

THE GROWTH OF
FREEDOM
TRY W NEVINSON

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO



3 1761 01139902 9



JC
585
N4

THE PEOPLE'S BOOKS




Presented to the
LIBRARY of the
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO
by
The Estate of the late
PROFESSOR A. S. P. WOODHOUSE
Head of the
Department of English
University College
1944-1964

A. S. P. Woodhouse.

THE
PEOPLE'S
BOOKS

THE GROWTH OF FREEDOM



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2007 with funding from
Microsoft Corporation


THE GROWTH OF FREEDOM

By HENRY W. NEVINSON



LONDON: T. C. & E. C. JACK
67 LONG ACRE, W.C., AND EDINBURGH
NEW YORK: DODGE PUBLISHING CO.

JC
585
N4



1045738

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

THE MEANING OF FREEDOM	PAGE 9
----------------------------------	-----------

Attempt to define freedom—How freedom cannot imply absence of external pressure, only possible in isolation, but must exist in society—"Whose service is perfect freedom"—A harmony of external pressure and inward will is implied—This freedom a condition of happiness, being essential for the highest development of personality—Such freedom will be rare—Conscious external control usually needed, being often higher than the average will—But in finer natures the unwritten and inward laws often surpass it—Subdivisions of freedom, civil, political, national, family, economic, artistic, mental, &c.—Our subject chiefly political, but touching other spheres.

CHAPTER II

THE ORIGIN OF AUTHORITY	13
-----------------------------------	----

Family authority among prehistoric and modern savages—Tribes organised for food and protection—Origin of kingship—Example from Hebrew history—Theory of Contract or Covenant—Hobbes—Monarchical ideal—Its development.

CHAPTER III

THE EARLY EMPIRES	19
-----------------------------	----

Earliest records of authority—Prehistoric, Egyptian and Assyrian—Tendency to acquiesce in despotism, especially in the East until lately—Personal freedom of thought in Buddhism and Judaism—Jewish assertion of nationality—Greek types of government—City communities—Monarchy and oligarchy—Sparta—Athenian democracy—Its

nature and limitations—Its glory in Nationalism and fall through Imperialism—Collapse of freedom under Alexander's Empire—Rome's service to freedom—Influence of law—Religious toleration—Development of Roman State—Kings, nobility, Commons and "superior classes"—Formation of the Empire—Origin of the Emperors—The Roman Imperialism.

CHAPTER IV

CHRISTIANITY AND FEUDALISM 31

The inward law revealed by early Christianity—Insistence upon the individual soul—Equality in Christ—The heavenly anarchy—Appearance of an official or established Church—The Church takes the seat of the Cæsars—Two-sided effect on freedom—Slavery discredited—Subsequent attitude of Christianity to slavery usually hostile—The Barbarians equally disturbing to Imperial monotony—But the conception of the Roman Empire lingered—Its subsequent history—Emperor as God's temporal Vicar—Rivalry of Emperors and Popes—How far each side promoted freedom—The order of Feudalism—Origin of landowners—Evil effects of this private ownership on freedom—But the military force of a feudal baronage restrained the monarchy and checked centralisation—Chivalry—How far it liberated women of rank—How far it extended a higher ideal of womanhood.

CHAPTER V

TAXATION AND REPRESENTATION 42

Origin and growth of the King's Council—The English Witan—The Norman Great Council—First signs of representation—Its close connection with taxation—"The characteristic mark and seal of British freedom"—The Great Charter—Its two main provisions—Taxation by consent, and trial by equals—Gradual growth of Parliament—Edward I.'s "Model Parliament"—"Approved by all"—The ideal of democracy—Government by majorities—"De Tallagio"—The two Houses—Finance limited to Commons—Great importance of this custom—Historical value of our Parliament in the growth of freedom—Dangers and compensations of representative government.

CHAPTER VI

THE FREEDOM OF THE SOUL	PAGE 51
-----------------------------------	------------

In fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the main growth of freedom no longer constitutional—Power of Crown increased—An age of great personalities—Social movements—The Peasants' Revolt—Jack Cade—The Pilgrimage of Grace—Robert Ket—The "Jacquerie"—The "Bundschuh"—Anabaptists—Fifth Monarchy Men and Levelers—The intellectual movement—Error as to "The Dark Ages"—Growth of mental freedom—The Greek scholars—The New Learning—The great printers—Diffusion of books—Gunpowder—Also a destroyer of privilege—End of castles—Arts and knowledge—Discoveries—Investigation of nature—Criticism of authority—Criticism of religious dogma—Attempts to purify Catholicism—Puritan reaction in Italy against corruptions—Vain attempts to maintain unity in the Church—Schism and wars of religion—English revolt from Rome at first political—Then violently spiritual—The Independents—The Jesuit attempt at internal reform of the Church—Religious persecution common to all divisions—Appearance of Nationalism in Switzerland, Ireland, and the Netherlands—Growth of Puritanism—How far a hindrance to freedom or conducive to it.

CHAPTER VII

THE AGE OF REVOLUTION	PAGE 65
---------------------------------	------------

Changes in the conception of man and the universe since the Middle Ages—Effect of physical knowledge on thought—And on conditions of life—How far freedom has gained—Main course of political and social advance during three centuries—Chief progress in freedom during the seventeenth century effected by England—The religious element in rebellion—Renewed protest against taxation without consent—The Petition of Right—Eliot, Hampden, and Pym—Overthrow of absolutism—Effect of military power—Failure of the Commonwealth—Government by aristocracy—The Cabinet—Dynastic wars and the expansion of Empire—Extension of British ideals of government to Colonies and other races—The French Revolution—The "Social Contract"—The States General—Course of the Revolution—Results—Abolition of serfdom—Peasant proprietors—Equality—Effect of the

- French ideal on serfdom, slavery, and popular rights
 —Napoleon's attempt at Empire stimulates Nationalism
 —Vindication of Nationalism in the nineteenth century.

CHAPTER VIII

TOWARDS DEMOCRACY 77

Misery of the people in early nineteenth century—In country and factories—Riots—The Reform Bill—Power of the middle classes—The Corn Laws—The Chartists—'Forty-eight—Reform Bills of 1867 and 1884—The House of Lords—Budget of 1909—The Parliament Act—Struggle for Women's Enfranchisement—Proposal for Adult Suffrage—Removal of other restrictions—The machinery of democracy nearly complete—Progress of constitutionalism in other countries—European and Asiatic—Checked by diplomatic Imperialism—Overthrow of freedom in small Nationalities—Disregard of treaties—Absence of popular control over international relations—The popular will checked or perverted—Excessive powers of Cabinets—Dangers of officialdom—Need for the extension of opportunity—Privileges of inheritance, tenure, sex, and, above all, of education still remain to be removed—And in the advance towards freedom there is no finality.

THE GROWTH OF FREEDOM

PART I

EARLY LIMITATIONS TO AUTHORITY

CHAPTER I

THE MEANING OF FREEDOM

LIKE all abstractions, freedom is difficult to define, and though we may usually know it when we see it, our knowledge is often uncertain. Even the word has not exactly the same meaning as its supposed equivalents in other languages. "Eleutheria," "Libertas," "Freiheit," and their derivatives suggest different shades of feeling. Our own word "Liberty" is commonly used as identical with "Freedom," but it sounds less solid.

At first sight we might accept as a definition "the power of doing what one pleases, in the absence of external pressure." We talk, for instance, of being "free as air," because we suppose that the wind bloweth whither it listeth. Even that supposition is false, for the movement of the air depends upon numerous controlling forces, such as the sun, the sea, ice, and deserts; but still the definition would fairly well apply to such complete isolation from human society as a Hima-

layan hermit might conceivably enjoy. When Alexander Selkirk boasted—

“ I am monarch of all I survey,
My right there is none to dispute,”

he probably meant that he was free, not being aware of the pitiable trammels that hold monarchs in captivity. But this kind of freedom, to enjoy which men and women must live in scattered isolation, like raisins in a schoolboys' pudding, even if desirable, can no longer be attained, because the earth's surface would not be large enough to accommodate the eremites ; not, at all events, until wild beasts had devoured the greater part of them piecemeal. Besides, at the first appearance of a family the freedom of isolation breaks down, and in all speculations on man we must assume that the human race is worth preserving, or, at lowest, will be preserved.

This kind of freedom, then, must be inconsiderable in extent, and perhaps it is also undesirable. Alexander Selkirk said that, rather than have no one to dispute his right, he would live in the midst of alarms. He could do what he pleased in the absence of external pressure ; he was free by definition ; but he tells us that he longed for the church-going bell, the very emblem of social discipline. In much the same mood Wordsworth complained that “ unchartered freedom ” tired him. To most people, uncontrolled loneliness, like unconditioned leisure, though accompanied with the power of doing what one pleases, soon becomes tedious and degrading. But the moment we admit society, even the society of one other person, we admit limit and external pressure, whether willingly accepted or not. We must, therefore, modify our first definition ; for, since we continue to use the word “ freedom ” under social conditions, some kind of external pressure

will be present even where freedom exists. The Prayer-book phrase, "Whose service is perfect freedom," proves that from our idea of freedom a Divine pressure, at all events, is not excluded, and, in the same sense, Milton in his *Comus* urges upon his audience to love virtue because "she alone is free." But virtue, except among hermits, implies society, and even the duty to oneself as a spiritual incarnation is hardly ever accomplished in loneliness.

So we are driven to abandon part of our definition and must look for a new one. Perhaps we may find it in that very phrase, "Whose service is perfect freedom." Such service involves, not merely a submission to external pressure, but an entire agreement with it—an even passionate co-operation, not because it is authoritative, but because it is recognised as the best way of life. All government without the consent of the governed is the very definition of slavery, said Swift,¹ and in a definition of freedom we must demand the exact opposite. In that service which is perfect freedom, reason and the highest inward impulses act harmoniously with a control of which they are hardly conscious, and joyfully combine to carry out its orders, because reason, impulse, and the external pressure coincide. When the inner mind and the outer ordinance are thus indistinguishable, and the consent is so complete that no external pressure is felt, we may say that a state of perfect freedom has been reached. It is not submission even to a Divine Will that is implied, but a positive, reasoning, and joyful co-operation or harmony, of such a nature that freedom becomes one of the essential conditions of happiness. For without such freedom the highest development of personality is impossible, and the useful old definition tells us that happiness lies in the active exercise of a man's vital

¹ *The Drapier's Letters*, iv.

12 THE GROWTH OF FREEDOM

powers along the lines of excellence, in a life affording full scope for their development.¹ In other words, happiness consists in the highest possible development of a man's personality.

Perfect freedom will, therefore, be rare, just as perfect happiness is rare, both being known by the shadows thrown from the region where perfection of all kinds dwells, and all are as the angels of heaven. It is seldom that in any large number of people the reason is so powerful and the inward impulses so high as to need no conscious pressure from without in order to keep action decent. A few inspired characters may become a law unto themselves, and extend freedom by rising into a realm of higher ordinances. But many fall to pieces in the attempt, because the existing ordinances are still higher than anything they can live up to, being at all events better than themselves. Still more seldom, however, is it that external ordinances coincide with reason and the highest impulses of the soul when it passionately desires to act in free obedience to those "unwritten and unchanging laws of heaven" to which the Greek appealed from the ordinances of rulers—"laws that are not of to-day or yesterday, but abide for ever, and of their creation knoweth no man."² Our definition of freedom, is, indeed, now becoming so lofty and exacting that various degrees and approximations are the best we can hope for.

It is evident, too, that the principle of freedom has many aspects, for it may enter into nearly every phase of human life. Thus we talk of a free man when he lies under no social or legal disabilities, but is "his own master," thinking, speaking, and acting for himself, choosing his own means of livelihood, standing on a level with all other citizens before the law, and following the kind of religious belief or disbelief that seems

¹ Aristotle's *Ethics*, i. 6.

² Sophocles' *Antigone*, 450 ff.

to him most salutary or most reasonable. We call a people free when every grown-up member of the community has some voice in the government, and may without danger try to change its action by persuading others to adopt his or her views. And we call a nation free when its own government manages its own affairs and its foreign relations without the interference, tutelage, or dictation of another nation. There are many other aspects of freedom besides—family freedom (the claims of wife and children), economic freedom (the claims for a certain standard of wages and decency), freedom from snobbery, freedom from conventions and artistic traditions. In all these kinds there has been growth, and in most of them the world has hitherto only reached an approximation. One kind does not necessarily imply another. In Russia, for instance, where political freedom and civil freedom still hardly exist, we find greater freedom of thought and greater social freedom than in England, where political and civil freedom is far more advanced and is still rapidly developing. Though the growth of political freedom is the chief subject of this short treatise, we shall be obliged to take account of some of the other kinds, especially of national freedom, and freedom of thought. For without national freedom, political freedom cannot exist, and freedom of thought has in some cases largely contributed to freedom of government.

CHAPTER II

THE ORIGIN OF AUTHORITY

“MAN is born free,” said Rousseau in the opening sentence of his *Social Contract*—“Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains.” One is tempted to

reverse the famous saying and to think that man is born in chains, and in some parts of the world he is gradually becoming free. The earliest form of authority may be uncertain ; it is natural to suppose that it grew from the protective power of the mother and, in a less degree, of the father over their young, as we see it still in the case of lions, chickens, and other living things not very far removed from man. On the other hand, we must remember that myriads of creatures which are supposed to stand much lower in the scale than man, such as ants and bees, had developed elaborate communities, probably long before man appeared upon the earth, and though their object was the preservation of the family, the queen-mother can hardly be said to exercise authority ; still less can the drones who are being prepared for selected fatherhood and subsequent execution. In the case of man, however, we may probably assume that parents were the first embodiment of authority, and it was due to their power of feeding and protecting their young, restraining them from danger, and striking, pinching, or biting them when their tempers were tried. The young obeyed, chiefly owing to their own helplessness, their hunger, and their danger from cold, cannibals, and other wild beasts ; but partly owing to fear of being hurt by the parents themselves. In the prehistoric family various forms of authority must have existed in germ, and to-day, even in the most primitive species of mankind, we cannot discover or imagine human life coming to maturity without them.

By common descent, intermarriage, or mere propinquity, families naturally developed into tribes, just as sheep, wolves, deer, and rooks form herds and flocks, either for seeking food or securing safety in numbers. In tribes, as in herds, the strongest and cleverest member, or the largest family, would take the lead in defence

and in assault upon other tribes. Next to the production of food, warlike skill and courage are the most necessary qualities in primitive life, and they more easily win distinction, because the struggle for food is continuous and slow, but the crisis of war sudden and charged with instant issues of life or death. Danger faced in common is still the strongest bond of union between man and man. The perils of defence or aggression unite families into tribes and nations quicker and more firmly than barter or common pasturage and cultivation. So it was that the man who best served the tribe against the enemy was joyfully endowed with special honours, rights, and possessions. Religious functions gathered round him. He sought the will of the gods, and from the appearance of sacrificed carcasses divined the chances of approaching conflict. When his tribe overcame another, the wonder of his greatness increased, especially among the subjected people, who had not known him as a boy. Knives, sticks, and decorations were bestowed upon him. The sword of State, the sceptre, and the crown appeared. Kingship was created.

In all primitive races probably something of this kind occurred, and we have a well-known instance in a race which had long passed the primitive stage and under the influence of priests and religious laws has carefully avoided kingly authority. In spite of divine ordinances and the warnings of prophetic wisdom, the Israelites insisted on having a king, "like all the nations." Samuel told them how it would be: their sons would become the king's soldiers and workmen; their daughters his confectioners, cooks, and bakers; their lands would be called his, and he would take tithes of their produce and cattle for taxes, so that in the end the whole people would become his servants. But, in spite of this accurate forecast, the people insisted on having a king.

"like all the nations," to judge them and fight their battles. And the prophet, against his better judgment, gave way.

The philosophers' conception of an agreement or contract between government and people was mainly an imaginary hypothesis, but in so far as it was historic at all, events of this kind were its basis. The theory was most strongly and logically stated by Hobbes, who maintained the obligation of absolute obedience to the government or State, because "without a State the life of man is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short"; for which reason people had agreed to erect a supreme power for peace and common defence:—

"The Covenant of the State," he says, "is made in such a manner as if every man should say to every man: 'I authorise and give up my right of governing myself to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition that thou give up thy right to him and authorise all his actions in like manner.' This done, the multitude so united is called a Commonwealth, in Latin Civitas. This is the generation of that great Leviathan, that mortal god to whom we owe, under the immortal God, our peace and defence."¹

Hobbes here mentions an assembly of men, but in reality he was writing in support of monarchy, and

¹ The *Leviathan*, II. chap. xvii. I have taken Hobbes because among the philosophers he seems the most nearly historic in his theory. For Locke, as for Rousseau, the state of primitive nature was not anger and strife, but liberty and equality. "Men being by nature all free, equal and independent," he says "no one can be put out of this estate and subjected to the political power of another without his own consent. The only way whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty, and puts on the bonds of civil society, is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community" ("On Civil Government," chap. viii.). This theory had great effect on the liberalising mind of the eighteenth century, but compared with it Hobbes's theory might almost be said to be founded on history.

though he did not intend his theory of contract or covenant to be taken as literal and historic fact, it fairly well represented what unconsciously happened in the prehistoric or primitive world—the surrender of individual liberties into the hands of a headman, chief, or king, who was granted certain possessions, decorations, and ceremonies as inducements to protect and enrich the tribe, or as marks of admiration for his success. Still more closely does Hobbes's *Leviathan* or "mortal god" represent the conception of monarch which has existed from time immemorial, and exists to this day in a great part, perhaps the greatest part, of the world. It is this conception which has hedged kings with divinity, and rendered their persons and their families sacred in majesty. It has given them the control of peace and war, of life and death. It has entrusted to them the making of laws at their pleasure, and accepted the breaking of laws at their caprice. It has bestowed on them such fictions of property that they have actually believed they owned their country and their subjects. It has so identified them with their States that one would call himself "France," another, "Spain," another "England," and when Louis XIV. said, "The State? I am the State," no one took him for a maniac. By various taboos and magic incantations it has shed such mystery around them that the boldest of subjects prostrates himself or bows his head, and a man may not look at a king. Outside Europe and America, the conception ruled unshaken till the restless movement for freedom began to stir the East from Constantinople to Peking after the Japanese success in war against Europeans. It must be remembered that in public documents the Japanese generals and admirals invariably still attribute their victories to the personal virtues of their Emperor. Even in Europe the conception survives. It upholds the tyranny of

the Tsar; it makes the Kaiser the problem of the Continent; and it surrounds even constitutional monarchs with adulation, fairy-like attributes, and an ancient symbolism haunted by memories of sanctity.

A great part of this brief study must be devoted to tracing the gradual emancipation of a few countries from the sway of such conceptions. The Leviathan, or external and superior authority acting in the name of the State and controlling or even destroying its subjects without granting them a voice in the matter, may, it is true, take other forms than monarchy. It may be a priesthood, a family party, or even an assembly of citizens with exclusive privileges. But the monarch has always been the prevailing form, and is so still. The Israelites, as we have seen, observed with envy that all the other nations had a king, and it must be remembered that, in the first instance, and where there was no subjugation of one race by another, the king was granted and has retained his powers with the goodwill of the people and for the protection of the public. If a recording angel should hear the anguished cry of such a nation, prostrate in after times under the tyrant's oppression, he could but say with the Comedian, "Vous avez voulu"—"You have brought it on yourselves." Hope of reward, the love of marvel, various superstitions, military commands, and the easy-going acquiescence of mankind have piled up the monarch's powers. But he was originally created for common service; the word "king" probably means father; and even under the Tsars the peasants, with their prattle of "the Little Father," strive to maintain the illusion of a benevolence lurking somewhere at the heart of their despot's authority.

CHAPTER III

THE EARLY EMPIRES, AND JUDÆA, GREECE, AND ROME

By the time that records begin, and even as far back as we can trace some kind of history by means of monuments, excavations, and other relics, we find the Leviathan, or central authority, firmly established. The remains of civilisations that disappeared leaving small trace or influence except in myths—such civilisations as in Crete and Mycenæ—seem to point to a dominant monarchy equally with the enormous vestiges of Assyrian and Egyptian empires. We can only reckon approximately, even within a thousand years, how long the great communities upon the Nile and the Euphrates may have existed before we fix with certainty a single date in their history. But through all that vast period of power maintained during three or four millenniums we may dimly discern king succeeding king, dynasty succeeding dynasty, while the multitudes of the population toiled from day to day, regulated in every detail of their thoughts and lives by authoritative orders in which they had no voice. Monarchs and dynasties were supported, limited, and sometimes overthrown by castes of priests and soldiers. Sometimes the State was threatened and temporarily even overwhelmed by incursions of the innumerable savage hordes of Central Asia or Central Africa. Sometimes the monarch, prompted by the soldier caste or at least relying upon them, engaged in a course of conquest, destroying cities, annexing subject races, and enriching himself and his governing classes with pillage and slaves. The ordinances of law and ritual were also elaborated for common use, and inscribed on carved tablets or frescoes.

But the people as a whole had no other part in religion or law but to obey their regulations; and they had no other part in defence from invasion or in the aggressions of empire but to fight and to suffer.

Speaking of the Pyramids and similar monuments in Egypt, Herodotus tells us he heard from the priests that during their construction the people were reduced to the extremity of misery.¹ Aristotle observed that works of this kind are imposed by despots with the aim of wearing down their people's power of resistance and breaking their spirit. But there is no need to suppose that the rulers of Egypt, Babylon, or Nineveh were conscious of such a purpose, or were driven to tame their subjects by the construction of their own stupendous tombs. Captured slaves could not complain, and, even apart from them, the fellow-countrymen of kings and priests probably raised no protest either against the autocracy or the priestly rule. The acquiescence of mankind in their own subjection is the continuous marvel of history. External authority, whether resting on custom, law (which is codified custom), religion, or mere force has been seldom questioned; for most people are afraid of change or of punishment, are occupied with daily hunger, or lulled by comfort into indifference. The idea of freedom, or of any form of government beside the dominating authority, seems never to have occurred to the subjects of the early Empires in Asia and North-East Africa. To us it is surprising, but we must remember that the enormous Empires of China and India similarly acquiesced for at least as many ages, in successions of dynasties and kings, some of whom entered as foreigners; and they have till quite recently continued to acquiesce, although, in the case of India, the present dynasty is not only foreign but resides in a distant part of the

¹ Herod. ii. 129.

world. This tendency to accept external authority, without much question, being more general in the East, partly owing to the Oriental fervency of spiritual life and consequent disregard of the transitory world, and partly, it has been suggested, owing to the ease with which the natives of hot countries secure sufficient food,¹ almost limits the history of political freedom to Europe and peoples of European descent. There are signs, however, that under the leaven of European political example, the East within the next few years will also have to be included in any record of freedom.

Even in the East of pre-Christian times, authority was sometimes encroached upon. The vast reform in Brahminism effected by Buddha implied a movement towards freedom of thought and mind, and though it did not greatly influence political life, it promoted equality by breaking down the caste system. The Jews also were, as usual, exceptions to the mental and national life around them. Their best poems or psalms are quite as individual and "heartfelt," as the Buddhist hymns. The prophets and poets of their best age, from David onwards, often express personal and intimate truths of religion that have no dependence on a priesthood or even on a nationality, but belong to the inward consciousness of the human soul. They might serve as the utterance of any human being capable of religious feeling, even though he detested the Jews and all their works except the religion which he had borrowed from them without usury. On the national side the Jews, though they fell victims to imitation in demanding kings, yet maintained their freedom by a stubborn resistance to the Imperialism of both Egypt and Babylon, and they even recovered freedom when lost. After their first acquisition of a strip of country by a bloodthirsty war of extermination, they, on their part, never at-

¹ Buckle, *History of Civilisation*, i. 2.

tempted to subjugate an empire for themselves, nor even to extend their distinctive religious belief, although in its highest expression it appealed to all the earth as the creation of one God, and to all mankind as brethren under His fatherhood.

With the beginning of definite history in Greece, freedom in every form rapidly developed. The very word Greek or Hellenic has come to imply a freedom of aspect, a criticism of authority, that is chiefly mental, artistic, or religious, but has political significance also. The very form of our common words monarchy (government by one), hierarchy (government by priests), oligarchy (government by a few, *i.e.* usually a nobility or caste), plutocracy or timocracy (government by the propertied classes), tyranny (despotism), and democracy (government by the people, *i.e.* the majority of the voters or their representatives)—this Greek form of words is due to the example of Greek history and the lasting influence of Greek political writings, especially Plato's *Polity (State or Republic)* and Aristotle's *Politics*. Types of all these governments are found in the Greek states, except perhaps the hierarchy, and, with that exception, Athens herself may be said to have passed under all of them, almost in the order named, though the time they lasted varied very much. The patriarchal form of monarchy that we find in Homer, where kings were "shepherds of the people," and could to some extent be influenced by men of experience (the Elders or Council) and by public opinion (the Commons or Market), probably existed in all early Greek States or "cities." We may call the States "cities" because the appearance of small city-communities (originally formed by the combination of related clans or villages round a central fortress for defence and government) distinguishes Greece from the vast Oriental Empires. The formation of independent cities was encouraged by the

nature of the country, small, but divided up by long gulfs and inlets, as well as by frequent mountain chains, leaving only scanty and isolated patches of plain for cultivation and building. Separation by the sea or mountains has usually promoted freedom, whereas vast inland plains, like the Russian, give despotism and conquest an advantage.

By the time that actual history begins in Greece, the Homeric monarchies had disappeared, though they left their traces in the two "kings" at Sparta, and in the title of "king" retained for the second of the nine annually elected Archons or Executive in Athens, because he carried on the early king's priestly duties. Otherwise, most Cities in Greece proper came under the power of oligarchies, or governments by noble and distinguished families, interrupted at various times by "tyrannies," or the government of despots who seized the control by violence or military force, but in some cases proved advantageous to freedom by humiliating family pride or exterminating the families themselves. In the almost incredible constitution of Sparta, which regulated every detail of the citizen's existence under a socialistic despotism nowhere else realised in history, the old forms of Kings, Council, and Assembly were maintained, but absolute power lay with an executive of five Overseers (Ephors), who were themselves elected annually by the citizens, and may to that extent be said to furnish the earliest type of representative government. For the Archons in Athens, though called "rulers" and similarly elected, were controlled throughout their year of office by the Assemblies.

The Athenian "democracy" grew out of the successive ruins of monarchy, oligarchy, plutocracy, and "tyranny." As at Sparta, the older forms were retained—the Archons (elected to represent the kings, but later appointed by lot), the Council of 500 (elected),

and the Assembly of citizens. But the real power in the State rested mainly with the Assembly, which met every eight or nine days, and consisted of all citizens who were true-born Athenians on both sides. There was no representation; the Assembly was addressed by speakers, and the decision taken by a direct vote. In these respects the Athenian democracy had a great advantage over our modern systems, in which the influence of the single vote through its representative is almost infinitesimal, and nearly half the voters have no true representation at all, because their candidates were defeated at the polls. The control of public affairs, especially of foreign affairs, was in Athens far more direct and vital. There was less danger of stagnation, of antiquated routine, or the dead hand's sterilising touch than in our own House of Commons. At the same time, the Athenian Assembly was subject to more sudden gusts of passion; as when they condemned the whole male population of Mytilene to death but repented next day (427 B.C.). And it must be remembered that the Athenian democracy can be called a government by the people only as a fashion of speech. Not only was the woman half of the population strictly excluded from public rights as was usual in all "democracies" up to recent times, but the actual voters made up only a very small fraction of the real population. The aliens and slaves in Athens outnumbered the pure-bred Athenians by at least five to one, as usually estimated,¹ and though the slaves were as a rule kindly treated, and there was no "colour bar," they formed a subject race without political rights. So far as the form of government goes, we must compare the Athenian democracy rather with the constitution of one of the

¹ Mr. A. E. Zimmern, however, estimates the adult alien population (including 80,000 slaves) as about equal to the adult citizen population, i.e. 125,000 (*The Greek Commonwealth*, pp. 173, 375, 393).

South African States in which the vast majority, consisting of women and "natives" have no voice in the State, but are governed without consent, though nominally for their own good. Nevertheless, when all deductions have been made, the Athenian democracy historically marked a great advance—almost the first great advance—in the growth of freedom, and its influence upon the course of Europe has been incalculable.

The cause of freedom in Athens was fortunately assisted by the glory of her national resistance to the extension of the Persian Empire (500 to 479 B.C.), and even by the Persian fires which destroyed the city itself and cleaned away much of the lumber and tradition that hamper the development of ancient and uninvaded countries where freedom broadens very slowly down. But though Athens and, indeed, the whole of Greece owed such fame and advantage to their heroism in repelling a foreign Empire's encroachment, none of the most powerful Greek cities could resist the temptation of acquiring Empires of their own. Athens rapidly extended her power over related islands and cities, and, impelled by desire for gold mines and territory, she disregarded the warnings of Pericles, her greatest statesman, and entered upon the experiment of distant conquest by invading Sicily (415 to 413 B.C.). With the Sicilian Expedition the ruin of her own political greatness and freedom began, and within two or three generations she declined from a living and enterprising metropolis to a kind of university town, subsisting chiefly on memories of her past. Sparta, Thebes, and Macedon took up the tale of Empire in turn, and with the widespread Oriental campaigns of Alexander the freedom of the city-states in Greece may be said to have died. Extensive as was the Hellenising influence of the Alexandrian Empire, it made no contribution to freedom, but was an obstacle rather. Alexander died

at thirty-two (323 B.C.), but he had already created an Imperial ideal that, imitated by Rome and subsequent dominating Powers, was destined to become the greatest enemy of individual and national freedom. After his death the Empire fell into military satrapies from which the very conception of self-government disappeared. The Greek colonies that retained any independence degenerated, at the best, into fairly successful "Tyrannies." The Greeks, whose hands, in the poet's words, took freedom first into them, sank to the level of literary men, imitative artists, and amateurs of pleasurable pursuits. A few struggling attempts at federation failed, and a century after Alexander's death his Empire and the whole Hellenised world lay helpless before the march of Rome.

The contribution of Rome herself to the history of freedom is not so easy to analyse. It was made rather to civil and religious freedom than to the political, national, or mental phases. The vast system of Roman law, which still prevails in a great part of the world and influences all civilised countries, by the very rigour and definiteness of its rulings extended the right of civil equality, without privilege of class or person. It gave all citizens what Locke calls "a standing rule to live by," and though at times it may be quite as necessary to rebel against law as against any other form of external authority, such a code as the Roman law advanced freedom by diffusing this sense of equality, and by defining, not only what a man may not do towards others, but what no others of any class or rank may do towards him. In matters of religion also, Rome showed herself unusually tolerant, proudly indifferent whether or not the worship of her own national gods was extended among the heathen. She readily identified with those gods any foreign deities possessing similar attributes, and latterly she admitted not only

degenerate Greek statuary, but Oriental and mystic forms of religion, like the worship of Osiris or Milhras, as dangerous but irresistible correctives to the rather too abstract and spiritual nature of her own simple conceptions, inherited from the good old times. As an Imperial power, she became hostile to priest-rule or nationalistic religions that encouraged resistance to the central government, such as Judaism and Druidism, but the only form of worship which she persecuted with cruel violence was one under whose precepts, as Bishop Magee of Peterborough said, no modern State could exist, if they were really acted upon. Nevertheless, it is significant that when Christianity was found to be spreading from point to point through the Roman world, it was adopted, within three centuries of its Founder's death, as the Empire's official religion, destructive precepts and all.

Even on the side of political freedom, the history of Rome supplied something as service, and more as warning. Though inspired by so different a temperament, Rome's political history followed a course outwardly parallel to that of Greek city-states, and especially of Athens. Rome, too, began with a union of village clans under patriarchal kings, elders, and assembly. She, too, abolished kingship, retaining the title of king only for the purpose of priestly functions. There followed generations of strife between the nobility of birth, Fathers, or Patricians, and the common citizens, Crowd, or Plebs, that originally lived under their protection. Point by point, by passive and active resistance, by general strikes and even by withdrawal from the city, the people forced their way. Special representatives, or Tribunes, with an absolute power of veto, and doors open day and night for appeal, were appointed to defend their interests.¹ After the city had been in-

¹ The number of Tribunes was fixed at ten after the withdrawal of the Plebs and the fall of the Decemvirs in 449 B.C.

vaded and swept cleaner of tradition by the Celts (390 B.C.), as Athens was by the Persians, the people gained the important concession that one of the Consuls, or chief elected officials in Rome, must be a Plebeian.¹ From this everything followed, for the Consulate admitted into the Senate, and the constitutional privileges of mere birth rapidly disappeared. As in Athens, the Assembly of the Roman citizens themselves became the source of government and basis of authority.

But this approach to democracy was not only limited, as in Athens, by the exclusion of the great majority of the population, such as slaves and women, from political rights; it was further checked and, finally, cut short by two obstacles. In the first place, a Plebeian raised to Senatorial rank did not necessarily become more Plebeian in sympathy, any more than a Radical raised to the House of Lords always becomes more revolutionary. A new and combined order of moneyed Plebeian and Patrician families grew up, calling themselves "the Superior Classes" (Optimates). They might roughly be compared with our old Whig nobility, or to the distinguished families, both Liberal and Conservative, which retain a preponderating influence in our public life by means of wealth, intermarriage, and political experience. By their hold upon financial interests, which they naturally exploited for their own advantage, and by their hold upon the land, which they desolated, not indeed for sport, but through the employment of slave labour, they acquired a power more oppressive and more unpleasant than the old aristocracy of birth, and it was mainly the revolt against the authority of this painful admixture of wealth and family pride that led to the long civil strife in which the democratic republic ultimately perished. For even a tyrant is more endurable than a clique of superior persons.

¹ By the Licinian Rogations, 367 B.C.

The second and more obvious cause of the Republic's collapse was the inability of the large and haphazard assemblage of citizens in Rome herself to control or defend the large and variegated Empire over which the Roman power gradually extended. After making herself supreme among the Latins, Etruscans, and Greeks in Italy, and after subduing her most formidable rival in the Phœnician city of Carthage, Rome went on to absorb the greater part of the Alexandrian Empire piece by piece. By about 150 B.C. she was mistress of the whole basin of the Mediterranean, east and west. By the government of prætors and pro-consuls, by military and commercial colonies, by garrisons, by the extension of municipal and even citizen rights to provinces and distant cities, she attempted to consolidate and organise her rule. But the highly cultured Greek cities of Italy and the great fragments of Empire, such as Asia Minor and Egypt, were not understood by the crowd of voters in the Comitia, nor were the Provinces inclined to yield obedience to a Roman mob. The wider the franchise, the more unsatisfactory was government by the Roman populace, since it was incapable either of representation or federation. Having set out to rule the nations by her sway as part of a divinely ordained Imperial destiny, Rome discovered that she must herself submit to a ruler supported by the legions.

Marius, Cinna, Sulla, and Pompey only marked the steps along the inevitable path to Imperialism. With Cæsar the end was reached, and after his murder by the doctrinaire champions of a worn-out constitution, Augustus had but to clear the stage of an Orientalised rival and then to consolidate his powers as monarch of the known world. He maintained the old forms. The Senate remained, with a high property qualification. The Consuls fixed the date by their term of office. The Comitia met, if not to elect, at all events to applaud

the Emperor's nominations. Augustus himself accepted only the vaguely general title of Princeps, which may or may not have signified his place in the Senate; but he gathered all the important offices into his own hands, and by instinctive judgment the people and subsequent history selected the title of Imperator (or commander of the armies) as most fitly representing the source and support of the powers conferred upon all the Roman and Byzantine rulers in turn. The Emperors, though recognised as divine, were not worshipped till after their death. Even among the early Cæsars the Empire was not strictly hereditary, and after the Cæsarian blood became extinct with Nero, the choice and maintenance of Emperors lay almost entirely with the armies themselves.

It is a commonplace, even with the greatest historians, that under the Emperors Trajan, Hadrian, and the Antonines (98 to 180 A.D.) human life within the limits of the Empire was at its happiest and best. Secure and generally peaceful it certainly remained, but the greatest happiness does not consist in security or repose. It consists, as we have seen, in "an energy of the soul along the lines of excellence, where life is fully developed." Calm and restful though the Mediterranean shores must have appeared in that autumnal peace of the classic age, we feel the want of stir, of vital energy, of self-directed development, in a word, of freedom. And we can imagine that even under Hadrian's bureaucracy, or under the rule of Marcus Aurelius himself, so dutiful, so deliberately cheerful, and yet so weary in spirit, the educated citizen's life, however bland, must have appeared a little melancholy, tired, and disappointing.

PART II

PARLIAMENTS AND REPRESENTATION

CHAPTER IV

CHRISTIANITY AND FEUDALISM

THE melancholy calm of that beneficent imperium did not long survive the Antonines. Already the disturbing and vitalising elements were at work beneath the placid surface. How far Christianity has supported a merely external authority or furthered the cause of freedom is one of the common problems of European history. Up to now the balance of advantage may seem to lie on the side of authority; for the Christian priesthood, whether Orthodox, Catholic, Anglican, or Lutheran has usually lent the power of its influence to maintain the domination of Tsars, Emperors, Kings, or capitalists as against subjects and workpeople, though ready at times to oppose encroachments upon the privileges itself has claimed. But in the early centuries when Christianity was struggling for existence, the Emperors were right in regarding the Christian teaching as subversive and revolutionary, if not anarchic. Carrying to extremes the personal side of religion already revealed in the greatest poets of Judaism, it made the relation of each separate soul to God the centre of its purport. Compared to a secret and spiritual grace of heart, matters of ritual, authority, and external observance rightly appeared trivial. Mosaic codes and Roman ordinances were rolled up and set aside. There was no need violently to destroy them; they had done their service; they were "fulfilled." "The kingdom of God is within you!" That was the astonishing discovery

in which lay the vital germ of Christianity's finest influence on the world. Law was made for man, not man for law. The soul stood isolated and immortal in the presence of the Eternal as her one arbiter, whether for conduct or belief. The appeal no longer lay to Cæsar, but to God.

This insistence upon the incalculable value of every human being ("for whom Christ died") was the great service of Christianity to the history of freedom. It resulted, not so much in the defiance as in the disregard of external authority. Laws, masters, officials, and Emperors shrivelled to small account before a soul confronted with eternity and redeemed by the Son of God. Historians, occupied with the scandals of a Court, naturally confused Christianity with Judaism; but within a few years of the Founder's death, the limits of Hebrew nationality were overpassed, and apostles proclaimed that in Christ was neither Jew nor Gentile, neither bond nor free. All mankind was gathered into the common fold of equality and brotherhood. The slave was declared equal in Christ to the senator, the beggar to the pro-consul fattening on a province. This new religion was subversive, not only to the State, but to all distinctions of rank, wealth, and education—distinctions that count far more in daily life than laws and political regulations. Rightly had Christ foretold that He came not to bring peace upon earth but a sword. An inward and spiritual kingdom, equality of all in the sight of God, indifference to prosperity, thrift, social position, culture, and all the other things after which the Gentiles, or "Philistines," seek—here were principles outrageous enough to stir up strife in every province of the Roman Empire, and every villa along the Mediterranean shore.

If such principles had ever been accepted in reality, a condition of celestial anarchy would have ensued—

a state of perfect freedom, in which love alone would have directed action, and law, government, and other authoritative controls would have perished for want of use. The ideal of government might then have been fulfilled, in the disappearance of governors, and mankind have been saved the long misery of wars, empires, churches, politics, financial speculations, and poverty. But, because of the hardness of their hearts, mankind could not receive so beneficent a gospel. The comfortable process of watering down paradoxes, of suggesting compromises and sensible interpretations, soon began, and it grew with the increasing power and organisation of "the Church," that, under the stagnant peace of Empire, extended its influence among worshippers of obsolete deities, and concentrated the authority of a new priesthood under the glorified name of Rome. It grew still more rapidly when, with a keen eye to its political aid as well as its enlivening faith, Constantine adopted Christianity as the official religion of the Empire.¹

No division between Church and State was at first recognised, and the Imperial title of "Pontifex Maximus" appeared to imply religious supremacy over bishops, priests, and all subjects of the Empire. But the removal of the capital to Constantine's city on the Golden Horn, the consequent separation of East and West, and the collapse of the Western Empire under Odoacer,² all weakened the Imperial claim, and increased the reverence due to a priesthood and bishopric that still maintained the tradition of Rome's immortal splendour.

¹ Constantine became a partner in the Empire in 306, and was sole Emperor from 324 till his death in 337. He proclaimed Christianity as the State religion in 324, and removed the capital to Byzantium in 330.

² Odoacer dethroned the last Western Emperor Romulus Augustulus in 476, and was himself dethroned by Theodoric the Ostrogoth (493 to 526).

Thus the Church stepped into the vacancy of Empire, and by the very name of its chief bishop secured much of the reverence and allegiance hitherto rendered unto Cæsars. It organised itself closely upon the Cæsarian model, and its temporal and spiritual authority grew side by side, under a system centralised around the Basilica of St. Peter. As to the influence of the Church on freedom, we may say that as a rule whenever the sacerdotal side of Christianity has stood in the ascendant, and the priesthood has insisted upon ritual, apostolic efficacy, and its own mysterious powers, the Church has strengthened the predominance of authority whether in mental or political life. Liberty, on the other hand, has advanced provided that the personal relations of the soul towards religion have been regarded as of the highest value for spiritual life. Absurd and distasteful as the results of "private judgment" have often been, it has naturally promoted independence of thought in other spheres besides religion. It has encouraged a general temper of criticism and investigation, has penetrated the glamour that surrounds constituted officialism, and, at the worst, has endowed the mind with a sturdy self-possession that would compensate for considerable error.

Slavery proper—*i.e.* the ownership of men and women for compulsory labour, and their sale as property—the Early Christian spirit certainly assisted in bringing into discredit. Among Roman moralists there was already a growing feeling against slavery as degrading and inhumane. It was also recognised as one of the causes of agricultural decay and depopulation in Italy. Round the centre of the Empire it might have died out in any case, but the Christian doctrines of equality in God's sight and of universal redemption in Christ made it impossible any longer to accept Aristotle's definitions of "slaves by nature" and "animated implements." As

long as the Christian doctrines were genuinely believed, slavery within Christendom gradually and almost unconsciously declined. Passing through mitigated forms, such as villeinage and serfdom, under which the serf was "bound to the soil," it fell into disuse. The act of freeing slaves was considered acceptable to God, and in the early history of English and European liberties the difficulties of a great slave population, as in Athens and Rome, hardly arose. It is true that the later forms of slavery in this country only disappeared under the stress of plague and civil war,¹ and that the Church favoured the African slave-trade as an opportunity for baptism. But as a rule we may say that throughout the Middle Ages, and at intervals in modern times, the general sense of Christianity has been actively opposed to slavery. Though the whole question of slave-traffic and enforced labour, especially in the tropics, is still before the world, the Abolitionists have appealed as often to Christian brotherhood as to horror at cruelty, and very few Christianised people now openly defend the system, though it is maintained under different pretexts nearly all round the equator.

The official acceptance of Christianity was soon followed by the appearance of that other vitalising force which disturbed the regretful stagnation of the Roman world. For about a century and a half, successive hosts of "Barbarians" poured over the frontiers of the

¹ The Black Death devastated England 1349 to 1351, and 1361 to 1362; the abolition of slavery was one of Wat Tyler's demands in 1381 in protest against the Statute of Labourers of 1350; slavery of all kinds almost disappeared during the Wars of the Roses, though families were sold even after the Reformation, and in Scotland the colliers and salters were really serfs till the end of the sixteenth century, being sold with the mines, &c. They were freed by special Acts of 1775 and 1799 (Cunningham's *Growth of English History and Commerce*, p. 465; Boyd's *Coal Pits and Pitmen*, p. 18).

Empire, permeating and occupying the most distant provinces, but, as a rule, making Rome and Italy the central object of their attack.¹ Their incursions were rendered possible by the general distress of the outlying provinces, by the feebleness and indifference of alien and mercenary garrisons, especially along the line of the Danube, but, above all, by the indifference of the subject races themselves. It is true that Caracalla, (211 to 217), for purposes of taxation by death-duties, had extended Roman citizenship to all free-born inhabitants of the Empire. But concessions under an Empire do not inspire the devotion of nationality, and more than the privilege of taxation is required to stimulate patriotism up to the point of dying on the field. Amid all the horrors of barbarian invasions, and all the savage chaos of the succeeding centuries, the new stirring of life, like a breath from the outer air, promised future amends for the bloodshed, the upheaval, and the destruction or neglect of the accumulated stores of classic beauty and wisdom. The peace of benevolent Empire, even if it were as placid and tolerant as historians have imagined, could not continue without blunting the aspirations of mankind, and reducing the

¹ The chief barbarian invasions were carried out by Alaric and the Visigoths, 401 (sack of Rome, 410); Genseric and the Vandals (crossed the Straits of Gibraltar and landed in Africa, 429; returned from Carthage to the sack of Rome, 455): Attila and the Huns (defeated at Châlons, 451, but Attila invaded Italy in 452, and died on the Danube meditating another invasion, 453): Theodoric and the Ostrogoths, 489-493 (Theodoric reigned in reality as Emperor of the West, till his death in 526); the Lombards, 568. Britain, the first province abandoned by Rome (411), was overrun by Jutes and Saxons during the second half of that century. Among later barbarian invaders we may include the Northmen of Denmark and Norway, and the Hungarians of the ninth and tenth centuries; but by that time the Empire was already beginning to be divided on the lines of subsequent nationalities.

variety of life's interests to a monotony of torpid satisfaction. If such monotony was the danger of the Antonine inheritance, Christianity and the Barbarians between them certainly brought enough of turmoil and heart-searching to avert it. The Christian claim to spiritual personality, the Barbarians' demonstration that mankind will accept no central authority as unquestioned, not even the authority of Rome—these were new and powerful motives, rousing the European world to the vindication of personal and national self-fulfilment.

Yet, in spite of the division of East and West, in spite of the increasing helplessness of Rome, and the growing independence of Franks, Saxons, and other German races within the old limits of her power, the conception of universal Empire lingered for many centuries. It was partly maintained by the almost superstitious respect of the Barbarians themselves for the Roman name, partly by the almost religious ambition which prompted the West-Frankish German King Charlemagne, and won more definitely the East-Frankish German King Otto to attempt to renovate and reoccupy the throne of the Cæsars. Charles the Great was crowned Emperor by the Pope in 800, and Otto the Great was crowned by the Pope as Lord of the Roman Empire in 962.¹ As is well known the vision of that Holy Roman Empire, though becoming gradually more shadowy, hung before Europe till the Austrian Francis II. renounced the Imperial Crown in 1806, two years after Napoleon had received it from the hands of the Pope in Paris. It is probable that among the innumerable titles of the Hapsburgs the title of Lord of the Holy Roman Empire still survives, and till the age of Bismarck the Austrian House certainly claimed a certain

¹ Frederick Barbarossa seems to have been the first to add the epithet "Holy" (1152). See Bryce's *Holy Roman Empire*, p. 199.

predominance in Europe on account of a supposed ancestral and Cæsarian right.

So many other kings have felt unsatisfied until they also ranked as Emperors that the dignity has now become a little vulgarised. But throughout the best centuries of the Middle Ages the conception of the Emperor of Christendom, standing before the world as the representative of God's will in temporal affairs, while the Pope stood as His Vicar in things spiritual, lent a sublime significance to an ideal of earthly government that was seldom justified, but, nevertheless, inspired many of the noblest minds of those ages to seek in a great Emperor the best assurance of orderly freedom. In the rivalry between the two Vicars of Christ, whose joint control of the world ought to have run so harmoniously in parallel lines,—in that long strife between Guelph and Ghibelline—the progress of freedom was, on the whole, best maintained on the Imperial side. Or, perhaps one should rather say, there was on the Ghibelline side less hindrance to such chance of growth as freedom during those ages possessed. In spite of repeated failures, such Emperors as the greatest of the Hohenstaufen performed a true service to freedom in withstanding the extreme claims of the Papacy. Such a contention, however, is still much disputed, and it must not blind us to the definite services of a few great churchmen in the foundation of popular liberties, especially in the case of England.

The ideal of an Emperor holding his title to Empire direct from God fitted in with the vast system of feudalism, which was first developed under the successors of Charlemagne, though traces of it may be found among the earlier Franks, and within the nearer boundaries of the Roman power. Under God, the Emperor was, as it were, the crown of the system. Kings held their title from him, as he from God. Under the kings came the

bishops and the various ranks of lords. Under the lords, the remaining holders of land, and so downward to the working classes and the serfs attached to the soil. Kings and vassals, lords and "men," tenants and sub-tenants—so the degrees of social order ran. For feudalism was a fixed and logical system, threatening to be as rigid and lasting as the Hindu castes, had it not collapsed under exactions from above and refusals from below. Unconsciously and against their will, the great monarchs and the great aristocracies in turn advanced the general freedom, each side seeking in turn to control the other's power. While they fell out, the chartered towns, the smaller gentry, and ultimately even the craftsmen, villeins, and peasants began to come by their own.

Europe has paid a long price for its feudal aristocracy, and in England we continue to pay it still. To feudalism we owe the small but powerful body of landowners whom the growing prosperity of the country, and especially of London and the manufacturing towns, has endowed with disproportionate wealth, acquired without any effort, on their part, and held without any obligation to public service. It cannot, of course, be said that William the Conqueror, who first established the definite system of feudalism in this country, was apprehensive of any such result; but in his determination to restrain the power of feudal lords, he declared himself sole landowner of the country, so that all lords and landholders of every class might receive their tenure directly from the Crown. Had this wholesome provision been maintained, the ownership of all land would have passed to the State, as Crown and State came to be identified. The country might thus have been saved the burden of its present great landowners, nor should we now be obliged to devise means for recouping for the nation some poor fraction of its

diverted wealth. Even more disastrous, however, than the inequality of wealth arising from the feudal tenure and subsequent private ownership of land has been the false ideal of life which has followed. For centuries the great landowners have dominated the country districts, have interfered with the lives and opinions of their tenants and labourers, have set the social fashion, and persuaded the country at large to believe that the aristocratic manner of existence is the best and most enviable, consisting though it chiefly does in physical pleasures stimulated by sport, and social amusements tempered by the cares of amateur legislation.

On the other hand, the military service, on condition of which the land was originally held, but which our landowners have successfully evaded since the break-up of feudalism on the accession of the Tudors, undoubtedly acted as some control upon the central power of the Crown. Having no national army beyond an uncertain levy of knights and freemen, the king was compelled to stand well with at least a powerful section of his vassals, in order to retain their allegiance and the service of their arms. The extreme claims of monarchy were thus held in check, and we owe it to feudalism that the Cæsarian ideal of a monarch's supremacy in all departments of State—or even of his identity with the State itself—never obtained a foothold in England. The aristocracy was narrow and often oppressive, but it tended to personal liberty within its own class, and, what was more important, it tended to local independence. It obviated a Court bureaucracy or centralised officialdom, which, as was once seen in France, and is now seen in Russia, constitutes freedom's most deadly opponent.

Some advantage must also be attributed to the peculiarly feudal phase of mind called chivalry. Mawkish and sentimental as the word has now become—a mere

excuse for sugared despotism or the false heroics of a cheap politeness—nevertheless, on its first appearance, that ideal of knightly behaviour added the charm of adventurous strangeness to life, and cast around womanhood, within the limits of nobility, a delicate halo of mystery, evoking an adoration too passionate to be called religious. It is true, this adoration was not extended to working women, or even to the wives and daughters of citizens. The conception of chivalry never reached those classes. But by insisting upon the gracious and romantic charm of queens and high-born ladies, the knights and poets of chivalry recalled attention to beautiful qualities always possessed by many women, and their praise helped to diffuse those very qualities themselves. Nobly expressed admiration, however much exaggerated, served to counteract habits of inveterate brutality. It counteracted also the contempt for womanhood encouraged by monasticism and the ascetic overestimate of sex, while the position of abbesses and other nuns in their own convents proved the capacity of women for organisation and control. A kind of balance was thus effected, and women, after being simultaneously worshipped as inspiring angels, and abhorred as instruments of the foul fiend, emerged from the Middle Ages under the human form depicted in the Elizabethan drama. Their re-admission to the free level of humanity might by this time have been complete, had not Puritanism and the literal acceptance of a few Biblical texts again depressed them in the valuation of ordinary men, and of ordinary women too.

CHAPTER V

TAXATION AND REPRESENTATION

It is to the credit of mankind that, though many kings have regarded themselves as owners of their country, masters of their subjects, and embodiments of the State, few have attempted to govern without advice or consultation. The African chiefs had their palavers, the Redskins their pow-wows, the Homeric kings their Elders, the Indian rajahs their durbars, the early English kings their Witan, or Witana-gemot—the Council of experienced people. The Witan probably originated from the Micyl Gemot or general meeting of the inhabitants of a Mark, or village community. In early German times these meetings were attended by the whole armed population, and their functions were to conduct the affairs of the Mark, to select leaders, and act as juries and judges. However primitive, they might be compared in principle with the Assemblies in Athens and the Comitia in early Rome. Nominally, they were attended by the whole armed population even in Saxon England; but if this general meeting ever congregated in reality, the crowd could only influence the Council itself by applause or hooting; and with the growth of monarchies in various parts of the country, the local kings began to limit their Councils to bishops, aldermen, and thegns or officers of the household. These Councils were small—numbering about 20 members at most—but after the union of England into a single kingdom, we read of a Witan that included the 2 archbishops, 17 bishops, 2 Welsh princes, 15 Aldermen, and 59 thegns—nearly 100 members in all.¹ The Witan had a consultative part in all important affairs, ecclesi-

¹ Held at Luton in 931.

astical and civil. Laws were passed with its "counsel and consent"; it was the final Court of Appeal in civil and criminal cases; and it elected the new king out of the predecessor's near relations.

In spite of the concentration of power under the Norman kings, the Witan, or Great Council, as it was now called, retained its general form. It met for brief sittings, usually three times a year, and was attended by the archbishops, bishops, abbots, earls, barons, knights, and (under Henry II.) by all tenants-in-chief. Its duties were not mainly financial. The bulk of the revenue was collected by the Sheriffs, and paid into the Exchequer, which managed the finance of all departments, and was attended by the Justiciar, the Chancellor, the Constable, the Marshal, and other Court officials. After the Conquest the first interference with the king's finance arose from Becket's refusal to pay a direct property tax (probably Danegeld) on Church lands.¹ But some years later, when the Sheriffs had been superseded by Exchequer officials, we find that for the Saladin Tithe (a direct personal tax on income and moveables) Henry II. had the amounts assessed on the declaration of knights and juries.²

Here we come upon the device of representation—a solution of the difficulty of numbers that seems to us so natural. Yet it was just this simple device that was to make so great a difference between the old Assemblies of the people and the modern Parliaments—between the mechanism of ancient and modern democracy. And it is significant that representation appears in close connection with taxation. On the basis of that connection our liberties have been built, and the famous precept

¹ It was a year after Becket had been made Archbishop, and the occasion was the court at Woodstock after Henry II.'s second Welsh War, 1163.

² The Saladin or Crusade Tithe was levied in 1188.

that "Taxation without representation is tyranny," has been frequently proclaimed as their chosen motto by Liberal statesmen, until they recently found it inconvenient to grant representation to large classes in this country, and to subject nationalities in the Empire. Nevertheless, Burke's words remain true, when he called the union of taxation with representation "the characteristic mark and seal of British freedom"; and the endeavours of our politicians now to repudiate this mark and seal are condemned in his further sentences:—

"In order to prove that the Americans have no right to their liberties, we are every day endeavouring to subvert the maxims which preserve the whole spirit of our own. To prove that the Americans ought not to be free, we are obliged to depreciate the value of freedom itself."¹

Throughout the thirteenth century these two leading principles of our political liberties—representation, and taxation by consent—developed side by side, and in close union. The first large representative assembly was the Council of St. Albans (1213) summoned by the Cardinal Archbishop Stephen Langton and the Justiciar Fitz Peter, and attended by representatives (probably a reeve and four men) from all the townships on the royal demesne. Grievances were discussed, but the assembly was too irregular to be called a Parliament; and, in fact, the word "Parliament" had not then come into use. The assembly at Runnymede which forced upon King John the treaty of the Great Charter two years later, was truly national, as including all three Estates of the realm—clergy, nobles, and commons—but was not strictly representative. The importance of the Charter in the history of freedom lies chiefly in the two provisions:—

(1) That no scutage or aid should be imposed without

¹ Speech on Conciliation with America, 1775.

the consent of the common council (*nisi per commune consilium*), which council was to be summoned with forty days' notice by Sheriff's writ, the object of the meeting being stated, and the decisions binding on all present or not present; and (2) that no one should be imprisoned or punished in any way except after legal trial by his equals or by the law of the land, and to no one should justice be sold, denied, or delayed.

These two provisions were not new, but for the first time they were sanctioned in a definite form as part of a treaty between king and subjects. Twenty-five barons were chosen to enforce the Charter, with the right of proclaiming a national war against the king if he failed to observe the terms. By securing the control of the purse, the Council closed all prospect of absolute monarchy in this country, and laid the foundation of the supremacy now possessed by the elected Chamber. Who pays the piper, calls the tune. Refusal of supplies is an irresistible weapon, against which neither monarchy nor aristocracy have been able to stand. People who tax themselves, and cannot be taxed without consent possess the assurance of political freedom; people on whom taxation can be imposed from above, or from whose pockets taxes can be filched without consent possess no such assurance. Only where the members of all classes and both sexes have a controlling voice in their own taxation can the elements of political freedom exist.

The second provision, enacting immediate and uncorrupted trial by equals, laid down the basic principle of legal justice. It was repeated in the Petition of Right (1628) and finally confirmed by the Habeas Corpus Act of Charles II. The suspension of that Act, whether directly, or by a subterfuge, as in the Indian deportations of 1907 and the following years without trial or cause shown, is the customary sign of a Government's panic, or of its compliance with reactionary

clamour, in face of some popular movement that is developing economic, political, or national freedom too rapidly for the official mind. The refusal of the right to trial on cause shown is despotism's most terrible instrument, as was seen in France before the Revolution, and is seen in Russia to-day.

The long reign of Henry III. was occupied in struggles to secure and develop rights already won. About the middle of the century the Common Council began to be called a Parliament, and in 1242 we find the first duly reported discussion, the Council being apparently unanimous in opposition to the king's demand for a large grant to maintain a war with France. For the Parliament of 1254, four representative knights were elected by the county court of each shire, and representative clergy by each diocese. Debate upon a grant was the occasion of that assembly also. When the Barons' War of ten years later gave the control of the country for a brief space into the hands of Simon de Montfort, he extended the principle of representation by summoning two elected burghers from each city or borough, as well as two knights from each shire, five earls, the Archbishop of York, and a large proportion of clergy. But as the assembly was only a meeting of Simon's own supporters, it can hardly be called a genuine Parliament, and its importance lies in the suggestion of representative borough members. Simon was killed at Evesham some six months after his Parliament assembled (1265), but his idea of representation was adopted by Edward I., the greatest lawgiver among our kings, in his so-called "Model Parliament" thirty years later.

Edward I. was guided by two fine sayings. One of them—"Pactum serva" (Keep Troth)—was inscribed on his tomb, and the need for such a motto was proved by the repeated necessity of compelling kings to confirm charters already granted. The other was a prin-

principle of Justinian's—"Quod omnes tangit, ab omnibus approbetur" (What concerns all, must be approved by all). That saying is the very basis of democracy. It is never fulfilled to the letter, for there are no questions on which all concerned would be agreed. But where all who are concerned have the right of expressing their opinion, attempting to win other people to their side, and doing their best by their votes to have their opinion represented in the governing body of the nation, there at least the nation enjoys the greatest political freedom as yet devised. Only two or three nations, and these small, such as Australia, New Zealand, and Norway, have hitherto succeeded in reaching even that point. It implies a government, not, as Justinian may have hoped, approved by all, but approved by a majority; and government by the majority can often be unpleasant, oppressive, and even outrageous. But it can never be unendurable, like other forms of tyranny, so long as every member of a minority or group has the free opportunity of endeavouring to convert the majority by revolutionising their views.

In a series of great statutes, and by an organisation of justice which has persisted almost unchanged to the present day, Edward I. faithfully attempted to realise his principle. But his desire was especially evident in the form of "the Model Parliament," which he summoned in 1295. The object was financial—to raise a grant for threatened wars in France, Scotland, and Wales; and the Parliament was deliberately designed so that all classes, from which a contribution was demanded, should be represented. Writs were issued to archbishops, bishops, abbots, and Proctors or representatives of the clergy; to earls and barons (the title of Duke was not granted till Edward III.'s reign); to knights of the shires, elected by freeholders, and burgesses elected by the freemen in certain boroughs nomi-

nated by the king. The three Estates voted separately, and taxed themselves separately, but their decrees were declared to be enacted by the king "with the advice of his Council and the consent of Parliament."

This was the first true Parliament in history, and it is significant that it was almost immediately followed (in 1297) by the great statute known as "De Tallagio non concedendo," in which, as the Church and the barons had refused supplies in turn without a redress of grievances, the king solemnly confirmed the principle that taxation cannot be levied without the common consent of the realm as represented in Parliament. Thus the struggle of eighty years was closed, and the two main instruments for the furtherance of England's political liberties were established—the right to representation, and the right to control taxation through representatives.

Two important developments were made, almost accidentally, as it seems, within the next century: first, the Parliament was divided into two Houses; and, secondly, the control of finance was limited to the House of Commons. It was probably at first intended that the three Estates, which voted separately, should have separate chambers for deliberation, but should meet in council round the king. By degrees the lesser clergy or their proctors withdrew from Parliament, preferring their own Houses of Convocation, but leaving the Archbishops and Bishops to represent the Church lands with other great landholders in the Council which became the House of Lords. The knights of the shire (afterwards county members) receiving 4s. a day for expenses, and the representatives of the boroughs receiving 2s. a day, certainly met in a separate room within half a century of the Model Parliament, and they came to be called the House of Commons, partly as belonging to the common people, but chiefly as representing "com-

munities." This division of Parliament into two Chambers, though so casual in origin, has been almost universally imitated in practice, though few, if any, "Lower Houses" have yet succeeded in obtaining the actual control of the country's government, except in the United Kingdom.

The control of the government by the House of Commons grew out of its sole right to control finance. Exactly a century after the Model Parliament we find a grant made by the Commons, with the assent of the Lords. When, a few years later (1407) Henry IV., without reference to the Commons, inquired of the Lords what aid was required, the representatives of the Commons refused to accept the answer of the Lords, and the king "recognised the rule that on money grants he should receive the determination of the two Houses by the mouth of the Speaker of the Commons."

"The leaving of the determination of the money grant to that estate, which being collectively the richest was individually the poorest of the three, was consonant to common sense; where taxation fell on all in the same proportion, the Commons might safely be trusted not to vote too much; sparing their own pockets, they spared those of the Lords. But the importance of the event is not confined to the points thus illustrated; it contains a full recognition of freedom of deliberation."¹

In origin the sole right of the House of Commons to control finance was, as Bishop Stubbs says, merely a matter of common sense; but the value of our representative system depends entirely upon it, and it is significant of our haphazard constitution that this right, though vindicated by a Resolution of the Commons in 1678, was never definitely secured by statute until the Parliament Act of 1911, by which the Lords were precluded from interference with finance, and the deci-

¹ Stubbs, *Constitutional History*, vol. ii. p. 260.

sion as to which of the Bills sent up to them were Money Bills was left to the Speaker's judgment.

I have dwelt on the history of our early Parliament because Parliament developed into the chief instrument of our own political freedom, and has served as a model more or less closely followed by all constitutional nations. The actual word "representation" in our modern sense does not occur until the Tudor period, but the reality existed in the middle of the thirteenth century, and was brought into full use by Simon de Montfort and Edward I. The weaknesses and dangers of the system are obvious. It is always possible that the majority in Parliament will not represent the majority of the people, or even of the voters. It is possible (without proportional representation) that a minority consisting of nearly half the population may go entirely unrepresented. It is possible for a constituency to regard its representative merely as a local delegate to further the wishes of the local majority. And, worse than all, it is very possible that the majority of the voters may be wrong. But most of these dangers are avoided in practice. The majority in Parliament does, as a rule, represent the sense of the country. Large minorities, by opposition and criticism, can to some extent hold in check the extremists on the Government side. Some members of Parliament are statesmen rather than delegates. And there is a basis of good sense and fairness in the general mind which in course of years usually causes right reason to prevail. Even in cases where the majority goes most persistently wrong, it is better for a nation to control its own destiny, learning by bitter suffering and admitting the free discussion or criticism of every decision, than to avoid the evil consequences of error by submitting to the dictation of one man, however wise, or one class, however devoted. "Self-government," as that truly Liberal statesman,

Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman said, "self-government is better than good government," and to forget that great principle of political freedom is the prime offence of all benevolent despots, whether they seek to benefit by their rule the people of their own country or the subject races of an Empire.

PART III

THE MODERN MOVEMENTS

CHAPTER VI

THE FREEDOM OF THE SOUL

THE Parliament thus organised by Edward I. was not long in displaying its power. In very little over a century it twice took the strongest action then possible for any form of government. It deposed two of its own kings. After due debate, and in the second case after passing a regular Act of Deposition, it declared Edward II. and Richard II. to have broken their coronation oaths and to be incapable of reigning (1327 and 1399). Lesser points of advantage were also gained or confirmed, especially with a view to checking the Crown's financial extortions, and the acquisition of worldly blessings by the Church. Even under the Tudor dynasty, while the powerful personality of a king and his two daughters dominated home and foreign affairs, the constitutional forms subsisted unchanged or were further developed, and the monarchy was compelled to employ or manipulate the Parliament as the instrument—usually a pliant instrument—of its will.

But during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, it was not along constitutional or political lines that the main current of freedom ran, either in this country or the rest of Europe. In Courts, as elsewhere, it was an age of conspicuous individuality, and the course of government was directed by a series of emperors, kings, queens, popes, dukes, and statesmen, who took small account of popular desires, but retained unshaken the conception of the monarch as identical with the State. By the end of the fifteenth century, the limits of Western nationalities were in the main definitely drawn, and in each the monarch stood as the arbiter of its destinies.

In the case of England the kingly power was augmented by the mutual slaughter of the dominant nobility which had hitherto held it in check. During a series of dynastic and internal or external wars that excited no enthusiasm among the populace and only slightly affected their daily life, the ancient barons of feudalism cancelled each other almost to extinction. The rising middle-class of merchants and gentry did not yet realise its own political importance, and its representatives, destined to become the founders of aristocratic families which still retain so powerful a hold on our politics and society, had not yet been enriched by the consecrated plunder of the Church. Now and again the labouring classes stirred uneasily, but their grievances and demands were not strictly political. Throughout the later fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries the constitutional limits imposed upon the power of the Crown were, perhaps, less regarded than at any other period of our history, and the unquestioned authority of our rulers was paralleled on the Continent in such eminent figures as the Emperor Maximilian I., Ferdinand and Isabella, Charles V., and Philip II. of Spain, Louis XI., Francis I., Catherine of Medici, and Henry IV. of France, and the Pope

Julius II., to say nothing of Lorenzo of Florence, Lodovico Sforza of Milan, and other conspicuous governors of the lesser States.

In politics, as in art and learning, it was an age of splendid personalities ; but the true line of freedom's advance lay in social movements which have been until recently excluded from the conception of political life, and in a vast expansion of human knowledge, arts, and speculation. In England, the social movement came to a head in three outbreaks, remarkable as the only attempts at violent revolution by which the English working people have hitherto sought to relieve their poverty. The first and greatest dates back to the latter part of the fourteenth century (1381). It was an organised Peasant Revolt of the eastern and south-eastern counties, and Wat Tyler, whose name is usually connected with it, was only one among its many leaders. The true inspiration of the rising, however, came from the wandering priest, John Ball, who derived his teaching of human brotherhood partly from the Gospel, partly from William Langland's poems on riches and poverty. The immediate occasion of discontent was the chaotic condition of society resulting from a series of plagues that had depopulated the country from twelve to thirty-two years earlier (1349 to 1369), and the attempts of landowners to enforce the old rights of serfdom, and keep down wages to the rate established before the pestilence.¹ It is disputed how far the Lollards were concerned in the movement. In the south of England, at all events, popular feeling ran strongly against John of Gaunt, who, for political reasons, stood as Wycliff's patron. But though Wycliff himself took no part in the revolt, his English Tracts were appearing at the time, and, through the preaching of the " Poor Priests," Lollardry was already becoming

¹ Statutes of Labourers, 1351-1353, nominally in force till 1562.

a centre of social as well as religious discontent, demanding reform both in society and in the Church. The rising itself, conducted by Tyler with skill and moderation, ended in the usual bloodthirsty suppression and apparent failure; but, nevertheless, it marked a rapid progress towards the collapse of serfdom in this country, and a step forward in the slow advance of the labouring classes towards some share in human rights.

Jack Cade's revolt of seventy years later (1450) was prompted by political discontent at the misgovernment of Henry VI.'s ministers rather than by hopes of social redress, and it was limited to the south-eastern counties. Both in leaders and objects it is related rather to the Civil War under Charles I., than to the "Peasants' Hurling-time." But the demand for the repeal of the Statute of Labourers, the terror of general plunder which fell on London merchants when Cade entered the city, and the common misuse of his name as invective against modern social reformers, may allow the inclusion of his rising among the very few efforts of English people to redress poverty rather than misgovernment by force. The "Pilgrimage of Grace" (1536), though largely due to the misery arising from the conversion of arable land into pasture, was mainly religious in its motive, being a protest against the overthrow of monasteries and the other innovations ordained by Henry VIII. for the maintenance of piety and the distribution of religious pillage. But Robert Ket's rising in Norfolk (1549) was wholly agrarian, and his "Rebels' Complaint" remains among the noblest expressions in our language of poverty's indignation.¹ It was a protest,

¹ Quoted in Mr. Joseph Clayton's *Leaders of the People*, p. 226. It begins:—

"The pride of great men is now intolerable, but our condition miserable. These abound in delights; and compassed with the fulness of all things, and consumed with vain pleasures, thirst

in the first place against the enclosure of common lands as private estates, but also against the overwhelming ascendancy which Ket foresaw that the private possession of the land of England without the restraints of feudal tenure and obligations would bestow upon the land-owning class. Most unhappily for the future economic freedom and well-being of the country, the movement was stamped down with the usual savagery of a possessing class supported by Government forces. Most unhappily, for to the failure of Ket's attempt the subsequent predominance of our landowners in politics, rank, and wealth, may be traced, and neither the outcry against the class that filches away the land's "un-earned increment," nor the hesitating efforts of agrarian Budgets and Small-Holdings Acts have yet availed to check the perpetuation of that injustice. Nearly the whole surface of the island has thus come into the hands of private persons who, released from all national obligation, claim it as their absolute possession to be devoted to sport, pleasure-gardens, or money-making, as their inclination or profit suggests.

On the social and economic side these English attempts to win freedom by force were in the main unsuccessful. They may be compared with the far more terrible rising of the French peasantry known as the "Jacquerie," which preceded Tyler's rebellion by about twenty years (1358), and with the "Bundschuh" movement which smouldered for some thirty years in the southern and western states of Germany (1492 to 1525), and, though only after gain, inflamed with the burning delights of their desires. But ourselves, almost killed with labour and watching, do nothing all our life long but sweat, mourn, hunger, and thirst. Which things, though they seem miserable and base (as they are indeed most miserable), yet might be borne, howsoever, if they which are drowned in the boiling seas of evil delights did not pursue the calamities and miseries of other men with too much insolent hatred.'

condemned by Luther himself, was certainly encouraged by Luther's actions, until it was finally extinguished with hideous slaughter at Frankenhause. More theoretic and doctrinal was the communistic movement of the Anabaptists, who prematurely endeavoured to establish a city of saints and angels among mankind, and chose Munster in Westphalia as a suitable locality. Their celestial polity was overthrown by carnal violence in 1532, but their spirit lingered for some generations, and one may trace it in the Fifth Monarchy Men and, perhaps, in the Levellers, whose uncompromising logic troubled even the most godfearing opportunists of the following century.

The movements in which the working people thus strove for economic freedom towards the close of the Middle Ages, and at the beginning of the new era, failed of their object. Wretched as was the labourer's condition described by Piers Plowman, it probably grew still worse, both in England and Europe, during the next two centuries, partly owing to the violent disorganisation of the Church, which had to some extent relieved and defended the poor, and partly owing to industrial changes and the influx of foreign plunder. For the time the social movements failed; but the intellectual movement, which influenced them and almost exactly coincided with them in date, resulted in such a liberation of the human mind as could hardly be paralleled, unless it were in the greatest century of Greek history. The contempt implied in the phrase "The Dark Ages" arose from careless arrogance. The centuries so called are seen to have been touched with imaginative light and colours of a peculiar beauty. They produced not only great warriors, statesmen, and ecclesiastics; they produced many great forms of painting and decoration, some of the noblest forms of architecture, a traditional literature rich in ballads, songs, and stories, and a

poetry culminating in one of the few supreme poets of time. But still, in passing even from Dante to the intellectual atmosphere of the sixteenth century, we are conscious of a change—an expansion of thought, a general diffusion as it were of mental and physical sunshine, an intensified realisation of the wealth, interest, and variety of human existence in this actual world, and a resolve to accept no doctrine or assumption without submitting it to the ordinary tests of the senses and reason. In a word, we are conscious of increased intellectual freedom.

Though there were, in reality, many anticipations and signs of its coming, the change appears to us now strangely sudden and complete. Most contemporaries were probably blind to its extent or significance, but the leading spirits carried it forward with peculiar gusto and *élan*. External events prompted or furthered their zeal. The death of the last Greek Emperor on the walls of Constantinople, and the occupation of Christianity's eastern capital by a Turkish Sultan (1453) overthrew the old conceptions of the civilised world, and gave to European culture the stimulus of approaching peril. Refugee scholars brought with them the masterpieces of ancient Greece, and a knowledge of the Greek language, long neglected among Catholic clerks. Intellectual circles were overcome with irresistible admiration. They were seized with a passion for learning, hardly comprehensible to those whom the enforced study of the classics from one generation to another has dulled to their perfection. The rediscovery of the relics of Greek art and literature was greeted as a rebirth of thought and beauty. The Greek spirit of free criticism, experiment, and speculation permeated every mental interest and branch of knowledge. The revelation of Greek beauty inspired not only the artist with a new and eager incentive, but the scholar, the

merchant, and the price equally with new perception of this world's splendour and delight. Existence appeared suddenly to burn with more brilliant flame. Such trammels and rules of conduct as had been unrecognised in the classic world were set aside, and the canon of excellence ordained intensity of experience rather than the restraints of accepted virtue. Men of learning pursued pleasure with intellectual delicacy, teachers commended the humanities by their own example, and even in fashionable circles the love of knowledge and beauty was for the time being rather honoured than despised.

The diffusion of the New Learning was assisted by the growing communication between Western nations, especially between France and Italy after the invasion of Italy by Charles VIII. of France (1494). From Italy also the English and Dutch derived their knowledge of the movement, and such reflected brilliance of art and learning and manner of life as reached their lands. This intercommunication was furthered by the recent invention of printing and the construction of famous printing-presses, as in Venice, Antwerp, London, and some German cities, where the great examples of literature were reproduced with something of the beauty of manuscripts, and were multiplied beyond the limits of clerical monopoly or special scholarship. The creation of books released knowledge. Such knowledge, at all events, as can be gained by reading was now open to all who could afford a literary education. The enthusiasm for it, and the expectation of consequent blessings on mankind may appear exaggerated, and it is easy now to make light of "printed matter" as a deliverer and guide to the soul; but, nevertheless, the printing of books, pamphlets, and newspapers has set free large parts of the human race from unreal terrors, from horrifying conceptions of God and man, and from many

cruel or filthy practices. It has also extended the deep and sympathetic pleasure of imaginative art. It has afforded a basis of mental freemasonry among educated people of all classes and countries, and supplied a convenient medium for information, and a partial substitute for teaching.

Similarly, the invention of gunpowder acted as an emancipating force. By breaking down the protective privileges of wealth and rank upon the battlefield, it equalised the chances of death, and extended the democratic principle to slaughter. Armour, though increasing for a time in cost, became a splendid decoration rather than a defence, until it was gradually thrown aside with other mediæval lumber. Castles that could shake off arrows and the blows of maces or catapults crumbled before even a wooden or big-mouthed gun. The isolated life of knights and barons, dominating the villages huddled round their walls, and maintaining a private retinue for supplies, plunder, or defence, was broken up, and the country seats of the gentry took the place of fortresses picturesque in ruin. In England, when the lay-appropriation of sacred property had been completed, the country seats took the place also of secluded abbeys, convents, and monasteries, destined in their turn to become tourist resorts of picturesque attraction.

This general liberation of life and intellect, chiefly revealed in the intensified thought and emotions of educated people, took more permanent forms in the arts of architecture, sculpture, and painting, especially in Italy, and in an outburst of the finest literature, especially in France, England, and Spain. It was further accompanied, and to some extent caused, by a rapid development of scientific knowledge and discovery. The astronomical theories of Copernicus (1473 to 1543), by deposing the earth from her imagined position at the centre of the universe, prepared the way for the

future revelation of celestial space. The discoveries of Columbus (1492 and 1498), of Vasco da Gama (1497) and other travellers enlarged the conception of the earth herself, opened new spheres for trade, plunder, slavery, and adventure, and deposed Jerusalem from her imagined position at the centre of the world. The investigation of nature, though still hampered with magical or religious beliefs, was substituted for metaphysical speculations and philosophic assertions beyond the test of reality or proof. Authority in the region of thought was shaken, as in the regions of conduct and traditional art. Personal research, questioning experiments, and the first-hand convictions of "private judgment" began to take the place of sanctioned dogma, and as philosophy returned from metaphysics to phenomenal nature, so religious belief attempted to return from the agglomerated doctrines of the Western Church to the origins of the accepted faith.

This attempt to strip the teaching of Christ and the primitive Church of later accretions had been begun in England a full century before by Wycliff (died 1384) and in Bohemia by John Huss (burnt 1415). By violent outrages upon the religious feeling of their time, Wycliff's Lollards anticipated the insensitiveness of the English Reformation; but his translation of the Bible enabled more English people to acquaint themselves with the earliest form of Christianity; and after the printing-press increased the number of readers, the habit of personal examination grew under the influence of such scholars as the Dutchman Erasmus and the Germans Melancthon and Luther. It was the hope of the earlier scholars to discover some reasonable basis for common agreement among all Christians, and to purify the existing Church from the inside, without decisive rupture. But reason plays a small part in human and religious affairs compared with passion, and

the reverence for Rome, already shaken by the long Schism between the rival Popes (1378 to 1449), hardly survived the reign of the Spaniard, Roderic Borgia, as Vicar of Christ during the critical years 1492 to 1503. Various attempts, from Bishop Creighton's onward, have recently been made to exonerate the Borgias, but at the time it was believed that Roderic, under the title of Alexander VI., not only endeavoured to enslave Italy to his son Cæsar, but converted the Papal Court into a scene of brilliant and insatiable depravity, in which that almost monstrous son stood unsurpassed, though sedulously rivalled.

Unrestrained and remorseless paganism at the very centre of Christ's Church rekindled a passion for the strict limits of morality. Stirred by the preaching of Savonarola (burnt 1498), the Piagnoni, or Mourners of Florence, forestalled the British Puritans of more than a century later in their condemnation of the arts, learning, and pleasurable life which so relaxed and confused the rigid distinctions of conduct. It is true that, in origin, both movements came as reactions rather against the Renaissance than the Church. In England the clergy may be charged with general frivolity, indifference to spiritual things, and an absence of moral fervour rather than with astonishing or æsthetic crimes.¹ But an inoffensive slackness, whether of intellect or morality, is more repellent than the sins of an impassioned mind, and is harder for the serious members of any church or society to endure. It was unfortunate, therefore, for those who loyally strove to maintain unity under reform that the Church was exposed to the scandal of flagrant and seductive evils on the one side, and on the other to the contempt due to uninspired torpor in a spiritual community.

The movement in central Europe connected with the

¹ See Stubbs' *Constitutional History*, chap. xix. vol. III. p. 371 ff.

name of Luther (died 1546) was also partially based on a moral and even a social protest. But in origin Luther's own revolt was mainly doctrinal, being another of the attempts to restore a simplified Christianity in accordance with scriptural records. The vigour of his defiance to the Roman Court, and his violent rejection of most of the Church's sacramental teaching precluded the hope of retaining unity under some reasonable and internal reform. After the failure to suppress his rebellion or to conclude a compromise at the Diet in Worms (1521), a religious revolution, involving a lasting schism in Western Christianity, was inevitable, and the armed struggle between "Protestant" and Catholic in Germany, though terminated for the time by the Peace of Augsburg (1555), upon the ludicrous condition that each region should follow its ruler's religion, was but the prelude to the devastation that ruined Germany's progress during the next century's Thirty Years' War (1618 to 1648).

In England, on the other hand, where the chance of benignant reform had, perhaps, been most hopeful, the schism was mainly political in origin, and partly financial. In order to confirm his first divorce for dynastic reasons, and also as an international move against the Emperor Charles V., who held the Pope in his power, Henry VIII. declared himself Supreme Head of the Church (1534), thus concluding the long struggle of the English Crown against Papal authority. Within the next five years the dissolution of the monasteries and the confiscation of Church lands brought equal distress upon the poor and profit to the new aristocracy. But at first there was no intention of doctrinal change. Even after Convocation itself had adopted certain main principles of German Protestantism, such as the sole authority of the Bible and the Creeds, in Ten Articles (1536), the king attempted to restore the Catholic doctrines by the Bill

of Six Articles three years later. Nevertheless, the revolt against Roman authority in things spiritual as well as temporal continued. Under Protector Somerset it became violent, and neither the subsequent brief reaction under Mary nor Elizabeth's endeavour to hold a middle course, with a leaning towards Catholicism, sufficed to check it. As a rule, the necessity of a State religion, if not of a common and universal faith, was still accepted; but the close of the century witnessed the appearance of Independent and democratic congregations, from which the last rag of sacerdotalism had been stripped away.

Meantime, two currents of reaction against "the Humanities" and intellectual liberation, whether represented by the Renaissance of beauty or by the reasonable reformers, had set in. On the one side, the power of the Roman Church was revived, and her limitations again strictly drawn by an internal movement, perhaps chiefly due to the moral genius and whole-hearted devotion of the Spaniard, Ignatius Loyola (died 1556), and such companions of his as the Frenchman, Francis Xavier. Their Order of Jesus was definitely recognised by Rome in 1543. Bound by a special vow of unquestioning obedience to the Pope, the Jesuits early distinguished themselves by defence of the Roman faith against all heretical opinions, as well as by their educational methods and their unflinching missionary zeal in Eastern countries. It was largely under their influence that the Council of Trient or Trent (1545 to 1563) attempted to confirm the authority of the Church, shaken by Luther and less compromising reformers. But the renewal of Rome's vitality was really due to their personal self-sacrifice and the consequent purification of ecclesiastic life rather than to the reassertion of doctrines concerning justification by works and the insufficiency of Biblical guidance.

The reaction was accompanied by systematic cruelty and occasional fits of bloodthirstiness, such as characterised most sections of belief in times when flames were thought the fitting purge for mistaken convictions upon impenetrable mysteries. But partly to a protest against the reaction and its instrument of brutality we may trace one of the first movements for national liberation that had arisen since the Roman Empire was organised. Between the middle of the thirteenth and the end of the fifteenth centuries, Spain had gradually freed herself from the power of the Moors; and in the fourteenth century the Swiss Cantons had successfully united against Austria. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries Ireland began or continued her heroic and hitherto vain struggle for nationality. But the long revolt of the Netherlands against Spain during the latter half of the sixteenth century, under the guidance of William the Silent (murdered 1584), served as a more vital example of a rebellious vindication of national independence. It is to the credit of our country that, in spite of the dubious intrigues of Elizabethan policy, and although inspired by Protestant rather than nationalistic zeal, the temper of the nation supported the Netherlands in their struggle, and by the overthrow of Spain's Armada (1588) the British admirals helped to confirm its success.

Besides the revival of Catholicism, another current of reaction checked the "Humanism" of the sixteenth century and partially constrained the liberated intellect once more. The aspect of life that we roughly call Puritanism had many origins. On one side, it raised a protest, in common with the early Jesuits, against the moral laxity attributed to pagan knowledge and artistic pursuits. On the doctrinal side, it insisted upon St. Augustine's conception of Grace, and on the impassable distinction between the eternally reprobate and the

elected saints. Such became its chief characteristics under the influence of the Frenchman Calvin (died 1564), who, from his adopted home in Geneva, so extended the uncomfortable logic of his doctrine that Calvinism ultimately grew to be the accepted aspect of Christianity not only in Protestant Switzerland, France, Scotland, and the Netherlands, but in the United States and a great part of Germany, England, Ireland, and our Colonies. While advancing freedom by encouraging resistance to priestly authority, and affirming the self-sufficiency of the isolated soul, Calvinism, Puritanism, and other forms of Protestant belief checked on many sides the expansion of man's nature and intelligence. They tended to limit his mental interests to spiritual self-examination and one narrow form of religion; to guide his ideas of truth by the uncritical application of Biblical sentences, usually regardless of their contexts; and to seek his excellence rather in a "fugitive and cloistered virtue" than in the courageous and free-spirited fulfilment of his highest energies. It is, unhappily, true, on the other hand, that the opportunities for the passionate fulfilment of the highest energies afforded by life to the ordinary citizen and working man or woman are, in any case, rare; whereas nearly every one is constrained to follow some accepted and fairly definite rule of conduct from day to day.

CHAPTER VII

THE AGE OF REVOLUTION

IF we consider the difference in Europe between the end of the Middle Ages and the present time, we see that the most vital changes have been due to the increasing knowledge of physics, external nature, and the earth's history. The profound discoveries of natural

laws connected with the names of Newton and Darwin have revolutionised the former conceptions of space and time. They have completely reversed the mediæval beliefs in man's central importance in the universe, his Golden Age at a date not very remote, his fall from happy innocence, and his special guidance by rules that were right because they were commanded. They have revealed him as a remarkable animal dwelling on an insignificant planet that is attached to an insignificant star, and taking uncounted centuries to reach even the slightly mitigated wretchedness and savagery of our historic ages. They have proved that, if we may speak of any Golden Age, it lies far before us instead of a short distance behind, and that, if we usually have still to follow the ancient rules of conduct, we must seek for them a different origin and sanction from external authority, even though the authority be assumed divine.

Far less important, and upon a lower plane, is the revolution that physical knowledge has effected in the conditions of ordinary life. This revolution is chiefly felt in greatly increased rapidity of communication by earth, air, or water, and in greatly increased rapidity in the production of clothing, metal work, and, to a lesser degree, of food. The development in speed, combined with other physical discoveries, has produced social changes among civilised, and even among uncivilised peoples, surpassing the effects of political revolutions. Machinery has superseded handicraft; steam and electricity have superseded other mediums of power, traction, and communication; people have gathered in dense crowds to centres where machinery works best; the whole system of daily labour and wages has been transformed; and in most parts of Europe and America there is probably an average of at least five people now standing where one stood before.

Such increase in numbers, and such changes in ex-

ternal conditions are not necessarily good. They have, in fact, been vehemently denounced as disastrous by the greatest latter-day prophets. We must ultimately bring them all to our test of individual happiness, or the fulfilment of what is best in each man's nature; and though the issue is still doubtful, it seems probable that the increasing number, confluence, power, and estimation of working people, joined to easier means of moving about, have, on the whole, increased the general opportunities for that self-fulfilment, however inadequate they still are. If that is so, we may say that the rapid development in man's physical knowledge during the last three centuries has tended towards greater personal freedom of thought and action, at all events among the ordinary, hard-working, and undistinguished people who form the majority of mankind.

Following the more usual lines of history, we see that the course of freedom during the three last centuries has flowed in a few main currents. The seventeenth century was marked by the overthrow of absolutism; the eighteenth by the overthrow of oligarchy, combined with a general abolition of serfdom; and the nineteenth by the birth of nationalism and some advance towards democracy. Not that these currents began and ended in each successive century; they are still incomplete, still flowing, and in some countries they have flowed side by side. But each century effected a remarkable progress, and made ultimate attainment almost certain. The overthrow of absolutism was due chiefly to England; the overthrow of oligarchy and deliverance from serfdom chiefly to France; and the birth of nationalism chiefly to Germany, though her example had been forestalled, as we have seen, by Switzerland, Spain, Ireland, and the Netherlands, and was rapidly and more boldly followed by other nations. An advance towards democracy has been general in Europe and America.

During the seventeenth century, Italy, which had previously led the world alike in the great rival spheres of intellect, beauty, and conduct, lay rotting and degenerate as the conquered or inherited prey of Spaniards. Imperial possessions, whether in Italy or America, only contributed to the long decay of Spain herself. In France, famous politicians were building a centralised monarchy on the ruins of feudalism, which had fallen in civil wars—a more absolute monarchy than the Tudors succeeded in building on similar foundations. Torn by thirty years of internal war, in which foreign Powers intervened for her ruin, Germany lay for more than a century as an impotent collection of little States, at the mercy of France, and intellectually controlled by her. The Empire, equally impotent, was barely saved from destruction at the hands of the Turks, who threatened Vienna itself. Only in England and the Netherlands was the cause of freedom maintained and forwarded. Towards the end of the century the Netherlands checked the domination of the French monarchy, as they had thrown off the domination of Spain a hundred years before. And during the whole century England was engaged in overturning the Stuart absolutism, on the same principles and by much the same action as she had used to restrain the old absolutism between the reigns of John and Edward IV.

But our rebellious spirit in the seventeenth century took many forms, and was stirred by many motives to indignation. It was very largely religious. In releasing themselves from Church authority, men's minds were much occupied—often bitterly occupied—with their own and other people's salvation, with conduct, and with church government. The attempts to restore a primitive Christianity in various forms, especially as Calvinism, increased the abhorrence of sacerdotalism, whether Roman or Anglican. Charles I. and Laud were

accused of designing to restore Romanism, which was now regarded as an idolatry as well as a political danger. In their case the charge was unfounded; in the case of James II. it was probably just. The prevalence of independent, republican, and presbyterian forms of church government influenced political life, especially counteracting the theory of a king's Divine Right, according to which the monarchy was held directly from God, now that no delegation through Pope or Emperor was accepted. On the other hand, the increasingly Puritan aspect of life stimulated a sanctified horror alike at the wantonness of Courts and the amusements of the people. Chiefly under religious influence also, scattered attempts were made to transform social conditions into a saintly communism of healthful labour and equalised simplicity.

These variegated ideals and discontents, signifying a refusal to permit State interference in religion, all contributed to the political movement which overthrew the claims of absolutism, first in this country, and gradually throughout the world. In England the central point of political controversy was again the right of taxation. It had been so in the time of the feudal barons, and now the gentry and landowners who had succeeded to the barons' position, instinctively perceived that, as in the past, political freedom could alone be maintained by the control of supplies. The refusal of supplies they recognised as the one method, short of armed rebellion, by which the consent of the governed could be withheld; and government by the consent of the governed is, as we have seen, the very definition of political liberty. Accordingly, it was upon the sole right of Parliament, as representing the country, to impose taxation that the leading opponents of absolutism insisted. The Petition of Right (1628), which is the second Great Charter of our freedom, only repeated

in its two most important clauses the two main principles of Magna Charta: that no tax should be levied without consent of Parliament, and that no subject should be imprisoned without cause shown. A declaration of the following year, drawn up by Sir John Eliot, and passed by the Commons with locked doors, while the Speaker was held down in his chair, began with the words:—

By the ancient laws and liberties of England it is the known birthright and inheritance of the subject that no tax, tallage, or other charge shall be levied or imposed but by common consent in England.

That Parliament (the third of Charles I.) was at once dissolved, and Eliot was imprisoned in the Tower, where he died. Towards the end of the eleven years of attempted absolutism that followed, John Hampden again raised the same question of right by refusing ship-money, on the plea that the tax was unjust, and that it was levied without Parliament. His case was overthrown in the Courts by a small majority of judges. But little more than a year later, unable to raise further supplies on his own authority, especially as Scotland stood in open revolt, the king summoned two Parliaments in rapid succession. In the first, Pym, following the ideal of Eliot that Parliament represented the collective wisdom of the nation, laid down the main principle of our subsequent political life—a principle we still try to maintain in spite of all discouragements: that the powers of Parliament are to the body politic what the rational faculties of the soul are to a man. It was the second, or Long, Parliament that organised the armed resistance to absolutism, and in a "purged" condition, supported by a powerful and zealous army, ultimately executed the king upon the charge of having levied war against the Parliament. Such a charge

assumed the supremacy of Parliament as the chief representative of the nation, and the source of all authority in the country.

The success of the Parliament was due to the nation's instinct for freedom, realised by a selected army under Cromwell's military genius. Similar attempts at revolution have often failed because the military element in success has been neglected. At the outset of the rebellion, the Parliament perceived that the command of the army was the vital question. In other cases, the advocates of freedom have forgotten that even a small body of armed and disciplined men will slit through unorganised masses of civilians like a knife through butter, and the growing power of firearms has enormously increased the advantage of the authority that commands the use of them for good or evil. Cromwell was justified in his insistence upon the New Model that broke the backbone of despotism. His error lay in disregarding the nation's profound dislike of interference. While attempting forcibly to establish and confirm a kingdom of God, he failed to realise that most men and women prefer variety to godliness, and value their daily habits more highly than their eternal salvation. For the only time in history, a great country was organised as Christ's realm; but the change from civilisation was too abrupt for human nature. For five generations afterwards, the appeal to righteousness only roused derision, and the enemies of progress had but to recall the Commonwealth in order to discredit popular reform.

The community of saints was succeeded by an oligarchy of good birth, and the oligarchs retained their power, almost unquestioned, for a century and a half. Within thirty years they finally overthrew royal absolutism in this country by declaring that the King, James II., had "abdicated the Government through breaking the

original contract between King and people, and through violating the fundamental laws." Having thus denied the right of a monarch to absolute rule either as owner of the country or as the anointed of God, they further limited his power by repeating in the Bill of Rights (1689) the principle of our liberties that refuses taxation without consent, and by ordaining that no army could be kept up in time of peace, and that subjects have the rights of petition, free election, and pure justice. Under the oligarchy also the system of Cabinet government was gradually evolved, whereby the Ministers are appointed by the King only on condition that they represent the party holding a majority in the House of Commons, thus making them responsible, no longer to the Crown, but to the body which nominally at all events, represents the main will of country. The Cabinet became "the sovereign in commission," and the King's power was limited to such personal influence over the Ministers as he might possess. No sovereign has vetoed a Bill since Queen Anne, or dismissed a Ministry since 1834.

Having made this important advance in constitutional government, the oligarchy found itself chiefly occupied for the rest of the eighteenth century in dynastic Continental wars, in the foundation or expansion of an Empire in both hemispheres, and in combating the revolutionary spirit that was gathering for the overthrow both of oligarchies and crowns. The dynastic wars of Europe, and the attempts of Kings to clutch various portions of each other's territories do not here concern us, except as examples of royal indifference to the wishes or existence of the peoples inhabiting the territories in dispute. The expansion of the Empire concerns us only in so far as the pioneers and subsequent colonials bore with them the principles of our political liberties and so developed the constitutional

system now prevailing in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and, to a certain extent, in the United States. In these cases the original owners of the countries have been either exterminated or subjugated to an inferior position in numbers or status; but even where extermination has been impossible, and subjugation less complete, as in India and the Egypt of to-day, our political ideals have slowly permeated, and lately they have spread to countries like Turkey, Persia, and China, where the influence of our Empire and form of government has been only indirect. The contest of our oligarchy against the revolutionary spirit brings us to the great movement connected with the French Revolution, under the stress of which, throughout the greater part of Europe, serfdom disappeared, oligarchies were overthrown, and constitutional limits were laid upon the autocratic ideal.

When the leaders of the revolution against James II. in England declared that he had broken "the original contract between the King and the people," they may have derived the idea of such a contract from Hobbes or earlier writers. But it was more probably suggested by Locke, whose treatises on "Civil Government" were published in the following year (1690). The phrase was adopted from Locke by Rousseau, whose *Contrat Social*, appearing in 1762, formed the theoretic basis of the revolution in France, and was accepted with doctrinaire exactness by the early leaders of the movement. The American war, in which French officers played a distinguished part, and the American Declaration of Independence (1776), which followed the theory of Social Contract in declaring that all men are created equal, and are endowed by the Creator with inalienable rights, served as examples to the pioneers of revolution in France. On similar grounds they aimed at transforming the centralised monarchy built up by Louis XIV.,

and the oligarchy which had taken shelter under it. The Commons of the States-General, summoned for the first time since 1614, called themselves the National Assembly, and claimed the sovereignty as representing the people with whom the original Contract was made. They at once adopted the basis of the British Constitution by refusing all taxation imposed without their consent (June 1789), and with that refusal the Revolution began. The storming of the Bastille as the symbol of tyranny quickly followed (July 14). A host of poor and hungry women invaded Versailles and brought the King to Paris. The oligarchs emigrated with ignoble rapidity. To restore their privileges, and to maintain the monarchical principle in Europe, German armies entered French soil. The country rose against tyrants. A Republic was proclaimed. The King was executed (January 1793). The Revolution declared war, and a general levy, or conscription, that was to transform the military system in nearly the whole world, supplied the armies with which the Revolutionary generals and, in natural succession to them, Napoleon exposed the absurdity of privileged courts and classes, supported by obsolete etiquette and mercenary troops.

The most obvious and permanent results of the six years' revolution in France were the overthrow of the nobility's feudal privileges, the abolition of feudal serfdom, and the division of the communal and confiscated lands, both of the emigrant aristocracy and the Church, among the peasants themselves. France has thus been preserved from the disastrous inheritance of large landowners; and though a system of peasant proprietorship has drawbacks in the exaggeration of thrift and the fear of change, it has increased and diffused the national wealth, while tending to equality, stability, and peace. The French Revolution, like our own, was in origin and direction mainly a middle-class movement, but this

much was achieved for the peasants, and the violent appearance from time to time of the working poor, who are driven to revolt by hunger rather than by political theory, was significant of the next line of advance.

Not so material in profit as the division of land among the peasants, but of still higher value was the general diffusion of the sense of equal manhood and citizenship among all classes. Since the Revolution, France has, perhaps, led the world in social equality and indifference to privilege; and by the influence of her culture and her armies she has succeeded in extending some share of those advantages to ourselves and other European races. This was especially true of her influence during the revolutionary and early Napoleonic wars. Her soldiers passed from victory to victory like men inspired, bearing with them a new gospel. They were fighting, not only to preserve their newly-acquired bits of land, or their newly-won freedom from degrading and intolerable servitude to their lords; they were fighting for the ideal of equality and the rights of common manhood. Prepared to face every risk and hardship rather than return to the ancient conditions into which kings and aristocrats were trying to force them back, they marched with spirit invincible upon the field, and carried even to the peoples whose mercenary armies they overcame something of their faith's illumination. As time passed, the Courts of Europe appeared to recover from the shock of French victories, but they never fully recovered from the shock of French equality. Wherever the traces of serfdom had lingered, they were now gradually obliterated, till, after a long interval, even Russia abolished them in shame (1861). The same belief in the equality and brotherhood of man, supported by the doctrine of a common brotherhood in Christ, inspired the Abolitionists who, after a

prolonged and bitter struggle (1788 to 1833), secured the overthrow of slavery within our Empire. But of more subtle effect, and more widely permeating influence, has been the growth of the demand for equal citizenship and equal opportunity among the populations of all civilised countries, together with an increasing indignation and contempt towards the established privileges of wealth, birth, or religion. Since the Revolution, most people have been slowly learning to realise that kings, nobles, priests, and property-owners hold their peculiar positions only on sufferance, and must justify them by other means than appeals to inheritance, possession, law, or the grace of God.

Such was the service of France as liberator. But when, on the strength of almost uninterrupted victory, Napoleon, with a Pope's blessing, assumed the tawdry rags of Empire, and extended Cæsarian powers over the ancient races of Europe, he revived against himself a force of Nationalism, such as had previously shaken and despoiled the Empire of Spain. After he had been already weakened by the collapse of his invasion of Russia, he found himself confronted by the Nationalism of German States combined to resist him, while the obstinate hostility of the British aristocracy continued unrelieved. His fall was succeeded by years of tyrannical suppression under the Holy Alliance, but in the midst of those years the note of Nationalism, so distinctive of the nineteenth century, was sounded again. Byron surpassed even the fine service of his satire by his championship of Greek nationality against Turkish Imperialism, and in 1829 the independence of Greece was won. During the same period (1821 to 1825) the South American States shook themselves free of Spain. Some years later (1848) Hungary asserted her nationality as a joint power with Austria, though the Magyars continue to suppress the Slav nationalities around them.

The prolonged labours of Mazzini, the policy of Cavour, and the inspired splendour of Garibaldi's exploits achieved the "resurrection" of Italy as a nation (1849, 1860, and 1870). The Danubian Principalities were released from the Turkish Empire in 1858; Bulgaria and Thessaly in 1878; and Crete, except in name, in 1898. The union of German States and kingdoms into a solidly federated German Empire was also a triumph for Nationalism, though it involved no removal of a foreign yoke.

It is true that during the century many attempts to recover or establish Nationalism failed. We may count among them the revolts of Poland against Russia (1830 and 1863); the Indian Mutiny (1857); Arabi's revolt in Egypt (1882); and the long series of movements in Ireland connected with the names of Robert Emmett (executed 1803), O'Connell (died 1847); Smith O'Brien, John Mitchel, and others of the "Young Ireland" party (1848); the "Fenians" (in the 'sixties); and the Home Rule movement of Parnell (died 1891). Nevertheless, Nationalism was one of the strongest motive forces of the nineteenth century. In many cases it prevailed, and on the whole it was favoured by British statesmanship and popular feeling, unless our own supposed interests were very closely involved.

CHAPTER VIII

TOWARDS DEMOCRACY

FOR most people in this country the nineteenth century opened with years surpassing in misery the average condition of the working classes. It was a time of social and industrial transition more violent even than the changes which had disturbed the population three

hundred years before. The heirs of those who then had pillaged the Church, now consummated the iniquity by pilfering from the poor. In about fifty years, from 1760, five million acres of common land were converted into private property through Acts of Parliament promoted by the landowners themselves in the name of agricultural improvement.¹ The improvement was seen in their pockets, while remorseless ruin was spread throughout the country districts. The peasantry disappeared, large numbers being transported to penal settlements in the Antipodes. The rest either sank to the squalor of a subsistence-wage at the landlord's pleasure, or herded into towns and mining districts, where the rapid increase of mechanical power was creating a demand for the cheapest labour. Village life was further destroyed by the ruin of cottage hand-loom industries, unable to compete with factories. Unorganised and unrepresented, protected neither by combination nor by law, the working people lay at the mercy of landowners and manufacturers, who cloaked their greed under the sanction of immutable economic principles, conveniently discovered just in time. Upon the strict laws of supply-and-demand, unfettered competition, non-interference, and the benefits of cheap labour, a national prosperity was established that almost realised the dreams of avarice, and reduced a large part of the working population to a brutish ignorance and toil compared with which Nigerian savagery was not only luxurious but edifying.

Misery raised its protest in riot. Hampden Clubs were formed in the name of the resister of taxes. The "Luddites" hoped to strike the enemy by breaking his machinery, the labourers by burning his ricks. A

¹ Levy, *Large and Small Holdings*, p. 24. Johnson, *Disappearance of Small Landowner*, p. 90, in a table based on Dr. Slater's calculation, gives 5,730,216 acres between 1761 and 1844.

vast, but peaceful, concourse at Manchester was violently broken up by yeomanry and dragoons, whose victory over the unresisting crowd in St. Peter's Fields won the name of Peterloo (1819). In the southern and south-eastern counties, sporadic outbreaks (1830) recalled the days of the Peasants' Revolt. A successful revolution in Paris (July 1830), driving the restored Bourbons from the country, and setting up a "Citizen King," combined with the triumph of Greek independence, South American revolts, and the growing movement for the abolition of negro slavery, to encourage the cause of freedom in all lands. So did the Catholic Emancipation, which the British Government yielded at last (1829), under the threat of imminent civil war. But in England all grievances were merged for a time in the clamour for Parliamentary Reform. A Reform Bill, abolishing rotten boroughs, nominations, and other abuses, while extending some share of representation to the growing industrial centres, was introduced by a Whig Ministry, and after obstinate resistance in the last ditch of the House of Lords, the aristocracy again submitted to the danger of civil war, as revealed by violent riots in Bristol, Derby, and Nottingham. This Reform Bill (June 1832) closed the period of aristocratic oligarchy, and the chief legislative power passed into the hands of the middle classes.

Middle class legislation was mainly guided by the above-mentioned laws of political economy, tempered with philanthropic compassion. Free competition and non-interference, maintained in the interests of capital as incontrovertible axioms, produced conditions of labour—especially of child labour—which the loving-kindness of common humanity could not long endure. Lord Ashley's (Shaftesbury's) Factory and Colliery Acts, and Lord Brougham's early attempts at general education, justified the interference of the State as a

protective power against wage-slavery in extremes. The introduction of free trade in food by the repeal of the Corn Laws (1846) appeared to promise equal benefits to industrial capitalists and their manufacturing hands. But by organising Trade Unions for effective strikes, by a frequent repetition of riots, especially in the Midlands and South Wales, and by the presentation of immense petitions for the People's Charter (1842 and 1848), the working classes themselves bore witness to their gathering indignation at the cruelty and shame of their position.

Nevertheless, the people's cause advanced but slowly. Though nearly all the five points of the Charter are now secured, Chartism collapsed, partly through the leaders' want of courage. The revolutionary year of 1848, which saw a semi-socialistic government established in Paris, and shook monarchical despotism in most European capitals, left England almost unmoved. In Ireland, the demand for repeal and national independence had been overwhelmed by an awful visitation of famine, which ultimately reduced the population by about one-half (1846). Years of general reaction on the Continent followed 1848, and a war with Russia, a perilous crisis in India, a prolonged civil war in the United States to avert division on the question of slavery, a consequent cotton famine in Lancashire, and two great European wars for the aggrandisement of Prussia over Denmark and Austria distracted attention from the deeper social grievances. Commercial prosperity rapidly increased, but the middle classes absorbed an exaggerated proportion of the benefit; and it was not till 1866 that, owing to a disturbance in Hyde Park and other riots and processions, the popular movement again made itself felt.

In answer to the crisis, Disraeli, with the combined purpose of "dishing" the Whigs and shaking the com-

placency of the manufacturers, extended the franchise to all male householders in towns (1867). This extension was almost immediately followed by a compulsory Education Act, the legalisation of Trade Unions, the abolition of University Tests, various attempts at Irish reform, and a great reorganisation of the army on a more popular basis, all carried out by Mr. Gladstone's Government of 1870-1874. Ten years later, being one of the happy few whose love of freedom grows with age, Mr. Gladstone extended the same suffrage to the country districts, and enfranchised the agricultural labourer (1884). On this occasion, the violence which has otherwise preceded extensions of the franchise was absent, but big demonstrations and threats of marching great masses of working men from Birmingham upon London were thought necessary to coerce the Lords into consent, and they consented on conditions.

Under the growing power of representation, the position of the House of Lords, acting as a constant block against Liberal measures but serving neither to check nor revise Conservative proposals, was becoming untenable. It was in vain that Liberal premiers persistently rewarded the failing powers, political incapacity, or large contributions of their zealous supporters by elevating them to the Upper House. Such qualifications are not proof against the infection of aristocratic society, and those upon whom greatness is thrust quickly catch the prevailing temper of others who are born great. At last a crisis came with the rejection of a Budget by the House of Lords (1909). Control of the purse implies the ultimate control of policy, and at the basis of our unwritten Constitution lies, as we have so often seen, the established principle that the representative Chamber alone grants or withholds supply. This principle had been definitely affirmed by the Commons in a resolution of 1678, and in the debate on the Paper Duty in 1860.

The claim of the Lords would have empowered an unelected aristocracy to drive any Ministry from office by paralysing the business of government. It was answered by a Parliament Act (1911), definitely depriving the Lords of all control over Money Bills, and further enacting that every Bill sent up by the Commons for three successive sessions should become law, whether the Lords assented or not. The latter provision was obviously only temporary, since it rendered the legislation of any Liberal Government futile during its last two years of office. But the Act marked an advance in the slow process of reducing privilege, whether of birth, or land, or capital.

The sex privilege of men was at the same time vigorously attacked, though the Liberal Government refused to co-operate. "The Colonies," said Burke, speaking of the Americans in 1775, "the Colonies complain that they have not the characteristic mark and seat of British freedom. They complain that they are taxed in a Parliament in which they are not represented." The similar exclusion of all women from representation, though they contributed to taxation on equal terms with men, and were equally subject as citizens to the laws and penalties enacted by Parliament, was an anomaly exposed by John Stuart Mill at the time of Disraeli's Reform Bill (1867). Women's enfranchisement then became an academic annual, something like the motion not to adjourn for the Derby, and it made no difference whether the majority of the House of Commons was favourable to it or not, since no statesman had the insight or principle to introduce it as a Government measure. The grievance, after smouldering for nearly forty years, became a burning question when the Liberals were evidently entering upon a long spell of power at the end of 1905. With every year it grew more evident that government was now being

carried on without the consent of large bodies of the governed. The agitation expressed itself in vast processions, innumerable meetings, riotous demonstrations, window-breaking, and other time-honoured methods of displaying indignant discontent, especially in regard to refusal of the franchise. But the demand was more than political, and it was urged with a passionate devotion and self-sacrifice unequalled except at the greatest crises of our history. Bill after Bill to redress the grievance passed the second reading by large majorities in the representative House; but, secure in the docility of the "Private Member," the Government remained deaf to representation. In answer to increasing agitation, and a majority of 167 for the Conciliation Bill giving women the household suffrage (May 1911), Mr. Asquith announced (November 1911), that "a man's right to vote depended on his being a citizen," and, with these provocative words, seeking to exclude all women from the rights of citizenship, he promised a Manhood Suffrage Bill for the next session (1912). At the same time he conceded that, if a private amendment giving women some kind of a franchise were carried through the House in spite of the opposition of himself and other Cabinet Ministers, the Government would adopt it. But he expressed a hope that the House of Lords would, in that case, wreck the amendment, and, presumably the Reform Bill with it. So at the time of writing (January 1912) the matter stands.

Timidity and blindness to rising indignation may for a time postpone the completion of a general and equal suffrage for men and women. But Adult Suffrage is supported by the whole Labour Party, which entered Parliament as a strong section in 1906, and by the general Socialistic tendency that has prevailed in our political thought since the middle 'eighties. It cannot be long delayed. Hereditary privilege has been checked,

and will not long survive. Religious privileges and religious disabilities are being gradually abolished. Catholics gained full citizenship in 1829, Jews in 1858, Free-thinkers in 1886. The Irish Church was dis-established in 1869, the Welsh Church is now threatened. Local Government is extended throughout the kingdom. Self-government is granted to South Africa, as well as to Australia, Canada, and other Colonies. It is promised to Ireland, and will probably be extended to Wales, Scotland, and England for their separate affairs. The monarchy is mainly decorative and sentimental, and so long as it is limited to decoration and sentiment, it remains popular. Members of Parliament have opened their House to the poorest by voting themselves adequate payment. So far as machinery goes, the consummation of democracy in this country has come within sight.

A similar democratic spirit is felt throughout the most advanced regions of the partially civilised world. All the States of Europe and America now enjoy some form of representative government, though in many it differs from ours in important respects, especially in the appointment and responsibility of Ministers. Some States have already adopted Adult Suffrage; in others the demand for the admission of all grown men and women to full citizenship is increasing. France has been a republic for forty years. Turkey, by an almost bloodless revolution in 1908, sought to abolish despotism, and establish a Parliamentary system. Portugal, with hardly more bloodshed, overturned the monarchy and declared a republic in 1910. Even Russia, where the population enjoys much social freedom, but suffers under the most oppressive Government now extant—even Russia keeps up the semblance of an elected Duma and of the Constitution wrung from the Tsar by the general strike and revolutionary movement of 1905. In Asia,

by the Constitution of 1889, Japan instituted a Diet of two Chambers, under the supremacy of the Emperor. China was advancing by gradual stages towards constitutional government when the revolution of November 1911 precipitated progress, and at the time of writing (January 1912) a republic is being declared. In India, Lord Morley's reforms of 1909 extended the elective principle among the Councils. Persia, after expelling a despotic Shah, established a Mejliss or Parliament in 1909, and was on the point of acquiring internal freedom when Russia, prompted by Persia's military helplessness and her own greed and detestation of liberty, at the end of 1911 violently attacked her independence, in collusion with Great Britain, which was equally pledged to maintain Persia's independence and integrity.

This assassination of freedom at its birth was but another instance of the lust for conquest which, since about the date of the first Peace Conference at The Hague (1899), has possessed diplomatic circles with renewed ferocity. It chiefly urges them to assault isolated and helpless communities where no serious resistance need be feared, and it seeks to destroy that spirit of nationality which the nobler statesmanship of last century sought to establish or confirm. England has thus absorbed the South African Republics (1902) after a struggle unexpectedly prolonged, and, contrary to repeated promises of evacuation, she has retained her hold on Egypt for thirty years. By her occupation of Fez (1911) France has overthrown the independence of Morocco, which by the Act of Algeciras she and the other Powers pledged themselves to maintain. For her violent annexation of Tripoli (1911), Italy hardly condescended to produce a pretext. The whole of Africa (with the exception of Abyssinia, which possesses some capacity for resistance) has now been apportioned among the Powers. In Europe, by her

annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1908), Austria tore up the Treaty of Berlin (1878), and by her continuous encroachments upon the liberties of Finland (1906-1911) Russia violated the oaths of all the Tsars since the Diet of Borga (1809). In Asia, Japan has annexed Korea (1911), thus violating the Agreement which guaranteed Korea's independence and integrity (1904). And at the end of the same year (1911), as we have seen, Russia destroyed the independence of Persia, which she and England had pledged themselves to uphold by the Agreement of 1907. Seldom in modern history has the game of grab been played with so shameless a voracity as in 1911, and it is evident that the Foreign Offices of Europe and this country now regard the most solemn international treaties, pledges, and obligations as no longer worth more than three or four years' purchase.

A serious weakness in to-day's democracy is here exposed. The general will has little or no control over Foreign Secretaries or diplomatists. Probably the majority of people in most countries have no predisposition to bad faith, to the violation of pledges, the subjugation of the weak, or the slaughter of workingmen in other lands. But their will is not consulted or considered until the expression of it is negligible. Crimes that would appear abhorrent in private life are secretly prepared by international diplomacy, the peoples remaining ignorant until the fact is accomplished, or stands upon the verge. The general mind is then easily deluded by such words and phrases as "inevitable," "self-defence," "prestige," "teaching a lesson," "the true humanity that requires cruelty," "the survival of the fittest," or "the extension of Christianity, civilisation, and markets." These persuasive catchwords are propagated by financiers with loans to run, by capitalists with an interest in arma-

ments, company-promoters with an eye on exploitation, manufacturers watching the closed or open door, and the landowning or professional gentry with sons to launch in life. It is difficult for newspapers to resist the clamour of wealth for war or aggrandisement, since their existence depends upon circulation and advertisement among the well-to-do. They now tend to colour, not only their comment, but their news according to demand, or in support of Ministers from whom favours of various kinds may be expected. The hungry populace, occupied with their daily interests, and untrained to imagine foreign life or distant events, look up and are fed with deception.

Similar to the removal of foreign relations from the control of a people thus kept in ignorance is another Constitutional danger that threatens our approach to democracy. That is the despotism of Cabinets. Owing to "Party loyalty," and to the increased pressure of local and Imperial business in the House of Commons, the Cabinet escapes control and almost escapes criticism. The Private Member counts as a vote, but hardly as a voice. Ill-considered and undigested proposals are rushed into law, for fear their rejection should involve the fall of the Government, an expensive election, and the doom of some other measure upon which a section of the Government's supporters has set its heart. A complicated Bill, intimately affecting the daily life of people who have neither demanded nor approved it, is forced through by the votes of the Government's allies, unconcerned to investigate its details or scope, but cherishing the vision of some future design of their own. In the hurry of political life, the best that the Minister who has charge of it can do is to trust the abstract and statistical knowledge of permanent officials in some State department, and, acting upon their irresponsible advice, he flings his measure

at the country in the hope that future amendment may justify his good intentions.

It is, perhaps, the official, rather than the Crown, the aristocracy, or even the plutocrat, who now most endangers liberty. Bureaucratic interference with personal life, long the plague of most European capitals from Lisbon to St. Petersburg, threatens to infest the world. We are called upon to accept "the expert" as our controlling guide, and "efficiency" as the final test of government. Many of the perils of monarchy or any other government from above lurk in such advice. Bees and ants are efficient, but their progress appears to have stopped—stopped dead, as we say; or if you want expert government, watch the law and order of sheep before a dog. Officials usually govern badly, because they naturally magnify their office and routine above life, regarding the intrusion of reality as an unwarrantable disturbance to their habitual toil or leisure. But that is not the worst of it. Even under the most efficient officialdom, the governed suffer a degrading loss of personality. It is disastrous to maintain order, however mechanically perfect, or to organise virtue and comfort, however judiciously proportionate, if personality and variety are gone. "Self-government is better than good government," and self-government implies the right to go wrong. It is nobler for a nation, as for a man, to struggle towards excellence with its own natural force and vitality, however blindly and vainly, than to live in irreproachable decency under expert guidance from without. Better free than sober, said Bishop Magee of this country, and we may well imagine that it will be more tolerable for Sodom and Gomorrha in the day of trial than for a blameless city, cautiously regulated to virtue by the best mechanical appliances of the clerks on Boards and the heads of Government Departments.

Up to this point—up to the beginning of the year 1912, itself heavy with destiny—we have traced what appear to be the most conspicuous among the slow advances and the hard-won victories of mankind in the long contest for freedom. If prophecy availed, one might suppose that the next great stage in that contest would be a more determined struggle for the extension of opportunity. “The career open to talent” was an ideal loudly acclaimed as Napoleon’s gospel; but a century has passed since Napoleon’s time, and the gospel remains far from fulfilment. Equal opportunity for all men and women, independent of their inheritance, birth, or surroundings, has still to be won. The division, not only between leisure and work, rich and poor, but, what is far more serious, between educated and uneducated, still exists and is almost impassable. That bar splits every country in two, and across it there is no real community, no real understanding. The larger section suffers more, but the people on both sides of the division suffer. One section loses intellectual growth and the finer sorts of pleasure; the other loses strength of character, physical toughness, and wide companionship. Both lose equal opportunity for that self-fulfilment in a fully developed life which is the aim of freedom.

Only where that opportunity is given can we hope for a nation endowed with the right judgment in all things for which we pray—a nation whose right judgment has become a general instinct for nobleness; maintaining a high and honourable course; rejecting understandings, friendships, or alliances with lingering despotisms or brutish aggressors; and confirming in others the principles of freedom, won for itself by persistent and unfaltering battle. But even if the vision of such a nation could soon be realised, our battle would not cease. The enemy stealthily reappears after defeat;

his encroachments are perpetually renewed. Again our pickets must be aroused, the sentries posted, the column fallen in for advance. On that field there is no rest or pause, no interlude for victorious satisfaction. The army of freedom is like the Happy Warrior :—

“ Who, not content that former worth stand fast,
Looks forward, persevering to the last,
From well to better, daily self-surpast.”

For, in the campaign of freedom, no truce is lasting, and peace will never be concluded, unless, perchance, in some distant age, there should be revealed far-off the shining gates of that City which, in language familiar to Greek and Christian alike, is a heavenly, whose builder and maker is God.¹

¹ Plato, *Republic*, Book ix. 592, B. ; Hebrews xi. 10 and 16.

BOOKS FOR REFERENCE

CHAPTER I

THE MEANING OF FREEDOM

- J. S. MILL, *On Liberty*.
L. T. HOBHOUSE, *Liberalism*.
G. LOWES DICKINSON, *Liberty and Justice*.
BERNARD BOSANQUET, *Philosophical Theory of the State*.
LORD ACTON, *Essay on Liberty*.
HOBBS, *Essay on Liberty*.
J. R. SEELEY, *Political Science*.
T. H. GREEN, *Principles of Political Obligation*.
ARISTOTLE, *Ethics and Politics*.
PLATO, *Republic and Laws*.

CHAPTER II

THE ORIGIN OF AUTHORITY

- J. G. FRAZER, *The Golden Bough*.
EDWARD CLODD, *The Story of Primitive Man*.
LOCKE, *On Civil Government*.
HOBBS, *Leviathan*.
ROUSSEAU, *Contrat Social*.
TAINE, *Rights of Man*.
BUCKLE, *History of Civilisation*.

CHAPTER III

THE EARLY EMPIRES

- The Old Testament*.
HERODOTUS (edited by R. W. Macan).
C. SEIGNOBOS, *History of Ancient Civilisation*.
J. B. BURY, *History of Greece*.
GEOTE, *History of Greece*.
G. B. GRUNDY, *The Great Persian War*.
G. B. GRUNDY, *Thucydides and the History of his Age*.
W. WARDE FOWLER, *The City State of the Greeks and Romans*.
H. F. PELHAM, *Outlines of Roman History*.
MOMMSEN, *History of Rome*.
MOMMSEN, *The Provinces from Cæsar to Diocletian*.

J. L. STRACHAN DAVIDSON, *Cicero*.

W. WARDE FOWLER, *Cæsar*.

W. WARDE FOWLER, *Social Life at Rome in the Time of Cicero*.

W. WARDE FOWLER, *The Religious Experience of the Roman People*.

SIR SAMUEL DILL, *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius*.

J. B. BURY, *Student's History of the Roman Empire*.

GIBBON, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (edited by J. B. Bury).

CHAPTER IV

CHRISTIANITY AND FEUDALISM

H. W. C. DAVIS, *Mediæval Europe*.

H. W. C. DAVIS, *Charlemagne*.

C. W. C. OMAN, *Short History of the Byzantine Empire*.

C. W. C. OMAN, *History of Europe, 476-918*.

H. A. L. FISHER, *The Mediæval Empire*.

JAMES BRYCE, *The Holy Roman Empire*.

T. F. TOUT, *The Empire and the Papacy*.

W. E. H. LECKY, *History of European Morals*.

GWATKIN AND WHITNEY, *Cambridge Mediæval History*.

C. SEIGNOBOS, *History of Mediæval Civilisation*.

LAVISSE and RAMBAUD, *Histoire Générale*.

THOMAS HODGKIN, *Italy and her Invaders*.

MILMAN, *History of Latin Christianity*.

GREGOROVIVS, *History of Rome in the Middle Ages*.

CHAPTER V

TAXATION AND REPRESENTATION

J. F. BRIGHT, *History of England*.

BISHOP STUBBS, *Constitutional History of England*.

H. W. C. DAVIS, *England under the Normans and Angevins*.

E. A. FREEMAN, *Old English History*.

E. A. FREEMAN, *History of the Norman Conquest*.

SIR C. T. ILBERT, *Parliament, its History, Constitution, and Practice*.

THOROLD ROGERS, *History of Agriculture and Prices*.

JOSEPH CLAYTON, *Leaders of the People*.

JOSEF REDLICH, *Procedure of the House of Commons*.

CHAPTER VI

THE FREEDOM OF THE SOUL

J. A. SYMONDS, *The Renaissance in Italy*.

RANKE, *History of the Reformation*.

G. M. TREVELYAN, *Wycliffe and his Times*.

- BISHOP CREIGHTON, *History of the Papacy.*
 SISMONDI, *History of the Italian Republics.*
 MOTLEY, *The Rise of the Dutch Republic.*
 HAKLUYT, *Voyages.*
 LAVISSE and RAMBAUD, *Histoire Générale.*
Cambridge Modern History, vols. i. and ii.

CHAPTER VII

THE AGE OF REVOLUTION

- J. F. BRIGHT, *History of England.*
 S. R. GARDINER, *History of England under the Stuarts.*
 S. R. GARDINER, *The Thirty Years' War.*
 CARLYLE, *Cromwell's Letters and Speeches.*
 JOHN MORLEY, *Oliver Cromwell.*
 W. E. H. LECKY, *History of England in the Eighteenth Century.*
 J. R. SEELEY, *Expansion of England.*
Cambridge Modern History, vols. viii. and ix.
 CARLYLE, *French Revolution* (Rose's edition).
 LORD ACTON, *Lectures on the French Revolution.*
 HILAIRE BELLOC, *The French Revolution.*
 P. A. KROPOTKIN, *The Great French Revolution.*
 J. HOLLAND ROSE, *Life of Napoleon.*
 AUGUST FOURNIER, *Life of Napoleon.*
 ALICE STOFFORD GREEN, *Irish Nationality.*
 MAZZINI, *Life and Writings.*
 MAZZINI, *God and the People.*
 MAZZINI, *Essays* (edited by J. Okey).
 BOLTON KING, *History of Italian Unity.*
 G. M. TREVELYAN, *Garibaldi.*

CHAPTER VIII

TOWARDS DEMOCRACY

- G. P. GOOCH, *History of Our Time.*
 J. F. BRIGHT, *History of England.*
 C. SEIGNOBOS, *Political History of Contemporary Europe.*
 LAWRENCE LOWELL, *Government and Parties in Contemporary Europe.*
 G. LOWES DICKINSON, *The Development of Parliament during the
 Nineteenth Century.*
 ERSKINE MAY, *Parliamentary Practice* (continued to 1911 by Francis
 Holland).
 WALTER BAGEHOT, *The English Constitution.*
 A. V. DICEY, *Law of the Constitution.*
 SIR WILLIAM ANSON, *Law and Custom of the Constitution.*
 SIDNEY and BEATRICE WEBB, *The History of Trade Unionism.*
 SIDNEY and BEATRICE WEBB, *Industrial Democracy.*

- J. L. and BARBARA HAMMOND, *The Village Labourer, 1760-1830.*
 J. A. HOBSON, *Imperialism.*
 J. A. HOBSON, *The Industrial System.*
 L. T. HOBHOUSE, *Democracy and Reaction.*
 J. S. MILL, *The Subjection of Women.*
 E. S. PANKHURST, *The Suffragette.*
 LORD MORLEY, *Life of Gladstone.*
 BARRY O'BRIEN, *Life of Parnell.*
 JUSTIN MCCARTHY, *History of Our Own Times.*
 JAMES BRYCE, *The American Commonwealth.*
 J. E. C. BODLEY, *France.*
 BOLTON KING and T. OKEY, *Italy To-day.*
 WILLIAM ARCHER, *Life of Ferrer.*
 SIR ALFRED LYALL, *Asiatic Studies.*
 SIR HENRY COTTON, *New India.*
 SIR VALENTINE CHIROL, *Indian Unrest.*
 LORD MILNER, *England in Egypt.*
 THEODORE ROTHSTEIN, *Egypt's Ruin.*
 R. W. SETON-WATSON, *The Southern Slav Question.*
The Cambridge Modern History, vols. x., xi., xii.

THE PEOPLE'S BOOKS

"A wonderful enterprise, admirably planned, and deserving the highest success."—*The Nation*.

THE FIRST DOZEN VOLUMES

5. BOTANY: THE MODERN STUDY OF PLANTS.

By M. C. STOPES, D.Sc., Ph.D., F.L.S.

"A wonderful 'multum in parvo,' and cannot fail, by its lucidity and pleasant method of exposition, to give the reader not only a clear conception of the science of botany as a whole, but also a desire for fuller knowledge of plant life."—*Notes and Queries*.

10. HEREDITY. By J. A. S. WATSON, B.Sc.

"Accurate, and written in a simple manner which will stimulate those who are interested to wider reading."—*Athenæum*.

12. ORGANIC CHEMISTRY. By Professor J. B. COHEN, B.Sc., F.R.S.

"An excellently clear and efficient treatise on a subject not easily confined within a short or untechnical discourse."—*The Manchester Guardian*.

13. THE PRINCIPLES OF ELECTRICITY. By NORMAN R. CAMPBELL, M.A.

"As for Mr. Norman Campbell's treatise 'in petto' I cannot but think it a model of its kind. He takes next to nothing for granted."—*Sunday Times*.

15. THE SCIENCE OF THE STARS. By E. W. MAUNDER, F.R.A.S., of the Royal Observatory, Greenwich.

"Will convey to the attentive reader an enormous amount of information in a small space, being clear and abreast of current knowledge."—*The Athenæum*.

26. HENRI BERGSON: THE PHILOSOPHY OF CHANGE. By H. WILDON CARR.

"The fact that M. Bergson has read the proof-sheets of Mr. Carr's admirable survey will give it a certain authoritativeness for the general reader."—*Daily News*.

32. ROMAN CATHOLICISM. By H. B. COXON. Preface, Mgr. R. H. BENSON.

"This small book is one which cannot fail to be of use to those who desire to know what Catholics do, and do not, believe."—*The Catholic Chronicle*.

39. MARY QUEEN OF SCOTS. By E. O'NEILL, M.A.

"Mrs. O'Neill, on 'Mary Queen of Scots,' is splendid; it is an attempt to give the very truth about a subject on which all feel interest and most lie freely."—*Daily Express*.


47. **WOMEN'S SUFFRAGE.** By M. G. FAWCETT, LL.D.
 "Mrs. Fawcett's admirably concise and fair-minded historical sketch of the women's suffrage movement. We could hardly ask for a better summary of events and prospects."—*Daily News*.
51. **SHAKESPEARE.** By Professor C. H. HERFORD, Litt.D.
 "Well worth a place alongside Professor Raleigh's book in the 'English Men of Letters.' . . . Sets a high note and retains it without effort."—*Observer*.
53. **PURE GOLD—A CHOICE OF LYRICS AND SONGS.** By H. C. O'NEILL.
 "An anthology of good poetry such as we might expect from a man of taste."—*Daily News*.
57. **DANTE.** By A. G. FERRERS HOWELL.
 "It is a fine piece of scholarship, and should be read by any one who is beginning the study of Dante, or indeed any one who is interested generally in the early process of European literature, for the process is here admirably analysed."—*The Manchester Guardian*.

THE SECOND DOZEN VOLUMES (Ready)

1. **THE FOUNDATIONS OF SCIENCE.** By W. C. D. WHETHAM, M.A., F.R.S.
11. **INORGANIC CHEMISTRY.** By Professor E. C. C. BALY, F.R.S.
14. **RADIATION.** By P. PHILLIPS, D.Sc.
22. **LORD KELVIN.** By A. RUSSELL, M.A., D.Sc., M.I.E.E.
23. **HUXLEY.** By Professor G. LEIGHTON, M.D.
36. **THE GROWTH OF FREEDOM.** By H. W. NEVINSON.
41. **JULIUS CAESAR: SOLDIER, STATESMAN, EMPEROR.** By HILARY HARDINGE.
43. **ENGLAND IN THE MIDDLE AGES.** By Mrs. E. O'NEILL, M.A.
54. **FRANCIS BACON.** By Professor A. R. SKEMP, M.A.
55. **THE BRONTËS.** By Miss FLORA MASSON.
60. **A DICTIONARY OF SYNONYMS.** By AUSTIN K. GRAY, B.A.
61. **HOME RULE.** By L. G. REDMOND HOWARD.

List of other Volumes in Preparation may be had.

LONDON AND EDINBURGH: T. C. & E. C. JACK
 NEW YORK: DODGE PUBLISHING CO.



JC
585
N4

Nevinson, Henry Woodd
The growth of freedom

PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE
CARDS OR SLIPS FROM THIS POCKET

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LIBRARY

