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


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
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
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Y E Z O

*Otari*

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FROM

# The Yalu to Port Arthur

AN EPITOME OF THE FIRST PERIOD OF  
THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.

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UNIVERSITY OF  
CALIFORNIA

OLIVER ELLSWORTH WOOD,  
Lieut.-Colonel, United States Artillery.  
(Late Military Attaché.)

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TOKYO, 1905.

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## PREFACE.

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This brief summary of the First Period of the Russo-Japanese War covers only the operations of the Japanese armies; no reference being made to naval operations except when land and sea forces co-operated.

The naval history of this war should be written by a naval man.


The basis of the work is the Japanese official reports daily received from the Imperial Headquarters before being given to the press, supplemented by important information from other reliable sources.

Much confusion has arisen from the difference in spelling of the various places in Manchuria which doubtless will continue until the record of the Russo-Japanese is written in a universal language.

On the accompanying maps an earnest effort has been made to the end that the places shown shall correspond in spelling with the text.

O. E. W.


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
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 9. Naval action at Chemulpo.  
 10. Japan's Declaration of War.  
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## THE SIEGE OF PORT ARTHUR.

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30. Capture of "P." fort.  
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18. North fort of Tungkikwanshan captured.  
23. Occupation of Houyangshukeu.  
28. Capture of Erhlungshan fort.  
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7. Prisoners of war turned over to the Japanese Army  
10. Transfer of forts, warships, etc. completed.  
13. Entry of Japanese Army into Port Arthur.



## PART I.

### FROM THE YALU TO THE SHA-HO.

---

#### CHAPTER I.

NOTIFICATION TO RUSSIA BY JAPAN.—The long-drawn-out negotiations had come to an end, and Japan notified Russia that “Further prolongation of the present situation being inadmissible, the Imperial Government has decided to terminate the pending negotiations, and to take such independent action as it may deem necessary to defend its menaced position and to protect its rights and interests.”

This meant *War*, but the Russian Bear, in the over-confidence of his might and position—which had been further strengthened by unparalleled success in the huge game of bluff that for years had deceived not only all the Powers, but himself as well—could not believe it possible that his pigmy antagonist would dare to fight.

Note well the date of this notification—*February 5th*.

Telegrams were sent at once to Mr. Kurino, the Japanese Minister at St. Petersburg, to convey to the Russian Government the statement of Japan’s resolution and to prepare to apply for his passports.

At the same time Baron Komura, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, conveyed a formal intimation to Baron Rosen, the Russian Minister in Tokyo, that whereas the Japanese Government had made every effort to arrive at an amicable settlement of the Manchurian question with Russia, the latter had not evinced any disposition to reciprocate this peaceful purpose;

therefore Japan could not continue the diplomatic conference. She was regretfully compelled to take independent action for the protection of her rights and interests, and she must decline to accept the responsibility of any incidents that might occur in consequence.

DECLARATION OF WAR PROMULGATED.—Mr. Kurino, the Japanese Minister, left St. Petersburg on February 10th and repaired to Berlin. On this date also the Declaration of War was issued as an official notification to the Powers. The Russian Minister, Baron Rosen, left Tokyo on February 11th.

FIRST SHOT FIRED AT PORT ARTHUR.—It was not until midnight of February 8th—three days after Russia had received notification of Japan's warlike intentions—that the first hostile shot was fired by the destroyers of Togo's squadron at the enemy's ships in Port Arthur—and the war was on.

ACTION AT CHEMULPO.—The succeeding day (the 9th) Rear-Admiral Uriu's detached squadron at Chemulpo disposed of the Russian cruisers *Varyag* and *Koreetz*.

It is not the writer's purpose to follow the numerous naval actions and maneuvers off Port Arthur, which followed in quick and startling succession, and showed Japan's great naval ability and superiority, but rather to summarize briefly the various land actions and the movements of the Japanese armies.

FIRST TROOPS LANDED IN KOREA.—The first detachment of the First Army was landed at Chemulpo on February 8th, under cover of the Japanese squadron. From Chemulpo to the Yalu River is a distance of about 330 miles, through a rugged hilly country, with roads hardly worthy of the name, and which, at this season, were full of snow and ice.

TRANSPORT AND SUPPLY.—The question of transport and supply was a vital one to the Japanese Army. Let us see how it was met.

During the previous three years the writer, as the American military attaché at Tokyo, had had unusual advantages in visiting and inspecting the military posts and headquarters of every



division of the army, extending from the Hokkaido in the north to Kyushu in the south, including also a month profitably spent in Formosa.

The annual fall maneuvers of the Japanese Army in 1901, 1902, and 1903 had likewise furnished much food for thought on all these questions.

The conclusions drawn are that to-day the Japanese Army has no superior in many vital points; the discipline is superb, the men render absolute instant obedience to their officers, who are studious, well informed, and keenly observant in regard to all details. No confusion in an emergency, no boisterous commands, nor unnecessary speech mark their every action. They are each a part of a great and complete system, well organized and well administered.

Every Japanese in uniform, from the Field Marshal to the newest conscript in the ranks, exhibits an unquestioned loyalty and devotion to his Emperor and his country that is marvelous to contemplate, and is the key-note of discipline. There is but one conclusion—such men with such leaders are invincible.

REQUIREMENTS OF OFFICERS.—One of the requirements of a military or naval officer is that he must speak and be familiar with one other language besides his own, be it French, German, English, Russian, Chinese, or Korean. You can imagine the result and see its fulfillment in the present war.

It was a comparatively easy matter, therefore, to select officers and specially-instructed men to precede the Army into Korea and Manchuria. That this was done is without question; results speak for themselves.

The transport and supply of the Japanese Army in its long march to the Yalu never failed. With their small carts and coolies, they not only kept up with the troops, but, until reaching the Yalu, preceded them. When a detachment of troops halted for the night, food and shelter (if the latter could be had), were waiting for them.

One thing greatly aided the supplies being on hand when they were needed, and it is indeed the key-note of proper supply—no package weighed more than seventy-five pounds (gun-ammunition alone excepted), and as a rule the packages were of uniform size, so that an exact number could always be carried on the carts, or packed on animals or on coolies. Every package was distinctly marked as to its contents and amount, and no confusion existed in its distribution. Neither heat nor cold, mountain passes nor rough trails stopped the continuous procession of the human-supply train, which, like a column of ants, wended its tortuous way northward to the Yalu.

The following quotation is taken from an article entitled "How Japan Moves," written from Korea towards the end of April by Mr. MacKenzie, of the *London Daily Mail*:

"HOW JAPAN MOVES.—Nothing should give the friends of Japan more confidence than the way the details of supply is being managed here. The arrangements are the more noteworthy because of the contrast supplied by the other side. The Russians sent their cavalry from Manchuria into Korea hampered by baggage-wagons, and having to depend mainly upon what they could gather from the people. At every step their troops had to stop and hunt for fodder.

"The Japanese have gone to work in a different style. Long ago they started Korean language classes in Tokyo for picked soldiers. While some of the best Japanese officers were making their way through Manchuria and Mongolia others went all over northern Korea. Men living as Koreans, speaking the language like natives, regarded even by the natives as people of their own race, were in every district. The Japanese knew not only every road and trail, but apparently every person. Thus, when fighting came, they knew the land, while the Russians living in its borders, did not. Every Japanese officer has his map of the part of the country he is working in. The Russians, apparently, have had to make their maps as they go, for the first Russian scouting expeditions have been accompanied by staff

officers who drew plans and sketched as they went. The Russians have had difficulty in obtaining reliable interpreters, and, if reports speak true, have been utterly misled more than once by information received from Koreans—the Japanese have their own people trained for that purpose.

“The first great movement northwards was not of troops, but of transport. A few soldiers were forced up to save Ping-yang from the Russians, but the remainder waited until there were supplies ready for them. In every town between Seoul and Ping-yang, Japanese dressed as coolies, but armed with rifles, appeared on the streets. One man in plain uniform takes possession of a temple or a palace, and gigantic stocks of food and clothing arise, as it were, from the earth. Here is a mountain of red blankets, there an avalanche of coolie loads of rice. Here come men from fifty miles away driving cattle; while the advance guard of Japanese troops is still miles away in the rear. You enter a village, knowing that it is at least two days before the first soldiers pushing on from Seoul can reach there. At the entrance to the village you will probably find a newly-erected notice-board with a large map showing every house and road around, and with minute directions below for the billeting of the troops.

“You go some miles off the main road to find one or two cavalry vedettes and a civilian bargaining with the Koreans about the purchase of pigs and rice. And very likely an army of coolies is setting out in another direction for soldiers who are coming on a side road.

“The same foresight is shown in every detail—the rice is made up to the exact weight for a coolie to carry; these weights are further calculated—so many to a pony or ox-load. Picked natives are decorated with stripes of red to show that they are now in the service of His Imperial Japanese Majesty’s Transport Corps.

“At this time the Japanese do not haggle over money. Coolies are paid wages never before dreamed of, and the price of

pack-ponies has gone sky-high. It must be borne in mind, in justice to the Russians, that the Japanese have worked in this land before. Campaigning in Korea is no new thing to them. Their armies marched through it in 1894 and spent a hard winter in northern Korea.

“‘It has been very hard work,’ the head of one of the Japanese transport stations said to me. ‘Our first problem has been to get our supplies over from Japan. Every transport ship is wanted for the troops. There is very little to be had from the country itself; the people are so poor that they have not got enough to sell to us.’

“At every step one sees the care taken for the comfort of the individual soldier. He has to have a hard time, but the military authorities see to it that what comfort he needs shall be there for him. Hours before a company, even on a forced march, reaches a place, men have arrived ahead, have prepared the houses, lighted great fires in the streets, and have cooked food ready for them. The essence of a successful business is organization. Japan has adopted that as the essence of war.”

## CHAPTER II.

**JAPAN HAS TO GIVE UP PORT ARTHUR.**—From the close of the China-Japan War in 1895, when—at the instance of Russia—Japan was compelled by the Powers to relinquish her hold on Port Arthur on the ground that it imperiled the integrity of the Chinese Empire—only to see that port a few months later pass under the control of Russia—Japan commenced her preparations for the present war.

**JAPAN'S PREPAREDNESS.**—Secretly, quietly, and systematically, every move was towards the one end—when she might be able to meet her huge antagonist in the field.

Officers of ability, engineers, and agents were selected who could speak the language, and traveled in various disguises all over Korea, Manchuria, and Mongolia.

Surveys were made, accurate maps were prepared of the whole region east of Lake Baikal. These indomitable spirits lived among the people, spoke their language. They knew well every foot of ground they would have to fight over, every mountain defile, every road and trail, every river—its depth and availability for water transport. They traversed on foot the entire route of the Siberian Railway east of Lake Baikal, noted the bridges, tunnels, trestles, and curves. They are also credited with having organized later, bodies of mounted bandits, having in view the destruction of the railway bridges and portions of the great line of steel, but of this nothing is known certainly, and it may be but idle rumor.


That the Japanese possessed a more accurate knowledge of that region of country held and controlled by the Russians than the Russians themselves is as true as the oft-quoted statement that at the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War the Germans knew more about France and her communications than did the French themselves.

**BUREAU OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE.**—The bureau of secret military intelligence of the Japanese War Department is inferior to none, and many lessons, no doubt, could be learned therefrom, were such a thing permissible.









**AMMUNITION AND SUPPLIES.**—For more than a year prior to the outbreak of war the arsenals in Tokyo and Osaka were running their ammunition departments day and night; the Government clothing factories made innumerable uniforms, blankets and underwear; shoe factories under Government control piled up cords of boots and shoes; and so the work went on, day by day, night by night, quietly and unostentatiously, without comment or public criticism.

The procession of transport supply still goes forward regularly and continuously from an apparently inexhaustible store.

The great question of ammunition supply for naval ships, siege, field, and mountain guns and for small arms is also of vital importance. Hundreds of thousands of rounds have been used in the various engagements by land and sea, and yet the supply is not exhausted.



G.O Guard Division.  
 H.O 2nd "  
 XH.O 12th "


-  Japanese Army's position on the 30th, Apr.
-  Japanese Army's position and movements after day-break of May, 1st.
-  Russian Army's position on the 30th, Apr.
-  Russian Army's position and movements on the 1st, May.
-  Artillery.
-  Infantry.
-  Japanese Paratoon Bridge.
-  Directions of movements.

**Japanese Bridge.**

- A --- finished on the 26th, Apr. after occupation of Kuliido.
- B --- finished on the 29th.
- O --- " " " 30th.
- D --- " " " night of the 30th.
- E --- " " " 30th.
- F --- " by the evening of May, 1st.
- G --- " on the night of May, 1st.

**Russian Artillery.**

- A .... is the battery at Man-teu-Shan, and has been used to fire at A and B Japanese bridges.
- B .... six quick firing guns used in fight with Japanese guard artillery.
- C .... Eight machine guns which they deserted and were captured by the Japanese.
- D .... Position taken up by Russian artillery after their retreat and pursuit by the Japanese.

 Village.  Road.  Bank of river.  
 Mountain. 150 Elevation.  Sandy Point.  
 River.  Trees.





## CHAPTER III.

### *The First Army—Commanded by General Kuroki.*

FIRST ARMY ADVANCES TOWARD THE YALU.—The Japanese troops moved slowly northward; the rough roads, trails, and mountain passes were full of snow, and the rivers and streams encountered were covered with ice not always sufficiently strong to be utilized.

The hardships and difficulties were many, but were endured with that cheerful stoicism so characteristic of the race, and no difficulties, however great, proved to be insurmountable.

COLLISION OF SCOUTS AT PING-YANG.—On February 28th the scouts of the opposing armies came into the first collision near Ping-yang, and after a short skirmish the Russians were repulsed. Another skirmish occurred on March 8th at Pak-chhon (midway between Ping-yang and Wiju): on both occasions the enemy retreated northward.

ACTION AT CHONG-JU.—On March 28th a body of Japanese cavalry and infantry encountered the enemy, about 600 in number, a short distance from the south gate of Chong-ju. The Russians were defeated and forced to retire, the Japanese taking possession of Chong-ju. Later in the same day a body of Japanese infantry attacked a Russian force some two miles to the northeast of Chong-ju and compelled it to retire in the direction of Wiju (seventy miles away). The Japanese casualties were 1 officer, 1 non-commissioned officer, and 3 men killed and 2 officers and 10 men wounded; Russian losses, unknown beyond the fact that a few of their dead and wounded were left on the field.

OCCUPATION OF WIJU.—On April 3d Japanese scouts entered Wiju and found no Russians there. The natives stated

that the enemy had re-crossed the Yalu on the preceding day. The advance guard arrived at Wiju on April 6th. Evidently all hope of the Russians being able to offer resistance south of the Yalu was abandoned.

In view of the nature of the country between Ping-yang and the Yalu, it might reasonably have been expected that the Russians would have checked the Japanese advance in that region. With the exception of the coast-wise road there are no routes offering any reasonable facilities for the passage of troops, and the Cossacks might have made the advance extremely difficult.

**THE COSSACKS.**—It is interesting to read the first Japanese appreciation of the Cossacks. An officer of rank is reported as saying that in their habits these men differ from any people he has ever met. They live more like savages than civilized beings. They prefer to bivouac in the open to sleeping under cover, and their powers of endurance in covering long distances is remarkable. It is with regard to intelligence and courage that this officer denies them any praise. At Chong-ju they had all the advantages of position, but they made no attempts to utilize them. They can ride from fifty to sixty miles a day, and cannot easily be captured. The speed of their horses does not much differ from ours, but they are tough and hardy, and are more used to traverse mountain trails and difficult passes. They are far from being courageous, as has been repeatedly proved. The fact that a young Japanese lieutenant with twenty cavalry soldiers stood off a force of eighty Cossacks successfully for two hours (until reinforcements arrived) shows the fighting quality of the Cossack soldier.

**SMALL SKIRMISHES.**—Small skirmishes occurred along the Yalu between Wiju and Yong-am-po on April 11th and 12th and again on the 21st, the Russians being repulsed on each occasion.

**MILITARY OPERATIONS.**—On April 27th the *Japan Mail* had a leader on the military operations, from which the following is quoted:

“Some impatience has been shown by observers, who, without noting the essential points of difference between war-ships and battalions of troops, are surprised that while the navy has done so much the army should have done so little. But the question is, has the army done little? The army has transported itself to the Yalu, and that alone is no small achievement.

“If we refer to the China-Japan War of 1894, it appears that, whereas the order for mobilization was issued on the 5th of June the two divisions that marched from Seoul and from Yuensan, respectively, did not come together under the walls of Ping-yang until the 15th of September, on which day the chief land battle of the war was fought there. The 17th of October found these two divisions on the banks of the Yalu. Thus it appears that an interval of 133 days was required to carry two divisions from from Japan to the Yalu.

“Now on the present occasion the mobilization order was issued on the 7th of February, and the van of the army of three divisions reached the Yalu on the 6th of April—an interval of 58 days. We are not permitted to speak explicitly of numbers, but it will be no violation of the veto to note that three divisions of the Japanese Army to-day represent a force nearly three times as large as two divisions represented in 1894.

“The net result is that fifty-eight days’ work has accomplished in 1904 three times as much as 133 days accomplished in 1894.

“Nor is that the whole story. When the troops landed in Korea ten years ago the time was early summer; the roads were in their best condition, and the climatic conditions most favorable for campaigning. When the troops landed there in 1904 they found all these things as unfavorable as possible. Immense difficulties have had to be encountered. The van of the army seems to have moved with comparative ease, there still being sufficient frost to consolidate the paths and bridge the rivers. But every succeeding day produced a change for the worse. Soon it became impossible to drag artillery, and the

troops, instead of pushing forward, had to devote themselves to the task of road-making. These things do not occur to an ordinary onlooker, but to the mind of military men they are plain and significant. So far from complaining that time has been wasted, the sentiment should be one of admiration that so much has been done so quickly. After all, we must remember that great risks attended these over-sea operations at the outset. The ocean paths were not secure against attack; even the heavy blow delivered at Port Arthur in the beginning by the navy did not insure security, nor have the subsequent blows insured it altogether. A newspaper is not free to discuss these matters in full detail, but when the historian takes pen in hand his conclusion will certainly be that greater haste on the part of the Japanese would have meant worse speed, and that the movements which the situation dictates could not have been attempted earlier."

PREPARATIONS FOR CROSSING THE YALU.—It is both interesting and instructive to note that on the very day (April 27th) the foregoing extract appeared in print Kuroki's army began its preparations for crossing the Yalu into Manchuria.

DESCRIPTION OF COUNTRY.—At Wiju the Yalu has a width of from 7,000 to 8,000 metres, but the actual water surface is comparatively small, the bed being occupied by many islands, of which the largest (Keum-chong-do) measures nearly ten miles in circumference. These islands divide the river into three channels. Only the central one, however, cannot be crossed without a bridge or boat; the two side channels are passable by wading waist-deep, unless the river be in flood. On the Manchurian side the banks are steep, and the walled city of Kiulien, nearly opposite to Wiju, stands on ground elevated some sixty metres above the river.

Northward of Kiulien lie eminences called Makau and Yushukan, from which nearly all the islands can be searched by artillery, though at a long range. The base of these hills is

washed by the River Ai, an affluent of the Yalu, into which it flows a little above Kiulien.

The Ai and the Yalu form an acute angle at their junction and in this angle stands an eminence called Tiger's Hill, behind which again, where the angle widens, another hill called Yulchawon is situated.

These four highlands—Makau, Yushukan, Husan, and Yulchawon, together with Kiulien itself, constitute the keys of the position. The Ai River also is an important feature. Though it approaches the Yalu at an acute angle, it presently trends to the northward and then to the westward, thus greatly strengthening the northern flank of Kiulien. For the Ai is breast-high at this season, and the softness of its bottom renders it difficult for horses to cross.

DISPOSITION OF RUSSIAN FORCES.—Such being the general features of the ground, we have next to note the disposition of the Russian forces. Naturally, they were all on the Manchurian side of the central channel of the Yalu. The most advanced outpost was on the island of Cheung-song-do, immediately below Kiulien. Bodies of mounted infantry with guns were stationed on Tiger's Hill and Yulchawon, and thirteen miles up stream at Sukuchin a force was posted.

This Sukuchin is an important place. Usually the Yalu is fordable there, and in point of fact it was at Sukuchin that the main part of the Japanese forces crossed by wading in 1894. The depth of the water varies greatly at different seasons, and in the spring cannot always be forded on a given day. Nevertheless, since the Yalu there runs in a single stream and is comparatively shallow, the place is convenient for bridging. Therefore, the Russians watched it. On the other side of Kiulien—that is, the down-stream side—a strong force occupied Antung, some seven miles from Kiulien, and still further down batteries were in position on highlands called Antseshan and Niangniangchin, there being also cavalry patrols watching the banks. A large body occupied the heights beyond Kiulien on the north,

and the reserves were in an entrenched position at Hohmutang (Hamatang), about five miles behind Kiulien on the road to Liaoyang. Four roads converge there—from Antung, Kiulien, the Ai River, and Liaoyang, and all are commanded from the position of the entrenched camp.

Broadly speaking, the Russians were guarding the Yalu for a distance of some twenty-five miles from just above Sukuchin down the river.

**KUROKI'S PLAN OF CAMPAIGN.**—General Kuroki's strategic plan was, first, by the aid of a naval flotilla in the reaches of the Yalu from Antung towards the mouth, the gun-boats, torpedo-boats, and steam launches not only searching the right bank with their fire, but also threatening to land a force at some convenient point; secondly, the main body of the army was to make preparations for crossing in the immediate vicinity of Wiju, the Guards Division just above and the Second Division just below; thirdly, a powerful flanking movement (by the Twelfth Division) was to be organized from Sukuchin; and fourthly, Kiulien and the neighboring heights were to be subjected to artillery fire from the Korean side of the river.

For this latter purpose ordinary field-guns could not be very effective. Comparatively heavy pieces were therefore transported by the naval vessels to the mouth of the river and were thence brought up to their positions.

By April 27th everything had been prepared for the beginning of cardinal operations. There is reason in saying that all arrangements were timed with almost absolute precision. It was known in official circles that the 30th of April would be an important day in the history of the war—and so it proved.

**ATTACK BY JAPANESE ARTILLERY ON KIULIEN.**—Shortly after daybreak on the 27th Japanese artillery opened on Kiulien, and under cover of its fire a part of the Guards Division waded across the first stream of the Yalu to Kulido Island, which lies a short distance up stream from Wiju. From the western shore of this island they found themselves within easy rifle-range of

the Russian force on Tiger Hill's, and a sharp engagement ensued, which resulted in the enemy evacuating the position.

At the same time the Second Division waded across to Keumchongdo Island, immediately below Wiju, and, engaging the enemy's outpost on the opposite island of Cheunsongdo, compelled it to withdraw.

At dawn of the 28th two companies of the Guards crossed by boat to Tiger's Hill; as an evidence of the deadliness of their artillery fire on the previous day ninety-five dead horses were seen. The detachment continued northward and occupied an eminence at Yulchawon. Thus the important heights lying in the angle between the Ai and the Yalu were taken and occupied, and the posting of artillery in commanding positions rendered the holding of Kiulien by the Russians very precarious. On this day the Russians were observed to be entrenching positions on the heights beyond the right bank of the Ai—that is, of Makau and Yushukan—work that should have been done by them weeks before.

On the 29th the Guards proceeded to bridge the stream between Kulido Island and Tiger's Hill.

On the early morning of the same day the Twelfth Division opened fire on the Russian outpost opposite Sukuchin, and rendered its position untenable. Whatever may be the explanation, the singular fact remains that in the face of the Japanese fire the Russians vacated the river bank opposite Sukuchin and left the Japanese unmolested to commence building their bridges. Throughout this day an incessant artillery fire was maintained from the Korean bank of the Yalu upon the Russian central positions.

CROSSING OF THE JAPANESE TROOPS.—Shortly after midnight of April 29th the Twelfth Division began crossing their bridge, and moved westward through the hills on the east of the Ai River, and took up a position within reach of that river by 6 P. M. (30th).

The Guards finished their bridge and crossed by it to Tiger's Hill, and were followed later by a part of the Second Division.

DISPOSITION OF THE JAPANESE FORCES.—The evening of April 30th saw General Kuroki's dispositions completed for the final attack.

The Twelfth Division was posted among the hills east of the Ai River in readiness to cross the stream and turn the Russian left flank.

The Guards and part of the Second Division had crossed the central stream of the Yalu and were bivouacked on Tiger's Hill, ready to wade across the mouth of the Ai and advance direct on Kiulien.

The Reserves were prepared to follow in the center of these two divisions.

The Guards and the Second Division were inconveniently massed, owing to the circumstances of the crossing. This defect was to be remedied, however, immediately on reaching the other side, for the Second Division had orders to turn down stream and move direct on Antung and attack it, if the enemy was found still in possession. Such an advance would threaten the enemy's communications with Hohmutang and also its communication with the Russians' advanced base at Fenghwangcheng.

In the event of the enemy's retreat from Antung the Second Division was to move in such a direction as would carry it across the western part of the Hohmutang plateau.

THE BATTLE OF THE YALU.—On the morning of May 1st these various operations commenced; that they were hazardous cannot be denied, for if the Japanese were driven back the conditions would have been unfavorable for an orderly retreat, and a disaster could hardly have been avoided.

Precedence in movement had to be given to the Twelfth Division, for if it succeeded in driving the Russians from their entrenchments on the Yushukan, Makau, and other hills the Kiulien position would be completely turned, and a Russian retreat inevitable.



At dawn, the Twelfth Division began to advance. It was extended over a front of about four miles ; the interval between the men on the firing line is said to have been three yards. The Manchurian side of the Yalu is more hilly than the Korean, and, being higher, commands it.

This fact emphasizes the weakness of the Russian defense. They should have been able to prevent the crossing at Suku-chin, and to have also checked the advance through the hills in the district between the Yalu and the Ai rivers. The greater mobility of the Cossacks should have told strongly in such operations; but apparently they did little or nothing. The men of the Twelfth Division had to cross the Ai by wading in water breast-high, carrying their rifles above their heads. The division seems to have crossed without great difficulty and to have had with it its artillery—mountain-guns, which were packed on horses.

Meanwhile the frontal attack upon the Russian position was developing. About two hours after the Twelfth Division advanced towards the Ai, the heavy guns of the Japanese on the Korean side of the Yalu and the field-pieces which the Guards had posted on Tiger's Hill and Yulchawon, opened fire on the Russian batteries at Makau and silenced them. It was then about 7:30 A. M., and the Guards, advancing direct towards Kiulien, waded across the Ai, which at this point was not more than waist deep. They were closely followed by the Second Division, which, as soon as it had crossed, headed down stream in the direction of Antung. At this time the attention of the Russians in the Kiulien position was largely directed to repelling the flank attack now rapidly developing from the north—the attack of the Twelfth Division. For this purpose they changed front, and found themselves between two fires—that of the Guards Division from the south, and of the Twelfth Division advancing from the north. The Twelfth Division overcame all obstacles, driving the Russians from their entrenchments on the right bank of the Ai and pushing up the heights along a line

from Lishukan to Yushukan, while the Guards had swept the enemy from Makau.

**CAPTURE OF THE KIULIEN POSITION.**—The Kiulien position was lost, and at about 9 A. M. the Russians fell back upon their entrenched rallying point on the Hohmutang plateau.

Meanwhile the Second Division pushed rapidly down the bank of the Yalu. A considerable part of the advance lay over open country, and it suffered severely. But the Russians at Antung, bombarded simultaneously by the naval flotilla on the river, did not wait to have their communications cut; they retired upon Hohmutang. This closed the first stage of the battle.

**SECOND STAGE OF THE BATTLE.**—The second was an attack upon the entrenched position at Hohmutang. The Japanese advanced from three directions—the Guards from the east, the Twelfth Division from the north, and the Second Division from the south.

**CAPTURE OF HOHMUTANG.**—The Russians fought desperately, and were not completely dislodged until 6 P. M., and, while suffering themselves, inflicted heavy losses on the Japanese.

Hohmutang was a poor position for defensive purposes; it lies in a hollow surrounded by hills which, having been crowned by the Japanese, rendered it untenable. The wiser plan would have been for the Russians, after being driven from the Kiulien heights, to have retreated at once to Fenghwangcheng.

By 8 P. M. the Russians were finally driven from their position at Hohmutang and retreated towards Fenghwang.

The two most prominent features of the battle seem to be the absence of offensive movement on the part of the Russians and their poor marksmanship. They acted strictly on the defensive throughout, and while occupying positions in the beginning that commanded the ground over which the Japanese had to advance, they failed to inflict as much loss as they themselves received.

The Russians had had three months' time to make their positions impregnable to assault; the very nature of the country should have made it comparatively easy work—but three days' fighting sufficed to dislodge them and to drive them back with heavy loss in men and material.

**CASUALTIES.**—The Japanese casualties were: Killed, 5 officers and 218 men; wounded, 33 officers and 783 men. Total, 1,039. As to the Russian casualties, from such information as is available, the Japanese buried 1,363 Russian dead, and doubtless the Russians themselves removed the bodies of many officers. At all events, if we assume that 3 were wounded for 1 killed, the total of wounded would be over 4,000. The prisoners taken were 613, which would make their total casualties over 5,000.

**SPOILS OF WAR.**—The spoils of war taken on the battle-field were: Twenty-one 3-inch Q.-F. guns, 8 machine guns, 19 ammunition wagons for 3-inch guns, 8 ammunition wagons for machine-guns, 1,417 3-inch projectiles, 37,300 for machine-guns, 1,021 rifles, 51 small-arm ammunition wagons, 353,005 rounds of rifle ammunition, 63 horses, 10 commissariat wagons, 53 sets harness, 694 overcoats, 550 fur overcoats, 541 portable tents, and 613 prisoners.

**NUMBERS OF THE TROOPS ENGAGED.**—The Russians say that their force actually engaged in the battle of the Yalu were 12,000 infantry and 80 guns (some 1,200 men), and that there were 3 battalions of infantry and 2 batteries of artillery at Antung which, it is said, did not take part in the fighting; but no mention is made of cavalry; still it is undoubted that they had a considerable force of cavalry.

The Japanese estimate of the Russian forces is that there were between 15,000 and 20,000 of all arms.

The Japanese force under General Kuroki consisted of three divisions (the Guards, Second, and Twelfth); a total of about 35,000 men.

**KUANTIEN OCCUPIED.**—On the 5th of May, Kwantienching (Kuantien) was occupied by a detachment of the army.

OCCUPATION OF FENGHWANG.—Fenghwangcheng was occupied on May 6th by Kuroki's army, the enemy setting fire to their powder and ammunition magazine as they retreated.

SKIRMISH AT TEUTAOKU.—On May 21st a small body of Japanese infantry encountered 200 Russian cavalry at Teutaoku, about seven miles northeast of Kuantien, and caused the Russians to retreat in the direction of Aiyangpienmen with a loss of 20 men and 4 horses killed. There were no casualties on the side of the Japanese.

On May 27th there was a small skirmish at Taikiapaotsz, in which a Russian lieutenant and 7 men, who were reconnoitring from Saimachi, were captured.

ACTION AT AIYANGPIENMEN.—On the 28th a detachment of the army attacked a force of 2,000 Russians at Aiyangpienmen, and after an engagement of one hour and one-half, forced them to retire in the direction of Saimachi, pursued by the Japanese. The Japanese lost 4 killed and 28 wounded.

RECONNAISSANCE.—On June 3d a detachment sent from Aiyangpienmen towards Saimachi on a reconnaissance encountered some 500 Cossacks west of Sinkaichan and forced them to retire. The Japanese detachment lost one killed and 3 wounded.

SAIMACHI OCCUPIED.—On June 7th a detachment drove a force of Russians from the neighborhood of Saimachi and occupied that place. The Japanese casualties were 3 men killed and 24 wounded. The Russians left on the field 23 men killed and 2 officers and 5 men were taken prisoners. According to the natives, the Russians had 2 officers and 70 men wounded.

SKIRMISH AT LINKIATAI.—There was also a sharp skirmish on the same day near Linkiatai, and after two hours' fighting, the Japanese detachment repulsed the enemy, consisting of 6 companies of infantry and 300 cavalry, who retreated towards Tungyuenpao. The Russian casualties were about 70 killed and wounded; the Japanese losses were 4 killed and 16 wounded,

SIUYEN OCCUPIED.—On June 8th a detachment defeated the Russians near Tahuling and then occupied Siuyen, in coöperation with a detachment of the Takushan army.

The enemy's force, which consisted of 4,000 cavalry and 6 guns, retreated in the direction of Kaiping.

The Japanese casualties were 1 man killed and 1 officer and 21 men wounded.

NOTE.—This shows that Kuroki's left wing had established touch with the Takushan army along the road leading from Siuyen to Fenghwangcheng.

On June 22d a force of Russians, consisting of a regiment of infantry, two regiments of cavalry, and a battery of artillery attacked our detachment at Aiyangpienmen, but were driven back towards Sinkiatun.

Major Kubota was killed in this engagement. The enemy's losses, witnessed from our side, were 5 killed and 20 wounded.

SAIMACHI.—Saimachi is on the road leading northeast from Fenghwangcheng. There are two routes from the latter to Liaoyang, one passing through the Motienling defile, the other going to Aiyangpienmen and thence to Chingchang *via* Saimachi. From Chingchang it turns westward and continues to Liaoyang through the Taitsz Valley.

LIUTAOKEU OCCUPIED.—On June 27th a detachment from the Twelfth Division drove off a Russian force near Liutaokeu on the Mukden road, and occupied the position. Of some 5,000 Russian infantry and cavalry who had previously occupied Saimachi, the main force retreated towards Penchihu.

FENSHUILING DEFILE OCCUPIED.—On the same date a detachment of the Twelfth Division occupied Fenshuiling on the Liaoyang road, and on the 29th the advance guard occupied Fenshuiling, Lienshankwan, and a portion occupied Motienling.

MOTIENLING DEFILE ALSO OCCUPIED.—The Guards Division then occupied the line of Motienling, Siao-motienling, and Sinkailing. About 2,000 Russian troops, who were in front, re tired to the west of Tienshuitien.

OCCUPATION OF NORTH-FENSHUILING.—Again on June 29th a detachment of the Second Division occupied North-Fenshuiling without resistance; the Russians having evacuated the heights west of Penchihu Lake.

ACTION AT MANLUNG-HO.—A detachment attacked the enemy at the Manlungho river. Japanese casualties, 24; those of the Russians, more than 70. Three Russian officers and 16 men were captured.

ACTION AT LIPAOLING.—On the same date a detachment attacked the enemy at Lipaoling. Japanese losses were 3 men killed and 1 officer and 22 men wounded. The Russian losses were 10 killed and 8 captured. The enemy retreated to Tien-shuitien.

NOTE.—The name "Fen-shui-ling" signifies "the defile of the dividing of the waters," and consequently is applied to many places. Thus, Fenshuiling is the name of the chief defile on the road from Siuyen to Liaoyang, and it is also the name of a principal defile on the northern or smaller road leading from Fenghwang to Liaoyang.

The hundred miles of Kuroki's march from Kiulien on the banks of the Yalu to the crests of the heights looking down on Liaoyang have all been through mountainous and difficult country, and from these he finally disentangled himself when he forced the defiles of Motienling and Taling.

## CHAPTER IV.

**FIRST ATTEMPT OF RUSSIANS TO RECOVER MOTIENLING.**—Early on July 4th two battalions of Russian infantry, under cover of a dense fog, attacked our advance guard at Motienling. The enemy charged three times, and a hand-to-hand combat ensued. After severe fighting the Japanese troops repulsed the enemy and pursued him as far as Kinkiapaotsz (four miles from the western foot of Motienling). The enemy retreated to Yangtszling, west of Tienshuitien. The Japanese casualties were 19 killed and 1 officer and 36 men wounded. The enemy's dead left on the field and buried by the Japanese numbered 53 and their wounded 40. Their casualties during the pursuit are unknown.

**COSSACK ATTACK.**—On the afternoon of July 5th 1,300 Cossacks made a front attack on one of the Japanese detachments posted near North-Fenshuiling (on the road from Saimachi to Liaoyang), but the enemy was repulsed and retreated to the northward. Our losses were 4 killed and 3 wounded.

**HSIENCHANG OCCUPIED.**—On the night of July 6th one of the Japanese detachments dislodged some 300 Russian cavalry from Hsienchang (north of Saimachi) and occupied it, the enemy retreating northward.

**SECOND ATTEMPT OF RUSSIANS TO RE-CAPTURE MOTIENLING.**—In making a second attempt to re-capture Motienling the Russian plan included a wide turning movement, which placed their troops at a point several miles to the northeast of Motienling—namely, at Sinkailing, a height between the two roads from Fenghwang to Liaoyang. This point was reached at half an hour after midnight of July 16th; their previous essay in this direction having been in the nature of a forced reconnaissance, by which they had profited.

At 3 A. M. of the 17th General Count Keller, who commands an army corps, took advantage of a dense fog, and led a force of about two divisions, consisting of the Third and Sixth Divisions of sharpshooters and the Ninth Infantry Division, to attack the Japanese positions in the Motienling defile and its two flanks.

**RUSSIANS DEFEATED.**—The assault was fierce, but the enemy was driven back at every point, and after many hours of hard fighting (until about 10:30 A. M.) the enemy began to retreat, and was pursued by the Japanese as far as Kinkiapaotsz—about two and one-half miles east of Tienshuitien.

**CASUALTIES.**—The Japanese casualties were 47 killed and 255 wounded. The Russian casualties are estimated by General Keller as more than 1,000, which includes not only the 200 dead buried by Japanese on the 18th, but the 51 taken prisoners and the large number carried off the field on stretchers by the Russians themselves. There were many spoils taken, but no detailed list is at hand.

**IMPORTANCE OF THE ACTION.**—This action is of much importance. Considered from the point of view of the Russian forces engaged it is a great battle, for two Russian divisions represent at least 25,000 men of all arms. The main significance is that whereas the Japanese, by superior strategy, captured Motienling in the first place and all the other defiles on the two roads with most trifling loss and little effort, the Russians failed to re-capture them, though they sent a powerful force to make the effort. The presence of General Keller shows that the army engaged was the Second, a part of which fought at the Yalu under General Sassulitch, who was deprived of his command for his blunder at the Yalu, and Keller took his place.

**CO-ORDINATION OF MOVEMENTS.**—It appears to be plain that General Kuroki had coördinated his movements with those of the Liaotung (Second, Oku's) and Takushan (Nodzu's) armies, and that a maneuver on a large scale would ultimately be undertaken.



OCCUPATION OF HSIHOYEN AND CHAOKIAPAO.—It should be remembered that in addition to the main road from Fenghwang to Liaoyang there are two northern roads. After the attempt of the Russians to dislodge the Japanese from the defiles on the main road, General Kuroki immediately assumed the offensive in order to clear the two northern roads. It was known that the Russians were encamped in considerable force at Hsihoyen on the south of the two northern roads, and a column was therefore sent against this position on July 18th—the day after the Russian attempt to re-capture Motienling. A battalion of infantry as advance guard pushed on rapidly in consequence of indications that the enemy was retreating in northerly direction from the position of Hsihoyen; but these appearances proved deceptive, and the battalion found itself engaged with two battalions of the enemy with four guns. A fierce struggle ensued, and one company of the Japanese battalion lost its commander and all its officers were wounded. After fighting for about two hours it was joined by another battalion, but their united efforts failed to drive back the Russians, and they bivouacked on the ground for the night, facing the enemy. Reconnaissances showed that the enemy had at this place seven battalions of infantry, a regiment of Cossacks, and thirty-two field-pieces. His position could be approached only by a narrow road; his left was protected by an unfordable river; and to outflank his right it would be necessary to make a long detour over several precipitous hills.

A COMBINED FRONTAL AND FLANK ATTACK.—The Japanese, nevertheless, determined to pursue their wonted tactics of combined frontal and flank attacks. Their main body, in the early morning of the 19th, moved against the front of the enemy's position, and two forces pushed out on the right and left. It was 3 P. M. before the force, upon which the main reliance was placed to effect the outflanking of the enemy's right, reached its position. At the same time an auxiliary force reached the same neighborhood. The early part of the forenoon had been

occupied by an artillery duel. The Russians had thirty-two guns in action. The duel lasted from 5 A. M. to 9. A. M., after which the fire slackened on both sides. As soon as it was seen that the flank attacking party had reached its position on the right and was about to move forward, the center and left simultaneously advanced. The Japanese artillery resumed a hot fire. The fight seems to have been very severe, but at 5:40 P. M. the Japanese dislodged the enemy from the heights on the west and south.

**HSIHOYEN OCCUPIED.**—The Japanese troops on the enemy's right succeeded in cutting the line of retreat, and at 8 P. M. the whole position was in the possession of Kuroki's troops.

**CASUALTIES.**—The Japanese losses were 71 killed and 450 wounded. During the 20th they buried 131 Russian dead, and among the objects captured were 3 ammunition wagons, 300 rifles, a quantity of clothing, and miscellaneous objects.

About 40 prisoners, including 2 officers, were captured, and, according to their statements, it appears that the Russian casualties exceeded 1,000.

**CHAOKIAPAO OCCUPIED.**—With regard to the column which went by the northern road, it dislodged the enemy from his entrenched position at Chaokiapao without serious difficulty in a fight which lasted four hours, although his force consisted of one battalion of infantry and 1,000 cavalry. The Russians retired to the right bank of the Taitsz-ho. In this engagement the Japanese had 17 killed and wounded.

## CHAPTER V.

**BATTLES OF YUSHULINTSZ AND YANGTSZLING.**—At dawn of July 31st the army began operations in order to attack the Russian forces at Yushulintsz and Yangtszling, which places were strongly held.

**ATTACK ON YUSHULINTSZ.**—The attack on Yushulintsz was carried out before dusk of the same day, as had been previously arranged, and both wings of the enemy there were defeated. His forces, however, were so numerous and his positions so strong that even after dark our force was unable to dislodge him from his positions.

**YUSHULINTSZ OCCUPIED.**—On the following day (August 1st) we resumed the attack before daylight, and succeeded in driving the enemy off at noon, pursuing him as far as Laoholing (four miles west of Yushulintsz).

**ATTACK ON YANGTSZLING.**—The attack on Yangtszling also gradually succeeded, and at 1 P. M. of July 31st our infantry took the offensive, and, advancing from Tawan and Makumenzan, occupied the greater part of the Russian positions before dark. A portion of the enemy's force, however, made an obstinate resistance, and held its position throughout the night.

**YANGTSZLING OCCUPIED.**—Our troops passed the night in battle formation, and resumed the attack before dawn of August 1st, occupying all the heights of Yangtszling and vicinity by 8 A. M.

The following causes were responsible for the considerable prolongation of these battles:

1. The rugged nature of the ground, which was unsuitable for offensive operations.
2. The lack of good artillery positions, owing to which the full strength of the Japanese artillery could not be utilized.

3. The excessive heat—the temperature being above 100° Fahrenheit, which considerably fatigued our troops.

**STRENGTH OF RUSSIAN FORCE.**—The enemy's force at Yushulintz was at least two divisions with artillery. Most of these troops retreated towards Anping. The strength of the Russian force at Yantszling was two and one-half divisions of infantry and four batteries of artillery; they retreated towards Tanghoyen.


**CASUALTIES.**—The Japanese casualties were 40 officers and 906 men killed and wounded.

**GENERAL KELLER KILLED.**—The Russian casualties include General Count Keller, who was killed at Yangtszling. The number of Russian dead left on the field and buried by the Japanese is 6 officers and 506 men. The wounded left behind includes 3 officers and 112 men. The number of prisoners captured is 8 officers and 149 men.


**SPOILS OF WAR.**—The spoils of war include 2 field-guns, 600 rifles, a large quantity of ammunition, and a number of entrenching tools.

Nearly five divisions, or about 45,000 men, were in position at Yushulintz and Yangtszling to receive Kuroki's attacks on July 31st and August 1st, and there was probably a strong reserve at Liaoyang of at least two divisions.

The drama is now drawing near to its *dénouement*—Yushulintz and Yangtszling are equi-distant from Liaoyang, twenty-five miles. The positions to which the Russians retreated, Anping and Tanghoyen, are each about fourteen miles from Liaoyang, and neither of these places offer much facility for defense: in fact, all the serious obstacles on the road to Liaoyang have been surmounted by Kuroki.



100 100 100 100



Battery No. 1.	8.	8.7 c.m. Field g
No. 2.	4.	8.7 c.m. Canet g
No. 3.	4.	10.5 c.m. Canet g
No. 4.	1.	15.45 c.m. Naval g

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## CHAPTER VI.

### *The Second Army—Commanded by General Oku.*

THE SECOND ARMY.—This army (consisting of the First, Third, and Fourth Divisions) was mobilized at the same time as the First Army (Kuroki's), and to show how the Japanese plan of campaign for the different armies was synchronized—on the date of Kuroki's battle on the Yalu, the Second Army was waiting the result of that battle, on transports sheltered behind the Elliot Islands (a group of islands from ten to twenty miles off the eastern coast of the Liaotung Peninsula).

THE GREAT BOOM OF LOGS.—A boom of logs, ten miles in length, connecting adjacent islands, had been previously constructed as the result of great labor; the logs, cables, and other material used in the construction having been transported from Japan. This work had been quietly accomplished without apparent notice, and as the Japanese transports loaded with troops reached the vicinity under cover of darkness they were safely moored behind this shelter with a convoy of destroyers on guard.

While this army expected and hoped to land on the peninsula, had the tide of battle on the Yalu turned against the Japanese, it was ready to proceed at full speed to the mouth of the Yalu as an assisting force.

Nothing in military history can equal this for preparedness.

LANDING OF THE SECOND ARMY ON THE LIAOTUNG PENINSULA.—As soon as news of the Japanese victory on the Yalu was received by General Oku preparations were immediately made for disembarking on the peninsula.

Under cover of a Japanese squadron the first detachment (of bluejackets) landed on the Liaotung Peninsula on May 5th without meeting any resistance. A handful of Cossacks was watching the coast-line—that was all.

The sea off the place where the troops effected their landing was shallow for a great distance and was strewn with rocks. At the time of the landing there was a rough sea, and even the boats, barges, and sampans had to stop 1,000 metres off the shore; the men and horses wading through the waves, which at times rolled over their heads.

CO-OPERATION OF THE ARMY AND NAVY.—The Coöperation of the army and navy is one of the striking features of this war. The two services are working together in a most thorough, whole-hearted manner.

It was a capital plan that the sailors should precede the soldiers in landing and that the latter should defer their approach to the shore until they saw the Flag of the Rising Sun float over an eminence where the bluejackets had raised it. Generally, the plan pursued is for the ships to cover the landing operations, which are left entirely to the troops, except so far as the handling of the boats is concerned.

PULANTIEN AND PITSEWO OCCUPIED.—Immediately after landing, a detachment of troops moved swiftly across the peninsula and took possession of Pulantien (Port Adams), destroying the railway and telegraph lines between Port Arthur and the outer world; while another detachment was sent up the coast to cut the telegraph lines at Pitsewo—the point at which the Japanese landed in the China-Japan War in 1894.

PULANTIEN.—Pulantien has historical interest for the Japanese: it was there that the Chinese made one of the few really able strategical moves standing to their credit in the campaign of 1894-95.

At two places the Liaotung Peninsula takes the form of a narrow isthmus. Pulantien is on the north and Kinchow on the south. The exact point of the landing on May 5th is not known, but it is certain that not a moment was lost in occupying Pulantien and cutting the railway which there debouches on the coast.



**ACTION AT SANSHIHLIPAO.**—The detachment sent to Pulantien rejoined the advance guard on May 7th. On the 8th there was a sharp action with the Russian cavalry at San-shih-li-pao. On the 12th a detachment sent to Pulantien and Wafang-tien made a successful reconnaissance.

**KIULICHWANG OCCUPIED.**—On the 16th, after a two-hours' fight with a Russian force near Shihsanlitai, a body of Japanese troops occupied Kiulichwang (about one and one-half miles northeast of Kinchow) and the heights to the north of Chaukatung (east of Kinchow).

**CASUALTIES.**—The Japanese casualties in the engagement of May 16th were 146 officers and men killed and wounded, no officers being killed.

**ATTACK ON KINCHOW.**—On May 22d operations were commenced, and on the 23d the army began the advance on Kinchow and assembled in the rear of line of battle at Kiulichwang-Chankiatung-Chaitsz-ho.\*

**RUSSIAN POSITION.**—As a result of the reconnaissance on the 23d it was ascertained that the Russians had mounted eight heavy guns facing the sea on Hoshangtao on their right wing, some of them placed so as to fire northeast in the direction of Makiatung. Ten forts were believed to be on the summit of Nan-shan (a hill near Kinchow), and the majority faced either north or northeast. The northeastern base of the hill is protected by barbed-wire entanglements and mines. Along the heights on the eastern side of Nankwanling an entrenchment was observed. The enemy has search-lights at Tsoying, Houying, and Yangpaoying, south of Kiulichwang, by which our camps at night are lit up at times. Wire entanglements are laid by the Russians from Yenkiatung on the east of Nan-shan to a point about 1,000 metres northeast of Liutiutung, passing along the northern foot of the mountain towards the northwest. No defensive works were observed to the left of that point. A small number of infantry and artillery still guard Kinchow.

\*These are three distinct places, Kiulichwang—Chankiatung—Chaitsz-ho.

**KINCHOW OCCUPIED.**—On May 26th an artillery duel commenced in the early morning and lasted for five hours. Three of the Japanese naval ships coöperated in the bombardment from Kinchow Bay. Kinchow fell into our hands at 5:20 A. M., May 26th.

**THE BATTLE OF NAN-SHAN.**—General Oku, in his modest report, says: "The army, after occupying Kinchow to-day (May 26th) at 5:20 A. M., attacked the enemy at Nan-shan. After a severe engagement our army succeeded in occupying Nan-shan at 7 P. M., and is now pursuing the fleeing enemy. The Russian guns in the uncovered forts were silenced. The enemy had dug several rows of trenches around the forts on Nan-shan, and the auxiliary defense works were fortified with modern arms. The Russians offered an obstinate resistance making our repeated charges ineffective; but finally they gave way to a fierce charge about 3 P. M. and abandoned their camp, retreating in the direction of Nan-kwan-ling. It should be particularly recorded that our officers and men have shown extraordinary bravery by fighting for sixteen hours to-day and attacking the enemy's position in face of a severe fire. In the battle four of our war-ships coöperated with my forces and rendered great assistance."

**STRENGTH OF THE RUSSIAN POSITION.**—In a later report he says: "The enemy's position on Nan-Shan was strengthened by the high, rugged slope of the mountain, and in the semi-permanent fortifications were about seventy guns of various caliber and eight machine-guns. Round the line of forts which encircled the mountain side several times—one above the other—sheltered trenches for rifle fire were constructed; and in front of these works a great number of mines and a net-work of barbed-wire entanglements were placed, the space between being occupied by a number of machine-guns. The whole of our artillery tried hard to destroy these works, and assisted the advance of the infantry by changing the positions of the guns nearer and nearer to the enemy. Owing, however, to the strong

resistance of the enemy's infantry, the situation remained unchanged until 5 p. m. Up to this time no opening had been obtained for our infantry to advance, and the Third Division (our left wing) was not only in danger of being surrounded, but the enemy had reinforced his infantry in front of its left flank, and his two batteries at Nankwanling were assisting the defense.

"Thus the left flank of the division becoming more and more threatened, while the field supply of our artillery ammunition was nearly exhausted, it became evident that the fight could not be continued much longer. Consequently, I was obliged to order our infantry to make an assault, even at a heavy cost, and our artillery was ordered to use its remaining ammunition in vigorously bombarding the enemy.

CHARGE OF THE FIRST DIVISION.—The infantry of our First Division rushed forward to the enemy's position in the most gallant and daring manner, but, owing to the plunging and flanking shots of the enemy's vigorous fire, a great number of our men were quickly killed or wounded. The situation seemed critical, as a further advance was impossible. Just at this juncture our naval fleet in Kinchow Bay vigorously renewed its heavy fire on the left wing of the enemy's line, and the Fourth Division's artillery also joined in the cannonade against the enemy's fire. Taking advantage of this opportunity, the Fourth Division brought its full force against the left wing of the enemy and advanced first to the line of high ground.

GALLANTRY OF THE JAPANESE.—The whole line of soldiers of the First and Third Divisions, while supporting, now rushed up in the most gallant manner, jumping over the bodies of their dead comrades, and forced their way into the enemy's trenches.

NAN-SHAN CAPTURED.—The assault was so fierce that our bayonets crossed with those of the enemy. At last the stronghold of Nan-shan was taken, and at a little past 7 o'clock in the evening our national flag was flying on the top of every fort. The routed enemy fled in disorder towards Port Arthur. While retreating, the enemy blew up the powder magazine at Tavan-

shin. After sending a detachment in pursuit of the retreating enemy, the remainder of our army bivouacked on the battle-field. The spirit of the whole army was splendid, and in every direction loud shouts of "Banzai!" were heard. Our artillery pursued the fleeing enemy.

THE RUSSIAN FORCES.—The enemy's forces which opposed us consisted of about one division of the field army, two batteries of field artillery, besides the garrison artillery manning the guns in position, and some marines.

The enemy seems to have tried his hardest, in order to cover Port Arthur and Talienshan, to check our advance by tenaciously holding his position at Nan-shan. It also appears that he had endeavored to increase his defensive works there.

CASUALTIES.—The Japanese casualties at Nan-shan were 4,170, classified as follows: Killed, 34 officers and 716 men; and wounded, 65 officers and 3,355 men. The Russian casualties cannot be ascertained, but the number of the dead left on the battle-field alone amounts to more than 500. There are a number of prisoners (officers and men) captured.

TROPHIES.—"Our trophies are 68 guns and 10 machine guns, an electric battery, 3 search-lights, one dynamo, 50 mines, and a great number of rifles, ammunition, and other material.

"In conclusion, I wish to express my warmest thanks for the valuable assistance rendered by the Imperial Navy."

COMMENTS.—Among various comments on the battle of Nan-shan, the following is quoted from the editor of the *Japan Mail*, Captain Brinkley, a retired officer of the artillery of the British Army:

"Some critics think the Russians made a strategical mistake in selecting Nan-shan as their principal point of defense instead of Nan-kwan-ling. The former is only 350 feet high, while the latter eminence is 800 feet in height and has a wider command. As between the two places there cannot be any doubt. Nan-shan is the key of the whole position; it covers Dalny, and batteries placed on it completely search the whole isthmus. If

there be any strategical objection to Nan-shan it is that to hold the place against all contingencies its defenders should have access to the bays on either side—Kinchow Bay on the west and Talién Bay on the east. The isthmus being only two miles across, it is easy to appreciate the importance of the water approaches. Indeed, there is much reason to conclude that but for the coöperation of a naval flotilla from the direction of Kinchow Bay, the Japanese attack might not have succeeded without further heavy loss. What seems to have happened was that the First Division's repeated and most gallant attempts to force the position failed, and the failure appeared likely to be irremediable for that day at all events, when a portion of the Fourth Division on the right, having waded along the shore under cover of a heavy fire from the gun-boats and torpedo-boats, succeeded in crowning the heights on the enemy's left rear. That was the turning point of the long and desperate fight, and the inference is that had Russian ships commanded Kinchow Bay the isthmus never could have been forced. On the eastern side, the side of Talién Bay, the Russians were in possession of the sea, and one of their gun-boats seems to have galled the left wing of the Japanese terribly. Had they possessed access to the sea on the west also the position would have been impregnable. Even as it stood, Nan-shan presented one of the most formidable obstacles an army was ever required to negotiate. An eminence crowned with a great park of artillery, surrounded by line after line of shelter-trenches—trenches which completely concealed the troops occupying them, except so far as loop-holes offered a mark for the fire of the assailants, and then again defended by barbed-wire entanglements and rows of mines—nothing stronger can well be conceived.

“One imagines that to launch troops against such a position during broad daylight must be suicidal, and that night would necessarily be awaited. But experience has proved that whatever protection darkness affords is more than counter-balanced by the difficulty of effective operation and intelligent direction.

Besides, the darkness of fifty years ago is not the darkness of to-day, nor is the darkness of South Africa the darkness of Kinchow. The Russians had search-lights at Nan-shan, and thus to have attacked at night would have gained little for the assailants in the matter of concealment. It was a magnificent fight. We offer to the Japanese our highest tribute of admiration. That they would fight grandly and hold their own we never doubted, but such feats as the storming of Nan-shan belong to a category apart."

COMMENTS BY THE JAPANESE VICE-MINISTER OF WAR.—Major-General Ishimoto, Vice-Minister of War, in a recent lecture on the battle of Nan-shan before the Imperial Maritime Association, spoke as follows:

"Nan-shan stands midway between Kinchow and Dalny; and the isthmus there is only four kilometers wide. But Kinchow Bay, the water of which is shallow for some distance from the shore, can be waded, as was done by the Chinese when we attacked Port Arthur ten years ago. Of course the shallowness of the bay depends on the state of the tide.

"Very strong forts had been constructed on the summit of Nan-shan, but they were of a semi-permanent and not of a permanent nature. Permanent forts are always constructed in time of peace, at great labor and expense, and their materials are iron, bricks, stones, or concrete. Semi-permanent forts are usually constructed by the engineer corps after the outbreak of hostilities. The forts of Nan-shan belonged to the latter category.

"Some European authorities on fortifications now rather prefer semi-permanent forts to the permanent ones, which latter may become totally useless, according to the developments of war. In fact, a certain country has dispensed with permanent fortresses. We cannot say, of course, that Russia applied this theory to the defense of Nan-shan, but as a matter of fact Nan-shan was strongly defended with forts of a semi-permanent nature.

“The battle of Nan-shan has been compared with one of the battles that occurred during the Franco-Prussian War; but it might better be compared with that of Plevna in the Turkish War of 1877. The defenses of Plevna were at first very simple, having been temporarily constructed. But the Russian Army attacked the stronghold, and was repulsed several times. While the Russians were making preparations for another attack the Turks strengthened their defense, so that finally it became absolutely impossible for the Russians to take the place by storm. In consequence, Russia was compelled to carry out a regular siege, which entailed on her a heavy loss of troops and time. Had Nan-shan not been taken on the first day of the battle it would have been more difficult to carry it on the second day. The Russians would have strengthened the stronghold day by day, and we should have remained farther than ever from Port Arthur. The capture of Nan-shan on the first day of attack was a brilliant feat from a tactical point of view, and the sacrifice of so many lives was unavoidable.

“The enemy’s guns were most effectively placed in the terraces on the heights. Moreover, the wire entanglements, with which the approach to the guns was protected, were the most powerful equipment in modern defensive works. Wire entanglements are networks of wire interwoven between poles three or four feet high. The network usually has a width of fifteen or twenty feet and extends several hundred yards. It is impossible to pass over it at double time or to crawl under the wires. Nothing can stop the advance of troops so effectively as these entanglements. The latter, however, are never constructed over the entire surface of ground, but are divided into sections, through the openings of which the defending army can effect a sortie. When, however, the attacking army directs its way to these passages it must be prepared to meet the enemy’s quick-firing guns. When dealing with an enemy equipped with wire entanglements we must first silence the enemy’s guns, and then dispatch the infantry, led by engineers armed with shears and

other tools for clearing the entanglements; but as long as the enemy retains any available guns or rifles the feat cannot be performed without a heavy loss of men. One is apt to say that Nan-shan might have been taken by some other methods than those carried out by our army. But if we had hesitated on account of the probable casualties we should have reaped a result similar to that which befell the Russians at Plevna, and have lost much more men than was actually the case.

"Some say that Russia should have concentrated her forces at Nan-kwan-ling instead of at Nan-shan. This criticism, however, is too hasty. The question could not be decided until we knew more definitely about the strength of the Russian force. If it was sufficiently large it would certainly have been wise for the Russian commander to have held Nan-kwan-ling, which affords a far better deploying position than Nan-shan. According to the Russian official report of the Nan-shan engagement, it was announced that Russia had defended that stronghold for demonstrative purposes only. Such a declaration is quite inconsistent with the facts, and there is no longer any doubt that Russia had intended to check the advance of our army at that strategical point, as every possible measure for defense had been undertaken there.

"Considering the position of the Russians on the peninsula, the enemy must fight desperately to resist the advance of our forces. It is, therefore, no wonder that the Russians admirably defended that place in spite of our deadly artillery fire. It appears that the military experts in Europe thought it impossible to take the stronghold of Nan-shan, but, contrary to expectation, the latter was captured by our forces after some sixteen hours' fighting. It is hoped that the time will arrive when it will be possible to lay before the world the full particulars of the fight, which, no doubt, will afford valuable lessons of strategy."



## CHAPTER VII.

OCCUPATION OF DALNY.—The first official report indicating that Dalny was in possession of the Japanese was from General Oku, received on May 31st, in which he says:

“According to a late report, the barracks and warehouses at Dalny, consisting of over one hundred buildings, are in perfect condition. The telegraph office and railway station remain intact, and over two hundred railway cars (including both passenger and freight cars) are available. All the small bridges on the railway in the vicinity have been destroyed. A steam launch has been sunk at the entrance of the docks.”

It is reported that when a Japanese torpedo flotilla approached “the new landing-place” on May 29th a large conflagration was observed in Dalny, and it was conjectured that this indicated that the Russians had abandoned the place. General Oku’s report, as given above, seems to refer to the state of affairs following the conflagration.

What happened seems to have been that during the 26th of May—probably in the evening, when the Nan-shan position had been forced—orders were conveyed to the Russian commander at Dalny to destroy the place and retire on Port Arthur. It appears that on the evening of the 26th a body of Japanese troops occupied a position on a distant hill, despite a heavy rain, and bombarded the neighboring Russian position from early dawn of the 27th, and that the Russians retired from Dalny after destroying the railway and all the buildings which were possible in the limited time.

The Japanese troops entered Dalny on May 28th and hoisted their national flag.

CONDITION OF DALNY.—A later report states that all the principal bridges on the railway between Kinchow and Dalny

have been destroyed by the Russians. Owing to the prompt measures taken by the Japanese troops who occupied Dalny, the fire started by the enemy when retiring was practically confined to the official quarters; the principal buildings destroyed being the school-house, the city office (excepting the Mayor's official residence), and the residences of the railway officials. There are no locomotives at the station, and nearly all the goods-cars (some seventy or more only being intact) are still smouldering. The telegraph office, two electric light stations, the harbor office, the Dalny Hotel, the park, and the Chinese Eastern Railway Company's office are all intact.

Mines had been laid in the premises of the Electric Light Company and also near the piers, but are now being removed by the Japanese engineer corps. The boom and mines placed in the harbor by the Russians will shortly be cleared by men from the fleet. The dock is in perfect condition. As the water-main was destroyed, the town is short of good drinking water. Large quantities of material at the brick-yard, foundry, and ironworks have fallen into Japanese hands. On the night of May 26th about fifteen hundred Russian troops at Dalny left for Port Arthur, either by rail or junk. During the day preceding the arrival of the Japanese, mounted bandits, joined by members of the working classes, raided the residences of wealthy citizens and carried away all the property they could lay their hands on.

Letters from Dalny speak of the immense convenience furnished by that port. The Russians made the mistake of not destroying the factories, the electrical machinery, and so forth, before evacuating the place, and all these are now in full operation. The waterworks have been restored and thoroughly cleansed, and the bay being now open to steamers, the garrison and the troops at the front are in full communication with the outer world.

Trains are running to Kaiping and Haicheng, connecting with Newchwang.

Among the spoils that fell into Japanese hands on the occupation of Dalny was an ice-house containing 2,000,000 *kin* of ice. The ice is now being used by the Japanese field-hospital there.


## CHAPTER VIII.


BATTLE OF TEHLISZ.—On June 13th the Second Army advanced from the Ta-sha-ho (river) near Pulantien, driving before it small detachments of the enemy, which were encountered, and on the 14th occupied the line of Wangkiatung-Pangkiatung-Yuhutung, and bombarded the enemy's position from 3 P. M. till sunset. On June 15th, before daybreak, with a view to attacking the enemy at Tehlisz and vicinity, the right column was ordered to hold firmly the line between Sungkiatung and Wangkiatung, while the center column was sent from Yohutung to occupy the hills west of Tayankeu.

There was a dense fog in the morning. Fire was opened on both sides at 5:30 A. M., and as the firing on both sides increased in strength, a portion of the center column posted north of Fuchow found itself hard-pressed, but was steadily advancing, when a detachment of infantry and cavalry, which had been hurrying from Fuchow since daybreak, arrived on the heights west of Wangkiatung at 9:30 A. M.; and, coöperating with the center column, succeeded in repulsing the enemy in the vicinity of Tafangtcheu by 11 A. M. The enemy's artillery posted on Luangtangshan and the heights of Luangwanmiao poured a heavy fire on the center column and coöperating detachments, but they pressed forward, climbing cliffs and precipices.

The enemy confronting the wing of the right column was still in superior force, and several times assumed the offensive. Our forces in this direction were in consequence twice reinforced from the general infantry reserve of the Army. In the meantime the position of the right column became almost insupportable, but a body of cavalry arrived on the scene and threatened the left rear of the enemy. The enemy was now surrounded by our columns, but made a vigorous resistance, and on re-

# The Battle of Tehlisz, June 1





ceiving reinforcements tried to regain the situation by repeated counter-attacks.

**TEHLISZ CAPTURED.**—Our attacks prevailed at last, and the enemy's forces began to retreat at about 3 p. m. in the direction of Tashihkiao, and were thrown into confusion by our pursuit.

**ENEMY'S FORCE.**—The enemy's force in the field from the beginning of the battle consisted of 25 battalions of infantry, 17 squadrons of cavalry, and 98 guns. In addition, some reinforcements arrived during the engagement.

**CASUALTIES.**—The Japanese casualties in this battle were: Killed, 7 officers and 210 rank and file; wounded, 43 officers and 903 rank and file. Total, 1,163. Twenty-six horses were killed and 67 wounded. The Russian losses were as follows: Of the enemy's killed and left on the field, the number already buried by our army is 1,854; to this number must be added those subsequently buried by a specially appointed burial detachment, whose report has not been received. The number of their wounded is unknown. The number of prisoners is 300, including the colonel of the Fourth Regiment and 5 other officers.

**TROPHIES CAPTURED.**—With regard to the trophies captured, the following list is given:

- 16 quick-fire guns;
- 46 ammunition wagons;
- 953 rifles;
- 37,233 rounds of rifle ammunition;
- 1,121 rounds of artillery ammunition;
- 232 engineering tools and implements;
- 1,110 barrels of cement;

besides a large quantity of grain, and a number of other weapons, camp utensils, etc.

**COMMENTS.**—This is the bloodiest battle yet fought. It is also the first battle that has taken place in the open. At the Yalu and at Nan-shan the Japanese had to attack a foe entrenched in very strong positions. The Tehlisz fight, however, was in the open. It presented no special feature, and the

forces engaged were fairly equal. Of the two sides, the Japanese should have suffered more, for they were the attacking force. Yet their casualties slightly exceed 1,000, while the Russians lost several thousand. The fact is that the Tehlisz battle is the most important one thus far fought; not the most important, perhaps, from a strategical point of view; for while the fight on the Yalu decided the great question as to whether Korea or Manchuria should be the theater of war, and while the fight at Nan-shan placed Japan within striking distance of the Russian citadel in the Far East, the combat at Tehlisz merely beat back a relieving army which, even though it had gained possession of the Pitsewo-Pulantien line, could never have passed the Nan-shan Isthmus with the bays of Kinchow and Dalny both in Japanese possession.

IMPORTANCE OF TEHLISZ.—The importance of Tehlisz lay in the fact that it represented what must be regarded as the strongest effort of which Kuropatkin is immediately capable to restore the situation. He deliberately moved this relieving force down, organizing it with all the forces he could spare from the defenses of Liaoyang, Mukden, and Haicheng, and invited the Japanese to try conclusions with him in a position from which all chances of naval participation was excluded. The Russian army at Tehlisz consisted of two and one-half divisions—that is, 10 regiments of infantry or 30 battalions. If each battalion numbered 800 men, there is a force of 24,000. He had also 98 guns. The artillery of an army corps of three divisions is 96 guns, and it is probable that General Stackelberg's army consisted of the whole of the First Army corps—not far from 30,000 men. The result was an overwhelming defeat with an enormous loss of not far from 25 per cent of their total force.



## CHAPTER IX.

OCCUPATION OF KAIPING.—On July 9th the Second Army drove back the enemy in the vicinity of Kaiping, and at noon succeeded in completely occupying that place.

THE RUSSIAN POSITION.—The main force of the enemy was posted along the Kaiping River, which runs nearly due east and west, and has on its northern side the heights of Haishansai, Tsaikiatung, and Tapingtun. This was his principal position. In addition, on all the hills immediately south of the river were strong outposts. These hills form two chains of defenses. The southern chain, which is nearly parallel to the river, consists of four eminences—Szefangtai, Kinkiakau, Siaolanki, and Tsuikiatung. Szefangtai (or Sufantai) is on the extreme east of the chain, and from this point the second chain runs in a north-westerly direction, and consists of two groups of hills—Tatszekeu on the east of the railway, and Shakangtai and Tawanghaisai on the west. General Oku had to capture all these positions before reaching the main Russian force.

MOVEMENTS OF THE JAPANESE.—With this in view, on July 5th he moved up to Rhtao-hotsz, which is about two miles southward of the southern chain of outlying hills, and thence on the 6th, with his right moving on the east of the railway, his center along that line, and his left on the west of it.

He commenced by attacking Szefangtai (the apex of the two chains), and then drove the enemy from the other three heights. On the 7th his left wing advanced against the Shakangtai position, and this having been occupied, the right wing and center took Tatszekeu, while the left pushed on to Tawanghaisai. About noon of the 7th information received from the natives made it nearly certain that the enemy had 20,000 men at Kaiping, 2,000 at Haishansai, and 10,000 in that neighbor-

hood, while his artillery was posted at Hsi-tai. This intelligence was confirmed on the morning of the 8th. The enemy was seen to be in force on the west of the railway; his line extended from Haishansai to Hsi-tai; he occupied all the heights around and to the north of Kaiping, and from an early hour in the afternoon the railway brought fresh troops to Haishansai.


Dispositions having been made, the advance was commenced at 5:20 A. M. on July 9th. The right wing was thrown forward first and directed against Hsi-tai, while the center moved towards Kaiping. No considerable resistance was offered at the Kaiping River, and the enemy was dislodged from the heights east of the railway. On the west of the railway the enemy organized a strong resistance. His principal positions on that side were Haishansai, Shih-men, and Kaokiatung.

KAIPING OCCUPIED.—The Russians made two strong stands on the hills to the north of Kaiping, the second of which lasted until noon, when he finally retired towards the north in the direction of Tashihkiao, fifteen miles distant.

Oku's army, starting from Kinchow, had advanced 115 miles to Kaiping, fighting two battles *en route*—at Tehlisz and at Kaiping. Both combats were in hilly country, but with the capture of the heights north of Kaiping, Oku's soldiers found themselves looking down on the plain that stretches to Tashihkiao and Yingkow.

CASUALTIES.—The Japanese casualties in the neighborhood of Kaiping, lasting from July 6th to the 9th, inclusive, were: Killed, 24 men; wounded, 5 officers (including Major-General Koizumi) and 124 men. Total, 153. The Russian loss is unknown; the killed and wounded having been carried away by the enemy.

25, 1904.





[The following text is extremely faint and illegible due to low contrast and poor scan quality. It appears to be a list or a series of entries, possibly containing names and dates, but the characters are not discernible.]

## CHAPTER X.

YINGKOW OCCUPIED.—General Oku reports that a detachment of the army occupied Yingkow on July 25th. All the buildings at Yingkow station had been destroyed, and the Russian vessels there had fled to the upper courses of the Lia-ho, while the Russian garrison had retired to the northeast.

ATTACK ON TASHIHKIAO.—His detailed report of the occupation of Tashihkiao is so complete that it is quoted in toto:

JAPANESE MOVEMENTS.—“The army left the line of positions near Kaiping at 4 A. M. of the 23d of July, and moving forward occupied the line extending from Liukaikou *via* Hwarshan to Wutashan; each column driving off a number of Russians in its front. During that day several bodies of Russian infantry, cavalry, and horse artillery repeatedly resisted the advance of our left wing. The army deployed in the positions occupied, keeping the strictest watch, and made preparations for the next day's battle.

“Before dawn of the 24th the various bodies of troops constituting our right wing began operations, coöperating with each other, and marched on Tapingling—an elevation 180 metres west of the latter, and the ground further west. At 8 A. M. the army occupied the line extending from the heights north of Yangtsaokou to the eastern side of the heights north of Sunkiatun, along a height about 180 meters above sea-level. At this time the enemy's artillery on the heights of Tapingling Pienwukou, and Chengkiakou fired heavily on our positions. The unfavorable nature of the ground prevented our artillery from reaching the positions whence they could effectively reply to the hostile fire. The infantry, therefore, had to occupy the covered position and await an opportunity to attack.

"The center force of the army, timing its operations with the right wing, advanced under cover of our artillery near Hwarhshan, and occupied the heights north of Sunkiatus at 10 A. M. But owing to the severe fire from the numerous Russian guns between Tsingshihshan and Wangmatai our infantry suspended movement and waited the advance of the right wing and our artillery.

"The army's left wing, which at first occupied the positions near Wutaishan, seeing the advance of the troops on its right extended its first line from Niukiatus to Liupaitasz, and its artillery took position near Tapingchuang and engaged at once in a severe duel with the enemy's batteries at Wangmatai.

RUSSIAN POSITION.—"The enemy's main positions covered the ridge of heights from Niusinshan on his right to Tapingling on his left *via* Tsingshihshan. They were divided into defensive sectors, which commanded a view of the zone of our operations, and possessed a wide range of fire. The entrenchments which were constructed in terraces, had loop-holes and cover, and were defended by abatis, wire entanglements, and mines. The defenses were perfect from a standpoint of field tactics. The enemy's artillery had skillfully utilized the nature of the ground, and taken positions so well covered that it was difficult to ascertain the exact location of his guns.

"On the other hand, our artillery positions were everywhere exposed to the enemy's view, and the movements of our guns were very difficult. But our batteries frequently changed their positions in spite of great difficulties and covered the operations of our infantry. Even with this, the nature of the ground caused our artillery to suffer severely, and in spite of the strenuous efforts of our men, our artillery was not able to silence the enemy's guns. The commander of the army, intent on carrying out the attack to the last, ordered the right wing to advance on the enemy, regardless of losses. They accordingly advanced in face of the enemy's galling fire, but, owing to the nature of the ground, our troops were not able before the sun had set to storm

even one of the positions occupied by the enemy. With regard to the force next to the right wing, it was compelled to abandon one of the enemy's positions into which it had penetrated by its extraordinary bravery and to retire, owing to the unusual strength of the position and to a counter-attack delivered by a superior force of the enemy.

"Such being the situation, the artillery duel was practically suspended at sunset, though a portion of the enemy's batteries occasionally fired on us until 9 P. M.

A NIGHT ATTACK BY JAPANESE.—"The commander of the right wing then decided on a night attack on the enemy's positions in order to carry out the plans of the Commander-in-chief. Having obtained the latter's approval, the commander of the right wing finally carried out his plan at about 10 P. M., the majority of the infantry being used for that purpose.

"This infantry force dashed forward, charged at the point of the bayonet the strong positions of the enemy near Tapingling, and finally succeeded in carrying the enemy's first fort. Again, in spite of heavy losses, our troops charged the second fort, which they occupied at 3 A. M. of the 25th. The different bodies of troops adjoining the right wing also occupied the heights near Shansiteu shortly afterwards. With the dawn of day our artillery, in the vicinity of Wolungkang, opened fire on the enemy in front, only to discover that the enemy's condition had greatly changed from that of the preceding day. Thereupon several bodies of our troops at once pushed forward and occupied Tsingshishan. As soon as this was known by the left wing they advanced and occupied the line from Nuisinshan to Kiaotaipu. Our cavalry operated on the left of our army and protected our flank and rear against a superior force of the enemy's cavalry, assisted by horse artillery. The enemy retired towards Haicheng, the main body along the Tashihkiao road and a portion along the road to its east, while the enemy's reserves passed Tashihkiao about 11 A. M. in the midst of our firing.

TASHIHKIAO OCCUPIED.—“Then the advanced bodies of our several columns pursued the retreating enemy, and shortly afterward occupied Tashihkiao and its vicinity.

RUSSIAN FORCES.—“The enemy confronting us consisted of the First, Second, Ninth, Thirty-fifth, and the Siberian Reserve Divisions, and had about 120 guns.

KUROPATKIN COMMANDED.—“According to a captured Russian officer, General Kuropatkin took command in the battle, and the officer states that Lieutenant-General Sakharoff and Major-General Kondoravitch were wounded.

CASUALTIES.—“The Japanese casualties in this battle were: Killed, 12 officers and 136 men; wounded, 47 officers and 848 men. Total, 1,043. From various reports it is gleaned that the Russians lost more than 2,000. The enemy retreated in confusion, owing to our pursuit. Indications show that the enemy originally intended to strenuously defend the heights near Tsingshihshan and wage a decisive battle there. He suddenly retired at midnight, due to the defeat of his left wing.

“As to spoils of war taken, it is being investigated.”

On July 26th the enemy was still holding the positions near Huchangtun, while about two batteries of artillery appeared at Kiushanling, east of the former place, and fired in the vicinity of Tungkiaokeu. They later retired in the direction of Haicheng.

On July 27th there were only six squadrons of the enemy's cavalry in the neighborhood of Wenkiaotun, and another body of cavalry with a battery of horse artillery near Tungyungshukeu. The enemy's force which retired from Yingkow seems to have stopped near Hungwasai.

The Japanese troops which were dispatched to Yingkow to garrison the town, arrived there on the night of the 26th, and at once relieved the detachment of cavalry who first occupied the place.



## CHAPTER XI.

ADVANCE ON HAICHENG AND NEWCHWANG.—Both Haicheng and Newchwang were occupied on August 3d by General Oku's forces; he reports that at 4 A. M. on August 1st the army advanced in five columns from their positions near Tashihkiao. The second column occupied the positions near Nantsienshan at about 9 A. M. The first column drove off the enemy in its front and occupied the heights near Liukiapaotsz at 1 P. M. The third column took possession of the heights near Kiuling, and its artillery opened an indirect fire on the heights east of Tutaitz, which had for the last few days been occupied by the enemy. As the Russian force seemed to have retired, the column immediately advanced and occupied the heights northwest of Tashanpu at 9:30 A. M. At this time about two batteries of the Russian artillery appeared on the high ground northeast of Huluyi, and opened a severe fire on the infantry of the second and third columns. Shortly afterwards the artillery of our second column took up positions on the heights northeast of Tungkiakeu, and the batteries of the third column near Wengkiakeu, and an artillery duel ensued. At 11:30 A. M. another battery of the enemy's artillery appeared at the southern extremity of Hiakiaho and fired on the infantry of our third column. All of the enemy's batteries, however, evacuated their positions at a little past noon and retired towards Haicheng.

The fourth column drove off a small number of the enemy's cavalry, and reached the line extending from the left wing of the third column to Chaokiatun at 10 A. M. In its front about five or six squadrons of Russian cavalry with one battery of horse artillery appeared near Hungnasai and fired heavily on our infantry; but this force retreated towards Haicheng at

about mid-day. The fifth column drove off the enemy's cavalry and infantry and occupied Liukiapaotsz and Lienshantun.

The enemy's force opposing us aggregated about one division, and his main body retired towards Haicheng *via* the western foot of Tangwangshan.

HAICHENG AND NEWCHWANG OCCUPIED.—The army then advanced to the line of the Pali-ho on August 2d without meeting with any serious resistance from the enemy, and occupied both Haicheng and Newchwang and the ground between them on the 3d of August.

The enemy's force that retreated from Haicheng in a north-easterly direction included some two divisions.

No further particulars have been received nor any report as to the casualties. It is believed that the Russians will make their next stand at Anshantien, twenty-two miles north from Haicheng.

## CHAPTER XII.

### *The Fourth Army—Commanded by General Nodzu.*

THE FOURTH OR TAKUSHAN ARMY.—On the 19th of May, under cover of some Japanese war-vessels which were convoying the transports, a body of bluejackets, under a lieutenant, landed at Takushan unopposed, and by 8 A. M. took up a position at a prescribed point, and raised the national flag.

LANDING AT TAKUSHAN.—The landing of the troops was at once commenced, and the operations were greatly accelerated, owing to favorable weather.

ACTION NEAR WANGKIATUNG.—On the afternoon of May 20th a Russian squadron of Cossacks which appeared near Wangkiatung, six miles north of Takushan, was surrounded and attacked by our infantry. A Russian captain, a lieutenant, and four men were taken prisoners. The enemy's killed included a captain and nine men. In effecting the capture of the prisoners one of our men was killed. In addition, twenty-two of the enemy's horses were killed and nine were captured. The enemy appears to have retreated in the direction of Siuyen and Shalisai. A later report says that in the engagement of the 20th all of the Russian officers were either killed or taken prisoners and the men were entirely dispersed, showing that the Russian force was completely routed.

SKIRMISH NEAR CHIENKIATUNG.—On the morning of June 5th a small detachment, which had been posted at Fankiatung on the road to Kinchow, attacked a body of the enemy's cavalry at Chienkiatung and routed them, capturing two men and thirteen horses. The enemy fled in a northwesterly direction.

ACTION NEAR CHIPANLING.—On the night of June 13th a body of infantry and cavalry scouts encountered the enemy in the neighborhood of Chipanling (thirty miles west of Siuyen)

and captured one officer and two men, many rifles and lances, and killed over fifty of the Russians.

Our casualties were 1 man killed and 5 men wounded.

**ACTION AT HSIENKIAYU.**—At dawn of the 23d of June a squadron of Russian cavalry were routed at Hsienkiayu, ten miles northwest of Santaokeu on the road to Tashihkiao. Subsequently the same detachment dislodged the enemy from the heights north of the Santao-ho and occupied the position the same morning. The enemy retreated towards the northwest, leaving sixty dead on the field. His force consisted of two battalions of infantry and a battery of artillery. This shows that the Takushan Army has already established touch with the Second Army under General Oku, which is moving up the Liao-tung Peninsula.



*Japanese Position.*

■ on June 26.

■ on June 27.

A Asada Detachment

B Kamada "

C Marui "

D Tojo "

E Fukaya "


*Russian Position.*

■ on June 26.

■ on June 27.

▣ Counter-attack.

⇐ Retreat on June 26 and 27.



## CHAPTER XIII.

ADVANCE ON FENSHUILING.—The Takushan Army on June 26th was formed into three columns, and began operations with a view to the occupation of Fenshuiling (nine miles north-east from Siuyen).

“The Asada detachment proceeded from Yangpankeu towards Fenshuiling; the Kamada detachment from Tasangpoyu to the enemy’s right wing; the Marui detachment from Tsiehkuanyin, taking a devious route, to the rear of the enemy’s right wing; the Tojo detachment at the same time being deputed to cover the rear of the Marui detachment. The Tojo detachment advanced on its mission and on the 26th attacked the enemy, occupying Shanghohtah and Tungkiachwang, but the enemy’s force, consisting of about three battalions of infantry and a battery of horse artillery, with six guns and two machine guns, stubbornly defended its position. The fight continued from 5 A. M. into the evening, and the detachment bivouacked in battle formation. The detachment resumed its attack at midnight, drove off the enemy, and occupied its positions at an early hour on the 27th. In the afternoon, however, the enemy was reinforced by about three battalions of infantry and sixteen guns. He repeatedly assaulted our position and attempted to recover it, but in vain. Our force repelled the enemy, but the artillery duel continued until 7:30 P. M.

The Marui detachment reached Tsiehkuanyin on the night of the 26th, and dispatched a force to attack the flank and rear of the enemy at Hsiahohtan, who were opposing the Tojo detachment. The main force of the Marui detachment began to advance at 3 A. M. on the 27th in order to turn the enemy’s rear at Fenshuiling. On the way it was opposed by two battalions of Russian infantry at Erhtaokeu, but our troops drove off the assailants at 11 A. M., and finally reached Santaokeu.

The Asada detachment repulsed a force of the enemy, consisting of about 2,000 infantry and cavalry in the neighborhood of Wankiapao on the 26th, and passed the night to the south of Wafantien, at the eastern foot of Fenshuiling. At 5 A. M. on the 27th our artillery opened fire on the enemy, who was entrenched in strong fortifications, to which he skillfully replied. He poured a heavy fire on our troops at the ranges previously determined, which temporarily placed our artillery in a difficult position. Fortunately, the Kamada detachment, which had been dispatched at midnight of the 26th to turn the enemy's right flank, dislodged two companies of Russian infantry from half-way up the Tihungshan height, south of Fenshuiling, where, after great difficulty, guns were placed in position by 7 A. M. of the 27th, which now opened fire on the enemy's force at Fenshuiling from the right flank. The infantry then passed from Tihungshan to the rear of the enemy. The Fukaya regiment, which had been sent from the Asada detachment, began operations at midnight of the 26th, and cleared the heights west of Yangpankeu of about two companies of the enemy's force at 7 A. M. of the 27th, and then turned to the enemy's left rear. Thus the enemy was virtually surrounded by our forces, and his operations were confined. His artillery was silenced at 7:50 A. M., and the general retreat began at 8 A. M.

FENSHUILING OCCUPIED.—The infantry of the Asada detachment, who approached the enemy from his front, pressed hard on his force, destroying his defensive works, assisted by our sappers and miners, and occupied the summit of Fenshuiling at 11:30 A. M. June 27th. Our artillery hotly pursued the retreating Russians. The enemy's force retreated towards Hsimucheng in great confusion, after burning his store-houses at Sangtotsze.

CASUALTIES.—We took 6 officers and 82 men prisoners. The Russians, who were killed in the mountains, ravines, and valleys, are innumerable; those left on the main road alone numbering over 90. Our casualties on the Hsimucheng road



were Major Oba killed and about 20 men killed and wounded. The Tojo detachment sustained about 50 casualties."

THE RUSSIAN POSITION AT FENSHUILING.—Fenshuiling forms the key to the Hsimucheng road, and its fortifications were of a semi-permanent nature, in the construction of which the enemy had spent three months. They consisted of infantry entrenchments, batteries, passages, equipments for bivouac, etc. The front approach was so strongly defended with wire entanglements and barricades that its capture by a frontal attack alone was out of the question. But the Asada detachment skillfully operated in this direction, and the other columns cut the enemy's retreats one by one with the result that this strong position fell into the hands of the Japanese.

COMMENTS.—The battle, which ended in the capture of the Fenshuiling Defile—thus opening the way to Tomucheng—proves to have been a larger affair than is suggested by the foregoing official report. The position is naturally one of great difficulty, and the Russians had been preparing it for nearly three months, building forts, entrenching the slopes, preparing obstacles, such as pits, palisades, wire entanglements, etc., in order to hamper the approaching enemy, and constructing barracks and storing quantities of provisions and ammunition at Sangtotsze in the west part of the defile. The capture of such a place by a frontal attack would be enormously costly, and the Japanese determined to turn the position.

The exact number of Russian troops defending Fenshuiling is not known, but a close estimate is 14 battalions of infantry, 3 regiments of cavalry, and 46 guns.

RESUME OF OPERATIONS.—A brief resumé of the operations is as follows:

The commander of the Japanese attacking army organized three columns, one of which, under Colonel Kamada, moved against the western eminences of the defile, being the center of the Japanese line. Another, under Major-General Asada, moved against the eastern heights, thus forming the right wing.

The third, under Major-General Marui, moved in a westerly direction, so as to reach a point on the enemy's right rear. Finally an auxiliary force attached to Marui's column operated between that column and the center; its rôle being to capture certain heights, so as to cover the flanking march of the column with which it coöperated.

During the night of June 25th-26th this auxiliary force moved out, and at dawn of the 26th opened the attack. It was opposed by three battalions of the enemy's infantry with eight guns, two of them being machine guns. The fight lasted all day and was resumed before dawn of the 27th, the position being captured about 9:30 A. M. Meanwhile Marui's column, during the night of the 26th, reached its appointed place, whence it moved out at 3 A. M. of the 27th, and, sending its right wing to assist the fight then waging between its auxiliary force and the Russians, pushed forward with its center and left, driving back two battalions of the enemy's force, and by 11 A. M. reached a position directly threatening the right rear of the Fenshuiling position.

The whole front of the Japanese force extended about twenty miles; on the right General Asada's column took the appointed route on the 26th, and, driving back some 2,000 Russians, reached the lower slopes of the defile's eastern heights, where it planted guns and opened a heavy fire from 5 A. M. of the 27th. Very little was accomplished here. The Russian forts were skillfully placed and they had all the ranges marked, so that the operations of the Asada column were very difficult. But this column did not confine itself to simply gaining an artillery position. It had sent out a regiment which, diverging eastward, worked around towards a point on the enemy's left rear, which it reached about 10 A. M. In the meanwhile the center column (Colonel Kamada's) advanced during the night of the 26th towards the western eminences of the defile, and at 7 A. M. of the 27th, after driving back two companies of the enemy, gained a position, whence the Russians could be enfiladed. When,

in the early morning the enemy saw they were doomed to be outflanked, they limbered up their artillery shortly before 8 o'clock, and began to move off their infantry a trifle later. Thereupon General Asada's column, aided by the engineers, cleared away the obstacles, rushed the heights, and won the defile at 11 A. M., pouring a heavy artillery fire into the retreating Russians, who burned their stores, left eighty-eight prisoners and ninety dead, and fell back on Tomucheng.

**ACTION AT HSIENKIAYU.**—On July 9th a portion of our force, who was advancing along two roads leading to Tsiehkuanyin and Hsienkiayu, reached the heights to the south about 11 A. M.

The enemy, who occupied the heights west of Hsienkiayu, made a stubborn resistance, and held its positions until the evening. The main body of our troops, who had proceeded towards Tsi' kuanyin, engaged a force of the enemy, consisting of two battalions of infantry and a battery of artillery, until the evening of the 9th, when they succeeded in driving him off. Our troops passed the night in battle formation. Early on the morning of the 10th our columns repulsed the enemy from the heights west of Hsienkiayu and pursued him.

**ACTION AT HSUITSAIKEU.**—During this pursuit our troops attacked the enemy, who was strongly occupying the heights of Hsuitsaikeu, and took possession of them.

A column of troops was also sent towards Tang-chih *via* Hsienkiayu and Tsiehkuanyin and another column towards Tomucheng *via* Fenshuiling. The enemy, who had been at Tsiehkuanyin, retired southward along the valley, but at 5 P. M. his artillery appeared on the heights west of Choukiachwang and opened fire.

**ACTION AT SINPANLAYU.**—The troops who were advancing towards Tomucheng drove off the enemy in their front and attacked his advanced positions at Sipanlayu.

The enemy seemed to be greatly panic-stricken, but subsequently he was reinforced by some ten battalions of infantry and two batteries of artillery. Our troops, having attained the

object of their reconnaissance, avoided conflict, and retired to a previously selected position.

The enemy's force to the south of Tomucheng consists of about one division. The main force of his cavalry is near Niuhsuishan.

## CHAPTER XIV.

JAPANESE ADVANCE ON TOMUCHENG.—The enemy's force in front of the Takushan Army occupied strongly defended positions on the heights north of Kangyaoling to the east of Sanchiaoshan *via* Changsanyu. The epaulement for the enemy's artillery was seen on the heights of Kangyaoling, and about three battalions of infantry were observed in the vicinity of Lao-tatsz.

On July 30th the main force of the Japanese occupied the line along the western heights of Tafangshan and the northern heights of Hiaopachakeu, and the left wing took possession of the southern heights of Kukiapaotsz and the southwestern heights of Yinglaoshan.

ENEMY'S POSITIONS CAPTURED.—At dawn of July 31st the main force advanced against the enemy posted on the height east of Sanchiaoshan, and the left wing attacked the enemy on the heights north of East and West Yangshukeu. At 8 A. M. the left wing occupied the enemy's positions to the west of a height 345 metres high in a northeastern direction from East Yangshukeu. The enemy at Rhtaokeu were rapidly reinforced, and his guns were increased to twenty-one. The left wing, in coöperation with a detachment newly arrived, fired severely on the enemy and drove him north at 3 P. M.

The main Japanese force was able to occupy the enemy's positions on the heights west of Tapingling at 10:30 A. M., but owing to the severe fire of the enemy's artillery posted at Changsanyu and the heights east of Siaofangshan they were unable to advance further.

The enemy steadily received fresh reinforcements, and at 5:30 P. M. his entire front assumed the offensive, but were at once repulsed by the fire of the Japanese artillery and infantry. The enemy sustained heavy losses, but, owing to the severe fire

of his artillery, he was not pursued. Prior to this, the left wing had defeated the enemy and threatened to cut off his retreat.

**RUSSIANS RETREAT TO HAICHENG.**—In consequence the enemy, taking advantage of the cover of darkness, withdrew his positions one by one and retired towards Haicheng.

The Russians had spent several months in the construction of strong defensive works, in which they entrenched themselves during the battle. They used quick-fire guns, which greatly harassed the Japanese artillery.

**THE ENEMY'S FORCE.**—The enemy's force consisted of two divisions of infantry and seven batteries of artillery under the command of Lieutenant-General Alexieff, commander of the Fifth Division.

The day was extremely hot, the temperature at noon registering 120° Fahrenheit in the open.

**CASUALTIES.**—After the battle of Tomucheng on July 31st 700 dead Russians were found in the ravines and valleys and were buried by the Japanese. According to the Russian prisoners and natives, the number of the enemy's killed and wounded, which were sent to their rear after the battle and during the night, was very great. His casualties will reach over 2,000.

The Japanese casualties were: Killed, 8 officers and 186 men; wounded, 24 officers and 642 men. Total, 860.

**SPOILS OF WAR.**—The spoils of war were 6 field guns, 570 shells, 63 rifles, 980 rounds of ammunition, 180 entrenching tools, 890 *koku* of flour, 500 *koku* of barley, 130 overcoats.

The number of prisoners at present is thirty-three, but is increasing. The Russian surgeons who were left on the field have been sent to Haicheng.

**COMPOSITION OF THE TAKUSHAN ARMY.**—The *Official Gazette* of August 10th publishes an Imperial message, addressed to Lieutenant-General Kawamura on June 30th, after the capture of the Fenshuiling defile. His Majesty speaks of the force under General Kawamura (which is the Takushan Army) as the "Independent Division," and expresses high approval of the work

done by it in driving the enemy from important positions and in establishing and preserving connections with the other armies (the First and Second). From this it will be seen that the Takushan Army had for its original nucleus one division (the Tenth), and that any other troops included in its battle-line must have arrived after June 30th.

Evidently the necessity of preserving a strict reticence as to the nature of the Takushan force no longer exists, and the Takushan, or Fourth Army (now enlarged), is commanded by General Nozu.

## CHAPTER XV.

THE SITUATION ON AUGUST 1ST.—Ten battles have now been fought in Manchuria—namely, the Yalu, on May 1st; Nanshan, on May 26th; Tehlisz, on June 15th; Fenshuiling, on June 27th; Kaiping, on July 9th; Motienling, on July 17th; Tashihkiao, on July 25th; Tomucheng, on July 31st; Yushulintz and Yangtszling, on August 1st. In every one of them the Russians have been defeated. What Kuropatkin's real intention may have been with regard to the Yalu, opinions may still differ, but when we find his troops occupying positions, to strengthen which they have exhausted all the resources of field fortification, his intention to hold them—if possible—is beyond question. That was the case undoubtedly at Fenshuiling, Kaiping, Tashihkiao, Tomucheng, Yushulintz, and Yangtszling. The Russians were there to stay, and, having failed in every case to hold their ground, their strategy has now entered its secondary stage. Apparently they did not intend to make a stand at Haicheng. For some time it has been expected that they would not do so, and the defeat of their two divisions, which should have screened the place against the Takushan army, must have precipitated their decision.

Anshantien, too, has become a very questionable position. So long as Keller stood between Kuroki and Liaoyang, Kuropatkin might have fought with some confidence at Anshantien; but he cannot do so now. Indeed, no action has had more influence on the situation than Kuroki's last two victories, for they have laid bare the whole of the Russian left flank, and practically deprive Kuropatkin of any alternative except to fall back upon Liaoyang. Mukden would be incomparably a safer objective.

If Oku's army and the Takushan army lose touch of the retreating Russians they may have time to turn their backs on



Liaoyang, and convert the whole operation into a stern chase for the Japanese; even then heavy sacrifices would probably be inevitable. But Oku reached Haicheng on August 3d, and will probably not give the Russians time to throw up a new line of fortifications. Kuroki is pursuing the same tactics. His outposts are only five miles from those of the division lately commanded by General Keller.

**THE THREE JAPANESE ARMIES ARE UNITED.**—The next few weeks will be momentous in the history of the East. The three Japanese armies are moving with one impetus and under one direction. They had long been acting as separate pieces in a general plan of strategy, and the coördination of their maneuvers is now more striking than ever. Kuroki's, Oku's, and Nozu's armies are now under the command of Field Marshal Marquis Oyama, with General Baron Kodama as Chief of Staff.

## CHAPTER XVI.

**JAPANESE HEADQUARTERS.**—The headquarters of the Japanese armies in Manchuria, under the command of Marshal Marquis Oyama, were established at Haicheng on the 4th of August.

**RUSSIAN DISPOSITIONS.**—For three weeks heavy rains had suspended all operations. The Russians had massed six divisions at Anshantien, and had fortified the position strongly.

Five Russian divisions were in position at Anping, and they had at Liaoyang certainly five divisions more.

Between Anshantien and Anping the ground rises to an eminence called Chien-shan, and from the indications a severe battle was expected along this line. The Russian forces protected Liaoyang on the south and east, but not on the north, thus giving an attacking force an opportunity to flank the Russian positions. But as an offset to this weakness Kuropatkin was supposed to have posted another force along the Mukden-Liaoyang road, having its chief point of concentration at Shwangmiaotsz'.

**PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS OF A GENERAL ADVANCE.**—It was not until the afternoon of August 30th that the Imperial headquarters in Tokyo published the following official statement of the general advance on Liaoyang, which had been received from Marshal Oyama:

“According to telegraphic reports from subordinate commanders received up to the evening of August 29th, the military position in the vicinity of Liaoyang may be summarized as follows:

**POSITION OF THE FIRST ARMY.**—“The First (Kuroki's) army, as the result of vigorous fighting, lasting from the night of the 25th to the 27th, has taken possession of the enemy's positions strongly entrenched on the rugged ridges extending from

Hanpoling through Tatientsz' to Tashikeu, and, while pressing the enemy towards Liaoyang, has occupied the entire ground lying on the right bank of the Tang-ho. Details are given in the report of the First army further on.

ADVANCE OF THE SECOND ARMY.—“The forces which advanced along the Liaoyang-Haicheng road reached, on the morning of the 27th, a line extending from Shangshih-kiaotsz' to the westward of Sumatai through Huokiatur, after driving off several bodies of the enemy on the way. They then began the attacking operations against the enemy, who was strongly entrenched in the positions extending from Anshantien to Tengao-pao. But as certain signs were observed that the enemy was about to retire northward, evacuating his positions without resistance, our forces advanced forward in pursuit.

ADVANCE OF THE FOURTH ARMY.—“A number of our columns, which started early on the 28th in pursuit of the enemy in the districts east of the Liaoyang-Haicheng road, reached at 10 A. M. Tiaokuntai, Tashihteu, and Pakuakeu, when they overtook him and intercepted his retreat along that road. A fierce fire was poured in the neighborhood of Liushantun and Pankialu on a large body of the enemy, which was retreating in great confusion. Thereupon the Russians were thrown into greater confusion and retreated northward of the Sha-ho.

“A column and an artillery corps of our army, which were advancing at the same time in the districts west of the Liaoyang-Haicheng road, arrived in the vicinity of Pakuakeu and Taokungtun just in time to overtake a big column of the enemy, which was retreating in the districts northwest of Pakiatsz'. A violent fire was poured on the rear of this Russian column, which was thereby driven toward the north of the Sha-ho.

“Thus our armies on the Liaoyang-Haicheng road succeeded in pressing the enemy close to Liaoyang.

SPOILS TAKEN.—“The spoils taken in this part of the engagement were 8 field guns, 4 ammunition wagons, and a great

number of baggage-wagons. From this it may be judged how confused was the enemy's retreat.

OPERATIONS OF THE FIRST ARMY.—“The enemy's fighting-line in front of our army extended from Hungshaling to the heights north of Tashikey through Hanpoling and the heights north of Tatientsz', and the Russian positions on the steep mountains were strongly defended; the fortifications having been prepared several months previously.

“On the other hand, we had no positions suitable for making attacks on the enemy, and especially our field artillery was unable to find positions to mount its guns, except in the neighborhood of the main road.

“The account of the engagement is as follows:

POSITION OF THE LEFT COLUMN.—“The left column commenced operations on August 23d, and after driving forward small forces of the enemy occupied a line extending from the heights north of Rhtaoho to those south of Pailinzui on the 25th. Then the column carried out the preparations for the action of the following day. The center and right columns commenced their preliminary operations on the afternoon of the 25th.

OPERATIONS OF THE CENTER COLUMN.—“At midnight of the 25th the center column with its whole infantry force executed a bayonet charge against the center of the enemy's position on Kangchangling and the neighboring steep mountains.

A BAYONET CHARGE BY NIGHT.—“This charge was carried out most successfully, and the main stronghold of the enemy in this district was taken by our forces. But the enemy soon reinforced his troops on the heights in his second and third fighting-lines and strongly resisted our attack. A severe rifle engagement then ensued, and at noon of the 26th it was still going on with unabated vigor. Furthermore, the enemy's artillery in the neighborhood of Anping poured a terrible fire on us, and his infantry showed signs of making a counter-attack in order to capture the positions now occupied by us. Owing to the fact that we were unable to find a good position for our artillery, the

column was at one time in a very dangerous situation. But our column defended its position successfully, and finally repulsed the enemy's forces to the valley of the Tang-ho.

OPERATIONS OF THE RIGHT COLUMN.—“As for the right column, it delivered a night attack on the enemy's positions situated at Hungshaling and Chipanling and the space between these two hills. Though its left wing succeeded in carrying the position of the enemy's forces confronting it, Hungshaling could not be completely occupied. At daybreak severe rifle and gun fire were exchanged, which lasted till sunset.

OPERATIONS OF THE LEFT COLUMN.—“The main strength of the left column also took the offensive and advanced towards an eminence north of Tashikeu, while its artillery engaged the enemy's superior artillery force, which was under cover of semi-permanent defensive works on the heights north of Tatientsz' and northwest of Kaofengsz', the artillery duel reaching its height between 2 and 4 P. M. The enemy's guns were silenced occasionally, but not completely. Meanwhile the enemy's infantry, which had been reinforced, gradually pressed on our left wing, which was placed in a perilous position. Under these circumstances the advance of our left column was greatly retarded. In short, our army was only able to penetrate the enemy's central position, thus cutting his force in two, but could not carry both his wings, even late at night. In addition, the summits of all the hills were enveloped with mist, owing to a heavy thunderstorm which occurred at 4 P. M., so that we were obliged to suspend our attack and pass the night where we stood. During the night the enemy made several assaults on us in the direction of Hunshaling and Tashikeu, but he invariably failed.

“Availing ourselves of this opportunity, our force succeeded in occupying Hungshaling and capturing eight guns, which had fired on us most energetically from the heights.

THE ENEMY'S POSITIONS TAKEN.—“On the 27th all of our columns resumed their offensive movement through the mist, but were stubbornly resisted by a portion of the enemy's troops.

It was only towards twilight that we succeeded in occupying a line extending from Hungshaling to the heights north of Tashikeu *via* Sunkiasai. The severest engagement of all was the night attack in the neighborhood of Hungshaling and Kangchangling. By the light of the moon the advance of our troops was easily perceived by the enemy, who not only poured a deadly fire upon us, but also threw rocks and stones from the heights, causing numerous casualties to our troops, who, however, firmly maintained their positions and withheld their fire. With dauntless courage our soldiers climbed the steep mountains and then engaged the enemy. The loss sustained by us during this attack was heavy.

"The enemy on our left-hand column offered a stubborn resistance, and our soldiers in this direction fought most fiercely.

THE RUSSIAN FORCES.—"The enemy's strength consisted of sixty-five battalions of infantry (the whole of the Third Army corps of sharpshooters and the Tenth Army corps in line of battle,) with 120 guns. The greater portion of the enemy retreated in the direction of Liaoyang, while a portion remained in front of our army. The pursuit of the enemy is still continuing.

CASUALTIES.—"The casualties among our officers and men during the battles of August 26th and 27th were about 2,000. The enemy's loss is unknown, but believed to be considerable.

SPOILS.—"The spoils taken on the field include 8 guns, a quantity of ammunition, and a large number of other articles."

COMMENTS.—In the recent operations near Liaoyang, Kuropatkin disposed his army along two fronts—one facing eastward to meet the advance of Kuroki's army, and the other facing southward to confront Oku's and Nozu's armies. From the outset it had evidently been his purpose to hold Liaoyang, and for many weeks steps had been taken to strengthen the two faces by every means known to the science of field fortifications. Of the two faces, the most important was the eastern, for were this forced by Kuroki he would be able to threaten the Russian line of communications northward from Liaoyang to Mukden,

and all the Russian troops to the south of Liaoyang would be seriously imperiled. Nothing could be more favorable for defense purposes than the features of the country along this eastern face. It follows the valley through which runs the Tang-ho. All along the right bank of the river there is a chain of heights crossed at only three places by roads running through defiles; and on the left bank—that is to say, on the western side of the valley—there are hills which afford excellent sites for artillery. On the other hand, no such sites present themselves for the purposes of an attack from the east. With the exception of the immediate vicinity of the main road, which crosses the hills at Kangchangling and goes thence *via* Anping to Liaoyang, there are no places where artillery can be used by an attacking force.

The southern face has for its main point the town of Anshantien. Here the railway from Haicheng to Liaoyang passes through a defile, whence hills stretch westward to Fenyapo and eastward to Tashihteu. These hills also the Russians had spent weeks entrenching and fortifying, and it was expected that they would offer an obstinate resistance there to the advance of the Japanese armies of Oku and Nozu. But when Kuropatkin knew that his forces on the eastern face had been forced from their positions by the First army, and that Kuroki might soon threaten his right rear, he dared not attempt to hold the Anshantien position, and had already given orders to abandon Anshantien, when Oku began to reconnoiter that position on the morning of the 27th. Oku's forces then rapidly advanced and occupied the Anshantien position without any resistance, and then pushed on after the retreating Russians, who were in apparent disorder which degenerated almost into a rout by the time they passed over the Sha-ho.

Whether Kuropatkin will be able to hold Liaoyang will shortly be seen.

## CHAPTER XVII.

THE ADVANCE ON LIAOYANG.—On September 1st Marshal Oyama wired the Imperial headquarters as follows:

“The position of our forces in the neighborhood of Liaoyang up to the evening of August 31st was as follows:

THE FIRST ARMY.—“The First army, after occupying the districts on the right bank of the Tang-ho, continued the attack on the enemy.

HUNGSHALING AND SUNKIASAI OCCUPIED.—“The right and center columns took possession of the entire position of Hungshaling and the heights north of Sunkiasai after overcoming the stubborn resistance of the enemy.

SHWANGMIAOTZS' OCCUPIED.—“The two columns next advanced towards Shwangmiaotsz' and Shihtantsz', driving the enemy before them, and took possession of the heights east of Shwangmiaotsz', after repulsing the enemy who was occupying these heights, between the evening of the 27th and the morning of the 29th. The left column, however, was not able, owing to the strenuous resistance of the enemy on the heights southeast of Hiangshantsz', to advance to a line north of these heights.

“About two divisions of the enemy, which were driven back by the First army in the vicinity of Hanpoling, retreated on August 29th to the right bank of the Tatsz-ho by crossing the military bridge north of Shaotungtsz'.

“Since the night of the 28th till the morning of the 29th, the First army continued its forward movements, and its right and center columns were able to occupy a line extending from Shwangmiaotsz' to a point north of Shihtantsz'.

TASHIHMENLING AND HIANGSHANTSZ' OCCUPIED.—“The left column succeeded, on the morning of the 29th, in dislodging the enemy from Tashihmenling and Hiangshantsz' and its vi-



cinity. It then advanced towards Yayuchi and Mangkiafang. The enemy at these places being, however, greatly reinforced, the column has so far been unable to accomplish its object.

THE SECOND AND FOURTH ARMIES.—“These armies, which advanced along the Liaoyang-Haicheng road, after vigorously pursuing and pressing the enemy on the 28th, continued their advance on the 29th, when the Fourth (Central) army occupied a line extending from Laikiapao to Hohnewchwang; while the Second (Left) army occupied a line extending westward from Hohnewchwang to Yukiatai. In addition, a column of the Central army advanced far into WeiJaogao, and, effecting a junction with the left column of the First (Right) army, drove the enemy from that locality, and advanced toward Mangkiafang.

“The enemy in the direction of the Liaoyang-Haicheng road appeared to be in occupation of the line extending from the heights south of Sheushanpao and past the Shiuluitun heights to those east of Fangkiatun. These heights had strong defense works and were firmly held by a large force of the enemy. Under the circumstances our forces had to pass the night in the respective positions they had occupied. At dawn the following day, August 30th, all of our forces commenced aggressive operations against the enemy confronting them. As a result of these operations, the enemy appeared to be in dire condition, as it was impossible for him to effect a retreat.

“The enemy was still in occupation of the line extending from the heights north of Mangkiafang, past those south of Tsaofangtung, and east of Fangkiapao to the heights west of Sheushanpao. Determined attacks were delivered by each of our forces on these Russian positions, and fierce engagements took place in all directions.

THE ENGAGEMENT AT MANGKIAFANG AND TSAOFANGTUNG.—“At dawn on August 30th the left column of the First Army resumed its assault on the enemy stationed near Mangkaifang and Yayuchi. At about 1 P. M. the enemy was strongly reinforced,

and consequently we were still unable at 3 P. M. to carry his positions.

"The column dispatched from the Central army proceeded towards the heights south of Tsaofangtung, and opened an artillery fire at 6 A. M. At first the attack was attended with considerable success, but at 10 A. M. a strong Russian column arrived on the scene from the direction of Liaoyang and assumed the offensive against our column in order to recover the lost position. In the afternoon the enemy was again reinforced, so that his strength increased to over two divisions with fifty or sixty guns. In consequence, the right wing of the Central army was for a time, in a very perilous situation, but after a gallant and desperate struggle succeeded at about 3 P. M. in effecting a junction with the left column of the First army and in occupying the line extending to the neighborhood of WeiJaogao, dislodging the Russians from the heights south of Tsaofangtung. The enemy, however, stubbornly continued his aggressive operations, so that fierce fighting was still going on at 5 P. M.

THE ENGAGEMENT AT FANGKIATUNG AND SINLUITUNG.—

"The main strength of the Central army coöperating with a portion of the Left army commenced, on the morning of August 30th, offensive movements against the enemy, who occupied positions extending from the heights east of Fangkiatung to the heights west of Sinluitung. In attacking the enemy in this region our forces deployed on the heights extending from Dawa to the heights in the vicinity of Shaiayantsz'. The enemy in this district, establishing himself in strongly entrenched positions, offered a most stubborn resistance. Our army poured a heavy artillery fire on the enemy preliminary to a general assault, but up to 5 P. M. had not been able to silence the guns in the enemy's positions."

## CHAPTER XVIII.

THE ENGAGEMENT AT SHEUSHANPAO.—The main strength of the Left (Second) army commenced offensive operations at dawn on August 30th, and at about 11 A. M., after occupying a line extending from Mataoling to Tachaokiatung delivered an attack upon the enemy stationed at the heights west of Sheushanpao. The enemy in this direction dispatched his right wing to a village northwest of Kutsuasui, and incessantly fired on us with machine guns. Although our army attacked the enemy with its whole strength no progress was made up to 4:30 P. M., when a body of our reserves was sent forward to reinforce our left wing. Meanwhile the artillery of our column, which had advanced along the left flank of our army, at about 2 P. M. reached the neighborhood of Wangjantung, and opened fire on the rear of the enemy in the vicinity of Sheushanpao.

STRENGTH OF THE ENEMY.—The whole strength of the enemy's forces opposed to the Central army is not known, but, being gradually reinforced, the number of their guns mounted to the eastern part of the eminence of Sheushanpao alone amount to about 100, while all the enemy's positions in the different directions are thoroughly fortified, and even his auxiliary defense works would not permit an easy approach of our infantry. Under the circumstances, the attacking operations were continued even so late as after 7 P. M.

NIGHT ATTACKS.—During the night the enemy delivered an attack from the neighborhood of Sheushanpao upon our Left army, but was repulsed. A portion of our Left army, stationed at a point north of Shiaoyantsz', also delivered a night attack on the enemy occupying the hills south of Sheushanpao. A fierce engagement ensued, which lasted far into the afternoon of

the 30th, when no opportunity had presented itself of which we could avail for a turn in the operations.

Again at Mangkiefang and Tsaofangtung our army is holding its ground, courageously fighting against a much superior force of the enemy. In this situation our Left army occupied, at 12:20 P. M. the heights west of Sinluitung.

The whole force of the enemy facing our different armies appears to be about twelve to thirteen divisions in strength.

THE RIGHT (FIRST) ARMY.—The detachment from the left column of the Right army, which occupied the heights north of Sunkiasai before the evening of the 30th, received a fierce fire from the enemy in front, whose strength was gradually increased towards the right. At midnight our detachment was obliged to retreat to the heights south of Sunkiasai, and strenuously defended that district.

On the morning of August 31st the enemy in this direction showed signs of attacking us, but he ultimately abandoned his intention.

The main body of the right and center columns commenced operations at 11 P. M. on the 30th, crossed the Taitz-ho in the neighborhood of Lientaowan, and proceeded in the direction of Hwankufan. At 4 P. M. on the 31st our forces were to occupy a line extending from Hanjahtsz' to Tsuofangkow, but no report of their subsequent movements has yet been received. One battery of Russian artillery took its position in the north of Hoh-yingtai, and on the heights north of Tsuofangkow the enemy was seen busily engaged in constructing defense works.

The enemy in this direction did not appear to be in great strength.

THE CENTRAL (FOURTH) ARMY.—The enemy's artillery facing the right column of our Central army was not so active on August 31st as it was the previous day. But there took place fierce exchanges of fire between it and our force.

\* Our right column is firmly maintaining its positions. The battle in the direction of the left column of the Central army has

also been fought most fiercely since the morning of the 31st, but the enemy's positions have not yet been occupied. The enemy in the neighborhood of Fankiatung was reported to have commenced moving in a northwesterly direction at a little past 4 P. M. of the 31st, but no detailed report as to their actual movements has yet been received.

**THE LEFT (SECOND) ARMY.**—The right column of the Left army carried out a night attack from about 3 A. M. on August 31st, and though several bayonet charges were made, no satisfactory result was attained till about noon when reinforcements were dispatched, and our troops succeeded in occupying part of the heights southwest of Sinluitung.

**NIGHT ATTACK OF RUSSIANS REPULSED.**—The main column at 1 A. M. of the 31st repulsed the enemy, who had delivered a night attack, and pressed him along the railway route. In addition, the enemy's force, which had made several counter-attacks on the left of the column, was driven back with the cooperation of a portion of the left column. Our attack on the enemy has been continuously carried out, but the heights west of Sheushanpao have not yet been carried. The offensive operations of the Left army were maintained by sheer energy up to 6 P. M. of the 31st. At about 3 P. M. of the same day the enemy's infantry of an unknown strength, assisted by a certain number of guns, appeared in the neighborhood of Peitai, some six miles northwest of Sheushanpao, and was encountered by a body of our reserves. The Left army is determined to direct a further severe bombardment on the enemy with all the artillery at its disposal, and then deliver a general assault.

**CARRIED BY ASSAULT.**—At dawn on September 1st our Left army, by a fierce and daring assault on the enemy, completed the occupation of the heights west of Sinluitung and 99-metre height, west of Sheushanpao. The number of our casualties is probably large, but no detailed report is yet received.

A telegram from Marshal Oyama, sent at 1:15 P. M. on September 1st, says:

**RUSSIANS IN FULL RETREAT.**—"The enemy in front of our Central and Left armies has commenced to retreat towards Liaoyang, and our two armies are now in pursuit."

**CASUALTIES.**—According to an official report, the number of casualties sustained by the First army during the operations extending from August 24th to the 28th, is as follows: Officers killed 26, wounded, 69; rank and file, killed and wounded, 2,146; missing, 14. The Russians are believed to have lost 3,000 on August 30th. Up to August 27th the Russian killed alone numbered 3,150, and 18 trains carrying the wounded were sent northward.

## CHAPTER XIX.

The next official report from Marshal Oyama was wired Imperial headquarters at 10:20 P. M., September 1st, as follows:

**RUSSIAN RETREAT AND JAPANESE PURSUIT.**—"The enemy, unable to stand the fierce onslaught of our army, retreated towards Liaoyang from early morning of September 1st, and is being pursued vigorously by a portion of the Left army and the whole of the Central army.

"The enemy is in great confusion in the neighborhood of Liaoyang and apparently intends to retreat to the right bank of of the Taitzs-ho. Some Canet guns of 10.5-cm. calibre (previously captured) are now furiously bombarding the neighborhood of the Liayang railway station.

"At 11 A. M. of the 1st the Right army was attacking the enemy's position at Hohyingtai. The main force of the Left army is to further press the enemy to the Taitzs-ho from dawn of the 2d instant.

"The casualties to our armies since the 29th of August have not yet been ascertained, but are estimated at some 10,000."

**REPORT FROM CHIEF OF STAFF OF LEFT ARMY.**—From the dawn of August 30th the Left army attacked the enemy on the heights in the neighborhood of Sheushanpao, about five miles southwest of Liaoyang. As the enemy's force offered a very stubborn resistance, being protected by strong defensive works, our army could not attain its object, even after a fierce engagement lasting two days.

**SUCCESSFUL NIGHT ASSAULT.**—By a fierce assault, carried out on the night of August 31st, however, our army finally succeeded, at about 3 A. M., on September 1st, in dislodging the enemy from the high lands west of Sinlitung, those east of Tatszping, and those west of Sheushanpao.

**RAILWAY STATION AT LIAOYANG BOMBARDED BY CAPTURED GUNS.**—As the enemy was retreating towards Liaoyang, a force consisting of infantry, cavalry, and artillery was dispatched to pursue him, while the railway station at Liaoyang is being bombarded by the Canet guns, before mentioned. A large mass of the Russian force is still remaining in the vicinity of the station, whence trains are to be seen leaving for the north.

**CENTRAL ARMY.**—The troops in the first line of our army have occupied the line extending from Tatepu to Sivalichwang *via* Tunglichwang. The army is to continue its advance to-day (September 2d) and, if possible, occupy the line extending from Sincheng to Liaoyang, thereby keeping pace with the movements of the Left army.

On September 2d the headquarters of the commander-in-chief, Marshal Oyama, which had previously been at Haicheng, were advanced to the scene of operations.

**A FURTHER ADVANCE.**—The enemy facing the Central and Left armies continues to retreat to the right bank of the Taitsz-ho, while a portion of his troops is retaining a line of defense works extending from the south to the northwest of Liaoyang, as well as the heights northeast of Muchang (on the right bank of the Taitsz-ho).

Both of our armies which followed in pursuit of the enemy reached the line extending from Tatepu to Yangkialuitsz' through Sivalichwang, and are maintaining their aggressive operations. These armies expect to be able to advance to the right bank of the Taitsz-ho by to-morrow morning (September 3d).

**ATTACK AT HOHYINGTAI.**—The Right army attacked the Russian force on the heights (131 meters) west of Hohyingtai, and succeeded in carrying a portion of these heights this morning (September 2d). The subsequent development of the engagement has not yet been ascertained. It appears that the enemy's troops are gradually concentrating in the direction of the Yentai coal mine, near the right wing of the Right army.



On September 3d at 9 A. M. Marshal Oyama wires that the remnants of the enemy are still outside the walls of Liaoyang, continuing their resistance. The Central and Left armies are attacking them.

## CHAPTER XX.

LAST GENERAL ADVANCE.—Up to 9 P. M. of September 3d the situation is as follows:

RIGHT ARMY.—The main force of the right column of the Right army advanced west, leaving a portion in the neighborhood of Santsz'new in order to protect its right.

The center column has not yet succeeded in completely occupying the eminence 131 meters high.

The left column is remaining in the neighborhood of Hoh-yingtai, facing the enemy on the above eminence.

CENTRAL AND LEFT ARMIES.—These armies are continuing their attack on the enemy's forces to the south and west of Liaoyang. The buildings in the vicinity of Liaoyang station—apparently store-houses—were to-day destroyed by fire.

LIAOYANG OCCUPIED.—At 9 A. M., September 4th, Marshal Oyama wires: "As the result of the engagements during the night of the 3d and the morning of the 4th Liaoyang has completely fallen into our hands."

OPERATIONS FROM AUGUST 24TH TO SEPTEMBER 4TH.—A subsequent report gives the following particulars of the operations from August 24th to September 4th:

"Our various armies commenced operations for the attack on the enemy in the neighborhood of Anshantien and Tanghoyen towards the latter part of August, and the account of their subsequent movements is as follows:

RIGHT ARMY.—"The Right army commenced operations on August 24th, and after severe fighting, which lasted from the night of the 25th to the 27th, caused the enemy to retreat, and occupied a line extending from Hungshaling to Kaofengtsz' through Sunkiasai. Pursuing the enemy, the army reached a line covering Shihtantsz' and Hiangshantsz' on the 29th.

“During the night of the 30th and on the 31st its main body crossed over to the right bank of the Taitz-ho at Lientaowan, while a portion of the army remained on the left bank of the river in order to act in conjunction with the Central army. On September 1st the main body of the Right army commenced an attack on the enemy stationed in the west of Hohyingtai. The latter offered a stubborn resistance, and, assisted by reinforcements received on the previous day, made our further advance somewhat difficult. But after four days' fierce fighting we carried the enemy's position a little past mid-day on September 4th. On the same day the portion of the army which had been left on the left bank of the Taitz-ho crossed the river and proceeded to Kuantung.

**CENTRAL AND LEFT ARMIES.**—“The Central and Left armies began their operations on August 26th, and, steadily pressing the enemy, reached a line extending from Shangshihkiaotsz' to Sumatai through Huokiatung on the following day, when the strong forces of the enemy, stationed at Hsiafangsin and Anshantien, commenced to retreat in the direction of Liaoyang. Thereupon the Central and Left armies immediately pursued the enemy, and driving off one of his columns the Central army reached a line extending from Pankiatu to Shaho, and the left army a line extending from Shaho to Yukiatai, both on the 29th.

**RUSSIAN POSITION.**—“The enemy still held a strong position, extending from the heights north of Yayuchi to those west of Sheushanpao along the heights to the south of Tsaofangtung and to the east and west of Sinluitung. This position was attacked by the Central army. Acting in coöperation with the latter, the Left army also attacked the enemy in the vicinity of Sheushanpao.

“On the 30th the right wing of the Central army, in coöperation with the left wing of the Right army, commenced an attack on the Russian force occupying the line extending from the heights north of Yayuchi to those south of Tsaofangtung. The enemy, however, having been strongly reinforced from Liaoyang,

the right wing of the Central army was obliged to temporarily remain in the position taken from the enemy.

"Under these circumstances, I gave orders to the Left army to speedily attack the enemy's force in the neighborhood of Sheushanpao. During the same day the left wing of the Central army and the whole of the Left army commenced an aggressive movement against the enemy at Sinluitung and in the neighborhood of Sheushanpao, but their operations were rendered difficult, due to the enemy's stubborn resistance as well as to his frequent counter-attacks.

RUSSIANS RETREAT.—"The enemy's forces in both of these directions, unable to withstand the fierce attack of our armies, lasting day and night, were finally dislodged from their positions at midnight of August 31st, and retreated towards Liaoyang. Both of our armies at once pursued the enemy, who, however, offered a renewed and stubborn resistance, occupying positions on the strongly fortified line encircling the southern and western walls of Liaoyang, as well as on an eminence northeast of Muchang.

LIAOYANG COMPLETELY OCCUPIED.—"Our two armies, after a continual attack on Liaoyang from September 1st to the night of the 3d, at last succeeded in carrying the enemy's fortified line, completely occupying Liaoyang on the morning of the 4th.

"There are indications that up to August 30th the enemy sent reinforcements to Liaoyang by train.

STRENGTH OF THE RUSSIAN FORCES.—"The strength of the Russian forces engaged by our armies is not accurately known, but it must have been at least twelve divisions. The greater portion of the enemy appears not to have retired to the north of Yentai as yet, but are still in the neighborhood of Yingshuitsz'.

"The warehouses in the vicinity of the railway station, and the railway bridge, as well as the pontoon bridges over the Taitsz-ho, have been destroyed by the enemy.

"Our Left and Central armies are stationed on the left bank of the Taitsz-ho, and a detachment is under orders to occupy the heights north of Muchang and the vicinity of the railway bridge.

“Our losses since August 25th are not yet known, but must be great. Russian loss unknown.

A TEN DAYS' STRUGGLE.—“Notwithstanding the fact that the enemy had desperately defended his positions by means of semi-permanent defensive works, our armies have, after a struggle lasting ten days, been able to attain their object; and, in spite of the numerous casualties on our side, our officers and men are in high spirits.”

## CHAPTER XXI.

OPERATIONS OF THE RIGHT ARMY FROM AUGUST 25TH TO SEPTEMBER 5TH.—*August 28th:* Towards the evening the first column, after driving off a small number of Russian troops defeated in the previous battle, occupied the line extending from Yingyupao to Shuangmiaotsz' along the left bank of the Taitsz-ho. On that day the river had greatly increased in volume and could not be forded. All the bridges had been destroyed by the Russians, so that the first column was unable to cross to the right bank.

The main force of the right wing of the second column attacked the enemy on the heights north of Sunkiasai, while its left wing attacked the enemy on the heights northwest of the same place, and our force occupied the line extending from the heights south of Tsaokiayu to the north of Siaolingtsz, *via* an eminence 243 metres high, and spent the night facing the enemy at the heights west of Tsaokiayu and at Tashihmenling (the pass about two kilometers southeast of Wangpaotai).

After 10 A. M. the third column pursued the enemy the whole of the day and finally drove him off after repeated resistance on his part. At night the column occupied the line of heights from Szefangtai to Hiangshantsz'.

*August 29th:* The first column remained in the positions occupied on the previous day, and made preparations for crossing the river. A portion of the right wing of the second column drove off the enemy's outposts and occupied Shihtsuitsz' at a little past 8 A. M. The third column occupied the heights south of Chukiakeu and reconnoitered those of Yayuchi and Menkiasai.

*August 30th:* At dawn the third column attacked the enemy, occupying the heights of Menkiasai and Yayuchi, and was able, after gallant fighting, to occupy the heights north of Chu-

kiakeu. During the night, however, the enemy received considerable reinforcements. He lighted up our camp with his field search-lights, and poured a galling fire on the heights occupied by our troops, who, in consequence, were placed in an arduous position. The left wing of the same column occupied the heights east of Wangpaotai at 6 P. M., and afterwards coöperated with the main force of the third column. The first column left a portion of its force at a place between Shuangmiaotsz' and Tiao-shuilou, and waded across the Taitz-ho in the vicinity of Lieutawan from 11 P. M. A portion of the second column remained at Shihtsuitsz', while the main force followed in the steps of the first column.

*August 31st:* The Penchihu column crossed the Taitz-ho at 4 A. M. in the vicinity of Woluntsun, and attacked the Russian infantry at Weiningying, who fled. After pursuing the foe the column took possession of Penchihu.

The main body of the first column, followed by that of the second, also crossed to the right bank of the Taitz-ho unmolested by the enemy, and occupied before dusk the heights extending from Kuantien to Shintsuen *via* Santsago.

Pontoon bridges having been thrown over the Taitz-ho, our field artillery corps crossed the river the same night and joined the column to which it belonged.

The second column and the left wing of the third column maintained their positions of the previous day. From early morning the enemy seemed inclined to make a counter-attack, but abandoned his intention, his operations being confined to a continuous artillery fire.

*September 1st:* The main body of the first and second columns opened fire from early morning on the enemy's positions on the heights north and southwest of Hohyingtai and his positions further north. The enemy also bombarded us from his artillery positions concealed in the northwest of Hohyingtai, on the heights south and west of Suikwantun, in the vicinity of a hamlet to the north, and on the heights of Tsuofango. In addition, a

detachment of the enemy with some guns advanced upon the left flank of our first column, in consequence of which our attacking operations were interrupted. A severe rifle and artillery duel between the hostile forces in the vicinity of Hohyingtai and our own was maintained until after midnight. The enemy on the heights in the vicinity of Menkiafang retreated, however, and the heights extending from the north of Yayuchi to the north of Menkiafang were occupied by our third column between 7 and 11 A. M.

"A portion of the Penchihu column, after a fierce engagement lasting from 8 A. M. to shortly before 3 P. M., drove the enemy northward, and then occupied the heights north of Hsiangshantsz'. At 5 P. M. the enemy made a counter-attack southward, but was again repulsed.

"*September 2d:* After dawn the first column attacked the enemy's force, advancing to its right, and hard fighting ensued, as the result of which the line extending from the neighborhood of the coal mine to the heights about 2,000 metres west of Ta-yu was finally occupied by us. During the afternoon, however, the enemy was gradually reinforced and the number of his gun increased to sixty.

"As to the main force of our second column, it succeeded, after constant fighting, in carrying the eminence northwest of Hohyingtai between 2 and 3 A. M. A portion of this column attacked the 131-metre elevation from the edge of the heights at Suikuantun, but could not attain its object, owing to the concentration of the Russian fire, as well as to the counter-attack by their superior force; our troops merely succeeding in maintaining the heights northwest of Hohyingtai. The enemy's artillery, consisting of about fifty guns, subsequently poured a heavy fire upon the eminences occupied by the second column.

"Our artillery, however, had no proper positions and could not return an effective fire, so that the column experienced great difficulties. Under the circumstances, all the officers and men have not been able since the previous evening to obtain any



regular food or even water; subsisting merely on a quantity of clean rice they had with them. All this was due to the fact that their communication with the other columns had been completely severed by the enemy's fire, both from the front and on the flanks. At sunset two or three brigades of Russian infantry made a counter-attack on our first and second columns, while at the same time the exchange of rifle-fire became very fierce in the neighborhood of Hohyingtai.

"The left wing of the second column, which had fortunately arrived on the field during the afternoon, proceeded to the assistance of our troops in the direction of the above place, but in spite of their united efforts the repulse of the enemy had not been effected up to midnight, when the rifle-fire was still at its height.

"*September 3d:* The enemy's force making the counter-attack had been completely repulsed, but was still in occupation of the 131-metre eminence and the neighboring districts. In addition, a strong Russian force was stationed at the places southeast of Yentai and in the vicinity of Lotatai and Cheuchingtsz'. During this day both the first and second columns were only just able to maintain their positions, so that reinforcements were sent to them by the third column.

"*September 4th:* Since dawn tranquility has prevailed in all directions. The third column, which had been ordered forward in haste, arrived at Kuantien early in the morning. At 10 A. M. the enemy stationed on the 131-metre eminence completed his retreat, and our forces occupied the position. Thereupon our army at once commenced operations for the pursuit of the enemy.

"The Penchihu column occupied the neighborhood of Pingtatsz', and after leaving a detachment there in order to watch the enemy in the direction of Mukden, the column with its main force immediately hastened towards Yentai. Just at noon it reached the heights northwest of Sankiatsz' to the north of the coal mine, and, after fighting, succeeded in taking Yumentsz'shan at 6 P. M.

*“September 5th:* Since the previous night the first column has been encountering a superior force of the enemy in the neighborhood of Siaotalienkeu, resulting in desperate fighting; our forces finally causing the Russians to retreat in a north-westerly direction at 6:30 A. M.

“In pursuing the enemy, the column occupied a line between Talienkeu, Talienkeu and Liuluikeu, and then halted.

“The Penchihu column, which had been fighting the enemy since dawn, has occupied the Yumentsz’shan district. The second column also occupied Santaopa at 1:30 P. M. Its artillery fired on the enemy retreating from the neighborhood of Fangsin for thirty or forty minutes, throwing him into complete disorder. The main force of the third column advanced near Loiatai, and then halted.

THE RUSSIAN STRENGTH.—“The strength of the enemy engaged by our Right army on the left bank of the Taitz-ho mainly consisted of a portion of the Russians who had retreated after the engagements on August 26th and 27th. The strength of the enemy facing the second column was about one division, while that facing the third column was at least one and one-half divisions. The number of the Russians who had opposed us on the right bank of the Taitz-ho since September 1st was more than three and one-half divisions, comprising the Third, Ninth, Thirty-fifth, and Fifty-fourth Divisions in the line of battle; the Second and Third rifle regiments, and a portion of the Moscow infantry regiment. The hostile forces facing our right flank could not have numbered less than three divisions.

CASUALTIES.—“The number of our casualties since the engagement of August 28th can be roughly estimated at 4,000, an exact calculation not having yet been made. The Russian casualties are not certainly known, but, judging from those left behind on the battle-field, their number must be larger than ours.”

## CHAPTER XXII.

OPERATIONS OF THE CENTRAL ARMY ON SEPTEMBER 3D AND 4TH.—“Our army, resuming offensive operations from 5 A. M. on September 3d, attacked the Russian positions in the southern outskirts of Liaoyang. In spite of the enemy's unabated fire, the right column at 6 P. M. determinedly charged his forts at Yuifwanmiao, this step being taken in view of the gradual decrease of our ammunition, and the absence of any prospect of its being speedily supplied, as well as the nearness of our positions to the enemy's, and the fact that any longer stay under the fire of the enemy's artillery—consisting of over fifty guns—only meant an increase in our casualties.

“The left column, which had already approached the enemy's forts, frequently attempted to seize the opportunity for a charge, but was unable to do so owing to the undiminished fire of the Russian artillery and machine guns placed in the neighborhood of Chenjalinzui.

“Seeing however, that the right column had commenced a forward movement, the left also advanced ready for a charge.

“Notwithstanding the galling fire from the enemy, the left wing and the central force of the right column, pressed on the enemy's forts, destroying on their way the several lines of defense works and leaping over the dead bodies of their comrades. About 7:50 P. M. the Twentieth Regiment of infantry carried the enemy's redoubt on the eastern side of Yuifwanmiao and at once occupied it.

“Another battalion of infantry, acting in conjunction with the left wing of its neighboring detachment, also advanced on the western side of the enemy's fort.

“Owing to the enemy's stubborn resistance, the left wing was compelled to halt temporarily at a point 200 metres in front

of the enemy's position, but with the advent of evening rushed the fort.

"Even after the occupation of the enemy's fort by the central force, the latter was fiercely bombarded by the Russians inside the wall and an artillery duel ensued, lasting for some time. At 10:20 P. M. our various forces finally took possession of the south gate of the wall, and passed the night there.

"The left column commenced its advance from the northern end of Chenglijuan, but owing to the enemy's hot fire was unable to continue its advance, as well also the right column. Shortly after midnight the entire force of the left column charged and carried the enemy's positions, and thus the southern part of Liao-yang was finally taken by our detachments, which were subsequently sent in pursuit of the enemy.

CASUALTIES.—"Our casualties on September 3d are not yet accurately known, but from a rough calculation the losses in the right column were about 3,000, and 800 in the left."

GALLANTRY OF THE TWENTIETH REGIMENT.—This regiment lost its colonel and one of the battalion commanders in the battle of Anshantien, and subsequently lost two battalion commanders in the engagement near Weijaogao. On September 2d the succeeding regimental commander and another battalion commander were also killed, and there remained no officer above the rank of major in the regiment, so that Major-General Marui was compelled to assume the command in this direction.

But what raised the honor of the regiment conspicuously was the assault carried out on the 3d, when the men in the first line of battle fell one after another, and their colors wavered in spite of the reserve corps which pressed them forward. At this juncture Captain Egami assumed the command of the regiment and rushed forward at the head of his company under the regimental flag in front of the firing-line of the attack formation. The entire regiment, suddenly inspirited by this sight, trampled down the many defensive works, and penetrated into the enemy's entrenchments, raising lusty cheers for His Majesty, the Emperor.

But the honor was purchased at a heavy sacrifice. In a certain battalion all of its officers were killed, and a first-class private commanded one of its companies. The rank and file of another company was reduced to fifteen. Though the exact figures are out of the question, owing to the confusion that existed, this regiment alone sustained losses amounting to at least 1,300 men. Undaunted by these heavy losses, the regiment immediately after dawn of the 4th dispatched a detachment to the eastern extremity of Liaoyang in pursuit of the enemy.

## CHAPTER XXIII.

OPERATIONS OF THE LEFT ARMY FROM AUGUST 30TH TO SEPTEMBER 4TH.—“On August 30th at 5 A. M. the army advanced from the line of the Shaho, the first column forming the right wing, the second the center, and the third the left wing, with the object of attacking the enemy in the neighborhood of Sheushanpao. At 6:30 A. M., when the head of the first column had reached a line extending from the village northwest of Yingtaoyuen to Teutaitz', some two batteries of the enemy's artillery, situated in the valley south of Sheushanpao, opened fire. At the same time the sounds of severe cannonading were heard in the direction of General Nozu's (Central) army. As the result of reconnaissances made in various directions, it was perceived that the enemy's positions extended through the heights west and south of Sheushanpao, those west of Sinlunitun, and those east of Fangkiatun. They were defended with strong entrenchments, surrounded by wire entanglements.

“It was deemed too hazardous for our first column to make a frontal attack on the Russian positions, and consequently it was decided to occupy the southeastern projection of the heights west of Sinlunitun with the main force, by advancing from the eastern side of Hohniuchwang.

“The column opened fire at 7 A. M., making preparations for an attack in the near proximity with the left wing of General Nozu's army. Owing to the bad road, the march of the second column was retarded. But a portion of the column arrived at the villages southeast and northeast of Tachaokiatus, and immediately afterwards the major portion of its artillery also arrived on the scene and opened fire on the enemy's artillery in the valley southeast of Sheushanpao. By 1 P. M. some progress had been

made in the attack of the first column, but the latter was not yet in a position to scale the heights.

"The second column also assumed the offensive and advanced from the neighborhood of Tachackiatai, its right wing connecting with the left wing of the first column and its own left wing enveloping the enemy's right wing. A portion of its artillery had not yet arrived on the scene of the battle. At that time the main force of the third column was situated in the neighborhood of Hinglungtai. Our cavalry advanced from the neighborhood of Wangjentun, and made a demonstration with their field guns on the flank and rear of the enemy.

"At about 4 P. M. the enemy's infantry and artillery appeared to be steadily receiving reinforcements. His right wing extended to the villages northwest of Guzuazui, with machine guns placed at different intervals. The enemy offered a stubborn resistance. Notwithstanding the fact that the second column continued the attack with its entire force, the situation of the column was critical, and the safety of its left wing was threatened, so that the latter had to be reinforced with a portion of the infantry belonging to the third column. Prior to this, an infantry regiment and a battalion of artillery had been dispatched to the first column as reinforcements in order to assist its attack. The battalion of artillery took up its positions at Yingtaoyuen at 3:40 P. M. and opened fire. The right wing of the first column attacking the southeastern corner of the heights west of Sinlunitun was subjected to a severe flank-fire from the enemy's artillery situated on an elevation at Fangkiatun, as well as from the redoubt at a projected point in front, and was placed in such a difficult situation that it could not advance any farther. Under the circumstances, the first and second columns, though they continued their attack with the utmost energy, were prevented by the enemy's auxiliary defense works and his galling rifle- and gun-fire from effecting a charge before sunset. Thereupon it was decided to destroy, under cover of darkness, the enemy's auxiliary defense works and then make an assault, the

attack to be resumed at dawn in the event of failure. On this day our artillery could not place all its guns in position, owing to the difficult road, and it was a cause of profound regret that its sustained fire throughout the day could not silence the enemy's guns. During this engagement the enemy reconnoitered our movements by means of balloons, and frequently moved his troops from one point to another, thereby evincing his determination to fight a decisive battle. This consideration prompted us to exercise full caution and display redoubled energy.

"From 3 A. M. on the 31st the infantry of the first column determinedly carried out a fierce and daring assault. An infantry regiment, forming its left wing, succeeded about daybreak in carrying the southern portion of an eminence south of Sheu-shanpao, but owing to the enemy's severe frontal and flank-fire, as well as a counter-attack by a superior force of the enemy coming from the heights standing to the north, was obliged, after a hard fight, resulting in heavy casualties, to retire to the base of the above hill. The right wing also pushed forward in spite of extreme difficulties and considerable losses, but the enemy's auxiliary defense works were so strong and the scaling of the heights was so difficult that our troops could do no more than throw themselves upon the ground, and thus keep their position at the base of the elevation. The second column, commencing operations at 1 A. M., repulsed the enemy's repeated counter-attacks, and advanced through a terrible fire from his quick-firing guns in order to carry out a night attack.

"The column finally succeeded in pressing the enemy to the railway line and approaching within 50 to 100 meters of his positions. Owing, however, to losses which were heavy, due to a plunging fire by the enemy on one of the heights, the column was unable to charge. Meanwhile the day dawned, and subsequently about five battalions of infantry from the third column deployed to the left of the second column, which helped to improve the situation. At 7 A. M. three battalions of infantry were brought to the battle-field from the highway in order to



coöperate with the left wing of the first column. In this condition the first and second columns vigorously continued their attack, while our artillery severely bombarded the enemy's position, having taken up their respective positions within an effective range. But our forces were still unable to actively assume the offensive, and, owing to the rain of the preceding day, great difficulty was experienced in obtaining ammunition supplies. About noon the same day our artillery fire developed great strength and wrought havoc on the northeastern portion of a height west of Sinluitun. On perceiving this, the right wing of the first column dauntlessly stormed the Russian position and carried it by 12:30 P. M. Though a portion of the enemy's positions thus fell into our hands, yet our forces were unable to advance farther, owing to the stubborn resistance of the enemy in the other defenses, and also on account of the deadly fire of the Russian artillery stationed at Fangkiatun. Under these circumstances our troops of the second column were unable to continue their advance.

"At about 5 P. M. a report from the commander of the third column was received stating that at about 3 P. M. a force of Russian infantry with some guns, whose strength was not clearly known, had appeared at Peitai about six miles northwest of Sheu-shanpao and was proceeding southward. Thereupon the remainder of the third column in reserve was at once ordered to engage the enemy's force just mentioned. Our cavalry corps operated in front of the left wing of third column, guarding on the one hand the left flank of our army against the enemy in the north, and on the other, carrying out a reconnoissance in the direction of Liaoyang. At 7 P. M. it was decided that the whole of our artillery should bombard the enemy, and then make a general assault. This artillery fire doubtless inflicted considerable damage on the Russian defenses.

"During the night our infantry in various directions worked hard, making preparations for the destruction of the enemy's auxiliary defenses. The preparations completed, they made a

fearless and energetic charge on the enemy's position. The first column took a height west of Sinlunitun and the second column a height (99 metres) west of Sheushanpao, while the reinforcements received by the second column captured a height in the direction of the main road leading to Mukden. This was at about 3 P. M. on September 1st.

"The strength of the Russian forces engaged in the fighting appeared to consist of about two divisions of infantry (consisting, according to statements of prisoners, of the whole of the Third Siberian Reserve Division and detachments from the First and Fifth Rifle Divisions) with about fifty guns. The enemy retreated in the direction of Liaoyang at about 3 A. M. A portion of the second column's reinforcements pursued the enemy and reached the neighborhood of Siplichwang at about 8 P. M. The third column was ordered to join in the pursuit of the retreating enemy, while our main body assembled and were put in order on the positions taken from the enemy.

"From 1 P. M. on September 1st the third column commenced to pursue the fleeing enemy. By this time the greater portion of his defeated troops was in the neighborhood of the railway station. From about 4 P. M. the enemy increased the number of luggage-cars, and was retreating in succession. Our artillery poured an effective fire upon him, which caused great confusion in the vicinity of the station. The artillery belonging to the third column reached the vicinity of Shakiachwangtsh, in the afternoon, and after a brief duel succeeded in silencing the enemy's guns southwest of Jiguan. Thereupon the above column occupied the line extending from the villages northeast of the latter place to the neighborhood of Wanpaoshan, and reconnoitered the enemy's force near Liaoyang. The army bivouacked in the neighborhood of the battle-field, ready to advance in full force on the 2d instant.

"At 7 A. M. of the 2d the first and second columns began to advance in order to effect a junction with the right wing of the third column. As it appeared from various reports that the

enemy was determined to make another stand within the defensive works extending from the west to the south of Liaoyang station *via* the neighborhood of Jiguan, we at once attacked him. Fire was opened at about 8 A. M. in the direction of the third column.

“Meanwhile the advanced bodies of the second column, proceeding along the railway route, deployed quickly, and thus effected a junction with the third column. Between 9 and 10 A. M. the advanced portion of the first column reached the line extending from the neighborhood of Sulichjuan to Sivalichwang, while its artillery took positions on the heights southwest of the latter place, and opened fire at about 9:40 A. M. upon the enemy’s guns placed in the neighborhood of Chenjalinzui. At 10 A. M. the sound of cannonading was heard in the direction of General Nozu’s army, and at about 10:30 A. M. that army commenced to advance. It was then learned that the first fighting-line of Nozu’s army had reached the vicinity of Tateputsz’ and Tung-palichwang.

“From various reports it appears that the Russian right wing was occupying the positions extending from a point about two and one-half miles northwest of the railway station to the southwest of the station, and also from the vicinity of Jiguan to the south of Liaoyang.

“The middle and eastern half of the above line seem to have been strongly fortified. At about noon of the same day the first fighting-line of the third column gradually pushed forward, when fire was opened on it by two batteries of the enemy’s artillery, which suddenly took up their positions in the northeast of Yangkialintsz’. In addition, a column of the enemy also appeared in that direction and advanced southward, gradually increasing in number. The right wing of the enemy in the above direction then appeared to extend gradually westward.

“The third column still vigorously attacked the enemy, who, however, stubbornly resisted, and there were indications that the battle would be a protracted one. Owing to the

strength of the Russian defensive works and to his fierce resistance, our artillery made little impression, so that darkness descended on the battlefield before our army could obtain an opportunity of charging the enemy. During the same night a portion of the right wing of the second column attempted to storm the enemy's position in the vicinity of Jiguan, but was unsuccessful, owing to the strength of the auxiliary defense works and the deadly fire of his machine guns. It was noticed that a fire had broken out in the vicinity of the railway station the same day.

"The bombardment of the enemy's positions was renewed at daybreak on the 3d, but the enemy still offered a stubborn resistance. Advancing within range of the enemy's rifle-fire, our artillery endeavored to destroy his entrenchments and quick-firing guns. As a result, a portion of his troops at several points was thrown into confusion. The rest, however, still maintained their ground, and it seemed difficult for our infantry to attempt a charge. Under the circumstances it was decided to concentrate the whole of our artillery fire upon the enemy and await an opportunity to charge.

"We waited till 7 p. m., by which time our infantry had approached within 200 to 300 metres of the enemy. Our artillery then poured a final fire of great severity on the enemy, and a general attack was spontaneously commenced along our whole line. A fierce infantry engagement ensued, lasting far into the night. Shortly after midnight we at last rushed the Russian positions, and succeeded in carrying his first line of entrenchments, enthusiastic cries of "Banzai!" arising from the entire line. The fire raging in the neighborhood of the railway station became intense this day.

"On the 4th at 2 a. m. a portion of the second column occupied the railway station, and a portion of the third column occupied the northwestern extremity of Liaoyang. They did not stop there, but pursued the enemy retreating in the direction of Taitz-ho. The enemy at last retired to the right bank of the

river, setting fire to the railway bridge. As there was a strong force of Russian infantry on the opposite bank our army was not able to subdue their fire.

“Judging from the general conditions of this battle, it was evidently the enemy’s intention to check our advance to the utmost of his power by making a determined stand at the positions near Sheushanpao and by taking the offensive in other directions, thus fighting a decisive battle at Liaoyang. The resistance made by the enemy at the second line of defense indicated that he only wanted time to safeguard his flank and rear against General Kuroki’s army. On the whole, the enemy’s defensive action at Liaoyang was desperate, and proves that originally he had no intention to retreat.”

## CHAPTER XXIV.

CASUALTIES AT LIAOYANG.—From reports received up to September 10th from the chiefs of the medical corps of the three Japanese armies, the casualties, in the battles fought at Liaoyang and in the neighborhood reached 17,539, classified as follows: In Kuroki's Right army, 4,866; in Nozu's Central army, 4,992; and in Oku's Left army, 7,681.

Of the foregoing figures, the losses among the Japanese commissioned officers are stated as follows: In Right army, 54 killed, 131 wounded, missing 1, making a total of 186; in Central and Left armies, 137 killed, 151 wounded, making a total of 288. Two colonels were killed and 2 wounded; Lieutenant-General Ogawa was also wounded.

It is extremely difficult to arrive at the actual number of the total casualties sustained by the Russians in the various engagements at and near Liaoyang. No two of General Kuropatkin's reports agree as to the casualties. The latest detailed list as published by the Russian general staff shows 2 general officers, 54 regimental officers, and 1,810 men killed, while 3 general officers, 252 regimental officers, and 10,811 men were wounded, and 5 officers and 1,212 men were left on the field. Kuropatkin stated in another report that from August 28th to September 5th his casualties were 4,000 killed and 12,000 wounded. It is known by the Japanese official reports that 3,100 dead Russians were found on the field and were buried. Assuming the ratio of 4 wounded to 1 killed, it would make the total Russian casualties 24,830: the Japanese estimate, made by the field staff, was 25,000.

SPOILS OF WAR.—The spoils of war captured by the Japanese forces during the attack on and before Liaoyang were 3,578 rifles, 1,638,730 rounds of rifle ammunition, 10,056 rounds of

artillery ammunition, gun carriages and caissons of one battery of artillery, 129 ammunition wagons, 70 horses, 750 swords, 80 revolvers, 15,985 entrenching shovels, 5,639 entrenching mattocks, 2,570 axes, 6,400 overcoats, 18,915 tins of beef, 17,620 *koku* of forage, 3 electric flash-lights, 3 electric reflectors, and 3 portable telephones, besides large quantities of timber, iron wire, telephone wire, metal fittings, kerosene oil, rice, food stuffs, materials for field railways, coal, mining tools, etc.

After the occupation of Liaoyang 353 Russian barracks and 214 store-houses and godowns were found in good condition; these covered an area of 29,000 *tsubo*, and were situated in the neighborhood of the railway station, and are now occupied by the Japanese army.

About 7,000 *koku* of oats were burned and destroyed by the Russians, but the following were taken in good condition: Three thousand *koku* of barley, 6,000 of bran, 1,000 of Chinese rice, 1,000 of cracked wheat, 5,000 of *kowliang* (millet), 1,300 tins of kerosene oil, 100,000 *kwan* of wood for fuel, 250,000 *kin* of coal, and 1,800 cases of loaf sugar. In addition Kuroki's army destroyed 448,000 *kin* of coal and 6,250 meters of rails for field railway.

STRENGTH OF THE HOSTILE FORCES.—The Japanese forces consisted of Kuroki's (First) army of three complete divisions, 1 brigade of cavalry, 1 brigade of artillery, and 1 reserve brigade; Oku's (Second) army of 3 complete divisions, 1 brigade of cavalry, 1 brigade of artillery, and 1 reserve brigade; and Nozu's (Fourth) army of 2 complete divisions and 1 reserve brigade; making a total force of about 160,000 men. (*Note*.—The composition of a Japanese division will be found in the Appendix.)

Kuropatkin's forces consisted of 5 divisions of Siberian Rifles, 2 or 2½ divisions of Rifle Reserves, the Tenth Army Corps of 2 divisions, the Eighteenth Army Corps of 2 divisions, and the Fifth Army Corps of 2 divisions: making a total of 13 or 13½ divisions. A Russian army corps consists, nominally, of

3 divisions of infantry, 12 batteries of artillery, and from 2 to 3 regiments of cavalry.

But the army corps sent out from Russia this year (the Tenth, Thirteenth, and Fifth) seem to comprise two divisions only, and as each division has four regiments and each Siberian regiment three battalions (the others having four), a battalion being estimated at 800 men, it is seen that Kuropatkin's force of infantry concentrated near Liaoyang comprised 176 battalions, or 140,800 men, to which must be added his cavalry and infantry. Making the necessary deductions for his sick and wounded, it is safe to say that he had at least 140,000 men in line of battle.

COMMENTS.—Liaoyang stands where the Liao-ho valley comes in contact with the spurs of the Changpeishan range, which, beginning at the upper reaches of the Yalu, forms a converging point for the roads leading to the Liaotung Peninsula and the northwestern districts of Korea, and also those traversing the plains washed by the waters of the Liao-ho. The Taitzsho, which flows to the north of the city, is not navigable for large boats, but small junks from time immemorial have gone up the river for many miles beyond Liaoyang, and the produce of the fertile country used to be carried to Yinkow by this stream. The depth of the river is from four to six feet in ordinary times and its breadth from 100 to 150 feet. Liaoyang is thus very important point of radiation, not only so economically, but especially so from a strategical point of view. A mountain range runs close to the south, the highest peak of which is Shou-shan—a bald mountain covered only with underbrush to a height of a foot or so, but its sides being very precipitous, furnishes an ideal position for the construction of fortifications. It looks down upon the highway to Haicheng, and the tactical importance of the place made the Russians choose it for important works of defense. (*Note.*—The height is variously spoken of as Sheushanpao, or Shoushanpo). The city of Liaoyang is surrounded by a wall that measures twenty-five feet in



height and thirteen feet in breadth. Outside the wall it is surrounded by a ditch thirteen feet in depth and twenty feet in breadth. The town is connected with the outer world by means of six gates, the western one directly opening to the highway that leads to Haicheng. There is a great tower or pagoda outside the gate that was constructed hundreds of years ago, and the distance of about one mile between the town and the railway track is filled with Russian barracks, store-houses, and other buildings.

In Japanese hands, the occupation of Liaoyang will compel the Russians to abandon all designs on southern Manchuria. So long as Kuropatkin retained Liaoyang he was not only within practicable reach of Port Arthur, but he also covered Mukden, the capital of Manchuria—to occupy which is of cardinal moment from the point of view of Japan and China. He has now been driven beyond all immediate reach of southern Manchuria and beyond the capacity of guarding Mukden. This in itself is of very great importance. It is calculated that the stores destroyed or abandoned by the Russians at Liaoyang and during their hasty retreat represented a quantity such as would take the Siberian Railway six months to transport. Besides, Liaoyang is the great warehouse of local food supplies in Manchuria. Most of the agricultural products of the three provinces gravitate there for distribution. The Russians evidently intended to make the place their permanent base, and its loss must have upset Kuropatkin's plans. The lines of defenses surrounding the approaches to Liaoyang were deemed almost impregnable; months had been spent in their preparation, and all devices known in field and semi-permanent fortifications were exhausted.

The terrible losses sustained by the Japanese in their repeated attacks (notably the losses in the Twentieth Regiment of infantry) furnish mute evidence of their great strength. Yet some critics are disposed to condemn the Russian methods of field fortifications, probably with a view to minimize the value of the Japanese successes. However that may be, the fact is

that with one exception (at Tehlitz, which resulted in a crushing Russian defeat), the Russians have always fought behind fortifications—and have always been beaten. Should the day ever come when the task devolves upon them of attacking Japanese entrenched positions—and they will certainly have to do so if Manchuria is to be recovered—there will be an opportunity of seeing what they can do with the reversed position.

Undoubtedly Kuropatkin's retreat was well managed, but to those who feel disappointed because thousands of men were not taken prisoners and hundreds of guns captured, there are a few observations to be made. The first is that the battle of Liaoyang was not, in any sense a battle in the open. It was a battle or a succession of battles where one side had the advantage of fighting behind entrenchments, which by months of work had been prepared to resist the strongest assault. Under such circumstances, signal disaster cannot overtake the defenders unless they invite it by excessive optimism—by, in short, clinging to the position after all hope of holding it has vanished, and by thus exposing themselves to the danger of being captured simultaneously with their defenses, or flying from them in disorder and suffering all the disasters of a rout. Kuropatkin made no such error. He might very easily have made it.

Here was a position of vital strategical importance; a position which had served him as a principal base ever since the beginning of the war; a position which he had openly pledged himself before the world to hold—if he could. He must have abandoned it with vast chagrin. But he did abandon it in good time, and the fact does much credit to his soldierly acumen.

The second point is that the Russians were able to hold these entrenchments so long and to make the task of reducing them so terribly difficult that the Japanese had been fighting for ten days before they carried the position. After such an effort, unprecedented, so far as we know, in the history of warfare, the assailants could not have possessed sufficient physical strength to undertake a vigorous pursuit.

The third point is that the Russians were not surrounded; their rear was open; it rested on a river which, had they deferred their retreat too long, might have been a source of peril to them, but which, owing to their timely withdrawal, they were able to convert into a fresh obstacle to the Japanese advance. It would not have been at all surprising if Kuropatkin had succeeded in holding the Japanese at bay for two or three months at Liaoyang until winter came to his aid; that is assuredly what he hoped. The Turks at Plevna, though in possession of comparatively weak fortifications hastily improvised, defied an enormously superior Russian army for week after week. Kuropatkin might have fairly hoped to accomplish that much at least. The Japanese force was somewhat superior in strength to that of the Russians—a point of good generalship always—but assuming that the forces were equal the equation becomes, on one side, a certain force of Russians posted behind lines which possessed almost the rank of permanent fortifications; and on the other a similar force of Japanese required to carry these fortifications without any weapons except those used in the open field.

It was an immense achievement to capture this position under such conditions; an achievement which establishes beyond all question the superiority of the Japanese soldier to the Russian. But it was an achievement which could not have been accompanied by any signal results like those accomplished at Sedan, when the French were taken by surprise and exposed to the attack of a greatly superior enemy in the unfortified open.

The defeat at Liaoyang is crushing as it stands. The Russians have absolutely no excuse. It must be evident to them now that in order to conquer a Japanese army they must have enormous superiority, both in numbers and position.

Kuropatkin has shown himself clever in retreat. He manages to draw off his men without a crippling loss. But continual retreats do not win campaigns.

## CHAPTER XXV.

**ADVANCE ON MUKDEN.**—After the occupation of Liaoyang on September 5th the Japanese armies at once began preparations for an advance farther north.

When the Russians retreated they destroyed five military bridges across the Taitz-ho (two above and three below the railway bridge), and while they destroyed also the wood work of the railway bridge and removed the rails, they did not seriously injure the metal framework, so that it soon became available for the passage of infantry.


The main force of Kuropatkin's army retreated to Mukden and beyond, but a strong rear guard was posted along the north bank of the Hun-ho.


Kuroki's army, having previously crossed to the right bank of the Taitz-ho, had already reached the Manjuyama line of heights and also occupied Hohyintai, the Yentai coal mine, and Pingtuitsz', while the right flank of the Japanese line was further extended by the occupation of Penchihu by a reserve brigade under Major-General Umezawa.

The Central (Nozu's) and Left (Oku's) armies remained on the left bank of the Taitz-ho, and although bridges for crossing the river were constructed as rapidly as possible, they did not cross to the right bank until about October 5th, when it was known that Kuropatkin had commenced an offensive movement to the south. Then both the Central and Left armies crossed the river and straightened out the Japanese line, as previously determined.

The Russian Army moved southward, crossed the Hun-ho, and began the advance; the Russian left moving as far as Pingtuitsz', their line extending in a northwesterly direction, the right being refused. Prior to this, however, on September 17th, a

of the Shaho.





column of Japanese troops posted at Pingtaitsz' was attacked by a Russian force coming from the direction of Fushun (or Wushun), consisting of about five battalions of infantry, eight squadrons of cavalry, with eight guns, and another force from the Mukden highway of two battalions of infantry, a body of cavalry with six guns.

SEVERE FIGHTING AT PINGTAITSZ.—A severe engagement ensued, lasting from noon to 3 P. M.

The Russian force from the Mukden highway came within a very short distance of the Japanese defense line, but commenced to retire at 4 P. M., shelled by the Japanese artillery for about half an hour, which inflicted serious damage on the enemy. While the greater portion of the Russian troops gradually retreated, a body of the enemy offered a stubborn resistance until about 7 P. M., when it was finally repulsed. On September 20th skirmishes occurred at Taling and at Sanlungfu, but the Russians were repulsed and driven to the north. For several days the situation remained apparently unchanged.

RUSSIAN MOVEMENTS ON OCTOBER 4TH.—On October 4th a small body of Russian cavalry appeared in the vicinity of Aiyangpienmen, but was repulsed.

A Russian force, consisting of one battalion of infantry, eleven or twelve squadrons of cavalry, with five or six guns, made its appearance in the direction of Shangliuhotsz', but soon afterwards retired, leaving two or three squadrons on a line of observation extending westward from Mangkiafan. It is reported that the infantry of the advance guard wore Chinese clothes.

A small force of the enemy attacked our patrol stationed at Pingtaitsz', but was repulsed; the enemy retreated, leaving on the field his killed, in addition to arms and accoutrements. This force belonged to the Third Regiment of sharpshooters, and were all in Chinese clothes.

Four squadrons of Russian cavalry have been stationed at Shuangshutsuitz' on the Fushun road since yesterday, and were still there on the 8th instant.

The enemy's scouting parties, who had been moving in the neighborhood of Lungwangmiao, retreated towards the north, leaving behind an infantry patrol.

A small detachment of Russian cavalry advanced from Yenkaoshi towards Siaotai, while another force with three guns opened fire from the vicinity of Tatai upon our detachment at North Yentai.

The Russian force stationed at Changtan on the right bank of the Hun-ho appears to have retired to the north, leaving behind a portion of his force.

No Russians are to be seen in the vicinity of Tantaish.

KUROPATKIN'S PROCLAMATION.—An interesting feature in connection with the southward offensive movement of the Russian Army is the proclamation which Kuropatkin addressed to his troops at Mukden, prior to the movement, quoted as follows:

"Since the enemy attacked Port Arthur without declaring war, the hostilities have now continued for seven months.

"Our soldiers have performed brave acts, deserving the traditions of their country. Still not only the enemy is not vanquished, but he is indulging himself with the hope of decisively defeating us. Our army in Manchuria has had until now no numerical strength sufficient to defeat the enemy. In order to adequately reinforce our active army so as to perform with full measure of success the duties imposed upon it, much time was needed to overcome all the difficulties lying in the way. It was on this account that after having repeatedly repulsed the enemy at Tashihkiao, Lianchenshan (?) and Liaoyang, we were not able to follow up our victories, but we had to retreat under difficult circumstances.

"While being attacked by Kuroki you succeeded in retreating over rugged passes with guns and wagons which you were compelled to drag with your own hands and yet without



abandoning any of them. You left on the battle-field no prisoners nor wounded, neither did you suffer any train to be damaged. With much regret I had to order a retreat, but I took this step, having been firmly convinced that a complete and decisive victory would be impossible just then.

"The Tsar has sent us at the proper time a great force; and one hundred thousand men, together with ten thousand horses, and one million pounds of freight, have been brought over to Manchuria from European Russia and Siberia during the last seven months, over-coming every difficulty in transporting such an enormous force over 10,000 *versts*. In order, however, to fully carry out the inflexible will of the Tsar, more forces will be dispatched if these regiments are not sufficient.

"It is now high time to impose our will upon the enemy. The Manchurian Army is strong enough to force its way for an advance. It should always be kept in mind, however, that mere numerical strength is not to be relied upon in order to defeat the strong and brave enemy; but every one of you from the highest to the lowest must have a firm resolution to do your duty. You must offer any sacrifice whenever asked for, with the consciousness of the importance of victory for Russia. Especially it must be remembered how requisite a victory would be for relieving our comrades at Port Arthur, who have held the fort entrusted to them for seven long months. You must think hourly about the honor and rights of Russia, which the Tsar has confided to you to uphold. It is my constant belief that the defense of the honor of Russia and the fame of her army are entrusted to you. The Tsar with his whole nation is offering prayers for our sake. Encouraged and strengthened by these prayers to pursue new acts of bravery, we are bound to perform our duties to the last with unflinching determination, neither fearing dangers nor sparing lives."

BATTLE OF THE SHA-HO.—Events now followed thick and fast; and the following resumé of the daily operations of the

hostile armies is copied *verbatim* from the official Japanese reports, promulgated by the Japanese Imperial headquarters:

"The situation October 9th in front of the Right army was as follows:

"This morning the enemy crossed to the left bank of the Taitzsh-ho, at Weiningying and advanced toward Kiaoteu, finally cutting the communications between the latter place and Pen-chihu. His troops consisted of about a brigade of infantry, 2,000 cavalry, and two guns. The enemy also increased his force in the districts on the right bank of the Taitzsh-ho to a brigade of infantry, 1,500 cavalry, and eight guns. A composite brigade of the enemy was in the direction of Taling, and a regiment both at Mienhuapo and Pakiatsz'. These forces were all advancing south apparently, followed by others.

"At 2 p. m. about two regiments of Russian infantry entered Shangliuhotsz' and a regiment of cavalry, Hialihotsz'. Another Russian force, a division strong, which had also arrived at Shaotakow, had already reached the front of our position.

"Up to the morning of the 9th instant the Russian troops in front of the Central army numbered about a division, and were stationed on the line connecting Chienhuanghuatien, Pankiaopao, and Liutungkeu. In the afternoon a column of his troops headed south from the latter place along the railway line, its advanced bodies having already reached Nanwulikai. Russian infantry, at least three battalions strong, are also pouring ahead from Liutungkeu; others apparently following. The line of the enemy's troops advancing along the railway route extended over a distance of about five miles, and even their rear was invisible. About a regiment of infantry was also noticed on the heights east of Pankiaopao.

"The enemy's movements in front of the Left army are not active, and his main strength appears to be in the neighborhood of Liutungkeu and Sunkiatai.

"Since the 7th instant the Right army has been sustaining the Russian attack in the direction of Hsienchang, and has also

despatched a column of troops to reinforce the garrison at Kiaoteu. The Penchihu detachment was likewise reinforced; and the fight is going on, but particulars are not yet to hand.

"The Central and Left armies are fighting with the enemy in their front. Under these circumstances we intend to assume the offensive from to-morrow morning and attack the enemy's main force, in order to prevent him from concentrating his troops in the south of the Hun-ho.

SEVERE FIGHTING NEAR PENCHIHU.—"The Right army has effected a junction with the Penchihu detachment. The latter fought against a superior force of Russians for about twelve hours from the morning of the 9th instant. The fight was the fiercest towards Penchihu; the detachment, however, was able to maintain its positions. The Russian force, a little stronger than a brigade, was at Weiningying. A large Russian column arrived at Taling late last night, and about one brigade was at Tumentsz'ling. Last night the enemy attacked our positions and a hand-to-hand fight ensued at several places. The reinforcements dispatched from the Right army reached Huoliensai at about 4 P. M. yesterday. A detachment from this force reached Penchihu at about 9 P. M. and another detachment occupied Tumentsz'ling. The enemy is camped at close quarters at Pienshankeu and Tayupao. Colonel Hirata was wounded.

"On October 10th the situation was as follows:

"In front of the Right Army a considerably strong body of the enemy was in occupation of the heights east of Sankiatz', and a big column of infantry deployed in the valley of Yeh-hokeu. About one regiment of Russian infantry was constructing defensive works in the neighborhood of Shaotakeu. Another force with artillery advanced towards Shangliuhotsz' and Hialihotsz' about 2:30 P. M.

"The height east of Penchihu was assaulted and carried by the enemy, and subsequently the height east of the road and situated between Penchihu and Hualienkeu was also carried by the enemy, who successfully effected a night attack. Our Pen-

chihu detachment, however, maintained its principal positions throughout the night, and this morning, under cover of a dense fog, recovered the height east of Penchihu. The height between Penchihu and Hualienkeu was also re-taken at 11 A. M.

"The right column of the Right army is fighting along the whole line with the enemy's infantry and artillery in its forefront. At about 11 A. M. the Russian troops charged the heights east of Hualienkeu, and a severe bayonet fight ensued, the enemy being finally repulsed.

"The enemy left a great number of his killed on the field, and retreated to the base of the heights.

"According to a report received this evening, it appears the Russian force near Penchihu was greatly reinforced. But our troops are fighting splendidly.

"The right column of the Central army occupied the heights east of Yumentsz' this morning. On reaching the heights east of Hwangti the left column attacked the enemy at Wulitaitz', but was unable to complete the occupation of the position by sunset.

"Having occupied the neighborhood of Kukiatsz', the right column of the Left army effected a junction with the left column of the Central army, and then together assaulted the mixed force of the enemy on the heights of Wulitaitz' and in the neighborhood of Erhtaitz', thereby occupying a line extending from Shuangtaitz' to Erhtaitz'. The central column of the Left army having reached a line near Tsientaitz' and Kangkiatai, attacked the enemy at Tatungshanpao, which he had occupied the previous day, the position being finally carried by us.

"The left column attacked the enemy at Silaoshantun and continued its advance, proceeding as far as Hokiatusn.

"Our garrison at Msienchang delivered a night attack on the enemy in its front at 3 A. M., and succeeded in driving him to the northeast.

"On October 11th, in front of the Right Army, about five batteries of Russian artillery began to furiously bombard the

various positions in front of the Penchihu detachment from about 10 A. M. Presently the enemy assumed the offensive with a regiment from his right wing and five battalions from his central column, and fierce fighting is now going on. An artillery duel is proceeding in the districts between Taling and Penchihu. The same is also the case in the Tumentsz'ling district.

"A force despatched by the Penchihu detachment to the left bank of the Taitsz-ho has already returned to the right bank after driving off the enemy. The Russians have placed a number of guns in position in the neighborhood of Taiyupao on the upper reaches of the Taitsz-ho.

"It appears that the enemy posted to the east of the main road between Tumentsz'ling and Penchihu is at least two divisions strong, with about eighty guns. The enemy's main strength opposed to the Right army is posted on the line from Sankiatsz' to Pakiatsz', and its strength is not less than four divisions. The right column of the Right army and the right wing of the left column continued furiously fighting till sunset.

"The left wing of the left column, coöperating with the right wing of the Central army, tried to dislodge the enemy from the vicinity of Sankiatsz', but up till sunset it had not attained its object. The engagement, however, is progressing favorably. The commander of the Right army is going to continue his endeavors during the night to beat the enemy in his front.

"The right column of the Central army has been in occupation of the heights to the north of Yumentsz' since yesterday morning. The right wing of this column, in coöperation with the left wing of the left column of the Right army, advanced this morning in the direction of Kukaitsz'. The left wing of the Central army's right column has advanced to the attack of the enemy in the direction of Penniutzs' and the district east of Sankuaishihshan. The enemy opposing the left column of the Central army offered a stubborn resistance on the line extending from Pankiatun to Shihliho and Liutangkeu. In consequence the Central army was not able to effect the pre-arranged advance

before sunset. The enemy opposing the left column was slightly less than a division.

“The advance movement of the Left army to-day made comparatively rapid progress. The army continued the attack on the enemy defending the line of Pankiaopao and Liutangkeu. The right column has already occupied Yangkiawan, and is proceeding towards Liusankiatsz’. The left column advanced to the line extending from the neighborhood of Tayuchungpao to Litajantun *via* Tsingchuitsz’. Its main force was stationed in the vicinity of Tsingchuitsz’ and Sakiatientsz’, and menaced the enemy’s right flank and rear. In the event of the Left army being unable to reach its object before sunset, the commander will carry out a night attack, and continue the advance tomorrow. The enemy opposing the Left army was not less than two divisions.

A GENERAL ATTACK.—“On October 12th the situation in the direction of Mukden was as follows:

“The central column of the Right army occupied Laokoling and the heights north of Pakiatsz’, and subsequently took possession of Maerhshan. The left column of the Right army occupied the heights north of Shaotakeu. The Central army began operations from midnight the previous day, and early this morning proceeded from Sankiatsz’ to the line of heights northwest of Sankuaishihshan. This army is probably at present pursuing the enemy. Since last night the Left army has been incessantly attacking the enemy in the neighborhood of Shihliho, Lungwangmiao, and Wulikai, but has not yet achieved any conclusive success. This army is reinforcing its left wing and endeavoring to envelop the enemy’s right flank and rear.

“The fight is still proceeding in the direction of Penchihu. Such being the condition, the situation is judged to be favorably developing for the attainment of our original object.

SPOILS OF WAR.—“The Central army captured two field guns and eight ammunition wagons in the fight last night.

Major-General Marui and Lieutenant-Colonel Kuno were wounded and Colonel Yasumura was killed.

FURTHER VICTORIES.—“In the direction of Penchihu the enemy’s attack was repulsed everywhere, and the junction between our detachments at Penchihu and Kiaoteu has been firmly established.

“The pursuit of the enemy by the main force of the Right army and by the Central army has made great progress.

“Our armies have already reached the line of Maershan and Mangkiefen, where a detachment of Russian forces with guns has already been enveloped and thrown into great confusion. The rest of the enemy’s forces seem to have been routed northwards. In order to cut off the retreat of the Russian troops at Penchihu the Right army dispatched a detachment to Shihkiaotsz’, which must have been reached by 3 P. M.

MORE SPOILS CAPTURED.—“The Central army this morning captured eight field guns and ammunition wagons. According to a prisoner of war, Kuropatkin, with some three divisions of troops, had been in rear of the enemy opposing the main force of the Right army. The central column of the Left army, after overcoming the enemy’s strong resistance, occupied the neighborhood of Langtsz’kai at about 1:30 P. M., capturing eight guns. The enemy was completely routed and fled northwards. The pursuing troops at once advanced to Iiusankiaotsz’ *via* Siao-tungtai. The right column overcame the stubborn resistance offered by the enemy entrenched north of Endowniuloo (?) and routed him. The column is pursuing him towards the south of Lungwangmiao and Wulikai. The left column was fiercely bombarding North Yentai at 12:30 P. M.

THIRTY-SIX GUNS CAPTURED.—“Since forwarding the last report the Right army has been continuing its hot pursuit of the enemy towards the north. The detachment which had proceeded towards Shihkiaotsz’, in order to cut off the retreat of the enemy’s force at Penchihu, is still operating with that object.

"The Central army is still continuing its attack and advance and intends to occupy the line of Tungshankow, Hukia, and Kukiatsz'. The enemy in this direction is observed to be retreating north, the retreat being continued till evening. It is reported that a large column of the enemy's force at Huangwatien has proceeded southeast and begun to construct defensive works at Chienhuangwatien, but particulars are not yet to hand.

"The number of guns captured by the central column of the Left army, last reported as eight, should be corrected to sixteen. While continuing its pursuit of the enemy, the right wing of the same column subsequently captured four guns. The enemy twice delivered fierce counter-attacks on that column, but each time was repulsed with heavy losses inflicted by the artillery and infantry of the column. The right column of the Left army, while pursuing the enemy in the west of Shihliho, captured five guns and ammunition wagons belonging to the enemy.

In all, the Left army captured twenty-five guns and five ammunition wagons. The Left army removed its entire reserve and a body of artillery to the neighborhood of Kushutz'. A portion of these troops dislodged the enemy from Pankiatien, and is now coöperating with the right wing of the left column in advancing to the attack.

"The number of field guns and ammunition wagons captured by the Central army, last reported as eight, should be corrected to eleven. In addition, the army took 150 Russian prisoners.

A GENERAL ADVANCE.—"The operations on October 13th were as follows:

"The enemy in the direction of Penchihu, having been repeatedly repulsed, showed signs of retreating from about 5 P. M. yesterday. Our army in this direction assumed the offensive from early this morning, but further particulars are not yet to hand. Prior to this a large body of Japanese cavalry, commanded by H. I. H. Prince Kan-in, outflanked the enemy from his left and put his reserves to flight. This action did much to



improve the situation. The troopers were to advance to the rear of the enemy.

"The right column of the Right army is attacking the enemy at Chaohsienling. The central column occupied the range of heights at Lienhwashan and Maerhshan, and the right wing of the left column is attacking the remnants of the enemy's force which had been in possession of the heights north of Shaotakeu. The nature of the ground has prevented the operations of the Right army from progressing as desired.

"The right column of the Central army at about 10 A. M. began to advance to the attack on the heights north of Hukai and Kukiatsz'. The Russian artillery at those positions seems to have commenced retreating at 2 P. M.

"The right column of the Left army occupied Pankiaopao on the morning of the 13th, and its advance guards reached Pakiatsz'. The column was then reinforced by the reserves and is now attacking the enemy's force, about a division strong, in the neighborhood of Huanghwatien. Particulars of the battle are not yet to hand. Meanwhile, several batteries of Russian artillery at Chienhwanghwatien offered a stubborn resistance. A portion of our reserves is attacking this position, and the fight is progressing favorably. The pursuing troops of the central column have already occupied Liusankiatsz' and are now pursuing the enemy towards Kowsuitun (?).

"The right wing of the left column is attacking the enemy at Hunglingpao. Since the last report was dispatched the right column of the Right army has been engaging a superior Russian force at Chaohsienling, but the situation in this direction is turning advantageously for our army, owing to the arrival of reinforcements.

THE HEIGHTS OF MAERHSHAN AND LIENHWASHAN CARRIED.  
—"The central column of the same army has carried Lienhwashan, Maerhshan, and neighborhood, and is now attacking a strong force of the enemy. The right wing of the left column, after a hard-fought battle, succeeded in occupying one of the

enemy's important positions on the heights north of Shaotakeu. The aggressive operations of the Central Army have progressed satisfactorily.

MANGKIAFEN, HUKAI, AND KUKIATZS' OCCUPIED.—“Mangkiafen, Hukai, and the heights north of Kukiatsz' being occupied.

“The central and right columns of the Left army are attacking Shahopao and Huanghwatien, respectively.

MANKIAYUENTSZ' CARRIED.—“Towards sunset, the right wing of the left column attacked Linshanpao, and a portion of its troops succeeded in carrying Mankiayuentz', while the left wing also occupied the line extending from Hohlintun to Fukiachwang.

“Fresh reinforcements are constantly arriving at Yentai and neighborhood. The casualties sustained by the central column of the Left army on the 12th were 1 officer killed, 6 officers wounded, and from 300 to 400 casualties among non-commissioned officers and men.

“On October 14th another column of reinforcements for the Right army arrived in the neighborhood of Kiaoteu early in the morning. The column commanded by H. I. H. Major-General Prince Kan-in has been fighting with the enemy in the neighborhood of Wolungtsun on the left bank of the Taitzsho since dawn. The enemy who attacked us between Penchihu and Tumentszling began to retreat at about 11 A. M. The Penchihu detachment advanced in pursuit.

“The right column of the Right army received reinforcements on the night of the 13th, and since then has firmly maintained the positions on Chaohsienling against a superior force of the enemy. The left column took possession of Lienhwashan and the range of heights to its north at about 7 A. M. The central column occupied the neighborhood of the heights northeast of Kaoshantun, which is to the northeast of Kinkingshan, during the night of the 13th; while the first line of the left column seems to have occupied the heights of Sikeushan at about 9 A. M. to-day. In short, the situation in the direction of the Right army became decidedly favorable to us this morning.

The Central army this morning occupied the heights north of the line connecting Tungshankow and Hukai and Kukaitz' and is advancing to the attack.

"Though definite reports from the Left army are not yet to hand, the main force of the right column seems to have occupied the heights northeast of Huanghwatien this morning at 11 o'clock.

TEN GUNS CAPTURED.—"The central column, at about 7 A. M., took possession of the heights south of Shahopao, and a detachment from the column attacked the Russian force at Kankiawotsz' and captured ten guns. The enemy fled north-eastwards in great confusion.

"This morning about five companies of Russian infantry took up their position between Lushengpao and Talientun, while another company occupied Madaijintun. The left column is attacking this force of the enemy. This morning about two battalions of Russian infantry and a battery of artillery delivered a counter-attack on a portion of the left column at Wankia-yuentsz', but were repulsed.

RUSSIAN ADVANCE REPULSED.—"On the afternoon of October 14th the enemy in the neighborhood of Tumentszling and Taling, facing our Penchihu detachment in the right of our army, having found it impossible to resist our attack, commenced to show signs of retreat. Thereupon the commander of the Right army ordered the detachment to pursue the enemy closely in northern and eastern directions. The detachment at once divided its forces into two columns and hotly pursued the retreating Russians. Driving the enemy before it, the detachment advanced as far as the Pingtaitz' and Hiataho districts. The enemy halted in the neighborhood of Peinniulupaotsz' and began to construct defense works.

"The right column of the Right army facing the enemy near Chaohsienling, discovering in the afternoon that the enemy's forces in its front showed signs of retreat, at once commenced operations to pursue the enemy, and advanced in the direction

of Taikiatao. The central and left columns, in coöperation with the right column, also attacked the Russians in the neighborhood of Sikeushan, and reached the line of the Sha-ho. The enemy facing the left column consisted of about one division. He retreated in a disorderly condition in the direction of Fengshupao, while his artillery still occupies a position near Tashan and is firing on us. A detachment of our reserves, which, after driving off a small number of the enemy, has been in occupation of Waiteushan since this morning, discovered, at about 3 p. m., that a column of the enemy's transport was retreating and immediately pursued it. The detachment also sent a body of troops to Shuangshutsuitsz'.

"The Central army attacked the enemy occupying positions near Changlingtsz', Putsaowo, and Tungkiafen since this morning, and has finally succeeded in reaching the line of the Sha-ho by driving the enemy to the north of the river.

HWANGHWATIEN, LINSHENGAO, AND HEIGHTS SOUTH OF SHAHOPAO OCCUPIED.—"The main body of the right column of the Left army, which had been dispatched in the direction of Hwanghwatien, carried the enemy's position at that point at 1 p. m., while in the afternoon the central column also occupied the heights held by the Russians south of Shahopao.

"A detachment from the central column which had been sent to Linshengpao, acted in coöperation with a part of the left column, and, after fierce fighting, occupied the place at 4 p. m. It is now in pursuit of the enemy.

"The Russians at Linshengpao consisted of one regiment of infantry and more than two batteries of artillery. They retreated to Szefantai, where they made a halt.

"A detachment from the central column is pursuing the enemy in the direction of Liumutun.

"At about 2:20 p. m. the enemy in the direction of the left column near Changlingpao began to be reinforced. When his number had been sufficiently increased he delivered repeated counter-attacks on us, but was repulsed.

“The Russians encountered by the left column consisted of four regiments of infantry and about ten batteries of artillery. To sum up, by continuous fighting from October 10th to the 14th we have succeeded in defeating superior forces of the enemy in every direction and in pursuing him most resolutely, finally pressing him hard on the left bank of the Hun-ho and inflicting on him heavy damages. More than thirty guns have been captured, and several hundred prisoners have fallen into our hands.

“The enemy’s plan of war has completely failed, and his offensive movement has been utterly broken. The Russian dead left on the field are so numerous that their number has not yet been ascertained. It is also impossible at present to calculate exactly the total losses of the enemy, owing to the continuance of the battle; but it is believed that the number exceeds 30,000. The spoils, besides the thirty-six guns, mentioned above, consist of an inestimable number of ammunition wagons and rifles.

Of the Russian dead left on the field in consequence of the engagements from the 10th to the 13th, those already buried by our army exceed 2,000; besides, a large number of Russian dead was also left on the field during the engagement of the 14th.

“Another hundred prisoners have been captured since last report.

FURTHER OPERATIONS.—“On October 15th the main force of the Right army had already occupied the heights of Chou-kiafen, thus reaching the line of the Sha-ho. But the enemy’s force, about a division strong, is still offering a stubborn resistance at Sanjotszshan (?). The Central army, having already reached the pre-arranged line, it has not been engaged in any serious fighting since this morning.

“The enemy in front of the Left army remained this morning in the north of Shahopao and at Lamatun, and has offered a stubborn resistance. The right column of the Left army, therefore, is now engaged in the occupation of Shahopao, while the greater portion of the left column is advancing to the attack of the enemy at Lamatun.

"The enemy has stationed about six batteries of artillery between Shahopao and Szefangtai, and is furiously bombarding our attacking force, as well as on Linshengpao; but his force is insufficient to impede our advance.

"The number of Russian dead counted up to the present on the fields covered by our three armies since the 10th instant has reached a total of 8,550. The foregoing figures do not include those left on the scenes of the fierce fight which our Left army had with the enemy on the 14th and 15th instant. The number of our casualties will be sent as soon as the investigation is complete.

"The enemy on the Sha-ho in front of the Left army and at Lamatun has offered a stubborn resistance, but their positions were taken by our army towards the evening (15th).

"This afternoon a Russian detachment put in an appearance at Houlitajentun on the left wing of the Left army, but was speedily driven off by one of our detachments.

"A force of Russian cavalry at Santaokangtsz' continued its resistance, even after sunset. A portion of the Central army, coöperating with a portion of the Left army, is now endeavoring to dislodge the force from its position.

"On October 16th quiet reigned along the front of the Right and Central armies. Severe cannonading is, however, heard in the front of the Left army. The enemy in the direction of Lita-jentnu does not show much activity.

"The troops commanded by Major-General Yamada captured one gun and two ammunition wagons during the attack on the heights in the vicinity of Santaokangtsz' last night.

**RUSSIAN CASUALTIES IN FRONT OF THE RIGHT ARMY.**—"The enemy's casualties in the field of operations of the Right army are, according to investigations made up to the the 15th, as follows:

"The number of Russian dead left on the field in the direction of the Penchihu detachment is 350 on the left bank of the Taitzsho, 1,500 in front of Penchihu, 300 at Taling Pass, 200

in the neighborhood of Tumentszling in the direction of the right column, 600 in the neighborhood of Koinkoku and in the north of Tumentszling, 300 in the vicinity of Chientao, 150 in the vicinity of Wumingsz' north of Panlashan, and 300 in the northern neighborhood of Shaotakeu in the direction of the left column. The enemy's corpses left on the field thus totaled 4,500 in the regions covered by the Right army. There are besides numerous dead bodies left in places not mentioned, the number of which has not yet been ascertained. The enemy's casualties in front of the Central and Left armies are under investigation.

"During the five days from the 10th to the 14th instant the Left army sustained 3,500 casualties in officers and men, in killed and wounded. The number of Russian corpses buried by the Left army during the four days from the 10th to the 13th instant reached 2,000. Large numbers of dead bodies were also left on the field by the enemy on the 14th.

"On October 17th the situation was as follows:

"The portion of the Right army in occupation of the line extending from Upper Pingtaitsz' to Taikiayu was attacked by about a regiment of Russian infantry, who, however, at about 9:30 A. M., were repulsed and driven northward by our counter-attack. The enemy in the direction of Waiteushan seems still to hold his positions, but the situation is not clear. Otherwise there is no visible change in front of the Right and Central armies.

JAPANESE DISASTER, WITH LOSS OF FOURTEEN GUNS.—  
"Last evening a mixed detachment under Major-General Yamada, coöperating with the right wing of the Left army, attacked the enemy to the north of Shahopao, in order to assist the operations of a detachment of the Left army. General Yamada first drove off the enemy in the neighborhood of Weikialoutsz', and captured two Russian guns and ammunition wagons. The detachment then deployed towards Santaokangtsz', and discharged its mission successfully by driving back the enemy.

After sunset, at about 7 P. M., when this force was retiring to its former positions under cover of darkness, it was fiercely attacked by a Russian force, about a division strong, and both its wings were enveloped. Our troops fought desperately, a fierce hand-to-hand struggle ensuing. Though the enemy's frontal attack was repulsed, his assaults from both flanks were irresistible, so that our companies had individually to fight their way through the enemy's line in order to return to their original positions. In the meantime our artillery, having lost the majority of its men and horses on account of the enemy's terrific fire had to abandon nine field guns and five mountain guns.

"The enemy opposing our Left army still holds his position of yesterday, and intermittent fire continued until sunset. He has been conspicuously reinforced, especially in front of the Central army, and on our left he has nearly the strength of a mixed brigade. Our casualties in the various engagements will reach 1,000.

"During the night of the 17th the enemy twice delivered vigorous frontal counter-attacks on the right column of the Left army, and also attacked the Central and Right armies on a smaller scale, but was everywhere repulsed; the Russians retiring, leaving many dead behind.

"On October 18th there was little change in the situation; the enemy, driven off from Penchihu, has mainly retired towards Kaotailing. The enemy in front of the Left army is searching our positions with intermittent fire. The Russians facing our detachment on the extreme left are constructing defense works in the neighborhood of Mentapao, Sankiatsz', and Hungkiatai. On the night of the 18th a force of the enemy attempted to attack the front of the left column of the Left army, but was repulsed."



## CHAPTER XXVI.

Before taking up the subject of the strength of the hostile forces in the battle of the Sha-ho, with its casualties and the spoils of war, the following description by a Japanese correspondent of the fighting of the extreme right of the Japanese army, covering the period from the 1st of October to the 15th, may serve to elucidate several points not covered by the official reports:

“In launching into the great offensive movement at the battle of the Sha-ho, General Kuropatkin seems, according to press dispatches from the front, and to the statements of the officers invalided home, to have descried a weak point in the Japanese defensive position at Penchihu. Not only was the place far away from the main positions of the Right army, which were near Yentai—some twenty miles to the west, but our force there, under the command of Major-General Umezawa, was by no means a strong one. Even this small force was not concentrated at Penchihu. Its main force was encamped at a place called Pingtaitz’, north of Penchihu. The latter place, with important military stores, was defended by a few companies of infantry. Another headquarters of military supply in this direction was Kiaoteu, on the left bank of the Taitz-ho, and its garrison was also a few companies strong.

“General Kuropatkin, therefore, organized a great turning movement, with a view to carrying Penchihu and Kiaoteu, and then advancing on Liaoyang. The Russian force opposing our Right army consisted of ten divisions, the greater portion of which were directed to Penchihu. Lieutenant-General Renenkamp, with a division of Russian cavalry, headed the movement and crossed the Taitz-ho; General Stackelburg, of Teh-

liz' fame, was the commander of the force attacking Penchihu; General Kuropatkin was also advancing south along the railway.

"Indications of Russian activity on our right became palpable from about October 2d, but at first did not amount to more than the Russian scouts coming in contact with our advanced positions in the direction of Pingtaitsz', which were guarded by a larger force than usual.

"Day by day the Russian scouts were observed more frequently, and on the 6th the enemy's force in our front suddenly increased to formidable numbers. At the same time the general headquarters of the Manchurian armies were informed that all the Russians who had been encamped on the north bank of the Hun-ho between Mukden and Fushun had crossed the river on the 3d and 4th. There was no room for doubt as to the Russian intentions.

"Presumably acting under instructions from Marshal Marquis Oyama, General Kuroki ordered the Right army, on the night of the 6th, to take up its positions on Taling, Tumentszling, Chaohsienling, the heights east of Pakiatsz', and the heights north of the Yentai coal mine. These positions form the range of heights on the northern side of the road running from Penchihu to the coal mine in a northwesterly direction. Tumentszling is about midway, and the main force of the Right army was on the west of that place, whither the force under Major-General Umezawa at Pingtaitsz' was ordered to fall back. Unavoidably our force east of Tumentszling was very weak in numbers.

"During the daytime on the 7th, however, the Umezawa troops were in danger of being shadowed by the enemy, should they retire as ordered; so they waited for nightfall, when they effected their retreat successfully under cover of the darkness. The rest of the Right army also took up their appointed positions before daybreak on the 8th, when the battle was opened. On this day the enemy was also busily engaged in pushing to the south. The Russian force, which passed Pingtaitsz', was a mixed brigade of mounted infantry, two rifle divisions of the

Third Siberian Army Corps, three divisions of the Third Siberian Army Corps, and the rest were following.

"The enemy passed Shihkiaotsz', and a portion of them, consisting of some three battalions of infantry, 1,000 cavalry with several guns, appeared in front of our positions in the east of Penchihu, which were, as stated above, defended by only a few companies of infantry.

"A conflict between the defenders and the assaulting Russians continued from 1 to 3 P. M. of the 8th, and when the fighting ceased all of our outposts were withdrawn to our main positions. The Russians, however, did not renew the attack during that day; their movements were now directed to the crossing of the Taitzsho. It seemed as if they held the Japanese in utter contempt. During that day they gathered wood and lighted fires on the bank of the river, warming themselves in quite a leisurely manner. We could clearly see the almost naked Russians moving to and fro. Had our troops possessed either field or mountain guns these Russians would have been subjected to a cross-fire; but as it was they had neither, and the range was too great for their rifles. They stamped on the ground with mortification.

"A force of the enemy also appeared in front of the Umezawa troops, but did not open an attack. Meanwhile our troops were assiduously throwing up entrenchments.

"General Umezewa, who was then near Tumentintz', seeing that the Penchihu garrison was in a difficult position, sent a number of battalions, under a colonel with two guns, to its relief.

"The 9th was the worst day for our troops during the battle of the Sha-ho. The enemy attacked our positions from early dawn till evening without intermission. The Russian force opposing the Umezewa troops consisted of a mixed brigade on the left bank of the Taitzsho, a division attacking Penchihu, and a brigade, each attacking Taling and Tumentszling.

“After a brief artillery duel, the Russian troops were hurled against our positions *en masse*. Their assaults were so fierce and stubborn that even our soldiers could not help admiring the foe. Our positions were maintained more by reason of the nature of the ground than by the force of our troops. A mountain which the Japanese named Kabuto-yama was one of our positions north of of Penchihu. Its front was so steep and rugged that the Russians, infuriated as they were, could not easily find a way up the precipice. About two regiments of Russian infantry thronged the foot of the height and searched for a way to reach the position. Meanwhile the Russian batteries hailed shells on our trenches. They blew up rocks, smashed parapets, and scattered death all about. Some 300 Russians worked their way up to the right flank of our troops, and gallantly charged forward. The infantry in the trenches did not open fire until the foe was within fifty metres distance; then they poured in a heavy fusillade; most of the Russians were shot, and they tumbled down the precipice. Those who survived numbered only about fifteen. They fell back to their ranks. But the enemy’s assaults did not end here. Fresh troops attacked the position from every direction, and the gunfire raked our troops and levelled our trenches. And the position at last fell into the enemy’s hands.

“During the day the Cossacks cut the telegraph line near Penchihu. The heights on the right hand of the road leading from Penchihu to Tumentszling were also lost, and the situation was most precarious. Many couriers were sent to the headquarters of the Right army, asking for assistance. But most of these couriers fell *en route*, and the few who returned safe brought back the reply that reinforcements would be sent presently, and that meanwhile the garrison must defend Penchihu to the last.

“During the night, however, the much-needed reinforcements arrived. General Kuroki had ordered almost the whole of his right column to cooperate with General Umezewa’s troops. When the fresh bodies of troops arrived at Penchihu the garrison

there, quite oblivious of the presence of a large force of the enemy within a hundred yards, jumped upon the trenches and shouted 'Banzai!'

"Our troops, availing themselves of the dense fog that occurred on the morning of the 10th, assaulted and carried the heights east of Penchihu by dawn, and those heights on the right of the road from Penchihu to Tumentszling by 11 o'clock. But the much-contested Kabuto-yama was still in the enemy's hands. This time it was the Russians who had the advantage of the nature of the ground. The Japanese had to climb a very steep precipice. The Russians hurled stones and hand-grenades upon our attacking force. Some of the Japanese reached the summit, only to be pushed back at the point of the bayonet. When the Japanese fell back on their original positions the Russians in turn assumed the offensive. Their dead and wounded fell into the valley below in great numbers, and that place was a veritable shambles. Throughout the day and night the fighting was terribly severe. Between Tumentszling and Penchihu, a distance of five miles, the most relentless slaughter was taking place.

"On the 11th both armies fought with unabated violence. The Japanese were determined to assume the offensive, but the issue of the day hung in the balance.

"The enemy had been heavily reinforced, and his forces in our front were six divisions strong, with 20,000 cavalry and 80 guns, some of which were 15-cm. mortars. Moreover, the enemy's force, which had crossed the Taitz-ho on the 5th, recrossed the river with a view to carrying Penchihu by storm. Our troops fought till they were exhausted and sustained severe losses.

"The condition was so critical in this direction that General Kuroki was compelled to order Major-General Matsunaga's troops in his central column to turn the left flank of the enemy at Penchihu. General Matsunaga was then fighting at Hialinhotsz'—far west of Tumentszling. He attempted to proceed

through the valley of Pakiatsz'; but this was impossible during the daytime, owing to the searching fire from the enemy at Lienwashan. So he began his movement on the 11th, and attempted to reach Shihkiaotsz'. The day of the 12th dawned, after three days' continuous fighting.

"Major-General Prince Kan-in's cavalry brigade then made an appearance on the left bank of the Taitz-ho.

"Opposite the river two Russian battalions in close formation were severely attacking the right flank of our Penchihu garrison. Prince Kan-in at once ordered a battery of machine guns to open fire on these two battalions. The Russians were literally mowed down and were completely routed. The cavalry then gave a hot chase, and threatened the rear of the enemy attacking Penchihu. The result was disastrous to the Russians. After that they lost every position they had taken up, and a general flight took place. General Stackelburg beat a retreat.

"On the 13th General Stackelburg fought a defensive battle in the neighborhood of Niushantai. Our right column started on a fierce pursuit on the afternoon of the 14th, and compelled the enemy to fall back on the 15th. By that time Prince Kan-in and his brigade of cavalry had reached Kaokuansai, some distance northeast of Penchihu."

## CHAPTER XXVII.

**STRENGTH OF THE HOSTILE FORCES IN THE BATTLE OF THE SHA-HO.**—In the battle of the Sha-ho the Japanese force consisted of the three armies of Kuroki, Oku, and Nozu; of eight complete divisions, each having in addition one reserve infantry brigade; besides the foregoing there were also two brigades of artillery, two brigades of cavalry, and a mixed brigade of reserves under Major-General Umezawa on the extreme right of the Japanese line, with an aggregate strength of about 200,000 men.

It seems to be a difficult matter to place the exact strength of the Russian Army. Many of the press reports regarding the departure of troops from European Russia on various dates are conflicting and misleading; but it is safe to say that at the beginning of October Kuropatkin had eight army corps in the field. In addition, the Sixth Siberian Army Corps reached Harbin shortly before the battle, and it might have been available—in fact, in the following estimate, issued by the Imperial Japanese headquarters, this Sixth Corps is declared to have been present:

First Siberian Army Corps, Lieutenant-General Stackelberg, of two divisions of East Siberian Rifles (24 battalions) and 8 batteries of artillery.

Second Siberian Army Corps (commander uncertain) of two divisions of Siberian Reserves (24 battalions) and 8 batteries of artillery.

Third Siberian Army Corps, Lieutenant-General Ivanoff, of two divisions of East Siberian Rifles (24 battalions), and 8 batteries of artillery.

Fourth Siberian Army Corps, Lieutenant-General Sarubaieff, of two divisions of Siberian Reserves (32 battalions), and 8 batteries of artillery.

Fifth Siberian Army Corps, Lieutenant-General Danbofsky, of two divisions of reserves (32 battalions) and 12 batteries of artillery.

Sixth Siberian Army Corps, General Zabouf, of two divisions of reserves (32 battalions) and 12 batteries.

Tenth Army Corps, General Seruchensky, of two divisions of reserves (32 battalions) and 14 batteries.

First Army Corps, General Maiendorff, of two divisions of reserves (32 battalions) and 12 batteries.

In addition, there were 2 regiments of Moscow infantry, 4 batteries of artillery of the Second East Siberian Brigade, and 4 batteries of the Fourth Brigade, 5 regiments of field mortars, 5 batteries of horse artillery, 5 of mountain artillery, 1 battery of siege guns, and 1 independent battery of 8 guns; there were also 173 *sotnias* of cavalry; making a total of about 200,000 infantry, 26,000 cavalry, and 950 guns. This is a modest estimate, as it puts the strength of a battalion at only 700 men of all ranks. Therefore, Kuropatkin had nine army corps on the Sha-ho; and assuming the units complete his total force should have been 280,000, whereas the Japanese put it at 226,000, doubtless making large deductions for casualties and incomplete units.

CASUALTIES.—In collating the reports of the Japanese casualties of the different armies on various dates, it is found to be impossible to specify the exact loss in killed and wounded of officers and men in each of the three armies; but on October 26th it was officially announced at the Imperial headquarters that from the various reports received up to October 25th the Japanese casualties were 15,879 in killed and wounded. According to the official reports received, the number of Russian dead left on the field and buried by the Japanese was, in the direction of the Right army 5,200, and in the direction of the Left army 5,603, and in the direction of the Central army 2,530; making a total of 13,333 Russian dead found on the field.



With regard to the total Russian casualties, the Japanese estimate was 60,000, but the Russians themselves put their total casualties at 67,868.

THE SPOILS OF WAR.—An official report from Marshal Marquis Oyama, received at Imperial headquarters October 22d, reads:

“Investigations made up to the present with regard to the spoils of war and other details are: Prisoners captured, about 500; guns captured, 45; ammunition wagons, 37; rifles, 5,474; rifle ammunition, 78,000 rounds; artillery ammunition, 6,920 rounds; swords, 20; shovels, 92; axes, 23; overcoats, 356; portable tents, 85. Besides the above, large numbers of arms and other articles were left by the enemy on the field, the line of which extended more than twenty miles, but the investigations have not yet been completed. The Russian dead (13,333) on the field are now being buried with due honors. It is estimated that the Russian casualties will reach a total of 60,000.”

COMMENTS.—There are two salient points which attract attention in discussing what is known as the battle of the Sha-ho. The first is, that after the Russian retreat from Liaoyang to Mukden, Kuropatkin undoubtedly received positive orders from St. Petersburg that after receiving reinforcements he was to make an offensive movement to the south with the ultimate object of re-occupying Liaoyang, and, driving the Japanese before him, to proceed down the Liaotung Peninsula to the relief of Port Arthur. After a rather bombastic proclamation to his troops in Mukden he proceeded to carry out his proposed plan, and (here is the second salient point) organized a great turning movement on the right of the Japanese line, to attack Penchihu and Kiaoteu, where there were large stores of military supplies; and, having flanked the Japanese right, to swing up the valley of the Taitzsho and re-occupy Liaoyang; his main force coming down the line of the railway from the direction of Mukden.

It was a bold plan, and the flanking movement came very near being successful. Six divisions were sent to turn the Jap

anese right flank, taking the very road that Kuroki's flanking movement had followed during the battle of Liaoyang. They attempted to force back the Japanese at Penchihu, and, crossing the Taitsz-ho there, to move along its left bank towards Liaoyang. In order to aid this enterprise Kuropatkin sent another column, which crossed the river at a point higher up, and succeeded in cutting the Japanese line of communication at Penchihu. The Japanese force thus found itself severed from Kuroki's army, and was also confronted by a powerful body of the enemy advancing through the hills towards Penchihu. It was a perilous situation, but the mixed brigade of Umezawa held its ground stubbornly for twelve hours on October 9th, and in the early morning of the 10th, under cover of a dense fog, recovered all the heights east and north of their main position, which the Russians had captured during the night of the 9th. Reinforcements in meantime arrived from Kuroki, and thus a great danger was averted.

On the morning of October 10th Marshal Oyama assumed the offensive with the armies of Oku and Nozu. His reports received from various parts of the field showed six divisions facing Kuroki, one facing Nozu, and two in front of Oku. He, therefore, arrived at the conclusion that the Russians had not yet carried their full force across the river, and that his wisest move was to assume the offensive.

By the evening of the 11th Oku's and Nozu's armies had pushed northward as far as Pankiaopao and Liutangkeu, the former place being but twenty miles from Mukden. The Russians had contemplated a heavy advance along the main Mukden highway and along the railway route.

On the afternoon of the 9th a strong Russian column began to move southward from Liutangkeu—a force so strong that the Japanese scouts could not discern the rear of the column, though it stretched to a length of five miles. The southward advance of this column seems to have been effectually checked by the offensive movement of the Left and Central armies, and,

as already stated, so far from forcing back the Japanese, the Russians were themselves forced back, so that on the evening of the 11th the battle was raging in the neighborhood of Pan-kiaopao and Liutangkeu.

It will be apparent from the above that while the Japanese right had held its ground at Penchihu on the Taitzsho its left had rolled back the Russians, and the position on the evening of the 11th was, that while the Russian left was endeavoring to effect an outflanking enterprise at a point forty-two miles from Mukden, their right was endeavoring to hold back a Japanese attack at a point only twenty miles from that city.

The presence of Russian troops in the vicinity of Saimachi was known some days before the commencement of the great southward movement from the Hun-ho, and had Kuroki detached a strong body to avert danger in that quarter, Kuropatkin's attack at Penchihu might have been greatly facilitated. But both Oyama and Kuroki knew better to fall into the trap.

By the evening of the 13th the Russians, having originally retreated before the strong attack of Oku's and Nozu's armies, had rallied behind entrenchments, prepared in view of such contingency, and tried to hold the Japanese in the positions they occupied at Hwanghwatien, Shahopao, and the left bank of the Sha-ho.

Before noon of the 14th the Russian flanking column on the immediate north of Penchihu commenced to retreat, and the Japanese moved forward in pursuit. After five days of continuous fighting, the Russian attempt to outflank the Japanese right had signally failed. By the late afternoon of the same day Marshal Oyama reported that the enemy in every part of the field facing the armies of Oku and Nozu had broken and had retreated to the left bank of the Hun-ho, being pushed by the Japanese as far as the Sha-ho. The left column of Oku's army crossed the river, and on the 16th was engaged in a continuous struggle with the Russian right.

Oku's army advanced over a front of fifteen miles, and there was heavy fighting all along the line. But it was too late for the Russians to accomplish anything. They made desperate and gallant efforts to hurl back Oku's extreme left, and they failed as signally as they had done on his right and center.

The Russians were disheartened and commenced to retreat, and in doing so some of their units marched in close order past the positions of the Japanese, who were watching for just this contingency. The Russians were in column, and the Japanese did not fire a shot until the range was reduced to about fifty metres, when they pumped the contents of their magazine rifles into them. About 1,000 Russians were shot down at this point; and if such incidents were repeated in many parts of the field, it becomes easy to comprehend the reason for the enormous Russian casualties.

The Sha-ho is an affluent of the Taitz-ho, and the Taitz-ho in turn is an affluent of the Hun-ho. This latter river is a formidable obstacle. It is larger than the Taitz-ho and second in magnitude to the Liao-ho only. The general course of Hun-ho is southwesterly, but the Sha-ho, though parallel to the Hun-ho, turns to the southeast beyond the town at Shahopao. Hence the Japanese armies, moving with their fronts in approximate alignment, would naturally carry their wings over that river, though their center might still be on the south bank of Shahopao. Oku's left wing, being considerably thrown forward, threatened the railway, the main highway from Shahopao to Mukden, and also the railway bridge; and Kuropatkin strained every nerve to hold him in check. Thus, while the extreme Russian left was at Pienniulupao, some twenty-six miles away from the chief bridge-head on the Hun-ho, their right was only five miles from the same point—a very dangerous position in which to offer battle.

## CHAPTER XXVIII.

After the battle of the Sha-ho the Russian Army retreated to Mukden and Fushun with headquarters at Tashan, throwing up defense lines on the north bank of the Hun-ho; while the Japanese armies moved up close to the south bank of the Hun-ho, with headquarters at Yentai.

On the evening of October 20th about 200 Russian cavalry crossed the Taitz-ho at a point east of Penchihu, and moved in a westerly direction. About two battalions of Russian infantry were in the vicinity of Kaokwansai; and at the rear of this force it was reported that there were some 20,000 of the enemy in the neighborhood of Kaotailing. In the direction of the Central and Left armies the enemy maintains a desultory fire, and is using 15-cm. mortars. Since about 5 p. m. he has been cannonading the vicinity of the Sha-ho railway station from the neighborhood of Szfangtai.

On the 21st the condition in the direction of the various armies remains unaltered. The number of guns captured by the Left army are found to be forty-three, of which twenty-seven were taken by the left column and sixteen by the right column.

A party of scouts discovered some 200 dead Russians in the west of Changliangpao on the night of the 20th.

**OCCUPATION OF WAITENSHAN.**—On the 27th a portion of the Right army attacked the enemy at Waitenshan, who offered a stubborn resistance. Our army occupied the height at 4 p. m. The enemy who defended the position consisted of two battalions of the Eighteenth Regiment of infantry. In the action we captured two machine guns. Afterwards the enemy fiercely bombarded Waitenshan, occupied by our force. The firing continued till 10 a. m. of the 28th and ceased in the afternoon entirely. A large force of the enemy had been concentrated in

the neighborhood of Kantajinshan, and the scouts in the occupation of the fringes of the heights of Pienniuluhpao have totally disappeared.

On the night of November 11th at about 12:30 o'clock the enemy made an attack on the quarter of the army's left wing in front of Wuchentai, but was repulsed. The enemy's force, consisting of 200 infantry and 300 cavalry, that appeared in the direction of Shozaimon, was also repulsed by our garrison. The enemy retreated towards Machuantsz', his casualties being over sixty, while we lost but seven.

On the 15th, at 1:40 A. M., a detachment of the enemy, consisting of infantry and cavalry, with eight guns, fired on our positions at Tsihtaitsz' and Mamakiai. No damage was inflicted on us. Except for this incident, quiet prevails in every direction, and there is no change in the general situation.

At daybreak of the 18th a detachment of the enemy attacked our force near Hinglungtun, but was repulsed.

Since this morning the enemy stationed near Shahopao searched our position with fire from mortars and field guns, but we sustained no damage. As a detachment of the enemy's infantry was gathered near Shiaoyangtsz' our artillery opened fire and routed the enemy, who then fled into the villages of Huanglashetsz' and others to the south on the right bank of the Hun-ho, which were later set on fire by the enemy.

About noon on the 19th the enemy's infantry were seen to be constructing some works east of Liuchiangtun, and to the rear of these troops was another infantry force. Our artillery thereupon opened fire and dispersed the enemy. The situation in other directions remains unchanged.

OCCUPATION OF WEITSZYU.—On the 21st at half-past 6 in the morning a detachment of our forces, which had advanced in the direction of Weitszyu, attacked the enemy, which was bivouacking there, and occupied his position. Later a superior force of the enemy gradually closed in upon the left flank and rear of our detachment, but the latter being reinforced succeeded

at 9:30 A. M. in repulsing the enemy, who retreated towards Tsienholing. The strength of the enemy was some 600 infantry and 300 cavalry, with four guns.

In this engagement the enemy left behind 39 killed and 6 prisoners were captured. The spoils captured were 39 rifles and a large quantity of ammunition, etc.

Our casualties were 1 lieutenant wounded and 28 of rank and file killed and wounded.

At midnight on the 22d of November about 600 Russian infantry attacked Hinglungtun. Our pickets who were stationed there succeeded in returning to the main force after a sustained engagement. The village was completely destroyed by the enemy's bombardment.

At daybreak on the 23d the enemy frequently attempted to surprise us from the Sha-ho railway bridge, Paotsz'yen, and various districts north, but was repulsed.

From about 1 A. M. of the 23d a body of Russian infantry made several attacks on our scouting-line north of Lahmuhtun, but was repulsed each time, finally retreating northward. At the same time the enemy's artillery bombarded the vicinity of the railway bridge on the Sha-ho, firing twenty or thirty shells, but inflicted no damage on us.

From the night of the 25th to the morning of the 26th instant the enemy's infantry detachments attacked our forces in the neighborhood of Hsinglungtang, Fangshin, and Hsiaotankao, but were all repulsed.

About 2 P. M. of the 26th the enemy's artillery occupying the east of Taoshan furiously bombarded the vicinity of Makwangtsz' and Kuchiatsz', but we sustained no damage.

On the right bank of the Hun-ho a detachment of the enemy's cavalry attacked Mamachien on the 25th, but was repulsed by our garrison there. On the 24th the enemy set fire to the village of Shangtsaimen, more than half of which was thus destroyed.

On November 25th a detachment of our army attacked and drove off the enemy from his positions at Chuankialoutsz'. Subsequently, however, a strong column of the enemy's force was observed arriving from the rear, and consequently our force occupied the positions near Makiacheng.

On the morning of the 29th a body of the enemy's troops with artillery put in an appearance in the direction of Sankiatzwan and Liuho, and its strength gradually increased until in the afternoon it reached four battalions of infantry and eight guns. Our detachment, therefore, avoided fighting, and returned to the main positions.

OCCUPATION OF KUKIATSZ'.—On December 3d at 2 A. M. our infantry forced the enemy at Kukiatsz' to retire north, and occupied the village which had been strongly held by the enemy's infantry and machine guns. During the engagement twelve of our men were wounded, the enemy's casualties being about thirty.

Towards evening of the same day the Russian artillery fired on Weitsuhsan, and during that night two or three companies of Russian infantry also attacked that hill, but were repulsed.

On December 6th at about 2 A. M. the Russians at Tawuchanying attacked our outposts at Paotszyen. The latter were compelled to temporarily abandon their positions, but on being subsequently reinforced finally succeeded in recovering them. Two attacks on our positions east of Fangshan and Hohlintun were delivered by the enemy; one at 2 A. M., the other at 4 A. M. of the 7th, but they were repulsed before daybreak of that day.

On December 10th at a little past 2 A. M. a body of the enemy's infantry attacked Peitaitz', but before dawn it was completely driven back to the north. During the afternoon of the same day a Russian battery in the west of Wanpaoshan opened fire on Yaotun and Tangkiapaotsz'; and a battery in the western foot of Tashan bombarded the east of Puchangwo. We, however, sustained no loss.



A force of the enemy's cavalry attacked Mamakai on the right bank of the Hun-ho, but was driven off to the west. The enemy sustained several casualties, but we had none.

On the 17th from 8:30 to 11 p. m. the enemy's troops thrice attacked our outposts in the neighborhood of Santaokang, and at about 2 a. m. of the 18th another body of the enemy attacked Hinglungtun, Tunghotsengkeu, and neighborhood, but we succeeded in repulsing all attacks.

From 2 30 p. m. of the 13th the enemy's heavy guns in the neighborhood of Szufangtai fired some eighty shots on the vicinity of the railway bridge on the Sha-ho, but inflicted no damage on us.


On the 19th at 5 p. m. the enemy's battery in the east of Tashan bombarded the neighborhood of Hinglungtun.

A body of Russian infantry attacked southern Pienniulou-pao on the 20th at 1 a. m. and Tatsz'pao at 4 a. m., but was repulsed each time. About the same time the enemy's infantry attacked Kinshantun, Heilintun, and Huangti.

In the neighborhood Kinshantun fighting lasted for about one hour, but all attacks were repulsed without loss to us.

The reports from the front seem to show that the opposing armies in Manchuria will probably enter on the new year without any battle being fought. Judging from the attitude of the enemy it will be out of the question for him to assume the offensive at present.

The Russians are still engaged in making good the heavy losses occasioned in the battle of the Sha-ho, and it is certain that they have not yet received sufficient reinforcements to take the offensive.



## PART II.

### THE SIEGE OF PORT ARTHUR.

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#### CHAPTER XXIX.

The battle of Nanshan occurred on May 26th and 27th, and the defeated Russians retreated in the direction of Port Arthur. It is evident that as soon as the Russian defeat was known the commander at Dalny received orders to evacuate the place. When the Russians retired from Dalny they fully expected to return, and did not destroy much property, but sank some small vessels near the dock, removed parts of the machinery in the large electric power-house and machine-shops, exploded a mine in one part of the long pier, and left the harbor full of mechanical mines.

The Japanese troops entered Dalny on May 28th, and found a large conflagration in progress in the new town, the railway bridge and tracks destroyed, and not a single Russian in the vicinity. It seems that after the Russian troops had withdrawn, and before the arrival of the Japanese detachments, a party of mounted Chinese bandits had entered the town and burned about fifty of the Russian houses and looted the whole place.

Nankwanling and Liushutun (on the opposite side of the bay from Dalny) were at once occupied by the Japanese forces, and on May 29th they had reached the line of heights about two and one-half miles west of Sanshihlipao. The next day they advanced further, and occupied a line extending from Antsz'shan to Taitz'shan.

The main force of the Russian Army was occupying the line between Shuangtaikeu and Antsz'ling.

For over four months after the engagement at Nanshan the movements and operations of the Japanese army investing Port Arthur were kept a profound secret by the military authorities in Tokyo, and, although many rumors appeared in the foreign press, nothing was authoritatively known until October 8th, when the Imperial headquarters promulgated a detailed report of the operations of the Japanese army from May 26th to July 31st. Meager as it is, it follows below as the only official report:

REPORT OF OPERATIONS FROM MAY 26TH TO JULY 31ST.—

*“May 26th.* The Imperial forces succeeded in taking the enemy’s position on Nanshan after a severe fight lasting all day. The enemy fled toward Port Arthur.

*“May 27th.* A detachment under Major-General Nakamura advanced and occupied Nankwanling. The main strength of the army was quartered in the villages near Nanshan, and preparations for an advance was made. At about 10 A. M. the enemy in the neighborhood of Sanshihlipao station burned that dépôt, and fled toward Port Arthur.

*“May 28th.* A detachment belonging to the Nakamura force advanced and occupied Liushutun. The forts and some Russian buildings at that place had been destroyed by the Russians, as was also a portion of the pier. At this place we captured four guns, together with a quantity of ammunition, and five covered and forty-one open freight wagons for railroad use.

*“May 29th.* All sections of the army advanced and reached the line of heights about two and one-half miles west of Sanshihlipao.

*“May 30th.* The army further advanced and occupied the line extending from Antsz’shan to Taitz’s-shan. The enemy confronting us was occupying the line Shuangtaikeu-Antsz’-ling.

“The situation at Dalny and Liushutun, reported up to this time was as follows: At Dalny there were store-houses, barracks, etc., in perfect condition to the number of over 100. Both the telegraph office and the railway station were undam-

aged. About 300 open and some 120 covered freight-wagons, 50 lighters, 2,000 tons of coal, and 20,000 sleepers were taken as spoils. All the smaller railway bridges in the neighborhood were found destroyed. The dock and piers were safe, but the large pier had been destroyed and a portion of it was submerged. Near the entrance to the dock a number of small steamers had been sunk. At Liushutun the supports of the pier were destroyed, which, however, can be repaired with timber found there; and the crane belonging to the pier was burned down. The railway between Liushutun and Kinchow sustained no damage.

*“June 1.* The enemy in the direction of Port Arthur still occupies the vicinity of Shuangtaikeu and Fenshuilingtzsz in force. His scouts continue to approach our front and occasionally fire at our outposts. The distance between the outposts of the opposing forces is no more than 1,000 metres. Frequently the enemy's troops, disguised in Chinese clothes, approach our lines and, suddenly producing arms, fire at our outposts. On the whole, it appears that the enemy at Port Arthur is endeavoring to coöperate with the Russian forces in the north, whose movements at present indicate an advance south.

*“June 6th.* The enemy has commenced to construct a great number of defensive works at the northeastern foot of a hill (178 metres high) east of Shishankeu.

*“June 13th.* A strong reconnoitring force of the enemy attacked our position this day, and, after exchanging fire with us, retreated at dusk.

*“June 14th.* Two of the enemy's gun-boats and one battleship appeared off Ohshihtsiao, and after firing about for forty minutes on our positions withdrew to the west.

“On the same day reconnaissances made by us showed that the enemy had constructed some defensive works on Antsz'ling and the heights south of the latter, but none were observed on the heights west of Huangnishangtun and Huangnitasiatun. It was also ascertained from the appearance of the enemy's

dead that his forces in the vicinity of Chakou and Chuchuantz's'keu, respectively, consisted of the Fifth and the Twenty-eighth regiments of sharpshooters.

"*June 18th.* At 4:50 p. m. three of the enemy's vessels and eight destroyers appeared in the vicinity of Siaopingtao, and fired a shot at the left wing of our position. Our squadron immediately engaged the enemy, and after exchanging fire for about half an hour the enemy's vessels withdrew to Port Arthur. The works in the neighborhood of Shuangtaikeu were greatly increased. Some search-lights were also put up, enabling the enemy to observe our positions as well as the neighboring sea.

OCCUPATION OF WAITEUSHAN AND SHUANGTINGSHAN.—

"*June 26th.* The left wing of our right column advanced towards the heights west and south of Pantao, and occupied them after repulsing the enemy there. The left column, having been divided into three forces, the right wing advanced towards the heights east of Lannikiao, and gained possession of them without much resistance. The center advanced toward the heights (368 metres) south of Lannikiao and those north of Huangnishantun, and, after defeating a force of the enemy, delivered an attack at about 1 p. m. on the enemy occupying the former heights. The enemy made an obstinate resistance, but his position was completely captured by us at about 5 p. m.

"The left wing advanced toward Shuangtingshan and occupied it, after dispersing a number of the enemy's troops. Thus, the first line of our army extended from Antsz'shan on the right to Shuangtingshan on the left, through the heights about one kilometer west of Pantao, and those east and south of Lannikiao. The occupation of the heights (368 metre, hereafter called Kianshan), Waiteushan, and Siaopingtao, not only rendered the protection of Dalny more secure for us, but, by reversing the situation of the hostile forces, gave us greater facilities for observing the position and rear of the enemy. The principal

spoils in these engagements were two 6-cm. quick-firers and about 200 shells.

*“June 30th.* At Shuangtaikeu there was no change in the enemy's position. In the direction of Antsz'ling the enemy's defensive works extended from the southern projection of these heights to the vicinity of the summit of a hill about three kilometers towards the southeast, and in the direction of Laotsoshan there were similar works extending over the heights north and south of Wangkiatun.

THE RUSSIAN ASSAULT ON PANTAO AND HUANGNISHANGTUN.—*“July 3d.* The enemy's condition was unchanged in the direction of the right wing of the right column, while in the direction of the left wing his scouts made frequent appearances and showed signs of activity.

*“In the direction of the right wing of the left column only the scouts of the enemy were to be seen.*

*“In the direction of the center of the left column, between 1 and 2 P. M., about eight guns of the enemy appeared south of Wangkiatun, while his infantry, at least two companies strong, attacked our position in the direction of Kenzan and exchanged fire with the majority of our infantry, holding the place. About 4:30 P. M. the enemy's force confronting a portion of our troops, above mentioned, having been reinforced, took the offensive but was repulsed by the joint coöperation of our infantry, artillery, and machine-gun corps in the first line.*

*“At 5:20 P. M. four guns of the enemy took up a position in the neighborhood of the heights west of Tashihtung, and shelled the first line of our central body. All of the enemy's force facing the whole of our line gradually retired toward Tapaishan about 7 P. M., leaving behind only the artillery, which still maintained its position.*

*“At 8:30 P. M. about a battalion of the enemy's troops advanced, with band playing, from the direction of Tapaishan, but retreated, being surprised by the war-cries raised by our troops of the first line, who, leaving small portions behind for the pro-*

tection of both flanks of their position, made a counter-attack on the enemy. The enemy's force assaulting the central body consisted of some two battalions of infantry, about twelve field and machine guns, and spent the night in the line extending from the range of heights east of Tapaishan to the heights north-east of Wangkiatun.

"In the direction of the left wing of our left column our outposts on the range of heights north of Laotsoshan noticed, at 5:30 A. M., signs of the enemy's advance, and at 6 o'clock about two sub-divisions of the enemy's troops appeared on a 195-metre height and another sub-division on the elevation near the 127-metre height. Fire was then exchanged between the two opposing forces. During the interval from 1 to 2 P. M. the enemy's troops were gradually reinforced, so that our outposts returned to the main position. At 3:50 P. M. about two sub-divisions of Russians began to advance in close order down the valley north of Laotsoshan. They were, however, heavily fired on by our guns in the neighborhood of the 312-metre elevation, and retired in confusion. At 6:30 P. M. a battalion of the hostile force deployed on the heights south of Laotsoshan, and opened fire. At 6:45 P. M. at least four guns of the enemy appeared in the valley north of Laotsoshan, and poured a galling fire on our left wing. Our artillery returned the fire and finally succeeded in silencing them. During the night the enemy firmly retained the positions held by him during the day.

"*July 4th.* In the direction of our right column at 5 A. M. a company of Russian infantry appeared on the heights about 1,000 metres north of Chakeu, and fired on our reconnoitring forces at Wuchayingtsz' and further north, which returned the fire. At 9 A. M. some two companies of Russian infantry, advancing from Chakeutsun, occupied an eminence about 2,000 metres south of the latter, and opened fire on the left of our position. At the same time another company on the heights north of Chakeutsun also heavily fired on our position on the heights west of Pantao, our troops replying. A severe rifle



duel ensued. At 9:40 A. M. the artillery belonging to the right wing of our left column shelled the enemy's troops on the elevation south of Chakeu, but the latter took shelter behind the ridge and did not advance. Night fell on these conditions.

"A small body of the enemy's troops attacked our positions west of Pantao from the direction of Mufchengyi and Nankeu, but was at once repulsed.

"In the direction of the right wing of the left column, at 7 A. M. a company of Russians troops appeared on the heights east of Nanchakeu and another on those about 1,500 metres south-east of the latter, and commenced to throw up entrenchments. Thereupon a battalion (less one battery) of our artillery poured a heavy fire on those troops, who immediately sheltered themselves behind the ridges. At the same time four guns of the enemy opened fire upon our artillery, which, however, moving to a sheltered position, devoted itself to the bombardment of the enemy's infantry. The situation was unchanged when night fell. The enemy in front during the day was not more than a battalion strong, while his artillery at Antsz'ling consisted of at least four new-pattern quick-firing guns and six old-pattern.

"In the direction of the central body of our left column, from 1 to 2 A. M., a company or two of the Russians twice attempted to charge Kienshan (Kenzan), but were repulsed each time. At 6 A. M. a battalion of the enemy's forces assumed the offensive against Kienshan and the left of our position—namely, the heights about 3,000 metres southeast of Kienshan. Their advance was, however, checked by the rapid fire of our infantry and artillery. Meanwhile some eight guns of the enemy in the valley west of Wangkiatun opened fire on our troops. By 7 A. M. the enemy in this direction was increased to about three battalions, and, deploying at a distance of from 800 to 1,000 metres in front of our defense-line, exchanged fire with the men of our first line. The Russian guns heavily bombarded Kienshan and our artillery, from the position held by them during the previous day. At 7:30 A. M. about two companies of Russian

infantry came forward from the direction of Tashihtung, and our reserves were therefore ordered to advance on the western part of Chuchuantzsz'keu at 8 A. M. Prior to 11 A. M. the enemy repeatedly attempted to advance, but in vain, owing to the fierce rifle-fire from our troops. At noon the enemy's force in our front reached about seven and one-half battalions, and in addition another regiment was in the west of Kienshan. At 1:20 P. M. the two batteries of our artillery, which had been stationed at the eastern foot of Kienshan, changed their positions to the heights 1,500 metres southwest of western Chuchuantzsz'keu in order to avoid the fire of the enemy's infantry. At 3:50 P. M. the Russian artillery again opened a severe fire on Kienshan, and his infantry made strenuous efforts to advance, but the strong resistance of our troops defending the mountain rendered the enemy's efforts fruitless. The effective range of the fire of the enemy's artillery placed in the southwest of Wangkiatun on the heights east of Mäoteuku and at the southern side of Antsz'ling reached 6,000 metres, and the accuracy of their fire and the careful setting of time-fuses placed our artillery in a difficult position, and even our skirmishers could barely retain their positions on the heights. Moreover, the enemy's force in front of our center increased to about ten battalions of infantry, and the enemy's warships, appearing in the offing, fired at our left wing. Our situation was critical. At 6 P. M., therefore, our reserve infantry was advanced to the neighborhood of Chungkiatun and placed under the commander of the left column. Again, three batteries of our heavy guns, which had just arrived on the scene, were advanced to the neighborhood of Pantao, and two batteries to the east of Huangnishangtun, where they took up positions to assist our center. Our naval guns also participated in the fight, taking up their positions near the mouth of the Nansha-ho. During the night the enemy remained on the ground, and the firing continued all night. At 11 P. M. an unknown force of the enemy's troops attacked Kienshan, but were repulsed.

“In the direction of the left wing of the left column, at about 6 A. M., our guns opened fire on the Russian artillery positions in the valley north of Laotsoshan. After replying twice or thrice, the enemy was silenced. His infantry, however, deployed on the ridge of heights on the north of Laotsoshan, and severely fired on our first line of battle. At 11:30 A. M. about a battalion of Russian infantry proceeded from the west toward Laotsoshan whereupon we reinforced the first line of battle with our reserves. About 2 P. M. the enemy's force was greatly increased, and the fighting became remarkably severe. At 5 P. M. the enemy's artillery on the northern side of Laotsoshan opened fire, and the artillery and rifle conflict became very fierce. At 5 P. M. the enemy's war-ships appeared in the neighboring sea and fired on our positions, greatly embarrassing our troops. The enemy's infantry, however, made no attempt to descend from the hills and advance. The enemy's force was about three battalions.

“*July 5th.* In the direction of the right column at 2:30 A. M. the enemy's infantry began to advance from his positions of the previous day, and approached to a point fifty metres in front of our positions on the heights west of Pantao, but were repulsed by our troops. At day-break the enemy again attempted to attack our positions, but could not effect his purpose. At 8 A. M. the enemy's fire relaxed, and at 9 A. M. he began gradually to retreat. For a time his troops occasionally appeared at Pienshihpengtsz and on the heights northeast of Koukeu, but after 1 P. M. they totally disappeared.

“Nothing worthy of mention occurred in the direction of the right wing of the left column, but in the direction of the center of this column at 2:30 A. M. a body of Russian infantry attacked the forefront and flanks of our two companies of infantry defending Kienshan. Our troops engaged the enemy in a hand-to-hand conflict, and succeeded in repulsing him. At 6:30 A. M. the enemy began to retreat, and at 10 A. M. a portion of his troops halted at the heights of Tapaishan and began to construct defensive works, while the main portion of his force

retired westwards. At 11:30 A. M. a section of a company of our infantry proceeded to recover the old position of our pickets on the outpost-line, when it was subjected to the cross-fire of the enemy. The commander of the sub-division was wounded, and our troops returned without attaining their object. At 10:40 A. M. the enemy's artillery on the heights south of Wangkiatun opened fire on our first line of battle, especially on Kien-shan. The firing lasted for one hour, but afterwards the enemy fired at our positions in a desultory manner.

"In the direction of the left wing of the left column from early morning the main body of the enemy near Laotsoshan seemed to have retired, his scouts only being visible on the heights of the above place, but he was observed to be constructing entrenchments on the high land east of Tapaishan. At 11 A. M. five or six of the enemy's warships appeared off Lungwangtun, and occasionally fired on our positions at Shuangtingshan and Huangnishangtun-tasiatun until 6 P. M. Under these circumstances our army maintained its old positions—that is to say, the right wing of our right column held the line from near Antsz'-shan to the heights on the south of Wangkiatun. Its left wing occupied the line from near the south of the southern highlands of Wangkiatun to the neighborhood of Pantao. Our center held the line from the heights on the southeast of Pantao to a point about 2,000 metres southeast of Lannikiao. The right wing of our left column occupied the line from the highlands about 3,000 metres south of Lannikiao *via* Kienshan and Huangni-shangtun as far as Shuangtingshan. The enemy was posted along a line from near Shuangtaikeu *via* the highlands on the northeast of Weipingkeu and those on the east of Antsz'ling and Maoteuku to Tapaishan.

"The movements of the enemy during the above three days were not of a merely reconnoitring or menacing purpose. It would appear that his plan was to recover Kienshan, which had been taken by us, and which was essential to strengthen his line of defenses, and, further, he hoped to inflict damages on our

various works at Dalny, so as to prolong the life of Port Arthur. The experiences gained by our army as to the efficiency of the enemy's artillery, his manner of using it, his disposition for attack, and his methods of making night attacks, will be of great service to us in the future. The enemy's casualties are not accurately known, but report indicates that the enemy lost 300 or 400 men. The enemy's strength consisted of thirteen or fourteen battalions of infantry and twenty-four guns, of which eight seem to have been the newest quick-firers.

*"July 7th.* The enemy in the direction of Antsz'ling was incessantly constructing defense works. During the night a detachment of the enemy attacked our outposts, but was repulsed.

*"July 8th.* The enemy's artillery at Antsz'ling opened fire on the right wing of our left column.

*"July 10th.* Our enemy has placed in position on the heights east of Lannikiao twelve of the guns captured at Nanshan and six heavy naval guns at a point some 1,500 metres west of Chuchuantz's'keu.

*"July 12th.* At about 3 A. M. a company of Russians with machine guns appeared on the left side of our position and attempted to attack us, but was repulsed. During the day the enemy from time to time shelled our position.

*"July 17th.* About a company of Russian infantry appeared at a point 400 metres from the center of our left column, but was repulsed. Subsequently the enemy approached us flying the Red Cross flag, seeking permission to bury his dead, which was granted by us.

*"July 18th.* The enemy's artillery bombarded the left wing of our right column and the right wing of our left column.

*"July 22d.* Our army decided to attack the enemy along the whole line, and orders were issued to that effect.

*"During the night about one company of the enemy's infantry fired upon our outposts near Huangnitasiatun, but was driven off.*

*“July 23d.* A force of our Army was dispatched to selected positions at the center of our right and left columns.

FIGHTING AT SHUANGTAIKEU AND ANTSZ’LING.—*“July 26th.* Our army commenced operations as pre-arranged, but from early morning our movements were impeded by heavy fog. At 7:30 A. M. the attack began. The enemy replied with a heavy artillery fire, which became very severe at about noon, especially from the enemy’s guns on his right wing. Owing to the nature of the ground our artillery was unable to exert its full force, and, though our infantry began to advance at about noon, they encountered stubborn resistance. They, however, succeeded in occupying at dusk the regions near Yingchingtsz, Pienshih-pengtsz, and Tapaishan, passing the night there in battle formation.

*“July 27th.* From 6 A. M. our army resumed the attack. Our artillery first opened fire, and the main body of our right column and center advanced toward the heights about 2,000 metres on the north of Koukeu. The enemy withheld his fire, allowed our infantry to approach, and then poured a deadly fire on them, and as the steepness of the ground rendered it exceedingly difficult to climb, our repeated attacks were unsuccessful. At 3 P. M. our infantry, under cover of our artillery fire, finally succeeded after great difficulty in capturing a part of the heights, but on account of the enemy’s desperate resistance and the heavy fire poured on our flanks from neighboring positions, the whole of the heights could not be captured before sunset. The fighting had been very severe. Our left column attacked the 195-metre hill eastward of Tapaishan, but owing to the nature of the ground and the stubborn resistance of the enemy, the advance of our troops was greatly impeded; several of the enemy’s warships, which appeared near Lungwangtang and heavily bombarding our left wing, being also responsible for the impediment of our movements. At 5 P. M. we again resumed a forward movement, but were unsuccessful. Thereupon, it was decided that a night attack should be delivered, and at 1 A. M. of the 28th

our army attacked the enemy from three sides, with the result that the enemy's position was finally captured at 5 A. M.

*"July 28th.* The attack was resumed at dawn, and the enemy in the various directions, having now almost exhausted his powers of resistance, commenced to retreat at 9 A. M., so that by noon our troops were in possession of all his positions. Our troops pursued the enemy, and at 4 P. M. succeeded in occupying the line from Changlingsz to Yingkoshih, as originally planned. The main force of the enemy seemed to have retreated within the principal line of defense at Port Arthur. The enemy's positions in the neighborhood of Shuangtaikeu, Antsz'ling, and Tapaishan had the advantage of exceedingly steep approaches, and were fortified by semi-permanent defense works, constructed after two months' labor. The Russian force, which defended the position consisted of nearly the whole garrison of Port Arthur, with about sixty guns, of which at least four were heavy ones. According to various reports, the enemy's casualties during the engagements on the 26th, 27th, and 28th, were at least 1,000. We captured two heavy guns, three quick-fire guns, three machine guns and other spoils.

*"July 29th.* The army remained on the captured line. We readjusted the organization of troops, made good our supplies of ammunition, and reconnoitred the enemy in front.


*"July 30th.* Before daybreak the army, taking advantage of the darkness, approached the enemy's position, and commenced an attack at dawn. The right column advanced through the district west of the Port Arthur road, and the central column marched on Kantashan, while the left column, proceeding from a point south of Wangkiatun, attacked the enemy most resolutely. Thus, at 11 A. M. our forces carried a line extending from the heights south of Tuchengtsz to those east of Takushan, causing the enemy to retire to the fortress at Port Arthur. Since then the Russians fired on us merely from the guns mounted in the forts. The enemy left more than 100 dead on the field. At this stage, the Army at once proceeded to invest the fortress.


Our positions were then from about five to three miles from the town of Port Arthur.

“*July 31.* The enemy with his heavy guns shelled our position early the whole day.



LA.





## CHAPTER XXX.

It was not until November 1st that the Imperial headquarters published a detailed report of the operations of the investing army. The official narrative begins with August 1st and ends with October 29th.

On the latter day the Japanese troops succeeded in pushing their attack through tunneled passages on both Tungkikwan-shan and Erhlungshan forts, so as to be able to dynamite the outer embankments of those forts.

It may be remembered that the first extended report, published on October 8th, brought the operations up to the end of July, when the investing army had succeeded in carrying a line extending from the heights south of Tuchengtsz to those east of Takushan, causing the enemy to retire within the fortress of Port Arthur.

Bloody and difficult as were the operations which the investing army had to conduct thus far, still more bloody and difficult was the task that awaited the army after they had driven the enemy inside the last line of defense at Port Arthur. The report which follows is a long record of daily fighting, sometimes along the whole front and sometimes at some particular point; a series of desperate attacks and the resolute repulse of counter-attacks:

REPORT OF OPERATIONS FROM AUGUST 1ST TO OCTOBER 29TH.—“*August 1st and 2d.* The enemy fired on our siege-zone with large caliber and other guns, and his powerful forces occasionally attacked us, but were invariably repulsed.

“*August 6th.* From 4:30 P. M. the enemy was engaged in setting Shuishiyang on fire. For the past few days his troops had been actively constructing defense works on a line extending from the neighborhood of Yutashan (about 3,000 metres north-

west of Shuishiying) to the heights about 1,000 metres northwest of Palichwang *via* the vicinity of an eminence about 500 metres northeast of Shushiying.

"The enemy is still in possession of Takushan and Siaokushan.

TAKUSHAN CAPTURED.—"*August 7th.* As six or eight Russian guns placed at Takushan greatly impede our preparations for attack, the army has decided to first drive off this enemy. Takushan was therefore bombarded by a section of the siege artillery from 4 P. M. and was subsequently attacked by our left wing. The left wing started its movements about 7:30 P. M., and, in spite of the difficult topographical conditions and a heavy storm of wind and rain since sunset, succeeded, after a charge, in occupying the greater portion of the enemy's positions at midnight.

"*August 8th.* Up to this morning the enemy has stubbornly held the remaining portion of his positions. At the same time several Russian warships approached Yenchang and enfiladed our flank, in consequence of which our advance was temporarily checked. In the afternoon the bombardment was resumed by our siege artillery, and at the same time we fired on the enemy's warships, which shortly after fled into the harbor. Subsequently, towards the evening, our infantry made another charge, and at last succeeded in driving off the enemy from the heights. Takushan thus fell into our hands at 8:30 P. M. (the 8th) and Siaokushan at 4:30 A. M. the following day. The enemy is furiously shelling our positions from the forts.

"*August 9th.* At 1:30 P. M. five or six companies of the enemy's infantry attacked Takushan and Siaokushan, a heavy fire being at the same time poured both on our front and rear from various batteries, as well as from the Russian warships appearing off the coast near Yenchang. Our men were placed in a difficult situation, but stubbornly held out till evening, when the enemy was completely repulsed. His bombardment, however, still continued. During the above engagement our

troops were at a time greatly harassed by the continual fire of the enemy's warships on our flank and rear, but subsequently we were fully protected by our naval guns operating against the enemy, as well as by the combined fleet.

BOMBARDMENT OF PORT ARTHUR AND WARSHIPS.—“The results of the bombardment of Port Arthur by our naval guns were effective beyond expectation. For instance, fire broke out in the town about 10 A. M. on the 7th, and the flames were not under control until 1 P. M., while to-day at about 9:40 A. M. our projectiles struck the *Retvisan*, causing great confusion on board that vessel. A steamer (of about 2,000 tons) was also struck and sunk. The enemy concentrated the fire from his batteries and warships on our naval guns, but to no effect.

“*August 10th.* At about 2 A. M. the enemy profusely fired at us for about one hour with his guns, machine guns and rifles, from various forts south of Tungkikwanshan, but it is not known for what reason the firing was done.

IMPERIAL SOLICITUDE FOR SAFETY OF NON-COMBATANTS.—“*August 11th.* In obedience to His Majesty's command, Marshal Yamagata, Chief of the General Staff, dispatched the following message to the commander-in-chief of the Manchurian armies:

“His Majesty the Emperor, out of pure benevolence and goodness, sincerely desires that the non-combatants at Port Arthur may be kept free from the disastrous effects of fire and sword as much as possible. In pursuance of this Imperial wish, you are ordered to escort to Dalny and hand over to the commander of that port such women, children, priests, diplomats of neutral countries, and foreign military attachés at Port Arthur, as may desire to take refuge therefrom.

“Those non-combatants at the stronghold who do not belong to the above category, in so far as so doing may not jeopardize our strategical interests, may similarly be dealt with.’

"August 12th. From about 10 A. M. our forces bombarded with naval guns three of the enemy's battleships in the western harbor.

"August 13th. About one hundred Russians, stationed in the vicinity of Wukiafang, set fire to that place this afternoon, and then retired to Tungkikwanshan. The enemy's bombardment continued as on the previous day.

"August 14th. Our right column commenced operations during the night and attacked the enemy in its front, and succeeded in occupying the line extending from Kantashan to the heights west of Suikiatun *via* the highland north of Siaotungkeu and Suikiatun. But we were unable to maintain the above line, owing to the enemy's stubborn resistance on the heights southwest of Nieupankeu and those east of Siaotungkeu, which were strongly fortified. Our artillery heavily bombarded the enemy till nightfall.

"August 15th. Having advanced quite close to the enemy the previous night, our right column bombarded the enemy this morning, and at about 11 A. M. occupied the heights of Nieupankeu and northeast of Siaotungkeu.

THE ENEMY REFUSES TO SURRENDER.—"August 16th. At 8 A. M. Major Yamaoka was dispatched to a Russian position as our *parlementaire*, and handed to the Russians a note counseling their surrender, while the Imperial wishes were communicated to them at the same time, demanding a reply thereto by 10 A. M. to-morrow.

"August 17th. The enemy's *parlementaire* arrived at one of our positions, and in reply to our communication refused either to deliver the non-combatants or to surrender.

GENERAL ATTACK.—"August 19th. Early in the morning our army opened a general bombardment. The right column attacked the enemy occupying the 174-metre eminence north of Shihpankiao, and succeeded in taking the greater portion of the position by 2:30 P. M. The enemy offered a stubborn resistance, and twice charged our lines, but was repulsed each time. Co-

operating with each other, the central and left columns advanced forward, and passed the night on the line extending from Wukiafang to the western foot of Siaokushan *via* the heights north of Wukiafang and the neighborhood of Wangkiatun.

"*August 20th.* From early in the morning our army resumed the bombardment, and the right column took the 174-metre eminence shortly after midday, and then attacked the enemy in the direction of Itsz'-shan.

"In front of the Panlungshan fort and of the north fort of Tungkikwanshan there were wire entanglements charged with electricity, and beyond this was an endless field of ordinary wire entanglements. The central and left columns endeavored to destroy these obstacles.

"The bombardment by our siege and naval guns during the previous day was very effective, and the Panlungshan fort, the north fort of Tungkikwanshan, and a new fort between them, were almost destroyed.

"*August 21st.* Despite the stubborn resistance offered by the enemy, the right column occupied the line extending from the 120-metre eminence in the southeast of Tapingkeu to the heights north of Latokeu. Before daybreak the central column charged the east fort of Panlungshan, but failed to occupy it, owing to the fierce fire from the enemy's machine guns and to the incompleteness of the destruction of the wire entanglements. The left column destroyed the wire entanglements, and under cover of the darkness of early morning charged the north fort of Tungkikwanshan amid a hail of shots, and occupied an intermediate fort about 200 metres southeast of that fort. But the flank and rear of our troops were severely fired on by the neighboring forts, and, having sustained heavy losses, were compelled to abandon the fort at 9 A. M.

#### THE EAST AND WEST FORTS OF PANLUNGSHAN CAPTURED.

—"August 22d. At 9 A. M. the central column penetrated into the east fort of Panlungshan, and by noon two-thirds of the fort were captured. But the enemy made a stand at the keep and

offered a stubborn resistance. Moreover, our troops were fired on from the flank by the west fort of the same hill, and suffered heavy losses. At this juncture the central column despatched two companies of infantry from its reserve in order to reinforce the first line of battle. These two companies at once grasped the situation, and, finding it necessary to carry the west fort, rushed forward in face of a severe fire. After terrible fighting they captured the fort. The east fort was carried immediately afterwards. During the night the enemy repeatedly attacked the two forts in our occupation, but was repulsed each time.

✓ *“August 23d.* After dark the central and left columns, coöperating, attacked the heights northwest of Wangtai and the north fort of Tungkikwanshan, and a portion of the left column the same night reached the heights northwest of Wangtai, and was subjected in every direction to a fierce fire from the enemy’s machine guns.

“Our troops sustained heavy losses, and retired to the dead-angle at the foot of the hill.

IMPERIAL MESSAGE TO THE ARMY.—*“August 24th.* The central column again attacked the 100-metre height northwest of Wangtai, while the left column attacked the Wangtai fort and the north fort of Tungkikwanshan, but they failed to attain their object.

“To-day His Majesty the Emperor granted the following message to our army:

“We learn that since the opening of the attack on the main positions of the fortress of Port Arthur, you have been pressing hard day and night on the desperate defenders of that stronghold, and that, having captured two forts, you are still pressing forward.

“We are deeply concerned at the great hardships endured by you day by day in the hottest season of the year.

“We sincerely rely upon the bravery and discipline of you, officers and men. We enjoin upon you, officers and men, to conduct your finishing move in such a way as to secure a com-



plete consummation of the success which you have so nearly achieved.'

*August 25th.* General Baron Nogi, the commander of the army, forwarded a reply to the Imperial message as follows:

" 'In the opening battle of the attack on the main positions of Port Arthur we have been able to carry only two forts of the enemy's fortresses. With regard to this humble work your Majesty has been pleased to grant us the gracious message, by which we are deeply impressed.

" 'Your humble subjects, including myself and others, will endeavor, with increased energy, to fulfill your august wishes.'

*August 27th.* From 2 to 4 A. M. the enemy's troops, availing themselves of the thunder-storm, attacked the whole front of our army, and at the same time the enemy's artillery poured a severe fire on our positions. The enemy, however, was repulsed everywhere.

*August 28th.* The enemy's troops were assiduously engaged in the construction of defensive works on Wangtai and neighboring heights. They also mounted heavy guns and field pieces there in order to fire on the two forts occupied by our army.

"To-day His Highness the Crown Prince granted the following message to the army.

" 'I greatly appreciate the valiant operations of the officers and soldiers of your army, who have succeeded in taking a portion of the enemy's stronghold by attacking it with untiring stubbornness through consecutive days and nights.'

"General baron Nogi replied as follows:

" 'In the opening battle of our attack on the main positions of Port Arthur we have only been able to capture a portion of the enemy's fortress. With regard to this humble work, Your Highness has been pleased to grant us a gracious message, by which we are deeply impressed. We will endeavor, with increased vigor, to successfully discharge our military duties.'

*“August 29th.* After this date the enemy’s big guns occasionally bombarded the two forts in our occupation.

*“At 11 P. M. on this date* over 100 hundred of the enemy’s troops assaulted the west fort of Panlungshan. Our troops allowed the enemy to approach near the fort and then opened a severe fire on him. The enemy fled, leaving numerous killed and wounded on the field. Our casualties were extremely light.

*“August 31st.* The day passed quietly along the whole front. The enemy’s troops were still constructing defensive works on Wangtai and the heights to the northwest.

*“September 2d.* The field artillery of the right column and the naval guns poired a heavy fire for demonstrative purposes on the town of Port Arthur, especially on the barracks. The enemy replied by shelling our two forts at Panlungshan, as he had done during the preceding days.

*“September 3d.* The enemy fired some 200 shells at our forts at Panlungshan, destroying a greater portion of our works.

*“September 4th.* The enemy’s bombardment was not so heavy as in the preceding days.

*“September 6th.* At midnight some forty Russian troops assaulted the front of the right wing of the right column, but were driven back by our men. In the direction of the central column about sixty of the enemy’s troops also delivered a midnight attack on our engineer corps, and, though the enemy was finally repulsed, our work in consequence was completely checked. The two forts on Panlungshan were also heavily bombarded to-day, resulting in the demolition of a greater part of the defensive works.

*“September 8th.* The enemy directed a desultory fire on our forts at Panlungshan, and also concentrated the fire from his heavy guns on our sapping operations in various directions. In addition, he made repeated sorties under cover of darkness and attempted to obstruct our works, which were, however, in spite of these attempts, pushed forward without any serious damage being sustained.

PROGRESS OF ENGINEERING WORK.—“*September 9th.* Since the morning the enemy has persistently bombarded us. The tunneled passage leading to the Kuropatkin fort had already reached fifty metres in front of the fort, and the passages towards the Tungkikwanshan fort and the north fort of Tungkikwanshan had reached about 300 or 400 metres.

“*September 11th.* The sapping operations in various directions had progressed more and more satisfactorily, those leading to the forts south of Shuishiying having reached to within about seventy metres in front of the Russian forts.

“The enemy obstructed our works by the fire of his heavy artillery, as on preceding days.

“*September 12th.* At 10 A. M. and again at 2 P. M. about thirty Russians attacked our engineer corps operating against the north fort of Tungkikwanshan, but were driven off with heavy loss. According to the reports from the places of observation at various forts, as well as from the balloon corps, it appears that the enemy at the Tungkikwanshan fort is cutting a tunneled passage towards the east fort of Panlungshan.

“*September 13th.* About 3 A. M. some seventy Russians attacked the right wing of the right column in the neighbourhood of Tapingkeu, but were at once repulsed.

“*September 15th.* About 3 A. M. a small body of the enemy's troops charged our engineers working in the passages leading to the Kuropatkin fort, the forts south of Shuishiying, and a fort southeast of the Erhlungshan fort, but were immediately driven back.

“*September 16th.* About 2:30 A. M. about 100 Russians attacked our channel north of Lungyen, but were forced to retire after a hand-to-hand fight, lasting more than ten minutes. About 3 A. M. some forty Russians made another charge, but were routed by our shell fire.

“*September 18th.* At about 3 A. M. a force of twenty or thirty Russians made a sortie against the head of our approach

leading to the forts south of Shusuiying and threw two explosives, the enemy retiring immediately.

*"September 19th.* At about 1 P. M. our army opened fire with siege and naval guns. From about 6 P. M. our gun-fire was directed against a fort north of Lungyen (Kuropatkin Fort) and the forts south of Shuishiyng, a highland southeast of the 174-metre eminence and the 203-metre height.

KUROPATKIN FORT TAKEN.—*"September 20th.* Since last night the army has been continuously engaged with the enemy, and at dawn took possession of the Kuropatkin fort. Between 9:45 A. M. and 11:45 A. M. the army also occupied the group of four forts in the south of Shuishiyng. At 6 30 P. M. the army took possession of two forts on the highland southeast of the 174-metre eminence and inflicted heavy losses on the retreating enemy. Our troops attacked the fort on 203-metre height from three sides—the east, west, and north. At about 8 P. M. one company of our troops reached the northwestern corner of the height, where our force constructed a base with the object of occupying the whole of the eminence.

*"September 21st.* Having been reinforced by several hundred troops, the enemy on the 203-metre height offered a stubborn resistance, but our troops still maintained their position at the northwestern corner and continuously attacked the enemy, the fighting being of the fiercest description.

*"September 22d.* Our troops occupying the northwestern corner of the 203-metre height fought desperately day and night, throwing explosives with the object of driving the enemy out of the fort. Having found it impossible to maintain their position for a long time, they discontinued operations at about 6 P. M. and returned to their former position.

*"September 25th.* From about 8:30 P. M. the enemy in the forts in the neighborhood of Erhlungshan concentrated his fire upon our tunneled passages to the fort east of Erhlungshan. At the same time about thirty Russians, under cover of the rifle-fire from about 100 of their comrades, made a sortie and encoun-

tered our troops in hand-to-hand fighting, lasting some thirty minutes. The enemy then retired, leaving twenty killed on the spot.

"September 27th. Half an hour after midnight the enemy suddenly opened a galling fire on our passage to the fort north-east of Erhlungshan, but ceased firing at 1:30 A. M., when about twenty Russians made a sortie and threw some explosives into the passage, the enemy retiring immediately. After a lapse of nearly twenty minutes the enemy made another sortie, and after fighting for more than an hour they retired.

"September 28th. From 10 A. M. till 5 P. M. our naval guns fired on the Russian warships in the harbor, and it was distinctly seen that the warships were struck seven or eight times, the crews extinguishing the fire by means of pumps.

"September 30th. To-day the bombardment of the enemy's warships was continued by our naval guns, five or six shells apparently hitting the battleships *Peresviet* and *Pobieda*.

"Last night the battleship *Sevastopol* changed her anchorage to the eastern harbor.

"October 2d. The result of to-day's bombardment by our large calibre and naval guns was also very satisfactory, one of the shells having undoubtedly struck the left side of the turret of the Russian flagship *Peresviet*. Several other shells were also effective. From 7.30 P. M. to about 4 the next morning the enemy advanced to our trench leading to Tungkikwanshan from every side. The fighting was fiercest at about midnight, but our men finally succeeded in driving back the enemy at all points. At about the same time a battalion of Russian infantry assaulted the right of our siege-line, but retired after an hour's exchange of fire.

"October 4th. Fire was poured by our large caliber and naval guns on the enemy's warships, of which the *Poltava*, *Pobieda*, and *Peresviet* were struck several times.

"At 9 P. M. a body of our troops, with the object of demolishing the enemy's 47-mm. quick-firing guns on an elevation

south of Yengchang, surprised the enemy and completely accomplished its object. After having dismantled a quick-firer and a machine gun there, our men retired to their former position at the foot of Takushan. This step was taken because these guns, by their bombardment, had proved no small menace to the passage at our rear. During the same night the enemy repeatedly attacked our trench leading to Erhlungshan.

"October 5th. One of the projectiles fired by our 28-cm. guns, which bombarded the Russian warships, hit the *Poltava*, while the fire of our naval guns (6-inch) told on the large buildings at Laohuwei peninsula, three of which were totally destroyed.

RUSSIAN WARSHIPS SEVERELY DAMAGED.—"October 6th. Two of the shots from our large calibre guns struck the *Poltava* and *Retvisan*. Another shell hit a store in Laohuwei peninsula and set it on fire.

"October 7th. During the bombardment which we maintained on the Russian warships with large calibre guns from October 1st to the 7th, according to a moderate estimate, the battleship *Pobieda* was struck by one shell, the battleship *Retvisan* by four, the battleship *Peresviet* by four, and the *Poltava* by five shells. In addition, these ships were also hit by several shells from our naval guns. The result is that the *Poltava*, *Peresviet*, and *Retvisan* appear to have lost their power of motion.

"On the morning of the 6th instant the crew of the *Poltava* were seen to be landing by means of several Chinese boats, and so were also the crew of the *Retvisan* on the morning of the 7th. It was also noticed at about noon that the *Poltava* was towed into East Harbor. The majority of the other warships have also shifted their anchorage into the East Harbor. Up to date three Russian hospital ships have taken refuge in the West Harbor. The same night one of the enemy's electric lights at Erhlungshan was destroyed by our gun-fire.

"October 9th. During an artillery duel about 4 P. M. some two companies of the enemy descended the 203-metre height,

and were advancing upon Erhlungshan, when they were discovered by our force at Haishushan, who at once opened fire on them. The enemy then withdrew to his former position. During this engagement the enemy removed seven machine guns from the direction of Itsz'-shan to the direction of Erhlungshan. During the night the enemy appeared to have apprehended attacks by us, and from about 8 P. M. opened a random fire from various positions.

*"October 10th.* At about 9 P. M. some fifty Russians made several sorties against the east and west forts of Panlungshan, explosives being thrown into our positions, but the enemy was repulsed each time. The enemy is throwing numerous explosives every night into our trenches directed against Tungkik-wanshan fort, with the object of obstructing our work.

RUSSIAN DESTROYERS COME OUT.—*"October 11th.* At about 3:30 P. M. nine of the enemy's destroyers appeared twice off Yenchang, and, after exchanging fire with our destroyers and land batteries, retired into the harbor. Their appearance is presumed to have been prompted by the desire to observe our dispositions on land.

*"The right wing of the central column picked off fourteen of the enemy's troops in the neighborhood of the railway bridge south of Lungyen. We also captured on the same day over thirty entrenching implements, more than twenty overcoats, a number of rifles, etc., in a crevice east of Erhlungshan.*

*"At 7 P. M. three companies of our infantry from the left wing of the right column attacked the enemy near the railway bridge south of Lungyen. The place was occupied at 8:30 P. M. without serious loss on our side. Our troops then constructed an advanced position at a point 200 metres farther to the front.*

*"October 12th.* During the day our large guns bombarded the enemy's warships, on which nine shots told. One of these shots caused a fire, lasting fifteen minutes, on board one of the ships.

"During the night the enemy in the direction of the left column threw over fifty bombs into our trenches, but the damage was slight. During the day the enemy erected a heliotrope in order to survey our movements, but this we destroyed. The same day several of our men in the central column were wounded by dum-dum bullets fired by the enemy.

"*October 13th.* Three shells fired from our large guns hit the *Peresviet*; one of the shells caused a fire, lasting thirteen minutes. This battleship is presumed to have already lost her fighting capacity.

"As the result of our completely cutting off the enemy's water source at Lungyen, the river-bed, hitherto dry, was covered with water thirty centimeters deep.

"*October 14th.* Thirteen shots from our large calibre guns hit the Sungshushan fort; other forts and the warships were also struck.

HACHIMAKIYAMA TAKEN.—"*October 16th.* Between 4:30 and 5 P. M. the central column, skilfully taking advantage of our gun-fire, rushed into the fort at Hachimaki-yama (a height southeast of Erhlungshan) and into the entrenchments on the sides of Erhlungshan, and occupied them after a short, but fierce fight. The enemy's loss is not exactly known, but the dead bodies left by him on the field are about 100.

"Our spoils consist of a field gun, a small calibre gun, two machine guns, some rifles, and a lot of ammunition.

"*October 17th.* At about half an hour after midnight some fifty of the enemy issued from the south of the 203-metre height, and attacked our troops in the trenches directed against the above height. They retired after throwing explosives into our trenches and exchanging a fierce rifle-fire with our troops. About the same time a force of the enemy of unknown strength attacked us in the direction of Hachimaki-yama and Erhlungshan, but they were all beaten back by our men. Between 10 and 12 P. M. small forces of the enemy twice attacked our troops in the approaches to 203-metre height, but they were also re-



pulsed. Our troops on the Hachimaki-yama were attacked several times by forty or fifty Russians, but drove them off every time. The gorge of the above-mentioned height is still held by the enemy, who is erecting more defensive works there.

SITUATION INSIDE PORT ARTHUR.—“*October 18th.* A Russian soldier, who has surrendered to our Army, has made the following statement:

“‘Port Arthur, being in imminent danger, our superior officers compel the inhabitants, Chinese and otherwise, to work day and night, allowing hardly time for rest. Complaints and bewailings are consequently heard in every direction. We combatants suffer from privation, and for several months have received no pay. We are put to excessive work. I have, therefore, decided to surrender.’

“It is also stated by the prisoners that owing to the increasingly heavy damage caused by our bombardment, General Stoessel has organized a body of 400 determined volunteers out of his troops, and, by promise of decorations and money rewards, is trying to make them attempt sorties in various directions with the object of destroying our guns.

NEARER AND NEARER.—“*October 19th.* The approaches directed on Erhlungshan and the north fort of Tungkikwanshan, having advanced quite close to the enemy’s positions, we are subject to assiduous obstructions from the enemy day and night. Our work is, however, making steady progress.

“*October 21st.* The enemy’s obstruction gradually increases, but our work is steadily progressing.

“*October 22d.* Our work in the approaches to Erhlungshan and Tungkikwanshan continues to receive the enemy’s obstruction. Since last night we have bombarded with our large guns the Russian warships and arsenal.

“*October 23d.* We picked off and killed nine of the enemy moving in the vicinity of Sungshushan. The enemy in the vicinity of Erhlungshan has lately constructed wooden guns, by means of which he discharges explosives against our troops

working in the trenches. Our approaches to the north fort of Tungkikwanshan have reached to within fifty metres of the fort. Our troops are suffering very much from the enemy's obstruction and our work is consequently making little progress.

*"October 24th.* As the result of our bombardment, a fire occurred in the city of Port Arthur at 2 A. M. and was only subdued at 5 A. M. The central column's trenches directed on Erhlungshan have approached to within about fifty meters of that fort, and, although great obstruction is received from the enemy, the work is making good progress. It appears that the enemy has of late been pushing a tunneled passage toward us from the north fort of Tungkikwanshan. At about 9 P. M. he caused an explosion at the head of our sap, but we sustained no casualties. To-night the enemy shot at us two heads of fish torpedoes from Erhlungshan.

*"October 25th.* At 2 P. M. our naval guns fired at and sunk a two-funneled and three-masted ship of over 1,000 tons to the right of Paiyushan.

*"October 26th.* From 8:30 A. M. our large siege and naval guns opened fire mainly on Sungshushan fort, Erhlungshan fort, Tungkikwanshan fort, and the north fort of same name, the forts being struck no less than 250 times. The naval guns also poured an accurate fire on the Sungshushan and Erhlungshan forts. As the result of the bombardment, a breach was made in the parapets of the Erhlungshan fort, the coverings of which were also destroyed to some extent. The coverings of the gorge of the Sungshushan fort was also demolished at two places. Moreover, a 15-cm. Russian gun was dismantled, and another sustained severe damage, and a gun on the north fort of Tungkikwanshan was put out of action.

*"From 2 P. M.* other batteries of our siege guns fired on the enemy's skirmishers' trenches on the glacis in front of Sungshushan and Erhlungshan forts and on the trenches in the south of Hachimaki-yama, and inflicted on the enemy severe losses. At 5 P. M. a portion of our right wing charged the trenches on

Sungshushan and a portion of the center of the trenches on Erhlungshan and in the south of Hachimaki-yama, and occupied them without sustaining any serious losses. No sooner had we occupied these trenches when the enemy concentrated the fire of his batteries, not only of the neighboring forts, but also those on the heights west of Tayangkeu and those on Manteushan, Golden Hill, Paiyushan, Laoluhtszu, and other forts, on our attacking force. The enemy's shots mingled and crashed with those from our batteries, and the scene was for a time terrible beyond description. But the enemy's shells inflicted no material loss on our army. The enemy exploded a large mine laid on the glacis of the Erhlungshan fort, but the result was harmless to our troops. With the object of obstructing the enemy's repairing work, our force during the night bombarded the Erhlungshan, Tungkikwanshan, and the northern foot of the same, and Sungshushan fort, with our siege and naval guns. The enemy's ships and arsenal were also bombarded. The enemy at Sungshushan and Erhlungshan, under cover of their rifle and gunfire, attacked us several times during the night, but was everywhere repulsed.

*“October 27th.* The firing from our large calibre guns was carried out continuously, while our naval guns opened fire on Sungshushan, Itsz'shan, Antsz'shan, Paiyushan, Erhlungshan, the ship-building yard, and warships in the harbor. To mention some of the principal effects of our bombardment to-day—it demolished one of the gun-carriages on Tungkikwanshan; destroyed the infantry banquette extending from the east end to the center of the northern front of Erhlungshan; shattered the coverings; inflicted damage on two light guns, and destroyed one gun in the eastern front of the same fort. Nor was this all; several of our shells hit the southeast corner of the above fort with the result that the coverings were destroyed, as were also two machine guns in the vicinity. A gun mounted at a salient of Erhlungshan fort was dismantled; a 12-cm. Canet gun, facing the middle of our left wing, was damaged, as were also two cov-

ered positions and coverings. The same night our engineer corps, who were working against the north fort of Tungkikwanshan, succeeded in destroying a portion outside the salient of the fort. The enemy obstructed the progress of our sapping operations by means of bombardment (especially during the night), explosives, sorties, etc., and at the same time endeavored to repair those positions of the forts which had been damaged by our gun-fire.

*"October 28th.* The bombardment was continued with large calibre and other siege guns, the result being so satisfactory that the effective hits from the 28-cm. guns alone amounted to 285 in all. Several shells also hit Antsz'shan, Itsz'-shan the fort on 203-metre height, Peiyushan, and Peiyinshan forts. The naval guns fired principally on Sitaiyangkeu, Itsz'-shan, Antsz'shan, the Russian warships in the East Harbor, and the west (new) town of Port Arthur. Of the effects produced by our fire, the following are worthy of special mention:

"The infantry banquette and several buildings within Ehlungshan fort (where the enemy placed sand-bags in a section of the banquette which had been destroyed the preceding day) were destroyed, and considerable damage was also done to the gorge of the fort. At the north fort of Tungkikwanshan an ammunition magazine was exploded, and at the Tungkikwanshan fort a field gun, mounted on the west side of the gorge, was blown off, while at Sungshushan a covered 12-cm. Canet gun and another gun at the gorge were struck by our projectiles. At Itsz'-shan the carriage of a 12-cm. Canet gun was capsized, while another gun-carriage was deviated from its proper position. The covering of the fort on 203-metre height was destroyed at two places, together with some portions of wire entanglement, and entrenchments for sharpshooters. It appears that not a few injuries were inflicted on the guns and buildings in the northern fort at Sitaiyangkeu.

"Fire started in the old town of Port Arthur, and a second fire, lasting three hours, occurred at a manufactory at the base of Golden Hill. During the night the arsenal at Port

Arthur was bombarded, as usual, and we also fired for the purpose of covering our sapping operations.

"October 29th. To-day we resumed firing, and increased the number of shots from each gun. Before daybreak a force of the enemy about 100 in number came out to attack us at the head of our approach to Erhlungshan Fort, but we repulsed them with heavy losses. At the same time a similar force of Russians delivered a fierce attack on our tunneled channel leading to Sungshushan fort. Our troops defended their ground in a most desperate manner, but we were obliged to give up a part of it. At 2 P. M., however, our forces, in coöperation with a body of artillery, recaptured the lost position by a single attack.

"Our approach leading to Erhlungshan Fort reached the outer embankments last night, a portion of which was duly exploded and destroyed by our force.

"The casemates of the outwork in the eastern salient of the north fort of Tungkikwanshan were again twice exploded last night and a big breach was made, killing about a dozen of the enemy in the vicinity.

"Our firing is becoming more and more effective, and the number of effective hits by our 28-cm. guns reached 350 to-day. In addition, immense damage has been inflicted on the forts at Laoluhutz, Itsz'shan, and Peiyinshan, and the intermediate forts. The naval guns were used for firing on Sitayangkeu, Itsz'shan, Antsz'shan, Peiyushan, and Sungshushan. The shells from these guns blew up the magazine at Sitayangkeu. The naval guns also fired on the five mine-removing boats moored along the southern side of the West Harbor, and inflicted heavy damage on three of the boats and caused fire to break out on board two of them. The rest of the siege guns also bombarded from 1 P. M. the entrenchments attached to the forts between the old Chinese wall and the fortress."

## CHAPTER XXXI.

Beginning with October 30th the official reports of the operations of the Japanese army investing Port Arthur were issued from Imperial headquarters either daily or at short intervals; but for convenience the same method will be followed, as in the two preceding chapters:

**GENERAL ATTACK.**—“*October 30th.* Early this morning the army commenced the bombardment with siege guns of large as well as smaller calibre and also with the naval guns.

“From 1 P. M. a general forward movement was made in all directions. The right column and a portion of the central column advanced against Sungshushan, Erhlungshan, and the north fort of Tungkikwanshan, and succeeded by sunset in occupying the crest of their outer parapets, at the same time destroying a number of small defensive works in their outer trenches. Another portion of the central column at 1 P. M. carried the ‘P.’ fort, situated between Panlungshan Fort and the north fort of Tungkikwanshan. In spite of the enemy’s fierce fire, our troops succeeded in occupying the fort by 2 P. M., when they at once began to throw up works for their protection. At night, however, they were attacked by the enemy several times, and at about 10:30 P. M. they had to withdraw from there temporarily.

“P.” FORT CAPTURED.—But Major-General Ichinohe, personally commanding his troops in the trenches, succeeded in recapturing the fort at 11 P. M. The left column advanced against the north fort of Tungkikwanshan and two forts in the vicinity. At about 1 P. M. the column captured by assault one of the enemy’s forts to the northwest of Tungkikwanshan.

**STEADY PROGRESS.**—“*October 31st.* At 5 P. M. the left column charged the north fort of Tungkikwanshan, while a portion

of its troops had already reached the eastern top slope, where defensive works are being constructed. The retention of the 'P.' fort and the fort northwest of Tungkikwanshan occupied yesterday, has become firmly established. Our aggressive operations directed against other forts and batteries are progressing steadily.

"To-day our large calibre and naval guns fired on the harbor and dockyards. Several shots told on the gunboat *Gilyak*, and two steamers were sunk. A fire of large magnitude occurred in the neighborhood of the wharf, and the flames spread rapidly.

"At 8:30 p. m. the enemy attacked the extreme right of our army, but was repulsed at midnight.

"November 1st. Our large guns fired at and sunk two steamers of about 3,500 tons each. Two Russian soldiers surrendered themselves at a point south of Shuishiyang.

"November 2d. To-day sounds of an explosion were heard twice in the vicinity of the northern extremity of the town of Port Arthur, the first at 11 a. m. and the other some ten minutes later. It is presumed that they were due to the blowing up of powder magazines. Our large guns struck and sunk a steamer of about 3,000 tons to-day.

"November 3d. At the 'P.' fort (hereafter called the Ichin-ohé fort) our army captured three field guns, two machine guns, three fish torpedoes, and many other spoils. The Russian dead left at the fort number about forty

"At noon we opened heavy fire with our naval guns on the East Harbor, the dockyard, and other places, with the result that a big conflagration broke out in the neighborhood of the East Harbor fifteen minutes later, which continued until 4 a. m. the following day. The firing from our large guns caused heavy damage to 'H.' fort on the heights about 200 metres northeast of Wangtai hill. The enemy's field guns, mounted on the gorge of the Tungkikwanshan fort, were also hit by our shells, and were greatly damaged.

*"November 6th.* Our large calibre and naval guns fired on the enemy's ammunition storehouse at the northern end of the town of Port Arthur, and set it on fire.

*"At 3:30 p. m.* the powder magazine in the old fort of Sungshushan exploded, having been struck by our shells."

Between November 6th and 19th no official report was received, but reliable reports state that in spite of the apparent inactivity the sapping operations were making steady progress, being favored by fine weather.

On Erhlungshan and Sungshushan the besiegers and the besieged are entrenched at places at a distance of only thirty or forty metres from each other. The line of forts surrounding Port Arthur cover a distance of ten miles, so the magnitude of the Japanese siege operations must be borne in mind.

*"November 19th.* During the afternoon the fire from our naval guns caused the explosion of a powder magazine in Port Arthur near the enemy's arsenal.

*"Our sapping operations and works for attacking the enemy's forts are progressing in accordance with pre-arranged plans."*

There is another hiatus in the official reports, but from reliable sources it is learned that in the attacks on the Sungshushan and Erhlungshan forts on the 17th instant, certain of the outer works were blown up, and that the caponnières and counter-scarps were occupied by the Japanese on the 18th. From the 19th to the 25th nothing is yet officially known as to operations or results.

ANOTHER ASSAULT.—*"November 26th.* The operations for the attack on the forts on Sungshushan and east of the hill having been nearly completed, an assault was made this afternoon, but, owing to the enemy's stubborn resistance, no result has as yet been obtained, and fighting is still going on."

According to reliable reports, the Japanese troops succeeded early in the morning of the 27th, in occupying the counter-scarps of Sungshushan, Erhlungshan, and Tungkikwanshan.



In the attack, the right column was directed on Sungshushan, the central column on Erhlungshan, and the left column on Tungkikwanshan. In addition, an independent force under Major-General Nakamura charged from the neighborhood of Shuishiying, while a force under Major-General Saito pressed hard on the enemy from between the forts in the direction of Erhlungshan.

"*November 29th.* The attack on Sungshushan fort and the other forts to the east of it has thus far resulted in the firm occupation of the outer parapets and their neighborhood. Time is not yet ripe for our troops to force their way into those forts. They are at present engaged in destroying the casemates and other side defense works.

"The force attacking 203-metre height has, by several assaults, succeeded in capturing and holding the enemy's trenches near the crest of the height. The troops are now engaged in completing the occupation of the fort.

203-METRE HEIGHT CAPTURED.—"*November 30th.* A portion of the investing army sallied forth at 10 A. M. from the trenches already taken near the summit of 203-metre height, and attempted to gain possession of the southwest corner of the fort on the hilltop. We commenced cannonading at dawn, and up till 4 P. M. had effected several assaults, which were, however, not crowned with success, owing to the obstinate resistance of the enemy. About 5 P. M. the detachment which had advanced toward the southwest of the 203-metre height delivered an attack in force, which was pressed forward to a point about thirty metres below the summit; and at 7 P. M., dashing forward towards the summit, in conjunction with the reinforcing troops, finally succeeded in occupying it. Closely following this assault, the detachment which had proceeded toward the northeastern portion of the hill also carried out a series of successful assaults. Thus the whole position of the 203-metre height completely fell into our possession at 8 P. M. On the eastern slope the Rus-

sian dead are lying in heaps, but the number killed has not yet been ascertained.

A PARTIAL ARMISTICE.—“December 3d. In the direction of our left wing, *parlementaires* from the opposing armies arranged, on the 2d instant, for a partial armistice from 10 A. M. to 4 P. M. on that day, in order to recover the killed and wounded on both sides.

203-METRE HEIGHT.—“The 203-metre height, occupied by our army on the 30th ultimo, can, on account of its height, send a plunging fire upon the neighboring forts of the enemy, such as Itsz’shan, Antsz’shan, etc. The only hill at Port Arthur which has a greater altitude is Laotiehshan, but it is reported that the latter fort is merely sending a desultory fire against the newly-taken height, presumably due to lack of large caliber guns in the fort, which is an improvised one at the rear of Laotiehshan.”

It is stated that the communication between the different forts is maintained by a perfect telephone system, which enables the defenders to assist each other. Under the circumstances, our troops attacking the 203-metre height might have encountered greater resistance than they actually experienced had it not been for the quickness with which they carried the position. For, by the time the hill had fallen completely into our hands, the enemy’s reinforcements had reached half-way up the hill, and it was only due to the confusion into which the new-comers were thrown by their defeated comrades rushing from the summit that no counter-attack was attempted by the enemy at that time. But what reflects credit upon our gallant foe is that before many hours had elapsed his troops, apparently from the south and north Tayangkeu forts, rallied and attacked our newly-occupied position. This eminence commands the entire view of the west and east harbors of Port Arthur, and the Russian warships are not in a position to escape from the fire of our artillery. It may be thought that much time will be needed to mount heavy guns on the height, but, as a matter of fact, it is needless to bring our large guns there, for, with an observa-

tory and signal station, an accurate fire can be sent from any direction.

**BOMBARDMENT OF THE ENEMY'S WARSHIPS.**—"December 6th. On the 3d instant our naval guns bombarded the Russian warships, and as a result it was observed that the *Pobieda* was struck six times, another battleship of the *Retvisan* type eight times, and other vessels sixteen times. The bombardment was resumed on the 5th, observations showing that seven shots told on the *Pobieda* and eleven each on the *Poltava* and *Retvisan*. At a little past 3 P. M. one of our shells struck a powder magazine south of Peiyushan, which exploded, and columns of smoke were seen to arise. This was soon followed by a fire, which, after the lapse of two hours, had not been extinguished. Later in the same day our heavy guns again opened fire on the enemy's warships. Two shells struck the *Peresviet* and two another warship. A battleship of the *Poltava* type emitted a great volume of smoke for one hour. The siege works directed against the forts east of Sungshushan are progressing day and night.

"On December 4th our army captured two 36-mm. quick-fire guns in the casemate of the counter-scarp of Erhlungshan.

"To-day (the 6th) our heavy guns re-commenced the bombardment of the Russian warships at 10:45 A. M. By noon four shells had struck the *Retvisan* and one the *Peresviet*.

"December 7th. The commander of the naval landing party at Port Arthur reports that he visited 203-metre height yesterday (the 6th) and made an observation of the harbor. He found that the *Poltava* had been sunk and is resting on the bottom, and that the *Retvisan* has a heavy list to port. These two ships seem to be no longer capable of fighting or steaming. Since December 2d we have been making observations from a height near Shuishiyang, and continually firing every day upon the enemy's fleet lying on the south side of Peiyushan. From this height we can only see the tops of the masts and funnels of the *Pobieda*, *Retvisan*, or *Pallada*. We are, however, able to learn when our shots are effective. As to the other ships, we

can witness masses of smoke arising when our shells strike them and explode, but as these vessels are screened by the hills it is impossible to know the name of the ship that is struck. Up to to-day the *Pobieda* had received thirty-four, the *Retvisan* thirty-two, and the *Poltava* eleven shots in all. In addition, we observed from the explosion and smoke that fifty shells also told on the other ships. Yesterday (the 6th) seven shells struck the *Pobieda*, eleven the *Retvisan*, or *Pallada*, and eleven the *Poltava*. Furthermore, at about 3:30 p. m. a loud explosion occurred on the south side of Peiyushan, caused by our shells.

AKASAKA-YAMA OCCUPIED.—“The enemy’s forces at Akasaka-yama, being unable to stand the plunging fire of our troops occupying 203-metre height, evacuated their position on the 6th instant, and our forces occupied the whole of the hill at 1 p. m.

“We also succeeded in dislodging the enemy’s forces from the height north of Szerhkeu and from the height north of Sanklikia, occupying the former at 2 p. m. and the latter at 3 p. m.

“In consequence of the bombardment continually carried on for several days past, the *Poltava* has listed to starboard, being submerged up to her upper deck, and the *Retvisan* has listed to port, while the *Bayan* appears to be aground.

“About 4 p. m. on the 6th the enemy’s *parlementaire* arrived at our lines and proposed that hostilities should be suspended for about five hours in order to collect the killed and wounded of both sides. This proposal was consented to by our army.

“It is reliably reported that our defense works on the 203-metre height, against which the enemy have delivered several counter-attacks since its occupation by our army on November 30th, have made satisfactory progress, and that all the necessary work for establishing a signal station there was completed on the 5th instant. The enemy have apparently abandoned the idea of attempting to recover the height, no counter-attack having been made by them since the 5th instant.

CONDITION OF THE ENEMY’S SHIPS.—“According to observations made from 203-metre height, the Russian battleship *Pol-*

*tava* is submerged and aground; the *Retvisan* seems to be also aground, having sunk without a list, and is flooded with water as high as her stern-deck. It was also noticed that the *Pobieda* is seriously damaged and has a heavy list to starboard, her red hull showing on the side nearest us.

"December 8th. The bombardment yesterday by our large guns was very effective, and many shells were seen to hit the *Pallada*, *Peresviet*, and *Pobieda*. Fire also broke out on board the *Peresviet*. The latter has her central funnel greatly damaged and the greater portion of her stern is submerged; the *Poltava* is sunk to the line of her upper deck; the *Retvisan* is listing to starboard, the water nearly reaching her upper deck; the *Pobieda* is also sunk, with her upper deck under water. The condition of the *Pallada*, which is lying between the *Retvisan* and the *Amur* (mine-laying ship) is not certain: but it appears that her bow is at an angle, though the exact extent of her damage cannot be ascertained. On the upper deck of the *Banyan* fire has broken out and is still burning. The *Sevastopol* appears to be moored alongside the big crane in the East Harbor, only the top of her masts being visible, and her hull entirely hidden behind a hill.

"To-day we are firing mainly on the *Pallada*, *Bayan*, and *Sevastopol* with large calibre and naval guns.

"The sinking of the *Peresviet* at 12:30 p. m. is considered certain: she is now in nearly the same condition as the *Poltava*. The *Pallada* has commenced listing to port, and we are still sending a heavy fire on her. The number of shells which hit the *Pallada* to-day (8th) was eight, in consequence of which a conflagration took place on board, while her hull listed to port and her stern is now slightly sunk. She is deemed to have lost her fighting power and seaworthiness. As the *Gilyak* (gun-boat) was seen to be lying near the shore to the north of the *Peresviet* we fired on her, striking her eleven times, and she is now thoroughly disabled.

"The number of shells which struck the *Bayan* to-day was twenty-two. Fire broke out on board at 11:30 A. M. and was still burning at 4:15 P. M. Thus she is also considered to have sustained serious damage. The *Sevastopol*, *Amur*, and the transport vessels were subsequently bombarded, but the results are not yet known.

"December 9th. As the result of yesterday's firing with our naval guns on the Russian ships six shells struck the *Bayan*, while the *Amur* was hit fourteen times and caused her stern to sink slightly. The storehouse and other buildings at the southeastern foot of Peiyushan and in the vicinity of the arsenal were struck by thirty-six shells, which inflicted great damage.

"During the bombardment of the enemy's squadron to-day the *Pobieda* was struck five times and the *Bayan* seven. The latter was set on fire, and has a list of twenty-five degrees to port; she is now sinking. At flood-tide the water rises to the base of the turret on the upper decks of the *Retvisan* and *Poltava*. The hulls of the *Pallada* and *Pobieda* are exposed below the waterline. As to the *Peresviet*, she is covered at high water to the stern-walk and to her torpedo-tube in the bow. The *Gilyak* has apparently settled down to the bottom of the harbor. At daybreak the *Sevastopol* issued from the harbor and anchored its mouth, presumably in order to get out of the range of our guns.

"December 12th. On the 11th instant our large caliber guns again bombarded the interior of Port Arthur, and inflicted severe damage on the battleship *Poltava*, the transport *Amur*, and the wireless telegraph station below Golden Hill. An arms storehouse was also bombarded and set on fire. According to the naval staff, as the result of our bombardment, four battleships two cruisers, one gun-boat, and a torpedo-supply ship—eight vessels in all—have been totally destroyed, and need no more be fired at.

TORPEDO ATTACKS ON SEVASTOPOL.—"December 14th. On the 12th instant at 12:30 A. M. a torpedo-boat flotilla, commanded

by Commander Kasama, attacked the battleship *Sevastopol* at anchor outside the harbor of Port Arthur, the result being unknown. Subsequently two other torpedo-boats, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander Masato, approached in the face of a galling fire within striking distance of the battleship and discharged several torpedoes at her. The latter were observed to explode, and the consequent vibration of the air was felt, but the next morning (the 13th) the battleship was still in her position. Our flotillas sustained no loss.

"On the 13th instant at 2:30 A. M. another torpedo-boat flotilla, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander Arawawa, assaulted the *Sevastopol*, and discharged several torpedoes in spite of the enemy's gun-fire, but the result was not certain. During this attack one of our torpedo-boats was struck on the funnel by a shot and another received a shot in her engine-room. The two two boats being disabled were towed away. No casualties occurred in any boat.

"At 6 A. M. another torpedo-boat flotilla, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander Seki, effected an assault, but, owing to the glare of the search-lights and the enemy's fire, our men failed to discover the battleship, and the attack ended in failure. At the same time two other torpedo-boats, commanded by Lieutenant Adachi, approached the battleship and discharged their torpedoes. An explosion and the rising of a column of water were observed, but the result was not clear. During this operation both of our boats were subjected to a severe fire, and each received a shot. In one of the boats three men were wounded.

"On December 13th our naval guns principally bombarded the engine-works and fish-torpedo dépôt at Laohuwei and the ships and boats in the neighborhood. The torpedo dépôt was set on fire and burned for an hour. Three miscellaneous vessels were destroyed and another was set on fire and sunk. Severe damage was also inflicted on the buildings. An indirect fire was also opened on the *Sevastopol*, but as the observation was defective, owing to bad weather, the attack was suspended.

"December 15th. On the 14th instant at 3:30 A. M. two of our torpedo-boat flotillas, commanded respectively by Lieutenant-Commander Otaki and Lieutenant Miyamoto, attacked the *Sevastopol* and the military transports. The Otaki flotilla was prevented from attaining its object, owing to a severe snow-storm, but the Miyamoto flotilla, taking advantage of the concentration of the enemy's search-lights on the Otaki flotilla, succeeded in reaching its destination in spite of the heavy snowfall. While searching for the enemy's ships the torpedo-boats lost sight of each other. At about 4 A. M. the boat commanded by Lieutenant Nakamuda torpedoed a transport and observed an explosion, and that commanded by Lieutenant Miyamoto discharged a torpedo at the *Sevastopol*. The two boats then steamed back, but failed to discover the boat commanded by Lieutenant Nagata. The latter has not yet returned, and her fate is the subject of much anxiety. In the morning our signal station and picket boat reported that the bows of the *Sevastopol* were about three feet lower than before. Rear-Admiral Yamada reports that from 11:30 P. M. on the 14th instant to 3 A. M. to-day six torpedo-boats attacked the *Sevastopol*, the gun-boat *Otvazny* and transports without intermission. Particulars are not yet to hand. According to a report received from our watch-tower this morning at 9 o'clock, the bows of the *Sevastopol* had sunk more deeply than yesterday and that the water had reached above the torpedo-tubes in the bow of the ship.

MESSAGES FROM GENERAL STOESEL.—"December 16th. The following two messages have been received from General Stoessel, commander of the enemy's fortress at Port Arthur, concerning our bombardment:

" 'PORT ARTHUR FORTRESS, December 15, 1904.

" 'YOUR EXCELLENCY,—I hereby have the honor to notify you of the fact that your artillery is bombarding our hospitals. These hospitals are plainly marked with the Red Cross flags, which must be visible from your artillery positions. I therefore wish such practice to be prohibited, being actuated as I am



by my respect for our heroes who were wounded whilst fighting with your army, and who ought not to run the risk of being killed whilst lying in hospitals. I must also remind you that among these heroes there are several Japanese wounded.

“I avail myself of this opportunity to again express my respects.

“‘STOESSEL, *Lieutenant-General*,

“‘Commander-in-Chief of Kwangtung Fortress

“‘To General Baron Nogi,

“‘Commander of Japanese Investing Army.’”

“The above message was received at 8 P. M. of the 15th.

“‘No. 2. PORT ARTHUR FORTRESS, December 15, 1904.

“‘YOUR EXCELLENCY,—I have authorized Balaschoff, Langa, Jagermeister to His Majesty the Tsar, the bearer of this document and the authorized Chief Director of the Red Cross Society, to discuss with you concerning the arrangements for placing our hospitals outside danger during your bombardment. Your right to take steps necessary to ensure the success of your warlike operations shall, of course, be respected.

“‘STOESSEL, *Lieutenant-General*,

“‘Commander-in-Chief of Kwangtung Fortress.

“‘To General Baron Nogi,

“‘Commander of Japanese Investing Army.’”

This document, which was received at 8 P. M. on the 15th instant, had on the back of its envelope a statement in pencil to the effect that Balaschoff would come to the same place where the above messages were handed to our army at 1 P. M. on the 16th in order to receive the reply. Major Saito, one of the staff officers, accompanied by Dr. Ariga and Interpreter Kawazu, was therefore despatched to the appointed place, Sanlikiao, in order to hand over the following reply:

“‘HEADQUARTERS INVESTING ARMY,

“‘December 16, 1904.

“‘YOUR EXCELLENCY,—I have the honor to assure you that, since the commencement of hostilities, we have never deliberately aimed at and fired on any buildings or vessels flying the Red Cross flag. But the greater part of the fortress is not visible from our artillery positions, and, as we all know, shells cannot necessarily be expected to exactly reach the intended points. What I beg to make special mention of is the fact that

owing to your persevering and gallant resistance the number of our stray shots is unavoidably increased; and I therefore sincerely regret that our shots may possibly strike unexpected points.

“I avail myself of this opportunity to express my respect.

“GENERAL BARON NOGI,

“Commander of Japanese Investing Army.

“To Lieutenant-General Stoessel,

“Commander-in-Chief of Kwantung Fortress.’”

“At about 1:30 P. M. on the 16th instant *parlementaires* from both armies met, the account of the interview being briefly as follows:

“THE ENEMY: ‘The Japanese deliberately fire on the buildings flying the Red Cross flag.’

“THE REPLY: ‘I absolutely deny your assertion.’

“THE ENEMY: ‘We demand that you refrain from firing on the whole of the new town of Port Arthur, as well as the north-eastern section of the old town.’

“THE REPLY: ‘We absolutely disapprove of your proposal to limit the zone of our fire.’

“THE ENEMY: ‘As we shall give you a map indicating the location of the hospitals, we trust you will, as far as possible, take care not to fire on them.’

“THE REPLY: ‘The map shall be duly inspected by us in order to comply with your request.’

“Balaschoff was the enemy’s *parlementaire*, and he stated that the map in question would be handed to our Army on the 18th instant.”

NORTH FORT OF TUNGKIKWANSHAN CAPTURED.—“December 19th. At 2:15 P. M. on the 18th instant a portion of our forces effectively blew up the parapet of the north fort of Tungkikwanshan, and at once charged the fort. A severe hand-grenade engagement was fought, in which the enemy offered a stubborn resistance, our aggressive operations being at one time checked by his machine guns. Subsequently, at about 7 P. M. Lieutenant-General Samejima, at the head of the reserves, rushed into the

casemate at the counter-scarp, and this had the effect of raising the spirits of our troops. These reserves were then placed in the fighting-line, and the final assault was made, with the result that the fort was completely occupied at 11:50 p. m. Immediately after the occupation of the fort defensive works were at once constructed, our occupation being made secure by this morning.

"The enemy while retreating exploded four subterranean mines laid in the vicinity of the gorges. He left behind five 9-cm. field and two machine guns, a large quantity of ammunition, and forty or fifty dead. Our casualties are not yet ascertained, but are not considered heavy.

CONDITION OF THE RUSSIAN SQUADRON.—"The following report from Admiral Togo was received late last night:

"It is beyond doubt that the enemy's warships which have been sunk inside Port Arthur are no longer serviceable. As to the *Sevastopol*, though there are reasons to believe that she is no further fit for navigation, owing to the damage inflicted by our torpedo attacks, yet I have not received evidence strong enough to deliver a final judgment. The matter is now being investigated in various directions. It is safe to state that there are still six destroyers of the enemy's squadron remaining intact.

"The battleship *Peresviet* is lying at a point 200 metres northwest of Laohuwei with her bow facing northwest. At flood-tide the water reaches her torpedo-tubes above the water-line in the bows, and also the stern-walk. There is no longer any doubt that the ship's hull rests on the bottom of the harbor, as is evinced by the fact that she has no list. Her middle funnel is much damaged. The battleship *Poltava* is lying about the same distance to the north with her bow facing nearly east. At high water her stern-deck is covered and her hull is undoubtedly on the bottom, as she has no list.

"The battleship *Retvisan* lies at a point 100 metres east of the *Poltava* with bow facing nearly east. She is much deeper under water than the *Poltava*, and her stern-deck is always submerged, and she has a list to port of about five degrees.

“The battleship *Pobieda* is lying at a point 220 metres northeast of Laohuwei, and her bow points about northeast, her port side listing twenty degrees. Her stern deck is covered at flood-tide, and it is believed that her hull is resting on the bottom.

“The cruiser *Pallada* is lying at a point 100 metres northeast of the *Pobieda* with her bow facing southwest, and having a list to starboard of about five degrees. At high-tide her stern-deck is flooded, and she is doubtless on the bottom.

“The cruiser *Bayan* is anchored at a point 400 metres southwest of the entrance to the dock in the West Harbor; her bow faces northeast, and she has a list to starboard of about fifteen degrees. She is also believed to be resting on the bottom.

“‘No men are to be seen on board any of the ships, nor are there any boats in the neighborhood. It appears that the enemy has totally deserted these warships.’

FURTHER SUCCESSES.—“*December 22d.* The right wing of the army, this morning at 5 o'clock, perceiving signs of wavering on the enemy's part, attacked him on the heights north of Housanyangteu village, and occupied those positions. At 7 A. M. our force drove off the enemy from the heights in the peninsula west of the village and occupied them, capturing a small-calibre gun. The enemy delivered a counter-attack, but was repulsed. Housanyangteu is a village near the head of Pigeon Bay.

THE SEVASTOPOL AND A DESTROYER DAMAGED.—“According to a Russian taken prisoner by our fleet, eight of the torpedoes discharged by us during the attack since the 13th instant, struck the torpedo-net of the *Sevastopol*. It is beyond doubt that the ship itself was struck at least by one of these torpedoes, as early on the morning of the 16th the crew of the ship were observed to be in great confusion, and were pulling a hawser from the land. The ship was struck by the torpedo on the port side of her stern, the riveted seams of her armor-plates having been damaged for about eight feet. She is at present lying with her bow seaward and her stern apparently on the

bottom. The muzzles of the guns on the main deck are listing to starboard and are almost touching the surface of the water, while three of the aft lower deck windows are immersed. A torpedo-boat, a pumping ship, and what looks like a mine-laying vessel are moored near her stern. These vessels are strenuously endeavoring to pump the water out of the battleship, but to restore the latter to seaworthy condition seems an impossible task. One Russian destroyer was also torpedoed in her bow the same night, and is now lying beached.

"The body of the *Sevastopol* is not provided with a netting, but she is protected by a netting attached to the lower yard, which is placed crosswise in front of her bow. Moreover, at a point thirty to forty feet further ahead, there extends a boom constructed of rectangular logs three feet long, fastened together by iron chains and covered with netting."

"Admiral Togo further reports:

"As the result of a careful observation made by myself in the seas off Port Arthur, the battleship *Sevastopol*, which had been subjected to our torpedo attacks, was seen to be lying in shallow water about 400 metres from the foot of Chengteushan, and her crew were engaged in pumping out the water from the damaged portion. She was listing at least ten degrees, with her bow declining a little in the water. In view of the present situation at that port, no hope can be entertained of repairing her damages. It has therefore been clearly established that she has nearly lost both her fighting and navigating capacity.'

PRIZES OF WAR CAPTURED AT THE NORTH FORT OF TUNGKIKWANSHAN.—"Subsequent investigations show that the spoils of war taken at the north fort of Tungkikwanshan are as follows:

- 5 8.7-cm. quick-firing guns;
- 2 47-mm. quick-firing guns;
- 2 24-mm. quick-firing guns;
- 4 machine guns;
- 161 rifles;
- 461 gun projectiles;

350 47-mm. shells;  
240 24-mm. shells;  
1,150 rounds of machine gun ammunition;  
15,000 rounds of rifle ammunition;  
80 hand-grenades;  
9 star-light shells;  
6 cases of powder;

And a quantity of timber, sand-bags, clothing, etc.

OCCUPATION OF HOUYANGSHUKEU.—“*December 23d.* On the 22d instant our heavy guns bombarded the defensive works on the height east of Houyangshukeu and the forts of Sungshushan and Erhlungshan and “H” fort, inflicting on them considerable damage.

“The right wing of our army, availing itself of the result of the bombardment, attacked the enemy on the height east of Houyangshukeu at dawn to-day, and captured the ridge of the height by 6:40 A. M. The enemy concentrated his fire from the Tayangkeu and Yohutsui forts on our positions, and at 8:20 A. M. delivered a fierce counter-attack and approached our positions so closely that he was able to effectively use his hand-grenades. But the Russians were finally repulsed. Subsequently the enemy’s fire slackened, and we were enabled to construct some defensive works, with the result that the occupation has become almost secure.

“The bombardment by our heavy guns caused a conflagration in the north fort of Sitayangkeu, and a 15-cm. gun on ‘H’ fort was also destroyed and its covering damaged.

“According to a Russian soldier who was taken prisoner at the north fort of Tungkikwanshan on the 18th instant, and to another Russian who surrendered himself in the direction of Itsz’shan fort on the 22d instant, Lieutenant-General Kondrachenko, the commander of the Seventh Division of East Siberian Rifles, and Major-General Ilmann, the commander of the Fourth Brigade of artillery, were killed, and Lieutenant-General Fock,

the commander of the Fourth Division of East Siberian Infantry, was wounded during the fighting on the 203-metre height.

OPERATIONS OF THE RIGHT COLUMN.—“December 25th. On the 24th instant at about 10 P. M. the right column of the army surprised the enemy in the villages of Hensanyangten and Hsiaofang, and carried both places. Gradually driving the enemy further away, our troops succeeded, at 2:15 A. M. to-day, in occupying the whole of Taliukiatus. Our repeated attacks during the past few days have proved successful, with the result that the enemy's advanced positions in the direction of the right column are now entirely in our possession.

CAPTURE OF ERHLUNGSHAN FORT.—“December 28th. The left center of our army carried out an assault immediately after the great explosion of the outer parapets of the Eerlungshan fort, which took place at 10 A. M. to-day, and succeeded in capturing those parapets, where, in order to secure the occupation, entrenching operations were strenuously carried out, despite the enemy's gun and rifle-fire, under the protection of our artillery. At 4 P. M., when the occupation of the position had become somewhat secure, the heavy ordnance line inside was stormed, and immediately after carrying that line our forces dashed towards the gorge, and, dislodging the remaining forces of the enemy who defended it obstinately, the entire fort was finally captured by 7:30 P. M.”

RUSSIAN DEFENSES TO THE NORTHWEST OF PORT ARTHUR.—The defenses on the left or northwestern portion of the Port Arthur fortress exist on a line of hills starting from the neighborhood of Sanlikiao, northeast of Itsz'shan, and Szuerkeu, east of the 203-metre height, then running south toward the new town with Itsz'shan, Antsz'shan, north and west Tayangkeu lying *en route*, and finally turning west towards Yangshukeu. The east fort of Antsz'shan stands southeast of Itsz'shan and is separated from it by a distance of 700 or 800 metres. About 900 metres southwest of the east fort of Antsz'shan lies the west fort of the same. Separated from the latter by about 1,000 metres and

situated northwest is the north Tayangkeu fort, which faces the south toward the south fort of west Tayangkeu at a distance of 2,200 metres. Located northwest at a distance of 1,000 metres is the north fort of West Tayangkeu, which is but a short distance from Yangshukeu on the southwest. The height of Itsz'shan and that of the east fort of Antsz'shan is some 160 metres; that of the west fort of the same and of north Tayangkeu fort being about 112 and 114 metres, respectively, and that of the south and north forts of west Tayangkeu some 100 metres. All of these forts constitute the principal objective of the future attack by the right wing of our besieging forces. There are, however, a few more heights defending the Russian position in the neighborhood of Pigeon Bay; these include the Yahutsui fort, 2,000 metres west of the south fort of west Tayangkeu, and a 160-metre eminence in the vicinity of Pigeon Bay. It was the former of these two that poured a heavy fire upon our troops when they recently occupied a height east of Houyangshukeu (2,000 metres south of 203-meter height). The 160-metre height stands south of Housangyangteu and Taliukiatus, recently taken by our army, and north of Laotiehshan, being crowned with about half a dozen forts. These forts are, however, weaker than those at Antsz'shan and Itsz'shan, and therefore constitute a vulnerable point of the fortress in that their fall means the immediate isolation of Laotiehshan from the rest of the fortifications. It is therefore expected that the 160-metre height will be the scene of a fierce engagement.

*"December 29th.* On the night of the 28th, after the capture of Erhlungshan fort, a small force of the enemy still remaining in the pathway between the line of heavy guns and the gorge, offered some resistance, but this force was entirely driven away by 3 o'clock this morning. Thus our occupation of the fort has become secure. Three prisoners were captured, who stated that the garrison placed there consisted of 500 soldiers and a number of marines and that most of these men were killed in the engagement.



"The spoils taken consist of four large-calibre and seven small-calibre guns, some thirty 37-mm. and machine guns, besides a large quantity of ammunitions and tools, which are now under investigation.

ISOLATION OF SUNGSHUSHAN.—Now that Eerlungshan has fallen into our hands, Sungshushan is in an isolated position. It has Antsz'shan on the west and Peiyushan on the south. But a deep ravine separates Sungshushan from the other forts, so that the coöperation of the enemy's infantry will be out of the question. Again, Sungshushan has an auxiliary fort on its left, but the latter is too weak to render any material assistance to the main fort. Our army has been undermining this fort, so that a further development of the situation may be expected in the near future. It may be stated that when Eerlungshan was taken its garrison is said to have fled to the Sungshushan forts.

RUSSIAN DESTROYERS.—"It is reported that of the remaining Russian destroyers at Port Arthur three of them cannot be seen from our batteries. It is presumed that they are taking shelter somewhere from the fire of our heavy guns.

SUNGSHUSHAN CAPTURED.—"December 31st. At 10 A. M. to-day our army, after blowing up the parapets of Sungshushan fort, as previously planned, executed an assault with the left wing of our right center, and succeeded in securely occupying the whole position at 11 A. M. Immediately after the explosion of the parapets effected by our army, the enemy exploded the *fougasses* laid in the inner part of the fort. A portion of the enemy's forces retreated to the heights south of the fort, but another force which had been stationed in the caponniere at the gorge was buried under the *débris* caused by the explosions. A few hours later we succeeded in rescuing some of the imprisoned men through an opening made in the entrance. Two officers and 160 men were thus rescued and taken prisoners. According to the statements of these captives, the number of the enemy killed by the explosion appears to be about 150.

"The spoils taken include field guns, machine guns, etc., the particulars being under investigation.

"At 6 P. M. to-day our engineer corps, operating in front of the east fort of Panlungshan, blew up a portion of the old surrounding wall, and entrenching work is now being carried on in order to facilitate complete occupation.

CAPTURE OF 'H' FORT AND PANLUNGSHAN.—"*January 1st.* A portion of our central column dispersed the enemy and captured 'H' fort at 7 A. M., and then carried the new fort of Panlungshan. Thus the line extending from Erhlungshan to 'H' fort through the fort of Panlungshan has securely fallen into our hands.

"A portion of our right column commenced at about 8 A. M. to bombard the heights south of Housanyangteu, and towards 2 P. M., overcoming the enemy's obstinate resistance, succeeded in definitely occupying them.

WANGTAI FORT CAPTURED.—"From about 9 A. M. to-day the center and left wing made an attack on Wangtai hill, and, under cover of a fierce bombardment, succeeded in completely occupying it by 3:35 P. M.

"We captured to-day three guns in 'H' fort and four guns in Wangtai fort; their condition is now being investigated.

"At Sungshushan fort we captured three 7-cm., two 57-mm. and two machine guns."

## CHAPTER XXXII.

STOESSEL PROPOSES SURRENDER.—“*January 1st.* At 9 P. M. to-day a letter regarding the surrender of the fortress was received from General Stoessel, the commander of the Kwantung Fortress.

“General Baron Nogi, the commander of the investing army, says:

“It was about 5 P. M. to-day when the enemy’s *parlementaire* arrived at our first line south of Shuishiyang, and handed the following message to one of our officers, from whom I received it at 9 P. M., viz.:

“No. 2545.

“PORT ARTHUR, December, 1904.

“YOUR EXCELLENCY,—Judging from the general situation within the area of fighting, I think that further resistance is needless. In order, therefore, to avoid further loss of life, I ask you to negotiate for the terms of surrender. Should you accept my proposal, you will appoint a commissioner in order to discuss the terms and process of surrender, and fix a place of meeting between your commissioner and ours.

“Availing myself of the opportunity to express my highest consideration, I am,

“GENERAL STOESSEL.

“To General Baron Nogi,

“Commander of the Japanese Investing Army.”

“After due consideration I thereupon ordered our *parlementaire* to deliver the following reply to the enemy immediately after dawn of the 2d instant:

GENERAL NOGI’S REPLY.—“*January 2d.*

“HEADQUARTERS INVESTING ARMY,

“BEFORE PORT ARTHUR,

“January 2, 1905.

“YOUR EXCELLENCY,—I have the honor herewith to express my consent to the proposal of Your Excellency to hold negotiations on the terms and process of the surrender of the fortress. For this purpose I appoint Major-General Kosuke

Ijichi, Chief of Staff of the Investing Army, a commissioner, and attach to him a number of staff officers and civil officials. The party will meet the commissioner of your Army at Shuishiyang at noon on January 2, 1905.

"The commissioners of both armies shall be fully authorized to sign the stipulations for the surrender of the fortress, the stipulations to go into force immediately after the signing and without ratification. The credentials shall be signed by the highest commanders of both armies and be exchanged.

"I avail myself of this opportunity to express my highest respects to Your Excellency.

"GENERAL BARON NOGI,  
"Commander of Investing Army.

"To His Excellency General Stoessel,  
"Commander of Kwantung Fortress."

"By the order of His Majesty the Emperor, Marshal Marquis Yamagata, Chief of the General Staff, dispatched the following telegram to General Baron Nogi, commander of the investing army before Port Arthur, on January 2d at 8 A. M., viz.:

*"To the Commander of the Investing Army:*

"On submitting to His Majesty the Emperor the proposal of General Stoessel to surrender, His Majesty was pleased to appreciate General Stoessel's arduous services for the sake of his fatherland, and desires that all the honors of war be accorded him.

"I respectfully transmit the above to you.

"MARSHAL MARQUIS OYAMA,  
"Commander-in-Chief of Manchurian Armies."

THE ENEMY DESTROYS FORTS AND WARSHIPS.—"Shortly before 1 o'clock this morning several explosions were heard in the Tungkikwanshan and 'Q' forts, occupied by the enemy, and at the same time the latter opened a brisk random fire, which subsequently abruptly ceased. Our army at once sent out scouts, and found that the enemy had already withdrawn from those positions, whereupon our troops at once advanced and occupied these two forts, and the heights 'N' and 'M', to the south.

"This morning the enemy's warships, both large and small, were blown up and sunk by the enemy himself, either within or outside the harbor.

“Our aggressive operations on the entire line are suspended until the close of the meeting between both plenipotentiary commissioners.

CHANGE OF ZONE OF BLOCKADE OF PORT ARTHUR.—“The following proclamation, announcing a change in the blockade at Port Arthur, was published:

“ ‘I hereby declare, under command of His Imperial Japanese Majesty’s Government, that the zone of blockade, announced by me on the 26th day of the 5th month of the 37th year of Meiji, is now changed, and that on and after the 1st day of the first month of the 38th year of Meiji the coast of the Liaotung Peninsula, Province of Shinking, China, lying west of a straight line drawn from South Entry Point to Wadge Head, is placed and will continue in a state of blockade by a competent force of His Imperial Japanese Majesty’s ships; and that all the measures authorized by the Law of Nations and the respective treaties between the Empire of Japan and the different neutral Powers will be enforced on behalf of His Imperial Japanese Majesty’s Government against all vessels which may attempt to violate the blockade.

“ ‘Given on board H. I. J. M.’s ship *Mikasa*, this 1st day of the first month of the 38th year of Meiji.

“ ‘ADMIRAL TOGO, *Heiachiro*,

“ ‘Commander-in-Chief of

“ ‘H. I. J. M.’s Combined Fleet.’

SIGNING OF THE CAPITULATION.—“On January 2d at 9:45 P. M. the agreement for the surrender of Port Arthur was duly signed by the commissioners of both armies.

“*January 3d.* The text of the capitulation, which was formally signed yesterday at 9:45 P. M., is as follows:

“ ‘TEXT OF THE CAPITULATION.

“ ‘ARTICLE I.—All of the Russian military and naval officers and men and volunteers and Government officials, who are in the fortress and port of Port Arthur, shall be made prisoners of war.

“ ‘ART. II.—All of the fortifications and batteries, all war-ships and vessels, arms and ammunition, horses, all other materials for war purposes, official buildings, and all descriptions of

Government property, shall be handed over as they stand to the Japanese army.

“ART. III.—If the Russian force agrees to the provisions of the above two articles, it should, as guarantee of its agreement, withdraw its garrisons from the fortifications and batteries on Itsz’shan, Siao-Antsz’shan, Ta-Antsz’shan, and the whole range of heights to the southeast, and hand them over to the Japanese army by noon on January 3d.

“ART. IV.—In case it is observed that the Russian army or navy have destroyed any of the objects mentioned in Article II., which existed at the time of signing of this agreement, or that they have otherwise changed the condition of those objects, the Japanese army will break off negotiations and resume freedom of action.

“ART. V.—The Russian military and naval authorities at Port Arthur shall prepare and hand over to the Japanese army the chart showing the disposition of the fortress of Port Arthur, the chart of *fougasses*, submarine mines, and other dangerous things laid, the table of military and naval organization at Port Arthur, the roll of military and naval officers with their posts, ranks, and full names, a list of military corps and warships, ordinary vessels and boats, and of their crews, and a list of the ordinary inhabitants, with their sexes, races, occupations, and number.

“ART. VI.—Arms (including those carried by individual combatants), ammunition, all military materials, official buildings, all descriptions of Government property, horses, warships, ordinary vessels and boats, and all things (except private property) on board of them, shall be arranged in accordance with their present positions. The proceedings for their transfer shall be agreed upon between the Japanese and Russian commissioners.

“ART. VII.—The Japanese army will, in honor of the gallant defense made by the Russians, allow the Russian military and naval officers, as well as the civil officials attached to the Russian army and navy, to wear swords and take with them such personal effects as may be necessary for their subsistence. With regard to the above-mentioned officers, officials, and volunteers, the Japanese army will permit them to go home if they subscribe to a written oath not to take up arms until the close of the war, and to refrain from doing any action whatever in-

consistent with the interests of the Japanese army. Every such military and naval officer shall be allowed to take with him an orderly, who shall be specially released on parole.

“ ‘ART. VIII.—The military and naval non-commissioned officers and men, as well as the volunteers who have been disarmed, shall, in their uniform and with portable tents and necessary personal effects, assemble under the command of the respective officers at a place to be designated by the Japanese army. As for the details, the Japanese commissioner shall fix the same.

“ ‘ART. IX.—The members of the sanitary and accountant corps of the Russian army and navy at Port Arthur shall continue to discharge their respective duties of taking care of the Russian sick and wounded and prisoners, and of feeding and providing for them, under the superintendence of the sanitary and accountant corps of the Japanese army, until such time as may be deemed necessary by the Japanese army.

“ ‘ART. X.—Detailed rules for the question relating to the disposal of the non-combatants, the transfer of the administrative and financial business of the municipality, together with the documents there-*anent*, and for the enforcement of this agreement, shall be provided in the supplementary stipulations to this agreement. The supplementary stipulations shall have the same validity as this agreement.

“ ‘ART. XI.—This agreement shall be in duplicate, one copy to be retained by the Japanese and the other by the Russian Army. It shall be put in force immediately after signing.

“ ‘SUPPLEMENTARY STIPULATIONS.

“ ‘ARTICLE I.—The following commissions shall be appointed by both Japanese and Russian armies, in order to carry out the provisions of the capitulation:

“ ‘1.—Commission relating to Article VI. of the capitulation; commission relating to the fortifications and forts and the arms and ammunition existing on land; commission relating to the war-vessels and ordinary vessels; commission relating to the war materials in the parapets; and commission relating to the removal of dangerous objects.

“ ‘2.—Commission relating to Article VIII. of the capitulation.

“3.—Commission relating to Article IX. of the same.

“4.—Commission relating to Article X. of the same.

“ART. II.—The above-mentioned commissions shall meet at the entrance to the city on the main road of Port Arthur, on the northern foot of Peiyushan, at noon on January 3d, and begin their respective work.

“ART. III.—The military and naval officers and men in the fortress of Port Arthur shall draw up, according to the arrangement to be made by the Japanese army on receipt of the table of their organization, and proceed towards the eastern extremity of Yohutsui, their head reaching there at 9 A. M. on January 5th, and then receive orders from the commission relating to Article VIII. On this occasion the officers and officials attached to the Russian army and navy shall wear swords, but the non-commissioned officers and men shall not bear arms. All the members of this force must bring with them provisions for one day.

“ART. IV.—The Russian officials who do not belong to the army or navy shall form themselves into groups according to their respective offices, and follow the groups mentioned in the preceding Article. Those officials who have not been volunteers shall be released without parole.

“ART. V.—Such number of officers and men, or of persons of corresponding rank, as may be needed for the purpose of delivery, should be left in each fortification, each fort, each building, each store-house, each place where materials are stored, each warship, and each vessel. These individuals shall wear distinguishing badges supplied by the Japanese army.

“ART. VI.—Such military or naval officers or volunteers or officials as may, after 9 A. M. on January 4th, continue to wear swords, or refuse to repair to rendezvous assigned by the Japanese army, shall be dealt with suitably by the Japanese army.

“ART. VII.—The personal effects which the officers and officials belonging to the army or navy may carry, by virtue of Article VII. of the capitulation, may, when deemed necessary, be examined. The weight of such personal effects shall approximately correspond to that of the baggage allowed to the officers and officials of the Japanese army.

“ART. VIII.—The military and naval hospitals and hospital ships in Port Arthur shall be first inspected by a Japanese



commission and then placed under regulations to be determined by the said commission.

“ ‘ART. IX.—All private individuals shall be free to pursue their avocations in peace and tranquility. Such of them as may wish to leave the place shall be free to take with them all their private property. In case the families of military and naval officers and officials desire to leave the place the Japanese army will afford them all possible facilities.

“ ‘ART. X.—In case it is considered necessary to order the departure of any private individuals residing within the fortress of Port Arthur, such individuals shall retire at a time and by roads designated by the Japanese army.

“ ‘ART. XI.—The Russian commission relating to Article X. of the capitulation shall acquaint the corresponding Japanese commission as to the past and present condition of the administration and financial business, at the same time handing over all the documents relating thereto.

“ ‘ART. XII.—The Japanese prisoners of war in Port Arthur shall be handed over to the Japanese commission designated in Article I. of the present stipulations, at 3 P. M. on January 3d.’

STOESSEL COMMUNICATES WITH THE TSAR.—“*January 5th.* At the conference held on the 2d instant regarding the capitulation, the Russian commissioner requested our commissioner to forward a message to the Tsar with reference to the oath to be taken by the officers and civil functionaries in accordance with Article VII. of the capitulation; the commissioners stating that it was necessary to obtain the Tsar’s permission before such an oath could be taken. Upon the approval of the commander of our army our commissioner transmitted the Russian general’s telegram. A reply was subsequently received from the Tsar and immediately forwarded to General Stoessel. A translation of both messages follows:

“ ‘PORT ARTHUR, January 2, 1905.

“ ‘*To His Majesty the Tsar, St. Petersburg:*

“ ‘I have been forced to sign a capitulation concerning the surrender of Port Arthur. The officers and civil functionaries are allowed to wear arms and return to Russia under obligation not to take part in the present war; but should they refuse to

subscribe to the obligation they are to remain prisoners of war. I apply to Your Majesty for permission to grant the obligation demanded.

“ ‘GENERAL STOESSEL.’ ”

“THE REPLY.

“ ‘MITCHANOVITCH, January 3d, 5:30 P. M.

“ ‘*To General Stoessel, Port Arthur:*

“ ‘I allow each officer by the privilege reserved to him either to return to Russia under obligation not to take part in the present war, or to share the destiny of the men.

“ ‘I thank you and the brave garrison for the brilliant defense.

“ ‘NICHOLAS.’ ”

INTERVIEW BETWEEN GENERALS NOGI AND STOESSEL.—

“General Stoessel, having communicated his desire to have an interview with the commander of the investing army, the latter acquiesced in the meeting. The interview took place at noon to-day (the 5th) at Shuishiyang. The conversation during the interview only referred to private matters, and lasted some two hours.”

In connection with this memorable meeting, a special telegram to the *Kokumin* from Choukiatun, near Port Arthur, says that General Stoessel, accompanied by Colonel Reis, Chief of Staff, and Lieutenants Malchenko and Represkoi, and escorted by six Cossacks, arrived at Shuishiyang at 10:30 A. M. General Baron Nogi, accompanied by Major-General Ijichi, Chief of Staff; Captains Tsunoda, Yasuhara, and Matsudaira, and Mr. Kawakami, Secretary of the Foreign Office, arrived at 11:15 A. M. The meeting was a very cordial one. General Stoessel spared no words in praising the bravery shown by the Japanese soldiers and the untiring efforts of General Nogi. The Russian general thanked him for the trouble taken in transmitting his telegram to the Tsar, and also expressed his appreciation of the courteous treatment accorded him, as well as the officers and men under him, by our Emperor.

“On learning of the death of General Nogi’s two sons in battle, General Stoessel was visibly affected. When General

Nogi told him that he was glad as a father to have given his two sons to his country, General Stoessel was strongly impressed with the sentiment expressed by our General, and said that it was this spirit that had enabled the Japanese army to win a fame unparalleled in the history of warfare.

Luncheon was then served, in which the two generals and the two chiefs of staff took part. After luncheon General Stoessel offered his fine Arabian horse for the personal use of General Nogi. The latter, however, declined to accept the present for himself, stating that the horse was a portion of the spoils of war. He would, however, be pleased to receive it in the name of his Army, and promised its late gallant owner that special care would be taken of the animal.

General Stoessel returned to Port Arthur at 1:15 P. M.

THE TRANSFER OF THE FORTS.—“*January 6th.* The forts and fortifications on Itsz’shan, Ta-Antsz’shan, Siao-Antsz’shan, and the whole range of the heights to the southeast, which were claimed as the guarantee of capitulation, have been duly handed over, the arrangements being completed without any hitch on the 4th instant. The prisoners of war assembled at the designated place yesterday and were taken over by our army.”

Yahutsui, the place of gathering, appointed for the Russian prisoners of war, stands eighty metres high, and is situated at the northeastern extremity of a village called Yahu, about 2,000 metres west of the new town of Port Arthur. Being crowned with semi-permanent forts, this height constituted a vital point in the northwestern defenses of Port Arthur, being a connecting link in a chain of fortifications running from Tayang-keu to Pigeon Bay. The eminence is surrounded by level round, which was eminently suited for the purpose intended.

NUMBER OF PRISONERS OF WAR.—“The total number of Russian prisoners of war amounts to 32,207; of these 26,896 belong to the army, which are as follows: Eight general officers, 796 other commissioned officers, 13 priests, 22,434 rank and file, and 3,645 non-combatants. Those belonging to the navy num-

ber 5,311, as follows: Four admirals, 300 other commissioned officers, 7 priests, 4,500 petty officers and seamen, and 500 non-combatants. In the foregoing figures the volunteers are included among the non-combatants. The sick and wounded, who number nearly 17,000, are not included in the above total.

THE SPOILS OF WAR.—“*January 12th.* The delivery of fortifications and forts, warships and ordinary vessels, arms, ammunition, and other objects, was completed on the 10th instant. They are, briefly, as follows:

Permanent fortifications and forts. . . . .	59
Large calibre guns. . . . .	54
Medium calibre guns. . . . .	149
Small calibre guns. . . . .	343
Shot and shell. . . . .	82,670
Torpedoes. . . . .	60
Explosives. . . . .	1,588
Gunpowder ( <i>kilo</i> ). . . . .	30,000
Rifles. . . . .	35,252
Revolvers. . . . .	579
Sabers. . . . .	1,891
Rifle cartridges. . . . .	2,266,800
Ammunition wagons. . . . .	290
Commissariat wagons. . . . .	606
Miscellaneous wagons. . . . .	65
Saddles and bridles. . . . .	87
Sets of harness. . . . .	2,096
Electric lights. . . . .	14
Telegram apparatus. . . . .	15
Telephone apparatus. . . . .	135
Heliographs. . . . .	3
Entrenching implements. . . . .	1,171
Horses. . . . .	1,920
Battleships (excluding <i>Sevastopol</i> ). . . . .	4
Cruisers. . . . .	2
Gun-boats and destroyers. . . . .	14

Steamers.....	10
Steam launches.....	8
Miscellaneous vessels.....	12

Besides, there are 35 steam launches available after being repaired, and also a number of private-owned vessels. The Russian naval vessels, however, have all been wrecked or sunk."

THE VICTORIOUS ARMY ENTERS PORT ARTHUR.—The ceremony of the Japanese army entering into Port Arthur took place on January 13th. One company from each infantry regiment, one battery from each artillery regiment, and a detachment from each squadron of cavalry and each engineer regiment, with other arms of the service, assembled at the base of the hill near Yahutsui. At the firing of a signal-gun these troops marched into the new city of Port Arthur, passing *en route* through the old town. The sight of the troops marching in with their colors torn by shot and shell and stained with blood produced a marked impression on the spectators.

"On the 14th instant, in the midst of a dense fog, the Japanese troops held a religious celebration for the souls of their comrades who had died during the siege, at a point a little north of Shuishiying, which is said to have been a most impressive ceremony."

*With regard to the casualties sustained by the Japanese Army during the siege of Port Arthur it is impossible to give them at this time, for the reason that the Imperial Japanese authorities have never published them, but a reasonable estimate is between 40,000 and 50,000 killed and wounded. The Russian casualties likewise can only be estimated at this time on account of similar reasons, but an estimate of 25,000 may be accepted.*

## CHAPTER XXXIII.

In this chapter are given more detailed accounts of some of the more important events of the siege.

PARTICULARS OF THE OCCUPATION OF PANLUNGSHAN.—The net result of the first general assault on the main defenses of Port Arthur, lasting for five days, from August 19th to the 23d, and costing the Japanese army a loss of at least 15,000 men, was the capture of the east and west forts of Panlungshan by the left wing, commanded by Major-General Ichinohe of the central column. The assault on the east fort was begun on August 21st by a regiment under Colonel Ouchi. The first and second battalions, being placed in the first line, the former was to attack the east fort, while the second attacked an auxiliary battery to the east in order to prevent the latter from subjecting the first battalion to a flanking fire. The third battalion formed the second line of attack, and was to follow the first battalion in charging the main fort. With each battalion was a body of engineers. At 4:40 A. M. the engineers were hard at work destroying the wire entanglements, which were charged with electricity. After clearing the way for the infantry they rushed to the second entanglements just under the forts. Meanwhile the enemy perceived the approach of our force, and, by the aid of rockets, poured a withering rifle-fire on our men. The sappers were almost annihilated, but they had succeeded in cutting several passages through the entanglements. The first battalion was then hurled against the fort. The enemy, however, was fully prepared for the assault. The garrison opened a terrible rifle fire, and the machine guns also searched our troops, who were threading their way through the openings in the wire entanglements. Moreover, a severe fire was poured from Tungkikwanshan and Erhlungshan, so that the attacking force was raked from three

sides. Our battalions were literally shattered and only a few reached a line below the fort. Colonel Ouchi led up the third battalion to the front, and fiercely charged the fort. For a time the colonel was seen brandishing his sword on high, but soon after he fell dead, having received twenty-eight wounds. Captain Takabatake, who was carrying the regimental colors in the same line with his chief, was also killed, having been struck twenty-four times. Between 5 and 5:30 A. M. Major Sakuma, Ensign Yata, and other officers were killed. Meanwhile the second battalion, which had charged the battery east of the fort, had taken a trench below the battery, and was exchanging rifle-fire with the enemy.

When daylight appeared at 6 A. M. the battle-field presented a most terrible scene, viewed from the heights north of Wukiafang, where Major-General Ichinohe and his staff were watching the battle. The Japanese dead and wounded lay on the ground in great numbers, and the greater portion of our troops were still below the wire entanglements. The commander at once ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Orishita with the first battalion of his regiment to proceed to the assistance of the troops attacking the east fort. The first report from Colonel Ouchi's battalions that had charged the fort was received at 7:30 A. M. It said:

"The first and third battalions have pressed home the attack on the fort to the enemy's parapets, but, owing to the fierce fire from the enemy, who is under cover, we cannot carry the fort. Quickly send sappers and reinforcements."

A report from the battalion which was attacking the auxiliary battery was received at 8 A. M. It stated among other things that the battalion had been throwing up trenches for protection against the enemy's fire and that Colonel Ouchi's troops appeared to have been annihilated.

At 10 A. M. the first battalion of the Orishita regiment started on its perilous mission. The battalion gallantly at-

tempted to approach the fort, but was soon subjected to a severe fire from the enemy's infantry.

Our machine guns on the heights north of Wukiafang covered the advance of the attacking force. But as the enemy was strongly covered, the efficiency of our gun-fire was only about 1 per cent that of the enemy. There seemed to be but little prospect of the battalion reaching the fort. Genral Ichinohe then brought the third battalion of the Orishita regiment to the front. No sooner had the battalion reached the depression south of Wukiafang than it was subjected to a rain of shells. No soldier there could expose himself without being picked off by sharpshooters in the enemy's fort.

General Ichinohe, deeming the attack in the daytime to be an almost hopeless task, proposed to the commander of the central column that the attack should be postponed until the night. The commander then visited Major-General Ichinohe and personally ordered him to continue the attack, saying that a body of troops from the general reserve of the army and a battalion from the right wing of the central column should be placed under his command. The latter at once ordered the whole of the Orishita regiment to charge the fort a second time. The assault was performed under a most destructive fire from the enemy's guns and rifles at 3 p. m. Each company filed through the bullet-swept field and approached the enemy's fort, sustaining enormous losses. The Yamamoto battalion from the right wing was sent forward to attack the enemy's right wing in order to assist the Orishita regiment. The combined efforts of these troops, however, ended in failure. Our troops were forced back to the trenches at the foot of Panlungshan.

At 6 p. m. a report from Lieutenant-Colonel Orishita was received; it stated that forty or fifty Russian soldiers, concealed under cover, had shot every soldier approaching the fort, and that he deemed it advisable to resume the assault at night. The night came on. But the Orishita regiment could not speedily effect the attempted charges; the troops having been



totally shattered and broken during the daytime, and the regimental commander could not rally his force until 11 P. M. The Yamamoto battalion had also been reduced to a wretched condition. Should the night attack fail, General Ichinohe would probably lose the whole of his troops.

The assault began at midnight. Our troops gallantly rushed forward, their valor being all that could be wished. But the slaughter dealt by the enemy's machine guns, rifle-fire, and the bursting of the large shells was so terrible that only a few of our troops were able to reach the foot of the fort, where they shouted "*Banzai!*" They were, of course, unable to hold their ground long; all had to retreat to the crevice under the fort.

General Ichinohe, perceiving that it was impossible to carry out any further assault before daybreak, reported the fact to the commander of the central column. At 4 A. M. of the 22d an order from the latter was received to the effect that the attack should be suspended. The commander of the left wing, therefore, ordered the troops at the front to gather the wounded, and dispatched reinforcements to cover the retreat of the attacking force. The enemy had lit up the ground with rockets and fired his machine guns and rifles without intermission, so that our troops at the front had their retreat practically cut off.

SUCCESS OF THE SAPPERS.—During the meantime a handful of men, all that was left of the Ouchi regiment, which carried out the first assault on the east fort of Panlungshang, remained in the trench below the fort. The party consisted of Captain Kayukawa, Lieutenant Tanaka, Sub-Lieutenant Shimano, and fifty men, a few soldiers who had become separated from the Orishita regiment, and some twenty sappers, including Captain Sugiyama. The trench was twenty-four feet deep, twelve feet wide at the top, and ninety feet in length. The bottom was covered by water, five feet deep at places, the mud being knee-deep, and was filled with human corpses, which lay in heaps. A terrace, or shelf, was constructed along one side of the trench to serve as a banquettes as well as a seat for the wounded. The

latter were so numerous that the wounded soldiers had to remain standing all day and night. They had charged the fort on the morning of the 21st, and since then had been isolated from the other troops of the left wing. They had brought two meals with them, but now had none. They searched the pockets of the dead for food, and drank the water in the trench, which was mingled with blood. They had seen one Japanese battalion after another advance into the death-zone, there to be dealt with by the enemy's terrible fire. All hope of relief or a successful retreat had vanished long ago. They were not even aware of the fact that the commander of the column had issued an order suspending the attack.

On the morning of the 22d Captain Sugiyama made a desperate proposal to Captain Kayukawa; he suggested that the party should make another and final assault, rather than await death from starvation in the trench. He had some spare explosives, which he said he would throw into the enemy's casemate and destroy their machine guns. Should the project work well, Captain Kayukawa was to charge with all the troops under him. The proposal was heartily agreed to, and a reconnaissance was commenced. At 10 A. M. it was observed that the enemy's vigilance was relaxing. Meanwhile two or three hand-grenades with fuses attached were hastily made, and the task of throwing them into the casemate was entrusted to Sergeant Himeno and two soldiers. The hand-grenade was small enough to enter the loop-hole, whence the muzzle of the machine gun protruded. At first it was intended that the explosive should be thrown on the roof of the casemate, but the plan was abandoned owing to the doubtfulness of its efficiency. Sergeant Himeno started on his mission with a light heart. He ordered the two soldiers to lie down in a crevice, and he alone worked his way up the slope, persistently keeping to the cover of the furrows created by shells. At times he feigned death, lying with his face upward. The disguise was so skillful that one of his two companions hastened back to the trench and reported him dead. The sergeant,

however, steadily approached the enemy's citadel, and passed the last wire entanglement by creeping under the wires. Then, having reached the foot of the outer slope of the casemate, he ignited the fuse, and, running up to the casemate, threw the grenade through the loop-hole. By the time he had regained a crevice down the slope an explosion took place in the casemate. Looking back, he saw that a small breach had been made in the wall on the right upper part of the loop-hole, but the extent of the damage to the interior was not known. He then returned to the trench and reported the matter. By that time some hand-grenades had been prepared. Sergeant Himeno and three soldiers were then given grenades, which they were to throw into the casemate and caponniere. The four men took the same route, and advanced one by one. They were seen to assemble at a small furrow, where they lay down, awaiting an opportunity to proceed farther. But they did not move for some time. Captain Sugiyama, therefore, dispatched two more soldiers, each with a bamboo pole five inches in circumference and ten feet in length. The hollow poles were filled with explosives and especially suited for the destruction of the caponniere. These soldiers also conveyed to Sergeant Himeno a request from Captain Sugiyama that matters should be expedited; it was now about 10:30 A. M. The five soldiers under the Sergeant then proceeded in single file towards the fort, halting and crawling from time to time. One of them threw an explosive through the loop-hole of the casemate, while the four others placed explosives upon the caponniere, and the next moment they were running back to the crevice. The explosion of the machine gun was the first to take place. With a tremendous force the casemate was blown up, its roof flying high into the air, and the gun was shattered to pieces. Terrific explosions then followed one after another, destroying the greater part of the caponniere. At this sight of our troops in the trench clapped their hands and shouted "*Banzai* for the sappers!" But one of the explosives in a bamboo pole had not exploded, even after the lapse of five minutes since the

ignition of its fuse; it had been placed on the caponniere at the salient angle of the fort on the left of the casemate by Private Nakajima, who was called to account by his daring comrades for his failure. Mortified by his non-success, Nakajima rushed straight towards the fort, and, calmly examining the deadly explosive, discovered that the fuze had been extinguished. He struck a match, again lit the fuze, and placed the explosive in position. An explosion took place instantly, and the caponniere was smashed to pieces; another shout of "*Banzai!*" from our trench greeted this gallant feat. Nakajima was, however, wounded during the accomplishment of this task.

The main defense of the fort being thus pierced by the brave pioneers, Captain Sugiyama detected signs of wavering on the part of the Russians, and urged Captain Kayukawa to make a charge. This proposal was at once carried out, and all the infantry and sappers, less than seventy in all, were hurled upon the strong fort. Captain Kayukawa was soon wounded and his place taken by Lieutenant Tanaka. The flag of the Ouchi regiment was carried by Sub-Lieutenant Shimano. They swept up the slope like a hurricane, and drove off the enemy from the fort at 11 A. M., when every soldier produced the Rising Sun flag from his pocket and waved it high on the fort with lusty shouts of "*Banzai!*" and beckoned to the other troops far below the hill. The Orishita regiment and the Yamamoto battalion soon arrived in the fort.

A portion of the Russian garrison fled in the direction of Wangtai Hill, but the main force still held the western slope. Taking cover in the outer embankment of the fort, the Russians not only severely fired on the fort, but also obstructed the advance of the Japanese. Moreover, the neighboring forts showered a hail of shells on the fort. The Japanese, though fully exposed to gun and rifle fire, fought desperately, some of them using their rifles and others hurling stones on the Russians. The sappers hastened to reconstruct a parapet from the *débris*. General Ichinohe, seeing the critical situation at the fort, or-

dered a body of troops, commanded by a lieutenant, to attack the rear of the Russians clinging to the slope, and dispatched a body of sappers to the fort; at the same time ordering two Japanese machine guns to proceed forward. On the hill the ammunition was running short, and the soldiers were losing heart. Lieutenant-Colonel Orishita and Major Nakanishi were running to and fro, threatening to shoot any man who should turn his back to the enemy. Before long, however, a shell, fired by the enemy, killed these two officers.

General Ichinohe then determined to proceed to the fort in person, and, accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Serizawa, Captain Sugimoto, and some troops, he ascended the slope, where shells were bursting in all directions. The two officers accompanying him fell on the way; the General was fortunate enough to reach the fort.

The commander of the central column, having assured the commander-in-chief of the investing army that the fort could be retained, ordered the Mikami regiment to reinforce the fort. Major-General Takenouchi assumed command of the regiment which, after sustaining severe losses, reached the fort. Fighting of a desperate nature continued on the hill until 1:30 P. M. The casualties were heavy on both sides. At times the issue of the day hung in the balance, but finally the Russians were completely routed, mainly due to the fire of machine guns.

ATTACK ON THE WEST FORT.—Meanwhile Colonel Sunaga, who was standing beside the commander of the central column, believed that the garrison of the west Panlungshan fort was showing signs of weakening, and addressed the commander to that effect. The latter at once suggested to Major-General Ichinohe that the two companies under Captain Hamaguchi should be sent forward. At the same time he summoned Captain Hamaguchi and instructed him to proceed first to the east fort and reconnoiter the west fort, and then, if possible, to charge the latter. Before departure the commander addressed the companies, urging them to fight to the last man, as the issue

of the day depended on this particular enterprise. The two companies reached the east fort at 5 P. M. and at once charged the west fort under cover of the bombardment from the east fort. The gallant attack proved successful, and the first line of defense was quickly carried. The enemy, however, offered a stubborn resistance on their second and third lines, so that our troops had to make several disastrous assaults before they could capture the west fort, which was finally carried at 8 P. M. This was not, however, the end of the battle. Under cover of darkness the enemy delivered desperate counter-attacks upon our troops. Captain Hamaguchi was seriously wounded, and our retention of the fort again seemed precarious. It was solely due to the fierce attack on the flank and rear of the Russians by the Mikami regiment and the Yamamoto battalion dispatched from the east fort, that the west fort was saved. At 11 P. M. the Russians finally withdrew from the field; and subsequently it was arranged that General Ichinohe should hold the east fort and General Takenouchi the west fort of Panlungshan.

FIGHTING ON AKASAKA-YAMA.—After the occupation of Namako-yama, towards the end of September, the troops under Major-General Matsumura were engaged for two months in sapping operations directed towards the 203-metre height, the work being completed towards the end of November. A passage to Akasaka-yama, 170 metres high, constituted a branch to the one reaching the 203-metre height. On November 27th at 6 P. M. two battalions advanced to the latter and one battalion to the former. Of this battalion, two companies formed the first line, and from each company a body of twenty-three men was selected. Two of these bodies, commanded by Sub-Lieutenants Kaba and Hosokawa, were liberally supplied with hand-grenades. Accompanied by a number of pioneers, they advanced to the head of our troops. The first wire entanglements in front of the enemy's first trench were cut with shears by Sub-Lieutenant Kaba's men at two places, and all the polls were pulled down together with the wires. The way being thus opened, our troops

rushed up the steep slope, and, after encountering great hardships, the outer embankment of the first trench was reached. The enemy, who had remained quite silent during these proceedings, now suddenly opened a withering rifle-fire. The Russians at both wings of the trench hurled grenades at our troops, compelling the latter to form into close quarters at the center. Sub-Lieutenants Kaba and Hosokawa, enraged at the hesitancy of their men, leaped into the trench. This gallantry at once rallied the rank and file, who immediately followed their leaders and fell upon the Russians. After a terrible hand-to-hand fight the enemy was compelled to abandon his first trench at 6:40 P. M. Our troops had not been long in occupation of the first trench when the enemy delivered a counter-attack. The Japanese, therefore, had to dispatch to the trench the whole of the two companies, and the enemy was driven back. Our troops then charged the second trench, destroying the wire entanglements and other defensive works. A third company was dispatched as reinforcements, and after a murderous conflict with hand-grenades the second trench was occupied by 7:30 P. M. The enemy's final stand was made at the gorge of the fort and, in addition, a superior force of the enemy made a counter-attack from the eastern side of the height. Almost all of the officers in our battalion had been lost, and the suffering of our troops was beyond description. The occupation of Akasaka-yama, however, was not securely established until the 203-metre height fell into our hands a few days later.

OCCUPATION OF 203-METRE HEIGHT.—On November 28th the troops under Major-General Takenouchi began operations with a view to the occupation of 203-metre height. Major Miki delivered an impressive speech to his troops prior to the attack. By 9 A. M. our troops had negotiated the first wire entanglements and were pressing hard on the enemy's first trench. The enemy threw hand-grenades at our men and offered a stubborn resistance. Missiles of the same deadly nature had also been supplied to our troops, but, as the latter were below the enemy's positions

they could not successfully aim them at the enemy. Moreover, the Russian batteries on Sungshushan and Akasaka-yama, including 47-mm. quick-firers, light and heavy guns, hailed shell and shot upon our men. After working their way up to the trench, our men were hurled down the slope by the Russian bayonets. During this severe fighting Major Miki was wounded. After sunset our troops poured kerosene oil on the wooden structure in the enemy's trench and set it on fire. The fire was eventually subdued, but the enemy's resistance slackened in consequence. The opposing forces spent the night facing each other.


On the 29th Major Shizuta's troops were dispatched as reinforcements. A strong wind was blowing, in consequence of which our troops were barely able to keep their feet.


The Russians threw large blocks of stone from the height. Despite severe losses our troops succeeded in approaching the second trench, and bivouacked there for the night.

On the 30th, at 8:30 A. M., the close-range guns (for throwing hand-grenades) were brought to our trench, from which they bombarded the height, while our troops charged the fort. The slope was exceedingly steep, and our men constructed a passage with sand-bags. They at last carried the second trench, surmounted several wire entanglements, and were just reaching the summit when another hail of hand-grenades was hurled at them. They rushed over the killed and wounded, reached the third trench at 10 P. M., and shortly afterwards occupied the entire fort.

On December 1st at 3 A. M. the enemy made a counter-attack from a southern height, and severely bombarded our position from Akasaka-yama and Sungshushan. Our force was compelled to abandon the position, but shortly afterwards, on receiving reinforcements, again drove off the enemy from the height. *The summit was taken and lost three times, and it was not until the fourth attack, which proved successful, that the place finally fell into our hands.* During the night, owing to the bitter cold, many of the soldiers were frost-bitten.







## CHAPTER XXXIV.

MAJOR-GENERAL NAKAMURA ON THE SIEGE OF PORT ARTHUR.—Major-General Nakamura, who was severely wounded in his gallant assault on Sungshushan Fort, in an interview before the final surrender of Port Arthur, after expressing his high opinion of the valor and endurance of the Russians, says:

“The siege of Port Arthur has been more difficult in its execution than was generally expected by the outside public. In addition to the natural and artificial defenses, we have had to fight against desperate troops who willingly lay down their lives for the sake of their country. It is true that the 203-metre height and the north fort of Tungkikwanshan have, though at a heavy cost, already fallen into our hands; but considering the fortress as a whole, the former, whatever value it has with regard to the siege, is no more than an outer fort, while the latter cannot, properly speaking, be regarded as one of the enemy’s principal forts. The only forts which have a claim as such are those at Erhlungshan, Sungshushan, and some other places. These two forts had once been taken by us, but were recovered by the enemy afterwards. The fact that in spite of the rapid progress made in our siege-works these forts still defy our assaults only testifies to the immense difficulties of the task in which our army is engaged. Then I discredit any suggestion that the Russian rank and file have been decidedly thinned owing to our sustained siege. I would estimate their present number at over 10,000, and it is very likely that the majority of the Russians who were wounded a few months ago have already returned to the ranks. There are, moreover, quite a large number of sailors who, as the result of the sinking of their warships, may have been compelled to land and assist in the operations on shore. Next, the report that the Russians have run short of ammunition can, I think,

scarcely be received as true. Compared with the enemy's lavish use of ammunition during July and August, when he always returned three shots to one of ours, it is apparent that he has now become very cautious in this connection. This, however, cannot afford any ground for supposing that the enemy's stock of ammunition has been falling off. On the contrary, he has of late given ample proof, whenever the opposing forces have exchanged fire, that this is not the case. It is certain that he has no boundless supply of ammunition, but it is also beyond doubt that he can in some measure rely on his own productive power, as well as possible supplies smuggled in from the outside world.

“With regard to provisions, it will be safe to surmise that their stock is even more plentiful than that of ammunition. It seems beyond question that the Russians at Port Arthur are communicating with the home authorities by means of wireless telegraphy, though important messages are often carried to Chefoo through the instrumentality of their destroyers. It is, however, almost impossible for the Russians to send communications by land. It is true that the enemy still employs Chinese for that purpose, but there is little chance for the latter to succeed in their mission, as no natives are ever allowed to pass the fighting-line by either belligerent. In short, it will be no easy task to completely occupy the fortress; the more our siege-works progress, the more stubborn the Russians will become. They will no doubt fight to the last man in defense of the fortress, as well as Russia's prestige.

“Lastly, I deprecate the insinuation that the recent message from Stoessel, requesting our army to refrain from firing on the new town and a portion of the old one, shows how hard-pressed is the enemy. I think this idea is not a new one, but was formulated by the enemy some time in July or August last, but actually proposed to our army recently. We have, of course, never deliberately fired on any buildings flying the Red Cross flag, as stated in Stoessel's message.

"Since our occupation of 203-metre height we have been sending a fierce fire upon the town and harbor, with results already known, and this may have been sorely felt by the Russians, who were thus compelled to make the above proposal, ostensibly on behalf of the Red Cross."

THE LAST DAYS OF PORT ARTHUR.—The following interesting letter from Port Arthur, written by Mr. William Maxwell, of the *London Standard*, contains a detailed account of the historic meeting of the commissioners of the hostile armies to arrange for the capitulation of the fortress:

"The first day of the new year was drawing to a close, when a Russian officer came riding towards the Japanese outposts. A Cossack, mounted on a shaggy pony, carried before him a flag of truce. Their appearance at such a moment, not less than the grave looks of the young soldier, betokened business of importance. Halting at some distance from the enemy's lines, the Cossack put a trumpet to his lips and sounded a parley. A Japanese officer, whose keen glances followed every movement of the strangers, summoned an orderly and went out to meet the envoy of the besieged fortress. In a few minutes he returned with a letter in his hand, and the Russian ensign rode back to Port Arthur. The letter, brought to the Japanese lines under a flag of truce, made known General Stoessel's decision to surrender. General Nogi received it at 8 o'clock on New Year's night. He read it with astonishment, for he believed the garrison would not surrender until the last fort had been taken and the last shot fired.

"Only three days before, General Stoessel had convened a council of naval and military officers of high rank, and had laid before them the true state of affairs. The council was attended by twenty-two officers, and nineteen of them insisted on continuing the struggle. Three were in favor of making terms with the enemy. Among them was Major-General Reiss, Chief of Staff, who feared that if the resistance was prolonged and the city was carried by assault there would be a repetition of the in-

cidents of 1894, and the remnant of the garrison would be massacred. General Reiss is not popular with his comrades, and his fears were denounced as a slander on a brave foe. The council separated under the impression that its decision was final and that the conflict would be continued with vigor. It was with amazement and consternation that the officers received orders on New Year's day to destroy the ships in the harbor and to blow up one of the forts. General Stoessel had resolved to surrender. General Nogi, the commander of the investing army, knew nothing of this council of war; he was however, not ignorant of the fact that since the death of General Kondratchenko the resistance had weakened, and that dissension was rife among the leaders of the garrison. Nor did it escape his notice that the proposal to discuss the terms of capitulation was undated and had probably been written some days before. Next morning (2d) at 4 o'clock the answer was sent to the Russian lines under a flag of truce. General Nogi agreed to negotiate, and appointed as delegate the chief of his staff, Major-General Ijichi, with whom were associated Major Yamaoka, Chief of the Intelligence Section; Captain Tsunoda, Commander Iwamura, Dr. Ariga, and Mr. Kowazu.

"The conference was to be held at noon on the 2d of January in the village of Shuishiyang. From camp to camp ran the rumor of this momentous decision, and it was received with shouts of '*Banzai!*' But the dominant note was relief, rather than exultation. A great burden had been lifted, and men breathed more freely when they realized that the long struggle was over, and that Port Arthur had surrendered without a last and bloody sensation.

"Shuishiyang was once a prosperous Chinese village between the fort ridges and the mountains on the north. Between the hammer of Japan and the anvil of Russia it had been pounded into a heap of stones, out of which rise blackened gables and one solitary group of thatched cottages. To this ruined and deserted hamlet came the delegates of General Stoessel and General Nogi.

They passed through a broad gateway—which bore in Japanese characters the legend, “The road to Peace”—and vanished from the gaze of a few casual spectators. Plum Tree Cottage—named by its owner—is a straw-thatched hovel, consisting of two small rooms, which, until a few days ago, had served as a field hospital. Here the delegates met at noon.

“General Reiss, who represented the Russians, rode from Port Arthur with a small escort of Cossacks, and was accompanied by three colonels—the captain of the *Retvisan*, Count Ballashoff, the head of the Red Cross Society, a lieutenant and amidshipman. General Ijichi and General Reiss, having shaken hands and exchanged compliments, presented their comrades, who conversed through interpreters. At twenty minutes after 1 o’clock the terms of capitulation were handed by General Ichiji to General Reiss, who was invited to remain with his colleagues and to read over the documents. One hour was allowed for their perusal. Before the Japanese delegates retired to the adjoining room they were asked if the conditions were final. General Ijichi replied that they were final, but that he would gladly listen to any suggestions. The delegates then separated. The conference was renewed at half past 2 o’clock, when General Reiss made several proposals and inquiries. He asked that the soldiers and sailors might be allowed to return to Russia; that the horses in Port Arthur should not be handed over to the Japanese; that each officer should be allowed one orderly; that the buildings of the Red Cross Society should remain the property of the Society and should not be changed; that a telegram might be sent to the Tsar requesting leave to accept parole; and that a certain amount of personal baggage should be permitted to each officer. The battleships and cruisers, he said, had been destroyed, and the regimental colors had been burned, so that none of these could be surrendered. General Ijichi replied that the soldiers and sailors must be treated as prisoners of war; that horses must be handed over; that each officer would be allowed one orderly; that the buildings of the Red Cross Society would

remain untouched; that a telegram would be sent to the Tsar, provided it was written in English; that officers would be allowed to take with them personal baggage equal in amount to that of Japanese officers of the same rank.

"While these points were under discussion a message arrived by telephone from General Nogi's headquarters to the effect that a serious fire had broken out in Port Arthur, and that some deserters from the forts had passed beyond the enemy's lines. General Ichiji warmly protested against such conduct, and threatened to break off the negotiations if there was any further attempt at destruction of property in Port Arthur. A letter was accordingly written and despatched to General Stoessel, who immediately took steps to prevent any act of incendiarism.

"At half past four o'clock the conference ended, and messages were despatched to General Nogi and General Stoessel asking for a suspension of hostilities.

"The armistice began at thirty-five minutes after 4 o'clock on January 2d; five hours later a telegram was sent to the Tsar; the delegates dined together, and fair copies of the terms of capitulation were made in English and Japanese. The negotiations were conducted in English, the midshipman who accompanied General Reiss acting as interpreter for the Russians. At a quarter to 10 o'clock on the same night General Reiss and General Ijichi signed the articles of capitulation, and Port Arthur passed out of Russian control."

A WEEK AT PORT ARTHUR JUST AFTER THE SURRENDER.—  
Through the extreme courtesy of the Imperial Japanese War Department the writer was invited to make a trip to the front on the transport *Manshu-maru*.

We anchored in Dalny harbor at about noon on New Year's day. When the Russians hurriedly evacuated Dalny after the battle of Nanshan they fully expected to return, and did not destroy much property there, but sank some small vessels near the docks, removed parts of the machinery in the electric power-



house and machine-shops, exploded a mine in one part of the long pier, and left the harbor full of mines. Before the arrival of the Japanese, however, a party of mounted Chinese bandits entered the town, burned about fifty of the fine Russian houses, and looted the whole place. But to-day Dalny (now rechristened Tairen by the Japanese) is in full swing; the electric plant is working; the town is well lighted by electricity; the machine-shops are running; and bustle and activity prevail on every side. Many of the Russian houses, built of brick and stone in most ornate style, are being used as hospitals, where several thousand of Japanese wounded are being cared for, and, in addition, the town has become a vast war-base of supply. Stores of all kinds are stacked high; large wooden barracks have been constructed; there are railway cars, ties and rails in great numbers; huge supplies of food and forage; hundreds of carts for transport purposes; and necessary materials are gathered to fill all demands.

A transport arrived in the harbor to-day (January 2d) with 2,000 fresh troops; every day or two a transport comes and goes, bringing soldiers or supplies, and taking back to Japan the sick and wounded.

The wonderful systematic regularity with which the Japanese carry out everything in connection with the war is almost beyond belief; nothing is neglected nor forgotten; there is no confusion; and everything works as smoothly as a fine-running engine. Their system is perfect.

This evening all the warships of Kataoka's squadron and the transports in the harbor set their lights and blew their whistles in celebration of the fall of Port Arthur.

Arrangements having been made on the 3d instant, we left Dalny by train on the morning of the 4th, and reached the headquarters of General Nogi in a small Chinese village about noon. The victorious commander of the Japanese investing army was quartered in a rough Chinese house with a yard surrounded by high stone walls; the little house had but two rooms—in one, a

plain wooden table, one chair and several rough stools, was his office; on the walls were hung several well-penciled maps; the bare floor had but one small strip of matting. In the other room were his iron camp-bed, trunks and boxes, and a wooden trestle held his saddle, bridle, and accoutrements. Such were the simple surroundings of the grizzled veteran, whose brain had evolved the plan of campaign which had proved so successful.

In appearance, General Nogi is of ordinary height and build; a man between fifty-five and sixty years of age; his grayish hair showing thin on top of his head, with a square, resolute face and a strong, determined jaw, covered with a short, grey beard. This was the man who had given his only two sons to his Emperor and country—one was killed at Nanshan, the other at 203-metre height. It is said of him that when the remains of his first boy were sent home to Tokyo he cabled his wife to postpone the funeral ceremony until he and the other boy were brought home, and one ceremony would do for all. The body of the second son was sent home early in December, but the gallant old warrior still remains in the service of his beloved Emperor.

After lunch we started for a high peak about two miles in front of headquarters, which was used as the chief artillery observation station. Telephone wires from all the artillery positions were centralized here, connecting also with the General's headquarters and those of the four divisions. The dug-outs, huts, tents, and offices were concealed from the enemy's view on the reverse slope, which was very steep; the connecting passages being cut out of the hard earth; a narrow, crooked passage led to the observation point under cover, where, by aid of a powerful set of glasses, distinct view could be had of all the Russian forts and positions and a part of the west harbor of Port Arthur. The view from the summit was very extensive; the whole country seemed to be a confused mass of mountain-peaks, interspersed with hills of various heights—all absolutely bare and brown;

the surface of the heights was pitted with holes made by the bursting Japanese shells.

The different Russian forts and defensive positions were pointed out by the chief of artillery, and a most instructive lecture on the successive steps of the siege was given and explained on the large map before us.

On January 5th we visited the north fort of Tungkikwan-shan, passing through the Japanese trenches and approaches to the counter-scarp and caponniere; then through the ditch, tunnels, and passages into the main work. The fort was a total wreck; dismantled guns, hand-grenades, fragments of shells, and broken weapons of all sorts were scattered around in a huge pile of *débris*—the results of explosions and Japanese shells. From there we passed along behind the old Chinese palisade or wall, used as a covered passage-way by the Russians from one fort to another, to the top of Wangtai Hill, where three large-calibre guns had been mounted; of these but one remained apparently uninjured; another was broken at the chase; while of the third nothing was seen but the still-smoking embers of its platform—the gun and its carriage had disappeared.

Thence we proceeded past "H" fort, with its five large howitzers, of which but two seemed to have been injured; in one a ragged hole through the side of the iron top carriage showed the excellence of the Japanese gunnery—just below was the body of one of the Russian gunners.

Then past Hachimaki-yama, and one of the Panlungshan forts to the strong Erhlungshan fort, which had been almost totally demolished by a magazine explosion that had buried many Russians with their guns beneath a pile of rock and stone. Many fragments of dead bodies were seen here—one being the leg of a Japanese soldier, as shown by the legging. In trying to avoid stepping on them my foot struck against something which yielded slightly—an uncanny sort of feeling—it was the body of a Russian soldier, who had fallen forward on his face close to one of the wrecked guns. At the foot of the outer slope of Erh-

lungshan were seen, laid in rows preparatory to removal and burial, the bodies of many Japanese soldiers, some of them frightfully mangled.

Next we visited the Sungshushan fort, and here the same harrowing scenes were repeated—of wreck and desolation untold. A curious incident in connection with the attack and capture of this fort was that when the Japanese had tunneled from their advanced trench into the caponniere they exploded a portion of it in order to make a practicable breach. Unexpectedly, the concussion, together with the flames and gases which passed through one of the Russian tunnels, caused the explosion of their main magazine, hurling into eternity most of the garrison, and burying men and guns beneath *débris*, which nearly filled the main ditch of the work.

A Japanese clearing party was still hard at work. Many bodies of Japanese and Russian soldiers were lying on the slopes and in the ditches and trenches just where they had fallen. It was a gruesome sight. One notable feature of the scene was that on the slopes of all these forts and inside the works, the big Japanese shells in striking had blown out great piles of stone and rock until the whole surface seemed but a mass of broken stone; thus testifying to the terrible power of their wonderful explosive. The result seemed rather the effect of an internal convulsion of nature than the handiwork of man.

The Russian defense-line on this side of Port Arthur was an exceedingly strong one naturally; the various heights—some detached, but giving the impression of a continuous line—made a natural barrier to the approach of an enemy, which had been further strengthened by all of the devices known to the military engineer's art.

Perhaps the greatest impression was made by the fact that while from the highest point of observation of the Japanese line of position, every Russian fort, battery, and position could be distinctly and accurately located—from Wangtai Hill, the highest point in the Russian defense line, not a sign could be

seen which would indicate the location of even one of the Japanese artillery or infantry positions. The crests of the various Japanese heights and their slopes towards the enemy gave no clue whatever as to strength or position; the hills were just as God had made them, and there was no sign of man's presence—not a sand-bag nor shovelful of freshly-turned earth.

Here is a lesson to profit by—and the whole management of the investment by the Japanese is full of profitable lessons. Our text-books on strategy and the art of war will have to be re-written, if we are to gain anything from the Russo-Japanese War. Since the days of Sevastopol no other siege of like magnitude has occurred, and the siege of Port Arthur will go down to history as the greatest the world has ever seen. Much has been said and written by impatient critics about the slow progress of the siege, but it had all been previously arranged. Such forts and positions, aided as they were by great natural advantages, could not be taken in a week nor a month. Every step taken by the Japanese was a bloody one, costing many gallant lives (shall we ever know how many?), but the pre-arranged plans were carried out regardless of losses. They knew what they had to do—and did it.

The capitulation was signed late in the evening of the 2d of January; on the 7th we made an early start for Port Arthur. Along the road in the vicinity of the Japanese camps in dug-outs and trenches could be seen the soldiers drilling as if such a thing as war had never existed. Long columns of the small transport carts of the Japanese, or of the lumbering Chinese carts with their wooden wheels, passed and re-passed; some loaded with hospital supplies and food for the Russian sick and wounded in Port Arthur, who had been so long without proper food and care; others loaded with forage, and still others bringing out captured property, or the personal baggage of Russian prisoners of war—like a continuous procession of ants, they moved slowly along the dusty road.

One interesting feature in this connection was the construction by the Japanese of over seventy kilometers of a light narrow-gauge tramway, built in sections about seven feet in length, easily handled by one man, which were simply thrown on the ground; each section being easily locked by a backward thrust against the preceding section. This tramway had been built along the rear of the Japanese line of position and entirely surrounded the doomed city, extending from shore to shore. Along the tramway a large number of small platform-cars were seen, drawn by Japanese soldiers, taking back to an artillery park near General Nogi's headquarters the guns, ammunition, and supplies, now no longer required here, but to immediately start on their long journey to the Sha-ho. A party of 150 men was seen dragging on a low wide-wheeled cart one of the long six-inch naval guns, which had done such wonderful execution.

From early morning to late at night the hardy Japanese worked away at their appointed tasks, showing no fatigue whatever, but singing and laughing, as if life was one grand lark. By the way, it took 800 men to move one of the 28-cm. howitzers (with 11-inch bore) from the railway to the appointed artillery positions, and each gun and carriage were assembled on a stone platform, which rested on eight feet of solid cement. That's work!

As we neared Port Arthur the writer followed the railway embankment, whilst the others took the longer way by the road through Shuishiyang, and was the first foreign officer to enter the city after the surrender.

The Peiyushan fort is close to the railway and is the nearest one to the city. Leaving this on the left, the writer passed through two lines of strong barricades with wire entanglements and loop-holed infantry trenches, which covered and protected the city on this side from infantry attack, and entered the city through a massive wooded gateway. The new town of Port Arthur lies to the right beyond the west harbor and contains many fine brick and stone buildings, barracks, and houses; on

several of the larger buildings the Red Cross flag was flying. This part of the city was not so seriously injured by Japanese shells, though several of the buildings had ragged holes through side or roof, where a shell had struck. Many holes or caves in the ground were noticed, where some of the terrified inhabitants had sought shelter from the incessant bombardment.

The old town of Port Arthur surrounds the east harbor, and along the water-front were the Admiralty buildings, dock-yards, and shops. Standing on the sea-wall facing the entrance to the port, to the right was the west harbor, and within a stone's-throw were the Russian warships *Retvizan*, *Peresviet*, *Pallada*, *Poltava*, and *Pobaida*—seemingly close together, for the sake of company and protection against the hellish fire of Japanese shells. It was a pathetic sight; these huge warships in their utter helplessness reminded one of a herd of cattle which had been overtaken by a Montana blizzard, and, all huddled together, had perished in their tracks. All of these ships were sunk and resting on the bottom of the harbor at various angles; entirely deserted; the water up to or over their main decks; with funnels, upper-works, and sides showing the result of the unerring fire of the Japanese gunners. Beyond these, at a distance, and in different positions, lay five transports and one gun-boat, all resting on the bottom; while of three Russian hospital ships but one seemed intact, and apparently full of sick and wounded men. In front lay the narrow entrance extending from Tiger's Tail to Golden Hill with its strong battery of five large guns, and the signal and searchlight stations on its crest, and three other batteries farther down on the seaward slope, all intact and in good condition. Stretching across the entrance were four or five sunken vessels, leaving but a narrow passage of less than forty yards on the Golden Hill side of the entrance. Just outside the entrance was seen another sunken vessel showing only three inclined masts. Nothing was seen of the *Sevastopol*, for she had anchored outside the harbor to get out of range of the deadly gun-fire, only to be attacked by the torpedo-boats of

Kataoka's squadron and later had been sunk in deep water by the Russians themselves. To the left was the smaller east harbor, surrounded by Government buildings, dry-docks, and slips. Here lay the *Bayan*, the *Amur*, and three gun-boats on their sides with hulls resting on the bottom; several torpedo-boats and one large supply ship were also sunk here. Several tugs and harbor boats had been left uninjured, and these were being handled and used by Japanese crews.

This old town of Port Arthur was a scene of unspeakable desolation; hardly a building but what had from one to several holes through roof or side, caused by the big Japanese shells which had hurled destruction among them—the one singular thing being that the Japanese gunners never once saw their target, their fire having been directed from observation points far away. Never before in the history of the world has such target-practice been witnessed.

Such buildings as could be used were flying the Red Cross flag and were used as hospitals for the 17,000 sick and wounded—poor fellows! with but a handful of surgeons and nurses to care for them!

With the above exception this part of the town was absolutely deserted. The interior of the houses were full of *débris* of all kinds.

Numbers of wounded Russian officers and soldiers were seen walking about—all of them courteously returning the salutes to a brave but vanquished garrison.

The Russian barracks were full of soldiers getting ready to move out of the stronghold which Russia had held in her mighty grip for ten years, and Chinese carts were being filled with their belongings. Some of the men were singing; they showed in their faces they were glad to get out of the hell in which they had lived for eleven long and weary months. The agony and the strain were now things of the past. Few faces showed signs of emaciation; they had had five days of food and sleep; the



tired and drawn look had gone out of their eyes. They were simply glad the long struggle was over.


Here was a group of smiling Japanese surrounding a Russian soldier, who was playing an accordeon for their amusement. There stood a group of tall and bearded Russians surrounding one small Japanese soldier—all of them smoking cigarettes, and laughing heartily as each in turn stood beside the Japanese soldier and measured his height with theirs. The Russian soldiers fraternize with their small captors as if war was but a dream and they had never been foes. History is being repeated. Deadly enemies, having proved each other's mettle, often become the closest friends.

It is remarkable to notice the great racial differences in the Russian Army here gathered. With the big blue-eyed and fair-haired Russians are mixed Poles, Jews, Fins, and other tribes or races of the mighty empire of Russia; this in marked contrast to the soldiers of Japan, all of whom look like brothers of one family.

The transfer of the prisoners of war was concluded on this date; their large number shows conclusively that the original number of the Russian Army defending Port Arthur was much larger than had been estimated and believed, for they must have lost nearly 10,000 killed and had 17,000 sick and wounded.

It is believed by experts that several of the sunken warships can be raised and successfully repaired.

The clearing of the Port Arthur waters will be a long and arduous task. Both of the harbors, as well as the entrance to the port, are cumbered with wrecks, and the sea beyond must be littered with mechanical mines. In Dalny harbor and bay 600 mines have already been raised, and it will be no exaggeration to say that five times as many must be dealt with at Port Arthur.



*Staff.*

**EIGHTH DIVISION.**


Lieutenant-General Tachimi.

<b>Grade.</b>	<b>Fourth Brigade.</b>	<b>Sixteenth Brigade.</b>
<b>1st</b>	<b>Maj.-Gen. Yoda.</b>	<b>Maj.-Gen. Kimura.</b>
<b>2d</b>	<b>5th Inf. Reg't.</b>	<b>17th Inf. Reg't.</b>
	<b>31st Inf. Reg't.</b>	<b>32d Inf. Reg't.</b>

**8th Artillery Regiment.**

**8th Cavalry Regiment.**

**8th Engineer Battalion.**



## FROM THE YALU TO PORT ARTHUR.

## FOURTH ARMY. (MOBILIZED FEBRUARY, 1904.)

General Nozu.

## FIFTH DIVISION.

## TENTH DIVISION.

Lieutenant-General Ueda.

Lieutenant-General Kawamura.

Ninth Brigade.      Twenty-first Brigade.      Eighth Brigade.      Twentieth Brigade.

Maj.-Gen. Nagasaka.      Maj.-Gen. Tsukamoto.      Maj.-Gen. Tojo.      Maj.-Gen. Marui.

11th Inf. Reg't.      21st Inf. Reg't.      10th Inf. Reg't.      20th Inf. Reg't.

41st Inf. Reg't.      42d Inf. Reg't.      39th Inf. Reg't.      40th Inf. Reg't.

5th Artillery Regiment.      10th Artillery Regiment.

5th Cavalry Regiment.      10th Cavalry Regiment.

5th Engineer Battalion.      10th Engineer Battalion.

(NOTE.—In addition to the foregoing, each division has pontoon trains, supply and ammunition columns, hospital, and field telegraph and telephone detachments.

The aggregate strength of a mobilized division is over 20,000 and about 6,000 horses. The Fifth Army, commanded by General Kawamura, was mobilized in December, 1904, and consisted of Second Reservists, raised under the new military law; but as it did not take the field until January, 1905, it does not properly belong to the first period of the war.

Immediately after the surrender of Port Arthur the Third Army proceeded north to the Sha-ho and joined the other armies under the command of Marshal Marquis Oyama.)



## APPENDIX II.

### ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE RUSSIAN FORCES IN MANCHURIA

General Kuropatkin, Commander-in-Chief.

#### FIRST ARMY.

General Linievitch.

##### Second Siberian Army Corps.

Lieutenant-General Sassulich.

Fifth Division, East Siberian Rifles . . . . . Twelve battalions, 4 batteries.  
(Another division joined later.)

##### Third Siberian Army Corps.

Lieutenant-General Ivanoff.

Third Division, East Siberian Rifles . . . . . Twelve battalions, 4 batteries.  
Sixth Division, East Siberian Rifles . . . . . Twelve battalions, 4 batteries.

##### Fourth Siberian Army Corps.

Lieutenant-General Zarubaieff.

Second Division, East Siberian Infantry . . . Sixteen battalions, 8 batteries.  
Third Division, East Siberian Infantry . . . Sixteen battalions, 8 batteries.

##### Cavalry Division.

Lieutenant-General Rennenkamp.

Trans-Baikal Cossack Division . . . . . Twenty-four squadrons.

#### SECOND ARMY.

General Grippenberg.

##### Eighth Army Corps.

Lieutenant-General Mylov.

Fourteenth Division of Infantry . . . . . Sixteen battalions, 6 batteries.  
(Another division joined later.)

##### Tenth Army Corps.

Lieutenant-General Serpitsky.

Ninth Division of Infantry . . . . . Sixteen battalions, 6 batteries.  
Thirty-first Division of Infantry . . . . . Sixteen battalions, 6 batteries.

**First Siberian Army Corps.**

Lieutenant-General Stackelberg.

First Division, East Siberian Rifles . . . . . Twelve battalions, 4 batteries.  
 Ninth Division, East Siberian Rifles . . . . . Twelve battalions, 4 batteries.

**Fifth Siberian Army Corps.**

Lieutenant-General Demboffsky.

Fifty-fourth Division of Infantry . . . . . Sixteen battalions, 6 batteries.  
 Seventy-first Division of Infantry . . . . . Sixteen battalions, 6 batteries.

**THIRD ARMY.**

General Bilderling.

**First Army Corps.**

Lieutenant-General Meyendorff.

Twenty-second Division of Infantry . . . . . Sixteen battalions, 6 batteries.  
 Thirty-seventh Division of Infantry . . . . . Sixteen battalions, 6 batteries.

**Seventeenth Army Corps.**

Lieutenant-General Bilderling.

Third Division of Infantry . . . . . Sixteen battalions, 6 batteries.  
 Thirty-fifth Division of Infantry . . . . . Sixteen battalions, 8 batteries.

**Sixth Siberian Army Corps.**

Lieutenant-General Soboreff.

Fifty-fifth Division of Infantry . . . . . Sixteen battalions, 6 batteries.  
 Seventy-second of Infantry . . . . . Sixteen battalions, 6 batteries.


**Cavalry Corps.**

Lieutenant-General Mistchenko.

Fourth Brigade, Amur Cossacks . . . . . Twelve squadrons.  
 Trans-Baikal Division of Cossacks . . . . . Twenty-four squadrons.  
 Orenburg Division of Cossacks . . . . . Twenty-four squadrons.  
 Fourth Division, Don Cossacks . . . . . Twenty-four squadrons  
 Brigade of Caucasian Cavalry . . . . . Twelve squadrons.  
 Second Brigade of Dragoons . . . . . Twelve squadrons.  
 Other cavalry . . . . . Thirty-four squadrons.  
 Other artillery . . . . . Thirty-six batteries.  
 Grand total:—Infantry . . . . . 268 battalions.  
                   Artillery . . . . . 142 batteries.  
                   Cavalry . . . . . 166 squadrons.

(NOTE.—The strength of an infantry battalion is from 800 to 1,000; of a cavalry squadron, 150. The number of guns in a battery of artillery varies from 6 to 8.)





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