No
you
can go.
Good morning ladies and gentlemen committee
and House administration will come to order.
First I would like to advise and request all members of our audience here today
that all started our phones pagers
and other electronic equipment must be silenced to prevent interruption of our
business.
So I don't appreciate if you turn these devices off as I have the committee is
meeting today for a hearing on electronic voting machines and related issues.
The election that will occur in just a few weeks will be the first.
General federal election conducted since the Help America Vote Act of two thousand
and two better known as Hava was fully implemented
that act passed by this Congress in response to the voting system weaknesses.
S'posed during the two thousand recount in Florida set new standards for voting
systems that were meant to make our elections more accurate and accessible.
Three billion dollars were appropriated by the Congress pursuant to however with
most of these monies being dedicated to new equipment purchases by jurisdictions
localities counties cities townships etc
that want to improve their voting systems.
As a result many jurisdictions are using new equipment for the first time this year
it's no surprise that there have been a few problems.
Though however did not require the adoption of any particular kind of technology
many jurisdictions person purchased electronic voting systems because they felt the
systems were best able to meet the requirements of.
Not surprisingly some jurisdictions using this equipment for the first time have
encountered some difficulties.
Just two weeks ago in nearby Montgomery County Maryland polls were not able to open
on time because poll workers were sent to their posts without the cards necessary
to start up the electronic machines.
In the wake of this episode a column appeared in The Washington Post under the
headline. If paper ballots restore trust in elections.
Let's switch the column noted people trust paper ballots because the real you
can hold them in your hand and count them again if you need to.
Indeed before it had electronic monitoring system voting systems Montgomery County
used a punch card system.
Need to be reminded of the problems we had with that system.
Direct your attention to this to the screen above.
The audience can look at that when we look at this one.
And this is a reminder of what we saw in the two thousand election in Florida.
Images of people with paper ballots.
This one is a group of people staring at paper punch cards trying to figure out if
they constitute a vote and if so for whom. If you look at the second slide.
You see how closely these ballots were being examined by a group in the third
slideshows extreme. Putting things under the magnifying glass.
You can see this man has got paper. Now I'm not showing these to condemn paper.
I'm just pointing out that punch cards were paper thick paper at that.
And we got into problems with
that simply saying let's use paper as some people are saying does not mean all the
problems go away. We have to consider all the different aspects of.
These pictures as you can tell we're taking in Florida during the two thousand
recount. And that will go down in history.
I'm sure because of the recount and the ramifications.
These images do not expect exactly inspire trust and confidence either in the.
In the punch card system or in the voting systems in general.
As a way to look at this problem.
It's worthwhile remembering the famous words of H.L.
Mencken who once said for every complex problem.
There is an answer that is clear simple and wrong.
We would like to have answers that are clear and simple.
But we certainly do not want wrong answers
and so we are going to proceed with this very thoroughly delivered deliberately to
try to make sure that we have good answers that are right.
Unfortunately the some problems some jurisdictions have experienced with their new
systems have caused some to suggest
that we should revert to a reliance on paper the so-called paper trail
or paper tape.
We know from painful and bitter experience
that paper systems also can fail to deliver.
Results and are susceptible to manipulation.
To ignore this reality and assert that paper somehow ensures integrity
or a correct result is simplistic and wrong.
In fact no voting system by itself can guarantee election integrity the best system
on earth will fail if not properly maintained deployed and operated
and that's the key point that we have to remember.
And I'm not even though I'm a physicist
and I've used computers since one nine hundred fifty seven.
I'm not saying by virtue of this these comments so far papers battle electronics of
course is good. I've used it for many years.
I know that can fail to it's not programmed properly or not operated properly.
I think I believe the important point is design the best system you can
but make sure you have a lot of debility built and in some way whether it's paper
or some other electronic device.
Our hearing today will examine a range of issues related to electronic voting
machines. We will hear about their problems but also about their benefits.
We'll also hear about the experience in one jurisdiction
that tried to address the security concerns of a paperless system by requiring the
machine to generate a paper trail.
This hearing is being held to educate the members
and the public about these complicated issues.
I hope
when the hearing is over we will have a better understanding of the problems
and benefits of these new technologies.
I also hope
that look for solutions to these complicated problems we resist the temptation to
settle on answers that are clear simple and wrong.
Now I'd like to ask unanimous consent
that the gentleman from New Jersey New Jersey.
Percent of Rush Holt who is the author of a bill dealing very much with one aspect
of this be allowed to join us and does today and that he.
May be permitted to ask questions of the witnesses
and interest a minute to the director. Without objection so ordered.
Welcome to the present home.
Please to hear this is one of the few times in the Congress
when you're fined two physicists sitting at the front desk listening to testimony.
At this time of life through its merits
or I can remember them as making their McDonald from the opening remark she may
have thank you Mr Chairman and good morning to you and all of the witnesses
and gets here this morning.
I would like to thank you Mr Chairman for calling this very important hearing on
electronic voting machines.
I am sure that you have heard from your constituents
and constituents around the country as I have heard
that folks aware you about these voting machine apparatuses
and they are just not sure whether or not they are working.
Let me also thank you Mr Chairman for welcoming Congressman Rush Holt to sit on the
panel this morning.
It was just six years ago
that the two thousand presidential election brought to light many problems with the
elections process. In our country.
We encountered a wide range of frustrations
and election administration with the I'D LIKE should administration.
Some of the most infamous problems involved punch cards with all of the hanging
chads
that the chairman has just shown you others involved voters who were turned away
from the polls without the opportunity to cast a vote in response this committee
worked diligently and passed the Help America Vote Act which is Hava.
Trip the country of outdated voting to quit men enter ensure
that no eligible voter is turned away from the polls without casting a vote.
Despite the passage of Hava however many problems still remain as we witnessed
during the two thousand and four election and in several primaries this year.
Today I hope to hear about methods of addressing these. Issues.
Even if we may not be able to implement suggestive recommendations before the
November election.
I also hope
that this oversight hearing will serve as a forum for the American people to gain
confidence. In direct recording electronic voting system machines.
After the two thousand election Deore as we call them machines were viewed as the
answer to hanging chads
and century old lever machines Deore machines also allowed individuals with
disabilities to vote in private and without assistance for the first time.
They have also been supported by a number of civil rights organizations given the
ease with with which they are able to be programmed to display ballots in foreign
languages.
However as we are aware many concerns have been raised about the integrity
and the reliability of these story machines.
In fact at times it may be seen
that these machines have raised many more questions than answers. For example.
Some have called for a voter verified paper audit trail for Deore machines.
Some states already required that function for Deore machines.
But even this similarly simple math that raises numerous concerns for example
when mechanism serves as the official what mechanism serves as the official record
in a recount. That's a question that has been raised.
Often what happens when the printer jams.
With the voter which were proper with the votes which were properly recorded by the
R.E.B. Thrown out. If they are not similarly recorded on the paper.
Those are the questions that have been raised.
Often I am also interested in hearing from our witnesses expression all of the
local election the fish. Shields.
Regarding their views about the wisdom of imposing a federal mandate which would
specify which type of election equipment should be used.
These decisions have mostly been left up to the state
and local officials throughout our country's history
and I would like to know what the impact of a federal mandate
and a standard in this area would be what President it would set for future
election administration mandates on the states by the federal government
and how these mandates would be funded in addition to discuss to get stablished
concerns about the Arima chains.
I hope the witnesses invited today will address the security of all voting
equipment.
Only one third of Americans will cast ballots on Deore machines and although
that number is growing.
It's still means
that two thirds of our voters will be casting ballots using a methodology.
Are these machines secure. Are they reliable.
Are they subject to a suitable level of scrutiny.
I am concerned that all of the media attention to voting.
Security will inadvertently discourage voters from going to the polls resulting in
voter suppression.
As we witnessed a few weeks ago in Maryland voting machine reliabilities security
and accuracy with not the inherent cause of mayhem mayhem the lack of poll worker
training another human factors of election administration created problems
infusions at the polls. For both voters and poll workers.
If we do not adequately address all of these issues voters may feel as if their
votes will not be counted and decide not to participate on election day.
This is one reason why I offered an amendment to double the funding for the college
poll worker training program.
This programming current just college age students to service poll workers.
And to become more involved with the election administer. Process.
The electoral process is not perfect.
Mr Chairman improvements to the electoral process itself still need to be made.
Fortunately they Help America Vote Act of two thousand
and two is a solid foundation upon which we can institute further electoral
improvements.
Hava made it easier for voters to cast a ballot
and harder for people to knowingly commit crime and fraud.
Which is why we need to appropriate the remaining eight hundred million dollars
balance which is authorized in title to a father to follow up on the states
and give him a chance to work. As I have stated in the past.
It is guaranteed that your vote will be lost. If you don't cast a ballot.
I would encourage every eligible voter to cast a ballot. No matter how harsh.
The rhetoric about the November elections and no matter how
that ballot excuse cast by D.B.E.
Machines absentee ballots provisional ballots whatever.
Americans need to get out and vote in November with the confidence
that their vote will be counted correctly.
Exercise in this precious right is more important than the outcome of the elections
Mr Chairman I hope we can convene additional hearings in the future to examine any
shortcomings in election administration and any impediments
that voters experience in exercising their constitutional rights.
I look forward to working with the chairman
and other members to continue to improve the voting process.
And I will continue to seek full funding of the Election Assistance Commission
titles have grants to ensure
that the AC can continue is crucial work to improving the electoral process.
Even if one voter is disenfranchised.
That is one voter too many Thank you Mr Chairman thank the ranking member for
comments and I especially want to reinforce something your said.
Voting in this nation has traditionally been controlled and operated by the law.
You know. Cities townships counties and by the states.
The only reason the federal government
or this is because of the problems with the federal election of a president in two
thousand and.
We continue to have great respect for the localities
and the states which of the responsibility for implementation.
We are simply trying to stand.
Stover standards only for the federal gov actions as well as can do you have an
opening statement. Thank you Mr Chairman I am glad
that we are having this hearing today and delighted
that we're joined by our colleague Mr Holt the author of H.R.
Five five zero.
I am inclined to think that Mr Holt approach is the right one
but I have declined to be a co-author of this bill until this hearing because I
wanted to try and keep an open mind on the subject
and listen to the witnesses without being a co-author of the bill
but coming from Silicon Valley.
You can imagine
that I have had considerable input from people who are quite skilled
and I guess the question
that needs to be answered is can this election be hacked. There are many issues.
I'm sure we'll get into them today.
But the integrity of the election process is absolutely essential to the.
Sustenance of a vigorous democracy elections to count as we know
and the direction that our country is going in will be decided by elections
and if we if we can't know for certainty that
that process is not corrupted then it really goes to the core of the spirit of our
nation and in our future as a democracy.
So I realize we're not in a mark up mode here today we're here to get information.
I'm going to listen. Very carefully to all the witnesses but I'm hopeful
that we could take quick action because.
This my own state of California has already moved in the direction that.
Mr Holder is suggesting with a verifiable paper audit trail.
We need to be able to let the voters of America know
that this their elections are on the up and up and their vote really does count
and the election has not been hacked.
So with that Mr Chairman I thank you for holding this hearing
and I will yield back because I am eager to hear a very large panel of witnesses
before we are called to say thank you very much.
Thank you for a statement
and Mr whole statement will be entered into the record as we mentioned earlier.
And setting up the panel for this hearing.
I was determined to try to get the broadest representation possible.
I would have had to have twenty seven witnesses to totally accomplish that.
But the fact
that we have tried very hard as indicated by the large number of witnesses we do
have I'm very pleased with the quality of the witnesses who agreed to appear
and we now turn to Dr Felton for his testimony he is
a professor in the Department of Computer Science at Princeton University which
also happens to be Mr Holt's district.
He recently completed a study of an electronic voting system will give us a report
on his findings
and I also understand you have a demonstration for us doctor for you maybe.
You turn on the microphone please.
Thank you Mr Chairman
and members of the Committee for the opportunity to testify today Mr Chairman.
There's lights on that is there a way to yes.
Much better. Thank you. From a security standpoint what distinguishes computer.
Voting Systems from traditional systems is not
that computers are easier to compromise but
that the consequences of compromise can be so much more severe tampering with an
old fashioned ballot box can affect a few hundred votes at most.
But injecting a virus into a single computerized voting machine can potentially
affect an entire election two weeks ago my colleagues Ari Feldman
and Alex Halderman
and I released a detailed security analysis of this machine the default actually
vote TS which is used in Maryland Georgia and elsewhere.
My written testimony summarizes the findings of our study one main finding is
that the machines are susceptible to computer viruses
that spread from machine to machine
and silently transfer votes from one candidate to another such a virus requires
moderate computer programming skills to construct launching it requires access to a
single voting machine for as little as one minute.
I will now demonstrate this using a virus we constructed in our laboratory.
We've set up here a simulated election for president between George Washington
and Benedict Arnold it's Election Day morning and we just opened the polls.
No votes have been cast yet.
I'll start by casting the first vote
when I checked in at the polling place at the front desk.
The poll workers gave me this voter card which I now insert into the machine.
I press the Start button
and I choose to cast my vote for George Washington the machine asks me to confirm
my choice and I confirm my choice and cast my ballot.
The second vote is similar
and certain other voter card.
A choose George Washington again and again I confirm
and cast my ballot.
The third voter inserts another voter card.
And votes again for George Washington.
The correct vote counted this election obviously is George Washington three.
Benedict Arnold zero.
Now it's the close of Election Day a poll worker inserts a special supervisor card
into the machine.
Enters a pin code.
And tells the machine to end the election
and tally the votes.
The machine will now print out a paper tape summarizing the ballot count.
When I cast my vote earlier my choice of candidate was recorded in the machines
electronic memory.
This record of my vote was invisible to me I have I had no way of verifying whether
it was recorded correctly
or whether it was changed after it was recorded in this machine the records were
modified by or virus.
This paper tape printed out by the machine reports the elections results.
And it shows George Washington with one vote
and Benedict Arnold with two.
Every record in the machine.
And outside the machine is consistent with this fraudulent result our technical
report referenced in my written testimony goes into considerable detail about this
problem
and explains why existing election procedures are not sufficient to prevent it.
One lesson is that security depends on getting the technical details right.
Too often the designers of this machine fail to get the details right.
A good example. Is the access door here on the side of the machine.
It protects the removable memory card that stores the votes.
So the door should be locked securely
and access to the Keys should be strictly limited
but in fact tens of thousands of Accu Vote machines can all be opened with the very
same key and this very same key is used widely in office furniture juke boxes
and even hotel mini bar keys and even hotel mini bars.
It's easily purchased on the Internet this one I bought online from a jukebox
supply shop
and it does open the machine the implications of our study go beyond just this
machine
and reveal broader systemic problems more worrisome than any specific vulnerability
is that this system despite its many problems was certified purchased
and deployed by many states and counties
and has been used in Portland elections which we
can do more to improve the security of our evolving.
I detail many recommendations in my study and written testimony
but one important safeguard is a voter verified paper audit trail.
A well designed paper trail can improve security
and enhanced voter confidence without compromising accessibility certainly paper
records have their drawbacks.
But they have different failure modes than electronic records do
and the combination of electronic
and paper records together can be more robust against fraud than either one would
be alone getting the details of voting right is difficult especially in today's
high tech polling place but failure is not an option.
The stakes are too high and the risk of malfunction
or fraud too great to make our current course tenable in the long run election
experts accessibility experts
and computer security experts all have a role to play in improving our voting
system. If we work together we can solve this problem
and give the American people the voting system they deserve.
Thank you for your time and attention. Thank you very much for your testimony.
Our second witness is Gary Smith.
Mr Smith is the election director in Forsyth County Georgia Georgia uses a
paperless system statewide and for those who don't know what he stands for.
It's direct recording electronic computer.
Basically it's a type of a computer. We have displayed here.
Mr Smith uses a De Bolt system that was the subject of the Princeton study.
Mr Smith also participated in the recount of the Cuyahoga County primary
that was conducted on idea or a system with a paper audit trail.
Mr Smith you are recognized as well as as much money as Gary Smith I
reside in force that County Georgia is your microphone on. That better.
Yes we have an overflow room and people are very anxious to hear you.
All right well my name is Gary Smith as you match
and then I am the election director for Forsyth County Georgia county just north of
Atlanta.
It's quite a fast growing county we have about eighty thousand registered voters
and we are one of the top fastest growing counties the United States.
So we have a lot of issues
that we have to deal with all the time one of the things I think that's important.
Maybe is to look at the those of us as election directors how we come about.
I'm actually appointed through a selection committee that comes about.
We're a grand jury is brought forth.
They pick a panel of people who are at the background to be able to do this it's
then sent up to the chief superior court judge and then I am selected from
that I was selected from that process.
I'm in my second term as the director of elections it's a term of four years.
And it is a nonpartisan position. Prior to. Coming into this position.
I spent most of my time working in the private sector I retired I was running
various companies and I have worked most of my life in industrial automation.
So I have a technical background I have an undergraduate degree in electrical
engineering and I'm also a certified election registration ministry
or from a program that's ministered by all burned University.
As the director of elections one of the things
that I've been privileged to do is to be able to set on a task force.
Several of them one has been from the Georgia task force which allows me to be able
to participate and look at new processes and equipment
that we applied to elections in our county in our state.
In addition of
that I served on a national taskforce for election reform for two thousand
and four where we looked at all the processes across the country with regards to
elections.
In addition I think you just mentioned is I did lead the manual recount for the
Cuyahoga County the pat.
So I have some practical experience with that and I was happy to be able to do
that I did that.
Or spent a weekend as a matter of fact we have implemented the.
D.R. He's the one that you're looking at right here which is the divil T.S.U.
and
that In fact my my county one hundred fifty eight counties in Georgia implemented
this during the general election of two thousand
and two we have held from what I heard was the last count something like twenty
five hundred elections in our state.
In addition to that I've held elections on special elections primaries
and general elections runoff and just about any kind of election
and a minister of election as well.
So again we have a lot of experience with and one of the things that I've.
It has been talked about a lot
and I think we have to deal with is you know how do you look at these the security
and the integrity of this kind of equipment.
It starts with obviously with the vendor who builds equal amount goes through
the end dependent testing laboratories that then look at to make sure
that what we are receiving has the technical.
Wherewithal to be able to provide us with a piece of equipment
that really meets what our needs are.
Thirdly we have in our state which I'm very proud to talk about is the center for
election systems it's a program administered by councils State University
and Dr Brant Williams who's a well known authority in elections we do
all of our.
Creation or a ballot cards and that sort of thing through this group
and so it's a it's a nother level of testing that we have that goes on.
Lastly it's up to those of us who are election directors to hold these elections.
So I'm tasked with a lot of the things
that Mr Felton is talked about which is maintain the security
and integrity of the process that goes on in elections.
I guess word where the rubber meets the road as much as anything.
So those are that's our job.
I'm not going to go through all of the details with regards to certification
because it's certainly going to take a lot more than a few amounts
that I've got to talk about it but it is in my paper and I hope
that you will look at it.
I think where we pick it up is where we pick up the memory cards is this
developments mention that come to us from the Center for election systems.
The process of making sure that they come to us under the chain of custody.
Manner so that we know that there is at least more than one person
that has access to you know what we're talking about is they're looking at we go
through a process called let logic and accuracy testing this is
when the process that he has talked about goes through the fur.
We are taking the memory cards we are marrying
and essentially to the voting machine
and then we're taking them through the testing process.
At which time then we lock the machines up
and we pass them on to the next level which really is.
The the election poll worker himself
and what I'd like to do is to show you some of the chain of custody forms
and I think they're in front of you too if they're not I'm going to show you the
one actually that's coming. That's going to be go in there.
So it's OK.
You know it's as good as it can get up there
but I think most of you can probably see it.
And what I'm what I'm pointing out and it is is. The.
Is OK if I stand up. It's always a cure the microphone with you.
So all the people in the overflow crew room can hear you too.
OK. Can you hear me now.
Yes. All right.
I think what what is critical about this is
and I think this is one of the things maybe
that because we're doing it statewide we've had an awful lot of change good chances
to be able to. Work.
Processes out I think Mr Felt
and one of the things he said is you need to have a good chain of custody
and they say this actually is for the precinct big creek.
This is the actually an actual form that we're using it says here.
Item number one it's a it's a custodian certification form for the accurate.
TS units are going to be used under Point number two what I've got here is I've got
actually the touchscreen serial number which is you got a number in here it's
eleven six eight two seven then across here what you're looking at is are all of
the tests that we take individually to run on the machines.
This takes about fifteen minutes per machine to run.
It's a process is done under my direction.
And we actually have done this for five hundred machines for the upcoming election.
The next the next point.
That's important to look at is that there's a seal number that is right here
and that seal number.
What I'm going to show you is how it's carried forward to the process were
when we're holding the election at the precinct what happens with the next thing.
OK this machine that is sealed up. It has a wire serial number on it.
So there's no access to this machine once the logic
and accuracy testing is done now.
The next
and the next form I'm going to show you is right here this is a form then
that is carried forward to the precinct itself so that
when the poll workers the poll manager
and his assistant This is their responsibility. This is a form signed triplicate.
One she goes to the secretary of state one comes to me
and one goes to the Supreme Court.
You'll notice again it's for Precinct Big Creek zero one.
This is the recap sheet that goes with it.
Here again is the serial number if we look back before we would find that
that serial number is the same one is here.
Now.
I think this cooperation. And I think it's great.
Here is the serial number that then shows up on the comes
that is transferred from the original L N A testing.
Now what happens with it is we open up the machines we go through we can we do the
count number
and then at the end of the end of the election because this is the recap sheet.
The key part here is that there's another. Mechanical.
Low tech seal put on it.
It is a wired sealed so it's kept on there all the time and.
But that's the process that we go through I wanted you to be able to see that.
OK And I'm going to have to ask you to wrap up because we have a lot of witnesses
and a lot of discussion.
OK I'm sorry.
Yeah. Is that it.
You know I you know one of the other part I think
that we I want to talk about it and I think this has to do with the comments
that miss me wonder McDonnell said is what's the confidence that people have
that and I'd like to hear it at least respond to
that another time because we've done.
Surveys in our county to show that ninety nine percent of the people feel
that the process is an excellent process so there is a conflict high level of
confidence in our equipment.
All right we can defer that to the question period so thank you very much.
Thank you.
And as a reminder to those I should have mentioned before you have a little device
in front of you with the lights on it.
Green means go yellow means it's some up red manger in deep trouble.
So please keep an eye on the car. Next.
Please to recognize Ms Barbara Simmons past president of the Association for
Computing Machinery and she's done a lot of work on voting systems.
Dr Simons you are recognized. Thank you.
Good morning Mr Chairman members of the committee on behalf of the computing
professionals that constitute the Association for Computing Machinery.
I want to thank you for the opportunity to testify today about evolving system
security
and the need for voter verified paper trail secure reliable usable
and excess of all voting systems are critical towards ensuring transparent
fair and inclusive elections. These are not. Actually exclusive goals.
I shall discuss aspects of both security
and accessibility this morning first security.
Because of the risks of software bugs. Malicious code or computer failure.
We cannot trust
that the results in a paperless voting machine accurately reflect the will of the
voters. That is why voter verified paper ballots or audit trails
or the pads as we refer to them are needed the pads are automatically produced by
an optical scan system since the ballot is verified by the voter when he marks it.
Fortunately forty eight percent of counties have optical scan systems so they
already have the pads.
Optical scans can be used together with tactile ballots leaves
or accessible marking devices for excess ability.
Someday Ari's have been retrofitted to produce the paths to the.
In fact all of them for use in California is a Congresswoman Lofgren said.
Two years ago a C.M.
A leading Computer Society issued a statement calling for well engineered voting
machines that I will every voter to verify his
or her record has been accurately cast by the inspection of a physical E.G.
Paper records. At its two thousand and six.
National Convention the League of Women Voters passed a resolution calling for
voter verified paper ballots or records to be used for audit and recounts.
The league also urged that routine random audits be conducted in every election.
Both the A.C.N.
Statement
and the League resolution can be found in my written testimony in summary as a
defense against malicious or buggy software. We must have reliable.
Well engineered accessible via Pats.
Policies and Procedures
that guarantee the integrity of the paper records secure storage
and delivery of machines and so on.
Mandatory random manual audits of the Pats
and a full manual recount if discrepancies are uncovered unless there is evidence
that. The pads have been compromised.
On the discuss accessibility people's disability should be able to vote privately
in a dependently and be able to verify their votes.
However does not require the dear ease be used for accessibility.
There is evidence
that a number of people with disabilities are finding the theories are not meeting
their accessibility needs.
Charlie Pierce a nationally known advocate for the blind and visually impaired.
Review tactically the sternal controls spoken prompts visual display
or worker assistance following him controlling normalisation
and ballot review for four voting machines in his report for Cook County state
attorney's office. Pierce concluded
that if any one of the four machines were to be deployed in Chicago
or suburban Cook County.
Many voters with disabilities particularly blind voters would not be able to cast
about independently and privately.
Blind computer scientists know Runyan discussed his frustration with his hour long
voting experience in the two thousand and four presidential election and I quote.
It took me thirty minutes to work my way through the ballots and make my selection.
After
that I had quite a bit of trouble getting into the review MO to get a full list of
all my selections. When I did it went on
and on for twenty three minutes like a long uncontrolled drink from a fire hose
review function read each item and then at the very end.
Said my lecture selection was for that item.
It even threw in details of what the fiscal impact would be and took forever.
This is completely backwards. He went on to say.
In the time I signed in
and got my vote a smart card it took eight ministry bought the machine as an audio
voting machine thirty minutes to make my choices.
Twenty three ministry view and verify
and another four minutes to make a correction and record my vote.
Not counting the hour waiting in line.
It took me about sixty five minutes to Mark and record my ballot and quote.
We do not have to settle for inaccessible voting systems all technologies such as
text audio devices tactile ballots leaves and ballot marking
and generating systems could be combined with new to.
Knowledge is that make the entire voting
and verification process accessible while remaining auditable.
Technology engineers and tested success carefully
and if deployed the safeguards against failure can reduce error rate provide more
accessibility increase accountability and strengthen our voting system.
However the current state of evolving technologies leaves us far short of these
goals we need paper trails
and manual audits to protect us protect us against failures and attacks.
We need additional research to make voting machines more usable secure
and accessible. And we need to work together to achieve these goals.
Thank you thank you very much.
Next we turn to Mr Leask Cunningham who is the election director in Allen County
Ohio.
He serves on the board of advisors to the Election Assistance Commission
and also participated in the Cuyahoga County recount study performed by the
election science and says Mr Cunningham you are recognized Thank you Mr Chairman
and let me say what an honor.
It is for a guy from a small town in Ohio to be sitting here before you today in
this tremendous forum.
I am also the immediate past president of the Ohio Association of election
officials and I want to say to you before I begin when I wake up in the morning
and head for my job I I'm feeling pretty good about it.
I believe the job
that I'm involved in which is an election is director has meaning and has merit
and is doing things to make our country and our community better.
One thing I think we all agree on is
that electronic voting needs some type of verification system some component
that allows it to be audited. And of course all systems need that.
But as my predecessors have said hard ballot systems.
It's rather obvious how we audit those Personally I do not have any particular
aversion to voter fide voter verified paper audit trails.
However in Ohio the system is
that the voter verified paper audit trail becomes the official ballot of record for
recount purposes. I must say to you.
Clearly I am adamantly opposed based on the experience I've had in Cuyahoga County
to that I believe that program is setting election officials up for failure.
At this point in time. If the V.P.
That was to be extended to voters as a courtesy by which to check their votes I
have no problem with that of course I think statistics indicate
that voters don't even use it when it's available to them.
I think the the studies on hand show
that maybe less than ten percent of the people actually utilized that.
We looked at approximately three hundred fifty tapes in Cuyahoga County and over
and over and over.
We encountered tapes that were missing that were in some way compromised.
You have the numbers before you so I won't bore you with the statistics
but I think two of them are very important for you to remember.
Nearly seventeen percent of the V.
Pat tapes that were reviewed by that team and
that team consisted of a lot of Ohio election officials
that came in to help participate nearly seventeen percent of those tapes showed a
vote discrepancy of one to five votes from the electronic machine
and there Lee ten percent of those tapes were either destroyed blank missing tape
together or in some other way compromised.
And my point is this that the when you use the V.
Pad at this point in time as the official record of a reek of a recount.
It actually serves to disenfranchise the voter because votes are lost in the V.P.
that Process. They're simply not there and cannot be retrieved
and we could have retrieve those votes by other means from those machines
but in Ohio. We're not allowed to because the recount.
Official vote ballot of record in a recount becomes the V. Pat.
And so I would submit to you that it was the paper
that actually caused the count to be in question.
Additionally
and we have some photographs hard like to show you there is no reliable technology
for which to recount to be Pat's size credit they had a makeshift kind of real
crank thing that you could put the tapes in and reel them up.
This is kind of you know when these things are sort of like wrestling octopuses.
As you can see.
Let's go to the next when the next two
and some of my friends I want to make sure they go to this just kind of the the
scene there you can see the machine that.
You know I'll tell you what I equate this to were pretty agricultural in my part of
Ohio.
I equate this to planting several hundred acres of wheat with a million dollar planting
machine and going out and harvesting it by hand like the Amish used to
and stacking it up in the fields to go on please with.
A lot you know this was mind numbing to say the least to sit
and now keep in mind we went through three hundred and some tapes.
There were probably nearly four thousand tapes in Cuyahoga County.
This took us to ten hour days actually two
and a half was the first half a day it was setting a system continue please.
This is simply a tape with no record printed on it continue. Again please.
Same same thing.
This is the information that we're looking through on the tapes trying to.
And remember at least this is Ohio's rule that
when you recount a race you can't recount any other race.
You could only recount the race
that is going to be recounted So if you've got twenty seven candidates on the
ballot. You've got a real through all twenty seven to get to the race.
Maybe a down ballot race or something. Your county has gone.
Please with size and this is exactly the one that's taped together.
That's obviously been in the machine accordion.
Corti and up in the machine I don't know how many
that black line probably represents twenty or thirty votes. I don't know.
You know there was no way to reconcile that. One place.
There's another torn tape another shot of the crude machine we were using to do
this. You know I think they speak for their self themselves.
I honestly don't have any reason to believe the Aries don't record votes accurately
but I understand the concerns and I do believe
that we should have some kind of audit system for it. I would say to you.
Considering the size
and scope of the deployment of voting machines in the last twelve to twenty four
months in America. I think election officials have done a pretty darn good job.
We're working on improving it.
Unfortunately I believe and we'll wrap up here in just a second.
I believe it is the environment which is slowing our pace of improvement as a local
election official I'm going to tell you I feel like I'm in a crossfire
and I know many of my colleagues do and
that crossfire is a very very polluted conversation.
And it's being polluted with political interests and corporate interest
and scientific one upmanship
and I often wish I had as many people helping me find the solutions to these things
as I did identifying the problems for me it would make my job. An awful lot easier.
I want to echo the remarks earlier
that I do believe we should continue to fund Hava I think the underfunding of Hava
sends a very inconsistent message to those of us out there trying to do this on a
daily basis.
I would say to you also leave allow us to finish what has been started.
And what is in motion before we begin to tinker with this.
We have been given a set of tasks that are very very hard to manage and.
Again in scope of the deployment that has taken place in this country.
I don't want to say there weren't problems in it
but I think my colleagues have done a very good job.
And I would hope that in the future when we do begin to debate
and speak about this we can do it in honest
and direct terms without misrepresentations half truths
and focus on what it is we need to do to cure these problems
and make America's elections. Give people confidence in them and.
I think it's too far to expect too much to expect any less than that.
Thank you for your time appreciate it thank you. And we hear your cry for help.
Last namely leave us alone. Let us do it. But I also want to know.
You're not the only one who has crowds of people yelling at them for solutions
and offering no assistance where experience that every day of the week.
So you have our sympathy the next person I'm pleased to introduce James
Dickson vice president of government affairs for the American Association of People
with disabilities.
He's been a very strong advocate throughout this process of making certain
that anyone with disabilities is permitted to vote
and has a sanctity of the secret secret ballot which is essential to all of us
and essential to democracy. Mr Dixon you are recognized.
Thank you Chairman Ehlers member committee. I have two disabilities.
I have two disabilities.
I'm blind and I'm blunt
and in these five minutes I'm going to summarize some of the points in my
written testimony.
First I want to thank the members of Congress who passed to help
and I voted secretly
and independently for the first time two years ago for the second time just a month
ago. I cannot put into words.
Glorious feeling and a product
that I had as American.
And I'm speaking for tens of millions of other Americans who have
now the first opportunity to vote privately
and independently.
I've got a few stories to tell about the problems that I face.
And which millions of other voters face.
When not being able to vote privately or independently.
These happened to me but. Literally there are millions of stories like it.
The very first time I voted. The poll worker.
Said to me.
Loud enough for everybody in the polling place to hear you want to vote for who.
On another occasion I had a poll worker say to me. We're very busy.
Nobody votes for a state legislator in these other races so how about if we finish
now.
On another occasion I had a poll worker say to me.
These referenda are really confusing. Most people don't vote on them.
So why don't we start now on yet another occasion I had a poll worker say to me
this print on the referenda is too small I can't read it to you.
So we'd be finished.
That particular excuse did not get much sympathy from me.
Touchscreens.
The best existing product we have that offers accessibility to.
The greatest number of people.
I participated in the early work that was referenced by Kelly Pierce.
The rest of the story is
that after those initial tests the company was able to
in this inexpensively and quickly.
Make changes to the Access procedures so
that the problems were of them in need.
Touchscreens access is a continuum
and we need to have equipment designed so
that as access increases it can be cheaply efficiently
and quickly installed on the equipment touchscreens are the only product available
now that meets those requirements at a P.D.
We absolutely want. Secure accurate recount the bull.
Elections that are the systems that are accessible.
The paper trail is not accessible.
This is a California ballot three Try recount a leave for the committee
this is the row.
That was not able to be counted in Ohio.
Paper Trail is a rule Goldbrick contraption.
It doesn't work it's not accessible. You can't recount it.
It doesn't even off the verification not only to people not look at the
verification of the test done at MIT where the computers were set up so
that votes were changed. MIT students didn't.
Find the changed vote when they looked at the verification on paper
when the verification mean was done. Audio. Listening through earphones.
They found the change votes.
I want to sum up with the following three points things have to be accessible thank
you for making that stand and have.
The paper trail does not even
do what the proponents want.
And the proponents are a very small group who speak very loudly.
There have been over and over again.
Public opinion polls when voters use touch screens. They trust them.
Eighty percent eighty percent when they use them.
We shouldn't let a loud vocal minority using fear determine what's going to happen
in the sanctity of the polling place and the last point I want to make
and it is very very important is the real problems in our
voting system. Are human factors.
Human errors.
And before we order something to be done in the polling place.
We need money to research.
And document what the problems are
and we need to test proposed solutions in the reality of the polling place.
Not in a laboratory put me in an empty room with a ballot box full of
paper and I will have hacked into it in less than sixty seconds.
Thank you again.
This discussion is very important and I would just ask you to remember
that eighty percent of Americans who vote on touchscreens believe their vote is
secure. And accurate.
Thank you Mr Dixon and appreciate your comments of the.
Showing why it was so worth it for us to insist
that all individuals be able to cast their vote and say so. Thank you.
Next I'm pleased to introduce Michael Seamus is a professor of current Carnegie
Mellon University and is also the director of the Institute for software research.
Dr Seamus you are recognized.
Thank you Mr Chairman I just want to make a small correction to the record I'm not
the director of the Institute for softer research I'm just a member of the
Institute for software research.
But I'm also an attorney admitted to practice in Pennsylvania
and before the United States pad and Trademark Office.
Since one nine hundred eighty.
I've been an examiner of voting systems electronic voting systems for various
states. I'm currently an examiner for Pennsylvania
and I've personally performed one hundred eighteen voting system examinations.
I'm going to do my hundred nine hundred six emanation next week.
I recall that Mr Chairman. You're a physicist Representative Holt is a physicist.
I am a former physicist My proposal is
that we settle this issue like physicists based on scientific evidence
and not based on emotion.
I view electronic voting as primarily an engineering problem.
That includes the design of processes and procedures.
Once the requirements for a voting system are agreed upon.
It's not a matter of developing and manufacturing equipment and processes
that meet the requirements.
The question is whether Congress should be setting technical performance guidelines
and engineering standards as H.R. Five fifty would have it do.
Or whether such guidelines should be left to NIST
and the E A C as Hava has already provided the proposed bill is based on three
major assumptions all of which are false. First it assumes that paper.
Words are somehow more secure than electronic ones a proposition
that has been repeatedly shown to be wrong. Throughout history.
Second it assumes
that voting machines without voter verified paper trails are an audit to Bill
because their claims to be paperless which is also false.
They are neither paperless nor a nautical third it assumes
that paper trails actually solve the problems exhibited by D R E machines which is
likewise incorrect.
The reason
that mechanical voting machines were introduced over a century ago was to stop
rampant fraud involving paper ballots H.R.
Five fifty would restore us to the year eight hundred ninety
when anyone who wanted to tamper with an election needed to do no more than
manipulate pieces of paper the recent example.
In Cleveland Ohio comic Kiowa County is extremely instructive.
That was the case we would we just heard
that ten percent of the paper trails could not be read. H.R.
Five fifty provides that in the event of any inconsistency between electronic
and paper records the paper records are Iraq
but I believe presumed to be correct attorney such as myself are always wary of
your rebuttable presumption.
Applying
that provision to Cleveland would have resulted in the disenfranchisement of ten
percent of the electorate because their paper records could not be read.
I cannot believe
that the numerous sponsors of this legislation contemplated such an outcome.
I did a review of U.S.
Elections starting in the year eight hundred twenty four
when popular vote began to be kept
and I looked at the percentage of times if you took ten percent of the popular vote
and subtracted from the winner and gave it to the loser.
How often with the outcome change
and the answer isn't eight hundred twenty four fifty five percent of our
presidential elections would have been reversed if you couldn't count ten percent
of the paper trail. The argument is made
that security problems with D R E voting demand remediation of the type proposed in
the bill. Indeed Professor Felten at Princeton Hari her city and.
Others have done a great service by exposing security vulnerabilities in voting
systems. Some of these vulnerabilities are severe and require immediate repair
but the point is that they are easily remedied.
The question for the committee is what the proper response to such discoveries
ought to be. When tainted spinach was found in California.
Congress did not ban the eating or distribution of leafy vegetables.
Even though at least one human life had been lost the appropriate reaction to the
discovery of a security flaw in a voting system is to repair it not to outlaw an
entire category of voting machine with which we have a quarter century of
experience. It's claimed that observed reliability problems with V.R.E.
Machines would be alleviated by adding a paper trail the field experience has shown
the opposite the failure rate of paper trail D R E's is double
that of the areas without paper trails.
It should be obvious
that adding a new device with moving mechanical parts to an existing electronic
machine cannot improve its reliability. The effect of H.R.
Five fifty would be to ban electronic voting entirely in federal elections.
I want to repeat
that it would be to ban electronic voting entirely in federal elections.
The reason is that the bill sets forth conditions that are not met by any D.R.S.
System currently on the market in the United States.
If it were to pass in its present form.
There could be no more electronic voting in this country
and Congress would be in the position after having spent three billion dollars on
new voting equipment of spending billions more to replace what it just paid for.
I cannot believe
that the numerous sponsors of this legislation contemplated such an outcome.
Further the bill as written mandates a system that would violate constitutional
and statutory provisions in more than half the states.
The secret ballot is regarded as an essential component of American democracy.
Each one of the D.R.V.
Paper trail systems
that are currently on the market either enables voters to sell their votes
or allows the government
and the public to discover precisely how each voter in a jurisdiction has a vote.
I cannot believe that the numerous sponsors of this legislation contemplated
that outcome either.
I am in favor of voter verification the proposed bill despite incorporating the
phrase voter verified into its title does not come close to providing real voter
verification. While it shows the voter that her choices were properly understood
and recorded by the machine.
It offers no assurance whatsoever that her ballot was counted
that it ever will be counted or
that it will even be present in the event of a recall a recount is demanded.
Once the polls have closed the voter not only has no recourse or remedy.
But is powerless to even determine whether her vote is part of the final tally
or to object if she believes it isn't that is not voter verification.
Regardless how it may be denominated in the text of the bill.
I submit
that if Congress desires to enact a comprehensive statute mandating voter verification.
It ought to verify whether the proposed legislation actually accomplishes
that goal. Numerous effective verification methods are known
that are not based on vulnerable paper records these have not yet been implemented
in viable commercial systems.
I understand
that scientist at NIST will soon announce another one if H R five fifty isn't acted
there would be no point in continuing research
and development in the such system since the statute would prohibit any system
that didn't use paper records.
PROFESSOR RONALD Revestive MIT has recently invented a voting method
that allows each voter to verify after the election is over
that her vote has actually been counted.
A feature that is absent from the systems contemplated by H.R. Five fifty.
Professor of a system also allows any member of the public.
To tabulate the results of the election for herself.
So it's not even necessary to trust the official count these discoveries
demonstrate that voter verification is now a ripe area of scientific research
and it is far too early to mandate by statute a bad non-solution to a presumed
problem. My purpose here today is not simply to complain about the bill
but to offer constructive alternative. As part of my written testimony.
I've included a complete markup of the proposed legislation
that retains its essential positive features such as voter verification.
But eliminates its ill advised provisions.
I urge the committee not to report the bill favorably in its present form.
And I thank you for the opportunity to be here today. Thank you very testimony.
We will now turn to questions from the committee. And I will begin.
Myself five minutes for the purpose.
Dr Seamus and Terry just finished with you.
Let me pursue one comment you made I could pursue many
and I'm sure others will pursue.
But on the one the paper trails are no more accurate than any other method.
Let me ask if you would also include paper ballots which are then read by a
computer in that category.
Mr Chairman I don't think I actually made any comment about the accuracy of voting
systems I think I said that paper systems weren't secure.
As far as accuracy accuracy is a very poorly defined concept in voting systems
and extremely difficult to measure because we need to know in advance the voter's
intent before they go into the voting booth.
Then we need to see through the entire chain of custody of all the ballots at the
end whether the final tally really reflects how the voters intended to vote.
That's nearly unmeasurable except in small laboratory experiments.
So I actually haven't made a comment about accuracy.
In general your comments about paper trails to those of also applies to paper
ballots that are then scandal like trying to clean.
Paper ballots there are scandal at tronic we are certainly subject to the same
kinds of tampering fact it's easier in general to tamper with those because they're
cut sheets of paper their individual individual pieces of paper.
There are all sorts of problems with with optical scan voting
but it's certainly acceptable as. As a method of voting.
We we use it in Pennsylvania. It's used in widespread use around the country.
Let me just explain that one little bit.
In terms of recounting for.
In the case someone demands a recount in the paper ballot.
A good reliable for a method of recounting simply because the voters themselves.
Have marked that particular piece of paper.
No the problem is that once the voter has marked the ballot and verified
that the ballot is marked the way she wants she has no assurance
that by the time the recount occurs
that same piece of paper is going to be in the hands of the re counters.
LOFGREN from Silicon Valley might recall that in the two thousand
and four election in San Francisco three weeks after the election ballot boxes were
found floating in San Francisco Bay with ballots in
and so we have not solved the problem security of paper ballots in a widely
distributed voting system
that we have in the United States with a couple of hundred thousand precincts.
Thank you. I didn't realize we had since L.B.J. Election and.
Tammany Hall Prendergast. Thank you.
And quickly turning to Mr I'm interested in your comments how easily
could one access the voting machine and insert a virus with a comment
and how long does it take to actually get the virus in place would someone need to
access the machine for an appreciable amount of time or something that a voter
and of in a voting booth could do it takes about one minute of access to the
machine. And I could show you. Roughly what would be involved. It would involve.
Opening the door on the side of the machine which would require getting a key as I
said those are for sale on the internet there may be some security tape
that would need to be removed and might be missing already. Opening up.
Store putting in a memory card like this. Into the side of the machine.
The memory card would have been prepared in advance with the computer virus on it
then pressing the red power button and waiting about thirty seconds.
And afterward closing everything up and putting it back.
This is something
that would be unlikely to be doable by a voter in the in the polling place.
But if the machine is not if the machine is not guarded with very careful chain of
custody throughout its life cycle.
It can be available to that in my polling place in Princeton the D.R.V.
Machines sit on attended over night the night before the election in a locked
school lobby
and how long would it take someone to to actually get access to the machine to
figure. Or to write the program.
If it requires some information about how the machine works.
This is not a Manhattan Project.
It requires a moderate level of skill in computer programming
and some limited knowledge probably the knowledge that has.
That in this case
that had leaked from the vendor to the internet a few years ago would be nearly
enough and I think
that an unscrupulous person would not have difficulty getting the necessary
information.
So from the time you started looking at the machine to devise the virus were what
sort of timers
and we got the machine in May At first we spent a lot of time taking it apart to
understand everything we could about how it worked.
We were interested not only in whether a virus would be possible
but we really wanted to understand all of the security mechanisms
and we wanted to treat it very carefully from the time we started developing virus
code until we had a working virus. Perhaps a few weeks.
Thank you very much my time has expired.
I'm pleased to recognize my ranking member. Thank you. Nobody from California.
Thank you so much as Chairman
and thank you again for this very interesting hearing.
One thing I want to say about my friends in the Senate.
They have a bill out now saying
that every polling place should have a large supply of emergency paper ballots.
That can be used in emergency situations.
That's just hair poor we are that's what we think about voting now in this country
of ours. And so Senator Dodd and Senator Boxer and others have to submit this bill.
But I have also I have said all along that there is a security issue here.
There's an issue that we must a trust issue
that we must come to bear with in terms of voters.
Mr Felt and spoke about when there are
when there are consequences there are compromises
or compromise consequences bring compromises
and I want him to expound a little bit on that.
And he also said
that existing election procedures are not adequate for elections I want you to
expound on that too sir. And tell me.
If Mr Dixon feels that paper trail.
A paper trail is not adequate expression only for disability.
Then you are suggesting Mr Felton that paper trails do cut down on voter fraud.
So you know we have some imbalance here if you can just speak to
that for me on those issues. Yes Thank you.
The first for the first if you had to do with the consequences of.
Of compromise being worse an electronic system.
And in the example that we gave here.
There is a computer virus
that will spread itself from one voting machine to others
and the consequence is that if someone is able to compromise one machine.
The virus can spread to many machines
and potentially affect all the votes on all of those machines as compared to.
Fraud with an old.
Fashioned ballot box where access to a ballot box only allows someone to tamper
with the votes that are in that ballot box or maybe increase them by some amount
but what access to one cannot involve stealing tens of thousands of votes as with
an electronic system but this virus as you say can pass from one machine
or a one voter to the other I think use data that.
How can that be when I'm told
that manufacturers do not give out this so-called code a secure code that they use.
How can that then be done with that.
Well the way that the virus was the way
that this virus spreads is on these memory cards the memory cards are programmed
before an election usually at a central location in the programmed with the list of
races and the list of candidates and so on for that election
and then they're distributed out to the polling places
and put into the voting machines. That's a possible.
That's a possible motive travel of the virus if the virus gets onto a memory card
at that central location.
It will then be installed out into the voting machine after the election.
The memory cards go in the opposite direction to carry the votes back to the county
clerk or board of elections office to tabulate them.
And that's that allows the virus to go in the other direction.
So a virus in one machine may hitch a ride on a memory card after an election back
to the election headquarters and then potentially.
SPREAD THEIR on to many other cards which are then distributed say for the next
election.
This is much like the process by which older computer viruses spread on floppy
disks. If you put an infected floppy disk into your P.C. Your P.C.
Would catch the virus and then it would spread to any other disk
that you put into your into your machine.
So it hitches a ride opportunistically on top of the the flow of these memory cards
that happens in running an election normally.
How do we answer Mr Dixon's the whole notion that paper trail leads are not.
Except old to the disabled and yet you say cut down on voter fraud.
Yes I do believe it cuts down on voter fraud and I do believe that is
that a paper trail well designed can be just as accessible.
Mr Dixon held up the role of paper and pointed out that he could not view that
or verify it or audit it but the Deore system
that he is advocating stores his votes on this with which neither he
nor anyone else can simply look at and read the problem with these D.I.R.
Eased
and the security problem is exactly the thing Mr Dixon is complaining about the
inability of any voter to look at the machine
and see their vote recorded a so I don't believe
that there's a conflict between the use of a paper trail and accessibility.
There are just so many questions
that I have just put all over the place here I am.
The whole notion Mr Cunningham
that you spoke of an icy mind my red light is on already.
That's what I'm saying it's just so much
and so little time to talk with the second I have a second to go back.
So I can run a second round. OK then my second round.
I'll come back to you Mr Cunningham
and Mr Shaw Shamas because I do want to talk with you. Thank you Mr Chairman.
Thank you.
Chair recognizes Mr Brady the gentleman from Pennsylvania think it was the chair Mr
Craig generously to. The point of inquiry Well Mr Hope have a chance to speak.
We have a chance to speak is not given the unanimous consent will Mr.
Well I'm just I don't think voting is a science.
I think it's a people person thing I think it's a I think it's a human thing
and I think
that anything we do here no matter what it may be can be attacked can be hacked
into can be verified can be ballots boxes can be put in.
River could not be shown
but I think we're trying to do is try to eliminate as best as most as possible.
All these things that can possibly go wrong
and I don't understand why a receipt because that's what I look as a paper ballot
as a receipt. Why when you vote and you get your receipt.
And you have that and you see what you voted for and if you don't have
that then you could if you don't have
that then you can lodge some type of protest somewhere.
If you have no receipt you think you vote and you don't know
and it's up to now whatever tabulation or whatever machine or mechanical
or scientific tabulation happens and on the stand.
Why there would be a problem for anybody you know having a receipt
and missed a shame if you are in my state and you have you have. You have.
Inspected many many times the voting machines and
and from what I understand you had said
that Alicia's hacker could easily make the same switch allowing Bush to be changed
from one vote to thousands of votes then if that's the case why are these just
think the system is not reliable and if that's the case.
What would be the problem would have verified paper trail.
If I come in a vote and I want to vote for you and I get my paper
and I says I didn't vote for you.
I can logic your plate right then and there if I walk out of it with nothing.
I don't know who actually voted for one of many hands or that machine that hacker
or anybody could probably get in a vial of the voting process.
So I don't understand why this should be should be a problem
and even in the matter WHAT we do is still going to be a human.
Human Factor somewhere someplace somehow police a voter has the confidence
that he has a or she has a piece of paper stating
that yes I did vote yes if I voted for and if there was a mistake.
They may have a chance to rectify right there that's my only point you know back
about for my time. Thank you Mr Jim.
Any answers for incumbents anyone.
Well I can say Mr Shamus Yes.
So it's certainly true
that if a malicious hacker is able to gain access to a voting machine
and replace the software that's in there.
In such a way that that change is not detected. Then there are severe problems.
And that's what I say when we have to when we find security vulnerabilities.
We have to find ways of plugging them. For example the vulnerability discovered by.
Professor Felton's group at Princeton was known to us in Pennsylvania back in March
right before our May primary
and we were forced to make an emergency remediation in Pennsylvania.
To blunt the effect of
that discovered vulnerability because we wanted to be able to assure county
election officials and voters that an intrusion of the kind
that was demonstrated here today was not possible or if it had happened.
The effect of it would have been reversed.
And so we remediated that we also instructed the vendor.
That the next time it comes back for certification it better have a remediation of
its own so that we don't have to impose administrative procedures to make sure
that that vulnerability can't be exploited.
So I'm not minimizing the possibility
that people are out there trying to hack things.
My point is
that the response to the hack is not to throw the machines in the ocean
and go back to what we were doing in eight hundred ninety there.
If it's a technological problem we have a technological solution.
With respect to the receipt.
A lot of people think of the word receipt as meaning something
that the voter can take home with them.
And look at it later at their leisure and show up.
Maybe at some later time to an election official
and say See this is really how I voted.
It's not legal to give receipts of
that kind because they could you can't give a voter anything
that they could use to prove how they voted since they could then sell their vote.
So the receipts
that we're talking about in these voter verified paper trail systems the voter has
a chance to view the receipt on the machine and then.
Yes that truly represents my vote or not.
And then
when they leave the polling place they don't have a piece of paper to take with
them and my point. The point that I made in my earlier testimony was that.
It's nice enough to show the voter that their vote was properly recorded.
But again there's no assurance
that at the time the votes are actually tallied later or recount is done that
that piece of paper is even around has been replaced by something else
and there are people who are working on the solution to that problem
and we're not there yet.
I mean you're talking about voting you're talking about people
manipulating.
That they may
or may not just know you've become a human factor if the human factor to some of
these hell bent on trying to rig an election.
We're talking about we're talking about voter confidence.
That's what I'm talking about and I'm not on whether we should you take home
and say this is what I I want to change my vote
or I made a mistake which people do make a mistake if you make mistakes.
You make a mistake you can rectify.
That but I'm saying you're saying look you see that.
OK here's my vote for this is what I want to do push the OK button push the button
whatever closed. What was the curtain that you. And I that's all I'm saying.
If I told you that
that mechanism could be used to discover how every voter in the precinct voted it
might change your mind.
OK I learned the people with this electronic scientific
can show me anything I ever did in my entire life.
So this is my make
an interesting episode quickly in memory if I just wanted to comment briefly on
this whole paper issue because I think we're comparing apples and oranges.
One of the basic issues is how well engineered these systems are as somebody who
was advocating for voter verified paper audit trails early on before the machines
were read. Well fitted.
I have to say I was appalled by what the voting machine companies came out with
they are bad. I mean Mr Cunningham is right this is Jim Dixon is right.
These continuous rolls of thermal printed paper have privacy issues as Michael
Shamus says but they're badly engineered it's bad technology.
There's no reason why people has to be paper. Why V.
Pads have to be designed that way they were the cheapest way to do it.
That was why it was done that way.
I mean banks deal with paper all the time they manage to count it
and I don't think they make many counting mistakes other countries vote on paper
and they don't have problems we can do it too but we have to do it right.
If you do it wrong.
It will fail then for the last quick word Mr Dixon.
Chairman Ehlers I wanted to respond to your question about counting optical scan
ballots by machines we have a lot of experience in this country with that.
When you have large numbers of ballots hundreds of thousands.
And you've got a close race every time the obstacles
and ballots have been counted. You get a different number.
You get a different number we do not have the technology
to accurately count the large pieces of paper.
All right thank you very much.
Next The chair recognizes and gentleman from California.
Ms love going for a five minute Ehrman I. This is a very helpful. Hearing and.
As I've listened and it seems to me
that the point made by Miss Simmons needs to be emphasized the fact
that we have a dysfunctional role doesn't mean that that's the only old.
And of available as as it ought of the ball. Trail.
You know I spent more years on the board of supervisors in Santa Clara County than
I have so far.
In Congress
and in California the counties are the repository of the registrar of voters in
California the registrar of voters is a civil service position I mean it's very
nerdish I guess is the best word you can say in Silicon Valley
and very apolitical.
And it wasn't really until I got on the board of supervisors
that I realized I guess I've never really thought about it
that some of the votes get lost.
People don't think about that
but the we had a little punch cards for a long time
and it would jam up the machines election night in and some of the ones
that got mangled didn't get caught and it didn't ever at a time
when the country was less closely divided than it is today.
It didn't nobody really noticed because elections weren't that close
but of course now we have close elections all the time
and we're paying more attention to it and so I do think
that we need to make sure you can't have a perfect system.
I suspect but
but we need to have a system where people do not question the integrity of it.
I remember going in with a computer scientist in my district who
really said this. Yes you can make a mistake.
I mean you can take a ballot box and throw it out
but the difference with packing a machine is
that it's all it's not random the direction in which those votes are going to be
lost and so I'm very enticed by Mr Holt's bill I would note
that in standard setting there's been discussion
that this would eliminate the privacy of individuals
but on page three line thirteen of his vote. It's perspective five says to comply.
With the act that would not be permissible.
So I think you know part of what we do here in Congress is this is to set standards
and laws that need to be met just business does from an engineering point of view.
I'm wondering. Mr Felton.
Mr Seamus said something to the fact
that you could verify other than by paper means I don't want to misquote you I
think was something to that effect. How would you do that.
With the virus that your lab created how would you do a verification without.
Would there be a way. Well.
I think that the idea of non paper verification is something that's not ready yet.
It's an active area of research.
Mr Seamus referred to Professor vest work which by the way is a is a an all paper
system.
The and that is an interesting proposal
but I would not want to trust an election to it tomorrow.
I think that years from now we may be in a position to have effective
and usable non paper based verification systems
but I don't believe they're ready yet.
And I and I don't think we can afford to wait this Seamus.
Your testimony has been very interesting in thank you for your advocacy in your
work on assuring systems.
One of the things that you've suggested that we need to make sure
that vulnerabilities are protected against and no one would disagree with that
but one of things I learned in my prior life on in local government was
that elections are kind of not chaotic
but they're they're not they're not they're chaotic.
I mean you've got you know P.T.A.
Mothers and you've got volunteers and there's schools
and it's really I love Election Day but it's not.
Really a tightly controlled
and cannot be because that's not the way Americans hold elections unless we
completely fund this
and have full time paid people I don't think we're moving in that direction.
So how would we be able even if we found this virus I know from
Silicon Valley I mean there's a million ways to hack this stuff.
How do you given the fact
that we have this chaotic system we have smart hackers everywhere.
How do you protect against those vulnerabilities in your judgment.
OK So there are several ways.
One is
that we're never going to achieve perfection we're never going to locate all vulnerabilities
of existence systems because we don't know how clever people may be in the future
to get around the protections that we've built in
but this is true not just in voting systems in every kind of system that's ever
been made there are there later discovered vulnerabilities.
So as I said in my testimony I'm in favor of voter verification voter verification
is a way of assuring that if if.
A vulnerability has been exploited that we're going to know about it.
I think you just asked about a potential non paper mechanism for verification.
I'll give you a very simple one that the TS unit over there has a touch screen
that shows things to the voter. The voter is not positive.
However that the marks that she makes
that are visible on the screen are actually getting recorded by the machine.
So all we have to do is have a second screen made by a different manufacturer.
And we take an electrical wire
and we get a copy of whatever is on the first screen to the second screen
and we attach a digital camera to that.
So it actually makes a record of what the screen showed.
And of the voter has any doubt that it's been recorded correctly.
She can press a button that says replay and it'll show
or her vote again on the screen. And that vote gets recorded on a CD or D.V.D.
and A right one smacked mechanism. So it can't be tampered with later.
That's just a trivial example of a non paper verification mechanism.
The second way of doing it is through something called parallel testing which is
used in at least ten counties in California.
It's going to be used in Massachusetts in November
and several other states where you sequester a machine
or machines during the election during the actual time of the election
and you have a team of people vote on them simulating the way real voters would
vote.
Except
that they vote according to a predefined script so we know what the total should be
at the end.
Then at the close of polls we close that machine and we see if the totals match
and if they don't match then we know that there is a rat somewhere
and we do a forensic examination to find out where the rat is.
The gentleman's time has expired. Please to recognized or just.
For five minutes.
I thank the chairman and I am pleased to see that we are holding.
You are holding this hearing and I welcome the opportunity to be with you
and I regret
that the hearing has been held the day before our target adjournment for the year
but. Nevertheless I think you put together a good panel of witnesses.
Let me just make.
Two quick comments one is how if I had the and and anticipated.
Effect of motivating jurisdictions to go out
and buy devices for voting that are clear simple accessible easy to use
and totally on verifiable and it may be
that there are various future methods of verifying.
That would be
that are not yet thought of her not yet developed but right now we have a.
A method of verifying where each voter can verify her vote at the time of voting
and that is a paper trail and I do think it can be made.
Accessible for voters for all voters.
Mr Seamus just described a rather Rube Goldberg issue.
C.C.D. Camera that was going to photograph another screen.
The paper record sounds a whole lot easier to me. But anyway.
Let me first go to to Mr Felton Professor Felten
how detectable would the virus that you devised or
that someone might devise be before during and after the election.
And let me ask another question.
I don't know whether you're familiar enough with the kind of.
Of chain of custody and other checklists that Mr Smith puts his machine through.
Do you think a virus could be implanted.
In a system that had the kinds of protections that Mr Smith.
Describes first the question of how detectable this would be there is
there is a long established cat and mouse game in the P.C.
World between virus writers and antivirus companies
and the virus writers have proven very successful at making viruses
that are quite difficult to find especially in advance and I would expect or.
I suppose fear that we would see the same phenomenon here.
We did not try to make this virus a stealthy as we could.
But but I think that if if if someone used the same methods
that are used in the P.C.
World to make viruses hide it would be very difficult indeed to find in advance
pre-election logic
and accuracy testing as has been discussed here will not you will not find device.
That we devised because it simply.
Checks whether whether the machine is in logic and accuracy testing mode
or real election mode and if it's a logic
and accuracy testing though the virus simply lies low.
So I think it might be quite difficult to find
and I certainly would not have confidence
that if it were implanted it could be found.
The second part of your question related to the procedures that Mr Smith described.
And I think those sorts of procedures are very valuable.
They do help to close the gap to close the window of vulnerability.
But we also have to recognize that procedures.
Are not perfect and are not always followed.
Like any other part of our election system there will be gaps there will be errors
and I still worry despite the best of procedures
that the window of vulnerability opens enough
that a determined adversary can get through it. Thank you.
Mr Shane.
Yes Mr Smith.
If there will be another round of questions I'll be happy
and I would like to respond
that out of the think it's comes to the core of what we're really trying to talk
about.
I'd listen to the you know the situation with regards I'm the only one here by the
way that uses Deeble TS units
and I'm the only election director I guess on the panel
that does one of the things that I've been listening to
and concerned about is how this virus would spread.
I am an engineer by background I'd hold a double a degree.
So I have some kind of technical capability and that.
First of all if you took one and you corrupted one of the I.C. Your memory card.
Would get if you took and you. Corrupted this memory card.
It's going to go into one machine.
OK and that one machine
and my county is probably going to vote between one hundred one hundred fifty votes
that's all it's going to be counted on.
So the issue comes in is this card supposedly the hand is going to be corrupted.
OK we'll lose one hundred votes.
That's not good but it's not like we're losing fifty thousand votes
that I have cast in a general election and the last one in two thousand and four.
Now this comes out it goes back to
that end of the process as Mr Felton has said it's only going to corrupt one more
machine. The machines are not interconnected.
There is not a possibility of corrupting the five hundred machines
that I'm going to put in place for the two thousand and six general election
that is a you know an issue is a tactic is not going to happen.
Now there are a lot of other things that we do.
I mean we we have a lot of security in place we follow
but I'm very anal about those types of things
and I've talked to Mr Felton about it and I think that he believes
that in our county we have a good thing.
The last thing as I'd like to to respond to this the lender McDonald said I think
this was even as important as anything is that the confidence
that people have in our equipment is very important.
I mean I I couldn't say anything more we taken after every election
we hand out a response card.
Given out randomly to our people we say you know what do you think about the
process. You want to have whatever. And I've got in front of you.
Prius not a technical you know survey of the type
but there are seven hundred fifteen responses you can see the names you can see
when they the precincts you can see the election was held for in addition you can
see their comments ninety nine point five percent of the people
that responded to these things in my county. Said we did an excellent job.
There was only two people. Only two the requested a paper trail.
So I think we're doing a good job and Forsyth County Georgia.
I think we're doing an excellent job and in the tire state of Georgia
and I think that we need to be.
I don't want to say recognize work
but hopefully don't don't impose things on us which are going to make our job much
harder to do but I also tell you
that I agree with Mr Felt with regards to having you know. Verification.
But I believe that we do not need to limit it to paper.
My time is expired I hope Mr Felton will get a chance to reply because on my visit
to his laboratory.
It was my understanding
that the message of spreading the virus is different than Mr Smith seems to
understand. Very quickly. Could you give a brief response.
Well. Without getting into a long technical debate.
Let me just say that when this memory card goes back to the central facility
and is put into a so-called accumulator machine which adds up the votes if
that accumulator machine becomes infected.
It can then in fact a very large number of other memory cards
that are subsequently put into it. And it acts is as a.
As is a very very serious carrier of the of the virus.
Thank you. Just an announcement to my colleagues received a note
that votes are expected between twelve and twelve fifteen.
I would like to have a second round of questions let me suggest
that each of us tries to limit ourselves to three minutes.
And I will begin.
Then recognize minority leader of the ranking member.
Mr Little presumably will be settled in by then ready with his question.
Let me.
We were just talking to Mr Smith
and I was wondering this is what kind of system to Georgia have before
it adopted the electronic system. Why do.
They see the need to change to the current system
and what were some of the problems you experience with the previous system
basically is a new system better than the previous one.
OK I think I can respond to that.
Fortunately I took over as director of elections prior to the introduction of the
evil Deore machines we had at
that point in time the punch card machines by the way I would say
that the security level that we had on punch cards was pretty miserable now
and I've gone through
and listen to all of the you know the technique Oh dissertations have gone on our
punch card machines were monitored by a computer as well that computer said
and I it was an I.B.M.
Three eighty six or something like that is sad and I clause it that we kept
and in fact they downloaded software to it routinely you know over the telephone
lines. I would say that was highly and secure and I was and I was mortified at
that when I thought.
The changes made changes
that we had six months prior to the two thousand and two election.
DB old machines were introduced into Georgia.
We had six months in which to take this across the entire state
and I would say the secretary of state
and the Center for election systems from Kansas all State University did an
outstanding job. I tell you I personally I used to run major computer projects.
I didn't think they could do it. They did an outstanding job and we've done it.
We have continued to hold elections
and people are very pleased with them in our state. Are their problems.
I think some of the things
that miss them a lender McDonald brought up with regards to training poll workers
were very valid and I appreciate the fact that she's going to continue to fund it.
I would like to ask her if she would fund the program.
Also So that is part and parcel of a program
that I have introduced which is called foresight first vote
but we also use high school students. To do it.
One third of all of my poll workers are students.
We've changed the entire complection of the people in our county.
Maybe that's why we're running good elections I don't know
but I've got poll workers
that we turn away because we have a very good program I'm very pleased with it.
Thank you thank you very much.
And briefly Mr Cunningham You mentioned you grew up in a small town in Ohio were
spent my high school years
and even smaller town I'm sure better known as salary ville.
Population two hundred.
So we have a question for you about the.
Technology of the printing paper trail technology it's relatively new You've
described the problem is that even countered with that in Ohio.
Do you believe improvement could be made to the printer technology to to make it
more reliable to capture to vote totals to avoid the problems they had
and then with the added complexity they bring to the system always increase the
likelihood of failure or do you think that through sufficient risk research
and study we could make them more reliable.
Well thank you Mr Chairman I have a personal motto I never buy the first model of
anything.
I always let other people figure out what the problems are before I buy it
and that's what I think we're in here as we are in the I think the fact of the
matter is when the Help America Vote Act was passed.
Most of the touch screen voting machines were by and large prototypes.
And rushed in to manufacture.
I'm not taking any issue with any of the manufacturers
and I'm not making a comment on the reliability of their machines
but I think what we've got on our hands here is the Model T.
Ford we are in the early stages. Now can they be improved.
Absolutely and I think throughout my comments I was very definite to say
that these machines as they currently set. Not reliable.
My question back to you though in
that regard is who's going to pay to fix it because right now one of the problems
we have right now is in the last twenty four months every election jurisdiction in
this country has spent the three billion dollars We spoke about earlier on new
election equipment and that's what's emplace so.
Without somebody stepping forward to fund that
that enterprise I don't know how we're going to improve them ourselves.
And if I could offer
and I like in running an election to throw in a package of Bibi's on your kitchen
table and while somebody is on each leg moving the table.
You're trying to keep them all on the table all day long.
That's that's why analogy of elections. Thank you for that discouraging about.
Well that's that's why I'm actually recognize the ranking member for five
minutes. Thank you Mr Chairman
and let me again thank you so much for this hearing this has been just absolutely
the most informative hearing
that one of the great ones we've had is to counting him.
I thank you for saying that we all agree
that some type of verification system is needed
and at least we have a consensus here for that.
But you did speak of the fact
that you are adamantly opposed to any program such as yours in your state.
Which makes the pact the official ballot of record for recount.
What did you do if I'm not mistaken Ohio lost ten thousand ballots
and what happened here. Given
that you were unable to recount because you can't reprint am I correct on that.
I'm not I mean in Ohio.
What election are you talking about it was my understanding
that there were ten thousand votes
that were unable to be recounted because you're unable to reprint it in the sigh.
Yes and we partner Well ten percent of the v Pats.
Counted forget what the numbers were exactly.
I believe the statement that I made it is and is
that nearly ten percent of the tapes are either destroyed blank missing tape
together or otherwise compromised in some way.
I don't I don't think that it would be correctly mathematically to say
that it was ten percent of the votes by say ten percent of the V.
Pat tapes based on what we reviewed had some kind of compromise
that made it very difficult to ascertain what the real numbers were
but to make a valid point that because of the V.
PAC one is unable to reprint therefore voters will be unable to discern whether
or not their vote counted in an election am I correct on that I'm sorry repeat
that I am I correct in saying
that because the packed.
It's official ballot of records for recount purposes.
That if you should need a recount.
You cannot go to a reprint discern whether those votes that are exactly right.
And I would submit to you that to reconcile
and verify vote totals on an electronic machine.
There are better ways to do it
and more controlled environments than the Election Day environment
that I just mentioned in Unst For instance
when the machine is back in the office and other records that are stored in
that machine can be printed and otherwise looked at electronically.
You know we work every day on this try.
I mean that that is my job is to try
and reconcile those numbers at the end of the day
but trying to maintain this contemporaneous record in the current state
that it's in. And I think we've.
I'm just saying is it's never going to match
and it's only going to fuel this this fire.
That voting systems don't work
and I think Ohio has set itself in a very very dangerous situation.
If I may just go along with
that I know there has been a little talk here about we're only concerned with
federal elections.
You know the least frequent election I run is a federal election.
So we need to be very careful that one of the problems
that has occurred since the passage of Hava was it put many state rules
and regulations in conflict with the federal law. Absolutely.
What we ended up with was these rules apply in a federal election
and these rules apply to local election. That's a terrible situation.
We cannot operate this enterprise with two sets of standards so I couldn't agree
with you more please do not think in terms of only federal elections because it is
a very problematic proposition because you know what sir in a given election.
You have three different laws that you perhaps might have to implement.
Local charters state and federal
and you know my hat's off to all of you local elected ones who have to balance
and balances between.
The Trenches it is it is just really problematic.
Mr Man's let you close me down.
Because I wanted to go to this Seamus
but I just have second here for you to come in.
I wanted to remind the panelists of what happened in Qatar at counting North
Carolina. I believe it was zero four where paperless D.R.S.
Were used
and over four thousand votes we lost I mean there's this concern about being able
to reprint paper ballots or paper v pads
when you lose votes in a Deore which has no paper.
There is nothing you can do and in fact there was an election.
For the statewide election for agricultural commissioner.
Where the separation between the two candidates.
Was such that the results could have been reversed by those missing votes
and it went to court it went to two different courts where they first tried to hold
a recount just for card for the county itself
that was thrown out then it went to four statewide recount and
that was thrown out because we had no laws to deal with what happens
when the armies fail. And finally there were a number of people who submitted.
Subpoenas petitions say they had voted for one of the candidates
and based on those submissions.
It looked like the judge was going to declare that candidate the winner and so
that was how the election was decided this is not a way to hold elections in this
country and this is a problem with the Auris No Matt paperless D.-R. Ease.
This is a case of a failure but there are many other problems too.
We haven't even touched upon security problems such as for example the risk of of
somebody.
Malicious getting a job for the vendor
or for the delivery service of some implanted.
Malicious code that way we know that all software is buggy.
We don't know for example if elections have been wrongly recorded because of buggy
software forget malicious code so.
So there are so many basic problems that we just have no way of verifying
that elections
that were held on people's voting machines we cannot verify them at this point.
They Juncker many times.
Why the average voter now is so they fold over elections.
And most of us are average voters.
So the trick is to recognize the gentleman from California must do a little for
five minutes to Chairman.
Mr Simmons your written statement said quote unless there is evidence
that the the V P B S have been compromised the paper ballots should
be used to determine the election results.
And I want to ask what sort of evidence of.
Compromise where you refer and well obviously if you have the kind of mess
that Mr Cunningham talked about that that would raise a lot of concerns I mean
when you don't have all of the V.P.
Pads and I I share his concern about that kind of technology
and I think we just have to remember that that's not the way the Pats or the P.B.S.
Have to be done. We need to have good engineering.
We need to have high standards
and we have to hold vendors to high standards they should not be allowed to produce
machines that can create this kind of mess.
Well they are machines and I notice that machines occasionally make messes.
Well but you know you. Sometimes you get what you pay for.
We know I mean you can buy printers that don't jam.
You can buy printers
that the don't have privacy issues they're the me this is not rocket science.
These things exist now these technologies exist now and I think a question
that we have to ask ourselves is how much are we willing to pay for our democracy.
Do you know how many I really have like
and our republic I think yes.
Now I apologize because I should have been here
and I just I couldn't be here earlier so I missed the direct testimony
but I think Mr Cunningham is from Allen County right but there was a.
There was an incident in Cuyahoga County.
Where there was a problem. I just wondered if you could tell us.
Miss Sims do you think
that the the seven it's a compromise is revealed in the higher Cuyahoga recount sir
that's what I was referring to.
Oh OK All right well do you think the paper trail should have
been used as the official ballot in that case.
Because that was that's kind of the obviously in that case it's a problem.
It's a real problem just as the card. County example is a real problem too.
We can see problems with the paperless systems and problems with the systems
that have been retrofitted with easy pets
and I think the underlying issue which I believe everyone on this panel would agree
on is that we need to have well engineered well designed robust systems
and as Mr Cunningham said this is sort of like the Model T.
Visa first generations and they are failing. That's not good.
Well I understand the Model T.
Analogy
but I don't think the members of this committee in the Congress in general want to
throw away hundreds of millions of dollars on the Model T.
Mr Dixon would you like to comment. Yes there are two points.
The loss of votes is is really a terrible situation is really what's are the
loss of any votes is a terrible situation. Thank you.
What's get lost on paper to the chair your right county voting machine is.
Does not meet the current standards.
If
that county had purchased an excess above voting machine built to the current
standards that problem would not have happened.
The Cal you are at machine a little red light comes on with no words around it
that says this machine is full.
There was no explanation in the training for poll workers
that said this read like means the machine is for this automatic Senate bill
machines the screen reads machine for all
that it will not accept new machine new votes.
Where as you said what are you talking about which which machine.
Are you talking with the one in Cuyahoga County.
No I'm talking about Caught red county in North Carolina where
votes were lost on a voting machine. That county administrator.
Wanted to buy accessible voting equipment
and the purchase of it was delayed.
Because of the motion about a paper trail.
And the problem was created because of a delay.
Well I just wonder in that Cuyahoga County case I understand
that the paper trail which is the I think Mr Holt bill is going to be the thing we
go by if there's a conflict that in
that case a paper trail lost nearly ten percent of the votes so.
It would seem that there'd be real problems in that instance at least.
Hopefully that would be relatively rare but.
In
that instance if we want by the paper trails the bill calls for we would be having
a lot of problems with me. Oh actually there were many problems.
In that county
and this is the I think this is really interesting example where there was a very
thorough analysis done of the situation in fact I.
I understand there are problems with the D.R. Ease.
That the redundant memories did not match in about twenty six percent of the cases.
So if you're going to try to do verification using the redundant memories there can
be issues.
I mean there was so many problems I think I'm sure you would acknowledge that
that it wasn't just the Wii pads and this just shows
that we need to to focus more on technology on policies and procedures
and as Mr Cunningham said right in elections a complicated thing.
But because there were problems in one area doesn't mean that everything in
that area can't be done as I said Banks count banks deal with money with paper
ballots all the time Canada holds its federal election using paper ballots.
So does the U.K. and They manage.
Well in this case the paper trail didn't solve the problem right because it was
badly engineered while the point is paper is not.
The ultimate solution but thankfully time has expired.
Mr Brady do is recognize for thank you Mr Chairman we went through we're going
through as I speak in my city
and county of Philadelphia a write in ballot write in candidate as you head
and we're doing that as we speak. And we're in court.
Now because the candidate on machine one then they had a paper
that they can write on and they're counting the write on about right about let's
and that person. Now one
and then after we do one of the side of courts at least we have the opportunity to
do that. And I heard that you have ways of. Rectifying or.
Double checking you know votes by people voting electronically than having a camera
with a lot of people on a good faith in any kind of electronics
and what we're trying to do here is the right thing we're trying to restore
confidence and most importantly trying to restore trust back into our process
and we're trying to figure out the best way to do that
and I understand there's a financial problem
and I understand it was a financial issue
but I like what you said you know you know how much you know there's never enough
money to.
There's always find some money to ensure democracy and I just described that.
Thank you to recognize a gentleman from California. Thank you Mr Chairman.
At the conclusion of my first set of questions Mr Shamus had described
alternative ways to verify the vote.
I'm wondering if Mr Felt do you have a comment on those proposals
and also on the Simmons.
Yes if I recall correctly he mentioned two mechanisms one involving a second screen
and a video camera and so on
and it seems to me more complicated more expensive than a paper based verification
system and and probably not any more trustworthy.
He also mentioned parallel testing which involves.
Taking the machine aside and holding a.
Simulated election
and this is something we discussed in some detail in our research paper
and the bottom line is that that is a worthwhile mechanism
but it's not completely effective not one hundred percent effective at finding the
problem. It raises the bar makes it more difficult to make a virus.
For example that will evade detection but it's not a complete solution.
We should do it but we shouldn't we should not believe
that it's going to entirely fix the problem. And.
To take up on its comments.
The the first of the alternate device that
that Professor Seamus mentioned makes it very difficult to hold a recount
and I think when one is thinking about these things and
when you talk about trying to get public confidence in elections.
One way in which you do that is by audits and recounts
and I don't know how you would audit that screen.
It seems to me it would have the same problems that these long rules of paper
that Mr Cunningham showed you've got someone who's going to sit in front of it
and say well this one voted here and this one voted.
There was just Smith Do you have a comment. Oh I cut you off.
Barbara I didn't know you made me I thin it's yes I thought you had as far as
parallel testing goes well first of all if you want to count if you want to count
things.
The best way to count things is the way you count money used you sorted into piles
new count each pile and that can be done transparently and with a T.V.
Camera watching the count as a way of getting confidence in the in the results.
The other thing as far as parallel testing goes I think we all agree parallel
testing is a good thing to do but there's a big what ifs in
that what if is what if you find a problem with the parallel testing.
Are you going to go back and rerun the election as we saw at Catterick county
that that raises enormous legal and technical problems. Mr SMITH.
You know I guess what I'd like to speak about is from the complexity of the
operation. You're trying to do to bring about one of the things
that we've got in Georgia is we have a more simple format I think for running the
election because we do not have voted verifiable. Well one of the issues.
I actually was charged with.
Running the manual recount so I have some experience with that too.
I want to see it being done because being talked about in our state.
One of the concerns that I have and I think we all should look back to is you know.
Who are the people are going to be putting this stuff
and operation on Election Day.
I mean you know it's typical We have done things you.
You see it we don't have we have part time people who are volunteers who really try
to do things
but they've gotten up at four o'clock in the morning five o'clock the morning had
gotten there they have to open the machines up they have to do all the other things
in Ohio with the the path for Cuyahoga County they had to do other things
that we didn't have to do they go through the logic
and accuracy testing essentially right there.
They enter the machines they start him off they do everything they bring the memory
cards are
that part of the problem was is the memory cards weren't ends in weren't seated
properly. That was a problem
but the other thing is they had to be responsible for these printers you know in
some cases favoring backwards let's let me explore
that because I'm taking as a given
that we're not going to completely change the way America holds elections I think
that's true and and I can remember you know voting.
When I was still at my parents' house and you go down to the quarter
and this is lucky who is always ran and you know and it's and it's retiree's
and it's people volunteers it's a wonderful thing
but that's the given a lot of states have these verifiable systems
California among the missing most as any of them come up with a system a receipt
that actually works better than that silly tape that we've seen.
Well I think precinct based optical scan systems are excellent
that gives the photo a chance to check for over votes
and no votes you you put your ballot through the scanner
and it tells you if there's a problem with it it makes recounts relatively easy
or audits relatively easy the voter verifies the ballot by.
Definition because you can look at it.
And there are ways for blind voters to verify it.
One possibility is getting some sort of handheld device that
that will read it for a blind voter we know that this technology exists.
Another is to allow blind voters to vote using tactile ballots where they insert
the optical scan into a kind of an Onslow pitches marked
and where they can mark the ballots
and there's a system out which actually allows them to verify it using a vibrating
device which compete for them Mr Chairman I see my time's expired
but I'd just like to note that.
I think we may have in the future some other way to verify
but I just asked Mr Holt to put me on his bill because I think we need to have.
No demonstrations. No place to recognize Mr Holt for five minutes.
Thank you Mr Chairman.
My questioning will be along a couple of lines.
First of all.
Mr Shamus refer I'm sorry I didn't have the exact transcript here
but said something
or other you hate to see outlaw an entire category of machines this
legislation doesn't outlaw any particular kind of voting system except on
verifiable ones
and you said further I think
that scare tactics by a minority.
You hate to see
that disrupt the whole process the Brennan Center for Justice.
New York University Law School.
Conducted a study with very distinguished people run Revestive MIT Howard Schmidt
administration
and corporate security expert a number of others said it found quote.
All three major types of voting systems have significant security
and reliability vulnerabilities
that pose a real danger to the integrity of national state and local elections.
The League of Women Voters not a scary minority says they
support quote only voting systems that are designed so
that they employ a voter verifiable paper ballot
or other paper record said paper being the official record of the voter's intent.
The report of the card or Baker commission.
Similarly called for a voter verified paper record random audits and so forth.
Mr Chairman I would like to.
Mr Chairman I would like to ask that the Brennan Center report.
The statement of the National League of Women Voters
and the Carter Baker report be made a part of the record.
Without objection so ordered. Thank you so. I would.
I want to make the point
that a number of organizations very responsible organizations with
computer scientists involved and so forth have taken a look at this matter
and we would do well to look at
that Miss Symons I would appreciate if you would say a little bit more about A.C.M..
And. The.
Subcommittee
that is looking at this then also what I would like the.
Witnesses to comment on as Mr Dixon recounts and Mr Smith
and others votes can be lost in a lot of ways they can be lost through.
Minute delay doing the registration lists intimidating voters there are a lot of
things that we need to address.
Redo restricting your sensibility at polling places or in the polling booth.
You know.
Memory cards may not be seated properly we may not recognize
that the memory is full before Election Day is over.
And paper records Mr do little might be illegible
or torn or otherwise difficult to use.
But it has been determined at least as often
that redundant electronic memories have show
that there are problems with purely electronic memory so what I would like to ask
of the witnesses is would you prefer to have a system where there is no possible
way of recovering what happened.
Another is where the electronic vote for whatever reason a poorly seated memory
card or something else is wrong and there is no possible way of recovering it
or is miss him
and points out a well designed system with a paper audit trail where there's at
least a reasonable chance of being able to recapture recover.
What the voters intentions were so I'd be happy to have a quick comment from
from the witnesses. But since. Beginning with Miss him. It's.
Oh you asked me about a C.M.A. To say. C.N.
Is an eighty thousand member professional society of computer professionals like
the A.P.S. It's the premier society.
I would say in this country.
And this statement
that I referred to which is in my written testimony was voted on by a C.M.
Council passed by a C.M. Council which is the elected ruling body of a C.M..
But they did something unusual not typical for a C.M.
We put the statement was put on the website for members to vote on of those who
voted ninety five percent supported the statement of the five percent who would.
Not positive roughly half based on written comments objected to the fact
that it wasn't broad enough that it didn't discuss usability issues as well.
So I would say.
Obviously you never get one hundred percent agreement whenever you get a room full
of well I shouldn't say that but scientists often disagree
but I would say in this case we're pretty pretty close to a consensus at least
within a C.M.
We have a gentleman's time has expired to make brief comments please Mr
Seamus first I just want to respond to a couple of things I I actually didn't make
a comment about scare tactics although I believe there was another member of the
panel the did I I just said I don't think we should appeal to emotion on this issue.
I agree that H.R.
Five fifty does not expressly outlawed any particular type of voting equipment.
My point was that the practical effect of that is the outlaws Deore machines
and the reason that outlaws Deore machines.
Is there is no current machine on the market
that meets the requirements of the bill and
that is usable in individual states along with their requirements for example in
Pennsylvania. There is popular call for a paper trail machine.
For vendors have come to Pennsylvania with their paper trail machine not a single
one of them has been able to simultaneously offer a paper trail
and meet Pennsylvania statutory and constitutional requirements.
So we can't have one even if we want one.
The technology is just not there yet. Mr.
So hadn't become a key issue I think is resiliency things go wrong people make
mistakes and we need to have a system that we can trust.
Even when things do go wrong. The combination of paper.
Plus electronic records is more resilient than either one would be alone and
that I think is the strongest argument for having a paper based verification system.
Thank Mr coming in as a last answer.
I want to make.
The point to everybody
that my experience is most votes are lost due to voter error not machine error not
election official error and I don't know if you looked at my resume
but I have about twenty years in the printing business
and I've been around a lot of printing machines and copy machines
and I can assure you that anything you put paper through will jam.
At some point in time. A vote and I want to say to you.
I truly believe that in the long term interest of this country it.
We are still voting the same way we did one hundred fifty years ago you as you
mentioned. This often down to your little poll at the corner in your precinct.
Our society has changed.
It's mobile it's around it's moving the ability to incorporate the vote centers
Ascott Doyle in Colorado has been working with as a convenience to voters those
types of concepts are based on electronic voting.
You know let's not throw the baby out with the bathwater here
and I think what is doing.
Mr Mr Brady I think what is doing more damage to voter confidence quite frankly.
Is to people like your distinguished colleague Mr Conyers.
Publishing reports about the election in Ohio that are fact lists and baseless.
None of the accusations have been proved. Those you know we've got to quit this.
We've got to get this conversation back to an honest debate about this.
I think the whole panel said how do we work together and move this thing forward
and quit the sky is falling kind of thing because I'm here to tell you I think
elections given the magnitude of them and I've seen now nine years worth of them.
Two presidential couple of gubernatorial.
Given what could happen and given the magnitude of this task to run
and pretty darn good in this country
and I know people all over the country like myself and Mr Smith
that are darn proud. They're involved in it
and the net effect is we're going to begin to.
Drive those people out of this which is going to make the system more vulnerable
than you ever imagine Mr Cunningham and I sure hope that is accurate.
What you've said because the voter is not there yet understand the vote even though
you folks are and your experts the voter is not there yet and
that is the ultimate wand that we must bring truth security. To bere.
I would like for you to get for me.
Whatever documentation you have
that suggests voter error is more than a paper error if you have
that type of verification of that statement you made have a like too high.
My point was that most.
Voting error is voter error.
I thank I thank you for a comment it's a good wrap up.
We are going to votes in just a few moments
and I would just like to make a few closing comments. A moment.
First of all I thank each
and every one of you for being here in the audience as well as at the witness table.
You have contributed immensely to this very important issue.
There's I wrote and.
I recognize very clearly since I've served at the local level in the state
legislature and now here
that the states have an important role local governments have an important role
and the federal government has an important role.
We often say here that the states the experimental.
Apparatus that tests ideas.
And then the federal government should select from the best of what the states have
discovered we did not take the time to do that in the HOV and I think
that was a mistake.
We also did not take the time to first set the standards clearly
and then allow manufacturers to develop equipment to meet those standards
and I think
that was a fatal flaw which is I believe created much of the uncertainty
that we have.
I agree totally with the statement someone made never buy the first model of
anything but the first model of one automobile.
Just because it precisely fit my needs was a good manufacturer.
A bad mistake and frankly relieved
when the car eventually got totaled.
And I got the insurance value probably could never have sold.
We have to recognize that there's a lot of work to be done here.
The public's confidence will return because we will build a better system.
Finally I want to comment.
I've always looked at two aspects here we want to assure every voter
that their vote will be counted.
Be counted accurately and the system will work
that way there's a second factor we must remember and
that gets back to the viruses
and all the other issues we have to also assure every voter.
Not only because not be negated
or voted by other people voting fraudulent only
or performing fraudulent acts such as viruses throwing ballot boxes away
and so forth.
I want to make sure every voter is assured of both of those kind of their vote in
the surance no one else is going to make it through illegal activity.
So I'm concentrating on those two not just in this particular issue
but in other issues such as.
The photo ID bill
that we passed through the house a week ago which I think will also help.
Thank you very much outstanding panel I appreciate all that you've done.
We do have to go vote and I have a few things to read here a moment.
I ask unanimous consent that members
and witnesses have seven calendar days to submit material for the record including
additional questions of the witnesses and for those statements
and materials to be entered into the appropriate place in the record
and I said if we send you written questions you will respond to the.
Without objection the marriage material will be so answered.
I ask unanimous consent
that Steffi authorize to make technical conforming changes on the law
and then are considered by the committee at today's hearing.
Without objection so order.
Having MS non-image I just wanted to concur with you.
I have served on the local state and federal level and I do think
that we need to revisit Haba because it was more or less geared for the federal
and we appreciate all of those who have come today those who serve on both the
local state and federal. Thank you Mr Chairman thank you.
And having completed our business for today
and for this hearing the committee is hereby adjourned.
Thanks.
I'm ready I'm ready.
Actually no thank you. I thank you.
Because I got the message.
Right. Right right.
But I know I feel so
so good there with you know we know.