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HARVARD STUDIES
IN
CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY

*EDITED BY A COMMITTEE OF THE CLASSICAL
INSTRUCTORS OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY*

VOLUME III

BOSTON, U.S.A.

PUBLISHED BY GINN & COMPANY

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27 & 29 LUDGATE HILL

LEIPSIK: OTTO HARRASSOWITZ
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PREFATORY NOTE.

THESE Studies are published by authority of Harvard University, and will be contributed chiefly by its instructors and graduates. But contributions from other sources are not excluded, and in this volume we publish with pleasure a paper by Professor Thomas D. Seymour of Yale University.

WILLIAM W. GOODWIN,
JAMES B. GREENOUGH,
JOHN WILLIAMS WHITE, } EDITORIAL
COMMITTEE.

CONTENTS.

	PAGE
THE DATE OF CYLON	I
By John H. Wright.	
CATULLUS AND THE PHASELUS OF HIS FOURTH POEM	75
By Clement Lawrence Smith.	
ON THE HOMERIC CAESURA AND THE CLOSE OF THE VERSE AS RELATED TO THE EXPRESSION OF THOUGHT	91
By Thomas D. Seymour.	
ON THE NOTION OF VIRTUE IN THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THOSE OF THE FIRST PERIOD AND TO THE THIRD AND FOURTH BOOKS OF THE REPUBLIC	131
By William A. Hammond.	
NOTES	181
INDEXES	195



THE DATE OF CYLON.

BY JOHN HENRY WRIGHT.

"Si in tantis temporum difficultatibus definire quidquam licet." — BÖCKH.

I.

INTRODUCTORY.

THE fifty years preceding the legislation of Solon witnessed most significant changes in the political, social, and economic conditions of Athens, and in the relations of that little state to the world without. The main features of these changes were, as regards internal development, first, the dawning of popular political consciousness — the birth, from the throes of economic distress, of Democracy, — and, secondly, an increased intensity of factional feeling among the several families of the ruling Aristocracy; and, as regards both domestic and foreign relations, we have to note the development of local industries and of foreign trade, *i.e.* the beginnings of the commercial enterprise which subsequently aided in giving Athens her political supremacy among the Greek states.

The dates of a few events in these and in earlier important movements have been preserved to us. If we are to place any confi-

NOTE. — This paper was originally prepared in 1888 and was read before the American Philological Association at the meeting of that year (*Proc. Am. Philol. Assoc.*, 1888, p. xxvi.); in the summer of 1890 it was rewritten for publication in the HARVARD STUDIES. Since that time, however, the important and long-lost treatise of Aristotle on the Athenian Commonwealth, recently discovered, has been published to the world, with its complete confirmation of the correctness of the writer's chief contention — a pre-Draconian date for Cylon. Instead of the fragments of this work, preserved in the Berlin Papyrus, No. CLXIII., and in a garbled form in the later Greek writers, we have now a copy of the original text, prepared probably not far from A.D. 100 (British Museum Papyrus, No. CXXXI.), to which to appeal. The paper has accordingly been revised, and in part rewritten, in the new light thus unexpectedly shed, not only upon the affair of Cylon, but also upon the whole subject of Athenian constitutional history before the time of Peisistratus. See F. D. Allen, *The Nation*, March 5, 1891 (No. 1340, pp. 197, 198).

dence in the recorded lists of Olympic and Pythian victors, of Attic archons, etc., — many of which were made up contemporaneously, — and in the chronological studies of ancient Greek scholars, which were based upon these lists, we must regard most of these dates as fairly well established.

Attic history opens with the rule of kings by right of birth; this early merges into that of kings by election, for such must we regard the so-called life-archons.¹ About the middle of the eighth century B.C.,² the last life-archon gives place to the decennial archon:³ this is evidently a movement on the part of the aristocratic families in the direction of greater control. In the first half of the seventh century B.C.,⁴ the decennial archontate is replaced by a board of nine

¹ The term βασιλεύς was applied to the life-archons and to the decennial archons down to the last Medontid, Hippomenes: Photius *Lex.*, (and Suidas) *s.v.* παρ' Ἱππων καὶ κόρην . . . Ἱππομένης . . . τελευταῖος ἐβασιλευεν. In Marmor Parium (Epp. 27, 28, 29, 30, 31) certain life-archons are named as kings: cf. Eusebius *Chron.* I. 188 *p* (Schöne), βασιλεύει Ἀλκμαίων. In fact, the name βασιλεύς was always retained (βασιλεύς alone is correct, not ἄρχων βασιλεύς: Hauvette-Besnault, *de Archonte Rege*, Paris, 1884, p. 1). Cf. Busolt, *Griech. Gesch.* I. 400, 401, and below, p. 30, note 2, for a discussion of the name by which the annual archons were probably designated before Solon's time. Once for all I wish here to express my debt to Busolt, not alone for his abundant bibliographical references, but also for the suggestion of many new points of view.

² The dates given for these events are those computed by the ancient chronographers, and may be regarded as fairly authentic, at least after contemporary records of Olympic victors, etc., were begun. These ἀναγραφὰι seem to date as far back as the first half of the eighth century B.C. Euseb. *Chron.* I. 194: ἱστοροῦσι δὲ οἱ περὶ Ἀριστόδημον τὸν Ἡλείου ὡς ἀπ' εἰκοστῆς καὶ ἐβδόμης Ὀλυμπιάδος . . . ἤρξαντο οἱ ἀθληταὶ ἀναγράφεσθαι . . . πρὸ τοῦ γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἀνεγράφη . . . τῇ δὲ εἰκοστῇ ἡγδόῃ τὸ στάδιον νικῶν Κόροιβος Ἡλείου ἀνεγράφη πρῶτος. καὶ ἡ Ὀλυμπιάς αὕτη πρώτη ἐτάχθη, ἀφ' ἧς Ἕλληνας ἀριθμοῦσι τοὺς χρόνους. τὰ δ' αὐτὰ τῷ Ἀριστοδήμῳ καὶ Πολύβιου ἱστορεῖ. *Ibid.* 192, ἀπὸ γὰρ τούτων τὰ τῆς Ἑλληνῶν χρονογραφίας ἀκριβοῦς ἀναγραφῆς τετευχέναι δεκεῖ· τὸ πρὸ αὐτῶν, ὡς ἐκάστῳ φίλον ἦν, ἀνεφάνητο. On the ἀναγραφὰι (Macedonian, Argive, Sicyonian, Halicarnassian, etc.), see Busolt, *G. G.* I. 137, note 2. Mahaffy's arguments for a later date (about 580 B.C.) for the Olympian register do not convince me (*Journ. Hellen. Stud.* 2 [1881], pp. 164-178).

³ B.C. 752/1, according to Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Ant.* I. 71 and 75), Julius Africanus and Eusebius (I. 187 *p*, *q*), probably based upon Eratosthenes-Apollodorus.

⁴ B.C. 682/1 (Ol. 24. 3), according to Dionysius Halic., Julius Africanus, and Eusebius, here likewise apparently following the system of Eratosthenes as elabo-

chief magistrates annually chosen. According to the recently discovered treatise on the Athenian Commonwealth, this board was historically developed in the following way:¹ at a very early date the office of Polemarch ('Field-marshal'), and afterwards that of Archon ('Regent'), were established for the purpose of providing coadjutors for the King; very much later — when the elections became annual — this board of three was enlarged by the addition of the six Thesmothetae. At some date not to be determined, perhaps not before the time of Solon, but possibly when the archontate became annual, the Archon took precedence of the King and this precedence was ever afterward retained. All these changes in the nature and tenure of the chief magistracy clearly testify to the increasing influence of the leading families, seeking to limit and circumscribe, as far as might be, the power of rivals in office. It should be remembered that throughout these times, and probably for long afterward, the privilege of election to this board of officials belonged for the most part to the nobles, commonly called Eupatrids, and that the number of families constituting this class was not large. In the seventh century B.C. Athens was a community of ancient and powerful families, with social and political conditions very different from those that prevailed subsequently.

The archontate, at least before the time of Solon, and to a certain extent in the sixth century B.C., though then somewhat shorn of its powers, was not only nominally but actually the highest office in the state; it combined the widest executive and judicial functions, and was the prize eagerly sought after by the ambitious.² The

rated by Apollodorus. Mar. Par. (Ep. 32) gives B.C. 683/1. Syncellus, p. 399, 21, i.e. Jul. Africanus: *μετὰ τούτους ἄρχοντες ἐνιαυσιαῖοι ἠρέθησαν ἐξ εὐπατριδῶν, ἑννέα τε ἀρχόντων Ἀθήνησιν ἀρχὴ κατεστάθη* (cf. Euseb. *Chron.* II. 84, 85). The chronographer whom Pausanias follows (IV. 5. 10 and 13. 7) puts the beginning of the annual archontate in B.C. 687/6. For an explanation of this fluctuation in dates, see Gelzer, *Hist. u. Philol. Aufsätze E. Curtius gewidmet*, 1884, p. 20; his best example, however, has lost its value, now that Damasias is known to belong to the sixth, not the seventh, century B.C. For further literature, see Busolt, *G. G. I.* 407.

¹ Aristotle, *Respublica Atheniensium*, c. 3 (Kenyon).

² Thuc. I. 126: *τότε δὲ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν οἱ ἑννέα ἄρχοντες ἐπρασσον*. Aristot. *Respub. Ath.* c. 13: *δῆλον ὅτι μεγίστην εἶχεν δύναμιν ὁ ἄρχων· φαίνονται γὰρ αἰεὶ στασιάζοντες περὶ ταύτης τῆς ἀρχῆς*. Also probably Herod. V. 71: *οἱ πρυ-*

archons in this period are commonly men of note and importance,¹—not the figureheads of the fifth and later centuries, when the choice was by lot from a considerable number of selected persons,²—and their election attested the triumphs of family or of political factions, thus having something of the significance that attached to the election of generals in the age of Pericles and in the Peloponnesian war.³

The most important datable event following the establishment of the annual archontate—leaving out of the question for the present that which is the subject of our enquiry—is the legislation of Draco, in Ol. 39, probably B.C. 621.⁴ At this time, besides the enactment of

πάντες τῶν ναυκράων ὡς περ ἔνεμον τότε τὰς Ἀθήνας (see below, p. 30, note 2). The two-year archonship of Damasias and his violent ejection from office (Aristot. *Respub. Ath.* c. 13), as also the request urged upon Solon to crown his work by making himself tyrant, *i.e.* to become perpetual archon (Plut. *Sol.* 14)—much as Pittacus of Mitylene had done, whose office as aesymnete Aristotle (*Pol.* III. 14. 1285^a 31 ff.) calls an *αἰρετὴ τυραννίς*,—all testify to the great power and importance of this office in these early times.

¹ Among the notable persons who held the office of archon between 660 and 500 B.C., we might name Miltiades the Philaid, archon in 659 B.C.; Solon, probably in 594 B.C., but possibly in 591 B.C.; Damasias, in 583–81 B.C. or 581–79 B.C.; Miltiades (the hero of Marathon?), in 524 B.C.; Isagoras, in 508 B.C., bitter and for a time successful rival of Cleisthenes for the control of the Athenian state (Herod. V. 66, *οἳτοι οἱ ἄνδρες ἐστασίασαν περὶ δυνάμιος*). It is not certain that Draco was archon (Aristot. *Respub. Ath.* c. 4); see below, note 4.

² Under Solon, the choice of archons was made by lot from forty previously selected candidates (*πρόκριτοι*), ten from each tribe. Later there were probably one hundred such candidates (not five hundred—see Kenyon, p. 60, note). But choice by lot appears to have been suspended for many years (from 589 B.C.?), and was resumed about 487 B.C. (Telesinus, archon). Cf. Aristot. *Respub. Ath.* cc. 8, 22, and 13.

³ On the significance of the choice of *στρατηγοί*, see Gilbert, *Beitr. zur innern Gesch. Athens im Zeitalter d. Pelop. Krieger*, Leipzig, 1877, pp. 1–72; Beloch, *Ath. Politik seit Perikles*, 1884, *passim*; list, pp. 289 ff. Headlam's contention (*Election by Lot at Athens*, 1891, pp. 21 ff.), mainly on theoretical grounds, that the elections of generals at Athens had no party significance whatever, is hardly borne out by all the facts. The importance of the elections, however, from this point of view, has doubtless been unduly magnified.

⁴ Draco, Ol. 39 (B.C. 624–0): Tatian, *Or. ad Graec.* 63; Clem. Alex. *Strom.* I. p. 366 Pott.; Suid. *s.v.* Δράκων. Eusebius (*Chron.* II. 90, 91) gives the year: Armen. Vers. Abrahamic year 1395 = Ol. 39. 4 = 621 B.C., but Jerome 622 B.C. Diod. Sic. IX. *Frag.* 17 places Draco 47 years before Solon; 7 is a sure number (Tzetz. *Chil.* V. 350), and 47 can only be a mistake for 27: B.C. 594 + 27 = 621.

several measures meant to remove the increasing alienation of the rich and the poor, and the proposal of new constitutional forms, — in which, since the discovery of the Aristotle papyrus, one is tempted to see the real beginnings of Athenian Democracy,¹ — the laws are put on record and codified, as a safeguard for the people, who now are making themselves felt as a powerful element in the state. Factional quarrels² between prominent families, which in many instances are strengthened by foreign alliances, prevail in this period, and are at their bitterest. The families of the Lycomidae,³

Cf. Busolt, *G. G. I.* p. 510, note 4. Aristotle (*Respub. Ath.* c. 4) makes Aristaechnus, not Draco, archon at the time of the latter's legislation. Possibly Draco was chosen archon soon after proposing his reforms, to carry them into execution: Solon was appointed archon for a like purpose. The exactness of the dates ascribed to Draco is perhaps to be explained on the supposition that his name occurred in the archon-lists. Still, the view that Draco was archon, held by all modern historians — the ancients speak of him as νομοθέτης, etc. — seems to rest wholly upon the word θεσμοθετήσαντα in Paus. IX. 36. 8; since θεσμοθέται often means οἱ ἄρχοντες (Dem. LVII. 66), it was inferred that θεσμοθετήσας here meant ἄρχων γενόμενος (C. F. Hermann, *De Dracone: Ind. Schol. Götting.* 1849–1850, p. 5, note 15). But this inference is not justifiable: θεσμοθετήσας is here merely a participial rendering of θεσμοὺς ἔθηκεν in Aristotle's *Respub. Ath.* c. 4; cf. τοὺς νόμους ἔθηκεν, Suid. s.v. Δράκων. The κατὰ τινος of Eusebius (Syncell. 403, 11) suggests that there was an ancient variation in the date assigned to Draco.

¹ B. Keil, *Berl. Philol. Wochenschrift*, 1891, No. 17, p. 520. "Die Rhetorik des vierten Jahrhunderts [hat] die Bedeutung Drakons völlig vernichtet und allen Ruhm auf den Volksmann Solon gehäuft," Diels, *Sitzungsb. d. Berl. Akad.* 1891, p. 392. Cf. Aristot. *Respub. Ath.* c. 4.

² Aristot. *Respub. Ath.* c. 13, οἱ δὲ τῆ πολιτείας δυσχεραίνοντες . . . ἐνιοὶ δὲ διὰ τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους φιλονικίαν.

³ The ancestral home of the Lycomidae (shortened form of *Λυκομητίδαι, Λυκομηθῆς being a family name) was Phlya (Plut. *Them.* 1; *C.I.A.* II. 1113 gives tribe, gens, and deme, ὄρος χωρίου προικὸς Ἰπποκλεία Δημοχόρους Λευκονοιῶς Ἰδση πλείονος ἔξιον Κερροπίδαις ὑπόκειται καὶ Λυκομίδαις καὶ Φλυεῦσι). It was from Phlya that the Myron came who conducted the formal prosecution of the Alcmeonidae after the affair of Cylon (Aristot. *Respub. Ath.* c. 1; Plut. *Sol.* 12). Busolt (*G. G. I.* p. 508) pointing out that Themistocles, a Lycomid, was charged with treason by Leobates, an Alcmeonid (Craterus, *Frag.* 3 in Müller, *F. H. G.* II. p. 619; Plut. *Them.* 23) remarks that the family feud would seem to have reached back into the seventh century B.C. Diels, however, finds significance in the fact that Phlya (like Eleusis) was a religious community, and the Lycomidae a distinctively priestly family; as a supporter of

the Philaïdae¹ (who were, or soon became, connected by marriage with Cypselus, despot of Corinth), the Alcmeonidae² (who later became allied by marriage with the tyrants of Sicyon), are prominent in these controversies and rivalries. It is safe to infer that the ancient and powerful family³ to which Cylon belonged, himself the son-in-law of a foreign tyrant, was equally prominent, if the issue of the struggle between the adherents of Cylon and the powerful Alcmeonidae—the banishment of the latter from Athens—is to be taken as a criterion.

the ancient, simple religion of the people, outraged by the license of the free-thinking, high-born Alcmeonidae, who unhesitatingly violate the places deemed most holy by the common folk, the Lycomid Myron becomes the formal accuser of the family of the guilty (*l.c.*, p. 390).

¹ The honors received and the offices held by Philaïdae are evidence of the prominence of this family. Miltiades was archon in 664 B.C. and 659 B.C. (Paus. IV. 23. 10, and VIII. 39. 3); Hippocleides, archon in 566 B.C., had unsuccessfully contested, with Megacles and other prominent young Greeks, for the hand of Agariste, daughter of Cleisthenes of Sicyon; a descendant of the earlier Miltiades, Miltiades, the oecist (Herod. VI. 38) was a formidable rival of Peisistratus, who was glad to make a compromise with him (Herod. VI. 35, 36; Marcellinus *Thuc.* 7: cf. also Herod. VI. 103); Isagoras, champion of the oligarchic reactionaries after the final expulsion of the Peisistratidae (Herod. V. 66–73; Aristot. *Respub. Ath.* c. 20), was archon in 508 B.C. His election to the archontate at the same time that Cleisthenes was entrusted with the reorganisation of the state shows that a compromise was effected between the two rival parties. On the relationship of the family to the Cypselidae of Corinth, cf. Herod. VI. 128; Cypselus was the name of the father of Miltiades, the oecist of the Thracian Chersonese (Herod. VI. 35; cf. Töpffer, *Ath. Gen.* pp. 279, 280).

² On the Alcmeonidae, see below, pp. 42–61, with the notes.

³ Thuc. I. 126: Κύλων . . . τῶν παλαι ἐγγυῆς τε καὶ δυνατός. This family, or at least the members of it who participated in the Cylonian attempt, went into exile and were excluded from the amnesty of Solon. It is probable that it early became extinct, though the name Κύλων recurs in a sepulchral inscription dating from the sixth century B.C. (*C.I.A.* I. 472; Roberts, *Greek Epigraphy*, p. 82; Kaibel, *Epigr. Graeca*, no. 9). The slab bearing this inscription was found near Liopesi, the ancient Paeania, and it has been suggested that the family of Cylon were Paeanians (Ross, *Arch. Aufs.* I. p. 214). May not the family, early leaving their ancient homes, have survived under a slightly different name, Γύλων for Κύλων? The Gylon of history, Demosthenes' maternal grandfather, belonged to the deme Cerameis (Aesch. *Ctes.* 171), but perhaps in the marriage of his daughter to Demosthenes the Paeanian, there was a renewal of ancient local associations. Gylon himself, like Cylon, sought for his own wife the daughter of a foreign prince. Still, the hypothesis that makes Demosthenes a descendant, or even a connexion of Cylon, is not without the gravest difficulties.

Meantime — the measures of Draco proving ineffectual — the discontent of the people increases ; it is greatly aggravated by a long and losing war with Megara, and by economical disorders at home in which the peasant proprietor grows poorer and poorer at the expense of the capitalists enriched by trade. At last in the demoralization of social conditions a Solon appears, and by drastic measures rescues the state from ruin. By his reforms the rights of all parties are measurably secured and peace and concord are ultimately established.¹ The people, however, as over-against the nobility, the poor as over-against the rich, are constantly gaining in influence, and to such an extent that only a few years after Solon's archonship, the peasant and the artisan classes² secure a representation in the board of archons, if only for a short period.³ And yet in the local factional disputes that follow, between the men of the Plain, the Shore, and the Up-

¹ Cf. Solon, *Frag.* 5, and the excerpts in Aristot. *Respub. Ath.* c. 12, in which *Frag.* 4, 34, and 36 appear in a fresh version, with new verses.

² Aristot. *Respub. Ath.* c. 13: τῷ δὲ πέμπτῳ [*sc. ἔτει*] μετὰ τὴν Σόλωνος ἀρχὴν . . . καὶ πάλιν ἔτει πέμπτῳ . . . μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν χρόνων Δαμασίας αἰρεθείς ἔρχων ἔτη δύο καὶ δύο μῆνας ἤρξαν ἕως ἐξηλάθῃ βία τῆς ἀρχῆς. εἰτ' ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς διὰ τὸ στασιάζειν ἔρχοντας ἐλίσθαι δέκα, πάντε μὲν εὐπατριδῶν, τρεῖς δὲ ἀ[π]οίκων, δύο δὲ δημιουργῶν, καὶ οὗτοι τὸν μετὰ Δαμασίαν ἤρξαν ἐνιαυτόν.

The name of the peasant class in this passage is in dispute, — ἀποικοὶ or ἄγροικοὶ. In the Berlin fragment (Pap. No. 163, I^b 8. ed. Diels) the word is unmistakably ἀποίκων. In Brit. Mus. Pap. No. 131, Col. 5, line 7, there is a gap (ἀ[]οίκων); Kenyon, following Dion. Hal. *Ant.* II. 8, and thinking he sees a trace of ρ, restores ἄγροίκων. But the fac-simile shows no clear trace of ρ; the gap, though wide, could easily have been filled, as in lines 9, 11, 12, etc., by a sprawling π, which indeed I fancy can be made out; the word ἀπό in l. 18 fills precisely the space available for the corresponding letters in ἀποίκων, l. 7. In Dion. Hal., accordingly, ἄγροικοὶ — which is his regular word for *plebei* — must be a gloss on the unfamiliar ἄποικοὶ (*i.e. rustici*), used in contrast with ἀστοί. Similarly ἄγροιώται in Hesych. *s.v.*, and in Plut. *Theseus* 25 γεωμέτροι are glosses for ἄποικοὶ. The word ἄποικοὶ in this sense should not arouse suspicion. If ἡ κῆμη ἀποικία οἰκία ἐστὶ (Aristot. *Pol.* I. 2. 1252^b 17), then οἱ κωμήται, *i.e.* 'country folk,' *rustici*, might be regarded, for name-making purposes, as the ἄποικοὶ of the πόλις, which may be regarded as the great political οἰκία. (To be sure in Herondas I. 2, ἀγροικίης is a correction for ἀποικίης, but below, at 13, we have ἀποικίω.)

³ This provision, *viz.*, that the ἀποικοὶ (ἄγροικοὶ, γεωμέτροι) and δημιουργοὶ should have a share in the archontate, may have continued in force for several years. Diels, *Abb. d. Berl. Akad.*, 1885, p. 19, note 1.

land,¹ the leaders are members of the old houses, and their aims are hardly those of disinterested patriots.² The rise of Peisistratus to supreme control is, however, a sufficient evidence of the power of the populace, while his numerous reverses, brought about in great part by the Alcmeonid Megacles, and his compromises with his enemies, show that the ancient families are not without their influence.

¹ Although the geographical subdivision of Attica into Pedion, Paralia, Diacria (Mesogaea), appears to be as ancient as the time preceding the incorporation of Eleusis (Philoch. *Frag.* 35), it yet seems probable that the local factions founded thereon are post-Solonian in origin. Plutarch, our only authority for making them pre-Solonian, is inconsistent with himself; in *Sol.* 13, in *Mor.* 805 D, and 763 D, he represents them as pre-Solonian, and explains the choice of Solon as archon as a compromise between the three parties. On the other hand, in *Sol.* 29 he regards them as post-Solonian, here agreeing with Aristotle (*Respub. Ath.* c. 13) and Herodotus, who distinctly asserts that Peisistratus formed his party (I. 59, *καταφροήσας τὴν τυραννίδα ἡγεῖρε τρίτην στάσιν*). We have them after Solon: did they exist before? On this point we can only make the general answer, that nothing in our accounts of pre-Solonian conditions makes this probable; indeed, at the time of Cylon they certainly did not exist (Thuc. I. 126, *πανδημει δὲ τῶν ἀγρῶν*), and the language of Herodotus tells against it. With Diels (*l.c.*, p. 20), we must suppose Plutarch here guilty of dittography. The recently discovered *Respub. Ath.* (c. 2 *ad init.* compared with c. 5) explains the blunder. Plutarch finds in his authority — which is, or is based upon, an abridged form of Aristotle *Respub. Ath.* — for the time immediately following the Cylonian troubles and preceding that of Solon, words to the effect: *τὴν παλαιὰν ἀθθὺς στάσιν ὑπὲρ τῆς πολιτείας ἐστασίαζον* (*Sol.* 13), which a glance at the original text of Aristotle would have shown him referred only to the contest between the notables and the commons (*στασιάσαι τοὺς τε γουρμίους καὶ τὸ πλῆθος*). His explanation of this contest as that between the local factions is thus wholly gratuitous. The whole passage, from *ἴσας ἢ χάρα* to *τοὺς ἐτέρους κρατήσας* (*Sol.* 13) has the appearance of a misplaced gloss. See below, p. 25, note 3.

For a discussion of the names of these parties, see Landwehr, *Philol.*, Suppl.-Bd. V. (1884) pp. 154–7, and for some remarks about the Parali, cf. below, pp. 53 and 57, and notes.

² The leader of the Pediaei was Lycurgus, probably of the ancient family of the Eteobutadae (*Βουτάδαι ἔτιμοι*, *C.I.A.* II. 1386; but the *εὐγένεια* of the orator Lycurgus refers to moral qualities, not to nobility of birth — pseud. Plut. *Vit. X. Or.* 842 D); that of the Diacrii was Peisistratus, afterward tyrant. A Peisistratus was archon at the time of the ancient battle of Hysiae (B.C. 669? Paus. II. 24. 7); and while we cannot establish an ancient family of *Πεισισπαραῖδαι*, — as would W. Petersen, *Hist. Ath. Gent.*, 1885, pp. 71 ff., 114; cf. Töpffer, *l.c.*, p. 228, note, — it is at least certain that Peisistratus claimed descent from the ancient stock of the Neleidae (Herod. V. 65); the supposition that he

Such, in barest outlines, were the political movements at home. Early in the seventh century B.C. it would seem that something of the spirit of foreign conquest was active in the subjugation and absorption into the Athenian state of the commonwealth of Eleusis.¹ Later on, but some time before Solon, the spirit of war, whatever its occasion, stirred up a prolonged and humiliating contest with Megara for the possession of Salamis.² Still later, commercial enterprise showed itself in an increasing trade,³ both export and import, in which the ancient aristocracy did not disdain to engage.⁴ Towards the close of the seventh century B.C., Athens attempted to gain a foothold in the Hellespont,⁵ undoubtedly in order to ensure to herself some share of the import trade in corn from the shores of the Black Sea, which at that time appears to have become the monopoly of Megara.⁶

belonged to the γένος Philaïdae (Westermann in Pauly, *R. E.* V. 1646, quoted by Petersen, *l.c.*, p. 115) arose from the fact that his native place (Plut. *Sol.* 10; Plat. *Hipparch.* 228 B) was Philaïdae, *i.e.* the village that became the Cleisthenean δῆμος of that name. For the family of the Alcmeonidae, from which came Megacles, the leader of the Parali, see below, pp. 42 ff., and notes.

¹ On the lateness of the incorporation of Eleusis into the Athenian state, cf. Busolt, *G. G.* I. pp. 379, 419. In the Homeric Hymn to Demeter (not long after 700 B.C.; Kuno Francke, *De Hymn. in Cer. Hom. compositione, dictione, aetate*, 1881, p. 27) Eleusis is an independent city. Athens once established to the north, a conflict with her neighbor Megara was inevitable.

² A long and bitter war with Megara, which had for its result the surrender of Salamis, precedes the political activity of Solon: Justin, II. 7 (*i.e.* Ephorus: — prope usque interitum armis dimicatum fuerat), and Solon, *Frag.* 2 (τῶν Σαλαμιναιῶν . . . χαλεπὸν τ' αἰσχρὸν). The war for the recovery of the island probably took place after Solon's legislation, and in one of its later stages Peisistratus took part in it. Cf. Niese, *Zur Geschichte Solons und seiner Zeit (Histor. Untersuch. A. Schäfer gewidmet)*, Bonn, 1882), pp. 22 ff.; also below, p. 73, and note.

³ On the beginning and growth of Athenian trade, see Busolt, *G. G.* I. pp. 500 ff., and below, p. 55, and notes. Solon, *Frag.* 13. 44: δ μὲν κατὰ πόντον ἀλάται | ἐν νηυσὶν χρῆζων οἴκαδε κέρδος ἄγειν | ἰχθυοέντ', κ.τ.λ.

⁴ According to Hermippus, quoted by Plut. *Sol.* 2, Solon himself was a trader (ἔβριμσε νέος ἂν ἔτι πρὸς ἐμπορίαν), and we are also told that it was for the sake of χρηματισμός rather than πολυπραγία and ἰστορία that his travels were undertaken (Plut. *Sol.* 25 ff.; cf. Niese, *l.c.*, p. 8). Aristotle (*Respub. Ath.* c. 11) remarks of Solon, that after his legislation, ἀποδημίαν ἐποίησατο κατ' ἐμπορίαν ἅμα καὶ θεωρίαν εἰς Αἴγυπτον.

⁵ Herod. V. 94 and 95; Strabo XIII. 599. The date of the conquest of Sigeum was probably about 610 B.C. Cf. Busolt, *G. G.* I. p. 513; and Töpffer, *Quaest. Pisistr.* p. 107.

⁶ H. Droysen, *Athen. u. d. Westen*, p. 41, and Busolt, *G. G.* I. p. 500.

II.

THE PROBLEM.

At some point of time within the period outlined above, not earlier than 636 B.C.¹ and not later than 594 B.C.,² occurred the episode of Cylon.³

Cylon, a young Athenian of high family, who has in 640 B.C. won a victory at Olympia, at the time of a subsequent Olympic festival, with the aid of youthful comrades and of troops furnished by his father-in-law Theagenes, tyrant of Megara, attempts to seize the Acropolis of Athens and make himself master of the city. The people, however, rise *en masse* against him, hurrying in from the country, and invest the Acropolis.⁴ The siege lasts long; most of the besiegers withdraw, leaving matters in the charge of the nine archons.⁵ According to the earlier and probably more authentic accounts, Cylon and his brother escape,⁶ while the comrades left behind are sorely pressed :

¹ Not before 636 B.C., because this was the first Olympic year after Cylon had won his Olympic victory. Jul. Africanus *s. Ol.* λέ (B.C. 640; p. 13, Rutgers; *ap. Euseb. Chron.* I. 197, 198): [Τ]ριακοστή πέμπτη. Σφαίρος Λάκων στάδιον. [κ]αὶ δίαυλον Κύλων Ἀθηναῖος ὁ ἐπιθέμενος τυραννίδι.

² The episode of Cylon is distinctly pre-Solonian: to be sure, Herodotus (V. 71) says of it only ταῦτα πρὸ τῆς Πεισιστράτου ἡλικίης ἐγένετο, and Thucydides (I. 126), Κύλων . . . τῶν πάλαι. Solon's archon year was either 594/3 B.C. (Ol. 46. 3, Socrates *ap. Diog. Laert.* I. 2. 62, *i.e.* here probably Apollodorus — Diels, *Rhein. Mus.* 31, p. 21; cf. Clinton, *Fasti Hellen.* II. p. 298) or 591/0 B.C. (if the text of Aristot. *Respub. Ath.* c. 14 be correct — 31 years before Comeas, *i.e.* 660 + 31). Ad. Bauer (*Lit. u. Hist. Forsch. zu Aristot.* Ἀθ. Πολ., 1891, pp. 46, 47), who accepts B.C. 661/0 as Comeas's date (after Töpffer, *Quaest. Pisistr.* pp. 142 ff.), thinks that the δευτέρῳ in Aristotle (*l.c.*) is a copyist's mistake for τετάρτῳ, *i.e.* that δ' was taken to be 'two' instead of 'four'; the correction would yield (661 + 33) B.C. 594 as Solon's date, and thus confirm the Apollodorean tradition.

³ The account given above is a condensed statement, only those items that bear on the date being emphasized.

⁴ Thuc. I. 126: οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι . . . ἐβοήθησάν τε πανδημεὶ ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν ἐπ' αὐτοὺς καὶ προσκαθεζόμενοι ἐπολιόρκουν.

⁵ Thuc. I. 126: χρόνον δὲ ἐπιγιγνομένου οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τρυχόμενοι τῇ προσεδρία ἀπὸ πολλοῦ οἱ πολλοὶ, ἐπιτρέψαντες τοῖς ἐννέα ἄρχουσι τὴν φυλακὴν καὶ τὸ πᾶν αὐτοκράτορι διαθεῖναι ἢ ἂν ἄριστα διαγιγνώσκωσι.

⁶ So Thuc. I. 126. But Herod. V. 71, in his briefer account, says nothing of escape; hence probably arose the erroneous statement of the later authorities.

some of them perish of starvation, and the survivors take refuge at the altar of Athena Polias. As the temple is in danger of pollution from the presence of dead bodies, the officers in charge, unquestionably the nine archons, promise the suppliants their lives and a formal trial, and lead them away. This promise is broken; while still under divine protection the suppliants are slain,¹ some at or near the altar of the Eumenides on the Areopagus, whither they had fled in terror, and others on their way thither.² The guilt of this sacrilege attaches to the Alcmeonidae, and in particular to Megacles, named in the later authorities as archon; the family of this man and its adherents are tainted by this crime, and not only for two generations, but for more than two centuries, remain under a curse.³ The captured survivors of the party of Cylon are subsequently tried and banished.⁴

¹ According to Plut. *Sol.* 12, the Cylonians fastened a thread to the statue (of Athena), and held this as they descended; the thread broke, and Megacles and his fellow-archons attacked them. The breaking of the thread was doubtless the Alcmeonidean excuse for the sacrilege of slaying suppliants, it being taken as a sign that Athena had withdrawn her favor. This thread may be meant in the abbreviated form of the story in Schol. I. Ar. *Eq.* 445 (ἐξάψαρτες τὴν λικτηρίαν· ἧς διαρρησίης κ.τ.λ.).

² Thuc. I. 126.

³ *ἐναγείς*, Thuc. I. 126, cf. 127, of Pericles; ἀλιτήριοι, Ar. *Eq.* 445 with Scholia, and often. For the conception among the Athenians, see Junghahn, *Agos-síhne bei Thuc. I. 126-139*, Berlin, 1890.

⁴ This may be inferred from the language of the provisions of the amnesty-law of Solon (Plut. *Sol.* 19, ἀτίμων ὄσοι ἄτιμοι ἦσαν πρὶν ἢ Σόλωνα ἄρξαι, ἐπιτίμους εἶναι πλὴν ὄσοι ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου ἢ ὄσοι ἐκ τῶν ἐφετῶν ἢ ἐκ πρυτανείου καταδικασθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν βασιλέων [*i.e.* presiding archons — βασιλῆς, one for each court?]) . . . ἐπὶ τυραννίδι ἔφευγον ὅτε ὁ θεσμός ἐφάνη ὄδε). The penalty of θάνατος, at least later fixed for one convicted in a δίκη τυραννίδος, was excluded by the terms of the compromise between the Cylonians and the archons (Thuc. I. 126, Herod. V. 71). Schömann thinks that the court was one held by the πρυτάνεις τῶν ναυκράρων (*Jahrb. f. Philol.* 111 [1875], p. 460), a doubtful hypothesis; see below, p. 32, note 2. Cf. Busolt, *G. G. I.* p. 408, note 1.

Stahl, who in *Rhein. Mus.* 46 (1891), p. 251, explains ἐκ πρυτανείου as referring to "das Archontengericht," withdraws this explanation, on p. 481, in view of what he supposes to be the meaning of Aristotle's *Respub. Ath.* cc. 3, 8, and explains this court to be the Areopagus. But this can hardly have been the case. The language of the amnesty-law distinguishes between the three courts (Areopagus, Ephetae, Archons), and ascribes decrees ἐπὶ τυραννίδι to the last. Again, the Σόλωνος θέσμος of Aristot. *Respub. Ath.* c. 8, used of a regu-

Is it possible to date this event? The writers that have independently examined the available evidence have come to very diverse conclusions. Herodotus is the oldest authority for the statement that the event fell on an Olympic year. In the list of Olympic victors drawn up by Sextus Julius Africanus, and embodied by Eusebius in his *Chronicon*, Cylon is named as victor in the δίαυλος at Olympia in Ol. 35 (640 B.C.). This date, then, is the *terminus post quem*, while the fairly well established date of the archonship of Solon, B.C. 594, is the *terminus ante quem*.¹ The only years that would satisfy the conditions are, accordingly, B.C. 636, 632, 628, 624, 620, 616, 612, 608, 604, 600, 596. With the exception of B.C. 624 and the earlier dates, there is hardly one of the other years that has not found its advocates: thus, B.C. 620 has been claimed by Clinton,² C. Peter;³ 616, by Duncker,⁴ Hertzberg,⁵ Holm⁶; 612, — a favorite date, — by Corsini,⁷ W. Wachsmuth,⁸ L. Ross,⁹ Schömann,¹⁰

lation providing that the Areopagus should pass judgment upon conspirators against the state, shows that previously another court had taken action in such matters. In pre-Solonian times, there must have been much confusion of jurisdictions: Solon simplified the system of courts, regulating the competency of each.

The authenticity of Plutarch's quotation is attested by the fact that this ancient law was incorporated by Pythocleides in his amnesty-law, proposed B.C. 403 (*Andoc. Myst.* 78); it was so incorporated doubtless only as a venerable but largely otiose formula, since the judicial system involved in it had ceased to exist with Solon's reforms. It was in keeping with the spirit of the times, when the laws of Draco and Solon were revived as the main stay of the state (*C.I.A.* I. 61; *Andoc. ib.* 81, 82).

¹ For these dates, see above, p. 10, notes 1 and 2.

² Clinton, *Fasti Hellen. s. a.* (I. p. 206).

³ C. Peter, *Griech. Zeittafeln*, p. 30, s. a.

⁴ Duncker, *Gesch. d. Alterthums*, VI.⁵ p. 96, note 2.

⁵ Hertzberg, *Gesch. d. Griech. im Alterthum (Allg. Weltg. II.)* p. 106.

⁶ Holm, *Gesch. Griechenlands*, I. p. 463 ("vielleicht um 616 v. Chr.").

⁷ Corsini, *Fast. Att.* III. pp. 63-65. "Ol. XLII. Megacles Archon. Ergo quum Cylon Ol. XXXV. victor in Olympiis fuerit, ipsius facinus patriaeque occupandae consilium longe commodius ad Ol. XLII. quam ad XLV. revocabitur, qua Cylon ipse 60 aetatis annum superasset. . . . Ergo Cylonis facinus quod Olympiorum tempore patratum fuit adeoque Megacis principatus ad ineuntem Ol. XLII. sive alteram ipsi proximam referri debet." The date 612 B.C. may be regarded as the vulgate date, and Corsini is doubtless responsible for it.

⁸ W. Wachsmuth, *Hellen. Alterthumskunde*,³ I. p. 470.

⁹ L. Ross, *Arch. Aufs.* I. p. 215.

¹⁰ Schömann, *Jahrb. f. Philol.* 111 (1875), p. 456.

Grote,¹ Duruy,² G. Gilbert,³ W. Petersen⁴; 600, by Scaliger⁵; 599, by Boeckh.⁶ Several writers leave the date uncertain: Curtius⁷ thinks it fell between B.C. 612 and 596; H. Stein,⁸ between B.C. 620 and 600; Landwehr,⁹ before B.C. 612; E. Abbott,¹⁰ not later than B.C. 612; Pöhlmann¹¹ is uncertain whether it was before or after Draco.

Since the hint was thrown out by Niebuhr,¹² the first writer of prominence,¹³ so far as I know, to urge that the episode of Cylon is to be placed at some date nearer 640 B.C. than 600 B.C., at B.C. 636, 632, 628, or 624 — *i.e.* before and not after Draco — is Busolt.¹⁴ A re-examination of the evidence, and a consideration of a few points not hitherto noted, tend to confirm the correctness of this view.

The arguments upon which the claim for the earlier or pre-Draconian date is based are fourfold: (1) those drawn directly from the language of the best and most trustworthy sources; (2) those drawn from a consideration of the probable age, at the time of the

¹ Grote, *Hist. Greece*, III. p. 88 (Harper ed.).

² Duruy, *Histoire des Grecs*, 1887, I. p. 378.

³ G. Gilbert, *Handb. d. Griech. Staatsalt.* I. p. 128 ("um 612").

⁴ Petersen, *Hist. Gent. Attic.* p. 79.

⁵ Scaliger, *Ὀλυμπιάδων ἀναγραφὴ*, s. Ol. 45. 1 (Scheibel, p. 25, note 141).

⁶ Boeckh, *Pind.* II. 1, p. 391 ("Megacles, Ol. 45. 2 archon fuit"); II. 2, pp. 301, 303. But see below, p. 51, note 1.

⁷ Curtius, *Gesch. Griech.* I. 6 pp. 668, 669.

⁸ Stein, Note on Herod. V. 71.

⁹ Landwehr, *Philol. Suppl.-Bd. V.* (1884), p. 134.

¹⁰ E. Abbott, *History of Greece*, I. pp. 292, 296.

¹¹ Pöhlmann, *Grundz. d. polit. Gesch. Griechenlands* (I. Müller, *Handb.* III.), p. 385, note 1.

¹² Niebuhr, *Vorträge über alle Geschichte*, I. (1847), p. 314, "das erstere [ἄγος Κυλωναίων] schon in die alte Zeiten, in den Anfang der Olympiaden gehört." But as Niebuhr without hesitation puts Theagenes, Cylon's father-in-law, in Ol. 40 (*ib.* p. 331), his suggestion as to Cylon's date loses significance.

¹³ Schömann, *Jahrb. f. Philol.* 111 (1875), p. 449, admitted that Herodotus's ἡλικιωτέων must mean youthful persons of the same age with Cylon, but did not draw the necessary inferences as to an earlier date than 612 B.C., which he accepted on p. 456.

¹⁴ Busolt, *Griech. Gesch.* I. (1885) pp. 498, 505, with notes: the only argument distinctly urged by Busolt is that based on ἡλικιωτέων and ἐκόμησε, expressions to be used only of young persons; he sustains this argument by a communication from H. Stein (*ib.* p. 505, note 2), on the probable meaning of these expressions in this passage. Of course, since the recovery of the *Respub. Ath.*, *i.e.* since January, 1891 — the earlier date for Cylon has been universally accepted (see p. 14).

affair, of the Megacles concerned, as also from a consideration of certain points in the history of the Alcmeonidae in these times; (3) those drawn from the probable date of Theagenes, Cylon's father-in-law. These considerations, it is believed, will be enough to create a strong presumption in favor of the date proposed. If, finally, after objections have been met, it can be further shown (4) that the adoption of this date, rather than a later one, will disclose something of a natural sequence and coherence in the movements of the time, as regards both the domestic and the foreign relations of Athens, this fact must be regarded as a confirmatory argument of no small force.

As preliminary, however, to the special discussion of the Date of Cylon, two matters call for brief treatment: first, the character and credibility of our primary sources of information on the subject, and, secondly, the nature and extent of the connexion of the Alcmeonidae with the affair of Cylon,—at least in so far as these two questions touch the problem before us.

III.

THE STORY OF CYLON: OUR SOURCES OF INFORMATION.

THE story of Cylon is first told by HERODOTUS (V. 71), very briefly, as an episode in his account of Cleisthenes of Athens, of Alcmeonid descent, in explanation of the reason why Cleisthenes was obliged to leave Athens as *ἐναγής*. It is again given, with fuller details and with interesting variations, by THUCYDIDES (I. 126), likewise as an episode, to account for the demand made by the Spartans, at the opening of the Peloponnesian war, for the banishment of Pericles who was also an Alcmeonid. The next author who we know told the story — there must have been others — was ARISTOTLE in his Athenian Commonwealth. It was probably given in full. In the copy of this work recently recovered, the early chapters have been lost, and we have references only to the last incidents — the trial of the Alcmeonidean faction, the casting of the bones of the guilty dead beyond the borders, the perpetual exile of the family, and the subsequent purification of the city by Epimenides of Crete.¹ All these state-

¹ Aristot. *Respub. Ath.* 1: καταγνωσθέντος δὲ τοῦ ἄγου [αὐτ]οῖ μὲν ἐκ τῶν τάφων ἐξεβλήθησαν, τὸ δὲ γένος αὐτῶν ἔφυγεν ἀειφυγίαν. Ἐπιμενίδης δ' ὁ Κρήσι ἐπι

ments, which stand at the very beginning of the treatise as preserved, and are followed by *μετὰ ταῦτα*, preceded the account of Draco; this fact makes it clear that Aristotle put before the time of the Draconian legislation, at least the affair of Cylon if not its consequences here touched upon. THEOPHRASTUS appears to have touched the event at least to the extent of asserting that it was the occasion of the dedication by Epimenides of two altars on the Areopagus, to Violence and to Pitilessness.¹

The event is briefly referred to in the Excerpts from the Constitutions of HERACLEIDES;² this account, based on a lost portion of

τοῖσις ἐκάθηρε τὴν πόλιν. With Kirchhoff I read [αὐτ]οί for Kenyon's [νεκρ]οί, which is impossible because of the missing article. Diels proposes [ἐκείν]οι.

¹ Theophrastus appears to be, directly or indirectly (through Ister?), Cicero's authority in *De Legg.* II. 11. 28, as also that of Clem. Alex. *Ad Gent.* 2. 26. See below, p. 67, note 1.

² Commonly known as Heracleides Ponticus, and of late identified with Heracleides Lembos. The authorship of these Excerpts (the manuscripts usually begin with the words *ἐκ τῶν Ἡρακλείδου περὶ πολιτείας Ἀθηναίων*, but include also other *πολιτείας*) is a matter of conjecture. Schneidewin (*Heraclidis politiarum quae extant*, 1847) showed that they could not have been composed by the philosopher Heracleides Ponticus, and demonstrated their dependence on Aristotle. Unger (*Rhein. Mus.* 38 (1883), p. 504) claims them for Heracleides Lembos (fl. under Ptolemy VI. Philometor — B.C. 180–145; Suid. *s.v.* Ἡρακλείδης Ὀξυρυχίτης, and, according to Diog. Laert. V. 694, from Calliatis in the Pontus), and in this has been followed by Busolt and others; but according to Rose (*Aristot. Fragm.*, p. 260) incorrectly. The author of these Excerpts would seem not to have been from Pontus, for [Aristot.] *Respub. Argiv.* (Rose, *Aristot. Frag.* 481; preserved in Orion, *Etym.* p. 118, 19), cites Heracleides Ponticus for a statement not found in the Excerpts. Rose claims that he was a pupil of Didymus drawing from his master: thus in [Aristot.] *Respub. Samior.* (Rose, *Aristot. Fragm.* 573; Schol. *Ar. Av.* 471 = *Heracl. Exc. Pol.* 33), Didymus — *i.e.* the original of the Scholiast — cites Aristotle by name, but Heracleides in his quotation from Didymus omits the name; see Rose, *Aristot. Pseudepigr.*, pp. 521, 532; also 479, 481. The frequent resemblances in phraseology between the Scholia (and certain Suidan glosses) and the Excerpts also suggest Didymus as the intermediate. Unger (*l.c.* p. 504) urges, that since with one unimportant exception — where Aristotle might have expressed two opinions — all the statements in the Heracleidean Excerpts coincide even verbally with what is extant of the Aristotelian *Πολιτείας*, we must infer that Aristotle has been slavishly pirated (hence *λέμβος*); this is undoubtedly true, but it looks as if the material had come through a Didymean channel. Rose (*l.c.* p. 491) intimates that Didymus — *i.e.* the author of the original of the Excerpts — combined material from Ephorus with his extracts from the Aristotelian *Πολιτείας*.

Aristot. *Respub. Ath.*, though very brief, furnishes one or two items not found in Herodotus or Thucydides: the name of Megacles as the leader of the party that slew the fleeing Cylonians is mentioned for the first time. The SCHOLIAST on Aristoph. *Eg.* 445 gives three versions of the story in forms which show that Herodotus and Thucydides were the primary sources, together with some other writer on Attic history not to be identified: the items not given by Herodotus and Thucydides are, in the first version (Schol. I.), a κρίσις ἐν Ἀραίῳ πάγῳ (probably, as we find it nowhere else, a misunderstanding of the *καθεζομένους δὲ τινας καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σεμνῶν θεῶν* of Thucydides), and the mention of the fact that the Cylonians fastened to the throne of the goddess some token that they were suppliants, on the breaking of which they were stoned by the Athenians. The second and third versions (Schol. II., III.) are distinctly Thucydidean, and add nothing while they omit much (the *κατέλαβε τὴν ἀκρόπολιν ὡς ἐπὶ τυραννίδι* of Thucydides becomes *ἐπέθωκε τῇ ἀκρόπολι ληστεῖα καὶ ἀδίσκεται*). PAUSANIAS three times mentions Cylon: once (I. 28. 1), in commenting upon a bronze statue of him seen on the acropolis of Athens, he expresses surprise that a statue should have been erected to one who attempted to make himself tyrant, and would explain it by the fact that Cylon was very handsome, as well as famous for his victory at Olympia in the δάουλος and for his marriage with the daughter of Theagenes of Megara. Again, in I. 40. 1, he refers to this marriage alliance; and in VII. 25. 3, speaking of the treatment received by suppliants at Athens, he says that the magistrates put to death the adherents of Cylon, suppliants of Athena, who had seized the acropolis, and that in consequence the murderers and their descendants were

It is, however, more likely that Aristotle himself furnished this material, obtaining it perhaps from Ephorus, or, what is more likely, from the same sources as Ephorus (and for that matter, the same as the βίαι of Satyrus, Sotion, and Hermippus), and that thus are to be explained coincidences of statement between the *Exc. Pol.* and the fragments of Ephorus, and what we know of the βιογράφοι named above, where some writers (Busolt, *G. G. I.* p. 437) claim a non-Aristotelian origin for portions of the *Excerpts*. The close and perhaps exclusive dependence of the Heracl. *Exc. Pol.* on the Aristotelian Πολιτεῖαι can no longer be denied. Indeed, since the recovery of the *Respub. Ath.*, we may place yet greater confidence in them as giving us as far as they go — of course in a very much abridged form, occasionally in a different order, and with many corruptions — not a little of what was to be found in the Πολιτεῖαι.

ἐναγεῖς τῆς θεοῦ. DIOGENES LAERTIUS (I. 10. 110) briefly mentions the Κυλώνειον ἄγος, intimating that it was, in the opinion of some, the cause of the visit to Athens of the Cretan Epimenides, who, according to the chronological authority from whom Diogenes drew, came to Athens in Ol. 46 (B.C. 596-2). PLUTARCH (*Sol.* 12) gives a full account of the episode, with some additional details which are highly significant: Megacles the archon is mentioned as having promised the suppliants safety until trial; on the breaking of the thread that connected the suppliants with the statue of the goddess, he and his fellow-archons attacked the Cylonians, stoning them, and butchering those that fled for refuge to the altars, sparing only such as appealed to the wives of their assailants: hence the Alcmeonidae were styled ἐναγεῖς and became objects of hatred. Afterward the survivors of the Cylonians, becoming strong, kept up for a long period an agitation against the family of Megacles. In due time, the quarrel being at its height and the people divided, Solon interposed with the leaders of the Athenians and persuaded the polluted Alcmeonidae to submit to a trial and to the decision of three hundred citizens. Myron of Phlya became their formal accuser, and they were found guilty; the living were banished, and the bodies of the dead were cast forth beyond¹ the borders.² JULIUS AFRICANUS, quoted by Eusebius, furnishes us, as we have seen, the date of Cylon's victory at Olympia (Ol. 35, B.C. 640). Finally, SUIDAS, s.v. Κυλώνειον ἄγος and Περικλῆς, has two glosses on the subject: he or his source blunderingly connects the event with Pericles, confounding him with the Μεγακλῆς of the original documents.³ A

¹ This detail—the casting of the bones of the dead beyond the borders—cannot now be explained (Busolt, *G. G.* I. p. 508, note 2) as a mere dittography of the procedure in the case of the banishment of Cleisthenes (Thuc. I. 126 *ad fin.*; cf. Herod. V. 70, 72). Aristotle's language ([ἀντ]οὶ μὲν Kirchhoff, [ἐκεῖν]οὶ μὲν Diels) intimates that the guilt lay mainly with the dead; the ἐξορισμός of their bones was their punishment, and the family as tainted went into exile.

² Plutarch also accepts the connexion of Epimenides with the affair of Cylon. And the same is true of Cicero and Clement of Alexandria. See below, p. 67, note 1.

³ Küster's suggestion, adopted by Bernhardt (*Suid. Lex.*, s.v. Κυλώνειον ἄγος), that the original reading was οἱ πρὸ τοῦ Περικλέους, or οἱ πρόγονοι τοῦ Περικλέους, is shown to be unlikely (1) by the language of Suid. s.v. Περικλῆς, and (2) by that of the Heracl. *Exc. Pol.* 2, of which the gloss of Suidas (s.v. Κυλώνειον ἄγος) is virtually an abridgment (see next note).

fuller gloss is here condensed, with the omission of essential details: thus the suppliants are spoken of only as fleeing to the *σεμναὶ θεαί*, whereas in the fuller accounts they were suppliants of Athena, and fled to the *σεμναὶ θεαί* only as an incident in their efforts to escape.¹ Suidas adds the item, that, while opposition was made, Megacles (*Περικλῆς*) refused to be persuaded.² In still another gloss (*s.v.* *Ἐπιμενίδης*) of Suidas we read that Epimenides, born in Ol. 30, purified Athens of the *Κυλώνειον ἄγος* about Ol. 44, being then an old man.

The problem of the relation of these various accounts to each other, and to their sources which are now lost to us, is one that cannot be satisfactorily solved. But a few important considerations may be pointed out.

A chasm of several centuries seems to separate the earlier authorities from the later: are we, therefore, to remain satisfied with the meagre though vivid accounts of Herodotus and Thucydides and to look no further? Are all the new items given in the later writers to be viewed with suspicion, not alone such as contradict earlier statements, but also such as supplement them? Are we, with Symmachus, to assert that a statement is false because it does not occur in the narrative of Herodotus or of Thucydides?³

In the well-known passage at the opening of his history, Thucydides, seeking to justify himself for limiting his scope to the war between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians, remarks that the events preceding this war, both in the immediate and in the remoter past, are at once obscure and unimportant, — obscure and difficult of investigation through the long lapse of time, unimportant mainly

¹ Heracl. *Exc. Pol.* 2 (Rose, *Aristot. Fragm.* 611, p. 371). *Τοὺς μετὰ Κύλωνος διὰ τὴν τυραννίδα ἐπὶ τὸν βωμὸν τῆς θεοῦ πεφευγῶτας οἱ περὶ Μεγακλῆα ἀπέκτειναν.* Suid. *s.v.* *Κυλώνειον ἄγος . . . Κύλωνος.* *ὃν καταφυγόντα ἐπὶ τὰς σεμνάς θεὰς ἀποσπῶσαντες αὐτὸν οἱ περὶ Περικλέα τὸν Ἀθηναῖον ἀπέκτειναν.*

² Suid. *s.v.*: *Περικλῆς . . . οἱ δὲ ἀντεπέταττον, Περικλῆς δὲ οὐκ εἶα πείθεσθαι.* Here is probably a confusion arising from the words of Thuc. I. 127. *οὐκ εἶα ὑπέικειν*, where Pericles is mentioned as resisting the demands, not, to be sure, of Athenians, but of the Lacedaemonians. Cf. also Thuc. I. 135: *οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι . . . ἀντεπέτασαν.*

³ Schol. Ar. *Eq.* 34: *Σύμμαχος δὲ φησὶ ψεύδεσθαι περὶ Θεμιστοκλέους· οὐτε γὰρ Ἡρόδοτος οὐτε Θουκυδίδης ἱστοροῦν.*

from the point of view of military science, but also in all other respects. It thus happens that upon Attic history before the expulsion of the Peisistratidae he has very little to say; ¹ he does not mention the great law-giver Solon, whose half-mythical figure dominates the following centuries, ² nor does he name even Cleisthenes the reformer. Herodotus, the range of whose history is more extended, has occasion to treat more fully of early Attic history; but even he, when he passes beyond the generation preceding the Persian wars, has little to tell but piquant and untrustworthy anecdotes: his Solon is the friend of Croesus, and the traveller in Egypt; Solon's services to Athens as a reformer are dismissed with only a word. ³ It would seem, then, that the Greeks of the fifth century B.C. had no clear historical impressions of much that preceded the times of Peisistratus. Later the case was different in some particulars.

In the narratives both of Herodotus and of Thucydides one episode of pre-Peisistratidean Athenian history stands out in unique prominence, — this episode of Cylon. This prominence is due to two causes: Cylon was the only person on record besides Peisistratus who had attempted by violence ⁴ to make himself tyrant of Athens; and, secondly, in the suppression of this attempt an important family had become tainted with sacrilege, receiving a stain that centuries of brilliant public service were powerless fully to wash away. The vividness and precision of the language of the two historians, and the fulness of detail given by Thucydides, are to be explained from the fact that in the traditions both of the Alcmeonidae and of their hereditary enemies the main features of the story had been handed down with singular definiteness and amplitude. Such vagueness as may be discovered in these accounts springs from the fact that both accounts are given incidentally, as episodes, and from the habit of these

¹ The language of Thuc. VI. 54 implies that uncertain stories were current in his day about the Peisistratidae.

² Niese, *Zur Gesch. Solons*, pp. 1, 2.

³ As legislator, Herod. I. 29, II. 177 (see p. 53, note); as friend of Croesus, I. 29–33; author of a poem in honor of the despot Philocyprus, V. 113.

⁴ Aristotle (*Respub. Ath.* c. 13) now teaches us that the prolonged archonship of Damasias was a usurpation of supreme power in the state. In Solon *Frag.* 32, τυραννίδος δὲ καὶ βίης ἀμελίχου | οὐ καθηψάμεν (cf. 33. 5, 6), an allusion to Damasias has been seen by Diels and Ad. Bauer.

historians in treating subjects of this sort,—apparently not from any uncertainty about the main points of the story.¹

The apparatus for the study of the earlier Athenian history used by the writers of the fifth century B.C. was not so extensive as that of their successors after the middle of the following century.² Not to attempt an exhaustive survey, it will be enough to call attention to a few leading names. Thucydides, whatever may be one's views as to the presence of personal bias in his writing, had certainly set the example of systematic research, although his enquiries were mainly confined to events of his own day. A vast amount of material was available, awaiting the scientific student: family, local, political, and religious traditions; records of ancient ordinances, of laws passed, and of legal decisions rendered, from before the time of Draco³; probably lists of officials, secular and religious; and a certain amount of literary compositions, as the poems of Solon. Hellanicus, the contemporary of Thucydides, in his four books on Attic history had used these recorded lists and inscriptions, but his work was inaccurate and provoked the criticism of Thucydides and of Ephorus.⁴ The historians Ephorus and Theopompus, in the next century, had gathered a vast amount of material, and though their ideas as to historical evidence

¹ Is Thucydides (I. 126) correcting Herodotus (V. 71)? This is substantially the view of Wecklein (*Ber. Bayer. Akad.* 1873, pp. 33 ff.), and others, including Busolt (*G. G. I.* pp. 504, 505), who gives the bibliography. Schömann (*Jahrb. f. Philol.* 111 [1875], p. 452) controverts it, perhaps not wholly successfully. The answer to the question is determined by the meaning we give to Herodotus's *πρυτάνεις τῶν ναυκράρων*, on which see below, p. 30, and notes.

² On the studies in early Athenian history made by the Greeks, see Busolt, *G. G. I.* pp. 361–370, 436, 437, and his notes *passim*.

³ According to Josephus (*Adv. Apion.* I. 4. 21), the laws were first put on record by Draco. Aristotle (*Respub. Ath.* c. 3) reports that the six *θεσμοθέται* were appointed—of course long before Draco, when the archontate became annual—to record the *θέσμια*; but see c. 41: *ἡ ἐπὶ Δράκουτος ἐν ἧ καὶ νόμους ἀνέγραψαν πρῶτον*. The contrast is here suggested between mere records of legal decisions (*θέσμια*), and a formal code (*θεσμοί, νόμοι*).

⁴ Thuc. I. 97. Ephorus, *ap.* Joseph. *Adv. Apion.* I. 3. 16: *Ἐφορος . . . Ἑλλάνικον ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις ψευδόμενον ἐπιδείκνυσιν*. Diels (*Rhein. Mus.* 31 [1876], p. 52) doubted whether Hellanicus reckoned by archons and treated of events as late as the close of the Peloponnesian war, but in this view he has been controverted by Wilamowitz, *Hermes* 11 (1876), p. 292, and Lipsius, *Leipz. Stud.* 4 (1881), p. 153.

were hardly such as would commend these authors to the modern historian, their writings formed the basis for subsequent writers. The material furnished by these different historians and by the earlier writers of *Atthides*, Aristotle and his immediate followers of the Peripatetic school seem to have put together, augmented by material independently collected, and subjected to critical examination.¹ The study of chronology, though not reduced to a science until the time of Eratosthenes,² had already begun in the compilation, for historical purposes, of lists of Olympic victors by Hippias³ of Elis, later by Aristotle, by Timaeus⁴ of Sicily, and others; as also of victors at the Pythian games.⁵ Critical lists of the Athenian archons were drawn up as early as the time of Demetrius of Phalerum⁶ (B.C. 317-307; died B.C. 283), who compiled an *ἀρχόντων ἀναγραφὴ* and wrote *περὶ τῆς Ἀθήνησι νομοθεσίας*. It was not later than the middle of the fourth century B.C. that, following in part the example set by Hellanicus, there first appear writers of special histories of Attica (*Ἀτθίδες*), in which legends, history, topography, literature, religion, antiquities, were fully treated: as Cleidemus, Androtion, and above all Philo-

¹ Cicero, *De Fin.* V. 4: omnium fere civitatum . . . ab Aristotele mores instituta disciplinas, a Theophrasto leges etiam cognovimus. Cf. Cic. *De Legg.* III. 6. 14. See, for the historical-antiquarian studies of the Peripatetics (Aristotle and his immediate pupils) which go mainly under the name of Aristotle's *Πολιτείας*, V. Rose, *Aristot. Pseudepigraphus*, pp. 393-579, who, however, denies Aristotelian authorship, and Dümmler, *Rhein. Mus.* 42 (1887), pp. 179 ff. In the fragments of these *Πολιτείας*, authorities are sometimes quoted and controverted, and this is especially true of the *Respub. Ath.* recently discovered. The problem of the sources of the latter work has not yet been solved; for some remarks on the subject, see Ad. Bauer, *l.c.*, pp. 37 ff., 155; F. Cauer, *Hat Aristoteles . . . geschrieben*, etc., pp. 37 ff., and *The Nation*, May 7, 1891 (No. 1349, p. 383), etc. The independence of Aristotle has been emphasised by Oncken, *Staatslehre d. Aristoteles*, I. pp. 24, 25, and II. p. 330.

² On the chronological studies of Hellanicus and Eratosthenes, see Niese, *Hermes*, 23 (1888), pp. 81-102, and for Apollodorus, Diels, *Rhein. Mus.* 31 (1876), pp. 1-54 and Unger, *Philol.* 41 (1882), pp. 602 ff. ³ Plut. *Num.* 1 *ad fin.*

⁴ Suid. *s.v.* Τίμαιος . . . ἔγραψεν . . . Ὀλυμπιονίκας ἤτοι χρονικὰ πραξίδια.

⁵ By Aristotle, or his pupils (Rose): Diog. Laert. V. 126. Aristotle's *Πυθιονίκα* are cited in Plut. *Sol.* 11 and Schol. Pind. *Ol.* 2. 87.

⁶ Demetrius Phalereus was a pupil of Theophrastus; cf. Diog. Laert. V. 5. 75, also I. 22, II. 7 (Müller, *F.H.G.* II. pp. 362 ff.). His archon-list was probably one of the authorities used by Apollodorus in preparing his chronological system: Diels, *l.c.*, pp. 28, 37.

chorus¹ (fl. 306 B.C.), who paid stricter attention than heretofore to chronology, narrating events in annalistic form at first according to kings, and afterward according to archons. Philochorus also made special studies of many historical subjects, such as the colonization of Salamis, Attic inscriptions, the Olympiads, and the like.

If we are to judge from the use made of it by subsequent writers, clearly the most important work produced in these times on the early history of Athens, especially from the point of view of constitutional changes, was the treatise on the Athenian Commonwealth (ἡ Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία,) ascribed by the ancients to Aristotle, and undoubtedly prepared, if not wholly by his own hand, with the assistance of some pupil acting as secretary, under his personal direction; it carries with it the weight of the master's authority.² The recent discovery of

¹ Suid. s.v. Φιλόχορος. Cf. Boeckh, *Ueber den Plan der Athis des Philochorus* 1832 (*Kl. Schr.* V. pp. 397 ff.).

² This treatise affords satisfactory internal evidence that it was composed a short time before Aristotle's death, between B.C. 326 and 323. We are compelled to believe, from many indications, that it was written mainly by Aristotle, with perhaps the help of a pupil who prepared certain of the less important passages, the padding, as it were; the work, since it everywhere bears evidence of the master's hand, was then revised, but not rewritten, by him. If we are ready to maintain — a proposition by no means self-evident — that the main body of the writings current as Aristotle's are the genuine works of the master in the original form, and that, accordingly, they are the only norm by which everything else is to be tested, we may still account for the "non-Aristotelian" peculiarities of the language of the *Respub. Ath.* as due, in part, to the fact that the historical sources (epigraphic and literary) are often given in verbal quotations, or at least in paraphrases that retain original forms of expressions; due in part, perhaps, to the stylistic idiosyncrasies of an assistant whose work was incorporated with the master's, and, finally, to the most significant fact that the work was intended not for the scientific inner circle, but for the "general reader," being, as it has been happily characterised by an English scholar, a sort of "primer of the constitutional history of Athens, and citizen's handbook."

Into the question whether the treatise is in spirit and method, un-Aristotelian, and whether it exhibits other features impossible in a work of Aristotle's, — carelessness and inaccuracy in historical research, radically inconsistent political judgments, etc. (cf. F. Cauer, *Hat Aristoteles die Schrift vom Staate der Athener geschrieben*, Stuttgart, 1891; Schwarż, *Ungarische Revue*, April, 1891; Rühl, *Rhein. Mus.* 46 (1891), pp. 426-64, and several English scholars), — we cannot here enter. The evidence, internal and external, of essentially Aristotelian authorship as well as authority seems so overwhelming, that, as between the two alternatives,

this work in the writing on the *verso* of British Museum Papyrus No. CXXXI., and its publication by Mr. F. G. Kenyon, together with the attention given to it in current philological literature, and the promise on the part of eminent specialists of critical editions, render any detailed account of it unnecessary here. It is enough for our present purposes to remark that this important and authoritative work bears evidence of a discriminating use of earlier sources, sources at once extensive and various.

Of subsequent writers, who, drawing their knowledge from the authorities named above, doubtless dealt with the affair of Cylon, and were thus sources for the writers whose fragmentary statements have reached us, the names of some can be ascertained, while those of others have been lost. Thus Didymus Chalcenterus, contemporary of Cicero, besides being the source of most of the information on this subject given by the Scholiasts and in the lexicon of Suidas,¹ was the author of a work *περὶ τῶν ἀξίων Σόλωνος* cited by Plutarch (*Sol.* 1), on the basis of which at least cc. 19–24 of the latter's *Life of Solon* were composed. Didymus drew from Aristotle's *Respub. Ath.*, and from the writers of *Atthides*, and must have drawn also from the treatise on Athenian *νομοθεσία* by Demetrius of Phalerum. Hermippus (fl. B.C. 230), pupil of Callimachus and writer of *βίος*, — drawing from Aristotle and other writers, — was doubtless the most important immediate authority of Plutarch, supplemented by matter from elsewhere: it may have been he who compiled the statements about

one should prefer to modify his conceptions of Aristotle than reject this treatise. As Diels has pointedly phrased it (*Archiv f. Gesch. d. Philos.*, 4. p. 479, quoted by Gildersleeve, *Am. Journ. Philol.*, 12 (1891), p. 100), "Diese 'Αθηναίων πολιτεία [ist] nicht nur echt aristotelisch sondern aristotelischer als die meisten der uns erhaltenen Lehrbücher an welcher sich jene Skeptiker halten." For an argument aiming to show that Philochorus, writing about 306 B.C., knew and quoted the *Respub. Ath.* as Aristotle's, see my article in the *Am. Journ. Philol.*, 12 (1891), pp. 310–318.

¹ Didymus wrote extensive commentaries on Aristophanes. Cf. Mor. Schmidt, *Didymi Chalcenteri Fragm.*, 1854, especially pp. 246–61 and 261–99 (de Didymo interprete sceniorum poetarum scholiorumque principali fonte). Meiners (*Quaestiones ad Scholia Aristophanea Historica pertinentes: Diss. Halens.*, 11, pp. 217–403) aims to demonstrate "scholia historica [for Aristophanes] in univrsam . . . ex eodem fonte, Didymi commentario, fluxisse," and points out in detail the sources of Didymus for his statements. Rose (*Aristot. Pseudepigraphus*, pp. 400 ff.) sketches Didymus's relation to later learning.

Solon's political career and made the illustrative extracts from Solon's poems which we find in common in Plutarch and in a secondary version in Diogenes Laertius (I. 2).

Enough has been said to show that, though the fragmentary items of information that we possess about the affair of Cylon are found in writings of various kinds, which were composed several, and in some cases many centuries after Herodotus and Thucydides, they have the value of evidence much earlier, which is probably as trustworthy as that of the historians named. A tentative pedigree of these different parcels of information, showing as far as may be their relation to each other and to their probable sources, might be drawn up as follows:—

Herodotus and Thucydides are substantially independent, both basing their statements, probably, on distinct family and political traditions, and not on records. Aristotle, or at least the *Respub. Ath.* ascribed to him, is authority, certainly (1) for the statements about the trial of the Alcmeonidae and its results; probably, (2) as we may infer from the language of the Heracleidean Excerpts, for some account of the murder of the Cylonians in which Megacles figured prominently; and, perhaps, (3) for certain other statements made in Plutarch's narrative, which will be considered below. The sources, in turn, of the *Respub. Ath.* at this point of Athenian history, it is at present impracticable, if not impossible, to define with any certainty. The Scholia on Ar. *Eq.* 445, in the three versions, go back to Didymus, ultimately to Herodotus and Thucydides, and to some writer on Attic history whom we cannot certainly identify: in particular, Schol. II. and Schol. III. are Herodotean and Thucydidean; while Schol. I., though briefer, has independent matter, which, partially agreeing with that given by Plutarch¹ and in the Heracleidean Excerpts, is doubtless taken from Aristotle's *Respub. Ath.*, combined with matter from some Atthid-writer (Philochorus?). Pausanias, in I. 28. 1, and 40. 1, was perhaps drawing from Polemon;² in VII.

¹ Thus Schol. I. has *λίθοις αὐτοὺς ἔβαλλον*, and the thread (by implication, see p. 11, note 1), both of which details are not found elsewhere, except in Plut. *Sol.* 12. On the other hand it says *εἰς τὴν κρίσιν κατέβησαν ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ* instead of Plutarch's more correct *ὡς ἐγένοντο περὶ τὰς σεμνὰς θεὰς καταβαίνοντες*. It omits the archon's name and says nothing of the butchery of the Cylonians.

² If, as is more than probable, the statue of Cylon—see below, p. 41, note 2—was an *ἀνδρῆμα*, it was doubtless commented upon by Polemon in his great work *περὶ*

25. 3, we have probably — at least ultimately — some Atthid-writer who bears a striking resemblance to one of the sources of Plutarch. The Epimenidean gloss of Suidas and the statement of Diogenes Laertius (I. 10. 110) cannot be traced to their final sources; the former, in part at least, seems to contain the tradition followed by Aristotle, as to the date of Epimenides's visit; the chronological datum in the latter is perhaps traceable to Apollodorus. The statements as to the dates of Epimenides are so contradictory, that for the present they may be left out of the enquiry.¹ Most of Plutarch's² statements on the affair of Cylon are traceable to Aristotle's *Respub. Ath.* A comparison of Plutarch's account of pre-Solonian affairs with that of Aristotle shows, however, first, that this dependence is not immediate,³ and, secondly, that there is much admixture of foreign matter,

τῆς ἀκροπόλεως (Strabo IX. 396). This work seems to have been confined to *ἀναθήματα*, for Strabo adds *τέτταρα βιβλία συνέγραψε περὶ τῶν ἀναθημάτων τῶν ἐν ἀκροπόλει*. Pausanias made abundant use of it. Cf. Paus. V. 21, 1: *ἐν ἀκροπόλει μὲν γὰρ τῇ Ἀθήνησιν οἱ τε ἀνδρῖαντες καὶ ἔποσα ἕλλα, τὰ πάντα ἐστὶν ὁμοίως ἀναθήματα*. Kalkmann, *Pausan.* pp. 59 ff. and *passim*.

¹ See below, pp. 66-70, and notes.

² On Plutarch's sources in his *Life of Solon*, see Prinz, *De Sol. Plut. fontibus*, Bonn, 1867; Begemann, *Quaestiones Soloneae*, Göttingen, 1875. Cf. Meiners, *Diss. Hal.* XI. pp. 393, 394. In *Sol.*, cc. 19-24 are evidently from Didymus; perhaps also 17, 18 (first half), 25, 26, with quotations in 1, 11, 14, 15, 31, 32 (Begemann). C. 25 *ad init.* is distinctly Didymean (cf. Aristot. *Respub. Ath.* c. 7; Rose, *Aristot. Frag.* 39).

³ At least the following passages in Plut. *Sol.* (chapter, page, line — Sintenis ed. Bibl. Teubn. 1877) bear resemblance to passages in Aristot. *Respub. Ath.* (chapter, page, line — Kenyon, 2d ed. 1891), and are evidently traceable to the latter work. Only once, however, is Aristotle here named (*Sol.* 25, *ad init.*).

PLUT. <i>Sol.</i>	ARISTOT. <i>Respub. Ath.</i>	PLUT. <i>Sol.</i>	ARISTOT. <i>Respub. Ath.</i>
I., p. 154, ll. 28, 29.	V., p. 14, ll. 8, 9.	XV., p. 170. 14-31.	VI., p. 16. 1-19.
" " 155. 2, 3.	XVII., p. 45. 17.	XVI., p. 171. 1-3.	X., p. 28. 11-17.
XII., p. 165. 16-19.	I., p. 1. 1-p. 2. 2.	" " 17, 18	XII., p. 30. 3, 4.
" " 24, 25.	" " 2, 3, 4.	(eleg.).	
XIII., p. 166. 21.	II., p. 2. 4, 5.	" " 21, 22	" " 32. 14, 15.
" " 23-26.	XIII., p. 36. 1-6.	(eleg.).	
" " 31-p.	II., p. 2. 3-p. 3. 12.	XVII., p. 171. 31, 32.	VII., p. 16. 21-p. 17. 1.
167. 10.		XVIII., p. 172. 14-17.	" " 17. 8-p. 20. 10.
XIV., p. 167. 22, 23.	V., p. 15. 10, 11.	" " 26, 27.	IX., " 26. 4.
" " 23, 24.	" " 13. 13.	" " 28, 29.	" " 26. 10-p. 27. 1.
XV., p. 169. 21.	VI., p. 15. 15, 16.	" " 31.	" " 26. 4, 5.
" " 24.	" " 14.	" " 173. 3-8	XII., p. 28. 25-p. 29. 5.
" " 28-31.	X., p. 27. 8-14.	(eleg.)	

some of which came directly or indirectly from an Atthid-writer. For the account of Cylon this writer may have been Philochorus; for the narrative of the part taken by Epimenides it may have been Theopompus, possibly Theophrastus, directly or through Ister: Plutarch appears to have been familiar with all of these writers, partially

PLUT. <i>Sol.</i>	ARISTOT. <i>Respub. Ath.</i>	PLUT. <i>Sol.</i>	ARISTOT. <i>Respub. Ath.</i>
XVIII., p. 173. 10.	IX., p. 26. 1, 2.	XXIX., p. 185. 21-28.	XIII., p. 35. 9-p. 36. 6.
XIX., p. 173. 23-27.	VIII., p. 24. 5, 6.	XXX., p. 186. 30-p. 187. 2.	XIV., p. 37. 1-2.
" " 28, 29.	" " 7, 8.	XXX., p. 187. 8-10.	" " 38. 3, 4.
XX., p. 174. 20-22.	" " 25. 7-10.	" " 18-21.	" " 8-p. 39. 1.
XXV., p. 180. 16, 17.	VII., p. 17. 6, 7.	" " 188. 5-8.	" " 39. 1-5.
" " 19, 20.	" " 2.	XXXI., p. 188. 25-27.	XVI., p. 44. 23-26.
" " 25-29.	" " 4, 5.	XXXII., p. 189. 26, 27.	XIV., p. 38. 7, 8.
" " 181. 10-24.	XI., p. 28. 3-11.		
XXIX., p. 185. 20, 21.	XIII., p. 33. 1.		

A minute comparison of the wording of these parallel passages, and a consideration of the order in which they occur in the two writers, as also of extraneous matter inserted and of important and illuminating facts omitted, show that Plutarch was certainly not intimately acquainted with the *Respub. Ath.* The resemblances, the dissimilarities, and the discrepancies alike are intelligible only on the supposition that Plutarch was transcribing from some work in which an abridgment of these parts of the *Respub. Ath.* was embodied. In transcribing from this abridgment he interpolates foreign matter, which is inconsistent with the unabridged Aristotle. The abridgment omitted the main part of cc. 2-4, also c. 13 from p. 34, l. 1 to p. 35, l. 9, as well as many minor statements. The poetical quotations of Plutarch are from a different collection; such as coincide are in a different order. A reader of the *Respub. Ath.* in its original form would probably not have said *ἕκαστος τῶν θεσμοθετῶν* (*Sol.* 25), where the work reads *οἱ δ' ἐννέα ἄρχοντες*, nor would he have turned *τὸ γὰρ ἀρχαῖον ἢ ἐν Ἀρείφ πάγφ βουλή . . . ἐφ' ἐκδότῃ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐπ' ἐνιαυτὸν [καθιστᾶ]σα ἀπέστειλλεν* (to be sure, the text is uncertain) into *συστησάμενος δὲ τὴν ἐν Ἀρείφ πάγφ βουλήν ἐκ τῶν κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν ἀρχόντων*. He would not have made Peisistratus active in the (earlier) Megarian war (*Sol.* 8); Aristotle had declared this impossible from the point of view of the age of Peisistratus (c. 17). At all events, if he had known that the *Respub. Ath.* had a contradictory statement, he would have inserted *ὡς ἐνιοὶ φασιν* as in *Sol.* 1 (cf. *Respub. Ath.* c. 17, *ληροῦσι οἱ φάσκοντες ἐρόμενον εἶναι Πεισίστρατον Σόλωνος*). His *ἐνιοὶ* here, however, is suggested by the language not of Aristotle, but of the common sources of Aristotle and his other authorities. If, as is probable, *ὁ θεὸς Ἴαονίαν τὴν Σαλαμίνα προσηγόρευσε* (*Sol.* 10) is traceable to *πρεσβυτάτην ἑσπερῶν γαίαν Ἴαονίας* (*Respub. Ath.* 6), the connexion is altogether too vague for a first-hand contact. Especially instructive are *Sol.* cc. 18, 25, 30, when compared with the parallel passages.

But the accurate delimitation of the relation of Plutarch to Aristotle is possible only after a careful examination shall have been made of all the passages in the *Lives* and *Morals* where the two are on common ground, and this cannot be here undertaken. Incidentally one might suggest that Plutarch's otherwise unac-

at least at first hand.¹ All the channels through which Plutarch collected his varied information it is perhaps impossible to ascertain: certainly Hermippus and Didymus were concerned in the transmission, and perhaps Ister. The first of the Cylonian glosses of Suidas (*s.v.* Κυλώνειον ἄγος) has a marked resemblance to the item from the Heracleidean Excerpts (*i.e.* ultimately Aristotle's *Respub. Ath.*); while the other gloss (*s.v.* Περικλήης), rewritten in the light of the former, has a Thucydidean foundation which is discernible in the Scholia cited: thus these glosses have characteristics that suggest Didymus as one of the intermediate channels. Finally, the chronological item in Julius Africanus is ultimately to be traced to one of the Ὀλυμπιονικῶν ἀναγραφαί made not long after the time of Aristotle, from the authentic inscriptions preserved at Olympia.²

countable omission in his *Them.* of the characteristic anecdote of Themistocles, Ephialtes, and the Areopagus (*Respub. Ath.* c. 25) may be explained on the hypothesis that the copy of Aristotle's work used by Plutarch did not contain this story. In *Pericles* 9 Aristotle is cited, but immediately there follow statements as to Pericles which directly contradict Aristotle (cf. Ad. Bauer, *l.c.*, p. 77, who believes, however, in a first-hand use of *Respub. Ath.* by Plutarch). It might be objected that Plutarch had the original copy, while ours (British Mus. Pap. No. 131) is an inflated and interpolated edition. I have tried to meet this objection, very briefly, in *Am. Journ. Philol.* 12 (1891), p. 317, note.

¹ Plutarch's *Theseus* is largely drawn from Philochorus. Gilbert, *Philol.* 33 (1874), pp. 46 ff., attempts to prove that Plutarch drew from Philochorus, not at first hand, but through Ister, who is the source of the whole *Life* except cc. 1, 2. Wellmann (*De Istro Callimachio*, pp. 31 ff.) has demonstrated an independent use of Philochorus by Plutarch, — in cc. 14, 16, 19, probably also in 24, 31, 35, 36, — as well as a second-hand use through Ister. Wilamowitz (*Phil. Unt.* I. p. 8) claims for Plutarch an immediate contact with Cleidemus as well as Philochorus. Theopompus was the ultimate authority of Diog. Laert. (*l.c.*) for a part, at least, of his account of Epimenides at Athens, which in some particulars agrees with that of Plutarch. Plutarch used Theopompus freely in *Lysander*, and elsewhere. On Theophrastus as a source (through Ister?), see below, p. 67, note 1.

² The inscriptions were recorded by the Hellanodicae, evidently immediately on the completion of the festival: Paus. VI. 8. 1 says of Euanoridas, γενόμενος δ' Ἑλληνοδικῆς ἔγραψε καὶ οὗτος τὰ ὀνόματα ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ τῶν νενικηκότων (cf. Harpoc. *s.v.* Ἑλληνοδικαί . . . Ἀριστοδμήδης φησι, κ.τ.λ.; Rose, *Aristot. Frag.* 482). These evidently are the Elean records of Olympionicae mentioned by Pausanias (*e.g.* III. 21. 1; VI. 2. 3, and 13. 10). Rutgers, *Jul. Afric.* p. 1. Julius Africanus, in constructing his own list, probably made use, not of the original records, nor of Phlegon's list, but of a sort of chronological compendium apparently prepared by the Elean Aristodemus (fl. B.C. 150?). Cf. Unger, *Philol.* 41 (1882), p. 604. Gelzer, *Sextus Julius Africanus*, I., 1880, p. 168.

IV.

MEGACLES AS ARCHON.

UNTIL within a few years historians have had no serious difference of opinion as to the part taken by the Alcmeonidae in the affair of Cylon. The traditional account as given by Plutarch has been accepted as authentic, and the earlier statements have been interpreted in the light of it. But of late a difference of opinion has arisen, which it becomes necessary for us briefly to examine.

There are three possibilities as to the part played by the Alcmeonidae in the affair. The antagonists of Cylon, to whom the guilt of sacrilege became attached, may have been the officials who promised the Cylonians safety until the matter could be tried and then broke their promise: as such we might regard them either (1) as the whole body of officials, or (2) as a band headed by one or more of the officials. On the other hand, (3) these sacrilegious persons may have held no office whatever, but may have been a faction that ill brooked the restraint imposed by the officials, and attacked the party of Cylon while still under divine protection. In the first of the three possibilities we should be obliged (with W. Petersen) to consider all of the archons at this time as members of the family of the Alcmeonidae.¹ According to the second, substantially the traditional, view we should have to suppose an Alcmeonid (Megacles) prominent among the archons, to whose support the members of his family and their sympathizers rallied,—influential to such an extent as to carry with him some of his fellows in office in his efforts to punish the daring Cylonians even by unholy means. The third view, by which we are to consider the Alcmeonidae as an irresponsible and rival faction, is urged by Landwehr.²

The third explanation is inconsistent with the direct language of Thucydides and with the most probable meaning of Herodo-

¹ W. Petersen, *Hist. Gent. Attic.* p. 81.

² Landwehr, *Philol.* 46 (1886), p. 133. In *Philol.* Suppl.-Bd. V. p. 147, this writer argues that Cylon trusted to the Eupatrids to sustain him as against the *ἄρουντες*, and appeals to Plut. *Sol.* 14, where *οἱ ποιστῶμενοι* (by him identified with the Eupatrids) urge Solon to make himself tyrant. He might also have cited one of the Thucydidean meanings of *δυνατός*, used of Cylon (I. 126), viz. aristocratic opponents of the people. But these are hardly sufficient grounds.

tus: in both of these writers the blame rests upon certain persons who give to the Cylonians a promise, which is broken. Herodotus calls these persons *πρυτάνιες τῶν ναυκράρων*. Thucydides, however, having said that the conduct of the siege had been committed to *οἱ ἐννέα ἄρχοντες*, adds, after an interval, that they, — *οἱ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπιτετραμμένοι τὴν φυλακὴν*,¹ — when they saw the Cylonians perishing in the temple, lifted them up from their suppliant position with a promise that they should receive no harm (*ἐφ' ᾧ μηδὲν κακὸν ποιήσουσι*), led them off, and slew them (*ἀγαγόντες ἀπέκτειναν*). Herodotus asserts that the *πρυτάνιες τῶν ναυκράρων* lifted up the suppliants upon the promise that they should not be slain (*ὑπεγυγίους πλὴν θανάτου*); the blame of the murder, however, he adds, is attached to the Alcmeonidae; he does not, it is true, distinctly identify, as does Thucydides, the murderers with those who gave the promise. This failure is to be most rationally explained it seems to me, from some such considerations as the following: Herodotus, for one reason or another,² has always a good word for the Alcmeonidae, and appears ready to explain away certain objectionable stories told of them. The affair of Cylon was an all-important episode in the traditions of the family. It seems to be highly probable that the family traditions preserved the fact³ that at the time of the affair one of their number was chief official of the

¹ This statement of Thucydides is abbreviated in Schol. I. Ar. *Eq.* 445 into the unmeaning *οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι*.

² The glories of the family are celebrated in Herod. VI. 121–131, from Megacles, the father of Alcmeon, down to Pericles: the Alcmeonidae freed Athens far more than even Harmodius and Aristogeiton (VI. 123); it is unlikely that they were traitorously disposed toward Athens at the time of Marathon (VI. 115, 121). They are *ἐπαγίεις* (I. 61; cf. V. 70, 71); in exile because of Peisistratus (I. 64); later, while still in exile because of the Peisistratidae, after a defeat at Leipsydrium, they built the temple at Delphi (V. 62); at last they are restored to their home (V. 69–73), though afterward, about 490 B.C., they are under a cloud (Herod. VI. 115, and Pind. *Pyth.* 7. 15). The ostracism of Megacles III., nephew of Cleisthenes, as an upholder of the Peisistratidae, not long after the battle of Marathon, attested by Aristot. *Respub. Ath.* c. 22, is new evidence on this last point; see p. 46, note.

³ The family tradition seems also to have been preserved by the writer who gives (*ap. Plut. Sol.* 12) the distinctly Alcmeonidean explanation and justification of the conduct of Megacles and his associates, viz. that the breaking of the thread which connected the suppliants with the statue of Athena implied that the goddess rejected such a relation. Grote, *Hist. Greece*, III. p. 83 and note.

state, holding the position of archon, one of the board of nine chief magistrates known collectively in the fifth century as οἱ ἄρχοντες, and that he was the head of an ardent faction.¹ There is good reason for maintaining that these nine officers were known at the time of the affair of Cylon, not as οἱ ἄρχοντες, but as οἱ πρυτάνεις (Ion. πρυτάνεις).²

¹ Herodotus mentions Athenian archons as such only once (VIII. 51. 5, Calliades, archon 480/79 B.C.), while Thucydides does frequently; thus Herodotus does not mention the fact that Solon was archon, nor Hippocleides, nor Isagoras, though he names the men, and though the election of the latter to the archonship in 508/7 B.C. was an indication of the success of his faction. The argument *a silentio* has very little weight when we are dealing with Herodotus's treatment of political history.

² It is highly probable that up to the time of Solon the nine higher magistrates were called πρυτάνεις, 'foremen,' 'chiefs,' and that at their head stood the βασιλεύς. After Solon, under whom the board was more definitely organized and united (Aristot. *Respub. Ath.* cc. 3, 8; Diog. Laert. I. 2. 58, quoting Apollodorus, who probably here drew from Demetr. Phal. *περὶ νομοθεσίας*), and the precedence of the ἄρχων over the βασιλεύς had become an established fact, the whole board received the name of οἱ ἐννέα ἄρχοντες. The term πρυτάνεις was thereupon technically appropriated by the chiefs of the naucreries, and continued to be so used until the time of Cleisthenes. Later, when the naucreries had ceased to exist in their ancient form, the term passed over to the chiefs, for the time being, of the newly organized Senate, acquiring the sense in which the word is most familiar to the student of Athenian history.

The arguments urged in support of the proposition that the pre-Solonian archons were called πρυτάνεις may be summed up (mainly after Busolt) as follows: (1) in post-Solonian times the fees of the archons' courts were called πρυτανεία, a use of language that cannot be explained except as a survival from pre-Solonian times. (2) In the amnesty-law of Solon (Plut. *Sol.* 19), three courts are mentioned: that of the Areopagus, that of the Ephetae, and that ἐκ πρυτανείου (see above, p. 11, note 4). From Aristot. *Respub. Ath.* c. 3, pp. 6, 7 (hitherto known only in *Lex. Segner.* p. 449, 17 = Suid. s.v. ἄρχοντες οἱ ἐννέα τῆρας) we learn that the so-called archons held courts; hence ἐκ πρυτανείου (= ἐκ τῶν πρυτάνεων, i.e. the later archon, if not ἐκ τῶν πρυτάνεων: Plut. *Sol.* 19 *ἀντίφω.* explains by πρυτάνεις: cf. Schömann, *ib.* p. 460) in this law must have referred to the archon's court, if not to the archons' court. The original language of Aristotle, now happily recovered, does not justify us in maintaining that the archons might not, under certain circumstances, pass and execute judgment collectively, though they commonly exercised independent jurisdiction. Cf. Meier and Schömann, *Ath. Pros.* I. p. 15, note 21 (Lipsius). (3) Thuc. (I. 126) informs us that the — so-called — archons had supreme direction of the state in the time of Cylon (τῶρα). The ancient home and headquarters of the government (τὰς ἀρχάς . . . πρυτανείου, Thuc. II. 15) was the Prytaneum. (4) In many Asiatic Ionian colonies a πρυτάνεις followed the

Now the tradition also handed down the fact that *πρυτάνεις* made and broke the promise to the Cylonians. Herodotus, we are to suppose, was not aware of the identity of the *πρυτάνεις* and what in his day were called *ἄρχοντες*: he held them to be different officials; hence, on hearing or reading that the *πρυτάνεις* were the responsible persons, and knowing that the Alcmeonidae, one or more of them, were *ἄρχοντες* at the time, he inferred that the blame for the murder of the Cylonians was wrongly attached to the Alcmeonidae. The only *πρυτάνεις* in Attic history that he knew about were the *πρυτάνεις τῶν ναυκράρων*: hence he very naturally wrote *πρυτάνεις τῶν ναυκράρων*, inferring that these officials were the guilty party, not the Alcmeonidean *ἄρχοντες*.¹ Had he known that *πρυτάνεις* was but the pre-Solonian

βασιλεύς (Herod. I. 147), and the chief official for a long time afterward continued to retain this designation; e.g. in Miletus (Aristot. *Pol.* VIII. (V.) 4. 5, p. 1305^a 18), Ephesus (*C.I.G.* 2955), etc. The expression *πρύτανις* is often used for *βασιλεύς* (Blass, *Hermes*, 13 [1878], p. 386). The chief official would thus be known both as *βασιλεύς* and as *πρύτανις*. Of Epænetus, Attic archon in B.C. 636, pseud.-Hippys of Rhegium (Müller, *F. H. G.* II. p. 14) wrote *ἐπὶ βασιλέως Ἐπαινέτου*. (5) Suid. *s.v.* *πρύτανις* . . . *βασιλεύς, ἄρχων, κ.τ.λ.*, is probably too vague to be in evidence for the practice in Athens. On the whole subject, cf. Busolt, *G. G.* I. pp. 408, 409.

The recently discovered *Respub. Ath.* does not seem, on first examination, distinctly to bear out this theory, though there is nothing in the treatise that tells decidedly against it except that, if the theory be correct, we must admit that Aristotle was unacquainted with the facts. One or two arguments, however, are suggested from the historical conditions set forth in the work itself: viz. (6) the archon's official residence, or "office," was the Prytaneum (c. 3); the Polemarch's, — anciently, — the Polemarcheum; that of the Thesmothetæ, the Thesmotheteum. As the name of the officer in the two latter cases suggested that of the place of his activity, so in the former, Prytaneum must have arisen from *πρύτανις* (= *ἄρχων*). (7) In c. 4 occur these words: *τοὺς μὲν ἐννέα ἄρχοντας . . . στρατηγούς δὲ καὶ ἱππάρχους . . . τοὺς πρυτάνεις καὶ τοὺς στρατηγούς καὶ τοὺς ἱππάρχους*. The text as it stands is corrupt, and the point must not be pressed; but does not this collocation suggest that, in the source, at least, of this passage, *τοὺς πρυτάνεις* and *τοὺς ἐννέα ἄρχοντας* were identical in meaning? Later on in the work, of course, *πρυτάνεις* is used in its fifth century sense (cc. 29, 43).

¹ Aristot. *Respub. Ath.* c. 8 seems to show that the institution of the *ναυκράριαι* was pre-Solonian, though the reorganization of the system is distinctly Solonian. Hence Gilbert's contention (*Jahrb. f. Philol.* 111 [1875], pp. 9–20) that both the institution and the name begin with Solon (Phot. *s.v.* *ναυκράρια*) is futile. Schömann (*Jahrb. f. Philol.* 111 [1875], p. 454) and others — see Busolt, *G. G.*

name for the ἀρχοντες, such an inference would not have been made, and the passage in Herodotus would then have perfectly agreed with that of Thucydides,¹ as also with the statements of the other writer or

1. p. 502 — maintain that the ναυκροπία were established toward the end of the seventh century B.C., i.e. a short time before Solon, to extend the Attic navy and to protect the newly developing merchant marine; Solon merely gives the institution a more definite organization. Schömann's conclusions are doubtless sound, though his argument from the use of ἐκ πρυτανείου (*ib.* p. 460; cf. *Attischer Prozess*, I. p. 25 [Lipsius]) may be unsatisfactory.

¹ The language of Herodotus is, on the face of it, difficult to reconcile with that of Thucydides: the former puts the blame on one set of officials, the latter on another. There are several ways of accounting for this difference; the one suggested above seems to me on the whole the most probable. We might (A) regard the passage in Herodotus as textually unsound, i.e. that τῶν ναυκρόπων is an interpolation. But the source of Harpocration i.e. ναυκροπῶν¹ evidently had a text with τῶν ναυκρόπων, as is shown by the attempt to explain the word as equivalent to ἀρχοντες (ναυκρόπους γὰρ τὸ πάλαιον τοῖς ἀρχοντας ἔλεγον ὡς καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐ' Ἡροδότου βιβλίῳ). Accepting the text, then, as substantially sound, we may (B) explain the language in one of three ways: either (a), as does Harpoc. i.e. ναυκροπῶν, by taking ναυκροπῶν as another name for 'archon.' This is extremely improbable, when we regard the meanings given to the word, and the history and nature of the institution of naucraries. This explanation is undoubtedly merely an attempt to reconcile the language of Herodotus with that of Thucydides. It is interesting as perhaps an early — Didymeian? — attempt. Or (b) we may hold that Herodotus is giving the actual facts in the case, i.e. that certain officials known as prytans of the naucraries did have a part, and a very responsible part, in the Cylonian sacrilege. This again may be taken in one of two ways: either (α) there is no essential contradiction between Herodotus and Thucydides; there were two sets of officials concerned, the prytans of the naucraries and the archons; the former may be regarded either (α') as executive officers acting under the order of their superiors, or (β') the local leaders (ναυκρόπους = δημοδοχούς) who came with their people ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν and subsequently handed over the conduct of affairs to the archons: Herodotus — following Alcmeonidean tradition — emphasizes the part taken by the prytans; Thucydides, that of the archons. Thucydides thinks Herodotus mistaken, and corrects him. Or (β) we may hold that there were two accounts of the affair, one of which made the archons responsible, — followed by Thucydides, and the other the prytans of the naucraries. — followed by Herodotus. Or finally (c) we may explain the matter as given above, viz. that we have here not an exact statement of the facts (τῶν ναυκρόπων), but only a partially exact statement (πρυτανεία), vitiated by the addition, made with honest intent, of an explanation (τῶν ναυκρόπων) which, though supposed to throw light on the matter, thoroughly darkens it. We have thus to do with a mental interpolation on the part of Herodotus.

writers from whom Plutarch and Pausanias drew. In the light of these considerations, to suppose the Alcmeonidae to have had no connexion whatever, as officials, with the Cylonian affair is distinctly to discredit the most obvious meaning of our best sources, and is an arbitrary procedure for which there is no sufficient justification.¹

If, now, the Alcmeonidae were officials at the time, it remains to be determined whether the whole body of archons was made up of Alcmeonidae, or whether only the leading archon was an Alcmeonid supported by his family and friends. The objections to the former view are mainly *a priori*. It seems quite unlikely that one family should have gained such power in Athens at this time of factional and family feuds as to obtain possession of all of the archonships. Not many years later we find that competition for these offices is so strong that candidates are elected even outside of the privileged class, and that a compromise is effected by which each of the three classes shall be duly represented. Again: the Cylonians received a promise of trial; the court before which the survivors were tried — and by which they were condemned to exile, the penalty of death having been made impossible by the promise of the officials — was undoubtedly that of the Prytaneium. This court was distinctly the archon's court, if not — as is more likely — the court of the college of archons.² Acting together in promising a fair trial, the archons would have sat together in judgment. Now it is extremely improbable that the judges of the survivors in this cause could have been none other than the murderers of the friends of the survivors; it is therefore next to impossible that all of the archons could have been Alc-

Of the possible explanations summarized above, A is clearly most improbable; B *a* is likewise improbable; B *b a* (*a'*, *β'*) and *β* have each their advocates, whom we need not here enumerate. The greater probability of B *c* must be judged from the available evidence, which, so far as I know, is here presented in full in the text, or in the notes, though very briefly.

If the conclusion B *c* be correct, the prytans of the naucraries disappear wholly from the scene of the Cylonian affair, and all inferences as to their duties and functions, based on their supposed connexion with it, lose their foundation. In all its essential features, the story as given in our various accounts now becomes clear, and thoroughly consistent with itself.

¹ For an additional, though hardly probable argument, based on the presence of a statue of Cylon in the acropolis, see below, p. 41, note 2.

² See above, p. 11, note 4, and p. 30, note 2.

meonidae, though not at all unlikely that one or more of them may have belonged to the family.

Having now shown that one or more of the Alcmeonidae were connected, as officials, with the suppression of the Cylonian attempt, and tainted by the sacrilege involved not only in the murder of suppliants before Athena, but also in the violation of a solemn promise, let us briefly examine the evidence that tends to show that Megacles the Alcmeonid was archon at the time of the affair.

The first appearance¹ of the name Megacles is in the Heracleidean Excerpts (οἱ μετὰ Μεγακλέους). The dependence of these Excerpts upon Aristotle's *Respub. Ath.* has been too often proved to require demonstration here.² There is, therefore, a strong presumption in favor of the view that in the introductory account in the *Respub. Ath.* mention was made of Megacles, if not as an archon, at least as the leader of the anti-Cylonian party. This presumption is made more certain when we bear in mind the thorough familiarity with the family of the Alcmeonidae apparent in this treatise, as well as the nature of the information given in the earlier or historical portion of it (cc. 1-41). Here several members of the family are not only mentioned, but mentioned in such a way as to show that the writer, or at all events his authorities, had them distinctly differentiated in mind. The first person named in this treatise with his parentage affixed is Megacles, son of Alcmeon, the leader of the Parali (c. 13); this statement about the parentage, not made in the case of his rivals, would seem to show one of two things, if not both: either that the father Alcmeon had been mentioned in an earlier portion of the account, or that a Megacles had been mentioned earlier, from whom the later Megacles (his grandson) was to be distinguished by the addition of his father's name. The adoption of the latter alternative confirms us in our contention that the Megacles of the affair of Cylon was named in the *Respub. Ath.*; the adoption of the former would add another bit of evidence in proof of the statement that the Alcmeonidae figured largely in this work.³

¹ The absence of the name in Herodotus and Thucydides need not awaken suspicion; the important thing in the story, told only as an episode, is the family taint, not the guilt of the original offender. As we have noted already, even Thucydides does not mention such memorable names as Solon and Cleisthenes.

² See above, p. 15, note 2.

³ Perhaps Aristotle was here merely transcribing Herodotus's Μεγακλέος τοῦ

That Megacles was named in the *Respub. Ath.* can hardly be disputed; but that there was a distinct statement in the same work that he was archon is not capable of demonstration. This is, however, extremely probable, since archons are again and again mentioned by name in the treatise, the oldest being Aristaechmus, in whose archonship the reforms of Draco were proposed (c. 4). The absence of such an assertion in the Heracleidean Excerpts and in the glosses of Suidas means nothing; all these statements are abridgments of abridgments, and it was perhaps regarded as unnecessary to retain an item which would be taken for granted. The presence of this statement in Plutarch—and, by inference, in the work from which Pausanias drew—would show simply that Plutarch had some authority for it, not necessarily that of the *Respub. Ath.*; for, though we may hold that much in Plutarch is traceable to this work, most of it seems to have come so indirectly and with so much admixture of other material, that it is hazardous to quote Plutarch, when unsupported, as authority for Aristotle. That, however, Plutarch did draw from some good authority in which the statement was made that Megacles was archon, is more than probable; the concurrence, together with the essential independence, of the items given in Schol. I. Ar. *Eq.* 445, in Paus. VII. 25. 3, in Suidas *s.vv.* Κυλώνειον ἄγος and Περικλῆς, and in Plut. *Sol.* 12, point to some writer or writers of a good period, possibly only Aristotle,¹ but probably also an Atthid-writer, by whom

¹ Ἀλκμείωνος (I. 59). Still, even on this supposition, it is significant that he did not also transcribe Ἀριστολαΐδew with Λυκούργου. The Alcmeonidae interested him. Other instances, in the *Respub. Ath.*, of mentions of parentage are: Aristeides (son of Lysimachus, cc. 22, 23); Cimon (Miltiades, c. 26); Cleon (Cleaenetus, c. 28); Ephialtes (Sophonides, c. 25); Hipparchus (Charmus, c. 22); Isagoras (Teisander, c. 20); Megacles (Hippocrates, c. 22); Themistocles (Neocles, c. 23); Theramenes (Hagnon, c. 28); Xanthippus (Ariphron, c. 22). Probably also Pythodorus (c. 29); following Diog. Laert. IX. 8. 54, I proposed τοῦ Πολυ(ή)λου (*Nation*, No. 1349, p. 384), but now adopt the Ἐπι(ή)λου of Kaibel-Wilamowitz, who refer to *Athen. Mittheil.* 14 (1889), p. 398.

¹ That Aristotle could hardly have been the only writer from whom Plutarch drew is shown by the language of Pausanias (VII. 25. 3), which, as the context shows, though dealing with the same subject, treats it after the fashion of an Atthid-writer, and is thus probably drawn from an Atthid-writer (through Polemon or Ister?): Philochorus was the favorite source for these later writers. It is, however, not impossible that the Aristotelian element in Plutarch's account of the

the fact that Megacles was archon was distinctly expressed. From Plutarch's well-known partiality for Philochorus, who we know treated Attic history according to archons,¹ it is perhaps safe to infer that this famous writer, in the third book of whose *Atthis* the affair of Cylon was doubtless mentioned, was the source that we desire. At all events, we have fourth century B.C. evidence (Aristotle's *Respub. Ath.*) for the name of Megacles as that of the leader in the anti-Cylonian movement; we have fifth century B.C. evidence (Thucydides) that the archons, in part at least, were of the anti-Cylonian faction; we have the earliest possible evidence (Herodotus, though apparently not the much earlier Solonian amnesty-law) that the Alcmeonidae were held responsible and punished for the Cylonian sacrilege. In the light of this evidence, is it not safe to assume that at the time of the Cylonian attempt Megacles was one of the prominent officials, probably the archon *par excellence*?

affair of Cylon (though probably not of Solon's activity) may have reached Plutarch through Philochorus. A fairly clear case of such transmission is found in Plut. *Them.* 10: cf. my article in *Am. Journ. Philol.* 12 (1891), pp. 313 ff.

¹ Cf. Schol. Luc. *Tim.* 30 (pp. 47, 48 Jacobitz): *ἐπέστη δὲ (Κλέων) καὶ τῇ πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους εἰρήνῃ ὡς Φιλόχορος, προσθεὶς ἔρχοντα Εὐθύνον, καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης. Suid. s.v. ἔγραψεν Ἀτθίδος βιβλία ἑξήκοντα· περιέχει δὲ τὰς Ἀθηναίων πράξεις καὶ <τοὺς> βασιλεῖς καὶ ἔρχοντας ἕως Ἀγιοῦ τοῦ τελευταίου. Cf. also Müller, *F.H.G.* I. *Frag.* 97 (Schol. Ar. *Pnc.* 605), ἐπὶ Πυθοδώρου (Mss. Θεοδώρου); 108 (Schol. Ar. *Pnc.* 466), ἐπὶ Ἀλκαίου (Mss. Ἀλκμαίωνος); 107 (Schol. Ar. *Vesp.* 210), ἐπὶ Ἰσάρχου, etc. On the annalistic form adopted by the Atthid-writers, see Dion. Hal. *Ant.* I. 8: also Usener, *Jahrb. f. Philol.* 103 (1871), pp. 311 ff., and Busolt, *G. G. I.* p. 363, note 4. Didymus made abundant use of Philochorus; cf. Meiners, *Diss. Halen.* II. pp. 336-72, who demonstrates more than two dozen citations in the historical Scholia on Aristophanes. Marcellinus *Thuc.* 32, and Harpocration s.v. *περίστοιχοι* also give us Didymeian citations from Philochorus. Possibly in the otherwise unknown *Φιλοκλέους τινός*, cited by Plutarch (*Sol.* 1) as quoted by Didymus, we are to see an ancient corruption of *Φιλοχόρου*.*

V.

CYLON A YOUNG MAN.

THE more important arguments upon which the claim for an early date for Cylon is based, drawn from the direct language of the sources, are concerned with the age of Cylon at the time of his attempt to possess the acropolis.

The earliest and in fact the only writer who gives any information on this point is Herodotus (V. 71), in these words: *οὗτος ἐπὶ τυραννίδι ἐκόμησε, προσποιησάμενος δὲ ἑταιρηίην τῶν ἡλικιωτέων, καταλαβεῖν τὴν ἀκρόπολιν ἐπειρήθη*. The word of especial significance in this passage is *ἡλικιωται*, which though not found elsewhere in Herodotus is a word of good classical usage. It means 'age-mates,' 'persons of the same age,' but as actually used it seems to be restricted almost wholly to the young and to the old.¹ When used of combinations for political purposes, it can have reference only to leagues of youthful comrades and associates. There would be a manifest absurdity in supposing that a combination of middle-aged men was here meant; the fact of age is not dwelt upon in speaking of men in middle life: this is a feature that impresses itself upon the attention only when persons at the extremes of age are spoken of. Still more absurd would it be to suppose that Herodotus here meant a combination of aged men. Herodotus's own use of language makes it very clear that *ἑταιρηίην τῶν ἡλικιωτέων*² refers to a company of young men,³

¹ The gloss of Suid. *s.v.* *ἡλικιωται*: *συμπράκτορες* does not give the classical usage.

² Lange's emendation of *ἡλικιωτέων* to *ἐτῶν* or *συνετῶν* (*De Ephel. nom. comm.*, Leipsic, 1873, pp. 22, 23) is wholly unnecessary. Cf. Schömann, *Jahrb. f. Philol.* 111 (1875), p. 449; also Schöll, quoted *ib.* p. 177.

³ In the absence of an adequate lexicographical index to Herodotus, the following summary of uses may be helpful (Stein's text):—

ἡλικιώτης is not elsewhere found in Herod., but its meaning may be inferred from the uses of *ἡλικία* and its cognates. *ἡλικία* (1) 'time of life,' 'age,' *αιτίας*: *τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίην* (*ἔχων, ἔχοντας, ἐχόντων*, with dative), III. 16, III. 14; *κατ' ἡλικίην τε καὶ φιλότητα*, I. 172; *νέος . . . ἡλικίην*, III. 134, VI. 43; of old age, *οὄρος δὲ ἡλικίης . . . ἄλλος οὐδεὶς*, I. 216; *ἐς τὸδε ἡλικίης ἤκοντα*, VII. 38: with number of years, *ἐδν ἐτέων ὀκτῶ ἢ ἐννέα ἡλικίην*, V. 51; *ἡλικίην . . . ἑπτακαίδεκα . . . γαγονάς*, III. 50; *ἡλικίην ἐς εἰκοσι . . . ἔτεα*, I. 209. (2) Of im-

and this is sustained, not only by the striking words *ἐκόμησε ἐπὶ τυραννίδι*,—when Herodotus speaks of the ambition of the mature Peisistratus he says *καταφρονήσας τὴν τυραννίδα* (I. 59; cf. I. 66),—but also by the context: the deed is portrayed—briefly, to be sure,

pulses and feelings peculiar or proper to one's years: (of 'youthful' passion), *μὴ πάντα ἡλικίῃ καὶ θυμῷ ἐπίτραπε* III. 36 and *εἶκε τῇ ἡλικίῃ*, VII. 18; (of an old man), V. 19. For III. 36, cf. *νεανίας* in lex. (3) 'Time,' *Ἡσίοδον . . . καὶ Ὀμηρον ἡλικίῃν τετρακοσίοισι ἔτεσι δοκέω μεν πρεσβυτέρους γενέσθαι*, II. 53; 'period,' *ταῦτα ἡλικίῃν εἶη ἂν κατὰ Λάϊον*, V. 59; *Σκαῖος . . . ἡλικίῃν κατ' Οἰδίπου*, V. 60; *ταῦτα πρὸ τῆς Πεισιστράτου ἡλικίης ἐγένετο*, V. 71; (4) 'proper age for,' *οὐ γὰρ εἰχέπω ἡλικίῃν στρατεύεσθαι*, I. 129. In III. 16, *τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίῃν* carries also with it the idea of size. As 'age' in English connotes, when used alone, 'old' age, so *ἡλικία* to the Greeks suggested 'youth,' 'prime.'

Light on the meaning of *ἡλικιωται* comes also from the cognates: *τῶν ἡλικῶν . . . πρῶτος*, I. 34; *τῶν ἡλικῶν ἀνδρειοτάτω*, I. 123; *οἱ δὴμῆλικες*, I. 99. *ἡλικιωται* is thus equivalent to *οἱ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίῃν ἔχοντες* (Suid. *ἡλικιωτής* τῆς αὐτῆς μετεσχηκῆς ἡλικίας). Such persons are united in interests and tastes (*ἡλικα γὰρ ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος τέρπειν τὸν ἡλικα*, Plat. *Phaedr.* 240 C) as well as in years. That the word does not elsewhere occur in Herodotus should not arouse suspicion; he had several ways of expressing the idea (see examples above). It frequently occurs in Plato (cf. Ast, *Lex. s.v.*), and in the orators in the sense used by Herodotus.

ἑταιρήν is another *ἄπαξ λεγόμενον* in Herodotus; its meaning, however, is clear from passages where the concrete word is used: *ἑταῖρος*, sing. 'comrade,' masc. III. 14 (*bis*), VI. 62 (*ter*); fem. II. 134 (of Rhodope, *ἑταίρης γυναικός*, i. e. 'hetaera'); plu. masc. only III. 125 (*ἀγόμενος . . . πολλοὺς τῶν ἑταίρων*), fem. III. 51, and (of the 'hetaerae' of Naucratis) II. 135. Add *τῶν συνεταίρων*, VII. 193 (of Jason and his comrades on the Argo); *Δία . . . ἑταίρηιον*, I. 44 (*bis*) and the verb *προσεταιρῖσασθαι*, III. 70 (*bis*); *προσεταιρίζεται*, V. 66 (Cleisthenes and the Athenian *δῆμος*). If there were more examples preserving the same proportions, one might infer that *ἑταιρήν* (or *συνέταιροι*) was Herodotus's plural for *ἑταῖρος*. At all events, *ἑταιρήν τῶν ἡλικιωτέων*, as used by Herodotus, is the exact equivalent of *ἡλικιωται καὶ ἑταῖροι* (Plat. *Sympr.* 183 C).

Finally, one might be tempted to suppose that Herod., using the language of the Attic Greeks, when political *ἑταιρεία* prevailed (Vischer, *Kl. Schriften*, I. pp. 153-204, especially p. 156), intended to describe Cylon's band as a club of a similar sort (cf. Aristot. *Respub. Ath.* c. 20, *ἡπτωμέσος δὲ ταῖς ἑταιρείαις ὁ Κλεισθένης*, following Herod. V. 66, but not verbatim). This is possible, but hardly probable. Even if this had been his meaning, he would have been guilty of an anachronism. Solon's *σύνοδοι* (*Frag.* 4. 22; cf. Plato, *Theaet.* 173 B, *σπουδαὶ δὲ ἑταιριῶν ἐπ' ἀρχὰς καὶ σύνοδοι καὶ δειπνα κ.τ.λ.*), to which appeal might be made, probably does not refer to such combinations as that of Cylon, young revolutionary spirits aided by foreign mercenaries, but rather to the factional

but vividly and with no uncertain lines—as a deed of youthful and heedless daring and violence.

Now we know that Cylon was winner in the *δαυλος* at Olympia in 640 B.C. The nature of this contest was such that only men in the flower and vigor of young manhood could participate in it; at this time, then, Cylon must have been still a young man, certainly not above thirty years of age, and probably younger. In twenty or more years after 640 B.C., *i.e.* after 620 B.C., language such as Herodotus uses could not have been applied to him. At the time of his attempt to make himself tyrant of Athens he certainly cannot have been over forty years of age—in all probability he was much younger; hence this episode in his life must have taken place before 621 B.C. (Draco's legislation), and probably much nearer 628 B.C., or even 636 B.C., than 621 B.C.

The only objections that can be offered to this reasoning must be based either on a supposed inaccuracy in the language of Herodotus,

combinations of families and their adherents (*Ἀλκμεωνίδαι καὶ οἱ συστασιώται*, Herod. V. 70) against each other, which were a prominent feature of the times (*στάσειν ἔμφυλον*, *Frag.* 4. 19; cf. Aristot. *Respub. Ath.* c. 13).

That the language of Herodotus would have been unusual, to say the least, had he intended here to describe the attempt of a political faction led by a man of mature years, must be evident. That this cannot have been his meaning will be clear from a consideration of the several ways in which he speaks of such attempts. The members of parties of this sort are called *στασιώται* (the occasion of the formation of *στάσεις* is that an ambitious man wishes to become *κορυφαῖος*, III. 82), I. 59, 173; III. 83, 144; V. 36, 72 (of Isagoras and his men), 70 (adherents of Alcmeonidae, under Cleisthenes, reaching back to Cylon's time); VIII. 132. Especially significant is I. 59, *καταφρονήσας τὴν τυραννίδα ἤγειρε τρίτην στάσιν, συλλέξας δὲ στασιώτας κ.τ.λ.* (of Peisistratus). In I. 96 Deioces, *ἀνὴρ . . . σοφὸς . . . ἐρασθεὶς τυραννίδος ἐποίησεν τοιαύτην*, and in V. 46 Euryleon, *τυραννίδι ἐπεχείρησε Σελινούντος (καὶ ἐμουνόρχησε χρόνον ἐπ' ὀλίγον*; his fate, however, has a suggestive resemblance to that of the Cylonians: *οἱ γὰρ μὴν Σελινούσιοι ἐπαναστάντες ἀπέκτειναν καταφυγόντα ἐπὶ Διὸς ἀγοραίου βωμόν*). These passages raise the strong presumption that if Herodotus had meant by the attempt of Cylon an affair like those of Peisistratus, Deioces, or Euryleon, he would have used different language. The meaning of the word *ἐκόμησε* (*ἐπὶ τυραννίδι*) as describing the feeling more natural for a youth (Stein, *op. cit.* Busolt, *G. G. I.* pp. 505, note 2) cannot be pressed; for though the word in this sense is an *ἄπαξ λεγόμενον* in Herodotus,—it occurs several times in a literal sense: *e.g.* I. 195; II. 36; IV. 168, 180, 191,—it is not much stronger than the word *ἐρασθεὶς* used of the sage Deioces's feeling.

or on a supposed untrustworthiness of the date of Cylon's Olympic victory. As to this second point, it may be said that if any matters in Greek chronology rest on a secure basis, the best attested are the dates of Olympic victors, after those records were begun; and there is no reason, from the records, why this date of Cylon's victory should be regarded with suspicion. Indeed, if the date were a forged date, inserted in the lists without authority, we should have looked for it somewhat later; Solon was supposed to have been concerned with the efforts to purify the city of the Cylonian sacrilege, and an inventor of this date would have placed it much nearer Solon's time than 640 B.C.

It must be plain to every reader of the passage from Herodotus that there was no uncertainty in the historian's mind as to the nature of the attempt of Cylon, and as to the age of the young adventurers. Where did he gain this impression? The tradition of the affair, in all its essential features, was still definite and clear among the Alcmeonidae when Herodotus visited Athens and heard tales of the house from them or their sympathizers: no story could be more vivid in all its details than that of the youthful, heedless adventurer, ill-prepared, speedily overwhelmed, his company either slain or exiled. Alcmeonidae at least would never have transformed, in their traditions, a powerful enemy, in the maturity of his strength, into a daring, foolish boy. Later on some of these features, the more picturesque as contrasted with the more essential, faded from the historical consciousness.

There is nothing whatever in any of the other authorities that makes our inferences as to Cylon's age improbable. It is true that in none of the accounts is the fact distinctly stated that Cylon was a young man, and it may be claimed that had this been the case, it would have been dwelt upon, especially by Thucydides, whose narrative is very explicit. It is noteworthy, however, that in the earliest of the authorities this aspect of the matter is made clear; in the subsequent accounts other features of the interesting incident attracted attention and were emphasized.

In his walk upon the acropolis of Athens, Pausanias¹ saw, evidently

¹ Paus. I. 28. 1. It makes no difference, for our purpose, whether Pausanias saw the statue himself, or merely read about it in his authority. The explicit and

near the great Athena *πυλαίμαχος*, a statue of Cylon, the presence of which in that place — the statue of a man who had attempted to make himself tyrant — was a mystery to him. The explanation which he suggests, though undoubtedly an incorrect one, carries with it a bit of information that bears upon the matter of the age of Cylon at the time of his attempted usurpation: the statue was of a man *εἶδος κάλλιστος*. Such language could hardly have been used except of the statue of one in the early prime and beauty of youth. In this statue, then, made doubtless long after the event, probably after the Persian wars¹ and perhaps in the Periclean age, — if not as a substitute for a figure set up very soon after the event² and destroyed at

somewhat recondite information that he furnishes about Cylon is clearly taken from some book in which matters of interest concerning these *ἀναθήματα* were given (Polemon, drawing from Atthid-writers, and other sources).

¹ In the Persian occupation of Athens, the Acropolis was cleared of nearly everything. Herod. VIII. 53.

² The dedication of the statue here, near the temple of outraged Athena Polias, was intended as a sort of expiation for the guilt of sacrilegious murder. The statue was set up either by the offenders, or by their friends, or by the state, either immediately after the event, which is unlikely, or at some much later time, when it should have seemed that the crime had not been fully expiated. Now since we know that Cylon escaped, this proceeding is more likely to have taken place a long time after the event, when the fact of his escape had become obscured. In answer to the demands of the Lacedaemonians, at the opening of the Peloponnesian war, that Pericles should be cast out, as tainted by ancient sacrilege, — *τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον ἐλαύνειν*, — the Athenians made the counter-demand that the Spartans should free themselves of the taint of the crime committed against Athena Chalcioccus, *i.e.* the starving of King Pausanias in the temple of Athena at Sparta, thirty (Ad. Bauer, *l.c.* pp. 70, 72) years or more earlier. The Spartans had, however, in compliance with the direction of the god of Delphi, already offered "two bodies for the one," two bronze statues of Pausanias, which were set up near the temple (Thuc. I. 127, 128, 134, 135; cf. also Paus. III. 17. 7-9). From this language one might perhaps infer that the Athenians had already done their utmost in atonement for the Cylonian sacrilege: had, among other things, already dedicated on the Acropolis a statue of Cylon.

The existence of this statue of Cylon can hardly be explained in connexion with the curious regulation with reference to the archons, whereby on entering office they solemnly swore that, if they should transgress any of the laws, they would dedicate a golden statue (*οἱ δὲ ἐννέα ἀρχοντες ὁμνύοντες πρὸς τῷ λίθῳ κατεφάτιζον ἀναθῆσαι ἀνδριάντα χρυσοῦν ἐάν τινα παραβῶσι τῶν νόμων*, Aristot. *Respub. Ath.* c. 7; cf. Heracl. *Exc. Pol.* 8; Pollux VIII. 86; Suid. *s.v.* χρυσῆ εἰκών). In Plato (*Phaedr.* 235 E) Socrates playfully embroiders this oath, and adds unessential details

the time of the Persian occupation of the acropolis, perhaps as a sort of an expiatory offering made by the friends of Pericles at the time when party strife had made his hereditary taint as an Alcmeonid a factor of great weight against him,¹ — we have a survival of the authentic tradition, elsewhere meeting us only in Herodotus, that Cylon was a young man at the time of his attempt.

A second class of arguments in favor of a date for Cylon earlier than 621 B.C. may be based upon the probable age of the Megacles prominent in the affair as the archon who broke his word, and, at the head of a faction, committed sacrilegious murder. The age of this man at this time is to be inferred from that of his son Alcmeon, general of the Athenians in the First Sacred War. A discussion of this topic raises several related questions concerning the chronology, fortunes, and wealth of the Alcmeonidae in the latter part of the seventh and in the first half of the sixth centuries B.C.

VI.

THE ALCMEONIDAE BEFORE PEISISTRATUS.

ACCORDING to Attic traditions the noble house of the Alcmeonidae² had in the earliest historic period shown its pre-eminence: two of its members, Megacles and Alcmeon, had been so-called life-archons, the later being the last in that series.³ Uncertain as this tra-

(*χρυσῆν εἰκόνα ἰσομέτρητον εἰς Δελφοὺς ἀναθήσειν*, but Plutarch (*Sol.* 25), not seeing the fun, reproduces the whole passage from Plato as the ancient regulation). The statuette here provided for was of gold, and was evidently intended as a penalty for receiving bribes in office, not for other forms of malfeasance, and doubtless would have been a statuette of some divinity, probably Athena, whose treasure had been appropriated. The statue of Cylon, however, mentioned by Pausanias, was a portrait statue of bronze. Pre-Solonian archons could hardly have dedicated such a statue. Furthermore, pre-Solonian archons would have known that Cylon had escaped.

¹ This statue seems to have stood not far from one of Pericles: Paus. I. 25. 1 and 28. 1.

² Alcmeon (Alcmeonidae), not Alcmaeon, is the spelling of the Attic inscriptions, e.g. *C.I.A.*, IV^b 373, n. 189, p. 98 (sixth century B.C.). Cf. Meisterhans, *Gramm.*² § 14, p. 28, and notes 167 and 517. Euripides's play was entitled Ἀλκμέων, Cramer, *Anec. Oxon.* II. p. 337. 4. Ἀλκμεωνίδαι, Dem. XXI. 144 (Σ).

³ In the list (Euseb. *Chron.* I. 185 ff.) of thirteen life-archons, beginning with

dition may be, there is no uncertainty about the tradition that makes this family one of the noble γένη, later called Eupatridae,¹—from

Medon, the sixth is Megacles and the thirteenth Alcmeon. The periods ascribed to these archons, who lived before ἀναγραφῆ were begun, are purely conjectural. The presence of these names in this list, as also of the names of Agamestor (Philaid?), and Ariphron (Buzygid), and others, shows one of three things: either (1) that the tradition that the succession was limited to Medontidae, and so continued into the period of the decennial archontate (Paus. I. 3. 3; IV. 5. 10; 13. 7), was false; or (2) that these men were Medontidae on their mothers' side, but on their fathers' side members of other families; or (3) that these names do not belong in the historic series, the ancient list having been revised by the insertion, at a late period, of well-known Attic names. Cf. Busolt, *G. G. I.* p. 406, note 2.

¹ The answer to the question as to whether the Alcmeonidae were Eupatridae (denied by Sauppe, Stein—on Herod. I. 59—and others; affirmed by Vischer and others) will depend upon the sense in which we are to take the word: whether (1) as the name of an Attic γένος, Εὐπατριδαί, or (2) εὐπατριδαί, as the generic name of a political class, an estate (Germ. 'Stand'), composed of certain ancient noble-born families, possessing certain traditional political rights and privileges. That there was such an Attic γένος is clear: see Isocr. XVI. 25, Dem. XXI. 144; Polemon, *ap. Schol. Soph. O. C.* 489 (cf. Wilamowitz, *Phil. Unt.* I. 119, note, and *Hermes*, 22 [1887], pp. 121, and 479 ff. [Töpffer]; also Hirzel, *Rhein. Mus.* [1888], p. 631, but especially Töpffer, *Att. Gen.* pp. 175 ff.); that the Alcmeonidae did not belong to it is equally clear (cf. Isocr. *l.c.*). That, however, the Alcmeonidae were an ancient family, and that its members enjoyed the highest privileges, in the state, of holding office, etc., is also demonstrable (cf. Vischer, *Kl. Schriften*, I. pp. 401 ff.). The scolion preserved in Aristot. *Respub. Ath.* c. 19, and often quoted (see Rose, *Aristot. Fragm.* 394, and *Aristot. Pseudopigr.* pp. 417, 418), shows that in the mouths of the people the Alcmeonidae were early called εὐπατριδαί, whatever the word may have meant: αἰαὶ Λειψόδριον προδωσέταιρον | οἶους ἄνδρας ἀπάλεσας μάχεσθαι | ἀγαθούς τε καὶ εὐπατρίδας | οἱ τὸτ' εἰδείαν οἶων | πατέρων ἔσαν.

From the extreme rarity, if not entire absence, of the word εὐπατριδαί in prose-writers before Aristotle, to designate a political office-holding class of nobles as contrasted with the low-born populace (*i.e.* in the sense of Lat. *optimates*, *patricii*),—perhaps because the word had already been taken up in the name of the γένος Εὐπατριδαί (cf. Isocr. XVI. 25),—and from the use, where we should look for it, of οἱ εὐγενεῖς, τὰ γένη, οἱ δυνατοί, οἱ λαμπροί, οἱ ἐκ τῶν γένων, οἱ γνῶριμοί, etc., one might raise the question whether εὐπατριδαί, at least before the time of Aristotle, was naturally and generally understood in this special sense. A poetical word originally (*Soph. El.* 160, 857, *Eur. Alc.* 920), it had more than one meaning: 'good or true to one's father'—so of Orestes, perhaps the reputed founder of the γένος Εὐπατριδαί (Hirzel, *Rhein. Mus.* 43 [1888], p. 631)—or 'of good parent-

which archons were chosen,—and that connects its members with many important phases of Attic history from the latter half of the seventh century B.C. onward. The Alcmeonidae first meet us in connexion with the affair of Cylon, and their attitude in this matter raises a question as to the causes of their activity. Did they assail and suppress Cylon only as the head or representative of a rival family, wishing to retain for themselves the pre-eminence which the election of one or more of their number to the archonship bears witness to? Or did they act rather as patriots, defenders of the state against tyrants, — *μισοτύραννοι*, as Herodotus calls them—with disinterested motives? Or were they merely public officers doing their official duty in quelling a sedition and uprising that threatened the existence of the state? The violence with which they acted, disregarding the holiest laws which made the suppliant sacred, shows that this last explanation is inadequate. A definitive answer can hardly be given: doubtless several or even all of these considerations combined as motives. Aristotle's *διὰ τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους φιλονικίαν*, said of the party strug-

age.' It may have been adopted by Aristotle in a technical sense, — in part because of one of its meanings; in part perhaps because of the representative character of the family *Εὐπατρίδαι*, just as in Roman times *Eteobutadae* was used as the synonyme of *εὐγενεῖς* (Töpffer, *Att. Geneal.* p. 117), — and later on, especially in Roman times, when the analogy of Roman political conditions affected the scholar's conceptions, it may have become thoroughly established in this sense. Thus Plut. uses it for the Latin patricians (*Fab.* 16, *Popl.* 18); and in Dion. Hal. *Ant.* II. 8, *εὐπατρίδαι* is Greek for *patricii*, as *ἄγροικοι* for *plebeii*. Landwehr, *Philol.* Suppl.-Bd. V. (1884) pp. 143 ff., has the examples; cf. also Busolt, *G. G. I.* pp. 387–89, for the bibliography.

It should be added that Aristotle himself never uses the word in the *Politics*, and only twice in *Respub. Ath.* (cc. 13, 19), elsewhere preferring, where this would seem to have been the natural expression, other words (*οἱ γνῶριμοι*, etc.). It is doubtful—a third possible case—whether this word was found in Aristotle's account of the Attic state under Theseus, in the lost part of the *Respub. Ath.* (Rose, *Aristot. Fragm.* 384, 385). It is not given (as Kenyon remarks, p. 173) in the early versions of this passage (*Lex. Dem. Patm.* p. 152—Sakkelion, *Bull. Corr. Hellén.* I. 1877; — Schol. Plat. *Axiach.* 371 D; Moeris, *Lex. Att.* p. 193), though it occurs in the paraphrase in Plut. *Thes.* 25, and in Pollux VIII. 111. The last version is in part, at least, demonstrably an expansion, by the insertion of the words *ἐξ εὐπατριδῶν*, of the language of Aristotle (*Respub. Ath.* c. 8: *φυλαὶ δ' ἦσαν δ' καθάπερ πρότερον καὶ φυλοβασίλεις τέτταρες, κ.τ.λ.* Pollux., *ib.*: *οἱ δὲ φυλοβασίλεις ἐξ εὐπατριδῶν δ' ὄντες, κ.τ.λ.*).

gles immediately after Solon's reforms, points, as we have already remarked, to early family rivalries. Friends of the Alcmeonidae in subsequent centuries, as they looked back upon the history of the family, in which prominent members stand forth as the enemies of tyrants and as the upholders of the people against oligarchical domination, saw in this house ideal champions of the liberty of the people, but they viewed history with false perspective.¹ Megacles, the younger, who, at the head of the Parali, withstood Peisistratus, champion of the Diacrii, did so, — as also Lycurgus, the leader of the Pediaei, — not with high motives, but because he hoped to gain something by it, and in particular a mastery over his rivals. The subsequent compromise proposed by Megacles to Peisistratus, whereby the tyrant having married his daughter should receive Megacles's support in his usurpation, is hardly the conduct of a pure-minded patriot.² When finally the Peisistratidae were cast out, in large measure through the efforts of the outraged Alcmeonidae, and Cleisthenes, the son of Megacles, with his adherents gained the ascendancy in the state, as over-against his oligarchic rivals now headed by Isagoras, it was apparently mainly to establish himself and his party in power that he instituted his far-reaching reforms.³ At

¹ Cf. especially Isocr. xvi. 25, who celebrates the wealth and patriotic spirit of the family: *οἱ τοῦ μὲν πλούτου μέγιστον μνημεῖον κατέλιπον — ἴππων γὰρ ζεύγαι πρῶτος Ἀλκμείων τῶν πολιτῶν Ὀλυμπίαισιν ἐνίκησε — τὴν δ' εὐνοίαν ἦν εἶχον εἰς τὸ πλῆθος ἐν τοῖς τυραννικοῖς ἐπεδείξαντο . . . οὐκ ἤξιωσαν μετασχεῖν τῆς ἐκείνου (i.e. Peisistratus) τυραννίδος ἀλλ' εἶλοντο φυγεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς πολίτας ἰδεῖν δουλεύοντας, κ.τ.λ.* Modern instances of a similar lack of historical perspective abound.

² Plut. *Sol.* 29: *πράγματα νεώτερα προσδοκᾶν καὶ ποθεῖν ὅπαντας (i.e. these party leaders) ἑτέραν κατάστασιν, οὐκ ἴσον ἐλπίζοντας, ἀλλὰ πλεόν ἕξειν ἐν τῇ μεταβολῇ καὶ κρατήσειν παντάσῃ τῶν διαφορομένων.* Herod. I. 59, 60: *ἔνθα δὴ ὁ Πεισίστρατος ἤρχε Ἀθηναίων.* The factions of Lycurgus and Megacles combine against Peisistratus and cast him out; they subsequently fall out among themselves, and Megacles makes a compromise with Peisistratus, offering his daughter in marriage (*ἐπὶ τυραννίδι*).

³ Herod. V. 66: *οἷτο οἱ ἄνδρες ἐστασίασαν περὶ δυνάμιος, ἐσσοῦμενος δὲ ὁ Κλεισθένης τὸν δῆμον προσεταιρίζεται, as more than a century earlier, for a practically similar purpose, Cylon had called to his aid an ἑταιρήτην τῶν ἠλικιωτέων.* Aristotle's language is (*Respub. Ath.* c. 20): *ἐστασίαζον πρὸς ἀλλήλους Ἰσαγόρας . . . καὶ Κλεισθένης . . . ἡττώμενος δὲ ταῖς ἑταιρείαις ὁ Κλεισθένης προσηγάγετο τὸν δῆμον, ἀποδιδούς τῷ πλήθει τὴν πολιτείαν* (see above, p. 38, note). The radical

no point in the political history of the family — except, perhaps, in some of the acts of its greatest scion, Pericles — do we find evidence of wholly disinterested and patriotic conduct; misfortune, exile, and many other reverses, together with signal success in the gaining of wealth, uniting its members closely, had strongly developed the family feeling, and had taught them insight and political wisdom, which, when the opportunity arrived, they put to brilliant use to their own great advantage, as also to that of the state.

According to the clear language of Thucydides the attempt of Cylon was brought to a summary end by an uprising of the people, hastening in from the country, followed by violent measures on the part of the Alcmeonidae. The interests of the Alcmeonidae are here served by the people from the country: the family may be regarded as now standing at the head of the second of the two great classes into which from early times the Athenian people fall, — the class whom Aristotle calls *ἀτοικοί*, and which would at this time include the artisan as well as the peasant class. Though the lines appear sharply drawn between the well-to-do and the poor, there is as yet no evidence of minuter subdivisions according to class differences, nor according to local factions, which meet us in quick succession soon after Solon's legislation. Two generations later the family appears — in the person of Megacles, grandson of the Megacles of the affair of Cylon — as the champion of the local faction of the Parali, social and economic changes having come about that led most naturally to this relation; three generations later it is the people (*Demus*) as such that Cleisthenes allies to himself; five generations later it is by his extraordinary services to the Demus that Pericles maintains himself in his supreme position; while in the sixth generation the coquettings of

character of the reforms of Cleisthenes was doubtless suggested to him by the experience of his grandfather, for whose reorganization of the Sicyon constitution one would hardly claim a patriot's disinterestedness. The ostracism of Megacles, son of Hippocrates and nephew of Cleisthenes, in 487/6 B.C., as supporter of the Peisistratidae shows that the family had no ingrained aversion to tyranny (Aristot. *Respub. Ath.* c. 22). Lysias (xiv. 39; cf. [Andoc.] *Contra Alc.* 34) makes him Cleisthenes's son, grandfather of Alcibiades, — hence perhaps the *δῆς*. See also the ostrakon bearing the name of Megacles, son of Hippocrates, the person mentioned by Aristotle (Benndorf, *Griech. u. Sicil. Vasenbilder*, p. 50, pl. 29, no. 10); and a pinax discussed by Studniczka (*Jahrb. d. Arch. Inst.* 2. [1887], p. 161).

the Alcmeonid Alcibiades with the same Demus are the causes at once of his rise and of his fall.

The affair of Cylon, marked as it was by violence and unholy bloodshed, was followed by a long period of strife. The survivors of the Cylonians and their adherents gain strength, and a reaction against the Alcmeonidae sets in, mainly political,¹ but doubtless sharpened by the superstitious sense of outraged divine law. The people are at variance and in dread of worse ill; according to some authorities Solon,² then beginning to rise into prominence, having the confidence of both parties, or some other influential citizen, prevails upon the Alcmeonidae to submit to the verdict of trial by a special court of three hundred citizens selected for this purpose. The formal accuser, as we have seen, is Myron, a Lycomid; the Alcmeonidae are found guilty; the bodies of the dead offenders are dug up and cast beyond the borders; the living relatives withdraw, condemned to perpetual exile.³

The trial and exile of the Alcmeonidae must have taken place no little time before the legislation of Solon, and before the breaking out of the Sacred War, in which Alcmeon, now head of the house, is general of the Athenian contingent.⁴ There are two grounds for

¹ Cf. Schömann, *Jahrb. f. Philol.* 111 (1875), pp. 464 ff.

² The connexion of Solon with this trial has only slight evidence to sustain it. Niese, *Zur Gesch. Solons*, p. 14.

³ Unless the detail about the *ἔφορος* of the bodies of the dead be a ditto-graphy for what was said of the procedure in the time of Cleisthenes (an unlikely hypothesis; see above, p. 17, note 1), one must infer that a considerable time had elapsed between the sacrilege and the trial. Aristotle's language suggests that Megacles, the chief culprit, was one of the dead; at all events, we hear nothing of him again. Diels (*Sitzungsb. d. Berl. Akad.*, 1891, p. 388) supposes a generation to have passed.

⁴ The main ground for a later date of the trial is the supposed connexion of Epimenides with the measures taken for the purification of the city from the *Κυκλώσιον ἔργον*. According to this view, the trial must have taken place, if not after the arrival of Epimenides, — according to one account (Diog. Laert. I. 10. 110; cf. Suid. *s.v.* Ἐπιμενίδης for another date) he came Ol. 42. 1 = 596 B.C., — at least shortly before it. Thus Schömann — who fixes the date of the affair of Cylon at 612 B.C., and not, as we would, a dozen or more years earlier — would put the trial after the beginning of the Sacred War (by him dated 600 B.C.), and before Epimenides (596 B.C.): after the beginning of the war, because otherwise Alcmeon could hardly have been chosen general; before Epimenides, because in

this inference: first, the selection of Alcmeon as representative of the Athenian people in the war for the honor of Delphi, and, secondly, the fact that a reaction had set in against the Cylonians before the enactment of Solon's laws. Both of these things would have been impossible but for a considerable lapse of time. We must conceive of the case somewhat as follows: after the departure of the Alcmeonidae, the keenness of the feeling of hatred (*ἐναγείας ἐμισσοῦντο*) which prompted the severity of their punishment became less and less sharp, — in part because of the natural reaction that sets in in all such cases; in part doubtless because of the good report that came home of the brave and wise conduct of the members of the family in their absence, and especially of Alcmeon; in part also because of new ties of business formed between enterprising Athenians at home and the absent Alcmeonidae, who were now in all probability adventuring themselves in trade and commerce in foreign lands, and thus laying the foundations of the wealth for which in subsequent times their family was illustrious. With the growth and spread of this feeling in favor of the Alcmeonidae — the most conspicuous evidence of which was the choice of Alcmeon as general, and the restoration of the family therein involved — there went also a deepening of the feeling against the Cylonians, which is clearly expressed in the language of the amnesty-law of Solon, given in the thirteenth *ᾄξων*.¹

the accounts of the activity of Epimenides in purifying the city, no mention is made of the trial and exile. But — to leave out of consideration the very questionable date of the Sacred War assumed by Schömann and the fact that the order of events in Aristotle's narrative (*Respub. Ath.* cc. 1 ff.) points conclusively to a trial of the Alcmeonidae, if not before Draco, certainly not long after him, — it is highly improbable that Solon's amnesty-law (Plut. *Sol.* 19) should have allowed the return of the exiles only a few months after their awful banishment, while making an express exception in the case of the exiled Cylonians. Further, as will be shown later (pp. 69 ff.), the connexion of Epimenides with this affair, at least as late as 596 B.C., is problematical, and arguments based upon it have little weight.

¹ Plut. *Sol.* 19: this law, which provides for pardon and restoration to rights of citizenship, makes exception in the case of the Cylonians, in the words *πλὴν ὅσοι . . . ἐκ πρυτανείου καταδικασθέντες . . . ἐπὶ τυραννίδι ἔφευγον*. Even if, with Lipsius-Schömann (*Ath. Proc.* I. p. 27), we deny that the court before which the Cylonians were tried was an archon's court, there can be no doubt that in these words the Cylonians are meant. The *εἰς τὴν κλίσην . . . ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ* of Schol. I. Ar. *Eq.* 445 is a mistaken form of statement, which has no weight. See pp. 16, 24, and note 1.

All such changes of popular feeling take time, and we can hardly be wrong in insisting that between the affair of Cylon, which was the original cause of all these changes of mental attitude, and the later exhibitions of popular feeling in the matter, a period of many years must have elapsed.

In the generation in which the attempt of Cylon was thwarted, the conspicuous Alcmeonid is Megacles. In the next generation the leading member of the family is Alcmeon, the son of Megacles, noted for the part he took in the Sacred War and for his great wealth.¹ About the exact date and length of the Sacred War there is still ground for uncertainty, though there is every probability that the war practically closed in the archonship at Athens of Simon (*i.e.* 590 B.C.);² its duration is wholly uncertain, since we must regard the ten-year period ascribed to it by later writers³ as a sort of anachronistic echo of the ten-year period of the Sacred War in the fourth century B.C. (357–346 B.C.), if not suggested by the legend of the Trojan War. This first Sacred War, though not so great an affair as it was made out to be in much later times,⁴ still has something of a universal character, the several tribes of the Delphian amphictyony taking sides: the leader of the Athenian contingent in it, — according to the best records, the Delphic *ὑπομνήματα* — was Alcmeon.⁵ It is reasonable

¹ Plut. *Sol.* 11; Herod. VI. 125; Isocr. XVI. 25.

² Simon, archon Ol. 47. 3; Mar. Par. Ep. 37. For a discussion of the date of the founding of the Pythian *στεφανίτης ἀγών*, which is connected with that of the Sacred War, see Landwehr, *Philol.* Suppl.-Bd. V. (1884), pp. 105–114. Ad. Bauer, *l.c.* p. 48, discussing the subject in the light of the recovered *Respub. Ath.*, sets this date at B.C. 583; Damasias he would place B.C. 583–1, understanding the *δευτέρου* of Mar. Par. Ep. 38 to refer not to Damasias's second year, but to Damasias II. (Damasias I., archon in B.C. 639/8; Dion. Hal. *Ant.* III. 38).

³ Callisthenes, *ap.* Athen. XIII. 560 c. Cf. Niese, *Zur Gesch. Solons*, pp. 16 ff.

⁴ Thuc. I. 15.

⁵ Plut. *Sol.* 11: *ἐν τε τοῖς Δελφῶν ὑπομνήμασιν Ἀλκμαίων . . . Ἀθηναίων στρατηγὸς ἀναγράφεται.* The tradition (Aristot. *Pythion.* and Euanthes the Samian, as quoted by Hermippus, — given us in Plut. *Sol.* 11; also Aesch. *Ctes.* 108) represented Solon as prominent in the agitation that led to the war, and, according to Euanthes, made him general. Even though with Niese (*Zur Gesch. Solons*, p. 17) we may be disposed to look upon this as a pleasing Aeschinean fiction (Dem. *Cor.* 149, *λόγους εὐπροσώπους καὶ μύθους δθεν ἢ Κιρραία χώρα καθιερώθη συνθεὶς καὶ διεξελθῶν*), a proceeding which the quotation from Aristotle (*πεισθέντες γὰρ ὑπ' ἐκείνου πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἔβησαν οἱ Ἀμφικτύονες ὡς ἄλλοι τε μαρτυροῦσι καὶ*

to believe that, under all the circumstances, Alcmeon at this time, *i.e.* before 590 B.C., could not have been a young man.¹ The necessary qualifications for the office of general were age, experience, reputation, and these conditions must have been especially required in a candidate belonging to a family upon which the taint still rested. The bearing of this inference upon the main question under discussion will be more evident later on.

The wealth of Alcmeon and its source is a subject deserving examination, especially as the testimonies relating to it are somewhat confused. Herodotus (VI. 125) names Alcmeon as the friend of Croesus, — which is of course impossible, — and gives the well-known story of the origin of his wealth from the gifts of Croesus, and remarks that it was by reason of this wealth that he presented himself at Olympia with a four-horse chariot and won the race; he also adds that the house was further enriched in the next generation by Cleisthenes of Sicyon, into whose family Megacles, Alcmeon's son, had married. Evidently the same victor and the same victory in the four-horse chariot-race, adduced as an evidence of the wealth of the Alcmeonidae, are celebrated by Isocrates (xvi. 25); this victory is by him said to have been the first one of its kind won by an Athenian.² Pindar³ (*Pyth.* 7. 14) declares that one Olympic, five

¹ *Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῇ τῶν Πυθιακῶν ἀναγραφῇ* Σέλιον τὴν γράμην ἀπαθελίς ought to make us slow to do, we still have no reason to doubt the part taken in the war by Alcmeon.

² Aristot. (*Ῥητορ. Ἀθ.* c. 4) asserts that, under the Draconian constitution, which prevailed at the time when Alcmeon was chosen to office, it was required that the generals should be men with a property qualification of not less than one hundred minae, and should have children born in wedlock over ten years of age.

Phrynon, general before Sigeum, about B.C. 610, must have been, at the time of his *στρατηγία*, not less than forty-five years of age. He won an Olympic victory, Ol. 36 (B.C. 636): in the *παραστάσις*, according to Diog. Laert. I. 4. 74; in the *stadium* (apparently), according to Euseb. I. 199; he fell before Sigeum in a single combat with Pittacus. Probably Jul. Afric. wrote *Ἀρτυτάμας ἄδικον ἐτάδιον*. *Παραστῆσιον Φρύνονος Ἀθηναίου, ἢ Πιττακῆς πορομαχῶν ἀγροῦθι* (Rutgers, *Jul. Afr.* pp. 13, 14; for Artytamas, cf. Antigon. Carystius, *Hist. Mirak.* 121, in Westermann's *Paradulogographi*, p. 90).

³ The *πρῶτος τοῦ αἵματος ἡρώδης* . . . was established Ol. 25 (B.C. 680), and the first victor was the Theban Pagonidas (Paus. V. 8. 7).

⁴ Pind. *Pyth.* 7. 13 ff.: *ἔγνω δὲ με πρῶτον αἶμα Ἰσθμίου | οἴκου, μίαν δ' ἐκπρῶτον | ἀέτα Ὀλυμπιάδα | ἦτο δ' ἀπὸ Κίρρας*. The contradiction of this statement found in

Isthmian, and two Pythian victories were obtained by members of the family (before B.C. 490). The Scholiast on this passage, though he gives us an extraordinary wreck of details, yet preserves the good tradition (*ἀναγράφεται*), that this victory was won in Ol. 47 (B.C. 592).¹

It was traditionally believed, then, that at this early date — about 590 B.C. — the Alcmeonidae were a wealthy family, and the explanation for this wealth was found, perversely and impossibly enough, in a supposed connexion with Croesus. Croesus, however, belonged to the next generation, not ascending the throne before 560 B.C.,² though he may have had a share in the government with his father Alyattes

Arg. II. Ar. *Nub.* and in Schol. Ar. *Nub.* 64 (Tzet. *Chil.* I. 8 only follows this Schol.) is sufficiently met by Boeckh, *Pind.* II. 2, pp. 303, 304. The large number of Isthmian victories accredited to the family is doubtless to be explained by the proximity of Sicyon to the place of the games: Sicyon must have been to Megacles, the husband of Agariste, and to their immediate descendants, a second home. According to Krause's lists (*Pythien, Nem. u. Isth.* pp. 209–23), the cities that furnished much the larger number of Isthmian victors were Corinth, Aegina, and Sicyon; Athens is only slightly represented. This shows that there were exceptional reasons — probably due to local causes — why the Alcmeonidae were often at these games.

¹ Boeckh, *Pind.* II. 1, p. 391. In the Schol. the name of the victor is wrongly given as Megacles, a reading which Boeckh at first accepted, and accordingly identifying this Megacles with the Cylonian Megacles, he brought down the date of Cylon to suit (B.C. 599). In the commentary on the passage Boeckh withdraws this identification (II. 2, p. 304: "meam ad Scholia olim proditam opinionem removero"), and would emend the date to Ol. 57, — without, however, withdrawing the date for Cylon, — and refer the victory to Megacles, the contemporary of Peisistratus (Schol. Ar. *Nub.* 64). This latter victory, by the way, is, on the face of it, wrongly ascribed to Megacles; the Schol. has confused the name of Megacles with that of Cimon (Herod. VI. 35, 36; VI. 103), and ascribes to the former what belongs to the latter (cf. Krause, *Olympia*, p. 324). The confusion of names in the Schol. is not surprising; as the orators confuse the names of Miltiades and Cimon, as Herodotus, Aelian, and Paus. (VI. 19. 6) furnish similar instances, it is to be expected that a less familiar Alcmeon should be turned into a more familiar Megacles. Cf. Töpffer, *Att. Gen.* p. 280, note.

² Croesus's reign probably ceased 546 B.C.: he marched against Cyrus B.C. 548, Ol. 58. 1 (Euseb. I. 96), and was soon defeated, and Sardis was taken (cf. Sosicrates *ap. Diog. Laert.* II. 7. 95): cf. Clinton, *F. H.* II. *s. a.* 546 B.C.: the date of the fall of Sardis was an accepted and well-known epoch (Diels, *Rhein. Mus.* 31, p. 20). Croesus was thirty-five years of age at the death of his father (Herod. I. 26), and reigned fourteen years (Herod. I. 86); the date of his accession to the throne would then be about 560 B.C. For variant dates, see Busolt, *G. G.* I. pp. 332 ff.

for a while before this time. In the light of the statement in Herodotus (I. 19) that Alyattes, having fallen sick, consulted the oracle at Delphi, and of the subsequent statement (VI. 125) that the Lydian king — here, to be sure, named Croesus — in gratitude to Alcmeon for aid rendered his ambassadors invited him to Sardis and vastly enriched him, Schömann¹ makes the ingenious suggestion that Alyattes, not Croesus, was the actual source of the wealth of the Alcmeonidae. The confusion² of the son with his father was very natural, especially after Croesus had become the type of the wealthy monarch.³

¹ Schömann (*Jahrb. f. Philol.* III [1875], p. 466) gives two reasons for believing that Herodotus is wrong in here naming Croesus: Croesus did not ascend the throne until fully thirty years after Alcmeon's *στρατηγία*, and, secondly, he always stood in too good repute in Delphi to make it likely that his ambassadors needed the aid and special pleadings of others.

² Though there are several fictitious features in this story, it is more reasonable to believe that Herodotus has erred in his chronology than that there is no basis of fact whatever for friendly aid given the Alcmeonidae by a Lydian king.

³ Of course the story in Herodotus (I. 30-33), followed by Plutarch (*Sol.* 27 ff.), which brings Solon and Croesus together, is equally improbable. Plutarch admits the chronological difficulties, but naively waives them in the characteristic passage: τὴν πρὸς Κροῖσον ἐντευξιν αὐτοῦ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι τοῖς χρόνοις ὡς πεπλασμένην ἐλέγχειν. ἐγὼ δὲ λόγον ἔνδοξον οὕτω . . . καὶ, ὃ μείζον ἐστι, πρόποτα τῷ Σόλωνος εἶθι . . . ὅθ' μοι δοκῶ προφασισθαι χρονικοῖς τισι λεγομένοις καθάτι κ.τ.λ. (*Sol.* 27, *ad init.*). Niese, *Zur Gesch. Solons*, p. 10.

Five instances of error on the part of Herodotus in establishing synchronisms will strike every reader: viz. (1) Herod. I. 29, which brings Solon and Croesus together; (2) Herod. VI. 125, Alcmeon and Croesus; (3) Herod. II. 177, Solon and Amasis; (4) Herod. V. 127, Pheidon of Argos and Megacles, the suitor of Agariste; and (5) Herod. V. 94, 95, where the (original) conquest of Sigeum is ascribed to Peisistratus. Now we must suppose that Herodotus was well informed as regards the chronological position, measured by generations, in relation to himself, of prominent persons living as far back as the middle of the sixth century B.C., i.e. one hundred years before his own time (Croesus, Megacles, and perhaps Amasis). It is to be noted that, in all these instances of error, he has merely drawn down into the times known to him personalities belonging to a vaguer, earlier generation: Alcmeon was rich, — hence he must have been the friend of the wealthy Croesus. Solon was a sage, — hence he must have been the adviser of the ill-starred Croesus; also a law-giver, — hence he must have had some connexion with the prince of the land of wise and hoary institutions. Almost everything that Herodotus tells about the intercourse of these persons is of the most general character, like the anecdotes, of a painful family likeness, that are popularly told of all noteworthy personages. With, perhaps, the single excep-

However this may be, there must have been some ground for the tradition that made the Alcmeonidae gain their wealth over seas. I would offer a suggestion as to the source of the ancient wealth of the Alcmeonidae at the time, which, though not certain, seems to have a large degree of probability in it. It is that the Alcmeonidae were among the first foreign traders from Athens, at a time when foreign trade was, for Athens at least, in its inception; that the sure foundations of their activity as traders were laid in their exile, though this activity may have begun yet earlier; that this activity was kept up with such vigor and success after their return, that the head of the house in the generation next following Alcmeon — *i.e.* Megacles the younger — naturally became the leader and representative of the merchant or trading class in the Athenian state. The main argument on which this theory is based is the fact that Megacles was the leader of the Parali. This leadership could not have been due to the accident of local habitation, as Peisistratus's leadership of the Diacrii was perhaps due to the fact that his family home and stronghold was

tion of what is related of Solon's debt to Amasis, nothing in these instances has the stamp of a vivid, unique historical reality. The explicit, and apparently more historic, character of the statements in *IL 177*, to the effect that *Solon owed to Amasis* what was afterward called the *rhônos áppias*, gives them the air of greater credibility, and T. Case (*Class. Review*, 1888, p. 241) does well to call attention to them. On the other hand, however, the tradition as to the origin of this *rhônos áppias* is so variant in antiquity that we can by no means be certain that Herodotus's form of it is the correct one; thus (1) Lysias, *Contra Nicias* (*op. loc. cit.* *loc. cit.* I. 2. 55) asserts that Draco prepared the law, and Draco's connection with the law further appears from *Plat. Sol. 17*, *Plat. Lex. App. 7* (*ibid.*, Volume VIII. 42. (2) Theophrastus asserts that Peisistratus was the author of the law (*Plat. Sol. 31*), while (3) Herodotus (*IL 177*), ascribes it to Amasis. Now Peisistratus and Amasis were contemporaries; Amasis therefore might be supposed to have suggested the measure to Peisistratus, Amasis being the personal form for Egypt. Herodotus, however, makes Solon the promulgator of all good laws; hence it would have been to Solon that Amasis suggested it. It more probable explanation would have been personal connection between Solon and Amasis as the ruler of the country, in ancient times there was not a distance and a Egypt a law promulgating Amasis, Amasis was the friend of Egypt, and hence the friend of Amasis, Egypt was more ancient than Greece, hence Amasis gave laws to a Greek people. Solon visited Egypt; what more natural — as Peisistratus would say, it is a step to the right of Solon's law — that that the Egyptian legislation would have been the Egyptian law, and adopted from him the measure which prevailed in the leading

in the thickly populated Brauronian fastnesses in the upland country of Diacria¹; the ancient seat of the Alcmeonidae seems to have been, not on the shore, but well up in the Athenian plain, on the slopes of Parnes near Leipsydrium,² where many years later they bravely though unsuccessfully withstood the sons of Peisistratus. This leadership can be most intelligibly explained only on the supposition of

¹ Plut. *Sol.* 10; Schol. Ar. *Av.* 873; Schol. Ar. *Pac.* 874.

² Aristot. *Respub. Ath.* c. 19: 'Αλκμεωνίδαι . . . τειχίσαντες ἐν τῇ χώρῃ Λειψύδριον τὸ ὑπὲρ [ὑπὸ?] Πάρνηθος, εἰς δὲ συνήλθόν τινες τῶν ἐκ τοῦ ἄστεως. The text is probably corrupt, since the readings derived from the original text are various, viz. (1) ὑπὲρ Πάρνηθος, Hesych. s.v. Λειψύδριον. (2) τὸ ὑπὲρ Πάρνηθος, Suid. s.v. λυκόποδες. (3) περὶ τὴν Πάρνηθον, Schol. Ar. *Lys.* 666. (4) ὑπὸ τῆς Πάρνηθος, *Et. Mag.* p. 361. 32. (5) Herod. V. 62: Λειψύδριον τὸ ὑπὲρ Παιονίας τειχίσαντες. Aristotle is following Herodotus; perhaps in the original text of Herodotus stood the words ὑπὲρ Παιονίας ὑπὸ Πάρνηθος, which in the version that has reached us have been abbreviated into the incorrect ὑπὲρ Πάρνηθος. Paeonia — Paeonidae, not far from modern Menidhi — lay in the Attic πεδῖον, north of Athens (Mülchhöfer, *Text* to Curtius and Kaupert's *Attika*, II. 42); according to the explanation suggested above, Leipsydrium lay "beyond" it, on the southern slopes of Parnes. Aristotle, the Scholiasts, and the lexicographers make Leipsydrium a sort of earlier Phyle, whither the patriots of the sixth century fled and where they congregated. We may best explain the several statements by supposing that the Alcmeonidae fortified their ancient family home. The Alcmeonidae and the Paeonidae were cognate γένη, and must originally have dwelt near each other; Paeonia was the seat of the Paeonidae. Isocrates (xvi. 25) asserts that whenever the Peisistratidae conquered the Alcmeonidae, they levelled their houses to the ground and dug up their graves. Perhaps the scolion on Leipsydrium (see above, p. 43, note 1) refers in part to some such acts. Later members of the family of the Alcmeonidae, to be sure, come from Agryle (Leobates, Plut. *Them.* 23) and Alopece (*C.I.A.* I. 122; Aristot. *Respub. Ath.* c. 22), and from other demes of the πεδῖον, not, however, in the vicinity of Leipsydrium, but near Athens. These cases, however, belong to post-Cleisthenean times; the new demes by no means stood for the ancient homes of families of the demotae. The members of an ancient family might well be scattered over Attica.

One might hazard the conjecture that it was as promoters of trade between Euboea and Athens — the chief route of which passed their doors — or perhaps as exporters of corn from their fertile inland estates that the Alcmeonidae originally came into relation with the Shoremen, a relation that grew more intimate as new foreign connexions, formed when the family went into exile, extended the range of their commercial activity. Aristotle seems to suggest Delphi as the source of the wealth of the family (*Respub. Ath.* c. 19, ὅθεν εὐπρόσπον, κ.τ.λ.). But the passage, besides being corrupt, is a faulty condensation of Herod. VI. 62 *ad fin.* and 63 *ad init.*

an identity of business interests, an identity that had been the slow growth of years.¹

The beginnings of trade and industry in Attica² are hardly to be placed much earlier than the last third of the seventh century B.C. The primitive system of barter had prevailed hitherto. By the middle of the following century there was a vigorous trade with the west, in which Athens received grain in exchange for her pottery and for her silver. Solon's prohibition³ of the export of all agricultural products of Attica — this cannot include manufactured articles — except oil, the supply of which alone exceeded the demand for local consumption, shows that before his legislation there had been extensive trading and an exportation by enterprising merchants of articles needed for home use. The corn trade, to be sure, was largely in the hands of Megara, which, like Corinth and Aegina, much anticipated Athens in commercial enterprise; and when the war with Megara closed this source of supply, distress was prevalent. But Athens herself launched her ships upon the seas, and now sought gain in foreign lands.⁴ Indeed, it was probably with a view to securing something of the corn trade of the Black Sea that the Athenians were led, not long after Draco, to send an expedition, their first to cross the seas, so as to secure a foothold on the Hellespont in the Troad. Involved in a quarrel with Mytilene, which laid claim to the Troad as her own colonial territory (Aeolic), the Athenians succeeded, however, in maintaining their ground after the decisive capture of Sigeum.⁵ The establishment of the naucraries,⁶ which clearly had to do with the promotion of a navy, probably for the protection of the merchant marine, is unintelligible except upon

¹ The significance of the connexion of the family with the Parali reappears as late as the time of Pericles, whose son Paralus received his name probably in recognition of this relation, a name originally suggested, doubtless, by that of the Attic hero Paralus (Eur. *Suppl.* 659), himself, however, perhaps the mythical impersonation of the Parali. Cf. Stein, on Herod. I. 59. 16.

² On the whole subject, see Busolt, *G. G.* I. pp. 501 ff.; H. Droysen, *Athen u. d. Westen*, pp. 39-40. ³ Plut. *Sol.* 24.

⁴ Sol. *Frag.* 13. 43-46, cited in part above, p. 9, note 3.

⁵ Strabo XIII. 599. The date of the operations before Sigeum was not far from B.C. 610: see above, p. 9, and note 5. The Sigeian Inscription belongs to a date only a little later: Roberts, *Greek Epigr.* pp. 78, 334-6; Kirchhoff, *Studien zur Griech. Alphab.* p. 22 ff. For Phrynon, the general, see above, p. 50, note 1. ⁶ On the naucraries, see above, p. 31, note 1.

this supposition. We have good evidence that Solon himself engaged in trade, and the sagacity of his economical and financial reforms reveals a man practically acquainted with the intricacies and needs of business intercourse. The evident friendliness of Solon for the Alcmeonidae might possibly be explained on the supposition of a unity of interests with them in matters of trade.

The social distress in Attica which prevailed for a number of years before Solon's appearance upon the scene was due to a variety of causes. The long war with Megara not only had exhausted the resources of the people, but had forced the Athenians to get such imported corn as was needed as best they could, probably only at a great cost. The change from primitive traffic by barter to that of buying and selling with coined money would weigh very heavily upon the peasant, and even upon the landed proprietor who had no capital but his lands; increase and uncertainty in prices would naturally ensue, and a financial crisis would be precipitated. A third cause of discontent was found in the unjust manner with which the ruling families, in whose hands lay the judicial functions, executed judgment, favoring their friends and oppressing the helpless. The only persons who did not suffer in this order of things were the capitalists, who, in fact, thrive in it. In some cases the capitalists were landed proprietors, but many of them must have got their money by trade. A land-owner with money had the peasant at his mercy, and the result was not only that the country was dotted with slabs which served as records of mortgages, but that the holdings of land by single individuals vastly and unduly increased. Nay, more: so high was the rate of interest which it was possible to exact from starving debtors, that many of the unfortunates found it impossible to pay the principal and were thus sold into slavery, themselves or their children, in satisfaction for their debts.

Solon's reforms changed these conditions, and secured equity for every one. For our purposes it is unnecessary to dwell upon these reforms. It is enough to say that the *χρεῶν ἀποκοπή*, or absolute remission of debts, commonly known as the Seisachthy, and in fact the whole revolution, must have been highly objectionable to the capitalists,¹ who,

¹ In the words *ἄλλως δὲ διετέλουσιν ποσοῦντες τὰ πρὸς ἑαυτούς, οἱ μὲν ἀρχὴν καὶ πρόφασιν ἔχοντες τὴν τῶν χρεῶν ἀποκοπήν (συμβεβήκει γὰρ αὐτοῖς γεγεῖναι πένη-*

however, when once a financial and business settlement had been reached, preferred to allow it to remain rather than to risk losses by further revolution.¹

It is an interesting fact that of the post-Solonian parties,—the Parali, Pediaei, Diacrii,²—the Parali is the party of law-abiding citizens, which stands intermediate between the two extremes of oligarchic and democratic agitators, and seeks the perpetuation of the *status quo*.³ That the Parali were rich is apparent from the language of Plutarch,⁴ and their wealth would show that they were something more than fisher-folk. Everything supports the hypothesis that they were traders as well;⁵ and the wealth, foreign alliances and connexions of the Alcmeonidae, the champions and representatives of this party, can best be explained on the supposition that they, too, were engaged in trade in a large and liberal manner.

It would probably require no little amount of time for a number of persons of identical business interests to transform their mercantile union into a political combination; accordingly the party of the Parali must have been long in forming, and the wealth of the Alcmeonidae must have been well assured before Megacles assumed the leadership of the Parali.

The chronology of the early history of the house will gain further definiteness if we note a few matters in connexion with the life and

σιν), οἱ δὲ τῇ πολιτείᾳ δυσχεραίνοντες διὰ τὸ μεγάλην γεγόνεαι μεταβολήν, ἔβριιοι δὲ διὰ τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους φιλονικίαν (Aristot. *Respub. Ath.* c. 13), we probably have the capitalists, the ancient conservatives, and the rising anti-Alcmeonidean factions, reviving old family feuds.

¹ This may explain the readiness of the Parali (Megacles) to compromise.

² On the various forms of these names, see Landwehr, *Philol. Suppl.*-Bd. V. (1884), pp. 154 ff.

³ Plut. *Sol.* 13 (οἱ Πάραλοι μέσον τινὰ καὶ μεμιγμένον αἰρούμενοι πολιτείας τρόπον, κ.τ.λ.; cf. 29) is of course only a paraphrase of Aristot. *Respub. Ath.* c. 13 (μία μὲν τῶν Παραλίων, ὧν προειστήκει Μεγακλῆς ὁ Ἀλκμείωνος, οἵτερ ἐδόκουν μάλιστα διώκειν τὴν μέσην πολιτείαν), itself drawn freely from Herod. I. 59.

⁴ Plut. *Sol.* 29, of the party of Peisistratus, ἐν οἷς ἦν ὁ θητικὸς ὄχλος καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς πλουσίοις ἀχθόμενοις. Cf. also Polyænus, I. 21. 3: Μεγακλῆς ὑπὲρ τῶν πλουσίων τεταγμένος, κ.τ.λ.

⁵ In Aristot. *Respub. Ath.* c. 13 (εἶχον δ' ἕκαστοι τὰς ἐπωνυμίας ἀπὸ τῶν τόπων ἐν οἷς ἐγεώργουν), ἐγεώργουν is not to be pressed in its literal sense; still, the lands of the traders would doubtless be mainly near the shore.

fortunes of this Megacles : viz. the probable date of his marriage with Agariste, daughter of the Sicyonian Cleisthenes, and of two or three of the episodes of his struggle with Peisistratus.

The house of the Orthagoridae ruled, or, as Plutarch would put it, chastised,¹ the Sicyonians for one hundred years,² evidently a round number intended to include three generations. Myron, the son of the founder, won an Olympic victory in the four-horse chariot-race in Ol. 33 (B.C. 648),³ and his more illustrious grandson Cleisthenes won a Pythian victory in Ol. 49. 3 (B.C. 582).⁴ The same Cleisthenes was by tradition one of the important participants in the First Sacred War.⁵ As the length of his reign was about thirty years,⁶ we may suppose him to have ruled from about 595 B.C. to 565 B.C. At some date within this period yet to be established, he gave his daughter Agariste in marriage to the young and wealthy Megacles, son of the Alcmeon whose acquaintance he had doubtless made in the operations before Crisa. The tale of this wedding as given by Herodotus has many fictitious elements in it, but the marriage itself is an undoubted historical fact.⁷ One of the rejected suitors, the Philaid Hippocleides, was archon in 566 B.C. (Ol. 53. 3)⁸; the wedding can hardly have taken place much less than ten years before this date. If Megacles's daughter, who became the wife of Peisistratus⁹ about 550 B.C., was

¹ Plut. *De Sera Num. Vind.* 7 (*Mor.* 553 B). Cf. Herod. V. 67, "Ἀδρηστον μὲν εἶναι Σικωνίων βασιλέα, ἐκείνον δὲ λευστήρα (Pythia, of Cleisthenes).

² [Aristot.] *Pol.* VIII. (V.) 12. (9), 21, p. 1315^b 14. (pp. 587 ff. Susemihl). Cf. Busolt, *G. G.* I. p. 466, note 2.

³ Paus. VI. 19. 2.

⁴ Paus. X. 7. 6.

⁵ Paus. II. 9. 6; X. 37. 6.

⁶ Nicol. Damasc. 59 makes it thirty-one years.

⁷ Herod. VI. 126-131. Cf. Zühlke, *De Agaristes Nuptiis* (Königsb. 1880); Busolt, *G. G.* I. pp. 466, 554; Töpffer, *Att. Gen.* p. 279, and Petersen, *Hist. Gent. Attic.* pp. 21, 83.

⁸ Athen. XIV. 628 C, D. Hesych. and Suid. *s.v.* οὐ φροντίς. Archon, Ol. 53. 3: cf. Euseb. II. 94 (Syncell. p. 454. 8) with Marcell. *Thuc.* 3 (*i.e.* Pherecydes and Hellanicus, on the authority of Didymus), 'Ἱπποκλείδης ἐφ' οὗ ἄρχοντος Παναθήναια ἐτέθη. The family of Hippocleides was already connected with another ruling house, the Bacchiadae of Corinth. Stemmata are given by Petersen, *l.c.* p. 16, and Töpffer, *l.c.* p. 320.

⁹ Cf. Herod. I. 60 and Aristot. *Respub. Ath.* c. 14; the latter, while following Herodotus closely, at times verbatim, gives fuller information upon the chro-

a child of this union, which seems highly probable, we gain another *terminus ante quem* for the date of the wedding; viz. about B.C. 565. Herodotus also informs us that the wedding contests and the wedding took place in a year in which the Olympic games had been celebrated, where Cleisthenes had won a victory with the four-horse chariot. The dates that best satisfy all the conditions are B.C. 568, 572 or 576.¹

The struggles of Megacles with Peisistratus and their mutual compromises furnish one or two additional chronological data of significance. Peisistratus established himself as tyrant for the first time, after a picturesque conflict with Megacles in the popular assembly,² in the

nology. Although there is some uncertainty as to the dates of Peisistratus and the Peisistratidae (cf. Busolt, *G. G. I.* 551, 552, and notes; Meiners, *Diss. Hal.* II, pp. 263 ff.; and Kenyon, note on Aristot. *L.c.*, who discuss the subject fully), the following conclusions may safely be drawn. Peisistratus established himself as tyrant in the archonship of Comeas, B.C. 561 or 560 (Comeas, archon: Phantias, *ap. Plut. Sol.* 32, makes this date B.C. 560-59; Mar. Par. Ep. 40, either B.C. 561-60 or 560-59, but Euseb. II. 94, Arm. Vers., 561-60). He was twice afterward deposed. Herodotus says that he was first ejected, *μετὰ δὲ οὐ πολλὸν χρόνον . . . τυραννίδα . . . οὐκ ἄρτα ἐρριζωμένην*. Aristotle makes this period five years (*ἕκτεν ἔτει μετὰ τὴν πρώτην κατάστασιν, ἐφ' Ἡγησίου ἀρχοντος*), and then says *ἔτει δὲ δωδεκῆτεν μετὰ ταῦτα* a reconciliation was effected with Megacles, whose daughter Peisistratus takes in marriage. If we take *ταῦτα* as referring to B.C. 556 or 555, the subsequent dates of Peisistratus are thrown into hopeless confusion. If, however, we take *ταῦτα* (wrongly written for *τρίτην*?) as referring to the *πρώτην κατάστασιν* above (but see p. 68, note 3), everything becomes consistent, and we are not forced to infer, with Kenyon, that Aristotle has made a blunder. On this supposition, the compromise with Megacles, and the marriage of his daughter, would have taken place about B.C. 550-49. Very soon, however, Peisistratus breaks with Megacles, and from this time dates the period of irreconcilable hostility between the Alcmeonidae and the house of Peisistratus, by Isocrates described roundly as forty years in length (*τετταράκοντα δ' ἔτη τῆς στάσεως γενομένης*, Isocr. XVI. 25), *i.e.* from 550 B.C. to 510 B.C. (expulsion of Hippias).

¹ I am unable to see the bearing of Busolt's remark (*G. G. I.* p. 466), which is true enough, that Cleisthenes the Athenian was born after 575 B.C., nor why this should show that the wedding could not have taken place as early as 576 B.C. I know of no evidence that shows that Cleisthenes was the first-born child, born soon after the marriage. Undoubtedly he was born some considerable time after 575 B.C.: he would not seem to have been an old man when he carried through his reforms (about 508-7 B.C.).

² This episode is not given by Herodotus nor by Aristotle, but by Polyænus (I. 21. 3), very briefly, from an independent source.

archonship of Comeas (B.C. 561 or 560).¹ It was, then, before this date that the parties of the Parali, Diacrii, and Pediaei were in vigorous rivalry: these agitations succeeded by several years the two-year and two-month archonship of Damasias, which, according to Aristotle (*Respub. Ath.* c. 13), began at least ten years after the archonship of Solon; Damasias having been expelled from office, a compromise was adopted by which a board of ten archons was chosen, five from the *εἰπατρίδαι*, three from the *ἄποικοι* (*ἄγροικοί*), and two from the *δημιουργοί*. Less than a score of years before B.C. 561, then, the strife of classes had merged into that of local factions. Peisistratus does not, however, long remain in secure possession of his power; by a combination, according to Herodotus (I. 60), of the parties of Megacles and Lycurgus, he is driven out. Subsequently, however, — we are not in a position to establish the dates with accuracy, but probably about 550 B.C., — he compromises with Megacles, and receives his daughter in marriage as a token of cordial union. As Cylon had been son-in-law of a Megarian despot, so Peisistratus becomes the husband of the granddaughter of a Sicyonian ruler, though in all probability Cleisthenes was not living at this time. Aristotle (*Respub. Ath.* c. 17) points out that Peisistratus had secured foreign allies by his marriage with the Argive Timonassa; by this alliance he may have hoped to win not alone the support of the powerful Megacles, but also the favor of the foreign Sicyonians.

Of the subsequent falling-out of Megacles and Peisistratus, and of the later uncompromising struggles between the family of Megacles and that of Peisistratus, of the services of the Alcmeonidae to art and religion in rebuilding the Delphian temple, and to political progress in the achievements of Cleisthenes, this is not the place to speak.

It remains to gather up the chronological data obtained in this examination of the evidence, and to draw the necessary inferences: —

Megacles II., married in 568 B.C., or before, at the head of a powerful political party as early as 565 B.C., was born not later than 595 B.C., and probably as early as 605 B.C. His father, Alcmeon, general in the Sacred War, was well on in years in 595 B.C., hardly less than forty or forty-five years of age. This would carry back the

¹ Cf. p. 58, note 9, above.

date, at which Alcmeon's father (Megacles I.) was in the prime of his powers and eligible for election to the archonship, to some point of time before Draco, much nearer to 640 B.C. than to 610 B.C.¹

VII.

THEAGENES OF MEGARA.

THE age of Cylon, that of Alcmeon, and that of Megacles have thus furnished us some data for determining the time of Cylon's attempted usurpation. If we had it in our power, in a way equally independent, to establish the date of Theagenes, tyrant of Megara and father-in-law of Cylon, this fact would furnish additional considerations of much weight. Unfortunately the evidence on this point is both meagre and inadequate. Hitherto Theagenes has gained his date from Cylon, not Cylon from Theagenes, and there seems to be no direct evidence, except that which connects these two men, as to the date of the Megarian tyrant. Is there, however, nothing in the historical conditions, economic and political, of Megara that makes it most probable that Theagenes was in power as early as 640 B.C.?

In the industrial and commercial development of the states on and near the Saronic gulf, in the course of the seventh century B.C., a far greater activity prevailed at Epidaurus, Aegina, Corinth, Sicyon, and Megara than at Athens. Athens—and this is the political name of the people inhabiting the geographical district known as Attica²—was, as we have noted, actively engaged during this time in bringing into relation with herself the newly acquired state and district of Eleusis; she was rent by the opposing factions of great

¹ An argument, like the above, when it stands alone, has no convincing force; it suggests merely one of several possibilities, and it is only when all other seeming possibilities which are contradictory or inconsistent have been eliminated that one's possibility becomes a certainty. When, however, an argument of this sort reaches conclusions sustained by other and wholly independent courses of reasoning, the possibility that it urges becomes a probability, and the argument thus has value and weight.

² Hom. γ 278 ἄκρον Ἀθηνῶν (of Sunium); Thuc. II. 93, and *passim*. "Seit Kleisthenes ist ἡ πόλις ἢ Ἀθηναίων ein ideeller begriff, gleich ὁ δῆμος ὁ Ἀθηναίων, und der bedeutungswechsel zwischen stadt und staat," Wilamowitz, *Phil. Unters.* I. p. 111.

families ; the people were slowly increasing in numbers, and domestic industries — the manufacture of pottery and the culture of the olive for its oil—were beginning to flourish. Thus engaged, and endowed with a land in which agriculture was on the whole a remunerative occupation, the Athenians, as a people, did not have occasion to concern themselves in the far-reaching commercial movements whereby, throughout this century and also through the last fifty years of the preceding century, the Greek name and civilization were spread over the shores of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. In this activity Athens was far behind her sister states, and it was not until about the time of Solon that many of her citizens became interested in commercial enterprises.

With Corinth and Sicyon, and with Megara in particular, the case had been different. The latter state, as early as the first half of the seventh century, had sent powerful colonies to the Thracian Bosphorus and had there founded the great cities of Chalcedon and Byzantium ; still earlier she had sent colonies to Sicily.¹ Now, such movements imply, at least in this period of Greek colonization, great inward agitation ; commercial activity is often the occasion as well as the result of domestic upheavals. The acquisition of wealth by industry and by trade — and the two necessarily go hand in hand — introduces into the social organism a new aristocracy, which ranges itself in opposition to the ancient aristocracy of birth, the wealth of which mainly lies in lands. The lines that separate classes thus grow fainter ; the masses of the common people, finding a source of abundant livelihood in the social occupations of industry and trade, as against the lonelier occupation of agriculture, become conscious of their common interests and common relations, and from union in occupation easily acquire and gradually develop a sense of union in political concerns.

It thus happened, as an historical fact, that in this period of activity in colonization, the states that were most prominent were precisely the states that underwent the most radical political revolutions. The ancient conservative aristocracy, that in the eighth century B.C. had gradually and apparently without revolution taken the place of the rule of kings, now underwent rapid and signal

¹ Chalcedon in 675 B.C., and Byzantium in 659 B.C. See Busolt, *G. G. I.* pp. 326, 327, for the authorities.

transformation ; the new aristocracy of wealth — and wealth, according to Aristotle, is the essential feature of oligarchy¹ — supplanted the older aristocracy of family. The people meantime became restive, and were ripe for a change. The political agitations that ensue sprung in part from the consciousness in the people of increased power, with a growing discontent at the existing state of affairs and a resentment at the oppression to which in the unequal contests of the times they were subject, and in part from the factional quarrels of the ruling oligarchic aristocrats, the families of which were no longer held by ancient ties. These agitations commonly issue in one of two political conditions. In the conflict between people and aristocrats, the aristocrats yield in part, and by way of compromise *αισυμνηται*² are chosen as arbiters, whose main duty it is to make record of the ancient law which in the troublous times was wrested by its administrators — the aristocratic rulers and judges — to the hurt of the people. Another and perhaps more frequent result is that some member of the leading families in power takes up the cause of the people, and sustained by the people rebels against the sway of his fellow-oligarchs, and thereby establishes himself as sole ruler or tyrant. The period of the rule of the oligarchs, before it received modification by the activity of the aesymentae or was supplanted by that of tyrants, was usually a brief period — at least in commercial states. The history of Corinth and of Sicyon in particular illustrate these propositions, and from the *Politics* of Aristotle one may gather additional examples.

What bearing have these considerations upon the date of Theagenes? As the period of Corinth's greatest colonial activity was coincident with that of the rule of the Cypselidae ; as at Sicyon the Orthagoridae held sway throughout all this period of commercial and industrial activity, it is natural to suppose that similar changes and states were found under precisely similar conditions at Megara, — in other words, we must infer that the tyranny of Theagenes, and its successful establishment, are to be placed nearer 650 B.C. than 621 B.C.

¹ Aristot. *Pol.* VI. (IV.) 4, 7, p. 1290^b 1; *ib.* VI. (IV.) 8, 4, p. 1294^a 11; *Rhet.* I. 8, 5, p. 1366^a 5.

² Aristot. *Pol.* III. 14. (9), 5, p. 1285^a 31; *ib.* VI. (IV.) 10, 2, p. 1295^a 14. Busolt, *G. G.* I. pp. 438, 439.

At Sicyon certainly some time before 650 B.C. the Orthagoridae are well established; for it was in 648 B.C. that Myron, son of the ruling tyrant, won an Olympic victory,¹—a victory which may have spurred the ambition of the youthful Cylon. At Corinth before 650 B.C.² Cypselus was in the full possession of power; and a date certainly not more than ten years later must be ascribed to Procles,³ the cruel despot of Epidaurus. As early as 640 B.C., then, Theagenes would have had at any rate precedents enough for making himself master of Megara.

Certain features in the subsequent history of Megara are somewhat more intelligible if we ascribe to Theagenes an early date rather than a late one. At a date considerably preceding the archonship of Solon, Megara had begun her efforts to subjugate Athens. The first step, an insidious one, may have been Cylon's attempt, at a time when Athens and Megara would seem to have been on good terms; this was followed, as a second step, by a long war for the possession of Salamis; Megara in this war was successful, gained the island and colonized it, — only at a considerably later period being obliged to give it up. Commercial rivalry is not, at this time, a sufficient ground to explain this contest over Salamis, at least in its earlier stages,

¹ After his victory he erected at Olympia the treasury of the Sicyonians (Paus. VI. 19. 1, 2), in which were two *θάλαμοι*. The recent excavations at Olympia have discovered the *θησαυρὸς Σικυονίων*, not, however, in its original form; the inscriptions (Roehl, *J.G.A.* pp. 171, 172, No. 27 *b, c*) are not earlier than the end of the sixth century B.C. Cf. Bötticher, *Olympia*, pp. 215 ff.; Busolt, *G. G. I.* p. 467, 468, note 3.

² According to Ephorus and Apollodorus (inferred from Diod. Sic. VII. *Frag.* 9), Cypselus began his reign 657 B.C. Busolt, *G. G. I.* pp. 333, 447.

³ Procles married, for political reasons, the daughter of Aristocrates of Orchomenus, who was slain about 640 B.C., of course before her father's death; their daughter Lyside became the wife of Periander of Corinth, and was thereafter named Melissa. Periander came into power about B.C. 625: he was tyrant for forty years. As the sons and daughters of his union with Melissa were grown up, and also, on the other hand, as Melissa died in pregnancy at the time when Periander fell out with his aged father-in-law and subjugated Epidaurus to Corinth, we cannot place the conquest of Epidaurus much before or much after B.C. 600 (Periander was nearly seventy in 600 B.C., since he died in 585, eighty years of age: Diog. Laert. I. 7. 95, 98, but see Diels, *Rhein. Mus.* 31 [1876], pp. 19, 20). Procles, then, would seem to have made himself tyrant of Epidaurus before 640 B.C. Cf. Duncker, *Gesch. d. Alterthums*, VI.⁵ pp. 51, 52.

Athens as yet not having distinctly become a commercial state. The high-handed proceedings of the Megarians are such, one may venture to believe, as would be undertaken by a state ruled by an ambitious man, and not by a people engaged in trade and rapidly growing rich, enjoying a peaceful aristocratic regime. In the later stages of this long struggle with Megara, initiated on personal grounds, the sense of commercial rivalry added a spur to the intensity with which the contest was carried on. As we have already remarked, the attempt of Athens to gain a foothold in the Hellespont was in part intended as a menace to Megara. It was also doubtless a feeling of rivalry with Megara as a formidable competitor that brought Athens and Corinth into close commercial union at this early date.¹ If the attempt of Cylon had proved successful, Athens would have become a subject state of Dorian Megara, and the subsequent history of Hellenic civilization would have been vastly different from what it actually became. Athens, however, was not now ripe for a tyrant; the people had not yet gained that consciousness of their own power, combined with a feeling of helplessness before their masters, that would lead them to range themselves against their ancient rulers on the side of a young, half-foreign adventurer.

Finally, the condition of things at Megara in the middle of the sixth century B.C., *i.e.* at the time of Theognis, who reflects it in his elegiacs, would presuppose a long period of social disintegration and disorder. Theagenes seems to have raised himself into power by championing the interests of the poor country folk as against certain wealthy landed proprietors. Aristotle² informs us that on behalf of the humbler folk he slew the herds of the rich that were grazing in the river-meadows, which were naturally the property of the poor but had been appropriated by the rich. There is, however, no evidence that Theagenes's power rested upon a general uprising of all the lower classes against the ruling aristocracy. His rule was beneficent, and to him were ascribed, doubtless correctly, certain great public works that

¹ The adoption, at this early period, by the Athenians, of the Euboeic standard, bound Athens more closely to Corinth-Chalcis, and aided in bringing about mercantile emancipation from Aegina and Megara. Cf. Busolt, *G. G. I.* pp. 460, 461, and *Griech. Staatsalt.* (I. Müller, *Handb.* IV.) p. 114.

² *Aristot. Pol.* VIII. (V.) 4 (5), 5, p. 1305^a 24; cf. also *Rhet.* I. 2. 7, 1357^b 33.

were the pride of Megara.¹ Of the length of his reign we have no information; it was followed by a mild regime in which power was exercised by the aristocrats,² and then came little by little the dreadful social disorganization and demoralization that saddens the verses of Megara's patriot-poet. To Theognis³ the most painful feature of the new order of things is that it is the base-born rich that have supreme influence and power, and that society is turned completely upside down. It may safely be asserted that so many changes in the political system, and so complete a revolution in the very social order, could hardly have been wrought within the compass of a few decades.

VIII.

THE DATE OF EPIMENIDES.

THE only objections that can be offered to an early date for Cylon, not already incidentally considered, are based upon the alleged connexion of the Cretan Epimenides with the ceremonies that attended the purification of Athens from a pestilence visited upon the city, presumably because of the Cylonian sacrilege. According to certain late writers (among them probably Hermippus, apparently quoted by Plutarch in *Sol.* 12), the city was disturbed by superstitious fears and strange appearances; the priests declared that the sacrifices intimated some villanies and pollutions not yet expiated. Hereupon Epimenides was sent for; he not only purified the city by various lustrations, but by his new ordinances humanized the people and rendered service to religion and justice, thereby preparing the way for Solon.⁴ Now the date of the visit of Epimenides to Athens is by some authorities — whom many classical historians follow — given as Ol. 46 (596–2 B.C.).⁵ Hence, it has been inferred, the Cylonian attempt

¹ Paus. I. 40. 1 and 41. 2, of a fountain in Megara, with its extensive aqueduct.

² Plut. *Quaest. Graec.* 18 (*Mor.* 265 D).

³ Theognis, 53–60, 289–93, etc. Theognis Ol. 59. 4: Euseb. II. 98.

⁴ Further details about Epimenides's work are given in Diog. Laert. I. 10. 110–112. Plutarch ascribes to Epimenides well-known Solonian ordinances (e.g. the sumptuary regulations as to funerals, etc.). Cf. Niese (*Zur Gesch. Solons*, p. 13), who demonstrates the fabulous character of much that is ascribed to Epimenides.

⁵ Diog. Laert. I. 10. 110 (Ol. 46); Euseb. (Jerome), II. 93 (Abrah. year 1422 = B.C. 595, Ol. 46. 2). See Busolt, *G. G. I.* p. 509, for the literature before

must have preceded this date by only a short time, and should be placed at the nearest convenient Olympic year.

Now, as will soon be shown, this whole story of the connexion of Epimenides with the affair of Cylon may be a fiction, and yet, even if the substantial truth of it be granted, the inference by no means follows that Cylon's attempted usurpation took place only a short time before the visit of Epimenides to Athens. Plutarch (*Sol.* 12) expressly asserts that the affair had for a long time been disturbing the state before remedial measures were resorted to, and his ἐκ πολλοῦ in its connexion is much more likely to connote forty years than four. Again, even those ancient writers who maintained that Epimenides visited Athens in Ol. 46 were not unanimous in asserting that the cause of this visit, according to Epimenides himself,¹ was the Κυλώνειον ἄγος.² Plutarch's language also is inconsistent with itself: all

1885. Little weight is to be attached to this date, Ol. 46; it is evidently not based on ἀναγραφὰι, but is due to the conjectural combinations of the later chronographers. See p. 68, notes 2 and 3, below.

¹ One well-known apparent point of contact between the Κυλώνειον ἄγος and Epimenides is that referred to in Cicero *De Legg.* 2. 11. 28, and Clem. Alex. *Ad Gent.* II. 26. It appears that near the precinct of the σεμναὶ θεαί, i.e. between the western slope of the Acropolis and the Areopagus, but nearer the latter, was the Κυλώνειον, presumably the spot where the sacrilege was committed (Polemon *ap. Schol. Soph. O. C.* 489, Codd. Κυδώνιον). Probably here also were the two ancient stones, known as the stones of Violence and of Pitilessness, whereupon, before the court of the Areopagus, accused and accuser used respectively to stand (Paus. I. 28. 5, "Ἐβρεως καὶ Ἀναιδείας λίθους). In the later tradition these stones appear to be turned into altars: so Theophrastus (Θεόφραστος ἐν τῷ περὶ νόμων "Ἐβρεως καὶ Ἀναιδείας παρὰ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις εἶναι βωμοὺς, Zenob. 4. 36). Ister, however, writing after Theophrastus, and possibly quoting him by name, makes Ἀναίδεια have a temple (ἱερόν) at Athens (Suid. s.v. Θεός ἢ Ἀναίδεια). It is probable that Ister, if not Theophrastus whom Cicero may have known at first hand (*De Off.* 2. 18), is the authority for *De Legg.* 2. 11. 28: "nam illud vitiosum Athenis, quod Cylonis scelere expiato Epimenide Crete suadente fecerunt Contumelie fa n um et Impudentie [better, Implacabilitatis]." The earlier form of statement (βωμοὺς) reappears in Clem. Alex. *l.c.* It is highly probable that the part ascribed to Epimenides in this matter is merely an attempt to bring into connexion the Κυλώνειον and the two stones, the story arising only when the ancient use of the stones had been long forgotten. These stones may originally have been merely venerable fetishes.

² Diog. Laert. I. 10. 110: οἱ δὲ τὴν αἰτίαν εἰπεῖν [sc. Ἐπιμενίδην] τοῦ λοιμοῦ τὸ Κυλώνειον ἄγος.

the commotion and disorder ceased with the departure of the Alcmeonidae, and yet afterward came Epimenides and allayed the disorders.¹

Both of the arguments given above presuppose that the date of Epimenides's visit is correctly given in the tradition cited. Aristotle gives yet another tradition, which is possibly also at the bottom of some of Suidas's chronological data;² according to this the visit of Epimenides must have taken place a dozen or a score of years before Ol. 46.³ Good reasons, however, have been offered of late

¹ Plut. *Sol.* 13. Cf. Niese, *Zur Gesch. Solons*, p. 13, note 3. Thuc. (I. 126) appears to believe that the banishment of the Alcmeonidae was deemed a sufficient atonement for the *étyos*.

² Suidas, *s.v.* 'Επιμενίδης, gives a farrago of information, in which, however, lurk some interesting points. We are told that Epimenides was born Ol. 30 (*i.e.*, 660-56 B.C.) and that he purified Athens of the Cylonian taint Ol. 44 ($\mu\delta'$ = 604-00). Now the ancient chronographers, in dealing with periods and persons not attested by recorded documents (*ἀναγραφαί*, etc.) followed two principles, that of *ἀκμῆ* and that of synchronism (Diels, *Rhein. Mus.* 31 [1876], pp. 12-15). The *ἀκμῆ* fell forty years after birth: the memorable deed of the persons whose dates were investigated marked the *ἀκμῆ*. Thus, in many such cases the birth-year given is exactly forty years before the characteristic, and in some cases datable, deed. With Epimenides we must take the reverse step: his birth is given B.C. 660-56; hence his great deed — doubtless the purification of Athens — fell about B.C. 620-16. But as the synchronistic principle was also at work with the chronographers, this date — according to our view, a correct one, if Epimenides had any share whatever in the Cylonian business — is tampered with. Solon and Epimenides must be brought together; in reconciling the two traditions, Suidas's source, as it were, strikes the balance between 620 and 594, and fixes upon 604 as the date of Epimenides's visit.

³ Aristotle (*Respub. Ath.* c. 1) distinctly connects Epimenides with the affair of Cylon, but it would be doing violence to the obvious sense of his language to suppose that the visit of Epimenides was as late as Solon's archonship: between the mention of Epimenides and that of Solon the narrative describes the Draconian constitution, the ancient pre-Draconian state, and the political and economic agitations that preceded Solon's appearance upon the scene. — We must not, however, press *μετὰ ταῦτα*, and infer that Epimenides's visit preceded Draco (c. 1, *ad init.*); these words — in accordance with a usage of which other examples may be noted at cc. 14 (see above, p. 58, note 9), 19 *ad init.*, 22 (p. 58, line 2, Kenyon), 26 (p. 74, l. 2), 28 (p. 78, l. 7), 38 *ad init.* (?) — seem to refer, over the intervening clause about Epimenides, to the important statement preceding, in this passage, the Cylonian affair. Thus, while Cylon must have preceded Draco, it does not necessarily hold true that Epimenides's purification did. At

for believing that the story of the visit of Epimenides to Athens at this time, if not the actual existence of the Cretan sage, is pure fiction.

The earlier sources (Herodotus and Thucydides) have nothing whatever to say of Epimenides, either directly or by implication. The first appearance of the name of the Cretan in Greek literature is in Plato's *Laws* (I. 642 D), where it is said that he visited Athens ten years before the beginning of the Persian wars to carry out certain sacrifices ordered by the Delphic god; he also prophesied that the Persian wars would not take place for ten years. According to the tradition in Diogenes Laertius (I. 10. 110), Epimenides visited Athens in part to bring an end to a pestilence. Now an inscription said to belong to about 500 B.C. has come to light which shows that a pestilence prevailed in Athens about this time.¹ Combining all these data, Lösckcke² has drawn the inference that Epimenides was an historical personage who actually visited Athens and rendered her signal service a few years before the beginning of the Persian wars. This ingenious hypothesis has been widely adopted, and Busolt³ has suggested how the story might have become applied to the events of the former century: the pestilence of 500 B.C. might have been explained by the enemies of Cleisthenes as due to the *Κυλώνειον ἄγος*. Diels,⁴ however, on the strength of Aristotle's language, reverses

the same time, it is highly improbable that Epimenides visited Athens very long after Draco.

It appears, then, that one tradition, which Aristotle follows, connected Epimenides with the purification of Athens for the Cylonian sacrilege not very many years after the crime. Another tradition brought Epimenides into relation with Solon. Solon's chief activity was in Ol. 46; hence the later chronographers, to give expression to this synchronism, assign the visit of Epimenides to Ol. 46. Yet another, evidently late, form of the legend combines the two traditions, and makes both Solon and Epimenides active in the measures adopted for the deliverance of the state from the Cylonian crime, the former in the trial, the two in co-operation in the ritual purifications (Plut. *Sol.* 12).

¹ *C.I.A.* I. 475: [λοι]μῆ θανάσεως εἰμι [σῆ]μα Μυρ(ρ)νης. This inscription seems, however, to belong to a much earlier date, being, perhaps, as old as the psephism (*C.I.A.* IV. 1 a) relating to the cleruchs on Salamis, the oldest Attic decree extant (perhaps 570-60 B.C.). Roberts, *Greek Epigr.* p. 84.

² Lösckcke, *Die Enneakronosepisode bei Pausanias*, pp. 24 ff.

³ Busolt, *G. G. I.* p. 510.

⁴ Diels, *Ueber Epimenides von Kreta (Sitzungsab. d. Berl. Akad.* 1891, pp. 387-403).

Löschcke's proposition: the historic, actual Epimenides visited Athens not very long before Solon, to purify the city of the results of the Cylonian sacrilege, and, as the religious reformer of Athens, became associated, in the later legends, with Solon, her great political reformer. Later on, however, when the renewal of the Alcmeonidean *dyos* in Cleisthenes's time had revived the memory of the ancient seer, the name of Epimenides was attached to several Orphic forgeries and spurious oracles produced under and after the Peisistratidae, and this connexion gave rise to the tradition of his activity at Athens ten years before the Persian wars, which reappears in Plato: it also explains the story of his extraordinarily long life.

Whichever of these views¹ we may accept, — and that of Diels is extremely attractive, especially if we modify it to the extent of placing Epimenides's visit to Athens at about 615 B.C., — it is undeniably true that there are altogether too many mythical features about the stories of the Cretan sage — his preternaturally long life, his sleep of many years, his prophecies to the Athenians of the Persian wars and of the disasters connected with Munichia, to the Spartans of their defeat at Orchomenus, his alleged oracles,² etc., etc., — too many contradictory stories about his work and date,³ to make it necessary for us to give much, if any, weight to considerations based upon the time of his supposed visit to Athens.⁴

¹ Löschcke's hypothesis has recently been examined by Töpffer (*Att. Geneal.*, 1889, pp. 141–5), who gives reasons for maintaining, with Niese, that the figure of the Cretan Epimenides belongs wholly to the domain of myth.

² Diog. Laert. I. 10. 109–115; Plut. *Sol.* 12; Paus. II. 21. 3. For some of these stories Theopompus may have been the source. Is not the reference to Munichia (*ἰδόντα γούν τῆν Μουνυχίαν κατ' Ἀθηναίους ἀγροεῖν φάσαι αὐτοὺς δεῦρ κακῶν αἰτίων ἔσται τοῦτο τὸ χροῖον αὐτοῖς*, Diog. Laert. *l.c.* 114) now made more intelligible by the statement, in Aristot. *Respub. Ath.* c. 19, of the circumstance not elsewhere mentioned, that Hippias endeavored to fortify Munichia, and that while thus engaged he was thwarted by the Spartan Cleomenes, this being the first, but by no means the last, instance of Spartan interference with Athens?

³ As Diels suggests, speaking of Aristotle's mention of Epimenides, "die chronologisch unbestimmte Art, wie sein [Epimenides] Auftreten an die Process gegen die Alcmeoniden angeknüpft wird, zeigt dass ihm kein genaueres Datum zuverlässig überliefert war" (*l.c.* p. 392).

⁴ Two additional objections that might be urged are only apparent. (1) Boeckh's assertion (*Pind.* II. 2, p. 304) that the Cylonian Megacles was archon in B.C. 599, because winner at Olympia Ol. 47 is based upon an assumption

IX.

RESULTS.

IF the conclusion be correct to which all these considerations bring us, — viz. that Cylon sought to make himself tyrant of Athens not later than 624 B.C. and perhaps as early as 636 B.C., — and if the various positions that we have taken in the course of our enquiry be well taken, it becomes important and interesting, finally, to note the place that the episode of Cylon will thus hold in the social and political changes of Athens in the last half of the seventh century B.C. and in the first half of the sixth century B.C. The case must have been somewhat as follows :

In the family rivalries for pre-eminence in the conduct of the Athenian state that prevailed about 640 B.C. and onward, the ancient and aristocratic family of Cylon forms a powerful alliance with a foreign prince who had designs on Athens.¹ Cylon, youthful and ambitious, misinterpreting the signs of the times, failing to see that the social conditions of his native city were not ripe for his enterprise, as those of Megara had been for that of his father-in-law, with the help of foreign troops² and of hairbrained comrades seizes the acropolis in his attempt to make himself ruler of Athens. The people, still in the main true to the ancient regime,³ though pregnant with the spirit of revolution,

which he himself gives up (see above, p. 51, note 1). (2) The presence in current chronological hand-books of the name of Megacles as archon opposite the years B.C. 612, 599, or elsewhere. There is no evidence for the date of Megacles as archon except that based upon his connexion with the affair of Cylon, given above; in other words, it is the date that we adopt for Cylon that fixes the date for Megacles, not the reverse.

¹ Schömann suggests that the naucraries, then newly established, aroused the suspicions of Megara (*Jahrb. f. Philol.* 111 [1875], p. 455).

² As Sparta aided Hippias, more than a hundred years later (Herod. V. 91), and the Thirty, more than two hundred years later (Xen. *Hellen.* II. 3; Aristot. *Respub. Ath. c. 34, ad fin.*).

³ May not the several stages of differentiation in the social body at Athens be briefly summed up as follows? (1) The ancient regime, the whole people living in contentment with members of the old leading γένη as their rulers. (2) A gradual differentiation of the residents of the city from those of the country: ἀστυοί (including the rulers, for whom, though in some few cases actually resident in the country, the city was the political centre) as against ἄστυοι. (3) Sharp demarcation

hasten to subdue the adventurous youth; they are aided, perhaps led, by the family of the Alcmeonidae, now happily represented on the board of chief magistrates, who find a peculiar satisfaction in humiliating the formidable family of Cylon. The insurrection is wholly suppressed, the people having taken a prominent part in the movement. This activity on the part of the people, which like an electric shock has united them in a deepened consciousness of common danger and of common interests, leads them as a next step, — also in view of the stress of certain economic conditions, which only by Solon's day became absolutely unendurable, — to demand concessions from the ruling classes, at least to the extent that the laws should be recorded; for hitherto the laws have been written only in part and subject in their interpretation to the whims of rulers which are selected by members of the old families from their own numbers and unite in themselves executive and judicial functions. The concession is granted. In B.C. 624–0 Draco conducts the commission for the codification of the laws. As he appears to have been a duly elected magistrate, though probably not the chief archon, at least at the beginning, it was unnecessary to appoint him a special officer (aesymnete), as was commonly done elsewhere in similar cases. Draco yields to the popular demand, and proposes a new constitution, which, with all its novel and democratic features, has still somewhat of an aristocratic, if not plutocratic, stamp. For a time things go smoothly at home, though the little state has become

between ruling γένη (εὐπατρίδαι?), artisan class — mainly in the city, — and peasant folk (εὐπατρίδαι, δημουργοί, ἄποικοι [ἄγροικοὶ ἢ γεωμόροι]). From the permanent nature of such a differentiation when once commercial and other conditions had brought it about, whereby it long remained a social if not a political division, later generations would ascribe to it great antiquity. Thus Plut. *Thes.* 25, apparently quoting Aristotle, makes Theseus the founder of these class distinctions. (4) Local factions (Parali, Pediaei, Diacrii), in which the old lines of social demarcation were largely, though by no means wholly, obliterated, and were crossed by new ones arising in part from local, in part from family, and in part from class, interests. (5) Finally, as society becomes more and more united, as its various members come into closer contact geographically, economically, politically, it gradually falls asunder into its two grand divisions of the Few and the Many, the Well-to-do and the Populace. This principle of division is, of course, at work in the earliest stages, and lies at the bottom of them all, but it now becomes practically the only principle at work.

embroiled in a war with Megara for the possession of Salamis, which began doubtless immediately after Cylon's attempt and was but one step in the efforts of Theagenes to gain control of Athens; this war continues long, and its bitterness is intensified by the growing feeling of commercial rivalry between the two states. Athens, finally, unsuccessful nearer home, attempts by her new fleet and with new commercial enterprise to check the foreign power of her nearest foe by establishing herself on the Hellespont; Salamis, however, she is at last obliged to forego, and recovers the island only much later.¹ In all these anti-Megarian movements it is not surprising that the Cylonian party should continue to be in the background, but in time something of a reaction sets in: the family and friends of the surviving but exiled members of Cylon's party, still powerful at home, bestir themselves. They rally to their side all the factions that are hostile to or jealous of the Alcmeonidae, who thus early have figured, though by no means wholly disinterestedly, as champions of the humbler classes. The Alcmeonidae and their supporters are not as yet strong enough to meet this reactionary movement; in the conflict that ensues, the Alcmeonidae are sacrificed, and after a formal trial voluntarily go into exile. In exile they form powerful connexions both at home and abroad with Athenian traders and with foreign princes, and perhaps at Delphi with the far-seeing priesthood; they engage in trade, laying

¹ Plutarch (*Sol.* 8-10, and 12) speaks of two losses of Salamis: one, when the island, with Nisaca the seaport of Megara, was surrendered to Megara, presumably long after the Cylonian affair, and afterward recovered by Solon (*αὐτὸς κῆρυξ ἦλθον, κ.τ.λ.*); the other, just after the Cylonian affair. Herodotus (*I.* 59) makes Peisistratus prominent in the reconquest of Nisaea, and Aristotle (*Respub. Ath.* c. 14) follows him. Aristotle, however, denies (*Respub. Ath.* c. 17) that Peisistratus could have been general (*στρατηγείν*) in the Megarian war, — probably because he was not old enough to hold that office; Aristotle does not here necessarily refer to a pre-Solonian struggle, as Ad. Bauer (*l.c.*, p. 57, note) asserts. It seems probable, therefore, in view of these statements and of other serious chronological difficulties, that only one war for the recovery of Salamis took place, and this after Solon's legislation; in this the youthful Peisistratus won distinction. (See also Niese, *Zur Gesch. Solons*, pp. 21-24.) The ancient psephism referred to above (p. 69, note 1), touching Athenian cleruchs on Salamis (not later than 570-60 B.C.), would presuppose a conquest of the island, if not immediately, only a short time, before its enactment, when certain abuses that had lately arisen called for immediate correction.

thus the foundations of their great wealth. The trial and banishment may have taken place as early as 615 B.C., and perhaps the Hellepontine operations of Athens are undertaken at the instance of the alert exiles, who see in them not only a measure of great advantage to Athenian commerce, but also a party-stroke that will serve them a good turn at home against the friends of Cylonian faction. Life at Athens is not stagnant. The people, not only the lowest class, but the traders and the fisher-folk, the peasants, and the artisans, now, perhaps, for the first time so differentiated, gain in importance and power. In the reforms of Solon, carried through mainly in the interest of the people, and particularly of the peasant class, we have an evidence that the people, though down-trodden and degraded through the operation of economic forces, have enough power to constrain the state to make ample provision for their needs. In the meantime, evidently before the archonship of Solon, the aristocratic factions that have supported the cause of the Cylonians fall into the background, while the counter party is restored to favor. The Alcmeonidae return from exile; and in due time their tried leader, rich, powerful, the friend of princes, the Alcmeonid Alcmeon, son of the bloodstained Megacles, gains so much of consideration in the eyes of the people and of their advocate Solon, that he becomes their leader and representative in the holy war for the honor of Delphi. In the controversies that soon follow, it is another Alcmeonid, a second Megacles, who, as the head of the Men of the Shore, champions the cause not only of his associates in business enterprises, but also of the great law-abiding middle class in its struggles for supremacy with the party of the ancient aristocracy, headed by Lycurgus, and with the proletariat, whom Peisistratus, himself also a member of an ancient family, for his own purposes was willing to lead.

Thus viewed, the episode of Cylon ceases to be a detached incident in Attic history: it now reveals itself, in its true light, as one of the most interesting and significant steps in the social and political development of pre-Solonian Athens.

CATULLUS AND THE PHASELUS OF HIS FOURTH POEM.¹

BY CLEMENT LAWRENCE SMITH.

THAT Catullus sailed home from Bithynia in the yacht whose prowess he sings so charmingly in his fourth poem has always been an accepted article of philological faith. An article of faith it is in the truest sense. The poet does not so much as hint that he was ever on board the yacht, but tradition placed him there in the picture which the first reading of his fresh verses painted on our fancy, and we never ask for proofs. The earliest editors of Catullus² appear to have quietly taken for granted, what seems indeed at first sight the natural supposition, that the poet, in describing the yacht's voyage, is describing his own journey; and their successors for four hundred years accepted this plausible, if unproven, hypothesis without question. The serious difficulties which the hypothesis involves have not altogether escaped the notice of scholars, and various attempts have been made to explain them away; but in the discussion which has sprung up about them the hypothesis itself has been treated, as if by common consent, with the respect which is due to unquestioned fact.

To this statement there is, so far as I know, but one exception. Baehrens, in his commentary published in 1885, boldly rejected the traditional belief, and maintained that the voyage of the phaselus had nothing to do with the poet's return from Bithynia. Unfortunately Baehrens, in support of this view, lays the greatest stress on

¹ Read before the American Philological Association at Princeton, N.J., July 7, 1891.

² How much the scholars of the sixteenth century occupied themselves with this poem is illustrated by a little duodecimo volume which I find in the Harvard Library, with the title: *Phaselus Catulli et ad eam quotquot exstant Parodiae, cum Annotationibus doctissimorum virorum . . . Lugduni, apud Thomam Soubron, MDXCII.* It contains, besides the familiar *Sabinus ille* of the *Catulepta*, eleven modern parodies on the phaselus poem.

an obscure passage in the Bernese scholia on Virgil (Georg. IV. 289). The scholium is attributed to Junilius and, as given by Hagen, reads in the MSS. as follows: '*phaselis* genus nauium picturam sicus phasillus ille quem agiunt auctorem esse nauium calaetarum quem habuit Serenus hospes.' In spite of the hopeless state of this text, it is still reasonably certain that the scholiast's 'phasillus ille' is a quotation of the opening words of Catullus' poem, and the statement 'quem habuit Serenus hospes' must be taken — for what it is worth — as probably referring to our yacht. Baehrens thinks it is worth much, and for him it settles the question of the ownership of the yacht. The name Serenus, he holds, cannot be an invention, but must have come down from a good and trustworthy source. Serenus, and not Catullus, was the yacht's owner. Who Serenus was, is of course unknown. Baehrens guesses that he was a townsman and friend of the poet, a *negotiator*, who had dedicated his outworn yacht to the Dioscuri; and that at his request Catullus wrote this poem, to be set up on a tablet in the shrine.

It must be acknowledged that Baehrens is here building on very slender foundations. The authority of the scholia is too uncertain, and the text in which they are transmitted too corrupt, to justify us in accepting their statements without other evidence. The most we are entitled to say in this case is that, if there are other grounds for believing that the yacht did not belong to Catullus, the owner's name may have been Serenus.

But Baehrens had a better reason for his view, and one which he would have done well to make more prominent. In a brief note on verse 25 of the poem he points out that the words 'sed haec prius fuere; nunc,' etc., with which the poet concludes his description, require us to suppose an interval of some years between the end of the voyage and the writing of the poem, and that as Catullus died in B.C. 54, the voyage of the phaselus could not have been as late as B.C. 56, the year in which Catullus returned from Bithynia.

This argument, almost in itself conclusive, in my judgment, Baehrens tucks away in a note of four lines, where it has attracted little attention. In the present paper I propose to examine the question more at length, and to set forth the reasons which have convinced me that the prevailing view is untenable. The reader who is sufficiently interested to follow me through the discussion will find it

convenient to have the poem before him, and I therefore print it here :—

Phasellus ille quem uidetis, hospites,
ait fuisse nauium celerrimus,
neque ullius natantis impetum trabis
nequisse praeterire, sive palmulis
5 opus foret uolare siue linteo.
Et hoc negat minacis Adriatici
negare litus insulasue Cycladas
Rhodumque nobilem horridamque Thraciam
Propontida trucemue Ponticum sinum,
10 ubi iste post phasellus antea fuit
comata silua ; nam Cytorio in iugo
loquente saepe sibilum edidit coma.
Amastri Pontica et Cytore buxifer,
tibi haec fuisse et esse cognitissima
15 ait phasellus ; ultima ex origine
tuo stetisse dicit in cacumine,
tuo imbuisse palmulas in aequore,
et inde tot per impotentia freta
erum tulisse, laeua siue dextera
20 uocaret aura, siue utrumque Iupiter
simul secundus incidisset in pedem ;
neque ulla uota litoralibus deis
sibi esse facta, cum ueniret a marci
nouissimo hunc ad usque limpidum lacum.
25 Sed haec prius fuere : nunc recondita
senet quiete seque dedicat tibi,
gemelle Castor et gemelle Castoris.

The traditional view that in these verses Catullus describes his own voyage has only one solid fact to rest upon,— the poet's actual journey from Bithynia to Italy,— a fact of course inadequate in itself, because it is quite consistent with the opposite view. To supplement this fact we have nothing but such evidence as the poem itself affords ; for Catullus nowhere else makes any allusion to the phaselus, nor does he anywhere give the least indication of his route from Asia to Italy, which we might compare with that of the yacht.

What then do we find in the poem itself? A careful reading discloses nothing that can properly be called evidence: the poet's interest in the yacht and its voyage, and his knowledge of its route,—that is all. The verses show admiration, but give no distinct indication of personal interest,—a fact of much significance when we consider the directness and unreserve of Catullus when he expresses his own feelings. The yacht is made to tell its own story, and what it has to tell is this: It was once the fleetest of ships and could pass any timber afloat. It was built at Amastris in Paphlagonia; there it was launched, and from there it “carried its master over many wild seas” to the shores of the Adriatic. The points mentioned on the way are the Euxine (Ponticus sinus), the Propontis, Rhodes, the Cyclades. The journey ended in a ‘limpidus lacus,’ where the poem represents the yacht as laid away, out of service, in old age and repose “dedicating itself” to the Dioscuri.

What now do we know, or what can we safely infer, about the poet's journey? The main facts are not disputed. He went to Bithynia in the suite of Memmius, whose headquarters were at Nicaea. In regard to the outward journey we have no information. The year of Memmius' administration of the province is generally thought to be B.C. 57, and the homeward journey would, therefore, under the usual practice of Roman provincial governors, fall in the the spring of B.C. 56; but Ellis thinks there is good reason for believing that Memmius governed Bithynia in B.C. 65, in which case the return falls in B.C. 64. That it was in the spring appears also from the forty-sixth poem, in which Catullus takes leave of his colleagues at Nicaea:—

Iam uer egelidos refert tepores,
iam caeli furor aequinoctialis
iocundis zephyri silescit aureis.
Linquntur Phrygii, Catulle, campi
Nicaeaeque ager uber aestuosae;
ad claras Asiae uolemus urbes.

• • • • •
O dulces comitum ualete coetus,
longe quos simul a domo profectos
diuersae uariae uiiae reportant.

From the last two verses it appears that the members of the governor's suite did not make the homeward, as they had made

the outward, journey' together. Catullus had in prospect a tour of the "famous cities of Asia." Which of these he visited or how he travelled, we do not know. We only know of his visit to one place in Asia, — his brother's tomb in the Troad; but whether he made this visit on his way out or on his way home, we are not informed. His homeward journey, from Asia to Italy, is a complete blank in our knowledge. At the end of it we find him in his father's country-seat at Sirmio, on Lake Garda, which he hails with an outburst of enthusiasm (XXXI.): —

Paene insularum Sirmio insularumque
ocelle, quascumque in liquentibus stagnis
marique vasto fert uterque Neptunus,
quam te libenter quamque laetus inuiso.

He is thoroughly happy to be once more at home after the worry of his 'peregrinus labor,' and thankful for his safe return as a blessing almost too good to be real: —

uix mi ipse credens Thuniam atque Bithunos
liquisse campos et uidere te in tuto.

This poem was evidently written in the first days after his return, when he was brimfull of the joy of 'Home Again.' The contrast between its tone and that of the phaselus poem, which is commonly assigned to the same time, is significant.

The available points of comparison, then, between the poet's journey and the yacht's voyage are at the beginning and at the end; and at both of these points there are obvious difficulties in the way of accepting the traditional view. These difficulties have been partly recognized. Westphal sought to escape from them by abandoning the traditional view so far as it relates to the beginning and the end of the journey, and keeping the poet and the yacht in company only in that intermediate part of the voyage, of which we are safely ignorant. Westphal thinks the yacht did not belong to Catullus; the poet, by previous arrangement, joined the ship at Rhodes and from there sailed in it to some Adriatic harbor (possibly on the Greek coast), the 'limpidus lacus' of our poem.

Munro rejected this explanation, not without reason, as giving "a very lame and impotent meaning to the piece," and attempted to

clear the matter up in a better way. The difficulty at the beginning of the journey is this: Catullus began his journey at Nicaea, as the verses quoted above, in which he took leave of his companions, show; the voyage of the yacht, *with its master on board*, began at Amastris, according to the plain intent of the poet's words in IV.:—

16 tuo imbuisse palmulas in aequore,
et *inde* tot per impotentia freta
erum tulisse.

It follows, therefore, that if Catullus was the yacht's master and sailed home in it, he travelled first from Nicaea eastward to Amastris, and embarked there; and this is the view maintained by Ellis, in his second edition, against Munro's theory. Munro refused to believe that Catullus would "make a most difficult and laborious land journey" to Amastris, "solely to add to the length and annoyance of the sea-voyage." He adhered to the common view that "the phaselus was unquestionably built for Catullus or purchased by him in Bithynia," but held that the poet would not go to Amastris to embark; he would rather "order his yacht to be brought round along the 'surlly' Pontus, through the Bosphorus into the Propontis, and would embark with all his belongings either at Cios . . . or at Myrlea (Apamea), to both of which there was a short and easy road from Nicaea."

To reconcile this view with the poet's language in IV., Munro is obliged to take *inde*, vs. 18, in a temporal sense; and he translates the verses last quoted: "in your waters [she] handselled her blades; *and next* she carried her master over so many raging seas." I venture to say that this interpretation would not have occurred to any one who came to the verse without a preconceived notion of the facts. The 'and next' ignores a cruise of two hundred or two hundred and fifty miles, and that, too, the yacht's maiden voyage. Munro makes other requisitions on the poet's language which it will hardly bear. It did not escape him that the 'surlly' Pontus is included in the same category in vss. 6-9 with Rhodes, the Cyclades, and the rest, which according to his own theory are named to trace the *poet's* voyage. The natural inference from this, that the Pontus was also included in the poet's journey, he meets by pointing out that the list of these places is divided into "three main sections" by

the conjunction *ve* in vss. 7 and 9; and on this basis he divides the yacht's voyage into three parts, in the first of which the poet was not on board. This is certainly ingenious, if not convincing. Again he argues that the poet's lack of personal knowledge of the first part of the yacht's voyage "might appear from his appeal to Amastris and Cytorus" (vss. 13 sqq.); overlooking the fact that throughout the whole account of the yacht's achievements the poet speaks as one who had no personal knowledge of the facts. This is a point to which I shall have occasion to return later.

But if we cannot follow Munro in twisting the poet's language into conformity with his view that the yacht's master embarked in it elsewhere than at Amastris, we must still admit the soundness of his contention that Catullus did not go to Amastris to embark for Italy. The poet's own words and the probabilities of the case alike forbid such a supposition. In taking leave of his friends at Nicaea (XLVI.), he is all eagerness to "fly to the illustrious cities of Asia," of which certainly none lay in the direction of Amastris: —

Linquantur Phrygii, Catulle, campi
Nicaeaeque ager uber aestuosae;
ad claras Asiae uolemus urbes.

Ellis thinks that "to trace the legendary course of the *Argo*, if only for a part of its voyage, would be almost a sufficient motive" for the poet's journey, "in itself unnecessary," to Amastris. Perhaps so; but how can we believe that he made this literary tour when he tells us himself that he was going somewhere else? And, finally, is it credible that our poet, who we know came home from his Bithynian venture disappointed and as poor as he went out, would make the long journey to Amastris, toilsome and uninteresting by land, tedious and dangerous by sea, to purchase a fast-sailing pleasure-boat to carry him to Italy, — a boat, moreover, for which he would have no further use when he got there? I, for one, cannot believe it.

The result, then, of our examination of the first part of the question is this: The language of the fourth poem requires us to believe that the master of the *phaselus* (the '*erus*' of vs. 19) embarked in it at Amastris; the poet's account of his own plans in XLVI. and all the probabilities of the case forbid us to believe that he went to Amastris to embark. From this dilemma there is no escape but in

abandoning the hypothesis that the poet was the master of the yacht.

Before leaving this part of the subject, I may observe that the expressions of eager anticipation in XLVI. are anything but suggestive of a slow voyage in a sailing-boat : —

ad claras Asiae uolemus urbes.
Iam mens praetrepidans auet uagari,
iam laeti studio pedes uigescunt.

If the language of the last verse is significant at all, it suggests a journey by land rather than by water. I need not refer to the numerous familiar phrases formed with *pes* or *pedes* to express locomotion on land, but it is worth while to recall two places in Horace where *pedes* is used for a land-journey in direct contrast with a sea-voyage : —

I pedes quo te rapiunt et aerae. C. III. 11. 49.

Ire pedes quocunque ferent, quocunque per undas
Notus vocabit aut protervus Africus. *Epod.* 16. 21.

Let us now turn to the end of the voyage and the scene of the poem. The traditional view is thus stated by Munro and repeated by Ellis : "Catullus represents himself as pointing out and praising to some guests, who were with him at his villa in Sirmio, the phaselus, now laid up beside the Benacus or Lago di Garda, which had carried him from Bithynia to Italy." Westphal, as we have seen, dissented from this view, and cut the voyage short at some Adriatic port, where the poet commends the yacht to the friends who entertained him there. His reason for this is that a vessel that made the voyage from Asia to Italy would be too large to sail up the Po and the Mincio to Lake Garda. This notion, however, was not begotten of a practical knowledge of the sea, and Munro had no difficulty in showing that the boat need not have been too large. There can be no doubt that the owner of the yacht could bring it to the lake, if he wished to do so, though the navigation of the rivers was not improbably such that he would have to transport it at certain points. Munro thought that Catullus did not stay on the yacht in its slow journey up the rivers, but hastened by some quicker and more convenient route to Sirmio, — a view which he sought to sustain by a comparison with Ovid's *Tristia*, I. 10. We need not enter into an examination of his arguments here. With or without Catullus on board, according to the common view, the yacht was taken to Sirmio ; and there certainly

Catullus himself went, as we know from XXXI., immediately on his return.

What object could Catullus have in taking the yacht to Sirmio? Nothing but a sentimental one, if we accept the common view; for he straightway proceeds, we are told, to dedicate the craft to Castor and Pollux. If we can believe that our poet, after his fruitless sojourn in an impoverished province (X. 6 sqq.), had the means to indulge his sentiment or his piety in this expensive fashion; if we resolve to stifle our doubt that a yacht of exceptional excellence, after its first cruise, or at least after a cruise which showed it was still in prime condition, and in which it had met with no mishap whatever, would be at once laid up and left to decay,—if we make up our minds to believe this, we are immediately treated to another and a greater surprise. The yacht has suddenly grown old,—

æ nunc senet quiete,—

truly a marvellous transformation from the fleet racer that only the other day sailed proudly over the Adriatic.

Westphal's theory does not help us here, but rather leaves us in a worse plight; for according to him this miraculous old age overtakes the yacht during the few days of the poet's sojourn in the Adriatic port where he parts company with it. Westphal, we must suppose, did not observe this difficulty. It was seen by Bruner, who suggested an ingenious solution which has been adopted by some recent editors. To most readers the speaker in the poem is the poet himself, who describes to his friends a real voyage, made by a real yacht, which lies before them; to Bruner the poem is a dedicatory inscription, designed to be set up on a tablet in a shrine of the Dioscuri on the shore of Lake Benacus. The idea that the poem was an inscription is not a new one. It was propounded two hundred years ago by Vossius, who thought the poet consecrated some portion of the yacht ("acrostolium aut aplustria") as an emblem of the whole. This seems hardly sufficient to meet the requirements of the poet's words,—'phasellus ille quem uidetis,'—and Bruner suggested that the ἀνάθημα must have been a picture of the yacht. Working on this hypothesis, Riese proceeds to deal with our difficulties as follows: The poem is an idealized description (poetisch verklärte Beschreibung)¹

¹ Einleitung, p. xv.

of Catullus' homeward voyage. "It combines reality—*e.g.* the description of the route—with fancy. The ship actually used for the long voyage cannot possibly . . . have come up to Lake Garda; Catullus, moreover, is represented as having embarked at Amastris, . . . and the ship is represented as having been laid up after its first voyage. This is all fancy,—though Catullus may, of course, have purchased a ship for his use on the journey."

This theory withdraws the personality of the poet entirely from the poem; and the 'hospites' are no longer the friends of Catullus, but only the vague 'strangers' commonly addressed in epitaphs. I find it a little difficult in reading the poem to bring myself to this view of it. The lively personification of the yacht itself I can understand if I think of it in actual presence before the poet and his friends, but hardly in a mural inscription under a painted boat. "With this dedicatory poem," Riese further says, "he thanks the gods for his happy return."¹ But I find in the poem no expression or intimation of gratitude to the gods. On the contrary, it is so wholly occupied with the merits of the ship that gratitude to heaven is quite excluded; in fact, it is part of the ship's boast that *no vows were made* anywhere on the voyage (vs. 22). Yet we are told by at least one editor that these verses were written for a *voix* tablet! Finally I know of no instance of a thank-offering *dedicating itself* to the gods, and this seems all the more inappropriate if it is nothing but a picture.

But if we could accept the inscription hypothesis, how much would it help us? Riese, as we have seen, disposes of our difficulties by treating the parts of the poem which give rise to them as fancy. I find it hard to follow him here. Catullus had had an actual voyage, had returned home in safety, had something to be thankful for, and *was* thankful, as XXXI. shows. In this frame of mind he proceeds to compose a permanent memorial of his gratitude to the protecting deities, in which he mixes fiction with fact in the most unblushing manner, and with no apparent object. What object, for example, could he have in saying he had sailed in the yacht from Amastris, if he did not sail from Amastris? What object in saying the yacht "came from the farthest sea all the way to this limpid lake," if it did not come near the lake? Does the description of the phaselus fit

¹ Einleitung, p. xv.

the actual ship in which the poet sailed, or is that, too, mere fiction? If fiction, I ask again, to what purpose? Why exaggerate the praise of the ship in a way to belittle the benefit of the gods? If fact, then we come back to our old difficulty: this admirable ship is suddenly grown old, and laid away to rot at the end of its first voyage. And whether fact or fiction really makes little difference: such a ship is *represented* as so laid up and grown old. It does not help the matter to say the representation is pure fancy: the poet cannot ask us to fancy what is palpably absurd and incredible. We can no more believe that Catullus represented the yacht as growing old and useless in a few weeks than we can believe that it did so in fact.

Nor does Catullus so represent it. His language throughout is that of one describing *past* achievements. From the opening words —

Phasellus ille quem uidetis, hospites,
ait *fuisse* nauium celerrimus —

to the end, the perfect tense is prominent; not only the voyage but the excellence of the craft is placed emphatically in the past; and in conclusion he sums it all up with

Sed haec *prius* *fuere*; *nunc* recondita
senet quiete.

What could be more manifest than that the history of the yacht belonged to a period now closed, and separated by an interval from the present?

By how long an interval? Common sense answers, by an interval long enough for the yacht to become worn out and no longer fit for active service. The two years that are usually thought to have elapsed between the return of Catullus and his death are not long enough; and if this was the yacht's first voyage, which is a natural inference from the description, the period of ten years which we should gain by accepting Ellis' dates, is not long enough.

There are two conceivable motives to which the composition of this eulogy of a yacht may be ascribed: one, that it was the poet's own, that he had made in it the one great voyage of his life, and that he therefore felt a personal interest in it and an attachment for it:

the other, that the yacht was in some way remarkable in itself or distinguished by some achievement. The former is the traditional hypothesis which has thus far been discussed, which is admitted by all who have examined the question carefully to be involved in serious difficulties, and which I hold to be untenable because, unsupported as it is by any proof, the corollaries which we must accept with it are not only improbable, but contradictory and absurd. The other hypothesis I have not seen anywhere suggested, but it deserves consideration.

Let us look at the two hypotheses in the light of the poet's own words.

The most obvious fact that presents itself to the reader is that the poet does not speak as of his own knowledge; he simply acts as spokesman for the yacht, and his language is that of an interpreter. He tells the story as if the yacht had told it to him or were telling it to him then in its own language. This is impressed upon us at the outset: —

Phasellus ille quem uidetis, hospites,
ait fuisse nauium celerrimus, —

and it is made prominent throughout: —

6 et hoc *negat* minacis Adriatici
negare litus —
14 tibi haec fuisse et esse cognitissima
ait phasellus; ultima ex origine
tuo stetit *dicit* in cacumine.

It is only when he comes to the present time and scene that he speaks as of his own knowledge: —

25 Sed haec prius fuere; nunc recondita
senet quiete seque dedicat, etc.

The reader will observe further that the yacht tells its story as if the poet who speaks for it were no more cognizant of the facts than the friends to whom he repeats them; its appeal for confirmation of its statements to the distant places which had witnessed its exploits conveys the impression that there was no present witness to whom it could appeal. I have already alluded to the partial way in which

Munro has made use of this feature of the poem in support of the view that Catullus did not embark at Amastris. That Catullus, he says, "did not personally know the first part of the yacht's voyage might appear from his appeal to Amastris and Cytorus: all this, the growth of the wood, the first launching of the ship, you, Amastris and Cytorus, know, it says, and know full well, even if I do not." This is true; but it does not apply, as Munro applied it, to the first part of the voyage only. The yacht appeals equally for confirmation of its claims to the "coast of the menacing Adriatic, the Cyclades and famous Rhodes, the rough Thracian Propontis, and the savage Pontic gulf," — in short, to all the seas and islands which it names at all.

I do not maintain that this fact is necessarily inconsistent with the supposition that Catullus is describing his own voyage. He *may* have chosen to cast his poem in this form, to speak as if he had no personal knowledge of the facts he reports. Scholars will differ as to the probability of such a supposition. But that he does so speak all must concede; and in the absence of any direct evidence, this fact must have its weight.

Again, Catullus *may* have chosen to disguise all personal interest in the yacht which had brought him safely home "over so many wild seas"; certainly he betrays none. I have already referred to the excursion which Munro made into Ovid's *Tristia* in search of light on our poem. The tenth poem of the *Tristia* has for its subject the ship in which Ovid sailed from Cenchreae on the Isthmus to the Hellespont and thence back to Samothrace, where the poem was written. From Samothrace the ship was to sail to Tomi, while Ovid crossed over to Thrace and proceeded by land. In his poem there are certainly reminiscences of Catullus, as in the couplet

Siue opus est uelis, minimam bene currit ad auram,
siue opus est remo, remige carpit iter.

From these reminiscences Munro sought to draw certain inferences in regard to the facts of Catullus' voyage, which are, as it seems to me, quite unwarranted; but with these we are not now concerned. What I am surprised Munro did not notice, is the contrast between the two poems in the matter of the personal interest of the poets in

the ships they celebrate. Ovid does not for a moment leave us in doubt on this point. He begins : —

Est mihi, sitque precor flauae tutela Mineruae,
nauis, et a picta casside nomen habet.

He then goes on to praise his ship in verses of which I have quoted two above ; he tells of his first acquaintance with her and of their subsequent companionship ; she has remained to that day the trusty guide and comrade of the anxious exile —

fida manet trepidae duxque comesque fugae ;

his prayers go forth with her when she leaves him at Samothrace : —

Nunc quoque tuta precor, uasti secat ostia Ponti,
quasque petit Gœtici litoris intret aquas ;

and he offers vows for the safe completion of her voyage, to the detailed description of which the rest of the poem is devoted.

All this is in marked contrast with the phaselus poem. Read it through from beginning to end, we find no intimation that the poet ever set foot on the yacht, no hint that he had any personal interest in it which he could not ask the friends whom he addressed to share. And this is Catullus, the most direct, the most unreserved, the most transparent of Roman poets. Can any poem of his be named in which, recording a personal experience, he disguises all personal knowledge of it, or having a personal interest in the subject of his verse, he fails to disclose it?

Why should we not take the poem for just what it is? It records no personal history. It is wholly given up to the praises of the yacht, — of its distinguished origin, its matchless speed, its brilliant sailing qualities, its fortunate voyage. If it be asked why it should be singled out for such eulogy, the answer ought not to be difficult.

The actual data of the poem are simple and clear. On an Italian lake is a yacht of remarkable excellence which had been brought by its owner from Amastris, on the Euxine, where it was built. What the lake was we do not certainly know, but Lake Garda is the only one with which we know our poet had anything to do. Who the owner was we know still less. It may have been Catullus' father, who was a man of means, and may have had connections with the

East, a supposition to which the fact that the poet's brother died there lends some support. It may, however, have been some one else who had a villa on the lake. His name may have been Serenus. In any case it was somebody who could afford to purchase a pleasure yacht in Bithynia for use on the lake at home. Arrived there, this boat with a foreign name must have become conspicuous at once, — by its graceful lines, by its great speed, and above all by its solitary distinction of having sailed on the open sea all the way from the Euxine to Italy. Among the homely craft of the lake this genuine

Pontica pinus,
siluae filia nobilis,

would hold a unique place and be the boast of the neighborhood for many a day.

“Sed haec prius fuere”: all this was before our poet's time. When he points out the yacht to his friends, its prowess and its achievements are only a memory. Its days of service are over. It lies on the shore, a reminder, to all who know its history, of the goodness of the twin deities who long ago, without so much as demanding a vow for their service, had brought it safely through its dangerous journey.

ON THE HOMERIC CAESURA AND THE CLOSE OF
THE VERSE AS RELATED TO THE EXPRESSION OF
THOUGHT.

BY THOMAS D. SEYMOUR.

THE fundamental difference of form between Greek poetry and Latin poetry rests upon the important but often forgotten fact that the one was made for the ear and the other for the eye. The former was made to be sung or recited and *heard*, while the latter was made to be *read*. In the first centuries of its existence, the Iliad was read by few persons and heard by multitudes, while on the other hand only a comparatively small number ever heard the Aeneid recited from memory. The odes of Pindar and Sappho were sung; while the odes of Horace were published and sold by booksellers,—though Roman poetasters were fond of repeating their own compositions. On this fact rests the importance of the proper, lively scansion of Homer and Pindar. The mere division of the verse into feet profits little. A school-boy may so divide into feet the whole Iliad with no advantage, if he goes no further. Even to recite the poems in a mechanical way, does little good, except as it aids the learner in acquiring familiarity with meanings, forms, and constructions. Our ideal must be to listen to a Greek poem just as the old Greeks themselves listened to it. The pause of the reciter threw emphasis upon the word before the caesura, or at least made a distinct break, which is only imperfectly indicated in print by italics and dashes. The Roman poet, composing simply for the eye, could neglect the pauses, which were simply for the ear, and from which he could get no emphasis or expression. Much indeed of the beauty of Tennyson's poems and much of the charm of the odes of Horace would be lost if we were ignorant of the poet's rhythms and metres. But if familiarity with English and Latin rhythms is important for an appreciation of the poetry, much more should we expect to find in the rhythms of early Greek poems an aid to the discovery of the poet's intention.

Pindar's odes instead of being less intelligible (like our own poetry) when sung, seem to have been much easier of comprehension than when received simply by the eye. The careful student sees many marks of connexion and emphasis clearly indicated by the verse. Words which would seem widely separated if the poem were written as prose, are seen to be closely united by the rhythm.¹ It is often easier for syntactical construction to leap over two or three whole verses than part of a verse. The rhythm is constantly so used as to bring the poet's thought into stronger relief. The ancient poet was less tempted even than his modern brother to select the rhythm and metre of his verse at random.

In the early orators, too, passages are found which must have been far less ambiguous to the hearer than they are to him who reads them for the first time.²

Blass, who has done more than all others to recall and revive the rhythmical principles of the ancient rhetoricians and critics, and has added acute observations of his own, calls attention to the fact that obscurity would be a real fault in Demosthenes, if the

¹ Cf. Κλεόδαμον ὄφρ' ἴδοις' υἱὸν ἐπης, ὅτι οἱ νέαν
κόλποις παρ' εὐδόξου Πίσης
ἐστεφάνωσε κυδίμων ἀέθλων πτεροῖσι χαίταν Pindar, *Ol.* xiv. 22 ff.

τεθμὸς δὲ τις ἀθανάτων καὶ τάνδ' ἀλιερκέα χῶραν
παντοδαποῖσιν ὑπέστασε ξένοις
κίονα δαιμονίαν·
ὁ δ' ἐπαντέλλων χρόνος
τοῦτο πράσσω μὴ κάμοι·
Δωριεῖ λαῶ ταμεινομένην ἐξ Λιακοῦ *id.* *Ol.* viii. 25 ff.

κελαδησόμεθα βροντᾶν
καὶ πυρπάλαιμον βέλος,
ὄρσικτύπου Διός,
ἐν ἅπαντι κράτει
αἰθωνα κεραινὸν ἀραρότα *id.* *Ol.* x. 39 ff.

² Cf. Πύρρος, ἄπαις ὧν γνησίων παίδων, ἐποίησατο "Ἐνδίων τὸν ἀδελφὸν τὸν ἐμὸν υἱὸν ἑαυτῷ Isaeus iii. 1 (where the speaker certainly made a pause before υἱὸν), ὅς γε ἐτόλμησε μαρτυρησάι ἐγγυῆσαι τὴν ἀδελφὴν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γυναῖκα εἶναι κατὰ τοὺς νόμους *id.* 4, πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοις ἐκείνο αὐτοὺς ἔρραθε, εἰ τις τῶν γνησίων τῶν αὐτοῦ ἐπιδικάζεσθαι ἀξιοῖ *id.* 67, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ τούτου μὲν ποιήσασθαι τὴν δὲ μὴ εἰσαγαγεῖν τὴν μὲν νόθην, ὥσπερ αὐτῷ προσήκε, καὶ ἀκληρον κατέστησε, τὸν δὲ κληρονόμον κατέλιπε τῶν ἑαυτοῦ *id.* 75.

rhythm of the clause did not bring together what seems to be widely separated.¹

But in reading Pindar and the choral odes of tragedy, we are at a great disadvantage, since two elements of the song — the music and the dance — have been lost. Doubtless the dance had its poetical effect, as well as its share in the pageantry. But while in the choral odes we lose the effect of the chorus, in the Homeric poems we have lost no voices of a chorus nor marked and important melody, while the words have preserved for us the distinct rhythm. In the early epic times, indeed, the poems were sung or chanted to a musical accompaniment, but by a single voice, to a thin-toned cithara, with no marked melody. We can 'render' the Homeric poems full as well as the orations of Demosthenes. In epic poetry, the 'written accent' (as we call it) was disregarded by the poet in the composition of his verse, and thus we may reasonably think it of slight moment in the recitation of the poems. But the force of this 'written accent' and its effect in the orator's day cannot be even remotely reproduced by the ordinary scholar. That Demosthenes watched and marked the rhythm of quantity, no one can doubt. That he marked the word-accent is just as certain. Who of to-day can give this combination, with the two elements in due proportion?

The scientific study of the Homeric verse does not date from before the present century. While Bentley treated scientifically the metres of Terence and explained many anomalies in Homer's verse by his restoration of the dropped *vau*, and Porson made subtle observations on the laws of the iambic trimeter, Gottfried Hermann (in his edition of the *Orphica*, 1805) was the first to show the development of the dactylic hexameter, and the characteristics of different poets and periods. Enough remained to be done. Many simple observations were not yet made, and much good truth did not get into the

¹ Blass brings forward as illustrations Dem. v. 18 *διὰ τὴν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους ἡμῶν ἐπικηρυκείαν ἐχθρῶς σχήσουσι*, where for the reader the construction is obscured by the separation of *ἡμῶν* from *σχήσουσι*, but where for the hearer, the rhythm (with a slight pause after *ἡμῶν*) brought the pronoun into its proper relation with the participle; and Dem. xiii. 69 *τῷ δ' ἐπιθεῖν διδόντα δίκην ἔξοστιν, ἦν ἔταξ' ὁ νόμος, τὸν ἀλόγῃ, πέρα δ' οὐδὲν τοῦτου*, where, according to the view of Blass, a division into three clauses (ending with *δίκην*, *νόμος*, *τοῦτου*, respectively) formed the necessary connexion.

ordinary text-books for long years. Few school-boys or college students a quarter of a century ago were taught the two great tangible differences between Vergil's verse and that of the Homeric poems,—the predominance of the feminine caesura and of dactyls in Homer, and of the masculine caesura and of spondees in Vergil. The larger number of spondees in Vergil, and the heavier swing of the Roman verse, seems obvious, but the ordinary school-boy believes that Vergil's verse is like that of Homer in every particular. As late as 1885, the treatise on Greek metres by Gleditsch, in Iwan Müller's admirable *Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft*, stated, 'die Caesur nach der Thesis des dritten Fusses, τομή πενθημιμερής, ist die beliebteste und häufigste Teilung des Hexameters. . . . Die Penthemimeres ist zu allen Zeiten besonders bevorzugt worden, ausser bei Nonnos und seinen Nachfolgern.' In the second edition of 1889, in the paragraph which treats of the feminine caesura, the statement is inserted, 'bei Homer ist diese Caesur so gebräuchlich dass sie die Penthemimeres noch überwiegt,' but the following paragraph retains the sentence, 'die Caesur nach der Thesis' etc. Thus even the most elementary facts with regard to the heroic hexameter have long escaped observation or general recognition. The subtler difference of arrangement of spondees and dactyls seems to have been almost entirely neglected by scholars. Just as the historic interpretation of the Homeric poems was hindered by the assumption therein of Attic meanings and constructions, so the appreciation of the subtler characteristics of the Homeric verse has been delayed by the belief that this verse did not differ from that of Vergil. The Roman poet doubtless strove in the main to follow in the metrical footsteps of his pattern, but he had stubborn material to deal with; the Latin words did not settle themselves readily in the Greek measure, and their order could not be so simple; the caesura became a mechanical, stencil-plate pause, without special poetic effect,—a pause in the *sound* merely, not in the sense,—like the caesura in the Sapphic verse of Horace as compared with those in the stanzas of the Lesbian herself.

Some scholars have been inclined to think of the caesura in Greek verse as musical rather than rhetorical or poetical,—without appreciable effect upon the expression of the thought,—while the grammatical construction of one verse has been supposed to be connected

with that of the preceding or following as freely as in Vergil or Milton. The caesura of which this paper treats, however, is a veritable pause in thought,—in some cases a musical *rest*, and in others a musical *hold*—a pause affecting the sense directly; and a distinct pause in the sense at the close of the verse is also here claimed to be Homeric. The relation of these two pauses to the expression of thought in Homer has been too much neglected; scholars have not recognized with sufficient distinctness the aid to interpretation which lies in them.

THE PAUSE AT THE CLOSE OF THE VERSE IN HOMER.

In general, all must feel that 'the thought of each Homeric verse is somewhat more independent than is the case with later poetry,' and that 'other things being equal, a word should be construed with words in the same rather than in another verse.'¹ 'The metrical unit coincides with the grammatical and rhetorical unit.' Take for example,

A 1 μῆνιν αἶεδε, θεά, Πηληϊάδεω Ἀχιλῆος
 οὐλομένην, ἣ μυρί' Ἀχαιοῖς ἄλγε' ἔθηκεν,
 παλλὰς δ' ἰφθίμους ψυχὰς Ἄϊδι προΐαψεν
 ἡρώων, αὐτοὺς δὲ ἐλώρια τεύχε κύνεσσιν
 5 οἰωνοῖσὶ τε δαῖτα, Διὸς δ' ἐτελείετο βουλή,
 ἐξ οὗ δὴ τὰ πρῶτα διαστήτην ἐρίσαντε
 Ἀτρεΐδης τε ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν καὶ δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς.
 τίς τ' ἄρ σφωε θεῶν ἕριδι ξυνέηκε μάχεσθαι;

Here the thought of the first verse is complete in itself; the sentence might have ended with the verse. But the thought of the *μῆνις* suggests its results, and *οὐλομένην* is added as an appositive to *μῆνιν* and an introduction to the rest of the verse,—it is not forced by considerations of 'metrical convenience' from a place in the first verse. The 'wrath' was 'mortal' inasmuch as it caused the Achaeans many woes. Doubtless Milton had this passage and adjective in mind when he wrote

'whose mortal taste
 Brought Death into the world and all our woe,'

¹ Seymour's *Homeric Language and Verse*, § 1 g. See *Lehrs de Aristarchi Studiis Homericis*,³ 446 ff.

but his adjective is unemphatic because of its position, while Homer's adjective is made prominent not simply by its place at the beginning of the line, and its wide separation from the noun with which it agrees, but still more so by its relation to the following clause. Homer's sentence clearly might end too with the second verse, of which the thought is repeated in more definite form by the following verses; or it might end at the close of the third verse. *ἥρώων* 4 is used without special emphasis; of course it does not mean 'heroes' as contrasted with ordinary men; it signifies simply 'warriors' or 'brave warriors,' and is used to form a sort of contrast with the following *αὐτούς*. Thus, also, it is clear that the sentence might close with any of verses 4, 5, and 6. The seventh verse may fairly be taken as in apposition with the subject of *διαστήτην*, rather than the subject itself; but this point shall not be pressed at present.

In the following passage, also, each succeeding verse is clearly added as a sort of afterthought.

ζ 180 “ σοὶ δὲ θεοὶ τόσα δοῖεν, ὅσα φρεσὶ σῆσι μνοιναῖς,
 ἄνδρα τε καὶ οἶκον, καὶ ὁμοφροσύνην. ὀπάσειαν
 ἑσθλήν· οὐ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ γε κρείσσον καὶ ἄρειον,
 ἢ ὄθ' ὁμοφρονέοντε νοήμασιν οἶκον ἔχητον
 ἀνὴρ ἢ δὲ γυνή· πᾶλλ' ἄλγεα δυσμενέεσσιν,
 χάρματα δ' εὐμενέτησι, μάλιστα δέ τ' ἔκλυον αὐτοί.”

As another illustration of the principle under discussion, consider

Ζ 254 “ τέκνον, τίπτε λιπὼν πόλεμον θρασὺν εἰλήλουθας;
 ἦ μάλα δὴ τείρουσι δυσώνυμοι νῆες Ἀχαιῶν
 μαρνάμενοι περὶ ἄστυ, σὲ δ' ἐνθάδε θυμὸς ἀνήκεν
 ἐλθόντ' ἐξ ἄκρης πάλιος Διὶ χεῖρας ἀνασχεῖν.
 ἀλλὰ μὲν', ὄφρα κέ τοι μελιγδέα οἶνον ἐνείκω,
 ὡς σπέισης Διὶ πατρὶ καὶ ἄλλοις ἀθανάτοισιν
 260 πρῶτον, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τὸς ὀνήσειαι, αἶ κε πῆγσθα.
 ἀνδρὶ δὲ κεκμηῶτι μένος μέγα οἶνος ἀέξει,
 ὡς τὴν κέκμηκας ἀμύνων σοῖσιν ἔτησιν.”

In this passage a full stop could be placed at the close of any verse without troubling the sense or grammatical construction up to that point. The only opportunity for difference of opinion is in verse 256; is *ἐνθάδε* to be construed directly with *ἀνήκεν*, or with *ἐλθόντα*

of the following verse? After an examination of many such passages, I have no hesitation in expressing my opinion that the former construction is to be preferred. 'Thy soul urged thee hither, — to come and pray to Zeus.' In 260, *πρώτον* is added to the thought of 259 simply as an afterthought (like *ἠρώων* A 4; see p. 96), in order to form a contrast with what follows. Verse 262 is added clearly only as an explanation of 261, as is indicated by *κεκμηῶτι* and *κέκμηκας*, which are in exactly the same position in the verse. Compare also

- X 38 "Ἔκτορ, μή μοι μίμνε, φίλον τέκος, ἀνέρα τούτων
 οἷος ἀνευθ' ἄλλων, ἵνα μὴ τάχα πότμον ἐπίσπης
 40 Πηλείωνι δαμείς, ἐπεὶ ἦ πολὺ φέρτερός ἐστιν,
 σχέτλιος· αἶθε θεοῖσι φίλος τόσσονδε γένοιτο,
 ὅσσον ἐμοί· τάχα κέν ἐκύνες καὶ γῦπες ἴδοιεν
 κείμενον· ἦ κέ μοι αἶνον ἀπὸ πραπίδων ἄχος ἔλθοι·
 ὅς μ' υἴων πολλῶν τε καὶ ἐσθλῶν εἴνιν ἔθηκεν,
 45 κτείνων καὶ περνάς ἐπὶ νήσων τηλεδαπάων."

Here, again, the punctuation cannot be taken as the test of a pause. Only at the close of verse 41, could the reader doubt the possibility of a full stop. I would not press this, for I am far from asserting that the sense is always complete at the end of a line in Homer, but I would call attention to the fact that the idea of *ὅσσον ἐμοί* is in a measure already contained in *σχέτλιος*. This adjective *σχέτλιος* cannot be referred (with Monro) to Hector. Its position can be explained only by its reference to Achilles and its connexion with what follows. 'Horrible man that he is! Would that the *gods* so hated him!' (*θεοῖσι* is emphatic before the caesura.) This interpretation is applicable to the parallel passage in Hecabe's address to Hector,

- X 85 "μηδὲ πρόμος ἴστασο τούτῳ·
 σχέτλιος· εἴ περ γάρ σε κατακτάγη, οὐ σ' ἔτ' ἐγὼ γε
 κλαίσσομαι ἐν λεχέεσσι, φίλον θάλος, ὃν τέκον αὐτή,
 οὐδ' ἄλοχος πολυδάρος· ἀνευθε δέ σε μέγα νῶιν
 Ἀργείων παρὰ νηυσὶ κύνες ταχέες κατέδονται."

Here the thought is: 'Stand not forth on the field of battle to meet Achilles. Horrible man that he is! If he slay thee, he will throw thy body to the dogs.' Achilles deserves the epithet *σχέτλιος*, in

Hecabe's eyes, because he is pitiless and will not accept a ransom for Hector's body. The ordinary reader would fail to appreciate the situation from a literal translation of the passage without regard to the arrangement of the words.

APPOSITIVES ADDED AS BONDS OF CONNEXION.

In general when an adjective (or its equivalent, a limiting genitive) or substantive at the beginning of a verse agrees with (or limits) a word in the preceding line, it is added as a kind of appositive in order to introduce the following clause, either directly, as in

κ 348 ἀμφίπολοι δ' ἄρα τέως μὲν ἐνὶ μεγάροισι πένοντο
τίσσορες, αἷ οἱ δῶμα κάτα δρήσταιραι ἕασιν,

or by way of contrast, as in

κ 354 ἦ δ' ἐτέρη προπάραιθε θρόνων ἐτίταινε τραπέζας
ἀργυρίας, ἐπὶ δέ σφι τίθει χρύσεια κάνεια.

Some apparent exceptions to this remark are only superficial. A noted case is

Μ 51 (ἵπποι) μάλα δὲ χρεμέτιζον ἐπ' ἄκρῳ
χείλει ἐφισταότες,

but even here ἐπ' ἄκρῳ is to be construed directly as an adverbial phrase with χρεμέτιζον, and χείλει as dative of place with ἐφισταότες.

The following passage well exemplifies the Homeric characteristic in question, and at the same time is itself elucidated by a full application of the principle :

α 48 “ ἀλλὰ μοι ἀμφ' Ὀδυσῆι δαΐφρονι δαίεται ἦτορ,
δυσμῶρῳ, ὅς δὴ δηθὰ φίλων ἀπο πῆματα πάσχει
50 νήσῳ ἐν ἀμφιρύτῃ, ὅθι τ' ὀμφαλός ἐστι θαλάσσης,
νήσος δενδρήσσσα, θεὰ δ' ἐν δώματα ναίει,
“ Ἀτλαντος θυγάτηρ ὀλοόφρονος, ὅς τε θαλάσσης
πάσης βένθεα αἶδεν, ἔχει δέ τε κίονας αὐτὸς
μακρὰς, αἷ γαῖάν τε καὶ οὐρανὸν ἀμφὶς ἔχουσιν.”

δυσμῶρῳ 49 is added in apposition with Ὀδυσῆι, in order to introduce the rest of the verse, just as οὐλομένην A 2 is an appositive to μῆνιν A 1 and is explained by the following ἦ μυρὶ' Ἀχαιοῖς ἄλγε'

ἔθηκεν. Similarly μακράς 54 introduces the rest of the verse ; the columns which perform such service deserve this epithet. Ἄτλαντος θυγάτηρ 52 is in apposition with θεά, and νῆσος δενδρήεσσα 51 is a repetition of νῆσῳ just above. To place a period at the close of 50, with Nauck and Hentze, is unreasonable in view not only of the Homeric method of forming a connexion between consecutive verses, but also of the frequent examples of attraction to the construction of a nearer relative clause, as in

a 22 ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν Αἰθίοπας μετεκίαθε τηλόθ' ἰόντας,
Αἰθίοπας τοὶ διχθὰ δεδαΐαται, ἔσχατοι ἀνδρῶν,

where ἔσχατοι is attracted to the case of the relative τοί, and

a 69 Κύκλωπος κεχόλωται, ὃν ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀλάωσεν,
ἀντίθειον Πολύφημον,

where Πολύφημον is attracted from the genitive to the case of the preceding relative, ὃν.

To note here a characteristic which will receive fuller illustration in the latter part of this paper, I may observe that δλοόφρονος 52 is added after the verse-pause, in apposition with Ἄτλαντος and introducing the following relative clause, exactly as δυσμῶρφ 49 and μακράς 54 are used ; the phrase ὅς τε θαλάσσης κτλ. marks Atlas as a sea divinity (cf. δ 385 Πρωτεΐς, ὅς τε κτλ., Ποσειδάωνος ὑποδμῶς), and the sea was proverbially many-faced, deceitful, and destructive.

Compare also the following passages :

- E 125 ἐν γάρ τοι στήθεσσι μένος πατρώϊον ἦκα
ἄτρομον, οἷον ἔχεσκε σακέσπαλος ἱππότα Τυδεΐς.
E 63 (νῆας) ἀρχικέκους, αἱ πᾶσι κακὸν Τρώεσσι γέγοντο.
E 51 ἐσθλὸν θηρητῆρα· δίδαξε γὰρ Ἄρτεμις αὐτῇ
βάλλειν ἄγρια πάντα, τὰ τε τρέφει οὐρεσιν ὕλη.
E 312 εἰ μὴ ἄρ' ὄξυ νόησε Διὸς θυγάτηρ Ἄφροδίτη,
μήτηρ, ἣ μιν ὑπ' Ἀγκίστη τέκε βουκολέοντι.
E 339 ῥέε δ' ἄμβροτον αἶμα θεοῖο,
ἰχθῆρ, οἷός περ τε ῥέει μακάρεσσι θεοῖσιν.
E 361 λίην ἄχθομαι ἔλκος, ὃ με βροτὸς οὐτάσεν ἀνὴρ
Τυδείδης, ὃς νῦν γε καὶ ἂν Διὶ πατρὶ μάχοιτο.
E 377 ἐγὼ φίλον υἱὸν ὑπεξέφερον πολέμοιο
Αἰνείαν, ὃς ἐμοὶ πάντων πολὺ φίλτατόν ἐστιν.

- Ε 405 οὐδ' ἐπὶ τοῦτω ἀήνη θεὰ γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη·
 κήρυκα οὐδὲ τὸ αἶθε κατὰ φρονίμην Τυδείης κίεον,
 ὅττι μάλ' οὐδ' ἀρμῆος, ὅς ἀθροίσουσι μάχηται.
 Ε 544 ἀφραῖος βύσσων γένος ὃ ἦν ἐκ τοπαμῶν
 Ἀλφειῶν, ὅς τ' εἴρη μῖα Πυλίων διὰ γαίης.

Here Ἀλφειῶν is certainly in apposition with τοπαμῶν, and we have not the mere equivalent of the prosaic τοῦ τοπαμῶν Ἀλφειῶν.

- Ε 319 οὐδ' κίεον Κασσάνης εὐχόμενος στυβαίων
 νέεω, ὅς ἐπέελλε βίην ἰσχυρὸν Διομήδεα.
 Ε 738 ἀμφὶ δ' ἄρ' ἄρμῆσον βάλει' αἰγίδα θεοειδέουσαν
 δουρῆ, ἦν κέρα μὲν πάντῃ φάειος ἀποφαιόμενα.
 Ε 745 ὅς δ' ἔχε φλόγα κατὰ βήματα λείετο δ' ἔγχος
 βροθὸ βίην στυβαίῃ, τὴ δαίμοντι στίχας ἀφῆεν
 ἠέριον, τοῖσιν τε κατέστυετο ὀβριμωκασίῃ,

'and seized her spear — (the spear) heavy, great, and strong, with which she breaks the ranks of men, — of the brave warriors at whom she, the daughter of a mighty father, conceives anger.'

- Ε 862 τοῖς δ' ἄρ' ὑπὸ τρήμος εἶλεν Ἀχαιοὺς τε Γρῶνις τε
 εἰσέωντας· τοῖσιν ἔβραχ' Ἄρης ἔπος παλάρια.
 Ε 875 σοὶ πάντες μαχόμεσθα· σὺ γὰρ τοῖς ἄφρασι κοίφην,
 σιδερόφην, ἧ τ' αἶεν ἀήματα ἔργα μεμύλειν.
 Ε 892 μητρόσ τε μοῖος ἔστιν ἀπύχιστος, οὐκ ἐπισκῆτος.
 Ἴφρη· τὴν μὲν ἔργῳ στυβῆ δαίμονι ἀπέστυε.
 Ζ 136 δεινὸν εἶλος κατὰ κῆρα, θέτις δ' ὑπεδύετο κλέου
 δουρῆτα· κρατερὸς γὰρ ἔχε τρήμος ἀφῆρος ἰμοκλή.
 Ζ 289 εὐθ' ἔσαν αἱ τέκλαι παμφοῖαλα, ἔργα γυναικῶν
 Σιδωνίαν τὰς αὐτοῖς Ἀλέξανδρος θεοειδῆς
 ἤγαγε Σιδωνίβην.

In 290, Welcker, Nauck, and Madvig have proposed to read τοῖς (referring to τέκλαι) for τοῖς, but the change is directly opposed to Homeric usage, as is set forth in these examples. The position of Σιδωνίαν is inexplicable unless it forms the connecting link between what has preceded and the rest of its verse. It cannot be an attributive adjective with γυναικῶν. In 289, the reading παμφοῖαλα is recommended not only as required by the initial *tau* of γάρ, but also by the fact that its position after τέκλαι, and separated from it

by the caesura, is unusual unless the adjective follows as an appositive and in close connexion with the next clause. (See p. 116.)

Z 392 εὔτε πύλας ἴκανε διερχόμενος μέγα ἄστν,
Σκαίης, τῇ ἄρ' ἔμελλε διεξιμέναι πεδίονδε.

Z 497 αἴψα δ' ἔπειθ' ἴκανε δόμους ἐν ναετάνοντας
Ἑκτορος ἀνδροφόνοιο, κυχῆσατο δ' ἔνδοθι πολλές
ἀμφιπόλους, τῆσιν δὲ γόνον πάσῃσιν ἐνώρσεν.

In 499, ἀμφιπόλους is in apposition with πολλές, while Ἑκτορος 498 does not limit δόμους directly but is also in apposition. 'She came to the house, the house of Hector, and found within many women, maidservants,' etc.

Z 158 ὅς ῥ' ἐκ δήμου ἔλασεν, ἐπεὶ πολὺ φέρτερος ἦεν,
'Αργείων· Ζεὺς γάρ οἱ ὑπὸ σκήπτρῳ ἐδάμασεν.

In 159, commentators have been uncertain whether δήμον Ἀργείων or Βελλεροφόντην was to be supplied in thought as the object of ἐδάμασεν, but the analogy of the other passages requires that the object be supplied from the first word of the verse. Otherwise Ἀργείων is out of position. But if Ἀργείων is rather an appositive to δήμον than a limiting genitive with it, then Ἀργείους is to be supplied, rather than δήμον Ἀργείων, as the object of ἐδάμασεν.

A 558 ὡς δ' ὅτ' ὄνος παρ' ἄρουραν ἰὼν ἐβίησατο παῖδας
νωθῆς, ᾗ δὴ πολλὰ περὶ ῥόπαλ' ἀμφὶς ἐάγη.

Slightly different is

M 234 ἐξ ἄρα δὴ τοι ἔπειτα θεοὶ φρένας ἄλεσαν αὐτοί,
ὅς κέλεαι Ζηνὸς μὲν ἐριγδούποιο λαθέσθαι
βουλῶν, ἃς τέ μοι αὐτὸς ὑπέσχετο καὶ κατένευσε,

where Ζηνὸς should be construed with λαθέσθαι, while it is explained by the following verse; — it is not the prosaic 'to forget the counsels of Zeus.'

Σ 20 κείται Πάτροκλος, νίκυος δὲ δὴ ἀμφιμάχονται
γυμνοῦ· ἀτὰρ τά γε τεύχε' ἔχει κορυθαίολος Ἑκτωρ.

Σ 199 αἶ κέ σ' ὑποδείσαντες ἀπόσχονται πολέμοιο
Τρῶες, ἀναπνεύσωσι δ' ἀρήιοι νῆες Ἀχαιῶν
τειρόμενοι· ὀλίγη δὲ τ' ἀνάπνευσις πολέμοιο.

Τρῶες 200 forms a contrast to νῆες Ἀχαιῶν, and τειρόμενοι 201 suggests similarly ἀνάπνευσις.

- Σ 225 ἠνίοχοι δ' ἐκπληγεν, ἐπεὶ ἴδον ἀκάματον πῦρ
δαινὸν ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς μεγαθύμου Πηλείωνος
δαιόμενον· τὸ δὲ δαίε θεὰ γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη.
Σ 310 ὡς Ἔκτωρ ἀγόρευ', ἐπὶ δὲ Τρῶες κελάδησαν
νήπιοι· ἐκ γὰρ σφῶν φρένας εἴλετο Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη.
Σ 516 οἱ δ' ἴσαν· ἦρχε δ' ἄρα σφιν Ἄρης καὶ Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη,
ἄμφω χρυσεῖω, χρύσεια δὲ εἵματα ἔσθην,
καλῶ καὶ μεγάλω, σὺν τεύχεσιν, ὡς τε θεῶ περ,
ἄμφω ἀριζήλω· λαοὶ δ' ὑπ' ὀλίζονες ἦσαν.
Τ 357 ὡς δ' ὅτε ταρφειαὶ νηάδες Διὸς ἐκποτέονται
ψυχραὶ, ὑπὸ ῥιπῆς αἰθρηγενεῖος Βορέας.
Υ 316 μηδ' ὀπτό' ἂν Τροίῃ μαλερῶ πυρὶ πᾶσα δαίηται
δαιομένη, δαίωσι δ' ἀρήιοι νῆες Ἀχαιῶν.

The desire to secure such a connexion as we have been considering is the basis of the so-called 'epanalepsis.' *E.g.*

- Υ 371 τῷ δ' ἐγὼ ἀντίος εἶμι, καὶ εἰ πυρὶ χεῖρας ἔοικεν,
εἰ πυρὶ χεῖρας ἔοικε, μένος δ' αἰθῶνι σιδήρω.
Β 849 τηλόθεν ἐξ Ἀμυδῶνος, ἀπ' Ἀξιοῦ εὐρὸν ῥέοντος,
Ἀξιοῦ, οὐ κάλλιστον ὕδωρ ἐπικίδναται αἶαν.
Β 870 τῶν μὲν ἄρ' Ἀμφίμαχος καὶ Νάσσης ἠγησάσθην,
Νάσσης Ἀμφίμαχος τε, Νομίονος ἀγλαὰ τέκνα.
Ζ 153 ἔνθα δὲ Σίσυφος ἔσκεν, ὃ κέρδιστος γένετ' ἀνδρῶν,
Σίσυφος Αἰολίδης· ὃ δ' ἄρα Γλαῦκον τέκεθ' υἱόν.
Ζ 395 Ἀνδρομάχη, θυγάτηρ μεγαλήτορος Ἡετίωνος,
Ἡετίων, ὃς ἔναιεν ὑπὸ Πλάκῳ ὑληέσση.
Φ 85 γείνατο Λαοθόη, θυγάτηρ Ἄλταο γέροντος,
Ἄλταω, ὃς Πελέγεσσι φιλοπτολέμοισιν ἀνάσσει.
Ψ 641 οἱ δ' ἄρ' ἔσαν δίδυμοι· ὃ μὲν ἔμπεδον ἠνιόχευεν,
ἔμπεδον ἠνιόχευ', ὃ δ' ἄρα μάλιστα κέλευεν.

In X 331 "Ἐκτορ, ἀτάρ που ἔφης Ἀπατροκλῆ' ἐξεναρῖζων
σῶς ἔσσεσθ', ἐμὲ δ' οὐδὲν ὀπίζεις νόσφιν ἔοντα.
νήπια! τοῖο δ' ἀνευθεν ἀσσοσητῆρ μέγ' ἀμείνων
νηυσὶν ἐπὶ γλαφυρήσιν ἄγῳ μετόπισθε λελείμμην."

Bekker (1843) placed a comma at the close of 332, and a period after νήπια 333, and has been followed by later editors. But, when this is compared with similar passages, νήπια is seen to be construed with what follows.

X 418 λίσσωμ' ἀνέρα τοῦτον, ἀτάσθαλον ὄβριμοεργόν,
 ἦν πως ἡλικίην αἰδέσσεται ἢ δ' ἐλεήσῃ
 γῆρας. καὶ δέ νυ τῷ γε πατὴρ τοῖόςδε τέτυκται.
 Πηλεΐς, ὃς μιν ἔτικτε, καὶ ἔτρεφε πῆμα γενέσθαι
 Τρωσὶ· μάλιστα δ' ἐμοὶ περὶ πάντων ἄλγε' ἔθηκεν.

A recent edition translates ἡλικίην αἰδέσσεται by 'have shame before his equals,' saying that 'if ἡλικίην mean *my age*, then 420 is purely tautological.' I believe, however, that the thought may be considered complete at the close of each of these verses, and that 419 means 'if haply he may reverence my age and pity it.' Then ἡλικίην suggested γῆρας κτλ., 'my *old* age,—the age of his own father.' Then πατήρ suggested Πηλεΐς, which is modified in the rest of 421. Τρωσὶ 422 is introduced chiefly in order to form a full contrast with ἐμοί.

Ω 290 ἀλλ' εὐχέου σύ γ' ἔπειτα κελαινεφεὶ Κρονίωνι
 Ἴδαίῳ, ὃς τε Τροίην κατὰ πᾶσαν ὄραται.
 Ω 453 θύρην δ' ἔχε μόνος ἐπιβλής
 εἰλάτινος, τὸν τρεῖς μὲν ἐπιρρήσεσκον Ἀχαιοί,
 τρεῖς δ' ἀναοίγεσκον μεγάλην κληῖδα θυράων,
 τῶν ἄλλων· Ἀχιλεὺς δ' ἄρ' ἐπιρρήσεσκε καὶ αὐτός.
 Ω 468 ὡς ἄρα φωνήσας ἀπέβη πρὸς μακρὸν Ὀλυμπον
 Ἑρμείας· Πριάμος δ' ἐξ ἵππων ἄλτο χαμᾶζε.

Ἑρμείας 469 is not itself the subject of ἀπέβη (which is supplied easily from what has preceded), but is in apposition with that subject, and is added in order to form a marked contrast to Πριάμος.

Ω 478 χερσὶν Ἀχιλλῆος λάβε γούνατα καὶ κύσε χεῖρας
 δεινὰς ἀνδροφόνους, αἱ οἱ πολίης κτάνον υἱας.
 Ω 614 νῦν δέ που ἐν πέτρῃσιν, ἐν οὖρεσιν οἰσπόλοισιν,
 ἐν Σιπέλῳ, ὅθι φασὶ θεῶων ἔμμεναι εὐνὰς
 νυμφῶων, αἱ τ' ἀμφ' Ἀχελῷων ἐρρώσαντο.

νυμφῶων 616 is doubtless in apposition with θεῶων.

α 17 τῷ οἱ ἐπεκλώσαντο θεοὶ οἰκόνδε νέεσθαι
 εἰς Ἴθάκην, οὐδ' ἔνθα πεφυγμένος ἦεν ἀέθλων
 καὶ μετὰ οἴσι φίλοισι.

In this passage, εἰς Ἴθάκην is an appositive to οἰκόνδε, and καὶ μετὰ οἴσι φίλοισι to ἔνθα.

α 150 αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ πόσιος καὶ ἐδητύος ἐξ ἔρον ἔντο
 μνηστήρες τοῖσιν μὲν ἐνὶ φρεσὶν ἄλλα μεμῆλυν.

The ordinary punctuation of this passage is a comma after *μηροτήρας* and none after *ἔτα*. But *μηροτήρας* cannot be the subject of the preceding verb, according to Homeric usage. Nitzsch conjectures *μηροτήρατο τοῖσιν μιν*, and Ameis-Hentze places the comma after *ἔτα*, supposing that the logical subject of the apollipsis in 120 is at once taken up in an altered construction by *τοῖσιν μιν*. The truth seems to be that *μηροτήρας* is added as an appositive to the subject of *ἔτα*, and is in close connexion with the following clause. See the examples in which the article is expressed at the beginning of the verse in order to introduce the next clause. (P. 108.) *τοῖσιν μιν* is contrasted of course with *αὐτῶν Τρῳάωνος* 120.

α 120 ἀπορῶντος ἔτασθεν εἴρωε, ἔθελ' περ ἄλλω
ἔρχε' Ὀδυσσεύς τελευτόφρονος ἴσταντο πολλῶν.

In this passage some might be tempted to see only the ordinary Greek idiom of *ἄλλος* (cf. *οἱ τοῖσιν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ζῆνοι*), if it were not for other examples like the one immediately following, where *ἄλλος* is followed by an appositive.

α 132 πῶρ' ὃ αὐτὸς εἰσὶν ἄλλοι θεοὶ πολλοὶ ἐκαστὸν ἄλλω
μηροτήρα, μὴ ζῆνος . . . ὄκιστον εἴρωεσσι.
α 159 τοῖσιν μιν ταῦτα μέλα, κίθαρις καὶ ἀείρη,
βῆ', ἐπὶ ἄλλοτρίων βίοντι νηγεσσὸν εἴρωεσσι,
ἄρωε, σὺ δὲ πού λικέ' ὄστρα τούθρα ἄρωεσσι
αἴρω' εἰ' ἤγειρσθαι, ἢ εἰς ἀλλ' αἶμα κολύβει.

Clearly *βῆ'* 160 modifies *μέλα*, but is introduced as an afterthought in order to prepare the way for the rest of the verse; while *ἄρωε* is in apposition with the *ἄλλω* which is implied in *ἄλλοτρίων*. Both thought and grammatical construction are complete at the close of each of these verses.

α 197 ἄλλ' ἐπὶ πού ζῆνος κατεργασσάμενοι αἶρω ταῦτα
νήρω ἐν ἀφροσύτῃ, χαλεκοὶ δὲ μιν ἀνδρες ἔχουσιν
ἄρωε, αἶ' πού αἶων ἐρπασσάμενοι ἀκασσάμενοι.

Here *νήρω κτλ.* is added to explain the close of 197, while *ἄρωε* forms the connexion with the rest of its verse, which explains it.

α 210 πῶρ' γε τὸν ἐς Τροίην ἀναβήμενα, ἔθελ' περ ἄλλω
'Αργείων οἱ ἄρωεσσι ἔβαν κούλησ' ἐπὶ νηυσίν.
α 217 ὡς δὲ ἐγὼ γ' ὄφελον μάκαρος σὺ πού ἐμμενα υἱὸς
ἄρωε, σὺν κτείσσασθαι αἶωσ' ἐπὶ γῆρας ἔστερμα.

Only a veritable beginner would construe *μάκαρος* directly with *άνερος*, and fail to see that the latter is added simply in order to form a close connexion with the following clause.

In α 326 ὁ δ' Ἀχαιῶν νόστον ἄειδεν
 λυγρόν, ὃν ἐκ Τροίης ἐπετείλατο Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη,

the pause after *Τροίης* separates that from the following verb and connects it with the relative pronoun. Here, too, the adjective *λυγρόν* has a different effect from what it could have in the preceding verse. 'He was singing of the return of the Achaeans,—the sad return from Troy which Athena imposed upon them.' With this is to be compared

α 340 ταύτης δ' ἀποπαίε' ἀοιδῆς
 λυγρῆς, ἣ τέ μοι αἰὲν ἐνὶ στήθεσσι φίλον κῆρ,

where clearly the adjective *λυγρῆς* is explained by the following clause.

α 370 τόδε καλὸν ἀκουέμεν ἐστὶν ἀοιδῶ
 τοιοῦδ' οἷος ὃδ' ἐστί, θεοῖς ἐναλίγκιος αὐδήν.

Here *ἀκουέμεν κτλ.* is in apposition with *τόδε*, while the whole verse 371 is added in explanation of *ἀοιδῶ*, and the second half-verse of 371 is explanatory of *τοιοῦδε*.

α 441 βῆ ῥ' ἴμεν ἐκ θαλάμοιο, θύρην δ' ἐπέρυσσε κορώνη
 ἀργυρήν, ἐπὶ δὲ κληῖδ' ἐτάνυσσεν ἱμαντι.

β 21 τρεῖς δὲ οἱ ἄλλοι ἔσαν, καὶ ὁ μὲν μνηστήρων ὁμίλειν,
 Ἐθέρονομος, δύο δ' αἰὲν ἔχον πατρώια ἔργα.

β 65 ἄλλους δ' αἰδεσθήτε περικτίονας ἀνθρώπων,
 οἱ περὶ ναιετάουσι· θεῶν δ' ὑποδείσατε μῆνιν.

β 165 ἐγγυὶς ἐὼν τοῖσδεσσι φόνον καὶ κῆρα φυτεύει
 πάντεσσιν· πολέσιν δὲ καὶ ἄλλοισιν κακὸν ἔσται.

β 281 τῷ νῦν μνηστήρων μὲν ἔα βουλὴν τε νόον τε
 ἀφραδίων, ἐπεὶ οὐ τι νοήμονες οὐδὲ δίκαιοι.

β 405 ὡς ἄρα φωνήσασ' ἠγήσατο Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη
 καρπαλίμως· ὁ δ' ἔπειτα μετ' ἵχνη βαίνει θεοῖο.

γ 75 τὸν δ' αὖ Τηλέμαχος πεπνυμένος ἀντίον ἠῦδα
 θαρσήσας· αὐτὴ γὰρ ἐνὶ φρεσὶ θάρσος Ἀθήνη | θῆκε.

γ 93 κείνου λυγρὸν ἄλεθρον ἐνισπεῖν, εἴ που ὄππας
 ὀφθαλμοῖσι τεοῖσιν ἢ ἄλλου μῦθον ἀκουσας.

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the ὀφθαλμοῖσι is contrasted with ἄκουσας at the other end : verse ; compare the other collocation for emphasis, Ἄργείων σι quoted just below from δ 273.

- γ 297 αἶ μὲν ἄρ' ἐνθ' ἦλθον, σπουδῆ δ' ἦλυξαν ὀλεθρον
ἄνδρες, ἀτὰρ νῆας γε ποτὶ σπιλάδεσσιν ἔαζαν | κύματα.
- γ 437 χρυσὸν ἔδωχ'· ὁ δ' ἔπειτα βοὸς κέρασιν περιέχουεν
ἀσκήσας, ἴν' ἀγαλμα θεὰ κεχάροιτο ἰδοῦσα.
- γ 449 ἦλασεν ἄγχι στάς· πέλεκυς δ' ἀπέκοψε τένοντας
αὔχενιους, λῦσεν δὲ βοὸς μένος.
- δ 13 ἐπεὶ δὴ τὸ πρῶτον ἐγείνατο παῖδ' ἐρατεινήν,
Ἑρμιόνην, ἣ εἶδος ἔχε χρυσοῦς Ἄφροδίτης.
- δ 63 ἀλλ' ἀνδρῶν γένος ἐστὲ διοτρεφείων βασιλῆων
σκηπτούχων, ἐπεὶ σὺ κε κακοὶ τοιοῦσδε τέκοιεν.
- δ 131 χρυσῆν τ' ἠλακάτην τάλαρὸν θ' ὑπόκυκλον ὅπασσεν
ἀργύρεον, χρυσῷ δ' ἐπὶ χεῖλεα κεκράαντο.
- δ 272 ἵππῳ ἐνὶ ξεστοῦ, ἴν' ἐνήμεθα πάντες ἄριστοι
Ἄργείων Τρώεσσι φόνον καὶ κῆρα φέροντες.
- δ 534 τὸν δ' οὐκ εἶδὸτ' ὀλεθρον ἀνήγαγε καὶ κατέπεφνεν
δειπνίσσας, ὡς τίς τε κατάκτανε βοῦν ἐπὶ φάτῃ.
- δ 719 περὶ δὲ δμῳαὶ μινύριζον
πᾶσαι, ὅσαι κατὰ δώματ' ἔσαν, νέαι ἦδὲ παλαιαί.
- ε 105 φησὶ τοὶ ἄνδρα παρῆναι οἰζυρώτατον ἄλλων,
τῶν ἀνδρῶν, οἳ ἄστν περὶ Πριάμοιο μάχοντο.
- ε 346 τῇ δέ, τόδε κρήδεμνον ὑπὸ στέροιο τανύσσαι
ἄμβροτον· οὐδέ τί τοι παθίειν δέος οὐδ' ἀπολείσθαι.
- ζ 34 ἦδη γάρ σε μῶνται ἀριστῆες κατὰ δῆμον
πάντων Φαίηκων, ὅθι τοι γένος ἐστὶ καὶ αὐτῇ.
- ζ 54 ἐρχομένῳ ξύμβλητο μετὰ κλειτοῦς βασιλῆας
ἐς βουλήν, ἵνα μιν κάλειον Φαίηκες ἀγαυοί.
- ζ 176 τῶν δ' ἄλλων σου τίνα οἶδα
ἀνθρώπων, οἳ τῆνδε πόλιν καὶ γαίαν ἔχουσιν.
- ζ 181 καὶ ὁμοφροσύνην ὀπάσειαν
ἑσθλήν· οὐ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ γε κρείσσον καὶ ἄρειον,
ἣ ὅθ' ὁμοφρονέοντε νοήμασιν οἶκον ἔχῃτον
ἀνήρ ἠδὲ γυνή.

In this passage, *ἔσθλῆν* is added in order to introduce the rest of the verse, and *ἀνὴρ ἠδὲ γυνή* is in apposition with the subject of *ἔχρητον*.

η 64 τὸν μὲν ἄκουρον ἔοντα βάλ' ἀργυρότοξος Ἀπόλλων
νύμφιον, ἐν μεγάρῳ μίαν οἶην παῖδα λιπόντα
'Αρήτην· τὴν δ' Ἀλκίνοος ποιήσασα' ἄκοιτιν.

θ 100 νῦν δ' ἐξέλθωμεν καὶ ἀέθλων πειρηθῶμεν
πάντων, ὡς χ' ὁ ξείνος ἐνίσπη οἴσι φίλοισιν
οἴκαδε νοστήσας, ὅσσον περιγιγνόμεθ' ἄλλων
πίξ τε παλαιμοσύνη τε καὶ ἀλμασιν ἠδὲ πόδεσσιν.

Here too the thought is fairly complete at the close of each verse.

ι 270 Ζεὺς δ' ἐπιτιμήτωρ ἱκετάων τε ξείνων τε
ξείνιος, ὅς ξείνοισιν ἄμ' αἰδοίοισιν ὀπηδεῖ.

κ 38 ὦ πόποι, ὡς ὄδε πᾶσι φίλος καὶ τίμιός ἐστιν
ἀνθρώποις, ὄτεινός τε πόλιν καὶ γαίαν ἱκῆται.

κ 159 ὁ μὲν ποταμόνδε κατήκεν ἐκ νομοῦ ὕλης
πύμενος· διὴ γάρ μιν ἔχεν μένος ἡελίοιο.

κ 208 βῆ δ' ἰέναι, ἅμα τῷ γε δῶμα καὶ εἰκοσ' ἑταῖροι
κλαίοντες· κατὰ δ' ἄμμε λίπον γούωντας ὄπισθεν.

κ 348 ἀμφίπολοι δ' ἄρα τέως μὲν ἐνὶ μεγάροισι πένοντο
τέσσαρες, αἱ οἱ δῶμα κάτα δροῦστεραι ἔασιν.

λ 448 πάσις δέ οἱ ἦν ἐπὶ μαζῶν
νήπιος, ὅς που νῦν γε μετ' ἀνδρῶν ἴζει ἀριθμῶ,
δλβιος· ἦ γὰρ τόν γε πατὴρ φίλος ἄφεται ἐλθών.

In 449, *νήπιος* is brought over from the former verse as an introduction to the contrast which follows, while in 450 the exclamation *δλβιος* is explained by the rest of the verse.

μ 21 σχέτλιοι, οἳ ζῶοντες ὑπήλθετε δῶμα' Αἶδαο,
δισθανέες, ὅτε τ' ἄλλοι ἄπαξ θνήσκουσ' ἀνθρώποι.

μ 62 τῇ μὲν τ' οὐδὲ ποτιγὰ παρέρχεται οὐδὲ πέλειαι
τρήρωνες, ταί τ' ἀμβροσίην Διὶ πατρὶ φέρουσιν.

ο 223 σχεδόθεν δέ οἱ ἦλυθεν ἀνὴρ
τηλεδαπέε, φεύγων ἐξ Ἄργεος ἄνδρα κατακτάς,
μάντις· ἀτὰρ γενεὴν γε Μελάμποδος ἔκγονος ἦεν.

φ 11 ἐνθα δὲ τόξον ἔκετο παλίντονον ἠδὲ φαρέτρην
ιοδόκος, παλλοὶ δ' ἔνεσαν στονόοντες διστοῖ.

φ 25 ἐπεὶ δὴ Διὸς υἱὸν ἀφίκετο καρτερόθυμον,
 φῶθ' Ἡρακλῆα, μεγάλων ἐπίστορα ἔργων,
 ὃς μιν ξεῖνον ἐόντα κατέκτανεν ᾧ ἐνὶ οἴκῳ,
 σχέτλιος, οὐδὲ θεῶν ὄπιν ἠδέσατ' οὐδὲ τράπεζαν
 τῆν, ἣν οἱ παρέθηκεν· ἔπειτα δὲ πέφνε καὶ αὐτόν.

ω 83 ὡς κεν τηλεφανῆς ἐκ ποντόφιν ἀνδράσιν εἶη
 τοῖς, οἳ νῦν γεγάασι καὶ οἳ μετόπισθεν ἔσονται.

Homer's habit of closing the thought with the verse creates a strong presumption against the received punctuation in passages like

X 249 τὸν πρότερος προσέειπε μέγας κορυθαίολος Ἴκτωρ·
 "οὐ σ' ἔτι, Πηλέος υἱέ, φοβήσομαι, ὡς τὸ πάρος περ
 τρίς περὶ ἄστῃ μέγα Πριάμου δῖον οὐδέ ποτ' ἔτλην
 μῆναι ἐπερχόμενον· νῦν αὐτὴ με θυμὸς ἀνήκεν
 στήμεναι ἀντία σείω· ἔλομ' κεν ἢ κεν ἀλοίην."

Here a colon should stand at the close of 250, as in the edition of Heyne (Wolf has a period). The following verse follows in a sort of apposition with τὸ πάρος περ. To place a comma after φοβήσομαι and connect ὡς τὸ πάρος περ with δῖον is to neglect the indications of Homeric rhythm.

Similarly Bekker (1858) was right in punctuating

X 129 βέλτερον αὐτ' ἔριδι ξυνελαυνόμεν ὅτι τάχιστα·
 εἶδομεν ὀπποτέρῳ κεν Ὀλύμπιος εὖχος ὀρέξῃ,

instead of with a period after ξυνελαυνόμεν. Compare

γ 17 ἀλλ' ἄγε νῦν ἰθὺς κίε Νέστορος ἵπποδάμοιο·
 εἶδομεν ἦν τινα μῆτιν ἐνὶ στήθεσσι κέκευθεν.

In passages like

α 197 ἀλλ' ἔτι που ζωὸς κατερύκεται εὐραί πόντῳ
 νήσῳ ἐν ἀμφιρύτῃ, χαλεποὶ δὲ μιν ἄνδρες ἔχουσιν
 ἄγριοι οἳ που κείνον ἐρκακώσω' ἀέκοντα,

commas should be placed at the close of the verse (197, 198), in order to mark the relation of the succeeding verse and to make clear that ἄγριοι (for instance) is not construed exactly like χαλεποί.

In other passages also the punctuation may be revised to advantage in accordance with these principles. For instance,

X 285 νῦν αὐτ' ἐμὸν ἔγχος ἄλευα
 χάλκεον· ὡς δὴ μιν σφ' ἐν χροῖ πᾶν κομίσαιω·
 καὶ κεν ἐλαφρότερος ἅπλομος Τρώεσσι γένοιτο
 σείω καταφθιμένοιο· Ἄσδ' γάρ σφισι πῆμα μέγιστον.

The usual punctuation is given above. Some editors place a full stop instead of a colon, at the close of 286. The Homeric style seems to demand a comma after 286 and another after 287. Verse 287 gives the result of the wish of 286. The first hemistich of 288 simply repeats the condition which is implied two lines above, as Lange said. The suggestion that 288 was an interpolation appears to have been based upon oblivion of Homer's habit of repeating such clauses. The comparative indifference which has been shown toward punctuation since Nicanor's time, is shown in Hecabe's lament

X 431 τέκνον, ἐγὼ δειλή· τί νυ βείομαι αἰνὰ παθούσα,

which, until Düntzer's edition, had no colon at the caesural pause. What the construction really is, appears from Andromache's corresponding lament

X 477 Ἔκτορ, ἐγὼ δύστηνος· ἰῆ ἄρα γεινόμεθ' αἴσῃ.

In K 252 ἄσπρα δὲ δὴ προβέβηκε, παροίχωνκε δὲ πλέων νύξ
τῶν δύο μοιράων, ἄτριτάτη δ' ἔτι μοῖρα λείλειπται,

if 253 is not to be rejected with most authorities, the rhythm of the verse strongly favors the construction of δύο as nominative, in apposition with πλέων νύξ, and of τῶν μοιράων as partitive genitive.

In Λ 653 εὖ δὲ σὺ οἶσθα, γεραῖε διατρεφές, οἶος ἐκείνος
δεινὸς ἀνὴρ· τάχα κεν καὶ ἀναίτιον αἰτιόητο,

Bekker (1858) was right in placing a stop at the close of 653; but Nauck's colon seems better than Bekker's period or Doederlein's comma, to indicate that δεινὸς ἀνὴρ is in apposition with οἶος. Doederlein compares

O 93 οἶσθα καὶ αὐτή,
οἶος ἐκείνου θυμός, ἰπερφιάλος καὶ ἀπηγής,

and Φ 108 οἶχ' ὄραας οἶος καὶ ἐγὼ, καλὸς τε μέγας τε,

where the adjectives are generally recognized as in apposition with the relative pronoun.

Scholars must not allow the traditional punctuation to play the despot in their Homeric studies, any more than the traditional division into books. Most details of punctuation have no support in ancient authorities.

HOMERIC RHYTHM USED TO FORM PARENTHESIS.

For the interpretation of the Homeric poems, the student must note that many verses and half-verses are parenthetical, and that the construction may be continued without reference to them. Easy cases are :

- Ε 907 αἱ δ' αὖτις πρὸς δῶμα Διὸς μεγάλοιο νέοντο,
(Ἦρῃ τ' Ἀργεΐῃ καὶ Ἀλαλκομενῆϊς Ἀθήνῃ,)
παύσασαι βροτολαγὸν Ἄρην ἀνδροκτασιῶων.
- Δ 22 ἦ τοι Ἀθηναίῃ ἀκέων ἦν οὐδέ τι εἶπεν,
(σκυζομένη Διὶ πατρί, χόλος δέ μιν ἄγριος ἦρειν·)
Ἦρῃ δ' οὐκ ἔχαδε στήθος χόλον, ἀλλὰ προσηΐδα.
- Χ 279 ἤμβροτες, οὐδ' ἄρα πῶ τι, θεοῖς ἐπιείκελ' Ἀχιλλεῦ,
ἐκ Διὸς ἠεῖδης τὸν ἐμὸν μόνον· ἦ τοι ἔφησ γε·
(ἀλλὰ τις ἀρτιεπῆς καὶ ἐπίκλοπος ἔπλεο μύθων,)
ᾧφρα σ' ὑποδείσας μένος ἀλκῆς τε λάθωμαι.

At the close of 280 a comma should stand, and not a colon, since 282 depends on ἔφησ γε. 'You asserted that my death was certain, in order to frighten me.'

- Χ 412 λαοὶ μὲν ῥα γέροντα μόγις ἔχον ἀσχαλῶντα
(ἐξελθεῖν μεμαῶτα πυλάων Δαρδανιάων)
πάντας δὲ λιτάνευε κυλινδόμενος κατὰ κόπρον.

Here ἐξελθεῖν μεμαῶτα is a repetition in different form of ἀσχαλῶντα.

- Χ 340 ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν χαλκὸν τε αἶλις χρυσὸν τε δέδεξο
(δῶρα, τὰ τοι δώσουσι πατῆρ καὶ πότνια μήτηρ),
σῶμα δὲ οἰκαδ' ἐμὸν δόμεναι πάλιν.
- Χ 194 ὄσσακι δ' ὀρμήσειε πυλάων Δαρδανιάων
(ἀντίον ἀΐξασθαι, ἐνδμήτους ὑπὸ πύργους,)
εἴ πως οἱ καθύπερθεν ἀλάλκοιεν βελείεσσιν.

In 194, πυλάων is to be construed with the 'verb of aiming,' ὀρμήσειε, and not with the adverb ἀντίον. Compare

- Ξ 488 ὠρμήθη δ' Ἀκάμαντος· ὁ δ' οὐχ ὑπέμεινεν ἐρωήν.
- Δ 334 ἔστασαν, ὅππότε πύργος Ἀχαιῶν ἄλλος ἐπελθὼν
Τρώων ὀρμήσειε καὶ ἄρξειαν πολέμοιο.
- Φ 595 Πηλείδης ὠρμήσατ' Ἀγήνορος ἀντιθείω.
- Ο 693 ὧς Ἐκτωρ ἴθυσε νεὸς κνανοπρώροιο
ἀντίος ἀΐξας.

- X 199 ὡς δ' ἐν ὄνειρῳ οὐ δύναται φεύγοντα διώκειν·
 (οὐτ' ἄρ' ὁ τὸν δύναται ὑποφεύγειν οὐθ' ὁ διώκειν·)
 ὡς ὁ τὸν οὐ δύνατο μάρψαι ποσὶν οὐδ' ὅς ἀλύξαι.
- X 157 τῇ ῥα παραδραμέτην, φεύγων, ὁ δ' ὄπισθε διώκων¹
 (πρόσθε μὲν ἐσθλὸς ἔφευγε, δίωκε δέ μιν μέγ' ἀμείνων,)
 καρπαλίμως, ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἱερόμον οὐδὲ βοείην
 ἀρνύσθη.

The reference of καρπαλίμως 159 has troubled commentators, who generally construe the adverb with ἔφευγε. Bekker condemns 158, perhaps failing to notice how many analogies can be found for such parenthetical verses. The second hemistich of 157 — 'in flight, and the other behind in pursuit' — suggests 158.

- γ 137 τῷ δὲ καλεσσαμένῳ ἀγορὴν ἐς πάντας Ἀχαιοῦς,
 (μάψ, ἀτὰρ οὐ κατὰ κόσμον, ἐς ἥλιον καταδύντα,
 οἱ δ' ἦλθον οἴῳ βεβαρηότες νῆες Ἀχαιῶν,)
 μῦθον μυθείσθη, τοῦ εἵνεκα λαὸν ἄγειραν.
- γ 191 πάντας δ' Ἴδομενεὺς Κρήτην εἰσήγαγ' ἐταίρους,
 (αἱ φύγον ἐκ παλέμου, πάντος δὲ οἱ οὐ τιν' ἀπήγυρα).
- γ 307 κατὰ δ' ἔκτανε πατροφονῆα,
 (Αἰγισθον δολόμητι, ὃ οἱ πατέρα κλυτὸν ἔκτα.)
 ἦ τοι ὁ τὸν κτείνας δαίνυ τάφον Ἀργείοισι.
- γ 346 Ζεὺς τό γ' ἀλεξήσεια καὶ ἀθάνατοι θεοὶ ἄλλοι,
 ὡς ὑμεῖς παρ' ἐμείο θοῆν ἐπὶ νῆα κίοιτε
 ὡς τέ τευ ἦ παρὰ πάμπαν ἀνείμονος ἠδὲ πενιχροῦ,
 (ῶ οὐ τι χλαῖναι καὶ ῥήγεα πόλλ' ἐνὶ οἴκῳ,
 350 οὐτ' αὐτῷ μαλακῶς οὔτε ξεῖνοισιν ἐνεύδειν.)
 αὐτὰρ ἐμοὶ πάρα μὲν χλαῖναι καὶ ῥήγεα καλά.
- γ 380 ἀλλὰ ἄνασσ' Ἰλῆθι, δίδωθι δέ μοι κλέος ἐσθλόν,
 (αὐτῷ καὶ παιδεσσι καὶ αἰδοίῃ παράκοιτι·)
 σοὶ δ' αὖ ἐγὼ βρέξω βοῦν ἦνιν εὐρυμέτωπον
 ἀδμήτην, ἦν οὐ πω ὑπὸ ζυγὸν ἦγαγεν ἀνήρ.
 δ 20 τῷ δ' αὐτ' ἐν προθύροισι δόμων αὐτῷ τε καὶ ἵππῳ,
 (Τηλέμαχος θ' ἦρωσ καὶ Νέστορος ἀγλαὸς υἱός,)
 στήσαν. ὁ δὲ προμολῶν ἴδετο κρείων Ἐτεωνεύς,
 (ἄτηρὸς θεράπων Μενελάου κυδαλίμοιο,)
 βῆ δ' ἱμεν ἀγγελίων διὰ δώματα ποιμένι λαῶν.

¹ Cf. X 200 quoted just above.

- δ 52 χέρνιβα δ' ἀμφίπολος προχόῳ ἐπέχευε φέρουσα
(καλῇ χρυσεῖῃ ὑπὲρ ἀργυρέου λέβητος)
νίψασθαι, παρὰ δὲ ξεστὴν ἐτάνυσσε τράπεζαν.
- δ 602 σὺ γὰρ πεδίοιο ἀνάσσεις
(εὐρέος, ᾧ ἐνὶ μὲν λωτὸς πολὺς, ἐν δὲ κύπειρον
πυροί τε ζεαί τε ἰδ' εὐρυφνὲς κρὶ λευκόν.)
ἐν δ' Ἰθάκῃ οὐτ' ἄρ' δρόμοι εὐρέες οὔτε τι λειμών.
- δ 722 κλύτε, φίλαι· πέρι γάρ μοι Ὀλύμπιος ἄλγ' ἔδωκεν
(ἐκ πασέων, ὅσσαι μοι ὁμοῦ τράφεν ἠδὲ γέγοντο·)
ἢ πρὶν μὲν πόσιν ἰσθλὸν ἀπώλεσα θυμολέοντα,
(παντοίῃς ἀρετῆσι κεκασμένον ἐν Δαναοῖσιν
ἰσθλόν, τοῦ κλέος εὐρὺ καθ' Ἑλλάδα καὶ μέσον Ἄργος·)
νῦν αὖ παιδὶ ἀγαπητὸν ἀνηρέψαντο θύελλαι
ἄκλεια ἐκ μεγάρων, οὐδ' ὄρμηθέντος ἄκουσα.
- ε 5 τοῖσι δ' Ἀθηναίῃ λέγε κήδεα πόλλ' Ὀδυσῆος
(μνησαμένη· μέλε γάρ οἱ εἶν ἐν δώμασι νύμφης·)
"Ζεῦ πάτερ, ἠδ' ἄλλοι μάκαρες θεοὶ αἰὲν ἔόντες."
- ε 47 εἴλετο δὲ ῥάβδον, τῇ τ' ἀνδρῶν ὄμματα θέλγει,
(ὣν ἐθέλει, τοὺς δ' αὐτε καὶ ὑπνώοντας ἐγείρει·)
τὴν μετὰ χερσὶν ἔχων πέτετο κρατὺς ἀργειφύνης.
- ε 421 ἠέ τί μοι καὶ κῆτος ἐπισσεύῃ μέγα δαίμων
(ἐξ ἄλλος, οἶά τε παλλὰ τρέφει κλυτὸς Ἀμφιτρίτης)
οἶδα γάρ, ὡς μοι ὀδώσεται κλυτὸς ἐννοσίγαιος.
- ζ 232 ὡς δ' ὅτε τις χρυσὸν περιχεύεται ἀργύρῳ ἀνήρ
(ἔδριε, ὃν Ἥφαιστος δέδαιεν καὶ Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη
τέχνην παντοίην, χαρίεντα δὲ ἔργα τελείει.)
ὡς ἄρα τῷ κατέχευε χάριν κεφαλῇ τε καὶ ὤμοις.
- ζ 278 ἢ τινά που πλαγχθέντα κομίσσατο ἦς ἀπὸ νηὸς
(ἀνδρῶν τηλεδαπῶν, ἐπεὶ οὐ τινες ἐγγύθεν εἰσὶν·)
. . . βέλτερον, εἰ καὶ τῇ περ ἐποιομένη πόσιν εὐρεν
(ἄλλοθεν· ἢ γὰρ τοῖσδε γ' ἀτιμάζει κατὰ δῆμον
Φαίηκας, τοί μιν μνῶνται πολέες τε καὶ ἰσθλοί).
ὡς ἐρέουσιν, ἐμοὶ δέ κ' ὀνειδέα ταῦτα γένοιτο.
- ζ 321 δύσετό τ' ἥελιος καὶ τοὶ κλυτὸν ἄλσος ἴκοντο
(ἴρον Ἀθηναίης, ἰν' ἄρ' ἔζετο διὸς Ὀδυσσεύς).
αὐτίκ' ἔπειτ' ἠῤῥατο Διὸς κούρη μέγαλοιο·
κλυθί μεν, αἰγιόχοιο Διὸς τέκος, ἀτρυνύωη·
νῦν δὴ πέρ μεν ἄκουσον, ἐπεὶ πάρος οὐ ποτ' ἄκουσας
(δαιομένου, ὅτε μ' ἔρραιε κλυτὸς ἐννοσίγαιος).

θ 372 οἱ δ' ἐπεὶ οὖν σφαῖραν καλὴν μετὰ χερσὶν ἔλοντο,
(πορφύρεην, τὴν σφιν Πόλυβος ποίησε δαΐφρων,)
τὴν ἕτερος ῥίπτασκε ποτὶ νέφεα σκίοεντα.

θ 492 ἀλλ' ἄγε δὴ μετάβηθι καὶ ἵππου κόσμον ἄεισον
(δουρατίου, τὸν Ἐπειὸς ἐποίησεν σὺν Ἀθήνῃ,)
ὄν ποτ' ἐς ἀκρόπολιν δόλον ἤγαγε δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς.

Perhaps the most noticeable of all brief Homeric parentheses is in Helen's lament,

Ω 762 “Ἐκτορ, ἐμῶ θυμῶ δαίρων πολὺ φίλτατε πάντων,
(ἦ μὲν μοι πόσις ἐστὶν Ἀλέξανδρος θεοειδής,
ὅς μ' ἄγαγε Τροίηνδ' ὡς πρὶν ὤφελλον ὀλέσθαι,)
765 ἦδη γὰρ νῦν μοι τόδ' εἰκοστόν ἐτος ἐστίν,
ἐξ οὗ κείθεν ἔβην καὶ ἐμῆς ἀπελήλυθα πάτρης.”

The failure to notice that 763 f. were parenthetical, led an editor to say that ‘Helen’s speech is all disjointed with passionate anguish’! Even Bekker and Nauck put a full stop at the close of 764, and thus separate 765 from πολὺ φίλτατε 762, to which it refers. Helen’s thought is simply that Hector is the dearest to her of all Priam’s sons, since during these twenty trying years he has never reproached her. But the mention of δαίρων ‘husband’s brothers,’ involuntarily causes the parenthetical exclamation, ‘Alas and indeed, Paris *is* my husband! I wish he were not!’ 763 f. were even condemned by Düntzer as containing an ‘absurd asseveration that Paris was her husband, which no one in Troy doubted.’

PAUSE IN SENSE AT THE CAESURA.

That Homer is more inclined than the later Greek and the Roman poets to make a pause, though it be but slight, at the close of the verse, may be considered as illustrated by the foregoing examples. This pause at the close of the verse has been used properly to explain the *syllaba anceps* which is allowed there. Of the first forty lines of the Iliad, twenty end with an apparent trochee, and occasionally this is accompanied by a hiatus, as διαστήτην ἐρίσαντε | Ἄτρείδης τε ἀναξ ἀνδρῶν A 6 f. The poet himself thus marks the pause as clearly as could be desired. From such a distinct metrical pause in itself we should have a right to infer an *original* pause in the thought at that point. But Homer allows at the main caesura the same metrical

freedom as at the break between two verses, viz. the *syllaba anceps* and hiatus.¹ Examples are not needed to show that hiatus is freely permitted in the third foot. Indeed, the poet seems to prefer hiatus to elision at that point, since elision would tend to bind the two parts more closely together. Compare

A 565 ἄλλ' ἀκίονσα κάθησο, ἄμψ̄ δ' ἐπιπέθειο μύθη.

That a short syllable might take the place of a long syllable, before a caesural pause, was not observed by scholars at first, since they were accustomed to explain the quantity of not a few syllables as 'lengthened under the *ictus*.' But in verses like

α 40 ἐκ γὰρ Ὀρέσται ἄτις̄ ἔσσεται Ἀτρείδαι

no one need hesitate to explain the use of the final syllable of Ὀρέσται in exactly the same way as the final syllable of Ἀτρείδαι. If at the close of the verse the slight following pause is sufficient to fill up the lacking quantity, and if scholars are right in saying that in this place a short syllable plus a short musical rest may be used for a long syllable, then analogy allows the assertion that at the principal caesura as well, a short syllable plus a short musical rest may be used for a long syllable. Such a musical rest in the midst of a sentence, and especially between words which are bound in close grammatical union, involves distinct emphasis upon the preceding word. This emphasis is generally fully justified by the connexion. In the verse quoted above as an illustration, α 40, Orestes is made prominent since apparently Aegisthus had no thought of danger from him, with Agamemnon slain and Menelaus out of the way. 'Nay,' said Hermes, 'Orestes will take vengeance for his father.'

The influence of the caesural pause in the verse and, hence, the importance of observing it closely in the interpretation of the poems, seem to have been too much overlooked. Editors and translators have made too little use of this aid, just as they have often neglected to observe the position of words in the verse and the separation of words by the close of the verse. The contrast at the beginning of the Twenty-second Book of the Iliad is lost or mistaken (appar-

¹ Similarly Shakspeare allows himself after the caesura the same metrical freedom as in the first foot of the verse; while before the caesura the 'double' or 'feminine' ending is allowed just as at the close of the verse.

ently) not only by such amateurs as Chapman and Lord Derby, but also by such scholars as Professor Newman and Mr. Myers.

Χ 1 ὧς οἱ μὲν κατὰ ἄστυ, ἄπεφυζότες ἤτε νεβροί,
 ἰδρὸ' ἀπεψύχοντο, πῖον τ' ἀκείοντό τε δίψαν
 κεκλιμένοι καλῆσιν ἐπάλξεσιν· αὐτὰρ Ἀχαιοὶ
 τείχεος ἄσσον ἴσαν, σάκε' ὤμοισι κλίναντες.
 5 Ἔκτορα δ' αὐτοῦ μείναι, ὀλοὴ μοῖρα πέδησεν
 Ἴλιου προπάροιθε, πυλῶν τε Σκαυῶν.
 αὐτὰρ Πηλείωνα, προσήυδα Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων.

Old editions generally, I think, have no punctuation within the first verse; Heyne and Wolf placed a comma after *πεφυζότες*, Bekker placed the comma after *ἄστυ*. The ordinary school-boy is divided in opinion, whether *οἱ μὲν* is contrasted with *αὐτὰρ Ἀχαιοί* 3 (to this most boys incline) or with *αὐτὰρ Πηλείωνα* 7. But the poet has done his best to show that the Trojans within the city are contrasted with the one Trojan who remains before the gates. The pause in the first verse creates a strong presumption that the preceding *κατὰ ἄστυ* is contrasted with something. But *κατὰ ἄστυ* cannot be contrasted with *τείχεος ἄσσον*. Nothing remains for the contrast but *αὐτοῦ μείναι* 5, in the same position of the verse, before the caesural pause. And *αὐτοῦ* is emphatic also in itself, being prevailing in Homer a true intensive,—not simply ‘there,’ but ‘right there,’—while it is rendered doubly emphatic here by the fact that the whole of the following verse is added in apposition with it,—‘right there, before Ilios and the Scaean Gate.’ Such a contrast as the poet has made in this passage deserves to be clearly marked. Similar contrasts, which are often overlooked, may be found on almost every page of the Homeric poems. For instance,

α 6 ἄλλ' οὐδ' ὧς ἐτάρους, ἔρρισατο ἰέμενός περ·
 αὐτῶν γὰρ σφετέρησιν, ἀτασθαλίησιν ὄλοντο,
 νήπιοι, οἳ κατὰ βούς Ὑπερίονος Ἡελίοιο
 ἦσθιον· αὐτὰρ ὁ τοῖσιν, ἀφείλετο νόστιμον ἡμῶν.
 10 τῶν ἀμόθεν γε, θεῶν θύγατερ Διός, εἰπὲ καὶ ἡμῖν.

Just as truly as *ἐτάρους* is made emphatic by the following pause, so truly does *τοῖσιν* 9 receive like prominence for the sake of the same contrast, and he would be bold who should deny this of *σφετέρησιν*. In line 10, the rhythm indicates that *θύγατερ Διός* is not immediately connected with *θεῶν*.

In general, Homer seems to use the pause in the verse just as distinctly to mark a break or separation as the pause at the close of the verse.¹

The parenthetical nature of the second hemistich is obvious in passages like

X 25 τὸν δ' ὁ γέρον Πριάμος πρῶτος ἶδεν ὀφθαλμοῖσιν
παμφαίνονθ' ὥστ' ἀστέρ' ἄπεσσύμενον πεδίοιο,
ὅς ῥά τ' ὀπώρης εἶσιν, κτλ., where the relative *ὅς* 27 refers not to *πεδίοιο*, nor to the subject of *ἄπεσσύμενον*, but to *ἀστέρα*.

Another illustration of the emphasis afforded by the caesural pause, even where no mark of punctuation could stand, is found in

X 261 "Ἐκτορ, μή μοι, ἄλαστε, συνημοσύνας ἀγόρευε.
ὡς οὐκ ἔστι λέονσι, καὶ ἀνδράσιν ὄρκια πιστά,
οὐδὲ λύκοι τε καὶ ἄρνες, ὁμόφρονα θυμὸν ἔχουσι,
ἀλλὰ κακὰ φρονέουσι, διαμπερές ἑλλήλοισιν,
265 ὡς οὐκ ἔστ' ἐμὲ καὶ σέ, φιλήμεναι."

Here the comparison between *λύκοι τε καὶ ἄρνες* and *ἐμὲ καὶ σέ* is marked chiefly by the position of the two clauses before the verse-pause.

Cf. a 45 "ὦ πάτερ ἡμέτερε, Κρονίδη, ὑπάτε κρείοντων,
καὶ λίην κείνός γε, εἰκότι κείται δλίθρῳ,
ὡς ἀπόλοιτο καὶ ἄλλος, ὅστις τοιαῦτά γε ῥέζοι·
ἀλλὰ μοι ἀμφ' Ὀδυσῆι, δαίφρονι δαίεται ἦτορ."

Here *κείνός γε*, *καὶ ἄλλος*, and *Ὀδυσῆι* stand immediately before the trochaic caesura of the third foot, and thus are brought into immediate connexion and contrast with each other, while in 45, *Κρονίδη* is marked as in apposition with *πάτερ*.

In a 222 οὐ μὲν τοι γενεήν γε, θεοὶ νώνυμον ὀπίσσω
θήκαν, ἐπεὶ σέ γε τοῖον ἐγείνατο Πηνελόπεια,

the school-boy is saved from error, perhaps, if he remembers the important principle that a translation which preserves the order of

¹ I can only refer here to the works of two scholars who maintain the origin of the Homeric verse from a combination of two tetrameters: Professor F. D. Allen, Ueber den Ursprung des homerischen Versmasses, in Kuhn's Zeitschrift xxiv; and Usener, Altgriechischer Versbau. My observations have not been consciously affected by these views, although these seem very probable.

the words, but neglects to keep the exact construction, is often more literal than one which preserves the grammatical construction of the original but neglects the order of words. But after all, it is the caesura which gives the first hint that τοῖον is all emphatic, and that ἐγείνατο Πηνελόπεια is simply part of the poetic form of statement ('Penelope's son').

The first part of the verse in Homer in general bears the burden of thought. The last part of the verse is often simply illustrative and explanatory. Thus

Η 11 Ἐκτωρ δ' Ἡιονῆα βάλ' ἄγχει ὀξύνοντι
 ἀχίν' ὑπὸ στυφάνης ἄνυχάλκου, λύσε δὲ γυνῖα.
 Γλαῦκος δ' Ἴππολόχοιο πάϊς, Λυκίων ἀγὸς ἀνδρῶν,
 Ἴφίνοον βάλε δουρὶ κατὰ κρατερὴν ὑσμίνην
 Δεξιόδην ἵππων ἐπιαλμένων ὠκείων,
 ἄμον ἄδ' ἐξ ἵππων χαμάδις πέσε, λύντο δὲ γυνῖα.

In most such cases, although not always, the line between the necessary and the ornamental and picturesque part of the verse is drawn at the caesura in the third foot.

α 11 ἐνθ' ἄλλοι μὲν πάντες, ἄσοι φύγον αἰτὴν ἄλεθρον,
 οἴκοι ἴσαν ἄπόμενόν τε πεφηνγότες ἠδὲ θάλασσαν·
 τὸν δ' οἶον ἄνόστου κεχηρμένον ἠδὲ γυναικὸς
 νέμφη πότνι' ἔρκει ἄΚαλυψῶ δια θεῶων
 15 ἐν σπείσοι γλαφυροῖσι, ἄλλαιωμένη πόσιν εἶναι.
 ἄλλ' ὅτι δὴ ἔτος ἤλθε ἄπεριπλομένων ἐνιαυτῶν,
 τῷ οἱ ἐπεκλώσαντο θεοὶ οἰκόνδε νέεσθαι κτλ.

The last part of each of these verses is not otiose. It is not padding, nor a mere tag. To omit it would be to reduce poetry to prose. Beginners often can see the difference between the Homeric and the prosaic form of statement most easily by the simple device of omitting the last half-verse.

Other illustrations are not far to seek.

Α 8 τίς τ' ἄρ σφωε θεῶν ἔριδι ξυνέηκε μάχεσθαι;
 Δητοῦς καὶ Διὸς υἱός· ὁ γὰρ βασιλῆι χαλωθεῖς
 10 νοθσον ἀνά στρατὸν ἄρσι ἄκακῆν, ὀλέκοντο δὲ λαοί,
 οὔνεκα τὸν Χρῦσῆν ἠτίμασεν ἀρηγῆρα
 ἄΤραϊδῆς. ὁ γὰρ ἔλθε ἄθαδς ἐπὶ νῆας ἄΧαιῶν
 λυσιόμοτος τε θέγατρα ἄφέρων τ' ἀπερείσι' ἄποινα,
 στέμμα τ' ἔχων ἐν χερσὶν ἄεκηβόλου ἄπόλλωνος

15 χρυσέῳ ἀνὰ σκήπτρῳ, καὶ ἐλίσσεται πάντας Ἀχαιοὺς,
 Ἄτρεΐδα δὲ μάλιστα, ἄδω, κοσμήτορε λαῶν.
 “Ἄτρεΐδαί τε καὶ ἄλλοι, ἐκνήμιδες Ἀχαιοί,
 ὑμῖν μὲν θεοὶ δοῖεν Ὀλύμπια δώματ’ ἔχοντες
 ἐκπέρσαι Πριάμοιο πόλιν, εὐ δ’ οἴκαδ’ ἰκέσθαι.
 20 παῖδα δ’ ἔμοι λύσαιτε φίλην τὰ τ’ ἄποινα δέχεσθαι
 ἀζόμενοι Διὸς υἱὸν, ἐκίββον Ἀπόλλωνα.”

In two of these verses the pause as marked does not coincide with the usual punctuation, but perhaps that is so much the worse for the usual punctuation! Certainly in 10, the position of *κακῆν*, following its noun and separated from it, can be explained only on the ground that the adjective is added as an appositive to *νοῦσον* and is introductory to the following clause, — exactly in accordance with the use of adjectives at the beginning of a verse, which has been shown above (p. 98). Thus also *φίλην* 20 is much more pathetic in its present place than if it followed *παῖδα* immediately. ‘Release to me my daughter, my dear daughter!’ If any one were still tempted to think *φίλην* a mere possessive pronoun, he would be sorely perplexed to account for its position here. In 16, *δύω* is commonly construed with *Ἄτρεΐδα*, but in some early editions it was connected with *κοσμήτορε*, as is reasonable enough; cf. ὦ διπλοῖ στρατηλάται, | Ἀγάμεμνον, ὦ Μενέλαε Soph. *Phil.* 793 f., τῶν Ἀτρέως | διπλῶν στρατηγῶν *ib.* 1023, δισοῖ στρατηγοί *ib.* 264. The order of words as well as the rhythm throws the numeral with what follows. The pause in 21 shows *Ἀπόλλωνα* to be in apposition with *Διὸς υἱόν*, and that in 18 would indicate that *Ὀλύμπια δώματ’ ἔχοντες* is in apposition with *θεοί*. Similarly the pause in 17 would separate *ἄλλοι* from the rest of the verse, which follows as an appositive: ‘Ye sons of Atreus and ye others, — well-greaved Achaeans!’ With this last passage may be compared passages like ἦ ἐς Ἀθηναίης ἐξοίχεται, ἐνθα περ ἄλλαι | Τρωαὶ ἐνπλόκαμοι δεινὴν θεὸν ἰλάσκονται Z 379 f., where the appositive follows at the beginning of a new verse, and α 128, 132, quoted on p. 104.

- A 223 Πηλεΐδης δ’ ἐξαυτίσ’ ἀταρτήροισ ἐπέεσσιν
 Ἄτρεΐδην προσέειπε, καὶ οὐ πω λῆγε χάλιο.
 225 “οἶνοβαρές, κυνὸς ὄμματ’ ἔχων, κραδίην δ’ ἐλάφοιο,
 οὔτε ποτ’ ἐς πόλεμον ἄμα λαῶ θωρηχθῆναι
 οὔτε λόχονδ’ ἔναι, σὺν ἀριστήεσσιν Ἀχαιῶν
 τέτληκας θυμῷ, τὸ δέ τοι κῆρ εἶδεται εἶναι.
 ἦ πολὺ λάϊόν ἐστι, κατὰ στρατὸν εὐρὴν Ἀχαιῶν

- 230 δῶρ' ἀποιρῆσθαι, ἄς τις σέθεν ἀντίον εἶπη·
 δημοβόρος βασιλεύς, ἄπεὶ οὐτιδανοῖσιν ἀνάσσεις·
 ἦ γὰρ ἄν, Ἄτρείδῃ, νῦν ὕστατα λωβήσαιο.
 ἄλλ' ἐκ τοι ἔρω, καὶ ἐπὶ μέγαν ὄρκον ὁμοῦμαι."

In nine of the above eleven verses, the part after the caesura in the third foot is not needed for sense or grammatical construction. In the other two verses, the caesura in the third foot is distinctly marked; even in 225, the emphasis falls on *κυνὸς ὄμματα* as contrasted with *κραδίην ἐλάφου*.

- Γ 293 καὶ τοὺς μὲν κατέθηκεν, ἐπὶ χθονὸς ἀσπαίροντας,
 θυμὸν δαυομένους· ἀπὸ γὰρ μένος εἴλετο χαλκός·
 295 οἶνον δ' ἐκ κρητῆρος, ἀφυσσόμενοι δεπέεσσι
 ἔεχεον, ἦδ' εὔχοντο, θεοῖς αἰειγενέτησιν.
 ᾗδε δὲ τις εἶπεσκεν, Ἀχαιῶν τε Τρώων τε.
 Δ 248 τὸν δ' ὡς σὺν ἐνόησε, Κόων ἀριδείκετος ἀνδρῶν
 πρῶσβυγενῆς Ἀττηνοριδῆς, κρατερόν ῥά ἐ πένθος
 250 ὀφθαλμοῦς ἐκαλυψε, κασιγνήτῳ πεσόντος.
 στή δ' εὐράξ σὺν δουρὶ λαθῶν Ἀγαμέμνονα δῖον,
 νῆξε δὲ μιν κατὰ χεῖρα, μέσσην, ἀγκῶνος ἐνερθεν,
 ἀντικρὺς δὲ διέσχε, φαινοῦ δουρὸς ἀκωκῆ.
 ῥίγησέν τ' ἄρ' ἔπειτα, ἀναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγαμέμνων·
 255 ἄλλ' οὐδ' ὡς ἀπέληγε, μάχης ἦδὲ πτολέμιοι,
 ἄλλ' ἐπόρουσε Κόων, ἔχων ἀνεμοτρεφῆς ἔγχος.
 ἦ τοι ὁ Ἰφιδάμαντα, κασιγνήτην καὶ ὄπατρον
 ἔλκε ποδὸς μμαῶς, καὶ αὐτεὶ πάντας ἀρίστους·
 τὸν δ' ἔλκοντ' ἀν' ὄμιλον, ὑπ' ἀσπίδος ὀμφαλοέσσης·
 260 οὔτησε ξυστῆ, χαλκῆρεϊ, λύσε δὲ γυῖα.

In 252, *μέσσην* is clearly added in close connexion with *ἀγκῶνος ἐνερθεν*. Cf. *κακῆν, ὀλέκοντο δὲ λαοί* A 10 (see p. 118). In 260, the case is not so clear; but since the sense is complete after *ξυστῆ*, the verse reasonably may be held to have two caesuras, — the penthemimeral as well as the bucolic. In twelve of the thirteen verses, the burden of thought is in the first half-verse.

- X 499 "δακρυῖς δὲ τ' ἀνισι, πάϊς ἐς μητέρα χήρη,
 Ἀστυνάξ, ὅς πρην μὲν, εἰσὶ ἐπὶ γούνασι πατρὸς
 μυελὸν οἶον ἔδισκε, καὶ οἶων πίονα δημόν·
 αὐτὰρ ὄθ' ὕπνος ἔλοι, παύσαιτό τε νηπιαγεῖων,
 εὔδισκ' ἐν λίκτροισιν, ἐν ἀγκαλίδεσσι τιθήνης,
 ἐστῆ ἐνὶ μαλακῇ, θαλίῳν ἐμπλησάμενος κῆρ.

ἤμος δ' ἥλιος κατέθυσαι καὶ ἐπὶ κρέφας ἦλθεν,
οἱ μὲν κοιμήσαντο παρὰ πρυμνήσια νηός,
ἡ δ' ἐμὶ χειρὸς ἐλοθσα φίλων ἀπονόσφιν ἑταίρων
εἰσὶ τε καὶ προσδαικτο καὶ ἐξερέεινεν ἅπαντα."

In Ψ 83 "μὴ ἐμὰ σῶν ἀπάνευθε τιθήμεναι ὄστέ, Ἀχιλλεῦ, ἀλλ' ὁμοῦ, ὡς τράφομέν περ ἐν ἡμετέροισι δόμοισιν,"

the thought clearly is, 'Place our bones together, just as we were brought up [together], in your home.' ὡς τράφομέν περ is to be construed more closely with what precedes than with what follows, and the ordinary punctuation is misleading.

In Ψ 241 ἐν μέσση γὰρ ἔκειτο πυρῆ, τοὶ δ' ἄλλοι ἀνευθεν ἰσχατιῇ καίοντ' ἐπιμίξ, ἵπποι τε καὶ ἄνδρες,

the pause in the third foot of 242 is made probable also by the similar verse

Φ 16 πλῆτο ρόος κελάδων ἐπιμίξ ἵππων τε καὶ ἀνδρῶν.

Early editions have no punctuation in either of these verses. The comma in Ψ 242 seems to be the work of Wolf. Of recent editors, Düntzer (whose punctuation is often thoughtful) alone places the comma before ἐπιμίξ.

In μ 206 αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ διὰ νηὸς ἰὼν ὤτρυνον ἑταίρους
μειλιχίους ἐπέεσσι παρασταδὸν ἄνδρα ἕκαστον.

ἄνδρα ἕκαστον is probably not to be construed in apposition with ἑταίρους, but directly with παρασταδόν, which is equivalent to παραστάς.

THE SECOND HALF-VERSE PARALLEL TO THE FIRST.

The second half-verse often repeats the thought of the first half-verse in more definite, picturesque form. Thus in

Χ 5 Ἔκτορα δ' αὐτοῦ μείναι ὀλοὴ μοῖρα πέδησεν
Ἴλιό προπάραιθε πυλάων τε Σκαίαν,

the statement 'before Ilios' is comparatively colorless, while the addition, 'and the Scaean Gate,' brings to the hearer's mind the company of elders with Priam on the Tower, and the throng of women who are watching what is done on the field below.

In X 52 εἰ δ' ἤδη τεθνᾶσι καὶ εἰν Ἀΐδαο δόμοισιν,

the second half-verse added nothing to the hearer's information; if these youths were dead, of course they were in the home of Hades;

but neither seems neutral and still, while in *Odyssey* there is some before the final *is* and such parallelism is frequent in Homer's language:

- 7.16 Τόσσον ἴσθι παλαγγαί φρονεῖ σταροῖσι θύμῳι.
 7.16 ἴσθῃσι ἄγασθαι ἰδύσθαι ἴσθαι ἰδύσθαι ἴσθῃσι.
 7.22 βέβηκοντες παύσει, ὄπισθον δὲ παρα κρητοῖσι.
 7.25 ἢ δ' Ἀχαιῶνδ' ἴσθαι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθαι ἴσθῃσι.
 7.27 ἄγασθαι ἴσθαι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι.
 8.12 ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι.
 8.15 ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι.
 8.14 ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι.
 8.202 ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι.
 8.205 ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι.
 8.208 ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι.
 8.236 ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι.
 8.245 ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι.
 8.287 ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι.
 8.334 ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι.
 8.72 ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι.
 8.251 ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι.
 8.275 ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι.
 8.281 ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι.
 8.287 ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι.
 8.293 ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι.
 8.299 ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι.

The number of verses in which the second hemistich is parallel to the first, would appear considerably greater if those be added in which the parallelism is not so exact, as in

- 7.142 εἰ δὲ τὸς ἐσσι βροτῶν, αἰ ἀρούρης αἰσῶν ἐσσοῖσι.
 7.354 ἀλλ' ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι.
 7.431 ἀλλ' ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι.

- In M 13 ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι ἴσθῃσι.
 πολλοὶ δ' Ἀργείων, αἰ μὲν δάμεν αἰ δὲ λίαντα.
 πέφθετο δὲ Πριάμοιο πόλις δακτύλῳ ἐπαστῷ.

the usual punctuation of 14 is misleading, since the second half-verse is wholly parenthetical, thrown in as a side remark: 'But when all the bravest of the Trojans were slain, and many of the Argives (some of these Argives were slain, it is true, but some were left),' etc.

Another marked example of the parenthetical use of the second half-verse is

Σ 192 ἄλλου δ' οὐ τευ οἶδα, — τεῦ ἂν κλυτὰ τεύχεα δύω;
εἰ μὴ Αἴαντός γε σάκος Τελαμωνιάδαο.

The ordinary comment that 'τεῦ is used for the relative τοῦ or οὗ' explains nothing, and all conjectural emendations are uncertain; but the passage is not only intelligible but natural when the second half-verse is understood as an independent, impatient question.

In the passages which immediately precede, the second half-verse is parenthetical (and so marked by the caesura), exactly as whole verses are often parenthetical. (See p. 110.)

The caesural pause in the third foot often gives the clue to the true construction of words which at first sight appear equally well connected with what precedes or what follows; it frequently separates words which are not in the same construction and yet have a similar form. For instance, in

A 29 τὴν δ' ἐγὼ οὐ λύσω· πρὶν μὲν καὶ γῆρας ἔπεισιν
ἡμετέρῳ ἐνὶ οἴκῳ ἔν' Ἄργεϊ, τηλόθι πάτρης,

ἐν Ἄργεϊ is in apposition with ἐνὶ οἴκῳ and is followed by a second appositive, τηλόθι πάτρης. We should not construe 'in our house at Argos.' Compare for the double apposition

X 156 τὸ πρὶν, ἐπ' εἰρήνης, ἂ πρὶν ἐλθεῖν υἱας Ἀχαιῶν,
X 179 ἄνδρα, θνητὸν ἕντα, ἂ πάλοι πεπρωμένον αἴσῃ,
Ω 199 κείσ' ἰέναι, ἐπὶ νῆας, ἂ ἔσω στρατὸν εὐρὺν Ἀχαιῶν,
Ω 614 νῦν δέ που ἐν πέτρῃσιν, ἂ ἐν οὖρεσιν οἰοπόλοισιν,
ἐν Σκιπύλῳ, ὅθι φασὶ θεῶν ἔμμεναι εὐνάς.

Above, in X 156, 179, Ω 199, the punctuation is here changed to accord with the observation made just before.

The poet often gives a hint to the true construction by using the caesura as a separating bar.

An easy case of separation by the pause in the verse is

α 307 ξεῖν', ἧ τοι μὲν ταῦτα ἂ φίλα φρονέων ἀγορεύεις,

where the caesura separates ταῦτα from φίλα, and thus connects it properly with ἀγορεύεις. Compare the following:

X 283 οὐ μὲν μοι φεύγοντι ἂ μεταφρένω ἐν δόρῳ πῆξεις,
ἀλλ' ἰθὺς μμαῶτι ἂ διὰ στήθεσφιν ἔλασσον.

Clearly the two participles *φεύγοντι* and *μεμαῶτι* contain the sum of the matter: 'I will not flee, but will press straight forward.' This emphatic contrast (which is neglected by one of the best modern translators of the *Iliad*) is marked by the verse-pause; but in addition, in 283, the pause separates *φεύγοντι* from *μεταφρένω* at the first glance, and connects it with *μοί*.

X 395 ἦ ῥα καὶ Ἔκτορα δῖον Ἀεικέα μῆδετο ἔργα.

X 291 τῆλε δ' ἀπεπλάγχθη Ἀσάκεος δόρυ. χῶσατο δ' Ἔκτωρ
ὅττι ῥά οἱ βέλος ὠκὺ ἔτώσιον ἔκφυγε χειρός.

Here the predicate construction of *ἐτώσιον* is indicated by the caesura.

X 256 οὐ γὰρ ἐγὼ σ' ἔκπαλον Ἀεικιδῶ, αἶ κεν ἐμοὶ Ζεὺς
δῶη καμμοίνην, ἅσῃν δὲ ψυχὴν ἀφέλωμαι.

Here *ἔκπαλον* is better taken in apposition with *σε* ('thee, the mighty warrior,' cf. also of Achilles,

Φ 589 ὦδ' ἔκπαλος ἐὼν καὶ θαρσαλέος πολεμιστής,

and A 146 ἦε σὺ, Πηλεΐδην, πάντων ἔκπαλότατ' ἀνδρῶν),

than as adverbial or cognate accusative with *ἀεικιδῶ*.

Θ 133 βροντήσας δ' ἄρα δεινὸν ἀφῆκ' ἀργήτα κεραυνόν.

The Homeric scholar feels at once that *δεινόν* is cognate accusative with *βροντήσας*, and that the mere order of words is sufficient to separate it from *ἀργήτα κεραυνόν*, but the beginner, who expects essentially the same arrangement of words in Homer as in Vergil, is helped by noticing the intimation offered by the verse-pause. Similar is

Z 182 δεινὸν ἀποπνέουσα πυρὸς μένος αἰθομένοιο.

Here *δεινόν* is not in direct agreement with *πυρὸς μένος*, but the second half-verse is in apposition with *δεινόν*, as cognate accusative with *ἀποπνέουσα*.

Ω 670 σχήσω γὰρ πόλεμον ἅτσοσιν χρόνον ὅσσοσιν ἄνωγας.

β 266 μνηστῆρες δὲ μάλιστα κακῶς ὑπερηγορόεντες.

β 298 βῆ δ' ἵεναι πρὸς δῶμα φίλον τετιμημένος ἦτορ.

γ 88 κείνου δ' αὐτὸ καὶ ὄλεθρον ἀπευθεία θῆκε Κρονίων.

In many passages besides those which have been cited, the true poetic order of thought is brought out by the rhythm of the verse, as

γ 83 πατὸς ἐμοῦ κλέος εὐρὺ μετέρχομαι, ἦν ποῦ ἀκούσω
 δίου Ὀδυσσῆος, ταλασίφρονος ὃν ποτέ φασιν
 σὺν σοὶ μαρνάμενον Τρώων πόλιν ἐξαπατάει,

where ταλασίφρονος 84, 'the stout-hearted warrior,' is in apposition with Ὀδυσσῆος. So also

γ 109 ἔνθα μὲν Αἴας κείται, ἀρήμιος, ἔνθα δ' Ἀχιλλεύς,

where the passage becomes prosaic if it is understood as if the order were ἀρήμιος Αἴας.

γ 165 αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ σὺν νηυσὶν ἀολλέσιν, αἶ μοι ἔποντο,
 φεύγον, ἐπεὶ γίγνωσκον, ὃ δὴ κακὰ μῆδετο δαίμων.

In 165, the comma is needed before ἀολλέσιν, much rather than after it. The adjective is here essentially equivalent to the prose πάντων. With this should be compared the similar use of adjectives at the beginning of the verse. (See p. 98.)

In κ 395 ἄνδρες δ' αἶψ' ἐγένοντο, νεώτεροι ἢ πάρος ἦσαν

(of the comrades of Odysseus whom Circe had turned into swine), the emphasis is confused by the usual comma after νεώτεροι. All the emphasis is laid by the poet upon the first half-verse, 'they became men again.'

Ω 650 ἔκτος μὲν δὴ λέξο, γέρον φίλε, μὴ τις Ἀχαιῶν
 ἐνθάδ' ἐπέλθῃσιν, βουληφόρος, οἷ τέ μοι αἰεὶ
 βουλὰς βουλεύουσι παρήμενοι, ἣ θέμις ἐστίν,

βουληφόρος is equivalent to βουληφόρων, — 'lest some Achaean should come hither, one of the counsellors,' etc.

In Μ 330 τὼ δ' ἰθὺς βήτην, Λυκίων μέγα ἔθνος ἄγοντε,

the pause again gives the first hint of warning against construing Λυκίων with ἰθὺς. Compare also

Β 321 ὡς σὺν δεινὰ πέλωρα, θεῶν εἰσῆλθ' ἑκατόμβας.

δ 402 πνοιῇ ὑπὸ Ζεφύρου, μελαίνῃ φρικτὴ καλυφθεῖς.

Π 180 παρθένιος τὸν ἔτικτε, χορῶ καλῇ Πολυμήλη.

Here the construction of χορῶ καλῇ is made definite and amplified by the following

ἠράσατ', ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἰδὼν μετὰ μελπομένησιν
 ἐν χορῶ Ἀρτίμηδος.

In Z 278 ἄγριον αἰχμητήν κρατερόν μήστωρα φόβοιο,

the usual punctuation, a comma after αἰχμητήν, is surely better than Ameis-Hentze's former punctuation, commas after ἄγριον and κρατερόν.

CONCLUSIONS.

We find, then, that in the Homeric poems much which at first sight seems tautological and is often explained as such, is really in apposition with what has preceded, and is marked as an appositive by the verse. These appositive additions do much to make a picturesque scene and to mark emotion. We find, also, that the true construction is often indicated by the pause at the close of the verse, and by that in the third foot. The caesura is in many cases the most immediate clue that the verse affords to the construction. The beginner repeatedly is saved the comparison of different passages by noting the rhythm of the verse. We find, moreover, that the right contrast is marked clearly again and again by the caesura. Translators and commentators in general have paid too little attention to this matter, and have thus lost many delicate Homeric touches of emphasis and contrast. We have seen that the traditional punctuation may be changed in some places to the advantage of the text.

The examples which have been given in this paper of the relation of the rhythm to the thought, have been taken almost at random from a great mass of illustrative material. They may easily be multiplied. This paper does not claim, however, that the sense is complete at the close of every verse in Homer, nor that the caesura in every verse is significant. But in addition to a large number of verses where the pause in the third foot corresponds to a musical 'hold' rather than to a musical 'rest,'—falling between two words which are closely connected grammatically, but the first of which is distinctly emphatic,—in the Twenty-second Book of the Iliad, I find that the second half-verse is not needed for the grammatical construction, but is simply picturesque, in about 145 verses of 515. And this is in a book which is noticeably free from 'tags'; a book in which no Greek hero but Achilles is even named, and in which appear no *κάρη κομόωντες Ἀχαιοί, ἐυκνήμιδες Ἀχαιοί, Ἀχαιῶν χαλκοχιτώνων, or ἵπποδαμοι Τρῶες*. In the First Book of the Iliad I count about 175 such verses out of 611. Thus in these two books, about

29 per cent. of the verses have a clearly marked appositive element in the second hemistich. In the first 700 lines of Vergil's Aeneid, I find that not more than about 14 per cent. are of this character. Vergil, then, seems to have less than one-half as many of these picturesque additions, in which rests so much that is characteristic of Homer's poetry. This appears to prove the thesis which was maintained on an earlier page, that the caesuras of Vergil, and thus the scanning of Vergil, are far less important for the thought than the caesuras and scanning of Homer.

In the portion of Hesiod which I have examined with a view to these picturesque additions, I found that about 20 per cent. of the verses have such picturesque hemistichs as have been described above. In Apollonius of Rhodes, the proportion falls to about 10 per cent.,—varying in the passages examined, from 9 to 12 per cent.,—or fewer even than Vergil has. Apollonius, also, carries the construction of one verse over to the following, with all the freedom which Vergil used after him.

In the first hundred lines of the Dionysiaca of Nonnus, I find only half a dozen of the second hemistichs which are not needed for grammatical construction, and these are not clearly marked. Nonnus, as all know, followed Homer in many respects with much original genius, and returned to the early preference for the feminine caesura and for an abundance of dactyls, but he did not follow Homer at all in making each line a sort of unit and giving much weight to the verse-pause.

In Quintus Smyrnaeus is found about as large a proportion as in Vergil of these picturesque half-verses. But in the *Hero and Leander* of Musaeus, such hemistichs are rare, and indeed, as a rule, there the second half-verse contains the more emphatic words and the burden of thought.

The opening verses of the later Greek epics will form a clear contrast with the early verses of the Iliad and Odyssey, as discussed on pages 95, 98, 115, 117, and are therefore appended for easy comparison.

Apollonius Rhodius, *Argonautica* i. 1-7:—

ἀρχόμενος σέο, Φοῖβε, παλαιγενέων κλέα φωτῶν
μνήσομαι, οἳ Πόντιοι κατὰ στόμα καὶ διὰ πέτρας
Κυανέης βασιλῆος ἐφημοσύνη Πελίαο

χρύσειον μετὰ κῶας εἴζυγον ἤλασαν Ἄργαί.
 5 τοῖπρ γὰρ Πελῆϊς φάτιν ἔκλυεν, ὡς μιν ὀπίσσω
 μοῖρα μένει στυγερή, τοῦδ' ἀνίρος ὄντιν' ἴδοιτο
 δημόθεν οἰσπέδιλον ὑπ' ἐννεσίησι δαμῆναι.

In this passage no second half-verse could be omitted, and the thought of the first sentence is not complete even grammatically until the close of the fourth verse.

Nonnus Panopolitanus, *Dionysiaca*, i. 1-10 : —

εἰπέ, θεά, Κρονίδαο διάκτορον αἴθοπος αἰγῆς
 νυμφιδίῳ σπινθήρι μογαστόκον ἄσθμα κερανοῦ
 καὶ στεροπὴν Σεμέλης θαλαμηπόλον, εἰπέ δὲ φύτλην
 Βάκχου δισσοτόκοιο, τὸν ἐκ πυρὸς ὑγρὸν αἰέρας
 5 Ζεὺς βρέφος ἡμιτέλεστον ἀμαινέτοιο τεκοῦσσης,
 φειδομέναις παλάμησι τομῆν μηροῖο χαράξας,
 ἄρσεν γαστρὶ λόχευσε πατῆρ καὶ πότνια μήτηρ,
 εὖ εἰδὼς τόκον ἄλλον ἐῷ γονόεντι καρῆνῃ
 ὡς πάρος ὄγκον ἄπιστον ἔχων ἐγκύμοιο κόρησιν
 10 τεύχεσιν ἀστράπτουσιν ἀηκόντιζεν Ἀθήνην.

Quintus Smyrnaeus, *Posthomerica* i. 1-9 : —

εἰθ' ὑπὸ Πηλείῳσι δάμη θεοείκελος Ἔκτωρ,
 καὶ ἐ πυρὴ κατέδαψε, καὶ ὄστέα γαῖα κεκείθει,
 δὴ τότε Τρῶες ἔμμνον ἀνὰ Πριάμοιο πόλτην,
 δειδυότες μένος ἦν θρασύφρονος Αἰακίδαο·
 5 ἦ ἦτ' ἐνὶ ξυλόχοισι βόες βλοσυροῖο λέοντος
 ἐλθέμεν οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ἐναντία, ἀλλὰ φέβονται
 ἰληδὸν πτώσσουσαι ἀνὰ ῥωπήμα πικνά·
 ὡς αἰ ἀνὰ πτολίεθρον ὑπέτρεσαν ὄβριμον ἄνδρα,
 μνησάμενοι προτέρων, ὁπόσων ἀπὸ θυμὸν ἴαψεν.

Musaeus, *de Herone et Leandro* 1-9 : —

εἰπέ, θεά, κρυφίων ἐπιμάρτυρα λύχρον ἐρώτων
 καὶ νύχιον πλωπῆρα θαλασσοπόρων ἡμεναίων
 καὶ γάμον ἀχλυόεντα, τὸν οὐκ ἴδεν ἀφθιτος Ἥως,
 καὶ Σηστὸν καὶ Ἄβυδον, ὅπῃ γάμος ἐννυχος Ἡροῦς.
 5 νηχόμενόν τε Λεάνδρον ὁμοῦ καὶ λύχρον ἀκούω,
 λύχρον ἀπαγγέλλοντα διακτορίην Ἀφροδίτης,
 Ἡροῦς νυκτιγάμοιο γαμοστόλον ἀγγελιώτην,
 λύχρον, ἔρωτος ἄγαλμα, τὸν ὠφέλεν αἰθέριος Ζεὺς
 ἐννύχιον μετ' ἄεθλον ἄγειν ἐς ὀμήγηριν ἀστρων.

Compare further the proem of the *Batrachomyomachia*:—

ἀρχόμενος πρῶτον Μουσῶν χορὸν ἐξ Ἑλικῶνος
 ἔλθειν εἰς ἐμὸν ἦτορ ἐπεύχομαι εἶνεκ' ἀοιδῆς,
 ἦν νέον ἐν δέλτοισιν ἐμοῖς ἐπὶ γούνασι θῆκα,
 δῆρην ἀπειρεσίην, πολεμόκλονον ἔργον Ἄρηος,
 5 εὐχόμενος μερόπεσσιν ἐς οὐατα πᾶσι βαλίσθαι,
 πῶς μύες ἐν βατράχοισιν ἀριστεύσαντες ἔβησαν,
 γηγενέων ἀνδρῶν μιμούμενοι ἔργα Γιγάντων,
 ὡς ἔπος ἐν θνητοῖσιν ἔην· τοίην δ' ἔχεν ἀρχήν.

The reader notices at once in this last passage the un-Homeric obtrusion of the poet's personality, and the prominence of the fact that the poem was *written* on tablets. Almost as distinct evidence as the foregoing, if it were needed, for the late authorship of the *Batrachomyomachia* is the long delay in presenting the theme of the work; the first sentence is not complete until the close of the sixth verse. I may call attention also to the total lack of poetical or rhetorical emphasis at the caesura in the third foot; the fourth verse alone has a true pause there.

Even a superficial examination shows at once the impossibility of applying to these later poets the principles which have been urged in this paper as fixing important elements of Homeric style. These principles, then, may fairly be counted characteristic of the early age of Greek epic poetry.



ON THE NOTION OF VIRTUE IN THE DIALOGUES OF
PLATO, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THOSE
OF THE FIRST PERIOD AND TO THE THIRD AND
FOURTH BOOKS OF THE REPUBLIC.¹

BY WILLIAM A. HAMMOND.

Ἀρετὴ μὲν ἔρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὀγλίαι δὲ τις ἂν εἴη καὶ κάλλος καὶ εὐεξία ψυχῆς. — Republic 444 E.

TO say precisely how much of Plato's Ethics is Platonic and how much was adopted from the teaching of Socrates or other preceding or contemporary philosophers, is not possible from the nature of the subject; though that he was influenced by his predecessors and contemporaries, by the national life of his time, and by inherited tendencies in Greek character, can be said with certainty. This is not the place to attempt to measure these influences and to show their traces in Plato's writings, though a mention of the chief of these influences, in order to see the main conditions under which Plato worked, will be in keeping with our purpose.

In the second period of Greek Ethics, to which Plato belongs, Philosophy is no longer characterized, as in the first or pre-Socratic period, by struggle toward a knowledge of the laws and aims of human life on the basis of the Cosmos,² — to live in unity and harmony with which was virtue and happiness.³ The middle period is anthropological, — man becomes the centre of investigation; the laws of Ethics are sought for in the *ἄνθρωπος*, and not in the *κόσμος*. In this Socratic period we first meet with a systematic study of philosophical Ethics, separate from religion; and a return to this scientific treatment of the subject is to be found, in modern Ethics, chiefly in Germany. In this middle period, *i.e.* from the later Sophists to Aristotle, all the chief ethical theories of ancient or modern times

¹ This paper was accepted by the University of Leipsic as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

² Luthardt: *Die antike Ethik*, p. 39.

³ Köstlin: *Die Ethik des classischen Alterthums*, I. 247.

were discussed. Ethical science is no less subject to diversity in views than any other branch of Philosophy; quite as great differences are to be seen in modern Altruism, Individualism, Evolutional Ethics, and Christian Ethics, as in the ethical species of the fourth and third centuries B.C. Philosophical Ethics is possible only when investigated in perfect freedom, uninfluenced by tradition, religion, or other like causes; and this freedom was, in the age succeeding the death of Socrates, as absolute and as little modified by public sentiment and popular religion as in any succeeding period of ethical inquiry. The contention for this freedom was begun by the sophists; the struggle culminated in the martyrdom of the immortal teacher of Plato. Early Greek Ethics was based on tradition and law; these furnished the standards of right and wrong. The Sophists, in their examinations into the character of the then existing institutions, were not satisfied with this groundwork of Ethics, and took the first steps toward the establishment of a system on a natural basis. In this respect they were the forerunners, not only of the Cynics and Stoics, but also of Plato and the later Academy.¹ Their ethical teaching was naturalistic, *i.e.* they declared natural individual desire and power to be the determining norm of Ethics. Much decried as the Sophists are, this decisive breaking with tradition and dogmatism was a valuable and fruitful step in the development of Greek Ethics.² The practical or ethical side of sophistic thought in Greece was an outgrowth of Hellenic government, in which, during the Periclean age, individualism was fostered by prevailing democratic sentiment. In the Ethics of the Sophists, right and wrong could be measured only by individual judgment, and could not be determined by law, the national sense, tradition, or other such standard. The dictum of Protagoras, πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ οὐκ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν,³ gives the keynote to the Ethics of the Sophists. In Plato's Ethics virtue has nothing to do with divine or civil law as such, but is harmony of the soul of the individual. In so far he agrees with the Sophists; but he goes further, and considers the relationship of the individual to society. He does not stop with the purely subjective state of the single person. It is easy to see that this position of the Sophists is in its tendency

¹ Köstlin: *Die Ethik des classischen Alterthums*, I. 244.

² *Ibid.* I. 119.

³ Diog. Laert. ix. 51.

destructive; it cannot be carried out ethically or politically. It is not compatible with objective moral or civil law, inasmuch as such law can be no standard while individual will and opinion are final appeal. The chief question in such a system is, "What is good and advantageous for the ego?" and this is not very remote from the position that "might makes right": *Καὶ γὰρ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος, ὃ Κλειτοφῶν, ξυμφέρον δίκαιον εἶναι ἔθετο.*¹ Pythagoras² and Heraclitus³ made the opinion of the individual subordinate to the law.

¹ *Repub.* I. 340 A.

² According to the author of the *Magna Moralia* (a compilation probably from the Eudemean and Nicomachean Ethics by an unknown hand, cf. Überweg-Heinze: *Grundriss der Gesch. d. Phil. des Alterthums*, 7te Aufl. p. 196) Pythagoras was the first to philosophize on virtue: *πρῶτος μὲν οὖν ἐπεχείρησε Πυθαγόρας περὶ ἀρετῆς εἰπεῖν* (*Magn. Mor.* I. 1). He did not, however, treat the notion dialectically, as Socrates, but, as the author just quoted says, *οὐκ ὀρθῶς*.

The conception of virtue as a harmony and the application of the idea of harmony to the commonwealth are both Pythagorean; both of these conceptions are particularly prominent in the *Republic*. For the employment of the former by the Pythagoreans, cf. *Diog. Laert.* viii. 33: *τὴν τε ἀρετὴν ἁρμονίαν εἶναι*; and for its employment in reference to the commonwealth, cf. *Stob. Flor.* 48. 61, ed. Meineke, I. 261. That Plato was early acquainted with the teaching of the Pythagoreans we can believe from the fact that the Thebans, Simmias and Cebes, who were familiar with the philosophy of the Pythagoreans through Philolaus, were in Athens during the time that Plato was a disciple of Socrates, and from the fact that both of them had discussed philosophy with Socrates (cf. *Phaedo*, 59 C). So much we can accept as probable, even if we reject the statement that Plato bought a MS. of Philolaus for a great price, out of which he wrote his *Timaeus*. Köstlin, in remarking on the influence of Pythagoras on Plato, says: "Ohne Pythagoras kein Plato" (*Ethik des class. Alterth.* I. 178). That the Pythagoreans acknowledged an objective norm of conduct or law, is plainly shown by their reduction of the virtues to numbers (cf. *Magn. Mor.* I. i.) and by the doctrine of the Limited and Unlimited as applied to good and bad.

³ The influence of Heraclitus' teaching on Plato can be seen best, perhaps, in *Philebus* (e.g. *Phil.* 54 C-E), where it is stated that pleasure cannot be the highest good, because it is not *οὐσία*, but only *γένεσις*. Every *γένεσις* has an end outside of itself, but the good is its own end. Consequently, *γένεσις* cannot be the good. The general confusion caused by this comparison of man and the Cosmos (cf. further *Phil.* 64 A), by which Plato had little to gain, shows unmistakable traces of the teaching of Heraclitus. The doctrine of pre-existence, which plays a part in the more developed form of Plato's Ethics, occurs in the philosophies of both the Pythagoreans and Heraclitus. The latter accounts for souls coming into the earthly life by the tendency of all things to change, or, as

This direct opposition between the position of the Sophists and that of Pythagoras and Heraclitus was one of the reasons which induced Plato to investigate the subject of Ethics independently. The influence of Pythagoras is seen more particularly in the later dialogues. Heraclitus bases the notion of the right and justice on law, instead of making the idea of justice prior to law and its basis.¹ Heraclitus, like Plato, took no active part in the politics of his own country, with which he showed little sympathy; for the intellectual and moral development of his time he expressed the severest censure. Neither the one nor the other, however, was pessimist.

The influence which chiefly gave form and direction to the Ethics of Plato was that of Socrates. With this we shall have mainly to do in the treatment of the succession of dialogues from the Lesser Hippias to Gorgias. Although it is doubtful if much is to be gained for the evolution of Plato's Ethics, in its growth from Socratic beginnings to its completion in the Republic and Laws, by establishing, or attempting to establish, the chronology² of the early dialogues, nevertheless, in order to have some fixed order of treatment, the chronology of Susemihl has been adopted, which seems best to har-

his theory is generally expressed, by constant *flux*. For the opinion of Heraclitus on the relation of the individual to law *vide* his doctrine of *κοινὸς λόγος* (cf. also Stobaeus Serm. iii. 84) and the interpretation this found amongst the Stoics: *ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν*. Compare, further, the following note.

¹ Bywater: *Heracliti Ephesii Reliquiae*, Fragm. 60, 61, 91, and 92.

² The question of the chronology of the Platonic dialogues, much as it has been discussed, has not been satisfactorily settled. The main points, however, in the chronology are, since Hermann, pretty generally fixed. The dialogues are divided into three periods, the first of which extends from probably a short time before the death of Socrates (although that any of the dialogues were written during the lifetime of Socrates is denied by Grote: *Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates*, I. 196) until 395 or 396 B.C.; the second period until 386, when the Academy was opened with the inaugural dialogue Phaedrus (cf. Hermann: *Geschichte und System der Platonischen Philosophie*, I. 373 seqq.), which Schleiermacher, however, places at the beginning of the first period, a view which no longer finds favor; the third or constructive period, from 386 to the end of Plato's literary activity, which probably continued until his death in 347. Ion and Alcibiades, which Hermann reckons to the first period, are rejected by Überweg-Heinze and Susemihl, the former of whom regard the genuineness of both dialogues as "sehr unsicher" (*Grundriss der Geschichte d. Phil. d. Alterthums*, 7te Aufl. p. 148). For the arrangement of Thrasylus and Aristophanes the grammarian, *vide* Diog. Laert. iii. 35 seq.

monize with the contents¹ of the dialogues themselves, and on inherent grounds the chronology must for the most part be decided.

In the earlier dialogues σοφία, ἀνδρεία, σωφροσύνη, etc., are treated as individual and separate virtues, and the contents of the separate notions are examined without reference to a system, whereas in the Republic they are treated in reference to a systematic division of the faculties of the soul. For this reason it is of little consequence, as far as the evolution of a system is concerned, whether Charmides or Laches was written first; the same can be said of most of the other writings of the same period. That they are all of Socratic character and belong to the earlier writings of Plato, is almost universally accepted as correct. In the case of Protagoras and Euthyphro, the fact that in the number of cardinal virtues treated Euthyphro is in closer agreement with the Republic than Protagoras is, argues for a later time of composition for Euthyphro than Protagoras. In the latter Plato deals with five cardinal virtues, which in Euthyphro² he reduces to four, the number employed in the Republic and the later writings generally. This seems to place Euthyphro later than Protagoras. Outside of this, the chronological order of the writings of this period gives little help in studying the development of the Platonic doctrine of virtue. The Socratic, or as Susemihl calls them, the "ethisch-propädeutische" dialogues, with which the first part of our inquiry has to do, are Hippias Minor, Lysis, Charmides, Laches, Protagoras, Meno, Apology, Crito, Gorgias, Euthyphro. Our first business will be to examine the notion of virtue in these dialogues separately³ in the order named.

*Hippias Minor.*⁴ In this dialogue on mendacity, Socrates argues that the man who does evil intentionally is better than he who does

¹ Überweg-Heinze: *Grundr. d. G. d. Phil. d. Alterthums*, 7te Aufl., p. 148.

² Auermann: *Platons Cardinaltugenden vor und nach Abfassung des Euthyphron*; Inaug. Diss. Jena, 1876, p. 29.

³ Grote: *Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates*, I. 497 seq.

⁴ Although the genuineness of Hippias Minor has been questioned on account of the non-Socratic character of the contents (Ast and Stein reject it), the fact that its genuineness is attested by Aristotle (*Metaph.* IV. 29. 1025a. 6. διὸ δ ἐν τῷ Ἰππία λόγῳ κτλ.) is sufficient guaranty. Besides, the historical Socrates maintains the same position in the Memorabilia of Xenophon as here in Hippias II. (*Mem.* 4. 2. 20: τὰ δίκαια δὲ πρότερον ὁ ἐκὼν ψευδόμενος καὶ ἑξαπατῶν οἶδεν ἢ ὁ ἄκων; ἄλλων ὅτι ὁ ἐκὼν, κτλ.).

it unintentionally.¹ The opposite view is maintained by Hippias. Socrates affirms that Odysseus, who deceives with the intention of deceiving, is better than Achilles, who is honest and does not understand the art of deception. It is better to have the ability of a good archer who misses his aim designedly, than that of the bad archer who misses because he is unable to hit. Hippias, the Sophist, is better in arithmetic than the ignorant man, because he can answer in accordance with truth or error, as he likes. The man of understanding is, therefore, better in the speaking of both truth and falsehood. If justice is a capacity of the soul,² then the more capable soul will be more just; the less capable, less just. The justice of a soul will vary in direct ratio with its capability. In this way Socrates bases virtue on knowledge.³ Susemihl believes that this Socratic conception of knowledge was not purely theoretical, but also practical; — was not merely the understanding of what is false and true, but included further the actualization of this in conduct. In this way, he maintains, Socrates teaches the unity of knowledge and will.⁴ Aristotle says⁵ that Plato does not mean the man who lies is better than he who does not, but the man who *can* lie is better than he who can not. This he criticises as a misuse of terms. Aristotle locates the moral quality of truth or falsehood not *ἐν τῇ δυνάμει*, but *ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει*.⁶ We shall have further to discuss the relationship between knowledge and virtue in the other dialogues. The Lesser Hippias, which ends without establishing any positive view, serves to introduce the subject of the entire series of Socratic dialogues, viz. Virtue.

Lysis. The Platonic Erotic, which lies at the basis of Platonic Ethics,⁷ is the subject of *Lysis*. It is by means of philosophical love

¹ Hippias II. 372 A seqq.

² *Ibid.* 375 D, E.

³ *Ibid.* 375 E.

⁴ *Genetische Entwicklung der Platon. Philosophie*, I. 15.

⁵ *Metaph.* Δ 1025a 6 seq.

⁶ *Eth. Nic.* IV. 13. 1127 b, 14.

⁷ Becker, in an article in *Philologus*, opposes the position that *Lysis* is an ethical dialogue. He says: "Eine genauere Prüfung des platonischen Gedankenganges wird überall die Unhaltbarkeit dieser Vorstellung erhärten: Plato sucht nicht die wahre, philosophische Freundschaft, sondern die Freundschaft überhaupt zu definieren; er sucht nicht eine sittlich tiefe, sondern eine logisch berechtigte Definition." *Philologus*, Bd. 41, 1882, p. 293. He says further in the same article (p. 300): "Und wo steht denn im *Lysis* etwas von sittlichen Aufgaben? Doch nicht etwa in dem Wort ἀγαθόν? Weiter wenigstens, finde ich nichts im *Dialoge*, was jenen Schein hätte erzeugen können. Ἀγαθός aber bedeutet tüch-

that we are impelled to struggle toward¹ the highest good, which in the later writings is the idea good, the *πρῶτον φίλον*, by means of which individual things become good and the object of desire. Philosophical love is, further, that which lies at the root of all effort toward the attainment of knowledge and truth,² without which apathy would take the place of philosophic search. Although the doctrine of ideas is not to be found in the *Lysis*, there are, as Stein remarks,³ traces of the doctrine here.

The useful⁴ and the good are with Socrates identical. Love has for its object a good; but as the good and useful are identical, or the good is good by the fact of its being useful, the object of love is, therefore, the useful. Consequently we do not love a friend indefinitely as an individual, but we love those qualities in him which meet our own needs, and which are, therefore, useful to us, and appear to us in the light of goods. On these grounds the friend becomes to us an object of love. Further, the things which are to us goods are so by the fact of our associating them with the abstract good, or by reason of their resemblance to a *primum amabile*. This is an approximation to the idea of good. Plato has in *Lysis* got so far as the generic notion of good; e.g. if good is predicated of happiness, power, man, and a book, or of any other series of objects, there is a common underlying something which constitutes these good.

tig, brauchbar, heilsam, förderlich," and also *good*. We see no reason why a "logisch berechtigte Definition" should interfere with its being at the same time a "sittliche" or even a "sittlich tiefe."

Whether *Lysis* was written before or after the death of Socrates has no important bearing on the interpretation of the contents of the dialogue. There is nothing inherently improbable in the statement of Diogenes Laertius (iii. 35) that Socrates had heard the dialogue read, although the remark is introduced by *φασί*. Stallbaum and Hermann accept the statement; Zeller (*Phil. der Griechen*, 4te Aufl. Bd. II. 1, p. 488 note) attaches no historical weight to it. It is of course rejected by Grote, who holds that none of the dialogues was composed until after the death of Socrates. The majority of later critics are of the opinion it was written before the death of Socrates, according to which view there is at least nothing improbable in the statement of Diogenes Laertius.

¹ Luthardt: *Die antike Ethik*, p. 47.

² Überweg-Heinze: *Grundriss d. Gesch. d. Phil. d. Alterthums*, p. 170.

³ Stein: *Geschichte des Platonismus*, I. 202; Susemihl: *Genetische Entwickel. d. Plat. Phil.* I. 21.

⁴ *Lysis* 215 A seq.

The individual good is such by a kind of participation in the *ἁπλοῦς ἀγαθόν*. This *ἁπλοῦς ἀγαθόν* is the generic notion. In the later Platonic writings the idea good is in other ideas, is in the same way a generic notion, not a further concrete substance, an intelligible *ἰδέα*. This cannot be asserted of the primary good, as explained in *Lysis*. With the good in Plato's sense the notion of the beautiful was inseparably associated. In friendship, accordingly, both *ἡσθητικόν* and *καλόν* have a part. The fact of the inseparable association of *ἡσθητικόν* and *καλόν* plays no inconsiderable part in the idealism of Greek Ethics generally. The *Enigme* *εὐφίας*, as *Hippias Minor*, negatively, at least contains no direct answer to the main problem of the dialogue: this, however, is not inconsistent with its containing certain positive teachings. The main question of what is Love or Friendship is left unanswered: that Good, however, lies at the basis of it, so much *Lysis* seems to teach.

Charmides. In (*Charmides*), which investigates the virtue of Moderation (*σωφροσύνη*), we find a fuller and more definite explanation of the Socratic position that virtue is knowledge than we meet with in *Hippias Minor*. In the last part of the introduction to the dialogue, Moderation is called the health of the soul. The soul is

¹ *Lysis* 203 B.

² Stein: *Geschichte des Platonismus*, I. Mi. Grote: *Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates*, I. 523 seqq.

³ After an examination of the form and contents of the dialogue *Charmides*, Schaefer-Schmidt (*Sammlung der platonischen Schriften*, p. 120) says "Für den Kenner platonischer Kunst und Wissenschaft bedarf es nicht der keiner besonderen Mühe einzusehen, dass ein Dialog des angegebenen Inhalts, der nicht weder in der Mimik und Dramatik, noch in seinem dialektischen Verfahren künstlerischen oder philosophischen Geist zeigt, auch Plato nicht zugeschrieben werden dürfte, selber nicht unter der Voraussetzung dass er eine Jugendproduktion des Philosophen sei." With this compare Hermann: "Nur wer es sich stets vergegenwärtigt dass der platonische Sokrates in dieser Periode nicht sowohl übrige Meinungen zu widerlegen als vielmehr unklare Vorstellungen zu bekämpfen und dem Missbrauche zu wehren strebt, dem selbst richtige Begriffe ohne wissenschaftliche Begründung angesetzt sind, wird auch hier vom Anfang an nicht etwa eine bestimmte Fokierung des Begriffes der *σωφροσύνη*, sondern eben nur den Beweis erwarten, dass die gewöhnliche volkreiche Betrachtungsweise diese Begriffs nicht ausreiche, um ein deutliches und gegen jeden möglichen Einwurf gesichertes Bild von demselben zu geben." Hermann: *Geschichte und System d. Plat. Phil.* I. 444.

treated not with herbs, as the body, but with noble words. In this way Moderation is produced: ¹ ἐκ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων λόγων ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς σωφροσύνην ἐγγίγνεσθαι. Moderation is, therefore, something acquired, and if acquired ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων λόγων, then it must be of the nature of something learned. Whether or not virtue can be taught is discussed more especially in Meno and Protagoras. After Socrates has refuted two definitions of Sophrosyne, Charmides puts forward an opinion he has heard from some unnamed person (Critias), that Sophrosyne is "doing one's own work" (τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν ²). Although Socrates considers this definition puzzling and unsatisfactory, and rejects it on the ground of a verbal quibble, the same phrase is used in both Gorgias ³ and the Republic, ⁴ in the former as the characteristic of the life of a philosopher, and in the latter as defining δικαιοσύνη. Whether τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν is synonymous with virtue in general, Socrates does not explain in Charmides. This appears to be the case in Gorgias, where the life of the philosopher, as the life of the virtuous man, is characterized by this phrase. In fact, Sophrosyne in Charmides does not appear clearly distinguished from the other virtues, as is the case when Plato arrives at a classification of the faculties and corresponding virtues of the soul. The nature of ἀρετή in general occupies more attention in Charmides than a discussion of the particular notion σωφροσύνη. In the definition of Critias that Sophrosyne consists in knowledge (ἐπιστήμη ⁵), and further that this ἐπιστήμη is more especially self-knowledge (γνώθει σαυτὸν ⁶), the Socratic doctrine of virtue in general is expressed; viz. that the essence of virtue is knowledge of the good, and that this is based on self-knowledge (Legg. V. 726-735). No further definition is put forward, so that the dialogue closes without coming to any definition of Sophrosyne which Socrates can approve.

Laches. In the dialogue Laches, ⁷ the question whether Courage

¹ Charmides 157 A.

² Charmides 161 B.

³ Gorgias 526 C.

⁴ Republic 433 A.

⁵ Charmides 165 C. *et al.*

⁶ Charmides 164 E.

⁷ On the subject of the genuineness and chronological position of Laches, *vide* Bonitz: *Hermes*, Vol. V. 429 seqq., and Siebeck: *Jahrbücher für Class. Philologie*, Vol. 131 (1885), p. 225 seqq., in which article Siebeck puts the composition of Laches after the fourth book of the Republic. Stallbaum has nothing more definite to say, and probably nothing more definite can be said: "*scriptum esse a Platone admodum juvene,*" Prolegom. ad Lach. p. 29.

can be learned from fencing-lessons and war exercises is stated in the introduction. To this question Nicias and Laches are asked to give answers. In the main part of the dialogue three definitions are given of Courage. The first one is put forward by Laches, who considers *andreia* the staying by one's post in battle. This Socrates holds to be expressive of only a single phenomenon of *andreia*: it does not define what Courage is outside of battle. Laches then broadens his definition and declares Courage to be a kind of steadfastness of soul. This Socrates sees to have the opposite fault of the former definition. The former was too narrow, this is too wide: for not all steadfastness is morally good, but only steadfastness directed by intelligence.¹ Without intelligence steadfastness might be only obstinacy or foolishness. Nicias follows with the definition that it is the knowledge of what is and what is not to be feared, in war and elsewhere.² In the examination to which Socrates subjects this definition, he finds that the knowledge of what is and what is not to be feared is synonymous with the knowledge of good and evil. According to this definition, therefore, *andreia* is not a part, but the whole of virtue. Laches closes here negatively,³ as the former dialogue Charmides. There remains uncontested, as in the case of Charmides, that the specific virtue under consideration rests on knowledge, as does virtue in general; but what is the object of this knowledge remains undefined. The characteristic features of the genus is given,⁴ but the species is not determined. Susemihl's⁵ interpretation of the object of Laches seems the correct one, viz. that Courage, which appears to be most remote from the other virtues, is at one with them in this respect, that they are all based on knowledge. In this fashion he paves the way to the teaching of the Protagoras, that virtue, as the knowledge of

¹ Laches 192 E.

² *Ibid.* 195 A.

³ As to whether Laches ends negatively or positively, vide Becker: *Führerführer für Class. Philologie*, Bd. 122 (1880), p. 305 seqq., with which compare Stallbaum: *Prolegomena ad Lach.* p. 16: *Jam vero hic quoniam in superioribus fortitudinem concessit unam aliquam universae virtutis esse partem, subtilissima haec Socratis argumentatione id efficitur, ut ei denique concedendum sit, fortitudinis vim naturamque nondum ab ipsis usquequaque indagatam recte definitam esse.* Also Laches 193 E: *οὐκ ἔγωγε εὐφραμαι, ὁ Νικίας, ἀρέσκω δ' ἔτι λέγω.*

⁴ Laches 193 E.

⁵ Cf. Susemihl: *Genet. Sentu. d. Platon. Phil.* I. 39.

the good, is a unity. A secondary object of the dialogue is to bring to view the worth of the Socratic method in moral training. Knowledge or wisdom, as Socrates used σοφία (for which ἐπιστήμη is also employed, cf. Protag. 330 B), has a moral character, and is not simply an intellectual excellence. It implies what Sidgwick calls "right judgment in respect of ends as well as means."¹ In Greek Ethics two distinct features of ἀνδρεία are to be noticed; the first is *knowledge* of what is and what is not to be feared; the second, that of *steadfastness*. The one has mainly to do with the intellectual conception, the other with the will. Socrates gives greater prominence to the former, Aristotle² to the latter. With Socrates, however, we must not forget that virtue was not simply a correct intellectual estimation of the good or bad, but also a corresponding course of conduct; the former, as the primary, was with him the fundamental part of virtue. Conduct is only the actualization of thoughts. If these are wrong, acts will be correspondingly wrong, independently of any estimate we may put upon the quality of motive. Green, in referring to the Socratic unity of virtue, reads out of the Platonic Dialogues and Xenophon's Memorabilia more than is to be found in them. He says: "Here we have — not indeed in its source, but in that first clear expression through which it manifests its life — the conviction that every form of real goodness must rest on a will to be good, which has no object but its own fulfilment."³ The same author

¹ Sidgwick: *The Methods of Ethics*, 3d ed., p. 230.

² With Aristotle the primary characteristic of ἀνδρεία is ὑπομένειν, and this is the prevailing conception in later Greek Ethics. In Polit. 1334a 22, ἀνδρεία and καρτερία are used synonymously. The definition of courage as ἐπιστήμη τῶν δεινῶν καὶ οὐ δεινῶν included both the notions courage and fortitude, the one being the facing of danger and the other the enduring of pain without flinching. Bravery in battle and fortitude in illness are both regarded by Socrates as elements of the notion, the essence of which, however, is knowledge (cf. Xen. Mem. iv. 6. 11; Protag. 360 D; Laches 190 E, 194 E). Cicero seems not to have approved the Socratic definition: *Nam fortis animus et magnus in homine non perfecto nec sapienti ferventior plerumque est* (De Officiis I. 46). Although Aristotle lays chief emphasis on *endurance* in courage, he also makes reason an element in it when he distinguishes between θαρραλέα and φοβερά in such way as to make ἀνδρεία α μασόρης between them, i.e. rational courage, not foolhardiness (cf. Eth. Nic. III. 11. 1116a. 10). See further, Protagoras 351 A, B, in which θάρσος is distinguished from ἀνδρεία; also 359 B seqq.

³ Green: *Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 271.

says elsewhere: "In every moral action, good or bad, each capacity [reason and will] is exerted as much as the other."¹ Socrates, as we know him from Plato, made not the will, but purely the intelligence the basis of virtue: further, Socrates nowhere teaches that the will to be good had "no object but its own fulfilment." His Ethics is essentially utilitarian: τὸ τέλος in his teaching is happiness. He was strongly opposed to the hedonistic doctrine that makes pleasure the primary end of life; still he does not succeed in sharply distinguishing the good and the agreeable.² The criticism of Aspasius³ on the Socratic definition of courage, viz. that men are courageous not by reason of the noble (διὰ τὸ καλόν), but by reason of experience (διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν), does not touch a real difficulty. For ἐμπειρία, by which Aspasius designates the Socratic ἐπιστήμη, not only does not exclude τὸ καλόν, but a correct knowledge of the good actualizing itself in conduct is itself, according to Socrates, καλόν.

*Protagoras.*⁴ Around this dialogue, which is chiefly concerned with the question whether or not virtue can be taught, Schleiermacher arranges all the smaller ethical dialogues. The sophists, of whom Protagoras of Abdera was the first to call himself σοφιστής, announced themselves as teachers of virtue. Socrates inquires into the nature of this assertion. To do this he is obliged first to inquire into the nature of virtue itself, and from its nature to determine whether or not it can be taught.⁵ All of the five virtues named in Protagoras — Wisdom, Courage, Moderation, Justice, Piety⁶ — are only forms of one virtue,⁷

¹ Green: *Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 138.

² Protagoras 351 E. *et al.*

³ Διδὸ καὶ μένουναι ὡς περ οἱ ἀνδρείοι ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις στρατιωτικῶν καὶ εὐρε φοβούνται καὶ θαρροῦσιν ὡς περ καὶ οἱ ἀνδρείοι, οὐ μόνον διὰ τὸ καλόν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν. Aspasii in *Ethica Nicom. quae supersunt Commentaria*, ed. Heylbut, p. 85 11. See also, Δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡ περὶ ἑκάστου ἐμπειρία ἀνδρεία εἶναι, p. 84. 20.

⁴ Aristotle was acquainted with the dialogue Protagoras, and recognized it as Platonic. Cf. Bonitz's article in *Hermes*, III. p. 447, in which he points out that Aristotle, in *περὶ ζῳῶν μορίων* Δ 10. 687 A 23, had Protag. 321 C before his mind.

⁵ Protagoras 319 A.

⁶ Justice and Piety, which here seem to be regarded as separate virtues, are later on treated as one: δικαιοσύνη is justice in reference to men, and δεισιπύνη is justice in reference to gods, or piety. Cf. Euthyphro 12 D. seqq.

⁷ Protagoras 320 B seqq., 349 B seqq.

the essence of which is knowledge. The notion of good¹ is in none of the Socratic dialogues a very definite one.² In the Protagoras it appears in hedonistic coloring; the agreeable and painful appear as prominent characteristics of good and evil, and the Protagoras 357 D even identifies ἀγαθόν and ἡδύ. But inasmuch as things agreeable and painful are of different character and intensity,³ we must understand how to estimate them; *i.e.* our conduct in reference to both pleasure and pain must be regulated by ἐπιστήμη, — an art of estimating or measuring (μετρητική). In this way we are brought back to the main element in the Socratic notion of virtue, *viz.* that its basis is knowledge. One of the results of this position is, that if virtue is knowledge, it must be capable of being taught; a second, that no one can do evil wilfully.⁴ Every person who does anything does it for an object. A person represents to himself the attainment of this object as a good, whatever be the intrinsic nature of it. If it is not a good, then the error lies in the person's false knowledge. With correct knowledge, therefore, no one will do wrong, or no one can do wrong wilfully (ἑκόν); for a person only wills that which his intelligence represents to him as a good. The difficulty here is that there is no fixed notion of good; physical good and moral good not being kept distinct. Not until the late writings of Plato do we find an absolute idea of good (τὸ ἀγαθόν), to struggle toward⁵ a knowledge of which embraces the sum of the duties of man. In this early period there is no absolute good; consequently, no knowledge of absolute good. Knowledge, therefore, as the basis of virtue, can furnish no absolute standard of right and wrong. Lastly, we find in Protagoras utilitarianism⁶ approved. Things are good in so far as they produce pleasure or happiness, bad in so far as they bring physical evils and unhappiness. The character of things and acts is estimated by the character of the effects produced on the individual or society in reference to happiness.

¹ Protagoras 351 C seqq., 353 E seqq.

² Luthardt: *Die antike Ethik*, p. 41. In the Ethics of Plato in the later period we find an absolute notion of good in the idea τὸ ἀγαθόν.

³ Protagoras 357 A.

⁴ Protagoras 345 D.

⁵ Susemihl: *Genet. Entw. d. Plat. Phil.* I. 58.

⁶ Protagoras 353 D.

Meno. The subject of Meno is the same as that of Protagoras, viz. Can virtue be taught? The answer to this depends on the nature of virtue. Meno says it is "delight in the noble and the power to attain the same."¹ Socrates urges that the first part of this definition can be affirmed of all men, but the power of attaining to the noble (by "noble" is here meant² wealth, power, health, and such physical goods as are the object of universal desire) is not the characteristic constituent of virtue; for this power, in order to be designated as a property of virtue, must always be exercised with justice (*δικαίως*).³ This requires us to regard *δικαιοσύνη*, or one of the other individual virtues, as essentially belonging to the definition of Meno. This definition must therefore be abandoned as defective. Whether virtue is teachable or not, depends on whether or not virtue is knowledge. If it is knowledge, then it can be taught.⁴ Socrates proves that it is knowledge; therefore it can be taught. Then the opposite opinion is adopted, and, to prove that virtue is not knowledge, the fact is cited that there are no teachers of virtue, which would be remarkable if virtue were teachable. The Sophists give themselves out as teachers of virtue, but are not.⁵ The discussion at this point is involved in two hypothetical syllogisms, both of which cannot be true.⁶ The second of these syllogisms is —

If virtue is knowledge, it is teachable.
 Virtue is not teachable,
 ∴ Virtue is not knowledge.

This is evidently ironical, and is in direct opposition to the entire ethical teaching of Socrates in the other dialogues. The first syllogism, which harmonizes with the whole teaching of Socrates, therefore, stands. The same opinion is expressed by Cicero, with much

¹ Meno 77 B. ² Meno 78 C. ³ Meno 78 D. ⁴ Meno 89 C.

⁵ Dümmler: *Akademika*, p. 266.

⁶ a) If virtue is knowledge, it is teachable.

Virtue is knowledge,
 ∴ Virtue is teachable.

b) If virtue is knowledge, it is teachable.

Virtue is not teachable,
 ∴ Virtue is not knowledge.

Grote: *Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates*, II. p. 10.

less circumlocution: "ἀρετή non est διδακτόν: quod mihi persuaderi non potest."¹

In this dialogue Socrates draws a distinction between two sorts of virtue, one of which rests on δόξα ἀληθής, and the other on ἐπιστήμη.² The virtue which produces great statesmen — *i.e.* the inherent power which lifts such men above their fellows and makes them the wise guides of states — is not imparted by teaching: it comes only by divine gift (θεία μοίρα); it is a kind of genius. Sheer knowledge is not enough, according to the Meno, to produce an able man of this kind: there must, in addition, be the divine spark in the soul to direct it in the right. This sort of virtue is, accordingly, not the work of man, but of God.³ All real virtue is communicated by inspiration from the gods; *i.e.* the knowledge which we possessed in a pre-existence is revived, through ἀνάμνησις. This inspiration is, further, a sort of god-given (θεία μοίρα) impulse to attain truth and virtue, which has for its effect the awakening of dormant knowledge into conscious knowledge. To virtue there are, accordingly, two guides, — δόξα ἀληθής and ἐπιστήμη. In the Republic, however, the virtue which does not rest on knowledge is uncertain and blind. The virtue which rests on right opinion (δόξα ἀληθής), or ordinary virtue, is only introductory and preparatory to philosophic virtue. The opposition between the two in the Meno disappears in the Republic. The one grows out of the other; the two form a unity.⁴ In δόξα ἀληθής and ἐπιστήμη and ἀνάμνησις we have unmistakable traces of the doctrine of ideas; though, as in Lysis, nothing more definite than these pointings toward the doctrine are to be found in Meno.

Apology. The value of the Apology is chiefly an historical one.⁵ It explains the attitude of Socrates towards the law; gives us his own opinion of the charges preferred against him; and shows us the teacher living to the last, under severest trials, consistently with his teaching. In the indictment preferred against him were three points, one negative and two positive (Xenoph. *Mem.* I. 1): a) He did not

¹ Suidas sub voce 'Ἀρετή: διδακτὴν τε εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν, καὶ δῆλον ἐκ τοῦ γίνεσθαι ἀγαθὸς ἐκ φαύλων.

² Meno 97 C. seqq.

³ Köstlin: *Die Ethik des class. Alterthums*, I. p. 387.

⁴ Zeller: *Philosophie der Griechen*, II. 1. 881 seq.

⁵ Susemihl: *Genet. Entw. d. Plat. Phil.* I. 90.

had probably not arrived at any definite conception of the psychological nature of what we term conscience. With him the activity of δαιμόνιον was confined to negative judgments,¹ which fact leads most modern investigators to suppose that the δαιμόνιον of Socrates is something entirely distinct from conscience. Socrates believed this Daimonion to be a divine voice within him, but we may say in the same way that some Christians still identify conscience with the voice of God. The forbidding office of conscience, as the most prominent characteristic of the moral monitor, was the one side to which the attention of Socrates was particularly directed; this phenomenon of conscience was his Daimonion; *i.e.* δαιμόνιον is identified with conscience in its negative manifestations. It is not necessary that anything transcendental should be seen in his doctrine of Daimonion; personality is assigned to it figuratively.² Daimonion, which is a dissuading power, as well as the positive sense of duty or persuading power, is in the moral philosophy of Socrates referred back to knowledge; both of these elements are combined in our notion of conscience. A thing should be done, or is advisable to be done, on certain grounds; with these grounds reason or knowledge has principally to do. A thing is *not* advisable, or should *not* be done; a kind of moral instinct, δαιμόνιον, holds us back. Both of these, *viz.* the advisory and dissuadatory principles, are based on knowledge, *i.e.* a knowledge of what *is* and what *is not* to be done, which, in a word, is the foundation of all virtue. In the instance of "thou shalt not," the moral instinct speaks clearly and sharply; this clear, sharp voice is the Socratic δαιμόνιον, or what we may call, for the lack of a better term, the negative conscience. The grounds of "thou shalt not" are, however, taken cognizance of by reason; consequently the ultimate basis of the negative as well as positive command (Gebot and Verbot) is knowledge (ἐπιστήμη).

Green, in his *Prolegomena to Ethics*, says: "The ideal of virtue which our consciences acknowledge has come to be the devotion of character and life to a perfecting of man, which is itself conceived as consisting in a life of self-devoted activity on the part of all persons."³

¹ Αὐτὸ ἀποτρέπει με τοῦτο ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ ὄψομαι, Apol. 31 D.

² For the various opinions that have been expressed on this much discussed subject, *vide* Zeller: *Die Phil. d. Griechen*, 4te Aufl., II. 1. 75 seqq.

³ Green: *Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 311.

Measured by this standard we have in the Socrates of the Apology and Crito a realized ideal of virtue. In the fulfilment of his last duty, viz. drinking the hemlock in obedience to the law of the state, when he had power to do otherwise, he performed the last of a series of duties, which gave historical proof that the doer was an ideally virtuous character.¹ Socrates did not regard the sentence as right, but he regarded obedience to the law as duty, consequently he refused the opportunity put in his way to evade the law. In his heroically suffering the infliction of wrong from the Athenians, he gives expression to one of his immortal precepts for conduct: οὐδέ ἀδικούμενον ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν.²

*Gorgias.*³ Socrates, after a discussion of Rhetoric, which he disapproves on account of abuses made of it (for flattery, putting the wrong in a good light before the court, making the worse appear the better reason, are the chief employments made of Rhetoric), inquires into the question, "What is the chief end of life?" This is examined in company with Callicles, the host of the celebrated Sophist Gorgias. It was a prevailing teaching amongst the later Rhetoricians and Sophists that the *agreeable* is the *good*, that to do wrong is better than to suffer wrong, that the satisfaction of such passions and desires as afford sensual pleasure is the good at which men should aim.⁴ This is the fundamental doctrine of the hedonistic school,⁵ of which Aristippus⁶ was the founder. Callicles asserts the right of the stronger as the law of nature (τὸν κρείττω τοῦ ἥττονος ἄρχειν καὶ πλέον ἔχειν). Socrates says if the κρείττονες are identical with the φρονιμώτεροι, as Callicles admits, then they should rule themselves as well as others. To which Callicles responds that no barriers

¹ Höffding: *Ethische Principien*, p. 113.

² Crito 49 B.

³ For the time of composition, about which there is a disparity of twenty-nine years between the opinions of Teichmüller and Bergk, *vide* Dümmler: *Akademika*, p. 69, and Susemihl: *Genet. Entw. d. Plat. Phil.* p. 113.

⁴ Cf. *Gorgias* 491 seqq.; *Repub.* 343, 344; *Meno* 71 E. How far the same teaching is to be referred to the Sophists in general, especially to the earlier Sophists, is likely to remain a matter of controversy. This is due to the fact that one is left much to the general tone and tendency of the Platonic writings, and to the fact that the Sophists represent no definite body of doctrine. But on the question, *vide* Zeller: *Die Phil. d. Gr.*, 4te Aufl., II. i. 606 seqq., and Grote: *History of Greece*, ch. 67, vol. viii. pp. 479-544.

⁵ *Vide* note 1, p. 155.

⁶ Stein places his birth in 435 B.C., thus making him Plato's elder by eight years.

or boundaries should be placed to the satisfaction of desire, and that the ability to satisfy desire to the fullest extent is virtue and happiness. Against the view that the agreeable or pleasure is identical with the good, Socrates puts forward two objections: α) Good excludes its opposite — bad. The same thing cannot be both good and bad at the same time. Pleasure,¹ however, consists in the satisfaction of desire. Desire as such is a feeling of dissatisfaction. If there be no feeling of dissatisfaction there can accordingly be no feeling of satisfaction; the one is, therefore, the precursor and condition of the other. Consequently the feeling of pleasure includes its own opposite as a necessary condition to its own existence. Good, however, cannot include its own opposite; pleasure and the good are, therefore, not identical.² β) Callicles admits that knowledge and courage are goods *per se*, and that men by means of them become ἀγαθοί. But he has said that pleasure is the only good. It is evident from this that Callicles employs good in different senses. Callicles now admits that amongst pleasures some are good and others bad. This admission having been made, Socrates says that pleasure evidently cannot be the final aim of conduct or the absolute good.³

In Gorgias, Socrates or the Socratic Plato⁴ bases happiness (εὐδαιμονία) on moderation (σωφροσύνη) and justice (δικαιοσύνη),⁵ *i.e.* on virtue; by evil (κακία) men are made unhappy. In this dialogue σωφροσύνη⁶ is the inner harmony of the soul, which manifests itself outwardly in the virtues of justice, holiness, and courage. The attainment of happiness, which is only to be attained through virtue, is the highest object of life. When this is reached and the soul disrobed of the body, which keeps us from seeing its real nature and it comes before the last judgment, no scars and disfigurements inflicted by wrong and injustice are seen. By the attainment of perfect harmony and beauty of the soul, which is perfect virtue, men attain the μακάρων νῆσοι (Gorgias 523 B), as described in the splendidly wrought myth which Plato works out on the basis of Iliad XV. 187 seq., and with which he closes this, one of the finest of the entire series of dialogues.

¹ Stein: *Geschichte des Platonismus*, I. 171. ² *Id.* I. 175.

³ Bonitz: *Platonische Studien*, 2te Aufl. 1875, p. 12.

⁴ Dümmler: *Akademika*, p. 73. ⁵ Gorgias 508 B. ⁶ *Vide note 2 (above).*

Euthyphro.¹ In *Euthyphro*, which treats of Holiness (*δσιότης*), the case from which the discussion has its starting-point is that of Euthyphro against his father. This case is used as a text, from which to proceed to a justification of Socrates against the charge of impiety, or a wrong attitude toward the gods. The father of Euthyphro has caused the death of a slave contrary to law, and the son brings a complaint against him for homicide. This treatment of his father on the part of Euthyphro Socrates declares to be impious. Euthyphro defends his action as right. Whereupon Socrates asks in what consists the essence of holiness or piety, — λέγε δῆ, τί φῆς εἶναι τὸ ὄσιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον.² Euthyphro cites an instance which is meant at the same time to defend himself and to explain what holiness is. This instance is the example of Zeus punishing his father Cronos for wrong. Socrates urges that the citation of a single case does not furnish a definition. Euthyphro then formulates a definition in which he says that the holy is that which is pleasing to the gods (τὸ μὲν τοῖς θεοῖς προσφιλὲς ὄσιον).³ The objection which Socrates urges to this is that there is a difference of moral judgment amongst the gods, as is proven by the numerous quarrels amongst them. Consequently what would please one might not please another. This cannot therefore be made a standard. Euthyphro then amends his definition and says that what is pleasing to *all* the gods is holy (τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ὄσιον ὃ ἂν πάντες οἱ θεοὶ φιλῶσιν).⁴ Socrates urges that the pleasure of the gods in a thing does not constitute the essence of its holiness, but *vice versa* a thing is pleasing to the gods because it is holy, *i.e.* the intrinsic character of the thing is prior to and exists independently of the judgment of the gods. Euthyphro has here confused the consequences of a thing with its grounds. Socrates now puts forth the view that *δσιότης* is a part of

¹ For the time of composition, as to which there is great difference of opinion, *vide* Susemihl: *Genet. Entw. d. Plat. Phil.* I. 125 seq.; also Zeller: *Phil. d. Gr.*, 4te Aufl., II. 1. 530: "Noch etwas früher, um die gleiche Zeit wie die Apologie, könnte in ähnlicher Absicht [ein Bild. d. Sokr. und d. sokr. Phil. zu entwerfen] der Euthyphron geschrieben worden sein, wenn er nicht schon der Zeit des sokratischen Processes angehört."

² Euthyphro 5 D.

³ Euthyphro 6 E.

⁴ Euthyphro 9 E.

δικαιοσύνη,¹ to which Euthyphro gives his approval. This is further defined² as that part of justice (δικαιοσύνη) which has reference to the gods.³ In continuing the inquiry into the nature of this "justice in reference to the gods," *i.e.* holiness, Euthyphro says it consists in the knowledge of sacrifice and of prayer. This appears to mean a knowledge of what we owe the gods and what we are to expect from them — the sum of our active and passive relations to the gods. This phase of virtue is therefore in its turn grounded on knowledge (οὐχὶ ἐπιστήμην τινὰ τοῦ θείου τε καὶ εὐχεσθαι;⁴). With this the Euthyphro closes, the discussion as to the essence of δσιότης remaining unfinished. The definition that the holy is that which the gods love⁵ is rejected by Socrates, but no other is found to take its place. In this respect the dialogue ends negatively. It is not, however, wholly negative. It is established that δσιότης is a part of δικαιοσύνη, in consequence of which Plato uses hereafter only four cardinal virtues, the fifth — δσιότης — being subordinated to justice as a species. Further, δσιότης is justice in reference to the gods, and as a virtue has its foundation in knowledge. In so far the dialogue contains positive teaching.

This closes the examination of the separate writings in the so-called first period (*vide* p. 135). We have now further to examine the results of the foregoing, prior to a treatment of the notion of virtue as Plato conceived it in the third and fourth books of the Republic. We may note here, in passing, that one virtue,⁶ φρόνησις, has not been treated in the foregoing, though it receives special mention in Meno (88 C, D, 97 B), where it is defined as a hegemonic virtue; but this is precisely the nature of σοφία. It receives further mention in the Apology (29 D). It is entirely omitted here,

¹ Euthyphro 12 D; Protagoras 329 C, 330 D, E, 333 B.

² Euthyphro 12 E, 13 C.

³ Laches 199 D.

⁴ Euthyphro 14 C.

⁵ "Das Gute wird dann dasjenige, was mit Gottes Willen übereinstimmt, und gut ist es nur, weil es mit Gottes Willen übereinstimmt (*bonum est quia deus vult*). Diese Leheward von Duns Scotus gehörig formulirt, 'Der Mord sei keine Sünde, wenn Gott den Mord vorgeschrieben hätte.'" — Höfding: *Ethische Principien*, p. 13. This principle of divine authority or divine approval as the ground of right and wrong is contested by Socrates in Euthyphro.

⁶ Meno 87 B, C; Protagoras 323-329.

The virtue of man is in the same way his fitness to fulfil his aim;¹ it is the *pleasing* and *satisfactory* condition of man.² In the Socratic Ethics virtue is not the contemplation of the ideas, or the becoming like the absolute good,³—the aim of the virtuous life in the later dialogues,—but fitness to attain *εὐδαιμονία*. This fitness expresses itself in this,—that a person live in harmony with his higher nature, viz. reason.⁴ Closely related to this is the Stoic conception of virtue as a life in harmony with nature, *ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν*. Chrysippus conceives *φύσις* here as the unity of human and universal nature, and Zeno, who calls the *τέλος* at which the virtuous life aims *τὸ ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν*, says further: *τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ καθ' ἕνα λόγον καὶ σύμφωνον ζῆν* (Stob. Ecl. II. 6. 6. 132; ed. Meineke II. p. 39). The virtue of man is then the health and fitness of the soul as the highest part of man, and of the understanding as the highest part of the soul, and the living in accordance with this.⁵ The same doctrine underlies the sentence which Chr. Wolf lays at the foundation of his teaching on virtue: "Do that which makes you more perfect; avoid that which makes you less perfect." The *reason* must say what tends to make more perfect and what to make less perfect. The life therefore which corresponds with the utterances of reason is the virtuous life. Reason is consequently in the Wolfian Ethics the ultimate basis of virtue. The chief of the cardinal virtues is with Socrates *σοφία*. Without reason there can be no virtue. We have remarked that the Ethics of this period as well as the Greek Ethics in general is eudaemonistic. Virtue was regarded by Socrates and the Socratic Plato not only as an end in itself, but also as a means; the end at which all virtue aims is happiness. All conduct accordingly is good only in so far as it is useful to the attainment of this end. Further, that the ethical teaching of the historical Socrates

¹ Köstlin: *Die Ethik des class. Alterthums*, I. 70.

² Cf. the etymology of Curtius, *ἀρε-τή*, *ἀρι-στος*, *ἀρέ-σκειν*.—*Griechische Etymology*, 342. Also Etymolog. Magnum, ed. Gaisford, *sub voc. ἀρετή*. "ἡ παρὰ τὸ ἀρῶ, ἀρέσω, ἀρεστή καὶ ἀρετή, ἢ πᾶσιν ἀρέσκουσα."

³ Überweg-Heinze: *Grundr. d. Gesch. d. Phil. d. Alter.*, 7te Aufl., p. 169 seq.

⁴ In the Ethics of the contemporary of Socrates, Democritus, the same position is assigned to knowledge: *διόπερ ξυνέσι τε καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ ὀρθοπραγέων τις ἀνδρῆσιος ἄμα καὶ εὐθύγνωμος γίνεταί*. Mullach's *Fragmenta: De Democrito*, 135.

⁵ Rep. 431, 444, 611.

was utilitarianism is seen from the testimony of Xenophon,¹ as well as from that of Plato.² Socrates acknowledged no such thing as an obligation to do anything for its own sake, or that the non-performance of such thing would be *sin* in the Christian sense. The sole obligation lay in its serviceableness to reach an end. The sum of conduct aims at the highest end, *i.e.* the highest good for man, viz. *εὐδαιμονία*. In fitness to reach this lay all the moral quality of virtue; *i.e.* its moral quality lay in its character as means and not as end, or at least not as final end, but at the same time it is with Plato an *essential* means to happiness.³ In application to society Stephen gives expression to an equally definite utilitarianism: "The ultimate and governing principle is in all cases the utility of the quality, in the sense in which utility means fitness for the conditions of life. . . . Moralists agree approximately in the admission that truthfulness is an essential condition of the welfare of society as known to us. This, according to me, is the ultimate ground, in a scientific sense at least, of its moral value."⁴ In an utilitarian system of Ethics of this kind, the only means of estimating utility is reason; but inasmuch as the judgments of reason in different men are different, there can then be no absolute standard of good and bad, such as is to be found in the Christian religion, where the standard is revealed law of an absolutely good Law-giver, and in which the morally bad takes the name of *sin*. Socrates made the usefulness of a thing to attain the end (happiness) the standard of good and bad, consequently he knew no such standard as the will of God, nor any such thing as *sin*, in the sense of *sin* being transgression of the law of God. His doctrine of virtue was therefore purely naturalistic; the transcendental basis of right and wrong which Euthyphro proposes was rejected by Socrates. The moral character of a thing, as already remarked, is nothing beyond its fitness to serve the end at which life aims, and this is not so much the happiness of society as the happiness of the individual. Plato does not get beyond individualism until after the Socratic

¹ "τὸ ἕρα ὠφέλιμον ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶν ὅταν ἂν ὠφέλιμον ᾖ; Δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη." — Xen. Mem. iv. 6, 8.

² . . . ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ, ἃ ἐστὶν ὠφέλιμα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις; καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δι' ἔφη. — Protag. 333 D.

³ Köstlin: *Die Ethik des class. Alterthums*, I. 112.

⁴ Stephen: *Science of Ethics*, pp. 189, 206.

period, when he concerns himself with social Ethics or Politics. Furthermore, in this first period Plato has done nothing toward a psychological foundation for his ethical system, which forms a prominent feature of the Republic. Plato in the Socratic period takes for granted the relation of will and motive to ethical questions, without any closer examination into the subject; or possibly he was not at all conscious of their nature. Both are included in his notion of knowledge, which embraced theoretical knowing as well as will to actualize the known good. Green thus presents both features: "That a man should seek an object as 'part of his happiness,'¹ or as one without which in his then state he cannot satisfy himself, — and this is to will — implies that he represents himself to himself as in a better state with the object attained than he is without it; and this is to exercise reason."² This relationship, however, is not expressed in the Socratic Ethics. Further, the distinction between good and moral good is nowhere clearly made by Socrates. Power, wealth, justice, are all *ἀγαθά*. The objective intrinsic character of an act, independent of the motive to which it is to be referred or any like subjective element, as qualified to make for happiness, is the fundamental notion of the Ethics of Socrates. "The distinction between the good and bad will," says Green, "must lie at the basis of every system of Ethics."³ However it may stand with the truth or untruth of this statement that 'the distinction between the good and bad will must lie at the basis of any system of Ethics,' it is not the *conscious* basis of the ethical teaching of Socrates.

In the first period all the writings may be called essentially dialogues of search; notions are investigated and popular beliefs and traditions in reference to virtue are made the subject of inquiry, in order to find out if they be true, and if not, what the true is. No preconceived doctrines are started with and defended. Although

¹ Socrates, in his Eudaemonism, although he does not adopt Hedonism as it took form in the Ethics of the later Aristippus, still does not always keep the notions of the *good* and *agreeable* distinct. Cf. Protagoras, 351 E, 358 B. And although he does not set *ἡδὴ* in the foreground like Aristippus, still its position in the Socratic teaching is prominent enough to lend it a decidedly hedonistic coloring.

² Green: *Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 186.

³ Green: *Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 160.

the generic notion 'virtue' occupies considerable space in these Socratic inquiries, it is always investigated through the single or specific virtues, in order to determine, through what is common to the specific virtues, the content of the generic notion. Therefore psychological questions of will, motive, etc. find no place in this period. The separate cardinal virtues are examined; and these Plato did not arbitrarily name, but accepted from tradition. The one element which the Socratic Plato finds common to these is that with which we have had to do in almost every dialogue, viz. knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*), and this he considers the essence of the generic notion *ἀρετή*. The cardinal virtues¹ which Plato employs in *Euthyphro* are *σοφία*, *ἀνδρεία*, *σωφροσύνη*, and *δικαιοσύνη*. Before leaving the smaller dialogues for the *Republic*, we shall review what Plato has done in them to define these specific virtues.

Σοφία. The notion *σοφία* in the early dialogues has much in common with the notion *reasonableness*, i.e. the right relation of reason to opinion or conduct, a subjective disposition in reference to something external, which disposition is in harmony with and regulated by reason. In *Laches*² every man is good in reference to the things in which he is wise. The courageous man is wise in reference to the things in which he exhibits rational courage; in other words, courage is a kind of wisdom. It therefore falls under the more generic notion *σοφία* with which *ἐπιστήμη* is used synonymously,³ though the ordinary Platonic usage of *ἐπιστήμη* is classified knowledge or science. The close relationship of *σοφία* to *ἀγαθόν* is seen from *Meno*,⁴ where *σοφός* and *ἀγαθός* are placed together. In *Protagoras*⁵ wisdom is identified with self-control, in which it approximates *σωφροσύνη*: οὐδὲ κρείττω ἑαυτοῦ ἄλλο τι ἢ σοφία. Here theoretical knowledge goes entirely over into *πράξις*. In all of these dialogues *σοφία* refers not merely to abstract science or theoretical knowledge, but also to practical wisdom with which conduct has directly to do.

¹ In the *Laws* Plato adheres to this number of cardinal virtues, although they do not have the same content, and for *σοφία* he has substituted *φρόνησις*. Legg. 631 C.

² *Laches* 195 A, 194 E.

³ *Protagoras* 330 B.

⁴ *Meno* 93 E.

⁵ *Protagoras* 358 C.

Ἄνδρεία. No precise definition of *ἄνδρεία* is reached in the smaller dialogues. Two elements in the notion, however, are marked. α) It is based on knowledge. β) It has for its object that which tends to produce fear. What the more precise nature of these objects is comes to no explanation. A distinction is made in Protagoras¹ between foolhardiness and courage (*θάρασος* and *ἄνδρεία*). *Ἄνδρεία* is something that is always good and noble, *καλόν* and *ἀγαθόν*, whereas *θάρασος* is not a good; it does not have for its origin nobility of nature, but is derived *ἀπὸ τέχνης*; *ἄνδρεία*, on the other hand, is derived *ἀπὸ φύσεως καὶ εὐτροπίας τῶν ψυχῶν*. Only the wise man can be brave, *i.e.* only rational courage can be real courage. It is, as we saw in Laches,² a knowledge of what is and what is not to be feared. In Meno³ we find that, if courage is not united with practical wisdom or insight (*φρόνησις*), it is injurious; consequently under such circumstances it is not a virtue, for virtue cannot be injurious. Courage without intelligence (*ἄνευ νοῦ*) is *θάρασος*. In Protagoras⁴ the element of knowledge is made so prominent in *ἄνδρεία*, that Socrates suggests it is identical with *σοφία*. In Gorgias⁵ their separateness is affirmed without meeting contradiction. Further than this, no definition is given in the first period either of the intrinsic nature of *ἄνδρεία* or of its relation to the other cardinal virtues or of the character of the objects with which it concerns itself.

Σωφροσύνη. The chief attempts at a definition of *σωφροσύνη* in the early dialogues have been given in noticing Charmides, which is specially devoted to this virtue. General and unsatisfactory as are the various definitions put forward in Charmides, quite as general are the definitions which we find in the other dialogues of the same period. In the treatment of all the cardinal virtues the attention is directed chiefly to the nature of the virtue itself, without reference to its bearing on the person exercising it. In the case of *σωφροσύνη* the reflex action of the virtue is characterized by saying it is not only a good *per se*, but in its working makes the person good.⁶ Whether the possession of the virtue is prior to its exercise, or whether the person becomes virtuous by the fact of the exercise, is nowhere in this series of writings discussed. The last definition in Charmides

¹ Protagoras 349 D, 350 A seqq.

² Meno 88 B.

⁴ Protagoras 350 D.

² Laches 195 A, 196 D.

⁵ Gorgias 495 C.

⁶ Charmides 161 A.

is perhaps the most general of all, in which *σωφροσύνη* is said to be the science of good and evil (*ἀγαθοῦ τε καὶ κακοῦ*).¹ This would seem to identify the notion *σωφροσύνη* with virtue in general. No more satisfactory determination of the content of this notion is arrived at in the dialogue specially devoted to its discussion. In Protagoras² it is suggested that *σωφροσύνη* is one with *σοφία*, as *δοσιότης* with *δικαιοσύνη*. A few lines further in the same dialogue³ *σωφροσύνη* is defined as right state of thought (*εὖ φρονεῖν*).⁴ In this conception Socrates has regard only to the subjective; the object or objects to which 'right thinking' refers is not made clear. All virtue in the Ethics of Socrates is 'right thinking' in reference to a something, but includes further a *πρᾶξις* which corresponds to *εὖ φρονεῖν*.⁴ This definition is then only one side of the general notion of virtue with Socrates. This *εὖ φρονεῖν*, as an intellectual state characteristic of *σωφροσύνη*, will, however, be of interest in noticing the definition in the Republic. The remarks on *σωφροσύνη* in Gorgias⁵ will also have interest for the Republic. In Gorgias it is said that good order in the body is called health; good order in the soul, by which it is brought into harmony with its laws, is justice (*δικαιοσύνη*) and moderation (*σωφροσύνη*). These two virtues are placed in juxtaposition as, taken together, denoting the health, harmony, and virtue of the soul. What particular office, however, is to be assigned to each, is left indefinite. Toward a determination of the notion under consideration we draw from the foregoing the following results: α) It has for its foundation, as in the case of the other virtues, knowledge. β) It is of the nature of health, or harmony of the soul. γ) It has a reflex action on the person exercising it, which gives him the character 'good.' δ) An emphasized feature of it is that it is 'right thinking' (*εὖ φρονεῖν*), which indicates that it is chiefly concerned with a subjective state.

¹ Charmides 174 D.

² Protagoras 333 B.

³ Protagoras 333 D.

⁴ Xenophon, the disciple of Socrates, emphasizes in his definition of *σωφροσύνη* the external element, the praxis: ἀλλὰ σωφρόνων τοί ἐστι καὶ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς οὕτως ποιεῖν ὅπως τὰ τε ὄντα ὡς βέλτιστα ἔξει καὶ ἕλλα ὅτι πλεῖστα ἐκ τοῦ καλοῦ τε καὶ δικαίου προσγενήσεται. Xen. Oeconom. vii. 15.

⁵ Gorgias 504 C.

Δικαιοσύνη. In these dialogues of search, from the Lesser Hippias to Euthyphro, the entire ethical investigations are of a tentative character; current notions are examined and found unsatisfactory, new definitions are put forward, which on being investigated are rejected. The mass of the writings is consequently of a negative character. Many of the definitions which are put forward are rejected as wholes, but parts of them would have been accepted by Socrates as true. To tell just how much of each definition Socrates would have accepted as true, is a difficult feature in the study of this period.

Important as is the position which the cardinal virtue *δικαιοσύνη* holds in the Ethics of Plato, no very complete result can be reached as to the content of the notion in the ten compositions immediately under consideration. In Hippias II¹ *δικαιοσύνη* is said to be either *δύναμις* or *ἐπιστήμη* or both. The juster soul shows itself to be at once the wiser and stronger. When the powerful and wise soul does anything unjust, it does it intentionally and for a purpose, by means of the possession and skilful use of power (*δύναμις* καὶ *τέχνη*). These are both, therefore, elements of justice. *Δύναμις* is power, whether of a moral, intellectual, or physical kind; *τέχνη* is the ability to make use of the *δύναμις* in a practical way: it is practical art. The two terms would therefore mean the potential and actual phases of *δικαιοσύνη*. In order that justice exist, there must be in the person not only α) a capability or potentiality of justice, but β) this must be actualized. Justice is therefore an actualized power, or a capability made effective. In Protagoras² justice is made to consist in the state of the person; it consists in a person being just, *i.e.* it is *ἕξις* as well as *δύναμις*. The same thing is said of virtue in the *Definitions*³ which go under Plato's name: *ἕξις καθ' ἣν τὸ ἔχον ἀγαθὸν λέγεται*. In Crito⁴ the notion has to do chiefly with law, with what is right or wrong in reference to a legal standard. Refusal to escape from prison and obedience to the law by undergoing the penalty imposed by it is called by three terms, — *δίκαιον, καλόν, ἀγαθόν*. Again virtue and justice are placed side by side to represent the sum of right

¹ Hippias II. 375 E seqq.

² Protagoras 33 D.

³ *Ἔρμ.* III. 411 D. Baiter, Orelli 855. 2.

⁴ Crito 47 C, 48 A, 53 C, 53 E.

action in reference to the matter of obedience to law. A few lines later justice is called a part of virtue, no other part being mentioned in this connection. This makes it evident that *δικαιοσύνη* was the cardinal virtue to which Socrates attached greatest importance at that time, which was a time when his chief concern was with law. Justice is, therefore, the virtue which has chiefly to do with legal obligations. This further agrees with the idea which lies at the basis of its etymology. In *Gorgias*¹ the nature of man is divided into physical and psychical; with the former the sciences of gymnastics and medicine have to do; with the latter, politics. Politics is further divided into α) nomothetics or legislation, and β) justice. Further, justice is to the soul what medicine is to the body. In *Protagoras*,² in the course of the myth narrated by the Sophist, a distinction is made between technical and political virtues; the former was given to men by Prometheus and had reference only to handicraft; the latter were bestowed later by Zeus, and were such virtues as justice and moderation, which immediately concerned society and the state. This *πολιτικὴ ἀρετὴ* of the Protagoras is not to be confused with the political or citizen's virtue of the Republic, which goes under the same name as this in Protagoras, but in the Republic is used to distinguish a lower order of virtue from the higher or philosophic virtue.

Before turning to the Republic as the representative dialogue of Plato's finished moral philosophy, there are certain elements in the doctrine of virtue in these Socratic dialogues to be specially noted:

a) Virtue is identified with knowledge, or knowledge is at least the essential element in the notion, without which virtue cannot exist. b) In all men there is a like capacity for virtue.³ The slave in *Meno* is the possessor of dormant knowledge, which only requires to be awakened in memory. All men are like possessors of this through reminiscence. c) Virtue can be developed by instruction. d) There are four cardinal virtues, viz. *σοφία, ἀνδρεία, σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη*. e) There is only one virtue; these four cardinal virtues, or manifestations of the one, are reducible to a generic notion. f) The good is identified with the useful (*ὠφέλιμον*); the character of the moral teaching of Socrates in this direction is, therefore, utilitarianism. g) This implies that virtue is not an end in itself;

¹ *Gorgias* 464 B.

² *Protagoras* 323 B.

³ *Zeller* II. 1, p. 879.

for if a thing is *ὠφέλιμον*, it is useful for something; a thing useful for its own sake or useful without reference to a something for which it is useful, is an absurdity.¹ The end aimed at in the utilitarianism of Socrates is happiness; in reference to the final end of virtue the Socratic teaching is, therefore, eudaemonism. The *ἡδύ* which forms the chief element of happiness is not momentary sensual pleasure, though that may form part of the sum. The essence of happiness, at which all virtue aims, consists in pleasant sensations of the greatest possible intensity for the greatest length of time,² *i.e.* the greatest amount of happiness during existence. Against intemperance and sensual indulgence the only argument Socrates could bring was, that they decrease the sum of happiness and are on this ground evils. That he censured both is clear from his manner of living and his expressed disapproval of *ἀκρασία*.³ It is plain that Socrates taught a form of Hedonism, though very different from that of Aristippus, with whom the separate sensations⁴ of pleasure are the good, without reference to the sum of happiness for the sum of life. In the foregoing we have noticed the chief features in the teaching on virtue, as found in the so-called Socratic dialogues. There remains for consideration the content of the same notion in the Republic.

The Republic.

The Republic has been reserved for consideration at the conclusion of this inquiry, in order that the ethical contents of the dialogues of the Socratic period might be examined independently and the results more easily compared with the fully developed ethical system of Plato. Of all the works of Plato the Republic is the most important for his Ethics as well as his Politics. Both are branches of practical philosophy: an investigation of the one involves more or less an understanding of the other. Sidgwick calls Politics "the theory of what ought to be (in human affairs) as far as this depends on the

¹ Heinze: *Der Eudaimonismus in d. griech. Phil., in Abhandlungen d. Königl. Sächs. Gesell.*, Bd. 8, p. 741.

² Heinze: *Der Eudaim. in d. griech. Phil.*, p. 744.

³ Heinze: *Der Eudaim. in d. griech. Phil.*, p. 747.

⁴ Überweg-Heinze: *Grundriss d. Gesch. d. Phil. d. Alterthums*, 7te Aufl., p. 127.

common action of societies of men,"¹ and Ethics "the science or study of what ought to be, so far as this depends on the voluntary action of individuals."² In this, one of the last, and without exception the greatest of Plato's works, the state is investigated as an analogue of the individual. What is difficult to see and read in the individual is here written in large letters; it is the individual enlarged. We have seen that Socrates scarcely went beyond a dialectical investigation of the single virtues in the individual, and that he examined almost exclusively the material already at hand.³ His work was not creative, and did not result, except in the later efforts of his disciples, in the building up of any system. In the entire history of Ethics as a philosophic science, Plato was the first to work creatively. Part of his material, as the names of the four cardinal virtues, he borrowed from tradition; he gave them, however, different meanings and brought his teaching on virtue into harmony with his psychology. This tradition he uses in his early works as hypothesis; later, when confirmed by his triple division of the soul, he adopts the fourfold division of virtue into his system. The chief features of Plato's Ethics as set forth in the Republic are, according to Höfding, α) The unity of virtue, and β) self-government for the good of the state; *i.e.* the sum of individual duties consists in the sum of duties to the state. This same view, he further notices, is to be found in Comte's Altruism and in Fichte's Ethics, the latter of whom says: "Es gibt nur eine Tugend, die — sich selber als Person zu vergessen, und nur ein Laster, das — an sich selbst zu denken."⁴ The individual is made subservient to the state; the state is prior in right to the individual. The primary notion which lies at the basis of the state is justice; the state is the concrete realization of the idea of justice. The morally good is determined by the notion *δικαιοσύνη* as found in the state. The individual can consequently be good or moral only in as far as he is a member of the state, in which alone the notion "moral good" or justice becomes realized.⁵ There is, however, corresponding to the notion justice in the state, which

¹ Sidgwick: *The Methods of Ethics*, 3d ed., p. 15.

² *Id.*, p. 4.

³ Baur: *Drei Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der alten Philosophie*, etc. Neuausgegeben von Zeller, 1876, p. 256.

⁴ Höfding: *Ethische Principien*, German translation by Bendixen, p. 118.

⁵ Baur: *Drei Abhandlungen s. Gesch. d. alten Phil.*, p. 256.

consists of a harmony of the different classes in the state, further a justice in the individual, which consists in a harmony of the different parts of the soul. There are in the state three classes; viz. α) The rulers, β) The warriors, γ) The ordinary citizens. These three essentially different classes form the state. These three correspond to the three elements in the individual: α) The rational, λογιστικόν. β) The emotional (for lack of a better term to designate the element of the soul in which zeal, θυμός, is the characterizing feature, "emotional" will be employed here), θυμοειδές. γ) The desiderative, ἐπιθυμητικόν. The virtues which belong to these parts and classes severally, though in the case of σωφροσύνη not exclusively, are: α) Wisdom, σοφία, β) Courage, ἀνδρεία, γ) Moderation, σωφροσύνη. The virtue of the ruling class or philosophers, σοφία, takes, as in the smaller dialogues, rank above ἀνδρεία and σωφροσύνη, though here σοφία has a different meaning from that in the first period. In the first place, Plato's interpretation of the soul as a complex organism makes it impossible for him to accept the Socratic doctrine that right knowledge will be followed by right action simply by means of the intrinsic power of right knowledge; there are impulses, emotions, and animal desires which stand in the way of right knowledge going over into right conduct. Justice is, therefore, designated the chief and all-embracing virtue, by means of which all the parts of the soul perform their own work and produce in this way a harmony. The office of wisdom or knowledge is to rule over the lower elements. Further, knowledge has now what it did not have in the Socratic dialogues, ideas for its object and the idea of good for its highest object. Ideas have in this period the meaning of the really existent, prototypal substance, οὐσία, of which material things, as plants, animals, and in general such things as we take cognizance of by sense-perception, are only shadows and have existence only by participation (μέθεξις) in the prototypal substance. Of these ideas that of the good is highest, with which Plato identifies God.¹ The highest good,

¹ Zeller: *Philosophie d. Griechen*, 4te Aufl. II. 1, p. 707 seq. Überweg-Heinze: *Grundriss d. Gesch. d. Phil. d. Alterthums*, 7te Aufl., p. 162: "Alles, was existirt und erkennbar ist, hat von Gott, welcher gleich ist mit der Idee des Guten," u.s.w. Zeller says: "Indem nun das höchste Sein als das Gute und als die Zwecksetzende Vernunft bestimmet wird, ist es als das schöpferische Princip aufgefasst, welches sich in der Erscheinung offenbart: weil Gott gut ist, hat er die Welt

however, for man is to become like the idea good; *i.e.* like God. This is the aim of all virtue. In order to attain this end it is necessary first of all to struggle toward a knowledge of the idea. The faculty which takes cognizance of the idea is *νοῦς*, and the virtue corresponding to this faculty is *σοφία*. This struggle toward a knowledge of the highest good, as the chief business of man, is identical with the life of a philosopher. Plato therefore places at the head of his state, for its legislators and rulers, the philosophers, as the class which is in possession of *σοφία*. By the fact of this class, *viz.* *φιλόσοφοι*, *ἐπιστήμονες*, or *σοφοί* ruling the state, the entire social organism becomes characterized by the virtue *σοφία*.¹ In the individual, when the other faculties are subject to the guidance of the rational faculty, *λογιστικόν*, the individual becomes *σοφός*. This is the directing and commanding virtue in the state, as well as in the individual: in the individual it is the property of the noetic faculty; in the state, of the corresponding class. It is *reasonableness* in the widest and best sense of the term. Without wisdom courage is only physical wrath, and degenerates on the one side into foolhardiness, or on the other into cowardice. Courage (*ἀνδρεία*) is the characteristic virtue of the warrior class, which forms the defence of the state;² in the individual it is the subjection of the *θυραρχία* to the *λογιστικόν*, in the matter of what is and what is not to be feared, in the matter of what is to be opposed, endured, or dared. Knowledge is here, as in the early dialogues, essential to *ἀνδρεία*. In this respect we come no nearer to a definition of *ἀνδρεία* than in the other dialogues. The courageous man is said to fear only that which from its nature is really to be feared; *i.e.* *δένειν*. This is of course, as a definition, tautological; what we want to know is the content of *δένειν*. The man who fears what he should fear and does not fear what he should not fear is courageous. This leaves us, however, very far from a definition of what is and what is not to be feared.

The virtue *σωφροσύνη* is the rational control of sensual desires, or

gebildet," II. 1, p. 718. For a discussion of the question whether the idea of good is identical with God, *vide* Zeller: II. i. 708 seqq. Cf. further, *Repub.* vi. 508 E, with Stallbaum's note; vii. 517 A-C; *Phil.* 22 C seq.; *Tim.* 37 A. With this compare Pythagoras (from whom we know Plato derived many notions) in Stobaeus *Ecl.* I. ch. 2[58]; ed. Gaiffard: Vol. I. p. 22.

¹ *Repub.* 428 B.

² *Id.* 429 B seqq.

moderation. It is the virtue, therefore, which belongs especially,¹ though not exclusively, to the third (*i.e.* the working) class in the state, or the *ἐπιθυμητικόν* in the soul. The fourth and chief of the cardinal virtues, *δικαιοσύνη*, consists in the harmony of all the parts of the soul, in that each individual part does its own work (*τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν*). Just what is the teaching of Plato on *σωφροσύνη* and *δικαιοσύνη*, is one of the most difficult points in the whole of his ethics to determine. Courage and wisdom are virtues peculiar to single classes in the state or single parts of the soul, *viz.* *θυμοειδές* and *λογιστικόν*. Moderation, however, is not the exclusive property of *ἐπιθυμητικόν*, although it has especially to do with this principle. In the dialogue *Gorgias* (506 E–507 C) *δικαιοσύνη* has a different meaning from the notion in the fourth book of the *Republic*. According to this passage in *Gorgias* *σωφροσύνη* is the basis of justice. The content of the notion is not further defined than that it consists in an orderliness of the soul, — *ἡ δὲ γε κοσμία σῶφρων; πολλὴ ἀνάγκη*, — and that this orderliness or harmony is purely inward, the outward expression of which receives a different name, — *δικαιοσύνη*. This conception of *σωφροσύνη* as purely inward harmonizes further with *Protagoras* (333 D), in which dialogue it is defined as a right state of thought — *εὖ φρονεῖν* (*cf.* p. 158). These two dialogues out of the early period coinciding in this respect, the fact that a different view is put forward in the *Republic* would seem to indicate that this conception is Socratic: at least it does not represent the final teaching of Plato. The only other passages with which we have here to do are found in the *Republic*, and for the most part in the third and fourth books. In the third book the notion *σωφροσύνη* is discussed from 410 D seqq. According to this passage it is a harmonious state of the soul brought about by music² and gymnastic. Music, — by which we are to understand literature, music, and general intellectual training, — without gymnastic, produces softness and effeminacy of character; while on the other hand gymnastic without music produces roughness. Rudeness is the natural property of the spirited element of the soul; but if this part is properly nurtured and trained, it becomes brave. Gentleness is a property of the philo-

¹ Cf. pp. 169 seq. and p. 177.

² *Γραμματικὴ* in the usual division of Greek education is here included in *μουσική*.

sophic temperament, which, if overindulged, degenerates into effeminate weakness; but, if rightly nurtured, gives the soul an orderly and cultivated fineness. The guardians of the state should combine both of these qualities and harmonize them; where this harmony exists, the soul possesses *σωφροσύνη* and *ἀνδρεία* (410 E). To correct these two temperaments, the spirited and philosophical, some god has given to men two arts, music and gymnastic: these properly used produce in the soul that accord which Plato here terms *σωφροσύνη*. The art of gymnastic is intended rather to develop the spirited element of the soul, than to produce muscular strength, and the art of music is meant directly to produce temperance, — *τῇ ἀπλῇ ἐκείνῃ μουσικῇ χρώμενοι, ἣν δὴ ἔφαμεν σωφροσύνην ἐντίκτειν* (410 A). This is expressed in a less definite and exact way than in the following book, though it is not contradictory to the teaching on the same subject in 429 D seqq., as Hirzel assumes. Hirzel says, with a curious indefiniteness out of which no exact meaning is to be derived: “denn gerade im dritten Buche tritt die *σωφροσύνη*, die mit der *φιλόσοφος φύσις* in Verbindung gebracht wird, in einen gewissen Gegensatz zur thatkräftigen *ἀνδρεία*, cf. p. 410 D f. Aber schon dieser Gegensatz zwischen *σωφροσύνη* und *ἀνδρεία* kann zeigen, dass wir hier mit einer anderen *σωφροσύνη* zu thun haben, als die ist, welche IV. p. 429 D ff. gesucht wird.”¹ This is no doubt partly true. The notion *σωφροσύνη* does stand in a certain antithesis to *ἀνδρεία* and is brought into connection with *φιλόσοφος φύσις*. But what we should like to find out, is precisely what the nature of this “Verbindung” is and the nature of this “Gegensatz zur thatkräftigen *ἀνδρεία*.” Further, that this antithesis between *σωφροσύνη* and *ἀνδρεία* shows that the notion *σωφροσύνη* in the third is different from that in the fourth, we are not disposed to admit. In the fourth book *θυμοειδής* is the auxiliary of *νοητικόν*, and both of these combine in subduing the concupiscent element. This antithesis, therefore, between *σωφροσύνη* and *ἀνδρεία* is to be found in the fourth book. This applies not only to *θυμοειδής* and *ἐπιθυμητικόν* in the individual, but also to the two classes in the state *ἐπίκουροι* and *χρηματιστικοί*. The two higher elements form an antithesis to the lowest element, and the corresponding virtues form a corresponding “Gegensatz.” So that this

¹ Hirzel: *Über den Unterschied der δικαιοσύνη und der σωφροσύνη in der platonischen Republik*. *Hermes*, Bd. VIII. (1874), p. 410.

“Gegensatz,” being applicable to both books, really proves nothing. When Hirzel further says: “Und andererseits fehlt die σοφία, die zur vollkommenen σωφροσύνη nicht entbehrt werden kann, jener im dritten Buche geschilderten; denn diese soll eine Tugend der Krieger sein, während die σοφία den Philosophen allein gehört,”¹ we again cannot agree with him. Hirzel assumes that by φύλακες in Bk. III. 410, to which class σώφρων is applied, the warriors are meant; consequently the highest class, viz. philosophers, is omitted in this passage; σωφροσύνη, therefore, as a harmony of the three classes of the commonwealth or the three elements of the soul, would be an impossibility when one of the three classes is entirely missing; consequently the notion σωφροσύνη here treated is entirely distinct from that referred to in the following book. But does φύλακες refer to the warrior class, or to both the warriors and rulers? In 416 C the soldiers are referred to under the name of “guardians” (φύλακες). In 415 B, however, the term φύλακες is distinctly applied to the class of rulers, of whom it is said, that they have received special command from the gods to take notice in their capacity of guardians (φύλακες) of births, and through their observation of the children to say whether these belong to the *gold, silver, or copper* class; i.e. whether they are fitted to become rulers, warriors, or workingmen. In 415 C φυλακῆν and ἐπικουρίαν are distinctly employed to represent the two classes of rulers and auxiliaries. In 503 B φύλακας is applied to φιλοσόφους, — ὅτι τοὺς ἀκριβεστάτους φύλακας φιλοσόφους δεῖ καθιστάναι. The same thing can be said of φύλακι πόλεως τε καὶ νόμων. In the beginning of the fourth book (428 D), which continues the discussion of the last chapters of the third, wisdom is described as a protective science, which resides in that governing class called “perfect guardians.” Hirzel, therefore, in assuming that the philosophic or ruling class is wanting in 410 D seqq. is plainly in error. That both the philosophic and warrior classes are included in φύλακες is evident from 416 C–417 A, in which passage the guardians are said to include both the *gold* and *silver* elements, i.e. both the philosophic and warrior classes. Moreover, the employment of φιλόσοφος φύσις in 410 D sufficiently indicates that reference is had to the rulers. The notion σωφροσύνη is, then, in the third book a harmony (410 E: καὶ τοῦ μὲν ἡρμοσμένου

¹ Hirzel: *Hermes*, Bd. VIII. p. 410.

σώφρων τε καὶ ἀνδρεία ἢ ψυχῆ; Πάνυ γε), the two expressed elements of which are the philosophic and spirited temperaments. The element which is wanting is, therefore, not λογιστικόν but ἐπιθυμητικόν. In a definition of σωφροσύνη of such general character as this at the end of the third book, which is rather preliminary to the more precise treatment of the same notion in Bk. IV., in which definition, moreover, φύλακες is used for two classes and both adjectives σώφρων and ἀνδρεία are applied to the harmony named, *i.e.* where the terms are evidently not strictly employed, — in such definition there is no reason why the concupiscent principle, or applied to the state, the working class, should not be tacitly understood. In this part of the third book it is, moreover, evident that Plato, although notice is scarcely taken of it, has in mind the threefold division of his state. This is plain from 415 B, where the copper, iron, or working class receives mention. There have been three sets of views on the Platonic notion of σωφροσύνη and its relationship to the several parts of the soul. a) The interpretation that it is exclusively the virtue of ἐπιθυμητικόν. Impossible as it is to reconcile this view with either the Republic or the Gorgias, it was the prevailing one in the history of Platonic interpretation until the time of Schleiermacher. This is no doubt largely due to the fact that Aristotle advocated this view, and inasmuch as a special virtue was ascribed to λογιστικόν and θυμοειδές, it was not unnatural to assign one especially to ἐπιθυμητικόν. Aristotle says: ¹ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν οὕτως ἐκάστης λαμβανομένης, εἴη ἂν σωφροσύνης ἴδιον τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ πεφυκέναι ἐπιθυμητικοῦ ἀρετὴν εἶναι.² Further, in the Pseudo-Aristotelian work Περὶ ἀρετῶν καὶ κακιῶν we find this statement: τριμεροῦς δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς λαμβανομένης κατὰ Πλάτωνα, τοῦ μὲν λογιστικοῦ ἀρετὴ ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις, τοῦ δὲ θυμοειδοῦς ἡ τε πραότης καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία, τοῦ δὲ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ ἡ τε σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια.³ Again: σωφροσύνη δ' ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ, καθ' ἣν ἀνόρεκτοι γίνονται περὶ τὰς ἀπολαύσεις τῶν φαύλων ἡδονῶν.⁴ β) The view

¹ That Plato is meant in this passage, cf. Top. V. c. 1, p. 129a 10. According to Aristotle σωφροσύνη is an ethical virtue, in distinction from dianoëtic, to which latter σοφία belongs. Σωφροσύνη belongs in Aristotle's division to τὸ ἔλογον; σοφία, on the other hand, to τὸ λόγον ἔχον. τὸ ἔλογον corresponds to the combined θυμοειδές and ἐπιθυμητικόν of Plato, which division Aristotle did not approve.

² Aristotle: Topika, E. c. 6, p. 136b 12, ed. Bekker.

³ Aristotle: Περὶ ἀρετῶν καὶ κακιῶν, p. 1249a 30, ed. Bekker.

⁴ Aristotle: Περὶ ἀρετῶν καὶ κακιῶν, 1250a 7.

that *σωφροσύνη* belongs to two elements of the soul and is a harmony of these two. This view is found in the definition of Suidas, who seems to have the Platonic division of the soul in mind. Aristotle, who is referred to in the course of the definition, approved no such division. Suidas says: τῷ δὲ αὐτῷ ὀνόματι χρώμεθα ἐν ὁμολογίᾳ τινὲ καὶ συμφωνίᾳ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ πρὸς λογισμὸν.¹ Here belong, as it seems to me, the earlier definitions of Überweg and Zeller,² although Hirzel places them in the first class. γ) The third explanation of the Platonic *σωφροσύνη* is that it is a virtue of all three parts of the soul, and is, furthermore, a harmony of these. Brandis says: "Nicht wie die Tapferkeit als Tugend des Eifers (*θυμός*), nicht so darf die Besonnenheit oder Mässigkeit (*σωφροσύνη*) als Tugend des Begehrlichen in uns bezeichnet werden."³ That is, it is not exclusively the virtue of a single element of the soul. Überweg-Heinze and Zeller give expression in the last editions of their works, to less negative statements than this quoted from Brandis. In the former work, however, the statement does not appear to me as definite as the teaching of the Republic justifies: "Die *σωφροσύνη* gehört nicht wie die *ἀνδρεία*, nur einem Seelentheile an, sondern sie kommt den beiden niederen Seelentheilen oder auch der ganzen Seele zu."⁴ It seems to me that the words "den beiden niederen Seelentheilen" might safely be omitted. Zeller in the fourth edition of his *Philosophie der Griechen* makes the following statement: "Es müssen die niederen Seelentheile, der Muth und die Begierde, sich der Vernunft unterordnen, sie müssen mit ihr darüber einverstanden sein, wer von ihnen zu befehlen und wer zu gehorchen hat, und

¹ Suidas: sub voc. *σωφροσύνη*.

² "Die auch dem begehrliehen Theil zukommende besondere Tugend ist die Besonnenheit (Mässigkeit oder Selbstbeherrschung, Selbstbescheidung, *σωφροσύνη*), welche in der Zusammenstimmung des von Natur Besseren und Schlechteren darüber, welches von beiden herrschen solle, besteht." I., § 43, p. 139. 4te Aufl. "Es muss der begehrende Theil, ebenso, wie der Muth, sich der Vernunft unterordnen, und dies ist die Selbstbeherrschung oder Besonnenheit, die Sophrosyne." *Gesch. d. Phil. der Gr.* II. 1, 567. Both of the above quotations are taken from Hirzel's article in *Hermes*, Bd. VIII.

³ Brandis: *Handbuch der Gesch. der gr.-röm. Phil.* II. 1, 499. Vide Hirzel: *Hermes*, Bd. VIII.

⁴ Überweg-Heinze: *Grundriss der Gesch. d. Phil. des Alterthums*, p. 175. 7te Aufl.

diess ist die Selbstbeherrschung oder Besonnenheit, die Sophrosyne."¹ Hirzel, in the article in *Hermes* already referred to, has treated this notion more fully than any other writer on the subject. In this article he defines *σωφροσύνη* to be a harmony of the entire soul; furthermore to be the product of *δικαιοσύνη*, which in turn he defines not as harmony of the entire soul, but as that virtue of the individual parts by which each does its own work. That *σωφροσύνη* is a virtue of the *entire* soul *in distinction* from *δικαιοσύνη*, which he calls a virtue of the *individual parts*,² is not supported by the fourth book, and it is entirely the fourth book that Hirzel uses for proof. Sophrosyne is a virtue of the entire soul and is a harmony, but it is such only in the matter of agreement between the lower parts and the *λογιστικόν* as to which shall rule and which obey, — *Τί δέ; σάφρονα σὺ τῇ φιλίᾳ καὶ ξυμφωνίᾳ τῇ αὐτῶν τούτων, ὅταν τό τε ἄρχον καὶ τὸ ἀρχομένον τὸ λογιστικὸν ὁμοδοξῶσι δεῖν ἄρχειν καὶ μὴ στασιάξωσιν αὐτῷ; Σωφροσύνη γοῖν, ἣ δ' ὅς, οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστίν ἢ τοῦτο, πάλεώς τε καὶ ἰδιώτου.*³ This means then nothing more than that in the matter of what is and what is not to be feared, and in the matter of the lower desires, the decision of the highest element of the soul, viz. reason, is to be obeyed by the lower parts. In this virtue, however, the part taken by *θυμοειδές* is a double one and quite peculiar to this faculty, a feature of it which seems to have attracted, as far as we know, the attention of no writer on Plato. The part taken by *ἐπιθυμητικόν* in *σωφροσύνη* is exclusively one of obedience, of subjection to rule, while the *θυμοειδές* is not only subject to the rule of *λογιστικόν*, but has further a mediatory position, in which it takes the side of *λογιστικόν* against *ἐπιθυμητικόν*. The concupiscent element is, therefore, subject to the combined rule of the *λογιστικόν* and *θυμοειδές*.⁴ These two properly trained hold in restraint the

¹ Zeller: *Die Philosophie d. Griechen*, 4te Aufl. II. 1, 884.

² Hirzel: *Hermes*, Bd. VIII. (1874), p. 398.

³ Republic 430 E, 432 A, 442 C seqq. Cf. also Köstlin: "Mässigung ist die Einstimmung der Drei, darin bestehend, dass die Vernunft einer — der Muth und Begierde andererseits darin übereinkommen, dass die Vernunft herrschen müsse und keines ihr widerstrebt." *Die Ethik des. class. Alterthums*, I. 399.

⁴ "Καὶ τοῦτω δὴ οὕτω γραφέντε καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τὰ αὐτῶν μαθόντε καὶ παιδευθέντε προστατήσαστον τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ, ὃ δὴ πλείστον τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν ἐκάστῳ ἐστὶ καὶ χρημάτων φύσει ἀπληροτότατον." Republic 442 A.

principle which forms the largest part¹ of every man's soul and is by nature the most insatiable, viz. ἐπιθυμητικόν. In the control of θυμοειδές the rational principle stands alone; in the control of ἐπιθυμητικόν the rational principle has θυμοειδές for its ally. In 441 A the spirited principle is called the natural ally of the λογιστικόν, — ἐπίκουρον ὄν τῷ λογιστικῷ φύσει.² The spirited element never takes the part of the concupiscent element. The two lower elements, therefore, do not stand in the like relationship to the rational element. The spirited element stands very much more closely related to it, so that according to 441 A and 440 B there is ground for referring σωφροσύνη especially to ἐπιθυμητικόν, though the other elements of the soul also play essential parts in it. Sophrosyne is especially the control of the lower passions, desires, and lusts; these are seated in the so-called concupiscent element. For this reason the virtue σωφροσύνη has frequently been applied, though wrongly, to the ἐπιθυμητικόν exclusively.³ There are three

¹ Republic 442 A.

² Cf. . . . σύμμαχον τῷ λόγῳ γηθήμενον τὸν θυμὸν τοῦ τοιοῦτου; κτλ. Republic 440 B.

³ Pseudo-Aristotle, immediately following an explanation of the Platonic conception of virtue, applies σωφροσύνη to the regulative of sensual pleasures: σωφροσύνη ἔστιν ἀρετὴ τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ, καὶ ἣν ἀσκήσαντες γίνονται περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τῶν φαίδων ἡδονῶν. Arist. Περὶ ἠθικῶν καὶ κακῶν, c. 2, 1290a 7. Aristotle, in treating the Aristotelian notion of σωφροσύνη, lays stress on the fact that it is a mean between pain and pleasure, though not identical with all pleasures, but only such somatic pleasures as have to do with ἡδῆ. (Vide Ueberweg-Hübner: Grundr. d. Gesch. der Phil. für Anth., p. 214.) . . . "τὴν τοῦ σωφροσύνης περὶ ἡδονῶν καὶ λύπης φασὶν εἶναι μεσότηα ἢ περὶ πάντων αἰσθητῶν τοῦ σώματος, καὶ οὐ περὶ τῶν νοητικῶν ἡδονῶν αἰσθητῶν καὶ ἡδῆ, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν θηροειδῶν καὶ ἀνθρωπείων." — Harmonie in Est. Nr. 11. 7, p. 52. W. (Harv., p. 187ff., 2 seq.).

Further that this viz. τὴν σωφροσύνην is a mean between the extremes, Aristotle gives expression to, writing out of words we can understand that in general σωφροσύνη in any sense is a harmony. Further, σωφροσύνην πρὸς ἡδοναῖς ἀναφέρει itself partly with the expression, while with Plato it is a positive relationship of essential relationships. In the Platonic sense the whole σωφροσύνην can refer to those in which men connect themselves in relation to the pleasures of the body or the low passions: σωφροσύνην ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ τοῦ σώματος καὶ τῶν ἀσθενῶν ὁμοῦ ἔχουσα ἐν ὁμοῦ αἰσθητῶν. Plat. l. 3 : 384^a ἡμετέρας. 17. Vide also Brander Plato. Opera, Baezel, (coll. 185, 2^a ed. 1874) p. 211 et 212.

essential elements in the notion *σωφροσύνη*. α) *λογιστικόν*, the directing element, to which belongs the right to rationally control the lower elements. β) *θυμοαδές*, the spirited element, which requires the control of the directing principle, and is at the same time its auxiliary in the management of the lowest principle. γ) *ἐπιθυμητικόν*, the concupiscent element, whose business it is to restrain its passions and desires in accordance with the guidance of the rational principle, supported by the spirited element. *Sophrosyne* is further purely an internal harmony, and has to do exclusively with the relationships of the several parts of the soul to each other in the matter of the lower elements submitting to the wise rule of the rational principle. Applied to the individual soul, this notion means the subjection of the will, desires, and passions to reason, which has *κατὰ φύσιν* the right to rule. Applied to the state, it is the allegiance and obedience of the governed to the rightful governors: the result of the former is a moral harmony of the soul; of the latter, a political harmony of the commonwealth.

As to *δικαιοσύνη*, the most important passage for the determination of the content of the notion is Bk. IV. 443 C-E. The passage, on account of its fulness of statement and consequent importance for the determination of the notion in question, follows here: Τὸ δὲ γὰρ ἀληθές, τοιοῦτον μὲν τι ἦν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡ δικαιοσύνη, ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ τὴν ἕξω πρᾶξιν τῶν αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν ἐντὸς ὡς ἀληθῶς περὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ,¹ μὴ ἑάσαντα τὰ ἀλλότρια πράττειν ἑαυστον ἐν αὐτῷ μηδὲ πολυπραγμανεῖν πρὸς ἄλλα τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γένη. ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι τὰ οἰκεία εὖ θέμενον καὶ ἄρξαντα αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ κοσμήσαντα καὶ φίλον γενόμενον ἑαυτῷ καὶ ξυναρμόσαντα τρία ὄντα, ὡς περὶ ὄρους τρεῖς ἁρμονίας ἀτεχνῶς, ναίτης τε καὶ ἑπάτης καὶ μέτης, καὶ εἰ ἄλλα ἄλλα μεταξύ τυγχάνωσιν ὄντα, πάντα ταῦτα ξυνηθήσαντα καὶ παντάπασιν ἓνα γενόμενον ἐκ πολλῶν, σώφρονα καὶ ἡρμοσμένον, οὕτω δὴ πράττειν ἤδη. εἴαν τι πράττῃ ἢ περὶ χρημάτων κτήσιν ἢ περὶ σώματος θεραπείαν ἢ καὶ πολιτικόν τι ἢ περὶ τὰ ἴδια συμβόλαια, ἐν πᾶσι τοῖτοις ἡγούμενον καὶ ὀνομάζοντα δικαίαν μὲν καὶ καλὴν πρᾶξιν ἢ ἂν ταύτην τὴν ἕξω σώξῃ τε καὶ ξυναπεργάζηται, σοφίαν δὲ τὴν ἐπιστατοῦσαν ταύτῃ τῇ πράξει ἐπιστήμην. ἀδικον δὲ πρᾶξιν ἢ ἂν αἰετῶς ταύτην λύῃ, ἀμαθίαν δὲ τὴν ταύτῃ αὐτῷ ἐπιστατοῦσαν δόξαν. According to the foregoing, justice is the internal harmony of the individual,

¹ Arist. Rhet. A. 9. 1366 (Spengel, 29. 15).

which results from each part of the soul doing its own work, — τὰ ἑαυτοῦ. It is not, therefore, as Schleiermacher and Brandis suppose, a harmony of the soul expressing itself in acts,¹ but is purely internal, — ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν ἐντὸς ὡς ἀληθῶς. The passage in Gorgias before referred to stands accordingly in apparent contradiction to the Republic. Every virtue of the soul finds some expression in outward acts, and it is external conduct to which the attention is chiefly directed in estimating any particular virtue. This seems to be the feature especially emphasized in Gorgias, according to which δικαιοσύνη may well be regarded as “eine in Thaten ausbrechende Harmonie.”² But the virtue itself, in distinction from the manifestation of the same, is purely internal and has to do strictly with an ἔξις of the soul. This point finds clear exposition in Köstlin's History of Ethics. Justice is not a particular kind of rightness in acts, but is an inward power or condition, a δύναμις or ἔξις,³ of the soul itself.⁴ In the conception of Plato, justice is prior to conduct; man is not made just by performing just acts, but performs just acts by reason of his being just. Justice consists in this, that each of the parts of the soul does its own work and no more, that none of the parts transgresses the ground of another, that in the man full harmony reigns inwardly. As a result of such inward harmony there follows an outward realization of justice, an outward harmony

¹ This view is based chiefly on Gorgias 506 E seq.

² Tennemann makes δικαιοσύνη both outward and inward, i.e. both the inward just state of the soul and outward just conduct. Cf. *System der Platonischen Philosophie*, Bd. IV. p. 105.

This outward expression of virtue we have already explained to be a necessary part of the conception ἀρετή in the Ethics of Socrates, as well as Plato; but it is at the same time only phenomenon and not essence. It may be said in support of Tennemann's division of δικαιοσύνη into “innere” and “äussere Gerechtigkeit,” that it would explain the difference in Gorgias 506 E and Republic 443 C-E. Strictly speaking, however, no such thing as “äussere Gerechtigkeit” exists in Plato's Ethics. “Gerechtigkeit” is the quality of a disposition of the soul, not of an act.

³ Köstlin: *Die Ethik d. class. Alterthums*, Bd. I. 400.

⁴ Pseudo-Plato: *Δικαιοσύνη ὁμόνοια τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὐτὴν καὶ εὐταξία τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μερῶν πρὸς ἄλληλά τε καὶ περὶ ἄλληλα· ἔξις διαμεμητικῆ τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν ἐκείτου· ἔξις καθ' ἣν ὁ ἔχων προαιρετικῶς ἐστὶ τῶν φαινομένων αὐτοῦ δικαίων.* *Opera Baier*, Orelli 885.2 (Steph. T. III. 411 E).

in conduct. This inward harmony is to the soul what health is to the body;¹ it is further the highest good of the highest element in man, viz. the spiritual. An act, properly speaking, cannot be virtuous; virtue can be predicated only of a state of the soul. By pre-eminence *δικαιοσύνη* is the virtue of the soul; it is identified with *ἁπέρη* in 444 C seq., in which passage both are employed to designate the health and harmony of the soul. Against the Platonic conception of justice and virtue in general, as a harmony, Kirchmann objects² that it is only a relation (Beziehungsform),³ and that consequently the notion is without content. Against this objection there is to be said, α) A harmony of the soul resulting from the several parts doing their own work is more than a mere relation; it is a *state*. β) It is further to be asked whether harmony in any case is mere relation, or is the result of relations. The notion health is certainly not devoid of content; yet health means only a certain state of the body in which the several parts of the body perform normally their functions, or in other words, the harmony of a physical system in which its several members do their own work. This is, however, precisely the same notion, only applied to the physical instead of the psychical element. According to Hirzel, justice is not a virtue of the entire soul, but only of the several individual parts. The virtue of the entire soul is Moderation. He says: "Der höchste vernünftige Theil ist gerecht, wenn er die ihm obliegende Aufgabe, über die beiden niedrigen Theile zu herrschen, erfüllt, der zweite, wenn er die Befehle des ersten ausführt, und der dritte niedrigste, wenn er sich der Herrschaft der beiden höhern unbedingt unterwirft. Die Gerechtigkeit ist also eine Tugend, die sich in den einzelnen Theilen eines Ganzen findet und ihrem Wesen nach nur

¹ 444 B. Republic.

² *Plato's Republik*, Erläuterung, 131. A further criticism of this notion made by Kirchmann is, that this harmony could be predicated of a drunkard, in whom appetite (Leidenschaft) and not reason rules. In the Platonic conception of a harmony based on the several parts of the soul doing their own work, it is expressed that one part may not transgress on another; and it is further expressed that the right of rule and guidance belongs to reason. Whereas, in the case supposed by Kirchmann, Leidenschaft has assumed the place of reason, and by this very fact has transgressed the law τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πρᾶττεν.

³ Eduard v. Hartmann: *Phänomenologie des sittlichen Bewusstseins*, p. 124 seqq.

hier finden kann."¹ The same writer says further: "Und da nun, wie aus dem Gesagten hervorgeht, diese Harmonie des Ganzen die Wirkung der Gerechtigkeit in den einzelnen Theilen ist, so folgt, dass wir in der *σωφροσύνη* als der Harmonie und Tugend des Ganzen die Wirkung zu sehen haben der Gerechtigkeit als der Tugend der einzelnen Theile."² Neither of these statements appears to us correct. It is true that, in order that *δικαιοσύνη* should exist in the soul, all of the parts must do their own work. But although this is a part, it is not the whole of *δικαιοσύνη*. The vital point in the conception of justice is that each part of the soul is not regarded as a separate and independent thing, but as a member of a whole, and *δικαιοσύνη* consists not in a part doing its work as an independent thing, but as a member of an organism; further, *δικαιοσύνη* is not three several elements of the soul doing their own work, but the condition and harmony of the whole soul resulting from *ἕκαστον τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν*. This is plain from the fact of *δικαιοσύνη* being called a harmony of the soul; *i.e.* it is a state of the entire soul, not of several individual parts. Otherwise how a harmony? Secondly, justice is employed to mean the health of the soul without distinction from the general notion *ἀρετή*, and is therefore by pre-eminence *the* virtue of the soul.³ If this is true, how can *σωφροσύνη* be regarded as the virtue of the entire soul in distinction from *δικαιοσύνη*, as the virtue only of individual parts? To a certain extent a parallel to *δικαιοσύνη* is the instance of an orchestra: The harmony of a number of instruments is not identical with each instrument's doing its own work, though this is essential to it, but is the *product* of the combined work of the several instruments. So *δικαιοσύνη* is not the several parts of the soul doing their own work independently, but the *product* of their combined work, *i.e.* a resultant harmonious state.

In the application of the notion justice to the state, it is difficult to take sides with Spencer in a criticism published as a note to his article⁴ on justice in the *Nineteenth Century*, *viz.* that the notion

¹ *Hermes*, Bd. VIII. 397.

² *Hermes*, Bd. VIII. 398.

³ Republic 444 C. "Die Gerechtigkeit endlich (*δικαιοσύνη*) ist die allgemeine Tugend." Überweg-Heinze: *Grundriss d. G. der Phil. des Alterthums*, p. 170. Aristotle employs *δικαιοσύνη* in the same way: *δικαιοσύνη κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν τεταγμένη*. *Eth. Nic. E.* 5. 1130b. 18.

⁴ *The Nineteenth Century* for April, 1890. Article "On Justice."

justice is made to include the idea of inequality. It is difficult to see how the notion justice *includes* the idea of inequality. It is true that it takes cognizance of the idea of inequality, and this is true of the notion justice whether applied to a modern factory or the Platonic state. If, for example, one workingman turns out only two-thirds as much work as another, he receives only two-thirds as much wages, and the inequality of the two men is taken cognizance of in this application of the notion justice. So, in the Platonic state certain classes and certain individuals of a class have greater rights; but this is on the basis of greater capability. That such inequality in men should be taken into account is essential to the idea of justice in a commonwealth or in society.¹

It will be in place here to notice the Platonic characterization of the just man.² The character is described negatively; he is defined as a man who will not be guilty of certain kinds of wrongdoing, by which is implied he will practise the corresponding virtues. He will not be guilty of a) Sacrilege; b) Theft; c) Falsity to friends; d) Treason to his country; e) Bad faith in the matter of an oath, contract, or otherwise; f) Adultery; g) Neglect of parents; h) Indifference to the worship of the gods.

For convenience, Plato's division of the cardinal virtues, and their application to the several faculties of the soul and classes of the commonwealth, are represented here in tabulated form:—

¹ In the same article Spencer points out two supposed fallacies in the employment of *his own*. He says: "Because a man's own property and his own occupation are both called *his own*, the same conclusion is drawn concerning both. Two fallacies are involved,—the one, that a man can 'own' a trade in the same way that he owns a coat, and the other, that because he may not be *deprived* of the coat he must be *restricted* to the trade." In the first place, Plato nowhere argues or implies in any statement that because a man may not be deprived of his property, he must be restricted to his trade. He must be restricted to *his share*, because his nature and qualifications fit him for a certain class and certain corresponding duties, and in order to preserve the harmony of the state; i.e. it is his duty as a member of the commonwealth. But Plato offers no such argument from analogy as Spencer suggests. In the second place, the import of *his share* is not so much that of possession, (as would appear from the note quoted) as of duty.

² Republic, *loc. cit.* 4, 8.

	CARDINAL VIRTUE.	FACULTY IN THE INDIVIDUAL.	CLASS IN THE STATE.	NATION CHARACTERIZED.
'Αρετή	σοφία	λογιστικόν	ἀρχοντες οἱ (ἐπιστήμονες) (φιλοσοφοί)	Hellenes.
	ἀνδρεία	θυμοειδές	ἐπικουροί οἱ (ἀνδρείοι) (θυμοειδεῖς)	Scythians, Thracians, and Northerners.
	σωφροσύνη	λογιστικόν ¹ θυμοειδές } ¹ ἐπιθυμητικόν } ² } ³	ἀρχοντες } ἐπικουροί } χρηματιστικοί }	
	δικαιοσύνη	λογιστικόν ² θυμοειδές } ἐπιθυμητικόν }	ἀρχοντες } ἐπικουροί } χρηματιστικοί }	

For the purpose of comparison, Hirzel's view has also been reduced here to tabular form: —

λογιστικόν	σοφία	δικαιοσύνη ²	} σωφροσύνη.
θυμοειδές	ἀνδρεία	δικαιοσύνη	
ἐπιθυμητικόν	—	δικαιοσύνη	

The foregoing shows the application Plato made of his doctrine of virtue to the state, and it is only in the state, as remarked by Zeller, that Plato attempts a systematic application⁴ of his ethical principles. He derives his Ethics for the individual from the state. Virtue is the

¹ 1. The rational element has for its ally the spirited element. 2. Both the spirited and concupiscent elements are subject to the rule of the rational part. 3. The harmonious working of all parts in the matter of the rule of reason is σωφροσύνη.

² In the functions of the several parts of the soul no distinction is made; in each case the function is τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν. In this respect all of the elements are on equal footing with regard to the virtue δικαιοσύνη.

³ Δικαιοσύνη is in this case purely a virtue of the individual parts, quite as much as σοφία or ἀνδρεία, while σωφροσύνη is a harmony of the entire soul arising out of δικαιοσύνη.

⁴ Zeller: *Die Phil. d. Griechen*, II. 1. p. 892. 4te Aufl.

highest good of the commonwealth;¹ it is also the highest good of the individual. The state exists not to make its citizens powerful, but to make them virtuous, *i.e.* happy, for virtue makes for happiness. Although virtue is with Plato always a means, it is also a good *αἰετὸν καὶ ἴδιον*. The end at which virtue aims is likeness with God:² *ἀγαθὸν δὲ (i.e. θεῶν) ἕκαστος ἀνὴρ κατὰ ἀρετὴν ἑαυτοῦ ποιεῖται*.³ The highest good then is the becoming like God; it is not pleasure as in the school of the Hedonists, though this forms part of the highest good.⁴ A life absolutely without pleasure or pain, *i.e.* a life of complete apathy, does not make for happiness, and cannot, therefore, be the virtuous life. The highest pleasure is that which is found in the contemplation of truth, and of this pleasure none has tasted save the philosopher: *ἡδὴ δὲ τοῦ ἀποῦ θεοῦ οὐκ οὐκ ἴσμεν ἕξει, ἀλλ' ἄρα ὅλας γυμνάσεις αὐτῷ τῷ εὐδαίμονι*.⁵ In the writings of Plato a fundamentally ethical conception of good and bad is wanting. The soul is a purely transcendental substance into which the bad enters from without, *i.e.* from the body, — “a material substance essentially different from the soul and in which the soul is for a time entombed. This evil of being imprisoned in a material body has to be counteracted by moral education. Inasmuch as moral good is the becoming like God, one must free himself as much as possible from the influences of the body, though not through suicide, and strive toward the attainment of truth, especially toward a knowledge of the idea of good. The ground of virtuous effort lies in the kinship between the soul and ideas. All real virtue is based on knowledge.” The innate longing for truth drives the soul to seek it for its own satisfaction, but perfect satisfaction can be reached only in the contempla-

¹ *Solon: De Pol. & Cratylus*, II. 1. 7. 302.

² *Cherwyn-Hansen: Kommentar & Gloss. z. Plat. im Alkibiades*, pp. 170, 174.

³ *Theset*, 170 B.

⁴ *Cherwyn-Hansen: Kommentar z. v. p. 174.* Cf. *Phaedrus* at D. E. 63 E. see C. *Solon: II. 1. 374.*

⁵ *Republic*, 587 C.

⁶ *Timæus* 36 A seq.; *Phaedrus* 263; *Theset*, 170 A.

⁷ It has already been noticed that Plato makes a distinction between philosophical and ordinary virtue. The distinction between the two corresponds to that between *θεωρητικὴ* and *ἡθικὴ*; the former is firm, fixed, and the result of clear insight; the latter is accidental, unstable, and is based on custom rather than any rational principle. Cf. *Solon: De Pol. & Cratylus*, II. 1. 382. see *Solon*.

tion of pure being,¹ τοῦ ὄντος, i.e. of the ideas. This the soul does through the element λογιστικόν, and the virtue is σοφία or νοεῖν τὰ νοητά. Through this virtue we contemplate the idea good or the deity.² In this the soul finds its highest happiness, to which all virtue is a means. This transcendental element in the Ethics of Plato corresponds, as Paulsen points out,³ to the religious element in Christian Ethics. In Greek Ethics the object is to determine what is the highest good and how to reach it: it is essentially a philosophy of virtue. In Christian Ethics the object is to determine what according to the law of God is *duty* and what is *sin*: it starts with the assumption that the law of God is the absolute ethical standard. In Christian Ethics, as in the Ethics of Plato, the chief cardinal virtue does not always appear to be the same. In the history of Christian dogma *faith* is the chief virtue; otherwise *love* appears to be the first. With Plato σοφία seems frequently to have the highest place, because it has immediately to do with the idea good and is the virtue of the highest faculty; while δικαιοσύνη is in the Platonic system, as a whole, the chief and all-embracing virtue,⁴ and is used, moreover, synonymously with ἀρετή. The relationships in which the various cardinal virtues stand to each other and to the man who practises them may be briefly summarized as follows:—

- α) A man is wise when reason performs its duty; when it recognizes truth and makes wise use of it; when, as governing principle, it wisely guides and orders the lower elements of the soul.
- β) A man is courageous when the will (for the spirited element corresponds to the will in our psychology) performs its duty in controlling the concupiscent element (ἐπιθυμητικόν) of the soul; when it serves reason as faithful ally, and acts on the judgment of λογιστικόν as to what is and what is not to be feared.
- γ) A man is moderate when the animal impulses and desires perform their functions without causing disturbance in the soul, and

¹ Republic 490 B, 511 A seqq.

² What the sun in the material world is to sight, the same is the idea of good in the spiritual world to reason. Republic VI. 508 B E.

³ Paulsen: *System der Ethik*, p. 21 seq.

⁴ Höfding: *Ethische Principien*, translated from the Danish by Bendixen, p. 135.

when the rule of reason is accepted by the two lower elements as absolute.

- δ) A man whose soul is properly ordered and controlled in every way, in which all the parts do their own work in such way as to produce in the soul health, harmony, and beauty, — this man deserves the name *δίκαιος*.

Finally, Plato advocates a doctrine of future rewards; he not only teaches the immortality of the soul, but believes further that in the future life the just and virtuous man shall be rewarded.¹ He says in the last book of his immortal Republic: "We must, therefore, in the instance of the just man, believe, if poverty or disease or any other reputed evil befall him, that these will finally be converted to some good, either during his life or in death. For, verily, a man can never be left uncared for by the gods, who determines to struggle zealously to become just and who practises virtue in order to become — as much as in the power of man lies — like God."² He who approaches most nearly to perfect virtue and likeness with God is the philosopher, a characterization of whom is found at the beginning of the sixth book of the Republic³: He has the greatest love for truth and is unceasingly active in his quest for it; he hates falsehood; he is manly, noble, quick in apprehension, and despises external pomp; by association with the godlike and orderly he becomes himself, as far as is possible to man, godlike and orderly.⁴ Such person has moral *health* because the several parts of the soul perform their functions normally; he has moral *beauty* because of the symmetry and harmony in his character; there is moral *orderliness* in his soul, because reason, which alone can give right judgment on the true and false, the good and bad, maintains in the soul its rightful rule. It is then in this sense that Plato says in the Republic: "Virtue would, therefore, as it seems, be a sort of health, beauty, and orderliness of the soul."⁵

¹ Gorgias 478 E, 480 A, 505 B, 525 B. Republic X. 613 A. Diog. Laert. III. 44. 79: *ἐν δὲ τοῖς διαλόγοις καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην θεοῦ νόμον ὑπελάμβανεν, ὡς ἰσχυροτέρων προτρέψαι τὰ δίκαια πράττειν, ἵνα μὴ καὶ μετὰ θάνατον δίκας ὑπόσχοιεν οἱ κακοῦργοι.*

² Republic X. 613 A.

³ Republic VI. 490 B. seqq.

⁴ Republic VI. 500 C.

⁵ Republic IV. 444 E.

NOTES.

ANTE AND POST.

It has long been known that *ante* and *post* are ablatives, as in *antidea postidea*, but to what stems they belong and what is their relation to each other is not so clear. Their form, as well as that of their derivatives *anticus* and *posticus* (cf. Sk. *antikam*), points to *i*-stems, of which the nominatives would be the *-ti* stems respectively *antis* and *postis*. With *ante* belong Sk. *anti*, Gr. *ἀντί*, and Goth. *and-*, doubtless from the same stem, but of uncertain case. Of the same root (cf. Sk. *ani*, *év*, *eis*, *in*, *év-repov*, *inter*, etc.), but with a *-to*, *-tā* suffix, are Sk. *anta* (*end*), Goth. *andis* (*end*), Gr. *ἀντή* (acc.), *ἀντα* (of uncertain case). In Latin we have of the *-ti* stem *antes*, used of rows of plants, and perhaps rows of men. If this word is regarded as meaning *files*, *i.e.* rows looked at 'end on,' the whole group of *t*-formations is a natural one, although its connection with the simple root in *év*, etc., is still obscure. *Ante* would naturally mean something like 'on the front end.' With this fits very well the meaning of *antae* used in the expression *templum in antis* (*év παραστώσει*), of a temple built within two side-walls, which project more or less beyond the temple itself, leaving a portico covered by the gable end of the roof. In this case the projecting side-walls are the rows or files standing 'end on' to the spectator (see Vitruv. III. 1, IV. 4 and 7; Gruter, 207).


The stem of *post* is evidently a *-ti* stem of the same kind as that of *ante*, from the root (or stem) *pas*, appearing in *po(s)ne*, Sk. *paçcha* (*pas* + *çhā*), *paçchā* (instr. adv., *behind*), *paçchāt* (abl. adv., *from behind*, *after*), and in Gr. *πύμαρος*, *πυρός*. Thus the two adverbs, *on the front* and *on the back*, seem to fit in with their kindred.

The only objection to the latter combination is found in the Latin *postis*, which is in form the precise word of which *post* (*postid*) should be the ablative, as *antes* represents the stem from which *ante*

should come. Now *postis* gives no signs of having had any meaning in Latin except that of *doorpost*, and hence sometimes *door*. It is as if *postern* should become the regular word for *door* in English. How 'the front door' should come to be 'on the back side,' it seems difficult to explain.

It occurred to my colleague, Professor F. D. Allen, and myself, that the explanation of the anomaly was to be found in the Roman augural discipline or ritual, a system which must have had an enormous influence on the Latin language and customs. The words *anticus* and *posticus* seem to have a special relation to that system. Nor does the expression *templum in antis* seem a natural one except in connection with some special method of construction having a peculiar significance. Now if we consider that the first Roman temples were built under Etruscan influence, and that in the whole early history augury was supposed to have played a prominent part, it is natural to refer this peculiar expression, and in fact the whole system of temple construction, to the augural discipline.

In Festus (M.), 157, we find *minora templa sunt ab auguribus cum loca aliqua tabulis aut linteis sepiuntur ne uno amplius ostio pateant certis verbis definita. itaque templum est locus ita effatus aut ita septus ut ea una parte pateat † angulus quod adfixus habeat ad terram* (cf. Cic. de Div. II. 35; Liv. IV. 7; Plut. Marc. 5; Serv. Aen. II. 178; Interpres ad Serv. Aen. IV. 200; Varr. de L. L. VII. 8). The last part of the Festus passage is corrupt and unintelligible, but a slight change to *angulos qua adfixos habeat ad terram* makes very good sense. This reading would still leave it in doubt whether the rear or the front *anguli* were referred to.

In the passage Interp. ad Serv. Aen. IV. 200, the phrase *uno exitu* occurs, and this method of structure seems to be emphasized here as in Festus. Nothing is said about a roof. We are thus left in doubt whether the construction was that of a bark shanty, enclosed with two side-walls and a back, with the front open to the south, or that of a sheepfold with a single door at the north, conceived as the back. The so-called *auguratorium* on the Palatine points to the former, and seems to be the original of the *templum in antis*. The form of the *auguratorium* is this:  *templum in antis*. The words of Festus, however, seem to point to the second form of construction.

The reading *angulos*, etc., would fit either view, but better still a

construction with a front open, and a back-door besides. In that case the front must be regarded as religiously enclosed, so that there is no entrance or exit in that quarter.

But on any supposition, in the laying out of a *templum* for the great sacred edifices, the *cella* or main temple could not be in front of the augur, but, as the Palatine *auguratorium* shows, at the back. It would thus correspond to the *templum in antis*, wherein the back part of the *locus effatus* is cut off for a *cella*, and has its door or *postes* at the back of the augur, where, according to the etymology of the word, they ought to be. So if we conceive the original locating of a temple *augurando*, we may well suppose the augur to have taken his observations from a spot in front of the proposed structure, with his field marked out at the sides. In front of him would be the *pars antica*, and behind the *pars postica*. Whether there was originally at the back of this field a door (the *unum ostium* of Festus, the *unus exitus* of the Commentator), or whether the augur himself then for the first time marked the place for the front of the temple, in either case *postis* would be the natural name for the doorpost in the rear, which the official afterwards took hold of (*postem tenere*) in the act of dedication. If this view be taken, the whole list swings into line with *ante* and *post* in the most natural manner, and the only obstacle to the combination is removed.

J. B. GREENOUGH.

PETRONIANA.

1. Petron. c. 21 Buech. *uterque nostrum religiosissimis iuravit verbis, inter duos periturum esse tam horribile secretum*. These words should perhaps be removed from their present position and placed after *periculo nostro* in c. 18. The "*horribile secretum*" will then be equivalent to the *tot annorum secreta* of c. 17 *ad fin.*, and the continuity of c. 21 will be increased by the change.

2. *Ibid.* c. 58: *qui te primus deurode fecit*. The word *deurode* is manifestly corrupt. Buecheler says in his third edition (p. 38, note): "*latere puto graecum tale eleutherode*." Perhaps we should read *lerode*, i.e. *ληρώδη*, "*nugatorem*," which gives very good sense. The corruption was possibly due to confusion between Λ and Δ.

3. *Ibid.* c. 58: *magistrus, non magister*. The word *magistrus* is yet unexplained, and is probably corrupt. Can it be an error for *magistrus*, a corruption of *μαγιστρός*?

4. *Ibid.* c. 60: *et repente una ludorum missio hilaritatem hic refecit*. It is clear from the context, as Buecheler and others long ago pointed out, that *refecit* gives exactly the opposite sense from that which Petronius intended to convey. Ought we not rather to read *reserat*, "checked," "cut short"? Cf. Hor. Od. I. 11, 6: *et spatia iocum solum linguam reseres*; Plin. Epist. II. 5. 4.

5. *Ibid.* c. 62: *gladium tamen struxi et macturata tan umbrae*. A "locus desperatissimus." The conjecture which comes nearest to the reading of the Ms. is that of Antonius, *muta in ada*. Scheffer's *in ada via*, which Buecheler has accepted, is well suited to the context, but differs too widely from the Ms. reading. One is strongly tempted to conjecture that, instead of *macturata*, Petronius wrote *macturata*, or rather *permissura*, "in the most random fashion." This gives excellent sense, but is perhaps too recommending a word for a rustic like Nicerus. One might also read *muta citata*, but this is less plausible.

6. *Ibid.* c. 65: *meretricibus margaritarum carulis et muticam unguentum*. *Carulis* is clearly corrupt. Reck conjectured *et carulis*; Jacobs *carulibus*. Possibly we should read *carulibus*, i. e. *carulibus*, a word applied to precious objects laid away for safe-keeping. *Carulibus* nests occurs in Apul. Met. XI. 6.

7. *Ibid.* c. 72: *namque cum talibus se non possent domos carulis esse et regere*. It seems almost certain that instead of *talibus*, which Buecheler retains, we should read with Hemsius *talibus*, which is really a very slight change and suits the context admirably.

8. *Ibid.* c. 77: *regere non possent se non possent se non possent*. The last clause is a manifest guess and should be bracketed. The phrase *regere non possent* is *regere* in the sense *regere* again and again in Petronius without any such explanatory comment.

NOTES ON THE TEXT.

regere non possent se non possent se non possent. The last is clearly corrupt, but so are the others. The first two are also corrupt, but in a different way. The first two are *regere non possent* and *regere non possent*, both of which are found in the text.

χώροις ἰν' αὐτ' οὐκ αἰθίνου θάλπος θεοῦ. Αἰθίνος is attested only by Hesychius and the Etym. Mag., and we have no authority for its occurrence in tragedy. If αἰθίνου is not accepted, perhaps we should read χώροις ἰν' αὐτ' ἀκμαῖον οὐ θάλπος θεοῦ. Ἄκμαῖον οὐ for καὶ νεν οὐ is not a very harsh change, and the expression ἀκμαῖον θάλπος, 'strong' or 'violent heat,' suits the context very well.

ARIST. Ἄθ. πολ. C. 4 (P. 7, L. 10, K. & W.)

καὶ παρέστηκεν ἵππος ἐκμαρτυρῶν, ὡς τὴν ἱππίδα τοῦτο σημαίνουσαν. Here ἐκμαρτυρῶν must be wrong. Perhaps we should read καὶ παρέστηκεν ἵππος, ὡς τεκμαίρονται, τὴν ἱππίδα αὐτοῦ σημαίνουσα, *i.e.* "and by it stands (a statue of) a mare, indicating, as they infer, his (*i.e.* Anthemion's) rank of knight." One might also think of ἐκ μαρμάρων as a possible reading for ἐκμαρτυρῶν.

LIV. 22. 17. 2.

Et metus ipse relucens flammae a capite, etc. So Madvig. The Cod. Puteanus has by the first hand *excampie a capite*, while the second hand gives *ex capite a capite*, which seems to point to a dittography. But is it not possible that *excampie* of P¹ is a corruption of *extemplo*? If we read *relucens flammae extemplo a capite calorque iam ad vivom ad imaque cornua veniens*, etc., we have a needed antithesis between the immediate blazing of the fire and the gradual burning down to the roots of the horns.

H. W. HALEY.

LIVY, I. 55. 1.

Inde ad negotia urbana animum conuertit; quorum erat primum, ut Iouis templum in monte Tarpeio monumentum regni sui nominisque relinqueret: *Tarquinios reges ambos, patrem uouisse, filium perfecisse.*

This passage seems to imply either that an inscription was actually attached to this temple, or that it was the intention of Tarquin to attach one to it, for how could the building possibly be a memorial of all that is here stated without an inscription?

The words in italics, if changed to direct discourse, would make an excellent inscription, and it is at least possible that they served or were intended to serve this purpose.

Although the temple of Jupiter was not completed and dedicated until the first year of the republic, there is every indication that the work was nearly completed at the time when the Tarquins were expelled. May not the work have advanced so far that the inscription was actually placed on the temple?

If afterwards the Roman hatred of kings led them to object to this public mention of them, and if the inscription was then replaced by a new one, some tradition of the existence of the original inscription may have remained; in fact, the very words of the original may have been quoted by some writer from whose book Livy drew his account of the story.

There are many inscriptions of exactly this character, e.g. the original inscription on the Pantheon, Wilmanns, 731:

M · Agrippa · L · F · Cos · Tertium · Fecit.

The inscription C.I.L., I. 591, which originally belonged in the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus as restored by Quintus Catulus, contains no mention of the temple nor of the deities to whom it was dedicated; it simply states that Catulus de sen. sent. faciendum coeravit eidemque probavit.

The plural form *Tarquini* and the omission of the *prænomena* is paralleled by Wilmanns, 92: *Antonii Mariani Pater et Filius*.

A. A. HOWARD.

ON THE MEANINGS OF CERTAIN GREEK VERBS.

In Hom. *α* 127 ff. we read:—

ἔγχος μὲν ῥ' ἕστησε φέρων πρὸς κίονα μακρὴν
 δουραδίκης ἔντοσθεν εὐξέου, ἔνθα περ ἄλλα
 ἔγχε' Ὀδυσσεύς ταλασίφρονος ἵστατο πολλά,
 αὐτὴν δ' ἐς θρόνον εἰσεν ἄγων, κ.τ.λ.

What is the meaning here of *ἵστατο*? Usually *ἵσταμαι* must or may be translated 'to take a stand,' 'to arise,' or the like. That is to say, the present regularly expresses a movement, and is thus sharply

contrasted with the quiescent perfect ἵστηκα, 'to stand.' But in the passage quoted it seems inevitable to take ἵστατο as equivalent to ἵσθήκει. Cf. Hom. N 261 f. :—

δούρατα δ', αἱ κ' ἐθέλησθα, καὶ ἐν καὶ εἴκοσι δῆεις
ἵστασ' ἐν κλισίῃ.

This same use of ἵσταμαι appears pretty clearly in Homer in K 173, Ψ 517, τ 201, not to insist on numerous other places where the translation 'to stand' is tempting, but the more regular meaning may be saved by a little determination; e.g. Π 166, 305, X 318.

In post-Homeric Greek of the classical period it is not easy to find unquestionable cases of the same usage. Thuc. II. 97, 1, ἦν δὲ κατὰ πρύμναν ἵσθῆται τὸ πνεῦμα, looks that way, especially when compared with Thuc. VI. 104, 2 : (ἄνεμος) κατὰ βορείαν ἵσθηκώς. Nevertheless, an objector might maintain that in the former passage there is a notion of 'rising.' At any rate, in Xen. Anab. I. 10, 1, οὐκέτι ἵστανται, ἀλλὰ φεύγουσι, it is clear that ἵστανται means 'hold their ground.' In post-classical Greek analogous usages become commoner, and in the modern literary language ἵσταμαι is regular for 'to stand.'

The case of ἵσταμαι is not a solitary case. On the contrary, there is a considerable series of verbs which show in the present and future systems similar double meanings. In these verbs the aorist signifies 'to put into such and such a condition'; the present, either 'to put' or 'to keep.' The phenomenon is not, of course, confined to the middle voice; voice has, fundamentally, nothing to do with the matter. But in several cases I have not noted crucial illustrations of the double meaning in each voice, while in κρεμάννυμι and the collateral κρήνημι the two voices seem to have really differentiated, one appropriating one meaning and the other the other. Following is a list, doubtless incomplete, of the verbs in question. The citations are merely exemplary, but are meant to be decisive. Naturally, in great numbers of cases the two senses cannot be confidently discriminated.

εἰνάζω, 'to put to bed' (Soph. O. T. 961); εἰνάζομαι, 'to go to bed,' 'lie down' (Hom. δ 449 and often); also, 'to lie in bed' (Eur.

Or. 151); cf. εἰνᾶσθαι (Soph. O. C. 1569).

κοιμάω, 'to put to bed,' 'put to sleep' (Aesch. Ag. 580); κοιμῶμαι,

- 'to lie down' (Xen. Cyr. VIII. 8, 9); also, 'to lie,' 'to sleep' (Aesch. Ag. 2, Xen. Hier. 6, 7).
- κρεμάσσομαι, κρήμηγμα, 'to hang,' *suspendo* (Aristot. H. A. 612^a 10, Pind. Pyth. 4, 43); κρέμαμαι, κρήματαμαι, 'to hang,' *pendeo* (Plat. Legg. 831 C, Aristoph. Nub. 377, and often).
- κρύπτω, 'to put in hiding,' 'cover up' (Herod. V. 4, Eur. Hipp. 245, 250); also, 'to keep in hiding,' 'keep concealed' (Hom. Hymn. Cer. 240, Soph. El. 957); also, 'to remain in hiding' (Soph. El. 826); κρύπτομαι, 'to be in hiding,' much like κέκρυμμαι (Eur. Or. 1107).
- λείπω, 'to go away from' (Hom. X 226, κ 462 and often); also, 'to leave remaining' (Hom. Ω 726); λείπομαι, often, 'to remain,' like λάλειμαι (Herod. IX. 45, Thuc. VIII. 81, 3); especially in the impersonal λείπεται (e.g. Plat. Theaet. 157 E, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1106^a 9). Cf. μονούμενος, apparently synonymous with μεμυστωμένος (Eur. Alc. 380, Plat. Legg. 710 B).
- ὁμοίω, 'to make like' (Thuc. III. 82, 2); ὁμοιοῦμαι, 'to become like' (Plat. Theaet. 176 E, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1172^a 10); also 'to be like' (Thuc. II. 97, 6, Eur. Bacch. 1348[?]).
- ὀρθῶ, 'to set upright' (Archil. 53 [33], Eur. Tro. 505, Aristot. Pol. 1322^b 20); also, 'to hold upright' (Eur. Hec. 60, Bacch. 364, Plat. Lach. 181 A, B, Legg. 957 D): ὀρθοῦμαι, 'to rise' (Aesch. Eum. 698); also, 'to be held upright' (Soph. Aj. 161), or, 'to keep oneself upright' (Soph. El. 742, Xen. Cyr. I. 3, 10, VIII. 8, 10, Symp. 2, 25); often figuratively (e.g. Herod. VII. 103).
- ἀποστερῶ, 'to take away from the owner,' 'to rob' (Aristoph. Av. 1605, Plat. Legg. 873 A, C); also, 'to keep from the owner,' 'to withhold' (Soph. O. T. 323, Xen. Mem. I. 7, 5, Anab. VII. 6, 9); στεροῦμαι, ἀποστεροῦμαι, 'to have one's property seized' (Plat. Theaet. 201 B); also, 'to be kept in deprivation,' like ἀπεστέρημαι (Eur. Hipp. 1460, Thuc. III. 39, 8, Isocr. VII. 25). See Veitch, Greek Verbs, s.v. στερέω. Wilamowitz (Herakles II. 78-9), from whom two of the foregoing citations have been borrowed, is too absolute, when he says: "στερεῖσθαι ist nicht *privari* sondern *carere*. . . auch das activ ἀποστερεῖν bedeutet nicht 'berauben' sondern 'vorenthalten.'"

F. B. TARBELL.

CIC. IN CAT. IV. 3, 6.

Latius opinione disseminatum est hoc malum : manavit non solum per Italiam, verum etiam transcendit Alpes, et obscure serpens multas iam provincias occupavit.

It is often said that in English most common metaphors are dead, *i.e.* have lost their original metaphorical picturesqueness, whereas in Latin the understanding of the metaphor survived. That this last is not by any means a universal truth is evident from the passage cited. The *malum* is, of course, the conspiracy of Catiline and the causes leading to it. This is said to be *disseminatum*, *i.e.* it is compared to seed sown broadcast; then it *manavit*, *i.e.* it is compared to a liquid; then *transcendit Alpes*, *i.e.* it is compared to some living creature or creatures, perhaps with a faint reminiscence of Hannibal; then *obscure serpens*, where some creeping reptile is brought before the mind, *provincias occupavit*. In the last words Cicero seems to leave metaphor and revert to a plain statement that the prevailing discontent has taken possession of many provinces, though even here the expression suggests allusion to a *hostile army*.

It is hardly possible that Cicero consciously mixed his metaphors to such an extent. If his hearers retained in their minds the fundamental meaning of each word, the effect of this whole sentence would have been as absurd as that of the famous "I smell a rat; I see him floating in the air; but I will nip him in the bud."

PLUTARCH, QU. GR., § 1.

Τίνες ἐν Ἐπιδαύρῳ κονίποδες καὶ ἄρτυνοι; οἱ μὲν τὸ πολίτευμα ὀλιγαρχία καὶ ἑκατὸν ἄνδρες ἦσαν. ἐκ δὲ τούτων ἤρουντο βουλευτὰς, οὓς ἀρτύλους ἐκάλουν, κτλ.

According to this, the whole number of active citizens at Epidaurus was 180, and from this number were chosen senators called *ἄρτυνοι*. It is hard to believe that the oligarchy was so exclusive, and certainly if the number of citizens was so small, it would have been unnecessary to choose a senate, as the whole body could easily have met for deliberation. The 180 must have been the senate, and the *ἄρτυνοι* must have had some other functions. This is substantially the opinion of Tittmann (*Darstellung d. gr. Staatsverfassungen*,

p. 359) and C. O. Müller (*Aeginetica*, p. 134, and *Dorier*, II. p. 140).

I think a word has fallen out, and the passage should read: οἱ μὲν τὸ πολίτευμα [διοικούντες?] ὀγδοήκοντα καὶ ἑκατὸν ἄνδρες ἦσαν, ἐκ δὲ τούτων ἤρουντο τῶν βουλευτῶν, οὓς ἄρτύνοὺς ἐκάλου. When once the word διοικούντες (or another word of similar meaning) had fallen out, the genitive τῶν βουλευτῶν had no sense and was naturally changed to βουλευτάς. The statement, "those who governed the state were 180 men, and from these senators they chose the so-called ἄρτυνοι," is at least reasonable.

Gilbert (*Gr. Staatsalt.* II. p. 86, 315) accepts the statement of Plutarch as it stands in the texts, but makes the ἄρτυνοι equivalent to the πρόβουλοι of Corinth and other states. The 180 he regards as representatives of the Doric families. He does not, however, explain how the ἄρτυνοι came to be called βουλευταί, their functions being those of πρόβουλοι, nor how the 180 representatives came to be called τὸ πολίτευμα.

Hesychius (*s.v.*) defines ἄρτυνος by ἄρχων, and Thucydides (V. 47) gives an official document, in which the ἀρτῦναι at Argos are mentioned, corresponding, at least so far as position in the sentence is concerned, to the ἐνδημοὶ ἀρχαί at Athens. In view of Plutarch's expression concerning the ἄρτυνοι at Epidaurus, it seems improbable that ἀρτῦναι should be a general term, — a local Argive expression equivalent to ἀρχαί. It refers rather to a body of officers distinct from the senate and the board of eighty mentioned by Thucydides. This agrees also with the general meaning of ἀρτύνω and its derivatives, for which see the lexicon.

The number of citizens at Epidaurus is, then, unknown, the senate numbered 180, and from the senate the magistrates called ἄρτυνοι were chosen. The powers of the ἄρτυνοι may have been similar to those of the πρόβουλοι elsewhere, or may have been greater, like those of the Spartan ephors or Cretan kosmoi.

In the passage of Thucydides mentioned above, most editors read οἱ ἀρτῦναι for Ms. αἱ ἀρτῦναι. The only authority for a form (ὁ) ἀρτύνης (ἀρτύνας) is Herodian I. p. 56, and II. p. 653, ed. Lentz. In both these places the form Ἄρτύνας occurs among proper names, and Lentz is probably right in taking this word also as a proper name. Of course, as Stahl (on *Thuc.* V. 47) suggests, it is possible

that there may have been two forms, *ἀρτυνος* and *ἀρτύνας*. His other suggestion, that *ἀρτυνος* in Plut. and Hesych. is corrupt, would deserve more consideration if the Ms. reading in Thuc. were *οἱ ἀρτύναι*. The Ms. reading *αἱ ἀρτύναι* can be explained by assuming that the office stands for the officials.

HAROLD N. FOWLER.

LYSIAS, XVI. 10.

καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας οὕτως βεβίωκα ὥστε μηδεπώποτε μοι πρὸς ἓνα μηδὲν ἔγκλημα γενέσθαι.

The phrase *μοι . . . γενέσθαι* is interpreted by the commentators in different ways. An explanation of it is also given by Liddell and Scott. The question is whether it means 'No person has ever had ground of complaint against me,' or 'I have never had ground of complaint against anybody.' This question can be settled only by a comparison of other passages in which a similar phrase occurs.

In SOPH. *Phil.* 323, *ἔχεις | ἔγκλημ' Ἀτρείδαις*, the dat. of the person is evidently used in the sense of *against*. In the following passages the same dat. occurs, and also *πρὸς* with the acc. of the offended party or the party that brings the *ἔγκλημα*: XEN. *Hellen.* vii. 4, 34, *καταλιπεῖν εἰς τὸν αἰὶ χρόνον τοῖς παισὶν ἔγκλημα τοῦτο πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς*. HYP. *Lyc.* xiii. p. 31 (Blass), *οὔτε αἰτίαν πονηρὰν οὐδεμίαν πώποτ' ἔλαβον, οὔτ' ἔγκλημά μοι πρὸς οὐδένα τῶν πολιτῶν γέγονε*. LYS. X. 23, *τίνος ὄντος ἐμοὶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐγκλήματος*; (the context fixing the meaning). In DEM. I. 7, *ἐπειδὴ δ' ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς ἐγκλημάτων μισοῦσι (Φύλιππον)*, there is no dat., but we have the same *πρὸς* and acc.: so in LYS. XXV. 23, *ὥσπερ μηδενὸς ἐγκλήματος πρὸς ἀλλήλους γεγενημένον*.

These passages show that the phrase in LYS. XVI. 10 should be rendered, '*there has never been any ground of complaint at all against me on the part of a single solitary man.*' They also explain XEN. *Cyr.* i. 2. 6, *γίγνεται γὰρ δὴ καὶ παισὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὥσπερ ἀνδράσιν ἐγκλήματα*. This passage leads the editors of the *Lexicon* to say that '*I have a ground of complaint against somebody*' could be expressed by *γίγνεται* or *ἔστι ἐγκλημά μοι πρὸς τινα*. In support of this they quote LYS. X. 23 (see above), which, rendered as they

propose, could not possibly make sense with the context. Their imaginary sentence would rightly be expressed: γίνεται δ' ἔγκλημά τινι πρὸς με. In all these sentences the use of πρὸς is very like that in Lys. XIII. 75; cf. XXIII. 13, ἀμφισβητῶν μὴ πρὸς τὸν πολέμαρχον εἶναί οἱ τὰς δίκας. But Shuckburgh goes too far in rendering XVI. 10 μὴδ' πρὸς ἑνα, *before no one single magistrate*. Although Lutz (*die Präpositionen bei den attischen Redern*, p. 160) recognizes this local use of πρὸς, he wrongly states that with ἔγκλημα it has the sense of *against*; he cites no example to prove it (p. 163). For ἔγκλημα in the sense of *ground of complaint* (not the mere written bill of charges), see Meier & Schömann, *Att. Process.*, p. 195, Lips.

AESCHYLUS, AG. 412 SQ. (421 SQ. WECK.).

In this passage the codd. (*f* and *h*) read:—

πάρεστι σιγᾶς ἀτίμος ἀλοιδόρος
ἀδιστος ἀφεμένων ἰδεῖν.

These words make no sense. Many emendations have been offered. The one most commonly accepted is that of Hermann, who reads:—

πάρεστι σιγᾶς ἀτίμους ἀλοιδόρους
αἰσχιστ' ἀφεμένων ἰδεῖν,

and thus interprets: 'Behold the silence, scorned yet unrebuking, of those so shamefully deserted.' It is generally admitted that something like this was what Aeschylus meant to say, but to get at it Hermann had to alter five words, as well as one in the antistrophe. I desire to offer an emendation which preserves the same general thought with a much slighter change of text.

In the Farnesian Ms. and the edition of Victorius we have a scholion on this passage. The writer attempted a paraphrase and made confusion of it, but in spite of his errors it seems incredible that he should have interpreted, as he did, the common word ἀτίμος by πολύτιμος. It is also striking that, in the Florentine Ms. (which has no scholia just here), the same word πολύτιμος is written as a gloss just over ἀτίμος. It is well known that some of these scholia and glosses are much more ancient than the codd. themselves, and here I believe that we are on the track of a reading older than the Medi-

cean. What word might call for the definition *πολύτιμος*? Maybe *ζάτιμος*. There is no such word in our dictionaries, but it is a good word enough in itself, and Aeschylus uses *ζαπληθής* and *ζάπυρος*. The copyist of the Medicean may have carried in his mind the sounds *σίγα ζάτιμος*, and have written them as *σιγὰς ἀτιμος*. Restoring the former, we have, —

πάρεστι σίγα ζάτιμος ἀλοίδορος
ἄδιτος ἀφειμένων ιδεῖν,

which I would interpret: ‘He is there in silence, full of honor, unrepublishing, sweetest of those who have ceased to behold (her).’ We should, however, expect the genitive with *ἀφίεμαι* in this sense; hence it may be better to write with Hermann *ἀφειμένων*, interpreting ‘sweetest of deserted ones,’ and to take *ιδεῖν* with *πάρεστι*, ‘he is to be seen’; cf. Eur. I. T. 291; Goodwin, M. T. 768.

The metrical scheme would be : —

υ : — υ | λ | — υ | ~ υ | — υ | — Λ
> : — υ | υ υ υ | — υ | — Λ

or, with *ἀφειμένων* : —

> : ~ υ | — υ | — υ | — Λ

The antistrophe, without a change, would be : —

τὸ πᾶν δ' ἀφ' Ἑλλάδος αἴας συνορμένους
πένθεια τλησικάρδιος.

υ : — υ | ~ υ | λ | — υ | — υ | — Λ
> : — υ | — υ | — υ | — Λ

I see no musical reason for a change, and I do not believe in wholesale emendation to make strophe and antistrophe correspond exactly, syllable for syllable. That such emendation must be resorted to in order to obtain exactness of correspondence in the choruses of tragedy is made very evident in Dr. Verrall's preface to his edition of the Agamemnon.

M. H. MORGAN.

GENERAL INDEX.

- Abbott, E., date for Cylon, 13.
 Agariste, date of marriage, 58 f.
 ἄγροικοι (ἔποικοι), 7, 60, 72.
 ἀγροῖται, 7.
 Agryle, 54.
 αἰσυμνήται, 63.
 ἀκμή, 68.
 Alcmeon, not Alcmaeon, 42.
 Alcmeon, (a) life-archon, 2, 42; (b) general in Sacred War, 49; Alcmeon and Megacles confused by Scholiast, 51.
 Alcmeonidae, 6, 42 ff.; Eupatrids?, 43; in Herodotus, 29; date of trial and exile, 47; gain wealth in trade, 53 ff.; at Isthmian games, 50.
 ἀλιτήριοι, 11.
 Alyattes, confused by Herodotus with Croesus, 52.
 Amasis and Solon, 52 f.
 Amnesty-law, Solon's, 11, 48.
 ἀναγραφάι, 2, 68.
 ἀνδρεία, notion of, 157.
 Androtion, 21.
ante and *post*, 181 ff.
 ἔποικοι (ἄγροικοι), 7, 60, 72; *vs.* ἄστοι, 71.
 ἀποκοπή χρῶν, Solon's, 56.
 Apollodorus, 2, 10; sources of, 21; on Cypselus, 64.
 Apollonius of Rhodes, 127.
 ἀποστερῶ, meanings of, 188.
 Appositives as bonds of connexion, 98.
 ἀρετή, notion of, 152 ff., 160.
 ἄρχοντες = πρῶταις, before Solon, 30 f. [ἄρχων] βασιλεὺς, 2.
 Archons, choice of, under and after Solon, 4; archon's or archons' court, 11 f., 33; their oath, 41 f.
 Archontate, life, decennial, annual, — dates and development of, 2 ff.
 Aristaechmus, archon, 5, 35.
 Aristocracy in Greece, how transformed, 62.
 Aristocrates, 64.
 Aristodemus, the Elean, chronographer, 2, 27.
 Aristotle, studies in Attic history, 21; his Πολιτεῖαι, 15.
Respub. Athen., authorship, 22 f.; recognized as Aristotelian by Philochorus, 23; sources of, 21; and Plutarch's *Sol.*, 25 ff.; mentions of parentage in, 35; story of Cylon in, 14; μετὰ ταῦτα in, 68.
 ἄρτυνοι, interpreted, 189 ff.
 Artytamas, 50.
 ἄστοι *vs.* ἔποικοι, 71.
 Athena Polias, 11.
 Athens, a political name (= Attica), 61; stages in differentiation of the social body at, 71 f.; study of early history in antiquity, 20; Athens and Corinth commercially united, 65.
Atthides, 21 ff., 35.
 Attica, geographical subdivisions, 8; causes of social distress before Solon, 56; early trade and industry, 55; local factions post-Solonian, 8.
 Bacchiadae, 58.
 Baehrens, on Catullus iv, 75 f.
 βασιλεὺς, of Athenian archons, 2; βασιλεὺς and πρῶταις, 31.
 Batrachomyomachia, 129.
 Berlin papyrus (No. 163), 1, 7.
 βίοι, βιογράφοι, 16, 23.

- Boeckh, date for Cydon, 13
 British Museum papers (No. 131),
 1, 7.
 Bupal, date for Cydon, 13.
 Byzantium, 12.
- Catullus, Phœbus of, 75 ff.; modern
 paradox, 75, 2, 2.
 Chalcidion, 12.
 Chronographers, Greek, 2 ff., 17.
 Chronology, Greek, 21.
 Chrysippus, conception of *oikeia*, 153.
 Cicero, use of Theophrastus, 17.
 Ciceroneus, 21.
 Clisthenes, *κ* of Sicyon, 20, 26;
κ of Athens, 45.
 Cleomenes, 70.
 Clinton, date for Cydon, 12.
 Colonization, Greek, causes and effects,
 12 ff.
 Comens, archon, 10, 50.
 Corinth, colonies of, 62.
 Coresia, date for Cydon, 12.
 Coressa, 10, 20 ff.
 Curtius, E., date for Cydon, 13.
 Cydon. The Date of, 1 ff.; introduc-
 tory, 1 ff.; the problem, 12 ff.; the
 story and sources of information,
 12 ff.; Megacles archon, 26 ff.; Cy-
 don a young man, 37 ff.; the Alce-
 monidae before Pausanias, 42 ff.;
 Theagenes of Megara, 61 ff.; date
 of Epimenides, 66 ff.; results, 71 ff.
 Cypselus, 6, 64.
- Darius, meaning of 140 f.
 Democritus, 3 f., 10, 20.
 Date of Cydon, 1 ff., 12 f.
 Democles, 30.
 Delphi, 54, 73; Delphi: *ἀναστροφή*,
 40.
 Demetrius Phalereus, 31 f.
 Democracy, Athenian, begins with
 Draco, 5.
 Demosthenes, 6.
 Demosyrus, 22.
 Demostyrus, 7, 60, 72.
 Dicaea, 5, 24.
 Diocles, Cydon victor in, 12, 16.
- Indemus, 13, 23, 32; and Philochorus,
 30.
Ἰνδένου, notice of, 150, 172, 177.
 Dindorf, 17, 47.
Ἰνδὸς ἀσπίς, use of, 145.
 Itraca, not archon, 4; *ἴτρα*, 4; his re-
 turns, 72; and *μακρὸν ἄρμα*, 53.
 Isocrates, Thucydidean use of, 26.
 Iuvencus, date for Cydon, 12.
 Iuvencus, date for Cydon, 13.
- Ἰσχυρὸν* in ethics of Socrates, 143, 161.
 Eleasa, 6.
Ἰσχυρὸν in Herodotus, 37 f.
Ἰσχυρὸν, 13; meaning in Herodotus, 37.
 Ellis, E., on Catullus 75, 82 ff.
 Emendations, Aesch., 47, 417 ff., 192.
 At. *Ἰσχυρὸν*, *Ἰσχυρὸν*, 4, 185.
 Festus, 157, M., 182.
 Livy, *Ἰσχυρὸν*, 27, 2, 185.
 Perizonius, 21, 24, 26, 63, 71,
 87, 185 f.
 Plat., *Ἰσχυρὸν*, 1, 180.
 Soph., 77, 145, 184.
- Ἰσχυρὸν*, 11, 14, 17.
Ἰσχυρὸν, 17, 47.
 Epimenides, 31.
 Epimenides, its name, 102.
 Ephebus, 4, 15, 26, 28.
 Erachurus, 24.
 Epimenides, 14, 17, 25, 47; date of
 visit to Athens, 12 ff.
Ἰσχυρὸν, loss of virtue, 130 ff., 156,
 180.
Ἰσχυρὸν, in Plato's psychology,
 182 ff., 171, 177.
 Erastus, 25.
 Eratosthenes, 2, 23.
Ἰσχυρὸν in Herodotus, 36.
Ἰσχυρὸν in Herodotus, 36.
 Pausanias, 27.
Ἰσχυρὸν, notice of, 152 ff.
Ἰσχυρὸν, 5.
Ἰσχυρὸν, 45, 48.
 Romaniles, 11, 18, 67.
Ἰσχυρὸν, meanings of, 187.
Ἰσχυρὸν, 60, 72; meanings of word,
 43; Aristotle's use of, 44; *Ἰσχυρὸν*
Ἰσχυρὸν, 43.

- FOWLER, H. N., notes on Cicero, *Cat.* iv (3, 6), 189.
Plut. *Qu. Gr.* (1), 189 ff.
- γεωμέτροι, 7, 72.
ἐγεύργουσι, 57.
Gilbert, G., date for Cylon, 13.
Greek poetry sung, 91.
GREENOUGH, J. B., on *ante* and *post*, 181 ff.
Grote, date for Cylon, 13.
Γύλων, Κύλων, 6.
Gylon, 6.
- HALEY, H. W., notes on Petronius, 183 f.
Soph. *Tr.* (145), 184.
Arist. *R. A.* (4), 185.
Livy (xxii, 17, 2), 185.
- HAMMOND, W. A., on the Notion of Virtue in the Dialogues of Plato, 131 ff.
Hedonism, in the philosophy of Socrates, 149, 154, 161.
Hellanicus, 20, 58.
Hellanodicae, 27.
Hellas, 73.
Heracleides (Lembos?), 15; *Exc. Pol.*, relation to Aristotle's *Respub. Ath.*, 15 f.
Heraclitus, influence on Plato, 133.
Hermippus, *Βιογράφος*, 9, 16, 23.
Herodotus, on early Attic history, 19; on Cylon, 14 ff.; on Solon, 19; on Alcmeonidae, 29; on Athenian archons, 30; errors in synchronisms, 52; corrected by Thucydides?, 20.
Hertzberg, date for Cylon, 12.
Hesiod, 127.
Hippias, (a) of Athens, 70 f.; (b) of Elis, 21.
Hippocleides, date of, 58.
Hirzel, on the meaning of *δικαιοσύνη* and *σωφροσύνη*, 166 ff.
Homeric Caesura, 91 ff.
Hysiae, 8.
Holm, date for Cylon, 12.
HOWARD, A. A., note on Livy (i, 55, 1), 185 f.
- Ister, 15; source for Plutarch, 27; source for Cicero, indirectly, 67.
- Julius Africanus, 2 ff., 10, 17, 50; sources for his list of Olympic victors, 27.
- κοιμάω, meanings of, 187.
ἐκόμησε, 13, 38 f.
κρεμάννυμι, κρήνημι, meanings of, 188.
κρύπτω, meanings of, 188.
Κυλώνειον, at Athens, 67.
- Landwehr, date for Cylon, 13.
λείπω, meanings of, 188.
Leipsydrium, 43, 54.
Leobates, 5.
λίθοι Ἰβρεως καὶ Ἀναδείας, 67.
λογιστικόν, in Plato's psychology, 163 ff., 171, 172, 177.
Lycomidæ, 5 f.
Lycurgus, leader of Pediaei, 18, 60.
Lyside (Melissa), 64.
- Meanings of certain Greek verbs, 186 ff.
Medontidae, 43.
Megacles, (a) life-archon, 42; (b) Megacles I., 11, 16; archon, 28 and 34 ff.; (c) Megacles II., 34; life and fortunes, 57 ff.; (d) Megacles III., ostracised, 29, 46.
Μεγακλῆς, Περικλῆς, 17.
Megara, 64 ff., 73; trade of, 55.
Melissa (Lyside), 64.
Mesogaea, 8.
μετὰ ταῦτα, in Aristot. *Respub. Athen.*, 68.
Miltiades and Cimon, confused, 51.
Munichia, 70.
Munro, on Catullus iv, 79 ff., 87.
Musæus, 127.
Myron, (a) of Sicyon, 58, 64; (b) of Phlya, 17, 47.
Mytilene, 55.
- πανκραταίαι, 31, 55 f.
Niebuhr, date for Cylon, 13.
Nisaea, 73.
νόμος ἀργίας, 53.
Nonnus, 127.
Notes, 181 ff.

- Sigeum, 9, 50, 52, 55.
 ΣΜΙΤΤΗ, C. L., Catullus and the Phae-
 ulus of his Fourth Poem, 75 ff.
 Solon, archontate, date of, 10; Solon
 and Epimenides, 66 f.; reforms, 56;
 amnesty-law, 11, 48; laws on trade,
 55; as merchant and traveller, 9;
 Herodotus on Solon, 19; Solon not
 named by Thucydides, 19.
 σοφία, notion of, 156.
 Sophists, ethics of, 132 ff., 148.
 σωφροσύνη, notion of, 157, 169, 170,
 177.
 Sosicrates, 10.
 Sotion, 16.
 στασιώται, in Herodotus, 39.
 Stein, H., date for Cylon, 13.
 στρατηγοί, significance of election, 4;
 age of, 50.
 Suidas, *s. Έπιμενίδης*, 68, and *Index
 of Citations*.
 Susemihl, interpretation of Laches, 140.
 Symmachus, 18.
 Synchronisms, attempted by chrono-
 graphers, 52, 68.
 Theagenes of Megara, 10; date of,
 61 ff.
 Themistocles, 5, 27.
 Theognis, 65.
 Theophrastus, 15, 21.
 Theopompus, 20, 27, 70.
 θέσµα, θεσµοί, 20.
 θεσµοθεταί, 3, 20; = ἄρχοντες, 5.
 θεσµοθετήσας (in Paus. ix 36. 8) = θε-
 σµόντς ἔθηκεν, 55.
 Thucydides, on early Attic history, 18;
 on Cylon, 14 and *passim*.
 θυμοειδής, in Plato's psychology, 163 ff.,
 171, 177.
 Timaeus, 21.
 Timonassa, 60.
 Ueberweg-Heinze, on the notion of
 σωφροσύνη, 169.
 Vergil, 127.
 Virtues, cardinal, 135, 160.
 Virtue, notion of, in the dialogues of
 Plato, 132 ff.
 Virtue, see ἀνδρεία, δικαιοσύνη, δειότης,
 σοφία, σωφροσύνη, φρόνησις.
 Wachsmuth, W., date for Cylon, 12.
 Westphal, on Catullus iv, 79, 82 f.
 WRIGHT, J. H., on the Date of Cylon,
 1 ff.
 Zeller, on the notion of σωφροσύνη,
 169.

INDEX OF CITATIONS.

- Aeschines, ii 108^b, 49; 171. 2.
 Aeschylus, *Ag.* 112 f., 192.
 Andocides, i 78, 81, 92; 122. *ps.* An-
 toides, v 34, 40.
 Aristophanes, *Eq.* 445, 11.
 Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* ii 11 1110^a, 101,
 141; v 13 1127^a, 14, 130;
 v 5 1130^a, 181, 175, 2. 3.
Metaph. v 29 1025^a, 91, 135, 138.
P. A. v 10 687^a, 23; 142.
vera operatio ora. i 1299^a, 30,
 168; 2 1290^a, 71, 168, 171, 2. 3.
Polit. i 2 1252^a, 17; 71. iii
 12. 9). 3. 1285^a, 31, 93; iv
 vii 15. 13). 18 1334^a, 22),
 141; vi 19). 4. 7. 1290^a, 1.,
 63; *ibid.* 10. 2. 1295^a, 14., 63;
 vii 7). 4. 5., 5. 1305^a, 18),
 31; *ibid.* 1305^a, 24., 65; *ibid.*
 12. 9). 21 1315^a, 14., 58.
Respon. Ath. Kenyon, *passim*,
 1-74; especially 1), 5, 15,
 25, 48, 68; 2), 3, 25; 3), 3,
 20, 30, 31; 4), 5, 31, 35, 20,
 185; 5), 3, 25; 6), 25; 7), 25,
 26, 41; 8), 4, 11, 20, 31, 44;
 9), 25, 26; 10), 25; 11), 2,
 20; 12), 7, 25; 13), 3 f., 5,
 20, 34, 57; 14), 10, 20, 58,
 68; 16), 26; 17), 25, 60, 73;
 19), 43, 54; 20), 6, 38, 45;
 22), 4, 29, 35, 46, 54, 68; (23),
 35; 25), 27, 35; 26), 35, 68;
 (28), 35, 68; 29), 35; (34), 71,
 38, 68.
Rhet. i 2. 7. 1357^a, 33), 65; *ibid.*
 3. 5. 1366^a, 51, 63; *ibid.* 9
 (1366^a, 13), 171, 2. 3.
Top. v 6. 137^a, 12), 168.
- Aspasius, in *Eth. Nic. Com.* 9c, 11.,
 142.
 Athenaeus, iv 628 a, b), 5. 3.
 Callisthenes, *ap.* Athen. iii 500 C), 49.
 Caelius, iv 112., 75 f., viii 79; viii,
 78, 81 f.
 Cicero, *Att.* v 13. 91, 180; *De Fin.*
 i 4., 21; *De Leg.* ii 11 28,
 15, 97; iii 9 14., 21; *De Off.*
 i 40), 141, 2. 21 ii 18), 97.
 Clement of Alexandria, *Ad Gentes*, i
 20), 15, 97.
 Coeterus, *Pres.* 31, 5.
 Democritus, *Pres.* 135 Muil., 153.
 Demosthenes, i 71, 191; xviii 149),
 49; xii 144), 42 f.; xvii 66), 5.
 Diogenes Laertius, i 2 55), 53; *ibid.*
 10 110), 17, 25; *ibid.* 10 (109-
 115), 70; *ibid.* 22), 21; ii 7),
 21, 51; iii 44 79), 180, 2. 11; v
 5 75., 21; ix 3 54., 35.
 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Ant.* i 8),
 30; *ibid.* 71 and 76), 1; ii 8),
 7, 36, 44.
 Euripides, *Alc.* 920), 43; *Suppl.* 659),
 55.
 Eusebius, *Chron.* Schöne), i 100),
 51; 185), 42; 188^a), 2; 197,
 198), 10; II. 93), 66; 194), 59;
 98), 66.
 Festus, 157, M., 182.
 Harpocration, *Lex. Rhetor.* 32; *Lex. Rhetor.*
 36.
 Heraclides, *Err. Phil.* (2), 17, 18;
 (8), 41.

- Heraclitus, *Frag.* (60, 61, 91, 92), 134.
 Hermippus (*ap. Plut. Sol.* 11), 49.
 Herodotus, *passim* 1-74, especially 37, 38; i (19), 52; (30-33), 52; ii (177), 52; v (62), 54; (66), 38, 45; (71), *passim*, especially 3, 10, 14, 32; (94, 95), 52; vi (125), 50, 52.
 Herondas, i (2 and 13), 7.
 Hesy chius, *s. ἀποκρίται*, 7.
 Homer, A (1-8), 95; (8-21), 17 f.; (29 f.), 123; (223-233), 118 f.; E (312), 99; (745), 100; Z (158 f.), 101; (254-262), 96; (289-291), 100; (497-499), 101; H (11-16), 117; K (252 f.), 109; A (248-260), 119; (653 f.), 109; M (13-15), 122; (51 f.), 98; (234-236), 101; N (261 f.), 187; Ξ (192 f.), 123; X (1-7), 115; (5 f.), 121; (25-27), 116; (38-45), 97; (52), 121; (85-88), 97; (129 f.), 108; (157-160), 111; (190-196), 110; (249-253), 108; (256), 124; (261-265), 116; (279-282), 110; (283 f.), 123 f.; (285-288), 108 f.; (331-334), 102; (412-414), 110; (418-422), 103; (431), 109; (499-515), 119 f.; Ψ (83 f.), 121; (241 f.), 121; Ω (468 f.), 103; (614-616), 103; (762-766), 113.
 α (6-10), 115; (11-17), 117; (17-19), 103; (22 f.), 99; (40), 114; (45-48), 116; (48-54), 94; (69 f.), 99; (127 ff.), 186; (128), 104; (150 f.), 103 f.; (159-162), 104; (197-199), 104, 108; (222 f.), 116; (326 f., 340 f., 370 f.), 105; γ (83-85), 125; (109), 125; (165 f.), 125; (278), 61; δ (401-408), 120; ζ (180-185), 96, 107; κ (395), 125; λ (448-450), 107; μ (206 f.), 121.
 Horace, C. iii (3, 2), 146; (11, 49), 82; *Epod.* (16, 21), 82.
 Hypereides, *Lyc.* xiii, p. 31 (Blass), 191.
 Inscriptions: C. I. A. i (61), 12; (122), 54; (472), 6; (475), 69; ii (1113), 5; (1386), 8; iv (1 a), 69, 73; iv^b 373, n. 189 (p. 98), 42.
 C. I. G. (2955), 31.
 Roehl, *I. G. A.*, pp. 171, 172 (No. 27 b, c), 64.
Marmor Parium, 3; (Ep. 32), 3; (Ep. 37), 49; (Ep. 38), 49; (Ep. 40), 59.
 Isocrates, xvi (25), 43, 45, 54, 59.
 Josephus, *Adv. Apion.* i (3, 16 and 4, 21), 20.
 Julius Africanus, see *General Index*.
 Justin, ii 7 (Ephorus), 9.
Lexicon Dem. Patm. (p. 152), 44.
 Livy, i (55, 1), 185; xxii (17, 2), 185.
 Lysias, x (23), 191; xiii (75), 192; xiv (39), 46; xvi (10), 191 f.; xxiii (13), 192; xxv (23), 191; *Contra Nigid.* (*ap. Diog. Laert.* i 2, 55), 53.
 Marcellinus, *Thuc.* (3), 58; (32), 36.
 Moeris, *Lex.* (p. 193), 44.
 Ovid, *Trist.* x, 87 f.
 Pausanias, *passim* 1-74; i (28, 1), 16, 40; (28, 5), 67; (40, 1), 16; iii (17, 7-9), 41; iv (5, 10), 3; (13, 7), 3; vii (25, 3), 16, 35; ix (36, 8), 5.
 Petronius (21), 183; (58), 183, 184; (60), 184; (62), 184; (63), 184; (71), 184; (87), 184.
 Phanias (*ap. Plut. Sol.* 32), 59.
 Philochorus, *Frag.* (35), 8; see *General Index*.
 Photius, *s. αναγραφαι*, 31; *Lex. App.* (p. 665), 53.
 Pindar, *Pyth.* (7, 13 ff.), 29, 50.
 Plato, *Apol.* (31 D), 147; (32 B), 146.
Charm. (157 A, 161 B, 164 E, 165 C), 139; (161 A), 157; (174 D), 158.

Plato — *continued*.

- Jur.* 46 B, 146: 47 C, 159;
49 B, 148.
- Def.* 411 D, 159; 411 E, 175.
- Sisyph.* 3 D, 150; 6 E, 150;
9 E, 150; 12 D, 151; 14 C,
151.
- Jur.* 401 B, 160; 491 *seq.*,
148; 495 C, 157; 502 C,
158; 508 B, 149; 520 C,
159.
- Hipp. Min.* 372 A *seq.*, 156;
375 D, E, 156; 375 E, 159.
- Laches.* 192 E, 140; 194 E,
150; 195 A, 140; 157; 199
D, 151; 199 E, 140.
- Legg.* 631 C, 152; II. 1: 642 D,
150.
- Lysis* 215 A *seq.*, 137; 223 B,
138.
- Men.* 71 E, 148; 77 B, 144;
78 C, 144; 78 D, 144; 87
B, C, 88 C, D, 151; 88 B,
157; 89 C, 144; 93 E, 150;
97 C, 145.
- Phaed.* 66 B, 178.
- Phaedr.* 235 E, 41 C, 240 C,
38.
- Protag.* 319 A, 142; 320 B,
142; 323 B, 100; 330 B,
150; 333 D, 154; 345 D,
145; 349 B, 142; 349 D,
157; 351 C, 145; 351 E,
142; 353 E, 145; 357 A,
145; 358 C, 156.
- Rep.* 410 C, 107; 428 B, 104;
429 B, 104; 430 E, 170;
433 A, 139; 442 A, 170;
(443 A), 176; 443 C-E, 172;
444 B, 174; 444 E, 180;
450 B, 179; 450 C, 180;
453 B, 167; 508 B, E, 179;
522 C, 178; 613 A, 180,
II. 1.
- Theat.* 173 D, 38; 176 B, 178.
- Tim.* 86 A, 178.
- Eutarch. *Fab.* 10, 14; *Perruc.* 9,
27; *Popl.* 18, 14; *Sauro.* 1,
25, 36; (8-10 and 12), 75 (11),

Eutarch — *continued*.

- 49; 123, II. 17, 25, 25, 97 and
passim 1-74; 153; 4, 25, 57;
14, 25, 28; 15, 25; 161,
25; 177, 25, 25; 187, 25, 20;
10), II. 25, 30, 48; 201, 20;
24, 25; 25, 20, 20; 27, 20;
20), 4, 20, 45, 57; 30, 20;
31, 20, 55; 32, 20; *Them.*
10), 30; *Them.* 25), 7, 44,
72.
- Mor.* 205 D, 20; 255 B, 20;
703 A, 305 D, 2.
- Quaest. Graec.* 1, 180.
- Polemion *ap. Schol. Soph.* J. 1 (289),
37.
- Polux. III. 421, 55; 861, 41; 1111,
14.
- Polyaenus. I. 11 B, 57, 59.
- Scholias on
Aristophanes. *Av.* 873), 54; *Eq.*
184), 18; 145), II. 10, 24, 25,
48; *Ves. Arg.* II., 51; 62),
51; *Pax.* 872), 54.
- Lucian. *Tim.* 30), 30.
- Phalar. *DL* 2, 37), 22; *Arch.* 7,
15 E, 31.
- Plato. *Arceol.* 371 D), 14.
- Solon. *Frags.* 21, 3; 4, 22), 38; 14
34 and 30), 7; 5), 7; 13-14),
9; 15-15-16), 25; 32), 10.
- Sophrone. *Elect.* 100, 357), 45; *Phed.*
323), 191; 77, 145), 180.
- Socrates *ap. Diog. Laert.* 1, 7, 25; 51.
- Stobaeus. *Sci.* II. 2, 132), 155.
- Suidas. s. *Opera*, 145; s. *Erasmides*,
68; s. *Plutarchus*, 37; s. *Deos* 7
Arceol., 67; s. *Kulakouros* 170,
171, 35; s. *De* *Opera*, 58; s.
Them., 171, 35; s. *Phalaxus*,
22; s. *Ypocrit*, 41.
- Theophrastus *ap. Zenob.* 4, 36), 67.
- Thurycides, I. 15), 49; 126), *passim*
1-74, especially 3, 8, 10, 14, 32;
127), 18; 155), 18; II. 15),
30; 97), 187; VI. 54), 19;
(104), 187.

Tzetzes, *Chil.* i (8), 51.

Vergil, *Georg.* iv (289), 76.


Xenophon, *Anab.* i (10. 1), 187.
Cyr. i (2. 6), 191.

Xenophon—*continued.*


Hellen. ii (3), 71; vii (4. 34),
191.

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iv. (6. 8), 154.

Oec. vii. (15), 158, n. 4.







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