No. 11

OXFORD PAMPHLETS

1914

FRENCH POLICY SINCE 1871

BY

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AND

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FOURTH IMPRESSION

Price Twopence net

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

HUMPHREY MILFORD

LONDON EDINBURGH GLASGOW

NEW YORK TORONTO MELBOURNE BOMBAY


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FRENCH POLICY SINCE 1871

The foreign policy of France, since 1871, is a fascinating subject. The history of France has always been the history of her foreign policy; for it is in their dealings with foreign friends and enemies that the French people have expressed most clearly their ambitions and ideals. Not that the thoughtful Frenchman has ever been indifferent to problems of domestic government and social organization. It was the French statesman Colbert who, as long ago as the seventeenth century, first reduced to a system the protection by the State of native industries. The wave of enthusiasm for democratic government, which swept over Europe in the early nineteenth century, spread outwards from France. More recently French thinkers have taken a foremost place among the pioneers of industrial co-operation and of socialism. But it would be difficult, if not impossible, to convince the French people as a whole that the supreme duty of the State is merely to secure good and just government for all its subjects, or an equitable distribution of material wealth. From the French point of view, a state which pursued no other objects would be as contemptible as a private individual who cherished no ambitions beyond those of earning an assured income and of leading a comfortable existence.

The Frenchman holds that the State, no less than the individual, should seek renown (*la gloire*) in performing

'deeds of noble note'. The French conception of glory has been modified from one age to another, sometimes for the worse, sometimes for the better. But, until comparatively recent times, the noble deeds expected of a powerful French Government were always deeds of war, to be accomplished in the name of some cherished national idea. Under Louis XIV the nation fought for natural frontiers, under Louis XV for colonies and commerce. The statesmen of the French Revolution roused their fellow countrymen to the most astounding military efforts by announcing that France would compel all other nations to be free in the same sense as herself. Under Napoleon I, and more obscurely under his nephew, Napoleon III, France aspired to impose her suzerainty by force of arms upon the whole of Western Europe. Since 1871 times have changed, and with them the temper of France. In the last forty-three years she has produced some visionary soldiers who dreamed of a new French ascendancy in Europe; but their vapourings have been nowhere more mercilessly satirized than in their own country. The French people are wise enough to know that they can no longer hope to overrun Europe, imposing their authority or their ideas of government at the point of the bayonet. They do not hope for this, and they have even ceased to wish that it were possible.

Still it is not to be expected that old traditions should be entirely extirpated in a moment, even by such a catastrophe as the Franco-Prussian war of 1870. That disaster made it imperative for France to maintain a huge military establishment, as a safeguard against future attacks; therefore, since 1871, the majority of Frenchmen have still been trained as soldiers, and still the influence of French military leaders upon national policy

is sometimes greater than the wisdom of their counsels. The French nation, as might be expected of a military nation, are keenly sensitive to any slight; they have not always avoided the mistake of supposing that any opposition to their cherished schemes must be the outcome of malevolence. They have ceased to think of war as the obvious means of furthering national interests; but they are by no means so pacific as the Anglo-Saxon peoples, who have hitherto dispensed with conscription. The foreign policy of France still strikes the average Englishman as too audacious and too restless. The French are less cautious than ourselves in counting the cost of foreign enterprises; what we call common prudence they would call want of spirit. And they are the more disposed to run great risks for relatively slight advantages, because they still believe that their national credit depends upon their foreign policy. The Minister of Foreign Affairs in a French Government is expected to pursue a policy which is not only safe and dignified, but something more. He must have a clear-cut programme, which holds out the promise of tangible results (for the French mind is attached to the concrete), and which at the same time is based upon some broad principle of right, or some far-reaching theory of the proper course of national development. Frenchmen do not demand that their foreign policy should be aggressive, in the sense of constituting a menace to other civilized states. But they are imbued with the idea that great states always are, and always must be engaged in competition, in a race for the acquisition of allies, of markets, of spheres of influence. They would feel humiliated if they thought that France was dropping out of the race from want of foresight, from timidity, or from lack of interest. It is not the

prize of victory which they value so much as the consciousness that their country is honourably distinguished in the competition.

Once we have grasped the French point of view, we have surmounted the chief difficulty under which an Englishman labours when he tries to understand French policy. There are other difficulties, and they are not to be underrated. The materials upon which to found a thorough judgement are not yet available. It is probable that France is bound by secret treaties, the nature of which we can only guess. The published treaties to which she is a party will not be fully intelligible until we know much more about her aims in subscribing to them, and her share in framing their provisions. These, however, are difficulties which beset us equally when we turn from France to the consideration of the foreign policy of any other modern state. The peculiar difficulty, in studying French diplomacy, is to apprehend and to keep in mind the French point of view; it is so different from that of the Englishman, whose insular position leads him to think of foreign relations as a regrettable necessity, and to demand of his statesmen that they shall only intervene in foreign complications when some very obvious and very pressing interest is at stake. For England, perhaps, this is the wiser rule of action. But the course which is safest for an island power may be highly dangerous for a continental power; and a theory of the mission of the State which suits the Anglo-Saxon temperament may be altogether unsuitable to Latin peoples. We should not only endeavour to understand how a Frenchman thinks about foreign policy; we should also do our best to appreciate the reasons which make him differ so widely from ourselves upon this topic.

Remembering then that, in a Frenchman's eyes, there is a world of difference between activity and aggression, between stealing a march upon a rival and aiming a blow at his existence, between winning a race and inflicting an injury, let us attempt to form some judgement of French foreign policy in the last forty years or so. Has it been aggressive? Has it carried competition to the point of wanton and unforgivable provocation? Has the mainspring of it been the desire to revenge upon the German Empire the disgraces and the losses of 1870? Or has it aimed at restoring French prestige, in a less dangerous way, by discovering and developing new fields for French influence? These are questions which cannot be answered with dogmatic confidence until the archives of all the Great Powers have been thrown open. But they are questions on which it is important that we should form a provisional judgement from such material as is available. For they concern the honour and the trustworthiness of a cherished ally.

These questions can best be answered in a brief historical survey. It is a complicated story that we have to tell; but it becomes simpler if one observes that there are three well-marked phases through which French policy has passed since 1871; and that in each successive stage there is one national interest which exercises a predominating influence upon the minds of French statesmen and determines their attitude towards other powers.

(1) From 1871 to 1880 the key-note of French statesmanship was expressed in the words, Recuperation and Reorganization. In these years the Republic, as it exists to-day, was founded and endowed with a fixed constitution. The Republic rapidly paid off the enor-

mous indemnity (£240,000,000) which the victorious German Empire had exacted. The army and the defences of the eastern frontier were put upon a satisfactory footing; and these were only the more striking manifestations of the new spirit of reform which was in the air. The nation, no less than the Government, set to work with amazing energy and success to build up national prosperity on new foundations. The French put away their old illusions and vaingloriousness; they cultivated the clearness of thought and thoroughness in action which had given victory to the Germans. It was for France a time of melancholy, of regrets, of stern self-examination, but any patriotic Frenchman, as he looks back upon the work of those ten years, must feel that there never was a more creditable period in the history of his people.

In foreign policy France did little during the years 1871–80. She stood in constant dread, perhaps exaggerated dread, of a new attack from Germany. The French people would never formally acknowledge the title of the German Empire to Alsace and Lorraine; it was hardly to be expected that they should, while the population of the ceded provinces remained obstinately French in sympathies—as it does to this day in Alsace at least, if not also in Lorraine. But on the whole the French people were wise enough to obey the warning of Gambetta, their most popular statesman in those days, who said: 'Think of it (*Revanche*) always and never speak of it.' A German historian complains that the German Empire, from the day of its birth, has always been 'burdened with a French mortgage', that is, with the danger implied in the latent hostility of France; and Bismarck taught his countrymen, only too well, the lesson that, for their own safety, France must be kept

in a state of weakness. France, however, did not allow herself the dangerous luxury of translating her natural resentment into action. There was, it is true, a prospect of a new Franco-German war in 1875; but it arose from a feeling, which prevailed in German military circles, that France had been let off too lightly in 1871, and that it was advisable to 'bleed her white'. War was averted by the intervention of Russia and of England; and Bismarck's apologists now allege that he never intended to do more than scare the French out of any thoughts of revenge which she might still be harbouring. Whatever his intentions, he had certainly acted in such a way as to give France every reason for strengthening her defences and for watching the slightest move of Germany with deep suspicion.

(2) In 1881 the French showed the world that they had at last recovered confidence and strength. That year saw the French occupation of Tunis and the beginning of the new colonial policy which, from that date to 1904, was the main interest of French statesmen. For twenty-three years France was engaged in acquiring and developing tropical or sub-tropical territories, partly in Africa and partly in the Far East. These new possessions were, and are, as Bismarck once sardonically remarked, 'colonies without colonists'. Since she lost Canada in the eighteenth century France has never aspired to become, like Great Britain, a mother of new nations. Indeed, if she had the aspiration, she would find it difficult to provide the emigrants, or to secure a land in the temperate zones where they could settle. But both in Africa and in Asia she has copied with remarkable success the model afforded by the Indian Empire.

At the fall of Napoleon there remained to France, of all the colonies which she had established in the seventeenth

and eighteenth centuries, only a few trading posts in India, a few of the West Indian Islands, the islets of St. Pierre and Miquelon off the coast of Newfoundland, and Cayenne (French Guiana) on the east coast of South America. When France began to think once more of colonial enterprises, it was to the Mediterranean that she first turned her gaze. Between 1830 and 1847 Algeria was completely subdued; and it was no mere accident that the Suez Canal was originally planned in France and was finally constructed (1859–69) by De Lesseps, a retired French diplomat. Napoleon III probably dreamed, as his uncle Napoleon I had dreamed, of a French protectorate in Egypt; he and his advisers certainly hoped that the Suez Canal would make the Mediterranean a highway for French trade with the Far East. Under Napoleon III France acquired Cochin-China, thus staking out for herself a considerable sphere of influence in Asia. But Napoleon III was distracted between many and conflicting schemes; there was no consistent plan in his colonial enterprises.

The Republic, in and after 1881, pursued a more energetic colonial policy than Napoleon III, because it was not distracted by any hopes of aggrandizement on the European mainland. Tunis was the first considerable prize to be gained (1881); and Tunis was occupied with the goodwill of England. At the European Congress of Berlin (1878) Lord Salisbury said to the French representative: 'Do what you think fit in Tunis; England will offer no opposition.' Neither did Germany oppose the occupation. In fact Bismarck had prompted Lord Salisbury's offer, in the hope of diverting France from the pre-occupation of *Revanche*. It seemed a remarkable piece of good fortune, an omen of returning prosperity, that such a prize could be obtained

without exciting the jealousy of the two powers whom Frenchmen regarded as most jealous of their nation.

The occupation of Tunis has indeed proved a landmark in the history of French colonial enterprise; though, like many other notable events, it has not produced the consequences which were predicted at the time. Tunis did not become a stepping-stone to Egypt, for reasons which we shall narrate hereafter; and, now that Italy has occupied Tripoli, to the east of Tunis, it is improbable that France will ever succeed in drawing nearer to the Nile delta. On the other hand, the possession of Tunis gave France a stronger claim to the Sahara and the Western Sudan, when the powers interested in the partition of Africa agreed to recognize the 'doctrine of the hinterland', the principle that any power which possesses the sea-coast is entitled to the inland districts of which that coast is the natural outlet. Further, it was in Tunis that the French first proved the value of a remarkably flexible and inexpensive system of colonization—the method of establishing a protectorate which allows the native forms of government to continue, under careful supervision, but gives the fullest opportunities for 'peaceful penetration' by the explorer and the merchant. It is a method which France has applied on an extensive scale since 1881. In 1885 she applied it to Madagascar in the Indian Ocean, and to the states of Tonkin and Annam in the Indo-Chinese peninsula. Quite recently (1912) she has applied it to the larger half of Morocco.

It is easier to pass a sweeping condemnation on such a method than to recognize the fact that, under certain circumstances, it affords the only way out of an intolerable position. Protectorates of this kind have too often been created to protect imaginary interests, to exploit unoffending populations, or to gain a monopoly of

commerce. But they are often as beneficial to the country which is annexed as to the power which annexes; with one or two glaring exceptions, they have always meant the establishment of better justice, better police, and greater security of person and of property. Every one must admit that Egypt, for example, is infinitely better governed under the British supremacy than she had been at any time since the Mohammedan conquest; and the history of independent Morocco between 1904 and 1912 is the best apology for the protectorate which France has now established in that country. Nor is it true to say that these protectorates, however justly exercised, are always founded upon an unjust usurpation. No one objects when the subjects of a civilized power begin to settle and to trade in a country like Tunis or Morocco. Every one agrees that, if these settlers are ill-used by the native government, their mother-country has the right to demand redress, and, if necessary, a reform of the laws and institutions which have produced oppression or have failed to prevent it. Why then should it be called unjust if, in the last resort, when protests have proved ineffectual, the offended power undertakes to reform and to supervise the offending government? No doubt the colonizing powers of Europe have sometimes alleged a grievance which did not exist, or have made a mountain of a molehill, in order to justify the establishment of a protectorate. But each case must be judged upon its merits; and we have no right to denounce France as a robber simply because she has become the protector of numerous uncivilized or half-civilized communities.

This, however, is a digression. If the French policy of protectorates has created difficulties between France and other powers, this is not because those powers disapprove

of the system, which they are equally ready to apply when opportunities occur, but because they complain that France has usurped a right of intervention which properly belonged to themselves, or that she has protected her own interests by destroying those of her rivals. The occupation of Tunis led at once to a complaint of this kind from Italy, who regarded Tunis as lying within her lawful sphere of interest, both on the score of geographical position and also because Italians were heavily interested in the foreign trade with Tunis. It was natural too that a country which had been a Roman province, and was now politically derelict, should be claimed as a suitable outlet for the trade and the colonial ambitions of the young Italian kingdom. Since France turned a deaf ear to these complaints, Italy proceeded to form the Triple Alliance with Austria and Germany (1882); and she was encouraged by her powerful allies to prosecute the feud. Until 1898 there was constant friction between Italy and France. Mutual ill will found expression in a war of tariffs, and in 1888 the two powers were on the brink of war.

Happily that crisis was averted, the feud has been healed; and Italy is now indemnified with Tripoli for her disappointment in Tunis. Still we must call it an ominous feud. It showed how inevitably the race for new markets and new spheres of influence was leading the European powers into quarrels which reacted on the European situation. Of such disputes France has had more than her full share — not because she has been more lawless than her rivals, but because she has been more energetic and adventurous. In the last thirty years no country has produced so many pioneers who have worked heart and soul to extend the influence of their native country by systematic exploration. There is something romantic,

indeed we might almost say fantastic, in the rapid extension of French power over the hinterlands of North-West Africa. Sometimes France has appropriated with surprising avidity a desert diversified by small and rare oases. Sometimes she has based a claim to more fertile districts upon the possession of a tiny outpost, hundreds of miles beyond the effective jurisdiction of any of her colonial governors. But she has not been singular in her methods. Her fault, if it be a fault, has consisted in the adroit circumvention of slower-witted rivals. Germany has never forgiven France for the skill with which France enveloped and hemmed in the German colony of the Cameroons, although the French success was ratified in 1894 by a convention between the two governments.

But until 1904 the most serious colonial rivalry of France was that with England. It was stimulated no doubt by memories of older quarrels in the eighteenth century. Frenchmen felt that, both in Canada and in India, the English had reaped where they had not sown. France entertained profound suspicions of English colonial policy, imagining that England was restlessly and insatiably ambitious of new conquests. These suspicions were strengthened by the English occupation of Egypt (1882), which was begun as a temporary measure of precaution, to protect the great European interests in that country when they were threatened by a native revolution, and which has continued ever since. As a matter of fact the suspicions were unfounded. Mr. Gladstone, the Prime Minister of that day, was sincerely anxious to keep England clear of the complications which were bound to follow if we interfered in Egypt. He desired the joint intervention of all the interested powers; and England only undertook the

task single-handed when every power, France among the rest, had declined to share in it. England remained in Egypt with the intention of restoring the native system of government to tolerable efficiency; but, before she had completed the work of reorganization, the new and formidable problem of the Sudan was thrust upon her; and though the solution of this problem was brought nearer by the capture of Khartoum (1898), the evacuation of Egypt has been indefinitely postponed.

It was long before France could bring herself to accept the English occupation as something more than a temporary expedient. As late as 1898 a singularly bold attempt was made by a French explorer, Major Marchand, to occupy the basin of the White Nile. The French flag was hoisted at Fashoda just when the English forces were entering Khartoum, three hundred miles lower down the river. The English refused to recognize the legitimacy of the French occupation, and the dispute was at length settled in England's favour; but not before it had threatened to produce a war in Europe. Happily this episode, which both countries have agreed to forget, was the last rumble of a storm-cloud which for sixteen years had overhung every frontier, from Western Africa to Eastern Asia, where French and English interests came into close contact. As Italy had become reconciled to France, so France entered by degrees upon friendlier relations with England.

The causes of the Anglo-French reconciliation were manifold. Undoubtedly one cause was the respect which each nation felt for the characteristic virtues of the other. One is tempted to say that the English and the French were predestined to be allies. No nations could be more unlike; but the very unlikeness made for mutual

respect. Englishmen have always admired the elasticity of the French temperament and the idealism of French policy. Frenchmen, on their side, have not been slow to recognize the pacific and reasonable character of the English, their readiness to accept a compromise and to abide loyally by an agreement. In the colonial sphere it has often happened that English interests have clashed with those of France. But a way of settlement, honourable to both parties, has always been discovered; and France has never had occasion to complain that England regards the prosperity of a competitor as an insult or a menace.

(3) The third period, from 1904 to 1914, has been remarkable for the steady and deliberate preparations of France to face the German peril. For at least ten years her statesmen have not only feared invasion, but have been pretty well informed of the plan of campaign which the German General Staff would pursue. Indeed the more militant of German newspapers, and the leading exponents of German strategy, have not troubled to disguise the intentions of the German governing class. The only doubts in French minds have been as to the date at which the German plan would be put in execution, and the exact nature of the pretext which would be alleged. It was, however, reasonable to expect that the blow would be struck when German military and naval expenditure had reached the maximum permitted by the state of the public revenue; and that the occasion would be found in the Franco-Russian alliance which the Pan-German party have affected to treat as a crime against European civilization.

The Russian alliance was in fact projected and concluded during the years 1891–7, when France asked for nothing more than freedom from continental embarrass-

ments and the fullest opportunity of developing French interests in Africa and Asia. Russia stood in need of loans from French financiers. France on her side felt that a Russian alliance would protect her against Germany, and might be a valuable support in her colonial rivalries with England. Some such measure of insurance was necessary to France; her population was becoming stationary, her colonial policy required the maintenance of a strong navy, and her military resources, relatively to those of Germany, were rapidly declining. But even in Bismarck's time the German Empire had watched with apprehension the growth of the Russian power on its eastern flank; and this apprehension was intensified as German statesmen, after Bismarck's fall, committed themselves more and more deeply to the support of Austrian designs in the Balkans. It was impossible for Russia to tolerate the prosecution of those designs, which involved the destruction or the mutilation of small Slavonic states. Germany and Austria-Hungary were steering a straight course towards a racial war of Teuton against Slav. They counted themselves superior to Russia in military organization, and were not afraid so long as Russia stood alone. But they feared that the Dual Alliance of France and Russia would be too strong for them; and they vented their irritation upon France.

From 1897 it was apparent that an armed conflict, of the Triple Alliance or its two Teutonic partners against the Dual Alliance, was well within the range of possibility. Neither Russia nor France desired a continental war; but their union was the most dangerous obstacle which German and Austrian projects of expansion had hitherto encountered. The one redeeming feature of the situation, from the German point of view, was that England also viewed the Dual Alliance with some

apprehension—as was shown by the fact that the English standard of naval construction was fixed, for some time after 1897, with reference to the combined strength of the French and Russian navies. It was fortunate for France that Germany was encouraged, by the outbreak of the South African War, to develop a new naval policy which could only be explained on the assumption that she intended, sooner or later, to strike directly or indirectly at British interests. The events of the present year, and especially the terms of the now notorious German bid for British neutrality, suggest that the immediate object of the German fleet-laws was to prepare for an attack upon French colonies. But undoubtedly the remoter object was the ruin of the British Empire; and the consciousness of a common danger brought England to the side of France just at the moment when Russia, owing to her war in the Far East with Japan (1904), was incapacitated from helping her ally. In the year 1904 England and France publicly made up their differences on the chief points which had hitherto kept them apart—the question of French fishing rights off Newfoundland, the question of the English occupation of Egypt, the question of French intervention in Morocco.[1] The most important features of the settlement were that the French withdrew their old demand for the evacuation of Egypt by some fixed date;

[1] Two of these disputes were old, the last was of comparatively recent date. France had now become mistress of the hinterlands behind Morocco, and her trade interests in that country had developed. She felt that the time was at hand when she could no longer tolerate the state of anarchy which seemed normal in Morocco. England was the other power largely interested in Moroccan trade, and feared at first that France would find means of excluding all merchants but her own, when Morocco had been made French.

and that the English agreed to leave the French a free hand in Morocco, so long as all nations were permitted to trade there on equal terms, and the Straits of Gibraltar were left open. But these written terms of agreement were of less importance than the silent understanding that it might be desirable, in the near future, for France and England to form a closer alliance.

Since 1904 the Anglo-French Entente has been twice robustly, not to say rudely, tested by the statesmen of the German Empire, who have spared no pains to sow mistrust between the two great colonizing powers. In 1905 and 1911 Morocco served as the pretext. In the first of these years the German Emperor announced that he would not recognize any arrangement concerning Morocco which prevented him from treating directly with the Sultan; in 1911 a German warship was sent to seize the Moroccan port of Agadir, on the pretext that the safety of German commercial interests was imperilled by the disorders of Morocco. It is probable that Germany coveted Morocco; a German minister is said to have declared that Agadir, once occupied, would never be evacuated. The country was the most promising of those which still remained to be occupied by some European state. But it is certain that Germany expected England to desert France on each of these occasions, and that such a desertion would have ended the Entente. On each occasion England stood firm, and Germany experienced a diplomatic rebuff which was keenly resented by all German parties except the Socialists. Under cover of the Entente, France was enabled to establish the Protectorate over Morocco, which she had so long desired. Italy and Spain, who next to England were the powers most concerned, have accepted this arrangement; some arrangement of the kind was

imperative if any Europeans were to continue trading in Morocco.

On the whole Germany had no cause to complain of the terms upon which she was twice allowed to escape from a false position. The dispute of 1905 was adjusted, amicably enough to outward appearance, by the international conference of Algeciras. In 1911 German honour was salved by some French concessions concerning the boundary-line between the French Congo and the Cameroons. Germany, it is true, had demanded much more than she obtained; she had asked for the coast-line of the French Congo, and the territory behind it as far as the river Sangha. But enough was conceded by the French ministry of the day to arouse feelings of lively dissatisfaction in the French legislature. In 1912 the French Government continued the work of conciliation by coming to an arrangement with Germany about the boundaries of Togoland and the French Sudan. But it is clear that, after 1911, if not earlier, the German colonial party came to the conclusion that France was their superior in the art of 'peaceful penetration', and that the short way of establishing a German colonial power was to strip France of her African territories.

France has not been blind to this danger. Like England, she has often, in the past few years, given foreigners the impression of being wholly absorbed in party politics and of wilfully turning her back upon the European situation. But in France, as in England, though party differences are clamorously expressed, there is a broad basis of agreement on which all parties take their stand when the national existence is in question. Whatever have been the quarrels of French politicians in domestic questions, they have worked

harmoniously and unobtrusively against the common foe. They have not done so in any spirit of *Revanche.* They have not boasted, and they have not threatened; and they have shown their conviction that France was unequal to the task of an aggressive war. It was not until the eleventh hour, in 1913, that they agreed to increase the strength of the army, and to demand three years of military training (instead of two) from every conscript; and this step was only taken in answer to the sensational German Army Bill of the same year—a Bill, it may be mentioned, which frightened Belgium into adopting universal military service.

Until 1913 the preparations of France were mainly diplomatic. Her Foreign Ministers have been eminently pacific since 1905, when M. Delcassé was relegated to the background as being a statesman too brilliant and original for the national safety. This was no ordinary concession to German susceptibilities; for M. Delcassé is the most distinguished Foreign Minister whom the Republic has produced. His successors have occupied themselves in clearing up old differences with foreign powers, more particularly with Italy and Spain. In 1906 France and Italy agreed that each would respect and would defend the interests of the other in Ethiopia; and, significantly enough, both agreed to defend the interests of England in Egypt and in the basin of the Nile. In 1912 France and Italy made a further agreement concerning their interests in Morocco and in Libya; and in the same year Spain, by the Treaty of Madrid, acquired a protectorate over definite zones in Morocco in exchange for a recognition of the French protectorate over the remainder of the country. The effect of these transactions has been to establish friendly relations between

the three Latin powers of the Western Mediterranean. They have made it clear that they neither invite nor desire the intervention of Germany in their disputes; Spain and Italy will not allow themselves to be used, as the cats'-paws of German colonial policy, to molest a sister nation. Italy and France will not tolerate a German or an Austrian descent upon the Nile valley. It is to agreements of this kind that German publicists refer when they complain that the German people is being strangled in a network of diplomacy. The complaint will only become justifiable when the right to steal is recognized by European public law.

But these agreements of the Latin peoples among themselves, instructive as they are, only helped France negatively, by releasing her from embarrassments which might have hampered her in a war of life and death. It is to the Entente with Russia and with England that she has looked, and not in vain, for actual support. Until 1909 the weak spot in her armour of alliances was the absence of any direct understanding between her two chief supporters. She had one set of agreements with Russia, another set of agreements with England. She felt that she could certainly depend on Russian help, and that England, though not definitely committed in the same way as Russia, could not afford to stand neutral while French territory or French colonies were being appropriated by another power. But there was no guarantee that England and Russia would work harmoniously together when both were ranged upon the side of France. From 1904 to 1909 it was a leading object of French foreign policy to secure this guarantee. There can be no doubt that French influence was largely responsible for the gradual reconciliation of England and Russia in those years, for the growth of a feeling in

both countries that their Asiatic interests, hitherto the main cause of disputes, were by no means irreconcilable. In 1905 England acted as a mediator between Russia and Japan; in 1907 England and Russia came to an agreement respecting their claims in Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet. Finally, in 1909, the Tsar paid a ceremonious visit to England; and from that moment the Triple Entente became a new and vital factor in the European situation. The immediate effect was that France found herself able to concentrate practically the whole of her fleet in the Mediterranean, where it would be ready to defend her North African colonies. For it was understood that, if the three powers found themselves jointly engaged in a war against a common enemy, Russia would guard the interests of her allies in the Baltic, and England would be responsible for holding the North Sea and the English Channel.

There can be no doubt that the Triple Entente has operated as a bar against some cherished hopes of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Since 1909 it has been the fixed intention of Germany, if not also of Austria-Hungary, that France should be made to pay heavily for her presumption in building up this coalition. Apparently Germans think that the Triple Entente exists largely, if not entirely, to thwart German colonial ambitions, and to promote those of France.

To such suspicions we can only answer that no proof of them is offered, and that they are not confirmed by any facts which are generally known. There is evidence that French statesmen have feared a war with Germany as one of the greatest evils that could befall their nation. There is evidence that France has been relatively less prepared than Germany for the present war. We do not contend that France has pursued

a policy of peace at any price; but the events of 1905 and 1911 are in themselves a proof that she has been prepared to pay a high price to avert the ill will of Germany. In the colonial sphere, as we have shown, France has pursued an active and sometimes an audacious policy. She has quarrelled over colonial questions with other powers besides Germany. But her differences with England, with Italy, with Spain, have been amicably settled by compromises not invariably too favourable to France. Her colonial policy has been one of competition, but not of war to the knife; and she owes her most brilliant successes not so much to her diplomacy as to the industry of her traders and the self-devotion of her explorers. Her rivals, with one exception, have not found it necessary to remain her enemies, to treat her prosperity and the prosperity of her colonies as an insult and a wrong. Germany is the exception; and Germany has no reason to complain if France has woven a network of alliances to protect herself against the overt and covert threats to which she has been exposed in the last generation.

Oxford: Horace Hart Printer to the University

No. 12

OXFORD PAMPHLETS

1914

RUSSIA

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF A NATION

BY

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FOURTH IMPRESSION

Price One Penny net

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

HUMPHREY MILFORD

LONDON EDINBURGH GLASGOW

NEW YORK TORONTO MELBOURNE BOMBAY

RUSSIA

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF A NATION

(*Reprinted, by permission, from* The Times *of September 14, 1914.*)

In this time of crisis, when the clash of ideas seems as fierce as the struggle of the hosts, it is the duty of those who possess authentic information on one or the other point in dispute to speak out firmly and clearly. I should like to contribute some observations on German and Russian conceptions in matters of culture. I base my claim to be heard on the fact that I have had the privilege of being closely connected with Russian, German, and English life. As a Russian Liberal, who had to give up an honourable position at home for the sake of his opinions, I can hardly be suspected of subserviency to the Russian bureaucracy.

I am struck by the insistence with which the Germans represent their cause in this world-wide struggle as the cause of civilization as opposed to Muscovite barbarism; and I am not sure that some of my English friends do not feel reluctant to side with the subjects of the Tsar against the countrymen of Harnack and Eucken. One would like to know, however, since when have the Germans taken up this attitude? They were not so squeamish during the 'war of emancipation' which gave birth to modern Germany. At that time the people of Eastern Prussia were anxiously waiting for the appearance of Cossacks, as heralds of the Russian hosts who were to emancipate them from the yoke of Napoleon. Did the

Prussians and Austrians reflect on the humiliation of an alliance with the Muscovites, and on the superiority of the Code Civil, when the Russian Guard at Kulm [1] stood like a rock against the desperate onslaught of Vandamme? Perhaps by this time the inhabitants of Berlin have obliterated the bas-relief in the 'Alley of Victories' which represents Prince William of Prussia, the future victor of Sedan, seeking safety within the square of the Kaluga regiment! [2] Russian blood has flowed in numberless battles in the cause of the Germans and Austrians. The present Armageddon might perhaps have been avoided if the Tsar Nicholas I had left the Hapsburg Monarchy to its own resources in 1849, and had not unwisely crushed the independence of Hungary. Within our own memory, the benevolent neutrality of Russia guarded Germany in 1870 from an attack in the rear by its opponents of Sadowa. Are all such facts to be explained away on the ground that the despised Muscovites may be occasionally useful as 'gun-meat', but are guilty of

[1] *Kulm.* After the defeat of the Allies by Napoleon at Dresden in 1813, the French corps of Vandamme appeared in their rear. If it had succeeded in cutting the line of communications with Prague, the retreat of the Allies might have been turned into a rout. The First Division of the Russian Guard was ordered to stop Vandamme, and this it did at Kulm on August 29, although it was outnumbered by three to one and lost almost half its men in killed and wounded. On the next day, Prussian and Austrian troops came up, and Vandamme surrendered with the remainder of his corps. The battle was the turning-point in the campaign of 1813. The King of Prussia granted the Iron Cross to all those who took part in this desperate struggle; hence the Iron Cross was called the 'Kulm Cross' by the Russians.

[2] *Prince William of Prussia and the Kaluga regiment.* The future conqueror of Sedan first fought as a boy of seventeen at Bar-sur-Aube (February 27, 1814). In that battle he joined the Russian Fifth Infantry (Kaluga), a regiment of which he afterwards became an honorary colonel.

sacrilege if they take up a stand against German task-masters in 'shining armour'? The older generations of Germany had not yet reached that comfortable conclusion. The last recommendation which the founder of the German Empire made on his death-bed to his grandson was to keep on good terms with that Russia which is now proclaimed to be a debased mixture of Byzantine, Tartar, and Muscovite abominations.

Fortunately, the course of history does not depend on the frantic exaggerations of partisans. The world is not a class-room in which docile nations are distributed according to the arbitrary standards of German pedagogues. Europe has admired the patriotic resistance of the Spanish, Tyrolese, and Russian peasants to the enlightened tyranny of Napoleon. There are other standards of culture besides proficiency in research and aptitude for systematic work. The massacre of Louvain, the hideous brutality of the Germans towards non-combatants—to mention only one or two of the appalling occurrences of these last weeks—have thrown a lurid light on the real character of twentieth-century German culture. 'By their fruits ye shall know them,' said our Lord; and the saying which He aimed at the Scribes and Pharisees of His time is indeed applicable to the proud votaries of German civilization to-day. Nobody wishes to underestimate the services rendered by the German people to the cause of European progress; but those who have known Germany during the years following the achievements of 1870 have watched with dismay the growth of that arrogant conceit which the Greeks called ὕβρις. The cold-blooded barbarity advocated by Bernhardi, the cynical view taken of international treaties and of the obligations of honour by the German Chancellor—these things reveal a spirit which

it would be difficult indeed to describe as a sign of progress.

One of the effects of such a frame of mind is to strike the victim of it with blindness. This symptom has been manifest in the stupendous blunders of German diplomacy. The successors of Bismarck have alienated their natural allies, such as Italy and Roumania, and have driven England into this war against the evident intentions of English Radicals. But the Germans have misconceived even more important things. They set out on their adventure in the belief that England would be embarrassed by civil war and unable to take any effective part in the fray ; and they had to learn something which all their writers had not taught them—that there is a nation's spirit watching over England's safety and greatness, a spirit at whose mighty call all party differences and racial strifes fade into insignificance. In the same way, they had reckoned on the unpreparedness of Russia, in consequence of internal dissensions and administrative weakness, without taking heed of the love of all Russians for Russia, of their devotion to the long-suffering giant whose life is throbbing in their veins. The Germans expected to encounter raw and sluggish troops under intriguing time-servers and military Hamlets whose ' native hue of resolution ' had been ' sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought '. Instead of that, they were confronted with soldiers of the same type as those whom Frederick the Great and Napoleon admired, led at last by chiefs worthy of their men. And behind these soldiers they discovered a nation. Do they realize now what a force they have awakened ? Do they understand that a steadfast, indomitable resolution, despising all theatrical display, is moving Russia's hosts ? Even if the Russian generals had proved mediocre, even if

many disappointing days had been in store, the nation would not have belied its history. It has seen more than one conquering army go down before it. The Tartars and the Poles, the Swedes of Charles XII, the Prussians of Frederick the Great, the Grand Army of Napoleon, were not less formidable than the Kaiser's array, but the task of mastering a united Russia proved too much for each one of them. The Germans counted on the fratricidal feud between Poles and Russians, on the resentment of the Jews, on Mohammedan sympathies with Turkey, and so forth. They had to learn too late that the Jews had rallied round the country of their hearths, and that the best of them cannot believe that Russia will continue to deny them the measure of justice and humanity which the leaders of Russian thought have long acknowledged to be due to them. More important still, the Germans have read the Grand Duke's appeal to the Poles and must have heard of the manner in which it was received in Poland, of the enthusiastic support offered to the Russian cause. If nothing else came of this great historical upheaval but the reconciliation of the Russians and their noble kinsmen the Poles, the sacrifices which this crisis demands would not be too great a price to pay for the result.

But the hour of trial has revealed other things. It has appealed to the best feelings and the best elements of the Russian nation. It has brought out in a striking manner the fundamental tendency of Russian political life and the essence of Russian culture, which so many people have been unable to perceive on account of the chaff on the surface. Russia has been going through a painful crisis. In the words of the Manifesto of October 17/30, 1905, the outward casing of her administration had become too narrow and oppressive for the

development of society with its growing needs, its altered perceptions of rights and duties, its changed relations between Government and people. The result was that deep-seated political *malaise* which made itself felt during the Japanese War, when Russian society at large refused to take any interest in the fate of the army ; the feverish rush for ' liberties ' after the defeat ; the subsequent reign of reaction and repression, which has cast such a gloom over Russian life during these last years. But the effort of the national struggle has dwarfed all these misunderstandings and misfortunes, as in Great Britain the call of the common Motherland has dwarfed the dispute between Unionists and Home Rulers. Russian parties have not renounced their aspirations ; Russian Liberals in particular believe in self-government and the rule of law as firmly as ever. But they have realized as one man that this war is not an adventure engineered by unscrupulous ambition, but a decisive struggle for independence and existence ; and they are glad to be arrayed in close ranks with their opponents from the Conservative side. A friend, a Liberal like myself, writes to me from Moscow : ' It is a great, unforgettable time ; we are happy to be all at one ! ' And from the ranks of the most unfortunate of Russia's children, from the haunts of the political exiles in Paris, comes the news that Bourtzeff, one of the most prominent among the revolutionary leaders, has addressed an appeal to his comrades urging them to stand by their country to the utmost of their power.[1]

I may add that whatever may have been the shortcomings and the blunders of the Russian Government,

[1] *Bourtzeff, a prominent Russian revolutionary leader.* I am glad to note that Bourtzeff fully endorses my view in a letter to *The Times* (issue of September 18, 1914).

it is a blessing in this decisive crisis that Russians should have a firmly-knit organization and a traditional centre of authority in the power of the Tsar. The present Emperor stands as the national leader, not in the histrionic attitude of a War Lord, but in the quiet dignity of his office. He has said and done the right thing, and his subjects will follow him to a man. We are sure he will remember in the hour of victory the unstinted devotion and sacrifices of all the nationalities and parties of his vast Empire. It is our firm conviction that the sad tale of reaction and oppression is at an end in Russia, and that our country will issue from this momentous crisis with the insight and strength required for the constructive and progressive statesmanship of which it stands in need.

Apart from the details of political and social reform, is the regeneration of Russia a boon or a peril to European civilization? The declamations of the Germans have been as misleading in this respect as in all others. The master works of Russian literature are accessible in translation nowadays, and the cheap taunts of men like Bernhardi recoil on their own heads. A nation represented by Pushkin, Turgeneff, Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky in literature, by Kramskoy, Verestchagin, Repin, Glinka, Moussorgsky, Tchaikovsky in art,[1] by Mendeleeff, Metchnikoff, Pavloff in science, by Kluchevsky and Solovieff in history, need not be ashamed to enter the lists in an international competition for the prizes of culture. But the German historians ought to have

[1] *Kramskoy, Verestchagin, Repin,* &c. Only a few names are selected almost at random. Of course, no description of pictures and no characterization of painters can convey any adequate impression. Those who wish to form an opinion of Russian painting should go to Moscow and pay a visit to the Tretiakoff Gallery.

taught their pupils that in the world of ideas it is not such competitions that are important. A nation handicapped by its geography may have to start later in the field, and yet her performance may be relatively better than that of her more favoured neighbours. It is astonishing to read German diatribes about Russian backwardness when one remembers that as recently as fifty years ago Austria and Prussia were living under a régime which can hardly be considered more enlightened than the present rule in Russia. The Italians in Lombardy and Venice have still a vivid recollection of Austrian gaols; and as for Prussian militarism, one need not go further than the exploits of the Zabern garrisons to illustrate its meaning. This being so, it is not particularly to be wondered at that the Eastern neighbour of Austria and Prussia has followed to some extent on the same lines.

But the general direction of Russia's evolution is not doubtful. Western students of her history might do well, instead of sedulously collecting damaging evidence, to pay some attention to the building-up of Russia's universities, the persistent efforts of the Zemstvos, the independence and the zeal of the Press. German scholars should read Hertzen's vivid description of the 'idealists of the forties'.[1] And what about the history of the emancipation of the serfs, or of the regeneration of the judicature? The 'reforms of the sixties'[2] are

[1] *The idealists of the forties.* They have been described by Hertzen in his *Byloe i Dumy* (*Past and Thoughts*) in connexion with intellectual life in Moscow. Both Westerners like Granovsky, Stankevitch, Ketscher, Hertzen himself, and Slavophiles like J. Kireievsky and Khomiakoff, are vividly characterized in this brilliant autobiography.

[2] *The reforms of the sixties.* They comprise the great reforms carried out with rare patriotism and insight during the early years

a household word in Russia, and surely they are one of the noblest efforts ever made by a nation in the direction of moral improvement.

Looking somewhat deeper, what right have the Germans to speak of their ideals of culture as superior to those of the Russian people ? They deride the superstitions of the *mujikh* as if tapers and genuflexions were the principal matters of popular religion. Those who have studied the Russian people without prejudice know better than that. Read Selma Lagerloef's touching description of Russian pilgrims in Palestine[1]. She, the Protestant, has understood the true significance of the religious impulse which leads these poor men to the Holy Land, and which draws them to the numberless churches of the vast country. These simple people cling to the belief that there is something else in God's world besides toil and greed ; they flock towards the light, and find in it the justification of their human craving for peace and mercy. For the Russian people have the Christian virtue of patience in suffering : their pity for the poor and oppressed is more than an occasional manifestation of individual feeling—it is deeply rooted in national psychology. This frame of mind has been scorned as fit for slaves ! It is indeed a case where the learning of

of Alexander II's reign. The principal were—the emancipation of the peasants (1861), the reorganization of the judicial system (1864), and the creation of Zemstvo self-government (1864). There was a number of other reforms besides—the University Statutes of 1863, the Press Law of 1865, the partial abolition of corporal punishment in 1863 : and so forth. Many of these reforms have been adulterated by subsequent modifications ; but the main current of progress could not be turned back, and there are no greater names in the history of Europe than those of N. Milutine, D. Milutine, Prince Cherkassky, J. Samarine, Unkovsky, Zarudny, and their companions.

[1] *Selma Lagerloef on Russian pilgrims.*—"Jerusalem," vol. ii, "On the Wings of the Dawn."

philosophers is put to shame by the insight of the simple-minded. Conquerors should remember that the greatest victories in history have been won by the unarmed—by the Christian confessors whom the emperors sent to the lions, by the 'old believers' of Russia who went to Siberia and to the flames for their unyielding faith, by the Russian serfs who preserved their human dignity and social cohesion in spite of the exactions of their masters, by the Italians, Poles, and Jews, when they were trampled under foot by their rulers. It is such a victory of the spirit that Tolstoy had in mind when he preached his gospel of non-resistance; and I do not think even a German on the war path would be blind enough to suppose that Tolstoy's message came from a craven soul. The orientation of the so-called 'intelligent' class in Russia—that is, the educated middle class, which is much more numerous and influential than people suppose—is somewhat different, of course. It is 'Western' in this sense, that it is imbued with current European ideas as to politics, economics, and law. It has to a certain extent lost the simple faith and religious fervour of the peasants. But it has faithfully preserved the keynote of popular ideals. It is still characteristically humanitarian in its view of the world and in its aims. A book like that of General von Bernhardi would be impossible in Russia. If anybody were to publish it, it would not only fall flat, but earn for its author the reputation of a bloodhound. Many deeds of cruelty and brutality happen, of course, in Russia, but no writer of any standing would dream of building up a theory of violence in vindication of a claim to culture. It may be said, in fact, that the leaders of Russian public opinion are pacific, cosmopolitan, and humanitarian to a fault. The mystic philosopher,

Vladimir Solovieff[1], used to dream of the union of the Churches with the Pope as the spiritual head, and democracy in the Russian sense as the broad basis of the rejuvenated Christendom. Dostoyevsky, a writer most sensitive to the claims of nationality in Russia, defined the ideal of the Russians in a celebrated speech as the embodiment of a universally humanitarian type.[2] These are extremes, but characteristic extremes pointing to the trend of national thought. Russia is so huge and so strong that material power has ceased to be attractive to her thinkers. Nevertheless, we need not yet retire into the desert or deliver ourselves to be bound hand and foot by 'civilized' Germans. Russia also wields a sword—a charmed sword, blunt in an unrighteous cause, but sharp enough in the defence of right and freedom. And this war is indeed our *Befreiungskrieg*. The Slavs must have their chance in the history of the world, and the date of their coming of age will mark a new departure in the growth of civilization.

[1] *Vladimir Solovieff.* A talented philosopher, the son of the famous historian S. Solovieff. He was a professor at Moscow for a short time.

[2] *Dostoyevsky's speech.* It was delivered in Moscow in 1880, on the occasion of the unveiling of Pushkin's statue in that city.

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No. 14

OXFORD PAMPHLETS

1914

GERMANY AND 'THE FEAR OF RUSSIA'

BY

SIR VALENTINE CHIROL

FOURTH IMPRESSION

Price Twopence net

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
HUMPHREY MILFORD
LONDON EDINBURGH GLASGOW
NEW YORK TORONTO MELBOURNE BOMBAY

GERMANY AND THE 'FEAR OF RUSSIA'

Of all the arguments used to enlist the sympathies of the British public on the German side during the crisis which led up to the war, none made so wide an appeal to British sentiment as Germany's 'fear of Russia'. The average Englishman knows very little about Russia, and what he knows about her is often derived from violently though not unnaturally prejudiced witnesses—political refugees, Jews, Poles, Finns, and other victims of the repressive methods to which the Russian governing classes have clung, in many directions, tenaciously, in spite of the marked movement towards progress in other directions. Many Englishmen, therefore, see in Russia a remote but formidable and scarcely half-civilized Power, sprawling across two continents, imbued with an insatiable lust of conquest, herself ignorant of freedom and bent on confiscating the freedom of other peoples brought under her sway. This, of course, is a very distorted picture, but it fitted in admirably with Germany's purpose, which was to represent the coming war as a war for German 'culture' against Russian 'barbarism'. That it is nothing of the kind, many distinguished Russians, who cannot be suspected of subserviency to the Russian Government, have now undertaken to tell the British public. Amongst these are Professor Vinogradoff, whose admirable letter to *The*

Times has been republished by the Clarendon Press; Professor Struve, one of the founders of the Russian Constitutional Democratic party of the Duma, and M. Bourtseff, a leader of the advanced revolutionary party. They all speak on this aspect of the question with an authority to which I cannot pretend.

All that I desire to show is how incompatible is this theory of the German 'fear of Russia' with the relations of close intimacy and co-operation with Russia which Germany has always sought to cultivate, and has successfully cultivated until quite recently, with great advantage to her own immediate political purposes, but to the detriment of all the best interests of Russia.

The 'fear of Russia' is, it is true, not quite a new bogy in Germany. Even Bismarck used to trot out the danger of Pan-Slavism on sundry occasions when he wanted to make the German people's flesh creep, in order to procure acceptance of fresh military burdens. But he quickly put it away again as soon as it had fulfilled its purpose. Friendship with Russia was one of the cardinal principles of his foreign policy, and one thing he always relied upon to make Russia amenable to German influence was that she should never succeed in healing the Polish sore. In his own *Reflections and Reminiscences*, he boasts with the most extraordinary cynicism of the agreement which he made with Russia in 1863 for the repression of the Polish insurrection. There was a powerful party in Russia to which the Tsar Alexander II himself at first inclined which favoured large concessions to Poland. Bismarck threw the whole weight of Prussian influence into the scale of the reactionary party at St. Petersburg; and the result was, as he himself describes it, 'a victory

in the Russian Cabinet of Prussian over Polish policy. . . . An agreement between Russia and the German foe of Pan-Slavism [i.e. Prussia] for joint action, military and political, against the Polish "fraternization" movement was a decisive blow to the views of the philo-Polish party at the Russian Court.' What Bismarck also defeated at the same stroke was the possibility of a triple *entente* between Russia, France, and England, even in those far-off days. For the two Western Powers were then working together to win Russia over to the liberal policy towards Poland, which Bismarck succeeded in checkmating. In regard to Poland, the Emperor William II, except for a couple of years under the more liberal Chancellorship of Bismarck's immediate successor, Count von Caprivi, has adhered steadily to the Bismarckian tradition. Germany, down to the present day, has oppressed her own Poles not less ruthlessly than Russia, but a great deal more scientifically.

In just the same spirit, Bismarck always sided with the party of German ascendancy in Vienna against the Austrian Slavs; and he used openly to resent any concessions made to them, until the Austro-German alliance was signed and sealed in 1879. Then he felt he could henceforth rely upon the still more anti-Slav tendencies of the Hungarian Government to counteract, as far as foreign policy was concerned, the tenderness which the Emperor Francis Joseph was inclined to display towards his Slav subjects in the Austrian part of his dominions. Here again, the Kaiser has walked in Bismarck's footsteps.

Nevertheless, when the Kaiser came to the throne and dropped the old pilot overboard, the relations between Germany and Russia entered upon a new phase.

Bismarck preferred, on principle, the friendship of Russia to that of Austria; for he believed that there could be no more solid basis for political co-operation between great European Powers than common principles of internal government. At bottom, he remained a Prussian *junker* all his life long, and absolutism was and still is the ideal of all Prussian *junkers*. Thus, when the Tsar Nicholas I died in 1855, during the Crimean war, the Berlin *Kreuz-Zeitung*, then and still their chief organ, appeared in the deepest mourning with a leading article headed, 'Our Emperor is dead.' There was, of course, no German Emperor in those days; and, though there was an Austrian Emperor at Vienna, it was towards the Russian autocrat that the Prussian *junkers* turned in worship, just as every Mohammedan turns in prayer towards the Prophet's shrine at Mecca. After the Franco-German war, when Bismarck concentrated all his energies on the preservation of the great German Empire he had created, the combination which above all commended itself to him was the 'Three Emperors' Alliance', i.e. an alliance between Germany, Austria, and Russia, based upon common dynastic interests and, to a great extent, common principles of domestic government. It was only when Russian policy with regard to Turkey and her subject races began to alarm Austria-Hungary that, compelled to make his choice between Russia and Austria, Bismarck chose rather reluctantly the latter. He did not himself care twopence about the fate of the Christian races in the Balkans, which, as he once said, were not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier. But Russia could not remain indifferent to them. The whole nation regarded the emancipation of the Balkan peoples from the Turkish yoke as the historic mission of Russia. It was the Russo-Turkish war of

1827–9 which consummated the independence of Greece. The Crimean war was, for the Russian people, a war waged primarily for the overthrow of Turkish misrule. The Russo-Turkish war of 1877–8 resulted in the liberation of a large part of what is now the kingdom of Bulgaria. Austria-Hungary, on the other hand, had quite different views about the Balkans. The Austrians had played a great part in driving back the tide of Turkish conquest in Eastern Europe, but they had retained for themselves large territories inhabited by Slav races, Serbs, Croats, and others ; in the same way, after the last Russo-Turkish war of 1877–8, they had occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina, also largely peopled by Slavs. Their ultimate object was to get down to Salonica and the Aegean Sea, and they did not want to see Turkey dismembered merely to make room for independent Balkan States, least of all for Balkan States under Russian protection. When Bismarck saw the growing friction between Russian policy and Austro-Hungarian policy in the Balkans, he could not run the risk of falling between two stools. He therefore concluded an alliance with Austria-Hungary, partly because she was far more likely than Russia to be content with the position of a subordinate ally. At the same time, to borrow one of his favourite expressions, he was not going to 'cut the wire to St. Petersburg' altogether; and, a few years later, when the wire was becoming rather shaky, he did not shrink from the famous Reinsurance Compact with Russia which, concluded behind Austria's back, fell only very little short of a treacherous bargain that Germany would put her own interpretation, when the time came, upon her treaty obligations towards Austria in the event of an Austro-Russian conflict.

That was the position when William II dismissed

Bismarck. Now Bismarck's chief object was to safeguard the position of undisputed pre-eminence which the German Empire had acquired on the European continent, and to prevent, at all costs, any hostile combination of Powers which might imperil his life's work. This did not satisfy the young Emperor. He wanted Germany not merely to remain the most powerful State in Europe but to become a world Empire. The Near East, Constantinople, Asia Minor, and Syria—first attracted his attention, and, as he could not very well conquer the Sultan's dominions, he set to work to capture the Sultan himself. All the other Powers were constantly warning the Sultan to introduce reforms and to set his house in order. The Kaiser said to him in effect : 'Deal with your house as you think fit, and I will protect you against these busybodies, if you will make it worth my while. All I want is railway concessions, commercial concessions, banking concessions, privileges for my German colonists in Syria and elsewhere, and the employment of German officers to reorganize and equip your army with German war materials.' To seal this bargain, he was quite willing to go to Constantinople and pay his court to the 'Red Sultan', Abdul Hamid, when the rest of the civilized world was boycotting him on account of the Armenian massacres. Austria-Hungary followed the lead of Germany, though not without occasional hesitation; for she knew that it was only with the help of Germany that she could achieve her own ambitions in the Balkan Peninsula.

But to Russia, German ascendancy at Constantinople could not fail to be most unpalatable; and, as one of the first acts of the Kaiser after he had dismissed Bismarck was to drop his Reinsurance Compact with Russia, the German wire to Petrograd, if not actually

cut, was again very much weakened, and a tariff war between Russia and Germany tended further to make bad blood between the two countries. The Kaiser was by no means ready at that time to break with Russia, and the policy of adventure which Russia was then entering upon in the Far East proved a godsend to Germany. The construction of the Siberian railway, linking up the Tsar's dominions in Europe with his possessions on the remote Pacific, was opening up to Russian statesmen the possibility of finding in the Far East that access to the warmer waters of the world from which they were practically cut off in Europe. The victories of Japan over China in 1894–5 introduced, however, a new and very disturbing factor into their calculations. The Emperor William was quick to seize his opportunity. If he did not, as the Japanese firmly believe, actually instigate Russia to prevent Japan from reaping the fruits of her Manchurian campaign against China, he was prompt to lend her his heartiest co-operation; even at the cost of sowing in Japan a harvest of bitter resentment which has even now come to maturity in the investment of Kiaochao by the Japanese forces, Germany helped Russia and her (on this occasion) somewhat unwilling ally France to eject the Japanese from the territories ceded to them by China. She of course very soon required payment, and Russia was not overwell pleased when, two years later, the Mailed Fist descended upon Kiaochao. On the other hand, she was able to rely on the Kaiser's eager acquiescence when, shortly afterwards, she herself took possession of Port Arthur. One good turn deserves another, and so, in the international expedition for the relief of the Legations in Peking, during the Boxer movement in 1900, the Tsar allowed himself to be jockeyed by the Kaiser

into proposing that all the foreign forces in Northern China should be placed under a German Generalissimo, Field Marshal von Waldersee, who returned the compliment by giving the Russians a free hand in Manchuria. Germany, again, had no sooner signed an agreement with this country during the Boxer movement for the preservation of the integrity and independence of the Chinese Empire than, at the first hint from St. Petersburg, she hastened to repudiate all idea of its having any application to the Manchurian provinces of China, over which Russia was establishing a scarcely veiled protectorate. Directly and indirectly, German influence henceforth steadily elbowed Russia into a conflict with Japan which, it was hoped in Berlin, would not only divert all Russia's energies from Europe, but also lead to the ultimate conflict between Russia and Great Britain which was then still the certain hope of German statesmen.

Here, however, as in many other cases, the Emperor William overreached himself. From the days of the Holy Alliance onwards, the Russian and German sovereigns have been in the habit of entertaining much closer personal relations than usually exist between the rulers of two independent States. Apart, for instance, from the ordinary diplomatic representation, a special military plenipotentiary, accredited to the person of the sovereign, served as the medium for direct and extremely confidential communications, sometimes quite unknown to the Embassies. Moreover, in Russia, a large section of the Court and of the higher official world consists of Russians of German origin, many of them from the Baltic provinces, whose sympathies have not unnaturally been largely German. Even amongst pure Russians, the reactionary party

has always had much more in common with Imperial Germany than with the liberal Powers of Western Europe. All these forces were in turn mobilized by the Kaiser to urge Russia on to action in the Far East, and to encourage the belief that Japan either would shrink at the last from a conflict with the mighty Russian Empire, or would be easily crushed if she ventured upon the attempt. These forces carried the day, and brought on the Russo-Japanese war, but the result was not what the Kaiser had expected. Thanks very largely to the cordial understanding which had been restored between England and France, both Powers were able to stand out of the conflict, though France was the ally of Russia and Great Britain was the ally of Japan. The war was localized in the Far East, and Russia was defeated.

It was true that, as one result of the Japanese war, Russia's military forces were seriously crippled for years and her position, even in Europe, considerably weakened; but the bitter lesson which she learnt from her defeat was not at all that upon which the Kaiser had reckoned. In the first place, the Tsar Nicholas realized that the advice he had received from London before the war had been far sounder and inspired by far more genuine friendship than the advice he had received from Berlin; for the British Government had consistently warned him that Japan would certainly fight if pressed too hard, and that, if she fought, she might prove to be a very formidable foe. Then, again, the revolutionary movement in Russia, which had derived much of its strength from popular resentment at the Manchurian fiasco, had not ended in the complete triumph of reaction which the Kaiser and the pro-German party in Russia had expected. On the

contrary, the constitutional reforms, the establishment of the Duma, the attempts to infuse a more liberal spirit into the bureaucracy, created new currents of thought throughout Russia, which were much more in sympathy with Western Europe than with Germany. Not only the most progressive parties in Russia, but even the moderate conservative parties welcomed from the first the possibility of a better understanding between Great Britain and Russia, not merely on international grounds, but because they were convinced that friendly relations between the two countries were bound to exert a favourable influence on the Russian internal situation. The reactionary parties, on the other hand, were those that persisted in the old distrust of England, and clung desperately to the time-honoured connexion with Germany.

Thus, for the first time, the Russian Government was induced to approach the question of a political understanding with Great Britain in an entirely new spirit. This country had often before, especially under Liberal administrations, made overtures to Russia for a settlement of existing differences in Asia; but until the Japanese war induced a more chastened spirit in St. Petersburg, such overtures never met with any genuine response. French influence, too, was now exerted in St. Petersburg for the removal of any further chances of conflict between her Russian ally and her British friend. In 1907, an Anglo-Russian agreement was signed for the settlement of the three principal questions concerning Central Asia, which had repeatedly threatened to embroil the two countries, and it not only removed the chief dangers of collision between them, but paved the way for more intimate relations than had existed for nearly a hundred years. To

Germany, the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 brought even more bitter disillusionment than had the Anglo-French agreement of 1904, because it was still more unexpected. The Kaiser felt that, just as he has already lost one of his trump cards in the removal of the old colonial jealousies between France and England, he was again losing another in the removal of the old Asiatic antagonism between Russia and Great Britain. So as, in 1905, Germany had made a desperate attempt to break up over Morocco the Anglo-French understanding before it had had time to consolidate, so, in 1908, a determined attempt was made to smash the Triple Entente between Great Britain, France, and Russia. The crisis arose with the formal incorporation of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the Hapsburg dominions and the simultaneous proclamation of Bulgarian independence. I need not dwell here upon its vicissitudes. Austria-Hungary, who was primarily concerned, had practically carried her point by diplomatic pressure, but this did not satisfy the Kaiser. It was not enough that Russia, whose military organization had not yet recovered from the Japanese war, should be compelled to abandon the claims she had rather rashly advanced on behalf of her Slav clients. The Kaiser insisted upon her public humiliation, and a scarcely veiled ultimatum was delivered at St. Petersburg, which at that stage was quite needless except to advertise Germany's 'Shining Armour'.

The humiliation thus inflicted upon Russia was resented all the more keenly as it struck at the very point where the policy of the Russian Government most accurately reflected the sentiments of the whole nation. There is in Russia as in most other countries, and far more than in any democratic country, a chauvinist

party whose ambitions find little echo in the nation as a whole, and that party has always been very strongly represented amongst the official classes, and not least in the Russian Foreign Office. The policy of Asiatic adventure upon which the Russian Government had entered was the policy of that party. The Russian people have always remained more or less indifferent to Persian or Tibetan or Far Eastern questions. Its heart was never even really stirred by the war against Japan. On the other hand, Russian policy in the Balkans, whether or not it was always prompted by disinterested solicitude for the little Slav brothers, always struck a responsive chord throughout Russia; and the people perhaps even more than the Government fiercely resented the slap in the face which Russia had received as a great Slav Power.

As between the two Sovereigns, the wire from Berlin to St. Petersburg had been almost irreparably damaged by the Kaiser's Shining Armour; but when, in theory, the supreme authority is concentrated, as in Russia, in the hands of one man, he is rarely able to exercise real control over any department of the State. Hence in Russia the curious administrative anarchy which often seems to prevail under autocratic rule, even after the events of 1909. Thus it came about that although the Tsar had from the beginning been a whole-hearted supporter of the understanding with England, German influence continued to make itself felt in many powerful quarters, and even in the Russian Foreign Office. In foreign policy, it was chiefly in connexion with Persia that the voice of the German tempter still frequently obtained a hearing, and partly under pressure, Russian diplomacy, it must be admitted, often put a severe strain upon the spirit if not the letter of the Anglo-

Russian agreement of 1907. Still more visible was the hand of Germany in the swing of the Russian pendulum towards reactionary methods at home; but the more bitter the disappointment of the progressive parties in Russia over the developments of internal policy, the more steadfastly they clung to the maintenance of friendly relations between the Russian and the British Governments as a certain safeguard for what remained of their liberties. Events, meanwhile, were shaping themselves in the Balkan Peninsula in such a way as to force the hands of even the worst reactionaries, who, whatever else they might be willing to do, could not repudiate altogether the traditions of Russian policy in regard to the Slavs outside the Empire.

The small States of South-eastern Europe had taken to heart the lesson of 1908–9. They felt that their interests and even their independence were exposed henceforth to even greater danger from the ambitions of the two Germanic Powers than from their old enemy Turkey. Each of them began to set his own house in order, and a genuine attempt was made to compose their past differences and jealousies in order to meet the common enemy. Long-drawn negotiations between them resulted in the formation of a Balkan League composed of Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro. All had not, probably, quite the same objects in view. Bulgaria and perhaps Greece had an eye chiefly to Constantinople. For Serbia and Montenegro, it was the Austrian menace that loomed largest. All, however, claimed special, if sometimes rival, interests in Macedonia, and it was Turkish misrule in Macedonia which ultimately brought the Balkan League into the field. The action, perhaps the very existence, of the League took Austria and Germany by surprise. The result of

its action was a still more unpleasant surprise for them. A victorious Balkan League was likely to prove a very formidable obstacle to Austro-Hungarian expansion to the Aegean Sea; and Germany's prestige at Constantinople was specially affected by the fact that it was she who had made herself largely responsible for the organization and even for the equipment of the defeated Turkish armies. Germany, therefore, was quite ready to co-operate as peacemaker with Great Britain. The British Government was chiefly concerned to put an end to the war lest it should spread beyond its local limits. The German Government reckoned that, once peace was signed with Turkey, the Balkan League would quarrel over the division of the spoils and fall a prey to internal dissensions. It proved an accurate calculation. Russia tried at the last moment to defeat it by offering to act as arbitrator between the Balkan States. Serbia, whose exorbitant demands had gone far to provoke the conflict, could not reject the Russian proposal, for she, more than any other Balkan State, was dependent, in the last resort, upon Russian protection. But at Sofia the influence of the Germanic Powers prevailed, and King Ferdinand of Bulgaria, whose ambitions were still more inordinate, would not hear of arbitration, and himself cut the Gordian knot by initiating hostilities against his Serbian neighbours. Once more, the result was not what Germany or Austria-Hungary had expected and hoped. For Rumania, who had hitherto been regarded as a satellite of the Germanic Powers, suddenly emancipated herself from their influence. Under the pressure of her armies, as well as of defeats inflicted upon the Bulgarian armies by both Serbia and Greece, Bulgaria was compelled to acknowledge herself beaten; whilst with Greece, Serbia, whom Austria had flouted

in 1909, emerged triumphantly from this fratricidal struggle.

Both in Vienna and in Berlin, it was felt that a severe blow had been dealt to the position of the Germanic Powers in South-eastern Europe, and that the situation could only be retrieved by taking action which would inevitably involve the risk of bringing Russia into the field. It was then that, for the first time, German statesmen began to talk about the 'Russian peril', and the impending conflict between German 'culture' and Russian 'barbarism'. In Vienna, the talk was more about Serbian insolence, and the necessity of chastising it. The murder of the Austrian heir apparent and his consort at Serajevo on June 28 provided the long-sought-for opportunity. That abominable crime overbore the old Emperor Francis Joseph's reluctance to sanction any kind of warlike enterprise, whilst the German Emperor, who had been a close friend of the Archduke, unquestionably felt it deeply, and as a personal injury not less than as a political misfortune. The counter-blow was dealt swiftly and brutally. The Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia, charging her with a deliberate conspiracy against the safety and integrity of the Hapsburg dominions, as well as with the actual connivance of some of her officials in the crime, demanded an abject and quite unparalleled surrender of Serbia's independence. We know now that, though the German Foreign Office may have been content to give a free hand to Austria without asking or wishing to be made acquainted with the details of the Austrian demands, it was not so with the German Emperor. His ambassador in Vienna, Herr von Tschirschky, whose influence was throughout exerted for war, enjoyed his special confidence; through the am-

bassador he knew exactly what the Austrian ultimatum was to be—an ultimatum carefully framed to secure not acceptance but rejection. Even so, under Russian advice, Serbia did accept it almost in its entirety; but even this sacrifice in the cause of European peace was of no avail. We know also, from the German official memorandum published after the outbreak of hostilities, that, though addressed to Serbia, the ultimatum was from the first directly aimed over her head at Russia. M. Sazonoff, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, was quick to realize that this was the real object which the two Germanic Powers had in view, but the whole Russian nation was equally quick to realize it. Popular feeling ran as high over the Austrian menace to Serbia as it had done in former days, when the issue was the emancipation of the Balkan Slavs from the Turkish yoke, and M. Sazonoff undoubtedly spoke for the Russian people as well as for the Russian Government when he at once declared that Russia could not allow Serbia to be crushed, and that she would rather face all the risks of war. In Austria there was at first an inclination not to take this warning very seriously. It was lightheartedly assumed that Russia would, at the last moment, flinch as she had done in 1909 before the Kaiser's 'Shining Armour'; and when it became clear that this time she was in grim earnest, a belated attempt was made to resume conversations with St. Petersburg, which were, in fact, still proceeding when the Kaiser precipitated the catastrophe by his two-fold ultimatum, to Russia and to France. Then, indeed, was the German wire to Petrograd irrevocably cut, and all the warnings of Bismarck's statesmanship cast to the winds.

Even from so brief a review of Russo-German relations,

it will be seen how little the present war has to do with any inexorable antagonism between German 'culture' and Russian 'barbarism'. So long as Germany could successfully exploit for her own purposes all the worst elements in the governing classes of Russia and deflect Russian ambitions into channels which did not impede her own, German statesmen and the German press laid eloquent stress upon the old dynastic friendship and the community of conservative principles and of political interests between the two countries. But when the gradual movement towards progress in Russia itself began to undermine the buttresses of German influence, and when finally the exigencies of the Kaiser's World-Policy compelled him to make a frontal attack upon Russia's position as the great Slav Power of Europe, then German statesmen and their scribes in the German press suddenly discovered that it was no longer, as in the old days when Germany was helping to hypnotize Russia in the Far East, the Chinese and the Japanese that threatened the 'holiest possessions' of European civilization, but that terrible Slav barbarism of which Russia was the monstrous embodiment. Well, if Russian barbarism were all that Germans in their new-fangled 'fear of Russia' have depicted it to be, it might still stand comparison with the sort of German 'culture' which has staggered humanity since the outbreak of this war. But the so-called 'barbarism' which has suddenly provoked in Germany a righteous indignation too long dissembled to be very genuine, is largely the result of long-arrested development. It is too often forgotten that, whilst Western civilization was slowly but steadily emerging from the Dark Ages, the forbears of modern Russia provided for a couple of centuries the great breakwater against which the tide of Asiatic

invasion repeatedly spent itself. Only then was Russia free to begin to tread the path on which the rest of Europe had already been striding forward. If we still owe the Russians of those remote days a debt of gratitude, it looks as if, before this war is over, Western Europe may have contracted a further debt towards their descendants of the present day for bearing a very large share in the preservation of Europe's liberties against the modern Huns.

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Explains the ideas for which the British Empire stands, and the political and moral issues of the present war so far as they affect the Dominions.

SERBIA AND THE SERBS[1]

UNTIL the outbreak of the war Serbia was perhaps to most Englishmen little more than a name, and not a very acceptable name, for it was the worst pages of her history which chiefly clung to people's memory. It is not surprising, therefore, that, when Europe was suddenly threatened with a great conflagration of which Serbia was supposed to be the cause, Englishmen were inclined to visit upon her their horror and indignation. Gradually, as proofs accumulated that, whatever the demerits of Serbia, she had been used on this occasion merely as a stalking-horse for vast ambitions bent on war, a reaction set in and grew with every fresh report of her splendid gallantry in the field. It is proposed in these pages to tell as briefly as possible the story of Serbia and of the part her people have played throughout the course of events that have been leading up for many years past to the present catastrophe—a part that has been neither unimportant nor discreditable.

Serbia is one of the small States which grew up during the nineteenth century, in that part of South-eastern Europe commonly known as the Balkan Peninsula, out of the gradual disintegration of the Turkish Empire. Many hundred years ago, before the Turkish invasion of Europe, the Serbs, who are of Slavonic origin, formed for a time quite a powerful kingdom which attained its

[1] The term 'Serbs' is applied generally to the Slav population belonging to that family of the Slavonic race, whilst the term 'Serbians' is reserved specifically for those who inhabit the kingdom of Serbia.

zenith under their national hero, Stephen Dushan, towards the middle of the fourteenth century. But on June 15, 1389, the Sultan Amurath I overthrew, on the plain of Kossovo, a great Christian host consisting of Albanians and Hungarians as well as Serbs, and though the Sultan himself was slain by a Serb prisoner, Dushan's kingdom passed under the Turkish yoke. But the ecclesiastical self-government which the Turkish conquerors left, partly from a shrewd instinct of political expediency and partly from contempt, to the Christian races they subdued, helped the Serbs to maintain a sort of national existence even under Turkish misrule. They preserved their churches, their language, and their traditions. It was not, however, till nearly the close of the eighteenth century that they ventured to dream of reconquering their freedom, and—strange as it may seem to-day—it was under Austrian colours that bands of Serb volunteers first went forth to fight against Turkey. At last, in 1804, the Serbians rose in open revolt against Turkish oppression under a popular leader called Karageorge, or the Black George, whose descendant is to-day King Peter I of Serbia. Thus, they may claim to have been the real pioneers of Balkan independence. The struggle was a long and fierce one, and it was only in 1817 and after many terrible vicissitudes that Turkey agreed to recognize a certain measure of Serbian self-government whilst still retaining garrisons in the fortress of the Serbian capital, Belgrade, and other strong places. By the Treaty of Adrianople, after the Russo-Turkish war of 1827–9, which had completed the liberation of Greece, a few more districts were added to the self-governing Serbian province; and in 1867, after a succession of further risings, the Turks finally withdrew all their garrisons. Though still recognizing the nominal suze-

rainty of the Sultan, Serbia became henceforth a practically independent State.

By this time also, Serbia had begun to cultivate very close relations with the kindred people of Montenegro, a little mountain principality overlooking the Adriatic, which had practically never been subdued by the Turks, and was only separated from Serbian territory by a narrow strip of Turkish territory known as the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar. In spite of occasional jealousies between the two reigning families and a somewhat prolonged period of coolness when Serbia appeared to be falling under Austrian influence, the two States have acted together in almost every important crisis in South-eastern Europe. The total population of Montenegro to-day is only half a million, but her people are hardy mountaineers and splendid fighters, and have always enjoyed the special protection and goodwill of Russia. Prince Nicholas, who assumed the title of king in 1910 on the fiftieth anniversary of his accession to the throne, is one of the popular heroes of the Slav world, and, whilst two of his daughters have become Russian Grand Duchesses, another is married to the present King of Italy. The more aggressive the ambitions of the Germanic Powers have grown in South-eastern Europe, the more closely have Serbia and Montenegro drawn together in defence of their common interests.

But to go back to Serbia. Though a practically independent State since 1867, it was, and still is, a State which comprises but a very small portion of the territories inhabited by Serbs, Serbo-Croats, and other closely-related races, a large part of which were incorporated in the Austrian dominions as the tide of Turkish conquest in Eastern Europe retreated. Moreover, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and what was then called Old Serbia

to the south of self-governing Serbia, remained in 1867 and for many years after under Turkish rule, as also did the Bulgarian Slavs, who were only just beginning to make a name for themselves. But the practical independence to which the Serbians had attained made their State the rallying-point for the growing aspirations of those still outside the pale of freedom. So small a State obviously had to cast about for more powerful friends; and, not unnaturally, it turned chiefly towards Russia, the one great Slav Power in Europe. When, in 1875, the populations of Bosnia and Herzegovina in their turn rose against Turkey, it was Serbia who, with Montenegro, first gave them material aid, and, in the summer of 1876, boldly went to war with Turkey on their behalf. Defeated by superior numbers, the Serbians were compelled after a gallant resistance to make peace, as Russia professed to be still confident that the Concert of Europe would succeed in imposing far-reaching reforms upon the Turkish Government. But under Lord Beaconsfield's administration, British distrust of Russia was largely responsible for the failure of the Conference which met at Constantinople in the following winter; and the Russian armies took the field in the spring of 1877. Great Britain, dreading to see Constantinople in the hands of the Russians, saved Turkey from the worst consequences of military defeat. The Treaty of San Stefano, which the victorious Russians had imposed upon Turkey at the gates of Constantinople, was subjected to complete revision by the Congress of Berlin, and though Serbia had once more joined in the fray, the final settlement afforded her, beyond the recognition of her complete independence, very slender territorial compensation for the heavy sacrifices she had made in the common cause. Indeed, both at San Stefano and at Berlin, Russia

showed much more anxiety to promote the interests of the new Bulgarian Principality she had created than those of her sorely-stricken Serbian ally.

The bitter disappointment experienced by the Serbians created a great revulsion of feeling, and, at the instigation of Prince (afterwards King) Milan, Serbia turned away from Russia to Austria. For the next twenty years that prince was destined to play a most mischievous part in Serbian history. From the very beginning Serbia has been too often singularly unfortunate in her rulers. Greece, Rumania, and Bulgaria owe more than their people are often willing to admit, to their alien princes and to the powerful dynastic influences which those princes have enlisted at critical moments in favour of their adopted countries. Serbia chose her rulers amongst her own people, and few of them have proved worthy of their trust. The great patriot Karageorge had no sooner achieved the first emancipation of his country from Turkish rule than he was assassinated in 1817, and a member of the rival Obrenovitch family rose to power in his stead. Henceforth the domestic history of Serbia was constantly bound up with the deadly feuds of the Karageorgevitches and the Obrenovitches and of the political factions which supported them. Prince Milan's immediate predecessor had been assassinated in Belgrade in 1868. Milan himself was the worst of all despots—a weak despot—whilst Serbia was nominally endowed with domestic institutions of the most advanced type, for which her people were still quite unfitted. Austria-Hungary found in him an all-too-willing tool, and throughout the greater part of his reign the Dual Monarchy was able to treat Serbia as a sort of Austro-Hungarian satrapy. It was at the instigation of Austria-

Hungary that in 1884 the Serbian armies fell upon Bulgaria in the rear at the very moment when Eastern Rumelia, as Southern Bulgaria was then called, having driven out her Turkish governor and proclaimed her union with Northern Bulgaria, was threatened with invasion by Turkey. Milan, who had exchanged the title of Prince for that of King in 1882, led his forces into Bulgaria, and it was largely through his incompetency and cowardice that they were hopelessly beaten after a three days' battle at Slivnitsa by the Bulgarians, who had the advantage of gallant and successful leadership in Prince Alexander of Battenberg. Milan's sordid quarrels with his eccentric consort, Queen Nathalie, and his repeated attempts to ride roughshod over the Constitution, did not end even with his abdication in 1889 any more than his intrigues with Vienna. Until his death in 1891 his nefarious influence persisted, sometimes behind the scenes, sometimes before the footlights, throughout the reign of his son, King Alexander, whose marriage with Madame Draga added another scandalous page to the history of his country.

The revolting brutality with which King Alexander and his consort were murdered by a band of mutinous officers in 1903 sent a thrill of horror throughout Europe, from which the Serbian name has not yet recovered. That crime put an end to the Obrenovitch dynasty. King Peter I, who was then placed on the throne, belonged to the rival Karageorgevitch family. The regicides, whom King Peter hesitated for a long time to remove from his entourage, have been suspected in some quarters of having acted in the interests, if not with the connivance, of Russia; but Austria showed herself, at first at least, equally indifferent to the crime

they had perpetrated, and it was not until two and a half years later that the relations between Austria-Hungary and Serbia suffered, for quite other reasons, a marked change for the worse.

Even in Austrian history there are few more discreditable pages than the treatment of Serbia by her powerful neighbour during the quarter of a century which followed the Congress of Berlin. The Austrian hold upon Serbia during that period was twofold. There was first of all the personal subserviency of King Milan, whose extravagant vices made him to a great extent dependent upon Austrian subsidies; and there was the economic dependence of Serbia upon the markets of Austria-Hungary for the greater part of her import and export trade, for which there was scarcely any outlet in other directions. In 1905, Serbia attempted to find some relief by concluding a customs treaty with the neighbouring Principality of Bulgaria. Vienna replied by a merciless tariff war against Serbia, opprobriously termed by the Austrians the ' Pig War ', because swine form a very important item of the Serbian export trade. This fresh turn of the economic thumbscrew, however, roused in Serbia a spirit of fierce revolt against Austro Hungarian ascendancy, and, for the first time, she applied herself with great courage and resourcefulness to develop new channels of economic communication with the outer world. Politically, she drew once more nearer to Russia, and when, in 1908, Austria found, in the revolution at Constantinople, a long-sought-for pretext for definitely annexing the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which she had occupied after the Congress of Berlin and administered ever since, Serbia as well as Montenegro appealed to Russia for help. The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was not only held by

Serbians and Montenegrins alike to seal irrevocably the fate of their Slav kinsmen in those provinces, but the Serbians saw in it a direct menace to their independence, especially as, in collusion with Vienna, Bulgaria had seized the same opportunity to repudiate the last shadowy rights of sovereignty which the Sultan had until then retained over the Bulgarian Principality as well as over Bosnia and Herzegovina. None of the Great Powers was disposed to resist by force of arms the action either of Austria-Hungary or of Bulgaria, though in both cases the absence of any previous consultation constituted a flagrant breach of the international law of Europe. Russia, nevertheless, with the diplomatic support of Great Britain and of France, strongly pressed for some compensation for Serbia and Montenegro, and, though she was not then in a position to go to war, she did not altogether abandon her clients' claims until she found herself confronted with a scarcely veiled ultimatum, not from Austria-Hungary, but from Germany, who had gone out of her way to convert the support she was bound to give to her Austrian ally into a direct humiliation inflicted upon Russia. It was on that occasion that the German Emperor made his flaming speech about Germany's ' shining armour ' which was never forgotten or forgiven in Petrograd.

This crisis marked a turning point in Serbia's fortunes. At Vienna and at Pesth there had been incessant talk about chastising Serbia. But for the pacific influence of the old Emperor, Francis Joseph, war would certainly have been declared against Serbia, and, in order to justify it, the Austrian Foreign Office had already prepared an anti-Serbian ' case ' very similar to that which was produced a few weeks ago from Vienna. I shall refer to it again later. The military party had

discovered that the strategic roads down to Salonika and the Aegean Sea, the goal of Austro-Hungarian ambitions, lay through Serbian territory, and Serbia must, therefore, be got out of the way. At the same time Germany, who seemed to have lost her trump card at Constantinople with the dethronement of the 'Red Sultan', Abdul Hamid, was regaining her hold over the Young Turks. Under her sinister influence, the liberal professions of the first days of the Turkish revolution were repudiated, and Turkish oppression settled down more heavily than ever upon the Christian populations of Macedonia, whether Serbs or Bulgars or Greeks. Bitter as had been the rivalry between the small States of the Balkan Peninsula, they were compelled now, by a sense of common danger, to draw closer together. They formed themselves into a Balkan League for common defence, Serbia and Montenegro perhaps chiefly as a safeguard against Austria-Hungary, Greece and Bulgaria rather with an eye to Turkey. The welter in Macedonia grew worse and worse, and Turkey having been to some extent weakened by her war in Tripoli with Italy, though hostilities had never extended to the Turkish territories in Europe or in Asia, the Balkan States declared war in September 1912. Within a few weeks the Sultan's armies were defeated in all parts of European Turkey, and Constantinople itself was in danger. This result was a tremendous blow to both Austria-Hungary and Germany—and especially mortifying to the latter, as it was German officers who had reorganized and equipped the Turkish army. Thanks mainly to the unselfish efforts of this country, the war had, however, been localized; and lest worse things should befall her Turkish friends, Germany was as anxious as England to bring hostilities

to a close. At the Peace Conference held in London, the German Ambassador worked heartily with Sir Edward Grey to bring about a settlement, but for very different reasons. The Germanic Powers calculated that, once peace was signed with Turkey, the Balkan League would destroy itself. And the League very nearly did this. The old jealousies between the Balkan States broke out afresh, especially between Serbia and Greece on the one hand, and Bulgaria on the other, in regard to the division of Macedonia. None displayed much moderation, but it was the inordinate ambition of King Ferdinand of Bulgaria which precipitated the final rupture. Serbia was ready to refer the question at issue to the arbitration of the Tsar; but, secretly prompted from Vienna and from Berlin, and relying upon the splendid achievements of his army against the Turks, King Ferdinand rejected the Russian offer and rushed into war against his recent allies. Again the hopes of Austria-Hungary and of Germany were frustrated. The Balkan League, it is true, was shattered for the time being, but it was Bulgaria who was beaten, and Serbia, the client of Russia, who, with Greece, emerged triumphant from this second ordeal. Rumania, too, though not a party to the first Balkan war and suspected until then of strong leanings towards the Germanic Powers, had on this occasion entirely thrown off their influence and brought decisive military pressure to bear upon Bulgaria.

The attitude of Austria-Hungary towards Serbia grew more and more menacing. Not only had Serbia proved herself a fighting Power of no mean value; not only had she, under the Treaty of Bucharest which closed the second Balkan War, nearly doubled her territory and added more than 50 per cent. to her

population, which now numbers about four and a half millions,—but her prestige amongst the Slav populations of the Hapsburg dominions had risen exceedingly. By sheer misgovernment Vienna and Pesth had driven the two chief Slav races in the southern provinces of the Monarchy, the Croats and the Serbs, to draw closer together, in spite of the denominational and other differences which tended to keep them apart—the Croats, numbering over three millions, being mostly Roman Catholics, whilst the Serbs, numbering nearly two millions, belong to the Orthodox Eastern Church. Croats and Serbs were equally exposed to official persecution, they were equally robbed of their liberties, they were thrown into the same prisons. They joined hands in a common spirit of revolt, and in common they put their faith in their Serbian kinsmen. To such an appeal the population of the Serbian kingdom could not but respond, and the Serbian authorities themselves, even if they had wished to, could not have stemmed a movement which was directed more or less openly to the emancipation of all the Southern Slav provinces of the Monarchy from the Austro-Hungarian yoke. The attitude of Serbia towards the southern Slavs of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy resembled more and more that of the little kingdom of Piedmont, fifty years ago, towards the other Italian States struggling for unity and freedom. The Russian Minister in Belgrade, of a very active and rather unscrupulous type not uncommon amongst Russian diplomatists, made no secret of his sympathies with this movement, which at Vienna and even more at Pesth began to be regarded as a serious danger to the Monarchy. Germany was only indirectly affected, but the ascendancy of Austria-Hungary in the Balkan Peninsula was essential to

Germany's own ascendancy in Constantinople, upon which depended the success of her far-reaching schemes of expansion in Asia Minor and Mesopotamia. Behind Serbia loomed, or was supposed to loom, the spectre of Russian Pan-Slavism; and in Berlin, as well as in the Austrian and Hungarian capitals, the 'Russian peril' began to bulk large in Ministerial speeches as well as in inspired utterances of the press. Before the Balkan wars, moreover, the German Emperor had come to regard the Turkish army as a sure addition to his own armed millions in the event of a great European war. He could no longer do so with the same confidence after the Turkish defeats, and it was partly to redress the balance that a huge new Army Bill was introduced last year in Berlin. That, however, was not said in public, and during the parliamentary debates it was on French armaments and still more on the necessity of preparing for a great struggle against Russian Pan-Slavism that stress was chiefly laid by the German Chancellor and other official speakers. Austrian and Hungarian statesmen had Russia equally in their minds, but their talk was mainly of Serbia and of the chastisement which she was wantonly seeking at the hands of her mighty but long-suffering neighbour.

Such was the position when, on June 28 last, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Hapsburg throne, and his consort were murdered in the streets of Serajevo, the capital of Bosnia. There are many mysterious features about that tragedy. His death certainly did not serve any Southern Slav interests, for, however great and dangerous his ambitions, he is known to have been quite out of sympathy with the short-sighted policy of repression which had hitherto found favour in Vienna and in Pesth, where, for various

reasons, he had many enemies in extremely influential quarters. The absence of all the most elementary precautions for his safety during the visit to Serajevo, though according to the Austrians themselves the whole of Bosnia was honeycombed with sedition, is an awkward fact which has not hitherto been explained. And there are others. The actual murderers, however, were unquestionably Serbs, though Austro-Hungarian subjects; and neither public nor official opinion in the Dual Monarchy required any further proof that the crime was what they wanted it to be, namely, part of a vast conspiracy hatched in Serbia with the connivance of Serbian officials, if not of the Serbian Government, against the safety of the Dual Monarchy. The cry for the chastisement of Serbia was now fierce and universal, and the sovereign's reluctance to embark in his old age upon fresh warlike adventures was at last overborne by the duty which it was urged he owed to the memory of his murdered nephew. Nevertheless, the Austro-Hungarian Government kept its own counsel to the last. The only person to whom was confided the secret of the impending stroke was the German Ambassador, Baron von Tschirschky, who enjoyed in an exceptional degree the confidence of William II. The German Foreign Office, as it has since admitted, had given Austria a free hand, and neither asked for nor wanted details. On July 23 the Austro-Hungarian Government flung an ultimatum at Serbia demanding, in effect, such a surrender of her independence as no sovereign State, however puny, could ever be expected to agree to, and demanded it within forty-eight hours. Mr. Lloyd George has described in burning and yet absolutely accurate terms this episode, without a parallel in modern history:

What were the Austrian demands? She sympathized with her fellow countrymen in Bosnia. That was one of her crimes. She must do so no more. Her newspapers were saying nasty things about Austria. They must do so no longer. That is the Austrian spirit. You had it in Zabern. How dare you criticize a Customs official, and if you laugh it is a capital offence. The colonel threatened to shoot them if they repeated it. Serbian newspapers must not criticize Austria. I wonder what would have happened had we taken up the same line about German newspapers. Serbia said: 'Very well, we will give orders to the newspapers that they must not criticize Austria in future, neither Austria, nor Hungary, nor anything that is theirs.' Who can doubt the valour of Serbia when she undertook to tackle her newspaper editors? She promised not to sympathize with Bosnia, promised to write no critical articles about Austria. She would have no public meetings at which anything unkind was said about Austria. That was not enough. She must dismiss from her Army officers whom Austria should subsequently name. But those officers had just emerged from a war where they were adding lustre to the Serbian arms—gallant, brave, efficient. I wonder whether it was their guilt or their efficiency that prompted Austria's action. Serbia was to undertake in advance to dismiss them from the Army: the names to be sent on subsequently. Can you name a country in the world that would have stood that?

And what was the case on which Austria based her demands? It consisted solely of a series of charges supported by no evidence whatsoever, beyond statements ascribed to witnesses in the course of a secret inquiry conducted by the Austrian authorities themselves. And by whom had this case been drawn up? By the same Count von Forgach, notorious for his hatred of the Slavs, who had been Minister in Belgrade five years previously, at the time when another anti-

Serbian case that had been drawn up also to justify Austrian aggression, was proved before a reluctant Austrian tribunal to have consisted largely of forgeries, some of which were actually traced to the Austrian Legation over which Count von Forgach presided.

How, on the other hand, did Serbia face these outrageous demands ? Here again let me quote Mr. Lloyd George :

> It was a difficult situation for a small country. Here was a demand made upon her by a great military Power who could put five or six men in the field for every one she could : and that Power supported by the greatest military Power in the world. How did Serbia behave ? It is not what happens to you in life that matters ; it is the way in which you face it. And Serbia faced the situation with dignity. She said to Austria : ' If any officers of mine have been guilty and are proved to be guilty I will dismiss them.' Austria said : ' That is not good enough for me.' It was not guilt she was after, but capacity.
>
> Then came Russia's turn. Russia has a special regard for Serbia. She has a special interest in Serbia. Russians have shed their blood for Serbian independence many a time. Serbia is a member of her family, and she cannot see Serbia maltreated. Austria knew that. Germany knew that, and Germany turned round to Russia and said : ' I insist that you shall stand by with your arms folded whilst Austria is strangling your little brother to death.' What answer did the Russian Slav give ? He gave the only answer that becomes a man. He turned to Austria and said : ' You lay hands on that little fellow, and I will tear your ramshackle empire limb from limb.' And he is doing it.

As a matter of fact, when Austria saw that Russia was in earnest, she was for a moment disposed to relent, and conversations had been actually resumed between

Vienna and Petrograd, and not altogether without some prospect of success, when Germany interposed with her own ultimatum to Russia, followed within twelve hours with the declaration of war which started the great European conflagration. This is the story of the share that Serbia has had in the European crisis. We ourselves are not fighting for Serbia, nor should we ever have fought for Serbia, since we were never under any obligation to fight for interests so far removed from our own. But we have no reason to feel ashamed that we are now fighting on the same side with her against a common enemy. Her history may not, indeed, be unblotted, but the splendid pluck with which her sons have faced the Austrian Goliath and smitten him hip and thigh would have wiped out even worse blots, and the cause for which she is fighting is to-day the same cause for which we are all fighting—the cause of freedom.

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1914

THE EASTERN QUESTION

BY

F. F. URQUHART

THIRD IMPRESSION

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OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
HUMPHREY MILFORD
LONDON EDINBURGH GLASGOW
NEW YORK TORONTO MELBOURNE BOMBAY

THE EASTERN QUESTION

EUROPE has never been without an 'Eastern Question' of some kind. The division between East and West is a very ancient one, and wherever such a division exists there must necessarily be a wide debatable land in which there will be interaction or conflict political, social, and religious. At times some powerful political organization, such as the Roman Empire, or a unifying spiritual force, such as Christianity, may impose peace on this debatable land and encourage a period of fruitful intercourse between the two 'civilizations', to use a convenient though a dangerous word. At other times, as for instance during the wars between Greece and Persia, at the time of the great Mahometan attack, or during the Crusades, East and West have been in violent spiritual and military conflict. The frontier has naturally shifted backwards and forwards, and it is difficult at any given moment to say where Europe ends and Asia begins. At all times there has been much that is Asiatic about the eastern part of the 'Europe' of our maps, and in the Middle Ages the frontier of Latin Christendom, of those countries whose religious life had its centre in Rome, was in many respects the boundary of Europe. In the south the Eastern Empire, that is to say that eastern half of the old Roman Empire which had its capital at Constantinople, tended to become more 'oriental' as time went on; and in the north there was a great difference between the Russians, who had been converted to Christianity by missionaries from Con-

stantinople, and the Poles, who owed religious obedience to Rome. This Asiatic character of eastern Europe was naturally intensified when in the thirteenth century the Mongols, a people who had come originally from northern China, conquered and settled in Russia, and when in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the Ottoman Turks became the masters of the Balkan Peninsula and of many lands to the north of it. At the close of the Middle Ages, therefore, and for the two centuries that followed, the 'Eastern Question' was concerned with the Turks, their victories and their defeats. In the eighteenth century a new power appeared in the North, Russia, still in many respects oriental in character, but prepared and anxious to carry on with the now pacific and weakening Turkish Empire an uninterrupted struggle for the mastery of the East. Thus in the nineteenth century the Eastern Question was concerned with the relations between Russia and Turkey, as well as with the internal condition of those two empires. So matters stood in 1912; then suddenly with the first Balkan war and the driving back of the Turks to the region of Constantinople the whole problem was changed. The Turks seemed to be practically obliterated, the antagonism between the rival Christian nationalities that had once been under Turkish rule was raised to fever-heat, and, most ominous change of all, the danger of foreign intervention became acute. Hitherto it had been the aim of England and France, and indeed of all lovers of peace, to isolate the storm region in South-east Europe, to promote either better government under the Turks or to see that what they lost should be gained by the small Christian states and not by any of the Great Powers. Thus would both the peace of Europe be secured and the independence of small states. For the moment this policy was successful. The Turkish

spoils were divided between Greece, Bulgaria, and Servia, and the Great Powers looked on. Austria did, indeed, insist on the preservation of Albanian independence in order to limit Servia on the west; but the proposal was in itself perfectly reasonable, though no doubt difficult to carry out, and it met with general agreement. Unfortunately that victory of peaceful diplomacy was not to be lasting. The racial quarrels within the old Turkish frontiers merged into a wider movement which extended far beyond the Balkan Peninsula, the Servian question passed into the Southern Slav question, and the diplomatic barriers which had been set up round the storm region were swept away. Russia and Austria came into the conflict and the world was ablaze. It would be absurd to say that Servia is the *cause* of the War; that cause is to be found in much more far-reaching antagonisms, but it cannot be denied that it was the Eastern Question, in this its most recent phase, that provided the spark. That evil spirit which had so troubled our fathers, and which was thought to be finally laid when the Christians of Europe had been emancipated from the Turk, suddenly reappeared once more in fatal conspiracy with German war-policy.

These few words of introduction show how great is the part played in this Eastern Question by 'races', 'racial movements', and 'racial problems', and before describing the conditions in south-eastern Europe it is essential to turn for a moment to the meaning of this word, 'race'. It represents obviously enough certain broad distinctions between men. An Englishman, for instance, is in a number of ways unlike an Italian. But when we try to obtain an accurate definition we find that the term is elusive. What exactly is the Anglo-Saxon race? Does it include the Scotch or the Irish? If we make

'race' simply a matter of hereditary descent then English, Scotch, and Irish are all mixed races, and the 'Anglo-Saxon' race seems to vanish altogether. In order to get a clearer definition it is not uncommon to make language the test of race. Yet this is a most untrustworthy test. Men with very different racial characteristics often speak the same language. In any case it will tend very much to clearness of thought if we make a distinction between 'race' and 'nationality'. The latter term should be kept for the description of a definite body of people, large enough to be to some extent self-sufficient, who have a permanent wish to be united in a political community. Race, language, religion, past history, geographical position—all these bonds of union will help to produce the state of mind which makes a nationality, but they should not be confused with it. Thus the Swiss are a nation because they desire to be united politically. This desire they have in spite of the absence of nearly all the ties mentioned above; and it should be respected by other nations. In other words 'nationality' is a question of human will and desire, 'race' is one of hereditary descent or physical characteristics.

Now during the last hundred years race and language have had more influence on nationality than they have ever had before. In the eighteenth century, for instance, political and racial divisions cut across each other in many directions, and the French Revolution took no account of race. But in the nineteenth century the principle that populations of the same race and language should be politically united and independent gradually came to be recognized as almost self-evident. It became, in fact, one of the most powerful political forces of the century, breaking some states to pieces and building

up others. Its triumph, however, has not been without danger. In the earlier stages 'oppressed nationalities' naturally attracted sympathy; but in time nationalities, once they had grown powerful, proved that they too could be both oppressive and warlike, and they added racial bitterness to oppression and to war. It is not altogether an advantage that the wars of races have taken the place of the wars of kings. Again, race instead of being recognized simply as one of the sources of national feeling has been put in its place, physical characteristics have been preferred to human will and political loyalty. The people of Alsace, in spite of being German by descent, were enthusiastically attached to France; Germany, however, maintained that she had the 'right' to compel them to become Germans mentally as well as physically. To-day, too, there are many Germans who claim Holland and the Flemish parts of Belgium because the people in those countries are of Teutonic stock. We should not, therefore, be too ready to accept racial similarity as the basis of territorial rearrangements. Each case must be examined on its own merits. It is, indeed, quite possible that political systems which can link together different races, as the British Empire does, may prove a greater benefit to mankind than those in which political divisions are deepened by racial exclusiveness.

The Balkan Peninsula, to which we must now return, is a country where races were numerous and contentious even before the coming of the Turk; yet the share of these Turks in the Eastern Question has long been so predominant, and their power is still so much alive, that it is natural to begin with them.

The Ottoman Turks were a branch of a people who in the eleventh century had migrated from central into

western Asia, and who, though for a time driven back by the Crusades, settled down permanently in Syria and Asia Minor. This westward movement the Ottomans resumed once more in the fourteenth century. They crossed into Europe and rapidly extended their conquests over the greater part of the Balkan Peninsula. They owed their success to fine military qualities, to the mutual antagonisms between the small Christian states with whom they came into contact, and to the absence of any substantial or enduring resistance from the nations of the west. In 1453 Constantinople, and with it the last fragment of the Eastern Empire, fell into Turkish hands and became the capital of constantly expanding dominions. The great Sultans of the sixteenth century exercised a real, if unequal, authority over south-eastern Europe, western Asia, and northern Africa. Even as late as 1683 the Turks were knocking at the gates of Vienna. From that moment their decline was rapid, and they lost much territory in central Europe ; but at the beginning of the nineteenth century the Turkish Empire still nominally included the whole of the Balkan Peninsula south of the Carpathians, and it had lost little in Asia or Africa. The ties which kept these scattered provinces together were religious and military. The immense majority of the Sultan's subjects were Mahometans, and amongst them, as amongst most Eastern peoples, patriotism is mainly religious. Acceptance of the Moslem religion overrides, to a degree astonishing to us, every distinction of colour, race, or class. A pure-blooded Turk who is as white as any European is prepared to treat a Mahometan negro on lines of absolute equality. Religion, too, as in mediaeval Europe, entered into everyday life, into the legal system, into military service, and into the political and social organization.

It is indeed hard to think of any tie but religion which could bind together the many peoples and races, Berber, Egyptian, Arab, Syrian, Albanian, and Turk, which made up the Mahometan part of the Empire. This religious bond was strengthened by the fact that since 1517 the Sultans have been recognized as Caliphs by the larger of the two sects into which the Moslem world is divided. The Caliph is to some extent looked upon as the successor of the Prophet, though it is doubtful what authority the Sultan could exercise as Caliph beyond his own political dominions.

The government of the Turkish Empire was entirely oriental. The Sultan was supreme within the limits allowed him by Moslem religious law; and under him the governors whom he set over the different provinces were uncontrolled except by their fear of the Sultan, their fear of rebellion, and the strength of custom. A strong governor would sometimes make himself practically independent, and the Sultan might have to encourage a local rebellion in order to secure his fall. There was nothing corresponding to a legislature, nothing like a modern administrative system. Taxation was haphazard and primitive in its methods, and the property of individuals but very ill protected against the illegal exactions of the governor or his agents. Under such a system there was almost unlimited scope for personal tyranny, but there was none of that steady administrative pressure which a modern government can bring to bear upon a population. A bad governor might cause a great deal of suffering to his subjects, but he could effect no permanent change in their thoughts or their manner of living.

It is not easy for the West to understand the East. We may, therefore, easily exaggerate the evils of oriental

government. Much depended on the personal character of the ruler. Life and property were insecure: the economic development of the country, and the establishment of much that we know as civilization, was therefore impossible. Yet the supreme test of a government is the type of character which it produces or allows to develop. Judged by this standard the East has a strong defence. Few Europeans have acquired a knowledge of Eastern peoples without doing justice to many admirable qualities. Nor would it be easy to say whether, on the whole, there is more happiness in the East or the West. Many of the worst moral and social evils which are the fruit of our economic conditions are absent in a simpler society where family life is very vigorous and men are content to live as their fathers lived before them. Though every European who has lived in the East realizes the necessity of many practical reforms, few would wish to see a wholesale introduction of Western civilization. It is evident, however, that such a system will be least successful where the bond of 'religious patriotism' is absent; and the government by the Turks of their Christian subjects became a difficult problem as soon as Turkey began to lose her prestige as one of the great military Powers of the world. It then became possible for foreign Powers to interfere in the internal government of Turkey, and to encourage resistance. Under such circumstances it is not surprising that the Turk was considered the 'sick man' of Europe, and that his speedy death was prophesied at intervals throughout the nineteenth century. It must be remembered, however, that his authority did not rest simply on his military power: no authority can do so for any length of time. It depended on the fact that, however bad his government might seem from a Western point of

view, it had at least the saving virtue of not interfering with the national habits and ideas of the different Christian peoples. No effort was made, even in the days when Turkish military power was unquestioned, to 'assimilate', to use government pressure in order to change the character of a people. On the contrary, the Turks, while treating the Christians as inferiors, still recognized their religion, their language, and even their corporate organization. Thus Bulgarian and Greek villages were able to live side by side and to preserve their national life in a manner which has been impossible since Turkish rule has been removed. Nor is it fair to account for this toleration by a cunning policy of strengthening Turkish authority by dividing its adversaries: for the Turks acted in this manner in the days of their strength as well as in the days of their weakness. It is rather to be explained by the oriental character of Turkish rule and their familiarity with the idea of political organizations based on religion.

The Turks, perhaps unfortunately for them, were not content to remain oriental. Throughout the last century there was a movement among them in favour of introducing European reforms. Some of these, such as the military reforms of Mahmoud II, were essential to the existence of Turkey; others were obvious practical reforms, such as the regular payment of officials. There were other changes more distinctively Western, such as the introduction of European education and dress, and attempts to imitate Western political institutions. This movement culminated in the 'Young Turkish' revolution of 1908. It was brought about by the impossible government of the late Sultan, who had set all the educated classes, whether Turkish or Christian, against him; and at first the 'Young Turks' included, besides others,

much of what was best in Turkey. After a time, however, the worst elements in the party began to prevail. These were partially westernized individuals who had often lived in European capitals and had, in any case, lost all respect for the religion and the practices of their own people—men, in a word, who illustrate the difficulty of combining East and West without loss of character. The constitution which the Young Turks set up was intended to conciliate the Christians, and it succeeded at first, but not for long; while, on the other hand, the army was revolutionized and weakened. The Balkan States saw their opportunity; and they succeeded, much to the surprise of Europe, in both forming a League and defeating the Turks. The Young Turkish party still appears to prevail at Constantinople, but it is to be hoped that its place may soon be taken by men who are better representatives of the good qualities of the Turkish race.

Without good qualities the Turks could not possibly have kept even elementary order in the Balkan Peninsula. It is a patchwork of rival nationalities, a population amongst whom a genuine love of fighting and an astonishing courage are found combined with a remarkable capacity for hatred and cruelty. The second Balkan war showed that these passionate little peoples could attack one another more fiercely than they had fought their old Moslem masters.

The relative positions of the Balkan States will be best studied in the map, but it must be remembered that so-called racial maps record the frontiers not of race but of language, and that in many districts, especially in Macedonia, such maps are of no value at all, since the races were inextricably mixed up with one another. Since the recent wars migration and massacre have considerably simplified these racial puzzles.

Of all the Christian populations of the Peninsula the Greeks are by far the most numerous. The old Greek stock has been mingled with many of the races which at different times have visited the country; but, whatever their origin, the modern Greeks form a very distinct nationality, and they speak a language which, thanks to a modern classical revival, is very like ancient Greek. They played a great part in the old Turkish Empire; for besides peopling Greece and the islands with a hardy and primitive population, they were scattered through all the towns and became successful merchants and administrators. The Turk has never taken kindly to any profession except those of the farmer and the soldier, and he was glad to use for all kinds of official work the Greek, whose military incapacity he despised. The Greeks were the first among the Christian races to secure the complete independence of at least a portion of their race. This success they won in 1828. They owed it more particularly to the indomitable perseverance of the semi-barbarous peasantry and islanders; but since those heroic days it is the urban and educated Greek who has become the most characteristic type. The Greeks, too, controlled the ecclesiastical organization of the Christian subjects of Turkey. The immense majority of these belonged to the orthodox Greek Church, and its head was the Patriarch at Constantinople. The Turks, who were themselves organized on a religious basis, recognized the authority of the Patriarch and bishops over their flocks; and all members of the Orthodox Church; whatever their race, were habitually known as Greeks, just as all Moslems were called Turks. It was only by degrees, during the course of the nineteenth century, that the other Christian populations of Turkey, Servian, Roumanian, and Bulgarian, emancipated themselves from

this Greek rule. After the formation of the kingdom of Greece a very considerable Greek population still remained subject to the Turk. They were to be found particularly in Salonica, Constantinople, and all the coast towns round the Aegean Sea. They formed, too, the majority of the population in most of the islands; and in Crete, where they have preserved the vigour with the barbarity of the heroic days, they have steadily destroyed or pushed out the Turkish minority. On the mainland they have been more peaceful. They challenged the Turks indeed in 1897, but with very unfortunate results. They are very successful traders, and they have devoted much care and money to education. They are great politicians, but their politics have not got a good reputation. In the recent Balkan wars the Greeks fought much better than in 1897, but they had to meet neither the best Turkish nor the best Bulgarian troops. There can be no doubt, on the other hand, that they destroyed Bulgarian villages and their inhabitants in a cold-blooded manner and, apparently, with the deliberate purpose of claiming the districts as entirely Greek. Since Greece was the only Power which possessed a fleet she was able to secure a large share in the spoils of these wars. Salonica fell to her lot with 17,000 square miles of territory, and in addition to this a number of islands. For the present the appetite of Greece is probably satisfied, though she is doubtless allowing her semi-independent guerillas to invade southern Albania. Her main preoccupation must be to keep what she has recently acquired, and she probably looks for danger from two quarters, either from the buying or the building of a fleet by the Turks or from a Bulgarian revival. In the first case her newly acquired islands and her own coasts would be exposed, and in the second she might easily

lose some of her Macedonian conquests. We may hope that with enlarged territories and new responsibilities the Greeks may bring into their political life a dignity, a reserve, and an honesty which have hitherto been lacking ; but in any case the Greek of the future is not likely to emulate the Greek of ancient days. It is no discredit to them to say that whatever may happen their great achievements lie behind them in the past.

It is the future which we instinctively think of when we turn to any section of the Slav race. The Slavs are the most numerous race in Europe. Out of a population of some 400,000,000 over 150,000,000 speak one of the numerous Slavonic languages. They are not recent immigrants into Europe. There is evidence of their existence, at least in the neighbourhood of the Danube, very early in our era. Their movements in the sixth and seventh centuries are on record. They are, therefore, an ancient as well as a very numerous race. Yet they seem to have profited neither by numbers nor time. Numbers should have meant power, and time brings opportunities for rule. As a matter of fact Slav 'empires' of considerable extent have from time to time come into being in different portions of the vast Slav lands. But they have never lasted more than a few generations. Russia is the one exception, and even in Russia there is hardly as yet a stable political organization. In the last century, however, there was much stirring among the Slavs. Russians, Poles, and Bohemians have in very different ways borne witness to the vitality of the race. It is difficult not to believe that they will play a very much greater part in the political history of the future. The most southern of all the Slav populations is to be found in south-eastern Europe occupying a

wide belt of country roughly speaking between the Danube and the Drave on the north-east, and the Adriatic on the south-west. The south-eastern half of this district is inhabited by the Servians ; north-west of them come the Croatians, and finally a small Slav people, with whom we are not concerned, the Slovenes. East and partly south of the Servians are the Bulgarians, a people who speak a Slavonic language and have long been considered Slavs ; but they are not Slavs by origin, and they will be dealt with later on. The Servians have been, on the whole, one of the more backward of the Slav peoples, though they had a brief period of glory in the fourteenth century, not long before their conquest by the Turks. They were often restive under Turkish rule, but rarely successful. A considerable number of Servians became Moslems. The first step towards their independence was made in 1812 with Russian help, and in 1878 the Kingdom of Servia secured its complete independence. It did not, however, include all the Servians. Austria was allowed to occupy the large province of Bosnia, and many Servians remained under direct Turkish rule. There was also the little principality of Montenegro established in a rugged and mountainous district not far from the Adriatic and peopled by men of Servian race. It had never owed much more than a nominal allegiance to the Turks, and for generations the Montenegrins carried on a ruthless vendetta warfare with their neighbours the Albanians. They too owed their independence in the nineteenth century to Russian patronage.

As a result of these territorial arrangements Servia became the centre of a movement for a ' Greater Servia '. Her ambition was to include within her frontiers all the people of her race. In the past Servia had often been

helped by Austrians against the Turks, but now Austria became the enemy because she occupied Bosnia, territory claimed by Servia, and because it was known that many Austrians hoped, if the Turkish Empire broke up, to push the Austrian dominions right down to the sea at Salonica. These territorial ambitions Servia only very partially satisfied after the two Balkan wars of 1912, the first against the Turks, the second against Bulgaria. To her original 3,000,000 inhabitants she added 1,700,000 more, but she was cut off from the Adriatic by Albania, and from the Aegean by the Greeks at Salonica, while Bosnia still remained in Austrian hands. The Servian problem is, however, still further complicated by its relations with Croatia. The Croats dwell to the north and north-west of Servia and Bosnia. They are closely allied to them, but they are a more educated and developed people. Most of them never came under the Turkish yoke, and they have long been members of the Austria-Hungarian Empire. Now it must be remembered that Austria-Hungary is a 'Dual Monarchy', that Austria proper and Hungary are almost separate countries. They have, for instance, distinct legislatures sitting in different capitals, Vienna and Buda-Pesth. The Croats are in the Hungarian part of the Dual Monarchy, and ever since the beginning of the Slav revival in the middle of the last century there has been almost uninterrupted friction between Croat and Hungarian. Of recent years the struggle between the two peoples has increased in intensity. Servia has naturally endeavoured to profit by this movement and to include Croatia in her schemes for a 'Greater Servia'. The Servians are born fighters and make excellent soldiers, but they have had in the past an unhappy fondness for assassination and intrigue. The murder

of their late king and queen was creditable neither to the army nor to the people. There can be no doubt that there was an extensive Servian movement within the borders of the Austrian dominions, a 'South Slav danger' threatening both Austria and Hungary, and all the more serious because of the known and natural sympathy between Russia and Servia. Unfortunately the Austro-Hungarian Governments have proved entirely incapable of dealing with this problem and finding any peaceful solution. The Archduke who was recently murdered had, indeed, been endeavouring to reconcile Austrians and Slavs by sacrificing Hungary. His plan was to separate the Slav districts from Hungary and to give them 'Home Rule'. This policy was opposed by the anti-Slav party at Vienna, by the Hungarians, who would lose a considerable province, and by Servians who hoped to unite to Servia the discontented Slavs under Austro-Hungarian rule. After the murder of the Archduke all idea of conciliation was abandoned, and both Austria and Hungary decided for war.

East of Servia, south of the Danube, is Bulgaria. The Bulgarian people seem to have come into Europe with the Huns. They were not Slavs, and spoke a language which did not belong to the European family of languages. Their original home probably lay in the plains north of the Caspian and farther east. Very soon, however, they acquired the language and many of the characteristics of the Slavs whom they conquered, and until the present day they have generally been spoken of as Slavs. Their recent war with the Servians has now revived these almost prehistoric distinctions. At different epochs during the Middle Ages the Bulgarians were the prevailing power in the Balkans, masters of the Slavs, and even at times the successful antagonists of Constantinople. After

the Turkish conquest they suffered an extraordinary eclipse. From a military point of view they were completely under Turkish control, and in other matters Greek influence prevailed entirely over Bulgarian. The ecclesiastical organization was Greek, Greek was the language of all the educated classes. Englishmen traversing the country in the first half of the last century spoke of the people as if they were all Greeks. Slowly, however, the Bulgarian nationality reasserted itself, especially after the Crimean War. By 1870 they had secured ecclesiastical self-government, and five years later they rebelled, largely in response to a Russian propaganda, against the Turks. That revolt was put down in a way which won for the Turks an unenviable notoriety, though recent events both in the Balkan Peninsula and elsewhere have shown that 'atrocities' are no Turkish monopoly. The Bulgarian revolt was followed by a Russian war on Turkey in 1877–8, and the victory of Russia led to the formation of the Bulgarian State. It consisted of the district between the Danube and the Balkans, with a semi-attached province south of the Balkans, a province which was definitely united to Bulgaria a few years later. This new principality was still nominally under Turkish suzerainty, and remained so till 1908, but its chief ambition was to extend itself to the Aegean and to include the districts where Bulgarian villages were to be found, though they might be mixed up with a Greek or a Turkish population.

The history of Bulgaria has been a very stormy one. Though the people owed much to the Russians they dreaded from the first the influence of Russia. On the one hand, Russian propagandism was carried on with extraordinary thoroughness; on the other, the Bulgarian Government fought hard for its independence. The

first Bulgarian Prince, Alexander of Battenberg, was kidnapped by the Russian party, and the strong-willed minister who ruled during the first years of the present sovereign was murdered. Recently the Bulgarian Government appears to have come more under Russian influence, and there is little doubt that the Balkan League which was formed by Ferdinand of Bulgaria against Turkey has secured at least the diplomatic support of Russia. In the war which followed the Bulgarians showed great military efficiency and were unexpectedly successful. Unfortunately for themselves, in a moment of madness they challenged their recent allies, suffered a series of defeats, and lost some of their conquests both on the western and their eastern frontiers. They are considered by many, however, to be the most progressive and the most efficient of the Balkan States, and their friends maintain that when they have recovered from the consequences of defeat and repaired their resources, they will once more endeavour to secure a predominant position in the Peninsula.

The most northerly of the states that were included a century ago in the Turkish Empire is Roumania. The name was originally given to the language spoken by the inhabitants. The people themselves were generally known as Vlachs, and the country consisted of two principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia ; they were currently spoken of as the ' Danubian Principalities'. The language is a Latin language, derived like Italian or French from the popular Latin of the Roman Empire. Considering, however, that what we now call Roumania lay right in the path of so many invasions from the east, of Goths, of Huns, of Slavs, and of other races who poured into the Roman Empire, it is extremely unlikely that the Roumanians represent the old inhabitants of

the Roman Province. They must be a very mixed race. During the period of Turkish supremacy the Principalities were never for long under direct Turkish rule, but normally enjoyed pretty complete autonomy. They suffered, however, very seriously from the Turco-Russian wars which began with Peter the Great and continued intermittently during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. At the beginning of the nineteenth century Russia exercised certain rights of Protectorate over them, and after 1859 the two principalities were united and called Roumania. In 1866 they elected as their Prince a member of the younger branch of the royal Prussian family, and in 1878 after the Turkish war, in which the Roumanians gave very valuable help to Russia, they secured their complete and formal independence of Turkey. Three years later their Prince took the title of King. The geographical position of Roumania makes it necessarily the most pacific of the Balkan States. Every disturbance of the *status quo* in the Balkans, anything which tends to weaken the separate states renders more likely a Russian intervention, and from such an intervention Roumania would be the first to suffer. She succeeded in almost entirely keeping out of the recent Balkan wars, though, in the interests of peace, she helped to bring about the surrender of Bulgaria. The Roumanians give the impression, therefore, of being the most ' western ', the least ' barbaric ' of this extraordinary group of little states. Like her sister states, however, Roumania has her national ambitions. Across the Carpathians, under Hungarian rule, live some three million Roumanians who would probably be willing enough to join their kinsfolk on the east. There are also little settlements of Vlachs scattered about the hills of the Balkan Peninsula itself, quiet folk without national

ambitions, as a rule, who got on very well with the Turks and were allowed by them to live in their own way. They will no doubt obtain more regular government but less toleration from their new Servian or Greek masters.

There remains yet another Balkan race, and that the oldest of all. The Albanians, who have been already mentioned as in a sense 'Turks' because they are mostly Moslems, are almost certainly the descendants of the tribes who occupied the same country in Roman times, and they may go back to very much earlier days. Securely established in their very inaccessible hills, they have watched many invaders come and go. The Turks never really conquered them, and they became Moslems chiefly that they might take part in the Turkish campaigns in central Europe. Besides the Mahometan Albanians in the centre, there are Catholic Albanians in the north, close to Montenegro, and Greek Albanians in the south, who are now included in the Greek kingdom.

Even this superficial survey of the Balkan Peninsula as it was in the past century will show that the task of maintaining law and order was one that would have taxed the resources, whether moral or material, of any government. The establishment by 1878 of the states of Greece, Servia, and Bulgaria diminished the responsibilities of the central government, but even then there remained Greeks, Servians, and Bulgarians under Turkish rule. These were constantly being encouraged by their independent kinsfolk to rise against the Turks and to struggle with one another. Nor were the reforms which the European Powers recommended and which the Sultan sometimes adopted of much avail, for the good government of Turkey was not at all to the interest of the Christian states. Each nationality was

working for its own independence and supremacy, not for a law and order which should be common to all.

Under such conditions it would not have been wonderful if from merely internal reasons European Turkey had become a scene of confusion and smouldering revolt. As a matter of fact, however, foreign intervention has been continually at hand to add to the confusion, and at times the Eastern Question seemed to be narrowed down to a struggle between Russia and Turkey. They were the two great antagonists in the East, and the weaker Turkey becomes the greater is the share which Russia will have in the ultimate solution. It is therefore more than ever essential to understand something of the character and aims of Russia.

It is difficult enough to describe briefly the character of any country, however compact and constant; but what can be said of Russia, a country which covers enormous spaces, includes numerous races, contains classes in very different stages of mental and social development, and where, for the last ten years, a revolution has been in progress, partly violent, partly peaceful, which must necessarily affect the character both of the people and of the state? The only possible course is to describe Russia as she was in the nineteenth century, and then to suggest the direction in which changes may tend.

Russia till the close of the seventeenth century may be described, for the sake of brevity, as an 'oriental' state. The process of bringing her into 'Europe' was begun by Peter the Great and it continued fitfully during the eighteenth century, a time which was passed in alternating periods of Western influence and Russian nationalist reaction. During the later years of the century the work of Peter was carried on with extraordinary

success by Catherine II, a masterful woman born of a small German princely family. She understood better than any native Russian sovereign the national sentiments of the Russian people, while she carried out the policy of a great and unscrupulous European Power. The Napoleonic wars left Russia the predominant power on the Continent, and on the whole she maintained that position till near the end of the nineteenth century. The Crimean War was really a drawn battle which did not diminish her prestige. But though Russia was so important a European Power, she was still very unique in character. From a political point of view her population consisted of two very distinct classes. The mass of the people were still very oriental. They consisted then, as they consist now, of peasants to whom religion is really the chief foundation of the State. This vast peasant state was governed by an official class, centralized and autocratic. At its head were some of the ablest statesmen in Europe—few of them were in fact Russians by birth. The chief foreign minister from the time of Napoleon to the Crimean War could not even talk Russian. Between these intelligent, all-powerful officials and the mass of the population there was no intermediate middle class. There were indeed many men and women who had received a Western education in the Universities, people who combined knowledge and high intellectual endowments with something of the primitive Russian sentiments and passions. It was from among these 'intellectuals', as they are sometimes called, that the great novelists came, men who are among the princes in the world of European letters; it is among them too that most of the anarchists have been found. This class indeed, both on account of its passionate and unpractical character, and because of its want of contact

with the peasants, was not able seriously to control the official class. The result was a system of government tyrannous in many of its features to an extent incredible in the West. It was not till 1905 that some of the most elementary principles of religious freedom were admitted by the Russian state. Autocratic government at home was accompanied by a policy of systematic expansion abroad. To such an extent has this policy been successful that a little state, whose name was hardly known at the end of the seventeenth century, included two centuries later one-seventh of the land surface of the globe.

How far this policy of conquest was in accordance with the wishes of the Russian people it is difficult to say, but there can be no doubt that one of the forms which it took, conquest from the Turks, was profoundly popular. To the Russian people the Turkish war was the renewal of the Crusade, the manifest task of Holy Russia : to the statesmen and officials it meant a stage on the road to Constantinople and the Mediterranean. So throughout the nineteenth century the Turkish war continued uninterruptedly in its many shapes and forms. Sometimes it was direct conquest and annexation that was aimed at ; sometimes, as before the Crimean War, Russia tried to control Turkey by securing rights of protection over her Christian subjects ; sometimes, as in the last years of the century, she exercised what was practically a protectorate over the Turkish government itself. In all this policy Russia has had three difficulties to face : first, the military power of the Turks which ought to have been successful in 1829, which did succeed in 1854, and which was near success in 1877 ; secondly, the suspicion with which she was regarded by the Christian peoples in the Balkan Peninsula ; and thirdly, the opposition of

the Western Powers, though the importance of the help which they gave the Turks has been much exaggerated.

If the nineteenth-century policy of Russia can be described very broadly, and neglecting for the moment the reforms of Alexander II, as one of systematic expansion abroad and systematic repression at home, what are we to look forward to in the twentieth ? It must be admitted, to begin with, that the high hopes with which the Russian Revolution of 1905 was greeted have not been fulfilled. Revolution has been followed by reaction, though the reaction has never been complete. The essentials of a representative system remain, though legislative power is still in the hands of the Emperor. Underlying this progress is an economic change. The growth of industry is gradually forming a middle class, and, considering what enormous undeveloped forces Russia controls, industry is certain to continue growing. At the same time the beginnings of constitutional liberty, the development of municipal government, and the many efforts made to deal with rural and other problems—all these forms of political and social activity will help to bring the educated classes, the ' intellectuals ', into closer touch with the realities of political life, and to give them more sense of responsibility.

Amongst the most immediate consequences of the Revolution of 1905 were the restoration of autonomy to Finland and the grant of some measure of Home Rule to Poland, concessions which were withdrawn when the reaction prevailed at Petrograd. Should Russia, after this war, succeed in uniting under her suzerainty the three parts of divided Poland, the autonomy which has been promised the Poles will become a practical necessity, and the reconciliation between Pole and Russian ought

to change entirely the character of Russian rule; it should mean the weakening of the central bureaucracy and a tendency towards a federal system. What has been granted to Poland and Finland will be demanded, though no doubt to a lesser extent, by South Russia. Indeed it is obvious that in a country so vast, so heterogeneous as Russia, decentralization is the first condition of any real constitutional progress. Reconciliation with Poland will also modify at once the relations between Russia and the other Slav peoples beyond her frontiers. A loose federal connexion with the Balkan States would be accepted by people who would look upon the supremacy of the old Russian Government in that Peninsula as in every way disastrous. It is at least conceivable that the great Slav movement of the future may be made compatible with the independence of other nations both great and small through this federal solution. A loose federal union between all the English-speaking peoples would not be a danger to the world; but their formation into a strong centralized and military state would be regarded as an intolerable menace.

A change such as has been suggested in the character of the Russian state would probably modify at once her foreign policy. She has possessions so vast and so undeveloped that expansion, even from the most selfish motives, can hardly be desirable. It will be said, however, that she will still demand 'blue water' and a Mediterranean port, will still want the 'keys of her house', the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. Constantinople is indeed a position of great value to an aggressive state. Though it is not as important as it was in the days when politics were European only, and the chief export of wheat came from the Black Sea ports, a strong military power at that incomparable meeting-place of

seas and continents would change at once the whole situation in the Balkans and in Asia Minor; while Constantinople as a naval base would threaten every Mediterranean Power. Should Russia, however, content herself with a policy of peace and development the present situation offers her many advantages. For the last two centuries the Turks have fought none but defensive wars. Constantinople could therefore hardly be in more inoffensive keeping. The trade of Russia has an absolutely safe and free passage through the Straits, while the closing of the Dardanelles to ships of war secures the Black Sea coasts of Russia from attack.

However summary may have been this attempt to survey the conditions and the problems of Eastern Europe, it is clear that after the present war the Eastern Question will be one of absorbing interest. The fate of the Christian nationalities of the south-east and the relations between Christian and Moslem, between West and East, will still be in the balance. If the Allies win it is obvious that the solution of these problems will depend most of all on the character and conduct of Russia, and we have very good reason to hope that when the Slav comes to his own he will show in his political conduct that appreciation of moral forces which in very different ways has distinguished both the man of letters and the peasant.

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