," characterizing a political state in which unbear- able repression from time to time brings about a bursting of all bonds. In this familiar fact, that a period of tyranny is followed by a period of license and vice versa, we see how these opposing forces are ever equilibrating each other; and we also see, in the tendency of such movements and counter- movements to become more moderate, how the equilibra- tion progresses towards completeness. The conflicts be- tween Conservatism (which stands for the restraints of so- ciety over the individual) and Reform (which stands for the liberty of the individual against society), fall within 526 EQUILIBRATION. slowly approximating limits; so that the temporary pre- dominance of either, produces a less marked deviation from the medium state. This process, now so far ad- vanced among ourselves that the oscillations are compara- tively unobtrusive, must go on till the balance between the antagonistic forces approaches indefinitely near perfection. For, as wTe have already seen, the adaptation of man's nature to the conditions of his existence, cannot cease until the in- ternal forces which we know as feelings are in equilibrium with the external forces they encounter. And the establish- ment of this equilibrium, is the arrival at a state of human nature and social organization, such that the individual has no desires but those which may be satisfied without exceed- ing his proper sphere of action, while society maintains no restraints but those which the individual voluntarily re- spects. The progressive extension of the liberty of citizens, and the reciprocal removal of political restrictions, are the steps by which we advance towards this state. And the ulti- mate abolition of all limits to the freedom of each, save those imposed by the like freedom of all, must result from the complete equilibration between man's desires and the con- duct necessitated by surrounding conditions. Of course in this case, as in the preceding ones, there is thus involved a limit to the increase of heterogeneity. A few pages back, we reached the conclusion that each advance in mental evolution, is the establishment of some further internal action, corresponding to some further external ac- tion— some additional connection of ideas or feelings, an- swering to some before unknown or unantagonized con- nection of phenomena. We inferred that each such new function, involving some new modification of structure, implies an increase of heterogeneity; and that thus, in- crease of heterogeneity must go on, while there remain any outer relations affecting the organism which are unbalanced by inner relations. Whence we saw it to follow that in- crease of heterogeneity can come to an end only as equilibra- EQUILIBRATION. 527 tion is completed. Evidently the like must simultaneously take place with society. Each increment of heterogeneity in the individual, must directly or indirectly involve, as cause or consequence, some increment of heterogeneity in the arrangements of the aggregate of individuals. And the limit to social complexity can be arrived at, only with the establishment of the equilibrium, just described, between social and individual forces. § 176. Here presents itself a final question, which has probably been taking a more or less distinct shape in the minds of many, while reading this chapter. " If Evolution of every kind, is an increase in complexity of structure and function that is incidental to the universal process of equili- bration, and if equilibration must end in complete rest; what is the fate towards which all things tend ? If the Solar System is slowly dissipating its forces — if the Sun is losing his heat at a rate which will tell in millions of years — if with diminution of the Sun's radiations there must go on a diminution in the activity of geologic and meteorologic processes as well as in the quantity of vegetal and animal existence — if Man and Society are similarly dependent on this supply of force that is gradually coining to an end ; are we not manifestly progressing towards omnipresent death? " That such a state must be the outcome of the processes everywhere going on, seems beyond doubt. Whether any ulterior process may reverse these changes, and initiate a new life, is a question to be considered hereafter. Eor the present it must suffice that the proximate end of all the transformations we have traced, is a state of quiescence. This admits of a priori proof. It will soon become apparent that the law of equilibration, not less than the preceding general laws, is deducible from the persistence of force. We have seen (§ 74) that phenomena are interpretable only as the results of universally-coexistent forces of attrac- tion and repulsion. These universally-coexistent forces of 528 EQUILIBRATION. attraction and repulsion, are, indeed, the complementary as- pects of that absolutely persistent force which is the ultimate datum of consciousness. Just in the same way that the equality of action and re-action is a corollary from the per- sistence of force, since their inequality would imply the dis- appearance of the differential force into nothing, or its ap- pearance out of nothing; so, we cannot become conscious of an attractive force without becoming simultaneously con- scious of an equal and opposite repulsive force. For every experience of a muscular tension, (under which form alone we can immediately know an attractive force,) presupposes an equivalent resistance — a resistance shown in the counter- balancing pressure of the body against neighbouring objects, or in that absorption of force which gives motion to the body, or in both — a resistance which we cannot conceive as other than equal to the tension, without conceiving force to have either appeared or disappeared, and so denying the persistence of force. And from this necessary correlation, results our inability, before pointed out, of interpreting any phenomena save in terms of these correlatives — an ina- bility shown alike in the compulsion we are under to think of the statical forces which tangible matter displays, as due to the attraction and repulsion of its atoms, and in the com- pulsion we are under to think of dynamical forces exercised through space, by regarding space as filled with atoms simi- larly endowed. Thus from the existence of a force that is for ever unchangeable in quantity, there follows, as a neces- sary corollary, the co-extensive existence of these opposite forms of force — forms under which the conditions of our consciousness oblige us to represent that absolute force which transcends our knowledge. But the forces of attraction and repulsion being univer- sally co-existent, it follows, as before shown, that all motion is motion under resistance. Units of matter, solid, liquid, aeriform, or ethereal, filling the space which any moving body traverses, offer to such body the resistance consequent EQUILIBRATION. 529 on their cohesion, or their inertia, or both. In other words, the denser or rarer medium which occupies the places from moment to moment passed through by such moving body, having to be expelled from them, as much motion is ab- stracted from the moving body as is given to the medium in expelling it from these places. This being the condition under which all motion occurs, two corollaries result. The first is, that the deductions perpetually made by the com- munication of motion to the resisting medium, cannot but bring the motion of the body to an end in a longer or shorter time. The second is, that the motion of the body cannot cease until these deductions destroy it. In other words, movement must continue till equilibration takes place; and equilibration must eventually take place. Both these are manifest deductions from the persistence of force. To say that the whole or part of a body's motion can disappear, save by transfer to something which resists its motion, is to say that the whole or part of its motion can disappear without effect; which is to deny the persistence of force. Con- versely, to say that the medium traversed can be moved out of the body's path, without deducting from the body's mo- tion, is to say that motion of the medium can arise out of nothing; which is to deny the persistence of force. Hence this primordial truth is our immediate warrant for the con- clusions, that the changes which Evolution presents, cannot end until equilibrium is reached ; and that equilibrium must at last be reached. Equally necessary, because equally deducible from this same truth that transcends proof, are the foregoing proposi- tions respecting the establishment and maintenance of mov- ing equilibria, under their several aspects. It follows from the persistence of force, that the various motions possessed by any aggregate, either as a whole or among its parts, must be severally dissipated by the resistances they severally en- counter ; and that thus, such of them as are least in amount, or meet with greatest opposition, or both, will be brought to 530 EQUILIBRATION. a close while the others continue. Hence in every diversely moving aggregate, there results a comparatively early dissi- pation of motions which are smaller and much resisted ; fol- lowed by long-continuance of the larger and less-resisted motions; and so there arise dependent and independent moving equilibria. Hence also may be inferred the tend- ency to conservation of such moving equilibria. For the new motion given to the parts of a moving equilibrium by a disturbing force, must either be of such kind and amount that it cannot be dissipated before the pre-existing motions, in which case it brings the moving equilibrium to an end; or else it must be of such kind and amount that it can be dissipated before the pre-existing motions, in which case the moving equilibrium is re-established. Thus from the persistence of force follow, not only the various direct and indirect equilibrations going on around, together with that cosmical equilibration which brings Evo- lution under all its forms to a close; but also those less manifest equilibrations shown in the re-adjustments of moving equilibria that have been disturbed. By this ulti- mate principle is provable the tendency of every organism, disordered by some unusual influence, to return to a bal- anced state. To it also may be traced the capacity, pos- sessed in a slight degree by individuals, and in a greater degree by species becoming adapted to new circumstances. And not less does it afford a basis for the inference, that there is a gradual advance towards harmony between man's mental nature and the conditions of his existence. After finding that from it are deducible the various characteristics of Evolution, we finally draw from it a warrant for the belief, that Evolution can end only in the establishment of the greatest perfection and the most complete happiness. CHAPTEE XXIII. DISSOLUTION. § 177. When, in Chapter XII., Ave glanced at the cycle of changes through which every existence passes, in its pro- gress from the imperceptible to the perceptible and again from the perceptible to the imperceptible — when these opposite re-distributions of matter and motion were sev- erally distinguished as Evolution and Dissolution; the na- tures of the two, and the conditions under which they respectively occur, were specified in general terms. Since then, we have contemplated the phenomena of Evolution in detail ; and have followed them out to those states of equilib- rium in which they all end. To complete the argument we must now contemplate, somewhat more in detail than before, the complementary phenomena of Dissolution. Xot, indeed, that we need dwell long on Dissolution, which has none of those various and interesting aspects which Evo- lution presents; but something more must be said than has yet been said. It was shown that neither of these two antagonistic pro- cesses ever goes on absolutely unqualified by the other; and that a change towards either is a differential result of the conflict between them. An evolving aggregate, while on the average losing motion and integrating, is always, in one way or other, receiving some motion and to that extent disintegrating; and after the integrative changes have ceased to predominate, the reception of motion, though 531 532 DISSOLUTION. perpetually checked by its dissipation, constantly tends to produce a reverse transformation, and eventually does pro- duce it. When Evolution has run its course — when the aggregate has at length parted with its excess of motion, and habitually receives as much from its environment as it habitually loses — when it has reached that equilibrium in which its changes end; it thereafter remains subject to all actions in its environment which may increase the quantity of motion it contains, and which in the lapse of time are sure, either slowly or suddenly, to give its parts such excess of motion as will cause disintegration. According as its equilibrium is a very unstable or a very stable one, its dis- solution may come quickly or may be indefinitely delayed — may occur in a few days or may be postponed for millions of years. But exposed as it is to the contingencies not simply of its immediate neighbourhood but of a Universe every- where in motion, the period must at last come when, either alone or in company with surrounding aggregates, it has its parts dispersed. The process of dissolution so caused, we have here to look at as it takes place in aggregates of different orders. The course of change being the reverse of that hitherto traced, we may properly take the illustrations of it in the reverse order — beginning with the most complex and ending with the most simple. § 178. Regarding the evolution of a society as at once an increase in the number of individuals integrated into a corporate body, an increase in the masses and varieties of the parts into which this corporate body divides as well as of the actions called their functions, and an increase in the degree of combination among these masses and their func- tions; we shall see that social dissolution conforms to the general law in being, materially considered, a disintegration, and, dynamically considered, a decrease in the movements of wholes and an increase in the movements of parts; while DISSOLUTION. 533 it further conforms to the general law in being caused by an excess of motion in some way or other received from without. It is obvious that the social dissolution which follows the aggression of another nation, and which, as history shows us, is apt to occur when social evolution has ended and decay has begun, is, under its broadest aspect, the incidence of a new external motion; and when, as sometimes happens, the conquered society is dispersed, its dissolution is literally a cessation of those corporate movements which the society, both in its army and in its industrial bodies, presented, and a lapse into individual or uncombined movements — the motion of units replaces the motion of masses. It cannot be questioned, either, that when plague or famine at home, or a revolution abroad, gives to any society an unusual shock that causes disorder, or incipient dissolu- tion, there results a decrease of integrated movements and an increase of disintegrated movements. As the disorder progresses, the political actions previously combined under one government become uncombined: there arise the an- tagonistic actions of riot or revolt. Simultaneously, the in- dustrial and commercial processes that were co-ordinated throughout the whole body politic, are broken up; and only the local, or small, trading transactions continue. And each further disorganizing change diminishes the joint opera- tions by which men satisfy their wants, and leaves them to satisfy their wants, so far as they can, by separate opera- tions. Of the way in which such disintegrations are liable to be set up in a society that has evolved to the limit of its type, and reached a state of moving equilibrium, a good illustration is furnished by Japan. The finished fabric into which its people had organized themselves, main- tained an almost constant state so long as it was preserved from fresh external forces. But as soon as it received an impact from European civilization, partly by armed aggres- sion, partly by commercial impulse, partly by the influence 534 DISSOLUTION. of ideas, this fabric began to fall to pieces. There is now in progress a political dissolution. Probably a political re- organization will follow; but, be this as it may, the change thus far produced by an outer action is a change towards dissolution — a change from integrated motions to disinte- grated motions. Even where a society that has developed into the highest form permitted by the characters of its units, begins there- after to dwindle and decay, the progressive dissolution is still essentially of the same nature. Decline of numbers is, in such case, brought about partly by emigration; for a society having the fixed structure in which evolution ends, is necessarily one that will not yield and modify under pressure of population: so long as its structure will yield and modify, it is still evolving. Hence the surplus popula- tion continually produced, not held together by an organiza- tion that adapts itself to an augmenting number, is contin- ually dispersed: the influences brought to bear on the citi- zens by other societies, cause their detachment, and there is an increase in the uncombined motions of units instead of an increase of combined motions. Gradually as rigidity be- comes greater, and the society becomes still less capable of being re-moulded into the form required for successful competition with growing and more plastic societies, the number of citizens who can live within its unyielding frame- work becomes positively smaller. Hence it dwindles both through continued emigration and through the diminished multiplication that follows innutrition. And this further dwindling or dissolution, caused by the number of those who die becoming greater than the number of those who survive long enough to rear offspring, is similarly a decrease in the total quantity of combined motion and an increase in the quantity of uncombined motion — as we shall pres- ently see when we come to deal with individual dissolution. Considering, then, that social aggregates differ so much from aggregates of other kinds, formed as they are of units DISSOLUTION. 535 held together loosely and indirectly, in such variable ways by such complex forces, the process of dissolution among them conforms to the general law quite as clearly as could be expected. § 179. When from these super-organic aggregates we descend to organic aggregates, the truth that Dissolution is a disintegration of matter, caused by the reception of ad- ditional motion from without, becomes easily demonstrable. We will look first at the transformation and afterwards at its cause. Death, or that final equilibration which precedes dissolu- tion, is the bringing to a close of all those conspicuous integrated motions that arose during evolution. The im- pulsions of the body from place to place first cease; pres- ently the limbs cannot be stirred; later still the respira- tory actions stop ; finally the heart becomes stationary, and, with it, the circulating fluids. That is, the transformation of molecular motion into the motion of masses, comes to an end; and each of these motions of masses, as it ends, disappears into molecular motions. What next takes place ? We cannot say that there is any further transformation of sensible movements into insensible movements; for sensible movements no longer exist. Nevertheless, the process of decay involves an increase of insensible movements; since these are far greater in the gases generated by decomposi- tion, than they are in the fluid-solid matters out of which the gases arise. Each of the complex chemical units composing an organic body, possesses a rhythmic motion in which its many component units jointly partake. When decomposi- tion breaks up these complex molecules, and their constitu- ents assume gaseous forms, there is, besides that increase of motion implied by the diffusion, a resolution of such mo- tions as the aggregate molecules possessed, into motions of their constituent molecules. So that in organic dissolu- tion we have, first, an end put to that transformation of the 536 DISSOLUTION. motion of units into the motion of aggregates, which con- stitutes evolution, dynamically considered; and we have also, though in a subtler sense, a transformation of the motion of aggregates into the motion of units. Still it is not thus shown that organic dissolution fully answers to the general definition of dissolution — the absorption of motion and concomitant disintegration of matter. The disintegra- tion of matter is, indeed, conspicuous enough; but the ab- sorption of motion is not conspicuous. True, the fact that motion has been absorbed may be inferred from the fact that the particles previously integrated into a solid mass, occupying a small space, have most of them moved away from one another and now occupy a great space; for the motion implied by this transposition must have been ob- tained from somewhere. But its source is not obvious. A little search, however, will bring us to its derivation. At a temperature below the freezing point of water, de- composition of organic matter does not take place — the integrated motions of the highly integrated molecules are not resolved into the disintegrated motions of their com- ponent molecules. Dead bodies kept at this temperature for an indefinitely long period, are prevented from decom- posing for an indefinitely long period: witness the frozen carcases of Mammoths — Elephants of a species long ago extinct — that are found imbedded in the ice at the mouths of Siberian rivers; and which, though they have been there for many thousands of years, have flesh so fresh that when at length exposed, it is devoured by wolves. AVliat now is the meaning of such exceptional preservations? A body kept below freezing point, is a body which receives very little heat by radiation or conduction; and the reception of but little heat is the reception of but little molecular motion. That is to say, in an environment which does not furnish it with molecular motion passing a certain amount, an organic body does not undergo dissolution. Confirmatory evidence is yielded by the variations in rate of dissolution DISSOLUTION. 537 which accompany variations of temperature. All know that in cool weather the organic substances used in our house- holds keep longer, as we say, than in hot weather. Equally certain, if less familiar, is the fact that in tropical climates decay proceeds much more rapidly than in temperate cli- mates. Thus, in proportion as the molecular motion of surrounding matter is great, the dead organism receives an abundant supply of motion to replace the motion continually taken up by the dispersing molecules of the gases into which it is being disintegrated. The still quicker decompositions produced by exposure to artificially-raised temperatures, afford further proofs ; as instance those which occur in cooking. The charred surfaces of parts that have been much heated, show us that the molecular motion ab- sorbed has served to dissipate in gaseous forms all the ele- ments but the carbon. The nature and cause of Dissolution are thus clearly dis- played by the aggregates which so clearly display the na- ture and cause of Evolution. One of these aggregates being composed of that peculiar matter to which a large quantity of constitutional motion gives great plasticity, and the abil- ity to evolve into a highly compound form (§ 103); we see that after evolution has ceased, a very moderate amount of molecular motion, added to that already locked up in its peculiar matter, suffices to cause dissolution. Though at death there is reached a stable equilibrium among the sensible masses, or organs, which make up the body; yet, as the insensible units or molecules of which these organs consist are in unstable equilibrium, small incident forces suffice to overthrow them, and hence disintegration pro- ceeds rapidly. § 180. Most inorganic aggregates, having arrived at dense forms in which comparatively little motion is retained, remain long without marked changes. Each has lost so much motion in passing from the disintegrated to the inte- 36 538 DISSOLUTION. grated state, that much motion must be given to it to cause resumption of the disintegrated state; and an im- mense time may elapse before there occur in the environ- ment, changes great enough to communicate to it the requi- site quantity of motion. AVe will look first at those excep- tional inorganic aggregates which retain much motion, and therefore readily undergo dissolution. Among these are the liquids and volatile solids which dissipate under ordinary conditions — water that evaporates, carbonate of ammonia that wastes away by the dispersion of its molecules. In all such cases motion is absorbed; and always the dissolution is rapid in proportion as the quantity of heat or motion which the aggregated mass receives from its environment is great. Xext come the cases in which the molecules of a highly integrated or solid aggre- gate, are dispersed among the molecules of a less integrated or liquid aggregate ; as in aqueous solutions. One evidence that this disintegration of matter has for its concomitant the absorption of motion, is that soluble substances dissolve the more quickly the hotter the water: supposing always that no elective affinity comes into play. Another and still more conclusive evidence is, that when crystals of a given temperature are placed in water of the same temperature, the process of solution is accompanied by a fall of tempera- ture— often a very great one. Omitting instances in which some chemical action takes place between the salt and the water, it is a uniform law that the motion which disperses the molecules of the salt through the water, is at the expense of the molecular motion possessed by the water. Masses of sediment accumulated into strata, afterwards compressed by many thousands of feet of superincumbent strata, and reduced in course of time to a solid state, may remain for millions of years unchanged; but in sub- sequent millions of years they are inevitably exposed to disintegrating actions. Raised along with other such masses into a continent, denuded and exposed to rain, frost, and DISSOLUTION. 539 the grinding actions of glaciers, they have their particles gradually separated, carried away, and widely dispersed. Or when, as otherwise happens, the encroaching sea reaches them, the undermined cliffs which they form fall from time to time, breaking into fragments of all sizes; the waves, rolling about the small pieces, and in storms turning over and knocking together the larger blocks, reduce them to boulders and pebbles, and at last to sand and mud. Even if portions of the disintegrated strata accumulate into shingle banks, which afterwards become solidified, the process of dissolution, arrested though it may be for some enormous geologic period, is finally resumed. As many a shore shows us, the conglomerate itself is sooner or later subject to the like processes; and its cemented masses of heterogeneous components, lying on the beach, are broken up and worn away by impact and attrition — that is, by communicated mechanical motion. When not thus affected, the disintegration is effected by communicated molecular motion. The consolidated stra- tum, located in some area of subsidence, and brought down nearer and nearer to the regions occupied by molten matter, comes eventually to have its particles brought to a plastic state by heat, or finally melted down into liquid. Whatever may be its subsequent transformations, the transformation then exhibited by it is an absorption of motion and disinte- gration of matter. Be it simple or compound, small or large, a crystal or a mountain chain, every inorganic aggregate on the Earth, thus, at some time or other, undergoes a reversal of those changes undergone during its evolution. Not that it usually passes back completely from the perceptible into the imper- ceptible; as organic aggregates do in great part, if not wholly. But still its disintegration and dispersion carry it some distance on the way towards the imperceptible ; and there are reasons for thinking that its arrival there is but delayed. At a period immeasurably remote, every such 540 DISSOLUTION. inorganic aggregate, along with all undissipated remnants of organic aggregates, must be reduced to a state of gaseous diffusion, and so complete the cycle of its changes. § 181. For the Earth as a whole, when it has gone through the entire series of its ascending transformations, must remain, like all smaller aggregates, exposed to the contingencies of its environment ; and in the course of those ceaseless changes in progress throughout a Universe of which all parts are in motion, must, at some period be- yond the utmost stretch of imagination, be subject to forces sufficient to cause its complete disintegration. Let us glance at the forces competent to disintegrate it. In his essay on " The Inter-action of Xatural Forces," Prof. Helmholtz states the thermal equivalent of the Earth's movement through space, as calculated on the now received datum of Mr. Joule. " If our Earth," he says, " were by a sudden shock brought to rest in her orbit, — which is not to be feared in the existing arrangement of our system — by such a shock a quantity of heat would be generated equal to that produced by the combustion of fourteen such Earths of solid coal. Making the most unfavourable assumption as to its capacity for heat, that is, placing it equal to that of water, the mass of the Earth would thereby be heated 11,200 degrees; it would therefore be quite fused, and for the most part reduced to vapour. If then the Earth, after having been thus brought to rest, should fall into the Sun, which of course would be the case, the quan- tity of heat developed by the shock would be 400 times greater." Now though this calculation seems to be nothing to the purpose, since the Earth is not likely to be suddenly arrested in its orbit and not likely there- fore suddenly to fall into the Sun; yet, as before pointed out (§ 171), there is a force at work which it is held must at last bring the Earth into the Sun. This force is the re- DISSOLUTION. 541 sistance of the ethereal medium. From ethereal resistance is inferred a retardation of all moving bodies in the Solar System — a retardation which certain astronomers contend even now shows its effects in the relative nearness to one another of the orbits of the older planets. If, then, retarda- tion is going on, there must come a time, no matter how remote, when the slowly diminishing orbit of the Earth will end in the Sun; and though the quantity of molar motion to be then transformed into molecular motion, will not be so great as that which the calculation of Helmholtz supposes, it will be great enough to reduce the substance of the Earth to a gaseous state. This dissolution of the Earth, and, at intervals, of every other planet, is not, however, a dissolution of the Solar System. Viewed in their ensemble, all the changes ex- hibited throughout the Solar System, are incidents accom- panying the integration of the entire matter composing it: the local integration of which each planet is the scene, completing itself long before the general integration is complete. But each secondary mass having gone through its evolution and reached a state of equilibrium among its parts, thereafter continues in its extinct state, until by the still progressing general integration it is brought into the central mass. And though each such union of a secondary mass with the central mass, implying transformation of molar motion into molecular motion, causes partial dif- fusion of the total mass formed, and adds to the quantity of motion that has to be dispersed in the shape of light and heat; yet it does but postpone the period at which the total mass must become completely integrated, and its excess of contained motion radiated into space. * § 182. Here we come to the question raised at the close of the last chapter — does Evolution as a whole, like * Though this chapter is new, this section, and the one following it, are not new. In the first edition they were included in the final section of the 542 DISSOLUTION. Evolution in detail, advance towards complete quiescence? Is that motionless state called death, which ends Evolution in organic bodies, typical of the universal death in which Evolution at large must end I And have we thus to contem- plate as the outcome of things, a boundless space holding here and there extinct suns, fated to remain for ever with- out further change? To so speculative an inquiry, none but a speculative answer is to be expected. Such answer as may be ventured, must be taken less as a positive answer than as a demurrer to the conclusion that the proximate result must be the ultimate result. If, pushing to its extreme the argument that Evolution must come to a close in complete equilibrium or rest, the reader suggests that for aught which appears to the contrary, the Universal Death thus implied will con- tinue indefinitely, it is legitimate to point out how, on carrying the argument still further, we are led to infer a subsequent Universal Life. Let us see what may be as- signed as grounds for inferring this. It has been already shown that all equilibration, so far as we can trace it, is relative. The dissipation of a body's motion by communication of it to surrounding matter, solid, liquid, gaseous, and ethereal, brings the body to a fixed position in relation to the matter that abstracts its motion. But all its other motions continue. Further, this motion, the disappearance of which causes relative equilibration, is not lost but simply transferred. ^Whether it is directly transformed into insensible motion, as happens in the case of the Sun; or, whether, as in the sensible motions going on around us, it is directly transformed into smaller sensible motions, and these into still smaller, until they become in- sensible, matters not. In every instance the ultimate result is, that whatever motion of masses is lost, re-appears as foregoing chapter. While substantially the same as before, the argument has been in some places abbreviated and in other places enforced by addi- tional matter. DISSOLUTION. 543 molecular motion pervading space. Thus the questions we have to consider, are — Whether after the completion of all the relative equilibrations which bring Evolution to a close, there remain any further equilibrations to be effected? — Whether there are any other motions of masses that must eventually be transformed into molecular motion? — And if there are such other motions, what must be the consequence when the molecular motion generated by their transforma- tion, is added to that which already exists? To the first of these questions the answer is, that there do remain motions which are undiminished by all the relative equilibrations we have considered; namely, the motions of translation possessed by those vast masses of matter called stars — remote suns that are probably, like our own, sur- rounded by circling groups of planets. The belief that the stars are fixed, has long since been abandoned: observation has proved many of them to have sensible proper motions. Moreover, it has been ascertained by measurement that in relation to the stars nearest to us, our own star travels at the rate of about half a million miles per day; and if, as is admitted to be not improbable, our own star is moving in the same direction with adjacent stars, its absolute velocity may be, and most likely is, immensely greater than this. Now no such changes as those taking place within the Solar System, even when carried to the extent of integrating the whole of its matter into one mass, and diffusing all its relative motions in an insensible form through space, can affect these sidereal motions. Hence, there appears no alter- native but to infer that they must remain to be equilibrated by some subsequent process. The next question that arises is — To what law do sidereal motions conform? And to this question Astronomy replies — the law of gravitation. The movements of binary stars have proved this. The periodic times of sundry binary stars have been calculated on the assumption that their revolu- tions are determined by a force like that which regulates the 544 DISSOLUTION. revolutions of planets and satellites; and the subsequent per- formances of their revolutions in the predicted periods, have verified the assumption. If, then, these remote bodies are centres of gravitation, — if we infer that all other stars are centres of gravitation, as we may fairly do — and if we draw the unavoidable corollary, that the gravitative force which so conspicuously affects stars that are near one another, also affects remote stars; we must conclude that all the members of our Sidereal System gravitate, individually and collectively. But if these widely-dispersed moving masses mutually gravitate, what must happen '. There appears but one ten- able answer. They cannot preserve their present arrange- ment: the irregular distribution of our Sidereal System being such as to render even a temporary moving equi- librium impossible. If the stars are centres of an attractive force that varies inversely as the square of the distance, there is no escape from the inference that the structure of our galaxy is undergoing change, and must continue to undergo change. Thus, in the absence of tenable alternatives, we are brought to the positions: — 1, that the stars are in motion; — 2, that they move in conformity with the laws of gravita- tion;— 3, that, distributed as they are, they cannot move in conformity with the law of gravitation, without under- going re-arrangement. If now we ask the nature of this re-arrangement, we find ourselves obliged to infer a pro- gressive concentration. Stars at present dispersed, must become locally aggregated; existing aggregations (except- ing, perhaps, the globular clusters) must grow more dense ; and aggregations must coalesce with one another. That integration has been progressing throughout past eras, we found to be indicated by the structure of the heavens, in general and in detail; and of the extent to which it has in some places already gone, remarkable instances are fur- nished by the Magellanic clouds — two closely-packed ag- DISSOLUTION. 545 glomerations, not, indeed, of single stars only, but of single stars, of clusters regular and irregular, of nebulse, and of dif- fused nebulosity. That these have been formed by mutual gravitation of parts once widely scattered, there is evidence in the barrenness of the surrounding celestial spaces: the nubecula minor, especially, being seated, as Humboldt says, in " a kind of starless desert." What must be the limit of such concentrations? The mutual attraction of two stars, when it so far predominates over other attractions as to cause approximation, almost certainly ends in the formation of a binary star; since the motions generated by other attractions prevent the two stars from moving in straight lines to their common centre of gravity. Between small clusters, too, having also certain proper motions as clusters, mutual attraction may lead, not to complete union, but to the formation of binary clusters. As the process continues, however, and the clusters become larger, they must move more directly towards each other: thus forming clusters of increasing density. While, there- fore, during the earlier stages of concentration, the proba- bilities are immense against the actual contact of these mutually-gravitating masses; it is tolerably manifest that, as the concentration increases, collision must become proba- ble, and ultimately certain. This is an inference not lack- ing the support of high authority. Sir John Herschel, treating of those numerous and variously-aggregated clus- ters of stars revealed by the telescope, and citing with apparent approval his father's opinion, that the more dif- fused and irregular of these, are " globular clusters in a less advanced state of condensation; " subsequently remarks, that " among a crowd of solid bodies of whatever size, ani- mated by independent and partially opposing impulses, mo- tions opposite to each other must produce collision, destruc- tion of velocity, and subsidence or near approach towards the centre of preponderant attraction; while those which conspire, or which remain outstanding after such conflicts, 546 DISSOLUTION. must ultimately give rise to circulation of a permanent character." Now what is here alleged of these minor clusters, cannot be denied of larger clusters; and thus the above-inferred process of concentration, appears certain to bring about an increasingly-frequent integration of masses. "We have next to consider the consequences of the accom- panying loss of velocity. The sensible motion which disap- pears cannot be destroyed, but must be transformed into insensible motion. What will be the effect of this insensible motion? Already we have seen that were the Earth ar- rested, dissipation of its substance would result. And if so relatively small a momentum as that acquired by the Earth in falling to the Sun, would be equivalent to a molecu- lar motion sufficient to reduce the Earth to gases of ex- treme rarity ; what must be the molecular motion generated by the mutually-arrested momenta of two stars, that have moved to their common centre of gravity through spaces immeasurably greater? There seems no alternative but to conclude, that it would be great enough to reduce the matter of the stars to an almost inconceivable tenuity — a te- nuity like that which we ascribe to nebular matter. Such being the immediate effect, what would be the ulterior ef- fect? Sir John Herschel, in the passage above quoted, de- scribing the collisions that must arise in a concentrating group of stars, adds that those stars " which remain out- standing after such conflicts ??iust ultimately give rise to cir- culation of a permanent character." The problem, however, is here dealt with purely as a mechanical one : the assump- tion being that the mutually-arrested masses will continue as masses — an assumption to which no objection appeared at the time when Sir John Herschel wrote this passage; since the correlation of forces was not then recognized. But obliged as we now are to conclude, that stars moving at the high velocities acquired during concentration, will, by mutual arrest, be dissipated into gases, the problem becomes different ; and a different inference seems unavoid- DISSOLUTION. 547 able. For the diffused matter produced by such conflicts must form a resisting medium, occupying that central re- gion of the cluster through which its members from time to time pass in describing their orbits — a resisting medium which they cannot move through without having their ve- locities diminished. Every additional collision, by augment- ing this resisting medium, and making the losses of velocity greater, must aid in preventing the establishment of that equilibrium which would else arise; and so must conspire to produce more frequent collisions. And the nebulous matter thus formed, presently enveloping the whole cluster, must, by continuing to shorten the gyrations of the moving masses, entail an increasingly active integration and re- active disintegration of them; until they are all dis- sipated. Whether this process completes itself inde- pendently in different parts of our Sidereal System; or whether it completes itself only by aggregating the whole matter of our Sidereal System; or whether, as seems not unlikely, local integrations and disintegrations run their courses while the general integration is going on; are ques- tions that need not be discussed. In any case the conclu- sion to be drawn is, that the integration must continue until the conditions which bring about disintegration are reached ; and that there must then ensue a diffusion that undoes the preceding concentration. This, indeed, is the con- clusion which presents itself as a deduction from the persist- ence of force. If stars concentrating to a common centre of gravity, eventually reach it, then the quantities of motion they have acquired must suffice to carry them away again to those remote regions whence they started. And since, by the conditions of the case, they cannot return to these remote regions in the shape of concrete masses, they must return in the shape of diffused masses. Action and reaction being equal and opposite, the momentum producing dispersion, must be as great as the momentum acquired by aggregation; and being spread over the same quantity of matter, must US DISSOLUTION. cause an equivalent distribution through space, whatever be the form of the matter. One condition, however, essential to the literal fulfilment of this result, must be specified; namely, that the quantity of molecular motion radiated into space by each star in the course of its forma- tion from diffused matter, shall either not escape from our Sidereal System or shall be compensated by an equal quan- tity of molecular motion radiated from other parts of space into our Sidereal System. In other words, if we set out with that amount of molecular motion implied by the exist- ence of the matter of our Sidereal System in a nebulous form; then it follows from the persistence of force, that if this matter undergoes the re-distribution constituting Evo- lution, the quantity of molecular motion given out during the integration of each mass, plus the quantity of molecular motion given out during the integration of all the masses, must suffice again to reduce it to the same nebulous form. Here, indeed, we arrive at a barrier to our reasonings; since we cannot know whether this condition is or is not fulfilled. If the ether which fills the interspaces of our Sidereal System has a limit somewhere beyond the outer- most stars, then it is inferrable that motion is not lost by radiation beyond this limit; and if so, the original degree of diffusion may be resumed. Or supposing the ethereal medium to have no such limit, yet, on the hypothesis of an unlimited space, containing, at certain intervals, Sidereal Systems like our own, it may be that the quantity of molecu- lar motions radiated into the region occupied by our Sidereal System, is equal to that which our Sidereal System radiates ; in which case the quantity of motion possessed by it, re- maining undiminished, it may continue during unlimited time its alternate concentrations and diffusions. But if,* on the other hand, throughout boundless space filled with ether, there exist no other Sidereal Systems subject to like changes, or if such other Sidereal Systems exist at more than a certain average distance from one another; then it DISSOLUTION. 549 seems an unavoidable conclusion that the quantity of mo- tion possessed, must diminish by radiation; and that so, on each successive resumption of the nebulous form, the matter of our Sidereal System will occupy a less space; until it reaches either a state in which its concentrations and diffusions are relatively small, or a state of complete aggregation and rest. Since, however, we have no evidence showing the existence or non-existence of Sidereal Systems throughout remote space; and since, even had we such evi- dence, a legitimate conclusion could not be drawn from premises of which one element (unlimited space) is incon- ceivable; we must be for ever without answer to this tran- scendent question. But confining ourselves to the proximate ^nd not neces- sarily insoluble question, we find reason for thinking that after the completion of those various equilibrations which bring to a close all the forms of Evolution we have contem- plated, there must continue an equilibration of a far wider kind. When that integration everywhere in progress throughout our Solar System has reached its climax, there will remain to be effected the immeasurably greater inte- gration of our Solar System, with other such systems. There must then re-appear in molecular motion what is lost in the motion of masses; and the inevitable transformation of this motion of masses into molecular motion, cannot take place without reducing the masses to a nebulous form. § 183. Thus we are led to the conclusion that the entire process of things, as displayed in the aggregate of the visible Universe, is analogous to the entire process of things as displayed in the smallest aggregates. Motion as well as Matter being fixed in quantity, it would seem that the change in the distribution of Matter which Motion affects, coming to a limit in whichever direc- tion it is carried, the indestructible Motion thereupon neces- sitates a reverse distribution. Apparently, the universally- 550 DISSOLUTION. co-existent forces of attraction and repulsion, which, as we have seen, necessitate rhythm in all minor changes through- out the Universe, also necessitate rhythm in the totality of its changes — produce now an immeasurable period during which the attractive forces predominating, cause universal concentration, and then an immeasurable period during winch the repulsive forces predominating, cause universal diffusion — alternate eras of Evolution and Dissolution. And thus there is suggested the conception of a past during which there have been successive Evolutions analogous to that which is now going on; and a future during which successive other such Evolutions may go on — ever the same in principle but never the same in concrete result. CHAPTEK XXIV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION. § 184. At the close of a work like this, it is more than usually needful to contemplate as a whole that which the successive chapters have presented in parts. A coherent knowledge implies something more than the establishment of connexions; we must not rest after seeing how each minor group of truths fall into its place within some major group, and how all the major groups fit together. It is requisite that we should retire a space, and, looking at the entire structure from a distance at which details are lost to view, observe its general character. Something more than recapitulation — something more even than an organized re-statement, will come within the scope of the chapter. We shall find that in their ensemble the general truths reached exhibit, under certain aspects, a oneness not hitherto observed. There is, too, a special reason for noting how the various divisions and sub-divisions of the argument consolidate; namely, that the theory at large thereby obtains a final illustration. The reduction of the generalizations that have been set forth to a completely integrated state, exemplifies once more the process of Evolution, and strengthens still further the general fabric of conclusions. § 185. Here, indeed, we find ourselves brought round unexpectedly, and very significantly, to the truth with 551 552 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION. which we set out, and with which our re-survey must com- mence. For this integrated form of knowledge is the form which, apart from the doctrine of Evolution, we decided to be the highest form. When we inquired what constitutes Philosophy — when we compared men's various conceptions of Philosophy, so that, eliminating the elements in which they differed we might see in what they agreed; we found in them all, the tacit implication that Philosophy is completely unified knowledge. Apart from each particular scheme of unified knowledge, and apart from the proposed methods by which unification is to be effected, we traced in every case the be- lief that unification is possible, and that the end of Philoso- phy is the achievement of it. Accepting this conclusion, we went on to consider the data with which Philosophy must set out. Fundamental propositions, or propositions not deducible from deeper ones, can be established only by showing the complete congruity of all the results reached through the assumption of them; and, premising that they were assumed till so established, we took as our data, those organized components of our in- telligence without which there cannot go on the mental processes implied by philosophizing. From the specification of these we passed to certain primary truths — " The Indestructibility of Matter," " The Continuity of Motion/' and " The Persistence of Force; " of which the last is ultimate and the others derivative. Having previously seen that our experiences of Matter and Motion are resolvable into experiences of Force ; we further saw the truths that Matter and Motion are unchangeable in quantity, to be implications of the truth that Force is un- changeable in quantity. This we discovered is the truth by derivation from which all other truths are to be proved. The first of the truths which presented itself to be so proved, was " The Persistence of the Relations among Forces." This, which is ordinarily called Uniformity of SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION. 553 Law, we found to be a necessary implication of the fact that Force can neither arise out of nothing nor lapse into nothing. The deduction next drawn, was that forces which seem to be lost are transformed into their equivalents of other forces ; or, conversely, that forces which become manifest, do so by disappearance of pre-existing equivalent forces. Of these truths we found illustrations in the motions of the heavenly bodies, in the changes going on over the Earth's surface, and in all organic and super-organic actions. It turned out to be the same with the law that every- thing moves along the line of least resistance, or the line of greatest traction, or their resultant. Among movements of all orders, from those of stars down to those of nervous dis- charges and commercial currents, it was shown both that this is so, and that, given the Persistence of Force, it must be so. So, too, we saw it to be with " The Rhythm of Motion." All motion alternates — be it the motion of planets in their orbits or ethereal molecules in their undulations — be it the cadences of speech or the rises and falls of prices; and, as before, it became manifest that Force being persistent, this perpetual reversal of Motion between limits is inevitable. § 186. These truths holding of all existences, were recognized as of the kind required to constitute what we distinguished as Philosophy. But, on considering them, we perceived that as they stand they do not form anything like a Philosophy; and that a Philosophy cannot be formed by any number of such truths separately known. Each such truth expresses the general law of some one factor by which phenomena, as we habitually experience them, are pro- duced; or, at most, expresses the law of co-operation of some two factors. But knowing what are the elements of a process, is not knowing how these elements combine to effect it. That which alone can unify knowledge must be 37 554 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION. the law of co-operation of all the factors — a law expressing simultaneously the complex antecedents and the complex consequents which any phenomena as a whole presents. A further inference was that Philosophy, as we under- stand it, must not unify separate concrete phenomena only ; and must not stop short with unifying separate classes of concrete phenomena; but must unify all concrete phenom- ena. If the law of operation of each factor holds true throughout the Cosmos; so, too, must the law of their co- operation. And hence in comprehending the Cosmos as conforming to this law of co-operation, must consist that highest unification which Philosophy seeks. Descending from this abstract statement to a concrete one, we saw that the law sought must be the law of the continuous re-distribution of Matter and Motion. The changes everywhere going on, from those which are slowly altering the structure of our galaxy down to those which constitute a chemical decomposition, are changes in the relative positions of component parts; and everywhere neces- sarily imply that along with a new arrangement of Matter there has arisen a new arrangement of Motion. Hence we may be certain, d priori, that there must be a law of the concomitant re-distribution of Matter and Motion, which holds of every change; and which, by thus unifying all changes, must be the basis of a Philosophy. In commencing our search for this universal law of re- distribution, we contemplated from another point of view the problem of Philosophy; and saw that its solution could not but be of the nature indicated. It was shown that a Philosophy stands self-convicted of inadequacy, if it does not formulate the whole series of changes passed through by every existence in its passage from the imperceptible to the perceptible and again from the perceptible to the im- perceptible. If it begins its explanations with existences that already have concrete forms, or leaves off while they still retain concrete forms; then, manifestly, they had pre- SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION. 555 ceding histories, or will have succeeding histories, or both, of which no account is given. And as such preceding and succeeding histories are subjects of possible knowledge, a Philosophy which says nothing about them, falls short of the required unification. Whence we saw it to follow that the formula sought, equally applicable to existences taken sin- gly and in their totality, must be applicable to the whole his- tory of each and to the whole history of all. By these considerations we were brought within view of the formula. For if it had to comprehend the entire progress from the imperceptible to the perceptible and from the perceptible to the imperceptible; and if it was also to express the continuous re-distribution of Matter and Motion; then, obviously, it could be no other than one defining the opposite processes of concentration and diffu- sion in terms of Matter and Motion. And if so, it must be a statement of the truth that the concentration of Matter implies the dissipation of Motion, and that, conversely, the absorption of Motion implies the diffusion of Matter. Such, in fact, we found to be the law of the entire cycle of changes passed through by every existence — loss of mo- tion and consequent integration, eventually followed by gain of motion and consequent disintegration. And we saw that besides applying to the whole history of each existence, it applies to each detail of the history. Both processes are going on at every instant; but always there is a differential result in favour of the first or the second. And every change, even though it be only a transposition of parts, inevitably advances the one process or the other. Evolution and Dissolution, as we name these opposite transformations, though thus truly defined in their most general characters, are but incompletely defined; or rather, while the definition of Dissolution is sufficient, the definition of Evolution is extremely insufficient. Evolution is always an integration of Matter and dissipation of Motion; but it is in most cases much more than this. The primary re- 556 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION. distribution of Matter and Motion is usually accompanied by secondary re-distributions. Distinguishing the different kinds of Evolution so pro- duced as simple and compound, we went on to consider under what conditions the secondary re-distributions which make Evolution compound, take place. We found that a concentrating aggregate which loses its contained motion rapidly, or integrates quickly, exhibits only simple Evolu- tion; but in proportion as its largeness, or the peculiar con- stitution of its components, hinders the dissipation of its motion, its parts, while undergoing that primary re-distribu- tion which results in integration, undergo secondary re- distributions producing more or less complexity. § 187. From this conception of Evolution and Dissolu- tion as together making up the entire process through which things pass; and from this conception of Evolution as dividing into simple and compound ; we went on to consider the law of Evolution, as exhibited among all orders of existences, in general and in detail. The integration of Matter and concomitant dissipation of Motion, was traced not in each whole only, but in the parts into which each whole divides. By the aggregate Solar System, as well as by each planet and satellite, progressive concentration has been, and is still being, exemplified. In each organism that general incorporation of dispersed ma- terials which causes growth, is accompanied by local in- corporations, forming what we call organs. Every society while it displays the aggregative process by its increasing mass of population, displays it also by the rise of dense masses in special parts of its area. And in all cases, along with these direct integrations there go the indirect inte- grations by which parts are made mutually dependent. From this primary re-distribution we were led on to consider the secondary re-distributions, by inquiring how there came to be a formation of parts during the formation SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION. 557 of a whole. It turned out that there is habitually a passage from homogeneity to heterogeneity, along with the passage from diffusion to concentration. While the matter com- posing the Solar System has been assuming a denser form, it has changed from unity to variety of distribution. So- lidification of the Earth has been accompanied by a pro- gress from comparative uniformity to extreme multiformity. In the course of its advance from a germ to a mass of rela- tively great bulk, every plant and animal also advances from simplicity to complexity. The increase of a society in numbers and consolidation has for its concomitant an in- creased heterogeneity both of its political and its industrial organization. And the like holds of all super-organic pro- ducts— Language, Science, Art, and Literature. But we saw that these secondary re-distributions are not thus completely expressed. At the same time that the parts into which each whole is resolved become more unlike one another, they also become more sharply marked off. The result of the secondary re-distributions is therefore to change an indefinite homogeneity into a definite heterogeneity. This additional trait also we found to be traceable in evolv- ing aggregates of all orders. Further consideration, how- ever, made it apparent that the increasing clefiniteness which goes along with increasing heterogeneity, is not an independent trait; but that it results from the integration which progresses in each of the differentiating parts, while it progresses in the whole they form. Further, it was pointed out that in all evolutions, inorganic, organic, and super-organic, this change in the arrangement of Matter is accompanied by a parallel change in the arrangement of Motion: every increase in structural complexity involving a corresponding increase in func- tional complexity. It was shown that along with the integration of molecules into masses, there arises an integra- tion of molecular motion into the motion of masses; and that as fast as there results variety in the sizes and forms of 558 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION. aggregates and their relations to incident forces, there also results variety in their movements. The transformation thus contemplated under separate aspects, being in itself but one transformation, it became needful to unite these separate aspects into a single concep- tion— to regard the primary and secondary re-distributions as simultaneously -working their various effects. Every- where the change from a confused simplicity to a distinct complexity, in the distribution of both matter and motion, is incidental to the consolidation of the matter and the loss of its motion. Hence the re-distribution of the matter and of its retained motion, is from a diffused, uniform, and in- determinate arrangement, to a concentrated, multiform, and determinate arrangement. § 188. We come now to one of the additions that may be made to the general argument while summing it up. Here is the fit occasion for observing a higher degree of unity in the foregoing inductions, than we observed while making them. The law of Evolution has been thus far contemplated as holding true of each order of existences, considered as a separate order. But the induction as so presented, falls short of that completeness which it gains when we con- template these several orders of existences as forming together one natural whole. While we think of Evolution as divided into astronomic, geologic, biologic, psychologic, sociologic, &c., it may seem to a certain extent a coincidence that the same law of metamorphosis holds throughout all its divisions. But when we recognize these divisions as mere conventional groupings, made to facilitate the arrangement and acquisition of knowledge — when we regard the different existences with which they severally deal as component parts of one Cosmos; Ave see at once that there are not several kinds of Evolution having certain traits in common, but one Evolution going on everywhere after the same SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION. 559 manner. We have repeatedly observed that while any whole is evolving, there is always going on an evolution of the parts into which it divides itself; but we have not observed that this equally holds of the totality of things, as made up of parts within parts from the greatest down to the smallest. We know that while a physically-cohering aggregate like the human body is getting larger and taking on its general shape, each of its organs is doing the same"; that while each organ is growing and becoming unlike others, there is going on a differentiation and integration of its component tissues and vessels; and that even the components of these components are severally increasing and passing into more definitely heterogeneous structures. But we have not duly remarked that, setting out with the human body as a minute part, and ascending from it to greater parts, this simultaneity of transformation is equally manifest — that while each individual is developing, the so- ciety of which he is an insignificant unit is developing too; that \vhile the aggregate mass forming a society is becom- ing more definitely heterogeneous, so likewise is that total aggregate, the Earth, of which the society is an inapprecia- ble portion; that while the Earth, which in bulk is not a millionth of the Solar System, progresses towards its concen- trated and complex structure, the Solar System similarly progresses; and that even its transformations are but those of a scarcely appreciable portion of our Sidereal System, which has at the same time been going through parallel changes. So understood, Evolution becomes not one in principle only, but one in fact. There are not many metamorphoses similarly carried on; but there is a single metamorphosis universally progressing, wherever the reverse metamorpho- sis has not set in. In any locality, great or small, through- out space, where the occupying matter acquires an apprecia- ble individuality, or distinguish ableness from other matter, there Evolution goes on ; or rather, the acquirement of this 560 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION. appreciable individuality is the commencement of Evolu- tion. And this holds uniformly ; regardless of the size of the aggregate, regardless of its inclusion in other aggregates, and regardless of the wider evolutions within which its own is comprehended. § 189. After making them, we saw that the inductions which, taken together, establish the law of Evolution, do not, so long as they remained inductions, form coherent parts of that whole rightly named Philosophy; nor does even the foregoing passage of these inductions from agree- ment into identity, suffice to produce the unity sought. For, as was pointed out at the time, to unify the truths thus reached with other truths, it is requisite to deduce them from the Persistence of Force. Our next step, therefore, was to show why, Force being persistent, the transformation which Evolution shows us necessarily re- sults. The first conclusion arrived at was, that any, finite homogeneous aggregate must inevitably lose its homoge- neity, through the unequal exposure of its parts to inci- dent forces. It was pointed out that the production of diversities of structure by diverse forces, and forces acting under diverse conditions, has been illustrated in astronomic evolution; and that a like connection of cause and effect is seen in the large and small modifications undergone by our globe. The early changes of organic germs supplied further evidence that unlikenesses of structure follow un- likenesses of relations to surrounding agencies — evidence enforced by the tendency of the differently-placed mem- bers of each species to diverge into varieties. And we found that the contrasts, political and industrial, which arise be- tween the parts of societies, serve to illustrate the same principle. The instability of the homogeneous thus every- where exemplified, we also saw holds in each of the dis- tinguishable parts into which any uniform whole lapses; SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION. 561 and that so the less heterogeneous tends continually to be- come more heterogeneous. A further step in the inquiry disclosed a secondary cause of increasing multiformity. Every differentiated part is not simply a seat of further differentiations, but also a parent of further differentiations; since, in growing unlike other parts, it becomes a centre of unlike reactions on incident forces, and by so adding to the diversity of forces at work, adds to the diversity of effects produced. This multiplica- tion of effects proved to be similarly traceable throughout all Nature — in the actions and reactions that go on through- out the Solar System, in the never-ceasing geologic com- plications, in the involved symptoms produced in organisms by disturbing influences, in the many thoughts and feelings generated by single impressions, and in the ever-ramifying results of each new agency brought to bear on a society. To which was added the corollary, confirmed by abundant facts, that the multiplication of effects advances in a geo- metrical progression along with advancing heterogeneity. Completely to interpret the structural changes constitut- ing Evolution, there remained to assign a reason for that increasingly-distinct demarcation of parts, which accompa- nies the production of differences among parts. This reason we discovered to be, the segregation of mixed units under the action of forces capable of moving them. We saw that when unlike incident forces have made the parts of an aggregate unlike in the natures of their component units, there necessarily arises a tendency to separation of the dis- similar units from one another, and to a clustering of those units which are similar. This cause of the local integra- tions that accompany local differentiations, turned out to be likewise exemplified by all kinds of Evolution — by the formation of celestial bodies, by the moulding of the Earth's crust, by organic modifications, by the establishment of mental distinctions, by the genesis of social divisions. At length, to the query whether these processes have any 562 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION. limit, there came the answer that they must end in equili- brium. That continual division and subdivision of forces, which changes the uniform into the multiform and the multiform into the more multiform, is a process by which forces are perpetually dissipated; and dissipation of them, continuing as long as there remain any forces unbalanced by opposing forces, must end in rest. It was shown that when, as happens in aggregates of various orders, many movements are going on together, the earlier dispersion of the smaller and more resisted movements, establishes moving equilibria of different kinds: forming transitional stages on the way to complete equilibrium. And further inquiry made it apparent that for the same reason, these moving equilibria have certain self -conserving powers; shown in the neutralization of perturbations, and the ad- justment to new conditions. This general principle of equilibration, like the preceding general principles, was •traced throughout all forms of Evolution — astronomic, geologic, biologic, mental and social. And our concluding inference was, that the penultimate stage of equilibration, in which the extremest multiformity and most complex mov- ing equilibrium are established, must be one implying the highest conceivable state of humanity. But the fact which it here chiefly concerns us to remem- ber, is that each of these laws of the re-distribution of Mat- ter and Motion, was found to be a derivative law — a law de- ducible from the fundamental law. The Persistence of Force being granted, there follow as inevitable inferences " The Instability of the Homogeneous " and " The Multi- plication of Effects; " while " Segregation" and " Equili- bration " also become corollaries. And thus discovering that the processes of change formulated under these titles are so many different aspects of one transformation, deter- mined 1 >y an ultimate necessity, we arrive at a complete uni- fication of them — a synthesis in which Evolution in general and in detail becomes known as an implication of the law SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION. 563 that transcends proof. Moreover, in becoming thus unified with one another, the complex truths of Evolution become simultaneously unified with those simpler truths shown to have a like affiliation — the equivalence of transformed forces, the movement of every mass and molecule along its line of least resistance, and the limitation of its motion by rhythm. Which further unification brings us to a concep- tion of the entire plexus of changes presented by each con- crete phenomenon, and by the aggregate of concrete phe- nomena, as a manifestation of one fundamental fact — a fact shown alike in the total change and in all the separate changes composing it. § 190. Finally we turned to contemplate, as exhibited throughout Nature, that process of Dissolution which forms the complement of Evolution; and which inevitably,, at some time or other, undoes what Evolution has done. Quickly following the arrest of Evolution in aggregates that are unstable, and following it at periods often long delayed but reached at last in the stable aggregates around us, we saw that even to the vast aggregate of which all these are parts — even to the Earth as a whole — Dissolution must eventually arrive. Nay we even saw grounds for the belief that the far vaster masses dispersed at almost im- measurable intervals through space, will, at a time beyond the reach of finite imaginations, share the same fate; and that so universal Evolution will be followed by universal Dissolution — a conclusion which, like those preceding it, we saw to be deducible from the Persistence of Force. It may be added that in so unifying the phenomena of Dissolution with those of Evolution, as being manifestations of the same ultimate law under opposite conditions, we also unify the phenomena presented by the existing Universe with the like phenomena that have preceded them and will succeed them — so far, at least, as such unification is possible to our limited intelligences. For if, as we saw reason to 564 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION. think, there is an alternation of Evolution and Dissolution in the totality of things — if, as we are obliged to infer from the Persistence of Force, the arrival at either limit of this vast rhythm brings about the conditions under which a counter-movement commences — if we are hence compelled to entertain the conception of Evolutions that have filled an immeasurable past and Evolutions that will fill an im- measurable future ; we can no longer contemplate the visible creation as having a definite beginning or end, or as being isolated. It becomes unified with all existence before and after; and the Force which the Universe presents, falls into the same category with its Space and Time, as admitting of no limitation in thought. § 191. So rounding off the argument, we find its result brought into complete coalescence with the conclusion reached in Part I. ; where, independently of any inquiry like the foregoing, we dealt with the relations between the Knowable and the Unknowable. It was there shown by analysis of both our religious and our scientific ideas, that while knowledge of the cause which produces effects on our consciousness is impossible, the existence of a cause for these effects is a datum of con- sciousness. We saw that the belief in a Power of which no limit in Time or Space can be conceived, is that funda- mental element in Religion which survives all its changes of form. We saw that all Philosophies avowedly or tacitly recognize this same ultimate truth: — that while the Rela- tivist rightly repudiates those definite assertions which the Absolutist makes respecting existence transcending per- ception, he is yet at last compelled to unite with him in predicating existence transcending perception. And this inexpugnable consciousness in which Religion and Philoso- phy are at one with Common Sense, proved to be like- wise that on which all exact Science is based. We found that subjective Science can give no account of those con- SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION. 565 ditioned modes of being which constitute consciousness, without postulating unconditioned being. And we found that objective Science can give no account of the world which we know as external, without regarding its changes of form as manifestations of something that continues con- stant under all forms. This is also the implication to which we are now led back by our completed synthesis. The recognition of a persistent Force, ever changing its mani- festations but unchanged in quantity throughout all past time and all future time, is that which we find alone makes possible each concrete interpretation, and at last unifies all concrete interpretations, Not, indeed, that this coincidence adds to the strength of the argument as a logical structure. Our synthesis has proceeded by taking for granted at every step this ultimate truth; and the ultimate truth cannot, therefore, be regarded as in any sense an outcome of the synthesis. Nevertheless, the coincidence yields a verifica- tion. For when treating of the data of Philosophy, it was pointed out that we cannot take even a first step without making assumptions; and that the only course is to proceed with them as provisional, until they are proved true by the congruity of all the results reached. This congruity we here see to be perfect and all-embracing — holding through- out that entire structure of definite consciousness of rela- tions which we call Knowledge, and harmonizing with it that indefinite consciousness of existence transcending re- lations which forms the essence of Religion. § 192. Towards some result of this order, inquiry, scien- tific, metaphysical, and theological, has been, and still is, manifestly advancing. The coalescence of polytheistic con- ceptions into the monotheistic conception, and the reduc- tion of the monotheistic conception to a more and more general form in which personal superintendence becomes merged in universal immanence, clearly shows this advance. It is equally shown in the fading away of old theories about 5C6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION. " essences," " potentialities," " occult virtues," &c. ; in the abandonment of such doctrines as those of " Platonic Ideas," " Pre-established Harmonies," and the like; and in the tendency towards the identification of Being as present to us in consciousness, with Being as otherwise conditioned beyond consciousness. Still more conspicuous is it in the progress of Science; which, from the beginning has been grouping isolated facts under laws, uniting special laws under more general laws, and so reaching on to laws of higher and higher generality ; until the conception of univer- sal laws has become familiar to it. Unification being thus the characteristic of developing thought of all kinds, and eventual arrival at unity being fairly inferable, there arises yet a further support to our conclusion. Since, unless there is some other and higher unity, the unity we have reached must be that towards which developing thought tends; and that there is any other and higher unity is scarcely supposable. Having grouped the changes which all orders of existences display into induc- tions; having merged these inductions into a single induc- tion; having interpreted this induction deductively; having seen that the ultimate truth from which it is deduced is one transcending proof; it seems, to say the least, very im- probable that there can be established a fundamentally different way of unifying that entire process of things which Philosophy has to interpret. That the foregoing accumulated verifications are all illusive, or that an opposing doctrine can show a greater accumulation of verifications, is not easy to conceive. Let no one suppose that any such implied degree of trustworthiness is alleged of the various minor propositions brought in illustration of the general argument. Such an assumption would be so manifestly absurd, that it seems scarcely needful to disclaim it. But the truth of the doctrine as a whole, is unaffected by errors in the details of its pre- sentation. If it can be shown that the Persistence of Force SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION. 567 is not a datum of consciousness; or if it can be shown that the several laws of force above specified are not corol- laries from it; or if it can be shown that, given these laws, the re-distribution of Matter and Motion does not neces- sarily proceed as described; then, indeed, it will be shown that the theory of Evolution has not the high warrant here claimed for it. But nothing short of this can shake the general conclusions arrived at. § 193. If these conclusions be accepted — if it be agreed that the phenomena going on everywhere are parts of the general process of Evolution, save where they are parts of the reverse process of Dissolution; then we may infer that all phenomena receive their complete interpretation, only when recognized as parts of these processes. Whence it follows that the limit towards which Knowledge is advanc- ing, must be reached when the formulae of these processes are so applied as to yield a total and specific interpretation of each phenomenon in its entirety, as well as of phenomena in general. The partially-unified knowledge distinguished as Sci- ence, does not yet include such total interpretations. Either, as in the more complex sciences, the progress is almost ex- clusively inductive; or, as in the simpler sciences, the de- ductions are concerned with the component phenomena; and at present there is scarcely a consciousness that the ultimate task is the deductive interpretation of phenomena in their state of composition. The Abstract Sciences, deal- ing with the forms under which phenomena are presented, and the Abstract-Concrete Sciences, dealing with the factors by which phenomena are produced, are, philosophically con- sidered, the handmaids of the Concrete Sciences, which deal with the produced phenomena as existing in all their natural complexity. The laws of the forms and the laws of the factors having been ascertained, there then comes the business of ascertaining the laws of the products, as deter- 568 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION. mined by the inter-action of the co-operative factors. Given the Persistence of Force, and given the various derivative laws of Force, and there has to be shown not only how the actual existences of the inorganic world necessarily exhibit the traits they do, but how there necessarily result the more numerous and involved traits exhibited by organic and super-organic existences — how an organism is evolved? what is the genesis of human intelligence? whence social progress arises? It is evident that this development of Knowledge into an organized aggregate of direct and indirect deductions from the Persistence of Force, can be achieved only in the remote future; and, indeed, cannot be completely achieved even then. Scientific progress is progress in that equilibra- tion of thought and things which we saw is going on, and must continue to go on; but which cannot arrive at per- fection in any finite period. Still, though Science can never be entirely reduced to this form; and though only at a far distant time can it be brought nearly to this form; much may even now be done in the way of approximation. Of course, what may now be done, can be done but very imperfectly by any single individual. 'No one can possess that encyclopedic information required for rightly organiz- ing even the truths already established. Nevertheless as pro- gress is effected by increments — as all organization, begin- ning in faint and blurred outlines, is completed by successive modifications and additions; advantage may accrue from an attempt, however rude, to reduce the facts now accumulated — or rather certain classes of them — to something like co- ordination. Such must be the plea for the several volumes which are to succeed this ; dealing with the respective divis- ions of what we distinguished at the outset as Special Phi- losophy. § 194. A few closing words must be said, concerning the general bearings of the doctrines that are now to be fur- SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION. 569 tlier developed. Before proceeding to interpret the detailed phenomena of Life, and Mind, and Society, in terms of Matter, Motion, and Force, the reader must be reminded in what sense the interpretations are to be accepted. It is true that their purely relative character has been re- peatedly insisted upon ; but the liability to misinterpretation is so great, that notwithstanding all evidence to the contrary, there will probably have arisen in not a few minds, the con- viction that the solutions which have been given, along with those to be derived from them, are essentially materialistic. Having, throughout life, constantly heard the charge of materialism made against those who ascribed the more in- volved phenomena to agencies like those which produce the simplest phenomena, most persons have acquired repug- nance to such modes of interpretation ; and the universal ap- plication of them, even though it is premised that the solu- tions they give can be but relative, will probably rouse more or less of the habitual feeling. Such an attitude of mind, however, is significant, not so much of a reverence for the Unknown Cause, as of an irreverence for those familiar forms in which the Unknown Cause is manifested to us. Men who have not risen above that vulgar conception which unites with Matter the contemptuous epithets " gross " and " brute," may naturally feel dismay at the proposal to reduce the phenomena of Life, of Mind, and of Society, to a level with those which they think so degraded. But who- ever remembers that the forms of existence which the un- cultivated speak of with so much scorn, are shown by the man of science to be the more marvellous in their attributes the more they are investigated, and are also proved to be in their ultimate natures absolutely incomprehensible — as absolutely incomprehensible as sensation, or the conscious something which perceives it — whoever clearly recog- nizes this truth, will see that the course proposed does not imply a degradation of the so-called higher, but an eleva- tion of the so-called lower. Perceiving as he will, that 38 570 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION. the Materialist and Spiritualist controversy is a mere war of words, in which the disputants are equally absurd — each thinking he understands that which it is impossible for any man to understand — he will perceive how utterly groundless is the fear referred to. Being fully convinced that whatever nomenclature is used, the ultimate mystery must remain the same, he will be as ready to formulate all phenomena in terms of Matter, Motion, and Force, as in any other terms; and will rather indeed anticipate, that only in a doctrine which recognizes the Unknown Cause as co-extensive with all orders of phenomena, can there be a consistent Religion, or a consistent Philosophy. Though it is impossible to prevent misrepresentations, especially when the questions involved are of a kind that ex- cite so much animus, yet to guard against them as far as may be, it will be well to make a succinct and emphatic re-state- ment of the Philosophico-Religious doctrine which per- vades the foregoing pages. Over and over again it has been shown in various ways, that the deepest truths we can reach, are simply statements of the widest uniformities in our experience of the relations of Matter, Motion, and Force; and that Matter, Motion, and Force are but symbols of the Unknown Reality. A Power of which the nature re- mains for ever inconceivable, and to which no limits in Time or Space can be imagined, works in us certain effects. These effects have certain likenesses of kind, the most general of which we class together under the names of Matter, Motion, and Force; and between these effects there are likenesses of connection, the most constant of which we class as laws of the highest certainty. Analysis reduces these several kinds of effect to one kind of effect; and these several kinds of uniformity to one kind of uniformity. And the highest achievement of Science is the interpretation of all orders of phenomena, as differently-conditioned manifes- tations of this one kind of effect, under differently-condi- tioned modes of this one kind of uniformitv. But when SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION. 571 Science has done this, it has done nothing more than sys- tematize our experience; and has in no degree extended the limits of our experience. We can say no more than be- fore, whether the uniformities are as absolutely necessary, as they have become to our thought relatively necessary. The utmost possibility for us, is an interpetation of the process of things as it presents itself to our limited consciousness; but how this process is related to the actual process we are unable to conceive, much less to know. Similarly, it must be remembered that while the connection between the phenomenal order and the ontological order is for ever inscrutable; so is the con- nection between the conditioned forms of being and the unconditioned form of being for ever inscrutable. The interpretation of all phenomena in terms of Matter, Motion, and Force, is nothing more than the reduction of our com- plex symbols of thought, to the simplest symbols; and when the equation has been brought to its lowest terms the symbols remain symbols still. Hence the reasonings con- tained in the foregoing pages, afford no support to either of the antagonist hypotheses respecting the ultimate nature of things. Their implications are no more materialistic than they are spiritualistic; and no more spiritualistic than they are materialistic. Any argument which is apparently fur- nished to either hypothesis, is neutralized by as good an argument furnished to the other. The Materialist, seeing it to be a necessary deduction from the law of correlation, that what exists in consciousness under the form of feeling, is transformable into an equivalent of mechanical motion, and by consequence into equivalents of all the other forces which matter exhibits; may consider it therefore demon- strated that the phenomena of consciousness are material phenomena. But the Spiritualist, setting out with the same data, may argue with equal cogency, that if the forces displayed by matter are cognizable only under the shape of those equivalent amounts of consciousness which they pro- 572 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION. duce, it is to be inferred that these forces, when existing out of consciousness, are of the same intrinsic nature as when existing in consciousness; and that so is justified the spiritualistic conception of the external world, as consisting of something essentially identical with what we call mind. Manifestly, the establishment of correlation and equivalence between the forces of the outer and the inner worlds, may be used to assimilate either to the other; according as we set out with one or other term. But he who rightly inter- prets the doctrine contained in this work, will see that neither of these terms can be taken as ultimate. He will see that though the relation of subject and object renders necessary to us these antithetical conceptions of Spirit and Matter; the one is no less than the other to be regarded as but a sign of the Unknown Eeality which underlies both. APPENDIX APPENDIX, DEALING WITH CERTAIN CRITICISMS. One way of estimating the validity of a critic's judgments, is that of studying his mental peculiarities as generally displayed. If he betrays idiosyncrasies of thought in his writings at large, it may be inferred that these idiosyncrasies possibly, if not probably, give a character to the verdicts he passes upon the productions of others. I am led to make this remark by con- sidering the probable connexion between Professor Tait's habit of mind as otherwise shown, and as shown in the opinion he has tacitly expressed respecting the formula of Evolution. Daily carrying on experimental researches, Professor Tait is profoundly impressed with the supreme value of the experi- mental method; and has reached the conviction that by it alone can any physical knowledge be gained. Though he calls the ultimate truths of physics " axioms," yet, not very con- sistently, he alleges that only by observation and experiment can these " axioms " be known as such. Passing over this in- consistency, however, we have here to note the implied propo- sition that where no observation or experiment is possible, no physical truth can be established; and, indeed, that in the absence of any possibility of experiment or observation there is no basis for any physical belief at all. Now The Unseen Universe, a work written by him in conjunction with Professor Balfour-Stewart, contains an elaborate argument concerning the relations between the Universe which is visible to us and an invisible Universe. This argument, carried on in pursu- ance of physical laws established by converse with the Uni- verse we know, extends them to the Universe we do not know : the law of the Conservation of Energy, for example, being regarded as common to the two, and the principle of Con- tinuity, which is traced among perceptible phenomena, being assumed to hold likewise of the imperceptible. On the strength of these reasonings, conclusions are drawn which are consid- 575 576 APPENDIX. ered as at least probable: support is found for certain theo- logical beliefs. Now, clearly, the relation between the seen and the unseen Universes cannot be the subject of any observa- tion or experiment; since, by the definition of it, one term of the relation is absent. If we have, then, no warrant for asserting a physical axiom save as a generalization of results of experiments — if, consequently, where no observation or experiment is possible, reasoning after physical methods can have no place; then there can be no basis for any conclusion respecting the physical relations of the seen and the unseen Universes. Not so, however, concludes Professor Tait. He thinks that while no validity can be claimed for our judg- ments respecting perceived forces, save as experimentally justi- fied, some validity can be claimed for our judgments respect- ing unperceived forces, where no experimental justification is possible. The peculiarity thus exhibited in Professor Tait's general thinking, is exhibited also in some of his thinking on those special topics with which he is directly concerned as a Pro- fessor of Physics. An instance was given by Professor Clerk- Maxwell when reviewing, in Nature lor July 3, 1879, the new edition (1879) of Thomson and Tait's Treatise on Natural Philosophy. Professor Clerk-Maxwell writes: — " Again at p. 222, the capacity of the student is called upon to accept the following statement : — ' Matter has an innate power of resisting external influences, so that every body, as far as it can, remains at rest or moves uniformly in a straight line.' Is it a fact that ' matter ' has any power, either innate or acquired, of resisting external influences 1 " And to Professor Clerk-Maxwell's question thus put, the an- swer of one not having a like mental peculiarity with Professor Tait, must surely be — No. But the most remarkable example of Professor Tait's mode of thought, as exhibited in his own department, is contained in a lecture which he gave at Glasgow when the British Asso- ciation last met there (see Nature September 21, 1876) — a lecture given for the purpose of dispelling certain erroneous conceptions of force commonly entertained. Asking how the word force " is to be correctly used " he says : — " Here we cannot but consult Newton. The sense in which he uses the word 'force,' and therefore the sense in which we must continue to use it if we desire to avoid intellectual confusion, will appear clearly from a brief consideration of his simple statement of the laws of motion. APPENDIX. 577 The first of these laws is: Every body continues in its state of rest or of uniform motion in a straight tine, except in so far as it is compelled by 7 forces to change that state.'l, Thus Professor Tait quotes, and fully approves, that concep- tion of force which regards it as something which changes the state of a body. Later on in the course of his lecture, after variously setting forth his views of how force is rightly to be conceived, he says " force is the rate at which an agent does work per unit of length." Now let us compare these two definitions of force. It is first, on the authority of .Newton emphatically endorsed, said to be that which changes the state of a body. Then it is said to be the rate at which an agent does work (doing work being equivalent to changing a body's state). In the one case, therefore, force itself is the agent which does the work or changes the state; in the other case, force is the rate at which some other agent does the work or changes the state. How are these statements to be reconciled ? Otherwise put the difficulty stands thus: — force is that which changes the state of a body; force is a rate, and a rate is a re- lation (as between time and distance, interest and capital); therefore a relation changes the state of a body. A relation is no longer a nexus among phenomena, but becomes a pro- ducer of phenomena. "Whether Professor Tait succeeded in dispelling " the wide-spread ignorance as to some of the most important elementary principles of physics" — whether his audience went away with clear ideas of the "much abused and misunderstood term " force, the report does not tell us. Let us pass now from these illustrations of Professor Tait's judgment as exhibited in his special department, to the con- sideration of his judgment on a wider question here before us — the formula of Evolution. In NaUirelox July 17, 1879, while reviewing Sir Edmund Beckett's Origin of the Laws of Nature and praising it, he says of the author: — "He follows in fact, in his own way. the hint given by a great mathe- matician (Kirkman) who made the following exquisite translation of a well-known definition : — Evolution is a change from an indefinite, inco- herent, homogeneity to a definite, coherent, heterogeneity, through con- tinuous differentiations and integrations* [Translation into plain English.'] Evolution is a change from a no- howish, untalkaboutable, all-alikeness, to a soraehowish and in-general- talkaboutable not-all-alikeness, by continuous somethingelseifications, and sticktogetherations." * A conscientious critic usually consults the latest edition of the work he criticizes, so that the author may have the benefit of any corrections or alterations he has made. Apparently Mr. Kirkman does not think 578 APPENDIX. Professor Tait, proceeding then to quote from Sir Edmund Beckett's book passages in which, as he thinks, there is a kin- dred tearing off of disguises from the expressions used by other authors, winds up by saying — " When the purposely vague statements of the materialists and agnostics are thus stripped of the tinsel of high-flown and unintelligible language, the eyes of the thoughtless who have accepted them on author- ity (!) are at last opened, and they are ready to exclaim with Titania, methinks ' I was enamoured of an ass.' " And that Mr. Kirkman similarly believes that his travesty proves the formula of Evolution to be meaningless, is shown by the sen- tence which follows it — " Can. any man show that my trans- lation is unfair? " One would have thought that Mr. Kirkman and Professor Tait, however narrowly they limited themselves to their special lines of inquiry, could hardly have avoided observing that in j)roportion as scientific terms express wider generalities, they necessarily lose that vividness of suggestion which words of concrete meanings have; and therefore to the unitiated seem vague, or even empty. If Professor Tait enunciated to a rustic the physical axiom, " action and reaction are equal and opposite," the rustic might not improbably fail to form any corresponding idea. And he might, if his self-confidence were akin to that of Mr. Kirkman, conclude that where he saw no meaning there could be no meaning. Further, if, after the axiom had been brought partially within his comprehension by an example, he were to laugh at the learned words used and propose to say instead — " shoving and back-shoving are one as strong as the other; " it would possibly be held by Pro- fessor Tait that this way of putting it is hardly satisfactory. If he thought it worth while to enlighten the rustic, he might perhaps point out to him that his statement did not include all the facts — that not only shoving and back-shoving, but also pulling and back-pulling, are one as strong as the other. Supposing the rustic were not too conceited, he might event- ually be taught that the abstract, and to him seemingly vague, formula "action and reaction are equal and opposite," was chosen because by no words of a more specific kind could be such a precaution needful. Publishing in 1876 his Philosophy without Assumptions, from which the above passage is taken, he quotes from the first edition of First Principles published in 1862: though in the edition of 1867, and all subsequent ones, the definition is, in expression, consider- ably modified — two of the leading words being no longer used. APPENDIX. 579 expressed the truth in its entirety. Professor Tait however, and Mr. Kirkman, though the physical and mathematical terms they daily employ are so highly abstract as to prove meaningless to those who are unfamiliar with the concrete facts covered by them, seem not to have drawn any general inference from this habitual experience. For had they done so, they must have, been aware that a formula expressing all orders of changes in their general course — astronomic, geo- logic, biologic, psychologic, sociologic — could not possibly be framed in any other than words of the highest abstractness. Perhaps there may come the rejoinder that they do not believe any such universal formula is possible. Perhaps they will say that the on-going of things as shown in our planetary sys- tem, has nothing in common with the on-going of things which has brought the Earth's crust to its present state, and that this has nothing in common with the on-going of things which the growths and actions of living bodies show us; al- though, considering that the laws of molar motion and the laws of molecular action are proved to hold true of them all, it requires considerable courage to assert that the modes of co-operation of the physical forces in these several regions of phenomena, present no traits in common. But unless they allege that there is one law for the redistribution of matter and motion in the heavens, and another law for the redistribution of matter and motion in the Earth's inorganic masses, and another law for its organic masses — unless they assert that the transformation everywhere in progress follows here one meth- od and there another; they must admit that the proposition which expresses the general course of the transformation can do it only in terms remote in the extremest degree from words suggesting definite objects and actions. After noting the unconsciousness thus betrayed by Mr. Kirkman and Professor Tait, that the expression of highly abstract truths necessitates highly abstract words, we may go on to note a scarcely less remarkable anomaly of thought shown by them. Mr. Kirkman appears to think, and Professor Tait apparently agrees with him in thinking, that when one of these abstract words coined from Greek or Latin roots, is transformed into an uncouth-looking combination of equiva- lents of Saxon, or rather old English, origin, what they regard as its misleading glamour is thereby dissipated and its mean- inglessness made manifest. We may conveniently observe the nature of Mr. Kirkman's belief, by listening to an imaginary 5S0 APPENDIX. addition to that address before the Literary and Philosophical Society of Liverpool, in which he first set forth the leading ideas of his volume; and we may fitly, in this imaginary addi- tion, adopt the manner in which he delights. " Observe, gentlemen," we may suppose him saying, " I have here the yolk of an egg. The evolutionists, using their jargon, say that one of its characters is e homogeneity; J and if you do not examine your thoughts, perhaps you may think that the word conveys some idea. But now if I translate it into plain English and say that one of the characters of this yolk is *' all-alikeness/ you at once perceive how nonsensical is their statement. You see that the substance of the yolk is not all-alike, and that therefore all-alikeness cannot be one of its attributes. Similarly with the other pretentious term ' heterogeneity.7 which, according to them, describes the state things are brought to by what they call evolution. It is mere empty sound, as is manifest if I do but transform it, as I did the other, and say instead ' not-all-alikeness.' For on show- ing you this chick into which the yolk of the egg turns, you will see that ( not-all-alikeness ' is a character which cannot be claimed for it. How can any one say that the parts of the chick are not-all-alike? Again, in their blatant language we are told that evolution is carried on by continuous i dif- ferentiations; ' and they would have us believe that this word expresses some fact. But if we put instead of it ' something- elseifications ' the delusion they try to practise on us becomes clear. How can they say that while the parts have been form- ing themselves, the heart has been becoming something else than the stomach, and the leg something else than the wing, and the head something else than the tail? The like manifestly happens when for ' integrations ' we read ' sticktogetherations: ' what sense the term might seem to have, becomes obvious nonsense when the substituted word is used. For nobody dares assert that the parts of the chick stick together any more than do the parts of the yolk. I need hardly show you that now when I take a portion of the yolk between my fingers and pull, and now when I take any part of the chick, as the leg, and pull, the first resists just as much as the last — the last does not stick together any more than the first; so that there has been no progress in ' sticktogethera- tions.' And thus, gentlemen, you perceive that these big words which, to the disgrace of the Royal Society, appear even in papers published by it, are mere empty bladders which these APPENDIX. 581 would-be philosophers use to buoy up their ridiculous doc- trines." There is a further curious mental trait exhibited by Mr. Kirkman and which Professor Tait appears to have in com- mon with him. Very truly it has been remarked that there is a great difference between disclosing the absurdities contained in a thing and piling absurdities -upon it; and a remark to be added is that some minds appear incapable of distinguishing between intrinsic absurdity and extrinsic absurdity. The case before us illustrates this remark; and at the same time shows us how analytical faculties of one kind may be constantly exercised without strengthening analytical faculties of another kind — how mathematical analysis may be daily practised with- out any skill in psychological analysis being acquired. For if these gentlemen had analyzed their own thoughts to any purpose, they would have known that incongruous juxtaposi- tions may, by association of ideas, suggest characters that do hot at all belong to the things juxtaposed. Did Mr. Kirkman ever observe the result of putting a bonnet on a nude statue? If he ever did, and if he then reasoned after the manner ex- emplified above, he doubtless concluded that the obscene effect belonged intrinsically to the statue, and only required the addition of the bonnet to make it conspicuous. The alterna- tive conclusion, however, which perhaps most will draw, is that not in the statue itself was there anything of an obscene suggestion, but that this effect was purely adventitious: the bonnet, connected in daily experience with living women, calling up the thought of a living woman with the head dressed but otherwise naked. Similarly though, by clothing an idea in words which excite a feeling of the ludicrous by their odd- ity, any one may associate this feeling of the ludicrous with the idea itself, yet he does not thereby make the idea ludi- crous; and if he thinks he does, he shows that he has not prac- tised introspection to much purpose. By way of a lesson in mental discipline, it may be not un- instructive here to note a curious kinship of opinion between these two mathematicians and two litterateurs. At first sight it appears strange that men whose lives are passed in studies so absolutely scientific as those which Professor Tait and Mr. Kirkman pursue, should, in their judgments on the formula of Evolution, be at one with two men of exclusively literary culture — a North American Reviewer and Mr. Matthew Ar- nold. In the North American Review, vol. 120, page 202, a 582 APPENDIX. critic, after quoting the formula of Evolution, says: — " This may he all true, hut it seems at hest rather the blank form for a universe than anything corresponding to the actual world about us." On which the comment may be that one who had studied celestial mechanics as much as the reviewer has studied the general course of transformations, might similarly have remarked that the formula — " bodies attract one another di- rectly as their masses and inversely as the squares of their distances," was at best but a blank form for solar systems and sidereal clusters. With this parenthetical comment I pass to the fact above hinted, that Mr. Matthew Arnold obviously coincides with the reviewer's estimate of the formula. In Chapter V. of his work God and the Bible, when preparing the way for a criticism on German theologians as losing them- selves in words, he quotes a sa}Ting from Homer. This he in- troduces by remarking that it " is not at all a grand one. We are almost ashamed to quote it to readers who may have come fresh from the last number of the North American Review, and from the great sentence there quoted as summing up Mr. Herbert Spencer's theory of evolution: — ' Evolution is &c/ Homer's poor little saying comes not in such formidable shape. It is only this: — Wide is the range of words! words may make this ivay or that way." And then he proceeds with his re- flections upon German logomachies. All of which makes it manifest that, going out of his way, as he does, to quote this formula from the North Anwrican Review, he intends tacitly to indicate his agreement in the reviewer's estimate of it. That these two men of letters, like the two mathematicians, are unable to frame ideas answering to the words in which evolution at large is expressed, seems manifest. In all four the verbal symbols used call up either no images, or images of the vaguest kinds, which, grouped together, form but the most shadowy thoughts. If, now, we ask what is the common trait in the education and pursuits of all four, we see it to be lack of familiarity with those complex processes of change which the concrete sciences bring before us. The men of letters, in their early days dieted on grammars and lexicons, and in their later days occupied with belles lettres, Biography, and a History made up mainly of personalities, are by their education and course of life left almost without scientific ideas of a definite kind. The universality of physical causation — the interpretation of all things in terms of a never-ceasing redistribution of matter and motion, is naturally to them an APPENDIX. 583 idea utterly alien. The mathematician, too, and the mathe- matical physicist, occupied exclusively with the phenomena of number, space, and time, or, in dealing with forces, deal- ing with them in the abstract, carry on their researches in such ways as may, and often do, leave them quite unconscious of the traits exhibited by the general transformations which things, individually and in their totality, undergo. In a chap- ter on " Discipline " in the Study of Sociology, I have com- mented upon the uses of the several groups of Sciences — Abstract, Abstract-Concrete, and Concrete — in cultivating different powers of mind; and have argued that while for complete preparation, the discipline of each group of sciences is indispensable, the discipline of any one group alone, or any two groups, leave certain defects of judgment. Especially have I contrasted the analytical habit of thought which study of the Abstract and Abstract-Concrete Sciences produces, with the synthetical habit of thought, produced by study of the Concrete Sciences. And I have exemplified the defects of judgment to which the analytical habit unqualified by the synthetical habit, leads. Here we meet with a striking illus- tration. Scientific culture of the analytical kind, almost as much as absence of scientific culture, leaves the mind bare of those ideas with which the Concrete Sciences deal. Exclu- sive familiarity with the forms and factors of phenomena, no more fits men for dealing with the products in their totalities, than does mere literary study. An objection made to the formula of evolution by a sympa- thetic critic, Mr. T. E. Cliffe Leslie, calls for notice. It is urged in a spirit widely different from that displayed by Mr. Kirkman and his applauder Professor Tait; and it has an apparent justification. Indeed many readers who before ac- cepted the formula of Evolution in full, will, after reading Mr. Cliffe Leslie's comments, agree with him in thinking that it is to be taken with the qualifications he points out. We shall find, however, that a clearer apprehension of the mean- ings of the words used, and a clearer apprehension of the formula in its totality, excludes the criticisms Mr. Leslie makes. In the first place he dissociates from one another those traits of Evolution which I have associated, and which I have alleged to be true only when associated. He quotes me as saying that a change from the homogeneous to the hetero- 584: APPENDIX. geneous characterizes all evolution; and he puts this at the outset of his criticism as though I made this change the pri- mary characteristic. But if he will refer to First Principles, Part II. chap. 1-1 (in the second and subsequent editions) he will find it shown that under its primary aspect, Evolution " is a change from a less coherent form to a more coherent form, consequent on the dissipation of motion and integra- tion of matter." The next chapter contains proofs that the change from homogeneity to heterogeneity is a secondary change, which, when conditions allow, accompanies the change from the incoherent to the coherent. At the begin- ning of the chapter after that, come the sentences — " But now, does this generalization express the whole truth? Does it include everything essentially characterizing Evolution and exclude everything else? ... A critical examination of the facts will show that it does neither." And the chapter then goes on to show that the change is from an indefinite inco- herent homogeneity to a definite coherent heterogeneity. Further qualifications contained in a succeeding chapter, bring the formula to this final form — " Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion; during which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homo- geneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity; and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transforma- tion." Now if these various traits of the process of Evolution are kept simultaneously in view, it will be seen that most of Mr. Cliffe Leslie's objections fail to apply. He says: — " The movement of language, law, and political and civil union, is for the most part in an opposite direction. In a savage country like Africa, speech is in a perpetual flux, and new dialects spring up with every swarm from the parent hive. In the civilized world the unification of language is rapidly proceeding." Here two different ideas are involved — the evolution of a lan- guage considered singly, and the evolution of languages con- sidered as an aggregate. Nothing which he says implies that any one language becomes, during its evolution, less hetero- geneous. The disappearance of dialects is not a progress to- wards the homogeneity of a language, but is the final triumph of one variety of a language over the other varieties, and the extinction of them: the conquering variety meanwhile be- coming within itself more heterogeneous. This, too, is the process which Mr. Leslie refers to as likely to end in an ex- APPENDIX. 585 tinction of the Celtic languages. Advance towards homo- geneity would be shown if the various languages in Europe, having been previously unlike, were, while still existing, to become gradually more like. But the supplanting of one by another, or of some by others, no more implies any tendency of languages to become alike, than does the supplanting of species, genera, orders, and classes of animals, one by another, during the evolution of life, imply the tendency of organisms to assimilate in their natures. Even if the most heterogene- ous creature, Man, should overrun the Earth and extirpate the greater part of its other inhabitants, it would not imply any tendency towards homogeneity in the proper sense. It would remain true that organisms tend perpetually towards heterogeneity, individually and as an assemblage. Of course if all kinds but one were destroyed, they could no longer dis- play this tendency. Display of it would be limited to the remaining kind, which would continue, as now, to show it in the formation of local varieties, becoming gradually more divergent; and the like is true of languages. In the next case Mr. Leslie identifies progressing unifica- tion with advance towards homogeneity. His words are: — " Already Europe has nearly consolidated itself into a Heptarchy, the number of states into which England itself was once divided ; and the result of the American War exemplifies the prevalence of the forces tend- ing to homogeneity over those tending to heterogeneity." To this the reply is that these cases exemplify, rather, the prevalence of the forces which change the incoherent into the coherent — which effect integration. That is, they exemplify Evolution under its primary aspect. In the Principles of Soci- ology, Part II. chap 3, Mr. Leslie will find numerous kindred cases brought in illustration of this law of Evolution. To which add that such integrations bring after them greater heterogeneity, not greater homogeneity. The divisions of the Heptarchy were societies substantially like one another in their structures and activities; but the parts of the nation which correspond to them, have been differentiated into parts carrying on varieties of occupations with entailed unlikenesses of structures — here purely agricultural, there manufacturing; here predominantly given to coal mining and iron smelting, there to weaving; here distinguished by scattered villages, there by clusters of large towns. Again, it is alleged that an increasing homogeneity is shown in fashion. " Once every rank, profession, and district 39 586 APPENDIX. had a distinctive garb; now all such distinctions, save with the priest and the soldier, have almost disappeared among men." But while for a reason to be presently pointed out, there has occurred a change which has abolished one order of dif- ferences, differences of another order, far more multitudinous, have arisen. Nothing is more striking than the extreme heterogeneity of dress at the present day. As Mr. Leslie alleges, the dresses of those forming each class were once all alike; now no two dresses are alike. Within the vague limits of the current fashion, the degree of variety in wom- en's costumes is infinite; and even men's costumes, though having average resemblances, diverge from one another in colours, materials, and detailed forms in innumerable ways. Other instances given by Mr. Leslie concern the organiza- tions for carrying on production and distribution. He argues that— " In the industrial world a generation ago a constant movement to- wards a differentiation of employments and functions appeared ; now some marked tendencies to their amalgamation have begun to disclose themselves. Joint Stock Companies have almost effaced all real division of labour in the wide region of trade within their operation." Here, as before, Mr. Leslie represents amalgamation as equiva- lent to increase of homogeneity; whereas amalgamation is but another name for integration, which is the primary process of Evolution, and which may, and does, go along with increas- ing heterogeneity in the amalgamated things. It cannot be said that a Joint Stock Banking Company, with its proprie- tory and directors in addition to its officers, contains fewer unlike parts than does a private Banking establishment: the contrary must be said. A Eailway Company has far more numerous functionaries with different duties, than had the one, or the many, coaching establishments it replaced. And then, apart from the fact that the larger aggregate of co-opera- tors who, as a Company, carry on, say a process of manufacture, is more complex as well as more extensive; there is the fact, here chiefly to be noted, that the entire assemblage of indus- trial structures is, by the addition of these new structures, made more heterogeneous than before. Had all the smaller manufacturing establishments, carried on by individuals or firms, been destroyed, the contrary might have been alleged; but as it is, we see that in addition to all the old forms there have come these new forms, making the totality of them more APPENDIX. 537 multiform than before. Mr. Leslie further illustrates his interpretation by saying: — " Many of the things for sale in a village huckster's shop were formerly the subjects of distinct branches of business in a large town : now the wares in which scores of different retailers dealt, are all to be had in great establishments in New York, Paris, and London, which sometimes buy direct from the producers, thus also eliminating the wholesale dealer." Eeplies akin to the preceding ones are readily made. The first is that wholesale dealers have not been at present eliminated; and cannot be so long as the ordinary shopkeepers survive, as they will certainly do. In the smaller places, forming the great majority of places, these vast establishments cannot exist; and in them, shopkeepers carrying on business as at present, will continue to necessitate wholesale dealers. Even in large places the same thing will hold. It is only people of a certain class, able to pay ready money and willing to go great distances to purchase, who frequent these large estab- lishments. Those who live from hand to mouth, and those who prefer to buy at adjacent places, will maintain a certain proportion of shops, and the wholesale distributing organiza- tion needed for them. Again, we have to note that one of these great stores, such as Whiteley's or Shoolbred's, does not with- in itself display any advance towards homogeneity or de-spe- cialization; for it is made up of many separate departments, with their separate heads, carrying on businesses substantially separate — all superintended by one owner. It is nothing but an aggregate of shops under one roof instead of under the many roofs covering the side of a street; and exhibits just as much heterogeneity as the shops do when arranged in line instead of massed together. That which it really illustrates is a new form of integration, which is the primary evolution- ary process. And then, lastly, comes the fact that the dis- tributing organization of the country, considered as a whole, is by the addition of these establishments made more hetero- geneous than before. All the old types of trading concerns continue to exist; and here are new types added, making the entire assemblage of them more varied. From these objections made by Mr. Leslie which I have endeavoured to show result from misapprehensions, I pass to two others which are to be met by taking account of certain complicating facts liable to be overlooked. Mr. Leslie re- marks that: — " In the early stages of social progress, again, a differentiation takes place, as Mr. Spencer has observed, between political and industrial f unc- 588 APPENDIX. tions, which fall to distinct classes ; now a man is a merchant in the morning and a legislator at night ; in mercantile business one year, and the next perhaps head of the Navy, like Mr. Goschen or Mr. W. H. Smith." Nothing contained in this volume explains the seeming anom- aly here exemplified; but any one who turns to a chapter in the second part of the Principles of Sociology, entitled " So- cial Types and Metamorphoses/' will there find a clue to the. explanation of it; and will see that it is a phenomenon con- sequent on the progressing dissolution of one type and evo- lution of another. The doctrine of Evolution, currently re- garded as referring only to the development of species, is erroneously supposed to imply some intrinsic proclivity in every species towards a higher form; and, similarly, a majority of readers make the erroneous assumption that the trans- formation which constitutes Evolution in its wider sense, implies an intrinsic tendency to go through those changes which the formula of Evolution expresses. But all who have fully grasped the argument of this work, will see that the process of Evolution is not necessary, but depends on condi- tions; and that the prevalence of it in the Universe around, is consequent on the prevalence of these conditions: the fre- quent occurrence of Dissolution showing us that where the conditions are not maintained, the reverse process is quite as readily gone through. Bearing in mind this truth, we shall be prepared to find that the progress of a social organism towards more heterogeneous and more definite structures of a certain type, continues only as long as the actions which pro- duce these effects continue in play. We shall expect that if these actions cease, the progressing transformation will cease. We shall infer that the particular structures which have been formed by the activities carried on, will not grow more hetero- geneous and more definite; and that if other orders of activi- ties, implying other sets of forces, commence, answering structures of another kind will begin to make their appear- ance, to grow more heterogeneous and definite, and to replace the first. And it will be "manifest that while the transition is going on — while the first structures are dissolving and the second evolving — there must be a mixture of structures caus- ing apparent confusion of traits. Just as during the meta- morphoses of an animal which, having during its earlier ex- istence led one kind of life, has to develop structures fitting it for another kind of life, there must occur a blurring of the APPENDIX. 589 old organization while the new organization is becoming dis- tinct, leading to transitory anomalies of structure; so, during the metamorphoses undergone by a society in which the mili- tant activities and structures are dwindling while the indus- trial are growing, the old and new arrangements must be min- gled in a perplexing way. On reading the chapter in the Principles of Sociology which I have named, Mr. Leslie will see that the above facts referred to by him, are interpretable as consequent on the transition from that type of regulative organization proper to militant life, to that type of regulative organization proper to industrial life; and that so long as these two modes of life, utterly alien in their natures, have to be jointly carried on, there will continue this jumbling of the regulative systems they respectively require. The second of the objections above noted as needing to be otherwise dealt with than by further explanation of the for- mula of Evolution, concerns the increase of likeness among developing systems of Civil Law; in proof of which increase of likeness Mr. Leslie quotes Sir Henry Maine to the effect that ' all laws, however dissimilar in their infancy, tend to resemble each other in their maturity : ' the implication to which Mr. Leslie draws attention, being that in respect of their laws societies become not more heterogeneous but more homogeneous. Now though in their details, systems of Law will, I think, be found to acquire as they evolve, an increasing number of differences from one another; yet in their cardinal traits it is probably true that they usually approximate. How far this militates against the formula of Evolution, we shall best see by first considering the analogy furnished by animal organisms. Low down in the animal kingdom there are simple molluscs with but rudimentary nervous systems — a ganglion or two and a few fibres. Diverging from this low type we have the great sub-kingdom constituted by the higher Mollusca and the still greater sub-kingdom constituted by the Verte- brata. As these two types evolve, their nervous systems de- velop; and though in the highest members of the two they remain otherwise unlike, yet they approximate in so far that each acquires great nervous centres: the large cephalopods have clustered ganglia which simulate brains. Compare, again, the Mollusca and the Articulata in respect of their vascular systems. Fundamentally unlike as these are originally, and remaining unlike as they do throughout many successive stages of ascent in these two sub-kingdoms, they nevertheless 590 APPENDIX. are made similar in the highest forms of both by each having a central propelling organ — a heart. Now in these and in some cases which the external organs furnish, such as the remark- able resemblance Evolution has produced between the eyes of the highest Mollusca and those of the Vertebrata, it may be said that there is implied a change towards homogeneity. No zoologist, however, would admit that these facts really conflict with the general law of Organic Evolution. As al- ready explained, the tendency to progress from homogeneity to heterogeneity is not intrinsic but extrinsic. Structures become unlike in consequence of unlike exposures to incident forces. This is so with organisms as wholes, which, as they multiply and spread, are ever falling into new sets of condi- tions; and it is so with the parts of each organism. These pass from primitive likeness into unlikeness; as fast as the mode of life places them in different relations to actions — primarily external and secondarily internal; and with each successive change in mode of life new unlikenesses are super- posed. One of the implications is that if in organisms other- wise different, there arise like sets of conditions to which cer- tain parts are subject, such parts will tend towards likeness; and this is what happens with their nervous and vascular sys- tems. Duly to co-ordinate the actions of all parts of an active organism, there requires a controlling apparatus; and the con- ditions to be fulfilled for perfect co-ordination, are conditions common to all active organisms. Hence, in proportion as ful- filment approaches completeness in the highest organisms, however otherwise unlike their types are, this apparatus ac- quires in all of them certain common characters — especially extreme centralization. Similarly with the apparatus for dis- tributing nutriment. The relatively high activity accom- panying superior organization, implies great waste; great waste implies active circulation of blood; active circulation of blood implies efficient propulsion; so that a heart becomes a common need for highly evolved creatures, however other- wise unlike their structures may be. Thus is it, too, with societies. As they evolve there arise certain conditions to be fulfilled for the maintenance of social life; and in proportion as the social life becomes high, these conditions need to be more effectually fulfilled. A legal code expresses one set of these conditions. It formulates certain regulative principles to which the conduct of citizens must conform that social activities may be harmoniously carried on. And these regu- APPENDIX. 591 lative principles being in essentials the same everywhere, it results that systems of Law acquire certain general similarities as the most developed social life is approached. These special replies to Mr. Leslie's objections are, how- ever, but introductory to the general reply; which would be, I think, adequate even in their absence. Mr. Leslie's method is that of taking detached groups of social phenomena, as those of language, of fashion, of trade, and arguing (though as I have sought to show, not effectually) that their later trans- formations do not harmonize with the alleged general law of Evolution. But the real question is, not whether we find ad- vance to a more definite coherent heterogeneity in these taken separately, but whether we find this advance in the structures and actions of the entire society. Even were it true that the law does not hold in certain orders of social processes and pro- ducts, it would not follow that it does not hold of social pro- cesses and products in their totality. The law is a law of the transformation of aggregates; and must be tested by the entire assemblages of phenomena which the aggregate present. Omitting societies in states of decay and dissolution, which exhibit the converse change, and contemplating only socie- ties which are growing, Mr. Leslie will, I think, scarcely allege of any one of them that its structures and functions do not, taken altogether, exhibit increasing heterogeneity. And if, instead of taking each society as an aggregate, he takes the entire aggregate of societies which the Earth supports, from primitive hordes up to highly civilized nations, he will scarcely deny that this entire aggregate has been becoming more various in the forms of societies it includes, and is still becoming more various. Criticism would be greatly diminished in bulk if there were excluded from it all that part devoted to disproving statements which have not been made; and were this course pursued, the work On Mr. Spencer's Formula of Evolution, by Malcolm Guthrie, would disappear bodily. It is little else than a mis-statement of certain fundamental views of mine, and then an elaborate refutation of the views as mis-stated. Let me first show by brief extracts from First Principles what these views are. In a chapter on " Ultimate Scientific Ideas," after showing how the hypothesis that matter consists of solid atoms commits us to alternative impossibilities of thought, I have shown how the hypothesis of Boscovich, that 592 APPENDIX. matter consists of centres of force without extension, is un- thinkable. In the course of the argument I have pointed out that though Boscovich's hypothesis cannot he realized in thought, yet, on the other hand, the hypothesis of extended atoms itself implies an imaginary separableness of each atom into parts, and again of these into parts, and so on without limit until unextended centres of force are reached: the con- sciousness of force being that which alone perpetually emerges. And I have ended by saying that " Matter then, in its ulti- mate nature, is as absolutely incomprehensible as Space and Time." In the second part of the work, in chapters treating of " The Indestructibility of Matter," " The Continuity of Motion," and " The Persistence of Force," I have at some length elaborated the view that Force is the ultimate com- ponent of thought into which our conceptions of external existences are resolvable. Summing up the first of these chapters I have said — "thus, then, by the indestructibility of matter, we really mean the indestructibility of the force with which matter affects us." At the close of the second of these chapters I have argued that " the continuity of motion, as well as the indestructibility of matter, is really known to us in terms of force " . . . " that which defies suppression in thought, is really the force which the motion indicates." And then in the third chapter, having shown how the truths that matter is indestructible and motion continuous, can be known to us only as corollaries from the truth that force is persistent — that force is that " out of which our conceptions of Matter and Motion are built " — I have gone on to say that " by the Persistence of Force, we really mean the persistence of some Power which transcends our knowledge and conception." Throughout all which arguments the implication is that I hold Matter and Motion to be conditioned manifestations of this unknown Power. Being aware of the perversity of critics, I have, in the " Summary and Conclusion," again endeavoured to bar out misinterpretations. Here is one of the sentences it contains: — " Over and over again it has been shown in various ways, that the deepest truths we can reach, are simply statements of the widest uni- formities in our experience of the relations of Matter, Motion, and Force ; and that Matter, Motion, and Force are but symbols of the Unknown Reality. A Power of which the nature remains for ever inconceivable, and to which no limits in Time or Space can be imagined, works in us certain effects. These effects have certain likenesses of kind, the most general of which we class together under the names of Matter, Motion, and Force." APPENDIX. 593 In which sentences it is distinctly stated' that I have through- out regarded Matter under the form present to consciousness, as a symbol — a certain conditioned effect wrought in us by the Unknown Power; and I have gone on to say that " the interpretation of all phenomena in terms of Matter, Motion, and Force, is nothing m'ore than the reduction of our complex symbols of thought, to the simplest symbols; and when the equation has been brought to its lowest terms the symbols remain symbols still." It will scarcely be believed, and yet it is true, that not- withstanding all this, Mr. Guthrie ascribes to me the vulgar conceptions of Matter and Motion; argues as though I really think they are in themselves what they seem to our conscious- ness; and proceeds to criticize my views on this assumption. He ignores the conspicuous fact that Matter and Motion are both regarded by me as modes of manifestation of Force, and that Force as we are conscious of it when by our own efforts we produce changes, is the correlative of that Universal Power which transcends consciousness. And then he ends the criti- cisms forming the second part of his work by saying " if this is not materialistic I do not know what is." He does not do this by inadvertence, though there would be little excuse even then; but he does it deliberately and with his eyes open. His next chapter begins: — " It will have been observed that in the preceding part of this criticism I have employed the term ' matter in motion,' and have avoided the use of the word ' force,' although it appears so prominently in the pages of Mr. Spencer's work. This has not been accidental, but by design, indicating as it does one of my main criticisms of Mr. Spencer. I can logically take up one of two positions. The first recognises matter, whose properties are merely those of extension, which are capable of being described in terms of geometry and arithmetic. I can also recog- nise as the sole active properties of matter its modes and rates of motion — the motion, that is to say, of ultimate units, atoms, molecules, or masses, also capable of measurement. The second position recognises matter and its activity or activities — matter as endowed with force or forces." Thus it will be observed that having avowedly dealt with Matter and Motion as modes of Force, I am " by design " criti- cized as though I had not so dealt with them. Having dis- tinctly said what I mean by Matter and Motion, I am prac- tically told that I shall not mean that, but shall mean what Mr. Guthrie means; and shall be dealt with accordingly. And then, further, it will be observed that of the two positions which Mr. Guthrie lays down as possible, and proceeds to 594 APPENDIX. argue upon as alternatives, one or other of which I must ac- cept, both speak of Matter and units of Matter as though actually existing under the forms thought by us; and the last, speaking of " matter as endowed with force or forces/' implies that whether in mass or in units, Matter is a space- occupying something which is in the one case inert and the other case made active by force with which it is " endowed " — force which is added to the inert something. Spite of all the pains I have taken to show that I regard Matter as itself a localized manifestation of Force — spite of all the evidence that our idea of a unit of Matter, or atom, is regarded by me simply as a symbol which the form of our thought obliges us to use, but which we cannot suppose answers to the reality without committing ourselves to alternative impossibilities of thought; I am debited with the belief that Matter actually consists " of space-occupying units, having shape and meas- urement." Though I have repeatedly made it clear that our ideas of Matter, Motion and Force are but the x, y, and z with which we work our equations, and formulate the various rela- tions among phenomena in such way as to express their order in terms of x, y and z — though I have shown that the realities for which x, y and z stand, cannot be conceived by us as actu- ally existing thus or thus without committing ourselves to alternative absurdities; yet questions are put implying that I must hold one or other hypothesis concerning these actual existences, and I am supposed to be involved in all the diffi- culties which arise. Another work devoted to the refutation of my views, is that of Professor Birks, — Modern Physical Fatalism and the Doctrine of Evolution, including an examination of Mr. H. Spencer's First Principles. Having dealt with the work of Mr. Guthrie, I cannot pass by that of Prof. Birks without raising the suspicion that I find some difficulty in dealing with it. Indeed, I do find a difficulty, — a difficulty illustrated by that found in disentangling a skein of silk which has been pulled about by a child for half an hour. And just as the patience of a bystander would fail were he asked to look on until, by unravelling the tangled skein, its continuity was proved; so would the reader's attention be exhausted before I had recti- fied one-tenth part of the meshes and knots into which Prof. Birks has twisted my statements. Abundant warrant for this assertion is furnished by the APPENDIX. 595 very first paragraph succeeding the one in which Prof. Birks announces that he is about to take First Principles as repre- sentative of the " fatalistic theory." In this paragraph he represents me as asserting that ultimate religious ideas are " incapable of being conceived." He further says that ulti- mate scientific ideas are by me " pronounced equally incon- ceivable." Now any clear-headed reader who accepted Prof. Birks' version of my views, would be led to debit me with the absurdity of saying that certain things which are put together in consciousness (ideas) cannot be put together in conscious- ness (conceived). To conceive is to frame in thought; and as every idea is framed in thought, it is nonsense to say of any idea that it cannot be conceived — nonsense which I have no- where uttered. My statement is that " Ultimate Scientific Ideas, then, are all representative of realities that cannot be comprehended; " and the like is alleged of ultimate religious ideas. The things which I say cannot be comprehended or conceived, are not the ideas, but the realities beyond con- sciousness for which the ideas in consciousness stand. In Professor Birks' statement, however, inconceivableness of the realities is transformed into inconceivableness of the answer- ing ideas! Further, at the end of this first paragraph which deals with me, I am represented as teaching that religion " is equivalent to Nescience or Ignorance alone." This statement is as far removed from the truth as the others. I have argued at considerable length, and in such various ways that I thought it impossible to misunderstand me, that though the Power universally manifest to us through phenomena, alike in the surrounding world and in ourselves, — the Power " in which we live and move and have our being," — is, and must ever remain, inscrutable; yet that the existence of this Inscruta- ble Power is the most certain of all truths. I have contended that while, to the intellectual consciousness, this Power, though unknowable in nature, must be ever present as exist- ing, it must be, to the emotional consciousness, an object to the sentiment we call religious; since, in substance if not in form, it answers to the creating and sustaining Power towards which the religious sentiment is in other cases drawn out. Yet though in the most emphatic way I have represented this unknown and unknowable Power as the object-matter of re- ligion, Prof. Birks represents me as saying that the unknow- ableness of it is the object-matter of religion! Though I hold that an Ultimate Being, known with absolute certainty as ex- 596 APPENDIX. isting, but of whose nature we are in ignorance, is the sphere for religious feeling; he says I hold that the ignorance alone is the sphere for religious feeling! When in the first sixteen lines specifically treating of my views, these three cases occur, it may be imagined what an intricate plexus of misrepresentations, misunderstandings, and perversions, fills the three hundred and odd pages forming the volume. Especially may it be anticipated that the meta- physical discussions, occupying five chapters, are so confused that it is next to impossible to deal with them. I must limit myself to giving a sample or two from this part of the work: one of them illustrating Prof. Birks' critical fairness, and the other his philosophic capacity. In his chapter on " The Keality of Matter," he says (page 111) " The sense of reality in things around us, Mr. Spencer has truly said, is one which no metaphysical criticisms can shake in the least; " and the rest of the paragraph is devoted to enlarging upon this proposition. The next paragraph begins — ' Permanent possibilities of sensation ' is merely an ingenious phrase, to disguise and conceal a self-contradic- tion: " sundry antagonistic criticisms upon this phrase being appended. And then the opening words of the paragraph which succeeds are quoted from First Principles. Xow since the refutation of my views is the aim of the work; and since both the preceding and succeeding passages specifically refer to my work; and since no other name is mentioned; every reader, not otherwise better instructed, will conclude that as a matter of course the phrase " permanent possibilities of sensation " is mine; and that the criticisms upon it tell against me. Even were there evidence that this phrase " permanent possibilities of sensation," expressed, or harmonized with, a doctrine entertained by me; yet as the phrase is not mine, the quoting it as mine would have been a literary misdemeanour. What then must be said of it when, instead of standing for any view of mine, it stands for an opposite view? Mr. Mill's expression, quoted by Prof. Birks as though it were my ex- pression, belongs to a theory of knowledge entirely at variance with that set forth and everywhere impliedini^V^Pn'^c/^/es; and a theory which, where the occasion was fit, I have per- sistently combated (see Principles of Psychology, Part VII. " General Analysis "). And yet Prof. Birks tacitly makes me responsible for the incongruities which result from uniting this theory with the opposed theory. APPENDIX. 597 From this sample of critical truthfulness let us pass now to a sample of critical acumen. In arguing against Hamilton and Mansell in § 26, I have said " It is rigorously impossible to conceive that our knowl- edge is a knowledge of appearances only, without at the same time conceiving a Eeality of which they are appearances; for appearance without reality is unthinkable." On page 121 of his work, Prof. Birks, quoting the last five words of this sentence, continues — " This is true, when once the conception of distance has been gained by actual experience." And he then proceeds to comment upon visual impressions, illusive and other. Again on page 135, when criticizing my argument concerning the indestructibility of matter, Prof. Birks says: — " Matter, as knowable, is declared to be not the unseen reality, but the sensible appearances, or phenomenal matter alone. Phenomenal matter, it appears from daily and hourly experience, appears and disappears, perishes and is new-created continually .... The cloud vanishes, the star sets, or a mist blots it out, the drop evaporates, the ship melts into the yeast of waves, the candle is burnt away and comes to an end. The substance may last in another form, but the phenomenon or appearance is gone .... Thus, by the theory, of Matter, the Noumenon, we know nothing, and therefore cannot know that it is indestructible. Of Mat- ter, the Phenomenon, we may know much. And one main thing we know of it, proved by hourly experience, is that it both may be and con- tinually is destroyed. For an appearance is destroyed and perishes, when it ceases to appear." In which sentences, as in all accompanying sentences covering several pages, the implication is that Prof. Birks identifies appearance in the philosophical sense with appearance in the popular sense! Everywhere his expressions and arguments make manifest the fact that Prof. Birks thinks the meaning of phenomenon in metaphysical discussion, is no wider than that implied by its derivation — something visible! Sounds, smells, tastes, are in his view not phenomena; nor are touches, pressures, tensions. And hence it results that since when a pound of salt is dissolved in water it ceases to be visible, its existence, phenomenally considered, ends: its continued power of affecting our senses by its weight, to the same extent as before the solution, not being considered as a phenomenal manifestation of its existence! In § 46, when commenting on the mental confusion which metaphysical discussions often produce, I have ascribed this in part to the misleading connotations of the words " appear- ance " and " phenomenon; " and after illustrating this have said: — 593 APPENDIX. •• So that the implication of uncertainty has infected the very word appearance. Hence, Philosophy, by giving it an extended meaning, leads us to think of all our senses as deceiving us in the same way that the eyes do : and so make us feel ourselves floating in a world of phantasms, liad ■phenomenon and appearance no such misleading associations, little, if any, of this mental confusion would result. Or did we in place of them use the term effect, which is equally applicable to alJ impressions produced on consciousness through any of the senses, and which carries with it in thought the necessary correlative cause, with which it is equally real, we should be in little danger of falling into the insanities of idealism." This caution was intended for the general reader. That it might be needed by one who should undertake to deal with the work critically, never occurred to me. Xot only, how- ever, does it seem that Prof. Birks (who quotes the last three words of the paragraph) needs such a caution, but it further seems that the caution is thrown away upon him. For just those misinterpretations of the words above pointed out, are the misinterpretations he makes. After this I shall, I think, be absolved from examining further his metaphysical criti- cisms. Of his criticisms upon various of the physical doctrines which this work contains, I will notice two only — the one because I wish to repudiate a view which, spite of abundant evidence to the contrary, he ascribes to me; and the other because, based as his statement is on a fact which he misin- terprets, it is desirable to give the right interpretation of it. On page 188, Prof. Birks says: — - " The Essence of the doctrine held by Mr. Grove, Dr. Tyndall, and Mr. Spencer, and which the last has made the foundation of his whole theory of Physical Fatalism, is that there is, every moment, an unchanging total of Force, which never varies in amount, while it incessantly changes its form. The Force, then, which persists, must be a present existence. But Potential Energy is nothing of the kind. It is the sum of trillions of trillions of future possibilities of force, ranging through trillions of trillions of different future intervals of time." Xow the tacit implication here is, that I accept the doc- trine of Potential Energy. The men of science named, with many others who might be added, hold that the total quan- tity of force remains constant. Against these it is urged that energy in becoming potential, ceases to exist; and that there- fore the doctrine is untrue. And being represented as hold- ing this doctrine in common with them, I am said to have based my general fabric of conclusions upon a fallacy. In the first place I have to ask on what authority Prof. Birks assumes that I hold the doctrine of Potential Energy in the way in which it is held by those named? And in the second place I have APPENDIX. 599 to ask how it happens that Prof. Birks, elaborately criticizing my views step by step, deliberately ignores the passages in which I have repudiated this doctrine? In the chapter on " The Continuity of Motion," I have, at considerable length, given reasons for regarding the conception of Potential Energy as an illegitimate one; and have distinctly stated that I am at issue with scientific friends on the matter. Devoting, as Prof. Birks does, his chapter entitled " The Transformation of Force and Motion," to the incongruities which result when the doctrine of the Persistence of Force is joined with the doc- trine of Potential Energy, as commonly received, it was doubt- less convenient to assume, spite of the direct evidence to the contrary, that I accept this doctrine, and am implicated in all the consequences. But there can be but one opinion respect- ing the honesty of making the assumption. Let me add that my rejection of this doctrine is not without other warrant than my own. Since the issue of the last edition of this work, containing the passages I have referred to, Mr. James Croll, no mean authority as a mathematician and physicist, has pub- lished in the Philosophical Magazine for Oct., 1876, p. 241, a paper in which he shows, I think conclusively, that the com- monly accepted view of Potential Energy cannot be sustained, but that energy invariably remains actual. I learn from him that he had in 1867 indicated briefly this same view. The remaining case, above adverted to as calling for com- ment, concerns my motive for suppressing a certain passage in the chapter on " Ultimate Scientific Ideas," and substitut- ing another passage. Before proceeding to state the reasons for this substitution, and to disprove the inferences which Prof. Birks draws from it, I may remark that it is usual in literary criticism to judge an author by the latest expression of his views. It is commonly thought nothing but fair that if he has made an error (I say this hypothetically, for in this case I have no error to acknowledge) he should be allowed the benefit of any correction he makes. Prof. Birks, however, apparently thinks that, moved by the high motive of " doing God service," he is warranted in taking the opposite course — perhaps thinks, indeed, that he would fail of his duty did any regard for generous dealing prevent him from making a point against an opponent of his creed. But now, saying no more about the ethics of criticism, I pass to the substantial question. In the first place, I have to point out that in the passage suppressed I have not said (300 APPENDIX. that which Prof. Birks alleges. He represents me as assert- ing " that gravitation is a necessary result of the laws of space " (p. 22?). I have asserted no such thing. He says " There can be no a priori necessity that every particle should act on every other at all at every distance " (p. 222). I have nowhere said, or even hinted, that there is any such a priori necessity. The notion " that gravitation results by a fatal necessity from the laws of space/' which he ascribes to me (p. 229) is one which I should repudiate as utterly absurd, and one which is not in the remotest way implied by anything I have said. What I have said is that " Light, Heat, Gravita- tion, and all central forces, vary inversely as the squares of the distances," and that " this law is not simply an empirical one, but one deducible mathematically from the relations of space." Now what is here said to be " deducible mathe- matically from the relations of space ? " Not a thing, or a force, but a law. What is the law here said to be knowable a priori? The law of variation of any or every central force. And what is alone included in the assertion of this a priori law? Simply this, that given a central force and such is the law according to which it will vary. Nothing is alleged re- specting the existence of any central force. Does Prof. Birks contend that if I say that light, proceeding from a centre, necessarily varies inversely as the square of the distance, I thereby say that the existence of light itself is known a priori as a result of space relations? When I assert that of the heat radiating in all directions from a point, the quantity falling on a given surface necessarily decreases as the square of the distance increases, do I thereby assert the necessary existence of the heat which conforms to this law? Why then do I, in asserting that the lata of variation of gravity " results by a fatal necessity from the laws of space " simultaneously assert " that gravitation results by a fatal necessity from the laws of space ? n Prof. Birks, however, because I assert the first says I assert the second. My proposition — Central forces vary inversely as the squares of the distances, he actually trans- forms into the proposition — There is a cosmical force which varies inversely as the squares of the distances. And debiting me with the last as identical with the first, proceeds, after his manner, to debit me with various resulting absurdities. Having thus shown that the passage in question contains no such statement as that which Prof. Birks says it contains, I go on to show that I have not removed this passage because APPENDIX. got I have abandoned the belief it embodies. Clear proof is at hand. If Prof. Birks will turn to the " Replies to Criticisms/' contained in the third volume of my Essays: Scientific, Politi- cal and Speculative, (pp. 334-337) he will find that I have there defended the above proposition against a previous attack; and assigning, as I have done, justification for it, I have shown no sign of relinquishing it. Why, then, Prof. Birks will ask, did I make the change in question? Had his mental attitude been other than it is, he might readily have divined the reason. Knowing, as he seemingly does, that this doctrine which he criticizes had been already criticized in a similar manner (for otherwise he would scarcely have discovered the change I have made), he might have seen clearly enough that the pas- sage was suppressed simply to deprive opponents of the oppor- tunity of evading the general argument of the chapter by opening a side issue on a point not essential to its argument. The chapter has for its subject, certain incapacities of the human mind — a subject, by the way, on which theologians are never tired of enlarging when it suits their own purpose, but on which an antagonist may not enlarge without exciting their anger. Various examples of these incapacities are given, to justify and enforce the conclusion drawn. Among these was originally included the example in question. Misrepre- senting it as Prof. Birks misrepresents it, another writer had before him similarly based on his misrepresentation sundry animadversions. Though still regarding the statement I had actually made (not the one ascribed to me) as valid, I con- cluded that it would be best to remove the stumbling-block out of the way of future readers; and therefore decided to replace the illustration by another. The rest of the chapter remains exactly as it was, and its argument is not in the re- motest degree affected by this substitution. Nevertheless, Prof. Birks, wrongly describing the nature of the illustration, and wrongly attributing the removal of the illustration to change in my belief, also wrongly conveys the impression that the doctrine which the illustration contained had some vital connection with the general argument of the chapter and with the doctrine of the work; and by conveying this impression calls forth exultation from religious periodicals. Were I to deal with Prof. Birks' book page by page, a much larger book than his would be required to expose his mis-statements, perversions, confusions. The above exam- ples must suffice. I will add only that in one belief of his I 40 602 APPENDIX. cordially agree with him. At the close of his preface he says — " I think that those who take the pains to read my strictures, and compare them with the statements of the work to which they are a reply, will find the effort repaid by a clearer appre- hension of the topics in debate." And I venture to join with this the expression of my belief that if readers follow Prof. Birks' tacit suggestion, " a clearer apprehension of the topics in debate " will not result from acceptance of his criticisms. SUBJECT-INDEX. (For this Index the Author is indebted to F. Howard Collins, Esq. of Edgbaston, Birmingham.) " A priori truth." defined, 183 n. Absolute, the : Mansel on conception of, 40-4, 78-81, 89-99; also Hamilton, 76-8, 89-99. Adaptation, an instance of equilibration, 526. Albumen, number of atoms in, 423. Alimentary canal, evolution of, 399-401. Amalgamation, the same as integration, 586. America, Central, effects of subsidence, 451. Animals, see Biology. Annealing, molecular action of, 301. Annulosa, longitudinal and transverse integration in, 323. Appearance and phenomenon, mislead- ing associations of, 161, 597. Army, evolution of an, 405. Arnold, M., on the formula of evolution, 5S1. Arts, the : integration shown by, 334-7 ; also heterogeneity, 360-4 ; 'definite- ness, 389 ; and multiplied effects. 468. Assyria, artistic development in, 360-4. Astacus flu vial ■His, transverse and longi- tudinal integration in, 324. Astronomy, various conceptions of solar motion, 105 ; persistence of force ex- emplified by planetary motion, 192; transformation and. equivalence of forces, 211-3 ; the laws of motion, 236-8 ; rhythm of motion, 264-6 ; si- dereal and solar integration, 318, 340 ; increased definiteness of evolving solar system, 375 ; greater definiteness of prevision in, 387 ; redistributions of motion in evolving solar system, 396 ; instability of the nomogeneous illus- trated by stellar distribution and colour, 416-9 ; by the nebular hypo- thesis, 419-21 ; and by planetary or- bits, 421 ; the multiplication of ef- fects, 446-8 ; segregation, 479 ; inde- pendent, or perfect moving equili- brium, 500; Equilibrium mobile, 501, 502 ; calculations to disprove the nebular hypothesis, 504 n. ; equilibra- tion illustrated, by nebular genesis, 503 ; by the planetary motions, 504-6 ; and by solar heat diffusion, 506-8 ; terrestrial disintegration, 540 ; univer- sal evolution and dissolution, 541-9 ; Sir J. Herschel on stellar concentra- tion, 545 ; gravitation of magellanic clouds, 544. Atheism unthinkable, 33. Babinet, J., on nebular hypothesis, 504 n. Baer, K. E. von, the formula of, 347. Ball and string, perceptible and latent activity shown by, 189. Beckett, Sir E., Origin of the Laics of Nature, 577. Bees, the sex of, 454, Beliefs : usually founded on fact, 3-5 ; the common groundwork of opposed, 5-11 ; {see also Religion.) Biology : relativity of knowledge and the nature of life, 84^9 ; definition of life, 86 ; transformation and equiva- lence of forces, 216-9 ; laws of motion, 240-4; rhythm of motion, 270-3 ; uni- versal presence of integration and dis- integration, 294 ; amount of contained motion in animals and plants, 310-4 ; and their mutual' interdependence, 321-5 ; heterogeneity of evolving or- ganisms, 344-7, 351 ; Von Baer's for- mula, 347 ; increasing definiteness of mammalian development, 378-81 : has increasing definiteness characterized evolving "flora and fauna?, 381 ; redis- 603 604 SUBJECT-INDEX. tributions of motion of evolving func- tions, 398-401 ; instability of the ho- mogeneous, 424-30; multiplication of effects, 452-60 ; probable effects of up- heavals in East Indian Archipelago, 456-8 ; segregation, 482-6 : equilibra- tion, 511-6 ; dissolution, 535-7. Bird, wounded, apologue, 71-3, 460. Birks, T. R., on First Principles, 594-602. Blood, mental effects ot cerebral supply, 223. Body: distinguishable from space, 194, 233. Bones : integration in ossifying, 322 ; heterogeneity in various races, 351 ; increased definiteness, 380 ; segrega- tion in ossifying, 482-6. Boscovich, R. J., theory of matter, 54-7, 61. Botany : transformation and equiva- lence of forces, 216-9; laws of mo- tion, 239-44 ; contained motion, 310-4 ; mutual interdependence of animals and plants, 321, 325; heterogeneity of evolving plants, 344-7; has increas- ing definiteness characterized evolv- ing flora ? , 381 ; instability of the homogeneous, 424—30 ; eflects of up- heavals in East Indian Archipelago,' 456-8 ; plant classification showing psychical segregation, 486-8.- Brain : causes influencing action of, 223 ; integration of growth, 321. Brewster, Sir D., on the nebular hy- pothesis, 504 n. Bronze, effects of substitution for stone, 464. Bullets, projection of, 202. Burnev, Dr. C, on musical development, 366/ Candle : chemical explanation of burn- ing, not philosophical, 284-6 ; eflects on igniting, 444. Cannon, rhythm consequent upon dis- charge, 261. ' Caoutchouc, introduction in England of, 467. Cause, the First: infinite and absolute, 37-40: Mansel on. 40-4; relativity of knowledge and inconceivability of, 95 ; is unknowable, 110-6. Cause and effect, popular misconceptions of, 180. Centipedes, unintegrated and homoge- neous motions, 401. Change, universality of, 291-3. Chemistry : transformation of chemical action into other modes of force, 209, 210; heat as facilitating change, 302; stability of elements and compounds, '303-5; increasing definiteness of, 387 ; instability of the homogeneous, 413, 421-4 ; segregation of analysis and crys- tallization, 476; dissolution, 538-40. Cilia, homogeneous and indefinite move- ments of, 401. ( la-sification: a progressive integration, 332 ; considered psychologically with segregation, 486-8. Coherence (see Integration). Coleridge, S. T., verbal " desvnonymiza- tion," 432. Colloids, instability of, 305. Comte, A. : co-ordination of knowledga, 132; on the nebular hypothesis, 504 n. Concentration (see Integration). Conception : the actual and symbolic compared, 26-30 ; the preliminary and complex, 314. Consciousness (see Psychology). Conservation of energy, objections to the term, 194 h. Conservatism: advantages of a theo- logical, 119-22; contrasted with re- form, 525. Contradictories and correlatives, Hamil- ton on, 91-4. Creation, an inconceivable hvpothesis, 33-7. Croll, J., on potential energy, 599. Crystalloids, stability of, 305. Crystals : simple evolution illustrated by, 306 ; influences aflecting segrega- tion, 477 ; conform to law of dissolu- tion, 538. Daxcixg : rhythm of, 274; origina^d with poetry and music, 364-9. Darwin, C. : date of publication of Oriyin of Species,vi; " natural selection " and multiplication of effects, 458 «. ; diver- gence of character. 486. Death: are Ave progressing to omni- present? 527; its relation to dissolu- tion, 535-7. Decomposition, an increase in indefinite heterogeneity. 372-5. Definiteness, a characteristic of evolu- tion : the evidence from astronomy, 375. 387 ; geology, 375, 376-8 ; meteo- rology, 378 ; embryology, 378-81 ; bioloirv with botany, 381; sociology, 883-5^*388; philology, 385; mathema- tics. 386; mechanics, 387, 389; chem- istry, 388; physiology, 388; the arts, 389; literature, 390;' is a secondary phenomenon of evolution, 391. Definition, difficulties attending, 139. Disease : the rhythm of, 278 ; an increase in indefinite" heterogeneity. 372-5 ; hereditary transmission of, 429 ; exem- plifies multiplication of effects, 453. Dissolution : definition of, 295, 536 ; in- SUBJECT-INDEX. 605 terdependent with evolution, 531 ; law supported from sociology, 532-5 ; bi- ology, 535-7 ; geology and chemistry, 537-40 ; astronomy^ 540 ; considered universally with evolution, 542-9, 563. Divine Eight, substituted for belief in divine origin, 6. Division ofdabour, social : an increase in heterogeneity, 355-7 ; illustrates in- stability of the homogeneous, 436 ; multiplication of effects, 462-7 ; and motion along line of least resistance, 491. Dress, progressive heterogeneity of, 585. Earth, the, conceptions only symbolic, 26 ; (see also Geology.) Earthquakes : exemplify laws of motion, 240 ; periodicity of, 269 ; a geologist's not a philosophical explanation, 284-6 ; an increase in indefinite heterogeneity, 375. Effects, multiplication of: evidence from astronomy, 446-8 ; heat, 448 ; geology, 448-52, 456 ; meteorology, 450, 452 ; em- bryology, 453-5 ; botany and zoology, 456-8 ; philology, 459 ; psychology, 460-2 ; sociology, 462-8 ; corollary from persistence of force, 4GS-70 ; final sum- mary, 562. Ego and non-ego, 156-8. Egypt, artistic development in, 360-4. Electricity : transformation into other modes of force, 208, 210; rhythm of the current, 261. Elie de Beaumont, L., the earth's irregu- larity, 214. Embryology : connection between vital and physical forces, 218 ; exemplifies progressive integration, 321-5 ; in- crease in heterogeneity of all organisms, 344-7 ; definiteness of mammalian de- velopment, 378-81 ; instability of the homogeneous, 424-30; multiplication of effects, 453-5 ; sex dependent on incident forces, 454 ; Ivirkman's criti- cism, 581. Emotions (see Psychology). Energy : " actual " and " potential," 189, 1 93 «... 195 ; the author assumed to hold doctrine of potential, 598. Engine (see Mechanics). Eiiiozoa, development of, 454. Equilibration : four orders of, 500 ; law supported from astronomy, 503-8 ; geology, 509-11 ; biology and physi- ology, 511-6 ; psychology, 516-20 ; sociology, 520-7 : and persistence of force, 527-30 ; summary, 562. Equilibrium, unstable, defined, 412. Equilibrium mobile, instances of, 499, 501. Error, definition of, 87. Ethnology : evolution of mankind, an increase in heterogeneity, 353 ; the savage and the European compared, 460 ; segregation of physical and psy- chical conditions, 486-8. Europe, national integration in, 327, 585. Evolution : superior to the word involu- tion, 296 ; an integration of matter and dissipation of motion, 296, 315; simple and compound, 297-300, 306-8, 339 ; with dissolution the total history of existence, 315 ; characterized by coher- ence, 337 ; relative nature of the defi- nition of, 340 n.\ a change from an in- coherent homogeneity to a coherent heterogeneity, etc., 371 ; increase in definiteness a secondary phenomenon, 391 ; a change from an indefinite, in- coherent, homogeneity, etc., 391 ; final definition, 407 ; persistence of force underlies phenomena of, 409, 560-3 ; resolutions accompanying redistribu- tions of matter and motion, 410 ; aid rendered by multiplication of effects, 444-6 ; which is deducible from per- sistence of force, 469 ; aid rendered by segregation, 471-9 ; relation to law of equilibration, 496-503 ; can end only in the greatest perfection, 530 ; mutu- ally interdependent with dissolution, 531 ; considered universally with dis- solution, 542-9, 563 ; the final sum- mary, 556-8 ; universality of, 558-60 ; justified by unification of developing knowledge, 565-7 ; the formula criti- cised by "Tait, 575-82 ; Kirkman, 577- 82 ; M. Arnold, 581 ; North American Review, 581 ; T. E. Cliffe Leslie, 583- 91 : M. Guthrie, 591-4 : and Birks, 594-602 ; traits associated in the defi- nition must be considered as a whole, 584 ; is dependent on conditions, 588, 590. Existence, the cognition of, 66-8. Explanation, limitation of, 71-5. Eye, development of the, 431. Faculty, capacity and desire usually associated, 462. Fashion: rhythm of, 278; progressive heterogeneity of dress, 585. Fibrine, number of atoms in, 423. Figures, mental development and, 179. Fiji, belief in ruler's unlimited power, 5. First Cause {see Cause, the First). First Principles, aim and scope of, xvii. Flint implements, lack of precision and definiteness, 389. Food, equilibration of quantity to force expended, 512-14. Force : incomprehensibility of, 60-3 ; un- COG SUBJECT-INDEX. derlies time, space, matter, and mo- tion, 172; the intrinsic and extrinsic forms of, 194-6; persistence of rela- tions among various forms of, 201 ; the various forms qualitatively and quantitatively correlated, 205-10 ; reso- lutions accompanying redistributions of matter and motion, 410 ; heteroge- neous effect of action on homogeneous aggregate, 437 ; and the multiplied effects, 442-6; Tait's definitions of, 576. Force, persistence of (see Persistence). Forces : of attraction and repulsion sym- bols, not realities, 232-4 ; persistence of force underlies parallelogram of, 255 ; persistence of relations among, a philo- sophical truth, 282. Forees, the transformation and equiva- lence of: shown in astronomy, 211-3 ; geology, 213-6; biology, 216-9; psy- chology and physiology, 219-26 ; so- ciology. 226-9 ; corollary from persist- ence of force, 229 ; a philosophical truth, 283. Generalities, when unsuggestive, 578- 83. Geology : the transformation and equi- valence of forces, 213-6 ; laws of mo- tion, 238^40 ; rhythm of aqueous and igneous action, 266-70 ; changes un- dergone by species, 272 ; segregation of silica in porcelain clay, 303 ; terrestrial integration, 319-21 ;and heterogeneity, 341-4; the record consistent with evo- lution from simple to complex, 347- 51 ; indefinite heterogeneity of earth- quakes, 375 ; increased definiteness inferable from terrestrial structure, 375-8 ; molar motion originating in molecular, 393 ; redistributions of mo- tion from earth's evolution, 397 ; hete- rogeneity of trap rock, 414; physi- cal effects of instability of the ho- mogeneous, 421 : also chemical, 422-4 ; multiplied effects of diminishing ter- restrial heat, 448 ; and of aqueous and atmospheric agencies, 449-52 ; prob- able effects of "upheavals in East In- dian archipelago, 456-60 ; segregation of aqueous and igneous action, 480-2 ; equilibration illustrated, 509-11 ; also law of dissolution, 538-40; the earth's disintegration, 540. Glass, molecular effect of annealing, 301. Government: authority and functions of, 5-11 ; evolution of, marked by in- creasing heterogeneity, 353-5 ; also in- tegration, heterogeneity, and definite- ness, 406 ; and by equilibration, 524-7. Granite, segregation of, .4^1. Gravity : incomprehensibility of, 62, 105 > shows " latent" and " perceptible " ac- tivity, 190 ; terrestrial effects of, 213-6 ; effect on vascular system, 243. Grove, Sir W. K., The Correlation of the Physical Forces, 209. Growth : laws of motion exemplified, 240-4 ; universal presence of, 292 ; in- tegration of, 294; shows molecular be- coming molar motion, 393. Guthrie, M. On Mr. Spencers Formula of Evolution, 591-4. Hamilton, Sir W. K. : the philosophers agreeing in relativity of knowledge, 71 ; on the absolute and infinite, 76-8, 89-99; correlatives, 91-3; trustworthi- ness of consciousness, 143. Harvests, correlation of vital and physi- cal forces, 227-9. Heart, the : spiral form of, 242 ; mental influences on, 246 ; increasing definite- ness of development, 380. Heat : of air breathing animals, 134 ; transformation into other modes of force, 206-8, 210; Joule's mechanical equivalent, 210 ; terrestrial effects of solar, 213-6 : a cause of condensation or diffusion, 292, 293 ; molecular ef- fects, 301 ; chemical stability, 303-5 ; simple and compound evolution illus- trated, 305-8 ; amount possessed by organisms, 309, 310-4 : instability of the homogeneous, 413 ; multiplied ef- fects of the terrestrial decrease, 421-4, 448 ; action on simple and complex combinations, 423 ; action of, on sphere, 438 ; aids segregation in granite, 481 ; equilibration shown by solar, 506-8; necessary for organic and inorganic dissolution, 536, 538, 540. Helmholtz, H. : on solar heat diffusion, 507 ; terrestrial motion and the tidal wave, 509; thermal equivalent of earth's motion, 540. Heredity, the instability of the homo- geneous, 428-30. Herschel, Sir J. F. W.: a rotating ethe- rial medium, 505 ; the sun's rays the ultimate source of every motion, 509 n. ; stellar concentration, 545. Heterogeneity of matter : its increase during evolution shown by astronomy, 340 ; meteorology, 343 ; geology, 341-4; biology with embryology and botany, 344-7 : paleontology, 347-51 ; sociol- ogv. 351-7; ethnology, 352; philology, 357-60 ; the arts and" literature, 360-9. Heterogeneity of motion (see Motion). Hieroglyphics, the development of, 359. Hinton. J., on direction of organic growth, 240-3. SUBJECT-INDEX. 607 History, definition of complete, 288-90. Homogeneous, instability of the, 412-6 ; evidence from mechanics, 413 ; astro- .nomy, 416-21; geology, 414, 421; chemistry, 413, 421-4 ; meteorology, 424; biology with embryology and botany, 4^4-30; psychology, 431-4; philology, 432; sociology, 434-7; co- rollary from persistence of force, 437- 41 ; relation to segregation, 473 ; sum- mary, 560. Huxley, Prof. T. H. : on persistence of force, 1 94 n. ; Persistent Types, 349 ; osseous segregation, 484. Ideas : and impressions, 145-60, 174; ad- vantages of preliminary, 314. Impulsiveness, influences modifying, 461. India : domestic and political fixity in, 383 ; segregation ot physical condi- tions in, 4S9. Induction, necessary to verify deduc- tion, 317. Infinite, the : Mansel on conception of, 40-4, 78-81, 89-94; also Hamilton, 76- 8, 89-94. Insanity, correlation of the mental and physical forces, 225. Insects, transformation of physical and vital force exemplified by, 219. Integration of matter: and disintegra- tion, 291 ; the primary aspect of evo- lution, supported by astronomy, 318 ; geology, 319-21 ; biology, with em- ryology and botany, 321-5 ; sociol- ogy, 326-9; philology, 329-32; sci- ence and meteorology, 332 ; industrial and aesthetic arts, 334-7. Integration of motion (see Motion). Involution and evolution, the terms, 296. Iron, molecular rearrangement in, 300. Japan, effect of European civilization in, 533. Joule, J. P., mechanical equivalent of heat, 210. Kant, Im., space and time forms of the intellect, 51. Kirkman, T. P., on the formula of evo- lution, 577-82. Knowledge : thought transcended by, 16 ; resume showing limitations, 68 ; rela- tivity of, 84-8 ; definition of complete, 288-90; unification of developing, 565-7. Language (see Philology). Laplace, P. S., on nebulous ring develop- ment, 419, 479. Latham, R. G., on inflexional language, 331. Laughter, laws of motion exemplified by, 247. Law : of continuity, 53, 59 ; uniformity of, 203 ; the author's belief in univer- sality of, 347 n. ; increase in definite- ness of evolving statutes, 384 ; develop- ing systems, and the formula of evo- lution, 589-91. Leibnitz, G. W., theory of matter, 55. Leslie, T. E. Clift'e, on the formula ot evolution, 583-91. Liberty : general establishment of, 7 ; equilibration of, 527. Life : and relativity of knowledge, 84-9; definition of, 86. Light : transformed into other modes of force, 209 ; compound rhythm of interference, 262 ; like mode of pro- duction with sound, 334 ; segregation exemplified, 478. Literature : integration of, 336 ; hetero- geneity, 369 ; increasing truth of rep- resentation, 390 ; multiplied effects of, 468. Liver, development of, 380. Logic, definition of " a priori " and " necessary " truths, 193 n. Magnetism : transformation into other modes of force, 208, 209 ;. illustrates laws of motion, 235 ; rhythm of varia- tions, 266 ; consequent on added mo- tion, 301 ; segregative power, 473 ; equilibration and the solar-spot cycle, 510. Majorities, usually in error, 5. Manifestations, the vivid and faint, 147- 60,174. Manners and Fashion, essay on, 354. Mansel, H. L. : on the first cause, the absolute and the infinite, 40-4, 78-81, 89-94 ; conceptions of rational the- ology, 42 ; consciousness of self, 67 ; attributes being asserted of the abso- lute, 110. Marriages, equilibration to means of sub- sistence, 520. Ufarsupialia, integration of generative system in, 324. Materialism and evolution, 568-72. Mathematics : figures and mental devel- opment, 179 ; increase in definiteness, 386. Matter: divisibility, 52; incomprehensi- bility, 52-7 ; solidity, 53 ; theories of Boscovich, 54-6, 61 ; Leibnitz, 55 ; and Newton, 54-6, 61 ; connection with force, 60-3 ; consciousness of, 170 ; in- destructibility, 176-8, 182 ; creation and annihilation, unthinkable, 180-2 ; 608 SUBJECT-INDEX. and space, 233 ; indestructibility of, a philosophical truth, 281, 286; mo- lecular motion and rearrangement of parts, 300-3 ; contained motion in or- ganic, 308-10, 310-4 ; effect of uniform force on uniform, 442-6. Maxwell, J. Clerk, on Thomson and Tait's Treatise on Natural Philosophy, 576. Measurement, unable to prove persist- ence of force, 197-9. Mechanics : progressive integration of machinery, 334 ; increase in Indefinite- ness of, 387, 389 ; instability of the homogeneous illustrated, 413 ; multi- plied effects of locomotive engine, 465 ; dependent moving equilibrium shown by steam engine, 500. Metaphysics : sense of illusion after read- ing, 161 ; antagonism resulting from word real, 162." Meteorology : laws of motion exempli- fied, 238-40; also rhythm of motion, 266-9 ; effect of heat on clouds, 293 ; visibility and audibility of objects pre- ceding rain, 333 ; climatic effects of terrestrial irregularity, 343; definite- ness of phenomena of, 378 ; molar, originating in molecular motion, 393 ; redistributions of motion caused by earth's evolution, 397 ; instability of the homogeneous, 424 ; multiplied effects of solar action, 450 ; probable effects of Central American subsidence, 451 ; segregating effect of climate, 439. Microscopes, great exactness of, 389. Mill, J. S., on limit to industrial progress, 523. Monotremata, integration of generative system in. 324. Morbid growths, an increase in indefi- nite heterogeneity, 372-5. Motion : incomprehensibility of, 57-60 ; relativity, 68 ; changing 'to rest. 59 ; conception derived from experiences of force, 170 ; continuity not self-evi- dent, 184 ; Newton's first law, 186, 576 ; " latent " and " perceptible," 186-91 ; of celestial bodies and pendulum, 186- 8 ; continuity known in terms of force, 191 ; and involves its persistence, 192 ; transformed into heat, electricity, &c., 205-10 ; along line of least resistance, 234-6 : general laws of direction, 236 ; laws supported by astronomy, 236-8 ; meteorology, 238-40 ; geology, 238-40 ; biology and botany, 240-4 ; psychology, 244-8 ; sociology, 248-54 ; spiral direc- tion, 241 ; persistence of force under- lies laws of direction, 254-8 ; universal rhythm of, 259-64; illustrated from astronomy, 264-6; magnetism, 266; meteorology, 266-9 ; geology, 266-70 ; biology with physiology and palaeon- tology, 270-3, 398-401 ; psychology with the arts, 273-6, 364-9, 517 ; soci- ology, 276-9, 526 ; corollary from per- sistence of force, 279-81 ;" final sum- mary, 553 ; continuity of, a philosoph- ical truth, 282; also "law of direction, 283 ; facility of an aggregate to undergo rearrangement, 298-300 -"through space, and effects of incident forces, 298-300 ; amount in organic matter, 308-314 ; in- tegration, heterogeneity, and distinct- ness of its evolution. 392-6 ; shown by geology, 393 ; meteorology, 393, 397 ; astronomy, 395 ; biology with physi- ology, 398-401 ; psychology, 401-5 ; philology, 402-4 ; sociology, 405 ; final- ly results in cessation, 496-8 ; molar, changing to molecular, and its relation to universal evolution and dissolution, 542-9 ; final summary of the laws of direction, 553. Mountains : rybthm in rain caused by, 267 ; altitude and thickness of the earth's crust, 320, 343, 448. Movement (see Motion.) Multiplication of effects {see Effects). Muscle : transformation and equivalence of its action to the sensations causing it, 221-3 ; contraction caused by in- terrupted nerve discharge, 274 ; equi- librium of expenditure to nutrition, 513. Music: rhythm of, 274; and progressive integration, 336 ; originated with poet- ry and dancing, 364-9. Natural selection : implies change along lines of least resistance, 244 ; relation to multiplication of effects, 459. Nature : Thomson and Tait's Treatise on Natural Philosophy, 576; Force, by Tait, 576 ; Beckett's Origin of the Laws of Nature, 577. Nebular hypothesis {see Astronomy). Nerves, transverse integration of, in an- nulosa and Crustacea 323 {see also Psy- chology). Newton, "Sir I. : theory of matter, 54-7, 61 ; on force of gravity, 62, 105 ; his first law of motion, 186, 576. Nitrogen : instability of compounds, 305 ; amount in animals and plants, 311. North American Review, on formula of evolution, 581. Object and subject, 156-60, 174. Orange and Earth's crust, 449. Organic matter {see Matter). Origin of Species, The, date of publica- SUBJECT-INDEX. 609 tion, vi.; "natural selection" and mul- tiplication of effects, 459. Ostrich, osseous segregation in, 483. Owen, Sir R., on anoplotherium and paleolherium, 350. Fain, varying rhythm of, 275. Painting {see Arts). Palaeontology : rhythm of motion shown by, 272 ; its record consistent with evo- lution, 347-51. Pantheism, inconceivability of, 33. Pendulum : " latent" and "perceptible" activity, 186-8; alteration of rate by locality, 395. Persistence of force : underlies continuity of motion, 192; transcends demonstra- tion, 197-200; definition, 200; under- lies uniformity of law, 203 ; and trans- formation and equivalence of forces, 229 ; and laws of motion, 254-8 ; and rhythm of motion, 279-81 ; a philo- sophical and universal truth, 282 ; un- derlies phenomena of evolution, 409; and instability of the homogeneous, 437-41 ; and multiplication of effects, 468-70 ; and segregation, 493-5 ; and law of equilibration, 526-30 ; sum- mary, showing it to be the ultimate truth, 552 ; and evolution to result from, 560-3. Phenomenon and appearance : their mis- leading'associations, 162 ; misinterpret- ed by Birks, 597. Philology : language and the dispersion of mankind, 14; errors of verbal misinterpretation, 161-5; integration, shown by agglutination of language, 329-32 ; by fewer number of syllables, 330 ; by increasing coherence, 331 ; and greater complexity of sentences, 332 ; incoherence of Chinese, 331 ; Latham on inflexional languages, 331 ; com- pleteness of English language, 357 ; increase in heterogeneity of written and spoken language, 357-60 ; devel- opment "of writing, 362 ; integration, heterogeneity, and definiteness of evolving speech, 385,402-4; heteroge- neity, "desynonymization" of words, 432; establishes racial community, 459 ; unsuggestiveness of abstract words, 577-83 ; Leslie on language and law of evolution, 583. Philosophers, and relativity of knowl- edge, 70. Philosophy : hypothesis of first cause, 37-40 ; Hamilton on the absolute and infinite, 75-7,' 89-99; also Mansel, 40-4, 78-81, 89-99; varied interpreta- tions of, 130-3; completely unified knowledge, 133-6; general and spe- cial, 136 ; must assume intuitions necessary to thought, 139 ; and justify them, 140-2 ; also assume conscious- ness trustworthy, 142-4; the postu- lates adopted, 159, 174; errors from verbal misinterpretation, 161-5; re- lation to science, 282-7; resume of the laws constituting it, 282; should seek law of continuous redistribution of matter and motion, 287 ; and unify history of existences, 288-90 ; formula must comprehend evolution and diffu- sion, 291 ; induction necessary to verify deduction, 317 ; summary of its relation to evolution and dissolution, 551-6 ; to science and religion, 564 ; and conclusion, with the doctrines re- stated, 568-72. Phosphorus in the brain, 223. Physiology : knowing, illustrated by processes of, 72 ; transformation and. equivalence of forces, 220-4 ; rhythm of motion, 270 ; increasing definite- ness of, 387 ; integration of alimentary canal, 399-401 ; correlation of organs to functions, 511-6. Physiology, Transcendental, and Origin of Species, dates of publication, v-vi. Piano, thought and concept of, 97. Pleasure, varying rhythm of, 275. Poetry: rhythm of, 274; originated with music and dancing, 364-9. Political economy, rhythm in the pro- cesses of, 276-9. Population : equilibration of, 520 ; disso- lution shown by decrease, 534. Pressure, hypothesis of an universal 232-4. ' Principles of Biology, general aim and scope, xvii. Principles of Morality, general aim and scope, xxi. Principles of Psychology, general aim and scope, xviii. Principles of Sociology, general aim and scope, xix. Printing, the development of, 362. Progress, its Law and Cause, and Ori- gin of Species : dates of publication, v, 347 n. Protein, characteristics of, 308-10. Protestantism and Catholicism, 117. Protozoa : extreme indetinitcness, 381 ; and lack of differentiated parts, 425. Psychology : knowledge transcended by thought, 16; actual and symbolic conceptions, 27-30 ; Mansel on the absolute and infinite, 40-4, 78-81, 89- 99; consciousness only conceivable as a relation,— Mansel, 41 ; duration of consciousness inconceivable, 64-5 ; also its substance, 66-9 ; relativity 610 SUBJECT-IXDEX. of cognitions, 71-5, 137-40 ; Hamilton on the absolute and infinite, 75-7, 89- 99; likeness implied by complete act of consciousness, 81-4; the definite and indefinite forms of consciousness, 89-93, 96; the belief in the actuality behind appearances, 96-9 ; formation of a thought shown by concept of piano, 97 ; philosophy must assume consciousness trustworthy. 142-4 : the two classes of manifestations, 145-60 : relation the universal form of thought, 165; experiences of force underlie modes of consciousness. 172; recogni- tion of " necessary truths," 178-80 ; the conception of force, 196 ; correlation and equivalence of physical and men- tal forces, 221-6; the laws of motion exemplified, 244-8; also rhythm of motion, 273-6, 364-9, 517 ; the inte- gration, etc., dis] ilayed by evolving phenomena of, 401-5; instability of the homogeneous exemplified, 431-4 ; also multiplication of effects, 460-3 ; persistence of force underlies assertion of dissimilarity, 469 ; segregation of developing nerve structure, 486-8: and of men's affinities, 488-93 ; equili- bration shown by moral and nervous adaptations, 516-20; rhythm exempli- fied by, 517 ; mental defects from studying one group of sciences, 583. Pythagoras, philosophy defined by, 130. Railways : rhythm of trains, 261 ; in- tegration exemplified by clearing house, 328; multiplied effect of, 465. Eeal, definition of, 162-5. Eeform, contrasted with conservatism, 525. Religion: relation to science, 11-13; universality, and independent evolu- tion of, 13-18; antagonism shown to science, 18-21 ; the subject matter transcends experience, 17 ; the funda- mental verity of its varied forms, 17, 123; the discovery of which would aid its development, 21-3; can only coalesce with science in some abstract truth, 23 ; the various creeds defined, 44; the underlying mystery, absolute, 44-8; summary reconciling it with science, 100; its gradual purification, 101-4 ; instances of its irreligion, 102 ; the purification effected by science, 104-7 ; a necessary correlative to sci- ence, 107-110 ; the ultimate cause un- knowable, 110-6 : and of which no attributes should be asserted, 110; its approximation to the truth depend- ent on contemporary mental develop- ment, 118-22; its imperfections rela- tive, 118, 124; advantages of eonserva* tism in, 118-22; toleration needful in dealing with its beliefs, 122-4 ; rhythm displayed by, 278; heterogeneity shown by its evolution, 353-5 ; religious char- acter of early art, 361 ; the poetry, music, and dancing, of its ancient festivals, 364; summary of its relation to philosophy and science, 564; and conclusion with doctrines re-stated, 568-72. Respiration, explained to illustrate knowing, 73. Rest, changing to motion, unthinkable, 59. fihizopods, without limiting membrane, 425. Rhythm (see Motion). Rivers, lateral undulations of, 257. Roads follow line of least resistance, 252. Rulers, varied interpretations of their origin and power, 5-11. Salutations, the heterogeneity of their evolution, 354. Sand, rhythm shown by ridging of, 263. Scales, instability of the homogeneous exemplified by, 413. Science: general justification, 18-21: a higher development of common knowl- edge, 18 ; is prevision, 19 ; decreases superstition, 104; instances of its be- ing unscientific, 106; is partially uni- fied knowledge, 133-6, 567 ; rhythm of its varied eras, 278 ; and philoso- phy, 282-7 ; its progressive integra- tion, 332-4; mutual "interdependence of its division, 338 ; increase in hetero- geneity, 369; and definiteness, 386-8; exemplifies multiplication of effects, 467 ; final summary of its relation to philosophy and religion, 564; and con- clusion with the doctrines restated, 568-72 : mental discipline of, 583 ; {see also Religion I. Sculpture (see Arts). Segregation: the varied modes of action of, 471-9 ; illustrated from magnetism, 473; chemistry, 476; light, 478; as- tronomy, 479 ; geology, 480-2; biology with osteologv, 482-6 ; psvcholocrv, 486-8, 488-90 ; sociology with eth- nology and anthropology, 488-93 ; resume, 493-5; final summary, 561. Self, its cognition forbidden by nature of thought, 66-8. Self-creation an inconceivable hypothe- sis, 33. Self-existence, an inconceivable hypothe- sis, 31-3. Sex, and the embryo, 454. SUBJECT-INDEX. 611 Ship : relativity of motion, 57 ; rhythm of motion, 259. Shops, integration displayed by, 587. Small-pox, multiplied effects of, 453. Sociology : transformation and equiva- lence of the social, vital, and physical forces, 226-9 ; laws of motion illus- trated by a society's growth, 248-50; by localization of industries, 250 ; by barter, etc., 251-3 ; and by commerce, 253-4 ; exemplifies rhythm of motion, 276-9, 526 ; progressive integration of societies, 326-9 ; the increase in hete- rogeneity of civilization, 351-7 ; and in the detiniteness of an evolving so- ciety, 383-5 ; increasing detiniteness of, 388 ; integration, heterogeneity, and detiniteness of social evolution, 405; the instability of the homogeneous, 434-7 ; multiplication of effects, 462-7 ; segregation, 488-93 ; equilibration, 520- 7; law of dissolution conformed to by an evolving society, 532-5. Sound and light, their like modes of production, 334. Space : without limit, inconceivable, 16 ; also its non-existence and creation, 36 ; wholly incomprehensible, 49-52; its inconceivability an argument for rela- tivity of knowledge, 95 ; experiences of force underlie consciousness of, 168-72; how distinguishable from body, 194, 233. Species: rhythm in increase and decrease, 271; palasontological evidence, 272 ; are ' they becoming moredefinitely marked? 382; instability of the homogeneous, 430 ; also segregation, 485 ; and equili- bration, 575. Sphere, action of radiant heat on, 438. Spiritualism and evolution, 568-72. Sponges, general indefiniteness of, 382. Statue, intrinsic and extrinsic absurdity exemplified by, 581. Stephenson, G., on solar rays, 509 n. Stewart, B., and P. G. Tait, The Unseen Universe, 575. Subject and object, 156-60. Substance (see Matter). Sugar, segregation in preserves, 303, Sun, the : varied terrestrial effects, 213-6; plant-life dependent on, 216 ; inspira- tion increased by, 221 ; correlation of social and physical forces, 228 ; redis- tribution of motion effected by, 394; its reserve of force, 506-8. Supply and demand, 521-4. Tait, Prof. P. G., The Unseen Universe, 575 ; on the formula of evolution, 575- 82 ; lecture on Force, 576. Tape-worm, development of, 454. Temperature (see Heat). Tension, the hypothesis of an universal, 232-4. Theism, hypothesis inconceivable, 34-7. Theology, Mansel on fundamental con- ceptions of rational, 42 ; (see also Re- ligion). Theories, the basis common to all, 45. Tide, Ilelmholtz on terrestrial effects of, 509. Time : incomprehensibility of, 49-52 ; relativity of knowledge shown by, 95 ; consciousness of, arises from experi- ences of force, 165-9. Top, equilibration of spinning, 498. Trains (see Railways). Transcendental Physiology, and Origin of Species : their dates of publication, v; chapter on "instability of the ho- mogeneous" a development of, 412 n. Truth : definition of, 87, 141 ; a " neces- sary," 178-80 ; " a priori " and " ne- cessary," 183 n.; words expressing the highly abstract unsuggestive,. 579- 84. Tuning-fork, persistence of force, 279- 81. Tyndall, Prof. J., on the rhythm of mo- tion, 262 n. Universe, the ; hypothesis of self-exist- ence, 31-3 ; of atheism, 32 ; of self- creation, 33 ; and of creation by exter- nal agency, 34-7. Unknowable, the: 3-126, 564; the ulti- mate cause is, 111-6 ; the two classes of its manifestations, 147-60; sum- mary of its relation to the knowable, 564. Unseen Universe, criticism of, 575. Unstable equilibrium, definition of, 412. Varnish, effect of drying, 414. Vascular system : influenced by force of gravity, 243 ; heterogeneity of its evo- lution, 399 ; and multiplied effects, 453. Velocity, intermediate [degrees of a changing, 53, 58. Vertebrata : transverse and longitudinal integration of, 324 ; also heterogeneity of osseous system, 351. Vessel (see Ship). Vision deceptive when unverified by touch, 162, 165. Volcanoes : laws of motion illustrated by, 240 ; rhythm of eruptions, 269. Watch, theological simile, 113. Water: laws of motion shown by, 240; rhythm caused in opposing objects by, 259, 263; organic redistributions e'f- 12 SUBJECT-INDEX. tected by, 310-4 ; segregative power of, 472, 475, 480. Weighing and persistence of force, 197-9. Weight, popular misconceptions of, 180 n. Whewell, Dr. W., on increasing definite- ness of science, 386-8. Wind, segregative action of, 472, 475. Words and abstract truths, 577-83 {see also Philology). Writing {see Philology). THE END. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY Los Angeles This book is DUE on the last date stamped below. REC'D UMiitt QL 4AN2 3 AC MAY tfi2' University of California, Los An- L 006 039 912 8