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
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
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
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SCHLEIERMACHER,

ON THE

WORTH OF SOCRATES AS A PHILOSOPHER.

THAT very different and even entirely opposite judgements should be formed by different men, and according to the spirit of different times, on minds of a leading and peculiar order, and that it should be late, if ever, before opinions agree as to their worth is a phenomenon of everyday occurrence. But it is less natural, indeed it seems almost surprising, that at any one time a judgement should be generally received with regard to any such mind, which is in glaring contradiction with itself. Yet, if I am not mistaken, it is actually the case with Socrates, that the portrait usually drawn of him, and the historical importance which is almost unanimously attributed to him, are at irreconcilable variance. With Socrates most writers make a new period to begin in the history of Greek philosophy; which at all events manifestly implies that he breathed a new spirit and character into those intellectual exertions of his countrymen which we comprehend under the name of philosophy, so that they assumed a new form under his hands, or at least that he materially

widened their range. But if we enquire how the same writers describe Socrates as an individual, we find nothing that can serve as a foundation for the influence they assign to him. We are informed, that he did not at all busy himself with the physical investigations which constituted a main part even of Greek philosophy, but rather withheld others from them, and that even with regard to moral inquiries, which were those in which he engaged the deepest, he did not by any means aim at reducing them into a scientific shape, and that he established no fixed principle for this, any more than for any other branch of human knowledge. The base of his intellectual constitution, we are told, was rather religious than speculative, his exertions rather those of a good citizen, directed to the improvement of the people, and especially of the young, than those of a philosopher; in short, he is represented as a virtuoso in the exercise of sound common sense, and of that strict integrity and mild philanthropy, with which it is always associated in an uncorrupted mind; all this, however, tinged with a slight air of enthusiasm. These are no doubt excellent qualities; but yet they are not such as fit a man to play a brilliant part in history, but rather, unless where peculiar circumstances intervene, to lead a life of enviable tranquillity, so that it would be necessary to ascribe the general reputation of Socrates, and the almost unexampled homage which has been paid to him, by so many generations, less to himself than to such peculiar circumstances. But least of all are these qualities which could have produced conspicuous and

permanent effects on the philosophical exertions of a people already far advanced in intellectual culture. And this is confirmed, when we consider what sort of doctrines and opinions are attributed to Socrates in conformity with this view. For in spite of the pains taken to trick them out with a show of philosophy, it is impossible after all to give them any scientific solidity whatever: the farthest point we come to is, that they are thoughts well suited to warm the hearts of men in favour of goodness, but such as a healthy understanding, fully awakened to reflexion cannot fail to light upon of itself. What effect then can they have wrought on the progress, or the transformation of philosophy? If we would confine ourselves to the well-known statement, that Socrates called philosophy down from heaven to earth, that is, to houses and market-places; in other words, that he proposed social life as the object of research in the room of nature: still the influence thus ascribed to him is far from salutary in itself, for philosophy consists not in a partial cultivation either of morals or physics, but in the co-existence and intercommunion of both, and there is moreover no historical evidence that he really exerted it. The foundations of ethical philosophy had been laid before the time of Socrates, in the doctrines of the Pythagoreans, and after him it only kept its place by the side of physics, in the philosophical systems of the Greeks. In those of Plato, of Aristotle, and of the Stoics, that is, of all the genuine Socratic schools of any importance, we again meet with physical investigations, and ethics were exclusively cultivated only

by those followers of Socrates who themselves never attained to any eminence in philosophy. And if we consider the general tendency of the above-named schools, and review the whole range of their tenets, nothing can be pointed out, that could have proceeded from a Socrates, endowed with such qualities of mind and character as the one described to us, unless it be where their theories have been reduced to a familiar practical application. And even with regard to the elder Socratics, we find more satisfaction in tracing their strictly philosophical speculations to any other source rather than to *this* Socrates; not only may Aristippus, who was unlike his master in his spirit as well as his doctrines, be more easily derived from Protagoras, with whom he has so much in common, but Euclid, with his dialectic bias, from the Eleatics. And we find ourselves compelled to conclude, that the stem of Socrates, as he is at present represented to us, can have produced no other shoot than the Cynical philosophy, and that, not the cynicism of Antisthenes, which still retains many features which we should rather refer to his earlier master, Gorgias, but the purer form, which exhibits only a peculiar mode of life, not a doctrine, much less a science: that of Diogenes, the *mad Socrates*, as he has been called, though in truth the highest epithet due to him is that of *Socrates caricatured*. For his is a copy in which we find nothing but features of such an original: its approximation to the self-contentedness of the deity in the retrenchment of artificial want, its rejection of mere theoretical knowledge, its unassuming course of going

about in the service of the god to expose the follies of mankind. But how foreign all this is to the domain of philosophy, and how little can be there effected with such means, is evident enough.

The only rational course then that seems to be left, is to give up one or other of these contradictory assumptions. Either let Socrates still stand at the head of the Athenian philosophy, but then let those who place him there undertake to establish a different notion of him from that which has been long prevalent: or let us retain the conception of the wise and amiable man, who was made not for the school but wholly for the world: but then let him be transferred from the history of philosophy to that of the general progress of society at Athens, if he can claim any place there. The latter of these expedients is not very far removed from that which has been adopted by Krug!¹ For, as in his system Socrates stands at the end of the one period, and not at the beginning of the next, he appears not as the germ of a new age, but as a product and aftergrowth of an earlier one; he sinks, as an insulated phenomenon, into the same rank with the sophists, and other late fruits of the period, and loses a great part of his philosophical importance. Only it is but a half measure that this author adopts, when he begins his new period with the immediate disciples of Socrates as such; for at its head he places the genuine Socratics, as they are commonly called, and, above all, Xenophon, men of whom he himself says, that their only merit was that of having propagated and

diffused Socratic doctrines, while the doctrines themselves do not appear to him worth making the beginning of a new period.—Ast had previously arrived at the same result by a road in some respects opposite.* With him Plato is the full bloom of that which he terms the Athenian form of philosophy, and as no plant begins with its bloom, he feels himself constrained to place Socrates at the head of this philosophy, but yet not strictly as a philosopher. He says, that the operation of philosophy in Socrates was confined to the exercise of qualities that may belong to any virtuous man, that is to say, it was properly no philosophy at all; and makes the essence of his character to consist in enthusiasm and irony. Now he feels that he cannot place a man endowed with no other qualities than these at the head of a new period, and therefore he ranges the sophists by his side, not indeed without some inconsistency, for he himself sees in them the perverse tendency which was to be counteracted by the spirit of the new age; but yet he prefers this to recognizing the germ of a new gradation in Socrates alone, whose highest philosophical worth he makes to consist in his martyrdom, which, however, cannot by any means be deemed of equal moment in the sphere of science, as in that of religion or politics. Though in form, this course of Ast's is opposite to Krug's, in substance it is the same: its result is likewise to begin a new period of philosophy with Plato. For Ast perceives nothing new or peculiar in the struggle Socrates made against the Sophists, only virtue

* Grundriss einer Gesch. der Philos.

and the thirst after truth, which had undoubtedly animated all the preceding philosophers; what he represents as characteristic in the Athenian philosophy, is the union of the elements which had been previously separate and opposed to each other; and since he does not in fact show the existence of this union in Socrates himself, and distinctly recognizes their separation in his immediate disciples, Plato is after all the point at which, according to him, that union begins.

But if we choose really to consider Plato as the true beginner of a new period, not to mention that he is far too perfect for a first beginning, we fall into two difficulties. First as to his relation to Aristotle. In all that is most peculiar to Plato, Aristotle appears as directly opposite to him as possible; but the main division of philosophy, notwithstanding the wide difference between their modes of treating it, he has in common with Plato, and the Stoics with both; it fits as closely and sits as easily on one as the other, so that one can scarcely help believing that it was derived from some common origin, which was the root of Plato's as well as theirs. The second difficulty is to conceive what Plato's relation to Socrates could really have been, if Socrates was not in any way his master in philosophy. If we should suppose that Plato's character was formed by the example of Socrates, and that reverence for his master's virtue, and love of truth, was the tie that bound him, still this merely moral relation is not a sufficient solution of the difficulty. The mode in which Plato introduces Socrates, even, in

works which contain profound philosophical investigations, must be regarded as the wildest caprice, and would necessarily have appeared merely ridiculous and absurd to all his contemporaries, if he was not in some way or other indebted to him for his philosophical life. Hence we are forced to abide by the conclusion, that if a great pause is to be made in Greek philosophy, to separate the scattered tenets of the earlier schools from the later systems, this must be made with Socrates; but then we must also ascribe to him some element of a more strictly philosophical kind than most writers do, though, as a mere beginning, it needs not to have been carried very far toward maturity. Such a pause as this, however, we cannot avoid making: the earlier philosophy which we designate by the names of Pythagoras, Parmenides, Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, &c. has evidently a common type, and the later, in which Plato, Aristotle, and Zeno are the conspicuous names, has likewise one of its own, which is very different from the other. Nothing can have been lost between them, which could have formed a gradual transition: much less is it possible so to connect any of the later forms with any of the earlier, as to regard them as a continuous whole. This being so, nothing remains to be done, but to subject the case of Socrates to a new revision, in order to see whether the judges he has met with among posterity have not been as unjust, in denying his philosophical worth and his merits in the cause of philosophy, as his contemporaries were in denying his worth as a citizen, and imputing to him

imaginary offences against the commonwealth. But this would render it necessary to ascertain somewhat more distinctly, wherein his philosophical merit consists.

But this new inquiry naturally leads us back in the first instance to the old question, whether we are to believe Plato or Xenophon in their accounts of what Socrates was; a question, however, which only deserves to be proposed at all, so far as these two authors are really at variance with each other, and which therefore only admits of a rational answer, after it has been decided whether such a variance exists, and where it lies. Plato nowhere professes himself the historian of Socrates; with the exception perhaps of the Apology, and of insulated passages, such as the speech of Alcibiades in the Banquet. For it would certainly have been in bad taste, if here, where Plato is making contemporaries of Socrates speak of him in his presence, he had exhibited him in a manner that was not substantially faithful, though even here many of the details may have been introduced for the sake of playful exaggeration. On the other hand, Plato himself does not warrant any one to consider all that he makes Socrates say in his dialogues, as his real thoughts and language; and it would be rendering him but a poor service to confine his merit to that of having given a correct and skilful report of the doctrines of Socrates. On the contrary, he undoubtedly means his philosophy to be considered as his own, and not Socrates'. And accordingly every intelligent reader is probably convinced by his own reflections, that

is not still more strongly expressed, than we here and there actually find it. And still less should we be able to comprehend, why men of such abilities as Critias and Alcibiades, and others formed by nature for speculation, as Plato and Euclid, set so high a value on their intercourse with Socrates, and found satisfaction in it so long. Nor can it be supposed, that Socrates held discourses in public such as Xenophon puts into his mouth, but that he delivered lessons of a different kind elsewhere, and in private; for this, considering the apologetic form of Xenophon's book, to which he rigidly confines himself, he would probably not have passed over in silence. Socrates must have disclosed the philosophical element of his character in the same social circle of which Xenophon gives us specimens. And is not this just the impression which Xenophon's conversations make? philosophical matter, translated into the unphilosophical style of the common understanding, an operation in which the philosophical base is lost; just as some critics have proposed, by way of test for the productions of the loftiest poetry, to resolve them into prose, and evaporate their spirit, which can leave nothing but an extremely sober kind of beauty remaining. And as, after such an experiment, the greatest of poets would scarcely be able to restore the lost poetry, but yet a reader of moderate capacity soon observes what has been done, and can even point it out in several passages, where the decomposing hand has grown tired of its work: so it is in the other case with the philosophical basis. One finds some parallels with Plato, other

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the Ionians alone, though their
to physics, made occasional excursions
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to himself the honour of having dis-
l and combined these sciences, and ascribed
to Xenocrates, and think that even Aris-
andoned it again; this in my opinion is
ed on a misunderstanding, which however
d here lead us too far to explain. Now it
we cannot assert that Socrates was the first
mbined the characters of a physical, ethical,
dialectic philosopher in one person, especially
to and Xenophon agree in taking physics
of his range; nor can it be positively said
Socrates was at least the author of this dis-
tion of Science, though its germ may certainly
found from the Memorabilia. But we may
ly inquire whether this phenomenon has not
a simpler and more internal cause, and whether
is may not be found in Socrates. The following
bservation will, I conceive, be admitted without
uch dispute. So long as inquirers are apt to
step unwittingly across the boundaries that separate
one province of knowledge from another, so long,
and in the same degree, does the whole course of

their intellectual operations depend on outward circumstances: for it is only a systematic distribution of the whole field that can lead to a regular and connected cultivation of it. In the same way, so long as the several sciences are pursued singly, and their respective votaries contentedly acquiesce in this insulation, so long, and in the same degree, is the specific instinct for the object of each science predominant in the whole sphere of intellectual exertion. But as soon as the need of the connexion and co-ordinate growth of all the branches of knowledge has become so distinctly felt, as to express itself by the form in which they are treated and described, in a manner which can never again be lost; so far as this is the case, it is no longer particular talents and instincts, but the general scientific talent of speculation, that has the ascendant. In the former of these cases it must be confessed, that the idea of science as such is not yet matured, perhaps has not even become the subject of consciousness, for science as such can only be conceived as a whole, in which every division is merely subordinate, just as the real world to which it ought to correspond. In the latter case, on the contrary, this idea has become a subject of consciousness; for it can have been only by its force that the particular inclinations which confine each thinker to a certain object, and split science into insulated parts, have been mastered. And this is unquestionably a simpler criterion to distinguish the two periods of Greek philosophy. In the earlier period, the idea of science as such was not the

governing idea, and had not even become a distinct subject of consciousness: and this it is that gives rise to the obscurity which we perceive in all the philosophical productions of that period, through the appearance of caprice which results from the want of consciousness, and through the imperfection of the scientific language, which is gradually forming itself out of the poetical and historical vocabulary. In the second period, on the other hand, the idea of science has become a subject of consciousness. Hence the main business everywhere is to distinguish knowledge from opinion, hence the precision of scientific language, hence the peculiar prominence of dialectics, which have no other object than the idea of science; things which were not comprehended even by the Eleatics in the same way as by the Socratic schools, since the former still make the idea of *being* their starting-point, rather than that of *knowledge*.

Now this waking of the idea of science, and its earliest manifestations, must have been, in the first instance what constituted the philosophical basis in Socrates; and for this reason he is justly regarded as the founder of that later Greek philosophy, which in its whole essential form, together with its several variations, was determined by that idea. This is proved clearly enough by the historical statements in Plato, and this too is what must be supplied in Xenophon's conversations, in order to make them worthy of Socrates, and Socrates of his admirers. For if he went about in the service of the god, to justify the celebrated oracle, it

was impossible that the utmost point he reached could have been simply to know that he knew nothing; there was a step beyond this which he must have taken, that of knowing what knowledge was. For by what other means could he have been enabled to declare that which others believed themselves to know, to be no knowledge, than by a more correct conception of knowledge, and by a more correct method founded upon that conception? And every where, when he is explaining the nature of non-science (*ἀνεπιστημοσύνη*), one sees that he sets out from two tests: one, that science is the same in all true thoughts, and consequently must manifest its peculiar form in every such thought: the other, that all science forms one whole. For his proofs always hinge on this assumption: that it is impossible to start from one true thought, and to be entangled in contradiction with any other, and also that knowledge derived from any one point, and obtained by correct combination, cannot contradict that which has been deduced in like manner from any other point; and while he exposed such contradictions in the current conception of mankind, he strove to rouse those leading ideas in all who were capable of understanding, or even of divining his meaning. Most of what Xenophon has preserved for us may be referred to this object, and the same endeavour is indicated clearly enough in all that Socrates says of himself in Plato's *Apology*, and what Alcibiades says of him in his eulogy. So that if we conceive this to have been the central point in the character

of Socrates, we may reconcile Plato and Xenophon, and can understand the historical position of Socrates.

When Xenophon says (Mem. IV. 6. 15), that as often as Socrates did not merely refute the errors of others, but attempted to demonstrate something himself, he took his road through propositions which were most generally admitted: we can perfectly understand this mode of proceeding, as the result of the design just described; he wished to find as few hindrances and diversions as possible in his way, that he might illustrate his method clearly and simply; and propositions, if there were such, which all held to be certain, must have appeared to him the most eligible, in order that he might show, in their case, that the conviction with which they were embraced was not knowledge; since this would render men more keenly sensible of the necessity of getting at the foundation of knowledge, and of taking their stand upon it, in order to give a new shape to all human things. Hence, too, we may explain the preponderance of the subjects connected with civil and domestic life in most of these conversations. For this was the field that supplied the most generally admitted conceptions and propositions, the fate of which interested all men alike. But this mode of proceeding becomes inexplicable, if it is supposed that Socrates attached the chief importance to the subject of these conversations. That must have been quite a secondary point. For when the object is to elucidate any subject, it is necessary to pay attention to the

less familiar and more disputed views of it, and how meagre most of those discussions in Xenophon are in this respect, is evident enough. From the same point of view we must also consider the controversy of Socrates with the Sophists. So far as it was directed against their maxims, it does not belong to our present question; it is merely the opposition of a good citizen to the corrupters of government and of youth. But even looking at it from the purely theoretical side, it would be idle to represent this contrast as the germ of a new period of philosophy, if Socrates had only impugned opinions which were the monstrous shapes into which the doctrines of an earlier school had degenerated, without having established any in their stead, which nobody supposes him to have done. But for the purpose of awakening the true idea of science, the Sophists must have been the most welcome of all disputants to him, since they had reduced their opinions into the most perfect form; and hence were proud of them themselves, and were peculiarly admired by others. If, therefore, he could succeed in exposing their weakness, the value of a principle so triumphantly applied would be rendered most conspicuous.

But in order to show the imperfection of the current conceptions both in the theories of the Sophists, and in common life, if the issue was not to be left to chance, some certain *method* was requisite. For it was often necessary in the course of the process to lay down intermediate notions, which it was necessary to define to the satisfaction

of both parties; otherwise, all that was done would afterwards have looked like a paltry surprise; and the contradiction between the proposition in question, and one that was admitted, could never be detected without ascertaining what notions might or might not be connected with a given one. Now this method is laid down in the two problems which Plato states in the *Phædrus*, as the two main elements in the art of dialectics, that is, to first know how correctly to combine multiplicity in unity, and again to divide a complex unity according to its nature into a multiplicity, and next to know what notions may or may not be connected together. It is by this means that Socrates became the real founder of dialectics, which continued to be the soul of all the great edifices reared in later times by Greek philosophy, and by its decided prominence constitutes the chief distinction between the later period and the earlier; so that one cannot but commend the historical instinct which has assigned so high a station to him. At the same time this is not meant to deny, that Euclid and Plato carried this science, as well as the rest, farther toward maturity; but it is manifest that in its first principles, Socrates possessed it as a science, and practised it as an art, in a manner peculiar to himself. For the construction of all Socratic dialogues, as well of those doubtfully ascribed to Plato, and of those attributed with any degree of probability to other original disciples of Socrates, as of all those reported in the *Memorabilia*, hinges without any exception on this point. The same inference re-

sults from the testimony of Aristotle (*Metaph.* I. 6. XIII.4.): that what may be justly ascribed to Socrates, is that he introduced induction and general definitions; a testimony which bears every mark of impartiality and truth. Hence there is no reason to doubt that Socrates taught this art of framing and connecting notions correctly. Since, however, it is an *art*, abstract teaching was not sufficient, and therefore no doubt Socrates never so taught it: it was art that required to be witnessed and practised in the most manifold applications, and one who was not firmly grounded in it, and left the school too early, lost it again, and with it almost all that was to be learned from Socrates, as indeed is observed in Plato's dialogues. Now that this exercise and illustration was the main object of conversations held by Socrates even on general moral subjects, is expressly admitted by Xenophon himself, when, under the head—What Socrates did to render his friends more expert in dialectics,—he introduces a great many such discourses and inquiries, which so closely resembled the rest, that all might just as well have been put in the same class.

It was with a view, therefore, to become masters in this art, and thereby to keep the faster hold of the idea of science, that men of vigorous and speculative minds formed a circle round Socrates as long as circumstances allowed, those who were able to the end of his life, and in the mean while chose to tread closely in their master's steps, and to refrain for a time from making a systematic application of his art in the different departments of knowledge,

for the more elaborate cultivation of all the sciences. But when after his death the most eminent among them, first of all at Megara, began a strictly scientific train of speculation, and thus philosophy gradually ripened into the shape which, with slight variations, it ever after retained among the Greeks: what now took place was not indeed what Socrates did, or perhaps could have done, but yet it was undoubtedly his will. To this it may indeed be objected, that Xenophon expressly says (Mem. 1. 11.): that Socrates, in his riper years, not only himself gave up all application to natural philosophy, but endeavoured to withhold all others from it, and directed them to the consideration of human affairs; and hence many hold those only to be genuine Socratics, who did not include physics in their system. But this statement must manifestly be taken in a sense much less general, and quite different from that which is usually given to it. This is clearly evinced by the reasons which Socrates alleges. For how could he have said so generally, that the things which depend on God ought not to be made the subject of inquiry, before those which depend on man have been despatched, since not only are the latter connected in a variety of ways with the former, but even among things human there must be some of greater moment, others of less, some of nearer, others of more remote concern, and the proposition would lead to the conclusion that before one was brought to its completion, not even the investigation of another ought to be begun. This might have been not unfairly turned

by a sophist against Socrates himself, if he had dragged in a notion apparently less familiar, in order to illustrate another; and certainly this proposition, taken in a general sense, would not only have endangered the conduct of life, but would also have altogether destroyed the Socratic idea of science, that nothing can be known except together with the rest, and along with its relation to all things beside. The real case is simply this. It is clear that Socrates had no peculiar talent for any single science, and least of all for that of physics. Now it is true that a merely metaphysical thinker may feel himself attracted toward all sciences, as was the case with Kant; but then this happens under different circumstances, and a different mental constitution from that of Socrates. He on the contrary made no excursions to points remote from his centre, but devoted his whole life to the task of exciting his leading idea as extensively and as vividly as possible in others; his whole aim was, that whatever form man's wishes and hopes might take, according to individual character and accidental circumstances, this foundation might be securely laid, before he proceeded further. But till then his advice was, not to accumulate fresh masses of opinions; this he for his part would permit only so far as it was demanded by the wants of active life, and for this reason he might say, that if those who investigated meteoric phenomena had any hope of producing them at their pleasure, he should be more ready to admit their researches: language, which in any other sense but this would have been ab-


surd. We cannot, therefore, conclude from this that Socrates did not wish that physics should be cultivated, any more than we are authorised to suppose, that he fancied it possible to form ethics into a science by sufficiently multiplying those fragmentary investigations into which he was drawn in discussing the received opinions on the subject. The same law of progression was involuntarily retained in his school. For Plato, though he descends into all the sciences, still lays the principal stress on the establishment of principles, and expatiates in details only so far as they are necessary, and so much the less as he has to draw them from without: it is Aristotle who first reveals in their multiplicity.

This appears to me as much as can be said with certainty of the worth of Socrates as a philosopher. But should any one proceed to ask, how far he elaborated the idea of science in his lessons, or in what degree he promoted the discovery of real knowledge in any other province by his controversial discussions, and his dialectic essays, there would perhaps be little to say on this head, and least of all should I be able to extricate any thing to serve this purpose from the works of Plato taken by themselves. For there in all that belongs to Plato there is something of Socrates, and in all that belongs to Socrates something of Plato. Only if any one is desirous of describing doctrines peculiar to Socrates, let him not, as many do in histories of philosophy for the sake of at least filling up some space with Socrates, string together detached moral theses, which, as they arose out of occasional discussions, can never

make up a whole, and as to other subjects, let him not lose sight of the above quoted passage of Aristotle, who confines Socrates' philosophical speculations to principles. The first point therefore to examine would be, whether some profound speculative doctrines may not have originally belonged to Socrates, which are generally considered as most foreign to him, for instance, the thought which is unfolded by Plato in his peculiar manner, but is exhibited in the germ by Xenophon himself (Mem. I. 4. 8), and is intimately connected with the great dialectic question as to the agreement between thought and being: that of the general diffusion of intelligence throughout the whole of nature. With this one might connect the assertion of Aristocles (Euseb. Præp. XI. 3), that Socrates began the investigation of the doctrine of ideas. But the testimony of this late Peripatetic is suspicious, and may have had no other foundation than the language of Socrates in the Parmenides.

But whether much or little of this and other doctrines belonged to Socrates himself, the general idea already described cannot fail to suggest a more correct mode of conceiving, in what light it is that Plato brings forward his master in his works, and in what sense his Socrates is to be termed a real, or a fictitious personage. Fictitious, in the proper sense, I hold, he is not, and his reality is not a merely mimic one, nor is Socrates in those works merely a convenient person who affords room for much mimic art, and much cheerful pleasantry, in order to temper the abstruse

investigations with this agreeable addition. It is because the spirit and the method of Socrates are everywhere predominant, and because it is not merely a subordinate point with Plato to adopt the manner of Socrates, but is as truly his highest aim, that Plato has not hesitated to put into his mouth what he believed to be no more than deductions from his fundamental ideas. The only material exceptions we find to this (passing over several more minute which come under the same head with the anachronisms) occur in later works, as the Statesman and the Republic; I mean doctrines of Plato foreign to the real views of Socrates, perhaps indeed virtually contradicting them, and which are nevertheless put into his mouth. On this head, we must let Plato appeal to the privilege conferred by custom. But on the whole we are forced to say, that in giving Socrates a living share in the propagation of that philosophical movement which took its rise from him, Plato has immortalized him in the noblest manner, that a disciple can perpetuate the glory of his master; in a manner not only more beautiful, but more just, than he could have done it by a literal narrative.



SCHLEIERMACHER'S INTRODUCTION

TO THE

APOLOGY OF SOCRATES.

I HAVE already observed, in the general Introduction of this translation of Plato, that the reader is not to conclude, because certain works are placed in an appendix, that by this I mean to deny or to call in question with regard to all of them, that they are writings of Plato. My only reason for assigning such a place to the following work which has been at all times loved and admired for the spirit that breathes through it, and the image it presents of calm moral dignity and beauty, was, in the first instance, that it contents itself with its peculiar object, and makes no pretensions to the title of a scientific work. It is true, that the Euthyphron likewise has unquestionably an apologetic reference to the charge brought against Socrates; but, on the other hand, its connection with the notions started in the Protagoras, clearly entitled it to be subjoined to that dialogue. But the

Apology is so purely an occasional piece, that it can find no place in the series of its author's philosophical productions. Yet there is certainly one sense, in which, let not the reader be startled, one might perhaps say that it is not a work of Plato's. I mean that it can scarcely be a work of his thoughts, a thing which he invented and fabricated. For if we attribute to Plato the intention of defending Socrates, we must first of all distinguish the times at which he might have done it, either during his process, or subsequently, no matter how soon or how late, to his execution. Now in the latter case, Plato could only have proposed to vindicate the principles and sentiments of his friend and master. But this vindication he, who was so fond of combining several ends in one work, might easily have coupled with his scientific views: and accordingly we not only find detached intimations of this kind scattered over his later writings, but we shall soon be introduced to an important work, one which cannot be denied to be closely enough interwoven with his scientific speculations, in which a collateral object, but one made distinctly prominent, is to place the conduct and virtue of Socrates as an Athenian citizen in a clear light. Now this is intelligible enough: but Plato could scarcely have found any inducement at a later period to compose a work which merely confronts Socrates with his actual accusers. It must have been then during the process that he

wrote this speech. But for what purpose? It is manifest that he could have rendered his master no worse service, than if, before he had defended himself in court, he had published a defence under his name, just as if to help the prosecutors to the arguments which it would be their business to parry or to elude, and to place the defendant in the difficult situation of being reduced either to repeat much that had been said before, or to say something less forcible. Hence the more excellent and the better suited to the character of Socrates the defence might be, the more harm it would have done to him. But this is a supposition which will scarcely be maintained.

After the decision of the cause, there were two purposes which Plato might have had, either that of making the course of the proceedings more generally known at the time, and of framing a memorial of them for posterity, or that of setting the different parties and their mode of proceeding in a proper light. Now if we inquire about the only rational means to the latter of these ends: all will agree that the speech should have been put into the mouth, not of Socrates, but of some other person defending him. For the advocate might have brought forward many things, which the character of Socrates rendered improper for him to urge, and might have shown by the work that, if the defendant's cause had only been pleaded by a person who had no need to disdain

resources which many men of honour did not think beneath them, it would have had a very different issue. Now if there were any foundation for an anecdote, not indeed a very probable one, which Diogenes Laertius has preserved from an insignificant writer, Plato's most natural course would have been, to publish the speech which he would himself have made on the same occasion if he had not been hindered.* He would then have had an opportunity of exemplifying those great precepts and expedients of rhetoric, the force of which he had himself first disclosed; and undoubtedly he might have applied them with great truth and art to the charges concerning the new deities and the corruption of youth. And so it would have been far better for him to have used any other person's name for the purpose of retorting on the accusers of Socrates, and to have spoken of his merits in a different tone. Whereas in a speech put into the mouth of Socrates himself, yet different from that which he really delivered, he can have had no other object than to show what Socrates voluntarily neglected or involuntarily let slip, and how his defence should have been framed so as to produce a better effect.

* "See Diog. Laert. II. 41. where it is related that Plato was prepared to defend Socrates; but in the first sentence of his speech was interrupted by the petulance of the jurors, and compelled to descend from the bema. But this anecdote is too little attested and too improbable in itself to build upon."

Now not to mention that this would have been scarcely possible without departing from the character of Socrates, it is evident that the defence we now have was not framed with this view. For how could such a speech have been followed by the address after the verdict, which implies an issue not more favorable than the real one? The only supposition then that remains is, that this work was designed simply to exhibit and record in substance the real proceedings of the case, for those Athenians who were not able to be hearers, and for the other Greeks, and posterity. Now are we to believe that, in such a case and under such circumstances, Plato was unable to resist the temptation of fathering upon Socrates a work of his own art, which in all but the outline was perhaps entirely foreign to him, like a boy who has a theme set him to declaim on. This we cannot believe, but must presume that in this case, where nothing of his own was wanted, and he had entirely devoted himself to his friend, especially so short a time before or after the death of Socrates, as this work was undoubtedly composed, he considered his departing friend too sacred to be disguised even with the most beautiful of ornaments, and his whole form as so faultless and majestic, that it was not right to exhibit it in any dress, but, like the statue of a god, naked, and wrapt only in its own beauty. And so in fact we find he has done. For a critic who should

undertake the task of mending this speech would find a great deal in it to alter. Thus the charge of misleading the young is not repelled with arguments by any means so cogent as it might have been, nor is sufficient stress by a great deal laid on the fact, that Socrates had done every thing in the service of Apollo, for defending him against the charge of disbelief of the ancient gods: and any one with his eyes only half open may discover other weak points of the like kind, which are not so well grounded in the character of Socrates that Plato should have been compelled to copy them.

Nothing therefore is more probable, than that in this speech we possess as faithful a transcript of Socrates' real defence, as Plato's practised memory enabled him to make, allowing for the necessary difference between a written speech and one carelessly spoken. But perhaps some one may say: If Plato, supposing him to be the author of this work, did nothing more than record what he had heard: what reason is there for insisting on this fact, or how can it be known, that it was he, and not some other among the friends of Socrates who were present at the trial? Such an objector, if he is familiar with the style of Plato, need only be referred to the whole aspect of the Apology, which distinctly shows that it can have proceeded from no pen but Plato's. For in it Socrates speaks exactly as Plato makes him speak, a manner in which, so far as we can judge from all we

have left, he was not made to speak by any of his other scholars. And this resemblance is so indisputable, that it may serve as a foundation for a remark of some importance. For it suggests the question: Whether certain peculiarities of the Platonic dialogue, particularly the imaginary questions and answers inserted in a sentence, and the accumulation of several sentences comprehended under one, and often expanded much too amply for this subordinate place, together with the interruption almost inevitably arising from this cause in the original structure of the period: whether these peculiarities, seeing that we find them so predominant here, ought not properly to be referred to Socrates? They occur in Plato most frequently where he is imitating Socrates closest; but nowhere so frequently, and so little clear of their accompanying negligences, as here and in the following dialogue (the Crito), which is probably of like origin. All this together renders it a very natural conjecture, that these forms of speech were originally copied from Socrates, and are therefore to be numbered among the specimens of the mimic art of Plato, who endeavoured in a certain degree to copy the style of the persons whom he introduces, if it had peculiarities which justified him in so doing. And any one who tries this observation by applying it to Plato's different works, especially in the order in which I have arranged them, will find it very strongly

confirmed by the trial. The cause why such an imitation was not attempted by other disciples of Socrates, was probably this: that, on the one hand, it really required no little art to bend these peculiarities of a careless colloquial style under the laws of written discourse, and to amalgamate them with the regular beauty of expression, and, on the other hand, it called for more courage to meet the censure of minute critics than Xenophon probably possessed. But this is not the place for entering further into this question.

One circumstance, however, must still be noticed, which might be alleged against the genuineness of this work, and with more plausibility, indeed, than any other: that it wants the dress of the dialogue, in which Plato presents all his other works, and which he has given even to the Menexenus, though in other respects, that, like this, consists of nothing more than a speech. Why therefore it may be asked, should the Apology, which so easily admitted of this ornament, be the only work of Plato that is destitute of it? Convincing as this sounds, the weight of the other arguments is too strong not to counter-balance this scruple, and we reply to the objection as follows. In the first place, it is possible that the dialogic form had not then become so indispensable with Plato as it afterwards was: which may serve as an answer for those who are inclined to set a great value on the dress of the Menexenus;

or Plato himself distinguished this work from his other writings too much to think of subjecting it to the same law. Besides, it would in general be very unworthy of Plato, to consider the dialogue, even in those works where it is not very intimately blended with the main mass of the composition, as nothing more than an ornament arbitrarily appended to them: it always has its meaning, and contributes to the conformation and effect of the whole. Now if this would not have been the case in the present instance, why should Plato have brought it violently in? Especially as in all likelihood he wished to hasten the publication of this speech as much as possible, and might not think it advisable at that time to hazard a public declaration of his sentiments on the issue of the cause, which, if he had clothed the speech in the form of a dialogue, it would have been difficult to avoid, without rendering the form utterly empty and unmeaning.



ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ.

Cap. I. Ὅτι μὲν ὑμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι,^a πεπόνθατε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγορῶν, οὐκ οἶδα· ἐγὼ δ' οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὀλίγου ἔμαντοῦ ἐπελαθόμεν^b οὕτω πιθανῶς ἔλεγον. καὶ τοὶ ἀληθῆς γε, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν,^c οὐδὲν εἰρήκασιν. μάλιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν ἐθαύμασα^d τῶν πολλῶν ὧν ἐψεύσαντο, τοῦτο, ἐν ᾧ ἔλεγον, ὡς χρῆν ὑμᾶς εὐλαβεῖσθαι, μὴ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξαπατηθῆτε,^e ὡς δεινοῦ ὄντος λέγειν. τὸ γὰρ μὴ αἰσχυνθῆναι, ὅτι αὐτίκα ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξελεγχθήσονται ἔργῳ, ἐπειδὴ μὴδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν^f φαίνωμαι δεινὸς λέγειν, τοῦτό μοι ἔδοξεν αὐτῶν ἀναισχυντότατον εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα δεινὸν καλοῦσιν οὗτοι λέγειν τὸν τᾶληθῆ λέγοντα· εἰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο λέγουσιν, ὁμολογοῖεν ἂν ἔγωγε οὐ κατὰ τούτους εἶναι ῥήτωρ.^g οὗτοι μὲν οὖν, ὡς περ ἐγὼ λέγω, ἢ τι ἢ οὐδὲν ἀληθῆς εἰρήκασιν^h ὑμεῖς δ' ἐμοῦ ἀκούσεσθε πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δί', ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, κεκαλλιπημένους γε λόγους,ⁱ ὡς περ οἱ τούτων, ῥήμασί τε καὶ ὀνόμασιν, οὐδὲ κεκοσμημένους, ἀλλ' ἀκούσεσθε εἰκῆ λεγόμενα τοῖς ἐπιτυχούσιν ὀνόμασι· πιστεύω γὰρ δίκαια εἶναι ἃ λέγω,^k καὶ μηδεὶς ὑμῶν προσδοκησάτω ἄλλως.

οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δήπου πρόποι, ὦ ἄνδρες, τῆδε τῆ ἡλικία, ὥσπερ μειρακίῳ πλάττοντι λόγους εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσιέναι. καὶ μέντοι καὶ πάνυ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι καὶ παρίεμαι.¹ εἴαν διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων ἀκοιήτέ μου ἀπολογουμένου, δι' ὧνπερ εἴωθα λέγειν καὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν,² ἵνα ὑμῶν οἱ πολλοὶ ἀκηκόασι, καὶ ἄλλοθι,³ μήτε θαυμάζειν μήτε θορυβεῖν⁴ τοῦτου ἕνεκα. ἔχει γὰρ οὕτωςί. νῦν ἐγὼ πρῶτον ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβέβηκα, ἔτη γεγονὸς πλείω ἑβδομήκοντα·⁵ ἀτεχνῶς οὖν ξένως ἔχω⁶ τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως. ὥσπερ οὖν ἂν, εἰ⁷ τῷ ὄντι ξένος ἐτύγχανον ὢν, ξυνεγυγνώσκετε δήπου ἂν μοι εἰ ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ φωνῇ τε καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ ἔλεγον, ἐν οἷσπερ ἔτεθράμμην,⁸ καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι δίκαιον, ὥς γ' ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, τὸν μὲν τρόπον τῆς λέξεως εἴαν— ἴσως μὲν γάρ τι χείρων, ἴσως δὲ βελτίων ἂν εἴη—, αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο σκοπεῖν καὶ τούτῳ τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν, εἰ δίκαια λέγω, ἢ μή· δικαστοῦ μὲν γὰρ αὕτη ἀρετή, ῥήτορος δὲ τἀληθῆ λέγειν.

II. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δίκαιός εἰμι ἀπολογήσασθαι,⁹ ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρὸς τὰ πρῶτά μου ψευδῆ κατηγορημένα καὶ τοὺς πρώτους κατηγοροὺς, ἔπειτα δὲ πρὸς τὰ ὕστερα καὶ τοὺς ὑστέρους. Ἐμοῦ γὰρ πολλοὶ κατήγοροι γεγόνασι πρὸς ὑμᾶς, καὶ πάλαι πολλὰ ἤδη ἔτη¹⁰ καὶ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς λέγοντες· οὐδ' ἐγὼ μάλλον φοβούμαι ἢ τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἄνυτον,¹¹ καίπερ ὄντας καὶ τούτους δεινούς. ἀλλ' ἐκείνοι δεινότεροι,¹² ὦ ἄνδρες, οἱ ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκ παίδων παραλαμβάνοντες ἔπειθόν τε καὶ κατηγοροῦν ἐμοῦ οὐδὲν ἀληθές, ὡς ἔστι τις Σώκρατης, σοφὸς ἀνὴρ, τὰ τε μετέωρα φροντιστής,¹³ καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς ἅπαντα ἀνεζητηκώς, καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν.¹⁴ οὗτοι, ὦ

ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ταύτην τὴν φήμην κατασκευάσαντες,⁸ οἱ δεινοὶ εἰσὶ μου κατήγοροι· οἱ γὰρ ἀκούοντες ἡγοῦνται τοὺς ταῦτα ζητοῦντας οὐδὲ θεοὺς νομίζειν.⁹ ἔπειτὰ εἰσιν οὗτοι οἱ κατήγοροι πολλοὶ καὶ πολλὸν χρόνον. ἤδη κατηγορηκότες, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ λέγοντες πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ἐν ἧ ἂν μάλιστα ἐπιστεύσατε,¹ παῖδες ὄντες, ἔνιοι δ' ὑμῶν καὶ μεϊράκια, ἀτεχνῶς ἐρήμην κατηγοροῦντες,² ἀπολογουμένου οὐδενός. ὃ δὲ πάντων ἀλογώτατον, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὰ ὀνόματα οἷόν τε αὐτῶν εἶδέναι καὶ εἰπεῖν, πλὴν εἴ τις κωμφοποιὸς τυγχάνει ὢν. ὅσοι δὲ φθόνῳ καὶ διαβολῇ χρώμενοι¹ ὑμᾶς ἀνέπειθον, οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ πεπεισμένοι ἄλλους πείθοντες, οὗτοι πάντες ἀπορώτατοί εἰσιν.¹⁰ οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀναβιβάσασθαι οἷόν τ' ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἐνταυθοῖ¹¹ οὐδ' ἐλέγξαι οὐδένα, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ σκιαμαχεῖν ἀπολογούμενόν τε καὶ ἐλέγχειν μηδένοσ ἀποκρινομένου. Ἀξιώσατε οὖν καὶ ὑμεῖς,⁹ ὥσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, διττοὺς μου τοὺς κατηγοροῦσας γεγονέναι, ἐτέρους μὲν τοὺς ἄρτι κατηγορήσαντας, ἐτέρους δὲ τοὺς πάλαι, οὓς ἐγὼ λέγω. καὶ οἰήθητε δεῖν πρὸς ἐκείνους πρῶτόν με ἀπολογήσασθαι· καὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ἐκείνων πρότερον ἠκούσατε κατηγορούντων, καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τῶνδε τῶν ὕστερον.

Εἶεν. ἀπολογητέον δὴ,¹² ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἐπιχειρητέον ὑμῶν ἐξελέσθαι τὴν διαβολήν,³ ἣν ὑμεῖς ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἔσχετε, ταύτην ἐν οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ. βουλοίμην μὲν οὖν ἂν τοῦτο οὕτω γενέσθαι,⁴ εἴ τι ἄμεινον καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ἐμοί, καὶ πλέον τί με ποιῆσαι ἀπολογούμενον οἶμαι δὲ αὐτὸ χαλεπὸν εἶναι, καὶ οὐ πάνυ με λανθάνει οἷόν ἐστιν. ὅμως τοῦτο μὲν ἴτω ὕπη τῷ θεῷ φίλον, τῷ δὲ νόμῳ πειστέον καὶ ἀπολογητέον.

III. Ἀναλάβωμεν οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, τίς ἡ κατηγορία ἐστίν, ἐξ ἧς ἡ ἐμὴ διαβολὴ γέγονεν, ἧ δὴ καὶ πιστεύων Μέλητος με ἐγράψατο τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην.^α Εἶπεν. τί δὴ λέγοντες διέβαλλον οἱ διαβάλλοντες; ὥσπερ οὖν κατηγορῶν τὴν ἀνταμοσίαν δεῖ ἀναγνῶναι αὐτῶν.^β Σωκράτης ἀδικεῖ καὶ περιεργάζεται^γ ζητῶν τά τε ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ τὰ ἐπουράνια, καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν, καὶ ἄλλους ταῦτα ταῦτα διδάσκων. Τοιαύτη τίς ἐστὶ ταῦτα γὰρ ἐωρᾶτε καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν τῇ Ἀριστοφάνους κωμῳδίᾳ,^δ Σωκράτη τινὰ ἐκεῖ περιφερόμενον, φάσκοντά τε ἀεροβατεῖν καὶ ἄλλην πολλὴν φλυαρίαν φλυαροῦντα, ὧν ἐγὼ οὐδὲν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν πέρι^ε ἐπαίω. καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἀτιμάζων^ς λέγω τὴν τοιαύτην ἐπιστήμην, εἴ τις περὶ τῶν τοιούτων σοφός ἐστι. μὴ πως ἐγὼ ὑπὸ Μελήτου τοσαύτας δίκας φύγοιμι! ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τούτων, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδὲν μέτεστι. μάρτυρας δ' αὐτοὺς ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς παρέχομαι, καὶ ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς^ς ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν, ὅσοι ἐμοῦ πώποτε ἀκηκόατε διαλεγομένου πολλοὶ δὲ ὑμῶν οἱ τοιοῦτοί εἰσι. φράζετε οὖν ἀλλήλοις, εἰ πώποτε ἢ σμικρὸν ἢ μέγα ἤκουσέ τις ὑμῶν ἐμοῦ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων διαλεγομένου καὶ ἐκ τούτων γνώσεσθε,^β ὅτι τοιαῦτ' ἐστὶ καὶ τᾶλλα περὶ ἐμοῦ ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν.

IV. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὔτε τούτων οὐδὲν ἐστίν, οὐδέ γ'^α εἴ τινος ἀκηκόατε, ὡς ἐγὼ παιδεύειν ἐπιχειρῶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ χρήματα πράττομαι,^β οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀληθές. ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτό γέ μοι^γ δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι, εἴ τις οἴος τ' εἴη^δ παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους ὥσπερ Γοργίας τε ὁ Λεοντίνος, καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος, καὶ Ἴππίας ὁ Ἡλείος. τούτων γὰρ ἕκαστος, ὦ ἄνδρες, οἴος τ'

ἐστὶν ἰὼν εἰς ἑκάστην τῶν πόλεων τοὺς νέους, οἷς ἔξεστι τῶν ἑαυτῶν πολιτῶν προίκα ξυνεῖναι ὃ ἂν βούλωνται, τούτους πείθουσι^ο τὰς ἐκείνων ξυνουσίας ἀπολιπόντας σφίσι ξυνεῖναι χρήματα διδόντας καὶ χάριν προσεῖδέναι. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄλλος ἀνὴρ ἐστὶ Πάριος^ε ἐνθάδε σοφός, ὃν ἐγὼ ἠσθόμην ἐπιδημοῦντα· ἔτυχον γὰρ προσελθὼν ἀνδρὶ, ὃς τετέλεκε^ς χρήματα σοφισταῖς πλείω ἢ ξύμπαντες οἱ ἄλλοι, Καλλία τῷ Ἰππονίκου.^η τοῦτον οὖν ἀνηρόμην—ἐστὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ δύο υἱέε—^θ Ω Καλλία, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, εἰ μὲν σου τῷ υἱέε πῶλω ἢ μόσχῳ ἐγενέσθην, εἴχομεν ἂν αὐτοῖν ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν καὶ μισθώσασθαι,^ι ὃς ἔμελλεν αὐτῷ καλῶ τε κάγαθῶ ποιήσειν τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀρετὴν· ἦν δ' ἂν οὗτος ἢ τῶν ἵππικῶν τις ἢ τῶν γεωργικῶν. νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐστὸν, τίνα αὐτοῖν ἐν νῶ ἔχεις ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν; τίς τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρετῆς, τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης τε καὶ πολιτικῆς, ἐπιστήμων ἐστίν; οἶμαι γὰρ σε ἐσκέφθαι διὰ τὴν τῶν υἱέων κτήσιν. ἐστὶ τις, ἔφη ἐγὼ, ἢ οὐ; Πάνυ γε, ἢ δ' ὅς. Τίς, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, καὶ ποδαπός; καὶ πόσου διδάσκει; Εὐηνος, ἔφη, ὃ Σώκратες, Πάριος, πέντε μνῶν.^κ Καὶ ἐγὼ τὸν Εὐηνον ἐμακάρισα, εἰ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔχει^ι ταύτην τὴν τέχνην καὶ οὕτως ἐμμελῶς διδάσκει. ἐγὼ γοῦν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκαλλυνόμην τε καὶ ἠβρυνόμην ἂν, εἰ ἠπιστάμην ταῦτα· ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ ἐπίσταμαι,^μ ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι.

V. Ὑπολάβοι οὖν ἂν τις ὑμῶν ἴσως, Ἄλλ' ὃ Σώκратες, τὸ σὸν τί ἐστὶ πρᾶγμα; πόθεν αἱ διαβολαὶ σοι αὐται γεγόνασιν; οὐ γὰρ δήπου σου γε, οὐδὲν^α τῶν ἄλλων περιττότερον^β πραγματευομένου, ἔπειτα τοσαύτη φήμη τε καὶ λόγος γέγονεν, εἰ μὴ τι ἔπραττες ἄλλοῖον ἢ οἱ πολλοί. λέγε οὖν ἡμῖν, τί ἐστίν, ἵνα μὴ ἡμεῖς περὶ σου αὐτοσχεδιάζωμεν.^γ Ταυτί μοι

δοκεῖ δίκαια λέγειν ὁ λέγων, καὶ γὰρ ὑμῖν πειράσομαι ἀποδείξαι, τί ποτ' ἔστι τοῦτο, ὃ ἐμοὶ πεποίηκε τό τε ὄνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολήν.^α ἀκούετε δὴ. καὶ ἴσως μὲν δόξω τισὶν ὑμῶν παίζειν, εὖ μέντοι ἴστε, πᾶσαν ὑμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐρῶ. Ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δι' οὐδὲν ἄλλ' ἢ διὰ σοφίαν τινὰ τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ἔσχηκα. ποῖαν δὲ σοφίαν ταύτην; ἥπερ ἐστὶν ἴσως ἀνθρωπίνῃ σοφία. τῷ ὄντι γὰρ κινδυνεύω ταύτην εἶναι σοφός· οὗτοι δὲ τάχ' ἂν, οὓς ἄρτι ἔλεγον, μεῖζω τινὰ ἢ κατ' ἀνθρωπίνῃ σοφίαν σοφοὶ εἶεν, ἢ οὐκ ἔχω, τί λέγω οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔγωγε αὐτὴν ἐπίσταμαι, ἀλλ' ὅστις φησὶ ψεύδεται τε καὶ ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τῇ ἐμῇ λέγει.^β καὶ μοι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μὴ θορυβήσητε, μηδὲ ἂν δόξω τι ὑμῖν μέγα λέγειν.^γ οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν ἐρῶ τὸν λόγον, ὃν ἂν λέγω, ἀλλ' εἰς ἀξιόχρεων^δ ὑμῖν τὸν λέγοντα ἀνοίσω. τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς, εἰ δὴ τίς ἐστὶ σοφία καὶ οἶα,^ε μάρτυρα ὑμῖν παρέξομαι τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς. Χαιρεφῶντα γὰρ^ς ἴστε που. οὗτος ἐμός τε ἐταῖρος ἦν ἐκ νέου, καὶ ὑμῶν τῷ πλήθει ἐταῖρός^ζ τε καὶ ξυνέφυγε τὴν φυγὴν ταύτην καὶ μεθ' ὑμῶν κατῆλθε. καὶ ἴστε δὴ, οἷος ἦν Χαιρεφῶν, ὡς σφοδρὸς ἐφ' ὃ τι ὄρμήσειε. καὶ δὴ ποτε καὶ εἰς Δελφοὺς ἐλθὼν ἐτόλμησε τοῦτο μαντεύσασθαι,^η— καί, ὅπερ λέγω, μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ὦ ἄνδρες. ἤρητο γὰρ δὴ, εἴ τις^θ ἐμοῦ εἴη σοφώτερος. ἀνεῖλεν οὖν ἡ Πυθία^ρ μηδένα σοφώτερον εἶναι. καὶ τούτων περὶ ὃ ἀδελφὸς ὑμῖν αὐτοῦ^α οὕτωσι μαρτυρήσει, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος τετελεύτηκε.

VI. Σκέψασθε δὲ, ὧν ἕνεκα ταῦτα λέγω. μέλλω γὰρ ὑμᾶς διδάξαι, ὅθεν μοι ἡ διαβολὴ γέγονε. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας ἐνεθυμούμην οὕτωσί, Τί ποτε λέγει ὁ θεός, καὶ τί ποτε αἰνίττεται; ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ

οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν ξύνοιδα ἑμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὢν·^a τί οὖν ποτε λέγει φάσκων ἑμὲ σοφώτατον εἶναι; οὐ γὰρ δήπου ψεύδεται γε· οὐ γὰρ θέμις αὐτῷ.^b καὶ πολὺν μὲν χρόνον ἠπόρουν, τί ποτε λέγει,^c ἔπειτα μόγῃς πάνυ ἐπὶ ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ τοιαύτην τινὰ ἐτραπιόμην. ἦλθον ἐπὶ τινα τῶν δοκούντων σοφῶν εἶναι, ὡς ἐνταῦθα, εἶπερ που, ἐλέγξω τὸ μαντεῖον καὶ ἀποφανῶν τῷ χρησμῷ, ὅτι Οὔτοσί ἐμοῦ σοφώτερός ἐστι, σὺ δ' ἐμὲ ἔφησθα. διασκοπῶν οὖν τούτον — ὄνοματι γὰρ οὐδὲν δέομαι λέγειν, ἦν δέ τις τῶν πολιτικῶν, πρὸς δὲ ἐγὼ σκοπῶν τοιοῦτόν τι ἔπαθον, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι — καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ, ἔδοξέ μοι^d οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ δοκεῖν μὲν εἶναι σοφὸς ἄλλοις τε πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ μάλιστα ἑαυτῷ, εἶναι δ' οὐ. κάπειτα ἐπειρώμην αὐτῷ δεικνύειν, ὅτι οἶοιτο μὲν εἶναι σοφός, εἴη δ' οὐ. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν τούτῳ τε ἀπηχθόμην καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν παρόντων. πρὸς ἑμαυτὸν δ' οὖν ἀπιῶν ἐλογιζόμην,^e ὅτι Τούτου μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐγὼ σοφώτερός εἰμι· κινδυνεύει μὲν γὰρ ἡμῶν οὐδέτερος οὐδὲν καλὸν κάγαθὸν εἰδέναί, ἀλλ' οὗτος μὲν οἶεται τε εἰδέναί οὐκ εἰδώς, ἐγὼ δέ, ὥσπερ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἶομαι. ἔοικα γοῦν τούτου γε σμικρῷ τινὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ σοφώτερος εἶναι,^f ὅτι ἂ μὴ οἶδα οὐδὲ οἶομαι εἰδέναί. ἐντεῦθεν ἐπ' ἄλλον ἦα τῶν ἐκείνου δοκούντων σοφωτέρων εἶναι, καὶ μοι ταῦτά ταῦτα ἔδοξε καὶ ἐνταῦθα κάκεινῳ καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς ἀπηχθόμην.

VII. Μετὰ ταῦτ' οὖν ἤδη ἐφεξῆς ἦα, αἰσθανόμενος μὲν καὶ λυπούμενος καὶ δεδιώς, ὅτι ἀπηχθανόμην,^a ὅμως δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἐδόκει εἶναι τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ περὶ πλείστου ποιεῖσθαι. ἰτέον οὖν, σκοποῦντι^b τὸν χρησμὸν τί λέγει, ἐπὶ ἅπαντας τοὺς τι δοκούν-

τας εἶδέναι. καὶ νῆ τὸν κύνα,^c ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, —δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς ὑμᾶς τᾶληθῆ λέγειν— ἢ μὴν ἐγὼ ἔπαθόν τι τοιοῦτον· οἱ μὲν μάλιστα^d εὐδοκμοῦντες ἔδοξάν μοι ὀλγού δειν τοῦ πλείστου ἐνδεεῖς εἶναι ζητοῦντι κατὰ τὸν θεόν, ἄλλοι δὲ δοκοῦντες φαυλότεροι ἐπιεικέστεροι εἶναι ἄνδρες πρὸς τὸ φρονίμως ἔχειν. δεῖ δὴ ὑμῖν τὴν ἐμὴν πλάνην ἐπιδείξαι, ὥσπερ πόνους τινὰς ποιοῦντος, ἵνα μοι καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος ἡ μαντεία γένοιτο.^e Μετὰ γὰρ τοὺς πολιτικούς ἦα ἐπὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς τοὺς τε τῶν τραγωδιῶν καὶ τοὺς τῶν διθυράμβων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὡς ἐνταῦθα ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ καταληψόμενος ἑμαυτὸν ἀμαθέστερον ἐκείνων ὄντα. ἀναλαμβάνων οὖν αὐτῶν τὰ ποιήματα, ἃ μοι ἐδόκει μάλιστα πεπραγματεῦσθαι αὐτοῖς,^f διηρώτων ἂν αὐτοὺς τί λέγοιεν, ἵν' ἅμα τι καὶ μαθάνοιμι παρ' αὐτῶν. αἰσχύνομαι οὖν ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν, ὃ ἄνδρες, τᾶληθῆ ὁμῶς δὲ ῥητέον. ὡς ἔπος γὰρ εἰπεῖν, ὀλγού αὐτῶν ἅπαντες οἱ παρόντες ἂν βέλτιον ἔλεγον περὶ ὧν αὐτοὶ ἐπεποιήκεσαν.^g ἔγνω οὖν καὶ περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐν ὀλγῷ τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ σοφία ποιοῖεν ἀποιοῖεν, ἀλλὰ φύσει τινὶ καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες, ὥσπερ οἱ θεομάντεις καὶ οἱ χρησμοδοί.^h καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι λέγουσι μὲν πολλὰ καὶ καλά, ἴσασι δὲ οὐδὲν ὧν λέγουσι. τοιοῦτόν τί μοι ἐφάνησαν πάθος καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ πεπονθότες. καὶ ἅμα ἠσθόμην αὐτῶν διὰ τὴν ποιῆσιν οἰομένων καὶ τᾶλλα σοφωτάτων εἶναι ἀνθρώπων,ⁱ ἃ οὐκ ἦσαν. ἀπῆα οὖν καὶ ἐντεύθεν, τῷ αὐτῷ οἰόμενος περιγεγονέναι, ὅπερ καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν.

VIII. Τελευτῶν οὖν ἐπὶ τοὺς χειροτέχνας ἦα· ἑμαυτῷ γὰρ ξυνήδειν οὐδὲν ἐπισταμένῳ, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, τούτους δὲ γ' ἦδειν ὅτι εὐρήσοιμι πολλὰ καὶ καλά ἐπισταμένους. καὶ τούτου μὲν οὐκ ἐψεύσθην,^k

ἀλλ' ἠπίσταντο ἂ ἐγὼ οὐκ ἠπιστάμην καὶ μου ταύτη σοφώτεροι ἦσαν. ἀλλ', ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ταῦτόν μοι ἔδοξαν ἔχειν ἀμάρτημα, ὅπερ καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ δημιουργοί^b διὰ τὸ τὴν τέχνην καλῶς ἐξεργάζεσθαι ἕκαστος ἡξίου καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ μέγιστα σοφώτατος εἶναι,^c καὶ αὐτῶν αὐτῆ ἢ πλημμύλεια ἐκείνην τὴν σοφίαν ἀπέκρυπτεν^d ὥστ', ἐμὲ ἐμαυτὸν ἀνερωτᾶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ,^e πότερα δεξαίμην ἂν οὕτως ὥσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν, μήτε τι σοφὸς ὢν τὴν ἐκείνων σοφίαν, μήτε ἀμαθὴς τὴν ἀμαθίαν,^f ἢ ἀμφοτέρα ἂ ἐκείνοι ἔχουσιν ἔχειν. ἀπεκρινάμην οὖν ἐμαυτῷ καὶ τῷ χρησμῷ, ὅτι μοι λυσιτελοῖ ὥσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν.

IX. Ἐκ ταυτησὶ δὴ τῆς ἐξετάσεως, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πολλαὶ μὲν ἀπέχθεται μοι γεγόνασι καὶ οἶαι χαλεπώταται^a καὶ βαρύταται, ὥστε πολλὰς διαβολὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν γεγονέναι, ὄνομα δὲ τοῦτο λέγεσθαι, σοφὸς εἶναι.^b οἴονται γάρ με ἐκάστοτε οἱ παρόντες ταῦτα αὐτὸν εἶναι σοφόν, ἂ ἂν ἄλλον ἐξελέγξω τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῷ ὄντι ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι,^c καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησμῷ τούτῳ τοῦτο λέγειν, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία ὀλίγου τινὸς ἀξία ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδενός^d καὶ φαίνεται τοῦτ' οὐ λέγειν τὸν Σωκράτη,^e προσκεχρηῆσθαι δὲ τῷ ἐμῷ ὀνόματι, ἐμὲ παράδειγμα ποιούμενος, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ εἴποι,^f ὅτι Οὗτος ὑμῶν, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, σοφώτατός ἐστιν, ὅστις ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἔγνωκεν, ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἀξίός ἐστι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν. ταῦτ' οὖν ἐγὼ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν περιωῶν ζητῶ καὶ ἐρευνῶ κατὰ τὸν θεόν, καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ τῶν ξένων^g ἂν τινα οἶωμαι σοφὸν εἶναι καὶ ἐπειδάν μοι μὴ δοκῇ, τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν ἐνδείκνυμαι,^h ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι σοφός. καὶ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἀσχολίας οὔτε τι τῶν τῆς πόλεως πράξαι μοι σχολὴ

γέγονεν ἄξιον λόγου οὔτε τῶν οικείων, ἀλλ' ἐν πενία μυρία εἰμί¹ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν.

Χ. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οἱ νέοι μοι ἐπακολουθοῦντες, οἷς μάλιστα σχολή ἐστίν, οἱ τῶν πλουσιωτάτων.² αὐτόματοι χαίρουσιν ἀκούοντες ἐξεταζομένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλάκις ἐμὲ μιμούνται, εἶτα ἐπιχειροῦσιν³ ἄλλους ἐξετάζειν κἄπειτα, οἶμαι, εὐρίσκουσι πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν οἰομένων μὲν εἰδέναι τι ἀνθρώπων, εἰδόντων δὲ ὀλίγα ἢ οὐδέν.⁴ ἐντεῦθεν οὖν οἱ ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἐξεταζόμενοι ἐμοὶ ὀργίζονται, ἀλλ' οὐχ αὐτοῖς,⁵ καὶ λέγουσιν, ὡς Σωκράτης τίς ἐστί μαρῶτατος καὶ διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους. καὶ ἐπειδὴν τις αὐτοὺς ἐρωτᾷ, ὃ τι ποιῶν καὶ ὃ τι διδάσκων, ἔχουσι μὲν οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀγνοοῦσιν, ἵνα δὲ μὴ δοκῶσιν ἀπορεῖν, τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφούντων πρόχειρα ταῦτα λέγουσιν, ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς,⁶ καὶ θεοὺς μὴ νομίζειν, καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρεῖττω ποιεῖν. τὰ γὰρ ἀληθῆ, οἶμαι, οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοιεν λέγειν, ὅτι κατὰδηλοὶ γίνονται προσποιούμενοι⁷ μὲν εἰδέναι, εἰδότες δὲ οὐδέν. ἅτε οὖν, οἶμαι, φιλότιμοι ὄντες καὶ σφοδροὶ καὶ πολλοί, καὶ ξυντεταγμένως καὶ πιθανῶς λέγοντες⁸ περὶ ἐμοῦ, ἐμπεπλήκασιν ὑμῶν τὰ ὄψα⁹ καὶ πάλαι καὶ σφοδρῶς διαβάλλοντες. ἐκ τούτων καὶ Μέλητος μοι ἐπέθετο καὶ Ἄνυτος καὶ Λύκων, Μέλητος μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν¹ ἀχθόμενος, Ἄνυτος δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, Λύκων δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν ῥητόρων. ὥστε, ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, θαυμάζοιμ' ἄν, εἰ οἷός τ' εἶην ἐγὼ ὑμῶν ταύτην τὴν διαβολὴν ἐξελέσθαι ἐν οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ, οὕτω πολλὴν γεγυυῖαν. Ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ὑμῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὰληθῆ,¹⁰ καὶ ὑμᾶς οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν ἀποκρυψάμενος ἐγὼ λέγω

οὐδ' ὑποστειλάμενος.¹ καὶ τοι οἶδα σχεδόν, ὅτι τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀπεχθάνομαι. ὃ καὶ τεκμήριον, ὅτι τάληθῆ λέγω καὶ ὅτι αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ διαβολὴ ἢ ἐμῆ καὶ τὰ αἷτια ταῦτά ἐστι. καὶ ἐάν τε νῦν ἐάν τε αὖθις ζητήσητε ταῦτα, οὕτως εὐρήσετε.

XI. Περὶ μὲν οὖν ὧν οἱ πρῶτοί μου κατήγοροι κατηγοροῦν αὕτη ἔστω ἰκανὴ ἀπολογία^α πρὸς ὑμᾶς· πρὸς δὲ Μέλητον τὸν ἀγαθὸν τε καὶ φιλόπολιν,^β ὡς φησι, καὶ τοὺς ὑστέρους μετὰ ταῦτα πειράσομαι ἀπολογεῖσθαι. αὖθις γὰρ δὴ, ὥσπερ ἐτέρων τούτων ὄντων κατηγορῶν, λάβωμεν αὐ^ο τὴν τούτων ἀντωμοσίαν. ἔχει δὲ πως ὧδε^δ Σωκράτη φησὶν ἀδικεῖν τοὺς τε νέους διαφθείροντα καὶ θεοὺς οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει οὐ νομίζοντα, ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινὰ. τὸ μὲν δὴ ἐγκλημα τοιοῦτόν ἐστι· τούτου δὲ τοῦ ἐγκλήματος ἐν ἕκαστον ἐξετάσωμεν. Φησὶ γὰρ δὴ τοὺς νέους ἀδικεῖν με διαφθείροντα. ἐγὼ δέ γε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀδικεῖν φημι Μέλητον, ὅτι σπουδῆ χαριεντίζεται,^ο ῥαδίως εἰς ἀγῶνας καθιστὰς ἀνθρώπους, περὶ πραγμάτων προσποιούμενος σπουδάζειν καὶ κήδεσθαι, ὧν οὐδὲν τούτῳ πώποτε ἐμέλησεν. ὡς δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, πειράσομαι καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιδειξάι.

XII. Καί μοι δεῦρο, ὦ Μέλητε, εἰπέ,^α "Ἄλλο τι περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖ,^β ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστοι οἱ νεώτεροι ἔσονται;" Ἐγωγε. "Ἴθι δὴ νῦν εἰπέ τούτοις, τίς αὐτοὺς βελτίους ποιεῖ; δῆλον γάρ, ὅτι οἶσθα, μέλον γέ σοι.^ο τὸν μὲν γὰρ διαφθείροντα ἐξευρών, ὡς φῆς, ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις τουτοῖσι^δ καὶ κατηγορεῖς· τὸν δὲ δὴ βελτίους ποιοῦντα ἴθι εἰπέ καὶ μῆνυσσον αὐτοῖς, τίς ἐστίν. ὀρᾶς, ὦ Μέλητε,^ο ὅτι σιγᾶς καὶ οὐκ ἔχεις εἰπεῖν; καὶ τοι οὐκ αἰσχρὸν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἰκανὸν τεκμήριον οὐ δὴ ἐγὼ λέγω, ὅτι σοι οὐδὲν μεμέληκεν;

ἀλλ' εἰπέ, ὦ ἴγαθέ, τίς αὐτοὺς ἀμείνους ποιεῖ; Οἱ νόμοι. Ἄλλ' οὐ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἀλλὰ τίς ἄνθρωπος, ὅστις πρῶτον καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο οἶδε, τοὺς νόμους. Οὗτοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἱ δικασταί. Πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Μέλητε; οἶδε τοὺς νέους παιδεύειν οἱοί τέ εἰσι καὶ βελτίους ποιεῖν; Μάλιστα. Πότερον ἅπαντες, ἢ οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν, οἱ δ' οὐ; Ἄπαντες. Εὐ γε νῆ τῆν' Ἡραν^α λέγεις, καὶ πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν τῶν ὠφελούτων.^β τί δαὶ δὴ, οἶδε οἱ ἀκροαταὶ βελτίους ποιοῦσιν, ἢ οὐ; Καὶ οὗτοι. Τί δαὶ οἱ βουλευταί;^γ Καὶ οἱ βουλευταί. Ἄλλ' ἄρα, ὦ Μέλητε, μὴ οἱ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, οἱ ἐκκλησιασταί, διαφθείρουσι τοὺς νεωτέρους;^δ ἢ κακείνοι βελτίους ποιοῦσιν ἅπαντες; Κακείνοι. Πάντες ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, Ἀθηναῖοι καλοὺς καγαθοὺς ποιοῦσι πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἐγὼ δὲ μόνος διαφθείρω. οὕτω λέγεις; Πάνυ σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω. Πολλὴν γ' ἐμοῦ κατέγνωκας δυστυχίαν.^ε καὶ μοι ἀπόκριναί ἢ καὶ περὶ ἵππους οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν; οἱ μὲν βελτίους ποιοῦντες αὐτούς πάντες ἄνθρωποι εἶναι, εἰς δέ τις ὁ διαφθείρων;^ς ἢ τούναντίον τούτου πᾶν εἰς μὲν τις ὁ βελτίους οἶός τ' ὦν ποιεῖν ἢ πάνυ ὀλίγοι, οἱ ἱππικοί. οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ἐάνπερ ξυνῶσι καὶ χρώνται ἵπποις, διαφθείρουσιν; οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, ὦ Μέλητε, καὶ περὶ ἵππων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ζώων; παντως δὴ που, ἐάν τε σὺ καὶ Ἄνυτος οὐ φῆτε^μ ἐάν τε φῆτε· πολλὴ γὰρ ἂν τις εὐδαιμονία εἴη περὶ τοὺς νέους, εἰ εἰς μὲν μόνος αὐτοὺς διαφθείρει,^ν οἱ δ' ἄλλοι ὠφελούσιν. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Μέλητε, ἱκανῶς ἐπιδείκνυσαι, ὅτι οὐδεπώποτε ἐφρόντισας τῶν νέων, καὶ σαφῶς ἀποφαίνεις τὴν σαντοῦ ἀμέλειαν, ὅτι οὐδὲν σοι μεμέληκε περὶ ὧν ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις.

XIII. Ἔτι δὲ ἡμῖν εἰπέ, ὦ πρὸς Διὸς Μέλητε,

πότερον ἔστιν οἰκεῖν ἄμεινον ἐν πολίταις χρηστοῖς,
 ἢ πονηροῖς; ὧ τᾶν, ἀπόκρισαι· οὐδὲν γάρ τοι χαλεπὸν
 ἔρωτῶ. οὐχ οἱ μὲν πονηροὶ κακὸν τι ἐργάζονται
 τοὺς αἰεὶ ἐγγυτάτῳ ἑαυτῶν ὄντας,^b οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ
 ἀγαθὸν τι; Πάνυ γε. Ἔστιν οὖν ὅστις βούλεται
 ὑπὸ τῶν ξυνόντων βλάπτεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ὠφελεί-
 σθαι; ἀπόκρισαι, ὧ γαθῆ· καὶ γὰρ ὁ νόμος κελεύει
 ἀποκρίνεσθαι.^c ἔσθ' ὅστις βούλεται βλάπτεσθαι;
 Οὐ δῆτα. Φέρε δῆ, πότερον ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις δεῦρο ὡς
 διαφθείροντα τοὺς νεωτέρους καὶ πονηροτέρους ποι-
 οῦντα ἐκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα; Ἐκόντα ἐγωγε. Τί δῆτα,
 ὧ Μέλητε; τοσοῦτον σὺ ἐμοῦ σοφώτερος εἶ τηλικού-
 του ὄντος^d τηλικόςδε ὢν, ὥστε σὺ μὲν ἔγνωκας, ὅτι οἱ
 μὲν κακοὶ κακὸν τι ἐργάζονται αἰεὶ τοὺς μάλιστα πλη-
 σίον ἑαυτῶν, οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθόν· ἐγὼ δὲ δῆ εἰς
 τοσοῦτον ἀμαθίας ἤκω,^e ὥστε καὶ τοῦτ' ἀγνοῶ, ὅτι
 ἐάν τινα μοχθηρὸν ποιήσω τῶν ξυνόντων, κινδυνεύ-
 σω κακὸν τι λαβεῖν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ὥστε τοῦτο τὸ το-
 σοῦτον κακὸν ἐκὼν ποιῶ, ὡς φῆς σύ; ταῦτα ἐγώ
 σοι οὐ πείθομαι, ὧ Μέλητε, οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ ἄλλον
 ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα.^f ἀλλ' ἢ σὺ διαφθείρω, ἢ, εἰ δια-
 φθείρω, ἄκων, ὥστε σύ γε κατ' ἀμφότερα ψεύδει.
 εἰ δὲ ἄκων διαφθείρω, τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἀκουσίων
 ἀμαρτημάτων οὐ δεῦρο νόμος εἰσάγειν ἔστιν, ἀλλ'
 ἰδίᾳ λαβόντα διδάσκειν καὶ νουθετεῖν δῆλον γάρ,
 ὅτι, ἐὰν μάθω, παύσομαι ὃ γε ἄκων ποιῶ.^g σὺ δὲ
 ξυγγενέσθαι μὲν μοι καὶ διδάξαι ἔφυγες καὶ οὐκ ἠθέ-
 λησας, δεῦρο δὲ εἰσάγεις, οἱ νόμος ἔστιν εἰσάγειν τοὺς
 κολάσεως δεομένους, ἀλλ' οὐ μαθήσεως.

XIV. Ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο μὲν
 δῆλον ἤδη ἔστιν, ὃ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι Μελίτην τού-
 των οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν^a πάποτε ἐμέλησεν.

ὁμως δὲ δὴ λέγε ἡμῖν, πῶς με φῆς διαφθείρειν, ὃ Μέλητε, τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἢ δῆλον δὴ, ὅτι^δ κατὰ τὴν γραφήν,^ε ἣν ἐγράψω, θεοὺς διδάσκοντα μὴ νομίζεῖν οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει, ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινά; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις^δ ὅτι διδάσκων διαφθείρω; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω. Πρὸς αὐτῶν τοίνυν, ὃ Μέλητε, τούτων τῶν θεῶν, ὧν γῆν ὁ λόγος ἐστίν,^ε εἰπέ ἔτι σαφέστερον καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἀνδράσι τουτοσί. ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐ δύναμαι μαθεῖν, πότερον λέγεις διδάσκειν με νομίζεῖν εἶναί τινος θεοῦς, καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρα νομίζω εἶναι θεοῦς καὶ οὐκ εἰμὶ τὸ παράπαν ἄθεος οὐδὲ ταύτῃ ἀδικῶ, οὐ μέντοι οὐσπερ γε ἡ πόλις, ἀλλ' ἑτέρους, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστίν ὁ μοι ἐγκαλεῖς, ὅτι ἑτέρους. ἢ παντάπασί με φῆς οὔτε αὐτὸν νομίζεῖν θεοῦς τοὺς τε ἄλλους^ε ταῦτα διδάσκειν. Ταῦτα λέγω, ὡς τὸ παράπαν οὐ νομίζεις θεοῦς. Ὡ θαυμάσιε Μέλητε, ἵνα τί ταῦτα λέγεις;^ε οὐδὲ ἥλιον οὐδὲ σελήνην ἄρα νομίζω θεοῦς εἶναι, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι; Μὰ Δί^δ ὃ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἐπεὶ τὸν μὲν ἥλιον λίθον φησὶν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ σελήνην γῆν. Ἀναξαγόρου οἶε^ι κατηγορεῖν, ὃ φίλε Μέλητε καὶ οὕτω καταφρονεῖς τῶνδε καὶ οἶε αὐτοὺς ἀπείρους γραμμάτων εἶναι, ὥστε οὐκ εἰδέναί, ὅτι τὰ Ἀναξαγόρου βιβλία, τοῦ Κλαζομενίου, γέμει τούτων τῶν λόγων. καὶ δὴ καὶ οἱ νέοι ταῦτα^ε παρ' ἐμοῦ μανθάνουσιν, ἃ ἔξεστιν ἐνίστε, εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ, δραχμῆς ἐκ τῆς ὀρχήστρας^ι πριαμένοις Σωκράτους καταγελαῶν, ἐὰν προσποιῆται ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι, ἄλλως τε καὶ οὕτως ἄτοπα ὄντα. ἀλλ' ὃ πρὸς Διὸς, οὕτωςί σοι δοκῶ οὐδένα νομίζεῖν θεὸν εἶναι; Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δί', οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν. Ἄπιστός γ' εἶ, ὃ Μέλητε, καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς, σαυτῷ. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ οὐτοσί, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πάνυ

εἶναι ὑβριστῆς καὶ ἀκόλαστος, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην ὑβρεῖ τινὶ καὶ ἀκολασίᾳ καὶ νεότητι[™] γράψασθαι. εἶοικε γὰρ ὡςπερ αἰνιγμα ξυντιθέντι διαπειρωμένῳ,^π Ἄρα γινώσεται Σωκράτης ὁ σοφὸς δὴ ἐμοῦ χαριεντιζομένου^ο καὶ ἐναντὶ' ἐμαυτῷ λέγοντος, ἢ ἐξαπατήσω αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἀκούοντας ; οὗτος γὰρ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τὰ ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ, ὡςπερ ἂν εἰ εἶποι Ἄδικεῖ Σωκράτης θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἀλλὰ θεοὺς νομίζων. καὶ τοι τοῦτό ἐστι παίζοντος.

XV. Ξυνεπισκέψασθε δὴ, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἢ μοι φαίνεται^α ταῦτα λέγειν σὺ δὲ ἡμῖν ἀπόκριναι, ὦ Μέλητε. ἡμεῖς δέ, ὅπερ κατ' ἀρχὰς ὑμᾶς παρητησάμεν, μέμνησθέ μοι μὴ θορυβεῖν, ἐὰν ἐν τῷ εἰωθότῳ τρόπῳ τοὺς λόγους ποιῶμαι.

Ἔστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων, ὦ Μέλητε, ἀνθρώπεια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, ἀνθρώπους δὲ οὐ νομίζει ; ἀποκρινέσθω, ὦ ἄνδρες, καὶ μὴ ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα θορυβεῖτω. ἔσθ' ὅστις ἵππους μὲν οὐ νομίζει, ἵππικὰ δὲ πράγματα ; ἢ αὐλητὰς μὲν οὐ νομίζει εἶναι, αὐλητικὰ δὲ πράγματα ; οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν εἰ μὴ σὺ βούλει ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἐγὼ σοὶ λέγω καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τουτοισί. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ γε ἀπόκριναι. ἔσθ' ὅστις δαιμόνια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, δαίμονας δὲ οὐ νομίζει ;^β Οὐκ ἔστιν. Ὡς ὦνησας, ὅτι μόγις ἀπεκρίνω ὑπὸ τουτωνὶ ἀναγκαζόμενος.^ο οὐκοῦν δαιμόνια μὲν φῆς με καὶ νομίζειν καὶ διδάσκειν, εἴτ' οὖν καινὰ εἶτε παλαιά, ἀλλ' οὖν δαιμόνιά γε νομίζω^δ κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ διωμόσω ἐν τῇ ἀντιγραφῇ.^ο εἰ δὲ δαιμόνια νομίζω, καὶ δαίμονας δήπου πολλὴ ἀνάγκη νομίζειν ἐμέ εἶσιν, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει ; ἔχει δὴ· τίθημι γάρ σε ὁμολογοῦντα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀπο-

κρίνει. τοὺς δὲ δαίμονας οὐχὶ ἤτοι θεοὺς γε ἡγούμεθα ἢ θεῶν παῖδας ;¹ φῆς ἡ οὐ ; Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ δαίμονας ἡγούμεαι, ὡς σὺ φῆς, εἰ μὲν θεοὶ τινὲς εἰσιν οἱ δαίμονες, τοῦτ' ἂν εἶη ὃ ἐγὼ φημί σε αἰνίττεσθαι καὶ χαριεντίζεσθαι, θεοὺς οὐχ ἡγούμενον φάναι ἐμέ θεοὺς αὖ ἡγείσθαι πάλιν, ἐπειδήπερ γε δαίμονας ἡγούμεαι· εἰ δ' αὖ οἱ δαίμονες θεῶν παῖδές εἰσι νόθοι τινὲς ἢ ἐκ νυμφῶν ἢ ἐκ τινῶν ἄλλων, ὧν δὴ καὶ λέγονται,² τις ἂν ἀνθρώπων θεῶν μὲν παῖδας ἡγοῖτο εἶναι, θεοὺς δὲ μή ; ὁμοίως γὰρ ἂν ἄτοπον εἶη, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἵππων μὲν παῖδας ἡγοῖτο ἢ καὶ ὄνων τοὺς ἡμίονους, ἵππους δὲ καὶ ὄνους μὴ ἡγοῖτο εἶναι. ἀλλ', ὦ Μέλητε, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως σὺ ταῦτα οὐχὶ ἀποπειρώμενος ἡμῶν ἐγράψω τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην, ἢ ἀπορῶν ὃ τι ἐγκαλοῖς ἐμοὶ ἀληθὲς ἀδίκημα· ὅπως δὲ σύ τινα πείθοις ἂν καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα ἀνθρώπων, ὡς οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ [ἀνδρός] ἔστι καὶ δαιμόνια καὶ θεῖα ἡγείσθαι, καὶ αὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μήτε δαίμονας μήτε θεοὺς μήτε ἥρωας, οὐδεμίαν μηχανὴν ἔστιν.³

XVI. Ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες⁴ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οὐκ ἀδικῶ κατὰ τὴν Μελήτου γραφὴν, οὐ πολλῆς μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀπολογίας, ἀλλ' ἱκανὰ καὶ ταῦτα. ὃ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, ὅτι πολλή μοι ἀπέχθεια γέγονε καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς, εὖ ἴστε ὅτι ἀληθὲς ἔστι. καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὃ ἐμέ αἰρήσει,⁵ ἂν περ αἰρή, οὐ Μέλητος, οὐδὲ Ἄνυτος, ἀλλ' ἢ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή τε καὶ φθόνος.⁶ ἂ δὴ πολλοὺς καὶ ἄλλους καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας ἤρηκεν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ αἰρήσειν οὐδὲν δὲ δεινόν, μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στῆ.⁷

Ἴσως δ' ἂν οὖν εἴποι τις, Εἶπ' οὐκ αἰσχύνει,⁸ ὃ Σώκρατες, τοιοῦτον ἐπιτήδευμα ἐπιτηδεύσας, ἔξ οὗ κινδυνεύεις νυνὶ ἀποθανεῖν ; Ἐγὼ δὲ τούτῳ ἂν δίκαιον

λόγον ἀντείποιμι, ὅτι Οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ ἄνθρωπε εἰ οἶε δεῖν κίνδυνον ὑπολογίζεσθαι¹ τοῦ ζῆν ἢ τεθνήαι ἄνδρα, ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελός ἐστιν,² ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνο μόνον σκοπεῖν, ὅταν πράττη τι, πότερον δίκαια ἢ ἀδίκαια πράττει, καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἔργα, ἢ κακοῦ. φαῦλοι γὰρ ἂν τῷ γε σῶ λόγῳ εἶεν τῶν ἡμῶν θεῶν ὅσοι ἐν Τροίᾳ τετελευτήκασιν, οἳ τε ἄλλοι καὶ ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος υἱός,³ ὃς τοσοῦτον τοῦ κινδύνου κατεφρόνησε παρὰ τὸ αἰσχροῦ τι ὑπομεῖναι, ὥστε ἐπειδὴ εἶπεν ἡ μήτηρ αὐτῷ προθυμουμένῳ Ἐκτορα ἀποκτεῖναι, θεὸς οὔσα, οὕτωςί πως, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, ὦ παῖ, εἰ τιμωρήσεις Πατρόκλῳ τῷ ἐταίρῳ τὸν φόνον καὶ Ἐκτορα ἀποκτενεῖς, αὐτὸς ἀποθανεῖ· αὐτίκα γάρ τοι, φησί, μεθ' Ἐκτορα¹ πότμος ἐτοιμός· ὁ δὲ ταῦτ' ἀκούσας² τοῦ μὲν θανάτου καὶ τοῦ κινδύνου ὠλιγώρησε, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον δέσας τὸ ζῆν κακὸς ὢν καὶ τοῖς φίλοις μὴ τιμωρεῖν, αὐτίκα, φησί, τεθναίνῃ¹ δίκην ἐπιθεις τῷ ἀδικούντι, ἵνα μὴ ἐνθάδε μένω καταγέλαστος παρὰ νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν, ἄχθος ἀρούρης. μὴ αὐτὸν οἶε³ φροντίσαι θανάτου καὶ κινδύνου; οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ· οὐ ἂν τις ἑαυτὸν τάξῃ ἢ ἡγησάμενός² βέλτιον εἶναι ἢ ὑπ' ἀρχοντος ταχθῆ, ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, μένοντα κινδυνεύειν, μηδὲν ὑπολογιζόμενον μήτε θάνατον μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ.⁰

XVII. Ἐγὼ οὖν δεινὰ ἂν εἶην εἰργασμένος,² ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ, ὅτε μὲν με³ οἱ ἄρχοντες ἔταπτον, οὐς ὑμεῖς εἴλεσθε ἄρχειν μου, καὶ ἐν Ποτιδαίᾳ καὶ ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει καὶ ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ,¹ τότε μὲν οὐ ἐκείνοι ἔταπτον ἔμενον ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλος τις καὶ ἐκινδύνευον ἀποθανεῖν, τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάπτοντος, ὡς ἐγὼ φήθην τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον, φιλοσοφοῦντά με δεῖν

ζῆν καὶ ἐξετάζοντα ἑμαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνταῦθα δὲ φοβηθεὶς ἢ θάνατον ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν πρᾶγμα λίποιμι τὴν τάξιν. δεινὸν μὲντ' ἂν εἴη, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τότε ἂν με δικαίως εἰσάγοι τις εἰς δικαστήριον, ὅτι οὐ νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι ἀπειθῶν τῇ μαντεία^α καὶ δεδιῶς θάνατον καὶ οἰόμενος σοφὸς εἶναι, οὐκ ὄν. τὸ γὰρ τοι θάνατον δεδιέναι, ὦ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ δοκεῖν σοφὸν εἶναι, μὴ ὄντα· δοκεῖν γὰρ εἰδέναι^β ἐστὶν ἂ οὐκ οἶδεν. οἶδε μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς τὸν θάνατον οὐδ' εἰ τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων μέγιστον ὄν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, δεδίασι δ' ὡς εὖ εἰδότες, ὅτι μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστὶ. καὶ τοῦτο πῶς οὐκ ἀμαθία ἐστὶν αὕτη ἢ ἐπὶ νοεῖδιος, ἢ τοῦ οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι^γ ἂ οὐκ οἶδεν; ἐγὼ δέ, ὦ ἄνδρες, τούτῳ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἴσως διαφέρω τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ εἰ δὴ τῷ σοφώτερός του φαίην εἶναι, τούτῳ ἂν,^δ ὅτι οὐκ εἰδῶς ἰκανῶς περὶ τῶν ἐν Αἴδου οὕτω καὶ οἴομαι οὐκ εἰδέναι. τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀπειθεῖν τῷ βελτίονι, καὶ θεῷ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτι κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν ἐστὶν οἶδα. πρὸ οὖν τῶν κακῶν, ὧν οἶδα ὅτι κακά ἐστιν, ἂ μὴ οἶδα εἰ ἀγαθὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει, οὐδέποτε φοβηθήσομαι οὐδὲ φεύξομαι.^ε ὥστε οὐδ' εἰ με νῦν ὑμεῖς ἀφίετε,^ς— Ἄνιτῳ ἀπιστήσαντες,^ζ ὃς ἔφη ἢ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐ δεῖν ἐμὲ δεῦρο εἰσελθεῖν, ἢ, ἐπειδὴ εἰσῆλθον, οὐχ οἷόν τε εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἀποκτεῖναι με, λέγων πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ὡς, εἰ διαφευξοίμην, ἤδη ἂν ὑμῶν οἱ υἱεῖς ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἂ Σωκράτης διδάσκει πάντες παντάπασι διαφθαρῆσονται,—εἰ μοι πρὸς ταῦτα εἶποιτε Ὡ Σώκρατες, νῦν μὲν Ἄνιτῳ οὐ πεισόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἀφίεμέν σε, ἐπὶ τούτῳ μὲντοι, ἐφ' ᾧτε μηκέτι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ζητήσῃ διατριβεῖν μηδὲ φιλοσοφεῖν.^η ἂν δὲ ἀλῶς ἔτι τοῦτο πράττων, ἀποθανεῖ· εἰ οὖν με, ὅπερ εἶπον, ἐπὶ τού-

τοις ἀφίοιτε, εἶποιμ' ἂν ὑμῖν, ὅτι Ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς, ὧ ἄν-
 δρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀσπάζομαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ,^m πείσομαι
 δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ἢ ὑμῖν, καὶ ἕωςπερ ἂν ἐμπνέω
 καὶ οἷός τε ὦ, οὐ μὴ παύσωμαι φιλοσοφῶν καὶ ὑμῖν
 παρακελευόμενός τε καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενοςⁿ ὅτῳ ἂν αἰεὶ ἐν-
 τυγχάνω ὑμῶν, λέγων οἷάπερ εἶωθα, ὅτι, Ὡ ἄριστε
 ἀνδρῶν, Ἀθηναῖος ὢν, πόλεως τῆς μεγίστης καὶ εὐ-
 δοκιμωτάτης εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἰσχύν,^o χρημάτων μὲν οὐκ
 αἰσχύνει ἐπιμελούμενος, ὅπως σοι ἔσται ὡς πλείστα,
 καὶ δόξης καὶ τιμῆς, φρονήσεως δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς
 ψυχῆς, ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη ἔσται, οὐκ ἐπιμελεῖ οὐδέ
 φροντίζει; καὶ εἰάν τις ὑμῶν ἀμφισβητήσῃ καὶ φῆ
 ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, οὐκ εὐθύς ἀφήσω αὐτὸν οὐδ' ἄπειμι,
 ἀλλ' ἐρήσομαι αὐτὸν καὶ ἐξετάσω καὶ ἐλέγξω, καὶ εἰάν
 μοι μὴ δοκῇ κεκτῆσθαι ἀρετὴν, φάναι δέ, ὄνειδιῶ,
 ὅτι τὰ πλείστου ἀξία περὶ ἐλαχίστου ποιεῖται, τὰ
 δὲ φαυλότερα περὶ πλείονος. ταῦτα καὶ νεωτέρῳ καὶ
 πρεσβυτέρῳ, ὅτῳ ἂν ἐντυγχάνω, ποιήσω,^p καὶ ξένῳ
 καὶ ἀσπῷ, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῖς ἀστοῖς,^q ὅσῳ μου ἐγγυτέρω
 ἔστέ γένει. ταῦτα γὰρ κελεύει ὁ θεός, εὐ ἴστε. καὶ
 ἐγὼ οἶομαι οὐδέν πω ὑμῖν μείζον ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι ἐν
 τῇ πόλει ἢ τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν.^r οὐδέν γὰρ
 ἄλλο πράττων ἐγὼ περιέρχομαι ἢ πείθων ὑμῶν καὶ
 νεωτέρους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους μήτε σωματίων ἐπιμε-
 λείσθαι μήτε χρημάτων πρότερον μηδὲ οὕτω σφό-
 δρα,^s ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπως ὡς ἀρίστη ἔσται, λέγων, ὅτι
 οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετὴ γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρετῆς
 χρήματα καὶ τὰλλα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἅπαντα^t
 καὶ ἰδία καὶ δημοσία. εἰ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα λέγων δια-
 φθείρω^u τοὺς νέους, ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη βλαβερά· εἰ δὲ τίς
 μέ φησιν ἄλλα λέγειν ἢ ταῦτα, οὐδέν λέγει. πρὸς
 ταῦτα, φαίην ἂν, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἢ πείθεσθε

Ἄνυτῳ, ἢ μή, καὶ ἢ ἀφίετε, ἢ μὴ ἀφίετε, ὡς ἐμοῦ οὐκ ἂν ποιήσοντος· ἄλλα, οὐδ' εἰ μέλλω πολλάκις τεθνάναι.·

XVIII. Μὴ θορυβεῖτε,· ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀλλ' ἐμμείνατέ μοι οἷς ἐδεήθην ὑμῶν μὴ θορυβεῖν ἐφ' οἷς ἂν λέγω, ἀλλ' ἀκούειν καὶ γὰρ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ὀνήσεσθε ἀκούοντες· μέλλω γὰρ οὖν ἅττα ὑμῖν ἐρεῖν καὶ ἄλλα, ἐφ' οἷς ἴσως βοήσεσθε ἄλλα μηδαμῶς ποιεῖτε τοῦτο. Εὖ γὰρ ἴστε, ἐὰν ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε τοιοῦτον ὄντα, ὅλον ἐγὼ λέγω, οὐκ ἐμὲ μείζω βλάψετε ἢ ὑμᾶς αὐτούς. ἐμὲ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἂν βλάβειεν οὔτε Μέλητος οὔτε Ἄνυτος. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δύναιτο· οὐ γὰρ οἶομαι θεμιτὸν εἶναι^β ἀμείνονι ἀνδρὶ ὑπὸ χειρόνος βλάπτεσθαι· ἀποκτείνειε μὲντ' ἂν ἴσως, ἢ ἐξελάσειεν, ἢ ἀτιμάσειεν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα οὗτος μὲν ἴσως οἶεται καὶ ἄλλος τίς που μεγάλη κακὰ, ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ οἶομαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον^ο ποιεῖν ἢ οὗτος νυνὶ ποιεῖ, ἄνδρα ἀδίκως ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποκτιννῖναι. νῦν οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πολλοῦ δέω ἐγὼ^α ὑπὲρ ἐμαντοῦ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, ὡς τις ἂν οἶοιτο, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν μὴ τι ἐξαμάρτητε περὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δόσιν ὑμῖν ἐμοῦ καταψηφισάμενοι.^ο ἐὰν γὰρ ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε, οὐ ῥαδίως ἄλλον τοιοῦτον εὐρήσετε, ἀτεχνῶς, εἰ καὶ γελιοότερον εἰπεῖν, προσκείμενον τῇ πόλει^ι ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὥσπερ ἵππῳ μεγάλῳ μὲν καὶ γενναίῳ, ὑπὸ μεγέθους δὲ νοθεστέρῳ καὶ δεομένῳ ἐγείρεσθαι ὑπὸ μύωπός τινος· ὅλον δὴ μοι δοκεῖ ὁ θεὸς ἐμὲ τῇ πόλει προστεθεικέναι τοιοῦτόν τινα,^ο ὃς ὑμᾶς ἐγείρων καὶ πειθῶν καὶ ὀνειδίξων ἓνα ἕκαστον οὐδὲν παύομαι τὴν ἡμέραν ὄλην πανταχοῦ προσκαθίζων. τοιοῦτος οὖν ἄλλος οὐ ῥαδίως ὑμῖν γενήσεται, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἐμοὶ πείθησθε, φείσεσθέ μου. ὑμεῖς δ' ἴσως τάχ' ἂν

ἀχθόμενοι, ὥσπερ οἱ νυστάζοντες ἐγειρόμενοι, κρούσαντες ἄν με, πειθόμενοι Ἄνιτῳ, ῥαδίως ἂν ἀποκτείναιτε,^h εἶτα τὸν λοιπὸν βίον καθεύδοντες διατελοῖτ' ἄν, εἰ μὴ τινα ἄλλον ὁ θεὸς ὑμῖν ἐπιπέμψει κηδόμενος ὑμῶν. ὅτι δ' ἐγὼ τυγχάνω ὢν τοιοῦτος, οἷος ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ πόλει δεδόσθαι,ⁱ ἐνθένδε ἂν κατανοήσαιτε. οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπίνῳ ἔοικε^k τὸ ἐμὲ τῶν μὲν ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπάντων ἡμεληκέναι καὶ ἀνέχεσθαι τῶν οἰκειῶν ἀμελουμένων τοσαῦτα ἤδη ἔτη, τὸ δὲ ὑμέτερον πράττειν αἰεὶ, ἰδίᾳ ἐκάστῳ προσίοντα, ὥσπερ πατέρα ἢ ἀδελφὸν πρεσβύτερον, πείθοντα ἐπιμελείσθαι ἀρετῆς. καὶ εἰ μέντοι τι ἀπὸ τούτων ἀπέλανον καὶ μισθὸν λαμβάνων ταῦτα παρεκελεύομην, εἶχον ἄν τινα λόγον. νῦν δὲ ὁρᾶτε δὴ καὶ αὐτοί, ὅτι οἱ κατήγοροι τὰλλα πάντα ἀναισχύντως οὕτω κατηγοροῦντες τοῦτό γε οὐχ οἷοί τε ἐγένοντο ἀπαναισχυντήσαι, παρασχόμενοι μάρτυρα, ὡς ἐγὼ ποτέ τινα ἢ ἐπραξάμην μισθὸν ἢ ἤτησα. ἰκανὸν γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐγὼ παρέχομαι, τὸν μάρτυρα,^l ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγω, τὴν πενίαν.

XIX. Ἴσως ἂν οὖν δόξειεν ἄτοπον εἶναι, ὅτι δὴ ἐγὼ ἰδίᾳ μὲν ταῦτα ξυμβουλευῶ περιμῶν καὶ πολυπραγμονῶ, δημοσίᾳ δὲ οὐ τολμῶ ἀναβαίνων εἰς τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέτερον ξυμβουλεύειν τῇ πόλει. Τούτου δὲ αἰτιὸν ἔστιν ὃ ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ πολλάκις ἀκηκόατε πολλαχοῦ λέγοντος, ὅτι μοι θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνεται [φωνή], ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐπικωμωδῶν Μέλητος ἐγράψατο.^m ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον, φωνὴ τις γυγνομένη, ἢ ὅταν γένηται, αἰεὶ ἀποτρέπει με τούτου, ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὐποτε. τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὃ μοι ἐναντιοῦται τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττειν. καὶ παγκάλως γέ μοι δοκεῖ ἐναντιοῦσθαι. εὐ γὰρ ἴστε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ ἐγὼ πάλαι

ἐπεχείρησα πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ πράγματα, πάλαι ἂν ἀπολώλη καὶ οὐτ' ἂν ὑμᾶς ὠφελήκη οὐδὲν οὐτ' ἂν ἐμαυτόν.^β καί μοι μὴ ἄχθεσθε λέγοντι τάληθῆ· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων σωθήσεται οὔτε ὑμῖν οὔτε ἄλλῳ πλήθει οὐδενὶ γνησίως ἐναντιούμενος καὶ διακωλύων πολλὰ ἄδικα καὶ παράνομα ἐν τῇ πόλει γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι τὸν τῷ ὄντι μαχοῦμενον ὑπὲρ τοῦ δίκαιου, καὶ εἰ μέλλει ὀλίγον χρόνον^γ σωθήσεσθαι, ἰδιωτεύειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ δημοσιεύειν.

XX. Μεγάλα δ' ἔγωγε ὑμῖν τεκμήρια παρέξομαι τούτων, οὐ λόγους, ἀλλ' ὃ ὑμεῖς τιμᾶτε, ἔργα· ἀκούσατε δὴ μου τὰ ἐμοὶ ξυμβεβηκότα, ἵν' εἰδῆτε, ὅτι οὐδ' ἂν ἐνὶ ὑπείκαθοιμι^α παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον δεῖσας θάνατον, μὴ ὑπέικων δὲ ἅμα καὶ ἀπολοίμην. ἐρῶ δὲ ὑμῖν φορτικὰ μὲν καὶ δικανικά,^β ἀληθῆ δέ. Ἐγὼ γάρ, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἄλλην μὲν ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν πώποτε ἤρξα^γ ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἐβούλευσα δέ. καὶ ἔτυχεν ἡμῶν ἡ φυλὴ Ἀντιοχίς^δ πρυτανεύουσα, ὅτε ὑμεῖς τοὺς δέκα στρατηγούς τοὺς οὐκ ἀνελομένους τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας ἐβούλευσθε ἀθρόους κρίνειν,^ε παρανόμως, ὡς ἐν τῷ ὑστέρω χρόνῳ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν ἔδοξε.^ε τότε ἐγὼ μόνος τῶν πρυτάνεων ἠναντιώθην ὑμῖν μηδὲν ποιεῖν παρὰ τοὺς νόμους, καὶ ἐναντία ἐψηφισάμην^ζ καὶ ἐτοίμων ὄντων ἐνδεικνύειν με καὶ ἀπάγειν τῶν ῥητόρων,^ς καὶ ὑμῶν κελευόντων καὶ βοώντων, μετὰ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τοῦ δικαίου ὄμην μᾶλλον με δεῖν διακινδυνεύειν ἢ μεθ' ὑμῶν γενέσθαι μὴ δίκαια βουλευομένων, φοβηθέντα δεσμὸν ἢ θάνατον. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἦν ἔτι δημοκρατομένης τῆς πόλεως. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλιγαρχία ἐγένετο οἱ τριάκοντα αὐτὸ μεταπεμφάμενοί με πέμπτον αὐτὸν^η εἰς τὴν θόλον^ι προσέταξαν ἀγαγεῖν ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος Λέοντα τὸν Σαλαμῖνιον, ἵν' ἀποθάνοι· οἷα δὴ καὶ ἄλ-

λοις εκείνοι πολλοῖς πολλὰ προσέταπτον, βουλόμενοι ὡς πλείστους ἀναπλήσαι αἰτιῶν.^κ τότε μέντοι ἐγὼ οὐ λόγῳ, ἀλλ' ἔργῳ αὐ ἐνεδειξάμην, ὅτι ἐμοὶ θανάτου μὲν μέλει, εἰ μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἦν εἰπεῖν, οὐδ' ὅτιοῦν, τοῦ δὲ μηδὲν ἄδικον μηδ' ἀνόσιον ἐργάζεσθαι, τούτου δὲ τὸ πᾶν μέλει.^λ ἐμὲ γὰρ ἐκείνη ἡ ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἐξέπληξεν οὕτως ἰσχυρὰ οὕσα, ὥστε ἄδικόν τι ἐργάσασθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἐκ τῆς θόλου ἐξήλθομεν, οἱ μὲν τέτταρες φέροντο εἰς Σαλαμίνα καὶ ἤγαγον Λέοντα, ἐγὼ δὲ φρόνην ἀπίων οἴκαδε.^μ καὶ ἴσως ἂν διὰ ταύτ' ἀπέθανον, εἰ μὴ ἡ ἀρχὴ διὰ ταχέων κατελύθη. καὶ τούτων ὑμῖν ἔσονται πολλοὶ μάρτυρες.

XXI. Ἄρ' οὖν ἂν με οἴεσθε τοσάδε ἔτη διαγενέσθαι, εἰ ἔπραττον τὰ δημόσια, καὶ πράττων ἀξίως ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἐβοήθουν τοῖς δικαίοις καί, ὥσπερ χρὴ, τοῦτο περὶ πλείστου ἐποιούμην;^ν πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὡ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων οὐδεὶς. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου δημοσίᾳ τε εἰ πού τι ἔπραξα, τοιοῦτος φανούμαι,^ξ καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος οὐδενὶ πώποτε ξυγχωρήσας οὐδὲν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον οὔτε ἄλλῳ οὔτε τούτων οὐδενί, οὐς οἱ διαβάλλοντές μὲ φασιν ἐμοὺς μαθητὰς εἶναι.^ο ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος μὲν οὐδενὸς πώποτ' ἐγενόμην· εἰ δὲ τις ἐμοῦ λέγοντος καὶ τὰ ἐμαντοῦ πράττοντος ἐπιθυμεί ἀκούειν,^π εἴτε νεώτερος εἴτε πρεσβύτερος, οὐδενὶ πώποτε ἐφθόνησα· οὐδὲ χρήματα μὲν λαμβάνων^ρ διαλύγομαι, μὴ λαμβάνων δ' οὐ, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως καὶ πλουσίῳ καὶ πένητι παρέχω ἐμαντὸν ἐρωτᾶν,^ς καὶ ἂν τις βούληται ἀποκρινύμενος ἀκούειν ὧν ἂν λέγω. καὶ τούτων ἐγὼ, εἴτε τις χρηστὸς γίγνεται εἴτε μὴ, οὐκ ἂν δικαίως τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπέχοιμι,^τ ὧν μῆτε ὑπεσχόμην μηδενὶ μηδὲν πώποτε μᾶθημα μῆτε ἐδίδαξα. εἰ δὲ τις φησὶ παρ' ἐμοῦ πώποτέ τι

μαθεῖν ἢ ἀκούσαι ἰδίᾳ ὃ τὸ μὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες, εὖ ἴστε, ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγει.

XXII. Ἀλλὰ διὰ τί δὴ ποτε μετ' ἐμοῦ χαίρουσι τινες πολὺν χρόνον διατρίβοντες; Ἀκηκόατε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι· πᾶσαν ὑμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐγὼ εἶπον, ὅτι ἀκούοντες χαίρουσιν ἐξεταζόμενοι τοῖς οἰομένοις μὲν εἶναι σοφοῖς, οὗσι δ' οὐ ἔστι γὰρ οὐκ ἀηδές. ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτο, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, προστέτακται^α ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πράττειν καὶ ἐκ μαντειῶν καὶ ἐξ ἐνυπνίων καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ὥπερ τίς ποτε καὶ ἄλλη θεία μοῖρα ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ὀτιοῦν προσέταξε πράττειν. Ταῦτα, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἀληθῆ ἔστι καὶ εὐλέγτα.^β εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἔγωγε τῶν νέων τοὺς μὲν διαφθείρω, τοὺς δὲ διέφθαρκα, χρῆν δήπου, εἴτε τινὲς αὐτῶν πρεσβύτεροι γενόμενοι ἔγνωσαν, ὅτι νέοις οὗσιν αὐτοῖς ἐγὼ κακὸν πῶποτέ τι ξυμβούλευσα, νυνὶ αὐτοὺς ἀναβαίνοντας ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖν καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι· εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτοὶ ἤθελον,^γ τῶν οἰκείων τινὰς τῶν ἐκείνων, πατέρας καὶ ἀδελφούς καὶ ἄλλους τοὺς προσήκοντας, εἴπερ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ τι κακὸν ἐπεπόνθησαν αὐτῶν οἱ οἰκείοι, νῦν μεμνήσθαι. πάντως δὲ πάρεισιν αὐτῶν πολλοὶ ἐνταυθοί,^δ οὗς ἐγὼ ὀρώ, πρῶτον μὲν Κρίτων οὔτοσί,^ε ἐμὸς ἠλικιώτης καὶ δημότης, Κριτοβούλου τοῦδε πατὴρ· ἔπειτα Λυσανίας^ς ὁ Σφήττιος, Αἰσχίνου τοῦδε πατὴρ· ἔτι Ἀντιφῶν ὁ Κηφισιεὺς οὔτοσί, Ἐπιγένοῦς πατὴρ. ἄλλοι τοίνυν οὔτοι,^ς ὧν οἱ ἀδελφοὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ διατριβῇ γεγόνασι, Νικόστρατος,^β ὁ Θεοδοτίδου, ἀδελφὸς Θεοδότου—καὶ ὁ μὲν Θεόδοτος τετελεύτηκεν, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν ἐκεῖνός γε αὐτοῦ καταδεθελή—, καὶ Πάραλος ὅδε, ὁ Δημοδόκου, οὗ ἦν Θεάγης ἀδελφός· ὅδε τε Ἀδείμαντος, ὁ Ἀρίστωνος, οὗ ἀδελφός οὔτοσί Πλάτων, καὶ Αἰαντόδωρος, οὗ Ἀπολλόδωρος ὅδε

ἀδελφός. καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς ἐγὼ ἔχω ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν, ὃν τινα ἔχρην μάλιστα μὲν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ λόγῳ παρασχέσθαι Μέλητρον μάρτυρα· εἰ δὲ τότε ἐπελάβετο, νῦν παρασχέσθω, ἐγὼ παραχωρῶ,¹ καὶ λεγέτω, εἴ τι ἔχει τοιοῦτον. ἀλλὰ τούτου πᾶν τοῦναντίον εὐρήσετε, ὃ ἄνδρες, πάντας ἐμοὶ βοηθεῖν ἐτοιμοὺς τῷ διαφθειρόντι,² τῷ κακὰ ἐργαζομένῳ τοὺς οἰκείους αὐτῶν, ὡς φασὶ Μέλητρος καὶ Ἄνυτος. αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ οἱ διεφθαρμένοι τάχ' ἂν λόγον ἔχουσιν βοηθοῦντες·³ οἱ δὲ ἀδιάφθαρτοι, πρεσβύτεροι ἤδη ἄνδρες, οἱ τούτων προσήκοντες,⁴ τίνα ἄλλον ἔχουσι λόγον βοηθοῦντες ἐμοὶ ἄλλ' ἢ τὸν ὀρθόν τε καὶ δίκαιον,⁵ ὅτι ξυνίστασι Μελήτρῳ μὲν ψευδομένῳ, ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀληθεύοντι·

XXIII. Εἶεν δὴ, ὃ ἄνδρες, ἃ μὲν ἐγὼ ἔχομι' ἂν ἀπολογεῖσθαι, σχεδὸν ἐστὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα ἴσως τοιαῦτα. Τάχα δ' ἂν τις ὑμῶν ἀγανακτήσειεν⁶ ἀναμνησθεὶς ἑαυτοῦ, εἰ ὁ μὲν ἐλάττω τουτουῦ τοῦ ἀγῶνος ἀγῶνα ἀγωνιζόμενος⁷ ἐδεήθη τε καὶ ἰκέτευσε τοὺς δικαστὰς μετὰ πολλῶν δακρύων, παιδίᾳ τε αὐτοῦ ἀναβιβασάμενος, ἵνα ὁ τι μάλιστα ἐλεηθείη, καὶ ἄλλους τῶν οἰκείων καὶ φίλων πολλοὺς, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄρα τούτων ποιήσω,⁸ καὶ ταῦτα κινδυνεύων, ὡς ἂν δόξαιμι, τὸν ἔσχατον κίνδυνον. τάχ' ἂν οὖν τις ταῦτα ἐννοήσας αὐθαδέστερον ἂν πρὸς με σχοίη,⁹ καὶ ὀργισθεὶς αὐτοῖς τούτοις θέτο ἂν μετ' ὀργῆς τὴν ψῆφον. εἰ δὴ τις ὑμῶν οὕτως ἔχει,—οὐκ ἄξιόν μὲν γὰρ ἔγωγε—εἰ δ' οὖν, ἐπιεικῆ ἂν μοι δοκῶ πρὸς τούτον λέγειν λόγον, ὅτι Ἐμοί, ὃ ἄριστε, εἰσὶ μὲν πού τινες καὶ οἰκείοι. καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου,¹⁰ οὐδ' ἐγὼ ἀπὸ ὀνύδος οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρης πέφυκα, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, ὥστε καὶ οἰκείοί μοι εἰσὶ καὶ υἱεῖς γε, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τρεῖς, εἰς μὲν μειράκιον ἤδη, δύο δὲ

παιδιά. ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐδέν' αὐτῶν δεῦρο ἀναβιβασάμενος δεήσομαι ὑμῶν ἀποψηφίσασθαι. Τί δὴ οὖν οὐδὲν τούτων ποιήσω; Οὐκ αὐθαδιζόμενος, ὡ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδ' ὑμᾶς ἀτιμάζων ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν θαρραλέως^f ἐγὼ ἔχω πρὸς θάνατον ἢ μὴ, ἄλλος λόγος, πρὸς δ' οὖν δόξαν καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ὅλη τῇ πόλει οὐ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι ἐμέ τούτων οὐδὲν ποιεῖν καὶ τηλικόνδε ὄντα καὶ τοῦτο τοῦνομα ἔχοντα, εἴτ' οὖν ἀληθές εἴτ' οὖν ψεύδος· ἀλλ' οὖν δεδογμένον^e γέ ἐστι τὸν Σωκράτη διαφέρειν τινὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων. εἰ οὖν ὑμῶν οἱ δοκοῦντες διαφέρειν εἴτε σοφία εἴτε ἀνδρεία εἴτε ἄλλη ἡτινιοῦν ἀρετῇ τοιοῦτοι ἔσονται, αἰσχροὺς ἂν εἴη· οἴους περ ἐγὼ πολλάκις ἐώρακά τινας, ὅταν κρίνωνται, δοκοῦντας μὲν τι εἶναι,^b θαυμάσια δὲ ἐργαζομένους, ὡς δεινόν τι οἰομένους πείσεσθαι, εἰ ἀποθανοῦνται, ὡς περ ἀθανάτων ἐσομένων, ἐὰν ὑμεῖς αὐτοὺς μὴ ἀποκτείνητε· οἱ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν αἰσχύνην τῇ πόλει περιάπτειν, ὥστ' ἂν τινὰ καὶ τῶν ξένων ὑπολαβεῖν, ὅτι οἱ διαφέροντες Ἀθηναίων εἰς ἀρετὴν, οὗς αὐτοὶ ἑαυτῶν ἔν τε ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τιμαῖς προκρίνουσιν, οὔτοι γυναικῶν οὐδὲν διαφέρουσι.¹ ταῦτα γάρ, ὡ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὔτε ἡμᾶς χρὴ ποιεῖν^k τοὺς δοκοῦντας καὶ ὀτιοῦν εἶναι, οὔτ', ἂν ἡμεῖς ποιῶμεν, ὑμᾶς ἐπιτρέπειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ὅτι πολὺ μᾶλλον καταψηφιεῖσθε τοῦ τὰ ἐλεεινὰ ταῦτα δράματα εἰσάγοντος¹ καὶ καταγέλαστον τὴν πόλιν ποιοῦντος ἢ τοῦ ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντος.

XXIV. Χωρὶς δὲ τῆς δόξης,^a ὡ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲ δίκαιόν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι δεῖσθαι τοῦ δικαστοῦ οὐδὲ δεόμενον ἀποφεύγειν, ἀλλὰ διδάσκειν καὶ πείθειν. οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτῳ κἀθηται ὁ δικαστής, ἐπὶ τῷ καταχαρίζεσθαι τὰ δίκαια,^b ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῷ κρίνειν ταῦτα· καὶ ὁμῶμοκεν^c οὐ

χαριεῖσθαι οἷς ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ ἀλλὰ δικάσειν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους. οὐκ οὐκ χρὴ οὔτε ἡμᾶς ἐθίζειν ὑμᾶς ἐπιорκεῖν, οὐθ' ὑμᾶς ἐθίζεσθαι· οὐδέτεροι γὰρ ἂν ἡμῶν εὐσεβοῖεν. μὴ οὖν ἀξιοῦτέ^α με, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοιαῦτα δεῖν πρὸς ὑμᾶς πράττειν, ἢ μήτε ἡγοῦμαι καλὰ εἶναι μήτε δίκαια μήτε ὅσια, ἄλλως τε πάντως νῆ Δία, μάλιστα μέντοι καὶ^ο ἀσεβείας φεύγοντα ὑπὸ Μελήτου τουτουῖ. σαφῶς γὰρ ἂν, εἰ πείθοιμι ὑμᾶς καὶ τῷ δεῖσθαι βιαζοίμην^ι ὁμωμοκότας, θεοὺς ἂν διδάσκοιμι μὴ ἡγείσθαι ὑμᾶς εἶναι, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς ἀπολογούμενος κατηγοροῖην ἂν ἑμαυτοῦ, ὡς θεοὺς οὐ νομίζω. ἀλλὰ πολλοῦ δεῖ οὕτως ἔχειν νομίζω τε γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς οὐδεὶς τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγορῶν, καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιτρέπω καὶ τῷ θεῷ κρίναι περὶ ἐμοῦ ὅπη μέλλει ἐμοὶ τε ἄριστα εἶναι καὶ ὑμῖν.

XXV. Τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν,^α ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ γεγονότι, ὅτι μου κατεψηφίσασθε, ἀλλὰ τέ μοι πολλὰ ξυμβάλλεται, καὶ οὐκ ἀνέλπιστόν μοι γέγονε^β τὸ γεγονὸς τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον θαυμάζω ἑκατέρων τῶν ψήφων τὸν γεγονότα ἀριθμόν. οὐ γὰρ ᾄμην ἔγωγε οὕτω παρ' ὀλίγον ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ πολὺ νῦν δέ, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἰ τρεῖς μόνοι μετέπεσον^ο τῶν ψήφων, ἀποπεφεύγη ἂν. Μέλητρον μὲν οὖν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, καὶ νῦν ἀποπέφευγα, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἀποπέφευγα ἀλλὰ παντὶ δήλον τοῦτό γε, ὅτι, εἰ μὴ ἀνέβη^γ Ἄνυτος καὶ Δύκων^δ κατηγορήσοντες ἐμοῦ, κἂν ὦφλε χίλιας δραχμάς, οὐ μεταλαβὼν τὸ πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων.^ο

XXVI. Τιμᾶται δ' οὖν μοι ὁ ἀνὴρ θανάτου.^a Εἶπεν. ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ τίνοσ ὑμῖν ἀντιτιμῆσομαι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι; ἢ δῆλον, ὅτι τῆς ἀξίας;^b τί οὖν; τί ἀξίός εἰμι παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσαι,^c ὅτι μαθὼν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἦγον, ἀλλ' ἀμελήσας ὧν περ οἱ πολλοί,^d χρηματισμοῦ τε καὶ οἰκονομίας καὶ στρατηγιῶν καὶ δημηγοριῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν καὶ ξυνωμοσιῶν καὶ στάσεων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει γυγνομένων, ἡγησάμενος ἑμαυτὸν τῷ ὄντι ἐπιεικέστερον εἶναι ἢ ὥστε εἰς ταῦτ' ἰόντα σώζεσθαι, ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὐκ ἦα,^e οἱ ἐλθὼν μῆτε ὑμῖν μῆτε ἑμαυτῷ ἔμελλον μηδὲν ὄφελος εἶναι, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστον ἰὼν εὐεργετεῖν τὴν μεγίστην εὐεργεσίαν, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, ἐνταῦθα ἦα,^f ἐπιχειρῶν ἕκαστον ὑμῶν πείθειν μὴ πρότερον μῆτε τῶν ἑαυτοῦ μηδενὸς ἐπιμελείσθαι, πρὶν ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιμεληθεῖν, ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστος καὶ φρονιμώτατος ἔσοιτο, μῆτε τῶν τῆς πόλεως, πρὶν αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως τῶν τε ἄλλων οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον^g ἐπιμελείσθαι. τί οὖν εἰμι ἀξίος παθεῖν τοιοῦτος ὧν; ἀγαθόν τι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ δεῖ γε κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τιμᾶσθαι καὶ ταῦτά γε ἀγαθὸν τοιοῦτον, ὅ τι ἂν πρέποι ἐμοί. τί οὖν πρέπει ἀνδρὶ πένητι εὐεργέτη,^h δεομένῳ ἄγειν σχολὴν ἐπὶ τῇ ὑμετέρα παρακελεύσει; οὐκ ἔστ' ὅ τι μᾶλλον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρέπει οὕτως, ὡςⁱ τὸν τοιοῦτον ἀνδρα ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτεῖσθαι,^k πολὺ γε μᾶλλον ἢ εἰ τις ὑμῶν ἵππῳ ἢ ξυνωρίδι ἢ ζεύγῃ νενίκηκεν Ὀλυμπιάσιν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὑμᾶς ποιεῖ εὐδαίμονας δοκεῖν εἶναι, ἐγὼ δὲ εἶναι· καὶ ὁ μὲν τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεῖται, ἐγὼ δὲ δέομαι. εἰ οὖν δεῖ με κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον τῆς ἀξίας τιμᾶσθαι, τούτου τιμᾶμαι, ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτήσεως.

XXVII. Ἴσως οὖν ὑμῖν καὶ ταυτὶ λέγων παραπλησίως δοκῶ λέγειν ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ οἴκτου καὶ τῆς ἀντι-

βολήσεως, ἀπαυθαδιζόμενος· τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοιοῦτον, ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε μᾶλλον. πέπεισμαι ἐγὼ ἐκὼν εἶναι^δ μηδένα ἀδικεῖν ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ ὑμᾶς τοῦτο οὐ πείθω· ὀλίγον γὰρ χρόνον ἀλλήλοις διειλέγμεθα^ο ἐπεὶ, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, εἰ ἦν ὑμῖν νόμος, ὡς περ καὶ ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις, περὶ θανάτου μὴ μίαν ἡμέραν μόνον κρίνειν, ἀλλὰ πολλὰς, ἐπέισθητε ἂν νῦν δ' οὐ ράδιον ἐν χρόνῳ ὀλίγῳ μεγάλας διαβολὰς ἀπολύεσθαι. πεπεισμένος δὴ ἐγὼ μηδένα ἀδικεῖν πολλοῦ δέω ἐμαυτὸν γε ἀδικήσειν καὶ κατ' ἐμαντοῦ ἐρεῖν αὐτός, ὡς ἄξιός εἰμίτου κακοῦ^δ καὶ τιμῆσεσθαι τοιοῦτου τινὸς ἐμαντῶ. τί δέισας; ἢ μὴ πάθω^ο τοῦτο, οὐ Μέλητός μοι τιμᾶται, ὃ φημι οὐκ εἰδέναι οὔτ' εἰ ἀγαθὸν οὔτ' εἰ κακόν ἐστιν; ἀντὶ τούτου δὴ ἔλωμαι ὧν εὐ οἶδ' ὅτι κακῶν ὄντων,^ε τούτου τιμησάμενος; πότερον δεσμοῦ; καὶ τί με δεῖ ζῆν ἐν δεσμοτηρίῳ, δουλεύοντα τῇ αἰεὶ καθισταμένῃ ἀρχῇ, τοῖς ἔνδεκα;^ς ἀλλὰ χρημάτων, καὶ δεδέσθαι ἕως ἂν ἐκτίσω;^η ἀλλὰ ταῦτόν μοι ἐστίν, ὅπερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον· οὐ γὰρ ἔστι μοι χρήματα, ὅπόθεν ἐκτίσω. Ἀλλὰ δὴ φυγῆς τιμήσομαι; ἴσως γὰρ ἂν μοι τούτου τιμήσαιτε. πολλὴ μὲντ' ἂν με φιλοψυχία ἔχοι, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ οὕτως ἀλόγιστός εἰμι,^ι ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι λογίζεσθαι, ὅτι ὑμεῖς μὲν ὄντες πολῖται μου οὐχ οἰοί τε ἐγένεσθε ἐνεγκεῖν τὰς ἐμὰς διατριβὰς καὶ τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλ' ὑμῖν βαρύτεραι γεγόνασι καὶ ἐπιφθονώτεραι, ὥστε ζητεῖτε αὐτῶν νυνὶ ἀπαλλαγῆναι· ἄλλοι δὲ ἄρα^κ αὐτὰς οἴσουσι ραδίως. πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι. καλὸς οὖν ἂν μοι ὁ βίος εἴη ἐξελεθόντι τηλικῶδε ἀνθρώπῳ ἄλλην ἐξ ἄλλης πόλιν πόλεως ἀμειβομένῳ καὶ ἐξελαυνομένῳ ζῆν.^λ εὐ γὰρ οἶδ' ὅτι, ὅποι ἂν ἔλθω, λέγοντος ἐμοῦ ἀκροάσονται οἱ νέοι ὡς περ ἐνθάδε. κὰν μὲν τούτους ἀπε-

λαίνω,^m οὔτοι ἐμὲ αἰτοὶ ἐξελώσι, πείθοντες τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἀπελαίνω, οἱ τούτων πατέρες τε καὶ οἰκείοι δι' αὐτοὺς τούτους.

XXVIII. Ἴσως οὖν ἂν τις εἴποι, Σιγῶν δὲ καὶ ἡσυχίαν ἄγων, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐχ οἴός τ' ἔσει ἡμῖν ἐξελθὼν ζῆν; Τουτὶ δὴ ἐστὶ πάντων χαλεπώτατον πείσαι τινὰς ὑμῶν. ἐάν τε γὰρ λέγω, ὅτι τῷ θεῷ ἀπειθεῖν τοῦτ' ἐστὶ καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, οὐ πείσεσθέ μοι ὡς εἰρωνευομένῳ· ἐάν τ' αὖ λέγω, ὅτι καὶ τυγχάνει μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ὄν^a ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦτο, ἐκάστης ἡμέρας περὶ ἀρετῆς τοὺς λόγους ποιῆσθαι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, περὶ ὧν ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ ἀκούετε διαλεγόμενου καὶ ἐμαντὸν καὶ ἄλλους ἐξετάζοντος, ὁ δὲ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ,^b ταῦτα δ' ἔτι ἤττον πείσεσθέ μοι λέγοντι. τὰ δὲ ἔχει μὲν οὕτως, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, ὦ ἄνδρες, πείθειν δὲ οὐ ῥάδιον. Καὶ ἐγὼ ἅμ' οὐκ εἶθισμαι ἐμαντὸν ἀξιῶν κακοῦ οὐδενός. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν μοι χρήματα, ἐτιμησάμην ἂν χρημάτων ὅσα ἐμελλον ἐκτίσειν οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἐβλάβην νῦν δέ—οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν,^c εἰ μὴ ἄρα ὅσον ἂν ἐγὼ δυναίμην ἐκτίσαι, τοσοῦτου βούλεσθέ μοι τιμῆσαι. Ἴσως δ' ἂν δυναίμην ἐκτίσαι ὑμῖν μνᾶν ἀργυρίου τοσοῦτου οἶν τιμῶμαι. Πλάτων δὲ ὅδε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ Κρίτων καὶ Κριτόβουλος καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος κελεύουσί με τριάκοντα μνῶν τιμῆσασθαι, αὐτοὶ δ' ἐγγυᾶσθαι^d τιμῶμαι οἶν τοσοῦτου ἐγγυηταὶ δ' ὑμῖν ἔσονται τοῦ ἀργυρίου οὔτοι ἀξιώχρηφ.

XXIX. Οὐ πολλοῦ γ' ἕνεκα χρόνου,^a ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὄνομα ἔξετε καὶ αἰτίαν ὑπὸ τῶν βουλομένων

τὴν πόλιν λουδορεῖν, ὡς Σωκράτη ἀπεκτόνατε, ἄνδρα σοφόν· φήσουσι γὰρ δὴ με σοφὸν εἶναι, εἰ καὶ μὴ εἰμί, οἱ βουλόμενοι ὑμῖν ὄνειδίζουσιν. εἰ οὖν περιεμείνατε ὀλίγον χρόνον, ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰτομάτου ἂν ὑμῖν τοῦτο ἐγένετο·^b ὁράτε γὰρ δὴ τὴν ἡλικίαν, ὅτι πόρρω ἤδη ἐστὶ τοῦ βίου,^c θανάτου δὲ ἐγγύς. λέγω δὲ τοῦτο οὐ πρὸς πάντας ὑμᾶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἐμοῦ καταψηφισαμένους θάνατον. λέγω δὲ καὶ τότε πρὸς τοὺς αὐτοὺς τούτους. Ἴσως με ἀλεσθε, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἀπορία λόγων ἐαλωσκέναί τοιούτων οἷς ἂν ὑμᾶς ἔπεισα, εἰ ᾤμην δεῖν ἅπαντα ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν, ὥστε ἀποφυγεῖν τὴν δίκην.^d πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. ἀλλ' ἀπορία μὲν ἐάλωκα, οὐ μέντοι λόγων, ἀλλὰ τόλμης καὶ ἀναισχυντίας καὶ τοῦ ἐθέλειν λέγειν πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοιαῦτα, οἷ ἂν ὑμῖν μὲν ἡδιστ' ἦν ἀκούειν, θρηνησύντος τέ μου καὶ ὄδυρομένου καὶ ἄλλα ποιοῦντος καὶ λέγοντος πολλὰ καὶ ἀνάξια ἐμοῦ, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι· οἷα δὴ καὶ εἰθισθε ὑμεῖς τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν, ἀλλ' οὔτε τότε φήθηεν δεῖν ἔνεκα τοῦ κινδύνου πρᾶξαι οὐδὲν ἀνελεύθερον, οὔτε νῦν μοι μεταμέλει οὕτως ἀπολογησαμένῳ, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον αἰρούμαι ὧδε ἀπολογησάμενος τεθνᾶναι ἢ ἐκείνως ζῆν·^e οὔτε γὰρ ἐν δίκῃ οὔτ' ἐν πολέμῳ οὔτ' ἐμὲ οὔτ' ἄλλον οὐδένα δεῖ τοῦτο μηχανᾶσθαι, ὅπως ἀποφεύξεται πᾶν ποιῶν θάνατον. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μάχαις πολλάκις δῆλον γίγνεται, ὅτι τό γε ἀποθανεῖν ἂν τις ἐκφύγοι καὶ ὄπλα ἀφελῆς καὶ ἐφ' ἱκετεῖαν τραπόμενος τῶν διωκόντων καὶ ἄλλαι μηχαναὶ πολλαί εἰσιν ἐν ἐκάστοις τοῖς κινδύνοις, ὥστε διαφεύγειν θάνατον, ἔάν τις τολμᾷ^f πᾶν ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν. ἀλλὰ μὲ οὐ τοῦτ' ἢ χαλεπὸν, ᾧ ἄνδρες θάνατον ἐκφυγεῖν,^g ἀλλὰ πολὺ χαλεπότερον πονηρίαν θάπτειν γὰρ θανάτου θεῖ. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἄτε βραδύς ὢν καὶ πρῆσβύτης^h ὑπὸ τοῦ βραδυτέρου ἐάλων, οἱ δ'

ἐμοὶ κατήγοροι ἄτε δεινοὶ καὶ ὀξεῖς ὄντες ὑπὸ τοῦ θάπτονος, τῆς κακίας. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἄπειμι ὑφ' ὑμῶν θανάτου δίκην ὀφλῶν,¹ οὗτοι δ' ὑπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας ὀφληκότες μοχθηρίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν. καὶ ἔγωγε τῷ τιμῆματι ἐμμένω, καὶ οὗτοι. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν πού ἴσως οὕτω καὶ ἔδει σχεῖν, καὶ οἶμαι αὐτὰ μετρίως ἔχειν.

XXX. Τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπιθυμῶ ὑμῖν χρησμοδῆσαι, ὃ καταψηφισάμενοί μου καὶ γὰρ εἰμι ἤδη ἐνταῦθα, ἐν ᾧ μάλιστα ἄνθρωποι χρησμοδοῦσιν,² ὅταν μέλλωσιν ἀποθανεῖσθαι. φημί γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες, οἱ ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε, τιμωρίαν ὑμῖν ἤξειν εὐθύς μετὰ τὸν ἐμὸν θάνατον πολὺ χαλεπωτέραν νῆ Δί' ἢ οἶαν ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε.³ νῦν γὰρ τοῦτο εἰργασθε οἰόμενοι ἀπαλλάξεσθαι τοῦ διδόναι ἔλεγχον τοῦ βίου. τὸ δὲ ὑμῖν πολὺ ἐναντιὸν ἀποβήσεται, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι. πλείους ἔσονται ὑμᾶς οἱ ἐλέγχοντες, οὓς νῦν ἐγὼ κατεῖχον, ὑμεῖς δὲ οὐκ ἠσθάνεσθε καὶ χαλεπώτεροι⁴ ἔσονται ὄσφ νεώτεροί εἰσι, καὶ ὑμεῖς μᾶλλον ἀγανακτήσετε. εἰ γὰρ οἴεσθε ἀποκτείνοντες ἀνθρώπους ἐπισχῆσειν τοῦ ὄνειδίζειν τινὰ ὑμῖν, ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ζῆτε, οὐκ ὀρθῶς διανοεῖσθε οὐ γὰρ ἐσθ' αὕτη ἢ ἀπαλλαγὴ οὔτε πάνυ δυνατὴ οὔτε καλή, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη καὶ καλλίστη καὶ ῥάστη, μὴ τοὺς ἄλλους κολουεῖν,⁵ ἀλλ' ἑαυτὸν παρασκευάζειν, ὅπως ἔσται ὡς βέλτιστος. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὑμῖν τοῖς καταψηφισαμένοις μαντευσάμενος ἀπαλλάττομαι.

XXXI. Τοῖς δὲ ἀποψηφισαμένοις ἡδέως ἂν διαλεχθελήν ὑπὲρ τοῦ γεγονότος τουτουῦ πράγματος, ἐν ᾧ οἱ ἄρχοντες ἀσχολίαν ἄγουσι καὶ οὕπω ἔρχομαι οἱ ἐλθόντα με δεῖ τεθνάναι. ἀλλὰ μοι, ὦ ἄνδρες, παραμείνατε τοσοῦτον χρόνον οὐδὲν γὰρ καλῶς διαμυ-

θολογήσαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἕως ἔξεστιν. ὑμῖν γὰρ ὡς φίλοις οὖσιν ἐπιδειξαι ἐθέλω τὸ νυνὶ μοι ξυμβεβηκὸς τί ποτε νοεῖ. Ἐμοὶ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί—ὑμᾶς γὰρ δικαστὰς καλῶν ὀρθῶς ἂν καλοῖην—θαυμάσιόν τι γέγονεν. ἡ γὰρ εἰωθυῖά μοι μαντικὴ ἢ τοῦ δαιμονίου^α ἐν μὲν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ παντὶ πάνυ πυκνὴ αἰεὶ ἦν καὶ πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς ἐναντιουμένη, εἴ τι μέλλοιμι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράξειν νυνὶ δὲ ξυμβέβηκέ μοι, ἅπερ ὀράτε καὶ αὐτοί, ταυτί, ἃ γε δὴ οἰηθείη ἂν τις καὶ νομίζεται^β ἔσχατα κακῶν εἶναι. ἐμοὶ δὲ οὔτε ἐξίόντι ἔωθεν οἴκοθεν ἠναντιώθη τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον, οὔτε ἠνίκα ἀνέβαινον ἐνταυθοῖ ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον, οὔτ' ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οὐδαμοῦ μέλλοντί τι ἐρεῖν. καὶ τοι ἐν ἄλλοις λόγοις πολλαχοῦ δὴ με ἐπέσχε λέγοντα μεταξύ.^ο νῦν δὲ οὐδαμοῦ περὶ αὐτὴν τὴν πράξιν οὔτ' ἐν ἔργῳ οὐδενὶ οὔτ' ἐν λόγῳ ἠναντιώται μοι. τί οὖν αἰτίων εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνω;^α ἐγὼ ὑμῖν ἐρῶ· κινδυνεύει γάρ μοι τὸ ξυμβεβηκὸς τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν γεγονέναι, καὶ οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως ἡμεῖς ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὅσοι οἴομεθα κακὸν εἶναι τὸ τεθνάναι. μέγα μοι τεκμήριον τούτου γέγονεν. οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅπως οὐκ ἠναντιώθη ἂν μοι τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον, εἰ μὴ τι ἐμέλλον ἐγὼ ἀγαθὸν πράξειν.

XXXII. Ἐννοήσωμεν δὲ καὶ τῆδε,^α ὡς πολλὴ ἐλπίς ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι. Δυοῖν γὰρ θάτερόν ἐστι τὸ τεθνάναι· ἡ γὰρ οἶον μὴδὲν εἶναι^β μὴδ' αἰσθησιν μῆδεμίαν μῆδενοῦς ἔχειν τὸν τεθνεῶτα, ἢ κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα μεταβολὴ τις τυγχάνει οὐσα καὶ μετοίκησις τῇ ψυχῇ^ο τοῦ τόπου ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον. καὶ εἴτε δὴ μῆδεμία^α αἰσθησίς ἐστίν, ἀλλ' οἶον ὕπνος, ἐπειδάν τις καθεύδων μὴδ' ὄναρ μὴδὲν ὄρα, θαυμάσιον κέρδος ἂν εἴη ὁ θάνατος. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἂν οἶμαι,^ο εἴ τινα ἐκλεξάμενον δέοι ταύτην τὴν νύκτα, ἐν ἣ οὕτω κατέ-


δαρθεν, ὥστε μηδ' ὄναρ ἰδεῖν, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας νύκτας
 τε καὶ ἡμέρας τὰς τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ἀντιπαραθέντα
 ταύτῃ τῇ νυκτὶ δέοι σκεψάμενον εἰπεῖν, πόσας ἄμεινον
 καὶ ἡδιον ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας ταύτης τῆς νυκτὸς βεβίω-
 κεν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ βίῳ, οἶμαι ἂν μὴ ὅτι ἰδιώτην¹ τινά,
 ἀλλὰ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα εὐαριθμήτους ἂν εὐρεῖν
 αὐτὸν ταύτας² πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας. εἰ
 οὖν τοιοῦτον ὁ θάνατός ἐστι, κέρδος ἔγωγε λέγω· καὶ
 γὰρ οὐδὲν πλεῖων³ ὁ πᾶς χρόνος φαίνεται οὕτω δὴ εἶναι
 ἢ μία νύξ. εἰ δ' αὖ οἶον ἀποδημησάι ἐστιν ὁ θάνατος
 ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον, καὶ ἀληθὴ ἐστὶ τὰ λεγόμενα,
 ὡς ἄρα ἐκεῖ εἰσὶν ἅπαντες οἱ τεθνεώτες, τί μείζον
 ἀγαθὸν τούτου εἴη ἂν, ὧ ἄνδρες δικασταί; εἰ γάρ
 τις ἀφικόμενος εἰς Αἴδου, ἀπαλλαγείς τούτων τῶν
 φασκόντων δικαστῶν εἶναι, εὐρήσει τοὺς ὡς ἀληθῶς
 δικαστάς, οἵπερ καὶ λέγονται ἐκεῖ δικάζειν, Μίνως
 τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθους⁴ καὶ Αἰακὸς καὶ Τριπτόλεμος,
 καὶ ἄλλοι, ὅσοι τῶν ἡμιθέων δίκαιοι ἐγένοντο ἐν τῷ
 ἑαυτῶν βίῳ, ἄρα φαύλη ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀποδημία; ἢ αὖ
 Ὅρφεϊ ξυγγενέσθαι καὶ Μουσαίῳ καὶ Ἡσιόδῳ καὶ
 Ὅμηρῳ ἐπὶ πόσῳ ἂν τις δέξαιτ' ἂν ὑμῶν;⁵ ἐγὼ μὲν
 γὰρ πολλάκις ἐθέλω τεθνάναι,¹ εἰ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθὴ,
 ἐπεὶ ἔμουγε καὶ αὐτῷ θαυμαστὴ ἂν εἴη ἡ διατριβὴ
 αὐτόθι,² ὅποτε ἐντύχοιμι Παλαμήδει καὶ Αἴαντι τῷ
 Τελαμώνος καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν παλαιῶν διὰ κρίσιν
 ἄδικον τέθνηκεν· ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι τὰ ἑμαντοῦ
 πάθη πρὸς τὰ ἐκείνων, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, οὐκ ἂν ἀηδὲς
 εἴη. καὶ δὴ τὸ μέγιστον,³ τοὺς ἐκεῖ ἐξετάζοντα καὶ
 ἐρευνῶντα ὥσπερ τοὺς ἐνταῦθα διάγειν, τίς αὐτῶν
 σοφός ἐστι καὶ τίς οἶεται μὲν, ἔστι δ' οὐ. ἐπὶ πόσῳ
 δ' ἂν τις, ὧ ἄνδρες δικασταί, δέξαιτο ἐξετάσαι τὸν
 ἐπὶ Τροίαν ἀγαγόντα⁴ τὴν πολλὴν στρατιάν, ἢ Ὀδυσ-

σέα, ἢ Σίσυφον, ἢ ἄλλους μυρίους ἂν τις εἴποι^p καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας; οἷς ἐκεῖ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ ξυνεῖναι καὶ ἐξετάζειν ἀμήχανον ἂν εἴη εὐδαιμονίας^q πάντως. οὐ δῆπου τούτου γε ἕνεκα οἱ ἐκεῖ ἀποκτείνουσι· τὰ τε γὰρ ἄλλα εὐδαιμονέστεροί εἰσιν οἱ ἐκεῖ τῶν ἐνθάδε, καὶ ἤδη τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἀθάνατοὶ εἰσιν, εἴπερ γε τὰ λεγόμενα ἀληθῆ ἔστιν.

XXXIII. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑμᾶς χρή,^a ὧ ἄνδρες δικασταί, εὐέλπιδας εἶναι πρὸς τὸν θάνατον, καὶ ἐν τι τοῦτο διανοεῖσθαι ἀληθές,^b ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ κακὸν οὐδὲν οὔτε ζῶντι οὔτε τελευτήσαντι, οὐδὲ ἀμελείται ὑπὸ θεῶν τὰ τούτου πράγματα· οὐδὲ τὰ ἐμὰ νῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ μοι δῆλόν ἐστι τοῦτο, ὅτι ἤδη τεθνάναι καὶ ἀπηλλάχθαι πραγμάτων βέλτιον ἦν μοι· διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐμὲ οὐδαμοῦ ἀπέτρεψε τὸ σημεῖον, καὶ ἔγωγε τοῖς καταψηφισαμένοις μου καὶ τοῖς κατηγοροῖς οὐ πᾶν χαλεπαίνω. καίτοι οὐ ταύτη τῇ διανοίᾳ κατεψηφίζοντό μου καὶ κατηγοροῦν, ἀλλ' οἴομενοι βλάπτειν τοῦτο αὐτοῖς ἄξιον μέμφεσθαι.


Τοσόνδε μέντοι αὐτῶν δέομαι· τοὺς υἱεῖς μου, ἐπειδὴν ἠβήσωσι, τιμωρήσασθε, ὧ ἄνδρες, ταῦτά ταῦτα λυποῦντες,^c ἅπερ ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς ἐλύπων, ἐὰν ὑμῖν δοκῶσιν ἡ χρημάτων ἢ ἄλλου του πρότερον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἢ ἀρετῆς, καὶ ἐὰν δοκῶσί τι εἶναι μηδὲν ὄντες ὄνειδίζετε αὐτοῖς, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ὑμῖν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιμελοῦνται ὧν δεῖ, καὶ οἶονταί τι εἶναι ὄντες οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι. καὶ ἐὰν ταῦτα ποιῆτε, δίκαια πεπονθὼς ἐγὼ ἔσομαι ὑφ' ὑμῶν αὐτὸς τε καὶ οἱ υἱεῖς.

Ἀλλὰ γὰρ^d ἤδη ὥρα ἀπιέναι, ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀποθανομένῳ, ὑμῖν δὲ βιωσομένοις. ὁπότεροι δὲ ἡμῶν ἔρχονται ἐπὶ ἄμεινον πρᾶγμα, ἄδηλον παντὶ πλην ἢ τῷ θεῷ.



ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

K R I T O N .



SCHLEIERMACHER'S

INTRODUCTION TO THE CRITO.

IT has been already remarked in the introduction to the Apology, that this dialogue appears to be of the same nature with that piece. It seems probable that the Crito is not properly speaking, a work conceived and framed by Plato himself, but a conversation, which actually took place; and which was communicated to Plato as faithfully as possible by Crito, between whom and Socrates it had occurred. In this conversation Plato appears to have made scarcely any alteration, except that he restored and embellished the Socratic mode of speaking which was so well known to him, adorned the commencement and the end, and perhaps here and there supplied little deficiencies. This view rests upon exactly the same grounds, which have been explained in the introduction to the Apology. For neither in the one case nor in the other, does there appear any special philosophical object; and although the occasion itself naturally led to the most important inquiries concerning justice, law, and compact, in which Plato was certainly at all times interested, yet these subjects are here treated of so exclusively with a view to the

individual case before us, that we clearly see that the persons engaged in the dialogue, if the conversation actually took place, were wholly wrapt up in it; and should it be considered as a work of Plato's, which was written without reference to anything that actually occurred, we must admit, that it bears the complete character of a work written for a special occasion. Besides, it is expressly mentioned in it that philosophical inquiry is put aside, since particular principles are only stated and taken for granted, without any further examination, and with reference to previous conversations, though by no means as if these principles were to be sought for in other writings of Plato,—a mode of proceeding never employed in those works of Plato which are of philosophical importance. But supposing it to have been Plato's own work, what could have been the occasion of his writing it? For there is no sentiment given here, which is not contained in the Apology. If, however, we should suppose that it was Plato's intention only to make known the fact, that the friends of Socrates offered to assist him in escaping from his prison, and that he refused their offer, and that the remainder, with the exception of this historical basis, is Plato's own invention: a more minute consideration would perhaps prove, that the former part of this supposition can stand the test of examination, but not the latter. For, on the one hand, there is nothing remarkable in this fact except the manner in which it took place; for the result might have been foreseen from the

Apology; and the friends of Socrates would therefore have been perfectly justified, even if they had not undertaken anything of this kind; on the other hand, the conversation itself bears the character of one that actually took place, which must always to a certain degree be subject to chance circumstances; but these characteristics would not be suited to a conversation that was deliberately and artificially composed. For dialogues of the former class may easily abandon an idea after barely alluding to it, or they may confirm and establish by repetition what might at once have been said decidedly and expressly; the latter, on the contrary, can neither return to the same point without having some particular object in view, for their progress would be interrupted, nor raise expectations which they do not satisfy. The characteristics of the former kind of conversations are manifest in the Crito, and although the idea is on the whole beautifully and clearly defined, yet the connection of its parts is often loose, unnecessarily interrupted and carelessly resumed. Of these defects of a real conversation, which is reported to a third person, scarcely one will be found entirely wanting in the Crito.

I still think it possible for this dialogue to have been written by Plato in this manner; and I conceive that writing it so near the death of Socrates, he may have treated such a conversation as conscientiously as he did the Apology. It was only at a more distant period, to which according to my view the Phædo belongs, that he could, even

on circumstances connected with the death of Socrates, depart from a strict adherence to facts, and proceed to use them freely, and to interweave them in a work of his own, destined to illustrate certain philosophical problems. For the present, at any rate, I shall endeavour by means of this view to vindicate the claims of Plato to this dialogue, until some criticism more solid than any that has been hitherto produced, shall prove that it is not his work. Two things, chiefly, induce me to maintain this opinion; in the first place, the language, against which Ast makes no particular objection, which unites all the peculiarities of the first period of the Platonic writings just as clearly as the language of the Apology; and secondly, the great strictness with which the author keeps to the individual case which is the subject of the conversation—abstaining from introducing any kind of enquiry concerning first principles—an act of moderation, which such inferior men as the other Socratic philosophers, were certainly incapable of; and by which Plato at the same time clearly distinguishes this work from his other writings. Hence the strong emphasis, which is laid on the assertion, that all deliberation in common is impossible for those who start from different moral principles — an emphasis, which must rather be ascribed to Plato, who thereby intended to explain the nature and the tenor of the conversation, than to Socrates, who would hardly have made use of it towards his friend Crito, since he could only differ from him in his inferences.

Little importance, perhaps, is to be attached to the statement of Diogenes, that the conversation actually occurred between Socrates and Æschines, and that Plato, from dislike towards the latter, substituted Crito in his place. However, it is possible that Plato in this respect may have made some alteration, and chosen Crito, who was most secure by his station and age from unpleasant consequences, and who probably died soon after the death of Socrates. The desire, at least, of not compromising any of the Athenian friends of Socrates is evident from the fact, that Plato only mentions strangers as having partaken in the plan of saving Socrates by his escape from prison. So that while the fact itself is not improbable, the motive seems to be fictitious; but whose invention it is we do not know.



ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

Κ Ρ Ι Τ Ω Ν .

Char. I. Τί τῆνικάδε ἀφίξει, ὦ Κρίτων ; ἢ οὐ πρῶ
ἔτι ἐστίν ; ΚΡ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Πηνίκα μάλιστα ;
ΚΡ. Ὁρθρος βαθύς.^β ΣΩ. Θαυμάζω, ὅπως ἠθέλησέ^ς
σοι ὁ τοῦ δεσμοτηρίου φύλαξ ὑπακοῦσαι. ΚΡ. Ξυ-
νήθης ἤδη μοί ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, διὰ τὸ πολλάκις
δεῦρο φοιτᾶν, καί τι καὶ εὐεργέτηται^δ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ. ΣΩ.
Ἄρτι δὲ ἤκεις ἢ πάλαι ; ΚΡ. Ἐπιεικῶς πάλαι.
ΣΩ. Εἴτα πῶς οὐκ εὐθύς ἐπήγειράς με, ἀλλὰ συγῆ
παρακάθησαι ; ΚΡ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δι', ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδ'
ἂν αὐτὸς ἠθελον^ε ἐν τοσαύτῃ τε ἀγρυπνίᾳ καὶ λύπῃ
εἶναι. ἀλλὰ καὶ σοῦ πάλαι θαυμάζω αἰσθανόμενος, ὡς
ἠδέως καθεύδεις^ς καὶ ἐπίτηδές σε οὐκ ἤγειρον, ἵνα ὡς
ἠδιστα διώγῃς.^β καὶ πολλάκις μὲν δὴ σε καὶ πρότερον
ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ εὐδαιμόνισα τοῦ τρόπου,^δ πολὺ δὲ μά-
λιστα ἐν τῇ νυκτὶ παρεστῶση ξυμφορᾷ, ὡς ῥαδίως αὐτὴν
καὶ πρῶως φέρεις. ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἄν, ὦ Κρίτων, πλημ-
μελὲς εἴη ἀγανακτεῖν τηλικούτον ὄντα, εἰ δεῖ ἤδη τε-
λευτᾶν. ΚΡ. Καὶ ἄλλοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τηλικούτοι ἐν
τοιαύταις ξυμφοραῖς ἀλίσκονται,^ε ἀλλ' οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς
ἐπιλύεται ἢ ἡλικία τὸ μὴ οὐχὶ ἀγανακτεῖν τῇ παρουσίᾳ
τύχῃ. ΣΩ. Ἔστι ταῦτα. ἀλλὰ τί δὴ^ε οὕτω πρῶ ἀφί-
ξει ; ΚΡ. Ἀγγελίαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φέρων χαλεπὴν,
οὐ σοί, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται,^μ ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς σοῖς ἐπι-

τηδείους πᾶσι καὶ χαλεπὴν καὶ βαρείαν, ἣν ἐγώ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατ' ἂν ἐνέγκαιμι. ΣΩ. Τίνα ταύτην; ἢ τὸ πλοῖον ἀφίκεται^π ἐκ Δήλου, οὐ δεῖ ἀφικομένου τεθνάναι με; ΚΡ. Οὐ τοι δὴ ἀφίκεται, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ μὲν μοι ἤξειν^α τήμερον ἐξ ὧν ἀπαγγέλλουσιν ἤκοντές τινες ἀπὸ Σουνίου καὶ καταλιπόντες ἐκεῖ αὐτό. δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τούτων τῶν ἀγγέλων, ὅτι ἤξει τήμερον, καὶ ἀνάγκη δὴ εἰς αὔριον ἔσται, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸν βίον σε τελευτᾶν.

II. ΣΩ. Ἄλλ', ὦ Κρίτων, τύχη ἀγαθῆ.^α εἰ ταύτη τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον, ταύτη ἔστω. οὐ μέντοι οἶμαι ἤξειν αὐτὸ τήμερον. ΚΡ. Πόθεν τοῦτο τεκμαίρει; ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ σοι ἔρῶ. τῇ γάρ που ὑστεραία δεῖ με ἀποθνήσκειν ἢ ἢ ἂν ἔλθῃ^β τὸ πλοῖον. ΚΡ. Φασί γέ τοι δὴ οἱ τούτων κύριοι.^γ ΣΩ. Οὐ τοίνυν τῆς ἐπιούσης ἡμέρας οἶμαι αὐτὸ ἤξειν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐτέρας. τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἐκ τινος ἐνύπνιου, δ' ἐώρακα ὀλίγον πρότερον ταύτης τῆς νυκτός· καὶ κινδυνεύεις ἐν καιρῷ τινι^δ οὐκ ἐγείραί με. ΚΡ. Ἦν δὲ δὴ τί τὸ ἐνύπνιον; ΣΩ. Ἐδόκει τίς μοι γυνὴ προσελθούσα^ε καλὴ καὶ εὐειδής, λευκὰ ἱμάτια ἔχουσα, καλέσαι με καὶ εἰπεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡματὶ κεν τριτάτῳ Φθίην ἐρίβωλον ἴκοιο. ΚΡ. Ὡς ἄτοπον^ε τὸ ἐνύπνιον, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Ἐναργὲς μὲν οὖν, ὡς γ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ὦ Κρίτων.

III. ΚΡ. Δίαν γε, ὡς ἔοικεν ἄλλ', ὦ δαιμόνιε^α Σώκρατες, ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐμοὶ πείθου καὶ σώθητι. ὡς ἐμοί, ἐὰν σὺ ἀποθάνῃς, οὐ μία ξυμφορὰ ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ χωρὶς μὲν τοῦ ἐστερηῆσθαι τοιούτου ἐπιτηδείου, οἷον ἐγὼ οὐδένα μὴ ποτε εὐρήσω, ἔτι δὲ καὶ πολλοῖς δόξω, οὐ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ μὴ σαφῶς ἴσασιν, ὡς οἴός τ' ὦν σε σώζειν, εἰ ἤθελον ἀναλίσκειν χρήματα, ἀμελήσαι.^β καὶ τοι τίς ἂν αἰσχίων εἶη ταύτης δόξα^γ ἢ δοκεῖν χρήματα

περὶ πλείονος ποιείσθαι ἢ φίλους; οὐ γὰρ πείσονται οἱ πολλοί, ὡς σὺ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἠθέλησας ἀπιέναι ἐνθένδε ἡμῶν προθυμουμένων. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τί ἡμῖν, ὦ μακάριε Κρίτων, οὕτω τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλει; οἱ γὰρ ἐπιεικέστατοι, ὧν μᾶλλον ἄξιον φροντίζειν, ἡγήσονται αὐτὰ οὕτω πεπρᾶχθαι, ὥσπερ ἂν πραχθῆ. ΚΡ. Ἄλλ' ὄρα^ς δη, ὅτι ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλειν. αὐτὰ δὲ δῆλα τὰ παρόντα^α νυνί, ὅτι οἰοί τ' εἶσιν οἱ πολλοὶ οὐ τὰ σμικρότατα τῶν κακῶν ἐξεργάζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέγιστα σχεδόν, ἐὰν τις ἐν αὐτοῖς διαβεβλημένος ἢ ΣΩ. Εἰ γὰρ ὄφελον, ὦ Κρίτων, οἰοί τε εἶναι οἱ πολλοὶ τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ ἐξεργάζεσθαι, ἵνα οἰοί τε ἦσαν^α αὐ καὶ ἀγαθὰ τὰ μέγιστα^α καὶ καλῶς ἂν εἶχε. νῦν δὲ οὐδέτερα οἰοί τε^α οὔτε γὰρ φρόνιμον οὔτε ἀφρονα δυνατοὶ ποιῆσαι, ποιούσι δὲ τοῦτο, ὃ τι ἂν τύχωσιν.^ε

IV. ΚΡ. Ταῦτα μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἐχέτω^α τάδε δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπέ μοι. ἄρά γε μὴ ἐμοῦ προμηθεῖ^α καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδείων, μή, ἐὰν σὺ ἐνθένδε ἐξέλθῃς, οἱ συκοφάνται ἡμῖν πράγματα παρέχωσιν ὡς σὲ ἐνθένδε ἐκκλέψασι, καὶ ἀναγκασθῶμεν ἢ καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν οὐσίαν ἀποβαλεῖν, ἢ συχνὰ χρήματα,^β ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι πρὸς τούτοις παθεῖν; εἰ γὰρ τι τοιοῦτον φοβεῖ, ἕασον αὐτὸ χαίρειν^α ἡμεῖς γάρ που δίκαιοι ἐσμεν σώσαντές σε κινδυνεύειν τοῦτον τὸν κίνδυνον καὶ, ἐὰν δέῃ, ἔτι τούτου μείζω. ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ πείθου καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖ.^α ΣΩ. Καὶ ταῦτα προμηθεύμαι, ὦ Κρίτων, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά. ΚΡ. Μῆτε τοίνυν ταῦτα φοβοῦ^α καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ πολὺ τἀργυρίαν ἐστίν, ὃ θέλουσι λαβόντες τινὲς σῶσαι σε καὶ ἐξαγαγεῖν ἐνθένδε. ἔπειτα οὐχ ὄρα^ς τούτους τοὺς συκοφάντας^ε ὡς εὐτελεῖς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἂν δέοι ἐπ' αὐτούς^ε πολλοῦ ἀργυρίου; σοὶ δὲ ὑπάρχει μὲν τὰ

ἐμὰ χρήματα,^h ὡς ἐγὼμαι, ἰκανά· ἔπειτα καὶ εἴ τι ἐμοῦ κηδόμενος οὐκ οἶε δεῖν ἀναλίσκειν τὰμά, ξένοι οὔτοι ἐνθάδεⁱ ἔτοιμοι ἀναλίσκειν. εἰς δὲ κεκόμικεν ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀργύριον ἰκανόν, Σιμμίας ὁ Θηβαῖος· ἔτοιμος δὲ καὶ Κέβης καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ πάνυ. ὥστε, ὅπερ λέγω, μήτε ταῦτα φοβούμενος ἀποκάμης^k σαυτὸν σῶσαι, μήτε ὃ ἔλεγες ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ,^l δυσχερές σοι γενέσθω, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοις ἐξελθὼν ὃ τι χροῶ σαυτῷ.^m πολλαχοῦ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἄλλοσε ὅποι ἂν ἀφίκηⁿ ἀγαπήσουσι σε· ἐὰν δὲ βούλη εἰς Θετταλίαν ἵεναι, εἰσὶν ἐμοὶ ἐκεῖ ξένοι, οἳ σε περὶ πολλοῦ ποιήσονται καὶ ἀσφάλειάν σοι παρέξονται ὥστε σε μηδένα λυπεῖν τῶν κατὰ Θετταλίαν.

V. Ἔτι δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδὲ δίκαιόν μοι δοκεῖς ἐπιχειρεῖν πρᾶγμα, σαυτὸν προδοῦναι, ἐξὸν σωθῆναι.^a καὶ τοιαῦτα σπεύδεις περὶ σεαυτὸν γενέσθαι, ἅπερ ἂν καὶ οἱ ἐχθροὶ σου σπεύσαιέν τε καὶ ἔσπευσαν σὲ διαφθεῖραι βουλόμενοι. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ τοὺς υἱεῖς τοὺς σαυτοῦ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς προδιδόναι, οὓς σοὶ ἐξὸν καὶ ἐκθρέψαι καὶ ἐκπαιδεῦσαι οἰχῆσει καταλιπῶν,^b καὶ τὸ σὸν μέρος,^c ὃ τι ἂν τύχῃσι, τοῦτο πράξουσι.^d τεύξονται δέ, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, τοιούτων, οἷάπερ εἴωθε γίγνεσθαι ἐν ταῖς ὄρφανίαις περὶ τοὺς ὄρφανούς. ἢ γὰρ οὐ χρεὴν ποιεῖσθαι παῖδας, ἢ ξυνδιαταλαιπωρεῖν καὶ τρέφοντα καὶ παιδεύοντα· σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς τὰ ῥαθυμότατα αἰρεῖσθαι.^e χρεὴ δέ, ἅπερ ἂν ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἀνδρείος ἔλοιτο, ταῦτα αἰρεῖσθαι, φάσκοντά γε δὴ ἀρετῆς διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου ἐπιμελείσθαι. ὡς ἐγωγε καὶ ὑπὲρ σοῦ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν τῶν σῶν ἐπιτηδείων αἰσχύνομαι,^f μὴ δόξη ἅπαν τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ περὶ σὲ ἀνανδρία τινι τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ πεπραῆχθαι, καὶ ἢ εἰσοδος τῆς δίκης εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον,^g ὡς εἰσῆλθες, ἐξὸν μὴ εἰσελθεῖν, καὶ αὐτός

ὁ ἀγὼν τῆς δίκης^h ὡς ἐγένετο, καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον δὴ τοῦτί, ὥσπερ κατ'ἀγγελως τῆς πράξεως,ⁱ κακία τινὶ καὶ ἀνανδρία τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ διαπεφευγέναι ἡμᾶς δοκεῖν,^k οἷτινες σε οὐχὶ ἐσώσαμεν, οὐδὲ σὺ σαυτὸν,^l οἷόν τε ἢν καὶ δυνατὸν, εἴ τι καὶ σμικρὸν ἡμῶν ὄφελος ἦν.^m ταῦτα οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὄρα, μὴ ἅμα τῷ κακῷ καὶ αἰσχροῦ ἢ σοί τε καὶ ἡμῖν, ἀλλὰ βουλευέου, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδέ βουλευέσθαιⁿ ἔτι ὦρα, ἀλλὰ βεβουλευέσθαι. μία δὲ βουλή τῆς γὰρ ἐπιούσης νυκτὸς ταῦτα πάντα δεῖ πεπράχθαι· εἰ δέ τι περιμενούμεν, ἀδύνατον καὶ οὐκέτι οἷόν τε. ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ὦ Σώκρατες, πείθου μοι καὶ μηδαμῶς ἄλλως ποιεῖ.

VI. ΣΩ. ὦ φίλε Κρίτων, ἡ προθυμία σου πολλοῦ ἀξία, εἰ μετὰ τίνος ὀρθότητος εἶη^a· εἰ δὲ μή, ὄσφ μείζων, τοσοῦτ' ἁλεπωτέρα. σκοπεῖσθαι οὖν χρὴ ἡμᾶς, εἴτε ταῦτα πρακτέον εἴτε μή· ὡς ἐγὼ οὐ μόνον νῦν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἰεὶ τοιοῦτος, οἷος τῶν ἐμῶν^b μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ πείθεσθαι ἢ τῷ λόγῳ, ὃς ἂν μοι λογιζομένῳ βέλτιστος φαίνηται. τοὺς δὲ λόγους, ὃς ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, οὐ δύναμαι νῦν ἐκβαλεῖν,^c ἐπειδὴ μοι ἤδη ἡ τύχη γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ σχεδόν τι ὅμοιοι φαίνονται μοι, καὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς πρεσβεύω καὶ τιμῶ,^d οὗσπερ καὶ πρότερον ὦν ἐὰν μὴ βελτίῳ ἔχωμεν λέγειν ἐν τῷ παρόντι, εὐ ἴσθι, ὅτι οὐ μὴ σοὶ ξυγχωρήσω,^e οὐδ' ἂν πλείω τῶν νῦν παρόντων^f ἢ τῶν πολλῶν δύναμις ὥσπερ παῖδας ἡμᾶς μορμολύττηται, δεσμοὺς καὶ θανάτους ἐπιπέμπουσα καὶ χρημάτων ἀφαιρέσεις.^g Πῶς οὖν ἂν μετριάτα σκοποίμεθα^h αὐτά; Εἰ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἀναλάβοιμεν,ⁱ ἢν σὺ λέγεις^k περὶ τῶν δοξῶν, πότερον καλῶς ἐλέγετο ἐκάστοτε ἢ οὐ, ὅτι ταῖς μὲν δεῖ τῶν δοξῶν προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, ταῖς δὲ οὐ. ἢ πρὶν μὲν ἐμὲ δεῖν ἀποθνήσκειν καλῶς ἐλέγετο, νῦν δὲ κατὰδηλος

θῶν καὶ τῶν ἐναντιῶν. ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ, φαίη γ' ἄν τις, οἷοί τ' εἰσὶν ἡμᾶς οἱ πολλοὶ ἀποκτινύνουσι; ΚΡ. Δῆλα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα· φαίη γὰρ ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες.^α ΣΩ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ἀλλ', ὦ θαυμάσιε, οὗτός τε ὁ λόγος, ὃν διεληλύθαμεν, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἔτι ὁμοῖος εἶναι τῷ καὶ πρότερον^β καὶ τόνδε αὐτὸ σκόπει, εἰ ἔτι μένει ἡμῖν ἢ οὐ, ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζῆν περὶ πλείστου ποιητέον, ἀλλὰ τὸ εὖ ζῆν. ΚΡ. Ἀλλὰ μένει. ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ εὖ καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ὅτι ταῦτόν ἐστι, μένει, ἢ οὐ μένει; ΚΡ. Μένει.

ΙΧ. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων^α τοῦτο σκεπτέον, πότερον δίκαιον ἐμὲ ἐνθένδε πειρᾶσθαι ἐξιέναι, μὴ ἀφιέντων Ἀθηναίων,^β ἢ οὐ δίκαιον καὶ ἐὰν μὲν φαίνηται δίκαιον, πειρώμεθα, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἐῷμεν ἄς δὲ σὺ λέγεις τὰς σκέψεις περὶ τε ἀναλώσεως χρημάτων^γ καὶ δόξης^δ καὶ παιδῶν τροφῆς,^ε μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων, σκέμματα^ς ἢ τῶν ῥαδίως ἀποκτινύντων^α καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένων γ' ἄν, εἰ οἷοί τε ἴσαν, οὐδενὶ ξὺν νῶ, τούτων τῶν πολλῶν. ἡμῖν δ', ἐπειδὴ ὁ λόγος οὕτως αἰρεῖ,^β μὴ οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκεπτέον ἢ ἢ ὕπερ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, πότερον δίκαια πράξομεν καὶ χρήματα τελούντες τούτοις τοῖς ἐμὲ ἐνθένδε ἐξάξουσι καὶ χάριτας, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐξάγοντές τε καὶ ἐξαγόμενοι, ἢ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἀδικήσομεν ταῦτα πάντα ποιοῦντες· κὰν φαινόμεθα ἄδικα αὐτὰ ἐργαζόμενοι, μὴ οὐ δέη ὑπολογίζεσθαι οὗτ' εἰ ἀποθνήσκειν δεῖ παραμένοντας καὶ ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντας, οὔτε ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν πάσχειν πρὸ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν.^γ ΚΡ. Καλῶς μὲν μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅρα δὲ τί δρώμεν. ΣΩ. Σκοπῶμεν, ὦ γαθέ, κοινῇ, καὶ εἴ πῃ ἔχεις ἀντιλέγειν ἐμοῦ λέγοντος, ἀντίλεγε καὶ σοὶ πείσομαι· εἰ δὲ μὴ, παῦσαι ἤδη, ὦ μακάριε, πολλάκις μοι λέγων τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ὡς χρῆ

ἐνθένδε ἀκόντων Ἀθηναίων ἐμὲ ἀπιέναι· ὡς ἐγὼ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιοῦμαι πείσαι σε ταῦτα πράττειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄκοντος.^κ ὅρα δὲ δὴ τῆς σκέψεως τὴν ἀρχήν, ἐάν σοι ἰκανῶς λέγηται, καὶ πειρῶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὸ ἐρωτώμενον, ἢ ἂν μάλιστα οἴη. ΚΡ. Ἀλλὰ πειράσομαι.

Χ. ΣΩ. Οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ φαμέν ἐκόντας ἀδικητέον εἶναι,^α ἢ τινι μὲν ἀδικητέον τρόπῳ, τινὶ δὲ οὐ; ἢ οὐδαμῶς τό γε ἀδικεῖν οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε καλόν, ὡς πολλὰ κίς ἡμῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ὠμολογήθη; ὅπερ καὶ ἄρτι ἐλέγετο. ἢ πᾶσαι ἡμῖν ἐκείναι αἱ πρόσθεν ὁμολογίαι ἐν ταῖςδε ταῖς ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις ἐκεχυμένα εἰσί,^β καὶ πάλαι, ὦ Κρίτων, ἄρα τηλικοῖδε γέροντες ἄνδρες πρὸς ἀλλήλους σπουδῇ διαλεγόμενοι ἐλάθομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς παίδων οὐδὲν διαφέροντες; ἢ παντὸς μᾶλλον^γ οὕτως ἔχει, ὥσπερ τότε ἐλέγετο ἡμῖν; εἴτε φασὶν οἱ πολλοὶ εἴτε μή, καὶ εἴτε δεῖ ἡμᾶς εἶτι τῶνδε χαλεπώτερα πάσχειν εἴτε καὶ πραύτερα, ὅμως τό γε ἀδικεῖν^δ τῷ ἀδικούντι καὶ κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν τυγχάμεν ὅν παντὶ τρόπῳ; φαμέν, ἢ οὐ; ΚΡ. Φαμέν. ΣΩ. Οὐδαμῶς ἄρα δεῖ ἀδικεῖν. ΚΡ. Οὐ δῆτα. ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ ἀδικούμενον ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται,^ε ἐπειδὴ γε οὐδαμῶς δεῖ ἀδικεῖν. ΚΡ. Οὐ φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δῆ; κακουργεῖν δεῖ, ὦ Κρίτων, ἢ οὐ; ΚΡ. Οὐ δεῖ δῆ που, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἀντικακουργεῖν κακῶς πάσχοντα, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ φασι, δίκαιον, ἢ οὐ δίκαιον; ΚΡ. Οὐδαμῶς. ΣΩ. Τὸ γὰρ που κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲν διαφέρει. ΚΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ΣΩ. Οὔτε ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν δεῖ οὔτε κακῶς ποιεῖν οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων, οὐδ' ἂν ὅτιοῦν πάσχη ὑπ' αὐτῶν.^ς καὶ ὅρα, ὦ Κρίτων, ταῦτα καθομολογῶν, ὅπως μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ὁμολογήσῃ. οἶδα γάρ, ὅτι ὀλίγοις τισὶ

ταῦτα καὶ δοκεῖ καὶ δόξει. οἷς οὖν οὕτω δέδοκται καὶ οἷς μὴ, τούτοις οὐκ ἔστι κοινὴ βουλή, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη τούτους ἀλλήλων καταφρονεῖν, ὀρώντας τὰ ἀλλήλων βουλεύματα. σκόπει δὴ οὖν καὶ σὺ εὖ μάλα,^ε πότερον κοινωνεῖς καὶ ξυνδοκεῖ σοι καὶ ἀρχώμεθα ἐντεύθεν βουλευόμενοι, ὡς οὐδέποτε ὀρθῶς ἔχοντος^β οὔτε τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὔτε τοῦ ἀνταδικεῖν οὔτε κακῶς πάσχοντα ἀμύνεσθαι ἀντιδρώντα κακῶς· ἢ ἀφίστασαι καὶ οὐ κοινωνεῖς τῆς ἀρχῆς; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ πάλαι οὕτω καὶ νῦν ἔτι δοκεῖ, σοὶ δ' εἴ πῃ ἄλλη δέδοκται, λέγε καὶ δίδασκε. εἰ δὲ ἐμμένεις τοῖς πρόσθεν, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἄκουε. ΚΡ. Ἄλλ' ἐμμένω τε καὶ ξυνδοκεῖ μοι· ἀλλὰ λέγε. ΣΩ. Λέγω δὴ αὐτὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, μᾶλλον δ' ἐρωτῶ· πότερον ἂν τις ὁμολογήσῃ τῷ δίκαια ὄντα ποιητέον ἢ ἑξαπατητέον; ΚΡ. Ποιητέον.

XI. ΣΩ. Ἐκ τούτων δὴ ἄθρει.^α ἀπιόντες ἐνθένδε ἡμεῖς μὴ πείσαντες τὴν πόλιν^β πότερον κακῶς τινὰς ποιούμεν, καὶ ταῦτα οὐδ' ἠκίστα δεῖ, ἢ οὐ; καὶ ἐμμένομεν οἷς ὁμολογήσαμεν δίκαιοις^ο οὔσιν, ἢ οὐ; ΚΡ. Οὐκ ἔχω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀποκρίνασθαι πρὸς δ' ἐρωτᾶς· οὐ γὰρ ἐννοῶ. ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ὧδε σκόπει. εἰ μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνθένδε^α εἶτε ἀποδιδράσκειν, εἴθ' ὅπως δεῖ ὀνομάσαι τοῦτο, ἐλθόντες οἱ νόμοι καὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως^ο ἐπιστάντες ἔρουντο. εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τί ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ποιεῖν; ἄλλο τι ἢ τούτῳ τῷ ἔργῳ,^ε ὃ ἐπιχειρεῖς, διανοεῖ τούς τε νόμους ἡμᾶς ἀπολέσαι καὶ ξύμπασαν τὴν πόλιν τὸ σὸν μέρος;^ε ἢ δοκεῖ σοι οἷον τε ἔτι ἐκείνην τὴν πόλιν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἀνατετραφῆθαι,^β ἐν ἣ ἂν αἱ γενόμεναί δίκαι^ι μηδὲν ἰσχύουσιν, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ ἰδιωτῶν ἄκυροί τε γίνωνται καὶ διάφθειρονται; τί ἐροῦμεν, ὦ Κρίτων, πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα; πολλὰ γὰρ ἂν τις ἔχοι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ῥήτωρ, εἰπεῖν

ὑπὲρ τούτου τοῦ νόμου ἀπολλυμένου, ὃς τὰς δίκας τὰς δικασθείσας προστάττει κυρίας εἶναι. ἢ ἐροῦμεν πρὸς αὐτούς, ὅτι Ἡδίκηει γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἢ πόλις^κ καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς τὴν δίκην ἔκρινε; Ταῦτα ἢ τί ἐροῦμεν;^λ ΚΡ. Ταῦτα νῆ Δί', ὦ Σώκρατες.

XII. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν, ἂν εἴπωσιν οἱ νόμοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἢ καὶ ταῦτα ὠμολόγητο ἡμῖν τε καὶ σοί, ἢ ἐμμένειν ταῖς δίκαις αἷς ἂν ἡ πόλις δικάζῃ;^α εἰ οὖν αὐτῶν θαυμάζοιμεν λεγόντων, ἴσως ἂν εἴποιεν, ὅτι ὦ Σώκρατες, μὴ θαύμαζε τὰ λεγόμενα, ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου, ἐπειδὴ καὶ εἴωθας χρῆσθαι τῷ ἐρωτᾶν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι. φέρε γάρ, τί ἐγκαλῶν ἡμῖν τε καὶ τῇ πόλει ἐπιχειρεῖς ἡμᾶς ἀπολλύναι; οὐ πρῶτον μὲν σε ἐγενήσαμεν^β ἡμεῖς, καὶ δι' ἡμῶν ἐλάβανε τὴν μητέρα σου ὁ πατήρ καὶ ἐφύτευσέ σε; φράσον οὖν, τούτοις ἡμῶν, τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς περὶ τοὺς γάμους^ο μέμφει τι ὡς οὐ καλῶς ἔχουσιν; Οὐ μέμφομαι, φαίην ἂν. Ἄλλὰ τοῖς περὶ τὴν τοῦ γενομένου τροφήν τε καὶ παιδείαν,^δ ἐν ἣ καὶ σὺ ἐπαιδεύθης; ἢ οὐ καλῶς^ο προσέταπτον ἡμῶν οἱ ἐπὶ τούτοις τεταγμένοι νόμοι, παραγγέλλοντες τῷ πατρὶ τῷ σῷ σε ἐν μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ παιδεύειν;^ε Καλῶς, φαίην ἂν. Εἶεν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐγένου τε καὶ ἐξετράφης καὶ ἐπαιδεύθης,^ε ἔχοις ἂν εἰπεῖν πρῶτον μὲν, ὡς οὐχὶ ἡμέτερος ἦσθα καὶ ἔκγονος καὶ δούλος, αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ σοὶ πρόγονοι;^δ καὶ εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, ἄρ' ἐξ ἴσου οἶε εἶναι σοὶ, τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἡμῖν, καὶ ἅττ' ἂν ἡμεῖς σε ἐπιχειρῶμεν ποιεῖν, καὶ σὺ ταῦτα ἀντιποιεῖν^ι οἶε δίκαιον εἶναι; ἢ πρὸς μὲν ἄρα σοι τὸν πατέρα οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου ἦν τὸ δίκαιον καὶ πρὸς τὸν δεσπότην, εἰ σοι ἂν ἐτύγχανεν, ὥστε, ἄπερ πάσχους, ταῦτα καὶ ἀντιποιεῖν, οὔτε κακῶς ἀκούοντα ἀντιλέγειν^κ οὔτε τυπτόμενον ἀντιτύπτειν οὔτε ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολ-

λά· πρὸς δὲ τὴν πατρίδα ἄρα¹ καὶ τοὺς νόμους ἐξέσται σοι, ὥστε, ἐάν σε ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἡμεῖς ἀπολλύναι δίκαιον ἡγούμενοι εἶναι, καὶ σὺ δὲ ἡμᾶς τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὴν πατρίδα καθ' ὅσον δύνασαι ἐπιχειρήσεις ἀνταπολλύναι, καὶ φήσεις ταῦτα ποιῶν δίκαια πράττειν, ὃ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελόμενος; ἢ οὕτως εἰ σοφός, ὥστε λέληθέ σε, ὅτι μητρός τε καὶ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων προγόνων ἀπάντων τιμιώτερόν ἐστι πατρίς^m καὶ σεμνότερον καὶ ἀγιώτερον καὶ ἐν μείζονι μοίρᾳⁿ καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώποις τοῖς νῦν ἔχουσι, καὶ σέβεσθαι δεῖ καὶ μᾶλλον ὑπέκειν καὶ θωπεύειν πατρίδα χαλεπαίνουσαν ἢ πατέρα, καὶ ἢ πείθειν, ἢ ποιεῖν^o ἢ ἂν κελεύη, καὶ πάσχειν, ἐάν τι προστάτῃ παθεῖν, ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντα, ἐάν τε τύπτεσθαι ἐάν τε δεῖσθαι, ἐάν τε εἰς πόλεμον ἄγῃ τρωθησόμενον ἢ ἀποθανούμενον, ποιητέον ταῦτα, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ οὐχὶ ὑπεικτέον, οὐδὲ ἀναχωρητέον, οὐδὲ λειπτέον τὴν τάξιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ καὶ πανταχοῦ ποιητέον ἢ ἂν κελεύη ἢ πόλις καὶ ἢ πατρίς, ἢ πείθειν αὐτὴν ἢ τὸ δίκαιον πέφυκε^p βιάζεσθαι δ' οὐχ ὅσιον οὔτε μητέρα οὔτε πατέρα, πολὺ δὲ τούτων ἔτι ἡττον τὴν πατρίδα. Τί φήσομεν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων; ἀληθῆ λέγειν τοὺς νόμους, ἢ οὐ; ΚΡ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

XIII. ΣΩ. Σκόπει τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαῖεν ἂν ἴσως οἱ νόμοι, εἰ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα ἀληθῆ λέγομεν, ὅτι οὐ δίκαια ἡμᾶς ἐπιχειρεῖς δρᾶν ἢ νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖς. ἡμεῖς γάρ σε γεννήσαντες, ἐκθρέψαντες, παιδεύσαντες, μεταδόντες ἀπάντων ὧν οἰοί τ' ἡμεν καλῶν σοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι πολίταις, ὅμως προαγορεύομεν τῷ ἔξουσίαν πεποιηκέναι^a Ἀθηναίων τῷ βουλομένῳ, ἐπειδὴν δοκιμασθῆ καὶ ἴδη^b τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει πράγματα καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς νόμους, ὧ ἂν μὴ ἀρέσκωμεν ἡμεῖς, ἐξεῖναι λα-

βόντα τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀπιέναι ὅποι ἂν βούληται. καὶ οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἐμποδῶν ἐστὶν οὐδ' ἀπαγορεύει, ἔάν τέ τις βούληται ὑμῶν εἰς ἀποικίαν ἵεναι, εἰ μὴ ἀρέσκοιμεν ἡμεῖς τε καὶ ἡ πόλις, ἔάν τε μετοικεῖν ἄλλοσέ ποι' ἔλθῶν, ἵεναι ἐκείσε, ὅποι ἂν βούληται, ἔχοντα τὰ αὐτοῦ. ὅς δ' ἂν ὑμῶν παραμείνη, ὁρῶν ὃν τρόπον ἡμεῖς τάς τε δίκας δικάζομεν καὶ τὰλλα τὴν πόλιν διοικοῦμεν, ἤδη φάμεν τοῦτον ὠμολογηκέαι ἔργῳ ἡμῖν ἂν ἡμεῖς κελεύομεν ποιήσειν ταῦτα, καὶ τὸν μὴ πειθόμενον τριχῆ φάμεν ἀδικεῖν, ὅτι τε γεννήταις οὖσιν ἡμῖν οὐ πείθεται, καὶ ὅτι τροφεῦσι, καὶ ὅτι ὁμολογήσας ἢ μὴν πείθεσθαι^α οὔτε πείθεται οὔτε πείθει ἡμᾶς,^β εἰ μὴ καλῶς τι ποιῶμεν, προτιθέντων ἡμῶν, καὶ οὐκ ἀγρίως ἐπιταπτόντων ποιεῖν ἂν κελεύομεν, ἀλλὰ ἐφειντων δυεῖν θᾶτερα, ἢ πείθειν ἡμᾶς, ἢ ποιεῖν, τούτων οὐδέτερα ποιεῖ.

XIV. Ταῦταις δὴ φάμεν καὶ σέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῖς αἰτίαῖς ἐνέξεσθαι,^γ εἴπερ ποιήσεις ἂν ἐπινοεῖς, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα Ἀθηναίων σέ, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα.^δ Εἰ οὖν ἐγὼ εἴποιμι, διὰ τί δή; ἴσως ἂν μου δικαίως καθάπτωιτο,^ε λέγοντες, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα Ἀθηναίων ἐγὼ αὐτοῖς ὠμολογηκῶς τυγχάνω ταύτην τὴν ὁμολογίαν. φαῖεν γὰρ ἂν ὅτι Ὡ Σώκρατες, μεγάλα ἡμῖν τούτων τεκμηρία ἐστίν, ὅτι σοὶ καὶ ἡμεῖς ἠρέσκομεν καὶ ἡ πόλις· αὐτὰρ ἂν ποτε τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἀπάντων διαφερόντως^α ἐν αὐτῇ ἐπεδήμεις, εἰ μὴ σοὶ διαφερόντως ἤρεσκε, καὶ οὔτ' ἐπὶ θεωρίαν^β πώποτε ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐξήλθες, ὅτι μὴ ἄπαξ εἰς Ἴσθμόν, οὔτε ἄλλοσε οὐδαμόσε, εἰ μὴ ποι στρατευσόμενος,^γ οὔτε ἄλλην ἀποδημίαν ἐποιήσω πώποτε, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι, οἱ δ' ἐπιθυμία σε ἄλλης πόλεως οὐδ' ἄλλων νόμων ἔλαβεν εἰδέναι,^δ ἀλλὰ ἡμεῖς σοὶ ἱκανοὶ ἡμεν καὶ ἡ

ἡμετέρα πόλις· οὕτω σφόδρα ἡμᾶς ἤροῦ, καὶ ὠμολόγεις
 καθ' ἡμᾶς πολιτεύεσθαι^h τά τε ἄλλα καὶ παῖδας ἐν
 αὐτῇ ἐποιήσω, ὡς ἀρεσκούσης σοι τῆς πόλεως· ἔτι
 τοίνυν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ δίκῃ ἐξῆν σοι φυγῆς τιμήσασθαιⁱ εἰ
 ἐβούλου, καὶ ὅπερ νῦν ἀκούσης τῆς πόλεως ἐπιχειρεῖς,
 τότε ἐκούσης ποιῆσαι. σὺ δὲ τότε μὲν ἐκαλλωπίζου
 ὡς οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν, εἰ δέοι τεθάναι σε, ἀλλ' ἤροῦ, ὡς
 ἔφησθα, πρὸ τῆς φυγῆς θάνατον νῦν δὲ οὐτ' ἐκείνους
 τοὺς λόγους αἰσχύνει, οὔτε ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἐντρέπει,
 ἐπιχειρῶν διαφθεῖραι, πράττεις τε ἄπερ ἂν δούλος
 φαυλότατος πράξειεν, ἀποδιδράσκειν ἐπιχειρῶν παρὰ
 τὰς ξυνθήκας τε καὶ τὰς ὁμολογίας, καθ' ἃς ἡμῖν ξυ-
 νέθου πολιτεύεσθαι. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἡμῖν τοῦτ' αὐτὸ
 ἀπόκριναι, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγομεν, φάσκοντές σε ὠμολογη-
 κέναι πολιτεύεσθαι καθ' ἡμᾶς ἔργῳ, ἀλλ' οὐ λόγῳ, ἢ
 οὐκ ἀληθῆ. Τί φῶμεν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων; ἄλλο
 τί ἢ ὁμολογῶμεν; ΚΡ. Ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ.
 Ἄλλο τι οὖν ἂν φαίεν^k ἢ ξυνθήκας τὰς πρὸς ἡμᾶς
 αὐτοὺς καὶ ὁμολογίας παραβαίνεις, οὐχ ὑπ' ἀνάγκης
 ὁμολογήσας, οὐδὲ ἀπατηθεὶς, οὐδὲ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ
 ἀναγκασθεὶς βουλευσασθαι, ἀλλ' ἐν ἔτεσιν ἐβδομη-
 κοντα, ἐν οἷς ἐξῆν σοι ἀπιέναι, εἰ μὴ ἠρέσκομεν ἡμεῖς
 μηδὲ δίκαιαι ἐφαίνοντό σοι αἱ ὁμολογαί εἶναι. σὺ δὲ
 οὔτε Λακεδαίμονα προηροῦ οὔτε Κρήτην, ἃς δὴ
 ἐκάστοτε φῆς εὐνομεῖσθαι,^l οὔτε ἄλλην οὐδεμίαν τῶν
 Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων, οὐδὲ τῶν βαρβαρικῶν,^m ἀλλ'
 ἐλάττω ἐξ αὐτῆς ἀπεδήμησας ἢ οἱ χωλοὶ τε καὶ τυ-
 φλοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνάπηροι· οὕτω σοι διαφερόντως
 τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἤρεσκειν ἢ πόλις τε καὶ ἡμεῖς
 οἱ νόμοι δῆλον ὅτι·ⁿ τίνοι γὰρ ἂν πόλις ἀρέσκοι ἄνευ
 νόμων; νῦν δὲ δὴ οὐκ ἐμμενεῖς τοῖς ὠμολογημένοις;
 εἰ ἡμῖν γε πείθη,^o ὦ Σώκρατες· καὶ οὐ καταγέλαστός
 γε ἔσει ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐξελθών.


XV. Σκόπει γὰρ δὴ, ταῦτα παραβάς καὶ ἐξαμαρτῶν τι τούτων τί ἀγαθὸν ἐργάσει σαυτὸν, ἢ τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους τοὺς σαυτοῦ· ὅτι μὲν γὰρ κινδυνεύουσιν γέ σου οἱ ἐπιτηδείοι καὶ αὐτοὶ φεύγειν καὶ στερηθῆναι τῆς πόλεως, ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀπολέσαι, σχεδὸν τι δῆλον αὐτὸς δὲ πρῶτον μὲν εἰς τῶν ἐγγύτατά τινα πόλεων ἔλθῃς, ἢ Θήβαζε ἢ Μεγαράδε, — εὐνομοῦνται γὰρ ἀμφοτέραι — πολέμιος ἦξεις, ὡς Σώκρατες, τῇ τούτων πολιτείᾳ,^α καὶ ὅσοι περ κήδονται τῶν αὐτῶν πόλεων, ὑποβλέψονται σε διαφθορέα ἡγούμενοι τῶν νόμων, καὶ βεβαιώσεις τοῖς δικασταῖς^β τὴν δόξαν, ὥστε δοκεῖν ὀρθῶς τὴν δικὴν δικάσαι· ὅστις γὰρ νόμων διαφθορεὺς ἐστὶ, σφόδρα πονεὶ δόξειεν ἂν νέων γε καὶ ἀνοήτων ἀνθρώπων διαφθορεὺς εἶναι. πότερον οὖν φεύξει τάς τε εὐνομουμένας πόλεις καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς κοσμιωτάτους;^γ καὶ τοῦτο ποιοῦντι ἄρα ἀξίον^δ σοὶ ζῆν ἐσται; ἢ πλησιάσεις τούτοις καὶ ἀναισχυντήσεις διαλεγόμενος — τίνας λόγους, ὡς Σώκρατες; ἢ οὐσπερ ἐνθάδε, ὡς ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη πλείστου ἀξίον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τὰ νόμιμα καὶ οἱ νόμοι; καὶ οὐκ οἶει ἄσχημον ἂν φανεῖσθαι^ε τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους πρᾶγμα; οἴεσθαι γε χρὴ. Ἄλλ' ἐκ μὲν τούτων τῶν τόπων ἀπαρεῖς, ἦξεις δὲ εἰς Θετταλίαν παρὰ τοὺς ξένους τοὺς Κρίτωνος· ἐκεῖ γὰρ δὴ πλείστη ἀταξία καὶ ἀκολασία,^ς καὶ ἴσως ἂν ἠδέως σου ἀκούοιεν ὡς γελοῖως ἐκ τοῦ δεσποτηρίου ἀπεδίδρασκες, σκευὴν τέ τινα περιθέμενος,^ζ ἢ διφθέραν λαβὼν, ἢ ἄλλα οἷα δὴ εἰώθασιν ἐνσκευάζεσθαι οἱ ἀποδιδράσκοντες, καὶ τὸ σχῆμα^η τὸ σαυτοῦ μεταλλάξας. ὅτι δὲ γέρων ἀνὴρ σμικροῦ χρόνου τῷ βίῳ λοιποῦ ὄντος, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, ἐτόλμησας οὕτω γλίσχρως^ι ἐπιθυμεῖν ζῆν, νόμους τοὺς μεγίστους παραβάς, οὐδεὶς δὲ ἐρεῖ; ἴσως, ἂν μὴ τινα λυπῆς· εἰ

δὲ μή, κ' ἀκούσει, ὦ Σώκρατες, πολλὰ καὶ ἀνάξια σαυτοῦ. ὑπερχόμενος δὴ βιώσει πάντας ἀνθρώπους καὶ δουλεύων¹ τί ποιῶν ἢ εὐωχούμενος ἐν Θετταλίᾳ, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ δεῦπνον ἀποδεδημηκῶς εἰς Θετταλίαν; λόγοι δὲ ἐκεῖνοι οἱ περὶ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς ποῦ ἡμῖν ἔσονται; Ἄλλὰ δὴ τῶν παιδῶν ἕνεκα βούλει² ζῆν, ἵνα αὐτοὺς ἐκθρέψῃς καὶ παιδεύσῃς; τί δαί; εἰς Θετταλίαν αὐτοὺς ἀγαγὼν θρέψῃς τε καὶ παιδεύσεις, ξένους ποιήσας, ἵνα καὶ τοῦτό σου ἀπολαύσωσιν;³ ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐ, αὐτοῦ⁴ δὲ τρεφόμενοι σοῦ ζῶντος βέλτιον θρέφονται καὶ παιδεύονται, μὴ ξυνότος σοῦ αὐτοῖς; οἱ γὰρ ἐπιτήδειοι οἱ σοὶ ἐπιμελήσονται αὐτῶν. πότερον ἔαν εἰς Θετταλίαν⁵ ἀποδημήσῃς, ἐπιμελήσονται· ἔαν δὲ εἰς Αἴδου ἀποδημήσῃς, οὐχὶ ἐπιμελήσονται; εἴπερ γέ τι ὄφελος αὐτῶν ἔστι τῶν σοι φασκόντων ἐπιτηδείων εἶναι οἴεσθαι γε χρή.

XVI. Ἄλλ' ὦ Σώκρατες, πειθόμενος ἡμῖν τοῖς σοῖς τροφεῦσι μήτε παῖδας περὶ πλείονος ποιοῦ μήτε τὸ ζῆν μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ δικαίου,⁶ ἵνα εἰς Αἴδου ἔλθων ἔχῃς ταῦτα πάντα ἀπολογήσασθαι τοῖς ἐκεῖ ἄρχουσιν· οὔτε γὰρ ἐνθάδε⁷ σοι φαίνεται ταῦτα πράττοντι⁸ ἄμεινον εἶναι⁹ οὐδὲ δικαιοῦτερον οὐδὲ ὀσιώτερον, οὐδὲ ἄλλω τῶν σῶν οὐδενί, οὔτε ἐκεῖσε ἀφικομένω ἄμεινον ἔσται. ἀλλὰ νῦν μὲν¹⁰ ἡδικημένος ἄπει, ἔαν ἀπίης, οὐχ ὑφ' ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἀλλ' ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων ἔαν δὲ ἐξέλθῃς οὕτως αἰσχρῶς ἀνταδικήσας τε καὶ ἀντικακουργήσας, τὰς σαυτοῦ ὁμολογίας τε καὶ ξυνηθήκας τὰς πρὸς ἡμᾶς παραβάς καὶ κακὰ ἐργασάμενος τούτους, οὗς ἤκιστα ἔδει, σαυτόν τε καὶ φίλους καὶ πατρίδα καὶ ἡμᾶς, ἡμεῖς τέ σοι χαλεπανοῦμεν ζῶντι, καὶ ἐκεῖ οἱ ἡμέτεροι ἀδελφοὶ οἱ ἐν Αἴδου νόμοι

οὐκ εὐμενῶς σε ὑποδέχονται, εἰδότες, ὅτι καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐπεχείρησας ἀπολέσαι τὸ σὸν μέρος. ἀλλὰ μὴ σε πείσῃ Κρίτων ποιεῖν ἃ λέγει μᾶλλον ἢ ἡμεῖς.

XVII. Ταῦτα, ὦ φίλε ἐταῖρε Κρίτων, εὖ ἴσθι, ὅτι ἐγὼ δοκῶ ἀκούειν,^α ὥσπερ οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες τῶν αὐλῶν δοκοῦσιν ἀκούειν, καὶ ἐν ἐμοὶ αὕτη ἡ ἡχὴ τούτων τῶν λόγων βομβεῖ καὶ ποιεῖ μὴ δύνασθαι τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν ἀλλὰ ἴσθι, ὅσα γε τὰ νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα, ἐάν τι λέγῃς παρὰ ταῦτα,^β μάτην ἐρεῖς. ὁμως μέντοι εἴ τι οἶει πλέον ποιήσῃς, λέγε. ΚΡ. Ἄλλ' ὦ Σώκρατες οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν. ΣΩ. Ἐὰ τοίνυν, ὦ Κρίτων, καὶ πράττωμεν ταύτη, ἐπειδὴ ταύτη ὁ θεὸς ὑφηγεῖται.^γ



NOTES

ON THE

APOLOGY OF SOCRATES.

CHAP. I. * ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι.] Socrates might also have addressed the tribunal with the words ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί. But the style which he has actually adopted was one which was peculiarly pleasing to the Athenian ear, and simple as it is, partook of the nature of a compliment. For Ἀθηναῖος, in addition to its primary and obvious meaning, seems also to carry with it the notion of that urbanity and lettered refinement which was the characteristic of Athens. Compare what Socrates says in chapter xvii.: ὅτι, ὦ ἀριστεροὶ ἀνδρῶν, Ἀθηναῖος ὢν, πόλειώς τῆς μεγίστης καὶ εὐδοκιμωτάτης εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἰσχύν, κ.τ.λ. And in the like spirit Cicero contrasts the native of Athens with the boor. See de Offic. I. 1, and Epist. ad Divers. XV. 19. It is worthy of remark, however, that Socrates reserves the title of δικασταί for those who showed their superiority over jealousy and party-spirit by voting for his acquittal. See chap. xxxi. The words ἔτι μὲν ὑμεῖς πεπόνθατε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγορῶν may be thus translated: *How your minds have been impressed by the speeches of my accusers.* For the preposition ὑπὸ after a verb neuter, see Matth. Gr. § 496. 3. It may in all cases be so used when the state indicated by the verb is represented as the consequence of something said or done by another. The preposition *ab* is occasionally used in the same manner in Latin.

^b ἐγὼ δ' οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς—ἐπελαθόμεν] *As for me, I was well nigh forgetting myself while listening to them, i.e., was ready to fancy myself other than I really am; of course said ironically.* The same expression is used in Phædr. p. 228. A. εἰ ἐγὼ Φαῖδρον ἀγνοῶ, καὶ ἑμαντοῦ ἐπιλέλησμαι. Menexen. p. 235. C. μόγις ἀναμνησέσσομαι ἑμαντοῦ. For the ὑπὸ after a neuter verb, see the foregoing note.

^c ὡς ἔπος εἰπῆν] *that is, So to speak: One might almost say.* It refers to οὐδὲν εἰρήκασιν, *They have hardly uttered a word that is true.*

^d *αὐτῶν ἐν ἰθαύμασα*] On the partitive genitive *αὐτῶν*, see *Matth. Gr.* § 317. The meaning is, "one thing in those persons;" for *αὐτῶν* is masculine. *τῶν πολλῶν* also depends on *ἐν*. *But what astonished me above all in these persons, was the following particular one of the host of falsehoods which they told.*

^e *ὡς χρῆν ὑμᾶς εὐλ., μὴ—ἐξαπατηθῆτε*] The imperfect indicative indicates that the thing has not been as his accusers would have had it; i.e., that the insinuation has been disregarded by the dicasts. Compare *Matthiæ* § 505. obs. As Socrates is here putting himself in his enemies' position, and, indeed, quoting their words, we should naturally expect the optative *ἐξαπατηθείητε*, rather than the subjunctive. Hence Heindorf proposes our correcting accordingly. But nothing is commoner than this transition from the direct to the indirect mode of speech; and the use of the subjunctive enables us to realise more vividly the probability which appeared to present itself to the mind of the speaker whose words are quoted. See *Matth.* § 518.

^f *ἔπειδ' ἂν μὴδ' ὀπωσιούν*] The particle *ὄν*, attached to relative pronouns and adverbs, has about the force of the Latin *cunq̄ue*. Thus *ὀποῖος* is *qualis*; *ὀποιοσοῦν*, *qualis cunq̄ue*; *ὅπως* is *quomodo*; *ὀπωσοῦν*, *quocunq̄ue modo*. Accordingly, *μὴδ' ὀπωσιούν* will be *ne minime quidem, not in the very least*. A little further on occurs the formula *εἰ μὴ ἄρα*, about equivalent to the Latin *nisi forte, unless perchance*; used ironically here, of course.

^g *ὅ κατὰ τοὺτους εἶναι ῥήτωρ*] That is, *If this be their definition of an orator, I must needs confess that, unlike them, I am an orator, seeing I speak only the truth*. The very plausible conjecture of Muretus, that the *ὅ* should be omitted, is, therefore, rendered entirely unnecessary. Socrates agrees with his opponents in their (assumed) *theory* of the duties of an orator, but not in their practice.

^h *ἢ ἢ τὶ ἢ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς εἰρήκασιν*] That is, *They have said little or nothing that is true*. For the formula here used, compare *Xen. Cyr.* VII. 5, 45. *τούτων τῶν περιεστηκότων ἢ τινὰ ἢ οὐδένα οἶδα*. *Ælian de Nat. Anim.* VI. 50. *ἴσασιν Αἰγυπτίων ἢ τις ἢ οὐδεὶς*. See *Matth. Gr.* § 487, 8. *πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν* must be taken in the concrete sense, *the whole matter as it really stands*.

ⁱ *κεκαλλιεπημένους γὰρ λόγους—*] *Καλλιεπεῖν* signifies *to speak gracefully and elegantly*. Accordingly, *λόγοι κεκαλλιεπημένοι ῥήμασι τε καὶ ὀνόμασι* are speeches composed of graceful sen-

tences and elegant words. For *ρήματα* and *δνόματα* differ in this, that the latter are simply *nouns by themselves*; the former, nouns or *subjects with their predicates*. Socrates further adds the expressions *κεκοσμημένους*, i.e., embellished with all the figures of oratory.—*εἰκῆ*, at random, i.e., *extemporaneously*. The idea is more fully carried out in the words immediately subjoined, *τοῖς ἐπιτυχούσιν δνόμασι*, i.e., *with such words as offer themselves unsought*. Fischer is undoubtedly wrong in supposing that by *τὰ ἐπιτυχόντα δνόματα*, Socrates meant *common and trite words*.

^k *δίκαια εἶναι ἃ λέγω*] Socrates is conscious of having right on his side, and therefore feels little anxiety about the precise words he shall make use of, or the form which his speech is to take.—*τῆδε τῆ ἡλικίᾳ*, to an old man like me; for the abstract is here as often used for the concrete. Hence the *ὥσπερ μαιρακίῳ*, which is immediately subjoined. Socrates was seventy years of age at the time of his trial and death. See a little farther on in this chapter. *πλάττειν λόγους* is to *frame one's words artificially*, to speak like a rhetorician. Compare Demosth. de Coron. p. 268. ed. R. *τί λόγους πλάττεις*;—*εἰς ὑμῖς εἰσιέναι* is equivalent to *εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον εἰσιέναι*. For *εἰς* is not simply identical in meaning with *πρός*. Similarly, in Chap. XIX., we have *ἀναβαίνων εἰς τὸ πλῆθος*, i.e., ascending the bema to *speak before them*.

^l *καὶ παρίεμαι*] The verb *παρίεμαι* is pretty nearly synonymous with *δέομαι* or *παραιτοῦμαι*. Literally, *I bring over to myself*, or *try to do so*: hence *I beg*, or *entreat*.

^m *καὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν*] That is, at the bankers' tables in the agora. The reading, *καὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν*, is manifestly incorrect; for there is no doubt that the *τράπεζαι* referred to were in the *ἀγορᾷ*. The *καὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ* is answered to by the *καὶ ἄλλοθι*, which follows almost immediately afterwards. The benches of the *τραπέζιται* would be chiefly frequented by the wealthier citizens, to whom Socrates thus appeals for confirmation of his assertions; and the dicasts were probably most of them of this class.

ⁿ *καὶ ἄλλοθι*] That is, in the workshops of artisans, in the gymnasia, etc. Compare Xen. Mem. I. 1, 10. *πρωτὶ τε γὰρ εἰς τοὺς περιπάτους καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια ἦμι, καὶ πληθούσης ἀγορᾶς ἐκεῖ φανερόν ἦν*, κ. τ. λ.

^o *μήτε θορυβεῖν*] The verb *θορυβεῖν* is said of bustle and confusion of every kind, as when the dicasts mutter to one another, and speak loud enough to be heard. *Μὴ θορυβεῖτε* is an

established formula of the orators, when they are about to say anything which may be displeasing to their auditors. See Chap. V. in two places.

^p ἔτη γεγονώς πλείω ἐβδομήκοντα] There is no necessity that ἦ should be added after πλείω. See Matth. Gr. § 455. 4. Ser-ranus translates "more than sixty years old;" so that he appears to have read πλείω ἐξήκοντα; and we have the testimony of Laertius II. 45, that some alleged Socrates to have been put to death at the age of sixty. But see Crito, Chap. XIV.

^q ἔνως ἔχω τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως] On this use of the genitive see Matth. § 337.—ἢ ἐνθάδε λέξεις, style of speaking customary in courts of justice.

^r ὥσπερ οὖν ἄν, εἰ] It must not be supposed that in this and like cases, the ἄν is to be referred to the protasis of the sentence. It belongs to the verb in the apodosis; but by its being placed thus prominently at the beginning of the sentence, the reader is beforehand apprised of its hypothetical character. It is, however, generally repeated with the verb of the apodosis. The passage before us is, therefore, to be understood as if it were written: ὥσπερ οὖν ἄν ξυνεγιγνώσκειτε δήκου μοι, εἰ τῷ ὄντι ξένος, κ. τ. λ. Comp. Gorg., p. 447. D. p. 479. A. ὥσπερ ἄν εἰ τις τοῖς μεγίστοις νοσήμασι συνισχόμενος φοβούμενος, ὥσπερ-ρανεί παῖς, κ. τ. λ., where ὥσπερρανεί παῖς must be explained as equivalent to ὥσπερ ἄν φοβοῖτο εἰ παῖς εἴη. Similarly Xen. Cyr. I. 3. 1. ἡσπάζετο αὐτὸν ὥσπερ ἄν εἰ τις πάλαι συντεθραμμένος ἀσπάζοιτο, i. e., ὥσπερ ἄν τις ἀσπάζοιτο, εἰ πάλαι συντεθραμμένος ἀσπάζοιτο.

^s ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ φωνῇ—ἐτεθράμμη] That is, in my own mother tongue or dialect. Socrates is here referring to the δίκαι ἀπὸ συμβόλων, as they were called. See Dict. Antiqq. p. 1081. τοῦτο δίκαιον is the same as τοῦτο ὡς δίκαιόν τι, the δίκαιον being in apposition with τοῦτο, and not its proper substantive. See Matthiæ Gr. § 470. In the same manner in c. 5. ταυρί μοι δοκεῖ δίκαια λέγειν ὁ λέγων.

^t αὐτῇ ἀρετῇ] If the article is preserved, the words are to be thus connected: αὐτῇ ἢ ἀρετῇ (that is, that he see whether the truth be spoken or not) δικαστοῦ ἐστίν; this virtue belongs to a judge, is proper to a judge. If the article is omitted: for this is the virtue of a judge. For when the pronoun is the subject, and the substantive the predicate, the article is omitted.

II. * δίκαιός εἰμι ἀπολογήσασθαι] On this construction see

Matth. § 296. A participle is sometimes employed in cases of this kind; see Chap. X., about the middle, *κατάδηλοι γίγονται προσποιούμενοι*. A little further the construction is *πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα κατηγορημένα μου ψευδή*.

^b *καὶ πάλαι πολλά ἤδη ἔτη*] The words *πολλά ἔτη* are added for the purpose of determining more precisely the meaning of *πάλαι*; since *πάλαι* is not always used of time long since past, but often also of a short space of time, of years, months, days, &c. The Latin *dudum* and *jamdudum* are used in the same manner. The words are to be thus connected: *καὶ πάλαι πολλά ἤδη ἔτη λέγοντες καὶ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς λέγοντες*, the sense being: *For there have been many accusers of me before you, who, though they have accused me for a long time past,—now many years,—have not brought forward a word of truth.*

^c *ἢ τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἄνυτον*] That is, Anytus and his associates, Meletus and Lycon. See Matth. § 272. Anytus, in particular, is mentioned, because he was the most formidable and bitter enemy of Socrates: he had acquired great popularity by his conduct during the time of the Thirty Tyrants. For some further particulars respecting him, see Chap. X., note i.

^d *ἀλλ' ἐκείνοι δεινότεροι—*] Socrates appears to refer to the accusations which Aristophanes and the other comic poets, as Eupolis, &c., had brought against him. See Chap. III.

^e *τὰ τε μετέωρα φροντιστής κ. τ. λ.*] *φροντιστής* having the same signification as *φροντίζων*, takes the accusative. With regard to the charge which is here positively denied, see also Aristoph. *Nubes*, vv. 100, 189, etc. Xenophon tells us that Socrates discountenanced the pursuit of the study of astronomy, deeming it of no practical utility. "And yet," he adds, "he was not uninformed in relation to these matters" (*καίτοι οὐδὲ τούτων ἀνήκοος ἦν*). It would seem, therefore, that he must in his earlier days have paid some attention to this and kindred subjects; and, indeed, Xenophon tells us in the same chapter (*Mem.* IV. 7. 3), that he was possessed of a knowledge of geometry. The physical speculations in the *Phædo*, Chap. 58 and following, must be ascribed to Plato, and perhaps, also, the reference to Anaxagoras's lecture (*ib.* c. 46).

^f *καὶ τὸν ἦττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶ*] See Aristoph. *Nubes*, v. 99 foll. Cicero in *Brutus*, c. 8. *docere, quemadmodum causa inferior dicendo fieri superior possit*. Gell. *N. A. V.* c. 3. *docere, quam verborum industria causa infirmior fiat fortior.*

ε. ταύτην τὴν φήμην κατασκεδάσαντες] Heindorf thought we ought to read: οἱ ταύτην τ. φ. κ. But there is no need of the article, since the participle is used not to define the class, but to express the reason why that class of accusers was most dangerous to Socrates. "Those persons," he says, "because they have spread abroad that report, are formidable and dangerous accusers."

^h οὐδὲ θεοὺς νομίζουσιν] That is, not even believe that there are gods.

ⁱ ἐν ᾗ ἂν μάλιστα ἐπιστεύσατε] *And these things they told you too, at the age when you were above all likely to lend an ear to them?*

^k ἀτεχνῶς ἐρήμην κατηγο.] ἐρήμη (δική) is a cause heard in the absence of the accused, who fails to appear in court. See Dict. Antiq., p. 404. The defendant was then said εἰς τὴν κυρίαν μὴ ὀφθῆναι or μὴ ἀπαντῆσαι. Accordingly ἐρήμην κατηγορεῖν is to *accuse an absent defendant, when he has forfeited his recognisance.*

^l φθόνῳ καὶ διαβολῇ χρώμενοι] That is, φθονοῦντες καὶ διαβάλλοντες. A little farther on follows οἱ δέ, as if οἱ μὲν had been inserted after οὗτοι δέ.

^m ἀπορώτατοι εἰσι] *The most impracticable*, that is, such as are the hardest of all to convince and expose.

ⁿ ἀναβιβάσασθαι—ἐντραυθοῖ] ἀναβιβάζειν is to *order any one to ascend, to produce any one*, that is, on account of another, or by the order of another, or for the advantage of another. ἀναβιβάζεσθαι is to do the same thing on one's own account, and for one's own purpose. It is therefore obvious why Plato used the middle voice. In the following words, σκιμαχεῖν ἀπολογούμενον are in immediate connection, and form one compound idea, so that τὲ is correctly subjoined to them; and the corresponding clause is ἐλέγχειν μηδενὸς ἀποκρινομένου. In exactly the same manner, Rep. V. p. 470. C. πολεμεῖν μαχομένους τε φήσομεν καὶ πολεμίους φύσει εἶναι.

^o ἀξιώσατε οὖν καὶ ὑμεῖς] That is, *do you also then consider.* The word ἀξιοῦν has been ably illustrated by Buttmann, Demosth. in Midiam, p. 165.

^p Ἐλεν, ἀπολογητέον δῆ] In Attic Greek the word εἰεν is used to signify that the writer or speaker does not wish to say more on what has preceded, but to pass to other things. Sometimes, also, it simply indicates a transition, as in Chap. III.

^a ἐξελεῖσθαι τὴν διαβολήν] That is, *to remove from your minds this prejudice against me*, as in Chap. X., line 9 from end. For διαβολή means *prejudice, suspicion, produced by false accusations*. Hesychius: Διαβολή ὑπόπτεισις ἢ ὑπόληψις. And since Socrates, in removing this ill opinion of the judges concerning himself, consulted his own advantage, and did himself a service, it is easy to see why Plato wrote ἐξελεῖσθαι, not ἐξελεῖν. In the words ταύτην ἐν οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ observe the emphasis of the sentence, which lies partly in the pronoun ταύτην, partly in the opposition of the words ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ and ἐν οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ. Compare c. X.

^r τοῦτο οὕτω γενέσθαι] The words οὕτω γενέσθαι are more accurately defined by the following words: καὶ πλεον τι με ποιῆσαι ἀπολογούμενον, *that I might do something more, that is, not only divest you of your bad opinion of me, but inspire you with a favourable one*. On the formula ἀμεινόν ἐστιν, see observations on Crito, c. XVI., note (^d).

III. * Μέλῃός με ἐγράψατο τὴν γραφήν ταύτην] See Euthyphro, p. 5, where is found γραφήν σί τις, ὡς ἔοικε, γέγραπται. For it is correct to say, γράφεσθαι γραφήν: also to say, γράφεσθαι τινα: and hence, by the union of both constructions, has arisen γράφεσθαι γραφήν τινα. The accusation against Socrates was a γραφή, inasmuch as his alleged offence was not one that affected any individual in particular. A private suit is properly called δίκη.

^b ὡς περ οὖν κατηγορῶν—αὐτῶν] The sense is: *their indictment, like the information of accusers properly so called, ought to be recited*. Ἀνωμοσία is properly the oath, either of the plaintiff, when he swears that he brings the accusation for just causes and without calumny; or of the accused, when he swears that he is innocent. Further, this term is applied to the written formula of accusation, which is given in to the judge by the plaintiff: in which signification it is also found in Chap. XI.

^c περιεργάζεται] περιεργάζεσθαι is properly *to treat any subject minutely, to bestow too much attention on anything*. Hence it signifies, as in this passage, *to attend to those things which do not in any way belong to you; to trouble yourself about frivolous, vain, and useless things*.

^d ἐν τῇ Ἀριστοφάνους κωμῳδίᾳ] The first edition of the Clouds appears to have been represented in the year 423 B.C. In the extant play, Socrates is represented as a foolish speculator

in celestial phenomena, who is borne about suspended in a basket, and who, when questioned by one Strepsiades as to his occupation in that elevated region, replies, ἀροβαρῶ καὶ περιφρονῶ τὸν ἥλιον. It has been too hastily concluded, that the odium excited against Socrates was to be ascribed to the impressions produced by this comedy. Twenty-four years had now elapsed since its performance, and even supposing it to have been the aim of the poet to expose the philosopher to ridicule, it was but very partially obtained; for the *Clouds* obtained but the third place at its first representation, and does not appear to have been any more successful at the second. Indeed, it would seem to be altogether erroneous to regard the comedy as in any sense an onslaught upon Socrates personally. The fact would seem to be, that the acquaintance which the comic poet had with the character and tenets of Socrates was superficial, and formed at second hand. Aristophanes was a man whose sympathies lay strongly with the sturdy morals and politics of the Athenians of an earlier time—"the men of Marathon," as he delighted to designate them; and he regarded the speculators in nature and ethics, whose lectures formed the great attraction of the young in his day, as the class to whose influence was mainly traceable the degeneracy of his own time. He seized, with a bold hand, upon the salient features of the teaching of these men; and, with the freedom of a popular poet, cared more for the pungency of his illustrations than for their applicability in every particular to the precise individuals whom he singled out as the scapegoats of his satire. Moreover, the intimacy which existed between Socrates and Euripides, the freedom of whose physical and theological speculations was notorious, gave Aristophanes a handle to work with, by means of which he could lend a double efficacy to his representations. It is possible that the two men learned to understand each other better in the course of time; at any rate, the subsequent plays of Aristophanes contain no further ridicule of Socrates, though, doubtless, opportunities for it would have been found or made if they had been desired.

* ὡς—περί] Remark the preposition *περί* removed a good distance from its noun. The word *ἐκράτειν* is constructed either with a simple genitive, or with the preposition *περί* and a genitive.

† καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἀτιμάζων—] The words are to be taken ironically in this sense: *Nor do I say this with any intention of casting*

a reflection upon such science as this, if there be any that are wise in such matters : no, indeed ; may I never be prosecuted by Meletus on so grievous a charge ! The form *δίκεν φεύγειν* is to be accused, to be prosecuted, and is opposed to the word *διώκειν*, which signifies to accuse. And since *φεύγειν* is the same as *διώκεισθαι*, it is easy to see why it should be construed as a passive. Compare note [a], Chap. I. The ellipsis *ἀλλὰ γὰρ* may be filled up something as follows: *ἀλλ' ἐκείνο οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει* (i.e., the so-called indictment is without foundation) *οὐ γὰρ ἔμοι τούτων οὐδὲν μίτεσσι.*

^s *καὶ ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς—*] That is, I request that you yourselves would explain to one another.

^b *καὶ ἐκ τούτων γνώσεσθε*] Namely, *ἐκ τοῦ διδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν κ. τ. λ.*

IV. ^a *Ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὔτε τούτων οὐδὲν ἔστιν οὐδέ γ'—*] He proceeds to another accusation made against him by his adversaries, that for his instruction he exacted money from his pupils. See Aristoph. Nub. v. 98. *οὔτε γε* is properly followed by *οὐδέ*, since the latter clause is emphatic. It is as if he had said: *No, nor has this charge any truth about it either.*

^b *καὶ χρήματα πράττομαι*] Is the same as *μισθὸν τῆς συνουσίας πράττεσθαι*, to lay a charge on one's company, in Xenoph. Mem. I. 2. 60., in which passage Xenophon bears witness that Socrates never received any remuneration from his pupils.

^c *ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτό γέ μοι—*] It is clear that this is said in bitter irony, in order to stigmatise the avarice of the Sophists. Yet there have been some persons who have supposed that it was said seriously.

^d *εἰ τις οἶός τ' εἴη*] On this construction, Matth. §. 524. Obs. 3. There is a peculiar appropriateness and refinement in this transition to the purely hypothetical form.—Gorgias, the Sophist, disciple of Empedocles and preceptor of Isocrates, was born at Leontini, a town in Sicily, about 480 B.C. He did much to raise the study of rhetoric by his discoveries; according to Suidas, he was the first to reduce it to the form of a science. His eloquence in extemporaneous speaking procured for him signal honours from all Greece, and particularly from Athens, where he resided for many years. He is said to have followed the example of Protagoras, in exacting a hundred minæ from each of his pupils. See especially the dialogue of Plato, inscribed Gorgias. *Prodicus* [flourished about B.C. 435] was a native of Ceos, one of

the Cyclades. He bestowed much labour on distinguishing and explaining the signification of words. As his authority for refusing to teach any gratis, he is said to have been ever ready with a motto from Epicharmus: *ἂ δὲ χεῖρ τᾶν χεῖρα νίζει· δός τι καὶ λαβέ τι*. Hippias was a native of Elis, a city in the Peloponnesus; Cicero has given some particulars concerning him in the *De Orat.* III. c. 32. and *Brut.* c. 8. Compare also Plato's dialogue inscribed with the name of Hippias.

* *τούτους πείθουσι*] These words afford a remarkable instance of *ἀνακολουθία*. For as *οἷός τ' ἐστίν* goes before, an infinitive ought now to follow. But *πείθουσι* is used as if the writer forgot or ignored the foregoing *οἷός τ' ἐστίν*. *ξυνεῖναι* and *ξυνουσία* refer to learning and instruction, as is frequently the case: whence disciples are often called *οἱ ξυνόντες*.

[†] *ἀνὴρ ἐστὶ Πάριος*] Namely, Evenus, of the Isle of Paros. The subsequent words, *ὃν ἐγὼ ᾗσθόμην ἐπιδημοῦντα*, are to be understood thus: *whom I once understood to be staying in our city*. Socrates means that he had not seen Evenus himself, but had heard from Callias what he is about to say of him.

‡ *ὃς τετέλεκε πλ.*] That is, *who has paid more money to the Sophists than any single individual of the whole class who attend their lessons*. The old reading *τετέλεκει* is bad, being altogether opposed to the construction of the sentence.

[‡] *Καλλίᾳ, τῷ Ἰππονίκου*] The wealth of Callias was so great, that he was called, according to Plutarch, simply *ὁ πλούσιος*. It is evident, from many passages, that the Sophists found in him a very profitable customer. See *Protagor.* p. 314. B.C. *Hipp. Maj.* p. 218. B. *Xenoph. Sympos.* 1. 5. An account of this wealthy family is given in Bœckh's 'Public Economy of Athens,' Vol. II. p. 242. foll. (*Eng. Trans.*)

[‡] *μισθώσασθαι*] *μισθοῦν* to let or hire to another, = locare; *μισθοῦσθαι* to procure services for hire, = conducere, redimere.

[‡] *πέντε μνῶν*] An Attic mina consisted of 100 Attic drachmæ. Evenus, therefore, demanded a comparatively trifling remuneration for his wisdom, since it is recorded that Protagoras, Gorgias, and others, received 100 minæ.

[‡] *εἰ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔχει*] Concerning the construction, see *Matth.* § 529. 5. Socrates has recourse to the *oratio recta*, in order to repeat the very words in which he congratulated Callias. Such a transition is often made when the writer wishes to set a thing more vividly before the minds of his readers. The words *καὶ*

οὕτως ἰμμελῶς seem to have a double meaning, referring, on the one hand, to the propriety and elegance of the lessons given by Evenus; and, on the other, to the moderate price, τῶν πέντε μνῶν. For ἰμμελές is said of anything which does not depart from a proper medium. It is a metaphor taken from musicians who keep tune and time in playing or singing. There is a refinement of banter in these words, which is far more telling than if Socrates had said without disguise, οὕτως εὐτελῶς, *so cheaply*.

^a ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ ἐπίσταμαι] That is, ἀλλ' οὐ δύναμαι καλλύνεσθαι καὶ ἀβρύνεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ ἐπίσταμαι. Compare Chap. III. note [f].

V. ^a οὐ γὰρ δήπου σοῦ γε οὐδέν] Compare c. XXXII. οὐ δήπου τοῦτου γε ἔνεκα οἱ ἐκεῖ ἀποκτείνουσι.

^b οὐδέν τῶν ἄλλων περιττότερον] That is, *if you were doing nothing out of the common way*. A little further, ἔπειτα is introduced after the participle, a usage of frequent occurrence, on which, see Buttm. Gr. Gr. § 131. not. 6. and § 136. The words εἰ μὴ τι ἐπραττες κ. τ. λ., are clearly redundant, being but a repetition of the notion contained in the foregoing clause, οὐδέν τῶν ἄλλων κ. τ. λ.; but they serve to bring out the meaning with greater emphasis. Such phrases, added *per epezegetin*, are of frequent occurrence in Greek classical authors.

^c περὶ σοῦ αὐτοσχεδιάζωμεν] αὐτοσχεδιάζειν, properly said of those who say or do anything suddenly and on the impulse of the moment, is here applied to judges who form a hasty decision.

^d πεποιθεὶ τό τε ὄνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολήν] τὸ ὄνομα refers to the fame of Socrates for wisdom, as is said a little further on, τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ἔσχηκα: and ἡ διαβολή refers to the calumnies and accusations of his adversaries. Muretus compares the phrase ποιῆν ὄνομα with the Latin 'famam conficere.'

^e εὐ μέντοι ἴστε, πᾶσαν—ἔρω] Crito, Chap. XVII. Ἄλλὰ ἴσθι, ὅσα γε τὰ νῦν ἔμοι δοκοῦντα, εἴαν τι λέγῃς παρὰ ταῦτα, μάτην ἔρεῖς. Apol. Chap. XVII. ταῦτα γὰρ κελεύει—εὐ ἴστε. Many similar examples have been collected. See Jacobs ad Athen., p. 271.

^f μείζω τινὰ ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπων] That is, *may have a greater wisdom than falls to the lot of man*. Compare Matth. Gr. Gr. § 149. The words ἢ οὐκ ἔχω, τί λέγω are said ironically: *the Sophists have either divine wisdom, or none*.

^g ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τῇ ἐμῇ λέγει] That is, *for the purpose of*

calumniating me. For *ἐπι* indicates an object aimed at. Compare Matth. Gr. Gr, § 585. For this use of the possessive pronoun instead of the personal, compare Homer. Odys. XI. 202. *σὸς πόθος, a longing for thee.* So, too, Iliad XIX. v. 336. *ἐμὴν ἀγγελίην, i. e., περὶ ἐμοῦ.* Plat. Gorg. p. 476. *ἐννοία τῇ σῷ, from goodwill towards you.* See Matth. § 466. 2. Compare Sallust Jug. c. 14. Vos in mea injuria despecti estis. And likewise Livy, II. 1. has used regium metum for metum regis; and III. 16. terrorem servilem for terrorem servorum.

^h *μέγα λέγειν*] That is, *to say something boastful.* Socrates deprecates the odium which he was in danger of exciting against himself, by declaring that the words he is about to quote are those of the Delphian god.

ⁱ *ἀξιώχρεων*] Which is properly said of one who is solvent, and, therefore, worthy to have money intrusted to him. In the same manner *locuples* in Latin is used of a witness worthy of credit. Hesych.: *ἀξιώχρεως, ἀξίόπιστος.* Suid.: *ἀξιώχρεως, ἱκανός, ἐχέγγυος, ἀξίόπιστος.*

^k *τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς—καὶ οἷα*] That is, *παρέξομαι γὰρ ὑμῖν τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς μάρτυρα τῆς ἐμῆς σοφίας, εἰ δὴ τίς ἐστίν, καὶ οἷα ἐστίν.*

^l *Χαιρεφῶντα γὰρ—*] Chærephon's energetic and enthusiastic character is caricatured by Aristoph. Nubes v. 104. v. 501 sq., upon which passages see the remarks of the scholiast. See, too, Xenoph. Memorab. II. 3. Plat. Gorg. 447.

^m *καὶ ὑμῶν τῷ πλήθει ἐταῖρος*] Reference is made to the flight of the Athenians in the time of the Thirty Tyrants. The words *κατιέναι, κατέρχασθαι* are very often used in speaking of those who return to their native country from exile. See Aristoph. Ran. 1274; Herod. III. 45. and Porson on Eurip. Med. 1011.

ⁿ *ἐτόλμησε τοῦτο μαντεύσασθαι*] *μαντεύεσθαι* here is, to request an oracle to be delivered to him, that is, *to consult, to inquire,* as in Xenoph. Memor. I. 1. 6. *περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀδῆλων, ὅπως ἀν ἀποβήσοιτο, μαντευσομένους ἔπεμπεν, εἰ ποιητέα.—ὑπερ λέγω· i. e., as *afonensaid.* See Chap. I., note [°].*

^o *ἤγρεο γὰρ δὴ, εἴ τις*] Respecting this act of Chærephon, see Xenoph. Apolog. 14. and Laert. II. 37.

^p *ἀνείλεν οὖν ἡ Πυθία*] The words of the Pythian priestess were, according to Laert. II. 37. *Ἀνδρῶν ἀπάντων Σωκράτης σοφώτατος.* In the Scholiast on Aristoph. Nubes v. 144. they appear thus: *Σοφός Σοφοκλῆς, σοφώτερος δ' Εὐριπίδης· Ἀνδρῶν*

δι πάντων Σωκράτης σοφώτατος. Xenophon (Apol. 14) gives them in a slightly different form.

^q ὁ ἀδελφός—αὐτοῦ] Chærecrates. See Xenoph. Mem. II. 3.

VI. * ξύνοῦσα ἑμαυτῷ σοφός ὢν] By a different construction, Chap. VIII, the participle is attracted into the case of the reflexive pronoun: ἑμαυτῷ ξυνήδειν οὐδὲν πισταμένῳ. See Matth. § 548. 2.

^b οὐ γὰρ θέμις αὐτῷ] Compare De Republ. II. p. 383. B. κομιδῇ ἄρα ὁ θεός ἀπλοῦν, καὶ ἀληθές ἐν τε ἔργῳ καὶ ἐν λόγῳ. And the sentiment may easily be paralleled from other authors.

^c ἠπόρουν, τί ποτε λέγει] There is here a transition from the *oratio obliqua* to a direct address: whence also τί, not ὅ τι, is used. See Matth. § 529. 5. and above, c. IV. note (!).

^d διασκοπῶν οὖν τοῦτον—καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ, ἔδοξέ μοι] The sentence may be thus rendered: *Now, upon studying the character of the man,—there is no need to mention him by name; but it was one of your statesmen, men of Athens, with whom I was so impressed;—and upon conversing with him, I was led to the conclusion, &c.* The usage of the participle in the nominative case with the verb ἔδοξε, where the strict grammatical construction would require the dative, is not uncommon. It comes under the head of *constructio κατὰ σύνεσιν*, or *κατὰ τὸ σημαίνόμενον*; for ἔδοξέ μοι is naturally equivalent to the English, *I was led to the conclusion—I thought to myself.* Compare De Legg. III. p. 686. D. ἀποβλέψας γὰρ πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν στόλον, οὐκ ἐπι διαλεγόμεθα, ἔδοξέ μοι πάγκαλος εἶναι. Xenoph. Hell. VII. 5. 18. ἐνθυμούμενος, ὅτι—ἔδοκει αὐτῷ. Cyrop. VI. 1. 18. βουλόμενος πέμψαι—ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ. In the same way in Latin, Hirt. De bello Afric. c. 25. Dum hæc ita fierent, rex Iuba, cognitis difficultatibus copiarumque paucitate, non est visum, &c.

^e πρὸς ἑμαυτὸν—ἐλογιζόμεν] That is, *I reasoned with myself*, as Phædo, c. 45. πρὸς ἑμαυτὸν σκεψάμενος, and Euthyphro, p. 9. B. πρὸς ἑμαυτὸν σκοπῶ.

^f σμερῶ τινι αὐτῷ τούτῳ σοφώτερος εἶναι] Cic. Academ. 1. 4. Socrates—ita disputat, ut—nihil se scire dicat nisi id ipsum, eoque præstare ceteris, quod illi quæ nesciant scire se putent, ipse se nihil scire id unum sciat; ob eamque causam se arbitrari ab Apolline omnium sapientissimum esse dictum, quod hæc esset una hominis sapientia, non arbitrari sese scire quod nesciat. The sense is: *I think I am a little wiser than this man, at least in this, that what I am ignorant of, I do not even fancy I know.*

VII. * ὅτι ἀπηχθανόμεν] The words belong not only to δειώς, but also to αισθανόμενος and λυπούμενος. The sense is: *Though seeing with sorrow that I was rendering myself the object of hatred, and apprehensive of what might be the consequences, it yet appeared to me a necessity to yield to the claims of the god the precedence over all others.* On τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, see Matth. § 284.

^b ἰτεόν οὖν, σκοποῦντι] Socrates relates to the judges what he said and thought at the time spoken of. *I must go then, I said to myself* (for this is implied in the preceding ἰδόκει), *to find out what is the meaning of the oracle, &c.* The reading *καὶ ἵνα* σκοποῦντι, which appears in the old editions, gives a feebleness to the sentence, and might easily have arisen from a correction. We have, therefore, agreed with Bekker in rejecting it. In one MS., which has preserved the true reading, we find in the margin *καὶ ἵνα*.

^c *καὶ νῆ τὸν κύνα*] There are various opinions respecting the custom of Socrates of swearing *by the dog* and other animals, which have been collected by Menagius, Laert. II. 40. p. 92. foll. and Pet. Petitus Observatt. Miscell. 4. 7. These writers thought that *by the dog* was to be understood the *daemonium* of Socrates. Ioach. Camerarius Opusc. de R. R. p. 28, thought that the dog was the symbol of faith, and, therefore, that the oath *νῆ τὸν κύνα* nearly answered to the Latin *medius fidius*. But Socrates swears not only *by the dog*, but *by the goose* and the *oak*; and it would appear as if some scruple led him to avoid the frequent mention of the names of the gods themselves. Compare Arist. Vesp. 83. *μὰ τὸν κύν', ὃ Νικόστρατε* on which the Scholiast remarks: *τὰχα μμεῖται τοὺς φιλοσόφους εἰς κύνα καὶ χῆνα ὀμνύοντας.*

^d *ἐπαθόν τι τοιοῦτον· οἱ μὲν μάλιστα*] Those sentences, which are subjoined to others for the purpose of explanation, which are added without connective particles. Gorg. p. 450. A. *καὶ μὴν καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι τέχνηαι, ὃ Γοργία, οὕτως ἔχουσι· ἐκάστη αὐτῶν περὶ λόγους ἐστὶ τούτους, οἳ τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες κ.τ.λ.* Ibid, p. 465. D. *τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου ἂν πολὺ ἦν, ὃ φίλε Πῶλε,—ὄμοῦ ἂν πάντα χρήματα ἐφύρετο.* Compare Phædo p. 68. E. *τί δ' οἱ κόσμοι αὐτῶν; οὐ ταῦτόν τοῦτο πεπόνθασιν· ἀκολασία τινὶ σῶφρονές εἰσι;* Legg. I. p. 635. D. *ἔνεκα τῆς γλυκυθυμίας τῆς πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς ταῦτόν πείσονται τοῖς ἠττωμένοις τῶν φόβων· δουλεύουσι σουσι τρόπον ἕτερον καὶ ἔτ' αἰσχίω.*

^e *ἵνα μοι καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος ἢ μαντεία γένοιτο*] Socrates says, that he did everything in his power in order to refute the oracle; but,

that after much trouble on his part, he even confirmed its truth so completely, that it was ἀνέλεγκτος, that is, *incapable of being convicted of error*. The *kai* before ἀνέλεγκτος renders it emphatic: *that the oracle might positively be, after all, irrefutable*.

^f ἄ μοι ἐδόκει—πεπραγματεῦσθαι αὐτοῖς] That is, *which appeared to have been composed by them with most care*. The imperfect διηρώτων joined with ἀν, denotes the repetition of the action. See Matth. § 599. 1.

^g οἱ παρόντες ἀν βέλτιον ἔλεγον περὶ ὧν αὐτοὶ ἐπεποιήκεσαν] *Pretty nearly every one of those who were present at these interviews could speak more to the point on the subjects of these poems than the poets themselves*. Wolf understands οἱ παρόντες of those to whom Socrates was now addressing himself; but if this were the meaning, we should rather have λέγοιεν. The imperfect with ἀν, as in the foregoing instance, indicates an action often repeated.

^h ὥσπερ οἱ θεομάντις καὶ οἱ χρησμοφδοί] Ion. p. 533. E. πάντες γὰρ οἱ τε τῶν ἐπῶν ποιηταὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ οὐκ ἐκ τέχνης, ἀλλ' ἐνθεοὶ ὄντες καὶ κατεχόμενοι πάντα τὰ καλὰ λέγουσι ποιήματα, καὶ οἱ μελοποιοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ὡσαύτως.—καὶ οὐ πρότερον οἷός τε ποιεῖν (ὁ ποιητής), πρὶν ἀν ἐνθεός τε γένηται καὶ ἐκφρων καὶ ὁ νοῦς μηκέτι ἐν αὐτῷ ἐνῆ. ἕως δ' ἀν τοῦτο ἔχῃ τὸ κτήμα, ἀδύνατός ἐστι ποιεῖν—καὶ χρησμοφδεῖν.

ⁱ ἡσθόμην αὐτῶν—εἶναι ἀνθρώπων] On the construction see Matth. § 349. 1. Compare § 549. 4. and § 536. —ἀ οὐκ ἦσαν, that is, σοφοί.

VIII. ^a τούτου μὲν οὐκ ἐψεύσθη] See Matth. § 338.

^b ὅπερ καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ δημιουργοί] Demosth. in Midiam, p. 514. ed. Reisk. ἐγὼ δ' ὅπερ ἀν καὶ ὑμῶν ἕκαστος ὑβρισθεὶς προεἶλετο πρᾶξαι, τοῦτο καὶ αὐτὸς ἐποίησα. Phædo p. 64. C. σκέψαι δὴ, ὦ ἀγαθέ, ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ σοὶ ξυνοκῆ ἅπερ καὶ ἐμοί.

^c καὶ τὰλλα τὰ μέγιστα σοφώτατος εἶναι] That is, *able to take a part in the management of the affairs of the state*. At the time of Socrates, many who had attained to wealth by their trade or business, were aspiring to the direction of public affairs. The absurd ambition of such persons is often made a subject of ridicule by Plato and Xenophon, as well as by the comic poets.

^d ἐκείνην τὴν σοφίαν ἀπέκρυπτεν] That is, *the error and folly of these men obscured their real knowledge*.

^e ἀνερωτᾶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ] That is, *on behalf of the*

oracle. Further on, the word *δέχεσθαι* signifies *to prefer, to choose*, as often elsewhere.

[*ἔμμηθῆς τὴν ἀμαθίαν*] *i. e., αὐτῶν.—δμψότερα.* understand *σοφίαν* and *ἀμαθίαν*.

IX. ^a *καὶ οἶαι χαλεπώταται*] That is, *by far the most grievous and severe.* For before *οἶαι* is to be understood *τοιαῦται*. Xenoph. Mem. IV. 8. 11. *ἰδόκει τοιοῦτος εἶναι, οἶος ἂν εἴη ἄριστός γε ἀνὴρ καὶ εὐδαιμονίστατος.* See Matth. § 461.

^b *ὄνομα δὲ τοῦτο λέγεσθαι, σοφός εἶναι*] The words *σοφός εἶναι* are added by way of explanation to the preceding. The usual construction would require *σοφὸν εἶναι*; Stallbaum resolves the anacoluthia by remarking that Plato writes as if *ἀπέχθῆς γέγονα* or the like had preceded, instead of *ἀπέχθεται γεγόνασι* κ. τ. λ. Perhaps, however, the nominative is rather used absolutely. It is usual to put *εἶναι* after a verb of naming; see Heindorf on Theætet. p. 160. *ὥστε εἶτε τις εἶναι τι ονομάζει.*

^c *τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει—σοφός εἶναι*] That is, *The truth would seem to be, that it is the Deity alone who is really wise.* With respect to the *τὸ δὲ*, compare Rep. I. p. 340. C. *λέγωμεν τῷ ῥήματι οὕτως, ὅτι ὁ ἱατρὸς ἐξήμαρτε καὶ ὁ γραμματιστής· τὸ δ', οἶμαι, ἕκαστος τούτων, καθ' ὅσον τοῦτ' ἐστίν, δ' προσαγορεύομεν αὐτόν, οὐδέποτε ἀμαρτάνει.* Menon. p. 97. D. *λέγοντες, ὅτι φρόνησις μόνον ἡγείται τοῦ ὀρθῶς πράττειν. τὸ δὲ ἄρα καὶ δόξα ἦν ἀληθής.* Theætet. p. 157. A. *ὥστε ἐξ ἀπάντων τούτων—οὐδὲν εἶναι ἐν αὐτῷ καθ' αὐτὸ, ἀλλὰ τιμὴ αἰεὶ γίνεσθαι—τὸ δ' οὐ δεῖ κ. τ. λ.,* on which see Heindorf. For *τὸ δὲ* the fuller expression *τὸ δὲ ἀληθές* is sometimes given. Rep. IV. p. 443. D. *τὸ δὲ γε ἀληθές, τοιοῦτον μὲν τι ἦν—ἡ δικαιοσύνη.* Tim. p. 86. D. *τὸ δὲ ἀληθές, ἢ περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια ἀκολασία—νόσος ψυχῆς γίγνεαι.* From the above passages, it is easy to arrive at a perception of the precise force of the formula: the *δὲ* indicates the contrast between the view now to be stated and some other which has been previously advanced.

^d *ὀλίγου τινός—καὶ οὐδενός*] Here *καὶ* before *οὐδενός* corrects and heightens the force of *ὀλίγου τινός*, in this sense: *human wisdom is of little value—I should rather say, of no value at all.* In the same way *μικρὰ καὶ οὐδὲν* in Demosth. p. 790. 20. and p. 260. 26. ed. Reisk. So, too, Theæt. 173. E. *ταῦτα πάντα ἡγησαμένη μικρὰ καὶ οὐδὲν.* The Latin writers use *atque* in exactly the same manner. See Matth. on Cicer. II. Catil. XII. 27. Manil. XVIII. 54.

* *καὶ φαίνεται τοῦτ' οὐ λέγειν τὸν Σωκράτη*] That is, *and he appears not to say this of Socrates*. The pronoun *τοῦτο* refers to what has gone before *τὸ σοφὸν εἶναι*. This sentence furnishes a good example of what is called the *accusativus de quo*, or *schemata Homericum*. Similarly Attic writers say *λέγειν τινά τι* for *λέγειν. περί τινός τι*. Compare, too, Crito Chap. VIII. *φροντιστίον, τί ἐροῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἡμᾶς*. Menon. p. 77. A. *ὑπερ φασὶ τοὺς συν- τρίβοντάς τι*. Aristoph. Acharn. v. 593. *ταυτὶ λέγεις σὺ τὸν στρατηγόν;* Ibid. v. 580. *τί δ' εἶπας ἡμᾶς; οὐκ ἐρεῖς;* Soph. Electr. v. 984. *τοιαῦτά τοι νῦν πᾶς τις ἔξερεῖ βροτῶν*.

† *ὥςπερ ἂν εἰ εἴποι*] On the construction of the words *ὥςπερ ἂν εἰ*, see Chap. I. note (r). In this passage, the complete sentence would be *ὥςπερ ἂν ποιοῖτο, εἰ εἴποι*. So that there can be little doubt that Stephens, Heindorf, and Bekker have done right in inserting *εἰ* after *ἂν*, although it is not found in the MSS.

‡ *καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ τῶν ξένων*] These genitives depend on the following *τινά*.

§ *τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν ἐνδείκνυμαι*] That is, *making it my object to vindicate the honour of the god, I demonstrate the fact that he is not a wise man*. The middle voice implies that he does this for his own satisfaction. Compare, also, c. XVII. note (u), where the same word occurs. The word *ἀσχολία*, Thom. Mag., interprets: *ἡ περί τι ἀναστροφή*, that is, *attention bestowed on anything*.

¶ *ἀλλ' ἐν πενία μυρία εἰμι*] *Πενία* differs from *πτωχεία*, in the same manner as Lat. *paupertas* from *egestas*. Accordingly, *πενία* is applied to artisans and other men of that description, who, by the labour of their hands, just earn enough to support life; but *πτωχεία* to beggars. See Aristoph. Plut. v. 552, sqq. and the commentators on the passage. *μυρία πενία* is *extreme poverty*: an expression which has been illustrated by Valckenaer on Phœniss. v. 1480. The poverty of Socrates is spoken of by himself, in Xenoph. Œconom. II. 3., where he says that he would sell his house and all his other property for five Attic minæ. Whence he was also commonly called *πένης*, as we learn from Xenoph. Œcon. II, 3.

X. * *οἱ τῶν πλουσιωτάτων*] Socrates seems to add this clause with a view to indicating more clearly the source of the odium that had been excited against him. Some commentators have, without sufficient reason, supposed the words to be a gloss. Compare Protagor. p. 328. C. *καὶ ταῦτα μάλιστα ποιοῦσιν οἱ*

μάλιστα δυνάμενοι (i. e., take care that their sons should be instructed), μάλιστα δὲ δύνανται οἱ πλουσιώτατοι.

^b ἐμὲ μιμῶνται, εἶτα ἐπιχειροῦσιν] It is well known that εἶτα and ἔπειτα are often put for καὶ εἶτα and καὶ ἔπειτα after a finite verb. See Theætet. p. 151. C. Euthyd. p. 295. C. D. Phædr. 63. C., in which passage it signifies *then*, in the sense of *afterwards*. The meaning in this passage is a little different, as εἶτα is here equivalent to καὶ τότε, and then, in so doing. It is used in the same manner, Cratyl. p. 411. B., where Heindorf, besides this passage, compares Rep. p. 336. B.

^c εἰδόντων δὲ ὀλίγα ἢ οὐδέν] There is more severity and sternness about this than about the common reading ἢ ὀλίγα ἢ οὐδέν. For ἢ used in this manner, signifies *or rather*; a meaning which is not suitable to the present case. Compare Plat. Phædr. p. 224. B. βραχέα ἢ οὐδέν. Alciphron. III. 4. ὀλίγα ἢ οὐδέν διαφέρουσι.

^d ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτοῖς] Said with bitter irony. *They are enraged, he says, with me, when they ought rather to be angry with themselves, for allowing themselves to be refuted by those lads.* The common reading οὐκ αὐτοῖς, has much less of ironical elegance, and had such been the meaning of the writer, we should probably have had οὐκ ἐκείνοις.

^e ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς] These words depend upon διδάσκων, which must be repeated at the end of the sentence.

^f ὅτι κατάδηλοι—προσποιούμενοι] On the construction see Chap. II. note (*).

^g καὶ σφοδροὶ καὶ πολλοὶ, καὶ ξυντεταγμένως καὶ πιθανῶς. λ.] This is a metaphor taken from soldiers arrayed in line of battle; who are said to attack the enemy ξυντεταγμένως, when they assault them in regular line. The calumniators of Socrates are here said ξυντεταγμένως λέγειν, because they assailed him with calumnies, as it were, in regular array; that is, *in such a manner that it appeared they had come to an agreement among themselves as to the best and most efficacious mode of calumniating.* πιθανῶς, that is, *in a manner adapted to persuade.*

^h ἐμπεπλήκασιν ὑμῶν τὰ ὦτα] Compare Plat. Lysis, p. 204. C. ἡμῶν γοῦν ἐκκεκώφωκε τὰ ὦτα καὶ ἐμπέπληκε Λύσιδος.

ⁱ Μέλητος μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν] MELETUS, who brought the cause of Socrates, by a regular form of accusation, before the Archon (βασιλεὺς), as appears from Euthyphr. p. 2. B. and other passages, was a tragic poet, though not very celebrated or suc-

cessful in his art. Euripides is ridiculed by Aristophanes, Ran. 1337, for introducing fragments of his scolia into the lyrical parts of his dramas. At the time he accused Socrates he was quite a youth, but puffed up with pride and arrogance, as may be understood from Euthyphr. p. 2. B. C. Meletus is said to have been one of the Five who, by order of the Thirty Tyrants, brought Leon of Salamis to Athens; a proceeding which Socrates regarded as in the highest degree unjust, and which he accordingly reprobated in the strongest terms. See Chap. XX., where reference is made to this matter. Socrates' bold and manly bearing on this occasion doubtless tended to whet the animosity of Meletus against him, as the obsequious conduct of the latter was by it set in a still more unfavourable light than it would otherwise have been.

ANYTUS, son of Anthemion, a tanner, was by far the most powerful and inveterate of the accusers of Socrates, so that Horace, Satir. II. 4., not without reason, called Socrates *Anytium*. Being a man of great wealth and political influence, and opposed to the aristocratical party, he was exiled by the Thirty Tyrants; he returned to Athens with Thrasybulus, after holding the rank of general at Phyle. His influence was greatly increased by the part which he took in the revolution; he attained to the highest offices of state, and his head seems to have been turned by the dignities heaped upon him. Plato introduces him in his dialogue entitled Menon, and represents him as retiring from the company when unable to maintain his argument, and threatening Socrates with a more substantial revenge for his thus worsting him in the field of dialectics (Men. 92—94. E). Xenophon and others have advanced other and more probable reasons for his animosity. The disreputable character of Anytus has been exposed by various writers: see Aristotle ap. Harpocr. s. v. *δέκάζειν*, etc.

LYCO was one of those professional orators who exercised so extensive and so prejudicial an influence upon the popular mind by means of their harangues in the public assemblies. There seems to be no reason for believing him to have been one of the ten official *συνήγοροι*, or counsel for prosecution. The contempt which Socrates felt, and which he would not hesitate to express, for unprincipled aspirants to statesmanship like Anytus and Lyco, no doubt served to provoke them to the present attack.

* Ταῦτ' ἔστιν ὑμῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τάληθῆ] That is,

These are the facts which I promised to lay before you; referring to Chap. I., where he had said, ὑμεῖς δ' ἐμοῦ ἀκούσαθε πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ would be the Greek for *these things are true*.

¹ οὐδ' ὑποστειλάμενος] ὑποστέλλεσθαι is properly *to withdraw one's self, to depart privately*: hence *to dissimulate*, as in this passage.

XI. * αὕτη ἔστω—ικανὴ ἀπολογία] The old editions erroneously add the article. For αὕτη is the subject: *Let this be sufficient defence*. It must be noted, that whenever the demonstrative pronoun is attached to a noun without the article, it is to be regarded as the subject, the noun being the predicate: οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ, or ὁ ἀνὴρ οὗτος, *this man*; but οὗτος ἀνὴρ, *this is a man*. Compare Chap. I. note (*).

^b τὸν ἀγαθὸν τε καὶ φιλόπολιν] Suidas and other grammarians are wrong in saying that the word φιλόπολις is κοινόν, but φιλόπατρις, Ἀττικόν. Both are used in Attic Greek; see Ducker on Thucyd. VI. 92., φιλόπατρις means *a lover of Greece*; but φιλόπολις, *a lover of the Athenian community*.

^c αὐθις γὰρ δὴ—λάβωμεν αὖ] He indicates by these words, that after having disposed of the charges of his former accusers, he is now going to refute those of the others; and that he wishes their bill of indictment likewise to be read, as he had read the ἀνθρωμοσία of the others, Chap. III. αὐθις αὖ, *Again then—let us now on the other hand take the indictment of these*.

^d ἔχει δὲ πως ᾧδε] That is, *somewhat thus*. Hesych. ᾧδε πως· οὕτω, τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον. But that is the meaning of ᾧδε by itself. Socrates intimates that he is not going to give the exact words, but only the substance of the indictment against him. The form of the accusation was still extant at Athens in the time of Phavorinus, in the second century, in μητροῦψ, that is, in the temple of the mother of the gods, in which, says Diog. Laert. II. 40., there was a registry in these words: ἡ δὲ ἀνθρωμοσία τῆς δίκης τοῦτον εἶχε τὸν τρόπον ἀνάκειται γὰρ ἔτι καὶ νῦν, φησὶ Φαβωρίνος, ἐν τῇ μητροῦψ. “Τάδε ἐγράψατο καὶ ἀνωμολογήσατο Μέλιτος Μελίτου, Πιπθεύς, Σωκράτει Σωφρονίσκου, Ἄλωπεκῆθεν. Ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης οὐδὲ μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοῦς οὐ νομίζων, ἕτερα δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσηγόμενος· ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων. τίμημα θάνατος.” The accusation, which is here put first, is there mentioned in the second place.

^e ὅτι σπουδῇ χαριεντίζεται] χαριεντίζεσθαι, which is derived

from *χαριεις*, witty, pleasant, is properly to *joke* or *banter* in a pleasant and witty manner, in the same sense as *εὐτραπελεύεσθαι*; hence, absolutely, to *joke*, to *sport*, as here and c. XIV. Accordingly, *σπουδῇ χαριεντίζεσθαι* is, as we say in English, to *joke in earnest*. For Meletus, in casting such an unfounded imputation on Socrates, and pretending that he himself cared for the education of youth, appeared *χαριεντίζεσθαι*, that is, to *sport and joke*; but, because he accused Socrates of corrupting youth, and prosecuted that accusation seriously and in good earnest, he is said *σπουδῇ χαριεντίζεσθαι*. The phrase is an instance of what the grammarians call *oxymoron*. Further on, *ράδιως*, lightly, *inconsiderately*. *εἰς ἀγῶνα καθιστάναι*, means to *accuse*. See Euthyphr. c. 3.

XII. ^a Καί μοι δεῦρο,—εἰπέ] Bekker Anecd. I. p. 88. δεῦρο ἀντι τοῦ ἔρχου. Aristoph. Ecclesiaz. v. 989. ἀλλ' οὐτοσί γάρ αὐτός, οὐ μεμνήμεθα. δεῦρο δὴ, δεῦρο δὴ, φίλον ἐμόν.

^b Ἄλλο τι περὶ π. π.] That is, *Do you not deem it of great importance, that our young should turn out in the highest degree virtuous?* ἄλλο τι, or ἄλλο τι ἢ, is pretty nearly equivalent to ἀρ' οὐ = *nonne*. The ellipsis may be supplied as follows: ἄλλο τι ποιεῖς ἢ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖ κ. τ. λ. *Do you do otherwise than regard it, etc.* See Hermann. on Viger. p. 730. n. 110. On ὅπως used with a future, see Herm. on Viger, p. 851. Euthyphr. p. 2. D. ὁρθῶς γάρ ἐστι τῶν νέων πρῶτον ἐπιμεληθῆναι, ὅπως ἔσονται ὅ τι ἀριστοί. Dawes seems to have been the first to point out the uniformity of this usage.

^c μέλον γέ σοι] On the construction, see Matth. § 564. Buttm. § 132. 6. obs. 7.

^d ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις τουτοισί] The verb *εἰσάγειν* is said either of the magistrate, when it signifies to *permit an accuser to indict a person on some law, to grant permission to bring an action*; or of the prosecutor, when it means to *bring into court, to accuse*, as here. In both significations, either *εἰς δικαστήριον*, as c. 17., *με εἰσάγοι τις εἰς δικαστήριον*, or something of the kind is understood. In this passage the word *τουτοισί* is added, and supplies the place of that expression. See Meier and Schœmann 'Der Attische Process,' p. 709. not. 19.

^e ὀρᾶς, ὦ Μέλιγγε] The word *ὀρᾶς*, prefixed in this manner, is used in derision. Compare Aristoph. Nubes v. 662. 669. Vesp. v. 393. Pac. v. 330. Ranæ, v. 1136. 1245. Eurip. El. v. 1121. The whole of the following passage is expressed rather in the

Socratic style of argument, than in that of a speech in a court of justice.

¹ νή τήν Ἑραν] This oath is also used by Socrates in Xenoph. Mem. I. 5, 5; III. 10, 9; III. 11, 5; and elsewhere.

² τῶν ὠφελούντων] That is, τῶν βελτίους ποιούντων.

³ Τί δαί οἱ βουλευταί] Concerning the βουλευταί, see note (b) on C. XX. There were two senates at Athens: the Areopagus, βουλή ἡ ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου, and the senate of five hundred, βουλή ἡ τῶν πεντακοσίων, instituted by Solon. There can be no doubt that the latter body is here intended. On the words ἄλλ' ἄρα —μή οἱ ἐν τ. ἐκκ. see Protag. p. 312. A. ἀλλ' ἄρα, ὡ Ἰππόκρατες, μή οὐ τοιαύτην ὑπολαμβάνεις; Euthydem, p. 290. E. ἀλλ' ἄρα, ὡ πρὸς Διός, μή ὁ Κτήσιππος ἦν ὁ ταῦτ' εἰπών.

⁴ τοὺς νεωτέρους] No one was permitted to be present at the assemblies until he had attained the age of at least 18. See Schœmann 'De Comitibus Atheniensium,' p. 76 sq. Hence it is obvious that οἱ νέοι and νεώτεροι were young men under 18.

⁵ ἐμοῦ κατέγνωκας δυστυχίαν] This construction is explained by Matthiæ § 378. Compare Æsch. adv. Ctesiph. § 12. τίς ἐν οὖν ἡμῶν τολμήσειε τοσαύτην ἀνελευθερίαν καταγνῶναι τοῦ δήμου;

⁶ οἱ μὲν βελτίους—ὁ διαφθείρων] Το πάντες ἄνθρωποι we must understand δοκοῦσι, from the preceding clause. These words contain the explanation of the foregoing οὕτω δοκεῖ σοι εἶχειν, and therefore are added without connective particles. Gorg. p. 479. B. κινδυνεύουσι γάρ—τοιούτον τι ποιεῖν καὶ οἱ τὴν δίκην φεύγοντες, ὡ Πῶλε· τὸ ἀλγεινὸν αὐτοῦ καθορᾶν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ὠφέλιμον τυφλῶς εἶχειν καὶ ἀγνοεῖν.

⁷ εἰάν τε—οὐ φῆτε] Grammarians commonly say that after εἰ, εἰάν, ἵνα, ὅφρα, ὅπως, and other words of the same kind, μή and not οὐ ought to be used. We may, however, correctly say εἰ οὐ, when οὐ is so closely joined in signification with the verb, as in reality to form with it only a single idea, as Hermann says, on Viger, p. 833. And this is the case in the form οὐ φάναι, which, from its literal signification, to say no, becomes equivalent to to deny. When it retains this meaning, οὐ φάναι, and not μή φάναι, is always used, although preceded by conditional particles; the οὐ qualifying not the φάναι, but the suppressed predicate.

⁸ εἰ εἰς—διαφθείρει] Chap. XXVII. πολλὴ μὲντ' ἂν με φιλοψυχία ἔχοι,—εἰ οὕτως ἀλόγιστος εἶμι. Chap. XVII. εἰ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα λέγων διαφθείρω τοὺς νέους, ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη βλαβερά. Theæt.

171. B. οὐκοῦν τὴν αὐτοῦ ἂν ψευδῆ συγχωροῖ, εἰ τῆν τῶν ἡγουμένων αὐτὸν ψεύδεσθαι ὁμολογεῖ ἀληθῆ εἶναι. Compare Matth. § 524. 1., and on a similar form of the Latin writers, Heindorf Horat. Satir. II. 3. 154. Socrates speaks on the supposition, that what Meletus had before affirmed, was true. Our own language is not sufficiently flexible to admit of so abrupt a transition from the hypothetical to the positive. We may, however, render with sufficient fidelity: *Lucky indeed must it be for our young people, if only a single individual corrupts them.*

XIII. ^a ὦ τᾶν, ἀπόκριναι] A contraction of ὦ ἐτᾶν, see Hermann on Sophocl. Philoctet. v. 1373. Hesychius: ὦ τᾶν πρόρρημα τιμητικῆς λέξεως λέγεται δὲ καὶ ἐκ' εἰρωνείας πολλάκις.

^b τοὺς αἰεὶ ἐγγυτάτων—ὄντας] That is, *those who are for the time being nearest to them.* Compare Buttman, § 137.

^c καὶ γὰρ ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρίνεσθαι] The very words of the law to which Socrates here refers, are found in Demosth. c. Steph. orat. II. p. 1131. Νόμος. τοῖν ἀντιδικῶν ἐπάναγκες εἶναι ἀποκρίνασθαι ἀλλήλους τὸ ἐρωτώμενον, μαρτυρεῖν δὲ μή.

^d τηλικῶςδε ὢν] For Meletus was a mere youth. See c. X. note (!). Compare c. XIV.

^e εἰς τοσοῦτον ἀμαθίας ἤκω] On this construction see Matth. § 341. Compare, too, § 504. 1. 2.

^f οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ ἄλλον—οὐδένα] That is, *κείσεσθαί σοι*, by a usual ellipsis after οἶμαι δὲ καί. Euthyphro p. 3. E. ἀλλὰ σύ τε κατὰ νοῦν ἀγωνιεῖ τὴν δίκην, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ τὴν ἐμὴν.

^g παύσομαι ὃ γε ἄκων ποιῶ] The participle ποιῶν must be understood. For it is not correct to say *παύεσθαί τι*. Heindorf conjectures that *ποιῶν* ought to be restored to the text.

XIV. ^a οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρόν] Compare c. VI. οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρόν ξύνοῦδα ἐμαντῶ σοφὸς ὢν.

^b ἢ δῆλον δὴ, ὅτι—] Here ἢ is put as it were to correct what he has before said. The sense is this: *Or, are my question and your answer unnecessary? and is it evident, etc.*

^c ὅτι κατὰ τὴν γραφήν] Understand *ἐμὲ φῆς διαφθεῖρειν τοὺς νεωτέρους.*

^d οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις] We are to connect ταῦτα with the participle διδάσκων.

^e ὦ νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐστίν] ὢν is the objective genitive, and depends upon λόγος; nor is there any necessity whatever for supplying *περὶ*, as some have done. For as we can say not only *λέγειν περὶ τινος*, but also sometimes *λέγειν τινά* (on which con-

struction some remarks have been made on c. IX. note (*), we may also correctly say both *λόγος περί τινος* and *λόγος τινός*. Hence, resolving *λόγος* into a verb, we might have, in the present instance, *οὗς νῦν λέγομεν*, as well as *περί ὧν νῦν λέγομεν*; and, indeed, the former would be more appropriate than the latter. The same construction is found in Charmid. p. 156. A. *οὐ γάρ τί σου ὀλίγος λόγος ἐστίν*. Demosth. de Cor. p. 281. ed. R. *τοὺς λόγους αὐτῶν*, i. e. *περὶ αὐτῶν*. Eurip. Med. v. 541. *οὐκ ἂν ἦν λόγος σίθεν*, i. e. *περὶ σοῦ*. Sophocle. Antig. v. 11. *μῦθος φίλων*, i. e. *περὶ φίλων*.

^f *οὔτε αὐτὸν νομίζειν—τούς τε ἄλλους*] See Protagor. p. 347. E. *οὐδὲν δέονται ἀλλοτρίας φωνῆς οὐδὲ ποιητῶν*, οὗς οὔτε ἀνερίσθαι οἷόν τ' ἐστὶ *περὶ ὧν λέγουσιν*, *ἐπαγόμενοί τε αὐτοῦς οἱ πολλοὶ—ἀδυνατοῦσιν ἐξελέγξαι*. Ibid. p. 361. E. *οὔτε τὰλλα οἶμαι κακὸς εἶναι ἄνθρωπος*, *φθονερός τε ἥκιστ' ἂν ἀνθρώπων*.

^g *ἵνα τί ταῦτα λέγεις*] *ἵνα τί*, as Hermann remarks (ad Viger, p. 849), involves an ellipsis: the full construction in the present tense would be *ἵνα τί γένηται*; in the past, *ἵνα τί γένοιτο*.

^h *Μὰ Δί',—ἐπεὶ τ. ἤλ.*] With *μὰ Δία* we are to understand from what has gone before *οὐ νομίζει θεούς*. For *μὰ Δία* is not a negation by itself, since with *ναί* preceding it, it can be used even in affirmative propositions. Matth. § 605. We have often to supply the negation from the preceding part of the sentence. See Viger, p. 450.

ⁱ *Ἀναξαγόρου οἶε*—] Anaxagoras of Clazomenæ, according to Laertius II. 8., taught that the sun was *μύδρος διάπυρος*, which some understood to be an ignited mass of iron, others of stone, as Socrates himself, in Xenoph. Mem. IV. 7. 7., where he endeavours to refute this opinion of Anaxagoras. The same philosopher maintained that the moon had upon its surface hills, ravines, and dwelling-places; that is to say, was perfectly analogous to the earth. Meletus attributed these opinions to Socrates, because Socrates had received instruction from Archelaus, who had been a disciple of Anaxagoras. Anaxagoras was born B.C. 500, and died B.C. 428. In the clause *ὥστε οὐκ εἶδέναι*, Stallbaum accounts for the use of *οὐ* rather than *μὴ*, by making *οὐκ εἶδέναι* equivalent to *ἀγνοεῖν*. The two words, he urges, combine to form one idea. Compare c. XII. note (m). But Socrates clearly uses *οὐκ* in the present case, because he intends to represent it as a fact that Meletus *was* thus ignorant. He might have said, with almost precisely the same force, *ὥστε οὐκ οἶσθα*.

^k *καὶ δὴ καὶ οἱ νέοι ταῦτα—*] *And the young men forsooth learn these things from me.* Socrates ironically repeats the words which he supposes to proceed from Meletus. Heindorf, by taking away the comma before *καὶ δὴ καὶ*, makes these words depend on the preceding *ὄτι*, a construction which appears somewhat forced.

^l *δραχμῆς ἐκ τῆς ὀρχήστρας*] Dacier understands by these words, that the books containing these opinions of Anaxagoras might be purchased for a drachma from the orchestra. But Forster rightly remarks that we never read of books being exposed for sale in the orchestra.—Originally no sum was charged for admission to the theatres; but crowds and tumults having arisen from the concourse of many persons, the custom of letting the seats—*θεὰν ἀγοράζειν, θεὰν ἀπομισθοῦν*—was introduced, in the first instance, it is said, by Pericles. The seats were let by the farmers or lessees of the theatres, who were called *θεατρῶναι, θεατροπῶλαι*, or *ἀρχιτέκτονες* as in Demosth. de Corona p. 234, 23. Vol. I. Compare Casaubon on Theophrast. Char. 2.; and two oboli was the general price paid by each person, according to Demosthenes in the passage referred to; sometimes it rose as high as a drachma, according to Casaubon. Compare Boeckh 'On the Public Economy of Athens,' p. 219 foll. *Engl. Transl.* ed. 2. And since, according to Harpocration and Suidas, under the word *θεωρικά*, a drachma was the greatest sum that could ever be demanded by the lessee, it is evident why Socrates said *ἂ ἐξεστίν, εἰ πάντῃ πολλοῦ, δραχμῆς πρίασθαι*.—But how could these doctrines of the philosopher be learned in the theatre? The answer to this question is found in the fact that the dramatic poets often introduced the opinions of the philosophers into their plays; either to praise them, as Euripides, who frequently alluded in his tragedies to the opinions of Anaxagoras, or to condemn and ridicule them, which we know to have been done by Aristophanes. That Socrates principally alludes to Euripides in this passage, appears from the circumstance that he was the first who introduced on the stage the doctrine of Anaxagoras concerning the sun and moon. See Valcken., *Diatribē in Frag. Euripid.* p. 31, and Porson on Eurip. *Orest.* v. 971. The sense of the whole passage is this: *Meletus declares that I affirm the sun to be a stone, and the moon, earth. But surely the judges know that this is the doctrine of Anaxagoras; and if I were to pretend that I introduced this opinion, the young men would have it in their*

power to discover, even from the works of the dramatic poets, my vanity in appropriating it to myself, and would justly ridicule me.

^m και νεότητι.] He alludes to the youth of Meletus. See c. XIII.

ⁿ ὡςπερ αἴνιγμα ξυντιθέντι διαπειρωμένῳ] Correctly interpreted by Ficinus: *videtur enim ceu aenigma quoddam componere, tentans, an Socrates, &c.* There is no need of και, which is commonly inserted before διαπειρωμένῳ. Compare Gorg. p. 479. D. Ἀρχέλαον εὐδαιμονίζων τὸν τὰ μέγιστα ἀδικούντα, δικὴν οὐδεμίαν δίδοντα, where και is commonly inserted after ἀδικούντα.

^o γνώσεται—ἐμοῦ χαριεντιζ.] This construction is explained by Matthiæ § 349. obs. 2.—ὁ σοφὸς δὴ, *that wise man forsooth*, said ironically.

XV. ^a ἣ μοι φαίνεται.] That is, *in what light that which he has said appears to me*; lit. *in what manner he appears to me to have said what he has said.* For Socrates goes on to show that Meletus is so inconsistent as both to deny and to affirm that Socrates believes in the existence of gods.

^b δαιμόνια μὲν νομίζει—δαιμονας δὲ οὐ νομίζει.] Τὸ δαιμόνιον in Plato appears to be an adjective, as Cicero understood it, de Divinat. I. 54. *Esse divinum quiddam, quod dæmonion appellat, cui semper pareat.* See Schleierm. on this passage; Part I. Vol. II. p. 432 foll. Schneid. on Xenoph. Memor. I. 1, 2. Narey in the Classical Journal for 1817. No. XXX. p. 105. Socrates appears to refer to a kind of divine voice within the soul of man, which taught him to distinguish between what was auspicious and what inauspicious, what was good and what evil. Compare Phæd. p. 242. B.

^c Ὡς ὤνησας,—ἀναγκαζόμενος] *How much have you obliged me by giving me an answer at length!* Casaubon has observed on Pers. Sat. I. v. 112. that ὀνήσαι, like the Latin *juvare*, often has the meaning of *delectare* and not *βοηθεῖν*; and Stallbaum would give it that meaning here: *How glad I am that, &c.* Stephanus reads ὤνησας for ὤνησας; but with the *μογίς ἀπεκρίνω* immediately following, this seems tautological.

^d ἀλλ' οὖν δαιμόνιά γε νομίζω] These words are to be referred to what goes before, εἰτ' οὖν καινὰ εἶπε παλαιά.

^e διωμόσω ἐν τῇ ἀντιγραφῇ] Ἀντιγραφῆ is here the same as ἀνωμοσία, in c. III. note (^b), that is *the bill of accusation.* The plaintiff, on delivering the bill of accusation to the judges, was

obliged to swear that he did not bring the accusation through malice. Meletus had taken this oath.

[†] ἦτοι θεούς γε ἠγούμεθα ἢ θεῶν παῖδας] Phædo p. 76 A. ἦτοι ἐπιστάμενοί γε αὐτὰ γεγόναμεν—ἢ ὕστερον—ἀναμνήσκονται. Gorg. p. 460. A. ἦτοι πρότερον γε ἢ ὕστερον μαθόντα παρὰ σοῦ. Ibid. p. 467. E. The word δαίμονες is here employed in that broader signification, which comprehends both the superior divinities and the *genii*, occupying an intermediate stage between them and the human race, and forming the connecting link between the two. These subordinate divinities were believed to be entrusted with the care of the interests and welfare of human beings.

^ε ὧν δὴ καὶ λέγονται] *i. e.* ἐξ ὧν. This omission of the preposition before the relative is not unfrequent. Compare Gorg. p. 453. E. πάλιν δ' εἰ ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τεχνῶν λέγομεν, ὥνπερ νῦν δὴ κ.τ.λ. Phædo. p. 76. A. ἢ ἐν τούτῳ (χρόνῳ) ἀπόλλυμεν, ὥνπερ καὶ λαμβάνομεν. Laches p. 192. B. See Matth. Gr. § 595.

^h ὡς οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ—οὐδεμία μηχανή ἐστιν] Stallbaum renders: *You will be utterly unable to convince any man with his wits about him, that the same person can believe in things appertaining to dæmons and gods, and, at the same time, be a disbeliever in gods, dæmons, and heroes.* But if, as Stallbaum has done, we read οὐ, the meaning would seem rather to be: *You will be unable to convince any reasonable man, that the person who believes in things appertaining to dæmons can do other than believe in things appertaining to gods; or, again, that he who denies the existence of gods and heroes, can do other than deny likewise that of dæmons.* The fact of the οὐ slipping out in the ordinary editions, indicates the difficulty which was felt by the interpreters in explaining the passage as it originally stood. Nor can the οὐ be explained away on being merely an emphasizing of the negative in οὐδεμία; for the οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ κ.τ.λ. is distinctly enunciated as a negative proposition before the οὐδεμία has fallen upon the ear.

XVI. ^a Ἄλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες] Socrates, having concluded the material part of his defence, now commences the discussion of other points which bear upon the subject. He first complains of the danger of his being sacrificed to the hatred of the multitude; but, at the same time, maintains that a good man ought to consider virtue and justice as of more importance than life itself.

^b ὃ ἐμὲ αἰρήσει] That is, *which will cause my condemnation.* For αἰρεῖν δίκην and αἰρεῖν τινά τινος are legal phrases, signifying *to gain a suit against a party.* Whence οἱ ἐλόνητες and οἱ ἐαλω-

κότις, are opposed in Demosthen. in Midiam, p. 518. ed. Reisk. p. 15. ed. Buttm.

^c ἀλλ' ἢ—διαβολή τε καὶ φθόνος] Fischer has observed that these words might have been omitted, since the preceding pronoun τοῦτο referred to the same thing; but they are added to express the former idea with more emphasis.

^d οὐδὲν δὲ δεινόν, μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στῆ] That is, *there is no danger of my being the last who will be condemned through the envy and hatred of the multitude.* Compare Phædo p. 84. οὐδὲν δεινόν, μὴ φοβηθῆ.

^e εἰτ' οὐκ αἰσχύνει] On the particle εἴτα used in interrogations to indicate astonishment and indignation, see Valcken. on Phœn. v. 549. Viger. p. 395. Buttmann Gr. § 136.

^f εἰ οἶε δεῖν κίνδυνον ὑπολογίζεσθαι—] For the lofty sentiment here expressed, compare Crito. c. 8. κὰν φαινώμεθα ἀδίκᾳ αὐτὰ ἐργαζόμενοι, μὴ οὐ δεῖν ὑπολογίζεσθαι οὐτ' εἰ θνήσκειν δεῖ παραμένοντας καὶ ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντας οὔτε ἄλλο ὀτιοῦν πάσχειν πρὸ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν. Compare the conclusion of this chapter.

^g ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελός ἐστιν] That is, *a man of ever so little account.* Euthyphro p. 4. E. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν μου ὄφελος εἴη. Legg. IX. p. 856. C. πᾶς γὰρ ἀνὴρ, οὗ καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελος. Crito c. 5. εἰ τι καὶ σμικρὸν ἡμῶν ὄφελος.

^h καὶ ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος υἱός] Allusion is here made to Iliad. σ'. v. 90 foll.

..... ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ἐμὲ θυμὸς ἀνώγει

ζῶειν οὐδ' ἀνδρεσσι μετέμμεναι, αἱ κε μὴ Ἔκτορ
πρῶτος ἐμῷ ὑπὸ δουρὶ τυπείας ἀπὸ θυμὸν δλέσση
Πατρόκλοιο δ' ἔλωρα Μενoitιάδew ἀποτίσῃ.—

παρὰ τὸ αἰσχρόν τι ὑπομείναι, in comparison with enduring anything disgraceful—rather than submit to anything disgraceful; i. e. rather than that it should be said he had borne with tameness the death of his friend Patroclus. For παρὰ with an accusative often indicates a comparison; see Matthiæ Gr. § 588. c.

ⁱ αὐτίκα γὰρ τοι, φησι, μεθ' Ἐκτορα] These words are introduced in a parenthesis, which will account for their want of strict connection with the context.

^k ὁ δὲ ταῦτ' ἀκούσας] ὁ δὲ is inserted in consequence of the length of the sentence. The regular grammatical construction would be: ὃς τοσοῦτον τοῦ κινδύνου κατεφρόνησεν, ὥστε—ἀκούσας ταῦτα—ὠλιγώρησε. This is, therefore, an anacoluthia. Similar passages are given by Matthiæ Gr. § 626.

¹ *αὐτικά—τεθναίην*] *Iliad*. σ'. v. 98. and 104.

² *μη αὐτὸν οἶει*] *You surely do not think, do you?* *μη* has often the force of an interrogation where a denial is expected or wished for.

³ *ἡ ἡγησάμενος*] The symmetry of the sentence would be more complete if, instead of *ταχθῆ*, we had *ταχθεῖς*; but these sudden modifications of construction are of not unfrequent occurrence, and serve more than anything else to illustrate the pliability of the Greek tongue. The *ταχθῆ* is made *immediately* dependant upon *οὐ ἂν*, instead of being so *secondarily*, by strict connection with the foregoing *ἡ ἡγησάμενος*.

⁴ *πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ*] For this use of *πρὸ* compare Phædo p. 99. A. *εἰ μὴ δικαιότερον ψῆμν καὶ κάλλιον εἶναι πρὸ τοῦ φεύγειν*. Crito c. 16. *μήτε παῖδας περὶ πλείονος ποιοῦ μήτε τὸ ζῆν μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ δικαίου*. See c. XVII. *πρὸ οὖν τῶν κακῶν*. On the sentiment compare Crito c. 12. at the end, where Socrates is speaking of the obedience to be paid to the laws of our country.

XVII. ⁵ *δεινὰ ἂν εἶην εἰργασμέμος*] Heindorf. on Gorg. p. 518. E. remarks that *εργάζεσθαι* in this passage is used for *ποιεῖν*. But *εργάζεσθαι* is stronger in its signification than *ποιεῖν*. It has, too, something of a tragic complexion about it. *I should have perpetrated a great crime*.

⁶ *εἰ, ὅτε μὲν με—τότε μὲν οὐ ἐκ.—τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ—ἐνταῦθα δέ—*] See Buttman on Demosthen. Mid. p. 155., where he has given many similar instances. He remarks that when there is a double *μὲν* and a double *δέ* in the sentence, the whole becomes more emphatic. In a similar manner, Isocrat. Areopag. 18. *παρ' οἷς μὲν γὰρ μήτε φυλακὴ μήτε ζημία τῶν τοιούτων καθίστηκε, μήθ' αἱ κρίσεις ἀκριβεῖς εἰσι, παρὰ τούτοις μὲν διαφθεῖρεσθαι καὶ τὰς ἐπιεικεῖς τῶν φύσεων' ὅπου δὲ μήτε λαθεῖν τοῖς ἀδικοῦσι ῥᾶδιόν ἐστι, μήτε φανεροῖς γενομένοις συγγνώμης τυχεῖν, ἐνταῦθα δ' ἐξιτήλους γίγνεσθαι τὰς κακοθειας*. Observe the difference of moods, *ἔμενον καὶ ἐκινδύνευον*, and *λίπομι*. The indicative refers to a matter which really happened; the optative indicates what is purely hypothetical.

⁷ *καὶ ἐν Ποιδαίᾳ—Δηλίῳ*] On the campaigns of Socrates see Laert. II. 22 foll. Athenæus IV. 15. Ælian. III. 17. Cicero de Divin. I. 54.

⁸ *ἀπειθῶν τῆ μαντεία*] That is, *τῆ μαντεία τοῦ θεοῦ*.

⁹ *δοκεῖν γὰρ εἰδέναι—οἶδεν*] The phrase at full length would be: *ἔστι γὰρ ἐκεῖνο* (namely, *τὸ θάνατον δεδιέναι*) *δοκεῖν εἰδέναι*

ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν. On the third person, οἶδεν, put indefinitely, see Matth. § 294. 2. Compare Charmid. p. 167. B. εἰ δυνατόν ἐστι τὸ ἃ οἶδε καὶ μὴ οἶδεν εἰδέναι.

^f ἢ τοῦ οἰεσθαι] That is, (ea insipientia) quæ in eo cernitur, ut quis se scire opinetur quæ non sciat. The genitive of the verbal substantive is not simply explicative of the foregoing ἢ ἀμαθία, but indicates the whole of the action, οἰεσθαι κ. τ. λ., of which the ἀμαθία is one thing that may be predicated. Compare Matth. Gr. § 375.

^g τοῦτω ἄν] With these words φαίην σοφώτερος εἶναι may be understood. Further on, οὕτω is used to make the reference to the foregoing οὐκ εἰδώς more emphatic, οὐκ εἰδώς being equivalent to ὡςπερ οὐκ οἶδα.

^h πρὸ οὖν τῶν κακῶν—οὐδὲ φεύκομαι] This construction is remarkable. For φοβεῖσθαι and φεύγειν πρὸ τῶν κακῶν—ἃ μὴ οἶδα, are used instead of φοβεῖσθαι μᾶλλον τὰ κακὰ ἃ οἶδα ὅτι κακά ἐστιν ἢ ταῦτα ἃ μὴ οἶδα εἰ ἀγαθὰ ἔντα τυγχάνει. On this use of the preposition πρὸ see c. XVI. note (e).

ⁱ ὥστε οὐδ' εἰ με νῦν ἀφίετε—τήν ἀρχήν] 'Ἀρχήν is at all, whether with the article, as here, or without it. as is more generally the case. A little further on, ἀποκτείναι, as in c. XVIII., is to condemn to death by their votes: in which sense ἀποκτείνειν is also used by Xenoph. Mem. IV. 8. 5., where it is opposed to ἀπολύειν. The structure of the sentence is remarkable, εἰ—ἀφίετε, εἰ μοι—ἐπιποιε, εἰ οὖν ἀφίοιτε, the particle οὖν indicating that the speaker returns to what he has been saying before.

^k Ἄνύτω ἀπιστήσαντες] 'Ἀπιστεῖν, ἀπιστος, ἀπιστία, are said not only of those who do not believe, who have no faith in others, but also of those who refuse to comply with the demands of others: for πείθομαι has the signification both of to obey and to trust. A little farther on, we have ἤδη ἄν..... διαφθαρήσονται, being apparently an instance of ἄν with the future indicative. The common reading, it is true, is διαφθαρήσοιντο, but the indicative is preserved by the best MSS. Still, it would be erroneous to suppose that the conditional particle is actually used to qualify the future indicative. We may suppose that the writer at first intended to put the consequence as purely hypothetical, in which case the optative would have been the only legitimate mood; but with that marvellous flexibility, which is such a characteristic of the Greek tongue (compare c. III. note (l), and c. XII. note (n)),

he indicates the speaker's certain realisation of the catastrophe by making him employ the indicative mood.

¹ ἐφ' ᾧτε—φιλοσοφεῖν] That is, *On condition that I should no longer, &c.* On this construction see *Matthiae* § 479.

² ἀσπάζομαι μὲν καὶ φιλεῖν] Ἀσπάζεσθαι is to salute with an embrace, φιλεῖν to salute with a kiss. Such a passage as this, in which the language of compliment forms so important a part, is incapable of literal translation. We may, however, freely render: *I am, in the highest possible degree, indebted to you for your generosity; but still I am resolved to obey God rather than you.* Compare *Lysid.* p. 217. B. ἀναγκάζεται δὲ γε σῶμα δια νόσον ἱατρικὴν ἀσπάζεσθαι καὶ φιλεῖν.

³ καὶ ἐνδείκνυμαι] This word is used in the same manner in c. IX. at the end, τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν ἐνδείκνυμαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἐστὶ σοφός. See note on that passage.

⁴ εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἰσχύν] ἰσχόν is used here not in the sense of power, but of greatness and strength of mind. For the subsequent words show that ἰσχόν is opposed to a desire of riches, honours, and praise.

⁵ καὶ νεώτερον—ποκίσω] On this rather uncommon construction, see *Matth.* § 415. obs. 1. The dative is, however, strictly a *dativus commodi*; and the sense is, therefore, not precisely the same with what it would have been had Socrates said: ταῦτα καὶ νεώτερον καὶ πρεσβύτερον ποκίσω. We may translate: *and this service will I render to both young and old, &c.* With the accusative the meaning would be, *this will I do to young and old.* In confirmation of the view we have taken of the passage, see a little further on: καὶ ἐγὼ οἶμαι οὐδὲν πω ὑμῖν μείζον ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι κ. τ. λ.

⁶ μᾶλλον δὲ τοῖς ἀστοῖς, ὅσῳ μου ἔγγ.] That is, τοσοῦτον μᾶλλον..... ὅσῳ. Compare c. XXX. about the middle, καὶ χαλεπότεροι ἔσονται, ὅσῳ νεώτεροί εἰσι. *Gorg.* p. 458. A. μείζον γὰρ αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν ἡγοῦμαι, ὅσῳ περ μείζον ἀγαθὸν ἴστω αὐτὸν ἀπαλλαγήναι κακοῦ τοῦ μεγίστου ἢ ἄλλον ἀπαλλάξαι, where likewise before μείζον we may understand τοσοῦτον. The same construction is used by Latin writers. *Liv.* II. 51. Quo plures erant, major caedes fuit. *Ovid's Epist.* IV. 19. Venit amor gravior, quo serius.

⁷ τῷ θεῷ ὑπαρξίαν] See c. IX. διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρίαν, which might equally well have been διὰ τὴν τῷ θεῷ λατρίαν, since verbal nouns are frequently constructed with the same

case as the verb from which they are derived. See *Matthiæ*, § 367. 1.

* *μηδὲ οὕτω σφόδρα*] *Μηδὲ* is here introduced after *μήτε*, because these words form, as it were, a new member of the sentence. The common reading, *μήτε ἄλλου τινὸς οὕτω σφόδρα*, appears to have been inserted by some grammarian to explain the sense. Compare c. XXVI. at the end, *οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅ τι μᾶλλον—πρέπει οὕτως ὡς τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτεῖσθαι*, and the note on that passage. The full sentence would be, *μήτε σωματῶν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι..... πρότερον τῆς ψυχῆς, μηδὲ οὕτω σφόδρα ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς*.

† *καὶ τᾶλλα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἅπαντα*] The common reading, *καὶ τᾶλλα γάγαθά*, is opposed to the whole drift of the passage, for it would intimate that these secondary comforts are, after all, the things which are substantially good.

‡ *εἰ μὲν οὖν—διαφθείρω—, ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη βλ.*] On the change of mood see c. XII. note (n).

§ *οὐκ ἂν ποιήσουτος*] On *ἂν* construed with a future, see note (k), c. XVII. There is, however, nothing at all unusual in the employment of the same particle with the *participle* of the future, seeing it is capable of resolution into either the future indicative or the future optative. Similarly, the present or aorist participle may be resolved into the corresponding tense of the indicative, subjunctive, optative, or imperative, according to the complexion of the sentence; e. g. *τοῦτο ποιήσας εὐ ἐποίησας=ἔτι τοῦτο ἐποίησας, —τοῦτο ποιήσας εὐ ποιήσεις=ἔδαν ποιήσας*, etc.

¶ *οὐδ' εἰ μέλλω πολλάκις τεθνάναι*] That is, *not even if I were to be several times dead*. It is worthy of remark, that the Greeks, when they wish to lay stress on the bitterness of death, use words indicating the state and condition of death itself rather than the pains which precede it. *Crito*, c. I. *ἡ τὸ πλοῖον ἀφίκται ἐκ Δήλου, οὐ δὲ ἀφικομένον τεθνάναι με*; which is a more emphatic expression than *ἀποθνήσκειν με*. *Crito*, c. XIV. *ὡς οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν, εἰ δέοι τεθνάναι σε*. *Apol.* c. XXIX. *πολὸν μᾶλλον αἰροῦμαι ὧδε ἀπολογησάμενος τεθνάναι ἢ ἐκείνως ζῆν*. So, too, *Dem.* de *Coron.* p. 301. *πῶς οὐκ ἀπολωλέναι πολλάκις ἐστὶ δίκαιος*.

VIII. * *μη θορυβεῖτε*] *Socrates* now enters upon another part of his subject. He proceeds to show that his condemnation and death will be a loss and injury, not to himself, but to the state of Athens; while the prolongation of his life, on the other hand, will be a blessing to his country. It is in this part of the

defence that we see most conspicuously displayed that calm intrepidity, that cheerful freedom, so aptly blended with the most polished irony, and that dignified superiority to the fear of death, which win our tribute of admiration and reverence for the sage of Athens. Cicero might well say that he here stands forth like no plaintiff at the bar, but like 'a master and a lord.'

^b οὐ γὰρ οἴομαι θεμιτὸν εἶναι] That is, *I do not believe that, under the divine administration, it is possible for a better man to be injured by a worse.* With regard to the grammatical construction, ἀμείνω ἀνδρα would be equally admissible with ἀμείνωνι ἀνδρί; by the use of a dative, a closer connection is established between the words ἀνδρί and θεμιτόν. It is, in fact, a species of attraction; for the general proposition of which θεμιτόν is denied is, ἀμείνω ἀνδρα ὑπὸ χείρονος βλάπτεσθαι. In the next sentence, ἀποκτείνειν, ἐξελαύνειν, ἀτιμάζειν are used of the person or persons whose influence or whose accusation *may lead* to the infliction of these punishments. On the different kinds of ἀτιμία, see Dict. Antiquities, s.v.

^c ἀλλὰ πολλὸ μᾶλλον] Understand οἴομαι μέγα κακόν. *Far rather do I regard it as a great calamity.*

^d πολλοῦ δέω ἐγώ] On the construction of δέω, see Matth. Gr. § 355.

^e μή τι ἐξαμ.—καταψηφισάμενοι] That is, *that you may not bring upon yourselves the guilt of slighting the boon conferred upon you by the god, by passing sentence of condemnation upon me.* The dative ὑμῖν is dependant upon the verbal notion contained in the noun δόσις, on which subject see c. XVII. note (*).

^f προσκείμενον τῇ πάλει] The word μύωπος signifies both a spur, and a gad-fly, that is, a kind of larger fly, which annoys and infuriates cattle; equivalent to ὀστρος. We are disposed to adopt the latter meaning in the passage before us, as favouring more of the homely and provoking style of banter which Socrates was so fond of indulging in, and also as more consistent with the kind of apology which follows: εἰ καὶ γελούτερον εἰπείν. Then, too, the words προσκείσθαι, προστεθεικίναί, and προσκαθίζεω, are far more apt and descriptive, when applied to the gad-fly, than to the spur. For προσκείσθαι is not merely *to be attached to*, as some have understood the word in this passage, but there is involved in it the additional idea of pressing and urging. Compare ἐγκείσθαι and ἐπικείσθαι. The full meaning will, therefore, be: *fastened to the state like a gad-fly, to sting it on its way.*

Similarly, *προκαθίζων* may be rendered *sticking to it*. Socrates has the image of the tormenting little creature still vividly before his eye.—*Νωθεστέρῳ βραδυτέρῳ*. Suidas.

⁸ *οἶον δὴ μοι—τοιούτων τινα*] *τοιούτων τινα* is added by apposition to the pronoun *οἶον*, in order to unite what follows the more closely with this part of the sentence.

⁹ *ὑμεῖς δ' ἴσως—ῥαδίως ἂν ἀποκτείναιτε*] The accumulation of participles in this passage is extraordinary. We may translate as follows: *Very probably you might, in your vexation, like a man aroused from a doze, take Anytus's advice, and, by dealing me a blow, dispatch me without trouble; and afterwards sleep on through all the rest of your lives, unless the deity, in his concern for you, should send you another*. The metaphor of the gad-fly is still kept up, whence the word *κροθεῖν*.

¹ *οἶος ὑπὸ τοῦ θ.—δέδοσθαι*] On the construction see Matth. § 535.

² *οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπίνῳ ἔουκε*] That is, *it does not appear consistent with human motives*. The singular and disinterested course of life pursued by Socrates might well be appealed to as something utterly foreign to ordinary human policy. Then, too, neglect of his personal property and household exposed an Athenian to an *ἀργίας γραφή*, the penalty being at the first conviction a fine; at the third, *ἀτιμία*. Draco had made *ἀτιμία* the penalty of a single offence. Moreover, when Socrates says that his mode of life was at variance with human motives, he means to intimate that it so far transcends them that it must inevitably be regarded as the work of an over-ruling and directing deity. There seems no reason for regarding the genitive *τῶν οἰκείων ἀμελουμένων* as dependant upon *ἀνέχεσθαι*. It is much better to regard it as a case absolute. Matthiæ, however, explains it on the principle that *ἀνέχεσθαι* is the opposite of *ἠτῶσθαι*, and may, therefore, by analogy, take the same case after it, namely, a genitive of comparison. But it is, perhaps, never found with a genitive unattended by a participle, except once in Homer, Od. xxii. 423.

¹ *ἐγὼ παρέχομαι τὸν μάρτυρα*] In order that the force and propriety of the article attached to *μάρτυρα* may be seen, it must be borne in mind that by it is indicated the subject of a virtual proposition: *ὁ μάρτυς... ἱκανός ἐστιν*. It is only the exigencies of grammar which throw *μάρτυρα* into the accusative case.

XIX. ² *φωνή—ἐπικωμωδῶν ἐγράψατο*] The word *φωνή*

appears in all the manuscripts; but seems so unnecessary, that editors have generally regarded it as a mere gloss. In the words immediately following, Socrates is referring to the language of the indictment: "Ἐρεπα δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρειν, and in so doing, dexterously throws out a hit at Meletus, as adopting the unscrupulous, slanderous, style of the old comedy. Ἐπικυμῶδεῖν is, therefore, only a somewhat more pungent and racy expression for διασφύρειν, σκώπτειν, or χλευάζειν.

^b αἰ ἀποτρέπει—ὀπίσσει] The writings of Plato contain frequent reference to this voice from within. See, for example, in Chap. XXXI. of this piece, Theages p. 126. D. etc., and Xen. Mem. IV. 8. 5. Compare, also, Cic. de Divin. I. 54. Hoc nimirum est illud, quod de Socrate accepimus, quodque ab ipso in libris Socraticorum sæpe dicitur, esse divinum quidquam quod *dæmonion* appellat, cui semper ipse paruerit, nunquam impellenti, sæpe revocanti.

^c καὶ εἰ μίλλαι δλίγον χρόνον σωθήσονται] Hermann was the first to attempt to point out the difference between καὶ εἰ and εἰ καὶ; see Herm. Viger. p. 832. Stallbaum distinguishes them as follows: καὶ εἰ always implies a gradation in the thought, as carried out even further than might have been anticipated; as, in the present case, the force of these particles seem to be, 'Yes, even if he is to save his life for a brief space of time,' whereas εἰ καὶ is simply *although*. εἰ καὶ, says Hermann, l. c., indicates that the supposition, or, rather, condition, is consistent with the actual facts of the case; while καὶ εἰ indicates merely an hypothesis entertained for the purposes of argument or rhetoric.

XX. ^a ὑπεικάθομι] Elmsley lays it down as a rule that these forms in *αθεῖν*, *θεῖν*, *υθεῖν*, are aorists, and, therefore, to be written perispomena (Med. 186). But there seems to be little to support this dictum, and Professor Herrmann of Erfurdt has maintained the contrary view in his treatise *de verbis Græcorum in αθεῖν*, *θεῖν* et *υθεῖν exeuntibus*. He there endeavours to show that they are rather a kind of intensitive form, and indicate either energy, continuation, or perpetuity of action. Perhaps they are frequentatives, which have lost their true iterative significance. They may, indeed, possibly be identical with the Latin forms in *ito*. We may translate the whole passage from ἀκούσατε δὴ as follows: 'I beg you to listen to an account of what has befallen myself, that you may be convinced that there is not a creature to whom I would so far yield, under the fear of death, as to do what is con-

trary to justice, even though by refusing to yield I should bring upon myself instant destruction.' There is something a little extraordinary in the repetition of ἄμα, but it is capable of being paralleled; for example, we find such phrases as ἄμ' ἔπος, ἄμ' ἔργον, and Xenophon writes ἄρα, μὴ ἄμα τε εἰ ποίησας καὶ ἄμα οὐ φίλον νομίωσιν (Cyr. III. 1. 15). The first ἄμα belongs to the ὑπέικων, the second to the ἀπολοίμην; and the iteration serves more emphatically to indicate that the two things, the offence and its punishment, would be simultaneous.

^b φορτικὰ μὲν καὶ δικανικὰ] That is, *egotistical and tiresome*. φορτικὸς may be correctly applied to anything that is burdensome and offensive. Socrates appears to be deprecating the odium which he might excite against himself, by enlarging upon his own public career. δικανικὸς is strictly *legal, forensic, litigious*, hence by inference, *tiresome and offensive*. φορτικὸς is not unfrequently used in the sense of *rude, arrogant, vain-glorious*.

^c ἀρχὴν οὐδέμιαν... ἦρξα] That is, *I never filled any public office in the state, but I was once a member of the βουλή*. The senate of five hundred is here intended. It was during the prytany of the tribe Antiochis that the case of the ten (strictly *eight*) generals was brought on, Socrates being at the time president of his tribe, Antiochis, and, by virtue of that office, being chairman in the public assembly (ἐπιστάτης ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ). Socrates considered the attempt to condemn the whole number of generals by one vote as unconstitutional and unjust, and refused to put the motion to the vote; but his manly and determined opposition was overruled, and the sentence passed by acclamation. See the account of this matter given by Xenophon Mem. I. 1. 18, and Hell. I. 7. 14, 15, 38. For a full account of the constitution and arrangements of the senate of five hundred, see Dict. of Antiq. s. v. βουλή and ἐκκλησία.—ἀναιρεῖσθαι is the word regularly used to signify the removal of the dead for interment, after a battle.—τούς ἐκ ναυμαχίας. We should have expected ἐν; but the Greeks were fond of suggesting an additional circumstance, or a fresh view of the subject, by a preposition thus serving with the noun to form an attribute of the principal subject or object. For example, in Gorg. p. 516. D. we read: Μιλτιάδην δὲ τὸν ἐν Μαραθῶνι εἰς τὸ βάραθρον ἐμβαλεῖν ἐψηφίσαντο, i. e., the Miltiades, who distinguished himself at Marathon. So, too, in Hdt. VI. 46. ἐκ μὲν γε τῶν ἐκ Σκαπτῆς ὕλης τῶν χρυσίων μετᾶλλων τὸ ἐπίπαν οὐδῶκοντα τάλαντα προσήϊε, where the ἐκ

anticipates the idea contained in the *προσῆις* (quoted by Matth. § 272). So here the *ἐκ* refers us to the sea-fight as not merely the scene, but the *cause*, of the death of the individuals in question.

^d *ἡμῶν ἢ φυλῆ Ἀντιοχίς*] According to regular usage, the article should be repeated before the word *Ἀντιοχίς*; but the construction is not without support from parallel passages, *e. g.*, Phædon. p. 57. A. τῶν πολιτῶν Φλιασίων οὐδεὶς.

^e *ἀθρόους κρίνειν*] That is, to sentence them by one vote, when the laws required each individual's name to be proposed separately,—*κρίνειν δίχα ἕκαστον*. A full account of the whole proceedings subsequent to the battle of Arginusæ will be found in Grote, Vol. VIII. Chap. 64.

^f *ὡς ἐν τῷ ὑστέρῳ... ἔδοξεν*] See Xen. Hellen. I. 7, 12. *καὶ οὐ πολλῷ χρόνῳ ὕστερον μετέμελε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις*. The Athenians passed a decree that Callixenus, who proposed the illegal verdict, together with his accomplices, should be brought to trial; but they managed to anticipate their sentence by voluntary exile. They had rendered themselves liable to a *γραφὴ παρανόμων* (Dict. Antiq. *παρανόμων γραφή*).

^g *ἐτοιμῶν ὄντων—τῶν ῥητόρων*] The words *ἐνδεικνύσαι* and *ἀπάγειν* describe the summary proceedings resorted to in the case of certain criminals. The former refers to the denunciation of the culprit before the magistrate; the latter to the act of dragging him before his tribunal. The two modes of action were called respectively *ἐνδείξις* and *ἀπαγωγή*; and they must be carefully distinguished, for the former was resorted to, we are informed, in the case of absent criminals, while the latter was necessarily restricted to those upon whom the accuser could lay his hands (see Dict. Ant. *ἐνδείξις*). The two, however, are very frequently mentioned together. Compare Dem. Sept. p. 504. 24. ed. Reisk. *εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἐνδείξεις καὶ ἀπαγωγάς*; and in Timocrat. p. 745. *οὐδ' ὄσων ἐνδείξεις ἐστὶ τιμὴ ἢ ἀπαγωγή*, etc. The orators here mentioned had no recognised office; but as they were ever ready to pander to the wishes of the multitude, they would not hesitate to avail themselves of such an opportunity of ingratiating themselves with their patrons.

^h *οἱ τριάκοντα—μεταπειψάμενοί με πέμπτον αὐτόν*] On the defeat of the Athenians at Ægospotami, and the capture of the city, Lysander, in pursuance of the uniform policy of his country, placed over them a hateful oligarchy of thirty, who went by the

name of the thirty tyrants: οἱ τριάκοντα and τριάκοντα πάντων ἄρχοντες αὐτοκράτορες (Plat. Ep. VII.).—πέμπτον αὐτόν, i. e., by a very frequent idiom, myself and four others. It would be easy to multiply examples. One of the five here referred to was named Meletus (Andocid. de Myster. p. 46. ed. Reisk). See c. X. note (!). It has been questioned, however, whether the accuser of Socrates was not a different individual from the Meletus employed upon this business. The circumstance is spoken of by Lysias adv. Agorat. p. 106. Brem. ἴσπερ μὲν γὰρ τοῖς ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος τῶν πολιτῶν κομισθέντας οἱοὶ ἦσαν καὶ ὄσοι, καὶ οἷψ ὀλέθρῳ ὑπὸ τῶν τριάκοντα ἀπόλωντο. Also c. Eratosthen. p. 77. ὁ δὲ—ἐλθὼν μετὰ τῶν συναρχόντων εἰς Σαλαμίνα καὶ Ἐλευσίνα δὲ τριακοσίους τῶν πολιτῶν ἀπήγαγεν εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον καὶ μιᾷ ψήφῳ αὐτῶν ἀπάντων θάνατον κατεψηφίσατο.

¹ εἰς τὴν θόλον] The θόλος was a public building near the βουλευτήριον τῶν πεντακοσίων, according to Pausan. I. 5, in which the Prytanes dined and sacrificed every day. It derived its name from its resemblance to a tortoise. Leon, born at Salamis, but a citizen of Athens, had gone into voluntary exile to Salamis, to avoid falling a victim to the Tyrants, who coveted his wealth. See Xenoph. Hellen. II. 3, 39.

² ἀναπλῆσαι αἰτιῶν] That is, to stain with guilt and crimes; in order that as many citizens as possible might appear to have betrayed the cause of liberty by taking part with the Tyrants. On the word ἀναμπλάναί, in the sense of polluting and staining, see Ruhnken on Tim. Glossar. p. 30.

³ τὸ πᾶν μέλει] That is, altogether, by all means, a care to me. So Xenoph. Cyrop. I. 6, 13. τὸ πᾶν διαφέρει.—ἐκπλήττειν, to strike and move one so that he becomes, as it were, beside himself.

^m ψυχόμεν ἀπιὼν οἰκαδε] That is, I went straightway. See Matth. § 559. c.

XXI. * εἰ ἔπραττον τὰ δημόσια—ἐποιούμην] The aorist διαγενέσθαι ἂν, having preceded, one might have expected εἰ ἔπραξα—ἐποιήσαμην. But the imperfect is used, because he speaks not only of past time but also of the present; that is, of a past action continuing to the present time. In English, we should say: *Do you think that I could have lived so many years, if I had continued to take a part in public affairs, and as an honest man stood by the side of justice, regarding this, as it was my duty*

to do, above all other considerations?—οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄν ἄλλος ἄνθρ. οὐδεὶς. Understand διεγένετο.

^b ροιοῦτος φανοῦμαι] The pronoun ροιοῦτος is explained by words which follow it a little further on: οὐδενὶ πώποτε ξυγχωρήσας οὐδὲν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον.

^c ἰμοὺς μαθητὰς εἶναι] Alcibiades and Critias are probably alluded to; whose vices were maliciously said to have arisen from the instruction of Socrates. See Xenoph. Mem. I. 2. 12 sqq.

^d εἰ δὲ τις—ἐπιθυμῆ ἀκούειν] By τὰ ἱανροῦ Socrates means what he was enjoined to do by Apollo, namely, that he should detect and rebuke the errors of men, and exhort his fellow-citizens to the pursuits of virtue. See Chap. IX. etc.

^e χρήματα μὲν λαμβάνων] An allusion to the avarice of the sophists. See notes on C. IV.

^f παρέχω ἑμαυτὸν ἐρωτᾶν] That is, *I give an opportunity of interrogating me*. The subsequent words, καὶ ἴάν τις βούληται ἀπ. ἀκούειν, are to be explained καὶ παντὶ, ὅστις ἂν βούληται ἀκ. For ἴάν τις is about equivalent to ὅστις ἂν.

^g οὐκ ἂν δικαίως τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπέχοιμι] That is, *this cannot fairly be attributed to me*. Αἰτίαν ὑπέχειν is strictly used in a bad sense, of one who is deservedly blamed; and hence, in general, in the sense of to be responsible or accountable for a thing. Τούτων, masculine, is dependent upon τὴν αἰτίαν.

XXII. * ἐγὼ εἶπον ὅτι κ. τ. λ.] The ὅτι is not to be made dependent upon the immediately preceding word, εἶπον. It introduces the answer to the question, διὰ τί δὴ κ. τ. λ., in the previous sentence: *They do so, because they take a pleasure in hearing put to the question those people who fancy themselves to be wise when they are not so.*

^b καὶ εὐλέγκτα] Εὐλέγκτος is generally applied to *what may easily be refuted*; but here it means *what may easily be examined to find out whether it is true or false*. For ἐλέγχειν not only signifies *to refute*, but also *to examine with the design of convicting another of error*. The word may therefore be rendered, *easy to be refuted if they are not true*.

^c εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτοὶ ἤθελον] Fischer erroneously reads εἰ γε μὴ under the impression that the δὲ was destitute of a correlative. But εἰ δὲ may follow εἴτε in the same manner as δὲ by itself may come after τὲ, and οὐδὲ after οὔτε. In c. XXXII. we have: καὶ εἴτε δὴ μηδεμία αἰσθησίς ἐστιν—εἰ δ' αὖ οἶον ἀποδημησαι.

^d πάρεσις—ἐνταυθοῖ] Hesychius: ἐνταυθοῖ· ἐνταῦθα. Er-

roneously. For as *παρῖναι εἰς τινα τόπον* is not barely equivalent to *παρῖναι ἐν τινι τόπῳ*, but is used in such a manner as if two sentences were joined together;—that is, it signifies *to come to a place and be there*;—so *ἐνταυθοῖ* by itself is not put for *ἐνταῦθα*. but *παρῖναι ἐνταυθοῖ* signifies *to come hither and be present here*. Compare Protagor. p. 310. A. τί οὖν οὐ διηγῆσω ἡμῖν τὴν ξυνουσίαν, εἰ μὴ σέ τι κωλύει, καθιζόμενος ἐνταυθοῖ, that is, *coming to this place and sitting here with us*.

^c Κρίτων οὔτος] Crito is the same person whose name forms the title of the following dialogue of Plato. He is called ἡλικιώτης, or of the same age with Socrates; and δημότης, that is, of the same *demos*, namely, Ἄλωπικῆ.

^f Λυσανίας] Lysanias, father of the Socratic Æschines, is called ὁ Σφήττιος, from the deme Sphettus, which was in the tribe Acamantis. Antipho is called Κηφισιεύς, from the deme Cephisus, which was in the tribe Erectheis. Epigeneas, son of Antipho, is introduced in Xen. Mem. IV. 12, where he holds a discussion with Socrates on the subject of lack of attention to his person exhibited by the sage.

^g ἄλλοι τοίνυν οὔτοι—] An unnecessary difficulty has been raised respecting the word *τοίνυν*, as if it necessarily indicated a logical inference from what immediately precedes. Heindorf imagines that the text must be corrupt. But nothing can be commoner than this use of an illative particle to indicate a transition in the discourse. So *igitur* is used in Latin; not *συλλογιστικῶς*, as the grammarians describe it, but *καταβατικῶς*, i. e., simply carrying on the writer or speaker from one point to another. We may render: *And then, besides these (ἄλλοι), there are the following, whose brothers have had this intimacy with me, οὔτος* is, however, regularly used of what precedes; ὅδε of what follows.

^h Νικόστρατος] Respecting this person and Theodotus nothing seems to be known.—Respecting Demodocus, father of Theages, see Theages, p. 127. E. Of Paralus, who is not to be confounded with his namesake, the son of Pericles, nothing is known.—Adimantus is the brother of Plato, often mentioned in the Republic. See II. p. 357—368, and elsewhere.—Of Æantodorus nothing is known.—Apollodorus is known to have been most devoted to Socrates. See Phædo p. 59. A. p. 117. D. Xenoph. Mem. III. 11, 17.—*καταδεῖσθαι* is *to prevail upon one by entreaties*. The sense is this: *Theodotus cannot beseech*

his brother Nicostratus not to accuse me and bear testimony against me. A little further on *μάλιστα* is above all, in the first place; or, as the thing most to have been desired. It is frequently followed up, as here, by *εἰ δὲ*, and *εἰδὲ μή*. Compare Rep. VIII. p. 564. B. *μάλιστα μὲν ὅπως μὴ ἐγγένησθον, ἀν δὲ ἐγγένησθον, ὅπως ὅτι τάχιστα ἐκτεμῆσθον*, etc. See Stallbaum on Euthydemus, p. 304. A.

¹ *ἐγὼ παραχωρῶ*] That is, *I yield to him the privilege of doing this*. For no one was permitted to interrupt the accused while defending himself, and by irrelevant matters to abridge the time granted for his defence, which was measured by the clepsydra. The accuser was bound to go through all that had reference to his side of the question before the defendant commenced his answer to the charge. Hence the frequently recurring formula in the orators: *ἐν τῷ ἐμῷ ὕδατι εἰπάτω, ἐπὶ τῷ ἐμοῦ ὕδατος μαρτυρησάτω*, giving the opposite party permission to state anything during the limited time belonging to the speaker in possession of the court.

² *τῷ διαφθείροντι*] There is a quiet irony in the way in which this apposition is introduced. Compare Crito c. XII. *καὶ σύ—φῆσεις ταῦτα ποιῶν δίκαια πράττειν, ὁ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελούμενος*; Euthyphr. p. 3. A. *Μέλητος ἴσως πρῶτον μὲν ἡμᾶς ἐκκαθαίρει τοὺς τῶν νέων τὰς βλάστας διαφθείροντας, ὡς φησι*.

¹ *λόγον ἔχοιεν βοηθοῦντες*] That is, *would have some object to attain in defending me*: namely, that they might not appear to have been intimate with an impious and depraved man, and that they might not be accounted wicked themselves.

² *οἱ τούτων προσήκοντες*] A participle joined with a genitive like a substantive; for *προσήκοντες*, with the article attached to it, is a virtual substantive.

² *ἀλλ' ἢ τὸν ὀρθόν τε καὶ δίκαιον*] The formula *ἀλλ' ἢ* is regularly preceded by an actual or virtual negative, and appears to be correctly explained by Stallbaum, Phæd. p. 81. B. Chap. XXX., as arising from a combination of two forms of construction. After a word of comparison like *ἄλλος*, either *ἀλλά* or *ἢ* may be used. Compare Plat. Protag. 354. B. *ἔχετέ τι ἄλλο τέλος λέγειν, εἰς ὃ ἀποβλέψαντες αὐτὰ ἀγαθὰ καλεῖτε, ἀλλ' ἡδονὰς τε καὶ λύπας*, where *ἢ* would have been quite as naturally admissible as *ἀλλά*, and where Bekker and others actually read *ἀλλ' ἢ*. See Matth. § 455. b.—In the passage before us *τίνα ἄλλον* is the virtual negative.

XXIII. ^a *τάχα δ' ἂν τις ἀγανακτήσειεν*] Socrates now proceeds to give his judges an explanation of the grounds of his firmness and fortitude; and he shows why he will not follow the example of others by attempting to move their pity. For, first, he says such a course would be unworthy of the estimation in which he is held; secondly, it would be contrary to the laws.

^b *ἐλάττω — ἀγῶνα ἀγωνιζόμενος*] That is, *tried on a less serious charge*. The expression *ἀγῶνα ἀγωνίζεσθαι* is analogous to *μάχην μάχεσθαι* — *somnium somniare*, etc. Similarly in Euthyphro p. 3. E. we have *ἀγωνίζεσθαι δίκην*. It was the custom at Athens for the defendants to bring into court their children, and even their wives, to excite the pity of the judges. See the amusing picture in Aristoph. Vesp. 566—

*κἂν μὴ τοῦτοις ἀναπειθώμεθα, τὰ γε παιδᾶρι' εὐθὺς ἀνέλκει,
τὰς θηλείας καὶ τοὺς υἱεῖς, τῆς χειρὸς' ἐγὼ δ' ἀκροῶμαι.
τὰ δὲ συγκύπτουθ' ἅμα βληχᾶται' κἄπειθ' ὁ πατήρ ὑπερ' αὐτῶν,
ὥσπερ θεὸν, ἀντιβολεῖ με τρέμων τῆς εὐθύνης ἀπολύσαι.*

^c *ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄρα τ. κ.*] The particle *δὲ* indicates the contrast between Socrates' course of procedure and what was usual under such circumstances; the *ἄρα* refers the reader to the grounds previously enumerated or hinted at, upon which he might have been expected to comply with the received usage—*If I then, on the contrary, do no such thing*, etc. Stallbaum, however, it should be remarked, refers the *ἄρα* to the grounds supposed to exist in the mind of Socrates for acting as he did—*ἄρα, as you might have anticipated, from what you have heard me say*. But this reference seems too remote, when a nearer one intervenes.

^d *ἀθθαδίστερον ἂν πρός με σχοίη*] *Should feel himself more set against me*. Socrates deprecates the prejudice of such judges as might refuse to acquit him, in spite of the goodness of his cause, because he would not descend to the low arts ordinarily employed for the sake of exciting compassion. A little further on, after *εἰ δ' οὖν*, supply *τις ὑμῶν οὕτως ἔχει*. The *οὖν* refers the reader back to the original supposition: if, *as I said*, there should be such a one among you.

^e *τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου*] *Odys. XIX. v. 163*, where Penelope asks Ulysses, whom she had not recognised, to relate from what race he has sprung, adding to her request the words:

οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ δρυὸς ἔσσι καλαιφάτου οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρης.

—*καὶ υἱεῖς γε*. In enumerating several things, it is customary

to add γὰρ to that noun to which the most weight and emphasis is attached. It is, therefore, incorrectly omitted by some MSS. in this passage. The three sons of Socrates were Lamprocles, Sophroniscus, Menexenus. The eldest was Lamprocles, who is here called *μειράκιον*, a youth, but, in Phædo 65., *μέγας*. See Xenophon, Mem. II. 2, 1.; but the other two, whom their father here calls *παιδιά*, are called by Plato also (Phædo 65.), *σμεκροί*. Seneca tells us that these three bore a greater resemblance, in point of character, to their mother than to their father.

[†] ἄλλ' εἰ μὲν θαρραλίως] *Now, whether I am fearless of death or not is another question; but apart from this (οὖν), in respect of my own reputation and yours, and that of the whole city, it does not seem to me creditable for a man of my time of life, and of such a name (for wisdom), whether it be true or a lie, to do any such thing.* The οὖν refers to the words ἄλλος λόγος, as if he had said, accordingly, we will dismiss it for the present. It must not be supposed that we ought to read ψευδές instead of ψεύδος. Cratyl. p. 430. A. ἢ τὸ μὲν τι αὐτῶν ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ ψεύδος; Euthydem, at the beginning, ἐξελέγγειν τὸ ἀεὶ λεγόμενον ὁμοίως, ἴάν τε ψεύδος ἴάν τε ἀληθές ᾗ; Aristoph. Ran. v. 628. χῶπως ἐρεῖς ἰνταῦθα μὴδὲν ψεύδος.

[‡] ἄλλ' οὖν δεδογμένον κ. τ. λ.] *That is, But however that may be, it is certain that Socrates is believed to be, in some respect, superior to the bulk of mankind.* Compare the explanation of οὖν in note (†).

^h δοκοῦντας μὲν τι εἶναι] *That is, fancying themselves to be something; to profess some amount of knowledge.* See Matth. § 487. 5.—ὡς δεινὸν τι οἰομένους πείσασθαι. Here, as often is the case, ὡς introduces the reason for something before mentioned. Heindorf was therefore wrong in connecting it with δεινὸν, in the sense of *very*; and, moreover, the examples of this signification collected by him are very unsatisfactory. ὡς οἰομένους is precisely equivalent to Lat. utpote putantes: *as thinking, under the impression that.* It would be easy to multiply examples in support of this interpretation. Still more concisely, Plato might have written ὡς πεισομένων. On the genitives ὡς περ ἀθανάτων ἰσομένων, see Matth. § 568. 2.

ⁱ οὗτοι γυναικῶν οὐδὲν δ.] *This use of the demonstrative, to gather up the particulars before mentioned in one idea, gives emphasis to the sentence.* See Matth. Gr. § 472. 2.

^k ὅτε ἡμᾶς χρῆ ποιεῖν] The common reading ὑμᾶς is clearly wrong, since these words immediately follow: οὐτ', ἂν ἡμεῖς ποιῶμεν, ὑμᾶς ἐπιτρέπειν. The sense is: *neither does it become us to do such things, nor, if we were to do them, would it become you to tolerate them.* Similarly c. XXIV. οὐτε ἡμᾶς ἐθίξειν ὑμᾶς ἐπιορκεῖν, οὐθ' ὑμᾶς ἐθίξεσθαι.—καὶ ὅτιοῦν εἶναι, that is, *who appear to ourselves to possess even the least worth.* So Æschin. against Ctesiph. § 5. τῶν καὶ ὅπως οὖν πρὸς τὰ κοινὰ προσεληλυθότων, that is, *even in any manner.* Xenoph. Cyrop. I. 6, 12. οὐδ' ὅτιοῦν ἐπεμνήσθη, that is, *not in the least degree.* Aristoph. Plut. v. 385. κοῦ διοίσοντ'—οὐδ' ὅτιοῦν τῶν Παμφίλου. Phædo, p. 78. D. μήποτε μεταβολὴν καὶ ἡντιοῦν ἐνδέχεται. In Latin the particle *cumque* is similarly used. In exactly the same manner as in this passage, Rep. IV. p. 422. E. κὰν ὅτιοῦν γ'. Ibid. VII. p. 538. D. τοῦς καὶ ὅπως μετρίους. The common reading καὶ ὅπως οὖν εἶναι is bad, since *τι* is thus removed from the verb *εἶναι*, and serves merely, as in ὅπως οὖν, to qualify the foregoing adverb.

^l τὰ ἐλεεινὰ ταῦτα δράματα εἰσάγοντος] 'Ἐλεεινὰ δράματα are tragedies in which the pity of the spectators is excited. *εἰσάγειν*, to bring into the court, as when the accused introduces his wife, children, and relations, in tears, to dispose the minds of the judges to mercy.

XXIV. * Χωρὶς δὲ τῆς δόξης] That is, *but apart from reputation: putting my own reputation out of the question.* A little further on ἀποφεύγειν is *to escape in safety, to be acquitted.*

^b ἐπὶ τούτῳ—ἐπὶ τῷ καταχαρίζεσθαι τ. δ.] The clause ἐπὶ τῷ καταχαρίζεσθαι contains the definition of the τούτῳ; for this end, namely, to sacrifice justice to favour. For this emphasizing use of the demonstrative pronoun, see Matth. Gr. § 472. 2 b. Compare Soph. Phil. 1355—

πῶς.....

ταῦτ' ἐξανασχῆσεσθε, τοῖσιν Ἀτρέως

ἐμὲ ξυνόντα παισίν, οἳ μ' ἀπόλεσαν;

Gorg. p. 474. E. οὐ δῆπου ἐκτὸς τούτων ἐστὶ τὰ καλά, τοῦ ἠφέλιμα εἶναι ἢ ἡδέα ἀμφοτέρα.

^c καὶ ὁμώμοκεν] The form of the dicast's oath may be gathered from Demosth. against Timocrat. p. 747. ed. Reisk. ψηφιοῦμαι κατὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ ψηφίσματα τοῦ δήμου καὶ τῆς βουλῆς τῶν πεντακοσίων. Compare, too, Pollux. Onom. VIII. 122. ὁ δὲ ὄρκος ἦν τῶν δικαστῶν περὶ μὲν ὧν νόμοι εἰσὶ,

κατὰ τοὺς νόμους ψηφιεῖσθαι· περὶ δὲ ὧν μὴ εἶσι, σὺν γνώμῃ δικαιοσάτην.

^d μὴ οὖν ἀξιούτε] That is, *do not then think*. A little further on, the collocation of the words is worthy of remark: ἃ μῆτε ἡγοῦμαι καλὰ εἶναι. The common order would be: ἃ ἡγοῦμαι μῆτε καλὰ εἶναι.

^e ἄλλως τε πάντως—μάλιστα μέντοι καί—] That is, *both at all other times, and most particularly now, when I am accused of impiety by Meletus*.

^f εἰ πείθοιμι—βιαζοίμην] That is, *if I should win you over by persuasion, and constrain you to violate your oath*. Understand χαρίζεσθαι μοι τὰ δίκαια. In the following clause the words should be connected thus, διδάσκοιμι ἂν ὑμᾶς μὴ ἡγείσθαι θεοῦ εἶναι.

XXV. ^a Τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν] The preceding part of the 'Apology' is supposed to have been spoken before the judges gave their first votes concerning him; the following portion after he was found guilty of the crime imputed to him by Meletus; the conclusion, after the definite sentence of death had been passed upon him. The question of the punishment due to his offence was to be determined. There were two kinds of causes, the one ἀγὼν ἀτίμητος, in which the punishment was already appointed by the laws; the other τιμητὸς, in which the judges were allowed by the laws a discretionary power as to the punishment. We must always, therefore, when we read of causes in ancient writers, be careful to distinguish to which of these two kinds the cause belongs. There is no doubt that the cause of Socrates ought to be referred to the kind called τιμητοί. In a cause of this kind, the following mode of proceeding appears to have been adopted in the courts of justice. After the accuser and the defendant had made their speeches, the judges determined, by their first votes, whether they condemned or acquitted the accused. Then, if the crime was not capital, and the punishment was not fixed by law, they proceeded to determine the punishment; that is, the defendant was asked what punishment he considered himself to deserve, whether that which the prosecutor wished, or another more mild. In giving this counter estimate, he was said, ἀντιτιμᾶσθαι. This having been done, the judges again gave their votes, and decided the cause. On these two kinds of causes, see Dict. of Antiq., s. v. γραφή.

^b καὶ οὐκ ἀνέλπιστον γέγονε] That is, *has not happened to me*

contrary to my expectation. For *ἐλπῖς, ἐλπίζειν*, and their derivatives are indifferent words, and in themselves imply neither hope nor fear, but simple expectancy. Plato himself says, *Leg. I. p. 664, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἀμφοῖν αὐτῶν δόξας μελλόντων, οἷον κοινὸν ὄνομα ἐλπῖς κ. τ. λ.* The use of *ἄλλα τε πολλὰ*, followed by *καὶ οὐκ ἀνέλπ.*, is highly idiomatic; the former and more general expression serving to prepare the reader for the specification of one or more of the particular things included in it. Thus immediately after, we have *καὶ οὐκ κ. τ. λ., i. e., καὶ δὴ καὶ τούτο, ὅτι οὐκ κ. τ. λ.* A parallel instance is to be found in *Crit. c. XIV. τὰ τε ἄλλα, καὶ παῖδας ἐν αὐτῇ ἐποίησω*; and it would be easy to multiply examples. A little farther on, *οὐ γὰρ ᾤμην κ. τ. λ.*, we may translate: *For I did not anticipate that the numbers would come so near, but that there would be a large majority against me.* Stallbaum, after Fischer, seems to make *ἀριθμὸν* the subject to *ἴσισθαι*; but the drift of the passage seems rather to lead us to connect the verb with *τὸ γεγονός τοῦτο*, or, generally, with the idea of *τῆν δίκην*. In familiar language, *I didn't think it would have been such a near touch.* On *παρ' ὀλίγου, παρὰ πολὺ, παρ' οὐδέν*, and the like, see *Matth. Gr. § 588. n. 2.*

° *εἰ τρεῖς μόναι μετέπεσον*] That is, *if but three votes had changed sides*, had fallen into a different balloting urn. So far all is quite clear. Socrates would thus have been condemned by a majority of five or six. But there is a passage in the life of Socrates, by Diogenes Laertius, which is somewhat difficult to harmonise with this statement of Plato. He writes (*II. 41*), *ὄρ' οὖν κατεδικάσθη, διακοσίας ὀγδοήκοντα μᾶ πλείοσι ψήφοις τῶν ἀπολουύσων κ. τ. λ.*, the simplest interpretation of which would seem to be, that there was a *clear* majority of 281 against Socrates. The words, however, admit of another interpretation, and, in the strength of the passage before us for discussion, we are, perhaps, bound to accept it. Diogenes may simply mean that there was a majority, *which consisted of* 281 votes. This would make the minority to have been 275 or 276. But there still remains a difficulty. By adding together the votes thus obtained for and against Socrates, we obtain a total of 553, a number which is quite without a parallel in the records of dicasteries. Its largeness need not surprise us, for we occasionally meet with even higher numbers. An ordinary *Helixæ* consisted of 500 dicasts, and we have instances of 700, 1000, 1500, sitting upon the same trial; but there is no analogy to support us in

entertaining the notion, that a tribunal was ever constituted of so irregular a number as 553. The various reading *τριακοντα*, in place of *τρῆις*, shows that this objection was felt by ancient critics. This emendation would give us for the majority 281; for the minority, 221; and as we may suppose Socrates to use a round number with some little freedom, we should obtain for the total number of dicasts 500, a result which is in itself quite satisfactory. But it is not easy to believe that Socrates would speak in so slighting a way of a *clear* majority of 60 out of 500; and, moreover, the canons of criticism seem to forbid our accepting this solution of the difficulty. Perhaps the explanation which is on the whole the least objectionable, is that which proceeds upon the supposition that some of the dicasts deposited their votes into an *ἀμφορέδς ἀκυρος*, or neutral urn; so that, in order to arrive at the true total, the number of these neutral votes would have to be added to the numbers *for* and *against*. This is Petit's conjecture; but though an ingenious one, it must be borne in mind that it is *merely* a conjecture, as we have no evidence that such a use was made of the *ἀμφορέδς ἀκυρος*.

^d *εἰ μὴ ἀνέβη Ἄνυτος καὶ Λύκων*] Since Anytus and Lyco were *συνήγοροι* or *σύνδικοι* of Meletus, who had instituted the prosecution, they, as well as Meletus, were at liberty to speak against Socrates on the trial. See Dict. of Antiquities, article *συνήγορος*.

^e *κἂν ὠφλε χ. δρ.—τῶν ψήφων*] Unless the accuser obtained a fifth part of the votes he was fined one thousand drachmæ, was branded with infamy (*ἀτιμία*), and was forbidden to become an accuser again. See Demosth. in Mid. p. 529. 23., and elsewhere. Socrates means to say that the influence of Meletus alone would appear, from the result of the trial, to have been inadequate to the task of securing even a fifth portion of the votes. The inference seems based upon the supposition, that each of the *συνήγοροι* would carry with him the same proportion of the dicasts. The majority against Socrates was little more than half the gross number, and this again divided by three, would give for the aggregate of votes, obtained by the personal influence of Meletus alone, but little more (only *one* more, if we retain the reading *τρῆις*) than one-sixth.

XXVI. ^a *Τιμᾶται δ' οὖν μοι ὁ ἀνὴρ θανάτου*] The accuser, in an *ἀγὼν τιμητὸς*, always inserted in his formula of indictment the punishment which he thought the accused deserved. This was called *τιμᾶσθαι*.

^b ἢ δῆλον, ὅτι τῆς ἀξίας] That is, *but why do I ask?* or, *is it not indeed evident?* etc. The reading ἢ is therefore erroneous. Compare Chap. XIV. note (^b).

^c τί ἀξίως εἰμι παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσαι] This was a regular phrase in trials, παθεῖν referring to the punishment of the body, ἀποτίσαι to the fine. The phrase ὅ,τι μαθῶν requires some explanation. τί μαθῶν and τί παθῶν are of frequent occurrence in dialogue, as equivalent to διὰ τί; the former referring to some supposed knowledge or information received, which may have led to the conduct which is the object of inquiry; the latter to some external circumstance or sudden impulse, which may have influenced the actor. Thus τί μαθῶν τοῦτο ἐποίησας is, '*what has come to light that you should act so?*' but τί παθῶν is, '*what ails you that,*' or '*what has befallen you that,*' etc. But it is difficult to hold with Matthiae, that ὅ,τι μαθῶν, without a word indicating a question to introduce it, can be simply equivalent to ὅ,τι. Stallbaum seems right in interpreting: '*What penalty do I deserve to suffer, because I have taken it into my head to give myself no rest all my life long?*' more literally, '*from what reason soever it may be that I have,*' etc. Similarly, Euthyd. p. 283. E. εἶπον ἄν, σοὶ εἰς κεφαλὴν, ὅ,τι μαθῶν ἐμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καταψεύδει τοῦτο πρᾶγμα, ὃ ἐγὼ οἶμαι οὐδ' ὅσιον εἶναι λέγειν. '*Shame upon you,*' I would have said, '*whatever it may be that has put it into your head to tell this falsehood of me and the rest, a falsehood which is not even to be mentioned.*' Compare, also, Euth. p. 299. A. The other instance quoted by Stallbaum seems of rather a different nature. Eupolis ap. Stob. Serm. IV. p. 53. εὐθὺ γὰρ πρὸς ὑμᾶς πρῶτον ἀπολογήσομαι, "Ὅ,τι μαθόντες τοῦς ξένους μὲν λέγετε ποιητὰς σοφούς—'*I will at once make my defence, by asking, in the first place, what puts it into your heads to call poets wise?*' Here ὅ,τι μαθόντες is merely τί μαθόντες, in oratio obliqua; for the idea of ἐρήσομαι is inferred from ἀπολογήσομαι, by reason of the general structure of the sentence, whilst in the previously-quoted examples there is no purely interrogative notion.

^d ἀλλ' ἀμελήσας ὥνπερ οἱ πολλοί] Understand ἐπιμελοῦνται. For when a negative verb precedes in sentences opposed to one another, the affirmative verb is frequently omitted. καὶ δημηγοριῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν. Δημηγορία in this passage means the occupation of one who makes speeches in the assemblies of the people. Although this was not one of the magistracies, yet it

is not by any means inconsistent with the usage of Greek writers to add τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν. Compare, for instance, Gorg. p. 473. C. ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων, i. e., by citizens, and others who were strangers; or, by citizens, and, moreover, by strangers. It would be easy to multiply examples, but the above is sufficient. We may translate: ‘*caring nothing for what the multitude care most for—money making, household affairs, military command, rhetorical celebrity, and, in addition to these things, public offices, conspiracies, and the cabals that are constantly arising in the state.*’ Fischer, therefore, is wrong in defending the other reading δημουργιῶν, especially since he has by no means proved that δήμαρχοι were also called at Athens by the name δημουργοί.—The factions and seditious, which arose after the Peloponnesian war throughout all Greece, and particularly at Athens, are well known.—Ἐπιεικῆς is frequently opposed to φαῦλος, and signifies good, liberal, just.

^e ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὐκ ᾔα] Remark this use of ἐνταῦθα, which occurs again, a few lines below, in ἐνταῦθα ᾔα. This mode of expression is exactly the reverse of that which has been spoken of in c. XXII. note (^d). For in the same manner as it was shown there, that verbs signifying rest are joined with adverbs of motion to a place, the two ideas of rest and motion being united in a single proposition: so, conversely, verbs indicating motion are added to adverbs which properly signify rest, and not motion. It serves to illustrate the activity of the Greek mind, which often led a speaker or writer to unite many different notions in the same member of a sentence.

^f ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ ἴδιον ἕκαστον ἰὼν—ᾔα] This redundancy is remarkable. It is evident that the participle ἰὼν might have been omitted. Probably the influence of the foregoing ἐλθὼν led to its introduction.

^g οὕτω κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν τῶν τρόπον] These words, also, are put ἐκ παραλλήλου. The recurrence of such redundancies as this serves to prove that the compactness and compression which characterise the best Greek authors, was not the result of a conscious effort to avoid wordiness and circumlocution, but the natural consequence of their manner of thinking. Similar examples have been collected by Astius ad Legg. p. 24.

^h ἀνδρὶ τίμητι εὐεργέτῃ] A person who had deserved well of the state was honoured with the name εὐεργέτης. Dorvill on Chariton. p. 317. ed. Lips. says: “Great men, nay, even kings,

sought as a distinguished honour *εὐεργέτας τοῦ δήμου γραφήναι* of Athens." See Suidas, under *σῆλη*. Ancient inscriptions supply many examples.

¹ *μᾶλλον πρέπει οὕτως, ὡς—*] The ordinary mode of expression would have been either *ὅ,τι μᾶλλον πρέπει ἢ, or ὅ,τι πρέπει οὕτως ὡς*. Uniting these constructions, he gives us *μᾶλλον οὕτως ὡς, κ. τ. λ.* So c. XVII., *μήτε σωμαίων ἐπιμελείσθαι μήτε χρημάτων πρότερον οὕτω σφόδρα, ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς*. See, also, Rep. VII. p. 526. C. *καὶ μὴν, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, ἃ γε μείζω πόνον παρέχει μανθάνοντι καὶ μελετῶντι, οὐκ ἂν ῥαδίως οὐδὲ πολλά ἂν εὔροις, ὡς τοῦτο*. Min. p. 318. E. *οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅ τι τούτου ἀσβεστέρον ἐστίν, οὐδ' οὕτω χρή μᾶλλον εὐλαβεῖσθαι, πλὴν εἰς θεοῦς καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ ἐξαμαρτάνειν*. Eryx. p. 392. C. *ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν συμκρῶν τούτων ἂν μᾶλλον ὀργίζονται οὕτως, ὡς ἂν μάλιστα χαλεπώτατοι εἴησαν*.

² *ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτεῖσθαι*] The Prytaneum was a place in the citadel where the laws of Solon were kept, see Pausan. I. 18.: and where a daily allowance of provisions was given to citizens who had deserved well of the republic. A public maintenance in the Prytaneum, *ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτεῖσθαι*, was accounted a high honour. See Cic. Orat. I. 54. Demosthen. de falsâ leg. p. 231. —“*Ἴππος* is the same as *κῆλης*, a race-horse, mounted by a single rider. *Ξυνωρίς* is a chariot with two horses, and *ζευγος* one with three or four horses. *νενίκηκεν Ὀλύμπια* is used indifferently with *Ὀλυμπίᾳσι νενίκηκεν*, and is analogous to such expressions as *μάχην μάχεσθαι*, and the like. So Ennius ap. Cic. de Senectute has—

Sicut fortis equus, spatio qui sæpe supremo
Vicit Olympia, etc. (Chap. VI.)

XXVII. ³ *ὡς περὶ τοῦ οἴκου καὶ τῆς ἀντιβολήσεως*] He refers to his saying, in c. XXIII., that he would not follow the example of other accused persons, who tried to move the pity (*οἴκος*) of the judges, and that he would not, as a suppliant, implore the mercy of his judges. This is the *ἀντιβόλησις* or *ἀντιβολία* which he speaks of. For as *ἀντιβολεῖν* is the same as *ικετεύειν*, so *ἀντιβόλησις* is the same as *ικετεία*.

⁴ *ἐκῶν εἶναι*] That is, *as far as my will has been concerned*. As *ἐκῶν εἶναι* implies an exception, it will naturally be found chiefly, if not exclusively, in negative propositions, whilst *ἐκῶν* alone is generally found with affirmative ones.

⁵ *ὀλίγον γὰρ χρόνον—εἰ ἦν ὑμῖν νόμος, κ. τ. λ.*] There is here

an evident reference to the caution and tardiness with which the Spartans proceeded in any case which affected the life of a citizen. See Thucyd. I. 132.

^d ἀξίως εἰμι τοῦ κακοῦ] So after Koehler, Heindorf, and Bekker we have corrected the common reading ἀξ. εἰμι τοῦ κακοῦ. A correction which is proved to be necessary by the words in c. XXVIII. οὐκ εἶθισμαι ἐμαντὸν ἀξιοῦν κακοῦ οὐδενός. The indefinite pronoun τις is occasionally put before the word which it agrees with. Theocrit. Idyll. I. 32. ἐντοσθεν δὲ γυνά, τι θεῶν δαίδαλαμα, τέτυκται.

^e τι δείσας; ἢ μὴ πάθω—] The manuscripts read τι δείσας, ἢ μὴ πάθω, 'through fear of what? or is it that I may experience the fate at which Meletus estimates my offence, and which I confess myself ignorant, whether it be a good or an evil?' The sense thus obtained is quite in keeping with the drift of the argument, and we may, therefore, question the propriety of Stallbaum's reading (after Heindorf) ἦ. It seems more natural to carry the sense on, without making two distinct interrogations. Nor is there any need for interpreting the reading of the MSS., as he says it must be interpreted if retained, τί ἄλλο δείσας ἢ μὴ πάθω.—οὐ Μέλητος μοι τιμᾶται. Remark the construction of the verb τιμᾶσθαι with a dative, as in c. XXVI and c. XXVIII, where he says of the judges: τοσούτου βούλεσθέ μοι τιμῆσαι. It is a dativus commodi. The active is always said of the judges, the middle of the accuser and accused, in accordance with the nature of the middle voice; for neither the accuser nor the accused have the power to impose the penalty, but merely to get it imposed. An example in point occurs a few lines farther on in this chapter: ἀλλὰ δὴ φυγῆς τιμῆσομαι; ἴσως γὰρ ἂν μοι τούτου τιμῆσαιτε.

^f ἔλωμαι ὧν εὐ οἶδ' ὅτι κακῶν ὄντων] The regular construction would be, either ἔλωμαί τι τούτων ἃ εὐ οἶδα ὅτι κακά ἐστιν, or ἔλωμαί τι τῶν, εὐ οἶδα, κακῶν ὄντων. Both constructions are here combined. In a similar manner Gorg. p. 481. D. αἰσθάνομαι ὄν σου ἐκάστοτε καίπερ ὄντος δεινοῦ, ὅτι, ὀπόσ' ἂν φῆ σου τὰ παιδικὰ καὶ ὅπως ἂν φῆ ἔχειν, οὐ δυναμένου ἀντιλέγειν, ἀλλ' ἄνω καὶ κάτω μεταβαλλομένου, where see Heindorf.

^g τοῖς ἑνδεκα;] The Eleven were magistrates, to whom persons condemned by public trial were delivered for punishment. Some have regarded these words as a gloss, and recommended their omission; an opinion embraced by Heindorf, Schleiermacher, and Bekker. But they may very well be retained, as exhibiting

more emphatically the disagreeable and odious condition on which he would then hold his life.

^b *καὶ δεδέσθαι ἕως ἂν ἐκτίσω;*] *Δεδέσθαι*, to be in the public prison. This passage alone is sufficient to show that persons who were fined were imprisoned until the fine was paid. Compare Demosth. c. Timocr. p. 721. 1. *ἐὰν ἀργυρίου τιμηθῆ δεδέσθαι ἕως ἂν ἐκτίσω.* Adv. Mid. p. 529. 26. See the commentators on Nep. Miltiad. 7., and also Cimon. 1.

¹ *εἰ οὕτως ἀλόγιστός εἰμι*] On this use of the indicative see c. XII. note (a).—A little further on *ζηρεῖν* is to wish, to desire.

² *ἄλλοι δὲ ἄρα*] On this expression see c. XXIII. note (c). These words do not depend on the preceding *ὅτι*, but the sentence begins anew; or, rather, *λογίζεσθαι*, in positive sense, must be mentally supplied from the *μὴ δύνασθαι λογίζεσθαι* above. Compare c. XXVI. note (d).

¹ *καλὸς οὖν ἂν μοι ὁ βίος εἴη—ζῆν*] This is said ironically.—The verb *ἐξέρχεσθαι*, not *φεύγειν*, is said of going into exile, as has been well observed by Fischer.—*ἄλλην ἐξ ἄλλης πόλιν πόλειως ἀμείβεσθαι* is to change, or go, from one state to another to take up his residence.—The infinitive *ζῆν* is added *per epezegein* to the preceding words, *καλὸς—ὁ βίος εἴη*, to give additional force to the expression; a usage which is frequent after demonstrative pronouns. Compare Matth. § 535. γ. and § 468.

² *κἂν μὲν ᾿ ἀπελαύνω*] That is, do not admit them to hear my discourses.—On the Attic future *ἐξελεύσει*, see Buttm. § 86.

XXVIII. ² *τυγχάνει μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν οὖν*] The old reading was simply *τυγχάνει* without the *οὖν*, but the participle is found in the best MSS., and has been restored accordingly. It has been a matter of controversy whether *τυγχάνειν* can be used absolutely in the sense of *to be*; but Heindorf, Matthiæ, and others seem to have established the affirmative side of the question. Compare Hipp. Maj. p. 299, near the end. *οὐδέ γ' αὖ ἡ δι' ἀκοῆς ἡδονή, ὅτι δι' ἀκοῆς ἐστι, διὰ ταῦτα τυγχάνει καλή.* Soph. Elect. 313. *νῦν δ' ἀγροῖσι τυγχάνει sc. ὤν.* Nor would it be difficult to multiply examples. For the opposite view, see Porson's Hecuba, v. 782.

^b *ὁ δὲ ἀνεξέταστος—ἀνθρώπων*] This is not an independent sentence, introduced by way of parenthesis, as some have thought. The words are under the government of the foregoing *ὅτι*. The particle *δὲ* in *ταῦτα δ' ἐπι ἤτρον πείσεισθέ μοι λέγοντι*, serves to bring out the apodosis with greater force. Moreover, it refers us

back to the foregoing *οὐ πείσεσθέ μοι ὡς εἰρωνευομένην*. The emphasis of this use of *δέ* in the apodosis of a sentence doubtless lies in its suggesting to us an alternative, which, if not expressed, is at least implied. Its use is, then, analogous to that of the Latin *vero* in such phrases as *tum vero*.

^c *νῦν δέ—οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν*] After *νῦν δε*, or, rather, after *οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν*, we must understand *οὐ δύναμαι τιμῆσασθαι χρημάτων*, or simply *οὐ τιμῶμαι χρημάτων*; the declaration receiving its correction from what follows, *εἰ μὴ ἄρα ὅσον, κ. τ. λ.* Socrates begins the sentence as if he intended its form to be something as follows: 'But in the present case, as I have no money, I am unable to assess myself in that way'; but being led to correct and modify his statement, that he had no money to pay, he is under the necessity of attaching a different termination to the sentence from that which he had intended. The *τοσοῦτου οὖν τιμῶμαι* is the representative of the *οὐ τιμῶμαι χρημάτων*, which is thus displaced.

^d *αὐτοὶ δ' ἐγγυᾶσθαι*] Understand *φασί*, which is contained in the preceding word *κελεύουσι*. It not unfrequently happens that we have thus to abstract from a word of precise and definite signification, occurring in one part of a sentence, the more general meaning which alone is applicable to some other part of the same sentence. This is the principle of what the grammarians call *zeugma*. On *ἀξιόχρεως*, see c. V. note (!).

XXIX. ^a *Οὐ πολλοῦ γ' ἐνέκα χρόνου*] The remainder of the Apology was delivered after the judges had, by their second vote, passed sentence of death upon Socrates. The bold and uncompromising tone which he had adopted in the second portion of his address, especially his declaration that he considered himself worthy of a public maintenance in the Prytaneum, had exasperated his enemies; and the majority against him was, according to Diogenes, greater by eighty votes than on the preceding question. The same features which characterise the foregoing portions of the defence are exhibited, in this closing section, in a manner even more striking. There is a pathos, too, about the words, in which the venerable old man takes his leave of his judges, which has found enthusiastic admirers in all ages:—'I will say no more: it is already time for us to be going—for me to die, for you to live; and which of the two is the better issue is a secret to all but God.' *οὐ πολλοῦ γ' ἐνέκα χρόνου*, i. e. *for the sake of no long period of time*. The last few

years of an old man's life, he would intimate, were but an ignoble mark for so much animosity and malignity. It is true some of the philosophers of ancient Greece enjoyed a marvellously green old age, and prolonged it in a most extraordinary manner (see Cic. Cat. Maj. Chap. V. VII. etc.); but, in the common course of nature, a septuagenarian could not count on many more years of life.—*δνομα ἔχειν*, ordinarily in good sense, to *enjoy distinction*, but still capable of being applied to mere notoriety, as here. Perhaps Socrates, with that irony which was so favourite a weapon of his, has purposely chosen to employ a word which would more naturally suggest a favourable interpretation.—*αίριαν ἔχειν* is a phrase of indifferent import, though more frequently occurring in a bad than in a good sense.—The idea contained in *δνομα καὶ αἰριαν ἔχειν* is passive, and we have after it, consequently, *ὑπὸ* with the genitive, as after a passive verb. Compare c. I. note (*).

^b *ὑμῖν τοῦτο ἐγένετο*] That is, *ἐμὲ τεθνάναι δῆ*, an addition, which appears to have crept from the margin into the text of several MSS. Heindorf wished it to be retained, but thought that it should be read, *τὸ ἐμὲ τεθνάναι δῆ*. See, however, the observations of Matthiæ, § 468. b.—*ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου*, of its own accord, even if you had not condemned me to death.

^c *πὸρρω ἤδη ἐστὶ τοῦ βίου*] Analogous to such expressions as *ὀψέ τῆς ἡμέρας*, *πὸρρω τῆς ἡμέρας*, and the like. Similarly, Plato has *πὸρρω ἔναι τῆς φιλοσοφίας*, to go to great lengths in philosophy. The subject to *ἐστὶ* is *ἡλικία*: *my time of life is far advanced*. The genitive indicates a partitive notion.

^d *ἅπαντα ποιεῖν... ὥστε ἀποφεύγειν*] The phrase *πάντα*, or *ἅπαντα ποιεῖν*, is about equivalent to ours, *to leave no stone unturned*; it may be followed by *ὡς*, *ὥστε*, or *ὅπως*, and is sometimes construed with a participle, e. g., *πάντα ποιεῖν φεύγοντες τὴν δίκην*, Euthyph. p. 8. C. The whole sentence may be rendered as follows: '*And perhaps you imagine that it is through a lack of arguments that I have been brought in guilty, by the help of which I might have convinced you, had I thought it right to have recourse to all possible means, both in word and deed, in order to elude justice. Far from it,*' etc. It is impossible to say whether the *οἷς ἂν ὑμᾶς ἔπεισα* is intended as an independent sentence, thrown in parenthetically, or as under the government of *οἷεθε*. Probably Socrates begins by putting the sentiment in the mouths

of his judges, and then, from his conviction of his truth, adopts it as his own.

* *τεθνάναι ἢ ἐκείνως ζῆν*] With *ἐκείνως* understand *ἀπολογησάμενος*. On the use of the perfect tense, see c. XVII. note (*).

† *ἐάν τις τολμῶ*] That is, if any one can prevail on himself to do this, if any one can go to so great a pitch of impudence, that—Xenoph. Mem. II. 1, 3. *τις ἂν εὖ φρονῶν τοῦ σοῦ θιάσου τολμήσειεν εἶναι*; Plat. Crit. c. XV. *ἐτόλμησας οὕτω γλίσχρωσ ἐπιθυμῶν ζῆν*.

‡ *θάνατον ἐκφυγεῖν*] On the infinitive subjoined for the purpose of explanation to the pronoun *τοῦτο*, see c. XXIV., note (b). With *πονηρίαν*, a little further on, understand *ἐκφυγεῖν*.

§ *ἄτε βραδὺς ὦν*] Socrates and his accusers are represented as followed, the former by the comparatively slow pursuer, death; the latter by what steals upon us with far more rapid speed, iniquity. The adjectives *δεινοί* and *δέξεις* contrast, by what grammarians call chiasmus, with *πρεσβύτης* and *βραδύς* respectively. Some have advocated our reading *νέοι* instead of *δεινοί*; but the former epithet would not be altogether appropriate to the dicasts *en masse*, and then *δεινοί* conveys more forcibly the impression of bodily strength and vigour.—Socrates plays on the ambiguity of the verb *ἀλῶναι*, which is applied both to one who is overtaken in running, and to one who has lost his cause and been condemned.

¶ *θανάτου δίκην ὀφλῶν*] That is, *condemned to the punishment of death*. Literally, having owed, or incurred the penalty of death. The expression is not uncommon. But while we say *δίκην ὀφλεῖν*, we may also say, with equal propriety, *μωρίαν*, *μοχθηρίαν*, or *ἀδικίαν ὀφλεῖν*, in the sense of to incur the charge of folly, wickedness, or injustice. Socrates avails himself of this double meaning to add *ὑπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας ὠφληκότες μοχθηρίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν*, that is, *you are convicted and condemned by Truth to the reproach of wickedness and injustice*.—*τῷ τιμῆματι ἐμμένω*, that is, I abide by your sentence.—*μερῶς ἔχειν*, nearly the same as *εὖ*, *ὀρθῶς*, *ἔχειν*, though somewhat weaker. ‘For my own part, I think it is *all very well* as it is.’

XXX. * *ἐν ᾧ μάλιστα ἄνθρωποι χρησιμοδοῦσιν*] Alluding to the current belief, that the soul attained a closer resemblance to divinity on the approach of death, and acquired the power of foreseeing and foretelling the future. On this interesting subject see Cicero Div. I. 30, with the commentaries upon that passage.

^b ἢ οἶαν ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε] That is, *than the punishment which you have inflicted on me in condemning me to death*. The mode of expression is one which arises out of studied brevity. Ordinary usage would have required οἶαν... ἐλάβετε; but, at the thought of the nature of the revenge they had taken, he substitutes the more definite word, ἀπεκτόνατε.—τοῦ διδόναι ἔλεγχον τοῦ βίου, that is, *from giving an account of your life, and being therefore censured*.

^c καὶ χαλεπώτεροι] On the omission of τοσοῦτοι, see c. XVII., note (9). A little further on, ἀποκτείνοντες ἀνθρώπους is, *because you put men to death*. Fischer was wrong in supposing that the aorist was required.

^d μὴ τοὺς ἄλλους κολούειν] Κολούειν is properly *to mutilate*; hence, *to prevent anything from being accomplished; to frustrate an undertaking*.

XXXI. ἐν ᾧ οἱ ἄρχοντες ἀσχολίαν ἄγουσι] That is, while the Eleven are occupied. The judges used to deliver to the Eleven those who were condemned to be punished. It was the duty of these functionaries to order their assistants to lead away the culprit to prison, and inflict on him the prescribed punishment. See the article ἔνδεκα in the Dictionary of Antiquities, where the particulars of this magistracy are given. οἱ ἐλθόντα — τεθνάναι i. e. εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον. A little further on, διαμυθολογήσαι is *to discuss or converse together*.

^a ἢ γὰρ εἰωθυῖά μοι μαντικὴ ἢ τοῦ δαιμονίου] Schleiermacher considers the words ἢ τοῦ δαιμονίου a gloss, because Plato elsewhere is accustomed to call the thing itself τὸ δαιμόνιον, and because, when he expresses the same thing by a substantive, as μαντικὴ, φωνή, σημεῖον, he either adds nothing, or else τοῦ θεοῦ, rather than τοῦ δαιμονίου. But even if a passage cannot be found in every respect resembling this, yet we are safe in following all the MSS. And the want of those words would be felt, since, without them, it might be doubted what description of μαντικὴ he meant. Therefore he adds ἢ τοῦ δαιμονίου, namely, *that which I owe to the spirit which I have before mentioned*. For ἢ μαντικὴ does not denote the thing itself which Socrates intended, when he spoke of his δαιμόνιον, but rather the effect of that *daimonion*.—A little further on, observe the collocation πάνν ἐπὶ συμφορῆς for ἐπὶ πάνν συμφορῆς. The reason is, that πάνν is the emphatic word. So Euthyd. p. 305. C. πάνν παρὰ πολλοῖς. Phædo, p. 110. C. καὶ πολὺ ἔτι ἐκ λαμπροτέρων. — εἰ τι μέλλοιμι,

that is, *as often as I was about*, etc. On the use of the optative, to indicate an action frequently repeated, see *Matth. Gr.* § 521.

^b ἃ γε δὴ οἰηθεῖν ἂν τις καὶ νομίζεται] That is, *which any one would take to be, and which really are regarded, as the worst of evils*. The relative pronoun ἃ serves at once for object to οἰηθεῖν and subject to νομίζεται. See *Matth. Gr.* § 428. 2, and 474. d.

^c λέγοντα μεταξὺ] That is, *at the very moment of my speaking; in the middle of my speaking*. Compare *Theag.* p. 128. E. λέγοντος σου μεταξὺ γέγονέ μοι ἡ φωνή ἢ τοῦ δαιμονίου. *Rep. I.* p. 336. A. καὶ διαλεγομένων ἡμῶν μεταξὺ ὄρμα ἀντλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ λόγου.

^d τί οὖν — ὑπολαμβάνω] Stephens and others substitute a comma for the note of interrogation; but this much impairs the vigour and liveliness of the passage. Plato often makes his speakers interrogate themselves, and answer their own questions. The whole sentence we may render as follows: ‘*Do you ask what I conceive to be the reason of this? I will tell you. I am disposed to think that the event which has befallen me is a blessing; and it is impossible that those among us can have been right in our notions, who believed death to be an evil. I have had convincing proof of this; for the wonted sign would certainly not have failed to oppose me, if I had not been purposing to do something that was good.*’

XXXII. ^a Ἐννοήσωμεν δὲ καὶ τῆδε—] The sentiments expressed in the former part of this chapter have excited much attention, and portions of it have been often quoted and translated. Eusebius has transcribed part of it in his *Præparatio Evangelica*, and Stobæus in his *Sermones*; while Cicero has given us his version of almost the whole chapter in his *Tusculan Disputations*, *Lib. I.* 41. ‘*Magna me spes tenet, iudices, bene mihi evenire, quod mittar ad mortem. Necessè est enim, sit alterum de duobus; ut aut sensus omnino omnes mors auferat, aut in alium quendam locum ex his locis morte migretur,*’ etc.

^b ἢ γὰρ οἶον μὴδὲν εἶναι] That is, *ταυτὸν τι ὧστε μὴδὲν εἶναι* as a little lower down: εἰ δ’ αὖ οἶον ἀποδημησαὶ ἔστω ὁ θάνατος. Eusebius, and Theodoret (who likewise quotes this passage), have μὴδὲν τι εἶναι, whence Heindorf conjectures that the reading ought to be μὴδὲν ἔτι εἶναι.

^c καὶ μετοίκησις τῆ ψυχῆ—] On this use of the dative see *Matth.* § 389. 1.—Instead of μετοίκησις τοῦ τόπου might have been said μετοίκησις ἐκ τοῦ τόπου. Yet the former is no less

usual. For since the verb *μετοικεῖν* is not only construed with prepositions, but also is used with an accusative of the place, from which one person goes to another, as in Pausan. IV. 40. *Ἀκαρνανίαν μετοικῆσαι* therefore *μετοίκησις τόπον* is no less correct than *μετοίκησις ἐκ τόπου*.—A little further on, *τοῦ ἐνθίνδε* is put for *τοῦ ἐνταῦθα*, because the verbal substantive signifies motion to a place. We have before spoken of a similar use of prepositions (c. XX. note (°)): the construction of the adverbs has been illustrated by Heindorf on Gorgias, p. 472. B. where we find: *ἡ Περιελεύς ἔλη οἰκία ἢ ἄλλη συγγένεια, ἦντιν' ἂν βούλη τῶν ἐνθίνδε ἐκλίξασθαι*. Compare also Buttman's Gr. § 138. 8.

^d *καὶ εἴτε δὴ μηδεμία*—] The other alternative is given a good way on, and introduced by the words *εἰ δ' αὖ οἶον ἀποδημησαί ἔστιν ὁ θάνατος*. On *εἰ δὲ* after *εἴτε*, see c. IV. note (°).

^e *ἐγὼ γὰρ ἂν οἶμαι*] *Ἄν* belongs to the infinitive *εὐρεῖν*. It is repeated on account of the long parenthesis; and its insertion at the head of the sentence prepares us for the hypothetical character of the proposition. Compare Soph. Ant. 466.—

ἀλλ' ἂν εἰ τὸν ἐξ ἐμῆς

*μητρὸς θανόντ' ἄθαπτον ἠνσχομένην κέκυν,
κείνοισι ἂν ἤλγουν.*

For a similar reason, the words *δέοι* and *οἶμαι* are subsequently repeated. Heindorf wished also the word *εἰ* to be repeated before the words *δέοι σκεψάμενον*, for the sake of perspicuity. And it is written so in Eusebius. But as the construction of the sentence is not altered from the beginning, this repetition does not appear to be necessary.

^f *μὴ ὅτι ιδιώτην*] That is, *not to say any private man*. See Matth. Gr. § 624. 4.

^g *εὐαριθμήτους ἂν εὐρεῖν αὐτὸν τ.*] The pronoun *αὐτὸν* is to be connected with *τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα*, and add emphasis to the expression: *the great king himself*.—*Εὐαριθμητοὶ ἡμέραι*, that is, *days which may be easily counted, very few*: *πρὸς* indicates comparison: *if they be compared with other days and nights*. So a little further on: *τὰ ἑμαντοῦ πάθη πρὸς τὰ ἐκείνων*.

^h *καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν πλείων*] Fischer, following the quotation in Eusebius, reads *πλείων*. But the more correct reading is *πλείων*, meaning *longer*, *οὐδὲν* being used in the sense of *οὐ*, as is frequently the case. Cicero has thus translated these words: *perpetuitas consequentis temporis similis futura est uni nocti*.—For the expression *ὁ πᾶς χρόνος*, compare Eurip. Med. v. 25. *τὸν*

πάντα συντήκουσα δακρύοις χρόνον. Ibid. 1096. τρυχομένους τὸν πάντα χρόνον.

¹ Μίνως τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθους, κ. τ. λ.] These words are placed in apposition with the relative pronoun; whereas the first part of the sentence would lead us to expect the accusative. So Phædo, p. 66. Ε, καὶ τότε—ἡμῖν ἴσται οὐ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν,—φρονήσεως. Hipp. Maj. p. 281. C. τί ποτε τὸ αἰγίον, ὅτι οἱ παλαιοὶ ἐκείνοι, ὧν ὀνόματα μεγάλα λέγεται ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ, Πιττακοῦ τε καὶ Βίαντος, —φαίνονται ἀπεχόμενοι τῶν πολιτικῶν πράξεων. These apparent irregularities are due to the principle of attraction, which exercises so strong an influence in the structure of a Greek sentence. It would be easy to multiply examples; but those who are anxious to see a greater number, may refer to Wolf on Demosth. Lept. § 15, or Heindorf on Hippias Maj. § 2. By a similar construction, Sulpicius in Cic. ad. Diversos, IV. 5, writes: genus hoc consolationis miserum est, quia, per quos ea confieri debet, propinquos ac familiares, ipsi pari molestia afficiuntur.—Respecting the judges of the infernal regions, and their duties, there is a remarkable passage in Gorg. p. 523. E. εἰς. It appears to have been the opinion of the common people in Attica, probably derived, by rumour, from the Eleusinian mysteries, that Triptolemus, and other heroes who had lived a just and pious life, became judges in the infernal regions. For Triptolemus was said not only to have taught the Athenians agriculture, but also to have given them laws, whence he was called θεσμοφόρος. The following words, καὶ ἄλλοι, ὅσοι κ. τ. λ., seem to refer to the prevalent notion, that the dead would practise in the shades what had been their occupations in the upper world.

² ἐπὶ πόσῳ ἂν τις δέξαιτ' ἂν ὑμῶν] Cicero renders: quanti tandem aestimatis? Xenoph. Mem. II. 2, 8. ἀλλὰ νῆ Δία λέγει, εἰ οὐκ ἂν τις ἐπὶ τῷ βίῳ παντὶ βούλοιστο εἶναι. Compare Matth. § 585. B.

³ ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ πολλάκις ἐθίλω τεθνάναι] On this use of the verb τεθνάναι see c. XVII. note (*). Eusebius has: ἐγὼ μὲν καὶ πολλάκις: whence Heindorf conjectured that Plato wrote: ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ καὶ πολλάκις, etc. But there is no need of change. The word γὰρ sometimes introduces the real reason for a preceding or following statement; but, very frequently, indeed, refers to a statement or sentiment, to which the train of thought leads so spontaneously as to render it unnecessary to do more than thus intimate it; and sometimes, like the Latin *cum*, seems to

mean simply, *indeed, at any rate*, according to its etymology, γε ἄρα.

^m ἢ διατριβὴ αὐτόθι] That is, 'As far as I myself am concerned, the intercourse there would be delightful; to meet with Palamedes and Ajax, the son of Telamon, and any of the rest of the ancients, who, through an unjust sentence, were put to death: to compare their sufferings with my own would, I conceive, be no unpleasant occupation.'—ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι is, in point of sense, equivalent to ἀντιπαραβάλλειν. The stories of Palamedes and Ajax are well known. See, for the former, Virg. *Æn.* II. 81, and Ovid. *Met.* XIII. 55; for the latter, Hom. *Od.* XI. 545.

ⁿ καὶ δὴ τὸ μέγιστον] The expression τὸ μέγιστον is placed in apposition with the whole of the following clause. See Matth. § 432. 5.

^o τὸν ἐπὶ Τροίαν ἀγαγόντα] That is, Agamemnon.

^p ἢ ἄλλους μυρίους ἂν τις εἴποι] Stephens would read ἢ ἄλλους μυρίους, οὓς ἂν τις εἴποι, not bearing in mind that brevity by which several sentences are sometimes united in one clause. See Gorg. p. 483. D. 'πεὶ ποίῳ δικαίῳ χρώμενος Ξέρξης ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐστράτευσεν; ἢ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τοὺς Σκύθας; ἢ ἄλλα μυρία ἂν τις ἔχοι τοιαῦτα λέγειν. Phædo, p. 94. B. λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε, ὡς εἰ καύματος ἐνότος καὶ δίψους ἐπὶ τούναντιον ἔκειν, ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ πίνειν καὶ πείνης ἐνούσης ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ ἐσθιεν. καὶ ἄλλα μυρία που ὀρῶμεν ἐναντιουμένην τὴν ψυχὴν τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα.

^q ἀμήχανον ἂν εἴη εὐδαιμονίας] Similarly Theætet. p. 175. A. ἄτοπα αὐτῷ καταφαινεται τῆς συμκρολογίας, monstrous degree of stupidity. The genitive is a partitive one.


XXXIII. ^a 'Ἄλλὰ καὶ ὑμᾶς χρῆ] Cicero: vos, judices, qui me absolvistis. Socrates will not recognise as judges those who condemned him. Compare c. XXXI.

^b καὶ ἔν τι τοῦτο διανοεῖσθαι ἀληθές] The circumstance that τι is used here before τοῦτο arises from the usage of the Greeks, first to express what they mean generally by the pronoun τι, and then to limit or define the meaning more accurately. So we should say, *one particular thing, namely this, is to be regarded as true.*—ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου: that is, *by chance, fortuitously, not by the design and will of the gods.*—ἀπηλλ. πραγμάτων, that is, *human affairs*, with the accessory notion of labour and toil.—οὐ πάνυ χαλ., *not much; not greatly.* Others have incorrectly translated it *by no means*, a signification which the words no where

have.—A little further on, Heindorf suggests that the reading ought to be: τοῦθ' ὁ ἀποῖς ἀξίον μέμψεσθαι. But the language is more serious and emphatic as it stands.

^c ταῦτὰ ταῦτα λυποῦντες] That is, giving them just the same annoyance which I have done you; to wit, exhorting them to virtue, making trial of their wisdom, convincing them of folly.—εἶναι τι κ. τ. λ., that is, *If they think themselves to be something when they are nothing, reproach them, as I have done you, etc.*

^d Ἄλλὰ γὰρ—] Cicero Tusc. I. 41. Sed tempus est jam hinc abire, me, ut moriar; vos, ut vitam agatis. Utrum autem sit melius, dii immortales sciunt: hominem quidem scire arbitror neminem. See c. XXIX. note (*).



NOTES ON THE CRITO.

Crito.] *Crito*, whose name is honoured by standing at the head of this dialogue, was a wealthy and generous Athenian. He wrote a considerable number of treatises in the dialogue form, but it is to his faithful and self-sacrificing attachment to his friend and master that he owes by far the greater part of his fame. His sons were also pupils of *Socrates*

I. ^a Πηνίκα μάλιστα;] *What hour is it as near as you can tell?* The interrogative *πηνίκα* is correctly used, not of time in general, but of the subdivisions of the day. See *Thom. M.* p. 713, ed. Bern. — *πηνίκα μὴ εἴπῃς ἐπὶ χρόνου. ἔστι γὰρ ὥρας δηλωτικόν οἶον ἂν εἴπῃς ἕωθεν ἢ περὶ μισημβρίαν.* The adverb *μάλιστα* is frequently used with numerals and similar words, to indicate that nothing more than an approximation, as near as possible however to the exact truth, is intended.

^b ὄρθρος βαθύς.] *Crito* defines the time more accurately in these words, for *πρῶ* and *ὄρθρος* differ from one another, as in Latin *mane* and *diluculum*, of which the former is the part of the day extending from twilight to about the third hour, according to the antient division of the day; but the latter is the twilight itself, when

Nox abiit, nec tamen orta dies,

according to *Ovid. Amat. I.* 5, 6. *Phrynichus*: ὄρθρος τὸ πρὸ ἀρχομένης ἡμέρας, ἐν ᾧ ἔτι λύχνῳ δύναται τις χρῆσθαι. The adjective *βαθύς* is used by the Greeks in reference to time as the word “depth” is used in the phrase “the depth of winter.” *Protagor.* p. 310. A. τῆς παρελθούσης νυκτὸς ταυτησί, ἔτι ὄρθρος βαθύς. *Lucian. Asin.* 34. νύξ βαθεία, where see *Beitz. Polyæn. Strateg.* I. 28, 2, βαθείας ἐσπίρας.

^c θαυμάζω, ὅπως ἤθελ.— *I wonder how it came to pass that.* Compare *Xenoph. Mem.* I. 1, 20. θαυμάζω οὖν, ὅπως ποτὲ ἐπέστησαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι. *Eurip. Med.* v. 51. πῶς λείπεσθαι θέλει; So a little further on: πῶς οὐκ ἐπήγεράς με εἰθύς; *Socrates*

wonders that Crito was admitted so soon by the jailor, because it was not yet the legitimate time for opening the doors: *οὐ πάνυ πρὸ ἀνεψήγετο*. Phaedo c. III.—*ὑπακούειν* indicates the answering of a knock by the janitor.

^d *καί τι καὶ ἐβεργέτηται*] The reading *καὶ τοὶ καί*, and in truth also, which some have preferred, appears inconsistent with the modesty of Crito, who does not wish to boast of benefits conferred on the man, but merely to state the cause of his being admitted. Delicacy of feeling would lead him rather to depreciate the sacrifices he had made in order to secure a ready admission to his friend's cell. And the reading, we have admitted, is sanctioned by some of the best MSS. The *τι* is to be taken in connexion with *ἐβεργέτηται*: *he has received a trifle from me*: see Matth. § 415. Nor is there anything unusual in its being separated from the verb by the intervening conjunction. Buttman and others prefer the present imperfect *ἐβεργεῖται*, as indicating that Crito regularly gave the doorkeeper a gratuity on paying his visits to the prison. But the present perfect *ἐβεργέτηται* is even more expressive, as it indicates that the remembrance of his favours in time past, still survived in the man's mind; without at all precluding the notion of their being repeated from time to time. No universal rule can be laid down for the augment of verbs like *ἐβεργεῖω*. See Matth. § 169, and compare *ib.* 167, note 6.

^e *Ἐπεικῶς πάλαι*] That is, *pretty long since*, or, *a good while ago*. So Theaet. near the beginning, *Ἄρτι, ὦ Τερψίων, ἢ πάλαι ἐξ ἀγροῦ; ἐπεικῶς πάλαι*. Phaedo, p. 80. C. *ἐπεικῶς συχρὸν ἐπιμένει χρόνον*. Grammarians interpret *ἐπεικῶς*, when so placed, by *πάνυ, λίαν*. See Eustath. on *Π. α.*, p. 547. Hesych. under the word.—Immediately afterwards, the interrogative *εἶτα* indicates wonder and annoyance. See Apolog. Socr. c. XVI.

^f *οὐδ' ἂν αὐτὸς ἠθέλον*—] *I should not myself have liked to have been at once so sleepless and so sad*; literally, to have been in such wakefulness and sorrow. The particle *ἂν* used with the imperfect indicates the supposition of a case contrary to that which in reality exists. For *ἐν τοσαύτῃ τε ἀγρυπνίᾳ καὶ λύπῃ* the ordinary construction would be *ἐν τοσαύτῃ ἀγρυπνίᾳ τε καὶ λύπῃ*, which is found in some MSS. But the other reading is explained by understanding *τοσαύτῃ* again after *καί*. For *τε* is put immediately after *τοσαύτῃ* to show that that word belongs to *λύπῃ* as well as to *ἀγρύπνιᾳ*.

* *ὡς ἠδέως κ.*] Emphatically, for *ὅτι οὕτως ἠδέως κ.* For in expressions of this kind the word *ὡς* retains something of that force which it has when enunciated as an exclamation. Comp. Xen. Cyr., where the young Cyrus says of Astyages, *ὡς καλός μοι ὁ πάππος!* So a little further on: *ὡς ῥαδίως αὐτήν και πράως φέρεις.* Phædo, p. 58. E. *εὐδαίμων μοι ὁ ἀνὴρ ἐφαίνετο—ὡς ἀδεῶς και γενναίως ἐτελεύτα.* Ibid. p. 89. A. *ὡς ἠδέως και ἐμμενῶς τὸν λόγον ἀπεδέξατο.* Compare Matth. § 489. 3.

^h *ἵνα ὡς ἡδιστα διάγῃς*] The Greeks use the subjunctive mood after conjunctions indicating the final cause, even when a past tense has gone before, if the apodosis describes a state which is contemplated as still abiding, as is here the case. Crito intimates that not merely *was* it his purpose to secure his friend as much enjoyment of life as possible, but that it *is* so still. Compare Matth. § 518. 1. With *διάγῃς* we must understand *τὸν βίον*, a very customary ellipsis.

ⁱ *εὐδαιμόνισα τοῦ τρόπου*] On this genitive of *cause* see Matth. § 368. — *τρόπος* here means *the mode of thinking and acting exhibited in a man's life,—his disposition.* Phædo, p. 58. E. *εὐδαίμων ἐφαίνετο τοῦ τρόπου.* Xenophon likewise bears testimony to the calm equanimity of his master: Memor. IV. 8. 3. *ἐθανμάζετο ἐπὶ τῷ εὐθύμῳς και ἐκύδλως ζῆν.—τηλικούτον ὄντα,* i. e. *for me at my time of life,* for it is better to understand the indefinite subject, than the definite *ἐμέ.* *χρῆ δὲ—ταῦτα ἀρεῖσθαι φάσκοντά γε δῆ, κ. τ. λ.* To make the sentiment more emphatic, he expresses it in general terms: "*it were absurd that a man of such an age should be unwilling to die.*" Socrates was now seventy. See c. XIV.

^k *ἐν τοιαύταις ξυμφοραῖς ἀλίσκονται*] i. e. *are overtaken with like calamities.* It would be easy to multiply examples of this use of *ἐν.* Compare Phileb. p. 45. C. *ἐν τοιοῦτοις νοσήμασιν ἐχόμενοι.* Rep. III. p. 395. D. *ἐν ξυμφοραῖς τε και πένθει και θρήνοις ἐχομένην.* The reading *αὐτοῦς* seems preferable to *αὐτοῖς*, resting as it does on the authority of the better manuscripts. If, however, we read *αὐτοῖς*, it must be understood as a *dativus commodi*, after the general idea *ἐπιλύεται τὸ μὴ οὐχὶ ἀγανακτεῖν*; the *μὴ οὐχὶ* being, as often is the case, redundant in point of logic. Stallbaum seems to travel rather far for his solution of the difficulty presented by the latter reading: "*Vulgatum defendi potest,*" he writes, "*siquidem ἐπιλύεσθαι proprie est alicui aliquid liberum præstare ideoque concedere:*" i. e. he

would interpret, their old age by no means *vouchsafes* to them an exemption from grief, etc. The whole sentence we may render as follows: *Others beside you, Socrates, are overtaken at your time of life by the like calamities, and yet their age has not the effect of saving them from distress at the misfortune which has come upon them.*

The τὸ μὴ οὐχὶ ἀγανακτεῖν is an accusative of reference: as Stallbaum renders, "quod attinet ad illud," and the formula τὸ μὴ οὐ is often as here tantamount to the Latin *quominus*: "non liberat eos *quominus indignatur.*" We subjoin a few similar examples. Eur. Hippol. v. 48.—

.... τὸ γὰρ τῆς δ' οὐ προτιμήσω κακὸν
τὸ μὴ οὐ παρασχεῖν τοὺς ἔμους ἐχθροὺς ἔμοι
δίκεν τσοσύτην'

Where some MSS. have τοῦ μὴ οὐ.

Prom. v. 243.— ἐξερυσάμην βροτοῦς
τοῦ μὴ διαβραίσθηντας εἰς "Λίδου μολεῖν.

Where some MSS. have τὸ μὴ.

Plato, Rep. III. p. 354. B. οὐκ ἀπεσχόμεν τὸ μὴ οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῦτο
ἰλθεῖν ἀπ' ἐκείνου.

^l ἀλλὰ τί δή—] That is, *but, to return to the former subject, pray, why, etc.*

^m οὐ σοί, ὡς ἔμοι φαίναται] There is much beauty in these words. 'I am come, he says, 'to bring tidings which I know perfectly well will not be painful to you, but which to myself and all your friends are painful and distressing, and which, methinks, I shall feel the most deeply of all.

ⁿ ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατα] That is, ἐν τοῖς βαρέως φέρουσιν ἐγὼ
βαρύτατα ἀν ἐνέγκ. See Matth. § 289.

^o Τίνα ταύτην;] Understand φέρεις, i. e. τίς ἔστιν αὐτῆ ἢ ἀγγελία, ἣν φέρεις. See Matth. § 264. So Euthyphro, p. 14, D. τίς ἢ ὠφέλεια τοῖς θεοῖς τυγχάνει οὐσα ἀπὸ τῶν δῶρων; In such sentences the article or demonstrative pronoun indicates that mention has before been made of the thing spoken of.

^p ἢ τὸ πλοῖον ἀφίκεται] Schleiermacher translates, Ist etwa das Schiff aus Delos zurückgekommen? 'Is the ship, perchance, come back from Delos?' But the particle ἢ, like the Latin *an*, can only be used as an interrogative when another alternative is implied, though suppressed. Here we may supply, 'or, is my question needless, and is it that the ship, etc., i. e. *But why do I ask, etc.* Compare c. XXVII. note (e).— On the use of the in-

finitive *τεθνάναι*, where *ἀποθνήσκειν* might be expected, see Apolog. Socrat. c. XVII. note (*).—The Athenians, in gratitude for Apollo's sending Theseus and his companions back in safety from Crete, sent annually a public embassy to Delos, to offer sacrifice to Apollo, and celebrate his praises in hymns. These ambassadors were called *θεωροί*, or *θεωρία*, probably from the verb *ὠρεῖν*, i. e. *φροντίζειν*, *θεραπεύειν*, and the noun *θεός*, i. e. *Apollo*. From the time when the sacred ship was decorated with the laurel wreath, until its return, it was unlawful to inflict punishment on condemned criminals. See Xenoph. Mem. IV. 8, 2. Since the ship was adorned with the laurel wreath the day before the condemnation of Socrates, and returned thirty days after, Socrates must have been thirty days in prison after his condemnation. See the commencement of the Phædo, with the passage of Xenophon referred to above.

ἡ ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ μὲν μοι ἤξειν] After the verbs *οἶμαι*, *δοκεῖ*, and others, *μὲν* is often placed without being answered by *δέ*. But when this is the case, there is yet always some clause or sentence of contrast implied, which the reader mentally supplies for himself. In the present case, however, some doubts exist as to the precise manner in which the thought is to be completed. Most interpreters understand some such clause as *σαφῶς δ' οὐκ οἶδα*. But since Crito says afterwards: *δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τούτων τῶν ἀγγέλων, ὅτι ἤξει τήμερον*, it would seem that something different is required by the sense, and even that the words *δοκεῖ μὲν μοι ἤξειν τήμερον* are used with the delicacy of Attic speech to signify *ἤξει τήμερον*, a use of the verb *δοκεῖν* very common among the Socratic speakers. In the same manner Phædo, p. 61. C. we read, *ἄπειμι δέ, ὡς ἔοικε, τήμερον*. This being the case, we are disposed to think that the sentence to which *μὲν* refers us is contained in the preceding words *οὐ τοι δὲ ἀφίεται*, so that it might have been written thus: *τὸ πλοῖον ἤξει μὲν τήμερον, οὐ τοι δὲ ἀφίεται*.—It has been thought desirable to give Stallbaum's valuable note entire, but there seems reason to doubt the correctness of his explanation. It is not easy to believe that *μὲν* can refer us back to a sentence already enunciated; and the passage is quite capable of explanation without any such hypothesis. It must be remembered that *μὲν* can as well take after it a sentence of co-ordination or of climax as one of contrast and opposition, and may be followed by other particles than *δέ*. (See Matth. § 622. and Liddel and Scott's Lexicon, under *μὲν*.) And

in the present case the complement of the idea would seem to be *καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὕτως ἔσται, ἐξ ὧν ἀπαγγέλλουσιν*: 'This,' he would say, 'is not merely my opinion, but, from the reports which have been brought, it is clear that such will be the case.'—Immediately afterwards *ἐξ ὧν ἀπαγγέλλουσιν* is the same as *ἐκ τούτων ἀ ἀπαγγέλλουσι*: from the reports which have been brought. So Cicer. Epist. XVI. 22. ex tuis epistolis.—Σούνιον, a promontory of Attica, situated in that part which faces the Cyclades and the Ægean Sea.

II. * *τύχη ἀγαθῆ*] A well known form used by the Greeks as a good omen, when they themselves or others were undertaking anything. It answers to the Latin *quod bene vertat, quod felix faustumque sit*. See Sympos. p. 177. E. Thucyd. IV. 118. Socrates, hearing that he must die, is so far from fearing death that he even considers it to be an object to be sought for as a blessing.

^b *ἢ ᾗ ἂν ἔλθῃ*] After *ὑστεραία* the particle *ἢ* is put, because that word has all the force of a comparative. Sympos. p. 173. A. *τῇ ὑστεραία ἢ ᾗ τὰ ἐπινίκια ἔθνευ αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ χορευταί*. Instead of the optative *ἔλθοι* we have adopted the subjunctive: for the meaning is: *on whatever day it may have returned*. Compare Matth. § 527. The only way of explaining the optative is by regarding it as a quotation of the sentence in *oratio obliqua*: *I was to die when the vessel arrived*. But the subjunctive appears in the best MSS.

^c *Φασί γέ τοι δὴ οἱ τούτων κύριοι*] That is, the Eleven, οἱ ἐνδέκα, who had the office of executing sentence upon those who were condemned by the public tribunals. See note on Apolog. Socr. c. XXVII. and Dict. Antiquities, art. ἐνδέκα.—The particles *γέ τοι δὴ* have the force of an affirmation with some restriction, 'at all events, so say they who have the disposal of these matters.'—*τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἐκ τίνος*, i. e. *τεκμαίρομαι τοῦτο, ἢ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔσεσθαι*. The verb *τεκμαίρομαι* is frequently thus used with an omission of its object. Compare Gorg. p. 484. B. Republ. p. 406. D.—Socrates refers his dream to the time immediately before his awaking, because it was only after midnight that dreams were regarded as true. See Homer's Od. IV. v. 842. and XX. 82—91. So too Hor. Sat. I. 10. 33.

Quirinus

Post mediam noctem visus, quum somnia vera.

^d *ἐν καιρῷ τινι*] *Very opportunely*. *κινδυνεύει*, immediately before, is by a peculiar Attic usage equivalent to *δοκέει*. Strictly

it implies peril or risk; hence simply, a probability. Compare Apol. c. IX. note (c).

• Ἐδοκεῖ τις μοι γυνή] Δοκεῖν is often used of dreams and visions. Eurip. Iphig. Taur. v. 44. ἔδοξ' ἐν ὕπνῳ. Orest. v. 402. ἔδοξ' ἰδεῖν τρεῖς νυκτὶ προσφερεῖς κόρας. Aristoph. Vesp. p. 31. ἔδοξέ μοι περὶ πρῶτον ὕπνον ἐν τῇ πυκνῇ ἐκκλησιάζειν, κ. τ. λ.—As persons appearing in dreams were believed to be divine, they are generally represented as taller and more beautiful and imposing than human beings. Hence the woman, who appeared to Socrates, is called *καλὴ καὶ εὐειδής*, *beautiful and well formed*, and she is described as *λευκὰ ἱμάτια ἔχουσα*, *clothed in white*; for ancient superstition agreed with modern in assigning white attire to visitors from the world of spirits. Still the idea conveyed by *λευκὰ* is not that of a ghostly pallor, but rather of a brilliant, dazzling hue. It is, in short, equivalent to *candidus* rather than to *albus*. On this matter the commentators on Pliny's Epist. VIII, 27. may be consulted with advantage. The verse, which the woman is said to have recited, is taken from Iliad. IX, 363. They are the words of Achilles, who, enraged by the insults of Agamemnon, declares that he will return to his home, which he hopes to reach on the third day. Plato alters the verb from the first to the second person, to suit the convenience of the speaker. In the original passage it is *ἰκοίμην*. Cicero de Divinat. I, 25, where he mentions this passage, thus translates the verse: *Tertia te Phthiæ tempestas læta locabit*. The Phthia of the sage is the better life which he is anticipating. Life, he contemplates; as a mere sojourn at a distance from the country which best deserves to receive the name of home.

† Ὅς ἀτοκον—] That is, *how wonderful, ὡς θαυμαστόν καὶ παράδοξον*, as the word is correctly interpreted by Thomas M., Phavorinus, and others. Phædo, p. 60. B. *ὡς ἀτοκόν τι—εἰοικε εἶναι τοῦτο, ὃ καλοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἡδύ.*—He calls this dream *ἐναργής*, so clear and unmistakable, that there is no need of conjecturing in order to discover its import.—The particles *μὲν οὖν* have the force of increasing and correcting: *nay, nay indeed, say rather*. Thus, in the amusing scene in the knights of Aristophanes, where Cleon and the sausage-seller are vying with each other in obsequiousness to their master Demus, Cleon says (Eq. 910)—

.... ὦ Δῆμ', ἐμοῦ πρὸς τὴν κεφαλὴν ἀποψῶ.
Sausage-seller.—ἐμοῦ μὲν οὖν.

Cleon.—*ἰμοῦ μὲν ὄν.*

Cleon.—"Demus, wipe your nose on my head.

Sausage-seller.—Nay, on mine!

Cleon.—Nay, on mine!"

Compare, too, Gorg. p. 466, A. E., where it is used to indicate a decided agreement with what has gone before.

III. ^a ἄλλ', ὦ δαιμόνι—] By the words *ἔτι καὶ νῦν*, even now, now at least, Plato indicates that Crito had before made vain attempts to persuade Socrates to consult his safety by flight.

^b οὐ μία ξυμφορά—ἀμελήσαι] The sense is this: *it will be no single calamity that will befall me in the case of your death; but apart from my being bereft of a friend the like of whom I shall never find again, I shall in addition to this incur the suspicion, on the part of many who do not well know either you or me, of having neglected you; on the ground that I had it in my power to save your life, if I had been willing to lay out money for that purpose.* The full expression would be: *οὐ μία ξυμφορά ἴσθιν ἰμοί, ἀλλὰ πλείους χωρὶς μὲν γάρ τοῦ ἴσπερῆσθαι*, etc. The reading *τοῦ ἴσπερῆσθαι* is a correction of Wolf's, the MS. giving *σοῦ*. The following examples are subjoined to indicate the general usage of Greek writers in similar cases. Sympos. p. 173. C. *χωρὶς τοῦ οἴεσθαι ὠφελείσθαι ὑπερφυῶς ὡς χαίρω*. Ibid. p. 184. B. *οὐδὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ τούτων οὔτε βέβαιον οὔτε μόνιμον εἶναι χωρὶς τοῦ μηδὲ πεφυκέναι ἀπ' αὐτῶν γενναίαν φιλίαν*. Mark the manner in which the two negatives are employed in the expression *οὐδένα μὴ ποτε*. The rationale of the construction is precisely the same as that by which we explain the simple *οὐ μὴ* with the subjunctive, viz: *οὐ δέδοικα μὴ*, and *οὐδένα μὴ ποτε* is equivalent to *οὐ μὴ ποτέ τινα*. It is true, the verb is here in the future indicative and not in the aorist subjunctive; but the usage being once established, the combination of particles might henceforward be employed simply as an intensified negative. Buttmann and others connect the particle *ὡς* with the infinitive *ἀμελήσαι*. But *δόξω ὡς ἀμελήσαι* is not Greek, and hardly to be explained even with the supposition of an anacoluthia. The simpler way is to regard the clause *ὡς οἴός τε, κ. τ. λ.*, as parenthetical, as we have virtually done in the rendering of the sentence above given; the *ἀμελήσαι* being clearly under the direct regimen of *δόξω*. Nor is there any necessity for reading *ἀν ὄν*. See Hermann on Hecuba, v. 1087.

^c ταύτης δόξα ἢ δοκεῖν] When an infinitive is added by way

of explaining the idea intended to be conveyed by a comparative genitive, it is generally introduced by ἤ. Compare Theages, p. 127. A. οὐκ ἐστ' ὅτι τούτων μῆλλον ἀν ἔρμαιον ἡγήσασθαι, ἢ εἰ οὗτος ἀρέσκειτο τῇ σῆ συνουσίᾳ. The ἤ is, however, sometimes omitted. Matth. § 450. 2. The redundancy in δόξης.... δοκεῖν is not without parallel. Herod. viii. 4. παρὰ δόξαν.... ἢ ἔς αὐτοὶ κατεδόκουν. Indeed, it would be perfectly easy to multiply examples.

^d ἀτὰρ δὲ δῆλα τὰ παρόντα] There appears to be something unusual in this use of the adjective δῆλος, nor do we do anything more than evade the difficulty by saying, as Fischer does, that δῆλον is used in the sense of δηλωτικόν. For the passages which he brings forward in support of this interpretation, from Antoninus and Theophrastus, are either corrupt or susceptible of a different explanation. Stephens adopts Cornarius's conjecture of δηλοῖ, but there is no necessity for doing this. For the writer passes, by a kind of anacoluthia, from a passive to an active construction. Crito was about to add: ὅτι ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἐξεργασμένα ἐστίν, but he suddenly changes the construction, and expresses his idea much more emphatically by saying: ὅτι οἰοί τ' εἶσιν οἱ πολλοί, κ. τ. λ.

^e ἵνα οἰοί τε ἦσαν] The final conjunction ἵνα, like the hypothetical ἀν, is used with a past tense of the indicative, to indicate a contingency which has not come to pass, and which is therefore now contemplated as no longer possible. Comp. CEd. Tyr. 1886,

.... ἀλλ' εἰ τῆς ἀκουούσης ἔτ' ἦν
πηγῆς δι' ὧτων φραγμὸς, οὐκ ἂν ἐσχόμην
τὸ μὴ ἀποκλῆσαι τούμῶν ἄθλιον δέμας,
ἵν' ἢ τυφλὸς τε καὶ μὴδὲν κλύων

— that *I might have been* blind and deaf too, which, however, I am not. See Matth. § 519. It may, therefore, be with propriety used in the case of a supposition which both is, and always has been, impossible. We may translate: *Would that they were able to do us the greatest evil, in order that they might also in turn do us the greatest good, and it were well: but as matters now are, they can do neither.*

^f τοῦτο, ὅτι ἀν τύχωσι] That is, *they do not follow reason, but a kind of blind impulse.* So further on, c. V. ὅτι ἀν τύχωσι, τοῦτο πράττουσι. Protagor. p. 353. A. τὴν τῶν πολλῶν δόξαν ἀνθρώπων, οἱ ὅτι ἀν τύχωσι, τοῦτο λέγουσι. Sympos. p. 181. B. ὅθεν δὴ ζυμβαίνει αὐτοῖς, ὅτι ἀν τύχωσι, τοῦτο πράττειν.

IV. * ἄρά γε μὴ ἐμοῦ προμ.] 'Ἀρά (γε) μὴ asks a question with a kind of suspicion of what we are unwilling should be the case: *surely you are not concerned*, etc. The γέ has the effect of giving an additional emphasis to the interrogation: 'Surely you are not concerned for me, are you?' On the other hand, ἄρ' οὐ is about equivalent to the Latin *nonne*. — πράγματα παράχειν, *to give trouble, or create annoyance to any one*: often said of persons who annoy others by accusations. For the word πράγματα is sometimes used simply in the sense of *law-suits and quarrels*.

^b ἢ καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν οὐσίαν ἀποβαλεῖν, ἢ συχνὰ χρ.] That is, *to lose either even the whole of our property, or at least a great part of our wealth*. The καὶ with πᾶσαν has the force of emphasizing it; omnem adeo rem familiarem nostram, as Stallbaum renders it. It is used again with precisely the same force before ἄλλο τι πρὸς τούτοις, 'or even to suffer some additional penalty,' for example, imprisonment, exile, or death. It will be easy to see, therefore, why it is not repeated before συχνὰ χρήματα.

^c ἔασον αὐτὸ χαιρεῖν] That is, *dismiss this fear, bid it fare-well*.—Respecting the construction of the words ἡμεῖς γὰρ πον δίκαιοι ἐσμεν—κινδυνεύειν, see Matth. § 296. Buttmann, § 138. 5. We may render: *It is but right, I ween, that to save your life, we should be ready to incur this risk, or one even greater than this.*

^d καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖ] So c. V. at the end, *πεῖθον μοι καὶ μηδαμῶς ἄλλως ποιεῖ*.

^e Μήτε τοίνυν ταῦτα φόβου] The thread of discourse, which is here broken, is resumed a little further on with the words: ὡστε—μήτε ταῦτα φοβούμενος, κ.τ.λ. It was doubtless from not perceiving this that transcribers were led to write μὴ instead of μήτε, in the former case.

^f τούτους τοὺς συκοφάντας] Said with contempt: 'these fellows, the informers:' for τοὺς συκοφάντας is appended to τούτους by way of apposition. Compare chap. IX., at the end of the first sentence, τούτων τῶν πολλῶν. Apolog. c. I. ὁμολογήην ἂν σὲ κατὰ τούτους εἶναι ῥήτωρ. Demosthen. Philipp. I. p. 41. παραδείγμασι χρώμενοι τῇ τε τότε ῥώμῃ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων—καὶ τῇ νῦν ὕβρει τούτου.

^g ἐπ' αὐτούς] That is, *to bribe them*.

^h ὑπάρχει μὲν τὰ ἐμὰ χρήματα] *My wealth is ready for you, is at your disposal*: for ἱκανά is added by apposition.

ⁱ ἔνοι οὔτοι ἐνθάδε] The pronoun οὔτοι is here used δευτικῶς, as the grammarians say. 'My friends here present. "Ὅδε

is often used in precisely the same way. See Matth. § 471. 12. —Simmias and Cebes, Thebans and intimate friends of Socrates, are introduced disputing with him in the Phædo. Some few particulars concerning them are given in their lives by Laertius and Suidas. Both are said to have written something, but the Tabula, which goes under the name of Cebes, appears to be incorrectly ascribed to him.

^k μήτε—ἀποκάμψς] That is, *be not out of heart, do not despair of saving your life*. For Crito, in his love towards his friend, forgets the principles of virtue, and imagines that Socrates himself was willing to consult his safety by flight.

^l ὃ λέγεις ἐν τῷ δικ.] See Apolog. c. XXVII.

^m ὃ τι χρῆσαι αὐτῷ] As we say: *what to do with yourself*. So Gorg. p. 486. A. Sympos. p. 216. C. Xenoph. Anab. III 1, 41. Jacobs compares Lucian. Accusat. 27. ὃ τι χρῆσαιτο ἐαυτῷ οὐκ εἰδώς. Necyom. § 3. οὐκ εἰδώς ὃ τι χρῆσαιμην ἐμαυτῷ. Harmonid. ὅπως μοι χρησιότερον κάμαβτῷ καὶ τῇ τέχνῃ. So Æschin. adv. Ctesiphont. p. 76, ed. Bremi: ἀπορῶν δ' ὃ τι χρῆσαιτο αὐτῷ—μίαν ἐλπίδα λοιπὴν κατεῖδε.

ⁿ ὃ τι ἄλλοσε ὅποι ἂν ἀφίεν] The ordinary construction would require ἄλλαχού. But since ὅποι follows, attraction produces ἄλλοσε. On this subject see Matth. § 474. and Buttm. § 138. 1. 4. The comma is, therefore, removed from between ἄλλοσε and ὅποι.

V. ^a ἐξὸν σωθῆναι]. *When you have it in your power to escape*. On nominatives, or as some will have it, accusatives absolute, like ἐξὸν, see Matth. § 264. The infinitive clause *σαυτὸν παραδοῦναι* is applied to πρᾶγμα as an apposition; per epexegetin, as the grammarians say. So Menon p. 76. A. ὑβριστῆς εἰ, ὦ Μένων, ἀνδρὶ πρεσβύτῃ πρᾶγματα προστάτεις, ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

^b οἰχῆσαι καταλιπών] The word οἰχέσθαι seems to indicate the quickness of the action, and the eagerness of the agent. It might be rendered in Latin by *confestim desereres*. This peculiar force of the phrase is traceable to the *perfect* meaning of the present οἰχομαι. It is as if he had said, '*you will be off and leave them ere we are aware*.' For it must be borne in mind that οἰχῆσαι is strictly, not, *you will go*, but, *you will be gone*. Other examples have been collected by Matthiæ, § 559. c.

^c τὸσόν μέρος] *As far as in you lies, as far as you are concerned*, as c. XI and c. XVI.

^d ὃ τι ἂν—πραξουσι] That is, *they will undergo that lot which*

the will of fortune may assign to them: whatever may happen to them. For the word *πράττειν* is taken in the sense of meeting with good or ill fortune, as in the phrases *εὖ πράττειν* and *κακῶς πράττειν*. Remark the use of the pronoun *τοῦτο*, for which, according to the usual construction, some adverb would be substituted. But in the same manner Eurip. *Troad.* v. 700. we have *πράξαν τι κεδνόν*, where, according to Seidler, that phrase is employed for *εὖ πράξειν*. Eurip. *Iphig. Aul.* v. 345. *πράσσειν μεγάλα* the same as *μάλ' εὐτυχεῖν*. For the *ὅ τι ἂν τύχῃσι*, see c. III. note (*).

^e *τὰ ῥαθυμότατα αἰρεῖσθαι*] That is, *to choose the course most worthy of an indolent and self-indulgent man.* Tu autem mihi videris ea, quæ cum maxima pigritia atque supinitate conjuncta sunt, elegisse. Serranus. An indefinite subject, to which the participle *φάσκοντα* must be referred, is understood with the infinitive *ἐπιμελεῖσθαι*.

^f *ὑπὲρ σοῦ—αἰσχύνομαι, μὴ*] The verb *αἰσχύνομαι* is followed by *μὴ* because it involves in it the idea of apprehension, *φοβοῦμαι*.

^g *καὶ ἡ εἰσοδος τῆς δίκης εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον.* Forster and others, observing that the words *τῆς δίκης*, were not translated by Ficinus, suspected that they were a gloss. But as the verb *εἰσίναι*, or *εἰσέρχεσθαι*, may be predicated not merely of the litigants, but also with equal propriety of the suit, why should it not be correct to say *ἡ εἰσοδος τῆς δίκης*? Fischer, Schleiermacher, and Buttman defend the common reading in the same manner. The words *εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον*, which Schleiermacher thought ought to be rejected, are sometimes added when the cause itself is said *εἰσίναι* or *εἰσερχεσθαι*. Demosthen. *adv. Phormion.* T. II. p. 912. 27. *μελλούσης τῆς δίκης εἰσίναι εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον.* The phrase *ἡ εἰσοδος τῆς δίκης*, is used when the prosecutor and the accused are admitted to plead the cause before the judge. See Schömann and Meier's "*Attische Process.*," p. 705 toll. The words *ὡς εἰσῆλθες, ἐξὸν μὴ εἰσελθεῖν* are added for the purpose of interpretation: per epegesin. It may, however, be doubted whether we ought not to read *ὡς εἰσῆλθεν*, which was preferred by Wolf, especially since that learned commentator found in it some good MSS. This makes the expression more precisely parallel with the *εἰσοδος τῆς δίκης* above. The word *ἐξὸν*, however, seems to favour the reading *εἰσῆλθες*.—*ἐξὸν μὴ εἰσελθεῖν.* There is some little doubt as to what Crito

means by saying, that there was no necessity for Socrates to stand his trial. It may be that reference is made to a law mentioned by Lysias, according to which it was permitted to the defendant, if apprehensive of the issue of the trial, to go into voluntary exile (*δειδιότι δίκης έντα δρασκάξεν*). See Lysias, p. 354. ed. Reisk. Others prefer referring the words to Anytus, who, according to Libanius, after commencing the prosecution, wished to be reconciled to Socrates on certain conditions. (Liban. T. I. p. 644.) This opinion is certainly erroneous, since in public causes, when the prosecutor had once appealed to the magistrates, he had no longer the power of compromising the matter with the accused. See Meier and Schömann, p. 702.

^b *αὐτὸς ὁ ἀγὼν τῆς δίκης*] These words refer to the actual contest before the judges, with the orations pronounced, and especially to the defence of Socrates.

¹ *ὅσπερ κατάγελως τῆς πράξεως*] "The whole transaction resembles a comedy or tragedy, with its three parts, *πρότασις*, *ἐπίτασις*, *καταστροφή*. Thus the coming before the judges might be called the *πρότασις*; the pleading of the cause, the *ἐπίτασις*; and, finally, the fact that Socrates was not saved, the *καταστροφή*, which Plato here calls *κατάγελως*." Cornarius. In Crito's opinion, this issue of the affair is simply ridiculous. He therefore calls it *κατάγελως*, an absurd or preposterous turn which the drama has taken.

^k *διαπεφευγέναι ἡμᾶς δοκεῖν*] The words *τὸ τελευταῖον δὴ τοῦτι* are in apposition with the clause *ἅπαν τὸ πρᾶγμα πεκράχθαι* co-ordinately with what goes before, *καὶ ἡ εἰσοδος τῆς δίκης* and *καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἀγὼν τῆς δίκης*. For three things are mentioned by Crito, as probable sources of reproach to the friends of Socrates: the beginning of the cause, the defence made, and finally the issue of the trial, along with the fact that his friends would seem, from cowardice or from a want of concern for him, to have avoided exposing themselves to danger. *κακία τ. κ. ἄ. τ. ἡμ. διαπεφευγέναι δοκεῖν*. The infinitive *διαπεφευγέναι δοκεῖν* is added *per eperagesin* to the words *τὸ τελευταῖον δὴ τοῦτι*, according to a common construction. Gorg. p. 469. C. *ἀλλ' ἐγώγε τοῦτο λέγω, ὅπερ ἀρετὴ, εἶναι ἐν τῇ πόλει, ὃ ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ποιεῖν τοῦτο*, where Heindorf incorrectly suggests the reading *τὸ εἶναι*. Phædo, p. 78. C. *ἀρ' οὖν τῷ μὲν συντεθέντι τε καὶ συνθέτῳ ὄντι φύσει προσήκει τοῦτο πάσχειν, διαμεθῆναι ταῦτα, ἤπερ συνετέθη*.

The infinitive *διαπεφηνῆναι* is put absolutely, as equivalent to *διαπεφηνῆναι τὸν κίνδυνον*, a frequent usage, as may be seen from the Lexicons to Thucydides and Xenophon.—The infinitive *δοκεῖν*, after *μη δόξῃ ἄπαν τὸ πρᾶγμα—πεπρᾶχθαι*, might appear, at first sight, to be added by a kind of negligence or redundancy, such as we perceive in c. III., in the words: *καὶ τοὶ τίς ἂν αἰσχίων εἶη ταύτης δόξα ἢ δοκεῖν χρήματα περὶ πλείονος ποιῆσθαι ἢ φίλους*; but, on considering the matter more closely, it appears that the word *δοκεῖν* could not well be omitted in this passage. For if Crito had said: *διαπεφηνῆναι ἡμᾶς*, he might have appeared to admit the truth of the reproach which, he says, will be urged against himself and the other friends of Socrates; especially since he has been enumerating circumstances which were really true. For it was true that Socrates had appeared before the tribunal, and also that he had made his defence, which is called *ὁ ἀγὼν τῆς δίκης*. Hence it appears that the passage needs no emendation, and that there is no *anacoluthia* in it, as some have supposed.

¹ *οὐδὲ σὺ σαυτὸν*] These words at first seem to interfere with the sense. For Crito is now speaking, not of the indifference shown by Socrates himself respecting his own life, but of the apparent carelessness and apathy of his friends, who would seem to have deserted their master, and consulted nothing but their own safety. But they are quite capable of being defended and explained. While enlarging on the reproaches which he urges were sure to be heaped on the friends of Socrates, Crito cannot help throwing in by the way this justification of himself, which is at the same time a gentle and affectionate remonstrance with his master for thus persisting in his refusal of assistance. We may endeavour to render it: ‘*We shall be reproached with not having saved your life—and you would not save it yourself!—though it was quite possible, and in our power to do so.*’

^m *εἰ τι καὶ—ἡμῶν ὄφελος ἦν*] See Apolog. Socrat. c. XVI. note (g).

μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ βουλ.] *Μᾶλλον δὲ* is, or rather, *nay indeed*. Latin: *vel potius, immo vero*. *It is no longer the season to deliberate, but to have already deliberated, i. e. to have come to a resolution.*

VI. ^a *ἡ προθυμία σου—ὀρθότητος εἶη*] That is, *Your zeal is greatly to be commended, if it were only accompanied by rectitude*

of principle. With *ἀξία* we must understand *ἰστί*, a very frequent omission. On the optative in the apodosis, see Matth. § 524. 3. and Apol. c. IV. note (d).

^b *οἶος τῶν ἐμῶν*—] That is, *ὥστε*—*πειθεσθαι*. See Matth. § 479. 2, 3.—*Τὰ ἐμά*, the things which belong to me, as well passions and inclinations of the mind, as things extrinsic.

^c *οὐ δύναμαι ἐκβαλεῖν*] That is, to reject, to repudiate. For the words are opposed to *τιμᾶν* and *πρῆσβεύειν*. *Ἐκβάλλειν* is properly to cast out, to throw away, and is said of things that are useless, which we do not care about: hence it often means to spurn, to despise.

^d *πρῆσβεύω καὶ τιμῶ*] The verb *πρῆσβεύειν* is here almost synonymous with *τιμᾶν*. Compare Pollux Onom. II. 12. *πρῆσβεύειν, τὸ τιμᾶν παρὰ Πλάτωνι*. Sympos. p. 186. B. *ἵνα καὶ πρῆσβεύωμεν τὴν τέχνην*. Ibid. p. 187. C. *ἐὰν μὴ—μηδὲ τιμᾶτε αὐτὸν καὶ πρῆσβεύη*. Æschyl. Chæph. v. 480. Eumenid. v. 1. Eurip. Hippolyt. v. 5. Alcest. v. 282.

^e *ὅτι οὐ μὴ σοι ἐγγχωρήσω*] That I certainly will not yield to you. On the use of the combined negative particles *οὐ μὴ*, see c. III. note (b).

^f *οὐδ' ἂν πλείω τῶν νῦν παρόντων*—] According to Buttmann, the order of the words is: *οὐδ' ἂν ἢ τῶν πολλῶν δύναμις μορμολύττηται ἡμᾶς ὥσπερ παῖδας, ἐπιπέμπουσα πλείω, δεσμούς, κ. τ. λ.* But this does not appear to be correct. For the collocation of the words seems necessarily to lead us to connect *πλείω* with *μορμολύττηται*, and there is nothing at all unusual in this adverbial use of the accusative plural neuter. In precisely the same way, chap. XIV. of this dialogue (near the end), we have *ἐλάττω ἀπεδήμησας*. *Μορμολύττεσθαι* is to frighten children by gestures and by pronouncing the word *Μορμύ*, as it is correctly explained by Gesner, on Claudian, Carm. XXXI. v. 111. Hence it means to scare or frighten a person by bugbears; or generally, to terrify, to intimidate; but the terror meant is usually groundless. The active *μορμολύττειν* is only found in the works of grammarians: the Attic writers always say *μορμολύττεσθαι*.—The word *ἐπιπέμπειν*, like the Latin *immittere*, is said of what is suddenly and forcibly presented before a person.

^g *καὶ θανάτους—καὶ ἀφαιρέσεις*] The plural number is often thus used. It is an oratorical method of adding weight and energy to what is uttered. Compare Achilles Tatius, VIII. 8. *καὶ θανάτους καὶ δεσμοὺς παραδοθέντας*. Plat. Laches. p. 191. D.

ἄσοι πρὸς πενίας ἀνδρείοι εἰσι. So *mortes* in Cicer. Tusc. III. 4, de Fin. I. 8, *neces* Catil. I. 7. This plural may often be explained by referring it to a number of different species comprehended under one genus: thus θάνατοι, *different forms of death*.

^b Πῶς οὖν ἀν μετριώτατα σκοποῦμεθα] Μετρίως σκοπεῖσθαι is to *inquire as is proper, as agrees with the matter under consideration, as the matter demands*, i. e. *well, correctly*. So μετρίως λέγειν is about equivalent to εὖ λέγειν; and similarly in other phrases. Compare Apol. c. XXIX. note (1).—These words are commonly assigned to Crito, but the question does not come appropriately from him. And it is very much Plato's way to make his speakers, as it were, put questions to themselves, immediately subjoining the required answers.

¹ τὸν λόγον ἀναλάβομεν—] Ἀναλαμβάνειν is to *treat anew, to resume the investigation*. The reference is to what had been previously said by Socrates on the same subject; an investigation which he now proposes to renew. The words πότερον καλῶς ἐλέγγο ἐκάστοτε ἢ οὐ, are added by way of explaining what particular conversation or discussion is alluded to: 'Let us resume the question,' he says, 'and see whether the position then laid down was right or wrong; viz. that while we ought to regard certain opinions, we ought to disregard others?' etc.—ἐκάστοτε, i. e. on each occasion of our arguing the point.

^k ἂν σὺ λέγεις] Referring to the ground taken by Crito in chap. III. ἀλλ' ὀρθῶς δὴ, ὅτι ἀνάγκη, ὡ Σώκρατες, καὶ τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλειν. Compare also his remarks in chap. V.

¹ νῦν δὲ κατὰδηλος ἄρα ἐγένετο] On this construction see Matth. §. 296. Buttmann, §. 135. 5. On the use of the particles δὲ ἄρα, see *Apology*, c. XXIII. note (c).

^m ἄλλως ἔνεκα λόγου] These words are used ἐκ παραλλήλου. For ἄλλως, i. e. *idly, without reason*, is explained by the phrase ἔνεκα λόγου, *for form's sake*.—ἐπειδὴ ὡδε ἔχω, *Since I am in my present position*, i. e. *am in danger of my life*.—The form τι λέγειν is opposed to οὐδὲν λέγειν, φλυαρεῖν, and ληρεῖν, whence it is easy to determine its signification.

ⁿ ὅσα γε τάνθρωπεια] That is, *as human affairs are, as far at least as may be conjectured from what usually happens to men*. The word παρακρούειν Hesychius interprets ἐξαπατᾶν, πλανᾶν, a signification which has arisen from the artifice in wrestling τοῦ παρακρούειν ἢ ποδὶ ἢ χειρὶ. The sense therefore is this: *As far as one can conjecture in human affairs, you, Crito, are not to die*

to-morrow; and are not therefore in danger of being misled by the present calamity. Literally, the present calamity would not be likely to trip *σου* up.

° *οὐχ ικανῶς δοκεῖ*] Here *ικανῶς* is the same as *καλῶς* which goes before. Compare the use of *μετρίως* and *ἐπιεικῶς*. The use of the word *τιμᾶν* in this passage is worthy of remark. It often signifies *to cultivate, to regard, to esteem highly*. Compare Eurip. Iphig. in Taur. v. 54:—

κάγῳ τέχνην τήνδ' ἦν ἔχω ξενοκτόνον,
τιμῶσ', ὕδαινον αὐτὸν ὡς θανούμενον
κλάουσα.

Plat. Gorg. p. 462. D. βούλει οὖν, ἐπειδὴ τιμᾶς τὸ χαρίζεσθαι, συμκρόν τί μοι χαρίζεσθαι; So further on, c. VII.

VII. ° *καὶ τοῦτο πράττων*] *And giving his labour and exertion to this object*. Lat. huic rei operam dans, hoc agens. Thucydides aptly characterises the opposite mode of pursuit, when a thing is made merely a secondary consideration, as *ἐκ παρέρργου*. With the present instance compare Xenophon Hellen. IV. 8. 22. *ἀεὶ πρὸς ᾧ εἶη ἔργω, τοῦτο ἔπραττεν*. And for the corresponding Latin phrase, Cic. de Orat. I. 32. *quæ suâ sponte homines facerent, ea quosdam observasse atque id egisse: sc. ut ea observarent*.—The preceding words, *πῶς αὖ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐλέγετο*; are to be thus understood: *Whether were they said rightly or wrongly?* The imperfect tense indicates that reference is made to discourses repeatedly held at a former period on the same subject.

° *ὃς ἂν τυγχάνη ἰατρός ἢ παιδοτρίβης ὤν;*] The sense is this: *Or will he only regard the opinion of the person who presides over the exercises, and prescribes the regimen, whoever he may be?* It appears, therefore, that we must read *τυγχάνη*. Fischer attempts to defend the common reading, *ὃς ἂν τύγχανει*, which is entirely contrary to grammatical usage. It is also erroneous to use the optative *τυγχάνοι*, which would give this sense: *Or will he regard the opinion of him only who would be master of the exercises and physician, that is, if some other circumstances took place*. For the optative with *ἂν* signifies that his so being is contingent upon something else.—*ἰατρός*, in this passage, is the same person who is also called *γυμναστής*: his office was to prescribe the diet and regimen to future athletes, and to all persons who put themselves under his care to be trained in corporeal exercises (*τοῖς γυμναζομένοις*), as may be seen from Xenoph. Mem. II. 1, 26. and other passages. To this person reference is made in the words *ἰδεστῆον*

γι και ποτιον.— παιδοτριβης is the master of the exercises, who used to teach wrestling to the young men in the palaestra, and guide them in taking bodily exercise, etc. The words τι πρακτιον και γυμναστιον refer to the office of this person: the εδεστιον και ποτιον to the former officer, the λατρος or γυμναστικης.

^c δ τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ βέλτιον— ἀπόλλυτο ;] . Buttman is much at a loss to account for the imperfects in this passage, and quotes Theodoret, who has copied the passage, as an authority for reading ἐγένετο— ἀπόλετο, so that the aorist may indicate customary acts. But this mode of using the aorist does not seem suitable to the passage before us; and moreover the text of Theodoret does not exhibit ἀπόλετο, but ἀπόλλυται, which has been altered by Buttman without sufficient authority. No change is however necessary, for the imperfect is capable of a simple and satisfactory explanation. Socrates before used the imperfect when he opened the present disquisition, saying πῶς αὐτὰ τοιαῦτα ἐλέγετο; why should he not here also use the same tense, to indicate that he was referring to the remarks which he had formerly made on the same topic with his friends? Indeed, there seems a peculiar logical fitness about the use of the imperfect tense in the present connexion, as it serves to remind us that the basis of the argument has been previously reasoned out. The common reading may therefore be thus paraphrased: δ τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ βέλτιον γίνεσθαι, τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ ἀπόλλυσθαι ἐλέγετο ἐκάστοτε ὑφ' ἡμῶν περὶ τῶν τοιούτων διαλεγομένων; i. e. 'which, according to what we established when discussing these matters, is improved by justice, but ruined by injustice:' or, 'which, we said, by justice was made better, but by injustice was destroyed.'

VIII. * πειθόμενοι μὴ τῇ τῶν ἐπαίωντων δόξῃ] That is, submitting to the opinion not of those who understand the matter, but of those who do not: for μὴ τῇ τῶν ἐπαίωντων naturally suggests a suppressed clause, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὴ ἐπαίωντων. There is no warrant whatever for taking μὴ with ἐπαίωντων, nor will such grammarians' fictions as synchysis and hyperbaton help us to do more than evade the difficulty in this and similar passages. We subjoin a few illustrations parallel to the case before us.— Xen. Sympos. IV. 16. μαινονται δὲ καὶ οἱ μὴ τοὺς καλοὺς στρατηγούς ἀιρούμενοι. Understand ἀλλὰ τοὺς κακοὺς. Legg. XII. p. 943. A. εἰν δὲ τις ἐκλείπη τινὶ κάκῃ, μὴ στρατηγῶν ἀφέντων, γραφὰς ἀστρατείας εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς πολεμικοὺς ἄρχοντας, ὅταν ἔλθωσιν ἀπὸ στρατοπέδου. Phaed. p. 77. E., where ὡς δεδιότων precedes

μᾶλλον δὲ μὴ ὡς ἡμῶν διδιότων.— ἄρα βιωτόν; i. e. *is it worth while living?* ἄρα as a simple interrogative particle is generally used in the sense of *num*.

^b ἀλλὰ μετ' ἐκείνου ἄρα] The use of ἀλλά.... ἄρα here, corresponds to that of δὲ.... ἄρα in c. VI. note (1). But the contrast is more strongly brought out by the use of ἀλλά. So in Latin *sed* is far stronger than *autem*.

^c ᾧ τὸ ἀδικον μὲν λωβᾶται] The verb λωβᾶσθαι is more commonly construed with an accusative case. But the testimony of the grammarians as well as that of the manuscripts, assures us that it may with equal propriety take after it a *dativus incommodi*. Λωβᾶσθαι τόνδε καὶ τῷδε, αἰτιατικῇ καὶ δοτικῇ: Phrynichus, as quoted by Bekker. In conformity with this canon, the reading ᾧ has been retained, though most recent editors have preferred ὅ, as it stands in Eusebius. Compare Aristoph. Equites, v. 1413.

ἴν' ἴδωσιν αὐτόν, οἷς ἐλωβᾶσθ', οἱ ξένοι,

where Dindorf has corrected the common reading οὗς by the Ravenna MS. There is nothing at all surprising in the fact of Eusebius having written ὅ, seeing that the regimen with the accusative is far more common than that with the dative. Then moreover the word δύννησιν immediately follows, and this is a verb which is regularly followed by an accusative. But it is not unusual to put the relative pronoun before verbs of different constructions. Menexen. p. 239. C. ὧν δὲ οὔτε ποιητῆς πω δόξαν ἀξίαν—λαβῶν ἔχει, ἔτι τε ἐστὶν ἐν μνηστείᾳ. Sympos. p. 201. B. ὡμολόγηται, οὐ ἐνδεής ἐστι καὶ μὴ ἔχει, τοῦτον ἐράν. Compare Matth. §. 428. 2.

^d ἢ φαυλότερον] Φαῦλον is here equivalent to εὐτελής: for it is opposed to τιμώτερον.

^e φροντιστέον, τί ἐροῦσιν] The common reading ὅ τι ἐροῦσι, may have originated with the grammarians, in consequence of the ὅ τι which occurs in the next line. Phileb. p. 17. B. ἀλλ' ὅτι (ἴσμεν) πόσα τί ἐστι καὶ ὅποια. Gorg. p. 500. A. ἀρ' οὖν παντός ἀνδρός ἐστιν ἐκλέξασθαι ποῖα ἀγαθὰ τῶν ἡδέων ἐστὶ καὶ ὅποια κακά; Ibid. p. 448. E. ἀλλ' οὐδεὶς ἐρωτᾷ, ποῖα τις εἴη ἢ Γοργίου τέχνη, ἀλλὰ τίς, καὶ ὄντινα δέοι καλεῖν τὸν Γοργίαν. Regular usage, however, requires the forms beginning with ὁ in indirect questions. The use of the forms without ὁ in such cases as the above, and others that might be quoted, is probably due to that tendency of the Greek mind to slide imperceptibly from the

ἀναβιωσκομένων that it would have with the optative mood or with the past tenses of the indicative. Hence the conjecture *αὐ* is clearly erroneous. The words are to be explained thus: *καὶ τούτων, οἱ ἀναβιώσκοιτό γ' ἂν, εἰ οἰοί τε ἦσαν*. See Matth. §. 598. b. Buttm. §. 126. 14. The words *τούτων τῶν πολλῶν* are added by apposition, with a kind of contemptuous expression. On this use of the pronoun *οὗτος*, see c. IV. note (f), on the words *ἔπειτα οὐχ ὁρᾶς τούτους τοὺς συκοφάντας*.

^b *ὁ λόγος οὕτως αἰρεῖ]* *Since reason so decides*. The phrase seems to be a forensic one. *Αἰρεῖν* or *καθαίρειν*, for both the simple and the compound verb appear in the formula, is to *catch* or *convict*: hence to *prove* or *decide*. Horace has *ratio vincit*, in precisely the same sense. Sat. I. 3, 115. II. 3, 225. A little further on, the accusative *χάριτας* is made to depend upon *τελοῦντες*, a word which is strictly only applicable to *χρήματα*. This is what the grammarians call *zeugma*. See Apol. c. XXVIII. note (d).

¹ *μηδὲν οὐδὲν ὑπολογίζεσθαι—πρὸ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν]* Apolog. c. XVI. *μηδὲν ὑπολογιζόμενον μήτε θάνατον μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ*. The sense is this: *whether it would not be unbecoming in us to take into our calculations the possibility of being put to death in case we remain here and allow things to take their course, or of suffering any other conceivable calamity, prior to the consideration whether we shall be doing right or wrong*. *Παραμένειν* is to *remain in custody, and not to escape*: it is often used of faithful slaves, *παραμόνοι*, in contrast to *οἱ ἀποδιδράσκοντες*, runaways.

^k *ὡς ἐγὼ περὶ πολλοῦ—ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄκοντος]* There is some little difficulty about this passage, but the sense seems to be: *I attach great value to the friendship you have shown in thus seeking to persuade me; only do not try to do so against my will*. It is true this interpretation would seem to require *ἄκοντα*, the perception of which doubtless gave rise to that reading in some of the MSS. But the genitive absolute is not unfrequently used when the precise syntax of a sentence would require another case. Compare Thuc. VII. 48. *χρημάτων μὲν ἀπορία αὐτοὺς ἐκτροχῶσειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον ἤδη ταῖς ὑπαρχούσαις ναυσὶ θαλασσοκρατούντων* (i. e. *θαλασσοκράτοντας*). Cf. Matth. §. 563. And the present may very well be added to the number of such sentences. Buttmann and others, however, make Socrates the subject of the verb *πείσαι*, as if the sense were, 'I am very desirous to persuade you, Crito, not to continue repeating the same argu-

ments, provided this be not done against your will;’ i. e. provided this my persuasion is not disagreeable to you. But there seems something not altogether natural or probable in this over-anxiety on the part of Socrates to gain so comparatively trivial an end; and the sense obtained, though consistent with the syntax of the passage, is not in keeping with the general drift of the argument. Moreover, there is something extremely harsh in making ταῦτα πράττειν refer simply to the discontinuance of an action, παύσθαι πολλάκις τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον λέγοντα. This is Stallbaum’s view; and there can be no manner of doubt that he is right in rejecting the latter interpretation, and indeed in his general view of the passage. But it may be questioned whether a better explanation of the genitive absolute clause is not attainable. Perhaps we should put a colon at πράττειν, and translate, ‘*I should be greatly obliged to you if you could convince me that it is right so to do; but do nothing against my will.*’ According to this view of the passage, πείσαι, which, it must be borne in mind, is equivalent to *persuadere*, not *suadere*, is placed in strong contrast with ἀκοντος. ‘*I shall feel grateful to you if you will convince my reason; but until that is done, take no steps towards the object you have in view.*’ If this is the correct interpretation, the genitive case is not merely defensible, but necessary.

X. ^a ἐκόντας ἀδικητέον εἶναι] That is, *that we ought (not intentionally) to injure any one.* For though the verbals more commonly take a dative of the subject, like the Latin gerundives yet they not unfrequently are found with an accusative, as here. The reason of this is doubtless that they involve the notion of obligation, *χρῆ* or *δεῖ*. Thus ἐκόντας ἀδικητέον is equivalent to ἐκόντας ἡμᾶς *χρῆ* (δεῖ) ἀδικεῖν.

^b ἐκεχυμένα εἰσὶ] That is, ‘*that all our former conclusions are, as it were, spilt on the ground;*’ i. e. *discarded as worthless.* Compare the expressions, ἐκχεῖν πλοῦτον or χρήματα ἐκχεῖν. A little further on, the words γερόντες ἄνδρες, which are not strictly necessary to the sense, are added by way of marking the contrast with παιδῶν more emphatically than it is done by τηλικοῖδε.

^c ἢ παντὸς μᾶλλον] Παντὸς μᾶλλον, instead of which πάντων μᾶλλον is also used. It signifies, *most of all, beyond all dispute.*

^d ὅμως τό γέ ἀδικεῖν—] Compare Gorgias, p. 469., where, on being asked, σὺ ἄρα βούλοιο ἀν ἀδικεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἀδικεῖν, he gave this excellent answer: βουλοίμην μὲν ἀν ἔγωγε οὐδέτερα·

εἰ δ' ἀναγκαῖον εἴη ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι, βλοῖμην ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν.

• ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται.] It is easy to show, by quotations, the unanimity of opinion prevailing in the heathen world on the subject of the lawfulness and propriety of retaliation. Compare Archilochus as quoted by Theophilus, in the work which he addressed to Autolycus, on the elements of the Christian faith, II. 37:

..... ἔν δ' ἐπίσταμαι μίγα
τὸ κακῶς τι δρῶντα δεινοῖς ἀνταμείβεσθαι
κακοῖς'

Euripides, in a fragment:

ἰχθρὸν κακῶς δρᾶν ἀνδρὸς ἠγοῦμαι μέρος.

Sophocles, Ant. 641:

τούτου γὰρ οὐνεκ' ἄνδρες εἴχονται γονὰς
κατηκόους φύσαντες ἐν δόμοις ἔχειν,
ὡς καὶ τὸν ἰχθρὸν ἀνταμύνωνται κακοῖς,
καὶ τὸν φίλον τιμῶσιν ἐξ ἴσου πατρί.

ἴ οὐδ' ἂν ὀτιοῦν πάσχη ὑπ' αὐτῶν] That is, *even if he be subjected to the most grievous injuries*. For οὐν, when attached to relatives or relative particles, has the force of *vis* or *cumque* in Latin. Compare *quivis*, *quicunque*. After *πάσχη* Eusebius and Theodoret insert *τις*, without any necessity, since in the preceding δεῖ ἀνταδικεῖν there is a latent intimation of an indefinite subject.

ε σκόπει δὴ οὐν κ. σ. εὔ μάλα] There is a slight shade of difference between οὐν δὴ and δὴ οὐν; but it is hardly possible to convey it in English. And perhaps there is no case where δὴ οὐν is used, in which οὐν δὴ might not with almost equal propriety have been employed. The putting of οὐν first, seems to give prominence to the notion of inference; the putting of δὴ first, to mark the earnestness of the speaker or writer. Compare the following examples: Phædo, p. 61. E. *κατὰ τί δὴ οὐν ποτε οὐ φασι*; Theæt. p. 148. A. *τίς δὴ οὐν ὦ παῖ, λείπεται λόγος*; Protag. p. 333. A. *πότερον οὐν δὴ λύσωμεν... τῶν λόγων*;

ἢ ὡς οὐδέποτε ὀρθῶς ἔχοντος] That is, *taking it never to be right*. So Rep. IV. p. 437. A. *ὑποθέμενοι ὡς τούτου οὕτως ἔχοντος*. A little further on ἀρχή is the *principle of the discussion*, on which everything else is based. This is a very common use of the word, while τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο refers to the conclusions drawn from that principle. — ἐμμένειν here means *to abide by and retain*

your former opinion. Phædo, 92. A. ἐγὼ μὲν—καὶ τότε θαυμασ-
τῶς ὡς ἐπέισθην ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ νῦν ἐμμένω ὡς οὐδενὶ λόγῳ.

XI. * Ἐκ τούτων δὴ ἄθρει] That is, if this is true, that it is
wrong to injure any one in any manner soever, see what follows
from it.

^b μὴ πείσαντες τὴν πόλιν] That is, ἀκόντων Ἀθηναίων or
μὴ ἀφιέντων Ἀθηναίων, as in c. IX.

^c οἷς ὠμολογήσαμεν δ.] That is, and do we abide by what we
agreed to be right, or not? The relative is attracted into the case
of its antecedent, and its attributives naturally follow. See
Matth. §. 473. 2. Socrates is referring to the virtual compact
between a citizen and the commonwealth with which he is asso-
ciated.

^d εἰ μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνθένδε—] Since the verb ἀποδιδράσκειν
is generally used of runaway slaves, he adds, in order to soften
the expression, εἰθ' ὅπως δεῖ ὀνομάσαι τοῦτο, i. e. or by whatever
other name we are to call it. The dative ἡμῖν is dependent, ac-
cording to Stallbaum, upon ἐπιστάντες; but perhaps it is better
to consider it as governed by the general idea of saying which is
contained in ἔροιντο. 'Should put to us the question.'

* τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως] The community of the state. Cicero
uses the same construction, Verrin. II. 46, 63. commune Sicilia.
So τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως, in Protag. p. 319. D. Indeed, the usage
is so frequent as to render it unnecessary to give any further
illustration of it. Cicero seems to have had this passage before
his mind in that striking appeal to Catiline which is made in the
opening of the first Catilinarian oration. In Cat. I. 7.

ἄλλο τι ἢ τούτῳ τῷ ἔργῳ] On this form of interrogation,
see Apol. XII. note (b), and Compare Matth. §. 487. 8.

εἰ τὸ σὸν μέρος] The same as, c. XII., καθ' ὅσον δύνασαι.

^b καὶ μὴ ἀνατετράφθαι] That is, and not lie prostrate, being
overthrown: for this is the force of the perfect tense. The εἶναι
immediately preceding is used emphatically, as equivalent to Lat.
salvum et incolumem stare. 'Can it be said really to exist?'
Buttmann's conjecture, τὴν πόλιν πόλιν εἶναι, can well be dis-
penséd with.

¹ αἱ γινόμεναι δίκαι] Or αἱ δίκαι αἱ δικασθεῖσαι, the judgments
pronounced according to the laws.

² ὅτι ἠδίκηκε γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἡ πόλις] Speeches reported in their
original form may be introduced by ὅτι, as well as those given
in the *oratio obliqua*. In translation, the particle may accordingly

be disregarded, and the γάρ thus becomes perfectly intelligible. Heindorf would read ἀδικεῖ in preference to ἡδίκηει; and there can be no doubt that the present tense of this verb is often thus used in reference to a past action, especially when there is any intention on the part of the writer or speaker to represent that action as enduring in its effects. But there is no need for any change. And the use of the imperfect certainly shows more unmistakeably, that Socrates is speaking of the particular injustice of his own condemnation. The clause καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς, κ. τ. λ., is exegetical of the foregoing words ἡδίκηει γάρ ἡμᾶς. 'The commonwealth treated us with injustice in passing upon us an unrighteous sentence.' Stallbaum doubts the correctness of Buttman's view, in regarding ἔκρινε as an aorist; but the latter appears to be right.

¹ ἢ τί ἐροῦμεν;] That is, ἢ τί ἄλλο ἐροῦμεν; So Xenoph. Œcon. III. 3. τί οὖν τούτων ἐστὶν αἴτιον ἢ ὅτι, κ. τ. λ.; i. e. τί ἄλλο... ἢ. And it would be easy to multiply examples.

XII. ^a ἢ καὶ ταῦτα ὠμολόγητο... δικάζη] That is, *What, was this the understanding between us and you, that you should thus take upon yourself to impeach the justice of our decisions, or was it to abide by such sentences as the commonwealth should pronounce?* The ταῦτα must be understood to refer to the words to which Socrates has just before given utterance, ἡδίκηει γάρ ἡμᾶς, κ. τ. λ. The καὶ serves to emphasise the ταῦτα, as is often the case: *even* this. Socrates is supposed to be taken by surprise by this home-thrust, and to remain silent. The idea is more fully brought out a little further on: ἀρ' ἐξ ἴσου οἶε εἶναι σοὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἡμῖν, καὶ ἄτ' ἂν ἡμεῖς σε ἐπιχειρῶμεν ποιεῖν, καὶ σὺ ταῦτα ἀντιποιεῖν οἶε δίκαιον εἶναι; There is, therefore, not the slightest need for any conjectural emendations.

^b οὐ πρῶτον μὲν] The πρῶτον naturally leads us to expect an ἔπειτα, or a word of similar force, in the sentence, ἀλλὰ τοῖς περὶ τὴν τοῦ γενομένου τροφήν τε καὶ παιδείαν, κ. τ. λ. But it will be seen, at once, that this is about equivalent to ἔπειτα οὐ καλῶς προσέταττον οἱ ἐπὶ τῇ τροφῇ τε καὶ παιδείᾳ τεταγμένοι νόμοι παραγγέλλοντες... παιδεύειν; ἢ καὶ τούτοις μέμφει; In his second edition, Stallbaum adopts Buttman's reading, ἐλάμβανε for ἔλαβε. The former is found in some of the best manuscripts, and is recommended, moreover, by its greater difficulty. A transcriber would hardly have substituted ἐλάμβανε for ἔλαβε, had he found the latter in his copy; but it is easy to see why he

should substitute *λαβε* for *ἐλάμβανε*. The imperfect, according to Buttmann, serves to indicate the ordinary and legitimate nature of the procedure. Nor is there anything uncommon in the connexion of the different tenses, *ἐλάμβανε* and *ἐφύτευσε*.

^c *τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς περὶ τοὺς γάμους*] The words *τοῖς περὶ τοὺς γάμους* are added by way of defining more closely what is meant by *τούτοις ἡμῶν τοῖς νόμοις*. The *τοῖς νόμοις* has by some been regarded as a gloss; but the phrase would hardly be complete without it.

^d *τροφὴν τε καὶ παιδείαν*] The expression is a common one: compare Phileb. p. 55. D. *οὐκοῦν ἡμῖν τὸ μὲν, οἶμαι, δημιουργικόν ἐστὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ μαθήματα ἐπιστήμης, τὸ δὲ περὶ παιδείαν καὶ τροφὴν*; Xenoph. Mem. III. 5. 10. *τὴν Ἐρεχθέως γε τροφὴν καὶ παιδείαν*.

^e *ἢ οὐ καλῶς, κ. τ. λ.*] The laws repeat with great emphasis the same question which they had previously put, in the words: *Ἄλλὰ τοῖς περὶ τ. τ. γ.—ἐπαιδέυθης*; The passage may be thus translated: *But do you find fault with the laws respecting the rearing and education which you have received? Have not those of us (i. e. laws) which have been enacted for these purposes enjoined well, in directing your father to instruct you in music and gymnastics?* The common reading *ἢ οὐ κ.* is incorrect.

^f *ἐν μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ παιδέειν*;) Perhaps no people have ever felt more deeply the power of music over the mind, than the ancient Greeks. "Rhythm and melody," says Plato, "sink down into the soul; and bringing, as they do, grace and symmetry with them, render graceful and symmetrical the man who has been duly trained therein." De Repub. p. 401. D. E. Hence the prominence which was given to this branch of education, and which assigned to it a co-ordinate place in the three courses of training through which an Athenian citizen was expected to pass—*μουσική, γράμματα, γυμναστική*. But the word must yet not be taken in our more limited sense. The Greeks often comprehended under this head all the branches of a liberal education; all that portion of human culture, in short, over which the Muses might be regarded as presiding, and which distinguished a gentleman from a clown. A great deal of interesting matter relating to this subject is to be found in the Protagoras, pp. 325, 326. See also Aristoph. Nub. v. 958. for a vigorous enlogy of the system of musical training as it existed in the best days of Athens.

^ε ἐγένον τε καὶ ἐξεγράψης καὶ ἐπαιδευθῆς] Expressions parallel with the γάμοι, (i.e. γένεσις,) τροφή, and παιδεία before mentioned. So in Alcibiad. I. p. 122. B. τῆς δὲ σῆς γενέσεως καὶ τροφῆς καὶ παιδείας, κ. τ. λ.

^η καὶ δοῦλος, αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ σοὶ πρόγονοι;] The combined words αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ πρόγονοι form an apposition to the personal pronoun which is the subject of ἦσθα. So Sophocles, Œd. Col. v. 452.

ἐπάξιος μὲν Οἰδίπους κατοικτίσαι,
αὐτός τε παῖδες·

So, too, Apol. c. XXXIII. near the end, δίκαια πεπονθῶς ἐγὼ ἔσομαι ὑφ' ὑμῶν αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ υἱεῖς.—With regard to the word δοῦλος as expressing the relation of the citizen to the laws, compare Cicero pro Cluentio, c. 53. Legum omnes servi sumus, ut liberi esse possimus. There is a surrender of a certain measure of personal freedom and independence, in order to the substantial and well-ordered freedom of the whole body.

^ι καὶ σὺ ταῦτα ἀντιποιεῖν] Most manuscripts exhibit the reading καὶ σοὶ, but it is very questionable whether δίκαιόν ἐστὶ μοι ταῦτα ποιεῖν is good Greek. The universal usage of authors seems to be δίκαιός εἰμι, not δίκαιόν ἐστι. See c. IV. note (c). Still there is a difficulty about the nominative case σὺ, where ordinary usage would require σε. Probably this is to be classed among those instances of attraction which are so characteristic of the idiom of Greek; for the verb οἶε follows almost immediately, requiring a subject in the nominative case. Then, further, if σε had been used, it would render it doubtful whether that pronoun were the subject or the object of the verb ἀντιποιεῖν. For an instance of similar attraction to the above, see Protag. p. 316. C. ταῦτ' οὖν ἦδη σὺ σκόπει, πότερον περὶ αὐτῶν μόνος οἶε δεῖν διαλέγεσθαι πρὸς μόνους, ἢ μετ' ἄλλων. And Demosth. de Falsâ Leg. p. 414. 15. ed. Reisk. ἡγούμην ἐν τούτοις πρῶτος αὐτὸς περιεῖναι αὐτῶν δεῖν καὶ μεγαλοφυχότερος φαίνεσθαι.

^κ οὔτε κακῶς ἀκούοντα ἀντιλέγειν.—] These words are added, for the purpose of explaining ταῦτα καὶ ἀντιποιεῖν. It has been already remarked, that connectives are not used with sentences which are added for the purpose of explanation.

^λ πρὸς δὲ τὴν πατρίδα ἄρα —] Compare Apolog. Socrat. c. XXIII. note (c).—A little further on, instead of simply καὶ σὺ ἡμᾶς, we have καὶ σὺ δὲ ἡμᾶς, in order to add to the force of the opposition. δὲ is frequently thus used, in order to bring out the

apodosis with greater energy. The words ὁ τῆ ἀλ. τ. ἀρ. ἐπι-μελούμενος, added by way of apposition, are ironical.

^m τιμιώτερόν ἐστι πατρίς] There is no need of the article before πατρίς, which is found in some MSS. For the nouns πατήρ, μήτηρ, παῖς, ἀδελφός, γῆ, πόλις, ἀγρός, and others, when not used in reference to a certain and definite individual, but to a whole class, are usually put without the article. So, further on: καὶ σέβεσθαι δεῖ καὶ μᾶλλον—πατριδα χαλεπαίνουσαν ἢ πατέρα. There is also an example in the preceding words: μητρός τε καὶ πατρός. For this high estimate of the claims of country, as compared with the ties of affection, compare Cic. Offic. I 17. 57. Cari sunt parentes, cari liberi, propinqui, familiares; sed omnes omnium caritates patria una complexa est.

ⁿ καὶ ἐν μείζονι μοίρᾳ] Ἐν μείζονι μοίρᾳ εἶναι is said of that which is held in greater estimation and honour than some other thing. Compare Herodot. II. 172. αὐτὸν ἐν οὐδεμίᾳ μεγάλῃ μοίρῃ ἦγον. The word μοῖρα appears, in such phrases, to signify that portion of respect, honour, and reverence which is one's due.

^o καὶ ἢ πείθειν, ἢ ποιεῖν] That is, either to bring your country over to your way of thinking, or, failing to do this, to obey its orders. Compare the latter part of note (^k) to chap. IX of this dialogue. The citizen is at liberty to use persuasion, but not force.

^p ἢ πείθειν αὐτὴν ἢ τὸ δ. πέφ.] The infinitive πείθειν is used as if it had been preceded by ποιεῖν δεῖ, because ποιητέον is in fact precisely equivalent to ποιεῖν δεῖ. Compare c. X. note (^a). A few similar examples are subjoined by way of illustration: Xenoph. Mem. I 5. 5. ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ—ἐλευθέρῳ ἀνδρὶ εὐκτέον εἶναι μὴ τυχεῖν δούλου τοιούτου, δουλεύοντα δὲ—ικετεύειν τοὺς θεούς, κ.τ.λ. Lucian. Hermotim. c. 23. T. I. p. 761. πάντων μάλιστα ἐπὶ τούτῳ σπουδαστέον, τῶν δ' ἄλλων ἀμελητέον, καὶ μηδὲ πατρίδος.... πολλὴν ποιεῖσθαι λόγον, μήτε παιδῶν ἢ γονέων.... ἐπικεῶσθαι, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα μὲν κάκεινους παρακαλεῖν, κ.τ.λ.

XIII. ^a τῷ ἐξουσίαν πεποιηκέναι] There is somewhat of redundancy about the mode of expression here employed: προαγορεύομεν τῷ ἐξουσίαν πεποιηκέναι.... ἐξεῖναι, κ.τ.λ.; that is, 'we declare, by giving him liberty so to do, that he is at liberty, etc.' Hence Stephens was led to conjecture τὸ ἐξουσι. πεποιηκέναι, making the ἐξεῖναι, κ.τ.λ., to be merely a repetition or expansion

of the foregoing phrase. But there is no need for any alteration: the τῷ πεποισμένοι is the dative of the means by which; namely, by a legal enactment to that effect, that a dissatisfied citizen is at liberty to emigrate to another country.

^b ἐπειδὴν δοκιμασθῆ και ἰδῆ] That is, *after he has arrived at years of discretion, and has become acquainted with public affairs.* The passage is illustrated by Æschin. adv. Timarch. p. 26. ed. Bremi. ἐπειδὴν δὲ ἐγγραφῆ τις εἰς τὸ ληξιαρχικὸν γραμματεῖον, και τοὺς νόμους εἰδῆ τοὺς τῆς πόλεως, και ἤδη δύνηται διαλογίζεσθαι τὰ καλὰ και τὰ μὴ, οὐκ ἔτι ἐτέρῃ διαλέγεται (ὁ νομοθέτης). The reference is to the δοκιμασία εἰς ἀνδρας. At the age of twenty, on leaving the status of ἐφηβοι, those persons who wished to have the full and perfect rights of Athenian citizens, were enrolled in the ληξιαρχικόν, prior to which they were not qualified to be present or to vote in the assemblies of the people, or to enter upon an inheritance. Before this could be done, an inquiry was instituted as to the parentage, natural or adoptive, of the individual thus suing for citizenship, and sundry particulars of various kinds. Demosthenes makes reference to this δοκιμασία in his speech against Midias, c. 43. There is, therefore, no ground for the alteration δοκιμάσθ, which has been admitted by most editors, but which is supported by but a solitary manuscript. A little further on, we have the accusative λαβόντα, where strict syntax would require λαβόντι. But instances of this kind are extremely common. Compare Soph. Elect. v. 470.

Ἔπεστί μοι θράσος

ἀδυνάτων κλύουσαν ἀρτίως δνειράτων,

where one might have expected κλυουσῶ. On this usage, see Matth. § 536; and for other examples of the same kind, see Stallbaum's edition of Plat. Sympos. p. 176. D.

^c εἰς ἀποικίαν ἵναι—μετοικεῖν ἄλλοσέ ποι.] Εἰς ἀποικίαν ἵναι, is *to go to an Athenian colony*: but μετοικεῖν is *to go to a place belonging to a foreign power, Greek or Barbarian.*

^d και ὅτι ὁμολογήσας ἢ μὴν πείθεσθαι, κ.τ.λ.] That is, *after agreeing in very truth to be obedient to us.* The formula ἢ μὴν is especially used in strong protestations or oaths. The common reading for ἢ μὴν was ἡμῖν, which has been corrected from the best MSS.

^e οὔτε πείθει ἡμᾶς] Understand, *that we act unjustly*: as appears from the words εἰ μὴ καλῶς τι ποιοῦμεν. There is a redundancy in the words τούτων οὐδέτερα ποιεῖ, the sentence

being complete without them. However, since by the clause: *προτιθέντων ἡμῶν—δνεῖν θάτερα*, the principal idea intended to be conveyed is in some measure thrown out of view, there is no impropriety in the repetition, *τούτων οὐδέτερα ποιῆ*; especially, since another member of the sentence may appear to commence with *ἀλλὰ ἐπιέντων*. The laws are in this passage said *προτιθέναι*, with reference to those things which they enjoin, because all edicts were publicly set forth, in order that they might be read and judged of by all, which enabled any one to suggest any improvement. The passage may be thus translated: *Whereas we give every one the opportunity of learning and judging of what is enacted by us, and do not, by brutal severity, enforce obedience to our bidding; and, moreover, give a choice of two alternatives, either to convince us of error, or, if he is unable to do so, to obey us; nevertheless, this man does neither of these things.*

XIV. ^a Ταύταις δὴ φ.—ἐνίξεσθαι] Hesychius: ἐνέχεσθαι, ἐγκαλεῖσθαι, κρατεῖσθαι, συνέχεσθαι. The proper signification of ἐνέχειν is to hold a person bound: hence the middle verb means: to give one's-self up to be bound, and, in the legal sense, to be liable to a charge; from which is derived ἐνοχος, obnoxious, liable to a charge. Translate: *To these very charges, Socrates, do we affirm that even you will lay yourself open, if you carry out your purpose; and that, too, not in any less degree than another Athenian, but rather in the very highest degree.*

^b ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα] Understand ἐνεχομένοις, i. e. among those that are so liable, you most of all.

^c δικαίως καθάπτουτο] Hesychius: καθάπτεσθαι·λοιδορεῖσθαι, δνειδίξεν; to reproach, to upbraid.

^d τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων διαφερόντως] That is, more than the other Athenians; for διαφέρειν generally indicates difference by way of excess.

^e ἐπὶ θεωρίαν] That is, to witness the solemn games, namely, the Olympian, Nemean, Isthmian, and Pythian, which were attended by persons from every part of Greece.

^f εἰ μή ποι στρ.] When he fought at Potidæa and Amphipolis, in Thrace, and at Delium, in Bœotia. See Apolog. c. XVII.

^g οὐδ' ἄλλων—εἰδέναι] That is, ὥστε εἰδέναι αὐτούς. The infinitive is added *per epexegetin*. We are informed by Seneca, Laertius, Libanius, and others, that Socrates resisted the inducements of Archelaus, king of Macedonia, and other princes, who invited him to settle in their dominions.

ment respecting which he is prepared to judge: *Which you know very well you are in the habit of praising, etc.* ἐκάστοτε, i. e. whenever you mention them.

^a οὐδέ τῶν βαρβαρικῶν] This is the correct reading, being opposed to πόλειν Ἑλληνίδων. If βαρβάρων were read, τῶν Ἑλλήνων πόλειν would have been used.

^b οἱ νόμοι δῆλον ὅτι] These words appeared to Stephens to have arisen from a gloss. But Fischer has correctly observed that, if they were removed, what follows would lose much of its force: τίνοι γὰρ ἂν πόλις ἀρίσκοι ἀνευ νόμων; Besides, δῆλον ὅτι, or, as it was commonly written, δηλονότι, refers not only to οἱ νόμοι, but to the whole of the foregoing sentence, as if the passage stood thus: δῆλον ὅτι οὕτω διαφερόντως σοι ἤρεσκεν ἢ πόλις τε καὶ οἱ νόμοι.

^c ἴαν ἡμῖν γε κείθῃ] In these words the laws answer themselves: 'You will do so, if you will hearken to us.' The words necessary to complete the sentence are readily supplied from the preceding questions: ἐμμενεῖς τοῖς ὡμολογημένοις.

XV. ^a τῇ τούτων πολιτείᾳ] That is, to the citizens of these commonwealths; the abstract πολιτεία being equivalent to the concrete πολῖται. So in Thucydides, we have συμμαχία used as equivalent to οἱ σύμμαχοι. And it would not be difficult to multiply examples. A little further on, ὑποβλέπειν is to treat with suspicion. Both the active and middle forms seem to be used in this sense. Hesychius: ὑποβλεπόμενος ὑπονοῶν, ἐχθραίνων.

^b βεβαιώσεις τ. δ.] That is, either, You will confirm the judges in their opinion that they were right in condemning you: or, You will confirm others in the opinion that the judges were right in their decision; as if the reading were ὥστε αὐτοὺς δοκεῖν, κ. τ. λ. Stallbaum prefers the latter interpretation of the passage.

^c καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς κοσμιωτάτους] Κόσμοι is said of those who observe κόσμος, i. e. order and moderation, or, as Fischer interprets it, those who diligently direct and regulate their life, morals, and pursuits according to the standard of the laws; the moderate, upright. It is, therefore, about equivalent to ἐπιεικεῖς.

^d καὶ τοῦτο ποιῶντι ἄρα ἄξι.] Similarly, Phædo, p. 65. A. καὶ δοκεῖ γέ που τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ᾧ μὴδὲν ἠδὲ τῶν τοιούτων, οὐκ ἄξιον εἶναι ζῆν.—A little further on we have written: καὶ ἀναισχυντήσεις διαλεγόμενος—τίνας λόγους; since the structure of the sentence is changed by an interrogation suddenly in-

roduced. The former reading was: *καὶ ἀνασχυντήσεις διαλεγόμενος τινὰς λόγους, ὦ Σ., ἢ οὐς περ ἐνθάδε.* The use of the interrogative gives great life to the expression: '*discoursing,—yet what kind of discourses?*' while the indefinite *τινας* is tame and meaningless. The interrogative pronoun, too, *τινας*, is found in the best MSS.

* *ἄσχημον ἂν φανείσθαι*] The particle *ἂν* with a future infinitive is not unusual, any more than with the future participle, on which see Apol. c. XVII. note ('). For the future infinitive *φανείσθαι* is capable of being resolved sometimes into the future indicative, and sometimes into the future optative; in the latter of which cases, it may, of course, take *ἂν* with it.—*Τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους πρᾶγμα*, the business or affair of Socrates, is to be understood as meaning Socrates himself. So *τὸ πρᾶγμα* is said of the people, Gorg. p. 520. B. And Herodotus I. 36, has *μέγα χρῆμα σὺς* for a great boar.—The expression *οἶσθαι γε χρῆ* is often used in this manner. See c. XVI. *ἐὰν δὲ εἰς "Αἰδοῦ ἀποδημήσῃς, οὐχὶ ἐπιμελήσονται;—οἶσθαι γε χρῆ.* Phæd. p. 68. A. *οὐκ ἄσμενος εἰσιν αὐτόσσι; οἶσθαι γε χρῆ.* Protæg. p. 325. C. *ταῦτα δ' ἄρα οὐ διδάσκονται οὐδ' ἐπιμελοῦνται πᾶσαν ἐπιμέλειαν; οἶσθαι γε χρῆ.* Gorg. p. 412. B.

† *ἐκεῖ γὰρ δὴ πλείστη—ἀκολασία*] The Thessalians were then infamous, on account of the licentiousness of their mode of living; their fraudulence, indecency, wantonness, luxury, and other vices. See Athenæus, IV. 6. p. 137. X. 4. p. 418. XII. 6. p. 527. XIV. 38. p. 663.—Fischer.

‡ *σκευὴν τί τινα περιθ.*] The word *σκευή* does not denote any particular article of clothing, but includes the whole of the attire. Putting on some (different) kind of raiment by way of disguise, wearing, for, example, a leather coat, or any of the various articles of dress which runaway slaves are in the habit of assuming, and transforming your personal appearance.

§ *σχῆμα*] That is, general appearance, arising more especially out of the dress. Hesychius: *σχῆμα· ἱματισμός.* The *σκευή* includes the leather coats, or sundry vestments and disguises which are mentioned or hinted at; the *σχῆμα* sums up the whole, indicating the *tout ensemble* which is the result of these contrivances.

¶ *ἐτόλμησας οὕτω γλίσχρωσ*] Here *τολμᾶν* is to endure, not to blush at, *οὐκ αἰσχύνεσθαι.*

* εἰ δὲ μὴ] *But if otherwise; but if you should be troublesome to the Thessalians.* In all such cases εἰ δὲ μὴ is used, without any regard to the positive or negative character of the proposition, which is thus hypothetically denied. See Matth. Gr. § 617. Buttmann, § 135. 10. Compare Eurip. Alcest. v. 707. εἰ δ' ἡμᾶς κακῶς ἐρεῖς, ἀκούσει πολλά καὶ ψευδῆ κακά.

¹ ὑπερχόμενος δὴ—πάντας—καὶ δουλεύων] These are some of the taunts, πολλά καὶ ἀναξια, which, it is urged, will be levelled against Socrates, should he withdraw himself into Thessaly: *You will live, forsooth, constantly seeking to ingratiate yourself with everybody, and becoming the slave of all; and will you be doing anything else than banquetting in Thessaly, as if you had left your country for Thessaly, in order to attend a supper-party!* That is, such will be the sinister interpretation which the enemies of Socrates will put upon his conduct. Schleiermacher considers τί ποιῶν introduced in so awkward a manner, and δουλεύων so superfluous, that he regards the latter as a gloss on ὑπερχόμενος, and would read the sentence: ὑπερχόμενος δὴ π. ἀνθρ. βιώσει καὶ τί ποιῶν.—Buttmann, disliking the introduction of ἐν Θεσσαλίᾳ, towards the end of so long a sentence, and having seen in one MS. εἰς Θεσσαλίαν, omits these words after ἀποδεῖν., and thus remodels the whole passage: ὑπερχόμενος δὴ βιώσει πάντας ἀνθρώπους, καὶ τί ποιῶν ἢ εὐχούμενος, εἰς Θεσσαλίαν ὡς περ ἐπὶ δειπνον ἀποδεδημηκώς; But, to say nothing of the objections which might be offered to this correction, it does not appear necessary to alter the common reading. For καὶ δουλεύων is by no means without a distinct signification; it expresses the meaning more forcibly than the preceding ὑπερχόμενος. The second reproach is stronger than the first, especially when directed against a man who had so utter an aversion to everything servile. It does not appear necessary to insert καὶ before τί ποιῶν, as Schleiermacher has done. Indeed, the animation of the appeal seems impaired by so doing. Nor is the repetition of the word Thessaly without force. “Banquetting in Thessaly, as if he had said,—as though it were necessary to go all the way to Thessaly to supper.”—ποῦ ἔσονται, κ. τ. λ., i. e. *What will become of all those fine speeches about justice, and the other elements of virtue, I wonder?* The ἡμῖν is a *dativus ethicus*, and indicates the interest of the questioner in the subject of the inquiry. In the above use of ποῦ, compare Axiochus

p. 124. Ἀξίωχε, τί ταῦτα; ποῦ τὰ πρόσθεν ἀνχήματα; CEd. Tyr. v. 940.

..... ὡ θεῶν μαντεύματα

ἔν' ἔστε;

and Ib. 946.

τὰ σέμν' ἔν' ἤκει τοῦ θεοῦ μαντεύματα;

^m Ἀλλὰ δὴ τῶν παιδῶν ἕνεκα β.] Here ἀλλὰ δὴ, like the Latin *at enim*, may be translated: *But perhaps you will say that*. It is used for the purpose of refuting an objection by anticipation. Republ. X. p. 600. A. ἀλλὰ δὴ εἰ μὴ δημοσίᾳ, ἰδίᾳ τισιν ἡγεμῶν παιδείας αὐτὸς ζῶν λέγεται Ὀμηρος γενέσθαι. Protag. p. 338. C. ἀλλὰ δὴ βελτίονα ἡμῶν αἰρήσεσθε. Compare, too, Crito, c. VIII. near the end.

ⁿ ἵνα καὶ τοῦτό σου ἀπολαύσωσιν.] The verb ἀπολαύειν, which is properly said of enjoying things good and pleasant, is often employed with Attic *εἰρωνεία* in a bad sense. Legg. p. 910. B. καὶ πᾶσα οὕτως ἢ πόλις ἀπολαύη τῶν ἀσεβῶν τρόπον τινὰ δικαίως. Lucian. Dialog. Deor. X. Sol. τοιαῦτα ἀπολαύσονται τῶν Διὸς ἐρώτων. Mercur. Σιώπα, ὦ Ἥλιε, μὴ τι κακὸν ἀπολαύσης τῶν λόγων.

^o αὐτοῦ] That is, *At Athens*.—Immediately afterwards θρέψονται καὶ παιδεύονται are to be taken passively. Compare Matth. § 494.

^p πότερον ἂν εἰς θ.] The reader might possibly have expected some conjunction of an adversative kind, along with the πότερον; and Eusebius, who quotes the passage, does actually read πότερον δέ. But sentences placed in strong opposition are often without any particle to indicate it, the opposition being thus even more forcibly brought out. On the words εἰ τι ὄφελος, see c. V. note (^m).

XVI. ^a πρὸ τοῦ δίκαιου] See Apol. Socr. c. XVI. note (ε). A little further on, ταῦτα πάντα ἀπολογήσασθαι is to bring all these things forward in your defence. The accusative is governed by the idea of saying or alleging, which is involved in ἀπολογήσασθαι.

^b οὔτε γὰρ ἐνθάδε] That is, *in this life*.

^c ταῦτα πράττοντι] *What Crito has proposed to you*.

^d ἄμεινον εἶναι] ἄμεινον εἶναι is constantly used instead of ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. Compare Apolog. Socr. c. II., near the end. Phædo, p. 115. A. Gorg. p. 468. B. D. Republ. III. p. 410. D. But since the comparative ἄμεινον is frequently used in thi

manner, οὐδὲ δικαιοτέρον οὐδὲ δσιώτερον is also added by a kind of attraction. The sense is: *Neither in the judgment of yourself, or of any of your friends, does it appear desirable, so far as this life is concerned, or consistent with justice and piety, to do what Crito recommends; nor will it be the better for you in another world.*

* ἀλλὰ νῦν μὲν] That is, *But, as the matter now stands, if you do not comply with the suggestions of Crito, you will quit life an injured man.*

XVII. * ὅτι ἐγὼ δοκῶ ἀκ.] The Corybantes were priests of the Mother of the Gods in Phrygia, and they leaped and danced under the influence of the divinity. Their wild and enthusiastic worship was attended with the clash of cymbals, and the din of horns and of drums. Hence the verb κορυβαντιᾶν, to be affected with ringing and humming noises in the ears or head: the malady itself being called κορυβαντισμός. Plato could hardly have selected a more powerful and expressive metaphor, to indicate the earnestness and iterancy of the supernatural monitor within. The use of ἤχη for ἤχος is an Attic peculiarity. βομβᾶν is a verb evidently formed by the process of onomatopœia, to buzz or hum. *The voice of the laws is ever ringing in his ears.* Compare Synesius Epist. 123. ἐμβομβεῖ μου ταῖς ἀκοαῖς ἡ θανμαστή σου τῶν σοφῶν λόγων ἤχώ.—A little further on ἴσθι—μάτην ἐρείς is used as in Apolog. Socr. c. V. εὐ μέντοι ἴστε, πᾶσαν ὑμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐρῶ. Ibid. c. XVII. ταῦτα γὰρ κελεύει—, εὐ ἴστε.

^b ἴάν τι λέγῃς παρὰ ταῦτα] The preposition παρὰ has here the force of *contra*. So Phædr. p. 107. A. οὐκουν ἐγωγε ἔχω παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο τι λέγειν. Phædo, p. 80. B. ἔχομέν τι παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο λέγειν.

^c ταύτη ὁ θεὸς ὑφηγεῖται] Both this Dialogue and the Apology are appropriately and impressively closed by a humble and reverential acknowledgment of the Divine Being. Compare Apol. XXXIII. end. ὁπότεροι δὲ ἡμῶν ἔρχονται ἐπὶ ἀμεινων πράγμα, ἀδελον παντὶ πλὴν τῷ θεῷ.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

Φ Α Ι Δ Ω Ν .

Chap. I. ΕΧΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Αὐτός, ὦ Φαίδων, παρεγένου^a Σωκράτει ἐκείνη τῇ ἡμέρᾳ, ἣ τὸ φάρμακον ἔπιεν ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ, ἢ ἄλλου του ἤκουσας ; ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Αὐτός, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες· ΕΧ. Τί οὖν δὴ ἐστὶν ἅττα εἶπεν^b ὁ ἀνὴρ πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου ; καὶ πῶς ἐτελεύτα ; ἠδέως γὰρ ἂν ἀκούσαιμι. καὶ γὰρ οὔτε τῶν πολιτῶν Φλιασίων^c οὐδεὶς πάνυ τι ἐπιχωριάζει τὰ νῦν Ἀθήναζε, οὔτε τις ξένος ἀφίικται χρόνου συγχοῦ ἐκείθεν, ὅστις ἂν ἡμῖν σαφές τι ἀγγεῖλαι οἴος τ' ἦν^d περὶ τούτων, πλήνγε δὴ ὅτι φάρμακον πιὼν ἀποθάνοι. τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐδὲν εἶχε φράζειν. ΦΑΙΔ. Οὐδὲ τὰ περὶ τῆς δικῆς ἄρα ἐπύθεσθε^e ὄν τρόπον ἐγένετο ; ΕΧ. Ναί, ταῦτα μὲν ἡμῖν ἠγγειλέ τις,^f καὶ ἐθαυμάζομεν γε, ὅτι, πάλαι γενομένης αὐτῆς πολλῶ ὕστερον^g φαίνεται ἀποθανών. τί οὖν ἦν τοῦτο,^h ὦ Φαίδων ; ΦΑΙΔ. Τύχη τις αὐτῷ, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, συνέβη ἔτυχε γὰρ τῇ προτεραίᾳ τῆς δικῆς ἢ πρύμναⁱ ἔστεμμένη^k τοῦ πλοίου, ὃ εἰς Δῆλον Ἀθηναῖοι πέμπουσιν.^l ΕΧ. Τοῦτο δὲ δὴ τί ἐστὶν ; ΦΑΙΔ. Τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ πλοῖον, ὡς φασιν Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐν ᾧ Θησεύς^m ποτε εἰς Κρήτην τοὺς δις ἑπτὰ ἐκείνους ᾤχετο ἄγων καὶ ἔσωσέ τε καὶ αὐτὸς ἐσώθη. τῷ οὖν Ἀπόλλωνι εὗξαντο, ὡς λέγεται,

τότε, εἰ σωθεῖεν, ἐκάστου ἔτους θεωρίαν ἀπάξουσιν^α εἰς Δῆλον· ἦν δὴ αἰεὶ καὶ νῦν ἔτι^ο ἐξ ἐκείνου κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν τῷ θεῷ πέμπουσιν. ἐπειδὴν οὖν ἄρξωνται^ρ τῆς θεωρίας, νόμος ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ καθαρεύειν τὴν πόλιν καὶ δημοσίᾳ μηδένα ἀποκτινύναι, πρὶν ἂν εἰς Δῆλόν τε ἀφίκηται τὸ πολοῖον καὶ πάλιν δεῦρο· τοῦτο δ' ἐνίστε ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ γίνεσθαι, ὅταν τύχουσιν ἄνεμοι ἀπολαβόντες αὐτούς.^α ἀρχὴ δ' ἐστὶ τῆς θεωρίας, ἐπειδὴν ὁ ἱερεὺς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος στέψη τὴν πρύμναν τοῦ πλοίου· τοῦτο δ' ἔτυχεν, ὡς περ λέγω,^ι τῇ προτεραίᾳ τῆς δίκης γεγονός. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ πολὺς χρόνος ἐγένετο τῷ Σωκράτει ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ ὁ μεταξὺ τῆς δίκης τε καὶ τοῦ θανάτου.

II. ΕΧ. Τί δὲ δὴ τὰ περὶ αὐτὸν τὸν θάνατον, ὦ Φαίδων; τί ἦν τὰ λεχθέντα καὶ πραχθέντα, καὶ τίνας οἱ παραγενόμενοι τῶν ἐπιτηδείων τῷ ἀνδρὶ; ἢ οὐκ εἶων οἱ ἄρχοντες^α παρῆναι, ἀλλ' ἔρημος ἐτελεύτα φίλων; ΦΑΙΔ. Οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ παρῆσάν τινες, καὶ πολλοὶ γε.^β ΕΧ. Ταῦτα δὴ πάντα προθυμήθητι ὡς σαφέστατα ἡμῖν ἀπαγγεῖλαι, εἰ μὴ τίς σοι ἀσχολία τυγχάνει οὔσα. ΦΑΙΔ. Ἀλλὰ σχολάζω γε, καὶ πειράσομαι ὑμῖν διηγήσασθαι· καὶ γὰρ τὸ μεμνησθαι Σωκράτους καὶ αὐτὸν λέγοντα καὶ ἄλλου ἀκούοντα ἔμοιγε αἰεὶ πάντων ἡδιστον. ΕΧ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὦ Φαίδων, καὶ τοὺς ἀκουσομένους γε τοιοῦτους ἐτέρους ἔχεις.^ο ἀλλὰ πειρῶ ὡς ἂν δύνῃ ἀκριβέστατα διελεθῆναι πάντα. ΦΑΙΔ. Καὶ μὴν ἔγωγε θαυμάσια ἔπαθον παραγενόμενος. οὔτε γὰρ ὡς θανάτῳ παρόντα με ἀνδρὸς ἐπιτηδείου ἔλεος εἰσῆει.^α εὐδαίμων γάρ μοι^ο ἀνὴρ ἐφαίνετο, ὃ Ἐχέκρατες, καὶ τοῦ τρόπου καὶ τῶν λόγων, ὡς ἀδεῶς καὶ γενναίως^ι ἐτελεύτα, ὥστ' ἔμοιγ' ἐκείνον παρίστασθαι μὴδ' εἰς Ἄϊδου ἰόντα ἄνευ θείας

μοίρας⁸ ἴεσαι, ἀλλὰ κακέϊσε ἀφικόμενον εὖ πράξειν, εἶπερ τις πώποτε καὶ ἄλλος. διὰ δὴ ταῦτα οὐδὲν πάνυ μοι ἔλεεινὸν εἰσῆι, ὡς εἰκὸς ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι παρόντι πένθει.^h οὔτε αὖ ἡδονὴ ὡς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἡμῶν ὄντων,ⁱ ὥσπερ εἰώθειμεν, καὶ γὰρ οἱ λόγοι τοιοῦτοί τινες^k ἦσαν· ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς ἀτοπὸν τί μοι πάθος παρῆν καὶ τις ἀήθης κρᾶσις ἀπὸ τε τῆς ἡδονῆς συγκεκραμένη ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς λύπης, ἐνθυμουμένῳ, ὅτι αὐτίκα ἐκείνος ἔμελλε τελευτᾶν. καὶ πάντες οἱ παρόντες σχεδὸν τι οὕτω διεκείμεθα, ὅτε μὲν γελῶντες,^l ἐνίοτε δὲ δακρύνοντες, εἰς δὲ ἡμῶν καὶ διαφερόντως, Ἀπολλόδωρος· οἶσθα γὰρ πού τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ τὸν τρόπον αὐτοῦ. ΕΧ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; ΦΑΙΔ. Ἐκείνός τε τοίνυν παντάπασιν οὕτως εἶχε, καὶ αὐτὸς ἔγωγε ἐτεταράγμην καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι. ΕΧ. Ἐτυχον δέ, ὦ Φαίδων, τίνες παραγενόμενοι; ΦΑΙΔ. Οὗτός τε δὴ ὁ Ἀπολλόδωρος τῶν ἐπιχωρίων παρῆν καὶ Κριτόβουλος^m καὶ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ Κρίτων, καὶ ἔτι Ἐρμογένης καὶ Ἐπιγένης καὶ Αἰσχίνης καὶ Ἀντισθένης. ἦν δὲ καὶ Κτήσιππος ὁ Παιανιεὺς καὶ Μενέξενος καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς τῶν ἐπιχωρίων· Πλάτων δέ, οἶμαι, ἦσθένοι.ⁿ ΕΧ. Ξένοι δέ τινες παρήσαν; ΦΑΙΔ. Ναί, Σιμμίας τέ γε^o ὁ Θηβαῖος καὶ Κέβης καὶ Φαιδώνδης, καὶ Μεγαρόθεν Εὐκλείδης τε καὶ Τερψίων. ΕΧ. Τί δαί; Ἀρίστιππος καὶ Κλεόμβροτος παρεγένοντο; ΦΑΙΔ. Οὐ δῆτα· ἐν Αἰγίῃ γὰρ ἐλέγοντο εἶναι. ΕΧ. Ἄλλος δέ τις πυρῆν; ΦΑΙΔ. Σχεδὸν τι οἶμαί τούτους παραγενέσθαι. ΕΧ. Τί οὖν δὴ; τίνες, φης, ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι;

III. ΦΑΙΔ. Ἐγὼ σοι ἐξ ἀρχῆς πάντα πειράσομαι διηγῆσασθαι. αἰεὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ τὰς πρόσθεν ἡμέρας εἰώθειμεν φοιτᾶν καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι παρὰ τὸν Σωκράτη, συλλεγόμενοι ἔωθεν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, ἐν ᾧ

καὶ ἡ δίκη ἐγένετο· πλησίον γὰρ ἦν^α τοῦ δεσμοτηρίου περιεμένομεν οὐκ ἐκάστοτε, ἕως ἀνοιχθείη^β τὸ δεσμοτήριον, διατρίβοντες μετ' ἀλλήλων^ο ἀνεφύγετο γὰρ οὐ πρόφ' ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀνοιχθείη, εἰςῆμεν παρὰ τὸν Σωκράτη καὶ τὰ πολλὰ διημερεύομεν μετ' αὐτοῦ. καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε πρωϊαιότερον ξυνελέγημεν. τῇ γὰρ προτεραίᾳ ἡμέρᾳ ἐπειδὴ ἐξήλθομεν ἐκ τοῦ δεσμοτηρίου ἐσπέρας, ἐπυθόμεθα, ὅτι τὸ πλοῖον ἐκ Δήλου ἀφυγμένον εἶη. παρηγγείλαμεν οὖν ἀλλήλοις ἤκειν ὡς πρωϊαίτατα εἰς τὸ εἰωθός. καὶ ἤκομεν, καὶ ἡμῖν ἐξελθὼν ὁ θυρωρός, ὅσπερ εἰώθει ὑπακούειν,^δ εἶπε περιμένειν καὶ μὴ πρότερον παριέναι, ἕως ἂν αὐτὸς κελεύσῃ· Λύουσι γάρ, ἔφη, οἱ ἕνδεκα Σωκράτη καὶ παραγγέλλουσι, ὅπως ἂν τῆδε τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τελευτήσῃ. οὐ πολὺν δ' οὖν χρόνον ἐπισχῶν^ο ἤκε καὶ ἐκέλευσεν ἡμᾶς εἰσιέναι. εἰσιόντες οὖν κατελαμβάνομεν τὸν μὲν Σωκράτη ἄρτι λελυμένον^ι, τὴν δὲ Ξανθίππην, γυγνώσκεις γάρ, ἔχουσάν τε τὸ παιδίον αὐτοῦ καὶ παρακαθημένην. ὡς οὖν εἶδεν ἡμᾶς ἡ Ξανθίππη, ἀνευφήμησέ^ε τε καὶ τοιαυτ' ἄττα εἶπεν, οἷα δὲ εἰώθασιν αἱ γυναῖκες, ὅτι ὦ Σώκρατες, ὕστατον δὴ σε προσερούσι νῦν οἱ ἐπιτήδαιοι καὶ σὺ τούτους. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης βλέψας εἰς τὸν Κρίτωνα, ὦ Κρίτων, ἔφη, ἀπαγαγέτω τις ταύτην οἴκαδε. Καὶ ἐκεῖνην μὲν ἀπήγόν τινες τῶν τοῦ Κρίτωνος^η βοῶσαν τε καὶ κοπτομένην ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης ἀνακαθίζομενος ἐπὶ τὴν κλίνην^ι συνέκαμψέ τε τὸ σκέλος καὶ ἐξέτριψε τῇ χειρὶ, καὶ τρίβων ἅμα^κ ὦς ἄτοπον,^ι ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες, εἰοικέ τι εἶναι τοῦτο, ὃ καλοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἡδύ· ὡς θαυμασίως πέφυκε πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν^μ ἐναντίον εἶναι, τὸ λυπηρόν, τῷ ἅμα μὲν αὐτῷ μὴ ἐθελεῖν παραγίγνεσθαι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, εἰάν τις διώκῃ τὸ ἕτερον καὶ λαμβάνῃ, σχεδόν τι ἀναγκάζεσθαι αἰεὶ λαμβάνειν

καὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ὥσπερ ἐκ μιᾶς κορυφῆς συνημμένω δὴ ὄντε. καὶ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, εἰ ἐνενόησεν αὐτὰ Αἰσωπος, μῦθον ἂν συνθεῖναι, ὡς ὁ θεὸς βουλόμενος αὐτὰ διαλλάξαι πολεμοῦντα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἠδύνατο, ξυνήψεν εἰς ταῦτόν αὐτοῖς τὰς κορυφάς, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ᾧ ἂν τὸ ἕτερον παραγένηται ἐπακολουθεῖ ὕστερον καὶ τὸ ἕτερον. ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ἔοικεν, ἐπειδὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσμοῦ^α ἦν ἐν τῷ σκέλει πρότερον τὸ ἀλγεινόν, ἦκειν δὴ φαίνεται ἐπακολουθοῦν τὸ ἡδύ.

LXIV. Ταῦτα δὴ εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ, ὁ Κρίτων, Εἶπεν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες· τί δὲ τούτοις ἢ ἐμοὶ ἐπιστέλλεις^α ἢ περὶ τῶν παιδῶν ἢ περὶ ἄλλου του, ὃ τι ἂν σοι ποιοῦντες ἡμεῖς ἐν χάριτι μάλιστα ποιοῖμεν;^β Ἄπερ αἰεὶ λέγω, ἔφη, ὦ Κρίτων, οὐδὲν καινότερον^γ ὅτι ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιμελούμενοι^δ ὑμεῖς καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς^ε καὶ ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐν χάριτι ποιήσετε ἅττ' ἂν ποιήτε, κἂν μὴ νῦν ὁμολογήσητε· ἐὰν δὲ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἀμελήτε, καὶ μὴ θέλητε ὥσπερ κατ' ἴχνη κατὰ τὰ νῦν τε εἰρημένα καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ζῆν, οὐδ' ἐὰν πολλὰ ὁμολογήσητε ἐν τῷ παρόντι καὶ σφόδρα, οὐδὲν πλεόν ποιήσετε.^ς Ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν προθυμηθησόμεθα, ἔφη, οὕτω ποιεῖν· θάπτωμεν δέ σε τίνα τρόπον; Ὅπως ἂν, ἔφη, βούλησθε, ἐάνπερ γε λάβητέ με καὶ μὴ ἐκφύγω ὑμᾶς. Γελάσας δὲ ἅμα ἡσυχῇ καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀποβλέψας εἶπεν, Οὐ πείθω, ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες, Κρίτωνα, ὡς ἐγὼ εἶμι οὗτος ὁ Σωκράτης, ὁ νυνὶ διαλεγόμενος^ε καὶ διατάττων ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων, ἀλλ' οἶεταί με ἐκείνῳ εἶναι, ὃν ὄψεται ὀλίγον ὕστερον νεκρόν, καὶ ἐρωτᾷ δὴ, πῶς με θάπτῃ.^β ὅτι δὲ ἐγὼ πάλαι πολὺν λόγον πεποίημαι, ὡς, ἐπειδὴν πίω τὸ φάρμακον

οὐκέτι ὑμῖν παραμενῶ, ἀλλ' οἰχίσομαι ἀπιὼν εἰς μακάρων δῆ τινας¹ εὐδαιμονίας, ταῦτά μοι δοκῶ αὐτῷ ἄλλως λέγειν,² παραμυθούμενος ἅμα μὲν ὑμᾶς, ἅμα δ' ἑμαυτόν. ἐγγυήσασθε¹ οὖν με πρὸς Κρίτωνα, ἔφη, τὴν ἐναντίαν ἐγγύην ἢ ἣν οὗτος πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς ἤγγυάτο. οὗτος μὲν γὰρ ἢ μὴν παραμενεῖν.³ ὑμεῖς δὲ ἢ μὴν μὴ παραμενεῖν ἐγγυήσασθε, ἐπειδὴν ἀποθάνω, ἀλλὰ οἰχίσεσθαι ἀπιόντα, ἵνα Κρίτων ῥῆον φέρῃ, καὶ μὴ ὄρων μου τὸ σῶμα ἢ καόμενον ἢ κατορυττόμενον ἀγανακτῆ ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ, ὡς δεινὰ πάσχοντος, μηδὲ λέγῃ ἐν τῇ ταφῇ, ὡς ἢ προτίθεται Σωκράτη ἢ ἐκφέρει ἢ κατορύττει.⁴ εὐ γὰρ ἴσθι, ἢ δ' ὅς, ὦ ἄριστε Κρίτων, τὸ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν οὐ μόνον εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο⁵ πλημμελές, ἀλλὰ καὶ κακόν τι ἐμποιεῖ ταῖς ψυχαῖς. ἀλλὰ θαρρῆν τε χρὴ καὶ φάναι τοῦμὸν σῶμα θάπτειν, καὶ θάπτειν οὕτως, ὅπως ἂν σοι φίλον ἢ καὶ μάλιστα ἡγῆ νόμιμον εἶναι.

LXV. Ταῦτ' εἰπὼν ἐκεῖνος μὲν ἀνίστατο εἰς οἰκημῶν τι⁶ ὡς λουσόμενος, καὶ ὁ Κρίτων εἵπετο αὐτῷ, ἡμᾶς δ' ἐκέλευε περιμένειν. περιεμένομεν οὖν πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς διαλεγόμενοι περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ ἀνασκοποῦντες, τοτὲ δ' αὖ περὶ τῆς ξυμφορᾶς διεξιόντες, ὄση ἡμῖν γεγονυῖα εἴη, ἀτεχνῶς ἡγούμενοι, ὡσπερ πατρὸς στερηθέντες, διάξειν ὄρφανοὶ τὸν ἔπειτα βίον, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐλούσατο, καὶ ἠνέχθη παρ' αὐτὸν τὰ παιδία—δύο γὰρ αὐτῷ υἱεῖς⁷ σμικροὶ ἦσαν, εἰς δὲ μέγας—καὶ αἱ οἰκείαι γυναῖκες ἀφίκοντο,⁸ ἐκείναις ἐναντίον τοῦ Κρίτωνος διαλεχθεῖς τε καὶ ἐπιστεῖλας ἅττα ἐβούλετο, τὰς μὲν γυναῖκας καὶ τὰ παιδία ἀπιέναι ἐκέλευσεν, αὐτὸς δὲ ἦκε παρ' ἡμᾶς. καὶ ἦν ἤδη ἐγγὺς ἡλίου δυσμῶν. χρόνον γὰρ πολλὸν διέτριψεν ἔνδον. ἐλθὼν δ' ἐκαθέζετο λελουμένος, καὶ οὐ πόλλ'


ἅττα μετὰ ταῦτα διελέχθη. καὶ ἦκεν ὁ τῶν ἔνδεκα ὑπηρέτης καὶ στὰς παρ' αὐτόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, οὐ καταγνώσομαι γε σοῦ^d ὅπερ τῶν ἄλλων καταγνώσκω, ὅτι μοι χαλεπαίνουνσι καὶ καταρῶνται, ἐπειδὴν αὐτοῖς παραγγέλλω πίνειν τὸ φάρμακον ἀναγκαζόντων τῶν ἀρχόντων.^e σὲ δ' ἐγὼ καὶ ἄλλως ἔγνωκα ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ γενναιότατον καὶ πραότατον καὶ ἄριστον ἄνδρα ὄντα τῶν πώποτε δεῦρο ἀφικομένων, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν εὐ οἶδ' ὅτι οὐκ ἐμοὶ χαλεπανεῖς, γυγνώσκεις γὰρ τοὺς αἰτίους, ἀλλ' ἐκείνους. νῦν οὖν, οἶσθα γὰρ ἃ ἦλθον ἀγγέλλων,^f χαίρε τε καὶ πειρῶ ὡς ῥᾶστα φέρειν τὰ ἀναγκαῖα. Καὶ ἅμα δακρύσας μεταστρεφόμενος ἀπῆει. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἀναβλέψας πρὸς αὐτόν, Καὶ σύ, ἔφη, χαῖρε, καὶ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα ποιήσομεν. Καὶ ἅμα πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὦς ἀστείος, ἔφη, ὁ ἄνθρωπος· καὶ παρὰ πάντα μοι τὸν χρόνον^e προσῆει καὶ διελέγετο ἐνίοτε καὶ ἦν ἀνδρῶν λῶστος, καὶ νῦν ὡς γενναίως με ἀποδακρῦει. ἀλλ' ἄγε δὴ, ὦ Κρίτων, πειθώμεθα αὐτῷ, καὶ ἐνεγκάτω τις τὸ φάρμακον, εἰ τέτριπται· εἰ δὲ μὴ, τριψάτω ὁ ἄνθρωπος.^h Καὶ ὁ Κρίτων, Ἄλλ' οἶμαι, ἔφη, ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔτι ἥλιον εἶναι ἐπὶ τοῖς ὄρεσι καὶ οὔπω δεδουκέναι. καὶ ἅμα ἐγὼ οἶδα καὶ ἄλλους πάνυ ὄψε πίνοντας, ἐπειδὴν παραγγεληθῆ αὐτοῖς, δειπνήσαντάς τε καὶ πίνοντας εὐ μάλα, καὶ συγγενομένουςⁱ γ' ἐνίοις ὧν ἂν τύχωσιν ἐπιθυμοῦντες. ἀλλὰ μηδὲν ἐπέιγουν· ἔτι γὰρ ἐγγωρεῖ. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Εἰκότως γ', ἔφη, ὦ Κρίτων, ἐκεῖνοί τε ταῦτα ποιούσιν, οὓς σὺ λέγεις, οἴονται γὰρ κερδανεῖν ταῦτα ποιήσαντες, καὶ ἔγωγε ταῦτα εἰκότως οὐ ποιήσω· οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶμαι κερδαίνειν^k ὀλίγον ὑστερον πῶν ἄλλο γε ἢ γέλωτα ὀφλήσειν παρ' ἐμαντῷ, γλιχόμενος τοῦ ζῆν καὶ φειδόμενος

οὐδενὸς ἔτι ἐνότος. ἀλλ' ἴθι, ἔφη, πιθοῦ καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖν·

LXVI. Καὶ ὁ Κρίτων ἀκούσας ἔνευσε τῷ παιδί πλησίον ἐστῶτι. καὶ ὁ παῖς ἐξελθὼν καὶ συχρὸν χρόνον διατρέψας ἤκεν ἄγων τὸν μέλλοντα δώσειν τὸ φάρμακον, ἐν κύλικι φέροντα τετριμμένον. ἰδὼν δὲ ὁ Σωκράτης τὸν ἄνθρωπον, εἶπεν, ἔφη, ὦ βέλτιστε,^a σὺ γὰρ τούτων ἐπιστήμων, τί χρὴ ποιεῖν; Οὐδὲν ἄλλο, ἔφη, ἢ πιόντα περιμέναι, ἕως ἂν σου βάρους^b ἐν τοῖς σκέλεσι γένηται, ἔπειτα κατακεῖσθαι· καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸ ποιήσει.^c Καὶ ἅμα ὠρεξε τὴν κύλικα τῷ Σωκράτει. καὶ ὃς λαβὼν καὶ μάλα ἴλεως,^d ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, οὐδὲν τρέσας οὐδὲ διαφθείρας οὔτε τοῦ χρώματος οὔτε τοῦ προσώπου, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἰώθει, ταυρηδὸν ὑποβλέψας^e πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, Τί λέγεις, ἔφη, περὶ τούτου τοῦ πώματος πρὸς τὸ ἀποσπείσαι τι; ἔξεστιν, ἢ οὐ; Τοσοῦτον, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τρίβομεν, ὅσον οἰόμεθα μέτριον εἶναι^f πιεῖν. Μανθάνω, ἢ δ' ὅς· ἀλλ' εὐχεσθαι γέ που τοῖς θεοῖς ἔξεστί τε καὶ χρὴ τὴν μετοίκησιν τὴν ἐνθένδε ἐκείσε εὐτυχῆ γενέσθαι· ἂ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ εὐχομαί τε καὶ γένοιτο ταύτη. Καὶ ἅμα εἰπὼν ταῦτα ἐπισχόμενος^g καὶ μάλα εὐχερῶς καὶ εὐκόλως ἐξέπιε. καὶ ἡμῶν οἱ πολλοὶ τέως μὲν ἐπιεικῶς οἰοί τε ἦσαν κατέχειν τὸ μὴ δακρύειν,^h ὡς δὲ εἶδομεν πίνοντά τε καὶ πεπωκότα, οὐκέτι, ἀλλ' ἐμοῦ γε βία καὶ αὐτοῦ ἀστακτι ἐχώρει τὰ δάκρυα, ὥστε ἐγκαλυψάμενοςⁱ ἀπέκλαον ἐμαυτόν· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐκεῖνόν γε, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐμαιτοῦ τύχην, οἷου ἀνδρὸς^k ἐταίρου ἐστερημένος εἶην· ὁ δὲ Κρίτων ἔτι πρότερος ἐμοῦ, ἐπειδὴ οὐχ οἷός τ' ἦν κατέχειν τὰ δάκρυα, ἐξανέστη. Ἀπολλόδωρος δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ οὐδὲν ἐπαύετο δακρῶν, καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε ἀναβρυχησάμενος, κλάων καὶ ἀγανακτῶν

οὐδένα ὄντινα οὐ κατέκλασε¹ τῶν παρόντων, πλὴν γε αὐτοῦ Σωκράτους. ἐκεῖνος δὲ, Οἶα, ἔφη, ποιεῖτε,² ὦ θαυμάσιοι. ἐγὼ μέντοι οὐχ ἤκιστα τούτου ἕνεκα τὰς γυναῖκας ἀπέπεμψα, ἵνα μὴ τοιαῦτα πλημμυλοῖεν· καὶ γὰρ ἀκήκοα, ὅτι ἐν εὐφημίᾳ χρῆ τέλευτάν. ἀλλ' ἡσυχίαν τε ἄγετε καὶ καρτερεῖτε. Καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀκούσαντες ἡσυχύνθημέν τε καὶ ἐπέσχομεν τοῦ δακρύειν, ὁ δὲ περιελθὼν, ἐπειδὴ οἱ βαρύνεσθαι ἔφη τὰ σκέλη, κατεκλίθη ὑπτίως· οὕτω γὰρ ἐκέλευεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος. καὶ ἅμα ἐφαπτόμενος αὐτοῦ οὗτος ὁ δοῦς τὸ φάρμακον,³ διαλιπὼν χρόνον^ο ἐπεσκόπει τοὺς πόδας καὶ τὰ σκέλη, κάπειτα σφόδρα πῖεσας αὐτοῦ τὸν πόδα ἤρητο, εἰ αἰσθάνοιτο· ὁ δ' οὐκ ἔφη. καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο αὐθις τὰς κνήμας· καὶ ἐπανιῶν οὕτως^ρ ἡμῖν ἐπεδείκνυτο, ὅτι ψύχοιτό τε καὶ πῆγγνυτο. καὶ αὐτὸς ἤπτετο³ καὶ εἶπεν, ὅτι, ἐπειδὴν πρὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ γένηται αὐτῷ, τότε οἰχθήσεται. ἤδη οὖν σχεδὸν τι αὐτοῦ ἦν τὰ περὶ τὸ ἤτρον^τ ψυχόμενα, καὶ ἐκκαλυψάμενος, ἐνεκεκάλυπτο γάρ,^ε εἶπεν, ὃ δὴ τελευταῖον ἐφθέγγετο, Ὡ Κρίτων, ἔφη, τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ ὀφείλομεν^ι ἀλεκτρύονα. ἀλλ' ἀπόδοτε καὶ μὴ ἀμελήσητε. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα, ἔφη, ἔσται, ὁ Κρίτων· ἀλλ' ὄρα, εἴ τι ἄλλο λέγεις.^υ Ταῦτα ἐρομένου αὐτοῦ οὐδὲν ἐτι ἀπεκρίνατο, ἀλλ' ὀλίγον χρόνον διαλιπὼν ἐκινήθη τε καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐξεκάλυψεν αὐτόν, καὶ δὲ τὰ ὄμματα ἔστησεν.^ν ἰδὼν δὲ ὁ Κρίτων ξυνέλαβε τὸ στόμα^ω τε καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς.

LXVII. Ἡδε ἡ τελευταῖη, ὃ Ἐχέκρατες, τοῦ ἐταβρου ἡμῖν ἐγένετο, ἀνδρός, ὡς ἡμεῖς φαίμεν ἄν, τῶν τότε ὧν ἐπειράθημεν^α ἀρίστου καὶ ἄλλως φρονιμωτάτου καὶ δικαιοτάτου.



NOTES ON THE PHÆDO.

Chap. I. * *Αὐτός ὁ Φαίδων, π.*] The Phædo, whose name is affixed to this celebrated dialogue, was a native of the city of Elis, in the Peloponnesus. He was, at the time of Socrates' death, quite a young man, but the intimate friend both of him and of Plato. He subsequently became the founder of the school of philosophy called the Elean. Cicero distinguished him as Plato's Phædo, de Nat. Deor. I. 32. His philosophical writings, which were in the form of dialogues, were numerous; but none of them are extant. He is here introduced as narrating to his friend Echecrates the conversation which was held on the subject of the immortality of the soul in the dungeon of Socrates, previously to his taking the hemlock, with the closing scenes of the master's life.—Echecrates, as appears from what follows, was a native of Phlius, a town in Sicyonia. He appears to be identical with the Echecrates, also a Phliasian, mentioned by Diogenes Laertius and by Iamblichus, and by them both included among the Pythagoreans.

^b *τί οὖν δή ἐστιν ἄλλα*] This use of *τί* in the singular, when a plural subject follows the copula, is not unfrequent. So in c. II. we have *τί ἦν τὰ λεχθέντα καὶ πραχθέντα*; Gorg. p. 508. C. *σκεπτόν, τί τὰ συμβαίνοντα*; etc. Similarly Terence, Hecyra I. 2. 22. Sed *quid hoc negoti est modo quæ narravit mihi Bacchis*?

^c *οὔτε τῶν πολιτῶν Φλιασίων*] A more usual construction would have been: *τῶν Φλιασίων πολιτῶν*, or *τῶν πολιτῶν τῶν Φλιασίων*. Accordingly, some commentators have been disposed to eject the word *Φλιασίων*, others to insert *τῶν* after *πολιτῶν*; and the latter reading is actually found in one MS. But there is a tameness about the expression *τῶν πολ. τῶν Φλ.*; and, on the other hand, the appositive adjective is not wanting in a single MS. It would seem that a proper name is regarded in itself as

sufficiently definite without the article; making, as it were, but a single notion in combination with its substantive. Thus we have Apolog. Socrat. c. XX. *καὶ ἐτυχεν ἡμῶν ἡ φυλὴ Ἀντιοχίς πρυτανεύουσα*, where no MS. has the article. In Meno, at the beginning, *καὶ οὐχ ἤκιστα οἱ τοῦ σοῦ ἐταίρου Ἀριστίππου πολῖται Λαρισαῖοι*.—The verb *ἐπιχωριάζειν*, to *sojourn*, is joined with Ἀθήναζε, to *Athens*; since the Greeks frequently join verbs of rest to words signifying motion to a place; so as to unite two sentences in a single clause. The sense is this: *for none of the Phliasian citizens now go to Athens and sojourn there*. Xenoph. Anab. I. 2. 2. *παρήσαν εἰς Σάρδις*, i. e. *went to Sardis, and were there*. Stephens is, therefore, wrong in interpreting *ἐπιχωριάζειν* by the word “*ventitare*,” go frequently.

^d *ὅστις ἂν ἡμῖν—ὀλός τ' ἦν*] The sense being *no one was able to give us any certain information on that subject*, Heindorf appears to have been correct in reading *ὀλός τ' ἦν*, instead of *ῥ*, which was preferred by the older editors. Reisig, however, considers *ὅστις ἂν—ἦν* less elegant, on account of the preceding perfect, *ἀφίκαται*. This, however, may be thus explained: *οὔτε τις ἔστι τῶν ξένων τῶν ἐκεῖθεν ἀφικομένων, ὅστις—ὀλός τ' ἦν*. In the same manner, Euripid. Medea, v. 1306. we have:

*οὐκ ἔστιν ἦτις τοῦτ' ἂν Ἑλληνίς γυνή
ἔτλη ποθ' :*

And the optative *ὄτι... ἀποθάνοι* seems to favour the reading we have adopted.

^e *Οὐδὲ τὰ περὶ τῆς δίκης ἄρα ἐπ.*] Instead of *τὰ περὶ τῆν δίκην*, as Fischer has rightly observed, on account of the verb *ἐπέθεσθε*. See note (c) on Apolog. Socrat. c. XX.

^f *ταῦτα μὲν ἡμῖν ἠγγειλέ τις*] *μὲν* is used without *δὲ* following, because the idea, which would be contained in the corresponding clause of the sentence, is easily gathered from the foregoing words. Of *this* we were informed, but of the circumstances immediately attending his death we have heard nothing. See Crito, c. I. note (9), on the words: *ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ μὲν μοι ἕξειν*.

^g *πολλῷ ὕστερον*] *Thirty days afterwards*. This also appears from Xenoph. Mem. IV. 8. 2.

^h *τι οὖν ἦν τοῦτο*] That is, *why was this so?*

ⁱ *ἡ πρόμνα ἐστ. τ. πλοίου—πέμπουσι*] See Crito, c. I. note (p).

^k *ἐστεμμένη*] That is, ornamented with laurel, which was sacred to Apollo.

^l *πέμπουσι*] *Send with solemnity*. The word is peculiarly

applied to a ceremony of this kind. Hence the substantive *πομπή, πομπή*.

^m *ἐν ᾧ Θησεύς*—] Minos, King of Crete, in order to avenge the death of his son Androgeus, is said to have besieged Athens, and to have at length consented to withdraw his forces, on condition that every ninth year the Athenians should send to Crete, instead of tribute, seven virgins, and as many youths, to be devoured by the Minotaur, in the Labyrinth. These are, οἱ δις ἑπτὰ ἐκείνοι. Theseus, being among the number of victims at the third period of tribute, killed the Minotaur, and returned safe with his companions, that is, *καὶ ἔσωσέ τε καὶ αὐτὸς ἰσώθη*.

ⁿ *θεωρίαν ἀπάξειν*] The word *θεωρία* indicates not merely the embassy, but also the accompanying sacrifices and ceremonies. This may be gathered from Plutarch Nic. p. 525. A., where Nicias is said, *ἀγειν τὴν θεωρίαν*, when preparing a chorus, providing victims, and making other arrangements proper for festivals. The Delian *θεωρία*, here mentioned, and which was celebrated annually, must not be confounded with those festivals which are mentioned by Thucyd. III. 104., and which were held every fifth year, to commemorate the purification of the island of Delos by Pisistratus.

^o *ἀεὶ καὶ νῦν ἔτι*] The custom was continued to the times of Demetrius Phalereus, according to Plutarch, Theseus, p. 10. C.

^p *Ἐπειδὴν οὖν ἀρξωνται*—] That is, after the stern of the vessel had been ornamented with the laurel crown, as Phædo himself informs us. A little further on, the common reading, *καθαριεύειν*, is erroneous; since that verb, if used at all, which is very doubtful, is derived from *καθάριος*, *cleanly*; and can, therefore, signify nothing else than *to be cleanly*; a sense which is quite inappropriate in this passage. And the better manuscripts do actually exhibit the reading *καθαρεύειν*, i. e. *to be pure*, and *not to be polluted by punishments*, which is approved of by all the more recent commentators. The addition of *τὴν πόλιν* is to indicate that this law refers to the state in general, and not merely to the citizens individually.

^q *ἔσαν... ἀνεμοι... αὐτούς*] The older editions have *οἱ ἀνεμοι*, which seems repugnant to the sense of the passage, and is sanctioned by only a few MSS. Compare Herodot. II. 115. *ἄσοι ἔπ' ἀνέμων ἤδη ἀποληθόντες ἦλθον*, and Philost. Her. p. 741. *κἄν ἀνεμοι τὴν ναῦν ἀπολάβωσιν*.—For the *αὐτούς* we must under-

stand τοὺς κλείοντας, which is implied in the preceding word, κλοῖον.

^r ὡς περ λέγω] This expression is frequently used respecting anything already mentioned. We say: *As I said before*. See Apology, c. V. ὅπερ λέγω.

II. * οἱ ἄρχοντες] That is, οἱ ἐνέκα. See Apolog. Socr. c. XXVII. note (ε). At the beginning of c. XXXI. of the Apology, they are also called οἱ ἄρχοντες.

^b τινές και πολλοί γε] Similarly, Plat. Gorg. p. 455. C. ὡς ἐγώ τινας σχεδόν και συχνοὺς αἰσθάνομαι. In such sentences, και adds force to the following clause. See Apolog. Socrat. c. IX. note (δ). The sense, therefore, is: *some, nay many, were present*.

^c τοιοῦτους ἐτίρους ἔχεις] That is, *But you will find that those who are going to hear you have the same feeling*.

^d παρόντα με—εἰστέ] The verbs εἰσίνειαι and εἰσέρχεσθαι, like the Latin *subire*, are used of hope, joy, sorrow, pity, etc., taking possession of the mind. Eurip. Med. 931. εἰς ἡλθί μ' οἶκτος. Iphig. Anl. 491. μ' ἔλεος εἰς ἡλθε. And a little further on, with a slight variation of the same construction: οὐδέν πάνν μοι ἔλεινόν εἰστέ.

^e εὐδαίμων γάρ μοι] Compare with this passage, Crito, c. I. note (ε) on the words, ὡς ἠδέως καθέυδεις.

^f γενναίως] *With fortitude*. For the opposite notion, compare Plutarch Cimon, c. XIII. ὑποστάντων δὲ τῶν Περσῶν και δεξαμένων οὐκ ἀγεννῶς, κρατερὰ μάχη συνίστη.—The verb παρίστασθαι is often used in speaking of thoughts suggested by the circumstances in which a person may be placed. Compare Demosth. Olynth. II. at the commencement: οὐχι ταῦτά παρίσταται μοι γινώσκων.... ὅταν τε κ. τ. λ. The verb is in such cases as often as not used without any expressed subject, that is to say, impersonally.

^g ἀνευ θείας μοίρας] That is, *Without a share in the divine favour*. The idea is more fully carried out in the words immediately following: ἀλλά κάκεισε ἀφικόμενον εὐ πράξειν. Compare Plutarch in his treatise, 'Is wickedness alone enough to make a man unhappy?' An pravitas sufficiat ad infelicitatem, p. 499. B. ἀποθνήσκοντα δὲ αὐτὸν (Σωκράτη) ἐμακάριζον οἱ ζῶντες ὡς οὐδ' ἐν "Αἰδου θείας ἀνευ μοίρας ἐσόμενον.

^h ὡς εἰκόσ ἀν δόξειεν εἶναι π. π.] The proposition is a general one: *as would seem natural to one present at a melancholy scene* :

the participle involving an indefinite person. Similarly we have *πένθει*, not *τῷ πένθει*. Heindorf incorrectly refers *παρόντι* to *μοι* understood, and, consequently, would conjecture *τῷ πένθει*. The dative *παρόντι* depends upon *εἰκός*, as in Eurip. Hippolyt. 1433. *ἀνθρώποισι δὲ... εἰκός ἐξαμαρτάνειν*.

¹ *ὡς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ... ὄντων*] That is, *as might have been expected from our being engaged with philosophy; for our conversation was of that cast*. For this use of *ἐν*, compare Men. p. 91. E. *τετταράκοντα ἔτη ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ ὄντα*. Soph. Œd. Tyr. 570.

τότ' οὖν ὁ μάντις οὗτος ἦν ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ;

i. e. *was he then in the practice of his art?*

^k *τοιούτοί τινες*] That is, *They related to philosophical matters*.

^l *οὕτω διεκείμεθα, ὅτε μὲν γελῶντες, κ. τ. λ.*] The participle accommodated to the number and gender of the verb, is added by way of defining the meaning of the *οὕτω*. Compare Soph. Œd. Tyr. v. 10.

..... *τινὶ τρόπῳ καθίσταται*

δείσαντες ἢ σπέρξαντες;

Xen. Anab. IV. 1. 4. *τὴν δὲ... ἐμβολὴν ᾧδε ποιοῦνται, ἅμα μὲν λαθεῖν πευρώμενοι, ἅμα δὲ φθάσαι*; Remark the different accentuation of *ὅτε... ὅτε* (*ἐνίοτε*), *modo... modo*, and *ὅτε*, *quum*. So too *τοτέ... τοτέ* answers to Latin *tum... tum*. The Apollodorus here mentioned was a warm and enthusiastic admirer of Socrates. The author of the Xenophontean Apology for Socrates describes him as *ἐπιθυμητῆς ἰσχυρῶς αὐτοῦ*; he was prone to sadness, and his melancholy at last degenerated into a kind of madness, whence he received the surname of *ὁ μανικός*. His fortitude proved unequal to bearing with manly patience any severe trial; and on the occasion of the death of Socrates, he not merely wept excessively, but cried and wailed aloud. See chap. LXXVI. Ælian relates, in his *Varia Historia*, I. 16., that he brought to the prison a tunic and a cloak, to array Socrates for death.

^m *καὶ Κριτόβουλος*—] Crito, of whom an account is given in a note at the beginning of the Dialogue so inscribed, is said to have had four sons, Critobulus, Hermogenes, Epigenes, Ctesippus. But it would seem that the Hermogenes and Epigenes here mentioned are not the sons of Crito so named. Indeed, the manner in which they are separated from Critobulus would seem of itself sufficient to prove this. And Plato (*Euthydem.* p. 360) speaks of but two sons of Crito. But we meet with both an Epigenes

and an Hermogenes in the Memorabilia of Xenophon; and the former is described as the son of Antipho the Cephisean, the latter as the son of Hipponicus. See Mem. III. 12. 2., and IV. 8. 4. These would seem to be the persons here intended.—Æschines was a disciple of Socrates, born in very humble life, being the son of a sausage-seller. The dialogues which have come down to us under his name are spurious.—Antisthenes is well known as the founder of the sect of Cynics.—Ctesippus seems to be little known. His name occurs also in the Euthydemus and Lysis of Plato.—Menexenus is distinguished by the dialogue bearing his name, and probably written by Plato. He seems to have attached himself closely to the sophist Ctesippus, above referred to; whence, probably, the juxtaposition of their names.

^a Πλάτων δὲ οἶμαι ἰσοθίνει.] The conjecture of Forster is not altogether improbable, that Plato intended by these words to indicate his deep sorrow at the impending death of his master. But apart from this, the artistic reasons arising out of the nature of the conception of the Platonic Socrates would seem to require the absence of Plato, at least from the dialogue as it was published.—The circumstance of Xenophon's name not being mentioned here is enumerated by Athenæus (XI 15), among the arguments brought forward to prove that Plato and Xenophon were not on good terms. But Xenophon had, in the year 401 B.C., two years before the death of his master, joined the expedition of Cyrus the younger, and it would appear that he had not yet returned to Athens. It must be admitted, however, that a good opportunity was here presented for a kindly reference to him, had Plato felt disposed to make such.—For ἦν δὲ καὶ Κτήσιππος, Heindorf preferred παρῆν δὲ καὶ Κτ., but there is no necessity for any alteration. For it is usual with the Greeks, when verbs compounded with prepositions are to be repeated, to omit either verb or preposition in the repetition. The omission of the verb is of very frequent occurrence in the Poets and Herodotus. There is an example of the omission of the preposition in Eurip. Bacch. 1062.

λαβῶν γὰρ ἐλάτης οὐράνιον ἄκρον κλάδον,
κατῆγεν, ἤγεν, ἤγεν, εἰς μέλαν πέδον.

and many similar passages have been collected by Elmsley on Eurip. Medea, v. 1219.

^o Συμμίας τε γε—] Simmias and Cebes, the Thebans, are

said to have been disciples of Philolaus, a celebrated Pythagorean, who is mentioned by Plato in this dialogue, as well as in many other places. They were familiar associates of Socrates (see *Crito*, c. IV.). Plato could, therefore, suitably introduce them as engaged in a discussion with Socrates on the immortality of the soul.—Phædonides appears to have been a Theban.—Euclides was the founder of the School of the Megareans, also called *Eristici* and *Dialectici*: i. e. wranglers and logicians. In Plato's dialogue, inscribed *Theætetus*, he narrates to one Terpsion, of whom nothing further is known, a conversation which is supposed to have taken place between *Theætetus* and Socrates.—*Aristippus*, the founder of the Cyrenaic sect, is too well known to require any mention here. The name of *Cleombrotus* the Ambraciot, is also well known. It is said that, on reading this dialogue, he threw himself into the sea; on which subject there is extant an elegant epigram of *Callimachus*, n. 24., which is also mentioned by *Cicero*, *Tuscul.* I. 34. From what follows, however, it may be doubted whether another *Cleombrotus* is not referred to in this passage. For there seems to be a kind of reflection upon both him and *Aristippus*, in this express mention of their absence on this occasion. The island of *Ægina* was only about 200 stadia distant from Athens, a journey which they would certainly have found time and means to accomplish, had they been so disposed. And the fact of the two names being thus coupled together, seems to indicate that their absence was viewed in the same light.

III. * *πλησίον γὰρ ἦν*—] The prison was near the market-place, where the Court of the *Heliastæ* was held.

^b *ἕως ἀνοιχθείη*] On this optative, which indicates a thing frequently repeated, see *Matth.* § 521. In the same manner, a little further on: *ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀνοιχθείη*: *every time, as soon as it was opened.*

^c *διατρίβοντες μετ' ἀλλήλων*] That is, *διαλεγόμενοι πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς*, as he says in c. LXV.—*ἀνοίγω* is one of those verbs which take a double augment. See *Matth. Gr.* § 168. There seems no reason for reading with *Fischer*, who followed the Scholiast on *Lucian*, *οὐ πᾶν πρῶτ.* *Thomas Magister* gives the preference to the forms *πρωϊτερον* and *πρωϊτατον*, as compared with *πρωϊαιτερον* and *πρωϊαιτατον*. But it may be doubted whether there are sufficient grounds for this decision.

^d *ἔσπερ εἰώθει ὑπακούειν*] On the signification and use of the

verb *ὑπακούειν*, see *Crito*, c. I. note (*).—Immediately afterwards, instead of the common reading, *ἐπιμένειν*, we have restored *περιμένειν* from the best MSS. The meaning of both words is thus explained, by Fr. A. Wolf, on this passage: “*ἐπιμένειν* is to wait, to await patiently the result of anything; *περιμένειν* is generally to stay waiting for a person, to await the appearance of something. Hence the latter is commonly used absolutely, whereas the former is much more frequently joined with *ἕως ἄν*.” It is therefore somewhat surprising that this commentator should have approved of *ἐπιμένειν*, and rejected *περιμένειν*, which seems to be used here with singular propriety. Compare c. LXV. *ἡμᾶς δ’ ἐκέλευε περιμένειν. περιμένομεν οὖν*. A little before: *περιμένομεν οὖν — ἕως ἀνοιχθείη τὸ δεσμωτήριον*. *Sympos. init. οὐ περιμενεῖς; κἀγὼ ἐπιστάς περιίμεινα*. *Rep. I.* at the beginning. *ἐκέλευσε — τὸν παῖδα περιμείναι ἐκελευσαι*.

* *οὐ πολὺν — χρόνον ἐπισχῶν*] That is, *he returned not long afterwards*. It must not, however, be supposed that the accusative *χρόνον* is under the government of *ἐπισχῶν*: the latter must be taken in an intransitive or reflexive sense. This use of the verb *ἐπίχειν* is by no means an unfrequent one. See *Phædo*, p. 95, E. *συχρὸν χρόνον ἐπισχῶν*. *Legg. VI.* p. 751. B. *σμερὸν ἐπισχόντες*. And examples might easily be multiplied.—A little further on, for *ἐκέλευσεν* several MSS. read *ἐκέλευεν*, which was, perhaps, favoured, from *ἦκε* being regarded as an imperfect, instead of a past-complete. But even if it were an imperfect, there would be nothing objectionable in its combination with an aorist. Compare chap. IV. towards the end. *ἐπειδὴ ἦ τε δίκη ἐγένετο καὶ ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἑορτὴ διεκάλυε με ἀποθνήσκειν, ἔδοξε χρῆναι, κ. τ. λ.* *Farmenid.* p. 127. A. *ἀνεγνώρισέ τί με ἐκ τῆς προτέρας ἐπιδημίας καὶ ἠσπάζετο, καὶ — τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὤκνει, — ἔπειτα μέντοι διηγείτο*. *Phædr.* p. 228. B. *ἰδὼν μὲν ἴδντα ἦσθη, ὅτι ἕξει τὸν συγκορυβαντιῶντα, καὶ προάγειν ἐκέλευε*. Different tenses may with propriety be joined together, when two or more actions are to be regarded in a different manner, and separated in thought from one another.

¹ *εἰσιόντες οὖν κατελ. — ἄρτι λελυμένον*] That is, *at the very moment when we were entering*. The common reading, *εἰσελθόντες*, when we had entered, is less adapted to the sense of the passage.

² *ἀνεφήμησε*] *Cried out with weeping and wailing*. This is one of those words wherein we trace the Attic delicacy, which

applies to sad and disastrous things words properly applicable only to what is agreeable; a mode of speech to which the grammarians apply the phrase κατ' ἀντίφρασιν. For εὐφημεῖν and ἀνευφημεῖν are properly said of words and expressions well-omened and fortunate. And as such expressions were chiefly uttered under the apprehension of danger, or in distress, they also signify to lament, to cry out, to wail. Hesychius: ἀνευφημήσει· ἀνοιμῶξει, κατὰ ἀντίφρασιν Σοφοκλῆς Τραχινίαις. He also says: εὐφημοῦσι· στένουσι, κλαίουσι. See the observations on the word εὐφημος, made by Stanley on Æschyl. Agamemn. 1227. Hermann, however, on the passage in the Trachiniæ, referred to by Hesychius (Trach. 783), does not acknowledge any ἀντίφρασις in the word ἀνευφημεῖν; which he explains to mean, to cry out, εὐφήμει; that is, to cry out, "let ill-omened words be refrained from." But the testimony of the ancient critics and lexicographers is against him.

^b τῶν τοῦ Κρίτωνος] *Of the slaves of Crito.* For noble and rich Athenians seldom went abroad alone, but were generally accompanied by several attendants. See Meno, p. 82. B. ἀλλά μοι προσκάλεισον τῶν πολλῶν ἀκολουθῶν τουτωνί τῶν σουτοῦ ἕνα, ὄντινα βούλει.

ⁱ ἀνακαθ. ἐπὶ τὴν κλ.] That is, raising himself on the bed. For Socrates, who had been freed from his chains at the first dawn, was not yet risen; he now sits up in the bed. A little afterwards he lowers his feet from the bed to the ground, and he remains sitting in this posture to the end of the conversation: καθῆκε τὰ σκέλη ἀπὸ τῆς κλίνης καὶ καθιζόμενος οὕτως ἤδη τὰ λοιπὰ διελέγετο. The common reading, εἰς τὴν κλίνην, is to be rejected, since ἵζεσθαι and καθίζειν εἰς τι mean to go and sit down somewhere.

^k τρίβων ἄμα] *While rubbing.* Herodot. 1. 179. ὀρύσσοντες ἄμα τὴν τάφρον ἐπλίνθενον. Xenoph. Anab. III. 3. 7. φεύγοντες ἄμα ἐτίρωσκον. Republ. VII. p. 521. C. τόδε ἰννοῶ λέγων ἄμα.

^l Ὅς ἀποπον—] The adjective ἀποπος is applied not merely to what is absurd, but also to what is strange or marvellous. Thom. Mag. ἀποπον οὐ μόνον τὸ ἀλογον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ θαυμαστὸν καὶ παράδοξον. Πλάτων ἐν Φαίδωνι. See Crito, c. II. note (f).

^m ὡς θαυμασίως πέφυκε πρὸς τ. δ.] *How wonderful is the relation between pleasure and pain in this, that they will not be present with a man at once, etc.* For τῷ, with an infinitive, is, in this that, or because that. It appears to be a locative dative.

^a ὡς περ οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ἔοικεν, ἐπειδὴ ὑπὸ τ. δ.] That is, just as seems to have been my own case; since pain was before present in my leg, from the effect of the fetter, so pleasure seems to come following in its train. *ἔοικέ μοι* must on no account be taken as equivalent to *φαίνεται μοι*, *δοκεῖ μοι*: its dependent verb is the *ἦκει* in the last clause, the *φαίνεται* being introduced by a kind of looseness of speech, not unfrequent in Greek authors, and being by no means syntactically necessary. For instances of similar redundancy, compare Sophist. p. 225. D. *δοκῶ μὴν τ. γ. δ.*—*καλεῖσθαι κατὰ γνώμην τὴν ἐμὴν οὐχ ἕτερον ἀδολεσχεοῦ*. Laches, p. 192. C. *τοῦτο τοίνυν ἐμοίγε φαίνεται, ὅτι οὐ πᾶσά γε, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, καρτερία ἀνδρία σοι φαίνεται*. Phileb. p. 32. C. *οἶμαι—κατὰ γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν ἐμφανὲς ἴσασθαι*. Lys. p. 221. E., where after *ὡς ἔοικε* we find *ὡς φαίνεται*. Theocr. VII. 30. *καίτοι, κατ' ἐμὸν νόον, ἰσοφαρίσθην ἔλπομαι*. Aristoph. Plut. v. 827. *δῆλον ὅτι τῶν χρηστῶν τις, ὡς ἔοικας, εἰ*.

LXIV. ^a ἢ ἐμοὶ ἐπιστέλλεις] The verb *ἐπιστέλλειν* is properly used concerning the last will of the dying. Hence it would seem to be preferable to the common reading, *ἐπιτέλλω*, which does not appear to be in accordance with the usage of prose writers. Homer uses the latter in a similar sense, *Iliad*. XXIII. 95. and 107.

^b ἐν χάριτι ποιοῖμεν] That is, *what could we do to oblige you?* Compare Xenoph. *Æcon*. VIII. 10. *ἔρψαν δὲν—ἐν χάριτι διδόναι*.

^c οὐδὲν καινότερον] On this use of the comparative, which is especially frequent with the word *νεώτερος*, see *Matth. Gr.* § 457. There is a notion of comparison present to the mind of the speaker, though not expressed: '*nothing newer than this*,' as if that should be always new.

^d ἑμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιμ.] Evidently referring to the culture of the higher nature: intellectual and moral.

^e ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς] Socrates feels assured, that in proportion as they *are* in themselves what they ought to *be*, will they feel the disposition to recompense him individually, or in the persons of his family and friends.

^f οὐδ' εἰάν πολλαὶ δόμολ.—ποιήσεσσι] That is, *even if you pro-*

mise much, you will avail nothing. For οὐδὲν πλέον ποιήσετε is the same as οὐδὲν ὄφελος ὑμῖν ἔσται.

^b οὗτος ὁ Σωκρ. ὁ νυνὶ διαλ.] The words are to be construed thus: ὡς οὗτος ὁ Σωκράτης ὁ νυνὶ διαλ. καὶ δ. ἔκ. τ. λ. ἐγὼ εἰμι. "I cannot persuade Crito," he says, "that it is the Socrates who is now conversing with him and you, and who has been marshalling each of our arguments,—i.e. the thinking, reasoning being,—that is really ME. This passage is referred to by Cicero, Tuscul. I. 43.

^b ἐρωτᾷ δὴ, πῶς με θάπτῃ] If the common reading, πῶς δεῖ με θάπτειν, was found in any MSS. by Stephanus, there can be no doubt that it arose from an interpretation of what is called the deliberative subjunctive, of which the use in the third person is rather uncommon. Crito had before asked Socrates: θάπτωμεν δέ σε τίνα τρόπον; and Socrates now, as it were, putting himself in the place of Crito, repeats his expression, saying: πῶς με θάπτῃ, i.e. how he is to bury me. Plat. de Legg. p. 719. E. κότερον οὖν ὁ τεταγμένος ἐπὶ τοῖς νόμοις μηδὲν τοιοῦτον προσαγορεύῃ ἐν ἀρχῇ τῶν νόμων—καὶ μὴ φράζῃ τε καὶ ἀπαπειλήσας τὴν ζημίαν ἐπ' ἄλλον τράπηται νόμον, παραμυθίας δὲ καὶ πειθοῦς—μηδὲ ἐν προσδιῶ; Sophist. p. 225. A. τῷ δὲ λόγοις πρὸς λόγους τί τις, ὡ θεαίτητε ἄλλο εἶπῃ; Meno, p. 92. E. ἀλλὰ σὺ εἶπῃ, παρὰ τίνας ἔλθῃ Ἀθηναίων. Protag. p. 348. D. περιῶν ζητεῖ, ὅτῃ ἐπιδείξῃται καὶ μεθ' ὅτου βεβαιώσῃται. Rep. I. p. 348. E. οὐκέτι ῥάδιον ἔχειν δ τί τις εἶπῃ. Aristoph. Nubes, 438. ποῖ τις φύγῃ; Sophocle. Œd. Col. 170. θυγατερ, ποῖ τίς φροντίδος ἔλθῃ; Compare Matthiæ Gr. § 516. 3.

ⁱ εἰς μακάρων δὴ τινος] The δὴ serves to fix the reader's attention on the foregoing word μακάρων. Compare p. 107. D. οὗτος ἄγειν ἐπιχειρεῖ εἰς δὴ τίνα τόπον.

^k ἄλλως] i.e. μάτην.

ⁱ ἐγγυήσαθε οὖν με πρ. Κρ.] Ἐγγυᾶσθαι τίνα is to undertake to deliver up a person to another, to become bail for a person, to pledge one's-self for another. Demosthen. p. 609. ed. Reisk. ταῦθ' ὑπὸ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ γυναικὸς ὀρφῆτο ποιῶν, ἦν ὡς ἐλεύθερος ἐγγυήσατο. Ibid. 899. μάρτυρας ὑμῖν παρασχέσομαι, ὡς οὐκ ἠγγυησάμην ἐγὼ τὸν Παρμένοντα. Ibid. p. 1349. ἐγγυῶντα τὰς ἐτέρων θυγατέρας ὡς ἑαυτοῦ οὖσας.—As the Greeks use the phrases μάχην μάχεσθαι, ἔχθος ἔχθαίρειν, and others of the kind, so we here find ἐγγυᾶσθαι ἐγγύην. And since ἐγγυᾶσθαι takes an accusative of

the person, it is also correct to say *ἐγγύην ἐγγυᾶσθαι τινα*, in a similar manner as *ἐχθος ἐχθαίρειν τινά*, *μῖσος μισεῖν τινα*, and other expressions of the same nature are used.

^m οὗτος μὲν γὰρ ἢ μὴν παραμενεῖν] Understand *ἠγγυήσατο. ἀγανακτῶ*, be *indignant, troubled*, or *grieved*. The etymology of the word is somewhat uncertain. It occurs again in c. LXVI. Ἀπολλόδωρος δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ οὐδὲν ἐπαύετο δακρύων, καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε κλάων καὶ ἀγανακτῶν οὐδένα ὄντινα οὐ κατέκλασε.

ⁿ ὡς ἢ προτίθεται—κατορύττει] The verbs *ἐκφέρειν, κατορύττειν* and *προτίθεσθαι* are here used in their proper sense as applied to funerals. The middle voice of the verb *προτίθεναι* is regularly used to express the customary laying out of a corpse; the active would denote simply the act of exposure. See Eurip. Alcest. 378, where Admetus, being about to die, reproaches in these words his father, who refuses to die in his stead:

τοιγὰρ φυτεύων παῖδας οὐκετ' ἂν φθάνοις,
οἷ γηροβροσκήσουσι καὶ θανόντα σε
περιστελοῦσι καὶ προθήσονται νεκρόν.

The Athenian law upon the subject is given us in Demosth. in Macart. p. 1071. R. τὸν ἀποθανόντα προτίθεσθαι ἐνδον, ὅπως ἂν βούληται. Compare Lucian, de Luctu, § 27. μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ λοβόσαντες αὐτὸν καὶ μύρω τῷ καλλίστῳ χρίσαντες τὸ σῶμα καὶ στεφανώσαντες τοῖς ὠραίοις ἄνθεσι προτίθενται.

^o οὐ μόνον εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο] Not only in that respect, that is, in respect τοῦ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν.—With *πλημμελές* understand *ἴστιν*.

LXV. ^a ἀνίστατο εἰς οἰκημά τι] That is, *he rose and went into a certain chamber*. Aristoph. Plut. 683. ἐπὶ τὴν χύτραν τὴν τῆς ἀθάρη ἀνίσταμαι. Eurip. Heraclid. 59. ἀνίστασθαι σε χρὴ εἰς Ἄργος. These words are to be explained in the same manner as we explained *ἐπιχωριάζειν Ἀθήναζε*, c. I. The word *οἶκημα* is used for separate parts of a building according to circumstances.—Further on, the fuller construction would have been: *περιεμένομεν οὖν τοτὲ μὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοῦς δ. —τοτὲ δὲ—*. But *τοτὲ μὲν* is often omitted before *τοτὲ δὲ*, in the same manner as *ὁ μὲν* is sometimes omitted before *ὁ δὲ*.

^b δύο γὰρ αὐτῷ υἱεῖς] Compare note on Apol. c. XXIII. note (°).

^c καὶ αἱ οἰκίαι γυναῖκες ἀφ.] Nothing can be more ground-

less than the assertion that Socrates had two wives at one time. This passage has, however, been so far abused as to be urged in proof of that position. But there is not the slightest reason for translating *γυναῖκες*, *wives*; and Luzac, who has given the subject a careful study, seems to have satisfactorily shown that there is no foundation whatever for an assumption so prejudicial to the character of Socrates. Luzac rightly translates *οἰκίαι γυναῖκες* *women of the house and family, female relations or domestics*; for if Plato intended to speak of *wives*, he would have merely said, *αἱ γυναῖκες*, not *αἱ οἰκίαι γυναῖκες*.

^d οὐ καταγνώσομαι γε σοῦ] *I shall not perceive in your case.* The genitive has a kind of partitive force. For this use of *καταγνώσκω*, compare Euthyphr. p. 2. B. οὐ γὰρ ἐκείνῳ γε καταγνώσομαι, ὡς οὐ γε ἕτερον. Demosth., Mid. c. 2. οὐ γὰρ ἂν καταγνοίην ὑμῶν οὐδενός.

^e τῶν ἀρχόντων] He means the Eleven.

^f ἃ ἤλθον ἀγγέλλων] *What I have come to announce.* There is no necessity for the future in a case of the kind: for the fulfilment of the purpose begins with the arrival.

^g καὶ παρὰ πάντα μοι τὸν χρόνον] The preposition *παρὰ* is often thus used to signify duration of time. It gets this force from its meaning, *all along*. The events or conduct referred to have run parallel with the course of time throughout, so to speak. Compare Xenoph. Mem. II. 1, 2. *παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνου ἀρχὴν, during his government, while he governed.* The sense is: *throughout the whole thirty days which I have passed in prison, he has visited me, and sometimes talked with me.*

^h τριψάτω ὁ ἄνθρωπος] *Ἄνθρωπος* is generally thus used in speaking of a common and mean person: as here of the attendant and servant of the Eleven, and further on of the executioner.—The seed of the hemlock was bruised, in order to extract the juice. See Plin. H. N. XXV. 13.

ⁱ καὶ ξυγγ.] Stephens has correctly rendered this: *et quidem nonnullos suis amoribus potitos.*

^k οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶμαι κερδαίνειν] On this use of the Present Infinitive, see Crito, c. XIV. note (^b). A little further on, the words *καρ' ἐμὰνψ̄* are not superfluous, but are added to define more accurately the meaning of *ὀφλεῖν γέλωτα*, which signifies *to incur ridicule, either with others or with one's-self*. The meaning, then, is: *I do not see that by drinking the hemlock a few minutes later, I shall gain any other end than that of appearing*

ridiculous in my own eyes. In the words *φειδόμενος οὐδένης ἔτε ἐνόητος*, allusion is made to the Hesiodic precept:

ἀρχομένου γε πίθου, καὶ λήγοντος κερύσασθαι
μίσσοσθι φείδεσθαι· δεῖλη δ' ἐνὶ πυθμῆνι φειδώ.

Compare, too, Seneca, Epist. I. *Nam ut visum est majoribus nostris: sera parsimonia in fundo est.*

LXVI. ^a *εἰεν, ἔφη, ὦ βέλτιστε*] The word *εἰεν*, say the grammarians, serves to indicate assent to what has preceded, and forms also a transition to something else: *συγκατάθεσις μὲν τῶν εἰρημένων, συναφή δὲ πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα.* Its force is, however, due in a great measure, says Stallbaum, to the turn which the sentence takes immediately after it. The words *οὐ γὰρ τούτων ἐπιστήμων*, are put first, because the Greeks usually put that part of the sentence first, which contains the reason of what is about to be said. The particle *γὰρ* is prefixed in such cases. *Æschyl. Agam. 1077. ἐγὼ δ', ἐποικτείρω γάρ, οὐ θυμώσομαι.* *Sympos. p. 175. C. τὸν οὖν Ἀγάθωνα, τυγχάνειν γὰρ ἔσχατον κατακείμενον μόνον, δεῦρ' ἔφη φάναι, Σώκρατες, παρ' ἐμὲ κατάκεισο.*

^b *ἕως ἂν σου βάρος.*] There is no necessity for changing *σου* into *σοι*, though the latter appears more natural. So in *Crito*, c. XV. we have *σου ἐπιτήδειοι*, and *Rep. VII. p. 518. C. τὴν ἐνούσαν ἑκάστου δύναμιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ.* The *σου* is dependent upon the *σείλεσι*, not upon the *βάρος*.

^c *καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸ ποιήσει*] “*And thus, while you are walking, it will operate of itself, so as to require nothing else.*” *Ποιεῖν*, like the Latin *facere*, is used of the operation of medicines. See *Dioscorides*, c. I. 95. *ποιεῖ πρὸς φάρμακα, is efficacious against poisons.*

^d *καὶ μάλα ἄλωος*] *Very cheerfully.* This use of *καὶ μάλα* is frequent, *καὶ* having an intensive force. A little further on, *καὶ μάλα εὐχερῶς καὶ εὐκόλως ἔξέπιε.*

^e *ταυρηδὸν ὑποβλήψας*] That is, *looking at him with firm countenance, fixing his eyes steadily on him.* The sense of the subsequent words is: *Is it lawful to pour forth to any god a libation from this potion?*

^f *μέτριον εἶναι π.*] That is, *to be sufficient.*

^g *ἐπισχόμενος*] *Having put the cup to his lips, which is the force of the middle voice.* For *ἐπέχειν τινὶ πιεῖν* is *to offer*, or *present a potion to any one.* Compare *Aristoph. Nubes, 1385. εἰ μὲν γε βρῦν εἰποις, ἐγὼ γνοῦς ἂν πιεῖν ἐπίσχων.*—“I would hold

the cup to your lips." And for the middle voice, Stesichorus in Athenæus, XI p. 499. Β. σκυφίον δὲ λαβῶν πῖεν ἐπισχόμενος.

^b κατέχειν τὸ μὴ δακρ.] *Scarcely could we refrain from tears.* The μὴ appears redundant to us, but the Greek fixed his mind on the negative result. Similarly, Xen. Anab. I. 3. 2. μικρὸν ἐξέφυγε τὸ μὴ καταπετρωθῆναι.

ⁱ ἐγκαλυψάμενος] *Covering my face with my cloak.*

^k οἷον ἀνδρός] That is, ὅτι τοιούτου. Compare Herodot. I. 31. αἱ δὲ Ἀργεῖαι τὴν μητέρα αὐτῶν [ἱμακάριζον], οἷων τέκνων ἐκύρησε.

^l οὐδένα ὄντινα οὐ κατέκλασε] This reading κατέκλασε, which is found in the best MSS., was first restored by a conjecture of Stephanus, instead of the common reading, κατέκλαυσε. Nor does there seem to be anything harsh in this use of the word, without any further qualification. The analogous compound ἐπικλάω is used in exactly a similar manner by Plutarch, Life of Pericl. c. 37. ἡ παρούσα δυστυχία τῷ Περιμελῆϊ περὶ τὸν οἶκον, ὡς δίκην τινα δεδωκότι τῆς ὑπεροφίας καὶ τῆς μεγαλαυχίας ἐξείσης, ἐπέκλασε τοῦς Ἀθηναίους. Life of Demosthen. c. 17. ὄρωντες ἐπικλώντα πολλοὺς καὶ ἀποθελόνοντα τὸν Αἰσχίνην τῷ λογῷ τοῦτω πρὸς οἶκτον. And κατακλᾶν: Achill. Tat. III. 10. ληστήν μὲν καὶ Ἑλληνα καὶ φωνὴ κατέκλασε καὶ δέησις ἐμάλαιξεν.

^m οἷα ποιεῖτε] This is an expression of wonder and displeasure. Similarly Euthyphr. p. 15. Ε. οἷα ποιεῖς, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἀπ' ἐλπίδος με καταβαλῶν.

ⁿ οὗτος ὁ δοῦς τὸ φ.] There seems no sufficient reason for regarding these words as a gloss, as some have done. Repetitions of this kind, especially when they tend to increase the perspicuity of a passage, are quite in accordance with the genius of conversational language. And the removal of the words in question would not add to the euphony of the sentence: καὶ ἕμα οὗτος ἐφαπτόμενος αὐτοῦ.

^o διαλειπὼν χρόνον] That is, *he every now and then kept looking at his feet and legs.* The phrase by itself may be rendered, after an interval. So further on, ὀλίγον χρόνον διαλειπὼν ἐκινήθη. The word διαλειπὼν is also used by itself.

^p ἐπάνων οὐτως] *Advancing his hand higher and higher towards the vital parts.*

^q αὐτὸς ἤπτετο] *Socrates himself, too, felt his limbs as they*

grew cold and stiff, and said that he should die when, etc. For so these words are to be understood. Some refer them to the attendant, but incorrectly; at least Forster's conjecture, *αὔθις*, must be adopted in that case. There is a fine euphemism in the *τότε οἰχθήσεται*.

^r *περὶ τὸ ἤτρον*] The word *ἤτρον* is used to denote the parts of the abdomen below the navel.—*ἤτρον τὸν ὑπὸ τὸν ὀμφαλὸν τόπον, Ἀττικῶς ὑπογάστριον Ἑλληνικῶς.*

^s *ἐνεκάλυπτο γάρ*] Xenophon makes Cyrus the elder refer to this custom of wrapping up the faces of the dead in his dying speech. Compare, too, Livy VIII. 9, where the devotion of Decius is described.

^t *τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ ὀφείλομεν*] There is great beauty about this somewhat enigmatical speech, if it be correctly viewed. The sick were wont, on the recovery of their health, to sacrifice a cock to *Æsculapius*. Socrates would indicate that being now at length released from the chains of the body, he shall attain true health.

^u *εἴ τι ἄλλο λίγεις*] *If you have any other commission to give me.*

^v *τὰ ὄμματα ἵστησιν*] *Had fixed his eyes, his eyes had become fixed.*

^w *ἐνέλαβε τὸ στόμα*] *Closed his mouth.* See Kirchmann, de Funeribus, I. 6. p. 45.; and Casaubon on Suet. Octav. 99.

LXVII. ^x *τῶν τότε ὡν ἐκείραθ.*] If we translate the Greek as it stands, the sense is as follows: *Such, Echecrates, was the end of our companion; a man who was, I should say, the noblest of his time, so far as my own intercourse has extended; and, in other points of view, most wise and just.* Most critics, however, imagine there is some corruption in the text, the *τότε* seeming to them unsuitably to limit the praise. Heindorf suggests *πῶποτε*, notwithstanding this word is rarely used without a negative particle; and Stallbaum proposes the following reconstruction of the passage: *ἀνδρὸς ὡς φαίμεν ἂν, τότε θ' ὡν ἐκείραθημεν ἀρίστου καὶ ἄλλως, κ. τ. λ.* But if the *τότε* be taken with the article *τῶν*, and not, as has been erroneously done by some, with *ἐκείραθημεν*, the eulogy, as expressed above, seems a perfectly becoming one. A man's opinion, to be reasonable and valuable, must be based upon his knowledge and experience: hence the propriety of the restriction, *ὡν ἐκείραθημεν*.—The Greek for *the noblest of those of*

whom I had then enjoyed the intercourse, would be *ἀνδρὸς ὧν τότε ἐπειράθημεν ἀρίστου*, not *τῶν τότε ὧν*. The *ὧν ἐπειράθημεν* is a co-ordinate clause with *τῶν τότε*.—The adjective *ἀριστος* seems more particularly to denote fortitude and energy: hence the other points of view in his character are afterwards presented to us: *καὶ ἄλλως φρονιμωτάτου καὶ δικαιοτάτου*.

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