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10 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
 11 **CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

13 FOX BROADCASTING COMPANY,  
 INC., TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX  
 14 FILM CORP., and FOX TELEVISION  
 HOLDINGS, INC.

15 Plaintiffs,

16 v.

17 DISH NETWORK L.L.C. and  
 18 DISH NETWORK CORP.,

19 Defendants.

Case No. 12-CV-04529-DMG (SH)

**PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO  
 DEFENDANTS' EVIDENTIARY  
 OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFFS'  
 MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY  
 INJUNCTION**

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 22 Plaintiffs Fox Broadcasting Company, Inc., Twentieth Century Fox Film  
 23 Corp., and Fox Television Holdings, Inc. (collectively, "Fox") hereby respond to  
 24 defendants Dish Network L.L.C.'s and Dish Network Corp.'s (collectively, "Dish")  
 25 Evidentiary Objections to Fox's Preliminary Injunction Motion.  
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1 Dish asserts more than 800 evidentiary objections to the declarations and  
2 exhibits proffered by Fox in support of its preliminary injunction motion. The  
3 laundry list of objections is thick in pages (43 in total) but flimsy in merit. Dish  
4 objects to hearsay where none exists; it challenges the personal knowledge of  
5 witnesses who clearly establish a sufficient foundation to testify; it invents  
6 objections such as “misleading” and “vague”; and it objects on the grounds of  
7 completeness, which is not even a rule of exclusion.

8 Even if Dish’s objections had merit – and they do not – it is well settled that  
9 “a preliminary injunction is customarily granted on the basis of procedures that are  
10 less formal and evidence that is less complete than in a trial on the merits.” *Univ. of*  
11 *Texas v. Camenisch*, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). The evidentiary rules are relaxed  
12 because courts recognize the difficulties associated with gathering evidence while  
13 pressed with the urgency of a preliminary injunction motion. *See Flynt Distrib.*  
14 *Co., Inc. v. Harvey*, 734 F.2d 1389, 1394 (9th Cir. 1984). As a result, “[the] trial  
15 court may give even inadmissible evidence some weight, when to do so serves [the]  
16 purpose of preventing irreparable harm before trial.” *Id.*

17 For these reasons, and those set forth below, Dish’s objections are improper  
18 and should be overruled.

19 **I. The Challenged Declarations And Exhibits Are Not Hearsay**

20 **A. Hearsay May Be Considered At The Preliminary Injunction Stage**

21 A trial court may consider hearsay evidence on a motion for a preliminary  
22 injunction. *See, e.g., Flynt*, 734 F.2d at 1394; *Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v.*  
23 *F.D.I.C.*, 992 F.2d 545, 551 (5th Cir. 1993) (“At the preliminary injunction stage,  
24 the procedures in the district court are less formal, and the district court may rely on  
25 otherwise inadmissible evidence, including hearsay evidence.”). For this reason  
26 alone, Dish’s objections should be overruled.

1           **B. Statements By Dish Or Its Agents Are Not Hearsay**

2           Out-of-court statements by a party opponent are not hearsay and are  
3           admissible. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A). Similarly, documents that contain  
4           statements made by an agent or employee of a party, concerning a matter within the  
5           scope of the agency or employment and made during the existence of the  
6           relationship are not hearsay. *See* Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(D).

7           Here, much of the evidence challenged by Dish on hearsay grounds consists  
8           of statements by Dish employees and agents. Dish objects to video recorded  
9           statements that appear on Dish’s own website, including statements made by Dish’s  
10          own Vice President, Vivek Khemka. Dish also objects to statements made to the  
11          Wall Street Journal by Dish Chairman, Charlie Ergen. Dish also objects to  
12          authenticated screenshots and written statements that appear on Dish’s website, as  
13          well as Dish’s advertisements, marketing materials, user guides, and training  
14          materials. By definition, these are party admissions and are admissible under FRE  
15          801(d)(2).<sup>1</sup> Moreover, Dish does not even dispute the accuracy of any of these  
16          statements.

17          **II. The Witnesses Proffered By Fox Have Personal Knowledge Of The**  
18          **Matters In Their Declarations**

19          Dish objects to the declarations of David Haslingden, Michael Biard, and  
20          Sherry Brennan by asserting they are not based on personal knowledge. Dish is  
21          wrong. As set forth in each declaration, these declarants are Fox executives with a  
22          combined fifty-three years of experience in the television and media industries.  
23          Their job responsibilities include the subject matters upon which they testify.

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26          <sup>1</sup> Fox, therefore, is not required to satisfy the requirement under Rule 804 hearsay  
27          exceptions demonstrating that the declarants are unavailable. *See, e.g., Globe Sav.*  
28          *Bank, F.S.B. v. United States*, 61 Fed. Cl. 91, 94-5 (Fed. Cl. 2004) (“Statements  
denominated as ‘admissions by a party-opponent’ . . . ‘are outside the framework of  
hearsay exceptions, classed as nonhearsay, and excluded from the hearsay rule,’ as  
a result of the operation of the adversary system.”).

1 For example, David Haslingden is responsible for all corporate functions of  
2 the Fox Network, including strategic business development, finance, legal,  
3 advertising sales, engineering, operations, and communications. Haslingden ¶ 2.

4 Michael Biard oversees the negotiation of licensing and affiliation  
5 agreements on behalf of various Fox entities. Biard ¶ 1. He is often the lead  
6 negotiator for Fox’s contractual negotiations with multichannel video programming  
7 distributors (“MVPDs”), including cable television systems and direct broadcast  
8 satellite television providers, such as Dish, who distribute Fox’s television network  
9 programming and related content to their subscribers. *Id.* ¶ 2.

10 Sherry Brennan develops television content distribution strategy for various  
11 media platforms on behalf of numerous Fox entities including Twentieth Century  
12 Fox Film Corporation and Fox Broadcasting Company. Brennan ¶ 1. She has  
13 detailed knowledge about the business and markets at issue in Fox’s preliminary  
14 injunction motion.

15 Together, these declarants have a wealth of direct personal knowledge of  
16 Fox’s negotiations with advertisers, MVPDs, and digital rights distributors. They  
17 are more than qualified to testify about the nature of those business relationships as  
18 well as the potential effects of Dish’s unlawful conduct on those relationships. *See*  
19 *e.g. J.F. Feeser, Inc. v. Serv-A-Portion, Inc.*, 909 F. 2d 1524, 1535 n.11 (3rd Cir.  
20 1990) (allowing sales representative to testify about customer reasons for not  
21 dealing with supplier).

22 Dish also objects to the declaration of Steven Smith. Mr. Smith is the  
23 Chairman of Journal Communications, Inc. (“Journal”), a company that owns and  
24 operates thirteen broadcast television stations. Smith ¶¶ 1-2. Journal’s main source  
25 of income is the sale of commercial advertising time on its broadcast networks.  
26 Obviously, this gives Mr. Smith sufficient personal knowledge to testify about the  
27 effects Dish’s commercial-skipping service on Journal’s advertising supported  
28 business model, as well as the industry in general.

1 Dish also objects to the declaration of Robert Liodice, the President and CEO  
2 of the Association of National Advertisers. Liodice ¶ 1. The Association of  
3 National Advertisers represents 400 companies and 10,000 brands that collectively  
4 spend over \$250 billion in marketing and advertising. *Id.* ¶ 2. Mr. Liodice's job is  
5 to understand and communicate the positions of advertisers who buy broadcast  
6 television advertising. He clearly has sufficient knowledge to give testimony on  
7 about the negative impact of Dish's infringement on advertisers.

### 8 **III. Fox's Declarants Have Not Proffered Improper Opinion Testimony**

9 Dish's objections to opinion testimony are improper. Any opinions given by  
10 Fox's declarants are all admissible under FRE 701 because they are (a) "rationally  
11 based on the witness's perception" and (b) helpful to the Court's understanding of  
12 their testimony. *See Minority Television Project, Inc. v. FCC*, 649 F. Supp. 2d  
13 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (allowed Vice President of large broadcasting station  
14 to hypothesize about impact that commercial advertising might have on the  
15 operations of other public radio stations because his testimony was "based upon his  
16 particularized knowledge that he has by virtue of his or her position in a business,  
17 as opposed to training or specialized knowledge within the realm of an expert, and  
18 is lay opinion"); *In re Google AdWords Litigation*, 2012 WL 28068, at \*4 (N.D.  
19 Cal. 2012) ("the rules of evidence have long permitted a person to testify to  
20 opinions about their own business based on their personal knowledge of their  
21 business"; collecting cases).

22 Even if the opinions at issue rose to the level of expert opinions, they would  
23 still be admissible in support of Fox's preliminary injunction motion because courts  
24 may consider declarations by experts at the preliminary injunction stage even where  
25 the declarant has not qualified as an expert pursuant to FRE 702. *See University of*  
26 *Texas v. Camenisch*, 451 U.S. 390, 395, 101 S.Ct. 1830, 1834 (1981) ("a  
27 preliminary injunction is customarily granted on the basis of procedures that are  
28 less formal and evidence that is less complete than in a trial on the merits"); *Flynt*,

1 734 F.2d at 1394 (9th Cir. 1984); *Welker v. Cicerone*, 174 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1059  
2 n.2 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (“because of the urgency involved and the limited time that a  
3 preliminary injunction remains in effect, declarations and evidence supporting the  
4 Motion need not conform to the standards for a summary judgment motion or to the  
5 Federal Rules of Evidence”).

6 **IV. The “Doctrine of Completeness” Is Not a Rule of Exclusion**

7 Dish makes “doctrine of completeness” objections to a number of Fox  
8 exhibits, such as screenshots from Dish’s websites. The FRE 106 “doctrine of  
9 completeness” is a rule of inclusion, *permitting* a party against whom a partial  
10 statement is entered in evidence to proffer the complete document. It is not a rule  
11 of exclusion *requiring* the party introducing evidence to offer the complete  
12 document.

13 FRE 106 provides that, when part of a writing is introduced by a party, the  
14 adverse party may introduce “any other part or any other writing or recorded  
15 statement which ought in fairness be considered contemporaneously with it.” Fed.  
16 R. Evid. 106. Indeed, “there is no rule that either the whole document, or no part of  
17 it, is competent.” *United States v. Littwin*, 338 F.2d 141, 146 (6th Cir. 1964);  
18 *accord United States v. Dorrell*, 758 F.2d 427, 434 (9th Cir. 1985). Accordingly,  
19 Rule 106 provides no basis to exclude Fox’s evidence.

20 **V. The Best Evidence Rule Does Not Apply Here**

21 Dish objects to a number of statements and exhibits on best evidence  
22 grounds. These objections are without merit. The best evidence rule applies only  
23 where secondary evidence is offered to prove the content of writing; secondary  
24 evidence offered to prove something other than the content of a writing is not  
25 barred by the evidence rule, even if the writing might be the “best” or “better”  
26 evidence on the issue. *See* Fed. R. Evid. 1002; *United States v. Fagan*, 821 F.2d  
27 1002, 1009 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1987) (allowing witness testimony about conversation  
28 even though conversation was tape recorded; “[t]he prosecution was not trying to

1 show the contents of the tape, but rather the contents of the conversation”)  
2 (emphasis in original); *Kenner v. C. I. R.*, 445 F.2d 19, 23 (7th Cir. 1971) (“courts  
3 do not bar oral proof of a matter merely because it is also provable by a writing”);  
4 *D’Angelo v. U. S.*, 456 F. Supp. 127, 131 (D. Del. 1978) (best evidence rule “is not  
5 applicable when a witness testifies from personal knowledge of the matter, even  
6 though the same information is contained in a writing.”).

7 Here, when Fox’s declarants reference the exhibits attached to their  
8 declarations, they are not attempting to prove the contents of the exhibits; rather,  
9 they are explaining the exhibits. Moreover, the declarants’ testimony is based on  
10 personal knowledge. As such the best evidence rule is not implicated, and Dish’s  
11 objections should be overruled.

12 **VI. Conclusion**

13 For the foregoing reasons, the Court should overrule Dish’s improper and  
14 unsubstantiated evidentiary objections.

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By: \_\_\_\_\_ /s/  
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