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No

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you

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can go.

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Good morning ladies and
gentlemen committee

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and House administration
will come to order.

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First I would like to advise and request
all members of our audience here today

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that all started our phones pagers

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and other electronic equipment must be
silenced to prevent interruption of our

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business.

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So I don't appreciate if you turn these
devices off as I have the committee is

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meeting today for a hearing on electronic
voting machines and related issues.

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The election that will occur in
just a few weeks will be the first.

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General federal election conducted since
the Help America Vote Act of two thousand

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and two better known as
Hava was fully implemented

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that act passed by this Congress in
response to the voting system weaknesses.

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S'posed during the two thousand recount
in Florida set new standards for voting

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systems that were meant to make our
elections more accurate and accessible.

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Three billion dollars were appropriated
by the Congress pursuant to however with

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most of these monies being dedicated to
new equipment purchases by jurisdictions

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localities counties cities townships etc

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that want to improve their voting systems.

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As a result many jurisdictions are using
new equipment for the first time this year

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it's no surprise that there
have been a few problems.

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Though however did not require the adoption
of any particular kind of technology

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many jurisdictions person purchased electronic
voting systems because they felt the

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systems were best able to
meet the requirements of.

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Not surprisingly some jurisdictions using
this equipment for the first time have

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encountered some difficulties.

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Just two weeks ago in nearby Montgomery
County Maryland polls were not able to open

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on time because poll workers were sent to
their posts without the cards necessary

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to start up the electronic machines.

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In the wake of this episode a column
appeared in The Washington Post under the

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headline. If paper ballots
restore trust in elections.

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Let's switch the column noted people
trust paper ballots because the real you

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can hold them in your hand and
count them again if you need to.

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Indeed before it had electronic monitoring
system voting systems Montgomery County

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used a punch card system.

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Need to be reminded of the
problems we had with that system.

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Direct your attention to
this to the screen above.

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The audience can look at that
when we look at this one.

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And this is a reminder of what we saw in
the two thousand election in Florida.

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Images of people with paper ballots.

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This one is a group of people staring at
paper punch cards trying to figure out if

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they constitute a vote and if so for
whom. If you look at the second slide.

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You see how closely these ballots were
being examined by a group in the third

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slideshows extreme. Putting things
under the magnifying glass.

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You can see this man has got paper. Now
I'm not showing these to condemn paper.

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I'm just pointing out that punch cards
were paper thick paper at that.

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And we got into problems with

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that simply saying let's use paper as some
people are saying does not mean all the

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problems go away. We have to consider
all the different aspects of.

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These pictures as you can tell we're
taking in Florida during the two thousand

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recount. And that will go down in history.

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I'm sure because of the recount
and the ramifications.

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These images do not expect exactly inspire
trust and confidence either in the.

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In the punch card system or in
the voting systems in general.

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As a way to look at this problem.

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It's worthwhile remembering
the famous words of H.L.

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Mencken who once said for
every complex problem.

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There is an answer that is
clear simple and wrong.

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We would like to have answers
that are clear and simple.

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But we certainly do not want wrong answers

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and so we are going to proceed with this
very thoroughly delivered deliberately to

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try to make sure that we have
good answers that are right.

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Unfortunately the some problems some
jurisdictions have experienced with their new

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systems have caused some to suggest

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that we should revert to a reliance
on paper the so-called paper trail

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or paper tape.

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We know from painful and bitter experience

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that paper systems also
can fail to deliver.

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Results and are susceptible
to manipulation.

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To ignore this reality and assert
that paper somehow ensures integrity

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or a correct result is
simplistic and wrong.

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In fact no voting system by itself can
guarantee election integrity the best system

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on earth will fail if not properly
maintained deployed and operated

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and that's the key point
that we have to remember.

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And I'm not even though I'm a physicist

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and I've used computers since
one nine hundred fifty seven.

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I'm not saying by virtue of this these
comments so far papers battle electronics of

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course is good. I've
used it for many years.

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I know that can fail to it's not programmed
properly or not operated properly.

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I think I believe the important point
is design the best system you can

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but make sure you have a lot of debility
built and in some way whether it's paper

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or some other electronic device.

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Our hearing today will examine a range
of issues related to electronic voting

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machines. We will hear about their
problems but also about their benefits.

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We'll also hear about the
experience in one jurisdiction

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that tried to address the security concerns
of a paperless system by requiring the

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machine to generate a paper trail.

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This hearing is being held
to educate the members

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and the public about these
complicated issues.

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I hope

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when the hearing is over we will have a
better understanding of the problems

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and benefits of these new technologies.

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I also hope

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that look for solutions to these complicated
problems we resist the temptation to

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settle on answers that are
clear simple and wrong.

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Now I'd like to ask unanimous consent

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that the gentleman from
New Jersey New Jersey.

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Percent of Rush Holt who is the author of
a bill dealing very much with one aspect

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of this be allowed to join us
and does today and that he.

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May be permitted to ask
questions of the witnesses

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and interest a minute to the director.
Without objection so ordered.

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Welcome to the present home.

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Please to hear this is one of
the few times in the Congress

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when you're fined two physicists sitting
at the front desk listening to testimony.

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At this time of life through its merits

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or I can remember them as making their
McDonald from the opening remark she may

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have thank you Mr Chairman and good
morning to you and all of the witnesses

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and gets here this morning.

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I would like to thank you Mr Chairman for
calling this very important hearing on

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electronic voting machines.

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I am sure that you have heard
from your constituents

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and constituents around the
country as I have heard

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that folks aware you about these
voting machine apparatuses

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and they are just not sure
whether or not they are working.

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Let me also thank you Mr Chairman for
welcoming Congressman Rush Holt to sit on the

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panel this morning.

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It was just six years ago

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that the two thousand presidential election
brought to light many problems with the

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elections process. In our country.

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We encountered a wide
range of frustrations

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and election administration with the
I'D LIKE should administration.

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Some of the most infamous problems involved
punch cards with all of the hanging

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chads

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that the chairman has just shown you others
involved voters who were turned away

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from the polls without the opportunity to
cast a vote in response this committee

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worked diligently and passed the
Help America Vote Act which is Hava.

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Trip the country of outdated
voting to quit men enter ensure

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that no eligible voter is turned away
from the polls without casting a vote.

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Despite the passage of Hava however many
problems still remain as we witnessed

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during the two thousand and four election
and in several primaries this year.

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Today I hope to hear about methods
of addressing these. Issues.

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Even if we may not be able to implement
suggestive recommendations before the

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November election.

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I also hope

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that this oversight hearing will serve as
a forum for the American people to gain

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confidence. In direct recording
electronic voting system machines.

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After the two thousand election Deore as
we call them machines were viewed as the

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answer to hanging chads

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and century old lever machines Deore
machines also allowed individuals with

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disabilities to vote in private and
without assistance for the first time.

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They have also been supported by a number
of civil rights organizations given the

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ease with with which they are able to be
programmed to display ballots in foreign

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languages.

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However as we are aware many concerns
have been raised about the integrity

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and the reliability of
these story machines.

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In fact at times it may be seen

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that these machines have raised many more
questions than answers. For example.

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Some have called for a voter verified
paper audit trail for Deore machines.

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Some states already required that
function for Deore machines.

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But even this similarly simple math that
raises numerous concerns for example

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when mechanism serves as the official what
mechanism serves as the official record

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in a recount. That's a
question that has been raised.

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Often what happens when the printer jams.

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With the voter which were proper with the
votes which were properly recorded by the

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R.E.B. Thrown out. If they are not
similarly recorded on the paper.

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Those are the questions
that have been raised.

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Often I am also interested in hearing
from our witnesses expression all of the

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local election the fish. Shields.

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Regarding their views about the wisdom of
imposing a federal mandate which would

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specify which type of election
equipment should be used.

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These decisions have mostly
been left up to the state

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and local officials throughout
our country's history

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and I would like to know what
the impact of a federal mandate

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and a standard in this area would be
what President it would set for future

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election administration mandates on
the states by the federal government

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and how these mandates would be funded
in addition to discuss to get stablished

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concerns about the Arima chains.

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I hope the witnesses invited today will
address the security of all voting

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equipment.

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Only one third of Americans will cast
ballots on Deore machines and although

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that number is growing.

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It's still means

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that two thirds of our voters will be
casting ballots using a methodology.

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Are these machines secure.
Are they reliable.

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Are they subject to a
suitable level of scrutiny.

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I am concerned that all of the
media attention to voting.

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Security will inadvertently discourage
voters from going to the polls resulting in

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voter suppression.

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As we witnessed a few weeks ago in Maryland
voting machine reliabilities security

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and accuracy with not the inherent cause
of mayhem mayhem the lack of poll worker

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training another human factors of
election administration created problems

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infusions at the polls. For
both voters and poll workers.

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If we do not adequately address all of
these issues voters may feel as if their

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votes will not be counted and decide
not to participate on election day.

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This is one reason why I offered an amendment
to double the funding for the college

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poll worker training program.

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This programming current just college
age students to service poll workers.

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And to become more involved with
the election administer. Process.

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The electoral process is not perfect.

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Mr Chairman improvements to the electoral
process itself still need to be made.

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Fortunately they Help America
Vote Act of two thousand

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and two is a solid foundation upon which
we can institute further electoral

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improvements.

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Hava made it easier for
voters to cast a ballot

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and harder for people to knowingly
commit crime and fraud.

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Which is why we need to appropriate the
remaining eight hundred million dollars

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balance which is authorized in title
to a father to follow up on the states

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and give him a chance to work.
As I have stated in the past.

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It is guaranteed that your vote will
be lost. If you don't cast a ballot.

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I would encourage every eligible voter
to cast a ballot. No matter how harsh.

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The rhetoric about the November
elections and no matter how

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that ballot excuse cast by D.B.E.

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Machines absentee ballots
provisional ballots whatever.

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00:19:01,19 --> 00:19:04,26
Americans need to get out and vote
in November with the confidence

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that their vote will be counted correctly.

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Exercise in this precious right is more
important than the outcome of the elections

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00:19:11,89 --> 00:19:16,55
Mr Chairman I hope we can convene additional
hearings in the future to examine any

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shortcomings in election
administration and any impediments

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that voters experience in exercising
their constitutional rights.

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I look forward to working
with the chairman

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and other members to continue
to improve the voting process.

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And I will continue to seek full funding
of the Election Assistance Commission

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titles have grants to ensure

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that the AC can continue is crucial work
to improving the electoral process.

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Even if one voter is disenfranchised.

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That is one voter too many Thank you Mr
Chairman thank the ranking member for

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00:19:51,43 --> 00:19:54,89
comments and I especially want to
reinforce something your said.

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Voting in this nation has traditionally
been controlled and operated by the law.

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You know. Cities townships
counties and by the states.

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The only reason the federal government

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or this is because of the problems with the
federal election of a president in two

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thousand and.

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We continue to have great
respect for the localities

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and the states which of the
responsibility for implementation.

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We are simply trying to stand.

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Stover standards only for the federal gov
actions as well as can do you have an

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opening statement. Thank
you Mr Chairman I am glad

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that we are having this
hearing today and delighted

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00:20:36,37 --> 00:20:40,54
that we're joined by our colleague
Mr Holt the author of H.R.

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Five five zero.

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I am inclined to think that Mr
Holt approach is the right one

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00:20:50,06 --> 00:20:54,87
but I have declined to be a co-author of
this bill until this hearing because I

235
00:20:54,87 --> 00:20:57,80
wanted to try and keep an
open mind on the subject

236
00:20:57,80 --> 00:21:01,39
and listen to the witnesses without
being a co-author of the bill

237
00:21:01,39 --> 00:21:04,22
but coming from Silicon Valley.

238
00:21:04,22 --> 00:21:04,73
You can imagine

239
00:21:04,73 --> 00:21:11,23
that I have had considerable input
from people who are quite skilled

240
00:21:11,23 --> 00:21:13,87
and I guess the question

241
00:21:13,87 --> 00:21:19,67
that needs to be answered is can this
election be hacked. There are many issues.

242
00:21:19,67 --> 00:21:22,52
I'm sure we'll get into them today.

243
00:21:22,52 --> 00:21:32,01
But the integrity of the election
process is absolutely essential to the.

244
00:21:32,01 --> 00:21:36,40
Sustenance of a vigorous democracy
elections to count as we know

245
00:21:36,40 --> 00:21:41,01
and the direction that our country is
going in will be decided by elections

246
00:21:41,01 --> 00:21:44,64
and if we if we can't
know for certainty that

247
00:21:44,64 --> 00:21:50,48
that process is not corrupted then it really
goes to the core of the spirit of our

248
00:21:50,48 --> 00:21:52,94
nation and in our future as a democracy.

249
00:21:52,94 --> 00:21:58,84
So I realize we're not in a mark up mode
here today we're here to get information.

250
00:21:58,84 --> 00:22:02,74
I'm going to listen. Very carefully
to all the witnesses but I'm hopeful

251
00:22:02,74 --> 00:22:05,75
that we could take quick action because.

252
00:22:05,75 --> 00:22:11,45
This my own state of California has
already moved in the direction that.

253
00:22:11,45 --> 00:22:16,48
Mr Holder is suggesting with a
verifiable paper audit trail.

254
00:22:16,48 --> 00:22:20,04
We need to be able to let
the voters of America know

255
00:22:20,04 --> 00:22:24,88
that this their elections are on the up
and up and their vote really does count

256
00:22:24,88 --> 00:22:27,86
and the election has not been hacked.

257
00:22:27,86 --> 00:22:31,22
So with that Mr Chairman I thank
you for holding this hearing

258
00:22:31,22 --> 00:22:36,31
and I will yield back because I am eager
to hear a very large panel of witnesses

259
00:22:36,31 --> 00:22:38,49
before we are called to
say thank you very much.

260
00:22:38,49 --> 00:22:39,68
Thank you for a statement

261
00:22:39,68 --> 00:22:45,19
and Mr whole statement will be entered
into the record as we mentioned earlier.

262
00:22:45,19 --> 00:22:48,67
And setting up the panel for this hearing.

263
00:22:48,67 --> 00:22:52,80
I was determined to try to get the
broadest representation possible.

264
00:22:52,80 --> 00:22:57,03
I would have had to have twenty seven
witnesses to totally accomplish that.

265
00:22:57,03 --> 00:22:58,68
But the fact

266
00:22:58,68 --> 00:23:02,63
that we have tried very hard as indicated
by the large number of witnesses we do

267
00:23:02,63 --> 00:23:07,24
have I'm very pleased with the quality
of the witnesses who agreed to appear

268
00:23:07,24 --> 00:23:13,39
and we now turn to Dr Felton
for his testimony he is

269
00:23:13,39 --> 00:23:19,84
a professor in the Department of Computer
Science at Princeton University which

270
00:23:19,84 --> 00:23:22,38
also happens to be Mr Holt's district.

271
00:23:22,38 --> 00:23:27,19
He recently completed a study of an electronic
voting system will give us a report

272
00:23:27,19 --> 00:23:28,28
on his findings

273
00:23:28,28 --> 00:23:37,02
and I also understand you have a
demonstration for us doctor for you maybe.

274
00:23:37,02 --> 00:23:41,20
You turn on the microphone please.

275
00:23:41,20 --> 00:23:42,15
Thank you Mr Chairman

276
00:23:42,15 --> 00:23:46,89
and members of the Committee for the
opportunity to testify today Mr Chairman.

277
00:23:46,89 --> 00:23:53,04
There's lights on that
is there a way to yes.

278
00:23:53,04 --> 00:23:59,90
Much better. Thank you. From a security
standpoint what distinguishes computer.

279
00:24:00,00 --> 00:24:02,90
Voting Systems from
traditional systems is not

280
00:24:02,90 --> 00:24:05,38
that computers are
easier to compromise but

281
00:24:05,38 --> 00:24:10,49
that the consequences of compromise can
be so much more severe tampering with an

282
00:24:10,49 --> 00:24:13,79
old fashioned ballot box can affect
a few hundred votes at most.

283
00:24:13,79 --> 00:24:18,41
But injecting a virus into a single
computerized voting machine can potentially

284
00:24:18,41 --> 00:24:23,64
affect an entire election two weeks
ago my colleagues Ari Feldman

285
00:24:23,64 --> 00:24:24,31
and Alex Halderman

286
00:24:24,31 --> 00:24:29,13
and I released a detailed security analysis
of this machine the default actually

287
00:24:29,13 --> 00:24:32,31
vote TS which is used in
Maryland Georgia and elsewhere.

288
00:24:32,31 --> 00:24:38,32
My written testimony summarizes the
findings of our study one main finding is

289
00:24:38,32 --> 00:24:40,48
that the machines are
susceptible to computer viruses

290
00:24:40,48 --> 00:24:41,86
that spread from machine to machine

291
00:24:41,86 --> 00:24:47,75
and silently transfer votes from one
candidate to another such a virus requires

292
00:24:47,75 --> 00:24:52,65
moderate computer programming skills to
construct launching it requires access to a

293
00:24:52,65 --> 00:24:54,84
single voting machine for
as little as one minute.

294
00:24:54,84 --> 00:24:59,45
I will now demonstrate this using a
virus we constructed in our laboratory.

295
00:24:59,45 --> 00:25:04,49
We've set up here a simulated election
for president between George Washington

296
00:25:04,49 --> 00:25:08,22
and Benedict Arnold it's Election Day
morning and we just opened the polls.

297
00:25:08,22 --> 00:25:10,45
No votes have been cast yet.

298
00:25:10,45 --> 00:25:12,80
I'll start by casting the first vote

299
00:25:12,80 --> 00:25:15,96
when I checked in at the polling
place at the front desk.

300
00:25:15,96 --> 00:25:20,04
The poll workers gave me this voter card
which I now insert into the machine.

301
00:25:20,04 --> 00:25:25,83
I press the Start button

302
00:25:25,83 --> 00:25:32,11
and I choose to cast my vote for George
Washington the machine asks me to confirm

303
00:25:32,11 --> 00:25:36,76
my choice and I confirm my
choice and cast my ballot.

304
00:25:36,76 --> 00:25:40,14
The second vote is similar

305
00:25:40,14 --> 00:25:45,96
and certain other voter card.

306
00:25:45,96 --> 00:25:51,37
A choose George Washington
again and again I confirm

307
00:25:51,37 --> 00:25:55,13
and cast my ballot.

308
00:25:55,13 --> 00:25:59,85
The third voter inserts
another voter card.

309
00:26:00,00 --> 00:26:10,15
And votes again for George Washington.

310
00:26:10,15 --> 00:26:14,52
The correct vote counted this election
obviously is George Washington three.

311
00:26:14,52 --> 00:26:15,75
Benedict Arnold zero.

312
00:26:15,75 --> 00:26:21,60
Now it's the close of Election Day a poll
worker inserts a special supervisor card

313
00:26:21,60 --> 00:26:24,64
into the machine.

314
00:26:24,64 --> 00:26:30,68
Enters a pin code.

315
00:26:30,68 --> 00:26:35,02
And tells the machine to end the election

316
00:26:35,02 --> 00:26:41,28
and tally the votes.

317
00:26:41,28 --> 00:26:47,32
The machine will now print out a paper
tape summarizing the ballot count.

318
00:26:47,32 --> 00:26:54,29
When I cast my vote earlier my choice of
candidate was recorded in the machines

319
00:26:54,29 --> 00:26:55,79
electronic memory.

320
00:26:55,79 --> 00:27:01,29
This record of my vote was invisible to me
I have I had no way of verifying whether

321
00:27:01,29 --> 00:27:02,46
it was recorded correctly

322
00:27:02,46 --> 00:27:07,05
or whether it was changed after it was
recorded in this machine the records were

323
00:27:07,05 --> 00:27:09,55
modified by or virus.

324
00:27:09,55 --> 00:27:16,91
This paper tape printed out by the
machine reports the elections results.

325
00:27:16,91 --> 00:27:19,75
And it shows George
Washington with one vote

326
00:27:19,75 --> 00:27:29,08
and Benedict Arnold with two.

327
00:27:29,08 --> 00:27:34,06
Every record in the machine.

328
00:27:34,06 --> 00:27:39,05
And outside the machine is consistent
with this fraudulent result our technical

329
00:27:39,05 --> 00:27:43,34
report referenced in my written testimony
goes into considerable detail about this

330
00:27:43,34 --> 00:27:43,59
problem

331
00:27:43,59 --> 00:27:49,88
and explains why existing election
procedures are not sufficient to prevent it.

332
00:27:49,88 --> 00:27:53,74
One lesson is that security depends on
getting the technical details right.

333
00:27:53,74 --> 00:27:59,08
Too often the designers of this machine
fail to get the details right.

334
00:27:59,08 --> 00:28:02,20
A good example. Is the access door
here on the side of the machine.

335
00:28:02,20 --> 00:28:06,09
It protects the removable memory
card that stores the votes.

336
00:28:06,09 --> 00:28:08,05
So the door should be locked securely

337
00:28:08,05 --> 00:28:10,83
and access to the Keys
should be strictly limited

338
00:28:10,83 --> 00:28:16,19
but in fact tens of thousands of Accu Vote
machines can all be opened with the very

339
00:28:16,19 --> 00:28:21,80
same key and this very same key is used
widely in office furniture juke boxes

340
00:28:21,80 --> 00:28:24,77
and even hotel mini bar keys
and even hotel mini bars.

341
00:28:24,77 --> 00:28:29,30
It's easily purchased on the Internet
this one I bought online from a jukebox

342
00:28:29,30 --> 00:28:30,14
supply shop

343
00:28:30,14 --> 00:28:35,60
and it does open the machine the implications
of our study go beyond just this

344
00:28:35,60 --> 00:28:36,11
machine

345
00:28:36,11 --> 00:28:41,65
and reveal broader systemic problems more
worrisome than any specific vulnerability

346
00:28:41,65 --> 00:28:46,63
is that this system despite its many
problems was certified purchased

347
00:28:46,63 --> 00:28:48,24
and deployed by many states and counties

348
00:28:48,24 --> 00:28:54,98
and has been used in
Portland elections which we

349
00:28:54,98 --> 00:28:57,54
can do more to improve the
security of our evolving.

350
00:28:57,54 --> 00:29:00,82
I detail many recommendations in
my study and written testimony

351
00:29:00,82 --> 00:29:04,90
but one important safeguard is a
voter verified paper audit trail.

352
00:29:04,90 --> 00:29:08,27
A well designed paper trail
can improve security

353
00:29:08,27 --> 00:29:14,10
and enhanced voter confidence without
compromising accessibility certainly paper

354
00:29:14,10 --> 00:29:15,35
records have their drawbacks.

355
00:29:15,35 --> 00:29:18,88
But they have different failure
modes than electronic records do

356
00:29:18,88 --> 00:29:21,34
and the combination of electronic

357
00:29:21,34 --> 00:29:25,46
and paper records together can be more
robust against fraud than either one would

358
00:29:25,46 --> 00:29:32,36
be alone getting the details of voting
right is difficult especially in today's

359
00:29:32,36 --> 00:29:35,74
high tech polling place but
failure is not an option.

360
00:29:35,74 --> 00:29:39,20
The stakes are too high and
the risk of malfunction

361
00:29:39,20 --> 00:29:44,61
or fraud too great to make our current
course tenable in the long run election

362
00:29:44,61 --> 00:29:46,93
experts accessibility experts

363
00:29:46,93 --> 00:29:51,20
and computer security experts all have
a role to play in improving our voting

364
00:29:51,20 --> 00:29:54,52
system. If we work together
we can solve this problem

365
00:29:54,52 --> 00:29:57,70
and give the American people the
voting system they deserve.

366
00:29:57,70 --> 00:30:03,83
Thank you for your time and attention.
Thank you very much for your testimony.

367
00:30:03,83 --> 00:30:06,70
Our second witness is Gary Smith.

368
00:30:06,70 --> 00:30:13,21
Mr Smith is the election director in
Forsyth County Georgia Georgia uses a

369
00:30:13,21 --> 00:30:19,05
paperless system statewide and for those
who don't know what he stands for.

370
00:30:19,05 --> 00:30:25,13
It's direct recording electronic computer.

371
00:30:25,13 --> 00:30:28,42
Basically it's a type of a
computer. We have displayed here.

372
00:30:28,42 --> 00:30:34,04
Mr Smith uses a De Bolt system that was
the subject of the Princeton study.

373
00:30:34,04 --> 00:30:38,87
Mr Smith also participated in the
recount of the Cuyahoga County primary

374
00:30:38,87 --> 00:30:43,69
that was conducted on idea or a
system with a paper audit trail.

375
00:30:43,69 --> 00:30:49,96
Mr Smith you are recognized as well
as as much money as Gary Smith I

376
00:30:49,96 --> 00:30:55,72
reside in force that County Georgia
is your microphone on. That better.

377
00:30:55,72 --> 00:31:00,57
Yes we have an overflow room and
people are very anxious to hear you.

378
00:31:00,57 --> 00:31:03,85
All right well my name is
Gary Smith as you match

379
00:31:03,85 --> 00:31:08,37
and then I am the election director for
Forsyth County Georgia county just north of

380
00:31:08,37 --> 00:31:09,12
Atlanta.

381
00:31:09,12 --> 00:31:14,68
It's quite a fast growing county we have
about eighty thousand registered voters

382
00:31:14,68 --> 00:31:19,87
and we are one of the top fastest
growing counties the United States.

383
00:31:19,87 --> 00:31:20,72
So we have a lot of issues

384
00:31:20,72 --> 00:31:26,53
that we have to deal with all the time one
of the things I think that's important.

385
00:31:26,53 --> 00:31:31,11
Maybe is to look at the those of us as
election directors how we come about.

386
00:31:31,11 --> 00:31:35,22
I'm actually appointed through a
selection committee that comes about.

387
00:31:35,22 --> 00:31:37,63
We're a grand jury is brought forth.

388
00:31:37,63 --> 00:31:43,24
They pick a panel of people who are at the
background to be able to do this it's

389
00:31:43,24 --> 00:31:48,18
then sent up to the chief superior court
judge and then I am selected from

390
00:31:48,18 --> 00:31:50,12
that I was selected from that process.

391
00:31:50,12 --> 00:31:55,73
I'm in my second term as the director
of elections it's a term of four years.

392
00:31:55,73 --> 00:32:01,56
And it is a nonpartisan position.
Prior to. Coming into this position.

393
00:32:01,56 --> 00:32:07,31
I spent most of my time working in the
private sector I retired I was running

394
00:32:07,31 --> 00:32:12,75
various companies and I have worked most
of my life in industrial automation.

395
00:32:12,75 --> 00:32:16,11
So I have a technical background I have
an undergraduate degree in electrical

396
00:32:16,11 --> 00:32:21,20
engineering and I'm also a certified
election registration ministry

397
00:32:21,20 --> 00:32:26,94
or from a program that's ministered
by all burned University.

398
00:32:26,94 --> 00:32:29,09
As the director of elections
one of the things

399
00:32:29,09 --> 00:32:32,06
that I've been privileged to do is
to be able to set on a task force.

400
00:32:32,06 --> 00:32:36,08
Several of them one has been from the Georgia
task force which allows me to be able

401
00:32:36,08 --> 00:32:39,50
to participate and look at
new processes and equipment

402
00:32:39,50 --> 00:32:43,35
that we applied to elections
in our county in our state.

403
00:32:43,35 --> 00:32:44,30
In addition of

404
00:32:44,30 --> 00:32:48,99
that I served on a national taskforce
for election reform for two thousand

405
00:32:48,99 --> 00:32:53,67
and four where we looked at all the processes
across the country with regards to

406
00:32:53,67 --> 00:32:55,47
elections.

407
00:32:55,47 --> 00:33:01,55
In addition I think you just mentioned
is I did lead the manual recount for the

408
00:33:01,55 --> 00:33:04,38
Cuyahoga County the pat.

409
00:33:04,38 --> 00:33:08,86
So I have some practical experience with
that and I was happy to be able to do

410
00:33:08,86 --> 00:33:09,75
that I did that.

411
00:33:09,75 --> 00:33:16,97
Or spent a weekend as a matter
of fact we have implemented the.

412
00:33:16,97 --> 00:33:22,77
D.R. He's the one that you're looking
at right here which is the divil T.S.U.

413
00:33:22,77 --> 00:33:22,98
and

414
00:33:22,98 --> 00:33:27,95
that In fact my my county one hundred fifty
eight counties in Georgia implemented

415
00:33:27,95 --> 00:33:31,03
this during the general
election of two thousand

416
00:33:31,03 --> 00:33:37,22
and two we have held from what I heard
was the last count something like twenty

417
00:33:37,22 --> 00:33:40,28
five hundred elections in our state.

418
00:33:40,28 --> 00:33:46,38
In addition to that I've held elections
on special elections primaries

419
00:33:46,38 --> 00:33:51,70
and general elections runoff and
just about any kind of election

420
00:33:51,70 --> 00:33:53,60
and a minister of election as well.

421
00:33:53,60 --> 00:33:59,91
So again we have a lot of experience
with and one of the things that I've.

422
00:34:00,00 --> 00:34:01,32
It has been talked about a lot

423
00:34:01,32 --> 00:34:05,73
and I think we have to deal with is you
know how do you look at these the security

424
00:34:05,73 --> 00:34:07,69
and the integrity of
this kind of equipment.

425
00:34:07,69 --> 00:34:14,47
It starts with obviously with the vendor
who builds equal amount goes through

426
00:34:14,47 --> 00:34:18,22
the end dependent testing laboratories
that then look at to make sure

427
00:34:18,22 --> 00:34:23,48
that what we are receiving
has the technical.

428
00:34:23,48 --> 00:34:27,42
Wherewithal to be able to provide
us with a piece of equipment

429
00:34:27,42 --> 00:34:29,40
that really meets what our needs are.

430
00:34:29,40 --> 00:34:34,64
Thirdly we have in our state which I'm
very proud to talk about is the center for

431
00:34:34,64 --> 00:34:38,43
election systems it's a program
administered by councils State University

432
00:34:38,43 --> 00:34:45,12
and Dr Brant Williams who's a well
known authority in elections we do

433
00:34:45,12 --> 00:34:46,89
all of our.

434
00:34:46,89 --> 00:34:50,79
Creation or a ballot cards and that
sort of thing through this group

435
00:34:50,79 --> 00:34:55,69
and so it's a it's a nother level of
testing that we have that goes on.

436
00:34:55,69 --> 00:35:00,26
Lastly it's up to those of us who are
election directors to hold these elections.

437
00:35:00,26 --> 00:35:02,81
So I'm tasked with a lot of the things

438
00:35:02,81 --> 00:35:06,49
that Mr Felton is talked about
which is maintain the security

439
00:35:06,49 --> 00:35:10,23
and integrity of the process
that goes on in elections.

440
00:35:10,23 --> 00:35:13,35
I guess word where the rubber meets
the road as much as anything.

441
00:35:13,35 --> 00:35:16,40
So those are that's our job.

442
00:35:16,40 --> 00:35:20,34
I'm not going to go through all of the
details with regards to certification

443
00:35:20,34 --> 00:35:22,37
because it's certainly going to
take a lot more than a few amounts

444
00:35:22,37 --> 00:35:25,22
that I've got to talk about it
but it is in my paper and I hope

445
00:35:25,22 --> 00:35:26,28
that you will look at it.

446
00:35:26,28 --> 00:35:31,56
I think where we pick it up is where
we pick up the memory cards is this

447
00:35:31,56 --> 00:35:36,36
developments mention that come to us
from the Center for election systems.

448
00:35:36,36 --> 00:35:41,72
The process of making sure that they
come to us under the chain of custody.

449
00:35:41,72 --> 00:35:46,69
Manner so that we know that there
is at least more than one person

450
00:35:46,69 --> 00:35:51,69
that has access to you know what we're
talking about is they're looking at we go

451
00:35:51,69 --> 00:35:55,31
through a process called let logic
and accuracy testing this is

452
00:35:55,31 --> 00:35:59,88
when the process that he has
talked about goes through the fur.

453
00:36:00,00 --> 00:36:03,37
We are taking the memory
cards we are marrying

454
00:36:03,37 --> 00:36:05,55
and essentially to the voting machine

455
00:36:05,55 --> 00:36:09,56
and then we're taking them
through the testing process.

456
00:36:09,56 --> 00:36:11,63
At which time then we lock the machines up

457
00:36:11,63 --> 00:36:14,14
and we pass them on to the
next level which really is.

458
00:36:14,14 --> 00:36:17,94
The the election poll worker himself

459
00:36:17,94 --> 00:36:22,26
and what I'd like to do is to show you
some of the chain of custody forms

460
00:36:22,26 --> 00:36:25,51
and I think they're in front of you too
if they're not I'm going to show you the

461
00:36:25,51 --> 00:36:30,37
one actually that's coming.
That's going to be go in there.

462
00:36:30,37 --> 00:36:33,23
So it's OK.

463
00:36:33,23 --> 00:36:35,68
You know it's as good
as it can get up there

464
00:36:35,68 --> 00:36:38,17
but I think most of you
can probably see it.

465
00:36:38,17 --> 00:36:44,89
And what I'm what I'm pointing
out and it is is. The.

466
00:36:44,89 --> 00:36:49,94
Is OK if I stand up. It's always
a cure the microphone with you.

467
00:36:49,94 --> 00:36:54,87
So all the people in the overflow
crew room can hear you too.

468
00:36:54,87 --> 00:37:01,81
OK. Can you hear me now.

469
00:37:01,81 --> 00:37:04,52
Yes. All right.

470
00:37:04,52 --> 00:37:09,13
I think what what is
critical about this is

471
00:37:09,13 --> 00:37:10,83
and I think this is one
of the things maybe

472
00:37:10,83 --> 00:37:14,79
that because we're doing it statewide we've
had an awful lot of change good chances

473
00:37:14,79 --> 00:37:20,27
to be able to. Work.

474
00:37:20,27 --> 00:37:22,02
Processes out I think Mr Felt

475
00:37:22,02 --> 00:37:24,33
and one of the things he said is you
need to have a good chain of custody

476
00:37:24,33 --> 00:37:28,43
and they say this actually is
for the precinct big creek.

477
00:37:28,43 --> 00:37:32,92
This is the actually an actual form
that we're using it says here.

478
00:37:32,92 --> 00:37:37,71
Item number one it's a it's a custodian
certification form for the accurate.

479
00:37:37,71 --> 00:37:42,22
TS units are going to be used under Point
number two what I've got here is I've got

480
00:37:42,22 --> 00:37:46,13
actually the touchscreen serial number
which is you got a number in here it's

481
00:37:46,13 --> 00:37:52,19
eleven six eight two seven then across
here what you're looking at is are all of

482
00:37:52,19 --> 00:37:54,99
the tests that we take individually
to run on the machines.

483
00:37:54,99 --> 00:37:59,16
This takes about fifteen
minutes per machine to run.

484
00:38:00,00 --> 00:38:03,55
It's a process is done under my direction.

485
00:38:03,55 --> 00:38:07,46
And we actually have done this for five
hundred machines for the upcoming election.

486
00:38:07,46 --> 00:38:09,83
The next the next point.

487
00:38:09,83 --> 00:38:14,27
That's important to look at is that
there's a seal number that is right here

488
00:38:14,27 --> 00:38:15,84
and that seal number.

489
00:38:15,84 --> 00:38:20,09
What I'm going to show you is how it's
carried forward to the process were

490
00:38:20,09 --> 00:38:25,66
when we're holding the election at the
precinct what happens with the next thing.

491
00:38:25,66 --> 00:38:32,58
OK this machine that is sealed up.
It has a wire serial number on it.

492
00:38:32,58 --> 00:38:36,80
So there's no access to
this machine once the logic

493
00:38:36,80 --> 00:38:39,03
and accuracy testing is done now.

494
00:38:39,03 --> 00:38:40,23
The next

495
00:38:40,23 --> 00:38:45,62
and the next form I'm going to show
you is right here this is a form then

496
00:38:45,62 --> 00:38:49,26
that is carried forward to
the precinct itself so that

497
00:38:49,26 --> 00:38:51,97
when the poll workers the poll manager

498
00:38:51,97 --> 00:38:57,08
and his assistant This is their responsibility.
This is a form signed triplicate.

499
00:38:57,08 --> 00:39:00,14
One she goes to the secretary
of state one comes to me

500
00:39:00,14 --> 00:39:03,11
and one goes to the Supreme Court.

501
00:39:03,11 --> 00:39:07,08
You'll notice again it's for
Precinct Big Creek zero one.

502
00:39:07,08 --> 00:39:11,58
This is the recap sheet that goes with it.

503
00:39:11,58 --> 00:39:16,12
Here again is the serial number if we
look back before we would find that

504
00:39:16,12 --> 00:39:19,53
that serial number is
the same one is here.

505
00:39:19,53 --> 00:39:23,14
Now.

506
00:39:23,14 --> 00:39:28,33
I think this cooperation.
And I think it's great.

507
00:39:28,33 --> 00:39:33,96
Here is the serial number that
then shows up on the comes

508
00:39:33,96 --> 00:39:38,38
that is transferred from the
original L N A testing.

509
00:39:38,38 --> 00:39:43,27
Now what happens with it is we open up the
machines we go through we can we do the

510
00:39:43,27 --> 00:39:43,76
count number

511
00:39:43,76 --> 00:39:48,86
and then at the end of the end of the
election because this is the recap sheet.

512
00:39:48,86 --> 00:39:53,30
The key part here is that
there's another. Mechanical.

513
00:39:53,30 --> 00:39:56,10
Low tech seal put on it.

514
00:39:56,10 --> 00:39:59,86
It is a wired sealed so it's
kept on there all the time and.

515
00:40:00,00 --> 00:40:03,69
But that's the process that we go through
I wanted you to be able to see that.

516
00:40:03,69 --> 00:40:08,19
OK And I'm going to have to ask you to
wrap up because we have a lot of witnesses

517
00:40:08,19 --> 00:40:09,60
and a lot of discussion.

518
00:40:09,60 --> 00:40:16,83
OK I'm sorry.

519
00:40:16,83 --> 00:40:18,28
Yeah. Is that it.

520
00:40:18,28 --> 00:40:21,65
You know I you know one
of the other part I think

521
00:40:21,65 --> 00:40:26,08
that we I want to talk about it and I
think this has to do with the comments

522
00:40:26,08 --> 00:40:29,57
that miss me wonder McDonnell said is
what's the confidence that people have

523
00:40:29,57 --> 00:40:34,06
that and I'd like to hear
it at least respond to

524
00:40:34,06 --> 00:40:36,82
that another time because we've done.

525
00:40:36,82 --> 00:40:41,93
Surveys in our county to show that
ninety nine percent of the people feel

526
00:40:41,93 --> 00:40:46,07
that the process is an excellent process
so there is a conflict high level of

527
00:40:46,07 --> 00:40:48,57
confidence in our equipment.

528
00:40:48,57 --> 00:40:55,39
All right we can defer that to the
question period so thank you very much.

529
00:40:55,39 --> 00:40:56,11
Thank you.

530
00:40:56,11 --> 00:41:01,50
And as a reminder to those I should have
mentioned before you have a little device

531
00:41:01,50 --> 00:41:03,07
in front of you with the lights on it.

532
00:41:03,07 --> 00:41:09,37
Green means go yellow means it's
some up red manger in deep trouble.

533
00:41:09,37 --> 00:41:13,38
So please keep an eye on the car. Next.

534
00:41:13,38 --> 00:41:20,22
Please to recognize Ms Barbara Simmons
past president of the Association for

535
00:41:20,22 --> 00:41:25,18
Computing Machinery and she's done
a lot of work on voting systems.

536
00:41:25,18 --> 00:41:28,51
Dr Simons you are recognized. Thank you.

537
00:41:28,51 --> 00:41:33,37
Good morning Mr Chairman members of the
committee on behalf of the computing

538
00:41:33,37 --> 00:41:37,54
professionals that constitute the
Association for Computing Machinery.

539
00:41:37,54 --> 00:41:41,37
I want to thank you for the opportunity
to testify today about evolving system

540
00:41:41,37 --> 00:41:42,18
security

541
00:41:42,18 --> 00:41:49,11
and the need for voter verified
paper trail secure reliable usable

542
00:41:49,11 --> 00:41:55,21
and excess of all voting systems are
critical towards ensuring transparent

543
00:41:55,21 --> 00:42:01,42
fair and inclusive elections. These
are not. Actually exclusive goals.

544
00:42:01,42 --> 00:42:03,82
I shall discuss aspects of both security

545
00:42:03,82 --> 00:42:07,96
and accessibility this
morning first security.

546
00:42:07,96 --> 00:42:13,61
Because of the risks of software bugs.
Malicious code or computer failure.

547
00:42:13,61 --> 00:42:14,70
We cannot trust

548
00:42:14,70 --> 00:42:19,32
that the results in a paperless voting
machine accurately reflect the will of the

549
00:42:19,32 --> 00:42:23,28
voters. That is why voter verified
paper ballots or audit trails

550
00:42:23,28 --> 00:42:28,59
or the pads as we refer to them are needed
the pads are automatically produced by

551
00:42:28,59 --> 00:42:33,75
an optical scan system since the ballot is
verified by the voter when he marks it.

552
00:42:33,75 --> 00:42:37,98
Fortunately forty eight percent of
counties have optical scan systems so they

553
00:42:37,98 --> 00:42:39,73
already have the pads.

554
00:42:39,73 --> 00:42:43,36
Optical scans can be used together
with tactile ballots leaves

555
00:42:43,36 --> 00:42:46,68
or accessible marking
devices for excess ability.

556
00:42:46,68 --> 00:42:51,27
Someday Ari's have been retrofitted
to produce the paths to the.

557
00:42:51,27 --> 00:42:56,70
In fact all of them for use in California
is a Congresswoman Lofgren said.

558
00:42:56,70 --> 00:42:58,45
Two years ago a C.M.

559
00:42:58,45 --> 00:43:02,60
A leading Computer Society issued a statement
calling for well engineered voting

560
00:43:02,60 --> 00:43:05,12
machines that I will every
voter to verify his

561
00:43:05,12 --> 00:43:09,42
or her record has been accurately cast
by the inspection of a physical E.G.

562
00:43:09,42 --> 00:43:12,52
Paper records. At its
two thousand and six.

563
00:43:12,52 --> 00:43:17,25
National Convention the League of Women
Voters passed a resolution calling for

564
00:43:17,25 --> 00:43:21,74
voter verified paper ballots or records
to be used for audit and recounts.

565
00:43:21,74 --> 00:43:26,93
The league also urged that routine random
audits be conducted in every election.

566
00:43:26,93 --> 00:43:27,99
Both the A.C.N.

567
00:43:27,99 --> 00:43:28,43
Statement

568
00:43:28,43 --> 00:43:33,44
and the League resolution can be found
in my written testimony in summary as a

569
00:43:33,44 --> 00:43:38,13
defense against malicious or buggy
software. We must have reliable.

570
00:43:38,13 --> 00:43:41,43
Well engineered accessible via Pats.

571
00:43:41,43 --> 00:43:42,95
Policies and Procedures

572
00:43:42,95 --> 00:43:47,25
that guarantee the integrity of
the paper records secure storage

573
00:43:47,25 --> 00:43:49,39
and delivery of machines and so on.

574
00:43:49,39 --> 00:43:53,39
Mandatory random manual audits of the Pats

575
00:43:53,39 --> 00:43:59,60
and a full manual recount if discrepancies
are uncovered unless there is evidence

576
00:43:59,60 --> 00:44:01,44
that. The pads have been compromised.

577
00:44:01,44 --> 00:44:07,15
On the discuss accessibility people's
disability should be able to vote privately

578
00:44:07,15 --> 00:44:10,72
in a dependently and be
able to verify their votes.

579
00:44:10,72 --> 00:44:13,96
However does not require the dear
ease be used for accessibility.

580
00:44:13,96 --> 00:44:14,99
There is evidence

581
00:44:14,99 --> 00:44:18,42
that a number of people with disabilities
are finding the theories are not meeting

582
00:44:18,42 --> 00:44:20,02
their accessibility needs.

583
00:44:20,02 --> 00:44:24,78
Charlie Pierce a nationally known advocate
for the blind and visually impaired.

584
00:44:24,78 --> 00:44:29,86
Review tactically the sternal controls
spoken prompts visual display

585
00:44:29,86 --> 00:44:34,22
or worker assistance following
him controlling normalisation

586
00:44:34,22 --> 00:44:39,48
and ballot review for four voting machines
in his report for Cook County state

587
00:44:39,48 --> 00:44:41,76
attorney's office. Pierce concluded

588
00:44:41,76 --> 00:44:45,19
that if any one of the four machines
were to be deployed in Chicago

589
00:44:45,19 --> 00:44:46,82
or suburban Cook County.

590
00:44:46,82 --> 00:44:50,90
Many voters with disabilities particularly
blind voters would not be able to cast

591
00:44:50,90 --> 00:44:53,16
about independently and privately.

592
00:44:53,16 --> 00:44:57,80
Blind computer scientists know Runyan
discussed his frustration with his hour long

593
00:44:57,80 --> 00:45:01,87
voting experience in the two thousand and
four presidential election and I quote.

594
00:45:01,87 --> 00:45:05,96
It took me thirty minutes to work my way
through the ballots and make my selection.

595
00:45:05,96 --> 00:45:06,74
After

596
00:45:06,74 --> 00:45:09,66
that I had quite a bit of trouble getting
into the review MO to get a full list of

597
00:45:09,66 --> 00:45:12,11
all my selections. When I did it went on

598
00:45:12,11 --> 00:45:15,81
and on for twenty three minutes like a
long uncontrolled drink from a fire hose

599
00:45:15,81 --> 00:45:20,11
review function read each item
and then at the very end.

600
00:45:20,11 --> 00:45:22,74
Said my lecture selection
was for that item.

601
00:45:22,74 --> 00:45:26,28
It even threw in details of what the
fiscal impact would be and took forever.

602
00:45:26,28 --> 00:45:29,72
This is completely backwards.
He went on to say.

603
00:45:29,72 --> 00:45:31,33
In the time I signed in

604
00:45:31,33 --> 00:45:34,77
and got my vote a smart card it took eight
ministry bought the machine as an audio

605
00:45:34,77 --> 00:45:37,46
voting machine thirty
minutes to make my choices.

606
00:45:37,46 --> 00:45:39,48
Twenty three ministry view and verify

607
00:45:39,48 --> 00:45:42,75
and another four minutes to make
a correction and record my vote.

608
00:45:42,75 --> 00:45:44,90
Not counting the hour waiting in line.

609
00:45:44,90 --> 00:45:49,32
It took me about sixty five minutes to
Mark and record my ballot and quote.

610
00:45:49,32 --> 00:45:53,57
We do not have to settle for inaccessible
voting systems all technologies such as

611
00:45:53,57 --> 00:45:57,29
text audio devices tactile ballots
leaves and ballot marking

612
00:45:57,29 --> 00:45:59,88
and generating systems could
be combined with new to.

613
00:46:00,00 --> 00:46:01,47
Knowledge is that make the entire voting

614
00:46:01,47 --> 00:46:05,66
and verification process accessible
while remaining auditable.

615
00:46:05,66 --> 00:46:09,00
Technology engineers and
tested success carefully

616
00:46:09,00 --> 00:46:13,46
and if deployed the safeguards against
failure can reduce error rate provide more

617
00:46:13,46 --> 00:46:18,23
accessibility increase accountability
and strengthen our voting system.

618
00:46:18,23 --> 00:46:21,62
However the current state of evolving
technologies leaves us far short of these

619
00:46:21,62 --> 00:46:23,55
goals we need paper trails

620
00:46:23,55 --> 00:46:27,29
and manual audits to protect us protect
us against failures and attacks.

621
00:46:27,29 --> 00:46:31,14
We need additional research to make
voting machines more usable secure

622
00:46:31,14 --> 00:46:34,97
and accessible. And we need to work
together to achieve these goals.

623
00:46:34,97 --> 00:46:38,06
Thank you thank you very much.

624
00:46:38,06 --> 00:46:44,55
Next we turn to Mr Leask Cunningham who
is the election director in Allen County

625
00:46:44,55 --> 00:46:46,03
Ohio.

626
00:46:46,03 --> 00:46:49,77
He serves on the board of advisors to
the Election Assistance Commission

627
00:46:49,77 --> 00:46:55,77
and also participated in the Cuyahoga
County recount study performed by the

628
00:46:55,77 --> 00:47:00,54
election science and says Mr Cunningham
you are recognized Thank you Mr Chairman

629
00:47:00,54 --> 00:47:02,29
and let me say what an honor.

630
00:47:02,29 --> 00:47:07,45
It is for a guy from a small town in Ohio
to be sitting here before you today in

631
00:47:07,45 --> 00:47:08,76
this tremendous forum.

632
00:47:08,76 --> 00:47:13,57
I am also the immediate past president
of the Ohio Association of election

633
00:47:13,57 --> 00:47:17,28
officials and I want to say to you before
I begin when I wake up in the morning

634
00:47:17,28 --> 00:47:20,95
and head for my job I I'm
feeling pretty good about it.

635
00:47:20,95 --> 00:47:23,03
I believe the job

636
00:47:23,03 --> 00:47:27,84
that I'm involved in which is an election
is director has meaning and has merit

637
00:47:27,84 --> 00:47:33,05
and is doing things to make our
country and our community better.

638
00:47:33,05 --> 00:47:35,16
One thing I think we all agree on is

639
00:47:35,16 --> 00:47:40,66
that electronic voting needs some type
of verification system some component

640
00:47:40,66 --> 00:47:44,61
that allows it to be audited. And
of course all systems need that.

641
00:47:44,61 --> 00:47:49,64
But as my predecessors have
said hard ballot systems.

642
00:47:49,64 --> 00:47:54,85
It's rather obvious how we audit those
Personally I do not have any particular

643
00:47:54,85 --> 00:47:58,64
aversion to voter fide voter
verified paper audit trails.

644
00:48:00,45 --> 00:48:04,26
However in Ohio the system is

645
00:48:04,26 --> 00:48:09,16
that the voter verified paper audit trail
becomes the official ballot of record for

646
00:48:09,16 --> 00:48:11,47
recount purposes. I must say to you.

647
00:48:11,47 --> 00:48:15,88
Clearly I am adamantly opposed based on the
experience I've had in Cuyahoga County

648
00:48:15,88 --> 00:48:21,59
to that I believe that program is setting
election officials up for failure.

649
00:48:21,59 --> 00:48:24,71
At this point in time. If the V.P.

650
00:48:24,71 --> 00:48:28,62
That was to be extended to voters as a
courtesy by which to check their votes I

651
00:48:28,62 --> 00:48:32,01
have no problem with that of
course I think statistics indicate

652
00:48:32,01 --> 00:48:35,39
that voters don't even use it
when it's available to them.

653
00:48:35,39 --> 00:48:37,70
I think the the studies on hand show

654
00:48:37,70 --> 00:48:41,79
that maybe less than ten percent of
the people actually utilized that.

655
00:48:41,79 --> 00:48:47,96
We looked at approximately three hundred
fifty tapes in Cuyahoga County and over

656
00:48:47,96 --> 00:48:49,04
and over and over.

657
00:48:49,04 --> 00:48:53,42
We encountered tapes that were missing
that were in some way compromised.

658
00:48:53,42 --> 00:48:56,87
You have the numbers before you so I
won't bore you with the statistics

659
00:48:56,87 --> 00:48:59,67
but I think two of them are very
important for you to remember.

660
00:48:59,67 --> 00:49:02,16
Nearly seventeen percent of the V.

661
00:49:02,16 --> 00:49:04,54
Pat tapes that were
reviewed by that team and

662
00:49:04,54 --> 00:49:07,24
that team consisted of a lot
of Ohio election officials

663
00:49:07,24 --> 00:49:12,14
that came in to help participate nearly
seventeen percent of those tapes showed a

664
00:49:12,14 --> 00:49:16,33
vote discrepancy of one to five
votes from the electronic machine

665
00:49:16,33 --> 00:49:22,11
and there Lee ten percent of those tapes
were either destroyed blank missing tape

666
00:49:22,11 --> 00:49:25,21
together or in some other way compromised.

667
00:49:25,21 --> 00:49:30,13
And my point is this that
the when you use the V.

668
00:49:30,13 --> 00:49:35,05
Pad at this point in time as the
official record of a reek of a recount.

669
00:49:35,05 --> 00:49:40,49
It actually serves to disenfranchise the
voter because votes are lost in the V.P.

670
00:49:40,49 --> 00:49:44,59
that Process. They're simply not
there and cannot be retrieved

671
00:49:44,59 --> 00:49:49,58
and we could have retrieve those votes
by other means from those machines

672
00:49:49,58 --> 00:49:53,87
but in Ohio. We're not allowed
to because the recount.

673
00:49:53,87 --> 00:49:58,95
Official vote ballot of record
in a recount becomes the V. Pat.

674
00:50:00,00 --> 00:50:02,33
And so I would submit to
you that it was the paper

675
00:50:02,33 --> 00:50:07,53
that actually caused the
count to be in question.

676
00:50:07,53 --> 00:50:08,37
Additionally

677
00:50:08,37 --> 00:50:12,75
and we have some photographs hard like to
show you there is no reliable technology

678
00:50:12,75 --> 00:50:18,94
for which to recount to be Pat's size
credit they had a makeshift kind of real

679
00:50:18,94 --> 00:50:23,17
crank thing that you could put
the tapes in and reel them up.

680
00:50:23,17 --> 00:50:27,76
This is kind of you know when these things
are sort of like wrestling octopuses.

681
00:50:27,76 --> 00:50:30,32
As you can see.

682
00:50:30,32 --> 00:50:33,64
Let's go to the next when the next two

683
00:50:33,64 --> 00:50:38,42
and some of my friends I want to make
sure they go to this just kind of the the

684
00:50:38,42 --> 00:50:40,76
scene there you can see the machine that.

685
00:50:40,76 --> 00:50:44,24
You know I'll tell you what I equate this
to were pretty agricultural in my part of

686
00:50:44,24 --> 00:50:44,66
Ohio.

687
00:50:44,66 --> 00:50:49,23
I equate this to planting several hundred
acres of wheat with a million dollar planting

688
00:50:49,23 --> 00:50:52,32
machine and going out and harvesting
it by hand like the Amish used to

689
00:50:52,32 --> 00:50:56,46
and stacking it up in the
fields to go on please with.

690
00:50:56,46 --> 00:51:03,02
A lot you know this was mind
numbing to say the least to sit

691
00:51:03,02 --> 00:51:06,59
and now keep in mind we went through
three hundred and some tapes.

692
00:51:06,59 --> 00:51:11,78
There were probably nearly four
thousand tapes in Cuyahoga County.

693
00:51:11,78 --> 00:51:15,03
This took us to ten hour days actually two

694
00:51:15,03 --> 00:51:20,81
and a half was the first half a day it
was setting a system continue please.

695
00:51:20,81 --> 00:51:26,14
This is simply a tape with no record
printed on it continue. Again please.

696
00:51:26,14 --> 00:51:28,75
Same same thing.

697
00:51:28,75 --> 00:51:33,60
This is the information that we're
looking through on the tapes trying to.

698
00:51:33,60 --> 00:51:36,52
And remember at least
this is Ohio's rule that

699
00:51:36,52 --> 00:51:40,62
when you recount a race you
can't recount any other race.

700
00:51:40,62 --> 00:51:42,63
You could only recount the race

701
00:51:42,63 --> 00:51:46,72
that is going to be recounted So if
you've got twenty seven candidates on the

702
00:51:46,72 --> 00:51:49,80
ballot. You've got a real through all
twenty seven to get to the race.

703
00:51:49,80 --> 00:51:52,73
Maybe a down ballot race or
something. Your county has gone.

704
00:51:52,73 --> 00:51:56,17
Please with size and this is exactly
the one that's taped together.

705
00:51:56,17 --> 00:51:58,85
That's obviously been in
the machine accordion.

706
00:52:00,00 --> 00:52:02,13
Corti and up in the machine
I don't know how many

707
00:52:02,13 --> 00:52:05,65
that black line probably represents
twenty or thirty votes. I don't know.

708
00:52:05,65 --> 00:52:10,32
You know there was no way to
reconcile that. One place.

709
00:52:10,32 --> 00:52:15,22
There's another torn tape another shot
of the crude machine we were using to do

710
00:52:15,22 --> 00:52:21,80
this. You know I think they speak
for their self themselves.

711
00:52:21,80 --> 00:52:27,97
I honestly don't have any reason to believe
the Aries don't record votes accurately

712
00:52:27,97 --> 00:52:30,53
but I understand the
concerns and I do believe

713
00:52:30,53 --> 00:52:35,29
that we should have some kind of audit
system for it. I would say to you.

714
00:52:35,29 --> 00:52:36,06
Considering the size

715
00:52:36,06 --> 00:52:40,79
and scope of the deployment of voting
machines in the last twelve to twenty four

716
00:52:40,79 --> 00:52:45,12
months in America. I think election
officials have done a pretty darn good job.

717
00:52:45,12 --> 00:52:47,59
We're working on improving it.

718
00:52:47,59 --> 00:52:51,69
Unfortunately I believe and we'll
wrap up here in just a second.

719
00:52:51,69 --> 00:52:56,37
I believe it is the environment which is
slowing our pace of improvement as a local

720
00:52:56,37 --> 00:52:59,23
election official I'm going to tell
you I feel like I'm in a crossfire

721
00:52:59,23 --> 00:53:01,83
and I know many of my colleagues do and

722
00:53:01,83 --> 00:53:05,32
that crossfire is a very
very polluted conversation.

723
00:53:05,32 --> 00:53:08,67
And it's being polluted with political
interests and corporate interest

724
00:53:08,67 --> 00:53:09,94
and scientific one upmanship

725
00:53:09,94 --> 00:53:14,82
and I often wish I had as many people helping
me find the solutions to these things

726
00:53:14,82 --> 00:53:18,99
as I did identifying the problems for me
it would make my job. An awful lot easier.

727
00:53:18,99 --> 00:53:21,83
I want to echo the remarks earlier

728
00:53:21,83 --> 00:53:27,52
that I do believe we should continue to
fund Hava I think the underfunding of Hava

729
00:53:27,52 --> 00:53:32,38
sends a very inconsistent message to those
of us out there trying to do this on a

730
00:53:32,38 --> 00:53:33,67
daily basis.

731
00:53:33,67 --> 00:53:39,62
I would say to you also leave allow
us to finish what has been started.

732
00:53:39,62 --> 00:53:43,52
And what is in motion before
we begin to tinker with this.

733
00:53:43,52 --> 00:53:49,71
We have been given a set of tasks that
are very very hard to manage and.

734
00:53:49,71 --> 00:53:53,66
Again in scope of the deployment that
has taken place in this country.

735
00:53:53,66 --> 00:53:56,14
I don't want to say there
weren't problems in it

736
00:53:56,14 --> 00:53:59,75
but I think my colleagues
have done a very good job.

737
00:54:00,00 --> 00:54:03,98
And I would hope that in the
future when we do begin to debate

738
00:54:03,98 --> 00:54:06,24
and speak about this
we can do it in honest

739
00:54:06,24 --> 00:54:09,60
and direct terms without
misrepresentations half truths

740
00:54:09,60 --> 00:54:13,46
and focus on what it is we need
to do to cure these problems

741
00:54:13,46 --> 00:54:18,64
and make America's elections. Give
people confidence in them and.

742
00:54:18,64 --> 00:54:21,91
I think it's too far to expect too
much to expect any less than that.

743
00:54:21,91 --> 00:54:26,98
Thank you for your time appreciate it
thank you. And we hear your cry for help.

744
00:54:26,98 --> 00:54:31,94
Last namely leave us alone. Let us
do it. But I also want to know.

745
00:54:31,94 --> 00:54:37,29
You're not the only one who has crowds
of people yelling at them for solutions

746
00:54:37,29 --> 00:54:41,04
and offering no assistance where
experience that every day of the week.

747
00:54:41,04 --> 00:54:47,47
So you have our sympathy the next
person I'm pleased to introduce James

748
00:54:47,47 --> 00:54:52,44
Dickson vice president of government affairs
for the American Association of People

749
00:54:52,44 --> 00:54:53,39
with disabilities.

750
00:54:53,39 --> 00:54:58,45
He's been a very strong advocate
throughout this process of making certain

751
00:54:58,45 --> 00:55:02,87
that anyone with disabilities
is permitted to vote

752
00:55:02,87 --> 00:55:08,32
and has a sanctity of the secret secret
ballot which is essential to all of us

753
00:55:08,32 --> 00:55:13,44
and essential to democracy.
Mr Dixon you are recognized.

754
00:55:13,44 --> 00:55:19,95
Thank you Chairman Ehlers member
committee. I have two disabilities.

755
00:55:19,95 --> 00:55:22,57
I have two disabilities.

756
00:55:22,57 --> 00:55:24,49
I'm blind and I'm blunt

757
00:55:24,49 --> 00:55:31,36
and in these five minutes I'm going
to summarize some of the points in my

758
00:55:31,36 --> 00:55:33,00
written testimony.

759
00:55:33,00 --> 00:55:39,06
First I want to thank the members
of Congress who passed to help

760
00:55:39,06 --> 00:55:45,00
and I voted secretly

761
00:55:45,00 --> 00:55:51,91
and independently for the first time two
years ago for the second time just a month

762
00:55:51,91 --> 00:55:57,31
ago. I cannot put into words.

763
00:56:00,00 --> 00:56:03,33
Glorious feeling and a product

764
00:56:03,33 --> 00:56:07,08
that I had as American.

765
00:56:07,08 --> 00:56:13,11
And I'm speaking for tens of
millions of other Americans who have

766
00:56:13,11 --> 00:56:19,59
now the first opportunity
to vote privately

767
00:56:19,59 --> 00:56:23,81
and independently.

768
00:56:23,81 --> 00:56:30,33
I've got a few stories to tell
about the problems that I face.

769
00:56:30,33 --> 00:56:33,84
And which millions of other voters face.

770
00:56:33,84 --> 00:56:38,63
When not being able to vote
privately or independently.

771
00:56:38,63 --> 00:56:44,22
These happened to me but. Literally
there are millions of stories like it.

772
00:56:44,22 --> 00:56:49,70
The very first time I
voted. The poll worker.

773
00:56:49,70 --> 00:56:53,75
Said to me.

774
00:56:53,75 --> 00:57:03,50
Loud enough for everybody in the polling
place to hear you want to vote for who.

775
00:57:03,50 --> 00:57:10,39
On another occasion I had a poll
worker say to me. We're very busy.

776
00:57:10,39 --> 00:57:15,97
Nobody votes for a state legislator in these
other races so how about if we finish

777
00:57:15,97 --> 00:57:19,75
now.

778
00:57:19,75 --> 00:57:23,11
On another occasion I had
a poll worker say to me.

779
00:57:23,11 --> 00:57:28,98
These referenda are really confusing.
Most people don't vote on them.

780
00:57:28,98 --> 00:57:34,52
So why don't we start now on yet another
occasion I had a poll worker say to me

781
00:57:34,52 --> 00:57:39,64
this print on the referenda is too
small I can't read it to you.

782
00:57:39,64 --> 00:57:41,74
So we'd be finished.

783
00:57:41,74 --> 00:57:52,31
That particular excuse did not
get much sympathy from me.

784
00:57:52,31 --> 00:57:53,94
Touchscreens.

785
00:57:53,94 --> 00:57:59,80
The best existing product we have
that offers accessibility to.

786
00:58:00,00 --> 00:58:01,65
The greatest number of people.

787
00:58:01,65 --> 00:58:07,97
I participated in the early work
that was referenced by Kelly Pierce.

788
00:58:07,97 --> 00:58:11,92
The rest of the story is

789
00:58:11,92 --> 00:58:17,69
that after those initial tests
the company was able to

790
00:58:17,69 --> 00:58:24,04
in this inexpensively and quickly.

791
00:58:24,04 --> 00:58:29,93
Make changes to the Access procedures so

792
00:58:29,93 --> 00:58:37,29
that the problems were of them in need.

793
00:58:37,29 --> 00:58:42,52
Touchscreens access is a continuum

794
00:58:42,52 --> 00:58:46,40
and we need to have equipment designed so

795
00:58:46,40 --> 00:58:50,94
that as access increases it
can be cheaply efficiently

796
00:58:50,94 --> 00:58:57,77
and quickly installed on the equipment
touchscreens are the only product available

797
00:58:57,77 --> 00:59:04,00
now that meets those
requirements at a P.D.

798
00:59:04,00 --> 00:59:10,27
We absolutely want. Secure
accurate recount the bull.

799
00:59:10,27 --> 00:59:15,99
Elections that are the
systems that are accessible.

800
00:59:15,99 --> 00:59:18,32
The paper trail is not accessible.

801
00:59:18,32 --> 00:59:25,30
This is a California ballot three Try
recount a leave for the committee

802
00:59:25,30 --> 00:59:27,12
this is the row.

803
00:59:27,12 --> 00:59:33,05
That was not able to be counted in Ohio.

804
00:59:33,05 --> 00:59:37,96
Paper Trail is a rule
Goldbrick contraption.

805
00:59:37,96 --> 00:59:43,44
It doesn't work it's not
accessible. You can't recount it.

806
00:59:43,44 --> 00:59:48,86
It doesn't even off the verification
not only to people not look at the

807
00:59:48,86 --> 00:59:55,85
verification of the test done at MIT
where the computers were set up so

808
00:59:55,85 --> 00:59:59,77
that votes were changed.
MIT students didn't.

809
01:00:00,00 --> 01:00:04,30
Find the changed vote when they
looked at the verification on paper

810
01:00:04,30 --> 01:00:10,99
when the verification mean was done.
Audio. Listening through earphones.

811
01:00:10,99 --> 01:00:13,79
They found the change votes.

812
01:00:13,79 --> 01:00:19,01
I want to sum up with the following three
points things have to be accessible thank

813
01:00:19,01 --> 01:00:21,80
you for making that stand and have.

814
01:00:21,80 --> 01:00:28,52
The paper trail does not even

815
01:00:28,52 --> 01:00:31,15
do what the proponents want.

816
01:00:31,15 --> 01:00:34,81
And the proponents are a very small
group who speak very loudly.

817
01:00:34,81 --> 01:00:37,41
There have been over and over again.

818
01:00:37,41 --> 01:00:42,04
Public opinion polls when voters use
touch screens. They trust them.

819
01:00:42,04 --> 01:00:45,94
Eighty percent eighty
percent when they use them.

820
01:00:45,94 --> 01:00:52,65
We shouldn't let a loud vocal minority using
fear determine what's going to happen

821
01:00:52,65 --> 01:00:56,38
in the sanctity of the polling place
and the last point I want to make

822
01:00:56,38 --> 01:01:02,85
and it is very very important
is the real problems in our

823
01:01:02,85 --> 01:01:08,14
voting system. Are human factors.

824
01:01:08,14 --> 01:01:11,12
Human errors.

825
01:01:11,12 --> 01:01:17,61
And before we order something to
be done in the polling place.

826
01:01:17,61 --> 01:01:22,82
We need money to research.

827
01:01:22,82 --> 01:01:25,67
And document what the problems are

828
01:01:25,67 --> 01:01:32,58
and we need to test proposed solutions
in the reality of the polling place.

829
01:01:32,58 --> 01:01:39,33
Not in a laboratory put me in an
empty room with a ballot box full of

830
01:01:39,33 --> 01:01:43,47
paper and I will have hacked into
it in less than sixty seconds.

831
01:01:43,47 --> 01:01:47,58
Thank you again.

832
01:01:47,58 --> 01:01:52,46
This discussion is very important and
I would just ask you to remember

833
01:01:52,46 --> 01:01:59,01
that eighty percent of Americans who vote
on touchscreens believe their vote is

834
01:01:59,01 --> 01:02:01,23
secure. And accurate.

835
01:02:01,23 --> 01:02:07,78
Thank you Mr Dixon and
appreciate your comments of the.

836
01:02:07,78 --> 01:02:11,89
Showing why it was so
worth it for us to insist

837
01:02:11,89 --> 01:02:17,36
that all individuals be able to cast
their vote and say so. Thank you.

838
01:02:17,36 --> 01:02:23,11
Next I'm pleased to introduce Michael
Seamus is a professor of current Carnegie

839
01:02:23,11 --> 01:02:28,46
Mellon University and is also the director
of the Institute for software research.

840
01:02:28,46 --> 01:02:31,96
Dr Seamus you are recognized.

841
01:02:31,96 --> 01:02:35,93
Thank you Mr Chairman I just want to make
a small correction to the record I'm not

842
01:02:35,93 --> 01:02:39,99
the director of the Institute for softer
research I'm just a member of the

843
01:02:39,99 --> 01:02:42,04
Institute for software research.

844
01:02:42,04 --> 01:02:45,29
But I'm also an attorney admitted
to practice in Pennsylvania

845
01:02:45,29 --> 01:02:48,54
and before the United States
pad and Trademark Office.

846
01:02:48,54 --> 01:02:49,95
Since one nine hundred eighty.

847
01:02:49,95 --> 01:02:54,01
I've been an examiner of voting systems
electronic voting systems for various

848
01:02:54,01 --> 01:02:57,45
states. I'm currently an
examiner for Pennsylvania

849
01:02:57,45 --> 01:03:02,24
and I've personally performed one hundred
eighteen voting system examinations.

850
01:03:02,24 --> 01:03:06,20
I'm going to do my hundred nine
hundred six emanation next week.

851
01:03:06,20 --> 01:03:13,01
I recall that Mr Chairman. You're a physicist
Representative Holt is a physicist.

852
01:03:13,01 --> 01:03:16,26
I am a former physicist My proposal is

853
01:03:16,26 --> 01:03:20,06
that we settle this issue like
physicists based on scientific evidence

854
01:03:20,06 --> 01:03:23,14
and not based on emotion.

855
01:03:23,14 --> 01:03:27,73
I view electronic voting as
primarily an engineering problem.

856
01:03:27,73 --> 01:03:30,35
That includes the design of
processes and procedures.

857
01:03:30,35 --> 01:03:34,25
Once the requirements for a
voting system are agreed upon.

858
01:03:34,25 --> 01:03:37,66
It's not a matter of developing and
manufacturing equipment and processes

859
01:03:37,66 --> 01:03:39,36
that meet the requirements.

860
01:03:39,36 --> 01:03:43,50
The question is whether Congress should be
setting technical performance guidelines

861
01:03:43,50 --> 01:03:47,05
and engineering standards as H.R.
Five fifty would have it do.

862
01:03:47,05 --> 01:03:49,46
Or whether such guidelines
should be left to NIST

863
01:03:49,46 --> 01:03:55,30
and the E A C as Hava has already provided
the proposed bill is based on three

864
01:03:55,30 --> 01:03:59,79
major assumptions all of which are
false. First it assumes that paper.

865
01:04:00,00 --> 01:04:03,85
Words are somehow more secure than
electronic ones a proposition

866
01:04:03,85 --> 01:04:07,28
that has been repeatedly shown
to be wrong. Throughout history.

867
01:04:07,28 --> 01:04:09,42
Second it assumes

868
01:04:09,42 --> 01:04:13,31
that voting machines without voter
verified paper trails are an audit to Bill

869
01:04:13,31 --> 01:04:17,32
because their claims to be
paperless which is also false.

870
01:04:17,32 --> 01:04:21,63
They are neither paperless nor
a nautical third it assumes

871
01:04:21,63 --> 01:04:26,07
that paper trails actually solve the problems
exhibited by D R E machines which is

872
01:04:26,07 --> 01:04:27,21
likewise incorrect.

873
01:04:27,21 --> 01:04:28,32
The reason

874
01:04:28,32 --> 01:04:32,43
that mechanical voting machines were
introduced over a century ago was to stop

875
01:04:32,43 --> 01:04:35,54
rampant fraud involving paper ballots H.R.

876
01:04:35,54 --> 01:04:38,11
Five fifty would restore us to
the year eight hundred ninety

877
01:04:38,11 --> 01:04:42,12
when anyone who wanted to tamper with
an election needed to do no more than

878
01:04:42,12 --> 01:04:46,52
manipulate pieces of paper
the recent example.

879
01:04:46,52 --> 01:04:52,07
In Cleveland Ohio comic Kiowa
County is extremely instructive.

880
01:04:52,07 --> 01:04:54,23
That was the case we would we just heard

881
01:04:54,23 --> 01:04:58,62
that ten percent of the paper
trails could not be read. H.R.

882
01:04:58,62 --> 01:05:02,52
Five fifty provides that in the event
of any inconsistency between electronic

883
01:05:02,52 --> 01:05:05,17
and paper records the
paper records are Iraq

884
01:05:05,17 --> 01:05:10,06
but I believe presumed to be correct
attorney such as myself are always wary of

885
01:05:10,06 --> 01:05:11,75
your rebuttable presumption.

886
01:05:11,75 --> 01:05:12,67
Applying

887
01:05:12,67 --> 01:05:16,11
that provision to Cleveland would have
resulted in the disenfranchisement of ten

888
01:05:16,11 --> 01:05:19,84
percent of the electorate because their
paper records could not be read.

889
01:05:19,84 --> 01:05:20,78
I cannot believe

890
01:05:20,78 --> 01:05:25,78
that the numerous sponsors of this
legislation contemplated such an outcome.

891
01:05:25,78 --> 01:05:27,31
I did a review of U.S.

892
01:05:27,31 --> 01:05:29,29
Elections starting in the year
eight hundred twenty four

893
01:05:29,29 --> 01:05:31,55
when popular vote began to be kept

894
01:05:31,55 --> 01:05:36,19
and I looked at the percentage of times if
you took ten percent of the popular vote

895
01:05:36,19 --> 01:05:39,77
and subtracted from the winner
and gave it to the loser.

896
01:05:39,77 --> 01:05:42,10
How often with the outcome change

897
01:05:42,10 --> 01:05:45,09
and the answer isn't eight hundred
twenty four fifty five percent of our

898
01:05:45,09 --> 01:05:48,97
presidential elections would have been
reversed if you couldn't count ten percent

899
01:05:48,97 --> 01:05:51,37
of the paper trail. The argument is made

900
01:05:51,37 --> 01:05:56,16
that security problems with D R E voting
demand remediation of the type proposed in

901
01:05:56,16 --> 01:05:59,86
the bill. Indeed Professor Felten
at Princeton Hari her city and.

902
01:06:00,00 --> 01:06:04,49
Others have done a great service by
exposing security vulnerabilities in voting

903
01:06:04,49 --> 01:06:09,60
systems. Some of these vulnerabilities
are severe and require immediate repair

904
01:06:09,60 --> 01:06:13,12
but the point is that
they are easily remedied.

905
01:06:13,12 --> 01:06:16,35
The question for the committee is what
the proper response to such discoveries

906
01:06:16,35 --> 01:06:20,16
ought to be. When tainted spinach
was found in California.

907
01:06:20,16 --> 01:06:23,77
Congress did not ban the eating or
distribution of leafy vegetables.

908
01:06:23,77 --> 01:06:28,98
Even though at least one human life had
been lost the appropriate reaction to the

909
01:06:28,98 --> 01:06:35,21
discovery of a security flaw in a voting
system is to repair it not to outlaw an

910
01:06:35,21 --> 01:06:38,96
entire category of voting machine with
which we have a quarter century of

911
01:06:38,96 --> 01:06:43,00
experience. It's claimed that observed
reliability problems with V.R.E.

912
01:06:43,00 --> 01:06:46,93
Machines would be alleviated by adding a
paper trail the field experience has shown

913
01:06:46,93 --> 01:06:50,75
the opposite the failure rate of
paper trail D R E's is double

914
01:06:50,75 --> 01:06:53,03
that of the areas without paper trails.

915
01:06:53,03 --> 01:06:53,91
It should be obvious

916
01:06:53,91 --> 01:06:58,07
that adding a new device with moving
mechanical parts to an existing electronic

917
01:06:58,07 --> 01:07:02,49
machine cannot improve its
reliability. The effect of H.R.

918
01:07:02,49 --> 01:07:06,88
Five fifty would be to ban electronic
voting entirely in federal elections.

919
01:07:06,88 --> 01:07:07,83
I want to repeat

920
01:07:07,83 --> 01:07:12,10
that it would be to ban electronic
voting entirely in federal elections.

921
01:07:12,10 --> 01:07:17,11
The reason is that the bill sets forth
conditions that are not met by any D.R.S.

922
01:07:17,11 --> 01:07:19,66
System currently on the
market in the United States.

923
01:07:19,66 --> 01:07:21,99
If it were to pass in its present form.

924
01:07:21,99 --> 01:07:24,39
There could be no more electronic
voting in this country

925
01:07:24,39 --> 01:07:27,80
and Congress would be in the position after
having spent three billion dollars on

926
01:07:27,80 --> 01:07:31,94
new voting equipment of spending billions
more to replace what it just paid for.

927
01:07:31,94 --> 01:07:33,06
I cannot believe

928
01:07:33,06 --> 01:07:36,58
that the numerous sponsors of this
legislation contemplated such an outcome.

929
01:07:36,58 --> 01:07:41,60
Further the bill as written mandates a
system that would violate constitutional

930
01:07:41,60 --> 01:07:44,56
and statutory provisions in
more than half the states.

931
01:07:44,56 --> 01:07:48,91
The secret ballot is regarded as an
essential component of American democracy.

932
01:07:48,91 --> 01:07:50,29
Each one of the D.R.V.

933
01:07:50,29 --> 01:07:51,27
Paper trail systems

934
01:07:51,27 --> 01:07:54,75
that are currently on the market either
enables voters to sell their votes

935
01:07:54,75 --> 01:07:55,77
or allows the government

936
01:07:55,77 --> 01:07:59,89
and the public to discover precisely how
each voter in a jurisdiction has a vote.

937
01:08:00,11 --> 01:08:04,21
I cannot believe that the numerous
sponsors of this legislation contemplated

938
01:08:04,21 --> 01:08:05,12
that outcome either.

939
01:08:05,12 --> 01:08:10,92
I am in favor of voter verification the
proposed bill despite incorporating the

940
01:08:10,92 --> 01:08:15,21
phrase voter verified into its title does
not come close to providing real voter

941
01:08:15,21 --> 01:08:19,26
verification. While it shows the voter
that her choices were properly understood

942
01:08:19,26 --> 01:08:21,10
and recorded by the machine.

943
01:08:21,10 --> 01:08:24,28
It offers no assurance whatsoever
that her ballot was counted

944
01:08:24,28 --> 01:08:26,29
that it ever will be counted or

945
01:08:26,29 --> 01:08:30,09
that it will even be present in the event
of a recall a recount is demanded.

946
01:08:30,09 --> 01:08:34,97
Once the polls have closed the voter
not only has no recourse or remedy.

947
01:08:34,97 --> 01:08:38,51
But is powerless to even determine whether
her vote is part of the final tally

948
01:08:38,51 --> 01:08:42,82
or to object if she believes it isn't
that is not voter verification.

949
01:08:42,82 --> 01:08:45,87
Regardless how it may be denominated
in the text of the bill.

950
01:08:45,87 --> 01:08:46,97
I submit

951
01:08:46,97 --> 01:08:52,05
that if Congress desires to enact a comprehensive
statute mandating voter verification.

952
01:08:52,05 --> 01:08:55,77
It ought to verify whether the proposed
legislation actually accomplishes

953
01:08:55,77 --> 01:08:59,17
that goal. Numerous effective
verification methods are known

954
01:08:59,17 --> 01:09:03,18
that are not based on vulnerable paper
records these have not yet been implemented

955
01:09:03,18 --> 01:09:04,55
in viable commercial systems.

956
01:09:04,55 --> 01:09:05,18
I understand

957
01:09:05,18 --> 01:09:10,18
that scientist at NIST will soon announce
another one if H R five fifty isn't acted

958
01:09:10,18 --> 01:09:12,24
there would be no point
in continuing research

959
01:09:12,24 --> 01:09:16,44
and development in the such system since
the statute would prohibit any system

960
01:09:16,44 --> 01:09:18,32
that didn't use paper records.

961
01:09:18,32 --> 01:09:22,17
PROFESSOR RONALD Revestive MIT has
recently invented a voting method

962
01:09:22,17 --> 01:09:25,78
that allows each voter to verify
after the election is over

963
01:09:25,78 --> 01:09:29,32
that her vote has actually been counted.

964
01:09:29,32 --> 01:09:34,25
A feature that is absent from the systems
contemplated by H.R. Five fifty.

965
01:09:34,25 --> 01:09:37,72
Professor of a system also
allows any member of the public.

966
01:09:37,72 --> 01:09:40,22
To tabulate the results of
the election for herself.

967
01:09:40,22 --> 01:09:44,30
So it's not even necessary to trust
the official count these discoveries

968
01:09:44,30 --> 01:09:47,93
demonstrate that voter verification is
now a ripe area of scientific research

969
01:09:47,93 --> 01:09:53,69
and it is far too early to mandate by
statute a bad non-solution to a presumed

970
01:09:53,69 --> 01:09:57,45
problem. My purpose here today is not
simply to complain about the bill

971
01:09:57,45 --> 01:10:01,60
but to offer constructive alternative.
As part of my written testimony.

972
01:10:01,60 --> 01:10:04,13
I've included a complete markup
of the proposed legislation

973
01:10:04,13 --> 01:10:08,76
that retains its essential positive
features such as voter verification.

974
01:10:08,76 --> 01:10:12,54
But eliminates its ill advised provisions.

975
01:10:12,54 --> 01:10:16,65
I urge the committee not to report the
bill favorably in its present form.

976
01:10:16,65 --> 01:10:21,45
And I thank you for the opportunity to
be here today. Thank you very testimony.

977
01:10:21,45 --> 01:10:28,24
We will now turn to questions from
the committee. And I will begin.

978
01:10:28,24 --> 01:10:32,40
Myself five minutes for the purpose.

979
01:10:32,40 --> 01:10:35,54
Dr Seamus and Terry
just finished with you.

980
01:10:35,54 --> 01:10:40,25
Let me pursue one comment you
made I could pursue many

981
01:10:40,25 --> 01:10:41,67
and I'm sure others will pursue.

982
01:10:41,67 --> 01:10:48,23
But on the one the paper trails are no
more accurate than any other method.

983
01:10:48,23 --> 01:10:54,11
Let me ask if you would also include
paper ballots which are then read by a

984
01:10:54,11 --> 01:10:56,10
computer in that category.

985
01:10:56,10 --> 01:11:00,41
Mr Chairman I don't think I actually made
any comment about the accuracy of voting

986
01:11:00,41 --> 01:11:04,42
systems I think I said that
paper systems weren't secure.

987
01:11:04,42 --> 01:11:10,68
As far as accuracy accuracy is a very
poorly defined concept in voting systems

988
01:11:10,68 --> 01:11:14,66
and extremely difficult to measure because
we need to know in advance the voter's

989
01:11:14,66 --> 01:11:17,36
intent before they go
into the voting booth.

990
01:11:17,36 --> 01:11:21,77
Then we need to see through the entire
chain of custody of all the ballots at the

991
01:11:21,77 --> 01:11:25,73
end whether the final tally really
reflects how the voters intended to vote.

992
01:11:25,73 --> 01:11:30,66
That's nearly unmeasurable except
in small laboratory experiments.

993
01:11:30,66 --> 01:11:33,45
So I actually haven't made
a comment about accuracy.

994
01:11:33,45 --> 01:11:39,71
In general your comments about paper
trails to those of also applies to paper

995
01:11:39,71 --> 01:11:42,45
ballots that are then scandal
like trying to clean.

996
01:11:42,45 --> 01:11:46,56
Paper ballots there are scandal at tronic
we are certainly subject to the same

997
01:11:46,56 --> 01:11:50,41
kinds of tampering fact it's easier in
general to tamper with those because they're

998
01:11:50,41 --> 01:11:53,89
cut sheets of paper their individual
individual pieces of paper.

999
01:11:53,89 --> 01:11:57,88
There are all sorts of problems
with with optical scan voting

1000
01:11:57,88 --> 01:12:00,98
but it's certainly acceptable
as. As a method of voting.

1001
01:12:00,98 --> 01:12:07,01
We we use it in Pennsylvania. It's used
in widespread use around the country.

1002
01:12:07,01 --> 01:12:10,06
Let me just explain that one little bit.

1003
01:12:10,06 --> 01:12:14,83
In terms of recounting for.

1004
01:12:14,83 --> 01:12:18,25
In the case someone demands a
recount in the paper ballot.

1005
01:12:18,25 --> 01:12:23,50
A good reliable for a method of recounting
simply because the voters themselves.

1006
01:12:23,50 --> 01:12:26,39
Have marked that
particular piece of paper.

1007
01:12:26,39 --> 01:12:31,95
No the problem is that once the voter
has marked the ballot and verified

1008
01:12:31,95 --> 01:12:36,14
that the ballot is marked the way
she wants she has no assurance

1009
01:12:36,14 --> 01:12:38,21
that by the time the recount occurs

1010
01:12:38,21 --> 01:12:42,14
that same piece of paper is going to
be in the hands of the re counters.

1011
01:12:42,14 --> 01:12:47,04
LOFGREN from Silicon Valley might
recall that in the two thousand

1012
01:12:47,04 --> 01:12:51,77
and four election in San Francisco three
weeks after the election ballot boxes were

1013
01:12:51,77 --> 01:12:54,29
found floating in San
Francisco Bay with ballots in

1014
01:12:54,29 --> 01:12:59,08
and so we have not solved the problem
security of paper ballots in a widely

1015
01:12:59,08 --> 01:13:00,89
distributed voting system

1016
01:13:00,89 --> 01:13:04,80
that we have in the United States with a
couple of hundred thousand precincts.

1017
01:13:04,80 --> 01:13:11,02
Thank you. I didn't realize we
had since L.B.J. Election and.

1018
01:13:11,02 --> 01:13:14,72
Tammany Hall Prendergast. Thank you.

1019
01:13:14,72 --> 01:13:21,69
And quickly turning to Mr I'm
interested in your comments how easily

1020
01:13:21,69 --> 01:13:27,99
could one access the voting machine
and insert a virus with a comment

1021
01:13:27,99 --> 01:13:33,79
and how long does it take to actually get
the virus in place would someone need to

1022
01:13:33,79 --> 01:13:38,52
access the machine for an appreciable
amount of time or something that a voter

1023
01:13:38,52 --> 01:13:43,29
and of in a voting booth could do it
takes about one minute of access to the

1024
01:13:43,29 --> 01:13:47,69
machine. And I could show you. Roughly
what would be involved. It would involve.

1025
01:13:47,69 --> 01:13:52,11
Opening the door on the side of the machine
which would require getting a key as I

1026
01:13:52,11 --> 01:13:55,65
said those are for sale on the internet
there may be some security tape

1027
01:13:55,65 --> 01:13:59,74
that would need to be removed and
might be missing already. Opening up.

1028
01:14:00,00 --> 01:14:06,41
Store putting in a memory card like
this. Into the side of the machine.

1029
01:14:06,41 --> 01:14:10,38
The memory card would have been prepared
in advance with the computer virus on it

1030
01:14:10,38 --> 01:14:15,52
then pressing the red power button
and waiting about thirty seconds.

1031
01:14:15,52 --> 01:14:18,06
And afterward closing everything
up and putting it back.

1032
01:14:18,06 --> 01:14:18,69
This is something

1033
01:14:18,69 --> 01:14:24,08
that would be unlikely to be doable by
a voter in the in the polling place.

1034
01:14:24,08 --> 01:14:30,64
But if the machine is not if the machine
is not guarded with very careful chain of

1035
01:14:30,64 --> 01:14:32,78
custody throughout its life cycle.

1036
01:14:32,78 --> 01:14:37,92
It can be available to that in my
polling place in Princeton the D.R.V.

1037
01:14:37,92 --> 01:14:41,58
Machines sit on attended over night the
night before the election in a locked

1038
01:14:41,58 --> 01:14:42,14
school lobby

1039
01:14:42,14 --> 01:14:47,66
and how long would it take someone to to
actually get access to the machine to

1040
01:14:47,66 --> 01:14:50,06
figure. Or to write the program.

1041
01:14:50,06 --> 01:14:55,41
If it requires some information
about how the machine works.

1042
01:14:55,41 --> 01:14:57,39
This is not a Manhattan Project.

1043
01:14:57,39 --> 01:15:00,68
It requires a moderate level of
skill in computer programming

1044
01:15:00,68 --> 01:15:05,31
and some limited knowledge
probably the knowledge that has.

1045
01:15:05,31 --> 01:15:06,61
That in this case

1046
01:15:06,61 --> 01:15:11,56
that had leaked from the vendor to the
internet a few years ago would be nearly

1047
01:15:11,56 --> 01:15:12,89
enough and I think

1048
01:15:12,89 --> 01:15:15,65
that an unscrupulous person would not
have difficulty getting the necessary

1049
01:15:15,65 --> 01:15:16,63
information.

1050
01:15:16,63 --> 01:15:22,04
So from the time you started looking at
the machine to devise the virus were what

1051
01:15:22,04 --> 01:15:23,14
sort of timers

1052
01:15:23,14 --> 01:15:29,61
and we got the machine in May At first we
spent a lot of time taking it apart to

1053
01:15:29,61 --> 01:15:31,91
understand everything we
could about how it worked.

1054
01:15:31,91 --> 01:15:35,81
We were interested not only in
whether a virus would be possible

1055
01:15:35,81 --> 01:15:38,93
but we really wanted to understand
all of the security mechanisms

1056
01:15:38,93 --> 01:15:43,38
and we wanted to treat it very carefully
from the time we started developing virus

1057
01:15:43,38 --> 01:15:47,53
code until we had a working
virus. Perhaps a few weeks.

1058
01:15:47,53 --> 01:15:49,38
Thank you very much my time has expired.

1059
01:15:49,38 --> 01:15:53,60
I'm pleased to recognize my ranking member.
Thank you. Nobody from California.

1060
01:15:53,60 --> 01:15:54,67
Thank you so much as Chairman

1061
01:15:54,67 --> 01:15:58,83
and thank you again for this
very interesting hearing.

1062
01:16:00,00 --> 01:16:04,13
One thing I want to say about
my friends in the Senate.

1063
01:16:04,13 --> 01:16:05,82
They have a bill out now saying

1064
01:16:05,82 --> 01:16:11,81
that every polling place should have a
large supply of emergency paper ballots.

1065
01:16:11,81 --> 01:16:14,38
That can be used in emergency situations.

1066
01:16:14,38 --> 01:16:20,25
That's just hair poor we are that's what
we think about voting now in this country

1067
01:16:20,25 --> 01:16:26,16
of ours. And so Senator Dodd and Senator
Boxer and others have to submit this bill.

1068
01:16:26,16 --> 01:16:30,22
But I have also I have said all along
that there is a security issue here.

1069
01:16:30,22 --> 01:16:33,31
There's an issue that
we must a trust issue

1070
01:16:33,31 --> 01:16:37,31
that we must come to bear
with in terms of voters.

1071
01:16:37,31 --> 01:16:43,41
Mr Felt and spoke about when there are

1072
01:16:43,41 --> 01:16:46,13
when there are consequences
there are compromises

1073
01:16:46,13 --> 01:16:49,63
or compromise consequences
bring compromises

1074
01:16:49,63 --> 01:16:52,78
and I want him to expound
a little bit on that.

1075
01:16:52,78 --> 01:16:55,45
And he also said

1076
01:16:55,45 --> 01:17:00,17
that existing election procedures are not
adequate for elections I want you to

1077
01:17:00,17 --> 01:17:04,23
expound on that too sir. And tell me.

1078
01:17:04,23 --> 01:17:10,76
If Mr Dixon feels that paper trail.

1079
01:17:10,76 --> 01:17:16,03
A paper trail is not adequate
expression only for disability.

1080
01:17:16,03 --> 01:17:22,59
Then you are suggesting Mr Felton that
paper trails do cut down on voter fraud.

1081
01:17:22,59 --> 01:17:25,23
So you know we have some imbalance
here if you can just speak to

1082
01:17:25,23 --> 01:17:27,78
that for me on those
issues. Yes Thank you.

1083
01:17:27,78 --> 01:17:33,93
The first for the first if you had
to do with the consequences of.

1084
01:17:33,93 --> 01:17:38,25
Of compromise being worse
an electronic system.

1085
01:17:38,25 --> 01:17:41,16
And in the example that we gave here.

1086
01:17:41,16 --> 01:17:42,18
There is a computer virus

1087
01:17:42,18 --> 01:17:45,31
that will spread itself from
one voting machine to others

1088
01:17:45,31 --> 01:17:50,84
and the consequence is that if someone
is able to compromise one machine.

1089
01:17:50,84 --> 01:17:52,55
The virus can spread to many machines

1090
01:17:52,55 --> 01:17:58,41
and potentially affect all the votes on
all of those machines as compared to.

1091
01:17:58,41 --> 01:17:59,91
Fraud with an old.

1092
01:18:00,00 --> 01:18:04,83
Fashioned ballot box where access to a
ballot box only allows someone to tamper

1093
01:18:04,83 --> 01:18:08,55
with the votes that are in that ballot box
or maybe increase them by some amount

1094
01:18:08,55 --> 01:18:13,49
but what access to one cannot involve
stealing tens of thousands of votes as with

1095
01:18:13,49 --> 01:18:17,37
an electronic system but this virus
as you say can pass from one machine

1096
01:18:17,37 --> 01:18:22,51
or a one voter to the other
I think use data that.

1097
01:18:22,51 --> 01:18:24,13
How can that be when I'm told

1098
01:18:24,13 --> 01:18:29,20
that manufacturers do not give out this
so-called code a secure code that they use.

1099
01:18:29,20 --> 01:18:32,81
How can that then be done with that.

1100
01:18:32,81 --> 01:18:35,98
Well the way that the virus was the way

1101
01:18:35,98 --> 01:18:40,69
that this virus spreads is on these memory
cards the memory cards are programmed

1102
01:18:40,69 --> 01:18:45,13
before an election usually at a central
location in the programmed with the list of

1103
01:18:45,13 --> 01:18:47,77
races and the list of candidates
and so on for that election

1104
01:18:47,77 --> 01:18:50,92
and then they're distributed
out to the polling places

1105
01:18:50,92 --> 01:18:54,83
and put into the voting
machines. That's a possible.

1106
01:18:54,83 --> 01:18:59,45
That's a possible motive travel of the
virus if the virus gets onto a memory card

1107
01:18:59,45 --> 01:19:00,91
at that central location.

1108
01:19:00,91 --> 01:19:04,97
It will then be installed out into the
voting machine after the election.

1109
01:19:04,97 --> 01:19:09,35
The memory cards go in the opposite direction
to carry the votes back to the county

1110
01:19:09,35 --> 01:19:12,13
clerk or board of elections
office to tabulate them.

1111
01:19:12,13 --> 01:19:16,54
And that's that allows the virus
to go in the other direction.

1112
01:19:16,54 --> 01:19:21,32
So a virus in one machine may hitch a ride
on a memory card after an election back

1113
01:19:21,32 --> 01:19:23,87
to the election headquarters
and then potentially.

1114
01:19:23,87 --> 01:19:27,71
SPREAD THEIR on to many other cards which
are then distributed say for the next

1115
01:19:27,71 --> 01:19:28,25
election.

1116
01:19:28,25 --> 01:19:33,77
This is much like the process by which
older computer viruses spread on floppy

1117
01:19:33,77 --> 01:19:39,15
disks. If you put an infected floppy
disk into your P.C. Your P.C.

1118
01:19:39,15 --> 01:19:41,69
Would catch the virus and then it
would spread to any other disk

1119
01:19:41,69 --> 01:19:44,00
that you put into your into your machine.

1120
01:19:44,00 --> 01:19:50,00
So it hitches a ride opportunistically on
top of the the flow of these memory cards

1121
01:19:50,00 --> 01:19:54,92
that happens in running
an election normally.

1122
01:19:54,92 --> 01:19:59,95
How do we answer Mr Dixon's the whole
notion that paper trail leads are not.

1123
01:20:00,00 --> 01:20:04,64
Except old to the disabled and yet
you say cut down on voter fraud.

1124
01:20:04,64 --> 01:20:08,44
Yes I do believe it cuts down on
voter fraud and I do believe that is

1125
01:20:08,44 --> 01:20:12,01
that a paper trail well designed
can be just as accessible.

1126
01:20:12,01 --> 01:20:17,35
Mr Dixon held up the role of paper and
pointed out that he could not view that

1127
01:20:17,35 --> 01:20:21,26
or verify it or audit
it but the Deore system

1128
01:20:21,26 --> 01:20:25,25
that he is advocating stores his
votes on this with which neither he

1129
01:20:25,25 --> 01:20:29,68
nor anyone else can simply look at and
read the problem with these D.I.R.

1130
01:20:29,68 --> 01:20:30,03
Eased

1131
01:20:30,03 --> 01:20:34,52
and the security problem is exactly the
thing Mr Dixon is complaining about the

1132
01:20:34,52 --> 01:20:37,41
inability of any voter
to look at the machine

1133
01:20:37,41 --> 01:20:40,28
and see their vote recorded
a so I don't believe

1134
01:20:40,28 --> 01:20:46,30
that there's a conflict between the use
of a paper trail and accessibility.

1135
01:20:46,30 --> 01:20:47,43
There are just so many questions

1136
01:20:47,43 --> 01:20:54,00
that I have just put all
over the place here I am.

1137
01:20:54,00 --> 01:20:58,22
The whole notion Mr Cunningham

1138
01:20:58,22 --> 01:21:01,77
that you spoke of an icy mind
my red light is on already.

1139
01:21:01,77 --> 01:21:03,12
That's what I'm saying it's just so much

1140
01:21:03,12 --> 01:21:08,24
and so little time to talk with the
second I have a second to go back.

1141
01:21:08,24 --> 01:21:11,91
So I can run a second round.
OK then my second round.

1142
01:21:11,91 --> 01:21:12,94
I'll come back to you Mr Cunningham

1143
01:21:12,94 --> 01:21:18,16
and Mr Shaw Shamas because I do want to
talk with you. Thank you Mr Chairman.

1144
01:21:18,16 --> 01:21:19,24
Thank you.

1145
01:21:19,24 --> 01:21:24,72
Chair recognizes Mr Brady the gentleman
from Pennsylvania think it was the chair Mr

1146
01:21:24,72 --> 01:21:30,02
Craig generously to. The point of inquiry
Well Mr Hope have a chance to speak.

1147
01:21:30,02 --> 01:21:36,44
We have a chance to speak is not
given the unanimous consent will Mr.

1148
01:21:36,44 --> 01:21:42,04
Well I'm just I don't think
voting is a science.

1149
01:21:42,04 --> 01:21:48,09
I think it's a people person thing I
think it's a I think it's a human thing

1150
01:21:48,09 --> 01:21:49,15
and I think

1151
01:21:49,15 --> 01:21:55,04
that anything we do here no matter what
it may be can be attacked can be hacked

1152
01:21:55,04 --> 01:21:59,90
into can be verified can be
ballots boxes can be put in.

1153
01:22:00,00 --> 01:22:01,57
River could not be shown

1154
01:22:01,57 --> 01:22:07,08
but I think we're trying to do is try to
eliminate as best as most as possible.

1155
01:22:07,08 --> 01:22:09,64
All these things that
can possibly go wrong

1156
01:22:09,64 --> 01:22:14,29
and I don't understand why a receipt because
that's what I look as a paper ballot

1157
01:22:14,29 --> 01:22:18,69
as a receipt. Why when you
vote and you get your receipt.

1158
01:22:18,69 --> 01:22:22,12
And you have that and you see what
you voted for and if you don't have

1159
01:22:22,12 --> 01:22:23,81
that then you could if you don't have

1160
01:22:23,81 --> 01:22:26,51
that then you can lodge some
type of protest somewhere.

1161
01:22:26,51 --> 01:22:29,34
If you have no receipt you think
you vote and you don't know

1162
01:22:29,34 --> 01:22:35,04
and it's up to now whatever tabulation
or whatever machine or mechanical

1163
01:22:35,04 --> 01:22:39,58
or scientific tabulation
happens and on the stand.

1164
01:22:39,58 --> 01:22:45,02
Why there would be a problem for
anybody you know having a receipt

1165
01:22:45,02 --> 01:22:50,90
and missed a shame if you are in my
state and you have you have. You have.

1166
01:22:50,90 --> 01:22:54,63
Inspected many many times
the voting machines and

1167
01:22:54,63 --> 01:22:57,61
and from what I understand you had said

1168
01:22:57,61 --> 01:23:02,05
that Alicia's hacker could easily make the
same switch allowing Bush to be changed

1169
01:23:02,05 --> 01:23:08,43
from one vote to thousands of votes then
if that's the case why are these just

1170
01:23:08,43 --> 01:23:11,71
think the system is not reliable
and if that's the case.

1171
01:23:11,71 --> 01:23:14,08
What would be the problem would
have verified paper trail.

1172
01:23:14,08 --> 01:23:17,78
If I come in a vote and I want to
vote for you and I get my paper

1173
01:23:17,78 --> 01:23:18,99
and I says I didn't vote for you.

1174
01:23:18,99 --> 01:23:22,17
I can logic your plate right then and
there if I walk out of it with nothing.

1175
01:23:22,17 --> 01:23:25,68
I don't know who actually voted for one
of many hands or that machine that hacker

1176
01:23:25,68 --> 01:23:28,64
or anybody could probably get in
a vial of the voting process.

1177
01:23:28,64 --> 01:23:31,53
So I don't understand why this
should be should be a problem

1178
01:23:31,53 --> 01:23:34,61
and even in the matter WHAT we
do is still going to be a human.

1179
01:23:34,61 --> 01:23:39,78
Human Factor somewhere someplace somehow
police a voter has the confidence

1180
01:23:39,78 --> 01:23:42,81
that he has a or she has
a piece of paper stating

1181
01:23:42,81 --> 01:23:46,51
that yes I did vote yes if I voted
for and if there was a mistake.

1182
01:23:46,51 --> 01:23:51,43
They may have a chance to rectify right
there that's my only point you know back

1183
01:23:51,43 --> 01:23:55,67
about for my time. Thank you Mr Jim.

1184
01:23:55,67 --> 01:23:59,50
Any answers for incumbents anyone.

1185
01:24:00,00 --> 01:24:02,86
Well I can say Mr Shamus Yes.

1186
01:24:02,86 --> 01:24:04,08
So it's certainly true

1187
01:24:04,08 --> 01:24:08,54
that if a malicious hacker is able
to gain access to a voting machine

1188
01:24:08,54 --> 01:24:11,89
and replace the software that's in there.

1189
01:24:11,89 --> 01:24:17,99
In such a way that that change is not
detected. Then there are severe problems.

1190
01:24:17,99 --> 01:24:21,34
And that's what I say when we have to
when we find security vulnerabilities.

1191
01:24:21,34 --> 01:24:26,04
We have to find ways of plugging them. For
example the vulnerability discovered by.

1192
01:24:26,04 --> 01:24:31,46
Professor Felton's group at Princeton was
known to us in Pennsylvania back in March

1193
01:24:31,46 --> 01:24:34,68
right before our May primary

1194
01:24:34,68 --> 01:24:40,12
and we were forced to make an emergency
remediation in Pennsylvania.

1195
01:24:40,12 --> 01:24:42,90
To blunt the effect of

1196
01:24:42,90 --> 01:24:47,06
that discovered vulnerability because
we wanted to be able to assure county

1197
01:24:47,06 --> 01:24:50,24
election officials and voters
that an intrusion of the kind

1198
01:24:50,24 --> 01:24:54,34
that was demonstrated here today was
not possible or if it had happened.

1199
01:24:54,34 --> 01:24:56,64
The effect of it would have been reversed.

1200
01:24:56,64 --> 01:24:59,97
And so we remediated that we
also instructed the vendor.

1201
01:24:59,97 --> 01:25:04,23
That the next time it comes back for
certification it better have a remediation of

1202
01:25:04,23 --> 01:25:09,21
its own so that we don't have to impose
administrative procedures to make sure

1203
01:25:09,21 --> 01:25:11,31
that that vulnerability
can't be exploited.

1204
01:25:11,31 --> 01:25:14,14
So I'm not minimizing the possibility

1205
01:25:14,14 --> 01:25:16,34
that people are out there
trying to hack things.

1206
01:25:16,34 --> 01:25:17,44
My point is

1207
01:25:17,44 --> 01:25:21,35
that the response to the hack is not
to throw the machines in the ocean

1208
01:25:21,35 --> 01:25:24,56
and go back to what we were doing
in eight hundred ninety there.

1209
01:25:24,56 --> 01:25:28,08
If it's a technological problem
we have a technological solution.

1210
01:25:28,08 --> 01:25:29,93
With respect to the receipt.

1211
01:25:29,93 --> 01:25:33,57
A lot of people think of the word
receipt as meaning something

1212
01:25:33,57 --> 01:25:35,68
that the voter can take home with them.

1213
01:25:35,68 --> 01:25:38,93
And look at it later at
their leisure and show up.

1214
01:25:38,93 --> 01:25:41,45
Maybe at some later time
to an election official

1215
01:25:41,45 --> 01:25:43,07
and say See this is really how I voted.

1216
01:25:43,07 --> 01:25:45,99
It's not legal to give receipts of

1217
01:25:45,99 --> 01:25:48,57
that kind because they could you
can't give a voter anything

1218
01:25:48,57 --> 01:25:52,05
that they could use to prove how they voted
since they could then sell their vote.

1219
01:25:52,05 --> 01:25:53,01
So the receipts

1220
01:25:53,01 --> 01:25:56,78
that we're talking about in these voter
verified paper trail systems the voter has

1221
01:25:56,78 --> 01:25:59,82
a chance to view the receipt
on the machine and then.

1222
01:26:00,00 --> 01:26:03,10
Yes that truly represents my vote or not.

1223
01:26:03,10 --> 01:26:03,77
And then

1224
01:26:03,77 --> 01:26:07,26
when they leave the polling place they
don't have a piece of paper to take with

1225
01:26:07,26 --> 01:26:12,83
them and my point. The point that I
made in my earlier testimony was that.

1226
01:26:12,83 --> 01:26:17,18
It's nice enough to show the voter
that their vote was properly recorded.

1227
01:26:17,18 --> 01:26:19,01
But again there's no assurance

1228
01:26:19,01 --> 01:26:22,97
that at the time the votes are actually
tallied later or recount is done that

1229
01:26:22,97 --> 01:26:26,20
that piece of paper is even around
has been replaced by something else

1230
01:26:26,20 --> 01:26:29,11
and there are people who are working
on the solution to that problem

1231
01:26:29,11 --> 01:26:31,97
and we're not there yet.

1232
01:26:31,97 --> 01:26:37,82
I mean you're talking about voting
you're talking about people

1233
01:26:37,82 --> 01:26:40,03
manipulating.

1234
01:26:40,03 --> 01:26:41,01
That they may

1235
01:26:41,01 --> 01:26:46,32
or may not just know you've become a human
factor if the human factor to some of

1236
01:26:46,32 --> 01:26:47,94
these hell bent on trying
to rig an election.

1237
01:26:47,94 --> 01:26:50,42
We're talking about we're
talking about voter confidence.

1238
01:26:50,42 --> 01:26:53,32
That's what I'm talking about and I'm
not on whether we should you take home

1239
01:26:53,32 --> 01:26:55,28
and say this is what I I
want to change my vote

1240
01:26:55,28 --> 01:26:57,90
or I made a mistake which people do
make a mistake if you make mistakes.

1241
01:26:57,90 --> 01:27:00,61
You make a mistake you can rectify.

1242
01:27:00,61 --> 01:27:04,57
That but I'm saying you're
saying look you see that.

1243
01:27:04,57 --> 01:27:08,49
OK here's my vote for this is what I want
to do push the OK button push the button

1244
01:27:08,49 --> 01:27:13,38
whatever closed. What was the curtain
that you. And I that's all I'm saying.

1245
01:27:13,38 --> 01:27:15,78
If I told you that

1246
01:27:15,78 --> 01:27:20,09
that mechanism could be used to discover
how every voter in the precinct voted it

1247
01:27:20,09 --> 01:27:20,92
might change your mind.

1248
01:27:20,92 --> 01:27:28,06
OK I learned the people with
this electronic scientific

1249
01:27:28,06 --> 01:27:31,94
can show me anything I ever
did in my entire life.

1250
01:27:31,94 --> 01:27:38,87
So this is my make

1251
01:27:38,87 --> 01:27:45,59
an interesting episode quickly in memory
if I just wanted to comment briefly on

1252
01:27:45,59 --> 01:27:49,63
this whole paper issue because I think
we're comparing apples and oranges.

1253
01:27:49,63 --> 01:27:54,62
One of the basic issues is how well
engineered these systems are as somebody who

1254
01:27:54,62 --> 01:27:59,60
was advocating for voter verified paper
audit trails early on before the machines

1255
01:27:59,60 --> 01:28:00,54
were read. Well fitted.

1256
01:28:00,54 --> 01:28:05,33
I have to say I was appalled by what the
voting machine companies came out with

1257
01:28:05,33 --> 01:28:10,11
they are bad. I mean Mr Cunningham
is right this is Jim Dixon is right.

1258
01:28:10,11 --> 01:28:14,76
These continuous rolls of thermal printed
paper have privacy issues as Michael

1259
01:28:14,76 --> 01:28:19,48
Shamus says but they're badly
engineered it's bad technology.

1260
01:28:19,48 --> 01:28:22,55
There's no reason why people
has to be paper. Why V.

1261
01:28:22,55 --> 01:28:25,67
Pads have to be designed that way
they were the cheapest way to do it.

1262
01:28:25,67 --> 01:28:27,75
That was why it was done that way.

1263
01:28:27,75 --> 01:28:32,23
I mean banks deal with paper all
the time they manage to count it

1264
01:28:32,23 --> 01:28:36,23
and I don't think they make many counting
mistakes other countries vote on paper

1265
01:28:36,23 --> 01:28:40,98
and they don't have problems we can
do it too but we have to do it right.

1266
01:28:40,98 --> 01:28:41,80
If you do it wrong.

1267
01:28:41,80 --> 01:28:49,52
It will fail then for the
last quick word Mr Dixon.

1268
01:28:49,52 --> 01:28:54,90
Chairman Ehlers I wanted to respond to
your question about counting optical scan

1269
01:28:54,90 --> 01:29:00,18
ballots by machines we have a lot of
experience in this country with that.

1270
01:29:00,18 --> 01:29:08,37
When you have large numbers of
ballots hundreds of thousands.

1271
01:29:08,37 --> 01:29:14,62
And you've got a close race
every time the obstacles

1272
01:29:14,62 --> 01:29:21,22
and ballots have been counted.
You get a different number.

1273
01:29:21,22 --> 01:29:26,42
You get a different number we
do not have the technology

1274
01:29:26,42 --> 01:29:33,31
to accurately count the
large pieces of paper.

1275
01:29:33,31 --> 01:29:36,98
All right thank you very much.

1276
01:29:36,98 --> 01:29:40,27
Next The chair recognizes and
gentleman from California.

1277
01:29:40,27 --> 01:29:47,00
Ms love going for a five minute Ehrman
I. This is a very helpful. Hearing and.

1278
01:29:47,00 --> 01:29:49,88
As I've listened and it seems to me

1279
01:29:49,88 --> 01:29:56,44
that the point made by Miss Simmons
needs to be emphasized the fact

1280
01:29:56,44 --> 01:29:59,91
that we have a dysfunctional role
doesn't mean that that's the only old.

1281
01:30:00,00 --> 01:30:05,34
And of available as as it
ought of the ball. Trail.

1282
01:30:05,34 --> 01:30:10,08
You know I spent more years on the board
of supervisors in Santa Clara County than

1283
01:30:10,08 --> 01:30:11,13
I have so far.

1284
01:30:11,13 --> 01:30:12,56
In Congress

1285
01:30:12,56 --> 01:30:18,68
and in California the counties are the
repository of the registrar of voters in

1286
01:30:18,68 --> 01:30:23,02
California the registrar of voters is a
civil service position I mean it's very

1287
01:30:23,02 --> 01:30:28,37
nerdish I guess is the best word
you can say in Silicon Valley

1288
01:30:28,37 --> 01:30:30,90
and very apolitical.

1289
01:30:30,90 --> 01:30:33,44
And it wasn't really until I got
on the board of supervisors

1290
01:30:33,44 --> 01:30:36,97
that I realized I guess I've
never really thought about it

1291
01:30:36,97 --> 01:30:40,03
that some of the votes get lost.

1292
01:30:40,03 --> 01:30:41,32
People don't think about that

1293
01:30:41,32 --> 01:30:44,07
but the we had a little
punch cards for a long time

1294
01:30:44,07 --> 01:30:48,25
and it would jam up the machines
election night in and some of the ones

1295
01:30:48,25 --> 01:30:54,59
that got mangled didn't get caught
and it didn't ever at a time

1296
01:30:54,59 --> 01:30:58,11
when the country was less closely
divided than it is today.

1297
01:30:58,11 --> 01:31:02,03
It didn't nobody really noticed
because elections weren't that close

1298
01:31:02,03 --> 01:31:05,60
but of course now we have
close elections all the time

1299
01:31:05,60 --> 01:31:08,49
and we're paying more attention
to it and so I do think

1300
01:31:08,49 --> 01:31:12,53
that we need to make sure you
can't have a perfect system.

1301
01:31:12,53 --> 01:31:14,24
I suspect but

1302
01:31:14,24 --> 01:31:19,68
but we need to have a system where people
do not question the integrity of it.

1303
01:31:19,68 --> 01:31:26,09
I remember going in with a computer
scientist in my district who

1304
01:31:26,09 --> 01:31:31,37
really said this. Yes
you can make a mistake.

1305
01:31:31,37 --> 01:31:34,00
I mean you can take a
ballot box and throw it out

1306
01:31:34,00 --> 01:31:36,69
but the difference with
packing a machine is

1307
01:31:36,69 --> 01:31:42,34
that it's all it's not random the direction
in which those votes are going to be

1308
01:31:42,34 --> 01:31:47,79
lost and so I'm very enticed
by Mr Holt's bill I would note

1309
01:31:47,79 --> 01:31:49,90
that in standard setting
there's been discussion

1310
01:31:49,90 --> 01:31:53,89
that this would eliminate
the privacy of individuals

1311
01:31:53,89 --> 01:31:59,93
but on page three line thirteen of his vote.
It's perspective five says to comply.

1312
01:32:00,00 --> 01:32:02,45
With the act that would
not be permissible.

1313
01:32:02,45 --> 01:32:07,14
So I think you know part of what we do here
in Congress is this is to set standards

1314
01:32:07,14 --> 01:32:11,62
and laws that need to be met just business
does from an engineering point of view.

1315
01:32:11,62 --> 01:32:16,91
I'm wondering. Mr Felton.

1316
01:32:16,91 --> 01:32:18,93
Mr Seamus said something to the fact

1317
01:32:18,93 --> 01:32:23,72
that you could verify other than by paper
means I don't want to misquote you I

1318
01:32:23,72 --> 01:32:27,28
think was something to that
effect. How would you do that.

1319
01:32:27,28 --> 01:32:33,84
With the virus that your lab created how
would you do a verification without.

1320
01:32:33,84 --> 01:32:36,83
Would there be a way. Well.

1321
01:32:36,83 --> 01:32:41,94
I think that the idea of non paper verification
is something that's not ready yet.

1322
01:32:41,94 --> 01:32:45,34
It's an active area of research.

1323
01:32:45,34 --> 01:32:51,35
Mr Seamus referred to Professor vest work
which by the way is a is a an all paper

1324
01:32:51,35 --> 01:32:52,78
system.

1325
01:32:52,78 --> 01:32:55,44
The and that is an interesting proposal

1326
01:32:55,44 --> 01:32:58,70
but I would not want to trust
an election to it tomorrow.

1327
01:32:58,70 --> 01:33:03,39
I think that years from now we may
be in a position to have effective

1328
01:33:03,39 --> 01:33:06,94
and usable non paper based
verification systems

1329
01:33:06,94 --> 01:33:08,34
but I don't believe they're ready yet.

1330
01:33:08,34 --> 01:33:14,58
And I and I don't think we can
afford to wait this Seamus.

1331
01:33:14,58 --> 01:33:21,52
Your testimony has been very interesting
in thank you for your advocacy in your

1332
01:33:21,52 --> 01:33:24,13
work on assuring systems.

1333
01:33:24,13 --> 01:33:26,84
One of the things that you've
suggested that we need to make sure

1334
01:33:26,84 --> 01:33:32,03
that vulnerabilities are protected against
and no one would disagree with that

1335
01:33:32,03 --> 01:33:37,68
but one of things I learned in my
prior life on in local government was

1336
01:33:37,68 --> 01:33:42,08
that elections are kind of not chaotic

1337
01:33:42,08 --> 01:33:48,85
but they're they're not
they're not they're chaotic.

1338
01:33:48,85 --> 01:33:52,29
I mean you've got you know P.T.A.

1339
01:33:52,29 --> 01:33:56,65
Mothers and you've got
volunteers and there's schools

1340
01:33:56,65 --> 01:33:59,89
and it's really I love
Election Day but it's not.

1341
01:34:00,00 --> 01:34:02,22
Really a tightly controlled

1342
01:34:02,22 --> 01:34:07,27
and cannot be because that's not the
way Americans hold elections unless we

1343
01:34:07,27 --> 01:34:08,93
completely fund this

1344
01:34:08,93 --> 01:34:13,17
and have full time paid people I don't
think we're moving in that direction.

1345
01:34:13,17 --> 01:34:19,81
So how would we be able even if
we found this virus I know from

1346
01:34:19,81 --> 01:34:22,92
Silicon Valley I mean there's a
million ways to hack this stuff.

1347
01:34:22,92 --> 01:34:24,81
How do you given the fact

1348
01:34:24,81 --> 01:34:28,86
that we have this chaotic system
we have smart hackers everywhere.

1349
01:34:28,86 --> 01:34:32,90
How do you protect against those
vulnerabilities in your judgment.

1350
01:34:32,90 --> 01:34:34,35
OK So there are several ways.

1351
01:34:34,35 --> 01:34:35,33
One is

1352
01:34:35,33 --> 01:34:39,97
that we're never going to achieve perfection
we're never going to locate all vulnerabilities

1353
01:34:39,97 --> 01:34:44,08
of existence systems because we don't know
how clever people may be in the future

1354
01:34:44,08 --> 01:34:46,86
to get around the protections
that we've built in

1355
01:34:46,86 --> 01:34:50,61
but this is true not just in voting systems
in every kind of system that's ever

1356
01:34:50,61 --> 01:34:54,12
been made there are there later
discovered vulnerabilities.

1357
01:34:54,12 --> 01:34:59,81
So as I said in my testimony I'm in favor
of voter verification voter verification

1358
01:34:59,81 --> 01:35:02,54
is a way of assuring that if if.

1359
01:35:02,54 --> 01:35:05,98
A vulnerability has been exploited
that we're going to know about it.

1360
01:35:05,98 --> 01:35:11,16
I think you just asked about a potential
non paper mechanism for verification.

1361
01:35:11,16 --> 01:35:17,03
I'll give you a very simple one that the
TS unit over there has a touch screen

1362
01:35:17,03 --> 01:35:21,42
that shows things to the voter.
The voter is not positive.

1363
01:35:21,42 --> 01:35:23,85
However that the marks that she makes

1364
01:35:23,85 --> 01:35:28,26
that are visible on the screen are
actually getting recorded by the machine.

1365
01:35:28,26 --> 01:35:34,13
So all we have to do is have a second
screen made by a different manufacturer.

1366
01:35:34,13 --> 01:35:35,76
And we take an electrical wire

1367
01:35:35,76 --> 01:35:39,69
and we get a copy of whatever is on
the first screen to the second screen

1368
01:35:39,69 --> 01:35:42,12
and we attach a digital camera to that.

1369
01:35:42,12 --> 01:35:45,94
So it actually makes a record
of what the screen showed.

1370
01:35:45,94 --> 01:35:49,81
And of the voter has any doubt
that it's been recorded correctly.

1371
01:35:49,81 --> 01:35:52,37
She can press a button that
says replay and it'll show

1372
01:35:52,37 --> 01:35:57,61
or her vote again on the screen. And that
vote gets recorded on a CD or D.V.D.

1373
01:35:57,61 --> 01:36:01,58
and A right one smacked mechanism.
So it can't be tampered with later.

1374
01:36:01,58 --> 01:36:07,17
That's just a trivial example of a
non paper verification mechanism.

1375
01:36:07,17 --> 01:36:11,19
The second way of doing it is through
something called parallel testing which is

1376
01:36:11,19 --> 01:36:14,09
used in at least ten
counties in California.

1377
01:36:14,09 --> 01:36:17,58
It's going to be used in
Massachusetts in November

1378
01:36:17,58 --> 01:36:22,15
and several other states where
you sequester a machine

1379
01:36:22,15 --> 01:36:25,94
or machines during the election during
the actual time of the election

1380
01:36:25,94 --> 01:36:30,16
and you have a team of people vote on
them simulating the way real voters would

1381
01:36:30,16 --> 01:36:31,19
vote.

1382
01:36:31,19 --> 01:36:32,21
Except

1383
01:36:32,21 --> 01:36:36,14
that they vote according to a predefined
script so we know what the total should be

1384
01:36:36,14 --> 01:36:37,40
at the end.

1385
01:36:37,40 --> 01:36:41,44
Then at the close of polls we close that
machine and we see if the totals match

1386
01:36:41,44 --> 01:36:45,64
and if they don't match then we
know that there is a rat somewhere

1387
01:36:45,64 --> 01:36:51,39
and we do a forensic examination
to find out where the rat is.

1388
01:36:51,39 --> 01:36:56,45
The gentleman's time has expired.
Please to recognized or just.

1389
01:36:56,45 --> 01:36:59,74
For five minutes.

1390
01:36:59,74 --> 01:37:06,44
I thank the chairman and I am
pleased to see that we are holding.

1391
01:37:06,44 --> 01:37:10,03
You are holding this hearing and I
welcome the opportunity to be with you

1392
01:37:10,03 --> 01:37:13,72
and I regret

1393
01:37:13,72 --> 01:37:18,12
that the hearing has been held the day
before our target adjournment for the year

1394
01:37:18,12 --> 01:37:23,68
but. Nevertheless I think you put
together a good panel of witnesses.

1395
01:37:23,68 --> 01:37:25,32
Let me just make.

1396
01:37:25,32 --> 01:37:32,15
Two quick comments one is how if
I had the and and anticipated.

1397
01:37:32,15 --> 01:37:37,12
Effect of motivating
jurisdictions to go out

1398
01:37:37,12 --> 01:37:43,00
and buy devices for voting that are
clear simple accessible easy to use

1399
01:37:43,00 --> 01:37:47,39
and totally on verifiable and it may be

1400
01:37:47,39 --> 01:37:51,08
that there are various
future methods of verifying.

1401
01:37:51,08 --> 01:37:54,31
That would be

1402
01:37:54,31 --> 01:37:59,88
that are not yet thought of her not yet
developed but right now we have a.

1403
01:38:00,00 --> 01:38:05,14
A method of verifying where each voter can
verify her vote at the time of voting

1404
01:38:05,14 --> 01:38:10,35
and that is a paper trail and
I do think it can be made.

1405
01:38:10,35 --> 01:38:18,40
Accessible for voters for all voters.

1406
01:38:18,40 --> 01:38:24,41
Mr Seamus just described a
rather Rube Goldberg issue.

1407
01:38:24,41 --> 01:38:29,60
C.C.D. Camera that was going
to photograph another screen.

1408
01:38:29,60 --> 01:38:35,06
The paper record sounds a whole
lot easier to me. But anyway.

1409
01:38:35,06 --> 01:38:41,05
Let me first go to to Mr
Felton Professor Felten

1410
01:38:41,05 --> 01:38:45,93
how detectable would the
virus that you devised or

1411
01:38:45,93 --> 01:38:50,87
that someone might devise be before
during and after the election.

1412
01:38:50,87 --> 01:38:54,65
And let me ask another question.

1413
01:38:54,65 --> 01:38:58,16
I don't know whether you're
familiar enough with the kind of.

1414
01:38:58,16 --> 01:39:03,90
Of chain of custody and other checklists
that Mr Smith puts his machine through.

1415
01:39:03,90 --> 01:39:08,63
Do you think a virus could be implanted.

1416
01:39:08,63 --> 01:39:12,24
In a system that had the kinds
of protections that Mr Smith.

1417
01:39:12,24 --> 01:39:18,63
Describes first the question of how
detectable this would be there is

1418
01:39:18,63 --> 01:39:23,58
there is a long established cat
and mouse game in the P.C.

1419
01:39:23,58 --> 01:39:27,36
World between virus writers
and antivirus companies

1420
01:39:27,36 --> 01:39:31,34
and the virus writers have proven
very successful at making viruses

1421
01:39:31,34 --> 01:39:36,66
that are quite difficult to find especially
in advance and I would expect or.

1422
01:39:36,66 --> 01:39:40,27
I suppose fear that we would
see the same phenomenon here.

1423
01:39:40,27 --> 01:39:44,25
We did not try to make this
virus a stealthy as we could.

1424
01:39:44,25 --> 01:39:48,70
But but I think that if if if
someone used the same methods

1425
01:39:48,70 --> 01:39:49,69
that are used in the P.C.

1426
01:39:49,69 --> 01:39:54,32
World to make viruses hide it would be
very difficult indeed to find in advance

1427
01:39:54,32 --> 01:39:55,95
pre-election logic

1428
01:39:55,95 --> 01:39:59,95
and accuracy testing as has been discussed
here will not you will not find device.

1429
01:40:00,00 --> 01:40:02,86
That we devised because it simply.

1430
01:40:02,86 --> 01:40:07,27
Checks whether whether the machine is
in logic and accuracy testing mode

1431
01:40:07,27 --> 01:40:09,59
or real election mode and if it's a logic

1432
01:40:09,59 --> 01:40:12,68
and accuracy testing though
the virus simply lies low.

1433
01:40:12,68 --> 01:40:15,20
So I think it might be
quite difficult to find

1434
01:40:15,20 --> 01:40:17,18
and I certainly would not have confidence

1435
01:40:17,18 --> 01:40:20,52
that if it were implanted
it could be found.

1436
01:40:20,52 --> 01:40:24,74
The second part of your question related
to the procedures that Mr Smith described.

1437
01:40:24,74 --> 01:40:27,81
And I think those sorts of
procedures are very valuable.

1438
01:40:27,81 --> 01:40:32,31
They do help to close the gap to
close the window of vulnerability.

1439
01:40:32,31 --> 01:40:35,30
But we also have to
recognize that procedures.

1440
01:40:35,30 --> 01:40:38,79
Are not perfect and are
not always followed.

1441
01:40:38,79 --> 01:40:42,47
Like any other part of our election system
there will be gaps there will be errors

1442
01:40:42,47 --> 01:40:46,02
and I still worry despite
the best of procedures

1443
01:40:46,02 --> 01:40:48,54
that the window of
vulnerability opens enough

1444
01:40:48,54 --> 01:40:53,89
that a determined adversary can
get through it. Thank you.

1445
01:40:53,89 --> 01:40:59,31
Mr Shane.

1446
01:40:59,31 --> 01:41:01,03
Yes Mr Smith.

1447
01:41:01,03 --> 01:41:03,29
If there will be another round
of questions I'll be happy

1448
01:41:03,29 --> 01:41:04,51
and I would like to respond

1449
01:41:04,51 --> 01:41:07,85
that out of the think it's comes to the
core of what we're really trying to talk

1450
01:41:07,85 --> 01:41:08,77
about.

1451
01:41:08,77 --> 01:41:14,33
I'd listen to the you know the situation
with regards I'm the only one here by the

1452
01:41:14,33 --> 01:41:16,35
way that uses Deeble TS units

1453
01:41:16,35 --> 01:41:18,60
and I'm the only election
director I guess on the panel

1454
01:41:18,60 --> 01:41:21,64
that does one of the things
that I've been listening to

1455
01:41:21,64 --> 01:41:25,53
and concerned about is how
this virus would spread.

1456
01:41:25,53 --> 01:41:28,83
I am an engineer by background
I'd hold a double a degree.

1457
01:41:28,83 --> 01:41:31,53
So I have some kind of
technical capability and that.

1458
01:41:31,53 --> 01:41:36,27
First of all if you took one and you
corrupted one of the I.C. Your memory card.

1459
01:41:36,27 --> 01:41:41,70
Would get if you took and you.
Corrupted this memory card.

1460
01:41:41,70 --> 01:41:43,69
It's going to go into one machine.

1461
01:41:43,69 --> 01:41:45,67
OK and that one machine

1462
01:41:45,67 --> 01:41:49,63
and my county is probably going to vote
between one hundred one hundred fifty votes

1463
01:41:49,63 --> 01:41:51,19
that's all it's going to be counted on.

1464
01:41:51,19 --> 01:41:57,19
So the issue comes in is this card supposedly
the hand is going to be corrupted.

1465
01:41:57,19 --> 01:41:59,66
OK we'll lose one hundred votes.

1466
01:42:00,00 --> 01:42:04,88
That's not good but it's not like
we're losing fifty thousand votes

1467
01:42:04,88 --> 01:42:09,49
that I have cast in a general election and
the last one in two thousand and four.

1468
01:42:09,49 --> 01:42:12,69
Now this comes out it goes back to

1469
01:42:12,69 --> 01:42:18,52
that end of the process as Mr Felton has
said it's only going to corrupt one more

1470
01:42:18,52 --> 01:42:22,12
machine. The machines
are not interconnected.

1471
01:42:22,12 --> 01:42:27,09
There is not a possibility of
corrupting the five hundred machines

1472
01:42:27,09 --> 01:42:31,32
that I'm going to put in place for the
two thousand and six general election

1473
01:42:31,32 --> 01:42:38,43
that is a you know an issue is a
tactic is not going to happen.

1474
01:42:38,43 --> 01:42:42,01
Now there are a lot of
other things that we do.

1475
01:42:42,01 --> 01:42:47,10
I mean we we have a lot of
security in place we follow

1476
01:42:47,10 --> 01:42:49,85
but I'm very anal about
those types of things

1477
01:42:49,85 --> 01:42:53,84
and I've talked to Mr Felton about
it and I think that he believes

1478
01:42:53,84 --> 01:42:55,52
that in our county we have a good thing.

1479
01:42:55,52 --> 01:43:00,95
The last thing as I'd like to to respond
to this the lender McDonald said I think

1480
01:43:00,95 --> 01:43:04,55
this was even as important as
anything is that the confidence

1481
01:43:04,55 --> 01:43:07,61
that people have in our
equipment is very important.

1482
01:43:07,61 --> 01:43:13,10
I mean I I couldn't say anything
more we taken after every election

1483
01:43:13,10 --> 01:43:16,59
we hand out a response card.

1484
01:43:16,59 --> 01:43:20,87
Given out randomly to our people we say
you know what do you think about the

1485
01:43:20,87 --> 01:43:25,78
process. You want to have whatever.
And I've got in front of you.

1486
01:43:25,78 --> 01:43:30,41
Prius not a technical you
know survey of the type

1487
01:43:30,41 --> 01:43:34,82
but there are seven hundred fifteen
responses you can see the names you can see

1488
01:43:34,82 --> 01:43:39,05
when they the precincts you can see the
election was held for in addition you can

1489
01:43:39,05 --> 01:43:43,94
see their comments ninety nine
point five percent of the people

1490
01:43:43,94 --> 01:43:49,51
that responded to these things in my
county. Said we did an excellent job.

1491
01:43:49,51 --> 01:43:56,43
There was only two people. Only
two the requested a paper trail.

1492
01:43:56,43 --> 01:43:59,56
So I think we're doing a good
job and Forsyth County Georgia.

1493
01:44:00,00 --> 01:44:03,52
I think we're doing an excellent job
and in the tire state of Georgia

1494
01:44:03,52 --> 01:44:06,69
and I think that we need to be.

1495
01:44:06,69 --> 01:44:08,93
I don't want to say recognize work

1496
01:44:08,93 --> 01:44:15,22
but hopefully don't don't impose things on
us which are going to make our job much

1497
01:44:15,22 --> 01:44:17,36
harder to do but I also tell you

1498
01:44:17,36 --> 01:44:21,93
that I agree with Mr Felt with regards
to having you know. Verification.

1499
01:44:21,93 --> 01:44:26,98
But I believe that we do not
need to limit it to paper.

1500
01:44:26,98 --> 01:44:32,02
My time is expired I hope Mr Felton will
get a chance to reply because on my visit

1501
01:44:32,02 --> 01:44:33,07
to his laboratory.

1502
01:44:33,07 --> 01:44:34,38
It was my understanding

1503
01:44:34,38 --> 01:44:40,73
that the message of spreading the virus
is different than Mr Smith seems to

1504
01:44:40,73 --> 01:44:46,20
understand. Very quickly. Could
you give a brief response.

1505
01:44:46,20 --> 01:44:50,73
Well. Without getting into
a long technical debate.

1506
01:44:50,73 --> 01:44:55,99
Let me just say that when this memory
card goes back to the central facility

1507
01:44:55,99 --> 01:45:00,38
and is put into a so-called accumulator
machine which adds up the votes if

1508
01:45:00,38 --> 01:45:02,47
that accumulator machine becomes infected.

1509
01:45:02,47 --> 01:45:05,92
It can then in fact a very large
number of other memory cards

1510
01:45:05,92 --> 01:45:09,64
that are subsequently put
into it. And it acts is as a.

1511
01:45:09,64 --> 01:45:16,06
As is a very very serious
carrier of the of the virus.

1512
01:45:16,06 --> 01:45:20,56
Thank you. Just an announcement
to my colleagues received a note

1513
01:45:20,56 --> 01:45:24,74
that votes are expected between
twelve and twelve fifteen.

1514
01:45:24,74 --> 01:45:27,66
I would like to have a second
round of questions let me suggest

1515
01:45:27,66 --> 01:45:31,81
that each of us tries to limit
ourselves to three minutes.

1516
01:45:31,81 --> 01:45:34,79
And I will begin.

1517
01:45:34,79 --> 01:45:39,11
Then recognize minority
leader of the ranking member.

1518
01:45:39,11 --> 01:45:46,46
Mr Little presumably will be settled
in by then ready with his question.

1519
01:45:46,46 --> 01:45:47,96
Let me.

1520
01:45:47,96 --> 01:45:49,62
We were just talking to Mr Smith

1521
01:45:49,62 --> 01:45:56,25
and I was wondering this is what kind
of system to Georgia have before

1522
01:45:56,25 --> 01:45:59,92
it adopted the electronic system. Why do.

1523
01:46:00,00 --> 01:46:03,07
They see the need to change
to the current system

1524
01:46:03,07 --> 01:46:06,22
and what were some of the problems you
experience with the previous system

1525
01:46:06,22 --> 01:46:10,35
basically is a new system
better than the previous one.

1526
01:46:10,35 --> 01:46:13,50
OK I think I can respond to that.

1527
01:46:13,50 --> 01:46:17,95
Fortunately I took over as director of
elections prior to the introduction of the

1528
01:46:17,95 --> 01:46:20,83
evil Deore machines we had at

1529
01:46:20,83 --> 01:46:24,95
that point in time the punch card
machines by the way I would say

1530
01:46:24,95 --> 01:46:29,18
that the security level that we had on
punch cards was pretty miserable now

1531
01:46:29,18 --> 01:46:29,86
and I've gone through

1532
01:46:29,86 --> 01:46:35,78
and listen to all of the you know the
technique Oh dissertations have gone on our

1533
01:46:35,78 --> 01:46:39,77
punch card machines were monitored by
a computer as well that computer said

1534
01:46:39,77 --> 01:46:42,04
and I it was an I.B.M.

1535
01:46:42,04 --> 01:46:47,14
Three eighty six or something like that
is sad and I clause it that we kept

1536
01:46:47,14 --> 01:46:52,86
and in fact they downloaded software to
it routinely you know over the telephone

1537
01:46:52,86 --> 01:46:57,41
lines. I would say that was highly and
secure and I was and I was mortified at

1538
01:46:57,41 --> 01:46:59,30
that when I thought.

1539
01:46:59,30 --> 01:47:02,24
The changes made changes

1540
01:47:02,24 --> 01:47:07,72
that we had six months prior to the
two thousand and two election.

1541
01:47:07,72 --> 01:47:12,02
DB old machines were
introduced into Georgia.

1542
01:47:12,02 --> 01:47:15,52
We had six months in which to
take this across the entire state

1543
01:47:15,52 --> 01:47:18,23
and I would say the secretary of state

1544
01:47:18,23 --> 01:47:22,56
and the Center for election systems
from Kansas all State University did an

1545
01:47:22,56 --> 01:47:27,28
outstanding job. I tell you I personally
I used to run major computer projects.

1546
01:47:27,28 --> 01:47:31,18
I didn't think they could do it. They did
an outstanding job and we've done it.

1547
01:47:31,18 --> 01:47:33,98
We have continued to hold elections

1548
01:47:33,98 --> 01:47:38,82
and people are very pleased with them
in our state. Are their problems.

1549
01:47:38,82 --> 01:47:39,84
I think some of the things

1550
01:47:39,84 --> 01:47:43,25
that miss them a lender McDonald brought
up with regards to training poll workers

1551
01:47:43,25 --> 01:47:47,84
were very valid and I appreciate the fact
that she's going to continue to fund it.

1552
01:47:47,84 --> 01:47:50,54
I would like to ask her if
she would fund the program.

1553
01:47:50,54 --> 01:47:54,62
Also So that is part and
parcel of a program

1554
01:47:54,62 --> 01:47:57,38
that I have introduced which
is called foresight first vote

1555
01:47:57,38 --> 01:48:00,36
but we also use high
school students. To do it.

1556
01:48:00,36 --> 01:48:04,57
One third of all of my
poll workers are students.

1557
01:48:04,57 --> 01:48:08,74
We've changed the entire complection
of the people in our county.

1558
01:48:08,74 --> 01:48:11,52
Maybe that's why we're running
good elections I don't know

1559
01:48:11,52 --> 01:48:13,44
but I've got poll workers

1560
01:48:13,44 --> 01:48:19,68
that we turn away because we have a very
good program I'm very pleased with it.

1561
01:48:19,68 --> 01:48:21,18
Thank you thank you very much.

1562
01:48:21,18 --> 01:48:26,71
And briefly Mr Cunningham You mentioned
you grew up in a small town in Ohio were

1563
01:48:26,71 --> 01:48:28,77
spent my high school years

1564
01:48:28,77 --> 01:48:33,49
and even smaller town I'm sure
better known as salary ville.

1565
01:48:33,49 --> 01:48:35,38
Population two hundred.

1566
01:48:35,38 --> 01:48:41,60
So we have a question for you about the.

1567
01:48:41,60 --> 01:48:46,35
Technology of the printing paper trail
technology it's relatively new You've

1568
01:48:46,35 --> 01:48:50,85
described the problem is that
even countered with that in Ohio.

1569
01:48:50,85 --> 01:48:57,07
Do you believe improvement could be made
to the printer technology to to make it

1570
01:48:57,07 --> 01:49:01,53
more reliable to capture to vote
totals to avoid the problems they had

1571
01:49:01,53 --> 01:49:06,97
and then with the added complexity they
bring to the system always increase the

1572
01:49:06,97 --> 01:49:11,35
likelihood of failure or do you think
that through sufficient risk research

1573
01:49:11,35 --> 01:49:14,23
and study we could make
them more reliable.

1574
01:49:14,23 --> 01:49:19,79
Well thank you Mr Chairman I have a personal
motto I never buy the first model of

1575
01:49:19,79 --> 01:49:20,28
anything.

1576
01:49:20,28 --> 01:49:24,44
I always let other people figure out
what the problems are before I buy it

1577
01:49:24,44 --> 01:49:28,72
and that's what I think we're in here as
we are in the I think the fact of the

1578
01:49:28,72 --> 01:49:31,35
matter is when the Help
America Vote Act was passed.

1579
01:49:31,35 --> 01:49:35,75
Most of the touch screen voting
machines were by and large prototypes.

1580
01:49:35,75 --> 01:49:38,20
And rushed in to manufacture.

1581
01:49:38,20 --> 01:49:41,70
I'm not taking any issue with
any of the manufacturers

1582
01:49:41,70 --> 01:49:44,65
and I'm not making a comment on
the reliability of their machines

1583
01:49:44,65 --> 01:49:48,78
but I think what we've got on
our hands here is the Model T.

1584
01:49:48,78 --> 01:49:52,66
Ford we are in the early stages.
Now can they be improved.

1585
01:49:52,66 --> 01:49:56,67
Absolutely and I think throughout my
comments I was very definite to say

1586
01:49:56,67 --> 01:50:00,77
that these machines as they
currently set. Not reliable.

1587
01:50:00,77 --> 01:50:03,05
My question back to you though in

1588
01:50:03,05 --> 01:50:07,37
that regard is who's going to pay to fix
it because right now one of the problems

1589
01:50:07,37 --> 01:50:12,24
we have right now is in the last twenty
four months every election jurisdiction in

1590
01:50:12,24 --> 01:50:16,76
this country has spent the three billion
dollars We spoke about earlier on new

1591
01:50:16,76 --> 01:50:21,56
election equipment and
that's what's emplace so.

1592
01:50:21,56 --> 01:50:25,42
Without somebody stepping
forward to fund that

1593
01:50:25,42 --> 01:50:29,66
that enterprise I don't know how we're
going to improve them ourselves.

1594
01:50:29,66 --> 01:50:31,36
And if I could offer

1595
01:50:31,36 --> 01:50:36,80
and I like in running an election to throw
in a package of Bibi's on your kitchen

1596
01:50:36,80 --> 01:50:40,15
table and while somebody is
on each leg moving the table.

1597
01:50:40,15 --> 01:50:42,57
You're trying to keep them all
on the table all day long.

1598
01:50:42,57 --> 01:50:49,39
That's that's why analogy of elections.
Thank you for that discouraging about.

1599
01:50:49,39 --> 01:50:56,14
Well that's that's why I'm actually
recognize the ranking member for five

1600
01:50:56,14 --> 01:50:57,34
minutes. Thank you Mr Chairman

1601
01:50:57,34 --> 01:51:01,61
and let me again thank you so much for
this hearing this has been just absolutely

1602
01:51:01,61 --> 01:51:03,24
the most informative hearing

1603
01:51:03,24 --> 01:51:08,16
that one of the great ones
we've had is to counting him.

1604
01:51:08,16 --> 01:51:11,02
I thank you for saying that we all agree

1605
01:51:11,02 --> 01:51:13,59
that some type of
verification system is needed

1606
01:51:13,59 --> 01:51:16,57
and at least we have a
consensus here for that.

1607
01:51:16,57 --> 01:51:18,87
But you did speak of the fact

1608
01:51:18,87 --> 01:51:25,25
that you are adamantly opposed to any
program such as yours in your state.

1609
01:51:25,25 --> 01:51:30,11
Which makes the pact the official
ballot of record for recount.

1610
01:51:30,11 --> 01:51:34,75
What did you do if I'm not mistaken
Ohio lost ten thousand ballots

1611
01:51:34,75 --> 01:51:36,03
and what happened here. Given

1612
01:51:36,03 --> 01:51:41,59
that you were unable to recount because
you can't reprint am I correct on that.

1613
01:51:41,59 --> 01:51:44,76
I'm not I mean in Ohio.

1614
01:51:44,76 --> 01:51:47,42
What election are you talking
about it was my understanding

1615
01:51:47,42 --> 01:51:49,66
that there were ten thousand votes

1616
01:51:49,66 --> 01:51:55,36
that were unable to be recounted because
you're unable to reprint it in the sigh.

1617
01:51:55,36 --> 01:51:59,81
Yes and we partner Well ten
percent of the v Pats.

1618
01:52:00,00 --> 01:52:04,09
Counted forget what the
numbers were exactly.

1619
01:52:04,09 --> 01:52:07,24
I believe the statement
that I made it is and is

1620
01:52:07,24 --> 01:52:11,94
that nearly ten percent of the tapes are
either destroyed blank missing tape

1621
01:52:11,94 --> 01:52:14,95
together or otherwise
compromised in some way.

1622
01:52:14,95 --> 01:52:19,30
I don't I don't think that it would
be correctly mathematically to say

1623
01:52:19,30 --> 01:52:22,37
that it was ten percent of the
votes by say ten percent of the V.

1624
01:52:22,37 --> 01:52:26,67
Pat tapes based on what we reviewed
had some kind of compromise

1625
01:52:26,67 --> 01:52:30,71
that made it very difficult to
ascertain what the real numbers were

1626
01:52:30,71 --> 01:52:33,55
but to make a valid point
that because of the V.

1627
01:52:33,55 --> 01:52:38,44
PAC one is unable to reprint therefore
voters will be unable to discern whether

1628
01:52:38,44 --> 01:52:43,89
or not their vote counted in an election
am I correct on that I'm sorry repeat

1629
01:52:43,89 --> 01:52:47,12
that I am I correct in saying

1630
01:52:47,12 --> 01:52:51,30
that because the packed.

1631
01:52:51,30 --> 01:52:55,30
It's official ballot of
records for recount purposes.

1632
01:52:55,30 --> 01:52:57,86
That if you should need a recount.

1633
01:52:57,86 --> 01:53:03,47
You cannot go to a reprint discern whether
those votes that are exactly right.

1634
01:53:03,47 --> 01:53:09,33
And I would submit to
you that to reconcile

1635
01:53:09,33 --> 01:53:12,66
and verify vote totals on
an electronic machine.

1636
01:53:12,66 --> 01:53:15,31
There are better ways to do it

1637
01:53:15,31 --> 01:53:19,57
and more controlled environments
than the Election Day environment

1638
01:53:19,57 --> 01:53:23,06
that I just mentioned in Unst For instance

1639
01:53:23,06 --> 01:53:26,61
when the machine is back in the office
and other records that are stored in

1640
01:53:26,61 --> 01:53:31,38
that machine can be printed and
otherwise looked at electronically.

1641
01:53:31,38 --> 01:53:35,65
You know we work every day on this try.

1642
01:53:35,65 --> 01:53:38,33
I mean that that is my job is to try

1643
01:53:38,33 --> 01:53:42,90
and reconcile those numbers
at the end of the day

1644
01:53:42,90 --> 01:53:49,81
but trying to maintain this contemporaneous
record in the current state

1645
01:53:49,81 --> 01:53:53,26
that it's in. And I think we've.

1646
01:53:53,26 --> 01:53:56,08
I'm just saying is it's
never going to match

1647
01:53:56,08 --> 01:53:59,86
and it's only going to
fuel this this fire.

1648
01:54:00,00 --> 01:54:01,87
That voting systems don't work

1649
01:54:01,87 --> 01:54:07,18
and I think Ohio has set itself in
a very very dangerous situation.

1650
01:54:07,18 --> 01:54:09,90
If I may just go along with

1651
01:54:09,90 --> 01:54:13,81
that I know there has been a little talk
here about we're only concerned with

1652
01:54:13,81 --> 01:54:15,30
federal elections.

1653
01:54:15,30 --> 01:54:20,24
You know the least frequent election
I run is a federal election.

1654
01:54:20,24 --> 01:54:24,40
So we need to be very careful
that one of the problems

1655
01:54:24,40 --> 01:54:28,68
that has occurred since the passage
of Hava was it put many state rules

1656
01:54:28,68 --> 01:54:32,52
and regulations in conflict with
the federal law. Absolutely.

1657
01:54:32,52 --> 01:54:35,97
What we ended up with was these
rules apply in a federal election

1658
01:54:35,97 --> 01:54:41,99
and these rules apply to local
election. That's a terrible situation.

1659
01:54:41,99 --> 01:54:47,48
We cannot operate this enterprise with two
sets of standards so I couldn't agree

1660
01:54:47,48 --> 01:54:53,08
with you more please do not think in terms
of only federal elections because it is

1661
01:54:53,08 --> 01:54:57,35
a very problematic proposition because
you know what sir in a given election.

1662
01:54:57,35 --> 01:55:02,00
You have three different laws that
you perhaps might have to implement.

1663
01:55:02,00 --> 01:55:04,67
Local charters state and federal

1664
01:55:04,67 --> 01:55:10,94
and you know my hat's off to all of you
local elected ones who have to balance

1665
01:55:10,94 --> 01:55:13,78
and balances between.

1666
01:55:13,78 --> 01:55:19,74
The Trenches it is it is
just really problematic.

1667
01:55:19,74 --> 01:55:23,11
Mr Man's let you close me down.

1668
01:55:23,11 --> 01:55:25,91
Because I wanted to go to this Seamus

1669
01:55:25,91 --> 01:55:31,21
but I just have second
here for you to come in.

1670
01:55:31,21 --> 01:55:36,09
I wanted to remind the panelists of what
happened in Qatar at counting North

1671
01:55:36,09 --> 01:55:40,54
Carolina. I believe it was zero
four where paperless D.R.S.

1672
01:55:40,54 --> 01:55:41,24
Were used

1673
01:55:41,24 --> 01:55:44,59
and over four thousand votes we lost I
mean there's this concern about being able

1674
01:55:44,59 --> 01:55:47,70
to reprint paper ballots or paper v pads

1675
01:55:47,70 --> 01:55:52,09
when you lose votes in a
Deore which has no paper.

1676
01:55:52,09 --> 01:55:55,49
There is nothing you can do and
in fact there was an election.

1677
01:55:55,49 --> 01:55:58,48
For the statewide election for
agricultural commissioner.

1678
01:56:00,00 --> 01:56:02,75
Where the separation between
the two candidates.

1679
01:56:02,75 --> 01:56:07,61
Was such that the results could have
been reversed by those missing votes

1680
01:56:07,61 --> 01:56:11,28
and it went to court it went to two different
courts where they first tried to hold

1681
01:56:11,28 --> 01:56:14,79
a recount just for card
for the county itself

1682
01:56:14,79 --> 01:56:17,96
that was thrown out then it went
to four statewide recount and

1683
01:56:17,96 --> 01:56:21,02
that was thrown out because we had
no laws to deal with what happens

1684
01:56:21,02 --> 01:56:26,02
when the armies fail. And finally there
were a number of people who submitted.

1685
01:56:26,02 --> 01:56:30,83
Subpoenas petitions say they had
voted for one of the candidates

1686
01:56:30,83 --> 01:56:33,32
and based on those submissions.

1687
01:56:33,32 --> 01:56:36,27
It looked like the judge was going to
declare that candidate the winner and so

1688
01:56:36,27 --> 01:56:39,72
that was how the election was decided this
is not a way to hold elections in this

1689
01:56:39,72 --> 01:56:45,06
country and this is a problem with the
Auris No Matt paperless D.-R. Ease.

1690
01:56:45,06 --> 01:56:48,88
This is a case of a failure but
there are many other problems too.

1691
01:56:48,88 --> 01:56:54,41
We haven't even touched upon security
problems such as for example the risk of of

1692
01:56:54,41 --> 01:56:55,50
somebody.

1693
01:56:55,50 --> 01:56:58,07
Malicious getting a job for the vendor

1694
01:56:58,07 --> 01:57:00,45
or for the delivery service
of some implanted.

1695
01:57:00,45 --> 01:57:04,35
Malicious code that way we know
that all software is buggy.

1696
01:57:04,35 --> 01:57:09,76
We don't know for example if elections have
been wrongly recorded because of buggy

1697
01:57:09,76 --> 01:57:12,41
software forget malicious code so.

1698
01:57:12,41 --> 01:57:17,07
So there are so many basic problems
that we just have no way of verifying

1699
01:57:17,07 --> 01:57:18,61
that elections

1700
01:57:18,61 --> 01:57:22,20
that were held on people's voting machines
we cannot verify them at this point.

1701
01:57:22,20 --> 01:57:24,22
They Juncker many times.

1702
01:57:24,22 --> 01:57:30,44
Why the average voter now is
so they fold over elections.

1703
01:57:30,44 --> 01:57:34,59
And most of us are average voters.

1704
01:57:34,59 --> 01:57:38,53
So the trick is to recognize the gentleman
from California must do a little for

1705
01:57:38,53 --> 01:57:42,82
five minutes to Chairman.

1706
01:57:42,82 --> 01:57:47,88
Mr Simmons your written statement
said quote unless there is evidence

1707
01:57:47,88 --> 01:57:54,59
that the the V P B S have been
compromised the paper ballots should

1708
01:57:54,59 --> 01:57:57,87
be used to determine the election results.

1709
01:57:57,87 --> 01:57:59,81
And I want to ask what
sort of evidence of.

1710
01:58:00,00 --> 01:58:04,56
Compromise where you refer and well
obviously if you have the kind of mess

1711
01:58:04,56 --> 01:58:09,64
that Mr Cunningham talked about that that
would raise a lot of concerns I mean

1712
01:58:09,64 --> 01:58:10,96
when you don't have all of the V.P.

1713
01:58:10,96 --> 01:58:15,70
Pads and I I share his concern
about that kind of technology

1714
01:58:15,70 --> 01:58:21,57
and I think we just have to remember that
that's not the way the Pats or the P.B.S.

1715
01:58:21,57 --> 01:58:24,66
Have to be done. We need
to have good engineering.

1716
01:58:24,66 --> 01:58:25,81
We need to have high standards

1717
01:58:25,81 --> 01:58:30,24
and we have to hold vendors to high standards
they should not be allowed to produce

1718
01:58:30,24 --> 01:58:33,53
machines that can create
this kind of mess.

1719
01:58:33,53 --> 01:58:38,56
Well they are machines and I notice
that machines occasionally make messes.

1720
01:58:38,56 --> 01:58:41,66
Well but you know you. Sometimes
you get what you pay for.

1721
01:58:41,66 --> 01:58:46,85
We know I mean you can buy
printers that don't jam.

1722
01:58:46,85 --> 01:58:48,11
You can buy printers

1723
01:58:48,11 --> 01:58:52,61
that the don't have privacy issues they're
the me this is not rocket science.

1724
01:58:52,61 --> 01:58:56,71
These things exist now these technologies
exist now and I think a question

1725
01:58:56,71 --> 01:59:01,06
that we have to ask ourselves is how much
are we willing to pay for our democracy.

1726
01:59:01,06 --> 01:59:03,07
Do you know how many I really have like

1727
01:59:03,07 --> 01:59:08,31
and our republic I think yes.

1728
01:59:08,31 --> 01:59:11,56
Now I apologize because
I should have been here

1729
01:59:11,56 --> 01:59:14,85
and I just I couldn't be here earlier
so I missed the direct testimony

1730
01:59:14,85 --> 01:59:21,62
but I think Mr Cunningham is from
Allen County right but there was a.

1731
01:59:21,62 --> 01:59:26,82
There was an incident in Cuyahoga County.

1732
01:59:26,82 --> 01:59:31,49
Where there was a problem. I just
wondered if you could tell us.

1733
01:59:31,49 --> 01:59:32,46
Miss Sims do you think

1734
01:59:32,46 --> 01:59:38,66
that the the seven it's a compromise is
revealed in the higher Cuyahoga recount sir

1735
01:59:38,66 --> 01:59:39,64
that's what I was referring to.

1736
01:59:39,64 --> 01:59:46,62
Oh OK All right well do you think
the paper trail should have

1737
01:59:46,62 --> 01:59:52,84
been used as the official
ballot in that case.

1738
01:59:52,84 --> 01:59:56,65
Because that was that's kind of the
obviously in that case it's a problem.

1739
01:59:56,65 --> 02:00:02,03
It's a real problem just as the card.
County example is a real problem too.

1740
02:00:02,03 --> 02:00:06,32
We can see problems with the paperless
systems and problems with the systems

1741
02:00:06,32 --> 02:00:08,34
that have been retrofitted with easy pets

1742
02:00:08,34 --> 02:00:13,69
and I think the underlying issue which I
believe everyone on this panel would agree

1743
02:00:13,69 --> 02:00:18,37
on is that we need to have well
engineered well designed robust systems

1744
02:00:18,37 --> 02:00:21,70
and as Mr Cunningham said this
is sort of like the Model T.

1745
02:00:21,70 --> 02:00:25,17
Visa first generations and they
are failing. That's not good.

1746
02:00:25,17 --> 02:00:29,20
Well I understand the Model T.

1747
02:00:29,20 --> 02:00:29,92
Analogy

1748
02:00:29,92 --> 02:00:32,89
but I don't think the members of this
committee in the Congress in general want to

1749
02:00:32,89 --> 02:00:36,42
throw away hundreds of millions
of dollars on the Model T.

1750
02:00:36,42 --> 02:00:41,92
Mr Dixon would you like to
comment. Yes there are two points.

1751
02:00:41,92 --> 02:00:48,91
The loss of votes is is really a terrible
situation is really what's are the

1752
02:00:48,91 --> 02:00:52,41
loss of any votes is a
terrible situation. Thank you.

1753
02:00:52,41 --> 02:00:58,83
What's get lost on paper to the chair
your right county voting machine is.

1754
02:00:58,83 --> 02:01:03,21
Does not meet the current standards.

1755
02:01:03,21 --> 02:01:04,71
If

1756
02:01:04,71 --> 02:01:11,43
that county had purchased an excess above
voting machine built to the current

1757
02:01:11,43 --> 02:01:17,31
standards that problem
would not have happened.

1758
02:01:17,31 --> 02:01:22,80
The Cal you are at machine a little red
light comes on with no words around it

1759
02:01:22,80 --> 02:01:24,71
that says this machine is full.

1760
02:01:24,71 --> 02:01:28,43
There was no explanation in
the training for poll workers

1761
02:01:28,43 --> 02:01:32,75
that said this read like means the machine
is for this automatic Senate bill

1762
02:01:32,75 --> 02:01:36,11
machines the screen reads machine for all

1763
02:01:36,11 --> 02:01:39,73
that it will not accept
new machine new votes.

1764
02:01:39,73 --> 02:01:44,50
Where as you said what are you
talking about which which machine.

1765
02:01:44,50 --> 02:01:46,22
Are you talking with the
one in Cuyahoga County.

1766
02:01:46,22 --> 02:01:53,01
No I'm talking about Caught red
county in North Carolina where

1767
02:01:53,01 --> 02:01:58,96
votes were lost on a voting
machine. That county administrator.

1768
02:02:00,00 --> 02:02:03,93
Wanted to buy accessible voting equipment

1769
02:02:03,93 --> 02:02:08,60
and the purchase of it was delayed.

1770
02:02:08,60 --> 02:02:13,42
Because of the motion about a paper trail.

1771
02:02:13,42 --> 02:02:18,35
And the problem was created
because of a delay.

1772
02:02:18,35 --> 02:02:24,64
Well I just wonder in that
Cuyahoga County case I understand

1773
02:02:24,64 --> 02:02:29,52
that the paper trail which is the I think
Mr Holt bill is going to be the thing we

1774
02:02:29,52 --> 02:02:32,24
go by if there's a conflict that in

1775
02:02:32,24 --> 02:02:37,69
that case a paper trail lost nearly
ten percent of the votes so.

1776
02:02:37,69 --> 02:02:43,48
It would seem that there'd be real
problems in that instance at least.

1777
02:02:43,48 --> 02:02:46,62
Hopefully that would be
relatively rare but.

1778
02:02:46,62 --> 02:02:47,19
In

1779
02:02:47,19 --> 02:02:51,14
that instance if we want by the paper trails
the bill calls for we would be having

1780
02:02:51,14 --> 02:02:54,81
a lot of problems with me. Oh
actually there were many problems.

1781
02:02:54,81 --> 02:02:55,81
In that county

1782
02:02:55,81 --> 02:03:00,49
and this is the I think this is really
interesting example where there was a very

1783
02:03:00,49 --> 02:03:07,21
thorough analysis done of
the situation in fact I.

1784
02:03:07,21 --> 02:03:09,79
I understand there are
problems with the D.R. Ease.

1785
02:03:09,79 --> 02:03:13,90
That the redundant memories did not match
in about twenty six percent of the cases.

1786
02:03:13,90 --> 02:03:17,83
So if you're going to try to do verification
using the redundant memories there can

1787
02:03:17,83 --> 02:03:18,47
be issues.

1788
02:03:18,47 --> 02:03:22,70
I mean there was so many problems I think
I'm sure you would acknowledge that

1789
02:03:22,70 --> 02:03:26,44
that it wasn't just the Wii
pads and this just shows

1790
02:03:26,44 --> 02:03:32,15
that we need to to focus more on
technology on policies and procedures

1791
02:03:32,15 --> 02:03:37,41
and as Mr Cunningham said right
in elections a complicated thing.

1792
02:03:37,41 --> 02:03:41,19
But because there were problems in one
area doesn't mean that everything in

1793
02:03:41,19 --> 02:03:45,11
that area can't be done as I said Banks
count banks deal with money with paper

1794
02:03:45,11 --> 02:03:49,12
ballots all the time Canada holds its
federal election using paper ballots.

1795
02:03:49,12 --> 02:03:51,50
So does the U.K. and They manage.

1796
02:03:51,50 --> 02:03:56,26
Well in this case the paper trail didn't
solve the problem right because it was

1797
02:03:56,26 --> 02:03:59,95
badly engineered while the
point is paper is not.

1798
02:04:00,00 --> 02:04:04,08
The ultimate solution but
thankfully time has expired.

1799
02:04:04,08 --> 02:04:10,31
Mr Brady do is recognize for thank you
Mr Chairman we went through we're going

1800
02:04:10,31 --> 02:04:12,02
through as I speak in my city

1801
02:04:12,02 --> 02:04:15,92
and county of Philadelphia a write in
ballot write in candidate as you head

1802
02:04:15,92 --> 02:04:19,72
and we're doing that as we
speak. And we're in court.

1803
02:04:19,72 --> 02:04:23,30
Now because the candidate on
machine one then they had a paper

1804
02:04:23,30 --> 02:04:27,14
that they can write on and they're counting
the write on about right about let's

1805
02:04:27,14 --> 02:04:28,27
and that person. Now one

1806
02:04:28,27 --> 02:04:31,85
and then after we do one of the side of
courts at least we have the opportunity to

1807
02:04:31,85 --> 02:04:37,77
do that. And I heard that you
have ways of. Rectifying or.

1808
02:04:37,77 --> 02:04:42,72
Double checking you know votes by people
voting electronically than having a camera

1809
02:04:42,72 --> 02:04:47,41
with a lot of people on a good
faith in any kind of electronics

1810
02:04:47,41 --> 02:04:51,28
and what we're trying to do here is the
right thing we're trying to restore

1811
02:04:51,28 --> 02:04:56,79
confidence and most importantly trying
to restore trust back into our process

1812
02:04:56,79 --> 02:04:58,96
and we're trying to figure
out the best way to do that

1813
02:04:58,96 --> 02:05:00,40
and I understand there's
a financial problem

1814
02:05:00,40 --> 02:05:02,64
and I understand it was a financial issue

1815
02:05:02,64 --> 02:05:07,21
but I like what you said you know you know
how much you know there's never enough

1816
02:05:07,21 --> 02:05:08,62
money to.

1817
02:05:08,62 --> 02:05:14,26
There's always find some money to ensure
democracy and I just described that.

1818
02:05:14,26 --> 02:05:21,18
Thank you to recognize a gentleman from
California. Thank you Mr Chairman.

1819
02:05:21,18 --> 02:05:27,84
At the conclusion of my first set of
questions Mr Shamus had described

1820
02:05:27,84 --> 02:05:31,73
alternative ways to verify the vote.

1821
02:05:31,73 --> 02:05:35,58
I'm wondering if Mr Felt do you
have a comment on those proposals

1822
02:05:35,58 --> 02:05:37,89
and also on the Simmons.

1823
02:05:37,89 --> 02:05:43,62
Yes if I recall correctly he mentioned two
mechanisms one involving a second screen

1824
02:05:43,62 --> 02:05:45,41
and a video camera and so on

1825
02:05:45,41 --> 02:05:51,51
and it seems to me more complicated more
expensive than a paper based verification

1826
02:05:51,51 --> 02:05:56,63
system and and probably
not any more trustworthy.

1827
02:05:56,63 --> 02:05:59,92
He also mentioned parallel
testing which involves.

1828
02:06:00,00 --> 02:06:02,34
Taking the machine aside and holding a.

1829
02:06:02,34 --> 02:06:03,63
Simulated election

1830
02:06:03,63 --> 02:06:06,66
and this is something we discussed
in some detail in our research paper

1831
02:06:06,66 --> 02:06:10,08
and the bottom line is that
that is a worthwhile mechanism

1832
02:06:10,08 --> 02:06:15,38
but it's not completely effective not one
hundred percent effective at finding the

1833
02:06:15,38 --> 02:06:18,83
problem. It raises the bar makes
it more difficult to make a virus.

1834
02:06:18,83 --> 02:06:22,02
For example that will evade detection
but it's not a complete solution.

1835
02:06:22,02 --> 02:06:25,88
We should do it but we shouldn't
we should not believe

1836
02:06:25,88 --> 02:06:29,55
that it's going to entirely
fix the problem. And.

1837
02:06:29,55 --> 02:06:33,06
To take up on its comments.

1838
02:06:33,06 --> 02:06:36,42
The the first of the alternate device that

1839
02:06:36,42 --> 02:06:42,10
that Professor Seamus mentioned makes
it very difficult to hold a recount

1840
02:06:42,10 --> 02:06:45,12
and I think when one is
thinking about these things and

1841
02:06:45,12 --> 02:06:48,61
when you talk about trying to get
public confidence in elections.

1842
02:06:48,61 --> 02:06:51,73
One way in which you do that
is by audits and recounts

1843
02:06:51,73 --> 02:06:53,67
and I don't know how you
would audit that screen.

1844
02:06:53,67 --> 02:06:57,03
It seems to me it would have the same
problems that these long rules of paper

1845
02:06:57,03 --> 02:06:59,93
that Mr Cunningham showed you've got
someone who's going to sit in front of it

1846
02:06:59,93 --> 02:07:02,25
and say well this one voted
here and this one voted.

1847
02:07:02,25 --> 02:07:08,22
There was just Smith Do you have
a comment. Oh I cut you off.

1848
02:07:08,22 --> 02:07:12,06
Barbara I didn't know you made me I thin
it's yes I thought you had as far as

1849
02:07:12,06 --> 02:07:15,61
parallel testing goes well first of all
if you want to count if you want to count

1850
02:07:15,61 --> 02:07:15,99
things.

1851
02:07:15,99 --> 02:07:19,72
The best way to count things is the way you
count money used you sorted into piles

1852
02:07:19,72 --> 02:07:23,10
new count each pile and that can be
done transparently and with a T.V.

1853
02:07:23,10 --> 02:07:27,23
Camera watching the count as a way of
getting confidence in the in the results.

1854
02:07:27,23 --> 02:07:30,53
The other thing as far as parallel testing
goes I think we all agree parallel

1855
02:07:30,53 --> 02:07:33,93
testing is a good thing to do
but there's a big what ifs in

1856
02:07:33,93 --> 02:07:38,63
that what if is what if you find a
problem with the parallel testing.

1857
02:07:38,63 --> 02:07:41,81
Are you going to go back and rerun the
election as we saw at Catterick county

1858
02:07:41,81 --> 02:07:45,75
that that raises enormous legal
and technical problems. Mr SMITH.

1859
02:07:45,75 --> 02:07:49,63
You know I guess what I'd like to speak
about is from the complexity of the

1860
02:07:49,63 --> 02:07:53,23
operation. You're trying to do
to bring about one of the things

1861
02:07:53,23 --> 02:07:57,41
that we've got in Georgia is we have a
more simple format I think for running the

1862
02:07:57,41 --> 02:08:01,89
election because we do not have voted
verifiable. Well one of the issues.

1863
02:08:01,89 --> 02:08:04,10
I actually was charged with.

1864
02:08:04,10 --> 02:08:08,50
Running the manual recount so I
have some experience with that too.

1865
02:08:08,50 --> 02:08:11,34
I want to see it being done because
being talked about in our state.

1866
02:08:11,34 --> 02:08:15,20
One of the concerns that I have and I think
we all should look back to is you know.

1867
02:08:15,20 --> 02:08:17,13
Who are the people are going
to be putting this stuff

1868
02:08:17,13 --> 02:08:19,00
and operation on Election Day.

1869
02:08:19,00 --> 02:08:22,00
I mean you know it's typical
We have done things you.

1870
02:08:22,00 --> 02:08:26,73
You see it we don't have we have part time
people who are volunteers who really try

1871
02:08:26,73 --> 02:08:27,23
to do things

1872
02:08:27,23 --> 02:08:30,25
but they've gotten up at four o'clock in
the morning five o'clock the morning had

1873
02:08:30,25 --> 02:08:33,83
gotten there they have to open the machines
up they have to do all the other things

1874
02:08:33,83 --> 02:08:39,13
in Ohio with the the path for Cuyahoga
County they had to do other things

1875
02:08:39,13 --> 02:08:41,73
that we didn't have to do
they go through the logic

1876
02:08:41,73 --> 02:08:44,34
and accuracy testing
essentially right there.

1877
02:08:44,34 --> 02:08:48,79
They enter the machines they start him off
they do everything they bring the memory

1878
02:08:48,79 --> 02:08:49,69
cards are

1879
02:08:49,69 --> 02:08:54,00
that part of the problem was is the memory
cards weren't ends in weren't seated

1880
02:08:54,00 --> 02:08:55,53
properly. That was a problem

1881
02:08:55,53 --> 02:09:01,34
but the other thing is they had to be
responsible for these printers you know in

1882
02:09:01,34 --> 02:09:04,91
some cases favoring backwards
let's let me explore

1883
02:09:04,91 --> 02:09:07,95
that because I'm taking as a given

1884
02:09:07,95 --> 02:09:11,81
that we're not going to completely change
the way America holds elections I think

1885
02:09:11,81 --> 02:09:15,65
that's true and and I can
remember you know voting.

1886
02:09:15,65 --> 02:09:19,25
When I was still at my parents' house
and you go down to the quarter

1887
02:09:19,25 --> 02:09:23,53
and this is lucky who is always ran and
you know and it's and it's retiree's

1888
02:09:23,53 --> 02:09:26,42
and it's people volunteers
it's a wonderful thing

1889
02:09:26,42 --> 02:09:32,94
but that's the given a lot of states
have these verifiable systems

1890
02:09:32,94 --> 02:09:38,00
California among the missing most as any
of them come up with a system a receipt

1891
02:09:38,00 --> 02:09:41,02
that actually works better than
that silly tape that we've seen.

1892
02:09:41,02 --> 02:09:44,21
Well I think precinct based optical
scan systems are excellent

1893
02:09:44,21 --> 02:09:48,61
that gives the photo a chance
to check for over votes

1894
02:09:48,61 --> 02:09:52,08
and no votes you you put your
ballot through the scanner

1895
02:09:52,08 --> 02:09:56,91
and it tells you if there's a problem
with it it makes recounts relatively easy

1896
02:09:56,91 --> 02:09:59,91
or audits relatively easy the
voter verifies the ballot by.

1897
02:10:00,00 --> 02:10:01,77
Definition because you can look at it.

1898
02:10:01,77 --> 02:10:05,09
And there are ways for
blind voters to verify it.

1899
02:10:05,09 --> 02:10:09,47
One possibility is getting some
sort of handheld device that

1900
02:10:09,47 --> 02:10:13,46
that will read it for a blind voter
we know that this technology exists.

1901
02:10:13,46 --> 02:10:18,45
Another is to allow blind voters to vote
using tactile ballots where they insert

1902
02:10:18,45 --> 02:10:23,29
the optical scan into a kind
of an Onslow pitches marked

1903
02:10:23,29 --> 02:10:24,53
and where they can mark the ballots

1904
02:10:24,53 --> 02:10:28,62
and there's a system out which actually
allows them to verify it using a vibrating

1905
02:10:28,62 --> 02:10:31,74
device which compete for them Mr
Chairman I see my time's expired

1906
02:10:31,74 --> 02:10:34,50
but I'd just like to note that.

1907
02:10:34,50 --> 02:10:39,28
I think we may have in the
future some other way to verify

1908
02:10:39,28 --> 02:10:49,97
but I just asked Mr Holt to put me on his
bill because I think we need to have.

1909
02:10:49,97 --> 02:10:56,45
No demonstrations. No place to
recognize Mr Holt for five minutes.

1910
02:10:56,45 --> 02:10:58,04
Thank you Mr Chairman.

1911
02:10:58,04 --> 02:11:04,99
My questioning will be
along a couple of lines.

1912
02:11:04,99 --> 02:11:07,43
First of all.

1913
02:11:07,43 --> 02:11:14,04
Mr Shamus refer I'm sorry I didn't
have the exact transcript here

1914
02:11:14,04 --> 02:11:15,41
but said something

1915
02:11:15,41 --> 02:11:22,00
or other you hate to see outlaw an
entire category of machines this

1916
02:11:22,00 --> 02:11:26,58
legislation doesn't outlaw any particular
kind of voting system except on

1917
02:11:26,58 --> 02:11:27,67
verifiable ones

1918
02:11:27,67 --> 02:11:33,34
and you said further I think

1919
02:11:33,34 --> 02:11:36,63
that scare tactics by a minority.

1920
02:11:36,63 --> 02:11:38,34
You hate to see

1921
02:11:38,34 --> 02:11:44,93
that disrupt the whole process
the Brennan Center for Justice.

1922
02:11:44,93 --> 02:11:48,43
New York University Law School.

1923
02:11:48,43 --> 02:11:52,84
Conducted a study with very distinguished
people run Revestive MIT Howard Schmidt

1924
02:11:52,84 --> 02:11:54,79
administration

1925
02:11:54,79 --> 02:11:59,63
and corporate security expert a
number of others said it found quote.

1926
02:12:00,00 --> 02:12:04,65
All three major types of voting
systems have significant security

1927
02:12:04,65 --> 02:12:06,55
and reliability vulnerabilities

1928
02:12:06,55 --> 02:12:12,63
that pose a real danger to the integrity
of national state and local elections.

1929
02:12:12,63 --> 02:12:19,29
The League of Women Voters not
a scary minority says they

1930
02:12:19,29 --> 02:12:23,42
support quote only voting
systems that are designed so

1931
02:12:23,42 --> 02:12:26,35
that they employ a voter
verifiable paper ballot

1932
02:12:26,35 --> 02:12:32,70
or other paper record said paper being the
official record of the voter's intent.

1933
02:12:32,70 --> 02:12:36,43
The report of the card
or Baker commission.

1934
02:12:36,43 --> 02:12:41,85
Similarly called for a voter verified
paper record random audits and so forth.

1935
02:12:41,85 --> 02:12:46,99
Mr Chairman I would like to.

1936
02:12:46,99 --> 02:12:51,89
Mr Chairman I would like to ask
that the Brennan Center report.

1937
02:12:51,89 --> 02:12:54,11
The statement of the National
League of Women Voters

1938
02:12:54,11 --> 02:13:00,00
and the Carter Baker report
be made a part of the record.

1939
02:13:00,00 --> 02:13:06,05
Without objection so ordered.
Thank you so. I would.

1940
02:13:06,05 --> 02:13:11,00
I want to make the point

1941
02:13:11,00 --> 02:13:17,79
that a number of organizations very
responsible organizations with

1942
02:13:17,79 --> 02:13:21,26
computer scientists involved and so
forth have taken a look at this matter

1943
02:13:21,26 --> 02:13:23,53
and we would do well to look at

1944
02:13:23,53 --> 02:13:30,88
that Miss Symons I would appreciate if you
would say a little bit more about A.C.M..

1945
02:13:30,88 --> 02:13:35,03
And. The.

1946
02:13:35,03 --> 02:13:38,07
Subcommittee

1947
02:13:38,07 --> 02:13:42,85
that is looking at this then
also what I would like the.

1948
02:13:42,85 --> 02:13:48,73
Witnesses to comment on as Mr
Dixon recounts and Mr Smith

1949
02:13:48,73 --> 02:13:53,65
and others votes can be lost in a lot
of ways they can be lost through.

1950
02:13:53,65 --> 02:13:58,62
Minute delay doing the registration lists
intimidating voters there are a lot of

1951
02:13:58,62 --> 02:13:59,50
things that we need to address.

1952
02:14:00,27 --> 02:14:04,67
Redo restricting your sensibility at
polling places or in the polling booth.

1953
02:14:04,67 --> 02:14:06,92
You know.

1954
02:14:06,92 --> 02:14:10,26
Memory cards may not be seated
properly we may not recognize

1955
02:14:10,26 --> 02:14:14,06
that the memory is full
before Election Day is over.

1956
02:14:14,06 --> 02:14:20,69
And paper records Mr do
little might be illegible

1957
02:14:20,69 --> 02:14:25,85
or torn or otherwise difficult to use.

1958
02:14:25,85 --> 02:14:28,55
But it has been determined
at least as often

1959
02:14:28,55 --> 02:14:33,72
that redundant electronic
memories have show

1960
02:14:33,72 --> 02:14:37,32
that there are problems with purely
electronic memory so what I would like to ask

1961
02:14:37,32 --> 02:14:43,07
of the witnesses is would you prefer to
have a system where there is no possible

1962
02:14:43,07 --> 02:14:46,88
way of recovering what happened.

1963
02:14:46,88 --> 02:14:50,65
Another is where the electronic vote for
whatever reason a poorly seated memory

1964
02:14:50,65 --> 02:14:56,61
card or something else is wrong and there
is no possible way of recovering it

1965
02:14:56,61 --> 02:14:57,29
or is miss him

1966
02:14:57,29 --> 02:15:03,62
and points out a well designed system
with a paper audit trail where there's at

1967
02:15:03,62 --> 02:15:10,04
least a reasonable chance of
being able to recapture recover.

1968
02:15:10,04 --> 02:15:16,05
What the voters intentions were so I'd
be happy to have a quick comment from

1969
02:15:16,05 --> 02:15:20,16
from the witnesses. But since.
Beginning with Miss him. It's.

1970
02:15:20,16 --> 02:15:22,76
Oh you asked me about
a C.M.A. To say. C.N.

1971
02:15:22,76 --> 02:15:27,25
Is an eighty thousand member professional
society of computer professionals like

1972
02:15:27,25 --> 02:15:30,23
the A.P.S. It's the premier society.

1973
02:15:30,23 --> 02:15:34,80
I would say in this country.

1974
02:15:34,80 --> 02:15:36,54
And this statement

1975
02:15:36,54 --> 02:15:40,74
that I referred to which is in my written
testimony was voted on by a C.M.

1976
02:15:40,74 --> 02:15:44,98
Council passed by a C.M. Council which
is the elected ruling body of a C.M..

1977
02:15:44,98 --> 02:15:48,83
But they did something unusual
not typical for a C.M.

1978
02:15:48,83 --> 02:15:53,77
We put the statement was put on the website
for members to vote on of those who

1979
02:15:53,77 --> 02:15:59,94
voted ninety five percent supported the
statement of the five percent who would.

1980
02:16:00,00 --> 02:16:04,58
Not positive roughly half based on
written comments objected to the fact

1981
02:16:04,58 --> 02:16:08,74
that it wasn't broad enough that it
didn't discuss usability issues as well.

1982
02:16:08,74 --> 02:16:10,05
So I would say.

1983
02:16:10,05 --> 02:16:13,34
Obviously you never get one hundred percent
agreement whenever you get a room full

1984
02:16:13,34 --> 02:16:16,22
of well I shouldn't say that
but scientists often disagree

1985
02:16:16,22 --> 02:16:19,85
but I would say in this case we're pretty
pretty close to a consensus at least

1986
02:16:19,85 --> 02:16:20,57
within a C.M.

1987
02:16:20,57 --> 02:16:27,07
We have a gentleman's time has expired
to make brief comments please Mr

1988
02:16:27,07 --> 02:16:31,11
Seamus first I just want to respond to a
couple of things I I actually didn't make

1989
02:16:31,11 --> 02:16:34,43
a comment about scare tactics although I
believe there was another member of the

1990
02:16:34,43 --> 02:16:38,95
panel the did I I just said I don't think
we should appeal to emotion on this issue.

1991
02:16:38,95 --> 02:16:40,51
I agree that H.R.

1992
02:16:40,51 --> 02:16:45,55
Five fifty does not expressly outlawed
any particular type of voting equipment.

1993
02:16:45,55 --> 02:16:51,45
My point was that the practical effect
of that is the outlaws Deore machines

1994
02:16:51,45 --> 02:16:53,54
and the reason that
outlaws Deore machines.

1995
02:16:53,54 --> 02:16:56,12
Is there is no current
machine on the market

1996
02:16:56,12 --> 02:16:58,38
that meets the requirements
of the bill and

1997
02:16:58,38 --> 02:17:02,80
that is usable in individual states along
with their requirements for example in

1998
02:17:02,80 --> 02:17:07,66
Pennsylvania. There is popular
call for a paper trail machine.

1999
02:17:07,66 --> 02:17:12,91
For vendors have come to Pennsylvania with
their paper trail machine not a single

2000
02:17:12,91 --> 02:17:17,14
one of them has been able to
simultaneously offer a paper trail

2001
02:17:17,14 --> 02:17:20,67
and meet Pennsylvania statutory
and constitutional requirements.

2002
02:17:20,67 --> 02:17:23,18
So we can't have one even if we want one.

2003
02:17:23,18 --> 02:17:29,43
The technology is just not there yet. Mr.

2004
02:17:29,43 --> 02:17:36,14
So hadn't become a key issue I think is
resiliency things go wrong people make

2005
02:17:36,14 --> 02:17:39,35
mistakes and we need to have
a system that we can trust.

2006
02:17:39,35 --> 02:17:43,31
Even when things do go wrong.
The combination of paper.

2007
02:17:43,31 --> 02:17:47,73
Plus electronic records is more resilient
than either one would be alone and

2008
02:17:47,73 --> 02:17:52,35
that I think is the strongest argument for
having a paper based verification system.

2009
02:17:52,35 --> 02:17:58,24
Thank Mr coming in as a last answer.

2010
02:17:58,24 --> 02:17:59,89
I want to make.

2011
02:18:00,00 --> 02:18:01,43
The point to everybody

2012
02:18:01,43 --> 02:18:07,07
that my experience is most votes are lost
due to voter error not machine error not

2013
02:18:07,07 --> 02:18:11,21
election official error and I don't
know if you looked at my resume

2014
02:18:11,21 --> 02:18:13,32
but I have about twenty years
in the printing business

2015
02:18:13,32 --> 02:18:16,17
and I've been around a lot of
printing machines and copy machines

2016
02:18:16,17 --> 02:18:20,71
and I can assure you that anything
you put paper through will jam.

2017
02:18:20,71 --> 02:18:26,41
At some point in time. A vote
and I want to say to you.

2018
02:18:26,41 --> 02:18:31,16
I truly believe that in the long
term interest of this country it.

2019
02:18:31,16 --> 02:18:35,15
We are still voting the same way we did
one hundred fifty years ago you as you

2020
02:18:35,15 --> 02:18:38,87
mentioned. This often down to your little
poll at the corner in your precinct.

2021
02:18:38,87 --> 02:18:40,57
Our society has changed.

2022
02:18:40,57 --> 02:18:45,03
It's mobile it's around it's moving the
ability to incorporate the vote centers

2023
02:18:45,03 --> 02:18:49,92
Ascott Doyle in Colorado has been working
with as a convenience to voters those

2024
02:18:49,92 --> 02:18:53,16
types of concepts are based
on electronic voting.

2025
02:18:53,16 --> 02:18:58,25
You know let's not throw the
baby out with the bathwater here

2026
02:18:58,25 --> 02:19:00,24
and I think what is doing.

2027
02:19:00,24 --> 02:19:06,39
Mr Mr Brady I think what is doing more
damage to voter confidence quite frankly.

2028
02:19:06,39 --> 02:19:12,55
Is to people like your distinguished
colleague Mr Conyers.

2029
02:19:12,55 --> 02:19:18,24
Publishing reports about the election in
Ohio that are fact lists and baseless.

2030
02:19:18,24 --> 02:19:24,29
None of the accusations have been proved.
Those you know we've got to quit this.

2031
02:19:24,29 --> 02:19:29,78
We've got to get this conversation
back to an honest debate about this.

2032
02:19:29,78 --> 02:19:34,30
I think the whole panel said how do we
work together and move this thing forward

2033
02:19:34,30 --> 02:19:38,71
and quit the sky is falling kind of thing
because I'm here to tell you I think

2034
02:19:38,71 --> 02:19:43,61
elections given the magnitude of them and
I've seen now nine years worth of them.

2035
02:19:43,61 --> 02:19:46,84
Two presidential couple of gubernatorial.

2036
02:19:46,84 --> 02:19:50,33
Given what could happen and given
the magnitude of this task to run

2037
02:19:50,33 --> 02:19:52,06
and pretty darn good in this country

2038
02:19:52,06 --> 02:19:54,98
and I know people all over the
country like myself and Mr Smith

2039
02:19:54,98 --> 02:19:57,14
that are darn proud.
They're involved in it

2040
02:19:57,14 --> 02:19:59,87
and the net effect is
we're going to begin to.

2041
02:20:00,00 --> 02:20:05,18
Drive those people out of this which is
going to make the system more vulnerable

2042
02:20:05,18 --> 02:20:09,50
than you ever imagine Mr Cunningham
and I sure hope that is accurate.

2043
02:20:09,50 --> 02:20:14,34
What you've said because the voter is not
there yet understand the vote even though

2044
02:20:14,34 --> 02:20:20,06
you folks are and your experts
the voter is not there yet and

2045
02:20:20,06 --> 02:20:26,78
that is the ultimate wand that we
must bring truth security. To bere.

2046
02:20:26,78 --> 02:20:28,46
I would like for you to get for me.

2047
02:20:28,46 --> 02:20:30,67
Whatever documentation you have

2048
02:20:30,67 --> 02:20:34,90
that suggests voter error is more
than a paper error if you have

2049
02:20:34,90 --> 02:20:39,40
that type of verification of that
statement you made have a like too high.

2050
02:20:39,40 --> 02:20:42,56
My point was that most.

2051
02:20:42,56 --> 02:20:46,59
Voting error is voter error.

2052
02:20:46,59 --> 02:20:50,97
I thank I thank you for a
comment it's a good wrap up.

2053
02:20:50,97 --> 02:20:53,00
We are going to votes
in just a few moments

2054
02:20:53,00 --> 02:20:57,68
and I would just like to make a
few closing comments. A moment.

2055
02:20:57,68 --> 02:20:59,88
First of all I thank each

2056
02:20:59,88 --> 02:21:04,19
and every one of you for being here in the
audience as well as at the witness table.

2057
02:21:04,19 --> 02:21:07,56
You have contributed immensely
to this very important issue.

2058
02:21:07,56 --> 02:21:12,13
There's I wrote and.

2059
02:21:12,13 --> 02:21:18,69
I recognize very clearly since I've
served at the local level in the state

2060
02:21:18,69 --> 02:21:19,93
legislature and now here

2061
02:21:19,93 --> 02:21:24,45
that the states have an important role
local governments have an important role

2062
02:21:24,45 --> 02:21:27,50
and the federal government
has an important role.

2063
02:21:27,50 --> 02:21:31,53
We often say here that the
states the experimental.

2064
02:21:31,53 --> 02:21:34,94
Apparatus that tests ideas.

2065
02:21:34,94 --> 02:21:38,62
And then the federal government should
select from the best of what the states have

2066
02:21:38,62 --> 02:21:43,76
discovered we did not take the time
to do that in the HOV and I think

2067
02:21:43,76 --> 02:21:44,75
that was a mistake.

2068
02:21:44,75 --> 02:21:49,20
We also did not take the time to
first set the standards clearly

2069
02:21:49,20 --> 02:21:53,36
and then allow manufacturers to develop
equipment to meet those standards

2070
02:21:53,36 --> 02:21:54,58
and I think

2071
02:21:54,58 --> 02:21:58,88
that was a fatal flaw which is I believe
created much of the uncertainty

2072
02:21:58,88 --> 02:21:59,44
that we have.

2073
02:22:00,00 --> 02:22:03,77
I agree totally with the statement someone
made never buy the first model of

2074
02:22:03,77 --> 02:22:06,91
anything but the first
model of one automobile.

2075
02:22:06,91 --> 02:22:11,62
Just because it precisely fit my
needs was a good manufacturer.

2076
02:22:11,62 --> 02:22:14,82
A bad mistake and frankly relieved

2077
02:22:14,82 --> 02:22:19,27
when the car eventually got totaled.

2078
02:22:19,27 --> 02:22:24,80
And I got the insurance value
probably could never have sold.

2079
02:22:24,80 --> 02:22:27,85
We have to recognize that there's
a lot of work to be done here.

2080
02:22:27,85 --> 02:22:32,90
The public's confidence will return
because we will build a better system.

2081
02:22:32,90 --> 02:22:35,31
Finally I want to comment.

2082
02:22:35,31 --> 02:22:39,84
I've always looked at two aspects
here we want to assure every voter

2083
02:22:39,84 --> 02:22:42,48
that their vote will be counted.

2084
02:22:42,48 --> 02:22:45,79
Be counted accurately and
the system will work

2085
02:22:45,79 --> 02:22:48,95
that way there's a second
factor we must remember and

2086
02:22:48,95 --> 02:22:50,56
that gets back to the viruses

2087
02:22:50,56 --> 02:22:55,59
and all the other issues we have
to also assure every voter.

2088
02:22:55,59 --> 02:22:59,54
Not only because not be negated

2089
02:22:59,54 --> 02:23:03,08
or voted by other people
voting fraudulent only

2090
02:23:03,08 --> 02:23:08,16
or performing fraudulent acts such as
viruses throwing ballot boxes away

2091
02:23:08,16 --> 02:23:08,91
and so forth.

2092
02:23:08,91 --> 02:23:14,90
I want to make sure every voter is assured
of both of those kind of their vote in

2093
02:23:14,90 --> 02:23:19,22
the surance no one else is going to
make it through illegal activity.

2094
02:23:19,22 --> 02:23:23,03
So I'm concentrating on those two
not just in this particular issue

2095
02:23:23,03 --> 02:23:26,34
but in other issues such as.

2096
02:23:26,34 --> 02:23:28,10
The photo ID bill

2097
02:23:28,10 --> 02:23:31,44
that we passed through the house a
week ago which I think will also help.

2098
02:23:31,44 --> 02:23:36,90
Thank you very much outstanding panel
I appreciate all that you've done.

2099
02:23:36,90 --> 02:23:42,11
We do have to go vote and I have a
few things to read here a moment.

2100
02:23:42,11 --> 02:23:44,15
I ask unanimous consent that members

2101
02:23:44,15 --> 02:23:48,42
and witnesses have seven calendar days to
submit material for the record including

2102
02:23:48,42 --> 02:23:52,57
additional questions of the
witnesses and for those statements

2103
02:23:52,57 --> 02:23:56,24
and materials to be entered into the
appropriate place in the record

2104
02:23:56,24 --> 02:23:59,82
and I said if we send you written
questions you will respond to the.

2105
02:24:00,13 --> 02:24:04,29
Without objection the marriage
material will be so answered.

2106
02:24:04,29 --> 02:24:05,44
I ask unanimous consent

2107
02:24:05,44 --> 02:24:09,24
that Steffi authorize to make technical
conforming changes on the law

2108
02:24:09,24 --> 02:24:12,05
and then are considered by the
committee at today's hearing.

2109
02:24:12,05 --> 02:24:14,49
Without objection so order.

2110
02:24:14,49 --> 02:24:19,53
Having MS non-image I just
wanted to concur with you.

2111
02:24:19,53 --> 02:24:24,13
I have served on the local state
and federal level and I do think

2112
02:24:24,13 --> 02:24:28,48
that we need to revisit Haba because it
was more or less geared for the federal

2113
02:24:28,48 --> 02:24:33,35
and we appreciate all of those who have
come today those who serve on both the

2114
02:24:33,35 --> 02:24:35,96
local state and federal. Thank
you Mr Chairman thank you.

2115
02:24:35,96 --> 02:24:38,41
And having completed
our business for today

2116
02:24:38,41 --> 02:24:42,87
and for this hearing the
committee is hereby adjourned.

2117
02:24:42,87 --> 02:24:45,74
Thanks.

2118
02:24:45,74 --> 02:24:52,66
I'm ready I'm ready.

2119
02:24:52,66 --> 02:24:57,20
Actually no thank you. I thank you.

2120
02:24:57,20 --> 02:25:03,50
Because I got the message.

2121
02:25:03,50 --> 02:25:07,92
Right. Right right.

2122
02:25:07,92 --> 02:25:14,60
But I know I feel so

2123
02:25:14,60 --> 02:25:16,45
so good there with you know we know.