EXHIBIT 2

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 $GREED, \overline{POWER}, \\ AND ENDLESS WAR$

JAMES RISEN

Author of STATE OF WAR

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Ever since 9/11 America has fought an endless war on terror, seeking enemies everywhere and never promising peace. In *Pay Any Price*, James Risen reveals an extraordinary litany of the hidden costs of that war: from squandered and stolen dollars to outrageous abuses of power to an attack on normalcy, decency, and truth. In the name of fighting terrorism, our government has done things every bit as shameful as its historic wartime abuses—and until this book, it has worked very hard to cover them up.

Among the many stunning revelations:

- As much as \$14 billion in cash was flown to Iraq by the United States government—only to have much of it stolen. Approximately \$2 billion of the money was secretly transported out of Iraq in what may be one of the largest robberies in modern history. More than \$1 billion of that cash is now sitting in a bunker in Lebanon, beyond our reach despite the fact that we have known about it for years.
- The Pentagon tried to set up its own version of the CIA, complete with foreign agents working for cover corporations—only to find itself in bed with questionable Middle Eastern figures, including one who allegedly sought to use a covert Pentagon operation to launder hundreds of millions of dollars. On the side, there were also proposals that could have led to sales of drones to Syria and Lebanon and sales of chemicals that could have been used for explosives to other customers. An internal criminal investigation of the fiasco has been kept secret, until now.
- Here at home, when whistleblowers at the National Security Agency tried to protest some of the abuses of domestic surveillance

continued on back flap

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GREED, POWER, AND ENDLESS WAR

JAMES RISEN

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To Penny

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"I've come back," he repeated; "and I was the King of Kafiristan—me and Dravot—crowned Kings we was! In this office we settled it—you setting there and giving us the books. I am Peachey—Peachey Taliaferro Carnehan, and you've been setting here ever since—O Lord!"

I was more than a little astonished, and expressed my feelings accordingly.

"It's true," said Carnehan, with a dry cackle, nursing his feet which were wrapped in rags. "True as gospel. Kings we were, with crowns upon our heads—me and Dravot—poor Dan—oh, poor, poor Dan, that would never take advice, not though I begged of him!"

RUDYARD KIPLING

The Man Who Would Be King

CONTENTS

A Note on Sources

ix

Prologue

хi

PART I

GREED

1. Pallets of Cash

3

2. The Emperor of the War on Terror

31

3. The New Oligarchs

54

PART II POWER

4. Rosetta

71

- 5. Alarbus 123
- 6. Too Big to Fail 142

PART III ENDLESS WAR

- 7. The War on Decency 163
- 8. The War on Normalcy 202
 - 9. The War on Truth 230

Afterword

269

Index

274

A NOTE ON SOURCES

Many people have criticized the use of anonymous sources. Yet all reporters know that the very best stories—the most important, the most sensitive—rely on them. This book would not be possible without the cooperation of many current and former government officials and other individuals who were willing to discuss sensitive matters only on the condition of anonymity.

PROLOGUE

On April 9, 2009, near the start of the first Obama administration, former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz attended a modest ceremony at Arlington National Cemetery marking the sixth anniversary of the fall of Baghdad. Fewer than fifty people were gathered that day in Arlington's section 60, where the dead of the Iraq war lay buried, to mark the fact that on April 9, 2003, American tanks had rumbled into downtown Baghdad, and the statue of Saddam Hussein in Firdos Square had been toppled. For Wolfowitz and the ardent advocates of the invasion of Iraq, April 9 was Iraq Liberation Day, and they didn't care that by 2009, most Americans were exhausted by Iraq and eager to forget that the war had ever been fought.

Wolfowitz listened to speeches by a representative of the American Legion, a Gold Star mother, the Iraqi ambassador, and Viola Drath, an aging Georgetown socialite who was the organizer of the event. Never mind that the invasion that ousted Saddam Hussein in just three weeks had turned into a prolonged and brutal war of attrition, or that the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction which had been the predicate for the invasion had turned out to be illusory, or that on

that same sixth anniversary in 2009, an estimated thirty thousand Iraqis poured into Firdos Square in Baghdad to angrily protest the continued American occupation of Iraq, while the anniversary went largely unmarked in the United States save for this small gathering in section 60. None of that mattered. Wolfowitz, one of the architects of the Iraq war, was upbeat. After the ceremony, he and I walked and chatted together through the cemetery, from section 60 back to Arlington's entrance, engaging mostly in small talk and pleasantries. But it was clear that Wolfowitz seemed happy that Iraq had turned out so well, at least in his view, and that the global war on terror was still going strong under the direction of a new president who was then in the process of extending and validating many of the Bush administration's most contentious policies.

*

And there was no end in sight. Wolfowitz was long gone from the Pentagon, and in the 2008 elections, Americans had swept the Republicans from power. Perhaps Barack Obama's greatest political strength was that he seemed as different from George Bush as any politician could be. His campaign offered the promise of light following eight years of Dick Cheney's fondness for operating on what he called the dark side.

But executive power, once accumulated, is a hard thing to give up, and Obama quickly succumbed. He announced that he was determined to "look forward, not back," and that he opposed any broad new investigations of the Bush administration's use of torture, extraordinary rendition, domestic spying, or other potential crimes. After issuing an executive order to close the prison at Guantánamo Bay on his first day in office, Obama changed course and kept it open. He surrounded himself with advisors who had been deeply enmeshed in the Bush administration's most contentious national security policies. He expanded the use of drones in so-called targeted killings around the world, continued the use of military tribunals to try terrorism suspects, allowed investigators to question such suspects captured in

the United States without reading them their *Miranda* rights, and approved the nonjudicial killing of American citizens who joined al Qaeda. He did virtually nothing to rein in widespread contracting abuse in Iraq, Afghanistan, or the broader global war on terror.

He pushed for and won the authority to allow the National Security Agency (NSA) to continue to conduct broad electronic surveillance on Americans, and he went further, placing the NSA in charge of cybersecurity, giving the spy agency broad new access to the domestic Internet. Senators from his own party soon began to warn that Obama was secretly expanding the government's surveillance powers even beyond those authorized by Bush. Obama allowed the civil liberties panel that was supposed to provide oversight of the government's war on terror to remain idle and only partially staffed for years. His administration launched a draconian crackdown on the press, spying on reporters while prosecuting more leakers and whistleblowers than all previous administrations combined.

And it paid off for Obama by taking the edge off longstanding Republican critiques that Democrats were soft on national security. Obama performed a neat political trick: he took the national security state that had grown to such enormous size under Bush and made it his own. In the process, Obama normalized the post-9/11 measures that Bush had implemented on a haphazard, emergency basis. Obama's great achievement—or great sin—was to make the national security state permanent.

Half a century earlier, President Dwight Eisenhower had warned of a new "military-industrial complex"; under Bush and Obama, a parallel "homeland security-industrial complex" has been born. The rise of the military-industrial complex had been fueled by fears of Communism. Now, another abstract fear was driving hundreds of billions of dollars a year into building the infrastructure necessary to wage a permanent war on terror, and it had grown like kudzu around the CIA, FBI, Department of Homeland Security, Treasury Department, Pentagon, and dozens of other smaller offices and federal agencies. The post-9/11 panic led Congress to throw cash at counterterrorism faster than the FBI, CIA, and other agencies were able to spend it.

One 2012 estimate concluded that the decade of war had cost Americans nearly \$4 trillion.

*

Greed and power are always a dangerous combination. In wartime, power expands and greed can easily follow. The more our counterterrorism infrastructure has grown, the harder it has become to control. The traditional military-industrial complex was at least partly visible to outsiders; it comprised mammoth defense contractors that built airplanes, ships, and rockets, as well as high-tech firms that pioneered computers and advanced electronics. There were often public, aggressive congressional debates about spending on big new weapons systems, and major defense contractors frequently felt compelled to take out advertisements in newspapers and on television to generate support for their projects.

The new homeland security—industrial complex operates differently. It is largely made up of a web of intelligence agencies and their contractors, companies that mostly provide secret services rather than large weapons systems and equipment. These contractors are hired to help Washington determine the scale and scope of the terrorist threat; they make no money if they determine that the threat is overblown or, God forbid, if the war on terror ever comes to an end.

The growth of this homeland security-industrial complex has come at the same time that outsourcing and privatization have become the new watchwords among management consultants working both in corporate America and inside the government. Now, contractors perform functions once considered inherently governmental, particularly in defense and intelligence. War-zone contractors eventually outnumbered American soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Today, the CIA relies so heavily on outside contractors that many case officers have learned that the way to get ahead is to quit—and then come back the following week to the same job as a contractor making twice as much money.

As bureaucrats dream up new counterterrorism programs in order

to spend the money, they have turned to new companies that seem to sprout mysteriously in the office parks that dot the Dulles Toll Road and other commercial centers in northern Virginia near the CIA and Pentagon. There were more than 1,200 government organizations and nearly 2,000 private companies working on counterterrorism, homeland security, and intelligence programs, the Washington Post found in 2010, and more than 850,000 people in America had top-secret clearances, producing 50,000 intelligence reports a year. The U.S. intelligence budget alone has at least doubled since 2001, and by 2013, stood at more than \$70 billion a year, including both civilian and military intelligence spending.

It is no accident that seven of the ten wealthiest counties in America are in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area. A 2012 report by Reuters found that income inequality in Washington was greater than in almost any other city, thanks to the massive amounts of money flowing to lobbyists, contractors, and others benefiting directly or indirectly from federal spending.

America has become accustomed to a permanent state of war. Only a small slice of society—including many poor and rural teenagers—fight and die, while a permanent national security elite rotates among senior government posts, contracting companies, think tanks, and television commentary, opportunities that would disappear if America was suddenly at peace. To most of America, war has become not only tolerable but profitable, and so there is no longer any great incentive to end it.

Thus, the creation of a homeland security complex at a time of endless war has bequeathed us with the central narrative of the war on terror—modern tales of greed joined hand in hand with stories of abuse of power. It was inevitable that those wise in the ways of the world would flock to Washington to try to cash in on the war on terror gold rush—and they have. This book offers just a few of those stories. But those trying to monetize America's obsession with terrorism are not the only ones who have sought to exploit 9/11.

Opportunism comes in many forms and is driven by more than just greed. Ambition and a hunger for power, status, and glory have

become great engines of post-9/11 opportunism as well. The more troubling stories here concern abuses of power that have extended across two presidencies for well over a decade. After 9/11, the United States deregulated national security, stripping away the post-Watergate intelligence reforms of the 1970s that had constrained executive power for thirty years. The results are morally challenging—and continue to this day.



In May 2013, almost exactly two years after Osama bin Laden's death, President Obama gave a major national security address declaring that it was finally time to reassess the war on terror and recognize that it could not last forever. He vowed to place new limits on drone strikes and to try once again to close Guantánamo, but he offered few details and left himself plenty of room to continue his counterterrorism policies largely unaltered. In fact, his speech came just one week after Pentagon officials testifying before Congress said that the war on terror was likely to go on for another ten or twenty years, and that the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force, the original congressional resolution providing the broad legal underpinning for the nation's counterterror policies under both Bush and Obama, continues to give the government the right to prosecute the war on terror anywhere and everywhere, from Boston to Pakistan.

Obama's speech, filled with soaring rhetoric about the dangers of endless war, offered little evidence that he planned to follow through with any significant actions to rein in his own policies. It seemed designed to quell a growing restlessness within his liberal Democratic base without actually implementing significant change. The address was inevitably met with skepticism from national security legal experts. "If there was a unifying theme of President Obama's speech," wrote Benjamin Wittes on the influential national security blog Lawfare, "it was an effort to align himself as publicly as possible with the critics of the positions his administration is taking without undermining his administration's operational flexibility in actual fact. To put it crassly, the president sought to rebuke his own administration

for taking the positions it has—but also to make sure that it could continue to do so." Similarly, Obama's January 2014 speech, in which he said he wanted to reform the NSA, appeared designed to placate Americans alarmed by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden's disclosures of mass surveillance, while actually doing little to limit the NSA's powers. And Obama's subsequent proposal to scale back domestic phone data collection was considered little more than a half measure by privacy advocates.

*

Washington's global war on terror is now in its second decade, thanks to the bipartisan veneer it has gained under Bush and Obama. It shows no signs of slowing down; hustlers and freebooters continue to take full advantage, and the war's unintended consequences continue to pile up. All too often, things are not what they seem.

Two years after Paul Wolfowitz visited Section 60 at Arlington to attend the Iraq Liberation Day ceremony, Viola Drath, the event's organizer, was found dead in her Georgetown townhouse at the age of ninety-one. Her much younger German-born husband, Albrecht Muth, was arrested for her murder. Muth had claimed to be a general in the Iraqi Army and often wore an Iraqi military uniform to public events in Washington. But after his arrest, the certificate of his supposed appointment by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was found to be a forgery. A receipt from a Washington printing shop for the certificate was discovered in the couple's Georgetown home.

In January 2014, Muth was convicted of first-degree murder in the death of Viola Drath.

PART I

GREED

2



THE EMPEROR OF THE WAR ON TERROR

Greed and power, when combined, can be devastating. In the case of the missing cash of Baghdad, greed tempted Americans and Iraqis alike, while the power of the Coalition Provisional Authority to make fast, sweeping decisions with little oversight allowed that greed to grow unchecked. Billions of dollars disappeared as a result.

Throughout the war on terror, greed and power have flourished just as readily back home in the United States, where the government's surging counterterrorism spending created a new national security gold rush. The post-9/11 panic led Congress to throw cash at the FBI, CIA, and Pentagon faster than they were able to spend it. Soon, a counterterrorism bubble, like a financial bubble, grew in Washington, and a new breed of entrepreneur learned that one of the surest and easiest paths to riches could be found not in Silicon Valley building computers or New York designing clothes but rather in Tysons Corner, Virginia, coming up with new ways to predict, analyze, and prevent terrorist attacks—or, short of that, at least in convincing a few government bureaucrats that you had some magic formula for doing so.

Consider the example of Dennis Montgomery. He provides the

perfect case study to explain how during the war on terror greed and ambition have been married to unlimited rivers of cash to create a climate in which someone who has been accused of being a con artist was able to create a rogue intelligence operation with little or no adult supervision. Crazy became the new normal in the war on terror, and the original objectives of the war got lost in the process.



Whatever else he was, Dennis Montgomery was a man who understood how best to profit from America's decade of fear. He saw the post-9/11 age for what it was, a time to make money.

Montgomery was the maestro behind what many current and former U.S. officials and others familiar with the case now believe was one of the most elaborate and dangerous hoaxes in American history, a ruse that was so successful that it nearly convinced the Bush administration to order fighter jets to start shooting down commercial airliners filled with passengers over the Atlantic. Once it was over, once the fever broke and government officials realized that they had been taken in by a grand illusion, they did absolutely nothing about it. The Central Intelligence Agency buried the whole insane episode and acted like it had never happened. The Pentagon just kept working with Montgomery. Justice Department lawyers fanned out across the country to try to block any information about Montgomery and his schemes from becoming public, invoking the state secrets privilege in a series of civil lawsuits involving Montgomery.

It was as if everyone in Washington was afraid to admit that the Emperor of the War on Terror had no clothes.



A former medical technician, a self-styled computer software expert with no experience whatsoever in national security affairs, Dennis Montgomery almost singlehandedly prompted President Bush to ground a series of international commercial flights based on what

now appears to have been an elaborate hoax. Even after it appeared that Montgomery had pulled off a scheme of amazing scope, he still had die-hard supporters in the government who steadfastly refused to believe the evidence suggesting that Montgomery was a fake, and who rejected the notion that the super-secret computer software that he foisted on the Pentagon and CIA was anything other than America's salvation.

Montgomery's story demonstrates how hundreds of billions of dollars poured into the war on terror went to waste. With all rules discarded and no one watching the bottom line, government officials simply threw money at contractors who claimed to offer an edge against the new enemies. And the officials almost never checked back to make sure that what they were buying from contractors actually did any good—or that the contractors themselves weren't crooks. A 2011 study by the Pentagon found that during the ten years after 9/11, the Defense Department had given more than \$400 billion to contractors who had previously been sanctioned in cases involving \$1 million or more in fraud.

The Montgomery episode teaches one other lesson, too: the chance to gain promotions and greater bureaucratic power through access to and control over secret information can mean that there is no incentive for government officials to question the validity of that secret information. Being part of a charmed inner circle holds a seductive power that is difficult to resist.

Montgomery strongly denies that he peddled fraudulent technology. He insists that the charges have been leveled by critics with axes to grind, including his former lawyer and former employees. He claims that he was following direct orders from both the NSA and the CIA, and says that the CIA, NSA, and U.S. military took his technology so seriously that it was used to help in the targeting of Predator strikes and other raids. Montgomery adds that he is limited in what he can say about his software and business dealings with the CIA and Pentagon without the approval of the Justice Department. The fact that the government is blocking public disclosure of the details of its relationship with him, he adds, shows that his work was considered

serious and important. "Do you really think," he asked, "the government invoked the state secrets privilege just from being embarrassed or conned?"



The strange tale of Dennis Montgomery and his self-proclaimed plan to win the war on terror begins, appropriately enough, inside the El Dorado Casino in downtown Reno.

Montgomery was an overweight, middle-aged, incorrigible gambler, a man who liked to play long odds because he was convinced that he could out-think the house. He once boasted to a business partner that he had a system for counting an eight-deck blackjack shoe, quite a difficult feat for even the best card sharks, and he regularly tested his theories at the El Dorado and the Peppermill Casino in Reno. He usually came up short but that didn't stop him from playing blackjack on a nightly basis, racking up unwieldy debts that eventually led to his 2010 arrest for bouncing more than \$1 million in bad checks at Caesar's Palace in Las Vegas.

Gambling is how he met his first backer, Warren Trepp. Trepp got rich in the biggest casino of them all, Wall Street. He had been Michael Milken's right-hand man in the heyday of Milken's famous Beverly Hills trading desk during the "greed is good" era of insider trading in the 1980s. When a hungry federal prosecutor named Rudolph Giuliani went after Milken for insider trading, he tried to get Trepp to roll over on his boss. Trepp refused, even in the face of a threat that he would be charged himself if he failed to cooperate. Milken went to jail, but Giuliani never could nail Trepp. Instead of facing criminal charges, Trepp became the subject of a marathon investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which tried to impose civil sanctions for Trepp's alleged part in Milken's insider-trading bonanza. It took nearly a decade, but Trepp finally beat the feds. In 1997, the SEC's case against him was dismissed. He walked away from the Milken years with a fortune.

Warren Trepp may have been able to defeat Rudy Giuliani and a

whole legion of federal investigators, but he couldn't outwit Dennis Montgomery.

By the late 1990s, Trepp was living in Incline Village, a wealthy enclave on the Nevada side of Lake Tahoe, where he was shaking off his past and trying to remake himself into a respected philanthropist, theater angel, and canny private investor. And then he met Montgomery.

Trepp was introduced to Montgomery by a casino host at the El Dorado in 1997. Montgomery was on the lookout for somebody to bankroll him, and had put out the word to his friends at the casinos that he frequented the most. A year later, Montgomery and Trepp were in business together. Trepp was one of the first, but hardly the last, to be beguiled by Montgomery's claims that he had achieved breakthroughs in computer technology of historic significance. The two founded a company together and tried to find buyers for Montgomery's alleged miracle software.

Montgomery convinced Trepp that he had achieved a series of major technological advances in computer software that could be worth millions. One was the development of software that he argued provided a new method of video compression, allowing for greater video storage and transmission than was ever available before. Another innovation was stunningly detailed video facial recognition. But the most dazzling claim of all involved software that Montgomery said could identify objects and anomalies embedded in video with unprecedented detail. He claimed that his technology could even find and identify objects hidden inside videotape that were not visible to the naked eye.

How his technology worked was a secret. Dennis Montgomery's computer code became the great treasure behind eTreppid Technologies, the company he and Trepp founded. Later, many of those around Montgomery began to suspect the reason why Montgomery had to guard his technological innovations so carefully. They came to believe that at least some of the technology didn't really exist.

To commercialize his technology, Montgomery first tried to convince Hollywood that he had developed a new and efficient means of colorizing old movies. His object identification software, he claimed, could speed the process of deciding where and how to colorize each frame of film. Warren Trepp later told a court that Montgomery had given him a demonstration of his software's ability to identify patterns and images in a video of the 1939 black-and-white classic *Gunga Din*.

But after failing to strike it big in Hollywood, Montgomery and Trepp shifted their focus to the casino industry in Reno and Las Vegas. Montgomery later bragged that he had developed pattern recognition software specifically for casinos that could help identify cheaters. He even claimed he had technology that could identify high-value chips inside piles of chips on gaming tables, to detect when dealers tried to steal from the casinos by slipping valuable chips to friends. Montgomery also said he had developed video compression software that would allow casinos to more easily store thousands of hours of surveillance tapes, rather than erase all of their old footage.

But his technology was never a big hit with the casino industry, either. So Montgomery turned to Washington. There, Montgomery finally succeeded in his new search for clients through a series of coincidences and chance encounters, along with strong political and financial connections that helped to smooth the way. And it all started, like so many other things in his life, in a casino.

In 2002, Warren Trepp arranged for the MGM Grand Casino to take a look at Montgomery's technology. An air force colonel who had heard about Montgomery's work decided to come and see it as well. Impressed, he helped Montgomery and eTreppid land a contract with the air force.

Michael Flynn, Montgomery's former lawyer—who later concluded that Montgomery was a fraud—said that Montgomery had told him that Montgomery had won over the visiting air force officer, who became convinced that Montgomery's object recognition and video compression technologies could help the air force's Predator drone program. The CIA and air force were flying Predator drones over Afghanistan at the time, and they were sending back thousands of hours of video that needed to be analyzed and stored. Just like

Las Vegas casinos, the air force needed a way to maintain the massive piles of video generated by its own version of the eye in the sky. Montgomery's object recognition technology could provide new ways for the air force to track suspected terrorists with the Predator. Montgomery claimed that his facial recognition software was so good that he could identify individual faces from the video camera flying on a Predator high above the mountains of southern Afghanistan.

By the spring and summer of 2003, eTreppid was awarded contracts by both the air force and U.S. Special Operations Command. Montgomery was able to win over the government in part by offering field tests of his technology-tests that former employees say were fixed to impress visiting officials. Warren Trepp later told the FBI that he eventually learned that Montgomery had no real computer software programming skills, according to court documents that include his statements to the FBI. Trepp also described to federal investigators how eTreppid employees had confided to him that Montgomery had asked them to help him falsify tests of his object recognition software when Pentagon officials came to visit. Trepp said that on one occasion, Montgomery told two eTreppid employees to go into an empty office and push a button on a computer when they heard a beep on a cell phone. Meanwhile, Montgomery carried a toy bazooka into a field outside eTreppid. He was demonstrating to a group of visiting U.S. military officials that his technology could recognize the bazooka from a great distance.

After he was in place in the field, he used a hidden cell phone to buzz the cell phone of one the eTreppid employees, who then pushed a key on a computer keyboard, which in turn flashed an image of a bazooka on another screen prominently displayed in front of the military officers standing in another room, according to court documents. The military officers were convinced that Montgomery's computer software had amazingly detected and recognized the bazooka in Montgomery's hands. (Montgomery insists that the eTreppid employees lied when they claimed that he had asked them to fix the tests, and also says that the air force issued a report showing that it had verified the tests.)

Montgomery had a lot of support when it came to dealing with the

government. Through Warren Trepp, he had excellent political connections, and in Washington that can take you a very long way.

To help eTreppid get more government business, Trepp brought in Letitia White, a Washington lobbyist with ties to congressional Republicans. She was particularly close with her former boss, California congressman Jerry Lewis. He, in turn, was chairman of the powerful House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee (he later became chairman of the full appropriations committee) and so was able to steer billions of dollars in spending to programs he favored throughout the Pentagon. Letitia White, who had been one of Lewis's closest aides, had left to go to work with the Washington lobbying firm of Copeland Lowery, where she specialized in arranging custom-built earmarks in the defense and intelligence budgets for her clients.

The connections among Lewis, White, and Copeland Lowery later became the subject of a long-running criminal investigation by the Justice Department. The U.S. attorney in Los Angeles probed whether Lewis had steered huge amounts of money to Copeland Lowery's clients in return for large campaign donations from the lobbying firm and from the defense contractors that were its clients. The investigation of Jerry Lewis was ongoing when the U.S. attorney handling the case, Carol Lam, was fired by the Bush administration in 2007, making her one of eight U.S. attorneys pushed aside by the Bush White House in a famously controversial, possibly political decision. The investigation into Lewis and his ties to Copeland Lowery was eventually dropped, but the lobbying firm broke up under the pressure, and Letitia White moved to a new firm. In 2009, Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW) named Lewis one of the fifteen most corrupt members of Congress.

But Trepp wasn't finished after hiring White. He convinced another heavyweight Nevada investor, Wayne Prim, to put money into eTreppid. In September 2003, Prim hosted a dinner that brought together Trepp, Montgomery, and Rep. Jim Gibbons of Nevada, a former airline pilot and rising star among congressional Republicans. Gibbons, an influential member of the House Intelligence Committee, almost certainly played a critical role in helping Montgomery to gain access to the Central Intelligence Agency.

Gibbons did not need much coaxing to try to assist eTreppid. Not only was the company based in his home state, but both Prim and Warren Trepp were longtime campaign contributors. After the dinner at Prim's house, Gibbons went to work immediately opening doors in Washington for eTreppid. Flynn said that Montgomery later told him that Gibbons quickly arranged to meet with Porter Goss, then the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, to discuss eTreppid and Montgomery's technology.

By the fall of 2003, Dennis Montgomery had made a series of impressive moves to gain access to the black budget of the government's national security apparatus. He had the backing of two wealthy investors, had one of the nation's most influential lobbyists scouring the federal budget for earmarks on his behalf, and had the support of a key member of the CIA's oversight committee. After obtaining a series of small contracts with the air force and the Special Operations Command, Montgomery was ready for the big time.



For a few months in late 2003, the technology from Dennis Montgomery and eTreppid so enraptured certain key government officials that it was considered the most important and most sensitive counterterrorism intelligence that the Central Intelligence Agency had to offer President Bush. Senior officials at the CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology began to accept and vouch for Montgomery to officials at the highest levels of the government. Montgomery's claims grew ever more expansive, but that only solidified his position inside the national security arena. His technology became too impossible to disbelieve.

Montgomery's big moment came at Christmas 2003, a strange time of angst in the American national security apparatus. It was two years after the 9/11 attacks, and the war in Iraq was getting worse. Iraq was turning into a new breeding ground for terrorism, and Osama bin Laden was still on the loose, regularly thumbing his nose at the Americans by issuing videotaped threats of further terrorist strikes. The CIA, still stumbling in the aftermath of the two greatest

intelligence failures in its history—missing 9/11 and getting it wrong on Iraq's supposed weapons of mass destruction—was desperate for success, a quick win with which to answer its critics.

The CIA's Science and Technology Directorate, which had largely been stuck on the sidelines of the war on terror, saw in Dennis Montgomery an opportunity to get in the game. The directorate had played an important role in the Cold War, but in the first few years of the war on terror, it was still struggling to determine how technology could be leveraged against small groups of terrorists who were trying to stay off the grid.

Montgomery brilliantly played on the CIA's technical insecurities as well as the agency's woeful lack of understanding about al Qaeda and Islamic terrorism. He was able to convince the CIA that he had developed a secret new technology that enabled him to decipher al Qaeda codes embedded in the network banner displayed on the broadcasts of Al Jazeera, the Qatar-based news network. Montgomery sold the CIA on the fantasy that al Qaeda was using the broadcasts to digitally transmit its plans for future terrorist attacks. And only he had the technology to decode those messages, thus saving America from another devastating attack. The CIA—more credulous than Hollywood or Las Vegas—fell for Montgomery's claims. In short, he convinced CIA officials that he could detect terrorist threats by watching television.

By late 2003, CIA officials began to flock to eTreppid's offices in Reno to see Montgomery's amazing software. Michael Flynn, Montgomery's former lawyer, said that Montgomery had dealings with or knew the identities of at least sixteen different CIA officials. These people now joined the senior military officers who had frequented the company since the previous spring, when it first began to work on the Predator program.

Montgomery persuaded the spy agency that his special computer technology could detect hidden bar codes broadcast on Al Jazeera, which had been embedded into the video feed by al Qaeda. Allegedly, al Qaeda was using that secret method to send messages to its terrorist operatives around the world about plans for new attacks. Montgomery convinced the CIA that his technology had uncovered a series

of hidden letters and numbers that appeared to be coded messages about specific airline flights that the terrorists were targeting.

Montgomery insists that he did not come up with the idea of analyzing Al Jazeera videotapes—he says that the CIA came to him in late 2003 and asked him to do it. CIA officials brought Montgomery two different versions of al Qaeda videotapes, he claims. They gave him original al Qaeda videotapes obtained independently by the CIA, and then also gave him recordings of the same videotapes recorded as they had been broadcast on Al Jazeera. The CIA wanted him to compare the two, he claims.

But even if it wasn't Montgomery's idea, he ran with it as fast as he could. He told the CIA that he had found that the versions of the tapes broadcast on Al Jazeera had hidden letters and numbers embedded in them. He says that he found that each bin Laden video broadcast on al Jazeera had patterns and objects embedded in the network's own banner displayed with the video recordings.

Montgomery let the CIA draw its own conclusions based on the information he gave them. After he reported to the CIA that he had detected a series of hidden letters and numbers, he left it up to the CIA to conclude that those numbers and letters referred to specific airline flights. He insists that he did not offer the CIA his own conclusions about what the data meant.

By the middle of December 2003, Montgomery reported to the CIA that he had discovered certain combinations of letters and numbers. For example, coded messages that included the letters "AF" followed by a series of numbers, or the letters "AA" and "UA" and two or three digits, kept repeating. In other instances, he told the agency that he had found a series of numbers that looked like coordinates for the longitude and latitude of specific locations.

The CIA made the inevitable connections. "They would jump at conclusions," says Montgomery. "There would be things like C4, C4, and they would say that's explosives. They jumped to conclusions." He added that he "never suggested it was airplanes or a threat."

Montgomery's data triggered panic at the CIA and the White House—and urgent demands that Montgomery produce more. On Christmas Eve, CIA officials showed up at Montgomery's house in

Reno and told him that he had to go back to his office to keep digging through incoming videotapes and Al Jazeera broadcasts throughout the holidays, Montgomery recalled.

Montgomery was telling the CIA exactly what it wanted to hear. At the time, the Bush administration was obsessed with Al Jazeera, not only because of the network's unrelenting criticism of the invasion of Iraq, but also because it had become Osama bin Laden's favorite outlet for broadcasting his videotaped messages to the world. Each time bin Laden released a new video, the American media immediately turned to the CIA for a quick response and analysis of whether the recording was genuine and where and when it had been taped. Each new broadcast on Al Jazeera forced the CIA to scramble to stay one step ahead of Western reporters baying for answers. At first, when bin Laden released videotapes filmed outdoors in what appeared to be the mountainous terrain of northwestern Pakistan, the CIA even tried to conduct a geological analysis of the rocky outcroppings that served as the backdrop for the video, to try to figure out where bin Laden was. His broadcast statements prompted the CIA to look for new methods of analyzing the news network, and also led some American officials to suspect that there was a covert relationship between Al Jazeera and al Qaeda.

Former senior CIA officials say that officials from the CIA's Science and Technology Directorate, including the directorate's chief, Donald Kerr, believed Montgomery's claims about al Qaeda codes. They also convinced CIA director George Tenet to take the technology and intelligence flowing from Montgomery's software seriously. As a result, in December 2003, Tenet rushed directly to President Bush when information provided by Montgomery and his software purported to show that a series of flights from France, Britain, and Mexico to the United States around Christmas were being targeted by al Qaeda. The data strongly suggested that the terrorist group was planning to crash the planes at specific coordinates.

Based on Montgomery's information, President Bush ordered the grounding of a series of international flights scheduled to fly into the United States. This step caused disruptions for thousands of travelers on both sides of the Atlantic, while further stoking public fears of an-

other spectacular al Qaeda attack just two years after the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington.



Years later, several former CIA officials who eventually pieced together what had happened in those frenzied days became highly critical of how Montgomery's information was handled by Tenet and other senior CIA managers. The critics came to believe that top officials in the CIA's Science and Technology Directorate became fierce advocates for Montgomery's information because they were eager to play a more prominent role in the Bush administration's war on terror. The scientists were tired of being shunted aside, and Montgomery gave them what they wanted: technology that could prove their worth. "They wanted in," said one former senior CIA official, "they wanted to be part of the game."

But former CIA officials blame Tenet even more; the CIA director enabled the overeager scientists. He allowed them to circumvent the CIA's normal reporting and vetting channels, and rushed the raw material fed to the agency by Montgomery directly to the president. Bush himself had no way of vetting the material he was being handed by the CIA. "Tenet made George Bush the case officer on this," said one former senior CIA official. "The president was deciding how this was being handled."

One former senior CIA official said that for two or three months in late 2003 and early 2004, the intelligence from Montgomery was treated like it was the most valuable counterterrorism material at the CIA. Special briefings were given almost daily on the intelligence, but only a handful of CIA officials were told where the intelligence was coming from. "They treated this like the most important, most sensitive compartmented material they had on terrorism," said one former CIA official.

Officially, the CIA still refuses to discuss any details of the episode. One CIA official offered a qualified defense of Tenet's handling of Montgomery's information, saying that the decision to share the threat information with President Bush was debated and approved by

the administration's so-called principals committee, made up of Vice President Dick Cheney, the secretaries of state and defense, and other members of the cabinet. Only after the principals agreed did Tenet take the intelligence in to Bush. In other words, Tenet wasn't the only one who appears to have been hoodwinked. Dennis Montgomery's information received the stamp of approval by the entire upper echelon of the Bush administration.



What remains unclear is how Montgomery was able to convince all of them that he had developed secret software that could decode al Qaeda's invisible messages. While he had gotten by a few credulous military officers who came to view his demonstrations, he apparently found it just as easy to persuade the CIA as well.

A CIA official defensively pointed out that the agency did not actually have a contract with eTreppid at the time Montgomery was providing data from the Al Jazeera videotapes. While they were working closely together during the final months of 2003, the CIA had not yet started paying Montgomery, the official said. The agency never finalized a contract with him because agency staff eventually realized they had been conned, according to this official. But that does not diminish the fact that for a few crucial months, the CIA took Montgomery and his technology very seriously.

Montgomery was able to succeed with the CIA in part because senior agency officials considered his technology so important that they turned the knowledge of its existence into a highly compartmented secret. Few at the CIA knew any more than that there was a new intelligence source providing highly sensitive information about al Qaeda's plans for its future terrorist strikes. In other words, the CIA officials working with Montgomery—people who had already bought into Montgomery—controlled who else was told about the man and his technology. By limiting access to the information, they enhanced their own standing within the CIA; they were the high priests in on the agency's biggest secret. There would be no second-guessing.

The fact that Montgomery and eTreppid had such powerful con-

nections in Washington also reduced the incentives for anyone at the CIA to speak up. Raising questions about Dennis Montgomery would almost certainly lead to a grilling in front of the House Intelligence Committee and Jim Gibbons. It might also incur the wrath of Jerry Lewis and the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, which, along with the House intelligence panel, controlled the intelligence budget.

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For those few allowed into the CIA's charmed circle of secret knowledge, Montgomery seemed to be providing powerful and frightening information.

The string of numbers flowing inexorably from Dennis Montgomery's computers prompted President Bush to act. One set of flights he ordered grounded were Air France flights from Paris to Los Angeles. French security detained seven men at Charles de Gaulle Airport in Paris for questioning, but then released them after no further evidence of a pending attack was uncovered. Christmas 2003 came and went with no attacks. But that did not make the White House any more skeptical of Dennis Montgomery.

One former senior CIA official recalled attending a White House meeting in the week following Christmas to discuss what to do next about the information coming from Montgomery. The official claims that there was a brief but serious discussion about whether to shoot down commercial airliners over the Atlantic based on the intelligence. The former CIA official said that during the meeting, Frances Townsend—then a counterterrorism official on the National Security Council—discussed with an NSC lawyer the fact that the president had the legal authority to shoot down planes believed to be terrorist threats, and that it might be time to exercise that authority. "I couldn't believe they were talking about it," the former senior CIA official said. "I thought this was crazy."

Townsend denied ever having such a discussion. The former CIA official repeated his version of events after being told of her denial.

Finally, the French brought an end to it. Since Air France flights to the United States were among those that had been grounded, French officials had taken a dim view of the entire episode. They began demanding answers from the Americans. The French applied so much pressure on Washington that the CIA was finally forced to reveal to French intelligence the source of the threat information. Once they heard the story of Dennis Montgomery and eTreppid, French officials arranged for a French high-tech firm to reverse-engineer Montgomery's purported technology. The French wanted to see for themselves whether the claims of hidden messages in Al Jazeera broadcasts made any sense.

It did not take long for the French firm to conclude that the whole thing was a hoax. The French company said that there were simply not enough pixels in the broadcasts to contain hidden bar codes or unseen numbers. The firm reported back to the French government that the supposed intelligence was a fabrication.

At first, CIA officials were taken aback by the French company's findings and did not want to believe that they had been fooled. Montgomery says that CIA officials continued to work with him for months after Christmas 2003, and that CIA personnel were still showing up at his offices in Nevada until late 2004.

Once the CIA officials finally accepted the truth, however, and agreed with the French findings, George Tenet and others at the CIA who had been Montgomery's advocates tried to forget all about him. They never talked about the operation again. Within the CIA, it was as if Dennis Montgomery had never existed.

The CIA never investigated the apparent hoax nor examined how it had been handled inside the agency. No one involved in promoting Montgomery, in vouching for his information to the president, or in proposing to shoot down planes based on his claims ever faced any consequences. Donald Kerr, the head of the CIA's Science and Technology Directorate at the time, was never held to account for the role the CIA's technical experts played in advocating for Montgomery. Instead, Kerr kept getting promoted. He received several other senior assignments in the intelligence community, and was eventually

named deputy director of national intelligence. Kerr did not respond to requests for comment.

At the time of the Christmas 2003 scare, John Brennan was head of the newly created Terrorist Threat Integration Center and in charge of distributing terrorism-related intelligence throughout the government. That meant that Brennan's office was responsible for circulating Montgomery's fabricated intelligence to officials in the highest reaches of the Bush administration. But Brennan was never admonished for his role in the affair. After Barack Obama became president, Brennan was named to be his top counterterrorism advisor in the White House. He later became CIA director.

In 2013, while the Senate was considering whether to confirm Brennan to run the CIA, Sen. Saxby Chambliss, a Georgia Republican who was vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, submitted a written question to Brennan about his role in the intelligence community's dealings with Montgomery. In response, Brennan denied that he had been an advocate for Montgomery and his technology, and insisted that the Terrorism Threat Integration Center was merely a recipient of Montgomery's information and data, which had been passed on by the CIA. He said that the center included Montgomery's data "in analytic products as appropriate." He claimed not to know what had become of the CIA's program with eTreppid, "other than it was determined not to be a source of accurate information."

There was no further inquiry on the matter from Congress. "Nobody was blamed," complains one former CIA official. "Instead, they got promoted."

Even more stunning, after the debacle over the bogus Christmas 2003 terrorist threats, Montgomery kept getting classified government contracts awarded through several different corporate entities. Montgomery's problems with the CIA did not stop him from peddling variations of his technology to one government agency after another. The secrecy that surrounded his work once again worked in his favor. CIA officials were reluctant to tell their Pentagon counterparts much about their experiences with Montgomery, so Defense Department

officials apparently did not realize that his technology was considered suspect at CIA headquarters.

In February 2004, just two months after the Christmas 2003 airplane scare, eTreppid was awarded a new contract with Special Operations Command. The contract was for both data compression and "automatic target recognition software," Montgomery's purported technology to recognize the faces of people on the ground filmed in videos on Predator drones. Special Operations Command gave eTreppid access to video feeds from Predator drones controlled from Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada. It is not certain how long officials there tested Montgomery's facial recognition technology before realizing that eTreppid had no secret formula for identifying terrorists from Predator drone video feeds. But eventually, Special Operations Command also began to see through Montgomery.

"The technology didn't meet the requirements for us," said a Special Operations Command spokesman drily. Still, there is no evidence that officials at Special Operations Command ever talked with their counterparts at the CIA to check up on Montgomery before awarding him a contract. Special Operations Command paid a total of \$9.6 million to eTreppid under its contract with the firm.

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By late 2005, Dennis Montgomery was in trouble. Employees at eTreppid were becoming more openly skeptical of Montgomery and trying to get access to his secret technology to see if it really existed. For years, Montgomery had somehow managed to hide the truth about his secret work for the government from the small number of employees he had hired. He successfully infused a sense of mystery around himself. He was like the Wizard of Oz, but now people were beginning to try to examine the man behind the curtain.

Sloan Venables, hired by Montgomery to be eTreppid's director of research and development, later told the FBI that another employee, Patty Gray, began to suspect that Montgomery "was doing something other than what he was actually telling people he was doing." Venables added in his statement to the FBI that he knew that "Montgom-

ery promised products to customers that had not been completed or even assigned to programmers."

At the same time, Montgomery was arguing with Warren Trepp over money; Montgomery needed cash and claimed that Trepp had shortchanged him on his share of the revenue from eTreppid's contracts. In December 2005, Montgomery asked Trepp for a personal loan of \$275,000, on top of the \$1.375 million Trepp had already loaned him since 1999, according to court documents. This was too much for Trepp, who finally became fed up with Montgomery.

But Montgomery moved first. Over the Christmas holidays, Montgomery allegedly went into eTreppid's offices and deleted all of the computer files containing his source code and software development data, according to court documents. He broke with Trepp, left eTreppid, and began looking for new backers. Trepp soon discovered that Montgomery had asked yet another casino host at the El Dorado if he knew of any wealthy gamblers who would be willing to invest \$5 to \$10 million in a new business he was about to launch. Trepp later told the FBI that on his way out the door at eTreppid, Montgomery screamed at one employee, "You're an asshole and I will see you again!"

Trepp was furious. According to court documents, he told the FBI that Montgomery had stolen the software eTreppid had used on secret Pentagon contracts. As federal investigators moved in to investigate the alleged theft of the technology, they heard from Trepp and others that Montgomery's alleged technology wasn't real. Yet they doggedly kept probing Montgomery's theft of secret technology, and even raided Montgomery's home searching for the computer codes, all the while largely ignoring the evidence that he had perpetrated a hoax.

After their partnership broke up, Montgomery and Trepp remained locked in a series of nasty and lingering legal battles. The worst involved Montgomery's allegations that Jim Gibbons, the Nevada Republican congressman whom he had met at Wayne Prim's house, had received bribes from Warren Trepp in return for helping eTreppid to obtain defense contracts. Montgomery's accusations were explosive because they became public just as Gibbons was be-

ing elected governor of Nevada. They helped to trigger a federal corruption investigation, but the inquiry was eventually shelved amid questions about whether e-mails that Montgomery claimed showed that Gibbons had accepted money and a Caribbean cruise in exchange for help in winning contracts for eTreppid—and thus supposedly provided evidence of bribery—may have been forgeries. Dennis Montgomery was widely suspected of having fabricated the e-mails in an effort to damage both Trepp and Gibbons.

In 2008, Abbe Lowell, the Washington attorney representing Gibbons, announced that Gibbons had been cleared of wrongdoing and that prosecutors had told him that he would not be charged in the corruption investigation. Lowell said, "It should be crystal clear that the only persons who should be investigated or charged are those who made false allegations of wrongdoing and who tried to fuel this investigation for their own private purposes," according to an account of his statement in the Associated Press. Gibbons added that "today, I am exceedingly pleased that the FBI and the Justice Department have vindicated me from the allegations and claims of Mr. Montgomery."

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Montgomery was able to recover from his battle with Trepp once he landed another wealthy patron, Edra Blixseth, the wife of billionaire Tim Blixseth. Tim Blixseth had made his fortune in timber land swaps in the Pacific Northwest, and then turned his focus to developing a mountain resort for the uber-rich in Montana called the Yellowstone Club. Set in the Rocky Mountains not far north of Yellowstone National Park, the 13,600-acre club was said to be the only private ski resort in the world. It attracted jet-setters who were willing to pay to avoid mixing with the rabble at public ski resorts.

Developing the Yellowstone Club helped to secure for Tim Blix-seth the ultimate status symbol—a spot on the Forbes 400. Tim and Edra enjoyed all of the perks of the super-rich—among many other things, they owned a private jet, a yacht, and a massive estate in Rancho Mirage, California, called Porcupine Creek, which came with its own private golf course. Their wealth and ownership of the Yellow-

stone Club also meant that the Blixseths were networking with some of the most famous and powerful people in the world, from Bill Gates to Jack Kemp to Benjamin Netanyahu.

Edra Blixseth was Dennis Montgomery's latest mark. After being introduced to him by a former Microsoft executive and then hearing Montgomery explain his software, she agreed in 2006 to bankroll Montgomery to launch a new company, to be called Blxware. Montgomery needed new government contracts for Blxware, and Edra Blixseth had the money and contacts to try to make it happen. Jack Kemp, the former congressman and onetime Republican vice presidential candidate, was a member of the Yellowstone Club, and in 2006 he helped to arrange a White House meeting for Montgomery to push his technology. Thanks to Kemp, Montgomery met with Samantha Ravich, a national security aide to Vice President Dick Cheney, who was an old friend of Kemp. Montgomery explained his technology to Ravich and then tried to convince her that Cheney should support his bid for more government funding. But unlike other officials who had dealt with Montgomery in the past, Ravich demanded proof. She told Montgomery that she could not do anything for him unless some technical experts in the government vouched for his technology. He was never able to get anyone from the Pentagon to call Ravich on his behalf, and so she dropped the matter. She said in an interview that she never tried to help him obtain any new government business.

Montgomery also sought to convince Israeli officials to use his technology, but, like Samantha Ravich, the Israelis were unimpressed and rejected his offer. Still, Montgomery continued to find ways to get Pentagon contracts. He says that his technology was often used to provide targeting information in raids in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that he was given access to the Predator Operations Center at Nellis Air Force Base—a sign that his work was playing a role in Predator strikes. "Months of testing and validation at Nellis," as well as at other bases, "confirmed the value of the technology," insists Montgomery.

Edra Blixseth refused a request for an interview.

Montgomery continued to get defense contracts even during the Obama administration. In 2009, Montgomery was awarded another air force contract, and later claimed that he had provided the government with warning of a threatened Somali terrorist attack against President Obama's inauguration. Joseph Liberatore, an air force official who described himself as one of "the believers" in Montgomery and his technology, e-mailed Montgomery and said he had heard from "various federal agencies thanking us" for the support Montgomery and his company provided during Obama's inauguration. The threat, however, later proved to be a hoax.

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Inevitably, Montgomery had a falling out with Edra Blixseth. He then turned to Tim Blixseth to invest and back his operation. By then, Tim and Edra Blixseth were going through an extremely bitter divorce, and Montgomery became caught up in their legal battles. Mysteriously, government lawyers sometimes sought to intervene in their court cases, with vague references to the need to keep classified information stemming from Montgomery's work with the intelligence community out of the public record.

When Montgomery approached him, Tim Blixseth had no intention of giving money to Montgomery, his ex-wife's erstwhile partner. Blixseth was interested in finding out what Montgomery was really doing, however, and so he played along when Montgomery called desperate for money. At one point, Montgomery's wife even called Blixseth to plead for help with bail after Montgomery was arrested for passing bad checks at Caesar's Palace in Las Vegas. (Eventually, Montgomery was forced into personal bankruptcy proceedings.) Blixseth refused to help but kept talking to Montgomery.

In 2010, Blixseth finally went to see Montgomery's latest computer software operation, hidden away in a nondescript warehouse near Palm Springs. Blixseth says that throughout the darkened office, Montgomery had mounted at least eight large-screen televisions, all tuned to Al Jazeera and all tied in to a computer in the middle of the room.

Dennis Montgomery was once again using his top-secret decoding technology to scour Al Jazeera broadcasts. Montgomery had not given up on his secret project, despite being abandoned by the CIA. As Blixseth took in the bizarre scene, Montgomery proudly told him that his Al Jazeera data was all being fed "straight to the Pentagon."

In fact, Montgomery says that his focus on Al Jazeera was unwavering. He claims that he recorded every minute of Al Jazeera's network broadcast nonstop from February 2004 until the London Olympics in the summer of 2012. "That's over 8 billion frames."

*

Today, Dennis Montgomery continues to argue that he is not a fraud, that his technology is genuine, and that he performed highly sensitive and valuable work for the CIA and the Pentagon. After former NSA contractor Edward Snowden leaked documents about the NSA's domestic surveillance operations in 2013, Montgomery suggested to me that he could provide the documents that would prove not only that he had been telling the truth, but that he had also been used by top U.S. intelligence officials in highly questionable intelligence operations.

But Montgomery has never provided the documents to back up his assertions.*

^{*} Eric Lichtblau and James Risen reported about Montgomery for the *New York Times*. Aram Roston also wrote an excellent story about Montgomery for *Playboy* magazine.

 $continued \ from \ front \ flap$

revealed by Risen and, later, in much greater detail, by Edward Snowden, their careers were destroyed, thanks to government persecution.

James Risen knows the costs of government persecution through direct experience. He has been pursued by both the Bush and Obama administrations as part of a six-year leak investigation into his previous book. When will the abuses stop?

Lincoln suspended habeas corpus. FDR authorized the internment of thousands of Japanese Americans. Presidents Bush and Obama now must face their own reckoning.



JAMES RISEN is an investigative reporter with the *New York Times* and the author of the *New York Times* bestseller *State of War*, among other books. In 2006 he won a Pulitzer Prize for his stories about warrantless wiretapping by the NSA. In 2007 he was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He lives in the Washington, D.C., area.

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HOUGHTON MIFFLIN HARCOURT

FROM

PAY ANY PRICE

In 2009, when the new Obama administration continued the government's legal campaign against me, I realized, in a very personal way, that the war on terror had become a bipartisan enterprise. America was now locked into an endless war, and its perverse and unintended consequences were spreading.

And so my answer—both to the government's long campaign against me and to this endless war—is this new book, *Pay Any Price*.

Pay Any Price is my answer to how best to challenge the government's draconian efforts to crack down on aggressive investigative reporting and suppress the truth in the name of ceaseless war.

My answer is to keep writing, because I believe that if journalists ever stop uncovering abuses of power, and ever stop publishing stories about those abuses, we will lose our democracy.