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# GERMANY'S HOUR OF DESTINY

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By COL. H. FROBENIUS

(Retired)

WITH INTRODUCTION  
BY  
PROF. W. R. SHEPHERD  
OF  
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

SECOND EDITION

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# GERMANY'S HOUR OF DESTINY

BY  
COLONEL H. FROBENIUS

WITH PREFACE BY  
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## INTRODUCTION

BY WILLIAM R. SHEPHERD \*

The little book, of which the following is a translation, first appeared last March and has already entered upon its twelfth edition. It is the German answer to a work written some years ago by Homer Lea, an American soldier who won fame at the time of the Boxer outbreak in China. Frank, earnest, genuine in tone and in statement, it offers a clear-cut study of the international situation that brought on the present war. It possesses, also, the great merit of brevity.

In this book one finds naught of the "mailed fist," of "sabre-rattling" or any of the other bogies which the opponents of Germany and her ally conjure up. It strives, instead, to explain, calmly and logically, what a German patriot believes to be his country's viewpoint. It is just the sort of document that should appeal to the American reader of open mind who refuses to allow the quantity, rather than the quality, of information to aid him in framing his judgment. It serves not to shake our neutrality, but to strengthen it.

The author describes the motives and aims of the chief powers now engaged in the struggle across the seas. For many years they have been playing a gigantic game. The moves and counter-moves, indeed, can be traced for centuries

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on the map of the world. Diplomatically they have reached a deadlock. Choosing, then, to ignore the fact that Germany has spent far less on armaments than they have, and accusing her of a "militarism," which, however, has kept the peace for more than forty years, her three great antagonists have been preparing to break the peace and to use the armaments: Russia—to throw down the walls of Berlin and Vienna, which bar the way to Constantinople and the North Atlantic; England—to dismantle the fleet that guards a growing merchant marine, and France—to regain the territories lost in an earlier war.

From a national standpoint, as nations are constituted today, the desires of Russia, England and France are perfectly legitimate; but so also are the interests of Germany and Austria-Hungary. It is only fair, therefore, that the American who loves his country and hates hypocrisy should "hear the other side," especially when it is presented in so candid and straightforward a fashion.

# GERMANY'S HOUR OF DESTINY

BY COLONEL H. FROBENIUS, RETIRED

It cannot be said that the federation of the German States and the renaissance of the German Empire in 1870-71 aroused great satisfaction in any European country. It seemed to the Great Powers that the political balance in Europe had been disturbed by the fact that, in the central region, which hitherto had supplied them with a welcome battleground for their struggles, there had arisen a power which commanded respect; and they were able to instill such fear of "plunder-loving Germany," and of her "greed for territory," in the smaller states, that even to-day the experience of forty-three years of peace has been unable to eradicate it. Yet by placing a great restraint upon itself, even to the extent of occasionally waiving its lawful rights, this new Empire, strong by reason of its military force, has proven itself a rock of security, and is chiefly responsible for these long years of peace.

There has indeed been no lack of pretexts for war during this period, and often the great statesmanship of a Bismarck was necessary to extinguish, before it was too late, the glowing spark which threatened to set fire to all Europe. However, since Russia is no longer bound by any treaty, since her interests have driven France into the arms of Russia, and since England believes her economic and military supremacy in the world at large to be threatened by Germany, conditions are beginning to shape themselves so unfavorably for the German Empire that its patience will be unable to endure the policy of annoyance much longer, and

the probability of a warlike solution at not too distant a time must be reckoned with. Let us examine what would be the interests of the chief, and therefore most dangerous opponents of Germany in such a war, which would doubtless involve the whole of Europe.

## I. GREAT BRITAIN

An American, but an enthusiastic Anglo-Saxon, Homer Lea, published a book a short time ago, "The Day of the Saxon," translated by Count E. Reventlow, as "Des Britischen Reichs Schicksalsstunde" (Berlin, 1913, E. S. Mittler & Son). In this he describes the dangers which have threatened the British world empire, since it has lost so much of its former prowess and has neglected its preparations for war (so far as a sufficient land force is concerned), to such an extent that it is no longer in a position to protect its gigantic possessions all over the world. "The old ideals," he says, "that made possible the Empire have been put aside. The militant spirit has become of secondary consideration; it is now hardly more than the spirit of trade, lazy and satisfied with the accumulation of things which are useless to national and racial progress." On the other hand this world empire, extending over the whole earth and embracing all its principal regions, presents enormous difficulties in the way of the expansion of other nations. Consequently, a conflict with the principal states that are in urgent need of expansion, Germany and Japan, is inevitable, springing as it does from interests vital to the life of these states. In the case of Russia, however, which still has a vast territory at the disposal of her steadily increasing population, the motive for expansion lies in a natural endeavor to secure an assured means of communication with the ocean. According to Homer Lea, Germany seems to be England's most dangerous opponent; indeed, England should never have permitted it to become united. She should rather have taken advantage of the dis-



union and dissension of Europe after Napoleon to make herself mistress of the European continent. Whether she had the opportunity and power to do it, the author does not consider. Indeed, since 1870, Germany has actually become a dangerous—not opponent—but rival of England in the markets of the world. The first blow at England's highly developed industry was made by Alfred Krupp, as early as the London World's Fair of 1851, when to the greatest achievement of the English steel industry, a block of 1,000 pounds, he opposed a similar one of 4,400 pounds; and when, in the World's Fair of 1862, in addition to a block of 4,000 pounds, he was able to exhibit breech-loading guns and huge propeller-shafts for ships, he won for the German iron industry the first place which had so long been claimed by the English. The perfect efficiency of his movable campaign-guns in the war of 1870-71 secured German gun-making a place in the world which, thanks to the untiring energy of our manufacturers, could not be disturbed even by the great efforts of English industry. Energetic representatives of other industries, too, rushed into the breach made by Krupp, and the resultant commerce, spreading to all parts of the world, soon enabled Germany to become an important rival in the world market.

She was not yet a dangerous one, because as long as the British fleet had undisputed control of all the sea-routes, if it came to the worst, the German merchant marine could, at the first favorable opportunity, be swept off the sea with little delay. The war of trade began to be dangerous only when Germany commenced to build warships to protect her commerce, and finally proceeded from a purely defensive coast protection to the construction of a fleet of war which developed into a considerable factor in German military power. The political causes for the opposition of England are due to an astonishing and obvious enough fear of German naval power. In order to make plain the motives which have hitherto shaped England's policy, let us review her past.

Ever since this country has played a part in the history of the great naval Powers, that is to say, ever since she started to secure for herself a position as a maritime power, her opponent has always been the strongest naval state at that particular time. Just as she was in constant opposition to the world dominion of Spain and Portugal, as long as these countries ruled the sea, so she turned against Holland, as soon as that country, after winning its independence from the Spanish yoke, had gained for itself the position of mistress of the seas. The moment Holland, misunderstanding its fundamental and vital necessities, and hard pressed on its land frontier, neglected its naval equipment, England took the field against another power, against France, which under Colbert's wise leadership, was growing powerful at sea. Great Britain persisted in this opposition as long as no other country seemed to her more dangerous. Wherever we find France, impelled by a restless ambitious policy, caught in some conflict, there we find Great Britain invariably on the side of the opponent, even when English interests were not directly concerned. And we find this state of affairs unchanged until there appeared on the horizon another power that threatened the Island Kingdom even more formidably than our western neighbor.

Slowly, but steadily, Russia had extended her boundaries in Asia. With rare obstinacy she sent her Cossack hordes to the east and south, and England saw that she must prepare herself for the moment when her own endeavors at expansion, with India as her point of departure, would meet with opposition from Russia. The danger arose from the fact that there her strength was not great; that, therefore, in a conflict in the heart of Asia, she might easily be at a disadvantage. It was necessary to wait for an opportunity to encounter her future opponent at sea. This presented itself when Russia tried to increase her powers in the Balkans in the war against Turkey. The Crimean War broke out and suddenly we find England allied with her arch enemy,

France, against the newer and more dangerous one. For a while peace appeared to reign between the two chief naval powers; but this state of affairs did not last long. Although since that time they have not actually been at war, it is still well remembered what a bitter diplomatic struggle between the two countries was occasioned in the last quarter of the past century by the partition of Africa and the renewed colonial expansion of France in Asia and the South Seas. In 1889 the English, concerned at France's naval power, considerably increased their fleet, and in 1898 both fleets were mobilized as a result of the Fashoda affair. Thereupon the first German naval law was promulgated.

With one stroke England changed her policy. The English had hitherto regarded the development of Germany's naval interests unfavorably and had tried to check them wherever possible; but the diplomatic struggle which we are now accustomed to consider perennial did not begin until that moment. The more friendly aspect which she occasionally assumes must not deceive us in this respect; it is generally for the purpose of concealing secret animosity. And this, in accordance with the whole course of English history, is inevitable. As soon as the German people, under the rule of a far-seeing monarch, conscious of their strength and of a definite purpose, prepared to forge a useful naval weapon, it was in accordance with English principles to regard that power as *the* enemy. But—let this be understood—it is the enemy, because it is building a fleet, and when this is destroyed, the pretext for hostility will immediately disappear. . . . The fleet destroyed, German commerce will naturally be deprived of the protection it surely needs, and, its merchant marine annihilated, it will be reduced to a cipher in the world market and can only re-establish itself slowly and with difficulty.

Homer Lea is indeed of the opinion that the British world empire can be saved only by the complete destruction of Germany, and, according to his view, there are two sides

to the military relationship between them. The military relationship of Germany to the British Empire possesses a two-fold significance. "While the Saxon can deal with Russia only on land, or with Japan only by sea, a war with Germany includes both land and sea. The severity of this struggle will be in keeping with the means and forces employed: twice as great as with Russia or with an insular power like Japan. We have said that, if Germany gains control of the sea, the war is brought to a close by this single act, and ends in the downfall of the Empire. On the other hand, should the British navy destroy that of Germany, the only result is that conditions remain the same as they were before the war," for "only in a war with an insular nation is the navy pre-eminent. In a war against Russia it has no place. In an offensive conflict with Germany it is of secondary importance. The British navy has one duty—to remain supreme in its sphere, the sea. From the beginning to the end it is restricted to the defensive. The army alone possesses the power capable of deciding the war, and of insuring such peace as will prolong the existence of the Empire." He claims that it is necessary for the future greatness of Germany to destroy the Anglo-Saxon's world supremacy, and to build up her own world power out of the fragments, while he declares that it is England's chief duty to destroy German power.

From such considerations Homer Lea deduces the necessity for Great Britain to create an invincible land force for the protection, not only of the Island Kingdom, but of the colonies as well. It is known that efforts in this direction have been made of late in England to a considerable extent and with the support of personages of standing, without overcoming the resistance of the nation. Such a measure would not only go contrary to England's deep-rooted conception of personal liberty, but would also be opposed to those traditions, preserved in spite of fate and fortune, in accordance with which it has utilized the military forces of other countries on land, and by their sacrifices has reaped the two-

fold advantage of crushing a resistance disagreeable to England and of weakening in a salutary manner the strength of the allies. For there is the possibility that in a short time they may be transformed into active opponents. And should not such a course of action be considered practical in reference to Germany as well?

But more of this hereafter. First of all a hasty glance at British measures to secure permanent supremacy on the ocean, measures which serve not only as protection for the commerce of the United Kingdom, but for preparations for war as well. With admirable clear-sightedness, she has always been able to find, in all parts of the ocean, the countries which command the trade routes and to annex them ruthlessly. By means of Gibraltar, she controls the entrance to the Mediterranean; by means of Malta, the communication between its eastern and western basin; and by means of Cyprus, the entrance to the Suez Canal, which, together with Egypt, is entirely in her hands. Thereby she controls the shortest water-route to India, the India Ocean, and the Pacific. But she extends her influence over the longer route by way of Africa through St. Helena and Ascension, as well as through her African colonies, while the route from the Red Sea into the Strait of Babel Mandeb is protected by the island of Perim. The way to the Pacific Ocean leads, furthermore, through the Strait of Malacca, and here a British port was made in Singapore. The construction of railroads was intended to afford the European states the possibility of rendering themselves independent of the water routes under the control of England. Russia did succeed in making connection with the Pacific by means of the Siberian Railroad, but her desire to acquire a permanently useful port was frustrated by the opposition of Japan. Germany started building the Anatolian and Bagdad roads; whereupon England succeeded in wresting an important point, Koweit, from Turkey and through the possession of the Bahrein Islands and Cape Jask, increased the obstacles which she can oppose to all shipping out

of the Persian Gulf. Only one newly made water route has escaped British inroads, the Panama Canal, that connects the Caribbean, or as one may well call it, the American Mediterranean, directly with the Pacific Ocean, and from that absolute British supremacy on the sea has received a considerable blow. The island kingdom is obliged to share her power—chiefly in the Pacific Ocean—with other great naval powers. However, she shares it only with the adjoining states, Japan and the United States, which possess naval stations there, and with France, which, it is true, was able to save portions of her territory in the East Indies from the greed of the English, and to increase her authority in Madagascar and Indo-China. She does not share it with Germany, which does not possess a single port of refuge on the whole route from its possessions in Africa to the Pacific.

And not only free water routes are necessary for navigation, now that sailing ships have been supplanted entirely in the navy, and in the merchant marine to a certain extent, by steamships. As every step of progress that has been won by humanity can be made only at the cost of sacrifice, so navigation has had to renounce unlimited freedom of action in return for the manifold advantages of the steam-engine; a ship is absolutely dependent on its supply of fuel for the boiler. Moreover, as a warship must carry the considerable burdens of its armature, artillery, and ammunition besides, it is impossible for even the largest warships to exceed a certain limit in the amount of fuel they can carry. In consequence of this the length of time that a supply necessary for a certain speed can last, as well as the distance which a ship can cover without new supplies, that is, the radius of action, is limited. If a renewal of supplies cannot be effected, the vessel is as unable to proceed as a locomotive, when the supply of coal and water has given out.

With the introduction of steamships, all sea-going nations had to consider the question of placing coaling stations at given distances. For this purpose, of course, only islands

and seaports which could afford sufficient protection for the transfer of coal were suitable, and the ownership for these must be acquired. Great Britain pursued this policy which proved an efficient weapon in her commercial rivalry with Germany, although it was a great obstacle to the utilization of her fleet in the decisive war she anticipated. She succeeded in thwarting every attempt of the German Empire to win naval or coaling stations. Every movement and undertaking of German ships was viewed with suspicion, and whenever it was even remotely possible that an attempt might be made to secure a port for a coaling station, a diplomatic protest or actual threats immediately followed. We can all remember how in the struggle for Morocco, France was quite willing to grant certain regions to Germany, until England's threatening attitude encouraged her to resistance and forced Germany to abandon all pretensions to possessions there.

As a result of this attitude on the part of our cousins across the channel, Germany's merchant and war marine were reduced to supplying themselves with coal from the stations of other nations, chiefly from those of England. Aside from the fact that, in return for this mark of hospitality, there are fixed charges for German ships and the resultant profit goes to a foreign nation, the question arises, where is Germany to find friendly nations who will supply her ships with fuel in case of war? English and French ports would be unquestionably closed to her; and whether the ports of the small European States would be open to her in defiance of Great Britain's threats is more than doubtful. Here we have an actual example of Germany's need of elbow-room, and of the manner in which England has set up an iron barrier in the way of Germany's necessary expansion. And it is evident that sooner or later it will be absolutely necessary for Germany to break these bonds, which, in the long run, will render her navigation unendurable, and, in case of war, extremely dangerous. For this purpose, however, annihilation of Anglo-Saxon world supremacy is not the necessity for the

future greatness of Germany that Homer Lea claims it to be. Germany's wants could be easily supplied out of the excessive riches of English possessions. But it seems as if England meant to continue the struggle until she should become absolute ruler of the seas. Then, according to her principles, she would constantly have to struggle against that nation at the time likely to become most dangerous; she would have to turn, in the first place, against Japan, an all too powerful opponent in the Pacific Ocean. In that case, she would have need of her whole naval force and this might appear hazardous in view of the strength of the German navy. Hence it would seem expedient to employ the first favorable opportunity of destroying the latter, her earlier enemy, and then to gain complete freedom of action in the Pacific. For this purpose the destruction of the German fleet would be sufficient, and there is no need of that complete annihilation of the German Empire, which Homer Lea insists upon.

Great Britain forged for herself another weapon, a network of cables, by which she connected all parts of the world with one another and with the Island Kingdom. For commercial, as well as for naval contests, a rapid means of communication is of the utmost importance. This makes possible a concentration of leadership, by means of which a nation may profit by every impending danger, and thereby subject her opponent, who is cut off from the news service, to the most unpleasant surprises. As long as England alone controlled the entire network of cables, she could at will prevent their use by other nations whom she could plunge into complete deafness and blindness concerning events in remote parts of the earth. Meanwhile, she preserved her own powers of hearing and vision and thereby secured all the advantages of the initiative. The realization of these dangers has recently caused other nations likewise to lay cables, which are able, independently of England—at least in some regions—to transmit news across the ocean. But, in the first place, these cables do not form a complete network, and, in the second, it



is not improbable that, in case of war, England would cut them, and thus render them useless.

The invention of wireless telegraphy now provides us with a means whereby we can be independent of the cable system. England followed its development very attentively and managed to have the seat of the Marconi Company transferred to her shores. She strove with all her might to secure for herself a certain monopoly of the wireless system that she might in this, too, rule the world. Thanks to German science, she was unsuccessful. Germans have surpassed Marconi's achievements and thus have obtained a certain compensation for their lack of a cable. This is true, of course, only within certain limits, that is, so far as German apparatuses are effective and so far as Germany has stations which can transmit communications. Therefore, it is of paramount significance that not so long ago the Kaiser was able to exchange wireless messages with the President of the United States of America.

It is readily understood and generally known that, in anticipation of a severe struggle with Germany, England has secured powerful allies. To what extent in addition to Russia and France, the smaller states, Belgium, Denmark and the Balkan countries are involved, is not yet evident. As England must reckon not only with the German Empire, but also with the Triple Alliance, the rôles of the three great powers are determined, as is already quite clear. Great Britain is apparently trying to veil her intentions and to lull the suspicions of Germany, while she regards Italy with disapproving sternness. Italy's growing fleet and in addition her military occupation of the Turkish islands in the Ægean Sea, after the war between Italy and Turkey, are most undesirable for England's unlimited control of the Mediterranean. It seems as though the Sublime Porte were quite satisfied with this state of affairs and hesitates for that reason to withdraw its last officers from the interior of Tripoli; and so Italy, in the meanwhile, is justified in keeping the islands, to prevent their

falling into other hands. When Sir Edward Grey declared that the situation in Europe would not become normal so long as a great power possessed these islands, Italy was disagreeably conscious of the pressure which the English minister attempted to bring to bear upon her. This was especially noticeable, as, at the same time, he was willing to leave to the discretion of the Greeks the evacuation of that part of Albania which they had occupied, although in the meanwhile in assembling their "holy battalions" on disputed grounds, they had not given evidence of a very compliant attitude.

To Homer Lea's desire that Great Britain, in order to preserve its position of world power, should annihilate Germany, not only by robbing it of its fleet and crippling its commerce, but also by destroying its military force, I oppose the belief that England cannot wish to destroy Germany's power on land. That would be contrary to her whole policy in the past. A strong military power on the European continent is indispensable to her, in order to divert to land warfare the chief attention of that power which otherwise might endanger her naval supremacy. The political game which she has played with the continental countries has always been based on this central idea. Let us take an example. At the beginning of the War of the Austrian Succession, while France, by greatly increasing its colonial possessions, was England's greatest rival on the ocean, Austria was the greatest land power, hence the Island Kingdom assisted her in the war against Prussia allied with France. In 1755, after England had begun to combat the naval forces of France, she had to renounce the assistance of Austria, which had united with Russia and France to crush Frederick the Great, and to range herself on the side of her former enemy, the King of Prussia. But when she had achieved her purpose, when she had driven the French fleet out of the East Indies and had won the French possessions in Senegal, when, in 1760 with the storming of Montreal, she had finally torn Canada from the French and had weakened French naval power to such an

extent that she could assert herself with full force in the West Indies and limit herself to blockading European ports—when, at last, the flourishing power of France was crippled, she suddenly withdrew her assistance from her Prussian ally. Prussia had served her turn in diverting the attention of the French from the sea. She must now manage her opponent alone, for England had no longer a motive for injuring France. It is customary to connect this sudden change of policy to Pitt's retirement, as if his friendship with Frederick had determined England's attitude. One can scarcely attribute such sentimentality to an English statesman.

Austria is no longer able to play the part against France which England once assigned to her! But a new power has arisen in Russia, whose vital interests run directly counter to those of England. It is only possible to preserve the balance of power against Russia by the opposition of a strong military force. France is useless for this purpose, since after the overthrow of Germany, she would immediately resume her former position of second strongest European military and colonial power. The rôle against Russia can be assigned only to Germany; and the purpose of the alliance (apparently so contrary to their mutual interests) between England and Russia, against Germany, is twofold; to break Germany's commercial power, and to undermine thoroughly the long standing friendship of Germany and Russia in order to play off Germany against Russia in the future. Therefore, it is not to England's interest to destroy Germany's power on land. On the contrary, *the purpose of war would be to destroy its fleet, while sparing its army as much as possible.*

It is doubtful whether a fleet even so powerful as that of England could accomplish this alone. The question is partially solved by a British author, a recognized authority and teacher of naval strategy, J. S. Corbett, who has laid down general laws, based upon former proceedings in naval warfare, in his book "Some Principles of Maritime Strategy" (London, 1911). According to his theory, it is apparent

from an examination of the history of maritime war that a contest between two fleets, leading to the destruction of one of them, can take place only when such is the wish of both parties concerned. This mutual desire for a decisive outcome can be satisfied only in open battle, when both parties have some prospect of victory, *i. e.*, when they are almost equally strong. If this is not the case, the weaker usually attempts to postpone the issue, while it tries to weaken its opponent by minor operations, until it can venture on a decisive blow with some hope of success.

Against such tactics the stronger force, as Corbett proves, has always found itself in a difficult position. Every day that delays the decision costs a great deal of money—and coal as well, the acquisition of which is always fraught with difficulties; every day can bring unpleasant surprises; and therefore, the stronger force must try to bring about the decisive moment as soon as possible. This may be accomplished in two ways; either by destroying by main strength the defences which protect the enemy in his fortified forts and by forcing a way under fire from the coast forts, into the harbor where he has intrenched himself (and one has seldom the audacity to do this), or by dislodging him and forcing him out into the open. It is generally impossible to accomplish the latter alternative from the water if the ports are well protected. In fact, this can be done only by land forces brought for this purpose, which must be provided with the necessary heavy artillery, in order to gain, by means of an unexpected attack by land, positions in the foreground which admit of an effective bombardment of the fleet anchored in the harbor. Thus it would be compelled to set sail and give decisive battle to its opponent. The conduct of the Americans at Santiago, Cuba, and of the Japanese at Port Arthur exemplify this mode of procedure. Consequently, the British fleet of war unquestionably needs the support of an adequate military force.

Now the question arises, will the present continental allies of England render her this service, in case of a conflict with

Germany? And one cannot confidently answer in the affirmative, because here their interests are already at variance. The continental powers would look for the decisive action along the shortest route between Berlin and their own capitals, and they would have no reason to break up and considerably to weaken their military forces by furnishing large numbers of troops and large supplies of ammunition for the bombardment of German coast defences. On the contrary, they would probably wish to destroy the land forces of Germany, while sparing her fleet as much as possible—to be used as a menace against England, their future opponent. The lessons to be learned from England's past policy are just as evident to them as to us, and enable them to anticipate their future enemy in the same manner. If England desires to accomplish her purpose, that is, the annihilation of German naval power, she must needs make use of her own unaided strength, and we shall make no mistake in assuming that the British expeditionary force of 150,000 men will be assigned the task of supporting the fleet by a descent upon the coast of the enemy.

The further question as to what the attitude of these troops will be, especially as to how far they will share in the operations of the allied forces and be considered as reinforcements to the allies, can be answered by a few sentences of the English naval strategist. They are as follows:

“This much is certain: The nation that commands the sea can do as it likes and can take as much or as little part in the war as it chooses; whereas even those who are strongest by land may, nevertheless, often find themselves in great straits.” (p. 55.)

“If the object of the war were unlimited and would consequently call forth your enemy's whole power, it is evident that no decision of the struggle could be reached till his war power was entirely crushed. Unless one had a reasonable hope of being able to do this, it would be a bad policy to seek satisfaction by force, that is, one ought not go

to war. In the case of a *limited* object, however, the complete destruction of the enemy's armed force would be more than necessary." (p. 42.)

"If now we turn to British experience of continental war, we find that a land force has frequently been used, but we also find the policy almost invariably accompanied by a popular disapproval as though there were something in it antagonistic to the national instinct." (p. 60.)

These three quotations characterize England's method of taking part in the wars of the continent. Since the beginning of the seventeenth century, she has almost always had at her disposal the necessary means of assuring to herself the control over the seas, or at least of claiming that favorable state of affairs which Corbett calls "disputed ownership." This fortunate country has nearly always been able to meddle in the wars of the European powers to this extent and "to get as much out of them as she wanted."

What she wanted of them is evident from the second quotation. Corbett is an admirer of our strategist, Clausewitz, and in his differentiation of the two distinct objects of war, the limited and the unlimited, he bases his conclusions on the latter's teachings. Clausewitz characterizes them with these words: "These two kinds of warfare are, first, the one in which the object is the downfall of the opponent, either to destroy him politically or simply to render him defenseless and to force him to a disadvantageous peace, and second, the one in which the object is merely to make certain conquests on the boundaries of the country, either with the intention of keeping them or of using them as a means of exchange when the terms of peace are arranged." The first case demands that the whole national strength be exerted; the second does not. Clausewitz gives an instructive example of war with limited purpose in a commemorative address of 1830-31, which contains a plan of attack against France. Conditions did not warrant a consideration of the complete overthrow of this state, and the suggestion of the German strategist was to

make the conquest of Belgium the actual object of attack. "This country of medium size and great sources of supply is bounded by Holland and Germany; after its conquest the power that establishes itself there will not constitute a strategical point extending into distant hostile territory, and consequently, this conquest can be permanently maintained even under ordinary circumstances. The French might establish themselves in Belgium as strongly as they liked; they would always be in a weaker position than in the midst of their own country. When an army had made itself master of the Meuse River, it might consider the conquest of Belgium as on the whole accomplished. We therefore believe that, if the arms of the allies can win a victory anywhere, and this must necessarily be assumed in the case of any offensive attack, the conquest of Belgium would afford the easiest and at the same time least permanent victory."

If we analyze the history of England, we must admit that though at times she has exerted the full strength of individual parts of her defensive forces, her navy and her finances, yet that demand for the whole national force, in which every man who could shoulder arms has been called to enlist, as in Prussia-Germany in 1813 and in France in 1870, has never been made. She was able to avoid this by the fact that she never waged war with unlimited purpose—a splendid illustration of Clausewitz's teachings. With the exception of war in the colonies, she never desired completely to conquer a country or to destroy an opponent. She always had a limited object which she sought to attain unaided: seizure of individual possessions across the sea, destruction of hostile naval forces, or commercial advantages. This may be due partly to a very clever policy, partly to that attitude of the people to which Corbett alludes. The British nation has never had any liking for or sympathy with the hard service of land warfare, service which commands innumerable sons of the peasantry to shoulder arms, and tears them from home and hearth. Either she employed for this purpose mercenary troops, when pos-

sible, or else she caused her allies to shed blood for her aims, and for them, of course, the war could easily develop into an unlimited one. We need only instance the wars of Frederick the Great.

Since England wages war with limited purpose only and dislikes to employ her army, one can draw one's own conclusions as to what her future policy will be in regard to the use of her land force. Again Corbett shows the way. He says: "Either the expeditionary force must act as an organic unit of the power which is making unlimited war without any reservations whatever, or else it should be given a definite territorial object with an independent leadership and organization, but with a limited function." (p. 59.)

*"But, what may be called the British or maritime form is in fact the application of the limited method to the unlimited type of warfare, as auxiliary to the larger operations of our allies—a method which has usually been open to us because the control of the sea has enabled us to select a theatre in effect truly limited."* (p. 63.)

This completely characterizes England's method of land warfare. It is immediately assumed that the continental ally will have to carry on a war with an unlimited object, and the chief burden will be gradually transferred to him. On the other hand, it is typical of the British that their expeditionary force is directed to avoid this as much as possible. Therefore, her co-operation as an organic unit of the force of our enemies can be expected only when Great Britain has no other means of accomplishing her particular purpose.

A glance at the history of war shows us better than any explanation Corbett's idea of this method of warfare.

Since the war of the Spanish Succession, in which Marlborough advanced close on the borders of South Germany with British reinforcements, in order that together with the imperial army he might fight a bloody and decisive battle with Louis XIV, never has an English army penetrated into the continent, so long as there was the slightest uncertainty as



to the outcome. Only in Holland or in Hanover, during the wars of Frederick the Great, that is always close to the coast line, do we see British troops conducting a hesitating and painstakingly indecisive war. Who has forgotten the wavering of the Duke of Cumberland, which the names of Fontenoy in 1745, Lafeld in 1747, Hastenbeck in 1757 and the capitulation of Kloster Zeven call to memory?

Then, too, in the course of the Spanish war against Napoleon, when the unlucky Moore was replaced by the more skillful Lord Wellesley, we see the English (so long as their opponent is not wholly overcome), carefully maintaining a line of communication with the sea. And where it is cut off on one side, it is cleverly set up again in another direction. Only once, at Waterloo, do we see an English army taking part in a decisive battle. But here after the defeat of the allied forces, any delay in the settlement of affairs meant the prospect of a most undesirable prolongation of the war, and Wellington had no choice in the matter.

*“So all the way through we find an endeavor to preserve the line of communication with the base of supply, which for the British is the sea-coast, wherever there are ports suitable for the embarkation of troops, and to avoid a decision as long as it is not forced upon them by the nature of the case. With this goes an avoidance of anything that would oblige them to join too closely in the operations of their allies; that is what one may call the British or maritime method.”*

With this preface we can attempt to form an idea of Great Britain's probable procedure in case of a war with Germany.

What she would want most would doubtless be to employ her military force quite independently, and if she could, from a consideration of the preparations for war and the strength at the disposal of the allied forces, assure herself that they could cope with the German army alone, she would assert this independence by her choice of the seat of war. If she were not confident of this, and if the preservation of inde-

pendent action on the part of her expeditionary force should be doubtful, the latter, functioning chiefly as an organic section of the whole, would have to take part in the operations of the whole. In this case a landing in Belgium—out of the reach of the influence of German troops—would enable British troops to extend the left wing of the French army.

Involuntarily, one recalls the opposition of the English press to the plan of the Dutch to renew the old fortresses of Flushing and to replace them with new ones, which would not only be able to protect its modern harbor against its use by the enemy, but also to create obstacles against the use of the western Scheldt for an entrance to Antwerp. In the face of the indisputable right of a sovereign state to provide for the defence of a harbor of importance to its own fleet (Holland has only one other, that of Helder), and for the fulfilment of its duties as a neutral state, this was a strange opposition. So was the fact that the French and Belgian press united with the English in intimidating the Dutch in order to cause the failure of the government's plan.

Herein lies the basis for the assumption that, in case of war with Germany, England's purpose is to land her expeditionary force in Antwerp, in order to place them at the side of France. And even if the new fortification of Flushing, as long as it is limited to a single line of defence on the right bank of the river is incapable of offering a lengthy resistance against attack, yet it could operate most unfavorably upon the entrance of so strong a transport fleet as the transfer of the British army would necessitate, and considerably delay a proposed landing in Antwerp. Everything would depend upon the rapidity of action—otherwise, British assistance would arrive too late and prove practically useless.

Admitting, therefore, that the British expeditionary force in one way or another could succeed in joining with the French left wing and be enabled to take part in the operations before it was too late; admitting that the first great victories over the German armies had been won, and that they

were sufficiently occupied by the French troops, then the second desired step for the British troops would begin when they freed themselves from undesired unlimited war and continued to work independently, that is, to seek for a limited territorial sphere of action. In accordance with Great Britain's purpose, this can be only the German coast of the North Sea, into the harbors of which, according to our presumption, the German fleet being the weaker, has withdrawn. The British naval forces are already expectantly waiting for the German ships to be driven out to them after the army's successful bombardment of the land fortresses, so as to destroy them as was done at Port Arthur.

How much time this would require, cannot be determined. The memory of Port Arthur warns us that we must count on considerable sacrifice of time and of human lives. At all events, the goal cannot be reached in the turn of a hand; and, therefore, it is not impossible that the line of communication of the present besieging army, hitherto protected by French and Belgian ports, might be greatly endangered by German attempts. The English have, however, always been very dexterous in changing their lines of communication, when these have been jeopardized. There is a good example of their mode of operation in the case of England's Spanish campaign against Napoleon in 1808-9. Napoleon advanced victorious from Madrid against the British troops in Portugal. An English corps under the leadership of Sir John Moore, which Napoleon believed to be in retreat, outflanked him and threatened his line of supplies from the direction of the Duero. When Napoleon turned against it and in his turn broke through its line of communication with Lisbon, it retreated, pursued by Marshal Soult, toward the northwest, where the British General Baird had meanwhile landed at Corunna. Although the ships arrived here late, and Moore had to give battle before the city in which he himself was killed, the embarkation succeeded and the English corps was able to return home.

For the event of a war with Germany, England has already prepared herself and secured a second line of communication by (to put it mildly) promoting the extension of the tiny harbor of Esbjerg on the Danish west coast of Jutland. Esbjerg lies at a distance of about 18 miles from the German-Danish frontier, and hitherto the basin of its entire harbor was about 39 acres in extent and had a depth of 13 to 20 feet. The entrance to the "Grantief" had a depth of 25 feet, but was obstructed by a sandbar through which a passage had been made by dredging. Those conditions would fully suffice for the export trade of butter and eggs to England. Now, however, the basin of the harbor has been enlarged to the extent of 100 acres, quays nearly two miles long have been constructed, which will enclose a harbor of 198 acres when it is completely dredged, and a water depth of 27 feet will be reached. It is very evident that such a disproportionate widening of the harbor is not calculated for the export of butter and eggs alone.

We can scarcely doubt that in the event of war, Denmark will favor our opponents. All the fortifications in the kingdom indicate this. The coast forts of Copenhagen are being increased and strengthened in order to barricade the waterways (especially the Drogden) in a southerly direction; in other words toward the German waters; the land forts, which would operate chiefly against an attack from the north, are neglected and apparently completely abandoned. Of greater significance are the newly constructed fortresses of the Great Belt. Flanking these there is a wide arm of the sea between the islands of Zeeland, Falster, Laaland and Langeland, the exits to which are all barred by fortresses, so that it can be compared to a fox-hole, since the much indented seacoast of the islands affords innumerable hiding places that would favor an attack on the Bay of Kiel and the Fehmarnbelt, as well as the exit of the Oeresund, and would be exceedingly difficult to attack. To crown it all, Minister Meergard has stated the purpose of

this fortified bay plainly: to facilitate communication in several ways with the seat of war, and thus to make possible an attack on the hostile fleet. Therefore, if, on the one hand, Belgium were chosen as a means to the first step for the British expeditionary forces, aiding in a war with unlimited object, on the other hand, to Denmark is allotted the part of providing a strong naval base and point of departure for the land forces in the second step. This would be a war with limited object, in this case an attack on the German harbors and the destruction of the fleet.

Aside from the less important undertakings of the British fleet, Great Britain would, according to Corbett, leave to her allies the task of engaging the German land forces so that only small divisions would be able to advance against the English operating in a limited area, while the latter would have as their sole aim the annihilation of the German fleet. Thus the expeditionary force would need to fight only these weak divisions.

Now the question arises whether England's allies would be satisfied with such a division of labor and with a limitation of British troops to this restricted purpose. If we may adopt the idea of an unnamed French General,\* this seems very doubtful. He takes up the principal points in this manner.

1. Purpose of landing: "As far as the strategic points are concerned, that will depend on the general situation. It might be necessary to rush assistance to the French against the German troops invading France, or to assist the Russians hard pressed by the Germans and the Austrians on the banks of the Vistula and the Dniester." (pp. 32-33.)

"A feeling of discomfort is aroused. The people be-

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\*"Die englische Invasion in Deutschland," von einem französischen Generalstabsoffizier. Verlag "Politik," Berlin, 1912. ("The English Invasion of Germany," by an officer of the French General Staff. Published by "Politik," Berlin, 1912.)

come uneasy. The soldiers become panic-stricken. . . . All this makes a breach in the self-confidence of all concerned. . . . Other Allies will appear: The Danes or the Dutch, as the case may be." (pp. 7-8.)

2. Place of Landing: In short, anywhere. The author seems to prefer the mouth of the Ems, or the Vistula. But other points on the coast of the Baltic Sea (Danish territory) are considered suitable.

3. Means of Landing: Deception as to the intended point and surprise.

As a matter of course, such advice for the utilization of the British land forces is not to be considered authoritative for the French command. Nevertheless it affords a conception of the ideas which are current on this point in the military headquarters of our western neighbor, and of the wishes, which they express to their English allies; that is, that they would prefer to regard the English expeditionary force as a purely auxiliary force, as reinforcements, not operating on an independent plan, established by the British staff of command, but only held in readiness to furnish assistance wherever the course of the war might render it desirable to rescue one ally or another, either the French in their country, or the Russians on the Vistula, or the Dniester. We may presume that the English fleet will be able to cope with the German, even without the assistance of land forces. The Allies would content themselves even without the entire annihilation of Germany.

This view appeared once before when it was a question of the promise made by the English Government to France, to send an army of relief in case of a war with Germany. It was to be employed as auxiliary troops for the French Army, and there was no mention of its independent utilization for special purposes in the interest of England. In France the opinion prevailed that England would unselfishly furnish a military force to serve French interests. This is

preposterous in the case of this country, which never yet subordinated its own interests to those of other nations. Quite the contrary, in many cases it utilized their forces for its own purposes and interests.

At this point it is already obvious that the interests of England and her allies are widely divergent, owing to the fact that their wishes are so incompatible. Great Britain must wish to destroy our fleet, but to spare our army. France and Russia must endeavor to crush the German army and preserve the fleet as a trump-card, which can be played in the future against the increasingly powerful Island Kingdom.

It is interesting to note, from the utterances of the French officer, that his countrymen count unfailingly upon the help of Denmark and even of Holland, but are prudently silent on the score of Belgium. If the neutral states had not joined the alliance before the beginning of the war, the appearance of English troops on the German coast must bring this about and produce an over-powering effect on the morale of the German troops, even though the invading army, as the author says, were soon to be checked at the coast by the German army of defense, and find itself limited to defensive warfare. Such a paralysis of their forces might not suit the English after all.

The fabulous armament of her two allies might well astonish England. If her aim is to destroy the German fleet at any cost; if (in accordance with Corbett's advice), she entrusted her expeditionary force with the limited object of driving our fleet, should it withdraw into the harbors, out under the cannon of her warships, then she cannot want the war to come to a rapid end, since for her purpose she needs time, considerable time. If the enormous French and Russian forces, pouring in upon Germany simultaneously from opposite sides should succeed—and for this purpose the armaments have been so increased—in crushing out armies with a few mighty blows, England, with her dilatory methods (sieges and the conquest of seaports), might conceivably

find that she had not sufficient time to accomplish this, regardless of the fact that she is not particularly concerned about the destruction of the German army.

Perhaps England seems more friendly to us for that reason at present. Perhaps the consideration, that the attack and destruction of our navy and merchant marine is impossible without damage and loss to her own fleet, is gaining ground. Germany is England's best customer, and she in turn relies in many respects upon German industry. Great Britain has more merchant ships on the high seas than we and they are less liable to destruction by our cruisers than are ours by the English. The English merchant ships cannot obtain sufficient protection from her warships on the distant seas, should these be detained in European waters to overpower our fleet. Finally, the Island Kingdom is dependent to such a degree upon a constant supply of provisions, that the discontinuance of them would bring about famine, and with it quite appreciable distress within a very short time. The proof of this was shown in the strike of the longshoremen, which by cutting off the supply of foodstuffs in the harbors of the capital, exposed its population to famine. England has not only the advantages of a situation secure against a strong invasion, but also the disadvantages contingent to it. As long as the Island Kingdom was sole mistress of the seas, these disadvantages were not important and she could allow herself the luxury of neglecting her own agriculture in order to give her sole attention to industry and allow herself to be nourished by foreign countries. These times are over forever. England cannot conceal from herself the fact that she must already share her control of the sea with other nations. Nor could this be changed by the destruction of our fleet; for everywhere fleets grow out of the water, and even rich Albion cannot permanently keep pace with the general strife for naval power.

Besides this, the fact is that it is not only a question of large amounts of money, but also of the manning of the great



warships that are being constantly built, and are useless without a very strong crew. Secretary of State v. Tirpitz recently informed us that expenses for the navy in the last five years have increased by \$54,000,000 in England, in Germany only \$13,750,000; that we are far behind not only Great Britain, but also her two allies, since the increase in France amounts to \$33,500,000 and in Russia for the fleet of the Baltic Sea alone to as much as \$75,500,000. This should give the British something to think about. As for the second point, the manning, it is an open secret how difficult it is in the case of a gradual increase of a fleet to provide at the proper time for the augmentation and the training of its complement of men, not so much in the case of sailors as in that of engineers and officers.

It is no secret for us that Great Britain is at present at a disadvantage in this very respect. It was affirmed, and doubtless correctly so, that Mr. Churchill suggested to Germany a year's holiday from the construction of warships, in order to gain a year in which to acquire the necessary trained crew and officers. It was a clever idea, as England could sufficiently occupy her dock-yards in shipbuilding for other powers and need not even lag behind in the supply of her own ships, since in case of need the foreign ships, lying at her wharves, could immediately be impressed into her own navy. Germany was not caught in the net, however—for the simple reason that she did not know how to provide employment for her own dockyard laborers during a whole year. The proposal has, however, contributed toward urging our representatives in the Reichstag to greater—let us say—prudence regarding our cousins across the sea, since the word "mistrust" is taboo at present. It may not be out of place either to recall the fact that England (at France's request in February, 1870) inquired confidentially of the Prussian Government if it would not consent to a simultaneous decrease of the military contingent on the part of both nations in the interest of European peace, and this took place almost

immediately before the outbreak of the war with France, the instigation of which I need not refer to. (Cf. Bismarck's letter of Sept. 2, 1870.)

Thus there are many reasons why England should avoid picking a quarrel with Germany at present. It is said that the relations between the two states are less strained, and that a more cordial spirit is developing; it is even recognized that in many questions they can work together, for the two countries have numerous interests in common.

But we must not forget that it was England that provoked this menacing coalition, unnatural, because not based upon community of interest, and that she endeavored to cause our few remaining friends to desert us. It must not be believed that our blood-relationship to England has the least influence or that she would avoid attacking us because hitherto we have really never crossed swords. How should England ever have had any idea of fighting us, as long as we were not bold enough to build a fleet to protect our coast and our great growing commerce? It was this very thing that changed the condition of affairs. If, therefore, Great Britain has every reason not to advance impetuously, but rather to hold back prudently, we must not deceive ourselves into thinking that she will not seize the first favorable opportunity for taking us by surprise and for casting the declaration of war into our harbors with the first cannon-shots. Even though she be inclined to peace herself, her allies will have very little inclination to support to no purpose the burden of an armament which, for France, at least, is not bearable much longer. When they consider the time to be ripe, England will not be able to stand back.'

## II. RUSSIA

Our eastern neighbor has really no reason to harbor a grudge against Germany. Even though Germany's conduct at the Congress of Berlin in 1878 has repeatedly been described in Russia as treachery and thereby the prejudice against us has been increased, yet we are fully justified in bringing forward the representation of events that Prince Bismarck has given in his "Reflections and Reminiscences" to which I will refer.

In response to the Russian inquiry whether Germany would remain neutral if Russia went to war with Austria, Bismarck, when pressed for a definite answer, in October, 1876, gave the Russian ambassador the following reply: "Our first care was to preserve the friendship between the great monarchies, which in a struggle with one another had more to lose as regards their opposition to the revolution [in the Balkan principalities] than they had to win. If, to our sorrow, this was not possible between Russia and Austria, then we could endure indeed that our friends should lose or win battles against each other, but not that one of the two should be so severely wounded and injured as to endanger its position as an independent Great Power, taking its part in the councils of Europe." (II, p. 214.) Thereupon the Russian storm clouds withdrew from Galicia to the Balkans, and Russia bought the neutrality of Austria by the cession of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the treaty of Reichstadt.

"The result for Russia, even after the Congress of Berlin, remained one of the most favorable, if not the most favorable, which she has ever obtained since the Turkish wars." (II, p. 106.) But "the indignation of Russia at the result of the Congress of Berlin was one of the manifestations which become possible, though contrary to all truth and reason, in a press so little intelligible to the people as that of Russia in its foreign relations, and with the coercion which is

easily exercised upon it. The whole influence which Gortchakoff . . . was strong enough to represent in the press, with the Moscow "Viedomosti" at its head, produced an appearance of indignation at the injury which Russia through German perfidy suffered at the Berlin Conference. But the fact is that no wish was expressed by Russia at the Berlin Congress which Germany would not have proposed for acceptance, if circumstances required, by energetic representation to the English Prime Minister. Instead of being grateful for this, it was found conducive to Russian policy, under the leadership of Prince Gortchakoff and the Moscow newspapers, to work on toward a further estrangement between Russia and Germany, for which there is not the slightest necessity in the interest of either one or the other of these great adjoining empires. We envy one another nothing, and have nothing to win from one another which we could turn to account." (II, p. 108.)

"It was expected at St. Petersburg that in the diplomatic discussion for carrying out the decisions of the Berlin Congress we should immediately in every case support and carry through the Russian interpretation as opposed to that of Austria and England, and especially without any preliminary understanding between Berlin and St. Petersburg. The demand which I at first only indicated, but afterwards unequivocally expressed, that Russia should tell us confidentially, but plainly, her wishes, so that they might be discussed, was evaded; and I had the impression that Prince Gortchakoff expected from me, as a lady from her admirer, that I should guess at and represent the Russian wishes without Russia having herself to utter them, and thereby to undertake any responsibility. Even in cases where we could assume that we were completely certain of Russian interests and intentions, and where we believed ourselves able to give a voluntary proof of our friendship toward the Russian policy without injuring our own interests, we received a grumbling disapproval, because,

as it was alleged, we had not met the expectations of our Russian friends. Even when that was undoubtedly the case, we had no better success. In the whole proceeding lay a calculated dishonesty, not only toward us, but toward the Emperor Alexander, to whose mind the German policy was to be made to appear dishonest and untrustworthy." (II, pp. 217-218.)

It is known that, in consequence of these intrigues, the Emperor Alexander was prompted to send an autograph letter to Emperor William to this effect: "If the refusal to adapt the German vote to the Russian is adhered to, peace between us cannot be maintained." (II, p. 219.) In 1879, also, it was due only to the wisdom and mildness of our aged Emperor that Gortchakoff's coquetry with France did not lead to a war between Germany and Russia. Perhaps, however, the French did not find the moment propitious, as the words of the Russian prince seem to imply: "I should have wished to go to war, but France has other intentions." (II, p. 219.)

There is no doubt that the complaints about our attitude at the Congress of Berlin are only pretexts and have no foundation, a fact which Russian diplomats have long realized; but they afford a desirable means of agitation and are, therefore, constantly reiterated. The political developments which destroyed the friendship with Germany lie in another direction. We will recognize them, if we follow Russia's attempts at expansion.

Here Homer Lea points out the way. Since the beginning of the 18th century, Russia has turned her endeavors at expansion in certain definite directions, which were determined by her recognized need of a seacoast. Though the country already extended from the Dnieper to Behring Sea and from the Arctic Ocean to the northwest bank of the Caspian Sea, even so, sea traffic was not possible, since, on the north, the water front is hemmed in by ice, and the Caspian Sea has no outlet. In the northwest, it was necessary to

oust the Swedes, in order to gain possession of the Baltic Sea, and on the west to tear from Poland Little and White Russia. On the south Russia is bound by the Black Sea; on the south-east the Caspian Sea and the Caucasus Mountains must be protected, and the route through Turan to India must not be lost sight of. On the East, finally, it was necessary to possess economically important stretches of the Pacific seacoast.

Russia has spared no sacrifice of time or men in achieving this purpose, and she did not permit herself to be thwarted by any defeat, however bloody, from continuing in the same path, in order by constant perseverance to win success. "Russia in her progress, is concerned no more with the devastation following her wars than is Russian nature with the destitution caused by her winters. In the 18th century this empire sent into her wars 4,910,000 troops; of these only 1,380,000 survived. In the 19th century the number of troops engaged was 4,900,000; the casualties were 1,410,000. Yet the population of Russia at the beginning of the 18th century was only twelve million, at the beginning of the 19th only thirty-eight million. Having for two hundred years witnessed the fortitude and determination with which Russia's 17th century plans for expansion have been pursued, we are unable to believe that she will voluntarily abandon them. Heretofore these same Russians have never faltered, never hesitated; without haste, always hopeful in defeat, reticent in victory, never seeing the ground they have furrowed with combat and hillocked with their dead, they have kept their eyes constantly on those distant, yet well defined horizons toward which they have been directed." (Homer Lea, pp. 130-131.)

We now have to follow only the expansion toward the northwest, the west and the south. On the west, after the destruction of the Polish kingdom, the Russians forced their way to the Pruth River and across the Vistula; on the northwest, they conquered the Baltic provinces and drove the Swedes from Finland; on the south, they are lords of the en-

tire coast of the Black Sea from the mouth of the Danube to beyond the Caucasus. But even so they have not attained their object. The Baltic Sea is connected with the ocean only by narrow and dangerous passages and these narrow straits can easily be completely blocked. The exit from the Black Sea, through the Bosphorus and the Hellespont, is closed to the Russian fleet of war by Constantinople and by treaties. In both directions Russia has come considerably nearer her object, it is true, but no longer are there small and weak nations in her path. Great powers, instead, now have decided interest in stopping the victorious advance of the Russians.

The Russo-Turkish wars of the last century, although they were waged to free the Christian States of the Balkans from the Turkish yoke, were aimed at placing these states under the influence and suzerainty of the Czar and were to afford him an entrance to Constantinople. In this plan, the interests of Austria were vitally affected, for her whole commerce with the Orient would have been endangered. To this is due the antagonism between Austria and Russia every time the Balkan question crops up. This was very apparent in the last Balkan war, in which Russia appeared as the moving spirit and permitted herself to be prevented from entering into it, preparations for war having already been made, only by the fact that her ally France—as in 1870—was not sufficiently equipped to successfully join her. For against these allies, Germany arose threateningly, and Italy, too, felt bound more closely to Germany by the endangering of her considerably increased interests in the Mediterranean.

Russia has always realized that she will never attain her object in the Balkans without waging a victorious war not only against Austria, but also against Germany. This binds her fast to France, on whose assistance she can rely under all circumstances, as long as there is any chance of overpowering the Triple Alliance. Consequently, it is not the fact that Russia's interests run directly counter to those of Germany

which caused the recent outcry against us, but rather the opposition which our ally must make against Russian attempts in the Balkans, in order to protect its vital interests, and the support which the German Empire has given its ally.

In the northwest, Russia has advanced to the Tornea River (Sweden). A distance of only about 94 miles separates her most advanced position from the long desired harbor on the ocean—Narvik, in the bay of the West Fiord (Norway), and nothing but a state with the small population of 5,500,000 stands in her way. All preparations to overrun this territory have been made for some time; a railroad has been constructed to the boundary river and ends at Tornea. But as it is a coast railroad it can, if necessary, be easily threatened by an enemy commanding the sea. Consequently, a second road was built so far into the Finnish maritime provinces that the frontier is not more than 250 miles distant and a third is under construction farther east. Every means is being employed toward the Russification of Finland, and troops have been sent forward to the northern garrisons. In short, one cannot escape the impression that Russia has made all preparations to overcome the possible opposition of Sweden with a mighty blow and to force a passage to Narvik, on the shore of the Atlantic.

But here, too, she must reckon with the opposition of Germany. The Swedes are fully conscious of the danger threatening them. In order to send troops to the northern province of Norbotten, which is very sparsely populated on account of its unfavorable climatic and economic conditions, and to provision them upon the scene of action, a railroad has been built as far as the Tornea River, and, as basis of support, at Boden, a ring of fortifications has been constructed on the Lulea River, about 63 miles from the boundary river, equipped with all modern means of defence. So the passage through to the coast will not prove altogether easy of achievement. The entire peasant population of Sweden has been aroused to such a pitch of excitement by the danger which



threatens them that they are willing to contribute life and property for the defense of their country, as the journey of 33,000 farmers to Stockholm has proven. At the same time many a longing glance falls on Germany, a powerful people of the same stock, whose armies could well afford powerful support to the hard pressed little folk. So it is by no means impossible that the danger which Russia threatens may be the means of a closer bond between two nations already so congenial, with whom Russia would have to reckon. That, too, adds a plausible reason for the discord with Germany.

Russia has received innumerable benefits from Germany. Without the large immigration from our country in particular she would be still more backward in her development than she actually is. It is not too much to say that everything in the line of industrial progress in Russia has arisen for the most part under German auspices, that even in the leading positions of the government, the most important work is in the hands of men of German descent, even though they have become Russianized. In the army the ablest leaders are generally of German blood, though like true Germans they have adapted themselves to the customs of the country to which they have consecrated their services and have transformed themselves into the most faithful and—in contrast to most natives—unselfish Russians. But the mental and material services which Germany has rendered Russia have never been appreciated by the latter. On the contrary, they have generally aroused nothing but jealousy, envy and hatred and have contributed largely at times to the persecution of the Germans and to their expulsion from the country. For hatred of the Germans lies deep in the heart of the Slav, as is apparent, not only in Russia, but to the same degree in the Slavic portions of Austria-Hungary and in the Balkan Peninsula. There the seeds of distrust, which France endeavors unceasingly to sow, thrive all too well, and the friendship between Germany and Austria-Hungary, which Gortchakoff attempted in vain to alienate, thanks to Bismarck's keen eye

and clever intervention, was bound to become more pronounced after the Balkan war ended without any furtherance of Russia's ambitions.

It cannot be denied that the hostile relations of the Balkan sister states, Bulgaria and Servia, have caused Russian statesmen much annoyance, though, to be sure, it has prevented the creation of any nation, which would attempt to withdraw from subjection to Russian authority, as Rumania did. She had to suffer sorely from Russia's ingratitude for her self-sacrificing aid in the war of 1877; but Bulgaria and Servia have so often experienced Russian unreliability and perfidy that it is astonishing that they continue to bow their necks under the old yoke, and listen to siren songs from St. Petersburg. Did not Servia recently, relying on the promised support of Russia, pick a quarrel with Austria-Hungary and continue it with astonishing obstinacy till she saw that, after all, she need expect no help from Russia? Was not Bulgaria placed in an extremely critical position in 1885, at the outbreak of the Bulgaro-Servian War, through the fact that the Czar recalled all the Russian officers who held the leading positions in the Bulgarian army? Was she not left in the lurch last year when she trusted in Russia's promise to prevent Rumania from intervening in the war, and when Russia instead, in a measure, commanded Rumania to make peace by intervention, just at the time when Bulgaria was hard pressed on all sides by the Servians, the Greeks and the Turks?

Who can judge what will eventually result from the present confusion on the Balkan peninsula? Will Bulgaria, having learned a lesson from such experience, ally herself with Turkey? Will Rumania unite with Greece, and what part will Servia, the trouble-maker, play? Real and durable may be two different things. Through Bulgaria's hatred for Greece and Servia, which was intensified by the second Balkan war, the unquenchable zeal of Russia will attempt to repeat the political game, notwithstanding the collapse of the Balkan federation established under her protection. The con-

ference of the leading Balkan statesmen who met "accidentally" in the Russian capital, can have no other purpose than that of making the most of Russian influence, in order to create an obstacle to Austrian interests. Then an opponent to Germany's ally might arise in the Balkan states, which could harass her when she was endeavoring on the one hand to protect herself against a Russian attack and on the other to hasten to the assistance of Germany.

There is no doubt that the Russian attempts at expansion, as they conflict more and more with the interests of the great European powers, will meet with ever increasing obstacles, and obstacles more difficult to overcome, and that thorough-going concentration against these well organized governments becomes absolutely necessary for Russia, in order to counterbalance them. It was a generally accepted idea that the severe blows which the Czar's empire suffered from its defeats in eastern Asia, from the revolution which followed, from the demoralization of the officials, civil and military, and, finally, from the various crop failures, would prove hindrances to the internal development of the country. Thus the strides which Russia has made in every respect in the last few years are astounding. In the first place, there is the agrarian organization, which purposes to put an end to the pauperization of the peasants. It is reported that, toward the end of the year 1912, the establishment of more than a million independent, separate farms has been completed, through which the peasants are enabled to work their small holdings freely. The occupation of Siberia is carried on with such zeal that from 1907 to 1912 no fewer than 2,400,000 people of both sexes settled there; and it is hoped within a few years to bring all the land fit for cultivation under the plough. This occupation of Siberia, especially, is of tremendous military significance, since by this means the possibility arises of basing the defence of the east Asiatic possessions of Russia upon the strength of the country itself, and not of being obliged, as heretofore, in case a conflict

should break out with Japan or with China, to send large masses of troops from the west of the empire. The seven army corps that are always maintained in Siberia can already be strengthened by a reserve army from among the inhabitants there of at least 285,000 men.

Just as the development of agriculture has doubled the export trade of Russia (\$687,500,000) between 1895 and 1911 and has raised the demand for agricultural machinery to the value of \$59,500,000, so its industry presents the same surprising picture; and, in spite of their constantly increasing number, the factories cannot yet satisfy the demands of the population. The financial conditions of the country, also, have shaped themselves very favorably since the gold standard was adopted. In addition to this the national bank has been reorganized. In spite of the war with Japan and its huge cost (\$900,000,000), Russia has succeeded in preserving her gold reserve so well that in October, 1905, it amounted to about \$625,000,000. It was still at about the same level in 1908, but had risen to \$850,000,000 by 1912. However, Russia is clever enough not to use this gold reserve for the present considerable expenditures necessitated by the army and the national defense; she can draw on her banker, France, to better advantage. In this way a safe financial basis for the anticipated war is assured.

That precautions for such a war—and preparations on the greatest scale imaginable—are under way is not admitted by the usually communicative Russian press. This is a very significant sign, especially as what one does hear is calculated to excite one's closest attention.

In all former wars in which Russia engaged the lack of a well developed network of communications—in early times of roads, in the last century of railways—has been a great obstacle to rapid mobilization and to the provisioning of the armies. The greater the distances which divided the positions of the troops from one another and from the scene of action in this enormous country, covered largely with exten-

sive swamps and forests, the more serious became this state of affairs.

Therefore, the hurried construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway had to precede the inevitable collision with Japan following upon the Russian occupation of Manchuria; and the difficult task of building the road along the banks of Lake Baikal had to be continued during the war. Consequently a large part of the loan of \$500,000,000 which had been obtained from France had to be used for the purpose of completing with the greatest possible rapidity, the network of railroad lines which connect the interior of the empire with the German and Austro-Hungarian frontiers.

The construction of these roads requires years for completion, and the constant demands of the allies must be satisfied in other ways. There were two possibilities: shortening the distance between the troops and the scene of action, that is, the routes to the western frontier; and increasing the standing army, so that it would have no need of very large numbers of reservists, who would have to be transported by rail, to fill the ranks. Russia has resorted to both of these expedients. Army corps were sent to the frontier in three directions; to the east, against Japan and China, where, at the same time, they were increased from five to seven; to the southeast in the Caucasus against Turkey, and to the west against the German and Austro-Hungarian frontiers. There, also, two new army corps were established, and, in addition, no fewer than nineteen regiments of cavalry.

In order to comply with the further demand of France that they should not restrict themselves to the defensive, but begin the war by taking the offensive, the Russians were advised to increase the regular strength of the divisions that go into action first, so that the attack could commence without calling out the reserves. This object was achieved by prolonging the time of military service. It was fixed at three years, that is, from the first of January to the end of the third year of service. However, the recruits had been called in the

preceding autumn, and the Minister of War as usual exercised his authority to order their dismissal in November of the third year of service. He could, it is true, hold the reservists in the service still longer by imperial permission, if there were sufficient reason for it. This power, which was exercised last year during the strained relations with Austria, has now been sanctioned by a law prolonging the term of service up to the first of April of the fourth year of service.

What is the result of this? During the training period, the infantry will have served three and the cavalry four years, the entire army will have been increased by one-fourth of its number during this most difficult and critical period, and will be as ready to fight then as after the end of the term of service. The difference between this method and that of our army, which during its time of service has only one full year of active training, is obvious. Furthermore, it must not be overlooked that in case a war should begin in the spring the reserves, instead of being dismissed, can be retained, in order to have troops practically of war strength at hand for immediate service. If, then, Russian measures do not go so far as the change of organization in France does, the latter's demands are fully complied with nevertheless. The peace-footing of the Russian army is estimated as follows:

|                        |                  |                     |
|------------------------|------------------|---------------------|
| For winter of 1913-14, | total 1,840,000, | in Europe 1,322,000 |
| For summer of 1914,    | total 1,415,000, | in Europe 1,017,000 |
| For winter of 1914-15, | total 1,860,000, | in Europe 1,337,000 |
| For summer of 1915,    | total 1,435,000, | in Europe 1,032,000 |
| For winter of 1915-16, | total 1,900,000, | in Europe 1,045,000 |

In the winter months these numbers give approximately the entire war strength of the army. Assuming that Russia should, on the whole, agree to the plan of campaign that the French general Cherfils has proposed, then fourteen to fifteen divisions of the armies of Warsaw, Vilna, St. Petersburg and Kiev, of which eight are only between 50 and 60 odd miles distant from our borders, would be combined on our

eastern frontier, against the provinces of East and West Prussia.

Not only is Russia preparing herself for a war of offence by increasing her army and its readiness for war, but she is also devoting great attention to strengthening her fortifications. The representative of the Minister of War was able to state last June that, in 1912, not only were the existing forts improved and strengthened, but that new fortresses had been constructed.

The Russians organize their system of national defence on the western frontier as follows: A northern seat of war defended by the fortifications of Kovno and the fortified Niemen line; a southern seat of war, opposite Galicia, defended by the fortresses at Dubno, Lutzk and Rovno, and an "advanced seat of war," the center of which is in the triangular fortifications of Warsaw, Novo—Georgievsk and Zegrze, the right wing of which is indicated by the fortified line of Narev and the left by the fortified towns of Ivangorod and Brest-Litovsk. Along the whole circumference of this position of defence the work is proceeding energetically; the center of Warsaw is being entirely transformed, Brest-Litovsk has been strengthened to a fortress of the first magnitude, and the Narev-Niemen line, after the fashion of the French barrier fortresses on its eastern boundary, has been made into an impregnable obstacle by the construction of strong bases of support. And Russia is not less active in preparing against an attack on St. Petersburg from the sea—by the construction of fortresses even stronger than those of Kronstadt; while she strives to make the mouth of the Gulf of Finland, on its northern and southern banks, secure against an attack from a fleet, by the new forts, Reval-Dago-Oesel and Sveaborg-Porkale.

Moreover, if one takes into consideration that the sum of \$145,000 expended in 1907 for the support of the reservists and the militia, who were called in for practice, increased in 1913 to \$5,587,500; that in the frontier regions, huge sup-

plies of grain, arms, automobile trucks and other accessories of war, are being accumulated; that Russia is making the greatest efforts to perfect aviation and to train the greatest possible number of officers as aviators, one cannot help thinking that she believes she can yield to the pressure of her ally and banker, since the moment is favorable for a combined attack on Germany and Austria-Hungary.

Nor has Russia failed to employ a means, hitherto untried, of weakening Germany's ally as much as possible, by sending emissaries into these very frontier regions, who have stimulated emigration to such an extent that tens of thousands of men liable to military service have left Austria and have deprived the Austrian army of irrecoverable strength.

The best standard for judgment of the efforts that a state makes for its defence is provided by the figures of the budget—by the annual appropriation. And Russia has increased her appropriation for the army alone, in the years from 1909 to 1914 by \$187,500,000, that is, by 72 per cent.; and as compared with the amount in 1913, the appropriation has increased in 1914 by \$136,500,000, or 43.5 per cent. The same conditions prevail with regard to the fleet: Of the new vessels for the Baltic fleet, four battleships are ready, and four of 23,370 tons are under construction; six armored cruisers are ready, and four of 32,500 tons are under construction; four protected cruisers are ready, and six are under construction; 58 torpedo boats are ready, and 36 are under construction; and 13 submarines are ready or under construction. These tremendous exertions to create rapidly a new fleet on the Baltic necessitated an increase in the state appropriation of \$78,000,000 from 1909 to 1913, that is, 154 per cent. At the same time the appropriations for the navy increased 50 per cent. in France, 29.6 per cent. in England, and only 13.8 per cent. in Germany. Judge by this how unfounded are England's reproaches to Germany, and to Germany alone, that she was strengthening her naval power inordinately. Why does she not reproach her allies, France and Russia?



## III. FRANCE

It is noteworthy that Homer Lea does not mention France at all in his book, "The Day of the Saxon." This should be mortifying to her, since it ignores her in the rivalry with England. She lost her importance on sea for the Anglo-Saxons when England succeeded in defeating her fleet in the 18th century and in tearing from her her great and prosperous colonial possessions. That France has meanwhile been able to win new and extensive possessions in other portions of the world does not seem to affect Great Britain, since she has been able to preserve for herself a certain supremacy. Under pressure from England, at the moment in which she believed herself already to have made the connection with her eastern territory, France was obliged to relinquish her rights in Egypt and with them the idea of gaining a colony straight across Africa from Senegambia to the Red Sea (Abyssinia). This was the only case in which her plans for expansion crossed those of the British Empire, and the latter did not hesitate to interfere immediately with brute force.

Although the English treatment of France in 1898 was regarded by the latter as deeply humiliating, this feeling rapidly vanished and, when England came to the aid of her former opponent in the Moroccan question, gave way to the policy of revenge against Germany, which had been cherished since 1870. What is the basis of France's hatred of Germany, which causes her constantly to plan revenge and whenever there is any chance of satisfying it, to relegate all other questions to the background? The French attempt to trace its course to the ancient struggle between the Gauls and the Germans for the possession of the blessed banks of the Rhine. They have set up a peculiar conception of historical events in order to justify Louis XIV's seizure of Alsace and Lorraine from Germany, and have persisted in it with such consistency

in the education of their youth, that not only the French, but also the inhabitants of those provinces under French influence, are thoroughly imbued with this idea. After the division of the empire by Charlemagne—whom they consider a French monarch—these provinces were the playthings of princes and nations so that they had no peace and no prosperity until King Louis XIV took pity on them and incorporated them into his kingdom, where they could enjoy the blessings of peace and culture. Even if this theory were correct—and it contradicts the facts of history on every point—it cannot be denied that the population of Alsace-Lorraine comes of pure Teutonic, and not Gallic, stock, and is still unchanged. Besides, the Alsatians and Lotharingians were never recognized as equals by the French; on the contrary they were always subordinated, mocked and scorned, as coming from alien stock.

But the defeats of 1870-71, which terminated in the reunion of Alsace-Lorraine with Germany, wounded the deepest feeling of the French nation—her vanity—and that is the root of her ineffaceable hatred. France could forget that England destroyed her naval power, that she lost her colonies, so long as she preserved her supremacy on land. Created by Louis XIV, it was increased on the continent to the utmost bounds of possibility by Napoleon; and since that time the “grande nation” has considered herself the bearer of culture, the ruling power in Europe. When relying on this power under Napoleon III, French arrogance met with the unexpected opposition of Germany, when the latter country, which had been despised, because of its system of small states and dissension, which had been scornfully charged with barbarity and lack of culture, rose in close union and won supremacy, not only on the field of battle, but also in industry and commerce, in art and science with unexpected power and ability, then the French nation, forced from its throne and wounded to the utmost in its vanity, became cognizant of its weaknesses. *Hinc illae lacrimae!*

Because of the military prowess of its inhabitants, who, as becomes descendants of ancient Teutonic races, have preserved warlike inclinations and virtues and have provided the French army with many of its best soldiers and most famous generals, France's fanatical desire to win back Alsace-Lorraine has a certain significance. Considering the decrease of the population in France, the two million inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine are a valuable addition, and, if admission to the French army were open to the Alsatians and Lotharingians, the lack of officers would to a certain extent be supplied.

Notwithstanding an occasional diminution of their hostile attitude—for this does not prevail over the whole of France, nor in an equal degree in the entire population—the French government, whatever its sentiments, has always striven to perfect and complete the army and the fortifications. Two objects governed it; a strong protection of the frontier, exposed since the loss of the Rhine boundary, and a strength in its own troops equal, as far as possible, to that of the German army.

On the 157 miles of German frontier along the Meuse and Moselle Rivers, a chain of four strong fortresses was created, which serve to protect two lines of barrier fortresses—Verdun-Toul and Epinal-Belfort. These serve as bases of support for the wings and flank the gaps—Verdun-Longwy (32 miles) and Toul-Epinal (44 miles). They were primarily intended to protect the advance of the army against the more rapidly mobilized German forces, especially as the position, Verdun-Toul, by reason of its situation on the edge of the Côte de Meuse, which slopes precipitously down to the plain below, is extraordinarily favorable for an army of defence and would have to be cut through by us. When Italy joined the German alliance with Austria-Hungary, a more adequate protection of the frontier of the Alps towards Italy had to be considered; and thus an extraordinarily strong system of fortifications, consisting of a blockade of the passes,

and strong bases of support further back, which not only intercepts and defends all the roads leading over the mountains, but many byways as well, was established here, too. Finally, the French had to provide against the possibility that German troops, disregarding neutrality treaties, would force their way into Belgium or march through Switzerland, so that the efficiency of the old fortifications on these frontiers, too, had to be examined and improved, as needed. Thus France has received a coat of mail, as it were, of fortifications stretching along the whole eastern frontier, a distance of about 625 miles, which would call a halt to the unexpected invasion of a hostile army. It is impossible to ignore these fortresses as in 1870 or to regard them lightly.

The construction of these fortresses and the constantly required improvements and modernization of old defenses could be easily accomplished by the possession of the necessary funds, which were always easily obtainable. Much more difficult was the maintenance of the army on the same level with that of the German Empire, for here the sacrifice of money, however much, was of no avail. Only large masses of men counted, and France did not have the same supply of men as of money. Even in the seventies the population of France was declining—a condition directly opposite to that in Germany. With about the same amount of territory, France had, in 1875 for example, only 36,900,000 inhabitants, while Germany had 42,700,000. Since that time the population of France has increased only to 39,700,000, or 7.6 per cent., while in Germany it has risen to 67,500,000, that is 58 per cent. The result was that France could not keep pace with Germany as regards the annual number of her recruits, even if she reduced her physical standard. She accordingly had to reduce the normal strength of the army units, primarily that of the companies, in order to retain the same number of larger commands, and finally was compelled to include as soldiers those who did not possess the physical requirements, by withdrawing the numerous officers' order-

lies and men employed in similar capacities, and replacing them by others still less fit.

The result of the smaller number of recruits was a smaller supply of drilled troops and of reserves for mobilization than in the case of the German army. If compulsory service had been as strict in Germany as in France, there would soon have been a far greater number of drilled soldiers for the German army than for the French. But the increase in the number liable to service, and, consequently, of recruits, in Germany, did not keep pace with the increase of the population, so that the balance between France and Germany was not appreciably disturbed. This would enable France, at least for the time being, to preserve a superiority, if she succeeded in augmenting her force in the standing army over that at the disposal of her eastern neighbor. In case of war the number of those liable to service, which depends on the number of recruits, could naturally not be increased by this means, and therefore, the superior number of possible soldiers at the disposal of Germany is indisputable. The prolonging of the term of service from two to three years, however, afforded a greater increase of the standing army, amounting to 200,000 men, and had the additional advantage of providing a much more thorough training, not only for the troops in general; but also for the candidates for the position of reserve officers than was possible in Germany.

After the introduction of the three-year term of active service, the French standing army attained a strength of 768,300 men, composed of petty officers and privates (including the 80,000 troops of reserves, the police force of 24,000 men and the 31,300 colonial troops), while our army numbered only 619,000. And even with our great augmentation, through which we again approached general conscription, we have not quite caught up with the French, as we have only about 751,000 men under the colors.

The three-year term of service was accomplished in a

strange manner, not without significance for the coming years. As the men born in 1890, serving their second year, objected to remaining another year, and gave vent to their feelings by gross excesses and mutiny, it was decided to dismiss them in the fall of 1913 and to replace them simultaneously by two other series of recruits, namely, those born in 1892 and 1893. Consequently, two series of recruits have to be trained at the same time, one of which has already served one year of its term, a circumstance which would make it almost impossible for the French army to enter into war at present. However, since, in order legally to justify the premature call to service of the series of 1893, the beginning of the term of service was shifted back a year, from twenty-one to twenty; in the fall of 1914, the series of 1894 will be obliged to serve. But, as the series of 1891 which is serving its second year is compelled to remain for three years, it can still be under arms during the year of 1915. The consequence will be that there will be, not only three, but four series next year in the standing army, that is, a greater strength than is necessary for the war basis. A mobilization, according to this, could be accomplished next year with all the more ease and rapidity, as not only have all the units of military force their full war strength already, but they could even furnish a considerable portion of their troops as a nucleus for the required reserves.

France will have another opportunity for a similar proceeding in 1916, since only in the fall of that year will the two series of 1913 receive their dismissal. If, by that time, she has not attained the purpose for which she keeps this exceedingly strong armament, if she has not been able to persuade Russia and England to attack Germany, then she will probably have to renounce the idea of a war of revenge, if she does not wish to face economic ruin. The state of affairs that France has created by the exceptional three years' term of service is nothing less than a continual preparation for war. It may be possible for a rich country to make the pecuniary

sacrifices hereby occasioned. The personal sacrifices, however, would be too great, if one considers that, not only is the peasant torn for so long a time from his plough, the craftsman from his trade, but also that all the young men whose scientific and artistic training is of vital importance to the state, are obliged to interrupt their studies for three years and thus undoubtedly will have to begin all over again. This youthful vigor, uselessly sacrificed to the "revenge" feeling would take bitter retaliation should it not be utilized for this purpose.

*For all these reasons the consequence of France's military measures is that she must press on to the beginning of the war against Germany in 1915 or 1916 under any circumstances.*

But it is not enough for her to have more than two per cent. of the whole population (including the officers) in the standing army. In addition, France is seeking to draw reinforcements from her colonies, in order to attain numerical superiority without the assistance of other states. In 1870, the most "civilized" nation of the world opposed us with all sorts of brutally savage African tribes. In this direction she can do still more. From Algeria, Senegambia and the Western Sudan especially, considerable support can be derived from a population which is estimated at 30,000,000, and the government has an eye to this purpose. A German traveler, who is well acquainted with conditions in the Sudan, confirms this with these words: "Ideas neither of commercial advantage nor of colonization are sufficiently encouraged. On the contrary, France's policy is to provide for the subsistence of the colony by means of the strength, intelligence and money of the colored races, and to produce French citizens of the black race, by the thousands, hundreds of thousands and millions, and naturally all these millions are to become good, enthusiastic and patriotic French soldiers."

There are already 28 battalions of so-called Senegal sharpshooters, and every year this organized plan progresses.

Naturally, these black troops cannot simply be transplanted to the European climate; yet the attempt to utilize them on the north coast of Africa has apparently had good results, so that there can be no hesitation in transporting the troops of European or Arabian blood, that are stationed in Africa, across to the seat of war, and in replacing them by Senegal sharpshooters. Perhaps it will be possible to bring over the blacks that have become acclimated to the north coast of Africa. At all events, there will be a considerable force at hand in the Sudan itself which can proceed along the roads of this region, and from Equatorial Africa against our African colonies and secure these valuable possessions. Already twenty thousand men are in readiness for such a task. It is evident from the continual increase of the Algerian regiments of sharpshooters, with what zeal preparations for war are proceeding in Algiers, for they are to be increased to the number of 48, by the yearly creation of five new battalions. They have already reached the number of 39.

But France has sought reinforcements in regions other than her African colonies, in order to outstrip Germany's military strength, despite her lack of men. Natives of the Antilles were brought over, who, as a matter of fact, succumbed to the climate. Consequently, they were transferred to Algeria, but even there they proved unequal to the climate. After such attempts, it should not surprise us if the German troops should encounter natives of Madagascar, Annam and Cambodia in the next war.

In the year 1912 the number of available trained troops in France was estimated at from four and a half to four and three-quarter millions, which would be from 11.3 per cent. to 12 per cent. of the whole population. As one can hardly count on more than from 17 to 18 per cent. of men liable to service, after the mobilization of such a number, only children, old men and weaklings would remain in the country, to fulfill the duties of citizenship. That would mean that all civil callings would be brought to a standstill in order to carry on



the war with such a large army. But as this is absolutely impossible, even in the interest of the army, it will be well not to count on such an enormous number. Russia with her 160,000,000 inhabitants can exact such a sacrifice of men, but not France.

However, the French army—or rather armies—will necessitate such great areas for operation, if the number of the army corps is doubled by the reserves, even without the divisions of the territorial army and its reserves, that the German-French frontier is much too short to admit of a simultaneous passage. Consequently, only one division of the forces could be utilized at a time, or else the means of egress would have to be increased and widened. This is where Belgium will play a part, for her sympathy with France is so well known that opposition, such as is the duty of a neutral state towards an encroachment on its territory, can hardly be expected from this quarter. It is true that Belgium would be playing a dangerous game, if she yielded to France, for, whatever the outcome, her independence would be a thing of the past. But England, too, as we saw, seems to count upon disembarking her land forces in Antwerp; and on neutral ground she would have to join forces with her ally France—of course, with the agreement to protect Belgium against “plunder-loving Germany,” even if German troops had not yet set foot on neutral ground.

Homer Lea gives us ideas on neutrality that are characteristic of the Anglo-Saxons. He thinks that the occupation of a neutral country—for example, Holland or Belgium—before a war with Germany might call forth violent opposition from England.

“This is false,” he remarks, “for the British Empire is not moved by the sanctity of neutrality. It is only a means of evading responsibility and shifting it upon those nations which delude themselves with the belief that declarations of neutrality are inviolable; whereas, no nation has violated neutral territory and denied the obligation of observing neutral-

ity more frequently than the British. The occupation by the Anglo-Saxons of these frontiers would be regarded as a territorial, and not a moral, violation of the neutrality of the states concerned. Neutrality of states under the conditions just mentioned has never had heretofore, nor will ever have in future, any place among the nations in time of war. Such a neutrality is a modern illusion. It means downright aberration." (pp. 265-266.)

I do not believe that the opposition of England to such a violation of neutrality would be aroused as Homer Lea seems to expect, rather do I think that his is the generally accepted theory of the country.

France has experienced various disappointments in the course of the last ten years, during which she has devoted herself exclusively to preparations for the war with Germany. We surpassed her in the construction of cannon; her much praised invention of smokeless powder was a fiasco. When the "Lebaudy" was proudly extolled as the only airship in the world, no fewer than three dirigibles appeared in Germany at the same time and proved themselves capable of greater speed than the French airships. When the French enthusiastically applied themselves to the construction and utilization of these flying machines, their triumph was brief, as the German apparatuses and airmen were able to accomplish equally as much in the course of a few years. The reason for all this lies in the native characteristics of the French; they are intelligent, inventive, courageous and seize every new idea with great dexterity and zeal. They are not careful workers, however, and lack the infinite patience of the German, who, unlike the Frenchman, is not satisfied with temporary success and then turns to new fields, but is never content with what he has achieved, and is constantly seeking to improve and to perfect it.

The French are able to utilize still another weapon with skill and good fortune: the undermining of our boundary lands, the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. I must refer

to this, because it will play a portentous part in the coming struggle, at least in the first stages, but will not be a blessing for the population if it cannot successfully resist.

#### IV. CONCLUSION

Since the downfall of the Roman Empire the Teutonic and Latin races of Europe have considered themselves rightly as the standard-bearers of civilization, and hence have regarded themselves as chosen to impress it upon the other portions of the earth and to exercise in most cases political, as well as intellectual, power. However, it has always been true in the history of the development of nations, that the conquered nation in time having acquired all the customs and habits of the conquerors, endeavors, finally, to break its fetters, be they of an intellectual or of a political nature. And so for the Great European Powers there is the unmistakable danger that in time they may be forced from their commanding position. This could not be long delayed, should they be obliged single handed to stem the tide of the newly made world powers. We have the beginning of this new era in Russia's struggle with Japan; for even if Russia cannot be regarded as a conspicuous member of the European Powers, so far as its civilization is concerned, still, as compared with Japan, she represents the European type of it. And there, where she suffered defeat in the region of the Pacific Ocean, the future struggles for world supremacy between the European, Asiatic and American nations will be decided. Years ago Emperor William II uttered the prophetic warning: "Ye peoples of Europe, guard your most sacred possessions." What he meant was very evident. No one can help realizing that there would be reason enough in a European combination for the purpose of warding off such danger. What would it require, but a few unimportant concessions, a quiet consideration of the vital needs of each indus-

try, increased territorial power, and the suppression of all feeling of revenge or jealousy among neighboring states? Are the interests of each really so directly opposed, that a little could not be sacrificed to guard against a greater catastrophe? If the Powers at the Hague Peace Conference had in mind that they would unite for common defence and cherished the hope of attaining such a union, then it would be of invaluable significance to Europe. But how different are the actual conditions. Divided into two great camps, the six Great Powers stand confronting one another, groaning under the burden of their heavy armament. They talk of peace and friendship, and all the time one of them is ready to strike, while the other, with sword unsheathed, must be prepared at a moment's notice to join in the struggle, in which Europe will tear itself to pieces and render itself for an indefinite period, unable to meet those dangers threatening it from without, in every sphere, economic, political and military.

Ever since King Edward of England, laboring under the delusion that the German Empire's growing land and naval power was becoming dangerous to Britain's position of world supremacy, formed an alliance against us with all England's former opponents and spared no pains to isolate us as much as possible and to surround us with hostile arms, Europe has been living in a state of constant preparation for a fearful, decisive struggle. That this contest has not long since been waged, that even so favorable an opportunity as the war torch in the Balkans did not set the spark to the powder, that it was in fact England, who always restrained her eager allies—that, in my opinion, is due chiefly to England's calculating business sense. England would not be much concerned, should the continental powers come to blows and inflict serious wounds on one another; but they then would be obliged to share the costs. Whoever the victor in this struggle, what benefit would accrue to him? Devastated lands and empty coffers. What defeated country could pay the war indemnity? What the benefits of such a war would be it is difficult

to conjecture. Inasmuch as Great Britain may be forced to take active part therein, since it is she who has the greatest interest in the destruction of the German fleet, inasmuch as she cannot hope to leave the field of battle without material losses, nor secure any great advantage from the struggle, she recoils from the moment in which she must take the decisive step.

However, the spirits that you summoned to aid, you cannot lightly cast aside—the spirit of revenge which was kindled in France, the burning hatred of Russia for Austria-Hungary, has impelled both countries to an increase of their military preparations, which can only be maintained for a short time. As a matter of fact, this preparation does not differ from a readiness for war, and in the spring of 1915, it will be so completely perfected that one must be prepared at any moment for the appearance of such mighty armies as Europe has never yet seen. *And that will be the hour of destiny for Germany and her allies*; then we shall have to strike harder blows than ever before, but then, too, the enthusiasm, the devotion, the courage of sacrifice will be commensurate. For we will be fighting for the right. Never will a people have been attacked with greater injustice than we in this coming war; never will a nation have borne with so much patience and meekness such agonizing jealousies and affronts; never has a nation possessed a greater ruler and firmer rock of peace than Emperor William.

Just as the government responded to the threatening measures of France in the re-establishment last year of the three-year term of service with a mighty increase of our military force, just as the German people accepted, without murmur, nay even with a sentiment of pride and devotion to the Fatherland, the pecuniary sacrifices involved, so—and of this we can be certain—every weapon will be ready promptly, and not only the military force, but the financial and industrial bases as well will be sound. For a war of such dimensions which demands the whole national strength of each country

will not be fought with the weapons of warfare alone, but will require the whole economic and financial strength involved to cope with such forces.

It must not be imagined that five or six million soldiers can suddenly overrun our territory from all sides and crush our army. At the beginning, only the active army, exclusive of the troops retained for garrisoning the fortresses and other purposes, will have to be reckoned with, for the mobilizing of the reserve forces demands some time. Secondly, large masses of troops always necessitate enormous moving space, so that in a given area only an army of approximately small strength can be utilized. In these respects our modern army of millions differs greatly from the smaller armies which were at the disposal of Frederick the Great and even of Napoleon. Those masters of strategy could always follow the course of battle from a point of vantage and intervene accordingly. In the battles of Metz and Sedan this was quite impossible, since the still comparatively small masses of the army had to spread over many miles in order to take part in the battle. Conceive of the dimensions of the battles in Manchuria! The mere weight of numbers will accomplish nothing in the coming war; it will not be necessary for one man to fight five or six; the opposing forces will be nearly equal. Therefore, in the future, as in the past, the moral qualities, coupled with the physical strength, training and marksmanship of each individual soldier, and the judgment of the commanders as to the distribution and proper placing of troops, will determine the outcome.

For the French army, the immoderate—in proportion to the strength of the country—increase of the number of troops will be of little benefit, inasmuch as this striving for increased enlistment has brought forward, not only those fit for war, but also many weaklings, who might easily become a burden. If one observes how little able the French soldiers are to resist the diseases that threaten them, one will see that at the present moment not less than 36 per cent. of those in active


service have been obliged to withdraw from it, because of sickness, weakness or death. One must not forget that men of this mold will succumb in many cases to the hardships of long marches, insufficient food, and constant nervous strain. It cannot be denied that in the French army, as in the Russian, the longer term of service can promote the attainment of a higher degree of efficiency, under appropriate guidance, than is possible in the case of the two-year term of service. However, most of all, this necessitates conscientious and self-sacrificing teachers, that is, a corps of officers and drill sergeants of superior quality. These might be hard to find in the Russian army, to judge from the outcome of the war with Japan, and, in France, the quality of the officers as well as that of the soldiers, is considerably affected by their constant participation in politics. Then, too, our army benefits by a certain characteristic of the German soldier, which is generally lacking in men of the Latin countries. The reservist and even the militiaman retains that which he learned in active service with extraordinary tenacity. One must have seen a company of the militia in the field in order correctly to estimate the value of this quality. I myself have noticed that in the work of the engineers, whose technical efficiency is most easily forgotten, they need but one or two days of practice, in order fully to regain their former proficiency, and require but a few directions in order to act with the same dexterity as if they had been dismissed yesterday, and not ten years ago.

When it comes to the struggle, we shall meet our foes with the same steadiness and determination for victory as in 1870, and we shall remember that numbers alone do not bring victory, but that it will fall to him who possesses the greatest endurance and the last dollar. Moreover, the motto, "*Si vis pacem, para justitiam*" ("If you wish for peace, prepare for justice"), which the architect of the Peace Palace placed over the window of the great hall of sessions, paraphrasing an old saying, would be all very well, if there could

be absolute justice. Who can decide whether Germany or France is entitled to the possession of Alsace-Lorraine? Each will always consider his own the sole just claim. Then it is better that we restore the saying to its old time form: "*Si vis pacem, para bellum*" ("If you wish peace, prepare for war").



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