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PLATO'S VIEW OF POETRY [1]

By WILLIAM CHASE GREENE

ANY one who reads the dialogues of Plato even superficially is bound to be first surprised, then perplexed, by the treatment that poetry receives at the hands of the philosopher. A further reading discloses such apparent inconsistencies that one is tempted to ask whether Plato really had a definite view about the value of poetry. Himself an artist endowed with a richly poetic spirit, he never wearies of quoting the poets. At times he appears to attribute their art to divine inspiration [2] or to a form of madness.[3] In his ideal state a large part of the education of the young is based on the study of certain kinds of poetry. Nevertheless he fiercely criticizes poetry as a whole, and professes to banish the tribe of poets from his commonwealth; they are perverters of morality, mere imitators and deceivers, and their art is concerned with the world of appearance, not of reality. So, as the founder of a city, he insists upon the ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry; [4] the legislator can brook no rival.[5]

If we turn to modern critics for an explanation of these apparent contradictions, we are met by most divergent views. J. Reber [6] holds that Plato criticizes poetry because it is imitation,[7] because the artist is ignorant of the things which he imitates,[8] and because poetry addresses itself to the lower faculties of man, with which he can not grasp truth.[9] Reber therefore concludes that Plato, loyal to a political purpose, definitely deprives poetry of its freedom.[10] Again, F. Stählin [11] defends a similar view with greater thoroughness, and concludes [12] that

[1] This essay in its original Latin form, entitled *Quid de poetis Plato censuerit*, was presented in 1917 in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Harvard University.

[2] *Ion*, 534 c. [3] *Phaedrus*, 244 a ff. [4] *Rep.* 607 b ff. [5] *Laws*, 858 c ff.

[6] J. Reber, *Platon und die Poesie*, Leipzig, 1864.

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 20 ff. [8] *Ibid.*, 24 ff. [9] *Ibid.*, pp. 27 ff. [10] *Ibid.*, p. 40.

[11] F. Stählin, *Die Stellung der Poesie in der Platonischen Philosophie*, Munich, 1901.

[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 18; 38; 46; 59 ff.

Plato's poet in depending on inspiration renounces knowledge, and can at best attain only to right opinion. On the other hand, J. A. Stewart,[1] holding that the Platonic doctrine of ideas is a method of accounting for concepts in use, goes so far as to contend that it is in poetry that we come into contact with reality that is timeless, because the poet concentrates his attention on that which interests him; and "groups which interest us as groups acquire a coherence which makes them what we call 'Things.'"[2] Thus it is only in the world of aesthetic experience that there are eternal and immutable archetypes.[3] Stewart's views are criticized by J. Burnet[4] and by A. E. Taylor.[5] Burnet argues that for Plato the Form of the Good is the *μέγιστον μάθημα*, and that judgments of value are impossible without the exercise of the intellect, since they imply a reference to the Good, which is known by the intellect only. He urges that for Plato everything is mythical except the ideas; in the world of sense and of time, knowledge ceases and myths become appropriate. And Taylor points out that the account which Stewart gives of the *εἴδη* neglects the fact that Plato represents the scientific treatment of them as an act of contemplation. Further, the discussion of poetic imagination and of mystic reverie that Stewart gives us, however interesting and valuable it may be, can not take the place of a sober examination of the dialogues of Plato. The question of Plato's views is, despite Stewart's contempt for the "Critics, most of whom have attended too much to the letter of Plato's text,"[6] not so much one for the psychologist as for the student of Plato's own utterances. The problem which confronts those who are puzzled by the apparent inconsistency in Plato's writings and by the disagreement of modern interpretations, is: What sort of truth did Plato attribute to poetry, and what is its relation to philosophy? Did Plato really intend to exclude the poets from his polity?

[1] J. A. Stewart, *The Myths of Plato*, Oxford, 1905; his reply to a review of this work by J. Burnet, in *Mind*, xxxi (1906), pp. 519 ff.; and *Plato's Doctrine of Ideas*, Oxford, 1909, especially Part II, *The Doctrine of Ideas as Expressing Aesthetic Experience.*

[2] *Plato's Doctrine of Ideas*, p. 130. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 173.

[4] J. Burnet, review of *The Myths of Plato* in *Mind*, xxxi (1906), pp. 94 ff.

[5] A. E. Taylor, review of *Plato's Doctrine of Ideas*, in *Mind*, xxv (1910), pp. 83 ff.

[6] *Plato's Doctrine of Ideas*, p. 171.

If modern discussions were not warrant enough for this investigation, we have still the invitation of Plato himself, extended immediately after what reads like a complete expulsion of the poets, "we should give the champions of poetry, though not themselves poets but lovers of poetry, an opportunity to speak in prose in her behalf, to show that she is not only pleasant but useful for states and for human life. And we shall listen in a friendly manner; for we are likely to profit if she proves to be not only pleasant but useful."[1] For a study in Plato one could ask for no better *imprimatur* than the authority of the philosopher himself.

It is chiefly in Plato's own works, then, that we must look for the answer to the challenge. And if we examine them carefully, perhaps we shall discover that the explanation of Plato's apparent inconsistencies is not the hopeless task that some writers have thought it to be. When one remembers how far divergent are the views of the most eminent scholars on this point, it seems pertinent to ask why such differences of opinion with regard to the same author are possible. A great deal of the current misunderstanding of Plato's views about poetry is due to an examination of only parts of his writings and to an attempt to fit these into a formula which is assumed to represent the Platonic philosophy. Those who consider chiefly the *Republic* carry away only the impression that he banished the poets and denied poetry all access to truth; whereas those who think chiefly of the *Phaedrus* often remember only the apotheosis of poetic madness, and suppose that Plato intended to dethrone the reason. It is therefore, of the greatest importance to consider every piece of evidence, even when it is imbedded in logical discussions. Above all, it is important not to regard each passage as an isolated *dictum*, but to consider it in its relation to the context, and in relation to Plato's historical and philosophical *milieu*. Though such a precaution would doubtless be necessary in the case of most philosophers, it is supremely necessary in the case of Plato; for Plato, more than any other philosopher, adapts his procedure to the circumstances. It is a commonplace that we must never forget that his dialogues are dramatic; but we often forget what that implies. We must remember that Plato's own thoughts are actors in the drama, and make their exits and their entrances in ac-

[1] *Rep.* 607 d.

cordance with the plot, sometimes, as it were, in the spirit of the mime. The phase of any subject that shall be presented on any particular occasion is therefore determined by the particular interest of the occasion; another occasion may suggest that a contrasting phase be introduced. Many remarks about poetry and inspiration and imitation are no more intended to be regarded as Plato's ultimate views than are the ironical and dialectic *obiter dicta* and *excursus* of his logical discussions. Sextus Empiricus, no doubt a prejudiced witness, tells us:[1] "Some said that Plato was a dogmatist, others that he was a doubter, still others that he was at times a dogmatist, at times a doubter." It transpires nevertheless that in almost every case where Plato discusses poetry he seems to play the *rôle* of doubter. A dilemma confronts him, and he solves as best he can the particular problem, never imagining that he has disposed of the whole question. The examination of the occasion and of the context ought to help us in determining how Plato came to make each remark, and how far it goes to show that all his remarks together imply a definite belief in the value of poetry.[2]

At the outset we must ask what evidence is fairly to be admitted in our investigation. One would suppose, to be sure, that the natural recourse for light on the views of Plato would be to the dialogues of Plato. But although we have always realized that Plato is a dramatic artist and that we must be on our guard against imagining him to speak at all times *in propria persona*, we have lately been told by Taylor[3] and by Burnet[4] that much that we had been prone to regard as dramatic is in truth historical, and is to be regarded as giving an account not of Plato's thought but of that of Socrates, who thus becomes a Pythagorean and Orphic philosopher, the head of a cult, and the champion of a well-developed doctrine of ideas. If this is true, our evidence for the views of Plato is much decreased. Yet the grounds on which this evidence is denied us are slender.[5] Unconvinced by

[1] *Hypotyposes*, i, 221.

[2] Cf. P. Shorey, *The Unity of Plato's Thought*, Chicago, 1903, pp. 1–8.

[3] A. E. Taylor, *Varia Socratica*, Parker, Oxford, 1911.

[4] J. Burnet, edition of *Phaedo*, Oxford, 1911; *Greek Philosophy: Thales to Plato*, London, 1914.

[5] In view of the host of arguments that have met the challenge of Taylor and Burnet, I need do no more than emphasize them, adding a few of my own. (See

them, I shall proceed in this study on the hypothesis that Plato's great interest was not in the history of philosophy but in philosophy.

in particular: G. C. Field, *Socrates and Plato*, Parker, Oxford, 1913; A. C. Pearson, review of Burnet's *Thales to Plato*, in *Class. Rev.* xxix (1915), pp. 141 ff.; W. A. Heidel, review of the same in *Philosophical Review*, xxiv (1915), p. 314; A. S. Ferguson, *The Impiety of Socrates*, in *Class. Quart.* vii (1913), pp. 157 ff.; P. Shorey, review of *Varia Socratica*, in *Class. Phil.*, vi (1911), pp. 361 ff.; his rejoinder to Taylor, *ibid.*, vii (1912), pp. 89 ff.; and his review of Burnet's *Phaedo*, viii (1913), pp. 233 ff.)

(1) It is not clear that Xenophon, the author of the *Anabasis* and of the *Hellenica*, was incapable of writing serious history, or that his picture of Socrates is essentially false. He expressly denies that Socrates was interested in mathematics and science; he is silent with regard to any " inner circle " of Pythagoreans and with regard to the theory of ideas. If Xenophon was trying to refute charges of impiety based on notorious facts, his silence is a strange sort of refutation.

(2) Aristotle doubtless derived most of his information about Socrates from Plato; but he need by no means have learned all that he knew from Plato's writings; in fact, he frequently distinguishes between the historical Socrates and the dramatic character Socrates in the dialogues. The passages in which Aristotle most explicitly tells of the genesis of the theory of ideas (*Met.* 1. 987 a 32–b 10; 13. 1078 b 9; cf. also 13. 1086 a 32) make it clear beyond all possibility of doubt that Aristotle sharply distinguished between Socrates, who was responsible for universals and definitions, and Plato, who was the author of the doctrine of ideas.

(3) The so-called Pythagorean comrades of Socrates were only in a limited sense Pythagoreans; and it is at least as significant that these young men (cf. *Phaedo*, 89 a 3) were Socratics. So it is fair, I think, to hold against Burnet (*Early Greek Philosophy*[2], p. 355) that when " we " discuss a familiar theory of ideas (*Phaedo*, 76 d 8; 75 d 2; and *passim*), " we " means not an older philosophical school but simply " you and I," the speakers in the dialogue.

(4) In adducing Plato's dialogues as evidence, we must distinguish between the one dialogue in which a certain degree of historical exactness was to be expected and the other Socratic discourses which were, according to Aristotle (*Poetics*, 1447 b 4) a form of poetic imitation. In the *Apology*, Plato could hardly make any actual misrepresentation; in it not only is there no reference to Pythagorean or Orphic cults in either accusation or reply, but Socrates declares that his interest is not in the teaching of specific philosophical or scientific tenets but in practical life. He expressly rules out of court one of Taylor's chief witnesses, Aristophanes (18, 19), and explicitly denies the charge of an inner circle of pupils (33). (Burnet, in *The Socratic Doctrine of the Soul*, Oxford, 1916, makes much of the use in the *Apology* of the word ψυχή in a specialized sense. But that the word as used by Socrates did not imply what we mean by an " immortal soul " seems clear, I think, from Xen. *Mem.* 3. 10, 7; 3. 3, 14; 4. 8, 1; 1. 4, 9, 13, 14, 17.) The interest of the other Platonic dialogues varies from the purely ethical to the metaphysical. If

Though he began by considering the topics that interested Socrates, his interests expanded and his doctrine developed far beyond their origin. Taylor and Burnet, on the other hand, are in the present case interested in the history of philosophy; unfortunately their very interest has prevented them from applying a proper canon to the historical evidence involved.

I

When Plato declared in the *Republic*[1] that there was an ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry, he was stating no more than the truth. He did not invent the quarrel; he found it already old, and he was so much impressed by its importance that he undertook to solve it. We are too often inclined to remember only that Plato used the phrase " ancient quarrel " in the *Republic*, and to neglect both the long development of thought that preceded his treatment of the problem and the survivals of older creeds that were potent even in his day. In order to understand Plato's discussion, we must trace rapidly the history of the quarrel *ab ovo*. And that means that we must realize as vividly as possible the conflict between emotion and reason, between the immediate intuition and the progressive discovery of truth that

Socrates really had a theory of ideas at the centre of his philosophy, it is curious that Plato should have expounded this philosophy in some ten dialogues, according to the ordinary arrangement of the works, before he mentioned it at all. It is certainly more natural to explain the silence of the dialogues before the *Phaedo* as indicating that Plato did not regard the doctrine as Socratic, and that he resorted to it after some years of speculation, influenced not only by the interests of Socrates but by those of the Ionian scientists and of the Pythagoreans. Because his interest came primarily from Socrates, however, he continued to express his opinions through the mouth of his master. Similarly, we are not surprised to find in the dialogues earlier thinkers — as Parmenides — discussing doctrines that they could not have known, or the " Pythagorean " Cebes defending a distinctly Heracleitean view (*Phaedo*, 8. e ff.). We notice that although the theory of ideas is mentioned as familiar (*Phaedo*, 76 d) it is nowhere in the dialogues explained in detail. It is natural to suppose that the introduction of the theory in this way is a mere literary device, and that Plato reserved a more exhaustive account of it for his oral discourses in the Academy; we know from Simplicius that several of his pupils published their notes on his lecture on the Good. And it is by no means necessary to hold that Plato's own conception of his doctrine was ever entirely definite and capable of complete demonstration; it was a living thing, rather than a formula.

[1] *Rep.* 607 b.

was a part of Greek life and thought. For in Greece, as in all countries, men found that their lives were controlled by two forces; the power of instinct and the love of reason. Man acts before he knows why he acts; so it is not surprising that the earliest records of Greek civilization must be sought not in science or in history, but in religion and poetry. In these activities the early Greeks expressed their conceptions of their relation to the world about them and of the way that they must act toward it. When they asked what might be the source of their ideas, they could not do otherwise than reply that the gods had inspired them.

The Greeks generally held that this immediate approach to truth was a gift of the gods. Dreams, for example, were a vision of the truth, though there were false dreams as well as true,[1] and Prometheus taught men to distinguish the true from the false.[2] Pindar says that the soul alone "is from the gods; it sleeps while the limbs of the body are active, but when they sleep it gives in dreams clear knowledge of future joys and troubles."[3] Socrates is said to have inferred the day of his death from the dream of a woman who quoted Homer;[4] and Plato distinguishes between dreams in which man's lower nature controls and those in which the reason rules; these may attain truth.[5]

Some persons are divinely endowed with a greater gift than ordinary mortals possess. In Homer, prophets like Teiresias, Helenus, and Calchas know the divine will, and expound it to the common people; they interpret dreams and omens and portents. Others act under the inspiration of madness; the *μάντις* is especially *ἔνθεος*. Cassandra is *φρενομανής* and *θεοφόρητος*,[6] since she has the *ὀρθομαντείας πόνος*.[7] Plato gives an account of the common belief of his day about *μαντικὴ ἔνθεος* which is better, as a divine gift, than human *σωφροσύνη*.[8] And he mentions, as examples of divinely-inspired tellers of truth, *ἡ ἐν Δελφοῖς προφῆτις αἱ τ' ἐν Δωδώνῃ ἱέρειαι μανεῖσαι*. The gods spoke through the lips of the prophets at the oracles.

The Olympian religion was closely related to the established order of the state; it could be invoked in the interest of conventional morality

[1] *Od.* 19, 562.
[2] Aesch. *Prom.* 485.
[3] Pind. *Frag.* 96 (108) ed. Christ. Cf. Aesch. *Eum.* 104.
[4] *Crito*, 44 b.
[5] *Rep.* 571 c.
[6] Aesch. *Ag.* 1140.
[7] *Ibid.*, 1215.
[8] *Phaedrus*, 244 b.

and of constituted polities. To question the right of kings would have been an offence not only against law but against religion. For the individual, accordingly, the old religion had little significance; it could not solace him in distress or give him hope of a happier life in the hereafter. In the political revolutions of the sixth century, it is not surprising that the tyrants founded their claims on other grounds, and were inclined to favor newly-discovered forms of religion that promised greater contentment to the common people whose champions they professed to be. And these new forms of religion offered immediate revelations of divine things not only to privileged persons but to ordinary men, satisfying their desire for a more abundant life, a life of greater hope and significance than their daily round. So arose the ritual of the Eleusinian mysteries, so too the intoxication of Bacchus and the ecstasy of his worshippers. His religion was purified, the Greeks supposed, by Orpheus.[1] The principle of Orphic worship is that its initiates may attain divine life; they become ὅσιοι.[2] In order to secure this end, the initiates lived a sober life, and engaged in various symbolic rites that survived from the more savage Dionysiac ritual. In later years these observances were carried to absurd lengths, and became the object of ridicule.[3]

Both the Eleusinian mysteries and the Orphic religion encouraged their adherents to believe that through initiation and their presence at certain rites they could win blessedness.[4] Yet the act of initiation or of participating in the rites was not an intellectual act; according to the testimony of Aristotle, " the initiated do not learn anything so much as feel certain emotions and are put into a certain frame of mind." [5] And all that we know of the ritual suggests that it consisted of the enactment of a simple drama and of spoken formulae.[6] Of the mysteries, the central part was the ἐποπτεία, which meant either the revelation to sight of symbols or the beholding of a play that represented the union of the human and the divine. In the Orphic ritual carried on at the oracle of Trophonius near Delphi, there was a vision

[1] Diod. Sic. 3, 65. [2] Cf. Eur. *Cret.*, Frag. 475: Βάκχος ἐκλήθην ὁσιωθείς.

[3] Cf. Theseus in Eur. *Hipp.* 952; Theophrastus, *Char.* 28; Plato, *Rep.* 364 b.

[4] Soph. *Frag.* 753 (Nauck²); Pind. *Frag.* 102 (114) ed. Christ.

[5] Synesius, *Dion*, p. 47 d (Migne, *Patrologia Graeca*, lxvi, p. 1134).

[6] Galen, *De Usu Part.* 7, 14 § 469: " the things done and the things spoken "; cf. Paus. 2. 37, 3 f.; 3. 22, 2.

of τὰ μέλλοντα;[1] the initiate drank of the springs of Λήθη and of Μνημοσύνη; and the Orphic sometimes had inscribed on his tomb the formula εὐνοίας καὶ μνήμης χάριν, in the hope that he might remember his vision of the divine.[2] Other Orphic inscriptions testify of the performance of ritual acts by which the initiate conceives that he has achieved purity and a sort of divinity.[3]

Not different from the early Greek view of religion was the view of poetry. As the gods sent dreams and inspired prophets, so they inspired bards. So in Homer the blind bard Demodocus was "beloved by the Muse" who gave him the gift of song; and is "impelled by a god."[4] Phemius, we find, was "self-taught but god-inspired."[5] Homer himself appeals for knowledge of his story to the θεά or to the Μοῦσα.[6] And the Muses are the daughters of Memory.[7] Democritus held that "all that a poet writes under the influence of enthusiasm and of holy inspiration is exceedingly beautiful";[8] he "denies that any one can be a great poet unless he is mad."[9] Plato, whether seriously or ironically, was giving only the current notion of the poet when he referred to Homer as divine.[10] Through the poets, then, the gods speak, and in poetry the people seek for truth.

At Athens, the poems of Homer were familiar in the sixth century; by the fifth century, Homer had become the "educator of Hellas."[11] In fact we have in the *Protagoras* of Plato, in the course of an argument intended to show that virtue can be taught, a picture of the Athenian boy's education in virtue; a large part of it consists of the study of the poets.[12] This description, we notice, comes from the famous sophist who was the arch-champion of humanism in the conflict that was beginning between humanism and science.

[1] Paus. 9. 39, 5–14.

[2] Cf. J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*², p. 583.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 572 ff.

[4] *Od.* 8. 63, 73.

[5] *Od.* 22. 347.

[6] *Il.* 1. 1; *Od.* 1. 1.

[7] Hes. *Theog.* 54, 915.

[8] Clem. Al. *Strom.* 6. 18, 168.

[9] Cic. *De Div.* 1. 80; cf. Hor. *A. P.* 295 ff.

[10] Plato, *Ion*, 530 b; cf. Pind. *Isth.* 3. 55 ff.

[11] *Rep.* 606 e.

[12] *Protag.* 325 e–326 e; cf. also *Laws*, 810 e. Niceratus was forced by his father to know all Homer by heart (Xen. *Symp.* 3). Even Aristophanes proclaims that the comic poet educates as well as amuses. Cf. Butcher, *Aristotle's Theory of Fine Art*², p. 218; C. L. Brownson, *Reasons for Plato's Hostility to the Poets*, *T. A. P. A.*, xxviii, pp. 18 ff.

For Homer was not universally praised. Xenophanes, the first to rebel against anthropomorphic religion, declared, "Homer and Hesiod have imputed to the gods all that is blame and shame for men."[1] Heracleitus exclaimed, "Homer and Archilochus deserved a sound thrashing," because they held that happiness is dependent on the will of Heaven.[2] And Pythagoras was said to have seen in the lower world the soul of Homer hanging from a tree, encircled by serpents, for his words about the gods.[3] The poets were apt to retaliate against these rebels; the philosophers who reduced the universe to a mechanism resembled barking dogs.[4] And in reply to those critics who were shocked by the obvious moral inferiority of the Homeric gods, judged by the standards of their own day, the students of Homer had attempted to interpret the poet by finding in him allegorical meanings.[5] Theagenes of Rhegium suggested a double interpretation: the names of the gods expressed either the mental faculties of man or the elements of nature. Antisthenes was a commentator on Homer;[6] the poet *τὰ μὲν δόξῃ τὰ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ εἴρηται*, he held. He, too, interpreted the poet allegorically, denying that Eros was a god, and calling him mere *κακία φύσεως*.[7]

But the "ancient quarrel" between philosophy and poetry lay still deeper. It was not enough for the humanists to apologize for Homer's lapses in morality, to allegorize his gods, or to turn their backs on science as a profitless and confusing pursuit, and to expound trivial matters in the poets[8] or to discuss the characters of Homer, as did Gorgias[9] and Hippias.[10] For science and philosophy were raising more profound questions. Men were asking about the nature of reality and the meaning of knowledge. What could men know?

The earliest Greek thinkers, to be sure, had not put the question in this form. They had not realized that the relation of man to nature involves man as much as it involves nature. But the very one-sidedness of their views had brought to light the need for the larger question. Plato suggests that the contradictions brought to us by the evidence of our senses are the source of our inquiry into the nature of being. For

[1] Sext. Emp. *Math.* 9. 193.
[2] Diog. Laert. 9. 1.
[3] *Ibid.*, 8. 21.
[4] *Laws*, 967 c; cf. *Rep.* 607 b.
[5] *ὑπόνοια*, *Rep.* 378 d.
[6] Dio Chrys. *Orat.* 53. p. 164, ed. Dindorf.
[7] Clem. Al. *Strom.* 2. 20, 107.
[8] *Protag.* 338 e ff.
[9] Arist. *Rhet.* 3. 17.
[10] Plato, *Hipp. Min.* 365 b.

example, ἅμα γὰρ ταὐτὸν ὡς ἓν τε ὁρῶμεν καὶ ὡς ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος.[1] The Milesian physicists, impressed by the manifoldness of natural phenomena, had tried to discover a single essence which should explain everything. Water, the boundless, air — these were their names for the primal unity in diversity. The Pythagoreans fixed upon number as the counterpart of reality, and therefore as their chief study. Heracleitus, scornful of the opinions of the mob and of the poets, declared "Wisdom is one thing. It is to know the thought by which all things are steered through all things."[2] This "thought" or law,[3] he holds, is the unity of the many conflicting things that we perceive, and the plurality of the one. Plato says that Heracleitus remarked that it was safest to say that reality is both many and one and is kept together by Hate and Love.[4] Burnet has pointed out[5] that the discovery of Heracleitus can not be called a logical principle. Logic, it is true, did not exist as a specialized branch of study; but Heracleitus was trying with the best logical instruments at his command to state a paradox that has always existed and that will always exist. Later thinkers did, indeed, use the doctrine of Heracleitus as the basis for a logical theory; since the only permanent thing was change, the only knowledge must be relative.

The Eleatics, in their several ways, demonstrated the unity of nature.[6] Aristotle tells us that Parmenides believed only in a sensible reality;[7] this sensible universe is one; it can not change, or it will become what it is not — which is absurd. In order to account for change, it is necessary either to deny that reality is one or to deny that it is merely sensible. Empedocles therefore, supposed there were a number of physical elements, two of which, Love and Strife, caused change. He made no distinction between thought and perception.[8] Anaxagoras conceived of an infinite number of elements, whose motion was caused by νοῦς, which, however, is nothing more than a material substance. Leucippus dispensed with any imputation of a rational principle. But it was not hard for Zeno to attack such positions; his book "argues against those who uphold a Many, and gives

[1] Cf. *Rep.* 523 a–525 a.
[2] H. Diels, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, Heracl. *Frag.* 41.
[3] *Ibid.*, 114.
[4] Plato, *Soph.* 242 d.
[5] J. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*[2], pp. 159 f.
[6] Arist. *Met.* 1. 986 b 10.
[7] *De Caelo*, 3. 1, 298 b 21.
[8] *De An.* 3. 3, 427 a 21.

back as good and better than they gave; its aim is to show that their assumption of multiplicity will be involved in still more absurdities than the assumption of unity, if it is sufficiently worked out." [1]

Confused by such contradictions, the teachers of Greece naturally supposed that science must be incapable of discovering an absolute truth. They therefore abandoned inquiry into the unity of the world of sense, and sought for principles of human conduct. Yet in the world of human affairs they found no less confusion; opinions and customs vary. From this Protagoras concluded that what appears to each man is for him true. Though he probably did not himself hold that knowledge consists entirely of sensations, Plato intimates in the *Theaetetus* [2] that the doctrine was held in his own time, and that he regarded it as sprung from the doctrine of Protagoras, which in turn was the offspring of the flux of Heracleitus. What Protagoras really was interested in maintaining was doubtless not the fluidity of the outer world, but the positiveness of the perceptions. The result was however, the same; there can be no absolutely true statements which are true for all persons, and judgments about particular things are all that we can make. This doctrine certainly was held by Aristippus. Gorgias maintained by means of Eleatic dialectic that there is no truth at all.

Such was the world in which Socrates began to teach. The poets and their interpreters still claimed a divine inspiration as the warrant for the truth of their works. Ordinary men believed, if not in all the mythology of the old Olympic religion, at least in a world of supernatural powers that spoke to men through dreams and oracles, and that could even be approached by means of rites which made men blessed. Eternal things could be seen, things that satisfied men's craving for perfection and for union with a world larger than themselves. Concerning the physical world, to be sure, the wisest men differed, and their opinions involved them in absurd contradictions. In matters of conduct, however, it was possible to learn enough to be a good artisan, a good soldier, a good citizen; and there were clever foreigners to teach them how to speak well in the courts and to explain the old literature to them. In human affairs all was relative; but even

[1] Plato, *Parm.* 128 d.

[2] *Theaet.* 152 a ff.

what was accepted as ordained by convention was often valuable in practice; those who did not choose to obey it were deterred by no dictate of an absolute right or wrong. For every man, his own perception was the most positive thing that existed.

The work that Socrates set before himself was to find in this world of flux and confusion certain permanent principles. It is customary to emphasize the skepticism of Socrates, the man who knew only that he knew nothing. We ought long ago to have been put on our guard against these rational doubters. Descartes built a colossal system on a smaller foundation. It is not likely that Socrates would have undergone poverty, ridicule, and death simply to convince Athens of his ignorance.[1] It is clear that Socrates distinguished between the subjects in which sure knowledge can not be found and those in which we can know something. He had nothing but ridicule for those contemporaries who speculated about the physical universe and its laws; they were not only ignorant of human affairs, but were vainly trying to learn what man can never learn. Speculation about it led to the most inconsistent explanations, and in the end had no practical application.[2] He himself, however, discoursed on human affairs, trying to define τὸ εὐσεβές, τὸ ἀσεβές, τὸ καλόν, τὸ αἰσχρόν, and other concepts of the same type.[3] And in the definition of these qualities, he was always using an inductive method and citing analogies drawn from those practical arts where, for ordinary purposes, no one could doubt that something fixed could be found. For him the type of all knowledge was that possessed by the artisan, who knows how to apply special knowledge to appropriate ends. Indeed, his ideal of knowledge is not really that of science but that of art; and this conception tinges not only his ethical notions but even his idea of creation as teleological. For example, his interpretation of "γνῶθι σεαυτόν" might almost be paraphrased as: "know what you can do for the service of mankind."[4] He was in fact always trying to find the peculiar capabilities of his associates for special purposes;[5] hence the virtues are different kinds of knowledge. And his whole account of the physical universe is directed

[1] Cf. Burnet, *The Socratic Doctrine of the Soul*, pp. 7–11; A. W. Benn, *The Greek Philosophers*[2], pp. 104–106.

[2] Xen. *Mem.* 1. 1, 11–15.

[3] *Ibid.*, 1. 1, 16.

[4] *Ibid.*, 4. 2, 24 ff.

[5] *Ibid.*, 4. 7, 1; and *passim*.

toward showing that it was designed for the satisfaction of man's needs.[1]

So far Socrates answered the doubters of his own time. It is possible, he asserted, by looking into the mind of man to find and by rational discourse to fix principles of conduct. Yet there is another side of his creed. Xenophon tells us that Socrates advised a resort to divination in those affairs whose termination was doubtful, but not in those in which the result was a necessary consequence of certain acts;[2] it was in accordance with this view that Socrates would depend at times not on the exercise of reason but on a god-given voice, that δαιμόνιόν τι whose promptings were never reducible to the form of connected reasoning. It was for this reason, too, that he observed the νόμος πόλεως in matters of religion, and obeyed divine injunctions.[3]

In like manner, Socrates quoted the poets often, as popular conveyers of knowledge.[4] Yet he finds that because they can not account for their wisdom they are ignorant,[5] unlike the artisans, who have learned how to make things adapted to special uses. Art, then, is a technical matter; and things are not absolutely beautiful, but are good or beautiful only with regard to purposes for which they are adapted.[6] He takes it for granted that sculpture is an imitation of visible objects, yet holds that it should be more than literal imitation; it should try to imitate expression and emotions.[7] If there is any historical element in the *Phaedo*, it must be in the opening passage; and there Socrates is represented as debating how to express in a myth the abstract idea of the relation of pleasure and pain.[8]

Throughout all his restless life, a life that combined the ardor of the prophet with the common-sense of the man of affairs, Socrates maintained these two aspects. To him, a life that did not examine rationally the ethical concepts that guided it was no life at all; on the other hand, he did not give up a faith in powers and motives that transcend reason.

[1] Xen. *Mem.*, 4. 3, 3–14; cf. 1. 4.
[2] *Ibid.*, 1. 1, 6–9.
[3] *Ibid.*, 1. 3, 1–4.
[4] *Ibid.*, 1. 2, 3, 56, 57; 2. 1, 25; 3. 2, 1, 2; Plato, *Apology*, 28.
[5] *Apology*, 22.
[6] Xen. *Mem.* 3. 8; cf. 4. 6, 8, 9.
[7] *Ibid.*, 3. 10, 1–7.
[8] That Socrates did at times resort to fables we know from Xen. *Mem.* 2. 7, 13, 14.

II

That Plato, the happy son of a happy age, grew up under the influence of poetry, seems certain. As a member of an aristocratic family in comfortable circumstances, he must have had the traditional education in Homer and the other poets whom he so frequently quotes, even to the end of his life, with signs of respect. We can detect in the words which he puts into the mouth of Socrates [1] the affection which he felt for Homer even when he was preparing to express the most severe censure on the whole tribe of poets: "And yet a certain friendship and a respect that I have felt from boyhood keeps me from speaking about Homer; for of all these fair tragic poets he seems to be the first teacher and leader." We need not believe implicitly the tradition that he wrote a great deal of poetry in his youth, but burned it when he came to know Socrates; nor are we obliged to hold that the poems which have come down to us under his name are genuine, or again to trust the story that later in his life he used to sleep with a copy of the mimes of Sophron under his pillow. For even without these pleasant tales, we can readily perceive in his own writings an instinct for beauty that is akin to poetry, and that occasionally kindles his discourse with a divine flame. Yet his great master had discovered that the poets understand nothing of what they say; their poems are the result not of *σοφία* but of *φύσις τις*; they write *ἐνθουσιάζοντες ὥσπερ οἱ θεομάντεις καὶ οἱ χρησμῳδοί*.[2]

So Plato himself, in his first [3] consideration of poetry, takes up just this problem: how much do the poets know, and what is the source of their knowledge? One who reads the *Ion* might almost imagine himself to be present at one of those conversations with the poets that are mentioned in the *Apology*. The conceited rhapsode Ion, who professes a superlative ability to expound Homer, is unable to account for his

[1] *Rep.* 595 b. [2] *Apology*, 22 a–c.

[3] In this study it seems unnecessary to discuss the chronology of Plato's dialogues; I shall assume them to have been written in the order in which they are placed by Lutoslawski (*The Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic*, London, 1897). It will be seen that I am far from accepting all the methods and results of Lutoslawski; but his arrangement of the dialogues is of service to all students of Plato, whether they acknowledge the fact or not.

inability to rhapsodize except in the case of Homer.[1] Socrates suggests that it is not by virtue of any τέχνη that *Ion* can discourse about Homer, but that a θεία δύναμις moves him, like a magnet.[2] The Muse communicates her inspiration from one inspired person to another. So the poets: "For all good poets compose their beautiful poems not by art but by inspiration and in a state of possession; and good composers of songs are not in their senses when they write their beautiful songs, but are just like Corybantes who are not in their senses when they dance. . . . For a poet is a light and winged and holy creature, and can not make poetry until he is inspired and is out of his senses and his reason is no longer in him; and until this comes to pass, no man can make poems or give forth oracles. For it is not by art that they make their many beautiful poems and speeches about things, . . . but by a divine dispensation each man can make a beautiful poem only about the single matter to which the Muse inspires him; . . . about all else he is incapable. . . . And this is the reason why the god chooses their minds and uses as his servants the deliverers of oracles and the divine soothsayers, that we who hear them may know that it is not they who speak who are of much account, since they have no reason, but that it is the god himself who speaks and addresses us through them."[3] This explanation is enthusiastically accepted by Ion. Socrates proceeds, however, to show that in all the special fields of action treated by the poet, the specialist is better informed than the poet and than the rhapsode who derives his inspiration from the poet.[4] Ion must therefore admit either that he is a deceiver or that his pretensions are founded on inspiration; he prefers to be regarded as inspired.

I have quoted extensive passages of this dialogue because they exhibit the traditional view of poetic inspiration[5] which Plato was coming to weigh. Some suppose that Plato is here seriously upholding this view; others contend that the dialogue was written expressly to ridicule it and to discard it. Neither interpretation, I think, is right. Plato here is weighing the common Greek notion that attributes the inspiration of the poet to an external influence. Just as the Greeks tended to find a myth in order to account for whatever they happened

[1] *Ion*, 530–533 c.
[2] *Ibid.*, 533d.
[3] *Ibid.*, 533 e–534 b.
[4] *Ibid.*, 536 e–541 e.
[5] As expressed, for example, by Democritus; cf. p. 9.

to believe, and to find ancestors for everything,[1] in the same way, recognizing that poetry is obviously a different thing from a man's ordinary expression, they assumed that some one else must have suggested it to him — a Muse or a god. So the poet was not his normal self; he was ἔνθεος, or the victim of ἔκστασις. Plato does not in the *Ion* discard this notion. He does, indeed, indicate the futility of appeals to inspiration for special knowledge in the ordinary affairs of life, in medicine and in chariot-driving, for example. Like the Socrates whom Xenophon knew, he distinguishes between things that are a matter of learning and left to human understanding and things that are not a matter of τέχνη. That is a distinction that Plato himself almost always preserved,[2] though he enormously increased the province of human understanding. And the irony that undoubtedly exists in the *Ion* is not that Socrates is supposed to deny the bewildered *Ion* all knowledge, but that *Ion* does not realize the meaning of knowledge. Plato at all periods of his life attributes inspiration to the poets in utter seriousness,[3] as giving forth wisdom in a way that can not be reduced to a τέχνη. What kind of wisdom this is, Plato had yet to consider. We must remember that at the time this dialogue was written, although the germ of the doctrine of ideas may well have been in Plato's mind, the doctrine itself had not yet been broached; the inspiration of the poet is therefore contrasted not with the knowledge afforded by science or by dialectic but with the purely practical kind of knowledge required in ordinary life — in other words, with the ideal of knowledge that Socrates had sought, typified by the arts. If we had to recast the conclusion of the *Ion* in modern language, it would be something like this: The poet's work is not produced in the same rational way that other things are produced; it is the result of his having a peculiar power, greater at some times than at others, of giving utterance to thoughts that are in some way more precious than those of ordinary life. Naturally Plato does not imply that all who pretend to be poets are thus inspired, even though otherwise bad poets may have occasional flashes of inspiration. And the irony of the dialogue lies in the fact that the fatuous assumption of the rhapsode

[1] Cf. Benn, *The Greek Philosophers*[2], pp. 47–52.

[2] Not in every case, however; see pp. 52 f.

[3] Cf. *Phaedrus*, 245 a; *Laws*, 682 a.

that he, too, shares in the inspiration of Homer, is apparently accepted by Socrates.

In the *Meno* we begin to see the emergence of a new standard of truth. "Can virtue be taught?" is the question. Only that can be taught, the argument proceeds, which can be known. Yet it appears that a man can not seek either for that which he knows or for that of which he is ignorant.[1] As a solution of this dilemma, Socrates proposes the previous existence of the soul, which he accepts from the priests and from Pindar and many other poets. "The soul, then, being immortal and having many times come to birth, and having beheld the things of a former life and of Hades and all matters, there is nothing which it has not learned; so it is not strange that it can recollect what it knew before about virtue and about other matters. . . . For in truth investigation and learning are altogether the same as recollection."[2] This doctrine is confirmed by the geometrical reasoning of an untrained boy, who is described as recalling opinions that he previously held.[3] Human affairs, however, are conducted not by science, but by right opinion, which must be distinguished from science because it can not, like science, deduce things rationally from a cause.[4] Hence ἐπιστήμη is more valuable than ὀρθὴ δόξα,[5] though in practice ὀρθὴ δόξα is as effective as ἐπιστήμη.[6] So the statesmen, who act through ὀρθὴ δόξα and not through ἐπιστήμη, are, like the χρησμῳδοί and μάντεις and οἱ ποιητικοὶ ἅπαντες, divinely inspired.[7]

In the *Meno* two points should especially be noted. In the first place, Plato is hinting at a standard of truth that shall be nothing less than absolute. The soul in its previous existence knew everything,[8] and can recover this knowledge by degrees. That is different from the knowledge of practical arts with which the inspiration of the poet and of the rhapsode was contrasted in the *Ion;* for it discovers necessary relationships among things, and it does not depend on inspiration. Of the methods of ἀνάμνησις, Plato does not here say more than that the opinions which a man has always held are aroused by questions;[9] the method was later to be developed further in the *Phaedo.* We must note moreover that inspiration, which in the *Ion* was contrasted with

[1] *Meno*, 80 e.
[2] *Ibid.*, 81 cd.
[3] *Ibid.*, 85 c.
[4] *Ibid.*, 98 a.
[5] *Ibid.*
[6] *Ibid.*, 98 bc.
[7] *Meno*, 99 cd.
[8] *Ibid.*, 81 c.
[9] ἀνερήσεται, *Ibid.*, 85 d.

the knowledge of the practical arts, is here placed in the same category with it. The reason, however, is patent; the inspired ποιητικοὶ ἅπαντες together with the statesmen, are unable to refer their opinions to a cause, and can not therefore be credited with science in the strict sense. But their opinions may be as valuable for practical purposes as if they were causally connected. So ὀρθὴ δόξα may imply a real possession of truth, and is inferior to ἐπιστήμη only because it can not explain the truth. It is not Plato's intention, of course, in this place to laud the practical value of inspiration, which is in theory only a makeshift; on the other hand, it becomes a makeshift only when the theoretically possible grasp of truth by means of ἀνάμνησις is assumed to be not an ideal but an actuality. We shall see that a similar valuation of δόξα occurs in later dialogues.

The *Symposium* is so full of imagery and of poetry that it is a hard and not altogether a gracious task to seek in it a definite formulation of philosophic doctrine. Yet the dialogue, in spite of its exceedingly complex form, throws a new light on our problem. At the home of Agathon, the tragic poet, the guests engage in a series of encomia on love. Although Socrates does not altogether omit, in his own contribution to the discussion, the ideas of his other predecessors, it is particularly the speech of the poet Agathon that is taken up and developed by him. For Agathon in his eulogy of Love has asserted that Love is a poet and the source of poetry in others.[1] "Since the birth of Love, and from the Love of the beautiful, has sprung every good in heaven and earth."[2] Using this rhetorical panegyric, which was "half playful, yet having a certain measure of seriousness," as a sort of text, Socrates proceeds to contribute his share to the discussion. Only he will not, like the others, say only what is good of Love, whether true or false; he will say only what is true. From his predecessors, then, Socrates accepts the conception of Love as a force that permeates all nature; he agrees with Agathon that Love is of the beautiful, and emphasizes, in a bit of dialectic, the point that it is of a beauty not in possession of the lover. And since the good is also beautiful, Love in wanting the beautiful wants also the good.[3]

The discourse of Diotima, which Socrates recounts, may be regarded as giving the views of Plato himself, who wishes to represent Socrates

[1] *Symp.* 196 de. [2] *Ibid.*, 197 b. [3] *Ibid.*, 201.

as too tactful to give utterance on his own authority to views that in a way contradict those of his host. He is also a learner. And what does he learn? Diotima explains to him, in allegory, the paradox of the position of Love between possession and non-possession. In the *Meno*, we saw, a similar paradox was solved by an appeal to the doctrine of *ἀνάμνησις*; the soul recovers what it formerly had.[1] Here the solution is in mythical form; as the child of Plenty and Poverty, Love is neither fair nor foul, and is between divine and mortal, as he is between ignorance and knowledge.[2] Love then, aims at the beautiful, or rather at the everlasting possession of the beautiful and the good.[3] Further, in accordance with its nature, Love desires to procreate, and to bring forth offspring, since only in this way can mortals achieve a sort of immortality. For in a world where all is change, both in body and in soul, it is only reproduction on the one hand and recollection on the other hand that conserve identity; hence the desire for immortality of either kind.[4] Diotima describes the creations of the soul: "wisdom and the other forms of virtue, of which all the poets and those who are called creative are the begetters."[5] And the fairest part of wisdom is that which is concerned with the ordering of states and families. Whoever has the seed of these qualities planted in him in his youth, in maturity seeks the beautiful so that he may beget offspring. His children are fairer than mortal children; and so it is that Homer and Hesiod, that Lycurgus and Solon have achieved immortality.[6]

At this point, though there is not an actual break in the thought, Diotima indicates by her language that we are passing to a new stage in the argument. She adopts the language of the mysteries, and tells Socrates that the mysteries so far described are within his grasp, but that the complete initiation and the sight of the mystic revelation to which they lead are perhaps beyond him. When we remember the ironic assumption by Socrates of the rôle of pupil in this part of the dialogue, we are justified in regarding what follows as exactly the new doctrine that Plato is interested in putting forth, and which he wishes expressly to distinguish from what has gone before and to mark as something not easily to be grasped by the average man. In what has gone before,

[1] *Meno*, 80 c ff.
[2] *Symp.* 204 b.
[3] *Ibid.*, 206 a.
[4] *Ibid.* 207 c ff.
[5] *Ibid.*, 209 a.
[6] *Ibid.*, 209 a–e.

the aspiration for permanence in a life of change has resulted, through the loving embrace of beauty, in the begetting of wisdom and virtue. Of these the types are the productions of the poet and of the legislator. In what follows, we have a glowing forecast of the stages by which the lover *should*[1] proceed. In other words, a programme is being announced. The lover should begin with the love of a single beautiful body, and should thus beget beautiful thoughts; then, perceiving that the beauty in any body is akin to that in other bodies, and that their beauty is one, he should be a lover of all beautiful bodies. Next, he should realize the superiority of the beauty that resides in souls, and should proceed to the contemplation of the beauty that is to be found in practices and in laws, and hence to think little of bodily beauty. He will then approach the sciences and contemplate their beauty, till drawing near to the vast sea of beauty he gazes upon it and begets a host of fair thoughts in his love of wisdom, and at last he beholds a single science, namely, that of beauty. The scholar in love who has reached this point then suddenly catches sight of a wondrous beauty, the goal of all his toils, a beauty that is eternal, absolute, and unchanging. It can not be represented to sense[2] or stated in terms of intellect.[3] It is absolute, and the source of the changing beauties of other things. This is the goal toward which tends the right love of beautiful things, rising as by the steps of a ladder from the love of particular beauties, through fair practices and fair sciences to the science of beauty itself, which ends in the knowledge of the essence of beauty.[4] This life, lived in the contemplation of real beauty, is the noblest ideal that a man could have; and the lover, always desirous of procreation, would at this stage have come into contact with truth, and so would beget not mere images of virtue, but true virtue.

In the *Symposium*, Plato develops further the notion at which he merely hints in the *Meno* — the ideal of a knowledge that is absolute. But whereas in the *Meno* the method was one of simple remembering, in the *Symposium* Plato, influenced no doubt by the image of the

[1] *Symp.* 210 a: *ἐὰν τις ὀρθῶς μετίῃ*; *ibid.*, 210 a: *τὸν ὀρθῶς ἰόντα ἐπὶ τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα.*

[2] *Ibid.*, 211 a: *οὐ δ' αὖ φαντασθήσεται αὐτῷ τὸ καλὸν οἷον πρόσωπόν τι οὐδὲ χεῖρες οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν ὧν σῶμα μετέχει.*

[3] *Ibid.*, *οὐδέ τις λόγος οὐδέ τις ἐπιστήμη.*

[4] *Ibid.*, 211 c.

lover's separation from the beloved, proposes knowledge of the absolute as the goal of love of the beautiful. From this point of view, the discourse must be regarded as the sketch of the end toward which the aesthetic experience logically tends. Particular beautiful things impel us to go beyond the world of sense into the world of thought where beauty itself is contemplated. But inasmuch as this ultimate beauty is neither corporeal nor even capable of representation in terms of intellect, it may be distinguished from the absolute that is finally envisaged by the philosopher who goes through the various steps of dialectic described in the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*. In this case, Plato seems to have been carried away by the enthusiasm of his imagination, in his attempt to assume a goal for the activity which deals with beauty. In later discussions of the dialectic process Plato does not indeed try to describe his absolute, but he makes it clear that he is dealing with a postulate of reason. In a certain sense, therefore, Love may be said to philosophize;[1] but in order to accomplish this end, Love is forced to give up its contact with the things of sense and to seek real beauty by the exercise of the intellect. What he finds is something that would ordinarily hardly be described as beauty at all. The later stages of the lover's ascent are described much as are those of the διαλεκτικός, who proceeds from the perception of particular objects to universal qualities and finally to an absolute. Is the account in the *Symposium*, then, simply an account of dialectic? The answer must be, I think, that it includes dialectic and something more. The lover of beauty aspires not only to know the truth but to embrace it ardently and to beget true virtue. His path, like that of the διαλεκτικός, leads to the summit of the same mountain;[2] the mountain to him, however, is known as beautiful, to the διαλεκτικός it is known as good. That does not mean that we have in the *Symposium* merely a dialectic tinged with emotion, such as we undoubtedly find in the *Republic*. We have rather the purifying of emotion by the intellect. And this conception was the more easily entertained by Plato by reason of the Greek tradition that extended the meaning of καλόν to conduct; it seems to be Plato above all, however, who extended the meaning of the word still farther to include the region of the intellect. Is it then fair to sup-

[1] *Symp.* 203 d: φιλοσοφῶν; *ibid.*, 210 d: ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἀφθόνῳ.

[2] *Symp.* 211 c: ὥσπερ ἐπαναβασμοῖς; *Rep.* 511 ab: οἷον ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὁρμάς.

pose that any other concept would have served Plato's purpose as well as that of beauty ?[1] Could he have begun as easily with justice or equality ? From a logical point of view, no doubt he could, as in fact, in the *Phaedo*, he did. Where Plato seems to make a distinction is in the greater impetus that the love of beauty gives to the lover. Though the perception of similar qualities in any kind of *sensibilia* may arouse a reminiscence of universals,[2] we are told in the *Phaedrus*, as we shall see,[3] that it is especially the sense of beauty which instigates this reminiscence. It is in fact hardly too much to say that it is the love of beauty that first gives Plato the incentive to rise from the world of sense to the world of pure thought, and that he makes the method which is outlined in the *Symposium* his general type of philosophic investigation. It is possibly going too far to find with Lévêque in the preceding growth of Greek art the seeds of the doctrine of ideas.[4] Yet it is true that whenever Plato has occasion to mention a quality and regard it as an *εἶδος*, *τὸ καλόν* is usually the first or one of the first that comes into his mind; in the later dialogues, *τὸ ἀγαθόν* more frequently comes first.[5] Further we note that in the *Symposium* the only concept that is mentioned is the single one of beauty. Now it would of course be absurd to imagine that Plato ever thought he could solve all metaphysical problems by the use of this one concept.[6] Clearly Plato deals in the *Symposium* with the concept that fits his immediate subject; the significant thing is that his consideration of it leads him to sketch for the first time an ideal something like the science of dialectic.

[1] Cf. C. P. Parker, *H. S. C. P.*, xxvii (1916), p. 73.

[2] *Phaedo*, 75 c ff.; see p. 25. [3] *Phaedrus*, 250 d; see p. 60.

[4] Cf. C. Lévêque, *Quid Phidiae Plato Debuerit*, Paris, 1852, p. 60, quoted by Lutoslawski, *The Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic*, p. 235.

[5] *Euthydemus*, 301 a: *κάλλος τι*. The doctrine of ideas has not been distinctly broached before this dialogue; this passage may therefore indicate that Plato used to talk about *τὸ καλόν* before he had a regular theory of ideas. Cf. *Cratylus*, 439 c: *καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν κτλ.*; *Gorgias*, 474 de: *τὰ καλὰ πάντα*; *Phaedo*, 65 d: *δίκαιον, καλόν, ἀγαθόν*; *ibid.*, 77 a: *καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τἆλλα πάντα*; *ibid.*, 100 b: *καλὸν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ μέγα καὶ τἆλλα πάντα*; *Rep.* 507 b: *πολλὰ καλά . . . καὶ πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἕκαστα οὕτως*; *Phaedrus*, 246 de: *καλόν, σοφόν, ἀγαθὸν καὶ πᾶν ὅτι τοιοῦτον*; *Theaetetus*, 157 d: *ἀγαθὸν . . . καλόν*; *Parmenides*, 130 b: *δικαίου καὶ καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ*; *Philebus*, 55 b: *ἀγαθόν . . . καλόν*.

[6] Cf. Shorey, *The Unity of Plato's Thought*, pp. 35 f.

The contribution of the *Symposium* to the solution of our problem, then, is twofold. In the first place, we have a statement of the actual results of the love of beauty, and of the productions of the soul that come to birth thereby; the typical examples of these are the works of the poets and the other creative artists, and of legislators. As in the *Meno*, there is no depreciation of the works of poets, except, of course, as they necessarily rank lower than the productions of the ideal activity that is to follow. Secondly, we have a statement of the end toward which the love of the beautiful ought to lead if carried to its logical extreme. This end is described as no more than a desirable, though never attained, ideal;[1] and it takes us from the perception of particular beautiful objects to the pure concept of beauty. It is really the denial of the principle on which modern languages describe the love of the beautiful by expressions derived from the word *αἴσθησις*. It ends, we notice, with the statement that he who is in contact with reality will bring forth true virtue. That means that truth can be begotten by the ecstatic vision of the lover of beauty. The truth so begotten, of course, would be of a purely intellectual nature.

III

Even more than the *Symposium*, the *Phaedo* affirms a distinction between body and soul, between sense and thought. In the acquisition of wisdom the body is an obstacle; the sight and the hearing can not give truth, still less the other senses.[2] Even the soul is hampered in its search by the body, and can grasp the truth only as it succeeds in getting rid of this disability. Of such a process, the life of the philosopher is the supreme example.[3] He alone has learned the necessity of purification from bodily impediments that must precede all knowledge, and regards the attainment of the several virtues as an initiatory pur-

[1] That this passage describes an experience whose realization can be only approximated appears from the language: *Symp.* 210 a: *ἐάν τις ὀρθῶς μετίῃ . . . τὸν ὀρθῶς ἰόντα ἐπὶ τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα . . . ἐὰν ὀρθῶς ἡγῆται ὁ ἡγούμενος*; *ibid.*, 210 e: *θεώμενος ἐφεξῆς τε καὶ ὀρθῶς τὰ καλά*; *ibid.*, 211 b: *ὅταν δή τις ἀπὸ τῶνδε διὰ τὸ ὀρθῶς παιδεραστεῖν ἐπανιὼν ἐκεῖνο τὸ καλὸν ἄρχηται καθορᾶν, σχεδὸν ἄν τι ἅπτοιτο τοῦ τέλους*; *ibid.*, 211 d: *ἐνταῦθα . . . εἴπερ που ἄλλοθι*; *ibid.*, 211 d: *ὃ ἐὰν ποτε ἴδῃς*; *ibid.*, 211 d: *τί δῆτα . . . εἰ τῷ γένοιτο*; *ibid.*, 212 a: *εἴπερ τῳ ἄλλῳ.*

[2] *Phaedo*, 65 b.

[3] *Ibid.*, 65 c 11.

gation.[1] Hence the philosopher is, of the many wand-bearers at the mysteries, one of the few inspired.[2]

It would seem that the severance between body and soul, between sense and thought, could go no further. But Plato makes reservations. In the proof of the immortality of the soul, as in the definition of virtue in the *Meno*, Plato has recourse to the doctrine of recollection. Knowledge of the abstract ideas may arise by a process of association.[3] For example, the lover may be reminded of his beloved by a lyre or by a garment; to see Simmias may remind one of Cebes; to see a painted horse or lyre may remind one of a man; a picture of Simmias puts one in mind of Cebes or of Simmias himself.[4] This reminiscence arises partly from the perception of similarity, partly from the perception of dissimilarity.[5] Moreover, in addition to the recognition of similarity, we notice whether one thing falls short of another with regard to similarity. Now there is such a thing as abstract equality, not one of a number of particulars. Yet we are put in mind of it by our perception of particulars. On this point Socrates is explicit; it is the senses through which we attain to our rediscovery of the universals.[6]

What is more to our purpose, τὸ καλόν is described as being in exactly the same relation as the other qualities that have been discussed.[7] The demonstration of the immortality of the soul, moreover, rests on the affirmation of these qualities as having a real existence prior to the particular things which we refer to them; and this affirmation is described as familiar.[8] In fact, nothing is to Socrates so clear as the existence of these things.[9] Unlike the particulars, they are immutable and invisible, and can be apprehended only by a process of thought.[10] Accordingly, the universe is divided into two types of existence: the visible and the invisible, of which the former is ever-changing, the

[1] *Phaedo*, 65 c–69 c.
[2] *Ibid.*, 69 c.
[3] *Ibid.*, 73 c.
[4] *Ibid.*, 73 de.
[5] *Ibid.*, 74 a.
[6] *Ibid.*, 75 ab: τόδε ὁμολογοῦμεν, μὴ ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸ [i. e. τὸ ἴσον] ἐννενοηκέναι μηδὲ δυνατὸν εἶναι ἐννοῆσαι ἀλλ' ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἰδεῖν ἢ ἅψασθαι ἢ ἐκ τινος ἄλλης τῶν αἰσθήσεων. ταὐτὸν δὲ πάντα ταῦτα λέγω . . . ἔκ γε τῶν αἰσθήσεων δεῖ ἐννοῆσαι ὅτι πάντα τὰ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἐκείνου τε ὀρέγεται τοῦ ὃ ἔστιν ἴσον, καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐνδεέστερά ἐστιν.
[7] *Ibid.*, 75 c ff.
[8] *Ibid.*, 76 d. I have already explained in what way it seems to me that this statement should be understood, p. 4, n. 5 (4) on p. 5.
[9] *Ibid.*, 77 a.
[10] *Ibid.*, 79 a.

latter changeless. This circumstance is given as the reason for an ascetic life; the senses are to be distrusted,[1] and one should guard against being deceived by the emotions, and especially by the emotions that are excited by the sense of sight, into accepting for true what is really not true; in this condition, above all, the soul is shackled by the body.[2]

Again, in order to investigate the nature of causality, Socrates has recourse to a second resort,[3] that is, to thought,[4] making use of hypotheses.[5] This process brings him back to what he describes as a familiar and often discussed hypothesis, namely, the real existence of certain concepts.[6] Further, how the relation of beautiful things to beauty itself is to be expressed, he is not quite sure; he is sure, however, of the fact that they are beautiful by reason of beauty.[7]

In the *Phaedo*, then, as in the *Symposium*, we find a sharp division between the world of sense and the world of thought. Sure knowledge can be only of the world of thought; it follows, therefore, that in order to attain sure knowledge one should get rid of the dependence on the evidence of the senses as far as possible. Whereas, however, the transition from the senses to thought is in the *Symposium* effected by the discovery of beauty first in sensible forms, then in intellectual forms, in the *Phaedo* it is effected by the discovery of an intelligible principle beyond particulars [8] or inherent in them,[9] which is to be accepted as an hypothesis as certain as anything that is known.[10] We note further that however anxious Plato is to get rid of the dependence on the senses[11] and the emotions,[12] the senses are indispensable as a means of acquiring knowledge of ideas. Of themselves, they can give no truth; yet without them we can not recapture the eternally existing realities that we once knew. Now the doctrine of recollection is only a poetic way of throwing into quasi-historical form a logical principle.

[1] *Phaedo*, 83 a. [2] *Ibid.*, 83 cd.

[3] *Ibid.*, 99 c: δεύτερον πλοῦν. Which, after all, is not worse than the sight of things themselves (*ibid.*, 99 e–100 a).

[4] *Ibid.*, 99 e: εἰς τοὺς λόγους. [6] *Ibid.*, 100 b.

[5] *Ibid.*, 100 a: ὑποθέμενος. [7] *Ibid.*, 100 c–e.

[8] *Phaedo*, 74 a: παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα ἕτερόν τι.

[9] *Ibid.*, 100 c 5: μετέχειν; 100 d 5: παρουσία εἴτε κοινωνία εἴτε ὅπῃ δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσγενομένη.

[10] *Ibid.*, 100 a; 107 b. [11] *Ibid.*, 83 a. [12] *Ibid.*, 83 c.

Just as the Greeks had tended to attribute to a power outside themselves the inspiration that they could not account for within themselves,[1] Plato finds it convenient to suppose that the knowledge of universals which we acquire, though we have previously seemed not to know them,[2] is to be explained by a knowledge of them before this life. The logical truth that is contained in this explanation, however, is not dependent on the explanation; it amounts to what modern philosophers would call the *a priori*[3] possession of forms of thought and perception. Indeed, one is tempted to compare the doctrine of ἀνάμνησις with the doctrine of Kant, in which the universals are forms of cognition, and are not valid except in relation to perception. But Plato would never have admitted that the universals are dependent for their validity on perception; all that he will grant to the senses is that for us they are the means by which we first obtain our acquaintance with universals.

In the *Symposium*, the only universal discussed, as we saw, was that of beauty. In his discussion of the love of beauty, he found that love of beautiful sensible objects leads to love of beauty itself. In the *Phaedo*, the perception not only of beautiful objects but of other objects may lead to the knowledge of their respective universals. Naturally we find that these universals are now not the end of desire, as was appropriate in the *Symposium*, but objects of knowledge. That is because we have here the logical statement, in a general form, of the principle that leads us from sense to thought. We note, however, that just as in the *Symposium* Plato foreshadowed a science of beauty which was to crown all lower forms of experience, in the *Phaedo* again we have the presage of a science[4] which is to deal with the hypothesis of forms, which are to be examined so as to secure the greatest degree of certainty of which man is capable.[5] Each universal is the cause of the particulars to which it is related; and in general, everything is disposed in the way that is best for it.[6]

Since in the *Phaedo* Plato does not discuss directly the matter of poetry proper,[7] we can only reconstruct from it the views that he

[1] Cf. pp. 8 f.; 16 ff. [2] *Meno*, 85 c. [3] Cf. *Phaedo*, 76 de: ὑπάρχουσαν πρότερον.
[4] *Phaedo*, 90 b: ἡ περὶ τοὺς λόγους τέχνη. [5] *Ibid.*, 107 b.
[6] *Ibid.*, 97 c: βέλτιστον; cf. *Symp.* 205 e: ἀγαθόν.
[7] Unless the passage 60 b–61 b is to be regarded as Platonic. I have already

would probably have expressed, and then note in succeeding dialogues how far these views are confirmed. Knowledge of the truth must mean knowledge of universals; to concern oneself only with the world of sense is to shut oneself off from the only region where truth can be found. Therefore the poet who attempts to convey truth simply by the use of sensible images is lending himself to deception. In order to make sure that his poems give some sort of knowledge of truth, he must choose his images in such a way that the reader or hearer shall be reminded by the particulars of the universals. Further, Plato would deprecate any attempt by the poet to appeal so strongly to the emotions that the mind would think only of the sensible images, and forget to pass beyond them to the realities that can be apprehended only by the mind. So much, and perhaps not more than so much, Plato might have said. There is no suggestion yet that poetry as a whole is to be distrusted.[1]

IV

In the previous dialogues we have seen Plato gradually approaching the problem of the nature of truth. In each case he has chosen a single aspect of the problem, because of a special interest. In the *Republic* we find his most extended and his most serious attempts to formulate an answer to the problem; we find in it also several discussions about the value of poetry in its relation to philosophy.

indicated (p. 14) my belief that there is no reason to suppose this passage not to be Socratic. If the passage, however, is Platonic, it supports the view here defended, since Socrates is represented as trying to express in the form of a myth, dealing with sensible material, a universal idea. Moreover, *μουσική* in the popular sense is portrayed as a form of *φιλοσοφία*, the highest *μουσική*.

[1] Lutoslawski suggests, *The Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic* (p. 264), that in the *Phaedo* Plato treats the poets with less respect than in the *Symposium*. He says that they are quoted "with a certain irony" (65 b) or with a "certain air of superiority and contempt" (70 c). But *θρυλοῦσιν* (65 b), the word which Plato here uses of the poets, is exactly the word which he himself uses of the precious doctrine of ideas (76 d). Cf. Plotinus 10. 6 (I, 101, ed. Kirchhoff); *θρυλλούμενον* surely means merely "frequently discussed." Again, the mention of the comic poets (*κωμῳδοποιός* 70c) is a good dramatic touch; it was the comic poets who had just been among the indirect accusers of Socrates, and they had made the very charge that they are here said to make (cf. *Apology*, 18 d; 19 c). But it is impossible to deduce from these references a notion of Plato's attitude. Can we argue a respect for Homer from the use of quotations (94 d–95 a) ?

We have already seen [1] that the claim of Homer to be regarded by the Greeks as their chief educator had been disputed on moral grounds by several early philosophers. Further, a writer of great learning and insight has told us: [2] "The underlying presumption of the whole of Plato's attack upon Greek poetry is that poetry was the universally recognized teacher of Greece. The head and front of his indictment is not that poetry does not teach, but that her doctrines — so Plato at least believed — are too often demoralizing and degrading." These words sum up very aptly a part of Plato's criticism; they err, as I think it will appear, in pretending to explain "the whole of Plato's attack." They describe well and truly the criticism of the second and third books of the *Republic;* the criticism is there based on ethical grounds. They do not account for the criticism of the tenth book, which is based, as it is easy to show, on another view of the nature of truth and of knowledge. Similarly, Stählin argues [3] that the banishment of Homer is apparently founded on the impossibility of finding knowledge in him, but that in reality the reason is his imitation of the immoral, and that the result of the discussion in the tenth book is essentially the same as that in the third book. Again, it will not be hard to show that there is a real difference in the point of view of the two discussions, and that the difference rests on the metaphysical discussion that has intervened.

The first half of the *Republic* deals with the founding of a city not essentially different from the best Greek states.[4] This fact appears in the ordering of many of the social institutions on Spartan models.[5] Indeed many of the regulations that deal with poetry in the second and third books of the *Republic* are like those of Sparta, which kept ancient traditions about music and poetry, permitting only hymns to the gods. Accordingly, the criticism of poetry in the early books of the *Republic* is based partly on the difference between the morality of Homer and that of his own day, partly on his observation of the psy-

[1] P. 10.

[2] J. Adam, *The Religious Teachers of Greece*, p. 10. Adam, of course, realizes that there is more to the problem than this (cf. his note on *Rep.* 598 a); he has here, however, committed himself to a popular half-truth.

[3] Stählin, *Die Stellung der Poesie in der Platonischen Philosophie*, p. 28.

[4] *Rep.* 470 e.

[5] Cf. Jowett, transl. Plato, iii, pp. clxx ff.

chological effect of contemporary drama. It will suffice to illustrate briefly each of these points.

Plato begins his account of the education of the guardians of his state by suggesting the traditional training.[1] This training includes the telling of stories,[2] which may be either true or false. Since these are used at any early age, when children are impressionable, it is important to choose only good fictions. But of the old story tellers of Greece even the greatest, Homer and Hesiod, not only tell lies but tell them badly, (1) in that their stories do not give true pictures of the gods. They describe the gods as committing all sorts of immoral acts of which children ought not to hear. And children are incapable of understanding allegorical interpretations of these stories. At this time Socrates and Adeimantus are not poets, but founders of a state; so they can not say just what poems shall be written, but can merely indicate what forms[3] will be accepted. In the first place, God is always to be represented as he is; that is, as good and as the cause only of good. In the second place, God never changes. Stories of Homer to the contrary are to be condemned. God has no need of any kind of lie; though there is room for an innocent sort of lie, in which the liar is not himself deceived. This serves its purpose in mythology, where we make falsehood as much like truth as we can, since we know little about ancient times.[4] It is justified because it gives a notion of truth even before children are capable of understanding the truth by the use of their reasons;[5] but the use of lies is permitted only to rulers.[6] There is another reason for censuring Homer; (2) his poems tend to make men fear death and the lower world. (3) No less reprehensible are the lamentations of heroes and above all the lamentations and the laughter of the gods. Plato shrinks from accusing Homer of impiety in telling immoral stories about Achilles; (4) yet all stories that impute evil-doing to the gods and that make heroes no better than men are to be done away with, lest they make the young lax in morals.[8] (5) Finally, the poets are not to be allowed to represent wicked men as prospering and just men as wretched.[9]

[1] *Rep.* 376 e. [2] *Ibid.*, 376 e: λόγους; 377 a: μίθους. [3] *Ibid.*, 379 a: τύπους.
[4] *Ibid.*, 382 d: ἀφοιμοιοῦντες τῷ ἀληθεῖ τὸ ψεῦδος ὅτι μάλιστα, οὕτω χρήσιμον ποιοῦμεν; cf. 414 bc ff.
[5] *Ibid.*, 402 a; 424 a; 425 a. [6] *Ibid.*, 389 b. [7] *Ibid.*, 391 a.
[8] *Ibid.*, 392 e. [9] *Ibid.*, 392 b.

So far Plato has discussed the subject matter of poetry.[1] All his criticism of Homer to this point is based on ethical grounds; it is, indeed, a more complete and illustrated version of the criticisms which Xenophanes and Heracleitus had made.[2] It would be true to say that it exemplifies the ancient quarrel between poetry and philosophy, if we limit philosophy in this instance to moral philosophy. But there has not yet been any hint of a criticism of poetry as such; stories and poems even though fictions, are retained, provided that they are purged of immoral elements.

Plato next discusses the forms of poetry.[3] He divides poetry into kinds, according to the extent to which imitation is employed. Thus tragedy and comedy are altogether imitations of action and of speech; dithyrambic is devoid of imitation; epic is in part imitative. The question propounded is whether poets are to be admitted as imitators in general, or whether they shall be allowed to imitate only certain things, and, in that case, what they may imitate, or, finally, whether they shall be debarred altogether from imitation.[4] This may mean only a question whether tragedy and comedy are to be admitted, or the argument may lead us further.[5] As it turns out, the argument in this passage is concerned with the effect of imitative poetry on the minds and characters of the public. Plato begins by asking whether the guardians ought to be imitators; this question, however, he finds, has been settled by the rule already laid down that one man can do only one thing well. If a man is to play a serious part in life, he can not at the same time imitate other parts also. Even when two kinds of imitation seem to be close to each other, the same persons cannot succeed in both; they can not write comedy and tragedy equally well.[6] The

[1] *Rep.* 392 d. [2] Cf. p. 10. [3] *Rep.* 392 d. [4] *Ibid.*, 394 d.

[5] This is not a reference to the discussion of epic in the tenth book, as Jowett and Campbell wrongly hold. (Cf. Adam on 294 d; 595 a.) Here the reference is clearly to the question that immediately follows: shall the guardians be imitators at all (394 e)? Note the word τοίνυν, 394 e 1; this word introduces the λόγος just mentioned, 394 d 8.

[6] But in *Symp.* 223 d Socrates tries to make Agathon and Aristophanes admit that the same man ought to be able to write both tragedy and comedy. We notice that the two poets do not quite follow the argument (οὐ σφόδρα ἑπομένους); as a matter of history, the Greek comic writers did not write tragedy, nor did the Greek tragedians write comedy (in the strict sense). That, perhaps Socrates meant to argue, was because their notions were derived from the world of sense about them,

reason for this lies in human nature;[1] we can not do more than one thing well. And the art which the guardians have adopted is the exclusive art of making freedom for the city; therefore "if they imitate at all, they should imitate only those characters which are suitable to their profession — the courageous, temperate, holy, free, and the like," since "imitations begun in youth and continued into later life grow into habits and are established in the body and voice and mind." The guardians accordingly must not imitate women, or base men, or animals, or natural phenomena; they will, in fact, prefer to imitate the sayings and actions of good men, and will shun those of inferior men. The worse a man is, the more he will be inclined to imitate any and every sort of thing — even all the sounds and voices that are to be heard in the decadent theatre. Plato will admit only the pure imitator of virtue.[2] He grants that the mixed style is pleasant, but it is unsuitable for his state, in which men are not double or manifold, but play only one part.[3] The man who imitates everything in his poems is, therefore, to be treated with all courtesy, but is to be sent out of the city; only the austere and severe poet is to be employed who imitates only the style of the virtuous and submits to the forms that the legislators have prescribed.

In this passage, Plato has announced that he is going to discuss matters of literary form or style. And he begins, to be sure, with an analysis of literature from the point of view of form. In this analysis he makes use of the obvious fact that poetry, like other kinds of art, is imitative; that is, it represents persons and things. In this sense, Plato is making no innovation. Socrates had expressed only the obvious and accepted notion when he said that sculpture is an imitation of visible objects;[4] and it is in this obvious sense that Aristotle declares that epic poetry, and tragedy, and comedy, and dithyrambic, and most flute and lyre playing are, generally, imitations.[5] To Socrates, how-

not from the contemplation of such pure beauty as Diotima had described to him. And such a contemplation would include the understanding of opposites (cf. *Laws*, 816 d). But this sort of argument is not in Plato's mind here; he is thinking here not of the understanding that creates drama, but of the character that drama produces, a character that must be one and not many.

[1] *Rep.* 395 b: ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσις.

[2] *Ibid.*, 397 d: τὸν τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς μιμητὴν ἄκρατον.

[3] Cf. also 387 b.

[4] Xen. *Mem.* 3. 10, 1.

[5] Arist. *Poet.* 1447 a 6.

ever, imitation was not a problem, except so far as technique was concerned: it was Plato who first found that the obvious sense of the term had to be explained and changed.[1] In the present passage, Plato divides literature according to the extent to which direct imitation enters into the various forms; tragedy has a larger amount of direct imitation than epic. At first, then, it seems as if Plato is going to base his decision about the admission of poetry strictly on the question of literary form. That, indeed, is the conclusion to which Adeimantus leaps.[2] But that is just what Socrates will not say; all that he will lay down at this point is that the question must be determined as the argument leads.[3] Now the argument that follows, we must note particularly, is based not on the distinction of literary form, but on the effect produced by poetry on its hearers. The question that immediately follows is whether the guardians ought to be imitators, and, if so, what they ought to imitate. Plato almost seems to suggest that his guardians are actually to become actors on the stage; but that he expressly denies.[4] Yet he proceeds at once to suggest that if they are to imitate at all, they shall imitate only characters that are becoming to their profession. It is clear that his meaning is not that they are to become actors, but that they shall by force of imagination and sympathy enter into the spirit of poetic imitations; they shall imitate, not on the stage, but with their minds and emotions, and as result, in their character.[5] In this sense, the spectator of a play is as much an imitator as the poet or the actor. Now it can not be doubted that Plato is thinking in the present passage especially of the sort of plays that were being exhibited

[1] Aristotle, of course, changed the meaning, too, but in a different way. It will be seen that in this study I make a very sparing use of Aristotle. That is partly because the relation of Aristotle's theory of art to Plato's has been well discussed (C. Belger, *De Aristotele etiam in Arte Poetica Componenda Platonis Discipulo*, Berlin, 1872; G. Finsler, *Platon und die Aristotelische Poetik*, Leipzig, 1900), partly because although, as all writers agree, the germs of most of Aristotle's ideas about art are to be found in Plato, Aristotle's purposes and views are so different that his writings are in this matter a misleading guide to the meaning of Plato.

[2] *Rep.* 394 d: *μαντεύομαι . . . σκοπεῖσθαι σε εἴτε παραδεξόμεθα τραγῳδίαν τε καὶ κωμῳδίαν εἰς τὴν πόλιν, εἴτε καὶ οὔ.*

[3] *Ibid.*, 374 d: *ὅτῃ ἂν ὁ λόγος ὥσπερ πνεῦμα φέρῃ, ταύτῃ ἰτέον.* Cf. p. 31, n. 5.

[4] *Rep.* 395 bc.

[5] On this point, cf. the admirable discussion of R. L. Nettleship, *Lectures on the Republic of Plato*, London, 1910, pp. 99–108.

in his own day, in which strange and debased types of character were shown in morbid or questionable situations, and in which at the same time every device that the stage could devise was being used to make the representation seem lifelike. And the purpose of this drama, as Plato had already pointed out, was not to be of profit to the spectators, but to give them mere pleasure of a low sort, and to flatter the mob.[1] This appeal was all the more dangerous if the poet happened to be a man of talent.[2] Yet Plato does not here attempt to decide on a basis of literary form what kinds of poetry are to be admitted. What he does lay down as a principle is that poets must not be allowed to present realistically all sorts of persons and situations; only those things are to be imitated which would serve as examples for imitation by the citizens.

In this passage, several points should be especially noted. In the first place, although we are led to suppose that the argument is to be one of literary form, it turns out that the argument is really concerned with ethical questions. That is because Plato begins by defining the types of literature according to their use of imitation, but then asks, not which is the best type, but quite a different question. He asks what sort of human nature ought to be imitated. The conclusion is, the sort of human nature that we ought in actual practice to imitate is the sort that poets ought by their art to imitate. The answer, then, is ethical. In the second place, we note that Plato does not here raise at all the question whether it is possible for poetic imitation to give any grasp of truth. Here it is assumed that imitation may, so far as it goes, give a true picture of its object. In a word, the metaphysical criticism of imitation has not come into the argument. We note further what is implied in the view of imitation that is here advanced. Plato seems to hold that poetic imitation may to a certain extent deal with universals. He has blamed Homer for not representing the gods as they are;[3] that implies at least that a true representation of them is not impossible. Again, he says that there is a sort of style in which a good man would speak,[4] and he admits the poet who imitates the

[1] *Gorgias*, 502 b–d.

[2] Cf. *Rep.* 387 b (about "Homer and the other poets").

[3] *Rep.* 377 e; 388 c. Cf. also p. 68, n. 2.

[4] *Ibid.*, 396 b: ἔστιν τι εἶδος λέξεως τε καὶ διηγήσεως, ᾧ ᾧ ἂν διηγοῖτο ὁ τῷ ὄντι καλὸς κἀγαθός.

style of the virtuous.[1] In theory, at least, then, there is a form or type of activity and of speech which not only can be imitated but which should be imitated.[2] Finally, we note in passing that Plato hints that even comedy is not to be ruled out of the state, provided that it is produced in a proper spirit of pleasantry.[3]

The next passage concerns us, because although it is not about poetry it is about other forms of art, the discussion of which is expressly based on the same principles.[4] Just as subject matter and style were subjected to a censorship, to make sure that they tended to produce certain kinds of character, melody and harmony and rhythm are to receive a similar purgation. Plato implies that in some way it is possible to imitate character by these musical modes, and that character may therefore be influenced by them.[5] And in words that are full of feeling and of poetry he describes what may be the influence on the young of an environment of beautiful sculpture and architecture and other works of creative art; if the artists are naturally endowed with the power to track out the essential nature of the beautiful and the graceful,[6] the young receive the good in everything, and through eyes and ears an effluence of every beautiful thing, like a breeze from a healthful region, reaches them, and they are insensibly brought into harmony with the beauty of reason.[7] Music above all sinks into the inward places of the soul, and breeds in one an appreciation of the beautiful and the good, so that when, later, reason comes to one, it is greeted as no stranger. But education will not be complete till the guardians have learned to know the essential forms of temperance and courage and liberality and magnificence and their kin and their opposites and can recognize them in every context wherever they are found, and also their images, not slighting them in small things or in great, but regarding them as all within the same art or study.[8] Finally, the

[1] *Rep.* 398 b: *ὃς . . . τὴν τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς λέξιν μιμοῖτο.*

[2] Cf. also 401 b: *τοῖς ποιηταῖς ἡμῖν . . . ἐπιστατητέον καὶ προσαναγκαστέον τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἰκόνα ἤθους ἐμποιεῖν τοῖς ποιήμασιν ἢ μὴ παρ' ἡμῖν ποιεῖν.* Concerning this point, more will be said below, p. 37.

[3] *Rep.* 396 d: *οὐκ . . . σπουδῇ;* 396 e: *ὅτι μὴ παιδιᾶς χάριν.*

[4] *Ibid.*, 398 c.

[5] This matter will receive further consideration below, pp. 67 ff. Cf. also *Rep.* 424 c; *οἰδαμοῦ . . . κινοῦνται μουσικῆς τρόποι ἄνευ πολιτικῶν νόμων τῶν μεγίστων.*

[6] *Ibid.*, 401 c. [7] *Ibid.*, 401 d: *τῷ καλῷ λόγῳ.* [8] *Ibid.*, 402 c.

fairest of sights is a beautiful soul in harmony with a beautiful body; the defect of the body can, however, be pardoned sooner than that of the soul, and true love is not that of violent sensual pleasure, but of order and beauty. So education ends in the love of beauty.[1]

Since Plato explains that his attitude toward music is to be consistent with the statements that he makes about the other arts, we are justified in looking for light on the foregoing passages in the present passage. And the principle, as it appears, that governs Plato in the discussion of music is again an ethical principle. Again it is the man of single and fixed purpose whose character is in the first place to be the model which music should try to express and which in the second place it should try to produce — *iustum et tenacem propositi virum.* So far, Plato's criticism is negative; certain types of art are to be repressed. But he also sketches the positive benefits that art can give. Here once more the effect of art seems to be ethical, or rather the idea of beauty and of goodness are so mingled that it is impossible to distinguish them; for in both, it is implied, there is a rational element, so that the culmination of an early acquaintance with the beauty and goodness everywhere to be discerned is a similarity or friendship or harmony with the beauty of reason. Education is thus nothing less than the process that is instigated by the perception of ordered beauty in the world of sense, that sinks into the soul and breeds character, that then rises from love of sensible things to love of beautiful character in the soul, and that ends in the love of pure beauty. Of course this process reminds us not only in its general thought but even in its language of the discourse of Diotima.[2] What is here especially interesting is that not only beauty, or even beauty in sensible form, is given the power of influencing the soul in a rational way, but works of art. One may find it curious that Plato's instances here are not drawn from poetry, which he has just limited, but from sculpture and architecture and other constructive arts[3] and music.[4] Perhaps the reason is that Plato could not approve of contemporary poetry, or indeed fully of any poetry that had ever been written, whereas it would be hard for sculpture to change much without ceasing to be sculpture.[5] And so Plato " did not see in the sculptors and architects of his time the signs

[1] *Rep.* 403 c: δεῖ δέ που τελευτᾶν τὰ μουσικὰ εἰς τὰ τοῦ καλοῦ ἐρωτικά.
[2] *Symp.* 201 e ff. [3] *Rep.* 401 b. [4] *Ibid.*, 401 d. [5] *Ibid.*, 420 c.

of degeneracy which drew his attention to the poets and musicians."[1] In any case we should notice that Plato wishes to consider the poets and the sculptors as subject to the same laws; that is, they are to be required to express the image of the good.[2] Moreover, we notice that the guardians, if they are to be truly educated, must have learned to know the forms[3] of temperance and courage and liberality and magnificence and the like, wherever they are to be found, and also the images of them.[4] These images must be copies of the forms just mentioned, represented in poetry and the other arts.[5] What, then are the εἴδη ? The first suggestion that occurs to one is that they are the ideas to which Plato's famous doctrine is related. If that is the case, we find it laid down here that the poet and the artist are to imitate directly the ideas. Such a conclusion is of course in opposition to the doctrine of the tenth book of the Republic. Is that any reason for supposing Plato not to have had this meaning here ? It depends, I think, on the extent to which the ideas are supposed by him in this passage to be separate. Though we have not had, to be sure, the discussion of the seventh book, in which the ideas are undeniably separate, in the *Symposium* and the *Phaedo* we have had the discussion of τὸ καλόν, which is separate; and education here, we are told, ends in the love of τὸ καλόν. Adam,[6] admitting that if the language of this passage be interpreted in the light of Book VII it can bear the meaning that I have suggested, argues that the doctrine of separate ideas does not appear elsewhere in books I–IV, and that the ideas here are spoken of as immanent.[7] He concludes therefore that we must suppose that the artist copies from the life. The use of εἴδη is thus "a sort of half-way house between the Socratic λόγοι and Plato's ideas."[8] But even if these εἴδη are not separate, we must ask what it means "to copy from the life." It is clearly something more than the literal kind of imitation that is

[1] R. L. Nettleship, in *Hellenica*, London, 1880, p. 117.

[2] *Rep.* 401 b. [3] *Ibid.*, 402 c: εἴδη.

[4] *Ibid.*, εἰκόνας αὐτῶν.

[5] As Adam (note on 402 c) holds. "On any other interpretation the introduction of these εἰκόνες is irrelevant in a discussion on the rules which imitative art must obey."

[6] *Ibid.* [7] *Rep.* 402 c: ἐνόντα ἐν οἷς ἔνεστιν.

[8] But Adam feels that the μουσικός is near the realm of εἴδη; cf. his note on 403 c 16.

implied in the tenth book. It is the discovery in things everywhere of the essential natures of all elements that constitute or that contribute to beauty; and it is this concern for beauty that unites our interest in small things and in great.

We have seen, then, that all the discussion of poetry in the second and third books of the *Republic* is based on ethical grounds. Imitation, is not, as such, criticized in an unfriendly spirit; on the contrary, the imitation of the good and of the beautiful that is to be discovered everywhere, in bodies and in souls, is expressly encouraged.[1] Each art is to assist, in its own medium, in the ennobling of character. This is not a complete theory of poetry and of the other arts, but it is by no means a low or an unworthy theory. Moreover, Plato is not committed by the introduction of the theory of ideas to any adverse criticism of the arts, as such.

Plato explains that the object of the training of his soldiers in μουσική and in γυμναστική is to prepare them to take the dye of the laws so that their opinions[2] may sink indelibly into their natures. In this passage, there is no reason to suppose that Plato speaks of δόξα in a tone of disparagement.[3] In fact, for practical purposes, courage exists through the saving power of true opinion.[4] But, as it will appear, Plato never confuses true opinion with knowledge.

When Glaucon brings down upon Socrates the "third wave," it is in the form of a question whether the state that is being described could ever exist.[5] To this Socrates replies that the very essence of an ideal is that it can not exist, and that this is no reproach against it. So one must not insist on his proving that any actual state will coincide with his ideal state; one must be content with an approximation. But he will go so far as to lay down the principle that actual states might be reformed so as to agree with the ideal state, provided only that philosophers were to become kings or kings were to become philosophers. The explanation of this principle requires Plato to ask what is the

[1] Lutoslawski is simply wrong in saying (*Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic*, p. 286) "Plato now (*i.e.* in *Rep.* ii–iv) despises poetry as a mere μίμησις, and banishes Homer from his state." Perhaps he is thinking of *Rep.* 595 a. Of that passage I shall have something to say below, pp. 50, 54.

[2] *Rep.* 430 a: ἡ δόξα . . . καὶ περὶ δεινῶν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

[3] Cf. *Meno*, 98 bc.

[4] *Rep.* 430 b.

[5] *Ibid.*, 471.

nature of the philosopher,[1] to explain his relation to society,[2] and to consider the methods by which the philosopher is to be trained.[3]

Who, then, is rightly to be called a philosopher? As the lover loves all things that are lovable, the philosopher, if he is true to his name, is a lover of all knowledge. But this does not mean that the name of philosopher is deserved by all lovers of sights or by the frequenters of the theatre who run to hear every chorus; they are merely somewhat like the true philosophers, who love the vision of truth.[4] The lovers of sights and sounds[5] are fond of beautiful tones and colors and figures and all that is made of them, but are incapable of seeing or loving absolute beauty.[6] They are like dreamers who take the resemblance for the reality, unlike waking persons, who recognize the existence of absolute beauty, and who do not confuse it with the objects of sense that are beautiful. They only who know this have knowledge; the others have only opinion — though Plato does not grudge them any knowledge that they may have. In general, knowledge is of being, and ignorance is of non-being; opinion, which lies between knowledge and ignorance, is of that which is between being and non-being. Now the *φιλοθεάμων*, who does not believe that beauty is one, must admit that beautiful things are also base, and that all visible things are relative, and do not deserve one name more than another. The notions of the multitude about these things therefore are tossing about between being and non-being; they must, then, be opinions, not knowledge. And those who see the many beautiful things that are visible to sense, and who yet neither see absolute beauty nor can follow any guide who points the way thither, have opinion, not knowledge; they are *φιλόδοξοι*, not *φιλόσοφοι*.

Attempts have been made to show that Plato is here gracefully refuting the views of Antisthenes, who is depicted as the *φιλοθεάμων*.[7] There is no doubt that rivalry existed between Plato and Antisthenes, or that their philosophies were opposed at every point.[8] The interests

[1] *Rep.* 474 b–480. [2] *Ibid.*, 484 a–502 a. [3] *Ibid.*, 502 c–541 b.

[4] *Ibid.*, 475 e: *τοὺς τῆς ἀληθείας . . . φιλοθεάμονας.*

[5] *Ibid.*, 476 b: *οἱ . . . φιλήκοοι καὶ φιλοθεάμονες.*

[6] *Ibid.*, 476 b.

[7] Dümmler, *Antisthenica*, p. 42, cited by Adam, *ad Rep.* 476 d 27; Stählin, *Die Stellung der Poesie in der Platonischen Philosophie*, pp. 26, 32.

[8] Diog. Laert. 6. 7; Athenaeus, 5. 220 D.

of Antisthenes included not only ethics but oratory, rhetoric, grammar, and physics.[1] He was a writer whose works, in style imitating Gorgias, were compared by the ancients with those of Thucydides and Plato; in fact, Plato was even accused by Theopompus of borrowing from Antisthenes.[2] What is more to our purpose, Antisthenes was a commentator on Homer, who interpreted parts of his author allegorically, and who said, as I have already observed,[3] that Homer spoke at times from mere opinion, at times from knowledge of the truth. But his philosophy was the negation of the possibility of real knowledge; though he required concepts of things,[4] he limited all predicates to proper names, so that only identical propositions were possible. For him, general conceptions are mere names. Thus he denied the real existence of *genera* in the famous remark, "I see a horse; but horseness I do not see."[5] It is not at all unlikely that Plato intended a glancing blow at this doctrine of Antisthenes; it is possible, too, that in 480 a Plato is replying to Isocrates,[6] the man who, though claiming for his notion of culture the name "philosophy," preferred to limit himself to matters in which opinion is more valuable than knowledge.[7] But what we must not fail to notice is that Plato's aim here is the definition of the philosopher. Accordingly, the philosopher, or lover of knowledge, is contrasted with the lover of opinion; and the distinction rests entirely on the doctrine of ideas. Now this doctrine is exactly the doctrine that Antisthenes of all people would not admit.[8] Further, we notice that in this place there is no attempt to demonstrate the theory of ideas. It is introduced, with hardly a word of explanation, as something familiar, much as in the *Phaedo*. It is, as in the *Phaedo*, readily accepted. We must conclude, then, that the theory has already been conceived in Plato's mind, and that he introduces it here for the express purpose of distinguishing between knowledge and opinion. Art

[1] Jerome, *contra Jovin.* 2. 14; Diog. Laert. 6. 1.

[2] Athenaeus, 11. 508 c. [3] P. 10. [4] ὁ τὸ τί ἦν ἔστι. Diog. Laert. 6. 3.

[5] Simplicius in *Arist. Cat.* p. 211, l. 17, ed. Kalbfleisch.

[6] So Teichmüller, cited by Adam *ad loc.*

[7] But Isocrates did not, like Antisthenes, deny the possibility of a science of absolute truth. "Rather he implicitly recognizes it. His contention is that this knowledge, supposing it attained, is worth less than judicious, though inexact opinion on the affairs of practical life." Jebb, *Attic Orators*, ii, p. 50.

[8] Cf. p. 56, n. 5.

and poetry have already been described as implanting δόξα,[1] though it has been intimated [2] that artists can go beyond particular objects. Here Plato attacks the habit of mind, shown by the φιλοθεάμων and by most people, that rests content with particulars, and shows that such people have no real knowledge, but only δόξα. Here, then, for the first time, we have an announcement on the part of Plato that he is going to set up a doctrine that opposes the ordinary conception of the value of poetry and art. And this opposition comes not from any ethical reason, but is made expressly in the name of philosophy; for it is the philosopher who is opposed to the lover of beautiful sights. And the philosopher is, in a word, no longer merely he who by a gift of nature loves to learn,[3] but he who accepts and applies the doctrine of ideas. But even now Plato does not condemn poetry or art as such; all that he says is that if the spectator rests content with the contemplation of sensible objects, he has no true knowledge. The theory of ideas which Plato has already held for some time does not make art impossible; it actually explains that which is valuable in art. Why does Plato write in so different a spirit in the tenth book? In order to understand the change of spirit, we must consider the theory of ideas that comes between the two discussions of art in the *Republic*, noting especially the grounds on which Plato came to hold this theory and his attitude toward the theory after he had conceived it.

V

The theory of Ideas has been so often discussed that I need not in this study give an exposition of it. But I must call attention to a number of points that have been too little noticed, or, at least, that have often been forgotten in the final estimate of the Platonic philosophy. I wish in the first place to point out the reasons that drove Plato to formulate the doctrine. I intend, moreover, to inquire to what extent he believed absolute knowledge to be attainable, noticing several indications on Plato's part of a failure to adhere to his own tenets. It is the neglect of this discrepancy that has led to the misunderstanding of Plato's treatment of the poets in the tenth book of the *Republic*.

[1] *Rep.* 430 a. [2] *Ibid.*, 402 c.

[3] Cf. *ibid.*, 375 e–376 b; esp. 376 b: τό γε φιλομαθὲς καὶ φιλόσοφον ταὐτόν.

In the first place, then, we can do no better than recall Aristotle's account of the genesis of the theory.[1] There, we remember, Plato was portrayed as having at one time adhered to Heracleitan views, and as having been weaned from them by Socrates. In order to escape from the flux of Heracleitus, in which no knowledge was possible, Plato had to assume that there is a different kind of reality that could be known. And this he did by supposing the moral concepts of Socrates to have a real existence. That is the germ of the whole theory of ideas: if knowledge exists, it must be of general ideas; it is impossible to deny the existence of knowledge; therefore general ideas must exist. "This argument, which Aristotle calls the 'argument from knowledge,'[2] . . . is the only formal argument in defence of the Ideal Theory with which we meet in the writings of Plato himself."[3] The ideas, then, are the postulates of the reason.

In the *Cratylus*, Plato deals especially with this matter. They who gave names to things gave them under the wrong impression that all things are in motion and flux, and try to drag others into the same whirlpool in which they themselves are.[4] But Socrates dreams of a real and unchanging beauty and goodness.[5] And we can not rightly speak of a beauty that is always passing away and is first this and then that; it is born and vanishes while we speak.[6] Nor can knowledge exist if everything changes and nothing abides;[7] but if there is a permanent thinker, and a permanent object of knowledge, they are not like the changing objects of sense.[8] Socrates does not positively affirm his view, but observes that the contrary view is very unlikely.[9]

This appeal to permanent objects of thought as the alternative to the denial of knowledge that is implied in a Heracleitean philosophy persists in other dialogues. The everlasting change in body and in thought is the reason why the soul, like the body, desires immortality.[10] That is, the relativity of the world of sense can be escaped only by postulating a real object of knowledge, in this dialogue, beauty. In the *Timaeus*, that which is apprehended by intelligence and reason is always in the same state; but that which is conceived by opinion with

[1] *Met.* 1. 6, 987 a, 29 ff.
[2] οἱ λόγοι οἱ ἐκ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν.
[3] Adam, *The Religious Teachers of Greece*, p. 423.
[4] *Cratylus*, 439 c.
[5] *Ibid.*, 439 d.
[6] *Ibid.*
[7] *Ibid.*, 440 a.
[8] *Ibid.*, 440 b.
[9] *Ibid.*, 440 d.
[10] *Symp.* 207 e–208 b.

the help of sensation and without reason is always in a process of becoming and never really is.[1] So the soul, when caught in a tumult of change, does not at first attain to truth, but has only sensations; when the torrent is abated, the soul regains its proper motion, and may become rational.[2] Phenomena, since they change, have no fixed identity; it is better to say of them that they are " of such a nature," rather than that they are " this " or " that."[3] Again, it is asked whether there is such a thing as self-existent fire, and the other things that are ordinarily supposed to have self-existence.[4] Although the present subject, it is answered, does not allow a long digression to establish the point, it will suffice to set forth briefly the great principle to which Timaeus adheres.[5] The principle then laid down is that these intelligible, imperceptible forms do exist; the ground, which for us is the important thing, is that reason and true opinion are not the same, but two distinct species, and that the object of reason must therefore be different from that of true opinion. The ideas again appear as practical postulates of reason; if there is knowledge, there must be ideas. Again, in the *Parmenides*, the difficulties that are involved in supposing ideas to have a real existence are clearly set forth; " he who hears what may be said against them will deny the very existence of them."[6] And yet, as Parmenides points out, if one fixes one's attention on these difficulties and will not admit the existence of ideas, one will have no object for one's mind, and so will utterly destroy the power of reasoning.[7] What then is to become of philosophy, if ideas are unknown ?[8] The recourse to the theory of ideas, it appears, is once more a postulate of thought. So in the *Theaetetus*, the Heracleitean doctrine is dismissed as unable to give an account of knowledge;[9] the separate senses give perceptions of particular things, but general ideas are perceived by the mind alone, without the help of the senses.[10] In the *Sophist*, again, we find a discussion of the conflict between idealism and materialism. It is admitted that the mind employs a certain kind of motion in the act of thinking; yet if it is admitted that all things are in motion, the mind has no existence. For identity and permanence can not exist without

[1] *Timaeus*, 28 a.
[2] *Ibid.*, 43, 44.
[3] *Ibid.*, 49 c.
[4] *Ibid.*, 51 b.
[5] *Ibid.*, 51 d.
[6] *Parmenides*, 135 a.
[7] *Ibid.*, 135 b.
[8] *Ibid.*, 135 c.
[9] *Theaetetus*, 179 ff.
[10] *Ibid.*, 184, 185.

a principle of rest;[1] and without these, mind can not exist.[2] Against him who would annihilate knowledge and reason and mind and who yet speaks confidently about anything, a great struggle must be made;[3] and the philosopher will include in his definition of being both rest and motion. Here we have in a few words the whole of Plato's position; the cat is out of the bag. He has adopted the theory of ideas as a less evil than its alternative, the confession that knowledge is impossible. Finally, in the *Philebus*, Socrates explains the common paradox about the one and the many, which are an impediment to thought,[4] by the use of a divine gift,[5] which turns out to be nothing else than the theory of ideas, used for the purpose of definition. There is no attempt to prove the existence of ideas; it is not profitable to deal with the difficulties involved in the assumption of their existence. It is better to assume them, and to use them.[6]

The theory of ideas, then, is in origin, according to Plato's account, a postulate of the reason. He even describes it as an hypothesis. In the *Phaedo*, he assumes the real existence of beauty, goodness, greatness, and the like, as giving an explanation of immortality.[7] This is the hypothesis which he judges to be the strongest, and by agreement with which he proposes to test everything else.[8] If the hypothesis is attacked, it is to be defended by being deduced from another hypothesis which appears best of those higher in the scale, till one is reached which is satisfactory.[9] Plato gives an example of the method in the *Meno*.[10] And Plato expressly directs that the hypotheses be examined, and says that the testing of them will carry one as far in the pursuit of knowledge as it is possible for man to go.[11]

[1] *Sophist*, 249 b. [2] *Ibid.*, 249 c.

[3] *Ibid.*: καὶ μὴν πρός γε τοῦτον παντὶ λόγῳ μαχετέον, ὃς ἂν ἐπιστήμην ἢ φρόνησιν ἢ νοῦν ἀφανίζων ἰσχυρίζηται περί τινος ὁτῳοῦν.

[4] *Philebus*, 14 d. [5] *Ibid.*, 16 c.

[6] Cf. Shorey, *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 63.

[7] *Phaedo*, 100 b: ὑποθέμενος εἶναί τι καλὸν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ μέγα καὶ τἆλλα πάντα· ἃ εἴ μοι δίδως τε καὶ συγχωρεῖς εἶναι ταῦτα, ἐλπίζω σοι ἐκ τούτων τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπιδείξειν καὶ ἀνευρήσειν ὡς ἀθάνατον [ἡ] ψυχή.

[8] *Ibid.*, 100 a. [9] *Ibid.*, 101 de: ἕως ἐπί τι ἱκανὸν ἔλθοις.

[10] *Meno*, 86 e ff. Cf. *Laches*, *Euthyphro*, *passim*; *Phaedrus*, 249 b; 265 ff.

[11] *Phaedo*, 107 b. Adam (ed. *Rep.* ii, p. 175) thinks that this exhortation "hints at something like the dialectic of [*Rep.*] vi and vii, for the original ὑποθέσεως cannot be satisfactorily proved (κἂν τοῦτο αὐτὸ σαφὲς γένηται) except by connecting them with

The dialectic method described by Plato in the passages thus far discussed is a practical method of which his own works furnish many examples. But Plato was unwilling to stop at this point. The love of beautiful things had led him to the love of beauty itself; and this beauty was a permanent thing, free from the vicissitudes to which particular beautiful things were subject. But the existence of this beauty was only an hypothesis. So the same faith that impelled Plato to postulate the existence of ideas carried him still further to postulate a first cause to which they were related. Ideas must exist, he argued, since knowledge is possible; absolute knowledge must have as its object an absolute idea that is unconditioned. In this way Plato projected an ideal that was nothing more than the logical end toward which the method of dialectic tended. To put the matter in the form of a paradox, the Idea of the Good, like the mental operation of which it is the correlate, is the end of an infinite line. That does not mean that the Idea of the Good, or that the ideas, are mere notions of the mind. For the argument is not: "knowledge is possible if I think that ideas exist;" it is rather: "knowledge is impossible unless ideas really exist." That is what Plato means when he declares that the Idea of the Good, though the cause of being and of knowledge, is higher than being and knowledge.[1] But we may notice a general tendency of Plato to assume conceptions, sciences, and objects of knowledge where the tendency of a course of reasoning seems to demand them. It was in this spirit that real beauty in the *Symposium* was spoken of as incapable of representation in terms either of sense or of thought;[2] that is because language could not keep apace with Plato's imagination. It is for this reason, too, that Plato made the sciences of harmonics and astronomy unduly abstract, in the hope of getting rid of all the bonds of the flesh. So, moreover, he arranged the subjects in his higher education, on the principle of an advance from the sensible to the intellectual, introducing certain of them simply to find suitable objects for the faculties of the mind which he had assumed.[3]

the Idea of Good." This notion, however, implies that Plato had already thought of the Idea of the Good. I think Burnet is nearer the truth when he observes (ed. *Phaedo*, note on 107 b 9), "the argument ends with a fresh confession of human weakness." Cf. *Phaedo*, 66 b ff.; *Timaeus*, 29 c; *Parmen.* 135 e–136 e.

[1] *Rep.* 508 e; 509 b.

[2] *Symp.* 211 a.

[3] Cf. Jowett, transl. *Rep.* iii, pp. xciv f.

We need not pause long to ask why Plato chose the Idea of the Good as the first principle of his philosophy. There are enough indications in the history of philosophy before him of attempts to find final causes;[1] moreover Plato had good authority in Greek usage for giving to the word *ἀγαθός* more than a merely moral or eulogistic meaning — something perhaps more akin to what is implied in the idea of fitness for a particular use.[2] Plato, however, was the first to attempt to unite the whole content of the universe in one orderly scheme, in which the operation of things was to be not mechanical but rational;[3] in which existence and goodness were to be merged; and in which each part was to be explained not as separate, but as deduced from one permanent principle which was the reason and cause of all things. Thus to know anything would be to explain its relation to this principle.[4]

It is this explanation that is the goal of the higher kind of dialectic, which proceeds by the use of reason only, without any reliance on sense, till it reaches the end of the intellectual world, which is the perception of the absolute good.[5] The nature of this perfect kind of dialectic can be understood only by those who have passed through the preliminary sciences.[6] But whereas even the highest of these depend on the use of hypotheses which are left unexamined and unaccounted for, it is only dialectic that proceeds by the destruction of hypotheses to the actual first principle, in order to make itself secure.[7] Since the dialectician in general is he who has apprehended the essence of each thing,[8] the same principle holds with regard to the Good; only he knows the Good or any good who can abstract and define it rationally and pass through all tests, appealing not to opinion but to real existence.[9] From this it appears that just as in the lower form of dialectic, exemplified in *Phaedo* 101 d and 107 b, one hypothesis is deduced from another, and consistency with the highest hypothesis discovered is the supreme test, here all the ideas are regarded as hy-

[1] Cf. Xen. *Mem.* 1. 1, 11.

[2] *Ibid.*, 3. 8, 1–8; 4. 2, 31–35; and *Cratylus*, 389 c; *Gorgias*, 503 e.

[3] *Phaedo*, 97 c; *Laws*, 967 a.

[4] *Rep.* 534 b: *λόγον ἑκάστου . . . τῆς οὐσίας . . . διδόναι.*

[5] *Ibid.*, 532 a.

[6] *Ibid.*, 533 a.

[7] *Ibid.*, 533 c: *ἡ διαλεκτικὴ μέθοδος μόνη ταύτῃ πορεύεται, τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀναιροῦσα ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρχὴν ἵνα βεβαιώσεται.*

[8] *Ibid.*, 534 b.

[9] *Ibid.*, cf. 510 b; 511 b.

potheses and are tested by each other; their mutual consistency is the highest standard to which reason can appeal. The Idea of the Good is thus known indirectly, as the principle that orders the other ideas.

The conception of the higher dialectic, like that of the Idea of the Good, is a bold leap of the imagination. It tries to complete in theory what is seen in practice. But when it professes to be a completed science, no longer merely a method, it is only an ideal, an aspiration to which Plato himself is unable to give content: "his mind seems to be filled with a vacant form which he is unable to realize."[1] That would not, perhaps, in his eyes imply any censure of the conception;[2] he would be content to have pointed out the true end of philosophy. We must, however, note that the ideal is one that not only he but no philosopher could more than approximate, valuable as the ideal undoubtedly is; we must note, also, how far the criticism of art and poetry in the tenth book of the *Republic* comes from the assumption of a completed science of knowledge and an absolute attainment of truth, such as Plato defined in 511 bc.

So far we have examined the reasons that led Plato to adopt the theory of ideas, and have found that it was an hypothesis demanded by the possibility of knowledge, the testing of which, theoretically, would lead one eventually to a vision of the perfect Idea of the Good. We must now ask how far he believed that he, or that any one, could attain to this vision.

In almost every dialogue we find expressions of doubt and of hesitancy in the affirmation of important doctrines. Many of these, to be sure, are only examples of Socratic irony, and are used for the purpose of calling attention to these doctrines. But others are the genuine expression of a man who feels that much is at stake,[3] and that he must feel his way in darkness. He speaks truly through the mouth of Socrates in the *Meno:* he does not lead others into difficulties when he

[1] Jowett, transl. *Rep.*, iii, p. xciii. Plato does not even have any explanation of the relation of mathematical ideas to the Good, or of numbers to ideas. The differences of opinion shown by commentators on the analogies of the Line and the Cave show not that the commentators are lacking in ingenuity or perseverance, but that Plato's own thought about these matters was not capable of being made perfectly precise and consistent. Cf. Adam. *ad loc.*, and Appendix I to *Rep.* vii; Nettleship, *Lectures*, pp. 238–277; Stocks, "The Line and the Cave," *Class. Quart.* V, 2 (1911).

[2] Cf. *Rep.* 472 c.

[3] *Phaedo*, 114 c; *Rep.* 608 bc.

himself has an easy way of escape from them; but he himself is in genuine difficulty.[1] But he will not on this account refrain from investigating the truth. The one thing in his argument on which he will insist is his duty to seek for knowledge of the things of which he is at present ignorant. So he could hope to be better and more manly and less idle than if he were to suppose that he could not find out what he did not know.[2] In the same spirit Simmias in the *Phaedo*, expecting Socrates to agree with him, observes that knowledge is hard or impossible to gain, but that only a weak man will refrain from testing views and acting on the best of human reasonings, risking himself as on a raft, unless he can get a divine reason.[3] So far, the discussion is only of the attitude of mind; the philosopher must not be discouraged by difficulties. But a little later Socrates lays down nearly the same principle as the limit of argument that is humanly possible.[4] And Socrates expressly warns his comrades against *μισολογία*,[5] hinting that although arguments seem to be unstable, if one is not skilled in reasoning, there is a true and stable kind of argument that is intelligible, and that could lead to truth and science.[6] What, then, is the hypothesis that Plato regards as most secure? It is simply that of the real existence of ideas, criticized and defended by the appeal to any higher hypothesis that he can find.[7] There is in the *Phaedo* no suggestion that human beings can attain to absolute knowledge; there is merely the exhortation not to be afraid to use the reason, to make use of the hypothesis of ideas, and to test the ideas as far as is practicable.

How far does Plato imply in the *Republic* that absolute knowledge is attainable? The discussion of the higher dialectic and of the Idea of the Good occurs in the course of the creation of the state whose realization is confessedly impossible.[8] Even so, when Adeimantus asks how the Good is to be conceived, and will not be content with

[1] *Meno*, 80 c. [2] *Ibid.* 86 b. [3] *Phaedo*, 85 c.

[4] Cf. *ibid.*, 85 c: *τὸν γοῦν βέλτιστον τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων λόγων λαβόντα καὶ δυσεξελεγκτότατον.* *Ibid.*, 107 b: *ἐὰν αὐτὰς* [i. e. *τὰς ὑποθέσεις τὰς πρώτας*] *ἱκανῶς διέλητε, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, ἀκολουθήσετε τῷ λόγῳ καθ' ὅσον δυνατὸν μάλιστ' ἀνθρώπῳ ἑπακολουθῆναι· κἂν τοῦτο αὐτὸ σαφὲς γένηται, οὐδὲν ζητήσετε περαιτέρω.*

[5] *Ibid.*, 89 d–90 d. [6] *Ibid.*, 90 cd.

[7] *Ibid.*, 100 d: *ἀσφαλέστατον*; 101 d: *ἐχόμενος ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς τῆς ὑποθέσεως*; 101 e: *ἕως ἐπί τι ἱκανὸν ἔλθοις.*

[8] *Rep.* 472 d; 592 a; cf. *Laws*, 739.

opinions, Socrates is unwilling to commit himself to an answer; he would be content if he could give an account of the Good such as he has given of justice and temperance and the other virtues, but he is afraid that he can not even do this.[1] Indeed, he has more in his mind than he can express, and will only describe the "child of the Good."[2] The importance of this passage has been too often overlooked. The confession that Socrates is here represented as making is one that is never retracted or even modified. Plato is no misologue; but he simply can not give a reasoned account of the Idea of the Good. He can only hint at its existence, or depict it by means of a comparison, or describe the steps that one should take in order to approach it. If it be urged that because Plato says that he can not now[3] describe the Good he hopes at a later time to do so, we must remember that in no dialogue does he do so.[4] In fact, in no dialogue after the *Republic* does he even mention the Idea of the Good.[5] It is his opinion, whether true or false, that in the world of knowledge the Idea of Good appears last of all and is beheld with an effort; when it is beheld, it is inferred to be the cause of all things good and beautiful; and it is this which one must look upon if one is to act rationally.[6] Yet when Glaucon asks for a description of the higher dialectic and of its divisions, and the paths by which the end was to be reached,[7] Socrates replies that Glaucon could not follow him, however eager his explanation; yet if he should try to set it forth, he could enable one to see something like the truth, and that is all he dares affirm.[8] Here again Plato refuses to

[1] *Rep.* 506 d.

[2] *Ibid.*, 506 d ff.

[3] *Rep.* 506 e: *τὸ νῦν εἶναι . . . τὰ νῦν.*

[4] Cf. Adam *ad loc.*

[5] But Plato did discourse orally about the Good in the Academy (cf. p. 4, n. 5 (4) on p. 6). He was averse to committing his views on this subject to writing; it was not capable of expression like other subjects. If he thought they could be adequately written out and communicated, what finer and more useful occupation could he have than to reveal Nature to the light? But he thought it wiser only to indicate it briefly to a few. (*Epistle* 7. 341 c–e. I do not think it necessary here to inquire into the authenticity of the *Epistles*. I will merely remark that many scholars to-day regard most of them as genuine. Even if the present passage were a forgery, however, it would be a stupid forgery if Plato had left any exposition of the Idea of the Good.) Cf. also *Phaedrus*, 275 d ff.

[6] *Rep.* 517 b.

[7] *Ibid.*, 532 e: *τέλος τῆς πορείας.*

[8] *Ibid.*, 533 c: *εἰ δ' ὅντως ἢ μή, οὐκέτ' ἄξιον τοῦτο διισχυρίζεσθαι· ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν δὴ τοιοῦτόν τι ἰδεῖν, ἰσχυριστέον.*

commit himself to a pretension to absolute knowledge; even if Glaucon could follow his description, all that he will promise is that he could indicate "something like" the truth. To use the figure just suggested by Glaucon,[1] he could point to a path which leads in the right direction, but he could not see the end of the path. For Plato, as for us, dialectic, like the Idea of the Good, is a limit which can never be reached: like the sailor's horizon, it always lies before one.[2]

At times, however, Plato speaks as if the experience of the higher dialectician were actually an attainable goal. We remember that the process, as it is described in the sixth book of the *Republic*, theoretically involves a double journey; first an ascent by means of hypotheses up to the unconditioned first principle, then a descent, starting from the summit and proceeding without the use of any sensible object, through and to ideas (which are no longer hypotheses but perfect ideas, since they are deduced from the Idea of the Good).[3] In the *Timaeus*, Plato proceeds on the assumption that he has already reached the unconditioned first principle, and that he is coming back into the world of sense. But in describing the creation of the world in accordance with a divine pattern he is aware of the fact that he can not entirely follow the rule laid down in the *Republic*, since he must to a certain extent use sensible materials; of the created copy he can speak only in the language of probability.[4] We shall see that Plato's criticism of poetry in the tenth book of the *Republic* is based on the temporary assumption that absolute knowledge of this sort is before him.

VI

At the beginning of the tenth book of the *Republic*, Plato expresses his gratification at the legislation that has been passed with regard to poetry. "What is that?" Glaucon asks. "The exclusion of poetry so far as it is imitative," Socrates replies.[5] We remember, however, that imitative poetry was not excluded in the earlier discussion, but only the imitation of the bad. The sentence therefore puts us on our guard for the remainder of the present discussion. If all imitative

[1] Cf. p. 49, n. 7.

[2] Cf. also *Parmenides*, 133 c–134 c: absolute knowledge is not within our grasp.

[3] *Rep.* 511 b. [4] *Tim.* 29 b. [5] *Rep.* 595 a.

poetry is now to be excluded, it must be on some new ground; and, what is more, Plato must have some new motive for wishing to exclude it. The reasons which Plato brings forward in this discussion are two. In the first place, the theory of ideas is to be used in order to account for the nature of imitation; this part of the argument extends from 596 a to 602 c. The theory of ideas, we have seen, was Plato's method of dealing with the fact that knowledge is impossible in a flux. The second ground is the division of the soul into parts;[1] this division was made, we remember, because it was discovered that the soul can be affected in contrary ways by the same object, and because the soul can apprehend truth only by thought, not by sense. In both arguments, then, what Plato is interested in deciding is whether imitative poetry, as such, can give us an apprehension of truth, it being understood that truth can be apprehended only by the reason.

The account of the theory of ideas which Plato here sketches strikes us at once as curious. Whereas in most of the previous discussions of the doctrine he has used ethical ideas and general notions as his examples, in the present instance it is not the beautiful or the good that he adduces, but a bed. Now Plato did at times admit the existence of ideas of created things and of natural *genera*, as well as of ethical notions.[2] So it can not be argued that Plato is giving here an account of the theory of ideas that was for him absolutely false. The interesting question for us is: When it was possible for Plato to use as examples in this discussion either the idea of the beautiful or the idea of the bed, why did he choose the latter? The answer must be that Plato deliberately chose the example that lent itself to exhibiting the artist in the most unfavorable light. Such an interpretation is supported by the fact that Plato begins the discussion of imitation with painting, and argues about poetry by analogy; for it is painting that most obviously imitates the objects of sense. Again, when it is possible for Plato to use as his example any of the created things of nature, such as man, he deliberately chooses an artificially created thing, in order to interpolate another process and to remove the imitative artist still further from the truth. All this discussion is doubtless influenced by the analogy of the divided line; but the analogy can not be pressed in

[1] *Ibid.*, 595 a; the results of this division are discussed in 602 c. ff.

[2] Cf. *Cratylus*, 389; *Meno*, 72 c; *Parmenides*, 130 de.

detail. For example, in the present discussion, the created things of nature and those created by the artisan are regarded as having a different degree of validity, since the *θεός* is higher than the *κλινοποιός*;[1] whereas in the Line, *ζῷα* and *σκευαστά* are placed together.[2] In the allegory of the Cave, however, it is only images[3] and shadows of them that are in the Cave, while the prisoner who is led into daylight, though he sees things at first most easily in shadows and images, finally sees things themselves.[4] These discrepancies I cite merely to show that the analogy of the Line and the allegory of the Cave can not be pressed in detail to illustrate the principle of poetic imitation. All that Plato wishes in any case to insist upon is the inferior value of sense to thought in the search for truth; and he places the imitator at one or two or three removes from the truth according to the demands of his special contexts.[5]

Here, then, he asks once more for a definition of imitation in general.[6] Although he has previously reached the conception of an imitation of universals,[7] here he wilfully reverts to the primitive and obvious notion of imitation — the imitation of particular objects of sense.[8] But to this notion he further applies the general condemnation of the objects of sense that is implied in the theory of ideas. Imitation is therefore condemned now, not for the imitation of evil, but because, as imitation, it is incapable of apprehending the truth. If one could make both the original and the copy, would one seriously make mere copies and set this sort of imitation as the principle of one's life?[9]

Further, imitative art creates false notions in the minds of spectators, who take the image for the reality — though only children and simple persons are deceived. The instance chosen here is curious: they may, at a distance, take a picture of a carpenter (which aims at representing the carpenter as he appears, not as he is) for the real carpenter.[10] This argument is connected in thought with the argument that immediately follows only by reason of the fact that both are

[1] Cf. also *Sophist*, 266 b ff.
[2] *Rep.* 510 a.
[3] *Ibid.*, 514 e.
[4] *Ibid.*, 516 a.
[5] The best discussion of the Line, I think, is that of J. L. Stocks, *Class. Quart.* V, 2 (1911). As he argues, the Line "is not primarily a classification of kinds of intelligence, but of kinds of things accessible to the intelligence."
[6] *Rep.* 595 c.
[7] Cf. pp. 36 ff.
[8] Cf. pp. 32 f.
[9] *Rep.* 599 a.
[10] *Ibid.*, 598 bc.

examples of copies substituted for realities by one who is ignorant of the reality.[1] The poet, though he speaks of generalship and statesmanship and all the other arts, speaks of things of which he is ignorant, but imposes on ignorant people by the incantation of metre and other adornments. This is the same matter that Plato discussed in the *Ion*;[2] and, as in the *Ion*, Plato will not admit that the poets are authorities to whom one can go for enlightenment in ordinary practical affairs.[3] In that dialogue, however, Plato left to the poet the appeal to inspiration, a conception whose possibilities he has not yet exhausted;[4] here, the only sort of knowledge that Plato will admit as valid, since he has adopted the method of original and copy, is knowledge of the original which is being copied. And in the present case, of course, the poet turns out to be ignorant. The only reply to this argument would be that the aim of the poet is entirely different; but that reply has been forestalled by Plato in the present case[5] by the assumption that the mere definition of imitation in general will cover the aim of poetry. In a word, he has already begged the question at the start: the rest follows easily enough.

Imitation having been proved, by reference to the theory of ideas, to be third from the truth, Plato gives a subsidiary proof of the ignorance of the artist, not strictly dependent on the theory of ideas.[6] It proceeds in Socratic fashion to distinguish degrees of knowledge according to practical familiarity with things; the user is higher in the scale than the maker, who, in turn, is higher than the imitator. Corresponding to the arts of these men are three states of mind, knowledge, opinion, and ignorance.[7] This argument, too, hinges on the assumption that the aim of the poet is to give information on the practical affairs of life.

The other main argument which Plato adduces for the condemnation of poetry is based on the division of the soul, and the discovery that poetry appeals to the irrational part of the soul that can see only appearances. This argument is not strictly new;[8] it derives new force however, from the analogy of the Line and the allegory of the Cave, in

[1] *Rep.* 600 e.
[2] Cf. pp. 16 f.
[3] As the Greeks did go; cf. p. 9.
[4] For a discussion of the *Phaedrus*, cf. pp. 56 ff.
[5] Not, of course, in general.
[6] Cf. Adam, on *Rep.* 601 b, 14.
[7] *Rep.* 601 e–602 b.
[8] Cf. *Protagoras*, 356 d.

the light of which the argument must in general be read. Imitation appeals to the faculty that is deceived by the illusions of sense, not to that which is able to correct rationally the variety of appearances. This fact is not confined to the sense of sight, but extends also to hearing and to poetry, which imitates men's strifes and inconsistencies, and their lapses from fortitude in pain and sorrow. These passions, indeed, offer a greater variety for imitation than does the equable temperament; and they appeal especially to a promiscuous crowd. But the imitative poet who aims at being popular is not by nature able, nor is his art intended, to please the rational part of the soul. He is like the painter, in that he is interested in appealing to the lower part of the soul, and in that his creations have an inferior degree of truth. Most important of all, poetry can harm even the good; few escape its evil influence. It calls forth our sympathy for imaginary woes, whereas in real life we restrain our feelings; and out of sentimental pity grows a real weakness. In the same way, the enjoyment of comedy tends to turn us into buffoons. In general, poetry feeds and waters the passions, instead of drying them; it enthrones the passions, rather than the reason.

For these reasons, Plato concludes, we can not accept Homer as an educator, or admit that he is profitable for the ordering of human affairs. We can admit no poetry in our state save hymns to the gods and praises of famous men; for if the Muse of pleasure is admitted, in epic or in lyric verse, the place of law and of universally accepted reason will be usurped by pleasure and pain. In short, there has always been a quarrel between philosophy and poetry; so that the former judgment of exile passed against poetry is justified by the nature of poetry.[1]

If Plato is trying in the tenth book merely to support his former argument, he has proved his case far too well. It is clearly his purpose in this place to damage the cause of poetry as much as he can. In order to do so, he (*a*) makes an inaccurate statement about the conclusion reached in the earlier discussion of art,[2] (*b*) narrows the meaning of the term μίμησις, (*c*) tacitly assumes that the aim of the poet is either to give practical advice or to play on the passions of the mob, (*d*) uses trivial or sophistic arguments which he can not himself have

[1] *Rep.* 607 b: ταιαύτην οὖσαν. [2] Cf. p. 38, n. 1.

regarded as conclusive,[1] and (*e*) does all this in the name of philosophy! Does Plato mean us to take it all seriously? Is it Plato's final judgment on poetry? Is he altogether ingenuous?

Plato himself gives us a clue to help us out of the difficulty. He who listens to poetry should, fearing for the safety of the city *which is within him*, be on his guard against her seductions.[2] That very phrase has just been used[3] of the city which is an ideal that can not be realized.[4] Plato, then, tells us as plainly as words can tell us that poetry is being brought into opposition with an ideal of philosophy such as he himself admits is unattainable. Further, whereas in the earlier discussion of poetry and of art it was in general the higher possibilities of art which Plato had in mind, and which he believed could deal with universals, here it is art as he found it in his own Athens that he condemns. Having sketched his picture of the ideal philosopher and of the absolute knowledge which is to engage his activity, Plato returns to the world about him, as the liberated prisoner of his allegory returns to the cave, and looks once more at the objects from the contemplation of which his fellow-countrymen hope to attain truth; the images of the cave happen to be the poets. In a certain sense, Plato's task is finished when he has pointed the path to the ideal world. But the temptation to imagine this world to be realized is too great; he must needs, in the spirit of the mime, contrast it with our visible world. So he calls into being his Paradiso, the *Civitas Dei*, and to it he opposes feeling and the senses in their most specious form. Of course they seem pale and unsatisfactory shadows when they are confronted with the dazzling radiance of the ideal world. Poetry is, poetry in this world must always be, like opinion, in some degree a makeshift. This is not the time to remember all that Plato has said about the contact of poetry with the ideal world, or, on the other hand, his frequent admissions that dialectic and the Idea of the Good are only ideals of the imagination; if we have the reality, the poet, as an imitator, is of course superfluous. At this stage, we need remember only that the philosopher is the sole hope of man's happiness, and that philosophy

[1] Cf. 600 a–e; note especially οὐκοῦν (600 e). Would Plato regard the number of pupils that the sophists gathered as a trustworthy index of the value of their teachings?

[2] *Rep.* 608 ab. [3] *Ibid.*, 591 e. [4] *Ibid.*, 592 ab.

is the leading of the soul from sense to pure thought. The poet, as he is, has been pronounced to be the ally of the tyrant;[1] he is a sophist;[2] and he is actually taken as an all-sufficient guide.[3]

It is hardly fair, then, to say that Plato's argument is insincere, though it is so complex as to lend itself easily to misunderstanding. Plato himself realizes how great are the chances against his own ideal being taken seriously, even as an ideal;[4] we must not outdo him and suppose that his exile of poetry from a Paradise is tantamount to sober literary criticism.[5] It must be read rather as a dramatic gesture, as a bit of satire on the accredited educators of Hellas. Plato himself adopted the rôle of poet in his sentence against the poets, and the very excess of his argument is almost a sufficient indication that he did not mean us to take him altogether seriously.

The "ancient quarrel," then, is simply the quarrel between sense and thought which we have been tracing. And the whole of the present argument is directed toward showing that any one who is content with the world of sensible things or who is content with imitations of them is thereby cut off from any possibility of real knowledge. If poetry is content with such imitation, it is to be condemned. If Plato seriously meant more than this in the *Republic*, we may expect to find traces of the more severe condemnation in the later dialogues. We may expect also to discover whether the theory of ideas in itself necessarily condemns imitative poetry.

VII

The subject of the *Phaedrus* has been much disputed. Some have held that the subject is love, others that it is rhetoric. Jowett suggests[6] that "the dialogue is not strictly confined to a single subject, but passes from one to another with the freedom of conversation." The unity of the dialogue, however, seems to me to have been estab-

[1] Cf. *Rep.* 568 a–d.

[2] *Protag.* 316 d.

[3] Cf. *Laws*, 701 a.

[4] Cf. *Rep.* 473 e.

[5] As most critics take it. Cf. Zeller[4], ii, pp. 940–945. Stählin, *Die Stellung der Poesie in der Platonischen Philosophie*, following Dümmler, argues (pp. 26 ff.) that Plato is here engaging in a polemic with Antisthenes, and beating him with his own weapons. But Antisthenes would not admit just the theory (of ideas) on which imitative art is here condemned. Cf. pp. 39 f.

[6] Jowett, transl. Plato, i, p. 393; cf. pp. 402 ff.

lished by Bonitz.[1] He has shown that the dialogue falls into two parts: (*a*) the speeches on love, and (*b*) the discussion of rhetoric. These are intimately related, and neither alone is *the* subject. The proposition that Plato is putting forward in the dialogue is this: A speaker must know the truth in order to speak.[2] So Plato echoes almost the words of the myth about love when he comes to deal with rhetoric.[3] This dialogue, then, like several others — the *Protagoras*, the *Euthydemus*, and the *Gorgias* — are examples of an attempt on the part of Plato to carry philosophy over into life, and to make it not merely a theoretical study but a principle of action.[4] Plato is opposing the sophistic rhetoric of his contemporaries and putting before them a philosophical ideal;[5] he tries "to establish the conditions of a philsophical rhetoric,"[6] and to show in what way it is possible to impart the knowledge that he has in theory attained. Although the primary aim of the dialogue is, then, the elucidation of the conditions to which rhetoric should conform, it contains a general statement of the relation of all utterance to truth, and is therefore of concern to us in dealing with our special problem.

In the second discourse of Socrates on love,[7] the speaker distinguishes from the kind of madness which is evil a noble madness. The distinction is made more clear in a later passage, where it appears that the divine sort of madness liberates us from ordinary conventions.[8] The liberating power of this madness is seen in each of its species — in prophecy, in the inspired rites and mysteries that deliver the guilty from sin, in poetry, and in love. Each of these is one of those manifestations of feeling and intuition by which the Greeks supposed that they could pass from the immediate object of sense to something be-

[1] Bonitz, *Platonische Studien*, pp. 270 ff.

[2] Cf. *Phaedrus*, 259 e.

[3] *Ibid.*, 249 bc: *οὐ γὰρ ἥ γε μήποτε ἰδοῦσα τὴν ἀλήθειαν εἰς τόδε ἥξει τὸ σχῆμα. δεῖ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον συνιέναι κατ' εἶδος λεγόμενον, ἐκ πολλῶν ἰὸν αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἓν λογισμῷ συναιρούμενον. τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ἀνάμνησις ἐκείνων, ἃ ποτ' εἶδεν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ συμπορευθεῖσα θεῷ καὶ ὑπεριδοῦσα ἃ νῦν εἶναι φαμεν, καὶ ἀναβλέψασα εἰς τὸ ὂν ὄντως.* 265 d: *εἰς μίαν τε ἰδέαν συνορῶντα ἄγειν τὸ πολλαχῇ διεσπαρμένα, ἵνα ἕκαστον ὁριζόμενος δῆλον ποιῇ, περὶ οὗ ἂν ἀεὶ διδάσκειν ἐθέλῃ.* 273 d: *ἐὰν μή . . . κατ' εἶδη τε διαιρεῖσθαι τὰ ὄντα καὶ μιᾷ ἰδέᾳ δυνατὸς ᾖ καθ' ἓν ἕκαστον περιλαμβάνειν.*

[4] Bonitz, pp. 287 ff.

[5] *Phaedrus*, 257 b.

[6] Lutoslawski, *Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic*, p. 326; cf. 346.

[7] *Phaedrus*, 243 e ff.

[8] *Ibid.*, 265 a.

yond, under the guidance of divinity.[1] So poetry, Plato says, can not be produced by mere art, without the madness of the Muses.[2] Is this, then, simply a reversion to the doctrine of inspiration that was discussed in the *Ion* and mentioned in the *Meno*? And is the criticism of poetry made under the aegis of the theory of ideas here repudiated? We must examine more carefully the nature of the inspiration that is here given as the justification of poetry.[3]

In the account of love, which is the best kind of madness, we are reminded of the earlier dialogue on love, the *Symposium*, in which the love of beautiful objects of sense incited the lover to the love of absolute beauty. In the *Phaedrus*, however, Plato not only attempts to depict the process with greater wealth of mythological detail, but he gives us more hints that enable us to connect the account with his view of poetry proper. The soul is figured as a charioteer with a pair of winged horses; in the human being, the pair is ill-matched, one horse being noble, the other ignoble. The wings, the corporeal element most like the divine, tend to soar to "the upper region which is the habitation of the gods, where is the divine — beauty, wisdom, goodness, and the like — on which the wing is especially nourished."[4] The gods go to the vault of heaven easily, and at the outside of heaven behold "the things beyond."[5] At this point, Plato can hardly find words to describe the vision of the absolute that awaits the charioteers; it is absolute reality; it is without color or form, and is intangible; it is visible only to the intelligence that is at the helm of the soul, and with it true knowledge is concerned. On this feeds the divine intelligence, and the intelligence of every soul that is capable of receiving its proper food. It beholds perfect justice, temperance and knowledge, not under the form of generation or of relation, but in existence absolute.[6] But most souls have difficulty in beholding true being, because their steeds are unruly. Many fail, and feed on opinion instead. So with broken wings, they drop to earth, and are born as men. Those souls that have seen most of truth pass into the body of a philosopher or of a lover of beauty or of some other musical and loving nature.[7]

[1] Cf. pp. 6 ff. [2] *Phaedrus*, 245 a.

[3] *Ibid.*: ἀπὸ Μουσῶν κατοκωχῇ τε καὶ μανίᾳ, λαβοῦσα ἁπαλὴν καὶ ἄβατον ψυχήν, ἐγείρουσα καὶ ἐκβακχεύουσα κατά τε ᾠδὰς καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ποίησιν.

[4] *Ibid.*, 246 a–e. [5] *Ibid.*, 247 c. [6] *Ibid.*, 247 c–e.

[7] *Ibid.*, 248 d: φιλοσόφου ἢ φιλοκάλου ἢ μουσικοῦ τινος καὶ ἐρωτικοῦ.

The others, according to the degree of truth they have beheld, pass into other classes. In the sixth class are found poets and other imitative artists. All must undergo a period of probation, in order to grow their wings again, and to determine what form they are to assume in their next transformation.[1] Then, in the midst of this highly poetical passage, we are told in purely logical language of the principle that governs the choice of these forms: the human form is reserved for those only who have seen the truth; and this vision is nothing else than the vision of universals, generalized from particular perceptions.[2] When Plato comes to apply the present discussion to the subject of rhetoric, he will not pretend that everything in this myth was uttered seriously, but two principles were implied in his discourse the effectiveness of which he would be glad if art could set forth; these are, the comprehension of particulars under a single idea, and, conversely, the division of wholes into parts according to natural species.[3] This power of division and generalization,[4] the power of seeing a One and a Many in nature, is a faculty of which Socrates is very fond; it is, indeed, the mark of the dialectician, as distinguished from the mere rhetorician; it is the most important part of the reformed art of rhetoric that Socrates sketches.[5]

By dialectic, therefore, man is to try to recover the vision of reality. We must notice, however, that whereas the dialectic described in the sixth and seventh books of the *Republic* is entirely free from any

[1] *Phaedrus*, 249 b.

[2] *Ibid.*, 249 bc: *οὐ γὰρ ἥ γε μήποτε ἰδοῦσα τὴν ἀλήθειαν εἰς τόδε ἥξει τὸ σχῆμα. δεῖ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον συνιέναι κατ' εἶδος λεγόμενον, ἐκ πολλῶν ἰὸν αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἓν λογισμῷ συναιρούμενον. τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ἀνάμνησις ἐκείνων ἃ ποτ' εἶδεν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ συμπορευθεῖσα θεῷ καὶ ὑπεριδοῦσα ἃ νῦν εἶναί φαμεν, καὶ ἀνακύψασα εἰς τὸ ὂν ὄντως. . . . διὸ δὴ δικαίως μόνη πτεροῦται ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου διάνοια· πρὸς γὰρ ἐκείνοις ἀεί ἐστιν μνήμῃ κατὰ δύναμιν, πρὸς οἷσπερ θεὸς ὢν θεῖός ἐστιν.*

[3] *Ibid.*, 265 c ff.: *ἐμοὶ μὲν φαίνεται τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τῷ ὄντι παιδιᾷ πεπαῖσθαι· τούτων δὲ τινων ἐκ τύχης ῥηθέντων δυοῖν εἰδοῖν, εἰ αὐτοῖν τὴν δύναμιν τέχνῃ λαβεῖν δύναιτό τις, οὐκ ἄχαρι . . . (a) εἰς μίαν τε ἰδέαν συνορῶντα ἄγειν τὰ πολλαχῇ διεσπαρμένα, ἵνα ἕκαστον ὁριζόμενος δῆλον ποιῇ περὶ οὗ ἂν ἀεὶ διδάσκειν ἐθέλῃ . . . (b) τὸ πάλιν κατ' εἴδη δύνασθαι διατέμνειν κατ' ἄρθρα ᾗ πέφυκεν . . . κτλ.* The first of these principles is that discussed in 249 bc; the second, though not expressly mentioned till 265 e, is the one on which the second speech of Socrates was constructed, as he proceeds to show.

[4] *Ibid.*, 266 b: *τῶν διαιρέσεων καὶ συναγωγῶν.*

[5] Cf. *ibid.*, 377 bc.

contamination of sense, the *Phaedrus* recognizes two forms of dialectic, a higher and a lower.[1] So it is necessary for all who are to become men to proceed *from the particulars of sense* to one form comprehended by reason;[2] and this process is expressly affirmed to be the reminiscence of reality.[3] The process is not different, therefore, from that which was described in the *Phaedo*,[4] in that there is a passage from *sensibilia* to the idea by means of *ἀνάμνησις*. This, apart from the imagery and the conception of the preëxistence of the soul, means that the experience of individual objects of sense may lead one to envisage directly an idea that one possesses *a priori*.[5] This process is to be distinguished from the higher dialectic, in which the memories of these ideas are used,[6] and by which only one can attain to a perfect initiation into the mysteries. That is the higher dialectic that was sketched in the *Republic*.

So far the description of the regained vision of reality has been given in general terms. The soul beheld beauty, wisdom, goodness, and the like,[7] justice, temperance, and absolute knowledge.[8] But at this point Plato restricts the description so as to include, as the channel by which the vision of reality is recaptured, only one concept — that of earthly beauty.[9] The reason that Plato gives for this restriction is significant. It is hard for man to recall the things of the other world, which he may have seen imperfectly, and the memory of which may have been impaired during this life. Few, indeed, retain it; and when they do per-

[1] Cf. Adam, ed. *Rep.* ii, pp. 173 f. [2] *Ibid.*, 249 c.
[3] *Phaedrus*, 249 b. [4] Cf. *Phaedo*, 73 c; 75 ab. [5] Cf. pp. 26 f.
[6] *Phaedrus*, 249 c: *τοῖς δὲ δὴ τοιούτοις ἀνὴρ ὑπομνήμασιν ὀρθῶς χρώμενος.*
[7] *Ibid.*, 246 de. [8] *Ibid.*, 247 d.
[9] *Ibid.*, 249 d: *ὅταν τὸ τῇδέ τις ὁρῶν κάλλος κτλ.* W. H. Thompson, in his edition of the *Phaedrus* (London, 1868), has a good note on 249 c (*ἔστι δὴ οὖν δεῦρο*). He points out the fact that the brilliant episode just concluded was designed as a picture of the fourth madness, that of love, or rather as a theory of the philosophic habit of mind. "Why is this enthusiasm to be styled Love, and what have the two states of consciousness in common? . . . Beauty furnishes the connecting link. Beauty, the object of Love, is one of the Ideas, and it is that one of which alone the world of sense presents a vivid and approximately adequate resemblance. The transition from ideal truth in general to this particular variety, in other words from *τὸ ὄν* to *τὸ καλόν*, had been prepared by the vivid imagery of the *ὑπερουράνιος τοπεία*, and the speaker is able to slip in the word *κάλλος* at the very commencement of this portion of the discourse, as if it were synonymous with *τὸ ὄν*, and had formed the subject of the foregoing episode, when in fact it has never once been mentioned."

ceive an image[1] of reality, they are bewildered, because their perceptions are inadequate. Moreover, in the images of justice and temperance and other precious ideas there is no gleam of light, so that they are dimly beheld, and few can pass from the contemplation of them to the contemplation of their originals. But beauty was beheld in the other world shining brightly;[2] and we who have come to earth find her shining here, too, by means of our clearest sense — that of sight.[3] For though sight can not behold wisdom, it is yet the sharpest of the senses; and beauty alone of the objects of desire, has the privilege of being the most lovely and the most palpable.[4] The perception of beauty in this world therefore incites the lover to the sight of absolute beauty,[5] and the wings grow anew, though the recollection may be tardy, if the lover's initiation is not recent.[6]

The meaning of all this discussion appears to be this: it is possible by the perception of visible beauty to gain an immediate apprehension of truth. Sensible objects, to be sure, are not affirmed to be real — Plato does not in the *Phaedrus* raise this point so explicitly as in the *Phaedo* — but they may put us in mind of beauty itself. So at least a part of our inquiry is answered;[7] we find that the theory of ideas, which is by no means given up in the *Phaedrus*, is not an obstacle to the passage of the mind from the world of sense to truth; it is rather a bridge. Neither has the figure of image and original been dropped,[8] though it is not employed in such a wooden way as in the tenth book of the *Republic*.

[1] ὁμοίωμα, *Phaedrus*, 250 a. [2] *Ibid.*, 250 b. [3] *Ibid.*, 250 d.

[4] *Ibid.*: νῦν δὲ κάλλος μόνον ταύτην ἔσχε μοῖραν ὥστ' ἐκφανέστατον εἶναι καὶ ἐρασμιώτατον.

[5] *Ibid.*, 250 e: ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε φέρεται πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ κάλλος.

[6] It would be hard to say how much of the thought and language in this remarkable passage is of Orphic origin or derived from the Mysteries. It will suffice to notice the phrases: ἐνθουσιάσεων, 249 e; λήθην . . . μνήμης, 250 a; θεῶνται . . . θεάν, 250 b; ἐτελοῦντο τῶν τελετῶν . . . μακαριωτάτην, 250 b; ὠργιάζομεν, 250 c; μυούμενοί τε καὶ ἐποπτεύοντες ἐν αὐγῇ καθαρᾷ, καθαροὶ ὄντες, 250 c; ἀσήμαντοι . . . σῶμα, 250 c; νεοτελῆς, 250 e. But more important than the use of such language is the idea that underlies it; the idea that it is possible by the contemplation of sensible objects to suffer initiation into a blessed state in which one beholds reality. The Plato who wrote the *Republic* might have used there such ecstatic language about the contemplation of ideas; the significant thing is that it is used here to connect the world of ideas with sensible objects.

[7] Cf. p. 56. [8] Cf. ὁμοίωμα, *Phaedrus*, 250 a; εἰκόνας, 250 b; εἴδωλον, 250 d.

So much may be granted by every reader of the *Phaedrus*. Possibly it may be objected, however, that we have here only a general account of the aesthetic experience, somewhat idealized, and that little has been said of poetry proper. It may be admitted that Plato places the lover of beauty in the same class with the philosopher; [1] but it is in the very same passage that the imitative poet is placed in the sixth rank.[2] The reason is not, however, far to seek. Plato is giving, as we have just said, an idealized account of the aesthetic experience: this may well be compared with the account of the higher dialectic given in the *Republic*. It is exactly because such an experience can not be completely realized that Plato is unable to give a description of the super-celestial region that is any more clearly defined.[3] The imitative poet, whom Plato has already criticized, so far as he is content with mere images, could not at best attain to the same level that is reached, theoretically, by the lover of beauty; [4] he must, then, perforce be ranked lower. In the assigning of ranks I think we must recognize a certain spirit of humor, another touch of the mime; [5] the poet comes after the politician, the economist, the trader, the gymnast, the physician, and the hierophant. If, on the other hand, we are required to suppose that Plato was serious in his arrangement of ranks, we must notice that the imitative poet is here ranked above the artisan. How that is to be reconciled with the fact that the imitative poet was ranked below the artisan in the tenth book of the *Republic* is a question that I leave to those critics who hold that Plato was always in earnest when he attacked the poets. Perhaps it may serve the rest of us as a warning against too great literalness of interpretation.

Yet there is one more passage in the *Phaedrus* that will help us to understand the bearing of the dialogue on poetry proper. We remember that the object of the dialogue is to give an idea of the conditions of a truly philosophical rhetoric, a rhetoric that is to be different from that of Plato's contemporaries. The method involves an account of

[1] *Phaedrus*, 248 d. [2] *Ibid.*, 248 e.

[3] Cf. Jowett, transl. Plato, i, p. 413: "This is because force of language can no further go."

[4] Cf. *Phaedrus*, 277 e f: *οὐδένα πώποτε λόγον ἐν μέτρῳ οὐδ' ἄνευ μέτρου μεγάλης ἄξιον σπουδῆς γραφῆναι . . . ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι αὐτῶν τοὺς βελτίστους εἰδότων ὑπόμνησιν γεγονέναι.*

[5] Cf. 265 c.

the nature of truth, and of the approach to truth from sensible things by generalization, and the deduction of particulars from an idea by natural division. Near the end of the dialogue, Plato, having briefly applied these principles to the art of rhetoric, sends an imaginary message to "Lysias and the other writers of speeches." And here, we must notice, although the discussion has been in the main on the principles of rhetoric, Plato goes out of his way to include the poets: they, and the political writers, if their compositions are based on such knowledge of the truth as surpasses their poor compositions, deserve the name of philosophers; if they can not rise above their compilations, they are mere poets and speech makers.[1] If Plato's main subject in this dialogue had been the conditions of a philosophical poetry, we should undoubtedly have more indications of the methods by which the vision of truth was to be realized in poetry;[2] as it is, the notable thing is that Plato cared at all to pause in his argument to give us the clues by which we are enabled to relate his view of the aesthetic experience as a whole, by means of the theory of ideas, to his view of poetry. Perhaps, then, it is not too much to say that Plato in this manner answers the question that he raised in the *Ion* about poetic inspiration; he does not, indeed, do away with the conception and the language of inspiration,[3] but he replaces it in his mind by the conception of the state of enthusiasm that the vision of beauty produces in its lover. In a word, then, inspiration by a god gives place to inspiration by the vision of the ideas.

VIII

In the *Laws*, Plato is describing a "second best state";[4] he is not, therefore, concerned with the conditions of an ideal state that can not

[1] *Phaedrus*, 278 c–e: καὶ Ὁμήρῳ καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος αὖ ποίησιν ψιλὴν ἢ ἐν ᾠδῇ συντέθηκε . . . εἰ μὲν εἰδὼς ἦ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔχει συντέθηκε ταῦτα, καὶ ἔχων βοηθεῖν, εἰς ἔλεγχον ἰὼν περὶ ὧν ἔγραψε, καὶ λέγων αὐτὸς δυνατὸς τὰ γεγραμμένα φαῦλα ἀποδεῖξαι, οὐ τι τῶνδε ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχοντα δεῖ λέγεσθαι τὸ τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ' . . . ἢ φιλόσοφον ἢ τοιοῦτόν τι . . . Οὐκοῦν αὖ τὸν μὴ ἔχοντα τιμιώτερα ὧν συνέθηκεν ἢ ἔγραψεν . . . ἐν δίκῃ που ποιητήν . . . προσερεῖς;

[2] He does incidentally throw out hints of great value. So in 264 e and 268 c–e, we find the principle of the organic unity of a composition. On the use made of this by Aristotle, cf. Finsler, *Platon und die Aristotelische Poetik*, pp. 50, 177.

[3] Cf. *Phaedrus*, 245 a.

[4] *Laws*, 739 a; 807 b.

be realized. Yet he does not abandon the theory of ideas.[1] In his criticism of poetry, he does not once suggest, however, that poetry can not imitate reality; on the contrary, he expressly enjoins that it shall imitate universals. In the second book, he explains that the object of early education is to train the young in right opinions and habits of character.[2] Education is, in a word, the attempt to bring the soul into harmony with reason and law.[3] The legislator, therefore, will persuade or compel the poet to express the character of good men;[4] he should be compelled to say that the good man, if he is temperate, is fortunate;[5] and he "shall compose nothing contrary to the idea of the lawful, or the just, or the beautiful, or the good, which are allowed in the state."[6] So poetry is to be subject to a censorship.[7] For Plato still opposes the sort of poetry that exists in his own day; the poets are now subject to no restrictions, and so introduce whatever novelties they think will please and flatter their audience.[8] They also are responsible for the idea that injustice can be expiated by sacrifices.[9] So far, then, Plato's criticism in the *Laws* is much like that of the second and third books of the *Republic*. He is not satisfied with poetry as it is, for it inculcates bad moral notions and seeks rather to appeal to the mob than to assist in the reign of reason and law.

But Plato goes farther than that. He actually raises again the question whether comedy and tragedy are to be admitted in the state that he is planning, and, with certain restrictions, admits them. For comedy, he finds, is essential to a complete understanding of things, and may teach us what sort of folly we should avoid.[10] But only slaves and hirelings are to be allowed to impersonate comic characters;[11] and the comic writers shall be admitted only on the condition that their ridicule shall be mere pleasantry, not bitter and serious vilification of citizens.[12] What is to be said to the tragic writers, if they beg to be admitted to the state? Plato cautiously but definitely admits them, provided that they will submit to the censorship. He, too, is a crea-

[1] Cf. *Laws*, 965.
[2] *Ibid.*, 653 ff.; cf. 815 d ff.
[3] *Ibid.*, 659 d.
[4] *Ibid.*, 660 a.
[5] *Ibid.*, 660 e.
[6] *Ibid.*, 801 c.
[7] *Ibid.*, 802 a.
[8] *Ibid.*, 660 b; 668 a ff.; 700 a–701 a.
[9] *Ibid.*, 885 d; cf. 716 e; 906–907; cf. *Rep.* 363 e–366 b.
[10] *Laws*, 816 d; cf. p. 31, n. 6.
[11] *Ibid.*, 816 e; cf. *Rep.* 395 b ff.
[12] *Laws*, 935 d ff.

tive poet, and their rival, and will not be so mad as to brook their intrusion, unless they can convince his censors that their ideals are at least not inconsistent with his.[1] This passage may be regarded as Plato's answer to *Republic* 607 b ff. In the earlier passage, Plato is working from sense to thought, from particular to universal. Finding poets, as they exist, to be an obstruction, he resorts to the poetical expedient of banishing them. His motive there, as he tells us, is the building of a city;[2] and this city proves to be not any actual city, by the time that the exile of the poets is decreed, but a city expressly devoted to the fulfilment of an ideal which Plato admits is unattainable. In the *Laws*, Plato is speaking as a poet,[3] but as a poet who has achieved a greater degree of truth and hence a greater seriousness of purpose than other poets. When he undertakes here to step back into the world of sense, he welcomes the coöperation of these other poets, so far as their aims can be made to fall in with his own. Indeed, when we remember the dramatic character of the whole discussion, it is perhaps not too much to say that Plato is himself speaking in the mouths of the petitioning poets, as well as in the mouths of the legislators. Since he has once used the image of a state and of exiled poets to express the conception of a conflict between thought and sense, he adheres to it in the expression of a partial reconciliation. If this be true, Plato is himself definitely announcing his own belief in an austere and chastened poetry as a vehicle for the realization of his ideals. The poetic faculty is still irresponsible;[4] yet the inspiration[5] of the poet is to be enlisted in the discovery of the best hymns.[6] Thus the legislator (i.e. the philosopher) does not surrender the right which he claimed in the *Republic*, of laying down the forms to which the poets are to submit;[7] but he is more friendly to the poets than he was in the *Republic*, since he is now dealing with a possible commonwealth more like ordinary Greek states.[8] If he had written the third plan of

[1] *Laws*, 817 a–d.

[2] *Rep.* 378 e: *οὐκ ἐσμὲν ποιηταὶ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ἀλλ' οἰκισταὶ πόλεως.*

[3] *Laws*, 817 b. [4] *Ibid.*, 670 e; 682 a.

[5] *Ibid.*, 802 b; 682 a. Note also that there is to be a variety in the songs, in order that the singers may not weary of them (665 c); this is a greater liberty than was allowed in the *Republic* (cf. *Rep.* 399 e). [6] *Laws*, 802 b.

[7] *Rep.* 379 a. [8] Cf. Jowett, transl. Plato, v, pp. ccxiii ff.

a state that he contemplated,[1] might he not have recognized the poets even more fully ?[2]

IX

In all these dialogues we have seen Plato struggling with the problem of the opposition between sense and thought. Reality can be apprehended only by thought, yet we live in a world of sense; poetry can be approved only if it helps us to pass from sense to thought. It remains for us to consider a number of indications that Plato has given of the way that he viewed the opposition, indications widely scattered in the dialogues, giving evidence of a persistently held attitude. As in the *Symposium*, the *Phaedo*, the *Republic*, and the *Phaedrus* the lover of beauty climbs from beautiful things up to beauty itself, he comes back in the other direction, Plato hints at times, to express this vision in the world of sense.

We must note, then, in the first place, the difficulty that Plato finds in expressing the relation of the world of sense to the world of ideas. In every case he has to resort to a metaphor, though no single phrase is altogether satisfactory.[3] He can show us the Good only through the "child of the Good." The reason is that our minds can not easily grasp abstract ideas without visible symbols.[4] But it is because the ideas are in some way represented in the world of sense, however imperfectly, that we begin our search for them. So the discussions in the *Symposium*, the *Phaedo*, and the *Phaedrus* imply the existence of the universal beauty in particular things, not necessarily in "works of art," but among beautiful things of all sorts.[5] It is only because of a

[1] *Laws*, 739 c.

[2] Finsler suggests (*Platon und die Aristotelische Poetik*, pp. 243 f.) that Plato's views in the *Laws*, though reflecting the struggle through which he had passed, represent almost a return to those of his youth. Possibly this is going too far; yet it is not mere caprice that sees in the partial reconciliation of the *Laws* something like the aspiration for a purified love of beauty that we find in the *Symposium*.

[3] *μέθεξις*, *παρουσία*, *κοινωνία*, *παράδειγμα*, *μίμησις* are all used with a show of dissatisfaction.

[4] *Theaetetus*, 149 c: *ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις ἀσθενεστέρα ἢ λαβεῖν τέχνην ὧν ἂν ᾖ ἄπειρος*; *Politicus*, 277 d: *χαλεπὸν . . . μὴ παραδείγμασι χρώμενον ἱκανῶς ἐνδείκνυσθαί τι τῶν μειζόνων κτλ*; *Phaedrus*, 262 c: *ψιλῶς πως λέγομεν οὐκ ἔχοντες ἱκανὰ παραδείγματα*. Cf. *Tim.* 47 a; *Sophist*, 224 d. These passages, and others, are cited by Shorey, *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 45.

[5] Cf. *Rep.* 402 a–d.

contact with beauty itself, in a past existence or as the goal of present activity, that particular things are appreciated as beautiful; on the other hand, the start toward beauty in this life comes only because of contact with particular beautiful things.

It is possible, then, for a universal idea to find expression in sensible form. This may mean simply the shaping of material for a certain purpose: so the workman, if a shuttle is broken, will use not the broken instrument as a model for a new one, but the imagined shuttle which expresses the essential nature of the shuttle.[1] Indeed, this conception of an ideal to which the artisan " looks " is a favorite one with Plato.[2] The orator, likewise, should have an ideal in view.[3] The ideal may be only an imaginary perfection, such as we never see in our visible world; yet it may be exactly such an ideal that an artist sets himself to depict.[4] Such a procedure is Plato's own purpose in seeking for perfect justice.[5] Yet the philosopher who has gained a vision of truth will be no mean artificer of virtue.[6] When the divine Demiourgos of the *Timaeus* stamps the ideas upon the matter, using the unchangeable as his model, his creations are fair; when he uses the changeable, they are not fair;[7] but in ordinary life we have to admit that the good is a mixture of different qualities and to accept music although it is an impure form of knowledge.[8] The value of any sort of imitation, Plato holds, depends on the extent to which the imitator knows the thing that he professes to imitate; so the sophist is criticized because he has no knowledge of virtue. But there is such a thing as a scientific or

[1] *Cratylus*, 389 b: *βλέπων πρὸς ἐκεῖνο τὸ εἶδος πρὸς ὅπερ καὶ ἦν κατέαξεν ἐποίει; . . . Οὐκοῦν . . . πάσας μὲν δεῖ τὸ τῆς κερκίδος ἔχειν εἶδος, οἷα δ' ἑκάστῳ καλλίστη ἐπεφύκει, ταύτην ἀποδιδόναι τὴν φύσιν εἰς τὸ ἔργον ἕκαστον.*

[2] Cf. *Rep.* 596 b: *Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰώθαμεν λέγειν ὅτι ὁ δημιουργὸς ἑκατέρου τοῦ σκεύους πρὸς τὴν ἰδέαν βλέπων οὕτω ποιεῖ ὁ μὲν τὰς κλίνας, ὁ δὲ τὰς τραπέζας, κτλ. . . .; οὐ γάρ που τήν γε ἰδέαν αὐτὴν δημιουργεῖ οὐδεὶς τῶν δημιουργῶν.* Cf. *Timaeus*, 28 a.

[3] *Gorgias*, 503 e ff. Note the phrase *ἀποβλέπων πρός τι.*

[4] *Rep.* 472 d. In the words *οἷον ἂν εἴη*, Plato of course foreshadows the words *οἷα ἂν γένοιτο*, with which Aristotle introduces the discussion of the difference between history and poetry (*Poetics*, 1450 a 38).

[5] *Rep.* 472 c: *παραδείγματος ἅρα ἕνεκα . . . ἐζητοῦμεν αὐτό τε δικαιοσύνην οἷόν ἐστι, καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν τελέως δίκαιον εἰ γένοιτο, καὶ οἷος ἂν εἴη γενόμενος . . . ἀλλ' οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα, ἵν' ἀποδείξωμεν ὡς δυνατὰ ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι.*

[6] *Rep.* 500 d. Cf. *Politicus*, 308 c–309 d.

[7] *Timaeus*, 28 a.

[8] *Philebus*, 61 f.

learned sort of imitation, differing from the other in that the imitator has a knowledge of the things that he imitates.[1] So far as universals (not merely *sensibilia*) are known, then, Plato would admit the possibility of imitating them.[2]

It is not hard to apply the notion of imitation in sculpture and painting, from which the notion of copy and original may well have been derived in the first place and transferred to the vocabulary of the theory of ideas.[3] How ideas are to be expressed in other media is a more difficult problem. Yet Plato believed that not only can a physical shape be expressed in different materials,[4] but physical and mental qualities can be imitated in painting and music,[5] and beauty is to be found embodied in different forms.[6] That is because things are similar to each other by reason of their relation to the same idea;[7] and in this way it is possible to speak of spiritual beauty.[8] So the problem that confronts the artist is that of correctness of imitation;[9] he must, since music is imitative, seek that which represents the beautiful.[10] Although Plato's illustrations here have been drawn chiefly from music and sculpture, the same principles hold, he affirms, in the other arts.[11] And it is precisely because the poets of Plato's time deny the existence of any such standard of correctness that they are censured.[12]

[1] *Sophist*, 267 d: *τὴν δὲ μετ' ἐπιστήμην ἱστορικήν τινα μίμησιν.*

[2] It has been held that since in the *Republic* the poets are always regarded as imitators, the admission of certain kinds of poetry is tantamount to a distinction between a true and a false imitation. Cf. *Finsler, Platon und die Aristotelische Poetik*, p. 22.

[3] Cf. Lévêque, cited, p. 23.

[4] *Cratylus*, 389 d ff.

[5] *Politicus*, 306 c.

[6] *Symposium*, 210.

[7] *Symp.* 210 a; cf. *Tim.* 52 a: *τὸ δ' ὁμώνυμον ὁμοιόν τε ἐκείνῳ δεύτερον*; *Parmen.* 148 a. *τὸ δέ που ταὐτὸν πεπονθὸς ὅμοιον.*

[8] *Symp.* 218 e.

[9] *Laws*, 667 b: *ὀρθότητα.*

[10] *Ibid.*, 668 b: *ἐκείνην τὴν ἔχουσαν τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῷ τοῦ καλοῦ μιμήματι . . . μιμήσεως γὰρ ἦν . . . ὀρθότης, εἰ τὸ μιμηθὲν ὅσον τε καὶ οἷον ἦν ἀποτελοῖτο.*

[11] *Ibid.*, 669 a: *περὶ ἑκάστην εἰκόνα, καὶ ἐν γραφικῇ καὶ ἐν μουσικῇ καὶ πάντῃ, τὸν μέλλοντα ἔμφρονα κριτὴν ἔσεσθαι δεῖ ταῦτα τρία ἔχειν, ὅ τί ἐστι πρῶτον γιγνώσκειν, ἔπειτα ὡς ὀρθῶς, ἔπειθ' ὡς εὖ, τὸ τρίτον, εἴργασται τῶν εἰκόνων ῥήμασί τε καὶ μέλεσι καὶ τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς.*

[12] Cf. *ibid.*, 700 e: *μουσικῆς ἅπαντες ὑπ' ἀνοίας καταψευδόμενοι ὡς ὀρθότητα μὲν οὐκ ἔχοι, οὐδ' ἡντινοῦν μουσική, ἡδονῇ δὲ τῇ τοῦ χαίροντος, εἴτε βελτίων εἴτε χείρων ἂν εἴη τις, κρίνοιτο ὀρθότατα.*

Clearly, however, there are many things in the world of ideas that can not in any literal sense be imitated in the visible world. This Plato recognizes. Yet he holds that it is possible to appeal to the soul through the eyes and the ears in such a way that it shall be properly disposed toward the truth, because good habits are inculcated and fostered. So the dances of the unwarlike Muse express an escape from danger or labor into good, or the preservation and increase of former good.[1] Music, in a similar way is to be used to symbolize the character of a brave man, and should be adapted to the words, rather than the words to the music;[2] indeed, Plato's objection to instrumental music without words is the difficulty presented to the hearer of recognizing that any worthy object is being imitated by it.[3] His perception of the difficulty of explaining in just what way music and words are related to ideas may be traced in his diction.[4] Indeed the relation is one that can not be precisely stated, any more than could the hierophant at the mysteries always say why certain rites and symbols were supposed to give access to grace. Plato would have to admit, as Aristotle said of the mysteries,[5] that the hearer of music does not learn anything so much as feel certain emotions and fall into a certain frame of mind. It can not be doubted, however, that Plato had in mind also a notion of the relation of mathematics to ethics.[6]

We have come very near to the heart of Plato's conception of poetry. When he remarks in the *Republic* that he is afraid that he is speaking like a tragic poet,[7] he means only that he is speaking metaphorically; for he has half revealed, half hidden in symbolic language the truth that he would fain express. And that is the trait of the poet.[8] Enigmatical or figurative language may be used to darken counsel,[9] or to hint

[1] *Laws*, 815 de. [2] *Rep.* 399 e. [3] *Ibid.*, 669 e.

[4] *Ibid.*, 399 a 6: μιμήσαιτο; 399 c 3: μιμήσονται; 400 a 2: ἕπεσθαι; 400 a 7: ποῖα δ'ὁποίου βίου μιμήματα; 400 b 3: πρέπουσαι; 400 c 7: ἀκολουθεῖ; 400 d 2: ἕπεται ὁμοιούμενον; 400 d 5: ταῦτά γε λόγῳ ἀκολουθητέον; 400 d 7: τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς ἤθει ἕπεται; 400 e 1: ἀκολουθεῖ; 401 a 7: ἀδελφά τε καὶ μιμήματα; *Phileb.* 17 d: ἔν τε ταῖς κινήσεσιν αὖ τοῦ σώματος ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἐνόντα πάθη γιγνόμενα; *Laws*, 661 c 7: ἐπομένους; 956 a 6: χρώματα δὲ λευκὰ πρέποντ' ἂν θεοῖς εἴη.

[5] Cf. p. 8, n. 5. [6] Cf. *Gorgias*, 507 e.

[7] *Rep.* 413 b: τραγικῶς . . . κινδυνεύω λέγειν.

[8] *Rep.* 332 b: Ἠινίξατο ἄρα . . . ὁ Σιμωνίδης ποιητικῶς τὸ δίκαιον δ εἴη.

[9] II *Alcibiades*, 147 b: αἰνίττεται . . . καὶ οὗτος καὶ ἄλλοι δὲ ποιηταὶ σχεδόν τι πάντες. ἔστιν τε γὰρ φύσει ποιητικὴ ἡ σύμπασα αἰνιγματώδης καὶ οὐ τοῦ προστυχόντος

at deep truths.[1] The poet, then, or the enigma maker, puts something *for* the truth, something that shall affect his hearer in such a way as to let him pass on to an immediate grasp of the truth. The poet, as seer, has beheld the truth; it is as artist that he seeks to convey it by means of images.[2] We have therefore come back to the problem that puzzled Socrates in the *Phaedo;* how is the poet who has conceived an idea that embodies truth to find the images that will constitute a myth ?[3] Socrates is represented as perplexed by the difficulty of finding a myth that will express a certain abstract idea. This, it appears, is his conception of the end of poetry; for, although he recognizes that philosophy is the greatest form of music,[4] nevertheless when he is convinced by a dream that he should apply himself to music in the popular sense, he tries for the first time to compose poetry. First he composes hymns to the god of the festival;[5] then he reflects that the mark of a poet is the invention of myths, not reasoned discourse,[6] and so, adopting some myths from Aesop, he sets them to music.[7] In this distinction between *μῦθος* and *λόγος*, here made by Socrates in the *Phaedo*, Plato perseveres.[8]

ἀνδρὸς γνωρίσαι· ὅτι τε πρὸς τῷ φύσει τοιαύτη εἶναι, ὅταν λάβηται ἀνδρὸς φθονεροῦ τε καὶ μὴ βουλομένου ἡμῖν ἐνδείκνυσθαι ἀλλ' ἀποκρύπτεσθαι ὅτι μάλιστα τὴν αὑτοῦ σοφίαν ὑπερφυῶς δὴ τὸ χρῆμα ὡς δύσγνωστον φαίνεται ὅτι ποτὲ νοοῦσιν ἕκαστος αὐτῶν.

[1] *Phaedo*, 69 c: *καὶ κινδυνεύουσι καὶ οἱ τὰς τελετὰς ἡμῖν οὗτοι καταστήσαντες οὐ φαῦλοί τινες εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι πάλαι αἰνίττεσθαι ὅτι ὃς ἂν ἀμύητος καὶ ἀτέλεστος εἰς Ἅιδου ἀφίκηται ἐν βορβόρῳ κείσεται, ὁ δὲ κεκαθαρμένος τε καὶ τετελεσμένος ἐκεῖσε ἀφικόμενος μετὰ θεῶν οἰκήσει. εἰσὶν γὰρ δή, φασιν οἱ περὶ τὰς τελετάς, "ναρθηκοφόροι μὲν πολλοί, βάκχοι δέ τε παῦροι."*

[2] Aristotle has interpreted Plato somewhat narrowly; but his general conception is the same. Cf. *Poetics*, 1459 a 5 ff.: *πολὺ δὲ μέγιστον τὸ μεταφορικὸν εἶναι, μόνον γὰρ τοῦτο οὔτε παρ' ἄλλου ἔστι λαβεῖν εὐφυίας τε σημεῖόν ἐστιν. τὸ γὰρ εὖ μεταφέρειν τὸ τὸ ὅμοιον θεωρεῖν ἐστίν.* Cf. also *Met.* 1. 982 b 18: *ὁ φιλόμυθος φιλόσοφός πώς ἐστιν.*

[3] *Phaedo*, 60 c ff. [4] *Ibid.*, 61 a. [5] *Ibid.*, 61 b: *εἰς τὸ θεὸν ἐποίησα.*

[6] *Ibid.*, *ἐνοήσας ὅτι τὸν ποιητὴν δέοι, εἴπερ μέλλοι ποιητὴς εἶναι, ποιεῖν μύθους ἀλλ' οὐ λόγους.* Cf. Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1451 b 27: *τὸν ποιητὴν μᾶλλον τῶν μύθων εἶναι δεῖ ποιητὴν ἢ τῶν μέτρων. ὅσῳ ποιητής κατὰ τὴν μίμησίν ἐστι, μιμεῖται δὲ τὰς πράξεις.* Aristotle's point is approached from a different interest, but it is identical. Cf. Plutarch, *Πῶς δεῖ τὸν νέον ποιημάτων ἀκούειν*, p. 16 b; there is no *ποίησις ἄμυθος οὐδὲ ἀψευδής.* [7] *ἐτείνας, Phaedo*, 60 d.

[8] Burnet (on *Phaed.* 61 b 4), cites *Gorgias*, 523 a 1; *Protagoras*, 324 d 6; *Timaeus*, 26 e 4. In each case, *μῦθος* stands for fiction, contrasted with *λόγος*, which is fact.

So much has been written about Plato's myths that it seems unnecessary for me here to discuss them in detail. In general, I am glad to be able to agree with Stewart in holding that the myths are to be distinguished from allegory; they do not take the place of reasoned discourse.[1] They appeal rather to that "part of the soul" which expresses itself not in "theoretic judgments" but in "value-judgments," or rather in "value-feelings." Plato never resorts to myths when his meaning could be adequately stated in logical formulae. Hence he is always careful to explain that he does not affirm his myths to be true in detail, or real objects to correspond with each part of them.[2] He does hold, on the other hand, that one would do well to act on the belief that they are in some sense true.[3] They are, perhaps, like the "noble lie."[4]

How does Plato himself believe that the poet[5] comes to find the particular images that are to assist his hearers to contemplate truth?

[1] *The Myths of Plato*, pp. 20 ff. [2] Cf. pp. 69 f.

[3] *Phaedo*, 110; 114 d; *Rep.* 621 b; *Phaedrus*, 252 c; 265 c; 274 c; *Politicus*, 277 a.

[4] Cf. *Rep.* 414 b ff.; 377 de; *Politicus*, 309.

[5] It may be convenient at this point to ask in what sense Plato regarded the poet as a creator. The word ποίημα was at first used of any sort of created thing. So Herodotus speaks of ποιήματα χρύσεα (4. 5), or ποιήματα χάλκεα καὶ σιδήρεα (2. 135). In this sense, too, Plato could speak of the ποιητής of a κλίνη (*Rep.* 597 d). Plato also distinguishes the ποίησις that is carried on by man from the divine creation (*Sophist*, 266 d θείας ἔργα ποιήσεως; cf. *Symp.* 197 a: τῶν ζῴων ποίησιν πάντων). He distinguishes likewise between the general meaning of ποίησις as a creation of something that did not previously exist (*Symp.* 205 bc; *Sophist*, 265 b), and the special meaning of the word as applied to metrical composition (*Symp.* 205 c. So *Protag.* 325 e; *Rep.* 600 a; *Laws*, 802 b, refer to the poet simply in the accepted and narrowed sense. *Gorg.* 449 d; 502 a; *Rep.* 394 c; *Phaedrus*, 245 a, 278 c, refer to poetry specifically as concerned with metre and music). In this sense, the poets leave creations, that is, the poems which are their offspring (*Symp.* 209; cf. *Sophist*, 265 b: ἡ γάρ που μίμησις ποίησίς τίς ἐστιν, εἰδώλων μέντοι . . . ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτῶν ἑκάστων. Plato could, on the other hand, refer to the writing of poetry in a depreciatory sense, as mere compiling (*Phaedrus*, 278 de).

From this it appears that to Plato, as to Greeks generally, the activity of the poet was creative only so far as it created poems; it could not create ideas (cf. *Rep.* 596 b: no workman can create the ἰδέα). In this respect the imitative poet is different from the ideal lover of beauty who does, by union with beauty, beget fair discourse (*Symp.* 210 d) and truth (212 a). Henri Weil has proved that the Greeks generally used the derivatives of the word ποιέω in a narrower sense than we com-

This is a matter in which the legislation of the state not only could not help but would have a positively baleful effect;[1] nor can even an art produce poetry by laws of its own.[2] Plato wisely does not try to tell how poetry is produced. So far as he commits himself on the subject at all, it is by falling back on the doctrine of inspiration, which, to be sure, he has modified considerably.[3] He is himself too much a poet to believe that it can ever be possible to lay down rules for the composition of poems. It is impossible, too, for him to solve the problem by an appeal to the conveniently ambiguous language of modern discussions. He "has no term for imagination as a faculty intermediate between abstract or verbal thought, on the one hand, and sense-perception, on the other. For *φαντασία* takes its color from *φαίνεται* and *φαντάζεται*, which includes all forms of opinion and illusion, and it is often merely a disparaging synonym of *δόξα*."[4] Most modern appeals to "imagination" as the source of poetic inspiration are decidedly less helpful than Plato's recourse to divine madness.

Perhaps a still more significant reason for Plato's failure to give a reasoned account of the poet's method is his perception of the fact that poetry is produced under the conditions of a flux, to which reasoned rules could not possibly apply. The vision of the poet as seer is determined by the immutable principles that are the same for all individuals, however imperfectly individuals may envisage them; but the poet as writer must deal with the evanescent *sensibilia* that no *a priori* principles can completely order. Generally the process will work in one of two directions, although it may be hard to pigeon-hole given cases too nicely. Either a definite experience encountered in the world of flux, an experience that appears to be unique, impresses the

monly attach to the word poet (*Etudes sur l'Antiquité Grecque*, Paris, 1900; pp. 237 ff.: *L'Origine du Mot Poète*). He seems to me, however, to be mistaken in saying (p. 239), that what the Attic writers meant by *ποιεῖν μῦθον* was not to invent a story but to put it in verse, and in citing the *Phaedo* as proof of this. Doubtless the expression did generally mean "to tell a story in verse"; but the very remark made in this place by Socrates is that he was not himself good at telling stories (*αὐτὸς οὐκ ἦ μυθολογικός*, 61 b), and, therefore, borrowing stories from Aesop, he set them to music (cf. Burnet, note on 60 d 1). The task of the genuine poet, then, would be to find the *μῦθος* as well as to put it in verse; he is the creator, not, to be sure, of ideas, but of images.

[1] *Politicus*, 299 b–e.

[2] *Phaedrus*, 245 a.

[3] Cf. p. 63.

[4] Shorey, *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 48.

poet so strongly by some phase of beauty that he determines to fix it in words, and in the process of so doing he lets shine through his work the ideal beauty that he beheld during his experience. The poems of Homer would be, in the main, an example of this process. Or the poet may conceive an abstract idea, and then endeavor to clothe it in such imagery as will present it concretely to those who have not yet become acquainted with it, trusting that their perception of the concrete imagery will serve as an initiation for them into the perception of the ideal beauty that he has seen. Of such a process we find instances in the hymns to the gods that Plato approves, and in his own myths.

X

We have now reached a point where we may turn and look back on our study in the hope of disengaging certain results. Yet once more we must caution ourselves against hoping for a definite formula that shall represent Plato's views. Plato himself knew better than that. He realized that truth is elicited from the conflict of views, and from the struggle with ever-recurring problems. He felt at liberty to modify and expand or even to retract statements, if the argument so demanded. He did not build a system of philosophy; he did much more than build a system, for he laid bare the springs from which all later streams of philosophy have flowed. His work then could never be finished or completely consistent. Above all, we must remember that Plato was a man in whose own breast raged the conflict between poetry and philosophy. Had he not himself been a poet, he had not been able to feel with such desperate seriousness the danger of poetry, or to resort, in a rash moment, to the poet's gesture of exiling the poets; had he not been a philosopher, he had not been able to see the heights to which poetry, regarded as an ideal, should climb. What makes our study so difficult is that the whole problem is not a mathematical puzzle but the workings of a human personality, the least ponderable of all things. We can set forth all that is certain; the rest can not be explained till personality can be explained.

We must suppose Plato, it follows, to have been born with a genius of many kinds. In his boyhood, the love of poetry and of the world of images and colors and sounds appealed strongly to him. As a student of philosophy he inclined to the creed that recognized most defi-

nitely this fascinating world. He had also a leaning toward reasoning about ethical matters, which found nurture in his association with Socrates. Later, during travels in Magna Graecia, he came into touch with the Pythagorean and Orphic sects, which stimulated, on the one hand, his tendency to speculate in a mystical fashion about the origin and the destiny of the soul, and which aroused, on the other hand, his interest in mathematics and pure science. When he started to teach in the Academy, all these interests crowded his mind, and he wavered in his devotion to them. Gradually the scientist in him came more and more to the fore, and tended to crush the poet; but the suppression was never complete. For one thing, the instinct of the poet was born too deep in him; and, as he came to realize after his first flush of enthusiasm was over, science itself has a limit. If man can not rid himself altogether of the trammels of sense, he may then at least use his earthly surroundings in order to see through them or to express by them the reality beyond them that his faith gives him.

We have traced the opposition of Plato's interests through a number of dialogues. In the *Ion*, we saw him weigh and reject the ordinary notion of poetic inspiration, reserving for some later occasion a more adequate explanation of the value of poetry. In the *Symposium*, we saw him sketch the ultimate goal to which the experience of the love of beauty, breaking away from sense and ascending by means of thought, should proceed. In the *Phaedo*, we found him elaborating the distinction between sense and thought, and indicating the manner in which, by the use of the theory of ideas, the ascent may be made from sense to thought. In the *Republic*, we saw him restrict the province of poetry, because of an ethical interest; and we watched him develop the hope of finding absolute knowledge to such a point that, for a moment, he almost imagined himself to have attained it, and spurned the poetry that clung to the world of sense. In the *Phaedrus*, we discovered him returning to the problem of inspiration, and relating it to the doctrine of ideas, distinguishing between the perfect experience of the ideal lover of beauty and the imperfect experience of the imitative poet. And, finally, in the *Laws*, we beheld him in a more practical mood reopen the issues of the *Republic* and, without his assumptions of omniscience, waive the condemnation of poetry in favor of a more temperate, though still an austere, acceptance of the art.

Plato, then, did not formulate a definite creed about the poetic faculty, and his special utterances are moulded by special interests. Accordingly, those interpreters are mistaken who attempt to make a sweeping generalization — as that Plato expelled the poets,[1] or that his real doctrine is contained in myths. But in spite of minor inconsistencies it is possible to see that Plato held during most of his life that thought and an understanding of life are possible only on the hypothesis that eternal forms exist, and that thought is ultimately an act of intuition which passes from the perception of particulars to the contemplation of these eternal forms. The absolute, for him, is both a principle of existence and a principle of goodness and beauty, and hence, in theory, can be approached either by a hypothetical science of dialectic or by the direct intuition of the lover of beauty. In practice, this goal is never attained, for both thought and aesthetic experience are corrupted by sense. Sensible objects and symbols may, however, put one in a way of approximating a vision of reality; and though the lover of beauty has to a certain degree a vision of reality, he can communicate this vision only by the imitation of it by means of sensible objects. If this imitation is regarded as true and valuable of itself, it is to be condemned; and since most contemporary poetry was content, Plato thought, to produce images without passing on to the ideal world, it was so far to be condemned. He recognized, however, that the poet might express eternal forms, and so far as he did so, he became a philosopher. In some such way Plato imagined that the ancient conflict between philosophy and poetry might cease.

[1] So, for example, I am obliged to disagree with R. K. Hack (*The Doctrine of Literary Forms*, *H. S. C. P.*, xxvii (1916), pp. 1–65), who holds that Plato, in order to enthrone scientific truth, excluded poetry (p. 44; pp. 47 f.), ignoring the fact that poetry is really the expression of man's creative power (p. 45), and has nothing to do with universals (p. 54). I hold, however, that Plato was right in believing that some sort of ideal theory must penetrate even the province of art, as a counterblast to the hopeless confusion that would come from a mere creative impulsive or mere expressiveness. My disagreement with the author of this brilliant essay on one point does not prevent me from admiring the essay in general. And I agree with him that the too literal interpretation of the doctrine of ideas has led the practitioners of literary art and the critics at times into grave errors.

COLLATIONS OF THE MANUSCRIPTS OF ARISTOPHANES' AVES

By JOHN WILLIAMS WHITE and EARNEST CARY

THE critical and exegetical edition of Aristophanes that Professor White had so long contemplated as the goal of his intimate and sympathetic study of the comic poet was unhappily not to be carried beyond the preliminary stages. With the scholarly thoroughness and exactness so characteristic of him he had built his foundations broad and deep; while gradually amassing the most complete apparatus, including collations of the MSS. for both text and scholia, and determining the general outlines of the work, he had been clearing the way by a series of preliminary studies, the most conspicuous of which were his *Verse of Greek Comedy* (1912) and his *Scholia on the Aves of Aristophanes* (1914). But scarcely had he completed his final revision of the text and commentary for one-third of the first play selected for publication — the *Aves* — when death suddenly interrupted his labors.

Professor White found his greatest satisfaction, as a classical scholar, in entering into the mind and thought of the ancient authors and in making that thought vital to his students and readers; all who have ever been privileged to listen to his interpretation of the plays of Aristophanes in the classroom will realize what an invaluable part of the projected edition his commentary would have formed. At the same time he held that the only sure foundation for the study of an author consists in an accurate knowledge of his text as handed down by the manuscripts; and he was more and more convinced of the essential correctness of the texts of the classical writers as they have come down to us, and always maintained that it was an editor's bounden duty to make every effort to understand the text as handed down before resorting to emendation. He was content, therefore, with nothing short of complete collations of all the manuscripts of his author,* at least

* With the single exception of G, conclusively shown by Dindorf to be a copy of V; but for his own satisfaction he took account even of this MS. for the *Aves*.

for the non-Byzantine plays, and in order that these collations might be as free from error as possible, had already equipped himself with complete sets of photographic facsimiles for four plays — the *Aves*, *Acharnenses*, *Vespae*, and *Pax*. The actual work of making the collations he entrusted almost entirely to Dr. Cary; but inasmuch as he had the collation sheets constantly before him in his critical study of the text and was always verifying any readings that seemed in any way striking or questionable, he would eventually have made the collations to all intents his own. This was actually the case with at least the first third of the *Aves*; but for the rest of that play and for the other plays named the collations remained virtually without revision on his part, and full responsibility for any errors that may occur therein is assumed by Dr. Cary.

Inasmuch as there is no edition of the *Aves* or *Vespae* equipped with a complete and reliable critical apparatus, the collations for these two plays have been prepared for publication in the "Studies"; those for the *Aves* are here presented, and those for the *Vespae* will follow in the next volume. The collations are given in the form of a critical apparatus, thus constituting a condensed transcript of the collation sheets, each of which contains in tabular form all the variants on a single verse. The text taken as the standard is that of Hall and Geldart (first edition, 1900). Since, however, the numbering of the lines in this, as in most modern editions, while in the main that of Brunck, is nevertheless sometimes very confusing in the lyric passages, Brunck's numbering has been rigidly followed throughout these collations; but, as the numbers in the two editions never differ by more than two and usually by only one, no embarassment should result to the reader. Not all the entries made on the collation sheets are recorded in the following pages. A great many minor details of accentuation, punctuation, and the like, were entered on the sheets as evidence of the practice of the various scribes; all erasures and changes of any sort were also entered, as well as differences in verse division. Much of this detail was never intended by Professor White to appear in his critical apparatus, which was planned to contain only significant variants. In the present report the principle followed has been to include all variants involving a difference of spelling, including *ν*

movable, and differences of accentuation, aspiration, and even punctuation, wherever there is any room for doubt as to the correct form; also all differences in the assignment of verses are noted. Where a reading has been corrected, this fact is stated, if apparently of any significance, and the original reading reported, if legible. The details omitted, except for special reasons, are: (*a*) neglect of iota subscript in inflectional forms, but not in the root forms of words of doubtful spelling or in adverbial forms such as πάντῃ, λάθρᾳ, etc.; (*b*) accentuation of ἄρα and ἆρα where only one form is permissible, and of enclitics and the various forms of εἰμί whether enclitics or not; (*c*) forms resulting from elision and crasis, except in cases such as ἀνήρ.* The designations of the various parts of the parabasis are not recorded for the *Aves*, since nearly all the MSS. give them in the regular form (except the πνῖγος, omitted by all); they are, however, given for the *Vespae* because of irregularities in several of the MSS.

The MSS. containing the *Aves* and the symbols adopted for them by Professor White† are as follows:

R = Ravennas 137, 4, A . . . . . (X or XI)
V = Venetus 474 . . . . . (XI)
G = Venetus 475 . . . . . (XV)
A = Parisinus 2712 . . . . . (XIII)
M = Ambrosianus L 39 sup. . . . . (XIV)
Γ = { Laurentianus XXXI 15 . . . . / Leidensis 52 . . . . . } (XIV)
U = Urbinas 141 . . . . . (XIV)
E = Estensis III D 8 . . . . . (XIV or XV)
M9 = Ambrosianus L 41 sup. . . . . (XV)
E2 = Estensis III D 14 . . . . . (XV)
B = Parisinus 2715 . . . . . (XVI ?)
Δ = Laurentianus XXXI 16 . . . . . (XVI ?)

* Also a dozen instances of recessive accent of the oblique cases of ἡμεῖς in the *Vespae* (vs. 67 in R; vs. 41, 242, 247, 268, 404, 519, 600, 822, 831, 961, 1073 in V), and a few places in the *Vespae* (vs. 230, 1033, 1072) where C apparently has -μἐσν, etc., for -μέσων, etc., through a misunderstanding of the ligature for μεν in the archetype; at least one of these errors (vs. 1072) is also found in Vp3.

† See his article in Classical Philology I (1906), pp. 9–20.

Vp2 = Vaticano-Palatinus 67 . . . . . (XV)
C = Parisinus 2717 . . . . . (XVI)
H = Havniensis . . . . . (XV)

For the *Vespae* the MSS. are R, V, G, Γ, B, Δ, Vp2, C, H, and
Vp3 = Vaticano-Palatinus 128 . . . . . (XV)
G, however, was not collated for the *Vespae*.

Accepting Dr. Cary's published proof* of the derivation of M9, E2, and Δ from E, M9, and B respectively, for the *Aves*, and unpublished proof of very close relationship between Vp2, C, and H † for the *Aves*, Professor White had decided to simplify his critical apparatus, first, by ignoring M9, E2, and Δ, as well as G, the recognized copy of V, except in a few cases where their departure from their parent MSS. seemed noteworthy, and, secondly, by using Vp2+ to indicate the group Vp2CH when these three MSS. agree on readings. With slight modifications this plan has been adopted for the present purpose. Vp2+ in the *Aves* collations is used as an abbreviation for Vp2CH, and similarly in the *Vespae* Vp2+ stands for the group Vp2H and Vp3+ for the group Vp3C.‡ As regards G, M9, E2, and Δ, the principle here adopted is to cite these MSS. only when they differ from their respective archetypes V, E, M9, and B, and in case the parent MS. has been corrected, only when they differ from the corrected reading; but in applying this principle to BΔ, it is the corrections of B^1 that are to be considered — not those of B^2, which were all made after Δ had been copied.§ In other words, if in a given passage only E out of the group EM9E2 is cited, all three MSS. agree; if only E and M9 are

* In Harvard Studies, XVIII (1907), pp. 166 f., 177 f.

† Although these three MSS. apparently derive from the same archetype for this play, Vp2 and C agree very frequently in minor details against H, owing to the fact that they are both slavish copies of their original, whereas the scribe of H corrected many trivial errors and, on the other hand, often made matters worse. No one of the three can be a copy of either of the others, since each omits verses contained in the other two.

‡ The three groups Vp2H, Vp3C, and BΔ have much the same characteristics in the *Vespae* as in the *Acharnenses* (see Cary, *loc. cit.*, 171–179; cf. 181 ff.), but the metrical recension of the first group is not carried out on the same scale in the *Vespae* as in the *Acharnenses* and in the *Aves*.

§ Cf. Cary, *loc. cit.*, 178 f.

cited (for different readings), E2 is the same as M9; if only E and E2 are cited, M9 follows E; in the few cases where E and E2 agree against M9, all three symbols appear. In the case of corrected readings, if the derived MS. agrees with the original rather than the corrected reading of the archetype, its symbol appears after the appropriate reading. Where the corrections in the parent MS. are indicated by such forms of statement as "δή B sup(ra)," or "231–33] om V, add. V¹ in marg.," or "ποεῖ (corr.) from ποιεῖ E," it will be naturally understood that the derived MS., unless cited to the contrary, has followed the intent of the corrector, not that it has repeated both error and correction. In the few cases where alternative readings are cited by the symbols Vγρ, Eγρ, etc.,* every MS. is reported separately, and no such entry is to be attributed to G, M9, E2, or Δ unless expressly mentioned; it is always to be understood in such places that the word of the text rather than the alternative form is copied in the text of the derived MS.

As regards the correcting hands seen in the MSS., both Professor White and Dr. Cary were content to accept Mr. T. W. Allen's views in respect of R† and V;‡ so in the case of R we have to deal with a second hand for both plays, and in the case of V for the *Aves* only. In Γ three correcting hands were recognized in the text of the *Aves* and two in the text of the *Vespae*, in addition to the corrections made by the original hands. For B there is a second correcting hand. No clear case of a second hand was to be found in any of the other MSS. with the possible exception of one instance each in A (*Av.* 1565) and C (*Av.* 40ᵇ–41ᵃ), where omitted words are added in the margin. In designating the various hands, Professor White employed the symbols V¹, Vp2¹, etc., to mean the original hand correcting itself; in A and M, where the corrections are sometimes made in minium, the symbols A¹min. and M¹min. are used. V^R he used instead of V² in the *Aves* to denote Allen's hand "A", because this scribe seems to have been the general reviser of the whole MS.; similarly Γ^R is Zacher's "Corrector I," § whose activi-

* Such variants are cited only when they appear in immediate connection with the text in some of the MSS.; variants mentioned only in the scholia are ignored.

† Journal of Philology XXIV (1896), pp. 311–317.

‡ Introduction to the Facsimile of the Codex Venetus, pp. 9–15.

§ See his Handschriften und Classen der Aristophanesscholien, pp. 550–552.

ties are seen in almost every play, and Γ^r (= Zacher's Corr. II ?) is used for a hand (identified by Dr. Cary* with B^2) seen hardly at all in the *Aves*,† but frequently toward the end of the *Vespae*, in the *Acharnenses*, and elsewhere. For the two plays with which we are concerned Γ^R seems merely to have added alternative readings ($\Gamma^R\gamma\rho$) and Γ^r to have supplied missing words and lines; the original hands and Γ^2 (Zacher's " Glossator ") made the other corrections. As it is very frequently impossible to determine positively which hand made a given correction in R, V, or Γ, particularly when only one or two letters or an accent have been changed, Professor White proposed to employ the symbols R^c, V^c, Γ^c in all such doubtful cases. Where assignments of verses have been changed in Γ and B, it has seemed simpler not to specify the hands, since in these MSS. the names of the speakers were entered in the first instance by one of the correcting hands (Γ^2 and B^2 in the *Aves*, Γ^R and B^2 in the *Vespae*).

U has no names of speakers entered after verse 1 of the *Aves*,‡ but regularly leaves a space in the middle of a line where Γ had one before the entries were filled in. Similarly Δ has no speakers entered for either play, but has the same breaks in the middle of lines that B showed at the time Δ was copied from it. Δ is therefore completely ignored in the matter of assignments and U is rarely mentioned except where a peculiar division of the verses in this MS. renders a space or its absence significant. The abbreviation "sp" is used for spatium; and — and : are the well-known symbols found in the MSS. to indicate a change of speaker (the former found at the beginning or in the middle of a verse, the latter in the middle or at the end). The spatium will be mentioned only when there is no other indication of a change of speaker.§

* *Loc. cit.*, 187 f.

† Vs. 115 supplied; perhaps also speakers before 1038, 1351, 1353.

‡ Except on vs. 656 and a few instances (vs. 228, 448, 646, 648, 1204, 1572) where the scribe evidently took them for part of the text.

§ The first scribe of V frequently failed to leave space in the middle of a line for any indication of a change in speaker, and one of the correcting hands (V^R?), in order to gain the space necessary for the symbols — or :—, has often erased and rewritten part of a line. In a few prominent instances these corrections will be found assigned to V^c, but they are usually ignored, inasmuch as V, V^1, and V^R are believed to have used the same archetype.

When the punctuation of the MSS. is cited, the comma and interrogation point are enclosed in parentheses to avoid any confusion. It must be borne in mind that U regularly uses the comma also as an interrogation point; in fact, the scribe hardly seems to know the regular sign. Here and there C seems to follow the same practice. When it is simply a question whether a sentence is interrogative or not, full information is not always given in regard to the MSS. that do not indicate a question; for example, the entry "(;) AΓ" or "(;) AΓ, (,) UC" means simply that these are the only MSS. indicating a question, the other MSS. either agreeing with the standard text or omitting punctuation.

A lemma is given wherever confusion might result from its omission, so particularly where the reading of a MS. has been corrected to or from that of Hall and Geldart or where any one of the four MSS. G, M9, E2, or Δ gives that reading instead of the reading of its archetype. The MSS. named immediately after the lemma are not, of course, to be regarded as the only MSS. offering the reading, unless all the rest are otherwise accounted for, either by their separate symbols or by the abbreviation "rel." Where all the MSS. agree on a variant, the abbreviation "lib." is used.

For the Hypotheses, see Professor White's *Scholia on the Aves.*

1 ΕΤΕΛΠΙΔΗΣ] ευελ$^{\pi}$ RH, εὐελ$^{\pi}$ V, εὐελ Vp2, εὔελπις M9 and B at first, εὐελπίδης rel. (no names of speakers appear in the photograph of C before vs. 5, but the photograph is apparently defective)* 2 ΠΙΣΘΕΤΑΙΡΟΣ] πεισθέταιρος E2B, πεισθαίτ(ε)ρος A, πεισθέτ(ε)ρος Γ, πεισθέ^{τρ} M, πισθ Vp2, πειθε^{στ} H, πεισ^{θ} or πει^{σθτ} rel.† διαρραγοίης U, -γείης(?) from -γ•εις C 3 ΕΤ] corrected from πει H ἄνω καὶ κάτω G 4 ἀπολλύμεθ' U προφορουμένωι R 5 ΠΙ] om R πόμενον U, πειθώμενον Vp2 6 πλεῖν from πλὴν (?) C 7 ΕΤ] om R, κολωοῖ M δύσμονον C 8 οὐχὰς M 9 ΠΙ] om R οὐδεποῖ RV, οὐδὲ πῇ B, οὐδὲ ποῦ C, οὐδὲ ποῖ (ποι H) G rel. ἐσμὲν] om E2 ἔγωγέ τι E 10 ΕΤ] om R πατρήδ' C 11 ΠΙ] om R, —M ἠξηκεστίδης H 12 ΕΤ] om R, —M ΠΙ] om RM τὰν B 13 ΕΤ] om R, —M ἦ]

* After vs. 1 GMΓ regularly use the abbreviation for εὐελπίδης, VAEBC favor εὐελπις, and RVp2H are always ambiguous.

† After this all the MSS., including Vp2, abbreviate πει(σθ) or πειθ (H).

ἡ R, ἤ U, ἦ Vp2+ δύκ] οὐ κ (two or three letters erased?) M, ὁ 'κ U 14 μελαχολῶν U 15 τῶδ' A, τῷδ' M, τάδ' U ἔφασκεν V (not G) νωΐ R, νῶιν bis Vp2+ (but second νῶιν deleted in C) 17 Θαρρελείδου] R^{c}, θαρελλείδου RA, θαρρελλείδου A^{1}, θαρρελίδου E2, θαρριλείδου B 18 τὴν δε δὶ RVM?ΓE, τὴν δὲ δὶ GA, τηνδεδὶ M^{1}B, τὴν δὶ δὲ U, τὴν δε (τήνδε H) δὲ Vp2+ 19 τάδ' U ἄρ' erased before οὐκ M9 (not E2) ἡότιν R, ἥσθην E2, ἐστὸν B, ἥστην rel. 20 κέχηινας V (not G) 21 (;) after ἄξεις AΓM9 (or M9^{1})BVp2+, om U, point E2 rel. ἐσθ' VE, ἐστιν M9 22 III]: R, om M δία V 23 ET] om R, —M οὐδ'] ἦδ' R, ἦδ' AMΓU, γρ καὶ οὐ μετὰ ὑποδιαστολῆς Γ^{2} τι] om MVp2+, τί rel. (;) after πέρι ΓM9B, (,) UC 24 III] om RM οὖ· BVp2+ (changed to οὐ C) ταὐτὰ] E, ταῦτα RAVp2?, τὰ M, ταυτὰ M9Vp2^{1} rel. μὰ Δία] μὰ δί' ἃ R, μὰ δί' VΓ^{2}, om ΓU 25 ET] om RM δὴ] δὲ M (and A at first?) λέγεις M9 III] sp R, —M 26 βρύκους G, βρύκουσα πέδεσθαι E2 27 ET] om R, —M οὖν] om A 28 καὶ bis (second καὶ deleted) R παρασκευασμένους G 29 μήξευρεῖν RM, μὴ ἐξευρεῖν GVp2+ 30 ὑμεῖς A 31 νόσω E2 Σάκᾳ] G, σακαῖ R, σακὰι V, σάκαν H 32 γὰρ] om Vp2+ εἰσβιάζεται lib. 33 τιμούμενοι U 35 ἀναπτόμεθ' U, ἀνεπτόμεθ' E2 ἐκ] εἰς E2 ἀμφοῖν τοῖν ποδοῖν M 36 μισοῦντ'] R^{c}B^{2}, μισοῦντες R?MB 37 τὸ] τῷ M 38 ἐναποτῖσαι RΓB, ἐναποστῆσαι U, ἐν ἀποτῖσαι Vp2C, ἐν ἀποτίσαι M9, ἐναποτίσαι rel. 39 γὰρ] Γ^{c}M9^{1}, om ΓM9 40 ἄδουσι GΔC, ἀιδουσιν (or ἀδ-) rel. 'Αθηναῖοι . . . ᾄδουσι (41)] om RVC, add R^{2}V^{2}C^{c} in marg. (om ἀεὶ R^{2}, om ᾄδουσι C^{c}); R^{2}V^{2} repeat πάντα τὸν βίον, G has ἀθηναῖοι . . . βίον as one vs. 43 — deleted before κανοῦν R ἔχοντε] R^{c}, ἔχοντες RG 44 ζητοῦντε] R^{c}ΓUBVp2C, ζητοῦντες RΓ^{c}Δ rel. 45 ὅπη B καθιδρυνθέντε RVM9 καὶ διαγενοίμεθ' U 46 παρὰ] πρὸς A 47 πειθέσθαι U (and M9 at first) δεομένωι R, δεομένων UC 48 εἶδε] οἶδε AM9Vp2+ πτόλιν A πέπταται AVp2+, πέπτατἄι BΔ, 'πέπτατο Γ, πέπτατο rel. 49 ἐστι U, abbr. Γ III]: R, —M 50 τι] UVp2+, τί M, τί rel. ET] A sup. (no sp), sp R, —M οὐτοσὶν M9 51 κέχηινην V (not G) 52 καὶ οὐκ M9 ἔστιν] ἐσθ' R ἐνταῦθα A, ἐνθάδ' M 53 εἰσόμεθα δ'] εἰσόμεθ' U ἂν lib. ποήσωμεν R 54 III] om RMVp2+ δρᾶσον] RVA^{1}ΓBVp2C, δράσεις MΓ^{1}U, δράσον GA rel. θένε] R, θεῖνε R^{c}, θέναι M9 55 ET] om R, πει MVp2+ γ'] om MB ὁ] RΓUB, om rel. 56 III] om R, —M, ευ Vp2+ λίθον M ET] sp R, —M, πει Vp2+ 57 — before vs. V(not G)M,

sp U (in middle of line), *ευ* Vp2+ ΠΙ] sp R, —M R punctuates after *λέγεις*, not after *οὗτος*; the rest punctuate after *οὗτος* if at all *παῖ*] om E2 58 *σ'*] *γ'* BVp2+, om rel., but U has *σε* (as gloss?) over *ν* of *ἐχρῆν*. *ἔποπα*$^{\text{ος}}$ H 59 om R ET] om MVp2, *πει* E sp after *ἔποποῖ* M9 *ποιήσεις*] AE2, *ποήσεις* A^{1}ΓE *ἔτι*] B, *τοί* V A^{1}M^{1}, *τί* AM rel. 60 ΘΕΡΑΠΩΝ ΕΠΟΠΟΣ] R^{1} in marg., sp R, *θε(ραπ)* ΑΓΕ, *θε* (as text, attached to *ἔποποῖ*) Vp2C, followed by *επ* Vp2, *θρ*$^{\pi}$ over *πει* C, *θε*$^{\rho}$ followed by *ἔπ* (as text) H 61 ET] *πει* RΓEB, —M, om H 62 ΘΕ] —M *ὀρνιθοθήρα*] E2, *-ᾳ* ME (and M9?) *τωδεῖ* B 63 ET] om R, —M, *πει* ΓEB *οὕτως τι*] A, *οὕτω 'στι* rel. After *δεινὸν* ΓB have (;), UΔCH (,), A omits, the rest have a point; after *λέγειν* ΓEB have (;), C (,) 64 ΘΕ] om R, —M ET] sp R, —M, *πει* ΓEB *ἀνθρώπω*] *ἀνῳ̄ι* R ΘΕ] sp R —M, om Vp2 *δαί*] *δὲ* ΓUE 65 ET] om RVp2, —M, *πει* ΓEB *ἀλλ' ὑποδεδιὼς* M, *ὑποδε* (*sic*) H *λυβικὸν* Vp2+ 66 ΘΕ] C^{1}, om R, —M, *πει* Vp2+ ET] sp R, om M, *πει* ΓEBC^{1}, *θε* (in Vp2 as part of text) Vp2+ *ἐροῦ*] Γ^{c}, *ἔρου* Γ rel. 67 ΘΕ] om RVp2+, —M *ὀδεδί* M *δή*] B in marg., C in ras., om AMUM9 *ἐρεῖς*] A^{1}, *ἐρᾷς* A 68 ΠΙ] C, om R, —M, *ευ* ΓEBC^{1} *φασιανὸς* VVp2+ 69 ET] om R, *θ*$^{\rho}$ A, —M, *πει* ΓEB *ἀτἀρ*] R, *ἀλλὰ* rel. *τῶν*] E^{1}, om AE 70 ΘΕ] om R, —M *δοῦλος*] M9 (*δοῦλ*)*ις* M9^{1}E2^{1} both in min. (gl.? cf. *δουλίς* in lemma of schol. E) ET]: R, —M, *πει* ΓEB *ἠττηθεὶς* B 71 ΘΕ] om R, sp M *οὐκ*] Vp2, *οὔ* M, *οὔκ* or *οὐκ* rel., nearly all with point following *ὅτε περ*] *ὄπερ* M9 72 *ηὔξατο*] M, *εὔ-* rel. 73 *ἔχοι* B 74 ET] om R, —M, *πει* ΓEB 75 ΘΕ] om R, —M *οὗτοι* E2 *γ'ἀτ'* R, *γἀρ ἄτ'* ΓUEB, *γἀρ* Γ^{c}? rel. *πρῶτον* V 76 *τότε* RVMVp2+, *ποτὲ* U (and M9 at first) *ἀφυίας* R^{c}, *ἀφυῖας* R 77 *'π'*] by correction R, *ποτ'* A, *ἐπ'* Vp2+ *αφυίας* R *'π' ἀφύας*] *'παφύας* E *λαβὼν ἐγὼ*] R, *ἐγὼ λαβὼν* rel. *τρύβλιον*] M9^{1}, *τρυβλίον* AMM9 78 *δ'*] Γ^{c}, om Γ, *δὲ* Vp2+ *εἰ πιθυμεῖ* U *δεῖ*] B, *δεῖ τὲ* B^{1}Vp2+ 79 *ἐπὶ* Vp2+ (and M9 at first) ET] sp R, —M, *πει* ΓEBVp2C^{1}, om CH *τροχῖλος* E, *τρόχιλος* H *οὐτοσὶν* UH 80 *ευ* before vs. Vp2+ *δ*] A^{1}, om V, *ὦ* A *δρᾶσον*] Γ, *δράσον* GM9H, *δράσεις* MΓ^{1}U *τροχίλε*] H, *τρόχιλε* VH^{1}, *τροχῖλε* UE 81 *ἡμῖν*] V, *ὑμῖν* V^{c}U ΘΕ] sp R, —M, *τροχ* Vp2+ 82 *μύρτας* A 83 ET] om R, —M, *πει* ΓEB *ἐπέγειρον*] B^{2}, *ἐπίγειρον* B ΘΕ]—M, *τροχ* Vp2+ 84 *σφώ* M (and Γ?), *σφῶιν* Γ^{c} *αὐτὸν*] R^{c}V^{c}, *αὐτῶν* RVVp2+ *εἵνεκα* M, *εἵνεκ'* rel. *ἐπεγερῶ*] V^{c}

(letter erased before ρ), επεγειρῶ R, ἐπιγερῶ Vp2+ 85 ἀπόλοι'] B1 Vp2+, -οιο B rel. ὡς] ὅς AME 86 μ' εἶχεται M9 87 III] sp R, — 1 σὺ] om M θηρίων RMVp2+ 88 ἀφεῖκας G ET] sp R, — 1 90 III] om RM ET]: R, —M γὰρ] δ' M ἐστιν lib. III]: R, —M απέπαυτο G, ἀνέπτατο A, ἀπέπτατο rel. 91 ET] om RGM No MS. punctuates after ἀφῆκας; RV have (;) after ὤγάθ', B a point 92 ἵνα VM 93 ET] om R, πει ΜΓΕΒ τὸ] RVMU, om rel. 95 ΕΠ] om R ET] sp R, om A, —M, πει ΓΕΒ 96 ἤξασιν ΜΕ2, ἦ- U ἐπιτρίψαι lib. σε] E21, σοι E2 ΕΠ] sp RA, —M με] B2, om MB 97 ὁρῶντες RM sp after πτέρωσιν E, πει M9 γὰρ bis C, corr. C1 98 ET] E2, sp RA, —M, πει ΓΕΒ καταγελοῦμεν H ΕΠ]: R, om A, —M, sp E2 99 ET] πει ΡΓΕΒ, om M γελοῖον GAMΓΕΒ 100 vs. in ras. V1 ΕΠ] om MM9 Σοφοκλέης] RVp2+, -κλῆς rel.

101 τραγωδίαις A Τηρέα] πηρέα Vp2 R has last three words of verse first, but correct order indicated 102 ET] om RE2, —M, πει ΓΕΒ εἶ om R, ἦ M ταῶς RV? G1Γc M9? Vp2C, ταώς Vc (accent by corrector) GΓE2 rel. 103 om H ET] sp R, —M, πει ΓΕΒ σου B ποῦ Vc sup. 104 ΕΠ] om RM ἐξερρύηκεν H ET] sp R, —M, πει ΓΕΒ νόσους Vp2+ 105 ΕΠ] om RM τῶρνεα] A, τὰ ὄρνεα rel. 106 πτερορρυεῖ τε] πτερορρυεῖται A, πτερρρρυεῖ τὲ B, πτερρυεῖ τὲ Δ, πτερρρυεῖ τε E2 107 σφὼι R, σφῶν M ET] sp R, om M, πει ΓΕΒ (;) after νώ] BVp2+, (,) Γ, om rel. 108 ΕΠ] om R, —M ET] sp R, —M, πει ΓΕΒ 109 ΕΠ] om RM ἠλιασταὶ A, ἡλιαστὰ MBVp2C ET] sp R, —M, πει ΓΕΒ μ' ἀλλὰ Γ (apostrophe by correction?), μᾶλα R, μάλα VAM, οὔκ ἀλλὰ ΓcUB, μή ἀλλὰ E, οὐ (ου Vp2, οὔ H) μάλα Vp2+ τρόπου] Vpγρ, γένους V 110 ἀπηλιασταὶ AU ΕΠ] sp R τοῦτο Vp2+ 111 σπέρμ'] ΓcBVp2C, σπέρμα Γ rel.; only VAΓB have (;) ET] sp R, —M, πει ΓΕΒ λάβοις] Γc, λάβοιο A, λάβῃς ΓΕΒ, λάβῃ U 112 ΕΠ] om. R δὴ τοῦ] τοῦ δὴ A δεομένωι R ἔπο[r] deleted before δεῦρο C 113 ET] om R, —M, πει ΓΕΒ συγγενέσθαι Vp2+ βουλομένωι R, βουλόμενε A ΕΠ] sp R, —M 114 ET] om R, πει ΜΓΕΒ νὼ ποτέ] MB (and so in 115, 116), νώ ποτε rel. 115 om ΓΔ, add Γ2Γ1Δ1 (the last at bottom of page after vs. 125); placed after 116 E ὀφείλησας M9 116 κούκ] κόὐδὲν V κοὐποδιδοὺς M9 117 εἶτ'] H1, εἶθ' Vp2+ 118 ἐπέτου lib. καὶ τὴν θάλατταν (-σσ- R) lib. ἐν] om V 119 πάνθ'] C1, πάντ' Vp2C μί deleted in

R after ὅσα **120** οἰκέται Vp2^{+} νὼ] νῦν B **121** ἡμῖν bis R, corr. R^{c} εὔερον] RV^{c}ΓEB and M^{1} (letter erased after εἰε), εὖρον V, εὐάερον AVp2^{+}, ἀέριον U, εὐέριον B^{2} **122** σισύραν] C^{1}, σισύ ραν R (letter erased after υ), σίσυραν Vp2^{+} ἐνκατακλινῆναι R, ἐγκατακλινθῆναι MΓ, -κλιθῆναι Γ^{c} rel. μαλθακήν] RMBVp2^{+}, μαλακήν rel. **123** ΕΠ] om R κρανεῶν U **124** ΕΤ] from π Γ, om R, —M **125** ΕΠ] om RM δὲ δῆλος M, δῆλον E2 ΕΤ] sp R, —M ΕΤ. ἐγώ] om Vp2H ἐγὼ δέ, U VA om punctuation after ἐγώ **126** γὰρ] om lib. τὸν M^{1}] τῶν M σικελλίου M, σκιλλίου B, σκελλίου rel. (ras. after ι Γ) βδελλύτομαι V (not G) **127** ΕΠ] om R, —M καὶ ποῖάν G οἰκεῖτ' Mg Vp2^{+} **128** ΕΤ] om R, —M μέγιστα from μέγιστ' ἂν R εἴη] C^{1}, ἄη Vp2CH^{1}?, ἄν H? τοιαδὶ B **129** πρῴ τις ἐλθὼν] Γ^{c}?B, πρώτιστ' ελθὼν R, πρώι (πρῶι GA) εἰσελθὼν VAE, πρῴ τις εἰσελθὼν Γ?U, πρῷ (πρῴ M^{1}) εἰσελθόντα M, τις ἐλθὼν Vp2^{+} (but Vp2 adds πρωὶ after φίλων) τῶν φίλων] φίλον M **130** λέγει G, λέγειν M τάδ' Vp2C, τάδε H **131** παρέσῃ MΓUB, πάρεισί H καὶ σὺ] σὺ A καταπαιδία U **132** λουσόμενα A, λουσάμενοι M πρῶι VAC, corr. C^{1} γάμους] γάλα E2 **133** ποιήσεις A **134** ἔνθης G **135** ΕΠ] om R, —M ταλαιπώρων] C^{1}, -πωρῶν A, -πώρον C **136** δαὶ] δὲ GΓUBVp2C, δὴ B^{1} ΠΙ] sp R, —M; in B πει was entered by mistake before τί, but corrected ἐρῶ] ἐγῶ G ΕΠ] sp R, —M **137** ΠΙ] E2, om RMg, —M **139** μοι E2 στιλβονίδη AU **140** εὑραὸν E2 **141** ἐκύσας Vp2C, ἐκύησας H προσηγάγου] A^{1}, -ηγάγω A **142** ὠρχιπέδησας lib. **143** ΕΠ] om R σὺ] σὺ φεῦ U **144** ἐστιν M ὁποίαν] V^{c}, ὁποία E, ὁποῖα V?Mg **145** περὶ U ΕΤ] sp R, om M **146** ἡμῖν] om G παρὰ] Γ^{c}, γε παρὰ RAMΓU ἵν' ἀνακύψεται] ἢν ἂν κύψεται A, ἵν' ἀνακαλύψεται M, ἵν' ἀνακύψαι Vp2 **147** κρητῆρ' M ἄγουσ'] V^{c}, ἄγουσα VE ἡ σαλαμινία first written before ἔωθεν in R, but deleted **149** ΕΠ] G, om RVM ἠλεῖον RΓ and M or M^{1} (breathing changed) U has (:) after οἰκίζετον **150** ἐλθόνθ' BVp2^{+}, ἐλθέτον U, ἐλθόντε rel. ΕΤ] sp R, —M ὁτιὴ] BV2^{+}, ὅτι rel. ὅς lib.

151 om C, add C^{1} **152** ΕΠ] om RM **153** ΕΤ] sp R, —M ὁποὑντιος MΓVp2^{+} **155** οὗτος γὰρ δὲ M ἔσθ'] BVp2^{+}, ἐστιν rel. μετ'] τῶν M **156** ΕΠ] sp R, —M ἐς τὴν τριβήν] om U τὴν B sup. **157** μὲν] om Vp2^{+} ζῆν] R^{c}?, ζεῖν R βαλαντίου GMΓUE2BVp2^{+} **158** ΕΤ] om RVp2C, —M, πει ΓB κιβδηλίαν] Γ^{2}, κιβακλίαν Γ **159** ΕΠ] om RVp2^{+} νεμόμεθα GUE2 τὰ] om Vp2^{+} **160** μύρτα with

dot under τ C μήκωνα] Γᶜ, μήκωναs ΓUB, μήκωρα C **161** ΕΥ] om RVp2+ ζῆτε] A¹, ζητεῖτε AE νυμφίωνα A, νυμφίον E2 (and M9 at first) **163** ἦ Vp2 πείθεσθαί R, πείθεσθέ rel. **164** ΕΠ] om R, —M πιθώμεσθ'] ΑΓ, πειθώμεσθ' R, πιθοίμεσθ' VΓᶜEHB¹ (ι and οι in ras.), πειθοίμεσθ' Vᶜ, πειθοίμεθα G, πειθόμεσθα M, πειθώμεθα U, πιθείμεσθ' Vp2, πιθειώμεθα C ΠΙ] sp R, —M, επει (i.e. επ changed to πει) Vp2 πείθοισθε RVᶜM, πίθοισθε V rel. **165** παντα χῇ] RV, -οῦ A, -ῆ G rel. κεχηνότες V (not G) **166** ἄτιμον] ἄντιμον Vp2+ RBVp2+ punctuate after ἐστίν, GAMM9 after αὐτίκα, Γ after both **167** ἡμῶν M9 (and C at first) τοὺς] om V πεττομένους H ἦν] ἦ C τίς οὗτος ὄρνις BVp2+ τελίας B RB punctuate after instead of before ὁ τελέας **169** ἄνθρωπος lib. **170** οὐδέποθ' R, οὐδέπω M **171** ταυτὰτὶ Vp2C, ταυταὶ H, ταυτασὶ E2 **172** ἂν] A sup. ποοῖμεν G, ποιῆμεν U, ποιῶμεν Vp2+ ΠΙ] B sup. (no sp), sp R, —M οἰκήσατε RAU **173** ΕΠ] om M οἰκήσαιμεν UM9 **174** ΠΙ] om M E2BVp2+ have a comma or point after ἄληθες, the others omit; no MS. has (;) after ἔπος **175** ΕΠ] sp R, —M ΠΙ] sp R, —M **176** ΕΠ] om RM βλέπω] A¹ min., βλέπε A ΠΙ]: R, —M ΕΠ] sp. R, —M **177** τί] BVp2+, om rel. γ'] δ' R **178** ΠΙ] om R, —M εἶδ'εστι R, εἶδες τί rel. ΕΠ] sp R, —M γε] om M9 **179** ΠΙ] E2, om RGM9, —M οὖν] Γ, om VΓᶜE ἐστὶν M9 (not E2) **180–182** om A, add A¹ in marg. ΕΠ] C by correction (first written before 181), om R (but : after 179), —M **180** πόλος G sup. Nearly all MSS. punctuate after πόλος, but only GΓB have (;) ΠΙ] A sup. (no. sp), sp R, —M ἂν] om lib. τόπον M **181** δὲ] δὴ Vp2+ **182** All except AM9 punctuate after ἅπαντα, none after τοῦτο τούτου] τοῦτό γε B¹Vp2+, τοῦτο B rel. νῦν] om Vp2+ **183** δ'] om R οἰκίσητε] second ι in ras. AU?E2, η in ras. A φράξησθ' UΔ, φράξηθ' rel. (θ by correction Γ) ἅπανθ' R **185** ἄρξετ'] ἄρξ' M9 μὲν] VᶜΓ, om VΓᶜE παρνώπων VΓᶜ (and E at first?) **186** λιμῷ Μηλίῳ] Vᴿ, μηλίω λιμῶ V **187** ΕΠ] om RMH (but : after 186 H) ΠΙ] A sup. (no sp), sp R, —M, επ H **189** Πυθώδε] AB, πυθῶδ* (last letter lost in photograph) V, πυθῶ δὲ GMUH, πυθῶδε rel. **191** ἂν U ὑμῖν] A¹, ἡμῖν RVA?ME, ἡμῶν U **193** μηρίω U, μυρίων Vp2+ κνῖσαν] R, κνίσαν VE, κρίσσαν C, κνίσσαν E¹ rel. διαφρήσετε] B², διαφορήσετε A, διαφ ρήσεται M (letter erased?), διαφορήσεται U, διαφήσετε B **194** γῆν] om E2, largely erased in M9 **195**

πω] που VAE 197 ξυνδοκοίη] Γ, -δοκεῖ VΓ°E τοῖσιν] E2¹, -σι E2 198 ΠΙ] Vp2⁺, om rel. αὐτοῖς τὸ πρᾶγμα V πρᾶγμα E διηγήσαντο C (and H at first) ΕΠ] Vp2⁺, sp R, πει VAΓEB, —M 199 επ VAΓEB, sp U (in middle of line) ἐγώ] Mg¹; σὺ Mg 200 πολὺν ξυνὼν χρόνον B In C ξυγκαλέσειας was first written (cf. 201), then corrected

201 ΠΙ] om R, —M ΕΠ] sp R, —M, πει E2 202 λόχμην] M¹, λόγχμην M 203 ἀηδόνα] E2¹, ἀειδόνα E2 204 καλοῦμεν] καλοῖμ' ἂν Γγρ U, καλοῖμι ἀν R²γρ, καλοῖμι γ' ἂν Γ°γρEγρ; cf. ἀντὶ τοῦ καλοῖμι Mg (not E2) 205 ἀκούσωσι VUE, ὑπακούσωσι A, ἀκούσωνται M θεύσονται] θεύσον τῷ E2 206 ὀρνίθων] ἀνθρώπων U ἵσταθι A 207 σ' ἀγ'] σέ γ' R εἰς E2 λόγχμην R 209 ΕΠ] E2, add πρὸς (ὡς πρὸς A) τὸν ἂν⁸ (τὸν ἄνδρα Γ°E, τὴν ἀηδόνα GAMΓ) VAMΓE σύνομέ UE2, ξύννομέ Vp2⁺ μοι] Γ, μου Γ°E μὲν] νῦν U 210 after 211 U, but corrected λῦσον] RUB, χῦσον VΓVp2⁺, χύσον V° rel., ἄσον U sup., χῦσον(or λῦσον?)καὶ ἄσον Mg sup., γρ λῦσον καὶ ἄσον VΓ²E, γρ λῦσον G (cf. γρ καὶ λῦσον . . . καὶ ᾆσον M in schol.) 212 πολυδάκρυν Mg¹, πολυδάκρυτον Mg, πολύδακρυον Vp2, πολυδράκρυον C, πολύδάκρυον H GMΓMg(not E2)Vp2C omit punctuation after Ἴτυν 213 ἐλελιζομένη lib.; no punctuation after this word in any MS. δ' ἱεροῖς] H, διεροῖς rel. μέλεσιν] BVp2C, -εσσι VM¹EMg¹, -εσι MMg rel. 214 γένος E2 : and sp after ξουθῆς U; all except GAMMg punctuate here χώρεῖ Γ, χώρει B 215 φιλοκόμου C μίλακος] R°, σμί- R 216 ἔδρασ$^{\upsilon}$ V ($^{\upsilon}$ perhaps a signum), ἔδρασας G 218 ἀντιψάλλω Vp2 219 ἱστήσοι C 221 σύμφωνος G 222–601 lost in E, but contained in Mg 222 —before θεία and before αὐλεῖ M αὐλεῖ] om AUVp2⁺, αὐλεῖ τις B 223 ΠΙ] om ME2, ευ Vp2⁺ τοῦ ὀρνιθίου M, τούρνιθείου U 224 κατεμελίττωσε Mg λόχμην] R°, λόγχμην R 225 ΕΤ] πει Vp2⁺ ΠΙ] sp R, —M, ευ Vp2C, om H τίς M sp before οὐ RUH, —M, πει Vp2C, ευ rel. σιωπήσει] Γ°, -ση AMΓ, -σεις BVp2⁺ ΕΤ] Vp2⁺, sp R, —M, πει rel. 226 ΠΙ] Vp2⁺, om RB, —M, ευ rel. ὁ ἔποψ H παρασκευάζονται M 227 ΕΠ] om RVp2⁺, ἔποψ ἄδει M ἐπο ποι πόι πο πο πο ποι πο ποί R, ἐπό· ποί· πό (πο G)· πό· πό· (πόι G) πό· πο (πό G)· πο (πό G)· ποί V, ἐπόποί· πόπό· πόπό· πόπό ποποί A, ἐποποί· πό· πό· πό· πό· πό· πό· πό· ποί (last πό from ποῖ?) M, ἐπὸ ποῖ (ἐπό ποί Γ²)· πό· πό· πό πό· ποῖ (ποί Γ²)· ποποῖ (πόποί Γ²) ΓΓ², ἐποποῖ· ποποποποποποῖ ποποῖ U, ἐ πο πο

πο πο πο πο πο πο ποί M9, *ἑποποῖ· πό· πό· πό· ποποῖ· ποποῖ* B, *ἑποποὶ* (*-οῖ* H) *ποποποὶ* (*-οῖ* H)· *ποποὶ ποποὶ* Vp2+ **228** *ἀηδών* before vs. ΓB and (as part of text) U *ἰὼ ἰὼ*] *κόἰ ἰὼ* H *ἴτω* four times Γ, *ἴτω* (4) UB (but last two *ἰτὼ* U1) The punctuation of the MSS. varies from a point after each *ἰὼ* and *ἰτὼ* (MM9B) to none at all (U) **229** *ἰτὼ* A *ἐμῶν*] om A *ὠμοπτέρων* M9, *ὠμ-* E2 **230** *ὅσοι*] B2, *ὅσα* BVp2+ *ἀγροίκων*] B2, *ἀγρῶν* BVp2+ *γύας*] MΓc, *γυίας* Γ rel. **231** *φύλλα* A **232** *τε*] om Δ *γένη*] Γc, *γένει* Γ **233** *μαλθάκ'* A **234** *ὅσα*] *ὅπα* U, *ὅσσα* BVp2+ **235** *ἀμφιτιττυβίζεθ'*] Γ, *-ίζετ'* VM9Γc, *-ίζεσθ'* AB, *ἀμφιτιτζυβίζεσθ'* U; in Γ *μ* stands over *υ* but has been deleted; MΓE2B write *ἀμφὶ* (*-ί*), Vp2+ *ἄμφι* **236** *ἡδόμενα* M, *ἡδομῖα* U *φωνῇ* U **237** *τιό* (10) A (and M9 at first), (7) H, (8) rel.; most of the MSS point after each *τιό* **238** *ὄθα θ'* C, *ὅσα καθ'* M9 **239** *κλάδεσι*] Γ, *-εσιν* Γ12?, *-εσσι* R *νόμον* AUVp2+ **240** *οὔρεα* U **241** *αὐδάν*] MγρB, *ἀοιδάν* VMΓM9B2 **242** *τριοτό· τριοτό· τοτοβρίξ* R, *τριοττό· τριοττό· τοβρίξ* V, *τριοτό τροτιό τότοβριξ* A, *τριοτό· τροτιοτό· τοβρίξ* MΓ, *τριοττό· τροτιοττό· τοβρίξ* Γ2M9 and (*τοβρὺξ*) B *τριοτυτροτιστοτριβρίξ* U, *τριοτὸ· τριοτὸ· τοτριοτὸ* (*τοτριοτὸ* Vp2, *τριοτὸ* H) *τοβρίξ* Vp21CH **243** *οἳ*] B2, *ὅσα* BVp2+ *εὐλείας* A **244** *τὰς ὀξυστόμους* BVp2+ U adds (as part of text after *ὀξυστόμους*) *ἐλώδεις τόπους* **245** *κάπτεσθ'* A, *κάμπτεθ'* Vp2+ *ὅσαι* R, *ὅσσα* Vp2+ *εὐδρόσους τε* Vp2+ **246–247** *γᾶς* B *καὶ λειμῶνα τὸν ἐρόεντα* BVp2+ *ἐρώεντα* M **248** *ὄρνις τὲ* BVp2+ *πτεροποίκιλος* lib. *τ'*] om lib. **249** *ἀτταγὰς* bis B

250–251 repeated at beginning of new page Γ **251** *ἀλκυόνεσσι*] Γc (second time) M91, *ἀλκυόνεσι* AΓ(first time)M9E2, *ἀλκιόνεσι* U, *ἀλκιόνεσσι* Γ(second time)U1 *ποτῆται*] *πέπταται* B, *ποτᾶται* rel. **253** *φῦλ'*] *φῦλα τ'* M *ἀθροίζομεν* lib. **254** *ταναοδειρῶν* A, *τ' ἀναδείρων* M, *τῶν ταναοδείρων* Vp2+ **255** *τις*] om M **256** *καινὸς γνώμην*] om A **257** between 254 and 255 Vp2 *τ' ἔργων*] ABVp2+, *ἔργων* M, *ἔργων τ'* rel. **258** *ἴτ'*] C, *ἴτε* Vp2C1H **259** *δεῦρο* (4)] AUVp2C, (3) H, (5) rel. **260** XO OPN] AE2, *χο ὄρν ἡ γλαύξ* VΓM9B, om RMVp2+ *τορο* (4)] RΓUH, (5) MBVp2C, (6) VM9, (7) A; B has *τορὸ·* four times, C has *τορὸ* three times with accent deleted, E2 has point after *τορο* the first three times, and the MSS. generally leave a space after each *τορο* except the last (R after each syllable) *-τίξ*] RVM9, *τίγξ* rel. **261** *ἡ γλαὺξ* before vs. E2 (cf.

M9 in 260) *κικκαβᾶς* bis G, *κικκιβᾶν κικκιβαβᾶ* A, *κικκαβᾶν* bis M, *κικκαζαῦ κικκαβαῦ* U **262** in marg. U *πει* Vp2 (cf. 263) *τορο* (4)] RA, (3) V in ras. ΓUVp2^{+} and (*τορὸ·*) B, *τοροτοτορο* M, *τριοτο* Γ^{2}γρM9 *-λιλιλίξ*] RA, *τολιλιλίξ* VMVp2C, *τολιλίγξ* ΓUB, *τολιλιλιλίξ* Γ^{2}γρM9, *λίγξ* H **263** ΠΙ] om. Vp2 *ὀρᾷς*] VGΓ, *-ῆς* RAΓ^{c}U, *-ηις* V^{c}, *-ῇς* M *τιν'*] V by correction, *τὴν* M9C ΕΤ] sp H *οὔ*] R^{c}, *οὖν* R **264** *κέχηινα* V (not G) *ἐς*] M, *εἰς* rel. *οὐρανὸν*] *ἀέρα* U **265** ΠΙ] om RMVp2^{+} *ἄλλως*] M^{1}, *ἀλλ' ὡς* A, *ἄλλος* M *ὁ ἔποψ* H *εἰς* ABVp2^{+} **266** *ἐπᾠζε*] RΓU, *-ω-* rel. **267** ΟΡΝΙΣ ΤΙΣ] *ὄρνι*^{θ} *ηλ*^{θ} R, *ευ* E2, *επ* rel. *τοροτίξ* bis] RM9, *τοροτίγξ* bis R^{c}M9^{1} rel. **268** ΠΙ] E2, *ευ* M, om M9 *εἶς*] om lib. *οὐτουσὶ* G *δῆ τι* R *ἔρχεται ὄρνις* V **269** ΕΤ] om M *ὄρνις* bis M *δῆτα*] om U (but sp) *τίς*] Γ^{c}, *τί* ΓU *δήπου*] *δῆτα που* M, *δήπω* Vp2C *ταῶς*] *-ὼς* RVΓ^{c} M9Vp2, *-ώς* V^{s}Γ rel. (;)] ΓVp2C, om GAUH, point rel. **270** om H ΠΙ] om R, *επ* M9 *νᾷν*] om Vp2C *ἐστιν*] Γ^{c} (abbr.), om ΓU, *ἐστι* M9 *ὄρνις*] *οὔρνις* (*ὀὖρ-* G) RVMM9 **271** placed after 274 M ΕΠ]—M, *ευ* E2 *ἡθάδων*] *ἡθά* and sp U **272** —M ΕΤ]—M, *πει* rel. *βαβαὶ*] *βαβαὶ καὶ* B *γε* Δ sup. *φοινικοῦς* AU **273** om U ΕΠ]—M *γε*] om lib. *'στὶ*] *ἐστι* M, *γ' ἐστὶ* Vp2^{+} **274** ΕΤ] ΓB, —VM, *πει* Vp2^{+}, sp U, om G rel. ΠΙ] sp R, —M, *ε* Vp2, *ευ* C, *επ* H ΕΤ] sp R, —M, *πει* Vp2^{+}, *επ* rel. **275** ΠΙ] E2, *επ* RVp2^{+}, —M, om M9 *δὴ τάχ'* (*τάχ* V, *τάχ* G) *οὗτος* VAMM9 *χρόαν*] *χώραν* lib. *ἔχει* U **276** —A, *πει* Vp2^{+} *ποτ'*] M^{1}, *ποθ'* RVMUVp2^{+} *ἔσθ'*] om U, *ἐστὶν* M9 *ὁ*] C^{1}, *οὗ* C *ὁραβάτης* E^{2} **277** ΕΠ] om AVp2^{+}, —M *ἐστι*] V^{c}Γ, *-ν* VAΓ^{c}M9, abbr. H ΠΙ] sp R, *επ* H **278** *ἔπτατο* A, *ἐπέπτατο* BVp2^{+}, *ἐσέπτατο* rel. **279** ΕΤ] Vp2^{+}, om R, —M, *επ* rel. **280** ΠΙ] om R, —M *ἆρ' ἦσθ' ἔποψ*] *ἆρκ* sp *σθ' ἔπ* sp U **281** — before vs. A ΕΠ] A sup. (no sp.), om R, —M *οὗτος* lib. *μέν ἐστι*] B, *ἔστι* (*ἐστὶ* Vp2^{+}) *μὲν* B^{1}(in ras.)Vp2^{+} **282** *ὡσπερεὶ* A *λέγοις*] E2^{1}, *-οις* in ras. B^{1}, *λέγεις* GE2Vp2^{+} **283** *ἰπονίκου* G **284** ΠΙ] om R, —M *ἆρ'* GAM9Vp2^{+} *ἐστιν ὄρνις* A *οὔρνις*] *οὐρ-* R^{c}Δ^{1}Vp2C, *οὖρ-* V, *ὀὖρ-* V^{c}ΓB, *οὖρ-* H, *ὄρνις* RMM9Δ (;) after *ἐστίν* VAΓM9^{1}(min.) BVp2C, (,) H, om V^{c}MUM9E2, point RG *πτεροῤῥυεῖ*] V^{c}, *-ορυεῖ* V **285** ΕΤ] om R, —M, *επ* rel. *γεναῖος* U, *γαιννᾶος* E2 *τε*] *τῶν* Vp2^{+}, om rel. **286** *πτερά*] *πλευρά* A **287** ΠΙ] om R, —M *ἕτερος*] *ὡς ἕτερος* lib. *ὄρνις*] *ὄνις* R **288** ΕΠ] om R, —M (;) after *οὐτοσὶ* VBM9^{1}(min.), (,) GU, point R, om rel. *κατωφαγᾶς*] Γ^{c}HB^{1},

-*άs* RΓBH[1] **289** ΠΙ] om R, —M *κατωφαγᾶs*] B[1], -*άs* RBVp2[+] *τις*] U sup., om E2 **290** ΕΤ] om lib. *ἂν*] Γ[2], om ΓU *ἀπόβαλε τὸ λόφον* E2 **291** ΠΙ] om RAΓM9B, *επ* V, —M, *ευ* Vp2[+] *μέντοι*] *μὲν* U *λόφωσιν* C *ἡ*] B[1] (in ras.), *εστ' ἡ πι* R, *ἔσθ' ἡ 'πὶ* (*ἡ ἐπὶ* V, *ἠπὶ* M) VV[c]AMM9, *ἔσθ' ἐπὶ* ΓU, *ἡ 'πὶ* Vp2[+], **πὶ* B **292** *ἦ*] *ἡ* R, *ἡ* Vp2[+], *ἦ* rel. ΕΠ] om G **293** *λόφων*] Δ[1], *λόφον* Δ, *τῶν λοφων* R *οἰκοῦσιν*] BVp2[+], -*σ'* rel. *εἵνεκα* M **294** ΠΙ] om R, —M *ὦ Πόσειδον*] om U *πόσειδον* from *ποσείδων* C **295** *ὀρνέω* V ΕΤ] Vp2[+], small sp M9, om rel. **296** *ἐστὶν* M *μετομένων* C **297** ΕΠ] om RVp2[+], —M *γε*] *γμ* C **298** *οὑτὸς* C *πηνέλοψ*] GΓ[2], -*οψ'* RV, *πηλέλοψ* Γ, *πηνέωψ* B (*πηνέ*)*λ*(*ωψ*) B[2], *πινέοψ* Vp2[+] *ἐκεινοσὶ* lib. *δέ γ'*] *γε νη δί* R **299** ΠΙ] om R, —M, *ευ* Vp2[+] ΕΠ] : R, —M, *πει* Vp2[+] *κειρύλος*] Γ[1]U, *κηρύλος* RVΓVp2[+], *κήρυλος* V[c]B, *κιρύλος* (*ι* and *υ* in ras. A) AΓ[2], *κήρυλλος* M, *κηρῦλος* M9 **300** ΠΙ] om RM, *ευ* Vp2[+] (by correction from *πει* H) *κειρύλος*] ΓU, *κηρύλος* RVM9Vp2H, *κήρυλος* V[c]B, *κιρύλος* A, *κήρυλλος* M, *κηλύλος* C *ὄρνις*] *ὄρος* M (;)] (,) Γ, point MU ΕΠ] Γ sup. (no sp), om RU, —M, *πει* Vp2C, *ευ* H *ἐστιν* U *σποργῖλος* VM9 (;) after *Σποργίλος*] B, (,) UCH, om VAM, point G rel.

301 *επ* before vs. Γ *γλαῦξ*] RBC, *γλαύξ* rel. ΕΤ] Vp2[+], sp R, —M, *πει* rel. (and H at first) *ἀθήνηζ'* G, *ἀθήναζε* U *ἤγαγεν*] VΓM9, -*ε* rel. **302** ΕΠ] om RMVp2[+] *κίττα*] V[c]?, *κήττα*(?) V, *κίττα* G *κορυδὸς*] RAΓ[c]B[2], *κοροιδὸς* ΓU, *κόρυδος* B rel. *ἐλεᾶς*] Δ[1], *ἐλεάς* A, *ἐλέας* (*ἐ-* H or H[1])Vp2[+], *ἐλαᾶς* Δ *ὑποθεμὶς* Δ *περιστερὰ* C **303** *νέρτος*] B, *νέρτερος* M, *νέοτος* Γ, *νεοτὸς* Γ[c], *νέωτος*? (*ω* over *ερ*) B[2] *φάττα*] Γ[c], *φάτα* Γ, *φ' ἄττα* Vp2C *κόκυξ* M9 *κεβλήπυρις*] *καὶ βλήτυρως* U **304** *κερχρηῖς* M, *κερχνὶς* C, *κερχνηίς* rel. **305** ΠΙ] om R, —M *ἰοὺ* once only ΓU **307** *οἶα*] *οἱ* Vp2 *πισπίζουσι* M, *παπίζουσι* U, *ποπίζουσι* B, *ποππίζουσι* B[1] *διακεκραγότα* G **308** *πει* before vs. R *ἀπειλοῦσίν*] Γ[2], -*σι* Γ rel. *γε*] Γ sup. and B[2], om B sp before *οἶμοι* R, —M *κεχήνασίν*] RB, -*σι* rel. **309** *ἐs*] U, *εἰs* Γ (in ras.) rel. ΕΤ] Vp2[+] (C by correction), sp R, —M, *επ* rel. *κάμοὶ*] A[1]min., sp A **310** XO] RAVp2H, *χο ορνιθ* rel. (the form regularly used in this scene by VΓM9, and occasionally by A; E2 uses it only before 310) *πο* (9)] RVMΓM9B, (8) AVp2C, (7) U, (5) H; A has *πό* each time, M *πό* each time but the last; AMB point after each *πο*. -*ποῖ*] VΓUM9B, -*ποὶ* rel. **311** *ἄρ* AMU (and Γ at first), *ἄρ'* M9Vp2

ἐκάλεσε] ΓΓ, -σεν VΓ°M9 **312** : before τίνα M, sp Vp2+ ποτὲ] B², om BVp2+ **313** The photograph of fol. 160ʳ of Vp2 (vs. 311–338) shows no speakers entered *before* verses, but is probably defective ἀποστατῶν G **314** τι or τί (8)] RVMΓM9 and (with πί for fourth and sixth τί) B, (10) A, (5) U, (4) Vp2C, (3) H; AMB write τί each time, H the first time, GM9 the last time; MB point after each τί; there follows in ΓU τιμπτρού· τιτιμπτρού, in B τιμπρού· τιτιμπρού, in Δ τιμπρού, τιμπρού, in Vp2+ τιμπερού **315** ἆρα ποτὲ] Γ², om Γ **317** ΕΠ] om M **318** λεπτολογιστὰ MB, but corr. M¹; λεπτὼ σοφιστὰ U ἀφῖχθον] ΓU, ἀφῖχθον θ' M, ἀφίχθον' θ' R, ἀφῖχθαι A, ἀφίκονθ' Γ²γρ rel. **319** ΧΟ] om M πᾷ] B², in ras. Γ, πῶ M (and Γ at first?), ποῦ B **320** ΕΠ]—M ἀπ'] om Vp2+ ἀφῖχθαι from ἀφίχθ* Γ°, ἀφῖκται Δ **321** ἔχοντε] M¹, ἔχετε M μεγάλου after πελωρίου as part of text Vp2+ **322** ἐξόσου RAM, ἐξ ὅσου VΓM9, ἐξ ὅσουπερ G, ἐξότου U 'τράφην] V, ἐτρ- Vp2+, τρ- rel. **323** επ before πῶς A ΕΠ] sp R, om A, —M φοβηθῇς] M9¹Δ¹, -θεὶς UM9Δ ΧΟ] sp R εἰργάσω lib. **324** ἐραστὰ] G, -ὰς RVAΓUM9 συνουσίας AM9BVp2+ **325** ΕΠ] sp R, —M **326** ΧΟ] om M Only R continues παρ' ἡμῖν to the chorus; M has — before παρ', the rest επ ὑμῖν M9, ἡμῖν from ἡμῶν C ΕΠ] sp R, om rel. **327** ΧΟ] om RVp2+ **329** ὁμότροφά θ'] ὁμότραᵉˢ, φάθ' H **330** ἐνέμετε U **332** μὲν θεσμοὺς (repeated from 331) deleted after παρέβη C **333** ἐκάλεσε] RVMΓ°UM9¹H, -εν ΓM9E2 rel. παρέβαλέ τ'] παρεσβάλετ' A, παραβάλλετ' M, παρέβαλέν τ' B παρὰ] περὶ ΓU **334** ἐξ ὅτ' B, ἔξωτ' H ἐγένετό γ' ἐπ' Vp2+ ἐμοῦ A **335** πολέμιόν γ' ἐτράφη Vp2+ **336** ἀλλὰ . . . μὲν] πρὸς μὲν τὸν ὄρνιν VΓM9, πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸν ὄρνιν V¹Γ² rel. ἐστὶ R ὕστερον M9 **337** τὼ] τὰ U τῶδε RΓ?U **338** ἀπολούμεθ' GAMBC, ἀπολούμεσθ' M¹ rel. **339** πει deleted before τούτων C **340** ἐπὶ] ἐπεὶ V° in ras. ΙΙΙ] sp R, —M ἀκολουθείης V(not G)UM9H **341** ΕΤ] om R, —M κλάοις M ΙΙΙ] : R, —M **342** — before vs. M πῶς] R, — πῶς —M, ευ πῶς πει rel. κλαύσει] AB, κλαυσῇ ΓUM9¹, κλαυσεῖ Γ°M9 rel. sp before ἦν R ἅπαξ] ἔπαξ U 'κκοπῇς] Vp2+, ἐκκοπῇ GUM9, σκοπῇ M, 'κκοπῇ rel. **344** ἔπαγ'] E2BVp2+, ἔπαγε rel. ἔπιθ'] ἔπειθ' RA, ἔπειτ' M **345** θερ before vs. H (misunderstanding of κω[λων] θ of metrical note seen in Vp2C before 343, 345) πάντα ΓΒΔ, πάντη U, πάνταγε Vp2+, πάντα rel. **350** ἐστι ΓE2, abbr. H. **352** μέλλομεν AU, μέλωμεν M **354** ΕΤ] om M τοῦτ'] οὔτ' M

ποῖ] *ποῦ* MΔ III] sp R **355** ET] om R, *πει* A, —M III] sp RA, —M *τούτους*] *τούτου* G *δοκεῖς*] R?VM9, *-ῆις* rel. **356** ET] : R, om M III] : R, —M *τοί*] Γ[1], *τι* Γ, *τί* Vp2[+], *τὰ* E2 *σοι*] *σὰ* E2 **358** ET] om R, —M *δὲ*] *δαὶ* A *χύτραν* G *νῶϊ* A III] sp R, —M *γλαῦξ*] VB, *γλαῦξ'* R, *γλαὺξ* V[c] rel. *νῶϊ* G **359** ET] ΓB, : sp U (in middle of line), om rel. *τοῖς δὲ*] G, *τοῖσδε* V, *τοῖσδε τοῖς* A, *τοῖς δέ γε* M9 *τοισδί*] R, om A, *τοῖς δὲ* Vp2[+], *τοῖσδε* rel. (;)] ΓUB, point RΔ, om rel. III] ΓB, sp U, om rel. *τὸν ὀβελίσκον*] V[c]Γ, *τῶν ὀβελίσκων* VΓ[2](gloss?)M9 **360** *κατάπτηξον* M *πρὸς αὐτόν* lib. ET] : R, —M **361** III] om R, —M *ἐντεῦθεν* B *πρόσθου* lib. *τρυβλίον* A, *τρύβλίον* M **362** ET] om R, —M *σοφατ'* R *εὖ* sup. Δ *γ' ἀνηῦρες*] *γ' ἂν εὗρες* (*εὖ-* ME2)RMM9, *γὰρ εὗρες* ΓUB, *γ' ἀνεῦρες* rel. **363** *ἤδη σύ γ'* V *γ'* by correction Γ **364** The scribe of R first wrote *χο· ελελεῦ· χώρει· παῖε· δεῖρε· κόπτε . . . χύτραν*, then verses 364 and 365 in full, except that *χο* was omitted *ἐλελελεῦ*] Vp2[+], *ἐλελεῦ* rel. *μέλλειν*] *μένειν* R **365** *δεῖρε*] *δαῖρε* placed after *κόπτε* A, *δεῖραι* M *κόπτε*] R (first time) R[1] (second time), *o* in ras. V, *κάπτε* R (second time), *κύπτε* M9Vp2[+], om M *πρώτην τὴν*] *πρώ τὴν* Vp2, *πρὼ τὴν* C, *πρώτην* H **366** EII] deleted(?)A *κάκιστα*]*-α*(?) by correction Γ, *κάκιστα*[ω] U *θηρίων*]*-ρίων* in ras. V[c] **367** *διασπᾶσαι* RV **368** *ξυνγενέε* R, *ξυγγενὲς* G, *ξυγγενέε* rel. **369** *φεισόμεθα* AΓUM9BVp2[+] *λύκων* from *λάχων*(?) C **370** *τινὰς* Vp2[+] *τησαίμεσθ'* R, *τισαίμεσθ'* VMΓM9, *τισαίμεθ'* rel. **371** EII] —V, om GM *εἰσιν* RB, *εἰσὶ* (*-ι*) rel. **372** *τι*] in ras. V[c], from *τὲ*? Δ *ἤκουσιν*] G, *ἤκουσι* V, *ἤκασιν* U *ὑμᾶς*] *ὑμὰς τί* (*τι* V) RV, *ἡμᾶς τι* AM, *ἡμᾶς* rel. **373** XO] om VM *οἷδ'*] *οἵ* (*οἳ*, *οἱ*) *γ'* lib. *ἡμεῖς* M9 *χρήσιμον*] BVp2[+], *χρήσιμον ἢ* rel. **374** *πάπποισι* R, *πάπποι* Vp2 *τοῖς*] om CH **375** EII] G, om V *δῆτα*] Vp2[+], *δεῖ* Δ, *δὴ* Δ[1] rel. **376** *σῴζει*] R, *-ώ-* rel. : after *πάντα* RΓ[c]? *οὖν* G sup. *φίλων* M **377** *τοῦθ'*] B[2], *τοῦδ'* A, *οὐδὲν* BVp2[+] *εἰθὺς*] R, *αὐτὸς* rel. *ἐξηνάγκακεν* E2, *ἐξανάγκασεν* B **378** *γ'*] om AΓUM9B *ἐχθρῶν*] G, *ἐχρῶν* V **380** *σῴζει*] R, *-ώ-* rel. *οἶκον*] V[c], *οἴκων* V *χρήματα*] *η* by correction Γ, *χρώματα* Γ[c] **381** XO] om R *ἂν* deleted after *ἔστι* A *ἡμῖν*] in ras U, *μοι* M **383** III] G, *αν*[θ] R, *πεῖἂν*[θ] V **384** *γ'*] om M **385** XO] G, *ορ'* R, *χο ὀρ'* V, om AM9 *πω*] RAMVp2[+], *που* rel. *πρᾶγμα* M *ἠναντιώμεθα* lib. **386** III] G, *αν*[θ] R, *πεῖἂν*[θ] V, om A, *ἄνσ ἢ πει* M9 *ἄγουσι νὴ Δί'*] *ἄγουσιν ἡμῖν* lib. *τήν τε χύτραν* Vp2[+] **387** *τῷ* ME2, *τῶ*

UM9BVp2+ τε] γε BVp2+ τρυβλίωι RM 390–391 παρ' αὐτὴν τὴν χύτραν ἄκραν] παρ' αὐτὴν χύτραν ἄκραν αὐτὴν AM, παρὰ (περὶ U) τὴν χύτραν ἄκραν αὐτὴν rel. 393 ΕΤ] om R, —M 394 κατορυχθησόμεθα (κατηρ- Γ?) lib. ποῦ] που MΔ 395 ΙΙΙ] om RV, —M δ] οὐ V 396 δημοσίᾳ] R°M, -ία rel. (V° in ras.) 398 μαχομένωι RE2, μαρναμένω B τοῖσι πολεμίοις Vp2+ 399 ἀποθανεῖν] -ν from σ A, ἀποθανῆ U Ὀρνεαῖς] ε by correction A 400 ΧΟ] ὁ χ$^{\rho}$ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν A, om M πάλιν] Γ^{2}, om Γ

403 κἀναποθώμεθα (breathing erased over second α) V, κἂν ἀποθώμεθα G, κἀναπυθώ (*sic*) U 405 ἐπὶ τίνα τ'] M9,^{1} καὶ ἐπὶ τίν' M9 τίνα] τια Δ 406 ἰὼ] ὼ U 408 ΧΟ] —M ποτ' R, ποτε Vp2+ 409 ΕΠ] om V, —M ξύνω U 410 ΧΟ] om V, —M 411 ὄρνιτας Vp2C 412 ΕΠ] G, sp V, —M τε] V^{1} sup. (letter erased after διαίτης), om M 414 ΧΟ] G, om V 415 δὴ] U, δὲ R, δὲ δὴ rel. 416 ΕΠ] G, —V, om M πέραι R 417 ΧΟ] G, corrected from επ H, —V, om M τι] M9Δ, τἰ M, τί rel. 418 ὅτῳ] οὕτω M πέποιθέ μοι lib. 419 επ deleted before κρατεῖν R ἂν] om U τὸν ἐχθρὸν] Vp2+, τῶν ἐχθρῶν rel. 420 φίλους A ἔχων (with dot under ω) M 421 ΕΠ] G, —VM λέγει] V°, λέγειν V, λέγειν τινα Vp2+ (retaining τιν' after μέγαν) μέγαν V^{1} sup. ὄλβον] Δ^{1}, ὄλβιον U, ἄλβον Δ 423 σὰ ταῦτα γὰρ δὴ πάντα Vp2+, σὰ γὰρ ταῦτα πάντα rel. 424 καὶ (second)] BVp2+, τε καὶ A, τε rel. 425 προσβιβᾷ] B^{2}, προσβιαβᾶ B, ξυμβιβᾶ (βαλ deleted after ξυμ H) Vp2+ 426 βαινόμενος M 427 ΕΠ] om V, —M 428 ΧΟ] om VA, —M σοφόν τι] σοφώτατον M, σοφόν τι καὶ U 429 ΕΠ] om VM, —A 430 — before σόφισμα M τρίμα U, τρίμμα rel. παιπάλ$^{\eta}$μ' AM9, παιπάλ$^{\lambda\eta}$μ' ΓU, πεπάλημ' E2 431 ΧΟ] om VM λέγειν λέγειν κέλευέ μοι] R, λέγειν κέλευέ μοι λέγειν (λέγει C) rel. 432 — M, sp U γὰρ] om U 433 λόγων] om M 434 σὺ (first)] Γ^{2}B^{1}, om AΓB καὶ σὺ erased after καὶ σὺ U σὺ (second)] om E2 μὲν πανοπλίαν A μὲν] om UBVp2+ 435 κρεμμάσατον M9, κρεμάσαντον C τύχη ἀγαθῆ(-θὴ M) AMM9, τύχ' ἠγαθῇ Γ°, τύχ' ἀγαθὴ U, τύχη 'γαθὴ B, τύχ' ἀγαθῇ Γ?M9^{1} rel. 436 εἰς lib. τοὔποιστάτου C 437 τούσδ'] τάδ' U οἷσπερ] οἷς περὶ A τοὺς λόγους M9, τοὺς λέγους E2 ξυνέλεξ' AVp2+ 440 ἐδιέθετο A 441 τούτους] τούς τ' U 442 ὀραχίπεδ' U ΧΟ] Vp2+, om RGMU, : V, —A sup. (no sp), sp ΓUB (something deleted in Γ?), επ M9, πει E2 443 τόν] τόνδ' M9 sp before οὐδαμῶς R,

—M III] M9Vp2+, sp VB, om GU rel. 444 XO] B by correction, —VM, επ GΓM9 (and B at first) διατίθεμ' ἔγωγε BVp2+, διατίθεμ' ἐγώ rel. III] G, sp RM?, : —V, ευ ἢ πει A κἀπόμοσον A, κατόποσον C 445 XO] B at first, πει R, —VM, επ G and B by correction, χο ἢ ὁ ἔποψ Γ ὄμνυμι A τούτοις πᾶσι] πᾶσι τοῦτον M 446 III] sp R, : V, om G, —M, επ M9 ταυταῖ M9 447 XO] om RVM 448 ΚΗΡΥΞ] A sup., as part of text U, κήρυξ ἢ πει M9, πει Vp2+ ἄκουε πελεὼ A νυνμενὶ] ΓM9¹E2, νῦν μὲν GA, νῦν μενὶ M9 rel. 449 θὤπλ'] R, θ'ὤπλ' VΓM9, θ'ὅπλ' G rel. 450 προγράφωμεν] M9¹, -ομεν GM9

452 ὤνθρωπος Vp2 453 τάχα] M9?B², τύχα B, τυχὰ M9¹?E2 τύχοις] τύχης U 454 χρηστὰ A μοι] μὴ A 456 — before vs. M παραλειπουμένην U ὑπ'] ὑπὲρ M φρενὸς] om Vp2+ 457 δὲ] δ' ὃ A, om M οὐρᾶς] ὁρᾶις (-ᾶς) lib. λέγ' ἐς] λέγεις M9, λέγ' εἰς rel. 459 τοῦτοι A κοινὸν] κο in ras. Γ, κο νὸν (ras. after κο?) M 460 πράγματι τὴν σὴν ἥκεις] ἂν ἥκοις τὴν σὴν πράγματι BVp2+, ἥκεις τὴν σὴν πράγματι rel. 461 πρότερον lib. 462 III] om V Δία] δί' V 463 οὐ om R στέφανον] στέφ^{a} V, στεφάνους G καταχεῖσθαι] AU, -χεῖσθε (-χείσθε with σθε in ras. V) G rel. 464 χερὸς VAΓUM9 ΕΤ] om GA, χο rel. 465 III] G, om VAMB μὰ δία Vp2+ ζητῶν M λαρινὸν] λιπαρὸν Vp2+ 466 θαύσει M 467 οἴτιν' ὄντε A πρότερον] B², πότερον B βασιλῆς] R¹VΓ^{c}, -εῖς RGΓ rel. XO] R sup. (no sp), : V, επ G, —M ὑμεῖς M βασιλῆς] V, abbr. R, -εῖς G rel. punctuation after βασιλῆς omitted in GMΓBH (and V at first) III] R sup. (no sp) G, : V, —M (;) after ὑμεῖς VB, (,) UΓ, point RM9Vp2C; om G rel. 468 ὁπόσων M9, ὁπόστ' Δ point after πρῶτον RMM9, om rel. point after τουδί RVMΓM9B, om rel. point after αὐτοῦ RMΓE2B, (,) GM9, om rel. 469 ἀρχαιότεροί τε A point after ἀρχαιότεροι RGMΓM9Vp2C, (,) H, om rel. τε] τε καὶ E2 ἐγένεσθε] E2¹, -σθαι E2 470 XO] R sup. (no sp), : V, επ GΓM9B, —M III] G, : —R, om V, —M XO] R sup. (no sp), επ VΓM9B, —M ταυτὶ A ἐπεπείσμην M9 471 III] om VM, ευ Vp2+ κού] B², καὶ B 472 κορυδὸν] κορυδων R πρώτην] om V ὀρνίθων R 473 πατέρ'] πᾱ VVp2+ ἀποθνήσκειν lib. 474 προσκεῖσθαι H πεμπταῖον] om U 475 ὑπὸ M πᾱ' M9 αυτῆς G, αὐ- rel. 476 ΕΤ] om RM, —V, πει G, χο AVp2+, επ ΓM9B ὁ πατὴν C νῦν Γ^{c}

(ras. after second *ν*) M9 *τεθνειὼς* H *κεφαλῆσιν* ΓM9, *-ῆισι* RVM, *-ῆσι* GA, *-ῆσιν* rel. 477 ΠΙ] *επ* RVMVp2+, om rel. *οὐκοῦν* lib. 478 *αὐτῶν*] om A No MS. has (;) after *βασιλεία* 479 ΕΤ] Vp2+, *πει* rel. 480 — before vs. B, *επ* rel. *δρυοκολάπτη* AM (and M9 at first), *δρυκολάστη* C (;) after vs. RAΓ, (,) C, om VUM9, point GE2 rel. 481 *δ'*] om RE2 *τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἦρχον* lib. *τὸ* V sup. 483 *ἐπεδείξω* M *ἀλεκτρυόνα* A 484 *περσῶν* bis A *μεγαβύζου* AΓUM9B 485 *καλεῖτε* E2 *ἔτ'* placed before *ὄρνις* M *ἐκείν* (ras. over *ν*) U, *ἐκείνοις* E2 486 ΕΤ] om RGM, —VA, *επ* rel. *ὁ βασιλεὺς ὁ* RVAMM9 *διαβόσκει* GA 488 ΠΙ] ΓM9B, —A, om. rel. *καὶ* (first) Δ sup. *τότε*] *ποτὲ* U *πολλοὺς* A 489 *ὄρθριον*] B2, *ὄρθιον* RAUB *ἀείση* M 490 *ἀναπηδῶσιν*] B, *-σι* rel. *ἔργον* from *ἔργων* R *χαλκῆς κεραμῆς* AΓB2, *-εῖς* bis GMΓcUM9B *σκυτοδεψοί* RVAMΓM9, *σκυτοδέψοι* UVp2+, *σκυτοδέψαι* ΓcU1B 491 *σκυτῆς βαλανῆς* AΓM91B, *-εῖς* bis GMΓcUM9Δ, *-ῆς -εῖς* Vp2+ *ἀλφοιταμοιβοί* M9 *τορνευτολυρασπιδοπηγοί*] R, *τορνευτασπιδολυροπηγοί* (*-τ' ἀσ-* Γ) rel.; Γc adds *οι* over *η*, i.e. *-ποιοί*(?) 492 *βαδίζουσιν ὑποδυσάμενοι* M9 ΕΤ] in marg. R1, —R sup. (no sp.) *τοῦτό γ'*] *τουτ'* R 493 *ἀπώλεσεν* A *μοχθηρὸς*] AB, *μόχθηρος* rel. 495 *κἄρτι*] Γ2*γρ*, *καὶ* ΓU *κἄθευδον* ΓM9, *κάθευδον* rel. *δειπνεῖν*] *δὲ πίνειν* AM, *δὲ πιεῖν* ΓU *ἄρ'*] *ἂν* A *ἦσε* AMΓUB 496 *Ἀλιμουντάδε*] U, *ἁλιμούνταδε* M9, *ἁλιμοῦνταδε* B (B2 adds acute accent over second *α*), *ἁλιμοῦνταδε* (*-δὲ* VM) rel. *προκόπτων* A 497 *ἔξω τοῦ τείχους* M9 *με* (?) deleted after *παίει* Vc *με ῥοπάλω* U, corr. U1 *με*] Γc, *μὲν* AΓ? *τὸ*] ABVp2+, *τὸν* rel. *νῶτον*] *νῦντον* U 498 *μέλλων* A *τε*] *δὲ* Vp2+ *ἀπέβλισε*] *ι* by correction Vc *θόλμάτιον* ΓB, *θοι-* rel. 499 ΠΙ] om M *ἵκτινος* lib. (but ^ or blot over second *ι* M) *δ'*] om AVp2+ *ἦρχεν*] R, *-ε* rel. *τότε*] M9 sup., *ποτὲ* R, *τότε γε* B *κἀβασίλευεν*] RABVp2+, *-ε* Vc (in ras.) rel. 500 om V, add in marg. V2 XO] om V2M, *ευ* A, *επ* rel. ΠΙ] :—R, om V2M *καὶ*] om U *κατέδειξε* AVp2+ *γ'*] BVp2+, om rel. *πρῶτος οὗτος* A *βασιλεύων τῶν ἑλλήνων* M

501 ΕΤ] R1 in marg., :—R, —M *Διόνυσον*] *δ*ῑ̯*ῦ*᾽ A, *δί'* Vp2+ *ἐγὼ γοῦν*] Vp2+ (*ἐγω* Vp2), *ἔγωγ' οὖν* rel.; there follows in Vp2+ *νὴ τὸν διόνυσον* 502 *ἐκυλινδούμην*] BVp2+, *-δόμην* rel. *ἵκτινον* lib. *ὢν*] *ὦ* A 503 *κενὸν*] *μὲν* M *θύλακόν γ'* B, *θύλακόν* C *ἀφεῖλκ*(*ον*) changed from or to *ἀφεῖλον*(?) R, *ἀφεῖλων* Vp2C, *ἀφεῖλον* H 504

III]—RV, om GMΓVp2+ *αἰγύστου* C *δ' αὖ*] *δὲ* M9 *Φοινίκης*] *φοικης* G *κόκυξ* E2 505 *πει* Vp2+ *τότ'*] RVGA?B, *τόθ'* G1A1 rel. *ἂν*] *αὖ* B, om rel. 506 *τὰς*] *τοὺς* U 507 ET] om RG, —VM, *επ* Vp2+ — before *ἀληθῶς* M *κόκκυ*] GE2, *κοκκὺ* R (and V?), *κοκκυ* V°ΓUM9, *κόκην* A 508 III]—RM, om V *δ'*] Γ, *θ'* Γ1M9 *οὕτως* RAU *καὶ*] om M *βασιλείοι*] E2, *-ει*(?) M9 509 *πόλεσιν*] B, *-σι* rel. 511–513 after 515 in A 511 ET] *επ* RG, —V, om M, *ευ ἡ χο* ΓB, *χο* Vp2+ *τοίνυν*] *νῦν* M, *τοίνυν γ'* Vp2+ *ἤδη*] Γ°, *εἰδ'* R, *ἠδ'* R1, *ἤδειν* M, *οἰδ'* Vp2+, *ἤδει* Γ, *ἤδη* (*ἠδη* V) G rel. *ἐγὼ* RMVp2+, *δ' ἐγώ* M9 *δῆτά*] *δή* B *ἐλάνθανε* A 512 *τοῖς* AM9 513 *εἰστήκει*] R, *ἐστ-* rel. *Λυσικράτη*] Γ°?, *λυσικράτην* RMΓ?U, *λυσοκράτη* A 514 *γ'*] BΔ1, om Δ rel. *νῦν*] *νοῦν* Vp2 (but dot under *o*), *ναῦ* (?) C 515 *ἑστηκ'* (*ἑστ-* Vp2+) *ὄρνιν* BVp2+, *ἑστηκεν ὄρνιν* rel. *βασι*$^{\lambda}$ ΓU 516 *γλαίγ'* C *ὥσπερ*] M9^{1}, *ὡς* M9 517 *δήμητραν* M, *δήμετρ'* E2 *οὕνεκα*] M9^{1}, *οὖν ἕνεκα* AVp2H, *ἕνεκα* M9, *γάρ ἕνεκα* C *ταῦτ'*] *τουτ* R *ἔχουσι* RAUC 518 III] G, —RM, om V *εἰς* lib. *χεῖρα* A *ἐστὶ* GAMUM9 519 *σπλάχνα* M9Δ, *σπλάγχα* C at first *διδοῖ* lib. *αὐτοὶ*] E2, *αὐτοὶ* M9 *πρότεροι*] om R, *πρότερον* M *σπλάχνα* M9Δ *λάβωσι* VUC, *λέγωσιν* E2 520 *ὤμνυ τ'*] G, *ὠμνύετ'* MΓVp2+, *ὤμνυέ* (or *-ε*) *τ'* rel. *ἂν*] om lib. *θεῶν* G *ἅπαντες*] Γ°Δ1, *ἅπαντας* ΓΔ 521 *ὄμνυσ'*] M9^{1}, *-σι* M9, *-σιν* Vp2+, *-σίν γ'* B *ἔτι*] M9^{1}, in ras. V°, om M9 *νῦν* lib. *χῆν'*] M9^{1}, *χῆνα* M9E2 *ἐξαπατῶ* GM, *-τῇ* E2 (and M9?) *τι*] *τις τί* Vp2+ 522 —M *ἁγίους τ'*] *θ' ἁγίους* AB, *θ' ἁγίους τ'* M, *τ' ἁγίους* Γ, *καλοὺς τ'* U 523 *νῦν* by correction Γ *δ'*] om VA *ἀνδράποδ'*] Vp2+, *-δα* rel. *ἠλθίους* Vp2 *μανίας* from *μανιάς* A, *μάνας* Vp2+ 524 om M 525 VM9Vp2+ punctuate only after *ὑμᾶς*, MU only after *ἱεροῖς*, ΓE2 have a point after both words, B a comma after *ὑμᾶς* and a point after *ἱεροῖς* 526 *ὀρνιθευτής* from *ὀρθευτής* Γ 527 — before *ἵστησι* M *ῥάβδους*] Γγρ, *βρόχους* Γ, om M; *γρ σταυροὺς* Γ^{R} M9(in schol.); A has *ἀντὶ του σταυροὺς* after *ὀρνιθευτὴς* as if part of text. 529 *ἀθρόῶν* U, *ἀθρόους* rel. 531 *κοὐδὲν οὖν* M *δοκῇ* M9 532 *ὀπτησάμενοι* V, *ὠπτ-* G *παρέθεντ'* RV, *παραθέντες* A 533 *ἐπικνῶσιν*] V, *-κρῶσι* C, *-κνῶσι* V° rel. 535 *κατάχυμ'* E, *κατάσχυμ'*(?) Δ 536 *κατεσκέδασας* Vp2+ 537 *ἡμῶν* M 538 *κενεβρίων* lib. 539 *δὴ*(second)] R1, om RΓUB 540 *ἄνθρωπ'* RVM9H *ὡς*] *ὁ* (*sic*) Vp2C, om H *ἐμῶν*] *ἡμῶν* M

541 *κακὴν* Vp2+ 543 *ἐμοὶ* AM 544 *σὺ δέ*] *οὐδὲ* G *τινα*] om lib. 545 *ξυντυχίαν* Vp2+ 547 *τὰ*] Vp2+, *τά τε* rel. *νεόττια* lib. *κἀμαυτὸν*] B2, *καὶ ἐμαυτὸν* B, *κατ' ἐμαυτὸν* A *οἰκίσω* M9, *οἰκήσω δὴ* Vp2+ 548 *ἀλλ' ὅ τι*] R, *ἀλλά τί* rel. *χρῆν* B *ὡς*] *καὶ* E2 *ζῇ*, U *ἡμῖν*] om ΓU 550 *δὴ τοίνυν*] A1min., *νῦν δὴ* A, *δὴ* M *πρῶτα*] U, *πρῶτον* AMU1

551 *πει* E2 *πάντα*] om M *κύκλῳ*] *τοῦτον* U *πᾶν*] *περὶ* G *τουτὶ*] *τὶ* C 552 *περιτειχίζειν*] Γc, *-ει* Γ 553 ΕΠ] —R, om VME2, *χο* ΑΓΒ *κεβριόνα* lib. *ὡς*] *ὠ* and sp U *σμερδαλέον*] Δ1, *μερδαλέον* ΔC, *ἀκερδάλεον* E2 *πόλισμα*] B2, *πτόλισμα* M, *τείχισμα* B 554 ΙΙΙ] —R, om VME2 *κἄπειτα* A, *κἀπειδ'* B *ἂν* lib. *ἐπανεστήκει* RG, *ἐπαναστήκη* A, *ἐπὰν ἐστήκη* ΓUM9 H repeats the first half of this vs. at the top of a new page. 555 *πει* M9 (om E2), *χο* Vp2+ *μὴ*] om A *φή* R, *'φῇ* Vp2+ *ἐθελήσει* AVp2+ *γνωσιμαχήσει* AVp2+ (and V at first?) 556 *πρωὶδᾶν*] Γ?UVp2C, *προυδᾶν* M9H, *πρωυδᾶν* (*-ὰν* RM)Γc?M9[1] rel. *αὐτῷ*] om M *τοῖσιν* V(not G) *θεοῖς* MU 557 *ἡμετέρας* AUM9Vp2 *ἐστυκόσι*] RVΓ, *ἐστηκόσι* rel. *διαφοιτᾶν*] Rc?, *-φυτᾶν* R 558 *μοιχεύσαντες* AU 559 *δ'*] om M *ἐπίωσιν* AM9 560 *ψωλήν*] *κωλὴν* BVp2+ *βινῶσ'*] Vc, *βει-* VG *ἔτι* G, *ἔτ' εἰς* A 561 *δ'*] Vc, om V *πέμψω* E2 563 *θεοῖς*] *τοῖς θεοῖς* M9 *προνείμασθαι* M9 (cf. *πρὸν-* V, *πρὸν-* U) 564 *θεοῖσιν*] B, *θεοῖσι* Vp2+, *θεοῖς* rel. *ὕστερον* deleted after *θεοῖσι* C *ὅσ'* RVΓUB *ἁρμόζει* RE2Δ, *ἁρμόζῃ* R1E2[1]Δ1 rel. *καθέκαστον* AMΓUM9 565–566 om M, add in marg. M1 *ἣν δ'* M1 *ἀφροδύτη* Vp2C *θύει* Vp2+ (but *-η* H or H1) No MS. punctuates after *θύῃ*; after *πυροὺς* RVΓBVp2+ do so 566 *ἐὰν* U *οἶνον* A, *ὄϊν* M, *ὖν* BVp2+ *τὶς βοῦν* Mγρ in schol. (cf. BVp2+ in 567), *βοῦν τις* M9γρ over 568 (= lemma of schol. on 566) *θύῃ*] M9[1], *θύει* M9 *νήττῃ*] M9, *νύττῃ* MC, *νήττῃ* M9[1], *νήττ' ἢ* E2 *καθαγίζειν*] UM9B, *καθαγιάζειν* Γ, *καταγίζειν* rel. 567 *δ'*] om R, *δὲ* Vp2+ *ἡρακλεῖ* lib. *θύῃ τι*] *τὶς βοῦν* BVp2+, *θύῃ τις* (or *τὶς*) rel. *λάρῳ ναστοὺς*] *λάρωνας τοὺς* (*τὼς* G) V *λάρων ἀστοὺς* A and (*ασ-*)E2 *μελιτούττας* V, *μελιτούτας* Γc, *μελιττούτας* (*-οῦ-* R) GΓ rel.; U adds *πλακουντώδεις* as if part of text 568 *κἂν . . . κριόν*] *ἢν δὲ ποσειδῶνι βοῦν τις θύῃ* M9γρE2 *θύει* U *ὀρχῖλος* GM9 569 *τοῦ*] *ποῦ* U *ἔνορχιν* AH, *ἐνόρχιν* Vp2C 570 *χο* before *βροντάτω* A *βροτάτω* R, *βοντάτω* U *Ζάν*] M9[1], *ζᾶν* RVC, *ζεὺς* AM9H 571 om A XO] *επ* lib. *θεοὺς νομιοῦσ'* M *χ'*

ουχι R, *κού* M 572 *πετόμεθα* GUE2Vp2+ III] —R sup. (no sp), *ευ* in marg. R1 *νη*] om Vp2+ *δ γ' Ερμῆς*] *ἔρως γε* A *γ'*] om B 573 *πέτεται*] Γ2γρ, *πέταται* Γ rel. *καὶ ἄλλοι* VAMM9 *γε*] om ΓUB 574 *πέταται* lib. *χρυσοῖν* VAM 575 *Ἥρην*] M, *ἶριν* (*ἰ-* RGA) rel. *γ'*] RVΓcM9, *χ'* VcΓ rel. *ὤμηρος* ΓU *πελείῃ*] *πελείματι* E2 H omits *γ' ὅμηρος . . . ἦν δ'* (577), reading *ἶριν δ'* (corr. from *δὲ*) *οὖν ὑμᾶς* etc. 576 ET] om Vp2C, *επ* rel. *οὐ*] om M *πέμψει*] Δ, *-η* M9Δ1? point after vs. MΔVp2C, (,) U, (;) rel. 577 III] —R, om MVp2C *μὲν*] om U *ἀνολας* VA *νομίσωσι*] *νομίσω εἰ* E2 578 *δὲ*] E21, om E2 *θεοὺς*] Γ2, om ΓU *χρὴ*] *δὴ* A *στρουθῶν* lib. *νέφος στρουθῶν* M9, corr. M91 579 *ἀνακάψαι*] V, *ἀνακάμψαι* VcA, *ἀνασκάψαι* M 580 —VA (om G) *κἄπειτα* A *ἡ Δημήτηρ*] *ἤδη μητρ'* E2 581 ET] *επ* lib. *αὐτὴν*] om Vp2+ *ἔχουσαν* M 582 *οἷσιν*] B, *οἷσι* rel. *καταροῦσιν*] RVVp2+, *-σι* G rel. 583 *προφάτων* R *ἐπιπείραι* R, *ἐπιπειρᾷ* V, *ἐπὶ πείρῃ* U 584 *εἰθ'*] VcH1, *εἶτ'* RVVp2+ *δ γ'*] M91, *ὁ* M9 *ἰατρὸς* bis A *γ'*] om lib. 585 ET] corr. from *πει* C *κοιδαρίω* G, *βοϊδαρίω* AB, *βοιδαρίω* rel. *πρ* deleted after *βοιδαρίω* R *πρότιστ'* E2 586 *σὲ δὲ*] M91B1, *σὲ* ΓUM9B *σὲ Κρόνον*] M9, *σὲ δὲ κρόνον* VMM91 *σὲ δὲ ποσειδῶ* VMM9 587 *αὐτοῖσιν*] B, *αὐτοῖσι* Vp2+, *αὐτοῖς* rel. EΠ] :—R, —VM, *ευ* G, *χο* ΓBVp2+ *ἕνα* M9 588 III] G, —RV, om M *πρῶτα*] Vc, *-ον* VM *αὐτῶν*] Γ2B2, om ΓU, *αὐτὰς* B *οἰνάνθας*] *ὄρνιθας* Δ *πάρνοπες*] *παρόντες* Δ, *σφῆκες* Γ2γρ (cf. gloss in R) Between 588 and 589 R has the first three words of 591, but deleted 589–590 after 599 in V, om A, add in marg. V2A1; V2 deleted V's entry after 599 *εἷς* V, *εἰς* V2AMVp2+ *αὐτοὺς*] Γ2, om ΓU *κερχνήιδων* (?) Δ, *κερχνηίδων* Vp2+, *κερχνῆΐδων* rel. *ἐπιτρίψῃ* M9 590 *εἰθ'*] V2, *εἶτ'* RV *αἱ* A *κνῖπες*] V2, *κνίπες* VMM9, *κνῆπες* A *ψῆρες* U 591 *επ* A *μιᾶ* G, *μιᾷ* M9 592 EΠ] G, —RVAM, *χ* Vp2+ *τουτουΐ* A *ἐρῶσιν*] VVp2+, *ἐρῶσι* G rel. 593 III] G, —RVAM *μέταλλ' αὐτοῖς*] Γ2γρ, *μέταλλα τοῖς* RV AMΓU *μαντευομένους* Vp2+ *τὰ*] om M *χρηστά*] B, *χρυσᾶ* B2 594–595 repeated at top of new page H 594 —A *κατεροῦσι* RAU 595 *ὥστ' . . . οὐδείς*] om A *ὥστ' οὐκ ἀπολεῖται τῶν ναυκλήρων τις οὐδεὶς* Vp2+ EΠ] :—R, —VA, *ευ* G, om M (at beginning of new line), *χ* Vp2+ 596 III] G, —RVA, om M *μαντευομενων* R 597 *πλεῖν* V (bis), *πλέε* U (bis) *ἐπέσται*] *ἔπεται* G,

ἐνέσται U, ἐπέστω M9 598 γαῦλον from γλ- R ναυκληρῶν G οὐκ M ἄν] V^{c}, om V μείνω A ἡμῖν G (and A at first?) 599 ΠΙ] om B τ'] om M αὐτοὶ R, αὐτοῖσι A πρότεροι] V^{c}, πρότερον RVGΓUB 600 ἴσασι] οἴσασι Vp2C, οἴδασι H λέγουσι] om E2 δὲ τὰ τοιάδε Δ πάντα A

601 οἶδεν] RB, οἶδε rel. ἄρ'] om R 602 E here resumes ΕΤ] G, —V πωλῶ] E2^{1}, πολλῶ VVp2^{+}, πολῶ E2 ὑδρίας] ἰδρίας A ἀνορύττω] om A, ἐνορύττω U 603 ΕΠ] —RVA, om GBVp2, χ CH ὑγίειαν lib. δῶσ' M περὶ U τοῖς M θεοῖς ΓU 604 ΠΙ] G, —RV πράττωσ'] V, -σιν V^{c} ὑγεία A, ὑγιειά γε B, ὑγίεια rel. 605 γε] by correction Γ, om B οὐδὲν V^{c}(εν in ras.)M ὑχλαίνει C 606 ΕΠ] —RVA, ευ G, χ Vp2^{+} εἰς lib. ἐστιν A 607 παιδάρι' ὄντ'] παιδάρι' ἔτ' ὄντ' RV, παιδάριον ὄντ' ΓU, παιδάριόν τ' EVp2^{+}, παιδάριον ὄν B, παίδριον (?) A, παιδάριον M ἀποθνήσκειν lib. ΠΙ] G, : —R, om V, —M 608 ΕΠ] : —R, : V, ευ G, om A, —M, χ Vp2^{+} παρὰ τοῦ] V^{c}, παραυτ- V, ποῦ τοῦ M ΠΙ] G, : —R, : V, om M παρ' ὄτου] παρὰ τοῦ lib. αὐτῶν Γ 609 —V (om G) γενεὰς πέντε ἀνδρῶν E, πέντε γενεὰς ἀνδρῶν E^{1} rel. ζώιει R, ζώη GMU λακέρυξα Vp2C 610 ΕΤ] G, —RV αἰβοῖ] αἰβοῖ ὡς lib. πολλοὶ A κρείττους E2 τοῦ Διὸς] V^{c} sup., om G (but τοῦ διὸς δη$^{\lambda'}$ as gloss) βασιλεύει G 611 ΠΙ] —R, om A πρῶτα ΓUB γ'] om lib. 612 ὑμᾶς M δεῖ] δοκεῖ A 613 αὐτοὺς A 614 χρυσαῖς M 615 οἰκήσουσιν] RVUVp2C, -σι G rel. 617 ἐλαίας lib. 618 κοὐδ' AVp2^{+} εἰς lib. οὐδ'] οὐκ M εἰς in ras. V^{c} Ἄμμων'] U^{1}, ἄμων' U 619 ἐκεῖ] om M ἐκθύσομεν M 620 ταῖσιν] RV, -σι rel. κομάροισι Vp2^{+} 622 εὐξώμεθ' E αὐτοὺς V ἀνατείναντες R, ἀναμείναντες M 623 χεῖρε A τι διδόναι A 625 προβαλοῦσιν] παραβαλοῦ ἔσθουσιν A 626 πολὺ] om U 627 ἄν] om G 628 τοῖσι] Vp2^{+}, τοῖς rel. 629 ἐξηπείλησα A 632 ἀδήλους Vp2^{+} : after ἀδόλους V (om G) 633 θεοῖς GM ἴης] ἴοις M, ἴοις rel. (corr. from ἴσοις R) 635 θεοὺς from θεῶν (?) Γ ἔτι] Γ, ἐστι A, ἐπὶ Γ^{2}γρE σκῆπτρ' ἀμὰ CH 636 πράττειν ῥώμη Γ τεταξόμεσθ' R 637 επ M ἀνάκεινται ME 638 ΕΠ] om M 639 ὤρ' ἀστιν A, ὤρ' ἐστὶν H μελλονικιᾶν] R^{c}, -ίαν RU, μέλλω νικᾶν A 640 γε] τι B, τε rel. 641 εἰσέλθετε M ἐς] εἰς (σ deleted in M?) τὴν ME, εἰς rel. νεοττιάν] Γ^{c}B, -ίαν ΓB^{2} rel. 643 τοὔνομα GA ἡμῖν] U, (ἡμ)ῶν U sup.

(gloss?) φράσετον F UB, (φράσε)τε U sup. (gloss?) ΠΙ] AΓB, : R, om rel. 644 —V, πει GMEVp2+ πεισθαίτερος AΓE2, πεισθέστερος Vp2H, πεισθέτερος C, πεισθέταιρος Γ1 rel.; followed by : —R, επ GAMΓEBVp2+, sp U τφδεδι] τὼι δὶ δὲ τί RV?V2γρ, τῶ δὲ τί BVp2?, τῶ δὲ δὶ τί Γ?, τῶδε δὲ τί V°GΓ°? rel. All MSS. except RD. punctuate at end of vs. 645 —V, πει GAMVp2+, ευ ΓE, sp U Κριῶθεν] RV°, κρίωθεν V?, κριόθεν GMγρE, θρίηθεν AMEγρ Mογγρ E2γρ, θρίωθεν Γ with κ added over ρ and ή over ω by Γ1, θρήηθεν U, θριᾶθεν BΔ1, θριῶθεν B2, θριᾶσθεν Δ; cf. the Scholia ΕΠ] G, : RV, —M All MSS. except GAU punctuate after χαίρετον 646 — before ἄμφω M, οἱ δύο ΓU (in U as part of text), πει EBVp2+ ΠΙ] A sup., : —R, : V (no sp VA), om G rel.; A alone punctuates after ἄμφω δεχόμεσθα EBVp2+ ΕΠ] G, : —R, : V, —M 647 ΠΙ] GB, —RVM, οἱ δύο ΓU (in U as part of text), ευ B sup. ΕΠ] G, : RV, ευ A, —M 648 ΠΙ] G, om RVA (but : after ἴθι V), —M, ἀνθρῶ ή επ Γ, οἱ δύο (as part of text) U δεῖνα δεῦρ'] in ras. V°, δεῖν' Vp2+ ἐπανακροῦσαι B 649 επ· φέρ' ἴδω· πει Vp2+, sp after ἴδω B φέρ'] δεῦρ' Γ°(ευ by correction) U φράσων U φράσον γε νῶν ὅπως Vp2+ ἔγωγε A, ἐγώγε E2 650 ξυνεσόμεθ'] GE2, -μεσθ' RVAΓE, ξυνέσθαι ἔσθ' M ποτομένοις E2 651 ΕΠ] Vp2C, —A, om H (but : after 650), ευ rel. ΠΙ] Vp2C, επ H, sp B, om rel. ὀρᾶ Vp2C 652–54 after 657 A ἐστιν] V, ἔστιν REB, ἔστι AM9, abbr. H, ἐστὶ V° rel. 653 φλαῦρος A, φαύλως H 654 φοβηθεὶς U (and M9Δ at first) τι] om E ῥίζιον Vp2+ 655 ἐπτερομένωι R 656 ΠΙ]—AM, ἀνθρ̄ Γ, ἄνθ̄ι U, ευ B : before ἄγε R, —M, επ E 657 λαμβάνετε] V°, λάμβανε RV, λαμβάνετον B 658 λέγω] καλῶ R XO] GMΓBVp2+, om rel. (at beginning of a new line VAUE) μὲν] νῦν U σαυτοῦ] σατοῦ R, σοῦ V, σοῦ τοῦ Vp2H, τοῦ σοῦ C 659 ἀρίστισον] RΓ°E, ἀρίστησον Γ? rel. εὖ] in ras. V, om BVp2+ σύμφωνον Vp2+ Μούσαις] -ης lib. 660 κατάλιφ' ΓUE ἐκμβιβάσας C 661 ΠΙ] om Vp2+ αὐτοῖσιν] RVA1B, -σι GA rel. πιθοῦ] V°, πειθοῦ V 662 om VM, add in marg. V1; placed after 663 in E2, but corrected τ'ὀρνίθιον A 663 ΕΤ] om lib. 664 θεασώμεσθα] ΓEBΔ1Vp2+, -ώμεθα RGA1M UM9Δ, θεασόμεσθ V, -όμεθα A 665 σφώιϊν R ή] ή M Πρόκνη] πύκνη E2 666 ἔκμβαινε Vp2C 667 τοὐρνίθειον G (and A at first) 668 ΕΤ] om RGAM, —R°, : —V, επ ΓEB 669 διαμερίζοιμ' UE2

αὐτὴν] RΓUEB, αὐτῆς rel. **670** ΠΙ] ΓEB, om rel. **671** ΕΤ] G, om R, —VAM, πει Vp2+ κἂν] καὶ lib. **672** ΠΙ] G, om RV, —AM, ευ Vp2+ ὀβελίσκοιν] GΓ, ὀβελίσκον AU, -ων Γ²(gloss?)B, ὀβελίσκοινον Vp2+ ἔχει] V, ἔχοι V° **673** ΕΤ] G, om RV, —AM, πει Vp2+ ᾠὸν] R, ὠὸν V° (in ras.) rel. **675** ΕΠ] om RVM, πει G, —A ΠΙ] om RVAM δὴ] G, δὲ RA, δεῖ V, om E τύχη 'γαθῆ ΑΓ°B, τύχῃ ἀγαθῇ M, ἀγαθῆ τύχη Vp2+, τύχ' ἀγαθῆ Γ rel. **676** ΧΟ] G, om RVM **677** φιλτάτη U ὀρνέων] R°, ὀρνίθων R ΑΓBVp2C punctuate after ὀρνέων, RΓE after πάντων (678), ΓE2 after ἐμῶν, ΓVp2C after ὕμνων (679) **678** ξύνομε V(not G)UE2 **679** ἀηδοῖ] M¹, ἀοιδῇ GM? and (-ή) Mg?, ἀοιδοῖ Mg¹, ἀοιδῆς E2 **680** θ Vp2, θεραπ C, θερ H (due to misunderstanding of [κωλ] θ' of a metrical note prefixed to 676) **681** ἠδὺν] B, ἀδὺν ΓUB² φθόγγων M **682** κέκρουσ' Mg E2, κρέκρουσ' Mg¹ (but κρέκουσαι in marg. Mg¹) **683** ἐρινοῖς E2 **685** ἄνδρ' A ἀμαυρόβιοι] ἀμαβρόβιοι Vp2+, ἀμαιρόβιοι Δ, ἠμερόβιοι E2Γ²γρΓᴿγρEγρMgγρ προσόμοιο R **686** σκι οειδέα Γ (ras.?) φύλ' RAU, φύλλ' ME **687** ἀστῆνες C εἰκελόνειροι ABVp2+, ἰκελ- (ῑ- R, ῐ- V) rel. **688** τὸν νοῦν] om A ἐοῦσιν] VBVp2+, οὖσι A, ἐοῦσι G rel. **689** τοῖσιν] τοῖς E ἀγήρως] A, -ως rel. τοῖς] B, τοῖσιν B² rel. ἄφθιτα] M¹, ἀφθίτοις M μηδομένοισι R **690** ἡμῶν from ὑμῶν (?) Γ **691** οἰονῶν V (not G) τ'] om A **692** παρ' εμοῦ προδίκωι R **693** χάον C εὐρύς] εἰθὺς Vp2+ **694** οὐρανοὶ E2 ἦν] om M ἀπείροισι RA **695** ᾠόν] RV, ὠόν G rel. **696** ἐξ] ξ Vp2 ποθεινός] πόθος R **697** εἰκὸς Vp2+ ἀνεμήκεσι E2 **698** νυχίων A κατὰ] ποῦ κατὰ U **699** ἐνεόττευσεν] RVB, ἐνεόττευσε GMΓEMg¹E2¹Vp2C, ἐνεότευσε UMg(?)E2H, ἐννεότευε A εἰς AMEVp2+ **700** ξυνέμιξεν Vp2+, συνέμιξεν rel.

701 συμμιγνυμένων B δ'] om RM γένετ'] BVp2+, ἐγένετο δ' M, ἐγένετ' rel. τε] om A **702** τε] om M, δὲ Vp2+ ἄφθιτον C **703** Ἔρωτος] Γ°, ερω᾽ R, ἔρωτες Γ?B **704** πολλοῖσι A πετόμεθα GMgVp2H, ποτέμεθα E2, μετόμεθα C τε] om lib. ἐρῶσι] GΓ, ἐρῶσιν VVp2+, ἔρωσι AMΓ°B **705** δὲ καλοὺς] om R καλλοὺς GH πτέρμασιν V **706** ἐμήρισαν A, διομήρισαν M, διεμήρυσαν U, διεμέρισαν E2H ἄνδρ' A **707** ὤρτυγα Vp2C πορφυρίων U, -ίωνα E2 (and Mg at first) χῆν'] Mg¹?, χῆνα MgE2 ὄρνεον E **708** πάντα] ταῦτα V **710** γέρανος] E¹, -οι AME?Vp2+ εἰς BC and

H (by correction) *τὴν* V^{e} sup. *μεταχωρῇ*] V?GM9^{1}, *-εῖ* V^{e}M9, *-χωρεῖν* AVp2^{+}, *-χωρθῇ* E2 711 *φράζει*] om A *κρεμμάσαντι* M9 712 *ὑφαίνει* M *ἀποδοίη* VM 713 *ἵκτινος* lib. *δ'*] om lib. *ἑταίραν* U 714 *ἡνίκα*] *ἵνα* Vp2^{+} *πέκτειν* VA, *πύκειν*(?) Γ, *πέκειν* Γ^{e} rel. *ὥρα*] V, *ὥραν* V^{e}A, *ὥρᾳ* M *ἠρινόν* R, *ἐρινὸν* E2, *εἰαρινὸν* (*-ικὸν* C) Vp2^{+} *χελιδὸν* R 715 *ληδάριόν*] ΓUB, *ληι-* RM9Vp2C, *ληῖ-* VAΓ^{e}MEH, *ληνδάριον* E2 717 *ὄρνεις* RVBVp2^{+} *οὗτο* C *πρὸς πάντα* ΓU *τρέπεσθαι* RAC 718 *ἂἳ* R 719 *ὅσαπερ*] *ὅσα* GB *περὶ*] om A 720 *ἐστίν* RE, abbr. ΓH 721 *σύμβολον* Vp2^{+} *ὄνον*] *ὄρνιν* A 722 *ἄρ'*] *αἳ* E2 *μαντείας* A *ὁ ἀπόλλων* M9 723 —R 726 *πνίγειν οὐκ* U 727 *καθευδούμεθ'* A 729 *δώσωμεν* R *ἡμῖν* A 730 *παισὶ* (bis) AMΓUBVp2^{+} and *παισὶ* (second) G 731 *πλοῦθ' ὑγίειαν* RVAΓ^{e}?, *πλοῦτον ὑγείαν* M, *πλουθυγίειαν* Γ? rel.; add *τ'* Vp2^{+} 732 *νεώτητα* E2 733 *θαλείας* RVAVp2^{+} *γάλα τ'*] *γάλακτ'* E2 735 *ὑπὸ*] *ὑπὲρ* A 738 *τιὸ* (7)] R, (5) ΓB, (4) rel.; RGAB accent each *τιο*, E each but the last; RAB point after each, GM9 after each but the last. *τἰξ* M9, *τίγξ* rel. 739–741 om Γ, 739–740 add Γ^{2} 739 om B *ποικίλλη* M9 740 *νάπῃσι* M, *νάπαις* Vp2^{+} *καὶ*] om lib. *κορυφαῖς*] *κορυφαῖσί τ'* lib. *ἐνορείαις* MM9Vp2C 741 *τιὸ* (4)] RVMEVp2^{+}, (5) AB, (3) G, *τιοτιοτιτιοτιοτιο* U; RGAEB accent each *τιο*, E2 each but the last; B points after each, GM9 after all but the last, A after the first three *τἰξ* M9C, *τίγξ* C^{1} rel. 742 *ἰζομένους* A, *-μένη* B *μελίας*] *μελίαις* R (but perhaps corrected), *μηλίας*(?) A *ἐπὶ* A sup. 743 *τιὸ* (4)] RVA^{1}MΓVp2^{+}, (3) AUE, (5) B; RGAΓEBVp2C have *τιό* or *τιὸ* each time, V only the first time and U the last, ΓH *τίο* each time; GAM9B point after each *-τίγξ*] AMB, *τιτίγξ* Γ, om rel. 744 *ξουθῆς*] Γ^{e}, *ξουθων* Γ 746 *σεμνά*] VAM, *σεμνᾶ* R? rel. (H corr. to or from *-ᾶ*) *τε*] om A *τε τῇ μητρὶ* Vp2^{+} *ὀρίαι* R, *ὀρία* VA, *ὄρεια* MVp2^{+} 747 *το* (11) A, (5) U, (8) Vp2C, (4) H, (9) rel.; R accents the first three and fifth, E every second one; M9 points after every second one, B after each *τἰξ* MM9Vp2C, *τίγξ* rel. 748 — before *ἔνθεν* M *ὡσπερεὶ*] *ὥσπερ ἡ* lib. 750 *ἀποβόσκετο* C *καρπῶν* A

751 *ἀεὶ* repeated after *φέρων* E *ἀοιδάν* E, *ὠδὴν* UVp2^{+}, *ὠιδάν*(*ὠ-*) rel. 752 *τιὸ* (4)] *τιό* (3) RAEB, *τιο* (3) VMΓUVp2C, *τίο τίο τιο* H;

M9B point after each *τίξ* RMM9C, *τίγξ* rel. **753** *ὑμᾶς* M **754** *ζῆν* U *τολοπὸν* H **755** *ἐστιν ἐνθάδ'*] AMVp2+, *ἐνθάδ' ἐστὶν* rel. *αἰσχρὸν* E **756** *ἐστὶ* lib. *τοῖσιν*] *τοῖς* M, om Vp2+ *ὄρνισιν*] RVB, *ὀρνέοισι* M9, *ὄρνοισι* C, *ὄρνισι* GM9^{1}C^{1} rel. **757** *τύπτειν*] V^{c}, *-ει* V **758** The scribe of V first wrote this vs. with *ποικίλος κεκλήσεται* in place of *ἦν . . . πατρί*, then deleted and wrote the verse correctly *ἐκεῖ*] *ἐκεῖνο* U *παρ' ἡμῖν καλόν* Vp2+ *ἐστι παρ' ἡμῖν* E **759** *εἶποι* A *πατάξας*] om A *μάχει* VAVp2+, *μάχηι* (*-η*) rel. **760** *τυγχάνει* from *-ηι* R **761** *ποικίλος*] om U **762** *ἥττων* E **764** *ἐστι*] G, *-ὶν* RV, abbr. H **765** *φυσσάτω* U, *φυσάτο* C *φανοῦνται*] *φαροῦνται* C *φάτορες* A, abbr. U, *φράτορες* rel. **766** *ὁ Πεισίου*] *ὀπισίου* AVp2, *ὁ πιδίου* Γ, *ὁ πισίου* Γ^{c} rel. **767** *γενέσθαι* AU *πατρὸς*] *πάππου* B *νεόττιον* lib. **768** *οὐδὲν αἰσχρόν*] *χρηστὸν οὐδέν* M *ἐστι* G **769** *τοιάνδε* ΓUBVp2+ **770** after 771 M *τιὸ* (4) RAEB, *τιο* (4) VVp2+, *τιο τιο τιο τιό* MΓU; AM9B point after each, R after first two *-τίγξ*] BΔ^{1}Vp2+, *τίξ* Δ, om rel. **771** *συμμιγῆν* Vp2+ **772** *πτεροῖσι* RBH, *-οῖσιν* Vp2C *κρένοντες* G *ἴαχον*] VAM, *ἴαχον* rel. **773–774** om H **773** *τιὸ* (4)] AVp2C, (3) GΓB, (2) U, *τιό τιό τι* RVE, *τιο τιο τιο τι* M; RAEB accent each *τιο*, AM9B point after each *τιο* *τίξ* RM9, *τίγξ* rel. **774** *Ἔβρον*] ΓU, *ἐβρον* R, *εβρον* V, *ἔβρον* M, *ἔβρῳ* M^{1}, *εὖρον* AB (*β* over *υ* B^{2})C^{1}, *ἔρον* C, *εὖρον* G rel. *ποταμόν*] M, *-ῷ* M^{1} **775** *τιο* (3) UH, (4) rel.; RAM9BVp2+ accent each *τιο*, MΓE only the last; AM9B point after each *-τίγξ*] om lib. **776** *αἰθέρῐον νέφος*^{ους} U *βοά*] R^{c}, *βοᾶ* RM9, *βαὰ* Δ **777** *ποικίλα* (*ποικὶ* U) *φῦλα τε* (*φύλαττε* Vp2+) lib. *θηρῶν*] *πτερῶν* M **778** *κύματά τ'*] *κύματ'* V, *κύματ' ἄτ'* Vp2H, *κύμα κατ' ἄτ'* C *ἔσβεσεν* E (not M9) *αἴθρη*] Γ^{2}γρ, *αἰθήρ* ΓU **779** *το* (5) UH, (10) Vp2C, (6) rel.; A accents each, and AB point after each *τίξ* M9, *τίγξ* rel. **780** *ἐπεκτύπησεν* MM9, *ἐκτύπησ'* B, *ἐκπεκτύπησ'* C **781** *θάμβος*] *φόβος* Vp2+ *ἄνακτας*] M^{1}min., *ἅπαντας* M **782** *οὐλυμπιάδες* BVp2+ *δὲ*] om H **783** *τ'*] *τε* M9 Vp2H, om C **784** *τιὸ* (3) UEVp2+, (4) rel.; R accents first three, A last three, M9 first two, B all; E2 points after first two, B after each *τίξ* M9, *τίγξ* rel. **785** *ἐστιν* M9 *οὐδὲ* G *ἥδιον*] *ἴδιον* M9 **787** *τραγωδιῶν* G *ἤχθετο* from *ἤιχ-* R **788** *ἐκπετάμενος* C, *ἐκπετόμενος* rel. *ἐλθεῖν* M **789** *κᾆτ'*] G, *κατ'* V, *κάτ'* M9 *ἂν*] *αὖ* G *ἐμπλησθῆς* A *αὖ*] *ἂν* A *κατέπτατο* lib. **790–92** om A

791 *θὶμάτιον* B, *θοι-* Δ rel. *ἀνέπτατο* lib. **792** om. V *κἂτ' ἀποπαρδὼν* (from *-ὢν*) R, *κἀποπαρδῶν* MUE *αἴθις*] Γ¹, *αὖτις* RΓΓ² sup. MUE *κατέπτατο* lib. **793** *τίς ἐστιν ὑμῶν* A *ὅστις*] *ὡς τίς* C **794** *καθορᾷ* M *βουλευματικῶ* H **795–796** repeated in U at top of new page *ἀνέπτατο* B, *ἀνίπτατο* rel. **796** *βινίσας* VM9 *ἐκεῖθεν*] om R, but add R¹ in marg. *αὖ* AVp2⁺, *ἂν* rel. *καθέζετο* lib. **797** *παντός* from *πάντως* R *ἐστιν*] om Vp2⁺ A alone has (;) after *ἄξιον* **798** *διιτρέφης* ΓUE, *διὶ τρέφης* M, *διιτρεφής* Γ^c rel. *πυτιναῖα*] *υ* in ras. B, *πιτυναῖα* AM *ἔχω* V **799** *φύλαρχας* V, *φυλάρχας* G *ὕπαρχος* VMM9Vp2H, *ὑππαρχος* CH¹ *εἶτ'*] *ὥστ'* VM ΓUE, *γρ καὶ εἶτα* Γ²E; cf. *εἶτα* sup. M9¹min. (not E2) *ἐξοιανὸς* G **800** *πράττειν* C *κἄστιν* Vp2⁺ *ἰπαλεκτρυών* V (not G), *ἀλεκτρυὼν* Vp2⁺

801 *τοιαυτοί* M sp before *μὰ Δί'* RA; E begins a new verse here **802** *γελοιώτερον* M **803** ΠΙ] : R, —V, om G *ἐπὶ*] *'πὶ* Vp2 *τοῖς* ΓUBVp2⁺ **804** om A *ᾧ*] *ὃ* M **805** *συγγεγραμένω* C (and VU at first) **806** om R, add R² in marg. ΕΤ] om R²G, —V *σὺ δὲ*] *οὐδὲ* G *κομψίχῳ* E2 *γε*] Γ in ras. *παρατετιλμένωι* R², *ἀποτετλιμένῳ* M **807** ΠΙ] om RV, —M *μὲν*] om Vp2⁺ *ἡκάσμεσθα* Vp2⁺, *ἡκάσμεθα* VAΓ, *ἠκάσμεθα* A¹Γ^cEM9¹ (*η* in ras.), *ἡκάσμεθα* U, *εἰκάσμεσθα* BΔ¹, *εἰκάσμεθα* RGMΔ **808** *αὐτῶν* EBM(or M¹), *αὐτοῖς* E2, *αὐτῶν* M9 rel. **809** ΕΠ] G, om R, —VM, *ευ* ΑΓΒ *χρὴ*] Γ²B², om ΓBVp2⁺ *δρᾶν γε* BVp2⁺ ΠΙ] : R, om V, sp GME2 **810** *τι*] om A, *τὲ* C **811** ΕΤ] : —RV^c, —M, *πει* G, *επ* Vp2⁺ *ξυνδοκεῖ* Vp2⁺ **812** ΕΠ] G, om R, —VM, *πει* rel. *εἶδω* G *ἡμῖν*] om E2 *οὔνομ'* B, *ὄνομ'* Δ rel. *ἔστω* M, *ἐστὶ* E and (*ἔστι*) Δ at first. **813** ΕΤ] om lib. *μέγα*] *μετα* R *τοὐκ*] *του* Γ, *τοὐκ'* Γ^c **814** *σπάρταν* B ΠΙ] G, sp R, —V^c (in ras.) M, *ευ* ΑΓΒ, *επ* rel. *'Ηράκλεις*] V^c in ras. **815** *σπάρταν* B **816** *χαμεύνην* BVp2⁺ *κυρίαν* B *γ'*] om ΓUBVp2⁺ **817** ΕΤ] —RM, om V, *πει* rel. *τί*] *τῇ* Γ *δῆτ'*] *δ'* U *θησόμεσθ'*] ΑΓ^c?B, *θησώμεθ'* R, *θησόμεθ'* VCH, *θησόμεσθα* Γ, *θησόμεθα* UE, *θησάμεθ'* Vp2, *θησόμε — θ'* (*sic*) M ΕΠ] corr. from *πει* H, sp R, om VM, *ευ* ΑΓΒ *ἐντεῦθεν* G, *τευθενὶ* C **818** —R **819** *χαῦρον* C ΠΙ] sp RU, om VMVp2⁺ MVp2⁺ punctuate after *βούλει*, not after *πάνυ* **819A** ΕΠ] GE, —V, *ευ* ΑΓΒ, om RMVp2⁺ **820** *γ'*] om A, *τ'* U *σὺ*] om lib. *εὗρες* lib. **821** ΕΤ] E, om rel. *αὐτηγὶ*] *αὐτή γ' ἡ* V, *αὕτη ἡ* M, *αὕτη* U,

αὕτη γ' ἡ rel. Νεφελοκοκκυγία] V°, εφελο- V **822** πει G θεαγένους (-γέρους C) lib. **823** γ'] ΑΓM9BVp2+, om G, γε M9[1] rel. ΠΙ] ΑΓΒ, sp RV°, επ GE, om VVp2+ οὖν] ἡ BVp2+ and A[1]min. (over τὸ in 824) **825** ἀλαζονεομένους Vp2, ἀλαζονεμένους C, ἀλαζονευομένους H κἄθ' (καθ' R) ὑπερ- RME **826** ΕΠ] Vp2+, om R, —VM, πει GE, ευ ΑΓΒ δαὶ] δὲ GM9 **828** ΕΤ] —RVM, επ GE, πει ΑΓΒVp2+ **829** ΠΙ] G, —RVM, ευ ΑΓΕ, επ Vp2+, om B ἔτι] V°, om V, ἔτοι C **830** πανοπλίοις E2 **831** ἔχουσαν U κερκίδα] Γ°, κερκίδα Γ **832** ΕΤ] —RVM, om G, πει rel. δαὶ] RA, δ' αὖ BVp2+, δὲ rel. καθέξοι Vp2+ **833** ΕΠ] EVp2+, —RM, om V, ευ ΑΓΒ **834** δεινὸς Vp2+ **835** ευ before Ἄρεως M9E2, but corrected by M9[1] ἄρεος AM ΕΤ] EM9[1], —RVM, om GM9E2, πει ΑΓΒVp2+ **836** επ before ὡς Vp2+ ἐπιτίδειος R οἰκεῖν] οὐκ ἦν A **837** ΠΙ] om AMΓΒ νυν] δὴ M, νῦν rel. **838** τοῖς A **839** χάληκας E ἀποδοὺς M δργασον] ορ by correction Γ°, ἔργασαι A **840** ἀνένεγκαι ΑΓγρUB, ἀλλ' ἐνέγκαι Γ **841** επ before φύλακας E2 ἔκρυπτ' Γ, ἔγκρυπται M9[1], ἔγρυ- M9 αἰεὶ G **842** κοδονοφορῶν Δ περίτρεχε] V, περίτρεχ' ἀεὶ V[1] **843** ἐς] AM, εἰς rel. **844** δ' ἄνωθεν αὖ] δ' αὖ ἄνωθεν A **845** αἴθις] GC[1], αὖτις RVMEC ἐμοῦ A ΕΤ] ΑΓΒ, : R, om VGM, —V°, πει E, επ Vp2+ **846** ἐμέ lib. ΠΙ] : R, om VMM9 ὦ 'γάθ' B, ὦ 'γαθ' (ὤγ- C) Vp2+, ὦγαθὲ R, ὦ 'γαθὲ rel. **847** οὐδὲ G ἃ λέγω] ἄλλων E2, but deleted **848** καινοῖσιν] R°ΑΓΕΒ, -σι RE2 rel. **850** χέρνιβα] M9, χερνίβα RVEM9[1], χερνίαν G, κέρνιβα C.

851 ΙΕΡΕΤΣ] χο lib.; H adds στρουθῶν (cf. στρ[οφὴ] Vp2C) **852** συνπαραινέσας R **853** προσόδια] ΓM9[1], προσώδια Γ°M9 σεμνὰ bis ΓUB[2] **856** πρόβατόν lib. τις θύει V **857** ἴτω (2)] U, (3) rel. βοᾶ VMEC τῶι θεῶι lib. **858** ξυναδέτω G ᾠδάν] om Vp2+ **859** ΠΙ] om G φυσσῶν A : before 'Ηράκλεις R, :—V°, ευ GE, sp A, —M, no break V rel. GUE2C omit punctuation after ἦν, B has (,) **860** point after τουτί BVp2, (,) CH, om rel. δεῖν'] BVp2C, δεῖν' rel. ἰδὼν] R°, ἴδον R **861** ἴδον RV° (α erased before ι) ΓUB, ἴδον H, ἰδών Vp2C ἐμπεφορβειωμένον] Γ[1], -βιω- Γ rel. **862** ἱερὰ E2, ἱεροῦ C τοῖς] ABVp2+, τοῖσιν E, τοῖσι M9B[2] rel. καινοῖς] ABVp2+, -σιν E, -σι V° (-ι θεοῖς in ras.) M9 rel. **863** ΙΕ] G, —V τὸ sup. V° **864** τρο[x] before εὔχεσθε H (due to a misunderstanding of στρ|κ|ι seen in Vp2C) 'Εστίᾳ]

ἐρία C **865** ιερ before καὶ τῶ ἱκτίνω H (see on 864) ἐστιόχω G **866** ὄρνισιν from ὄρνοισιν C ὀλυμβίοις M 'Ολυμπίηισι] R^{c}V^{c}(ηι in ras.)M^{1}(η from οι?)M9, -ηισιν EVp2^{+}, -ησι RGAB **867** πᾶσι] G, καὶ πᾶσιν R (but καὶ deleted), καὶ πᾶσι A, πᾶσιν V πάσηισιν] E2, πάσησισι RΓUM9C, πάησιν Vp2 **868** ΙΙΙ] om RVMVp2^{+} ὦ Σουνιέρακε] ὡς οὖν ἱέρακε A, ὦ σουνιάρακε M (ά by correction?); over ου Γ^{c} has written υ **869** ΙΕ] om RVMVp2^{+} δηλίω καὶ πυθίω Vp2^{+} **871** ἀρτέμιδ' C 'Ακαλανθίδι] M9^{1}(?), ἀκαλανδίδι A, ἀκαλανθίδη M9 E2, ἀκαλαναθίδι (from -ίδη?) C **872** ΙΙΙ] om Vp2^{+} κολωνὶς A ἀκανθαλὶς Γ, καλανθὶς Γγρ, ἀκολανθὶς U, ἀλλὰ καλανθὶς E2 (;) after vs. VAΓ (not G) **873** ΙΕ] om AE2 σαβαξίω A **874** στρουθῶ lib. **876** ΙΙΙ] A, om RGVp2^{+}, —V, εὐχή M, χο rel. στρουθε R, στρουθὲ rel. μήτηρ λεωκρίτου M **877** ΙΕ] ΑΓΒ, om rel. **878** ὑγεῖαν A, ὑγιείαν Vp2C^{1}, ὑγίειαν C rel. **879** αὐτοῖσι] G, -ιν RVVp2C Χίοισι] M, χίοσι G, χείοισιν C?, χίοισιν rel. **880** Χίοισιν] Γ, χίοσιν Γ^{c}? (;) after χίοισιν VB, point R, (,) ΜΓUΔ, om rel. προκειμένοις A, προσκαλουμένοις E2 **881** ΙΕ] om M9 ἥρωσιν] ἥρωσι καὶ lib. ἡρώων] om Vp2H, ἡρῶ C παισὶν M9B, παισὶν καὶ Vp2^{+} **882** : before πορφυρίωνι M9 (not E2) πορφυρίωνι from πορφυρίονι Vp2C (πορφυρῦ C at first) πελεκᾶντι] M9^{1}, πελεκάντι GMΓU, -άνω M9 **883** πελεκίωνι M **884** πέτρακι M ταῶνι lib. **885** ἐλεᾷ] Vp2^{+}, ἐλεαι R, ἐλέα Γ, ἐλεία B, (ἐ)λ(α) B^{2}, ἐλαία rel. βάσκα (-αι R) lib. **886** ἐλάσαι R, ἐλασῶ G, ἐλεσᾶ H. **887** καταρράκτη] ΓU^{1}BΔ^{1}, καταράκτη UΔ rel. μελαγκορύφῳ] C, μεγαγκορύφω ΓU, μελανγκορύφω Vp2C^{1} **888** αἰγι$^{\theta}$ A, αἰγιθάλῳ MU, αἰγισθάλλω Δ **889** παῦε M9Vp2^{+} κόρακας] A^{1}min., κόρακες A **890** συ$^{\kappa\prime}$ before ἐπὶ H (a misunderstanding of συστ[ημα], seen in Vp2C ἱέρειον E **891** ἀλιαιέτους] Γ^{c}, ἀλι αιέτους (ras.?) V, ἀλαιέτους Γ, ἀλιαιέτους E γῦπας] ΜΓ, γύπας M^{1} rel. ὅτι] ἔτι A **892** ἴκτινος lib. εἶς] om V τοῦτό γ'] τοῦτ' G οἴχοιτ' RV **893** καὶ (second)] om G στέμματα] B^{2}, στρώματα B **894** τουτονὶ ΓUB **897** χέρνιβι θεοσεβὲς] om Vp2^{+} χέρνιβι] G, χερνίβι RAΓE, χερνιβι V **899** μάκαρας . . . εἴπερ] om Vp2^{+} μάκρας Δ **900** ἔξεστ' GM

902 γένειόν τ' lib. κέρατα ἀντὶ τοῦ ξηρὸν A **903** εὐξώμεσθα] B, -όμεθα M9Vp2^{+}, -ώμεθα rel. τοῖς] BVp2^{+}, -σι rel. πετρίνοις M, πτερίνοις Mγρ rel. **904** ΠΟΙΠΤΗΣ] G, om V τὰν] Γ^{c}, τὴν ΓU, τὸν Vp2^{+} **905** κλῆσον] ΑΓUEM9^{1}B, κλεῖσον R, κλῆισον M, κλῆσον

M9E2 rel. · **906** *τεαῖσιν* ΓUB *ἀοιδαῖς*] RVU, *ἀηδαῖς* Γ, *ὠδαῖς* (*ᾠ-*) rel. **907** Π1] om G **908** Π0] —R, om V (;) after *ἐγώ* Γ, (,) U *μελιγλώσσων* from *μελισσων* H **910** *ὀτρηρός*] R^{c}Γ^{c}, *ὀτηρὸς* V, *ὀτρηρὸς* RΓU *κατὰ τὸν μηρον* M **911–14** om A **911** Π1] —RVM, om G *δῆτα*] om U *κώμην* H **912** Π0] —RVM, om G *οὐκ* Vp2, *οὐ* C **914** *ἱεροί* deleted before *ὀτρηροί* M9 *ὀτρηροί*] Γ^{c}, *ὀτ-* Γ **915** Π1] —RV, om GM *ἐτὸς*] *ἀετὸς* A *ὀτρηρὸν*] G, *ὀτ-* V *τὸ* om A *ληδάριον* RΓE, *ληδ-* M9 rel. **916** *ἀτἀρ*] G, *αὐτἀρ* RVAMUE (and Γ at first?) *ὦ*] *ὃ* M *ποιητά*] G, *ποητὰ* RVMΓU *ἀνεφθάρεις* E2 **917** Π0] —RM, om V *πεποίηκ'*] M1, *πεποίκ'* G, *πεποίηκα* M *τὰς* from *τὴν* C *Νεφελοκοκκυγίας*] *ενεφοκοκκυγίας* C **918** *πει* deleted before *τὰς* Γ, — (deleted?) M *ἡμετέρας* G *καλὰ καὶ πολλὰ* V *πολλὰ*] *πο* (*sic*) U **919** *παρθενεῖα* lib. *καὶ* (second)] om GU *τἀ*] om MUVp2+ **920** Π1] —RVM, om G *πότ' ἐπόησας* V° (*-οἰ-* G), *πότ' ἐποιήσω* R, *πότε ποήσας* VM **921** Π0] —RVM, om G *δὴ*] om AVp2+ *τήνδ' ἐγὼ*] *τήνδε* E *κλήζω* GM9ΔVp2+ **922** om R, add in marg. R1 Π1] om R1VE, —M **923** *πει* deleted before *καὶ* A *παιδὶ* B *δὴ* G sup. *θέμιν* M **924** Π0] om RVE, —M **925** *οἷαπερ* ΓUB *ἀμαρυγά* AΓU **926** *δὲ*] R, *δ' ὦ* rel. **927** *ξαθέων* E2 **928** *ἐμὶν*] Γ, *ἡ(μὶν)* Γ2 (gloss?), *ἡμῖν* B, *ὑμῖν* M, *ἐμῖν* C **929** —M *κεφαλῆι* lib. *θέλῃς*] M9[1], *-εις* MΓUM9BVp2+ **930** *δόμεναι* R, *δόμεν'* VM *ἐμῖν* M *τεῖν* R, *τεὶν* C **931** Π1] G, —R, om VMM9 **932** *μἤτι* Vp2C *τούτῳ δόντες*] *τοῦτο ἰδόντες* R, *τούτων δόντες* A *ἀποφευξόμεθα* C **933** *σπολάδα*] Γ°?M9[1]B, *σπιλάδα* Γ?M9B2 *χειτῶν'* Vp2+ (;) after *ἔχεις* R **934** *δὸς*] H1, *δῶς* Vp2C, *δῶς* H *ποητῆ* Γ **935** *σπιλάδα* Γ **936** *φίλα*] Γ°, *φύλα* Γ **937** *δῶρον*] A, *τόδε δῶρον* rel. **938–939** *τὺ . . . ἔπος* om C *τὺ*] Γ°, *τὸ* U (and perhaps Γ) **940** Π1] —R, om VMC (in C, owing to the omission of 938–939, the entries for 940 and 941 appear before 941 and 942) *ἄνθρωπος* lib. *οὐχ'* Vp2C *ἀπαλλαχθήσεται* Vp2 **941** Π0] —R, om VH, *πει* C *νομάδεσι* VMEC, *νομάδαισι* A *ἐν*] *ἐπὶ* A *σκήθαις* C **942** *ποι* before *ἀλᾶται* C (see on 940) sp after *ἀλᾶται* V (not G) *στρατῶν* A, *στρωμάτων* Vp2+ **943** *ὑφαντοδόνατον*] V?, *-δίνατον* G, *-δίνητον* AM9?Vp2+, *-δόνητον* V2?M9[1] rel.; possibly V's readings are *-δίνατον* and *-δίνητον* *ἔθος* E2 · *πεπτάται* R, *πέπαυται* M, *πέτταται* Vp2, *πέταται* CH **944** *ἔβας* (*ἔβαρ* C) *πολλὰς* Vp2+

945 *δ, τι* U, *ὅτι* Vp2+ 946 Π] —R, om VM, *πο* H *ξυνίημ'* lib. Between 946 and 947 R repeats *ἀπόδυθι . . . ποιητῆι* (934) 947 om V, add in marg. V^R *ποητὴν* RMΓ 948 Π0] :—RV, sp G, —M, om Vp2+ 949 *γ'*] om ΓUE2 *ποήσω* M *τοιαδί*] *δὴ ταδὶ* BVp2+, *τὰ δί* RU, *ταδὶ* rel. 950 *κλῆσον*] M9^1, *κλῆσον* VUM9E2, *κλήϊσον* Vp2+ *χρυσόθρενε* M9 *τὴν* U

952 *νιφόβολα*] R, *νιφοβόλα* rel. *πολύπορά*] Γ^{c}E2^1, *πολύσπορα* RVp2+, *πολύπυρά* ΓUE2?B 953 *ἤλυθον*] M, *ἦλθον* VM^1? *ἀλαλάντα* M, *ἀλαλὰν* BVp2+ 954 Π] om Vp2+ *δία* V *ἀλλ' ἤτοι* G, *ἀλλὰ γὰρ* Vp2+ *ταυταῖ* ΓEH 955 *τονδὶ*] om E, *τὸν δὲ* Δ *τὸν*] om RΔ 956 *τουτὶ* by correction V^c after 956 RVAUM9C (not E2) omit punctuation 957 *πυθέσθαι* B 958–964 om V, add in marg. V^1 958 *παραχώρει* GM *χέρνιβα*] GM9, *χερνίβα* RV^{1}AEM9^1, *χέρνίβα* Γ 959 *ἱερεύς* before vs. lib. *εὐφημιάσθω* G, *εὐφημί' ἄστω* A, *εὐφημι' ''στω* M, *εὐφημί'* (*εὖ φημί'* C) *ἔστω* ΓUBVp2+ ΧΡΗΣΜΟΛΟΓΟΣ] in margin R^1, *χρη* written as text and deleted R, *χρη$^{\sigma\tau}$* H (and so regularly afterwards), om V^{1}GM 960 XP] : R, om V^1, sp G, —M Π] —R, :—V^1, om GM 961 XP] —RV^{1}M, om G *φλαύρως* U, *φάβλως* Vp2H 963 *ἐς*] M, *εἰς* rel. Π] :—R, om V^{1}M 964 *οὐκ*] om V^1 *ἐχρησμολέγεις* Vp2C *πρὶν*] *πρὸς* A *με* ΓU, *μοι* B 965 *οἰκίσαι*] Γ^2*γρ*, *οἰκῆσαι* ΓU XP] :—RV, sp G, —M *ἐμπόδιζέ* U. 966 Π] om RGH, —VM 967 XP] om RGH, —VM *οἰκήσωσι*] RV?AUM9, *οἰκίσσωσι* B, *οἰκίσωσι* V^c rel. *τε*] *γε* G 968 *μεταξὺ* C 969 Π] —RVM, om G *ἐμοὶ*] *ἐνοὶ* U *τῶν κορινθίων* Vp2+ 970 XP] —RVM, om G *ἡνίξασθ'* Δ *βάκχις* VM 971 *πρῶτον*] *πρῶτον μὲν* B *πανδώρῳ* M, *παν τῆ γῆ δώρα* Vp2C *θῦσαι* from *θύειν* R *λευκότρυχα* ΔVp2C 973 *δόμεν'* R, *δόμον* Δ 974 Π] —RVM, om G XP] —RM, om V, :—V^c in ras., sp G *βιβλίον*] AΓ^{c}Vp2C, *βυβλίον* Γ rel. 975–976 om VΓ, add $V^1Γ^2$ Vp2H have *κἂν μὲν θέσπιε κοῦ* (from 977) before *καὶ φιάλην*; C has these words as a separate verse, but deleted *φυαλην* Γ^2 *σπλάχνων* M9Δ 976 Π] —RV^{1}M, om G *σπλάχνα* M9Δ *διδόν'*] M (by correction?) BVp2+, *διδόναι* rel. *ἔνεστι*] G, *-ιν* V^1, *ἔν 'στι* A, *ἔστι* Δ XP] : R, —V^1, sp G, om M *βιβλίον*] AVp2?, *βυβλιόν* Vp2^1 rel. 977 *θεσπέσιε* Γ, *θεσπίσιε* U, *θέσπειε* E(or E^1)M9 *ποιῆς*] G, *ποεῖς* RE, *ποῆς* VM ΓU 978 *αἰετὸς*] *αὐτὸς* A *ἐν*] om R *αἱ*] *εἰ* R, *αἰ* G *κε*] *καὶ*

R **979** ἔσει] RVAEVp2+, ἔση GM9 rel. οὐ om E, οὔτε B οὐδ'] οὐκ A, οὔτ' B δρυοκολάπτης M, δρυκολάστης C **980** ΠΙ] —R, om VAM ταῦτ'] V^{c}, ταῦθ' VR ἔνεστ'] V^{c}M9^{1}, -στι(ν) VM9 ΧΡ] —RVM, sp G βιβλίον] ΑΓ^{c}Vp2C, βυβλίον Γ rel. **981** ΠΙ] —R, om VM ἔσθ' ὅμοιος A τωδεῖ B **982** παρ' ἀπόλλωνος R, παρά τε ἀπ- G, παρὰ τοῦ ἀπ- Vp2+ ἐγεγραψάμην M **983** ἀτὰρ ἐπεί U ἄκλιτος M ἄνθρωπος ἰὼν ἄκλητος BVp2+ **984** λυπεῖ R σπλαγχνεύειν] G^{1}, σπλαχνεύειν GM9Δ ἐπιθυμῇ] V^{c}, -θυμεῖ V?Vp2+ **985** δή] δεῖ M9, δεῖ E2Δ αὐτῶν M9 **986** ΧΡ] —RVM, om G, πει Vp2+ ΠΙ] : —RV, —M, sp G, χρ Vp2+ βιβλίον] ΑΓ^{c}, βυβλίον Γ rel. **987** — before καὶ RV (not G), erased in R μὴ δὲ M νεφέλῃσιν] BVp2+, -ησι rel. **988** ἡ U ὁ] om M Διοπείθης] ει from ι R?, -πει$^{\theta}$, by corr. V^{c} **989** ΧΡ] —RM, om VVp2, πει ΓCH καὶ] om U ἔνεστ'] om M ἐνταῦθ' ἔνεστι ταῦτα U ΠΙ] —RVM, sp G, χρ ΓVp2+ βιβλίον] A, βυβλίον rel. **990** πει before οὐκ ΓH All MSS. punctuate after κόρακας, not after θύραζ' ΧΡ] —RVM, sp G **991** ΠΙ] —RVM, om G οὐκοῦν UH, οὐκ οὖν Vp2C ἐτέροσε U χρησμολογεῖς R, σχρησμολογήσεις C **992** ΜΕΤΩΝ] γεωμ(έτρης) lib. (and so throughout the scene) ὑμᾶς from ἡμᾶς G τουτὶ] EBVp2+, τουτὶ τὸ rel. **993** σὺ] σοι M, om Δ δράσων] V, δράσον V^{c}?G, δράσως C δ'] om R βουλήματος lib. (βουλ- from βολ- V) **994** 'πίνοια] AUVp2+ and (πι-) M, ἐπίνοια rel. κόθρονος UE2 **995** ΜΕ] —RVM, om G **996** ἡμῖν M τε] δὲ M κατ' αγυάς R, κατ' ἀγυιάς (αγ- R^{c})R^{c} rel. ΠΙ] : RV, sp G, —M **997** — before σὺ R ἀνδρῶν] ἐτεόν E ΜΕ] : RV, sp G, —M, γεω ἢ χρη E2 Μέτων] G, μέτών V, μετών ΑΓ (α over ν Γ^{c}) **998** εἶδεν UB Ἕλλας] V^{c}, ἑλὰς V ΠΙ] —R, : —V, sp G, om M **999** ΜΕ] —RM, : —V, sp G κανὸν U **1000** 'στι G ὅλος] V^{c}, ὅλως V?Vp2

1001 προσθεὶς] BVp2+, προστιθεὶς rel. **1002** κανόνα R E2 and all but RGUM9 point after καμπύλον, none after κανόν' **1003** διαβίτην U — before μανθάνεις M ΠΙ] : —R, —VM, sp G **1004** ΜΕ] —RV, om GMBVp2H ὀρθῷ] B^{2}, ὀρθῶς GB **1005** γενήσεταί M9Vp2+ κἂν MUM9 **1006** ἀγορᾷ M φέρουσι A (and RΔ at first) ὁδὸν M9 **1007** ἀστέρος] ΓU (and B at first), ἀστέρες Γ^{2}B^{1} rel. **1008** κυκλωτεροῦς U ὀρθὰ U πανταχῇ] R, -ῆ rel. **1009** ἀκτῖναις E2 ΠΙ] : —R, : V, sp G, om M, ποιητ H

ἄνθρωπος lib. Θαλῆς] Γ, *-ῆς* Γ° 1010 —R *μετών* A ME] :—RV, sp G, —M *εστι* (ἐ- U)RU, abbr. ΓH ΠΙ] : —RV, sp G, om M *ὅτι* Vp2+ (;) after *ἐγώ* VMΓEB (not M9), (,) U 1011 *κἀμοίγε* B, *κἄμοιγε* Vp2+ *πειθόμενος* lib. *ὑποκίνει* BVp2+ 1012 ME] —RV, om GM ΠΙ] M9 sup. (no sp), : —RV, sp G, —M *ὅσπερ* U 1013 *ξενηλατοῦνταί τε καὶ* A point after *τινες*] A1min.?MΓM9, om rel. 1014 *συχναὶ* placed after *ἄστυ* M *κατὰ* R ME] : —R, —VM, sp G *μῶν μαστιάζετε* M 1015 ΠΙ] —RVM, om G *τὸν*] om A Δί'] Γ°?, *δία* VΓ Δί' *οὐ*] *δίου* E2 *δῆτ'*] V°, *δεῖ τ'* V, *δῆτα* GMU (and Δ at first) ME] —RVM, om G ΠΙ] : —R, —V, sp G, om M 1016 *σποδεῖν*] V°, *σπονδεῖν* V?M9 1017 ME] —RVM, om G *τἄρ'*] *γὰρ* lib. *ἄν*] *ἄν γε* BVp2+ ΠΙ] : —R, : V, sp GU, —M; placed before *νὴ* Δί' RVG, before *ὡς* rel. *δία* MUH (and M9 at first?) *οἰδ'*] *οἰδ᾽* U, *οὐδ'* C *ἂν εἰ*] Δ1, om U, *ἄρ εἰ* VB, *ἄρει* MVp2H, *ἀρεί* C, *ἄρ' εἰ* G rel. 1018 *φθάνεις* U *ἐγγὺς*] *εἰθὺς* M *αὖται* E2 1019 ME] —RVM, om G ΠΙ] —RM, : V, sp G 1020 *ἐπι*$^{\sigma\kappa\pi}$ before vs. E, but deleted *ἀναμετρήσει* V, *-σῃ* M *σαυτὸν*] BVp2+, *ἑαυτὸν* R, *σεαυτὸν* rel. *ἀλλαχῇ*] R, *-ῆ* rel. 1021 *Σαρδανάπαλλος*] RA, *σαρνάπαλος* E2, *σαρδανάπαλος* rel. *οὐτοσὶν* H 1022 ΕΠΙ] in ras. (or deleted?) V, M9 sup., —R, om MΓ *ἐπίσκοπος*] *-ος* from *-οι* C *κυάμῳ*] *'κβάμω* E, *'κβόμῳ* E2 *λαχῶ* U 1023 *ἐς τὰς*] om C ΠΙ] : RV, sp G, —M 1024 *δὲ τίς σε*] *δέ σε τίς* B *δεῦρ* U ΕΠΙ] : —RV, sp GA, —M *βίβλιον*(?) from *βιβλίον* R, *βυβλίον* E2BVp2+ 1025 *τελέου* from *τελεοῦ* R, *ταλέου* M ΠΙ] : —R, : V, sp G, om ME2 Γ alone punctuates after *τι* *μισθὸν*] V°, *μισθὼν* V *λαβεῖν* U 1026–1029 lost in A (page torn) ΕΠΙ] om R, —VM, sp GM9 1027 — before vs. R *ἐδεόμην*] *ην* from *ω* V°, om M 1028 *ἔστιν*] RVB, *ἐστὶ* Vp2C, abbr. H, *ἔστι* V° rel. 1029 ΠΙ] —RVM, om G *ἔστιν*] RVEB, *ἐστί* Vp2C, abbr. Γ, *ἔστι* V° rel. *οὐτοσὶν* H 1030 ΕΠΙ] —RVM, om G ΠΙ]—RM, : V?, sp G 1031 ΕΠΙ] M9, —RVM, om GE *ὢν*] *ὦ* M 1032 ΠΙ] om RG, —VM *κάδιω* E2 1033 — before vs. R *πέμπουσιν ἤδη*] *πέμπουσι νὴ δί'* V *ἤδη*] Γ°B, *ἠδ'* R, *ἤδ'* ΓUE, *οἰδ'* AMH, *οἰδ'* Vp2C *'πισκόπους*] Γ°B, *ἐπι-* Γ rel. 1034 *εἰς* Vp2+ *τοὺς θεούς* R 1035 ΨΗΦΙΣΜΑΤΟΠΩΛΗΣ] V° under *ἐὰν δ' ὁ* but deleted, om VG, *ψηφισμ(ατο)ποιος* A

(and so in 1038), *ψηφισματογράφος* with *γράφος* deleted C *νεφελοκοκκυγεεὺς* M9 **1036** *('Aθ)ηναῖον ἀδικῇ* lost in A (page torn) *ἀδικῇ*] *ἀδικ* U, *ἀδικεῖν* M9 **1037** III] —RVM, om G *βιβλίον*] AE, *βυβλίον* E2 rel. **1038** ΨH] *ψ* Γ^{r}?, —RM, om VΓ *ψηφισμ-*] E2^{1}, *ψηφησμ-* E2 *νόμου* E2 **1039** III] : RV, sp G, —M **1040** ΨH] —RVM, om G *Νεφελοκοκκυγιᾶς*] RV^{c}, *-κοκκογιᾶς* G, *-κοκκυγιέας* Γ^{c}U, *-κοκκυγίας* V?Γ rel. *τοῖσδε*] *καὶ τοῖσδε* BVp2^{+} **1041** *μέτρῃσι* E2 (and M9 at first) *ψηφίσμασι*] E2, *-ιν* M9B **1042** *'Ολοφύξιοι*] ' in ras. V, *ολ-* R, *ὁλ-* M, *ὁλολύξιοι* C **1043** III] —RV?M, om G *δὲ γ'*] *δ'* E *οἵσιπερ* (*οἰσί-*, *οἵσί-*) all but G, which has *οἵσι πτερ*(*ωτοτύξιοι*) *ωτοτυξιοι* RG, *ω τὸ τύξιοι* V, *ὠτο-* ABH, *ὀτο-* MΓUE, *ὀτο-* Vp2C *χρήσῃ* MΓUEB **1044** ΨH] —RVM, om G III] corr. from *ψηφ* B, om RA, : —V, sp G, —M **1045** om R *πει* before *πικροὺς* A **1046** EIII] corr. from *ψηφ* B, om G *πεισθαίτερον* A, *πεισθέστερον* Vp2H, *πεισθέτερον* C, *πεισθέταιρον* rel. *ὕβρεως*] *σ* in ras. V, *ὕβρεων* R **1047** *Μουνιχιῶνα*] A, *μουννυχίωνα* R, *μουνυχίωνα* R^{c}, *μουνυχιῶνα* rel. *μῆνα*] om B **1048** III] om G No MS. has (;) after *οὗτος* *ἐνταῦθα* RVMΓU *ἦσθα*] G, *ἤθα* V, *ἦσα* H **1049** *ἐξελαύνει* G

1051 *σὺ* sup. M9 *ἐνταῦθα* G *ἦς* VMVp2^{+} point after vs. V, om RAU, (;) rel. **1052** *μυριάδας* E *δραγμάς* RM, *γραφὰς* M9 **1053** III] —RVM, om G *γε*] M^{1}, om MUM9 *τὼ*] AMΓEB, *τῶ* M9 rel. **1054** ΨH] —RVM, om G, *επι* rel. *κατετίλας*] ΓU, *-ετίλησας* R, *-έτιλας* rel. point after vs. AM, (,) U, (;) rel. **1055** om C III] —RV, om GM *οὐ* sup. V^{c} **1056** assigned to *ἱερεύς* by all except M **1057** *τοῖς*] MU, *τοῖσι* rel. *θεοῖς* A **1058** XO] om A (but entered before 1060), *χρη$^{\sigma\tau}$* H (cf. 959) *μοι* lib. *παντεπόπτα* G, *πανόπτα* UVp2^{+} **1060** *χο* A *θύσουσιν* VM9 *εὐχαῖσιν* UE, *-σι* rel. **1061** *γὰρ*] om AUH *γᾶν*] om M **1062** *σῴζω*] R, *-ώ-* rel. *αν* deleted between *εὐ* and *θαλεῖς* R *δευθαλεῖς* B **1063** *κτείνω* M *παμφύλων*] *υ* in ras. R, *-φύλλων* E *γέννειν* Vp2C **1064** *ἃ*] *ἢ* U^{1}, *οἳ* (*οἱ*) U rel. *ἐν γαίᾳ*] *ἐγαία* Vp2 **1065** *αὐξανόμενον*] ΓUB^{2}, *-ομένα* R^{c}VVp2C, *-ομενα* GA, *-όμενα* RB rel. *πολυφάγοις* lib. (*φάγοις* sup. U) **1066** *τ'*] in ras. B^{1}, *δ'* RVAVp2^{+}, *θ'* ΓB *ἐφεζόμενοι* Γ^{1}UB^{2}, *ἐφεζόμενα* ΓB rel. **1067** *κτείνω*] *κείνων* U, *κτήνω* E2 **1068** *φθείρουσι* lib. *λύμαις*] E^{1}, *λήμαις* EM9 **1069** *ἑρπετά*] *ἑρπέτα* Vp2 *δάκετα πάνθ'*] *δάκεθ'* lib. *ὁπόσ-*

σα πὲρ ἂν Vp2+ 1070 *ἔστιν*] E2, *ἔστι* VM9, abbr. ΓH *ἐν φοναῖς*] Vp2+, *φοναῖσιν* rel. *ὅλλυται*] Vp2CH1, *ὅλυται* H, *ἐξόλυται* V, *ἐξόλλυται* rel. 1073 *ἡμῶν* GA 1074 *λαμβάνει* R 1076 *βουλόμεσθ'*] RBVp2+, *βουλόμεθ'* rel. *οὖν ἂν νῦν εἰπεῖν* M *ἀνειπεῖν*] *ἂν εἰπεῖν* RVE *ταῦτα* lib. *χ'ὑμεῖς* R, *χ'ἡμεῖς* R1 1077 *φιλοκρα*r R, *-κράτην* U *Στροίθιον*] *στρου*θ R1 in marg., *μη θεωσ* R, *στοίθιον* A 1078 *ζῶντά γ'*] *ζῶντα* VA, *ζῶντ'* rel. *ἀγάγῃ*] M91, *ἀναγάγῃ* M9E2 *τεταρα* R 1079 *σπίνους*] M9E2Vp2, *σπίννους* REM91Vp21H, *πίνους* V *κατεπτὰ* RV 1080 *φυσσῶν* A *δείκνσι* R *καὶ*] Vp2+, *πᾶσι* (*-ιν* U) *καὶ* rel. 1081 *τε*] V°, om V *κοψίχοισι* Vp2C *ἐς*] ΓU, *εἰς* rel. *τὰς*] *τὰ* U *ῥῖνας*] corr. from *ῥῖνα* B1 *στερὰ* C 1082 *περστερὰς* C *θ'*] *τε* G *συλλαβὼν* B *εἵρξας*] VAM?Γ, *εἵρξας* R, *εἴρξας* G rel. 1083 *κἀπαναγκάζειν* Γ 1084 *βουλόμεθ'* E2 *ἀνειπεῖν*] *ἂν εἰπεῖν* RVAME, *εἰπεῖν* M9 *κεἶ*] *εἶ* A 1085 *εἰργμένους*] ME, *εἰργμένας* Γ, *εἰργομένους* A, *εἰργεμένους* (?) R, *εἰργομένους* Vp2+, *εἰργμένους* R°M9 rel. *ἡμῶν* Vp2+ (and V at first?) 1086 *πείθεσθε* VVp2+ (and perhaps B at first), *πίθησθε* M9, *πίθεσθε* E2, *πείθησθε* B1 rel. 1087 *ἡμεῖς* Vp2+ (and Γ at first) *παλεύσετε*] ΓUBVp2+, *-εύετε* rel. 1088 *εὔδαιμον*] *ἐνδαῖμον* R *φύλλον* M 1090 *ἀμπισχνοῦνται*] EM9, *ἀπισχοῦνται* MΔH, *ἀμπισχοῦνται* E1Δ1H1 rel. 1091 *θερμὴ*] Γ°B, *θέρμῃ* MΓUB2 *πνίγουσ'* M After *ἡμᾶς* H has *ἀχέτας* (see on 1095) 1092 *τηλαυγὶς* H *θάλπει*] Γγρ, *λάμπει* Γ 1093 *ἀνθειρῶν* U 1094 *τ'*] om lib. *ναίω*] Vp2+, *ἐννοίω* rel. 1095 *ὀξὺ μέλος*] *ὀξυβελὴς* RM, *ὀξυμελὴς* Vp2+, *ὀξυμελὴς* rel. *ἀχέτας* stands over *ὀξυμελὴς* in Vp2, thus appearing to end vs. 1093; in H it appears as the last word of vs. 1091 1096 *θάλπεσιν* U *ὑφηλιομανὴς* R, *ὑφ' ἡλίω* (E2, *ὑφηλίω* M9) *μανεὶς* rel. 1098 *ξυμπαίζων* Vp2C, *συμπαίζων* M9H, *συμπάζων* E2 1099 *βοσκόμενα* M *παρθένια*] Δ, *περθένια* B

1101 *τε*] om H 1102 *τοῖς*] *ταῖς* Γ, *παρα τοῖς* U *βουλόμεθα* ΓUE 1103 *ὅσ'*] *οἷς* lib. *ἀγάθ'*] *ἄγασθ'* B 1105 *πρῶτον* MVp2+ *γὰρ*] om E2Vp2+ *π* deleted after *οδ* in R 1106 *γλαῦχ'* A *ὑμᾶς*] *δ' ὑμᾶς* R *χαβριωτικαὶ* A, *λαβριωτικαὶ* M, *λαυ ριωτικαὶ* (*sic*) U, *λαιριωτικαὶ* Δ, *λαυριωτκαὶ* C, *λαυριωτικαὶ* rel. 1107 *ἐνοικήσουσι* E2Vp2C *ἔνδον . . . ἐνεοττεύσουσι* (1108)] om E2 *βαλλαντίοις*] RVAE, *βαλαντίοις* G rel. 1108 *ἐνεοττεύσουσι*] *ἐν* and *σι* in ras. and *ου* sup. V°, *-σιν* U, *-ττεύουσι* H, *-νεοτεύσουσι* C *κἀκλέψουσι*]

κἀ in ras. U, *κἀκκλέψουσι* V^{c}(*κἀκ* in ras.)EB, *καὶ κλέψουσι* A *σμικρὰ* E 1109 *τούτοισιν*] R^{c}, *τούτοισι* R *ἐν*] om ΓUB 1110 om U *ἡμῶν* A *ἀετόν* R 1111 *βούλησθέ τι*] R?, *βούλησθ'* (*βούλεσθ'* G) *ἔτι* R^{c}?VΓE 1112 *ἱερακισμὸν* AH, *ἱερακισκὸν* Vp2, *ἱερᾶκισκὸν* C *εἰς* AMB 1113 *δειπνῆτε*] R^{1} (*η* in marg.) and V^{c}, *δειπνεῖτε* R, V uncertain *πρηγορεώσας* M, *πρηγονεῶνας* C 1114 *χαλκεύετε* A, *χαλκείεσθαι* M *μηνίκους* V, *μηνίσκον* E2 1115 lost in A (page torn) *μῆν'*] G, *μήνιν* R, *μηνίσκον* E2 (= gloss in M9), *μήνυν* B, *μήνην* rel. *ἔχῃ*] R^{c}, *ἔχει* RVp2^{+} 1116 *ἔχη* E *χλιδανίδα* Δ 1117 *πᾶσιν* H *ὄρνεσιν* H *κατατιλόμενοι* A, *-τιλλόμενοι* ME 1118 Ἱ]ἱ om M *ἱερ'*] Vp2^{+}, *ἱερὰ* rel. *ὄρνιθες* RAMΔH, *ὦ ὄρνιθες* U *καλαί* A 1119 *τοῦ*] om ΓU 1121 om H *ἀλφιὸν* Vp2 C 1122 ΑΓΓΕΛΟΣ A]—R, *ἄγγ*(*ελος*) rel. (and so regularly) *ποῦ ποῦ 'στι*] *ποῦ ποῦ ποῦ 'στι* A *ποῦ ποῦ ποῦ 'στι* (first time)] *ποῦ ποῦ 'στι* H *ποῦ ποῦ ποῦ 'στι* (second)] AEBVp2C, *ποῦ ποῦ 'στι* Δ rel. 1123 *πει*$^{σθ\eta}$ as name of speaker (preceeded by :) V, *πεισθέστερός τ'* (*τ'* deleted) Vp2, *πεισθέτερός* C, *πειθέστερός* H, *πεισθέταιρος* V^{e} rel. *ἄρχων* lib. Ἱ]R above ras. *οὐτοσὶν* UH 1124 ΑΓ A] G, —R, om V *σου* A Ἱ] G, : RV, —M 1125 ΑΓ A] G, om RVMB 1126 *ὥσθ' εἰπὲρ ἄνω* Vp2C, *ὥστ' εἰ ὑπερ ἄνω* H *ἐπάνω*] *ἐπ' ἄνω* R, *ἐπαίνῳ* E *προξενίδος* Vp2^{+} 1127 *θεαγένης* (*-γένις* A or A^{1}) lib. *δύ'*]*δ'* G, *δύο* M 1128 *μεγέθους* C *δούριος*] Γ^{e}, *δουρίους* VA, *δουριαῖος* M, *δουριεὺς* E, *δούρειος* Γ rel. 1129 *παρελασέτην* E Ἱ] G, : RV, —M Ἡ*ράκλεις*]om C 1130 ΑΓ A] G, —RV, om M *αὖτ'*]B, om R, *αυτ'* R^{1} sup., *αὐτό τ'* Vp2^{+}, *αὖτ'* rel. 1131 *κατατοὐργυον* R, *-τούργυον* E2, *-ταύργυον* BVp2^{+}, *-τὤργυον* rel. Ἱ] G, : R, —VM 1132 —RV (not G) *ἐμοδομήσασιν* M *αὐτὸ*] VG, *αὐτὸν* V^{c}ME, *αὐτὸ τὸ* U *τηλικουτονί* V (not G) 1133 ΑΓ A] G, —RV 1137 *κατατετταυῖαι* M, *κατατετοκυῖαι* M9, *κατεπεπαυῖαι* (second *κ* by correction) C 1138 *ἐτίμων* U *βόγχεσιν*] R^{c}, *βόγχοισιν* R, *ὀρύγχεσιν* G 1139 *δὲ πλινθοφόρα* B *μύρια*] ΓU, *μυρίοι* Γ^{e} rel. 1140 *εἰς* AE 1141 vs. repeated at top of new page H *τετάμι'*] *τετάμια* M, *τετάμεν'* B *τετάμαρτα* E, *τετάμια ῥᾶα* E2 1142 Ἱ] G, —RVM ΑΓ A] G, : —R, : V, —M After *ἐμοὶ* G interpolates *παρὰ* | *τὴν ἔριν* as part of the text 1143 *λαιάνουσι*] R (corrected from *λειάνουσι*) and V^{c}, *λαιι-* V Ἱ] —R, : V, sp G, om M *ἐνεβάλοντο* AVp2^{+} 1144 ΑΓ A] —RM, om V, *πει*

A τοῦτο ΑΓU ἐξεύρηται M, ἐξεύρητο rel. 1145 ὑποτύπτοντες from ὑποτύποντες B ἅμαις] M9, ἁμαις R, ἄμαις VEVp2+ 1146 ἐνέβαλλον] ΡΓΕΕ2B, ἐννέβαλλον U, ἐνέβαλον M9Δ rel. αὐτὸν ΓUB, αὐτοῖν M 1147 ΙΙΙ]—RM, om VM9 ἂν (first)] V, om V°ΓU ἂν (second)] om E ἐργασαίαντο U 1148 ΑΓ Α]—RM, om VM9 δία A γε] τε M 1150, 1151 transposed in U, but correct order indicated ἑπέτων τ' M9, ἑπέτων δ' E2, ἕπετον τ' H παιδιὰ M 1151 One or two letters (π or τι?) erased before τὸν A 1152 ΙΙΙ]—RVM, om G ἂν] om M 1154 om M ἀπειργάσαντ' B1Vp2, ἀπειργάσατο V, ἐπειργάσαντ' C, ἀπειργάσαντο V°B rel. ΑΓ Α]—R, : V, sp G 1155 πελεκᾶντες] R°, πελεκάντες RGΓUC, πελεκᾶνες M91, πελεκάνες M9E2 1157 πελεκάντων RAMVp2+ ναυπηγία VA 1158 ἅπαντες A 1160 κωδωνοφορεῖται from δωνοφ- Γ, κωδονοφορεῖται E2 παντᾳχῇ] RV?, -ῇ G rel. 1161 καθεστήκασι] R°, -ασιν RU, -ασσι B 1162 τοῖς G 1164 XO] corrected from πει Γ, om M ποεῖς RM 1166 ΙΙΙ] om M 1167 ψεύδεσι RA 1168 ὧδε Vp2+ γὰρ] om E 1169 ἔσθει E δεῦρο] Γ2, om Γ, in ras. B 1170 ΑΓΓ B] ἕτερος ἄγγ ΓB, om M, ἄγγ(ελος) rel. (and so all afterwards) ἰοὺ (9) A 1171 ΙΙΙ]—RVM, om G (and Vp2, whose entry is one line too low), χο CH ΑΓ B] om RV, —M, αγγ A sup. (no sp) rel. 1172 χο Vp2 (see on 1171) ἄρτι] ἄντι C 1173 εἰσέπτατ' Vp2+, ἐσέπτατ' rel. ἐς] RVΓUC, εἰς rel. 1174 κολοιοὺς καὶ φύλακας A 1175 ΙΙΙ]—RVM, om G, χο Vp2+ 1176 ΑΓ B] om RV, —M, sp (by erasure) U εἶχεν RV 1177 ΙΙΙ] :—R, :(?) V, sp (?) G, —M, χο Vp2+ οὔκουν] ME, οὐκοῦν rel. περιπόλους] περὶ πόλλους C, but first λ deleted 1178 (;) after εἰθύς] RΓEVp2C, point AMUB, om VE2H ΑΓ B] :—R, om V, sp M 1180 —R χώρει R ἠγκυλωμένος] A1C1, ἐγκ- E2, ἠγγυλωμένας A?, ἠγκυλωμένους (?) C 1181 κερχνῆς Γ, κερχνῆς EB1, κέρχνης AB Vp2+, κερχνήις rel. τρίορχις G γύψ' R 1182 ροιζήμασι (ι deleted after ροι) R, ροιζήματι A 1184 ἄποθεν GMUM9 1185 ἥδ' ἐστὶν ME2 ΙΙΙ] :—R, : V, sp G, —M, χο Vp2+ οὔκουν] M, οὐκοῦν rel. 1186 No MS. has (;) after τόξα, but C has (,) : before χώρει V, sp G, αγγ EVp2+ 1187 τόξευε from τόξευες E παῖε] πᾶς RAM, πᾶς τις EVp2+ 1188 XO] om M αἴρεται] letter erased after αἰ- V 1190 θεὰς E2 1191 φύλαττε] A1, φυλάττεται A 1192 περινέφελον] πε from πτε Δ 1193 ὄν γ' Vp2+ ἐνέβος C

1195 *ταύτῃ*] M, *-η* rel. *περῶν*] *πτερῶν* AME 1196 *πᾶς*] *τὰς* A 1197 *πεδαρσίου*] Γ°, *μεταρσίου* ΓU, *περδασίου* Γγρ, *πεδαροίου* Vp2, letter erased after *πε* AM9 1198 *δίνῃς* Γ, *δεινὸς* B 1199 *πέτῃ* MΓUB 1201 *τί* A *ποδατὴ* C *ἐχρῆν*] *σε χρὴ* M *ὀπόθεν*] E1, *ὀπόθε* M, *ὄθεν*(?) E, *πόθεν* B *πότ' εἶ*] *πέτῃ* ΓUB 1202 *τῶν* (second)] om C 1203 III —RVM, om GB *ἐστιν* Γ (*ἐστ* by correction), abbr. H *κυνή* R°?, *κοινή* R 1204 IP] —RVM, om G, *ἶρις* as part of text U III] : R, : —V, sp G, —M *ἦ*] *ἡ* (?) E2 No MS. has (;) after the vs. 1205 IP] —RV, om GΓB III] AEE2 and M9 sup. (no sp), sp RGB (entry erased), : V, —M, om ΓUVp2+ *ταύτην ἶτις* GV?(and R at first?) *ξυλλήψεται* lib. 1206 om M, add M1 in marg. *πει* before vs. C *ἀναπτόμενος*] ΓUB, *ἀναστάμενος* C, *ἀναπτάμενος* rel. IP] sp RG, : V, —M, *ἶρις* as part of text H *ξυλλήψεται* lib. 1207 — before *τί* R, *πει* erased H III] : RV, om G, —M *οἰμώξει*] GR°?, *οἰμώξῃ*(*-ῳ-* Γ) MΓUB, *οἰμώζει* RV, *οἰμώζειν* A *μακράν* RVAE 1208 IP] —RVM, om G *γε* corrected from or to *τε* U *τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα* BVp2+, *τουτὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα* rel. III]: R, —VM, om G 1209–1210 om M9, add M9[1] between 1208 and 1211 as one verse (one verse in E2) 1209 *εἰς* AMEVp2+ 1210 IP] —RVM, om G *οὐκ οἶδ' ἔγωγε μὰ δία* A *δία* M9[1](not E2) In Γ *οὐκ . . . ἔγωγε* was also entered between the two columns by Γ2, but later deleted 1211 III] —RVM, om G (;) after vs.] (,) U, point B 1212 *τοὺς*] *τὸν* E2 *κολοιάρχας*] B, *κολιάρχας* CH, *κολοιάρχους* RMEγρM9γρ, *κολιάρχους* Vp2, *κολιάρχα* E2, *κολοιοὺς* E rel. *προσῆλθες*] BVp2+, *πῶς εἰσῆλθες* E, *πῶς προσῆλθες* rel. VAΓ UE2 omit punctuation before *οὐ* (;) after *λέγεις*] (,) U, point M, om G 1213 IP] : RV, sp G, —M 1214 III] om RVG (but : after 1213 V), —M IP] M9[1], om RVM9, sp G, —M *ὑγιαίνειν* E III] om R, : V(?), small sp G, —M 1215 *σοι*] *σύ* Vp2+ 1216 IP] —RVM, om G *ἐπέβαλ'* M *μέλεε* MUE2Vp2+, *μέλε'* Γ 1217 III] —RVM, om R[1]G *διαπέτῃ* ΓUEB, *παραπέτῃ* M 1218 *τοῦ*] *τοὺς* E2 1219 IP] —RV, om GM *ποίᾳ*] V°γρ, *ποῖ* RV *πέτασθαι* Vp2+ 1220 III] —RV, om GM 1221 —R *δὲ*] *με* R 1223 *εἶ*] *εἰς* C 1224 IP] —R, om VM *εἰμ'*] Vp2C, *εἶμ'* H, *εἶμ'* B, *εἰμὶ* (*-ι*) rel. III] : RV, om G, —M 1225 —R *δεινότητα* U *γάρ τα γάρ τοι* U *τοι*] *μοι* RVE, om A *πείσεσθ'* E 1226 *δὲ* Vp2+ 1227 *γνώσεσθε* A *ὅτι*] *ἔτι* G 1228 *ἀκροατέρου*

C *κρειτόνων* E2 1229 *τοί*] om E *ναυσταλεῖς* V 1230 IP] —RM, om V Point after *ἐγώ* RE, om M9 rel. *πρὸς* A 1231 — (deleted?) V (om G) After 1231 V has 1234 (not deleted), then 1232, 1233, 1234; correct in G 1232–1234 om M 1232 *ἐπ'*] *ἀπ'* U 1233 *κνισσᾶν* ΓUVp2+ *τ'*]*δ'* E III]A sup., : R, : —V, sp G *σὺ*] *σοι* R *ποίοις*] *ποίεις* U 1234 IP] RV, om G : before *ἡμῖν* R, sp. G 1235 III] om RV, —M IP] : —R, : V, sp G, —M *ἄλλοις* Vp2 1236 III] C1, —RVM, om G, *ιρ* C *εἰσὶν* A1B, *ἐσσι* V, *ἐσσὶ* E, *εἰσὶ* GAΔ rel. 1237 — (deleted?) V (om G) *αὐτούς*] R, *αὐτοῖς* rel. *δία* Vp2+ *οὐ τῷ*] *οὕτω* H 1238 IP] —RV, om G 1239 *σου μὴ* E 1240 *μακέλλῃ*] RMΓUE, *-η* M9 rel. *ἀνατρέψῃ* E2 *Δίκη*] Γc, *δίκᾳ* ΓU, *δίκᾱͅ* BΔ 1242 *καταιθαλώσῃ*] B1 (*η* in ras.), *-ώσει* RVp2+, *-ώσῃσι* (omitting *σου*) A *λικυμνίαισι* A 1243 III] —RVM, om GM9 *ταῦσον* A 1244 *ἀτρέμας* BVp2+ *πότερον* AU *κλυδὸν* Δ, *λύδειν* E2 1246 *λυπήσῃ* U *πέραι* R 1247 om R, add R2 in marg. *ἀμφίσν* U 1248 *αταιθαλώσω* Δ *πυρφόροισιν*] GΓc, *πυρφόροισι* V, *-οις* M, *πορφύροισιν*(?) Γ (;)] E, om GAU, point M9 rel. 1249 *εἰς* E2 1250 *ὄρνεις* RVBCH 1251 *πλεῖν*] Γc, *πλὴν* Γ?UE2; *γρ πλὴν ἢ 'ξακοσίους* Γ2 (;) after *ἀριθμὸν* ΓEVp2C (not M9), (,) U 1252 *παρέσχεν αὐτῶ* G 1253 *λυπήσεις*] B1, *λυπήσει* B RABVp2+ continue the whole verse to Peith., the rest give *τί* to Iris; — *τί* : V, sp *τί* sp GU, *ιρ τί πει* ΓE, — *τί* —M; all accent *τί* (or *τὶ*) 1254 *τὼ*] Vc, *τῶ* VVp2+, *τὰ* Γ *σκέλει*] RH, *κέλη* B, *σκέλη* B1 rel. *διαμεριῶ* E2 1256 *στύομαι*] *γύομαι* ΓU, om M (but space left) 1257 IP] —RVM, om G *μέλ'*] RVΓcB+, *μέλε* A, *μέλε'* GΓ? rel. *αὐτοῖσι* A *ῥήμασι* RA, *τοῖς ῥήμασι* U 1258 III] —RV, om GM sp before *οὐ* G, —M *τοτὲξ* A 1259 IP] —RVM, om GΓ *ἢ μήν*] *ἢ μή* M, *ἦν μή* rel. *παύσει*] RV, *παύση* G rel. (*η* in ras. B) *ἐμὸς* G 1260 III] om RG, —VM *οἶμαι* A *οὐκοῦν* RVAMVp2+ *ἐτέρωσε*] G, *-σεν* V, *ἐτέρασε* U 1261 (;)] RΓEB, (,) U, om CH, point M9 rel. 1262 *ἀποκεκλήκαμεν* lib. 1264 *τὴν*] *γε τὴν* Vp2+ 1266 *γε*] om lib. 1268 *βροτὸν* AVp2+ *πέμπειν κἂν* (*ἂν* Vp2+) *κατηύν* BVp2+ 1269–1271 om V, add V1 in marg. *τὸν* (second)] om V1E 1270 *εἰ*] *ἢ* M *μηδήποτε* Vp2+ *νοστήσῃ* R 1271 KHPΓΞ] om G *πεισθέτερ'* Vp2C, *πειθέστερ'* H, *πεισθέταιρ'* rel. 1272 om C *ὦ τρισμακάρι ὦ κλεινότ'* (*κλεινότατ'* Vp2H) RVp2H *ὦ σοφώτατ'*] om U

σοφώτατ' | R γλαφυρότατε U 1273 ὦ τρισμακάρι'] om R τρισμακάριε G ΠΙ] : RV, sp. G, —M 1274 after 1275 V ΚΗ] om RV, —M 1275 —V (not G) 1276 ΠΙ] —RVM, om G 1277 ΚΗ] —RVM, om G οἰκίσας] R°MΓ°EVp2¹CHB, οἰκίας Vp2, οἰκήσας RΓM9 rel. 1278 παρ'] π' Vp2 φέρει] ΓC, -η MΓ°UBC¹H (;) after φέρει ΓEB, (,) UC 1279 τ'] om A (;) after ἔχεις V°AΓEB, (,) UC, point GE2 rel. 1280 οἰκίσαι] Γ°, οἰκῆσαί VΓ 1281 ἐλακωμάνουν M9, ἐλακονομάνουν Vp2⁺ πάντες AVp2⁺ 1282 ἐρρύπων] R°, ἐρυπων RU, ἐρρύπουν A ἐσωκράτων R 1283 ὑποστρέψαντες] B², -στρέφοντες B 1284 ὀρνιθομανοῦσιν U 1287 ἔωθεν] ὥθεν Vp2C, ὄθεν (οθ by corr.) H ὑμεῖς B νομόν] M9¹B² Vp2¹, νομήν M9E2B, νόμον Vp2 1288 ἐς] RVVp2⁺, εἰς G rel. τὰ from τὰς C βιβλία] R°G?AME, βυβλία RG¹?E2 rel. 1290 ὠρνιθομάνουν] R°M9¹B¹, ὀρνιθομάνουν RM9BC 1291 ὀνόματα τ' ἦν Δ 1292 ὀνομάζετο C 1295 κόρυδος AM φιλοκλεῖ MBVp2⁺ θεαγένει lib. 1296 ἰβὶς Vp2, ἴβις rel. Χαιρεφῶντι] V°, -φῶτι V 1297 Συρακοσίῳ] Γ, συρρακουσίω A, συρακουσίω rel. μιδίας RMVp2⁺ 1298 καλεῖτο E, καλοῖτο M9 εἶκεν ΓUB, ἥκα E2, ἧκεν (ἡ- R) rel. ὄρτυγον U 1299 στυφοκόμπω Γ°, στυφοκόμπου Γ rel. πεπληγμένῳ] V°, -ου V, πεπηγμένω C 1300 εἶδον E2 δ'] om R

1301 ὅπου] B, ἦν που ΓUB² τ' deleted before ἦν R ἦν] om Vp2⁺ ἐμπεποιημένη] GME2, -ποη- RVΓ²γρ (but ο corrected from οι) E, ἐμπόνμένη (?)A, ἐμπεπληγμένη ΓB, ἐκπερωμένη U, ἐκπεποιημένη Vp2⁺ 1302 πηνέλοψ' R (cf. 298) 1303 τι] om G μικρὸν GA 1305 ἥξουσι κεῖθεν B πλεῖν] πλὴν GU μυρίοι R 1308 ἡμῖν] om R, add R¹ in marg. 1309 ἀρρίχας G 1310 κοφίνας M ἐμπίπλη lib. 1311 πτερά] στερὰ C 1312 χ before ἐγὼ C (cf. 1313). 1313 om C δὴ] δ' ἂν lib. τάνδε] G, τᾶν δε RV, τὴνδε Vp2H 1314 καλεῖ] Γ, καλοῖ BVp2⁺ and Γ² (gloss?) ἀνθρώπων ἂν BVp2⁺ 1315 om Vp2 τύχηι R, τείχη B 1316 om Vp2 ἔρωτες] om R, add R¹ in marg., ἔρωτος H 1317 θᾶττον lib. κελεύειν deleted before φέρειν, and -ειν of φέρειν in ras. M9 1318 ΧΟ] om R 1319 μετοικεῖν] V, μετεχειν Vγρ 1320 ἀμβροσίαι A 1321 ἀγανο|φρονος corr. from ἀγανοφροσύνης | R 1322 εὐήμερον] η in ras. V°, εὐάμερον B 1324 οὐ] ὡς A ἐγεννήσεις E2 1325 ΧΟ] om ΓB, no sp U (in middle of line) φερετὼ A φέρε τὸ E κάλανθον AB πτερῶν lib. 1326 πει A αὖθις] αὖ τις αὖ γ' BVp2⁺,

αὖτις rel. ἐξώρμα Vp2^{+} 1327 ΠΙ] C, om rel. 1328 ΧΟ] om lib. ἐστί τις] ἐστιν B and (-ἰν) Vp2^{+}, τις ἐστὶν or τίς ἐστιν rel. 1329 ΠΙ] E, —RVM, om G Vp2^{+}, χο A, κηρυξ ΓB 1330 ΧΟ] E Vp2^{+}, om RGΓB, —VM, no sp U (in middle of line) 1332 τε (second)] H^{1}, δε CH 1333 θαλάττια V (and A at first) 1334 πτερώσεις] V^{c} (-εις in ras) U, -ης U^{1} 1335 τὰς] τοὺς AU κερχνῆδας] ΓUEB, -ηί- RVM, -ή- Vp2^{+}, -ῆ- AM9 1337 ΠΑΤΡΑΔΟΙΑΣ] om Vp2 γενοίμαν] E?, γενοίμην G, γένοιμ' ἂν E^{1}, γένοίμαν Δ, γενοίμ' ἀν (ἄν C) Vp2C ἀετὸς G ὑψιπέτης U 1338 ἀμποταθείην] ἂν ποτεθείην M, ἂν ποτασθείην Vp2^{+}, ἂν ποταθείην rel. ὑπὲρ] B^{2}, om BVp2^{+} 1340 ΠΙ] om GVp2^{+} ἔοικε δ' οὐ V ψευδαγγελήσειν] ψευδαγγελὴς (-ἡ Vp2^{+}) εἶν' lib. ἄγγελος lib. 1341 ὅδε] ὧδε V, ὧδε EG αἰετοὺς] Γ^{c}, -ὸς AMΓB προσέρχεται] Γ^{1}, προσδέχεται Γ 1341A ΠΑ] om H (but : after 1341) 1343 ἐρῶ (ὀρῶ M9) δ' ἐγώ τι (ἐγώ τε U, ἔγωγε ΓBVp2^{+}) τῶν ἐν ὄρνισι (-ιν B) νόμων (νόμῶν ΓE, νόμον U^{1}, νομῶν B^{2}) lib. 1345 νόμων] M^{1}?M9B, νομῶν M?B^{2}, νόμῶν UEE2 1346 ΠΙ] —RM, om V νόμων] ΓH, νομῶν Γ^{c}Vp2 H^{1}, νόμῶν MUE νόμοι] M^{1}H, νομοί RMVp2H^{1}, νόμοί ΓE Erasures indicate that V originally had νομῶν and νομοί in this line 1347 ΠΑ] —RVM, om G μάλιστα] μάλι Δ νομίζεται] R, -τε R^{1} 1348 τοῖσιν R ὄρνισιν] G, -σι V 1349 ΠΙ] —RV, om GM 1350–1352 νεοττὸς ὤν . . . πατέρα] om U

1351 ΠΑ] Γ^{r}?, —RV, om GM ἂν (ἄν R) οἰκισθεὶς RAVp2^{+}, ἀνακισθεὶς Δ 1353 ΠΙ] Γ^{r}?, —RV, om GM τοῖς AMVp2^{+} ὄρνισιν] VB, ὄρνισι G rel. (ὄρνοισι C at first) νόμος from νόμοις (?)V 1354 παλαιὸς] om M, add M^{1}(min.) ταῖς] RA, τοῖς rel. κύρβεσιν] V^{c}, κύρμασιν V 1356 ποιήσῃ] C^{1}, ποήσῃ RΓ^{c}, ποήσει (?) Γ, ποιήσει M9C πελαργιδεῖς lib. 1358 ΠΑ] —RM, om VVp2 ἀπέλασα V τἄρα] γὰρ AMBVp2^{+}, γὰρ ἂν rel. νὴ τὸν δί' BVp2^{+} 1359 γέ] γάρ A 1360 ΠΙ] —RV, om GM ἐπειδήπερ] ἐπειδὴ ΓU γὰρ ἦλθες] ἀνῆλθες E μέλε' VMΓE2, μέλεε U 1362 σοὶ] σύ U νεανίσκ'] νίσκ' H 1363 αὐτοὶ E2 (possibly M9) παῖς] πῶς E2 ἦν AMU, ᾗ E 1364 μὲν M9 sup. ταύτην δέ γε BVp2^{+}, ταύτην δὲ rel. 1365 τουτὶ] BVp2^{+}, τοῦτο rel. θατέρα E2, θ'ητ- R, θητ- AE, θ'ἠτ- rel. 1366 τονδὶ] γε τὸν BVp2^{+}, τόνδε τὸν rel. 1368 τὸν] σὸν Vp2^{+} 1369 εἰς lib. 1370 ΠΑ] —RVM, om G διόνυσσον R δοκεῖν M 1371 ΠΙ] : R, om VG (at beginning of line, but : after σοι V), —M,

sp E2 *νοῦν*] *νῦν* M 1372 ΚΙΝΗΣΙΑΣ] VCH, add *διθυραμβοποιὸς* RAΓEB and C (which places it before *πτερύγεσι*, the beginning of a new line), om ME2Vp2 *ἀλλὰ πέτομαι* U *πρὸς*] *εἰς* E2 1373 *πτερύγεσσι*] V^{c}C?, *-εσι* VMM9BVp2C^{1}H 1374 *ἄλλαν*] *ἄλλων* Vp2^{+} 1375 ΠΙ] —RVM, om GE2 *τὸ*] om Vp2^{+} 1376 ΚΙ] om RV E2Vp2, —M, *διθ* CH (the form hereafter used by Vp2^{+}) 1377 *τε νέαν*] *γενεὰν* Vp2^{+} 1378 ΠΙ] Γ (but deleted), om RGH (but : after 1377 H), —VM, *χο* E *ἀσπαζόμεθα* GAUE2 *φιλύρινον*] AMΓB (*ιλ* in ras. B), *φελλύρινον* E, *φυλλύρινον* E2, *φιλύριον* U, *φελύρινον* rel. 1379 —R, *πει* Γ, *διθ* H *σὺ*] *σὸν* M *κυλὸν* G *ἀνὰ*] in ras. Γ *κυκλοῖς* A 1380 ΚΙ] —RVM, om G, *πει* H 1381 *λιγύφθογγος*] B^{2}, *λιγύμοχθος* B^{2}, *λιγύμυθος* MBVp2^{+}; *γρ καὶ λιγόμυ*$^{\theta}$ V, *γρ λιγύμυθος ἢ λιγύμοχθος* Γ^{R}E, *γρ λιγύμυθος ἢ λιγύφθογγος* M9 (cf. M in schol. *λιγύθυμος ἢ λιγύμυθος . . . καὶ λιγύμοχθος*) 1382 ΠΙ] —RVM, om G, *διθ* H *παῦσαι*] *πᾶσαι* U 1383 ΚΙ] —RM, om VAH (but : after 1382 H) 1384 *ἀναπτάμενος* AM 1385 *ἀεροδινήτους* A *νεφοβόλους* A *ἀναβολὰς λάβοι* M 1386 om V, add between 1385 and 1387 V^{R} ΠΙ] —RM, om V^{R} 1387 ΚΙ] —R VM, om G *κρέμμαται* M9 *ἡμῶν*] GΓ^{c}, U sup., *ἡμῶ* V, *ἡμῖν* ΓB 1388 *γίνεται* lib. 1389 *γε*] Vp2^{+}, om rel. 1390 *πτεροδίνητα* Vp2^{+} *κλίων*] Γ^{c}B^{1}, *κλείων* GA(and Γ?), *κίων* B *εἰσῃ* MΓU 1391 ΠΙ] —RV, om GM *οὐ*] *τί* A ΚΙ] : R, : —V, sp G, —M 1392 *δίειμί*] *ει* from *η* R *δίειμί σοι*] *σοῦ δίειμι* Vp2H, *σοῦ δίειμι σοὶ* CVp2^{1} *σοι*] B^{2}, *σου* AB 1393 *πετεινῶν*] R^{1}AMUM9H, *-η-* RH^{1} rel. 1394 *ταναοδείρων* Vp2^{+} 1395 ΠΙ *ὠόπ*] om H ΠΙ] om RV, —M *ὦ ὄπ* A, *ὦ ὄπ* MΓU, *ὀώπ* E2, *ὦόπ* Δ ΚΙ] om RV, —M, sp U (in middle of line) *αλάδρομον* (*ἀ-* V) RV, *ἀλαδρόμον* (*ἀ-* V^{c})V^{c}GAE, *ἄλα δρόμον* rel. *αλάμενος* R, *ἀλ-* VMU, *ἀλάμενον* C 1396 *ἀνόμων* Vp2 *πνοιαῖσιν* B, *πνοιαῖσι* Vp2^{+} *βαίην*] *βαίνων* Vγρ, *βιαίαις* A 1397 ΠΙ] R^{c}, —RV, om G *τὸν*] om Vp2^{+} *ἢ 'γώ*] *ἠγώ* RVU, *ἤ γώ* (*'γώ* E) ME, *ἤ ἐγώ* M9, *γώ* A, *ἐγώ* ΓVp2^{+}, *ἔγωγέ* B *σου*] *σ' οὐ* V, *σοι* A *πνοίας* Vp2^{+} 1398 ΚΙ] —RV, om GAM *νότια* E *στίχων* VΓU *προσοδὸν* (*ον* from *ων*?) R

1401 *χαρίεντ' ὦ* M *σοφὼ* G 1403 ΚΙ] *διθ* RVAVp2^{+} 1404 *ταῖς* ΓU Only ΓE (not M9) have (;), UVp2C (,) 1405 ΠΙ] —RVM, om G 1406 *Λεωτροφίδῃ*] RΓ, *-η* rel. *πετομένων*] *πεμένων* U 1407 ΚΙ] : R, —VM, om G *δῆλος*] *η* by corr. V^{c}, *λῆλος*

Vp2 After 1407 vs. 1404–1407 are repeated in M9; 1407^{b} of the first set and 1404–1407^{a} of the second set were then deleted **1408** *ἴσθ'*] C, *οἶσθ'* AC^{1} **1409** om R *πτερωδεὶς* C *τὸν ἀέρα διαδράμω* A **1410** ΣΤΚΟΦΑΝΤΗΣ] H, *πένης συκ* RAMΓEB, *συκ πένης* C, om Vp2, *πένης* here and *συκ* before *οὐδὲν* (the beginning of a new vs.) VM^{1} *οἶδε* (*οἶ-* RV) G rel. **1411** *πτεροποίκιλα* U, *πτερυποίκιλοι* E, *πτερυποίκιλλον* M9 **1412** *ταυσίπτερε*] B, *-πτεροι* EB^{2} sp before *ποικίλα* A **1413** *φαύλως* R **1415** ΣΤ] E2, —RV, om G, *πεν* AΓB (and so throughout the scene) *πεν συκ* E (and so for half the scene) **1416** ΠΙ] om RGM, —V *εἰς* B *θοἰμάτιον* V, *θὀἰ-* B, *θοι-* G rel. *σκολιὸν* VAMEB *μοι*] om E2 **1417** *πεν συκ* deleted before vs. E *οὐχ ὀλίγων* R, *οὐκ ὀλίων* C **1418** ΣΤ]—RVM, om G *δεῦρ'*] *δῆτ'* B **1419** ΠΙ]—RVM, om G *χρὴ δεῖ* AMEVp2^{+} **1420–1491** wanting in Γ (one folio lost) **1420** ΣΤ] —RM, om V *πίθῃ*] V^{c}, *πίθει* V **1421** ΠΙ]—RVM, om G *πελήνης* M9 *διανοῇ* GMUEB **1422** ΣΤ]—RVM, om G *ἀλλὰ*] *ἀλὰ* A **1423** ΠΙ] : R, —VM, om G, *πλ* (*sic*) Vp2, *πατρ* H **1424** ΣΤ] —RVM, om G *πραγματοδιφὴς* M, *πρᾶγμα τοδὶ φῄς* E2 **1426** ΠΙ] —RM, om V *ὑπὸ*] ABΔ, *ὑπαὶ* (*-αι* RV Vp2^{+}) B^{1} rel. *τι*] RE, *τἰ* M, *τί* M9 rel. *προσκαλῇ* MU, *-καλεῖν* BVp2^{+} *σοφότερον* E2, *σαφώτερον* Vp2^{+} Only BVp2C and possibly A have (;), U has (,) **1427** ΣΤ] —RM, om V *μὰ*] E2^{1}, *νὴ* E2 *ἀλλ'*] *ἀλ'* U *λῃσταί*] ME, *λῃ-* M9 rel. *τε*] *γε* lib. *λυπωσι γ'ἐμε* R, *λυπῶσι γέ με* VM, *λυπῶσιν ἐμὲ* U **1428** *γεράνων*] *γενάνων* C **1429** *καταπεπωκὼς*] C^{1}, *-ὰς* C, *-πεπτωκὼς* V **1430** ΠΙ]—RVM, om G *ἐργάζῃ* AMUM9B *τοὔργον σὺ* A point after *τοὔργον* E, om rel. (;) after *μοι* AVp2^{+} **1431** *συκοφαντεῖν* A **1432** ΣΤ] —RVM, om G *πάθω* from *μάθω* C **1433** ΠΙ] E2, —RVM, om GE *ἔστι* E2 *δία εἴργα* V **1434** *χρὴ* AM, *χρῇ* C *τουτονὶ* MVp2^{+} **1435** *ἐκ τῶν τοῦ* R *δικοραφεῖν* E2 **1436** ΣΤ]—RVM, om G **1437** ΠΙ] —RVM, om G *τοι*] B^{2}, *τι* U, *ταῦτα* BVp2^{+} *λέγω* E2 *πτερῶ σε*] *πτερώσει* V^{c} (*ώ* from *ῶ*), *πτερῶν σε* M ΣΤ] : R, —VM, om G *καὶ πῶς*] *ὅπως* M *λόγοις*] E, *λέγοις* E^{1} **1438** *ἄνδρας* V ΠΙ] : R, —VM, om G **1439** ΣΤ] : R, : —V, sp G, —M ΠΙ] : R, —VM, om G **1441** *κουρείοισι* ME2 E and M9^{1} (not E2) have (;) here, UC(,) **1442** *γἐ*] *δὲ* G, *τέ* rel. *ὁ διιτρεφὴς* RVM, *ὁ διιτρέφης* (*-τρέφε* E2) rel. **1443** *ἀνεπτέρωσεν* R

ἱππηλατεῖν (or ἱπιηλ-) G, ἱππηλατῶν E2 (;) Vp2C 1444 αὐτοῦ] B, M9 uncertain, αὖ- E2 rel. φησι Δ 1445 (;) after φρένας EVp2+ 1446 ΣΤ] —R, om VMH λόγοις G τ'ἄρα VAMUE, γ' ἄρα B, τ' ἄρα E1 rel. πτεροῦντα M, πτεροῦται U ΠΙ] : R, : —V, sp G, —M, συκ H 1447 τε] γε B, om rel. 1448 ἐπαίρεταί] -τάι from -τέ A, ἐπαίρετ' M τ'] τε G, om M ἄνδρ ἄνθρωπος G — before οὕτω M σ'ἐ—'γὼ (ras. after ε?) A 1449 χρηστοῖ R 1450 ΣΤ] : R, : —V, sp GE2, —M

1451 ΠΙ] —RVM, om GH δαὶ] δὲ U ποήσεις M ΣΤ] : R, : —V, sp G, —M, πει H 1452 παππαῖος M, παππῶς Δ (and C at first) 1453 πτέρου με] πτερουμαι (-οῦ- A) RA 1454 κερχνῆδος] RVUEB, -ηῖ- GAM, -ηι- Δ, -ῆ- M9 rel. 1455 ἐγκληκὼς E2 1456 κἄτ' lib. πέτωμαι] R, πέταμαι G, πέτομαι R°MEΔ ΠΙ] : RV, sp G, —M 1457–1461 om E 1457 ὠδὶ] ἀδὶ Vp2+ συκ before ὅπως M ὠφλήκῃ] RG, letter erased after φ V, ὠφλήκει A, ὀφλήκῃ M, ὀφλήσῃ UBH, ὀφλήσει Vp2C 1458 ἥκει M ὁ ξένος] ὦ ξένε A, ξένος U, γρ ὁ ξένος πένης A1 (all in black) ΣΤ] : R, om V, sp G, —M μανθάνω RVM 1459 ΠΙ] om RVB, συκ M κἄπειτ' RV, κἄπειτα G ἐκεῖσ' αὖ] ἐκεῖ αὖ RVAM, αὖ ἐκεῖ G πέτει] AVp2+, -η rel. 1460 ἁρπασάμενος AH ΣΤ] : RV, sp G, —M 1461 — before vs. R, πει M δεῖ] om C ΠΙ] : RV, sp G, —M 1462 — before vs. R — before καὶ M καὶ blotted or deleted R μὴν] νῦν MM9 1463 κερκυραῖα AMU τοιαυτὶ] om R 1464 ΣΤ] om RG, —V (;) after ἔχεις BVp2+ (not Δ) ΠΙ] sup. E2 (no sp), om R, : —V, sp G, —M πτερὰ V (and possibly A) 1465 — before vs. R οἷς M ποήσω R σήμερον MUBVp2+ βεμβικιᾶν] Vp2+, -ιαν R, βομβικιᾶν B, βεμβικίαν rel. 1466 ΣΤ] —RV, om G ΠΙ] om lib. After 1466 vs. 1465 is repeated in C at the top of a new page 1467 πει AMEBVp2+ (om E2) ἀπολιβάξεις] RE, -βάζεις rel. ἀπολούμενε G 1468 συκ M στρεφοδικο- M 1469 —R, πει M συλλαβόντες M, ξυλαβόντες Δ 1470 θαυμα| μάσ' V, θαυμαστὰ G ἐπετόμεσθα (-μεθα E2) ME, ἐπεπτόμεθα U 1473 γὰρ] γὰρ καὶ M 1476 μὲν] U sup. 1477 δῆλον A μέγαν A, μετὰ Vp2+ 1478 τοῦ] om lib. μέν γε ἦρος Vp2+ αἰεὶ BVp2+ 1481 φυλλοροεῖ RVU (and M9 at first), ν deleted after -εῖ Δ 1482 —M αὖ τις χώρα M 1483 πόρω R τις] om M 1484 λίχνων U, λίχνω Δ 1486 συναριστῶσι (-ιν U) lib. 1487 ξύνεισι] in

ras. V°, *ξυνιεῖσι* A 1489 *ξυντυνχάνειν* Vp2C 1490 *ἐντύχῃ* MUE Vp2+ *ἥρωϊ* lib. 1491 *τῶ βροτῶ* A *'Ορέστῃ*] *-η* from *-ει* A? 1492 Γ resumes here. 1493 *τάπιδέξια*] AM, *ταπίδεξιά* R (accent by R or R°?), *τάντιδέξια* ΓΒ, *τὰ 'πιδέξια* (*'πίδεξα* E2) rel. 1494 ΠΡΟΜΗΘΕΤΣ] om Vp2 *τάλας γ' ὁ* Vp2+ 1495 *πεῖσθέστερος* Vp2, *πεῖσθέτερος* C, *πειθέστερός* H, *πεισθέταιρός* (*-ρό* R) rel. *ἐστι* U, abbrev. ΓH, *ἐστιν* (*-ἰν*) rel. ΠΙ] R[1] in marg., : R *ἔα*] om Vp2 1496 *συγκαλυμμός*] V°B, *συγκαλυμὸς* VM9, *συνκαλυμμός* Vp2+, *συγκεκαλυμμένος* M, (*συγκαλυμμ*)*ένος* B[2] ΠΡ] : R, : —V, om G 1497 ΠΙ] : R, —VM, sp G *μὰ τὸν δί'* Vp2+ 1498 — before vs. RM, sp U (in middle of a line) ΠΡ] : R, : —V, sp G, —M *πηνίκα* G *ἄρα*] B, *ὥρα* B[2] 1499 ΠΙ] —RVM, om G 1500 ΠΡ] sup. M9 (no sp), : RV, om G, —M *βουλητὸς* UΔVp2+ *περαιτέρω*] *-αιτερ-* in ras. V, *περεταίρω* R no MS. has (;)

1501 ΠΙ] —R, om V ΠΡ] : R, : —V, sp G, —M *ποεῖ ὁ ζεὺς* U *ξεὺς* Vp2 *ποιεῖ*] RGBVp2+, *ποεῖ* R° rel. 1502 *πει* Vp2+ *ξυνεφεῖ* VΓE2Vp2+, *ξυννεφεῖ* V°Γ° rel. No MS. has (;) 1503 ΠΙ] —RV, om GH, *πρ* M *μεγάλ'*] BVp2+, *μεγάλα* rel. ΠΡ] : R, : —V, sp G, —M *ἐκκαλύψομαι* RMVp2+ 1504 ΠΙ] —RV, om GH (but : after 1503 H) *ὦ* om Vp2+ *προμυθεῦ* U ΠΡ] : R, —V, om G, sp M, *πει* H 1505 ΠΙ] om RG, —VM *ἐστιν* E, abbr. ΓH ΠΡ] : RV, om G 1506 *μ'*] R, om rel. *ὀλέσεις* BVp2+, *ὀλέσει* rel. *ὁ ζεὺς ἐνθάδ'* A 1507 *σοι*] Δ[1], om M, *σι* Δ 1508 *ταυτὶ* R *σκιάδειον*] R°A[1]?, *σκιάδιον* RGB, *σκιαδεῖον* A? 1509 *ἂν*] M9 sup. 1510 ΠΙ] —RV, om G 1511 *ἐπεπενόησας* A *αὐτὸ*] om M, *αὐτὼ* Δ *προμυθικῶς* U 1512 *ὑπόδηθι* G *κᾆτα . . . νυν* (1513)] om G 1513 ΠΡ] E2, —R, om VM9 *ἄκου* E2 ΠΙ] corr. from *πρ* B, : RV, sp G 1514 ΠΡ] om RG, —V ΠΙ] : RV, sp G *πηνίκατ'* A *ἄτ'*] *ἄρ'* UVp2+ 1515 ΠΡ] —RV, om GM *ἡμεῖς* G *ὠικήσατε* V 1517 *κνῖσα*] R, *κνίσα* VΓ°?EB, *κνίσσα* Γ?M9 rel. *μυρίων* U 1519 *ὥσπερ* A *Θεσμοφορίοις*] BVp2+, *-σι* RVAMΓ, *-σιν* U, *θεσμοφόροις* E 1521 *κεκραγότες* U 1522 *ἐπιστρατεύειν* MΓUBVp2+, *ἐπιστρατεῦσιν* E2 *φάσι'* M9 1523 *τἀμπόρι'*] *τὰ πόρι'* Vp2+ 1524 *εἰσάγοιτο*] V, *-άγοντο* Vp2+, *-άγοιντο* rel. (letter erased after *γ* U) *σπλάγχνα*] E2, *σπλάχνα* M9Δ *κατατετ μένα* (erasure after *τ*?) U, *κατα*(*κωτα* C)*τετμήμενα* Vp2C 1525 ΠΙ] —RV, om G *εἰσὶν*] RBVp2C, *εἰσὶ* rel. 1526 *ὑμῶν*]

Γ°, *ἡμῶν* ΓΒ ΠΡ] : R, —VM, sp G **1527** *πει* C *ἐξηκεστίδης* lib. **1528** ΠΙ] —R, om VVp2+ *τούτοις τοῖς*] *τούτουτοις* R *τοῖς θεοῖς τοῖς*] *τοῖς* M, *θεοῖς* (from *τοῖς*) C **1529** *τίς* C *ἐστι* U ΠΡ] : R, : —V, sp G, —M *ἐστιν* RE, abbr. H, *ἐστί* rel. *τριβαλλεῖ* U, *τριβαλοὶ* Vp2H, *τρβαλοὶ* C ΠΙ] : R, : —V, sp G, —M **1530** *ἄρα* R, *ἄρα* rel. No MS. has (;) after the vs. **1531** ΠΡ] —RV, om G *μάλλιστα* U *σοι*] *τοι* A *λέγω*] om E *σαφές* from *σαφῶς* A **1532** *δεῦρο*] om G **1533** *τριβαλῶν* Vp2+ **1534** *σπένδεσθ'*] Γ, *σπένδησθε* VM, *σπέδησθε* G, *σπένδησθ'* rel. *ἂν* VM **1535** *τὸ σκῆπτρον*] R[1] in margin, om R *τοῖσι* Vp2C *ὄρνισιν*] AE[1]B, *ὄρνοισι* C, *ὄρνισι* EM9Δ rel. *πάλαι* A **1536** *Βασίλειάν*] R, *βασιλείαν* rel. **1537** ΠΙ] —RV, om GM *ἐστιν*] om Vp2+ *Βασίλεια*] R, *βασιλεία* E2 rel. (except M9, which abbreviates) ΠΡ] om R, : —V, sp G, —M **1538** *ταμιεύει*] *κεραμεύει*(*-μένει* C) Vp2+ **1539** *ἅπαξ* (*ἅπ-* Vp2) *ἅπαντα* RVp2 *ἐνβουλίαν* Vp2+, *εἰουλίαν* Δ **1541** *τὸν*] *τὴν* B *κολακρέτην* M **1542** ΠΙ] corr. from *πρ* A, om RVM9 *γ' ἄρ'*] VΓUB, *γ' ἄρ'* A, *γὰρ* G rel. *αὐτὸς* V ΠΡ] : R, om V, sp GMM9, *πει* E2 **1543** *προμ* before vs. E2 *ἦν γ' ἦν*] *ἦν γε* M9 *παραλάβῃς*] *π*? *λ-* V, *πάντα λ-* G, *λάβῃς* ΓUBVp2+ *πάντ'*] *π* (*sic*) U, *ἅπαντ'* BVp2+ *ἔχεις*] om U **1544** *ἤλυθον* M **1545** *ἀεί*] E2, *αἰεί* rel. *ἀνθρώποισι* G *εὔνεως* G, *εὔνα* U *εἶμ'* VAMΓUVp2+ **1546** ΠΙ] from *πρ* Γ, —RV, om G *διὰ σ'*] *δι' ἄσ'* B, *διά σ'* rel. **1547** ΠΡ] —RV, om G *ὡς*] *οὗς* B **1548** ΠΙ] —RV, om G *Δι' ἀεί*] U, *δι' εἰ* A, *δι' αἰεί* ΓBVp2+, *δία εἰ* rel. *θεομισὴς*] Γ, *-μίσης* Γ°, *-μισῆς* Vp2C **1549** om V ΠΡ] —R *κανθαρός* EM9 (dot over *ν* E), *κάνθαρος* E2 **1550** *φέρε μοι* BVp2+, *φέρε μοι τὸ* B[2] rel. *σκιάδιον* RB *με*] om A *ἴδῃ*] *ἤδη* H

1552 ΠΙ] om RVM **1553** *ταῖς* M, *τοῖσι* Vp2+ *σκιάποσι* VM Γ, *σκιάποσσιν* B, *σκυάποσι* Vp2+ **1554** *λίμνη τις*] *λιμνητὴς* Vp2+ *ἐστ'* from *ἐστι* G, *ἐστιν* M *ἄλλουτος* Δ, *ἄλλ* (*ἄλλ'* C, *ἄλλος* H) *οὗτος* Vp2+ *οὖ*] om Vp2+ **1555** *χο* erased before vs. Γ *σωκράτης γὰρ* Vp2+ **1556** *ἦλθεν* AB **1557** *ἰδεῖν ψυχὴν δεόμενος* A *ἦ*] *ἦ* R, om H (but *ἠρακ* before 1558) **1558** *προὔλιπε*] VΓU and (*πρού-*) M, *προύλιπεν* RAEB, *προὔλιπεν* M9 rel. **1560** *κ'ἀμνόν* Vp2+ *ἦς*] *εἰς* A, *ἦ* Vp2 *λαιμὸν* G *τεμὼν* (*-ὢν* Vp2+) *τοὺς λαιμοὺς* BVp2+ **1561** *ποθ'*] om lib. *ὀδυσεὺς* M, *ὀδυσσεὺς* Vp2C, *ὀδυσσεὺς* rel. *ἀπῆλθεν* BVp2+ **1562** *ἀνῆλθ'*] R°, *-θεν* R, *ἦλθ'* A *κάτω* A **1563–1564** om

V at first but add between 1562 and 1565 λαῖτμα] V, λαῖμα rel. τῆς] τοῦ Vp2+ 1564 ἢ] ἥ A 1565 om A, add A^{c} in marg. Π0] om H τῆς] om Vp2+ 1566 τόδε B οἳ] οἱ RM, ἥ ΓUB Vp2+ (but C first wrote the abbreviation for ως] 1567 — before οὗτος R ἐπαριστέρ' R, ἐπαρίστερ' AE, ἐπ' ἀρίστερ' UM9, ἐπ' ἀριστερ' ΔH οὕτως from οὗτος C ἀμπέχῃ ΜΓUEB 1568 θοἱμάτιον B, θοι- rel. ὧδ'] V, ὡς δ' AΜΓU, ὡς rel. ἐπιδέξια] A, ἐπιδεξιά RM9 Δ^{1}Vp2, -ιάν R^{1}, -ιᾶ Δ, ἐπὶ δεξιὰν V, ἐπὶ δεξιὰ E2B (in ras.) rel. 1569 Γ alone punctuates (point) after κακόδαιμον λαισποδιὰς A, -ιᾶς Vp2+, λεσποδίας U 1570 ποῖ] πῶς E2 1571 εἶ] οἱ M9 After θεοί add τριβαλὸς U (belongs before 1572) 1572 ΤΡ] om Vp2+ Π0] : RV, om G, —M, ποιητ H δμωᾷς C δή] om Vp2+ 1573 ἑώρακα] VE, ἑώρακα V^{c}Vp2^{1} rel. βαρβαρώτερον V, βαρβώτατον Vp2 : after vs. U 1574 δὴ M sup. τί] in ras. V^{c} HP] R^{1} in marg., om R, V^{c} in ras. 1575 γ'] om R, θ' VAME 1576 ποτ'] A^{1}M^{1}, ποτὲ A, πόθ'? M ἔσθ' ὁ] ἔστ' Vp2+ (corr. from ἔστι H) 1577 Π0] om R, —V, πει G, ποιητ H ἠρίμεσθα R, ἠρήμεθα ME2 1578 HP] G, : RV, om M διπλασίους U ἄγχειν μᾶλλον A δοκεῖ] Γ^{c}, δοκῶ GΓ δοκεῖ μοῖ (μοῖα C, μοι H) Vp2+ (from δοκεῖ μοῖ in the archetype) 1579 τυρόκνηστίν] B^{2}, τυροκνήστιν R, -κνῆστιν B, τυρόκρηστιν C τις] BVp2+, μοι τίς ΓU, μοι rel. δότω] in ras. B^{1} 1581 Π0] —RV, om G, ἦρ rel. 1582 ΙΙΙ] Γ sup (no sp.), : R, —VM, om GU 1583 HP] —R, om VM ταδὲ from ταδὶ E δὲ κρέα] B^{2}, κρέα δὲ BVp2+ ἐστίν] E2, -ι M9 ΙΙΙ] : RV, sp G, —M 1584 δημοτικοῖσιν] BVp2+, -οῖ R, -οῖς rel. 1585 HP] : RV, sp G, om M 1586 ἐπικνᾷς lib. αὐτοῖς ΓU ΙΙΙ] : R, —VM, om G 1587 : before τί V, sp G (both in middle of line) ἔστιν U Π0] om RG, —VM, ἦρ rel. ἡμεῖς] om U, ἐνθάδ' Vp2+ 1588 πολέμου] BVp2+, τοῦ πολέμου καὶ rel. καταλλαγῆς] τῆς διαλλαγῆς R 1589 ΙΙΙ] H, δοῦλος A, οἰκετ' πει (om πει GE2) rel. ἐνεστ' RAM9 τῇ] τῷ Vp2+ (and U at first?) ληκίνθωι V (not G), λυκήθω U 1590 HP] om R, —V, πει GAΓBVp2C ὀρνίθια lib. λιπαρά γ' BVp2+, λιπαρὰ rel. εἶναι] om R 1591 Π0] —RV, om GMH, ἦρ AΓBVp2?C κερδαίνομεν from κεδαί- C 1592 τ'] V^{c}?G, om V? ὑμῖν R 1593 ἂν] om A τοῖς] om M9 1594 ἀλκυονίδας M, ἀλκιονίδας U, ἀλῡνονίδας E2 ἦγετ' R 1595 περὶ] V^{c}?GM9, περι RV?Vp2, πέρι ΜΓEB 1596 οὔτε R πώποθ'] E2, πώποτ' RVE 1597 τε θέλομεν A

1598 *δίκαιον*] *δι-* from *δα-* R? *ἄλλο* lib. *νῦν*] om M 1599 *ποιεῖσθαι*] M9, *ποιεῖσθε* RM, *ποεῖσθαι* E *δίκαι'*] M9^{1}Δ^{1}, *δίκαια* M9E2Δ *ἐστὶν*] RB, *ἔστιν* Γ^{c}E, abbr. U, *ἔστι* or *ἐστὶ* ΓM9 rel. 1600 *τοῖς* G *ὄρνισιν*] VΓ^{c}UEBVp2C, *-σι* GΓE2 rel.

1601 *ἀποδοῦναι*] *ἀπαιτεῖν* R *κἂν*] *καὶ* lib. *διαλλαττώμεθα*] RV^{c} ME, *διαλατώμεθα* V, *διαλαττόμεθα* U, *διαλλαττοίμεθ' ἂν* B, *διαλλαττόμεθα* rel. 1602 *ἐπ'*] *εἰς* A 1604 ΠΟ] *ποιητής* H *ἡλίθιος*] Δ^{1}, *ἥλιος* Δ *γάστριος* R 1605 *τυραννίδος*] *βασιλείας* R (;)] point MVp2, (,) C, om RUH 1606 *ἡμεῖς* M 1607 *ἰσχύσατ'* E2 *ἄρξωσιν*] RUEB, *ἄρξοσι* C, *ἄρξωσι* E2 rel. 1608 om M *γε* A *νεφέλαισιν*] E2, *νεφέλεσιν* M9E2^{1}Δ *ἐγκεκρομμένοι* U 1609 *κρίψαντες* A *ἐπιορκοῦσι* E2 1610 *ὄρνις*] E2^{1}, *ὄρνεις* RVE2B *ἔχητε*] V^{c}, *ἔχετε* VVp2C *ξυμμάχους* Vp2^{+} 1611 *ὀμνύει* Vp2C *τις*] om Vp2 *καὶ τὸν Δία*] placed after 1609 (one line above but on preceding page) Vp2, om H 1612–1613 om Vp2 *παρελθὼν*] Γ^{c}, *παελθὼν* Γ *λάθρα* lib. 1613 *προπτάμενος* M, *προσπτάμενος* rel. *θενών*] *σθένων* V, *θέλων* M, *θέν* U, *θένων* rel. 1614 ΠΟ] om A *Ποσειδῶ*] H^{1}, *-ῶν* H *λέγοις* Vp2C 1615 HP] om Vp2^{+} *δαὶ*] *δὴ* G *φῄς*] V^{c}, *φεῖς* V TP] : R, *ποσ* H *νάβαισατρεῦ* V, *βαβαὶ σατρεῦ* M, *μαβαισατρεῦ* U, *ναβαλσατρεῦ* B, *βαβακατρεῦ* B^{2} 1616 ΠΙ] G, —R, : —V, *ἠρ* AM, om B (;) after *ὀρᾷς*] EB, (,) GΓE2U, om Vp2^{+}, point rel. : before *ἕτερόν* R, *πει* AM, sp E?M9E2? 1617 *ἀκούσασθ'* VAΔVp2^{+} *ποήσομεν* M 1618 *τῳ*] B^{1}Δ^{1}, *τῶι* RB, *τῶ* rel. *θεῶν*] B, *θεῶι* (or *-ῶ*) rel. 1619 *διασοφίζηται*] B^{2}, *διασοφίσηται* M, *διασοφίζεται* E2Vp2, *σοφίζηται* B, *γρ ἐξαπατᾶ* C (in Vp2 *ἐξαπατᾶ*, standing over *διασοφίζεται*, seems to be the end of vs. 1617) *οὗτος λέγων* A 1620 *μαινετοὶ* U *μὴ 'ποδιδῶ* B, *μὴ ἀπο-* rel. *σιτία* A, *μισιτίαν* U, *μισητιάν* Vp2C, *μισητίαν* rel. (first *ι* in ras. B) 1621 ΠΟ] : R, —VM, om G, *ἠρ* E *τρόπῳ*] *τρ* U 1622 ΠΙ] —RV, om GEVp2^{+} *διαριθμῶν*] V^{c}, *δι'ἀριθμῶν* VAMH *ἀργύριον* ΓM (and M9 at first) 1623 *ἄνθρωπος* lib. *καθηται* E2, *κάθηται* rel. *λούμενος*] Γγρ Vp2, *βουλόμενος* Γ, *λουόμενος* Vp2^{1}CH 1624 *ἀναπτάμενος* A, *καταπτάμενος* rel. *ἵκτινος* lib. *ἁρπάσας*] ΓUB, *κ'ἀνάρπασας* R, *καὶ ἀναρπάσας* A, *κ'ἅρπασας* Vp2^{+}, *κἀναρπάσας* rel. *λάθρα* lib. 1625 *τιμαῖν* A 1626 HP] om E 1627 ΠΟ] A, sp (?) RG, : V, *πει* ME (and A at first?) *καὶ*] om UVp2^{+} *τρβαλλόν* G, *τριβαλόν* M9Δ, *τρίβαλόν γε* Vp2^{+} *ἐροῦ*] Γ^{c}, *ἐρο* U, *ἔρου* rel. 1628 HP]

—RV, om GE, *το* M Τριβαλλός] M9[1], *τριβαλός* M9E2ΔVp2[+] (*τριβαλος* H) *το* (deleted?) before *οἰμώζειν* A *οἰμώζειν*] M9E2, *οἰμώξειν* EM9[1] ΤΡ] M9[1], om RVM9, sp G, *τριβαλανεὺς* H *σαυνακα* R, *σαύνακα* VE, *σαναῦκα* M, *δαυνάκα* U, *σαυνάκας* Δ **1629** *βακταρικροῦσα*] RB, *-ουσα* V, *βακταρίκρουσα* (*-αν* E2) AME, *βάκταρι κροῦσα* ΓU, *βακταρικοῦσα* Vp2[+] ΗΡ] om R, : V, sp G, *πει* E *φησί μ'*] *φ*[9] V, *φησὶ* G, *φησὶν* rel. **1630** *τοι*] *τι* VMU, *περ* B, *τινι* Vp2[+] *δοκοκεῖ* (first *οκ* deleted?) R *κάμοὶ*] *κάκοὶ* H *συνδοκεῖ*] V?, *-ῆ* V[c]?G, *ξυνδοκεῖ* Vp2[+] **1631** ΗΡ]—RV, om GM *δοκεῖν* M *περί* A *πάλιν* deleted before *πέρι* C **1632** *ἐστὶ* Δ *μνήσθην* RVMB **1633** *γὰρ*] om M9 **1634** Βασίλειαν] R, *βασιλείαν* rel. *ἐμοὶ*] *ἐν* U **1635** *ἐστὶ* GUC, abbr. ΓΗ ΠΟ] R[1] in marg., om R *διαλαγῶν* Δ *ἐρᾷς*] *ἔρων* C **1636** — RV (but deleted in R), om. G *αὖθις*] Vp2[+], *αὖτις* rel. ΙΙΙ] : RV, sp G *μοι* E sup. *μέλει*] GM9[1] C[1], *μέλλει* VM9E2, *μελεῖ* C, om U **1637** —RV, *ἦρ* (deleted) E, om M9 *κατάχυμα* E2 *ποεῖν* M **1638** *φέρῃ*] Vp2C, *-η* ΜΓΒΗ, *φέρ* U **1640** ΠΟ] om E, *πει* E2 *δαὶ*] *δὲ* ΓUVp2[+] *ποῶμεν* AME (M9 by correction) ΗΡ] H sup. (no sp), : RV, om A *διαλλατ-τώμεθα*] V[c], *διαλλατώμεθα* R, *διαλαττώμεθα* V, *διαλλαττόμ* U **1641** ΠΟ] G, om RA, —V *δ'*] *δαὶ* R, om rel. *ὦζύρ'* RVp2[+], *ὦ 'ζύρ'* VEE2, *ὠιζυρ'* A, *ὦ ἰζύρ'* ΓU, sp *ζύν'* M, *ὦ 'ζυρ'* M9B[2], *ὦ 'ζυρέ* B *ἐξαπτώμενος* C, *ἐξαπατημένος* B (;)] ΓBVp2[+], om AUM9, point E2 rel. M ends here **1642** *βλάπτειν* A, *βλάπτε* E2 *ἂν* B *ἀποθάνῃ*] *ἀποθάνει* A, *ἄ* (*sic*) U **1643** *τούτοισιν* U **1644** *ἔσει*] RAVp2[+], *ἔσῃ* rel. *σοῦ*] *σοὶ* B *γίγνεται*] om U, *γίν-* rel. **1645** *ἀποθνήσκων* lib. (dot under *κ* in E) **1646** ΙΙΙ] *το* V, om G *τάλας γ' οἷον* B *σε*] *δε* U *περισοφ* (*sic*) U **1647** *ἔμ'*] *ἄμ'* Δ (and possibly B) **1648** *διαβάλεται* Δ *σύ*] om U **1649** *ἀκαρῆ*] R, *-εῖ* R[c] *μέτεστί*] *εσ* (?) deleted after *μ* R **1650** *εἶ*] VG, *εἶ σὺ* V[c]AE, *ἦ* Vp2C, *ἦ* H *κού*] *τ' οὐ* A *γνήσειος* C

1651 ΗΡ]—V, om G ΙΙΙ] : R, : —V, sp G **1652** *ποτε*] *το* U **1653** *ἀθηναῖαν* RVM9 (and E at first?) **1654** *ὄντων* from *ὤντων* R *γνησίων*] om U **1655** ΗΡ] —RV, om GB **1656** *νόθω* (*-φ* Γ) *'ξαποθνήσκων* ('*ξάπο-* U) lib.; *γρ νοθεία* EM9 (and Γ in schol.) ΙΙΙ] : R, —V, om G, sp A **1657** om R —(deleted?)V (notG) *πρῶτον* Vp2[+] **1658** *πρώων* V **1660** *δὴ*] om Vp2, sup M9 *νόμον*] *κόμον* U **1661** *ἀγχιστίαν* CH **1663–1664** *παῖδες*] om B

μὴ παῖδες E2 ὦσιν V(not G) νήσιοι C **1665** ἐγγυστάτω Vp2 τοῦ γένους UVp2+ **1667** HP]—RV, om G μέτεστιν ἐμοί A (cf. 1668) ἄρ R, ἀρ' VΓU οὐδὲ Δ **1668** μέτεστιν] om A III] : R, —V, om G μὰ] νὴ Vp2+ δι' V(not G) **1669** —R εἰσήγαγ'] E, ἐσήγαγεν V, ἐσήγ' Δ, ἐσήγαγ' rel. φράτορας lib. **1670** HP]—RV, om G δῆτ'] δῆτα τ' RVA, τοῦτ' E **1671** III] —RV, om G κέχηνας E (not M9) αἴκειαν] αἰτίαν AVp2H, αἰκίαν rel. **1672** ἧς] στῆς A, ἧς Vp2+ καταστήσω lib. **1673** σοι γάλα σοι (second σοι by correction C) Vp2+ (cf. 1675) **1674** καὶ δίκαι' A, δίκαιον E2 πάλιν RV **1675** κἀγὼ E σοι] after 1673 Vp2+ **1676** δαὶ] δὲ ΓU ΠΟ] in marg. R1, : R **1677** III] om RGA, —V τριβαλῶ Δ Vp2+ : before τί R, ⁘ A **1678** TP] om V καλανκορανυα R, καλανι κόρανυα V, κάλανικοράνα A, καλάνι κορανυὰ (-ᾶ U) ΓUBVp2+, καλὰ νικόρανυα (νικορανυὰ EΔ) E1Δ βασιλιναῦν AE **1679** ὄρνιτο] R and (ὀρ-) V, ὄρνιθι BVp2+, ὀρνίτω (ὀρ- E at first) rel. HP] in marg. R1, : R λέγεις lib. point] VE2, (,) U, om GM9, (;) rel. **1680** om M9, add in marg. M91 ΠΟ] —R, om Vp2H ποσει deleted before δι' C **1681** βαδίζοι γ' B **1682** οὐχοῦν Vp2C ταῖς] τοῖς E2, καὶ ταῖς Δ χελιδόσιν] RVEB, -σι GM9 rel. λέγε R **1683** ΠΟ] ποιητὴς H διαλλάττεσθε] ΓGrC1, διαλλάτεσθαι V, διαλλάτεσθε Vc, διαλλάττεσθαι M9 (and Γ?C at first) ξυμβένετε Vp2, βαίνετε C **1684** δοκεῖ] om H σιγήσομαι] συμβήσομαι VΓr2γρB2, ξυμβήσομαι E **1686** εἰς E2B **1687** Βασίλειαν] R, βασιλείαν rel. καὶ τὰ] κατὰ A τὰ] Vc sup., om VGM9Vp2+ **1688** κατευκόπησαν A **1689** εἰς E2 HP] R1 in marg., B sup. (no sp), om RVp2+ **1690** ταυτί γ' Bp2+, ταυτὶ from ταπὶ E2 μένων] om ΓUBVp2+ δ'] E, δὲ νῦν BVp2+, δὲ rel. **1691** τὰ] A, σὺ E, σὺ τὰ rel. πολλήν γε] in ras. V τενθείαν] τὴν θείαν A **1692** πει before vs. Vp2+ HP] om RVVp2+, sp G διετέθην] τεθ in ras. V, διεθέμην E **1693** III] πο Γ, om Vp2, χο C (but referred by corrector to 1694) ἀλλὰ] BVp2+, om rel. δότω] ΓUBVp2+, διδότω rel. **1694** ἐμφαναῖσι RV Φαναῖσι] E21, φανέσι E2 τῇ] τὴν Γ **1695–1696** κλαιψύδρα A ἐγγλωττογαστόρων] Rc, -γλωτο- RE, -γλοτο- H, -γλοττο- H1, εὐγλωττο- A γοργίαι τε καὶ deleted after γένος V **1697** θερίζουσίν] RB, -ί rel. (ras. after -ι V) **1698–1699** καὶ deleted before ταῖς R γλώττησι G, γλώταισι Vp2, γλωταισί C τε] γε A **1700** εἰσὶν] RVB, εἰσὶ G rel.

1701 *γοργίε* Vp2+ 1702 *κάπι* BΔ? *ἐγγλωττογαστόρων*] *-γλωτο-* E, *εὐγλ-* A, *ἐγγλωττοραστόρων* Vp2+ 1703 *'κείνων* Vp2+ *Φιλίπ-πων*] *-ίππων* in ras. V° 1705 *γλῶσσα* E2 *χωρὶς τέμνεται*] A1, *χωρίζεται* A 1706 ΑΓΓ] om H *πάντα τ' ἀγαθὰ* M9 *μεῖζον* A 1707 *πτηνῶν* VM9, *πτηρὸν* C 1708 *ὀλβίοις* from *ὀβίοις* E2, *ὀλιβίοις* Vp2 1709 *προσέρχετε* C *οἷος* by correction Γ 1710 *ἰδεῖν ἔλαμψε*] EBVp2+, *-εν* AE2[1], *ἔλαμψεν ἰδεῖν* rel. *χρυσαυγεῖ*] V°, *-ῆ* V, *χρυησαυγεῖ* Vp2+ *δρόμῳ* ECH, *δόρμω* Vp2 1711 *οὐδ'* Δ *ἥλιον* E2 1712 *τοιούτων* E, *τωῦτον* Δ *ἐξέλαμψ'* R *οἷον*] *ἔνδον* R, *οἷον δ'* U Vp2+, *οἷαν* B 1713 *γυναικὸς*] B2, *γυναῖκα* B 1714 *γερανὸν* H *πτεροφόρου* E2 1715 *ὁσμὴ*] *ὃς μὴ* VEE2C, *ὃς μη* M9 *ἀνονόμαστος* E 1716 *δ'*] om BVp2+ 1717 *διαψαίρουσιν* U 1718 *δὲ καὐτός*] E1, *δὲκ' αὐτὸς* E, *δὲ ἐκ' αὐτός* M9, *δὲ οὐκ αὐτὸς* E2, *δ' αὐτός* Vp2+ 1720 XO] M9, om ΓH (and B? photograph defective), *ἡμιχ* rel. *δίεχε*] *δίεχε δίαγε* E, *δίαχε* U 1721 *περιπετέθε* E2 1722 *ὦ*] B2, om BVp2+ 1723 *κάλους* UH 1724 *μακάριστον* RVE 1725 *πόλει*] *τῇ πόλει* BVp2+ 1726 —V(om G), *ἡμιχ* EVp2+ *μεγάλαι* (first)] *μεγάλα* H *μεγάλαι* (second)] Vp2 sup. 1727 *ἄνδρα* UBVp2+ 1728 *ἀλλ'*] *ἀλ'* Vp2 *ὑμεναίοις*] BVp2+, *-σιν* U, *-σι* rel. (*ὑμενέοισι* M9) *νυμφι-οισι* A, *νυμφιδίοις* BVp2+ 1729 *ᾠδαῖς*] *ὦδ'* Γ 1730 *Βασίλειαν*] RU, *βασιλείὰν* (accent over second *α* deleted?) Γ, *βασιλείαν* rel. 1731 *ἔτ(ερον) ἡμιχ* RVA, *ἡμιχ* ΓEB, *χο* Vp2+ *Ἥρᾳ*] Γ, *"ρα* U, *ἠρά* E, *ἠρά* (*η-* C) Vp2+, *ἤρα* rel. *'Ολυμπίᾳ*] R, *-ία* rel. 1732 *τῶν*] *τὸν* RVΓU *ἡλιβάτων* VVp2+, *ηλ-* R, *ἠλιθάτων* U *τρόνων* C 1733 *θεοῖ* G, *θεοῖσι* E 1734 *μοῖρα* RV, *μοίρα* V° *ξυναικόμισαν* C, *ξυνεκόμισαν* rel. 1735 *τῶδ'* Vp2+ 1736 om ΓUBVp2+ 1736A om lib. 1737 *Ἔρως*] om A 1739 *εἰθύνε* Vp2C, *εὔθυνε* rel. *πάλιν τόνους* VE2B (and C at first) 1742 *Ὑμὴν*] *ὑμὶν* U 1742A om M9 *Ὑμὴν ὦ*] om A *ὦ Ὑμέναι' ὦ*] B2, om BVp2+(*ὑμὴν* being attached to preceding vs.) 1743 ΠΙ] om C (the scribe took it for part of metrical note) *ὕμνης* Vp2C *ἐχάριν* U 1744 *αὐτοὺς* E2 1745 *χθονίους* E *κλήσατε*] V°, *κλήσατε* VUΔVp2+, *κλύσατε* G 1746 *πυρώδεις*] *πυρώδης* (?) A, *πυρρώδεις* A1 *ἀστραπὰς* E2 1747 *χο* before vs. Vp2+ (belongs before 1748) *τ'*] om A 1748 XO] om Vp2+ *ἀστραπῆς* E2, *ἀστεροπᾶς* B *φάνος* Γ 1749 *ἄμβροτον*] V°, *ἄμροτον* V *πυρφόρων* C 1750 *ὦ χθόνιαι*] B2, om B *βαρυαχέες*] RV°, *βαραχέες* VE, *βαρυχέες* Δ (and perhaps R°) *ὀμβροι-φόροι* G, *ὀμβρόφοροί* B

1751 *χθόνα σείει*] G, *χθόνας εἶει* (?) V *χθόνα*] om E2 1752 *ὦ κεραυνέ· διὰ σὲ* E (in V *ὦ κεραυνέ* follows *κρατήσας* almost as if part of text; G omits gloss) *τὰ*] om C 1753 *Βασίλειαν*] R, *βασιλεία* E2, *-είαν* rel. *ἔχει*] om E2, *ἔχειν* B 1754 *ὑμένε* M9, *ὑμέναιδέ'* Vp2 1755 III] Vp2+, om rel. *ἕπεσθαι* V(not G) *γάμοισι* RV 1756 *φύλλα* M9 *συνόμων* Vp2+ 1757 *ἐπὶ δάπεδον*] *ἐπίπεδον* M9, *ἐπὶ πάδον* Δ, *ἐπὶ πένδον* H, *ἐπὶ πέδον* rel. 1759 —V, om G, *πει* A, *χο* Vp2+ 1760 *χέρα* ΓUB 1761 *συγχώρευσον* U 1763 XO] om lib. *ἀλαλαί* AU, *ἀλλαλαί* BVp2+ *παίων* G 1764 *τήνελα* U *κάλλικος* E2

JOSEPH SCALIGER'S ESTIMATES OF GREEK AND LATIN AUTHORS

By George W. Robinson

In Criticis omnium recte aestimantium judicio princeps sine controversia, sine aemulo ac rivali dominatur. *Dominicus Baudius.*

Aquila in nubibus, quod Graeci dicunt, vere tu es. Vides, imo pervides omnia, et quidquid venaris, capis. *Justus Lipsius.*

Scaliger stand auf dem Gipfel universaler lebendiger philologischer Gelehrsamkeit, wie keiner nach ihm: und so hoch in Wissenschaft jeder Art, dass er mit eignem Urtheil, was ihm auch vorkommen mochte, fassen, nutzen, und richten konnte. *B. G. Niebuhr.*

THE recognized position of Joseph Scaliger as the greatest scholar of modern times — if not indeed of all time — gives a peculiar value to his estimates of the authors of classical antiquity. A few of these estimates have been collected and arranged in Sir Thomas Blount's *Censura Celebriorum Authorum* [1] (1690) and, in French paraphrase, in Adrien Baillet's *Jugemens des Savans* (latest edition, 1725). For the far greater part, however, they remain scattered through the huge bulk of Scaliger's writings, of which most have not been reprinted since the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; the longer are read by perhaps a dozen in a generation; while of some there are probably not more than three or four copies this side the Atlantic. I have, then, good reason to hope that the collection here for the first time presented will be useful and acceptable to classical students; and that I may count upon a liberal measure of their indulgence for the imperfections inevitable in the execution of such a task.

The critical judgments comprised in the *Scaligerana*, or memoranda of Scaliger's informal conversations jotted down by the physician

[1] I cannot place the passage on Dionysius of Halicarnassus attributed by Blount to "Jos. Scalig. in Animadv. Euseb.": "Dionysius . . . summus dicendi magister, et suavissimus scriptor." The quotation from Scaliger which Blount (p. 190, par. 7) puts under D. Magnus Ausonius in fact relates to the poet's father, Julius Ausonius. See *Ausonianae Lectiones*, ii, 33.

Franciscus Vertunianus[1] and the brothers Vassan,[2] students at Leyden, are, of course, on a different footing from those preserved in Scaliger's own writings. They contain, however, much that is of value; in not a few cases something is gained by their very informality. Accordingly it has seemed best, from every point of view, to include them.

The arrangement is alphabetical, by authors and in a few cases by groups of authors, with such cross references as seem necessary. Individual works are in like manner arranged alphabetically under their authors. A chronological list or key is prefixed. References in the notes are to the editions named below, the indicated abbreviations being used.

A. L. *Ausoniarum Lectionum Libri duo.* In the edition of Ausonius published at Geneva by J. Stoer in 1588. References are by book and chapter.

A. V. *In Appendicem P. Virgilii Maronis Commentarii et Castigationes.* In the Leyden edition of 1595.

B. S. Burmann's *Sylloge Epistolarum.* Leidae, 1727.

Cast. *Castigationes in Catullum, Tibullum, Propertium.* In the Antwerp edition of 1582.

Cyclom. *Cyclometrica Elementa duo.* Lugduni Batavorum, 1594.

C. F. B. *Confutatio Fabulae Burdonum.* Edition of 1617.

C. I. *Canones Isagogici.* Edition of 1658.

C. V. *Coniectanea in M. Terentium Varronem De Lingua Latina. Appendix ad eadem, nunc primum edita. Notae ad Varronis libros De Re Rustica.* In the Stephanus edition of 1581.

E. *Epistolae.* Edition of 1628. In several cases I have corrected the text from the more accurate but less complete and accessible edition contained in the *Opuscula*, Paris, 1610.

Elench. *Elenchus utriusque Orationis Chronologicae D. Davidis Parei.* Lugduni Batavorum, 1607.

E. T. *Opus de Emendatione Temporum.* Edition of 1629.

E. T. S. *Elenchus Trihaeresii Nicolai Serarii.* In *Trium Scriptorum Illustrium de tribus Judaeorum sectis Syntagma* (Delphis, 1703), vol. i, pp. 363–496. References are to the marginal page numbers, which follow the first edition (1605).

F. *In Sex. Pompei Festi Libros De Verborum Significatu Castigationes recognitae et auctae.* In the edition of Verrius Flaccus and Festus published at Paris by Petrus Santandreanus in 1593.

[1] *Prima Scaligerana*, from the years 1574–93.

[2] *Secunda Scaligerana*, from the years 1603–06.

L. F. I. *Lettres françaises inédites de Joseph Scaliger, publiées et annotées par Philippe Tamizey de Larroque.* Agen and Paris, 1879.
N. M. [*Prolegomena*], *Castigationes, et Notae in Sphaeram M. Manilii.* In Scaliger's final edition of Manilius, 1600.
Op. *Opuscula.* Paris, Beys, 1610.
P. *Poemata Omnia.* Berolini, 1864.
P. S. *Prima Scaligerana.* } Edition of 1740.
S. S. *Secunda Scaligerana.* }
R. N. *De Re Nummaria Antiquorum Dissertatio.* In Gronovius's *Thesaurus Graecarum Antiquitatum*, vol. ix (1735), coll. 1493–1548.
T. T. *Thesaurus Temporum.* Edition of 1658.
Y. V. *Yvonis Villiomari Aremorici in Locos Controversos Roberti Titii Animadversorum Liber.* Lutetiae, 1586.

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST. *Greek Authors.* Before 600 B.C.: Hesiod, Homer, Tyrtaeus.

Sixth century B.C.: Anacreon, Onomacritus, Solon.

Fifth: Aeschylus, Aristophanes, Democritus, Herodotus, Hippocrates, Meton, Pindar, Sophocles.

Fourth: Ctesias, Demosthenes, Megasthenes, Palaephatus, Plato.

Third: Apollonius Rhodius, Archimedes, Aristarchus Samius, Aristophanes of Byzantium, Berosus, Callimachus, Chrysippus, Eratosthenes, Eudoxus, Manetho, Theocritus.

Second: Ammonius Alexandrinus, Apollodorus, Aristarchus, Crates, Nicander, Polybius.

First: Charinus, Didymus, Diodorus Siculus, Dionysius Halicarnassensis, L. Tarutius Firmanus, Tryphon.

First century after Christ: Dioscorides, Erotianus, Josephus, Nicolaus of Damascus, Philo Judaeus, Strabo.

Second: Claudius Aelianus, Apollonius Dyscolus, Appian, Clement of Alexandria, Diogenes Laërtius, Galen, Harpocration, Herodianus Grammaticus, Hipparchus, Iamblichus the novelist, Justin Martyr, Oppian, Phrynichus, Plutarch, Ptolemy, Tatian.

Third: Julius Africanus, Hippolytus Romanus, Irenaeus, Origen, Porphyry.

Fourth: Epiphanius, Eusebius, Hesychius, John Chrysostom.

Fifth: Anianus, Isidore Pelúsiota, Nonnus, Panodorus, Proclus, Stephanus Byzantius, Synesius, Theodoret, Theon of Alexandria, Zosimus.

Sixth: Musaeus, Paulus Silentiarius, Procopius.

Seventh: Maximus Monachus.

Ninth: George Syncellus, Nicephorus Patriarcha.

Twelfth: Eustathius, Tzetzes, Zonaras.

Fourteenth: Thomas Magister.

Uncertain: Apollonides, Dionysius Periegetes, Geminus Rhodius,[1] 'Hermes Trismegistus,' Ocellus Lucanus, Pseudophocylides.

Latin Authors. Third and second centuries B.C.: Accius, Cato, Ennius, Lucilius, Pacuvius, Plautus, Terence.

First: Aelius Gallus, Antonius Gnipho, Auctor Commentarii de Bello Hispanico, Caesar, Catullus, Cicero, Horace, Hyginus, Lucretius, Ovid, Propertius, Publilius Syrus, Sallust, Santra, Sisenna, Tibullus, Varro, Virgil.

First century after Christ: Celsus, Quintus Curtius, Juvenal, Lucan, Manilius, Martial, Persius, Petronius, Phaedrus, Pliny Major, the Senecas, Silius Italicus, Statius, Sulpicia, Valerius Flaccus, Valerius Maximus, Velleius Paterculus.

Second: Florus, Gellius, Suetonius, Tacitus, Terentius Scaurus, Tertullian.

Third: Arnobius, Censorinus, Cyprian, Scriptores Historiae Augustae, Solinus, Terentianus Maurus, Ulpian.

Fourth: Ambrose, Ammianus, Ausonius, Avienus, Charisius, Donatus, Firmicus Maternus, 'Hegesippus,' Hilary of Poitiers, Jerome, Lactantius, Nonius, the Notitia Dignitatum, Optatianus, Pacatus, Paulinus of Nola, Rufinus, Servius, Symmachus, Aurelius Victor, Victorinus.

Fifth: Augustine, Claudian, Fulgentius, Macrobius, Mamertus Claudianus, Marcellus Empiricus, Martianus Capella, Orosius, Prosper Aquitanus, Prudentius, Rutilius Namatianus, Salvian, Sidonius Apollinaris, Sulpicius Severus.

Sixth: Boethius, Cassiodorus, Marcellinus Comes, Maximianus, Priscian.

Seventh: Isidore of Seville.

Eighth: Bede, Paulus Diaconus.

Uncertain: Calliopius, Symposius.

[1] 'Rhodius' is used as the conventional appellative, and without any idea of passing judgment on the dubious question of this author's provenance.

ACCIUS. Anapaesticos elegantissimos Accii poetae ex Phinidis . . .

Ac ubi curvo litore latrans
Unda sub undis labunda sonit . . .[1]

Mehercule longe felicius ingenium poeticum [than Cicero's].[2]

Pacuvius acer et Rudinus Ennius,
Utrique compar, sive maior[3] Attius.[4]

CLAUDIUS AELIANUS. Superstitiosissimus enim, si quis alius, est Aelianus.[5]

C. AELIUS GALLUS. *See* Critics and Grammarians.

AESCHYLUS. Tanti poetae.[6]

Graii cothurni nobilem, catam, gravem,
Tubae virilis intonatam incentibus,
Nervis adultam et viribus Tragoediam.[7]

JULIUS AFRICANUS. De iis tantum loquimur, qui sacrae historiae, ac veri cultus vetustatem opere ei rei privatim dicato asseruerunt: qui quum prope infiniti fuerint post tempora Constantini, qui ante illud tempus eam rem tractaverit, unus tantum impraesentia succurrit, Julius Africanus, et qui eum ipsis vestigiis ita sequitur, Eusebius Pamphili, ut totum ejus[8] fere Chronicum in suum transcripserit: quem, ut eam provinciam susciperet, honesta aemulatio, et aliae caussae, . . . sed ante omnia, amor veri impulit. Non enim se ad hanc scriptionem contulit, ut Gentium duntaxat pertinaciam obtunderet, sed et praecipue ut Christianorum errori succurreret, quibus nulla sacrae historiae constabat certa ratio.[9]

Neque vero mirum hic Africani nomen ab Eusebio reticeri, quum omnia Eusebii χρονολογούμενα non aliunde, quam ab Africano, sine ulla verborum immutatione, desumpta sint, cujus nunquam Eusebius meminit, nisi quum ab eo diserte se dissentire profitetur.[9]

[1] *C. V.*, p. 86.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 145.
[3] In the representation of consonantal i by i or j, I have followed the editions that I have used, which are named above. The usage varies even among editions prepared in Scaliger's lifetime and presumably under his own eye.
[4] *P.*, p. 47.
[5] *T. T.*, animad., p. 68.
[6] *A. V.*, p. 153.
[7] *P.*, p. 48.
[8] *T. T.*, prolegom., f. * v.
[9] *Ibid.*, notae, p. 426.

Viri eruditissimi.[1]

Accuratissimus temporum observator.[2]

Luculento scriptori.[3]

See Tatian.

AMBROSE. Optimi et Christianissimi scriptoris.[4]

AMMIANUS MARCELLINUS. Ammian Marcellin est bien scabreux.[5]

AMMONIUS ALEXANDRINUS. Vetustissimus et eruditissimus Grammaticus.[6]

Praestantissimum Grammaticum.[7]

ANACREON. Lepidissimus Anacreon.[8]

ANIANUS. Doctissimi suorum temporum Anianus et Panodorus Aegyptii monachi.[9]

M. ANTONIUS GNIPHO. Doctissimus simul atque vetustissimus Grammaticus.[10]

APOLLODORUS. Tota Bibliotheca Apollodori, opus sane ingeniosissimum et elegantissimum, fabulosa est, non utique si homines, sed si hominibus attributa considerentur.[11]

APOLLONIDES. ὁ πρὶν ἐγὼ Ῥοδίοισιν, κ.τ.λ. Luculentum et acutissimum poematium.[12]

APOLLONIUS ALEXANDRINUS or DYSCOLUS. *See* Critics and Grammarians.

APOLLONIUS RHODIUS. *See* Critics and Grammarians, Poetae Graeci.

APPIAN. Appianum alienorum laborum fucum.[13]

Portentosiora sunt, quae Appiani Syriacis assuta sunt. . . . Multa hujusmodi fabulosa adtexta sunt illi libro Appiani. . . . Quod si non sunt assuta, valde infantem in historia Appianum fuisse necesse est.[14]

Multa temere Appiano excidunt, quem auctorem studiosi cum delectu tractare debent.[15]

Sed nec delirium Appiani, cuiusmodi non pauca apud illum Scriptorem extant, praetermittendum est, qui tempus septem Regum

[1] *T. T.*, animad., p. 4.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 232.
[3] *C. I.*, p. 321.
[4] *E. T.*, p. 155b.
[5] *S. S.*
[6] *E. T.*, p. 26a.
[7] *T. T.*, animad., p. 162.
[8] *Cast.*, p. 136.
[9] *T. T.*, notae, p. 401. Cf. *C. I.*, p. 280.
[10] *F.*, p. lxiii.
[11] *Elench.*, p. 81.
[12] *N. M.*, p. 358.
[13] *T. T.*, animad., p. 177.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 212.
[15] *C. I.*, p. 335.

Romanorum centum Olympiadibus, et alteris centum intervallum a Regifugio ad Olympiadem CLXXVII definit.[1]

ARCHIMEDES. Magnus Archimedes.[2]

Archimedes divinus.[3]

Si quisquam divini ingenii Archimedis admirator et studiosus, is ego sum.[4]

Ut non regnum in Geometria obtinere, sed tyrannidem exercere videatur.[5]

ARISTARCHUS. *See* Critics, Critics and Grammarians.

ARISTARCHUS SAMIUS. *See* Mathematici.

ARISTOPHANES. Bonus auctor, Atticus et primus legendus, nec se quisquam jactet Atticismum intelligere, qui hunc ad unguem non teneat. Certe nullus est qui melius apud Graecos loquatur ipso Aristophane, ut nec apud Latinos Terentio.[6]

ARISTOPHANES OF BYZANTIUM. *See* Critics, Critics and Grammarians.

ARNOBIUS. Scriptor eruditissimus, neque magistellorum auribus commendandus.[7]

Optimum et eruditissimum scriptorem.[8]

AUCTOR COMMENTARII DE BELLO HISPANICO. Latinior, quam eloquentior (non enim assentimur iis, qui barbarum auctorem vocant, cum sit scriptor purissimi sermonis, sed inconditi).[9]

AUGUSTINE. Piissimus ac eruditissimus scriptor.[10]

Vir longe castigatioris iudicii, quam Eusebius.[11]

Sanctissimo ac eruditissimo scriptore.[12]

Virum omni exceptione majorem.[13]

Eram in convivio apud Polonos, loquebar cum Arminio de Augustino, qui est magnus disputator, sed non est ἐξηγητικὸς, non interpretatur bene Scripturam, est ineptus saepe. Saint Augustin se faschoit contre saint Hierosme, d'avoir tourné la Bible, lequel luy respondit fort bien, tellement que saint Augustin respondit tout doux. S.

[1] *C. I.*, p. 346. [2] *Cyclom.*, dedicatio, also p. 13.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 4. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 15: divini Archimedis.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 11. [5] *Ibid.*, p. 12. [6] *P. S.*
[7] *A. V.*, p. 193. Cf. *C. V.*, p. 48: eruditus scriptor.
[8] *A. V.*, p. 196. [9] *E. T.*, p. 439b. [10] *A. L.*, i, 29. [11] *E. T.*, p. 550c.
[12] *T. T.*, notae, p. 410. Cf. *ibid.*, prolegom., f. **** r.: sanctissimus vir.
[13] *Ibid.*, notae, p. 413.

Augustin a esté grand Theologien, mais s'il eust entendu le Grec et l'Hebreu, il eust esté encore plus grand. . . . Le meilleur des Anciens c'est saint Augustin. Le pauvre livre que les Confessions de saint Augustin! . . . Cela est beau, de faire reconnoistre ses fautes.[1]

AUSONIUS. Doctissimus poeta.[2]

Quosdam esse, quibus hic poeta non placet, id vero animum nostrum exercere non debet. Sunt enim iidem, qui dicunt Garumnam fluviolum esse, Burdigalam oppidulum, Aquitaniam ipsam non maiorem esse, quam sunt illae praepositurae, quae uno tantum Episcopatu, aut dioecesi continentur: ita ut Senatus ipse Burdigalensis eorum sermone sit tantum una decuria Senatuli municipalis. Cum eos ita loquentes audis, risum potes abstinere? Et non ridebis, cum Ausonium bonum poetam negant? Et tamen non a plebe haec audias, sed ab illis, qui honoribus amplissimis funguntur, qui in luce hominum versantur, qui in literis aliqui videri volunt. Nam nobilitati Galliae, quae putat in Gallia nihil esse boni, praeter eum tractum aut regionem, quam Franciam vocamus, et iuventuti Francicae, quae eodem morbo laborat, in illo praecipiti calore aetatis qui illis aciem mentis perstringit, et plebi, quam postulare sapere, est cum ratione insanire, facile ignosco. At illos magnos viros hoc dicere, quis poterit pati? Nos, qui neque acuti, neque adeo hebetes in iis rebus sumus, eos amplissimos viros, siquid de supercilio remittere velint, possumus docere, et quid sit Aquitania, et quid sit in literis Criticum esse. Aliter enim de literis hic apud nos, ac de negotiis in aula disputatur.[3]

Denique nihil fere in eius poëmatis reperias, quod eius saeculi scholasticum tumorem referat. Ita omnia ad imitationem veterum, tanquam ad examen quoddam exiguntur.[4]

Eruditissimus poëta.[5]

Clarissimi poetae.[6]

Ausonianae eruditionis ac reconditae literarum copiae.[7]

Acutissimus, et ad omnia ingenium in numerato habens poeta.[8]

Studiosus imitator Plauti ubique Ausonius.[9]

[1] *S. S.*

[2] *C. V.*, p. 230. So also *A. L.*, i, 1; *Cast.*, p. 68; *T. T.*, animad., p. 114.

[3] *A. L.*, praef.

[4] *A. L.*, i, 21.

[5] *Ibid.*, i, 23. Cf. *ibid.*, ii, 2, 27; *F.*. p. xiii.

[6] *A. L.*, ii, 17.

[7] *Ibid.*, ii, 4.

[8] *Ibid.*, ii, 4.

[9] *Ibid.*, ii, 18.

Satis domi habet, unde alienae gloriae desiderium tolerare possit.[1]

Hoc igitur in bonis disciplinis ac utraque lingua usus praeceptore, eos in illis progressus fecit, ut in tantum et talem Poëtam, quantum et qualem videmus hodie, evaserit.[2]

Ausonius nostras, poeta post tempora Domitiani omnium eruditissimus, et in cuius lectione nemo operam suam luserit.[3]

Ausonius auctor valde bonus, dignus qui meliore saeculo natus fuisset.[4]

Cuius moris eruditissimum interpretem dabimus Ausonium nostratem.[5]

Scis quam non vulgaris eruditio sit in poematiis Ausonii.[6]

Viro doctissimo Ausonio.[7]

De Bissula (Peiper, p. 114). Delicatissimis epigrammatis.[8]

De Herediolo (Peiper, p. 16). Est autem poëmatium illud in herediolum elegantiae priscae, et venustatis plenissimum. De quo hoc possum serio affirmare: si sine nomine aut titulo in veteribus membranis repertum fuisset, idem illi potuisse contingere, quod multis aliis poëmatis Ausonianis, Rosis, Viro bono, Literae Pythagorae, et aliis. Nam ut illa sine nomine auctoris in veteribus libris reperta, Virgilio diu attributa fuerunt: ita hoc delicatum elegidion non nisi veteri cuidam, ac etiam ultra aetatem Virgilii poëtae adscriptum fuisset.[9]

Epicedion in Patrem; De Herediolo (Peiper, pp. 21, 16). Lucilliano stilo patris sui, itemque praedioli Elogium scripsit. In quo mihi videtur omnium, quicunque idem tentaturi sunt, conatus posse deterrere. De industria enim veterem illam simplicitatem affectat, et quantum potest ad eius characterem stilum suum componit.[10]

Epistola Paulino in causa Philonis (Peiper, p. 272). Eruditissima et elegantissima est epodice epistola, quam mittit Paulino pro causa Philonis procuratoris quondam sui.[11]

Epistola Παύλῳ (Peiper, p. 232). Epistola bilinguis, quam ad Axium Paulum Rhetorem Bigerritanum mittit, et eruditissima et elegantissima est.[12]

[1] *A. L.*, ii, 32.
[2] *Ibid.*, ii, 33.
[3] *A. V.*, p. 223.
[4] *F.*, p. cxli.
[5] *E. T.*, p. 174a.
[6] *E.*, p. 403.
[7] *T. T.*, animad., p. 119.
[8] *A. L.*, ii, 33.
[9] *Ibid.*, i, 20.
[10] *Ibid.*, i, 20.
[11] *Ibid.*, ii, 9.
[12] *Ibid.*, ii, 4.

Epistola I Theoni (Peiper, p. 245). Epistola, quam scribit primam ad Clementinum Theonem, poetam Medulum, digna est, quae non solum propter eruditionem, sed etiam propter urbanitatem legatur.[1]

Mosella (Peiper, p. 118). Treveris agens caepit amoenitatem eius tractus, et fluminis Mosellae delitias admirari. Quo argumento mirum in modum oblectatus, caepit illud poëtica scriptione periclitari: id quod ei, ut alia omnia, feliciter cessit. Extat eius ea de re eruditissimus ac venustissimus Panegyricus.[2]

In eodem cultissimo et eruditissimo poëmate.[3]

In tam excellenti poemate.[4]

In politissimo Panegyrico Mosellae.[5]

Oratio Consulis Ausonii versibus rhopalicis (Peiper, p. 19). Apage illud illepidum et invenustum carmen Rhopalicis versibus conscriptum. Qui potest esse Ausonii, ineptum, insuave, soloecismis plenum, neque a docto homine, neque seculo Ausoniano scriptum ? [6]

Technopaegnion (Peiper, p. 155). In Monosyllabis suis, ingeniosissimo opusculo.[7]

AVIENUS. Avienus est optimus Arati non solum paraphrastes, sed etiam interpres.[8]

Elegans et eruditus Arati Paraphrastes.[9]

Auctorem locupletem habeam Festum Avienum.[10]

BEDE. Doctissimus Beda.[11]

Doctissimo sui aevi Beda.[12]

[Maximus Monachus et Beda] ambo monachi, et supra captum suorum temporum eruditi.[13]

See Isidore of Seville.

BEROSUS. Eximium scriptorem Chaldaeum.[14]

Berosi igitur et Megasthenis eximiae illae reliquiae apud Iosephum nobis veritatis fontes recluserunt.[15]

Ex antiquissimis et accuratissimis scriptoribus Beroso et Megasthene.[16]

[1] *A. L.*, ii, 12.
[2] *Ibid.*, ii, 33.
[3] *Ibid.*, i, 4.
[4] *Ibid.*, i, 5.
[5] *F.*, p. cviii.
[6] *A. L.*, ii, 3.
[7] *A. V.*, p. 223.
[8] *N. M.*, p. 51.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 73.
[10] *E. T.*, p. 76a.
[11] *T. T.*, animad., p. 6.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 52.
[13] *E. T.*, p. 746a.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. xiv.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. xxxi.
[16] *Ibid.*, p. xxxvii.

BOETHIUS. Boethius totus legendus est, magnus quippe Philosophus et Poëta eximius, phrasin Neroniani temporis imitans.[1]

CAESAR. Planitas aequabilis
Quam Caesar olim, quam colebat Tullius.[2]

See Critics and Grammarians.

CALLIMACHUS. Majorum gentium auctorem.[3]

See Critics, Critics and Grammarians, Pindar, Poetae Graeci.

CALLIOPIUS. *See* Critics and Grammarians.

CASSIODORUS. Nunquam Cassiodoro cum Eusebio convenit de anno aut tempore, quamvis eadem verba referat. Itaque studiosi caveant ab illa Cassiodori farragine: cujus miram confusionem in Consulibus temulentiae recte comparat Onufrius Panvinius noster.[4]

Bonus Auctor, et minime spernendus.[5]

CATO. M. Porcius Cato, qui omnes gentium Italicarum origines et urbium initia in lucem eruit, tanta diligentia, tam accurato studio, ut in hac parte ne Graecis quidem inferior sit, quantum quidem ex Dionysio Halicarnassensi coniicere possumus.[6]

Optimus Auctor cum Varrone. Praestaret nos amisisse totum jus civile, ut hodie habetur, sine integris Auctoribus, quam Catonem et Varronem.[7]

CATULLUS, TIBULLUS, PROPERTIUS. Nunquam parcemus operae, quin quodcunque nobis a gravioribus studiis vacabit, totum id bonis auctoribus iuvandis impendamus: id quod in istis tribus luminibus poetices Romanae praestitimus. In quibus vix est, ut ullum animadversione dignum locum praetermiserimus, praeterquam si quae sunt, quae castae aures ferre non possunt. Ea enim attingere neque partes meae sunt neque alius cuiuspiam, qui aliquem saltem pudorem habet. In istis commentatiunculis nostris ne verbulum quidem extat, quid me praeteriisse melius fuerit, quam scripsisse. Vellem equidem ipsi veteres pudoris aliquam rationem habuissent, neque tot infamibus scriptis hominibus sese traduxissent. Sed qui aliter contigisse videmus, interea nos isto Catone contenti erimus. Nam ex quibus Latinitatem, quam ex istis fontibus hauriemus ? Et tamen isti tres poetae flagitiosius non loquuntur quam vel una Aristophanis Comoedia, cuiusmodi

[1] *P. S.*
[2] *P.*, p. 21.
[3] *T. T.*, animad., p. 87.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 211.
[5] *P. S.*
[6] *E. T.*, p. 355a, b.
[7] *P. S.*

tamen multas semper lectitasse Chrysostomum proditur. At quantum virum! Cui profecto eloquentia, probitate, pietate parem alium nulla post aetas tulit. Lectionem poetarum ego mari comparo. In eo sunt scopuli, ad quos tamen peritus nauta nunquam navem offendit. In poesi sunt quaedam non bona dicta, in quae nunquam pius animus offendit, sed ea strenuus secure praetervehitur. Quare ut quosdam rogatos volo, quos delectant poetica, ut ab illis praetextatis verbis aures, oculos, linguam, animum denique abstineant: ita alios castigandos censeo, qui propter unam, aut alteram, vel denique paucas aspersas labeculas totum opus maculosum putant.[1]

Catullus observantissimus vel morosissimus observator puritatis Latinae linguae. Tibullus tersissimus ac nitidissimus Poëta fuit. Propertius castigatissimus Auctor, et facundissimus, a me emendatus est. Hi tres dicti sunt Triumviri amoris.[2]

CATULLUS. Elegantissimo poeta.[3]

Politissimum scriptorem.[4]

Cultissimi poetae.[5]

Politissimo poeta.[6]

Ex cultissimo Catulli poematio: [7]

. . . cuncto concepit pectore flammam
Funditus atque imis exarsit tota medullis.[8]

Ex cultissimo poematio Catulli in Ariadnes conquestione.[9]

CELSUS. Elegantissimus scriptor [10]

CENSORINUS. J'ai cognu par expérience que Censorin est le plus diligent auteur, qui soit aujourd'hui en nature.[11]

Aureolum libellum suum de die Natali.[12]

Eximius ille et doctissimus temporum et antiquitatis vindex.[13]

Luculento scriptore.[14]

CHARINUS. Charinus . . . inter efflandum animam hos lepidissimos ac elegantissimos Iambos in medium iecit:

Ἐρροις πλανῆτι . . .[15]

CHARISIUS. Doctissimus et vetustissimus Grammaticus.[16]

[1] *Cast.*, praef.
[2] *P. S.*
[3] *F.*, p. cci.
[4] *Cast.*, praef.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 13.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 72.
[7] 64.
[8] *A. V.*, p. 59.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 80.
[10] *Cast.*, p. 164.
[11] *L. F. I.*, p. 116.
[12] *E. T.*, p. 201c.
[13] *Ibid.*
[14] *E.*, p. 376.
[15] *A. L.*, ii, 18.
[16] *R. N.*, col. 1533d.

CHRYSIPPUS. *See* Critics and Grammarians.

CICERO. Neque vero novum est Ciceronis diligentiam et fidem in reddendis Graecis desiderari.[1]

C'est le plus bel Auteur Latin que nous ayons: les belles choses qu'il y a là dedans![2]

See Caesar.

Aratea. A nobis accipiantur tanquam ab adolescente effutita, non a sene castigata.[3]

Epistola ad Paetum. Erudita illa epistola ad Paetum.[4]

Opera philosophica. Libros omnes Philosophicos Ciceronis nihil facio; nihil enim in iis est quod demonstret et doceat ac cogat, nihil Aristotelicum.[5]

CLAUDIAN. Pneustica . . . eleganter . . . ita describit in eruditissimo carmine ad Manlium.[6]

Claudianus elegantissimus Poëta; quam praeclara habet in 4 Consulatu Honorii! Prudentius etiam.[7]

CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA. Eruditissimus scriptor.[8]

Vir saeculi sui eruditissimus.[9]

Doctissimus Clemens Alexandrinus.[10]

O le docte Escrivain! il entendoit bien les payens: Justin Martyr aussi, sed non tantum.[11]

See Tatian, Tertullian.

CRATES. *See* Critics, Critics and Grammarians.

CRITICS. Criticae principes apud Graecos sunt Aristophanes, Crates, Aristarchus, Callimachus. . . . Apud Latinos nobilissimi Critici sunt Varro, Santra, Sisenna: sed omnium Princeps Varro.[12]

CRITICS AND GRAMMARIANS. Josephus Scaliger Francisco Vertuniano Doctori Medico S. Ternas a te uno die accepi, sed omnes . . . idem continebant. In quo praecipuis duobus respondebo, de *Critice*[13] et de verbo *Macte.* Ac primum de eo quod prius ordine est, de Critice.[13]

[1] *V. V.*, p. 18. [2] *S. S.* [3] *N. M.*, p. 443. [4] *C. V.*, p. 64.
[5] *P. S.* [6] *A. V.*, p. 117. [7] *S. S.*
[8] *C. V.*, p. 220. Cf. *E. T.*, p. 378a; *T. T.*, prolegom., f. * v.
[9] *E. T.*, p. 551d. [11] *S. S.*
[10] *T. T.*, animad., p. 53. [12] *E.*, pp. 756 f.

[13] Here I have corrected the obvious error of the editions, which read *Critico.* In the Greek, and in the instance near the end of the passage, they have preserved the true reading.

Non est quod vos Asclepiadae gloriemini de vetustate Medicinae vestrae, quae nobis obiicitis Machaona et Podalyrium. Habet et ista doctrina quam Grammaticam vulgus vocat, neque tamen intelligit, habet, inquam, et vetustissimos suos vindices, Linum et Palamedem, et Cadmum et alios. Sed hoc nihil ad Criticen.[1] Ita sane. Volebam tamen nescius ne esses eam a maximis viris non solum cultam, sed etiam excultam fuisse. Qui enim de ea libros reliquerunt maximi viri, etiam in aliis studiis, fuerunt, Crates, Aristophanes, Nicander, Callimachus, Apollonius ille Rhodius, Chrysippus, alii Heroes magni. Illi igitur in monumentis suis nobis reliquerunt Grammatices partes tres esse, quarum primam τεχνικὴν vocarunt, secundam ἱστορικὴν, tertiam ἰδιαιτέραν. Τεχνικὴν πραγματείαν vocant eam quae in elementorum et syntaxeos disciplina tota est. Ἱστορικὴν, eam quae in mythologiis Poetarum, in Oratorum et Historiarum descriptionibus, locis, montibus, fluminibus versatur, et si quid simile. Ἰδιαιτέραν intelligi volunt, quae non illis finibus contenta est, sed ulterius evagatur, et in abditiora sapientiae penetralia se insinuat: cum scilicet spurios versus Poetarum a veris et legitimis discernit, depravata emendat, falso attributa suis auctoribus asserit ac vindicat, omne genus Poetarum, Oratorum, Philosophorum recenset atque excutit. Hanc partem propterea κριτικὴν vocarunt. Atque ut veteres Romani quatuor partes anni singulas in tres alias diviserunt, ut de vere dicerent, ver primum, ver adultum, ver praecipitatum: ita etiam iure merito per illos gradus voluerunt φιλόλογον ad perfectissimam φιλολογίας cognitionem pervenire. Itaque primam illam τεχνικὴν omnes vulgo de faece paedagogorum quotidie tractant, ut sibi videntur. In ea tamen excelluerunt clarissimi viri veteres, Herodianus, Tryphon, Apollonius Alexandrinus apud Graecos: apud Romanos autem Scaurus, Donatus, Caesar ipse et Plinius Secundus. Illam tertiam, id est nobilissimam omnium, ac vere Philosopho dignam tractarunt Graeci, Crates, Aristophanes, Aristarchus, qui propterea et vulgo κριτικὸς dictus est: Romani autem infiniti, inter quos Varro, Sisenna, Aelius Iurisconsultus, et alii. Mediam quae secunda est, imprimis Hyginus, Palaephatus, Stephanus, et Caesar etiam coluerunt. Quanto tertiam illam quam alias pluris fecerint, ex nomine intelligere potes. Non enim ab officio vocarunt, ut a tractanda arte primam τεχνικὴν, secundam ab enarratione historiarum ἱστορικὴν: sed quia non omnium est,

[1] Edd. *Criticum*.

sed pauciorum, neque in quibusvis auctoribus, sed in nobilissimis versatur, ἰδιαιτέραν, quasi peculiarem, vocarunt. Haec nos de Critice, quam cum iam plene cognoscas, illi merci precium iam recte dicere poteris. Quanti enim tibi indicanda sit, scire poteris. Versus Homeri illi tantum admissi sunt, quos Aristarchus probavit; Comoediae Terentii, quas Calliopius. Sic Tragoedia vetus Achilles Aristarchi, quod ab eo emendata esset.[1]

CTESIAS. Homo vanissimus.[2]

QUINTUS CURTIUS. Un bon Auteur.[3]

CYPRIAN. Cyprian a une belle simplicité et une grande pieté.[4]

DEMOCRITUS. Sane Democritus tantus vir fuit, ut etiam in quibus fallitur, ingenii tamen eius magnitudo elucescat.[5]

DEMOSTHENES. Pater eloquentiae.[6]

DIDYMUS. *See* Harpocration.

DIODORUS SICULUS. Auctor omnium Graecorum certissimus.[7]

Insignis est hallucinatio praestantissimi scriptoris, principium belli Gallici cum annis belli civilis confundentis. Sed Deum immortalem, quanta jactura historiae facta est amissione librorum illius Bibliothecae, praesertim quinque illorum, qui sequebantur post quintum. Nam in illis erat memoria totius vetustatis regnorum Orientis, quae multum historiae sacrae allucebant. Nunc de tot praeclaris monumentis nihil nobis, praeter desiderium, superest.[8]

Accuratissimi scriptoris.[9]

DIOGENES LAËRTIUS. Scriptore eruditissimo.[10]

Harum rerum [i.e., literary history] diligentissimus investigator.[11]

DIONYSIUS HALICARNASSENSIS. Omnium diligentissimo.[12]

DIONYSIUS PERIEGETES. *See* Oppian, Poetae Graeci.

DIOSCORIDES. Optimo scriptori.[13]

DONATUS. *See* Critics and Grammarians.

ENNIUS.

> Qui nitido intactos Musae pede primus inisti
> Italicae campos, Itale Maeonide,
> O quam hilares, Enni, spectamus, quamque lubentes,
> De Styge, de leti te reducem tenebris!

[1] *E.*, pp. 106 ff.
[2] *C. I.*, p. 321.
[3] *S. S.*
[4] *S. S.*
[5] *E. T.*, p. 167c.
[6] *R. N.*, col. 1510b.
[7] *E. T.*, p. xi.
[8] *T. T.*, animad., p. 156.
[9] *C. I.*, p. 348.
[10] *C. V.*, p. 189.
[11] *T. T.*, animad., p. 96.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 4.
[13] *E.*, p. 101.

Atquin relliquiasque tuas, dulcesque Camoenas
Mors, et vis duri temporis obruerant.
Nunc vates Latii inter cassos luce vagantem
Te Merula ex Orco, Phoebus uti puerum
Ante Coroniden, in luminis eruit oras.[1]

Poëta antiquus, magnifico ingenio. Utinam hunc haberemus integrum, et amisissemus Lucanum, Statium, Silium Italicum, et tous ces garçons-là.[2]

EPIPHANIUS. Eruditum Patrem.[3]

Non possum narrare quanto gaudio me affecit Epiphanius, quem misisti. Ego illum totum devorabo, cuius olim avidissimus helluo fui. Pauci agnoscunt illum penum veteris Christianismi.[4]

Multa cum delectu et judicio legenda apud Epiphanium, cujus Panarium nos solemus vocare Christianae antiquitatis scrinium. Et sane praestantissimum est opus, et non omnium hominum.[5]

Sed quot ejusmodi sunt in illo thesauro vetustatis rerum Christianarum! Quare cum delectu ille auctor tractandus, optime alioqui de literis divinis deque Ecclesia meritus.[6]

Longus liber de . . . Epiphanii hallucinationibus contexi posset.[7]

Nous avons un Thresor d'antiquitez en Epiphane, car il avoit de bons livres, ex quibus quando describit, optime, sed quando ex suo dicit aliquid, miserrimus est. Il estoit un ignorant.[8]

ERATOSTHENES. Canones Eratosthenei omnium optimi.[9]

EROTIANUS. *See* Hesychius.

EUDOXUS CNIDIUS. Vir suo saeculo eruditissimus, et Mathematicorum princeps.[10]

EUSEBIUS. Virum Christianorum in saecularibus literis illius aevi doctissimum.[11]

Homo et ipse neque mentis, neque *ὀρθοδοξίας* satis compos.[12]

[1] *P.*, p. 58: "Paullo Merulae Q. Ennii Annales edenti." Also in Greek. Merula's edition was published at Leyden in 1595.

[2] *P. S.*

[3] *E. T.*, p. 151b.

[4] *E.*, p. 86: 13 June 1591; to Gilbert Seguin. Cf. *P. S.*: Pauci agnoscunt illum penum Christianismi.

[5] *E. T. S.*, p. 109.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 157.

[7] *T. T.*, animad., p. 74. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 234.

[8] *S. S.*

[9] *E. T.*, p. 536d.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 69a.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 564b.

[12] *E.*, p. 282: *c.* Jan. 1606; to Casaubon.

Sed omnium simul opera unius Eusebii heroicus labor superavit, qui ex eorum scriptis in unum corpus contributis, et in membra digestis, luculenta et omni laude majora volumina contexuit, quibus defensionem Christiani cultus instituit, viginti quidem libris ἀποδείξεων adversus Judaeos, adversus Gentes autem quindecim voluminibus προπαρασκευῆς pro doctrina, pro vetustate vero, opere κανόνων χρονικῶν παντοδαπῆς ἱστορίας.[1]

Multae sunt hallucinationes, multa peccata Eusebii. Nullus est auctor, qui leviore studio, et majore securitate judicii lectorum scripserit, quam hic noster. . . . Nam erratis hujus auctoris enumerandis charta non suffecerit.[2]

Si eruditissimus vocandus, quia multa legit, sane nemo illi hanc laudem invidere potest. Sin autem is eruditissimus, qui judicium cum multa lectione conjunxit, alium potius, quam Eusebium producere debuit.[3]

Duorum summorum virorum [Eusebii et Hieronymi].[4]

Auctori optime de antiquitate Ecclesiastica merito.[5]

Nullius scriptoris sive Christiani, sive pagani tot deliria, tot absurditates extant, quot Eusebii nostri.[6]

See Africanus, Origen, Tatian.

Chronicon. Eusebii . . . qui omnium illorum veterum ut postremus, ita accuratissimus est.[7]

Nos unum tantum Eusebium discussimus, quod ipse, ut diximus, omnium illorum veterum clausula est. Itaque unum Eusebium noris, omnes noris.[8]

Eusebii anilibus hallucinationibus.[9]

Stabulum Augiae.[10]

Magna injuria est editionum in illum auctorem, cujus errores dum tollere volunt, turpius aliquando hallucinantur, quam ipse. Putamus nos ipsum pristinae formae, aut proxime ab illa, restituisse. Nam quin multum nocuerit illi temporum injuria, id vero negari non potest. Sed certum est, et ipsum tempori, et tempus ipsi nocuisse.[11]

[1] *T. T.*, notae, p. 402.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 417.
[3] *T. T.*, animad., p. 8.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 12.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 14.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 188.
[7] *E. T.*, p. 537a.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 541c.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. xvii.
[10] *B. S.*, tom. i, p. 243: 17 July 1600; to Lipsius.
[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 243 f.: 12 Aug. 1600; to the same.

Scito enim totum illud Chronicon ab inferis me excitasse.[1]

Spero me totum fere Eusebium Graece loquentem e mortuis excitaturum.[2]

Fere tota illius Chronica nihil aliud sint, quam centunculus ex pannis Africani consutus; et, quae fuit scriptoris illius inscitia, levitas, περισκεψία, nullos alios putavit σταδιονίκας deinceps fuisse, praeter eos quos ab Africano accepit.[3]

Incredibile est, quantum ille, prudens imprudens peccaverit. Mirabuntur, qui legent.[4]

Iste vero Eusebii labor, ut ita loquar, Herculeus, tanti fuit apud veteres, tantaque ejus dignitas, ut Chronologi, qui post Eusebium scripserunt, omne scriptum de temporibus aridum esse censuerint, quod non hujus fontibus irrigatum esset.[5]

[Africanum] non solum sequutus est, sed totum ejus Chronicon totidem verbis in suum transtulit, extra quam ubi ab eo dissentit.[6]

Opere illo eximio Chronicorum.[7]

Priscorum igitur Graecorum, ac maxime Africani viri eruditissimi vestigiis haerens Eusebius, opus heroïcum, et omni laude majus instituens, ut reliquam eorum dispositionem, ita et partitionem sequutus est.[8]

Praestantissimum Chronicorum et omnimodae temporum historiae opus.[9]

Quum videret ex Judaeis Josephum et Justum, ex nostris Clementem, Tatianum, et Africanum Mosem Inacho aequalem facere, primus omnium errorem aperuit, et infra aetatem Inachi, et, quod amplius est, posteriorem Cecrope, sed omnibus Diis Gentilium, sacris, et mysteriis antiquiorem esse demonstrare aggressus est: in quo laudem meruit maximam, quum adversus nostros veritatem asseruit, adversus Gentes autem nihilominus Mosem vetustissimum, et ante omnium Deorum natales fuisse firmissimis argumentis comprobavit.[10]

[1] *E.*, p. 339: 21 Nov. 1600; to Marcus Velserus. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 343: parum abest, quin Graece loquentem ab inferis excitare possim; also *L. F. I.*, p. 335: J'ai restitué si bien cet aucteur, qu'on peust dire qu'il est resuscité des morts.

[2] *E.*, p. 116: 20 Jan. 1602; to Janus Dousa.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 261: 5 June 1605; to Casaubon.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 285: 12 Mar. 1606; to the same.

[5] *T. T.*, notae, p. 401.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 417.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 430.

[8] *T. T.*, animad., p. 4.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

Sed ecquae finis erit, si omnes hallucinationes Eusebii referre velim, et alia omnia, quae tam scienter, quam imprudens commisit ? [1]

Tantum vero abest, ut propter illa vitia minor auctoritas doctrinae Eusebianae apud nos sit, ut potius eo nomine ea seorsim exposuerimus, ne caetera bona, quae scriptis Eusebii continentur, contaminarent, sed castigata sic cum reliquis, quae diligenter ab eo collecta, aut feliciter excogitata sunt, tuto conjungi possint.[2]

Tanta praestantia est horum Chronicorum Eusebii, ut fatendum sit, nullum vetus scriptum extare de ratione temporum, quod cum hoc comparari possit, et quod pluris nostra intersit ad nos salvum pervenisse. Imo nullum paulo vetustius est, quod ab hoc derivatum non sit.[3]

De qua historia [ecclesiastica] quum nullus veterum praeclarius meruerit, quam hic noster, in nullo certe scriptorum ejus illustrius hoc eminet, quam in hoc opere Chronico, quod mancum ad nos pervenisse dolendum est.[4]

Legendum cum judicio.[5]

Le premier liv. de ses Chroniques est admirable. . . . Les Canons de mon Eusebe c'est ce que j'aime le mieux, c'est l'ame de mon Eusebe.[6]

Historia Ecclesiastica. Quid de ejus historia ecclesiastica loquar ? Quid certi aut explorati a tempore Trajani, ad imperium Constantini Magni, Ecclesia haberet, si aut illi luculenti libri intercidissent, aut Eusebius nullos reliquisset ? [7]

Praeparatio Evangelica. Luculentis illis Commentariis προπαρασκευῆς.[8]

Taceo auctoris multiplicem eruditionem, indefessum lectionis studium, summam vetustatis peritiam, qui in omnibus priscorum auctorum monimentis peregrinatus illum divinum προπαρασκευῆς thesaurum collegit.[9]

EUSTATHIUS. Homeri . . . loquacissimum . . . interpretem.[10]

See Harpocration.

[1] *T.T.*, prolegom., f. ** 2 r.
[2] *Ibid.*, f. ** 3 v.
[3] *Ibid.*, f. *** v.
[4] *Ibid.*, f. *** v.
[5] *S. S.*, *s. v.* Histoire Ecclesiastique.
[6] *S. S.* Cf. *T. T.*, prolegom., f. **** v.: animam historiae . . . Chronologiam appellare soleo, sine qua historia non spirat: quae quanto multis scriptis, tanto Chronologia illi praestat, ut corpori anima.
[7] *T. T.*, prolegom., f. *** v.
[8] *Ibid.*, f. * v.
[9] *Ibid.*, f. *** v.
[10] *F.*, p. v.

SEXTUS POMPEIUS FESTUS. Tantum autem profecimus ex huius praestantissimi scriptoris emendatione, ut ea e tenebris eruerimus, quae antehac nec nobis ipsi cognita fuerunt, nec temere apud ullum veterum reperias: tot nempe vetustatis veneranda monimenta, praesertim ex antiquissimo Romanorum tum civili tum pontificio iure: item ex Regiis legibus, ex duodecim Tabulis, ex antiquis foederibus, et aliis, quae enumerare labor esset. . . . Caeterum de utilitate huius libri nunc agere, quia declamationes non scribimus, inutile, ac supervacuum puto. Is est enim scriptor, qui omnium manibus quotidie teritur, et sine quo humanioris literaturae candidati ad perfectam Romanae antiquitatis cognitionem, quae sunt iuris nostri incunabula, pervenire non possunt: tot vetustatis thesauros, tantam copiam bonarum rerum in hoc instructissimo penu reconditam esse intelligunt. Quare celeberrimum scriptorem commendare, hoc esset plane laudare, quem nemo vituperat.[1]

See Paulus Diaconus.

FIRMICUS MATERNUS. Hominem ingratum.[2]

Tam Hellenismi, quam astrologiae se imperitum prodit. Nam quos Graecos auctores artis vertebat, eorum neque verba neque artem assecutus est.[3]

Firmicum non solum rerum caelestium, sed et linguae Romanae prorsus imperitum fuisse ex illis, quae in hoc libro disputabimus, aperiemus.[4]

FLORUS. Florus τερατολογίᾳ poëtica drama amplificat. *D. Brutus aliquando latius Gallaecos, atque omnes Gallaeciae populos, formidatumque militibus flumen Oblivionis, peragratoque victor Oceani litore, non prius signa convertit, quam cadentem in maria Solem, obrutumque aquis ignem non sine quodam sacrilegii metu et horrore deprehendit.* Putida, καὶ κακόζηλα sunt haec.[5]

Un tres bel Auteur.[6]

FULGENTIUS. Doctissimus Mythologus.[7]

GALEN. Intacta et laude Galenum.[8]

[1] *F.*, praef. [2] *N. M.*, p. 385.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 447. Cf. pp. 370, 385, 391.
[4] *Ibid.*, ed. of 1579, p. 251. Not in the 1600 edition.
[5] *T. T.*, animad., p. 146.
[6] *S. S.*, *s. v.* Histoire Ecclesiastique.
[7] *A. V.*, p. 269. Cf. *A. L.*, ii, 29. [8] *P.*, p. 57.

AULUS GELLIUS. Est optimus Autor, infinita fragmenta habet, et propterea bonus. Caput illud de Legibus duodecim tabularum est optimum.[1]

GEMINUS RHODIUS. Praestantissimum scriptorem.[2]

Accuratissimus scriptor.[3]

Priscus et eruditus auctor.[4]

GEORGE SYNCELLUS. Latratoris.[5]

Odio Eusebii caecus.[6]

Eusebiomastrix.[7]

HARPOCRATION. Harpocration, Scholiastae Aristophanis, Apollonii, Thucydidis, Olynthiacarum Pindari, Nicandri, Arati, optimi; ut et Didymus, et Eustathius, optimi quoque.[8]

HEGESIPPUS. Supposititius ille Hegesippus auctor infimae vetustatis, qui sincerum vas Josephi incrustavit, non contentus verbis Josephi, . . . non veretur pannos suos purpurae Josephi assuere.[9]

HERMES TRISMEGISTUS. *See* Philo Judaeus.

HERODIANUS GRAMMATICUS. *See* Critics and Grammarians.

HERODOTUS. Historiae Graecae pater.[10]

Vetustissimus scriptor post poetas.[11]

Historiae parentem.[12]

Pater historiae.[13]

Pater historiae, et vetustissimorum scriptorum princeps, quo non capiuntur nisi elegantia ingenia, et quem Simioli non capiunt.[14]

Dulcissima illa τῆς Ἰάδος Μοῦσα, vetustissimus omnium solutae orationis scriptorum, qui hodie extant, scrinium originum Graecarum et barbararum, auctor a doctis nunquam deponendus, a semidoctis et paedagogis et simiolis nunquam tractandus.[15]

HESIOD. *See* Poetae Graeci.

HESYCHIUS. Eruditissimum Glossographum.[16]

[1] *S. S.*
[2] *N. M.*, p. 76.
[3] *E. T.*, p. 60b.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 78d.
[5] *T. T.*, notae, p. 410.
[6] *T. T.*, animad., p. 64.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 66.
[8] *S. S.*
[9] *T. T.*, animad., p. 153.
[10] *E. T.*, p. 59b.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 532b.
[12] *T. T.*, animad., p. 4.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 57.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 89.
[15] *Ibid.*, p.104.
[16] *E.*, p. 216.

Hesychii et Erotiani Lexica ad Hippocratem intelligendum maximo erunt adjumento; quorum hic ex professo ipsius Hippocratis dictiones exactissime perpendit enarratque, ille vero fuit optimus Grammaticus.[1]

Hilary of Poitiers. Le bel Auteur.[2]

Hipparchus. Homo φιλελεγχότατος.[3]

Emendator errorum popularium Astronomiae.[4]

Hipparchus a fait sur Aratus, non en Grammairien, mais en Astrologue; il a de bonnes choses.[5]

See Mathematici.

Hippocrates. Hippocratem divinum.[6]

Hippolytus Romanus. Un ignorant et fat Auteur.[7]

Homer. *See* Poetae Graeci.

Horace. Emendatissimus auctor, ut dicebat Augustus.[8]

Vide divinam Oden Horatii, quae omnes Pindaricas una provocat, *Qualem ministrum fulminis alitem.*[9]

Hyginus. Summo Critico.[10]

See Critics and Grammarians.

Iamblichus (the novelist). Futilibus amatoriis libris Iamblichi.[11]

Irenaeus. Irenée a une grande simplicité.[12]

Isidore Pelusiota. Isidori Pelusiotae Epistolae, bonus liber. . . . Isidorum Pelusiotam tam amat Vulcanius, et tanti facit, cum sit parvi momenti et sufficiat semel legisse.[13]

Isidore of Seville. Non prorsus malum autorem.[14]

Nugis plurimis scatet.[15]

Doctis utilissimus est.[16]

Il a beaucoup de ratisseries, pauca bona, ut et Beda, qui tamen melius scripsit.[17]

Jerome. Antiquitatis et linguae Romanae peritus scriptor.[18]

Summo viro.[19]

[1] *P. S.*
[2] *S. S.*
[3] *N. M.*, p. 69.
[4] *E. T.*, p. 272c.
[5] *S. S.*
[6] *P.*, p. 57.
[7] *S. S.*
[8] *P. S.*
[9] *T. T.*, animad., p. 173.
[10] *Y. V.*, p. 19.
[11] *E.*, p. 686.
[12] *S. S.*
[13] *S. S.*
[14] *C. V.*, p. 50.
[15] *Op.*, p. 49.
[16] *P. S.*
[17] *S. S.*
[18] *F.*, p. lxxvi.
[19] *E. T.*, fr., p. 45. Cf. *T. T.*, animad., pp. 12, 182.

Sane si quis hodie ita, ut fecit Hieronymus, Graeca verteret, non dico ab alienis, sed ut Actaeon, a suis canibus mordicus discerperetur.[1]

Doctus ille Scripturae interpres.[2]

Doctissimus Hieronymus.[3]

Gerere annum aetatis an alius praeter Hieronymum dixerit, equidem non memini. Quod non monerem, nisi essent, qui Hieronymum inter eos ponerent, qui Latinissime loquuntur, in quibus familiam ducit Erasmus.[4]

Ejuscemodi multa tanto viro excidunt non ab inscitia, sed a properantia, quae est mater hallucinationum.[5]

Magno Hieronymo.[6]

Eruditissimo Hieronymo.[7]

Quod autem de Eusebio diximus, idem merito de magno Hieronymo arbitrari possumus, nullum de Latinis scriptoribus extare, cui plus debeant Ecclesiasticae literae, tam in iis, quae ad origines sacras, quam quae ad interpretationem divinorum librorum pertinent: neque illo saeculo magis idoneum interpretem nostro Eusebio contingere potuisse, quam eum, qui Eusebii studiosissimus, et eorum, quae ab Eusebio tractantur, peritissimus fuit. Atque utinam per ejus occupationes ista non dictare notario, sed scribere illi vacasset. Quod enim a multis vel invitatus, vel lacessitus respondere cogeretur, neque ulla ei a labore requies daretur, temporis autem jacturam vel minimam facere neque posset, neque vellet; apparet eum, quum hujus Chronici interpretationem dictaret, scriptioni aliarum rerum simul, et notario eodem tempore operam dedisse, ut propterea necesse fuerit, quaedam, quod vitari non poterat, tanto viro humanitus excidisse, quae hodie apud magistellos et Criticastros non venia, sed jurgiis et contumeliis, non ut hallucinationes, sed ut crimina exciperentur.[8]

Hieronymus n'estoit pas si sçavant, qu'on le dit; il estoit bien ignorant, et escrivoit à des bigotes de femmes: per nebulam tantum Hebraea novit. . . . Il est bon pour les choses qui se faisoient de son temps. . . . Il est meilleur pour des choses des Payens que pour la

[1] *T. T.*, animad., p. 11.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 96.
[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 119, 125. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 117.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 124.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 140. Cf. *E. T. S.*, p. 66: tanto viro.
[6] *T. T.*, prolegom., f. **** r. Cf. *E. T. S.*, p. 231: maximus Hieronymus.
[7] *E. T. S.*, p. 65.
[8] *T. T.*, prolegom., f. *** 2r.

Theologie. . . . Hierosme estoit plus docte qu'Augustin, mais c'estoit un vray fou de Moine, qui a maintenu des choses fort absurdes. . . . Miserrime est commentatus in Prophetas.[1]

Epistola ad Dardanum. Est hominis barbari, et imperiti, non Hieronymi, cui injuria non parva fiat, si tam ineptum scriptum illi attribuatur.[2]

Epistola ad Pammachium. Epistola eruditissima.[3]

JOHN CHRYSOSTOM. Quantum virum! Cui profecto eloquentia, probitate, pietate parem alium nulla post aetas tulit.[4]

Ego studiosissimus illius Patris sum, tum quia nullus melior Novi Testamenti interpres, tum et propter miram dulcedinem et amoenitatem dictionis, quam post illum nullus Ecclesiasticus scriptor consequi potuit.[5]

Ego multum faveo Chrysostomo, propter illud flumen eloquentiae, quod nunquam lutulentum fluit, sed semper sibi simile est. Hoc tamen non possum dissimulare, quod in eo scriptore deprehendi, quum ab illis discessit, quae ad sacram paginam pertinent, nihil puerilius, ne dicam inscitius esse illo.[6]

Nullius veterum Patrum lectione magis afficior, tum propter inaffectatum dicendi characterem semper sibi similem; tum quia unicus est omnium veterum, cui probe nota fuerit mens totius Novi Instrumenti: in quo genere solus regnum obtinet. Nam in Veteris Instrumenti sensibus ut plurimum longe a recta veri regione vagari cogit Hebraismi inscitia et LXX. interpretum editio, quae quum sit longe mendosissima, tamen eam omnes veteres, quae illorum sinistra fuit κακοζηλία, non dubitant archetypis Hebraicis anteferre.[7]

Chrysostome le meilleur des Peres Grecs. . . . Infinita pulchra habet et optima in Novum Testamentum.[8]

JOSEPHUS. Diligentissimus καὶ φιλαληθέστατος omnium scriptorum.[9]

Scriptor, cuius diligentia et fides in notatione temporum spectatissima.[10]

[1] *S. S.*
[2] *T. T.*, animad., p. 169.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 6.
[4] *Cast.*, praef.
[5] *E.*, p. 676. Cf. *E. T. S.*, p. 214: omnium interpretum optimo.
[6] *E.*, p. 217. *Op.*, p. 497, reads, after "pertinent," "Chrysostomum non agnosco."
[7] *E.*, p. 236.
[8] *S. S.*
[9] *E. T.*, p. xvi.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. xvii.

De Iosepho nos hoc audacter dicimus, non solum in rebus Iudaicis, sed etiam in externis tutius illi credi, quam omnibus Graecis et Latinis.[1]

Omnium scriptorum veracissimum et religiosissimum.[2]

Ille optimus scriptor.[3]

Scriptori eximio.[4]

Nunquam satis laudatus scriptor.[5]

Accuratissimus scriptor.[6]

Sunt enim vetustissimae mendae librariorum; cuiusmodi non paucis totus Iosephus scatet, non multum post saeculum Iosephi subortis.[7]

Fidissimus, diligentissimus, et eruditissimus scriptor.[8]

Praestantissimo scriptori.[9]

Summus vir.[10]

Quis veterum fide tanta usus sit in historia conscribenda, quam Josephus ?[11]

In Maccabaeos. Liber aureolus.[12]

JUSTIN MARTYR. Summi illi pietatis vindices, Justinus, Tertullianus, Lactantius.[13]

Est autem iste Christi Martyr omnium scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum, qui hodie extant, vetustissimus.[14]

See Clement of Alexandria.

JUVENAL. Juvenalis excellens, et où il y a de belles choses. Satyrae tragicae.[15]

Juvenal est un admirable Poëte, il y a de belles choses à dire là dessus: c'est un si beau Poëte au prix de Perse, qui s'est plû à escrire obscurement.[16]

LACTANTIUS. Il a bien parlé de ce temps que la Barbarie venoit, tempore Constantini![17]

See Justin Martyr.

[1] *E. T.*, p. xvii. [2] *Ibid.*, p. xxiv.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 107c. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 467c: optimo scriptore; *ibid.*, fr., p. 46: optimus ille scriptor.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 534c. [5] *Ibid.*, fr., p. 28. [6] *Ibid.*, fr., p. 35.
[7] *Ibid.*, fr., p. 42. Cf. *ibid.*, fr., pp. 12, 42, 45.
[8] *Ibid.*, fr., p. 45.
[9] *Ibid.*, fr., p. 45. Cf. *E. T. S.*, p. 45: praestantissimum scriptorem.
[10] *Elench.*, p. 73. [12] *E. T.*, p. 437a.
[11] *E. T. S.*, p. 200. [13] *T. T.*, prolegom., f. * r.
[14] *T. T.*, animad., p. 219. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 3, 132. [15] *P. S.*
[16] *S. S.* [17] *S. S.*

LUCAN. Si propius totum opus Lucani putare volueris, non solum nullam Astronomiae peritiam in eo homine reperies, sed et importune semper interiectam rerum coelestium mentionem, et levem, vanum, et ostentatorem illum iuvenem fuisse deprehendes. . . . An nescis iudicium, quod Critici non recentiores illi quidem, sed aequales illorum temporum, de Lucano fecerunt ?

Sunt quidam, qui me dicunt non esse poetam.[1]

Porro omnes auctores antiquitatis excutiat, ut sciat, qui progressus astronomiae apud Graecos fuerit, antequam Eratosthenes, Timochares, Hipparchus eam expoliverunt: ex illorum atque veterum collatis rationibus colligat, quos auctores Manilius et Lucanus legerint. Ita ne Lucano exiguam quidem partem astronomiae attribuet, non magis mehercule quam Manilio. Praeterea si Virgilium et antiquiores poetas legerit, vix est, ut medium locum, fortasse ne subsellia quidem Lucano in penetralibus poetices relinquat, ubi tot proceres Heliconis ante eum primas obtinere animadvertet.[2]

Eo calore . . . quo Lucanus versus suos effundebat.[3]

Lucain qui tue le lecteur de ses longues comparaisons, antithèses, déclamations, philosophie, astrologie, et, pour mieux parler, de son immodestie. Je ne nie point qu'il n'ait de bonnes choses, mais je nie qu'elles soient poétiques.[4]

Lucanus violentissimum et terribilissimum ingenium. Il en avoit trop, et ne se pouvant retenir, il n'a sceu que c'estoit que faire un Poëme.[5]

Nero oderat Lucanum, quia uterque erat Poëta. Principes docti oderunt doctissimos homines, amant tantum pedantes Magisterulos.[6]

See Ennius.

LUCILIUS. Doctos laceri Lucili . . . artus.[7]

LUCRETIUS. Lucretius, bonus liber est, nec melior alius Auctor linguae Latinae. Virgilius ab eo multa desumpsit.[8]

MACROBIUS. Plutarchum et eius simiam Macrobium.[9]

Sive hoc finxit ipse, ut veterum scriptorum alter fucus Solinus.[10]

Macrobii docta papyrus.[11]

[1] *E.*, p. 66. [2] *Ibid.* [3] *P. S.*
[4] *E.*, p. 77. [4] *L. F. I.*, p. 284. [6] *S. S.*, *s. v.* Nero.
[7] *P.*, p. 52: "In Lucilii Fragmenta collecta et edita a Francisco Dousa" (Leyden, 1597).
[8] *P. S.* [9] *C. V.*, p. 41. [10] *E. T.*, p. 176b. [11] *P.*, p. 54.

MAMERTUS CLAUDIANUS. Mamertus in eruditissimo Panegyrico suo.[1]

MANETHO. O ingentem jacturam illarum Dynastiarum et Tomorum trium ipsius Manetho![2]

MANILIUS. Poète . . . fort obscur pour la matière qu'il manie, et aussi pour les énormes et innumerables faultes et transpositions par lesquelles il est miserablement gasté![3]

Grande poète.[4]

Poëtam eruditissimum.[5]

Cuius poëma Astronomicum quot versus habet, tot habet mendorum prodigia, quae nos, ut spero, omnia fere sustulimus.[6]

Disertissimo poeta.[7]

Praestantissimi scriptoris.[8]

Optimo scriptori.[9]

Divino prooemio [of bk. iv].[10]

Nota autem, candide Lector, fecunditatem ingenii poetae in istis morosis numeris concipiendis. Nescio, an Ovidio melius cessisset.[11]

Fuit Manilius imperitissimus earum rerum, quas tractabat, et quae ab aliis scripta legit, ea satis habuit sine delectu versibus concipere.[12]

Quod nemo illum poetam hactenus intellexerit, tam mihi constat, quam a nullo etiam peritissimo astronomo emendari potuisse. Astronomia enim parum apud eum nos iuvat; qui nec Astronomus semper est, et quem dolendum erat tam neglectum hactenus iacere.[13]

Manilium nullus fuit qui posset intelligere sicut ego, non enim describit Astronomiam hodiernam sed veterem. Oportet bene legisse Autores ut intelligatur.[14]

See Lucan.

[1] *N. M.*, p. 456.
[2] *T. T.*, animad., p. 125.
[3] *L. F. I.*, p. 21.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 26.
[5] *F.*, p. cxxxi. Cf. *A. L.*, ii, 31: eruditissimum poetam.
[6] *A. L.*, ii, 3.
[7] *A. L.*, ii, 31.
[8] *N. M.*, p. 85.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 226.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 304.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 335.
[12] *N. M.*, p. 370. Changed from the following in the edition of 1579 (p. 251): Videmus manifesto et Manilium et Firmicum homines ἀναστρολογήτους fuisse, ac eos sine ullo delectu ea, quae alii caelo conveniebant, Italico accommodasse.
[13] *E.*, p. 152.
[14] *S. S.*

MARCELLINUS COMES. Ille libellus est norma temporum a consulatu Ausonii ad ultima tempora Iustiniani.[1]

Illo eximio chronico consulari.[2]

MARCELLUS EMPIRICUS. Bonus auctor est.[3]

MARTIAL. Bono scriptore.[4]

Ego dico de Martiali quod ipse dixit de se ipso:

> Sunt bona, sunt quaedam mediocria, sunt mala plura,
> Quae legis, atque aliter non fit, Avite, liber.[5]

MARTIANUS CAPELLA. Barbarus scriptor.[6]

MATHEMATICI. Aristarchus . . . Hipparchus . . . Ptolemaeus . . . tres illos summos mathematicos.[7]

MAXIMIANUS. Barbari poetae.[8]

MAXIMUS MONACHUS. *See* Bede.

MEGASTHENES. Eximius scriptor.[9]

Exstat Megasthenis vetustissimi Persicarum rerum scriptoris fragmentum elegantissimum.[10]

See Berosus.

METON. Ut tunc captus erat Graecorum, insignis mathematicus floruit ineunte bello Peloponnesiaco, vir non solum peritia motuum coelestium, sed et aquiliciis, et librationibus nobilis.[11]

MUSAEUS. N'est pas cet ancien qui estoit du temps d'Homere. Mon pere a plus fait d'estat de Musaeus qu'il ne falloit; il le prefere à Homere. Il ne s'entendoit pas bien à la poësie Grecque. Musaee a un style de Sophiste, non pas pompeux comme Nonnus.[12]

See Poetae Graeci.

MYTHOLOGI. Nullus modus nugandi, nullus pudor horas in his perdendi fuit Graeculis illis, qui nihil disertum sine mendacio esse putarunt.[13]

NICANDER. *See* Critics and Grammarians, Pindar.

NICEPHORUS PATRIARCHA. Auctor levissimus.[14]

NICOLAUS OF DAMASCUS. Praeclarum de regibus Damascenis fragmentum.[15]

[1] *E. T.*, p. 513a.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 515a.
[3] *P. S.*
[4] *E.*, p. 353.
[5] *P. S.*
[6] *A. V.*, p. 53.
[7] *E. T.*, p. 282b, c.
[8] *Y. V.*, p. 22.
[9] *E. T.*, p. xxxiv.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 582b.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 72d.
[12] *S. S.*
[13] *T. T.*, animad., p. 49.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 242.
[15] *E. T.*, fr., p. 47.

NONIUS. Quem constat multis locis offendisse.[1]

NONNUS. *See* Musaeus, Poetae Graeci.

NOTITIA DIGNITATUM. O le bon livre que Notitia Imperii Romani![2]

OCELLUS LUCANUS. Un bien joly livre.[3]

OCTAVIA. *See* Seneca.

ONOMACRITUS. *See* Poetae Graeci.

OPPIAN. Egregium poetam.[4]

Oppianus et Dionysius elegantissimi poëtae.[5]

See Poetae Graeci.

OPTATIANUS. Publilii Optatiani Porphyrii poëtae Panegyricus . . . extat hodie, fastidiosae et putidae περιεργίας opusculum, illis mirandum, qui operosas nugas amant.[6]

ORIGEN. Origene a eu de terribles resveries. . . . Origenes optime scripsit contra Celsum, sed reliqua nihil valent. Il a un beau sens; sed imperitus fuit, et magna fuit autoritate in Ecclesia. Hieronymus quidquid dicat fuit Origenista. Eusebius etiam, et Arianus simul. Ruffinus, ce vilain maraut, scripsit Apologiam pro Origene.[7]

OROSIUS. Non pauca sunt apud Orosium in ratione temporum ἀλογιστήματα.[8]

Solum Latinum Eusebii Chronicon legerat, neque illos summos scriptores, [Strabonem, Berosum, Megasthenem,] fortasse ne de nomine quidem, aut saltem nomine tenus noverat. Nam Graeci sermonis imperitus fuit, utilis alioquin auctor, et valde necessarius.[9]

Multa mendorum portenta sunt apud illum scriptorem.[10]

Absurde vero Babylonem captam ante Lydos subactos refert Paulus Orosius, auctor alioquin valde bonus.[11]

OVID. Doctissimum poetam.[12]

Ovidii facilitas est inimitabilis.[13]

Sed quomodo de poëtis judicare possunt aversa a Musis pectora, quum magni nominis vir Petrus Victorius de Ovidio non veritus sit dicere eum ut oratione ac versibus, ita vita et moribus enervatum? Deinde dicit improbe ab illo dictum, munera placare deos et homines,

[1] *V. V.*, p. 26.
[2] *S. S.*
[3] *S. S.*
[4] *C. V.*, p. 218.
[5] *T. T.*, animad., p. 228.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 250.
[7] *S. S.*
[8] *T. T.*, animad., p. 49.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 64.
[10] *C. I.*, p. 321.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 323.
[12] *F.*, p. clvii.
[13] *S. S.*

et tamen a Platone prius dictum. Hoc modo non solum Ovidius, sed et Plato improbus fuerit. Sine contumelia hoc dictum velim, Ovidium meliorem poëtam, quam ipsum poëtarum censorem fuisse. Non longe ab hac temeraria sententia discedit Dionysius Lambinus, qui imperitissime eum malum Latinitatis auctorem vocat.[1]

PACATUS. Drepanius Pacatus Nitiobrix in suo divino Panegyrico.[2]

PACUVIUS. Pacuvius acer.[3]

PALAEPHATUS. *See* Critics and Grammarians.

PANODORUS. Chronologi eruditi.[4]

See Anianus.

PAULINUS OF NOLA. Elegantissima est eiusdem epistola Christiana ad eundem, quae incipit, *Quid abdicatas*.[5]

PAULUS DIACONUS. [Veteres Epitomarum concinnatores] ut ego valde improbo, ita etiam ut omnibus modis improbandum inter eos pono Paulum Diaconum Longobardum, hominem, meo iudicio, confidentissimum, ac, uti res ipsa docet, ineptissimum. Is . . . captus a Carolo Magno Imperatore, magnam et a victore, et a posteritate se initurum gratiam putavit, si Sex. Pomp. Festum, quo scriptorem utiliorem lingua Latina non habet, mutilaret, et tanto posteritatis damno se a victore redimeret. Parum abest, quin merito factum dicam. Festum enim, qui Verrii Flacci libros breviasset, aequo animo debuisse ferre, si quomodo ipse Verrium tractaverat, similiter ipse ab isto Paulo acciperetur. Hoc unum excipio: si Festo hoc modo pereundum fuit, digniorem arborem, ut est in proverbio, suspendio deligendam fuisse. Nihil enim illi peius potuisse accidere, quam quod in huius Pauli manus inciderit. Qui eum ita foede laniavit, atque inhonestis vulneribus confecit, ut cadaver pro homine, truncum pro corpore, semianimem pro vivo nobis reliquerit. Itaque hominis prodigiosos errores, atque crassam ignorantiam deteximus.[6]

Festi mutilator.[7]

Monstrum hominis.[8]

PAULUS SILENTIARIUS. Usus est vitio saeculi sui, quae tamen virtus erat, strepitus verborum, ambitus sententiarum, compositio

[1] *C. F. B.*, pp. 241 f.
[2] *N. M.*, p. 436.
[3] *P.*, p. 47.
[4] *T. T.*, notae, p. 419.
[5] *A. L.*, ii, 16.
[6] *F.*, praef.
[7] *C. V.*, p. 75. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 180: mutilator Festi; *F.*, p. vi: mutilator.
[8] *F.*, p. clxi.

dithyrambis audacior. Eiusmodi est ἔκφρασις ista. Quod uno verbo exponere poterat, maluit binis, trinis versiculis producere. Me quidem ista non offendunt, qui saeculi morbum novi. Sed qui nihil, praeter illos veteres legerit, quum ad haec se contulerit, tres continuos versus non patienter leget. Iuvat tamen nos, quod templi illius augustissimi adyta omnia nobis reseravit, ut illi gratias non tanquam poetae sed tanquam historico agamus.[1]

PERSIUS. Persius affectavit obscuritatem, et caecus dicitur a poëtis; Luciliano more scribit. C'est un pauvre poëte, lequel pourtant nous entendons tout.[2]

Persius, miserrimus autor, obscuritati studet; non pulchra habet, sed in eum pulcherrima possumus scribere.[3]

Iosephus Scaliger Isacio Casaubono suo S. Tandem exoptatissimus Persius tuus nudiustertius mihi redditus fuit: atque adeo totus sum in eo legendo. Si qui sunt, ut sane non pauci sunt, qui ad illius poetae adyta penetrasse putent, tuo Commentario moniti tam ab eo abesse fateantur necesse est, quanto propius sese accessisse putabant. Quanto in pretio is auctor olim fuerit, Quintilianus et Martialis testes sunt. Ego tamen, quamvis serio illius lectioni olim operam dederim, numquam caussam aut argumentum inde haurire potui, cur mihi persuaderem tanti faciendum, quanti fieri ab omnibus videbam. Tu luculenta illa explanatione fecisti, ut mihi non solum magnus propter se, sed et melior propter te videatur. Atque ut fatear mihi non visum, qui ultra sensum grammaticum exponi mereretur, nunc tamen plus meruisse fateor, quia et te interpretem nactus est, et si te non habuisset illustratorem sui, alium habiturus non esset. Qui enim hactenus illi manus admoverunt, operam luserunt. Quantus quantus tamen est ille, quoties Commentarium tuum considero, pluris condimentum esse videtur, quam pulpamentum. Tu illi scriptori animam dedisti, et apud admiratores suos effecisti, ut alia parte admirandus sit, quam qua ipsi censuerunt.[4]

See Juvenal.

PETRONIUS. Si enim is scriptor indignus est, qui tenerae aetati committatur, at non dignus, qui pereat tamen.[5]

PHAEDRUS. Phaedrus est un joly auteur, et Symposius aussi.[6]

[1] *E.*, pp. 487 f.
[2] *P. S.*
[3] *S. S.*
[4] *E.*, p. 254: 28 Mar. 1605.
[5] *C. F. B.*, p. 359.
[6] *S. S.*

PHILO JUDAEUS. [Platonis] aemulum, magnum imprimis virum.[1]

'Ελληνιστής, et Hebraismi penitus imperitus.[2]

Fuit ille Hebraismi imperitissimus. Atque adeo, ut tirunculi Christianorum, nedum Iudaeorum, possint eum in partes vocare.[3]

Mirabilis auctor est et lectione dignissimus. Mirabilior et antiquissimus Pimander Mercurii Trismegisti. Hebraïsmi tamen adeo imperitus fuit Philo ut tirunculi Christianorum, nedum Judaeorum, possint eum in partes vocare.[4]

Nemo, qui Philonem legerit, ignorare potest, illum Hebraïsmi imperitissimum fuisse: ideo an ullum scriptum sacrorum Bibliorum metricis legibus conceptum sit, illi non magis exploratum fuisse, quam qua lingua Hyperborei uterentur.[5]

Quod Philonem tantopere laudet, idem mecum facit, siquidem cum exceptione. Scripta enim ejus pigmentis Platonicis condita, et multis luminibus Hellenismi lita esse nemo negaverit: sed summam Hebraismi in illo imperitiam esse qui non deprehendit, ac propterea eum oportere doctissimum Hebraice fuisse putat, quia Judaeus fuit, is multum fallitur.[6]

PHRYNICHUS. De Phrynicho et Thoma Magistro memineris. Non habemus hodie Hellenismi meliores magistros.[7]

PINDAR. Pindare a beaucoup de mots qu'on ne trouve point ailleurs, mais habebat ex usu, et ne les recherchoit pas, comme faisoit Nicandre et Callimaque, qui prenoient plaisir à prendre et à choisir les plus obscurs antiques, et ineptes de tous. Pindare avoit ses mots de soy, non des autres.[8]

PLATO. Culti Platonis.[9]

See Ovid.

PLAUTUS. Plautus et Terentius optimi auctores linguae Latinae, quorum phrasi loquendum est.[10]

Plaute observe numeros in versibus, alioqui non essent versus.[11]

Friderico Taubmanno S. Tuum Plautum accepi. . . . Habeo igitur illum comicum, non solum, ut antea, comitem, sed etiam magis-

[1] *C. V.*, p. 72.
[2] *E. T.*, fr., p. 48.
[3] *E.*, p. 89.
[4] *P. S.*
[5] *T. T.*, animad., p. 7.
[6] *E. T. S.*, p. 199.
[7] *E.*, p. 675.
[8] *S. S.*
[9] *P.*, p. 118.
[10] *P. S.*
[11] *S. S.*

trum: quia ex tuo Commentario non minus doctus, quam ab eius lectione hilaris, fieri possum.[1]

PLINY MAJOR. Eruditissimi scriptoris.[2]

Mentem Plinii, hoc est, Latinitatem ipsam.[3]

Cui viro? Sane tanto, ut non mirum sit, si vulgus illum improbet, cum minime auctor vulgaris sit.[4]

Maximi scriptoris.[5]

Viro summo domi militiaeque.[6]

Hoc tene, Plinium eruditissimum suae aetatis hominem, Latinae elegantiae observantissimum, non mirum aliquando in vertendis Graecis hallucinari. Hoc non solum illi, sed et Ennio, Attio, Ciceroni accidit. At quibus viris! qui sunt columina priscae Latinitatis.[7]

Verum est . . . non intellexisse Plinium quae scriberet. Non quia potuerit si licuisset, sed quod non vacaret homini et urbanis et militaribus rebus districto.[8]

Homini non . . . Graecarum literarum imperito, sed qui melioribus occupatus, statim de mendo iudicare non potuit.[9]

Neque vero novum est, Plinium in reddendo Aristotele aut Theophrasto offendere, cum hoc sexcentis locis commiserit. Quod utique non Plinii inscitiae attribuendum, sed eorum negligentiae, qui excerpta ex autoribus mala fide descripta ad eum deferebant, ut in ordinem ab eo digererentur. Ita enim opus suum eruditissimum magna ex parte composuit vir ille nunquam satis laudatus. Quare errores in Plinio notamus, qui non sunt Plinii, sed amanuensium.[10]

Plinius ἱστορικῶς tantum φυσικά, ut et alia fere omnia tractavit, nil exacte: sed optimus auctor est, minimeque vulgaris; ideo non mirum, si tantum auctorem vulgus improbet. . . . Accuratus Plinii lector deprehendet ipsum Plinium omnia quae ex variis auctoribus excerpebat ordine litterarum vel alphabetico in sua digessisse adversaria, neglecto ordine naturali qui potior erat: ut scilicet quaerenti nullus esset labor reperire quae vellet: sic urbes saepenumero et situs locorum, non ordine, sed litterarum serie describit: ita gemmas, ita herbas ipsas,

[1] *E.*, pp. 787 f.: 13 March 1606.
[2] *E.*, p. 96.
[3] *Ibid.*
[4] *E.*, p. 97.
[5] *Ibid.*
[6] *E.*, p. 99.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 106.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 114.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 110.
[10] *Y. V.*, p. 10.

quia sic in adversariis repererat. Propterea immiscuit haec simul et multa confudit vir doctissimus, urbanis et militaribus rebus districtus.[1]

C'est un beau livre, mais les Pedans n'en sçavent rien.[2]

See Critics and Grammarians.

PLUTARCH. Gravissimus scriptor.[3]

Plutarchus harum rerum [4] ubique sese imperitissimum prodit.[5]

Plutarchus, qui . . . non raro in his rebus [4] hallucinatur.[6]

Summus enim ille scriptor in his rebus [4] puer est.[7]

Totius sapientiae ocellus.[8]

Aulicis tantum scripsit, non doctis.[9]

POETAE GRAECI. Ut anni, sic poeseos Graecae quatuor tempestivitates fuisse animadverti. Prima fuerit illa, in qua principes Homerus et Hesiodus. Hanc potes iudicare atque adeo vocare ver poetices, pubertatem potius, quam infantiam. Excipit eam aestas non fervida quidem, sed quae ex illo vere vestigia non obscura retinuit, in qua Onomacritus, Solon, Tyrtaeus, et quisquis fuit auctor *τῶν ἡοίων, καὶ τῆς ἀσπίδος*, quam praepostero iudicio Criticorum natio Ascraeo illi attribuit. Autumnus ab aestate non degenerans praestantissimos homines extulit, sed maiorem partem Grammaticos, in quibus *τὴν πλειάδα* ponas licet. Quid ingeniosius Callimacho, quid Apollonio pressius, quid Theocrito amoenius? Hactenus bene cum Musis agebatur. Initium hiemis suaves foetus protulit, Dionysium *τὸν περιηγητὴν*, quem cum poetis *τῆς πλειάδος* contendas licet, et Oppianum longe illi dissimillimum, quem nimis floridus character non passus est sese intra modum continere. Sed posterioris saeculi poetae, dum illam ubertatem affectant, nihil praeter strepitum verborum, et ampullas attulerunt. Qui in hoc genere licentius velificati sunt, primas obtinet Nonnus ille Panopolitanus, cuius redundantiam in Dionysiacis excusaret materia, nisi in Evangelii paraphrasi maiorem immodestiam, ut ita loquar, professus esset. Eum ita soleo legere, quomodo mimos spectare solemus, qui nulla alia re magis nos oblectant, quam quod ridiculi sunt. Parcior et castigatior quidem Musaeus, sed qui cum illorum veterum frugalitate comparatus, prodigus videatur.

[1] *P. S.*
[2] *S. S.*
[3] *E. T.*, p. 30c.
[4] I.e., mathematical chronology.
[5] *E.T.*, p. 35b.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 46b.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 237b.
[8] *P. S.*
[9] *P. S.*, *s. v.* Cicero.

Neque in hoc sequimur optimi parentis nostri iudicium, quem acumina illa et flores declamatorii ita caeperunt, ut non dubitarit eum Homero praeferre.[1]

POLYBIUS. Quam multa divina quae ad rem militarem pertinent, ad eum scriptorem dici possunt! Vix tres puto hodie extare in Europa, qui virtutes Polybii digito designare possint. Felicem illum, qui in tuas manus inciderit. Non enim paedagogorum, qui nullum actuosae vitae usum, neque politicorum, qui nullum literarum habent, manibus terendus erat.[2]

Gravissimo scriptore.[3]

PORPHYRY. Impius quoque Porphyrius.[4]

Docti sycophantae.[5]

PRISCIAN. Doctissimus Grammaticus.[6]

Optimo Grammatico.[7]

PROCLUS. Un fort bon auteur.[8]

PROCOPIUS. O le bel historien que c'est![9]

PROPERTIUS. Praestantissimi poetae.[10]

See Catullus, Tibullus, Propertius.

PROSPER AQUITANUS. Vir sui saeculi eruditissimus.[11]

PRUDENTIUS. Bonus poëta.[12]

See Claudian.

PSEUDOPHOCYLIDES. Carmen *νουθετικὸν* nomine Phocylidis hodie in manibus habetur omnium. Sed nemo animadvertit nihil in eo esse, quod ad illius veteris Phocylidis exemplum expressum sit, quantum ex illis, quae ejus hodie supersunt, reliquiis odorari possumus. . . . Neque vero puto ullius veterum carmen extare, quod cum Poësi hujus Phocylidis (si modo ei id nomen fuit) aut elegantia, aut nitore, aut cultu verborum conferri possit.[13]

PTOLEMY. Optimum Commentarium Cl. Ptolemaei de inerrantium stellarum significationibus.[14]

[1] *E.*, pp. 486 f.: 20 Nov. 1607; to Salmasius.
[2] *E.*, p. 281: 1 Jan. 1606; to Casaubon.
[3] *E.*, p. 284.
[4] *T. T.*, animad., p. 3.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 11.
[6] *F.*, p. vii.
[7] *C. F. B.*, p. 242.
[8] *S. S.*
[9] *S. S.*
[10] *Cast.*, p. 160.
[11] *T. T.*, animad., p. 8.
[12] *P. S.*
[13] *T. T.*, animad., pp. 95 f.
[14] *E. T.*, p. 235d.

Astronomiae Apollo.[1]

Mirabilis Ptolemaeus.[2]

See Mathematici.

PUBLILIUS SYRUS. Syrus *Mimus* praestantiora habet quam reliqui Philosophi.[3]

RUFINUS. Auctore futilissimo.[4]

Haec supplevimus ex Ruffino, quem scriptorem raro cum fructu, rarius sine indignatione legas.[5]

Adferrem huc interpretationem Ruffini, ut lector videat quam vetustae sint mendae, quae huic praestantissimo scriptori[6] inoleverunt; si sine stomacho imperitissimum illum interpretem legere possem: cuius tamen tanta impudentia fuit, ut cum summo viro Hieronymo manum conserere non dubitarit. Sed ut paucos Hieronymos haec aetas habeat, non desunt tamen hodie Ruffini multi.[7]

Mos est Rufino omittere, pervertere, mutare ex animi libidine.[8]

Ut tolerabilius ea verterit Rufinus, interpres alioqui barbarus et imperitus.[9]

Quis ignorat inscitiam Rufini ?[10]

Ruffinus quamvis Graece loqueretur, non intelligebat tamen Graeca quae legebat.[11]

See Origen.

RUTILIUS NAMATIANUS. In aureolo suo itinerario.[12]

SALLUST. Ille maximus Atticismi captator.[13]

Saluste a esté perdu par ingratitude, car il estoit fort petit, et n'avoit fait que cinq livres; le pire est gardé, le meilleur est perdu.[14]

SALVIAN. Christianissimum scriptorem.[15]

Gaudeo non solum, Salvianum tibi placuisse, sed et iudicium nostrum de illo voluptate illa quam in eius lectione percepisti comprobatum fuisse.[16]

Le beau livre que c'est, et une belle simplicité.[17]

[1] *E. T.*, p. 74b.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 327b.
[3] *S. S.*
[4] *E. T.*, fr., p. 10.
[5] *Ibid.*, fr., p. 35.
[6] Josephus.
[7] *E. T.*, fr., pp. 45 f.
[8] *T. T.*, animad., p. 192.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 197.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 225.
[11] *S. S.*
[12] *T. T.*, prolegom., f. ** 4r.
[13] *N. M.*, p. 172.
[14] *S. S.*
[15] *N. M.*, p. 448.
[16] *E.*, p. 733: 5 Nov. 1605; to Jean de Laet.
[17] *S. S.*

SANTRA. *See* Critics.

SCHOLIASTS. *See* Harpocration.

SCRIPTORES HISTORIAE AUGUSTAE. Verum est, nihil esse inquinatius; sed multa habent, quae illos commendent.[1]

SENECA. Seneca moralis philosophiae primas tenet, dignissimus qui semel atque iterum legatur, et fideli memoriae commendetur.[2]

Seneca Poëta bonus auctor est; tamen tragoediarum character non est exigendus ad veterem cothurnum. Novus character est a temporibus Augusti.[3]

Certe non possum satis mirari iudicium, quod de illis Tragoediis [Lipsius] dedit. . . . Deum immortalem, quid de omnium Principe Tragoedia Troade sentit ? Et cui persuadebit diversos esse auctores ? Ego illarum novem unum genium, atque ideo unum parentem agnosco, ne frustra sit. Octavia neque inepta est, ut ille putat, neque futilis auctoris, aut sub Domitiano viventis. Quid ? quantum intervallum est inter tempora Neronis et Domitiani ? Tam paucis annis defecisset eloquentia Romana ? Ego video auctorem Octaviae, ipsius Octaviae domesticum et Senecae amicum fuisse: et optimum poema esse.[4]

Maximus ille Criticus, quam pueriliter de Tragoediis Senecae iudicat! Lipsium dico. Divinam Tragoediam Troadas magistelli potius quam Senecae opus esse sciscit. In hoc qui illi assensum accommodet, praeter imperitos harum rerum, reperiet neminem. Nam illa Tragoedia est princeps omnium Senecae, quas novem asserimus esse. Octaviam autem Memoris fratris Turni esse non dubitamus.[5]

Quid ? Suadae medulla [6] Troada divinam Senecae Tragoediam trivialis poëtae foetum dixit, quae reliquarum Senecae princeps est, et verus illius summi scriptoris partus, atque a Prisciano optimo Grammatico ei attribuitur, quam non Troada, sed Ecubam vocat.[7]

Seneque est le premier en son rang. . . . De remediis fortuitorum non est Senecae, sed Senecae collectorum. Epistolae Senecae ad Paulum sunt antiquae; citantur ab Hieronymo; non sunt confictae a monachis, quia tunc non erant.[8]

Hercules Furens. Apud Euripidem tragoedia est huic affinis et argumento et nomine; oeconomia partim similis, partim dissimilis.

[1] *E.*, p. 198. [2] *P. S.* [3] *P. S.*
[4] *E.*, p. 706: 30 May 1602; to Jan Gruter.
[5] *E.*, p. 488: 20 Nov. 1607; to Salmasius.
[6] Justus Lipsius. [7] *C. F. B.*, p. 242. [8] *S. S.*

Velitatio Amphitryonis cum Lyco apud utrumque paria facit: sed in decore personae Amphitryonis longe inferior Seneca, ut in multis aliis. Reliqua studiosi inter se contendere possunt.[1]

Thebais. Haec fabula est . . . totum scholasticum drama, declamatorio charactere, multa putida sunt et affectata.[2]

SENECA RHETOR. Les Controverses de Seneque sont tres-belles. O si integras haberemus! divinum opus est.[3]

SERVIUS. Eruditissimus interpres Virgilii Servius, cuius commentariorum tantum hodie cadaver habemus monachorum barbarie ac spurcitia contaminatum.[4]

Doctissimum grammaticum.[5]

Magnus ille Virgilii interpres.[6]

SIDONIUS APOLLINARIS. Summi viri.[7]

SILIUS ITALICUS. C'est un naquet de tripot, et n'en dirai aultre chose.[8]

Silius Italicus, Cuisinier. Dixit quod alii omnes et male; non bonus auctor, legendus tamen ut vetus.[9]

See Ennius.

SISENNA. *See* Critics, Critics and Grammarians.

SOLINUS. Simia et fucus Plinii.[10]

Veterum scriptorum . . . fucus.[11]

Auctorem levissimum.[12]

See Macrobius.

SOLON. *See* Poetae Graeci.

SOPHOCLES. Sanum et sobrium poetam, et qui sane principem locum in theatro Graeco obtinet.[13]

Sophoclaei carmen regale cothurni.[14]

Sophocle est admirable; c'est primus Poëta Graecus, et fere Virgilium superat. Philoctetes quam divina Tragoedia! Tam sterile argumentum adeo bene amplificatur, et Oedipus Tyrannus quam paucas habet personas, quam pulcherrimus! Lors que j'avois 18 ou 20 ans, j'avois fort bien leu mes trois Tragiques; qui bene legerit, multum

[1] *Op.*, p. 299.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 304.
[3] *S. S.*
[4] *C. V.*, p. 252.
[5] *Ibid.*
[6] *F.*, p. xxxvii.
[7] *E. T.*, p. 613d.
[8] *L. F. I.*, p. 284.
[9] *P. S.*
[10] *V. V.*, p. 11.
[11] *E. T.*, p. 176b.
[12] *T. T.*, notae, p. 424.
[13] *C. V.*, p. 146.
[14] *P.*, p. 54.

profecit in Graecismo; quam multae praeclarae Sophoclis Tragoediae interierunt.[1]

STATIUS. Quant à moi je l'estime le premier poète *epicus* après Virgile, et il ne déclame point comme Lucain.[2]

See Ennius.

STEPHANUS BYZANTIUS. *See* Critics and Grammarians.

STRABO. Eruditus scriptor.[3]

Diligentissimus scriptor.[4]

SUETONIUS. Tam accuratum scriptorem.[5]

Accuratissimi scriptoris.[6]

In Suetonio, quem hic sequitur Hieronymus, non pauca ejuscemodi παραράματα deprehendimus, eximio alioqui et utilissimo scriptore, cujus omnes libros extare pluris interesset reipubl. literariae, quam multos, quibus aequo animo careremus, si illis potiremur.[7]

SULPICIA. Romana Sappho.[8]

SULPICIUS SEVERUS. Ecclesiasticorum purissimus scriptor.[9]

Elegantissimus scriptor.[10]

Dignus sane, qui vel eo nomine legatur, quod supra saeculi sui captum loquitur Latine.[11]

SYMMACHUS. Symmachus ne vaut rien que pour le droit de Theodose, il est bon de le lire une fois, mais non plus.[12]

SYMPOSIUS. *See* Phaedrus.

SYNESIUS. Il y a de belles choses dans les lettres de Synesius.[13]

TACITUS. Quis credat, nisi qui in ratione temporum, et historia externa Corn. Tacitum non semel, neque leviter peccasse meminerit?[14]

L. TARUTIUS FIRMANUS. Tantus vir.[15]

TATIAN. Auctor priscus et eruditus.[16]

Unico pulcherrimo quidem illo [libro].[17]

[1] *S. S.*
[2] *L. F. I.*, pp. 283 f.
[3] *C. V.*, p. 104.
[4] *N. M.*, p. 236.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 163.
[6] *E. T.*, p. 468a.
[7] *T. T.*, animad., p. 155.
[8] *A. V.*, p. 137.
[9] *E. T.*, p. xxiv.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 583b. Cf. *T. T.*, animad., p. 217: elegans scriptor; and *E.*, p. 544: Sulpitii Severi elegantissimum Chronicon.
[11] *E.*, p. 559.
[12] *S. S.*
[13] *S. S.*
[14] *T. T.*, animad., p. 189.
[15] *E. T.*, p. 396b.
[16] *Ibid.*, p. 401d.
[17] *T. T.*, prolegom., f. * v.

Sapientissimi scriptores, Tatianus, Clemens Alexandrinus, Africanus, Tertullianus, Eusebius, aliique.[1]

TERENCE. *See* Aristophanes, Plautus.

TERENTIANUS MAURUS. Politissimus et eruditissimus Grammaticus.[2]

Doctissimus et suavissimus Grammaticorum.[3]

Q. TERENTIUS SCAURUS. Optimum et vetustissimum Grammaticum.[4]

See Critics and Grammarians.

TERTULLIAN. Eruditissimum scriptorem veterem.[5]

Optimo scriptore.[6]

Disertissimus ac eruditissimus scriptor.[7]

Tertullianus semper in manibus habendus, accurateque legendus est, tum propter linguae Romanae proprietatem, tum propter disciplinarum ac litterarum omnium cognitionem; fuit enim Doctor omniscius et argutus, qui illotis manibus tractandus non est, nec obiter legendus; ubique enim remoratur lectorem. Tertullianus certe excellentissimus auctor est in omnibus.[8]

Acutissimus et eruditissimus ille Poenus.[9]

Tertullien estoit bien docte, mais il n'alloit pas voir les Auteurs; il se fioit à ses predecesseurs et les citoit de là, comme d'Irenée, Justin Martyr, qui a esté tres-docte; comme aussi saint Clement Alexandrin qui a esté tres-docte, mais non pas beaucoup au Christianisme.[10]

See Justin Martyr, Tatian.

THEOCRITUS. *See* Poetae Graeci.

THEODORET. Le meilleur Theologien des anciens Grecs.[11]

THEON OF ALEXANDRIA. Summum virum.[12]

THOMAS MAGISTER. *See* Phrynichus.

TIBULLUS. Suavissimi Poetae.[13]

Nemo est, qui non eum se intelligere credat. Quia enim character eius planus ac minime morosus est, propterea omnem dubitationem sustulit posse aliquid, quod legenti negotium facessat, in eo reperiri.

[1] *Elench.*, p. 77.
[2] *A. V.*, p. 219.
[3] *T. T.*, animad., p. 117.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 114.
[5] *C. V.*, p. 242.
[6] *A. V.*, p. 191.
[7] *F.*, p. xxviii.
[8] *P. S.*
[9] *T. T.*, prolegom., f. * 2r.
[10] *S. S.*
[11] *S. S.*
[12] *E. T.*, p. 74b.
[13] *A. V.*, p. 210.

Atqui aliter se rem habere, ipsa editione, quam primum nunc nova incude recudimus, omnibus testatum esse volo.[1]

See Catullus, Tibullus, Propertius.

TRYPHON. *See* Critics and Grammarians.

TYRTAEUS. *See* Poetae Graeci.

TZETZES. Homo gloriae et vanitatis Graecanicae plenus.[2]

Doctus Graeculus, sed ventosae ostentationis homo.[3]

Graeculus.[4]

Tzetzes cum Lycophrone, bonus.[5]

ULPIAN. Maximus vir.[6]

VALERIUS FLACCUS. Après Statius, Valerius Flaccus peust tenir rang.[7]

VALERIUS MAXIMUS. Ineptus affectator sententiarum, quanquam non inutilis propter exempla.[8]

Equidem multa notavi apud Val. Maximum non bene Latina, multa etiam inepte affectata, optimum alioqui et utilissimum scriptorem, et quem extare plurimum reip. literariae refert.[9]

VARRO. M. Varronis elegantia et nitore.[10]

Politissimo scriptore.[11]

Tanto scriptore.[12]

Politissimum scriptorem, atque adeo Latinae linguae columen.[13]

Norunt studiosi omnes, quis et quanti pretii sit Varro in Etymologiis.[14]

Togatorum doctissimo.[15]

Unicum Varronem inter Latinos habemus, libris tribus de Re Rustica qui vere ac μεθοδικῶς philosophatus sit; imo nullus est Graecorum, qui tam bene, inter eos saltem qui ad nos pervenerunt. O excellens opus, ex quo qualia ejus reliqua erant opera conjectare quivis potest! Sed quod mirum, non minus in poësi valuisse, fragmenta poëmatum indicant.[16]

See Cato, Critics, Critics and Grammarians.

[1] *Cast.*, p. 105.
[2] *C. V.*, p. 42.
[3] *T. T.*, animad., p. 121.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 201.
[5] *S. S.*
[6] *C. V.*, p. 132.
[7] *L. F. I.*, p. 284.
[8] *A. V.*, p. 248.
[9] *T.T.*, animad., p. 142.
[10] *C. V.*, p. 193.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 226.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 226.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 251.
[14] *E. T.*, p. 174d.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 367c. Cf. *V. V.*, p. 26: doctissimus togatorum; *R.N.*, col. 1532a: doctissimo togatorum.
[16] *P. S.*

VELLEIUS PATERCULUS. Optimus scriptor.[1]
AURELIUS VICTOR. Il y a de belles choses, il est bon.[2]
MARIUS VICTORINUS. Acutissimus Grammaticus.[3]
VIRGIL. Eruditissimum poëtam.[4]
Elegantia Virgiliana.[5]
Eruditio Virgiliana.[6]
Summo poetae.[7]
Divinus vir.[8]
Divinus poeta.[9]
Doctissimus Romanorum.[10]
Omnium poetarum principem.[11]

Les vers d'Homère et de Théocrite tournés par Virgile quelques fois plus heureusement qu'ils ne sont en leur langue.[12]

De Virgilio nunquam loquendum, nam omnes omnium laudes superat.[13]

Quid facient Virgilio, qui nihil pene nisi alienum habet, sed dispositione et inventione aut fecit suum aut melius ?[14]

See Lucan, Lucretius.

APPENDIX VIRGILIANA. *Aetna.* Frustra augurantur hoc poema esse Virgilii, quum ex verbis Senecae, Cornelii Severi esse necesse est. Ex quo poemate, quod nobis ex omnium illius scriptoris operum naufragio reliquum est, potes advertere, quantus fuerit ille vir in penetralibus Heliconis.[15]

Catalecta. (*a*) *Ad Venerem* (p. 88). Elegantissimum poemation et Virgilio dignissimum.[16]

(*b*) *Pauca mihi* (p. 90). Elegans poematium.[17]

Ciris. Politissimi poematii.[18]

Est autem prorsus cultissimum poematium, et quod nulli Latinorum neque nitore, neque elegantia cedat: atque adeo quod venustate sua

[1] *C. I.*, p. 288. [2] *S. S.* [3] *T. T.*, animad., p. 121.
[4] *A. V.*, p. 30. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 233: doctissimum poetam.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 69. [6] *Ibid.*, p. 70.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 77. Cf. *Y. V.*, p. 179: summo poeta.
[8] *A. V.*, p. 123. [14] *C. F. B.*, p. 371.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 131. [15] *A. V.*, p. 86.
[10] *F.*, p. cxlix. [16] *Ibid.*, p. 233.
[11] *Cast.*, p. 51. [17] *Ibid.*, p. 247.
[12] *L. F. I.*, p. 311. [13] *P. S.* [18] *Ibid.*, p. 44.

merebat, ut minus ad nos depravatum veniret. Non enim dici potest, quot mendis deformatum vix possit elegantiae suae dignitatem sustinere.[1]

Tam culto, ac tam nitido poematio.[2]

Divino poëmatio.[3]

Culex. Quisquis es, memineris non pueri ac tironis secundum eum Grammaticum, sed Virgilii ἀνδροῦ καὶ τελείου te opus legere.[4]

Dirae. Huius poematii auctor est Val. Cato Grammaticus. Quod deprehenditur ex iis, quae de eo scripsit Suetonius Tranquillus: nempe patrimonium suum amisisse bello Sullano: tum amasiam quandam Lydiam celebrasse carminibus suis. Utrunque in hac Ecloga apparet. Nam et Lydiae eius saepe meminit, et amissa bona sua deplorat. Quae fuit unica caussa, quare hoc eidyllion Virgilio attribueretur, quod et ipse quoque bello civili agros suos prope Mantuam amisisset. Sed quis sanus unquam hoc poema attribuat Virgilio, etiam si non constaret de nomine auctoris? Hoc dico, non quod malus fuerit poeta Val. Cato (Dii melius), sed quod dissimilis Virgilio. . . . Dividitur autem hoc opusculum in duas partes. Prima continet devotum carmen, plenum imprecationum, et vere quas vocat Horatius Thyesteas preces. Secunda tota ad amasiae Lydiae amissionem spectat. Quae quidem quanvis egregia sint et luculenta, tamen eorum nitori maxime officiunt menda, quae in illis iniuria temporum inoleverunt.[5]

Elegia de Obitu Maecenatis. Hoc opus Epicedium scripsit idem, qui et de morte Drusi ad Liviam, hoc est C. Albinovanus Pedo. Nam sane nimium sinistre quidam iudicarunt, qui id non ab ullo illius felicissimi seculi poeta, sed ab alio potius, qui multo posterior aetate fuerit, exercitationis gratia scriptum esse contendunt. Extiterunt et qui Lactantio propter stili, si Diis placet, affinitatem attribuerent. Primum ego neque Lactantii esse dicebam: neque verum esse, quod ipsi adstruunt, stilum similem esse Lactantiano. Aliter enim, ut ille ait, catuli longe olent, aliter sues. Deinde scriptam esse bono illo seculo non obstare humilem καὶ λιτὴν λέξιν. Non enim propterea non pure Latinam esse consequens est. Deinde in hac elegia multa sunt cognitu digna, quae illis Scholasticis poetis in mentem venire non potuissent, certo scio.[6]

[1] *A. V.*, p. 45.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 65.
[3] *T. T.*, animad., p. 54.
[4] *A. V.*, p. 4.
[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 169 f.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 262.

Moretum. De auctore vero huius elegantissimi Catalecti, non constat. Neque enim Virgilii esse, satis norunt, qui Virgilium magis quam Grammaticos nostros triverunt. Valde enim confutat eorum iudicium stilus tam diversus a Virgiliano. . . . Sane eruditum admodum, et politum poematium: et non nisi talis poetae, qui, quum eius nomen adhuc lateat, meruerit propter praestantiam suam Virgilio subdititius esse. . . . Stilus ipse planus et candidus. Nihil tumidum: nihil insolens: omnia aequabilia.[1]

Priapeia. Iosephus Scaliger Sebastiano Sennetonio suo S. . . . Scis enim quae sequuntur poematia eiusmodi esse, ut eorum omnes fere, nisi si qui penitus pudorem amiserunt, pudeat, pigeatque: flagitiosa, petulantia, obscoena. Equidem sic omnia confiteor: scelestissimi, qui haec in vulgus ediderunt. Execrandum porro seclum illud, in quo turpia scribere hominibus licuerit, cum et turpia facere non prohiberentur. Nam quis haec negare audeat? Cur ergo, inquies, haec vulgas? cur interpretaris? quid minus utile fuit, quam hoc ulcus tangere? Prius dicant velim: an possum ea supprimere, quae tot iam editionibus publicata sunt? deinde quare non licebit mihi, quod omnibus licuit, etiam sanctissimis et doctissimis viris? Postremo quid in interpretatione nostra aut ita suspectum est, ut non tecte, aut ita aperte dictum est, quod non necessario dicendum fuerit?[2]

ZONARAS. Graeculo.[3]

ZOSIMUS. Superstitior illo [i.e., Aurelio Victore] Zosimus.[4]

[1] *A. V.*, pp. 158 f.
[2] *A. V.*, pp. 183 f.
[3] *T. T.*, animad., p. 114.
[4] *E. T.*, p. 390d.

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