

FOR THE RIGHT

Essays and Addresses
By Members of the
"Fight for Right"
Movement

WITH A PREFACE BY
SIR FRANCIS YOUNGHUSBAND
K. C. I. E.

CONTRIBUTORS

VISCOUNT BRYCE	SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK
MAURICE HEWLETT	SIR HENRY NEWBOLT
A. F. WHYTE, M.P.	PROF. GILBERT MURRAY
H. WICKHAM STEED	PROF. RAMSAY MUIR
REV. W. TEMPLE	EMILE CAMMAERTS
PHILIP KERR	EVELYN UNDERHILL
WILFRID WARD	DR. L. P. JACKS
	M. PAINLEVE

Walter Clinton Jackson Library
THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT GREENSBORO
Special Collections & Rare Books

WORLD WAR I PAMPHLET COLLECTION

FOR THE RIGHT

ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES

BY MEMBERS OF THE

“FIGHT FOR RIGHT MOVEMENT”



G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS
NEW YORK AND LONDON
The Knickerbocker Press
1918

Frank
C
C
F
17-7

COPYRIGHT, 1918
BY
G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS

The Knickerbocker Press, New York

PREFACE

AFTER the first outburst of enthusiasm there was special difficulty, in Great Britain, in maintaining keenness for the war. Our homelands were not invaded, and after the first few weeks there was little chance that they ever would be. It was, therefore, actually harder for the mass of the British people than it was for Frenchmen or Russians to feel to the full the necessity for fighting. Moreover, the strict censorship which at the commencement of the war drew a veil over the doing of our fleets and armies inevitably damped down all the first fresh enthusiasm. When men could neither see nor know what was going on their interest was bound to flag.

Yet, as through the darkness a few stupendous facts came looming up, the true inner meaning and significance of the issues at stake became gradually more apparent to those who were carefully watching the course of the war. There seemed, therefore, to be scope for an organization whose business it would be continually to remind the nation of the ideals and principles for which

we were fighting; to demonstrate the value and importance of those ideals both for our national life and for mankind as a whole; and to sustain and heighten the spirit of the people in this great fight, first for the maintenance and then for the final enthronement of those ideals as established principles in the life of nations. And there seemed also to be a real necessity for such an organization to keep the mind of the nation steadily fixed on those ideals, and not let it be more than temporarily diverted to those minor questions of trade and territory and retaliation which might absorb attention that should be principally directed to those ultimate and fundamental aims which it is our chief object to achieve.

Our statesmen, busily engaged in the practical business of prosecuting the war, could not be expected to devote the necessary time to such a work. But there were others—our leaders in thought and art—to whom the nation were also accustomed to look for guidance in whatever concerned the foundation principles of national and human life; and it was the services of these men and women that it was necessary to enlist for this work of inspiring the nation. They, it was hoped, would be able to inculcate a spirit which was not merely patriotism in its narrower sense, but patriotism based on the profoundest depth of religious feeling; such as men can only feel for

their country when they are convinced that their country itself is fighting for something of priceless value to all mankind.

And now, in the third year of the war, it will become every day more necessary not only to state the principles for which we are fighting and to show their value, but also to consider how they may be embodied in concrete form in the settlement which lies before us. The Prime Minister has more than once during the course of the war referred to our purpose of establishing the idea of public right as the governing idea of European politics. And on August 4th, of this year he said that "By the victory of the Allies the enthronement of public right here in Europe will pass from the domain of ideals and aspirations into that of concrete and achieved realities." And by public right he explained that he meant "An equal level of opportunity and of independence as between small States and great States, as between the weak and the strong, safeguards resting on the common will of Europe, and [he hoped] not Europe alone, against aggression, covetousness, bad faith, wanton recourse in case of dispute to the use of force and the disturbance of peace; and, finally, as the result of it all, a great partnership of nations, confederated in the joint pursuit of a freer and a fuller life for countless millions who, by their efforts and by their sacrifices generation after generation,

maintain the progress and enrich the inheritance of humanity."

It was to elucidate this idea of public right that the series of addresses at King's College, University of London, which are here reprinted, were organized by the Fight for Right Movement, and to continue and develop this work will be our principal task in the coming year.

FRANCIS YOUNGHUSBAND.

August, 1916.

CONTENTS

	PAGE
PREFACE . . . <i>Sir Francis Younghusband</i>	iii
THE DEFENCE OF RIGHT . . . <i>Viscount Bryce</i>	I
AN INVINCIBLE FELLOWSHIP <i>Sir Henry Newbolt</i>	6
THE GREAT SOLVENT . . . <i>Maurice Hewlett</i>	23
WAR AND THE IDEAL OF CHIVALRY <i>Wilfrid Ward</i>	36
AN INTERIM RELIGION . . . <i>Dr. L. P. Jacks</i>	58
HOW WE STAND NOW . . . <i>Prof. Gilbert Murray</i>	82
THE DESIRE OF CIVILIZATION FOR THE REIGN OF LAW <i>Prof. Ramsay Muir</i>	101
A LEAGUE OF PEACE . . . <i>Sir Frederick Pollock</i>	130
INTERSTATE RELATIONS AFTER THE WAR <i>Philip Kerr</i>	141
THE OUTLOOK OF A GOOD EUROPEAN <i>A. F. Whyte, M.P.</i>	165
WHAT IS "RIGHT"? . . . <i>H. Wickham Steed</i>	203
FIGHT FOR THE RIGHT . . . <i>Rev. W. Temple</i>	224
THE CONSECRATION OF ENGLAND <i>Evelyn Underhill</i>	232
TO THE MEN BEHIND THE ARMIES <i>Emile Cammaerts</i>	243
THE FIGHT FOR RIGHT <i>M. Painlevé</i>	259

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2010 with funding from
Lyrasis Members and Sloan Foundation

<http://www.archive.org/details/forrightessaysad00unse>

FOR THE RIGHT

THE DEFENCE OF RIGHT¹

BY

THE RIGHT HON. VISCOUNT BRYCE, O.M.

THIS is a war of principles. It is the only war of principles that has been waged in Europe for centuries. There have been wars for many causes, more or less justified; but I cannot remember any case in which a great nation has been led into a war distinctly for the defence of right and justice. We did not expect this war; we did not wish for it; we had not prepared for it. We had nothing to gain by any war; and, materially speaking, we had a great deal to lose by this war. We have already suffered sorrows unexampled in our history; we have lost a far larger part of the finest element in our population, in every class and every part of the country, than Britain has ever lost before. A fable has been assiduously propagated

¹ Address delivered at Queen's Hall, London, March 21, 1916.

in continental Europe that King Edward VII. had conceived the plan of injuring Germany by forming a league against her, and surrounding her by a circle of enemies. For such a story there is absolutely no foundation. We have also been accused by Germany and Austria of having gone to war out of envy at German prosperity, and a desire to cripple her commerce. You know how utterly untrue that is. I am sorry to hear some people in this country talking about the destruction of German trade as one of our present aims, in a way that appears to give some occasion or pretext for this misrepresentation of our original purpose. It has been constantly used in Germany for that object; but I think our consciences are perfectly clear. There was nothing of the sort, no malignant jealousy of German prosperity, in the mind of the nation when the war began.

We entered this war to defend the cause of Right. We entered it to protect the rights of an innocent neutral nation which was attacked and saw its country devastated and its non-combatant population, women and children as well as men, destroyed for no other reason than that, in adherence to its pledged honour, it refused to admit the passage of a hostile force. And in the course of the war as it has gone on we have also been led to undertake the defence of those principles of humanity which we had believed to be recognized

by all the civilized peoples of the world. We have been compelled by the inhuman methods wherewith the German Government has been conducting war by land and sea, and from the air, to take upon ourselves the defence of those "natural" rights of mankind which are now endangered by methods that threaten to thrust us back into the ages of primitive barbarism. They are indeed worse than primitive barbarism, because they are systematic and scientific, not the mere outbreaks of temporary passion. We are now carrying on this war, not against the German people so much as against the German Government, on whose head lies the guilt not only of having brought about the war, but of having devised these atrocious methods, and of having so deceived its own people as to blind them to the true origin of this strife, as well as to the horrors it has caused. The great majority of the British nation do not desire to destroy German nationality, or to break up the German Empire. What is desired is to break and discredit the domination of an unscrupulous military caste—a caste which is hostile to liberty, and which has held the German people in practical thralldom—and to give to the German people the means of upsetting that detestable system, and of vindicating liberty for themselves.

We must, as a nation, comport ourselves with

dignity and self-restraint, making our conduct of the war humane so far as it is possible that so terrible a thing can be conducted with humanity. We must refrain from any imitation of German cruelties. Let us not think of doing what, not long ago, it was suggested we should do—dropping incendiary bombs upon open towns and villages, and so taking the risk of killing innocent women and children, as our women and children have been and are being killed by those German raiders, and may we not trust that both the sense of dignity and the conscience of the country would disapprove—indeed, it has already shown its disapproval—of any such reprisals. So also we should refrain from the passion of mere hatred towards individual enemies, however heartily we may detest the Government that controls them, and we must not let ourselves feel that indiscriminating bitterness towards a whole people which we are told that the enemy is indulging towards us. Such things would not be worthy of our nation, which has always carried on wars in a chivalric spirit. When the great Gustavus Adolphus was pressed to allow his troops to ravage and destroy as his enemies were doing, he refused. It was, he said, beneath him. I do not think that the Christian is debarred from fighting. If he, at the call of duty, fights for a good cause, to defend and protect the innocent and to vindicate justice, a

Christian man is justified in killing an enemy of that cause, and in sacrificing his own life for it. Let us hope that we shall come out of the war not only victorious, but purified and strengthened, knit more closely together than ever before, and purged by the trial through which we have passed, fixing our eyes on a future in which an assured peace shall come, a peace based upon Right, with its permanence secured by a league of the peace-loving peoples to maintain law and justice.

AN INVINCIBLE FELLOWSHIP

BY

SIR HENRY NEWBOLT

At this moment it might well seem that the whole of our energies are being devoted, and must be devoted, to the direct service of our naval and military forces. Ships must be built, armed, and manned; armies must be raised, equipped, and trained; immense supplies of war material must be provided. At the same time all the machinery of national life must be kept going, and that machinery must now include funds, institutions, and committees for the care of the wounded or disabled, and for the support of those whom war has bereaved. The Empire is working at high pressure, and with a sense of unity unparalleled in its history; what new movement could be justified at such a time, and how could its call be met?

The justification of the Fight for Right Movement is the fact that its call must be met, if we are not to lose that for which we have been fighting, that for which we have made all our sacrifices.

We are giving our whole national life to a struggle, the first stage of which is so urgent and so strenuous that it is in danger of putting the second out of mind. Yet the second stage is of at least equal importance with the first: we must know how to make peace as we have made war, with a right understanding and a right courage. The time has not yet come, but the time is undoubtedly coming, when the Fight for Right Movement will be as necessary as the movement of our ships at sea, or the movement of our men over the top of the trenches and forward against the machine guns. For us it is the hour of peace that will be the hour of peril. The real danger-point for men of our race has never been the moment of physical danger, the moment when they have to face difficulties or even defeat; it is by meeting difficulties and turning defeats to account that the Empire has been made.

The moment is coming—if it is not already here—when in the physical struggle of war we shall have the upper hand, when day by day and on all our battle fronts the enemy will be weakening before us. That will be our hardest trial, for it will be a time of more than physical danger. Our peril then will come, no longer from the enemy, but from ourselves. In every nation, as in every individual, there are weak and inconsistent elements, motives confusing or embar-

passing the main purpose. In the present war we have suffered less from this confusion and embarrassment than at some other crises in our history: but the elements of discord are known to be among us, and at the moment of danger they will certainly be active. The weary and the weak we must strengthen, the discordant we must overcome. The voices which we have for two years silenced with difficulty must be silenced then with a still more resolute effort. We may be sure that we shall hear again the ignoble advice that was offered us in the dark days of August, 1914—the advice that would have us mind our own affairs, leave our friends to fight out their own quarrels, and reap the advantages that fall to a nation which remains outside a war between her neighbours. The object of these men will be a separate peace—an end not only practically disastrous, but morally only another form of that base “Refusal of Aid between Nations” for which they originally hoped. We shall hear, too, the wail of the pacifists and conscientious objectors of all kinds: people who have lived so long in comfort under the protection of our Fleet and our Police that they have forgotten the conditions of the world in which they make and enjoy their living. Their conscience tells them that they must not fight, or help those who fight—a conscience singularly disciplined, for it

allows a man to live and thrive by the force of others, and yet refuses aid to the violated and oppressed. Such a creed is easily exposed, but none the less dangerous to the community; its power is due to the respect which is almost always paid to religious fanaticism, even when its main object is personal salvation.

A third attack upon the national unity will come from a still more dangerous quarter. It is astonishing, but it is undoubtedly true, that there are Englishmen whose fundamental sympathies in this war are with the Germans. They do not desire the defeat of their own country; they do not approve this or that act of barbarism or illegality; but from converse with German minds they have acquired, and will soon be preaching abroad, the characteristically German view of international politics. No one nation, they will say, is really responsible for this war. From a broader and more historical standpoint it is seen to be the inevitable result of European evolution. Every nation, when its time comes, must either strike for dominion or fatally decline. We have all done in our time what Germany is doing now. But she is doing it with the clearer vision gained by modern science. She sees that the moral law, the law of love, the law of honour, have no place in the relation of States to one another. Between nations there is no right but might, because by

might and by might alone the survival of the fittest is secured; and that is the only right according to nature. It may be thought that such an argument, proceeding from false premisses to monstrous conclusions, will have small chance of perverting even the ignorant among us. But the quasi-scientific and the cynical have a power which is not concerned with reason; the strength of this German argument is that it appeals to all who dislike or distrust morality and high-mindedness. "Let us have no cant," they will say: "let us defeat the Germans and make peace with them on reasonable terms; they are no more criminal than we are, and moral indignation against them is mere hypocrisy."

It is evident that this view, if widely prevalent, would rob us of more than half our force—would, in fact, have deprived us from the beginning of our main hope of resistance. We took up arms—such arms as we had at hand—not, as these cynics will tell us, in behalf of our own material interests only. We had been for years discreditably unprepared, discreditably negligent of those interests, and it would have been, for the time at least, more profitable to avoid war. But the wrong which we saw before us, the wrong to Serbia, the wrong to France, the wrong to Belgium, converted not only the great mass of a peaceable nation, but all except the fatuous and the feeble-

hearted among those upon whom lay the immense burden of decision. For months we took the punishment of our negligence and our credulity; we suffered as men must suffer who are not only outnumbered, but fight with bare hands against sword and flame. If we endured it was because we had a force that was not a material force—the force of indignation against shameless wrong, the force of determination that right should not be trampled under by the hordes of might. But these voices will have their effect. They have already been heard, though for the present they mutter only in corners; in the moment of supreme relief, which is also the moment of supreme weariness, they will speak loudly and insistently: “The situation is saved; we have done enough; we have borne all that we can bear; if we go on to the end we shall perish of exhaustion.” There will be by that time many among our people who are worn with anxiety and sorrow, and harassed by the fear of poverty. To their weakness such suggestions will appeal almost irresistibly. And the more subtle phrases of the cynics, the fanatics, and the anti-nationalists will be repeated with even greater chance of success. “All great struggles end in compromise; there is right and wrong on both sides; we must not be vindictive; it is not for us to be judges in our own cause.” To a people far more good-natured than clear-

headed these cloudy fallacies may well obscure the true issue.

How, then, are we to be ready to meet this danger, to defeat these subtle influences? By reason, no doubt, but hardly by reason of the cool and merely logical kind. Argument never convinced any man against his heart, never converted the cynic, silenced the fanatic, or uplifted the weak and weary. Our enemies at home are not formidable because of their arguments, but because of their opportunity and their power of suggestion. We must meet them with a power greater than theirs, the power of a right and active spirit, the vision of an ideal and the passion for it, the only force that in any struggle worth calling a struggle ever won a victory worth calling a victory. Personal remembrance, personal faith, personal sternness—if we have these, we shall save our world; if we have them not, we shall cast it away, and even though we win upon the battlefield we shall be left weaker and more miserable than before.

Peace certainly we must desire: but what is Peace? Those who cry out that war is so terrible that it must be stopped at all costs do not understand peace as the greatest of men, the greatest of religious teachers, have understood it. For them, we may be sure, peace could never be the name of that condition in which the nations

of Europe have been living for the last fifty years. Who can deny that they have been living in a state far worse than the wars of ordinary barbarism—a state of mutual distrust, jealousy, hatred, and long-plotted treason against one another? It is this false peace that we are now fighting to abolish. If an offer were made to us today to restore all things to the state in which they were before the war, the lovers of true peace would repel it instantly; they could never consent to refasten so hopeless a future upon their successors. The peace we desire is a real one; the peace we have known hitherto has been a German peace.

The choice, then, that lies before us is the choice, not between immediate Peace and continued War, but between two different ideals of human life, one of which, and one only, must govern the future of Europe. The position of modern Germany in the commonwealth of the world is a singular one. To that commonwealth every nation contributes some share; and in each case the most important part of the contribution is the idea or range of ideas for which the nation stands. The time has been when Germany, like France, Russia, Italy, and England, contributed ideas of great moral and intellectual value—ideas of which her national life was the most distinguished exemplification. Today, and for years past, she has thrown into the common stock one idea only, if

indeed it can be called an idea—the doctrine of the supreme rightness of force. This idea, like a malevolent growth, has eaten deeply into every vital part of German life. To say this is no doubt to bring an indictment against a whole nation; and such an indictment, we shall be told on Burke's authority, is impossible. It was, perhaps, impossible in the eighteenth century, when nations were far less homogeneous; it is not impossible today, when peoples are united as they have never been before, and when the vast mass of their citizens is co-extensive with their military force. To indict the German nation today, we have, first, to show that they are practically one in their practice of brutality, and one in the theory by which they prepare and justify it; secondly, that the facts are proved by incontrovertible evidence, and the most incontrovertible of all evidence will be that which is furnished by the accused against themselves.

The unity of the German people in all that concerns the present war has been their continual boast; and it must be admitted that they have proved it, beyond all expectation. Their army, obeying both their own brutal habits and the deliberate orders of their commanders, has accumulated a record in Belgium, France, and Poland, of which the world is as yet only partially aware. The wrong done by the invasion of Belgium

was justified in defiant terms by a long array of ninety-three professors, selected to represent the intellectual life of Germany. The Press has un-animously and repeatedly spoken in brutal and ferocious articles to a public which has shown no desire for any different commentary. It has applauded the murder of non-combatants, and called for the destruction of "not fewer, but more, women and children," "to teach these English the seriousness of war." Popular books have maintained that "between nations the Law of Love has no application"; popular military writers have openly disclaimed our common civilization. "We owe no explanations to anyone (for Rheims and Louvain); there is nothing for us to justify and nothing for us to explain away. Every act of whatever nature committed by our troops for the purpose of discouraging, defeating, and destroying our enemies is a brave act, a good deed, and is fully justified. There is no reason whatever why we should trouble ourselves about the notions concerning us in other countries. Certainly we should not worry about the opinions and feelings held in the neutral countries. Germany stands supreme—the arbiter of her own methods, which must in time of war be dictated to the world." These are the words of Major-General von Disfurth; from those of Count Reventlow and other popular writers a hundred

passages of equal ferocity could be cited. Their spirit has changed even the religion of the German people; from the profession of Christianity they have returned exultantly to frank heathenism. "Once man thought there was a God who listened more to the sobs of the downtrodden than to the words of kings. But today there is another God, and He, wearing the Death's-Head cap of the German Hussars, and carrying a white banner, storms side by side with the Kaiser at the head of the German troops."

In any other country of Europe such doctrines could hardly be uttered in public; they certainly could not be widely circulated or read with general approval. Nor in any civilized community could the sinking of a ship full of women and children be celebrated by a public holiday to the schoolchildren of all classes. But the German Empire is not a civilized community; and its schoolchildren are even more like savages than their elders. Europe has of late years known little of the Germans at home. In the first year of the war the facts were stated, not with perfect accuracy of detail, by an English author, Dr. Thomas Smith, who has resided and taught for twelve years in Germany. His book, which caused much pain to the partisans of Germany, was subjected to a drastic examination by the Rev. Father Thurston, S. J., in an article published in the

Month for January, 1916. For his own facts and figures Father Thurston relied entirely on German sources, chiefly consisting of the German Parliamentary Papers, the annual *Kriminalstatistik*, and the standard work, *Crime and its Repression*, of Dr. Aschaffenburg, the German specialist in criminology, Professor of Psychiatry at Cologne, and editor of the leading German magazine of criminology. The result of Father Thurston's examination is remarkable: he came to bless the Germans, and in the end he is compelled to curse them altogether. "The really important fact," he concludes, "is that the development of Germany, as evinced by its criminal records during the last forty years, so far from being a guarantee for a higher civilization, constitutes a standing menace to the moral integrity of Europe."

The German official statistics which have led him to this conclusion show that the common life of the German people is degraded by habits of unequalled vice and brutality. To give an idea of their condition it is necessary to proceed by way of comparison. In England and Wales, with a population of thirty-four millions, 1720 persons are convicted in the year of aggravated assaults, feloniously wounding, or maliciously wounding. In Germany with a population of sixty-five millions, the number of such convictions

reaches the astounding figure of 172,000. The proportion in the one case is 5 cases per 100,000, in the other 250 cases per 100,000 of population. The difference is so enormous as to evidence a wholly different standard of habit and feeling. Added to this are the facts that suicide is far commoner in Germany—there are no less than 15,000 cases annually—and that all the murders committed in a year in England and Wales are outnumbered by those committed in Germany in the same time by boys between the ages of twelve and eighteen.

There are darker facts even than these. In England and Wales we have in a year (*e. g.*, in 1911) 562 cases of violent offences against women; the Germans, with less than double our population, have 14,872 in the same time. Among us the convictions for indecent assaults on children have for many years been under 400 annually; in 1911 they were under 300. In Germany Aschaffenburg gives the figure as 8850; the Criminal Statistics for 1912 give 9309 cases. After allowance has been made for the difference of population, we find that these horrible kinds of crime are thirteen times as common in Germany as they are among us. Divorce is also fifteen times as common, and the illegitimate birth-rate more than twice as high.

Aschaffenburg notes two more facts which

greatly increase the gravity of these terrible figures. One is that the number of convictions in Germany falls far short of the number of crimes committed; the code is not strictly enforced. "Some crimes are represented in the statistics by figures far below the reality. This is true, for instance, of the worst kinds of crime and unnatural vice," and he quotes Lewin as rightly saying: "Such an open, universally known, and universally disregarded mockery of the law as exists should not be permitted to continue." The second grave fact is the alarming increase in the number of convictions of juveniles. Among them murders, suicides, aggravated assaults, and sexual offences are all rapidly increasing. "The statistics," says Aschaffenburg, "show a tremendous flood of socially dangerous persons . . . which in the case of juveniles, the hope of our future, is progressing unceasingly." This was written in 1912-13; in 1914-15-16 these very juveniles form the main body of that German Army whose savagery has shocked the world. To their friends at home they do not seem to have acted otherwise than as true Germans.

Here, then, we have a consistent people who practice what they preach, and do unto their neighbour abroad as they have done unto their brothers and sisters at home. The point is important, for it shows that German barbarities

were due not to any temporary madness of war, but to a criminal ferocity ingrained in their national character and let loose with set purpose and inhuman callousness. Evil is not merely their habit, but their principle, and the reign of evil is their dream of the world. The noble State, says Treitschke, is essentially distinguished by its assertion of power through war. Power is the sole end of such a State in its dealings with other States. To feel, or to show, consideration for the rights or aspirations of other States would be *pro tanto* a renunciation of power, and therefore a sin—"the sin against the Holy Spirit."

Even if it were accompanied by no practical demonstration such as we have witnessed, this ideal State would be the world's nightmare, for a nation's ideal is of even more account than the record of its acts. By their dreams ye shall know them. We do not seek, in this belief, an escape from judgment for our past. In a day which was not today, and in a measure which is not comparable with the German measure, our people too have done wrong. But what wrong they did was always at variance with their record and their creed. Today their dream is of a world where men and nations shall be free to live their own lives, a world made beautiful by diversity, a world where none shall take by force or rule by terror or plot treason in peace, or ravage women

and children in war; where man shall not enslave men by gross and deliberate wickedness. The German dream is the vision of a world where might needs no justification but itself, a world held down by force, cowed by massacre, terrified by brutality and destruction; and against it nothing can prevail but the power of a vision nobler and more lasting.

Their dream or ours—one of the two must make the world of the future. Our hope of victory has lain from the first in this very antagonism, in the difference of our ideals. For a material advantage a nation will fight; but it will not give everything. No one will give life itself for what is only a part of life. But for a spiritual possession a man or a nation may well give everything—even life; for it is more than life. To meet the material forces of our enemy we have already made an almost world-wide union—we have made an unshakeable Alliance of all the civilized great Powers, and we have achieved unity at home. The first stage of our effort has been successfully inaugurated, and its end is no longer doubtful. But the real crisis lies beyond: to meet that we must band ourselves together in a spiritual fellowship, a league of endurance and sacrifice for the hope of the world. The members of such a fellowship will be to each other a continual strength and consolation; against our enemies

and our tempters they will stand immovable, for they will have the strength which comes of faith, of religion, of poetry—they will accept life upon no conditions but their own. In the last extreme of sorrow and privation, when they are warned that to go on may be to lose all that we still possess, they will reply: "Take all that can be taken: but we will keep our dreams."

THE GREAT SOLVENT¹

BY

MAURICE HEWLETT

THE advance in technical science is, of course, the outstanding feature of our time, and with that stands—not necessarily, of course—the advance of men's technical faculty. What is strange and perplexing is that with the new extreme efficiency of hand and eye, the old passions, the old primitive instincts, remain, not only where they were yesterday, but where they have been apparently since the beginning of time. The inhabitant of another planet, who could appreciate without sharing our kind, would be interested to observe the ever-shifting, never-decided contest between our intellectual and our emotional natures. He would see us equipped with engines of deadly precision, of our own making, yet so far from being ourselves precise that we could be moved from our far-aiming purpose by the writhing of a chloroformed dog. He would see us, at the call of such an instinct as parentage, susceptible of the purest

¹ Address delivered at the Æolian Hall on November 14, 1915.

and most exalted passion a human being can know, yet possessing ourselves of a means of destroying wholesale, by tens of thousands at a time, with revolting detail, fellow-creatures, themselves the object, many of them the subject, of parental love. Here, surely, for us, is cause enough for tears. It might induce laughter in our alien visitant; but if it did, such laughter would be of that ironical sort which tears cannot express—a laughter which springs from a deeper well than that of tears. For the incongruity which may draw laughter from those who can afford to laugh lies exactly in this—that while the precision of our arms and the scope of our machines have been heightened to a superhuman pitch, our passions, our instincts, our emotions are just what they were in the beginning; no more capable of our regulation, no more answerable to our calculation, no less poignantly responsive to circumstance. And all this being so you might have supposed that man, having made such a monster as modern armament, would, like Frankenstein in the story, have devoted himself with frenzy to rendering it useless. But you would be wrong. The primitive in us is still the stronger: passion and instinct master the emotions; pity and terror have no place when those others are alight. There seems little hope ahead of us, as a great pacifist once fondly imagined, that horror

of the remedies at his disposal will ever make man shrink from employing them.

But there is one hopeful sign for us, pacifists though we may be. In this horrible conflict we are faced by a remarkable spectacle. The Central European Powers are in isolation. The whole moral world is against them. Their allies, Turks and Bulgarians, can be ruled out. Such as they are, they were cowed into war. Whatever the popular conscience may have said—and we know something of what the Bulgarian people, and guess pretty shrewdly what the Turkish people must have felt about the matter—such Powers are at the mercy of a stronger. The responsibility lies with Germany; yet of the German people it is necessary to say something like this. I know them, I have respected them; many of them I have loved. They are a highly emotional people; they love their country; they revere their rulers, even though they are self-appointed rulers, and believe them to be respectable. Of the German people as a whole there is every reason to suppose, ridiculous as it may seem to us, that they believe they are wielding this desperate and terrible monster of theirs for precisely the same reason that the Allies have for wielding it—for the only reason, I hope, for which a people as a whole (apart from their governors) would ever wield it: for the reason and the sake of Freedom. I come to

that now: to Freedom, but for whose sake I could not face you on this platform with any heart to speak of this war at all. But such as I am, I believe that our country and her Allies are fighting now for a thing so vital, a thing so indistinguishable from the very idea of humanity, so sacred in itself and so divine in its origin, that were the horror magnified a thousandfold, were civilization itself in the balance (as, indeed, it may be), we should be more than justified, we should be bound to fight. I believe that with every fibre of my being. Freedom of the individual man, freedom of the individual race, is the one thing for which a man at need must fight, and the only thing for which some races of men will willingly fight. With us in England this rooted instinct for liberty often assumes grotesque and even humorous forms. It leads some of us to prefer prison to vaccination; it has resulted in giving us about a hundred and sixty varieties of the Protestant religion. It is a passion with us; but it is an instinct with all men, an article of faith and an article of necessity. And astounding as it may seem, tragic beyond the dreams of poets as the mistake may be, it is none the less true that the German people believe they are fighting against Europe for precisely the same sacred thing. Fighting, as they believe, to defend themselves against foreign oppression, they are none the less content to live and die

under an oppression at home which to us seems incredible. Here is a paradox indeed.

We know that they are ruinously mistaken; we know—it needs no words of mine—that our country, that France, and Russia had no evil designs upon German integrity or German liberty. We all had problems enough and to spare of our own. I will dare to add that neither Britons nor French nor Russians would have supported their Governments, as they have universally supported them now, in any war of aggression. That statement needs no proof. It is not a time—the time is past—to charge Germany with forethought and long preparation, though evidence of them is at hand, and abundantly. I turn rather to what I feel to be the most deeply interesting, momentous, and enheartening fact of this war. I mean the unprecedented and overwhelming popular assent which was given to the Allied Governments in their stand for individual and racial liberty.

This is no question of statesmen and of the action which their duties may compel upon them. It is the business of statesmen to consider international relations and foresee and provide against eventualities for the moment remote. That might be a wisdom, but it is not the habit of ordinary people. The habit of ordinary people is to see one thing at a time, and the thing that ordinary people see is nearly always a thing susceptible

of generous emotion, and not of an emotion like fear, for instance. Take the case of the American Civil War. Whatever considerations, politic, economic, and what not, induced the Northern statesmen into civil war, we know that such did not maintain the people of the North in that grim and desperate struggle. What supported *them* was an idea. In this war, to speak for our own country, this fact is as clear to me as the sun at noonday: whatever ulterior motives, whatever political calculation, whatever international responsibilities may have, and must have, influenced our statesmen towards armed intervention, our people were moved to war, and moved as never before, by the salient fact—NOT the invasion and armed occupation of Belgium—they knew little and cared little about Belgium then—no, but that of which Belgium was the symbol: the sacredness of a Free People. There's no room for doubt about that. They leapt to it at once, and at the moment saw nothing but one thing. That thing was Freedom. We surged into war—getting on for five million of us—for an idea.

We had no fear of our own invasion. That has not happened for a thousand years; it has become our habit to put that out of account. Nor did we foresee, as we might have foreseen, that successful occupation of Belgium might lead to the occupation of Holland, and must certainly tend

to the occupator of Calais. These things are plain enough now, but I am sure that they did not sway our people then. We have been a settled nation for some 1500 years; we are easily the oldest uninterrupted government in the world, unless Japan is that. Often and often we have been *driven* into battle for unworthy—ah! and for disgraceful—reasons. Slaves can be driven so, and slaves we have been. But, as a people, we have never fought voluntarily but for one thing, and for that we fought Napoleon on and off for fifteen years; for that our own brethren in America fought and beat their governors; for that we ourselves have fought and beaten our governors. For that we are fighting now, as we have never fought before; for now, after a sorrowful history enough, our people have taken their place, as partners with their rulers. We have proclaimed ourselves by this act a conscious and responsible nation of men—which no Conscription Act could ever have proclaimed us. And never surely has there been a spectacle like this: a great nation of men banding itself, gentle and simple, master and man, spending itself in defence of an idea, the idea that men are born to be free before God. With so much that is revolting and heartrending, with passionate love for the land which bred our own race, with acute personal anxieties, with the severance of ties of

blood and of affection, with wounded sympathies and regrets for much that can never be again as it was—we can thank God for the spectacle: this time-worn country redeeming itself in the only way which is now open to it, buying back with fire and sword its own soil, its honour, and its divine birthright.

It is a fact of our nature which has to be reckoned with, that a man does not seem able to be at his best without having been at his worst. He seems to need the *catharsis* of pity and terror wielded by himself, some such dreadful purge as that. He seems to need it every hundred years or so; at any rate, every hundred years or so back to the thirteenth century, to go no further, some power, in some way or another, has made a bid in force for dominion of the world, and has been beaten back and beaten down by his fellow-men. But there it is—and while I believe that we must thank God for the recurrent spectacle of that beating, we may also thank Him, I believe, for the extraordinary moral uplifting which does for some unknown reason almost invariably follow upon it. War indeed is a solvent of some of our most obstinate impediments.

When I was thinking over what I intended to say here, I gave that for a title to the address I wished to make. I called this war The Great Solvent. I have so far been getting at it by

degrees, and I would suggest to you now that if the war has reduced into solution no harder and more rooted things than false ideals, false gods, sham standards, cant of all sorts, frivolity of every sort—and fused them by a noble rage into a burning brew which shall itself dissolve tyranny—even then it is a great solvent enough.

Let me now show you of what other things it has been a solvent, and then conclude by suggesting others of which it must be a solvent in the fulness of time. Out of the eater came forth meat. If out of the horror come forth some of the things which I shall suggest, then we need not regret our high rage.

I can give you one example at once, and I think a very striking one. I saw a photograph, reproduced in the French journal *L'Illustration*, a few weeks ago, evidently a snapshot. It represented a ruined church in France, broken-arched, roofless, its remaining walls leaning, scarred with shell-burst, its floor heaped with débris of rubble, masonry, and charred wood. Upon those mounds of rubbish English soldiers were on their knees; within that chancel, before the altar and under the sky, you were to understand an English chaplain celebrating the Communion. Side by side with his Anglican brothers the Catholic parish priest knelt at his prayers. The superscription was something to this effect: "*Dans une*

église du nord bombardée et incendiée, un office anglais auquel assiste le vieux curé du village." Ah, ladies and gentlemen, what an obstinate old rock between Catholic and Protestant seems to have been dissolved here! What other moral purge but this of war, as things now are, could have brought those two to worship the one God under the same species at the same altar, within the same walls? Did it need that the roof should be blown away, not that the one God might come in, but that the preposterous gods, like the seven devils, should flit out? A few months before this horror came upon our world and gave us something better to do, we in England were bickering in newspaper and pulpit and congress about the Sacrament having been given to some of our own people at some place in Africa, called by some such name as Hitchy Koo; and Bishops separated themselves from Bishops, and curate looked askance at curate. Heavens, what a people we were! Well, here's the Great Solvent at work in France: a smitten, charred, and bloody plain, a shattered church, maimed and broken men—but one God, one altar, and one Sacrament. That seems worth having; and what is more if war can solve such a stone of stumbling as that, it might remove mountains.

Mountains remain for dissolution. One actual example of what I mean will provide you with a

dozen possible ones, a round dozen of false relationships which war only, it seems, might resolve. War has made us sincere; it has enabled us to see things simply, as in themselves they really are; it has turned us all into idealists, since for an idea we are fighting. Our men fight for it, our women die for it. For what else did Edith Cavell die but that men should go free? Now, a year and a half ago, how stood the relations of men and women? Were they true relations or false ones? Were they not standing on a strained and essentially false one? Do you think this desperate tussle for realities, for the real instincts, the real needs of life, will not lay open, as it cuts deeper and deeper into the flesh of life and comes nearer and nearer the bone of it, the real relation between men and women? Do you think that when war is over they will look on each other as they were looking before it began? I don't.

Irish and English, master and man? How stood they, how stand they now? Can you look back and find their relations, as they were then, admirable? I can't. Nor can I believe that they can ever be again as they were then. The universal and eternal are in debate now. Englishmen and Irishmen have bled, suffered, or died for them; master and man have served together, voluntarily, remember, in the same trench and been buried for them in the same grave. Are

those who survive and come back, whether with all their members or with some of them, going to resume positions which are shifting and transitory, having once looked on those which are constant and abiding? God forbid. One might well despair of a nation which could so act, as one did begin to despair of a nation which was content to live in discord before all this was upon us. But I do believe that the Great Solvent has resulted in making of us one people as we have certainly never been before; and if that is not worth fighting for, then clamour is better than quiet, and the temporal more divine than the eternal.

There I end, although I might have considered more closely the strange phenomenon of the German people content to be led by such rulers as they have, contented to be whipped into war, and have asked whether such a war as this might not be a solvent of their own hard case. Germany as a whole—certainly politically, and certainly in moral and social development—stands as nearly as may be where we stood in those respects in the days of the Regency—days when citizens were cowed into order; when men thought it a duty on occasion to be drunk; when they thought that offended honour could be appeased by blood-letting; and when women stood to men as creatures of pleasure or creatures of use. Whether so rooted a habit can be solved by war

and the ensuing miseries of it is a hard matter; but I hope we are resolved upon one thing. This hateful régime of theirs, which aspires to put the civilized world under the spurred heel of a German soldier, is going to be broken down, and must be broken down, if humanity is to endure. But I claim to have shown you that that is our national resolve. I claim to have shown you that this is a holy war, and waged as such by people as well as governments. And I have touched upon moral benefits which have ensued, and others which we can hardly doubt must ensue—benefits which no other way yet open to us could have provided.

There is this last thing. The enemy is beaten; he has known that for some time; and one kind of end may be in sight, which is not the true end. That this war may be a final solvent of such warfare perhaps is too much to hope; but in order that it may ensure human freedom, humanity itself, all that is hopeful in the world, I pray that our hearts may be steeled to go through with it. Let that be done by long-mindedness, magnanimity, patience, stubbornness, if it may be, rather than carnage. To fight for right is well, but to fight aright is better. Let it be done, then, in God's name, that it may be done with.

WAR AND THE IDEAL OF CHIVALRY¹

BY

THE LATE WILFRID WARD

BEFORE I say anything at all, I should like to emphasize the fact that this is a moment for deeds and not words. Our soldiers at the Front, our sailors, our munition workers, our Red-Cross nurses, and the rest—these are the people who are really helping the country in its dire distress. It is not a moment for mere rhetoric. But our great national poet has said, “The song that nerves a nation’s arm is in itself a deed.” Any words, any speech, made at this crisis can only justify itself by fulfilling the function laid down in this line. It is only as ministering to deeds, as helping our workers, that words have any justification at the present moment. I venture, then, on a few poor words, not as being of value in themselves, but in the hope that they may suggest some thoughts of use to those here present—thoughts which may put heart into them in their work for the great cause.

¹ Address delivered at the Æolian Hall, December 5, 1915.

If we have hard work to do, we do it with better heart and more effectively if we feel it to be worth while, that there is a prize to gain by it, a cause to help. A sad worker never works so well as a hopeful worker. Great faith, great love, a noble ambition, make work easy and effective. If we feel that we have a great end to achieve, a great prize to win, we work better, the work is easier, and we do more work; and I want to bring home to you that what we are striving for in this fight is one of the biggest things in the history of the world.

There is indeed, I think, a real danger lest we become disheartened in this long weary struggle—the danger of a certain depression that may make work harder and less successful. Some of you may be almost overwhelmed by the greatness of our long-drawn-out trial; there are probably few here present who have not lost relations or dear friends at the Front. Most of us have probably still fighting those who are near and dear to us, and they cost us a constant agonizing anxiety. Then we have the anxious situation in the East to trouble us. We see in the Balkans the defection of Bulgaria, the ambiguous attitude of Greece. Then, again, we hear from our Belgian friends the heartrending tale of their sufferings. We see how the joy has been taken out of the lives of a whole

nation as it sojourns in a strange land, stricken with poverty, exiled from home. Or we go to the hospital and find our soldiers worn out and sad. Such experiences may almost overwhelm us. And we see no daylight—no end to this long weary struggle which is robbing England of the flower of her manhood.

The object of these meetings is to put into those who come to them some of that greatness of heart which should triumph over these paralyzing reflections, and make their work easier and more successful. A great heart, great courage, can triumph over all the trials life can bring. Even the old pagan poet Horace, who lived before the deeper hopes raised by Christianity of a better life in which injustice will be redressed, testified to the unconquerable courage of the righteous man who holds to his purpose, *justum et tenacem propositi virum*, and declared that if the world were broken in pieces and fell upon such a man, the ruin might crush him, but could not terrify him. Great courage, the realization of a great and inspiring cause, is equal to any trial that life may bring. To a small heart, to a man of little faith, of little love, every trial seems great; to a great heart, to a man of great faith and courage, the worst trials seem endurable. Our allies the French have expressed this in a proverb: *Pour un petit cœur tout est grand, pour un grand cœur tout est petit.* I

want, then, to try and express for myself and for all of us some of the thoughts which may help to give us the *grand cœur*, the great heart, the great faith, the great love, the great courage, which this terrible crisis demands.

The exceptional awfulness of this war is for us the cause of inspiration for exceptional enthusiasm. What is exceptional is not the acts of frightfulness, but the avowed policy. Not the disregard of treaties, but its defence by Treitschke and the Chancellor. Not the slaughter of civilians, with no military advantage, but the refusal to disavow it, the calm determination to repeat it. Not the existence of national ambition, but the deliberate sacrifice of all moral principles which might impede its successful gratification—the allowing national aggrandizement absolutely to absorb the whole energies of a nation as the one national aim, and to excuse all crime committed on its behalf. The acts we excuse in barbarians—on the ground that they lack the reflection and self-control which civilization brings—have been done with the premeditation and cold deliberation of a highly civilized race. What is so awful is the *deliberate* renunciation of the high ideals in war and diplomacy which centuries of Christian civilization had established. “There is nothing,” they say in effect, “for us to justify, and nothing for us to explain away. Every act, of whatever nature,

committed by our troops for the purpose of discouraging, defeating, and destroying our enemies is a brave act, a good deed, and is fully justified. . . . They call us barbarians. What of it? We scorn them and their abuse. Let them cease to talk of the Cathedral of Rheims and of all the churches and castles in France which have shared its fate. These things do not interest us. Our troops must achieve victory. What else matters?"

We fight, then, against avowed self-seeking, bullying, treachery, the spirit of the devil. On our own banner is emblazoned the ideals which our enemies have deliberately renounced—unselfishness, liberty, and honour, the Spirit of God.

We have seen selfish ambition and the principle that might is right rampant, naked, and unashamed—and it has been the determining cause of the whole war and the one principle of its conduct.

It has been a fearful orgy of unscrupulous national selfishness, with no principle or aim even professed except success in national aggrandizement; and it degrades those responsible for it below the level of humanity. But it also gives to the work of resisting something so devilish the character of a mission above that attaching to ordinary humanity—a veritable work of God. To oppose such a deliberate aggression on civilization and morality—principles which make peace impossible

—is the very highest and noblest mission on behalf of mankind which we can imagine. It gives to our share in the contest the characteristics of a holy war. It should give to us all, to you and to me, if we appreciate the situation, the sense that we are taking part in one of the most inspiring endeavours to right the wrongs of the world that have been called for since the story of humanity began.

If *avowed selfishness* and *tyranny* and *treachery* mark the whole German campaign, our own watch-words, I repeat, must be *unselfishness* and *liberty* and *honour*. We fight for the right of weaker nations like Belgium and Serbia to exist. We fight for principles of honour between man and man in the field, between nation and nation in the conduct of diplomacy. We fight for humanity in warfare towards the innocent civilian. There never was a war in which one side embodied more unmistakably selfish ambition from the outset, dishonour in its diplomacy, treachery and cruelty in the battlefield, and a scouting of the axiom of civilized war that the weak and helpless non-combatant was to be spared; and there has never been a war in which the other side, who fights to the death against these methods, has had a nobler rôle to play.

We English began well. We entered the field in the first instance for our Allies. Our own shores

were not invaded. We fought for our friends whose territory was attacked. We entered the fight on behalf of the honour due to our pledged word to Belgium. Our motives were noble and unselfish. We entered it to save the weak from the tyranny of the strong. Our soldiers are now fighting, not for English ambition or selfish national gain, but for others and for the cause of justice.

Now there is a certain craven evil spirit abroad which, instead of putting heart into our soldiers in their dreary and hard task, decries the soldier's calling as simply evil and unchristian. This spirit would paralyze the efforts of our men at the Front by maintaining that to kill the enemy is a wicked thing. The men who say this describe themselves as lovers of peace. We are to stand aside, forsooth, and see helpless women and children murdered, see whole nations annihilated by their stronger neighbours, and we are to call this *zeal for peace*. And we are to have such tenderness for the villains who are doing these things on the ground that we must love all our fellow-men, that we are not to raise our hand against them. We are to regard the triumph of unchecked tyranny as the triumph of peace!

This theory is foolish, cowardly, and immoral. It is all three. I do not know which it is most. It is foolish because, instead of helping to put an

end, as it professes, to the horrors of war, it increases those horrors. For if the pagan militarism of Prussia found few or none to oppose it strenuously by force of arms—and there would be only a few if pacifism spread widely—its horrors would become tenfold, and its influence would be rampant because it would be unchecked. It would encourage the worst features of war. It would end in enslaving the whole world. It would lead to the undisputed prevalence of just those exhibitions of selfishness, cruelty, and treachery which I said at starting made this war one of the most awful things in history.

Again, pacifism is cowardly. The pacifist professes to be too good to fight, but nobody will believe him. It is wholly incredible that moral scruples can suffice to make men stay their hand while the oppressor destroys the defenceless. No man of courage could act thus. If I see a big boy bullying a small boy unmercifully, and I tell my friends that though I regret it I cannot interfere because I think it wrong to fight, who will believe me? People will say I am afraid of the big boy. Pacifism is an excuse invented to conceal fundamental cowardice.

Moreover, the theory is profoundly immoral. It leads to the undisputed triumph in the world of the evil cause. It would create a world in which might would be right—almost a hell upon earth.

To invoke Christianity on behalf of pacifism is to read the Gospels with one eye. It is quite true that our Lord held it up as a high ideal that a man should submit without complaining to wrongs done to *himself*, but it is a totally different thing to submit to wrongs against others or against the whole community, or to evils which would lower the standard of morals throughout the world. When the money-changers perverted the Temple from its true character as a house of prayer, our Lord did not meekly sit down or profess Himself to be too good or too proud to fight them. He drove them out by force. It is true that He said, "If a man strike you on the right cheek, turn the left," but He also said, "I am come not to bring peace, but a sword."

"A soldier," wrote Cardinal Newman, "comes more nearly than a king to the pattern of Christ. He not only is strong, but he is weak. He does and he suffers. Half his time is on the field of battle, and half of it on the bed of pain. And he does this for the sake of others; he defends us by it; we are indebted to him; we gain by his loss; we are at peace by his warfare."

This is a contrast to the emasculated Christianity of the pacifist.

In point of fact, on this earth the principal mission of Christianity is warfare. Perfect peace comes only in heaven. Here below Christianity

is a constant warfare against the enemies of true peace, against wickedness in others, but also in ourselves, with a view to securing that triumph of justice and righteousness which is the only condition of such peace as the world can know. That is Christian pacifism—it seeks peace, not by remaining passive before great wrongs, but by resisting evil, oppression, and slavery. Thus war becomes the road to peace. The Christian is not one whit behind the pacifist in his horror of war. The Litany of the Middle Ages prays God to deliver us from the three great objects of horror—the plague, famine, and war. The Christian ideal is a kingdom of peace. But it holds that peace can only be permanent where justice reigns. And we cannot secure true peace unless we fight against the oppressor. A just war against him is the only road to peace.

Terrible though war is, Christianity holds that a world in which oppression is triumphant would be more terrible. The Christian's ideal of what is most terrible is found in the undisputed rule of the strong oppressor, and this is almost the *beau idéal* of the pagan warrior theory of German militarism in its most naked form. The Christian ideal of the noblest work on earth is the defence of the weak and the righting of the wrongs of this world—just the work of the Christian soldier in a righteous war. Martial courage and relentless warfare are enlisted

on the side of an ideal of peace and justice. The Christian warrior fights, not because he idealizes war, but because he idealizes the reign of righteousness and true peace, which can only be won in an evil world by warfare against the powers of evil.

This explains something at first sight perplexing. We are conscious of something noble in war—in the self-sacrifice and devotion to a cause which it involves. Yet we ask, How can so awful a process as the systematic killing of your fellow-men have in it a noble element? The answer is found in the Christian ideal that a just war is a fight against slavery and tyranny and on behalf of a lasting peace. The Christian soldier kills his foe as the minister of God's vengeance on selfish oppression. He has no more personal animosity than the hangman who is the minister of the law against the evil-doer. He fights, but his endeavour is not to promote anything so terrible as war, but to destroy its sources in putting an end to injustice. For this he risks his own life. The self-sacrifice, the devotion to something beyond the individual life, to a great cause, the power to rise above social comforts, we all intuitively admire in war. Such virtues the Prussian militarist rightly idealizes, but while he devotes them to selfish national ambition and to the glorification of war in itself they are found by the Christian soldier in the

unselfish battle for right and justice and as the condition of lasting peace.

Pacifism is, then, a libel on Christianity. It banishes from it the noble indignation which avenges the wrong, and makes it tame and spiritless rather than heroic and inspiring. "Be ye angry, and sin not."

In this matter we have a great deal to learn from the Middle Ages, when Christian principles permeated the ideals of civilization. The great enterprise of the Crusades developed the conception of the hero of chivalry, the Christian knight. He fought for a holy cause—not for selfishness or national ambition, but to win the Holy Sepulchre from the infidel. Our civilization is so different that we could never renew this attempt in its literal form. But we can learn much from the spirit which it generated in the knight—the spirit which made warfare holy and made the warrior the *beau idéal* of Christian virtue. The knight was pledged to the highest ideals of unselfishness by the oath taken in the ceremony of his investiture, which was a religious ceremony in the eleventh century. It was preceded by a fast, a solemn confession, and a midnight vigil followed by the reception of Holy Communion. The new knight offered his sword on the altar to signify his devotion to the Church and determination to lead a holy life. The sword had a benediction pro-

nounced over it, and was girded on by the highest ecclesiastic present. The title was conferred by binding the sword and spurs on the candidate, after which a blow was dealt him on the cheek or shoulder as the last affront which he was to receive unrequited. He then took an oath to protect the distressed, maintain right against might, and never by word or deed to stain his honourable character as a knight or a Christian. A knight might be degraded for the infringement of any part of his oath, in which case his spurs were chopped off with a hatchet, his sword broken, his escutcheon reversed, and some religious observances were added during which each piece of armour was taken off in succession and cast from the recreant knight.

Christian chivalry, then, destroyed among the old pagans and among the Prussians the absolute divorce between the heroism manifest in war and the Christian yearning for peace and mercy. In place of glorifying, as Homer does, the pitiless soul of the warrior, it held up pity for the weak and oppressed as the very motive force of military courage. Cruelty and treachery, which the pagan warrior regarded as necessary—for his one aim was victory at all costs—were the antithesis to the Christian warrior's ideal. His word was his bond: his first duty to defend the weak, to free the oppressed. The pacifist's view—peace at any price—and the Prussian militarist's view

—which glorifies relentless war—were alike rejected by him. Chivalry did not idealize war with its horrors like the Prussian. It idealized peace as much as the pacifist, but it refused to cry peace where there is no peace. And it idealized the heroic struggle on behalf of peace. It saw that the aggressions of cruelty and oppression often made a theory of peace at any price synonymous with cowardice, that so-called peace might mean the triumph of injustice. The wrongs of an evil world can often only be righted by force of arms. In a ruder society, like that of the Middle Ages, this was more obvious than it is at present, but nevertheless it is equally true now. It is the presence of force in the background that gives power to the law. In the last resort the soldiers are called out to keep order.

This noble ideal of Christian courage dwelt ever before men's minds, though passion led, of course, to excesses and made men often untrue to their ideal. It remained for the German of our day to hold up those excesses as the true ideal, and to call upon soldiers to aim at being robber knights and recreant knights, who cared nothing for truth and honour, but only for plunder. We have at this moment the amazing spectacle of a great military nation glorying in the violation of the knightly oath of their ancestors, and deliberately accepting and glorying in the disgrace attaching to the

recreant knight of the Middle Ages. This is no exaggeration.

It is literature that represents the ideal aimed at, and in mediæval literature the warrior is chivalrous; in German literature the warrior is pagan. Literature represents what in their calm moments a community or a nation admires. Treitschke, Bernhardi, and Nietzsche represent the deliberate admiration of the Germans for selfish, unscrupulous nationalism and cruel, relentless paganism in war. Old Homer had the same ideal. His greatest praise of Achilles is that his soul was pitiless. Our own literature long maintained the ideal of the Christian knight, equally relentless in battle, but also merciful towards the weak and unselfish. We see it in Chaucer. We see it in Malory's account of King Arthur and the Round Table. We see it in Spenser's *Faery Queene*. This was what public opinion admired. It was what the better self of the soldier respected. If he departed from it he was ashamed. For the German soldier's frightfulness is part of his ideal theory. For the Christian knight frightfulness might come in the frenzy of battle, but no man defended it as a theory or aimed at it. The combination of strength and gentleness which the knight presented was a new idea, a triumph of chivalry. It was not the ideal of Greek literature. It is not found in the pages of Homer.

Many Germans do not seem able even to comprehend the Christian ideal. Ruskin said of them that they did not know the meaning of the words "meekness" and "mercy." Their philosopher Nietzsche describes their own brutality as "master morality"—that is, the qualities suited to a ruling caste—courage and self-assertion. The Christian meekness he calls "slave morality." This distinction is old enough. It is in essence the view of the pagans of Greece and Rome. It divides the world into tyrants and spiritless slaves. Pagan bullies or Christian cowards. It simply fails to understand the essence of the Christian military spirit, which is neither tyrannous nor slavish, which invests the strong man with a tenderness and sense of justice which forbids him to abuse his strength. This ignorance is natural in Homer. But the Germans, who have seen Christianity and chivalry, ought to know better. It is an instance of the absence of insight which often marks German pedantry. The Christian ideal of the Middle Ages was not at all the slave ideal. Its truest expression in actual life was as alien from the mere spiritless slave as from the tyrannous bully whom the Teuton idealized. The Black Prince, as we have often read, fought like a lion, and after the battle he waited at table on his prisoner the King of France, whom he honoured for his valour. This alternation between strength and gentleness

was of the essence of the knightly ideal. And it was, we cannot doubt, an ideal as often realized as our present ideal of a gentleman. In both cases the ideal is frequently disregarded, but it is also often attained and still generally revered. Chaucer described the men and women he actually knew. His account of the knight has often been quoted, but it cannot be omitted from any discussion of mediæval chivalry:

A Knight ther was, and that a worthy man,
 That fro the tyme that he first bigan
 To ryden out, he lovede chivalrye—
 Trouthe and honour, fredom and curtesie.

And of his port as meke as is a mayde.
 He never yit no vilonye ne sayde
 In al his lyf, unto no maner wight.
 He was a verray parfit gentil knight.

The Christian knight, then, whom Chaucer knew, though his bravery and prowess were not one whit behind those of Homer's heroes or of our Prussian foes, yet he could be as gentle as a woman. He never bullied those weaker than himself; never broke his word; never was discourteous to those of lower station, and was always the defender of freedom against oppression. Truth, Honour, Freedom, Courtesy—we could not now better sum

up our watchwords than by this list of the virtues of Chaucer's knight.

You will tell me that the chivalrous knight was an ideal often not realized. There were robber knights in the Middle Ages. There were scenes of terrible carnage in the Crusades. True enough. But then it stood out as the inspiring pattern. This is what in better moments men loved and admired and aimed at. Ideals are in the long run very potent. Chaucer's knight and Malory's knight stood as a picture inspiring the youth of those times to deeds of valour and mercy. And now there stands among the Teutons the ugly theory of frightfulness naked and unashamed, a hideous idol, inviting worshippers in the holy name of patriotism. In both cases the ideal held up as a model to all has been realized by many. Chaucer's knight lived as certainly as the officers live who carry out the policy of "frightfulness." And Tommy Atkins has much of Chaucer's knight in him.

One more point. The international brotherhood among mediæval knights, again, lessened the ruthlessness of war. Every knight had a sacred character which was respected by his enemy. This sentiment was cemented when they were brothers in arms fighting under the banner of the Cross. The Crusades imparted to war a higher ideal than national ambition. They fought for a

sacred cause, not for selfish or national or ambitious aims. And the comradeship among the knights of Christendom remained as a permanent result. Both the ideal cause and the resulting comradeship ennobled warfare. The relentless determination to exterminate the foe where national ambition is the sole motive for fighting is tempered by the sense of comradeship in arms, of common ideals, of respect for the knightly enemy, of the consequent duty of generosity and fair play—a sense that honour is nobler than success, and that even victory is too dearly bought at the price of honour. Fame in the eyes of all Christendom as a loyal and honourable Christian warrior was a strong incentive in the battles of the thirteenth century. This was forfeited by flagrantly treacherous conduct, which made a knight worthy of degradation. We see still in Tommy Atkins a keen sense that he wants to play the game fairly according to the recognized rules. Prussianism has proved itself wholly indifferent to the verdict of any international tribunal. It holds up no ideal of loyalty and honour between combatants which may temper the hate which a war of rivalry between two nations naturally arouses. The standards of chivalry meant the presence of a certain conscience in war, which, however often it was set at nought by passion, did occasionally assert itself. The Prussian theorist is busily employed in

rooting it out. And he has succeeded remarkably well.

In conclusion, I want to urge that all of us, you and I, and our workers at the Front and at the hospitals, should each do his part, having before us that ray of divine light which Christianity shed on Chaucer's knight, who fought because he "loved truth, honour, freedom, and courtesy." I want you all to feel that it is a great opportunity in one's life to have to take part in such a struggle. That what we are fighting for is nothing less than the freedom, the honour, and the eventual peace of the world. We are fighting to save the ideals of civilization from destruction, to secure freedom from oppression, to prevent civilization from reverting to the barbarism and selfishness from which Christianity partially redeemed it, and to bring back the reign of those high ideals without which life knows no true happiness.

No peace can come for mankind, no happiness can come while selfish motives are allowed to predominate in the world. That is the root of the matter—unselfishness. And I would remark that we must get rid not only of the tyranny of German selfish ambition, but of selfishness at home. Why was it that the strikes in Wales were allowed so seriously to interfere with the great work of

supplying munitions for our men? It was the selfishness of class interest, of which those concerned ought to be bitterly ashamed. It is true that the national selfishness of the Germans more than all things led to this war. But at the same time the individual Germans showed an unselfish devotion to the cause of their nation which should put our Welsh strikers to shame. Let us not be ashamed to admire or to imitate our enemies in self-denying devotion to a common cause. But let that cause be not national selfishness and greed at the cost of treachery and falsehood and cruelty, but national honour as a contribution to international brotherhood and the well-being of the whole world. Let our national aim be unselfish as well as our individual action.

The work we are doing each in his own sphere is for the common good; it is mainly unselfish. Thus it is work which actually cultivates that very spirit of unselfishness which is the one hope for the future of civilization. Let any one who helps in this war keep before his mind's eye the inspiring vision of a future kingdom of peace, which, indeed, we can never fully realize on earth, but which, taught by the horror of a war due to selfishness, we may learn to approach through unselfish devotion. So fought, the war will be its own cure.

Selfish men are often cured by learning the awful consequences of their action. Let us trust that

this war will be an object-lesson in the consequences of selfishness to the nations, and will help to bring about a reign of peace and brotherhood—not less patriotism, but a patriotism which prefers national honour to victory through disgrace.

One last word. We fight not against the German or the Austrian or the Turk, but against the evil spirit which has possessed nations and individuals. Those low ideals of which I have spoken are the inspiration of an evil spirit. We fight to exorcise that spirit, to free the hearts of men and nations from its domination, to implant in all the true spirit of God, the noble ideals of justice, honour, and brotherhood. I say again the enemy is so terrible and the aim so great that there has not been a nobler fight since the world began.

AN INTERIM RELIGION¹

BY

DR. L. P. JACKS

THERE is a peace of God that passeth understanding; and there is a strife of God which passeth understanding no less. Religion is privy to the secret of both, but has no hold on either until the other is also within its grasp. Apart from the peace of God, the strife of God has neither motive nor end; apart from the strife, peace is a slumber of the soul.

Fatally defective is that view of religion which regards it as solely concerned with the possession and enjoyment of peace. It has taken a false measure both of the facts of the world and the nature of the soul. Equally defective and not less fatal is the opposite view, that the Lord is a man of war. Both are one-sided and corrupting; they are seen to be so by their moral fruits. The fruit of the first is Britain as she was before the war, full of idle dreams and discontent. The fruit

¹ Reprinted by the author's kind permission from the *Hibbert Journal* for April, 1916.

of the second is Germany as she was then and is now.

There is a good pacifism and a bad. There is a good militarism and a bad. Britain, before the war, was deeply wounded by bad pacifism, whose ideal is the undisturbed enjoyment of the good things of life. Germany remains the victim of bad militarism, whose ideal is the domination of force. Both ideals are false and poisonous.

Bad militarism and bad pacifism are natural enemies: the one is the beast of prey and the other is the quarry. Good militarism and good pacifism are in league for a common object, which is the education of men and nations. Their nature is not to fight one another, but to make war *together* on the bad varieties of each.

The true warrior is the best exponent of peace; and the true pacifist is the only man who has grasped the necessity and high meaning of war. It is the same man playing different parts; the noblest men and the noblest nations invariably play them both. The mere pacifist, on the other hand, is the worst enemy of peace, because he degrades its nature; the mere militarist is the worst exponent of war, because he fights without a moral aim.

Religion alternates between the preaching of peace and the preaching of war; nor could it preach the one unless it preached the other also. Let

any one who doubts this try the experiment of expurgating the Bible in the interests either of war or peace. That the Bible would be wholly misrepresented by a collection of its warlike passages will scarcely be doubted. But a collection of its pacific passages would be equally misleading. The same holds of any one of its parts. A pacifist Psalter would do no less violence to the spirit of Hebrew religion than would an anthology of the fighting Psalms so dear to the Ironsides. "I will lay me down in peace, for thou, Lord, makest me dwell in safety": "Blessed be the Lord my rock who teacheth my hands to war and my fingers to fight." These sayings do not contradict each other; they explain each other. In the New Testament, also, peace and war¹ are interdependent. The "non-resistance" sayings of Christ, torn out of the context of a life which resisted evil to the uttermost, would be meaningless. In St. Paul there is the same paradox, the same truth. His "peace and joy in the Holy Ghost" is an empty abstraction unless we remember those "weapons of our warfare, which are mighty before God to the casting down of strongholds." All these were both pacifists and fighters, and their effectiveness in the one part

¹ *Not* the kind of war which ends in making speeches and leaves a man with his skin whole and the breath in his body—for more speeches.

is the measure of their effectiveness in the other. The movement between peace and war is the "diastole and systole" of the religious heart.

The religion of peace cannot hold its ground unless it is prepared, when occasion arises, to transform itself into the religion of strife. That such occasions do arise is a fact written large in all moral experience. They are the moments, familiar I suppose to most of us, when a man must say to his soul, "Fight *now*, fight to the uttermost, resisting, it may be, even unto blood, or peace shall never visit thee any more." They occur to communities also, but at rarer intervals. They are the moments when nations and empires are put to the test; when they must prove, by the tenor of their response, what vocation they have in the moral order of the world, or whether they have any vocation at all. When this happens religion uncovers its other face. The peace of God which passeth understanding summons its partner in the education of the soul—the strife of God which passeth understanding also.

My thesis is that such an occasion is before our country and our Allies at the present moment. By the action of our opponents this conflict has been raised, *for us*, to the highest level. Not by making war—which in the abstract is no crime—but by the aim and method of their warfare they have identified their cause with naked evil, thereby

giving the war such a character that all who oppose them become, in the act, defenders of the Right.

Far be it from me to say that we as a nation are better fitted than others to play that part. There is nothing in our history, nothing in our national character, to suggest that we, and we alone, are the chosen champions of the Good. The part falls to us from the conditions of the conflict as the enemy has determined them. Whether or no we are worthy to play it our conduct must decide: enough that it has fallen to us; enough that the war is become, through the act of the enemy, a phase of the Eternal Conflict, and that no doubt remains on which side we stand. Once let that be fully realized and our strength will be doubled; our power to endure unto the end will become a certainty. For the prosecution of the war will be thenceforward a religious act.

Such it is rapidly becoming: but it was not so at the first. Through the long months of the war our national psychology has been moving onwards from dim and uncertain beginnings to a clear and definite climax. It is still too early in the day to tell the story in full, for the end is not yet. But enough has been revealed to show that we are in the presence of a genuine spiritual drama played out in the soul of a nation. Only as a drama can the story be fitly told; and so one day it will be—when the dramatist arises who can handle such a

theme. All that can here be attempted is to indicate, with the failings incident to the vision of an individual, some of the periods and turning-points of this remarkable history.

Since the outbreak of the present war it has been found necessary to write many books, pamphlets, and articles to explain to the British people what they are fighting for. I say it has been found *necessary*; and this necessity is not altogether to the discredit of the British. Only a people which, having lost its self-respect, had grown incapable of respecting others could have penetrated the aims of Germany offhand. The British, though far from innocent, are not that kind of people.

It may be said without extravagance that the British long ago acquired enough decency as a people to take decency for granted in the other peoples whom they regarded as their partners in the work of civilization. This may have been imprudent, but it was not disgraceful. When a man of seemingly high character, an honoured neighbour of long standing, turns violator and attacks the decent woman who lives next door, what wonder if at the first she fails to understand the object of her assailant? There is a moment of bewilderment, of incredulity, of inability to grasp the situation, before she can realize her peril.

A like interval of moral unpreparedness prevented the full plain truth from dawning on many of our countrymen during the early stages of the war. And therefore it was necessary for our statesmen, our publicists, our thinkers, and some of our preachers, to tell us, and again to tell us, what we were fighting for. It was to our damage as a belligerent that all this was necessary; but was it not also something to our credit as a people?

I admit that we ought to have known that the rulers of Germany were preparing to attack us. We ought to have known that the final objective of their ambitions was to overthrow the Empire and to seize the spoils. We are much to blame that we had to wait for the outbreak of war before discovering that Germany, as represented by its Government, is a predatory Power. We were amply warned. But even if we had known our danger—as Lord Roberts knew it, as Mr. Blatchford knew it—and even if we had made ready to defend our national existence, we should still have been unprepared for *this* war, such as it has turned out to be. We should still have had to wait for the discovery that behind the attack on the British Empire lay a deeper design, which was nothing less than the overthrow of the moral foundation on which Western civilization has been built up. By individual writers in Germany this object had indeed been clearly avowed.

Under the guise of a new philosophy of the State they had sought to revive that foul ambition of barbarism which prompts a nation to build up its own greatness on the ruin and abasement of its neighbours. But their utterances were treated, not unnaturally, as the ravings of madmen. That the Government of any civilized Power should identify itself with such an aim was inconceivable. What man in his senses could foresee, or be expected to foresee, that Germany, with the approval of her intellectuals, would deliberately plunge the world into war in the name of a creed so transparently insane? Nobody knew, moreover, or could have known that she was ready to base her conduct in war on a code of ethics which has never yet been acknowledged by man, nor practised anywhere, unless it be in the nethermost pit. Nobody knew, and nobody would have believed, no matter how great the evidence, that the rulers of an enlightened people, backed by divines and professors of morality, were capable of resolving to impose this ethic by force of arms and make it the basis of a new "civilization." Yet such we now know to be the fact. Germany herself has revealed it, by word¹ and by deed. For this nobody was prepared, or could be prepared. It is a new thing under the sun.

¹ For evidence on this point see the article by Herr Harden printed at the end.

Naturally we were slow to understand the situation with which we had to deal. There was a considerable number of Britons—the present writer was one of them—who owed, and were never ashamed to confess, a vast intellectual debt to Germany. The humblest worker among the things of the spirit was a sharer in that debt. To all such it seemed impossible that in any final sense Germany could be the foe even of our own nation. The quarrel was on the surface. It was the fruit of an intoxication, a fit of temporary insanity; and we knew, or thought we knew, enough of the better mind of Germany to feel confident that this would presently reassert itself and right reason prevail. We remembered our German friends. For many months a feeling of unreality restrained us. It caused us to make reservations, perhaps unspoken reservations, to the doctrine that we were wholly in the right and our enemies wholly in the wrong. We entered into the fight, but we entered with a certain reluctance of the spirit. We gave our sons to the armies; but our hearts protested against it as a hideous necessity, and we said to one another, “Alas! alas!” To many of us it was no joyful sacrifice, for the cause that demanded it was not perfectly self-evident, but a thing to be argued and decided by a balance of considerations. At certain points, to be sure, the situation admitted of

no debate, except by sophists. Such was the violation of Belgium, the immediate *casus belli*, which was clearly a crime, and a crime of the first magnitude, if anything in this world ever was. But the total quarrel, as developed from that point, was immense and complicated; it embraced questions which have been encumbered with controversy since men and nations began to reflect on their conduct: so that to many minds, which were just as well as patriotic, the war presented itself not as a clear-cut opposition of right and wrong but as a conflict of two opposing rights. There was thus a problematic element in the situation: some said so without disguise, risking the danger; while a far greater number who felt the problem, prudently, and wisely as it has turned out, held their peace. Let it be confessed without shame, but rather with pride, that for a long period the mind of serious and thoughtful people, though pledged to the struggle, was not perfectly at ease with itself. The will which carried them on fell short, by a little, of being the will of the whole man, of the whole nation. *Something* was holding them back—it may have been no more than a lingering scruple, but powerful enough in its cumulative effect to prevent the tide of the nation's energy and resolution from reaching the fulness of its flood. The time was yet to come when the last scruple could be flung to the winds; when the man of good-

will could boldly and finally turn his back on the paradox of his position and joyfully offer himself, body, soul, and spirit, to the service of the Cause.

Had the Germans been as subtle as some imagine them they would have masked their purpose, even though the wearing of the mask had put them under the necessity, so irksome to them, of fighting clean. They would have kept good men in England incredulous, bewildered, and careless until it was too late to recover the lost ground. They would have reserved their crimes for the last act of the drama. But they did otherwise. They began in Belgium with an orgy of treachery, cruelty, and bestiality such as the modern world has never seen. Amid the plaudits of their intellectuals they shattered the monuments of a civilization nobler than their own. They sank the *Lusitania* and bombarded defenceless towns on the English coast, and their professors and divines said "Well done." They stood by, apparently approving, while their allies, the Turks, murdered a million Armenians in cold blood. Little by little the truth was dawning upon us. Little by little: for the fact was so monstrous and incredible that repeated demonstrations left us like men struggling with a bad dream. Some still refused to believe. They kept on repeating the old legend: "This is not the true Germany, but some false usurper of her name."

Then they killed Nurse Cavell. Measured by the scale of the general bloodshed and brutality this was a little thing. But its moral significance was immense. It drove the lesson home—"the little more" that was needed to render our illumination complete. It was the key to Germany's policy of crushing the weak. It awoke our sluggish imagination. It was a summary revelation of the whole meaning of Germany's part in this war, clear as the sun in heaven, the sophistries by which it was defended only serving to put the final seal to our conviction that the work we have to resist and overthrow is, from first to last, the devil's. And much has happened since which repeats the same tale.

By a few people the legend of a true and a false Germany is still repeated, and will be to the end: but it counts no longer as a moral factor in the struggle. Whether or no a better Germany exist, the fact remains that it has failed to appear, failed to make its voice heard on the stage of this conflict. It has capitulated to the Germany which made the war, which has prosecuted the war with calculated disregard of human rights, which killed Nurse Cavell. The "true Germany" may now vindicate its own character if it can. The vindication is no longer any part of our business. For us the only Germany that now exists is the Germany whose nature is expressed by deeds such

as these, and whose aim in the war, as avowed by herself, is the synonym for that which stands accursed in the eyes of humanity. By what means she has forced her better mind to acquiesce in these things matters not now. Enough that she has done it. The character in which she challenges the world is one she has chosen for herself. Be it unto her even as she wills!

Thus at last the eyes of the doubting have been fully opened and we recognize what it is that calls us to battle. It is *naked evil*, shorn of the trappings which disguise it with the appearance of Good. It is no longer Germany, whom it were childish to hate, but a power behind her which has made her its victim and tool; a power we do hate, and must hate so long as we continue to be men and are capable of loving its opposite. We know what we are fighting against, and we know what we are fighting for. Knowing it, we make our resolution. Our cities are turned into arsenals; our peaceful country becomes a camp; in every town and village we see the preparations and the wreckage of war—and the conscience of the nation cries out, "So be it, and so let it be, till the work is done!"

If there is a being who, on receiving the challenge of evil, refuses to fight, that being has forgotten his nature. Not all the forces of the world are man's

coadjutors or his fellows: one of them is his opposite and enemy, and it is precisely in exercising resistance to its opposition that man comes most fully to himself. By the innermost definition of his nature he is a fighter *against evil*. I say a fighter, and mean it literally. With naked evil there is no other way. Reason and persuasion are out of the question, for the essence of evil is that it refuses to hear reason and cannot be reasoned with. He who thinks otherwise is in danger of missing his human vocation. By leaving things to right themselves, or by trusting to the power of persuasive words, he may even betray the cause for which man came into the world.

Name it as you will, there is a power which is not amenable to peaceable entreaty, to the persuasions of reason, to the influence of noble character or personality. Christ encountered it when he faced the tempter, when Judas betrayed him for thirty pieces of silver, when the mob crucified him instead of Barabbas. Nurse Cavell encountered it in the men who slew her. It exists in nature; it enters into man, and there are times when it dominates his will. At the present moment it has found an exponent in the policy and deeds of the German Government, and, above all, in the reasons given by Germans both for the policy and the deeds. The Zeppelins which kill our women and children are its messengers, and we might as well reason with

the bursting bomb as with the power that sent it forth.

Such is evil. It is that which declares its own nature by the terms in which it challenges its opposite. It is an ultimatum and a bribe; a threat of destruction to them that resist and a promise of the kingdoms of the world to them that bow down. Mingled with good it is often hard to recognize; but when pure and unadulterated no man can mistake it for anything else, for it is simply the opposite of himself and declares itself as such. Here is an unmistakable sample:

HYMN OF THE GERMAN SWORD ¹

"It is no duty of mine to be either just or compassionate; it suffices that I am sanctified by my exalted mission, and that I blind the eyes of my enemies with such streams of tears as shall make the proudest of them cringe in terror under the vault of heaven.

"I have slaughtered the old and the sorrowful; I have struck off the breasts of women; and I have run through the body of children who gazed at me with the eyes of the wounded lion.

"Day after day I ride aloft on the shadowy horse in the valley of cypresses; and as I ride I draw forth

¹ I found this in the *Pall Mall Gazette* for October 7, 1915. The Berne correspondent of that paper states that "the composition appeared in Leipzig a week or so ago, and has already run into half a dozen editions." Further inquiries have confirmed its genuineness.

the life blood from every enemy's son that dares to dispute my path.

"It is meet and right that I should cry aloud my pride, for am I not the flaming messenger of the Lord Almighty?

"Germany is so far above and beyond all the other nations that all the rest of the earth, be they who they may, should feel themselves well done by when they are allowed to fight with the dogs for the crumbs that fall from her table.

"When Germany the divine is happy, then the rest of the world basks in smiles; but when Germany suffers, God in person is rent with anguish, and, wrathful and avenging, He turns all the waters into rivers of blood."

If that is not evil, the genuine brew of hell, then no such thing as evil exists. To take it otherwise is to abolish the distinction between evil and good, and to leave us utterly indifferent whether the German or any other "sword" dominates the world.

Thanks to utterances such as this, of which there have been many, and to a long succession of deeds to correspond, our last hesitations have vanished. Our interpretation of Germany—the Germany with which we have to do—is clear and irrevocable. We admit her greatness. We are not blind to her military achievements. We recognize the organization and driving power. But these only serve to stamp more clearly the character of the foe

that threatens us. They are precisely what we should have to expect if the forces arrayed against us were the armies of the enemy of mankind, whoever or whatever that may be.

If there are any who still hesitate while yet believing that religion involves the assertion of the will against this enemy, I would venture to ask them this question: When, if not *now*, do they propose to begin? What clearer summons to show their faith by their works do they expect to receive than that which is calling to them at the present moment? What greater enormities of human conduct are they waiting for? What stronger proof do they want that the hour when the soul must put on its armour has arrived? If we cannot hear the summons in the present event, is any event conceivable in which we should hear it? Surely we may answer: If not *now*—never!

When Bunyan's Pilgrim encountered Apollyon in the Valley of Humiliation he might have argued thus: "This person looks uncommonly like the Evil One. But what if, in so naming him, I am merely yielding to the biassed judgment of a belligerent? It may be that, for all his black looks, my opponent is a very worthy gentleman. Obviously, he so regards himself. Obviously, also, he has a very low opinion of me. What if his opinion of me is nearer the truth than mine of him? Say what you will, he is an active, enterprising, in-

genious fellow. Perhaps I shall be well advised in waiting for some blacker apparition than this before drawing my sword."

So Christian might have mused, if time had been given him. But time would not have been given; for, long before his musings could be concluded, Apollyon would have hewn him to pieces. And Christian would have deserved his fate.

From now onwards till the work be finished nothing else really matters. At last we understand the Cause, and we know that if this is defeated life would be intolerable. No sacrifice can be too great to avert the disaster; no period of endurance can be too long; no strain on our tenacity can be too severe. We throw everything into the scale: our wealth to the last penny; the treasures of Empire; the garnered fruits of progress; the last ounce of mental and moral energy; the loss of our noblest and best; our own lives as a matter of course. For we are fighting against an enemy whose triumph would be the defeat of our souls; and the vow has been vowed that he shall not prevail.

That is now the religion of an ever-growing multitude of men and women throughout the Empire—the expression of the supreme duty; and what nobler thing can religion ever be? It is a religion which no doubts assail; and into which a man

can pour the full flood of the soul's energy without one hesitation. Not often is it given to a great nation to see before it a commanding duty which shines as clear as the day. Our response to it is the resurrection of the national soul—long asleep.

I write with deliberation when I say that we are fighting hell. What hell has meant to the vulgar concerns us not; but all that hell has ever meant to minds conversant with the tragedy of life is represented, embodied, realized in the power that we are fighting today. Cruelty and treachery are only the superficial manifestations of its nature. The essence lies in the directing mind. Beginning with a doctrine which subtly confuses the distinction between right and wrong, it grows, through ever bolder perversions, into a State-philosophy in which right and wrong are *transposed*, and moral reason turned into an instrument for the advocacy and justification of crime. This is the very Genius of the Pit; the spirit which proves every object of desire save the worst to be illusion; the parent of all sophistries and lies; the arch-enemy of mankind, doubly dangerous by its appeal to something intensely active in human nature everywhere, but held under restraint wherever man has learnt to know himself. Once let this spirit prevail, and there is an end to the hopes of the world. Its victory is the defeat of all that the ages have struggled to accomplish.

The religion of calmer times—the religion of love and peace—is not endangered by this temporary transformation into something of sterner quality. Rather will it be invigorated and revived; it will be shorn of the empty verbalisms that obscure its essence; it will return, enriched and ennobled, to every son of man who held not back when the call went forth to come to the help of the Lord against the mighty. There is a new wisdom growing in these Islands: not the wisdom which arises from union merely, for men may be united in evil as well as in good, but the wisdom which arises in union for the highest of aims; the wisdom born *simultaneously* in millions of hearts when a nation resolves to die rather than suffer the wrong to prevail. By this wisdom all our creeds and professions will hereafter be tested. The only people who will have a right in the coming years to preach the gospel of love and peace will be those who can give a good answer when the question is asked: “What were you doing in the Great Day?”

Let us, then, have no more complaining of our lot! Let us thank God that, since the great trial was to come, *we* are alive to share its actual perils and possible glories. It will be a glad thought hereafter to all of us who survive that we were found worthy to stand in the breach—that the trial came to us and not to our posterity. Welcome the hour which tests the manhood of this nation

to the uttermost! Welcome the call to show ourselves worthy of the great inheritance our fathers have bequeathed to us! Welcome the opportunity of proving the words we have so often uttered, that there are things dearer than life! Welcome the summons which brings us face to face with the business for which men were created!

How poor is the life to which that summons never comes! How demoralized the life whose highest service to the things of the spirit has consisted in their profession and their eulogy! Doubtless there are occasions which give an individual man, in the course of his normal experience, many an opening for practising the self-surrenders of the spirit. But now the occasion is offered to a whole nation all at once. That is a different and rarer thing; and out of it there arise revelations, revivals, resurrections, new births of the soul.

In the period preceding the war we were drifting away from all these splendid possibilities. We were growing unworthy of our mighty Empire, whose profound significance we had so long ignored. It was there for our benefit, for our glory, for our enrichment—so too many of us thought. Seldom did we pause to reflect that to no nation, however proud its history, are such trusts continued unless it can prove itself worthy to fulfil them.

I can imagine nothing worse for my native land

than another century of such a life as we were living before the war. Before the end of it we should have gone to pieces, and it would have needed no attack from without to lay our Empire in ruins. A shock was necessary to bring us to our senses and to send our quacks to the right-about. It came in a form for which we were ill prepared. It has come, and how good a thing it is to see so many proofs that the spirit which can answer the summons is not dead! Many of us feared it was. But now our fears have vanished, and we see the dawning of a better day, not for ourselves alone, but for all mankind.

TRANSLATION OF HERR HARDEN'S ARTICLE IN "NEW YORK TIMES," DECEMBER 6, 1914

"Cease the pitiful attempts to excuse Germany's action. No longer wail to strangers, who do not care to hear you, telling them how dear to us were the smiles of peace we had smeared like rouge upon our lips, and how deeply we regret in our hearts that the treachery of conspirators dragged us unwilling into a forced war. . . . That national selfishness does not seem a duty to you, but a sin, is something you must conceal from foreign eyes. . . . Cease also, you popular writers, the degraded scolding of enemies that does not emanate from passion but from greedy hankering for the applause of the masses, and which continually nauseates us amid the piety of this hour. That our statesmen failed to discover and foil shrewd plans

of deception is no reason why we may hoist the flag of most pious morality. Not as weak-willed blunderers have we undertaken the fearful risk of this war. We wanted it. Because we had to wish it and could wish it. May the Teuton Devil throttle those whiners whose pleas for excuses make us ludicrous in these hours of lofty experience! We do not stand, and shall not place ourselves, before the court of Europe. Germany strikes. If it conquers new realms for its genius, the priesthood of all the gods will sing songs of praise to the good war. . . . We are waging this war not in order to punish those who have sinned, nor in order to free enslaved peoples and thereafter to comfort ourselves with the unselfish and useless consciousness of our own righteousness. We wage it from the lofty point of view and with the conviction that Germany, as a result of her achievements and in proportion to them, is justified in asking, and must obtain, wider room on earth for development and for working out the possibilities that are in her. The Powers from whom she forced her ascendancy, in spite of themselves, still live, and some of them have recovered from the weakening she gave them. . . . Now strikes the hour of Germany's rising power.

“Not only for the territories that are to feed their children and grandchildren is this warrior host now battling; but also for the conquering triumph of the German genius, for the forces of sentiment that rise from Goethe and Beethoven and Bismarck and Schiller and Kant and Kleist, working on throughout time and eternity. . . . In order that that spirit might conquer we were obliged to forge the mightiest weapons for

it. . . . The fashioning of such weapons was possible only because millions of industrious persons with untiring and unremitting labours, transformed the poor Germany into the rich Germany, which was then able *to prepare and conduct the war as a great industry*. . . . To be 'unassailable'—to exchange the soul of a Viking for that of a New Yorker, that of the quick pike for that of the lazy carp whose fat back grows moss-covered in a dangerless pond—that must never become the wish of a German. And for the securing of more comfortable frontier protection only a madman would risk the life that is flourishing in power and wealth. Now we know what the war is for: not for French, Polish, Ruthenian, Lettish territories; not for billions of money; not in order to dive headlong after the war into the pool of emotions and then allow the chilled body to rust in the twilight dusk of the Deliverer of Races. No! To hoist the storm flag of the empire on the narrow channel that opens and locks the road into the ocean."

HOW WE STAND NOW

BY

PROFESSOR GILBERT MURRAY

A FEW weeks ago I was giving a lecture to a certain Scandinavian society, and was asked after the lecture to sign my name in the society's book. As I looked through the names of the previous lecturers who had signed, I noticed the signature of Maximilian Harden. I inquired about his lecture—it was given before the war, in 1913—and heard that it had been splendid. It had in the first place lasted two hours—a dangerous excellence—and had dealt with Germany's Place in the Sun. The lecturer had explained how Germany was the first of nations in all matters that really count: first in things of the intellect, in *Wissenschaft*, science, history, theology; first socially and politically, inasmuch as her people were at once the most enlightened and most contented, the freest and best organized and most devotedly loyal; first in military power and in material and commercial progress; most of all first in her influence over the rest of the world

¹ Lecture delivered at King's College, London, June 5, 1916.

and the magic of her incomparable Kultur. She needed to expand and was bound to expand, both in Europe and beyond Europe. This could be achieved without difficulty; for Europe was already half conquered, and England had been very obliging in the matter of colonies. So far the first hour and a half; then came the climax. This expansion would be of little use if it were obtained by mere peaceful growth. Germany's power needed a stronger foundation. It must be built on a pedestal of war and "cemented with blood and iron."

This lecture, if it could be unearthed, would form a curious comment on Harden's recent utterances in favour of peace and goodwill; but that is not what I wish to dwell upon. I want merely to take this doctrine as a sort of text, and carefully to consider its implications. I do not say for a moment that it is, or ever was, the doctrine of all Germany; but it is, I think, the doctrine that has prevailed. It is the doctrine of Bernhardi—a writer by no means so negligible as some critics have tried to make out. It is the doctrine of that very remarkable German Secret Paper which appears as No. 2 in the French Yellow Book. It is the doctrine of the leading German intellectuals represented by Rohrbach or by Naumann. And, what is more significant, it seems to me to be the doctrine generally held by pro-Germans in neutral countries.

Such pro-Germans seldom discuss the negotiations of 1914 or the responsibility for the war. They take the bold line that Germany is the finest nation in the world, and has a right, by war or otherwise, to seize the first place. They tacitly accept the doctrine of Harden's last half-hour, except, of course, that where Harden expected to achieve his end by one short and triumphant war, they now, with Dr. Rohrbach, only expect to realize their full hopes "in this war, or the next, or the next, or the next after that"!

Now what is our answer, speaking—if we can—not as indignant Britishers, but as thinking men who try to be impartial—what is our answer to Harden's claim? If Germany is really so superior to other nations—and she can make out, or could before the war make out, a rather plausible case—ought we to check her? Ought we to strengthen a comparatively backward Power, like Russia, against her?

Surely our reply is quite clear. If Germany is what she claims to be, she will get her due place by normal expansion and development. If she is growing in wealth, in population, in material, intellectual and spiritual power—no one will say she is hampered by undue modesty or lack of advertisement—she will inevitably gain the influence she demands; she was already gaining it. We do not

stand in her way except as legitimate rivals. We have not balked her colonial expansion; we agreed with her about the Bagdad Railways. But if, to make her claim firmer, she insists on war; if she seeks to build her empire upon innocent blood, then both as a rival nation valuing our own rights and as civilized men in the name of outraged humanity, we meet force with force. We will show this empire which demands a foundation of blood and iron that blood at least is a slippery foundation.

So much for the first question suggested by my text; now for a second. How does the existence of this doctrine and the fact of its wide acceptance bear upon the question of Peace? Have we blundered into this war, through the folly of our Governments, with no fundamental quarrel? Or are we confronted with a deliberate policy—a policy backed by an army of ten to twelve millions, which we cannot tolerate while we exist as a free nation? It seems to me clear, and ever increasingly clear, that the governing forces in Germany are fighting in the spirit of Harden's speech, to create a world-power which shall be, in the first place, hostile to ourselves, and, in the second place, based on principles which we regard as evil.

The ideal has been most clearly expressed in Naumann's remarkable book *Mitteleuropa*, and in the immense discussion to which that book has given rise. Some German critics think that Nau-

mann is too moderate in the East, some that he unduly neglects the colonies. But in general there emerges from the whole discussion the clear ideal of a united Empire reaching from Antwerp to Bagdad, dominated, organized, permeated, and trained for war by the German General Staff, developed economically by German trusts and cartels. It is the ideal of Rohrbach and the intellectuals who write in "Deutsche Politik." It is implicit in the old speeches of the Kaiser and Prince von Bülow. It is implicit equally in the recent speech of the present Chancellor, insisting that "any possible peace" must be based "on the war situation as every war map shows it to be."

The war situation on land already gives Germany her empire of Mitteleuropa! Her armies reach now from Antwerp to Bagdad, from Riga to the frontier of Egypt—that frontier which Rohrbach describes as the throat of the British Empire, to be held always in Germany's grip. The colonies are gone; true. But if Germany is sufficiently strong in Europe, it is a maxim of German policy that colonies can be recovered.

A critic may say: "But this implies annexation, and the whole principle of annexation is being vigorously repudiated in Germany." Quite true. It is being repudiated; and not only by the socialists, but by many bourgeois politicians and professors. There has been a curious unanimity,

these last weeks, in the repudiation of the annexation policy. What is the explanation of a phenomenon which seems so strangely, so suspiciously, gratifying?

Remember Austria before the war! She was willing to guarantee the territorial integrity of Serbia. She did not wish to annex territory; no, she wanted a Vassal State. That is the clue to the problem why Rohrbach and Harden want no annexation, why even the Chancellor is willing to consider a policy without annexation. Germany has no need of annexations if she can end this war as a conqueror, alone and supreme against a world in arms.

The Chancellor has explained that he is content not to annex Belgium provided he can have guarantees that Germany shall have her "*due influence in Belgium.*" The same "*due influence,*" I presume, which she now possesses in Turkey and Bulgaria, neither of which countries she has annexed. The same due influence which she will inevitably have, if peace is made on the basis of the present military situation, in Greece, in Rumania, in Sweden. And who imagines, after that, that Denmark or Holland can hold out? Peace on the basis of the present military situation establishes at a blow the empire of Mitteleuropa, and presents the professional German war-mongers with another successful war.

Let us here consider another objection. "If Germany is to gain this position by mere prestige, without any annexation," it may be suggested, "does she not clearly deserve it? Are we not wrong to object to it?" I answer, No, she does not deserve it, and we have the right to object. She claims that prestige on the ground that she has won the war; and that, we maintain, is a false ground, because she has not won the war. We mean to see whether she can win. An interesting object-lesson is now being worked out before the eyes of the smaller nations, those semi-civilized Balkan and Asiatic communities who have had so little experience of honest politics and such abundant experience of international scoundrelism. They are waiting to see whether the last word of political wisdom is to be found in the way in which Germany treated Belgium, and Austria treated Serbia, and both Powers treated the unhappy Balkan States at the time of the last Balkan War. They are waiting to see whether it is safe and wise to plot evil, to lie, to prepare, to spring upon your prey; or whether the great mass of decent human society is in the long run strong enough to beat down any nation that plays the assassin against its fellows.

That is how the knowledge of this policy bears on the question of Peace. A great Scandinavian shipbuilder the other day told me that he had one

word of advice, and one only, to give us about the war. "Beat Germany this time," he said, "for, if you do not, next time she will beat you."

I will ask you now to face with me a third question, suggested not so much by Harden's actual speech as by the tone of my own criticism of it. I think Harden's program wicked; I regard the political action and the whole manner of thought of the German leaders as both treacherous and cruel; I think and speak of it with indignation, and so do you. Now have we any right to that tone?

I met in France lately an old friend of mine, who told me in a genial way that all such indignation was hypocrisy, pure hypocrisy. "Germany was perfectly right in all she had done, and if we had been clever enough to think of it we would have done the same." And he challenged me with certain quotations from English and American writers which I will put before you in a moment.

Now we all know that our indignation is not hypocritical. Whether warranted or not, it is perfectly sincere. There is no question of that. But I wish, before answering my friend in detail, to make one frank admission. Our moral indignation is not hypocritical; but I admit that it is a dangerous state of mind. As soon as we begin to have that kind of feeling towards any national or personal enemy, a feeling of indignant scorn for someone else coupled with a conviction of our own

great superiority, it is dangerous: we ought instantly to collect ourselves and bear in mind at the least the possibility that, "but for the grace of God, there go we and there goes Great Britain."

"If we had been clever enough we would have done the same": let us see what, in this respect, Germany did. She forced on Europe a war that could have been easily avoided; she broke her treaty in a peculiarly treacherous way; she trampled on international law; she practised deliberate "frightfulness" on the civil population in Belgium and Northern France; she twisted all the rules of war towards less chivalry and greater brutality; she slew unarmed civilians wholesale with her submarines and Zeppelins; and, if we are adding up her list of crimes, we should not forget the most widespread and ghastly of all, her deliberate starvation of Poland and her complicity in the unspeakable horrors of Armenia.

Would we, could we, as a nation, ever have done these things? No one who knows England will really argue that we would actually have done them. But let us go further. Do we habitually harbour principles and use arguments which would justify our doing such things if circumstances tempted us that way? As a nation, I am clear that we do not; but I must face some of my friend's quotations.

As for the general theory: well, our late Field

Marshal, Lord Roberts, was a great and chivalrous soldier, admired and loved by his fellow-countrymen. Yet it seems that in his *Message to the Nation* he definitely praises and recommends for our imitation the doctrines of General Bernhardi, and particularly admires the German Government for pouring scorn on President Taft's proposals for arbitration treaties (pp. 8, 9). Well, I confess I wish Lord Roberts had not written thus. My defence must be the rather speculative one, that I do not believe he really accepted the doctrines that he seemed to preach. At any rate, you will not find anywhere in his long military life that he practised them.

Again, when we speak of "scraps of paper" I find that a certain English soldier, a member of my own clan, too, has expressed his opinions about them even more vigorously than Dr. Bethmann-Hollweg. He is speaking of our seizure of the Danish fleet in 1807. "Nothing has ever been done by any other nation more utterly in defiance of the conventionalities of so-called international law. We considered it advisable and necessary and expedient, and we had the power to do it; therefore we did it. Are we ashamed of it? No, certainly not. We are proud of it." The writer is Major Stewart-Murray in *The Future Peace of the Anglo-Saxons*. The history, of course, is incorrect, the language is muddled; but the writer's general

meaning is clear enough. And it is certainly not for him to throw stones at professed treaty breakers.

My friend's next quotations are from Mr. Homer Lea. Now I do not feel myself responsible for Mr. Homer Lea, because after all he is American, not English. But certainly, to judge by the quotations, his principles would warm the hearts of Attila or Admiral Tirpitz. They would not, I think, have appealed to General Robert Lee, and I am certain would have horrified Homer. Even that most sinister sentence with which the horrors of Belgium were justified—the maxim that an invading army should “leave the women and children nothing but their eyes to weep with”—even that was not the invention of the Teutons. It was welcomed and carried into practice by them; but its invention belongs to an American General, and it has been quoted with admiration by certain English writers.

Lastly, let us take two statements of what I may call the mystical creed of militarism. I want you to guess which of the two is German and which English. “War gives a biologically just decision, since its decisions arise from the very nature of things.” And, again: “War is the divinely appointed means by which the environment may be readjusted till ‘ethically fittest’ and ‘best’ become synonymous.” Which of those two is German? Which is the more remote from good

sense? Which the more characteristic in its mixture of piety and muddle-headedness? Well, I don't know what your guesses are, but the first is from Bernhardt, and the second from Colonel Maude, on *War and the World's Life*.

In *Punch* last week there was a cartoon representing a blundering Teutonic giant with a spiked club, advancing under the motto, "*Weltmacht oder Niedergang!*" Naturally, when any person is kind enough to give the rest of the world that choice, we all unanimously say "*Niedergang*, if you please." Yet I find in the book of a well-known and kindly and learned English writer the statement that "a choice is now given to England, a choice between the first place among nations and the last; between the leadership of the human race and the loss of Empire and of all but the shadow of independence."

Of course, one sees more or less what he means; but why exaggerate? Why insist on "leadership of the human race"? Why express the policy you advocate in terms which must necessarily exasperate Russia, France, the United States, and all the other great nations? Is that the way to get allies among nations of whom each one considers itself as good as you? Is it the spirit in which to conduct decent diplomacy, the spirit in which to deal fairly and reasonably with the other members of the great fraternity of Europe?

What, then, is the answer to my friend's challenge? I confess myself still unshaken by it. We must admit that these militarists, these enthusiastic spurners of international law, these eloquent would-be torturers of civil populations, these rejectors and despisers of arbitration and peace, do exist among us; they exist among us, but, thank Heaven and our own common sense, they do not control our Government. They are not England. In Germany they have controlled the Government. And the world has seen the fruit of their principles when carried into action, in all its horror and all its helpless futility.

Plato always insisted—you will excuse a Greek scholar for once referring to Plato—on the great complexity of human character. It is never One; it is always a mass of warring impulses; and his solution of the problem presented by that inward war was to maintain the character as an "aristocracy," in which the best forces should be uppermost and the lower ones beaten down. The same rule should apply both to the individual and the State. I believe that—in Plato's sense of the word, which is, of course, quite different from its ordinary modern meaning—we do possess in Great Britain such an "aristocracy." Our better natures on the whole rule our public action; we give our national confidence to our better men. We have behind us a very great tradition. In

peace we are the most liberal and the most merciful of all great Empires; in war we have Napoleon's famous testimonial, calling us "the most consistent, the most implacable, and the most generous of his enemies." It is for us to keep up that tradition, and I believe that the men who rule us do keep it up. The main effort of the nation is high and noble, but in the strain and anxiety of this long war one becomes conscious of the struggle towards expression of something lower, something mean, angry, intemperate, hysterical, slanderous . . . the barbarian slaves, as Plato would put it, clamouring that the city itself shall be governed by barbarian slaves.

I take one case, not mentioning names, because I do not wish to attack any individual, from *The Times* of one day in May. The children of interned aliens are fed by the Boards of Guardians on workhouse principles. With the rise of prices an increased grant was necessary, and was applied for by the Local Government Board. (It remained considerably lower than the allowance for the children of our own soldiers and sailors.) A certain Member of Parliament asked Mr. McKenna if, before sanctioning the grant, he would give due consideration to the increasingly bad conditions under which British civilians were now forced to live at Ruhleben.—Mr. McKenna: The proposals of the Local Government Board have

already been approved. In their treatment of prisoners and other enemy aliens in this country, His Majesty's Government are guided by the dictates of humanity and the principles of the Hague Convention.—Another Hon. Member: Before the right hon. gentleman sanctions the increase, will he ascertain what grants are being given to the children of interned British prisoners in Ruhleben?—Mr. McKenna: I do not think the two cases can be weighed one against the other. No matter what other Governments may do, this Government will continue to be actuated by the principles of humanity.—The Hon. Member: How does the right hon. gentleman expect to get better treatment for British prisoners in Ruhleben if he gives everything with both hands to the children of interned Germans here?—Mr. McKenna: I do not think my hon. friend states the case quite fairly. We believe ourselves bound by certain principles—the rules of the Hague Convention. We have acted honestly and fearlessly in conformity with those rules, and I hope the House will support the Government in so doing. (Cheers.)

I choose this incident, not from any wish to attack the Hon. Members involved, one of whom I know to be a quite kindly person, but because it just illustrates my argument. It shows a bad and foolish and un-English impulse struggling to obtain power and being very properly crushed. No

reasonable person really imagines that cutting down the food of these children below what the Guardians think necessary will help us in the faintest degree to win the war; and, above all, that is not the way in which Great Britain makes war, or, please God, ever will make war—by starving a lot of little enemy children whom we happen to have in our hands.

I wonder sometimes that people, especially people who write letters to newspapers, seem to have so little pride in their country. I suppose there is some psychological luxury in making vindictive suggestions of this kind, or in spreading wild accusations against one's leaders. But it is the sort of luxury that ought to be strictly cut down in time of war. It is misleading to other nations; and, with public servants as with others, you do not get the best work by incessant scolding. For my own part, I am more proud of Great Britain than ever in my life before, and that largely because, in spite of this froth or scum that sometimes floats on the surface, she is fundamentally true to her great traditions, and treads steadily under foot those elements which, if they had control, would depose us from being a nation of "white men," of rulers, of gentlemen, and bring us to the level of the enemy whom we denounce, or of the "lesser breeds without the law."

Probably many of us have learned only through

this war how much we loved our country. That love depends, of course, not mainly on pride, but on old habit and familiarity, on neighbourliness and memories of childhood. Yet, mingling with that love for our old country, I do feel a profound pride. I am proud of our response to the Empire's call—a response absolutely unexampled in history, five million men and more gathering from the ends of the earth; subjects of the British Empire coming to offer life and limb for the Empire, not because they were subjects, but because they were free and willed to come. I am proud of our soldiers and our sailors, our invincible sailors! I am proud of the retreat from Mons, the first and second battles of Ypres, the storming of the heights of Gallipoli. No victory that the future may bring can ever obliterate the glory of those days of darkness and suffering; no tomb in Westminster Abbey surpass the splendour of those violated and nameless graves.

I am proud of our men in the workshop and the factory, proud of our men and almost more proud of our women—working one and all day after day, with constant overtime and practically no holidays, for the most part demanding no trade safeguards and insisting on no conditions, but giving freely to the common cause all that they have to give.

I am proud of our political leaders and civil administrators, proud of their resource, their de-

votion, their unshaken coolness, their magnanimity in the face of intrigue and detraction, their magnificent interpretation of the nation's will. I do not seek to palliate mistakes or deprecate criticism, so long as it is honest and helpful criticism. But when almost every morning and evening newspapers professing to be patriotic pour in their attacks on these men who are bearing our burden—attacks which will wither away and vanish with our first big victory—I will venture to state one humble citizen's opinion: that, whether you look at the Head of the Government or whether you look at the great Secretaryships and Administrative Offices, from the beginning of the war till now, I doubt if at any previous period of English—I am not sure that we might not even say of European—history you will find a nation guided by such a combination of experience, high character, and commanding intellectual power.

A few days ago I was in France in the fire-zone. I had been at a field dressing-station, which had just evacuated its wounded and dead, and was expecting more; and, as evening was falling, full of the uncanny strain of the whole place and slightly deafened with the shells, I saw a body of men in full kit plodding their way up the communication trenches to take their place in the firing trench. I was just going back myself, well out of the range of guns, to a comfortable tea and a peaceful even-

ing; and there, in trench after trench, along all the hundred miles of our front, day after day, night after night, were men moving heavily up to the firing-line, to pay their regular toll of so many killed and so many wounded, while the war drags on its weary length. I suddenly wondered in my heart whether we or our cause or our country are worth that sacrifice; and, with my mind full of its awfulness, I answered clearly, Yes. Because, while I am proud of all the things I have mentioned about Great Britain, I am most proud of the clean hands with which we came into this contest, proud of the Cause for which with clear vision we unsheathed our sword, and which we mean to maintain unshaken to the bitter or the triumphant end.

THE DESIRE OF CIVILIZATION FOR THE REIGN OF LAW¹

BY

PROFESSOR RAMSAY MUIR

THE attempt to establish the reign of law in international relations is, like every other human endeavour, conditioned, though not determined, by history; and it is only when we have grasped the significance of past attempts in this direction, the extent to which they have succeeded, and the reasons for their failures, that we shall be able to discuss with any confidence the possibilities of the future. But all interpretations of historical facts are liable to be disturbed by the special bias of the interpreter. There are two kinds of bias in the interpretation of past endeavours towards international organization which are peculiarly dangerous. One is the bias of the cynic, the other the bias of the sentimentalist; and they are dangerous because both equally deny all value and reality

¹ Lecture delivered at King's College, London, on June 19, 1916. The argument here developed with extreme brevity is more fully worked out in the author's *Nationalism and Internationalism* (Constable).

to the achievements of the international movement in the past, and both lead us to an equally hopeless conclusion.

The bias of the cynic is fairly represented by the doctrine of Treitschke, which unhappily represents the mind of modern Germany, as it gathers up and expounds the traditional attitude and principles of the Prussian state; it is the doctrine that in the last resort Force has always been, and will always be, the one dominant fact in human affairs, whether within the state or in the relations between states. Holding this doctrine, Treitschke and those who think with him naturally see no binding force in international law, and deny it the very name of law, because it does not rest upon Power; naturally also, they take no interest in, and have no patience with, the attempts which have been made to establish the reign of law in the relations between states. They simply disregard all that has been done in this field, and thus leave out of account an important body of facts which do not accord with their doctrine.

The bias of the sentimentalist leads him to an equally hopeless conclusion. Passionately desiring the reign of justice upon earth, he is led, by the contrast between his dreams and the facts, to think of the whole of modern history as one long unrelieved anarchy, which has reached its culmination in the hideous outburst of this war. He can only explain

it by the theory that all governments and all peoples have in fact been swayed, as Treitschke asserts that they must be, by the belief that brute force is the only determining factor in international relations; and accordingly, like Treitschke, he wholly disregards every evidence that men and states have in fact striven to establish the reign of law, and striven not wholly in vain. An excellent example of this type of thought is provided by Mr. Lowes Dickinson's earnest and plaintive little book, *The European Anarchy*. Ever since the end of the fifteenth century, he tells us on his first page, "international policy has meant Machiavellianism," or the disregard of all moral considerations; and this has been true equally of all states and of all eras. There has been, in his view, no sort of endeavour to escape from the anarchy, and certainly no sort of progress in this endeavour. And at the close of his book he assures us that an all-but-universal opinion still accepts this state of things as natural and inevitable. "Most men," he says, "believe, feel, or passively accept that power and wealth are the objects states ought to pursue; that in pursuing these objects they are bound by no code of right in their relations to one another; that law between them is, and must be, as fragile as a cobweb stretched before the mouth of a cannon; that force is the only rule and the only determinant of their differences; and that

the only real question is when and how the appeal to force may most advantageously be made."

Thus the cynic and the disillusioned sentimentalist arrive at the same conclusion. The only difference between them is that the sentimentalist sincerely desires a change, while the cynic does not. But the sentimentalist's only hope is that there may take place some miracle of conversion among all the rulers of the world, or some still greater miracle of swift unorganized co-operation among all peoples, whereby it shall be brought about that a single controlling authority, representing all peoples, shall enforce the rule of law among them. But if it be true that all governments, however organized, have equally and always left the moral factor out of consideration in their mutual relations, then such a hope must indeed be visionary.

The sentimentalist view of international relations is a curious reproduction of Hobbes's old hypothesis regarding the condition of men before the origin of the state. Before the state existed, says Hobbes, men were in a state of nature, which was a state of ceaseless war, until they agreed to set up a common authority. Mr. Dickinson, indeed, definitely refers to the Hobbes parallel, and speaks of states as being in the state of nature in regard to one another: in order that they may escape from this chronic state of war he postulates as necessary

just such a sudden unanimous resolve on the part of states as Hobbes postulated on the part of the individuals forming the state. Though Hobbes, unlike Mr. Dickinson, did not assert that his hypothesis represented actual historical fact, yet his reasoning was largely invalidated by the too sharp antithesis which he drew between the utter anarchy of his state of nature and the absolute sovereignty of law which he attributed to his organized state. He did not realize that the state does not come suddenly into being, but is for ever in a condition of *becoming*; and that the substitution of the rule of law for brute force as between individuals does not take place at a single stroke, but passes through many gradual stages. But if this misconception largely vitiated the political thought of Hobbes, who only adopted it as a hypothesis, how much more must the precisely parallel misconception vitiate the thought of our sentimentalists, who adopt it as an actual statement of historical fact! It simply is not true that all states have been governed, in their mutual relations throughout the modern era, by purely Machiavellian or non-moral considerations. It is not true that there has been no difference, in this respect, between the attitudes of the various states. It is not true that most men have always believed, and still believe, that states "are bound by no code of right in their relations to one another." The falsity of

these pessimistic conclusions of the sentimentalist turned cynic is demonstrated on every page of modern history. International co-operation, throughout the modern age, has been "in a state of becoming." Not merely philosophers, but the despised politicians, have striven after the establishment of the rule of law in inter-state relations. They have achieved successes far more considerable than is generally recognized. These successes have been possible because the judgment and conscience of civilized humanity have increasingly supported such endeavours. And it is just because this is so that we have a right to believe in the ultimate triumph of the reign of law. But we shall only be able to hasten this triumph if we study and understand what has already been done, and especially if we profit from the lessons which can be learnt from the failures of the past. Our sentimentalist tells us that it is only by accepting his view of European history that we shall be able to act wisely in the future. The answer is that if his view is just, there is no hope for the future. But his view is not just. Throughout modern history the intellect and the conscience of Western civilization have continually shown that they felt the need to establish the rule of law in the relations of states. Some of their greatest endeavours have been baffled; but for all that there has been steady progress.

It is true that one of the distinctive features of the modern age has been the almost complete disappearance of the ideal of a world-state, enforcing peace and law upon the whole of civilization, which the Roman Empire had realized, and to which the Middle Ages pathetically and persistently clung. But what was the prime cause of this? It was not, as our sentimentalists suppose, the confirmed Machiavellianism of governments and peoples: it was the growth of the conception of nationality, a conception peculiar to the modern age of Western civilization. This it was which broke down the arbitral authority of the papacy, hitherto the exponent of the common conscience of Christendom; this it was which destroyed for ever the possibility of a single world-state. Nearly all the wars of the modern age are to be attributed directly or indirectly to the influence of the national idea. During the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, indeed, the nations were largely unconscious of the force that was impelling them; but in the nineteenth century the nationalist movement became entirely self-conscious, and every war of the century can be directly traced to it. It is, then, the working out of the national principle which has, more than anything else, broken up the unity of Europe, rendered difficult the establishment of a common system of law, and turned the history of the modern age into a story of almost

uninterrupted warfare. Yet who will deny that the birth and development of the national idea have led to the enrichment of civilization? The national idea has been the source of the progressive character of European life, which has been due to the life-giving contact and rivalry of distinct types upon a common basis of moral and political ideas. It has given to the state a far firmer basis of unity than it has ever possessed before. And it has rendered possible the growth of self-governing institutions, which have never really existed, and perhaps can never successfully exist, except in communities bound together by those conscious ties of affinity which make nationhood. These have been gains which were not purchased too dearly even by the all but unceasing strife that formed the birth-throes of the nation-states.

The growth of the national idea destroyed the old ideal of the world-state. But it did not destroy, though for a time it inevitably weakened, the desire of men to see the reign of law established throughout the civilized world. Only it gave to this desire a new form. Gradually the cosmopolitan aim gives place to the international aim: the idea of a world-state imposing a single law upon the whole of civilization gives place to the idea of a voluntary co-operation among independent and equal nation-states. And this is at once a nobler idea, and one infinitely more difficult to realize;

just as the idea of self-government by the co-operation of free citizens is nobler and more difficult to realize than the idea of despotic authority. This new conception of internationalism is to be seen slowly growing in influence from the sixteenth century onwards; we shall later see something of the modes in which it expressed itself. But the essential point is that internationalism implies nationalism: internationalism cannot fully triumph until nationalism has fully triumphed, and so long as there remained any large part of Europe where the national principle had not obtained its fulfilment, no effective international organization was even possible. Every advance made in the creation of free nation-states was therefore an advance towards internationalism, even though it was made at the cost of war and the disregard of existing treaty settlements.

This may seem a mere paradox. But it is not so, as may be seen from one outstanding fact. Every scheme of a fixed international organization for the maintenance of peace has rested upon the assumption that the territorial distribution of Europe at some arbitrarily fixed date could be guaranteed as permanent. This was the basis of Sully's Grand Design at the beginning of the seventeenth century, and of St. Pierre's Project of Permanent Peace at the beginning of the eighteenth century. It was necessarily the basis also of the great experiment

of the League of Peace at the beginning of the nineteenth century, which invited every European state to guarantee the inviolability of the treaty settlement of 1815, and constituted an alliance of the Great Powers to prevent any infraction of this settlement. It is the basis, finally, of the vague proposals which President Wilson laid before the world the other day, when he proclaimed the willingness of the United States to join a League of Peace which should forbid future war by guaranteeing the permanence of the territorial arrangements to be made at the end of the present war. Now the danger of any such arrangement is that the settlement upon which it is based may not be a just or satisfactory settlement, and in that case the attempt to make it inviolable will be resented by those to whom it does injustice. This was the fate of the settlement of 1815. It broke down because it attempted to stereotype the unnatural divisions of Germany and Italy, the unnatural union of Belgium with Holland and of Norway with Sweden. Still more inevitable would have been the failure of any similar arrangement in 1713, if St. Pierre had succeeded in persuading Europe to adopt his scheme. In other words, the premature attempts at international organization which have been made in the past have failed just because the political system upon which they were based was not in accord with the requirements of the

national principle, which had not yet worked itself out. The powerful brain of Napoleon grasped this when at St. Helena he told Las Cases that Europe would only attain unity and peace when its territorial distribution had been reconstructed on national lines. For it is the national principle alone which can give a logical, satisfactory, and lasting settlement of Europe, on the basis of which an international organization can rise.

Amid all the flux and change of modern history, one of the most striking facts is the extraordinary permanence and stability of national lines of division, once they have been satisfactorily fixed. It is commonly said that the statesmen of Europe, especially in the eighteenth century, uniformly disregarded national claims and rights in their treaty arrangements. But this statement is true only in regard to those areas wherein the national principle had not yet triumphed. The real nation-states, once organized, have never had to endure the indignity of partition, not even the weakest among them. To this there are only three apparent exceptions, and they are the kind of exceptions that help to prove the rule. The first is the case of Poland. But Poland, before 1772, was far from having achieved a real national unity; and her vast territory included great areas that were not truly Polish at all. The second is the case of Schleswig-Holstein. But these two duchies

had never been incorporated in the Danish nation; Holstein was wholly, and Schleswig largely, German. The third is the case of Alsace-Lorraine. But these provinces had formed part of France for only a single century in the one case, two centuries in the other, and it was perhaps reasonable to expect that they would soon learn to accept their return to their old allegiance. And the unceasing troubles which have been caused to the annexing states in Poland, in Schleswig, and in Alsace-Lorraine all show how profitless such interferences with national lines of division always are. The unmistakable moral of modern history therefore is that national lines of division, once established, are all but indestructible; and that the national principle affords us the only lasting basis of territorial distribution upon which an international settlement can arise. Is it not, then, plain that the progressive triumph of the national principle, won as it has been by constant war, has really brought us steadily nearer to the possibility of an international organization? And is it not also plain that we cannot hope for a permanently satisfactory settlement in the future, whether on the lines of President Wilson or anybody else, unless and until the national principle has achieved its victory in those regions of Europe, notably the Balkans and the Austrian Empire, where it has not yet obtained satisfaction?

Our first conclusion, then, is that the history of modern Europe has not been the story of unrelieved anarchy described by our sentimentalists, but that it has seen the working-out of a system of nation-states which forms the only possible basis for an international organization. This process has been for the most part unconscious, and, like all political movements, it has been obscured and complicated by the aggressions and even the crimes of particular states. But it has been a real process. And during the later part of the period some states, notably France and Britain, have systematically encouraged and assisted it, not exclusively or even mainly from motives of ambition, but on the moral ground of sympathy with legitimate national aspirations.

But alongside of this great process, which was mostly unconscious, there have also been quite definite and deliberate attempts towards the organized co-operation of the independent states of the European system. There has been developed a system of international law and of international legislation. There have been continuous and not unsuccessful attempts at the co-operative settlement of common affairs. There have been progressively successful attempts to work out methods of settling international controversies otherwise than by war. And these things had gone so far that when the future historian comes to form

a judgment on the work of the century preceding the great war, he is likely to conclude that the world was rapidly advancing towards an effective international system, when its progress was suddenly arrested by the challenge of a Power which was imbued with anachronistic conceptions, and was out of touch with the real trend of civilization. For the main feature, and the most encouraging feature, of this work is that it has been done by the practical politicians who are commonly regarded as wholly free from ideals, and that it has unquestionably represented the real will and desire of nearly all peoples. Permit me from this point of view to consider, very briefly, each of the three points I have enumerated: the growth of international law, the growth of an international executive, and the growth of a quasi-judicial mode of dealing with international differences.

It is significant that the creation of the system of international law began within a century after the Reformation had ended the general recognition of the Papacy as the moral arbiter of Europe. Europe required some expression of its common moral ideas. And the strength and reality of this need was shown by the extraordinary rapidity with which the system of Grotius was adopted by all the European states. Almost from the date of the publication of the *De Jure Belli et Pacis* in 1625, its principles were generally accepted, and, what

is more, began to be applied in the courts of most nations. International law has *not* been a futile and ineffective body of theory. The greater part of it has been actually incorporated in the legal systems of the various states. The most insecure parts of it, those which tend to limit the freedom of action of states, have indeed often been the subject of dispute; but you do not dispute about the meaning of a body of law whose validity you altogether deny. And on the whole it is true that, as Vattel claimed in the eighteenth century, the nations have observed these laws even in the heat of war. The wholesale and shameless repudiation of every inconvenient restriction which has been practised by Germany during the last two years is something unparalleled since the days of Grotius. Now it is important to realize why it was that all the civilized states accepted with such readiness a body of principles which seemed to have no higher authority than that of a few eminent jurists, and which certainly rested upon no common legislative enactment. Partly the explanation is that the international jurists, in fact, largely codified existing usages, and, by giving them more exact definition, gave them also a new sanctity. But there is more in it than this. The inspiration of Grotius's system was largely drawn from the Roman *jus gentium* or *jus naturæ*. We are not here concerned to show how this Roman body of law had

grown up, and for what purposes it was devised. The main point is that it had come to claim validity as being the expression of that body of customs which is common to all peoples because they are human, of that body of moral obligations which are incumbent upon all men because they are men, and upon all states because they are human institutions. And it was largely this claim, recommended by the revered authority of Rome, the mother of Western civilization, which accounted for the rapidity with which the Grotian system was accepted. That is to say, international law came into being and was generally accepted just because the mass of men and their rulers, whatever our cynics or our sentimentalists may say, do *not* believe that states "are bound by no code of right in their relations to one another." Incidentally it is significant to note what different meanings the phrase "law of nature" bears for Treitschke and for Grotius in its application to international relations. For Treitschke it is the law of nature that weak states shall be devoured by strong states. For Grotius it is the law of nature that all states should be regarded as equal and as possessing equal rights. And it is the doctrine of Grotius that represents the persistent belief of the civilized world, though of course neither peoples nor their rulers are always able to act up to their beliefs.

The weakness of the system of international

law created by the jurists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was that it lacked the authority of any recognized legislative body, and could not easily be revised or expanded. But in the nineteenth century we have the beginning of international legislation. The Congress of 1815 definitely added to the body of international law in three respects. In the first place, it defined the rights of navigation on rivers passing through more than one state. In the second place, it prohibited the slave-trade—in rather vague terms, it is true, but they were referred to by the Congress of Berlin in 1885 as having made this trade illegal by international law. And in the third place, by guaranteeing the neutrality of Switzerland it created a new kind of security for small states. This provision, extended to Belgium in 1832-39 and to Luxemburg in 1867, was faithfully observed by all nations until 1914. Its adoption formed a remarkable proof that Europe desired the security of small states, and intended to find a means of protecting the weak against the strong. During the nineteenth century co-operative international legislation, previously unknown, has become not uncommon. The Declaration of Paris (1856) on the laws of maritime war, the Declaration of St. Petersburg (1867) against the use of explosive bullets, the Conventions of Geneva on the treatment of the wounded in war, the postal agreements of Bern,

and the regulations as to international copyright adopted at the same place, are the outstanding examples. Legislative congresses were, in fact, becoming part of the ordinary machinery of European politics during the second half of the nineteenth century; and the meeting of The Hague Convention, and its work in the codification of the laws of war, is only the culmination of a movement which had long been silently progressing. The civilized world was thus equipping itself with a rudimentary organ of international legislation, and already possessed a code of international law.

Even more striking, in some ways, has been the progress towards what may be called an international executive for the maintenance of order and peace. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries this was an aspiration continually expressed, not only by philosophers, but by practical statesmen. It is unnecessary to dwell upon the proposals which succeeded one another during these centuries, except to note that, when impartially examined, they show a gradually clearer recognition of the nature and difficulties of the problem. Even if they stood alone they would be enough to show that our cynics and our sentimentalists are wrong in supposing that Europe has not desired to escape from anarchy. But they do not stand alone. The successive congresses which followed each of the great wars of the last three

centuries, and which included on many occasions representatives of most of the European states, as at Westphalia in 1648, or repeatedly during the eighteenth century, were at least the beginning of an attempt towards the common regulation of European affairs, and they repeatedly expressed the hope that their deliberations would lead to the establishment of permanent peace. But at the beginning of the nineteenth century came the first attempt at co-operation, not merely in defining the results of war, but in preventing it for the future by consultation beforehand. It is needless here to analyze the great League of Peace of 1815, with its regular meetings of representatives of the chief Powers and its guarantee of the treaty settlement, to which it obtained the signature of every state, great or small. Its organization and the causes of its failure have been abundantly discussed, especially since the outbreak of the present war. Some have drawn, like Mr. Alison Phillips, the conclusion that no organization of this kind can ever be successful. But that is surely an illegitimate conclusion: the most that can be said is that if it is to succeed, an organization of this kind must avoid the mistakes of the statesmen of 1815, must not rest upon the treacherous ground of the inviolability of treaties, since treaties cannot be permanent unless they are just; and, above all, must have ground for assurance that the territorial distribu-

tion of Europe, is defined upon reasonably permanent lines. And when all is said, the experiment of 1815 was by no means an unqualified failure. Although the intimate co-operation of the great Allies lasted only for ten years, the habit of conference for the preservation of peace had been established: the Concert of Europe had come into being, and it never ceased wholly to work. It kept peace in Europe for over thirty years after 1815—a longer period unbroken by war than Europe had yet seen. More than once the chanceries raised the question whether a resettlement and a reorganization of the treaty system of 1815 might not be possible. Mr. Mahomed Rifaat, in investigating the career of Mehemet Ali, has found in our Foreign Office the record of one such attempt at reconstruction made in 1840; while in 1861 Napoleon III., and in 1866 Britain and France in co-operation, did their best to persuade the Powers to make another attempt. These endeavours came to nothing: indeed, any highly organized system was certain to break down while the great nationalist movements of 1850-70 were as yet unachieved. But the desire and the endeavours were there. And, ineffective instrument as it appeared, the Concert of Europe went on working even during the period of nationalist wars. It found at least a provisional settlement for the Schleswig-Holstein question in 1852; it tried to

avert the Crimean War; it brought Cavour to the verge of despair by its labours to prevent the outbreak of the Italian War of 1859; it tried to save Denmark in 1864, and to avert the Austro-Prussian War in 1866; its influence worked strongly for peace in 1870. In all these cases it had to deal with a definite Will to War, against which nothing could be done. Yet it is something that the attempt was made. And since 1870 the Concert has succeeded in giving to Europe a longer spell of peace than all her history records. It has been a restless peace, between nations armed to the teeth. But it has been peace. In any earlier age the mutual suspicions born of these swollen armaments would have led to half-accidental war long ago. But in the nineteenth century Europe had at least reached this stage, that war was not lightly risked on trifling matters, but only with the utmost deliberation, by Powers which for good reasons or bad had definitely made up their minds to wage it. We have seen, during the last decade, how war was staved off by the labours of the Concert, in 1905, in 1909, in 1911, in 1912; and we know that it would have been averted in 1914 once more, if Germany had even permitted the Concert to set to work. This at least is something. Armageddon has come; but it has come to a world most of whose responsible rulers were anxious to avoid it; it has come not, like many earlier wars, through

carelessness or frivolity, but as a deliberate and desperate challenge against the desire of the world for the organization of peace. We may fairly claim, then, that during the nineteenth century Europe had worked out the rudiments of a common executive more effective than anything that she has known since the fall of the Roman Empire.

Lastly, Europe had taken considerable steps towards the creation of a sort of judiciary, a machinery for the settlement of disputes by quasi-judicial means. This has been wholly the work of the nineteenth century, and most people do not stop to realize how real, and how steady, the progress has been. It was on the very eve of the nineteenth century, in 1794, that the first settlement of an international dispute by arbitration took place. The parties to the arbitration were Britain and America, the two states which have ever since taken the lead in this movement; and the subject was the boundary of Canada, on which war might very easily have been provoked. When this first and epoch-marking experiment was made, the great Revolutionary War had already begun, and during the next generation the example was naturally not followed. But this new idea began to bear fruit soon after the close of the Napoleonic wars, and it grew steadily in favour during the nineteenth century. Between 1820 and 1840, eight subjects of international dispute were settled by

these means; between 1840 and 1860, thirty cases; between 1860 and 1880, forty-four cases; and between 1880 and 1900, ninety cases. In this record it is worth noting that Britain comes first, America second, France third, and Germany nowhere. By the end of the nineteenth century it had become a normal and common practice for civilized states to refer disputes between them to the quasi-judicial determination of a commission of arbitration; and the importance of this development is not diminished by the obvious fact that most of the questions they settled were minor matters not likely to be made the subjects of war. For, in the first place, the nations were acquiring the habit of resorting to judicial means of settlement, and, in the second place, the removal of petty causes of friction made the settlement of graver issues easier when they arose. When, therefore, The Hague Convention of 1899 determined to establish a permanent international tribunal, or panel of arbitrators, it was not putting forward a Utopian scheme, but meeting a clear and definite need. For one of the chief difficulties in the way of arbitration had hitherto been the difficulty of constituting the arbitral authority in each case.

The fact that a recognized machinery was now available certainly contributed greatly to encourage the next remarkable stage of development. Already in 1898 Italy and the Argentine Republic

had signed a treaty whereby they undertook to submit to arbitration all controversies between them not affecting their fundamental interests or honour. These two Powers were not in any case likely to go to war, but the precedent was a striking one. In 1904 it was succeeded by a much more remarkable treaty of the same kind, between France and Britain, the two European Powers which have been most often at war during the modern age. That the civilized world was ready for this advance was very impressively demonstrated during the next six years, when more than a hundred treaties of the same type were made between various states. In 1907, at the second Hague Convention, it therefore seemed possible to secure and extend this advance by making it rest no longer upon the independent action of various states, but upon the agreement of the civilized world. Accordingly four propositions were made. In the first place, it was proposed that a general form of arbitration treaty should be drawn up, which all nations should be asked to adopt, and which should bind all to submit to arbitration questions not affecting fundamental interests or honour. The proposal was wrecked by the unbending opposition of Germany and Austria. Secondly, it was proposed that an attempt should be made to define the kinds of disputes which ought normally to be dealt with by this mode, and

a list of twenty-four issues was drawn up for discussion. Germany and Austria voted flatly against every one of the twenty-four. Thirdly, it was proposed that The Hague Tribunal should be turned from a mere panel of arbitrators into a regularly organized court. This proposal broke down largely because the smaller Powers feared that the court would be dominated by the greater Powers. Fourthly, while the Convention recognized that arbitration could only be used for minor subjects of dispute, and that no nation would submit its vital interests to the decision of a group of foreign lawyers, it was proposed that a method of averting, or at least postponing, war on graver issues should be recommended, in the form of a joint commission of inquiry, whose report the disputants should be pledged to await before taking military action. This, if loyally observed, would at least have robbed aggressive Powers of the chance of making sudden and unexpected attacks upon their destined victims. It was therefore resisted by Germany, and emerged as only a tentative and vague suggestion. But on this suggestion the United States took action, and after the Great War broke out two treaties were signed, between the United States and Britain, and between the United States and France, whereby the contracting Powers undertook not to go to war with one another even on the most vital issues until the

question in dispute had been investigated by a joint commission, which should be required to report within twelve months. Taken as a whole, this movement forms a very remarkable advance towards the substitution of judicial or quasi-judicial inquiry for the arbitrament of force in disputes between nations. And it is quite obvious that this advance represented the will not only of most of the civilized peoples, but of most of the civilized governments.

The modern age, then, has seen the development of a considerable body of international law, which has on the whole been fairly well observed; and more recently it has worked out the rudiments of an organization for international legislation. It has once made a definite attempt to set up a common controlling body for the general interests of Europe, in the League of Peace of the Great Powers in 1815; and when that broke down, it has thrice attempted to revive it, in 1840, in 1861, and in 1866. A further attempt was suggested by Sir Edward Grey in the famous despatch to Germany, in which he asserted the possibility of a general *entente* of all the Great Powers if only Germany would co-operate in averting the outbreak of the present war. And though these attempts have failed, Europe has nevertheless possessed, ever since 1815, the rudiments of a common executive in the Concert of Europe, which, in face of great difficulties,

has succeeded in preserving peace during two periods of more than thirty years each in the course of the century. Finally, Europe had gone far towards the creation of a judicial machinery for the settlement of international disputes, and it was plain that the judgment of the greater part of the civilized world was in favour of this kind of action. In face of these facts, is it not absurd, is it not dangerously and mischievously false, to assert, as our cynics and our sentimentalists alike do, that all the states of Europe have equally allowed their policy to be governed by purely Machiavellian and non-moral considerations; that Europe has presented a scene of unrelieved anarchy, wherein was perceptible no attempt towards the establishment of the reign of law; and that the average opinion of civilized humanity still believes that force and force alone must ultimately decide?

The one vital weakness in this development has been that there has been no international organization for sustaining by force the provisions of international law, for securing obedience to the commands of the international executive, or for compelling recourse to the international judiciary except when all the Great Powers were in agreement. The whole fabric has depended upon the assumption that states would abide by their treaty obligations. But, on the whole, this assumption has been justified by past history. The cases

in which states have deliberately overridden their treaty obligations have been comparatively few; there have been plenty of *charges* of breach of treaty, but it has nearly always been possible to justify the action of the peccant state by some vagueness in the definition of the treaty. And upon the whole, as Vattel claimed in the eighteenth century, the requirements of international law have been tolerably well observed, even before the period when they were embodied in clearly defined codes endorsed by all the Powers. Since the era of the Thirty Years' War it is scarcely possible to find any parallel to the flagrant and shameless disregard of treaty obligations and of the provisions of the laws of war which Germany has perpetrated during the last two years. The course of action which Germany has followed might have been designed for the express purpose of flaunting her denial and repudiation of all that has been achieved during the modern age toward establishing the reign of law in international relations; just as she has, during the decade preceding the war, proved to be the principal obstacle in the way of the triumph of this cause. What has prevented the triumph of that movement towards international co-operation, which has been growing in power and influence during three centuries, and seemed on the eve of its final victory in these last years, has been the existence in Europe of a

state governed by a belief in the doctrine of Force: a state which accepted, as no other modern state has ever done, the pestilent heresies of the cynic, and adopted that reading of history which cynic and sentimentalist alike proclaim. Such is the strength of false doctrine! Let us beware of it, whether it be proclaimed with the cynic's brutality or in the mournful accents of the disillusioned sentimentalist.

A LEAGUE OF PEACE¹

BY

SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, BART.

It is abundantly clear that the end of the present war will not bring rest, but, on the contrary, years of hard work of many kinds. Among these tasks one of the most urgent is to provide some security for Europe, and especially for the weaker nations, against wars of aggression and surprise.

The present war has made it certain that such means as exist for that purpose are insufficient. We have had treaties and guarantees, and we have seen that they do not stand in the way of an unscrupulous Government which feels strong enough to break them. We have an international court of justice at The Hague, but resort to it is merely voluntary; except so far as particular nations may be bound as between themselves by special treaties, there is no obligation to refer disputes to this or to any tribunal, and offers to

¹ A lecture given at King's College, London, on June 26, 1916. Some parts of the argument which had to be condensed in delivery are now expanded.

do so may be disregarded with impunity by any Government which judges, correctly or not, that war will be more to its interest.

People who talk of making war impossible are assuming a reform in politics and in average human character which at best it may need centuries to accomplish. But it should at any rate be possible to find some way of making violent aggression, and especially surprise attacks by one nation on another, so dangerous to the aggressor that no sane rulers, even if as little troubled by ordinary conscience as the Hohenzollerns, will be likely to take the risk.

We take the peace we enjoy within our own borders, the King's peace, as a matter of course, but it was not such a simple matter for our ancestors in the Middle Ages. A thousand years ago private warfare was still considered lawful in some circumstances, and it was by no means the King's business to keep the peace at all times or places, still less had he the means of doing so. His protection, such as it was, extended only to certain solemn seasons and to the main centres and routes of trade, besides his own immediate surroundings. Seven hundred years ago the King's peace had become general, but the means of repressing violence were exceedingly weak. In the thirteenth century our forefathers, in the face of great difficulties, established two leading principles.

First, a man may not take the law into his own hands and do himself right, or what he thinks his right, by force; and if he does use force without lawful authority, he is a wrongdoer and punishable, even if his cause was in itself just.

Secondly, all lawful men are bound to give their aid in keeping the peace and restraining unlawful violence.

By the application of these elementary rules England obtained, in the course of a few generations, not, indeed, the degree of security to which we are now accustomed—for down to the latter part of the eighteenth century no prudent man would travel without arms—but yet such security as enabled most men at most times to go about their ordinary business with reasonable confidence; and this although, down to the sixteenth century or even later, the executive power at the disposal of the law was wholly inadequate according to any modern standard.

It may be useful, then, to consider whether the like principles may not be applied to the relations between sovereign states, and whether it is beyond the bounds of reason to hope for like results. We may find some encouragement as well as some warning in an early chapter of A. W. Kinglake's *History of the Crimean War*, to which no professed writer on international law has ever given any attention so far as I know. Kinglake wished that

a wrong done to one state in the European system could be treated as a wrong done to all, and, writing a little more than half a century ago, he thought he could find evidence in modern European history of an unwritten usage or expectation that the Great Power most nearly interested should take up the matter by arms or diplomacy. Certainly the last fifty years have not shown any improvement in this respect. Kinglake's supposed usage may be said, perhaps, to have been illustrated by the action of Great Britain and Russia when France seemed to be threatened with a renewal of war in 1875; it would certainly have been violated if this country had failed to resent the invasion of Belgium in 1914. It is worth while, however, to note what a very shrewd observer of public affairs, who was anything but a faddist, thought both desirable and in a general way practicable.

At this day it is only too manifest that no mere informal understanding will suffice to restrain the warlike ambition of an unscrupulous Great Power, and the question is what kind of express provisions can be framed within a reasonable time and with a fair prospect of success.

Anything like a true federal combination of the sovereign states existing in Europe, to say nothing of America and Asia, is beyond our sight. The difficulties of devising a quasi-federal constitution

for the British Empire alone (and I qualify the epithet advisedly) will be quite enough for this generation, though in my judgment they are not insuperable.

Some persons appear to think that the Concert of nations, when established, must have some kind of independent armed force at its disposal. The political and technical obstacles to setting up a cosmopolitan navy and army, making them subject to uniform command and discipline, and preventing them, if they really become effective, from being captured by some military adventurer and made the instrument of a new despotism, are so great, it is submitted, as to be prohibitive.

Other publicists assume that an international league of peace must include all the principle states of Europe. If this were so, we should have a long time indeed to wait. For Germany, as guided by her present rulers, persistently refused before the war to entertain any proposals for establishing a true international jurisdiction having power to compel the submission of disputes to its tribunal; and it is improbable, to say the least, that the Governments of Germany and of her Allies, or what may be left of them, will be in a more pliable temper when the war is over. If it be said that adherence to such a league might be one of the conditions of peace, the answer is that a consent so obtained would be worthless. From

the German point of view it would be an undertaking given under compulsion, and therefore might lawfully be repudiated at any convenient moment; and in any case a partner coming in under such conditions would not be a pleasant or profitable partner to work with. Certainly the ideal of a league for the preservation of peace is that all Powers of considerable military strength should be parties. But so long as this is not attainable, there is no reason why an effective majority should not serve. A league so composed would have, no doubt, to be armed against any attack from the dissentient Power or minority of Powers, and vigilant against the intrigues that would almost certainly be employed in the hope of breaking up its union. These are drawbacks which must be confessed: but even with them the state of a united and preponderant majority of civilized Powers would be far better than if they had only special and partial alliances to put their trust in. If such a league could stand firm, say for a generation, the recalcitrant Powers would come to see that they gained nothing by remaining outside.

I will proceed to state the conditions, as they appear to me, which may be necessary and sufficient to provide a tolerable working security for the general peace; and it is well to observe, and indeed insist, that I am advocating little or nothing that

is in itself novel. The points are put in my own way, and their connection and relative importance considered with special regard to the present necessity; but I believe that the substance of all or most of them is to be found among the contents of schemes already made public or privately circulated. In particular I am in close agreement with Mr. Taft, formerly President of the United States, whose excellent paper, entitled "United States' Supreme Court the Prototype of a World Court," appeared last year in the Proceedings of the American Society for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes.¹

For greater clearness I will set down my outline in the present tense, as if the proposed League were already formed.

The constituent nations of the League of Peace are bound jointly and severally to defend every one of the members against external attack.

As between themselves members are bound to refer disputes, according to the nature of the case, to a judicial tribunal or to a board of conciliation.

(The constitution of the court for "justiciable" and the board for "non-justiciable" cases are matters of a rather technical kind on which I do not dwell here. It may be considered an open question how far the machinery of the existing

¹ No. 21, May, 1915: Baltimore, U. S. A. (Address before the World Court Congress at Cleveland, Ohio.)

Hague Tribunal is suitable for the purpose. There would be some advantage, however, in the judicial body being a committee of a larger standing council; either a somewhat larger committee or the whole council might act as a board of conciliation. Recognition of the difference in principle between matters of dispute reducible to definite issues—questions of boundaries, or on the construction of treaties, for example—and matters not so reducible, being grounded in policy and moral claims rather than in positive right, is important, and has been insisted on by almost all those who have recently discussed the subject: most fully and forcibly, I think, by Mr. Taft.)

If any member of the League commits hostile acts against another without having duly submitted the case in dispute for settlement, the member so offending is thereby in a state of war with the whole League.

The same consequence follows if a member in whose favour an award has been given against another attempts to enforce it without the express further authority of the League.

(I do not mean that it would be desirable as a rule to give the conduct of executive proceedings to the state directly interested, but it might sometimes be necessary.)

Refusal to give effect to an award of the court, or vexatious delay in performing it, is dealt with

so far as practicable by measures of commercial restraint, but military force may be employed in the last resort.

The League maintains a common General Staff for the direction of such concerted employment of force as may be required.

(Some such provision appears necessary to secure prompt action in an emergency. Promptitude is essential, in order that any unlawful enterprise may be crushed at the outset.)

The standing council considers the written rules of international law, and from time to time submits sections of the work, as agreed upon after full discussion, to the Governments of the constituent nations. If, and so far as, the council does not within six months of promulgation receive a dissent in writing from any of those Governments, the section so laid before them, or so much of it as is not affected by any dissent, becomes binding on the League.

(This method of provisional legislation confirmed by tacit acceptance is quite familiar to us in this country in the shape of Orders in Council, and in some cases departmental orders made under the authority of various Acts of Parliament, which are laid before Parliament for a certain time and take full effect if neither House objects to them. There would be no great harm in extending the period of probation to twelve months; but, as the

preliminary discussion would be well known, six months might well be enough. Discussion should take place in a fairly large conference or committee but the formulation of the resolutions finally arrived at should be in the hands of a small number of expert draftsmen. It is a matter of detail whether the discussing body should be the council itself, or a standing committee of it, or a convention of specially chosen delegates.)

Reduction of armaments, which so far has not proved attainable by the resources of diplomacy or the debates of peace conferences, would naturally follow in course of time, as the danger of war diminished. In this country private citizens were never forbidden to carry arms, but they left off doing so when there was found to be no use for them in the ordinary course of life. Some persons have proposed to forbid or severely restrict the manufacture of arms and munitions of war by private firms; there is nothing in this incompatible with the proposals made above, but I think such a measure would be open to grave objection as imposing an undue burden on the smaller states and increasing their difficulties in providing for self-defence. The conventions of The Hague as to the regulation of warfare should certainly be restored and strengthened, I hope by a more practical procedure than that of The Hague Conferences, and definite penalties ordained for wilful defiance of

them. But this is only an alleviation of war, and has no power to remove its causes or to deter would-be aggressors.

On the whole, we cannot expect, as I said at the beginning, to make war impossible, but we may reasonably expect to make frivolous wars all but impossible, and wars of sudden aggression so dangerous to any Power undertaking them that they will not be undertaken.

It is not necessary to the working of a League of Peace that the United States and at least the chief South American nations should be parties, but it seems very desirable. The prospects of success would be much greater, and there would be much less plausible excuse for refusal to join, if the United States took the first steps towards the formation of such a league.

INTERSTATE RELATIONS AFTER THE WAR¹

BY

PHILIP KERR

THESE lectures have, I believe, been arranged with the purpose of concentrating public attention upon the ulterior ends for which we entered the war. At the present time people are so absorbed and so rightly absorbed, in the task of defeating the German attempt to create a despotism over Europe that they have little time to think of how that better world, which will result from an Allied victory, is to be constituted. Yet it is manifestly desirable that we should, from time to time, give some thought to this question, if only to remind us that we are fighting for a new civilization, and not simply to grind an enemy in the dust.

Before going on, however, to deal with this question, it is necessary, I think, to realize the contrast between the international ideals of Germany and ourselves, for it is largely by such a contrast that

¹Lecture (revised) delivered at King's College, London, July 3, 1916.

we shall see clearly the goal at which we aim. We are here at the very outset, however, faced by a difficulty. It is not easy to be certain that we are appraising correctly the ideals and purpose of Germany. We all know how far from the truth are many German estimates of our motives in this war. We all know how absurd is the common German view that we entered the war through jealousy of Germany, and because we hoped to throttle a powerful commercial rival. And what is true of us is no less true of the Germans. It is all nonsense to suppose that the Germans are a nation of savages, animated solely by the passion for plunder, conquest, and power. If that were all they would not be a difficult proposition to handle. But the broad truth is clear. The Germans have been fighting, not for loot, but for an idea—an idea which grips their minds and consciences, which drives them into brutality and frightfulness, but which also makes them endure the terrific discipline and sacrifices which it has already exacted from them in this war. What is that idea?

It is difficult to define, for it is a complex product. But, briefly, it has been an intense belief on the part of the dominant and dynamic section of the German people in their own view of life, in their own methods of government and organization, in the benefits which would follow for the whole world if they were made to prevail, and in their

own mission as the champions and apostles of a new Kultur. They have contrasted the slovenly methods of democracy, the disunity and disorder of Europe and the world, the poverty and slackness of the rest of mankind, with the order and discipline and efficiency of modern Germany, and they have had not the slightest doubt that Germanism was infinitely superior, and consequently must prevail. As I understand it, German Kultur assumes that man is not born free, but acquires freedom by being organized into efficiency and usefulness by the state. The state, indeed, precedes the citizen, and, so to speak, creates him. The ultimate vision of the neo-Prussians is not so much the universal domination of the existing Germany, as the triumph of the Prussian idea in the minds of men, so that eventually the world will be organized in one vast symmetrical state, to which every individual will owe implicit obedience, and which will provide for the material, intellectual, and æsthetic wants of all, and will allocate a specific sphere of usefulness to all.

Now that idea, so stated, is no mere predatory vision. It calls forth a responsive echo in all our minds. It provides for human unity. It is based upon active work and active service of others. It is thorough, it is efficient, it would obviously give peace, and a good subsistence, as well as such amenities as punctual railways, good opera, and

first-rate education to all mankind. It overcomes what all of us now recognize to have been the slovenly, undisciplined, and selfish want of unity of the democratic world before the war. And there is manifestly no insuperable obstacle in the way of carrying it into effect if people were willing to accept it. Prussia put an end to the chaos and disorder of the German confederation on these lines. It is now preparing to organize Central Europe—Mittel Europa—on the same principles. At the beginning of the war it saw nothing impossible in eventually organizing the whole world in the same way. Why do we reject the Prussian ideal with such decision, and why are we willing to make such supreme sacrifices to resist it being imposed upon us? We reject it not because of the unity and thoroughness and order which it would introduce into human affairs, but because of the methods by which the believer in Prussianism proposes to bring these improvements about, and because we believe that the same ends can be better attained in other ways. For what the Prussian relies upon is not the capacity of the individual to choose the right thing for himself and then do it, but the organization of a number of conscript minds in blind submission to a vast autocratic machine. The essence of the Prussian view is not new. It long preceded Bismarck. It is to be found clearly enforced in Fichte's letters

Interstate Relations after the War 145

written to the German people a hundred years ago. First of all is the belief in the pre-eminence of German Kultur:

“Races yet unborn implore you, the stranger in far-off lands entreats you; they and all the ages of humanity throughout the future have faith in you, and implore you to guard against any possibility that in the great confederation of a new humanity the member which is the most essential of all to its existence should disappear; they must not search for you in vain when they need your counsels, your example, your help. . . . You it is to whom among all modern nations the seeds of human perfection have been entrusted, and to whom has been given the first place in developing them. If you succumb, humanity succumbs with you and all hope of any future renovation will be lost.”

Then comes the explanation of the means by which it is to be made to prevail.

“To impose on other men a state of Right, to forcibly place on their necks the yoke of Right, is not only the right, but the sacred duty of every man who has the power and knowledge to do so. When the necessity arises, one man has the right to impose his will on all mankind; for in all matters opposed to right, its rights or liberty are absolutely non-existent.”

With that tradition behind them, was it not inevitable that the united professors of Germany

should have declared in October of 1914: "We are absolutely convinced that the future of all European Kultur depends upon the victory of our militarism"?

The essence of our rejection of Germanism, indeed, lies in those last words. We reject it because it involves that combination of autocracy and conscription which is the root of all political evil in Europe to-day, inasmuch as it delivers a people trained for war, bound hand and foot, into the hands of a small hereditary class. We reject it because it preaches obedience, not responsibility, and compels a whole people to surrender their consciences nominally into the hands of the state, but actually into the hands of those who can seize control of its machinery. We reject it because it cuts at that individual independence and character which is the sole guardian of morality and justice in public affairs. We reject it because not only does it break the spirit and destroy the liberty of its own devotees, but because it can extend its sway over others only by violence and war.

It is not enough, however, merely to point out the defects of the German solution of the political world problem. It is necessary to have a positive solution of our own. Otherwise, even if we are completely victorious, we shall drift back, as we did after 1815, to the mere balance of power, with

its endless competition of armaments, and its inevitable sequel in Armageddon. In fact, we may as well admit at once that if the active responsibility for the war rests on Germany, the passive responsibility for not taking steps to prevent it rests upon the rest of the civilized world, including ourselves.

It is perfectly obvious that there was something wrong with all nations before the war. If that had not been so, there would have been no war. The root of the trouble, to my mind, lay in an excessive nationalism. Nationalism has its good side. It is the manifestation of self-reliance in a people previously acquiescent in the arbitrary rules of others, or in facts as they are. It is, in its beginnings, often the awakening of conscience and public service. Nationalism freed Europe from Napoleon. Nationalism united Italy. Nationalism is one of the foundations on which a future federation of the British Empire must be built. But in recent years it has often grown into a veritable curse. Take the recent history of the Balkan states. In 1912 nationalism gave the Balkan peoples the nerve and courage and unity necessary to overthrow the paralyzing Turkish rule in Macedonia. In 1913, instead of leading on to a federation, in which all races had equal rights and equal liberty, it drove them into a merciless and fratricidal civil war. And nationalism is obviously the

principle of estrangement and war in the world today. The world, indeed, would present a spectacle to a visitor from Mars not very different to that presented by the Balkans to us in 1913.

The evil in nationalism is obviously an excessive egotism—an excessive concentration on one's own interests, or ideas, or desires, or civilization, with its correlative ignorance or disregard of the needs and ideals of others. Selfishness among nations, indeed, produces exactly the same effects as selfishness among individuals. It produces discontent, envy, hatred, and so war. This nationalist bigotry takes two forms. There is the form manifested by Germany, which has just been described—the desire to impose one's own will and kultur on others, if need be by force. There is also another form, that of indifference to others—the form expressed at the beginning of biblical history in the words, "Am I my brother's keeper?" and more recently by Canning in 1823, "Every nation for itself and God for us all." It was this latter more insidious form of nationalism which dominated all the democratic world before the war.

Now the consequence of national egotism is that everybody loses sight of the fundamental fact of the international situation, that humanity is in essence a family—a family divided, it is true, by race and language, religion and civilization, but

still a great family of human beings, alike in the endowments of the human mind and in the eternal impulses of the human heart. And it is not until we return to this principle that we really get daylight on to the problem of reorganizing the world and preventing war after this war. When we think of the world, not as a number of organized states labelled Germany and England and Russia and America and Japan, each necessarily striving, in constant friction with its neighbours, for place and privilege and power, for colonies, or trade, but as consisting of Germans and Englishmen and Russians and Americans and Japanese, etc., all living in one country, the earth, and all concerned to make that earth a better place for all to live in, we begin to see the problem in its true perspective. We see on the one hand that the idea that the world can be made peaceful and happy on the principle of "every nation for itself and the devil take the hindmost" is one illusion, and that the Prussian belief that it can be united and contented on the principle that one race should impose its ideas by force on all the rest is another. We see that we shall only begin to progress if, while every civilized nation is left free to work out its own internal salvation for itself, it combines actively with all other civilized nations in conducting the common affairs of the world for the benefit of all. That is the essential condition of improve-

ment and progress towards peace. We are at war at this moment because the non-German world never really faced the international problem. If all the great civilized nations had insisted in examining Germany's claims in an international conference when her armaments began to be a serious menace to peace, I don't believe this war would ever have taken place. They might have been able to meet her desires in certain respects, but they would have realized that her full aims were inconsistent with their own liberty, and have combined to take effective action to maintain liberty and public right in the world. But they preferred the policy of drift, of *laissez faire*, until it was too late, until the only way left of remedying the situation was that most of them should incur the terrific sacrifices to this war in order to restore liberty to the world.

I believe that most thinking men now agree that we can never go back to the *status quo*. Sir Edward Grey, in one of his last telegrams to Germany, suggested a system of European guarantees. Mr. Asquith, in one of his first speeches, defined our aim in the war as the establishment "of a real European partnership based upon the recognition of equal rights, and established and enforced by a common will." And later on—in April last—he said that "the purpose of the Allies in the war is to defeat the attempt (of the Germans to

dictate to Europe under threat of war), and thereby pave the way for an international system which will secure the principle of equal rights for all civilized states." At the same time he indicated the method by which it was to be attained. "As the result of the war," he said, "we intend to establish the principle that international problems must be handled by free negotiation on equal terms between free peoples." This, indeed, is the alternative which the war, forcing us to abandon the dream that we could drift to universal peace, has driven us to put forward in opposition to the German idea. According to the Germans unity and peace are to be imposed upon the world by the military power of a single dominant state or group of states. According to our ideas, to quote Mr. Asquith once more, it must come as the outcome of the "enthronement of public right," as a "concrete and achieved reality," through the general consent of the civilized world.

Now what does that mean? That is the whole crux of the problem. I do not propose to attempt to go into detail here tonight. - I intend simply to advance a few leading ideas. But I believe that having enunciated a principle of settlement as our leaders have done, it behoves us to give a little thought to what it implies, and not drift along a tide of shifts and makeshifts until we get into a hopeless mess again. How, then, are we to

establish an international system securing the rights of nations by general consent?

Before coming to any positive proposals, I would like to criticize briefly certain ideas which already hold the field.

There is, first of all, the idea that progress towards peace lies along the line of extending the use of arbitration or conciliation. I believe that this road is a blind alley, even if there is added, as some suggest, a guarantee of the Great Powers to enforce the arbitral award. Arbitration is in itself an inadequate method of dealing with international disputes. It works well enough in minor matters, such as the interpretation of treaties, or in disputes over the rights of individuals. But it cannot suffice in matters of first-class importance. Should we agree, for instance, to refer the size of our fleet to The Hague tribunal, or could we reasonably expect Germany to do the same with her army? Would America refer to an arbitral court her Monroe Doctrine, or Japan or the British Dominions the difficult problems connected with immigration? I am certain they would not. And they would be right not to do so, for these and similar international questions which occasion war are not judicial questions; they are political questions, and they must be settled by political means. Nobody suggests that we should ask the Chief Justice and a panel of Judges to settle the

Home Rule question, or to decide when we should make peace, or to determine whether or not Imperial Federation was a good thing, or to reconstruct the Capital and Labour system. That is not the function of a law court, and if an attempt were made to impose such a duty on the law courts, it would simply destroy their character as law courts and convert them into minor Parliaments. The function of the law court is not to make the law, but to interpret it, and apply it to the practical affairs of life. It is the same with arbitration. An arbitral court cannot make the law in matters of first-class importance. It can only apply a principle of settlement already agreed on to the practical facts. The principle of settlement itself must be laid down by plenipotentiaries of the nations concerned, and that is not arbitration.

Secondly, there is the proposal, popular in America, for the constitution of a League of Nations to enforce peace, which means that all nations should combine against any nation which had resort to warlike measures without first submitting its case to arbitration or to the consideration of a conference of the civilized Powers. I do not believe that this system will work, either. When things have reached the verge of war, it is often too late for conciliation to work. And when the case did come up it would be hopelessly

mixed up with the conflicting national interests of the participant Powers, as was the case in the conferences over the Balkans in 1912 and 1913. And if one of the parties took the law into its own hands, because it believed it could not get justice in any other way, the others would almost certainly never combine to coerce it. They could not ignore the merits of the case in dispute, and if it was the side which they thought right which took the law into its own hands, they would refuse to move. And even if they were doubtful about the merits of the case, they would probably, when it came to the point, refuse to go to war on the simple ground that if the prevention of war is the only object in view, it was absurd to start by making the war a general war instead of a local war. The truth is that nations will never go to war for the sake of peace alone. They will only incur the stupendous sacrifices and risks of war in self-defence or in defence of right and liberty.

Then there is the common proposal for the creation of some form of international government. Whatever the far future may bring forth, that proposal will certainly not come to fruition in our time. For if it means anything it means that a body representative of all the civilized Powers should not only have power to make laws for the world, but should alone control organized military force with which to enforce the laws. In other

words, a body in which each nation would be utterly outvoted by other nations, would have absolute power over the more important aspects of national and world development. No nation would or could agree to this so long as nations vary in the level of civilization and liberty as much as they do today. Moreover, apart from all other difficulties connected with the relative representation of large states and small states, backward peoples and advanced peoples, how can we find a method of constituting such a government at all, so long as the world is divided into democracies and autocracies? Will the Emperors of Russia or Germany, who are absolute in their own countries, allow themselves to be bound by international laws framed by their own subjects? In the long run, it is true, the creation of a world-state is the only cure for war, but before that comes within view a majority of the civilized states of the world must reach something like the same point of progress in their laws and principles of political conduct. When they have done that, but not before, will the civilized peoples be willing to merge themselves into one world-state, whose parliament shall be the ultimate law-giver and peace-preserver for mankind.

If none of these ideas will work, is there any practical road left? I believe there is. It will not bring the millennium at once. It is slow, but

it is also sure. It is the road of gradually extending the scope of international treaties to cover all the matters which cause war, and of securing the signature of all civilized Powers to these treaties on the specific understanding that it commits them to enforcing respect for them. If we cannot agree to create an international government, we can, I think, agree upon the rules which should govern the conduct of nations in their relations to one another, and bind ourselves to respect those rules and to defend them when challenged. The real road towards lasting peace, to my mind, is gradually to build up a Magna Charta of international right, protecting the liberties and rights of all nations, and backed by the preparedness and determination of the civilized world. What we want is not a League of Peace, or a League to enforce Peace, but a League to enforce Right, as defined by general consent.

It is obvious, however, that this right must be something very different from international law as it stands today. International law, indeed, is not at all.¹ Law is an enactment of sovereignty with power behind it, and there is no international

¹ It is only called law because in English the word "law" is used to denote two different ideas, represented in Latin by the words *jus* and *lex*, in French by *droit* and *loi*, in German by *Recht* and *Gesetz*. A better term would be "international right."

sovereign body, nor can there be, till all mankind is united into one world-state whose laws every individual is in duty bound to obey. Therefore, there can be no international law in the strict sense of the word. But not only is so-called international law not true law, but it does not cover the subject-matter of war. It deals with ceremonial, the rights of individual nationals, the rights and duties of neutrals and belligerents, but it leaves such matters as national liberty, the right to trade, the open door, immigration, the freedom of the land and of the seas, which are the matters which nations fight about, severely alone. It thereby abdicates the primary function of law. For the primary function of law is to prevent resort to methods of violence, by prescribing the principle of justice in accordance with which disputes are to be settled. So-called international law, indeed, by attempting to regulate war, while doing nothing effective to prevent it, is far more a war-book of the nations, laying down rules for belligerents and neutrals to observe, than a code of laws. Any attempt, therefore, to promote peace by insisting on a literal observance of existing international codes would simply defeat the end in view. The most probable result of a blind attempt to enforce existing international *law* would be to defeat international *right*. The treaty neutralizing Belgium, for instance, was not part

of international law because it had not received the assent of all nations. Under existing international law, therefore, Germany might have violated Belgium without breach of law, while the Allies might have been driven to acts clearly contravening the rights of neutrals, under that law, as the only method of preventing the creation of a German despotism over Europe.

The first step forward, therefore, is not to enforce existing international law (so-called), but to formulate, by agreement between civilized nations, treaties of international right covering all the most important causes of dispute between nations. Is it possible to lay down the national rights which must thus be secured under treaties of public right? I suggest that at present there are five matters which, if the principle on which they were to be handled could be formulated by agreement, and were universally respected, would enormously diminish the chances of war, if they did not eliminate it altogether. The first is that every state should be assured of its territorial integrity so long as it respected the liberty and rights of other states, and was able to maintain a civilized standard of government within its own borders. Secondly, that while every state should be free to protect its own industries, there should be equal opportunities for fair trade for all nations all over the world; that is to say, that there should

be something like the universal open door for fair trading. Thirdly, that there should be no interference in time of peace with the transit of goods and persons all over the world, by land or sea. Fourthly, that while every state should retain the right of determining what peoples should be admitted as permanent settlers and citizens, there should be unhindered entry and movement for students, travellers, and merchants of all nations, subject to such regulations as may be necessary to prevent evasion of the laws regulating the acquisition of the right of permanent domicile. Fifthly, that where a civilized people has taken charge of the government of a people politically backward, it should fulfil its functions properly as a trustee both for the peoples it governs and for the rest of the civilized world.

I do not suggest that the formulation of public right in all these matters is within our immediate reach. I gravely doubt it. The practical difficulty always is to avoid making agreements which will tie the hands of the pacific and treaty-respecting Powers, thereby giving an unnecessary advantage to the lawless Power in preparing to overthrow right and liberty. I merely put these suggestions forward because I am certain that the road of advance is to tackle in international conference the fundamental international problems, and to try to find solutions for them in accordance with the

principles of justice defined in treaties, and not in accordance with the balance of armaments. We shall certainly make no progress whatever towards peace by talking about peace, without at the same time tackling the real causes of war. The example of The Hague Conferences, which met to discuss the best way of promoting international peace, but were forbidden to discuss "political questions"—*i.e.*, the causes of war—is a sufficient warning. As was practically inevitable, all they did was to succumb to the old fallacy which declares that the best way to prevent crime is to handcuff the policeman, of which the Declaration of London is the most glaring example.

On the other hand, while the formulation of public right on all the most important international questions is going to be a difficult and slow business, a practical beginning is not so far off as we might think. Take the first of the five subjects mentioned above—national liberty. The civilized world is now pretty well agreed that any lasting peace must be based upon adequate security for the liberty of civilized states. In the past national liberty has been secured by two main international instruments. The first was the neutralization of Belgium. So long as Belgium was independent and inviolable, liberty in Western Europe was secure, because it was practically impossible for France permanently to dominate

Germany, or Germany permanently to dominate France. How effective a safeguard this neutralization of Belgium has been shown by the fact that when Germany set out to establish a permanent military preponderance in Europe, she was driven to violate the Belgian treaty. The second great security of national liberty has been the Monroe Doctrine, which secures national liberty in South and Central America, at any rate against interference from Europe. The first of these safeguards had behind it the signatures of four great European Powers, and Belgium itself was pledged to defend its own neutrality. The second has had behind it the arms and honour of the United States. If these or some similar safeguards of national liberty, supplemented, perhaps, by the neutralization of some equivalent pivotal area in Eastern Europe, were combined, under the guarantee of all these Powers, national liberty would be practically inviolable both in Europe and America, and the danger of wars such as the present would disappear as long as the signatory nations were ready to live up to their obligations. Further, it is well to remember that the treaty of peace itself will be a most important element in the body of public right, because, if the Allies win, it will be the security for liberty in Europe.

The practical road of advance, therefore, the practical outcome also of our entry into the war

and of the declarations of Mr. Asquith and Sir Edward Grey, is the gradual formulation of treaties of public right, covering not the unessentials now the subject-matter of international law (so called), but the fundamental problems of international relations, and the assumption of the obligation by all civilized nations of the duty of enforcing respect for public right so defined at any cost to themselves. We must get away from the futile methods of the pacifists who talk peace but ignore the causes of war. We know now that the right way is to formulate just law and have strong policemen, adequately trained and armed. We must get away also from the specious allurements of internationalism. The secret of peace is the reign of law, and the reign of law is the creation of the state. We shall do no good, therefore, by weakening allegiance to the state, or encouraging disobedience to its laws. We must rather strengthen and perfect the life of the state, and learn to preserve peace in the interstate sphere by settling disputes more and more in accordance with the principle of justice, formulated by treaty, and less and less in accordance with the balance of force, until, in the far future, when the laws of all states are equally just and civilized, it will be possible for their peoples to end war by merging into one world-state. We must get away also from the belief in a limitation of armaments as a

panacea. That also is dealing with effects and not causes. Reduction in armaments will follow the constitution of effective safeguards for public right and the relaxation of international tension which will ensue. It cannot precede it, for armaments are the only method of defending their own rights which sovereign states possess, so long as they act on the principle that states have obligations only to themselves. Moreover, even if an agreement of limitation could be drawn up, it could not last, because if a single Power were left out, or refused to abide by its terms, every other Power would be forced to modify their programs in self-defence.

The practical essence of the international problem is to substitute a combination of civilized Powers to uphold public right, as defined by general consent, for the present dangerous and illusory safeguards of the Balance of Power. By no ingenuity can we escape that fundamental truth. Law prevails within the state because it has irresistible force behind it—the force, first of all, of public opinion, and, in the last resort, of the armed action of the whole community against the law-breaker. It is the same in the international sphere. While there can never be a true reign of law between states, there will be an ever-increasing reign of right, in proportion as a larger and larger proportion of the civilized nations come

to realize that the best protection of their own rights and liberties is maintenance of respect for public right, and have joined hands with others in formulating that public right and in undertaking the preparations necessary to enable them to enforce respect for it. The creation of a system of public right on these lines is, I believe, the logical sequence of the vindication of the principle for which we entered the war. And to those who doubt whether the conscience and public spirit of mankind is sufficient to create and maintain effectively such a system, I would point to the evidence of this war. It is not for nothing that Belgium sacrificed herself on the altar of treaty obligations, or that 5,000,000 British citizens have flocked from the ends of the earth to give their lives and their substance in defence of national liberty and of public right.

THE OUTLOOK OF A GOOD EUROPEAN¹

BY

A. F. WHYTE, M.P., LIEUT. R.N.V.R.

THE general aim of this movement is the establishment of a European partnership to displace the Balance of Power, and thus to place the peace of Europe on a foundation more secure than the precarious equilibrium of armed force. The arguments in support of this policy have been already presented in the lectures of my predecessors in this chair, and its desirability is admitted. It is therefore no part of my aim either to rehearse or to reinforce the pleas in its favour, but rather to examine the more immediate political and racial problems of the war. But before I pass to them I propose to take a glance at the Balance of Power itself.

As an international doctrine the Balance of Power has a long and chequered history. It is defined as "a phrase in international law for such a just equilibrium between the members of the

¹ Lecture delivered at King's College, London, on July 10, 1916.

family of nations as should prevent any one of them from becoming sufficiently strong to enforce its will upon the rest." In its essence no more than a precept of common sense born of experience and of the instinct of self-preservation, it has nevertheless often been made to serve as the pretext for wars which were neither necessary nor just. And so it has fallen into disrepute among pacifically-minded democrats, who are prone to quote John Bright's violent phrase as a final judgment upon it. In many minds it has no better meaning than that of the facile gibe to which the British pursuit of the Balance of Power has given rise, that the enemy of yesterday becomes the friend of today, and the friend of today the enemy of tomorrow. But it is plain that an instrument must be judged not by its misuse, but by its proper use. And if we pierce beneath the superficial crust of prejudice which covers it, we shall find reasons of great substance to persuade us that the Balance of Power, despite all that can be said against it, has been, and may still be, an engine of European welfare. As Professor Alison Phillips says in an all too brief note on the subject,¹ the Balance of Power "became an axiom of political science . . . and formed the basis of the coalitions against Louis XIV. and Napoleon." And today, we may add, it is performing its his-

¹ *Encyclopædia Britannica*, eleventh edition.

toric function in a new coalition against a new and formidable aggressor. Judged by the results of its operation in these three supreme crises of European history, it is seen to be a bulwark of European liberty: and until a better international system takes its place, it is little short of treason to Europe to undermine it. "In the absence of any central authority, the only sanction behind the code of rules established by custom or defined in treaties, known as 'International Law,' is the capacity of the Powers to hold each other in check. Were this to fail, nothing could prevent any state sufficiently powerful from ignoring the law and acting solely according to its convenience and interests." Until a better sanction is established in the form of an international authority which shall be the law-giver of Europe, we must maintain the Balance of Power as the upholder of the rights of nations.

To this argument our enemies reply by impugning the sincerity of our motives. They say, in effect: "The enforcement of public right is only a veil for British interests. It is all very well for you, the older nations full of territories and wealth, to proclaim your satisfaction with the world as it is and to resist change. You are satiated. But since you won your great empires by force, we claim the right to test by force your power to hold what you have won." And some of our own

pacifists have made the same charge of hypocrisy against us by scoffing at our championship of small nations, and by declaring that, with the Boer War as an accusing crime behind us, we cannot profess a true sympathy with the little peoples of the world. The plea is wholly disingenuous. No one will pretend that the history of the British Empire is not marred by episodes of shame, but still less can any honest man close his eyes to the fact that these very episodes have taught us the lesson that adult nations are ungovernable except by their own will. We have learned this truth, and are even now painfully applying it to the one outstanding difficulty in the British Commonwealth. Germany has not learned it: nor Austria-Hungary, nor Turkey. And what is much more significant and depressing is that the dominant races in the Quadruple Alliance of our enemies—the Prussian, the Magyar, and the Turk—do not wish to learn it. Hence this war.

In this collision of opinion is the clue to the true settlement: and the British people has not been slow to take it up. No Prime Minister has ever spoken more truly the mind of the nation than Mr. Asquith did in his speeches at the Mansion House and in Dublin, when he proclaimed the resolve of the Allies to enthrone the idea of public right in Europe and to preserve the little peoples of the world from the aggression of powerful neighbours.

The Outlook of a Good European 169

The declaration of this twofold aim is a statement of principles which can only be fully understood after a detailed examination of their application to the political and racial problems of Europe. The idea of such an examination is not exactly congenial to the British mind. For, on the one hand, our insular position has kept us remote from the complications of continental politics, and, on the other, our fierce preoccupation in the business of war has bred in us the opinion that the defeat of Germany is the sum of our desires.

“There is no popular demand anywhere outside Germany for a definition of the objects of the war, for the simple reason that the people know what they are fighting for without being told. They are fighting to beat Germany; and they have a profound instinctive appreciation of the entire sufficiency of that purpose. How, when it is achieved, its achievement is to be expressed in the terms of peace is a quite subsidiary question in which (apart from the single unanimous demand for a full indemnity to Belgium) comparatively little interest, we believe, is taken by the public of this country.”¹

This is a true saying: and in nothing is it truer than in the assertion that the British people is not deeply concerned about the specific “terms” of peace. The common man says to himself, “Every-

¹ *New Statesman*, November 27, 1915.

thing will come right when we beat Germany." Now the defeat of Germany is certainly an end in itself. It is a great measure of relief for Europe. But it is not *the* end. Everything will not come right unless we will it so: and we cannot will it so unless we explore the way beforehand. Therefore the deliberate study of the specific results of the war is a manifest duty. The peoples and frontiers of Europe are before us: what will we make of them?

Now it is no use professing humility and pretending that it is presumptuous to embark on such a task. The war has forced us to take an interest in these large questions: and victory will compel us to find the right answers to them. Upon the proper answers depends the whole success of our dream of a new Europe where co-operation and not conflict is the dominant note. Failure today only means that the task of finding these true answers will be handed on to our children, who will have to pay their price in turn for the apathy and blindness of their parents. Nor can we leave these destinies solely in the hands of the Foreign Office and its diplomatists. In the past the official world has always been slow to understand the meaning of national movements, especially slow to appreciate how ungovernable and irresistible a thing nationality becomes when placed in the conditions in which Lombardy and Venice were under

The Outlook of a Good European 171

Austrian rule, in which Bohemia and Dalmatia are under Austrian rule, in which Croatia, Slavonia, and Transylvania are under Magyar rule. If Piedmont had relied on the abiding sense of justice in the Chancelleries of Europe, Italian unity would still be a dream: and today the subject races of Europe by a sure instinct appeal to the free peoples over the heads of their Governments to stand by them in their hour of need and hope. It is not necessary to recite at length the means by which the nations of Europe achieved their unity and independence in order to show that Great Britain has a special responsibility in this liberation. The Gladstonian tradition is still alive in the British people, though it has no upholder in the British Government; and it can be used—it certainly ought to have been used in one notorious instance in the war—to cement a new alliance between these islands and the little peoples of Europe.

The appeal of the oppressed races cannot fall on deaf ears: nor can a nation such as ours, hearing the appeal and possessing the power of redress, stand aside and make the great refusal. It is precisely in this region that our real opportunity lies. This is our mission, whose achievement will show that democracy is not a mere dream, but a fact against which all the frightfulness and efficient ruthlessness of autocracy cannot prevail. But if in the very

heat and height of war, if in the deep, fierce pre-occupation of victory, we forget that peace has her tasks of preparation no less than war, we shall be in danger of losing what we are fighting for. We may go further, and say that unless we prepare ourselves now for the constructive tasks of the settlement, we may as well stop fighting, and confess that while democracy in Western Europe is prepared to undergo the trials and dangers of a tremendous war and to make the difficult military preparation for victory, she is not prepared to embark on the more difficult, more thankless, but to a democracy more appropriate, task of equipping herself politically for the reconstruction of Europe on the generous lines of nationality, liberty, and justice. I do not suggest that political pre-occupation with the affairs of Europe should divert the attention of the people from the grave problems of its own domestic and imperial future: but I do suggest that we need to lay emphasis on the fatal reaction which a false European settlement will have upon the development of the British Commonwealth. The risk of such a false peace is greatly enhanced by the insular detachment of Great Britain from many of the most vital continental problems.

Broadly speaking, the task is the study of racial geography and the practice of map-making. Now, political map-making may be an ingenious

The Outlook of a Good European 173

and fascinating pastime: it is also the most intricate and difficult labour. It presupposes in the cartographer a thorough grasp of principle combined with wide and detailed knowledge. This is in very truth the straits between Scylla and Charybdis over again: for we are just as liable to be shipwrecked by the unprincipled expert as by the ignorant idealist. "How, then," you may say in scorn, "can any Democracy, with her rough measures of justice and her ignorance of essential detail, hope to achieve the results you demand from her?" The retort is pointed and not wholly unjust: but it can be shown that there is an appropriate function which the deep good sense and sympathy of the common people can and must discharge in a European settlement. The peoples of France and Great Britain can, if they will, play something like a decisive part in the liberation of nationalities. There is, indeed, no other check upon the diplomatist and the expert than the force of an instructed public opinion: and as, in the conditions of comparative secrecy in which the settlement will be discussed, the risk of being committed to policies which we disapprove is very great, it is vital that public opinion should begin to indicate now its well-founded preference for a certain course of policy. We have good precedent for assigning to public opinion an important part. Before we declared war against

Germany, Sir Edward Grey told the French and German Ambassadors that, whatever he did, he must have public opinion with him. That is a significant declaration which has an immediate bearing on the question in hand. We need waste no time in speculating how far the Foreign Office tends to pay heed to public opinion: the point here is that the Foreign Secretary has declared that for the purposes of war public opinion is the decisive factor. For the purposes of peace it is also the decisive factor. And when Viscount Grey goes to the Peace Conference, we must see to it that he carries with him the support, and, if need be, the spur, of a well-informed and resolute public opinion. There are two kinds of Peace Congress: there is Dictation of Terms, as at the Treaty of Frankfort in 1871, and there is Discussion and Compromise. Whichever it is, the opinion of the British people will be the paramount force. Possessing this force, we must be fully equipped for its best use. This is the very kernel of our growing demand for the control of foreign policy.

The pivot of our policy is nationality: and until the principle of the freedom of the subject races is securely established in the public law of Europe, we cannot proceed to set up any form of acceptable international authority. To set up such an authority in a Europe seething with racial trouble would be an invitation to disaster. The sources of such

trouble must be dried up before the ground can be made ready for the new international legislature, council, concert, or whatever name best describes it. The war offers a unique opportunity for achieving this result; for by the fact that it affects all Europe, it brings within our scope of reform all the outstanding racial problems of our time. It is therefore worth while to take a preliminary survey of the European field according to the test of nationality.

When victory comes, the application of this principle will raise the whole question of the constitution and territorial limits of our three enemies, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey. Owing to the contrast in the position and structure of these countries, the penalty of defeat will appear to fall in inverse proportion to the true guilt of the three partners. Germany will emerge from the war maimed, exhausted, humbled: but from the necessities of the case, if we are true to our professions of respect for nationality, Germany cannot under any conceivable terms of peace suffer as heavy a territorial penalty as Austria-Hungary or Turkey. The victory of the Allies and the triumph of nationality means the complete disruption of Austria-Hungary and the expulsion of the Turk from his capital in Europe; but it also means that German national unity remains intact, with the loss of non-German extremities—Posen in

the east, a corner of Schleswig in the north, Alsace-Lorraine in the west. Such terms mean in reality a more abject confession of defeat than at first appears: for Alsace-Lorraine represents to the modern German mind the territorial symbol *par excellence* of the Empire, and its loss means the end of that arrogant conquering career pursued by Prussia throughout her whole history, and at no time more ruthlessly than in the period since Bismarck's accession to power in 1862. Significant as the loss of the Reichsland will be, the mere surrender of territory is not the worst of the story. Fully to realize the spiritual disaster, the nemesis that awaits a purely material civilization, which must overtake Germany in defeat, we should have to go back to the creation of the modern German state and watch the process by which military power became its chief idol. This question has been widely canvassed in the British Press ever since war broke out, and needs no further elaboration here.

Parenthetically, let it be said that those who argue that because we have raised a great army we are likely to suffer the very evil of militarism of which we hope to rid Germany have not formed a clear idea of the nature of militarism. Militarism is a political system in which the army becomes an end in itself instead of a means to other ends. It is the usurpation by the military power of all the

The Outlook of a Good European 177

civil functions of government and the subordination of social and individual needs to the demands of the army. That is the German system: necessary in time of war, disastrous in time of peace. It is a system which has no chance of adoption in any Anglo-Saxon country. Wholly foreign to the political traditions of Great Britain, it is also an unthinkable inversion of deep-rooted British feelings: and as long as the love of liberty remains the dominant note in our politics, so long will militarism remain the unrealizable dream of a handful of British neo-Prussians who shall be nameless.

The recognition of this truth carries with it, however, the recognition of the complementary truth about Germany. If it be true that our political institutions reflect our character, it is equally true that the militarism of Prussia, which in the last forty years has almost completely infected the other states of the Empire is also appropriate to the character of the nation it rules. The excesses of militarism arouse disgust in the minds of Social Democrats, no doubt: but the humiliating surrender of the Reichstag after the Zabern affair should warn us not to place much reliance even on the Social Democratic Party, and, above all, to remember that the German army is the crown of their national life. Therefore, when we speak of the destruction of Prussian militarism, we must bear in mind that it is a process in two parts.

First, by the defeat of the German armies in the field we shall give the German people the best possible reason—(a) for doubting the value and pretensions of militarism; (b) for discovering that the free peoples are remarkably capable of self-defence whenever necessary; and (c) for concluding that the free democratic system, which guarantees its citizens real liberty in peace and at least the reasonable probability of an adequate power of self-defence in war, deserves adoption. To achieve this result will be a long step towards the desired goal: but it is not the goal itself. *Second*, the goal itself, the destruction of German militarism, can only be reached *by the Germans themselves*. Any attempt to achieve it by force from without can only end in rivetting the system more firmly on the acquiescent backs of the German people. No great nation, even in dire defeat, will tolerate any alien attempt to set its house in order. The substitution of free government for the tyranny of militarism must be the deliberate and conscious act of a politically-awakened people: otherwise it cannot last.

Passing from Germany to Austria-Hungary, we pass from a national reality to a purely artificial dynastic state. There is no nation in Austria-Hungary—but a dozen races, and one sovereign to unite them. “Among the many things which this war has thrown into the melting-pot, Austria-

The Outlook of a Good European 179

Hungary is the greatest and the most difficult to understand. No matter how we approach the subject, whether from a political, a racial, a constitutional, a social, or an economic point of view, the issues are equally complicated and difficult to sum up. Austria-Hungary is not a state like other European states, and cannot be judged by the same standards. Above all, political terms and values are not the same in Austria as in Hungary, or in either as in other countries. A clever diplomatist, after six months' residence in Vienna, made the remark that nothing happened in Austria as it does elsewhere; and this fact must be grasped at the outset by any student of the problem. Moreover, generalization is impossible in a country of eleven main races, ten principal languages, and twenty-three legislative bodies."¹

The only generalization which is possible is that the application of the principle of nationality means the end of the Dual Monarchy. The Habsburg dynasty has had not one chance, but many, of showing that it could govern all its subject races in harmony. It has seized none of them. Every wavering between East and West, torn in two by the antagonism so well represented

¹ *German, Slav, and Magyar*, by R. W. Seton-Watson. (Williams and Norgate, 1916.) See also *The Habsburg Monarchy*, by H. Wickham Steed. (Constable.) Mr. Steed's book is the standard work on Austria-Hungary in English.

in its double-headed eagle, the dynasty has never been able either to reconcile the Teuton and the Slav, or (turning its back upon the German) to build its foundation anew upon a predominantly Slavonic basis. And since the Compromise of 1867 with Hungary this fatal dualism has been accentuated. It has been suggested, and is not improbable, that, if the Archduke Francis Ferdinand had lived to ascend the Habsburg throne, he would have recreated the Monarchy on a basis—falsely called “trialism”—of equal rights for German, Magyar, and Slav, thus giving the Slavonic peoples under his rule tangible guarantees of good government for the first time in history. But this plan had one serious flaw. It recognized Slavonic rights only by denying the close kinship between the Serb of the kingdom of Serbia and the Croat of the Southern Slav provinces of Austria-Hungary, and thus could not claim to be a final solution. Rumour speaks of a third and more grandiose dream, in which the German provinces of Austria proper would be united to the German Empire under the Hohenzollerns, while the Archduke’s eldest son became the King of a resuscitated Poland stretching from Riga to Odessa, and the younger wore the crown of a new federal monarchy composed of Bohemia, Hungary, Croatia-Slavonia, Bosnia, Dalmatia, Serbia, Albania, and Macedonia. War has transformed all these plans, and places the

The Outlook of a Good European 181

disruption of the Dual Monarchy before us as the first indispensable step in the liberation of nationalities in South-Eastern Europe. Palacky's famous phrase, "If there were no Austria, we should have to create one," once so pregnant, has lost its meaning. It is no longer true, either, that the existence of Austria is necessary to save Europe from war over her constituent parts, or that the Austria-Hungary of the Ausgleich and the Triple Alliance is in any sense that large-minded and tolerant state for which Palacky and his pupil Dr. Kramarzh hoped.¹ As long as the *entente* between Berlin and Petrograd lasted—*i. e.*, till Bismarck's master-hand was removed—it was impossible for the non-Russian Slavonic peoples to look to Russia for support against German aggression: and so the Austrian Slavs staked their all upon a liberal Austria, and lost. Now that the *entente* of the autocrats is broken a new hope has arisen. More than that, in the interval Palacky's death (1876) and the outbreak of the Great War, the Slavonic peoples of Central Europe, the Czechs and Jugoslavs, had grown in political stature and culture; and today they appear before Europe as conscious, ethnical units, nourishing the aspiration

¹ Dr. Kramarzh, leader of the Young Czech Party in the Reichsrath, was arrested in December, 1915, kept in prison without trial till May, 1916, and sentenced to death in June on a vague charge of treason. See *New Statesman*, June 24, 1916.

and possessing the potential power of becoming recognized members of the family of organized states. Their evolution has been retarded by the inevitable blunders of an adolescent race: in Bohemia by a fatal lack of far-seeing leaders at the critical period after Königgrätz, and in Jugoslavia by foreign ill-will and feuds, both dynastic and sectarian, culminating now and then in political crimes of assassination which have disfigured the record of Serbia and obscured the strength and essential legitimacy of her national movement.

These flaws in the Slavonic situation were, indeed, grist to the Ballplatz mill. By an adroit Viennese control of the news supplied to Western Europe and America, they were made to appear as the fundamental character of the Slavonic peoples. It was as though a veil were hung from heaven over the little Slavonian frontier town of Semlin to obscure the growth and vitality of modern Serbia, and only lifted to disclose a crime like the assassination of Alexander and his worthless Draga, or the machinery—fabricated in Austria—of a plot to kill an heir to the throne. By defamation of character on a gigantic scale, by fraud, forgery, and violence, the subject peoples of the Dual Monarchy were forced into the limelight of the European stage in the character of outcasts and assassins; and, too indolent to probe the matter, we accepted the picture as true. Influenced by

old ties between Austria and England, still dazzled by the glamour of Kossuth's name, and hypnotized by adroit and interested persons into a belief in Hungary as the home of liberty, the British people had abandoned the Gladstonian tradition, and dismissed the Southern Slavs from the circle of polite Europe. Not even the almost incredible extent to which the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office resorted to fraud and forgery in its dealing with these subject races, not even the crushing results of three of the most sensational political trials of modern times,¹ nor the inherent improbability of much that passed for the truth about the Southern Slavs, availed to destroy the legend of Slavonic depravity. It was left to the Balkan Alliance of 1912 to reveal to an astonished world the results of long years of patient labour, and to prove that the Balkan peoples, and especially the Serbs, had been the victims of a perfidious campaign of denigration of which only an utterly cynical bureau like the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office could be capable. The first Balkan War—planned in Athens, Belgrade, and Sofia—raised

¹ The Agram (Zagreb) Treason Trial, the Friedjung Trial in Vienna, and Vasitch Trial in Belgrade. The story of the three trials is well worth reading either in Professor Masaryk's *Vasic—Forgach—Aehrenthal*, published in German in Prague, or in Dr. Seton-Watson's workmanlike books on the Dual Monarchy and its problems. See Bibliography at the end of this chapter.

the Balkan peoples to a true eminence; the second Balkan War—a veritable civil war engineered in Vienna and Budapest—only proved how easily heroic peoples may be made the tools of a cynical diplomacy. The lesson from both wars is three-fold. First, the realization that these vigorous peoples had made good their claim to enter the circle of European Powers. That is the lesson of Balkan strength. Second, the extent to which European peace depends upon peace in the Balkans. That is the lesson of Balkan solidarity with Europe. Third, the possibility, which is not nearly so remote as present circumstances make it appear, of the re-establishment of the Balkan Alliance in recognition of the racial kinship of Serb and Bulgar, and their common interest in peaceful development. That is the lesson of solidarity *within* the Balkans.

From all this it is evident that the “Austrian question” cannot be taken up without affecting the whole Balkan question, and the Balkan question in its turn is the key to *Mittel-Europa* and *Berlin-Bagdad*. Here *Mittel-Europa* and Nationality contend for the mastery. If Nationality succumbs, nothing can withstand the victorious advance of Germany to the Persian Gulf; if *Mittel-Europa* is to be overthrown, it can only be by setting the Slavonic nationalities on their feet in Bohemia and Jugoslavia. This is the fundamental

antinomy of Central Europe. *Things being as they are*, the liberation of nationalities in that quarter of the world is possible on no other terms than the disruption of Austria-Hungary. Let us see, then, where the dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy leads us.

Moving south on the Berlin-Bagdad line, we come to Bohemia, the first solid Slavonic block in Central Europe, inhabited by 9,000,000 Czechs and Slovaks. This national territory comprises Bohemia, Moravia, a slice of Silesia, and the north-west corner of Hungary from Pressburg to Ungvar. Bohemia is one of the most historic of the European battle-grounds of nationality. She is well known as a bulwark of Christendom against the invading Turk, and justly famed as the home of John Hus; but she is not by any means as yet fully acknowledged as one of the great modern upholders of liberty and nationality in Central Europe. The Czechs began fighting German Imperialism eight centuries ago, and the secular combat still rages. "The struggle of the Czechs against German influence and aggression runs through the whole history of Bohemia since its definite formation as a state." "The Hussite wars," says a modern historian, "are one of the most remarkable episodes in history, and are specially deserving of attention at the present time. For what do they mean? The Bohemian

nation, alone and unaided, held all Europe at bay, and routed army after army that the Germans sent against them . . . and when victory at last crowned the Hussite arms, the Bohemians made a moderate use of it, and indulged in no persecution or proscription of the Germans who dwelt among them." The rights thus won were enjoyed by Bohemia for a hundred and eighty years; but in 1620, at the Battle of the White Mountain, the House of Habsburg prevailed against her, and in the Thirty Years' War Bohemian freedom was utterly swept away. Before that terrible war was over the Germanization of Bohemia was complete, and Czech nationality slept in a trance for two hundred years. The re-awakening came in the ferment of social renewal that marked the opening of the nineteenth century, and for the last hundred years the progress made by Czech literature, art, and commerce against the tyranny of Vienna has been very remarkable.

In politics, progress has been slower, but there has never been any doubt about the political ideal of the Czech people. As long as there was no hope of overthrowing the Habsburgs, or, conversely, as long as there was any reason for looking to that dynasty rather than to Russia for succour against the more aggressive Germans of the north, the Czechs pinned their faith to a liberal Austria

The Outlook of a Good European 187

of the future, in which their ancient rights under the crown of St. Wenceslas would be restored. The form of this aspiration and its justification have been commented on above, but it may be well to repeat the statement that the policy of the Habsburg towards the Czechs and other Slavonic peoples before the war did much to make the war itself inevitable; while the war in its turn has destroyed the *raison d'être* of the Dual Monarchy, and rendered meaningless the historic phrase, "If there were no Austria, we should have to create one." The Habsburgs have failed to discharge the high office of patron of Slavs in Central Europe, and have thus relinquished all claim to retain Slavonic allegiance.

For the Czechs, the war has answered a long unanswered question. As the borderland between the German and Slavonic worlds, and for centuries "the avenue and junction of the migration of peoples," their country has been disputed by the rival hosts of Teuton and Slav. A different distribution of power in the eighteenth century might have cast Bohemia with Poland into the grasp of Russia, or a similar turn of the wheel in Napoleonic times have given her an orientation westwards or even south-eastwards which today is altogether unthinkable. A new opportunity came in 1867, when Austria was thrust out of Germany; but the Czechs lacked statesmen of the

stamp of Deak, Eötvös, and Andrassy, who seized the occasion of the Ausgleich to give Hungary a predominance which she did not merit. As Dr. Seton-Watson has pointed out, to gain this result "it was not enough that these men should appear on the Magyar side. Their effectiveness was, in a sense, doubled by the dearth of statesmen among the Germans of Austria and among the Czechs. In Bohemia especially fatal mistakes were committed which gave Hungary an advantage to which she was not entitled on historical grounds, and which all the efforts of Czech policy in the next two generations have failed to make good." In the result the Czechs remained in a true sense a subject people, unable to guide their own destinies, unable to influence the foreign policy of the Monarchy, which so largely rested upon the armies of their conscript sons and on the riches of their country. And today the Bohemian nation is forced by this cruel and unnatural system to fight the battles of an alien ruler against their brother Slavs, the Russians. Their whole sympathy is with the Allies: the Czech Legion has won high honour in the French army; thousands of Czech Volunteers are in the Russian ranks; and, most significant of all, Czech regiments in the Austrian army have surrendered *en masse* to the Russians, and are even now being absorbed as willing recruits in the Russian armies. In London,

The Outlook of a Good European 189

Bohemia's most distinguished representative is Professor T. G. Masaryk, the late occupant of the Chair of Philosophy in the Czech University of Prague, and leader of the Realist Party in the Reichsrath, now an exile from Bohemia with a price set upon his head by the Austrian Government. In the opening lecture from his new chair of Slavonic Literature and Sociology in King's College, Professor Masaryk took the appropriate theme of "The Problem of the Small Nation in the European Crisis," and handled it in a manner which gave him an immediate authority over his audience. "A good European," in the best sense of the word, Professor Masaryk is an invaluable guide to politics in Austria-Hungary, and places his unrivalled knowledge at the disposal of the British people just when it is most needed. He sums up the policy of his nation in the one word *Independence*.

If in passing on to the other great Slavonic question in Austria-Hungary—viz., Jugoslavia—I leave Poland on one side, it is not because the Polish question does not loom largely in any survey of Europe, but solely because I have not sufficient knowledge to justify an examination of it. And I have found, in the endeavour to instruct my own ignorance, that the literature for the purpose is none too copious. There has, indeed, been a constant stream of books, pamphlets, and other

publications on the subject of Poland and her wrongs; but there has, as yet, been no comprehensive attempt to present the problem of Polish unity and independence in a judicial and illuminating form before the British public. In this respect the literature about Poland, like the country herself, has suffered from partition. From Germany we have received a whole library of argument, biassed and full of that intolerant "Hakatist" sentiment which has poisoned the relation between German and Pole in Posen. The Austrian bias is quite different. Of the three rulers of Poland, the Habsburgs have been the least oppressive: the Austrian Pole is therefore "a Pole with a difference"! He is anti-Russian, to a less degree anti-Prussian or anti-Austrian. But his view of Poland is incomplete, and can only give us a partial assistance in our search for a solution. The Poles of Russian Poland represent the majority, and stand in agreement with their kinsmen in Germany and Austria in demanding the restoration of their country as a European national unit. But even from them we get only fleeting glimpses of the way in which the partitions can be undone: that the evil work of the partitions must be undone is plain, but in order that the friends of Poland may have ground for their demand, the whole Polish argument must be transformed from its present negative and

The Outlook of a Good European 191

critical character to something broad and constructive.

The Southern Slav question stands on a different footing, for it starts from an already existing European state which will form the nucleus of the enlarged state of Jugoslavia. Thus the problem of liberation is not complicated by the entire absence of an independent centre, as in Poland. The *disjecta membra* of the Southern Slav race have, in Serbia, a magnetic centre to which they can cohere as parts of a new Yugoslav federal state under the Serbian dynasty, and from this very fact the Southern Slav problem has a simplicity which is denied to Poland. All we need note, in passing, is that while Serbia is the vital centre, she is not the whole, and therefore the mere restoration of the Serbian kingdom, necessary and right as it is, is but the indispensable prelude to the liberation of the whole Yugoslav race.

The territory of *Jugoslavia* consists of (a) the kingdom of Serbia; (b) Montenegro; (c) the Southern Slav provinces of Austria-Hungary—*i. e.*, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia-Slavonia, the western half of the Banat, and Dalmatia; (d) (if the Slovenes are included, as they ought to be) Carniola, part of Styria, and the eastern half of the peninsula of Istria. Other groups of the Serbo-Croat race are to be found scattered round the fringe of this territory, in Northern Greece, in

Albania, in Roumania, and to such an extent along the frontier between Austria and Hungary that they form an almost continuous line of connection between the Slavs of Jugoslavia and their kinsmen the Slovaks of Northern Hungary. But these groups are more or less isolated, and cannot be used to extend the frontiers of Jugoslavia beyond its true racial limits. Like similar Saxon oases in Hungary, they can only figure in any settlement in those clauses which secure the rights of minorities. Territorially they are insignificant. But the great mass of the Southern Slavs is compact and unbroken, forming one of the most clearly-marked ethnical units in Europe, and now demanding European recognition of their racial unity in a new State—"Jugoslavia," or the "Land of the Southern Slavs." This racial unity, well known to ethnographers and not unknown to historians, was for long obscured by the confessional division between Croat and Serb. The Serb, both within the kingdom and without, was, and is, an adherent of the Orthodox Church; the Croat (of Dalmatia and Croatia, etc.) is a Roman Catholic, while a large Mohammedan element exists in Bosnia. Following the honoured Habsburg device—*Divide et Impera*—the Governments of Vienna and Budapest played these two branches of the same race against each other, till at times the Croat believed that the lamb might sooner lie

The Outlook of a Good European 193

down with the wolf than he with a Serb. But if racial unity had its enemies, it has not lacked friends, especially among the clergy of both Churches. The most remarkable of them was Bishop Strossmayer, known to us as the friend of Gladstone, and famous in Europe as one of the heroic minority of three in the Vatican Council in 1870. Strossmayer was the great apostle of the unity of all the Southern Slavs, and lived long enough to see the first signs of the dawn of its day. The generation of Croats who had grown up under his influence began to discover the truth; others, under the mellowing teaching of Thomas Masaryk¹ in Prague, came to the same conclusion by a purely political road; and by 1903 the foundation was laid of that Serbo-Croat coalition against Magyar aggression which first revealed to the world at large the reality and strength of racial kinship in Jugoslavia. Serb and Croat were at last awake to the identity of their interests, and to the power which as allies they could exercise to keep their oppressors in check. The exploits of Serbia in the Balkan

¹ The lecture room of Professor T. G. Masaryk in the Czech University of Prague was the intellectual and political exchange and mart for the whole young Slavonic world. Masaryk's students came to him from Russia, Poland, Serbia, Bulgaria, as well as from the Slavonic provinces of Austria; and to them he interpreted Europe, showing how high a part was assigned to the true and tolerant Slav spirit in the European politics of the twentieth century.

wars carried the process a step further by consolidating the unity of the whole race, and thereby preparing the way to the solution now demanded.

To this solution there are in reality only two obstacles. The *first* lies in the danger that the Governments of Western Europe, in their preoccupation with vaster problems, may at the last moment fail to grasp the importance of liberation and consolidation of all the Southern Slavs. Against this danger the best safeguard is the dissemination broadcast among the peoples of Great Britain and France of all the facts of the case. If we realize that our championship of nationalities coincides with our own interest in demanding the overthrow of the idea of *Mittel-Europa* (as far as it rests upon the exploitation of subject races), there can be little doubt that we shall be firm in our support of the idea of Jugoslavia in its totality. We must therefore welcome the propaganda amongst us of such bodies as the Serbian Society of Great Britain and the Yugoslav Committee, and do all in our power to widen the area of their operations. The second obstacle lies in the claims made by certain parties in Italy to the Dalmatian coastline. Without going too deeply into this dispute, we may, without difficulty, disengage certain conclusions by which the legitimate demands of both parties can be substantially satisfied. On the basis of population, Dalmatia

The Outlook of a Good European 195

is a Slavonic region, in which the non-Slavonic element is less than 10 per cent. of the total. Even the most extreme of Italian Irredentists do not claim more than 10 per cent. of Dalmatians as Italian; but they argue that the high historic mission of Italy over the whole Adriatic coastline, and modern strategic necessity, together demand and justify the annexation of Dalmatia. The past achievements of Italian culture in Dalmatia are splendid and undeniable—monuments of her architecture are to be found in profusion in all the coast towns—and no Yugoslav dreams of repudiating his debt to his famous neighbour. Indeed, he hopes to make it a link between Italy and the new Slav state on the Adriatic. The only thing he fears is that Italy, by making extreme territorial demands, may arouse the irreconcilable enmity of the whole Southern Slav race. In the early part of the war the Allied Governments showed a strong tendency to listen to these extreme demands, and even committed a breach of principle in making a provisional agreement with Italy upon them; but time has moderated the Italian claim and educated the Allies in racial geography, and today the prospect of justice to Yugoslavia is rather brighter than it was. But only the vigilance of an enlightened and well-informed public opinion can save us from such errors as are hinted at above.

It must be clearly understood that the attempt to set up a Southern Slav state minus Dalmatia means the certain perpetuation of strife. Imperialist aims must yield to racial liberation. The reasonable demands of Italian strategic defence, however, stand on a different footing, and can be met without any serious violation of national rights. If Italy holds Trieste and Pola in the north and Valona in the south, she is the strategic mistress of the Adriatic. The addition of two of the Dalmatian islands at most is perhaps necessary to make her naval power secure, and if found necessary they could be granted. Further, if the necessary treaty secures adequate guarantees of free speech, education, and civic rights to the Italian minority in Dalmatia, which, though tiny, is an important cultural element, the whole Italian case is fully met, and there should then be no reason why Jugoslavia should not start upon its hopeful career with the unalloyed amity of the Italian people to support it. Such undoubtedly is our goal.

The solution of these national problems is not the end of the problem of nationality in the Balkans. The war has torn to shreds the unhappy Treaty of Bucharest, and has re-opened both the Bulgarian and the Roumanian questions. The former centres in Macedonia, the latter in Transylvania. Now, both Bulgar and Serb claim

The Outlook of a Good European 197

Macedonia on racial grounds: but I have yet to hear any impartial authority pronounce a verdict in favour of either party. The truth is that Macedonia is a typical "No Man's Land" created by Turkish misrule, which by its position becomes inevitably a bone of contention between Serb, Bulgar, and Greek. This catalogue of claimants does not exhaust the Macedonia racial potpourri, which, like a veritable *macédoine*, includes Albanians, Turks, Roumanians, Vlachs, and a growing number of mongrels, none of whom are so firmly rooted in their nationality that they would not insensibly become Bulgar or Serb in character, according as Bulgaria or Serbia administered their country. It is therefore time to make an end of the pretence that nationality is the clue to the Macedonian (or Albanian) questions, and to remove Macedonia finally from the gaming-table of European politics by linking its solution with the establishment of Jugoslavia and the general Balkan settlement. Let us remember that the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty of 1912 gave Macedonia to Bulgaria on the *unexpressed* condition that Serbia found her way to the Adriatic. When that condition was quashed by the intervention of Austria, Serbia repudiated the Macedonian bargain, not without justice; but in doing so left a sense of injustice in the mind of Bulgaria which Vienna has not failed to exploit. But now that

Serbia has once more the prospect of the desired union with her Southern Slav kinsmen in a new realm which will give her abundant access to the Adriatic, she can afford to win back Bulgaria by showing an accommodating spirit over Macedonia. I do not suggest that Serbia should place any faith in Ferdinand of Bulgaria, whose Austrian military training and Magyar sympathies make him an evil guide for any Balkan people; but I do plead that she should remember that the Bulgarian people will continue to be her neighbours long after Ferdinand has gone, and that a Balkan Federation is the true destiny of Bulgar and Serb. . With that goal before her this Macedonian question no longer need wear the aspect of "trading with the enemy," but becomes one of the foundation-stones of peace and unity throughout the Balkans.

A similar adjustment of national claims in the north becomes possible if Roumania wins Transylvania from Hungary. She can then restore to Bulgaria the stolen triangle of the Dobrudja which she acquired without rhyme or anything but strategic reason by the Treaty of Bucharest. But the Roumanians must at the same time beware of pushing their racial claims too far westward in the region of the Banat, for there they infringe Serbian rights. Thus we see that, if excessive claims be suppressed by all the participants, there is a reasonable probability of an all-round settlement

The Outlook of a Good European 199

by a simultaneous agreement of all the peoples primarily concerned in the Balkan question.

At the end of this all too brief review, as at the beginning, we find ourselves again face to face with the fundamental fact that our principle of nationality, when translated into action in the Balkans, means the end of Austria-Hungary. That is the first indispensable stroke by which the way of progress is cleared. The second condition of success is the firm resolve to treat all these questions—Jugoslavia, Macedonia, Dobrudja, etc.—not as independent units, but as parts of a complex, coherent whole, which becomes incoherent and insoluble whenever the attempt is made to single any one part for exclusive treatment. The friends of the Balkans usually cannot see the wood for the trees, and by making themselves the partisans of one or other of its young nations, lose the perspective of the whole. Until this attitude is changed, and until the Great Powers recognize that the Balkans are not to be used as means to their own ends, but as a region which has a destiny of its own, there can be no lasting peace.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Those who desire to pursue these questions beyond the general sketch given in the foregoing lecture will find the following books very useful, but the list is to be regarded as a mere introduction to the subject under each heading:

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

- The Habsburg Monarchy.* H. Wickham Steed. London, 1912.
Modern Austria. Virginio Gayda. London, 1915.
German, Slav, and Magyar. R. W. Seton-Watson. London, 1916.
The Southern Slav Question and the Habsburg Monarchy. R. W. Seton-Watson. London, 1911.
Racial Problems in Hungary. R. W. Seton-Watson. London, 1908.
The Political Evolution of the Hungarian Nation. The Hon. C. M. Knatchbull-Hugesson. London, 1909.
Austria-Hungary. Geoffrey Drage. London, 1909.

THE BALKANS

- Nationalism and War in the Near East.* A Diplomatist. Oxford, 1915.
The Ottoman Empire. W. Miller. Cambridge, 1913.
The War and the Balkans. Noel Buxton, M.P. London, 1915.
Light on the Balkan Darkness. Crawford Price. London, 1915.
The Balkans, Italy, and the Adriatic. R. W. Seton-Watson. London, 1915.
Serbes, Croates, et Bulgares. Louis Leger. Paris, 1913.
The Balkans. Nevill Forbes. Oxford, 1915.

SERBIA AND JUGOSLAVIA

- (a) *La Grande Serbie.* Professor Ernest Denis. Paris, 1915.
History of Servia. Leopold von Ranke. English translation. London, 1853.
Servia of the Servians. Chedo Mijatovitch. London, 1911.
 (b) *The Southern Slav Library:* (1) The Southern Slav Programme; (2) The Southern Slavs, Land and People; (3) A Sketch of Southern Slav History; (4) Southern Slav Culture. London, 1915.
German, Slav, and Magyar, Chapters IV. and V. R. W. Seton-Watson. London, 1916.

The Outlook of a Good European 201

The Balkans, Italy, and the Adriatic. R. W. Seton-Watson.
London, 1915.

La Yougoslavie. Pierre de Lanux. Paris, 1916.

Italy and the Jugoslav Peoples. "Civis Italicus." London,
1916.

ROUMANIA

Mr. Seton-Watson's volume, *Roumania and the Great War* (Constable, 2s.), besides containing an invaluable bibliography, is the only up-to-date guide to the question in English.

BULGARIA

Nationalism and War in the Near East. A Diplomatist. Oxford,
1915.

The War and the Balkans. Noel Buxton, M.P. London, 1915.

L'Alliance Balkanique. Ivan Guéchoff. Paris, 1915.

(A statement of the Bulgarian case in 1912-13 by the
then Prime Minister of Bulgaria.)

BOHEMIA

Bohemia: An Historical Sketch. Count Lützow. London, 1909.

Bohemia. C. E. Maurice. ("The Story of the Nations.")

Bohemia under Habsburg Misrule. Thomas Capek. New
York, 1915.

The Future of Bohemia. R. W. Seton-Watson. London, 1915.

List of societies engaged in propaganda upon the subjects
raised in the foregoing lecture.

(1) THE BALKAN COMMITTEE: An old-established society whose
name sufficiently indicates the scope of its work.

Address: c/o Noel Buxton, M.P., House of Commons.

(2) THE ANGLO-CZECH ASSOCIATION: A recently formed society
devoted to the interests of Bohemia, which circulates *La
Nation Tchèque*, a fortnightly broad-sheet dealing with
the internal situation and political prospects of the Czech
people.

Address: 28, Gloucester Road, Regent's Park, N. W.

- (3) THE POLISH INFORMATION COMMITTEE circulates *The Polish News* and pamphlets dealing with Polish life and history.

Address : 110, St. Martin's Lane, London, W. C.

(The Polish Victims' Relief Fund is also a source of information on contemporary wants in Poland.)

- (4) THE SERBIAN SOCIETY OF GREAT BRITAIN has been formed to promote close relations with Serbia and the Yugoslavs. It co-operates with the Yugoslav Committee, which circulates the *Southern Slav Bulletin*, a valuable sheet containing news of the Slavonic provinces of Austria-Hungary during the war.

Address : 14, Great Smith Street, Westminster.

- (5) THE BRITISH ARMENIA COMMITTEE, Queen Anne's Chambers, London, S. W.

WHAT IS "RIGHT"?¹

BY

H. WICKHAM STEED

THIS movement is called "The Fight for Right." Its purpose, as defined by Sir Frederick Pollock, is "to encourage our fellow-countrymen, non-combatant as well as combatant, to use their utmost endeavour, in the several ways open to them, towards the end of attaining decisive victory as the only sure means of honourable and lasting peace; to maintain in them the spirit of bold confidence in a righteous cause without which full success is not possible; and to make plain to them the unexampled character of this war, a war not merely for British interests, but for the freedom of the civilized world, as a reason for the most strenuous effort and for ungrudging sacrifice."

In other words, the movement appeals to all men and women of goodwill to join hands and link their efforts in order to promote the triumph of Right.

The question at once arises: What is Right?

¹ Lecture delivered at King's College, London, on July 17, 1916.

What do we understand by its triumph? What do we mean by "decisive victory" and "an honourable and lasting peace"? Without some clear definition in our own minds of our purpose and some convincing expression of it, may not this movement share the fate of many another movement, which, proceeding from a broad moral impulse, and, therefore, appealing to a wide public, has lost efficacy and point in proportion as the positive ends to be attained became more concrete and needed for their attainment the support of clear-minded public resolve?

I have unfortunately been debarred from hearing the papers read at these meetings and from listening to the debates upon them. Should I therefore traverse ground previously covered or reiterate conclusions already reached, I must crave your forgiveness. What I have to offer as a contribution to the common stock of thought and reflection is the fruit of personal inquiry and of some experience of the hard political realities with which we have to reckon. My only title to offer this contribution is that, ever since I have been able to take an intelligent interest in public questions, my attention has been directed to those very problems which confront us today.

I have a vivid recollection of a somewhat acrimonious controversy more than twenty-five years ago with a keen law student, who was assimilating

his Blackstone, upon the question whether Law, or public right, possessed any inherent validity apart from its sanction; that is to say, whether Right could stand upon its own feet and secure recognition by its inward virtue without support from the policeman and the magistrate. The law student took what may be called the mystical view, claiming that Right was Right and would prevail without the policeman. I believed in the policeman, and argued that Right and Law were ineffective, except in so far as the members of a community or their delegates—that is, their policemen and magistrates—might be ready to uphold them, if necessary by force, and to visit moral or physical punishment upon transgressors.

In other words, the claim of Longfellow's Norseman, "Force rules the world still, has ruled it, shall rule it," seemed and seems to me incontrovertible—on condition that the force be organized in support of public consciousness of what is right.

Here we come, I think, to the essence of the question, "Public consciousness of what is right," or, in other words, public conscience. A celebrated German professor, Friedrich Paulsen, at whose feet I sat for many months, used to define "conscience" as "consciousness of what a community expects from its members in the interest of its own preservation." He based social impulses upon the instinct of self-preservation, and

defined the work of conscience as the "constant comparison of our doings with our duty." I have never found a serious flaw in his analysis or in his conclusions—not even when I perceived in after years that he, too, was being unconsciously carried away by the stream of arrogant Chauvinism, which between the end of the last century and the outbreak of the present war, swept away and swamped so much of what we had learned to admire and to love in German teaching before German culture was diabolically transfigured into *Kultur*.

Too late, men like Professor Rein, of Jena University, who had long stood with Paulsen as the twin leader of German educational thought, discovered whither this stream was leading the German people. He uttered, early in 1913, an ineffectual protest against the dominant idea that, in political and public life, nothing matters except force and organization, and that statecraft is essentially conscienceless. "What shall it profit us Germans," he exclaimed, "if we gain the whole world and lose our own soul?" His protest went unheeded. The German Government, with the acquiescence—nay, with the enthusiastic support—of the German people, attempted, eighteen months later, to gain the mastery of the whole world by the most appalling display of organized, conscienceless force known to history.

The attempt has failed. Force is being met and

will be vanquished by greater force in the service of the conscience of civilized humanity. Are we to see in this victory the triumph, after all, of the German principle that force in itself is supreme, and that might is right? Not if we ask how it came that the adversaries of German force have been able to gather yet greater force for its discomfiture. The answer can only be that the cause which they uphold appeals more widely, more powerfully to a larger number of human consciences, and to the consciences of a larger number of civilized communities, to whom the sense of outraged right has given strength to overcome armed wrong supported by the perverted conscience of the German people.

Our object, the object of the Allies, must be to secure, against any calculable renewal of the present peril, the supremacy of the normal human conscience in the civilized communities of the world. This aim cannot be achieved by academic expressions of our resolve "to fight on until complete victory shall have been gained" in this war. We must be honest with ourselves as to what we mean by "complete victory"; "the destruction of Prussian militarism"; "the vindication of the rights of small peoples"; and "the establishment of a lasting peace." We wish to impose a lasting peace on Germany. But what do we mean by "Germany"? Do we mean the present German Imperial State

controlled by the Hohenzollerns through the instrumentality of the army? Do we mean the score or so of Federal Units that make up the German Empire with their Kings and Princes? Do we mean the people, or, rather, the peoples of Germany? If so, how do we propose to get at these peoples apart from the Governments, with whose conduct they have as yet shown no tangible signs of dissatisfaction? Unless this "Fight for Right" is to be a sounding phrase, we need to think very clearly and to generate in regard to every aspect of what we call "complete victory" the same intense quality of dynamic impulse that has moved us in resisting the patent manifestations of German wrong.

Instinctive resistance to Wrong is far easier than constructive application of Right. Yet, unless we are to find ourselves balked of the fruits of victory—that is to say, the establishment of a just and lasting peace—we must, without delay, agree upon the character of that peace, inculcate upon the people the main principles upon which it is to be founded, and watch carefully that they be not betrayed by diplomatists or statesmen. *Si vis victoriam, para pacem.*

I anticipate the objection that these matters must, in the last resort, be left in the hands of the responsible Governments of the Allies, and that a public movement cannot do more than give sup-

port to broad principles without presuming to interfere with their application. It is precisely with this view that I wish to join issue.

It may be claimed that an attempt to create some form of direct popular control over Allied statesmen would be a revolutionary proceeding. Let us not be frightened by words. This war *is* a revolution—one of the greatest the world has seen. The difference between those who understand the war and those who do not is the difference between those who know and those who do not know that it is a revolution. Hitherto it has been guided, or, rather, its various phases have been registered and acquiesced in, by Governments more accustomed to deal with parliaments and electorates than to face events that mould the life of the world. Few, very few, members of those Governments appear to understand the nature of the revolution in which we are involved. Few of them "went to war," or mobilized themselves mentally and morally when war broke out. The unconscious mental attitude of many of them towards it is that the war is an unforeseen and disagreeable episode which has troubled the even course of political and economic life—a life which will be resumed with as few changes as possible when the war is once safely over. Thus they have acted, both wilfully and inadvertently, as brakes rather than as motors, and have remained

passive where they should have led. The peoples of France, England, and Italy have been obliged largely to lead themselves and to drive their Governments in the right direction. Their sense of the magnitude of the task to be accomplished, their faith in its accomplishment, their spirit of sacrifice, their sense of outraged right, have been constantly superior to those of their Governments. Perhaps it is well that it should be thus. The "heaven-sent leader" for whom some have sighed to lead us into the promised land "after the war" has not appeared. We may thus have been saved from running after false gods, and have been made to understand that upon us ordinary, unofficial folk lies the responsibility for the welfare of future generations. It is a tremendous trust, and unless we take timely thought and eschew vanities we too may betray it.

As long as it is merely a matter of providing recruits and equipment for the armies, of paying taxes, of remaining steadfast in evil fortune and humble in good, the danger will be small. But when it comes to the formulation of the guarantees for the maintenance of public right and freedom in Europe, when every avowed and occult force will seek to sway the men entrusted with supreme decisions, when the ardour of the physical struggle and the exaltation of sustained effort begin to give place to consideration of "interests," leadership

by the people will prove inadequate unless the people be instructed betimes and its mind directed towards essential positive requirements. What are these requirements? The restoration of Belgium? The restoration and indemnification of Serbia? The return of Alsace-Lorraine to France and the rebuilding of what has been destroyed in her northern provinces? The "destruction of Prussian militarism"? These things may prove to be mere shibboleths unless we know what lies behind them. Take the case of Belgium. We guaranteed her neutrality, and were bound to fight when it was violated. Why did we guarantee her neutrality? As a safeguard against the renewal of any attempt from any quarter to gain the military mastery of Europe and to control the narrow seas. Therefore, in fighting for the neutrality of Belgium, we fought formally for the sanctity of treaties, but really for the maintenance of an international engagement which protected our most vital national interest. What is that interest? The interest of self-preservation. Let us suppose that Belgian neutrality had been respected by the Germans, and that their armies had broken through the Vosges into France. Should we, could we, have remained neutral at the risk of seeing France crushed—or spared on condition that she should join Germany against us? Certainly not—though in that case the nation might have been less unanimous, thanks to the

ignorance in which our responsible statesmen had left it as to the fundamental conditions of our national safety. Had we fought for and with France alone without reference to Belgium, Serbia, the "sanctity of treaties," or the "freedom of small peoples," would our cause have been less righteous? Would the fight have been less a "fight for right"? By no means—though it might not have been surrounded, in the eyes of the undiscerning, with all the glamour derived from our championship of loyal and outraged little nations. We should have been fighting for the only valid safeguard of our and European freedom that past generations have known—for political equilibrium, or, in other words, for the "balance of power" in Europe.

I know that attempts have been made to discredit this phrase, and to prove that it is an outworn accessory of obsolete dynastic diplomacy. In some quarters hopes are entertained that "after the war" it may be possible to create, by international convention, some basis of public international right, such as to receive the assent and to enter dynamically into the conscience of civilized nations. I, too, believe that progress may lie in that direction, provided it be borne in mind that law, national or international, is apt to prove valueless without an adequate sanction, that is to say, without the "policeman"; and provided there

be due security that, at a given moment, the "policeman," or "policemen," will act.

But before a law of nations can be evolved for the maintenance of political equilibrium as the condition of organized freedom in Europe, it is necessary to be clear as to the nature of that equilibrium. The greatest civilized states of the world—with the regrettable exception of the United States of America—are now engaged in playing the policeman against Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, and Turkey, who have leagued themselves in a nefarious attempt to override the rights and liberties of others. When the delinquents shall have been arrested, the question will arise of inflicting upon them adequate punishment for their crime, of exacting "damages" for its victims, and of securing valid safeguards against its renewal. It is then, or rather it is now, that all our intelligence and our whole sense of practical righteousness will be and is needed to avoid at once weakness and over-generous error.

If I say "it is now" it is because I fear that events may outrun our moral preparation for facing them. I can conceive nothing more disastrous than a sudden "cracking up" or capitulation of the enemy before our minds are irrevocably made up as to the nature and the quality of the punishment we are bound to inflict and of the pledges we are bound to exact. In the sudden reaction from the strain

of military effort, in the re-awakening of appetites held in abeyance by the stress of war, in the tendency to grant extenuating circumstances to foes who have fought bravely, however damnable their purpose, and in the unreadiness of Allied Governments for the contingency of peace, I should see the direst peril that has yet threatened our cause.

I may say that I am not alone in this conviction. Many able Allied diplomatists in England and France have assured me that the contingency of sudden peace proposals, or of a demand for an armistice before the Allied peoples and their Governments have agreed upon minimum peace terms, fills them with anxiety. Some of them declare it urgent that all possible "spade work" should be done "outside"—by which they mean apart from official circles—to acquaint the public with the essential postulates of a lasting peace. Their desire is that the broad public demand for "Right" may be canalized and brought to bear upon concrete issues in such manner as to supply diplomatists with the necessary public support, or to create, if need be, a powerful public corrective to mistaken or dangerous tendencies.

Is not this an object worthy of the "Fight for Right" movement? Various committees and societies have been or are being formed, in this country and elsewhere, for the purpose of public

education upon specific features of the great peace problem. Would not the co-ordination of these various efforts be a task worthy of your movement? You may say that you cannot all be experts in these matters, or presume to make yourselves judges and dividers between conflicting claims or hypotheses. This is doubtless true; but what can be done is to acquaint yourselves as accurately as possible with the outlines of all these matters, to test them by your standard of what is right, and to support wholeheartedly those which pass the test.

Such work would, I know, be much harder than that of meeting to hear and discuss ideal suggestions for securing the future peace of the world. It would involve much seeking after positive knowledge, constant interchange and clarification of ideas, and, perhaps, the sacrifice of many a cherished notion. But we who are not in the fighting line, we who can only wait and wonder—and pay,—have, in our capacity as private citizens, a sacred duty to the men who are fighting our battles for us on land and in the air, on sea and under the sea. We owe it to them that their sacrifices and sufferings shall not be in vain. How could we stand before them, or, indeed, before our own consciences, were we to suffer, through supineness or ignorance, our Ministers or our diplomatists to assent to terms of peace that should undo or undermine what our soldiers and sailors will have done? They will

have fought for justice and right. It is for us to see that they be not robbed of the prize.

A preliminary to any rightful peace must be the utter military discomfiture of the enemy. When the enemy has been beaten, it must be our object so to treat him that he cannot have the power, even if he had the will, again to menace our lives and our liberties. The Imperial German nation has gained military successes enough to thrill with pride future generations of Germans. We cannot be sure that even crushing defeat will work in them a change of heart or modify their secret aspirations. It is conceivable that, as soon as the first shock of disaster shall have passed, false prophets may again arise among them and say: "We were unlucky. If Belgium had not resisted so stupidly, or if we had been a little stronger or a little more frightful from the beginning; if England had only been persuaded to 'keep out of it'—that is, if our diplomacy had been a little more astute, our financiers and their helpers a little shrewder—we might have crushed France according to program, have overrun Russia, and have secured the mastery of the world. Let us try again. The war has shown us that no nation in the world is fit to stand against Germany, and, in a second attempt, we shall hardly have to face so motley a gang of enemies as we had to face this time."

This is possible and even probable. We have

therefore to examine the circumstances which made Germany so formidable, and which, unless they be radically corrected, will make her more formidable in future. Some of these circumstances are:

(1) The supremacy of Prussia in Germany and the supremacy, in Prussia, of the reactionary military and Junker element in close, effective alliance with industrialists and financiers. This alliance was founded upon the tacit undertaking to industrialists and financiers by the military—"Make us strong, and we will make you rich."

(2) The consequent co-operation of German Finance and Industry with the reactionary and aggressive elements in and about the Imperial Government and the General Staff. (German trade and industry, backed by German and international finance, became, in the attempt to secure the mastery of the world, a factor scarcely less important than the military and naval factors. All were co-ordinated and consciously directed towards the same object.)

(3) The possession of the extensive coal and iron fields in Alsace-Lorraine which had been taken from France in 1870-71; the possession of the rich coal fields of Prussian Silesia, most of which are situated in territory ethnically Polish; and the possession or control of great arsenals like those of Krupp at Essen, Skoda at Pilsen, Wittkowitz

in Austrian Silesia, and many other subsidiary works.

(4) The spirit of Pan-Germanism which had penetrated the whole people, uniting all classes and parties in a determination that Germany should be supreme in the world, and based on the belief that Germans are naturally a *Herrenvolk*, a race of rulers to whom all things are given.

(5) The practical preparation for realizing Pan-German aims by the deliberate training of the German army and navy for offensive purposes; and by the political and economic control established over Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and (originally to a lesser extent) also over Bulgaria. The control of Austria-Hungary alone allowed Germany to dispose of a population of 50,000,000, of whom only one fourth are of German race.

(6) The embodiment of the most-favoured-nation clause in the Treaty of Frankfurt, which enabled Germany to use that clause as a lever for the economic subjection of other countries; and the non-existence in Great Britain of any effective means of checkmating unfair German commercial and financial competition.

(7) The possession of a well-thought-out, entirely unscrupulous, and consciously aggressive policy, military, naval, and political, as well as economic, which conferred upon its authors in time of peace advantages similar to those pertaining to the

offensive and the possession of the strategic initiative in war.

There were many other factors and elements in the phenomenal strength of Germany. Some of them have been or can be counteracted. Others are inherent in the position of the German people as a solid block of some seventy million in the centre of Europe. As long as the German people are animated by the feelings and aspirations which led them to make war, and remain obedient instruments of Prussian dynastic policy, so long will they continue to be a peril to the peace of mankind. The Allies cannot and do not wish to destroy the German people. But they can, and are morally bound to, build up against the weight of the German block a system of political and economic counterpoise that shall again create a true balance of power, military, political, and economic, and with it a guarantee of freedom in Europe.

A year ago an eminent French statesman showed me a little pamphlet by a practical American economist whose name I forget. If I remember rightly, it was called *The European Problem in Terms of Coal*. Its purport was that there could be no lasting settlement in Europe as long as coal supplies on the Continent were as unevenly distributed as they were before the war. He showed that Germany possessed actually and potentially an immense advantage over her neighbours in this

respect, and that any equitable European readjustment would require a more equal distribution of the coal supply.

It happens that some of the chief coal centres of Germany lie in the very regions of which political justice requires that she should be deprived—Alsace-Lorraine and Polish Silesia. Why has Germany made so protracted and bitter an attack upon Verdun? For military, political, and dynastic reasons no doubt, but also, and, perhaps, even principally, in order to assure her title by conquest to the Briey basin, with its rich iron and coal deposits. The partial occupation and exploitation of this basin during the war has enabled Germany greatly to increase her output of steel and of munitions. Shrewd French writers have already drawn attention to this aspect of the Verdun battle; but I recently found confirmation of their diagnosis in a report sent to a neutral Government by one of its Consuls in Westphalia. The Consul quoted a prominent German industrial authority as follows: "This Verdun battle is not a piece of folly. We Germans must possess the Briey basin. It is essential to the future development of our metallurgical industry."

You may ask, What have questions of coal and iron to do with the Fight for Right? Where is the moral basis of metallurgy? The answer is that unless the Fight for Right can be translated into

terms of practical guarantees of Right and Freedom, it will be apt to remain an exercise in moral academics, a kind of ethical gymnastics that may strengthen the fibre of our souls, but leave them powerless to resist wealthy and organized wrong. We need to direct our moral impulses towards the achievement of positively rightful aims. We need to feel as strongly about every aspect of the problem of a lasting peace as we feel, for instance, about the violation of Belgian neutrality. I have said that this war is a revolution. The issues it has raised must be dealt with in a constructively revolutionary spirit. The task before us is nothing less than the political and economic reconstruction of Europe. It involves the redemption and unification of Serbia and the Southern Slav race; the promotion of an agreement between the Southern Slavs and Italy in order to insure the security of the Adriatic; the redemption of the oppressed races in Austria and Hungary by the completion of Italian unity, by the creation of an ethnically complete Roumania, by the inclusion in Russia of the Ruthenes or Little Russians of Austria and Hungary, by the union of the Hungarian Slovaks with the Czechs of Moravia and Bohemia in an independent state, and by the reunion of ethnical Poland. A reunited Poland will need access to the sea at Danzig. In the same way no reconstruction of Europe could be complete that did not

assure to Russia the possession of Constantinople and a free outlet through the Straits. It will be necessary to secure the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France; the restoration and indemnification of Belgium and Northern France; and the provision of such an indemnity by Germany for the havoc wrought during this war that Germans may remember for many generations what it costs to set at naught the conscience of Europe, and may be turned to paths of peace by bitter experience of the fruits of war. It may be said that the Germans will have no money with which to provide indemnities. Then let them pay in fuel and raw material, machinery and ships, and in any other materials which may be required to make good to their victims what has been stolen or destroyed.

There will remain the serious questions of the future constitution and political configuration of Germany. The issue will have to be faced whether the Allies shall consent to deal with the present Government of Imperial Prussianized Germany or whether they should not rather insist upon dealing with the Governments of the various German States. Let us not forget that the German Empire was proclaimed at Versailles, and that it was fashioned by Bismarck under the influence of the German victories of 1870-71 to be an instrument of Prussian militarism. Those victories will, we trust, be undone by the yet completer victory of

the Allies. Let us use that victory, which we are determined to achieve, to a purpose fruitful of good. Let us destroy the supremacy of the Hohenzollern in Germany and the power of his nefarious retinue of Junkers and dumpers, international financiers and false pacifists. Let us refuse to recognize the Federal Council, which, as at present constituted, gives a permanent and artificial majority to Prussia. Then, when we have given the German people a chance of earning freedom through peace, and of resuming a place in the family of civilized nations, let us organize a system of international "police" that shall vindicate a true law of nations against wrongdoers. Let us not only fight for Right, but prepare the bases for that lawful exercise of force in the service of Right without which the advent of the reign of Right can be but a pious aspiration.

FIGHT FOR THE RIGHT¹

BY

THE REV. WILLIAM TEMPLE

THE phrase "Fight for the Right" may be used in two quite different senses. The emphasis may be put upon the first word, and then the suggestion of the phrase, taken as the title of a movement, would be that we ought to insist upon the rightness of our cause in order to stimulate a greater zeal in its supporters. That is a perfectly legitimate aim, but it is not in that sense that the phrase has any special attraction for me. We may, on the other hand, put all the emphasis on the last word, and then the suggestion is that we should keep vividly before ourselves that righteous cause for which we are fighting, in order that we may be sure of serving it by the victory which, with God's help, we are determined to win. It is this side of the matter which strongly appeals to me.

There can be no doubt that the temper of the people, at least as represented in the Press, is less idealistic now than at the opening of the war.

¹ The substance of an address delivered at Queen's Hall on March 21, 1916.

This may be inevitable, but is none the less regrettable. We went into the war, quite free from any desire for conquest or self-aggrandizement, to uphold public right; and the great question really at stake in this war is not whether at the end of it Great Britain is to be stronger than Germany or Germany stronger than Great Britain, but whether there is to be recognized in the world such a thing as the public law of nations. The grouping of the Powers is no accident, and it seems to me that the most illuminating thing that has taken place during the war is the fact that Italy was a member of the Triple Alliance and is now fighting for the Entente, while her place in the Alliance has been taken by Turkey. In the result you have a combination of just those Governments who believe in what we should call oppression as a definitely right principle. There is no need to speak of Turkey. The Turks are in many ways a fine people; they are admirable hosts and usually gallant enemies, but they are intolerable rulers. Wherever the hand of the Turk has rested, desolation has followed; and in the recent massacre of Armenians we have an illustration of Turkish methods.

The state of affairs in Austria is not essentially much different. Austria consists of three main sections. Of these it would appear that Galicia is the most fortunate, as it is, indeed, almost the

only place where the Poles are tolerably happy. This is partly due to the fact that they are given license, which they freely use, to make life wretched for the Ruthenes. In German Austria there is a subject population in Bohemia whose people, the Czechs, are members of the Slav race. I was in Prag in the spring of 1906. As I left my hotel to see the many sights of that most beautiful city, the hotel porter said: "Do you know your way about?" I said: "No, but I can ask." He replied: "What language shall you ask in?" I said: "German." He then said: "They won't answer you if you speak to them in German." So I asked whether the people there did not know German. "Oh yes," he said, "of course they know it: it is the only official language, and is necessary in trade; but they won't speak to anyone who addresses them in the street in German." That represents the degree of cordiality which existed at that moment between the Bohemians and their German rulers; and yet in constitutional theory the Bohemian people are free and on political equality with the Austrians.

Still worse, however, as it would seem, is the state of affairs in Hungary. Here the dominant population, the Magyars, are only just over half the total. They have adopted a deliberate policy for the Magyarization of Hungary, and both the Roumanians, and the Serbs and Croats, receive

singularly little consideration. I may quote some illustrations from that admirable book, *The War and Democracy*.

“Two years ago, at the funeral of a Roumanian poet at Kronstadt (Transylvania), gendarmes pressed up to the hearse and clipped off the colours from a wreath which had been sent by the Society of Journalists in Bucharest. About the same time a nurse was sent to prison because a child of three was found wearing a Roumanian tricolour bow, and its parents were reprimanded and fined. Last July, on the very eve of war, fifteen theological students, returning to Bucharest from an excursion into Transylvania, were arrested at the frontier by Hungarian gendarmes, hauled by main force out of the train, sent back to Hermannstadt, and kept for days in gaol; their offence consisted in waving some Roumanian tricolours from the train windows as they steamed out of the last station in Hungary!”

“In 1898 a well-known Slovak editor was sentenced to eight months' imprisonment for two articles severely criticizing the Magyarization of place-names in Hungary. On his return from prison he was met at the railway-station of the little county town by a crowd of admirers: songs were sung, a short speech of welcome was delivered, and a bouquet of flowers was presented. The sequel of this perfectly orderly incident was that no fewer

than twenty-four persons, including Mr. Hurban, the leading Slovak poet, were sentenced to terms of imprisonment varying from fourteen days to six months. The three girls who had presented the flowers were let off with a fine of £16."

When we pass to Germany this imposition of foreign methods and customs by a dominant people is less obvious, because the German Empire almost entirely consists of members of a single race; but we have seen in Alsace-Lorraine, with Zabern incidents and the like, where Prussian rule of an alien population works out, and in Prussian Poland the principle is even more apparent. There is great light thrown on the whole issue of the war by the chapter in Prince Bülow's book, *Imperial Germany*, which deals with Poland. He describes a system whose aim was to expropriate Polish landlords and substitute German landlords in their place: The suppression of the Polish language was also systematically undertaken. But the important point is this: he does not justify this action by any argument from military necessity, such as the nearness of Poland to Berlin, but by the plea that it is obviously better that the Poles be forced to live as Germans; and this plea is manifestly sincere. That is the whole horror of the thing. Here you have a group of Governments who definitely believe in forcing upon people a manner of life.

You turn to the opposing group of Powers. France is perhaps the country in which the people have more initiative politically than in any other. Italy is the very child of the revolutionary movement. Belgium is a country whose socialist Secretary of State we have been honoured to receive among us. Even Russia, though she is a military autocracy in foreign politics, is a nation which has carried social equality and democracy in local government to very great lengths.

Most important of all for us is an understanding of the nature of the British Empire. It is possible to regret that the word "empire" was ever used of the British Dominions. It suggests that our "empire" is just one more in the line of succession with Assyria, Babylon, Macedonia, and Rome. But it is nothing of the kind. It is a wholly new fact; there has been nothing at all like it in the world before. The Germans noticed before the war that we held it in a very light grasp; they seem to have thought that if they could, as it were, shake our hand, it would drop out and lie there for them to pick up. And then they found out (which does not matter), but we also found out (which matters a great deal), that we were not holding it at all; it was holding on to us. There is no sort of reason for the British Empire's continued existence except the desire of its component parts that it should exist. If Canada wished to join the United States,

we could not stop her. If Australia wished to "cut the painter" and assert her independence, we could not stop her. Even India, though she looks forward to taking control of her own destiny, would rather be a member of this Empire than accept any alternative actually open to her. But most remarkable of all is South Africa. The attitude of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand might be accounted for by the fact that they are united to us by ties of race and sentiment. But South Africa is largely, if not predominantly, Dutch by race and sentiment. That the Dutch General who so lately led his people in war against our Empire should have been now winning victories on its behalf is as significant a fact as any in the secular history of mankind; for it is the proof, once and for all, of the possibility of that free family of states whose establishment shall at last be the guarantee of the world's peace. However far off the realization of that ideal may be, what has happened in South Africa is proof of its possibility.

But all this means that the root principle of the British Empire is Liberty. It is, in fact, the greatest achievement of Liberty hitherto. This fact has been obscured by the unfortunate circumstance that those among us who have talked most about the Empire have not seemed to care much for the development of Liberty at home, while those who have worked for Liberty have not seemed to care

about the Empire. Yet so it is: the Empire rests on Liberty; it exists because its component parts desire that it should. That is a new kind of Empire altogether. Never before has there been a confederacy of free states, separated by vast oceans, held together by mutual goodwill.

But if this is at all a true account of the two opposing parties in this conflict, then you may say that the principle at stake is that dual principle of which one side is Law and the other is Liberty; for these two are inseparable the one from the other. This dual principle we must keep constantly in view in order that our success may secure its further application, and in order that when the international conflict is over we may turn our attention again to our own nation, and make it more than ever before the home of true Liberty and Justice, worthy of the sacrifice which its sons have made on its behalf.

THE CONSECRATION OF ENGLAND¹

BY

EVELYN UNDERHILL

MANY of the most clear-sighted amongst us see in the struggle which is now going on something more, even, than the greatest of all secular wars. They see in it the outward and awful sign of that disharmony inherent in the universe, which gives rise to the eternal spiritual strife between good and evil; between the divine forces which make for concord, and in the end for mutual love, and the primitive savage forces which make for aggression and self-seeking. In this perpetual struggle between the constructive and destructive tendencies of life, the present war is a phase of unexampled intensity—a phase in which, because of the dreadful daily incidents which surround us, it is not always easy to discern the divine forces at work, to see the God of mercy, beauty, and goodness achieving His difficult will. We are shocked and distressed by the cruelty and waste through which, as it seems, that will must now express itself:

¹ Address given at the West London Mission on June 4, 1916.

many are left puzzled, tormented, without any sure foundation for hope.

Seen thus from outside, the strife of nations, and the inner mystery of which that strife is an awful sacrament, does indeed hide its real secret from us. Only by yielding ourselves to its measure, by a humble co-operation in the movement of life, can we hope to understand something of the strange figure which it is treading, and so find the eternal peace which dwells even at the heart of war. As some difficult new music seems a mere noise when we listen to it in a mood of critical detachment, yet reveals to those who listen with their hearts and give themselves to its movement the secret harmony and beauty on which it was built; so the apparent discords and strange rhythms of existence are only comprehended by us when we surrender ourselves to the great impulses which God sends thrilling through His world.

This war, we say, is a phase in the long struggle between that power within the universe which makes for moral beauty and the unsubdued physical force which resists it: as Jacob Boehme would say, between the dark fire and the light. To England and her Allies have been given the great honour and great responsibility of fighting on the side of moral beauty—of suffering for those principles of rightness which we feel in our souls represent God's ideal for the world. And here by moral

beauty we mean something far greater than ordinary morality: anything which aims merely at the greatest happiness of the greatest number. We mean something loftier than this, as holiness is loftier than goodness; for, like holiness, moral beauty belongs to the supernal order, and involves the setting up of eternal values within the temporal world. It is for this spiritual thing, for this vindication of divinity, as expressed in the conceptions of justice, of freedom, of humanity, of mercy towards the weak, that we are called to fight under circumstances of the utmost material horror. We fight against an opponent whose aim is selfish and aggressive; whose national ideal has been disclosed to us as the ideal of the successful wild beast, the enemy of all but the members of its own pack, and indifferent to all but the satisfaction of its own appetites. We, then, with our Allies, are defending the best gifts of the past and the best hopes of the future against a sudden recrudescence of the savage and disintegrating instincts which still lurk in the subsoil of human consciousness. Such a statement need involve no claim to complete moral superiority. We may yet allow that on both sides there are plainly mixed motives at work; that on both sides there is individual self-seeking, on both sides individual nobility and self-sacrifice. But it does involve the claim that the general spirit and object of the Allies is a moral

spirit and a moral object; that it is right in itself, and possesses, as I have said, Moral Beauty. However diverse the symbols under which they conceive the objects of the struggle, at bottom they are fighting, as a French boy of nineteen said in one of his letters from the Front, because they are "in love with the righteousness that must be established afterwards."

So unless the end for which God is working in creation is simply the splendour and power of the successful wild beast raised to the highest levels of efficiency and intelligence, the Allied armies are fighting on the side of progress, and therefore on the side of life. Already the principles for which we struggle, the great tendencies upon which human history is built, have declared themselves; and it is the duty of all those who have the power and opportunity of thought to keep those great tendencies within the field of the national consciousness. The struggle is indeed between two mutually exclusive ideals of human life: between the separatist and self-seeking ideal of the wild beast, whether expressed in terms of individual or of national aggression, and the social ideal which first emerges in the herd, the tribe, and the family, which develops in richness and beauty as we ascend the ladder of life, and which does really seem to represent the line along which the creative will is working, the object which the creative strife is to achieve.

Germany has turned back to the conceptions which governed of necessity the first raw beginnings of life; when every creature struggled for itself against every other creature, and recognized no other law than that of physical strength. Her claim is in essence that a strong nation, like a strong wild beast, may kill, maim, and destroy as it chooses. As regards other nations, she has repudiated those obligations of mutual respect and mutual service on which all social life is built. In fighting her, therefore, we fight against that relapse to old levels, that degradation of the soul, which is of the very essence of evil. Because we believe in the moral rightness of the social ideal, and hold that this—since at bottom it is based on love—is what God is striving for in the world, we must now consecrate ourselves to the task of defeating, first on the battlefield and then in the heart, that other selfish and ungodly ideal of life which has obsessed the German people, and through them seeks to impose itself on the modern world. This is what we mean when we speak of fighting for the right, and insist on the spiritual character of the war.

This spiritual character has been realized from the first, not only by those whose profession inclines them to the philosophic point of view, but also by the military and political leaders of the State. For the first time since Cromwell, we see

the rulers of this nation consciously embarked upon a transcendental enterprise, consecrating the armed forces of the Empire to the achievement of an ideal good. "This war," said the Prime Minister on its second anniversary, "is something more than a mere clash of arms." "Against our enemies," said General Smuts, telegraphing from East Africa on the same occasion, "are ranged the great unseen spiritual forces of human progress. It is for us to take our stand with these forces."

We are not alone in feeling thus. Our French allies, too, are keenly aware—perhaps more keenly than ourselves—that it is in fact a supernatural struggle in which they are risking their nation's very life; that there is a sense in which they may claim to be fighting the battles of the Eternal Truth.

"The France of today," says Paul Sabatier, "is fighting religiously. Catholics, Protestants, Free-thinkers, we all feel that our sufferings renew, continue, and fulfil those of the innocent Victim of Calvary. But they are birth pangs; and so, though we may die of them, we cannot fail to bless the present hour, and take up with rejoicing the task before us. We have found again the secret of the life of nations: to work together at a hard task, and to be faithful to the Spirit of Life embodied in creation."

The work of the Fight for Right Movement,

which involves the correlation of patriotic thought and feeling with patriotic act—the welding of the national consciousness into one strong weapon devoted to the cause of right—remains incomplete until this profound spiritual conception of our present duty has become the inspiration of the daily life of every man and woman in the land. Only then will the nation be fully mobilized for the purposes of the war: when all are working together at their hard task, not from motives of revenge, nor for material victory alone, but in order to be “faithful to the Spirit of Life embodied in creation.” Nothing less than such a total consecration, such an idealization of the concrete, can suffice us. All our faculties—spirit, mind, and feeling, as well as physical power—must be brought into play: for only thus shall we be able to do our best. We must warmly feel and clearly understand the whole greatness of our part, the sublime nature of our opportunity, if we are to respond to the demand which events now make upon the corporate and individual life. The consecration of England therefore means the consecration of each one of us: our whole lives given and offered, our part, however inconspicuous, gladly and proudly accepted in the mysterious sufferings which surround us—sufferings through which, if we are faithful to the trust that has been given us, the purposes of God may at last be fulfilled.

Plainly, if the struggle be indeed a conflict of the spirit, it is not enough to send our men to fight in the trenches or in the fleet. They are the cutting-point of England's sword: but ours is the weight that drives it home. We too, then, must fight; must back them up by our firmness, patience, and courage. We, too, must take our risks and accept our honourable wounds,—bereavement, hardship, loss,—making with a cheerful simplicity of heart not only the great sacrifices which may be asked of us, but also the smaller, more lingering, less impressive renunciation of habits, privileges, preferences, and comforts.

It is obvious that this consecration of the civilian to the common lot cannot, in most cases, involve anything very grand or sensational. For most of the so-called non-combatant population, the war can only mean the willing or unwilling endurance of a succession of wearing anxieties, irritating restrictions, monotonous tasks. It means that incessant attention to the homely and practical detail of life, without which no ideal cause can succeed. It means sticking to work, however arduous and uninteresting; sacrificing holidays, however hardly earned. It means using our brains—and using them hard—in the endeavour to understand the economic problem. It means acting on the uncomfortable knowledge thus obtained. It means that every man must measure his use of tobacco

by the difficulties of our carrying trade; that every housewife must take the interests of England with her into the kitchen in the morning. It means eking out the meat, saving the sugar, making the tea and coffee go further, taking a new interest in the soda and soap. It means finding out what we ought and what we ought not to buy. It means economizing labour and fuel to the utmost of our ability. It means avoiding American goods. It means old clothes. It means, in fact, looking on every penny as a munition of war, to be used to our country's best advantage.

All this is the least that we can do for those who are dying for us. But beyond this, since it is not only for us but for right in itself that these men are fighting and dying, it becomes our religious duty to support them with our thoughts and words no less than with our deeds. To deny ourselves the pleasure of repeating gloomy prophecies, scandalous tales, or foolish rumours likely to injure the national morale. To cultivate that spirit of pure devotion, that faith, hope, and charity, through which alone true victory—the victory of the English soul—can come. Such a spirit is not easy to win: less easy to keep unsullied during the long dragging months of the war. If we are to achieve it, to consecrate ourselves indeed, we must fight a battle with ourselves not less violent than the war we wage upon the enemy.

There is an old picture in the National Gallery—perhaps the votive offering of one who had learned the intimate connection between the battles of the spirit and the battles of the flesh—which sums up in three symbols the duty and the hope of all those who are now called to fight for the right. It is the picture of two great soldiers. The first does not look like a soldier. He is an old man in cloak and hood, with the face of one who has suffered much and unveiled many of the secrets of life: St. Anthony, who fought for years long and terrible battles with the enemies in his own nature. In him one aspect of the universal strife is embodied; that unrelaxed interior warfare which is the secret of the spiritual life, the struggle against evil desires, selfishness, slackness—the victory of right in each man's soul. The other soldier, his companion, is St. George. He is the type of those who go out to fight the evil that is in the world, to defeat cruelty and aggression, and all who oppress the weak; and so make the earth a better place for their fellow-men. St. George is in full armour. He does not despise the help of material things. He has no conscientious objection to using his sword; for it is evil expressing itself in material form, a dragon that preys upon women and children, terrorizes whole countries, destroys beautiful and holy things, which he has undertaken to defeat. St. Anthony fights to deliver his own soul: St.

George, to deliver his fellow-men. They represent the two halves of the duty of man.

I said that there were three symbols in this picture. What is the third? It is the crown and conclusion of the whole. Above these two soldiers, blessing them both, there appears a vision of the Virgin Mary holding in her arms the Holy Child: God made manifest in the flesh, the divine shining out in our human life. It is here, in this appearance of Christ's spirit amongst us, that we may find the third and completing term, which makes plain the dreadful paradox of war, and resolves the disharmonies between the active and contemplative life. For that vision of transfigured humanity both justifies and depends upon those two forms of the universal strife which St. Anthony and St. George represent: the courageous and unremitting battle with the inward and outward forces of evil, wherever they may be found.

“And after long woe, suddenly our eyes shall be opened: and in clearness of light our sight shall be full.”

TO THE MEN BEHIND THE ARMIES¹

BY

EMILE CAMMAERTS

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:

It is possible that you may remember having seen a reproduction of the drawing by Forain of two French *poilus*, covered with mud and exposed to an infernal shell-fire. "Let's hope," says one, "that they'll hold out." "Who?" asks the other. "Why! the civilians."

Not the soldiers in the trenches, lashed by the rain and bitten by the frost, but the civilians, in their snug homes, with their feet upon the hearth; not those at "the front," who, every instant in danger of death and the most horrible mutilations, live the brutal and primitive life of savages; but those "behind," who sleep in beds, eat at well-furnished tables, and enjoy, by comparison, full comfort and security.

There is a bitter irony in these words, but at the same time a profound truth. The greater our

¹ An address delivered on February 18, 1917, at the Æolian Hall, at a meeting of the Fight for Right Movement.

experience of the present war becomes, the more surely do we grow convinced that the ultimate result will be found to depend as much upon the patriotism of the non-combatants as upon the valour of the Army. In this colossal struggle it is not alone the generals who have the control of the operations. The part played by the Government is every whit as important. It is not only the soldiers who fight with gun, and bomb, and bayonet; it is the workmen, the capitalists, the shopkeepers, the writers, who fight with hammers, money, and pens.

For, as we are often reminded, it is not here a question of material resources alone; we are not concerned to know simply who will be able to produce the greatest number of guns, the largest store of munitions; we must know also who will prove themselves capable of the greatest sacrifice, who will possess the truest faith and show the most genuine unselfishness. Our armies, if they are to conquer, must not only be supported by all the material power of their peoples; they must also have the consciousness of all the unknown virtues, all the inflexible hopes, all the fervent prayers of the grown men, of the aged, of the women, and of the children who are behind them. It is only when the weakest among us shall have given the best of his strength and the very essence of his being to the common cause that the sun of

victory shall rise. It is only when the war shall have absorbed us all and wholly that we may begin to hope for peace. It is only when the uttermost grain of corn shall have been sowed that we may look for our harvest.

If Germany and her vassals were not wholly at the orders of a military dictatorship, this fact would be entirely to our advantage. For how may we compare the patriotism of the allied nations with that of this motley throng of peoples that Prussia drags at her heels? But, in spite of the efforts which have been made in the countries of the Entente to co-ordinate and organize our efforts, it is impossible to apply, from day to day, to free men, in seven or eight different countries, those radical measures which Hindenburg, by a stroke of his pen, imposes upon his slaves, both civil and military, from Antwerp to Persia. The very ideal for which we are fighting robs us of certain practical advantages; an iron discipline, for instance, and unity of command. Our Governments require our support before they demand our services. From this state of things a certain loss of time and energy necessarily results. For this loss we, the civilians behind the Army, must make up by a more diligent watchfulness, a more eager enthusiasm, and a more spontaneous generosity, or else may it not happen one day that our love of liberty is charged against us as a culpable weakness?

When some among us give way to discouragement; when others—and this is more serious—delude themselves to such a degree that they become blind to the gravity of the situation and continue to pursue their own selfish aims; when, finally, yet others raise their voices in protest against the measures which the Government is forced to take, unless our chances of success are gravely to be endangered, it is by citing the example of the Army that we most generally seek to shame such people. “You are in despair, while at the front optimism is universal; you shrink from giving your time and money, while at the front no one hesitates to sacrifice his life; you clamour against a few paltry directions, a few timid restrictions, while at the front our soldiers cannot take a step or say a word which is contrary to the military rule.”

This argument has some weight with those who have relatives in the Army; but it is not wholly convincing. Here we are so far from the war that, unless we have some little imagination, we are unable to picture to ourselves either its horror or its splendour. Discipline at the front is not that of the parade ground. It is a necessity. *Esprit de corps* stifles all egoism and every man perceives vaguely that, for the greater part of the time, it is less dangerous to obey than to hesitate. This in no way lessens the value of individual bravery

—of which God knows what good cause we have to be proud!—but it explains to a certain extent how, out of millions of men, it is hard to discover even a few cowards. One cannot seriously compare the life in the trenches, the close daily intercourse of all the men in a section, of all the sections in a company, the perfect comradeship which grows up between the soldier and his fellows, the devotion that unites the men and their officers—those intimate relationships upon which depend the existence of each and the success of all—one cannot compare such a life with that of the clerk or the shopkeeper behind the battle lines, who, having done his day's work, gets back to his home or offers himself some pleasant diversion. In theory, perhaps, the workman who turns a shell, the employee of a Government department, and the peasant who sows his fields, are as necessary to success as the infantryman in the trenches; but, in reality, these men can feel the burden neither of quite the same responsibilities nor of quite the same duties.

If the energies and patriotism of some of us are, after thirty months of war, still in need of any galvanizing, it is not so much to the example of our soldiers that I would direct their notice, but to that of certain other civilians, people who, like themselves, wear the overall or the jacket, who, for all their weapons, carry a stick or an umbrella,

and who, living side by side with a detested enemy, have not even the satisfaction of being able to return him blow for blow and wound for wound. I speak, of course, of those seven millions of Belgians, isolated from the rest of the world after the fall of Antwerp, who, after thirty months, still, with an admirable resolution, maintain their struggle against their conquerors.

.

These are people who enjoy none of the heartening advantages of military life. They cannot so much as comfort themselves by reflecting that they are indirectly working for the war. Work has become hateful to them, since they know that it is the enemy who benefits by their labours. They can do nothing; it is their duty to do nothing; and at every moment starvation threatens them. It is forced idleness; it is the "strike of patriotism." Nor have they, like us, the satisfaction of giving vent to their feelings or of hoisting their flags. Even their womenfolk have ceased to wear tri-colour cockades, so that they may thus escape the insults and violence of the German officers, who do not hesitate to tear them off in the open street. The National Anthem may no longer be played unless on exceptional occasions upon the organs of the churches. Lately a boy was condemned to three months' imprisonment for having dared

to whistle it in the street. No national fête may be held. It is a criminal offence for a shopkeeper to close his shop or to alter, for the occasion, the display in his window; and to possess the portraits of King Albert and Queen Elizabeth has become a crime.

Ladies and gentlemen, it is possible that there may be among you people who believe that they are quite able to live happily without hearing "God Save the King" or seeing the Union Jack. These things are obviously nothing but symbols; and of what value are symbols for those who possess the realities for which they stand? So long as you are free to sing what you will and to wear in your buttonholes all the colours of the rainbow, it is, of course, open to you to adopt a superior attitude towards such "trifles." But let us suppose that the Germans were drilling in Trafalgar Square, and that their regiments were parading down the Strand, and tell me where you would find the "aesthete," the "intellectual," or the "pacifist" who would be bold enough any longer to smile at these "worn-out symbols of the past"—these holy relics of your national sentiment. Our Socialist workmen never sang the "Brabançonne" before the war. Today they are singing it, in the teeth of their gaolers, while the trains, filled with those who are being deported, make their way towards Germany.

Having crushed all patriotic demonstrations throughout Belgium, the Germans have set themselves to the task of poisoning the spirit and corrupting the soul of our people. Since the Belgian newspapers have ceased to appear rather than submit to the German censorship, they have created and now subsidize a number of journals with patriotic titles, such as *La Belgique* and *Le Bruxellois*, printed in French and Flemish, in the columns of which the most infamous accusations are made against the Allies and the Belgian Government. They have also posted notices, even in the smallest provincial villages, which give news of the war, and in which they announce, amongst other falsehoods, that the Allies have abandoned their intention of setting Belgium free, and that King Albert has taken refuge in England. When one remembers that in Belgium, at the beginning of 1915, a copy of *The Times* cost as much as £4, and that today it is almost impossible to obtain a foreign newspaper, one asks oneself by what miracle of good sense and loyalty the people have remained deaf to such propaganda. And this to such a degree that when certain Belgians succeeded in crossing the frontier, they were amazed to find that the refugees and the English people in London were less optimistic than themselves. Through steadily believing the opposite of that which the posters and the German news-

papers told them, the Belgians had come to believe no longer in anything but victories of the Allies. The check sustained last summer by the invasion of Rumania could alone give them a more correct idea of the situation. "It will be for this summer, no doubt," one of them said to me the other day, "but if another winter is necessary, they will wait, over there. We have acquired patience."

Ladies and gentlemen, I ask you, dare we, in the face of so much confidence and so stoical a resignation—dare we still complain that the war is a weariness, and that we have had enough of it? How may we "have enough of it," with the knowledge that is ours, with the pledges of victory which we possess, when there, out of that slough of lies and calumnies that the Germans have created, the voices of our friends cry to us: "Take your time. We will wait as long as may be necessary."

.

Germany has not succeeded in destroying the soul of Belgium, but she has succeeded, to some extent, in ruining her people. She has systematically requisitioned their harvests, their cattle, their raw material, and their machinery—in short, she has emptied the country of all that was in it, as a gang of robbers might empty a well-found

house. She has absorbed all our agricultural products, paralyzed our commerce, and utterly destroyed our national industries. The material wealth which she has thus carried off may not easily be estimated; but it is possible to give you an approximate idea of the monetary imposts, taxes, and fines which she has levied during one year (from June, 1915, to June, 1916). These amount to the fabulous sum of twenty millions of pounds—though this is nearly six times the total of the ordinary direct taxes paid to the Belgian State before the war, when the country's prosperity was at its zenith. The inevitable consequences of this policy followed. At the end of two years 500,000 workmen were out of work and 3,500,000 persons—half the population—were threatened with starvation and were exposed to serious hardships, in spite of all the efforts of the Commission for Relief.

It was now that, in October last, the deportations of Belgian civilians began. As you know, the general condition of unemployment was only the excuse. All the healthy men between 17 and 55 years of age, rich or poor, whether they were in work or no, are now threatened with slavery. Already more than 200,000 of them have been taken. And those who refuse to sign a contract for work are sent either to the Western front, where, with blows and brutalities of every kind,

they are forced to work for the army, or else into Germany, where, in punishment camps, their captors do their utmost to crush their resistance by starvation. We have received the evidence, during the last two months, of hundreds of witnesses. Men who have been deported and who have proved unable to withstand the treatment which they have had to endure have been sent back, dying, into Belgium. Others have succeeded in escaping. We have seen some of these. We have spoken with them. All tell the same story.

Those who refuse to sign are subjected to a terrible régime. The Germans force them to work with blows of the rifle-butt or the bayonet. For all sustenance they give them each day two or three cups of acorn or beetroot soup. They are so hungry that they go at night to scratch among the refuse which their German gaolers throw out behind their huts. A fish-head or a bit of potato-peel is a delicacy which they share with scrupulous fairness and devour raw. Their clothes are in rags and they sleep on the damp earth. Many of them have gone mad. Those who are sent back into Belgium, to die in their own homes, look like old men, and their families have difficulty in recognizing them. Men from 20 to 30 years old have white hair; their backs are bent, their voices are harsh, their gaze is dull, and they walk with

difficulty, dragging their feet. The Germans massacred 5000 Belgian civilians in August and September, 1914; but today they are ruining the lives of tens of thousands of strong men, whose only crime is that they will not betray their country.

Ladies and gentlemen, confronted by such misery and horror, who amongst us may any longer complain? We are given rations; but what a feast would not our daily ration appear, not only in the eyes of these unfortunate people who have been deported, but even in those of the formerly rich Belgian townsmen! We are asked to work. But how might we refuse our services to our own country and to our own Government, while Belgian civilians refuse, at the cost of what savage martyrdom! to assist their enemies? We are asked to have patience, and to endure calmly and with good temper such hardships as the existing situation imposes upon us. How might we dare to hesitate in our response to this appeal, when we learn the heroic and supremely patriotic conduct of those who live in the conquered territory? Let those who doubt speak with those who have been deported. Let them read their letters. "We are two or three hundred men here. They cannot kill us all. *It would not be right were our lot better than that of our brothers in the trenches.* We cannot take a

step without being menaced by the bayonets of our gaolers. *I am hungry . . . but I will never work for them.* "Hold on!" writes the author of a pamphlet that has been smuggled out. "*Upon our steadfastness hangs the liberation of Belgium from slavery and ruin.* If they wish to carry us away, let them come and drag us one by one from our homes. Let no one offer himself, neither employer, nor workman, nor priest, nor clerk, neither the man who is out of work nor he who has employment. Let them arrest us all! *Rather all than a few! L'union fait la force!*"

.

Ladies and gentlemen, when, last December, the German Government sought, by its shadowy proposals for peace, to weaken the Allies, it was not without some hesitation that the Belgians who had taken refuge abroad declined to consider the possibility of negotiations being begun. How, indeed, could they assume so great a responsibility without informing themselves upon the views of their brothers who were still in Belgium, for whom, if the struggle should be continued, the results must be so terrible? We therefore did our utmost to obtain a true idea of the state of mind existing in those parts of Belgium which were in

the occupation of the enemy, and we became profoundly convinced that the Belgian nation, in spite of the miseries which it has suffered, is just as firmly resolved to persist to the end as are the English or the French peoples. All those who are clothed with religious and civil authority, from Cardinal Mercier down to the humblest village *curé*, and from the senators and deputies down to the smallest parish councillor, have preserved their patriotism without a stain. And the working classes, for whom, more than for anyone else, the present situation spells misery, show no less enthusiasm. Listen to the last sentence of that eloquent appeal which, at the beginning of the deportations, the workmen of Belgium addressed to the workmen of all nations: "Let our tortures be what they may, *we will not accept any peace which does not assure the independence of our country and the triumph of justice.*" Everywhere we find the same force, the same uncompromising determination. After thirty months of captivity, a prisoner of war lately wrote: "*Even if the war goes on for another five years, I would rather have it than an indecisive peace.*"

In occupied Belgium there are no pacifists. Nor, ladies and gentlemen, would there be any here, did not the remoteness of danger and the leisure which our freedom gives us provide the theorists with an opportunity of building their

castles in the air. There is nothing like a reign of terror for bringing about a union of forces, nor for awakening patriotism like the perpetual presence of a hated enemy. A German newspaper states that in less than one year 100,000 persons have been condemned by the military tribunals in Belgium. Already many hundreds of people have been condemned to death; and in nearly every case for reasons similar to those which brought about the tragic end of Miss Cavell.

Personally, I am convinced that if London endured the same régime, the number of English martyrs would be no less than that of the Belgian. I believe, indeed, that many of our "peace cranks" and "C.O.'s" would be the very first to rush to arms should a German army attempt to descend upon England. At the beginning of the war we witnessed a great number of such conversions in France and Belgium. It would be, unfortunately, a dangerous experiment to make, and those who are in doubt upon this point will do well to profit by our experience. What is happening today in Belgium is a faithful picture of what would happen in England did we not adopt stringent measures for warding off the strokes of the enemy. There is no way out of this dilemma. Today it is necessary to work with all one's heart for one's own country or be forced to work, against one's will, for Germany; to respond cheerfully to the

appeal which our Government makes to us, or to subject ourselves to the persecutions of German officers; to serve our country as free men, or the Kaiser as his slaves.

THE FIGHT FOR RIGHT¹

BY

M. PAINLEVE (FRENCH MINISTER OF EDUCATION)

I HAVE the great honour of conveying to the City of London, the heart of England, the brotherly greeting of our nation, in the name of the French Government.

Two years ago the British Empire, of its own free-will, entered resolutely the terrific struggle which rends Europe and will decide the future of nations. In celebrating this anniversary, you celebrate the greatest deed that your land ever did in the course of its glorious history. By holding this commemoration under the ægis of the "Fight for Right" Society, you emphasize at the same time the ideal and the fixed purpose of the allied countries. "To fight for right" is the marching order for us all. We desire only what is equitable, but we shall fight on till we win it; and win it we shall. When war broke out, we stood for

¹ Speech delivered at the Mansion House on August 4, 1916, on the occasion of the meeting organized by the Fight for Right Movement to celebrate the second anniversary of the war.

right against violence: today our vast resources are marshalled and systematized, and we symbolize Right armed with strength.

The scales of Destiny, after long hesitation, are already inclining, and every day will incline yet more, to the side of righteousness. Every day, on all the fronts, the pressure on Germany and her accomplices becomes more formidable. From Russia, that inexhaustible reservoir of doughty soldiers, new armies spring forth, which by their *élan* burst through all obstacles. Italy has exacted punishment for the insolent attack of her invaders, her old-time foes. In the Balkans, side by side with the allied contingents, the Serbian army, which was said to have been annihilated—the Serbian army, banished but still in being, waits impatiently on the confines of its devastated fatherland.

While Verdun remains inviolate after six months of unprecedented assaults, while our bloody and victorious watch still endures around her sacred citadel, your millions of men in their turn enter the furnace of war. You bring to the Allies' aid not merely the silent but all-powerful vigil of your fleets upon the seas, not only your financial and industrial help, but you hurl on to the Continent all those sons of yours for the supreme grapple.

At this very moment, the most Prussian regiments and your battalions enlisted but yesterday are engaged in furious hand-to-hand encounters.

Despite acres of barbed wire, despite those villages now transformed into fortresses, despite their machine-guns, it is the Brandenburgers and the Prussian Guard who have to give ground.

The whole world admires the new virtues which this war has brought to light in our two nations, virtues which they seem to borrow from one another, without loss to the lender. Our soldiers combine with the *furia francesca* the rock-like stubbornness of Wellington's men; yours display on our soil the headlong impetuosity of the victors of Jemmapes and Solferino. Presently, when rural peace shall reign afresh over the fiery line now devastated by shells and poison-gas, there will not be a yard of earth before which one cannot say with the poet of old: "Stay, traveller, you tread a hero underfoot."

Among the numberless heroes which our French land will hold in her pious keeping, how many were born in distant parts, in other climes! Yet through space they heard the cry of outraged humanity. Canadians—many of whom spoke our tongue—or Newfoundland lads, joyful to be able to serve with equal loyalty their old and their new motherland; sunburnt Afrikanders, whose continent faces the other pole; fearless Australians from countries but yesterday hardly more than fables in European ears,—all wished to be at the carnival, the colossal and terrible carnival. At

duty's call, all with the same eagerness—not one was wanting—the Free Dominions answered, “Present!”

And what of the men, the hundreds of thousands of men, who hurried from the other side of the globe to defend with their breasts our marshy plains of the Somme as if they had been their own native fields! Have we not here a new phenomenon at which History will marvel? These young, clear-eyed athletes, yesterday scattered over the five parts of the world—what mysterious force was it that guided them to the same corner of France, and drove them to the miry and bloody trenches? It was that force which neither sea nor mountain nor desert can stay, as real as that which resistlessly turns the compass needle to the north—respect for right, inflexible love of justice. The dull pedants beyond the Rhine in their gross materialism may scoff at—because they cannot realize—these imponderable influences. Yet mammoth guns and asphyxiating gases are unable to vanquish them. To fight this new barbarism the human conscience summons to a new crusade all men worthy of the name of men.

This imperious appeal from righteousness which tolerates no half-devotion, no half-fledged courage, was obeyed by little heroic Belgium on that tragic night when she sacrificed herself—she and

her great-hearted king—rather than purchase her safety with shameful complicity. Having enriched the heritage of humanity by her willing martyrdom, she will retain a deathless glory, a revivifying strength which will stun her murderers.

This imperious appeal of righteousness was heard by loyal England too, who, when she rose as one man when the rending of a scrap of paper sounded in her ears, when the German Chancellor asked anxiously *whether she had reckoned well the cost of honouring her signature*, promptly and fearlessly replied: "The cost does not matter."

That summons also gripped the crowd below the Capitol on the unforgettable night of May, 1915, when the poet d'Annunzio adjured Italy not to engage in vile bargainings, but to follow the Roman eagle's flight through the heavens.

The same imperious summons has, from the opening day of the war, ranged Russia and France beside outraged Serbia. France had no desire for war, nor had England, nor had any of the allied nations. One and all they were striving for a higher organization of humanity, wherein assassination would be banned and repressed among individual men.

Peacefully they were waging war on war: they wage it today, weapon in hand, and are bound to wage it to the end. They would betray the cause of justice entrusted to their charge, did they

relax their efforts before exacting complete reparation for the monstrous attack launched against the right of nations.

In vain does Germany, having missed her stroke, play the hypocrite and lament the disasters which she has let loose upon earth, and strive to lay upon others the onus of fresh butcheries. It was she who willed, planned, and declared the war. It is she who has waged it with calculating and ordered cruelty, with a methodical system of bloody terrorism. It is she who has multiplied her challenges to humane feeling, hole-and-corner murders, under legal fictions, such as those which did to death Edith Cavell and Captain Fryatt. She it was who renewed, expanding them to her own "kolossal" scale, the massacre and pillage of the great destroyers whose names have been execrated through the centuries. Belgium has been trodden under foot. The women, the girls, the young folk of our Flanders have been deported like gangs of slaves. Serbia has been depopulated; the Armenian nation wiped out to leave the ground free for the German colonists of the Bagdad Railway. Now, speaking to the most inveterate of pacifists, to those who have the greatest horror of bloodshed, I ask them: "Do you wish that men who have done such things should be the lords of tomorrow and triumph in their crimes? Do you desire that they should be able to break

out again? Is it your wish that such horrors should be possible again on our planet?" Ah, let us endure any sacrifices, any tests, let us shed all our blood—but not that! So long as the monstrous pride of Germany is not abased, so long as she does not rouse herself in disgust from her bloody madness, so long as that awful slaughtering-machine, Prussian militarism, is not shivered to atoms, the world will know neither freedom, nor safety, nor justice.

Gentlemen, we have often found ourselves at odds in the course of our history. When we disputed the honour of civilizing islands and new continents and the taking up of what your Kipling has termed "The White Man's Burden," North and South, East and West, we filled the world with the echoes of our encounters. But our wars were to those which German "Kultur" now drives us to as a fairly fought duel is to a footpad's midnight ambush. The wars we waged were humane and chivalrous. *We* did not finish off the wounded when they were down; *we* did not murder women and children; *we* did not hit below the belt; *we* did not poison the air for men to breathe. Those fights, stoutly fought by both sides, gave us nerves and muscles able to sustain the supreme test which destiny had in store for us. And, when I conjure up the centuries filled with our rivalry, instinctively there rises

before my eyes the picture of two brothers who, after treating each other roughly, turn later upon some deadly enemy.

Today, on land and sea our armies are blended. They are animated by a common generosity, not by a brutal lust for conquest, gain, or domination. The same breath of humanity and justice flutters their united standards. In the cause not of slavery but of freedom they multiply heroic deeds. Formerly, when knights wished to ratify an endless comradeship of arms, in a sacred cause, they would mingle in a costly chalice the blood from their veins. Today your blood trickles with our own through the vast cup of our ancestral lands. With ours, it imprints in the red dust of our soil our common device: Right is greater than Might. The ages to come shall not separate us again, for together we shall have won a triumph for right in the greatest and justest of wars, and together after victory we must see to it that this triumph remains the law of nations.

THE END

*A Selection from the
Catalogue of*
G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS



**Complete Catalogues sent
on application**

Brave Belgians

By
Baron C. Buffin

Preface by
Baron de Broqueville
Belgian Minister of War

Translated by
Alys Hallard

12°. \$1.50 net. By mail, \$1.65

This volume of accounts, collected so patiently by Baron Buffin, well deserved the award of the Audiffred Prize by the French Academy of Moral and Political Science. They make us live over again the whole campaign, from the heroic resistance at Liège down to the hard moments through which the Belgian army passed in its victorious defense of the Yser.

G. P. Putnam's Sons
New York

London

The War and Humanity

By

James M. Beck

A Notable Sequel to "The Evidence in the
Case"

"Mr. Beck's volume was a classic the moment it appeared. We know of no more logical and lucid discussion of the essential facts and problems of the great war, nor any more truly, consistently, and even vigorously American in its spirit. We should be well content to let it stand, if there were no other, as the authentic expression of the highest aspirations, the broadest and most penetrating vision, and the most profound convictions of the American nation on matters which have never been surpassed and have only twice been rivalled in vital interests in all our history."—*New York Tribune*.

THEODORE ROOSEVELT'S OPINION

"It is the kind of a book, which every self-respecting American, who loves his country, should read."

Revised and Enlarged Edition

Nearly 400 pages. \$1.50 net. By mail, \$1.65

At All Booksellers

G. P. Putnam's Sons

New York

London

The Evidence in the Case

A Discussion of the Moral Responsibility for the War of
1914, as Disclosed by the Diplomatic Records
of England, Germany, Russia, France
Austria, and Belgium

By

JAMES M. BECK, LL.D.

Late Assistant Attorney-General of the U. S.

With an Introduction by

The Hon. JOSEPH H. CHOATE

Late U. S. Ambassador to Great Britain

*14th Printing—Revised Edition with much Additional
Material*

12°. Over 280 pages. \$1.25 net. By mail, \$1.35

“Mr. Beck’s book is so extremely interesting from beginning to end that it is difficult when once begun to lay it down and break off the reading, and we are not surprised to hear not only that it has had an immense sale in England and America, but that its translation into the languages of the other nations of Europe has been demanded.”—*Hon. Joseph H. Choate in The New York Times.*

New York

G. P. Putnam’s Sons

London

Belgium:

Neutral and Loyal

The War of 1914

By

Emile Waxweiler

Director of the Solvay Institute of Sociology at Brussels,
Member of the Académie Royale of Belgium


12°. \$1.25 net. By mail, \$1.35

In order to clarify opinion and to correct wrong judgment, the author has not deemed it superfluous to weigh in the balance all the imputations that have been made against Belgium, even to the inclusion of those that do violence to common sense. There are five chapters, with the following titles: "Up to 7 P.M. of August 2d," "To Be or Not To Be," "Belgian Neutrality," "Imputations against the Loyalty of Belgium," "German Rules of Waging War and their Application to Belgium."

G. P. Putnam's Sons

New York

London



WWI Pers. - Proc. 2002

749845

2/2002

