


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HANDBOOK
OF
MORAL PHILOSOPHY.



HANDBOOK
OF
MORAL PHILOSOPHY

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London
MACMILLAN & CO.
AND NEW YORK

1895

BOOKSELLERS & STATIONERS,
VANNEVAR & CO.,
YONGE STREET, - - TORONTO.

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HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.



INTRODUCTION.

SPHERE AND METHOD OF INQUIRY.

1. Moral Philosophy is the rational explanation of our moral actions, moral nature, and moral relations. It is a science of the life subject to moral law, in so far as the study of its activities enables us to reach a science of conduct. It is, first, a system of truth scientifically discovered and arranged; then a science of the practice of morality, as this implies knowledge of moral distinctions and power of 'self-determination.' It is a theory of knowing and of being, but only of such *knowing* as is concerned with moral distinctions, and only of *being* possessing and applying such knowledge.

'Moral Philosophy' and 'Ethics' are commonly used as synonymous. Etymologically, the Greek designation, Ethics (Ἠθικά, from ἦθος and ἔθος, custom, habit), refers to a more limited department of inquiry. It applies to conduct, taken in its more outward and historical aspects. The same limitation, however, exists in the Latin designation, Moral, since *mores* concerns primarily manners or customs. Aristotle, distinguishing ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ from ἡ διανοητικὴ ἀρετὴ, says (N. Eth. II. i. 1), 'ethical virtue has

its rise from habit, whence also it has its name but slightly modified from *ἔθος*.' According to the best usage, however, the names Moral Philosophy and Ethics are equivalent; *Moralis Philosophia*, *Tà Ἠθικά*; German, *Ethik* or *Sittenlehre*.

'2. Moral Philosophy ranks as a Science of Observation. 'Observation' has by some been unwarrantably applied to the recognition of external facts only. The term describes a mental *exercise*—does not carry any implication as to the facts or objects contemplated. Mental sciences, as truly as Physical, are sciences of observation.

In its higher development, when dealing with relations transcending the facts of experience, as when treating of our relations to the Absolute Being, Moral Philosophy becomes a Speculative Science. Any denial of a speculative branch of the science must rest on the denial of the need for a philosophy of the fact of man's existence.

Moral Philosophy is further described as a Practical Science, because the knowledge embraced is concerned with the guidance of human conduct. It is, therefore, properly named The Science of Conduct: Sidgwick, *Methods of Ethics*, p. 1.

As an Observational Science, Moral Philosophy is subject, —*First*, to the Laws of Evidence, requiring that facts be ascertained, distinguished, and classified; and *Second*, to the Rules of Logic, requiring that generalisation be reached by legitimate induction, or by deduction from sure generalisations or from self-evident truths.

As a Speculative Science, Moral Philosophy is dependent for its start, and for the test of its results, upon the accuracy and completeness of the underlying Science of Observation.

Inductive method determines the foundations of the Science, including the phases of our knowledge, the nature of

our powers, and the variety of our moral relations. Deductive method finds application in its practical department for determination of the legitimate application of a recognised law; and also in the speculative department, as when we deduce from the laws of moral life the character of the Moral Governor and the conditions of his government.

The 'critical method' of Kant distinguishes between *a posteriori* and *a priori* in knowledge—between knowledge derived from experience and knowledge transcending, because necessary to, experience. This is merely Analytic, bearing on the question as to the source of knowledge. It is concerned with the preliminary department of observation, yet the answer to the problem raised must affect the whole structure of Philosophy, Intellectual and Ethical: Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*.

The Deductive Method of Spinoza proceeds from definitions of the highest conceptions—The Self-Caused, Substance, God—deducing thence a scheme of existence. The Dialectic Method of Hegel starts from the conception of Pure Being, and proceeds by logical evolution of the Categories in search of a theory of existence, considered as manifestation of the Idea or Absolute through Nature and Spirit, returning to the Idea: *Wissenschaft der Logik*; Stirling's *Secret of Hegel*; Wallace's *Hegel*; Caird's *Hegel*. Both of these presuppose a theory of Experience, without which it is impossible to proceed; and they contemplate the whole area of Philosophy, including Ethics only as a branch of the general theory.

The distinction between experiential and original—*a posteriori* and *a priori*—elements in thought has led to some confusion in the accounts given of method. Thus Wilson and Fowler (*Principles of Morals*, p. 114) say, 'There are two methods in accordance with one or other of which the science of morals

may be treated—the one *a priori*, the other *a posteriori*.’ The terms *a priori* and *a posteriori* do not indicate methods, but results obtained by use of the one Inductive Method. They may, indeed, fitly describe schemes of thought resulting, but they cannot accurately describe methods employed. The question raised is this,—Are there original presuppositions for thought? This question can be answered only by analysis of consciousness, under the one Method,—Induction.

If there are original presuppositions for thought, this conclusion will affect the whole structure of Philosophy, Intellectual and Ethical. Sidgwick, in his *Methods of Ethics*, chap. i., properly defines Ethics as ‘the study of what ought to be done.’ To know the ought must be prior to the doing of it, and our leading question will be how we know what ought to be done. Sidgwick, also classifying theories, places them under the name of *Methods*, and says ‘The Methods may be classed under three heads,—Intuitionism, and the two kinds of Hedonism, —Egoistic and Universalistic,’ otherwise Altruistic, having a regard to others in preference to self. These, however, do not indicate Methods, but forms of Theory.

3. The order of Investigation must, as in all sciences, be from the simple to the complex. Moral Philosophy must, therefore, begin with individual experience; and must pass thence to social life, and thereafter to the wider testimony of History. From these fields of observation it rises to problems transcending observation, and springing by rational necessity out of the facts observed.

Comte pleads for commencing our study with society, because the laws of human conduct are best inferred from the actions of men in the mass: *Cours de Philosophie Positive*, i. 31, 2d ed. Mill’s reply is conclusive:—‘Human beings

in society have no properties but those which are derived from, and may be resolved into, the laws of nature of individual man :’ *System of Logic*, 2d ed., ii. 543. But it must be granted that observation of the actions of men is essential for completing our investigations : Hume (*Introd. to Treat. on Hum. Nature*).

4. CONSCIOUSNESS (Conscientia, Bewusstseyn) is the uniform condition of individual experience, the Knowledge of Self, with its actions and impressions. ‘Individual experience,’ and ‘the facts of consciousness,’ are thus identical. Experience, as belonging to man, implies intellectual activity ; no single phase of experience is possible without this. Consciousness is thus the spontaneous (involuntary) activity of intelligence, as it is aware of its own states.

Consciousness is employed too widely when it is made to include anything lower, such as physical impressions, or anything higher, such as the inferences drawn by the reasoning power. When it is said that we are conscious of muscular susceptibility, we mean that we are conscious of the sensation consequent on muscular activity ; when it is said that we are conscious that another means to inflict on us an injury, we intend only that we have such a suspicion or fear. Hamilton’s *Metaph.* i. 212, extends consciousness unwarrantably to the inclusion of the external object.

Hamilton says Consciousness ‘is the recognition by the thinking subject of its own acts or affections :’ *Metaph.* i. 201. Rather, let us say, it is the recognition by the thinking subject of *itself* and its own acts and affections, as these follow each other in the order of time, and are distinguished as like or unlike. It is an immediate knowledge which admits of no doubt. ‘What consciousness directly reveals, together with

what can be legitimately inferred from its revelations, composes, by universal admission, all that we know of the mind : ' Mill's *Exam. of Hamilton's Philos.*, p. 135, 3d ed.

The knowledge of our relation to an external world is only through the facts of consciousness, specially by sensations and muscular activity. This is also the mode by which we have our knowledge of qualities of external objects : Mill's *Exam.*, p. 166. Physical impressions are facts of experience only as they awaken sensations in consciousness. A striking proof of this is given by application of local anæsthetics, under the action of which the cutting of a muscle produces no sense of pain. The sensory nerves subjected to treatment are restrained from activity, and consciousness has not its usual content and testimony : Spencer's *Principles of Psychology*, 2d ed. vol. i., appendix, p. 631.

Consciousness, though associated with physical energy, is not so connected with it as to make the latter the measure of the former. 'Unconsciousness' is used in a variety of senses :—

1. As in sleep, severance from ordinary sensory impressions, so as to be without sensations usually afforded by the special senses.
2. As in a faint, when physical prostration incapacitates for sensory activity.
3. As in fever, when the abnormal agitation of brain is interpreted by the mind, and assigned to imaginary causes, while the patient is unaware of surrounding occurrences. Those said to be unconscious are often aware of what is transpiring around them, and often abnormally active in mental exercise.

For a full investigation of the nature, evidence, and authority of Consciousness, Hamilton's *Metaphysics*, Lects. xi.-xvi., and Note H. in Reid's *Works*. Hamilton's Lects. on Consciousness will specially repay study : *Metaphysics*, vol. i.

5. THE INTROSPECTIVE MODE OF INQUIRY is an essential requisite for the construction of a science of mind. It is named Introspective, as the individual must look *within himself* in order to attend to the facts of his experience ; Reflective, because he must *turn back* upon the facts of experience. Only as our experience is subjected to observation and analysis is it possible to construct a philosophy of mental activity.

Comte has declared Introspection impossible. He says, 'In order to observe, your intellect must pause from activity ; yet it is this very activity which you want to observe. If you cannot effect the pause, you cannot observe ; if you do effect it, there is nothing to observe :' *Cours de Philos. Positive*, Martineau's Translation, i. p. 11. This argument overlooks the following facts : that intellectual activity implies consciousness ; that attention to its own states is a possibility of mind ; that repetition in consciousness of the same act leads to increased familiarity with it ; that memory admits of the recall of what has previously passed through consciousness. The condition equally of impression and of action is that we know them as our own. A pause is truly impossible, but it is needless.

Dr. Maudsley not only accepts the argument of Comte, but supplements it thus : '(a) There are but few individuals who are capable of attending to the succession of phenomena in their own minds ; (b) there is no agreement between those who have acquired the power of introspection. (c) As long as you cannot effect the pause necessary for self-contemplation there can be no observation of the current of activity ; if the pause is effected, then there is nothing to observe :' *The Physiology and Pathology of Mind*, p. 10, 2d ed. That is :—(1) Few can use the introspective method ; (2) those who

can are not agreed as to the results thereby secured; (3) nobody can use it at all.

The following passage will show how hard Comte found it to maintain his consistency. 'Philosophers tell us of the fundamental difficulty of knowing ourselves; but this is a remark which could not have been made till human reason had achieved a considerable advance. The mind must have attained to a refined state of meditation before it could be astonished at its own acts,—*reflecting upon itself, a speculative activity* which must be at first incited by the external world: ' *Cours de Philos. Positive*, vi. 6, Martineau's Translation, ii. p. 159. If it be possible to reflect on our mental activity, the objection to introspection is untenable.

On this subject see Holland's *Mental Physiology*, chapter on Consciousness; Mill places over against Introspection a 'Psychological mode of ascertaining the original elements of mind'; but introspection is really a condition of Psychology: *Exam. of Hamilton's Philos.*, pp. 170, 173. Compare 'the Natural History' mode in Prof. Bain's *Senses and Intellect* with Append. A. and chapter on 'Consciousness;' *Emotions and Will*, p. 555; Spencer's *First Principles*, 3d ed. pp. 79, 135, and his *Principles of Psychology*, 'On Consciousness in general,' 2d ed., ii. p. 291.

The testimony of Consciousness cannot be denied without self-contradiction. He who doubts relies on Consciousness for the affirmation of his doubt.

'According to all philosophers, the evidence of Consciousness, if only we can obtain it pure, is conclusive:' Mill's *Exam. of Hamilton*, 3d ed. p. 151. Here the 'implied assertion' is 'that we do know some things immediately or intuitively,' and 'The verdict of Consciousness is admitted on all hands to be a decision without appeal:' *Ib.* p. 152.

This is the key of the Cartesian position, and the basis of

modern philosophy : Des Cartes's *Method*, i. ii. iii., translated by Professor Veitch ; Leibnitz, *Nouveaux Essais*, ii. 27.

Maudsley thinks the madman's delusion throws discredit on consciousness : *Physiol. and Pathol. of Mind*, p. 11. In reality the pathology of brain depends for scientific validity on the reliableness of the madman's consciousness. If a man says that he constantly sees spectres which have no existence, or that he is made of glass, it is because his consciousness is trusted that we but pronounce him insane.

6. Interpretation of Consciousness is the business of philosophy. This implies analysis of our states of consciousness, discrimination and classification of facts, determination of the conditions of their rise, and discovery of the laws of their combination. In this way a rational explanation of our experience is constructed.

Every state of consciousness involves three elements. The shortest expression of such a state is, I—am conscious—of a perception. An act of perception thus standing as the illustration, there are in the single state the conscious knower, the consciousness, and the present experience, viz., a perception. In consciousness, the recognition of self is invariable ; the special exercise recognised is variable. While, therefore, Consciousness is knowledge of a present state, it is always knowledge of Self as Intelligence—it is Self-consciousness, *Selbstbewusstseyn* ; and knowledge of difference, in respect of succession in time and variation in characteristic.

'Every complete act of consciousness, besides distinction and relation, implies likeness. . . . To produce that orderly consciousness which we call intelligence, there requires the assimilation of each impression to others that occurred earlier in the series :' Spencer's *First Principles*, 3d ed., p. 79.

'Every thought involves a whole system of thoughts, and ceases to exist if severed from its various correlatives. . . . From the unformed material of consciousness a developed intelligence can arise only by a process, which in making thoughts defined also makes them mutually dependent—establishes among them certain vital connections, the destruction of which causes instant death of the thoughts:' *Ib.* p. 135. Cf. Spencer's *Principles of Psychology*, 2d ed., vol. ii. p. 291. It is the interpretation of the order and relations of our thoughts which constitutes a scheme of philosophy. For Kant's view that this must imply *a priori* elements of consciousness in contrast with *a posteriori*, see his *Critique of Pure Reason*.

Des Cartes's 'Cogito, ergo sum'—I think, therefore I am—is not an argument, but a simple statement of fact, that each thinker is as certain of his own existence as of his own thought—is certain of the one in being certain of the other. Personal existence is the existence of a thinker, and is altogether superior to physical existence. On the physiological theory, Mind is only a manifestation of physical organism; thought is a function of brain: *Rapport du Physique et du Moral de l'Homme*, P. J. G. Cabanis.

Help towards study of the history of philosophic thought as to knowledge of Self, as given in consciousness, may be traced in the following line. DES CARTES makes the knowledge of self an essential element in all knowledge.—*Method* (1637), Pt. IV., Veitch's ed. p. 74; *Meditations* (1647), II., Veitch's ed. p. 24. He says,—'I think, therefore I am; if I doubt, still I affirm my own existence; if I am deceived, still I exist.' LOCKE, tracing all knowledge to sensation and reflection, admitted the existence of *mind*, defining Person as 'a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself.'—*Essay* (1690) II. 27, sec. 9. HUME denied 'that we are every moment intimately

conscious of what we call our Self,' maintaining that we are only 'a bundle of perceptions.'—*Treatise on Human Nature* (1739), i. iv. 6. The Scotch School, attacking the Sceptical Philosophy, sought some better basis than that of Locke. But REID spoke hesitatingly of the knowledge of mind; 'The attributes of mind, and particularly its operations, we know clearly, but of the thing itself we have only an obscure notion.'—*Intellectual Powers* (1785), Essay v. c. 2. STEWART followed more decidedly on the negative side, saying of mind, that 'we are not immediately conscious of its existence.'—*Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind*, vol. i. (1792), Introd. Part I. In these statements, both authors were hampered by discussions as to the Essence of Mind. The French School became more clear on the immediate consciousness of mind. ROYER-COLLARD led the van, in the Lectures delivered in Paris in 1811, published by Jouffroy in his edition of Reid's Works, vols. iv. and v. MAINE DE BIRAN, an independent thinker, made it his chief concern to maintain our consciousness of mind as a cause or active force.—*Exam. des Leçons de Philosophie de M. Laromiguière* (1809), Œuvres Philosophiques, edited by Cousin, 1841. After him, Cousin himself followed on the same side, *Cours de Philosophie*, Leçons v. vi., Wight's translation; *History of Modern Philosophy*, Edinburgh, 1852, vol. i. p. 88 and p. 109; and also *Leçons sur la Philosophie de Kant*, Leçon VIII., Henderson's translation, *The Philosophy of Kant*, London, 1854, p. 193. THÉODORE JOUFFROY, Prof. of Mor. Phil. at Paris, took the same ground, in his Introduction to Stewart's Outlines, translated by George Ripley of Boston, U.S.A., being the first of the *Philosophical Essays* by M. Théo. Jouffroy, Edinburgh, 1839 (Clark's series), see p. 11 and p. 56. The French movement is ably traced in Morell's *History of Modern Philosophy*. The German School, in its reaction against Hume, took a different course under guidance of its master spirit, KANT. In the development of a transcendental philosophy, Kant held that the Ego or Self is known in every conscious state; but such knowledge he considered a knowledge of mind only as phenomenon. 'The empirical consciousness which accompanies different representations is in itself fragmentary and disunited.' 'Only because I can connect a variety of given representations in one consciousness, is it possible that I can represent to myself the identity of consciousness in these representations:' *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 82. This is his

transcendental unity of self-consciousness. Subjoined are detailed references:—*Kritik der Reinen Vernunft* (1781), Vorrede zur zweiten Auflage, note, *Werke*, Rosencranz, Th. II. Supplement ii. p. 685. A very important passage withdrawn from the latest editions, given by Rosencranz as Supplement xi., Th. II. 716. Another withdrawn passage given by Rosencranz, Supplement xiv., Th. II. 730, and Supplement xxi., Th. II. 774. And Des Zweiten Buchs der Transcendentalen Dialektik, Erstes Hauptstück. Mr. Meiklejohn in his translation has wisely embraced all the passages in the text, admitting of the references being given to the pages, Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. xl. Introd., pp. 41, 81, 86, 95, 168, and 237. Seth's *Hegelianism and Personality*, p. 14. Progression of thought was by a transition to higher abstraction, with exception of a decided protest from JACOBI (1743-1819), 'The Faith-Philosopher,' as Ueberweg calls him, *Geschichte*, Th. III. 206, v.—*David Hume, über den Glauben, oder Idealismus und Realismus*, 1787. The elder FICHTE (J. G.) followed Kant with an Idealism which made the Ego or I the universal reason. Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre*, 1794; in the following year, SCHELLING took the same line, in his work entitled *Vom Ich als Princip der Philosophie, oder über das Unbedingte im Menschlichen Wissen*, 1795. With both of these philosophers the End was The Absolute or The Unconditioned, Das Unbedingte. HEGEL (*Wissenschaft der Logik*, 1812), working backwards, sought a beginning in the most general of the categories—Being—at the extreme opposite from Kant's commencement in the *Kritik d. R. V.*, 'all our knowledge begins with experience.' From Being Hegel comes, through dialectic evolution, to self-realisation. Later German thinking has returned upon Psychology. J. F. HERBART (1776-1841) insists that Philosophy must begin with the facts of consciousness. He gives primary importance to the *Ich*, I, 'with which word the proper self-consciousness of every one is indicated to himself;' and this Ich, I, 'exists, that is, is present, not merely in Itself, but also with the Not-I,—Nicht-Ich.'—*Lehrbuch zur Einleitung in die Philosophie*, 1813, sec. 124, *Werke*, by Hartenstein, i. 198. F. E. BENEKE (1798-1854) followed in the same line, insisting upon self-knowledge in self-consciousness, *Erkenntnisslehre*, 1820. See also, the younger FICHTE (Immanuel Hermann), who regards each Personality as an eternal entity, *Das Erkennen als Selbsterkennen*, 1833, and *Zur Seelenfrage, eine phi-*

losophische Confession,—Of the Problem of the Soul, A Philosophical Confession,—1859, translated by Morell under the title, *Contributions to Mental Philosophy*, London, 1860; and ADOLF TRENDELENBURG, *Logische Untersuchungen*, 1840. For the earlier stages of German thought, see Schwegler's *History of Philosophy*, translated by Dr. James Hutchison Stirling, with notes of the translator; for the later stages, see Ueberweg's *History of Philosophy*, edited by Professors Henry B. Smith and Schaff.

As to immediate consciousness of Self, see Hamilton, *Metaph.* i.; admirably treated by Ferrier, *Institutes of Metaphysic*, in which prominence is given to this as fundamental; by MANSEL, *Prolegomena Logica*, p. 137; and *Metaphysics*, p. 180; and by President M'COSH's *Exam. of Mill's Philosophy*, p. 80. For the unfolding of Self-consciousness, Lotze's *Microcosmus*, B. II. ch. v. § 3; Transl. i. 248; Cyples's *Process of Human Experience*, ch. ii. p. 221, ix. p. 220.

7. Analysis and Synthesis are the two leading conditions for attainment of a completed philosophy of intelligent life. Analysis in its simpler form is a discriminating process. As it becomes more searching it is a disintegrating of unities, in order to reach a fuller knowledge of constituents. Synthesis, as later, is a process of reconstruction by discovery of the laws providing for combination of things different, thereby explaining the coherence of phenomena in a simple state, and leading ultimately to a knowledge of the unity of intelligent life.

Attainment of a true philosophy is only by the pathway of analysis, leading onwards to a trustworthy synthesis. As concerned with mental phenomena, Analysis is the action of the Intelligence fulfilling its critical function by distinguishing things in personal experience; Synthesis is the act of Intelligence fulfilling its constructive function by discovering the conditions of harmony and unity in simple states, and in life as a whole.

Analysis and Synthesis are the two sides of the one essential method in philosophising. The one is a separating in imagination what cannot be severed in reality, thereby representing the several parts included in our complex experience. We seek to know the parts singly, in order to *see into the constitution* of intellectual activity. The other is true insight into the coherence of the diverse parts constituting intellectual activity, *by seeing it in action*. By correlation of these two, we reach a new and fuller knowledge of intelligent procedure, seeing the whole constituents working into the activity of an intelligent life.

8. While our life is an intelligent life, and Thought is the central combining power, it is not a life of pure intelligence; there is large admixture of *feeling* in manifold forms. We are conscious of sensation, through the nerve sensibility of an organism so truly a part of our being, that its affections are our own. Touch, taste, smell, hearing, and vision, afford distinct illustrations. Physical organism provides avenues for knowledge. Intellectual action brings after it varieties of feeling. Our life is a unity, finding its oneness in Consciousness; but the physical is necessarily regarded as subordinate to intelligence, as physical action is not within consciousness—does not belong to the same sphere as thought-action—yet is unified through thought-action. Organism is more properly described as belonging to Self, than as essential to its nature—a link of relation between the Self and an outer world.

9. Psychology (*ψυχή*, the soul, and *λόγος*, science), and Physiology (*φύσις*, nature, and *λόγος*) are quite distinct, yet, being closely related sciences, are capable of rendering mutual aid. In *The Relations of Mind and Brain* I have discussed in detail the structure and functions of the nerve

system, as related to personal experience and activity. To that work reference is made for full treatment of this complicated question concerning the relations of Mind and Body.

Reference may also be made to the following works :—

Principles of Medical Psychology, by Feuchtersleben, Sydenham Society (1845) ; *The Dietetics of the Soul*, by same author—London (Churchill), 1852 ; Laycock, *Mind and Brain*, treating of ‘the correlations of consciousness and organisation’ ; Sir Benj. Brodie, *Psychological Inquiries*, 1st and 2d series ; *Chapters on Mental Physiology*, by Sir H. Holland ; Jouffroy’s *Philosophical Essays* ; Fichte’s *Way of the Blessed Life* ; Bain’s *Senses and Intellect* ; Spencer’s *Principles of Psychology*, vol. i. ; Quain’s *Anatomy* ; Turner’s *Anatomy* ; Maudsley’s *Physiology and Pathology of Mind* ; Carpenter’s *Mental Physiology* ; Ferrier’s *Functions of the Brain*, and *Localisation of Cerebral Disease* ; Bastian’s *The Brain as the Organ of Mind* ; Lotze’s *Microcosmus*.

10. Physiology and Psychology are so related, that neither science can adequately interpret its facts without reference to the other. The phenomena of consciousness known as sensation and perception require Physiological aid for their explanation. The Physiology of nerve and brain needs the testimony of consciousness in order to interpret ascertained facts. The Pathology of nerve and brain comes closely into contact with Psychology, disordered action of the physical organism bringing normal action into clearer relief.

11. Nerve and Brain supply the physical conditions of sensation, of external perception, and of locomotion. To what extent they afford conditions for higher forms of mental exercise is not clear. Nerves are of two classes, not differing in structure, but only in the manner of distribution, the one set being distributed to the surface of the body, providing for sensibility to contact with things external ; the second, terminating in the muscles, provides for the excitation of muscular

contractility. Each nerve fibre consists of a slender thread, surrounded by a viscous substance, which is enclosed in a sheath. The fibres, isolated from each other by the enclosing sheath, are arranged in bundles. By this means the solidarity of the nerve system is secured (Fig. 1). The Sensori-motor system may thus be contemplated first on its two sides, and next from its grand vitalising centre in the Brain.

1. *Sensory Nerves.* The nerves of sensation, in minute ramifications, come from the surface of the body, join in bundles,




FIG. 1.—REPRESENTATION OF NERVE FIBRE.

(From Turner's Anatomy.)

‘1. Medullated nerve fibres, showing the double contour. 2. A similar fibre, in which A is the primitive membrane, B the medullary sheath, C the axial cylinder, protruding beyond the broken end of the fibre. 3. Transverse section through the medullated fibres of a nerve, showing the axial cylinder in the centre of each fibre. Between the fibres is the interfibrous connective tissue.’

and stretch up towards the great nerve centre in the brain. The apparatus for each Special Sense—sight, hearing, taste, smell—consists first of a specially adapted terminal arrangement, placed on the surface, exposed to external media; second, of an ordinary sensory nerve; and third, of a special sensory apparatus, in intimate vital relation with the great nerve centre, the brain. Thus, contemplating the eyeball, which has its lens for concentration of the rays of light, its darkened chamber, with its pigmentary substance, the extremity of the sensory nerve is spread

out in fine expansion (the retina) within the back of the eyeball, and behind this is a minute arrangement of cones and rods, from which the nerve of sight takes its course to the sensory centre within the brain. The Auditory Apparatus is also elaborate,

—the outer chamber of the ear terminating in a membrane like a drum-head ; the middle chamber containing minute closely-related bones, along which vibration may be transmitted ; and the third, or inner chamber, consisting of a vestibule which communicates on one side with a spiral shell-like arrangement containing minute fibres, like tuning-forks ; on the other, three semi-circular canals. With these the auditory tract is in vital relation, taking its course from them to the medulla of the brain.

2. *Motor Nerves*.—From the nerve centres, on the other hand, go the whole sets of motor nerves, or nerves of movement, by which control is maintained over the muscles.

3. *Nerve Centres*.—Every nerve centre is distinguished by the presence of grey matter, consisting of masses of nerve cells connected with the white fibres. The brain (cerebrum) is in the form of two lobes or hemispheres, adapted for communication with the two sides of the body, and specially with the double organs of sense (Fig. 2). The matter of the brain is of two kinds,—the outer grey matter is vesicular, having as its function to supply nerve energy ; the inner or white matter is fibrous in nature, and is continuous with the central endings of the nerves. *Vide* Quain's *Anatomy*, 7th ed. vol. ii. p. 501 ; Turner's *Anatomy*, Part 1. ; Carpenter's *Principles of Human Physiology*, 7th ed.

The sensori-motor nerves are gathered together in the spinal cord. Above the spinal cord certain large masses are formed:—the *medulla oblongata*, consisting of several elongated tracts of nerve fibres, through some of which masses of fibres distributed to the right side of the body pass to the left side of the brain, and others distributed to the left side of the body pass to the right side of the brain ; and the *basal ganglia*, the front pair containing motor

nerves grouped together; the back pair containing sensory nerves mainly.




FIG. 2.—UPPER SURFACE OF THE BRAIN. $\frac{1}{2}$

(From Quain's *Anatomy*, after R. Wagner.)

'This view was taken from the brain of a famous mathematician, Professor C. F. Gauss, who died in 1854, aged 78. It is selected as an example of a well-formed brain of the full size with fully developed convolutions.

α , superior or first frontal convolution; α' , second or middle frontal; α'' , third or inferior frontal; A, A, ascending frontal convolution; B, B, ascending parietal convolution; b , first or upper parietal convolution; b' , second or middle; b'' , third or inferior; c , first or upper temporal convolution; c' , second or middle; c'' , third or lower; d , first or upper occipital convolution; d' , second or middle; d'' , third or lower; l , the superior longitudinal fissure; r , the fissure of Rolando; p , parieto-occipital fissure.'*

Nerve fibres are in living relation with nerve cells in the spinal cord, in the bodies above it, but chiefly in the

brain itself, where they are in incalculable numbers (Fig. 3). The nerve cell as a living thing, with nucleus, generates nerve energy for distribution over the nerve lines, and is dependent on blood supply giving nourishment to the protoplasm of which it largely consists. The relation between the nerve fibre and the nerve cell is illustrated by the following diagram (Fig. 4, p. 20). If the reader imagine a fibre connecting the cell S with the cell M, he will, with the fibre shown, have a representation of the communication from the sensitive surface to the muscular system, providing for reflex action.

Consideration of the elaborate organisation thus briefly described will prove conclusively that its two main functions are properly included in the designation,—Sensori-Motor System. This is well shown by the diagram (Fig. 5, p. 21), in which the upward and downward movements are represented by the course of the arrows, the dark circles representing sensory centres; the white, motor centres; while the cross lines indicate the transference of molecular motion from the one side to the other. On the lowest level we




FIG. 3.—SECTION OF THE GREY MATTER OF THE BRAIN, magnified to show the cellular structure.

(From Turner's *Anatomy*.)

'Vertical section through the third and fourth layers of grey matter of the superior frontal convolution. Large and small-sized pyramidal nerve cells; the neuroglia, with its corpuscles and some capillary blood-vessels, are represented.'

have the spinal cord ; above it the medulla oblongata ; immediately above, the pons ; still higher—to the right—the cerebellum or little brain ; to the left—on the same level—the basal ganglia ; and highest, the hemispheres. With the sensori-motor system there is connected a Sympathetic System, providing for the functional activity of internal organs. But the great nerve-system, with its two vast sets of fibres, spreading out in ramifications so minute as to perplex observation, secures conspicuously two grand results, sensibility and mobility throughout the organism. If we contemplate this double




FIG. 4.—DIAGRAMMATIC REPRESENTATION OF THE RELATIONS OF MOTOR AND SENSORY APPARATUS.

M, Motor apparatus ; *c*, Motor cell ; *n*, Nerve ; *m*, Muscle. *S*, Sensory apparatus ; *c*, Sensory cell ; *n*, Nerve ; *s*, Sensory corpuscle, as in touch. The arrow indicates, in each case, the direction in which the impulse is conveyed.

result from the central position which consciousness affords, we can recognise how much the sensori-motor system contributes to our experience. We cannot, indeed, pass by way of the sensory lines, and the related nerve centres, into consciousness ; nor can we pass from conscious personal determination, into the realm where cells are working, nerve lines are conducting, and muscles are contracting and expanding. But we know that sensations are produced in consciousness by means of sensory impressions ; and, making use of the related motor system, we can repeat sensory impressions until we have fully satisfied ourselves of the source of those

experiences which were distinguished as sensations. Further, we know that the whole muscular system is under command by means of the nerve system ; thus we know that by simply willing to move our hand or our foot, the movement is at once




FIG. 5.—DIAGRAM OF NERVE CENTRES AND LINES OF RELATION.

accomplished ; but we have no adequate conception of the manner in which our resolution determines the conduction by nerves and the movements of muscles.

If it be suggested that this nerve system is capable of still

higher action, which may fitly be named 'intellectual,' it is impossible to make good the suggestion on scientific evidence. That the sensory system affects the mind, and that the mind acts upon the motor system, and indirectly, through it, acts on the sensory system, are facts quite clearly established. In these respects Physiology and Psychology meet each other. Even though it is impossible to construct the bridge by which observers in the allied regions may pass over to meet each other, the correlation of facts warrants certainty as to the co-operation of the nerve system and a conscious intellectual activity distinguishing phenomena as successive in time and diverse in quality. Intellectual activity is known only in consciousness.

To suggest, as Haeckel does, that certain nerve cells may be named 'mind-cells,' and may have attributed to them a higher order of function, is an hypothesis without evidence of any kind. (1) To every nerve cell belong the functions of producing and transmitting nerve energy; to every one of them the functions of receiving and propagating molecular motion within the organism. We cannot deny these functions to any of the nerve cells. (2) There is ample proof that some cells have more numerous lines of communication than others with related parts of the nerve system, as appears from the number of processes connected with their structure; but we are entirely without evidence to support a conclusion that some cells fulfil other functions besides those described. (3) The facts obtained by electric stimulation of the cortex of the brain afford evidence of molecular action, but are quite unfavourable to the hypothesis of discriminating or reflective power. (4) The silent portions of the brain, yielding no response under application of electricity, lend no

countenance, by specialities in the form, size, processes, or functional activities of the nerve cells there discovered, to the supposition of nerve cells assigned to a kind of work higher than that ordinarily fulfilled by nerve cells.

The facts concerning 'animal intelligence' belong to an entirely different sphere of observation, separated completely from investigations concerning the structure of nerve cells and nerve fibres; and they do not support any hypothesis as to intellectual functions being attributable to nerve cells. On the other hand, they may, in some measure, sustain a hypothesis in favour of a subordinate type of mind belonging to the most highly-organised animals. Evolution of mind is a still more perplexing hypothesis to be examined hereafter. Popular opinion tends considerably to exaggerate the representations of animal intelligence. This arises partly from our imperfect acquaintance with the possibilities of the organism; partly from a tendency to explain animal activity by reference to our own conscious deliberation. Even in our own life, however, it can be demonstrated that nerve organism accomplishes much more than we have been accustomed to allow. On the other hand, our sympathy with animals induces us to cultivate our interest in them by attributing to them what belongs exclusively to ourselves. Without discrediting the multitude of stories concerning 'animal intelligence,' or abating the wonder they occasion, it should be observed that our interest in such stories indicates our common judgment of what is attainable by animals. We are readily astonished by incidents in animal life which indicate no large measure of intelligence. A sure and easily available test on the subject, however, is found in the limits of education; and all experience shows how marked are the limits of animal training—how

quickly we reach obstacles to our attempts to carry animals higher. Repetition of practice readily establishes facility in action ; but demands on understanding quickly disconcert the teacher's efforts. It is open to doubt whether even highly-trained animals afford more striking evidence of intelligence than animals in their natural state. For it must be allowed that, even after marvellous patience and pains, the trained animal is apt to make us sensible of its awkwardness and of the strained character of its special accomplishments.

12. After study of sensory apparatus, and of the discriminating power by which we distinguish succession in time and diversity of quality belonging to experience, *THE RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE* becomes conspicuous. We know only according to our powers to know. This is, in one sense, a truism, but it must affect the structure of all philosophy. The sensory impressions reaching the nerve centre, giving rise to sensations in consciousness, are such as our sensory apparatus is capable of conveying ; and our consciousness is determined accordingly. These impressions are, in many cases (for example, olfactory impressions), much less acute in us than in some of the lower animals. The dog's sense of smell we cannot approach, and probably most will allow that we are fortunate in the limitation. This consideration will, however, illustrate the proposition that our powers of sensibility and of knowledge cannot be regarded as the measure of existence. Reality and Knowledge can have only a partial harmony. We cannot transcend the relations of subject and object—of knower and known ; expatiating on the powers of intellect, we must also acknowledge its limits. We know, and can know, only in part. But our Intelligence moves with freedom and power in the vast field of existence. In doing so, guarded by all the checks which the laws of evidence

imply, THOUGHT is the key to all real knowledge. A complicated sensory system opens manifold avenues to impression; but it is Thought, occupying itself with the wealth of impression, which finds meaning in things, and lays up available stores of knowledge. In its acquirement, true knowledge is the movement of a rational nature, carrying terms of certainty within itself—that is, supplying from within the principles guiding its own procedure. Knowledge is existence rationalised. For this, two things are required—the conditions of rationalising must be given in mind, and the rational must exist in Nature and in experience. Even if it be said, as it may in a sense be accurately said, that knowledge is only of appearances—only of phenomena, still the appearances exist—something appears. Hence it is, in another sense, accurate that knowledge can never be merely of appearances. Both in the perception of appearance and in the rationalising of it there is knowledge of existence.

13. In the history of our activity Consciousness reveals **SELF-DETERMINATION**. Physical action is subordinate to mental. While sensory impression arises, in a large measure, independently of ourselves; and while motor activity is largely stimulated in a reflex type by means of sensory impressions; a special characteristic of human life appears in personal control of bodily movement, implying a general personal command over the entire motor apparatus, as distinct from the sympathetic system, which provides for automatic action of vital organs. This command is something distinctive in the history of organism, and not accounted for by organism itself. For though we speak of 'voluntary movements' in the life of the lower animals, this is only an indiscriminating use of a term beyond its proper sphere. Self-determination, as recognised here, belongs to the rational

nature, not to the physical—to the proper Self, not to the sensori-motor apparatus; it illustrates the dominion of an intelligent nature over organism, governed, as that is, by its own laws. This self-determination *presupposes* thought—reflection on rules of conduct, or on means and end, formation of rational purpose, and personal effort for its realisation. This we cannot attribute to organism—apparently not even to any animal. With use of an organ such as the hand, there is self-direction of its use; with observation, there is selection of objects and concentration upon them; with thinking, there is self-determination of the order of thought. The testimony of consciousness for these things is direct.

Consciousness of Self-determination is consciousness of power exercised by me over both mental and physical activity. Self is thus known, not merely as Intelligence, but also as Power. Man is a self-conscious, intelligent, self-determining Power—a Person, not a mere living Organism, not a mere Thing. Personality involves self-conscious being, self-regulated intelligence, and self-determined activity. But there is no warrant for saying, with Fichte, that the Ego posits itself, or with Hegel, that the Ego realises itself, or, that the Ego is Universal Reason manifesting itself. The manner in which self-consciousness manifests itself, and in which intellect is developed, is inconsistent with the hypothesis that in these The Absolute is immediately active.

Whether the self-knowledge belonging to Personality is capable of development from Sensation is a question held in reserve. The reasons adverse to such a view will be found in Part I. Div. ii. c. i.

In all study of human activity, attention must be turned on conditions of existence known as *external* to Self; conditions of our physical existence, as part of the material world; and

conditions of intelligence, concerning itself with the consequences of direct contact with the outer world.

Moral Philosophy concentrates attention on all that belongs to Self as the determiner of personal activity. It is concerned with self-determination in a life placed under guidance of moral law.

Personality implies speciality of relations to others possessing the characteristics of personality. This implies the distinction between Persons, Living Organisms, and Things.

14. Personality is the basis of Moral Activity. Only where there is knowledge of Self, as the intelligent source of action, is there discrimination of motive, act, and end, placed under sway of moral law. Where such discrimination does not exist there is no morality. The knowledge of moral distinctions, and the practice of morality, are in such a case impossible ; Shaftesbury, *Inquiry concerning Virtue*, I. ii. § 3. 'The idea of person involves determination to individual morality : ' Trendelenburg, *Naturrecht*, § 86, p. 158, Leipzig, 1860. Personality in each case wears an aspect of individuality, or separateness of being, with distinctive characteristics, hereditarily determined. The individuality which is peculiar to each, is subordinated to the personality common to all, and for which moral law is a universal imperative. Morality does not recognise a doctrine of Individualism, as if specialities gave the law of moral life ; it implies a universal law to which all personality is subject, as possessing common powers, with equal rights, involving common responsibilities, with such special obligations as special powers and opportunities may represent. 'Personality, as the universal characteristic of man, advances to the phenomenal in the form of individuality : ' Martensen, *Die Christliche Ethik*, Gotha, 1871.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS.

PHILOSOPHY OF MAN'S MORAL NATURE.

PRELIMINARY.

1. MORALITY being concerned with what *ought* to be in conduct, it is better to begin the study of our moral nature by considering how we attain to our knowledge of moral distinctions. Only after this has been considered can we wisely extend observation to the springs or sources of activity in natural or acquired impulses.

This order has been commonly reversed in works on Moral Philosophy. The early Scotch Philosophy, swayed by the old classification of our powers into those of the Understanding and the Will, ordinarily began with an inquiry as to the Impulses of our nature, denominated Active Powers. Hutcheson's *Passions and Moral Sense*; Reid's *Active Powers*; Beattie's *Moral Science*; Stewart's *Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers*. German Philosophy has commonly taken the opposite course, seeking first to ascertain what is the Ethical idea or notion: afterwards inquiring how it is to be realised.

2. In a purely Intellectual Philosophy, Psychology includes the facts of experience belonging to morals, along with other facts of consciousness, but simply for determination of the nature of the former as mental facts. In Ethical Philosophy,

Psychology ascertains the nature of the facts only as a preliminary for determining their moral significance.

3. The Psychology of Ethics must provide a philosophy of all that belongs to our personality as moral beings. The facts of consciousness afford the exclusive data on which theoretic positions must rest. 'The value of every ethical system must ultimately be tested on psychological grounds : ' Mansel's *Prolegomena*.

But the basis of moral distinctions must be found somewhere else than in our nature. Psychology cannot include all our inquiry. Our nature does not cause moral distinctions—does not afford their basis, but only a field of application for them. The law of life must be superior to the nature that it governs.

4. In a system of Philosophy, every affirmation is liable to have its truth determined by a variety of tests. The conditions of knowledge are manifold, and accordingly the tests are varied. In Moral Philosophy there is uniformly a double test,—the true in theory must harmonise with the facts in consciousness, and it must prove to be in harmony with the conditions of our life. The Thinkable must be the practicable. The Ought must be the possible. When actualised it must be the agreeable and the useful, thus contributing to life's development and to the good of society. These things are presupposed, if our nature be itself a harmony, adapted to its environment. They are implied in the Ought—in the admission of an Ethical Ideal—as representing an attainable excellence.

PART I.

MAN'S MORAL NATURE AS COGNITIVE.

INTUITIONAL THEORY.

CHAPTER I.

KNOWLEDGE OF MORAL DISTINCTIONS.

1. THERE is in consciousness a knowledge of moral distinctions among personal actions,—an acknowledgment of subjection of life to moral law,—a classification of actions into right and wrong; *Honestum* (*rectum*), *malum*; καλόν, κακόν; *Recht*, *Unrecht*.

This distinction is otherwise expressed by the phrases 'morally good' and 'morally bad.' The term 'morally' indicates the specific nature of goodness or badness, namely, such as can belong to personal actions, the outcome of intelligent appreciation of moral law. 'The right' thus comes under a wider generalisation, namely, 'the good,' which includes also happiness.

The greatness of contrast between actions and things, as well as between active and passive experience, makes it undesirable to lay the foundations of Moral Science on such a generality as The Good. The whole Ethical Philosophy of ancient times was seriously encumbered by discussing the

question of Morals under the category of *The Good*, rather than under the notion of *The Right*. This commonly led to an estimate of moral good by its utility, as in the part taken by Socrates in the *Protagoras*, 351-8, or to the use of good and evil in a double sense, as when Socrates makes the doing of injustice a greater evil, and the enduring of it a less: Plato's *Gorgias*, 509. As a compensation we receive from the Ancient Philosophy valuable discussions in support of the unapproachable superiority of moral good, among all forms of good attainable by man. With Plato, The Good comes to be identified with God himself: *Repub.* vii. 517; Jowett, ii. p. 351.

A disposition to make The Good the basis of Morality, natural among Utilitarians, appears in writings belonging to the opposite school. For example, Schleiermacher, *Die Sittenlehre*, Werke, Philos. vol. v.; the younger Fichte, *System der Ethik*, ii. 1, p. 27; Rothe, *Die Theologische Ethik*, vol. iii.; Martensen, *Die Christliche Ethik*.

The different senses in which the word 'moral' is used are well given by F. H. Bradley, *Ethical Studies*, p. 53. 'The word "moral" has three meanings; (1) moral is opposed to non-moral. The moral world or world of morality, is opposed to the natural world, where morality cannot exist. (2) Within the moral world of moral agents, "moral" is opposed to immoral. (3) Again, within the moral world, and the moral part of the moral world, "moral" is further restricted to the *personal* side of the moral life, and the moral institutions. It stands for the inner relation of this or that will to the universal, not to the whole outer and inner, realisation of morality.'

Close as is the relation between action and end, the rule for action must be the main consideration with a rational nature, and under this rule the reference to end must be subordinate. The true meaning of Ethical life is found in its principle of action or rational maxim, not in its end. Unless we first discover and adequately interpret the principle or

rule of conduct, we cannot determine what is the true ethical end. Not till we have interpreted the structure can we forecast its possibilities.

2. The distinction between right and wrong in conduct is universally acknowledged. 'Those who have denied the reality of moral distinctions may be ranked among the disingenuous disputants; nor is it conceivable that any human creature could ever seriously believe that all characters and actions were alike entitled to the affection and regard of every one.'—Hume's 'Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals,' *Essays*, vol. ii. p. 223.

Granting moral distinctions, our first question must be,—How are they known? Of such distinctions, these may be taken as examples:—truthfulness, kindness, persevering use of powers, courage, endurance of privation, which are right actions; while vanity, envy, dishonest dealings, and wilful infliction of injury, are wrong actions.

Actions possessed of moral quality are the actions of intelligent agents, subject to law as an imperative of life. The term 'action,' when employed in a wider sense, carries a reference beyond the moral sphere, as when we speak of the 'action' of water on the rock—organic action, and the action of an animal in walking or eating. Where deliberate reflection on the nature of the act is impossible, moral quality cannot belong to the action.

Moral actions imply intelligent regard to law, and are carried out by personal determination for a definite end. Every moral action, therefore, is capable of being regarded in three relations, according to its origin, progress, and contemplated result or purpose. Motive, act, and end, may be distinguished from each other as separate acts. The motive may be right, though the act is wrong. The end, being the voluntary purpose of the agent, will commonly harmonise in moral character with the motive.

3. The varieties of activity possible to man, being accord-

ing to the powers belonging to his nature, may be contemplated as physical, intellectual, and moral. Action merely physical, or purely intellectual, does not necessarily come within the moral sphere.

Actions not in themselves moral, may often acquire moral character by being involved in conduct to which moral law applies. Our life being a unity, all parts of our nature may be concerned with lines of dutiful action. Every power belonging to us is capable of performing its part in moral activity, or is liable to restraint under authority of moral law. Physical development, and health, as well as intellectual activity, thus come under moral law, which regulates intelligent life as a whole.

Actions not in their essence moral actions are inappropriately described as 'morally indifferent.' The distribution of our actions into 'good, bad, and indifferent,' is inadmissible.

The designation 'indifferent' has come from the Stoic Philosophy, ἀδιάφορα, things neither good nor bad.—See Zeller's *Stoics*, etc., p. 218. The distinction was accepted by Cicero, who translated ἀδιάφορον by *indifferens*: 'Quod illi ἀδιάφορον dicunt, id mihi ita occurrit, ut *indifferens* dicerem.'—*De Finibus*, iii. 16. Cicero also described things indifferent by the designation *res mediae*, things lying in the middle between right and wrong. This phrase is equally unsuitable, for things morally right are not separated from things morally wrong by an intermediate territory. Moral distinctions belong to the inner sphere of life, the sphere of motive and purpose, as these are concerned with the direction of conduct. Beyond the sphere where moral law governs purpose, moral characteristics cease to appear.

The contrast is interesting between this classification of things without moral quality as *res mediae*, and Aristotle's *mean*, μεσότης, the middle course in action, as determining the nature of virtue. The Stoics aimed at a classification of

different kinds of good, placing such external good as health of body, honours, and wealth, as *res mediae*. Aristotle, looking at activity as determined by impulse, made the mean the test of virtuous action. In the Scotch Philosophy, Reid accepted the classification of actions into 'good, bad, and indifferent.'—*Active Powers*, Essay v. c. iv. (Hamilton's Ed. p. 646.)

4. That moral distinctions are recognised by men generally, is manifest from the testimony of individual conduct and of social life. Conclusions reached introspectively may thus be tested by external observation. *First*, Every man judges of the rectitude of his actions, and experiences self-approbation or self-condemnation accordingly. Remorse for wrongdoing is essentially different from vexation experienced because of failure. *Second*, Men agree in approving certain actions as right, such as just and benevolent actions, and all nations inflict punishment on evil-doing. The value of this evidence is somewhat diminished by the fact that men do not absolutely agree in the conclusions drawn. It is enough, however, that they agree in the recognition of laws of right conduct, and in the grand lines of action which ought to be pursued, never disputing that just and benevolent actions are right.

The explanation of disagreement on moral questions is found in the contrast between the *ought* of moral law and the force of personal *desire*. If only we find the rational basis of moral distinctions, we shall discover that diversity of opinion in morals arises in great measure at the point where the cleavage occurs between thought of duty and regard to self-interest.

5. PROBLEMS.—(1) State the objections against THE GOOD being taken as affording a commencement for Ethical Inquiry? (2) Does the identification of pleasure with the good, as in the *Protagoras*, 354-6, rest on sufficient grounds? (3) Animals may be trained to obedience; a dog will rush into the water

to save a drowning child ; animals undomesticated and untamed will die for the protection of their young : do such facts indicate knowledge of moral distinctions? Darwin's *Descent of Man*, I. c. iv., 'The Moral Sense.' On the opposite side, Wallace's *Contributions to the Theory of Natural Selection*.

CHAPTER II.

MORAL JUDGMENTS.

1. OUR first steps towards a philosophy of morals must be taken in searching for an answer to the question—How do we know that certain actions are right actions?

A further question must arise—How do we come to *feel* as we do on matters of right and wrong in conduct? This question, however, must be regarded as a later inquiry, waiting answer to the other. This second question is stated now only to be avowedly deferred, thereby escaping entanglement. That it cannot be considered here is clear on this ground, that what we *feel* as to right and wrong implies moral distinctions, the recognition of which first needs explanation.

At the outset our inquiry is concerned with Knowledge, and how it is attained ; with Understanding, and the basis on which it rests ; with our Thought, and its warrant.

2. Knowledge of matters of fact is obtained in three distinct forms. These are—*Sensation*, knowledge of impressions made on our physical nature ; *Perception*, knowledge of objects by interpretation of our experience ; *Judgment*, a more advanced knowledge of objects, either by means of simple comparison, or by inference. The second and third are commonly united in intellectual procedure, for Judgment is essential to Perception.

These distinctions in the exercise of intellectual power are here simply accepted as the product of Psychology, of the intellectual powers.

As Affections and Sentiments presuppose knowledge of qualities belonging to objects observed, and as the Laws of Association merely provide for the combination of the facts of knowledge, these cannot afford any theory of the origin of our knowledge of moral distinctions. Sentimental and Associational theories of the recognition of these distinctions are thus excluded on exactly the same ground. Such theories pass by the main question—How do we *know* the right? They prematurely introduce forms of experience incapable of explanation save by a preceding knowledge.

The following theories are excluded on these grounds, that moral distinctions are recognised by an 'inner sense' (Hume); by a special affection, such as Benevolence (Edwards), or by Sympathy (Adam Smith), or by a feeling of approveableness (Thomas Brown), or by Association of Ideas (Mill).

3. (a) Knowledge of moral quality in an action is not of the nature of Sensation. Sensation is an involuntary experience consequent on personal relation with a sensitive organism, and with objects capable of making impressions on that organism. Sensations of heat, cold, weariness, and pain are examples. Sensations supply conditions necessary for knowledge of the qualities of material objects, but they cannot account for knowledge of objects other than material. They express only the consequences of functional activity of the nerve system.

Those writers who described the moral faculty as a 'Moral Sense,' meant by that either a power of perception, or of judgment, with attendant emotions, not a mere capacity of feeling or of sensation. Thus Shaftesbury (1671-1713) says: 'In a creature capable of forming general notions of things, not only the outward beings which offer themselves to the sense are the objects of the affection, but the very *actions* themselves, and the *affections* of pity, kindness, gratitude, and their contraries, being brought into the mind by reflection, become objects. So that by means of this reflected sense,

there arises another kind of affection towards those very affections themselves which have been already felt, and are now become the subject of a new liking or dislike.' Behaviour and actions are said to be 'presented to our understanding,' and the faculty is said to be 'a sentiment of judgment.'—*Inquiry concerning Virtue*, I. 2, sect. 3; *Characteristics*, vol. ii. 29. So Hutcheson, *Syst. of Mor. Phil.*; and *Passions and Moral Sense*. In excluding Sensation as a lower order of experience antecedent to Thought, it becomes clear that on similar grounds we must exclude all feeling which is dependent on Thought. Till we have accounted for our thought we cannot assign theoretic value to that which depends upon it. Though it be true, as Hume says, that 'nature has made such (moral) feeling universal in the race,' the explanation of this must, in the first place, be found in the thought in connection with which the Feeling arises. Sidgwick states this well: 'By sense is sometimes meant a faculty not conversant with objective truth, but only with the sensations—purely subjective phenomena—of the sentient being, which may vary from A to B without either being in error. But then such a faculty does not furnish us with what are here called moral, but rather with psychological distinctions; its exercise does not lead to the affirmations "that this and that action ought to be done," but rather that this and that action excite in me such and such specific emotions.'—*Methods of Ethics*, B. I. ch. iii.

(b) Knowledge of the moral quality of an action is not of the nature of Perception. Perception is simple recognition of fact, as in observing a table or chair, or a sensation of heat or of colour; but the use of the names table, chair, colour, implies more than perception, thus showing that a power of understanding is essential for perception as we exercise it. Perception itself includes only such facts as are capable of being known by simple observation. Thus, perception gives knowledge of an extended surface, but not of its measure; knowledge of a signal, but not of its meaning;

knowledge of an action, but not of its moral character. Knowledge of the measure of a surface, of the meaning of a signal, and of the character of an action, are examples of knowledge requiring the application of a standard, whether the standard be universal or adventitious.

(c) Knowledge of moral quality in actions is of the nature of Judgment. When moral distinctions are considered we have passed into the region of Thought proper, where procedure is possible only by use of general notions. We make account of some rational law of procedure for the guidance of the conduct of men generally. It is in application of such a rule that power of discrimination is brought into exercise. The infliction of pain, for example, may be seen in a variety of circumstances, involving difference of view as to the character of the action. If the relation of persons be that of parent and child; if the motive of the parent be desire of the child's improvement, and the warrant a parent's right to restrain disobedience, we pronounce one verdict. If the persons concerned are related as neighbours, and if the suffering is inflicted in malice, we give an opposite verdict. In either case we form a judgment. We make account of relations and motives, applying the test of some standard of conduct. Analysis of mental procedure thus discloses these constituent parts: observation of an action,—knowledge of the relations of persons,—use of a general notion, as 'discipline' or 'malice,'—application of a law of conduct which regulates the duty of parents or of neighbours. We are thus in the sphere of thought; in making use of general notions, we are recognising what cannot be observed by the senses.

4. Moral Judgment does not result from comparison of individual objects, but from comparison of a particular act or series of actions with a general truth, acknowledged as an imperative of rational life. Every recognition of moral quality in conduct implies use of a general notion, by reference to which an action is judged. Comparison of an envious dis-

position now in consciousness, with a former experience of the same kind, warrants only a judgment of similarity. But if we pronounce a verdict of condemnation upon the envious disposition, this is not attained by simple comparison of particular cases, but by reference to some general truth applicable to all cases of the kind. We apply a definite standard in particular cases.

Moral Judgments do not themselves possess moral quality, as right or wrong, but intellectual quality, as true or false, correct or incorrect; and they are as liable to error as other judgments.—Hutcheson's *Syst. of Mor. Philos.* i. 4, 9. Along the pathway of the fallible and erring we find the road to certainty. We think, and test our thoughts as we go. In erring and correcting our errors, in thinking and criticising our thoughts, in defining and testing our definitions, we come to certainty. For human certainty is not always in the sunlight, but is often the reward of cautious search, as for hid treasure. Activity of mind is essentially reflective. Impressions from without come first, then pondering of their meaning, and by and by use of general principles, in order to secure a valid product of Thought. By a self-critical power belonging to Intellect, it is possible to assign its proper value to each element in the combination. Thus we are capable of distinguishing between appearances and realities, between impressions and principles, between our thoughts and their rational warrant in universal truth.

More detailed treatment of the sources of diversity of opinion in morals will be found in the chapter on Conscience.

5. Every accurate moral judgment affirms a particular application of a universal moral truth. It contains a principle valid as a law of activity, not only in the particular case, but in all similar cases; not only at this time, but at all times (*Id quod semper aequum et bonum est*); a principle whose validity is in its own nature. There are other judgments which apply a standard altogether adventitious, the result of

agreement or of common association. Judgments of morality differ in this respect from judgments of measurement. The judgment that an honest or benevolent act is right contains a general, even a universal, truth. The judgment that an extended body is seven yards long depends on a standard of measurement in common use in the country. In morality, on the other hand, the standard of judgment is invariable, because independent of personal or national choice. There may be various standards of measurement, but only one standard of morality. Truthfulness, and nothing else, must be the standard of morality in utterance. Honesty, nothing more or less, must be the standard of morality affecting property. It is therefore an essential feature of a valid moral judgment that it carry in it a general law of conduct.

6. PROBLEMS.—(1) In discussing the manner in which moral qualities are recognised, is the question as to 'that which renders morality an active principle' (Hume, followed by Mackintosh) legitimately introduced? (2) Distinguish between the rightness of an action, and the approbation of the action. (3) Can the moral quality of an action be distinguished from obligation to do or not to do it? (4) Distinguish between the rightness of an action, and the merit of an agent.

CHAPTER III.

FIRST PRINCIPLES OF MORALS.

1. To discover the pre-suppositions of our thought—to formulate the basis of thought itself—is the necessary task of philosophy. This work must prove difficult. No progress in it can be made except by careful analytic procedure, followed by synthesis of the complex unity of experience out of which our problem arises. This is the course to be followed in seeking to reach a philosophy of Ethical Thought. We need, in the first instance, a complete interpretation of our intellectual exercise. Mere judgment regarded alone is a wheel without a pivot—a lever without a fulcrum. Thought requires a resting point—a rational basis for its procedure.

Moral Judgments, as they find daily currency among us, involve application of a general truth or law of conduct to a particular action, and thus presuppose knowledge of such truth. Approval of a man who narrates exactly what he saw, is implicit approval of truthfulness itself. This may be only dimly perceptible to the speaker; but when the judgment is scientifically tested, its philosophical warrant is found in the general principle or law of rational life, that Truthfulness itself is right. So it is when we commend an act of justice. The *ideals* present to the speakers may be very different, but we all appeal to the law of justice as sovereign. Martineau denies that morality is a system of truths (*Essays*, second series, p. 6), but judgments must be true or false.—Mill's *Util.* 3.

The term Principle (*principium*, ἀρχή) signifies literally a beginning, and may refer to any commencement. Within the mind, it applies either to first principles of *knowledge* or to sources of *activity*, such as the passions. It is here employed in the former sense exclusively. See Reid, *Intell. Powers*, Essay vi. c. 4, and Hamilton's Notes, p. 761; Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, Transcend. Dialectic, Introd. II., Meiklejohn's transl. p. 212. In the latter sense it is employed by Hume, Adam Smith, and others who assign superiority to sentiment.

2. The general truths involved in moral judgments do not appear to be generalised truths dependent for their validity on an induction of particulars, but self-evident truths, known independently of induction. That truthfulness is right is clear to any one who considers what is involved in communication from one to another. Right means rule of rational life. In reporting to another what has occurred, the rule must be to aim at stating the facts, so as to secure that the understanding of the hearer is in harmony with our knowledge. To maintain the contrary is not possible without conscious sophistry. It is impossible, as a mere exercise of thought, to maintain that falsehood is the rule of life.

The general truths involved in moral judgments are as readily recognised when a single testing case is presented for adjudication as when a thousand such cases have been decided; they are as promptly seen by a child as by a man of large experience. Induction here guides merely to the fact that such truths are continually being recognised in consciousness; it does not explain the intellectual validity and ethical authority of the truths. (a) No induction can reach such truth, for induction tells only what has commonly been recognised and acted on, whereas this affirms what *ought* to be in conduct. In view of the uniformity with which men recognise the *ought*, expect its acknowledgment by their fellows, and express it in informal and formal requirements, it seems impossible to maintain that in Ethical thought there is nothing of the nature of command, or rational imperative. This retreat of Bentham, and of later Utilitarians, is closed. Evolu-

tionists must admit the *ought* of rational life, and face the difficulties encountered in seeking its explanation. At the same time, Induction can tell what is desirable or agreeable, if it cannot advance further. (b) Application of the law through successive ages can add nothing to its authority, however much it may illustrate changing phases of the ideals which find acceptance in different lands under varying conditions. Advance in these respects through progress of the race is consequent on continual exercise of thought through changing circumstances. (c) In the application of a law admitted to rest on a fixed rational basis, experience must testify to its harmony with the conditions of our life. It must, for example, illustrate the adaptability of the law to the changing requirements of extending civilisation. All this leaves untouched the central fact to be explained—an Imperative of Thought as a characteristic of rational life.

The pre-supposition, implied in common thought, which cannot be explained by experience, must be explained by reference to the Intellect itself. Kant's criticism of knowledge has clearly settled this. Honesty being taken as the example, the difference between the dictum of Intelligence and the lesson of experience may be seen in these propositions; Honesty is right—Honesty is the best policy. The former is a moral law; the latter is a generalisation of experience, liable to be reconsidered, under acknowledgment of the perplexities besetting the line of evidence.

'Honesty is right' is a statement needing explanation in both terms. The term 'right' signifies that Honesty is a law of rational life—that it is a rule of conduct involving an obligation essential to personal life. 'Right' is rule—law wearing the form of an imperative. So clear is this, that the same truth is expressed in the formula—'Thou shalt be honest.' Any attempt to represent the meaning as less than this will fail to interpret ordinary thought. 'Right' is a simple idea,

native to intelligence, which cannot be logically defined—that is, cannot be brought under any more general notion affecting conduct. ‘Honesty’ signifies any form of action, whether disposition or overt act, which honours the rights of private property. It is pre-supposed here that *things* may become personal possessions, implying personal rights, and that there is an obligation resting on other rational agents to respect these rights. We are honest when, both in outward form and in inward purpose, we respect the rights of private property. There is thus a law of rational life, securing men in their possessions by imposing upon others obligations to respect their rights.

In our thoughts, rules, and laws about property, it is always pre-supposed that there is an authoritative *demand* for activity, and an authoritative *limit* upon appropriation. Conduct is not left to individual option. Our inclination, or preference, or desire, does not settle what may be done; but we are under rule recognised by our rational nature, as involved in our thought procedure.

Again, Honesty is connected with Industry. These seem two sides of the same thing—the one law expressing what is essential to the other. As they appear in the exercise of our intelligence, the one seems the restricting, the other the impelling, phase of the same rule; both direct conduct as if under a single necessity, the one restricting, the other urging. Honesty regulates Industry; Industry preserves honesty. All moral law is limit, while it is also anticipation of expansiveness of life. Acknowledgment of a demand for regulation of conduct by direction and restriction thus runs through all ethical thought. The key to this demand is found in understanding the conditions of our life. That in all our industry we should be found providing for ourselves, and respecting the acquired rights of others, is the law of rational life contemplated under the name of Honesty. This is the Ought—the Imperative of conduct in acquiring and exchanging property.

Our question is—How is this law known as law, applicable equally to all rational agents?

We shall reach a definite philosophic result by exclusion of all the variable ideals, and concentration on the *ought*. How have we our knowledge of obligation to be honest? Not by reference to attainable pleasure, or to escape from penalty, for what we are here considering is that which *ought to be*, whatever the consequences for the agent. Not by reference to the tradition of the ages, for we are looking at duty regarded as a matter of personal reflection, quite independent of an acquaintance with history and its traditions. Not by reference to authority, whether individual, social, or civil, for we are dealing with an imperative applying to man as man, to parents and children, ruled and ruling *equally*, not coming from one man to another, or from any combination of men to the individual members of society. Obligation belongs to us as men. No rational being can reflect on his own activity and his relations to others without seeing it. This is matter of thought quite within compass of ordinary reflection. The truth arising in consciousness by pure action of our own intelligence is recognised as self-evident truth. That we ought to use our powers for their natural ends, producing what shall meet our own need; and, conversely, that we ought to hold sacred what others produce; these are two illustrations of the laws of human conduct known by natural exercise of our intelligence. This sight of self-evident truth is what we mean by Intuition, a direct vision of truth belonging to intelligence; but Intuition adds nothing to the nature or authority of the truth known. It is direct knowledge, immediate as when we are conscious of a sensation, but not present except in the midst of reflection, just as we have no consciousness of a sensation without exercise of judgment. Self-evident truths 'lie hid in the profundities of the mind, until drawn from their obscurity by the mental activity itself employed on the materials of experience;' Hamilton, *Metaph.* ii. 351, Lect. 38.

But self-evident truth is seen in the concrete, not in the abstract. It appears in the midst of a reflective process, and then reflection is commonly occupied with a specific example. We consciously rise above this example only when thought has become more general, or, it may be, philosophic. How much is involved in the law of honesty, as a law of thought and action, is not at once apparent to any mind, even the most highly disciplined. Thus ideals vary.

If the pre-supposition of Ethical Thought is an *a priori* element in consciousness, recognised spontaneously, it is only by personal experience of the demands of life, expanding before us as we advance in thought and effort, aided by current usage, that we succeed in reflecting on the content of our own thought, thus more fully appreciating the law as a universal. Under experience of life's demands we keep making our own ideal of Honesty, enlarging our interpretation of this law of our life until a more intelligent appreciation of its wealth of meaning becomes a fixed possession. We come to know in a wider sense than at first how much is meant by the Imperative: Thou shalt be honest. The root thought is seen to be obligation to respect the rights of the producer. The demand of this law is for an inner disposition whose uniform exercise will secure what is required. At the same time all that has been said by philosophers of the experiential and evolutionist school concerning progress in thought and practice is accurate, as it is in harmony with what has now been said. Intuition does not deliver from the need for reflection; it only supplies the basis on which reflection must proceed. It not only leaves room for reflection, but calls for careful thought. Thus the whole perplexities of any situation, including counter interests, must remain as the combination of events has determined; and to us is intrusted the task of disentangling and distinguishing. From this exercise of reflection there is no escape. The ever-increasing demand of our life is for greater care in distinguishing facts,

and greater accuracy in defining terms. In meeting these requirements of a rational life it is ever becoming clearer to us how large in significance is the Ethical Law: Be Honest. Yet every one is aware that what is required is that we produce what we would call our own, and that we constantly recognise the proprietorship of others in what they have produced.

When we proceed to speak of *exchange*, of sale and purchase, of the contracts engaging capital and labour, of work and wages, we are introducing varied applications of the law of honesty. 'Exchange' is the natural expression in every case, implying on two sides possessions, or vested interests, and on both willingness to exchange. Here the law is seen to be one of equivalents. Its practical result is that seller and purchaser should continue to hold property the same in value, but in form more suited to the desire of each. Honesty in applied Ethics is thus essentially a law of equivalents; the employer has a right to an amount of work agreed upon as the equivalent for wages; the worker has a right to an amount of wages agreed upon as the equivalent for stipulated work. These are detailed applications of the law of Honesty, to be thought out and arranged according to our own wishes, interests, and estimates of value. The law does not turn purchase into an obligation, but it enforces payment of debts, whether the debt be work or wages, since debt is the due, implying in action the Ought. Moral law places all possessors on an equality, for the rights of property are inalienable. Quantity may vary greatly, but the right is the same whether possessions are great or small.

If it be asked, What constitutes rights of property? What gives any man an inalienable right to anything, so that he can say, 'It is mine,' while others must say, 'It is thine'? the answer is implied in what has been said. Property is an acquired right, springing out of a natural inalienable right—that is, a right to work—connected with and dependent on an obligation to work—the law of Honesty being the converse of

the law of Industry. In the contemplation of man as a cause or rational agent we find the meaning of *producer*, and the true ethical source of ownership. Man not only needs to acquire, appropriate, and consume, as all animal life does; he is ordained to be a producer in a much larger and grander sense, within which his supply of bodily wants is reduced to a comparatively subordinate place. He moves in a wider realm of means and ends as an intelligent cause, the law of his nature requiring him to be a producer in the full sense implied in an intelligent appreciation of this sphere. This is the Imperative of Industry, as belonging to a rational life, lifting man above the place of a working machine, or an organism appropriating nutriment, and enjoining life according to his possibilities. Thus the law of work is a universal law, involving a necessary obligation, but this includes place for endless diversities of work and acquisition according to age, ability, and environment.

In recognising the laws of Honesty and Industry, we are surely disclosing a third principle, recognised in all ages as fundamental in the Ethical code—that is, the law of Justice—proclaiming the inalienable right of the rational agent to the use of all his powers in order to fulfilment of life's obligations. The Just is the Equal. Justice is the law of the Equality of moral agents under the obligations of the universal Ought, securing universal rights. All these three—Industry, Honesty, Justice—are essential to the rational agent as concerned with the exercise of his powers and the acquisition of property. And all three are recognised by direct insight of intelligence, not by induction from any form of experience, for all three are implied in the conduct of rational life from its earliest stages; no one of them can be modified by any change of position, whether involving material or social relations.

Taking these three examples of Moral Law, we see the exact meaning of Intuition, its bearing on the law known, and its relation to other mental exercises involved in the

guidance of conduct. It is a spontaneous action of intellect supplying the pre-suppositions on which our reflection must proceed. We see a universal in a singular, and with this universal we consider how conduct may be adjusted in conformity with the law. Here, then, are the related exercises of mind. We either observe or image an *action*, we consider the agent's position in his *environment*, we recognise a *law* which must guide and limit a rational agent, and we reach our *judgment* or conclusion as to what ought to be done in the circumstances. The law is the central element in the whole process, we recognise it spontaneously as knowledge given by intelligence; we apply it with reference to circumstances, and as we continue this exercise day by day we grow in familiarity with the vast range of meaning belonging to this *abstract term* 'Honesty,' under which we are constantly grouping an increasing variety of examples. Analytic procedure concerned with Ethical thought must therefore distinguish these four things—Action, Moral Law, Judgment applying the Law to Environment, and the Abstract Term naming at once the Law and the Virtue fulfilling the law, *e.g.* Honesty, objective and subjective.

When we speak of an Intuition we mean that the Law deciding what is right is so connected with the nature of the Person, that the recognition of it is immediately given in consciousness, being involved in intelligent self-direction. The knowledge is immediate, and its *source* is within the mind itself. By direct insight, a law is visible to us which cannot be inferred, but which regulates all inferences in morals within the area to which the law applies. 'In the case of Intuition no sort of procedure consisting of the connecting of various single acts is describable, whereas there is one in the case of Thought;' Lotze's *Logic* 357, Transl. 514.

Testimony in favour of the view here given can be amply drawn from upholders of Utilitarianism. 'I find that I undoubtedly seem to perceive as clearly and certainly as I see

any axiom in Arithmetic or Geometry, that it is right and reasonable, and the dictate of reason, and my duty to treat every man as I should think I myself ought to be treated in precisely similar circumstances ;' Sidgwick, *Methods of Ethics*, p. 470, 1st ed. ; p. 503, 3d ed. Sidgwick, notwithstanding his belief that actions are right in the degree in which they possess 'felicific' quality, thus admits that 'an intuitive operation of the practical reason seems to be somewhere assumed in all moral systems ;' *Ibid.* p. 26, 1st ed. ; withdrawn from 3d ed., see p. 34. J. S. Mill says, 'we know intuitively what we know by its own evidence ;' *Exam. of Hamilton*, 3d ed., p. 136. Herbert Spencer, the leader of evolutionists, says, 'the moral law, properly so called, is the law of the perfect man—is the formula of ideal conduct,—is the statement in all cases of that which should be, and cannot recognise in its propositions any elements implying existence of that which should not be ;' *Data of Ethics*, p. 271. From this will start the question whether 'that which should be' can be an inference from 'that which is'? In attempting to settle the differences between rival ethical schools, must we not proceed as Spencer has done in dealing with the differences between Science and Religion? 'The thing we have to seek out is that ultimate truth which both will avow with absolute sincerity—with not the remotest mental reservation ;' Spencer's *First Principles*, 3d ed., p. 21. 'And shall we not be led to grant in the one case as in the other a fundamental verity as the first cardinal fact?' In the one case, Spencer says, the first cardinal fact is 'the existence of a fundamental verity under all forms of religion, however degraded ;' *Ib.* p. 121. Must we not allow in morals also the existence of a fundamental verity under all forms of ethical thought, however confused and inconsistent?

The result of the preceding analysis has been the discovery of an element in ethical thought which is 'unquestionable' or 'indisputable,' because self-evident ; and we conclude that this is known by a pure intuition of the reason. Here we

come upon the ultimates in truth, and in rational activity. These ultimates are less conspicuous than the manifold variable elements present with them in consciousness, because the variable are on the surface, the ultimates are underlying,—the changing attracts attention, the unchangeable does not in the same measure.

If now we return upon our starting-point, and, as it were from behind, contemplate our rational procedure, we discover the synthesis of the whole. The key is found in these ultimates. The rational nature carries within itself that which rationalises the manifold and variable. The power to rationalise is given; ultimate truth is given also by the Reason for the guiding of thought; this truth is the moral law. Running through the heart of personal experience is the comparing, uniting, and constructing of ideals which we attribute to Understanding as the working power. But this power works with what is given at once from without and from within. Unifying is not a mere stringing together of successive experiences, grouping them as they are like or unlike; it is the gathering of things together into a true harmony, by the aid of rational data. Associations are tributary to unification; the phenomena of sensation are by their aid strung together as if on separate threads; but continuity in life, and a true rational harmony of thought, feeling, and action, is secured only by application of the data of our intelligence itself, which are of the nature of the universal.

3. A doctrine of intuitive knowledge of first principles of thought and conduct, ranking as Imperatives of the life, requires to be strictly guarded by adequate tests for admission into the hierarchy of truths. The difficulty is not to find such universal truths—we have already given three examples in the Imperatives of Honesty, Industry, and Justice—but accurately to distinguish all such truths from other truths. The characteristics of such truths must therefore be adequately stated.

Tests here must be objective, not subjective ; they must apply to the truths themselves, not to the exercise of mind. Intuition being immediate sight, logical tests cannot apply, for there is no process amenable to proof at distinct points. Intuitions are beyond question, whether they be intuitions of the senses or of the intellect. As there is no test for the reliability of our sensory system, so there can be none for consciousness, or for intuition of self-evident truth. All three are conditions of our existence, having their integrity secured in the integrity of our nature. To speak of clearness and distinctness as tests is misleading. In the hands of Descartes, these are valid tests of our thought processes. We therefore grant their value in testing our imperfect ethical ideals. Yet such ideals are stepping-stones helping our advance towards an enlarged conception of moral law. They may be clear enough for daily use, yet they may be far from the exactness of a universal truth, clearly elucidated and strictly expressed apart from details of circumstance connected with particular examples.

Truths which are ultimate, and of these are Imperatives of Conduct, are *universal*, not particular ; *necessary*, not adventitious ; *self-evidencing*, not demonstrable ; *unquestionable* (indubitable and indisputable), incapable of contradiction, whether in thought or practice. This last characteristic requires most caution in its use, inasmuch as the test is double, intellectual and practical.

(a) UNIVERSAL,—unrestricted by reference to time, or place, or outward condition of the agent ; this is characteristic of truth holding for all intelligences. ‘Every principle of justice and of law has the relation of a universal to a particular ;’ Aristotle’s *N. Ethics*, v. 7. 6. As Kant says, moral principles have ‘unlimited universal validity,—*unbeschränkte, allgemeine Gültigkeit.*’ (b) NECESSARY,—a constituent of intelligence, so that the truth thus named is essential for the rationalising process ; a necessary element in order that the

discursive process may be capable of dealing with the multiplicity of adventitious facts and relations. (c) SELF-EVIDENCING,—so strictly in harmony with our intellectual nature, that the understanding of it, and the acceptance of it, are one. (d) UNQUESTIONABLE,—so that (1) it is impossible to think its contrary as true; and (2) it is impossible to apply the contrary as a general rule of conduct for rational life. Its contrary must thus be regarded as unthinkable and impracticable. More rigid tests could not be found for guarding admission to the rank of ultimate truths; and all these are amply illustrated in the case of the three Imperatives of moral life already named, Honesty, Industry, and Justice. The contrary characteristics apply to all truths known by observation, or by inference; these are relative, as being experiential, or inductively proved, and liable to variation.

We take the last-named test of ultimate truths as most requiring vindication, and apparently most liable to question in view of diversity of opinion about questions of duty. In describing an ultimate truth as unquestionable or indisputable, the impossibility is not one of assertion, but of proof. It is easy to affirm the contrary of any proposition; the question is, can the affirmation be made to wear any semblance of rationality (see Lotze's *Logic*, B. iii. ch. v. p. 513). That 'Honesty is right,' is, we say, self-evidently true. Can it be maintained that dishonesty is right,—that it is right for any one to take what is admitted to be another's property? Then, what gives to the appropriator his right? How do his desire, cunning, and deceit, nullify the claims of the producer? To these questions there is no answer. Again, that 'Industry is right,' is self-evidently true. If any man claim that he ought to be idle, or, if that seem too severe a test, that he has a right to be idle if he likes, whence can come such a right? Not from the nature of his powers, not from regard to the end they are fitted to serve, not by attempting to establish the rationality of abdicating intelligent self-direction; not by

maintaining that inclination, preference, personal likes and dislikes, are to regulate action. That 'Justice is right' is also self-evidently true. Can any man claim that he has a right to be unjust, or will any one admit it to be a right thing that he should be treated unjustly? It is impossible to admit the reality of moral life, that is, subjection of the activity of life to an ethical imperative, without admitting that all life so subjected has equal right to the exercise of its powers for fulfilment of duty.

It will be apparent that what is here maintained is equivalent to the position *that there can be no exceptions to ethical law*. Yet nothing can be more certain than that exceptions are constantly being made in practice. For this also we must seek an explanation, and to attempt this with any promise of success, we must draw certain distinctions. (1) Violation of moral law is common. (2) Vindication of such violation, though not so common, is frequent. (3) It is solely into reasons of attempted vindication that we need to inquire. The limits placed on all vindication of deviation from rigid law show that its basis is not ethical. It does not seek to defend itself by denying the authority of moral law. It does not insist that dishonesty is right, or that industry is no part of the requirements of life, or that justice is not essential for right conduct.

Proffered vindications generally wear the aspect of excuses for occasional neglect, or even violation, of moral law, on some ground quite apart from the nature and authority of the law itself. What is commonly involved is some rivalry of interest, standing in opposition to the principles of action. A present or prospective gratification for self or for others stands out in contrast with a rigid observance of law. This introduces as a feature in all such cases a contrast between the claims of desire and of rational law; and if it be of the very nature of ethical law to require that desire be subordinated to reason—inclination to an Imperative—it will follow that excuses for

violation of moral law do not question the authority of the law, and thus do not possess rational warrant. In the sphere of desire they are strong ; in the sphere of intelligence they are weak. The truth of this is apparent in these facts, that they are excuses for acting in special circumstances, or under great temptation, not reasons for always doing what is defended ; and that they are in reality excuses for what is otherwise admitted to be *wrong-doing*—action which ought not to be done.

By contrast with this, another feature of the variable in morals must be named—one generation rises to a higher level of moral life than preceding generations. This appears in the acceptance of a maxim of conduct higher or more extended in application than had previously been acknowledged. Such advance appears in the growing condemnation of violence—abandonment of cruelties previously common, and in the adoption of rules of life more benevolent. In all such cases there is an advance at once in thought and in practice. Such advance in practice, however, is not perplexing to the believer in the necessary and spontaneous recognition of universal truth ; it involves only fuller interpretation and application of law admitted to be authoritative, even when it had been allowed but partial sway under the dominion of passion supported by social usage. In such progress we see by what struggles intellect clears itself from the bondage of passion and custom, gaining ascendancy in national history. But the possibility of such advance discloses the presence of an Ethical Ideal, not drawn from experience of the past, but towards which humanity advances as in some respects unknown, because unattained. Popular thought thus discovers the presence and power of an Ideal inexpressibly higher than the pages of history can supply.

On the characteristics of first principles of thought, see Descartes' *Method*, Pt. IV. ; *Meditations*, IV. ; *Principles*, I. xlviii. ; Leibnitz, *Nouveaux Essais*, Avant-Propos., and L. I. c. i. ; Reid's *Intellectual Powers*,

Essay vi. ch. vi. ; *First Principles of Necessary Truths*, Hamilton's Ed., 452 ; *Active Powers*, Essay v. ch. i. ; *First Principles of Morals*, Hamilton's Ed., 637 ; Kant's *Metaphysic of Ethics* ; Cousin's *True, Beautiful, and Good*, Pt. I. Lects. I.-III. ; Universal and Necessary Principles, Hamilton's *Metaph.*, Lect. 38 ; and Reid's works, Note A ; Lotze's *Microcosmus*, B. II. ch. iv., Transl. vol. i. p. 226 ; Lotze's *Logic*, B. III. ch. iii. Transl. p. 450 and p. 495. For the use of terms, Fleming's *Vocabulary of Philosophy*, Third Ed., *A Priori*, Common Sense, Innate Ideas, Principles.

4. Various modes of classification of First Principles may be adopted. The most natural seems to be to classify by reference to the different phases of personal life, as governed by moral law. This will give us Laws of Individual Life, and Laws of Ethical Relations, under which will be included Laws of our Relation to God, The Absolute, as Moral Governor ; and Laws of Social Life, of our relations to those who are morally equals by subjection to the same Imperatives of conduct. I. Under the Laws of Individual Life are included—(1) Self-development, (2) Industry, (3) Temperance, (4) Purity. II. Under the Laws of Moral Relations come (a) Laws of the Higher Life—(1) Reverence, (2) Love, (3) Obedience ; (b) Laws of the Social Life—(1) Justice, with Honesty, (2) Benevolence, (3) Truthfulness, (4) Fidelity. Under these will come a series of subordinate laws of life belonging to a sphere of inferential ethics.

5. The general principle which gives validity to an accurate moral judgment, is present in the judgment only by implication, not by formal expression. The presence of ethical principles in consciousness, as pre-suppositions, founded upon, yet not expressed, constitutes a marvel of mental faculty, which is illustrated in the life of the most illiterate. 'Deliberate reflection is required to make these ideas the subject of our thought, though they have been long and unnoticed the guiding-springs of our judgment ;' Lotze's *Microcosmus*, B. II. ch. iv., Transl. vol. i. p. 227. 'No one of these principles which we regard as innate can be operative in us . . .

exercise of practical thought they are regulative of *conduct*, thereby making action, with dependent experience, a continual test of their validity. A moral principle is first a truth discovered as an element of knowledge ; next a law, recognised as a determinator of action. It is first a revelation (*Offenbarung*), in order that it may be a law of life for an intelligent being.

From the standpoint of the Intuitionist, the first principles of action are primary *conditions* of individual and social development. Moral development is in its history the advance which the race makes in the understanding and application of all that is involved in its own thoughts. It is the adjustment of everyday thought to the Ideal which Nature gives ; it is the clearing of our thoughts by aid of the enlarging demands of social organisation ; it is attainment of deeper insight into the range of moral law. Progress in this respect must be greater in the individual mind than it can be in national history, or in the history of the race as a whole, for a community moves only with the momentum of the aggregate, while all depend in some measure on those who, by deeper reflection, are capable of leading.

In our Ethical life, the universal is ever blending with the transitory, thereby providing for the elevation of human life towards a larger fellowship with the absolutely perfect Being. So far as we individually conform to moral law, we are individually revealing to others some aspect of absolute truth. There is indeed an important sense in which it is true, as Kant has said in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (Transc. Doct. of Elements, Pt. i. sect. 9 ; Meiklejohn's Transl. p. 37 ; Max Müller's, ii. p. 38), that 'Right cannot appear as a phenomenon,' that is, that it is incapable of being presented in sensory form. Yet conduct which is in any measure the fulfilment of the Imperative, is an illustration of the absolute goodness of the law. It is also, in some sense, a manifestation of the holiness of the Absolute Being ; for moral law is the expression of his holiness. Action is right, not because God

wills it; but God wills the law as the expression of absolute right. Or, as Plato has stated the truth, 'I mean to say that the holy (*ἅγιον*) has been acknowledged by us to be loved of God, because it is holy, not to be holy because it is loved.' *Euthyphro* 10; Jowett's Transl. i. 311; 2d ed. i. 325. The absolute of Reason must be a revelation from the Absolute Being; and the realisation of the absolute of Reason must, however imperfectly, be some manifestation of the holiness of the Deity.

8. First principles of morals, as absolute truths, are incapable of contradicting each other. This is confirmed by practical test, inasmuch as they require excellences which constitute a harmony of character. It is impossible to select any example of an Ethical Imperative alien or antagonistic to some other moral law.

There can, therefore, be no force in Mill's objection, as against Intuitionism, that 'In other systems, the moral laws, all claiming independent authority, there is no common umpire entitled to interfere between them;' *Utilitarianism*, p. 38. In order to conflict in practice, they must contradict each other in meaning. But each principle of morals applies to a line of activity all its own, and always its own. 'The same general principles are common to all men, nor does one such principle contradict another;' Epictetus, i. 23. That principles are distinct, and independent because distinct, does not make them contradictory. Moral principles apply to perfectly distinct lines of activity, and do not claim authority other than is implied in their individual meaning. Benevolence and Justice, as they describe quite distinct forms of action, cannot contradict each other. If perplexity arise as to the *time* when or the case where a principle of morality should have application, while other principles are unapplied, this perplexity affects neither the validity nor the authority of any principle; it involves a question of present duty. If it be clear that present duty requires attention to

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the claims of justice, it does not on this account follow that the agent is thereby liberated from the law of benevolence, or entitled meanwhile to violate any other law, or regard it as shorn of its authority.

9. There are first principles of intellectual truth, as there are of moral truth. The former are laws of intelligence, as the latter are laws of conduct; these also are laws of thought, but as thought is concerned with conduct. Of the former, the laws of non-contradiction and of causality are examples. Both are distinguished by the same intellectual characteristics, and must be equally referred to the Reason, as distinguished from the Understanding or Reasoning power—Reason being merely a name for Intelligence as competent to the function of recognising self-evident truth.

Difference of application gives, however, sufficient warrant for distinguishing Intellectual or Speculative Reason from Moral or Practical Reason. There is no other warrant than that supplied by a high scientific convenience. As the two spheres of application are concerned with separate departments of science, the distinction is inevitable, and it is of consequence to have the popular term, CONSCIENCE, applicable to Reason in its ethical applications, as contrasted with Reason in its speculative bearings. Kant's distinction between Speculative Reason and Practical Reason is natural and serviceable, but it must not be held as implying difference of function in the field of intellectual activity. The Practical Reason is Pure Reason; *Metaph. of Ethics* (3d ed.) p. 64; v. Laurie's *Ethica*.

10. PROBLEMS.—(1) If *a priori* principles are conditions necessary for attainment of human experience, are they also assertive, expressing Absolute Truths? Find the philosophic interpretation of 'condition' in this case. (2) If *a priori* truths are not always present in consciousness, how is the recognition of them possible? The problem is, To state the Psychological law under which *a priori* truth may at any time be presented in consciousness.—For Kant's Spontaneity of

Reason, *Met. of Eth.* (Semple, p. 72.) (3) Granting that there are *a priori* truths Intellectual and Practical, and that both are laws of mind, in what respect do they differ? Interpret legality in the two cases. (4) If Moral Principles are at once Truths and Laws, can we draw rigidly the distinction between these two aspects of a principle? Distinguish truth from law. (5) If the mind is the source of primary truth, how far is mind dependent upon experience for use of what it possesses? (6) Can Truth be at once absolute and phenomenal? Can these two characteristics be found in combination? (7) Can Truthfulness, as a law of Personal Conduct, come into conflict with Justice as a law regulating the relations of Persons? (8) Can *a priori* moral truth be represented as expressing nothing 'except general legality,' or 'the form of law in general'?—Kant's *Met. of Ethics*, p. 13 (3d ed., Semple's). (9) Can an Experiential Philosophy assign a place to axioms 'true without any mixture of hypothesis'?—Mill's *Logic*, B. II. ch. 5. (10) Trace the implications of knowledge involved, when the Roman Law defines Justice 'A steady and perpetual will to give to every man his due.'

CHAPTER IV.

CONSCIENCE.

1. A FUNCTION of Intelligence, so remarkable in its nature, and so influential in our life, as recognition of first principles of all reasoning in morals must, both in common language and in philosophic usage, be identified with a distinct faculty or power of mind. Its central place and its regulative function in thought and conduct must secure this, for whatever the achievements of observation and induction, an original power recognising universal truth must appear the source of true wisdom. If the inductive process discloses the working power of Intellect, continually gathering fresh stores of knowledge, this gives trustworthiness to all rational procedure, and coherence to all our conceptions of existence.

If this function of Intelligence, to provide the authoritative conditions of its own procedure, be found also to include guidance for the activities of personal life, we have a double security for such a power being signalised. The principles of thought being laws of conduct, bringing an Ethical Imperative into consciousness, the sense of the authoritative becomes linked with our intellectual action, and a practical prominence is given to the central function which must sway the popular imagination, mould our common language, and have large importance attached to it in Philosophy.

In accordance with this view, we have from early times the distinction between *Noûs* (Intellect) and *Διάνοια* (the ratio-

cinative power), which engaged the attention of Anaxagoras when he represented Noûs as the source of all finite existence. In acknowledgment of this, Protagoras spoke of knowledge which is the gift of God. Socrates discoursed of knowledge which cannot be taught, and Plato made wisdom the ruling power among the Virtues. So, in recent times, Philosophy has proclaimed the impossibility of an absolute Scepticism, because of the necessary conditions of thought; Kant's distinction between Reason and Reasoning has found a ready assent, while the popular mind has recognised Conscience as an authoritative voice within the soul—the representative of Divine authority.

The conclusion reached through the preceding investigation is in harmony with common usage, according to which Conscience (*conscientia*, *συνείδησις*, *Gewissen*) is that power by which moral law is recognised. It is Reason discovering universal truth—having the authority of sovereign moral law, and affording the basis for personal obligation. 'Conscience is not a thing to be acquired, and it is not a duty to acquire it; but every man, as a moral being, has it originally within him.'—Kant's *Metaphysical Elements of Ethics*; Abbott's *Kant's Theory of Ethics*, 3d ed., p. 311.

Conscience is thus seen to be a cognitive or intellectual power, not a form of feeling, nor a combination of feelings. Feeling is not in itself of the nature of regulative truth. Such truth cannot find expression in the language of Feeling, though feeling may have potency towards fulfilment of moral law.

The popular name for the Moral Faculty applies to a cognitive power: Con-science (*con-scientia*, *συν-είδησις*), conjoint knowledge. *Conscience* and *Consciousness* are not only similarly compounded, but are originally two forms of the same word—*conscientia*. *Consciousness* is now employed as the more general term, the knowledge of ourselves and of every phase of our experience. By analogy, *Conscience* implies immediate knowledge of moral law.

Popular usage has, however, included under the name of Conscience emotional experience, as well as intellectual exercise. Thus Remorse is popularly attributed to Conscience, while moral law is held to be discovered by the same faculty. To include under a single designation phenomena so different would be inconsistent with philosophic usage.

The prefix, *con*, *with*, has frequently been held to mean knowledge of moral law along with the Moral Governor.—So Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theol.* II. 79. 13; Martensen, *Die Christliche Ethik*, sec. 117, p. 498; *Christian Ethics*, p. 356; Trench's *Study of Words*.

2. Conscience, as presenting moral law for guidance of action, has authority over all other springs of activity within us. With clear philosophic warrant, we may attribute to this power the authority belonging to the laws made known. 'The authority of Conscience' is an abbreviated expression for the authority common to ethical law. In affirming that Conscience has authority over the other powers of mind, we merely indicate that moral law, being concerned with guidance of conduct, is authoritative for regulation of all other motive forces and restraining forces of our nature.

Neither affections nor desires are competent for their own guidance. These forces depend upon intelligence for direction, and are all subordinated to moral law.

On the ground now stated, the theory that Conscience is to be regarded as either the acquiescence or the antagonism of the whole nature in presence of some appetite or desire is untenable. This theory, hinted at by Plato, when he described Injustice as 'a rising up of a part of the soul against the whole soul' (*Repub.* iv. 444), is advocated by Trendelenburg in a passage of great eloquence and power.—*Naturrecht*, sec. 39, p. 56. The leading parts of the paragraph are translated by Professor Lorimer, *Institutes of Law*, p. 152. The fact of such antagonism or acquiescence of our nature in the exercise of our propensities is admitted, though resentment against a

present evil disposition will appear with varying degree in different persons, and in the same person at different times. 'The whole man' does not always resent the action of the 'self-seeking part';—den selbsüchtigen Theil,—and what then? We need, moreover, an explanation of antagonism and of acquiescence when either occurs.

3. Conscience, by discovering universal truth wearing the form of an imperative of action, is vested with sovereign practical authority. This appears from comparison of the functions of the moral faculty with those of all other powers and capacities in mind.

That which discovers moral law has the teaching authority belonging to the law itself. This law, as absolute truth, admits of no contradiction. Other truths, recognised as in their nature absolute, such as the laws of thought, have application in another sphere, and do not come into competition with the laws of morality. 'The supremacy of conscience' is, therefore, an abbreviated expression for the sovereignty of moral laws in the realm of personal activity. Moral law has unquestionable and unchangeable authority over motives, acts, and ends. But while Conscience possesses this authority the moral agent is left to deliberate, to contemplate moral law, and to apply it, as circumstances may require.

To Butler belongs the high honour of establishing the supremacy of Conscience as an essential element in our nature.—*Sermons* I. II. III. and *Dissert. on the Nature of Virtue*. According to Butler, conscience is the 'moral approving and disapproving faculty,'—'a principle of reflection or Conscience.' Concerning its place in the mind, he says, 'That principle by which we survey, and either approve or disapprove our own heart, temper, and actions, is not only to be considered as what is in its turn to have some influence; which may be said of every passion, of the lowest appetites; but likewise as being superior; as from its very nature claiming superiority over all others; in so much that you

cannot form a notion of this faculty, Conscience, without taking in judgment, direction, superintendency.'—*Ser.* II. 'Thus does the Conscience of man project itself athwart whatsoever of knowledge or surmise, of imagination, understanding, faculty, acquirement, or natural disposition is in him; and, like light through coloured glass, paint strange pictures "on the rim of the horizon," and elsewhere! Truly this same "sense of the Infinite Nature of Duty" is the central part of all within us.'—Carlyle's *Past and Present*, B. II. ch. 14.

Butler has not entered with enough minuteness into the analysis of our mental activity to bring out in clear relief the psychological nature of Conscience, but he has placed the fact of 'superintendency' or supremacy on such a basis that it has been admitted with wonderful unanimity by upholders of most conflicting theories. In accordance with the practice of his time, he takes together without discrimination the phenomena we attribute to Reason, and those assigned to Reasoning.

This authority of Conscience is not found in any predominating force belonging to it as a faculty, but altogether in the character of the truth it reveals. The authority is not explained by the nature of the faculty. This faculty is a power of sight, making a perception of self-evident truth possible to man; but it contributes nothing to the truth perceived. To this truth itself belongs inherent authority, by which is meant, absolute right of command, not force to constrain. Professor Bain mistakes, therefore, in his interpretation of Intuitionism, when he says that a purely mental origin 'is held to confer a higher authority' on certain ideas.—*Mental and Moral Science*, II. 6, sec. 2. It is the nature of the truth known, not of the power knowing it, which accounts for its authority. As self-evident, it admits of no contradiction; as authoritative—because of what is involved in the simple notion 'Right,'—it demands submission.

4. From its nature it follows that Conscience cannot be educated. Education, whether in the sense of instruction or of training, is impossible. As well teach the eye to see, and the ear to hear, as teach Reason to perceive self-evident truth. All these have been provided for in the human constitution. When we speak of education of the eyes, we mean that the judgment is to be trained to accurate interpretation of the sensations of light; and such a statement may equally hold when Judgment applies the dicta of Conscience. Unquestionably we need to guard and train our understanding in the application of moral law; for the understanding is a faculty ever liable to err, whereas the Conscience, in presenting self-evident truth, is unerring.

The possibility of educating Conscience has been commonly advocated, even by Intuitionists. See Reid's *Active Powers*, III. iii. 8, H. p. 595. Stewart is more guarded, *Outlines of Mor. Phil.*, sec. 174. Whewell puts it as broadly as possible,—‘We must labour to *enlighten* and *instruct* our Conscience,’ and by consequence ‘he who acts against his Conscience is always wrong’; ‘but to say that he who acts according to his Conscience is always right . . . would lead to great inconsistencies in our Morality.’—*Elements of Morality*, i. p. 236, sec. 364-366. Very differently Kant,—‘An erring Conscience is a chimera.’—*Metaph. of Ethics*, 3d ed., p. 217. So Rothe, *Theol. Ethik*, ii. 29. Whewell confounds opinion with Conscience, as will appear from the following:—‘Whatever subordinate law we have in our minds is to be looked on only as a step to the Supreme Law,—the Law of complete Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Order.’—*Elements*, 366.

The School of Philosophers who maintain that all knowledge comes from Experience, and who, therefore, hold to a Utilitarian Theory of Morals, are naturally averse to the recognition of a distinct Moral Faculty. Under their scheme nothing is needed for guidance of conduct but exercise of intelligence. But when account is to be made of the authori-

tative in moral conceptions, they speak of persons 'of feeling and conscience,' of 'conscientious feelings' (J. S. Mill's *Utilitarianism*, p. 41); of the imitation within us of the authority without us (Bain, *Emotions and Will*, p. 283); of 'moral feelings and correlative restraints,' with 'the sentiment of moral obligation or duty' (Spencer, *Data of Ethics*, pp. 120, 125); of 'the aggregate of our moral opinions, reinforced by the moral sanction of self-approbation or self-disapprobation' (Fowler, *Progressive Morality*, p. 29). Under such a theory education is a necessary element, but the authoritative is presupposed, not explained.

The Hegelian School of thinkers, in giving prominence to the Evolution of Ethical Thought, manifest a similar tendency to define Conscience as a variable phase of feeling, advancing with advance of thought. 'Conscience is uneasy at the violation of the duty of man to man.'—Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 218. 'For the moralist, it is important to observe the real fusion, in the Conscience of those citizens of the modern world who are more responsive to the higher influences of their time, of duties enforced by legal penalties, and those of which the fulfilment cannot be exacted.'—*Ib.* p. 219. F. H. Bradley, pursuing the same lines of thought, seeks to disparage the name of Conscience under a singular definition,—'If a man is to know what is right, he should have imbibed by precept, and still more by example, the spirit of his community, in general and special beliefs as to right and wrong, and, with this whole embodied in his mind, should particularise it in any new case, not by a reflective deduction, but by an intuitive subsumption. . . . This intuition must not be confounded with what is sometimes miscalled "Conscience." It is not mere individual opinion or caprice. It is 'an intuition which does not belong merely to this or that man or collection of men. "Conscience" is the antipodes of this. It wants you to have no law but yourself, and to be better than the world.'—*Ethical Studies*, pp. 178, 180.

Moral training is something different from education of Conscience, implying training in reflective exercise for application of law, and in government of dispositions according to this application. Even though we possess the knowledge of moral law, its application can become known only through personal experience. But application of law *presupposes* knowledge of the law.

Personal attainment is to be achieved by subordination of other powers to the authority of Conscience. This is of the very essence of moral training, and it implies the certainty and sovereign authority of Conscience. Granting an unerring Conscience, revealing self-evident moral truth, there remains in personal history responsibility for self-direction and self-development, both of which must proceed through a persistent struggle to correct our errors of judgment, and to master our dispositions. For these ends an unerring Conscience, presenting a true Ideal, is required. To say that Conscience cannot be educated is simply to say that Intuition is immediate knowledge, and therefore independent of training. If 'we labour to enlighten and instruct our Conscience,' we regard it as deficient in guiding power and authority, and place Understanding above it. It is impossible, in this case, to speak of the supremacy of our Conscience; Butler's most important position is lost. That Conscience intuitively recognises moral law, that it is supreme in its authority, and that it cannot be educated, are three propositions which hang or fall together. The philosophic accuracy of all three seems to me established on the fullest evidence. But it is a condition of maintaining consistently these positions that we do not attribute to Conscience our inferences and conclusions as to present duty. To attribute 'sound and healthy conclusions' to Conscience, and unsound and unhealthy conclusions to some other power, is manifestly inadmissible. To distinguish between Conscience and Reasoning, between Intuition and Thought, is here essential; and all conclusions as to present duty, true and false equally, must

be attributed to the faculty of inference, for use of which we are individually responsible. This is the obvious answer to the criticism in Birks's *First Principles of Moral Science*, p. 253.

How much need there is for greater precision in philosophic language may appear from the following passage from an author so acute as Sidgwick: 'As all schools teach that a person may mistake his duty, and do what is wrong, sincerely believing it to be right, it results that an action may be right in one sense and wrong in another.'—*Methods of Ethics*, p. 181, B. III. ch. i. This conclusion is a *non sequitur*, and is at variance with the first condition of philosophising, as a search for certainty in the rational. Men may be equally sincere when adopting contrary views, viewing duty differently, as measured by reference to time and environment; but of contradictories both cannot be true. Accordingly, in stating the case, an admixture of the *false* is recognised; 'a person may *mistake* his duty and do what is *wrong*.' From this it follows that the false can be detected, and that the right cannot in any sense be the wrong. The confusion springs from the account given of the Moral Faculty, identifying it with 'judgment.' Sidgwick says, 'Conscience implies properly the passing of moral judgments, a process which tends to throw us into the introspective attitude, and to bring motives into view.' (*Ib.* p. 180); whereas knowledge of moral law is given without introspection, being an immediate knowledge.

5. In subjecting other powers to its authority, Conscience provides for moral training, and thus reveals the moral harmony of our nature. Moral law is not the product of our nature, nor is it inferred from our nature, but its knowledge is given into our nature, providing for the development of a moral life. All other powers are naturally under regulation of Conscience, and all powers thus regulated are capable of training. Life unfolds according as the guidance of dispositions, affections, and desires is determined by moral law.

Impulses out of harmony with Conscience are out of har-

mony with our nature, and can have no place in healthy moral development. Of these, pride, selfishness, jealousy, and envy may be taken as examples. In revealing a law which absolutely condemns such dispositions, Conscience authoritatively requires their suppression, thereby aiding moral advance. Conscience thus contributes destructively as well as constructively to the necessities of moral training. It gives meaning to the struggle of life, discovering in the distance the grandeur of its perfection.

6. Conscience, in revealing first principles of conduct, constitutes a leading distinction of human nature. The basis of personal life is thereby laid in self-evident, universal truth. The application of this truth for guidance of personal procedure has been left to ourselves as responsible agents, an exercise unspeakably higher than guidance by detailed rules. The possibilities of such a life involve the possibility of likeness to the Deity Himself. Hence Cicero speaks of Conscience as 'The god ruling within us.'

7. Popular usage, proceeding according to practical requirements only, makes no account of the analytic results gained by introspective exercise. It moves forward unhesitatingly in the use of self-evident truth, and is not turned aside by apparent inconsistencies of thought, so long as there is in every new turn of life acknowledgment of a universal law. Hence the name of Conscience has always been, and must always be, popularly used in a much wider sense than that employed under strict philosophic warrant. Thus our moral *judgments* are attributed to Conscience itself, and that even when they are discredited as erroneous. So, in like manner, *moral sentiment* is referred to Conscience. With certain disadvantages in this, there are obvious advantages. There is, indeed, an inevitable confusion of terms, but a comparatively slight confusion of results as to the main lines of personal responsibility. Variable judgments and sentiments are attributed to the law within, yet men are not excused for their inconsistencies; for

the law is held to be universal and unquestionable. If a man only question himself, it is believed that his Intelligence will be a sufficient guide, and he will not find it possible to rest in undetected error or in voluntary subterfuge.

The consequence of the neglect of analytic in popular thought is to give an unduly wide significance to the name of Conscience, with acceptance of a variety of phrases descriptive of varying conditions of the faculty. Of these, the following may be taken as examples :—An unenlightened Conscience, a scrupulous Conscience, a tender Conscience, a hardened Conscience, an upbraiding Conscience.

The philosophic interpretation of such phrases will appear by discriminating the Conscience properly so called from the moral judgments and the moral sentiments, all popularly referred to one power. In some phrases a mixed reference may be found ; but they commonly apply either to moral judgments or to moral sentiments.

The currency of such phrases throws no discredit on the theory of an intuitive knowledge of moral law, but provides some confirmation of it ; for after distributing them, by reference either to thought or to sentiment, there remains reliance in Conscience as authoritative. It is clearly recognised in popular usage that what is defective or faulty is to be referred to individuals, as distinct from the universal law, which is acknowledged. There is, therefore, no such perplexity for an Intuitional Theory, with its doctrine of an unerring Conscience, as is commonly supposed.

THE DIVERSITY OF MORAL JUDGMENTS AMONG MEN.—Diversity of opinion on morals is indeed common, but its significance does not involve denial of self-evident universal law. The extent and force of agreement is a marvel when we make account of the constant activity of a self-regarding spirit, and consequent rivalry of interests. All nations admit the distinction between right and wrong in conduct. There are no such differences as to involve contradictory positions when

moral law is formally expressed. There is general agreement that truthfulness, justice, and benevolence are right. Not a single nation is known to transpose moral distinctions, placing virtues in the category of the morally wrong. Diversity of opinion on moral subjects is, indeed, much more concerned with what is wrong than with what is right. Men excuse deceit, without condemning integrity; they take advantage of others, without condemning honesty; they applaud cruel vengeance, but still admire benevolence. There is thus a want of consistency in the excuses presented for falsehood, dishonesty, or vengeance, since all of them present a plea for a temporary exception from an admitted general rule of conduct. That this is so becomes evident when we find that those freely advancing these excuses still hold themselves to be wronged when they have been deceived, or when their property has been appropriated by others.

The philosophical explanation of diverse moral judgments as to the same act is thus readily found. Men differ not as to principles, but as to details of application. Epictetus explains it thus,—‘The same general principles are common to all men. . . . Where, then, arises the dispute? In adapting these principles to particular cases.’ (I. 23.) Discovery of the error involved in contradictory moral judgments implies possession of a common standard of morals, by reference to which every moral agent can escape uncertainty. If, then, the principles of morals are self-evident truths, of which a reasoned contradiction cannot be given, how can the rational nature of man accept and act upon a tacit contradiction of them? The answer is partly Psychological, partly Ethical; it lies both in *thought* and in *motive*.

Difficulty is often experienced in the application of the recognised law, when seeking to decide present duty. This opens the way for casuistry, under stimulus of personal preference. As sophistry finds shelter even in the laws of thought, even so may casuistry in the laws of right conduct.

Changing circumstances, varying degrees of responsibility, and inevitable uncertainties as to possible occurrences, all afford scope for doubt and conflict of opinion.

Occasion for diversity of view is greatly extended by the action of *feeling* influencing thought. A self-regarding disposition is strong within us, and bears powerfully on what we design and do. This feeling easily passes over into worse dispositions. Men readily agree that Benevolence is morally right, and yet, on a variety of grounds, they may greatly differ as to the duty of helping a suppliant.

Impulse to action is not necessarily rational. There are dispositions of intense force which are out of harmony with Conscience. Their rise in consciousness, influencing both thought and practice, is antagonistic to rational direction of conduct. Selfishness and Malice afford explanation not only of wrong *acting*, but also of erroneous *thinking*.

Dispositions swaying the conduct have power to bias the judgments. What a man inclines to do, that he is ready to think right. Contentment with fallacious reasoning is greatly favoured when cherished dispositions are sheltered. False generalisations thus usurp the place of moral law. Besides this, prevailing opinions are often accepted without independent investigation, and are retained without disturbing doubts. Where social custom establishes a practice, unreasoning acquiescence is easy. Authority and Inclination thus combine their forces.

Moral sentiments cluster around a false judgment as readily as around a true. If a man, whether correctly or incorrectly, approves an action, he will experience self-approbation in doing it. If he disapproves of an action, whether accurately or not, he will experience a sense of shame, or even of remorse, in doing it. Of all the recognised laws of mind, this is that to which most prominence is to be given in accounting for the astonishing diversity of opinion founded upon appeals to Conscience. Thus a South Sea Islander

approving of vengeance, may have a sense of well-doing while he tortures an enemy; an Indian, believing that the Deity requires him to wash in the Ganges, may have a sense of remorse in neglecting his ablutions. Moral sanctions may gather around even gross immorality. When this law of union between judgment and sentiment is recognised, it will be apparent that the only valid test of accuracy of thought is the rational basis on which it rests.

8. PROBLEMS.—(1) Can personal feeling possess authority in morals? (2) Critically examine the following,—‘As each man’s Reason may err, and thus lead him to false opinions, so each man’s Conscience may err, and lead him to a false moral standard.’—Whewell’s *Elements of Morality*, sec. 368, i. 238. (3) If Conscience be represented as ‘a power of reflection,’ can its supremacy be competently maintained? (4) Does the philosophical doctrine of an unerring Conscience imply infallibility of judgment in morals? ‘The universal Conscience and Reason, of which Dr. Whewell speaks as infallible, must reside in some men endued with Conscience and Reason. We ask, who are these infallible men, or this infallible Council?’—Prof. Bain, *Emotions and Will*, p. 267. (5) When sovereignty is attributed to Conscience, what is the nature and measure of this sovereignty? (6) Are the functions assigned to Conscience compatible with the hypothesis that this faculty deals only with accomplished actions?

CHAPTER V.

DUTY OR OBLIGATION.

1. WE have seen that the ultimate datum of Ethical Thought is an Imperative of the life. The rational view of conduct gives us 'Right,' or Rule of Action. Accordingly our judgments of morality rest on first principles at once of thought and of action. We cannot interpret such a maxim as this—'Honesty is right,' without regarding it as equivalent to this—'I ought to be honest.' Every ethical rule presents one phase of the Ought. What we have now to seek is a fuller interpretation of Ethical Obligation. The law imposing it may be expressed either in general abstract form, as when we say, 'Benevolence is right'; or in the form of command, 'Thou shalt be benevolent.' This authoritative element belongs to the nature of the law; it is included in the simple idea 'right,' and is recognised in all Moral Philosophy, but is specially emphasised by the Intuitionist School. It is prominent in the formula of Kant: '*Act* from a maxim at all times fit for law universal'; and in that of Hegel, '*Be* a Person and respect others as Persons;'; and it is also expressed in the Utilitarian formula, 'The Greatest Happiness of the greatest number'; for, while this states the common *end* of life, it is regarded as the law of our life, equivalent to a command—'Seek the Happiness of others,' act in acknowledgment of the truth that 'Benevolence is a universal law of human life.'

Taking this as our illustration, Ethical Law may be contemplated on two sides, as providing for a classification or

grouping of actions morally right, or as imposing a necessary or universal obligation on moral agents. In common life the former will be only occasionally and partly contemplated, the latter uniformly. 'Thou shalt be just' is the law for all rational beings at all times. The bearing of moral law on personality we have now to consider, as this is expressed in the word Duty. The general conception of obligation is that of subjection of personality to moral law, with responsibility for application of this law to the whole life.

Duty is *officium*, in contrast with *honestum*: καθήκον in contrast with καλόν; *Die Pflicht*, in contrast with *Das Recht*; *devoir*, in contrast with *droit*. The *officium* of Cicero, like the καθήκον of Zeno, is used in a wider sense than moral obligation, applying to rational selection of desirable objects. 'Quod ratione actum sit, id officium appellamus.'—Cicero, *De Fin.* iii. 17. According to Diogenes Laertius, Lib. vii., Zeno was the first to use καθήκον in the strictly ethical sense. See also Cicero, *De Officiis*, i. 3.

Kant describes Duty as 'the necessity of an act, out of reverence felt for law'; but when he says that the notion duty is 'a notion comprehending under it that of a good will, considered, however, as affected by certain inward hindrances,' the latter statement is open to grave objections. Moral law is universal, and must be abiding. Subjective hindrances may disappear; but even if the nature were perfect, moral law must continue the measure of that perfection and the rule of activity. Moreover, a just view of the harmony of our nature must prevent us holding that duty ceases to exist when the doing of it becomes a pleasure.

2. The law which imposes obligation rests on all intelligent agents equally; and as the law of rational life, it is to be interpreted and applied with careful regard to the situation occupied. Individual obligation is recognised by means of a judgment affirming a definite measure and direction of obligation as resting upon the agent at the time.

A judgment of oughtness applies to the agent, a judgment of rightness to the action. They imply each other, both drawing their warrant from the same moral law. The law determines the character of actions, expressing a common obligation. Notwithstanding the measuring and judging constantly going on in the regulation of our conduct, bringing out endlessly varied results, there is underneath all ethical thought a tacit acknowledgment of uniformity of obligation in so far as the *test* is the same for all. Sidgwick says: 'Our view of what ought to be is derived at least in all details from our apprehension of what is.'—*Methods of Ethics*, p. 2. This is correct in so far as our view of duty is always of a given measure of duty in view of environment. But 'what ought to be' must be prior in thought to 'what is.' Varieties rest on uniformities. Differences spring from environment; unity of thought and obligation from the fixedness of the standard. It is the recognition of ultimate law which explains the common response to appeals for fulfilment of duty. However diverse the popular measure of duty belonging to different ages or countries, the recognised standard has always been esteemed as binding on men generally. 'Scarcely less diverse' than ideals of art 'have been at different stages and periods of culture the Moral Ideals of the Practical Reason; but whatever might be their content, it was always felt as a duty to realise it in action, and the moral principles of each age were always sanctioned by the soul, otherwise than were the truths of cognition.'—Lotze's *Microcosmus*, B. II. ch v., Transl. vol. i. p. 247.

3. Partial or incomplete obligation to moral law is impossible, because the law is universal. However imperfect the Ideal accepted at any period, the moral agent is not exempted from the fulness of obligation, for law is uniform, and personal reflection is sufficient to secure a true representation of the law. The moral agent, as a thinker, is required to rise above the standard of the society in which he lives, finding the ground of obligation in the law itself, not in popular render-

ings of it, or in the measure of application of it which history discloses.

A distinction has, however, sometimes been drawn between 'perfect and imperfect' obligation, otherwise named 'determinate and indeterminate.' This distinction has more commonly been maintained from the standpoint of Positive Law, having reference to what civil authority can *enforce*. It is thus concerned with limited enforcement of personal rights, not with the measure of obligation. A brief account of this distinction may be presented under three examples of its use.

FIRST,—AN ETHICAL USE, That some duties are always binding, others only in certain circumstances. The former have been named 'perfect' duties, the latter 'imperfect'; *κατόρθωμα*, *officium perfectum*, and *καθήκον μέσον*, *officium medium*.

This is the view taken by the Stoics, and accepted by Cicero. It is merely a classification of *duties*, not a philosophy of obligation. It points to the obvious truth that moral law not only imposes common obligations, but carries its authority into all the intricacies of social life. It is to be observed, however, that 'social duties' are only common obligations adapted to existing relations. 'Relative duties,' applying to parents and children, masters and servants, do not rest on separate laws of moral life, but on the common laws of rational experience, taken in relation with recognised social relations.

The Stoics seem to have often used *κατόρθωμα* to signify an *action done* in acknowledgment of duty (*recte factum*, rather than *officium perfectum*), rather an action done in a perfect manner, than a perfect obligation requiring its performance. Cicero has complicated technical phraseology by the use of *rectum* qualifying *officium* as equivalent to *perfectum*.—Dio-genes Laertius, B. VII., Life of Zeno; Cicero, *De Officiis*, I. 3; Ueberweg's *Hist. of Philos.*, I. 197; Zeller's *Stoics*, etc., p. 269; Grant's *Aristotle*, I. 262; Reid's *Active Powers*, Essay¹ III. iii. 5, Hamilton's Ed., p. 588, and two Notes, p. 588 and p. 649; Mill's *Utilitarianism*, ch. v. p. 74.

SECOND,—A JURIDICAL USE, That in legal administration only some duties can be enforced under sanction of positive law, whereas others must be left to individual choice for performance. The former are named 'perfect' obligations, with equivalent perfect rights; the latter are 'imperfect' obligations, with imperfect rights. Thus Seneca insisted, *De Beneficiis*, that there can be no law to enforce gratitude by imposing a penalty on ingratitude. The limits of civil authority are recognised along with common obligation resting on ethical warrant. Such obligation supplies the condition on which civil obligation rests. That there are obligations belonging to the internal sphere which social authority cannot enforce, is a fact which illustrates the distinction between civil and moral law.

This view of perfect and imperfect obligation has been supported very generally by Jurists, and amongst moralists by Hutcheson, *System of Moral Phil.*, II. iii. 3; and Reid, *Active Powers*, Ess. III. pt. iii. c. 5.

THIRD,—A TRANSCENDENTAL USE, That inasmuch as moral law discovers only a maxim of conduct, and does not prescribe definite actions, all moral obligation is indeterminate, and only obligations enforced by positive law could be described as examples of determinate obligation.

This is the product of the transcendental philosophy of Kant, which makes the essence of the law consist in its form, so separating it from positive enactment. It is no doubt true that moral laws are general principles of action, which an intelligent being must apply for himself in guidance of his conduct, translating them into particular actions; but obligation encircles the whole life of the agent, having sway over all its activity, and is determinate and perfect under the demands of absolute law. Kant's view led him to regard the subjective principles only as 'not unfit to be elevated to the rank of law in a system of universal moral legislation.' But this gave them 'only a negative character, viz. not to be

repugnant to Law *in genere*.' His translator, Mr. Semple, ventures even the assertion that 'Duty is a negative conception only.'—*Metaphysics of Ethics*, 3 ed., p. 205. But a categorical imperative cannot be a negative. 'Thou shalt not' is only a defence against evil-doing. The true meaning of ethical life can be found only in the positive 'Thou shalt,'—in the command to *be*, and to *act*, as law requires. For a valuable discussion of this subject, see Professor Lorimer's *Institutes of Law*, c. xi.

4. The historical method, belonging to every scheme of Evolution, encounters special difficulty in treatment of ethical obligation. While rendering a large contribution towards the exposition of progressiveness in human thought, it fails to make sufficient account of the unity of rational life, and of the common data of rational procedure. To give prominence to progress, at the cost of rational unity, is to become one-sided and abstract, throwing into neglect the foundations of our thought, and involving loss of fidelity to the historic spirit itself. Hegelian and Neo-Kantian thinkers are peculiarly exposed to this hazard in their admiration of the evolution of thought, and of the growing humanitarian spirit of our age. Green speaks of 'the development of morality' as consisting in 'a gradual extension, for the mental eye of the moral subject, of the range of persons to whom the common good is conceived as common.'—*Prolegomena to Ethics*, B. III., ch. iii. § 206, p. 217. That there is under the advance of our modern civilisation a greatly enlarged conception of the measure in which the interests of men are intertwined is quite clear. But if this be spoken of as illustrative of 'the development of morality,' what is meant is an expansion of our conceptions of the range of application of a common law, which has determined the duty of men in all ages, being equally binding in the third century after Christ and in the third century before Christ, as in the nineteenth century of the Christian era. How readily Green's represen-

tation of expanding sense of the application of the law runs into a suggestion of a different conception of duty belonging to men in different ages appears in A. C. Bradley's rendering of this in the 'Analytical table of contents' for Green's work, where we read, 'the primitive *duty* to a narrow circle *gradually widens* into a *duty* to man as man.' And the language of Green quite favours this, as when, after speaking of the popular restriction of the common good to the good of a particular community, he says: 'Among ourselves, on the contrary, it is almost an axiom of popular Ethics that there is at least a *potential duty* of every man to every man.' Speaking of present sensibility, he adds, 'Conscience is uneasy at its violation, as it would not have been, according to all indications, in the case, let us say, of a Greek who used his slave as a chattel, though, according to his lights, the Greek might be as conscientious as any of us.' This reference to the Greek is well put, and historically accurate, even though we might supply its analogue in the nineteenth century. But in order to be true to the historic spirit, and to the demands of Philosophy, we must recall that 'the potential duty' of man to man was recognised as essential to human duty by Socrates and Plato, as they insisted that Justice cannot do injustice or wrong to another. 'Can the just by justice make man unjust?' 'If a man says that justice consists in repaying a debt, meaning that a just man ought to do good to his friends, and injure his enemies, he is not really wise; for he says what is not true, if, as has been clearly shown, the injury of another can be in no case just.'—Plato's *Republic*, B. I. 335 (Jowett's Translation).

5. Subjection to moral law, recognised in a judgment of obligation, may be described as 'moral necessity.' For man, there are three forms of necessity,—physical, intellectual, and moral. Physical necessity is represented in the uniformity of succession determined under the laws of material existence. Intellectual necessity appears in the conditions on which

rational power is used for discovery of truth. Such are the laws of non-contradiction and causality. Moral necessity is that which is recognised in an Imperative which is to be voluntarily applied in the government of motives and actions. Obligation is 'The necessity of a free action under a categorical imperative of reason.'—Kant, *Metaph. of Morals*, Abbott, 278.

It includes the ethical disposition, though it does not measure the outward activities. For it is true, as F. H. Bradley says, "Duty for duty's sake," says only "do the right for the sake of the right"; it does not tell what right is.'—*Ethical Studies*, 143.

Common obligation is fixed by the necessities of moral law. Individual duty is reached through adjustment of law to our circumstances, so as to determine the measure of present requirement. Personal application of moral law to the relations in which the agent is placed is left to the responsibility of the individual.

Every judgment as to individual obligation has thus a reference to moral law, as affording the rule; to personal power, as regulating the possibilities; and to present opportunity, as indicating the line of action called for at the time. The demand is for a disposition in vital harmony with the requirements of the rational nature, and for action accordingly.

A passing reference seems desirable to the opinion occasionally expressed that delight in well-doing is higher than Duty. The popular admission that duty is burdensome,—that the summons to obedience is irksome, taken with an oft-associated utterance of desire to do right because of the love of it, and not because we are ordered to do it, when taken together betray some confusion of thought. The instinct of obedience which finds expression is good so far as it goes, but the account it gives of itself is misleading. 'The irksome' is a sense of want of harmony between our knowledge of law and our disposition to act upon it. Irksomeness has no part

in the language of reason. The sense of the irksome is the expression of refractory feeling and rebellious disposition. Philosophic warrant for this there can be none. The affinities of this mode of representation are with the misleading utterance of Kant that Duty is the notion of a good will, 'as affected by certain inward hindrances.' The law is the utterance of our Reason,—it belongs to all that is best in man,—while the sense of the 'irksome' is the reverse. On the other hand, the declared desire to do duty for its own sake,—which affects even to be superior to the command,—does not know its own meaning. Duty is presupposed, in order that it may be fulfilled,—for the desire is to fulfil duty with the fulness of ethical life. When it is said, 'love is the fulfilling of the law,' it is only said, law is that which love fulfils. The recognition of the Imperative of Moral Law is simply a knowledge,—is not in itself an impulse. It is the consciousness of a universal law, as that is distinguished by the presence of the idea 'Right.' This belongs to the reflective activities of man. Such a statement does not, however, give a complete view of our experience, for when we deal analytically with consciousness, our statement of each detached element is necessarily one-sided or partial. There is no real, that is, no vital severance of thought and impulse. Knowledge and impulse combine in experience, or disappear together. Spontaneous or intuitive knowledge of the law, given within the natural activity of our intelligence, is *necessarily* accompanied by active *reverence* for the law, and this reverence is at once feeling and impulse. Antagonistic impulse there may be, involving us in the conflicts of moral life, but reverence for the Imperative discovered by our reason is natural to man, and spontaneous in its rise. Wheresoever, under the practical demands of life, the law is formulated and held up before the mind, reverence, as attendant feeling, spontaneously arises; and it is voluntarily stimulated and developed by means of intellectual exercise. Kant, at a very early stage in the

Groundwork, Chap. I. (Semple's Translation, 3d ed., p. 12; Abbott's, p. 17), has given the strongest testimony to this. 'Although reverence is a feeling, it is no passive feeling, but an active emotion generated in the mind by an idea of reason. . . . Reverence is the representation of a worth before which self-love falls.' When Kant, according to a favourite formula, speaks of the moral agent as willing his maxim to become law universal, he adds, 'for this potential legislation, reason forces me to entertain immediate disinterested reverence' (Semple's Translation). So also did Fichte, following the same line of observation, insist that there is no chasm between reason and practical feeling, that there is an inherent tendency towards activity,—movement to effect the unity of these three, thought, impulse, and action.

6. From personal obligation, there follows by necessary consequence, moral responsibility, or answerableness to the Deity for the degree in which obligation has been fulfilled. The rational explanation of the universe is found in the existence of the self-sufficient One (v. Kant's *Metaphysic of Ethics*): to Him as sovereign belongs the moral government of the universe: to Him who imposes duty must answer be made as to its performance.

7. Obligation is the true guide to any theory of the end of life. A universal law indicates some one definite end which cannot be severed from rational existence. We are thus led into the *essentials* of life, as separated from outward variable conditions, bringing with them different aspects of responsibility, liable to increase or diminution according to environment. Thus we clearly distinguish questions of property from questions of life, for conditions of holding property may vary greatly, while conditions of moral life are unchangeable. There may, therefore, be an absolute obligation belonging to life itself; and consequent inferential obligation, concerned with time and other relations.

Taking exclusively absolute obligation, we are on the way

for recognising the end of moral life. Some find this in the attainments of life itself, that is, in perfection of character ; some in its experience, that is, happiness. These two are necessarily related, for the perfect in character will give the perfect in blessedness. But neither singly nor unitedly do they guide to the true end. Happiness is not the subject of command, but is attendant on well-doing. And if there be an obligation to seek perfection—and this is implied in moral life—obligation is not determined by this. Perfection is attainment providing for larger possibilities by a wider harmony of being with existence beyond itself. Wherefore the end of life must be activity in accordance with moral law, as environment may require. It always is, and always shall be.

8. The contrast between absolute law, and varying possibilities of action, leads onward to a doctrine of variation in responsibilities. The ground of test is the same, the true ideal ; the measure of test is variable, and this variability is according to a full view of the variety of conditions affecting fulfilment of law. This meeting of a variable and an invariable constitutes a difficulty in securing an exact statement of the philosophic doctrine. Differences of responsibility imply differences of potentiality. The leading differences are comparative intelligence or ignorance, comparative power or weakness, comparative aids or obstacles. The law of life is one, but the arduousness of effort required for obedience spreads out into endlessly varied degrees.

At first sight, it appears difficult to harmonise immediate knowledge (intuition), natural to man, and diversity of knowledge, which last is commonly admitted to involve some want of knowledge, not unreasonably described as ‘ignorance of duty.’ But when we consider how intuition and reflection blend in consciousness, and mutually fulfil their functions ; how the self-evident truth and the lessons of experience are worked up in one state of consciousness, we find a combination which explains equally the simplicity or singleness of view

in the child, and the slowness of understanding often apparent in the grown man. There is a sense in which we naturally speak of 'ignorance of duty,' in so far as the entanglements of life may perplex the wisest, and still more the ignorant; there is also a sense in which the knowledge of duty is common,—known to all,—in so far as there is no uncertainty as to general rules of conduct. Taking both things together, we reach the conclusion that there is a common and a variable in responsibility.

Next will follow the whole series of diversities of individual constitution appearing under the law of heredity. An inherited bias or predisposition necessarily affects the individual's relation to ethical requirements. A fiercer struggle,—a sorer conflict,—falls to one than to another; or falls at one point on one agent, and at quite a different point on another. This complicated range of facts, most difficult to estimate,—quite impossible to measure under a uniform scale,—must bear upon the features of individual responsibility.

A further source of diversity is found in what may be named 'situation,'—including family training, general education, state of society, current ethical opinions.

In a careful estimate of all these, we may find the grounds for recognising variations of responsibility, while in the knowledge of absolute law we have the unchangeable basis of common obligation. A modified responsibility does not imply a partial obligation. It is only a measure of the stage of possibility in a course of advance towards a perfect obedience, imperatively required. Moral law is a law of progress for all mankind, and responsibility is according to the measure of power and the environment of the agent.

9. The relations of moral law, life, and action, are thus represented: Rightness is excellence of conduct discovered in moral law; Oughtness is subjection of personal life to the authority of such law; Goodness is rightness manifested in disposition and conduct under submission to moral law.

10. PROBLEMS.—(1) In what sense is obligation common to all moral creatures, and in what sense is it different to each? (2) Distinguish between the knowledge of the fact of obligation, and the scientific explanation of this knowledge. (3.) From what sources may uncertainty arise as to present duty? (4) How far is a performance of duty compatible with uncertainty as to which of two lines of action is the preferable? The problem is, to find moral certainty along with some degree of uncertainty as to the manner of its performance.

CHAPTER VI.

MORAL RIGHTS.

1. MORAL obligation, as imposed necessity, implies proportionate right of action, without restraint from others. Universal law is the security for the common rights of man. These include all that is implied in the right to act according to the light of Reason, as a rational agent is able to judge of its teaching. This is the natural and inalienable right of personality,—To act according to Conscience. God has in the constitution of our nature provided for it; moral law implies the reservation of it; our fellow-men can have no warrant to restrict it. Diversities of social rank, superiority or inferiority of natural relationships, cannot affect the equality of rights belonging to all moral life.

Right here is *Jus* in contrast with *Honestum* or *Rectum*. Hence jurisprudence, the Science of Law, is properly the Science of human Rights, for, as Hutcheson says,—‘*Jus* ensues upon *rectum*.’ Jurisprudence is therefore based upon Ethics. For the distinction between rightness,—The Right,—as law of rational life, and a Right, as a claim or title of a moral agent, *v.* Hutcheson, *Syst. of Mor. Phil.* II. iii. 1, vol. i. p. 252; Reid, *Active Powers*, v. iii. H. p. 643; Whewell’s *Elements of Mor.* I. iv. vol. i. p. 36.

Moral obligation, as it requires right actions towards others, implies security for their rights as for ours. The right

to fair judgment, to generous feeling, to payment of debts, have all the same ethical validity. The fact that the acknowledgment of the right is more easily enforced in one case than in another, constitutes no difference in the moral warrant for the claim.

Common obligations determining the forms of right action towards others, mark out the common rights of those associated in the same sphere of action. Special obligations resting upon some on account of speciality of relation to others, give to these others special rights in the given relation. This is the ethical basis of the rights of parents and children, husband and wife, master and servant, for these rights are the exact equivalent of the relative duties. The child has a right to be educated, as the parent is under obligation to provide education for his child.

2. If the question be raised as to the sense in which Rights can *belong* to us, or may be spoken of as *possessions*, a speciality of significance appears. Rights are not property as material possessions may be, consisting of something external; but are privileges secured under sanction of law, and essential to life. They are not *acquired*, as things may be; they are not *given* as the constituent elements of our nature are given. *Secured* to us by the Moral Governor, under the law He has imposed, their acknowledgment is required of every being living under ethical law. They are the hereditary possession of each man, affording area for rational activity; to be vindicated by each man when challenged; to be granted to others, even when unclaimed.

Moral rights are not self-exacted, nor can they be voluntarily surrendered. As the necessary accompaniment of obligation they are as unchangeable as the nature of moral law itself.

Duties and Rights are moral equivalents resting equally upon the unchangeable warrant of moral law as the universal rule of human action. The ground on which any man can

claim a right entitled to acknowledgment by others is exactly the ground on which by necessity the claimant must own moral obligation.

All moral rights are perfect rights, irrespective of their being claimed, or even intelligently recognised by an agent, or enforced by society. Positive law may not attempt to enforce all rights alike, because all rights do not admit of being enforced; but this does not affect the ethical validity of any of the rights of a moral being.

Hutcheson, while holding that 'the observing and fulfilling every proper right of others is matter of conscience, necessary to obtain the approbation of God and our own hearts,' nevertheless assents to the classification of rights into perfect and imperfect. He says,—'Rights, according as they are more or less necessary to be obtained and observed in society, are divided into perfect and imperfect.'—*Syst. of Mor. Phil.* II. iii. 3. In the former sentence he speaks as a moralist; in the latter as a jurist. Dr. Thomas Brown was more accurate, when he said,—'There is as little an imperfect right, in a moral sense, as there is in logic an imperfect truth or falsehood.'—*Philos. of Mind*, Lect. 91.

3. Besides natural moral rights, Rights are acquired. These result from natural rights. Of Acquired Rights, rights to special articles of property, and rights under contract, afford examples. The Rights of Personal Property follow directly from the natural right to the use of personal power, and to the fruit of its exercise. The Rights of Contract come from disposal of personal power and property, according to personal choice. These are restricted by common and special obligations.

Even acquired moral rights rest ultimately upon absolute moral law. The measure of any man's rights may depend upon the range of his efforts and upon the forms of contract into which he has entered; but the right of contract itself is determined by moral law, and is not dependent on voluntary agreement.

4. Consequent on natural rights, there is an obligation to defend them, to resist attack upon them, and to punish those infringing them. The right to punish is ultimately an ethical title, with attendant obligation, to vindicate our rights, to the extent even of restricting the natural rights of the assailant, as the penalty of wilful injury.

5. PROBLEMS.—(1) Critically examine the statement,—‘Where no covenant hath proceeded, every man has a right to every thing.’—Hobbes, *Leviath.* I. 14, also in ch. 13. Molesworth, iii. p. 130, and p. 117. (2) Does a state of war destroy the natural rights of the combatants? Hobbes says, ‘Force and fraud are in war the two cardinal virtues.’—*Leviath.* I. 13; Molesworth, III. 115. (3) In the organisation of society, how far is it in harmony with moral law to surrender a measure of personal right? (4) What is the natural limit to this surrender under requirement of civil government? The problem is,—To find the Ethical grounds for such limitation.

EVOLUTION THEORIES.

DIVISION I.—BIOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL.

1. THE strong position now secured by the theory of Biological Evolution gives great interest to every attempt to construct a scheme of Ethical Thought in harmony with its fundamental conception. The theory that all the complex orders of animate existence have sprung from the simplest forms is one which must test itself by facing the problem of human existence, including all that belongs to thought, speculative and practical. As long as we concentrate on organism, with its homologues and analogues, there is a rich treasury of evidence. But movement is not easy, because evidence is not clear, when we include Ethical life. An Evolution theory cannot shirk the problem encountered in the position and functions of the highest order of life in our world. Those who make a special study of the phenomena of reflection and of regulation of personal conduct are in possession of the order of facts most testing for this favourite scheme.

Accepting, *ex hypothesi*, the progression of organic existence according to this theory, we must in consistency trace all thought to experience, conditioned by the sensori-motor nerve system connecting us with the outer world. We must account for thought and for all consequent experience by means of organism, and without any power higher than sensation.

‘Nothing is to be held innate that can be shown to arise from experience and education.’—Bain, *Ment. and Moral*

Science, B. II. c. 6. This is common ground. A development theory of Moral Philosophy is sufficient if it can prove its competence to explain our recognition of moral distinctions, personal obligation, and personal rights. It becomes responsible for a scientific account of the genesis of the intellectual powers, including Conscience, and of all dispositions depending on exercise of intelligence. Within this must be included all that belongs to Ethical life as commonly recognised among men.

The Evolution theory must regard our most complex states of consciousness merely as developments, under natural law, from our simplest state. Present consciousness must be held to be the resultant of all previous experience. 'We have it not in our power to ascertain by any direct process, what consciousness told us at the time when its revelations were in their pristine purity. It only offers itself to our inspection as it exists now, when those original revelations are overlaid and buried under a mountainous heap of acquired notions and perceptions.'—Mill's *Exam.* p. 171. The development theory must, therefore, first present a theory of intellectual action in order to reach a theory of morals.

After study of the theory in the works of DARWIN (*Origin of Species* and *Descent of Man*) and ALFRED RUSSELL WALLACE (*Theory of Natural Selection*), the treatment of the leading problems may be traced through the following works :—LOCKE's *Essay* (1690), making sensation the origin of all knowledge, while attributing to mind a power of reflection. CONDILLAC, *Essai sur l'origine des Connaissances Humaines* (1746) and *Traité des Sensations* (1754). HARTLEY's *Observations on Man* (1749). PRIESTLEY's *Disquisitions relating to Matter and Spirit* (1777). ERASMUS DARWIN's *Zoonomia, or Laws of Organic Life* (1793-96); criticised by Dr. THOMAS BROWN's *Observations on Darwin's Zoonomia* (1798). JAMES MILL's *Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind* (1829), 2d ed., 1869; and a *Fragment on Mackintosh* (anonymously) 1835. JOHN S. MILL's *Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy*, 3d ed. 1867, Chaps. IX. XI. XII. BAIN's Works,—*Senses and Intellect*,—*Emotions and Will*,—*Mental and Moral Science*. HERBERT SPENCER's *Principles of Psychology*, 2d ed., and *Data of Ethics*. ALFRED BARRATT's *Physical*

Ethics, London, 1869. SIDGWICK's *Methods of Ethics*. CYPLES's *Process of Human Experience*. SIMCOX's *Natural Law, an Essay in Ethics*. WAKE's *Evolution of Morality*, 2 vols. WILSON and FOWLER's *Principles of Morals*, Introductory Chapters.; FOWLER's 2d part of same, and FOWLER's *Progressive Morality*. LESLIE STEPHEN's *Science of Ethics*. COURTNEY's *Constructive Ethics*.

2. With acceptance of the Evolution theory, there naturally arises aversion to recognise original powers of mind, and a preference for insisting upon *states* of consciousness as the proper subjects of study. No objection need be offered to this, as no perplexity is encountered, for all philosophic procedure must be analytic and synthetic, taking our states of consciousness as indubitable. The theory starts with organism and its functions, and must afterwards accept states of consciousness, as data given.

In a pure theory of Evolution, organism is the product of heredity, under laws operating through long ages; Mind is the manifestation of functions belonging to the most advanced organism. According to a mixed theory organism is evolved as described; but Mind is independent or superadded life, advancing by evolution from the lowest mental state, which is Sensation. The former is the type of theory which secures unity, and encounters the greatest difficulty. The latter escapes serious perplexities by surrendering unity of scheme. The theory as a whole may be contemplated in three phases: the Biological, for which Darwin and Wallace are the leading authorities; the Psychological, for which Mill, Bain, and Herbert Spencer are authorities; and Dialectic, or Transcendental, for which Hegel is the great authority, along with the Hegelian or Neo-Kantian School of this country, including Green, Bradley, and Professor Edward Caird. For discussion of the question whether the nerve system is capable of accounting for the phenomena of mind, I refer to *The Relations of Mind and Brain*, in which I have discussed the whole subject in detail.

PSYCHOLOGICAL EVOLUTION.

3. Here we begin with the problem in this shape—Can intellectual action be accounted for by Evolution of consciousness from Sensation? Can we find in Sensation the germ of all that belongs to intellectual life? An Evolution theory must maintain the affirmative.

As, however, it is impossible to go back to the dawn of individual experience, or to the earliest historic periods, the theory must begin with Sensation, as the simplest fact in consciousness. Hence it is named the Sensational theory. It professes to show how Sensation blossoms into Thought.

The sensory apparatus has already been described, consisting of a system of sensory nerves extending from the surface of the body to the brain, where the sensory nerve is in vital relation with a nerve cell. Sensation is the passive experience belonging to intelligent life consequent on excitation of sensory apparatus, such as the sensation of colour, or of smell. Let us take smell as the example, a sensation in which the least exercise of intelligence is involved, or, as Professor Bain puts it, one of 'the least intellectual sensations.' James Mill says, 'In the smell three things are commonly distinguished. There is the organ, there is the Sensation, and there is the antecedent of the Sensation, the external object.'—*Analysis*, i. 4, 2d ed. i. 8. The order of occurrence is this—contact, excitation of apparatus, sensation. The spheres of occurrence are—the external world, the organism, consciousness. Our main problem is to distinguish the several elements belonging to the state of consciousness, and next to account for their presence. We are dealing with the simplest fact in experience, consciousness of sensation.

What is Sensation? James Mill replies, it is 'a particular feeling, a particular consciousness.'—*Analysis*, i. 7, 2d ed., i. 12. On this no diversity of opinion seems possible.

'Odorous particles which proceed from the object' reach

the organ of smell, and, by contact, awaken molecular action along the sensory apparatus, and the sensation, in some way unknown, is the consequence. Hume says (*Treat. on Hum. Nat.* i. 1, 2), 'Sensations arise in the soul originally from unknown causes.' In the present state of scientific knowledge this is unsatisfactory, and is specially hazardous for a beginning in philosophic inquiry. Intelligent experience makes known the result of nerve excitation; physiological science teaches us the structure of the sensory nerve, and the phases of its functional activity. How the Sensation is awakened in consciousness continues unknown. That the impression is transmitted to the nerve-centre in the brain is acknowledged. Beyond this, Physiology makes no averment. Every one is able to tell when he has a sensation of smell. It is matter of experience. And, as James Mill says, 'we can distinguish this feeling, this consciousness, the sensation of smell, from every other sensation.'—*Ib.* i. 7, or i. 12. 'What is *in me* is the sensation, the feeling, the point of consciousness.'—*Ib.* p. 9, or p. 13. The sensation is in Me; not in my nostrils any more than in a rose. The sensation is 'a part of that series, that succession, that flow of something, on account of which we call ourselves living or sensitive creatures.' This is the simplest fact in experience, consciousness of sensation. This is our primary fact, a given experience, out of which a Philosophy of Mind and of Morals is to be constructed on the hypothesis of Evolution. We start with certainty, for, as J. S. Mill says, 'Consciousness of the mind's own feelings and operations cannot be disbelieved.'—*Exam. of Hamilton's Philos.* p. 166.

What, then, is involved in our experience of a sensation? Consciousness is not identical with Sensation. Sensation is a feeling; the act of *Consciousness is a knowledge of the feeling*, knowledge of it as mine,—hence I say, 'I am conscious'; and it is knowledge of a particular sensation known as distinct from other sensations familiar to us; hence we agree in

calling it a smell-sensation, in contrast with a sensation of light, or of heat, or of sound. Consciousness is a condition of any sensation; the particular sensation is a transitory condition of consciousness, for I may be conscious of other sensations, and not of this. And the particular sensation may be so far dependent on personal action that similar sensations may be renewed by bringing the rose close to the nostrils, time after time. Though the sensation is consequent on excitation of the sensory nerve, consciousness, that is, intelligence, is a prerequisite for sensation. Here the theory is already in difficulty. There is a *presupposition* for which it cannot account. Intelligence (for this is the significance of Consciousness) must be existence prior to sensation, and an intelligent being cannot have a *mere* sensation.

Further, *Consciousness is knowledge of personal existence*, in this case as affected by action of sensory apparatus. Consciousness is knowledge of Self, and knowledge of a particular feeling. It is smell-consciousness and Self-consciousness; in every case a double knowledge. It cannot be less, for there is knowledge of *object*, in contrast with *subject*.

In order that there may be such experience as sensation of smell implies, there must be an active intelligence,—self-acting,—knowing its own existence in the knowledge of its own experience. Here is a hopeless barrier to the advance of the Evolutionist. Personal experience implies Personality as its condition. To evolve Intelligence out of Sensation is an impossibility, sensory apparatus is indeed presupposed, but so is Intelligence. An advance from simple Sensation to Intelligence is foreclosed. In vain do we seek to explain Sensation by increased complexity in the structure of Organism; in vain is it attempted by reduction of Consciousness to some simpler initial stage of experience. There is no Sensation without Consciousness.

Fruitless is the attempt to identify Sensation and Consciousness as if the terms were synonymous. The venture is

made by James Mill, J. S. Mill, and Professor Bain, and the views of all three are brought together in the new edition of James Mill's *Analysis*, chap. v., with Notes, 74, 75, vol. i. p. 226. See Ward's 'Psychology,' *Encyc. Brit.* 9th ed. p. 39.

James Mill says, 'Though I have these various modes of naming my sensation, by saying, I feel the prick of a pin, I feel the pain of a prick, I have the sensation of a prick, I have the feeling of a prick, I am conscious of the feeling; the thing named in all these various ways is the same.'—*Analy.* i. 71, or i. 224. Reference to the pin and the puncture may here be laid aside, as wide of the mark, belonging to a distinct question. Sensation and feeling are the same, and may be used as synonymous. But when we say, 'I feel,' and 'I am conscious of feeling,' the two statements appear the same only because the second is really involved and understood in the first, under the reference made to *personality*. 'I feel' really means, 'I *know* that I feel.' We cannot succeed in simplifying this experience. The second is not tautological, and 'an impropriety of speech,' as James Mill suggests, but is the full expression of an implication left unexpressed in the first; for 'I feel' implies a double knowledge, recognition of Self and of the present state.

John Stuart Mill says, Many philosophers think 'we cannot have a feeling without having the knowledge awakened in us at the same moment of a Self who feels it. But of this, as a primordial fact of our nature, it is impossible to have direct evidence; and a supposition may be made which renders its truth at least questionable. Suppose a being, gifted with sensation, but devoid of memory, whose sensations follow one after another, but leave no trace of their existence when they cease. Could this being have any knowledge or notion of a Self? Would he ever say to himself, *I* feel; this sensation is *mine*? I think not. The notion of a Self is, I apprehend, a consequence of memory. There is no meaning in the word Ego or I, unless the I of to-day is also the I of

yesterday.'—*Analysis*, 2d ed., i. 229. In the supposed case a man could but express his momentary experience; he could not say less than this—'I feel.' To say 'feeling' would involve abstraction, and would imply still higher intellectual exercise than simple consciousness of feeling. The supposition is an impossible one. Language implies active intelligence, including memory, superiority to sensation in a high degree, — self-consciousness, observation, and abstraction. Bain makes conspicuous the force of this criticism. He says, 'We may be in a state of pleasure with little or nothing of thought accompanying; we are still properly said to be conscious, or under consciousness. But we may add to the mere fact of pleasure the cognition of the state as a state of pleasure, and a state belonging to us at the time. This is not the same thing as before; it is something new superposed upon the previous consciousness.'—*Analysis*, Note 74, i. p. 227. If so, feeling of pleasure is not personal experience, but we make it personal by an exercise of personality, which on Professor Bain's supposition not only is unknown, but does not exist. We superpose upon our feeling, when, *ex hypothesi*, there is nothing to act, and nothing to add.

Hume, discrediting the alleged knowledge of Self in every state of consciousness, says, 'I never can catch *myself* at any time without a perception.'—*Hum. Nat. B.* i. Pt. iv. sec. 6. But we have a true and very important knowledge of self in knowing self as exercising perceptive power. This is knowledge of Self as intelligence. A *conception* of our personality is, however, something much wider. It gathers up into a single representation the several characteristics of our intelligence as these are brought to unity in life. 'If a being can appear anyhow to itself, it must be capable of unifying manifold phenomena in an absolute indivisibility of its nature.'—Lotze, *Microcosmus*, Tr. i. 157. Cf. Kant's, *Transcendental Unity of Apperception*.

4. The second test of an Evolution theory concerns its explanation of the 'series, succession, or flow of our experi-

ences.' A sufficient explanation must account for the connecting or unifying of this series,—constituting 'a bundle or collection of different perceptions' (Hume); 'a thread of consciousness' (J. S. Mill).

Given a sensation, how are we to account for a correlated series, conscious of its own unity? Grant that there is sensitive organism, that there are external objects, and that these repeatedly come into contact with the sensory system; and you grant a series of impressions. Thus much is true of all organism. But on these conditions there can be nothing more than an unconnected series of sensory excitations. If these were induced along the same sensory line or strand, as in a series of smells, preceding impressions must pass away, in order that another may occur. This is the law of the sensory system. If several nerve lines be brought into action at the same time, the result is a complex experience. But the complex experience has no more endurance than the simple. Sensory lines are worked on the 'block system.' The line must be cleared in order that a new train of impressions may proceed. Sensory excitation is thus wholly external. Each successive impression is disconnected or broken from the preceding. There is nothing of the continuity, coherence, integrity, of personal experience. There is no pathway along this line into the experience which consciousness really constitutes. Succession is matter of knowledge, and so is relation, and so is difference. Here an Evolution theory is again baffled. Observation, comparison, memory, must all be *given*, in order that there may be intelligent experience, and an Evolution theory has none of them to give, and cannot show how they can be originated. According to Evolution they are all to be created by advance from lower to higher, yet without these higher we cannot have experience. Without observation, involving at least the distinction of subject and object, there can be no such Memory as we rely upon in building up our knowledge; without memory there can be no thought;

without thought no rational life. Neither from organism nor from Sensation can help be found here. No series of sensory impressions will produce thought ; no series of sensations can result in anything higher than its own content.

The first attempt to escape this dilemma is the suggestion that Sensation makes for itself a kind of memory. In a subordinate and very restricted sense this is correct. As the sensory system is continued in action, indications appear of a growing susceptibility—an increased readiness to act in familiar directions. This increased susceptibility may not unwarrantably be described as a phase of organic memory. But this does not originate consciousness, nor does it even introduce to it. There is in human experience a further fact which is interesting and suggestive, in the relation of Imagination to Sensation, for there is a possibility, by mere play of Imagination, of reawakening a sensation. But here Imagination is presupposed, an existing intellectual power, which an Evolution theory does not recognise unless it can be shown to be developed out of Sensation, and this, we submit, cannot be shown.

Professor Bain says that sensations possess the power of 'continuing as Ideas after the actual object of sense is withdrawn.'—*Emotions*, p. 17. But under the laws determining functional activity of sensory apparatus, a sensation cannot 'continue' ; while an idea cannot be different from the sensation, and yet a continuation of it. An ideal representation must be 'reproduced by mental causes alone,' and thus we postulate Memory as a property of Intelligence, entirely different from an 'organic memory' such as has been already recognised.

We have, besides, in our experience, forethought, a regard to the Future as well as to the Past. Thus, John S. Mill says 'that the human mind is capable of Expectation,—in other words, that, after having had Actual Sensations, we are capable of forming the conception of Possible Sensations.'—*Exam.*

p. 219. By aid of such forethought we take in hand our own development, in accordance with a rational anticipation ; we have an outlook, and we adapt procedure to possibilities. We direct a personal life by means of intelligent appreciation of the conditions in the midst of which it exists.

What then is the effect of postulating Memory and Expectation? Refer these two powers to Sensation, and attributes are included which cannot be explained by reference to sensory apparatus. If these powers are postulated as belonging to 'the human mind,' powers 'which we are capable' of using in order to interpret the Consciousness of Sensation, the theory of Evolution is abandoned. Intelligence is a recognised prerequisite. Without thought and memory there may be sensory impressions succeeding each other, for sensory apparatus is adequate to this, if there be only contact with the external ; but there can be no series, no 'continuous thread of consciousness,' no unity of personal life. Granting a continuity of experience, a unity of consciousness, intelligence is its uniform characteristic. It is the active and ruling power in the whole ; it is the very life to which the coherence belongs, and all the conditions of intelligence are implied as essential to procedure. In this we have a provision for discrimination of differences, first appearing between successive sensations, and afterwards in the more complex exercises of the understanding. Only on these admissions is a theory of human life possible. 'Our experience diversifies into kinds' ; we recognise 'variations of Sensation, those of the different senses, with their modifications ;' and 'the intellect, by its own proper function, comes to apprehend that a certain order discloses itself in these occurrences.'—Cyples, *Process of Human Experience*, p. 3.

The final resort of Psychological Evolution as a theory is found in the Laws of Association, on which account the theory is often named the Associational theory.

James Mill, following in the line taken by Locke and

Hume, traces the relation between Sensation and Association in the following manner : The simplest element in experience is Sensation ; the representation, copy, or recollection of the Sensation is an Idea : and the connecting or combining of Ideas in the mind is Association. This last is ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS, not of objects, nor of sensations. The name points to combinations in consciousness by exercise of intelligence aided by recollection. The Laws of Association are, therefore, Laws of Memory. So J. S. Mill says, 'Our ideas spring up, or exist, in the order in which the sensations existed of which they are the copies.'—*Analysis*, i. 56 ; or i. 78.

The Laws of Association, as given by John S. Mill, are the following : '1st, Similar phenomena tend to be thought of together. 2d, Phenomena which have either been experienced or conceived in close contiguity to one another, tend to be thought of together. 3d, Associations produced by contiguity become more certain and rapid by repetition. When two phenomena have been very often experienced in conjunction, and have not in any single instance occurred separately either in experience or in thought, there is produced between them what has been called Inseparable, or, less correctly, Indissoluble Association, by which is not meant that the Association must inevitably last to the end of life—that no subsequent experience or process of thought can possibly avail to dissolve it ; but only, that as long as no such experience or process of thought has taken place, the Association is irresistible. 4th, When an Association has acquired this character of inseparability, not only does the idea called up by Association become, in our consciousness, inseparable from the idea which suggested it, but the facts of phenomena answering to these ideas come at last to seem inseparable in existence.'—*Exam.* 219.

These four laws of Association may be named, the Laws of Similarity, Contiguity, Repetition, and Tenacity or Persistence. Hume named them, 'Resemblance, Contiguity in

time or place, and Cause and Effect.'—See also Hamilton's *Reid*, p. 199, and Dissert. D * *. These laws of Association are generally accepted, saving only the introduction of 'Inseparability' into the last.

The laws of Association are laws of Memory. As Herbert Spencer has said, 'associability and revivability go together.'—*Principles of Psychology*, i. 251. But as laws of Memory they imply laws of Intelligence, for they involve understanding, comparison, a recognition of similar and dissimilar, and subsequent action of mind based on those prior acts of discrimination. Under the Laws of Association we connect facts passing through consciousness, thereby constituting any single fact a help for recalling of others. Nothing, however, can 'recur' in consciousness which has not already passed through it. Laws of Association can give nothing new; and, as they even presuppose the full activity of Intelligence, they are unavailable in the structure of a theory of the evolution of Intelligence. Grant Intellect as existing, and their action is easily explained; attempt to introduce them for Evolution of Intellect, and they vanish from consciousness.

If we introduce Association of *Feelings*, rather than of Ideas, as Herbert Spencer would prefer, the result is the same. There is no movement, no binding together, without an intellectual exercise essential for effecting the association. The words of Spencer in describing the occurrence are these: 'The consciousness of two feelings presented together, or one just after the other, implies first the consciousness of each feeling as such or such, implies *recognition* of it, as like in some or all of its characters to a feeling previously experienced. . . . The consciousness further includes two relations between the feelings—their relation of difference and their relation of co-existence or of sequence; and the *knowing* of each of these relations as such or such implies past like relations to which it is assimilated.'—*Principles of Psychology*, i. p. 252. Thus it is admitted that Consciousness involves Intelligence; there can

be no association without discrimination of similarity or difference ; no recognised series of sensations without pre-existent Intelligence. The attempt to make out Evolution of Intelligence from Sensation proves a failure.

KNOWLEDGE OF MORAL DISTINCTIONS.

5. The Evolution theory in its earlier and tentative form, as developed by Darwin and Wallace, was concerned with lower organisms, and rested upon facts illustrating the struggle for existence, in which the weak are vanquished, and there is survival of the fittest. This presents to view a struggle for self-gratification and the dominion of physical strength. Out of this how can there arise reference to moral law as an imperative of life? How can we pass from the desired to the right, from appetite to its government, from individualism to universal law?

In facing this crowning problem of life, with no other materials save those supplied by an Evolution scheme, Herbert Spencer takes a more general sweep, J. S. Mill a more restricted range, for Mill does not entangle himself with responsibilities for the more extended inquiry. The whole scheme of Evolution is wrought up to unity by Spencer, who says that 'Ethics has for its subject-matter that form which universal conduct assumes during the last stages of its Evolution.'—*Data of Ethics*, p. 20. Mill concentrates inquiry on this last stage, being content to inquire how the Happiness possible to a human life can become the rule for this life.

This whole inquiry, on account of its starting-point and conditions of procedure, deals with the Good rather than the Right ; with the End of conduct, rather than with its Rule ; and with Adjustments to Environment, rather than with Absolute Imperatives. Both forms of the theory coalesce in discussing adjustment of means to ends, in order to reach general happiness. For it is true, as Spencer has said, that

'Sentient existence can evolve only on condition that pleasure-giving acts are life-sustaining acts.'—*Data of Ethics*, p. 83. Whether there are not pleasure-giving acts which are in human history life-enfeebling acts, is a question remaining for consideration.

An Evolution theory looks for the prerequisites of a moral theory in the pleasurable and painful experience occurring in life. Its ruling conception is that man becomes moral by rationalising as to the pleasurable. The basis of the theory has been stated thus: 'Actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.'—Mill's *Utilitarianism*, p. 9. In view of this, the theory is named 'The Happiness Theory,'—Eudæmonism (εὐδαιμονία, happiness), Hedonism (ἡδονή, pleasure). Of the two designations, the former indicates a view of happiness higher than the latter. Bentham thinks that 'the word *happiness* is not always appropriate,' because 'it represents pleasure in too elevated a shape.'—*Deontology*, i. 78. The theory is named Utilitarianism, because actions are estimated according to their value as means for securing happiness. The Egoistic form of the theory makes personal happiness the ultimate test of the Right; the Altruistic (*Alter*, another), points to the happiness of others, and therefore of the greatest number, as the test of the Right.

Exposition.—Mill's *Utilitarianism*; Bain's *Emotions and Will* and *Mental and Moral Science*; Spencer's *Data of Ethics*; Sidgwick's *Methods of Ethics*; Stephen's *Science of Ethics*; Fowler's *Principles of Morals*; Courtney's *Constructive Ethics*. Criticism.—Grote's *Exam. of Utilit. Philos.*; Lecky's *European Morals*, chap. i.; M'Cosh's *Exam. of Mr. J. S. Mill's Philos.* ch. xx.; Blackie's *Four Phases of Morals*; 'The Law of Nature' in Professor Lorimer's *Institutes of Law*; Professor Laurie's *Notes on Moral Theories*; Sorley's *Ethics of Naturalism*; Schurman's *Ethical Import of Darwinism*.

6. Pleasure and pain, as they belong to human experience, are forms of personal feeling, dependent either on susceptibility of organism as provided for in the sensori-motor

system, or on the action of thought, and attendant mental susceptibility. Feeling is therefore distinguishable as physical or mental, according to its source. But our life being a unity, our happiness may be contemplated as a whole.

A scheme of evolution must include all forms of human feeling which cooperate towards inducing personal action. So Mill has said,—‘By happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of pleasure.’—*Util.* p. 10. The pleasurable is the desirable; that which is sought for the sake of gratification. In man this must imply self-satisfaction, including the large range of possibilities belonging to us as intelligent beings.

Pleasure, as connected with the functions of life, is in part passive experience, in part the product of activity. In so far as it is beyond the province of self-directed activity, it cannot belong to the moral sphere. But pleasure is in large measure the consequent of personal conduct as depending on action, and it may thus far be contemplated as an end of action. It is, however, more properly the natural *accompaniment* of action, not the end of action. That is, it is not the natural purpose of action, though it may voluntarily be regarded as such. Pleasure and pain afford respectively an index of the natural and the unnatural in the use of powers; of conformity with the law of their exercise, or violation of that law. Feuchtersleben has said ‘Beauty is in some degree the reflection of health;’ so is pleasure the symbol of natural exercise.

7. Pleasures differ greatly in kind, varying in quality according to the quality of mental exercise they accompany. In this way we distinguish the pleasures of the senses, of the affections, of the intellect, of the imagination. The pleasures of the senses are in nature lower than those of the intellect; the former, as organic in origin, are more akin to animal experience, the latter belong exclusively to a rational life. Sensualism is accordingly a term of reproach applied to indul-

gence of the appetites in neglect of the restraints of understanding and conscience.

John S. Mill is here distinguished as an expounder of Utilitarianism by giving prominence to the superior quality of some pleasures in comparison with others. He says, 'a being of higher faculties requires more to make him happy . . . than one of an inferior type,' and those equally capable of appreciating and enjoying all pleasures 'give a most marked preference to the manner of existence which employs their higher faculties.'—*Util.* p. 12. This is admirable, both as indicating the relations of pleasures to the faculties employed, and the superiority of quality, according to the faculty in exercise.

8. Pleasure, as agreeable to our nature, is a common object of desire. Pain, as disagreeable, is a common object of dislike.

That pleasure is agreeable, and as such desirable, is simple matter of fact, and needs no proof. 'What proof is it possible to give that pleasure is good?'—*Util.* p. 6.

Likes and dislikes,—expectations and apprehensions,—play a large part in life. This antithesis stimulates exertion, gives zest to continued activity, guards life against the risks to which it is exposed, and contributes largely to mental development, by stimulating a life of activity.

Experience of pleasure or pain is largely dependent on our own actions. This raises the question as to direction of our conduct by reference to its consequences. Such direction is clearly implied in an intelligent life. All that is covered by 'the lessons of experience' is included here. We pursue one course eagerly, and shun another with fixed determination, on the simple ground of consequences. Conduct, is therefore, largely regulated by rational Expediency. We do not, indeed, consider that our happiness depends altogether on our own doings. Nor does it appear that Expediency and Rightness count as just the same in life. But men are agreed in making

consequences a test of action ; and an agent is prudent or rash, according as he does or does not give heed to the probable results of his conduct.

Actions may therefore be classified as pleasurable or painful. That pleasure must be described as good, and suffering as evil, is obvious ; but no additional meaning is thereby conveyed. We say no more than that pleasure is pleasure, and that pain is pain. Good and evil cannot here be taken in a moral sense. We do not regard all pleasant actions as right, nor all painful actions as wrong. If an attempt be made to found moral distinctions on consequences, some basis of discrimination must be introduced, to show when and how the pleasant becomes the right. We must somehow pass from the fact of agreeableness to the Ought, the Imperative of life. Even though the pleasurable and the painful be fixed independently of our choice ; even though, as Bentham has said, there is a sense in which Pleasure and Pain are our masters ; there is also an important sense in which we are masters of both ; and in an Ethical sense we *ought* to exercise this Mastery. Pleasure and pain are not 'sovereign masters.' The rational being must not be ruled by his Sensibilities, but by his Intelligence ; and this means that there is a Rule higher than the agreeable. This is affirmed when we speak of moral life.

9. Our actions determine not only our own experience, but often largely affect the experience of others. Certain actions may, therefore, be classified according as they produce happiness or unhappiness to others. Their happiness or unhappiness may be either the incidental and undesigned accompaniment of our action, or it may be the direct and designed result. If our end be the happiness of another, the motive is benevolent, the act is beneficent ; our purpose is to secure a definite amount of happiness to the person concerned. If the end contemplated be the unhappiness of others, the motive is malevolent, the act inflicts an injury.

Excluding motives, and the judgments pronounced on them, we here simply extend the application of agreeable and disagreeable to the experience of others, which we take to be an experience analogous with our own. But we here also recognise an extension of the area of action, and a similarly extended range of application for the law of pleasure and pain. Human susceptibilities lie exposed to social influence. We cannot guard effectually our happiness, as we would desire to do. It is intrusted to the care of others; it is even in many respects at their mercy. No doubt this applies mainly to outward circumstances. If obligations cannot be enforced beyond the external, neither can injuries be inflicted beyond this line. If we are true to the laws of our spiritual life, we have a sure defence within the lines of personal activity. But every moral agent has the happiness of others in large measure intrusted to him, and, in view of this fact, there arises a wider question as to the Right, or the Ought in human action, How far is the individual responsible for the happiness of others?

10. By the upholders of the Utilitarian Theory of Morals it is maintained that actions are morally right as they tend to produce happiness, morally wrong as they tend to produce unhappiness. The usefulness of actions in securing happiness is held to determine their moral character. On this account the Theory is named Utilitarian. According to this theory, Rightness must be ascertained by an estimate of the comparative degrees of pleasure attainable. Right becomes something relative and variable, rather than fixed and universal. This is a serious difficulty. Besides, calculations as to the probable happiness to be realised are difficult and precarious, and also seriously exposed to risks from personal bias. It would thus seem on practical grounds a serious defect, occasioning sacrifice of exactness in thought, if we regard Rightness as a waving line, expanding or contracting according to probable occurrences. This does not

seem readily to harmonise with the common recognition of the Imperative of morals. So obvious and serious is the difficulty here that Sidgwick, in arguing for the qualification of existing rules of morality, is constrained to say that 'a Utilitarian may reasonably desire, on Utilitarian principles, that some of his conclusions should be rejected by mankind generally; or even that the vulgar should keep aloof from his system as a whole, in so far as the inevitable indefiniteness and complexity of its calculations render it likely to lead to bad results in their hands.'—*Methods of Ethics*, 1st ed., p. 453. This is a strong presumption against the validity of the theory as a whole. Yet there are expounders of the Theory of Evolution who see no difficulties. Theirs is a large, uncritical belief; for them outward appearance of differentiation of types of life is enough. Thus Mr. Clodd says, 'Morals are relative, not absolute; there is no fixed standard of right and wrong by which the actions of all men throughout all time are measured. The moral code advances with the progress of the race.'—*Story of the Creation: a Plain Account of Evolution*, by Edward Clodd, p. 220. Was there, then, a time when justice, honesty, and benevolence were no part of the law of human life?

For the different senses of 'Utilitarianism,' see Prof. Grote's *Exam. of the Utilitarian Philos.*, 1867.

The Happiness theory was formally promulgated among the ancients by Epicurus, and has appeared in a variety of forms in modern times. A mere outline of the progress of thought from the seventeenth century will suffice here. For detail, reference will be made to the Historical Sketch.

The progress of thought has been from an Egoistic standpoint to an Altruistic, from a self-regarding view of life to a more generous and benevolent, giving prominence to an ethical formula in these words—The Greatest Happiness of the Greatest Number.

Hobbes, viewing every man as one fighting for his own

hand, rested in an Individualism, restricted by 'eternal laws of nature,' but mainly by the controlling influence of the State. Apart from civil authority, a man's desire is the rule of his conduct. This is Egoistic Hedonism.

Paley introduced a benevolent element, and made the regard to happiness apply mainly to the future state. 'Virtue is the doing good to mankind, in obedience to the Will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness.'

Jeremy Bentham propounded the theory of 'The Greatest Happiness of the Greatest Number' as the end determining the rightness of actions. The phrase was first used by Priestley.

John S. Mill, accepting Utilitarianism under the form of universal benevolence, still further refined and elevated the theory by distinguishing the *qualities* of pleasures in determining what is right, laying down the rule that a higher is always to be preferred to a lower. This is now the accredited type of Utilitarianism. By Herbert Spencer the theory has been carefully elaborated in accordance with the forms suggested by the lower stages of an Evolution theory as developed by Darwin. Contemplating man as the crowning result of evolution, and ethics as 'that form which universal conduct assumes during the last stages of its evolution,' he holds that the ends of moral action are the interests of self, of offspring, and of those around us. By Professor Henry Sidgwick it has been expounded and defended with much breadth of application and logical subtilty, extending through the manifold intricacies of reference suggested by progressive civilisation.

In general outline the theory may be stated thus,—Happiness is the end of human life; man *ought* to seek happiness as his end; actions are to be preferred in proportion to the happiness they are fitted to secure. In advance of these positions stands the Altruistic doctrine,—each man ought to seek the greatest happiness of the greatest number, and he finds his own in seeking theirs.

11. Criticism of the Utilitarian theory must apply first, to its theory of life, and secondly, to its theory of morals. An effective refutation must show that the theory which makes happiness the sole end of life is not a theory of human life, and thereafter that the tendency of an action to promote happiness does not determine the moral quality of the action.

In a rational life, the impulse of self-gratification, falling into a subordinate place, ceases to be the law of conduct. This is admitted by all Utilitarians who abandon the Egoistic type of theory. The law of the lower life proves inadequate for guidance of the higher. Thought has come into exercise, and its function is to recognise general rules of conduct. Desire of happiness is not here the sovereign law of life. And if not, something else than self-gratification,—something higher,—has been substituted. This the Altruistic Utilitarian admits; but, in doing so, he abandons his theory of life. He accepts a standard of universal benevolence, proclaiming that the happiness of others is the end. In doing so, he admits that Ethical thought rests on a basis which Evolution cannot supply. True, he holds that we are to seek our own good in the common good; but, in doing so, he either makes self-interest the ground of action, abandoning the Altruistic standard; or he makes the interest of others the end, and so abandons the theory of life with which he starts.

Human life here stands in complete contrast with even the highest orders of animal life. The impulse for self-gratification occupies a place inferior to the law of reason, which subordinates self-gratification without sacrificing it; and imposes self-denial as obligation in order to gain a higher end, such as the general good. A being of lower power must have a lower end of life, a being with higher faculties must have a nobler end of life. Even if it were admitted that happiness is the end of *all* life, still would it be a distinct happiness in each case, according to the different possibilities of each form of life. J. S. Mill, with keenness of feeling not

unreasonable, has successfully repelled the allegation that Utilitarianism lowers men to the level of swine. 'The comparison of the Epicurean life to that of beasts is felt as degrading, precisely because a beast's pleasures do not satisfy a human being's conceptions of happiness. Human beings have faculties more elevated than the animal appetites.'—*Util.* p. 11. The difference is that animals have impulses only, whereas men have *conceptions* of happiness superior to their current desires.

In a complex order of existence it must be granted that each power has its own appropriate end to serve. The system of sensory nerves provides for varied forms of sensibility, pleasure being in some cases connected with the exercise, though not the end of its action. Intelligence, Memory, Will, and Affection, being entirely different, cannot all have the same end. Among the various powers united and harmonised in one life, no single power has happiness as its end, yet each power has happiness as the concomitant of its natural exercise. The pleasurable or the painful may thus be connected with all activity. If, however, we are to seek the end of life as a whole, which is a distinctly rational conception, we must find it, not in individual preferences of one type of pleasure over other types, nor in the totality of pleasure attainable in some chosen walk of life; we must find it by a true estimate of our powers and capacities as characteristics of one life. Hence a sentient life must differ from a rational life, the one having sensitivity as its governing force, the other having intelligence for control of all desire. The Evolutionist must resent this as disturbing to his forms of thought; but there can be no success in the attempt to represent a purely sensitive and a rational life as only two phases of a common type.

It is, indeed, possible for an intelligent being to use his powers merely for the pleasure attending on their use. But this is possible only on condition of forming a conception of

happiness, and of acting on such a conception. The lower animals, however, experience pleasure simply by following the blind impulse of present craving. An entire revolution of being occurs when intelligent self-direction is possible, under conceptions of happiness, by aid of which comparisons are instituted. If anything in the form of a general rule of conduct be recognised, such as that man *ought* to prefer the higher forms of happiness, this is a still higher intellectual exercise, implying that ethical distinctions mean something more than a regard to happiness, for it asserts that there is a rule of preference higher than inclination. Oughtness is entrance into a new field of thought. The Imperative of morals is so different from personal inclination that Duty and Inclination may even be in conflict.

12. If 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number' is affirmed to be the rule of human life, our rational nature is admitted to be the source of our knowledge of an Ethical Imperative, and the impossibility of reaching a theory of Ethics on the data of Evolution is granted. The search for personal happiness is subordinated to a higher law,—Benevolence becomes an Imperative of rational life,—and we admit that the good of others is to be sought even at the cost of self-denial. This is Ethical law standing over-against Physiological law, and placing man above mere struggle for existence, which sacrifices rivals, and leads on blindly to 'survival of the fittest.' The contrast here is so complete that the law of ethical life and the law of animal life can subsist together in one life only by the lower being subordinated to the higher, the necessities of physical existence being provided for in harmony with ethical requirements.

If, however, all that is meant by the Utilitarian scheme is that men are to seek the happiness of others in order to secure their own, a law of benevolence is surrendered, an Ethical Imperative is unknown. In this view, self-gratification is the law of life with men, as with the lower animals, only that men

can experience gratification in much higher forms. Under this representation the consistency of the Evolutionist is so far maintained. But in this case men can speak of nothing higher than of the advantages arising from progressive civilisation, according to inductions of expediency. The prospect of individual life is circumscribed by a wise reckoning of the best possibilities of one's environment, as long as it is continued in the sphere of sentient existence. The men of the present age can but rejoice that they did not appear earlier in the world's history; and they may leave the world with at least one spark of a passively benevolent feeling, as they anticipate that the experience of the succeeding generation is likely to be better than theirs.

PROBLEMS.—(1) Granting ethical distinctions, how far can the agreeable in experience be shown to coincide with the right in action, and in what respects are they separated? (2) Distinguish the desirable from the right. (3) Take collectively the pleasures of scientific research, of truthfulness, of money-making, and of paying debts, and ascertain how far the moral character of the actions is determined by the quantity and quality of pleasure experienced. (4) How do the pleasure of self-approval and the pain of self-condemnation stand related to the ground of moral distinctions given by Utilitarianism? (5) Distinguish between the functions of self-government and of civil government. (6) Test the following:—‘The common dislike to utility, as the standard, resolves itself into a sentimental preference, amounting to the abnegation of reason in human life.’—Bain's *Emotions and Will*, p. 275.

CONSCIENCE.

13. In making the criterion of right to consist in a tendency to promote happiness, Utilitarians do not admit the need for a Moral Faculty. For a calculation of conse-

quences nothing more is required than ordinary intelligence. The perplexity for the Utilitarian therefore is to account for the popular references to Conscience, the sacredness felt to belong to moral distinctions, and the authority assigned to the faculty. The usual course here is to refer to the 'conscientious feelings' of mankind, meaning by this a combination of feelings, including the moral sentiments, which are forms of ordinary experience as we concern ourselves with moral distinctions. Why these feelings are called 'conscientious' it is difficult to explain without acknowledgment that the common tendency is to appeal to a special faculty, which is named Conscience; and this tendency needs to be accounted for. In referring to feelings of approbation and disapprobation when witnessing or doing actions right or wrong, the tendency naturally is to assign special importance to feelings holding men in check. Hence it happens that Utilitarians commonly regard 'Conscience' as a restraining force, involving 'a pain more or less intense, attendant on violation of duty.'

On account of the view thus taken of the functions of this power, it is commonly named by Utilitarians 'The Moral Sense.' This name has here an entirely different meaning from that intended by Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, with whom Moral Sense was a power of Perception.

A theory of Conscience, in harmony with a development theory of Mind, has been propounded by Hartley, *Observations*, I. iv. 6; by James Mill, *Fragment on Mackintosh* (anonymous, 1835), p. 259; by J. S. Mill, who says: 'Our moral faculty, according to all those of its interpreters who are entitled to the name of thinkers, supplies us only with the general principles of moral judgments. It is a branch of our reason, not of our sensitive faculty; and must be looked to for the abstract doctrines of morality, not for perception of it in the concrete.'—*Utilitarianism*, p. 3. 'The internal sanction of duty . . . is a pain, more or less intense, attendant on violation of duty. . . . This feeling, when disinterested, and connecting itself with the pure idea of duty, and not with some particular form of it, or with any of the merely accessory circumstances, is the essence of Conscience,' pp. 41-2. 'The ultimate sanction of morality is

... the conscientious feelings of mankind,' p. 42; most fully and definitely by Professor Bain, *Emotions and Will*, p. 283, and *Mental and Moral Science*, ETHICS, Chap. III. Schopenhauer (born in Danzig, Professor of Philosophy in Berlin, afterwards in Frankfurt-on-the-Maine, where he died in 1860) gives a representation of Conscience such as may be expected from an upholder of Pessimism. After saying that many would be surprised if they knew of what their Conscience is composed, he suggests that the elements may be computed thus—'one fifth, fear of man; one-fifth, superstition; one fifth, prejudice; one fifth, vanity; one fifth, custom.'—*Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik*, 1st ed., Frankfurt am Main, 1841, p. 196; 2d ed., Leipzig, 1860. This is the outcome of a theory which regards the world as the worst of all possible worlds, maintaining that the two things required of man are sympathy with suffering, and asceticism, which kills the desire to live. What in this case is the rational basis for requirement of sympathy? That an appeal to Conscience often covers exceedingly unworthy motives may be admitted. But when Schopenhauer grants that men would be surprised were his analysis of their motives presented to them, he practically admits that no one could imagine that the state of mind described could be attributed to Conscience, or have moral sanction.

14. Professor Bain's Theory of Conscience is the following:—'Conscience is an imitation within ourselves of the government without us.' Proof for this is found 'in observing the growth of Conscience from childhood upwards,' and 'its character and working generally.' 'The first lesson that a child learns as a moral agent is obedience. . . . The child's susceptibility to pleasure and pain is made use of to bring about this obedience, and a mental association is rapidly formed between disobedience and apprehended pain, more or less magnified by fear. The feeling of encountering certain pain' (both physical and moral) 'is the first motive power of an ethical kind that can be traced in the mental system of childhood.' . . . 'A sentiment of love or respect towards the person of the superior infuses a different species of dread,' which is 'sometimes a more powerful deterring impulse than the other.' . . . 'When the young mind is able to take notice of the use and meaning of the prohibitions imposed upon it, and to approve of the end intended by them, a new motive is

added, and the Conscience is then a triple compound, and begirds the actions in question with a threefold fear.'—*Emotions and Will*, pp. 283-6.

This theory, in its fundamental position, points only to the use parents can make of certain 'primitive impulses of the mind,' such as fear, love, and prudence, in order to secure obedience to themselves, quite irrespective of the rightness or wrongness of the demand. Parents requiring a wrong thing often enough make large use of intimidation. But the theory ignores the fact that there are commands which children resent as unjust, and which they are forced to obey only at the cost of injury to their nature. All parental authority has behind it the presupposition of subjection of parent and child equally to moral law. A child's subjection is not absolute, but is guarded by reference to the right in conduct.

The main perplexity for the theory is reached at the third stage in the alleged development of Conscience, 'when the young mind is able to take notice of the use and meaning of the prohibitions imposed upon it, and to approve of the end intended by them.' What Professor Bain has said in reference to an *a priori* theory, holds with equal force here,—'There can be no such thing as a standard overriding the judgment of every separate intelligence.'—*Emotions*, p. 262. Human thought cannot be kept in continual subjection to authority. To accept as right what we have been always commanded, or accustomed to do, is continued childhood. Every separate intelligence must find sufficient reason for accounting certain actions right, and others wrong, which cannot be found either in the authority of parents or in past practice; but must be obtained either in evidence of fact or in ultimate principle. It does, indeed, often happen, as Dr. Bain says, that 'wherever an agreement is come to by a large or ascendant party, there is a natural tendency to compel the rest to fall in with that.' But this compulsion is apt to be exercised in disregard of moral distinctions, consequently there may be

moral obligation to resist the compulsion of society, and of party, and even of civil government. Thus is it obvious that every man must seek a standard satisfying to his own intelligence, and must act upon that. This Dr. Bain practically admits in the quotation last given. J. S. Mill has powerfully argued for such unrestrained freedom of thought, in his work on *Liberty*.

The theory must fall back on utility as the basis of personal assent to moral distinctions. In doing so it owns failure in its attempt to develop Conscience by means of authority, and the theory is reduced to 'a natural history' of a child's training in obedience, leaving all our 'conscientious feelings' unjustified. Either 'every separate intelligence' must find for itself a law of nature, or it must continue under the trammels of authority. If the former, the failure is admitted; if the latter, escape is not effected. Professor Bain admits that 'the grand difficulty' is to account for 'the self-formed or independent conscience,' 'where the individual is a law to himself.' 'But' he adds, 'there is nothing very formidable in this apparent contradiction,' 'when the young mind is sufficiently advanced to be able to appreciate the motives, the utilities, or the sentiment that led to their imposition—the character of the conscience is entirely transformed; the motive power issues from a different quarter of the mental framework. Regard is now had to the intent and meaning of the law, and not to the mere fact of its being prescribed by some power.'—*Emotions*, p. 288. The difficulty here seems much more formidable than is allowed, for it is virtually granted that authority and training have not provided for evolution of Conscience. Consequently, for explanation of what occurs in mature life, we must turn to 'a different quarter of the mental framework' than that 'whence fear and love spring into Consciousness.' The theory is involved in a vicious circle. Utility is the basis of moral distinctions; but some limit must be assigned, for we do not make every act ethical

that we consider useful. Utility made compulsory is, then, the standard of morality; Morality is thus an institution of society; Conscience is an imitation of the Government of society; Conscience is first fear of authority, and then respect for it; but 'even in the most unanimous notions of mankind, there can be no such thing as a standard overriding the judgment of every separate intelligence.' The individual must therefore emancipate himself from authority, in order to be 'a law to himself;' to this end he must recognise 'the use and meaning' of the law; for this purpose he must fall back on Utility. It is not, however, all Utility, but only Utility made compulsory, which affords the basis of morals, and it is Society which determines what shall be made compulsory. How are we to escape the circle? How can every separate intelligence emancipate itself? How can it find to its own satisfaction a rule of life so essentially superior to the authority of Society, as to warrant independent action in opposition to the teaching of Society? Only by admitting that Utility is not the rational basis, that Society is not the ultimate authority, and that Conscience is not a feeble echo of the louder voice of Society. These two doctrines, that Morality is an institution of Society, and that there is in man a Conscience superior to human authority, are inconsistent.

15. These considerations press forward the main perplexity of Utilitarianism, as of every scheme of Evolution,—how to provide a philosophy of *DUTY*. If there is a moral law, there is obligation, that is, law is rule for the intelligent being, simply because he knows it as a universal law of conduct. If tendency to produce happiness determines the rightness of an action, how can we rise above what seems to each individual desirable, so as to find philosophic warrant for a doctrine of personal obligation? Utilitarianism meets its last and severest test in the attempt thus to distinguish between the desirable, which is the optional; and the dutiful, which is the imperative.

The desirable has power only to attract, not to command, and may often be unattainable. The dutiful is not only the possible, but the binding. The agreeable is determined by our physical and spiritual nature, quite apart from our choice. There is no imperative of pleasure, simply because every man desires happiness, no man desires the contrary, while the conditions needful for attaining what is desired are not always within reach. Duty is command, and is imposed upon all, because it is in its accomplishment only a phase of self-command. It is thus apparent that a law higher than that of happiness is required for guidance of human conduct. This is, indeed, the very meaning of morality, a regulation of our desires in submission to some higher law. Utilitarians cannot avoid recognition of this distinction between Desire and Duty. It is implied in the formula, 'the *greatest* happiness of the greatest number.' It has been emphasised in J. S. Mill's distinction between pleasures, higher and lower, with rational preference for the former, though we admit that life is impossible on a rigid application of the rule. It is enforced by all warnings against easy consent to lower indulgences, for it is true, as Aristotle insisted, that we need to be ever on our guard against pleasure (as in contrast with true happiness), lest we be drawn away to evil. If a man must at times surrender a higher enjoyment for a lower, and if he must, nevertheless, rigidly restrict lower pleasures for the sake of higher attainment and action, we need to discover the rational basis of these necessities. There is a *physical necessity*, man must eat and rest, as well as think and work; there is an *intellectual necessity*, man must concentrate his attention in order to acquire knowledge; and there is still another necessity, since of the things which a man can do, some are *binding* upon him as others are not, and this is *moral necessity*. If, to perform the high functions of his life, he must deny himself some pleasures; and if, as a member of society, he must surrender some pleasure for the good of others, there is a law of Self-

denial and also a law of Benevolence, both of which are essential to his life.' Utilitarianism must supply a basis of obligation in these cases, in order to make good its claims as a Philosophy of Morals.

The extreme difficulty of discovering such a basis under the theory has led to great diversity in the mode of handling this problem. Bentham makes the cleanest cut through the difficulty by simply denying that there is such a thing as duty. 'It is, in fact, very idle to talk about duties; the word itself has in it something disagreeable and repulsive.'—*Deontology*, I. 10. 'The talisman of arrogance, indolence, and ignorance, is to be found in a single word, an authoritative imposture. . . . It is the word "ought," "ought or ought not," as circumstances may be. . . . If the use of the word be admissible at all, it "ought" to be banished from the vocabulary of morals.'—*Ib.* pp. 31, 32. And yet, he has not advanced thirty pages before we find the following,—'Every pleasure is *prima facie* good, and ought to be pursued. Every pain is a *prima facie* evil, and ought to be avoided.'—*Ib.* p. 59. If there is no 'ought' there is no morality, therefore no 'rights of man.'

Charles Darwin attempts to surmount the difficulty by reducing the dimensions of the problem. 'The imperious word *ought* seems merely to imply the consciousness of the existence of a persistent instinct, either innate or partly acquired, serving him (man) as a guide, though liable to be disobeyed. We hardly use the word *ought* in a metaphorical sense when we say hounds ought to hunt, pointers to point, and retrievers to retrieve their game. If they fail thus to act, they fail in their duty, and act wrongly.'—*The Descent of Man*,—'Moral Sense,' 2d ed., 116. If Duty be a persistent instinct, how can it be 'disagreeable and repulsive,' as Bentham says? How far Darwin was appreciating the difficulty of the problem will appear from the following quotations,—'Thus at last man comes to feel, through acquired and perhaps inherited habit, that it is best for him to obey his more persistent instincts'

(114). This quotation is preceded, two pages earlier, by these words,—‘The wish for another man’s property is, perhaps, as persistent a desire as any that can be named,’ I. p. 90. This statement, involving a *reductio ad absurdum*, does not harmonise with Darwin’s own account of a moral being (111).

Professor Bain seeks to overcome the difficulty by making external authority the source of personal obligation, restricting obligation to ‘the class of actions enforced by the sanction of punishment.’—*Emotions*, p. 254. This very seriously narrows the circle of right actions, and even excludes from morals the whole region of motive. ‘When a man does his duty he escapes punishment; to assert anything more is to obliterate the radical distinction between duty and merit.’—*Emotions*, p. 292. On the contrary, it is only because duty binds to the performance of an action that merit belongs to the person fulfilling it. But to restrict moral obligation to the avoidance of wrong actions is to give up the grandest part of morality, and to confess failure at a vital point in the theory. For a Happiness theory there is the serious disadvantage of surrendering the obligation of benevolence, for this duty is not ‘enforced by the sanction of punishment.’ The injury to morality by this view causes also injury to the state, for if civil punishment is not founded on universal law, it becomes arbitrary, and endangers liberty.

Fuller appreciation of the difficulty is to be found in John S. Mill’s *Utilitarianism*. Keeping strictly to the foundation of morals in the tendency of actions to promote happiness, he finds no limitation except that afforded by the quantity and quality of pleasures. He therefore shuns the reference to external authority as the source of obligations. If he refers to external authority, it is only to find competent witnesses as to the comparative value of different pleasures (p. 15). But he does not assign to these witnesses the power of determining personal obligation.

Mill is, however, also unfortunate in his statement of the question of Obligation. He says, 'The question is often asked, and properly so, in regard to any supposed moral standard, What is its sanction? What are the motives to obey it, or, more specifically, what is the source of its obligation? Whence does it derive its binding force? It is a necessary part of moral philosophy to provide the answer to this question.'—Chap. iii. p. 39. But this apparent identification of 'sanction,' 'motive,' and 'obligation,' obscures the issue. *Sanction* is a confirmation of the moral character of an action, following on its performance, or a guard against doing of the contrary, such as punishment involves. *Motive* is the inward disposition inducing or impelling a man to do an action, whether that action be right or wrong. *Obligation* is the binding of a moral agent to do that which is right, whether he incline or not; and to refrain from doing a wrong action, however much he incline to do it. The rational basis for this must be moral law. Can regard to Happiness have the binding force of moral law? Happiness is agreeable; to secure it is desirable; but how is it dutiful or binding on me to seek it for myself, or for others, at the cost of sacrifice?

Mill finds 'the source of obligation' in personal feeling. The following are his most definite statements: 'The ultimate sanction of all morality is a subjective feeling in our mind,' p. 42; 'The internal sanction of duty, whatever our standard of duty may be, is one and the same,—a feeling in our own mind, a pain, more or less intense, attendant on a violation of duty,' p. 41; 'This feeling, when disinterested and connecting itself with the pure idea of duty, and not with some particular form of it, or with any of the merely accessory circumstances, is the essence of Conscience,' pp. 41, 42. All this misses the source, passing on to the consequents. A *Sense of Duty* presupposes duty, and a knowledge of it. The pain occasioned by recognised violation of duty is removed still further from the object of search. Duty itself cannot originate out of a pain

consequent on violating it. Our knowledge of duty and our painful experience because of its neglect are so different that the one must precede the other. The question, therefore, remains, 'what is the pure idea of duty?' 'Binding force' over a person must come from a source superior to the person. If so, it can come neither from his own feeling nor from his own knowledge. 'Binding force' must come from a sovereign law,—an imperative of the life. Obligation must thus be a condition of the life of a moral agent.

The insufficiency of Mill's view will appear under practical tests. Identification of Obligation with 'the conscientious feelings of mankind,' implies that those who have no such feelings escape obligation. Mill meets this difficulty in the following manner:—'Undoubtedly this sanction has no binding efficacy in those who do not possess the feelings it appeals to; but neither will these persons be more obedient to any other moral principle than to the utilitarian one': pp. 42, 43. This defence is unavailing. The difference between obligation and obedience is manifest. Obligation is requirement of obedience; Obedience is acknowledgment of obligation. A man's feelings cannot determine his obligations. He is not released from ethical demands because he feels no compunction in violating them.

The theory which makes 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number' the test of moral action loses its claim to be regarded as an ethical theory if it be without a scientific basis for moral obligation. The one thing which specially commends this theory to our admiration is its formula of universal benevolence. But it is shorn of its value if it do not place on a philosophic basis a doctrine of unvarying obligation to act benevolently. Mill puts the question thus: 'Why am I bound to promote the general happiness? If my own happiness lies in something else, why may I not give that the preference?' He answers, 'If the view adopted by the utilitarian philosophy of the nature of the moral sense be correct, this

difficulty will always present itself, until the influences which form moral character have taken the same hold of the principle which they have taken of some of the consequences—until, by the improvement of education, the feeling of unity with our fellow-creatures shall be (what it cannot be doubted that Christ intended it to be) as deeply rooted in our character, and to our consciousness as completely a part of our nature, as the horror of crime is in an ordinarily well-brought-up young person': p. 40. This is an admirable passage, but it concerns obedience, and passes by obligation. Granting that the obligation to benevolence rests on all equally, it vividly portrays the need for renovation of nature before the law of benevolence can become a common ethical impulse. It is doubtless beyond the power of Moral Philosophy to make men obey the law; but it is the part of Moral Philosophy to show that there is a moral law to be obeyed, and that the knowledge of the law necessarily carries with it personal obligation. Has, then, Utilitarianism no answer to this question, What is the source of obligation? 'Why am I bound to promote the general happiness?' Must Philosophy, before attempting an answer, wait until the improvement of education has rooted in the character of all men a feeling of unity with their fellows? Does not education itself presuppose an ideal towards which we must advance? Is it not clear that this ideal must in a sense be behind us in order that it may be before us—that it must be in our thought, in order that it may be in our lives?

EVOLUTION THEORIES.

DIVISION II.—DIALECTIC EVOLUTION.

1. FROM an organic and psychological scheme of Evolution, we pass to the scheme of Dialectic Evolution. This, as elaborated in the philosophy of Hegel, regards being as a Unity, a manifestation of the Absolute One, passing in its earlier stages through the manifold combinations of material existence, thence passing over to spiritual existence, thereafter passing back upon itself in the completion of the cycle. According to this theory, human life is only a stage in the evolution of existence, spiritual life being a fuller and higher manifestation of the Idea, the Absolute One.

A brief exposition of the theory as a whole is essential here, for the Hegelian Ethical Philosophy is only a part of the Logic, which is held to be the only true philosophy. Its fundamental position is that a philosophy of existence must be found in a philosophy of the forms of human thought, for 'the rational is the real.' This is true in a large degree. To philosophise is to rationalise, taking our intelligence as the test. Hegel, however, distinguishes between Existence and Reality, limiting the latter to rational existence; and if we take 'the real' in this sense, the statement 'the Rational is the real' is, as Schwegler says, 'simple tautology.' Philosophy is, however, 'the thinking view of things.' With this all must agree. The statement involves, however, important presuppositions. It presupposes (1) *existence*, in order that there may be a philosophy of it; and (2) *personal existence*, as distinct from existence external to itself,—from nature, as apart from the thinker; (3) *experience in consciousness*, as affording knowledge of both; and (4) the *con-*

ditions of thought given in the nature of our intelligence. Of these as data this theory must make account ; and it is to a certain extent prepared to do so, on its own line of procedure, in so far as it grants that the forms of the understanding, the general notions or Categories, are empty until they find content in the concrete, and this filling of the Categories cannot be secured otherwise than in accordance with the conditions of consciousness. We do not here dwell critically on the earlier aspects of a Dialectic Philosophy. Enough in this direction is secured by formal statement of its presuppositions.

It is impossible to contemplate the Hegelian system without recognising its deep philosophic insight ; impossible to consider its history without acknowledging gratefully the impulse to philosophic life which it has given. How powerful this impulse has been is proved by the depth and force of the current flowing from the fountain-head. The enthusiasm for Hegel has, indeed, greatly diminished in his own country, where the 'return upon Kant' is openly avowed ; but first in Germany, and afterwards in Great Britain and America, the influence of Hegel has rallied a vigorous school of thinkers, active and powerful in exposition and in defence of his theory, and in their adaptation of his scheme to the critical tests encountered. Beyond the borders of the school, all students of Philosophy, including even the most extreme Sensationalists, allow by common consent that Kant and Hegel, placed in close relation, must be honoured as two of the greatest leaders of philosophy. Even though more recent thought should involve rejection of much belonging to their theories, nothing can alter this distinction thus assigned to them.

2. Towards exposition of Dialectic Evolution considerable help is obtained at the outset by taking the development of a single organism as the type of a wider evolution, and so finding common ground with organic evolution. Every organism supplies illustration, whether it be lower or higher in the

scale. Development, proceeding from germ to maturity, implies movement from within according to law,—that is, predetermined movement under fixed law, according to the nature of the life, and the environment supplying required conditions. This is the statement *in terms of existence*, that is, of actual being and appointed relations. In *terms of thought*, it may be stated thus—Identity, Diversity, and End. The process of development may, in a restricted sense, be named ‘Self-determination.’ Hegelianism has a special favour for this descriptive term, a favour which all evolutionism inclines to share, and its use may be allowed, if only the limits of signification are clearly recognised and carried forward as we advance on more complex problems. ‘Self-determination’ here means that the nature of the life ‘determines’ the character of the development. The type of life is absolutely fixed. There is singleness, separateness, identity of life. ‘Self-determination’ does not, however, imply that development is secured exclusively by force within the life itself. Apart from environment life could not unfold. Nor does the term ‘Self-determination’ mean that within the life there is intelligent *purpose* towards development, determining the method of procedure. Movement is provided for by law in absence of a purpose internal to the organism. Within these limits we may describe the movement implied in the development of every organism as ‘self-determination.’ For Hegelianism any such life is the microcosm. The differentiation of spiritual life will be its main perplexity. Transcending the comparatively narrow limits of Physiological, and even of Psychological Evolution, Dialectic Evolution contemplates existence as a whole, finding the Philosophy of Being in an evolution of existence, whose predetermined order is held to be according to the logical relations of the forms of the understanding, or general notions named Categories. Claiming to be a representation of the only true method, Hegelianism claims to be the true Philosophy. At the same time it is contended that

‘Kant and Hegel are the very truest supports that philosophy has ever extended to the religious interests of humanity’: Hutchison Stirling, *Schwegler's History*, p. 476.

Guided by development, we have now to sketch Hegel's theory. The forms, notions, or Categories which underlie all thought are held to underlie all being. This is common ground for all science and philosophy, and for all theories of philosophy. If we interpret Nature, it is because we find in it that which, harmonising with the conditions of our thought, can be systematised accordingly. Kant, in his *Transcendental Analytic*, found these underlying notions as forms of the understanding; Hegel made them the essential conditions of existence, and so seemed to discover the unity of all being, without, however, annulling the distinction between knowing and being,—in a sense emphasizing this distinction by showing how marvellous is knowledge, how completely in advance of all that belongs to material, or even to organic existence, and how truly it is in living relation with the Absolute Intelligence. As the Categories underlie thought, providing for its movement, they underlie all being, even dull matter, as well as organism, in order that existence may be a cosmos, an orderly system or unity. Philosophy is therefore the orderly unfolding of the Categories, disclosing the system of existence, of which our intelligence in its own constitution carries the key. Orderly unfolding by persistent observation and thought is our construction of the *Logic of Being*; and by means of this we recognise what is essential to Absolute Intelligence. The student may ask,—Do we then escape the distinction between knower and known, and that between relative and absolute Intelligence? We cannot; and this is the crux for Hegelian method.

3. The *Logic of the Categories* is the orderly progression of thought from Being as the most general, up through Quality, Quantity, and Relation, including in this advance all aspects of differentiation which the concrete supplies. In

this order of procedure we at length pass from nature to spirit, where we come upon a higher type of Being. Thus represented, Philosophy is the logic of Being itself, as vivified in the absorption of the concrete ; and as it is the logic of *thought*, it is thereby shown that the rational in man is the key to the universe, as man himself is, in a higher sense, the true manifestation of the ever-enduring existence.

In the line of progression now described there is found *first* a doctrine of Being, *second* a doctrine of Essence, or of essential being, and *thereafter* we reach the Absolute Spirit. This line of progress is necessary, the one grand possibility. The order of movement is naturally expressed in the fixed laws of the rational life. The movement of our thought is only a faint shadow—if it is even so much as that—of the grander movement of Being. The history of existence is Evolution in successive and necessary cycles ; and by like necessity the movement of thought is in harmonious cycles. There is in each stage of the thought-movement a threefold succession of moments, the first being *affirmation*, the second recognised difference, which is *negation* of the other by affirmation of difference, and the third *absorption*, by coalescence of the two, completing the cycle, and affording a first moment for fresh advance. If it be granted that thought provides the order or logical relations in movement, the question remains,—What is the source of rational movement ? If it be not transcendent, but immanent, is it affirmation or negation ? If neither, what is thought-power ?

In the order of our thought (for we cannot escape the admission, that apart from the movements of *our* intelligent nature Philosophy vanishes) there is a constant repetition of this cycle, carrying us forward through all the intricacies of the manifold orders of organisation, and through all the complications of social life, until we reach (for it is reached in thought) the totality of Being, that is, the unity of Being in the true Infinite—The One—The Idea.

Our contemplation of the vast order of being brings us in due course to spiritual existence, as manifest in our own life, where we come in view of ethical distinctions. The 'good' has in a sense already appeared in the experience of all sentient existence; this is the agreeable, according to the conditions of sensitive organism. But the 'good' is now appearing in a new sense as the 'right'; and 'self-determination' is here in a new meaning as free-will, in exercise of which intelligent purpose becomes a source of action. Here is something so new, so entirely different from all that has been already recognised, that the conception of Evolution is brought into great perplexity, from which there seems no escape except on the admission that the Absolute Spirit is manifesting himself; but this welcomed escape will be found to lead into a forest of new perplexities.

Within this region of spiritual being, expressing itself in forms of personality, there rises before us the vast range of problems presented to the thinker as he considers ethical law, personal endeavour, diversities of personal action, and all complications of social organisation, with its interlacing of human interests, and its distinguishing of personal rights. In this line, according to the forms of Hegelian method, ethical life is a higher phase of 'self-determination' resulting in 'self-realisation.' The expression of moral law itself is given in the formula, 'Be a Person, and respect others as Persons.' In this form of *command*—or, at least, '*demand*'—the higher life, which we call ethical, is in a sense given over to each individual for realisation; by a later necessity, Society becomes an organised unity. As a sure result rational life—and this is true of all being—is moving towards its goal, in reaching which it shall lose itself in the Eternal, when reasoning shall cease, endeavour shall be brought to a close, and there will emerge the reign of Eternal Rest.

With this sketch in bare outline of the theoretic results of Hegel's thought—results greatly influenced by the powerful

and suggestive work of Kant and Fichte—we have now to inquire how far the theory meets the demands of the ethical problem taken in its full proportions. In prosecuting this investigation, we shall make account of the Hegelian and Neo-Kantian thought of the present day, and especially of treatises dealing directly with the ethical aspects of Hegelian thought. The end contemplated in the Hegelian Ethics is still ‘the good will’—‘the only absolute good in the world’—to which Kant gave prominence; but the whole discussion has been modified, and even in some aspects changed—not at all for the better, as I judge—by the dominating influence of the conception of Evolution.

4. In concentrating attention on the ethical stage in Dialectic Evolution, it becomes obvious from the most general survey that many difficulties are escaped which assail the scheme of evolution depending wholly on the forces of nature; but another set of perplexities, even more serious in character, is encountered. In regarding all existence as a manifestation of the one Absolute Being, the Universal Intelligence, whose power is the sole agency at work in all transformations, we escape the whole set of difficulties hanging on the track of a theory which, trusting to natural forces, would account for higher orders by reference to pre-existing *lower* orders of being. On the other hand, accepting the guidance of Dialectic Evolution, we encounter the host of difficulties starting in our path when all that is commonly attributed to man is referred to the direct agency of the Absolute One. All other difficulties are of quite secondary account beside these. To be asked calmly, and even with philosophic enthusiasm, to accept this representation as the result of the one only method, part of the only true philosophy, must prove the more trying to modern thought, that we are lamenting the degradation of large masses of men, and the frequency with which some are oppressed, while others are free to tyrannise. Admitting that a pessimistic view of human life is untenable,

we seem no less precluded from an optimistic view. The wrongs of life cannot be disposed of, or turned into 'good,' by the largest sweep of philosophic insight. If we grant that in the natural world 'the rational is the real,' it is not so easy to admit that in human life 'the real is the rational.'

Some more detailed scrutiny of the Logic of Dialectic Evolution now becomes necessary, and in attempting it here we are concerned chiefly with the account it has to give of the moral life of man. The Universal Intelligence, present and active in every finite intelligence (if Hegelians will allow us to say that the human intellect is finite), is, according to Hegel and the Hegelian school generally, the key to existence. This is boldly set forth—we must add, vividly and ably—in Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics*. This central position may, however, meanwhile be kept in reserve, as concerned with the Metaphysic held to be supplied by the Logic. We here test the theory of Hegel and his school, and of the Neo-Kantian thinkers generally, by its application within consciousness, as that includes both knowledge and effort. Symmetry of theory affords no guarantee for validity; we seek to ascertain how symmetry here stands the test when we move into the midst of the entanglements and conflicts of moral life.

The initial objection against a real *Evolution of Existence* contemplated as a unity stands against Dialectic Evolution just as against materialistic; but we do not stay to press this consideration that in seeking a philosophy of existence, the source of higher existence cannot be in what is lower. The admission of this must involve surrender of the notion of Evolution for a deeper notion of Causality—a power which is not Matter, not Organism, not Organic life; and whether this power is transcendent or immanent does not seem to affect the question. This necessity Hegelianism so far tacitly recognises in its metaphysic, making the Universal Intelligence the one Being manifesting Itself variously at different stages in the history of existence. A true philosophy must, however, in-

clude two positions—that the lower must be explained by the higher, yet the later must be explained by the earlier. Vain is it equally for Natural and for Dialectic Evolution to struggle towards satisfaction of these two conditions of thought, for germinal forms are inadequate, and the Absolute cannot have a history in time.

5. We are here, however, mainly concerned with the 'Ought,' as an attempt is made to include it within Evolution. How can we find a philosophy of the transition from that which *is*, and is *necessitated* to be, to that which *ought to be*, yet is only required or 'demanded' of the moral agent as the fruit of his own purpose? Moral life can mean nothing less than acknowledgment of moral law, and Neo-Kantians do not suggest that it can. Passing all that is concerned with Nature and the philosophy of its relation to intelligence, we concentrate on the conditions of moral life. We consider self-conscious life—personality—to which alone moral law can apply, and in doing so we take only what is given in ordinary thought as affording the data by which the Ethics of Dialectic Evolution are to be tested. What ordinary ethical thought implies may be indicated in the words of F. H. Bradley, a distinguished representative of the Hegelian School: 'What is clear at first sight is, that to take virtue as a mere means to an ulterior end, is in dire antagonism to the voice of the moral consciousness, . . . to do good for its own sake is virtue. . . . The theory which sees in virtue, as in money-getting, a means which is mistaken for an end, contradicts the voice which proclaims that virtue not only does seem to be, but is, an end in itself.'—*Ethical Studies*, pp. 56, 59. All this is so clearly true that it appears impossible to interpret 'the moral consciousness' of men in any other manner. But this implies that 'virtue,' or an ideal excellence of life, is known to men generally, though unattained in fact; and this form of representation recognises even some 'voice,' or authoritative dictum, as pressing personal obligation on common reflection—a repre-

sentation which goes a far way towards the position of Butler as to 'superintendency' of Conscience. Taking this as it stands, how can Dialectic Evolution account for 'the moral consciousness,' implying a command to act in given directions, and to shun acting in opposite directions? How, under a scheme of Dialectic Evolution, where 'the rational is the real, and the real is the rational,' are we to account for the doing of what ought not to be done, for demerit in the doing of it, and for liability to punishment? How can all these find place in human history if existence is the logical evolution of the Categories, even of an immanent Universal Intelligence? Green has very truly said in criticism of Natural Evolution, 'that to a being who is simply a result of natural forces, an injunction to conform to their laws is unmeaning': *Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 9. This seems unanswerable; but is the difficulty not as great for Green's own theory? How is a being whose life is the manifestation of the Universal Intelligence a fit subject for the injunction to obey moral law? How, under such a scheme, are we to interpret 'the right'—'duty,' as inseparable from personality—and the 'good,' or 'the end in itself'—'virtue for its own sake'? Suppose we accept the formula, 'Be a Person,' how can we interpret it under the Evolution of the Notion? Suppose even that we take the more general formula, familiar to 'the moral consciousness' of men—'to do good for its own sake,'—What is the 'good'? How is it known? What is meant by the command to do it—'obligation' to act? How can we present a philosophy of the reality of obligation, and of the possibility of its fulfilment? How can there be for the 'finite' intelligence, or rational agent, an *injunction* to conform to known objective law?

6. Neo-Kantianism starts on this excursus just as Utilitarianism does, beginning with feeling and desire, with the 'subjective'—the testimony of individual experience. And so it must. How can an Evolution scheme help itself in the

selection of its starting-point, even though it see clearly into what perplexity Natural Evolution is brought when attempting transition from the agreeable to the dutiful. There is no choice here, even for the loftier Dialectic. Its only hope must be to find some deeper meaning in Desire, to show that the rational is the real here also—nay, what is more difficult, that the real is the rational, and by the magical movement of the Categories to vanquish doubters.

The Hegelian theorem is this—Human Desire is the Personal in the evolution of existence. The intelligent agent desires, not a thing outside himself, but self-satisfaction, that is enlargement of being—‘self-realisation’ in a richer experience—so reaching the end of his existence. There is both truth and beauty in this representation of moral life. Does it then include the facts and account for them? Does it clear a path through the intricacies of life, which are worse than those of the African jungle? Is self-satisfaction equivalent to self-realisation, and this to duty? In so far as we treat of the Ethical End, are these three identical? No dispute arises over the first position; Desire seeks self-satisfaction. This piece of empirical psychology is correct. The question to be pressed concerns the extent of implication. Is, then, Desire the law of life, making the Agreeable the rule of conduct for man? This is the position of the crudest Utilitarianism, which Neo-Kantians declare to be contradictory of ‘the moral consciousness’ of men. For it is the commonplace of Ethics that some Desires must be resisted, others restrained, implying that in the ‘moral consciousness’ Desire is rejected as law, all Desire being placed *under law*, save only the Desire to fulfil Duty. Accordingly Utilitarianism has had to abandon its Egoistic basis for an Altruistic, seeking a universal in ‘The greatest happiness of the greatest number.’ For Dialectic Evolution it is no doubt the reverse of agreeable to admit that there are irrational desires; but this admission is involved in ‘the conflict of life.’ The struggle between inclin-

ation and duty has not vanished, however much we are agreed in desiring that it should end, by all desires merging in one—the desire ‘to do good for its own sake.’ We must, then, under present conditions, recognise that individual desire is not even an index of the ‘right,’ inasmuch as it is not so harmonised with law as to be its expression. Even though we still cling to self-realisation as having some appearance of greater promise, the interpretation of ‘right desire’—of duty in desiring—implies some higher law, which a more searching analysis must detect, and the presence of which philosophy must explain. Nor does it seem that philosophy is much better placed when making ‘self-realisation’ the test of ‘rightness.’ Self-realisation is, in the hands of Hegelians, too closely allied with the development of desire—too much a mere expression of it, as if desire were the law of life—even when indications of the inadequacy of the basis occur freely throughout the discussion. Take, for example, Bradley’s form of exposition. ‘Nothing moves except it is desired, and what is desired is oneself.’ How true, and yet how puzzling, if Desire in itself indicates the avenue to self-realisation! Doubtless all men desire their own satisfaction, what *they* at least consider their own good, as Aristotle said, so that in the attainment of what they long for, they *believe* they would find enlarged existence. And yet how far such desire is from truly guiding to self-realisation! If it be said under the theory that the desire of every man is pointing towards and aiming at self-realisation, we must at least grant that there are many who never seem to *see* this end, and that many more wander a long way, having only obscure glimpses of it, as of some mountain-top in the far distance, severed from the whole circumference of their present experience. Thus desire fails to give us the standard of ‘good’; and so does it fail to supply the measure of ‘self-realisation’ and the key to ‘self-determination.’ If virtue is an end in itself, the question still remains—What is it? And beyond this a later question—How is it to be reached?

To the moral consciousness of men generally, it is clear that we ought to do good for its own sake—that is, Virtue is an end in itself, we ought to do what is ‘right.’ These are different forms under which men express their *knowledge* of Duty. When we ask if this is a knowledge of what is involved in ‘self-realisation,’ the answer does not seem so clear. It does not seem possible to vindicate for the popular mind acquaintance with the content of ‘self-realisation.’ ‘Right’ men know, and duty, but what is ‘self-realisation’? Whatever may be said of ordinary consciousness—and it certainly contains a great deal more than men commonly interpret in fulness—it seems impossible to identify the notion ‘Self-realisation’ with that of ‘Duty.’ Every man has a clear notion of Duty; hardly any man has, or can have, a distinct notion of Self-realisation. Yet a clear notion is needful, if there is to be fulfilment of the demand—if, even within the measure of a lifetime, there is to be intelligent advance towards the one end of a rational being, as described by Hegelianism. No doubt there is a common admission among men that duty implies that we are to seek perfection; this is given in the intelligent recognition of the absoluteness of the ‘ought.’ But men make up their conception of perfection in a large measure, in the first instance, *negatively*, by exclusion of the wrong, which they know and to which they often turn aside; and, on the other hand, *positively*, by reference to a combination of virtues, more or less complete in number, and depicted under the name of ‘character.’ Commonly a few prominent virtues, such as justice and benevolence, figure conspicuously in the representation with which individual intelligence works, while variable and rather shadowy surroundings are connected, lending a vague sense of greatness to it. If this be a fairly accurate description of the operations of ordinary intelligence within the moral sphere, it seems to follow that ‘self-realisation’ cannot, as matter of fact, be taken as the end which the agent has in view when

he sets before himself the fulfilment of Duty. The theory which represents self-realisation as the end cannot escape a charge of abstraction by failing to include the realities of life. Vain here is a return upon Desire. Hegelianism accurately says, Desire seeks Self-satisfaction; but self-satisfaction is not self-realisation in the ethical sense, and is never mistaken for it in the popular mind. It is more frequently known as the antagonist of moral purpose.

7. In this argument it is not denied that self-realisation, in the high sense suggested by 'the practical reason,' is *an* ethical end, interpreted as development of our powers; but, on the other hand, it is not admitted that it is *the* ethical end. The natural tendency of every Evolution scheme is to represent self-realisation as the end of life. Darwin and Herbert Spencer, contemplating mainly with 'natural forces,' here agree with Green and Bradley. For, do we not under such representation at once harmonise all varieties of life? Is not progress always, and by fixed law, from feeble beginning upwards through development to maturity? This is the analogy which is at once the attraction and the snare of the Evolutionist. He who will drag ethical life down to organic destroys the higher life. He who will construct his theory of Ethics on the conditions of organism fails to include the facts to be explained. Law in the ethical sphere is not a name for natural force, but for injunction—command,—the Imperative of rational existence. Self-realisation in human life is not secured as is the growth of a tree, or the development of an animal. For this, intelligent recognition of the end is required, and personal purpose, and self-directed effort maintained with reverence and unceasing hope, throughout a protracted conflict, and in spite of manifold failures. Certainly Hegelianism is correct in maintaining that the notion Duty by implication urges the moral agent to seek the perfection of his own moral life. This is beyond dispute *a* moral end, prominent in duty through all stages of imperfect life; but it

is not, and could not be, *the* moral end. End can be interpreted only by Law; and moral law has only temporary application, without finding its limitation, by reference to the perfection of the individual agent. It is not with moral life as with organic, a condition of existence that from the point where maturity is reached decay begins. On the other hand, there is nothing in the notion Duty, nothing in the nature of moral law, to suggest that the perfection of the agent must bring with it the termination of the demand on ethical activity. What Lessing said of the search for truth may be said of the activity of the moral life—activity is more than life; as Aristotle insisted *ἐνέργεια* is more than *δύναμις*. The grandeur of self-realisation is dwarfed, and changed into an object of aversion, when it is interpreted as signifying the close of ethical existence. Yet there is no escape from this, under a scheme of Dialectic Evolution. The moments of the movement at length cease to be, finding their rest at last in the passing over of all finite being into the true Infinite. Moral life is like to that of the lowest organism in this, that it is movement towards a predetermined close—in advancing towards its accepted end it is reaching towards its extinction, which it never purposed and never desired. This is the product of Hegelianism in its attempt to include moral life within a scheme of the unity of existence, alleged to have its progress through Nature and Spirit up to the Absolute. Nothing else than this can we have under a scheme of Dialectic Evolution; and this is so far from being an interpretation of the notion Duty, and is so far from being in harmony with our aspirations under application of this notion, that the notion itself remains unexplained.

While giving the preference to Kant in the field of Ethics, we must admit that the root of this finality doctrine is in the Kantian system. His analysis of the notion Duty carried in it the seed of this later growth. At the same time, Dialectic Evolution has complete responsibility for the unfolding of its

doctrine of Self-realisation as *the* end of moral life. Kant's third position in the first chapter of *The Metaphysic of Ethics* is not open to challenge in this respect,—‘Duty is the necessity of an act out of reverence felt for law.’ The necessity of the act is proclaimed in the Imperative of the Law, and the only pure ethical impulse is reverence for the law itself. But Kant's preliminary statement leading up to this contains the germ of the evil. The passage runs thus, as translated by Semple, ‘In order to explain the conception of a good will, so highly to be prized in and for itself (and it is a notion common to the most uncultivated understanding), which it is alone which makes the action of any worth, we shall analyse the notion Duty—a notion comprehending under it that of a good will, considered, however, as affected by certain inward hindrances.’ If the notion Duty has its application only so long as the will of the agent encounters inward hindrances, this is nearly the same as to say that the end of the law is attained when perfection has been reached, even though Kant is uncommitted to the Metaphysic which Hegel adopts. The germ cannot be said to have developed in Kant's theory, but it comes to maturity in Hegel's doctrine that self-realisation is the ethical end. The fallacy involved in this doctrine will appear if the proper place be assigned to ETHICAL LAW. The law is an imperative of the life—an imperative of the Reason, and is on that account essential to the life in which reason reigns—the essential basis of the activity of the perfect life. Under an evolution theory, dominated by the notion of movement, not by that of law, the end of conflict is transmuted into the end of life itself, and this narrow view of duty is accepted. Such a view of duty is not true to life. Doubtless duty is not fulfilled until it becomes the pleasure of the agent; yet the notion ‘Duty’ does not disappear from the field of thought, ceasing to have application to conduct; such a doctrine would imply a violation of the laws of ethical progress. When right practice has

become personal preference, obligation continues as before, the only things new being a purer motive force, and a richer experience. Human life is a larger thing than Dialectic Evolution allows. The theory fails to interpret ethical law, losing it in the movements of an Evolution which makes it appear as if law were held to be rational only while actions continue irrational, or largely so; for when complete rationality of life has been attained, self-realisation becomes an assured fact, and self straightway ceases to be, passing over into something which transcends it—till then there is movement, always movement—but never an abiding perfection, except in the Absolute.

Under this theory prominent characteristics of moral life are allowed in considerable measure to disappear. In depicting the *end*, there is a shading down of the law, as if it were little more than a larger application of that operating from the beginning of organic life; while Conscience, Obligation, and self-regulation of the deliberate kind which concerns itself with government of impulses, are driven into the background. As a natural consequence the individual is made to count for little—he is first everything, and then as nearly as may be he is nothing—an atom in the mass, while the State becomes the one imposing unity in the ethical stage of Evolution—that which has continuity of being, and most fittingly represents the reality of dialectic movement in the history of existence.

8. In this summary of results it is not suggested that either the founder of the school, or any of the able thinkers accepting his leadership, deliberately ignores any of those phases of moral life enumerated. This could not be. The features named are too palpable to be overlooked, and too important in practical life to be dismissed by a wave of the hand. It is therefore of consequence to afford illustration of the manner in which they have been introduced and discussed.

There is no neglect of the difference between 'instinctive actions' and 'rational actions.' This is marked out clearly, and so a path is opened towards ethical distinctions. Among rational actions an ethical boundary is sought by detailed references to desire. This is not by any means successful, because all desire is not rational, and the ground for distinction between the irrational and the rational is not clearly indicated. All desires move in one volume as a stream in the open channel. But intelligent discrimination must be made between them. The demands of practical life require this, even of the most illiterate; and philosophy, with its instruments of analysis and synthesis, must essay the task with greater care and exactness. Examples of the Hegelian method of dealing with ethical problems may be given here, from treatises by authors of acknowledged authority as expounders of the theory.

Green opens the way into ethical territory in the following characteristic manner. Under the head of 'The Freedom of the Will' he proceeds to trace 'the action of the self-conditioning and self-distinguishing mind,' as dealing no longer with 'the apprehension of a world which *is*,' but with the apprehension of 'one which *should be*': *Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 90. This fixes the lines of procedure in use of the synthetic method under the ruling conception of Evolution; out of Desire, by unfolding of Will-power (according to knowledge?), to find the world that *should be*. Hegel did, indeed, ridicule Fichte for his *Sollen*, but how can we have a practical life without its 'should be'—its 'ought'? Is life not great, just by reference to its unattained ideal? To identify '*want*' and '*should be*' as two sides of a relation—to make want the index of the should be—is to suggest that all desire is rational, and in that case the 'should be' is the mere evolution of desire; 'ought' in the ethical sense is, in this case, unknown. We are here in danger of ignoring the practical life, and moral philosophy will disappear by consequence. If we admit a

distinction between 'may be' and 'should be,' we admit that the rational nature on rational warrant separates the two, and there is an ethical 'ought.' If we say that the 'should be' is the unfolding of desire in an order of self-realisation predetermined for 'the self-conditioning and self-distinguishing mind,' then 'should be' has no ethical meaning. What then are the lines of ethical thought as traced under the Neo-Kantian scheme? There are 'wants,' and there are 'impulses for the satisfaction of those wants.' As distinguishing the rational system from the animal, there is 'transition from mere want to consciousness of a wanted object,' implying 'the presence of the want to a subject which distinguishes itself from it, and is constant throughout successive stages of the want': *Ibid.* p. 91. We now concentrate attention on the activity of this subject under the conditions described. A reflective process is concerned in its direction. 'At the same time as the reflecting subject traverses the series of wants, which it distinguishes from itself, while it presents their filling as its object, there arises the idea of a satisfaction on the whole—an idea never realisable, but for ever striving to realise itself in the attainment of a greater command over means to the satisfaction of particular wants.' This idea, being concerned with our life as a whole, is equivalent to 'our good on the whole,' including all forms of self-interest, and all forms of suitable effort. Hence it cannot be identified with the 'should be' of ethics. 'Duty' is a distinct imperative of conduct; our 'Good' on the whole is an indefinite and variable conception. Bradley also suggests the identification of the 'should be' with the whole interests of life, but soon finds the position untenable. He presents the suggestion in a series of questions, which he admits 'are not easy questions to answer.' He asks, Is morality 'the whole end from all points of view, or is it one view of the whole? Is the artist moral so far as he is a good artist, or the philosopher moral so far as he is a good philosopher? Are their

art or science, and their virtue, one thing from one and the same point of view, or two different things, or one thing from two points of view?'—*Ethical Studies*, p. 59. Though Bradley does not at once directly answer these questions, it harmonises with the structure of Dialectic Evolution to maintain that they are one; and his answer is implied in what follows, that 'the most general expression for the end in itself' is 'self-realisation.' Now, it is beyond doubt that the 'self-realisation' of the artist is in his art, and of the philosopher in his philosophy. But how widely they differ Bradley himself clearly indicates when he says, 'Morality differs from art in that it cannot make the act a *mere* means to a result.' Again, 'Morality implies both the something to be done, and the doing of it by me'—though I may be neither artist nor philosopher—and the doing of it by all, including artists, whether they are good artists or only second-rate in their profession. Morality is a universal. Its law is a Categorical Imperative. The 'should be' is not to be identified with the fulfilment of particular desires, many of which may be excluded from it; nor with 'our good on the whole' except in the sense implied when this is held to be attainable only where morality is first recognised as absolute law, and obeyed as such—a reward which is not our end. For Bradley finely puts the characteristic of the moral action, 'The act for me means my act, and there is no end beyond the act.'

Through all this, a philosophic account of the 'should be' is still wanting; we are without a philosophy of the transition from Desire to Duty. Green has made a deliberate attempt to meet this demand. The self-distinguishing mind distinguishes 'self from the wants,' from which there supervenes 'a consciousness of wanted objects.' 'It is this consciousness which yields, in the most elementary form, the conception of something that *should be*, as distinct from that which *is*.'—*Prolegomena*, p. 92. Is this a possible representation of 'should be'? Can the keenest analysis find in it anything

to be classified as an 'elementary form' of Duty? That which a man desires is that which '*should be*.' Is there any possible meaning for 'should be' in such a proposition? Does not morality regard Desire as impulse, and reject it as standard? Does it not at one time place Desire in fetters, holding that its fulfilment is that which '*should not be*,' and at another, elevate Desire to a place of honour; and are not both lines of action adopted under sanction of a law which prescribes both things as duty? Further, this suggestion that 'consciousness of wanted objects' is the 'elementary form' of the 'conception of something that should be,' favours the view that all human action belongs to the field of morals, as Bradley affirmed. And so we find it here also. When Green proceeds to speak of 'the world of practice,' it is 'the world composed of moral or distinctively human actions,'—as if all motivated actions were moral, 'a motive being an idea of an end which a self-conscious subject presents to itself, and which it strives and tends to realise.' Evolution, by its nature, aims at including all human effort, that is, all desire that moves in consciousness, and by doing so, it fails to grasp the distinctive ethical conception—the '*should be*,' which is a Categorical Imperative.

But human obligations cannot be swallowed up in a generality—cannot be made to evaporate in longings after self-satisfaction such as men commonly cherish. As Mr. Bradley has said, 'Moral obligations do not vanish where they cease to be felt or are denied': *Ethical Studies*, p. 59. Or, to quote the words of Green, 'In relation to a nature such as ours, having other impulses than those which draw to the ideal, this ideal becomes, in Kant's language, an imperative and a Categorical imperative': *Prolegomena*, p. 206. 'We need not shrink from asserting as the basis of morality, an unconditional duty:' p. 207. What we need, therefore, is to find the rational basis on which absolute obligations rest, and the provision for acquaintance with it in subjective consciousness. If it be

urged that the fulfilment of our ethical obligations all tend to secure 'self-realisation' in the highest and truest sense, we entirely concur in this representation, but our obligations are *presupposed*. The result upon character does not supply the key to the presupposed obligation, for it is true, as Mr. Bradley states, that in recognising the moral obligation of an action 'there is no end beyond the act': p. 60. Must not then Mr. Bradley admit that even self-realisation is not the end, any more than it is the ultimatum of moral existence in time? There is an ethical ideal of *action*, as there is an ideal of *life* as a whole. It is the ideal of action that the moral agent needs to have before him, in order that he may be true and honest, and kind. This is the one grand necessity for an ethical life. Only more slowly and gradually, as the fruit of daily effort to do the actions which are right in themselves, does there arise a representation of life as a whole—the perfect ethical life. This representation is not the true formative power, but is itself formed under recognition and fulfilment of particular obligations, developing gradually, as the intellectual life gains in breadth and maturity. Some recognition of this we have from Bradley, when he says,—'We have no right first to find out just what we happen to be and to have, and then to contract our wants to that limit. We cannot do it if we would, and Morality calls to us that, if we try to do it, we are false to ourselves': p. 68. Morality calls to us that we *ought not* to do such a thing; its voice is heard in every moral obligation, declaring that the end of the act is the act itself. Self-realisation is to be reached by following its voice in successive efforts and in different fields of exertion—at all times and in all engagements—with all the outlying uncertainties belonging to individual life. When Bradley affirms that "'Realise yourself" does not mean merely, "Be a whole," but "Be an *infinite* whole"' ; if there be anything more in the words than a conceit of language, connected with knowledge of the limits of our being, the affirmation, 'Be an

infinite whole' cannot even have a place among moral obligations.

9. Under Dialectic Evolution, references to Conscience are slight, allowing mainly for notes on the concrete as appearing in individual consciousness, with ample disparagement of 'the subjective.' Evolution of the notion has no place for 'Conscience' in its ordinary acceptation. The consequence is, we have allusions to 'the moral consciousness of man,' rather than a formulated philosophical doctrine of the 'moral faculty.' This applies to Hegel's discussion in the *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts* (1821), under 'Das Gute und das Gewissen,' §§ 129-141 (pp. 125-155); *Werke* viii. 171-209; and to later treatment of the subject by Neo-Kantian writers. Hegel draws a distinction between 'Conscience' as a subjective phenomenon, belonging to the individual consciousness, and 'the true Conscience.' The name 'Conscience' Hegel applies to the consciousness, or judgment, or conviction of the individual as it concerns itself with particular, determinate, and definite phases of action, including all that may fitly come under the vague phrase 'moral consciousness.' Under this representation, 'Conscience' stands as equivalent to 'individual conviction,' and in this sense it is fairly open to all that Hegel charges against it as vague, uncertain, and capricious. But an Ethical Philosophy places itself badly which identifies such descriptions with the 'Moral Conscience' of man. The most popular and uninstructed thought must refuse to accept and rest in variable and uncertain judgments. Kant, though condemned as an 'abstract moralist,' was nearer the truth when he represented the conception of a good will as 'common to the most uncultivated understanding.' Rational procedure is here undervalued, is labelled 'subjective' in much the same way as a physician enters a patient as 'incurable,' and this is the first step towards a philosophy of 'Conscience.' Taking the description as given—Conscience is the individual judgment or conviction as to the

dutiful—on what does this conviction rest? This is the one question which needs answering before any advance is made. We are concerned with the possibility of forming a judgment, and with the worth of it after it has been formed. To the philosopher who rests in 'the universal,' it must be clear that there can be no test of the validity of a conviction save in the universal itself; and if this be so, the universal must be known, and 'subjective intelligence' must be capable of bringing its own opinions or convictions to the test of 'the universal.' Only on this admission can the individual attempt to 'realise' the universal in his own history; and granting this, it is impossible to identify 'Conscience' with individual or subjective conviction. According to Hegel 'the true conscience is the disposition to will that which is good in and for itself'; but this is 'the Good Will' as described by Kant—'self-realisation' as described by Hegel himself. For advance towards this, Conscience is a first requisite.

This course of criticism is applicable to all Neo-Kantian theory as to 'Conscience.'

Neo-Kantians appeal, as others do, and even more readily and openly than natural evolutionists of the Utilitarian School, to 'the voice of the moral consciousness,' 'the voice which proclaims that virtue is an end in itself': Bradley's *Ethical Studies*, pp. 56, 57. They refer to 'the inner man or mind,' to 'our actual moral nature,' and to 'self-reflection as the only possible method of learning' what it 'expresses' (Green's *Prolegomena*, p. 97); to 'Consciousness of there being some perfection which has to be attained' (p. 184); and to 'practical reason' (p. 186); but of this also there must be 'a development,' suggesting the need for an educated conscience, even while it is otherwise admitted that there is a sense in which 'the old language is justified which speaks of Reason as the *parent* of law' (p. 214). Still more formally there comes the reference to 'the conscience of the individual' (p. 228), when it is explained that 'the individual's conscience is reason in him, as informed

by the work of reason without him, in the structure and controlling sentiments of society' (p. 229), a position in singular accord with that of Bain on the lower utilitarian platform, hardly to be expected in the lines of Dialectic Evolution, least of all from Green, who had previously granted that 'every one of the duties which the law of the state or the law of opinion recognises, must in some way be relative to circumstances' (p. 207). Still more singular is Green's account of Conscience as instructed by the State, when taken with the sentence which succeeds it, 'The *basis* of that structure, the *source* of those sentiments, can only be a self-objectifying spirit' (p. 229). Can this be otherwise represented than in the individual intelligence? If not, how can 'the self-objectifying spirit' be the basis of the structure of society, and yet take instruction from it? How do the 'self-objectifying spirit' and 'the educated conscience' (p. 232) stand related to each other?

10. Beyond the problems of *knowledge*, there is further difficulty as to an adequate account of 'self-determination' or *will-power*. Duty implies self-originated action in sight of the demands of ethical law. But criticism on this point is reserved for a later stage, when the Will is the subject of investigation, and the profuse references to 'Freedom' in Hegelian philosophy will come under review.

But in close connection with Duty and its fulfilment there come into sight all the problems, vastly complicated in character, as to personal responsibility, and, connected with these, the further problems, bearing on human destiny beyond the present life, as these seem to be modified by our knowledge of the great diversities of attainment as these may be tested by advance towards 'self-realisation.' What account can be given of that burden of Responsibility which each life carries forward with its history, while we make account of the 'inward hindrances' and individual possibilities? Looking wider, for inclusion of the mysteries of our social life, what is to be said of the wickedness in the world, of the temptations

thrown about as 'wild-fire'; what of deterioration of character, and of the manifold miseries these evils are bringing upon humanity? Evolution in its lower type, concerning itself mainly with organism and environment, seems in some respects to have the advantage here. With its accounts of 'the struggle for existence,' its expectations of 'the weak being driven to the wall,' and its triumphant 'survival of the fittest,' it seems more favourably placed than the Evolution Theory which claims to walk on a higher plane. Neo-Kantian Thought is too much absorbed in movements, and too little engaged with facts. In its representations of spiritual life its influence has favoured an optimistic view, which has brought as a reaction the Pessimism of Schopenhauer. This reaction is nothing more than reaction, but it throws into clear light the inadequacy of the scheme which proclaims that 'the rational is the real'; the philosophy of the concrete is the logical evolution of the Categories. Whether we regard the distinctive features of personal life, or the complications of social life even under the most advanced civilisation, great are the perplexities of an Evolution Theory.

11. That an evolution scheme should find its grand unity in Society was only to be expected. Hegel presents us with a powerful exposition of this doctrine in his *Philosophie des Rechts*. After all that has been elaborated concerning 'self-realisation,' it now seems as if too little were made of individuals, as if these were but atoms in the mass, leaving us to marvel as to the basis of the social structure, and the extent to which national Parliaments keep tinkering at the ancient edifice which affords them a corner for their meeting-place. 'The State' and 'the moral universe' seem here identified. Hegel accepts it as the crowning effort of Dialectic Evolution 'to comprehend and to exhibit the State as an existence essentially rational' (als ein in sich Vernünftiges): *Philosophie des Rechts*, Preface xxi.; *Werke*, viii. 18. Accordingly he says, 'The State is the realisation of the Ethical Idea' (die

Wirklichkeit der Sittlichen Idee): *Ib.* p. 241; *Werke*, viii. § 257, p. 312. The true constitution of a State in accordance with Reason alone, must be a subject of deep interest in theoretic Jurisprudence. But there is no such State. We may say that it is not represented in the German State, when we add that it is neither in the constitution of any neighbouring State, nor in that of Britain or of America. There is not now, and there never has been in history, a State capable of informing 'the moral consciousness of man'—none that can help in the smallest degree towards a philosophy of self-regulation in 'the self-conditioned intelligence.' At the very best the State is only a faint indication of 'the moral consciousness of man'—a broken and inadequate expression of its application to ever-changing circumstances.

There is an ideal for human life given in the consciousness of mankind, which all life falls beneath. This Ideal transcends the existing; the rational is more than the real. Of 'moral consciousness' no philosophy has been provided. Hegelianism is powerful in its representation that the Right is the Universal, and that the rational End must be 'realised freedom'—'The Good'; but it has failed to supply a philosophy of practical life. It has stated its ethical formula, 'Be a Person and respect others as Persons'; but it has not shown how the ethical ideal is presented in consciousness, and applied by the intelligent agent in daily life. It has lost its 'Universal' as an efficient, by disparagement of the 'subjective'; it has sacrificed the Ideal as an 'imperative of the life,' in premature enthusiasm over anticipation of the 'realised Ideal' in the history of Society, or the State, regarded as the equivalent for the 'moral universe.'

For the study of the Hegelian and Neo-Kantian Philosophy the following works are available:—Hutchison Stirling's *Secret of Hegel*, 2 vols., contains Prolegomena and Translation of the First Volume of Hegel's larger *Logic*; Stirling's Edition of Schwegeler's *History of Philosophy*, with Annotations; Wallace's Translation of the smaller *Logic*, from the

Encyclopædia of the Philosophical Sciences, with Prolegomena, including Vocabulary. These two on the structure of *The Logic*. In Blackwood's Philosophical Classics, Prof. Edward Caird's *Hegel*, biographical and expository. In Griggs's German Classics for English Readers (Chicago, U.S.A.); *Hegel's Logic*, by Harris; *Hegel's Philosophy of History and of the State*, by Morris; *Hegel's Philosophy of Religion*, by Fairbairn.

English Expositors and Defenders of the Ethical System:—F. H. Bradley's *Ethical Studies*, 1876; Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics*, 1883; see also Green's *Introduction to Hume's Essays*, *in loco*, and in Green's *Philosophical Works*, i. p. 301.

How Kant's Philosophy is viewed from the Hegelian stand-point, in contrast with that of the Scottish School, will be seen by reference to Hutchison Stirling's *Text-book to Kant*; Green's *Philosophical Works*, vol. ii.; Prof. Edward Caird's *Philosophy of Kant*; Prof. Watson's *Kant and English Critics*.

Criticism of Hegel's Philosophy:—Trendelenburg *Logische Untersuchungen*; Haym, *Hegel und seine Zeit*; Lotze's *Logic* (edited by Bosanquet), p. 197-204; Seth's *Hegelianism and Personality*, specially important as bearing on the ethical side.

Translations of Hegel's Works, in *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, edited by W. T. Harris, St. Louis, Missouri, U.S.A. *Phenomenology of Spirit*, vol. ii.; *Outlines of Hegel's Phenomenology*, vol. iii.; *Outlines of Hegel's Logic*, vol. iii.; *Science of Rights, Morals, and Religion*, vol. iv.; *Absolute Religion*, vols. xv. and xvi. Parts of the *Philosophy of Spirit*,—as to *Philosophy of the State*, vol. xvi.

PART II.

IMPULSES AND RESTRAINTS NATURAL TO MAN.



CHAPTER I.

IMPULSES TO ACTION.

1. **ATTENTION** must now be turned towards the other side of our nature—The Impulsive, often taken first in Ethical Science. We here pass from the Reflective side of our conscious activity to the Impulsive, often named as if pre-eminently the ‘Active’ side, though conscious activity is a unity capable of being interpreted only when the Intellectual is seen to be the central feature in consciousness.

We concentrate now on **FEELING**, first as it is passive, a consequence of the nerve sensibilities belonging to organism, next as it appears in the Active form of spontaneous **DESIRE**. Feeling is a uniform characteristic of human experience. Conscious activity is in its reflective exercise self-centred. The Ego seems to be all. In Feeling, the universe seems to be all. Our experience is determined for us; our consciousness is acted upon; influence comes from the external by a thousand avenues. All this means activity on our part, but an activity prompted in part by external conditions, in part by the range of sensibility belonging to our nature, though external to our consciousness.

In accordance with the laws of organism, there is even at the earliest stages of our life a spontaneous activity, its range widening as physical development advances. At later stages, and in accordance with a higher order of law, the full activity of the life is attained through the exercise of thought, contemporaneous with which a higher order of impulse appears. There is thus a double order of impulse, blending in a single life, requiring to be brought into harmony in accordance with the specialities of an ethical life. The leading condition of such a life is self-directed activity in the government of all its impulses according to rational law.

These Impulses have been variously named 'principles of action,' 'motives,' 'active powers,' and 'springs of action.' 'Principle,' signifying a commencement, may apply to the origin either of activity or of knowledge; but this word is better kept for the latter, as recognised law is the true ἀρχή of moral activity. 'Motive' is ambiguous, being applied to external objects which attract, as well as to internal forces which impel. 'Active Powers,' the favourite title of Reid and Stewart, does not adequately discriminate these forces from the intellectual powers.

2. The distinction between passive feeling and active having an impelling force, becomes apparent from the earliest stage of life. Every life has its WANTS. Activity is the consequence, which is depicted under a variety of terms—longing, craving, seeking, striving. These are only different names for varying degrees of the same tendency common to all life. Longing and acting are so allied that they may be said to be parts of the same thing, for desiring is acting, and its external manifestation is at most a continuance of activity begun within the life. DESIRE belongs to every phase of human activity. The whole life, including its grandest features as well as its lowest, is a life of longing and expectation. Loss of these were cessation of life itself.

3. Impulses belonging to the Physical nature are such as are common to all organism,—Hunger, Thirst, and Sex. Those which are essential to the history of an organic life—

Hunger and Thirst,—arise from the waste involved in organic work, calling for restored nerve energy, and repaired animal tissue. That of Sex being concerned with the reproduction of the race, arises only as the organism approaches maturity, and, according to organic law, implies a function proper only to a matured state. Exercise in comparative immaturity implies injury to the organism. In the intelligent life its place is further modified by its subjection to ethical law, in view of the responsibilities of parentage, suggesting that 'the struggle for existence' is not the natural characteristic of intelligent life as it is of purely organic.

Impulses of the physical nature are commonly named Appetites. While identical in all organic life, they are placed in specifically distinct relations in intelligent life. They are governing forces in the organic life; they are merely subject forces in the intelligent. Here also, as in the lowest organism, they arise spontaneously under physical conditions; but they are capable of being either restrained or stimulated by intervention of a higher agency. The physical and the intellectual do not stand apart. They are not abstracted from each other, and cannot be so regarded. Appetite thus ceases to be the same thing in rational life as appears in merely organic life, for its activity is determined by different conditions. The organic conditions are the same, but all the accompaniments of self-conscious life are new. Appetite finds its place in consciousness; for intelligence encompasses all activity. Imagination and Thought, Purpose and Action, all belong to Appetite, as well as Feeling and Desire. Moral Law applies here as well as higher; and it is only by obliviousness to the most manifest facts that we speak of Appetite in human life as if it were the same as in purely organic life. Here the organic life is worked up into all the highest conditions of rational life; but this does not prove possible without risk of the higher life being dragged downwards towards a condition in which the physical is allowed to become the dominant,—an intelligent life animalised.

4. Impulses of the intelligent life are dependent for their existence in consciousness on the unfolding of intelligence itself. This is a truism requiring statement only because of undue exalting of the conception of Evolution. The intelligent life is itself the source of impulse. This is in accordance with the analogies of life. The type of life is given; the unfolding is conditioned accordingly.

With intelligent life, as with all other life, some conditions of development are external to itself, but the efficiency of these in consciousness depends, as in other cases, on the activity or 'self-direction' of the life itself. (For ambiguities interposed by use of favourite analogies, *v. p.* 133.) The influences of Nature, society, language, education, and association are all involved as belonging to Environment; but these all imply a life unfolding according to its germinal type. Environment is nothing without the intelligent life and its internal conditions.

In Darwin's *Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals*, the fallacy is not infrequent of attributing priority of action, for evolution of Intelligence, to feelings which are dependent on intelligence for presence in consciousness. See the three general principles stated in chap. I. and reduplicated upon in chap. XIV.

5. Difference of psychological nature among Impulses affords philosophic ground for classification. On this basis Impulses may be divided into three classes,—Desires, Affections, and Judgments;—craving powers, giving powers, and persuading powers. These indicate respectively, the emptiness of our nature, its fulness, and power of discrimination for self-guidance. All these forms of impulse may blend in a single mental state, but they cannot be merged in each other, or lose their distinctive features. Plato's *Republic*, B. IV., 437.

Various forms of classification have been proposed. Dr. Reid gives a threefold division,—mechanical, animal, and rational.—*Active Powers*,

III. i. 1. This is a mixed division, as mechanical impulses are animal. It has been objected to by Stewart (*Philos. of Act. and Mor. Powers*, Intro.), who classifies thus:—Appetites, Desires, Affections, Self-love, the Moral Faculty. Dr. Thomas Brown arranges by reference to their relation to Time,—Immediate, Retrospective, and Prospective.—*Lect. 52.* Bain's *Emotions and Will*, chap. II., enters largely into the natural history of their rise; as to which see also Sully's *Outlines of Psychology*, chaps. XI. and XII.

6. DESIRE is craving,—impulse to draw into our possession what is fitted to give pleasure. Self-satisfaction is an object of constant search. Desire, as present in consciousness, involves three things,—(1) sense of want; (2) consequent restlessness; and (3) longing for satisfaction. Appetites are distinguished from other desires as being periodical in rise, and becoming quiescent by gratification. Desires dependent on intelligence seek continuous gratification. Stewart distinguishes Desire of knowledge, of society, of esteem, and of power. (*Outlines of Mor. Phil.*) Desires in seeking self-satisfaction are not selfish, not seeking their end by injury of others; yet do they—specially the Appetites,—constantly expose to risk of selfishness. In so far as Desire is dependent on intelligence, and is properly named 'intelligent desire,' it is a measure of the greatness of our nature, giving promise of enlarged activity.

7. AFFECTION is inclination of feeling towards others, disposing us to give from our own resources for their gratification. In practical tendency, Affections are the reverse of Desires. Desires absorb; Affections give out. Affections presuppose admiration of certain qualities in persons, and, in a modified degree, in lower sentient beings, but not in things, for the exercise of affection presupposes in its object possibility of sympathy. At the same time, Affection implies the possibility of antagonistic feeling on contemplation of qualities the reverse of those admired. This is reaction of Feeling,—Antipathy.

Affections take the form of Love or Hate, according as

their objects are esteemed, in any sense, good or bad ; and the form of Reverence or Pity, according as the object is esteemed either superior or inferior in nature and experience. Affections may seek the benefit of others through their restraint.

A truly ethical Hate is the antipathy of the healthy moral nature to moral evil. It is directed against the agent, as against his act. Ethical Hate helps its object, does not hurt, for it is only one side of the love of the good. Such Love and Hate blend in one state of consciousness. This is in accordance with Christian Ethics, where the maxim 'love your enemies' strikes against malevolence and selfishness, our chief dangers in antagonism to our fellows. But the maxim does not imply that Love is matter of command irrespective of qualities of character. It points to resentment which carries a healing power.

8. JUDGMENTS rank as Impulses, either as Judgments of Prudence, concerned with self-interest, or as Judgments of Rectitude, rousing a sense of duty. Reid's *Active Powers*, iii. 3.

Judgments do not of themselves fulfil the function of Impulse, but the two classes named are naturally associated with dispositions which rank as the highest forces within an intelligent life :—Desire of personal advantage (often called, Self-love) ; and reverence for Moral Law. The Judgments awaken the impelling force. The presence of the dispositions depends, therefore, not upon a man's circumstances, but upon his intelligence being concerned with the question how far duty or interest is involved. Kant's *Metaph. of Ethics*, chap. i. Mr. Mill, objecting to the saying 'that my conscience prevails over my desires,' says—'as if conscience were not itself a desire—the desire to do right.'—*Exam.* p. 567. This overlooks the diversity amongst our desires, and the dependence of the higher desires on prior exercise of thought.

9. Our classification of Impulses being purely Psychological, assigns to all an equality of rank in so far as they are essential

parts of human nature ; but it at the same time marks a lower and higher, in so far as one class indicates want, the other possession. As essential to the nature, each has its appointed function, in accordance with a harmony of being belonging to the rational life.

10. An Ethical classification, in addition to the Psychological, is implied in the fact that the Judgment of Duty expresses an imperative of action, and the impulse awakened by it must have ascendancy in rank and function. From the elevation afforded by the sense of Duty, the rational agent will assign their relative place to the other impulses according to their psychological nature, recognising the superiority of affection to desire, of intelligent nature to blind physical impulse, of regard for others to self-interest.

Such ethical gradation of our natural impulses as is here implied is only a correlative expression of the supremacy of conscience. Everything must yield to the dictate of duty ; and if there be diversity of impulse, calling for subordination in action, the first to yield must be self-regarding dispositions, in so far as these concern men's present gratification, and do not concern integrity of character.

11. As Desires and Affections are natural forces, springing spontaneously into exercise, they are in their rise possessed of no moral quality. Only purposed action comes under Moral Law. Craving for self-satisfaction is not selfish ; Affections, inclining towards the good of others, are not in themselves benevolent ; resistance of others is not naturally malevolent. But as soon as Impulse comes into the field of self-directed activity, it may be subject to Moral Law. Still, as natural forces, Impulses have a natural equality, and in determining the difficult questions of ethical precedence, account must be made of natural functions, while we seek to determine the measure of requirement in given circumstances. That the lower impulse must always yield to the higher, is an unworkable rule—too general to be of practical service—inconsistent

with a due regard to the unity of our life. Under the requirements of Moral Law the whole life is included ; accordingly, nothing in the life can be low or little ; every natural force must have its legitimate place for fulfilment of natural function. But as ethical law is higher than intellectual or physical law, and has its function in government of the life as a whole, it follows that the whole forces of our nature are to be harmonised in view of ethical ends. Such harmony must imply a ready yielding of inferior impulses to superior, in subordination of all else to the dominant sense of duty.

12. Amongst subordinate natural Impulses, Affections occupy a position superior to Desires. Moral principle, demanding Self-denial in submission to its authority, imposes more restraint upon Desires than upon Affections. In practice, Self-denial is a negative attending on the acknowledgment of the supremacy of Moral Law. It is restraint in one direction, consequent upon activity demanded in another.

13. PROBLEMS.—(1) Distinguish between Judgment regarded as an expression of Truth, and regarded as an impulse to action. (2) Is Hate not by its nature malevolent? (3) If not, by what addition is it turned into a malicious force? (4) If desire be naturally attendant on affection, what in that case is the ethical rank of the desire?

CHAPTER II.

RESTRAINTS UPON ACTION.

1. THE law of activity implies a law of restraint. This is first illustrated in the inhibitory action of the nerve system. It is manifested on a much grander scale in rational life. One consequence of our nature being so rich in active force is the impossibility of all its forces acting simultaneously. Multiplicity of natural Impulses implies restraint upon some, in order to action of others. This appears first in the antitheses of Love and Hate, Reverence and Pity ; and further in the subordination of impulses to Moral Law, for command wears often the form of prohibition.

2. There are, besides, certain natural forces whose primary, though not exclusive, function it is to restrain from action. These are Emotions, of which the chief are Wonder, Fear, and Grief ; and all of them are largely connected with exercise of intelligence.

Emotion is agitation of feeling, attended by more or less physical disturbance, and it always implies a sense of weakness, and consequent shrinking. This restraining power is experienced in great diversity of degree, and at its height attains an overwhelming force, paralysing our energies. As Emotion is closely related with our physical nature, it is largely affected by nerve susceptibility, and varies according to physical constitution or temperament, and variations in physical condition. On the other hand, as belonging to

intelligent life, Emotions are liable to rise or fall in accordance with the play of imagination, and the exercise of thought.

Emotions like Desires, are concerned with Self-interest, and are marks of the weakness of our nature. Wonder throws an arrest for a time upon the voluntary direction of activity; Fear is capable of putting a restraint upon powers, both of intelligence and of action; Grief dulls the mind, abating proportionately its interest in things around.

3. Emotion finds its first condition in physical susceptibility. Hence the lower animals experience Emotion in a subordinate form. Unusual appearances excite their nerve system, causing outward expressions of fear, which come nearest to what appears in human life. By lack of intelligence, lower animals are often subjects of fear from which man is delivered, but it is no less true that animals escape many forms of fear to which men are liable.

4. Intelligence greatly widens the range, and varies the character of Emotion. With its wider range of vision, it brings enlarged occasion for disturbed experience. Rational expectation is flanked by rational apprehension. Besides, elevation brings its own risks, for imagination may be allowed ascendancy, and the intelligence deluded or disturbed may be lost in labyrinths of irrational expectations or fears.

The difference between the sensitive life and the intelligent is such as to give a distinct character to much of the feeling classified as human Emotion. Intelligence is the essential condition of its rise, even while physical agitation continues less or more the expression of its experience. The view of his good on the whole, which belongs essentially to the rational being, and still more the vast ranges of personal obligation and of future destiny, give rise to Emotions special to the life highly gifted in intelligence.

5. Emotions are naturally fitted for combination with Impulse, in which case the Emotion which restrains in one direction, lends its force to Impulse urging in another direc-

tion. Fear will thus give force to desire of safety ; Wonder will quicken curiosity ; Grief will stimulate reflectiveness. This law of combination holds good, however, only when Emotion is experienced in moderate degree. If it rise towards full energy, it absorbs consciousness. At the maximum of force, Fear paralyses, Wonder stupefies, Grief deepens into the listlessness of despair.

6. Under the law of action and reaction affecting the relations of body and mind, physical susceptibilities stimulate Emotion. This appears in the effects of depressed physical condition. These are part of the penalty attaching to the manifold advantages of a complex sensory system. We must bear what we cannot shun. But Moral Law demands a rigid government of the whole life ; and physical experiences do not pass from the region of self-regulation. In so far as it is possible for us, a mastery of physical conditions comes within the task of self-command.

7. PROBLEMS.—(1) Is Wonder greatest when it is the child of ignorance or of knowledge? (2) Do Emotions afford evidence of the greatness of our nature, while essentially connected with its weakness? (3) How does the Emotion of Fear stand related to the Affection of Reverence? (4) Is Grief capable of proving in any way an elevating power, though essentially depressing?

PART III.

THE WILL.

1. THERE now comes into view the great central problem of Ethics—the question of Self-control. Is man capable of this, in accordance with his judgment of obligation and his sense of duty? Is he able to take the management of his life, giving effect to his views of his good on the whole, by subordinating present desire, to a conception of higher possibilities in life? Is he a moral agent in any proper sense, capable of lifting up before himself Moral Law as the representation of an ideal of life, contemplating it as an imperative, and setting himself deliberately and persistently to govern his impulses? This is the problem. Any lower statement of it either distorts the problem or ignores it. A vast and perplexing problem it is; but it springs so out of the very conditions of intelligent existence that it is impossible to expel it from the region of Philosophy, or to lessen in any way its magnitude. To acknowledge Moral Law, as every man does, is to raise the question of the distinction between a merely sentient life and an intelligently directed existence; it is to walk with eyes open into the forest of logical entanglements to be encountered in distinguishing between ‘self-determination’ in animal and in intelligent life.

The whole preceding investigations seem to lead up to an affirmative answer to the problem concerning Self-control—to a declaration of man’s freedom from dominion of the Impulses—and of his power to shape the course of his own energies in accordance with an ethical ideal. But to elaborate a philo-

sophy of Self-control is far from easy. Kant, himself a renowned defender of the doctrine of Moral Freedom, has made Free-Will a deduction from Moral Law. Obligation implies ability; 'thou shalt,' regarded as a rational demand, implies 'thou canst,' as an actual possibility. The deduction is warranted. He who finds Moral Law given by Reason must grant a power of self-command in harmony; he who finds in intelligence itself that which transcends experience, will not hesitate in interpretation if efficiency imply more than is given in experience. Yet we cannot have discharge from seeking a philosophy of Experience, and contemplating its harmony with the dictates of Reason. Hamilton, champion of Moral Freedom in the Scottish School, has declared the problem insoluble. And more recent Neo-Kantian thought has made us familiar with disparagement of 'the question commonly debated with much ambiguity of terms between 'determinists' and 'indeterminists' (Green's *Proleg.*, 93); an utterance which suggests that Green had not cleared his way through the ambiguities, as appears when he adds, that the question 'as to the freedom of moral agents' is 'not the question whether there is or is not a possibility of unmotivated willing'! As if the 'ought' could concern activity in which impulses are dead—as if morality could be 'unmotivated willing'! Philosophy can afford no place for such a representation.

Is man capable of governing his Impulses in accordance with Duty? This is the single question, from which all ambiguities must be driven away, at whatever cost of labour, if an Ethical Philosophy is to be completed. The suggestion that this problem should be abandoned is utterly indefensible within any School of Philosophy; *first*, because a complete analysis and synthesis of conscious activity is the task of Philosophy; and *second*, because morality being matter of practice, its philosophy must interpret to the utmost possible extent the laws of activity belonging to the ethical life.

Given the notion Duty; given manifold natural Impulses

rising spontaneously, is the intelligent life capable of Self-direction in accordance with the governing notion of 'Oughtness'? This is the problem to be approached with patient analysis, in order that advance may be made towards the fullest possible synthesis.

2. In order to prosecute inquiry with advantage we must circumscribe our search, by provisional description of the class of facts sought, and by definition of terms. Excluding all passive experience, we concentrate on the phenomena of activity, and, amongst these, we seek specially for all facts concerned with the direction, shaping, and government of personal activity. Observation is restricted to the procedure of the conscious intelligent life, as a 'self-directed' life, whatever this expression may be found to include, after having completed our survey of facts. The name WILL is used provisionally to indicate a 'directing,' 'determining,' or 'governing' power belonging to intelligent life—a control over the varied activities within consciousness, rendering it possible to realise, at least in some degree, the ideal which Moral Law presents. Whatever may be the influence of Will over our own organism, or more widely still, out upon the field of external relations and activities, the philosophy of control is concerned with the activities belonging to the inner life of the rational agent. The 'self-directed' life now to be considered is presented in the self-distinguishing consciousness belonging to rational activity; it appears in a phase of action quite different from 'instinctive action' in lower orders of life. This gives the distinction between Animal and Person.

The phenomena of Will appear in control of our own powers for direction of the life, *not of external things*. Edwards extends too widely in saying, 'Will is that which chooses anything' (*Freedom of Will*, i. 2), chooses 'things present and absent.' Locke said, *Essay* ii. 21, § 15, with more accuracy, '*Volition* is an act of the mind knowingly exerting that dominion it takes itself to have over any part of the man, by

employing it in, or withholding it from, any particular action. And what is the *Will*, but the faculty to do this?' So Reid makes Will 'a power to determine in things which he conceives to depend upon his determinations' (*Active Powers*, ii. 1).

3. Previous analysis of conscious life in its practical aspects has led to discrimination of intellectual exercise from impulsive. But these two do not present the result of an exhaustive analysis. We find in constant relation with these an additional force giving unity to the whole conscious activity, by direction of the practical life, thus constituting it a 'self-determined' life in a sense entirely new, because differing from anything found in lower orders of life. This additional force appears in consciousness in close relation with both of the characteristics of the self-distinguishing life already named—Thought and Impulse.

In connection with observations, reflections, and conclusions of the Moral Life, there is a *self-directing energy* which calls in and concentrates attention, which prosecutes reflection until the desired end has been reached, by discovery of the bearing of Moral Law in circumstances calling for action. Thus each moral agent reaches his own estimate of present duty, and his activity is directed under this conception. This self-directing power is the additional feature now to be signalled under the name of Volition, or Will-power. Observations may, indeed, be in a sense involuntary, the product of contact of external existence with our sensitive organism, and of a spontaneously active self-consciousness. In such a case, if only we grant the spontaneity of consciousness, experience may be said to be determined from without. But what is now coming into view is something different. It is activity *originating* from within, for a rational end, and on conditions supplied by the rational nature itself. Attention is Self-concentrated; Thought is Self-originated—Self-sustained—Self-directed. By this statement is not meant that Attention concentrates itself, and that Thought regulates itself; but

that the Ego—the Self-distinguishing conscious agent—in the consciousness of his own causal energy, directs the whole intellectual exercise with full regard to a recognised aim. Intelligence wills its own procedure—Thought is voluntary. This we take to be a transcription of the facts disclosed by analysis of self-conscious activity as presented in the Moral Life. This analysis seems confirmed by all that is commonly recognised by the popular mind as to advance in education, success in business, and personal responsibility in all social relations. ‘Concentrate attention’ is the popular maxim.

An additional and closely related manifestation of ‘Self-determination’ in practical life is seen in the history of Impulsive Force within consciousness. Recognising all the Impulses already enumerated as given in our nature—as belonging to the type of life unfolded in human consciousness—and granting that each one of them arises with a spontaneity which admits exclusion of none, their history, while they contribute to contents of consciousness, illustrates in additional form the action of the governing force which we name Volition. The self-conscious life, as essentially intelligent, involves discrimination of the varying forms of experience. The presence of desire, affection, self-love, or sense of duty is possible only on condition of its recognition in consciousness. It belongs to the nature of all of these that they operate as motive forces—forms of feeling which urge towards activity—commonly towards some outward activity—for realisation of what is felt to be desirable. In advance of these facts, yet in close relation with them, lie the phenomena of ‘Self-adjustment’ in recognition of situation, and in view of the aims of an intelligent life. The leading features of the ethical life become fully apparent here, for only here are we able to distinguish between ‘impulsive activity’ and ‘intelligent activity,’ the latter being intelligent direction of Impulse in deliberate acknowledgment of rational principle. All life is distinguished

by 'impulsive activity'; human life has this in common with all other types. But the self-distinguishing, self-directing life has this special to itself, that it is capable of contemplating and appreciating the end which natural Impulse is fitted to serve—of comparing diverse ends—of selecting in accordance with a judgment of relative importance—and of restraining or expelling, cherishing and directing Impulse. All this is implied in the exercise of the power we name Volition, or the causal energy of an intelligent life. To exclude the account here given of the rise and fall of impulsive power in consciousness, in accordance with government by the rational nature, is to miss entirely the significance of the rational life. The history of Impulse in self-consciousness cannot be completed without seeing an impulse carried into the field of 'objects' contemplated by the discriminating power, and brought under sweep of that governing power which directs the intellectual life. It is here, and here only, that we stand by the sources of 'individual effort,' and perceive with what warrant men are agreed in acknowledging individuality as a force in history, and personal responsibility as a reality warranting attempts after equitable distribution of merit and demerit amongst intelligent agents.

Both types of the Evolution Theory are here chargeable with incomplete analysis. Starting from a lower level, they never reach the elevation of 'Self-determination' as this is characteristic of human consciousness. Want—Wish—Will—when taken together, give the suggested pathway from the undeveloped to the developed human life. This line, as that of a simple Evolution, is supposed to conduct surely to what Neo-Kantian thought means by 'Self-realisation.' The recognition of 'Want' as native to the self-conscious life is matter of common agreement. It is also agreed that what we consciously 'want,' we necessarily 'wish,' or long to reach. But just beyond this point a chasm occurs which Evolution has failed to span. According to the analogies of lower life—

what the life longs for it moves for—there is no intervention between these two ; whether animal life be lower or higher in the scale, movement is the expression of longing. But in conscious life we have not only something more complex, but something quite distinct ; intervention between conscious longing and outward effort for its gratification is a common occurrence, which Philosophy must note and explain. Consider the significance of ‘Wish’ in the self-conscious life ; its persistence—the series of checks to which it is subjected—and the conditions on which it is allowed to give shape to protracted effort. The things most persistently wished for, are those which cannot be had by willing—such as health, long life, or honour ; and all these are the products of conceptions, which themselves need to be accounted for. Our wishes are checked by reflections, which are not awakened by the wishes, and are not in the line of their gratification, but intervene in consciousness for settlement of duty, as when we inquire as to the ‘rightness’ of Self-gratification, and conclude in favour of self-denial. The meaning of ‘Self-denial’ is the extinguishing of a ‘wish.’ The wish for ‘Self-improvement,’ on the other hand, is often raised to ascendancy, to the crucifixion of the wish for Self-gratification ; and this is not the product of native Impulse, but of Thought as to an ideal, or an attainable in life, which only the thinking life can appreciate, and apply in the government of conduct. ‘Want’ and ‘Wish’ are essentially related ; Wish and Will are essentially separated, being often of necessity antagonistic. Even when they are in harmony in action, as Green has well said, ‘Wants, with the sequent Impulses, must be distinguished from the consciousness of wanted objects, and from the effort to give reality to the objects thus present in consciousness as wanted’ (*Prolegomena*, p. 90).

4. In so far as discrimination of phenomena in consciousness leads to designation of faculties, the directing or controlling power must be distinguished from the powers

directed. Intellect is knowing power, Will is controlling power. These two are so related that each supposes the other. The phenomena of intelligence and of direction of intelligent activity are in constant relation. Affection is inclination towards another person, Will is guidance of its activity. Desire is craving of what we have not,—of some form of self-gratification; Will is use of what belongs to us as part of our own nature. Emotion is excitement of feeling in contemplation of an object, Will is energy from within, directing us in our relation to external objects. Affection, Desire, and Emotion are all concerned with external objects; Will is concerned with the management of affections, desires, and emotions, as these are characteristic of the inner life, and can be made the objects of attention. Neither Desire, Affection, nor Emotion is capable of its own direction, or adequate to the task of governing the life.

Most important of these distinctions is that between Desire and Will. This distinction has been insisted upon by Locke, *Essay* II. 21; by Reid, *Act. Powers*, II. 1, Works, 531; by Stewart, *Act. and Mor. Powers*, App. p. 471, Works, VI. p. 345; by Upham, on the *Will*, c. v. p. 84. Des Cartes identified Desire and Will, *Principles of Philos.* xxxii. So also did Priestley, *Philosophical Necessity*, p. 35. Edwards said, 'Will seems to be a word of more general signification, extending to things present and absent. *Desire* respects something absent . . . I cannot think they are so entirely distinct, that they can ever be properly said to run counter' (*Freed. of Will*, I. 1). Dr. Thomas Brown said, 'These brief feelings, which the body immediately obeys, . . . are commonly termed Volitions; while the more lasting wishes, which have no such direct termination, are simply denominated Desires' (*Cause and Effect*, I. 3, 3d ed. p. 51).

The tendency of Evolutionists, Biological and Dialectic, is towards identification of Desire and Will. The one is the germ, the other is its unfolding.

5. Will is essential to Personality. A person is a self-conscious Intelligence, capable of intelligent self-determination. Obedience to Moral Law is possible only as a product of deliberate resolution. Power of intelligent self-determina-

tion is thus essential to the nature of a moral being. Hence Kant says of man that 'his Will' is his 'proper self' (*Metaph. of Ethics*, Chap. III.). Will is a characteristic of the Intelligent Life, whose function it is to control our whole activity, by the control exercised over intelligence, in accordance with the dictates of intelligence itself. Speaking by reference to 'Faculties,' it may be said that Will holds a double relation to Intelligence, (1) of *superiority* in respect of control; and (2) of *dependence* for guidance in the government of subordinate powers. Dropping reference to 'Faculties,' voluntary activity is realised in the self-directing power belonging to Intelligent Life taking cognisance of its activity as a whole. From one point of view, Practical Reason is the 'legislator and governor of Will' (Kant, *Metaph. of Ethics*, Chap. I.). From another, Will is the self-directing power belonging to rational activity, appearing in grandest form as it regulates natural impulses in accordance with the dictates of Practical Reason.

To all the powers lower than Intelligence, Will holds only the single relation of superiority in respect of control, without any dependence in respect of authoritative guidance. To these lower powers is granted the distinction of belonging to the nature, that is, to the type of life named 'human'; and accordingly, in a sense, equality of rank; but to Will belongs the task of bringing them into the harmonious activity appropriate to the rational life.

See Upham on the *Will*, Part I. chaps. ii. and iii.; Tappan, *The Doctrine of the Will*, chaps. iv. v.; Hazard, *Freedom of Mind in Willing*, Book I. chap. iii.

According to an Intuitional or Transcendental Theory of the cognition of Moral Law, the Will may be represented as standing between the Practical Reason, as it is the revealer of the law of rational activity, and the reflective and impulsive powers as these supply conditions of activity. Thus Kant has said that 'The Will is conceived as a faculty of determining

oneself to action in accordance with the conception of certain laws; and such a faculty can be found only in rational beings' (*Metaph. of Ethics*, Chap. II.).

If we pause to contemplate the *end* which Will seeks to realise under direction of the Practical Reason, we may with Green speak of 'an idea of an end which a self-conscious subject *presents to itself*, and which it strives and tends to realise' (*Prolegomena*, p. 93).

6. The point of transition from 'animal life' to 'rational' is passed when more is implied in the activity of life than movement of feeling, and consequent movement of organism. At what point in the scale of animate existence a *double phase* of active power appears is a question which may be difficult to answer; but it may quite well be waived here, for it is enough to warrant the investigation now being prosecuted if we recognise a clear duality in kind of motive force, as we certainly do in human experience. This we propose to make good on evidence.

The contrast between the two phases is illustrated in the history of each human life, for childhood is the impulsive period—manhood is the reflective. We do not need to make out that from the time of maturity man invariably acts a rational part; it is enough if he reasons to any extent; enough even if, to a still less extent, he *acts* upon his deliberate conclusions. For under these limitations, it is admitted that thought has to do with conduct. We therefore need to seek a philosophy of Thought-determined Activity. This distinction between impulsive action and thought-determined action is so great, that it is comparatively easy to decide whether both forms do indeed find a place in human life. Take, for example, the vindictive word, and the acknowledgment of its wrongness—desire of self-gratification, and deliberate self-denial—fear, and the comparative calm which expresses self-mastery. Contrasts may be multiplied indefinitely, but there is no need for extended illustration. The problem finds

ample expression in those given. We are describing opposites in experience and history—such opposites as warrant the distribution of praise and blame. In each case the contrast involves these differences, the force of Impulse and the directing power of Thought. This difference appears most vividly in the fact that what in the first instance is the motive to action is in the second controlled and worked by a superior power, which, nevertheless, we do not at once describe as a rival force, for we seem to regard it as distinct in kind. Our experience is not described by ‘the antagonism of forces.’ We describe ‘impulse’ as force; but we do not so describe ‘thought’; and when we press investigation further, we find *in connection with thought* a third element in consciousness, which we recognise as the causal energy of the soul, and which we name WILL. There is an activity in consciousness which we decline to name ‘force,’ for it is essentially connected with the reflective process in which we deliberate as to the ‘right’ in personal conduct—that is, as to the application of Moral Law to the situation in which we are placed in view of our feelings and our environment. Reflection on the moral aspect of the case belongs to personal activity, and analysis of our experience warrants us to say these things—our Thought is self-directed, our Impulse is checked in force, and the function of Intelligence is fulfilled only by settlement of the question of present duty. Action beyond this is concerned with a further stage of inquiry. The problem of Self-control is essentially connected with the activity of the Intelligence in dealing with the government of conduct, for this implies government of internal impulse in order to guidance of external conduct.

7. Analysis warrants our contemplation of personal activity on two sides, fitly named *impulsive* and *reflective*. These go to constitute personal action, and are uniformly present in personal conduct. If they may be described as contrasts, they are yet essential to the unity of consciousness.

Impulse does not disappear when reflection comes into operation. The change in relation consequent on reflection is that Impulse becomes the object of attention, along with the rule of conduct or ethical ideal of life ; while the mental exercise moves directly on a conclusion as to duty. This is a state of consciousness familiar to all, and essential to what is meant by Intelligent Self-direction. An adequate Philosophy of this we are now seeking. Impulse is given and is warrantably described as an example of spontaneity. In accounting for its rise, allowance must be made for individual tendency or temperament, modified according to heredity, environment, education, and other associations. All these are commonly dealt with by the Experimental School, and in a manner so accurate that there is no ground for adverse criticism except against the conclusion that human activity is thereby accounted for. We recognise a problem beyond this range of observation, and it is the *main* problem of human conduct. In dealing with it, we accept Impulse as given in consciousness, under the conditions commonly described by the Experiential School ; and we pass beyond to inquire as to 'reflection,' consequent 'modification' of the mental state, and formation of 'deliberate purpose,' in accordance with which conduct (external action) becomes entirely different from what it would have been if the agent had not paused and reflected before external action was begun. 'Reflection,' 'modification of consciousness,' 'deliberate purpose,' are the things to be accounted for, and they are not adequately explained by discussions as to heredity, environment, and association. Impulse is the one side of the conscious state, Reflection is the other ; the former is the lower, the latter is the higher. As Thought fulfils its function, moving towards a deliberate conclusion as to right purpose, Impulse is abated in force. This is invariable. The statement expresses the necessary condition of Ethical Thought ; and it is Ethical Thought which is left unexplained by reasonings as to heredity,

environment, and association. There is not the slightest ground for challenging these reasonings, but they leave the problem of Ethical Thought untouched. We accept them all, and only thus make a beginning with a Philosophy of Responsible Conduct. Given Impulse, account for Thought. Granted the knowledge of an Ideal, how is it applied to the details of life; how does the moral agent advance towards the attainment of a 'Good Will,' which Kant named the only absolutely good thing, and which Hegel made the end of life, under the descriptive term—'Self-Realisation'? Only in dealing with this question do we face the problem of moral action, and see the reality pointed towards in ordinary thought, when it said that 'virtue is to be sought for its own sake.'

It is futile to suggest that this implies the negation of Impulse. If there were no Impulse, there could be no question, no occasion for thought,—Ethical Thought has its essential meaning, because its first application is government of Impulse. This is the condition of righteous conduct. To suggest the contrary is to contradict universal testimony, for it is a common-place of morals, that action is valued according to its motive. Ethical Thought, therefore, implies two things,—spontaneity of Impulse, and voluntary dealing with it as a present fact, so as to move towards and mould a rational purpose in sight of a rational ideal. As Cicero well said, 'Voluntas est, quæ quid cum ratione desiderat' (*Tusc. Disput.* iv. 6). 'A mere Will without any motive is chimerical and contradictory' (Leibnitz, *Fourth Paper, Letters of Leibnitz and Clarke*, p. 93). Reid states it thus,—'Every act of will must have an object. He that wills must will something' (*Active Powers*, Essay II. 1; Hamilton, 531). 'Volitions never exist independently of motives' (Upham, *The Will*, sec. 136, p. 213).

Green fails in his antithesis when he classifies disputants as to 'freedom of moral agents' under the two designations 'determinists' and 'indeterminists' (*Prolegomena*, 93). In the history of Philosophy there are no thinkers to be classified under the latter designation. The true classification is of thinkers who maintain that action is determined by heredity, environment, and association; and thinkers, admitting that action *may be* so determined, who hold that *right action* is determined by personal application of Moral Law to the government of motive and regulation of external conduct.

8. As there are two sides, Impulsive and Reflective, in each state of consciousness, so we are led to distinguish two classes of states, as either the one feature or the other is found predominant in consciousness. Hume said, 'Internal principles and motives operate in a uniform manner' (*Liberty and Necessity*, Essays II. 103). Recent advocates of Determinism have said, more definitely, impulses are according to heredity, environment, and association. The next question is, How does Intellectual Activity stand related to Impulsive? The Impulsive seems to rule in some cases, and the Reflective or Intelligent in others.

There is first a phase of experience in which Impulse may be said to rule, while Intelligent Activity is subordinate, being at work in the service of the Impulse. This is the common characteristic of childhood, and applies to recurring periods in maturer life when passion gains ascendancy. Illustration of 'intelligent life' is at its lowest in these cases, for intelligence is not critically and reflectively at work, but is absorbed with observation of environment, questionings as to 'ways and means,' and anticipation of self-gratification. This is a state common enough in the history of intelligent life, but it is far from affording illustration of the 'self-directed life,' taken in its ethical sense. This is a state more readily allied with wrong-doing than with well-doing, and gives little promise of anything great in life. It is, however, a lower phase of the 'voluntary,' the responsibility of the agent being dependent on the possibility of a higher exercise.

In advance of this there is a greatly higher state of Intelligent Activity, in which Reflection has the ascendancy. It is in the history of Thought-procedure that we find illustration of Voluntary Power—the Causal Energy of the Soul, exercise of Will in Self-government. The Search for Truth and the Struggle for the Right present the two fields of action from which evidence as to the distinctive characteristic of Will-power is to be obtained. In concentrated observation, which we commonly

name Attention ; in prosecution of the Reflective process ; in deliberate inference from the data accumulated, we have the consciousness of Self-directing power. In presentation to our own consciousness of some phase of Ethical Law, such as Justice, Benevolence, or Honesty ; in consideration of the bearing of such law on the circumstances in which we are placed ; in the projecting before ourselves of an image of the action which we conclude would be fulfilment of the universal law of conduct ; in the formation of purpose to realise this in personal life ; in the consequent direction of attention, control of disposition, and prosecution of effort that law may be fulfilled and our ideal realised, we have the consciousness of personal agency which moral life implies. At every stage of the procedure summarised, the power of Volition is matter of consciousness.

If we keep by the classification of the phenomena of conscious life as Impulsive and Reflective, we can say that it is in Reflective procedure that Will-power is revealed and by means of it that an intelligent or rational Self-control is exercised. Where Thought is, Will is : where Will is, Thought is. In the clearing away of uncertainties and doubts ; in the formation of purpose ; in all effort for its fulfilment, we are conscious of the exercise of Will-power. In all this we find a contrast to the laws of Impulsive action, and consequently a contrast between animal and rational life. We mark this contrast by saying Spontaneous Impulse, Voluntary Reflection.

While, however, this contrast is clearly marked by such terms, a further advance is required in order to give full expression to the characteristics of the self-distinguishing consciousness. Voluntary Reflection expresses a reality in experience, but it does not enough describe the field of Volition. Our voluntary activity transcends reflective exercise. There is a sense in which Reflection is only a preliminary in order to voluntary activity. It is only one side of the field,

and not until we definitely include the phenomena connected with the governing of impulse, so as to secure the ascendancy of intelligence within consciousness, and also the direction of external effort towards fulfilment of personal purpose, is the field of Voluntary Action fully under view. Now its full dimensions become apparent. We have stated what is intended when we speak of Self-directed Intelligent Life modelled on the ideal supplied in Moral Law. This we claim as essential to ethical life. Either there is self-directed thought, motive, purpose, and action, or there is no such thing as moral agency. 'To a being who is simply a result of natural forces an injunction to conform to their laws is unmeaning' (Green's *Prolegomena*, 9). To admit a Categorical Imperative in life is, as Kant has urged, to grant that the life is that of a free-will agent. Our philosophy of Will is that of Self-directed Activity on a Rational and Ethical basis. To find in Impulse, or even in the Thought process, as such, the energy which determines activity, is to deny that there is such a thing as a moral life. If there is such a life, the Causal Energy of the Soul is equal to the task of directing its own intelligence, governing its own impulses, and forming its own action. Volition means freedom—freedom from the ascendancy of Impulse, and freedom in the direction of Impulse and of all other powers belonging to a self-distinguishing life. In view of these results of analysis we properly classify the phenomena of conscious activity as those of Impulse, Reflection, and Will; and we say that the moral agent is inherently a free-will agent within the limits and under the laws which intelligent life implies. A full representation of free action is found in the state, subsequent to the rise of Spontaneous Impulse, when intelligent heed is given to the demands of Moral Law, and in accordance with these, Impulse is controlled, and Conduct is directed for fulfilment of duty. It is quite possible in such a case that the notion of duty may be at fault, its validity or inadequacy depends on the quality of the intelligent action concerned with the application of law to

circumstances; but the intellectual procedure itself, and all subsequent procedure consequent upon it, comes within Voluntary Activity, for which there is personal responsibility. So clear is this to ordinary experience that the popular mind distributes responsibility for thought, feeling, and action in acknowledgment of it.

The contrast between this representation of the phenomena of Volition, and the representations given under schemes of Evolution, is clearly disclosed. If character, environment, and associations determine action, everything involved in self-directed action is excluded. Hardly less than this can be said of 'the realised freedom' of which Hegelianism treats in the largest manner, and which indicates the unfolding of the Rational life until Personality is manifested in its fulness. This is not, indeed, an Evolution determined *ab extra* in any degree, but *ab intra* altogether, and this is all that can be claimed under the scheme as an expression of Freedom. There is in it no adequate philosophy of Self-determination such as implies representation of Moral Law, conflict with Impulse, and deliberate advance towards realisation of the ideal present to consciousness. 'Self-determination' here means determination to the end of life by the inherent conditions belonging to the type. Even under such an elaborate scheme as that presented by Green, it is impossible to find scope for all that is here implied in 'freedom of choice' as bearing on application of law to the fight with passion, fulfilment of duty, formation of character. There is no place for all this under a theory which affirms that 'Character or Self,' all that we mean by 'Personality,' is a 'reproduction of itself on the part of the eternal self-conscious subject of the world—a reproduction of itself to which it makes the processes of life organic' (*Prolegomena*, 102). Under such a representation we fail to understand what is meant when speaking of 'moral action, virtuous or vicious' (*ib.*); but we understand why Green should shortly afterwards say, "'Free-will" is either a name for you know not what, or it is included, is the essential factor, in character' (113). This we take to be a Deterministic theory, not a theory of 'Free-will.'

9. 'Freedom of Will' is another name for 'Causal Energy' of the Soul—a power which makes the agent the source of activity, and therefore renders him reasonably and justly responsible for his conduct. The activity of the self-conscious intelligence stands in contrast with the sensori-motor activity

characteristic of organic life, consequent on the vital relations of the two sides of the nerve system, connecting for purposes of activity the sensory and the motor apparatus. This is a phase of reflex action. The motor system is brought into action only as the result of movement propagated along the sensory lines.

Freedom of Willing is misrepresented to the extent of complete contradiction when it is described either as unmotivated action or as uncaused activity. It is truly represented as a doctrine affirming personal control over motive force, and attributing to each moral agent a causal energy not anywhere else appearing in Nature. Adverse criticism founded on the law of Causality is futile, for the validity of the law is granted, and it is affirmed that in moral activity we have an illustration in consciousness of the exercise of Causal Energy. To the assailant of the theory, it is open to say, with Spinoza, that man supposes himself free, because he is ignorant of the causes of his actions; or, in accordance with the accepted doctrine of the Determinists, to insist that 'the strongest motive determines the Will'—that is, to maintain that there is no Will; but the entire criticism founded on the law of Causality is wide of the mark. Kant is the accredited representative of Libertarians when he says, 'The Will is conceived as a faculty of determining oneself to action in accordance with the conception of certain laws; and such a faculty can be found only in rational things' (*Metaphysic of Ethics*, Chap. II. ; Semple, 38; Abbott, 45).

The doctrine of Causality in Willing precludes the possibility of explaining action by reference to any prior or superior exercise of mind, whether impulsive or reflective; but it finds the key to its manifestation in Attention and Thought, as the two governing phases of our intelligent life under which every impulse is subject, and it points for evidence of its power to the actual subjection of motives under these exercises of the rational life. Here it is we find the real meaning of 'char-

acter,' and not earlier. Man's true liberty is found in the government of conduct according to ethical conceptions formed by the Understanding, and provided for by the Reason. Government of motive by use of Thought and Attention is matter of direct consciousness. On this account it is held by the Libertarian to be impossible to present any adequate account of the phenomena of intelligent life which does not include exercise of intelligent determination in the guidance of thought, government of impulse, and direction of external conduct. Causal Energy inherent in the activity of an intelligent life provides for a synthesis working into harmony under the name of 'moral character,' the multiplicity of motive forces capable of being harmonised on a rational basis. This Causal Energy we take as a primitive fact in the intelligent life—an essential characteristic of the type we call human—incapable of explanation by further prosecution of psychological research. As the life in the nucleus of a cell is incapable of explanation by physiological methods, so this is incapable of explanation by reference to motive forces and environment.

10. DETERMINISM seeks to explain the activity of the rational life, including 'Volition,' by reference to character and environment. Objection is taken to the name 'Necessitarianism' as seeming to imply *external constraint*, which opponents of a Libertarian Theory of the Will do not suggest. Determinists agree in admitting what has been named Freedom from 'Co-action'—that is, from external necessitation. In this sense they grant that man is free, but in no other sense. According to this view, 'Volition' is the last movement in consciousness—a phase of 'determination'—which immediately precedes external action. 'Volition' is thus narrowed to the boundary-line between the inner and the outer—between the sphere of consciousness and the sphere of physical activity; and 'Freedom' is 'freedom to act as we will'—that is, certainty in the healthy state that our outward actions shall be as our volitions direct. According to this view, 'Volition' seems

nothing more than *movement from within outwards*; and this does not give anything distinctive from that which occurs in the history of organism.

'I say that a thing is *free* which exists and acts by the sole necessity of its nature' (Spinoza, Letter 62, *Life, Corresp. and Ethics*, Willis, p. 393). 'By liberty we can only mean a power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the Will' (Hume, *Essays*, II. 110). By freedom or liberty in an agent is meant, 'being free from hindrance or impediment in the way of doing or conducting, in any respect, as he wills' (Edwards, *The Will*, Part I. sec. 5). J. S. Mill, as an upholder of this theory, speaks of it as 'the falsely-called Doctrine of Necessity,'—preferring 'the fairer name of Determinism,' and says, that the word *Necessity* 'in this application, signifies only invariability' (*Exam.* p. 552). The doctrine itself Mill states thus,—'A Volition is a moral effect, which follows the corresponding moral causes as certainly and invariably as physical effects follow their physical causes. Whether it *must* do so, I acknowledge myself to be entirely ignorant, be the phenomena moral or physical; and I condemn accordingly the word *Necessity* as applied to either case. All I know is that it always *does*' (*Ib.* p. 562).

11. The Deterministic Theory urges that every event follows a cause: that this holds true in the sphere of mind as well as of matter; and so applies to volitions as well as sensations. At this point there is no divergence of opinion. Most Libertarians go further, declining to halt with the statement that the effect 'certainly and invariably' *does* follow its cause, but advancing to the position that it *must* do so.

The questions in debate are these: Can there be a 'Free Cause'?—Can there be, prior to external action, voluntary deliberation and application of rational principle to the government of motives? If not, Determinism becomes responsible for a Psychology which shall account for 'volition' by antecedent predetermined forces, which seems much the same as maintaining that there is no such thing as 'willing,' 'choosing,' or 'forming a volition'; but only 'determination to act' in the ordinary sense, familiar when we contemplate lower orders of organism. This is tantamount to the thesis that all action, human as well as animal, is a phase of reflex action; activity

is the return according to impressibility ; human action is the play of internal forces responsive to the action of Environment. Cf. Huxley's Essay "On Animals as Automata."

Under this theory all references to causal force may be grouped under 'character' and 'environment,' the former including 'heredity,' the latter all external influences acting upon consciousness. Appeal is made to 'outward circumstances suited to call internal incentives into action.' Mill refers to 'education and other moral and physical influences.' Edwards points to 'the particular temper which the mind has by nature, or that has been introduced and established by education, example, custom, or some other means (*The Will*, pt. 1., sec. 2). Edwards arranged admirably the points of consideration, when he indicated these three, 'the nature and circumstances of the *thing viewed* ; the nature and circumstances of the *mind that veiw*s ; and the degree and manner of its *view*' (*Freedom of Will*, 1. ii. 2). The following are statements of the general conclusion :—'The Will always is as the greatest apparent good is,' and 'the Will always follows the *last* dictate of the understanding.' Hobbes said, 'Will is the last appetite in deliberating' (*Leviath.* 1. vi., Works, vol. iii. p. 49). The term 'Deliberation' is, however, used by Hobbes in a very wide sense (p. 48). 'The whole sum of desires, aversions, hopes, and fears, continued till the thing be either done, or thought impossible, is that we call Deliberation, . . . and it is called Deliberation because it is a putting an end to the liberty we had of doing, or omitting, according to our own appetite or aversion.'

12. The re-statement of the theory in harmony with the scheme of Evolution is given by implication, rather than formally, in Herbert Spencer's *Data of Ethics*, where conduct as a manifestation of life in all its stages is regarded as 'an organic whole—an aggregate of interdependent actions performed by an organism.' Conduct 'excludes purposeless actions,' includes 'the adjustment of acts to ends,' that is, all

movement which *we recognise* in this light. In its lower phases we observe 'combinations among the actions of sensory and motor organs' (p. 5). Thence we trace 'the evolution of conduct,' by 'addition of new sets of adjustments.' The struggle for existence and its consequences are depicted, after which the specialities of human action are contemplated. 'The mental process by which, in any case, the adjustment of acts to ends is effected, and which under its higher forms becomes the subject-matter of ethical judgments, is divisible into the rise of a feeling or feelings constituting the motive, and the thought or thoughts through which the motives are shaped, and finally issues in action' (p. 104). The reference here to Thought touches the crucial question. After enumerating different orders of feeling fulfilling their part in complex experience, simple sensation, compound, clusters of presentative and representative sensations, in which it appears to be held that a philosophy is obtained if only stages of growing complexity are reached, Spencer thus proceeds—'Presently is reached a stage at which the combined clusters of impressions, not all present together, issue in actions not all simultaneous, implying representation of results, or thought. Afterwards follow stages in which various thoughts have time to pass before the composite motives produce the appropriate actions. Until at last arise those long deliberations during which the probabilities of various consequences are estimated, and the promptings of the conclusive feelings balanced, constituting calm judgment' (p. 105). Contrasting 'the savage of the lowest type' with 'the superior savage,' it is admitted that there is 'activity which due forethought produces' (p. 107). While the thief appropriates what is not his own, having regard simply to his own satisfaction, 'in the conscientious man there is an adequate restraining motive, . . . including not only ideas of punishment, and not only ideas of lost reputation and ruin, but including ideas of the claims of the person owning the property, and of the pains which loss of it will entail

on him : all joined with a general aversion to acts injurious to others, which arises from the inherited effects of experience' (p. 107). 'When we come to civilised men, who . . . adjust their proceedings to various consequences, we see that the intellectual actions, becoming of the kind we call *judicial*, are at once very elaborate and very deliberate' (p. 108). 'Observe, then, what follows respecting the relative *authorities* of motives . . . The feelings have authorities proportionate to the degrees in which they are removed by their complexity and ideality from simple sensations and appetites' (p. 109). 'By studying *the intellectual sides* of these processes,' it is seen that 'with the development of the intelligence and the growing ideality of the motives, the ends to which the acts are adjusted cease to be exclusively immediate' (p. 109). 'As with bodily vision, which at first appreciates only the broadest traits of objects, and so leads to rude classings, which developed vision impressible by minor differences has to correct ; so with mental vision in relation to *general truths*, it happens that at first the inductions, wrongly made all-embracing, have to wait for scepticism and critical observation to restrict them by taking account of unnoticed differences' (p. 110). We are here 'tracing the genesis of the moral consciousness' (p. 113). 'The moral feelings and correlative restraints have arisen later than the feelings and restraints that originate from political, religious, and social authorities' (p. 121); and 'the essential trait in the moral consciousness is the control of some feeling or feelings by some other feeling or feelings' (p. 113). A much more masterly treatment of the subject will be found in Cyples's *Process of Human Experience*, pp. 236-342.

The criticism of this theory rests on these allegations :— First, the statement of the facts of consciousness is incomplete ; 'volition' is not restricted to that stage which immediately precedes external action, but is concerned with anterior procedure within consciousness ; and second, no adequate account has been given of their internal procedure, in so far

as reflection or thought-procedure has been a factor in personal action. All that determinists say concerning 'the nature and circumstances of the thing viewed,' and 'the nature and circumstances of the mind that views it,' will be admitted. There is no dispute within this area. But when reference is made to 'the degree and manner of the mind's view'; when we study 'the intellectual sides' of the processes occurring in consciousness 'by which the adjustment of acts to ends is effected'; when we seek to account for 'the thought or thoughts through which the motives are shaped'; when we consider 'those long deliberations during which the probabilities of various consequences are estimated, and the promptings of the corrective feelings are balanced,' Determinism leaves us without a theory of procedure. *If thought is not an efficient, there is not intelligent action; if it is, Determinism is not a philosophy of human conduct.* If 'a voluntary action' is an action, 'consciously directed to some end' (Sully—*Outlines of Psychology*, p. 574), there must be some account of the application of thought in the circumstances, and of the determination reached, both of which are implied in the history of activity; and such account is not supplied by references to feelings, desires, and beliefs. A Philosophy of Thought-procedure is required, and this Determinism does not supply. The Psychology of Evolution is rich in suggestiveness when discriminating successive stages of development; but it is weak in treatment of 'conscious evolution,' involving intelligent application of general truth to the government of conduct, and to the formation of character. When attention is restricted to the volition preceding external action, and it is said that 'the Will always follows the last dictate of the understanding,' or 'The Will follows the strongest motive,' the statements are accurate, but the problem, instead of being disposed of, stands before us waiting settlement. We have still to account for the procedure of the understanding.

13. One of the most careful and concentrated defences of Determinism is that presented in Sidgwick's *Methods of Ethics*,

3d ed. Book I. chap. v., entitled 'Free Will.' The plan of treatment is to show, first, how, under scientific guidance, it has become natural with us to regard all change as determined by fixed law ; to suggest that this affords a presumption against 'Free Will' ; to maintain that the evidence in favour of Determinism is cumulative and is steadily growing ; and finally to deal with the question 'how far the power of the Will actually extends,' as it bears on muscular effort, control over thoughts and feelings, and alterations in men's tendencies to future action. The main psychological question is, How can the reflective process be accounted for ? and the chief ethical question, What is the meaning of moral conflict in human life ?

In his opening paragraph, Professor Sidgwick states 'the substantial issue raised in the Free Will controversy' thus,— 'Can we say of the wilful wrong-doer that his wrong choice was "free" ; meaning that he might have chosen rightly, not merely if the antecedents of his volition, external and internal, had been different ; but supposing these antecedents unchanged' (p. 56). An exact statement of the problem to be discussed is so vital, that some consideration is required here. This statement is good in so far as it carries us surely to the ultimate difficulty—How can we account for the rise of Volition ? a difficulty to which every Libertarian must prefer to advance by the quickest line open to careful observation. The problem is admirably pointed. But there are a few questions bearing on its form. Why is the *wrong-doer* selected as the typical agent into whose conduct we should inquire ? We agree with Professor Sidgwick in regarding it as a one-sided view of the freedom alleged to belong to intelligent life, 'when a disciple of Kant says that a man "is a free agent in so far as he acts under the guidance of reason"' (p. 55) ; but there is also one-sidedness when the 'wrong-doer' is selected as presenting the problem in its typical form. There is danger of the problem appearing smaller than it is ; and the case is even worse when it is kept in view that the wrong-doer is commonly

the man swayed by passion, whose conduct supplies the worst, because the lowest representation of 'deliberate determination'; while deliberation is regarded by Libertarians as the key to the interpretation of Will-power. Another point calls for remark. The '*wilful* wrong-doer is taken,'—a fair thing on the part of the Determinist,—for 'wilful' distinguishes between unpremeditated and premeditated wrong-doing. This is a distinction recognised in every court of criminal justice, and its significance must be of some moment. The difference is a very broad one, bearing closely on the question of responsibility, and the correlative question of punishment. Professor Sidgwick clearly puts the position in these words: 'It is obvious that the freedom thus connected with responsibility is not the freedom that is only manifested in rational action, but the freedom to choose between right and wrong which is manifested equally in either choice' (p. 55). In speaking of the *wilful* wrong-doer, Sidgwick allows 'wilful neglect of duty,' and 'conscious' wrong-doing. Further light is thrown on the conditions involved when our author afterwards says: 'In the case of conscious actions, the agent is not regarded as morally responsible, except in an indirect way, for effects which he did not *foresee* at the moment of volition' (p. 57). The 'wilful wrong-doer' is thus one who *foresees* the effects of his conduct. While believing that what we condemn is not the *results*, as Professor Sidgwick seems inclined to suggest (p. 57), but the voluntary determination to act in full view of these results, we agree in considering that 'the results' taken into account when we pass condemnation on the 'wilful wrong-doer' 'would seem to be always the results of a man's volitions so far as they were *intended*, i.e. *represented in thought* as certain or probable consequences of such volitions' (p. 57). With these additional quotations the full breadth of the problem is seen. In trying to explain wilful wrong-doing, and our condemnation of it, we need to account for these exercises of the intelligent agent; 'foresight' of results, accomplished by 'representation in

thought' of the probable or possible consequences of contemplated action; deliberately formed 'intention,' as essential to wilful wrong-doing, and this implies knowledge that the action is wrong, and determination to do the deed nevertheless. We could not wish a clearer statement of these facts than Professor Sidgwick has given in the following sentence:—'In the case of volitions which are pre-eminently the objects of moral condemnation and approbation, the psychical fact "volition" seems to be a somewhat complex phenomenon; including besides what I may call the mere sensation of (psychical) action, intention or representation of the results of action, and also the consciousness of self as choosing, resolving, determining these results' (pp. 58, 59).

The Libertarian holds that these facts cannot be explained except on the basis of a metaphysical doctrine of freedom, as an inherent mystery of the nature which cannot be adequately accounted for by psychological laws. The Determinist holds that these facts are explained by the antecedents, external and internal, which are to be regarded as belonging partly to environment, partly to individual disposition, habit, and character; human action is the equivalent of antecedent forces, just as movement is in the physical world.

Professor Sidgwick's conclusion is stated thus:—'On the Determinist side there is a cumulative argument so strong as almost to amount to complete proof' (p. 60). 'The belief that events are determinately related to the state of things immediately preceding them, is now held by all competent thinkers in respect of all kinds of occurrences except human volitions . . . and naturally, with the increasing conviction of the essential unity of the cognisable universe, increases the indisposition to allow the exceptional character claimed by Libertarians for the department of human action' (p. 60). This is an admirable statement of the scope and tendency of scientific thought in our day; but it has no value, either in respect of evidence or of argument bearing on the philosophy of 'the consciousness of

self as choosing, resolving, determining.' In view of such consciousness, indeed, we need to be specially guarded against the dominion of a form of representation which comes from a sphere entirely distinct. This is obviously an essential condition of our inquiry, for it is not alleged by any one, and cannot be alleged, that such consciousness belongs to the sphere in which the reign of mechanical law is recognised.

The next portion of the argument represents the facts of consciousness as hardly distinguishable from the lower facts. But this is difficult in view of the ample representation of the problem of volition already given. 'When we fix our attention on human action, we observe that the portion of it which is originated unconsciously is admittedly determined by physical causes ; and we find that no clear line can be drawn between acts of this kind, and those which are conscious and voluntary. Not only are many acts of the former class entirely similar to those of the latter, except in being unconscious ; but we remark further that actions which we habitually perform continually pass from the latter class into the former' (p. 60). These positions are insufficient to suggest identity, or even analogy, of the voluntary action with actions of a lower order. The portion of human action originated unconsciously is determined by physical causes. This is only to point out and emphasise the difference, which Professor Sidgwick recognised in shaping the problem, when he said, 'Voluntary action is distinguished as "conscious" from actions or movements of the human organism which are "unconscious" or "mechanical"' (p. 56). This is the contrast we are seeking to explain. There are actions differing from physical actions, for which we must account by other than physical causes. Again, when actions determined by physical causes are said to be similar to voluntary actions, except in being unconscious, the exception marks an essential difference. The question just is, Has consciousness *no effect*? We are seeking an explanation of the actions of conscious intelligence, and actions which do not

belong to conscious existence can do nothing to help us in our search. Once more, the fact that actions which belong to the conscious and voluntary do by force of habit pass over into the unconscious and involuntary does nothing to suggest an analogy, but only marks out a severance. The action which can pass over into the region of the unconscious and involuntary, does not belong essentially to intelligent life; and no one professes that 'choosing, resolving, determining,' ever do pass over into the region of the unconscious, and 'the consciousness of self' doing these things is the occurrence we seek to explain. Still tending to minimise the difference between things higher and lower, the argument proceeds thus, — 'When we look closely at our conscious acts, we find that, in respect of such of them as I have characterised as "impulsive," . . . our consciousness can hardly be said to suggest that they are not completely determined by the strength of the stimulus and the state of our previously determined temperament and character at the time of its operation' (p. 61). Is not this oversight of the description of 'impulsive wrong-doing' given when the problem was being stated? 'We may define impulsive actions as those where the connection between the feeling that prompts and the action prompted is so simple and immediate that, *though intention is present, the consciousness of personal choice* of the intended result is evanescent' (p. 58). Can 'intention' and 'consciousness of choice' be allowed to vanish when the argument is developed? If 'intention is present,' must we not account for it; and is not its recognised presence the very ground on which we are agreed in condemning the wrong-doer, and holding him responsible?

The argument now includes the testimony coming from our judgments of our fellow-men. 'We always explain the voluntary action of all men, except ourselves, on the principle of causation by character and circumstances' (p. 61). This passes away from the direct line of evidence to another quite legitimate, but still only collateral. We are here judging

actions *ab extra*, and separated from direct observation of the phenomena to be explained; we are deciding according to what we see, and we may readily be forgetful of what we know of the inner action beyond the range of vision. But even thus, the position is much too strongly stated as if it described a uniform and universal mode of judgment. If it were true that 'we always explain' the conduct of others in the manner described, this would be an argument of considerable force, for it is hardly possible that men should uniformly overlook so essential an element as freedom of choice. But the position is considerably modified in the following footnote:—'I do not mean that this is the only view that we take of the conduct of others; I hold (as will presently appear) that in judging of their conduct morally, we ordinarily apply the conception of Free Will. But we do not ordinarily regard it as one kind of causation, limiting and counteracting the other kind.' This note destroys the force of the argument as a support for Determinism, and turns it over to the other side, admitting that in matters of morals, at least, we *ordinarily* judge in accordance with the conception of Free Will.

But let us pass on to consider the value of the representation as it is supposed to apply beyond the sphere of morals. It is an argument from our forecasts of the conduct of our fellow-men, bearing upon the probable action of individuals and of communities. These present an important point in the line of external evidence. 'The life of man in society involves daily a mass of minute forecasts of the actions of other men, founded on experience of mankind generally, or of particular classes of men, or of individuals; who are thus necessarily regarded as things having determinate properties, causes whose effects are calculable from their past actions; and if our forecast turns out in any case to be erroneous, we do not attribute the discrepancy to the disturbing influence of Free Will, but to our incomplete acquaintance with their character and motives' (p. 61). In considering this statement in so far as it bears on

Free Will, these things may be taken for granted as not in dispute, that we do form forecasts of the action of others ; that in doing so, we found upon the character and motives of the agents ; that we do not in this neglect the knowledge of ourselves, as guiding towards judgments of others ; and that we do not regard Free Will as caprice, but as choice of alternatives visibly and reasonably within reach. This last statement is so vital, that I recall the words of the problem (p. 56) 'that he might have *chosen* rightly, supposing antecedents unchanged.' Professor Sidgwick's contention is that, in forming our forecasts, we make no account of free choice, but only of dispositions, and that intelligent agents are necessarily regarded as *things*. This seems an overdrawn statement, unduly magnifying 'character and motives,' treating them as unchanging antecedents, or overlooking the conditions which go to determine change. 'We infer generally the future actions of those whom we know from their past actions.' In doing so we assume that we know the persons' dispositions, temperament, and general estimates of right, or wise, or desirable lines of conduct ; and that there is a given measure of fixedness in these, so as to make calculation of probable action quite reasonable. So far Determinists and Libertarians are agreed ; beyond this, differences arise. In contemplating another intelligent agent, I can no more regard him as a thing, than he can regard me in this light. The distinctive characteristics of intelligent agency are too marked to admit of confusion between intelligent agents and things. If this were not so, our calculations would not have so much of the element of probability in them, for this probability is not occasioned by ignorance, but is carried through all our forecasts on the ground of what we know in ourselves of self-determination. Never do we admit another's estimate of our character as limiting us. Accordingly, it will be found impossible to complete fairly representations of the elements which go to make up our forecasts, without allowing for personal choice. We do not dispute that the measure of

fixedness belonging to temperament, habits, and tendencies of thought is such as to make forecasts probable; but the causality of Will stands over against that lower type of causality (in the sense of *force*) belonging to the reigning tendencies or fixed characteristics of a man. This is the contrast which Professor Sidgwick has previously recognised as 'an important distinction between *impulsive* and *deliberate* wrong-doing' (p. 58). We all make account of this, that if a man begin to deliberate, it forthwith becomes a question whether some lower impulse or a regard to duty will determine his conclusion. We admit the possibility of conflict with a powerful disposition, or a strongly fixed habit, as we admit that the sense of duty includes an obligation to self-regulation and self-culture. In accordance with this, the paragraph under criticism is not closed without this clear admission, which seems fatal to the contention for Determinism—'the possibility of moral self-culture depends on the assumption that by a present volition we can determine to some extent our actions in the more or less remote future' (p. 62). Either we must deny moral progress or reject Determinism.

The argument now enters its last stage, with all the Ethical difficulties full in view. The question here is the validity of the plea 'that the conception of the Freedom of the Will is indispensable to Ethics and Jurisprudence' (p. 62), inasmuch as the 'ought' implies possibility of fulfilment, and civil penalties imply personal demerit or guilt. The force of these considerations is so far admitted as to lead to the conclusion that on the Determinist theory, the words "'ought,'" "responsibility," "desert," and similar terms *have to be used, if at all, in new significations*' (p. 62). We assume here that discontinuance of their use is a quite hopeless anticipation, even with this increase of force added to Bentham's plea, that the use of the word "'ought" ought to be banished from the vocabulary of morals' (*Deontology* I. 32). We must turn to the 'new significations.' Kant had urged that 'I *ought*' implies that

'I can.' To this Sidgwick answers thus :—'The Determinist allows that, in a sense, "ought" implies "can," that a man is only morally bound to do what is "in his power"; . . . but he explains "can" and "in his power" to imply only the absence of all insuperable obstacles *except* want of sufficient motive' (p. 63). This statement refutes itself. The Determinist holds that 'want of sufficient motive' makes it certain that the action cannot happen, for action is according to its antecedents. What is here said, therefore, is that there is a sense in which the person so placed 'can' act, but he 'cannot' act; there is 'the absence of all insuperable obstacles *except* want of sufficient motive,' which is an insuperable obstacle. Determinism abandons its position if it allow that want of sufficient motive is not an insuperable obstacle to action.

But we pass from use of words, and tests of new significations, to the conclusion reached by Professor Sidgwick. 'We must conclude, then, that against the formidable array of cumulative evidence offered for Determinism there is but one opposing argument of real force; the immediate affirmation of consciousness in the moment of deliberate action' (p. 64). This is to acknowledge that a man is *free in deliberating*, and the whole contention of the Libertarian is admitted. When a man deliberates, he is free; he has impulses under check, and whatever difficulty may remain as to 'motive' for deliberation, he deliberates, that is, reflects as to possible alternatives, estimates duty, forecasts probable consequences, and deliberating, or according to personal intention, decides to act in a given way, either in that of deliberate well-doing or of 'wilful wrongdoing.' The following sentences which Professor Sidgwick has penned are such as Libertarians will accept unreservedly. 'Certainly in the case of actions in which I have a distinct consciousness of choosing between alternatives of conduct, one of which I conceive as right or reasonable, I find it impossible not to think that I can now choose to do what I so conceive, however strong may be my inclination to act unreasonably,

and however uniformly I may have yielded to such inclinations in the past.' Again, 'I recognise that each concession to vicious desire makes the difficulty of resisting it greater when the desire recurs; but the difficulty always seems to remain separated by an impassable gulf from impossibility' (p. 64). To these sentences Professor Sidgwick adds this—'Whether this amounts to an affirmation of what any Libertarian metaphysicians have maintained as "Free Will," is a difficult and subtle question.' To me it implies that every moral agent is capable of reflecting as to right conduct, and is capable of acting according to deliberate intention, in view of moral law, and against the strongest *impulsive* tendency, opposed to reflection and deliberate determination. When Professor Sidgwick, leaving dubious the exact theoretic and controversial value of his admissions, proceeds to add—'But at any rate it will be admitted that the absence of adequate motive to do what I judge to be reasonable cannot be regarded by me, in deliberation, as a rational ground for not doing it,' I interpret this as meaning the absence of motive in the field of *impulsive* force, and even the presence of impulsive tendency towards the opposite, and the acknowledgment of the intellectual and practical ascendancy of Reason in human history; and on this interpretation it seems to me that all the requirements of Libertarians are met. If Determinists can find their requirements met in a lofty metaphysical determinism in which conscience is sovereign, the Will is absolutely good, and activity is wholly rational; and can allow that the conditions of moral life are such as to require and render possible individual struggle towards 'moral self-culture,' I do not know what controversy Libertarians can have with this view of Ethical life. But there seems no other course open in that case than that we should part with all the 'new significations' of 'ought,' 'responsibility,' and 'desert'; allowing for control over thoughts and feelings, and power to originate alterations in personal tendencies.

PROBLEMS.—(1) Distinguish the sources of a purely physical action from those of intelligent activity. (2) Distinguish between knowledge voluntarily acquired, and that acquired involuntarily. (3) Can Will originate an exercise of Affection? (4) Are there any circumstances in which love or pity may be matter of command? (5) How can there be various degrees of force belonging to volitions? Give examples and interpret them, so as to discover the law or laws which determine volitional force. (6) 'An intelligent being alone has the prerogative of acting according to the representation of laws, *i.e.* has a will; and since to deduce actions from laws, Reason is required, it follows that will is nothing else than practical reason' (Kant's *Metaphysic of Ethics*, Semple, p. 25). Critically examine the last clause. (7) Criticise the following:—'On the theory of Necessity (we are told), a man cannot help acting as he does, and it cannot be just that he should be punished for what he cannot help. Not if the expectation of punishment enables him to help it, and is *the only means* by which he can be enabled to help it'—Mill's *Exam. of Hamilton's Philosophy*.

LITERATURE.—Aristotle's *N. Ethics*, Book III. As to the teaching of the Stoics, see Zeller's *Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics*, Part II. chap. ix. As to the Epicureans, *Ib.* Part III. chap. xvii. The main problem belongs to Modern Philosophy.

Libertarian Doctrine.—*Letters of Leibnitz and Clarke*, Fourth paper. Reid's *Active Powers*, Essays II. and IV. Kant's *Metaphysic of Ethics*. Dugald Stewart's *Dissertation*. On necessitarian positions—Notes M.M. and N.N. Collected Works, vol. I. 573. Hamilton's *Metaphysics*, II. 410; *Discussions*, 627; Extracts from Reid's *Works*, 973; and notes to Reid's Essays II. and IV. in *Active Powers*. Mansel's *Limits of Religious Thought and Metaphysics*, 791. Lecture V. Chalmers's *Moral Philosophy*, chap. IV. M'Cosh's *Method of Divine Government*, Book III. Tappan *On the Doctrine of the Will*. Cairns's *Treatise on Moral Freedom*. Hazard's

Causality and Freedom. Porter's *Elements of Moral Science*, Part I. chap. iv. Bradley's *Ethical Studies*, Essay I. Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Book II. Laurie's *Metaphysica Nova et Vetusta*, and his *Ethica*.

Determinist Doctrine.—Spinoza's *Ethics*, Part II. Prop. 35. Edwards, *On the Will*. Collins's *Liberty and Necessity*. Hobbes's *Leviathan*, Part I. chap. vi. Hume's *Essays*, II. *Liberty and Necessity*, — Human Understanding, sec. viii. *Treatise on Human Nature*, Book II. Part III. Mill's *Exam. of Hamilton*, chap. xxvi. Bain's *Emotions and Will*. Sidgwick's *Methods of Ethics*, 3d ed. Book I. chap. v. Leslie Stephen's *Science of Ethics*, chap. vii. Div. II.

PART IV.

MORAL SENTIMENTS.

1. A FRESH excursus into the field of Sensibility has now become needful, for moral activity carries the agent into more complex experience, resulting from the wakening up of Sentiment peculiar to ethical life. To think as to the right in conduct, to form one's own purpose, and to pass forth into the field of activity as a self-directed agent, is at the same time to feel stirring within us an experience greatly in advance of everything already classified under the name of instinctive feeling. The stream of consciousness, widening and deepening, has here flowing in upon it accessions of feeling, as fresh springs open along the river's bank. And these accessions come early in the river's course, for moral life is a matter of early history, not waiting for full development of intellectual power. True to the characteristics of the early stages of human life, the sentimental is apparent in child-life in matters of conduct, even more quickly than extended or exact lines of reflection. Moral Sentiment, being of the nature of feeling, has in it something of affinity with the instinctive, while in point of time and rank it belongs essentially to the intelligent life. All that has been said of intellectual power, with intuitions of the practical reason, and of Self-determining Will-power, must now be read back into the history of child-life, and read forward into all the 'developments' of the nineteenth century. Intuitionism and Evolutionism must meet their critical tests in this way. Distinctions of right and wrong bear in upon the life at the early stages of education, and do not tarry for its later stages.

Every educationist knows this, and rejoices in it as giving zest and dignity to his profession. On the other hand, the Century as an Educator is throwing down its tests in the path of the moralist, not always to the credit of the Century, as we think, for a Socratic and Platonic age said some things more grandly than this age, and Jesus Christ said things so lofty as to personal life that nineteen centuries have carried our race in rather a feeble way up the ascent towards those elevations where rules the law requiring that all do to others as they desire that others should do to them. Yet the springs of human feeling are all favourable to the better thought within us; liable indeed they are to be overborne and polluted by the torrents of passion, but they are found still welling up as a pure stream after the torrent has swept past. In some respects it holds true that the power of Moral Sentiment is most apparent in early life, for progress in years is not always progress in morals. The springs by the river-side are apt to get choked by the *débris* of the torrent, which leaves its traces behind long after it has passed away. It *may* be true in consciousness as in Nature, though it *ought not* to be, that the waters are purer nearer their source.

Gathering up the best results of a wide induction, we are warranted in concluding that a strong healthy Sentiment attends on serious reflection as to morals, and on the application of its conclusions in practice. While we must recognise, however, that wrong-doing blends largely with well-doing, it becomes thereby, in some respects, only more conspicuous how varied are the kinds of sentiment possible to the ethical type of life.

2. To the class of Moral Sentiments belongs the whole range of feelings starting in consciousness as the direct consequence of our contemplation of moral activity, including observations directed upon our own conduct, and those turned upon the actions of others. Having a Philosophy of Thought and of Activity, we must seek a philosophy of the Sentiments of

Self-approval and Self-condemnation, with their correlatives connected with social life, Esteem and Dislike.

Every man is the critic and judge of his own conduct, under tests supplied by moral law. In advance of this is the experience of sentiment connected with the survey of conduct, for the moral agent is not an abstract thinker (whatever the moralist may be), but is concerned mainly with the concrete, and feels deeply interested in all that transpires. Judgment of his actions is judgment affecting himself, and to all phases of feeling touching his self-respect he is keenly alive, and continues so, unless the law of habit break perniciously on the law of moral life, and even then self-respect 'dies hard.' The self-consciousness characteristic of intelligent life proves from its earliest unfolding a *sensitive* consciousness, elevated or depressed by its judgments of itself. This sensitiveness is an inherent characteristic belonging to the type of life, inso-much that any deficiency appearing in this must be regarded as abnormal. Heredity, in this respect, means first a *common* inheritance; and any diversity beyond this, distinguishing individual life, is one of degree—a greater or less measure of sensitiveness. A law of development applies in this as in all other phases of power; but Evolution finds little here towards the completion of its philosophy of human nature. Moral Sentiments do not belong to the class of feelings which can be regarded as contributing towards evolution of intelligence, for they presuppose intelligence, and bear only reflexly on development of existing intellectual power. Yet it is because these forms of feeling are so clearly native to the mind, that they do not wait for full development of intellect, but are raised in consciousness by the most elementary and common uses of intelligence. Moral Sentiments accordingly make up a considerable part of the experience of child-life, though at this early stage human life is sensitive to surrounding influences, and feeling is easily checked in manifestation, or perverted in exercise, by unfavourable social influences.

On the relation of Moral Sentiment to Intellect these are the main facts ; its experience is dependent on the exercise of intelligence in judging as to conduct ; the most ordinary and even elementary exercise of intellect suffices for this ; while the highest developments of intellectual power concern so much the wider range of intellectual problems, literary, scientific, and philosophic, that these problems may readily engross so much of the life-interest as to turn it seriously from the essential questions of the common moral life, so operating to the suppression of Moral Sentiment.

In all its phases Moral Sentiment is the expression of a law of elevation or depression of feeling, of attraction, or repulsion, in accordance with personal application of moral law as a test of activity. That which first more immediately concerns self, naturally comes to apply also to the judgments formed of the conduct of others, for the moral agent who judges himself also judges his fellows, and Moral Sentiment rises in correlative forms suitable to this wider range of the criticism of conduct. It is the same fountain of feeling which is stirred by these decisions ; even though the keenness of personal interest may be diminished, the sentiments of approbation and of disapprobation rise in force. Thus there is a moral admiration and esteem for the man of upright and noble character ; and just as naturally, a sense of disapproval and aversion attends the condemnation of wrongdoing by others. So much akin are the Moral Sentiments of the social life to those of the individual that the former also involve a sense of personal elevation or depression, even though they concern actions of others, for which the observer has no responsibility.

3. The essentially important feature in the history of Moral Sentiment is the fixed relation between thought and sentiment. In this lies the key to numerous perplexing phenomena connected with the history of Moral Sentiment. Susceptibility is native to the mind, but the rise and fall of sentiment depends

constantly on the thought-exercise which is governing consciousness. As a man thinks, so he feels. This is the unvarying law. Hence it follows that *responsibility* for Sentiment springs out of responsibility for Thought. A fixed basis is given in moral law, but application of this law devolves on each moral agent, for he is constituted the critic of himself and of others. There is, therefore, no escape from this responsibility. In view of these conditions, it becomes manifest how it happens that singularly diverse results are gathered in the history of Sentiment connected with the varying conditions, physical, social, political, and religious, through the midst of which individual life runs its course. How greatly does thought vary in its application of the same law! When the influence of these manifold external conditions is included, a vastly complicated problem arises, requiring minute analytic exercise for discrimination of the contents of human experience as it appears in different countries, and under different social conditions in the same land. In the endlessly varied external relations of life, *associations* count as forces in personal history, controlling, or being controlled, according to the measure of a man's independence.

In order to reach a philosophy of what is here spreading out before our view in most perplexing detail, it is needful to keep constantly within reach the internal conditions which are common, and therefore fundamental. 1. As Thought operates in the application of moral law for criticism of Self or of other moral agents, so does Moral Sentiment flow in upon consciousness. 2. In connection with the conflicting results attained when the moral agent thus performs the part of critic and judge of conduct, sentiment rises in antagonistic phases of attraction or repulsion, elevation or depression, involving all the characteristics of Impulse and of Restraint. The hidden stores of Sentiment play their part in such manner that most varied results appear, largely influencing our experience. There is first, broadly described, the *stimulating* power of self-

esteem, and of that wider application of moral esteem which interpenetrates social life in all its aspects as a recognised force in human history. 'A generous and noble character affords a satisfaction even in the survey; and when presented to us, though only in a poem or fable, never fails to charm and delight us' (Hume, *Essays*, ii. 195; *Dissert. on the Passions*, § 2). On the other hand, the *restraining* power of the sense of Shame is incalculable, playing its part largely beyond range of observation, while the manifestation all through society of the disrespect cherished towards a man admittedly deserving of a large measure of moral blame is recognised, popularly as well as philosophically, as one of the strongest deterrent forces against wrong-doing.

4. The prominence of Moral Sentiment in practical life is such, and experience of it runs so deeply in the current of moral consciousness, that the tendency of the popular mind is to give precedence to the *judicial function* of ethical thought. To criticise one's-self, or to be criticised by others, seems amongst the most serious things in life. It is not at all so generally considered what are the ultimate tests of such criticism.

If attention be restricted here, for purposes of illustration, to criticism of one's-self, with attendant experience of self-esteem or self-reproach, it will sufficiently appear how there is a common tendency to attribute the whole of this experience to Conscience, even to the extent of shutting out from view the ultimate warrant on which the whole procedure rests. Experience of powerful Moral Sentiment, cheering or punishing the agent, is, in the popular view, the very 'voice of Conscience' itself. Accordingly we find in literature, and specially in dramatic literature, consecrated to the task of depicting the strongest emotions and passions, under this guise, the most telling representations of Conscience as a power in human life and history. Shakespeare stands pre-eminent for vivid representations of the enormous power of the Moral Sentiments when roused in a soul quivering under sense of grievous wrong-

doing. Conscience is thus described in *Richard III.* Act i. Scene iv., in the conversation between the two murderers of the Duke of Clarence :—

1 *Murd.* Where's thy conscience now?

2 *Murd.* Oh, in the duke of Gloster's purse.

1 *Murd.* When he opens his purse to give us our reward, thy conscience flies out.

2 *Murd.* 'Tis no matter ; let it go ; there's few, or none, will entertain it.

1 *Murd.* What if it come to thee again?

2 *Murd.* I'll not meddle with it, it makes a man a coward ; a man cannot steal but it accuseth him ; a man cannot swear but it checks him ; a man cannot lie with his neighbour's wife but it detects him : 'tis a blushing shamefaced spirit that mutinies in a man's bosom ; it fills one full of obstacles.

5. The natural and prevailing tendency of the popular mind is to fasten upon this feature distinctive of ethical thought, namely, its judicial function, and this leads inevitably to a common reference to Moral Sentiments, as if these expressed immediate dictates of Conscience. The consequences of this tendency need to be carefully estimated, if Philosophy is to reach any successful demonstration of its harmony with familiar types of everyday life. If examined closely, it will be found that the strange blending of apparently inconsistent lines of thought accepted by the popular mind has its source here. We are touching the root from which the growth and ramifications spring. Moral Thought differs from other thought in this, that it is characterised by a judicial function, in so far as it is concerned with agents. Ethical thought passes judgment on conduct and character. Every one marks this difference, and habitually makes account of it. In the ordinary course of thought, apart from philosophic research, it is mainly, almost exclusively, the *practical bearings* of this continual criticism of one's-self and of others that are noticed. The practical side of things is always in view ; the speculative

side is, for the most part, out of view. Under ordinary conditions moral agents do not trouble themselves with the rational implications of their thought, but with its significance as to practice. If this be true under the best forms of civilisation, what are we to expect from members of a savage tribe! The habit of the popular mind is moulded for *action*. Hence follow these two things,—popular thought cannot directly offer aid to philosophy; philosophic thought must be regarded as aside from everyday usage and work. The two do not meet together, and cannot be made to blend. If there is to be a philosophy of common practice, it must be found by deliberate observation of ordinary practice and consequent individual experience. Like Cowper, though without feeling as he did, the philosopher must look from ‘the loop-holes of retreat’ upon the busy haunts of men, where Thought and Sentiment are playing their part under all their usual conditions. Then it will appear how truly a strong sentiment, such as Self-approbation, seems for the moment to express all that moral life can mean. Or, on the other hand, how a distracting and agitating sentiment, such as Self-reproach or Shame, makes a man feel as if the whole forces of the moral universe were turned against him. So it has been, and so it will continue to be. Nature is too strong for Philosophy. Whatever may be done to secure that philosophic thought shall, in a slow but penetrating way, find a lodgment in intimate relation with public opinion, so as in some degree to sway it, the force of Sentiment will always appear to be the ruling force, and will be present in consciousness as one of its most conspicuous and most familiar elements.

If, then, the popular mind take Moral Sentiment as ‘the voice of Conscience’ we cannot marvel. This is the imperfect induction belonging to an intelligent life, which in the main is occupied with questions of practice. What the man feels in himself, or owns as a commonly cherished feeling around him, must seem to him as the voice of Conscience. Philo-

sophically it is quite impossible to grant this; but popularly it continues the accredited view, and the practical workaday life goes on so steadily in acknowledgment of it, that it seems well, upon the whole, that things are as they are, for comparatively few feel themselves wronged by it, and still fewer feel any tendency towards a pessimistic theory of moral life. Yet it is chiefly out of this position of affairs, admitted to be almost inevitable, that there spring up in the path of the philosophic thinker the difficulties coming from diversities of opinion in morals; conflicting codes on the two sides of the same mountain, strange inconsistencies of savage life, and more important allusions to a recognised precariousness in the manner in which educated men make their applications of moral law.

Only by marking carefully the conditions of ordinary thought, specially as it wears a judicial aspect, shall we find a clue to the labyrinth of entanglements involved in the varieties of Moral Sentiment. As Sentiment is the natural accompaniment of our thought when we condemn ourselves or others for acting wrongly, or approve ourselves or others for fulfilment of duty, Sentiment must, even if in a rather rough way intellectually considered, yet in a most efficient way in common experience, be an *index* to us of the wrong and the right. If it be as a voice within us, then it will be as 'the voice of Conscience.' On the other hand, as our thought on moral distinctions (which we have named *judicial thought*, as bearing on moral agents) provides for the rise of Sentiment, whatever phase it assume, it will follow that the test of thought is also the test of Sentiment. Wherever thought is faulty, Sentiment must be astray, and the only deliverance from serious consequences must lie in the criticism of our own thought, which must have its test in moral law, the knowledge of which is more or less easily accessible, and at immediate command. 'More or less easily accessible,' we say, designedly and unhesitatingly, in full view of the intuitional basis on which

our theory of the knowledge of moral law rests, inasmuch as questions of present duty, and judgments of conduct and character, belong exclusively to the region of individual thought, which will vary with individuals, and for which each intelligent observer must have his own responsibilities. It belongs to the crudest conceptions of an intuitional philosophy to suggest that discursive thought is intuitional; that intuitions are responsible for the bewildering fallacies of a man's reasonings; that if moral law is intuitively known it is impossible that men should differ in their applications of the law thus known, or in their verdict on conduct and character where there is a large admixture of motive. Intuitionalism must indeed be 'the easy philosophy,' in the worst sense, if this be what it implies.

Granting that there can be no magical charm delivering ethical thought from admixture of error, let us shift the standpoint, inquiring by what means the man involved in confusion or inconsistency of thought can clear his way towards a greater measure of certainty. He must take charge of his own thought for its rectification,—a possibility which bears witness for Intuitionalism; he who would be assured that his own thought truly fulfils a judicial function must criticise his own criticism. He must pass *behind his Sentiment* to deal with his thought itself, which has been instrumental in awakening the feeling experienced; and he must deliberately test the *maxim* on which he proceeded in his estimate of duty or of character. Now this is not a simple and casual affair. It will be found easier or more difficult according to the comparative intellectual development of the individual, and according to the number and mass of the associations and habits lying between him and a simple representation of his maxim of conduct. Unless we mean to make nothing of associations and habits; unless we suppose that these are only as outward garments which can be taken off and laid aside as the wrestler prepares for the trial of strength, we must admit that the moral agent becomes

greatly entangled in the meshes of intellectual habits, and must be greatly swayed by the sentiments familiar to him, and accredited by the people around. Savage and civilised equally supply their quota of evidence here. Nothing is presented either in favour of an Intuitional Theory or against it, when it is said that the highly-educated and civilised man can readily detect and rectify the errors of his moral judgments and the consequent inconsistencies of his own sentiments, whereas it must be much more difficult for the savage to clear himself from the trammels of superstition, so as to think, feel, and act in advance of the common practice around him. The one is more of a trained thinker than the other. This makes a wide difference. The educated man thinks to more purpose,—and not by the light of Sentiment, though always under the probability that Moral Sentiment may at any moment undergo change, at the dictate of intelligence.

6. The dominion of Moral Sentiment largely accounts for diversities of moral judgments, for by reference to Moral Sentiments we discover the shelter found for following traditional rule. We see how thought is accepted without personal test, being supported by the living sentiment of the community. This is the natural history of much of the thought travelling through the world under the assumed authority of Conscience.

Moral Sentiments are constantly recurring in consciousness, and as uniformly they are acting as forces at once in individual and in social life. They wield a mighty power in support of habitual practice. Springing from thought, they react upon thought, giving both by force of impulse and power of restraint encouragement to the ethical thought which happens to be common. There thus springs up within every man's experience an assumed *dominion* of Sentiment. This dominion is in turn sustained by the whole order of social customs and accredited rules of practice, which become traditionally fixed, having been modified by national characteristics. In this way Ethical Thought assumes national types readily distinguishable.

The individual is borne along on the surface of national sentiment, as a swimmer on the tidal wave.

If, with the recognition of this, we are still willing to make traditional thought and sentiment a test of moral distinctions, we immediately involve ourselves in serious perplexities. It is greatly easier and more rational to challenge the dominion of Sentiment, and fall back for test of the opinion on which it rests. If we are to accept popular phraseology and common sentiments of approval or disapproval as if in these 'the voice of Conscience' were heard, we are admitting that Conscience must have many voices as it sounds over the world, issuing its commands, and distributing praise or blame. The reality of the voices none can dispute. Their diversity of utterance we must allow; and forthwith the dilemma is upon us, supposed to be overwhelming for the Intuitionalist. But that must be a crude Intuitionism which is assailed with any advantage from a position so badly chosen. There is no Intuitionism worthy of the name which will suggest that accuracy and consequent uniformity of thought is a consequence of immediate knowledge of moral law. The chief difficulty here is for the experientialist, who is led to demonstrate how unreliable are the results of ordinary thought and feeling, and how little Moral Sentiment can be accepted as a test of moral judgments.

In reality, moral progress is achieved only by independence of thought; by conflict with false sentiment; by leadership of those who are ready to brave social consequences, moving in the van as liberators of their country. Independence of thought in the field of morals must mean conflict, not only with Tradition, and all its external supports, but with Sentiment, which has previously held sway in personal and social history.

The dominion which Sentiment has arrogated can be accounted for only by interpretation of the method by which ascendancy is gained, and this must expose the fact that it is a

pretender who holds the throne. Widely and readily as the dominion is recognised, its ascendancy is by allowing *thought* to fall into the shade as the main constructive element in consciousness, and with this, allowing the *tests* of the validity of thought to recede from attention, until the rational basis of life is regarded as a thing too far below the surface to admit of deliberate investigation. If the utterly unreasonable and unphilosophical character of this course be allowed, diversity of opinion on morals, and consequent diversity of Sentiment, become witnesses that an uncritical and unverified thought is not infrequently allowed to guide human conduct.

How far diversity of opinion on moral distinctions has extended is a question the mere raising of which will throw strong light on the whole subject, showing how truly Sentiment must occupy a relative and quite subordinate place in any scheme of moral philosophy. The current of consciousness is in the main rational; the necessities of a self-regulated existence are constantly bringing moral law into application; and such law is recognised among men so clearly to determine the great lines of practice, that justice, kindness, and fidelity are among the eternal verities—the unwritten laws—which it is the wisdom of man to acknowledge, and which the utmost diversity of opinion, feeling, and practice cannot induce a moral agent to doubt or discredit.

PROBLEMS.—(1) In Adam Smith's theory of Moral Sentiments, what is the value of his reference to a disinterested spectator in attempting to secure a test of sympathy? (2) Explain how one man can boast of an act which another man regards with shame. (3) In what combinations of experience may Shame instigate to action subversive of its own natural end?

PART V.

MORAL EVIL AND DISORDER OF MORAL NATURE.

1. EVEN at the very outset of our inquiry it was found needful to distinguish that which *is* from that which *ought to be*. This proved to be a necessity, because the ideal of life is never seen to be realised among us. Attention was then engaged with the significance of this contrast as implying a specialty in the structure of thought; now it must be occupied with this contrast as it is found in the practical life. The evil on which observation is now turned does not appear merely in a limited number of defective or enfeebled lives, as the diseased are among the healthy, whatever the grade of organism. 'Moral Evil' appears in all human life, though in endlessly varied forms, sometimes descending to deeds of so dark a type that they cannot be contemplated without intense revulsion of feeling on the part of most men.

Whatever we may regard as the true philosophy of the facts, there can be no denial of their serious character practically, and no disputing of the perplexing nature of the problem they raise, over against the ideal of life depicted by the representations of moral law. The contrast is extreme, and is of the most disturbing kind intellectually, apart from the conflict of emotion which may be awakened by its contemplation. Unless an observer allow himself to be influenced by the competing claims of rival theories, the presence of moral evil in life must

appear so constant and glaring as to render it impossible that any one should deny the grave nature of the perplexity for Philosophy which its presence implies. History is burdened with testimony to the prevalence of Moral Evil; Poetry has lent vividness of colouring to the dark background of evil passion, and to affecting scenes of unequal conflict with it; while Philosophy, whenever she has passed from the Speculative to the Practical, has lifted her voice to sound a warning against the proneness to evil which is part of the sad heritage of the race.

2. Philosophy has a very special and unusual task at this point. Warning of the dangers and conflicts of life, however natural in the circumstances, is not the proper task of philosophy. The cool, deliberate work of investigation must be pressed forward; analysis and synthesis must do their part as hitherto.

In view of the special difficulties to be encountered here, it seems needful to present, at least in brief outline, acknowledgment of the facts as supplied in philosophic literature.

At the outset, the witness of Socrates appears adverse to the admission of any actual disorder in the nature. But when examined more closely, the testimony is not what it may appear on a first reading. The Socratic doctrine, 'Knowledge is Virtue,' leads on to the position that no man is knowingly vicious,—*κακὸς ἐκὼν οὐδεὶς*,—which in the mouth of the great thinker proves equivalent to this, that every man so seeks his own good, that he really *cannot* desire evil. But in this case 'evil' means suffering, 'good' means pleasure; though it be true that every man shuns suffering, it is not thereby shown that every man seeks righteousness; even when we have accepted the Socratic contention, the perplexity remains, there is 'evil' in life, and great abundance of it; men seek their own happiness in blundering ways, which lead to heavy penalties; and they sacrifice the good of others for their own pleasure. Even if we admit, as Socrates pleads we must, that

men grievously need a 'measuring art' for determining the choice of pleasures, there is much more needed if we are to give weight to his plea that justice cannot injure another. Injury is sadly common, and there is abundance of vice in the world, notwithstanding the constant search for happiness,—in some measure even in consequence of this. Subsequent thinking brought out more vividly the presence of moral disorder, insomuch that Plato becomes emphatic in his testimony. Plato says, 'Virtue is the health and beauty and well-being of the soul, and vice is the disease and weakness and deformity of the soul' (*Repub.* iv. 444, Jowett's transl.). Distinguishing the parts of our nature as rational, concupiscent, and irascible, he says, 'Must not injustice be a kind of quarrel between these three—a meddlesomeness, and interference, and rising up of a part of the soul against the whole soul, an assertion of unlawful authority, which is made by a rebellious subject against a true prince, of whom he is the natural vassal—that is the sort of thing; the confusion and error of these parts or elements is injustice and intemperance, and cowardice and ignorance, and in general all vice?' (*Repub.* iv. 444, Jowett). Aristotle says, 'We are more naturally disposed' towards pleasures, and are 'more easily carried away to excess, than to propriety of conduct' (*N. Ethics*, II. 8. 8). Again, 'irrational passions—τὰ ἄλογα πάθη—belong to man' (*N. Ethics*, III. I. 27).

The testimony from modern philosophy is equally explicit. Des Cartes says, 'With respect to seemingly natural impulses, I have observed, when the question related to the choice of right or wrong in action, that they frequently led me to take the worst part' (*Medit.* III., Prof. Veitch's transl. p. 39). Hume's testimony is that 'we naturally desire what is forbid, and often take a pleasure in performing actions merely because they are unlawful. The notion of duty, when opposite to the passions, is not always able to overcome them; and when it fails of that effect, is apt rather to increase and irritate them,

by producing an opposition in our motives and principles' (*Dissert. on the Passions*, sec. vi., *Essays*, II. 218; Green's edition, vol. II. 164). Adam Smith's whole theory bears testimony as to moral disorder, being an acknowledgment of continual need for going out of self, in search of a disinterested spectator, in order to avoid bias. Mackintosh, in remarking that 'many passions prevail over' the Moral Sentiments, says, 'The prevalence itself . . . is perceived to be a disorder, when seen in another man, and felt to be so by the mind disordered, when the disorder subsides' (*Dissert.* sec. vi., Remarks on Butler, Whewell's ed. p. 153). Comte says, 'We must regret that even in the best natures, the social affections are so overborne by the personal, as rarely to command conduct in a direct way' (*Philos. Positive*, B. VI. c. 5, *Sociology*; Martineau's tr. II. p. 131). In accordance with this statement, Comte proceeds to speak of 'the radical imperfection of the human character' (II. p. 133). Kant was so deeply impressed by the fact of disorder that he describes 'the notion duty' as 'a notion comprehending under it that of a good will, considered, however, as affected by certain inward hindrances' (*Metaph. of Ethics*, I., Semple's transl., 3d ed. p. 7).

Theories of Evolution, Psychological and Dialectic, tend to minimise or modify representations more commonly given. But Psychological Evolution, as developed by Spencer, recognises the need for a measure of social 'compulsion' or 'coerciveness' in bringing about right conduct, and interprets the sense of duty in this way (*Data of Ethics*, p. 126). In their unfolding of Utilitarianism, Mill and Sidgwick represent Punishment as finding its vindication in this, that it supplies motive otherwise wanting. Punishment is vindicated, Mr. Mill says, 'if the expectation of punishment enables a man to help it (that is, to keep from acting wrongly) and is the *only means* by which he can be enabled to keep the law' (*Exam. of Hamilton*, p. 575). If this is the despair of Utilitarianism, it is very strong testimony to the power of evil impulse. So

great is the pressure on Utilitarianism at this point, that Professor Sidgwick also argues that 'punishment and the expression of moral displeasure are required to supply the desiderated motive force' (*Methods of Ethics*, 3d ed. p. 63). The same admission runs through Hegelian and Neo-Kantian reasoning. Hegel finds it needful to distinguish between the universal and the particular in individual will, to grant that the particular will has come into existence without reference to the universal, and that by consequence we see in it the effects of accident and caprice. In this way it is admitted that the individual is capricious, or prone to act in disregard of the rational; and Hegel declares that 'in Duty the individual liberates and elevates himself to substantial freedom' (*Philosophie des Rechts*, sec. 153). In like manner Green speaks of the 'conflict of desires' (p. 144); and of the agent's relation to 'competing passions' (p. 146); of the 'disturbance of the inner life,' and of 'virtuous resolution maintained in spite of some violent passion' (p. 146). He even declares that 'the ground of distinction between the good and the bad will . . . must lie at the root of every system of Ethics' (p. 161); and he concludes that 'it is some *better* reason with which in vicious action a man's will conflicts, while there is an exercise of reason by him which is the very condition of his viciousness' (p. 187). All these philosophers recognise that it is hopeless to deny the frequent prevalence of evil desire in consciousness; the perplexity is to bring this acknowledgment into harmony with theoretic positions.

3. The first requisite for dealing with the perplexing problem of the source of moral evil in the intelligent life is some exactness in discriminating the facts bearing witness to the presence of such evil. The thought of our times has in some ways added force to the perplexity, while it has favoured a disposition to cast doubt on the representation of disorder. Both of these facts need to be appreciated if a true estimate is to be formed of the task which philosophy here undertakes. On the

one hand, we have to consider the bearing of a theory of the evolution of organism, with its scheme of social dynamics applied to man; on the other hand, we must take the ideal representations of the Good Will, and of the work of self-realisation held to be the life-work of man. In these combined we have the most recent and novel aspects of thought which have tended somewhat to modify the conceptions of human life. And we must recognise that the general drift of the current is towards a conclusion adverse to the representation of moral 'disorder,' or actual disturbance of the normal conditions of existence; and still more active is the opposition likely to prove to the word 'depravity,' a word of deeper import, still less acceptable. These phases of popular thought—perhaps we should more properly describe them as phases of popular scientific and philosophic thought—make it needful to go more deliberately into the investigation of the facts which all theories have been constrained to acknowledge.

It is obvious that the two phases of Evolution, Biological and Dialectic, occupy positions considerably apart, and each scheme has its own set of perplexities to encounter. Change of standpoint affects the apparent contour even of a mountain range; and in the case before us the lower theory seems, in some ways, best to catch proportions from base to sky-line. The difference belongs to the fundamental conceptions which have determined the formation of the two schemes of thought. The distinctive history of the two carries ample confirmation of this. The one is the child of Observation, the other of Speculation. The one has been shaped under the influences arising from close contact with the realities of life; the other has been elaborated as the result of speculative study of the logical movements held to be uniform and invariable in existence. The Dialectic scheme has, indeed, constantly and resolutely struggled against the risks of abstract speculativeness, bearing testimony all the while against the abstract as the false. The

need for this self-command has been more manifest than the evidence of its success, for the problem concerning the source of moral evil—the conception of which is alien to both schemes—proves most unmanageable to the Dialectic Evolutionist.

In attempting now the task of deliberate investigation of facts, the lower phase of Evolution, concerning itself mainly with organic life, will be seen to supply an important contribution towards the success of the inquiry by the contrast it presents between lower and higher life. Our problem is, indeed, essentially connected with *human life*. This must be marked, and even emphasised, for it is a matter of chief moment when taken along with a theory of evolution which proposes to include man. To such a theory, the admission of inherent disorder must give perplexity, and specially if the alleged disorder appear in the higher life, and it is a 'disorder'—if we grant its reality—which appears in human nature alone. The single question is that of *moral disorder*, and this can exist only on that elevation where moral life appears. Biological Evolution thus helps much in the appreciation of this philosophic perplexity by presenting its contrast, extended up the whole scale of animate existence, for nowhere else has observation recognised disorder adhering to an entire species. But we have seen that evidence from all sides is overwhelmingly strong in proof of 'moral disorder' in human nature. We thus perceive the singular character of the facts, for which we can find no analogy. All lower life unfolds in strict accordance with the characteristics of its type, passing through a determinate series of stages as it advances towards maturity. Outward conditions may readily enough prove unfavourable; germs of disease may find lodgment in organism, and may there develop, threatening dissolution of the structure. This is a common danger. But the fixed law of organic life is a determinate order of development according to the essential characteristics of the germinal form. This presses into notice the essential difference of moral life. In all lower life, develop-

ment proceeds according to law, without exercise of purpose or intention within ; in moral life it cannot proceed thus ; it is impossible apart from purposed action, under intelligent appreciation of law and end. Disorder will inevitably appear here if there be lack of purpose ; and this is the recognised fact. Disorder of this nature could not exist anywhere else in the world than in human life.

This leads to a momentous step, which must determine the whole line of subsequent thought ; the key to moral disorder is not to be found in the physical nature, and can in no way be accounted for under physiological law. This is the reversal of a whole mass of philosophic reasoning, for it was a common thing in ancient times, and it is not uncommon still, to seek the explanation even of Moral Evil in matter. The modern materialist continues to take these antiquated lines. But he is pressed as the ancient thinker did not find himself hemmed in. The success of the modern scheme of Evolution of life is the death of a theory of the evolution of 'disorder.' Every scientific thinker feels the inner force of this, though there is manifest need for the lesson being written out in large letters on the pages of scientific literature. If there is disorder in human life, it cannot be the product of the laws of Evolution as applying to lower orders of organism. These laws imply the contrary. If it be suggested that 'imperfection' clings necessarily to the history of Evolution, this is true, and is, indeed, essential to the conception of Evolution ; but 'imperfection' in this case is altogether different from the 'disorder' we are discussing. The theory of Evolution affirms the difference in the most explicit terms, and presses it upon our notice, for while 'imperfection' cleaves to every stage in the progress of life, the 'disorder' of which we are speaking cannot appear anywhere lower than in the history of intelligent life, and is at variance with the whole analogies of lower life.

This carries us on to a further distinction bearing exclusively on human nature, when we mark the contrast between

physiological law and moral, as both are seen to apply in the history of a single human life. The analogies of normal development hold in the case of the physical, while they fail in the case of the moral. We find in human organism no breach in the harmony of life under the laws applicable to lower orders. Continuity in the line of observation is so clear that we are constrained to admit that the evidence of moral disorder does not appear under the action of physiological laws. If evidence of 'disorder' does appear in certain phases of the *physical life*, this is only a consequence of the unity of human life, including the physical and spiritual; it does not suggest that moral evil has in any sense a physical origin. This will be recognised if we take the most obtrusive aspects of 'moral disorder' manifested in outward and social relations. This brings into prominence Sensuality, one of the dread scourges of our race, from which alone come multitudes of physical and moral evils—sufferings, cruelties, and wrongs. This vice can find no adequate explanation by reference to organism. The evil does not devastate inferior organism, because physical functions do not account for its existence. Sensuality is a consequence of the intelligent life being dragged down and wilfully lowered, as if the satisfaction of life itself could be found in the gratification of appetite. Hence 'lust' is the name which marks our sense of the dire degradation of human life often connected with the function of propagation of the species. The full import of this dark and destructive phase of vice is not discovered if we content ourselves with saying that intelligence has become the *servant* of appetite. This is but a beginning of the evil, for under its sway intelligence itself becomes depressed and weakened, and the most sacred claims of social life are treated contemptuously. These results do not occur under physiological law; they cannot be accounted for by reference to characteristics of physical existence. The function of propagation is not connected with Moral Evil; its natural and rational exercise in maturity of life

opens out to wider appreciation of the social obligations, in recognition of which are found additional aids to moral advance. But unnatural desires are connected with evil imaginings, and base intrigue, and wilful disregard of the clearest moral obligations; in giving place to all this evil within the spirit, the body itself *becomes* tainted, and the whole life being thus corrupted, innumerable forms of baseness appear. Such results are impossible to a merely physical life, and by consequence Sensuality is classified as a type of *moral* evil. The dread consequences become apparent beyond individual life, for under the law of heredity a tainted organism is transmitted, and a physical condition is originated which becomes the abettor of moral evil, stimulated largely by the social environment in which such young life gathers its experience.

A somewhat analogous test of the contrast between the physical and the moral in this connection is seen in the vice of Drunkenness, and in all similar self-induced physical desires stimulated by use of various narcotics. The illustration here is even more striking in this respect, that there is not any natural physical appetite to afford a basis for origin of evil indulgence. It is in the general excitability of the nerve system that a physical basis is found; and the superinduced craving, which ultimately may become a dominant physical state of excitation, depends for its origin on a conception of self-gratification, by its fulfilment developing a physical craving which in multitudes of cases so completely conquers the life that truthfulness, tenderness of feeling, and social interests and obligations are wilfully sacrificed—the nature is wrecked. These results cannot be accounted for as effects flowing from direct action of physiological law. The intelligent nature is the source, and in that we must trace the moral causes which make such violation of rational law a possible occurrence in human history. Drunkenness implies a disordered state of the Will; inducement to it springs from self-induced abnormal condition of the body. The bitter results familiar to those

among whom drunkenness is a prevailing vice, do not come exclusively from the essential characteristics of 'moral disorder' common to the race, but, springing from that disorder, they are induced by a special wilful indulgence, in the face of rational law, leading to transmission of a tainted organism.

Viewing these two examples of vice, familiarly known as outstanding illustrations of 'moral evil,' it becomes obvious in how large a sense 'moral evil,' properly so-called, is separated from the normal action of physiological law. The natural cravings of the physical organism tend to the healthy development of that organism; the unnatural cravings found in some examples of human life obstruct development, and tend to deterioration and dissolution. This is the conclusion to which we are led under observation of the history of Sensuality and Drunkenness. The theory of Biological Evolution gives great additional vividness and force to this conclusion. Illustrations may be taken from the pages of Herbert Spencer at a point where the author is contemplating the laws of Evolution as bearing on the development of lower types of organism. His statements here will command universal assent. Dealing with the 'biological view' of existence, he says: 'In two ways it is demonstrable that there exists a primordial connection between pleasure-giving acts and continuance or increase of life, and, by implication, between pain-giving acts and decrease or loss of life. On the one hand, setting out with the lowest living things, we see that the beneficial act, and the act which there is a tendency to perform, are originally two sides of the same; and cannot be disconnected without fatal results. On the other hand, if we contemplate developed creatures as now existing, we see that each individual and species is from day to day kept alive by pursuit of the agreeable, and avoidance of the disagreeable. Thus approaching the facts from a different side, analysis brings us down to another face of that *ultimate truth* disclosed by analysis in a preceding chapter. We found it was no more possible to frame ethical conceptions from

which the consciousness of pleasure, of some kind, at some time, to some being, is absent, than it is possible to frame the conception of an object from which the consciousness of space is absent. And now we see that this necessity of thought originates in the very nature of sentient existence. Sentient existence can evolve only on condition that pleasure-giving acts are life-sustaining acts' (*Data of Ethics*, pp. 82, 83). Beyond question Spencer here expresses the general law of Evolution. It is characteristic of the progress of life that pleasure-giving acts are life-sustaining acts; and this holds uniformly until we reach man, when a serious disturbance in biological order is discovered. In human life there are pleasure-giving acts which are life-enfeebling acts. Such acts are not explained under the natural action of a healthy organism. They are the indications of physical deterioration and damage inflicted on human organism in consequence of 'disorder' of the higher nature which should have controlled physical life, and should have aided it in the performance of 'life-sustaining acts'; whereas it has deliberately fastened upon the organism a tendency to 'life-destroying acts,' placing individuals visibly out of the line of biological evolution. This is testimony from Biological Evolution to the reality of 'moral disorder.'

4. Investigation now carries us into the conscious life, to the seat of 'moral disorder,' that we may ascertain its nature. And here, quite apart from all physical inducements and manifestations, it appears as irrational impulse within the rational life itself. Of this disorder we have already had occasion to speak (p. 73), when reference was made to impulses antagonistic to the teaching of Conscience. We are returning upon these impulses now for elucidation of the facts recognised as affording evidence of a common moral disorder. Pride, selfishness, jealousy, and envy were given as examples; and they are now brought again to view as presenting the class of facts affording the broadest illustration of 'moral disorder,' and carrying with them strange entanglements of indi-

vidual and social life leading to confusion, and even reversal, of normal aspects of the agreeable and disagreeable.

In surveying these forms of feeling definite characteristics become manifest. These feelings are strong *impulsive tendencies*, all of them leading quickly, and with considerable measure of excitement, into lines of action which they favour. Further, the laws regulating their rise and influence are such that *the whole conscious life must become affected* by them while they play any part as internal forces. The current of consciousness, including thought, imagination, expectation, and desire, must all be sensibly affected by their presence. And finally, most important of all, as throwing light on what is really involved in 'moral disorder,' all these impulsive forces are *dependent on conceptions* for their rise. They cannot belong to any life unless conceptions of self-gratification are formed which could not find place without intellectual exercise, concerning itself with personal direction and personal interests. Here we are completely severed from the lower biological view. From the standpoint now occupied it appears how impossible it is that 'disorder' of the type here under consideration could have any place in the history of a life undistinguished by intelligence. The body could not be the source of such evil.

To account for the disorder recognised must be a perplexity; it may even prove to be beyond the province of philosophy to attempt the task; but it is at least possible to indicate the situation of the conscious life, as it is liable to the inroads of impulsive force, in its very nature morally wrong. We can observe how such a life is situated in relation to ethical law, to laws of habit, and to power of Will. The presence of evil impulses must imply much that is disturbing, but it can involve nothing that is effectually obstructive to the action of intelligence, for experience of evil impulse implies activity of intelligence, and cannot prevent the action of the better nature of man, for passion, however evil and strong, is short-lived,

leaving behind it reflective exercise, aided by moral sentiments. Nevertheless, we must recognise that the whole nature lies open to the action of the laws of habit ; while, at the same time, Will-power can find its range for exercise amongst the whole materials which consciousness includes. The helps of Intelligence and Will are at command, while both the helps and the hindrances of the law of habit are as hidden elements mingled in the stream of consciousness.

What, then, can be attempted as a representation of the condition of the moral nature described as a state of disorder? Contemplating the evil impulses appearing in consciousness, the deficiencies over against them become apparent. It is not implied by their action in consciousness that there is a lack of knowledge, that Conscience has disappeared, or ceased to fulfil its function as the guide of moral life. On the contrary, the evil character of the dispositions is sufficiently known, for there is not any one who doubts that pride and selfishness, and jealousy and envy are wrong, to however great an extent place is allowed for them in the life. But we come nearer the understanding of this disorder if we consider the wide popular usage assigned to Conscience, and the inadequacy commonly attributed to it, as in the famous sentence of Butler, 'had it strength as it has right ; had it power as it has manifest authority, it would absolutely govern the world' (*Sermons on Human Nature*, Sermon ii. div. 3). It is the want of controlling power which is thus recognised ; and by this is not meant sheer want of Will, any more than of Knowledge ; there is ample proof of the presence of both ; but there is want of high motives. When we press the inquiry as to what this implies, in full view of intuitive recognition of Moral Law which we have attributed to the soul, the character of the deficiency in our moral nature becomes obvious. It is deficiency in reverence for moral law itself—deficiency in a true benevolence of nature—and deficiency in reverence and self-consecration to the Moral Governor. These, which are pro-

perly the ruling motive forces of the moral nature, are low in strength. They are not wanting by any means—they could not be ; but they are not in the ascendant as they need to be in order to harmonise with Conscience. It is in strict accordance with these representations of moral deficiency that the Utilitarianism of to-day urges regard to others—a care for their good as for our own—viewing this as the great want of human life, and the great want of our times. Still more adequately does the Hegelian and Neo-Kantian thought of the day appreciate the grand deficiency, by urging self-realisation as that which stands before every human being in the line of true progress. Kant has done still better in insisting that reverence for Moral Law is the key-note for fulfilment of the demands of a rational existence. In advance of all these, and including them all, is the view that love to God as the fountain of being, and expressly of all righteousness, must be the supreme motive force in a spiritual life, the grand moral dynamic, as Principal Shairp has named it (*Studies in Poetry and Philosophy*, p. 348). In these things the practical power of the Christian religion appears, as it points to the great wants of humanity, and makes love to God and love to man the ruling forces in life, in the ascendancy of which is the fulfilment of Moral Law, and the source of unceasing well-doing.

5. The integrity of our moral nature is visible even through all the confusion which moral disorder occasions. As the language of philosophy has testified from the first, the higher nature is visible over against the lower. There can be no uncertainty as to which is higher, which lower ; no difficulty in making out the normal constitution of the moral nature. The law of our life is clear, and the violation of that law is distinctly recognised as such within consciousness. Intelligence, as the central characteristic of the life, bears with it as part of its own content the rational law of activity. The self-evident defies all forms of wrong-doing to obscure its nature ; the ‘common-sense’ of the human race is more than a match for the

sophistries which shelter the wrong-doer, tempting him to essay the impossible by misrepresenting the claims of Justice. Men may do wrong with temporary semblance of impunity; but men cannot be wronged without outcry. Whenever thought works, the depth of moral sentiment is stirred; hence all human nature bears witness to the disturbance of individual and social life coming from pride and selfishness, jealousy and envy. Thus it is apparent to every member of the race as he reflects, as he essays the work of self-government, as he tests results, that moral conflict is the pathway to victory—a victory over self, which is a victory for self and for others—a victory in fighting for which the soul is sustained by the fear and the love of God.

6. How moral disorder originated in human nature is a problem which philosophy is incompetent to solve. To distinguish between the normal and the abnormal is possible by analysis of the facts of consciousness. But the problem of the origin of abnormal experience and action is an historical, not a psychological one. Philosophy can only bring out and set in array the facts which prove disturbance of the rational balance of the nature. How the disturbance has originated, and how it is to be rectified, are questions equally beyond the reach of Ethical Philosophy.

PROBLEMS.—(1) How far does the disorder of the moral nature contribute to the explanation of the diversity of moral decisions? (2) Could an exercise of natural disposition be abnormal without being by consequence immoral? (3) Are there any conditions under which an evil influence may be said to become ungovernable? (4) Are there any latent mental forces morally evil in character, which are so related to the controlling power in mind, as to give them inevitable ascendancy when they arise in consciousness. (5) Can moral disorder be legitimately described as 'a bias which attaches uncertainty and inconclusiveness to all human inquiries and decisions concerning them'? (Wardlaw's *Christian Ethics*, p. 38).

METAPHYSIC OF ETHICS.

CHAPTER I.

METAPHYSICAL PROCEDURE.

1. THE Metaphysic of human thought reaches its highest levels in Ethics. A metaphysical element blends in all exercise of our intelligence. There is, indeed, a popular belief, fostered by the tendencies of scientific thought, that metaphysic is a purely speculative product, apart from the functions of ordinary life. But this is a delusion. Observation of external forms and relations obstructs observation of the contents of our own consciousness. But for this, it would appear that all thought bears within it some admixture of the metaphysical,—some recognition of truth transcending experience. For it is an irrational contention that we should believe only what our senses reveal; and no less surely will it be found impossible to restrict the acceptance of truth to that which is included in facts of consciousness, for consciousness itself bears witness to the transcendent, as it does to the external. The more deeply we study the procedure of our own intelligent life, the more clearly will it appear that all experience has its meaning determined by reference to transcendent truth, and is held together in the unity of intelligent life only by recognition of what is either beyond or above experience.

This Kant has strikingly shown in the place he has assigned to these three ideas of the reason, Self, God,

and the Universe,—ideas which transcend experience, yet are essential to thought. That they are merely regulative to thought, as Kant says, cannot be maintained, as even Kant himself has to admit to be true of the idea of God when the demands of ethical life are contemplated. This position is powerfully sustained by the facts connected with the religious consciousness of man, now presented for study in surprising fulness of detail as the basis for a philosophy of religions. If elements quite clearly transcending the range of experience mingle undesignedly, because necessarily, in our thought, the separate study of these elements becomes a distinct part of Philosophy.

These introductory references may suffice to show that there are two senses, a lower and a higher, in which we use the word Metaphysic. The one is concerned with the exercise of thought itself, the metaphysical in thought; the other with the objects of such thought, transcendent existence. There is the metaphysical, which is a thought-characteristic, whose presence is detected by the analytic process employed in Psychology—that is, by the critical method which discriminates experience from its conditions. And there is Metaphysic regarded as a theory of transcendent existence, involving a scheme of Being without which Psychology is an incomplete philosophy. In viewing this relation of the metaphysical in thought, and a metaphysical scheme of transcendent existence, we find that each is the complement of the other; Philosophy is complete only in their union. For it is here that intelligence, with rational warrant, transcends itself, and, with widest range of reference, connects itself in duly formed thought with transcendent Being, recognising its own place in the Universe, and its relation to the Absolute. It is indeed possible to interpose an initial difficulty here, which may readily be supported by large use of logical formulæ, on the plea that the relative in thought can be concerned only with the relative in existence (Hamilton's *Conditioned*;

and Mansel's *Limits of Religious Thought*). But, at this early stage of the discussion, 'the religious consciousness' of man is a sufficient rejoinder. It can neither be explained by the relative, nor parted from relations.

We are here emerging on the wide field of speculative thought concerning the Universe as a whole, attempting the unification of our knowledge; seeking to make our conceptions of things more truly in accordance with the reality of existence; seeking to account for the Universe as a whole. Progress in this direction is so necessary to intelligence that it is hopeless to stay procedure here, as it is illogical to suggest it. There can be no adequate reason for refusing to search into the ultimate conditions of our thought, or into the fixed relations of existence. Recent researches have strikingly shown the necessity for this, if we are to profess anything wearing the form of a completed philosophy of life and being. The whole department of the Philosophy of Religion, including all that belongs to a science of Comparative Religions, has grown up before our view as a testimony to the need for a Metaphysic of Ethics, bearing witness as it does to the uniform tendency of intelligence, even in its immature development, towards an exercise of religious thought. We must therefore endeavour to solve the problem how the metaphysical finds its place in thought; and must essay the more difficult task of a completed philosophy by the addition of a theory of existence as a whole.

In recognising the pre-eminence of moral life, and working out a philosophy of it, we reach an elevated standpoint, whence we have a clearer and more comprehensive view of existence. In looking towards all that lies beneath this level, we see the relations of things; in looking towards that which transcends it, we see the dependence of Nature as a whole. These two views, downwards and upwards, suggest the whole range of questions bearing on the different aspects of the world's government. We see man, a spiritual being subject

to moral law, as he stands related to existence beneath and above,—as he is a part of the fixed order of things, and as he attempts to form for himself a scheme of existence.

At the preliminary stages of our reflection here the Universe itself becomes the problem,—the Universe as a system of existence physical, intellectual, and moral,—the Universe as it is a complete thing, circumscribed and dependent, suggesting the higher problem as to the First Cause,—Existence infinite, independent, absolute.

While seeking to maintain here true appreciation of the vastness of the problem, and intellectual sympathy with the whole range of scientific work, we must be content to deal with the problem of the Universe as it appears when we perceive the subordination of material existence to spiritual, and subjection of the spiritual to Moral Law. Unquestionably we see things as they are, if we see material existence rationalised—that is, subjected to fixed law capable of being interpreted in harmony with laws of intelligence, and see also intelligent life subject to Moral Law.

2. The relations of Science and Philosophy are essentially concerned with entrance into the region of Metaphysic. Each presents its quota of the problem, for we do not deal with existence abstractly, but with existence as made known by the researches of Physical Science and of Mental Philosophy, as these together discover to us an orderly system of existence, which in its totality we name The Universe or Cosmos.

Even as we here attempt to combine the results of research presenting before us a marvellously complicated system of things, we are impressed with the visible limitations of our knowledge and thought. The range of knowledge, widening in this scientific age by rapid strides in a course of ceaseless advance, is ever impressing us with a sense of its smallness, as it appears over against the Universe itself, facing us with its thousands of unanswered questions. And even while recognising how much greater *thought* is than knowledge, how

much it has given to us of knowledge itself, and how necessarily it is ever outstretching the bounds of the ascertained, we are at the same time impressed with the futility of a large amount of its speculative effort, and with the conscious inadequacy of intelligence to deal with the mysteries of Being. This lesson of humility, for which Hamilton (Law of the Conditioned, *Discussions*) strenuously bore witness at this very point, is impressed on every thinker. The voice of Science and the voice of Philosophy unite in enforcing it. Thought is not equal to the task of harmonising in one comprehensive representation the vastness of the problem we so easily designate as that of the Universe. Yet must all intelligent beings deal with it in some fashion, for Metaphysicians are only more formally and deliberately grappling with the problem, in the hope of being able to contribute something towards that larger range of thought which it is the destiny of man to seek.

Even here, where a glowing intelligence has been most fascinated by the conception of Unity of Being as the final and satisfying result of all philosophising, we cannot escape Dualism. The problem is one, but we cannot unify existence ; for the existence occasioning the problem inevitably has its explanation lying *beyond itself*. The distinction of subject and object is besides still facing us, unresolvable and insuperable. Within the cosmos, Matter and Spirit are distinct, while the order of the entire Universe and its causation must be apart. The Universe contains the thinker, and yet, thought moving in our movements, is not the movement of the Universe ; this contrast is large and vividly depicted. Of Thought, we must say, it is in the Universe and of the Universe, but not identical with it. Not without misgiving and some sense of trouble does the thinker surrender the attractions of these grand systems of philosophy which have striven to satisfy the craving of the human intellect for unity. But the conditions of thought determine our procedure. These we cannot tran-

scend, and a return upon Dualism is inevitable. Being is greater than our philosophy, which is at best a philosophy of a Universe but partially known; for fuller knowledge we must wait on later advances of science; for explanation of the totality of finite existence we must lean upon the Absolute as First Cause,—Being eternally existent.

All sciences and all philosophies sustain this lesson of humility, for all of them bear witness to their own imperfection. Even the idealism, which unhesitatingly lays claim to absolutism, has no theory of existence apart from evolution, and is, therefore, constrained by the forms of its own procedure to recognise the antithesis of finite and infinite; and, under like pressure, it is constrained to make the true Infinite dependent on union of the finite and some lower 'infinite' for its own existence, for if these two pass over into 'the true infinite,' what is the Infinite itself but the combination of these two—a position doubly condemned, unwarranted in thought, and impossible in reality? Kant's words apply here with telling effect,—'If we cogitate existence by the pure category alone, it is not to be wondered at that we should find ourselves unable to present any criterion sufficient to distinguish it from mere possibility' (*Crit. of Pure Reason*, 369). We are translating an exercise of thought into a scheme of existence.

3. The problem of existence as it is shaped by the furthest advance of science and philosophy concerns the Universe as a whole. It is not in its first form a question concerning the origin of existence, for, raising it in that form, we should be dealing with existence in the abstract. What we seek is the explanation of the cosmos, that is, of the whole orderly system of things existing and advancing under fixed law. In ordinary reasoning we may be contented with various or even partial representations of the grand ultimate question of thought. It may, for example, be said that we seek to account for Nature, but thus there is some risk of dealing with Nature as distinct from the world of intelligence. We may say that our object

is to account for thought itself, or the exercise of intelligence as illustrated in activity within our own consciousness, but in this we are apt to exclude Nature as something inferior to mind, if not the creation of mind itself. We may prefer to represent the question as an inquiry into the ultimate meaning and source of fixed law governing the mutable,—and this is an admirable mode of stating the question,—but it is apt to be taken as if it were implied that laws are entities apart from Nature, and not mere manifestations of the orderliness belonging to Nature itself. Whatever, then, may be the varied forms of the question suggested by diverse phases of scientific or philosophic inquiry, without disputing the legitimacy of any one of them, it is needful to hold steadily in view the fulness of range belonging to this problem, which concerns the Universe as a whole, including matter and spirit as they belong to the harmony of an existing system.

When we have thus resolutely guarded the unity of the problem, a first step is taken towards its solution in remarking that there is nothing within the Universe sufficient to explain itself, for the Universe as a whole is not a self-sufficient entity. It is the recognition of this insufficiency which originates and perpetuates the problem we are facing. If the Universe were sufficient to account for itself we should cease to recognise the rational demand under pressure of which we widen the range of thought, seeking for a Cause of the Universe—which, if it be a Cause of all finite existence, and thus a First Cause, must be Self-sufficient—an Eternal Existence. Along all avenues of research all thinkers are advancing on the one ultimate problem, thereby tending towards the destiny of thought, which is seeking its resting-place in the Absolute, the true source of all finite being.

4. We are here, however, involved in special difficulty as to method of procedure, in the attempt to transcend the Universe, inasmuch as this involves transcending consciousness itself, and this by a line of procedure distinct and even remote

from sense-perception and induction. We are parting company with the methods which have approved themselves in all departments of science and philosophy. Accepting the results supplied by observation, we are now seeking to outstretch observation itself. A disturbing sense of the precariousness of this has given force to Agnosticism. We are affirming that the testimony of the senses is of no avail here, and that the inductive process, however valuable in subordinate fields of inquiry, and however far it may yet advance men in the interpretation of the Universe beyond present knowledge, is insufficient to meet the requirements of intelligence. We are seeking to account for the Universe itself, an attempt which implies that we are aiming at transcending the Universe, including even our own consciousness as representative of the intelligence in it; and we are, therefore, seeking to transcend the methods by which we have so far succeeded in interpretation of the Universe. A philosophy of ignorance can afford no halting-place. Our methods, by their very success, have driven us to an intellectual advance, carrying us beyond themselves, because beyond the sphere of their application. Here we must part from sense, and from induction and deduction; we must do this resolutely and consistently if we are to advance at all.

The special difficulties of the position are here made conspicuous by the insufficiency of all arguments for the being of God, an incompetency which Kant has pointed out with clearness and force. And yet, so far as Kant's criticism is concerned, it is to be remarked that while treating of the *argumentum a contingentia mundi*, which he names the Cosmological Argument, when observing that it includes 'the outlines of all the arguments employed in natural theology,' he is constrained to add,—'arguments which have always been, and still will be, in use and authority' (*Dialectic of Pure Reason*, Meiklejohn, p. 371). This is a needful admission. There is some rational necessity finding inadequate expression in these forms of

argumentation, some deeper reason for the general recognition of the Divine existence than is given in any argumentation, something deeper than logical forms can explain. How truly Kant recognised this appears in the *Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason*, when he regards 'God, freedom, and immortality' as 'conditions necessary' to the recognition of duty; and immediately adds, 'I cannot prove these by my speculative reason, although *neither can I refute them*' (*Ethics*, Abbott, 3d ed., p. 241). There is also additional philosophic significance in the combination of these three,—God, freedom, and immortality,—as *equally* incapable of proof, yet *equally given* in the notion *duty*. It would therefore seem, even in admitting the special difficulties in which philosophy is here involved, that there is at least no danger of becoming illogical, while admitting the insufficiency of logic. We are only saying that while logic is an instrument of knowledge, it is not the only instrument; a claim to be such could not be advanced in its behalf. What we perceive here is merely that logic fails us, even as our senses do. In seeking to pass from the Universe to the Infinite we cannot proceed by way of induction; and we have nothing from which to attempt deduction.

In the search for an explanation of the Universe, the argument from design,—which Kant names the Physico-Theological, we may even more fitly name it 'the Cosmological argument,' as it is in strict accordance with the teaching of science,—has had great power over the popular mind. Though the popular mind, even when highly instructed, does not apply rigid tests to the forms of reasoning; nevertheless a very general and persistent acquiescence, from age to age, implies some rational basis for the assent. We have already had extended proof, in connection with the popular recognition of duty, that the mind freely accepts a rational basis, without formal test of its warrant. What the warrant really is, it has been the task of philosophy to show; in fulfilment of this part of its task the Scottish School has had an honourable share; and it is a task similar in

kind which is again encountered at this point, when we seek a philosophy of common religious thought.

That thought is not discredited by admission of the logical insufficiency of the cosmological argument (or argument from design) is made plain in two ways—that the cosmological *problem* remains, pressed upon intelligence by the discoveries of science in vaster and grander proportions than ever before; and especially that the difficulty of procedure here encountered, only drives thought back upon itself to ascertain more fully the import of its own metaphysical constituents. From these considerations it becomes apparent that the *conclusion* accepted by the popular mind is not contradicted by philosophy; and if intellectual procedure is here challenged, it is only because there is inevitably reached a deeper metaphysical question.

To be led thus far is in itself to clear up considerably our perplexities, for these things seem so apparent as to be beyond dispute—(1) That philosophic thought must encounter the cosmological problem, attempting to construct a metaphysical theory of existence; (2) that consciousness in merely raising the problem, in shaping it and comprehending it as a problem for all intelligence, must contain within itself rational warrant for its procedure; to see a problem is, in some sense, to search for its solution; (3) the solution of the problem must be found in transcendent being; whether transcendent being may also be immanent, is a further question which may await discussion, but that the explanation of the Universe must be found in transcendent being admits of no dispute. If the Universe is inadequate to account for its own existence, its explanation must lie beyond itself. Stating this position from the opposite side, Kant says: 'The absolutely necessary must be accepted as out of and beyond the world' (*Critique of Pure Reason*, 379).

5. In falling back once more, under pressure of this problem, on the interpretation of our own thought, we are not

going in search of something new, but rather in search of a fuller interpretation of what has been all along implied. This admission is made in accepting the problem as it is presented ; for it is not one which is urged upon us by the senses—it is not one towards solution of which we travel by any inductive process ; to admit these things is virtually to admit that there is some occasion, demand, and even warrant for intellectual procedure, for the problem is one with which intelligence *must* concern itself. And this conclusion is amply sustained, for we are not adventuring on a purely speculative procedure, but are moving under pressure of an intellectual impulse, and are sustained by a broad historical basis, as appears in the facts of the history of religious thought and of the religions of the world, largely marshalled before us in our day. For it is no longer possible to refuse a place to ‘a science of religion,’ or to deny that the search for a philosophy of religion is only another phase of the metaphysical demand emerging from moral life. Even in the midst of the diversity, practically as wide as the number of nationalities, and still further modified by divergencies of tribal divisions ; even with the crude conceptions and fantastic representations of heathen religions, there are common elements of religious thought which betoken the inherent strength of intellectual life, showing that everywhere it concerns itself with the transcendent. The proof of this inherent intellectual force will appear increasingly striking the more deliberately the facts are examined. It is impossible that the critical eye of a trained observer should fail to pierce the crudities of heathenism to the discovery of the common intellectual conditions underlying the world’s religions—intellectual conditions all the more striking in view of these crudities and of their historic persistence. Kant states the position thus : ‘ Among all nations, through the darkest polytheism, glimmer some faint sparks of monotheism, to which these idolaters have been led, not from reflection and profound thought, but by the study and natural progress of the common

understanding' (*Crit. of Pure Reason*, 363). If any are disposed to make light of testimony drawn from such quarters, their adverse criticism, coming rather late in the day to be of much account, is overthrown by two obvious considerations: that the cultivated intellect of Greece clung to all the crudities of a polytheistic scheme; and that testimony coming from the lowest civilisations—rather from the rudest barbarism—because of the quarter from which it comes, is all the more striking evidence of the native force of the human intellect. Diversities of thought and of religious practice may be readily explained by reference to the absence of intellectual training, and to aggravations of moral disorder under attendant social conditions. The existence of religious thought among men of such a low level, educationally and socially, presents very impressive evidence of the tendency of intelligence, even under the least instructed contact with Nature, to concern itself with the transcendent. This position, supported by the history of single isolated tribes, is greatly strengthened by the accumulated evidence presented in the history of religions, as this has been so far sifted, classified, and set in array by competent authors. Discussions as to the primitive religion are quite aside from the point on which attention is here concentrated, which is concerned with the intellectual conditions of all religious thought, however modified. A just estimate of these conditions will disclose the large problem which is here set before us. Thought does not anywhere operate as to causality in Nature, without acknowledgment of the transcendent. In view of the facts belonging to the history of Religions, Positivism, Scepticism, and Agnosticism, severally and unitedly, encounter a task of an arduous kind. Even the confessedly high intellectual gifts ranged on their side will find large test for critical and constructive exercise.

In order that the work of philosophy may be deliberately prosecuted, in view of the complicated materials supplied by the religions of the world, we need to discriminate the ultimate

notion of intelligence from the religious *sentiments*, liable to rise and fall under external influences, and likely to be depressed or exalted in personal or tribal history by unexpected occurrences. Still more must we distinguish the ultimate in Thought from religious *observances* or rites super-induced, and subject to endless modification, according to the moral condition of the people. In all this, we say only that conscious life is essentially the movement of *intelligence*, whereas sentiment and practice, being more closely connected with the external, and being largely modified by outward conditions, are subject to large deviations from ideal excellence, to which intelligence in its deeper and more persistent movements much more closely adheres.

For summary of Evidence as to religious thought of uncivilised people, Tylor's *Primitive Culture*, 2 vols. For treatment of Problems involved, Max Müller's *Introduction to the Science of Religion*. The same author's *Origin and Growth of Religion*. Reville's *Prolegomena of the History of Religions*. Kant's *Religion within the Limits of Reason*. Pünjer's *History of the Christian Philosophy of Religion*. Pfleiderer's *Philosophy of Religion on the Basis of its History*.

6. Seeking now to guard to the utmost the legitimacy of rational procedure, it is needful to exclude everything in the subordinate forms of method clearly incompetent here; and to make conspicuous the method accepted and applied.

If the grounds for exclusion be clear, we shall be enabled to cast off all unwarranted admixture which must tend to weaken the philosophic position. We have seen that the Universe as a whole presents the problem; that science and philosophy combine in interpretation of it; and that its solution must transcend the Cosmos. Here we are transcending the *sensory*. We are no longer dealing with that which can be seen or touched; we are passing beyond all fields of observation; we are asking how the totality of things can be accounted for as a systematised reality. We are no longer attempting to make good by *inductive process* the laws

determining existing relations and observed occurrences. We are facing singly the problem of the Cosmos. To the metaphysician it can, therefore, be in no sense disturbing that the object of search cannot be an object of sense. Nor can it be the source of any rational trouble, that the object cannot be reached by scientific methods. These things are implied in the necessities of our inquiry. In seeking to transcend the Universe, the thinker is transcending those methods employed in dealing with the relations within its circumference. It is, therefore, settled once for all that neither sense nor inductive process can avail here. He who objects to procedure on these terms, ignores the problem; he who seeks to advance, trusts to intelligence as having a deeper power than has been represented by observation and induction; and he is to some extent fortified in procedure by previous recognition of transcendental principles of the reason. All this is so clear that we must adhere rigidly to this exclusion of sense and logical demonstration.

A secure advance is, however, most concerned with full understanding of what this exclusion implies. It is, indeed, to the partial recognition of this that we are to attribute the main obstacle to philosophy in the structure of Metaphysical doctrine. The conditions of our inquiry distinctly imply refusal to adopt reasoning from our conceptions to the existence of objective reality. This method of procedure has been so largely adopted by the great thinkers of modern philosophy, such as Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, and Hegel, that philosophic doctrine has been shaped in accordance with it, and its rejection, if we are prepared for that, must be quite deliberate, and on grounds which will deliver us from a tendency to return upon it, even as a possible auxiliary. We are now favourably placed for reconsideration and restatement, having the full advantage of the work of Kant and Hegel. The highest value is to be assigned to Kant's searching criticism of the arguments for the existence of God. But the acknowledg-

ment of this depends on a true estimate of the significance of his argument taken in its entire extent. In grouping the possible arguments under three heads, Kant takes first the argument from design, second that from the contingency of existence in the universe, and finally the argument *à priori*, or from the necessary conceptions of the reason. This classification includes all phases of argument for the being of God. In discussing these three arguments, he reverses the order, and our attention needs to be directed on the grounds given for this reversal. Kant says: 'As regards the order in which we must discuss those arguments, it will be exactly the reverse of that in which reason, in the progress of its development, attains to them. For it will be made manifest to the reader, that, although experience presents the occasion and the starting, it is the *transcendental idea* of reason which guides on its pilgrimage, and is the goal of all its struggles' (*Transcendental Dialectic*, Book II. chap. iii. section ii., *Critique of Pure Reason*, 364). The whole range of philosophic inquiry here is pretty well included in this paragraph, if its statements and necessary implications are fully interpreted, indicating as it does how the argument from design is the most natural and convincing, and how for the metaphysician the 'transcendental idea' is the central and governing consideration. The whole question is one of thought-procedure, and the test of its validity must be in the ground afforded by the intellectual nature itself, which provides for and governs such procedure. It is in our intelligence, and nowhere else, that we find warrant for outstretching the universe in the exercise of thought. And if this be so, the reversal by Kant of the natural order of thought is the artificial thing in his procedure, and likely to prove misleading to intelligence itself. Thought becomes entangled in the differences between conceptions, ideas, and ideals, and we find it difficult to recognise what is the truly primary element in our own thought.

The one thing which we are mainly concerned to exclude

is procedure from our conceptions to objective reality. Such procedure is logically vicious, and leads towards inconclusive reasoning, the exposure of which is apt, quite unwarrantably, to involve us in uncertainty and doubt, because forcing an acknowledgment of inconclusiveness in thought itself. The further we advance into the necessities of thought, the less we have to do with discursive reasoning. The more clearly we mark our standpoint here, and trace the area within which we find ourselves, the more clearly shall we recognise that we are discharged from inferential procedure, being liberated from the hazards to which it is liable, and against which logical law is our sole defence. Thus we are prepared to acknowledge the value of Kant's adverse criticism, as he finds vantage-ground for his assault on the *à priori* or Ontological argument for Divine existence. His criticism is of value as against the *argument*, while it is of no value as bearing upon the primal existence, as Kant is constrained virtually to acknowledge, when he admits that 'an existence out of the sphere of experience cannot be absolutely declared to be impossible' (*Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 370). By all the conditions of intelligence a negative here is shown to be worthless.

In accepting Kant's criticism we pass beyond the sphere within which alone the criticism applies, for we grant that argument from conception to objective existence is invalid. This is the main thing to be made perfectly clear. Kant's whole discussion of the Ontological argument is nothing more than a discussion of the doctrine of conception, with which we entirely concur. Objective existence cannot depend on my predication, but *vice versa*. Kant is, therefore, beyond doubt correct in maintaining that 'pure conceptions do not present objects' (p. 350), and that ideas are 'still further removed from objective realities,' and that 'in its ideals, reason aims at complete and perfect determination according to *à priori* rules' (p. 352). Predication cannot depend exclusively on conception, however necessary conception may be to thought

It is true, indeed, that we speak of 'necessary conceptions,' but these are necessary *to thought*, and there is a wide difference between necessary conceptions within consciousness, and necessary objective existence. Our conception in no way affects the reality of being, whether we refer to contingent or to necessary existence. When, for example, Kant says of the proposition 'God is Omnipotent,' that it is a 'necessary judgment,' it is so only as an analytical judgment. Omnipotence is included in the idea of God, and the attribution of Omnipotence to Deity is necessary, only in order that our thoughts of God may be coherent. But the certainty of the Divine existence, and therefore of the Divine Omnipotence, is above all this, and is in advance of it even in the history of thought. The necessity of the Divine existence is in no sense dependent on the necessary in our thought. Kant is, accordingly, entitled to unstinted praise for insisting on all this, and illustrating how '*logical* necessity has been the source of greatest delusions' in philosophy (p. 365). He has shown how the necessity of the Divine existence has been dragged to a level with the properties of the triangle, and he has rendered a service of special value to our race in a criticism fitted to banish such correlations from literature, as worthless logically, and worse than worthless ethically and metaphysically. 'The unconditioned necessity of a judgment does not form the absolute necessity of a thing' (p. 365).

On the grounds now indicated it becomes clear that as the Transcendent cannot be an object of sense, so neither can it be the object of inference, not even of inference from the necessary conceptions of the reason. Our method cannot be in form of demonstration, but must be in the form of a more close and exact interpretation of the conditions of intelligence itself, for these imply the recognition of the Intelligent First Cause, rendering formal denial of his existence a proposition of sheer dogmatism, destitute of intellectual warrant.

Having the problem of the Cosmos raised by our intelli-

gence, procedure is no longer by inference—not even by inference from the conditions of intelligence itself—but by interpretation of them; for recognition of the Supreme is found to be involved in the bare uninstructed use of intellect. It thus becomes a very striking thing to remark that intelligence—the most ordinary and the most cultivated—the least trained and the best trained—acknowledges that the explanation of Nature is ultimately in a Supreme Being. The reference to this fact does not at all suggest that singular misinterpretation of ‘common sense’ (accepting a favourite phrase of the Scottish philosophy), that it is an appeal to the illiterate on matters metaphysical. The reference carries us to the utmost severance from such a suggestion, for it points to a problem concerning the constitution of intelligence, and it must, therefore, find support in the action of mind, however situated. The purpose of this reference to the illiterate is disclosure of the completeness of the evidence, showing that the affirmation is supported by the testimony of the ages, even by the thoughts of those who are strangers to philosophic terms and formulæ, thus robbing the philosophic critic of his power, by showing that the evidence of history is against him, as is the testimony coming from the most searching scrutiny of the inner conditions of intelligence itself. Kant clearly recognised all this; no one has stated the position more clearly, as appears even when he is elaborating his criticism against the arguments for the Divine existence. Thus, in speaking of ‘considerations which compel reason to seek out some resting-place in the regress from the conditioned to the unconditioned,’ he says, ‘this is the natural course of every human reason, even of the most uneducated’ (p. 360). So in the passage already quoted, ‘through the darkest polytheism glimmer some faint sparks of monotheism, to which these idolaters have been led, not from reflection and profound thought, but by the study and natural progress of the common understanding’ (p. 363). In full accordance with this testimony, M. Albert Reville, in his *Pro-*

legomena of the History of Religions, has thus summarised the evidence from the history of religions, 'The active causes of religious development are these: 1st, increasing knowledge of nature; 2d, the genius of races; 3d, the progress of reason; 4th, the moral conscience; 5th, social and political events; 6th, the personal action of religious geniuses (revealers, reformers, etc.).' This product of a careful classification and induction is the historic support of the philosophic position that the conditions of intelligence themselves imply the recognition of a Supreme Intelligence.

CHAPTER II.

THE FIRST CAUSE.

1. INVESTIGATION of metaphysical procedure has prepared the way for full development of the position that the conditions of intelligence imply recognition of a First Cause—the Supreme, the Self-existent, the Eternal Intelligence. We are now to present the evidence of this in extended form. Excluding testimony of the senses as inapplicable in the case; excluding inference from finite existence to sufficient cause as inadequate in its conclusion; and excluding inference from general conceptions as logically unwarranted, we seek to ascertain in what manner the action of intelligence involves the common recognition of the First Cause.

All thought as to a First Cause arises within consciousness in connection with the problem of the existence of the Universe. This holds true of the most ordinary and casual thought, as of the most deliberate inquiry of the trained intellect, possessed of scientific knowledge and making full account of metaphysical requirements. There is a common inheritance of intelligence for the race, and consequently a common intellectual task. Inquiry as to the Cause of the universe is not exclusively for the Schools, but for all orders of intelligence. Metaphysic is not separated from the common demands of conscious life, but is committed to a philosophic interpretation of the exercise of intellectual power according to the necessary course of its procedure.

We are thus secured in a general position, whence all subsequent inquiry must proceed. All thought concerning the First Cause is thought concerning Nature. Nature and the First Cause are indissolubly united in the problem of existence, and the philosophic question largely concerns the action of intelligence as it connects these two. Further, the intellectual activity which raises the problem must be in some way competent for its solution, for in some sense it stands true that the raising of the problem is its solution. In making this statement, it may appear as if we were already assuming the existence of a First Cause. And this may well be, in accordance with preceding results concluding that *demonstration* of the existence is impossible, while its recognition is natural. But, without anticipating more than is required, or than is logically allowable, it is at least obvious that the mere raising of the problem, as is done by ordinary intelligence, is the asking after the Cause of the Universe; and this appears to be somehow an inquiry as to the First Cause, for it is hardly possible to interpret the *problem* to the exclusion of this.

How truly this is implied will appear by reference to the general position itself, for when we say Nature and its Cause, 'Nature' is all inclusive, so far as finite existence goes. The more closely the *problem* is considered, the more obvious this will become. When, however, we speak of a common problem, that is, of a problem common to intelligence, there can be no doubt that the representations under the general term 'Nature' must be endlessly diversified. This diversity must include all the differences possible between the knowledge belonging to the savage and that of the most highly cultivated intellect. But the problem itself has an inherent intellectual and moral interest for every man. However great the diversities of representation, from the narrowest to the grandest, the intellect in all cases concentrates upon an identical problem. It is concerned with the source of finite things.

The question is:—How can we account for 'Nature'? As Kant has said, 'The regress from the conditioned to the unconditioned' 'is the natural course of every human reason, even of the most uneducated. It does not begin from conceptions, but from common experience, and requires a basis in actual existence' (p. 360). The *amount* of knowledge possessed does not affect the inherent meaning of the problem, but only the area of existence in view of which it is raised. Science widens the range of vision, without changing the problem in itself. Science only shows that the problem is a much more complex one than common observation suggests. The essential inquiry, however, concerns Causality of the Universe. The only other thing to be said here is, that the more advanced our knowledge of the Universe, the deeper the demand upon Intelligence in its Cause. Still, 'Nature' is a common term expressive of system, within determinate lines, of order, law, and energy transcending human control, however ignorant, or however instructed, the inquirer may be. The term may, indeed, be associated either with conceptions quite unwarranted, or with conceptions sustained by the latest results of science; but in all cases the problem shapes itself in the same form. Looking only at the side which comes within range of observation, the problem always includes material existence, animate and inanimate, and all that belongs to an intelligent and moral life which concerns itself with personal and family interests, and with personal and social responsibilities. Looking at the other side, which comes from the intellect itself, the problem implies in every case an inquiry concerning Causality, in the very raising of which intellect directs its outlook towards the Supernatural—the Transcendent. Explain the Cosmos. This is the common demand. The savage asks no less; the scientist can ask nothing more. The philosophic question is—How does this problem of humanity come to wear the aspect of inquiry as to a First Cause?

2. The principle of Causality at once occasions the pro-

blem and carries its solution. Nature is to every intelligence a problem. Known existence invariably raises the inquiry how we can account for it; and such rational procedure, when concerned with the Universe as a whole, implies in the very question raised, not only that the explanation lies beyond the thing to be explained, which holds true in every case, but that the source of the Universe is the Self-existent. To bring out the full meaning of this will be to solve the problem.

The intellectual exercise under consideration implies no special intellectual effort, but is the ordinary exercise of intelligence in all its observations. This is in part the explanation of the fact that religious thought is common to the race. We engage in the same intellectual exercise when we ask the explanation of the flight of a stone through the air, or of the falling of a shadow on the floor, or of the wasting of growing corn, or of an eclipse of the moon, or of the origin of the world. The sight of *change* is only a help to more ordinary exercise of intellect, not a necessity. The quantity of existence included makes no perceptible difference so far as the inherent character of the rational exercise is concerned. Hence enlargement of range involves little perplexity even to the uneducated intelligence. Intellect lives and flourishes in the enlargement of its view, and is easily equal to the exercise of asking the Cause. In whatever relation a question as to Causality is raised, we may say indifferently that existence raises the problem or that intelligence does, for all intelligences work exactly alike as to this. The two statements coalesce. The inner and essential meaning is that intellect—that is, all intellect—intellect as such—seeks the explanation of all contingent or limited being; and this is to say that all intelligence moves towards the Absolute or Self-existent. The whole history of humanity substantiates this position, for religious thought is common to the race.

Intelligence, by its spontaneous activity in raising the problem of the Universe, affirms its superiority to the forms

and categories which determine experience. It thus 'comes to understand the range and significance of its own principles, as involving superiority to all that can be enclosed in its own experience. In dealing with the *limits* of Intelligence, Kant has considerably obscured the range of its vital force. In his elaborate theory of the forms and conditions of the understanding he has obscured the philosophy of its principles. Hence the negative cast of many of his positions when positive statements are needed to secure a true philosophy; for negations are only relatives, having no essential worth except as they are seen in correlation with their positives—a consideration essential on the side of pure reason as well as on the side of the concrete. In connection with the recognition of the contingent, we have the recognition of the Absolute. It is through a lower exercise that we come to recognise the presence of a higher in mind, discovering that the higher is involved in the lower, being necessary for its vindication.

The distinction between these two forms of knowledge now comes out clearly, and very largely in harmony with Kant's main line of contention, for it is not by argumentation, but by implication within the principles of intelligence itself, that the acknowledgment of a First Cause is secured. The principle of Causality itself is that which impels and supports the mind in all its inquiry; this has borne our race onwards through the whole range of investigations; and this seeks an explanation for contingent being, that is, for *all finite Being*, and thus the principle, singly by its meaning, implies that the Self-existent is the sole Cause of all being besides. In admitting, as every one does, that 'Everything that exists contingently has a cause,' we are saying only in another way that all contingent being depends on a First Cause.

What we desire next to see is, how the recognition of the First Cause stands related to our ordinary knowledge, that is, to the knowledge of the universe, in the characteristics of which we find occasion for our problem. Each contingent

object is known either directly or indirectly, that is, either by observation or by inference ; recognition of the First Cause is in neither of these ways, but is given in interpretation of the intellect's own principle of inquiry. The very question as to Causality is an affirmation of contingency in existence ; and is a declaration that intellect stays inquiry, and rests from its course of procedure only in the acknowledgment of the Uncaused. Thus the recognition of the Finite and of the Infinite is altogether different in the action of intelligence ; the one precedes the other in the history of consciousness, yet are the two so related in thought as to be united in the raising of the problem concerning existence generally. The essential implication of intelligence is, that all finite being is traced to a self-existent fountain of Being.

The description of any existence as contingent is an act of the understanding bringing the object under the category, and this is done only as an expression of actual knowledge ; we affirm the reality of a particular existence, and the contingency of it. The further affirmation that 'Everything which exists contingently must have a cause' is a universal. This is not given *in concreto* ; it is not found in the existing reality, nor in the category, but in the principle of reason. And this principle is not merely a *condition* of intelligence, which may be said of all categories, but it is the very basis of all intellectual procedure, without which intellect could not advance a single step. In acknowledgment and interpretation of this principle we prove nothing ; as Kant has maintained, no argument is adequate to this task, or possible in the case ; and yet it is correct to say, as Kant has done, that the *argumentum a contingentia mundi* in the track it pursues 'is at least natural, and not only goes far to persuade the common understanding, but shows itself deserving of respect from the speculative intellect ; while it contains at the same time the outlines of all the arguments employed in natural theology.'—*Critique of Pure Reason*, 371. Only it is to be added, we need no *argu-*

mentum. The principle that 'everything that exists contingently has a cause' is truly and strictly the acknowledgment as well of the Self-existent as of the contingent.

A clearer view of what is involved in the affirmation of Contingency as characteristic of all finite things may, however, be needful in order that the strength of the position may be seen. We refer to a common characteristic of all existence within the cosmos; it is true, as Kant maintains, that we could not conceive of this without reference to categories; but mainly we mark the limitation which involves dependence. This we recognise everywhere in nature; for we acknowledge it characteristic of nature as a whole, by speaking of nature as a systematised order of things, correlated under fixed laws. Contingency appears at every point; it bears on every form of existence, and concerns nature as a unity. Science, with all its elaborations, is the manifestation of contingency; and only when we consider what is involved in our use of the principle of Causality do we see that in the very act of recognising the contingent we are affirming a First Cause. In affirming that 'everything that exists contingently must have a cause,' we occupy an intellectual sphere higher than that of common knowledge, being severed from the processes by which knowledge is gathered, and in conscious relation with the necessities of rational existence. We are thus severed from 'intuition' in Kant's sense, and from inferences (and therefore from proof), for there could be nothing more vain than the attempt to prove that the contingent must have a cause.

It must be admitted, however, in response to Kant's reiterated contention that, by way of proof, 'we could never get further than proving that without relation to conceptions we could not conceive the existence of the contingent' (175); but this is a very small and unimportant matter here—however important it may be in other relations—for we are here dealing with the other side of the predication—with recogni-

tion of the necessary, as this finds expression or implication in the principle of our reason. We are not arguing from our conceptions to the Self-existent; we are simply reading the meaning of the principle of intelligence, without active acknowledgment of which we could not have formed such a conception as that which introduces the category of contingency. We are simply lifting up to view the universally accepted principle that 'everything that exists contingently has a cause,' affirming that it is an identical proposition, as Kant admits (175), for the caused is the contingent, and the contingent is the caused. It is an identical proposition, giving no space for contradiction, and therefore admitting of no doubt. And it is only the converse of this proposition when we say, by like necessity—and equally without place for denial—Necessary Existence is the cause of all contingent being.

What, then, is the value of Kant's position that 'we are able to prove the principle of Causality as valid only of objects of possible experience' (175)? Does it mean that the principle of Causality is capable of application by us, so as to find direct verification of its use, only when we are dealing with existence presented through the sensory? for Kant says that 'no other objects are presented to us besides sensuous objects' (358). Taken in this restricted sense, the statement, though true, is wide of the present contention. We are not here considering a possible verification of the law of causality within finite relations by tracing the connection between Effect and Cause in particular cases. We are examining the metaphysical significance of the principle of Causality as a condition of Thought, sustaining all scientific inquiry; and we find that the nature of this principle of Reason is such that all finite existence, as contingent, is regarded as dependent on a First Cause. Thus it is that the very problem of the Universe implies Necessary Existence. This Kant explicitly recognises in another form when he says: 'It is something very remarkable that, on the supposition that something exists, I cannot avoid

the inference that something exists necessarily' (378). Withdrawing the word 'inference,' which Kant himself would have challenged, it is certainly a fact very remarkable that the simple recognition of any existence implies in our thought, under the principle of Causality, acknowledgment of the Self-existent. It is upon this we fasten, and upon nothing else; in the preceding position, the principle of Causality, barely as a principle of the Reason, implies a self-existent Cause. Hence it arises that no human intelligence can concern itself with the question as to the cause of the universe without recognising Supreme Self-existence. In order voluntarily to shun this recognition, the utmost any man can do is to refuse to consider the significance of the principle of Causality, or to stay the procedure of his own intelligence; and this last is apt to be a merely mechanical obedience to a habit of mind, under which Intelligence is diverted from its inquiry.

But the criticism returns upon us—this does not prove the existence of the First Cause. And this allegation is correct. We have not supplied a proof; we have simply shown that the only possible result of exercise of our rational nature as to the problem of the Cosmos is acknowledgment of a Self-existent source of all finite being. Accepting implicitly the guidance of Kant as to the conditions of intelligence, our position is confirmed in every possible way. We are not reasoning from necessary conceptions to the existence of the object conceived; we are only recognising the metaphysical significance of a principle of intelligence. We find in the principle itself the affirmation of Self-existent being. If, then, we give expression to this in propositional form, affirming the existence of the First Cause, we do so in accordance with these positions in Kant's philosophy, which we take to be unchallengeable; that 'if a thing is assumed to be contingent, it is an analytical proposition to say, it has a cause' (p. 176); contingent and caused are identical; 'from categories alone no synthetical proposition can be made' (p. 174); categories

of thought presuppose existence ; and the principle of Reason, on which we proceed in acquisition of knowledge, carries in its very significance the implication of the First Cause—the Self-existent source of all contingent being, that is, of the Cosmos, or regulated order of correlated being. ‘Every existential proposition is synthetical’ (p. 367); it is a direct affirmation of reality, and the synthesis of all intelligence is found in the principle of Causality, which is a synthetical proposition *à priori*.

3. Under this principle, intelligence necessarily abandons the hypothesis of an infinite regress of finite causes as an impossible explanation of the universe. The representation of such regress is, indeed, a possible course of logical exercise ; but one from which intelligence naturally emancipates itself. Even if the undisciplined thinker does not fully recognise the implication of his own thought, and it is quite in accordance with the analogies of conscious life that he should not, he recognises that there is no adequate explanation of existence in a hypothesis of this kind.

An infinite regress of finite causes is a suggestion self-condemned as incapable of rational coherence. The principle of thought under which it advances condemns it. It may be granted that procedure, by continued regress of adequate causes, is competent logically, that is, regarded merely as a formal process of thinking ; but it is incompetent rationally as an explanation of existence, that is, on the basis of known existence under the necessary principle of reason itself. It is condemned in every aspect ; first, as an argument from our conceptions to existence ; second, as postulating an infinity of existence within which nothing is infinite ; and, third, as accepting the principle that ‘everything which exists contingently must have a cause,’ while maintaining that all contingent being may hang together without cause, that in the very *relations* of contingent existence we may escape contingency itself. These inconsistencies account for the fact that by

common agreement intelligence rids itself of the suggestion as one involving nothing more than a succession of logical forms, illustrating Kant's saying that 'logical necessity has been the source of the greatest delusions' (p. 365).

Modern Science, in presenting a natural history of the order of existence in the universe, drives this hypothesis from the field. In establishing a regress towards the undeveloped, it has banished the suggestion of a regress of causes, gaining in magnitude as advance is made towards Infinity. Taking the scientific account of 'natural causes,' the origin of the present complex orders of life is to be found in more simple forms—a view compatible with the dependence of contingent being on the Self-existent, but incompatible with a line of regress of finite causes, in which the earlier transcends the later. Science in this advance harmonises with the conditions of Thought. Evolution implies Creation; the contingent implies the Self-existent.

4. The principle of causality, while essentially a regulative principle, has necessarily an objective bearing. Its real significance appears when we regard it strictly as a regulative principle, but it is regulative of intelligence as that concerns itself with reality. In fulfilment of its function, it directs and stimulates inquiry as to the relations of existence in the Universe. To use Kant's expression, the intellect 'verifies' its principle by its application to objects presented by the senses. If on the lower external side of application the principle has objective reference, this must hold true also of its inner meaning, its higher side, applying to the transcendent. As soon as we recognise that its necessary rational significance implies the Self-existent, the whole force of the principle is seen to be concerned with objective reality. If we 'verify' or 'prove' the principle on the lower side, we cannot distrust it on the higher. We cannot regard it as trustworthy in its application to the concrete, yet untrustworthy in its very significance. There is no doubt a marked difference between

the two sides of interpretation of this ultimate principle of thought and of existence. No 'verification' is possible on the higher side, in the sense in which Kant alludes to verification; but there is something stronger and rationally more important than such verification would imply—verification on the lower side implies verity on the higher. That is to say, it is impossible that we should recognise the reality of contingent being, and not at the same time recognise the reality of Self-existent being.

A fuller interpretation of the '*regulative*' in conscious life is here required, for there is a difference in this respect between a principle of reason and a category of the understanding. It is the difference between the essence of rational procedure and the artificial (though reliable) methods of working up and bringing to unity the multiform in experience. If we may, for the purpose of illustration, use the distinction, there is more of reality and less of artificiality in the higher and more general principles of rational life than there is in lower and more restricted forms of knowledge. There is more and far higher reality in the objective reference of the regulative principle of the reason than there is in the thousands of phenomena by application to which we are wont, as is said, to 'verify' or 'prove' the principle. The more deeply we enter into the philosophy of rational life, the more readily shall we admit that even the implications of rational principles are more to us as indicative of reality than all the facts which are crowded into a human life.

The inherent worth of this contrast will appear still further if we compare the principle of causality with other dictates of the reason clearly subordinate in form and function. Compare the principle of causality with the other categories, with the ideas, and even with the ideals of the reason, and the recognised difference will confirm what has now been said.

Take the Categories—those general notions or forms of the understanding by aid of which we gather up the products of

continued and complex observations. Without them these observations have no true meaning for us—the realities themselves would be non-existent so far as our consciousness is concerned. This holds true as to all of them alike; but we notice a gradation among these categories. Hegel has recognised this, and has even built up his theory upon it. We are on a lower level, *i.e.* more abstract or ignorant, when we speak of Quality and Quantity than when we speak of Relations. In the one case, we indicate the possibilities of knowing and comparing the characteristics of things; in the other, we declare the possibility of appreciating the coherence of things, and interpreting to some extent the system or order of being belonging to the cosmos. Accordingly, the category of Cause is rationally higher, entering more deeply into the reality of things than quality and quantity, even while we admit that the whole three are necessarily correlated in the action of intelligence—even indissolubly connected. If this superiority belongs to the category of relation, how much more must superiority of insight as to the reality of things be assigned to the principle of causality, as the rational basis of the whole intellectual procedure concerned with interpretation of the material universe, and also of the world of mind. We cannot, therefore, have any hesitation as to acquiescing in these words of Kant: ‘if we cogitate existence by the pure category alone, it is not to be wondered at that we should find ourselves unable to present any criterion sufficient to distinguish it from mere possibility’ (p. 369).

Take next the Ideas which Kant has signalised—God, Soul, Universe. These ideas,—truly transcendental ideas, as Kant affirms—even if we regard them as *regulative*, are the representations to us of existences, and they are really of no *regulative* value except as conceptions of existences, in order that their recognition may be truly a guide to our thought, rendering science and philosophy possible. Kant’s whole reasoning would be brought effectually to a stand-still, if the

reference to being were not included as essential to an idea of the Reason. And when Kant urges, certainly in accordance with the strict results of critical philosophy, that the ideas are *only regulative*, his position amounts simply to this, that their value as known to us can be 'verified' or 'proved,' only as they supply the conditions for our thought-procedure. But, on the other hand, it is equally clear that their regulative value would disappear if they did not find verification by contributing towards intelligent recognition of the harmony of the facts—the realities—of experience. While, then, in representing the value of the idea in the history of consciousness, we may speak of the 'absolute totality in the synthesis of the conditions,' and so give to our intellectual procedure apparently a purely subjective significance; Kant nevertheless explicitly declares that this may be called 'the rational unity of phenomena (Vernunftseinheit), as the other which the category expresses may be termed the unity of the understanding (Verstandeseinheit).' Thus, what is called the purely regulative feature of the idea is not more so than the category, and not more severed from reality than the other.

This survey of the conditions of rational life is completed when we now include the *Ideals* of the reason, as these present still another feature of conscious life. And these will throw the fullest light on the relation of the dicta of reason to objective reality. This closing reference is all the more important here that it brings the purely intellectual and the ethical into direct relation and harmony. All the more valuable for illustration of the true import of the regulative in life is this reference, that it is quite beyond dispute that Ideals do not represent objective existence, such as is included within the compass of consciousness, or may belong to the world of phenomena. How Kant regards the relation between Idea and Ideal will appear from the following sentence: 'As the idea provides a rule, so the ideal serves as an *archetype* for the perfect and complete determination of the copy' (p. 351).

In connection with this, he says, 'human reason contains not only ideas, but ideals, which possess . . . certainly *practical* power—as regulative principles, and form the basis of the perfectibility of certain actions.' It thus appears that we are here in contact with all that is grandest in human life. What is more real in the true and higher sense than the ideal of a moral life—what more truly regulative at once of thought and action? If in representing to ourselves this ideal, we penetrate further into the reality of things than when we depict to ourselves the circumference of any department of science, how certain are we that the Self-existent Being is the source of the universe—that which 'contains the highest condition of the possibility of all that is cogitable' (p. 233). If reason is 'the faculty which prescribes to the understanding the laws of its harmonious and perfect exercise,' we can add that, 'in its ideals, reason aims at complete and perfect determination according to *à priori* rules; and hence it cogitates an object which must be completely determinable in conformity with principles, although all empirical conditions are absent, and the conception of the object is on this account transcendent' (p. 352).

5. Our conceptions of the First Cause are dependent on application of the principle of Causality to the known relations of things in the universe. For *knowledge* of the First Cause a fuller harmony is to be sought by each thinker of the two sides of truth implied in the admitted relation of the contingent and the necessary—the Universe as a whole, and the Absolute as the sole cause of all that the universe contains. The history of individual consciousness, as far as it is found to include certain conceptions of the Self-existent Being, will be determined by the degree of intellectual activity directed on the universe as a whole, in view of the great ruling principle of causality. The legitimacy of procedure in making the rational interpretation of the cosmos at the same time an interpreted manifestation of the Intelligent First Cause, is

placed beyond dispute. The principle which gives warrant for scientific research in all its departments, and for philosophic thought as well, warrants the plea that knowledge of the effect is by necessity in some measure knowledge of the Cause.

The contention of Sir William Hamilton in his celebrated exposition of the law of the conditioned, skilfully sustained by Mansel, has virtually passed from the sphere of philosophic interest. That contention was that knowledge of the Absolute is impossible under the recognised conditions of thought, inasmuch as the relative cannot encompass the Absolute—the finite cannot embrace the Infinite. The law of the conditioned has been unhesitatingly recognised; but the impossibility of knowledge of the Self-existent Being has been as unhesitatingly denied. We apprehend that this interpretation of the history of philosophic thought on the subject will not be seriously challenged. And it is accounted for by two distinct tendencies of thought prominent in the present day. On the one hand, there is the formal acknowledgment in philosophic teaching of the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge, and Hamilton had a large share in the honour of bringing about this result, as is generously acknowledged by such leaders of the opposite school of thought as Mill and Herbert Spencer. On the other hand, these leaders of the experiential philosophy and of the theory of Evolution have, with a decision and boldness quite unexpected, declared for a transcendent Power—an Unknown Power—‘a Power,’ though unknown: unknown though declared to be a Power, yet necessarily recognised by intelligence for interpretation of the Cosmos. This stroke has given the death-blow to the philosophy of ignorance, which claimed for itself that it was the pattern at once of wisdom and of humility. The humility was overstrained, and the power and responsibility of human intelligence was held to be misinterpreted under an illegitimate use of the law of the conditioned. Mill’s *Three Essays on*

Religion showed how impossible it was for one trained in an Atheistic school to ignore religious thought. Spencer's striking contribution to the harmony of Religion and Science, advanced even under the title of 'The Unknowable,' proclaimed surrender of the contention that the finite intelligence can make no account of transcendent being. Thus the utterance runs: 'The consciousness of an Inscrutable Power manifested to us through all phenomena has been growing ever clearer, and must eventually be cleared from its imperfections. The certainty that on the one hand such a power exists, while on the other hand its nature transcends intuition and is beyond imagination, is the certainty towards which intelligence has from the first been progressing. To this conclusion Science inevitably arrives as it reaches its confines; while to this conclusion Religion is irresistibly driven by criticism. And satisfying as it does the demands of the most rigorous logic at the same time that it gives the religious sentiment the widest possible sphere of action, it is the conclusion we are bound to accept without reserve or qualification.'—*First Principles*, p. 108. It will be noted that all this is said under the title of 'The Unknowable'; but Hamilton's law of the conditioned has been accepted only to have its restrictive application proclaimed impossible. And we must add, this harmony of Religion and Science is a harmony which proclaims the doom of Agnosticism, in so far that no truly scientific basis can be conceded to it. If only the deep significance of the scientific advance of the age be strictly interpreted, it is proclaimed as beyond dispute that Intelligence is the centre and source of all the existence the universe contains. In this way Herbert Spencer interprets our recent advance: 'The progress of intelligence has throughout been dual. Though it has not seemed so to those who made it, every step in advance has been a step towards both the natural and the supernatural.'—*First Principles*, p. 105. 'While our consciousness of Nature under the one aspect

constitutes Science, our consciousness of it under the other aspect constitutes Religion.'—*Ib.* p. 106. 'Religion and Science are therefore necessary correlatives.'—*Ib.* p. 107. Still, with all this, Spencer treats of the First Cause as 'The Unknowable,' and says that 'duty requires us neither to affirm nor deny personality.' Yet he is constrained to add these striking words: 'Let those who can, believe that there is eternal war set between our intellectual faculties and our moral obligations. I for one admit no such radical vice in the constitution of things.'—*Ib.* p. 108.

In view of all these statements, it seems impossible that Spencer should continue to maintain that he is reasoning of 'The Unknowable,' when he speaks of the 'consciousness of an inscrutable Power manifested to us through all phenomena.' As Dr. James Martineau has argued: 'If I can say all these things about it, it is no longer competent to me to designate it as the absolutely Unknowable. To know that an object *is*, yet know nothing that it *has*, is impossible, because contradictory.'—*Study of Religion*, vol. 1. p. 131. On the other hand, the impossibility of our intelligence reaching to any adequate conception of the nature of the Self-existent One, will be recognised unreservedly and reverently by all who contend most strenuously that the Absolute is the object of knowledge. 'The limits of religious thought' are granted. This is the important truth for which Hamilton and Mansel raised their testimony; and when taken in this sense as testimony to the inadequacy of all our thoughts of the Transcendent Being, Herbert Spencer will find a ready and cordial assent to this explicit and strong utterance: 'In all imaginable ways we find thrust upon us the truth that we are not permitted to know—nay, are not even permitted to conceive—that Reality which is behind the veil of Appearance.'—*First Principles*, p. 110. We know the Self-existent Cause; yet our knowledge, gathered in snatches by reference to mere fragments of truth, is continually marked by recognised imperfection; and

we must add that it must ever so continue to be, even throughout the successive stages of an unceasing advance.

6. Agnosticism does not formulate itself. It is a tendency, a habit of thought, an influence spreading through society, which does not commit itself to any philosophic scheme; it is strong in negatives and in nothing beyond, for it does not even profess a completed philosophy of the intelligent life represented in individual consciousness.

As concerned with intellectual procedure, Agnosticism connects itself with the ordinary activities of thought, seeking in these its ground for the restraint of thought. Restriction here must make good for itself the strongest defence if it is not to be brushed aside along with other obstacles which have started in the pathway of progress. Its test will be found in these very conditions of thought to which it appeals. Such positive form as belongs to it appears in the pre-eminence assigned to Observation. The observational sciences are made to afford the model of such knowledge as gives certainty. There is no adverse criticism to be expended here, for the value of observation is matter of agreement. But there is no observational science which depends upon observation alone, for intellectual activity invariably implies more than the senses supply. Hence, the restriction to pure observation is impossible. Scientific thought here turns against Agnosticism with telling effect. There is not a single example of observational science which does not recognise truth transcending such experience as is supplied by the senses, for it presents to us, as its main achievement, truth lying beyond reach of sight and touch. The very work of science is to interpret the secrets of nature; to discover by large induction the hidden things superior to the facts which lie under daily observation, assigning to these higher facts a special significance for discovery of truth still higher, in general laws of Nature. Now all this, so far as mere intellectual method is concerned, carries a reversal of the Agnostic plea. It is impossible at once to trust and to

distrust rational procedure ; or to insist on connecting rational procedure with the facts of material existence alone. Coming still more closely to the conditions of scientific thought, it is granted round the whole circle of the physical sciences that in the knowledge of effects we find some knowledge of their causes. It is in this way alone that scientific thought receives from observation guidance towards discovery of higher truth ; and it must be impossible on rational grounds to maintain that what holds for intelligence when dealing with sections of the universe, ceases to hold when intelligence attempts to deal with the universe as a whole, and continues to press the problem of Causality still further than physical science can do.

7. The history of the religions of the world carries everywhere evidence confirmatory of the position that all intelligence, by its reference to causality, is led to recognition of the Self-existent. This history bears on its surface at the same time the history of the intellectual development of the race ; and is on this account increasingly valuable in the testimony it affords as to the laws of the intelligent life, presenting, as it does, in vivid contrast stages of development far removed from each other. On this ground Pfeleiderer remarks that 'we must remember that in proportion to the distance between the whole mental position of primitive man and ours, must necessarily be the distance between his idea of God and ours' (*Philosophy of Religion*, vol. iii. p. 21). Max Müller, in his *Introduction to the Science of Religion*, p. 17, states his fundamental position in the following form : 'Religion is a mental faculty which, independent of, nay, in spite of sense and reason, enables man to apprehend the infinite under different names and under varying guises.' This utterance has naturally encountered adverse criticism on the ground that it is unwarrantable to describe Religion as a faculty ; but all religion does imply a definite characteristic of the conscious life, and the main point in the statement is the one which is borne out by large induction, that all religious thought carries somehow a recognition

of the Infinite or Supreme, and this in some way essential to intelligence, and superior to sense and to trained argumentation. If recognition of the Infinite be discoverable even in the rudest examples of religious faith and worship, the fact is in some respects the strongest testimony that can be presented as to the essential movements of all human intelligence under the principle of Causality. That such thought should be traceable in the action of the uneducated intelligence gives most convincing evidence of the native power of intellect itself; and when we pass to examples in the history of developed intelligence, we find that in such stages intellect has delivered itself from the inconsistencies accepted unreflectingly at lower stages, and has purified its conceptions of the First Cause, by more exact adherence to the rational basis in common thought. In seeking to account for the evidence now gathered from all sides, Max Müller concludes that along with sense, and the ordinary reasoning process, there is in man an exercise of *faith*, which recognises existence invisible; and he adds that 'without this third potential energy, the facts which are before us in religion, both subjectively and objectively, seem inexplicable' (*Origin and Growth of Religion*, p. 27). There seems full warrant for this position, that all 'religion in its subjective sense' implies faith; but we need also to admit in accordance with the unity of rational life that such faith finds its rise and development in accordance with the laws of the rationalising process as concerned with the facts of daily life. This position is admirably stated by Pfleiderer when he says: 'If the common kernel of religion in all its forms is that reference of man's life to the world-governing power which seeks to grow into a living union with it, this is actually present at the very lowest stage of the primitive mythical consciousness' (*Philosophy of Religion*, vol. iii. p. 27). On the other hand, the tendency of intelligence to free itself from sensuous modes of representation in the conceptions formed of the Supreme Being is conspicuous in the revulsion of the cultivated intel-

lect against anthropomorphic representations of the Deity, even while it is unreservedly granted that we must think of the Supreme Intelligence in accordance with the intellectual life given in our own consciousness. The higher advance intelligence makes, it admits the more readily in relation to religious conceptions, that while we cannot sever 'the religious intelligence,' if I may be allowed the phrase, from the limits and restraints belonging to consciousness, it must be the continual effort of the intellect to deliver itself from the inconsistency which must inevitably adhere to implicit anthropomorphism.

8. Knowledge of God is advanced by means of extending knowledge of Nature, and especially of the conditions and possible attainments of moral life. By appreciation, specially of the authority and transcendent excellency of moral law, we are enabled to rise to our loftiest conceptions of the Divine nature. Widening knowledge of the universe in all its inexhaustible wealth of correlated existence gives us ever advancing knowledge of the nature and government of the source of all finite being. Of this wealth of existence, Kant has written in apt terms: 'The world around us opens before our view so magnificent a spectacle of order, variety, beauty, and conformity to ends, that whether we pursue our observations into the infinity of space in the one direction, or into its illimitable divisions on the other; whether we regard the world in its greatest or its least manifestations—even after we have attained to the highest summit of knowledge which our weak minds can reach, we find that language, in the presence of wonders so inconceivable, has lost its force, and number its power to reckon—nay, even thought fails to conceive adequately, and our conception of the whole dissolves into an astonishment without the power of expression, all the more eloquent that it is dumb' (*Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 382).

9. Knowledge of God on the ground of analogy between the Divine nature and human intelligence presupposes know-

ledge of the attributes of Deity, fitting us to detect analogy, and also to determine where it fails. Neglect of this fundamental law of analogical reasoning is a defect in Bishop Browne's works on this subject, otherwise so valuable (*Proced. of the Human Understanding*, 2d edition, London, 1729; and *Things Divine and Supernatural*, London, 1733). Ability to recognise how analogy fails saves us from resting content in anthropomorphic representations of Deity, which would vitiate the radical conception resting on the fundamental belief (Buchanan's *Analogy as a Guide to Truth*).

10. Such knowledge as we have of the Divine nature is knowledge of Infinite Being, not of Infinitude. Here the position of Hamilton and Mansel is strong even to self-evidence. Human knowledge cannot compass the Infinite. But, on the other hand, it seems no less certain that Hamilton was wrong, on psychological grounds, in maintaining that 'existence can only be an object of thought, inasmuch as it is an object thought (Letter, *Philos. of the Infin.*, p. 498, *Metaphysics*, vol. ii.), and that partial knowledge of an object is knowledge of a part (*Ib.*). Mansel went still further wrong in making conception of an object equivalent to 'consciousness of Being,' or knowledge of 'a thing in consciousness' (*Bampt. Lect.*, 7th edition, p. 51. See Young's *Province of Reason*, London, 1860).

11. The Infinitude of the Divine Nature necessarily involves incomprehensibility of the excellence of that nature. No manifestation of the Divine power can discover the fulness of the Divine nature. Progress of human knowledge can be nothing more than relative approximation towards a fuller knowledge of the Divine.

12. Such knowledge as we attain can be formulated only by regarding the Deity as possessed of such Attributes as are adequate for the accomplishment of recognised facts. While the facts of the universe guide us in postulating the Divine attributes, our belief in the infinitude of the Divine nature

must regulate us in our affirmations and inferences. It is in this way that the original belief in the Divine existence delivers human thought from those contradictions set in array by Mansel as a barrier to systematic theology (*Limits of Religious Thought, Bampt. Lect.*).

CHAPTER III.

RIVAL THEORIES AS TO THE ORIGIN OF THE UNIVERSE.

1. THE MATERIALISTIC.—No theory of Existence can assume a purely negative form. Nothing is easier, certainly, than the utterance of a negation, for, as Lotze has said, 'It is possible to deny a thing' (*Logic*, p. 513), even the most widely accepted belief. An Atheistic position, pure and simple, is, however, impossible. The Universe is a reality, and some account of its source is needful. Whosoever takes a sceptical attitude must assume the responsibility of accounting for the universe apart from the Supernatural, thereby making the Universe itself the Self-existent. For if we deny that there is a First Cause, we affirm that the Universe has not been caused, and we are assigning to it eternity of existence. But this is merely a hypothesis,—a pure venture, without any warrant, impossible of support on grounds of observation, and with no ground in reason.

Taking the universe as known to us, as the problem to be solved, we find neither in the permanent nor in the changeable that which warrants a belief in its self-existence.

Permanency seems the most favourable characteristic for a materialistic scheme; and science supplies data with which some beginning may be made. No power found in operation can increase or diminish the matter or the energy in the universe. But this does not imply self-sufficiency or self-existence. On the contrary, the fixedness of amount is limitation—determinateness—calling for some explanation not presented in the nature of matter and energy, either when taken singly or

unitedly. That to which the Materialist refers as the source of all, itself requires to have its existence accounted for.

Granting, however, the pre-existence of matter and energy, it is impossible with such data to explain the history of this world as depicted for us under scientific observation. The perplexity of the problem under a Materialistic theory is not lessened but increased when duality of origin is assigned, by introducing Energy in addition to Material Substance. Duality of existence, with co-eternity of duration, involves perplexity sufficient to bar logical procedure. This duality of existence implies diversity of nature and mutual restriction; and these two, diversity and limitation, raise anew the problem which they were meant to solve. The explanation needs to be explained. We must account for two orders of existence and their correlation.

The second perplexity for the Materialist is that unorganised matter, even with the aid of the energy existing in the world, is inadequate to account for organised being.

The third perplexity is that organism is insufficient as the source of conscious life. Intelligence is the highest of the facts with which to test the adequacy of the materialistic doctrine. Intellect starts the problem, and the solution must at least carry an explanation of such powers as belong to the investigator. But it is impossible from sensibility to deduce the facts of consciousness. For detailed criticism of the attempt to make good the transition, we refer to the discussion under Biological Evolution, p. 95.

Finally, the whole theory is involved in the utmost logical perplexity as an attempted advance from less to greater, without the possibility of satisfying the demands of causality.

2. THE PANTHEISTIC.—The theory, That God is all— $\tau\omicron\pi\hat{\alpha}\nu$ —has appeared in a variety of forms. The common aim of the theory is to maintain, not only the unity of the source of finite existence, but absolute and eternal unity of all existence. That there is a changeable, a fluctuating, even an

evanescent existence, is admitted ; but the imperfect and transitory are only phenomenal—the mere varying manifestations of the one abiding, unchangeable Being—the surface swell on the unfathomable and untroubled ocean of existence.

The theory wears either a materialistic or spiritualistic type, according to the point of view from which facts are regarded. From the lower point of view, matter itself is of the very nature of the Deity. In this form, the theory is only a higher phase of materialism. From the higher point of view, the Deity is the spiritual existence pervading all things; the spiritual force operating through all things; the immanent cause of all occurrences. In this type of the theory, matter and intellect present broken discoveries of the grandeur of absolute being.

Akin to this in thought, apart from formulated philosophic theory, is the poetic perception of life and intelligence in all forms of existence.

The test of the Pantheistic theory is concerned with the philosophic competency of its account of the relation of finite existence to the Absolute. How can we identify the 'all' with the Divine? Accepting the testimony of experience, how can we establish the unity of the Absolute and the relative? The duality of existence being admitted as fact, to establish a real unity is the grand difficulty. Descending in the scale of being, the difficulty is great of attributing known existence to the Absolute. Ascending in the scale, human life, though highest in type, presents the greatest obstacle to the acceptance of this philosophy. Man is the living refutation of it. The Personality which makes independent action possible; the law which applies to such personality; the obligation which flows from this law; action at one time in obedience to the law, at another in *violation* of it; these are facts making it impossible for us legitimately to embrace all being in unity.

This is fatal to the philosophic claims of Comte's conception of a Great Being; the sum of all humanity. The Philosophy which declines the search for causes is naturally at its weakest in seeking for a Deity, and arranging forms of worship (Comte's *Politique Positive*, and *Catéchisme*; Lewes's *Hist. of Philos.* ii. 635; M'Cosh's *Method of Div. Govt.* 7th ed. p. 240; Caird's *Positivism*).

The philosophic system of Spinoza, as developed in the *Ethics*, is avowedly Pantheistic, and is properly taken as a type of such a theory. Hume, quite unwarrantably, spoke of Spinoza as 'that famous atheist' (*Treat. of Hum. Nat.* i. iv. 5), and his system has often been described as atheistic. Such representations are, however, altogether inconsistent with the structure of the theory. His system has theism in its very centre, and his whole frame of mind was alien to atheistic belief and feeling. With Spinoza, God is everything, and it is the overwhelming grandeur of the one conception which makes it impossible for him to admit a distinct existence for any other being. His purpose is from the conceptions of Substance, Self-existence, and God to deduce thence the scheme of existence.

The real strain upon Spinoza's theory is its mode of accounting for finite forms of existence. The transition point is reached at Prop. xv. Pars I., with its Demonstr. and Scholium. Any one may legitimately refuse to pass the Definition of Substance. But, once entered on the argument, Prop. xv. is the testing point. His theory may be summarised thus: Substance is self-existent; there is but one substance, God; attributes are the essential properties of Substance, finite forms are modes of the attributes; one substance cannot produce another, i. Prop. vi. ; 'whatever is, is in God,' Prop. xv. ; 'all who have ever thought of the Divine nature in any proper way deny that God is corporeal'; but corporeal substance itself is not divisible, since divisibility applies only to the mode of an attribute, not to the attribute itself, much less to the substance; divisibility applies only to modality, not to

reality—*modaliter, non autem realiter*; God himself therefore is not corruptible, but only the modes of his attributes; God himself is *natura naturans*, all that follows from the necessity of his nature is *natura naturata*, Prop. 29; therefore 'things could not have been produced by God otherwise than they have been,' Prop. 33.

The test of such a theory is twofold, from the theistic side, and from the finite side. *First*, it sacrifices the consistency of theism. The Absolute is represented as necessitated to act; God is a necessary cause, and is said to be free only in the sense of acting by the necessity of his own nature, a position which denies to Deity any choice in action. To aggravate the difficulty, God is necessitated to cause the changeable and corruptible; absolutely perfect attributes are necessitated to produce corruptible modes of existence; the modes of existence are not in harmony with their causes. *Second*, it fails to explain the facts of finite existence. Body is not mere measurement, but the thing measured; not mere modality, but reality, which every observer recognises as distinct from self. This theory of the 'All' is not a theory of the universe as known to us. These are fatal objections to the logical coherence of the scheme, and they cannot be modified without destroying its essential features.

3. THE POLYTHEISTIC.—This phase of thought, prominent as it has been in the history of human life, has not been presented in philosophic form, or only metaphorically. It is an illustration only of the broken and separate action of thought, assigning distinct personality to different manifestations of Supernatural power. It has influenced the life of nations, the lowest and the highest in civilisation, yet even as presented in the history of Greece and Rome, it must be regarded as the product of disintegration of thought.

CHAPTER IV.

RELATIONS OF THE MORAL GOVERNOR TO THE PROBLEMS OF MORAL LIFE.

I. THE FOUNDATION OF VIRTUE.—The first of the metaphysical questions peculiar to Ethical science is the source of all morality, or the foundation of Virtue. As moral beings, capable of recognising moral law, and of putting it into application, so as to realise virtue in our life, we are constrained to inquire as to the ultimate ground of morality.

Here there are two alternatives :—Either a theory of the Impersonality of Reason, identifying it with Absolute Intelligence, so that it is God in us who unfolds his own wisdom in moral life ; or a theory that Human Reason, while distinct from Divine Intelligence, is a power for recognising absolute truth, implanted by the Author of our being, and for the explanation of which we are thrown back in thought upon that which belongs to the Divine nature itself.

There are no data on which to warrant a metaphysical conclusion to the impersonality of Reason. Cousin asks the question, 'Is Reason, strictly speaking, purely human? or rather, is it only so far human as it makes its appearance in man?' To which he replies, 'Reason is not individual, hence it is not ours; it does not belong to us, is not human' (*Hist. of Mod. Philos.* i. p. 75; *Cours de Mod. Phil.*, Leçon 5). That we are not by interpretation of experience the source of all our knowledge is granted by all who accept a transcendental philosophy. Admitting that the knowledge which Reason gives is a common possession of the race—is 'Common

Sense,' as the earlier of the Scottish Philosophers named it, this admission lends no support to a theory of the impersonality of Reason. That we are not primarily the source of our knowledge holds, in a sense, even in reference to the knowledge experience affords. And nothing is more natural than that Intelligence in its constitution should be, *à priori*, in possession of its own laws and conditions of procedure, while the facts of experience are provided for by contact of the active consciousness with external nature. Though these conditions of knowledge are very different in the two cases, there is no warrant to regard Reason in any other light than as an organ of human knowledge. All that Cousin pleads for in the exercise of the faculty is granted, without accepting his conclusion, and the reference to the Deity is not ignored, but merely presented in a different form.

Knowledge of moral law belongs to us through the action of our Reason, which discovers this law, without explaining how the discovery has been provided for, or on what ultimate basis the law rests. In the language of Kant, 'Reason is the faculty which prescribes to the understanding the laws of its harmonious and perfect exercise' (*Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 353).

Taking the Divine Existence as the explanation of all finite being, it is in conformity with the solution of the earlier problem that we regard the Divine nature itself as the foundation of Virtue. There must be in the Divine nature that which explains the purpose and procedure realising themselves in a moral race. We thus reach the metaphysical result that the foundation of virtue is the moral purity or perfection of the Divine nature.

The relation of the Divine Will to the Divine nature must be such that the former, as expressed in creation, is the exponent of the latter. Moral obligation and responsibility imply the exercise of Divine control. We may, therefore, affirm that the source of all morality is in the Divine Will,

but this can rank only as a provisional and partial statement, leaning upon the excellence of the Divine nature. Cicero, *De Legibus*, reasons that there is '*Commune jus inter deos et homines.*' Human morality cannot have its ultimate source in mere command, or exercise of authority. Such a supposition would imply either that God might act capriciously, that is, without regard to his own perfection; or that he might act in violation of his own perfection. In appealing to the Divine nature it is simply affirmed that the action of the Deity must be in accordance with the perfection of his own nature—that Divine action never can fall beneath that.

In this appears the illogical character of a Scholastic assertion, such as that of William of Occam: '*Nullum actum malum esse nisi quatenus a Deo prohibitum, et qui non possit fieri bonus si a Deo præcipiatur*'; there is no act which is wrong except as it is forbidden by God, and which cannot be made right if commanded by God. Such a position can have no metaphysical sanction, being irreconcilable with the testimony of our own moral nature, as that is a witness for the righteousness of the Moral Governor.

II. RELATION OF DIVINE SOVEREIGNTY TO FREE WILL.—If the Divine existence is the explanation of all finite being, it follows that there is Divine sovereignty over all such being. This is a simple interpretation of the relation between the Absolute and the dependent. The dependent cannot restrict the Absolute; the Absolute Being cannot restrict his own nature. As Divine Sovereignty must apply equally to all forms of originated being, no creature can be so highly endowed as to be independent of Divine control. Independence could not be achieved by the dependent, and could not be conferred by the Absolute Being. Subjection to sovereign control must therefore hold true of the rational as well as of the irrational creation, and of activity as well as of sensitivity in creatures. In this necessary truth there is, however, no warrant for inference as to the manner in which such absolute

sovereignty is exercised. Inference on this subject must come from the facts of experience.

Running all through the universe there are lines of evidence which illustrate sovereign control. These cross the domain of human life as obviously as they touch the narrow field of activity belonging to the lowest organism. Man, whilst holding the highest place among living agencies in the world, is conscious of subjection to forces which he cannot control, and to which he must conform his efforts if these are to be attended with success. His experience is thus a continual lesson of subjection. The laws of the material world he can discover; these laws he can in some degree employ for the attainment of his own ends; but he cannot alter their nature or change their applications. The laws of mind are equally definite and uniform in their action; they are *laws* of our nature, altogether superior to personal choice.

In observing and classifying the facts indicative of the action of a sovereign determining power in the universe, we discover evidence of diversity in the manner of control over different forms of existence. As these vary so greatly that they may be classified as animate and inanimate, rational and irrational, the laws of their control differ accordingly. The analogies of our own control over others may so far guide us as to sovereign control over dependent being. Our control over our fellow-men, for example, may sustain a conclusion in favour of diversity in the forms of sovereign control within Creation. We are not in possession of facts, however, from which to reach exact conclusions as to the manner in which Divine control is exercised over the actions of men. Having no immediate consciousness of the exercise of Divine control in our own history, the exact manner and measure of such control transcends the range of a legitimate philosophy. This precludes an argument from Sovereignty to the denial of freedom of will, as we are precluded from reasoning conversely from freedom of will to a denial of Divine Sovereignty. On exactly

the same ground, we cannot reason from Divine foreknowledge to the denial of human freedom ; any more than we are warranted to reason, as some have done, from freedom to the denial of foreknowledge (see Ed. Williams, *Equity of Divine Govt.*, and *Defence of Mod. Calvinism* ; and Mozley on the *Augustinian Doct. of Predestination*).

While granting that the facts of intelligent self-control are the most perplexing in view of the absolute sovereignty of the Deity, Will itself bears direct witness to Sovereignty. The analysis of consciousness has shown that our freedom is not an absolute, but a restricted freedom. It is a power capable of controlling our other powers, and this freedom can be sustained and extended only by means of intelligent appreciation of the laws under which these powers operate. Will is, therefore, not a faculty which can claim to possess freedom of such form as to contradict Divine Sovereignty. On the other hand, the freedom which involves the agent in obligation and responsibility carries continual acknowledgment of the sovereignty of a Divine Ruler.

III. THE ORIGIN OF EVIL.—If the Deity be the source of all dependent being, which exists only because he wills that it should exist, how does he permit the outbreak and continuance of moral evil? This is one of the darkest and most perplexing problems of moral philosophy.

The limitation of a finite nature occasions no perplexity, and it affords no help towards a solution of our difficulty. To say that finite existence is imperfect is an identical proposition ; it is to say that finite existence is finite, and this gives no occasion for perplexity. Archbishop King puts it accurately when he says, ' Either nothing at all must be created, or something imperfect ' (*Origin of Evil*, chap. v. sec. v., subsec. i., 5th ed. p. 309). The question, therefore, does not assume this form, Why does imperfect being exist, and why are all the natural evils of restricted existence found in the universe ? but Why does moral evil exist, that is, why, in the

realm of creation, is there any being out of harmony with the laws of its own nature, and out of harmony with the nature and will of the Deity?

This problem includes two questions :—(1.) How could moral evil be superinduced upon a nature morally pure? (2.) How could moral evil on its appearance in the world be permitted to continue in it? The first question, though properly psychological, involves speculative inquiry, because ours is a consciousness of the operations of intelligence only in its disordered state.

That the Deity himself is not the source of moral evil is involved in the acknowledgment of his righteousness as the Absolute Moral Governor. That which is inevitable on a Pantheistic scheme is impossible on a Theistic, which maintains essential duality of existence. Spinoza and Hegel did not hesitate to maintain that as all finite modes belong to the Infinite, all forms of evil must be included. The Theistic scheme, maintaining that no finite modes can belong to the Infinite, maintains that no evil can be attributed to his nature or government. This is the essential contrast between a philosophy based on necessary acknowledgment of the First Cause, eternally Self-sufficient, and a philosophy drawn from the abstract conceptions of our Intelligence.

The impossibility of the Deity himself being the source of moral evil is implied in the nature of such evil. Moral law, and the moral obligation, and responsibility belonging to us, all rest upon absolute moral purity in The Absolute. In denial of this, the solution of the problem of existence is surrendered. The fallacy, if there be any, must lie at an earlier stage; it cannot lie here. The present position can be turned only by a valid argument concluding that the source of finite existence is in the One Absolute Being. If the moral law in us is the expression of the Divine Will concerning us, he is a God of perfect moral purity.

In the laws of our moral nature as known in conscious-

ness, we find some clew to the possibility of the outbreak of moral evil. Our nature, being complex, so that desires, affections, emotions, intelligence, and will have their several parts to perform; and having its perfection secured only in the continued balance of all these; the possibility of its disorder is found in the peculiar nature of the desires, as craving powers (see before, *Psychol. of Ethics*, Pt. II. chap. i. sec. 6, p. 163). It is only the possibility of the outbreak of moral disorder which here concerns us, not the actual outbreak itself, which must be matter of history, not of philosophy.

The clew here obtained is nothing more, for there still remains the difficulty of deciding how a nature perfectly balanced could disturb its own harmony. So far as present experience can guide, the explanation lies in the freedom of the will, implied in the existence of a moral agent. Why such a power should have been given to any being is not a question at all, for without such power there could have been no morality. Why God should have created moral beings is a quite different question, not concerned with the possibility of disorder of the moral nature when created. But the possibility of disorder may be enough to account so far for the fact of disorder in the event of its taking place.

4. The permission of the outbreak and continuance of moral disorder must still remain the darkest mystery involved in the universe. If there be absolute sovereignty, why is moral evil allowed? Archbishop King has thus indicated the alternatives to which our thoughts may turn. 'There are three ways whereby God may be conceived able to have prevented bad elections: first, if he had created no free being at all; secondly, if his omnipotence interpose and occasionally restrain the will, which is naturally free, from any wrong election; thirdly, if he should change the present state of things, and translate man into another, where the occasions to error and incitements to evil being cut off, he should meet with nothing that could tempt him to choose amiss' (*Origin of Evil*,

chap. v. sec. v. sub. 2, p. 312*). More shortly,—The alternatives are, no free beings;—free agents always restrained when tempted to transgress;—or free agents whose freedom is never tried in such a way as to test voluntary submission to moral law. Of these, the first must be discarded as involving a claim for restriction upon the absolute; and the second, as implying a breach on the nature of the creature; and the third, as inconsistent with the conditions of moral life.

If, then, we can see no way in which moral beings could certainly be guarded against an outbreak of moral evil; and if it be a condition of moral life that voluntary obedience be put to proof; why did the Sovereign Being not visit with the punishment of destruction any moral agent who voluntarily destroyed the harmony of the moral world? This is the final form of a mystery, insoluble from the lower side of existence, and whose solution can lie only in the heights of Absolute Being.

IV. FUTURE LIFE. (IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.) With an Absolute Being as the Great First Cause, the final problem of the Metaphysic of Ethics concerns the question of future existence for moral agents. What is our destiny? What are the rational expectations as to a life beyond the present state? The immediate occasion for this question is the limit which death brings to our activity here. In seeking an answer, we must consider first the facts out of which the question arises.

The facts pointing towards the termination of our present state of existence are connected exclusively with our physical nature. In our physical life, as in the history of all organism, there is a progression of bodily development until maturity is reached, after which there is gradual decay. But in mind, the law of progress is not likewise associated with evidence of the law of decay, even when we most clearly recognise the mental results attendant on senile diminution of brain power. That our nature is one, and that weakness of body can entail restraint upon mental action, are admitted facts;

but the source of this restraint is in the body, not in the mind. The body may be dismembered while the mind continues active as before. Chief importance here attaches to the contrast between the facts of physical and mental life during the infirmities of age. At such a time, when recollection of the occurrences of the day is difficult, recollections of events which happened threescore years before are vivid and exact. Such facts point towards the possibility of continued existence and advancing activity of the spirit apart from the body (see Taylor's *Physical Theory of Another Life*).

Beyond these, the facts of our moral life expressly warrant a conclusion as to the certainty of a future state. If there be moral obligation and responsibility, their full significance can be realised only in another state of being, where account of moral actions can be rendered. On this line of reflection, it is legitimate to conclude that the future state must be one of rewards and punishments.

This argument does not rest on what Comte has called 'the police consideration of a Future State' (*Philos. Positive*, Martineau's Transl. ii. 165); a consideration which is the legitimate logical accompaniment of the utilitarian and necessitarian view of responsibility, as expressed by Mr. Mill, 'Supposing a man to be of a vicious disposition he cannot help doing the criminal act, if he is allowed to believe that he will be able to commit it unpunished' (*Exam.* 575-6). This consideration is reversed under a transcendental universalism, such as that of Spinoza or Hegel, for rejection of which I have argued on distinct grounds. I am not, however, here looking along the line of a 'police consideration' of restraint, but along the line of higher intellectual and ethical possibilities, in full harmony with obligations held sacred here. The spiritual achievements of the present life must remain as a personal possession, whose real worth shall find acknowledgment from the Absolute Ruler. The argument, resting on our conception of perfection of character yet to be attained,

our progress towards it, our aspiration after it, finds, in all these considerations, warrant for anticipating that the Future Life which obligation implies must afford scope for the realisation of the possibilities after which we aspire (see specially the very impressive passages closing Plato's *Apologia*). In the history of philosophic thought there is nothing more striking in anticipation of future judgment than the passage in Plato's *Phædo*, 107-14.

While the most prominent facts of our life combine to support the belief in a Future State, there is nothing which logically warrants an inference to Immortality of existence. Such a conclusion can be sustained neither from the immateriality of the soul, the favourite logical basis (see Dr. S. Clarke's *Answer to Dodwell*, with Defences);—nor from the ceaseless motion of the soul, as with Plato in the *Phædrus*;—nor from the ideas of abstract beauty, goodness, and magnitude, as in the *Phædo*;—nor from the nature of the soul as a simple being, as argued by Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786) in his *Phædon*, a Dialogue after the Platonic model, preceded by a sketch of the character of Socrates, published at Berlin, 1767, which reached a fifth edition in 1814, and is criticised by Kant, *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*, Meiklejohn's Transl. p. 245.

The finite, since it is not self-sufficient, cannot afford an argument towards immortality. The nature which is dependent upon the Absolute Being for its origin must be dependent on his will for its continuance. While, therefore, Futurity of Existence is clearly involved in the facts of the present life, Eternity of existence must depend upon the Divine Will, and can be known only as matter of distinct revelation, not as matter of metaphysical speculation. All that is greatest in us points towards an immeasurable future. Thither we must look for the solution of many of our dark problems, and for attainment of purity and grandeur of life unknown in the present state. But Immortality, if it be ours,

must be the gift of God. Over the best intellect, if it be restricted to pure speculation, must hang the great uncertainty which found utterance in the closing words of the *Apology* of Socrates,—‘The hour to depart has come,—for me to die, for you to live ; but which of us is going to a better state is unknown to every one except to God,’—*ἄδελον παντὶ πλὴν ἢ τῷ Θεῷ.*

APPLIED ETHICS.

CHAPTER I.

PHILOSOPHY OF PRACTICE.

1. WE now come to the consummation of the whole range of inquiry belonging to Moral Philosophy as a practical science. Aristotle was the first to draw formally the distinction between theoretical and practical sciences. With the enthusiasm of a mind great in the power of classification, he was inclined to push to an extremity his definition of the practical, as if it were the very end of science to secure right practice. This is an untenable position. The end of science is interpretation of procedure; it is an answer to the question, How are results effected? Right practice is a thing of the life, for which the life itself has its own fitness. Whatever it may need in motive force, it does not need philosophy for its accomplishment. The work even of a practical philosophy is only to interpret the manner in which our nature provides for the results which are proper to its life.

Leading up to this, we have sought a philosophy of our knowledge, and of our power as moral agents; and we have endeavoured to determine the implied relations of our life to the transcendent Being, the Absolute as Moral Governor. Now we must consider the relation of all this to the field of work, not merely in an external sense, but in view of the life-truths already discovered.

Our main question now is, How does Conscience realise itself in practical life? How does the Ethical Universal travel

through particular forms? How does moral law find its application in the government of personal life through all relations in society? How does a rational life begin to understand its own meaning, power, and promise; and prosecute its work in all diversities of environment? We have to consider how self learns the lesson of control, travelling by paths of self-denial to higher attainment; how it finds in society both tests and helps, learning the largeness of intelligent life, and the lofty place it holds in the universe.

First in this department comes the whole inquiry as to formation of character, for moral life, like every other, has to attain maturity; and beyond this the larger question as to the efficiency of moral power in all possible directions of activity.

2. The question which lies nearest to us as immediately connected with the early stages of life is formation of character; and for interpretation of personal activity in this direction, it becomes needful that we regard separately the fixed conditions of moral development, and thereafter the voluntary effort which must be exerted in every life in accordance with these permanent conditions.

Character, as distinct from nature, is an established order of disposition which by development gradually acquires strength, in accordance with the rules of life most frequently accepted and acted upon. Character is either good or bad, according as the reigning dispositions are in harmony with Conscience, or antagonistic to its authority.

THE LAW OF ASSOCIATION, providing for facility in retaining and recalling knowledge, enables us to classify actions and dispositions as right and wrong, so that we can promptly act without hesitation or critical inquiry. In this we are naturally helped (or hindered), as Herbert Spencer and others maintain, by the moral convictions prevailing around us. The results of the observation and experience of previous generations are necessarily transmitted.

THE LAW OF HABIT provides for greater facility in action

by frequent repetition of the act. It is not to be confounded with the law of Custom, or Familiarity, which only allows for the diminution of passive impression made by objects constantly under observation. Under the law of Habit moral conflict in self-government is simplified; subjection of all the motive forces to rational control becomes more constant; and dispositions which incline to the performance of duty gain practical ascendancy in co-operation with conscience. On this ground, Aristotle gave prominence to Habit (*Ethics*, I. 8). Such Habit is not 'a mechanical necessity,' as Kant represents it (*Metaph. of Ethics*, Semple, 224), but an aptness which is essentially dependent on personal direction, as it implies previous faithfulness in the application of Conscience.

Peril to moral life is constantly encountered under both of these fixed conditions, inasmuch as they are capable of giving permanence to erroneous conclusions and to evil habits. Just because these fixed conditions operate irrespective of personal choice and of direct design on our part; and because they play a part as readily for evil as for good; the fact is emphasised that all sure progress in the true development of moral life depends upon deliberate exercise of thought in the application of the principles of the reason. In a philosophy of practice we therefore pass beyond the fixed conditions tributary to formation of character, to reach the voluntary efforts for this end under guidance of the moral faculty.

Conscience realises itself only through the understanding, as the working power for the whole intelligent life. As we have seen that reason intuitively, that is, without direct effort, provides for us the principle of conduct which is to be applied in practice; and as such revelation of ethical principle is secured only in the ordinary action of intelligence as it is concerned with direction of conduct; the application of such principle must be effected through the action of thought as it concerns itself with direction of conduct. Thought is thus the true working power in the formation of character itself, without

the deliberate and searching action of which it is impossible that sound results can be secured. Anything that may be said in celebration of the worth of natural temperament, and of the value of feeling and interest, is of no philosophic significance in the procedure required for moral development, except in so far as such impulsive force is controlled by intelligence.

From internal conditions our survey must pass to those which are *external*, for environment supplies conditions of ethical progress, as essential as air and exercise are to physical health and development. For breadth of character and largeness of force in moral life, it is needful that external conditions should be largely above and beyond personal selection. The unexpected seems in large degree necessary,—and in view of the degree of moral disorder within, even the inimical,—in order that the mental basis may be broad and solid, and that moral energy may be equal to the demands. The self-selected and the artificial in outward arrangements are more likely to be hurtful than helpful to sound moral progress. So much does the true interest of moral progress lie in the unexpected, that that life is likely to be richer in the development of power, and enlargement of its possibilities of action, which is daily carried into the midst of the greatest varieties of circumstances, taxing resources and calling for diversity in the nature of occupation. Notwithstanding all that has been said and sung in praise of a meditative life, no human life can be truly great and strong which is developed and exercised mainly in meditation.

The true working force of practical thought is found in Will. Ethical thought must express itself in *volition*; and the more varied the range of activity, calling out the exercise of intelligence, making large demand on voluntary determination, the more must be the inherent strength belonging to the moral life. The fully developed moral agent must be able to look unflinchingly at absolute laws of life, and must turn thence

to face all possible complications in outward circumstances with a calm confidence, as well as profound sense of responsibility. What is to be sought is a *self-possessed life*, distinguished by the activity of ethical thought, and its efficiency in government of impulses and command of circumstances.

One serious practical perplexity there is connected with dependence on outward circumstances for breadth of moral development,—many must be so situated that monotony is characteristic of their life, rather than variety of situation and demand. Beyond doubt such a situation is unfavourable to wide moral culture, and it must be at once the duty and the interest of the individual so placed to enlarge the scope of individual life. And the interests of human life are so interlaced, and mutually dependent, that there should be no grave perplexity in solving the problem how to give variety to the activities of one's life.

3. Towards discharge of the duty of successful formation of moral character, it is a general and standing requirement that the ideal provided by Conscience have its lineaments fixed in a harmony of human Virtues.

A classification of these may be found in a recognised harmony of law with known relations of personal existence. Three fundamental virtues are thus obtained representing the inner dispositions, which are Reverence, Modesty, and Sympathy; Reverence for the Absolute Being; Modesty, which truthfully estimates personal dignity and efficiency; and Sympathy, which respects and esteems others as persons to whom belong the dignity and responsibility of human nature. With these must be brought into vital relation Faithfulness to known law, often distinguished by the name of Conscientiousness; Courage in the execution of known law; as regards personal gratification, Temperance, in harmony with a rational nature; as concerning dealings with others, Love of Justice, founded on respect for the law of Justice, and a truly general Benevolence.

The relations of these Virtues are such as to provide for special combinations among them, and perfect harmony of the whole in a single character. There are cardinal virtues, as the ancient philosophy proclaimed, hinge or pivot virtues, on which dependent virtues turn. Thus Reverence carries with it meekness and lowliness; Modesty, humility and penitence; Courage, endurance and perseverance. The unity of moral law provides for the harmony of all virtues.

4. In meeting the varying demands of life, absolute law must provide for inferential maxims suited to the measurements of personal duty. Moral life needs its 'measuring art,' and cannot rise to maturity, or fulfil its functions without constant use of it. This is not the 'measuring art' of Socrates, supplying a calculus for accurate estimate of pleasures near and remote; it is the measurement of personal obligation in view of the possibilities of effort. Here opens out the whole range of responsibility for personal thought, presenting the real strain of the practical life.

Law is universal; thought is individual. In order that thought may fulfil its function in the guidance of practical life, it must be as a channel through which the universal passes surely to application. If the law be intuitively known, as is here maintained—or even if it be, as the Utilitarian school insists, only matter of general agreement—the risk of going wrong is not found in the law, but in our *thinking* concerning its application; in this it is, even more than in evil passion, serious as the risk to moral life is from blinding impulse, for passion is only as a blast, while thought is life-long. If only our thinking is clear in its application of moral law, unmixed with any bias, the hope for a pure and noble life is good; the moral agent sees his course clear enough to make advance secure, and to give him readiness for needful conflict. The hopes and the hazards of life are connected with each man's thinking. The great ship is swayed by her helm, and her course depends, not on the wind, but on the steersman. In applied ethics

individual thought counts for everything. In this we find superiority to tradition, and to the standard of society; in this we find the danger of being content to take our guidance from those around us, in which case life can be no better than mediocrity, and may easily fall considerably below it. In this way it appears that the first condition of a truly moral life is independence of thought, in the attempt to attain thoroughness or singleness of application for moral law. The moral agent is saved here from egotism, or affected superiority over others, for it is not his superiority which becomes apparent, but the sovereignty of moral law. Hence the truth of what Kant has said here, that the moral agent cannot be an imitator. He must see and judge for himself, shaping his action for himself in view of personal duty. All life must move under guidance of a common law; but each life must shape itself in view of environment. No two lives are alike, nor can be in practice; though all lives unfold and have their part in the world's work under common law. The harmony of the universe is not disturbed by making each man the determiner of his own activity; but the danger of moral disturbance can be escaped only if each individual concerns himself with the rule of life, escaping a capricious individualism, by acting in accordance with universal law.

The word which serves in practical life to indicate the characteristic of individual thought as it seeks to express in life the requirements of moral law is *conscientiousness*. In order to escape the entanglements and perplexities which beset moral life, we must contemplate this word on both sides, as it claims to rest on Conscience; yet is, and must be, the expression of what the individual agent makes out of the teaching of Conscience, in view of the situation in which he is placed. In Applied Ethics we need to ascertain the exact meaning of 'conscientiousness,' and to determine its ethical value. In popular usage 'conscientiousness' is far from being identified with regard for the teaching of conscience, and is allowed to

cover great diversity of view as to duty. Indeed, the use of the word is familiar as a form of apology for what we consider an unreasonable line of action. We excuse a man on the ground that we believe him to be 'conscientious,' and yet so far is this apologetic aspect of the word from being a strictly accurate and warrantable one, that we can desire nothing better for ourselves or others than to be truly 'conscientious.'

We take first the sinister use of the term, when it does service as an apology for deliberate and persistent doing of what we account as no part of a man's duty, or it may be even what we regard as morally wrong, as in cases of intolerance, or persecution on religious grounds. In such cases we assume that the man *thinks* that he is doing his duty, and we so far give him credit for this, that we allow him to be a 'conscientious' man, that is, we do not regard him as a hypocrite; he is not saying and affecting one thing and doing another. Whatever we may think of him, we do not consider him wilfully wicked; he believes himself to be doing right, while we believe him to be doing wrong. We waive the case of the man who raises to the rank of duty that which we are unable to regard as duty, though this is a difficulty serious enough in its way, involving considerable differences of opinion in morals. But the more serious aspect may be allowed to cover the less. Persecution on religious grounds may be taken here for illustration. The persecutor is not merely a bloodthirsty tyrant taking delight in the sufferings of the tortured, or in the hardships of families driven from their homes, or in the anguish of grief fallen upon those who see the head of their house slain. Such disposition is that of the murderer, and no question as to conscientiousness can have any application. However men may differ as to persecution, or as to penalty of death inflicted for a proclaimed offence, there is no room left for diversity of opinion as to murder and wilful cruelty. The persecutor aims at an end which he regards as good; he thinks he 'does God service' and man also: and with what he esteems righteous

motives he is earnest, not unfrequently fanatical, in his determination. What he aims at doing is to stamp out soul-destroying heresy—to put an end to divisive courses in religion. Whether this task be undertaken at a man's own hand, as in the case of private persecution, with absence of violence, or at the call of the rulers of the nation in execution of the statute of the realm, does not materially affect the ethical question. The essential things are not the outward forms of the action, but the purpose and motives of the agents. And so far as the desire is concerned that men should maintain a faith and practice according to the will of God, we can have no quarrel with motives. A man may well claim to be conscientious thus far, for he claims only that it is right that men should do their duty to God, and this is 'conscientiousness' itself. But when a man insists, even to the extent of enforcing submission, or subjecting men to penalty, that men should on mere authority accept a definite creed as the true interpretation of the Divine Word, or a prescribed ritual as the Divinely appointed form of worship, the claim of 'conscientiousness' is misplaced, and must be disallowed. Such a man may be sincere in his own conviction, and honest in his desire to bring others to the same; but Conscience imposes on him no such 'duty' as he conceives, and gives no such right as he assumes. The Conscience which reveals moral law lays on each moral agent responsibility for its fulfilment; and there can be no such thing as a true 'conscientiousness' in seeking to exceed the demands of law in our eagerness to have it obeyed. Obligation and responsibility rest upon individual life, and we must be content to have it so; morality is impossible under compulsion, and all resort to it is at variance with the nature and application of the law. The name of 'conscientiousness' is absurd when a man shelters himself under it in claiming to judge for others. The categorical imperative leaves no space for human intervention, and guards constitutional civil government from grave dangers as well as from infliction of grievous wrong, by

impressing on the moral agent a personal obligation to judge of duty and to act accordingly.

The legitimate use of the word 'Conscientiousness' is thus made apparent. It applies to thought and purpose which arise and are carried into practical effect when a man has a single eye to moral law; when neither personal preferences nor outward restraints or inducements are allowed to decide conduct; but when duty alone determines. This is the relation in which Conscience and thought are in harmony, and a man has a right to declare that he is 'conscientious,' and others must grant his claim. In order to be truly conscientious, it is required of a man that he do not bow before any authority other than that of moral law itself, which is the expression of the Divine Will. If there are dangers connected with the intrusting to individual decision the measurement of personal duty—and no one can deny that there are—we truly escape the dangers of a false individualism, and effectually guard against pernicious aberrations, by acknowledging that our thought is reliable and carries a moral sanction, only when it is the vehicle by which the universal law finds a clear application within the field of activity. This is the sense in which conscientiousness is to be valued by all.

These considerations open the path into the very wide and entangled field of Opinion in Morals; where are found the vast variety of questions coming within scope of what has been named Casuistry. The disputatious element here appearing does not spring from any indefiniteness in moral law, or from any uncertainty as to its requirements; but from the fact, just adduced, that the application of moral law is intrusted to the moral agent. There is thus inseparable from moral life a measure of uncertainty as to the lines of action to be followed. This arises from the fact that Conscience does not settle duty, but supplies the principles on which it is to be settled. It constitutes the moral agent a thinker, and sets him forth in the field of action to shape his thoughts—and thus to regulate his

life—in accordance with the maxims of right conduct which reason supplies. It is impossible in these circumstances to escape diversity of opinion, to obviate dispute over questions of duty, or to shun the producing of an impression of uncertainty as to the precise demands of moral law. All these things belong essentially to a community of moral agents, in which every member has assigned to him as a leading exercise of his intelligence, to measure out duty between universal law and opportunity for action. There is certainty in moral life, and this is connected with the Universal, as the very basis of thought and action; over against this, there is uncertainty arising as we deal with the particular aspects of conduct, and opportunities implying the possibility of doing one thing rather than another, or seeking to accomplish a purpose in one way rather than in another. Duty is so wide and varied in dimensions that moral agents may readily differ as to what is to be done in given circumstances, and what things may be left undone, when many things are possible.

Slight illustration must suffice for indication of the guidance which Conscience gives, and the responsibility which each agent must assume in matters debatable, as well as the tolerance of judgment each one is called to exercise in view of contrary decisions reached by others, who must be held to be equally 'conscientious' in the proper sense of the word. This possible diversity must be expected to expand or contract, according to the possibilities lying before men, and the complication of interests touched by distinct lines of conduct brought under review.

There is here no reasonable ground of perplexity, as if uncertainty adhered to the laws of moral life themselves, when men select different lines of duty, if it be matter of agreement, that conformity with moral law is secured in all that is undertaken. There is nothing more here than may be accounted for by reference to difference of stand-point, or of personal relations, or even of personal preferences.

A real difficulty may, however, be experienced by a moral agent when great complexity of motive is introduced under an urgent demand for settlement of duty. And where this difficulty implies adjustment of several aspects of possible conduct, we are prepared for recognising the force which may belong to an opinion formed on different lines from those we have preferred.

We now come still closer to the central point of difficulty, and more into the midst of the field of Casuistry, when we pass from mere selection or preference between lines of action equally open under moral law, to concentrate upon cases of direct conflict of opinion, in which the same act is judged right by one, or at least allowable, and is esteemed wrong by another. Such cases are not infrequent, for they are not restricted to the mere borderland where we may dispute whether an action lies beyond the domain of morals, but we encounter them in the heart of Ethical territory, and we are often constrained to conclude that the settlement of them in the one way, or in the other, must result in direct practical effects on the condition of character, and on the general outlook maintained in facing life's possibilities. Very often, indeed, it appears as if a higher and lower level of ordinary conduct were involved in the settlement of the particular question raised. And when this is so, there is need for care and caution lest Casuistry be allowed to descend into an exercise of logical dexterity supposed to be equal to the task of restricting the universal, making a categorical imperative look as if it were only a hypothetical, with which men may tamper under considerations of self-interest or temporary desire. To make the particular bend to the universal, the temporary to the Eternal, is essential to the integrity of Ethical thought.

No better illustration of the class of cases over which questions of Casuistry have arisen can be found than questions bearing upon *truthfulness*. In considering these, we shall pass entirely all cases in which truth is wilfully sacrificed at the bid-

ding of self-interest. Such cases so clearly involve deliberate violation of the law of moral life that there is no place for doubt that moral condemnation is the sentence to be pronounced upon them, and that quite unreservedly and without mitigation in any form. This includes all references to slight and temporary aspects of personal inconvenience, as well as to all the most serious possibilities of loss or gain, for escape from which there is resort to falsehood.

We cross the line, however, beyond which serious conflict of opinion arises, when we come to cases of falsehood which can be fairly represented as having a benevolent aim. In reference to such instances some philosophic moralists have expressed the opinion that it is impossible to maintain that moral law can be held to carry their condemnation. The contention is that the motive is pure, and highly to be commended, since the sole purpose is to obviate, or, at least, to mitigate, suffering, or to secure large and lasting advantages at the cost of very slight and temporary disadvantages. But how can such representations find philosophic basis? Tenderness of heart and benevolent feeling and generous sympathy are parts of our duty; and if they find scope at the cost of much toil and sacrifice to the agent, we must commend the surrender in order to bring good to others. But who can have a right to make surrender of the authority of moral law for this end? Is not this equivalent to suggesting that there is power to limit law, and does not this place the agent above the law? How is it possible to maintain that moral law is a Categorical imperative, and then profess on philosophic grounds to make exceptions to it? Is law modified when feeling intervenes to make fulfilment of the law trying to us or to others? The suggestion would carry a reversal of morality itself. The ultimate test for apologies for falsehood is found in the reasonable demand that the maxims, or maxim, covering legitimate exceptions should have formal expression. But we do not find any promising attempt to meet so natural a demand. If it be

suggested—and this is really the implication—that benevolent disposition itself may excuse falsehood, or even gain for it moral sanction, the reply is obvious, that benevolence may work havoc over the field of morality,—that a one-sided and unreflecting virtue may lead to the violation of moral law, or else that truthfulness cannot take rank as such a law. To the Utilitarian it may seem an apt answer that consequences are the sole test of moral law ; but in view of the admitted difficulty of determining what results may follow, morality is thus reduced to a vacillating and quite uncertain thing, a philosophy of which is hardly possible ; and in that case, judging even from the Utilitarian basis, social results may be perplexing enough, for it is by no means impossible—it is not even a difficult thing to bring about—that a real benevolence of feeling may prove cruel in its effects. If any philosophic basis is to be allowed for morals, it must be a strictly rational basis, and on such foundation the claims of feeling to a governing place must be disallowed.

The probability of difference of opinion in morals is likely to be greatest as we advance into the region of inferential ethics. So long as we deal with direct command, and no doubt exists that the case contemplated comes under such command, any diversity of opinion is likely to be traceable to casuistry of the worst kind. But when we are considerably beyond the range of direct application of law ; when the morality of conduct is to be determined only on condition of a searching analysis of motives, and of a subsequent careful inferential process, uncertainties and honest differences of opinion are most likely to appear. And here consequently the risks of a feeble or faulty self-government are serious. The man who desires integrity of moral life throughout, will specially guard thought and action in this region. If only we can succeed in our application of the laws of ethical life in smaller and more remote matters, we shall not readily fail when greater things still are at stake

One of the most familiar and suitable illustrations here is found in Betting—the risking of loss for chance of gain by means of another's loss, who makes an equal risk for a similar chance. Things seem so fairly balanced in such a case; the difference between this and ordinary means of acquiring money appears so slight, and the agreement seems so much removed from the play of evil motive, that when the practice has become general, there is great readiness in assuming that it is 'right enough,' or at least is not wrong. Love of excitement is the first inducement to betting, and the question may well be pressed, is this a healthy excitement? Love of gain follows close behind, for success culminates in money-making, and money-making is not wrong. Only in connection with the mode of making it do ethical questions arise. Loss helps to raise other thoughts, and to put things in a different light. The lost money may not be much, and so it may not awaken serious concern; but experience under such loss does not seem free from annoyance, if even from bitterness. But who has a right to object? This query has not great value, for the ethical question is this: What right has the agent to act as he does? If a man throw his money into the river he may ask the same question with as little reason. We aim at settling the rightness of Betting; and in order to do so, we must penetrate to the motives and bring these under test. There is no ethical challenge to love of excitement or to love of gain; both belong to the natural exercise of power, and may contribute to a healthy moral condition and also to beneficial activity. The evil spot is touched when we come upon *desire of gain by means of another's loss*. This is the evil thing lying at the heart of the mixed motives, and not easily covered by the others which gather around it; when it is brought out to view and made the object of attention, we find it impossible to pronounce it a right motive, or to say anything else of it than that it is morally wrong. If any one plead that the desire of gain by means of another's loss contributes no part of the interest he feels in

betting, there is an easy test of the validity of his contention,—let him return the money he has gained under the contract. But if the money is kept, and there is some sense of gratification over this easy accession to resources, not only is a wrong thing done, it is deliberately done ; and the confirmation of its wrongness will appear in this, that a craving after such success begins to arise ; evil is being done even to the agent's own nature greatly worse than the loss of money sustained by his neighbour. An evil and harmful passion is being nourished in the soul, which will prove a source of unquiet, disorder, and trouble in life, leading onwards to deep and darker passion. Betting opens an easy bye-path towards gambling, which in its individual and social effects is as truly a curse as any type of intoxication. Every moral agent has reason to set large account on a true mastery over himself, for its value is unspeakably beyond all possible pecuniary gain.

CHAPTER II.

SOCIAL LIFE, ORGANISATION, AND GOVERNMENT.

1. IN widening our range of view to include all that belongs to social life, the most important fact within the department of applied ethics is the essential one that moral life belongs to personality, and such life is incapable of subsisting save on these acknowledgments, that to the individual is intrusted immediate knowledge of the law, that on him is laid a consequent obligation which cannot be laid off, and that on him rests the responsibility for the development and guidance of his life, which no other power in the world, however great it be, can accomplish. Carrying with us these implications of moral life, we are to consider how moral law bears on social life, organisation, and government.

Social life in a sense precedes organisation, for this is matter in some measure of voluntary arrangement, whereas that is provided for independently of choice. The individual life awakes to consciousness in the midst of the social life, and is so connected with it as to be dependent upon it. Hence Comte's observation is strictly accurate and profoundly important, that the family is the primary unit in Society. Accordingly, the philosophy of moral life, while beginning in the study of personal constitution and power, must pass over to include the whole range of social questions, which are of deepest interest to humanity, and are securing increased attention in our day, under pressure of the conflict originating through complications in organisation. But this transition can be effected on a philosophic basis, only on condition that we

accept personal life and family life as already given, and agree to have our social philosophy guided by their nature.

As the family is the primary unit in Society, moral law applies directly within its constitution in a manner analogous to that in which moral law applies within the personal life. Governing and working power belong to it, as to individual life; and the play of feeling, Affection and Emotion, belongs to it as a unity, in closest analogy with all that is characteristic of a single life. The relations of husband and wife, parents and children, brothers and sisters, constitute a true unity, in the moral significance of which it becomes apparent how strong and how great is this central though smallest type of social organisation. This unity belongs to the very structure of nature, which we seek to account for when we raise the all-embracing problem concerning the Universe as a whole.

The unity of the family is founded on biological and ethical laws conjointly, for both apply throughout family life just as in individual life. Here lies the provision for order, purity, government, and harmonious activity. In constitution of the family, the marriage bond is presupposed as the essential condition of social life, and this constitution is sustained by recognised application of moral law equally to both sexes. The obligation to physical, intellectual, and moral purity is the same for all; and family life becomes the watchful guardian of social purity. The law of purity applies to man as to woman,—to woman as to man,—with no trace in reason for making the slightest difference in our judgments. There is nothing more clearly destitute of moral or rational warrant than the opinion which would distribute on a different scale the condemnation of Social vice.

All the relative duties of the social life grow from the applications of universal law to the relations existing in accordance with the bonds which nature has ordained. The fact that moral law bears equally on all is the security for a sus-

tained unity. Thus if moral relations be studied as represented in family life, it will be seen how difficulties are to be met, and how increased strength and vitality of social life are to be secured, by special recognition of the duties and inalienable rights of each personality, taken with the claims which these give on others. For it is when we look steadily at those difficulties which spring from the entire dependence of the young on parental authority (or on authority regarded as its equivalent) that we see how dependence and independence are to be harmonised. It is because parents are subject to moral law exactly as children are, that we find provision for defence of the weak, not merely in the affections, but in the duties of the strong. Moral law thus carries a guide to all organisation on a more extended scale, which must be in a large degree voluntary, and must involve the rival claims of the weak and the strong. In every family the father and the mother have in their own hands the application of the principles concerned in government of communities and of nations. There is no more striking example of dependence than appears in the life of children; and there is no case in which the acknowledgment of personal rights seems more difficult, as a duty to be persistently fulfilled. It is comparatively easy to insist on absolute submission, but it is a quite serious difficulty, in the circumstances, to make full account of the claims of personality, testifying without stint to the reality that moral law controls those in authority as well as those who are subject.

2. By extended study of the laws applicable to family life, it is possible to develop in natural order the principles of civil and political government. Diversities in the mere form of government and administration are here excluded, as these may be determined largely on grounds of expediency in view of territorial, historic, and economic considerations. The leading points of study here are those connected with social questions directing attention on common interests, or interests of the majority, as above the interests of the individual or of the

minority. There is here included the whole set of questions concerning the claims of the many and of the few ; and also those questions which apply to the interests and rights of the single individual.

In all social organisations, a full recognition of the rights of individuals is the first point to be ensured. This must be taken as a pre-supposition, anterior in point of time, and provided for under sanction of moral law. The rights of personality are neither to be originated nor terminated, but are to be openly acknowledged as inalienably vested in moral life. No social organisation can find for itself a rational foundation which does not accept this as an essential condition of existence. Here lies the protection for personal liberty—the birthright of man—and the security for national progress. Everything which threatens this, whether under an absolute sovereignty or under a republic, should be resisted to the last by the concentrated purpose of the people. A sound political philosophy leans upon the results of moral philosophy. Moral obligation is the true support for patriotism ; Duty to God and to our country must go together.

The next question is, How shall we combine the social principle with the personal ; the co-operative principle with the individualistic ? Changes in the history of political government are all tending to give importance to this problem, which may be regarded as in some senses the problem of the day. This is the result of the democratic tendency which has brought into prominence the will of the people as a whole, and which must carry thought towards the general interest with more or less clearness, according as intelligence is brought to bear on questions of organisation, and on methods for development of national resources. But it is an essentially philosophic question, coming to some extent within scope of Applied Ethics. The difficulty is to combine the personal and the social in an Ethical harmony ; and this difficulty, which is serious enough in speculation, is still more serious in its practical form, when

numbers count for so much, and the mere will of the majority must rule, whether it be the expression of reflection or of passion. The true harmonising power is to be found in the spirit which cares for the few and the feeble, as having rights equal to those of the multitude. Effective security against the most serious dangers is found in the claims of Justice which guard the meanest and the highest alike. Wherever these are regarded in the civil constitution and in the public opinion of a country, there is security for stability and progress.

In passing from defence to development of resources, the co-operative principle must come into view as a leading one; the aim being to secure the fullest combination with the largest results. Class interests must pass into the common good, according to the maxim on which Utilitarianism concentrates attention. The greatest happiness of the greatest number must be the Ethical basis on which the problems of political science are to be worked out in political organisation. The heroic spirit, ready for defence of hearth and home, has been largely developed through ages of military organisation; a spirit of national and international benevolence needs now to be developed, which shall be more truly the expression of the ethical law of good-will than has been illustrated by any type of political life that has yet appeared in the history of the world. But this task is attempted under great disadvantages because in face of great difficulties. The spirit of self-interest is ever strong; the competitions of business are powerful in encouraging persistent selfishness; and, when hindrances from these sources are overcome, even an honest eagerness for a good end is apt to become intolerant, and so bring upon itself defeat, opening the way for temporary triumph of a reactionary movement. These are the inevitable obstacles to a true social advance, bringing with them much discipline in the history of national life. The grand hope for the future must spring from a deep, patient, and active confidence in moral principle; a readiness to suffer as men have suffered when

compelled to face the evils of war ; but withal a reigning conviction that more is to be gained for our race by quiet persistent striving after the common good than by any other course of action that can be contemplated ; and with these, an unshaken confidence that most is done towards this grand end, when we seek to develop in heroic form a national spirit of benevolence.

CHAPTER III.

MORALITY IN ITS RELATION TO RELIGION.

As there is a Natural Theology springing out of morality, so is there a Natural Religion. The acknowledgment of the Absolute as First Cause of the Universe, and as Moral Governor over all responsible agents, must carry with it a reverence which opens life to the exercise of personal homage and devotion. Religious sentiment is proved by ample induction to be a natural instinct, acting as an impulse, and checking the materialism to which the mind is in some ways prone. Religious thought and feeling rest on a rational basis, and are capable of being elevated and purified by regulation of both in strict consistency with our conceptions of the glory of the Self-existent One. Towards success in this process, moral thought and feeling must render the most efficient aid.

Philosophy becomes the vindicator and upholder of a reverential and submissive acknowledgment of the Absolute One, and opens the way for a fuller appreciation of the attributes of a Being to whom all excellence is an eternal possession. This was esteemed the result of philosophic thought by the best spirits which preceded the Christian era, as in the case of Socrates (*Apologia*) and of Plato (*Republic*, Book VI.). Since the dawn of that era the Christian system has shed a breadth of light over the darkest mysteries of philosophic thought, and has opened for Philosophy itself new courses of inquiry, culminating in a fuller devotion. So Hume, whose thought at many points seems antagonistic to this admission, while considering it 'a kind of indignity to philosophy,

whose sovereign authority ought everywhere to be acknowledged, to oblige her on every occasion to make apologies for her conclusions, and justify herself to every particular art and science which may be offended at her,' says powerfully, 'there is only one occasion when philosophy will think it necessary and even honourable to justify herself, and that is, when religion may seem to be in the least offended; whose rights are as dear to her as her own, and are indeed the same' (*Treat. on Hum. Nat.*, Book I. Part IV. sec. 5, vol. i. p. 435).

Rational homage offered to the Deity is the highest exercise of mind. In such exercise, intellect is occupied with the highest conceptions which it can reach, and our sensibility proves competent for companionship with thought, as it goes forth on its most exalted range. Unity of both sides of our nature in this lofty exercise is sure indication of the possibility of attainment far beyond everything that has yet come within the limits of consciousness. In assured prospect of moral and spiritual advance for our race as a whole, we recognise religion as the most powerful agency for individual, family, and social development, as its exercise is the obvious duty of every intelligence contemplating God as the source of finite existence and of all forms of good with which restricted being is blessed. Our highest greatness appears in the appreciation of the Absolute Greatness, and in dedication of all our energies to the fulfilment of the will of Him who has bestowed upon us our moral nature. The religious life and the moral are thus essentially one, for we yield a true homage to the Author of our being when we use our whole nature aright, realising Moral Law in action, as having been vitalised in personal character.

SKETCH OF THE HISTORY OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

A BRIEF Historical Sketch will constitute the closing part of this work. Here the object will be to present the leading features in the development of Ethical Philosophy in ancient and modern times, as essentially connected with the Intellectual Philosophy accompanying the Ethical, referring the reader in all cases to available Histories of Philosophy for a more extended and complete treatment of the subject. In prosecution of the plan here preferred, it will be the constant aim to present as far as possible the thought of the authors in their own language.

SOCRATES, born about 470 B.C., was the father of Moral Philosophy. He made it his chief business to reach a proper understanding of our general ethical conceptions, such as piety, justice, bravery, temperance, and virtue. In this, as Aristotle affirms (*Metaph.* xii. 4), he simply carried out a process of generalisation, in order to form a general or abstract conception which might be afterwards applied to any variety of examples. These general conceptions he subjected to the test of experience, in course of the dialogue, which constituted his method of teaching. He insisted that knowledge is essential to virtue, or, more broadly, that 'knowledge is virtue.' This last declaration, commonly represented as the central position of the Socratic philosophy, involves a theory of practice rather than of knowledge, resting on the allegation that 'no man is knowingly vicious.' By this he intends that men naturally and necessarily seek their own good, and will not

prefer what they regard as evil. This implies, however, no more than that the agreeable is desired.

While making it his chief business in philosophising to ascertain the significance of ethical conceptions, Socrates did not press the question as to the rational ground on which general conceptions are held to afford a standard of morals. He did, however, draw a distinction between a knowledge of moral principle which cannot be taught and a knowledge, implying a kind of 'measuring art,' which must be gathered by experience. If we may regard the Platonic Socrates in the *Theætetus* as the historic Socrates, he argued strenuously against the doctrine of Protagoras, which reduces everything to the phenomenal.

Our best authorities as to the theory of Socrates are Xenophon's *Memorabilia* and Plato's *Apologia*. After these in importance come the Platonic *Dialogues* and references in Aristotle's *Metaph.* and *Ethics* and Diogenes Laertius. See Stanley's *Lives of the Philos.*; Ritter's *Anc. Philos.* vol. ii.; Schwegler's *Hist. of Philos.*, Dr. Hutchison Stirling; Zeller's *Socrates and Socratic Schools*, Reichel; Ueberweg's *Hist. of Philos.*, G. S. Morris; Lewes's *Hist. of Philos.*; Sir A. Grant's *Aristotle*, Essay ii. Professor Sidgwick's *Outlines of the History of Ethics* is specially commended throughout, but in this valuable addition to our helps, the lack of references is a serious want.

PLATO, born about 427 B.C., rises into a higher region of inquiry. He gives to the general conceptions of Socrates the character of Ideas, which constitute the fundamental ideas of Reason, and which are, at the same time, regarded by him as the perfect essences of things—the eternal laws of being. These belong to a supersensible state, 'a world or sphere of ideas.' Intelligence is at first confused by the shadows of the sensible state, and is ever striving to rise into this 'upper world' of higher knowledge, where the Good, which he ultimately identifies with God, is supreme (see specially the *Republic*, B. vii. 514-518, Jowett's tr. 1st ed., ii. 348; Aristotle's *Metaph.* i. 6). The power to know these primary ideas 'is already in the soul,' (*Rep.* vii.); and the presence of such

ideas is to be explained by a theory of *reminiscence*, possible on account of our having descended from a higher sphere—(*Meno*, 81; *Phædo*, 75).

Plato regards Virtue as the harmony of the Soul; Vice as its deformity. He treats of the practical life as distinguished by four cardinal virtues—Wisdom, Courage, Temperance, and Justice. These are illustrated as holding a place in human character analogous to that held by them in the constitution of the State, regarded as a Republic. In such a State, Wisdom is the virtue of the rulers, who are few in number; Courage is the soldierly virtue, the right kind of fear, guarding against dangers of which the rulers give warning; Temperance is the moderating virtue, the virtue of the subjects; Justice is the distributive virtue, assigning to each man his work, and requiring each man to do his proper work, a virtue which applies to all classes. So, in the government of the soul, Wisdom is the regulating virtue; Courage the defence against evil; Temperance the defence against mere pursuit of pleasure; and Justice the activity of the life, with constant regard to the claims of others.

Plato's fullest treatment of the Future State, with its punishments and rewards, is in the *Phædo*, 107-114. For the student of Moral Philosophy the most important of the Platonic Dialogues are *Protagoras*, *Meno*, *Gorgias*, *Phædo*, *Philebus*, *Republic*, *Laws*.

On Plato's *Philos.* see Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, B. 1; Ritter's *History* and the admirable representation of it in Archer Butler's *Ancient Philos.* vol. ii. From an opposite point of view, Grote's *Plato*. For Kant's view of the Platonic *Ideas*, see *Critique of Pure Reason*; Transc. Dia. B. II. ch. 3, Transl. p. 351. Maguire's *Essays on the Platonic Ethics*.

ARISTOTLE, born 384 B.C., separates Ethics from other sciences. He commences the *Nicom. Ethics* with a discussion of the chief good,—*summum bonum*, ἀριστον,—or the perfect good, τὸ τέλειον ἀγαθόν,—which he says is Happiness, εὐδαιμονία, not ἡδονή. He is thus led into the doctrine of the Mean,

(μεσότης), or avoidance of extremes, previously touched upon by Socrates (*Mem.* ii. i. 11). The leading part of the Ethics assumes the Eudæmonistic form, though with a greatly wider and higher view of Happiness than is taken by the modern Utilitarian school. Aristotle is more closely followed on this by the Hegelian and Neo-Kantian school. Books v., vi., vii. of the *Nicom. Ethics*, which are of disputed authority, carry through a more careful discussion of the action of reason in moral life. It is questioned whether these books were written by Aristotle himself, or by Eudemus as a report or amplification of the sayings of Aristotle (v. Cicero, *De Fin.* v. 5). In Book vi. the rule of practical life is to act according to right reason,—κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον. Reason is distinguished into Scientific (ἐπιστημονικόν), which contemplates necessary matter, and the Reasoning or Discursive Faculty (λογιστικόν), which deals with contingent matter. Aristotle's theory is burdened with the admission, i. 4, that while happiness is the *summum bonum*, men are not agreed as to what is most desirable. Grote maintains that 'by referring the principles to Intellect (Νοῦς), Aristotle does not intend to indicate their generating source, but their evidential value and dignity.' 'To say that they originate from Sense through Induction, and nevertheless to refer them to Intellect (Νοῦς) as their subjective correlate—are not positions inconsistent with each other in the view of Aristotle' (Grote's *Aristotle*, vol. ii. App. ii. p. 293). That both positions were taken by Aristotle seems plain; that he raised the question of their consistency is not clear.

On Aristotle's Ethical system see Ritter, Schwegler, Ueberweg, Sir A. Grant's *Aristotle's Ethics*, Essays and Notes; Hatch's *Aristotle's Moral Philosophy*. From the Utilitarian standpoint, Lewes's *Aristotle* and Grote's *Aristotle*.

The prominent defects of ancient systems render them, on the practical side, incompatible with a theory of necessary or universal moral law. They are systems constructed for the State rather than for Humanity; for friends, but not for foes.

This narrowness of reference is glaring even in the midst of the grandeur of Plato's Ideal system. Zeller dwells on some of these defects in the 1st chapter of *Stoics and Epicureans*.

The two conflicting elements in Aristotle's theory part company, and form two distinct and conflicting philosophies in later movements. This antagonism is represented by the Stoics and the Epicureans, and thenceforth these two divisions continue down the line of history. The severance was attended on each side by a disparagement of that which was rejected, and consequent undue exaltation of that preferred. The Stoics selected the Rational nature as the true guide to an ethical system, giving to it supremacy so rigid as to threaten the extinction of the affections. The Epicureans, laying hold of the doctrine that happiness is the chief good, gave such ascendancy to the pleasurable as to threaten the mob-rule against which Plato had protested.

The STOIC Philosophy was essentially a moral philosophy in which right action was rational action, and in this light the Stoic maxim is to be interpreted, to live according to nature (*ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν*). For while this implies harmony with the universe, it is by Reason that such harmony is recognised; and this is made so vital as practically to lean on the Socratic doctrine that knowledge is virtue. With the Stoics, as with Socrates, there is indecision as to the standard, though it is commonly said that the knowledge of right is given by nature.

For the Stoic Philosophy see Diog. Laertius, B. VII., specially lives of Zeno (about 350 B.C.), Cleanthes, Chrysippus. See also Plutarch; Cicero, *De Finibus* and *De Officiis*; with Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius. Of *Histories*, as above, very particularly Zeller's *Stoics and Epicureans*, Reichel.

In the system of EPICURUS, B.C. 342, Happiness was represented as the chief good, and it was declared to be the end of Philosophy to afford guidance in the attainment of it. The pleasure of the soul is placed above that of the body; but

there is no standard higher or more authoritative than the agreeable.

Diogenes Laertius, B. x. ; Plutarch, Cicero. Ueberweg's *History*. Zeller's *Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics*.

CICERO, 106 B.C., gave precedence to moral philosophy. In all his thought he was swayed by the Greek Philosophy, and though vacillating at times, was avowedly (*De Off.* i. 2) an adherent of the Stoics. Though far from being consistent as to the criterion of truth, he held to 'innate notions,' *notiones innatæ*, and the common consent of the nations, *consensus gentium*. He maintains that a man cannot say that he is ignorant of duty (*Acad. Pr.* 34); and that the conviction of the wisest men has been that Law was neither invented by the genius of men nor an institution of the popular will, but something eternal (*De Leg.* ii. 4).

Refer to Ueberweg's *History of Philosophy* for the Neo-Platonic Philosophy of Plotinus, Aurelius, and Porphyry; for the Patristic period, when the expansive power of Christian thought began to influence philosophy; and for the Scholastic period, with the controversy between the Nominalists and Realists. See also Cudworth's *Immutable Morality*, and Sir W. Hamilton's *Dissertation A.*, supplementary to Reid's *Works*.

DESCARTES (1596-1650), the father of modern philosophy, made Doubt a means for testing truth. Laying aside all that could be doubted, he continued his search for the indubitable. In this way *innate ideas* became a distinctive feature of his system. He held that these ideas are given by the light of nature, *lumen naturæ*. He divides ideas into innate, adventitious, and factitious (*Medit.* iii., where see his definition of *Nature*).

His theory is more fully unfolded in the *Principles of Philosophy*. In a letter to the French Translator of the *Principles*, he gives an important explanation of his views as to innate ideas as principles of Knowledge. 'They must be so clear and evident that the human mind, when it attentively

considers them, cannot doubt of their truth; in the second place, the knowledge of other things must be so dependent on them as that, though the principles themselves may indeed be known apart from what depends on them, the latter cannot be known apart from the former.' Prof. Veitch's tr., p. 94, new edition, and note 207. Descartes did not enter formally on Ethical Philosophy. His first halting-place is found in the simple fact of consciousness. His *cogito ergo sum* becomes a starting-point for modern philosophy, which thenceforth recognises the interpretation of consciousness as its proper work, including the facts of consciousness, the implications of thought, and the synthesis of conscious life. Next to his own being, the existence of God is the grand certainty, for as doubt implies imperfection, the human mind cannot be the source of the idea of an absolutely perfect being. For his influence on Philosophy see Kuno Fischer's *Descartes and his School*.

SPINOZA (1632-1677), disciple and expounder of Descartes, developed a system very different from the Cartesian. Taking the conception of God as the primary necessity of thought, his attempt was to deduce a scheme of existence from this conception alone, with such aid as experience can supply. His thinking was thus directed chiefly to the grandeur of the Divine nature, and our dependence upon God. His theory, as developed in *The Ethics*, is dialectic in form, depending almost wholly on definitions, not upon observed facts, and is Pantheistic in substance (*v. Metaphysic of Ethics, sup.* p. 281). Spinoza holds the conception of the Deity to involve that of an immanent all-pervading existence and all-efficient agency. *The Ethics* thus becomes really an exposition of the impossibility of Ethics, maintaining that all things follow by necessity from the perfection of the Divine nature. His definition of Substance is the basis of his system. 'By substance I understand that which is self-existent, and is conceived only through itself; that is to say, Substance is that

the conception of which requires the conception of nothing else from which it must be derived' (*The Ethics*, Pt. I. Def. 3). This is the beginning and end of all that Spinoza maintains. From this it follows that 'no substance can exist, or be conceived to exist, except God.' All existence is a manifestation of Deity, and can be in no sense distinct from the Deity. 'All things are determined by the necessity of the Divine nature.' 'Things could not have been produced by God in any other way than they have been.' From these positions in Part I. there necessarily follows, in Part II., a view of human life contradictory of Personality and of self-originated activity. The human mind is 'constituted by certain modes of the Divine attributes.' The False is only imperfection in knowledge, 'merely want of knowledge.' 'Men deceive themselves when they fancy themselves to be free.' Belief in freedom is possible only because we are 'ignorant of the causes which determine our actions.' On this rests the Ethical system of Part III. 'Affections or Emotions' are states of body and their ideas, Def. 3. Things awaken in us pleasure or pain, Prop. xv.; they are accordingly liked or disliked, loved or hated, Prop. xvi.; men strive to do whatever they regard with pleasure, and to avoid the contrary, Prop. xxix.; as different men are differently affected, they love and hate different things. Morality is thus the play of love and hate, based on likes and dislikes. The mind is grieved by contemplating its own inability to act; grief occasioned by our weakness is humility,—joy occasioned by our power is self-satisfaction,—humility is intensified when we imagine ourselves to be blamed by others, Prop. lv. Spinoza's Definitions of the Affections of the mind are found at the close of Part III. Spinoza's system is essentially a theory of human conceptions, in which the highest transcendental conception rules, and logical deduction produces a theory of human practice (*Benedicti de Spinoza Opera Philosophica Omnia*, vol. i. ed. Bruder, Leipzig, 1843-1846; *Benedict de Spinoza: his Life, Correspondence, and Ethics*

(Willis), *Works of Spinoza* (R. H. M. Elwes), Pollock's *Spinoza*, 1880, Martineau's *Spinoza*, Caird's *Spinoza*).

MALEBRANCHE (1638-1715) held the Cartesian doctrine, affirming that there are necessary truths which are truths of the Universal Reason (*Recherche de la Vérité*, I. 4; *Search after Truth*, translated by Taylor). On this basis he founds morality (*Traité de Morale*).

LEIBNITZ (1646-1716) accepted the same account of the source of our knowledge of fundamental truth (*Nouveaux Essais*, B. I., ed. Erdmann, p. 204).

HOBBS (1588-1679), contemporary with Descartes, founded his theory of Moral Philosophy on an opposite view. 'Concerning the thoughts of a man, . . . the original of them all is that which we call Sense, for there is no conception in a man's mind which hath not at first, totally or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of sense' (*Leviathan*, I. 1).

He made happiness the standard, applying the term to personal happiness. 'Whatsoever is the object of *any man's appetite* or desire, that is it which he for his part calleth good; and the object of his hate and aversion, evil; and of his contempt, vile and inconsiderable. For these words of good, evil, and contemptible are ever used with relation to the person that useth them; there being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common rule of good and evil to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves; but from the person of the man where there is no commonwealth; or, in a commonwealth, from the person of him that representeth it, or from an arbitrator or judge, whom men disagreeing shall by consent set up and make his sentence the rule thereof. . . . Of good there be three kinds: good in the promise, that is, *pulchrum*; good in effect, as the end desired, which is called *jucundum*, delightful; and good as the means, which is called *utile*, profitable; and as many of evil; for evil in promise is that they call *turpe*, evil in effect and end is *molestum*, unpleasant, troublesome; and evil in means, *inutile*, unprofit-

able, hurtful' (*Leviathan* (1651), Part I. c. 6, Molesworth's ed. vol. iii. p. 41). 'There is no such *finis ultimus*, utmost aim, nor *summum bonum*, greatest good, as is spoken of in the books of the old moral philosophers' (*Ib.* c. xi. iii. 85). In chapters 14 and 15 he treats of 'Laws of Nature,' said to be 'found out by reason' (v. p. 37).

CUDWORTH (1617-1688) maintained, in reply to Hobbes, that there is 'a natural, immutable, and eternal justice' (*Immutable Morality*, I. 1); and that 'there are some ideas . . . which must needs arise from the innate vigour and activity of the mind itself' (*Ib.* iv. 2).

LOCKE (1632-1704) made it his primary aim to oppose the theory of 'innate ideas.' He insisted that there are neither speculative nor practical principles belonging to the mind by its original constitution. 'Children and idiots have not the least apprehension or thought of them' (*Essay* I. ii. sec. 5). This Locke regarded as an argument against 'innate truths.'

According to Locke, all our knowledge is obtained through Sensation and Reflection. 'Moral principles require reasoning and discourse and some exercise of the mind to discover the certainty of their truth' (B. I. chap. iii. 1). Yet he declares that 'justice and truth are the common ties of Society; and therefore even outlaws and robbers, who break with all the world besides, must keep faith and rules of equity among themselves or else they cannot hold together' (*Ib.*). In support of moral law, the Christian refers to 'Happiness and misery in another life;'; the Hobbist to the power of the state; the old heathen philosophers to the dignity of man and the highest perfection of human nature. 'Hence naturally flows the great variety of opinions concerning the moral rules, according to the different sorts of happiness they have a prospect of, or purpose to themselves' (B. I. iii. 5, 6). Still, he admits that moral rules are as certain as geometrical propositions (B. IV. iii. 18).

WOLLASTON (1629-1724) denied 'innate maxims,' and also rejected the happiness theory. He held that the reasoning

power, or rational faculty, is the judge of actions and the governing principle of life. He thus made 'right' identical with 'truth' (*Religion of Nature Delineated*).

SAMUEL CLARKE (1675-1724) insisted that there are 'eternal and necessary differences of things,' and a consequent 'fitness or unfitness of the application of different things or 'different relations one to another.' This fitness determines rightness. *Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion*.

JOSEPH BUTLER (1692-1752) devoted his strength to a deliberate investigation of the nature, relations, and functions of the Moral Faculty. His positions are developed in *Three Sermons* on Human Nature. He held that 'there is a principle of reflection in men, by which they distinguish between, approve and disapprove, their own actions. We are plainly constituted such sort of creatures as to reflect upon our own nature' (*Sermon* 1). 'There is a superior principle of reflection or conscience in every man which distinguishes between the internal principles of his heart, as well as his external actions; which passes judgment upon himself, and thus . . . magisterially exerts itself . . . and goes on to anticipate a higher and more effectual sentence.' To Butler belongs the honour of establishing the Supremacy of Conscience. This power is 'considered as a faculty, in kind and in nature, supreme over all others, and which bears its own authority of being so' (*Sermon* II.) You cannot form a notion of this faculty 'without taking in judgment, direction, superintendency' (*Ib.*). 'Had it strength, as it has right; had it power, as it has manifest authority, it would absolutely govern the world.' (*Ib.*). Beyond this view of the special function of a Moral Faculty, Butler does not push the inquiry.

PRICE (1723-1791) held that the understanding is the source of simple ideas, that 'our ideas of right and wrong are simple ideas, and must therefore be ascribed to some power of immediate perception' (*Principal Questions of Morals*).

HUME (1711-1776) propounded a Sceptical Philosophy

which reduced existence to a series of appearances, and mind to a bundle of perceptions (*Treatise on Human Nature*, 1. i. 1.; and 1. iv. 6). Yet he says, 'Those who have denied the reality of moral distinctions may be ranked among the disingenuous disputants' (*Essays*, II. 223, *Principles of Morals*, chap. i.). He referred to 'the original fabric and formation of the human mind' for the explanation of moral distinctions. 'Reason and Sentiment concur in almost all moral determinations and conclusions,' but 'the final sentence, it is probable, depends on some internal sense or feeling which nature has made universal in the whole species' (*Essays*, II. 222—*Principles of Morals*, sect. 1). The nature of this sense or feeling is thus indicated: 'Every quality, which is useful or agreeable to ourselves or others, is, in common life, allowed to be a part of personal merit:—the censure of the disagreeable and the approval of the agreeable are thus 'the universal sentiments of censure or approbation which arise from humanity.' In the Appendix on Moral Sentiment, he adds, p. 348, 'Virtue is an end, and is desirable on its own account, without fee or reward, merely for the immediate satisfaction which it conveys.'

To Hume's Scepticism, Philosophy has been peculiarly indebted for a powerful impulse experienced in Scotland, Germany, and France. On the relation of the Scottish and German Philosophies, see Cousin on Kant (Henderson's translation), p. 11.

REID (1710-1796), the father of the Scottish Philosophy, replied to Hume. What is known as the philosophy of 'Common Sense' is an appeal to a 'common knowledge,' to indubitable 'first principles' known to all, and recognised as authoritative in reasoning. 'As there are words common to philosophers and to the vulgar which need no explication, so there are principles common to both which need no proof, and which do not admit of direct proof' (*Intellectual Powers* (1785), Essay 1. chap. 2). 'We ascribe to reason two offices or two degrees. The first is to judge of things self-evident,

the second to draw conclusions that are not self-evident from those that are. The first of these is the province, and the sole province, of common sense' (*Intel. Powers*, Essay vi. chap. 2). 'There are propositions which are no sooner understood than they are believed . . . there is no searching for evidence, no weighing of arguments; the proposition is not deduced or inferred from another; it has the light of truth in itself, and has no occasion to borrow it from another.' These truths are called 'first principles, principles of common sense, common notions, self-evident truths.' Of these, some are 'first principles in morals' (*Ib.* Essay vi. chaps. 4 and 6). 'I call these first principles, because they appear to me to have in themselves an intuitive evidence which I cannot resist' (*Active Powers* (1788), v. 1). The knowledge of right and wrong is to be ascribed to 'an original power or faculty in man' called 'the moral sense, the moral faculty, conscience' (*Ib.* Essay iii. chap. 5). 'The truths immediately testified by our moral faculty are the first principles of all moral reasoning, from which all our knowledge of our duty must be deduced' (*Ib.*).

DUGALD STEWART (1753-1828) was the resolute upholder of the same theory (*Elements of the Philos. of the Hum. Mind* (1813), vol. ii. 1; Works, iii. 23). First Truths, Stewart designates 'the fundamental laws of human belief, or the primary elements of human reason.'

KANT (1724-1804) records that it was by Hume's Sceptical philosophy that he was roused 'from his dogmatic slumber' (Intro. to the *Prolegomena*, Werke, Rosencranz, iii. 9), a rousing of more than common significance to the philosophic world. For Kant's view of Hume see *Critique of Pure Reason* (Meiklejohn's trans.) pp. 453 and 464, and Intro. to *Prolegomena*. Cf. Cousin's *Philos. of Kant* (Henderson's trans.), p. 145.

Kant undertook a more searching critical investigation of the conditions of consciousness than Reid attempted. His

aim was to determine conclusively how much in consciousness is to be assigned to experience, and how much is original to mind. Regarding consciousness as the representation of a living intelligence working its own way towards a knowledge of all that comes within its reach, he sought to ascertain the conditions on which the living intelligence moves in the exercise of its own proper activity. The result led him to maintain an original or *a priori* element in the exercise of the Senses, of the Understanding, and of the Reason. These three involve in their exercise distinct functions,—observation, thought, and a regulative determination in and through both. Hence ‘reason is the faculty which furnishes us with the principles of knowledge *a priori*’ (15). The whole philosophy of consciousness may therefore be viewed from the stand-point which reason affords, and ‘there results the idea of a particular science which may be called the *Critique of Pure Reason*.’ Exercise of the senses is possible, only under the *a priori* forms of space and time; of the understanding, under the primitive pure notions denominated categories; the exercise of the reason gives the three grand Ideas of the Soul, God, and the Universe, which are transcendental ideas, regulative of the understanding as it is concerned with the problems of existence.

The grand lines of distinction running through the Kantian philosophy are those which sever the region of experience, the empirical, ‘the manifold of intuition’ (restricting the latter term to the experiential), from that which is original to mind, the rational, the *a priori*, the transcendental, so named as transcending experience. [In the Scottish philosophy, *Intuition* is applied mainly to the principles of the reason, the first truths, which Reid attributes to ‘Common Sense.’] According to Kant the transcendental is the essential condition of experience, for there can be no experience save by use of the conditions of intelligence supplied by the intellect itself, not by the data of experience. This necessary relation imposes on intelligence restriction in the use of its own forms. ‘The understanding

cannot make of its *a priori* principles or even its conceptions other than empirical use.' This precludes a transcendent use of *a priori* principle, as then 'it is referred to things in general, and considered as things in themselves' (*Pure Reason*, 180).

The main perplexities for the Intellectual Philosophy of Kant are, on the one hand, that it applies only to phenomena, and, on the other, that the principles of reason are only regulations of our conscious activity. We know only 'phenomena,' or passing appearances. Of things-in-themselves,—noumena,—we can know nothing. Even the Reason itself in directing the understanding involves us in hopeless entanglements. The Soul, however, is a noumenon, existing in a supersensible or cogitable world, superior to the laws of causality.

In the Ethical Philosophy of Kant the *a priori* becomes authoritative and practical in the guidance of conduct, and thus applies in a region superior to the phenomenal. The object of the practical life is to secure a Will absolutely good, that is, in complete harmony with absolute ethical law. Towards the structure of a theory of the possibility of this, Kant begins with analysis of the notion Duty, which implies 'the necessity of an act out of reverence felt for moral law.' This notion belongs to the uninstructed intellect, being the common possession of man. Its interpretation is found in the universality of the law which requires obedience independently of all 'inward hindrances,' and of all personal preferences. The notion Duty thus carries in it 'a Categorical Imperative,' or direct command, which in this respect makes ethical necessity stand out in contrast from all necessities applying to the life. 'The formula' of the law therefore expresses this speciality, and is stated thus: 'Act from a maxim at all times fit for law universal.' From the absoluteness of the command there follows necessarily 'the freedom of the Will'; and for execution of the law, in a manner suited at the same time to secure an absolutely good will as an ultimate result, it is needful that

the practical motive should be reverence for the law, and nothing besides.

INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.—*Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*, Werke, Rosencranz, II. ; *Critique of Pure Reason*, Meiklejohn's Translation, to which references throughout are made ; Schwegler's *History*, Stirling ; Ueberweg's *History*, Morris ; Cousin's *La Philosophie de Kant*, translated with Introduction by A. G. Henderson ; Mahaffy's *Kant for English Readers* ; *Inquisitio Philosophica*, by M. P. W. Bolton, London, 1866 ; *Time and Space*, by Dr. Shadworth Hodgson, London, 1865 ; *Kant*, article in *Encyc. Brit.*, eighth ed., Principal Cairns. For the terminology of Kant, Meiklejohn's *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 224 ; *Encyc. Wörterbuch der Kritischen philosophie*, by G. Mellin, eleven vols. Leipzig, 1797 ; Krug's *Handwörterbuch*, Leipzig, 1832, 2d ed. Monck's *Introduction to the Critical Philosophy* ; Kant's *Ethics : The Clavis to an Index* (by James Edmonds) ; Watson's *Selections from Kant* ; (the Intellectual Philosophy and the Ethical) ; Kuno Fischer's *Kant*, by Hough ; Wallace's *Kant* ; Caird's *Philos. of Kant* ; Stirling's *Text-book to Kant*.

ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY.—*Grundlegung zur Metaph. der Sitten*, 1785 ; and *Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft*, 1788, both in vol. VIII. of Werke, Rosencranz ; *The Metaphysic of Ethics*, translated by Semple ; Abbott's *Kant's Theory of Ethics* (the Third Edition is complete) ; Noah Porter's *Kant's Ethics*, a criticism.

JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE (1762-1814) adopted a pure Idealism which he developed largely under the influence of Kant's discussions of the problems of Thought and Action. He regarded the grand problems of Philosophy as practical, accepting it as the one necessity that philosophy should provide a science of knowledge which must be deduced from self-consciousness or interpretation of the Ego or self. In Ethics, he first developed the Science of Rights (*Grundlage des Naturrechts*, *Science of Rights*, 1796, Werke, III., translated by Kroeger ; and afterwards *System der Sittenlehre*, the *Science of Morals*, 1798, Werke, Th. IV.). With Fichte, Self-consciousness is the test of rationality, and the Rational Being necessarily posits itself as a free-will agent. To such a rational agent, Morality is action according to the ideas of Reason, in order to attain perfect or absolute freedom ; it is 'a resigning of the mere enjoyments of life for the sake of ideas,' and is in its

whole direction the moving of the self-conscious Ego towards the Infinite.

Smith's Translations of the works of Fichte. Seth's *From Kant to Hegel*; Adamson's *Fichte*; Seth's *Hegelianism and Personality*, Lecture II.

G. W. F. HEGEL (1770-1831) made the Idea the source of all reality, his system being a Dialectic, proceeding from Pure Being as its starting-point, through nature and spirit, returning upon the Idea. His theory, growing out of that of Kant, is that a philosophy of existence will be found by the structure of a Logic of the Categories, inasmuch as the rational is the real, and the forms of intelligence may therefore be regarded as affording the key to all reality. His Ethical Theory is in accordance with his general scheme. It is divided into three parts, Abstract Right,—Morality in the individual life,—and Moral Principles applying to social life (*Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, Berlin, 1821, Werke, viii.). The philosophical science of morals possesses the Idea of Right,—the Conception of Right,—and its realisation in objects' (sec. 1, p. 3). In harmony with Fichte, he says, 'The ground of the Right is the mental, and its primary position and starting-point the Will, so that freedom constitutes its substance and distinction, and the system of Right is the realm of realised freedom, the world of mind brought out from itself, as a second nature,' sec. 4, p. 14. 'Personality involves capability of Right.' 'The Law of Right is therefore, BE A PERSON AND RESPECT OTHERS AS PERSONS,' sec. 36, p. 42. For the extended account of Hegel's philosophy, reference should be made to the discussion of Dialectic Evolution, *supra*, pp. 131-158.

FRIEDRICH E. D. SCHLEIERMACHER (1768-1834) discussed the whole system of Ethics from the point of view afforded by the highest good, maintaining that 'the activity of Reason upon the nature expresses the beginning and ending of the science of morals' (*Sittenlehre* (1835), sec. 91; Werke Philos, v. p. 52). 'As Moral Philosophy is completely unfolded as a

doctrine of Good, or of the Highest Good, so is it the full expression of the whole unity of Reason and Nature.' But the highest good is not to be taken as a single good, but as a totality,—'the organic connection of all good.'

The FRENCH philosophers belonging to the latter half of the eighteenth century carried out the sensationalism of Condillac, by developing a utilitarian system of morals. Thus HELVETIUS (1715-1771) argues from sensation as the origin of all knowledge to the pleasurable as the ground of moral distinctions (*De l'Esprit*, Paris, 1758; *De l'Homme*, London, 1772; and *Les Progrès de la Raison dans la Recherche du Vrai*, London, 1775). D'HOLBACH (1723-1789), making actions the necessary product of our organism, develops a moral system similar to that of Helvetius (*Système de la Nature; ou Des Lois du Monde Physique et du Monde Moral*, 1770).

The French School of the nineteenth century, drawing its inspiration mainly from the Scottish School, partly from the German, finds the basis of morality in necessary principles of rectitude. VICTOR COUSIN (1792-1867) is the conspicuous leader of this school. As the critic at once of Locke and of Kant, he was the vindicator of Reid, and the upholder of universal and necessary principles as the basis equally of speculative and of practical science. His position is eloquently and powerfully stated in *The True, the Beautiful, and the Good*, translated by O. W. Wright; see specially Lects. I.-III. XI. and XIV. He says: 'I suppose in the mind of man the idea of a supreme law that attaches happiness to virtue, unhappiness to crime. Omit the idea of this law, and the judgment of merit and demerit is without foundation. . . . All the parts of the moral phenomenon are connected together; all are equally certain parts,—destroy one and you completely overturn the whole phenomenon. . . . The struggle between interest and duty energetically attests the presence of a principle of action different from interest and quite as powerful' (Lecture XIV.).

THÉODORE JOUFFROY (1796-1842) was the distinguished disciple and colleague of Cousin, who reached the same conclusions in morals. The main steps are these: There are 'primitive tendencies' in our nature, and 'faculties' for attaining the ends sought by these tendencies, 'pleasure' results from the use of these faculties. Reason finds these tendencies and faculties developed, enters into the meaning of all things connected with our nature and circumstances, and acquires an idea of the true end of our being. Thus man attains to morality in self-guidance, for he is moral only by the attainment of universal absolute ideas. From a survey of the relations of distinct personalities there comes the conception of Universal Order. The idea of Order awakens the reverence of Reason, and is accepted as 'the natural and eternal law.' 'All duty, right, obligation, and rules of morality spring from this one source, the idea of good in itself,—the idea of Order (*Cours de Droit naturel*, Paris, 1834; *Introduction to Ethics*, translated by W. H. Channing, Boston, 1840, 2 vols., specially vol. i. 1-82).

AUGUSTE COMTE (1798-1857) more recently in the history of France, became leader of a reaction. Under the name of Positivism he seeks to restrict philosophy to the recognition of facts and laws, to the exclusion of causes, proposing that we should abandon 'metaphysical idealities' for observed realities.

His moral system is a Sociology deduced from the data recognised in social organisation and progress. Quotations are from the translation by Miss Harriet Martineau's *The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte*, 2 vols., London, 1853.

Comte denies that society originates in utilitarian considerations, and holds that there is 'a spontaneous sociability of human nature' (ii. 127). There is in our nature a 'preponderance of the affective over the intellectual faculties' (128). 'The intellectual faculties are naturally the least energetic.

. . . Nevertheless, it is on the persevering use of these high faculties that the modifications of human life, general and individual, depend.' To produce and sustain intellectual effort impulse is needed from 'lower but stronger propensities.' 'The individual nature of man becomes lofty in proportion as incitement proceeds from propensities which are of a higher order' (129). 'Our affective faculties must preponderate' in order to give 'a permanent aim and direction' to the activity of our reason. 'Our social organism is, then, what it ought to be, except as to degree; and we must observe and remember that it is in our power, within certain narrow limits, to rectify this degree of difference.' 'The lowest and most personal propensities have, in regard to social relations, an unquestionable preponderance over the nobler,' 'our social affections are inferior in strength and steadiness to the personal,' 'this condition is necessary,' in order to stimulate exertion, and 'it is only its degree we have to deplore.' 'All notions of public good must be based on those of private advantage, because the former can be nothing else than that which is common to all cases of the latter' (130). 'Our moral nature would be destroyed and not improved if it were possible to repress our personal instincts' (131). The development of the race rests on 'a certain system of fundamental opinions,' or common beliefs (156). Positive Philosophy aims at ascertaining 'how those habits and views are to be rationalised so as solidly to establish the universal obligations of civilised man,' and thus to generate 'universal moral convictions' (475). 'When the morality of an advanced society bids us love our neighbours as ourselves, it embodies, in the best way, the deepest truth, with only such exaggeration as is required in the formation of a type which is always fallen short of in practice' (131). 'The sympathetic instinct, and the intellectual activity,'—'those two chief moderators of human life' (132)—'are especially destined to compensate mutually for common social insufficiency' (131); and 'the first function

of universal morals, in regard to the individual, consists in increasing this double influence' (132).

Next is unfolded the theory of human progress. 'Development consists in educating more and more the characteristic faculties of humanity, in comparison with those of animality.' 'Though the elements of our social evolution are connected, and always acting on each other, one must be preponderant, in order to give an impulse to the rest, though they may in their turn so act upon it as to cause its further expansion.' 'We must find out this superior element, and . . . we cannot err in taking that which can be best conceived of apart from the rest, while the consideration of it would enter into the study of others. This double characteristic points out the *intellectual* evolution as the preponderating' (156). By consequence we must choose 'the most general and abstract conceptions, which require the exercise of our highest faculties.' 'The scientific principle of the theory' (of human progression) 'appears to me to consist in the great philosophical law of the succession of the three states—the primitive theological state, the transient metaphysical, and the final positive state—through which the human mind has to pass in every kind of speculation' (157). In the Theological state it is 'the primary tendency of man to transfer the sense of his own nature into the radical explanation of all phenomena whatever.'

'The Metaphysical philosophy takes possession of the speculative field after the theological has relinquished it, and before the positive is ready for it.' 'The method of modification consists in substituting gradually the entity for a deity.'

This is only a transitional stage to the Positive, for 'men are unable to emancipate themselves' from the theological system, 'except by abandoning altogether these inaccessible researches and restricting themselves to the study of the laws of phenomena, apart from their causes' (160). 'Under this system of general education, morality will be immovably based

upon positive philosophy as a whole for the positive spirit is the only one which can 'generate universal moral convictions,' and develop 'the social sentiment as a part of morals.' The metaphysical system 'bases morality on self-interest,' but 'positive morality, which teaches the habitual practice of goodness, without any other certain recompence than internal satisfaction, must be much more favourable to the growth of the benevolent affections than any doctrine which attaches devotedness itself to personal considerations' (475).

For the student of Moral Philosophy, the most important parts of the *Cours de Philosophie Positive* are the Introductory discussion on the nature of Philosophy, and Book vi., *Social Physics*, chaps. v. and vi.; 'Social Statics,' or theory of the spontaneous order of human society; and 'Social Dynamics,' or theory of the natural progress of human society.

Martineau's *Positive Philosophy of Comte*; Mill's *Auguste Comte and Positivism*; Bridges, *Unity of Comte's Life and Doctrine*; Lewes's *History*, vol. ii.; Caird's *Social Philosophy and Religion of Comte*.

JOHANN FRIED. HERBERT (1776-1841), though an adherent of the transcendental philosophy, lifted his voice loudly in favour of a return to Psychology. His Ethical system *Allgemeine Practische Philosophie* was published in 1808.

The approval and condemnation implied in the words, Good, Better, Worse, makes it necessary to raise these questions: 'Is such a judgment admissible? And, if this may be affirmed, Which judgments are correct?' The verification or rectification of such a judgment 'may be expected from practical philosophy as its sole vocation,—if it has a vocation, and if it is anything' (p. 4). He treats of morals under the three conceptions,—the Good, Virtue, and Duty, showing that all three are concerned with the Will,—'Good stands as the boundary for man's Will; Virtue is the strength of his Will; and Duty is the rule of his Will' (p. 10). 'The judgment pronounced upon a volition never marks it out as a single volition, but always as the member of a relation; the judgment has originally no logical quantity, but the sphere of

its authority comes to it from the universality of the conceptions through which the members of the relation were thought' (p. 11). After defending the position that the recognition of moral quality is by a moral sense or taste, Herbart proceeds to inquire, 'How far a practical philosophy can attain to universality?' As morality is a matter of proportion or harmony, he says it is founded on the 'harmony between conceptions and real things' (p. 29). 'Universal conceptions, being abstracted from reality, lose a great deal of its determinateness.' On this account they do not afford a measure of degree of moral excellence. That is found only when we contemplate the real, and compare it with the universal conception. 'Harmonious or inharmonious proportions' between volitions and conceptions afford the ultimate test of moral actions (p. 30). On this basis rests a theory of ideas,—(1) The idea of internal freedom; (2) the idea of perfection; (3) the idea of good volition; (4) the idea of right.

HEINRICH M. CHALYBÄUS (1792-1862), *System der Speculativen Ethik*, in 2 vols. (1850), begins by considering Ethic in its relation to knowledge in general. 'As among the sciences Ethic does not take the place of the most fundamental, pure, and original, but belongs to the mixed or applied sciences, we must give to it that which is fundamental and pure. . . . It raises, therefore, in the foreground the demand (1) to indicate the relation of Ethic to pure philosophy, (2) particularly to show the basis of the Ethical principle in the absolute Idea, and its developement from the same; and lastly (3) to determine the special principle of Ethic itself as to content and application' (p. 3). 'It behoves us to make a path' to 'Pure or Fundamental Philosophy.' 'If such a general ground-science were not yet attained, the moralist himself must strive to unfold it, that thereby he may be able to give his principle the necessary foundation' (p. 4). His conclusion is that the Reason discovers necessary moral law, and that morality consists in the harmony of volition with reason.

IMMANUEL HERMANN FICHTE, son of Johann Gottlieb Fichte, published his *System der Ethik*, in 3 vols., Leipzig, 1850-51-53. 'Ethic is for us the science of the nature of the human Will.' It may also be treated as 'a system of practical ideas,' for the very conception of Will involves possession of such ideas (p. 1). 'Ethical ideas are the ideal notions of perfection of Will.' 'The idea of the Good' is the proper object of Moral Philosophy. The science shows how 'the abstract idea becomes a distinct and manifoldly articulate conception in the system of Ethical ideas; and how thence there arises for Moral Philosophy the threefold point of view of a Science of Virtue, of Duty, and of Good' (p. 28). The conception of the Will, 'resting on the depth and background of human consciousness,' recognises the will of the individual as 'a law for itself,—as command or prohibition' (p. 1). 'The source and internal basis of the Shall and Shall-Not is the simple internal nature of man, and specially of that which is fundamental to his Will' (p. 29).

MARTENSEN, in *Die Christliche Ethik*, published at Copenhagen (German translation at Gotha), 1871, maintains that 'Only in the domain of freedom is morality possible' (p. 3). 'The Moral itself is an idea which has not its source in conduct and experience, but rather itself exists as the unconditioned law of such experience' (p. 4). 'All research . . . points to the idea of an absolute aim and last end for the human will and voluntary action. This all-embracing end for the will of man is THE GOOD. The Good is what secures its end or object.' 'The Idea becomes also the Ideal when it presents itself as the pattern which, in the exercise of freedom, shall be reduced to a specific form' (p. 5). Moral Philosophy may be treated from three different standpoints,—THE OUGHT, or Duty, as a demand on man's will; VIRTUE, the ability to do good, the law admitted into the will; and the GOOD, the realisation of the sum-total of all good (p. 9). 'The Ideal of self-government is essentially the good, or the idea of Ethics.

And if we inquire as to the content of this ideal, it can only be described as man himself,—human personality, conceived in its purity and perfection.’ ‘The universal human,’—*Allgemeine Menschliche*,—thus becomes the test of all natural Ethics.

RECENT LITERATURE.

OUTLINE OF ARGUMENT IN RECENT WORKS.

THE METHODS OF ETHICS, by Professor Henry Sidgwick, Trinity College, Cambridge.—A vindication of Utilitarianism. This is a criticism of rival theories, tested by the question of the moral standard adopted. A threefold classification of Ethical theories is given: Egoistic Hedonism, which makes self-love or self-interest the sole test of what is right; Intuitionism, which makes absolute and self-evident law the standard; and Universal Utilitarianism, which takes as its test the greatest happiness of the greatest number. The author avows himself an Intuitionist Utilitarian. Throughout the work Psychological analysis is little employed. The objective method, or that of external observation, is generally preferred. Great favour is shown for an Eclectic mode of dealing with conflicting theories. In consequence, it is often difficult to say towards which side the discussion is tending, while assertions are commonly guarded with 'it seems,' or 'upon the whole,' or similar modifying phrase. A condensed statement is not easily attempted. The author 'seems' to assume that 'right,' 'ought,' and 'duty' are the same (*Introd.* p. 80, *passim*), yet he would embrace the 'right' under the 'good' (93) [102].¹ It is maintained that Moral Reason not only discovers moral law, but decides its application (24, 26, *passim*). It determines 'the true first principles of actions,' and judges of 'the relations of means to ends.' The Free-Will question is set

¹ The figures within parentheses () refer to the *first* edition, those within brackets [] to the *third* edition.

aside as non-essential and otherwise hopeless. 'The Freedom of the Will presents itself to me as an unsolved problem' (45); but our dispositions 'may be modified by voluntary effort' (179); 'we seem to be led to the conclusion' that we cannot without the idea of Free-Will 'make the common conception of right conduct at once rational and definite' (258) [283]; so with 'personal merit' (329) [350]. Egoism or Empirical Hedonism restricted to self-interest as the sole end of life is set aside as untenable (107-174) [115-194]. The main portion of the book is devoted to an adverse criticism of the Intuitionist theory, which is represented as standing midway between the scheme of self-interest and Utilitarianism—a transition from the one to the other. 'An intuitive operation to the practical reason seems to be assumed in all moral systems' (26, 364); Utilitarianism rests on a principle which 'cannot be known by induction from experience' (84) [93]; Intuitionism is identified with 'Common Sense Morality,' a phrase made to cover self-evident principles—common opinion—and even any deviation of thought on moral subjects which gains currency in a community (136, 138, 185, 190) [148, 150, 208, 212]. So reference is made to 'Conscience, or common moral judgments and sentiments' (177) [197]. What is right for me is right for all (183) [206], repeated (358) [378], modified (450) [482]. Special space is given to the attempt to disprove the claims of the principle of Justice to be regarded as objective truth intuitively known (236, 267) [262, 293]. Conclusion, 'Ideal Justice is very difficult to delineate, even in outline' (267). Utilitarianism defended and expounded (381-473) [407-505]. As to distribution of happiness, the Utilitarian principle needs to be supplemented thus:—'It seems reasonable to treat any one man in the same way as any other, if there be no reason apparent for treating him differently' (387) [413]. How to meet the difficulty of the Egoist (391) [416]. 'Why all Utility is not included within morality' (397) [422]. 'Utilitarianism solves the difficulties arising from want of

precision in Intuitionism' (396) [421]. Under Common Sense Morality there seems to be 'in most cases a large vague margin, with respect to which *consensus* could not be affirmed' (407) [432]. Under Utilitarianism the same state of things seems to exist, but from the altered point of view the 'vague margin' wears a different appearance. 'It is not necessary that a clear and precise theoretical line should be drawn between right and wrong in this matter. Here, as in other cases, it is sufficient for practical purposes if the main central portion of the region of duty be strongly illuminated, while the margin is left somewhat obscure' (423) [450]. How is the Utilitarian principle to be applied? By the method of Empirical Hedonism. 'We have in each case to compare all the pleasures and pains that can be foreseen as probable results of the different alternatives of conduct presented to us, and to adopt the alternative which seems likely to lead to the greatest happiness on the whole' (428) [455]. 'That this method is liable to the most serious errors, and this comparison must generally be of the roughest and vaguest kind, we have already seen; and it is highly important to bear this in mind: but yet we seem unable to find any substitute for it' (440) [472]. 'The Utilitarian must repudiate as superstitious the awe of established morality as an absolute or Divine code' (439) [470]. 'At the same time, this sentiment is in no way incompatible with Utilitarianism' (439, *n.*) [470, *n.*]. How exceptions to moral rules are to be allowed (448) [480]. How the 'enlightened Utilitarian should proceed as an innovator on current morality' (458) [490]. 'Though two different kinds of conduct cannot both be right under the same circumstances, two contradictory opinions as to the rightness of conduct may possibly both be expedient' (454) [486]. 'A Utilitarian may reasonably desire . . . that the vulgar should keep aloof from his system as a whole, in so far as the inevitable indefiniteness and complexity of its calculations render it likely to lead to bad results in their hands' (453) [485].

'Of course in an ideal community of enlightened Utilitarians this swarm of puzzles and paradoxes would vanish.'

Green's Introduction to HUME'S TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE, AND ESSAYS, 4 vols. 1874-1875, opens with a criticism of Locke's *Essay*, by use of a stern test of consistency. The early portion applies exclusively to the side of Intellectual Philosophy, but it is interesting to the student of Ethics as a criticism of the experiential theory of knowledge. The relation of Locke's 'ideas got by sensation' and 'ideas of reflection' is minutely traced, vol. i. 8. The discussion comes into the region of Ethical Science, when Locke's view of the idea of God is examined (116). Criticism of Locke's 'intuitive knowledge of our own existence' (122). 'A real existence of the mind, founded on the logical necessity of substantiation, rests on a shifting basis' (124). We are thus tempted 'to treat the inner synthesis as a figure of thought, . . . and to confine real existence to single feelings.' But 'the final result will rather be the discovery that the single feeling is nothing real, but that the synthesis of appearance, which alone for us constitutes reality, is never final or complete; that thus absolute reality is never to be found by us, belonging as it does only to divine self-consciousness, of which the presence in us is the source and bond of the ever-growing synthesis called knowledge' (125). Criticism of Locke's demonstration of the being of God (125). Relation of Berkeley and Hume (133). Berkeley, by making the philosophy of Locke consistent with itself, 'empties it of three-parts of its suggestiveness' (134). Berkeley's theory criticised (133-160). Hume's mission (161). Granted impressions of sensation and reflection, to what impressions can *relations*, such as cause and effect, be reduced (162)? 'The vital nerve of his philosophy lies in his statement of the "association of ideas," as a sort of process of spontaneous generation' (162). Here Physiology is of no avail. 'The quarrel of the physiologist with the metaphysician is due to an *ignorantia elenchi* on the part of the former.' 'The question is whether

the conceptions which all sciences presuppose shall have an account given of them or not' (164). 'Empirical Psychology' has to ascertain what consciousness is to itself *at the beginning*' (165). Assuming a beginning in impressions, the question is, —Can the theory 'explain thought, or "cognition by means of conceptions," as something which happens in sequence upon previous psychical events' (166). Hume made a strenuous effort but failed. A natural history of self-consciousness is impossible. 'Such a history must be of events, and self-consciousness is not reducible to a series of events' (166). Hume's position as to self and God (291).

INTRODUCTION TO THE MORAL PART OF THE TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE, by Mr. Green, in Vol. ii.—In the Moral Part, 'the originality of Hume lies in his systematic efforts to account for those objects, apparently other than pleasure and pain, which determine desire' (1). 'To understand that it is the constitution of the desired object . . . which forms the central question of Ethics, is the condition of all clear thinking on the subject' (3). Does the prior consideration which determines desire 'consist merely in the return of an image of past pleasure, or is it a *conception*,—the thought of an object under relations to self, or of self in relation to certain objects, in a word, self-consciousness as distinct from simple feeling' (4)? "'Happiness" is a familiar cover for confusion' (6). Locke's position,—'Every one knows what best pleases him, and that he actually prefers.' Different meanings of Happiness (6). "'The desired good is really just as it appears," this admission has always been the rock on which consistent Hedonism has broken' (11). The relation of personal character and circumstances to personal happiness (11-12). Responsibility and the choice of pleasures (13). 'The voice of conscience' (16). 'Whether something is good for us on the whole is to be determined, not by the imagination of pleasure, but by the conception of self' (16). Hume's characteristic lies in the more consistent application of the principles and method of

Locke (22). 'The work of reason in constituting the moral judgment ("I ought"), as well as the moral motive ("I must, because I ought"), could not find due recognition in an age which took its notion of reason from Locke' (28). Hume rejects rational or unselfish affections,—'this involves rejection of reason as supplying either moral motive or moral standard' (32). Hume's account of knowledge of self (37). How Hume attempts to account for the 'distinction between moral and other good' (54). Requirements for an answer (55). Locke's law of God disappears under Hume's theory (55). Virtues and vices are the usual likes and dislikes of society (57). Moral sense (59). Omissions in course of Hume's argument (59). Insufficiency of his account of 'oughtness' (65). Self-condemnation disappears (69).

ETHICAL STUDIES, by F. H. Bradley, 1876.—Written from Hegel's standpoint, making self-realisation the end. Essay 1. 'The vulgar notion of responsibility in connection with the theories of Free Will and Necessity.' The object here is to test the 'two great philosophies' by common notions, 'betaking ourselves to the uneducated man as the witness' (3). COMMON VIEW. Responsibility means answering, or imputability of all actions. The conditions are self-sameness, and that the acts are our own, implying that the source of the action is in the agent himself; that he is intelligent, knowing the circumstances, and a moral agent knowing the quality of his actions (5). FREE WILL THEORY. Freedom means liberty to choose, implying that our choice is not necessitated by motives, but that there is self-determination. Criticism of this theory. To a large extent it expresses indubitable facts, but it is merely negative, and implies that Will has no reason for deciding (10). [The two last statements apply only to liberty of indifference, not to the Free Will doctrine that freedom is power to act according to Reason.] NECESSITARIAN THEORY. Given the data, all our actions could be foretold. But the plain man objects to prediction of his actions, except in so far as they

can be traced to his character (13). Criticism. A man cannot be worked like a sum, by reckoning up environment, dispositions, and associations (14). Punishment may be taken as a test (24). The vulgar view is that punishment is deserved because wrong has been done. Punishment is thus an end in itself (25). Punishment is justice giving a man his due. All this Determinism denies, holding that punishment is justifiable only for the reform of the agent or for protection of others. In this way Determinism 'ignores the rational self in the form of will' (30). General conclusion: neither the one nor the other of our two great philosophic modes of thought does in any way express the moral notions of the vulgar mind. Mr. Bradley's formula of the Will is 'that a universal is real, and that universal is conscious of itself' (31).

Essay II. 'Why should I be moral?'—This is an argument for the formula of Hegel—'Be a Person.' The good is not a means (54). To do good for its own sake is virtue. This is the testimony of common consciousness (56). Is morality the same as the end for man, so that the two are convertible? It is, and accordingly there is an end in itself; morality is that end, and the most general expression for this end is *self-realisation* (59). Here we cannot separate end and means. The act must be my act, and there is no end beyond the act. We cannot possibly do anything else than perfectly or imperfectly realise ourselves (60). DESIRE. What is desired must in all cases be self (62). Desire is the feeling of an affirmation in the idea of something not ourselves, against the feeling of ourselves as void or negated. The self we try to realise is for us *a whole* (63). To realise self is always to realise a whole, and the question in morals is to find the true whole. No man seeks disconnected particular ends; he looks beyond, seeking to realise some larger whole. THE FORM OF THE WILL. We must distinguish the Will itself from this or that object of desire, and at the same time we must identify the two; the object is willed, and the will has uttered itself in

the object. We have, let us say, two conflicting desires; we cannot actually affirm ourselves in both; we reflect on the two objects, and decide for one or other. This implies (1) that Self is practically above both desires (and above both objects); (2) that we identify ourselves with one or other; (3) that Will is the identification of both, the realisation of the particular side and of the inner side (66). This unity is the individual whole, or the concrete universal. 'Realise yourself,' 'realise yourself as a whole,' is the result of the foregoing. This is the true theory and practice. The question of practice is 'to force the sensuous fact to correspond to the truth of ourselves' (67). Thus we realise ourselves, possess our world, find our own will in it, by having a harmony or a whole in system. But this realising of self, this combination of homogeneity and specification, means not only, Be a whole, but Be an *infinite whole* (69). To be finite is to be some one among others—some one which is not others. The mind is *not* finite, just because it knows it *is* finite; it is a self-contradiction that the finite should know its own finitude. If its knowledge ceases to fall wholly within itself, then *so far* it is not finite. There are two false views of the infinite: (1) that it is a mere negation of end=indefinite; (2) that it is something apart from the finite=limited (70). In neither of these senses is the mind infinite. It negates the finite, so that the finite disappears by being taken up into a higher unity, being both preserved and suppressed. The finite is relative to something *else*; the infinite is *self*-related. It is this sort of infinite whole the mind is. A circle is the best symbol of it; not as circumference is inclusive and exclusive, but as 'the line which returns into itself.' Desire is self and its opposite: satisfaction is the return of the opposite into self. The rule therefore is, Realise yourself as an infinite whole. Objections to this view: (1) morality is progress; (2) man is an individual among many. True; but I must will to be nothing but my true self, and that is to be part of the whole (72).

Be a member of a whole. The whole specifies itself in the details of its functions and yet remains homogeneous; so each member is alive, but the whole lives in it. In the moral organism the members are aware of themselves, and aware of themselves as members. But the relations of others to me are not mere external relations. The will of the whole knowingly wills itself in me. No doubt the distinction of separate selves remains, but in morality the existence of my mere private self as such is something which ought not to be, and which, so far as I am moral, has already ceased (73). 'Realise yourself as an infinite whole' means 'Realise yourself as the self-conscious member of an infinite whole, by realising that whole in yourself.' General conclusion: (1) The formula of 'what for?' must be rejected by every ethical doctrine as not universally valid; (2) the final end with which morality is identified, or under which it is included, can be expressed not otherwise than by self-realisation (74). The author appears to have some doubt whether the second statement may command assent as an accurate statement, for he adds, 'which second part, if it fall, the first need not fall.' 'To conclude: if I am asked why am I to be moral, I can say no more than this, that what I cannot doubt is my own being now, and that since in that being is involved a self, which is to be here and now, and yet in this here and now is not, I therefore cannot doubt that there is an end which I am to make real; and morality, if not equivalent to, is at all events included in, this making real of myself' (77).

This theory is supported in five additional essays. III. Pleasure for pleasure's sake. IV. Duty for duty's sake. V. My station and its duties. VI. Social morality. VII. Selfishness and self-sacrifice.

THE DATA OF ETHICS, by Herbert Spencer, 1879.—Utilitarianism contemplated as the evolution of general conduct. 'Conduct is a whole, and, in a sense, it is an organic whole—

an aggregate of interdependent actions performed by an organism.' Conduct 'excludes purposeless actions.' It is 'acts adjusted to ends or use—the adjustment of acts to ends.' The question is, 'What distinction is habitually made between the conduct on which ethical judgments are passed and the remainder of conduct' (5)? In many cases means and ends are 'ethically indifferent'; the transition 'to acts, good or bad, is gradual'; here we cannot contemplate 'the conduct of human beings only,' for 'conduct, as exhibited by all living creatures,' discovers 'acts adjusted to ends'; thus 'we have to include in our conception the less developed conduct out of which this has arisen in course of time,' that is, 'the part of conduct which Ethics deals with' (7). The subject of study therefore is 'the evolution of conduct' (8). This study begins with 'combinations among the actions of sensory and motor organs' (9). Evolution appears by 'the addition of new sets of adjustments' (12). With man 'the adjustments of acts to ends are both more numerous and better' (13). This appears further in the contrast between the uncivilised and civilised races of men. Along with the greater elaboration of life 'there goes that increased duration of life which constitutes the supreme end' (14). Besides adjustments securing increased 'duration of life,' with 'increased amount of life,' there are 'adjustments which have for their final purpose the life of the species' (15). But in 'the struggle for existence' the end is often unattained—'the stronger' often carries off the prey from 'the weaker'; 'the more ferocious drive off others,' and many are unable 'to escape enemies.' 'Contemplating these adjustments, . . . which miss completeness,' 'raises the thought of adjustments such that each creature may make them without preventing them from being made by other creatures. That the highest form of conduct must be so distinguished is an inevitable implication' (18). 'Members of a society may give mutual help in the achievement of ends,' 'and if, either indirectly by industrial co-operation, or directly by volunteered

aid,' this be done, 'conduct assumes a still higher phase of evolution' (19). 'Ethics has for its subject-matter that form which universal conduct assumes during the last stages of its evolution' (20). 'By comparing its meanings in different connections, and observing what they have in common, we learn the essential meaning of a word.' Things are 'good or bad' as they are well or ill adapted to 'achieve prescribed ends.' 'If from lifeless things and actions we pass to living ones,' these words still 'refer to efficient subservience.' So, 'in characterising conduct under its ethical aspects,' we apply the words according as adjustments 'are or are not efficient.'

1. Actions subserving individual life. All approving and disapproving utterances make the tacit assertion that conduct is 'right or wrong' according as its special acts 'do or do not further the general end of self-preservation.'

2. Actions subserving the rearing of offspring. Goodness or badness is affirmed of conduct as its methods are adapted to the physical and psychical wants of children. The expressions good or bad nursing, feeding, clothing, 'tacitly recognise, as special ends which ought to be fulfilled, the furthering of the vital functions.' [A question arises as to recognition of the 'ought.']

3. Deeds by which men affect each other. 'The words good and bad have come to be specially connected with acts which further the complete living of others, and acts which obstruct their complete living.' In caring for themselves and their children, men 'are so apt to hinder the kindred adjustments of other men, that insistence on the needful limitations has to be perpetual.' 'Goodness, standing by itself, suggests, above all other things, the conduct of one who aids the sick in reacquiring normal vitality, assists the unfortunate to recover the means of maintaining themselves, defends those who are threatened with harm in person, property, or reputation, and aids whatever promises to improve the living of all his fellows' (24). Conduct promoting the interests of self, offspring, and of others is good; it 'rises

to the conduct conceived as best, when it fulfils all three classes of ends at the same time' (26). 'The good is universally the pleasurable' (30). Under the Biological view of life, 'The ideally moral man is one in whom the functions of all kinds are duly fulfilled' (75). 'The performance of every function is in a sense a moral obligation,'—all the animal functions even have their imperativeness. Here 'we are compelled to consider that interaction of feelings and functions which is essential to animal life in all its more developed forms' (78). 'Sentient existence can evolve only on condition that pleasure-giving acts are life-sustaining acts' (83). Under the Psychological view of life, the mental process by which the adjustment of acts to ends becomes the subject-matter of ethical judgments is 'divisible into the rise of a feeling or feelings constituting the motive, and the thought or thoughts through which the motive is shaped and finally issues in action' (105). With civilised men, the intellectual actions become 'of the kind we call judicial.' This introduces 'relative authorities of motives,' for 'feelings have authorities proportionate to the degrees in which they are removed by their complexity and their ideality from simple sensations and appetites' (109). With the development of intelligence, 'the ends to which the acts are adjusted cease to be exclusively immediate.' Hence arises 'a certain presumption in favour of motive which refers to a remote good.' 'Mental vision in relation to general truths' needs to be restricted 'by taking account of unnoticed differences' (110). The current ethical conclusions are too sweeping by lack of the following qualifications,—(1) That 'the authority of the lower feelings as guides is by no means always inferior to the higher'; (2) Inferior feelings are not to be condemned intrinsically; (3) The pleasures of the present are not always to be sacrificed to the pleasures of the future (110-112). In the vision of general truths with their qualifications, we have 'the genesis of the moral consciousness.' 'The essential trait in the moral con-

sciousness is the control of some feeling or feelings by some other feeling or feelings' (113). 'The restraints properly distinguished as moral . . . refer, not to the extrinsic effects of actions, but to their intrinsic effects' (120). Moral feelings and correlative restraints have arisen later than the feelings and restraints that originate from political, religious, and social authorities' (121). 'Such a moral sentiment as that of abstract equity . . . can evolve only after the social stage reached gives familiar experience both of the pains flowing directly from injustices and also of those flowing indirectly from the class-privileges which make injustices easy.' 'One further question has to be answered—How does there arise the feeling of moral obligation in general? Whence comes the sentiment of duty considered as distinct from the several sentiments which prompt temperance, providence, kindness, justice, truthfulness, etc.? The answer is that it is an abstract sentiment generated in a manner analogous to that in which abstract ideas are generated' (124). The idea of duty is thus analogous to the idea of colour. 'An abstract idea thus formed often acquires an illusive independence.' Thus is produced 'the sentiment of moral obligation, or duty' (125) Its genesis is the following: 'More compound and more representative feelings, serving to adjust the conduct to more distant and general needs, have all along had an authority as guides superior to that of the earlier and simpler feeling—excluding cases in which these last are intense' (126). There is further 'the element of coerciveness' originating from experience of political, religious, and social restraints. The author agrees at this point with Dr. Bain as to the origin of 'the sense of compulsion which the consciousness of duty includes, and which the word obligation indicates.' 'The truly honest man' . . . 'is not only without thought of legal, religious, or social compulsion, . . . but he is without self-compulsion. He does the right thing with a simple feeling of satisfaction in doing it; and is, indeed, impatient if any

thing prevents him from having the satisfaction of doing it' (128).

THE PROCESS OF HUMAN EXPERIENCE, by William Cyples, 1880.—'Motion' may be taken to express the specific feeling accompanying activity in our muscular apparatus. Intellect is implied in the attempt to expound occurrences in experience. The primary data of experience are successive movements, diversity of kind in these, which is undetermined by ourselves, but apprehended by our intellect. 'Motion' may be used to describe the 'Executive-Operation' (4). Our apprehensions of this give us two generalisations,—the human body and the physical universe. These are operative systems, the former acting in and through the latter. In this interaction the ultimate activity is in the nerve system. In every case it is specific, involving a determinate impression. Organisation is the name for the way in which operations are modified providing for modifications without and within (10). 'What is really at the bottom of the dispute between the materialists and the anti-materialists is the question whether or not organisation does something besides effectuate itself as structure and systematised movement.' The contention of the latter party virtually is, that modern scientists assume mistakenly that organisation 'has some magic, accounting for the other facts of experience, besides the occurrence of its own determinate movements and relations.' To varied consecutions of physical results science gives different names, such as heat, electricity, but all are now agreed that such terms describe so much motion. 'Consciousness connects with the dynamical activities of the human body' (12). 'Force, matter, energy, or whatever it is styled, does not give consciousness from mere general activity or motion.' 'The researches of physiology are very valuable, as showing us the detailed apparatus which is required for the specific dynamics.' 'Since nerves, ganglia, brain, etc., are framed and maintained by the specific grouping of equivalent quan-

ties of force indifferently interchangeable, there is nothing in those names to help in the apprehension of the process of consciousness, further than as detailing the arrangement for giving the special events of motion' (13). But only some things in the physical universe are known directly through the senses; 'the mind of man is only in relation with a few fragmentary processes.' We can, however, at will reproduce forms of experience, 'by availing ourselves, through our volitional activities, of the modes in which, by means of organisation, energy is made to modify its own operations.' 'Our experiencing the specific sensations does not work any physical alterations or consequences in the movements in which those rapidities, volumes, etc., occur.' From the opposite point of view,—'This Executive system, according to the calculations of the intellect, takes no account whatever, either one way or other, of the happening of sensations, intellectual apprehensions, or emotions.' 'Consciousness in all its kinds is, whenever it occurs, so much pure addition to the sum-total of being.' 'Energy does not transform differently, or omit any of its changes of executive behaviour, when or while consciousness happens' (17). What is here required is to ascertain the law governing the actualisation of the Ego, or fix the point where self-consciousness arises. The Ego has to be actually subsisting when the non-egoistic phenomena are experienced. There is no question of priority between the non-egoistic and the egoistic sentiency. The actualisation of the Ego, and the conditioning of the sensory experience, result from a related systematisation of motion (19). We have no consciousness actualised by movements in the nerve fibres prior to the agitations reaching the brain; but in dreaming, imagining, etc., the motion largely originates in the brain. The brain has the power of multiplying movement, so that the proportion which the peripherally-started motion bears to the total of the current cerebral activity may be very small. These additional movements may be termed cerebral reactions; such

reaction is necessarily a hidden intra-cranial one; it can be prompted by impression on any sense-organ; and there is perpetual interchangeability of the actualising movements, provided only that there be chronological overlapping in the alternation and succession. With activity of the sensory apparatus, coincident activity of an associated locomotory apparatus is needed for effectiveness. The initial law of consciousness is that there must be *coincidence* of movement in the fibres of at least two senses (27). In use of the sensory, the feeling of self and the apprehension of not-self are variable elements, the preponderance of either being determined by the number of senses acting simultaneously (35). [Here follows discussion of the laws of pleasure and pain, memory, attention, succession of ideas.] The intellect stands for a further different kind of experience besides sensation (184). By it we understand our own activity as such, connecting our efferent movements with the sensory changes they work, and, through modifications of sensory impression, coming to be intellectually apprehendable as signs of measurement. The critical, comparing measuring function, is the basis on which the intellectual phenomena arise. From repetition arises the possibility of comparison as to larger or smaller, sweeter or sourer, etc. This is the germ of the intellectual process, and out of this germinal power a much larger faculty develops (186). By means of a positive development of its own style of experience, it goes on to a precise comparative judgment, obtaining objects for itself out of its own process, and forming conceptions (187). The problem is, How is this further additional style of experience executively conditioned? For an answer there must first be clear distinction between Sensation and Perception. Our nerve-system is 'progressively organised by cumulation or reminiscent activity' (188). The distinction between Sensation and Perception is according to the presence or absence of massed impression, along with the presence or absence of an

application of the intellectual conceptions to the unmassed sensory experience. The general effect of the application of the Intellectual Conceptions is to give an apprehension of executive-potentiality in objects (189). By the intellectual function we apprehend this, and thus the difference between Sensation and Perception is enlarged, for in perception we not only add the intellectual experiences of the relations of comparison, but we apprehend its executive potentiality. How this apprehension of causation arises is the next question. For explanation we have to turn to Efferent Activity, that is, the out-going or forth-putting of nerve energy. 'It is from that part of this activity, which is *volitional*, that the intellectual phenomena chronologically derive' (191). We only use the efferent activity in consequence of the promptings of sensory impression arousing the egoistic molecules, and the use of it leads to sensation afresh, thus completing the circle. The Ego knows the operations of efferent activity by the muscular sense, revealing the fact that muscular activity works changes in the known *order* of the occurring of the other sensations. 'The volitional efferent apparatus is naturally the machinery of the intellect' (192). Not one of the ideas of relation (the categories of number, size, etc.), nor the fundamental conceptions of substance, cause, etc., could ever be *exemplified* without a use of the organic apparatus. 'Every one of these intellectual conceptions is plainly something added to the other experiences by an egoistically-arising operation.' Among the helps of the intellectual process, 'the primary great stroke of economy is effected by the interpolation, so to speak, of the Language-faculty into the efferent system' (202). This included, the efferent fibrils give 'what we call rationality, being the only part of our experience which carries a totalisation of itself forward from moment to moment' (214). 'Thought and sensation have nothing directly in common.' Enlargement of consciousness follows from the development of Intellect, by means of which 'we can think

in respect of the happening of the sensation in quite a number of modes, getting experience which is not included in the sensation's own style of consciousness' (215). 'The general effect of the Intellect is to explicate in our common consciousness the apprehension of an external world, where all that happens in our experience of it gives practical limits, which we name Space and Time' (220). Preliminary to the discussion of Will and Conscience comes the question of the Ego's cognition of itself. That there is a duplication in our experience, an egoistic self-awareness as well as apprehension of being which is non-egoistic, has to be admitted throughout. 'Cognition' is a summary description of our intellectual apprehensions of the causative order of the Executive System in respect of the verified sequences, on account of which we speak of objects, or of Force, Matter, Energy, etc. 'To ask that we should know the Ego in this mode is really to overlook the very distinction which is the characteristic of the case, and to require that the Ego shall in some manner become at the same time non-egoistic. The very vital point of what is at issue is this—that the Ego is of another mode' (238). The final question is whether there is or is not in us 'a versatility of awareness which validly and sufficiently certifies ourself in our own egoistic consciousness, along with, though necessarily distinct in style from, our experience of the non-Ego?' 'The detailed difficulties which perplex this question go back to the facts of the Ego, showing cessation in its actualisation, and of limitations being imposed upon it while it is actual.' The Ego seems by virtue of the above facts to range itself in the category of phenomena. But 'this alternative supposition no more satisfies than does the other,' since 'all our experience is found to be additional to the intellectually-apprehended Executive System. It would seem, consequently, that the experience cannot be logically regarded as consisting of phenomena furnished by that system, unless we assume that at the bottom of the Executive System there

is a power which can multiply effects,—in other words, *a person*' (239). The 'power of multiplying effects arbitrarily is what is distinguishingly sought to be conveyed by the word 'person.' The Ego 'is hardly capable of being considered apart from its definition into a personality with remembrances of the past, and hopes of the future mixing in the present experience, broadening and heightening it' (244). 'The Ego has not the full command of its own history' (250); but 'the Ego becomes self-critical' (264); the extending and perfecting of personality is 'by habitually widening and exalting the complicated activities'; a complete explication of this gives 'the scientific doctrine of virtue'; 'the final superior form of personality is the unselfish' or universally sympathetic form; self-denial is the way, and the only way, of getting legitimate extensions of personality (265). We thus reach the Realm of Conduct. 'The phenomena of conduct seemingly arise within the Egoistic sphere' (298). All the complexity of conduct is got from these simple elements; man's being impelled to act volitionally by appetite and emotion, the tacking on to each act a consequence, which makes every doing in some way have reference to the future as well as to the present, and causes the future, when it comes, to remind us of the past; the arranging that his deeds shall affect others, their behaviour reacting upon him; and, finally, his being gifted with the power of imagining all different (300). The Emotions we get from the intellectual calculations of our possibilities 'infinitely transcend in worth to us the sensations themselves' (301). The general process of right conduct consists in 'the building up of character in man, an enlargement of the evolutionary activity, and a finer elaboration of self-apprehension' (307). 'The Will, in its first lowest meaning, is the popular name for an executive-faculty we have, associating physical activity in our muscular apparatus with a wish to that effect. In a higher significance ascribed to it by some, Will stands for an alleged power of option in reference to Conduct, de-

ciding arbitrarily [rationally ?] between opposing motives, out of the exercise of which it is said moral merit and demerit arise (310). The first point is the 'practical relation between bodily movement and thought.' 'If an adult human being wants to stir his finger, the nervous and muscular machinery has but to be perfect, and in thinking the act he does it.' If muscular activity 'is not wholly and necessarily reflex, the Will can interfere with it proportionately' (311). 'Prior to a volition, the cerebration giving Thought . . . must be going on.' The executive-effectiveness of volition is progressively acquired; it is not one of immediate original efficacy; it has no detailed control over the efferent machinery; volitions obtain this bit-by-bit, through blunders and miscarriages of all kinds. Our success in getting this power 'wholly hinges upon the fact of repair taking effect in pursuance of use, and so predisposing structure to repetitive activity' (313). Volition, as concerned with muscular activity implies 'the cessation of progress in thinking in reference to the particular matter; it must be so for the apparatus to be left free peripherally for observing the result' (316). In 'the higher questions of Conduct' the rule is reversed. In moral behaviour, it is exercise of thought which 'suspends the progress of the energy aroused by sensory experience.' Activity arising out of mere Passion is 'energy working itself out at a low instinctive level,' 'thought not having varied it.' 'In the high sense, Will can only refer to the enlargement of our process.' In the first stage, 'every improvement in conduct can be traced back to refraining' or 'abstaining.' 'At a later stage, there follows a positive activity.' 'At these critical moments, the Conscience is acting' (319). 'The mechanical notion of volition has here to be changed for another,' 'which takes on the aspect of an egoistic-phenomenon,' which 'may be provisionally spoken of as *aspiration*,' 'the only explanation of the possibility of it being, that it arises from a mystical, complex self-feeling which supervenes at these times of full use of structure.' 'At this moment,

when contrariety of motive breaks up the habituated-cerebration, the Ego is most vivid, and gets a persuasion that it decides arbitrarily.' 'Who can hope publicly to make quite intelligible such private matters?' 'Does it not suggest itself as the only approach to intelligibility in the case that the Ego, in its primary mode, is mystical from first to last' (322). 'The Ego, by a sort of mimicry of prerogative, if not really possessing an imperial faculty, has ultimately . . . a germinal power of self-determination arbitrarily' (323). 'Will, if the term is made to cover the possibility of altering our dynamical-activity optionally in Conduct, necessitates modification of structure, and this inevitably implies additions to the sum-total of physical energy' (324). What is involved is not merely Will-force, but increase of nerve-force, for 'Will does not act as an isolated faculty'; . . . 'the motion affording the larger experience must exist in the brain before the possibility of our exercising Will can arise.' 'The increments of energy have, in the first place, to be looked for in elaboration of cerebral structure' (326). 'When these high phenomena of Conscience and Will develop, the cerebral apparatus is acting in its most complicated style,—previously acquired structure is in full exercise of use.' 'A single vibration added, affecting only . . . a single brain-cell, might be sufficient to carry the struggling generalisation of virtuous thinking further than heretofore, though the improvement of structure might have to be finished and made stable under the test of varying situations, by the repeated and progressive overcomings of Temptation, through again and again aspiring rightly, followed, or accompanied by fresh impartations of energy.' 'If the right options be not in this way followed up, all the dangers of deterioration of character set in.' For such failure 'a man's Conscience challenges him with responsibility on the ill act subsequently arising in consequence.' It is requisite for an occasion of willing in the high sense 'that the conscience shall be fully acting' (328). 'The scheme of this world' pro-


vides for a forecast of conduct 'on the ground of more-or-less calculable repetitions of behaviour.' 'If we intimately know a man's structure as disclosed by past Conduct, we can in a rough general way predict his decisions, excepting at one of these alleged supreme moments. Then, on the above hypothesis, we are liable to be utterly wrong, for when a supernatural act of gratuitous addition to structure is taking place, who may limit the miracles of change of character that may occur?' No mathematical calculation of increasing energy is possible. 'We are thrown back upon the deliverances of our own consciousness, and of the testimony of others, subject to such criticism as rationally arises' (333). **MOTIVES.** 'There would be no opportunity for volition in any mystical style if appetite, opportunity, suggestion, did not operate dynamically' (337). But 'there may be much fluctuation and interaction ideatorily before the efferent operation finally determines itself. The problem is, how this sets up a struggle in the very consciousness which it conditions.' At such a time 'the egoistic-actualisation . . . is highly-emotionalised, taking note, so to speak, of the violence and suffering from it.' Thus 'by motives something more than Appetites must be meant.' 'Prospective pleasures and pains . . . become considerations offered to the Ego in a logic of the Emotions.' It is in reference to this that 'the struggle of temptation arises.' 'The old moralists, when speaking of man as being made a "rational" or a "reasonable" being, meant that he had the power of taking note on these consequences, . . . but that he, further, had an arbitrary faculty for yielding or not yielding to their instruction of his Intellect.' 'The play of the higher motives . . . can be seen to bring into activity more-and-more widely the existing structuralisation' (339). Improvement involved in amelioration of character 'should be called better efficiency of volitional activity rather than increased freedom of the Will' (342). The question next arises to what extent is man 'responsible for his structuralisation'? For answer we

must consider 'the manner in which the Intellect comes into play in these affairs of conduct, and definitely instructs the Conscience' (343). 'In practice, definite courses can be summed up in Duties to which set names are given, and a man is held responsible by his fellows,—after certain reasonable qualifications relating to inherited organisation, education, etc., have been made,—for the possession or non-possession of the structural-adaptations for performing those Duties.' The phenomena of Will are not to be regarded merely 'as practical volitions, taking effect in overt conduct.' 'The affairs of the Will are transacted far within the outward results of conduct ;' 'every fluctuation of desire is an efficient act of the higher volition ;' in this supreme region 'feelings are the facts, and the volitions determine them ;' Conscience 'takes note not only of volitions, but also of the omitting to will,—this latter being a real event in the moral and spiritual realms' (345-6). If our behaviour had no traceable causality,— . . . the added experience of Conscience could not arise' (349). 'We have always, when acting rationally, to consider more than the present experience.' 'In the facts of behaviour in the present juncture being made to frame the future situation, . . . we get a hint of the germ of Conscience' (350). 'Merely by man having Memory and Imagination, a new faculty both intellectual and emotional is naturally constituted, which works retrospectively and prospectively.' 'This power by its very nature continually busies itself in framing estimates of the Conduct then transacting ; passing judgments retrospectively, uttering, it may be, reproaches as consequences develop, and giving solemn warnings in advance. Here the germ has unfolded ; we arrive at the common natural Conscience which all men have in some degree' (351). How the Conscience gets its sanctions 'is not necessarily so mysterious as some teachers have made it appear.' 'In the lower grades of development great temporary anomalies in respect of these sanctions are possible, alike in the individual conscience, and in what may be called the col-

lective conscience of public bodies and communities' (352). 'Conscience begins . . . when . . . consciousness becomes retrospective and prophetic.' We found 'on the knowledge, naturally obtruding itself, that if we enjoy to excess now, we shall regret it in the future;' this is 'conscience's primary sanction.' 'Out of this, as a first conscientious distinction of conduct, arises the perception of the Good as not being the same as the directly pleasurable.' 'The contest between the Pleasant and the Good (out of which all final egoistic enlargement is to come) begins;' the decision of the struggle in a volition sets up reminiscence of itself, and gives the Conscience proper; all the means used in pursuing and carrying out the Good naturally tend to become ends in themselves; in this way Conscience 'develops requirements of its own, the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of which becomes an affair of pressing instant concern.' Next, 'the social sympathies are started;' 'a new, more liberal, far busier spontaneity than that of mere prudence towards ourselves bestirs itself; the feelings all suffer an enriching evolution; self-sacrifice becomes a higher economy of conduct;' 'accordingly the sanctions of the Conscience's own activity become still more powerful, more dread. For friends, for country, for humanity, anything can be endured' (357). 'Yet another step has to be taken. A further transformation, a yet more intricate involution, a still higher elaborateness of conduct, it is affirmed arise when the religious experience is attained. When experience has been so sublimated and totalised that love of a Supreme Being, or, if the phrase be preferred, of the Cosmos, is superadded to the love of one's fellows, the last stage of the exaltation of conscience opens 'before us.' 'The exercises of the Will, when the intellect is freely informed as to the acts, are themselves the highest achievements of conduct, and pass into the record of the Conscience.' 'The Conscience seems finally to become paramount over the Will' (358). 'To insist on applying to these alleged hyperphysical phenomena . . . the

simple arithmetical calculations of physics, . . . is necessary up to a certain stage for the formal purposes of argument, but who does not feel that beyond that limit there is stolidity in the question?' 'It is all but wholly hopeless to try adequately to indicate the subtle interworking of Conscience and Will in the finally developed stages.' 'Conscience gets a monitory authority over the Will, becoming critical of it.' 'The apprehending on a critical occasion of the possibility of the Will not acting when the understanding tells us the case requires that it should do so, perplexes the actualisation of consciousness, causing it partially to omit, so bringing the law of Pain into play.' 'This completes the dread sanctions, arming the Conscience at every point' (363). 'In nearly every case the categorical imperative (again borrowing the fine phrase made classical by Kant) tacks on to itself a retrospective reference. It not only says "Thou shalt," but, instructed by the Memory and the Intellect, it adds, "Thou oughtest to have done," "Thou didst not." . . . It is still within the province of the Conscience to add to the decalogue or catalogue of denunciation the inescapable capital sin of non-attainment,—the not being better than we are' (363).

The following incidental references to Conscience, occurring earlier than the formal treatment of its nature and functions, may be given as supplementary. 'We shall see, when inquiring into the Conscience, that the omission to act is a real occurrence in the world of conduct, even when we cannot trace any outward practical consequences' (301). The requirements of the Good 'always include the future, as well as the present; so organising a Conscience having, in more or less degree, powers of self-enforcement' (305). 'In the internal determinations of conduct, we all in some degree recognise struggles of Temptation, conflicts of Conscience' (337).



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