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THE FUTURE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)

Y 4. AR 5/2: S. HRG. 104-343

The Future of the North Atlantic Tr...

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AIRLAND FORCES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

APRIL 5, 1995

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services



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THE FUTURE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 5, 1995

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AIRLAND FORCES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:35 p.m. in room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Warner, Nunn, Exon, Levin, and Lieberman.

Committee staff member present: Richard L. Reynard, staff director.

Professional staff members present: Romie L. Brownlee, Lucia M. Chavez, Thomas G. Moore, and Eric H. Thoemmes.

Minority staff member present: John W. Douglass, professional staff member.

Staff assistants present: Shelley G. Lauffer, Connie B. Rader, and Jason Rossbach.

Committee members' assistants present: Grayson F. Winterling and Judith A. Ansley, assistants to Senator Warner; Matthew Hay, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Patricia L. Stolnacker, assistant to Senator Santorum; Richard W. Fieldhouse and David A. Lewis, assistants to Senator Levin; Patricia J. Buckheit and Suzanne M. McKenna, assistants to Senator Glenn; and John F. Lilley, assistant to Senator Lieberman.

Senator WARNER. The subcommittee will come to order.

Secretary Holbrooke, I understand you have to depart but that one of your deputies will remain for the question period. Am I correct in that?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I am available until 3:40 p.m. We have a meeting with the Turkish Foreign Minister, but absent that, I am here for at least an hour.

Senator WARNER. I can understand that. All right. I think we will dispense with opening statements and will proceed. Secretary Slocombe, we welcome you. And, General Clark, we welcome you as always.

STATEMENT OF HON. WALTER B. SLOCOMBE, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Mr. Chairman, it is a good opportunity to be here to discuss one of the biggest security challenges we face, which is

redefining Europe's role and the broader question of European security in the post-Cold War world.

Senator WARNER. Walt, pull that microphone down a little bit closer. I want to make sure the people in the back are able to hear you.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. It has a tendency to bounce back up. [Laughter.]

Senator WARNER. Due to budget cuts, our microphones are a little ancient. But if I had to make a guess, Walt, I think you have spoken into that microphone probably, in my 17 years, 100 times.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I doubt if it is that many. I do not think I broke it.

It goes without saying that NATO is a solid example of the fact that even in the post-Cold War environment, we need to manage American power and establish frameworks and priorities that make the most effective use of our resources. The United States has to be—and you may be assured we are—ready and willing to act alone when we must to defend American interests. But our common interests are far broader than the resources that the United States can reasonably commit alone.

Even when we do act alone, the cooperation of friends and the facilities to support an American forward presence are frequently essential to effective use of American military power. Alliances, cooperative defense arrangements and coalition warfare remain central to our security doctrine. Nowhere is that clearer than in the case of Europe.

As the committee knows, our commitment to the trans-Atlantic Alliance is the bedrock of U.S. security and military policy. To that end we will maintain about 100,000 troops in Europe, and we remain fully involved in European security issues. We also need continued heavy investment in lift, power projection, and the forces and capabilities that enable us to meet our present responsibilities and to hedge against the possibility of a revived first class threat.

We maintain this commitment to Europe not as an act of altruism, but because the security of the North Atlantic region, and indeed of Europe generally, is vital to the security of the United States. The task before us to build a structure of European security founded on a strong NATO that reflects today's world conditions.

The key factors in those conditions include: first, the positive changes in central and eastern Europe, including in the former Soviet Union; second, the growth of European integration; third, continued U.S. involvement in European security and a recognition of our interest in the security of all European states; fourth, the need to preserve NATO's core mission of defending its members' territory; but also recognizing the fifth factor, which is the reality that threats to European security can, under present circumstances, be at least as likely to arise from conflicts and problems beyond its members' territory.

Most of the attention this afternoon will, I expect, be focused on the issue of relations between NATO and the countries to its east. But it is important to mention at least briefly developments both in NATO's southern flank, if you will, and within the institutions of Western Europe itself.

Real, immediate challenges to NATO allies have been mounting in the south. Flash points have emerged in the Mediterranean lit-

toral, in Southwest Asia and the Balkans, and in North Africa. Increasingly in the coming years, the Alliance will have to devote its attention to these problems, which are particularly challenging, because although they are security problems, they are not, in the first instance at least, military problems in any sort of traditional sense. And second, the evolution of European institutions and arrangements within Europe itself is also a key part of the future of European security with which America must be concerned.

This administration has gone beyond its predecessors in its support of integration of European security efforts. Consistent with that goal, we have proposed making NATO assets available to Western European Union operations in which NATO itself is not involved through the device of the combined joint task force. The effort to reach agreement on a framework for CJTF is proceeding.

Next year will also be an active year on the European front because of the Inter-Governmental Conference, and we look forward to the decisions of that conference on European security issues next year. We are confident that the principle of a European security and defense identity as the European pillar of a strong trans-Atlantic Alliance and not as a competing entity will be preserved.

Let me turn to the issue of NATO enlargement, first to describe briefly what the process is and to refer you to Dick Holbrooke who will be able to describe it in more detail as the subcommittee desires.

As agreed at the December 1994 North Atlantic Council at U.S. initiative, NATO is this year engaged in a deliberative process to consider the practical requirements of membership, in a sense to say why enlarging the Alliance is important and how it should be done. We do not seek to set time lines or to enumerate detailed criteria or list favorite candidates, nor to label some candidates as excluded a priori. We intend the whole process, both this year and in the future, to be transparent.

We expect to reach intra-Alliance agreement on the broad character of the process during the course of the spring and early summer and then, during the latter part of 1995, present Alliance thinking on these issues to all interested partner countries.

The Alliance is actively working on this enlargement study. Many of the specific questions about cost and military implications and other details that I know are of special interest to this committee and indeed to all of us, simply cannot be answered at this point in advance of completion of that analysis. However, General Clark in his statement will speak to the military implications of enlargement in a general way.

Let me outline what we in the Defense Department believe to be four principles that have made NATO the strongest and most successful alliance in history and which have to be preserved in the enlargement process.

First, NATO is an effective alliance. It is not a system of paper guarantees. New members must be prepared to defend the Alliance and have capable, professional military forces to do so. There can be no free riders. At the same time, being a member of NATO implies a willingness of the other members to come to the defense of any member, including a new member. That is not an abstract concept. It is a commitment of treasure and, potentially, of lives. And

it suggests that new members must commit themselves to joining NATO's integrated military structure to make this collective defense effective. Expansion must not mean the dilution of the military effectiveness of the Alliance.

The second broad principle is that NATO is an alliance of free nations. New members must uphold democracy and free enterprise, protect freedom and human rights inside their borders, and respect sovereignty outside their borders. And their military forces must be under civilian control.

Third, NATO works by consensus. New NATO members do not have to agree on everything. Certainly, the current ones do not. But they must respect the proud history, culture, and traditions of all members, and they must be willing to hammer out differences on security matters in the spirit of cooperation. As we enlarge the Alliance, we must take care not to import instability into it.

And fourth, NATO is a military organization. New members' military forces must be capable of operating effectively with NATO's current members' forces. That means being open about defense budgets and plans, having commonality with NATO defense doctrine, and having some degree of commonality on equipment, particularly for things like communications.

Setting these principles up as central should not be regarded as creating hurdles to NATO membership for new countries. Rather, they are guarantees that the Alliance, at whatever size, will maintain its effectiveness, military capability, and political cohesion.

Finally, there is a broader point. NATO enlargement will be a part of a broader process of creating a general cooperative European security order. As we move forward, we must avoid drawing new lines across Europe—the risk that taking in some countries would imply permanently leaving out others, thereby either inviting a new division of the continent or undercutting the apostles of reform in places like Russia, Ukraine, and elsewhere. Therefore, NATO enlargement must not only be inclusive rather than exclusive; but it must also be accomplished in tandem and in an integrated way with developing the broad range of European security institutions, including the European Union and the OSCE, and in including the creation in a parallel process of a relationship between NATO and Russia.

These are serious problems but none is insuperable. I am confident that all will be solved, and that enlargement of NATO when it comes—and it will come—will effectively meet all these requirements.

Meanwhile, the United States is taking steps within the Alliance both to strengthen the Partnership for Peace and to develop concepts for a broad, inclusive security framework for Europe as a whole. Let me say a few words about the Partnership for Peace because it is integrally related to the broader question of NATO enlargement and European security generally.

The Partnership serves different purposes for different countries. For those nations that seek NATO membership, it is the essential stepping stone. For those not joining, a robust Partnership for Peace participation represents concrete evidence of NATO's concern for their security. For all, including those who do not seek member-

ship or those who are unlikely to be early new members, it is the road to closer relations with NATO.

Every partner country that makes the effort and devotes the resources can take part in most of the practical, day-to-day activities of the Alliance. That will gradually expand to include training, exercises, development of common doctrine, defense planning, civil-military relations, and, in time, the practical work of NATO peacekeeping and other operations.

The Partnership has accomplished a great deal in its first year; 25 nations have already signed up, including Russia and Austria, Sweden, and Finland, the former neutral states. The Partnership coordination cell to plan and coordinate the activities of the Partnership with representatives of the individual partner countries is up and running at Mons in Belgium adjacent the SHAPE headquarters. Many partners have already assigned liaison officers to it, as they have the NATO headquarters as well. There were three exercises last year between NATO and Partner nations and they were very successful. We have many more planned for this year.

We also have a very ambitious program of PFP activities—courses, meetings, seminars—on a wide range of subjects in the Partnership's very extensive work program. A PFP defense planning process is already underway with interested parties. It will provide them with a practical means to make their forces more compatible with NATO's. In sum, the Partnership, far from fading as the enlargement process goes forward, will assume even greater importance.

It is for that reason that the administration is seeking from the Congress a total of \$100 million for the so-called Warsaw Initiative to provide critical financial support to certain Partnership activities, as well as \$20 million under the Central European Defense Cooperation Program, and \$5 million for the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion. Those funding initiatives are described in more detail in my statement, and of course I will be glad to answer questions about them as they come up.

Before leaving the subject of NATO's evolution, it is important to say a bit about Russia. We are trying to create something more than a balance of power. We are trying to do nothing less than to extend the European Civil Space eastward, and in particular, to extend all Europe the reconciliation and renunciation of force among its members that is perhaps NATO's most distinctive accomplishment.

One of the most important elements of NATO's evolution, and indeed of European security generally, will be the re-definition of NATO's relations with Russia. Russia's development, both internal and external, is perhaps the central factor in determining the overall fate and future of European security. Neither Russia nor any other non-member will have a veto over the enlargement decisions of the allies so far as NATO enlargement itself is concerned. But to say that is not to imply that NATO enlargement threatens or sees a threat in Russia. Enlargement can add to the security of all and diminish that of none.

We in the United States have an enormous stake in the outcome of Russia's transition and we must continue to support Russian reform. That is one reason why we have been so concerned about

Russia's tactics in Chechnya, apart from the human tragedy. While we recognize the importance of maintaining the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, these tactics are a step backwards.

We need to be clear and open with Russia about our intentions for NATO. NATO is a defensive alliance committed to ensuring more security and stability for Europe as a whole, Russia included, whatever Russia's formal relationship with the Alliance is. NATO is no longer an alliance directed against Russia. Its basic principles of collective defense, democracy, consensus, and cooperative security are no threat to the Russia of today nor, we trust, that of tomorrow. As in the past, NATO will be a threat to no country unless that country, by its actions, chooses to make itself a threat.

With our allies, we have begun a dialogue with Russia about its role in European security and its relationship to NATO. This dialogue will follow a parallel path with NATO's, and it is a serious priority complementing the NATO enlargement process. But the pace of the NATO enlargement process is not linked to it.

We expect that this track will eventuate in a more cooperative relationship with Russia based on mutual respect and on providing for enhanced, regularized consultation. Naturally, this relationship will be reciprocal and it will not give either party, NATO or Russia, a veto or a vote in the other's decisions and actions.

We urge Russia to work with us to build this new relationship and to work with us in the Partnership for Peace. That message has been most recently carried by Secretary Perry in his meetings this week in Moscow. If it does this, Russia will see more clearly that, far from drawing new security divisions across Europe, NATO wants to erase what lines remain.

Far from being naive in our approach to the issue of Russia's place in the European security order, we are acutely conscious of the dangers and the hard lessons of history. In particular, should Russia turn away from its new path, we can and would have to re-evaluate our approach to trans-Atlantic security. We have made clear our view that when Russian forces operate beyond Russia's borders, or indeed within them as in the case of Chechnya, they must do so in accordance with international norms.

It was for this reason that we pressed hard and successfully that the planned and pledged Russian withdrawal of military forces from the Baltic states be carried out on schedule. That is why we made clear that Russia's methods in protecting its legitimate interests in Chechnya are not consistent with the role she rightly seeks in a future Europe.

We are also realistic about Russian foreign policy under any government. Russia is a great power. It will have interests different from ours. A partnership between nations does mean an identity of views but a recognition that our mutual interest in secure relationships provides a basis for working out concrete problems, such as the important one which now exists over Russia's plans to provide nuclear reactor technology to Iran.

All that said, it would be deeply premature now to let our real concerns about Russia's future make us abandon our hopes for a fundamentally new Europe. This is why we are pursuing the cooperative threat reduction program, and again, Secretary Perry had an opportunity yesterday to see one of the fruits of that program

when he went out to Engels Air Base and watched a Russian bomber being cut up in accordance with the START agreement, using in part American-provided or American-financed equipment.

Our vision is of a new European-American security system rooted in the common commitment to democracy and free economies and mutual respect for security, human rights, independence of states, inviolability of borders. A Europe that for the first time since the establishment of nation states would not be divided by present conflict or lingering animosities.

As we approach these issues, we in the Department of Defense recognize the absolute centrality of being very serious and hard-headed about what enlargement will mean. We look forward to the opportunity to continue a dialogue on this issue with this committee which, with the rest of the Senate, will ultimately have the final American vote on what happens about NATO enlargement. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Slocombe follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. WALTER B. SLOCOMBE, UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR POLICY

INTRODUCTION

It's a pleasure to be here, and to discuss one of the greatest international security challenges of our time—redefining NATO's role in the post-Cold War world.

The post-Soviet international security environment presents great opportunities. We have a possibility of building a system in which Europe and indeed the entire world is organized on the model of what we used to call "free world"—liberal market democracies, living in peace with their neighbors.

These developments come at a time when Europe is moving toward the realization of the dream of European integration—which is not only an economic, but also a strategic phenomenon.

Unilateralism unworkable

Let me say at the outset that NATO is a solid example of how, in an environment of important security challenges and resource limits, we need to manage American power, and establish frameworks and policies that make the most effective use of our resources.

We must be, and are, ready to act alone when we must to defend American interests.

But our common interests are far broader than the resources we can responsibly commit alone.

And even if we engage alone, the cooperation of friends, and the facilities to support forward presence are frequently essential to effective use of American military power.

Moreover, we have shared interests. Neither from a security perspective, nor from an economic perspective, does a unilateral "go it alone" approach make sense for America. It is neither fair nor wise for America to bear the military burden of defending shared interests by itself. This is one reason the administration so strongly opposes legislation that would effectively destroy U.N. peacekeeping.

Alliances, cooperative defense arrangements, and coalition warfare remain central to our security doctrine.

NATO GENERALLY

Nowhere is that clearer than in the case of Europe.

Our commitment to the trans-Atlantic alliance is bedrock U.S. security policy. We will maintain about 100,000 troops in Europe, and full involvement in European security issues. We also need continued heavy investment in lift, power projection, and in the forces and capabilities that enable us to meet our present responsibilities and to hedge against the possibility of a revived first-class threat.

We maintain our commitment to Europe not as an act of altruism, but because the security of the North Atlantic region is vital to the security of the United States. This is so, not just because of Europe's great economic and military potential, but because of even more important ties of culture, values and kinship. Now we no

longer fear a massive attack from a common enemy. But if our common adversary has vanished, we know that our common dangers have not and surely our common interests survive.

NATO has unique assets and characteristics—it is the only effective, continuing multilateral military alliance in the world, and an instrument for common political, strategic, and military efforts.

We need to build a structure of European security, founded on a strong NATO, that reflects today's world conditions:

- the positive changes in Central and Eastern Europe, including in the former Soviet Union;
- the growth of European integration;
- continued US involvement in European security and our interest in the security of all European states;
- the need to preserve NATO's core mission of defending its members' territory, but also recognizing
- the reality that threats to European security can arise from conflicts beyond its members' territory.

Much attention is focused on the issue of relations between NATO and countries to the East. But it is important to take account of developments both in the South, and within the institutions of Western Europe itself.

Real, immediate challenges to NATO allies have been mounting in the South. Flash points have emerged on the Mediterranean littoral, in Southwest Asia, in the Balkans, and in North Africa.

The spread of instability across the Mediterranean would not only threaten friendly regimes in North Africa and the prospects for a comprehensive peace in the Middle East. It also threatens Europe with new social and security problems, such as terrorism, mass migration and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The evolution of European institutions and arrangements is also a key part of the future of European security. Our administration has gone beyond previous American administrations to support integration of European security efforts. Consistent with that goal, we have proposed making NATO assets available to WEU operations in which NATO itself is not involved through CJTF. We look forward to the decision of the ICC next year on European security, confident that the principle of a ESDI as the European pillar of a strong transatlantic Alliance will be preserved.

NATO ENLARGEMENT

Inevitably—with the Berlin wall down, the nations of CEE independent once again, and the Soviet Union dissolved—the issue of NATO enlargement arose. The impulse for this desire to join NATO came, not from a judgment by the nations of Central and Eastern Europe that they face threats of external aggression in the present environment. Rather, they seek to reaffirm their link to Western European culture and values, and to gain the sense of thorough and permanent inclusion in the West that comes with NATO membership.

The Process

Thus, at the January 1994 summit, NATO's leaders declared that they expect and would welcome new members, as part of an evolutionary process.

As agreed at December 1994 NAC, at U.S. initiative, NATO has begun a deliberative process, considering the practical requirements of membership, why enlarging the Alliance is important, and how it should be done.

The Allies support the goal of NATO enlargement and continue to see NATO as the key institution in preserving European security.

We will not Seek to set arbitrary timelines, enumerate detailed criteria, or list favored candidates, nor seek to label some as excluded a priori. We intend for the process to be gradual and transparent.

We expect to reach intra-Alliance agreement on the broad character of the process and then, during the latter part of 1995, present Alliance thinking on the process, and the requirements for membership, to all interested countries.

The Alliance is actively working on the enlargement study mandated in December. At this point we are focusing on the "how" and "why" of enlargement. The questions of "who" and "when" will come later. Many of the specific questions I know to be of great interest to the committee simply cannot be answered at this point. For example, the cost and military implications of any specific enlargement will depend critically on the "who"—a question NATO cannot and will not study in 1995; however, General Clark in his statement will speak to the military implications of enlargement generally.

Principles for Enlargement

As we consider the enlargement question, I believe we need to bear in mind four principles that have made NATO the strongest, most successful Alliance in history.

- First, NATO is an effective alliance, not a system of paper guarantees. New members must be prepared to defend the Alliance, and have the capable, professional military forces to do so. There can be no free riders. At the same time, NATO must be prepared to come to the defense of any new member. That is not an abstract concept. It is a commitment of treasure and, potentially, of lives. And it suggests that new members must commit themselves to joining NATO's integrated military structure. Expansion must not mean dilution of the effectiveness of the Alliance.

- Second, NATO is an alliance of free nations. New members must uphold democracy and free enterprise, protect freedom and human rights inside their borders, and respect sovereignty outside their borders. And their military forces must be under civilian control.

- Third, NATO works by consensus. New NATO members won't have to agree on everything. But they must respect the proud history, culture and traditions of all members. And they must be willing to hammer out differences on security matters in a spirit of cooperation. We must not import instability into the Alliance.

- And fourth, NATO is a military organization. New members' military forces must be capable of operating effectively with NATO's military forces. This means being open about defense budgets and plans, having commonality with NATO defense doctrine, and having commonality on some equipment, especially communication equipment.

These principles should not be regarded as hurdles to NATO membership. Rather, they are guarantees that the Alliance, at whatever size, maintains its effectiveness, military capability and political cohesion.

Finally, there is a broader point. NATO enlargement will be a part of a broader process of creating a general cooperative European security order. As we move forward, we must avoid drawing new lines across Europe—the risk that taking in some countries will imply the permanent leaving out of others, thereby either inviting a new division of the Continent or undercutting the apostles of reform in places like Russia, Ukraine or elsewhere. Therefore, NATO enlargement must not only be inclusive, rather than exclusive; it must be accomplished in tandem with developing the broad range of European security institutions, including the EU and OSCE.

These are serious problems; none is insuperable. All will be solved. Enlargement of NATO, when it comes, will effectively meet all of these requirements.

PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE/OSCE

Meanwhile, we are taking steps both to strengthen the Partnership for Peace and to develop concepts for a broad, inclusive security framework for Europe as a whole, including an appropriate role for the OSCE.

For those nations seeking NATO membership, Partnership is the essential stepping stone. For those not joining, a robust PFP represents concrete evidence of NATO's concern for their security. For all, including those who do not seek membership, or who are unlikely to be early new members, it is the road to closer relations with NATO. PFP-related assistance should not prejudice potential NATO membership. PFP and NATO enlargement are mutually reinforcing. First, the Partnership is the pathway to membership for those nations ultimately joining NATO. Equally important, it also provides an invaluable link and assurance of NATO support to those Partners not doing so.

Every partner country that makes the effort can take part in most of the practical, day-to-day activities of the Alliance. That includes training, exercises, development of common doctrine, defense Planning, civil-military relations, and in time the practical work of NATO peacekeeping.

The Partnership has accomplished a lot in its first year. Twenty-five nations have already joined including Russia and, let us note, Austria, Sweden and Finland. A partnership cooperation cell is up and running in Mons. Many Partners have already assigned liaison officers to it as they have to NATO headquarters as well. The three exercises last year between NATO and Partner nations were a success, and we have many more planned for this year. Mounting these exercises will entail more than 100 workshops and planning sessions. We also have a very ambitious program of PFP activities—courses, meetings, seminars—on a wide range of subjects in the Partnership's very extensive Work Program. A PFP defense planning process is also underway with interested parties. It will provide them with a practical means to make their forces more compatible with NATO's.

In sum, PFP, far from fading as the enlargement process goes forward, will assume even greater importance.

RESOURCES

Warsaw Initiative

But these PFP activities cost money. Partner nations must foot most of the bill, but many have severe resource problems and need help.

In July 1994, President Clinton made a commitment to request \$100 million in fiscal year 1996 funds to help new democratic partners advance PFP goals. known as the Warsaw Initiative, this program is designed to build the foundations of partner participation in PFP, improve defense force interoperability, and prepare countries emerging from communist governments for eventual NATO membership. This program is designed to relieve some of the logistical and resource deficiencies, equipment obsolescence, and operational shortcomings which have hampered Partnership participation.

Fiscal year 1996 appropriations from both the Department of State and Department of Defense are needed to fund the Warsaw Initiative fully, using existing authorities. The State Department requests \$60 million to implement the bilateral military assistance programs that support equipment transfers and training. Bilateral assistance will be used to support transfers of equipment such as, search and rescue equipment, tactical radios, and other command and control equipment. The Department of Defense requests as part of its budget the balance of \$40 million to be allocated among programs to support individual Partner participation in joint exercises and other PFP activities as well as programs for advancing NATO-PFP interoperability.

Central European Defense Cooperation

While the Warsaw Initiative encompasses all PFP partners, including the NIS states, the related but distinct Central European defense infrastructure program is focused on selected countries in Central Europe. The State Department is requesting \$20 million in Foreign Military Financing grants to support this program. Designed to aid the reorientation of the former Warsaw Pact militaries to peaceful, non-offensive roles, it will promote peace and regional stability by helping these newly democratic states to acquire new and used U.S.-origin equipment; enhance the compatibility of CE defense infrastructure with NATO; and encourage the CE states to assume greater security responsibilities in the post-Cold War world. While the Warsaw Initiative has the immediate goal of facilitating PFP participation, this CE program will address deeper infrastructure deficiencies, such as lack of airlift capability and incompatible radar and IFF systems. Addressing these deficiencies may or may not facilitate PFP participation, but will promote the broader goal of improved NATO compatibility.

Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion

The Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (BALTBAT) aims to promote regional peace and cooperation by assisting the Baltic States in playing a larger, more effective role in international peacekeeping activities. The BALTBAT will also improve the interoperability of the fledgling Baltic defense forces with U.S. and NATO armed forces. Once operational (late October, 1995), it is envisioned that the BALTBAT will be made available for employment by the U.N. and NATO.

A series of donor nation meetings have been held during the past 7 months to coordinate multinational support for the BALTBAT. Representatives from the Ministries of Defense of Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the UK and the United States were in attendance. The United States has committed, inter alia, to provide uniform items, communications equipment, selected vehicles and various items of unit equipment. The success of the BALTBAT is to a significant degree dependent upon the receipt of the U.S. contributions, which have leveraged similar support from other donor nations.

To date, State has provided \$3.71 million in fiscal year 1995 PKO funds. These funds were used to deliver radios and uniforms in early January to meet initial BALTBAT cadre training requirements. Additionally, we are in the process of transferring 90 excess CUCVs (light tactical trucks). Other donor nations have to date completed the transfer of nearly \$6 million of equipment to support the unit. We are in the process of identifying funds to meet the remainder of the Presidential commitment.

The fiscal year 1996 State budget request contains \$5 million under FMF for the BALTBAT. These funds are intended to be used to sustain logistical related programs for the BALTBAT (procurement and replacement of expendable items and the

purchase of additional items of equipment such as mine detectors, field kitchens, etc.).

Other programs

PFP is also being supplemented by extensive bilateral programs between allies and partners in areas such as air defense, communications, defense procurement, and standardization. This is a worthwhile investment in European security, and we are urging our allies to provide similar bilateral assistance.

RUSSIA

Before leaving the subject of NATO's evolution, let me also say a word about Russia. The 16 Allies are trying to create something better than the balance of power. We are doing nothing less than trying to extend the European Civil Space eastward—one careful step after another—and, in particular, to extend to all Europe the reconciliation and renunciation of force among its members that is perhaps NATO's most distinctive accomplishment.

One of the most important elements of NATO's evolution will be its redefinition of relations with Russia—whose development, both internal and external, is a central factor in determining the future of European security. Neither Russia nor any other nonmember will have a veto over the enlargement decision by the allies. But to say that is not to imply that NATO enlargement threatens—or sees a threat in—Russia. Enlargement can add to the security of all and diminish that of none.

We have an enormous stake in the outcome of Russia's transition, and we must continue to support Russian reform. Our most fervent desire is for a free, stable, democratic Russia in Europe.

This is one reason why we have been concerned about Russia's tactics in Chechnya, apart from the human tragedy. While we recognize the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, these tactics are a step backwards.

We need to be clear and open with Russia about our intentions for NATO. NATO is a defensive alliance committed to ensuring more security and stability for Europe as a whole, Russia included. NATO is not an alliance against Russia. NATO's basic principles—collective defense; democracy; consensus; and cooperative security—are no threat to the Russia of today, nor, we trust, of tomorrow. As in the past, NATO will be a threat to no country, unless that country by its actions chooses to make itself a threat.

With our allies, we have begun a dialogue with Russia about its role in European security, and its relationship with NATO. This NATO-Russia dialogue will follow a parallel track with NATO's own dialogue about its future, and it is a serious priority, complementing the NATO enlargement process. We expect that this track will eventuate in a more cooperative relationship with Russia, based on mutual respect and on providing for enhanced, regularized consultations. Naturally this relationship will be reciprocal, and will not give either party, NATO or Russia, a veto, or a vote, in the other's decisions and actions.

Whatever we decide, NATO is committed to keeping Russia fully informed on a reciprocal basis. There will be no surprises and Russia will not be isolated. We urge Russia to work with us to build this new relationship and in the Partnership for Peace. If it does, Russia will see more clearly that, far from drawing new security divisions in Europe, NATO wants to erase what lines remain.

Far from being naive in our approach to the issue of Russia's place in a European security order, we are acutely conscious of the dangers, of the hard lessons of history. In particular, should Russia turn away from its new path, we can re-evaluate our approach to it, and to trans-Atlantic security and NATO's strategic priorities. We have made clear our view that when Russian forces operate beyond Russia's borders—or indeed within them—they must do so in accord with international norms. It was for this reason that we pressed hard and successfully that the planned and pledged Russian withdrawal of military forces from the Baltic States must be carried out. It is why we have made clear that Russia's methods in protecting its legitimate interest in Chechnya are not consistent with the role she rightly seeks in Europe.

We are also realistic about Russian foreign policy under any government. Russia is a great power. It will have interests different from ours. A partnership between nations does not mean an identity of views, but a recognition that our mutual interest in secure relationships provides a basis for working out concrete problems.

All that said, it would be deeply premature now to let our real concerns about Russia's future make us abandon our hopes for a fundamentally new Europe. This is why we are pursuing a Cooperative Threat Reduction program, why we need to continue aid for reform in Russia, and why we need to develop our policy on NATO enlargement conscious of Russia's concerns.

CONCLUSION

In sum, our vision is of a new European-American security system rooted in common commitment to democracy and free economies and mutual respect for security, human rights, independence of states and inviolability of borders—a Europe that, for the first time since the establishment of nation states, would not be divided by present conflict or lingering animosities.

Through the Partnership for Peace, through considered and gradual enlargement of NATO to members able to meet its commitments, and through the development of new institutions and habits of cooperation with all European nations, we are proceeding together to lay the foundation for a system in which freedom and security are established at their broadest, and deepest, in the history of Europe.

Senator WARNER. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. As you know, this committee is extremely interested in this particular subject. We consider it one of the very key issues to work our way through in the coming months as we prepare our annual bill for the Senate as a whole.

I would like to now turn to Secretary Holbrooke. We welcome you, Mr. Secretary, before the committee. You are no stranger before this committee. But it is fortunate that you bring with you at this particular time the experience of having been an ambassador in the immediate region affected by the Partnership for Peace, and I am sure you draw on that experience and knowledge as you advise the Secretary of State and, indeed, the Senate.

So, if you would proceed, thank you.

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD HOLBROOKE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN AFFAIRS

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It really is a great honor to appear before you and your colleagues, several of whom are among my closest and oldest friends in the U.S. Congress, and to particularly join Walt Slocombe and General Clark to discuss an issue which I know you, as we, feel is of historic importance in shaping the post-Cold War security environment. I have a long and, I am sure, brilliant statement which I would like to submit for the record at this point.

Senator WARNER. Without objection, the full statements of all witnesses will be made a part of the record.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. And I would like to make a very brief comment amplifying Walt Slocombe's opening statement.

The dilemma which faces the United States at the end of the Cold War and which has not yet been fully resolved in the public's eye but which this administration has a point of view on—is what role the United States should play in Europe at the end of the Cold War. We have faced this problem of course twice already in this century, in 1919–1920 when we helped create the post-World War I environment but withdrew from it, thereby hastening, perhaps making inevitable, the tragedy of 1939; and then after World War II when, contrary to popular mythology, the period was divided into two phases. We began a withdrawal from Europe in 1945–1946; we were drawing down to zero except for some occupying forces in Berlin. But then, after the challenge of the spring of 1947, a Democratic President and a Republican Congress, including your distinguished predecessors in this committee, fashioned the Cold War institutions which worked so well.

This is the third such moment in the century and we are at its midpoint. On the time scale of 1945 to 1949, we are roughly about the point where George Marshall spoke to the Harvard commencement class in 1947. The debate, in my view, is fully launched and should continue, and I think this is one of the most important forums for it.

What is the role for the United States in Europe? I know that most Americans today think that with the Cold War over we can come home. We would submit to you that if we do so, we will not have learned the lessons of history and we will pay for it. So we feel that the United States is, whether it realizes it or not, a European power and must remain so.

And drawing on my previous experience in Asia, I want to make the difference clear between the two parts of the world. We are not an Asian power; we are a Pacific power. We are a European power. We are on the land mass of Europe. We are still, of course, on the Korean Peninsula for historic Cold War legacy reasons. But our military presence or our political involvement in the balance of power in Asia is not required in the same way as in Europe. Why that is true is something that philosophers and historians can discuss. But, for purposes of U.S. national interests, U.S. withdrawal would be a disaster.

Now, the next question is whether the status quo that existed between 1947 and 1991 is still viable. We would submit to you that it is not. We would submit to you that if the accident of where the Red Army was in the summer of 1945 becomes a hardened, permanent dividing line in Europe, that it will create two classes of Europeans. And to the east of a non-existent Iron Curtain, instability, which has been endemic in Central Europe for over a century, will continue and become worse.

I want to stress the most obvious point. Central Europe has been where the two worst wars in human history, the most appalling extermination of peoples, and the Cold War have all played out in the lives of our parents and our grandparents. Anyone who thinks that part of the world is stable just does not know history and is not reading the newspapers.

As we appear before your committee today, we have been in touch with our Ambassadors in Ljubljana and Rome about the Italian-Slovenian dispute, which goes back to the earlier part of the century. We have been working hard on the Hungarian-Romanian issue, and we are meeting before and after this hearing with the foreign minister of Turkey. Those are only a fraction—that is just today's agenda. That is only a fraction of the issues in Central Europe.

We have been successful recently in encouraging the completion of the Hungarian-Slovakian peace treaty but less successful between Hungary and Romania, which we are still working on. We have had a success between Greece and Albania, but were less successful between Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. We are working on Cyprus.

And, Mr. Chairman, this entire part of the world—southeastern Europe including Turkey—remains inherently unstable in addition to the crisis in Bosnia. We believe that in that political environment, extending NATO eastward in a careful, gradual, and open

way is an important part of bringing stability to the region. But, as President Clinton said in Cleveland in his speech on January 13, we cannot open NATO automatically to countries, and particularly to countries that have unresolved irredentist territorial or ethnic disputes, which is why, as the Washington Times reported yesterday accurately, NATO membership is closely linked to settling of these issues.

Walt Slocombe referred to Russia. It is critically important that Russia understand that the new, expanding NATO is not directed against them. This is a difficult point for Russians who grew up when NATO was created and designed to stop a Soviet thrust through the central plains of Germany, and who are perhaps viscerally still viewing NATO in the old way. But we have made clear to the Russians at every level, including President Clinton's personal conversations with President Yeltsin, that this is not the case. And those of you in this room and other Members of Congress have also been very helpful in that regard.

We do not have a timetable for NATO expansion but we are committed to it, and in the next month we will make further progress in moving that process forward.

With that opening statement, Mr. Chairman, I will be happy to answer your questions.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Holbrooke follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY RICHARD C. HOLBROOKE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN AFFAIRS

Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to discuss the future of NATO within the context of Europe's changing security landscape.

When the Cold War ended—that symbolic midnight moment on December 25, 1991, when the Soviet flag came down over the Kremlin for the last time—it was inevitable that Americans would talk of ending, or sharply reducing their global commitments, of coming home.

A half century ago, at the end of World War II, the United States faced another time of great change, another time of enormous opportunity and uncertain peril, another time when Americans wanted nothing more than simply to go home. But we soon found that freedom's wartime victory was incomplete, and that the postwar period would require continuous and active American engagement to marshal the forces of freedom for a new kind of war, a cold war.

Among the challenges that Harry Truman, George Marshall, Dean Acheson and their Democratic colleagues faced was to build a new postwar order in cooperation with a new Republican Congress. And to the lasting benefit of our Nation and the world, they met that challenge. They found allies among Republicans who recalled the consequences of isolationism after World War I—a period that also began with a Democratic President facing new Republican majorities in Congress. They urged a bipartisan consensus based on the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the postwar institutions of the West, and sustained American leadership.

Now, a half-century later, we have the opportunity—and the responsibility—to marshal the forces of freedom for a new kind of European peace, one that is just and enduring. We have the opportunity—and the obligation—to work with our European partners to extend freedom's victory to all of Europe.

It is fair, of course, to ask why it is in the national interest of the United States to continue to play an active role in the restructuring of Europe's security. It is tempting to say, at the end of the Cold War, that we will leave it to the Europeans themselves to work out a new Concert of Europe, while we focus on problems at home.

We must resist this temptation for a simple reason: our own narrow self-interest. The context for U.S. relations with Europe may have changed, but bedrock American interests in Europe endure: a continent free from domination by any power or combination of powers hostile to the United States; prosperous partners open to our ideas, our goods and our investments; a community of shared values, extending across as much of Europe as possible, that can facilitate cooperation with the United

States on a growing range of global issues; a continent that is not so wracked by strife that it drains inordinate resources from the United States or the rest of the world. These interests require active U.S. engagement in Europe. They point to close cooperation with our European partners.

President Clinton's four trips to Europe last year underscored an inescapable fact: the United States has become a European power, an enduring and essential element of a stable balance.

Many thought our presence in Europe would no longer be necessary when the Soviet threat ended. But after only a few years—and the disastrous results of our early non-involvement in the Yugoslav tragedy—it is time to recognize that Europe cannot maintain stability on its own. An unstable Europe would still threaten essential national security interests of the United States, and Europe still needs American involvement to keep the continent stable. Our national security requires continued American participation in maintaining European stability and promoting an undivided continent.

During the Cold War Americans played an indispensable role in containing ancient conflicts by creating a framework of operative security across the western half of the continent, and on its always explosive southeastern Aegean flank. Today, American power and presence remain essential to extend these habits of cooperation across the entire continent, the eastern portion of which seethes still with unresolved historic legacies. To paraphrase Winston Churchill, it is still necessary for "the New World to redress the imbalances of the Old."

Local conflicts, internal political and economic instability, and the return of historic grievances have replaced Soviet expansionism as the greatest threat to peace in Europe. Western Europe and the United States must jointly ensure that tolerant democracies become rooted throughout all of Europe and that the seething, angry, unresolved legacies of the past are contained and solved.

Europe's diversity and historic rivalries remain a determining aspect of efforts to maintain stability. Maintaining peace in Europe has traditionally depended on a complicated set of structures that balanced often-conflicting interests. Disappearance of Cold War structures has left important parts of Europe without a sense of security provided by a credible framework. This sense of insecurity is related less to the perception of a new threat than it is to the need to generate a climate of confidence in which difficult economic and political reforms can be advanced.

In this context, building a new security architecture for Europe means providing a framework to build democracy, market economies, stable societies, and ultimately a stable and just peace across the continent. If we are to realize our goal of a peaceful, democratic, prosperous and undivided Europe, we must work with our European partners to reestablish a sense of overall security.

Today, the early euphoria that surrounded the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet empire has yielded to a more sober appreciation of the problems, new and old. The tragedy of Bosnia does not diminish the responsibility to build a new comprehensive structure of relationships to form a new security architecture. On the contrary, Bosnia, the greatest collective security failure of the West since the 1930s, only underscores the urgency of that task.

Any effort to redesign the new security architecture of Europe must focus first on central Europe, the seedbed of more turmoil and tragedy in this century than any other area on the continent. The two most destructive wars in human history began from events on its plains, and the Cold War played itself out in its ancient and storied cities, all within the last 80 years.

Other historic watersheds also have not treated this area well. First the treaties of Versailles and Trianon, then the agreements of Yalta and Potsdam, and finally the collapse of the Soviet empire—those three benchmark events left throughout central Europe a legacy of unresolved and often conflicting historical resentments, ambitions, and most dangerous, territorial and ethnic disputes. If any of these malignancies spread—as they have already in parts of the Balkans and the Transcaucasus—general European stability is again at risk.

But if there are great problems there are also great possibilities. For the first time in history, the nations of Central Europe have the chance simultaneously to enjoy stability, freedom, and independence based on another first: the adoption of Western democratic ideals as a common foundation for all of Europe. The emotional but also practical lure of the West can be the strongest unifying force Europe has seen in generations, but only if unnecessary delay does not squander the opportunity.

The West owes much of its success to the great institutions created in the 1940s and 1950s. These structures offer a usable foundation for a new era. There is no desire and no reason to dismantle these structures—on the contrary. These institutions form the basis for a new security architecture. Each has its own role to play and each represents a separate pillar of security. The essential challenge is to main-

tain their coherence, extend their influence, and adapt to new circumstances without diluting their basic functions.

If those institutions were to remain closed to new members, they would become less relevant to the problems of the post-Cold War world. It would be a tragedy if, through delay or indecision, the West helped create conditions that brought about the very problems it fears the most. The West must expand to central Europe as fast as possible in fact as well as in spirit. Western cooperation cannot be seen as a closed undertaking, open only to those who were lucky enough to be on the western side of the Iron Curtain.

Such a development would bring a halt to the process of European integration, which is vital for peace in Europe. A truly integrated security architecture cannot be built by extending the largesse of one part of Europe without a commensurate growth in the participation and responsibility of the other part. Integration must be open and organic. The goal must be a functioning community of nations, not a development program from the haves to the have-nots. The United States is ready to lead in the building of this community.

The President's comprehensive strategy to build a new interlocking security architecture builds on the success and enduring value of these Western institutions, and is based upon enlargement, integration, and inclusion. Its key elements include a gradual, deliberate and transparent process of NATO enlargement, enhancing the Partnership for Peace (PFP), strengthening the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), supporting European integration as embodied in the European Union (EU), and developing the NATO-Russia relationship. Each of these mutually supportive elements is critical to our overall success.

NATO AND PFP

The central security pillar of the new architecture is a venerable organization: NATO. NATO remains the anchor of American engagement in Europe and the linchpin of transatlantic security. First and foremost, NATO is the most successful and capable military alliance in history. When the forces of NATO join together, they are highly effective. NATO is a unified force for stability in a fragmented, unstable world. Its members are the cornerstone of the free world. We and our allies cherish peace and freedom, respect human rights, and thrive on free enterprise. If one looks for nations with political objectives and military forces capable of operating successfully with the United States, most are members of NATO.

The tried-and-true patterns of military exercises, planning and collaboration with NATO allies allow the United States to leverage its resources and relieve the United States from the unacceptable choice of either having to act alone or do nothing when confronted with crises. Without continuing political and military cooperation in NATO, the United States and its allies would be hard pressed to build the kind of political coalition and conduct the kind of coalition military operations that were the key to success of Operation Desert Storm.

In short, NATO has always been more than a transitory response to a temporary threat. It is a guarantor of European democracy and a force for European stability. NATO provides a proven structure for managing transatlantic relations. It is the accepted vehicle for our involvement in European security. These are the reasons why its mission has endured, and why its benefits are so attractive to Europe's new democracies.

Only 8 months after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and 17 months before the end of the Soviet Union, NATO began an historic transformation that continues today. New goals for the Alliance were set forth in NATO's London Summit Declaration of July 1990. NATO declared that it no longer considered Russia an adversary and announced a new program of cooperation with the states of Central and Eastern Europe. Just as importantly, NATO called for a restructuring of its military forces and a reorientation of its strategy. This Declaration also established the first ties between NATO and the countries of the then-existent Warsaw Treaty Organization.

Then, in June 1991 in Copenhagen, NATO foreign ministers issued a statement on "Partnership with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe." NATO declared that "We do not wish to isolate any country, nor to see a new division of the Continent. Our objective is to help create a Europe whole and free." This objective has guided NATO's policies ever since. It remains the foundation of NATO's current efforts to extend security throughout Europe.

In pursuit of this objective, the forces and missions of NATO's integrated military commands have been radically restructured. The former concentrations of heavily armored forces in the center of Europe have been replaced by more lightly armed, mobile and flexible multinational corps better able to respond to a range of possible security challenges in a different, less stable world. These forces are not directed

against any country or group of countries. Their purpose is to defend peace in Europe, either on NATO territory or—pursuant to a mandate from either the U.N. or the OSCE—in areas of instability or crisis.

The concept of containment has disappeared from NATO's strategy. No country, including Russia, is classified as an opponent or an enemy. These points were set forth clearly in the New Strategic Concept which Alliance heads of state and government adopted at the Rome Summit in November 1991, and they have been enshrined in NATO military planning documents ever since. The New Strategic Concept made clear that crisis management would become an important mission for the Alliance in addition to its core purpose of collective defense.

At the same Rome Summit, Alliance leaders created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, and invited Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union to join. The NACC, as it is known, has proven to be a useful vehicle for political contact and consultations. It began in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War when levels of trust were still being defined and has grown progressively more active and effective. As the level of trust has increased, NATO has redoubled its efforts to cooperate with Russia and other states in Central and Eastern Europe, and to build closer, institutional links aimed at promoting, common approaches to common problems.

At the Brussels Summit in January 1994, Alliance leaders added even more substance to NATO's new role through adoption of a broad strategy of cooperation with all of Europe. In reaffirming the political course set by the London and Rome summits and the military redirection enshrined in the Alliance's new Strategic Concept, NATO endorsed a series of "initiatives designed to contribute to lasting peace, stability and well-being in the whole of Europe, which has always been the Alliance's fundamental goal."

These initiatives included the Partnership for Peace, through which NATO invited members of the NACC, including Russia, and other states to "join us in new political and military efforts to work alongside the Alliance." In just 1 year, the innovative PFP has become an integral part of the European security scene.

Contrary to a fairly widespread impression, PFP is not a single organization; rather, it is a series of individual agreements between NATO and, at last count, 25 other countries ranging from Poland to Armenia, including Russia. Each "partner" country creates an individual program to meet its own needs. PFP helps newly democratic states restructure and establish democratic control of their military forces, develop transparency in defense planning and budgetary processes, develop interoperability with alliance forces, better understand collective defense planning and learn new forms of military doctrine, environmental control, and disaster relief. It provides a framework in which NATO and individual partners can cooperate in crisis management, peacekeeping and other activities.

PFP is already having a significant effect on Partner nations. For example, many Partners are organizing most if not all of their armed forces around NATO planning concepts. Some are submitting their Individual partnership Programs to their parliaments for approval—consolidating legislative oversight of military policy for the first time ever in their history.

PFP also provides a valuable framework for evaluating the ability of each partner to assume the obligations and commitments of NATO membership—a testing ground for their capabilities. And for those partners that do not become NATO members the PFP will provide a structure for increasingly close cooperation with NATO—in itself an important building block for European security.

The United States and its allies have agreed on a robust program of practical cooperation with Partner states that builds on PFP's early momentum. Thirteen joint exercises with Partners are planned in 1995, including a SACLANT sponsored event in August at Fort Polk, Louisiana.

No issue has been more important, controversial, or misunderstood than that of NATO expansion. NATO heads of state and government at the January 1994 summit decided the alliance would eventually expand. This decision was reaffirmed last June by President Clinton during one of his European visits, when he stated that the question was no longer whether NATO would expand but how and when.

NATO has embarked on a two-phase program for 1995. During the first part of this year, NATO is determining through an internal discussion the rationale and process for expanding the new, post-Cold War NATO. Then, in the months prior to the December 1995 ministerial meeting, NATO's views on these two issues—"why" and "how"—will be presented individually to PFP members. This will mark the first time detailed discussions on this subject have taken place outside the alliance. Then the ministers will meet again in Brussels in December and review the results of the discussions with the partners before deciding how to proceed.

Several key points should be stressed:

- First, NATO expansion must strengthen security in the entire region, including nations that are not members.
- Second, the rationale and process for NATO's expansion, once decided, will be transparent, not secret. All Partners will have the opportunity to hear exactly the same presentation from NATO later this year.
- Third, there is no timetable or list of nations that will be invited to join NATO. The answers to the critical questions of who and when will emerge after completion of this base of the process.
- Fourth, each nation will be considered individually, not as part of some grouping.
- Fifth, the decisions as to who joins NATO and when will be made exclusively by the alliance. No outside nation will exercise a veto.
- Sixth, although criteria for membership have not been determined, certain fundamental precepts reflected in the original Washington Treaty remain as valid as they were in 1949; new members must be democratic, have market economies, be committed to responsible security policies, and be able to contribute to the alliance. As President Clinton has stated, "Countries with repressive political systems, countries with designs on their neighbors, countries with militaries unchecked by civilian control or with closed economic systems need not apply."
- Seventh, all members, regardless of size, strength or location, should be full members of the Alliance, with equal rights and obligations.
- Eighth, new members will be expected to pay their share of NATO's common budgets, be prepared to contribute to Alliance missions, and have capable military forces to do so.
- Ninth, new members will be expected to commit themselves to the political aspect of NATO's unity—the commitment to building consensus and cooperating in the development of Alliance policies.
- Lastly, it should be remembered that each new NATO member constitutes for the United States the most solemn of all commitments: a bilateral defense treaty that extends the U.S. security umbrella to a new nation. This requires ratification by two-thirds of the U.S. Senate, a point that advocates of immediate expansion often overlook.

In this context let me briefly state why this administration, while leading the Alliance on the issue of NATO expansion, opposes the approach taken by the House of Representatives in H.R. 7. and the "NATO Participation Act Amendments of 1995," now pending before the Senate.

We believe these bills would result in the opposite effect of that intended by many of its sponsors. They could alter the steady course we and our allies have set toward expansion and could actually slow down the process. The legislation could complicate the expansion process by needlessly generating disagreements with our allies. It also violates one of the fundamental principles guiding the expansion process, i.e., that each nation will be considered individually on its own merits.

We must be very careful about unilaterally and prematurely trying to choose certain countries for NATO membership over others, or to set specific guarantees. The Washington Treaty is not a paper guarantee. New members have to be in a position to undertake the solemn obligations and responsibilities of membership, just as we will extend our solemn commitments to them. Our gradual, deliberate and transparent approach to NATO enlargements is designed to ensure that each potential member is judged fairly and individually, by the strength of its democratic institutions and its capacity to contribute to NATO's goals.

By following this approach, we give every new democracy a powerful incentive to consolidate reform. Arbitrarily locking into law advantages for certain countries would discourage reformers in countries not named and encourage complacency in countries that are. Indeed, the effect of these measures before Congress could be to encourage the very instabilities and imbalances we seek to avoid.

The Senate bill also does not acknowledge the key role played by PFP in increasing defense cooperation with Partner countries and thus helping to prepare them for eventual NATO membership.

The view shared by this administration and each of its allies is that in the process of expanding NATO we should not draw new lines in Europe, but should reach out to all countries emerging from communism. We must remember that the decision on expansion is not to be made by the United States alone, but by the allies collectively. The United States should not prejudice issues that ultimately will be subject to consensus among NATO's 16 members and ratified by legislatures in those countries.

We also do not believe that "observer status" in the North Atlantic Council, as provided in the Senate bill, is desirable given the highly sensitive nature of discus-

sions, including on the subject of NATO expansion. Both PFP and NACC provide ample opportunity for NATO's Partners to participate in appropriate meetings and other activities.

While we also attach high priority to improving the English language skills of partner defense forces, as reflected in our fiscal year 1996 IMET and Partnership for Peace program requests, we oppose the specific IMET earmarks in the bill. As a general proposition, we think the bill gives the President insufficient flexibility to meet shifting demands. We would much prefer a bill that provides what the President "may" do, as opposed to what he "shall" do.

Finally, we are concerned about the reporting requirements in the bill. They would place the President in the untenable position of having to make a public and unilateral evaluation of a country's suitability for NATO membership. This could generate disagreements with our allies and further complicate the expansion process.

We hope that Congress will make the necessary changes in the proposed legislation. Congress and the administration share the same goal with respect to NATO expansion. Working together, without unnecessary legislative constraints, we will reach that goal more quickly.

Fortifying the European pillar of the Alliance contributes further to European stability and to transatlantic burden-sharing. It improves our collective capacity to act. It means establishing a new premise of collective defense: the United States should not be the only NATO member that can protect vital common interests outside of Europe.

For these reasons the United States promoted the concept of the Combined Joint Task Force. CJTF offers a practical vehicle for making NATO assets and capabilities available to our European allies, should the Alliance as a whole, including the United States, decide not to participate. It is based on the notion that Europe's emerging defense identity should be separable but not separate from NATO. CJTF can become an important vehicle for the United States to develop more effective sharing of military burdens with its European allies. NATO will still have the right of first refusal to deal with crises that do not automatically invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, but if the Alliance as a whole chooses not to act, smaller coalitions of willing members can draw on NATO assets to deal with such crises. CJTF also provides a means to accommodate participation of forces from non-NATO allies, including members of the PFP.

NATO expansion cannot occur in a vacuum. If it did, it would encourage the very imbalances and instabilities it was seeking to avoid. In addition to NATO and PFP, the new architecture involves both the EU, other arrangements such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and a parallel track developing a pragmatic partnership with Russia.

THE EUROPEAN UNION

For more than 40 years both Democratic and Republican administrations have supported peaceful European integration. The European Union has become a vital partner in trade, diplomacy and security. Close partnership between the United States and the European Union is essential to our common agenda of democratic renewal. This administration has strongly supported the European Union's efforts at European integration.

Although the European Union is usually viewed as a political and economic entity, it is an essential pillar of European security. The integration of western European nations on the basis of democracy and free market economics has virtually transcended old territorial disputes, irredentist claims, social cleavages and ethnic grievances that tore apart European societies in earlier eras.

Throughout its history the Union has strengthened the democratic impulse of a wider Europe. The extension of the Union eastward will be immensely important both politically and economically. It will integrate and stabilize the two halves of Cold War Europe.

Expansion of NATO and the EU will not proceed at exactly the same pace. Their memberships are not and will not be identical, but the two organizations are clearly mutually supportive. Expansion of both is equally necessary for a stable Europe.

THE OSCE

Both EU and NATO expansion are proceeding within the broad context of a new European security architecture. Neither is being pursued in isolation. Integration of Central Europe and the nations of the former Soviet Union into the OECD, the GATT and its successor, the World Trade Organization, and such institutions as the

Council of Europe all complement and support the gradual expansion of NATO and the EU.

But neither NATO nor the EU can be everything to everybody, and the other organizations mentioned above are focused on narrower issues. This points to the need in the new European architectural concept for a larger and looser region-wide organization that can deal with a variety of challenges which neither NATO or the EU is suited to address.

Fortunately, the core for such a structure has existed for some years—the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Its broad structure of human rights commitments, consultation and efforts at cooperative or preventive diplomacy had begun to fill a niche in the new Europe. But it was clear by the middle of last year that CSCE, while offering intriguing possibilities, was wholly inadequate to the opportunities or the challenge. Under the leadership of the United States, a significant evolution of this organization, including a new name, was started in December at the Budapest CSCE summit.

Where NATO and the EU begin with the assumption that their members share common goals, the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe, or OSCE, as it was renamed, presumes that many of its participants disagree on how its standards are to be implemented. The OSCE takes such disagreement as a given and then works to find common ground.

Security in Europe today means solving conflicts, many of them centuries old, before they escalate as Bosnia has. This is why we have strengthened OSCE mechanisms, are making vigorous use of its norms, ensuring full implementation of its commitments, and increasing political and material support for its conflict prevention activities. At the Budapest Summit a comprehensive framework for the future of conventional arms control was developed; uniform non-proliferation principles were established among 52 nations; greater political and material support was pledged for support for the High Commissioner on National Minorities, the preventive diplomacy missions, and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights; and Russia and the OSCE as a whole agreed to merge negotiating efforts on the difficult issue of Nagorno-Karabakh and provide peacekeepers there once a political agreement is reached—all important steps on OSCE's path to becoming a more meaningful organization with greater capabilities, operating without regard to old Cold War dividing lines.

These decisions complement our efforts at NATO, and the efforts of the European Union to pursue cooperative, integrated security structures for Europe. But they do not make OSCE a substitute for NATO or the EU. In no way can OSCE be made "superior" to NATO. Because the functions, as well as the structures of OSCE and NATO are entirely different, and shall remain so, OSCE will not become the umbrella organization for European security, nor will it oversee the work of the NATO alliance. But we must develop new methods to identify and deal with future potential Bosnias by addressing at an early stage the causes of conflict. The OSCE must prove its worth in this area, as the CSCE did in spreading democratic values and legitimizing human rights. More must be done.

A PRAGMATIC POLICY OF ENGAGEMENT WITH RUSSIA AND THE NIS

This brings me to another essential pillar of the new security architecture: relations with Russia. If the West is to create an enduring and stable security framework for Europe, it must solve the most enduring strategic problem of Europe and integrate the nations of the former Soviet Union, especially Russia into a stable European security system.

Since his first day in office, President Clinton has pursued a pragmatic policy of engagement with Russia and the other New Independent States as the best investment we can make in our Nations's security and prosperity. As Secretary Christopher said last week, "our approach is to cooperate where our interests coincide, and to manage our differences constructively and candidly where they do not. We support reform because in the long run, its success benefits not only the people of the region but the American people as well."

The U.S. objective remains a healthy Russia—a democratic Russia pursuing reform and respecting the rights of its citizens, not fragmenting into ethnic conflict and civil war. This is why the events in Chechnya are so disturbing. Chechnya has become a serious setback for the cause of reform, democratization, and the evolution of the Russian Federation as a stabled democratic, multiethnic state.

But as President Clinton stated in January, as Russia undergoes a historic transformation, reacting reflexively to each of the ups and downs that it is bound to experience, perhaps for decades to come, would be a terrible mistake. If the forces of re-

form are embattled, the United States must reinforce, not retreat from, its support for them.

Enhancement of stability in central Europe is a mutual interest of Russia and the United States. NATO, which poses no threat to Russian security, seeks a direct and open relationship with Russia that both recognizes Russia's special position and stature and reinforces the integrity of the other newly independent states of the former Soviet Union.

It is in our interest for the NATO-Russia relationship to develop in parallel with NATO expansion. But this relationship can only deepen if Russia stays on the path of reform and respects international norms. As Secretary Christopher told Foreign Minister Kozyrev in Geneva 2 weeks ago, it is in Russia's interest to participate constructively in the process of European integration. Russia has an enormous stake in a stable and peaceful Europe. No country has suffered more when Europe has not been at peace. Russia's path to deeper involvement in Europe is open. It should not choose to isolate itself from this effort.

NATO and Russia already have a solid relationship through Russia's membership in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and through active diplomatic contacts. The next step is Russian acceptance of the documents which it has already negotiated with the Alliance setting forth the terms of the relationship both within and outside of PFP. This will include cooperative efforts in areas where Russia can offer special expertise or capabilities, including nuclear non-proliferation.

Any such arrangements as part of a new security architecture must also consider the special case of Ukraine. Its geostrategic position makes its independence and integrity a critical element of European security. Considerable cooperation is being pursued between NATO and Ukraine under the PFP. Strengthened relations should also be pursued beyond the PFP. Last year, for example, President Clinton negotiated a trilateral understanding with Russia and Ukraine that sets Ukraine on the path to become a non-nuclear power. In so doing, Ukraine joined Kazakhstan and Belarus in agreeing to give up nuclear weapons. We are leading efforts to dismantle their weapons and safeguard nuclear materials under a bipartisan program sponsored by Senator Nunn and Senator Lugar.

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to focus more specifically on the ways we are matching our European security policy with our resources to advance U.S. national interests.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR CENTRAL EUROPE

The evolution of Europe's security architecture, guided in large part by the United States, will fundamentally transform our security relations with the Central European states. Our fiscal year 1996 security assistance requests reflect the high priority we attach to nurturing these relationships.

Our requests are carefully designed to support our central security policy goals in the region, including advancing PFP, enhancing U.S.-Central European defense cooperation, promoting regional stability, fostering regional cooperation, and encouraging other states to play a greater role in multinational peacekeeping activities.

In previous years, we have been able to devote limited security assistance resources to the region. This year, we have requested increased resources in support of major policy initiatives, including PFP, and it is critical that we receive this increase. All of the democracies in Central Europe are eager to participate in cooperative defense activities with us, but most lack the wherewithal to do so.

We have designed a set of distinct, but mutually-reinforcing security assistance requests to advance U.S. policy objectives in Europe. We believe our efforts are consistent with the spirit of the NATO Participation Act of 1994, as well as the bills described above that are now pending before the Congress.

First, the administration has requested \$60 million in military assistance for Central European countries and the New Independent States under the Partnership for Peace program. In addition, the Department of Defense budget request contains \$40 million for Partnership for Peace activities more appropriately conducted under DOD authorities. Collectively, this \$100 million will meet the commitment made by the President last summer in Warsaw to support the Partnership for Peace. These funds will facilitate partner participation in PFP activities; improve the compatibility and interoperability of these countries' militaries with NATO forces; build bilateral ties between U.S. and Central European militaries; provide us the opportunity to influence the evolution of these defense establishments; and finance a range of cooperative multilateral security activities.

In addition, \$25 million is proposed for Central European defense infrastructure, peacekeeping, and related programs. These funds will continue the process of equipping and training the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion, and will support the reorienta-

tion of Central European militaries to defensive postures, regional cooperation based on uniform standards of equipment, and expanded military cooperation with the United States and NATO.

Third, \$25 million is requested to assist central European states in the deployment of units to multilateral peacekeeping operations. While dedicated peacekeeping units are now being established in most nations of the region, many would be unable to finance their deployment to non-U.N. operations, for example. This fund is intended to alleviate that problem, thereby integrating the military forces of these nations into broader, cooperative security arrangements, improving their interoperability with NATO forces, and reducing the need for U.S. forces in peacekeeping situations.

Finally, the administration has requested \$7 million for the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, which provides military education and training on a grant basis to students from allied and friendly nations. IMET is an extremely cost effective component of U.S. foreign policy. It provides training in defense management concepts, civil-military relations, human rights and military justice for civilian and military defense officials, members of national parliaments charged with defense oversight, and NGO personnel from Central Europe. It provides U.S. access and influence in a sector of society which often plays a critical role in the transition to democracy.

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

Our efforts at building a viable security architecture for Europe can only succeed if democracy and market economies take root throughout Central Europe. Democratic reform in this region is as important to U.S. interests now as when the SEED Act was passed in 1989. The success of these democratic and market reforms makes us all more secure; they are the best answer to the aggressive nationalism and ethnic hatreds uncorked by the end of the Cold War.

But the process of political and economic transformation is jeopardized today by a host of challenges—organized crime, ethnic tensions, unemployment and other social dislocations, the return of historic grievances, and the fire that continues to rage in the Balkans.

Democratic institutions have been established, but they remain fragile. Credible and transparent elections have been held, but in some countries the governing coalitions are unstable. Participatory structures for local government are still rudimentary. There is an urgent need for social sector restructuring throughout the region to solidify popular support for continued reform and reduce heavy burdens on weak budgets.

In fiscal year 1996, we are requesting \$480 million through the SEED program, primarily to maintain our core assistance for democratic and economic reform in Central Europe. These funds will promote small business development to spur job creation. They will restructure the financial sectors of the Central European countries and they will establish legal, regulatory and institutional frameworks conducive to private investment. In addition, they will help build accountable, responsive public administration at the central and local levels and promote independent news media. They will also help combat organized crime. Finally, they will support social sector reform in areas like health and housing. Beyond such core activities, our request includes significant funding for assistance to Bosnia and for helping South Balkan states cope with critical infrastructure needs.

The SEED program remains transitional in nature, its "sunset" in each country determined by the progress achieved. The program is reducing assistance in some countries of the Northern Tier, allowing a gradual shift in U.S. assistance to those in the Southern Tier, which have further to go in their transitions. The shift of resources from north to south will be carefully monitored to assure that programs are not withdrawn from countries before democracy and market economies are firmly established.

In short, because these funds help central European nations consolidate their democracies and market economies, they are an essential underpinning to our efforts to enhance security for the entire region.

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Taken together, the political, economic and military initiatives I have outlined underscore our efforts to strengthen and extend NATO within an inclusive framework that expands democracy, prosperity and a sense of security across the entire European continent.

It will take some time before the forms and patterns of a new era settle into place. In the meantime, we must expect continuing change and upheaval in Europe—at

times promising, at times frightening. There are great problems. But there are also great opportunities. To turn away from the challenges would only mean paying a higher price later.

The United States will be an active participant in Europe for a simple reason—our self-interest requires it. As we proceed along this course, I look forward to close cooperation with members of this committee and with Congress in general.

Thank you.

Senator WARNER. Thank you. I think, Mr. Secretary, that we will hear from the representative of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Clark, and then we will proceed with questions.

Thank you, General Clark.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. WESLEY K. CLARK, U.S.A., DIRECTOR FOR STRATEGIC PLANS AND POLICY (J-5), OFFICE OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

General CLARK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We welcome the opportunity to discuss NATO's future with this distinguished committee. My remarks today will focus on the military aspects of NATO expansion and the way ahead for expanding the Alliance.

I think it is unnecessary to remind this committee of the very important interests, vital interests, that the United States has in Europe. As Secretary Holbrooke said, we fought two world wars on this continent, stationed over a quarter of a million troops in Europe for most of the last 50 years. We have a stake founded not only in the past but also in the future, and we must maintain our linkages with Europe as we move into that future.

We believe that NATO as a military alliance will be very important to maintaining those interests in post-Cold War Europe. To be sure, NATO must adapt in order to remain relevant, but it must also rely on the foundations that have made the Alliance so successful for the past 45 years. NATO's adaptation has been evident in Summit declarations since 1989. The London Summit of 1990, the Rome Summit of 1991 where NATO adopted its new strategic concept, and the Brussels Summit of 1994 were landmark events for the Alliance and have demonstrated NATO's progressive growth, declaring that no nation is a potential adversary. By announcing a new program of cooperation with the states of Central and Eastern Europe, it called for a reorientation of NATO's strategy and major changes in the Alliance military posture including fielding smaller forces, scaling back readiness, reducing forward presence, and relying less on nuclear weapons.

The Brussels Summit took another step in the outreach program by endorsing a series of initiatives designed to contribute to lasting peace, stability, and wellbeing in the whole of Europe. And it was at this summit that Partnership for Peace was launched to provide a vehicle for practical military cooperation at a pace geared to each nation's interests and capacities.

Subsequently, it was time to address the underlying question confronting the Alliance, the question of expansion. And so we are today, inside NATO, engaged in an enlargement study to determine the how and the why of NATO enlargement. This study has been an excellent process for building consensus in the Alliance, and an excellent vehicle for exploring the issues that enlargement will bring.

We have supported this study in a variety of ways including articulating the dimensions for an effective and militarily credible enlarged NATO and its assessment. Assuring this credibility will be critical in extending NATO's Article V security guarantees to new members in Central and Eastern Europe.

In pursuing credibility, we have identified six key military dimensions for consideration. These military dimensions are force structure, the integrated command structure, interoperability, training and exercises, nuclear posture, and intelligence cooperation. In each of these areas, the NATO expansion study is seeking to develop the general requirements which new members of the Alliance would meet in order for NATO to have its essential credibility intact upon expansion.

Among the principles which appear to be emerging at this time as we look at these dimensions are the following: New members must be producers as well as consumers of security. There can be no second-tier members; each must have the same responsibilities under NATO Article V and the same benefits. And for NATO to continue to be militarily credible, expansion must not corrode collective defense provisions. There must be flexibility in the arrangements foreseen now to allow for further development later on.

As we have gone through the enlargement study,—and we are continuing to work that study now—NATO has not been sitting idle. The Partnership for Peace process continues to move at a rapid rate, and while I would not want to restate all that Mr. Slocombe gave you in an update on that, I would highlight to you that this summer, in August, we are going to be holding at our Joint Readiness Training Center a United States-sponsored Partnership for Peace exercise with 12 partners in attendance. Some of the \$30 million Congress approved for Partnership for Peace in fiscal year 1995 will enable them to participate in this important event despite resource constraints facing them. This exercise will showcase the PFP program in CONUS and lend additional credibility to interoperability capabilities that NATO is developing with Partner countries.

I would conclude by reiterating that we are working diligently to come to terms with the military issues of expansion. There are many unresolved issues but they are being worked within the Alliance's political and military structures in the same way the Alliance has functioned for the last 45 years—through detailed analysis, compromise, and consensus. These efforts are guided by two over-arching concepts. First, that a viable and prosperous NATO remains crucial to the future security of the nations of the Alliance and Eastern and Central Europe. And second, that NATO must remain both politically and militarily credible.

Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I would be happy to take questions at this time.

Senator WARNER. Thank you. We will now enter our question period. The clerk will inform us at 5 minutes.

Secretary Holbrooke, as you well know, over the past several weeks, top Russian officials have been making increasingly belligerent statements concerning NATO expansion, culminating in Defense Minister Grachev's warning to Secretary Perry on April 3

that Russia would be forced to make "counter-measures" if NATO expands its membership.

In response, both the European Union and the Clinton administration have indicated their support for some type of negotiated security arrangement between NATO and Russia. From the administration's point of view, what would be the content of such an agreement between NATO and Russia? What type of commitments is the United States at this time willing to agree to in order to presumably calm the Russian apprehension?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Mr. Chairman, your question goes to the heart of the restructuring of the security architecture of Europe. Let me answer it by going back into history and then moving directly forward to what happened the last few days and what we are going to do in the next few weeks.

Since 1917, Russia and the Soviet Union have not been part of the security structure of Europe; they have been outside it. From 1815 to 1914, they were part of it. It is the highest requirement of diplomacy, led by the United States, to find the appropriate role for Russia in the security structure of Europe after the end of the Cold War. And that is what we have been in the process of trying to do through a dialogue with Moscow and the closest consultation with our NATO allies.

Russia, as Walt Slocombe mentioned, is one of the 25 members of the Partnership for Peace, a historic connection between it and an organization formed for a specific anti-Soviet purpose. But that is not enough. And as we expand NATO, we—and by "we" I mean here the 16 nations of NATO, not just the United States—we have all agreed that there has to be a special form of association or relationship between Russia and NATO.

I might further add that this special relationship between Russia and NATO is one that all of the Central European countries that look forward to NATO membership also want. If you go, as I know some of you have, to Warsaw or Prague or Budapest or any of the other great capitals of Central Europe where NATO membership is high on their list of goals, they will all tell you that they welcome a strong dialogue with Russia, because they want the Russians to know as well that in joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization they are not creating an additional encirclement of Russia.

Now, the Russian reaction to this dialogue—well, first of all, let me back up. The discussions began in a highly preliminary and informal way only at the beginning of this year with Secretary Christopher's meeting in Geneva with Foreign Minister Secretary Kozyrev on January 16. They continued with Secretary Christopher's second set of meetings with Foreign Minister Kozyrev, with Secretary Perry's trip to Moscow this week. Deputy Secretary Talbot leaves for Moscow tonight to continue the discussions, and Secretary Christopher will meet again with Andrey Kozyrev before the Summit on May 9 and 10.

All of these meetings are preceded and followed by the closest contact with our NATO allies, who themselves are in direct communication with Moscow. This was a major subject of President Clinton's dialogue with Prime Minister Major yesterday, and I was on the phone this morning to Bonn, talking to the Germans about this.

Our goal here is to have a parallel discussion—and I stress the word parallel—with Russia as NATO expands. We are well aware of the comments you referred to in your question, Mr. Chairman. We take them seriously. But they will not deter us—and by us again I refer to the NATO Alliance, not just to the United States which leads it. It will not deter us from the careful, gradual, open expansion of NATO eastward, in parallel with a colloquy with Russia on its future role. Neither the Russians nor any other country not in NATO will veto membership by other countries in NATO. But the Russian role should be taken into account.

This is a work in progress. And I cannot answer the final part of your question precisely because the conversations have only just begun, and because they will not proceed faster than is appropriate, given the need to consult with NATO and to move forward in the expansion process.

Senator WARNER. Let me just make one point clear. You and I and others have had the opportunity to discuss this in a small group with the British Prime Minister the other night, and I was much impressed with his statement that under no circumstances could any of these overtures to Russia be construed as membership in NATO. And, therefore, I wish to make it clear—and to hear your response—that nothing will be done to cloak such parallel talks or whatever final agreement as giving the appearance of or equating in some way to membership. Am I not correct in that?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. These talks that have gone on have not involved the possibility of Russia's membership in NATO. For formal reasons, no country has been explicitly excluded as a potential future member of NATO at this point in the process. But I understand your point and I take it very seriously.

Senator WARNER. Quickly to General Clark, I have a disagreement with Dr. Kissinger and Brezhnevsky who have spoken out on this subject of the Partnership for Peace. Both of these men have advocated a security agreement between NATO and Russia which would prohibit—this is the key thing—prohibit the stationing of foreign troops in the territory of the new member states as they are admitted. Now, that would be to lessen the level of tension, presumably, with Russia.

But, from a military standpoint, if we were to extend Article V to the new members and not put in place such NATO forces as would be necessary to implement whatever scenario might be addressed under Article V, is that not putting the military at a severe disadvantage?

General CLARK. Senator, I am aware of the proposals that you are giving reference to. We are opposed to those proposals for the very reason that you cite. NATO's expansion is not directed against anyone, but each new member will have the same benefits of collective defense that the existing members have. And the arrangements that we make for expansion must be flexible enough to cope with circumstances as they evolve. Were we to agree to admit new members only on certain conditions at this point, then we would, in essence, be creating a second tier membership of the military alliance—something that we do not see as desirable. In fact, it might bring about the very instability in a crisis that NATO's expansion would be attempting to avoid.

Senator WARNER. I agree. Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. I just have a couple of questions.

Thank you for your excellent statements. I agree completely with the thrust of the statements made with regard to the obligations that we have around the world, and I am afraid isolationism is raising its head once again, indicating that at least some have not learned the lessons of the past. I appreciate the forthright stand of the administration on this.

I have a few specific questions about some of the concerns that are being raised now. With the arrival of spring in Bosnia and the likely prospect of renewed fighting, which I assume is likely, have the opinions of our NATO allies changed as to the continued presence of peace keepers in Bosnia and Croatia, the wisdom of the arms embargo against Serbia, and the efficiency of our humanitarian relief convoys that have tried to provide some measure of relief? In a nutshell, what is going on, if anything, that is new in Bosnia today, and how do you view the situation for the months immediately ahead?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Senator, I have nothing optimistic to report today on the Bosnian front. I would like to say before responding to your question that it is the lesson of Bosnia which I view as the greatest collective security failure of the West since 1938 that animates much of the policy you have heard today. It is not that you can automatically prevent it, but I think we all recognize now that earlier collective action could not have made things worse than they are today and might have made things better.

In response to your question, we spent the month of March trying to prevent a war in Croatia. We were successful in doing so. It would have been a whopping big war, worse than anything we have seen. We have now turned our attention back to Bosnia.

The 4-month cease-fire arrangement—

Senator WARNER. Do you mean a whopping big war had the Tudjman policy remained and the envoy having been required to withdraw? The administration I think very carefully negotiated that away.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. That is right. If President Tudjman had held to his demand that the U.N. withdrawal begin on April 1, 4 days ago, we would now be on an unstoppable slippery slope to a third Balkan war of the century which would have spread south and consumed Southeastern Europe in its worst case. We dodged that bullet barely with great support in the U.N. We passed three resolutions last week under Ambassador Albright's personal leadership, separating the U.N. forces in Bosnia, Croatia and Macedonia into three separate forces, and now we turn back to Bosnia.

We are approaching now the end of April, when the 4-month cease-fire will end. That cease-fire was never in effect in Bihae and is deteriorating rapidly in Tuzla and around Sarajevo. The Contact Group has been meeting steadily. They met yesterday in London to try to determine how to proceed.

We have agreed that we will stick to the Contact Group plan of last summer, which leaves us with the following situation. The Croats, President Tudjman; the Bosnians, President Izetbegovic and company; and even the Serbs and Belgrade, Milosevic and his colleagues, have accepted that plan. But Karadzic and the Bosnian

Serbs have not. We cannot continue to talk to Karadzic, and indeed we had one 3-week period in January where we gave him a chance to come back to the table on the base of accepting that plan. He refused it, and we terminated further discussions with him because it was clear he misunderstood those discussions and took them as a sign of weakness. We cannot deal with him in the current context.

On the other hand, he and his colleagues control some 70 percent of the land of Bosnia, and the Contact Group plan takes that down to 49 percent. We are facing, therefore, a very dangerous period. I would be misleading you if I said to you today that we are confident we can avoid a war. We did not know if we could avoid one in Croatia. We did. This one is going to be even tougher.

As for the specific question concerning the Serbs, we continue to believe that the Serbian government should not get any additional relief on the sanctions unless and until they take further actions which we have outlined to them in confidence. And meanwhile, we wish to continue to increase the isolation of the Bosnian Serbs. We are working as closely as possible with the Croatian-Muslim Federation. Among your colleagues in this room, Senator Lieberman has been particularly involved in recent weeks in assisting us, as have some of his other colleagues in the Congress, in emphasizing to both the Croats and the Muslims how vitally important it is they hang together.

We appointed a new military adviser to the Secretaries of State and Defense on Federation affairs this week. General John Sewell, the Vice Director of the National Defense University. He is in the State Department this afternoon, preparing to go to Sarajevo later this week.

I can answer more questions if you want, Senator, but I do want to stress the fact that we are working all out and the situation is not at all encouraging at this point.

Senator WARNER. Would the Senator yield for one clarification? You have repeatedly used the term "we." Do I infer from that it is the U.S. working in partnership with our other principal allies? Would that be the "we"?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. To the extent that we have joint diplomatic positions, yes, Mr. Chairman. But in regard to things like General Sewell's advisory efforts, those are unilateral. We work at two levels here, as do all four of our Contact Group colleagues. There are certain things that we do separately, but on the diplomatic front we work as a group of five.

Senator WARNER. I thank the Senator.

Senator EXON. Then let me make it clear. It is still strongly the position of the administration that we should not and must not lift the embargo. Is that correct?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. The arms embargo against the Bosnians is, in my mind, and I know in that of my colleagues, an immoral and unconscionable constraint against people who are being denied the right to defend themselves adequately. I have spoken out publicly on this before I entered the government and I continue to feel the same way.

In the current climate and the current situation, we are compromised by events that are now long since locked into the past;

and, therefore, we oppose the lifting of the arms embargo unilaterally. We have put forward a resolution in the U.N. Security Council but we do not have the votes. And going back to Senator Warner's previous question, we do not even have the support of at least three or three and a half of our Contact Group colleagues on this point.

Therefore, we believe that the consequences of lifting the arms embargo unilaterally would be so great as to create a worse situation than currently exists. Specifically, Senator, if the arms embargo is lifted unilaterally, the major nations with troops in Bosnia, led by the British, French, Canadians, Dutch, and Danes, five of our closest NATO allies, would all leave.

Senator EXON. Well, we have been through that many times and we have had them over here. I agree with you. I just wanted to get that established.

One last question. Four years ago Senator Levin, Senator Robb, and I went to Turkey to take a look at the situation with regard to the Kurds who were being run out of Iraq by Saddam Hussein and we saw some very difficult situations there. Now, everything is turned about and now Turkey is at war with the people that they were formerly trying to help.

Is this a long-range problem, or is this just one of those little wars that is likely to go away? Do you think it could expand into something much more serious?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I can give you a firm, categorical answer—yes and no. Senator, Secretary Slocombe, General Clark, and I have just had lunch with the Foreign Minister of Turkey. He met with some of your colleagues this morning here in the Senate, and he is meeting with the Secretary of State in half an hour. This issue is at the front of our agenda. The long-term problems that you are referring to are not going to go away. They are just not. And anyone who thinks they are is again denying history.

I was recently reading a biography of Attaturk, and in the early 1920s, military operations conducted by the new Turkish republic took place in exactly the area they are taking place today. Same town, same villages, same issues.

Now, having said that, let me address the current situation. The PKK, the current target of the Turkish military activities, is a terrorist organization headquartered in Damascus, which the whole world and all of Turkey's NATO allies agree is something that the Turkish government has every right to defend itself against. Turkey is the front line state for United States' security interests in Europe today. It always was, even during the Cold War. It had a common border with the Soviet Union. But today, with no front line situations in Central Europe, Turkey is the country where everything else impacts. Chechnya, Nagorno Karabakh, Iran, Iraq, Cyprus, Bosnia. Problems in Macedonia, Ukraine and Crimea. Everything impacts on Turkey, and they and the Greeks are our two NATO allies in this region.

We understand and do not object to their efforts to deal with the PKK. However, we have had some legitimate problems, which we expressed freely to them, in the area of human rights—excessive use of force. And in regard to the current operations, the Turks have assured us publicly and privately that these operations are

limited in scope and duration and will not last much longer. We take those assurances very seriously because we think the current situation is not one that makes any of us comfortable. Particularly—

Senator WARNER. Mr. Secretary, I do not want to cut you off but I do want to get you out of here in 10 minutes and I do want to accommodate my two colleagues with their opportunity to have questions.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. May I just complete this thought, Senator? Particularly in light of the fact that the European Union took an historic step on March 6 in voting the Turkish Customs Union with the EU.

Senator EXON. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WARNER. Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, let me thank you for keeping the NATO expansion issue on the front burner. There is no more important issue that we face and it is important that your good work be recognized as we continue in this effort.

Senator WARNER. On that point, Senator Levin was chairman of this subcommittee last year and took an equally forceful stand on the issues of NATO, and we have just been working together as partners some 17 years.

Senator LEVIN. On the Partnership for peace issue, one of our witnesses said that we are going to have parallel discussions as NATO expands, the parallel discussions being with Russia. He said that in parallel with colloquies with Russia, we can expect NATO expansion.

It seems to me that our goal should not be "parallel discussions and parallel colloquies," but our goal should be to secure a NATO-Russia agreement at least simultaneous with NATO expansion. I would hope that the parallel discussion comment does not mean that it is not our goal to have more than a discussion but, indeed, it is our goal to achieve a parallel agreement if possible. This agreement could assure that the expansion does not precipitate a real problem, that we may play right into the hands of those nationalistic Russians who would use NATO expansion to put Russia in a direction which would be very counterproductive for everybody.

So did I pick up something that was not there or that was there? Were the words "parallel discussions" and "parallel colloquies with Russia" to be contrasted with actual action on expansion?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. You certainly have picked up something because we want to reach an agreement with the Russians. We, in this case and certainly in the chairman's words, we, NATO, want to reach an agreement with the Russians on the NATO-Russia relationship. But we have said repeatedly that we do not want to give Russia a veto over the process of NATO expansion. And, of course, if we said that until we have an agreement with Russia on the NATO-Russia relationship we promise not to make decisions on expansion, that would de facto be a veto.

Senator LEVIN. I am not suggesting that. I am suggesting that you state it as our goal to have—

Mr. SLOCOMBE. It is certainly our goal to have both pieces in place. We do not say that one is absolutely linked to the other, but

it would obviously work out better from everybody's point of view if both pieces are in place.

Senator LEVIN. I would simply urge that when you contrast them you not describe, talk about NATO-Russian and action on expansion. The goal—not linked and not conditional—the goal should be a special relationship with Russia.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Senator, the goal is as you stated. The only word you used that we would use differently is the word "simultaneous."

Senator LEVIN. If possible. I said, by the way, at least simultaneous. I did not say simultaneous. In other words, it is very possible you would have the agreement with Russia prior to expansion. I am not linking them. I am not saying one should be conditioned on the other. But if you have both as goals it is possible they will come at different times, not necessarily simultaneously. One could come before the other.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I envisage it as somewhat linked; they move like this [indicating] and they do not move in lock-step.

Senator LEVIN. The membership issue is obviously important. By the way, I agree we should not give Russia a veto. I am not at all proposing that. But the membership issue is a very important issue.

Have we set out the criteria for membership with enough specificity so that you believe that Partnership countries know how to meet those criteria? Are they measurable criteria?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. For membership in NATO?

Senator LEVIN. Yes.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Not yet, Senator.

Senator LEVIN. What is our timetable for laying out measurable criteria?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Senator, General Clark referred to the presentations being prepared in NATO now. Those will be finished in the late spring and early summer. They will address those questions for the first time. They will be NATO-wide presentations. They will be then given to the 25 members of the Partnership for Peace, or as many as want them, and they will lay that out.

We are ironing out a lot of differences within the Alliance now. But generally, the criteria are going to be those implied in Article 10 of the original Washington Treaty of 1949.

Senator LEVIN. Do we expect that there will be measurable criteria? I think you know what I mean by that. For instance, one of the criteria might be respect for human rights. That is very important, but it is also—

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I think you can count on that.

Senator LEVIN. I hope that is in there. But I am asking, is it going to be in some way stated that there is going to have to be some assessment made of that by some committee which will then have to pass on it? Are there going to be a measurable criteria laid out? That is my question. And, if so, what is the timetable for these criteria to be set forth?

Senator WARNER. Do you suppose that we could, before you reply, yield to the Senator from Connecticut for a few minutes to have a colloquy with Secretary Holbrooke and then we will return to the Senator from Michigan.

Senator LEVIN. Certainly.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Senator Levin.

Let me just briefly thank the Chair for convening this hearing. This is a hearing that in a sense does not have to be held by this subcommittee, but it is a measure of the chairman's internationalist interest and leadership that he has done so as a preface to the more specific and—and I do not mean to demean it by saying—routine work of the subcommittee. And it is a small footnote, but for those who worry about the ascendancy of so-called neo-isolationist forces in our congress, I think Senator Warner, certainly by his action, speaks against them.

I appreciate this opportunity to just ask this one question. I am going to hold my questions on Bosnia, one, because we have gone through this, but two, because I think there will be a separate hearing on that subject matter.

Senator WARNER. That is correct.

Senator LIEBERMAN. But I wanted to state a contrary view, if I can, on the pace of expansion of NATO and ask you to respond to it. You have quite correctly talked about history and the lessons we learned from it in this century. There are two other historic factors in Europe that I want to cite briefly.

One is the historic inclination toward empire of Russia—a territorial outreach. And the second is the historic strength of Russia and Germany, the tension between them, and the way in which people in between have been caught and suffered as a result of that great power of Russian-German tension.

If we accept the premise that we are not going to have the Russians as members of NATO, which I certainly do, then my question is: Why not act more quickly to expand NATO to bring in at least the Visegrad countries of Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia. In other words, why not act now to make sure that those historic tendencies, particularly the Russian inclination to empire, is checked now and does not have an opportunity to appear later?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Senator, because I will have to leave in a minute, let me address your question which goes to the heart of the criticism that we are not moving fast enough. You know, we have been criticized by some people—the chairman mentioned Kissinger and Brzezinskiy—for not moving fast enough, and others for moving too fast.

First of all, that comforts me because, like Goldilocks, I think we are therefore maybe getting it about right. Second, it is a 16-nation decision. And in this train, the NATO expansion train headed out of the station eastbound, let me assure you—and I think all of you know this because so many of you have talked to European leaders—we are the engine of this train. And various other countries, I think you all know, are in the caboose, and the British, I am glad to say are our closest supporters in this, and the Germans are moving up the train rapidly. The Italians are coming up and so on.

Now, you have listed the two main reasons why people like Walt Slocombe and General Clark and I are so strongly in favor of expansion, but we cannot move as fast as people like Kissinger want for several reasons. One, our NATO allies are not ready for it. Two, the Central Europeans are not quite ready for it. Three, I may miss

my guess but I am not sure the Senate, which must approve each member as a bilateral treaty—Dean Acheson committed himself to the Senate on that in 1949—and that commitment still in our view binds, is ready for it. And finally, it is a process which will take a while, but launching it, in and of itself, in a careful, unprecipitous way I believe should be reassuring to the Russians while dealing with their needs.

But certainly, at every stage of the process we will want to re-examine its pace in light of conditions and circumstances. And I agree completely with your description of Russian-German history and the vacuum of the lands in between. That is where the wars started.

Senator LIEBERMAN. I appreciate your answer. I know you have to leave and I look forward to continuing the discussion. And I thank my colleagues for giving me the opportunity to ask some questions.

Senator WARNER. And I thank the Senator for remaining beyond his schedule.

I would only add one other entity to your list, and that is the American people. They do not fully understand as yet, and I am not faulting the President or anyone else. It is simply going to take a massive educational process to describe to them what Article V is, what are the obligations of the United States under Article V, and, most specifically, how their sons and daughters could be called upon to implement Article V.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Well, hearings like this, Mr. Chairman, help. And could I underscore General Clark's point before I leave, in response to an earlier question about Dr. Kissinger's views—why we are not comfortable with that? We do not want second class NATO citizenship. If you are in, you are in. Not halfway, not part of the way, not a political membership only. I recognize the French have that role but it is historic, it is unique, and it is not a model we want to perpetuate, nor indeed do the French.

So, as I leave, I will just stress—and General Clark and Secretary Slocombe can address this in more detail—why we think that NATO membership should be NATO membership and this club should not have different categories. And that is another critical reason to be sure that each country—since it is the most solemn commitment our Nation can make, extending that Article V guarantee—that each country is ready for it and that our country is ready to extend the umbrella to another country, as we hope we will be in the near future.

Thank you, sir.

Senator WARNER. Just one last observation. I am sure that you were a party to the discussions between the President and Prime Minister Major. Would you say that, basically, those two leaders are in parallel on this issue of the NATO expansion?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Yes. Completely.

Senator WARNER. Thank you very much. Senator Levin.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. There is a pending question. Do you want me to try to answer the question about criteria?

Senator LEVIN. Yes. That would be fine. Thank you.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Certainly, there will be standards. For example, one is commitment to a market economy. They will not be quantifi-

able in the sense that we will agree that once 52 percent of the gross national product flows through the private sector then you have met that criterion. But there will be factors which the Alliance will collectively have to analyze.

The Secretary of State just made a speech in which he made the point that really is fundamental, that each potential member will be judged individually. This is ultimately a political and strategic decision. Some of the factors have to do with the characteristics of the countries concerned. You mentioned human rights. There is this sort of one side and the other of a coin of respect for minorities and no unresolved border disputes, civilian control of the military, a transparent defense planning process. There are those sort of set of issues.

Then there is the sort of set of issues having to do with their military preparedness, at least in the sense of commitments. A commitment to working with NATO, to adopting NATO standards, to moving toward a higher degree, a workable degree, of interoperability.

Then there are obviously some political standards—issues of geography, issues of what is militarily feasible in terms of collective defense that will come into it. So there will be criteria in the sense of standards and guidelines. Those are now being developed—you asked about the timetable. Those are now being developed and agreed on within the Alliance. We expect that, at the May ministerials, the report will be formally approved and will then go through some further revision and will be briefed to partnership countries in the course of the summer and, obviously, the Congress will be kept fully informed as that process goes forward.

But that, of course, is not to say who is going to be a member. That is to say what the process will be and what the standards will be. That process will be decided on certainly not before December of this year; that is, at the next set of ministerials.

Senator LEVIN. But you expect it will be decided there?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I have very little doubt that this will be decided. We are well on schedule on this. Things can always go wrong, but I think we are well on schedule.

Senator LEVIN. You indicated that all members of NATO have agreed that there ought to be a special relationship between NATO and Russia. All 16 members have been consulted?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Oh, yes.

Senator LEVIN. And they all have agreed that that should be a goal of ours?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes, sir. Obviously, there are important differences of detail at this point about what the content and the form ought to be, but that we want to work toward an agreed relationship between NATO and Russia is certainly common ground. And, as Dick Holbrooke said, it also important that it is common ground for potential members.

Senator LEVIN. My question is this: Will there be a statement at that same ministerial about that goal?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I am less confident of that because that requires the Russians—

Senator LEVIN. I am talking about NATO members stating that it is their goal, which you say is a common goal.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I believe that has already been stated.

Senator LEVIN. It has been stated by all 16 NATO members in a formal way that that is a goal?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes.

Senator LEVIN. All right.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. What I meant by saying that depends on the Russians is that until the Russians are prepared to move forward on their dialogue with NATO, we cannot say much about what the pace of an agreement would be.

Senator LEVIN. Do you know when that statement was made by the 16 NATO nations that it is their desire to have a special agreement between NATO and Russia?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes. The most recent statement that would be relevant—and I will get it during someone else's answer, was a statement which referred to the need to define a relationship between NATO and Russia. And I will get the other reference.

Senator LEVIN. That does not quite carry the flavor that we have been talking about. At any rate, would you submit that for the record?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Sure.

Senator LEVIN. Can you tell us the state of the military relationship between NATO and Russia's military? Is there a good working relationship? I think it is very important that that relationship grow and deepen. What is the status of it? How are we doing?

General CLARK. We are working very hard, Senator, on this relationship. We have a number of bilateral activities in a military-to-military contact plan. Those activities have increased for 1995 over the level of activities of 1994, so we feel that we are making progress.

We held our second Joint Staff talks with the Russian military last August. They were quite candid and forthcoming with us. We agreed we needed to meet more often staff to staff on that, and so we are going to be meeting again in May and then subsequently in July of this year.

We are pressing to have a relationship between the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their Chief of the General Staff, General Kolesnikov, and it looks like we are making progress on that front.

We did a U.S.-Russian peacekeeping exercise last year as you are well aware. Plans are underway to do a follow-on exercise in the United States this year. We will be meeting with the Russians shortly to kick off a series of planning conferences leading up to that exercise. It is now planned that that exercise will be held at Fort Riley in the October time period.

We are also doing an exercise with the Russians in the Pacific this year. As a result, we have a variety of exercises, exchanges and visits going on. I think we are making headway in that relationship.

Senator LEVIN. Do the 12 Partners for Peace that are coming here later on this year include Russia?

General CLARK. Not to my knowledge.

Senator LEVIN. Is there any reason they are not?

General CLARK. Those Partners that are coming requested to participate when the invitation was provided.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The formal status is that they have signed the partnership framework agreement and it is all ready and waiting for signature and what was supposed to have been signed in December was the so-called individual program which defines and would kick off their active participation. For political reasons they have chosen not to sign that.

To go back to the previous question, this is the language which I have in mind. This is a quotation from the December 1, 1994 NAC communique, which of course is a statement of all the allies. "A cooperative European security architecture requires the active participation of Russia." There is another sentence in the middle. "We reaffirm our commitment to developing a far-reaching relationship, corresponding with Russia's size, importance and capabilities, both inside and outside the Partnership for Peace based on mutual friendship, respect and benefit; and we are encouraged by the progress and plans that have been made in the various elements of that relationship."

I think that is about as close to it. There is a multitude of similar statements.

Indeed, one of the other documents which the Russians declined to sign is the so-called "beyond PFP" document, which is meant as a first step in this process. I will be glad to provide the full communique.

Senator LEVIN. Fine. And any other such statements on that subject which have been issued by NATO would be helpful.

[The information follows:]


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PRESS COMMUNIQUE M-DPC/NPG-2(94)126For immediate release
15th December 1994FINAL COMMUNIQUE

1. The Defence Planning Committee and Nuclear Planning Group of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation met in Ministerial sessions in Brussels on 14th and 15th December.

2. Our meeting came at the end of a series of high-level meetings over the last two weeks, including the Summit meetings of the CSCE and the EU, and the Ministerial sessions of the NAC and NACC. We underscored the central role of NATO and the determination of our Alliance to maintain its unity and cohesion, as well as to enhance stability throughout the transatlantic area in a manner that strengthens the security of all. We attach particular importance to the transatlantic relationship, which is fundamental to the stability of Europe. The Alliance remains the indispensable foundation for all our nations' security. We agreed that its value must not be taken for granted. Our security continues to depend on an integrated military structure and collective defence arrangements which enable the Alliance to act in the common defence as well as to fulfil its new missions, including peacekeeping.

3. We considered important issues in the future development of the Alliance, including the progress of work on implementing decisions taken by the NATO Heads of State and Government at the Brussels Summit last January. We also reviewed developments in the former Yugoslavia. We conducted our Annual Review of the Alliance's conventional and nuclear forces, in particular national defence plans for 1995 to 1999 and beyond.

4. We examined the defence-related work on the Summit initiatives against the background of the fundamental transformation that the Alliance has already undergone to take account of the new security environment. We support the development of the emerging European Security and Defence Identity and the role of the Western European Union. We are building ever closer and more co-operative relations with our

Partners. In this regard, we welcomed the rapid progress in implementing the Partnership for Peace, which now has 23 Partners. Three major partnership exercises as well as many other activities have already been conducted with broad participation by both Allied and Partner nations.

5. At the Summit last January, our Heads of State and Government reaffirmed that the Alliance, as provided for in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, remains open to membership of other European states in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. We recalled the Summit agreement that enlargement will be part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe and contributing to the security of all. In this way, enlargement will be an integral part of the more general development of co-operative security relationships in the entire Euro-Atlantic area. We therefore welcomed the decision taken at the recent meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers to initiate a process of examination inside the Alliance to determine how NATO will enlarge, the principles to guide this process and the implications of membership. As Ministers of Defence we will contribute fully to this process which will have implications for our collective defence arrangements, particularly the defence planning process and the Integrated Military Structure. Therefore, we have invited our Permanent Representatives, with the advice of NATO's Military Authorities, to ensure that these implications are addressed as a contribution to the work of the North Atlantic Council on this subject.

6. The Partnership for Peace is essential for the development of co-operation between NATO and its Partners. It develops valuable patterns of co-operation in defence fields which will further enhance stability. It is an effective mechanism to develop the essential military capabilities required to operate effectively with NATO and to encourage interoperability between NATO and Partners which is of value to Partner countries whether they aspire to NATO membership or not. We confirmed that active participation in the Partnership for Peace will also play an important role in the evolutionary process of the expansion of NATO.

7. We attached particular importance to the defence planning and review process offered to Partners. It draws on NATO's long experience in this field, recognises the need for a tailored approach consistent with the specific circumstances of individual Partners, and will be broadened and deepened over time. This tailored approach needs to direct each Partner nation toward specific objectives designed to enhance interoperability. It will allow both concrete planning for the forces identified for PfP activities and a more general exchange of information among the Allies and Partners on overall defence and financial plans. In this way, the planning and review process will serve two of the central purposes of PfP: closer co-operation and transparency in national defence planning and budgeting.

8. The foundations for PfP are now firmly in place, and we are determined to maintain the momentum of the progress achieved since the Summit. We reviewed with satisfaction the work done since January in establishing the structural framework and procedures for the Partnership. With the demonstrated interest of our Partners in associating more closely with NATO and their increasing presence at NATO Headquarters and in the Partnership Co-ordination Cell, PfP has moved briskly toward fulfilling its purpose of working with Partners to build lasting stability. We noted the specific activities drawn up for 1995, including a full and ambitious range of exercises. These are supplemented by extensive and valuable bilateral co-operation programmes between NATO and Partner countries. We also noted with satisfaction proposals to expand practical co-operation with PfP Partners in the fields of air defence, communications, defence procurement and standardisation. PfP activities must continue to be adequately funded. We remain committed to providing the resources necessary for the success of this initiative, while recognising and welcoming the contributions that the Partners have to make in order to fund their participation.

9. We recognised that Russia can make considerable contributions towards stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area on a wide range of issues. We therefore affirmed the importance of NATO's relations with Russia, including practical co-operation both inside and outside the Partnership for Peace. We also affirmed the importance of an independent, democratic, and stable Ukraine, and our interest in developing further practical co-operation with it.

10. We assessed the progress made in adapting the Alliance's procedures and structures to enable our forces to respond effectively to the changing requirements of European security. We discussed progress in the development of the Combined Joint Task Forces concept which will have implications for collective defence planning and the Integrated Military Structure. We support this continuing work and encourage the examination of ways of facilitating the further development of the concept, including, as soon as appropriate, through pilot trials. CJTFs will significantly enhance the effectiveness of contingency operations, whether undertaken by the Alliance or by the WEU, and our ability to involve non-NATO countries. We affirmed our view that implementation of the concept should be consistent with the principle of developing separable but not separate military capabilities for use by NATO or the WEU. We also underlined the importance of this work to the further evolution of the European Security and Defence Identity and to closer co-operation between NATO and the Western European Union, based on the principles of transparency and complementarity.

11. We noted the progress report of the Joint Committee on Proliferation on the work undertaken by the Senior Politico-Military Group on Proliferation and the Senior Defence Group on Proliferation following the Summit's decision to intensify and expand NATO's political and defence efforts against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their

delivery systems. We agreed on the importance of this work as part of NATO's continuing adaptation to the new security environment. Diplomatic efforts to prevent or reverse proliferation remain our top priority. In addition, NATO as a defensive Alliance must address the range of capabilities needed to discourage weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation and use and, if necessary, to counter this risk by improving the protection of NATO populations, territory and forces. Political-military uncertainties and future technological trends related to WMD will affect NATO's collective defence planning. We noted the growing proliferation risks with regard to states on NATO's periphery, including the role of suppliers of WMD-related technology to them, and the continuing risks of illicit transfers of WMD and related materials. The DGP will next determine the range of capabilities needed on the basis of its work to date, and we look forward to receiving a report on its progress at our next meeting.

12. Collective defence planning remains fundamental to the cohesion and military effectiveness of NATO. On this basis, we reviewed national defence plans for 1995-99 and beyond and adopted a five-year force plan. Substantial progress continues to be made to provide the forces and capabilities necessary to continue to fulfil the Alliance's fundamental security task of deterrence and defence, while enabling these forces to undertake the Alliance's new missions, including peacekeeping. We noted progress in ensuring that the collective planning process takes both requirements into account. However, we noted shortfalls in certain capabilities, especially related to support for reaction forces, ground based air defence and strategic mobility, which could have important implications for the implementation of all aspects of Alliance strategy. We welcomed the announcement of the German Minister of Defence that the operational elements of German land, air, and naval forces in the new Federal Constituent States of Germany will be assigned to NATO on 1st January 1995.

13. A number of nations face continuing pressure for further savings in overhead, operations and maintenance costs, investment programmes, and force structures and readiness. We therefore reconfirmed our commitment to ensuring that all our forces are properly trained and equipped and noted in this regard that nations should continue efforts to stabilise defence budgets. We will continue to seek the resources necessary to enable our forces to perform the full range of their missions and tasks.

14. We noted from the first Annual Report submitted by the Senior Resource Board the status of existing funding programmes and the potential demands for common funding in the future. To maintain the necessary financial stability for NATO's common funded resource programmes, we reaffirmed our commitment to provide adequate funds to ensure that the essential requirements of our Alliance's Military Authorities, and new requirements stemming from the January 1994 Summit initiatives, continue to be met. In this regard, we support the decision at the recent meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers to undertake a wide-ranging

examination of Alliance budgetary management, structures, and procedures.

15. Effective transatlantic armaments co-operation remains an essential ingredient of our collective defence, particularly in the new security situation which puts an ever-higher premium on equipment interoperability to sustain multinational operations. We welcomed the recent decision by the Conference of National Armaments Directors to pursue work on an Alliance Ground Surveillance capability. Such a capability would complement our AWACS capability, and would be an invaluable tool for the command of military operations and also for peacekeeping and crisis management. We also noted with interest the extensive work being undertaken by National Armaments Directors with regard to the defence equipment implications of peacekeeping and extended air defence/theatre missile defence. We look forward to receiving the results of this work.

16. We discussed the situation in the former Yugoslavia and endorsed the position taken in this regard by the North Atlantic Council on 1st December. In particular, we continue to deplore the ongoing conflict in Bosnia, which has brought about large-scale suffering, most recently in and around the Safe Area of Bihac. We reiterated the call on the Bosnian Serbs and all those forces which support them to end their offensive in Bihac and on all parties to agree to and honour a ceasefire and allow humanitarian aid to flow to that beleaguered population and throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. We believe that UNPROFOR should continue its crucial mission of providing humanitarian assistance and saving human life. Our military authorities are, however, undertaking contingency planning to assist UNPROFOR in withdrawing should that become unavoidable.

17. As Defence Ministers we paid particular tribute to the courage and dedication with which our forces have carried out their demanding tasks both as part of UNPROFOR and in support of the United Nations. Ensuring their security will remain a high priority for us. The Alliance has agreed to undertake certain operations in support of the UN, and we expressed our determination that whatever our forces are asked to do under the existing UN Security Council Resolutions and in accordance with North Atlantic Council decisions should be accomplished promptly and efficiently. In this connection we reaffirmed our commitment to provide close air support for UNPROFOR and to use NATO airpower, in accordance with existing arrangements with the United Nations. We continue to support the efforts of the UN and the Contact Group to alleviate the suffering of the people in the region and to find a just and peaceful solution in Bosnia and elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia. In doing so we shall maintain the unity and cohesion of the Alliance.

18. We recalled the importance attached by the NATO Summit to security in the Mediterranean area and expressed our full support for efforts by the Alliance to strengthen regional stability.

19. We reviewed the status of the Alliance nuclear forces and reaffirmed their fundamental contribution to preserving stability and security. We received a presentation by the United States on the results of its Nuclear Posture Review, which was conducted in consultation with the Alliance, and expressed our deep satisfaction for the reaffirmation of the United States' nuclear commitment to NATO. In this context, we reiterate the essential value of maintaining widespread deployment of NATO's sub-strategic nuclear forces by the United States and European Allies. These forces, which are an integral part of NATO's nuclear posture, represent an essential element of the transatlantic link and are visible evidence of NATO's cohesion, solidarity and burden-sharing.

20. We expressed our continued support for the role of the ABM Treaty in ensuring strategic stability. We discussed the latest developments in U.S.-Russian negotiations on the demarcation between strategic defences against intercontinental missiles, which are limited by the Treaty, and the permitted theatre defences against shorter-range threats. We were also informed about and welcomed the work done by U.S. and Russian bilateral working groups to reduce the danger of nuclear miscalculation and to promote stability and understanding.

21. We reiterated our full support to efforts aimed at achieving the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1995. We will continue to support ongoing efforts to strengthen the international non-proliferation regimes. We will also work to enhance the verification regime for the NPT. We welcome Ukraine's recent accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state. In conjunction with the earlier action by Belarus and Kazakhstan, this meets an important obligation under the Lisbon Protocol of May 1992 and has permitted the recent exchange of instruments of ratification for the START I Treaty, allowing it to enter into force, and opening the way for early ratification of START II. We are convinced that implementation of these Treaties and the complete withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, will contribute to enhancing international security and stability.

22. We attach great importance to the consultations and cooperation between a number of NATO nations and the four newly independent states concerned, to provide practical technical assistance in nuclear safety and security, including dismantling of nuclear arms. We are pleased with the progress made in this regard. We believe this should continue to be an area for fruitful dialogue and cooperation.

23. We welcome the Agreed Framework between the United States and the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK) as an important step towards bringing the DPRK into full compliance with its obligations under both the NPT and its Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and to ensure that the Korean peninsula is free of nuclear weapons.

24. The end of East-West confrontation brought a dramatic improvement in the security of the Alliance's members. Nevertheless, as events in the former Yugoslavia all too painfully demonstrate, security and stability are not certain. We are convinced that the Alliance is essential to our nations' security and to the prospects for security in the wider Euro-Atlantic area. We accordingly reaffirmed our determination to ensure that its foundations - in the form of shared political values, solidarity, and a commitment to sound collective defence - remain firm.

Senator LEVIN. Is one of the conditions for entry into NATO that there not be border disputes between that country and neighbors?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. That is certainly one of the factors. I guess there is a territorial dispute between England and Spain, but that is not—

Senator LEVIN. How will it be stated?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Something to the effect that the countries will be expected to have renounced the use of force and accepted the sovereignty of their neighbors with respect to territorial integrity of their neighbors. That is somewhat different from saying you cannot have a border dispute. Border disputes exist as a matter of law. But it is a matter of ensuring that they have renounced any intent or any right to use military force or otherwise to affect the sovereignty of their neighbor.

Senator LEVIN. A recent article in The New York Times said that new members must have also resolved any outstanding border conflicts with neighbors. That is not, then, what is going to be required. Just a decision or statement that force would not be used in the resolution of disputes.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Formal words have not yet been agreed, so neither I nor The New York Times can be authoritative about what it will or will not be. Obviously, we would not want to import into the Alliance unresolved border disputes. That is not quite the same thing as saying that all border and territorial claims have to be absolutely and finally determined before we would be willing to consider a country for membership.

Senator LEVIN. What do you expect the human rights language is going to read like?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. My expectation is that the general language will be fairly broad in terms. It will probably make special reference to minority problems because, in some sense, normally, that is the obverse of a boundary dispute. But the criteria then will be applied in examining the application of individual countries, so that those countries which have a minority problem will presumably be subject to special scrutiny as to whether they have resolved that in a satisfactory way, or are dealing with it in a satisfactory way.

Senator LEVIN. Have we heard any nervousness from any of the Baltic nations about our expansion of NATO, which does not include them?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. We certainly hear regularly and consistently from all the Baltic countries that they very much want ultimately to become members of the Alliance. I think it is also true that they and other countries recognize that the process will be gradual, that not all the countries—this is not a once-for-all admission of new members. And in their more reflective moments they acknowledge that it is in their interest that the process gets started so that their turn will come, so to speak.

So what I am trying to say is they do not oppose the proposition that some other country should be admitted before them; they oppose the proposition that they should be excluded a priori from consideration, and that is certainly not our position, that they are excluded a priori.

Senator LEVIN. Have we heard any nervousness at all from Ukraine?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. We hear a lot of nervousness from Ukraine, not particularly about this issue. They—

Senator LEVIN. You say not about this?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Not particularly about this issue. They, like every other country indeed, in principle, like Russia, assert that their eventual goal is to become a full participant in the European structures in every sense, and one part of that is the NATO Alliance. Obviously, their immediate political and strategic situation is unique and not focused particularly on the issue of early membership in the Alliance. But, like others, they wish not to be excluded a priori, and that is consistent with our position.

Senator LEVIN. Excluded ultimately out of the Alliance?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Excluded from—Japan cannot be a member of the NATO Alliance—

Senator LEVIN. Obviously. But you are saying excluded ultimately from being a member.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The permanent exclusion.

Senator LEVIN. General, the rescission bill that is on the Senate floor cuts \$69 million from fiscal year 1995 funds for the NATO infrastructure account, and the United States has not paid its share of these infrastructure accounts in recent years. Do the Joint Chiefs and the Department of Defense object to the cut? And, if so, have people been informed of that in the Senate?

General CLARK. I will have to take that back and work that issue, Senator. Thank you.

Senator LEVIN. Back to the expansion issue for just a minute, Secretary Slocombe. Have we made an approximate estimate of the cost of NATO expansion?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. We have certainly not made a dollar cost estimate because you cannot make that until you know which countries and under what circumstances and when. But let me say a few things about the issue of cost.

We understand that NATO cannot take on additional defense responsibilities, and the United States as a leading member in the Alliance cannot do that, cannot agree to that, without recognizing the fact that there will be some additional burdens and some additional costs. The scale of these costs will depend on what countries become members, what was the state of their infrastructure, what they and other NATO allies could contribute and, perhaps most of all, the scale of the threat.

We would not expect that we would require additional combat units in the overall American military establishment—obviously, in the absence of the development of an emergent and direct threat—but there certainly would be costs. They would probably more be for additional facilities and assets for mobility, for command and control facilities, and for headquarters rather than for station forces. Some of those costs will presumably be met out of the NATO common budgets, including what used to be called the infrastructure fund which you just referred to.

These costs could be significant with the amounts, depending heavily on the mix and the particular circumstances. In general, besides being more flexible in the context where threats are uncertain, preparations for reinforcement and for the sort of creation of the framework for common defense, rather than a massive pre-posi-

tioned force, are cheaper than permanent stationing but they are by no means free. We have to acknowledge that there will be costs, and that is one of the things which both the Alliance and each individual member of the Alliance will have to look at in concrete terms as we consider the possibility of individual, particular countries becoming members of the Alliance.

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Chairman, could I just wind up with one additional question? The Federation Council Chairman in Russia, a man named Vladimir Chumako, was quoted yesterday as saying to Secretary Perry that the Russian Parliament will not ratify START II until questions over NATO's expansion eastward are resolved. Then it goes on to say that, while acknowledging the value that START II would have for nuclear nonproliferation, Chumako said the issues of NATO and START II are closely linked in the minds of Russian deputies. I am wondering whether or not you are familiar with that and, if so, do you think that he speaks for the majority of the deputies?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I am certainly familiar with the statement. We cannot, as of right now, count the votes in the Duma to ratify START II, period. And there is certainly no question that the issue of NATO expansion is a controversial one in Russia. Some of the reasons for that are the ones General Clark outlined.

We believe that with time and with the development of work on this special relationship which you have been talking about, we will be able to persuade the Russian government and the Russian Parliament that the enlargement of NATO is something which is not in their interest to take these kinds of extreme measures to try to stop. I believe the measures would also be unsuccessful and would not be in the Russians' interest.

But this is clearly going to be a long-term—not generations, but a long process of outlining what it is we have in mind and dealing not just with the issue of admitting new members to the Alliance, but of the greater context of NATO-Russian relations. That is one of the reasons it is so important to do that work.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you.

Senator WARNER. Senator Nunn.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me ask Mr. Slocombe and General Clark when the study that is being done, I assume, on NATO enlargement will be completed and whether that study is being done by the Joint Staff by itself and then feeding into NATO, or is it being done jointly between our Joint Staff and the NATO staff.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. It is actually being done at NATO by the NATO staff.

Senator NUNN. So the Joint Staff here is feeding into that NATO study.

General CLARK. That is correct.

Senator NUNN. What is the timeframe on that?

General CLARK. It should be done in May, Senator.

Senator NUNN. And when will it be presented and in what forum?

General CLARK. The purpose of the study is to be able to give a briefing to partners, so after the study is done—the study is right now not planned to be presented to the partners. The study is a

thought piece, and so out of that will be crafted the briefing that will then be offered to the partners sometime after the first of September.

Senator NUNN. Will you be presenting the study to the Congress?

General CLARK. We would be very pleased to do that, sir.

Senator NUNN. Sometime in May.

General CLARK. I do not know if we will have it in May.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. My understanding of the process in NATO is that, at the May ministerials, there will be presented a proposed enlargement study. If, as is quite possible, there will be issues which have to be resolved at a high political level, they will be resolved at that meeting or in a process to take place shortly after that. Then the briefings, the presentation to other countries, will be prepared. So our target is to begin those briefings in capitals in September and prepare over the summer. I just want to make it clear that I cannot promise that it will be finished in May.

Senator NUNN. Well, bottom line, when will we see it?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. You will see it as soon as it is done for all practical purposes, and we hope that will be May or shortly after that.

Senator NUNN. Okay. Does that study include studying the question of forward deployment of troops and what nations would forward deploy troops, if any? Also, does it include nuclear policy and whether we would station tactical nuclear weapons, if need be at some point in time, in those countries? And whether those countries that might be coming in would agree to that in advance, if it were needed for defensive purposes at some point in time? Are you tackling those kind of subjects, or is it broader than that?

General CLARK. I would say it is somewhat broader than that in that, first, it is attempting to keep the door open for the flexibility to evolve NATO's structure as the threat might emerge, if it does emerge. It also is not looking at particular countries. So, therefore, it is not addressing who might station forces forward; it is rather saying, for example, that it would be useful or would be vital, and these are the things that are being debated right now. And that the prospective members must understand that forces from the Alliance will train on their soil, their forces will train on somebody else's soil and participate in exercises. There could be peacetime stationing—is that required, is it possible. And it is that range that is being worked inside the Alliance now.

Senator NUNN. What about the nuclear question? Is this study going to anticipate that nuclear weapons might have to be deployed? I hope they never will be. I hope they will not be a threat. But the NATO Alliance has historically at least been threat-based. Would countries be expected to allow the deployment of theater nuclear weapons if the threat materialized?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. It will address the issue of NATO nuclear strategy as applied to an enlarged NATO.

There is another parallel effort which will feed into this looking specifically at the nuclear requirements, whether there would be a requirement for additional deployments. There is not just the question of additional deployments, but how new members would participate in the strategy and how the strategy would work in the context of enlargement.

Senator NUNN. My question really is: Are we likely to get in a situation where we expand NATO and we do not have clear understandings about the willingness of front line countries, if they become members of NATO, being willing to have nuclear weapons or aircraft that would carry nuclear weapons on their soil, if the threat arises? Or is that going to be an explicit part of the understanding that is tied to expansion, no matter which country happens to come in?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. One of the issues which the study is addressing is exactly that issue. That is, what will be expected of new members in terms of stationing forces, presence of forces, training, exercises, prepositioning equipment, adapting infrastructure, communications systems, and the specific issue of nuclear deployment and participation in NATO's nuclear strategy.

I cannot anticipate what the conclusions will be on those questions but it is exactly that kind of issue which is being addressed.

Senator NUNN. Have those issues started being discussed with the Partners for Peace at this juncture?

General CLARK. No, they have not, Senator.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Not with the Central European countries and the former Soviet Union states.

General CLARK. Nor have any of the other issues.

Senator NUNN. Yes. But what has got to be avoided—and I assume that is what Partnership for Peace and these studies will help avoid—is the situation where there may not be a threat now but one may emerge in 5 years, 10 years, and we go into an expansion of NATO with no understanding about forward deployment of forces, no understanding that if we do not have adequate conventional forces we may have to use nuclear deterrent, no understanding about deploying nuclear weapons on someone's soil.

I can anticipate kind of a worst case scenario of not anticipating those questions and thinking that there is something about being a member of NATO that you are then guaranteed security with no means that are visible to carry it out. And that is what you are trying to avoid, I assume.

General CLARK. Exactly right.

Senator NUNN. So that means you have to be rather explicit and have some explicit understandings before the final step, at least, of a new NATO member coming in.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Also, I have been trying to be clear about what the NATO enlargement study will address. The United States has a position on these issues in general, which is that new members will be full members and they will be entitled to all the rights and have all the obligations of members in general. And indeed, as Secretary Holbrooke said, there are some highly particular, historically based circumstances that at least the United States would not like to see repeated.

It is exactly the kind of problem that you raised in your question which makes us in the administration believe that Dr. Kissinger's proposal, for example, that you buy rapid expansion of the Alliance by agreeing never to station nuclear weapons in the new members, is not a wise proposal at all. Precisely because, quite apart from whether you would actually want to do it, it is wrong as a matter of principle to have an agreement with an outside country about

how an alliance will dispose its own forces to meet its own defense requirements. Quite apart from what you actually intend to do at any immediate time in the future.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you having these hearings. These are very valuable hearings and I will catch up on the previous testimony. I understand that it was very interesting testimony.

Senator WARNER. Excellent. An excellent hearing today, and we have laid a very solid foundation for further deliberations by the full committee. And I thank you very much.

We have before us here the following dollar figures that I want to establish a record for action by this committee. At this point, the United States is committed to provide \$130 million—\$30 million in fiscal year 1995 and \$100 million in 1996—to assist Partnership for Peace. My understanding is that assistance for NATO expansion is being provided on an ad hoc basis without any organized process within NATO. I am concerned that such an approach could well result in this effort being paid for primarily by the United States. What have our allies contributed thus far to the Partnership for Peace effort dollar-wise? And am I correct in the assumptions I made in that opening question?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. We can get you the exact contributions. They are, I have to say, very modest, of any country other than the United States. Up until right now, they are very modest by the United States because the—

Senator WARNER. But modest is relative.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Of the \$130 million, \$100 million of it has not even been appropriated yet. The \$30 million was appropriated last year and is only beginning to be spent.

We have made very strongly to the allies the point that for this PFP to work, other countries besides the United States have got to put real resources into it. I agree with the thrust of your question that, for the PFP to do what it needs to do, it is going to take resources and the United States should not have to provide all of those resources.

Senator WARNER. All right. I asked what commitments have they made. What you are saying is that we have advised them and thus far you have not received any firm commitments as to a dollar figure either for 1995 or 1996.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I believe that to be the case. However, there are a fair number of countries which have borne significant costs in connection with PFP activities, particularly—

Senator WARNER. Laying the foundation for it you mean? Laying the foundation for PFP?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. For example, when an exercise is held in a European country, in some cases the host nation will pay some costs of that exercise, and that of course is support for the PFP.

One specific area where there has been a direct support, not for PFP as such but parallel to ours, is of course our \$130 million in bilateral support. We will decide how to spend that. That money will not flow through the NATO system.

Other bilateral programs—the Nordic countries and the U.K. have a coordinated assistance program for the Baltic countries. The Germans have provided assistance for the Poles; the Italians are

working with the Albanians, and there are other varying amounts that are being provided. To the degree we have them, I can try to get them to the committee.

Senator WARNER. It would be important, Mr. Secretary, to put the information that is presently in the possession of the United States, be it yourself, State or otherwise—

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Absolutely. To the degree we have it we will get it, but a lot of these are bilateral payments and, therefore, do not go through the NATO system. And we are in the process of beginning to collect this information from the countries who spend it.

[The information follows:]

We have not tracked allied Partnership for Peace activities so closely that we can provide breakdowns of specific programs and contributions. However, your concern is well-founded. In recent months, this question has become a more prominent one for the entire Alliance. To alleviate concerns about bilateral PFP programs, NATO has decided to host a seminar in early May 1995 to examine in detail the range of contributions which nations have made (and continue to make) on a bilateral basis within the Partnership for Peace framework. Results of that meeting will be briefed to Ministers before the May North Atlantic Council meeting and at the June Defense Planning Committee meeting. These reports could be made available to Congress thereafter.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. But I do not want to mislead you as to the bottom line. The thrust of your question is, is the United States putting up more than its share. We are the only country who has committed anything like the scale of money that we are talking about, and we will be very clear with our allies that one of the main reasons we have done that is that we want this to be sort of a matching program. I do not necessarily mean dollar for dollar, but we are not going to put all the money into this enterprise.

Senator WARNER. I think that is a candid answer. I will just repeat this for the record. In other words, the \$100 million that the administration requested for 1996 would likely represent the bulk of allied dollar assistance for the PFP members.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Well, that assumes we fail in our efforts to get other countries to put up money. I would not necessarily—

Senator WARNER. I think the key word would be "bulk" of the dollar assistance. Well, all right. We will leave it open.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. We will have to see. I do not want to say that our appeals to the other countries will be such—it will obviously be a big chunk.

Senator WARNER. Fair enough. We will leave the record as it is. We have explored it I think as candidly and openly as we can at this point in time.

My understanding is that \$7 million of the \$40 million request for the PFP exercises for 1996 have been designated for exercises with Russia. Given Russia's refusal to sign the necessary documents to become a full-fledged participating member of PFP, why would we set aside these scarce resources for Russia?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. That is an extraordinarily good question. And if Russia does not, as we expect it will, sign up and become an active PFP participant by fiscal year 1996, we would certainly review that allocation.

Senator WARNER. Thank you. As you know, there are currently two pieces of legislation before the Senate which address the issue of NATO expansion; Title VI of H.R. 7—that is a House measure—

and S. 602, the Brown-Simon bill. Now, neither of these legislative proposals have a timetable for NATO expansion. But do you have any views on behalf of the administration as to these two pieces of legislation?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. As you may remember from your time in the executive branch, Mr. Chairman, individual executive branch officials do not get to state the administration's formal position on legislation, except that of course the administration has opposed most of the provisions of H.R. 7 but not all of them.

Senator WARNER. Opposed?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Opposed, yes.

On a personal basis, I looked at the new, what I think of as the Senate version. Some of the language is the same; some of it is quite different. Much of the principles in—what is the bill number?

Senator WARNER. It is 602, the Brown-Simon.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Are principles with which the administration fully agrees. That there is a security need to enlarge, that the process will be gradual and that countries will come in varied dates, that we need to work out the relationship of NATO with Russia, and the fact that there is not a deadline. And I understand that is now true in the final House-passed version of H.R. 7.

Areas where I believe there are problems are, first, the specific legislative designation of countries. The question came up earlier of the Baltic states. To identify the so-called Visegrad four countries, to declare that they are presumptively and virtually by statutory determination—it is the position of the United States that they have met still undefined NATO criteria. Even if that were a perfectly correct determination for those four countries, it raises problems for any countries that are left out, acknowledging that it has a procedure for the President to designate other countries.

But, obviously, the countries designated by the U.S. Congress and in a bill signed by the President would be a major step of doing exactly what we do not want to do, which is, in advance of this whole process, trying to jump ahead and designate particular countries.

Also, I believe that the provision, although it does not have a 5-year period, does not have any period for membership, I think tries to identify countries which will be eligible for membership within 5 years. Quite apart from being a very difficult judgment to make, again, our view is that we have to see this process as a rather long-term continuing one in which we deal with each of the countries in Europe, including some which are in all probability well beyond 5 years from membership. However, we want to have a solid security relationship, we want to work through the Partnership for Peace, and we want to build a relationship with NATO. So those are the kinds of problems. With the Chair's permission, what I would like to do is go through the regular process and provide a full analysis.

Senator WARNER. We will also submit other questions for the record. The record will remain open for questions for a reasonable period of time.

Mr. Secretary, I thank you and, General Clark, I thank you for an excellent hearing. The committee stands in recess until the call of the Chair.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

IMPACT OF U.S. NON-PAYMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE ASSESSMENTS

Senator LEVIN. I have a question for all three of you. I have been increasingly concerned that the United States has not met its obligations to the NATO infrastructure fund. My concern was heightened last week when the Senate voted to rescind another \$69 million of NATO infrastructure funds. Can you give us the impact of this to the alliance?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The impact has been immediate, and forceful and detrimental to the U.S. position in NATO. As a consequence of the recent \$33 million rescission of Fiscal Year 1995 NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP) funds from a budget that Congress reduced \$100 million from the start of the fiscal year, the United States is unable to support any significant funding of NATO projects for the remainder of the fiscal year.

In addition, the rescission of funds will have an impact on operational force readiness as well as on the existing NATO infrastructure i.e., both fixed facilities and the extensive command, control and communications systems which are vital for the conduct of effective military operations. Let me explain. This program represented the principal source of funding for the restoration and upgrade of existing operational facilities, as well as any new construction required such as storage for prepositioned Army material and equipment at Camp Darby, Italy. For the past several years, Congress has directed the Department to make maximum use of the program to defray costs for operational facility requirements, has restricted prefinancing, and has urged the expansion of funding criteria to include additional U.S. requirements. In this regard, the United States has engineered allied agreements on funding for the O&M costs of storage for prepositioned material, expansion of criteria for F-16 beddown facilities at Aviano, and some support for embarkation facilities in CONUS. However, because of the rescission of funds from this program, the United States cannot realistically expect NATO funding for any U.S.-unique projects, absent full funding support for the agreed \$800 million program. Whatever leverage the United States could have exerted to gain approval for the new requirements has quickly dissipated with Congressional reductions.

The funding shortfall affects other aspects of readiness too. Because of the transition to new NATO programming procedures, revised criteria and standards, base and force reductions, etc., many restoration/upgrade projects were delayed. At this juncture, some of the requirements are finally coming to decision and are crucial to continued readiness. They directly impact ongoing operations at U.S. bases (e.g. Sigonella runway, pavement work at Lakenheath and Mildenhall, storm drains at Ramstein, taxiway restoration at Aviano). With the funding shortfall, much of this work will again be deferred and it could fall to U.S. O&M and minor construction funding to cover critical needs. In the worst case, certain facilities may have to be shut down for health and safety reasons (runways due to debris, leaking fuel tanks, faulty HVAC systems).

In the final analysis, a failure to protect our equities in this program promotes the perception that the United States has relinquished its leadership position within the Alliance. United States failure to support our NSIP obligations will have a negative effect on programs and activities which are key to NATO's transition as a cornerstone of European security, now and well into the future. For example, the Partnership for Peace Program stands to benefit from access to NATO funds to support procurement of command and control and information processing equipment furthering interoperability and transparency in future initiatives. Likewise Alliance initiatives supporting key security interests in Europe such as counterproliferation programs and the development of greater European defense capabilities, will be delayed or set back because we lack the necessary capital.

We need to work together to seek restoration of rescinded funds and to obtain full funding for our fiscal year requirement of \$179 million for this, program.

General CLARK. As a direct result of the recent \$33 million rescission of fiscal year 1995 funds for the U.S. share of the NATO Security Investment Program, combined with the \$100 million cut to the Department of Defense submitted budget of \$219 million, the United States no longer has the means to meet its financial commitments to this NATO Program for the rest of the fiscal year. On April 11, 1995, the United States notified the NATO allies and placed an administrative hold on all NATO projects. The immediate impact on U.S. operations was the deferral of the U.S.-sponsored urgent remedial project to repair the taxiway at Aviano Air Base,

Italy, subject to U.S. funds confirmation, that will adversely affect on-going U.S. air operations including Operations Provide Promise and Deny Flight.

With only \$3.9 million of unobligated funds available and the prospects of additional receipts (from recoupment and deobligations) limited to a maximum of \$12-\$15 million, the United States cannot meet "must pay" costs of about \$30 million for contractor progress payments, cover existing commitments to NATO common-funded agency costs, or support any emergency facility repair. Even more critically, the funding of warehouses for U.S. prepositioned equipment in the Southern region and the fighter-beddown facilities at Aviano Air Base cannot be approved this year.

The NATO Security Investment Program remains the principal source of funding for the restoration and upgrade of existing operational facilities at U.S. European bases; construction required for new missions and the consolidation of forces; embarkation facilities in the United States to support the mobilization and movement of U.S. NATO-assigned reinforcement forces; and prepositioned materiel and equipment storage.

Absent adequate funding for the U.S. share of the program, U.S.-unique requirements cannot be considered for NATO funding in fiscal year 1995. Specific requirements, supporting all service components, include:

- Controlled humidity warehouses for the storage of Army prepositioned materiel at Camp Darby, Italy.
- Embarkation facilities in the States for the outload of troops and equipment (bases include: Fort Riley, Fort Hood, Sunny Point, and Fort Benning).
- Advanced logistics support sites for multinational maritime forces in NATO'S Southern Region; upgrade and restoration of Atlantic maritime bases; pier facilities at Naval Weapons Station, Earle, NJ.
- Restoration and modification of existing facilities and some new construction, at Spangdahlem and Ramstein air bases in Germany; and Mildenhall and Lakenheath air bases in the United Kingdom. Work at these bases support, in large part, the consolidation of United States squadrons as other air bases are closed.
- Major construction and upgrades, about \$200 million, at Aviano Air Base, Italy to support the relocation of two F-16 fighter squadrons.
- Computer-assisted battle simulation training facilities at the Warrior Preparation Center.
- A NATO funding decision on funding operations and maintenance costs of prepositioned fuel, ammunition, and equipment storage.

In addition to U.S.-specific requirements, there are theater-wide and common-use NATO systems and facilities that must be maintained and upgraded. U.S. forces and other NATO allies use these systems and facilities which are essential for the conduct of military operations and political consultations. U.S. forces require and support the following types of requirements (primarily command and control projects) planned for 1996:

- Upgrades to strategic and tactical communications related to the control of military operations presently being utilized by Operations Provide Comfort, Provide Promise, Deny Flight, and Sharp Guard.
- Upgrades and additions to the interconnecting system of early-warning, coastal, and air defense radar systems in daily use by U.S. forces.
- Upgrades to secure and reliable communications networks linking NATO static and mobile command centers with the national headquarters of NATO member nations.
- Upgrade and update of NATO command headquarters equipped with modern management information systems software and hardware.
- Cross-border petroleum pipeline systems that connect with refineries, fuel depots, airfields, and other major NATO bases heavily utilized during U.S. forces during contingency and humanitarian airlift operations.
- Fuel and ammunition depots, storage for prepositioned equipment and materiel, and air or sea embarkation and reception facilities for use by U.S. and allied reinforcement forces.
- Maintenance and upgrading of NATO multi-national training facilities and ranges.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. The \$33 million rescission of funds from the NATO Security Investment Program will have a tremendous negative impact upon the Alliance by delaying or canceling much needed operational capability improvements, construction, and purchases.

The NATO Alliance is the cornerstone of United States national security interests in Europe. It is the one Alliance that has worked for more than four decades. NATO assured peace and stability in Europe during the Cold War and ultimately ensured

western success. Today, NATO provides a major framework for the United States to influence critical decisions in the future shape of European security structures. A continuing U.S. military presence, although considerably reduced, is based upon the shared common defense burden with our allies.

The United States has worked hard to urge our allies to fully support the NATO Security Investment Program with sufficient funding. The 1995 budget rescission could well lead our other allies to reduce their own contributions to this critically important program. Such action would reduce NATO's capability to provide the required common funded support to operational requirements.

United States' failure to support our NATO Security Investment Program obligations will have a negative effect on programs and activities which are key to NATO's transition as a cornerstone of European security, now and well into the future.

For example, the President's NATO Summit initiative, Partnership for Peace, which has wide congressional support, stands to benefit from access to NATO funds to support procurement of common command and control and information processing equipment furthering interoperability and transparency in future partnership initiatives. Likewise, United States and Alliance initiatives supporting key security interests in Europe, such as counterproliferation programs and the development of greater European defense capabilities, will be set back if the necessary capital is not available.

For years, Congress has urged the Department of State to make maximum use of the NATO Infrastructure Program for our European facility requirements and additionally, to expand the criteria to include a wider range of projects, such as requirements in the United States. Some examples affected by the rescission are planned construction of pier facilities at Earle, NJ, and embarkation facilities at Fort Hood, TX. In addition we have been successful in adding U.S. costs for POMCUS included in the program. Unilateral reduction of our contribution to the NATO Security Investment Program could impact negatively our efforts to have the allies cover more of the United States' expenses in support of NATO.

[Whereupon, at 4:20 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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