## **EXHIBIT A**

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1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
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3	CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA		
4	WESTERN DIVISION		
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6	JOYCE WALKER, ET AL., )		
7	oolog migraph, grant,		
8	PLAINTIFFS, )		
9	VS. )	CASE NO. CV 10-9198-JVS(RNBX)	
10	)	SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA MARCH 20, 2012	
11	LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE ) SOUTHWEST, )	•	
12	DEFENDANT.	(1:47 P.M. TO 2:13 P.M.) (3:26 P.M. TO 3:39 P.M.)	
13	)		
14	DISCOVERY CONFERENCE		
15	BEFORE THE HONORABLE ROBERT N. BLOCK UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE		
16			
17		EXT PAGE	
18	COURT REPORTER: RECORD	DED; COURT SMART	
19	COURTROOM DEPUTY: KERRI	HAYS	
20			
21	COURTHOUSE SERVICES  1218 VALEBROOK PLACE		
22	(626)	963-0566	
23	PROCEEDINGS RECORDED BY ELECTRONIC SOUND RECORDING; TRANSCRIPT PRODUCED BY TRANSCRIPTION SERVICE.		
25			

2 1 APPEARANCES: (CONTINUED) FOR THE PLAINTIFFS: KASOWITZ BENSON TORRES & FRIEDMAN 2 BY: BRIAN P. BROSNAHAN JEANETTE T. BARZELAY 3 ATTORNEYS AT LAW 101 CALIFORNIA STREET 4 SUITE 2300 SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94111 5 6 FOR THE DEFENDANT: WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE & DOOR 7 BY: JONATHAN A. SHAPIRO JOEL FLEMING 8 ATTORNEYS AT LAW 950 PAGE MILL ROAD PALO ALTO, CALIFORNIA 94304 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

## Case 2:10-cv-09198-JVS -RNB Document 204-2 Filed 04/17/12 Page 4 of 21 Page ID #:8215

I N D E X MARCH 20, 2012 CASE NO. CV 10-9198-JVS(RNBX) PROCEEDINGS: PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL; LSW'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER 

4 SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA; TUESDAY, MARCH 20, 2012 1 2 9:50 A.M. 3 THE CLERK: PLEASE REMAIN SEATED AND COME TO ORDER. 4 THIS UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT IS NOW IN SESSION. 5 THE HONORABLE MAGISTRATE JUDGE ROBERT N. BLOCK 6 PRESIDING. 7 CALLING CASE NUMBER CV 10-9198, JOYCE WALKER, ET 8 AL. VERSUS LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE SOUTHWEST. 9 COUNSEL, PLEASE STATE YOUR APPEARANCES. 10 MR. BROSNAHAN: GOOD MORNING, YOUR HONOR. 11 BRIAN BROSNAHAN FOR THE PLAINTIFFS. 12 MS. BARZELAY: JEANETTE BARZELAY FOR THE 13 PLAINTIFFS. 14 MR. SHAPIRO: GOOD MORNING, JUDGE BLOCK. 15 IT'S JONATHAN SHAPIRO FOR THE DEFENDANT LIFE INSURANCE OF THE SOUTHWEST. 16 17 MR. FLEMING: AND JOEL FLEMING ALSO FOR LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE SOUTHWEST. 18 19 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. ALL RIGHT. COUNSEL, GOOD 20 MORNING. 21 LET'S START WITH MY TENTATIVE RULING. I'LL HEAR 22 FROM PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL FIRST. 23 MR. BROSNAHAN: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 24 WE APPRECIATE THE OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS THE

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COURT'S CONCERNS.

5 I THINK THE QUICKEST WAY TO GET TO THE HEART OF THE 1 2 MATTER MIGHT BE IF I MAY ASK THE COURT A QUESTION ABOUT THE 3 TENTATIVE. THE COURT: OKAY. I MAY NOT ANSWER, BUT YOU CAN 4 5 ASK. MR. BROSNAHAN: I JUST -- I DON'T UNDERSTAND HOW 6 7 THE TENTATIVE REQUIRES DENIAL OF THE MOTION UNLESS THE 8 COURT'S CONCERN TURNS ON THE WORD "RESOLD" IN THE QUOTE THAT 9 THE COURT PUT IN THE -- IN THE TENTATIVE, WHERE IT SAYS, 10 "IN DECEIT CASES THE VALUE OF AN ARTICLE IS 11 NORMALLY DETERMINED BY THE PRICE AT WHICH 12 IT COULD BE RESOLD IN AN OPEN MARKET OR BY 13 PRIVATE SALE IF ITS QUALITY OR OTHER CHARACTERISTICS WHICH AFFECT ITS VALUE WERE 14 15 KNOWN." OBVIOUSLY, IN A CASE LIKE THIS THE PLAINTIFFS CAN'T 16 17 RESELL THE INSURANCE POLICY. THE COURT: BUT THE QUESTION -- IT'S NOT A MATTER 18 19 OF RESELL. NO, THAT WASN'T IT. IT WAS WHAT WOULD THE VALUE 20 OF THE POLICY BE IF THESE ALLEGED NON-DISCLOSURES HAD BEEN DISCLOSED. 21 22 NOW, IT SEEMS TO ME BASED ON THE CASES -- AND I'VE

READ EVERY SINGLE ONE OF YOUR CASES. AND NOT ONE OF THEM IS

THAT, IF THAT'S YOUR THEORY OF DAMAGES, YOU'RE GOING TO NEED

EVEN CLOSE TO BEING ON POINT -- THAT IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH

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AN EXPERT TO TESTIFY WHAT HE THINKS THESE POLICIES WOULD HAVE BEEN WORTH TO A PURCHASER IF THESE DISCLOSURES HAD BEEN MADE.

LET ME GIVE YOU THIS EXAMPLE. I THOUGHT OF A MORE CONCRETE EXAMPLE BECAUSE, LIKE I SAID, YOU CITED A BUNCH OF CASES THAT DON'T REALLY HELP ME FIND IN YOUR FAVOR. YOU KNOW, IN THE LAST COUPLE OF WEEKS APPLE RELEASED THE IPAD 3 OR CALLS IT "THE NEW IPAD," RIGHT?

MR. BROSNAHAN: YES.

THE COURT: AND THEY TOUTED A LOT OF ITS FEATURES.

AND ONE OF ITS MOST TOUTED FEATURES IS IT'S THE FIRST APPLE

PRODUCT THAT HAS THE CAPABILITY TO RECEIVE DATA VIA THE 4G

NETWORK, RIGHT?

MR. BROSNAHAN: YES.

THE COURT: SUPPOSE SOMEONE DISCOVERED THAT THAT
WASN'T TRUE, THE NEW IPAD DOESN'T ACTUALLY DOWNLOAD DATA AT
4G SPEEDS. IT REALLY DOWNLOADS THEM AT 3G SPEEDS LIKE THE
IPAD 2. AND, SO, THERE WAS SOME ACTION BROUGHT. AND THE
ISSUE BECAME WHAT WAS -- YOU KNOW, THEORY OF DAMAGES WAS THE
ACTUAL VALUE. YOU KNOW, THAT IF APPLE HAD DISCLOSED THAT,
NO, IT REALLY DOESN'T DO 4G SPEED, IT'S 3G SPEED.

WELL, THE ANSWER TO THAT QUESTION HAS NOTHING
WHATSOEVER TO DO WITH HOW MUCH PROFIT APPLE MADE ON ITS
PRODUCT, WHETHER IT WAS \$5 PER UNIT, A HUNDRED DOLLARS PER
UNIT, \$350 PER UNIT. IT HAS NOTHING WHATSOEVER TO DO WITH
THE ACTUAL VALUE OF THAT PRODUCT IF THE ACCURATE

REPRESENTATIONS HAVE BEEN MADE.

SO, I TOTALLY REJECT YOUR THEORY OF RELEVANCE WITH RESPECT TO ALL OF THESE AREAS OF THE DISCOVERY REQUEST THAT YOU SAY ARE RELEVANT TO YOUR ACTUAL VALUE DAMAGES THEORY.

AND IF YOU WANT THAT DISCOVERY, YOU'RE GOING TO HAVE TO GET IT FROM JUDGE SELNA BECAUSE YOU'RE NOT GETTING IT FROM ME.

DO YOU HAVE ANY OTHER QUESTIONS?

MR. BROSNAHAN: I'D BE HAPPY TO ADDRESS THE COURT'S ISSUE. I THINK THAT IN YOUR APPLE HYPOTHETICAL THE QUESTION IS WHAT WOULD THAT PRODUCT HAVE SOLD FOR ON AN OPEN MARKET IF IT'S -- IF THE FACT THAT IT WAS REALLY ONLY 3G WERE DISCLOSED.

THE COURT: CORRECT.

MR. BROSNAHAN: IF IT SOLD FOR \$400 WHEN NOBODY
KNEW THAT IT WAS ONLY 3G SPEED, THE QUESTION WOULD BE IF
EVERYONE KNEW THAT, WHAT WOULD IT SELL FOR. AND YOU WOULD
HAVE EXPERTS COME IN. AND THE EXPERTS WOULD ANALYZE
COMPETITIVE PRODUCTS. THEY WOULD ANALYZE THE COSTS. THEY
WOULD ANALYZE AN ENTIRE BUT/FOR WORLD AS WE HAVE IN ANTITRUST
CASES ALL THE TIME WHERE EXPERTS ANALYZE BUT/FOR WORLDS OF
WHAT A PRODUCT WOULD HAVE SOLD FOR UNDER DIFFERENT
CONDITIONS. AND THEY LOOK AT FINANCIAL DATA. THEY LOOK AT
COSTS. THEY LOOK AT COMPETITIVE PRODUCTS --

THE COURT: I DISAGREE. WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT

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8 MAKE TO WHETHER APPLE MADE A LOT OF MONEY OR A LITTLE MONEY ON ITS PRODUCT TO WHAT A PURCHASER WOULD BE WILLING TO PAY FOR THAT PRODUCT. MR. BROSNAHAN: WELL, THE QUESTION ISN'T WHAT A PURCHASER WOULD BE WILLING TO PAY --THE COURT: WELL, ACCORDING TO THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT IT IS. MR. BROSNAHAN: THE QUESTION IS WHAT THE MARKET --THE COURT: THE MARKET VALUE AT THE TIME OF PURCHASE. MARKET VALUE -- YOU KNOW, I WAS AN ECON MAJOR. SO, MARKET VALUE IS WHAT A WILLING PURCHASER IS WILLING TO PAY. MR. BROSNAHAN: WELL, IT'S ALSO WHAT A WILLING SELLER IS WILLING TO SELL. AND --THE COURT: I DON'T AGREE WITH THAT THEORY. LET'S NOT WASTE ANY TIME BECAUSE, LIKE I SAID, YOU'RE NOT GOING TO TALK ME OUT OF THAT PART OF MY TENTATIVE. MR. BROSNAHAN: THAT'S FINE, YOUR HONOR. IF I MAY, THOUGH, I'D LIKE TO POINT TO A COUPLE OF THE REQUESTS THAT ARE WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THIS PART OF THE TENTATIVE THAT HAVE BASES IN ADDITION TO JUST A PURE "ACTUAL VALUE" THEORY. ONE OF THEM HAS TO DO WITH THE OFFSET. WE'VE REOUESTED --

THE COURT: WHICH REQUEST ARE WE TALKING ABOUT?

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9 MR. BROSNAHAN: WELL, THIS WOULD BE TOPIC NUMBER 33. AND THE DOCUMENT REQUESTS THAT GO ALONG WITH THAT WOULD BE NUMBER 100 AND NUMBER 110. THE COURT: OKAY. LET'S START WITH 100. MR. BROSNAHAN: NOW, ONE -- THIS DOCUMENT REQUEST SEEKS DOCUMENTS SUFFICIENT TO SHOW THE CURRENT AND GUARANTEED COST OF INSURANCE RATES FOR TERM PRODUCTS. THE COURT: HANG ON A SECOND. (PAUSE IN PROCEEDINGS.) THE COURT: IN YOUR PLAINTIFFS' CONTENTION SECTION, MEET AND CONFER DISCUSSIONS, YOU EXPLAINED THAT THESE DOCUMENTS ARE RELEVANT TO YOUR ACTUAL VALUE OF DEATH BENEFIT THEORY. AND YOU ARGUED ACTUAL VALUE ON PAGE 77 -- THAT WAS IN YOUR MEET AND CONFER SESSION. SO, WHERE IN YOUR ARGUMENT DID YOU SAY THEY WERE RELEVANT TO SOMETHING OTHER THAN ACTUAL VALUE? MR. BROSNAHAN: CERTAINLY ON PAGE 77 WE SAY ON LINE 19 LINE 18: "MOREOVER, IN THE EVENT THAT PLAINTIFFS ARE SUCCESSFUL IN SEEKING RESCISSION OF THE POLICIES AND A FULL REFUND OF WHAT THEY PAID LSW, LSW MAY SEEK TO ARGUE THAT BECAUSE IT PROVIDED DEATH BENEFIT PROTECTION TO CLASS MEMBERS WHILE THEIR

POLICIES WERE IN FORCE, IT SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO

A CREDIT OR OFFSET FOR THE VALUE OF THE DEATH

BENEFIT PROTECTION IT PROVIDED TO ITS 1 2 POLICYHOLDERS. 3 "LSW'S CHARGES FOR DEATH BENEFIT PROTECTION ON ITS TERM LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES MAY BE PROBATIVE 4 5 OF THE AMOUNT OF ANY SUCH CREDIT OR OFFSET THAT LSW MAY SEEK." 6 7 THE COURT: WELL, I MUST SAY I OVERLOOKED THAT AS A 8 DISTINCTION BECAUSE THEN YOU CONCLUDE THE PARAGRAPH WITH 9 "THUS, DOCUMENTS ARE DIRECTLY RELEVANT TO THE 10 CLAIMS ALLEGED IN THE FAC AND PREMIUMS PROOF 11 OF ACTUAL VALUE." 12 WHAT'S LSW'S RESPONSE TO THAT POINT. 13 MR. SHAPIRO: YOUR HONOR, A FEW RESPONSES. FIRST, OUR UNDERSTANDING WAS THIS WAS ACTUAL VALUE. 14 BUT IN ANY EVENT, TO THE EXTENT THAT PLAINTIFFS ARE 15 ARGUING THAT THIS DISCOVERY IS NECESSARY FOR THEM TO DEAL 16 17 WITH AN ARGUMENT THAT WE HAVEN'T RAISED, WE WOULD SAY IT'S 18 PREMATURE. 19 AND IN ANY EVENT, THE COST OF --20 THE COURT: WELL, BUT IT'S NOT GOING TO DO THEM ANY GOOD IF YOU RAISE IT PAST THE DISCOVERY CUT-OFF DATE. 21 22 MR. SHAPIRO: WELL, FAIR ENOUGH, YOUR HONOR. AND 23 THAT WOULD BE AT OUR TREMENDOUS PERIL. 24 THE COURT: NO, NO. MAYBE I SHOULD ASK YOU NOW,

ARE YOU WILLING TO STIPULATE YOU'RE NOT GOING TO RAISE THAT

ARGUMENT. AND IF YOU SAY NO, THEN THAT PUTS THIS --

MR. SHAPIRO: I WILL BE -- I'LL BE VERY CLEAR ON
THE RECORD. WE ARE NOT GOING TO ARGUE THAT THERE'S AN OFFSET
BASED ON THE COST OF TERM INSURANCE. THIS IS ABOUT A
DIFFERENT PRODUCT, YOUR HONOR. THERE IS A COST OF INSURANCE
COMPONENT FOR THE PERMANENT PRODUCT DISCLOSED IN THE POLICY

THE COURT: ARE YOU GOING TO ARGUE -- AS I

UNDERSTAND IT -- AND I DIDN'T -- IT DIDN'T JUMP OUT AT ME.

AND WE CAN DO -- I WANT TO DO THESE ONE AT A TIME, THAT THEY

ARE SAYING THAT IF THEY SEEK -- YOU KNOW, ONE REMEDY HERE

WOULD BE RESCISSION, RIGHT?

MR. SHAPIRO: YES, YOUR HONOR.

THE COURT: AND THEY'RE SAYING AND IF YOU'RE GOING
TO ARGUE THAT THE RESCISSION REMEDY SHOULD -- YOU SHOULD
RECEIVE A CREDIT, YOU KNOW, UNDER WHATEVER THEORY, EXPERT
TESTIMONY OR WHATEVER, FOR THE DEATH BENEFIT PROTECTION THAT
THE PLAINTIFFS RECEIVED DURING THE PERIOD OF TIME THE POLICY
WAS IN FORCE, THAT SOMEHOW THEY SHOULDN'T GET A HUNDRED
PERCENT BACK OF WHAT THEY PAID FOR THE POLICY BECAUSE IF THEY
HAD DIED THEY WOULD HAVE GOTTEN THE BENEFIT OF THE DEATH.

MR. SHAPIRO: OH, ABSOLUTELY.

THE COURT: AND, SO, IF YOU'RE GOING -- IF YOU'RE GOING TO MAKE --

MR. SHAPIRO: IN FACT, WE WOULD MAKE THAT ARGUMENT.

THE COURT: OKAY. SO, YOU ARE GOING TO MAKE THAT ARGUMENT.

SO, THE QUESTION BECOMES THEN DOES DOCUMENT REQUEST 100 SEEK INFORMATION RELEVANT TO THAT ARGUMENT OR NOT.

BECAUSE THE ANSWER MIGHT BE YOU ARE GOING TO MAKE THAT ARGUMENT, BUT IT'S STILL NOT RELEVANT.

MR. SHAPIRO: IT'S STILL NOT RELEVANT, YOUR HONOR,
BECAUSE WE'RE TALKING HERE -- AS I READ THIS. AND, YOU KNOW,
I'M AT SOME RISK OF GETTING LOST IN THE DOCUMENT. BUT TO THE
EXTENT IT HAS TO DO WITH TERM LIFE INSURANCE, IT'S A
FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT PRODUCT IN PART BECAUSE IT'S
UNDERWRITTEN ON THE BASIS THAT IT EXPIRES AS OPPOSED TO A
PERMANENT PRODUCT WHICH IS WITH YOU, YOU KNOW, UNDER AGE 95
OR, YOU KNOW, GOD WILLING YOU LIVE BEYOND THAT.

MAKE THAT AN OFFSET HAS ANYTHING TO DO WITH AN ENTIRELY
DIFFERENT PRODUCT. IT WOULD BE LIKE MATCHING APPLES AND
ORANGES. THERE IS CERTAINLY A MORTALITY COMPONENT, A COST OF
INSURANCE, THAT IS OBVIOUSLY PART OF THE PERMANENT LIFE
INSURANCE PRODUCT. AND THERE IS, IN FACT, YOU KNOW, A FIXED
COST OF INSURANCE THAT GOES UP OVER THE YEARS. AND THAT'S
ALL SET AT THE TIME OF PURCHASE. IT DOESN'T CHANGE AROUND.
BUT THAT'S NOT TERM LIFE INSURANCE. THAT'S THE MORTALITY
COMPONENT HERE.

AND CERTAINLY ACTUARIES -- AND THIS WOULD BE A

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13 PRIME EXAMPLE OF SOMETHING THAT BASED ON PUBLISHED COMMISSIONER'S DATA ON WHEN PEOPLE DIE IN AMERICA -- PUBLIC STUFF, THAT ACTUARIES COULD GO BACK AND FORTH ON WHAT THE TRUE VALUE OF INSURANCE COVERAGE WAS IN THE CASE OF ONE OF THE PLAINTIFFS --THE COURT: BUT SUPPOSE YOU HAVE DOCUMENTS -- I MEAN, THAT YOU'VE ALREADY GET THOSE CALCULATIONS. MR. SHAPIRO: WE DO. THE COURT: SO, WHY SHOULDN'T YOU PRODUCE THEM. MR. SHAPIRO: JUST NOT WITH RESPECT TO THE TERM PRODUCT. WE WOULD PRODUCE THEM WITH RESPECT TO THE PERMANENT LIFE INSURANCE, WHICH IS AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT PRODUCT. BECAUSE PERMANENT LIFE INSURANCE HAS TO BE UNDERWRITTEN FOR SOMEONE WHO, LIKE MYSELF, PERSONALLY I'VE GOT A 20-YEAR POLICY. AND MY INSURANCE COSTS ARE LOWER ON THE 20-YEAR POLICY BECAUSE, YOU KNOW, ALL THINGS BEING EQUAL, I'M PROBABLY GOING TO OUTLIVE THAT 20 YEARS. THE COURT: WELL, LET'S BACK UP. YOU JUST TOLD ME THAT IF PLAINTIFFS SUCCEED IN OBTAINING RESCISSION OF THE POLICIES, YOU ARE GOING TO ARGUE THAT THERE SHOULD BE SOME CREDIT --MR. SHAPIRO: YES, SIR. THE COURT: -- AFFORDED. MR. SHAPIRO: YES, SIR. JUST LIKE, FOR EXAMPLE --

THE COURT: AND WHAT POLICIES ARE WE TALKING --

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REFERRING TO?

WHEN YOU SAY RESCISSION OF THE POLICIES, WHAT POLICIES ARE WE

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MR. SHAPIRO: ONLY PERMANENT POLICIES ARE THE ONLY ONES IN THE CASE -- PERMANENT LIFE INSURANCE. THE COURT: IS THAT RIGHT? MR. BROSNAHAN: YES. PROVIDER AND PARAGON. THE COURT: PROVIDER AND PARAGON. LET'S BE SPECIFIC. SO, IF PLAINTIFFS -- IF PLAINTIFFS OBTAIN RESCISSION OF PROVIDER AND PARAGON POLICIES, LSW WILL SEEK A CREDIT -- WHAT? -- FOR THE VALUE OF THE DEATH PROTECTION PROVIDED DURING THE PERIOD OF TIME THE POLICIES WERE IN FORCE? MR. SHAPIRO: YES. YOU SAID IT NOW PERFECTLY TWICE IN THE SENSE THAT THERE IS ECONOMIC VALUE, YOUR HONOR, TO BE THE COURT: NO. I UNDERSTAND. AND THAT'S WHAT YOU WERE REFERRING TO IN THOSE LINES THAT YOU MENTIONED --MR. BROSNAHAN: YES, YOUR HONOR. THE COURT: -- TO ME. OKAY. SO, THE QUESTION PRESENTED IS DOCUMENT REQUEST NUMBER 100 -- SO, FORGET ABOUT ACTUAL VALUE, PLAINTIFFS' DAMAGES THEORY, BECAUSE I REJECT IT -- NOT THAT I REJECT THE THEORY. I REJECT THEIR ARGUMENTS THAT HOW WE -- YOU KNOW, I

15 1 WON'T REPEAT MYSELF. 2 BUT NUMBER 100 SAYS, 3 "DOCUMENTS SUFFICIENT TO SHOW YOUR CURRENT AND GUARANTEED COST OF INSURANCE RATES, 4 5 INCLUDED, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, YOUR COSTS OF 6 INSURABLE TABLES FOR ANY AND ALL TERM LIFE 7 INSURANCE PRODUCTS THAT YOU SELL." 8 NOW, WE WERE JUST REFERRING TO PERMANENT POLICIES, 9 WHICH ARE NOT THE SAME AS TERM POLICIES. 10 MR. SHAPIRO: THAT'S CORRECT, YOUR HONOR. 11 THE COURT: SO, HOW DOES -- SINCE THIS REQUEST ASKS 12 FOR INFORMATION REGARDING TERM INSURANCE PRODUCTS, NOT 13 PERMANENT INSURANCE PRODUCTS, HOW IS THIS INFORMATION RELEVANT TO THIS CREDIT THEORY? 14 15 MR. BROSNAHAN: YOUR HONOR, THIS IS RELEVANT BECAUSE THE COST OF INSURANCE PER TERM IS A MORE FAIR -- OR 16 17 THE COURT WOULD BE CERTAINLY FREE TO CONCLUDE THAT IT WAS A MORE FAIR AND REASONABLE MEASURE OF OFFSET THAN THE COST OF 18 INSURANCE THAT'S BUILT INTO THE FRAUDULENT PRODUCTS. 19 20 BY ASSUMPTION, IF RESCISSION IS BEING GRANTED, THE 21 COURT HAS CONCLUDED THAT THE PLAINTIFFS WERE DEFRAUDED IN 22 PURCHASING THE POLICIES. 23 WE KNOW THAT THE COST OF INSURANCE IS NOT DISCLOSED IN THE ILLUSTRATIONS. THAT'S ONE OF THE CHARGES THAT WE ARE 24

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COMPLAINING ABOUT.

WE ALSO KNOW FROM VARIOUS DOCUMENTS THAT THEY LOAD MARGINS INTO THEIR COST-OF-INSURANCE CHARGES SO THAT THOSE CHARGES ARE INFLATED. THEY'RE NOT A TRUE MEASURE OF --

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. JUST -- YOU KNOW, YOU'RE

STARTING TO WANDER ON ME NOW. I WANTED TO UNDERSTAND -
WE'RE FOCUSING ON NOW THESE LINES YOU POINTED OUT, THE OFFSET

FOR THE VALUE OF DEATH BENEFIT PROTECTION. OKAY.

SO, MY QUESTION IS -- WHICH WAS SORT OF BURIED IN THAT PARAGRAPH I THOUGHT YOU WERE TALKING ABOUT YOUR ACTUAL VALUE DAMAGES THEORY. BUT NOW YOU'VE GOTTEN ME FOCUSED ON IT. AND I STATED THE ISSUE PRECISELY ACCORDING TO MR. SHAPIRO.

SO, THE QUESTION IS, ARE THE DOCUMENTS SOUGHT BY NUMBER 100 OR SOME SUBSET OF THOSE DOCUMENTS IF IT WAS NARROWED RELEVANT TO THIS CREDIT ISSUE? THAT'S THE ONLY QUESTION.

MR. BROSNAHAN: YES. SO, THE QUESTION IS HOW IS THE COURT GOING TO DETERMINE THE AMOUNT OF THE OFFSET.

THE COURT: RIGHT.

MR. BROSNAHAN: AND THEY WILL ARGUE -- AND I THINK
MR. SHAPIRO HAS ALREADY INDICATED -- THAT THEY WOULD ARGUE
THAT THE CORRECT AMOUNT OF THE CREDIT IS THE
COST-OF-INSURANCE CHARGE THAT IS FOUND IN THE PROVIDER AND
PARAGON POLICIES.

AND WE WILL SAY, NO, YOUR HONOR. THAT IS NOT A

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17 CORRECT MEASURE OF THE OFFSET BECAUSE THOSE CHARGES ARE INFLATED BY THE FRAUD. AND TO FIND THE CORRECT AMOUNT OF THE CREDIT, YOU HAVE TO LOOK AT OTHER SOURCES. ONE WOULD BE THE COST OF TERM INSURANCE WHICH IS NOT INFLATED BY THE FRAUD. ANOTHER WOULD BE REQUEST NUMBER 110, WHICH LOOKS TO THE ACTUARY -- IT'S THE MORTALITY TABLES THAT THEY USE WHICH ESTABLISH THE ACTUARIALLY FAIR COST OF THE DEATH BENEFIT COMPONENT. BUT THAT DOESN'T BUILD IN THEIR EXPENSES OR ANY AMOUNT OF PROFIT IN IT. BUT I THINK THE COURT SHOULD BE ABLE TO LOOK AT BOTH OF THOSE ALTERNATIVE MEASURES TO CONSIDER WHAT IT BELIEVES IS THE CORRECT AMOUNT OF THE OFFSET. BECAUSE THE COST-OF-INSURANCE CHARGE IN THE PROVIDER AND PARAGON ARE INFLATED BY THE FRAUD. (PAUSE IN PROCEEDINGS.) THE COURT: SO, 110 IS THE MORTALITY TABLES USED IN PRICING IUL. MR. BROSNAHAN: YES. THAT WOULD BE PARAGON AND PROVIDER. THE COURT: THAT IS PARAGON AND PROVIDER. MR. BROSNAHAN: YES. THOSE ARE THE MORTALITY TABLES.

THE COURT: AS OPPOSED TO 100 WHICH TALKS ABOUT

MR. SHAPIRO: WE HAVE A WEAKER ARGUMENT.

1 THE COURT: OKAY. 2 MR. SHAPIRO: BECAUSE IT'S NOT TERM. THEY ARE HERE 3 -- THIS REQUEST IS DIRECTED -- IT IS DIRECTED TO THE PRODUCTS AT ISSUE, OR IT COULD BE NARROWED, AT LEAST TO 4 5 PARAGON AND PROVIDER, THE PRODUCTS AT ISSUE. 6 WE UNDERSTOOD THIS TO BE UNDER ACTUAL VALUE 7 REQUEST. 8 THE COURT: SO DID I BASED ON WHAT --9 MR. SHAPIRO: YES. 10 THE COURT: -- WHEN YOU MET AND CONFERRED, YOU KNOW 11 12 MR. SHAPIRO: SO, IF I MAY, YOUR HONOR, TAKE MY 13 SHOT AT WHY IT'S NOT RELEVANT. 14 THE COURT: YES. 15 MR. SHAPIRO: THE IRRELEVANCE OF THIS ONE -- CARVED OUT-- IS NOT LIKE IRRELEVANT FROM SPACE, WHICH IS 16 17 EFFECTIVELY, YOUR HONOR, OUR ARGUMENT WITH THE TERM. 18 HERE, THIS CASE HAS BEEN SUSTAINED ON THE BASIS OF 19 FOUR ALLEGED LIES IN THE PRODUCT LITERATURE. NONE --20 THE COURT: BUT THOSE FOUR LIES MIGHT STILL BE 21 SUFFICIENT TO -- I MEAN, I'M NOT GOING TO SPECULATE. AT THE 22 END OF THE DAY IF THEY GET RESCISSION, RIGHT? SO, IT DOESN'T 23 REALLY MATTER TO ME -- IT DOESN'T HAVE TO RELATE TO THE FOUR 24 ALLEGED LIES. IF AT THE END OF THE DAY THE REMEDY IS 25 RESCISSION, THEN, THE ISSUE BECOMES WHAT OFFSET, IF ANY, IS

LSW ENTITLED TO FOR THE DEATH BENEFIT PROTECTION IT PROVIDED DURING THE PERIOD OF TIME THE POLICIES WERE IN FORCE.

IF NUMBER 110 WERE LIMITED TO THE PROVIDER AND PARAGON POLICIES, WHY WOULDN'T THOSE MORTALITY TABLES BE AT LEAST ARGUABLY RELEVANT TO THAT ISSUE.

MR. SHAPIRO: THEY WOULDN'T.

THE COURT: THEY WOULD.

MR. SHAPIRO: NO. AND WE'VE BEEN THINKING ABOUT IT
THAT IN TERMS OF THE ACTUAL VALUES, CALL IT THE --

THE COURT: SO, 110 THEN I WOULD GRANT WITH RESPECT TO THE PROVIDER AND PARAGON POLICIES, RIGHT?

SO, NOW, LET'S GO BACK TO 101, WHICH WASN'T DIRECTED TO THE PARAGON AND PROVIDER POLICIES. IT'S DIRECTED TO TERM INSURANCE.

PLAINTIFFS HAVE ARTICULATED A THEORY. IT'S NOT MY
FUNCTION IN RULING ON A DISCOVERY MOTION TO MAKE IT AN IN
LIMINE RULING. YOU KNOW, THIS IS NOT THE SAME AS MY SAYING,
YOU KNOW, YOUR COSTS ARE NOT RELEVANT TO THEIR ACTUAL VALUE
BECAUSE I LOOKED AT THEIR CASES. AND THOSE CASES DON'T
SUPPORT THEM AT ALL.

BUT NOW THEY'VE ARTICULATED A THEORY THAT THEY SAY
THEY WOULD ARGUE THAT THE VALUE OF THE DEATH BENEFIT
PROTECTION IS -- SHOULD BE MEASURED, YOU KNOW, IF THAT'S AN
ATTRIBUTE OF THE POLICY THAT THE EVIDENCE OF THE COST OF
PROVIDING IT IN A TERM POLICY IS RELEVANT. IT'S NOT APPLES