

HASHISH SMUGGLING AND PASSPORT FRAUD:

“The Brotherhood of Eternal Love”

HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

—————
OCTOBER 3, 1973
—————

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary



DOCS

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

23-538 O

WASHINGTON : 1973

Research
Library

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price \$1.15

FRANKLIN PIERCE LAW CENTER

Concord, New Hampshire 03301

ON DEPOSIT JAN 4 - 1974

HASHISH SMUGGLING AND PASSPORT FRAUD:

“The Brotherhood of Eternal Love”

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 3, 1973

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

23-538 O

WASHINGTON : 1973

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price \$1.15

FRANKLIN PIERCE LAW CENTER

Concord, New Hampshire 03301

rch
ry

Boston Public Library

Boston, MA 02116

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, *Chairman*

JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas
SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina
PHILIP A. HART, Michigan
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
BIRCH BAYH, Indiana
QUENTIN N. BURDICK, North Dakota
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
JOHN V. TUNNEY, California

ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska
HIRAM L. FONG, Hawaii
HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania
STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
MARLOW W. COOK, Kentucky
CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, Jr., Maryland
EDWARD J. GURNEY, Florida

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, *Chairman*

JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas
SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina
BIRCH BAYH, Indiana

STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
MARLOW W. COOK, Kentucky
EDWARD J. GURNEY, Florida

J. G. SOURWINE, *Chief Counsel*
RAYMOND SIFLY, Jr., *Minority Counsel*
JOHN R. NORPEL, *Director of Research*
ALFONSO L. TARABOCHIA, *Chief Investigator*

RESOLUTION

Resolved, by the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, that the testimony of John R. Bartels, Jr., Gene R. Haislip, Lloyd Sinclear, and Ernest Donald Strange, all of the Drug Enforcement Administration; and the testimony of Miss Frances G. Knight, William E. Duggan, and John O'Dowd, all of the Passport Office, Department of State, taken in executive session on October 3, 1973, be released from the injunction of secrecy, be printed and made public.

JAMES O. EASTLAND, *Chairman*.

Approved December 10, 1973.

CONTENTS

	Page
Testimony of—	
John R. Bartels, Jr., Acting Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration.....	2
Lloyd Sinclair, group supervisor, DEA.....	7
Ernest Donald Strange, special agent, DEA.....	9
Gene R. Haislip, Counsel, DEA.....	12
AFTERNOON SESSION	
Testimony of—	
Miss Frances G. Knight, Director, Passport Office, Department of State.....	39
William E. Duggan, Chief, Legal Division, Passport Office.....	43
John O'Dowd, attorney-adviser, Legal Division, Passport Office.....	62
Appendix.....	79

HASHISH SMUGGLING AND PASSPORT FRAUD

"The Brotherhood of Eternal Love"

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 3, 1973

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT
AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:30 o'clock a.m., in room 1318, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James O. Eastland, presiding.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, chief counsel; David Martin, senior analyst; Raymond Sifly, minority counsel; John R. Norpel, Jr., research director; and Alfonso Tarabochia, chief investigator.

The CHAIRMAN. The purpose of this hearing is to look into the related problems of international drug trafficking and passport fraud—both of which have a direct bearing on the internal security of our country.

It is my understanding that the testimony this morning will focus primarily, but not exclusively, on the activities of the Brotherhood of Eternal Love, an organization founded by Dr. Timothy Leary which has combined a mystical fanaticism with criminal activities, and which has been massively involved in passport fraud and in the production, smuggling, and distribution of various drugs, LSD, and hashish in particular.

The Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security held extensive hearings last September and October, 1972, on the international drug traffic and its impact on U.S. security. The subcommittee appointed Gen. Lewis W. Walt, retired assistant commandant of the Marine Corps, to head up a staff investigation. General Walt's investigation covered some 20 countries, and the report which he made to the subcommittee, I think it is fair to say, played a major role in bringing about certain structural improvements in our national drug control machinery, and his recommendations are closely reflected in some of the legislation now pending before Congress.

Our hearings last year focused primarily on the heroin epidemic, although General Walt's report did deal briefly with the interrelated problems of cocaine, hashish, and marihuana. We also took the testimony of Dr. Olav Braenden, the distinguished Director of the U.N. Narcotics Laboratory in Geneva, on the current status of cannabis research.

In today's hearing we shall be dealing with the past activities of Timothy Leary's associates as the prime international manufacturers and distributors of LSD, and with the role his organization, the Brotherhood of Eternal Love, has played in the rapidly expanding problems of hashish smuggling into the United States.

I anticipate that this hearing will provide us with some useful information on the relationship between the increasingly widespread use of hashish and the extensive use of marihuana—which is really a weaker version of hashish—before the current hashish epidemic got underway.

In addition to establishing the basic facts about the rapidly mushrooming problem of passport fraud, it is my hope that this hearing will also produce certain concrete recommendations pointing to improvements in passport security.

The witnesses we have with us today are divided into two groups.

From the Department of Justice, we have: John R. Bartels, Acting Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration; Gene R. Haislip, counsel, Drug Enforcement Administration; Lloyd Sinclair, group supervisor, Drug Enforcement Administration; and Ernest Donald Strange, special agent, Drug Enforcement Administration.

From the Passport Office of the Department of State, we have:

Frances G. Knight, Director, Passport Office, Department of State; William E. Duggan, Legal Counsel, Passport Office (in charge of investigation of passport fraud by brotherhood members); and John O'Dowd, Attorney-Advisor, Legal Division, Passport Office.

I want to thank the witnesses for coming.

In order to expedite the hearing, I would like to ask that you all rise and be sworn in simultaneously.

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give the subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. BARTELS. I do.

Mr. HAISLIP. I do.

Mr. SINCLAIR. I do.

Mr. STRANGE. I do.

Miss KNIGHT. I do.

Mr. DUGGAN. I do.

Mr. O'DOWD. I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, we will begin, if it is agreeable with you, with the testimony of Mr. John R. Bartels, Jr., the Acting Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration of the Department of Justice.

**TESTIMONY OF JOHN R. BARTELS, JR., ACTING ADMINISTRATOR,
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, ACCOMPANIED BY
GENE R. HAISLIP, COUNSEL, DEA; LLOYD SINCLAIR, GROUP
SUPERVISOR, DEA; AND ERNEST DONALD STRANGE, SPECIAL
AGENT, DEA**

Mr. BARTELS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee.

I am pleased to appear before you this morning in connection with this subcommittee's continuing investigation into the illicit drug traf-

lic. In addition to other matters, you have asked that we inform you of the particulars of our investigation of a drug-oriented cult known as the Brotherhood of Eternal Love.

This is one of the most fascinating investigations of recent years, and I have brought with me today for the purpose of recounting it, two of the officers who were responsible for its success. These are the gentlemen on my left, Mr. Lloyd Sinclair, presently a group supervisor in our Los Angeles Regional Office; and next to him, Mr. Donald Strange, one of the resourceful agents who worked under Mr. Sinclair's direction. I would also like at this time to recognize Special Agents Terry Burke, Douglas Kuehl, Gary Elliot, Donald Monier, and William McKelvey, who also played an important role in this investigation, although they could not be with us today.

To avoid any subsequent confusion of terminology, let me explain from the outset that these gentlemen were at the time of this investigation serving within the former BNDD. This agency has since been merged with other units to form the new Drug Enforcement Administration, or DEA, which I now head; and this more current means of identifying the Federal Government's enforcement arm will be used hereafter.

Before Mr. Sinclair begins his narrative, I would like first to deal with some of the broader implications of the case about which you have also asked to hear. In many ways, the evolution of the drug trafficking activities of the members of the Brotherhood of Eternal Love is a tragic illustration of the cynicism into which the youthful drug revolution of the mid-1960's has fallen. It also underlines the development of new trends in the drug traffic of which the Nation needs to be aware.

The Brotherhood of Eternal Love was founded on the basis of Timothy Leary's exhortations to "Tune in, turn on, and drop out" with LSD. Leary's preaching consisted of a combination of mysticism, the use of drugs, and the disapproval of our society expressed in the phrases of rebellion which particularly appeal to youth. The novelty of his doctrine and the growing drug rebellion in general, drew considerable attention from the press, which merely extended the numbers of young people exposed to the message. Many thousands of teenagers reacted to it with an idealistic and religious fervor.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I interrupt, sir?

Mr. BARTELS. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that perhaps a very conservative estimate? Do you think it would be an exaggeration to suggest that at the height of his influence Leary may have had as many as a million of our young people paying attention to his rantings in one way or another?

Mr. BARTELS. No; I think that is quite right. That is quite possible.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead, sir.

Mr. BARTELS. Soon, California became the mecca for the new "counter-culture;" and in October 1966, Leary, with many of his youthful followers, established the Brotherhood of Eternal Love as a tax-exempt religious corporation under the laws of that State. Although many thousands of young drug abusers were in the Berkeley area at this time, the brotherhood was an exclusive organization to which not all were admitted. High echelon brotherhood members were already engaged in the manufacture and distribution of LSD, al-

though consideration of profits was probably a secondary motive in the beginning. In time, the drug activities of the brotherhood expanded and evolved new patterns of illicit traffic. By the time that our investigation reached its peak in the spring of 1973, no less than 750 of its members had been positively identified as participants in criminal activities that spanned the globe.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have a figure or a good estimate as to just how many active members of the Brotherhood of Eternal Love there were at the peak?

Mr. BARTELS. If I may, I would refer you to Mr. Sinclair but I believe it is around 3,000 or so.

Mr. SINCLAIR. That is correct, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead, sir.

Mr. BARTELS. During the late 1960's when the abuse of LSD began to peak, brotherhood leaders undertook the development of an entirely new trade in hashish. This is one of the stronger forms of marihuana—normally about 10 times more potent than that smuggled into the country from Mexico for the manufacture of the typical marihuana cigarette. Earlier, in the debate on the legalization of marihuana, Federal drug enforcement authorities warned that the marihuana question could not be considered from the standpoint of only the milder forms of the drug then predominating the traffic. They predicted that a brisk trade in hashish was bound to develop from the increased demands for cannabis products. The activities of the brotherhood were, in large part, responsible for proving the accuracy of this prediction. In 1968, shortly after it was founded, Federal authorities seized no more than 534 pounds of hashish. By 1972, this had increased to a figure of 30,094 pounds.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can I ask a question here?

Mr. BARTELS. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think that was because you were getting a higher proportion of the total traffic or was the traffic increasing in the same or greater proportion to your seizures?

Mr. BARTELS. I think the traffic was increasing in greater proportion rather than—

Mr. SOURWINE. It was outrunning your enforcement efforts.

Mr. BARTELS. That is right. I would like to think that we were seizing more but I think a more realistic appraisal is that that traffic was growing tremendously.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead. Go ahead, sir.

Mr. BARTELS. At some point late in 1967 or early 1968, members of the brotherhood developed their most important foreign contact for hashish. According to subsequent indictment, this was the Tokhi brothers who reside in Afghanistan on the outskirts of Kabul, its capital city. Brotherhood smugglers developed elaborate and successful means of getting the hashish into the United States. One of their earlier techniques was to hide quantities of 15 to 20 pounds of the drug within the interiors of fiberglass surfboards which they manufactured. This was soon considered too small a quantity, however, and they graduated to specially designed traps in Volkswagen campers or other vehicles which could hold up to 1,300 pounds in a single shipment.

Their mode of operation placed heavy reliance on the use of false passports; and with their financial resources and false documents, they

achieved complete international mobility. During the period of their successes, we have estimated on the basis of hard intelligence that approximately 24 tons of hashish was smuggled into this country. Although most of this drug came from their dealings within Afghanistan, we also know that shipments were brought in from both Lebanon and India.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean that statement to be exclusive, that is, that the only places it came from were Afghanistan, Lebanon and others or were there other minor sources?

Mr. BARTELS. There may have been other sources of which we have no knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Thank you.

Mr. BARTELS. Moreover, the brotherhood was not content merely to smuggle and market hashish. Under the guidance of one of its chief chemists, the brotherhood developed the manufacture of an even more potent product called marihuana or hashish oil. In the course of our investigation, six such hashish oil laboratories were seized.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that the same commodity that is sometimes referred to on the street as pot oil?

Mr. BARTELS. Yes, sir.

The marihuana product resulting from their operation in some cases may have achieved a THC content of up to 90 percent.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that—

Mr. BARTELS. Tetrahydrocannabinol. That is the percent of the active product within marihuana which gives the—

Mr. SOURWINE. That is the hallucinatory drug is it not?

Mr. BARTELS. That is right, and in normal marihuana it would run 2 to 3 to 5 percent.

Mr. SOURWINE. Ninety percent purity is extremely high, is it not?

Mr. BARTELS. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. As an oil, you cannot get it much higher, can you?

Mr. BARTELS. I do not believe so. We have never seen it any higher.

A typical laboratory such as that seized at Escanaba, Mich., could produce approximately 2½ quarts of hashish oil per day. Normally, a single drop placed within a regular cigarette would constitute one dose, and approximately 15,000 doses could be derived in this way from 1 quart.

Marihuana—or hashish—oil was first encountered in February 1972. Since then the number of exhibits received has increased and so has the potency as measured by the percentage of tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) present. During fiscal year 1973, 49.3 pounds of the drug were seized with an average THC content of 46 percent. This is a highly potent and concentrated hallucinogenic substance which can be manufactured with relatively simple equipment. As such, it must be regarded as a novel and threatening shift in marihuana abuse which should give those who advocate its legalization cause to re-think their position.

In the meantime, they continued their manufacture and distribution of LSD under the trade name of "Orange Sunshine." Until the recent enforcement successes, this product, which has now disappeared entirely, was found in quantity all over the world.

The first concentrated effort to eliminate this clandestine LSD operation resulted in the seizure of a mobile laboratory facility concealed

inside a truck in Denver in 1967 and the arrest of Nicholas Sand. Reportedly, this was the most productive LSD laboratory in the western United States. Unfortunately, the arrest was found to have been legally inadequate; and therefore, the case against Sand had to be dropped. Under the exclusionary rule of evidence, the seized laboratory equipment could not be placed in evidence and, in fact, was returned to Sand.

Almost 6 years later, some of the same laboratory equipment, still bearing the evidential labels applied by Federal agents, was again seized when Sand's laboratory was discovered by St. Louis police in a warehouse which had been leased for the manufacture of LSD. Sand had moved to St. Louis because of the mounting police pressure being brought to bear on the brotherhood in California at that time.

There are several lessons to be gained from this investigation, and I should like to mention them briefly, although not necessarily in order of importance.

First, this case has taught us the necessity of being flexible in our enforcement strategy and mode of operation. For many years, the concept of organized crime in drugs has always meant the Mafia, or the Cosa Nostra, or the Union Corse—traditional and reasonably well identified criminal groups with specific ethnic connotations. The Brotherhood of Eternal Love represents one of the new recently-emerged forms of organized crime totally different from our past notions in terms of membership, motivations, lifestyles, and drugs of preference.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mentioned the Mafia, the Cosa Nostra and Union Corse. Is one of those the same as the Unione Siciliano?

Mr. BARTELS. I do not know. I get frankly confused, Mr. Chairman, over the extent to which the Siciliano group form in with the Mafia or Italian organized crime. They overlap and the history of it—

Mr. SOURWINE. It is our understanding—I would like to be corrected if this is wrong so that the record would so reflect—that the Mafia or Cosa Nostra which are interchangeable names is controlled, supposedly, at least by the Unione Siciliano or the Union Corse is a Corsican branch or similar Corsican organization which is smaller and some people say tougher.

Mr. BARTELS. That is right. I think there are changes now within organized crime from the total control that the Sicilian group had in its origins in Italy and Sicily as opposed to the people who have now taken over some of these families and have been born in the United States.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead, sir.

Mr. BARTELS. Increasingly, this new form of organized drug trafficking activity is assuming a greater role in the enforcement problems we face. In the end, we see that the misguided idealism on which the brotherhood was first conceived finally gave way to the usual criminal motivations of big money for little labor. And, although their drug activity centered at first around LSD, they later branched out to include hashish and finally cocaine. In its last hour of activity, the hard narcotics were finally seized upon as offering the biggest profit for the least effort.

Mr. SOURWINE. Pardon me for continually interrupting. I want to make these points as they occur. You say "in its last hour of activity". You mean this entire Leary family group is out of business now?

Mr. BARTELS. I will let Mr. Sinclair comment on that. I think substantially it is out of business, is that not correct?

Mr. SOURWINE. It is good news if it is true. We did not think that was true.

Mr. SINCLAIR. Severely crippled.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead, sir.

Mr. BARTELS. A second aspect with important lessons for our tactical approach to the drug traffic is the rapidity with which the brotherhood became an international operation capable of tapping and developing illicit drug supplies in a country as remote as Afghanistan. The ease with which false passports may be obtained coupled with the great cash resources which the group possessed and the availability of modern jet travel made it not only possible, but likely, that the effort would be made.

For the last several years, we have concentrated developing our attack on the illicit drug traffic at its traditional foreign sources in Turkey, in France, and in Mexico. The events in Southeast Asia demonstrated the potential dangers from that particular area; and the investigation of the brotherhood activities proves no drug producing area, however remote, can be ignored in our international effort. What the brotherhood was able to accomplish in Afghanistan with regard to hashish could as easily be accomplished with regard to opium and heroin.

Without the assistance which our foreign offices can offer, and without a mobility and flexibility on our part at least equal to that of criminal organizations, we could not even learn of the criminal activities of such groups much less successfully cope with them. In the instant case, our agent in Kabul played a major role in coordinating the investigation with the California-based task force. Our offices around the world must be able to develop and exchange intelligence information rapidly so as to identify violators and make them targets of police activity. Our agents must further have the capability of using this information and moving rapidly throughout the world to put it to use. For example, in pursuit of the brotherhood investigation, DEA agents traveled to Paris, Kabul, Costa Rica, Mexico City, Belgium, and Honduras as well as traveling extensively within the United States.

One of the particulars in which DEA will differ from its predecessor agencies is in the increased emphasis which we intend to place on the development of intelligence as the second operational arm of our enforcement efforts.

Mr. SOURWINE. One more interruption, if I may. This mobility and ability to act is going to require agreements for cooperation with a great many other governments, is it not?

Mr. BARTELS. Yes, it will.

Mr. SOURWINE. The work of negotiating those agreements is underway now?

Mr. BARTELS. Yes, it is.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is really another subject. I do not want to push you into it but I thought we needed some mention of it here.

Mr. BARTELS. I think you are 100 percent right. We now will have 65 foreign offices in 49 countries which is a tremendous growth rate over the past several years.

Mr. SOURWINE. I also had one other question at this point. You mentioned the ease with which false passports may be secured. You are referring to U.S. passports?

Mr. BARTELS. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you say false passports, do you mean outright forgeries or do you mean actual passports which are obtained by persons under false names or through false pretenses?

Mr. BARTELS. The latter.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you say false passports you do not mean forgeries. You mean U.S. passports issued to people other than those they purport to cover.

Mr. BARTELS. Yes, sir. That is what—

Mr. SOURWINE. Or obtained by an actual person through false pretenses.

Mr. BARTELS. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead.

Mr. BARTELS. Finally, this case illustrates the inadequacies of existing criminal justice procedures in coping with contemporary high-level drug violators. Of the top 12 organizers of the brotherhood's activities, six continue to be fugitives from justice living on their ill-gotten wealth in foreign countries where additional enterprises can be planned. Worst of all, two of these were successfully arrested but were able to post bonds, whereupon they promptly fled the jurisdiction. Another brotherhood member was rearrested on three subsequent occasions and finally fled after forfeiting bonds totaling \$125,000.

In the more limited case of heroin trafficking, we have asked the Congress to consider imposition of new restraints on the granting of bail. We recognize the caution which must be exercised to safeguard constitutional rights, but we have offered new formulas for pretrial detention which we feel strike a balance between the necessity to protect the public and the rights of accused persons. This law was introduced by the chairman of this subcommittee and other distinguished members of the Judiciary Committee, and we recommend it as an appropriate starting point from which to consider the problem.

I would like to turn now to Mr. Lloyd Sinclair who will provide you with an account of the particulars of this investigation. I hope that you will keep in mind throughout his account, that the successes he describes were not those of DEA alone, but were the results of the efforts of many State and local officers and Federal agencies, particularly the Department of State, which cooperated in numerous false passport investigations of brotherhood members. We shall then be pleased to respond to whatever questions you may have. Special Agent Donald Strange will also assist in answering any detailed questions concerning the conduct of the investigation.

Mr. SOURWINE. Sir, before Mr. Sinclair begins his statement, I have a number of questions I want to ask. I have no reason to insist that you answer them, but may I ask you while you are here?

Mr. BARTELS. Certainly.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you want to field them, do so; and if you want to pass them to one of your experts, do so.

When you speak of the Department of State cooperating in numerous false passport investigations, what division or branch of the

State Department were you referring to? Do you mean the Passport Office?

Mr. SINCLAIR. Security.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean the Bureau of Security?

Mr. SINCLAIR. No, no. Within the Department of State.

Mr. SOURWINE. The Office of Security?

Mr. SINCLAIR. Right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Within the Department of State.

Mr. SINCLAIR. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who heads that?

Mr. SINCLAIR. I do not know.

Mr. STRANGE. Mr. Hibbard Lamkin was the special agent in charge in Los Angeles, whom we worked through initially. He has since retired.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are talking about cooperation at the local level rather than at the Washington level.

Mr. STRANGE. Yes, sir, but at one point in time we called direct to the State Department in Washington when we had reason to believe that one of the brotherhood members was using a fraudulent passport.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who did you talk with there?

Mr. STRANGE. I do not recall. It was primarily another agent's responsibility. He maintained liaison with a member of the State Department in Washington. He spoke with him almost on a day-to-day basis.

Mr. SOURWINE. Over quite a period of time?

Mr. STRANGE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you get the information you were telephoning for over a period of time?

Mr. STRANGE. Yes, sir. When documents that were obtained in either a search or through informant information gave us the idea that possibly one of these brotherhood members was using an assumed name, we would run that name through the passport section and see if they had an application on file for the member under that name, and quite often they did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, it may be that I am here anticipating something that one of your men plans to cover, and if so, I have no objection to deferring the question. But let us run through these and then go ahead with the director's statement.

Dr. Leary had a rather openhanded acceptance by the media or certain areas of our media of public information, did he not?

Mr. BARTELS. Yes, he did.

Mr. SOURWINE. I remember two major interviews with Leary in Playboy magazine, for instance. Was this access to the press and to a somewhat lesser but still substantial degree the airwaves, of any substantial or even critical importance in enabling Leary to increase his influence?

Mr. BARTELS. In my opinion, it was, and I would ask Mr. Sinclair if he would not confirm that.

Mr. SINCLAIR. Yes, absolutely.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Leary himself ever arrested for trafficking in drugs?

Mr. BARTELS. Yes, he was.

Do you know his record? I know he was in Texas once.

Mr. SINCLAIR. Yes, that was Customs.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you plan to cover that?

Mr. SINCLAIR. Not the Texas incident, but we do plan to cover another aspects of his—

Mr. SOURWINE. Would it be out of order to tell us about the Texas incident now?

Mr. SINCLAIR. I am not specifically familiar with it. I recall he crossed the border at Texas, I believe, with his daughter, and they were arrested at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. When—may I ask you cover the Texas incident fully when you correct the record either at this point or any other place you think it will fit best.

Mr. SINCLAIR. We would be happy to.

[The material referred to follows:]

Dr. Timothy Leary was arrested by a U.S. Customs official in possession of a small quantity of marihuana at Laredo, Tex., on December 22, 1965. The facts of the case are as follows:

Dr. Timothy Leary left New York on December 20, 1965, by automobile, accompanied by his two children, Susan, age 18, and John, age 16, and two other persons. Their destination was Yucatan, Mexico, and the alleged purpose of the trip was a Christmas vacation for the Leary children and to provide Dr. Leary the opportunity to write a book and to prepare for a summer session to be conducted with a research group at his home in Millbrook, New York. On December 22, 1965, Dr. Leary and the four passengers drove across the international boundary at Laredo, Texas, into the Republic of Mexico, stopped at the Mexican immigration station for several minutes, and turned back toward the United States. At approximately 6:45 p.m., they arrived at the secondary inspection area, Laredo International Bridge, Laredo, Texas. Dr. Leary, the driver of the vehicle, told a U.S. Customs official that they had driven across the boundary into Mexico within the prior hour, that they had been unable to secure tourist permits and had been told by Mexican immigration officials to return the following morning at 8:00 a.m. at which time the necessary Mexican permits would be given to them.

The U.S. inspector asked the group if they had anything to declare from Mexico and was told that they had not. After the occupants alighted from the vehicle, the U.S. inspector observed some vegetable material and a seed on the floor of the automobile which appeared to him to be marihuana. Thus the five travelers were arrested. A search of the baggage, the vehicle and of the individuals was made. Sweepings from the car floor and glove compartment were later proved to be marihuana. While Dr. Leary was being searched, he stated that he had never used marihuana. A woman Customs inspector performed a personal search of the two female travelers, which resulted in the finding of a small metal container on the person of Susan Leary after she had disrobed. Within the container were three partially smoked marihuana cigarettes, a small quantity of semi-refined marihuana and capsules of dextroamphetamine sulfate. Demand was made of Dr. Leary for the required Treasury Department transferee form. He stated that he had no such form. Susan Leary, in response to the same demand, refused to make any statement. Dr. Leary admitted to a U.S. Customs Agent that the metal box taken from his daughter, Susan, containing the marihuana was his property.

Dr. Timothy Leary and his minor daughter were jointly indicted on three counts pertaining to marihuana. Dr. Leary was tried before a jury on March 11, 1969. Count 1, which charged the smuggling of marihuana into the United States which should have been invoiced (declared), was dismissed by the court. Dr. Leary was found guilty, however, on Count 2, which charged transportation and facilitation of transportation, and concealment of marihuana after importation, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 176a, and on Count 3, which charged transportation and concealment of marihuana by defendants as transferees, required to pay the transfer tax in violation of 26 U.S.C. 4744 (a) (2). Dr. Leary was sentenced to the maximum penalties and fines provided for such offenses, subject.

however, to the provisions of 18 U.S.C. 4208(b), and was ordered committed to the medical center at Springfield, Missouri, for a complete study to be used by the court as a basis for determining the ultimate sentence in the case.

Susan Leary was tried at the same time as her father, Dr. Leary, by the court without a jury (trial by jury having been waived) and found guilty on Count 3 of the indictment but not guilty on Counts 1 and 2. Imposition of sentence was suspended and she was placed on probation during the remainder of her minority, without supervision, under the provisions of the Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. 5010 (a).

Dr. Leary appealed his conviction on Counts 2 and 3 to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit which affirmed the lower courts findings.

Dr. Leary then petitioned to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court agreed to consider two questions: (1) whether petitioner's conviction for failing to comply with the transfer provisions of the Marihuana Tax Act violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination; (2) whether petitioner was denied due process by the application of the part of 21 U.S.C. 176a which provides that a defendant's possession of marihuana shall be deemed sufficient evidence that the marihuana was illegally imported or brought into the United States, and that the defendant knew of the illegal importation or bring in, unless the defendant explains his possession to the satisfaction of the jury.

On May 19, 1969, the Supreme Court held in favor of the petitioner (Dr. Leary) on both issues and reversed the judgement of the Court of Appeals.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you say it is true the role Leary played was that of an ideological trafficker, whether or not he was himself selling the stuff?

Mr. BARTELS. Definitely.

Mr. SINCLAIR. Absolutely.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was responsible for hooking more young people, if I may use that term, than a good many pushers.

Mr. BARTELS. That is my opinion.

Mr. SOURWINE. Because of his acceptance and the access he had through the media to the minds of these young folks.

Mr. BARTELS. Developing the subculture which advocated the use of drugs.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, you gave us some figures about seizures. I do not remember precisely. What was the figure for hashish seizures in 1968?

Mr. BARTELS. 534 pounds.

Mr. SOURWINE. And in 1972?

Mr. BARTELS. 30,094 pounds.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have any one big or possibly lucky seizure in 1972 that would increase that figure, or is that the result of a steady year-by-year progression?

Mr. BARTELS. It is largely a steady year-by-year progression. We had one seizure which I believe was 1,300 pounds which was the largest in the history. I may add that we had a seizure 2 weeks ago of almost 900 pounds. But that shows what an extremely large seizure would be.

Mr. SOURWINE. But your 1,300 pound seizure was not any bigger part of the 30,000 pounds seized in 1972 than your largest seizure was of the 534 pounds in 1968.

Mr. BARTELS. That is correct. For instance, the figures, if I may, show this sort of a progression. In 1968, as I stated, there were 534 pounds. In 1969, 2,247 pounds. In 1970, 7,256 pounds. In 1971, 22,188 pounds. And as I said, in 1972, 30,094 pounds.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is your total so far this year?

Mr. BARTELS. Through June, from January of 1973 through June 30, 1973, we have 11,150 pounds of hashish.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are behind the 1972 rate, then.

Mr. BARTELS. Yes, we are slightly.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that because the traffic has dropped off or because you have been denied the force you need or for what reason?

Mr. BARTELS. I am not sure really at this early date. We may make it up. It may be also that there is a feeling among the youth to turn to other drugs. I think it is a little early to say.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you give us any reasonable estimate of the amount of hashish that has been entering this country undetected? Obviously, you would not have a statistic on it but do you have estimates on it?

Mr. BARTELS. No. Nothing really reliable.

Mr. SOURWINE. You told me that in your opinion, the traffic had gone up faster than your seizures had gone up, so you must have some kind of an estimate. Do you have an estimate of total traffic year by year?

Mr. BARTELS. We do not because we do not know how efficient we are in making seizures, whether we are seizing 10 percent, 5 percent, 20 percent, 25 percent. But we know that at the borders the nature of this traffic is such and the borders are so open and wide that we are not seizing what we would hope to, and a great deal comes in. If we are seizing 20 percent of it perhaps we are doing pretty well. And, of course, it is more difficult once you get into hashish oil which does not involve as cumbersome a shipment as marihuana.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you have any instrument of the confirmed hashish imports of the Brotherhood of Eternal Love which eluded detection of Customs and other law enforcement agencies?

Mr. BARTELS. Let me refer to Mr. Sinclair on that. I think we said 24 tons, did we not?

Mr. HAISLIP. Yes. That is a total, and all of that is based on what we would call hard intelligence from identifiable sources. And this is due just to the activities of the brotherhood.

Mr. SOURWINE. They brought in 24 tons in your opinion, over what period of years?

Mr. HAISLIP. 1968 to the present.

Mr. SINCLAIR. During that time we seized approximately 6,000 pounds so that means approximately 44,000.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, you must have seized—you mean from them.

Mr. STRANGE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. 6,000 pounds. That is 3 tons.

Mr. BARTELS. Out of 24 which is about a 12-percent seizure rate.

Mr. SOURWINE. 12, 12½.

Mr. BARTELS. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think you are getting that much generally over the whole traffic?

Mr. BARTELS. I do not know how I can estimate that.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have not worked the whole traffic as intensively as you worked the brotherhood, have you?

Mr. BARTELS. No.

Mr. HAISLIP. I think it would be fair to note, too, that in the last year or two of the activity with regard to the brotherhood members, probably increasingly large amounts of their hashish was seized be-

cause of the attention given to them. At first none of it was seized. It was all getting through.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not have any estimate of what they are handling, bringing in and peddling now.

Mr. HAISLIP. Not any reliable figure.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have not quit working on them yet, have you?

Mr. BARTELS. No. We have not totally quit working on them.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you give us a figure on what hashish sells for wholesale in the United States?

Mr. BARTELS. I will defer to Mr. Sinclair on that.

Mr. SINCLAIR. It depends on how much you are talking about. The standard price that we see and recognize is \$900 a pound.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that is a good deal less than it costs when you sell by the paper, is it not?

Mr. SINCLAIR. Or by the ounce. You can break it up by the bag and sell it at \$100 an ounce. That would realize \$1,600 a pound but when you think that it only costs \$15 a pound in Afghanistan, that is a substantial increase in profit.

Mr. SOURWINE. Everybody gets his cut.

That retail price, then, is about \$1,600 a pound, \$100 an ounce.

Mr. SINCLAIR. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is the average strength of the hashish sold in this country?

Mr. HAISLIP. I have a figure on that based on the reports of our laboratories. Over a period of time they found that the variations were great, but that the average strength of hashish contained approximately 10 percent THC and that for the marihuana or hashish oil, the average was approximately 46 percent THC.

Mr. SOURWINE. And then this real high strength pot oil you told us about that ran 90 percent was nine times as strong as the average.

Mr. HAISLIP. For hashish, yes.

Mr. BARTELS. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. So that, although you said that the usual dose of the oil was one drop to a normal cigarette, actually that will produce a strength $2\frac{1}{2}$ or 3 times as much as an ordinary marihuana joint, will it not?

Mr. BARTELS. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. How much hashish would the average person have to ingest in order to develop a real hashish high?

Mr. SINCLAIR. A gram or two, I believe. The size of a pencil eraser, a gram or two.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, what percentage of this \$100 an ounce would that be?

Mr. SINCLAIR. A small part of it, sir. There are approximately 30 grams in an ounce.

Mr. SOURWINE. If a man buys an ounce of it for \$100, does he have a hundred highs?

Mr. SINCLAIR. No. Probably around 30. That would be an average and that could vary up and down depending on the individual.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it the brotherhood which invented or first developed hashish oil?

Mr. BARTELS. Yes, I think that is right. It was Sand, was it not?

Mr. SINCLAIR. No. Another brotherhood member.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is any other organization producing it now that you know of?

Mr. SINCLAIR. There must be, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, you do not know who but you know there is production other than the brotherhood production.

Mr. SINCLAIR. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. You raised the question of who in the brotherhood was responsible for the development of hashish oil. Do you want to put that name in the record?

Mr. SINCLAIR. According to our best intelligence sources it is Ronald Hadley Stark.

Mr. SOURWINE. Getting back to this business of a dose of one drop in a cigarette—if he puts two drops in the cigarette, he has for practical purpose got a serious overdose, has he not?

Mr. SINCLAIR. Again, I think that depends on the individual.

Mr. SOURWINE. There is a tolerance that develops?

Mr. SINCLAIR. I do not know if it is a tolerance but you never know exactly how concentrated the THC or the hashish oil that you happen to be using is.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, suppose you take 45 percent which is half of the maximum the brotherhood was able to arrive at. And suppose a man gets eight drops which is about what, half a teaspoonful? What does it do? Put him out? Kill him? Affect his brain seriously?

Mr. BARTELS. We don't know. It will affect his brain seriously but I think it is new enough, hashish oil, that we do not know what it will do.

Mr. SOURWINE. It might seriously affect the brain permanently.

Mr. BARTELS. That is possible.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are any experiments being made along this line to determine tolerance?

Mr. BARTELS. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is anybody making experiments along this line with animals?

Mr. BARTELS. I do not know.

Mr. HAINSLIP. I think the National Institute of Mental Health has some research grants in this area but we would not be able to answer for what they are doing in the field.

Mr. SOURWINE. The FDA would not be working on it because it is not being offered in the market legally.

Mr. HAINSLIP. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Some of the evidence that this subcommittee took last year, about a year ago, suggests that there is a direct tie-in between hashish smoking and marijuana smoking. What would your opinion be on this? Does the marijuana smoking lead to the use of hashish in any degree?

Mr. BARTELS. I think the two are interchangeable.

Mr. SOURWINE. Interchangeable. Not a matter of movement from the man who smokes a joint to the man who smoke hashish. It is back and forth.

Mr. BARTELS. I think it can lead up. In other words, the hashish being more potent, more reliable, is more sought after by the confirmed and experienced marijuana smoker who frequently is dissatisfied with

the 2 percent THC when he can get higher, So I would think yes, it can lead to it——

Mr. SOURWINE. Before we get through I would like to cover for the record the connection of Leary with William Mellon Hitchcock, the multimillionaire who permitted Leary to continue his experimentation with LSD on the Hitchcock farm in Dutchess County, N.Y. Do you want to go into that now or leave it for one of the other men with you to offer?

Mr. BARTELS. That is sub judice right now.

Mr. SOURWINE. It will be covered in a later statement. All right.

Is the equipment for the preparation or production of hashish oil extensive or expensive?

Mr. HAISLIP. We have some photographs for the record that we have offered that will illustrate a typical laboratory.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is, it will be offered.

Mr. HAISLIP. It is being offered now.

Mr. BARTELS. I will be happy to offer them.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is fine.

Mr. Chairman, may these be received?


The CHAIRMAN. They will be received.

Mr. BARTELS. May I offer to you two photographs, one revealing a marihuana or hashish oil laboratory seized in Escanaba, Mich., and the other being the brotherhood "Orange Sunshine" LSD laboratory in St. Louis, Mo.?

[The photographs referred to follow:]



MARIHUANA OR HASHISH OIL LABORATORY, ESCANABA, MICH.



BROTHERHOOD "ORANGE SUNSHINE" LSD LABORATORY, ST. LOUIS, MO.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am not a laboratory technician or expert and unable to tell from looking at one of these but it does not look as though the equipment is very expensive. Do you have a conclusion in that regard?

Mr. BARTELS. It is very inexpensive.

Mr. SOURWINE. Very inexpensive.

Mr. BARTELS. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you talk about hashish oil, does that mean it can only be prepared from hashish or can it be distilled from simple marihuana?

Mr. BARTELS. From crude marihuana as well.

Mr. SOURWINE. Marihuana and hashish are different versions of the cannabis plant.

Mr. BARTELS. That is right, a different process.

Mr. SOURWINE. And the hashish oil that you get from one in an equal degree of concentration would be just the same as what you get from the other?

Mr. BARTELS. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does hashish oil have the characteristic cannabis odor so that it can be detected by your trained dogs that are used by the Customs and Post Office Departments?

Mr. BARTELS. I defer to Mr. Strange on that. Do you know?

Mr. HAISLIP. I think in most cases the oil would be sealed in a container in any case which would probably make it less subject to that type of discovery because it would be tightly sealed.

Mr. SINCLAIR. Usually in glass vials.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether the oil has a similar aroma or flavor when put in a cigarette or smoked to what you would get if you used marihuana?

Mr. HAISLIP. The best report we have on that is that it is not as easily detectable and that is just a street report.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have no more questions at this time. Do you want to go ahead? Mr. Sinclair next?

Mr. BARTELS. Yes, sir.

Mr. SINCLAIR. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, to the agents who participated in the Brotherhood of Eternal Love investigation, it was not just another routine case. For nearly a year and a half, we felt the pulse of what has come to be realized as one of the largest and most complex drug systems in the history of this country's narcotic law enforcement efforts.

Possibly you might ask: Are these notorious international traffickers from Italy, Mexico, or Turkey, or from the Golden Triangle in Southeast Asia? No, gentlemen, the great majority of these violators are from California; but, our story does not begin there. Although no one knew it at the time, the Brotherhood of Eternal Love began with Dr. Timothy Francis Leary at Harvard University in 1963.

It was in 1963 that Dr. Leary was fired from his post at Harvard as a result of his experimentation with LSD. He soon found a friend in multimillionaire, William Mellon Hitchcock, and was allowed to continue his experimentation with LSD from Hitchcock's 4,000-acre estate in Millbrook, a quiet community in Dutchess County, N.Y.

From 1963 to 1966, Dr. Timothy Leary planted the seeds of "mysticism through drugs" in the minds of countless thousands of young Americans. Even Dr. Leary never realized the fruitfulness of his crop or the international ramifications of its harvest.

From Millbrook, Dr. Leary traveled to Berkeley, Calif., and from Berkeley to a small city in southern California called Laguna Beach. This village-type community was soon to become the psychedelic drug capital of the world.

In October 1966, the Brotherhood of Eternal Love became a legal corporation in the State of California. The brotherhood was also granted a tax-exempt status on the basis that it claimed to be a religious organization.

The brotherhood was heavily drug oriented. From its inception, in addition, intelligence indicates that the group was ceremoniously practicing group sexual freedom in connection with the use of drugs.

From 1966 to 1968, the brotherhood flourished by dealing in marihuana smuggled in 100-pound lots from Mexico and by trafficking in LSD obtained from illicit sources and from Sandoz Chemical Works in Basel, Switzerland.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you imply that the LSD obtained from the Basel firm was legally obtained?

Mr. SINCLAIR. There was a time when lysergic acid diethylamide was available commercially. The first person to synthesize it worked for Sandoz and Sandoz actually manufactured it commercially.

Mr. SOURWINE. Thank you.

Mr. SINCLAIR. But, that was not enough; and in the latter part of 1967, Glenn Lynd and two other brotherhood members traveled to Afghanistan in search of a permanent source of supply for brotherhood hashish.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is Glenn Lynd, L-y-n-d?

Mr. SINCLAIR. That is correct, sir.

They purchased 125 pounds of high-quality Afghanistan hashish from their suppliers in Afghanistan for \$15 a pound and smuggled it back into California where they sold it for \$900 a pound. This was to be the first 125 pounds of nearly 24 tons of hashish smuggled into the United States from Afghanistan, Lebanon, and India by the Brotherhood of Eternal Love.

In the summer of 1968, brotherhood members traveled to San Francisco in an attempt to secure a permanent source of supply for LSD—which they found. The LSD was to be called orange sunshine and the laboratory was to be set up in December 1968.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I interrupt for a moment, sir?

Mr. SINCLAIR. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Here again, you used this 24-ton figure as though it was the end of the Leary operation. Do you know that 24 tons or any other amount is all they were ever going to smuggle in?

Mr. SINCLAIR. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you put them out of the business?

Mr. SINCLAIR. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. So that is only what you know about that they have done heretofore?

Mr. SINCLAIR. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead.

Mr. STRANGE. Two weeks ago there were 923 pounds of hash seized in New York and Las Vegas. That was a brotherhood shipment.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where in Las Vegas?

Mr. STRANGE. It came in from Amsterdam through Kennedy Airport to New York and from there to Las Vegas. It cleared U.S. customs in Las Vegas and it was seized on the outskirts of town, being transported from Las Vegas to southern California in a large Ryder truck.

Mr. SOURWINE. Came in through the McCarran Airport in Las Vegas. All right go ahead.

Mr. SINCLAIR. In March 1969, the first batch of "orange sunshine" LSD was made by brotherhood members in a laboratory located outside of San Francisco. Slightly under 1 million tablets were produced in this first endeavor. Numerous millions were to be made in the next 4 years.

At this point in time, the Brotherhood of Eternal Love was the largest supplier of hashish and LSD in the United States.

Mr. SOURWINE. Let us get the reference. That phrase "point of time" has meant a lot of things. You are talking about March 1969.

Mr. SINCLAIR. That is correct, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead.

Mr. SINCLAIR. The center of their operations was still Laguna Beach, Calif., although they were fast becoming international travelers and were purchasing property in Hawaii, Canada, Central America, and several States neighboring California.

From 1966 to 1971, members of the brotherhood traveled throughout the world using false identities with passports obtained under assumed names. Their operations were virtually untouchable during this period of time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why was that?

Mr. SINCLAIR. Because of their mobility, because no one was really aware of the extent of their activities.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do they have any untouchability today?

Mr. SINCLAIR. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Their pretensions to be a religion do not do them any good any more, do they?

Mr. SINCLAIR. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead.

Mr. SINCLAIR. No arrests were made of major figures in the organization, and thousands of pounds of hashish and millions of dosage units of "orange sunshine" LSD were being distributed through outlets in southern California. Local authorities were aware of the brotherhood's existence but could not penetrate the organization's outer wall.

The only significant accomplishment by local authorities during this period was the arrest of Dr. Timothy Leary on December 26, 1968, in Laguna Beach, Calif., for possession of marihuana. Dr. Leary was convicted in February of 1970 and sentenced to State prison for a term of 1 to 10 years. According to one of his companions, Leary escaped from prison in September 1970 with the help of the Weathermen faction of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) who also provided him with false papers and arranged for his flight abroad. According to several sources, the brotherhood paid \$50,000¹ to the Weathermen to see their spiritual leader set free.

While in Algiers and Switzerland, Leary, despite the fact that he was in exile, still exercised a major influence over the brotherhood, and was visited constantly by the higher echelon of the brotherhood organization.

In November of 1971, the brotherhood suffered its first major setback when George Oliphant was arrested in Lebanon while in possession of 800 pounds of hashish. It was later determined that Oliphant and other members of the brotherhood had smuggled approximately 4,000 pounds of Lebanese hashish into the United States since 1968.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did they make almost \$900 a pound on all of that?

Mr. SINCLAIR. Yes, sir. Oliphant is still in prison in Lebanon.

On December 15, 1971, brotherhood member Donald Alexander Hambarian was arrested in Laguna Beach, Calif., while operating a

¹ In the excerpt from his book, "Confessions of a Dope Fiend," on p. 35, Timothy Leary says: "I suddenly flashed on the meshing of underground energy systems. Dope dealers raise \$25,000 to finance the breakout. And the bread goes to the manic guerrillas." The subcommittee has no way of establishing whether the amount paid to the Weathermen was actually \$50,000 as stated to the Drug Enforcement Agency by a member of the brotherhood who was involved in the fundraising and is now cooperating with the DEA, or whether it was \$25,000 as stated by Leary in his book. What does appear certain is that a very substantial sum was paid to the Weathermen to arrange Leary's escape from the prison and from the country.

hashish oil laboratory. This hashish oil was to be the first encountered in the United States. Hambarian was also in possession of 86,000 dosage units of LSD.

Also in December of 1971, the two Afghan sources came to the United States accompanied by a brotherhood member, Robert Dale Ackerly, now serving sentence. Their trip appeared to be nothing more than a sightseeing tour until it was learned that two shipments of hashish totaling over 2,000 pounds were on their way to southern California. The Afghans were overseeing these shipments.

In January of 1972, brotherhood member Michael Lee Pooley was arrested in Laguna Beach, Calif., while in possession of 133,000 dosage units of "orange sunshine" LSD.

Mr. SOURWINE. What did that sell for?

Mr. SINCLAIR. Well, it depends again on supply and demand. You can sell tablets for as little as \$1 apiece, or you can sell as many as 4,000 of them for \$600. It just depends.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead, sir.

Mr. SINCLAIR. Later that same month, the first of the Afghan hashish shipments was seized in Portland, Oreg. This shipment totaled 1,330 pounds and still stands as the largest quantity of hashish ever seized in the United States.

In February of 1972, the second shipment of Afghanistan hashish was seized in Vancouver, British Columbia. This load totaled 729 pounds. According to outstanding indictments, both the Portland and the Vancouver shipments belonged to Brotherhood Chief Robert Lee Andrist. At this time, intelligence revealed Andrist was in control of the hashish smuggling arm of the brotherhood, while Michael Boyd Randall was generally considered to be the head of the "orange sunshine" LSD operation. Both Andrist and Randall became fugitives subsequent to indictment in this matter.

In March of 1972, Gordon Fred Johnson was arrested in Laguna Beach, Calif., for distributing approximately 50,000 dosage units of "orange sunshine" LSD. Over \$46,000 in cash was found in Johnson's residence upon execution of a search warrant. Also in March, Eric Chastain was arrested in southern California for distributing 45,000 dosage units of "orange sunshine" LSD.

Mr. SOURWINE. Chastain is part of this Leary family, too?

Mr. SINCLAIR. He is part of the brotherhood; yes, sir.

It became apparent that the mere seizures of hashish and LSD were doing very little to disrupt the Brotherhood of Eternal Love as a major drug system. As a result of this observation, Federal, State, and local narcotic officers formed a strike force, with the brotherhood as their sole target.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was done in what year?

Mr. SINCLAIR. That was done in early 1972.

This strike force operated under the code name "Operation BEL." The tool used by Operation BEL agents was the strongest weapon narcotic officers have in their battle against drug traffickers. The conspiracy laws.

On August 3, 1972, the Orange County, Calif., grand jury climaxed many months of investigation by Operation BEL agents when it returned indictments against 29 members of the brotherhood organization. This indictment was aimed primarily at the hashish smuggling arm of the brotherhood.

On August 5, 1972, at 6 a.m., Operation BEL agents executed search warrants and arrest warrants in Hawaii, Oregon, and in numerous locations in southern California. Sixteen major brotherhood figures were arrested, and over \$40,000 in cash was seized, along with a total arrest of 53 individuals.

In November 1972, a DEA special agent of the BEL Task Force traveled with an IRS agent to Brussels, Belgium, to investigate a laboratory relative to Ronald Hadley Stark. As a result of the investigation and subsequent followup, Stark was indicted by a Federal grand jury in April 1973. (Stark is a chemist from New York who in 1964 was worth approximately \$1,400 and who in 1968 was reportedly worth approximately \$1,200,000. Stark is a close associate of Nicholas Sand, and according to some reports, was the first person to ever produce hashish oil from solid hashish.)

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you give us lists of the names and whatever you have in the way of identification of the individuals in these two groups; that is, the 29 and the 53 that you just mentioned?

Mr. SINCLAIR. Yes, sir, for the record.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can that be provided for the record later?

Mr. SINCLAIR. Yes, sir, it can.

Mr. SOURWINE. May that be the order, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

[The information referred to may be found in the appendix, p. 79.]

Mr. SINCLAIR. The investigation continued, and on December 6, 1972, the Orange County grand jury returned another indictment, this time aimed primarily at the brotherhood's "orange sunshine" LSD system. On December 31, 1972, one of the major figures in the LSD system, Michael Boyd Randall, was arrested in San Francisco. Randall is currently a fugitive wanted on four separate narcotic and false passport warrants.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, that statement indicates that something happened in there to change his status. After he was arrested, how did he get loose so he is now a fugitive?

Mr. SINCLAIR. I would like to defer to Mr. Strange in this particular matter, because he had a great deal of—

Mr. SOURWINE. He will cover it?

Mr. SINCLAIR. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you like to talk—

Mr. STRANGE. As you wish. Michael Boyd Randall was indicted by the Orange County grand jury on December 6, 1972. He was arrested in San Francisco, Calif., on the night of December 31, 1972. He was brought down to Orange County where his bail was set at \$250,000. It was—

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you pardon me? We are going to get into quite a story here. Let us save it, and let the present witness finish his statement, and then we will come back to you.

Mr. STRANGE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SINCLAIR. On January 14, 1973, Dr. Timothy Leary was located by DEA agents in Kabul, Afghanistan; and on January 18, 1973, he was returned to Los Angeles, Calif. State and Federal agents arrested Leary on the BEL charges and for escape from a California prison farm in 1970. Leary was arraigned on BEL charges in State court on January 30, 1973, and bail was set at \$5 million. Leary was convicted

of the escape and, on April 23, 1973, was sentenced to 5 years in State prison.

On January 19, 1973, brotherhood chemist Nicholas Sand was arrested in St. Louis, Mo., and his laboratories seized. These illicit laboratories proved to be the largest of their kind ever seized in the United States, with a value of approximately \$500,000. The tableting press for the "orange sunshine" LSD was also seized along with 50,000 dosage units of the drug already tableted. Powdered LSD capable of producing over 14 million tablets of "orange sunshine" was found at two locations, along with the formulas and raw materials for the production of over 100 different psychedelic drugs.

On Easter Sunday, April 22, 1973, BEL Task Force agents arrested four members of BEL in Santa Cruz, Calif. Three of those arrested were fugitives from other jurisdictions. Some contraband was seized, along with seven phony passports. Huge stores of false identification were seized, indicating this was a point of contact of BEL fugitives desiring false identification and papers.

On April 25, 1973, Nicholas Sand, Timothy Scully, Michael Randall, and four other major figures in the LSD operation were indicted by a Federal grand jury in San Francisco, Calif. Four of these higher echelon members are still fugitives.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, for the record, would you identify the four that you did not name, and indicate which of the eight are the four that are still fugitives?

Mr. SINCLAIR. Yes, sir. The individuals referred to are David Lee Mantel; Charles Druce, currently a fugitive; Lester Friedman; and Ronald H. Stark, currently a fugitive. In addition to these four individuals, one of those previously mentioned, Michael Randall, is also a fugitive.

That, briefly, is a chronological summary of the Brotherhood of Eternal Love investigation. Overall statistics of Operation BEL concerning arrests and seizures are nearly unbelievable. To date, the brotherhood investigation has resulted in the arrests of over 100 individuals, including Dr. Timothy Leary who is currently serving 15 years in Folsom prison. Four LSD laboratories have been seized, along with over 1 million "orange sunshine" LSD tablets, and LSD powder in excess of 3,500 grams, capable of producing over 14 million dosage units of the drug. In addition, the source of diversion for the raw materials needed in the production of LSD was identified in Europe.

A total of six hashish oil laboratories were seized, along with over 30 gallons of hashish oil and approximately 6,000 pounds of solid hashish.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, those hashish oil laboratories were in this country.

Mr. SINCLAIR. Some were.

Mr. SOURWINE. Some were not.

Mr. SINCLAIR. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you differentiate that for the record when you correct it?

Mr. SINCLAIR. Yes, sir; I will.

[The information requested follows:]

Of these six laboratories, four were being operated within the United States, three of which were in California and one in Hawaii. Two others were being operated within foreign countries; one in Costa Rica, and one in Afghanistan.

Mr. SOURWINE. And with regard to the diversion of raw materials, the source of diversion in Europe, would you identify, that for the record?

Mr. SINCLAIR. Yes, sir; we will.

[The information requested follows:]

That individual is Charles Druce, a British citizen, indicted on April 25th for conspiracy in connection with the illicit manufacture of LSD.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead, sir.

Mr. SINCLAIR. Grand jury indictments were obtained on Amanullah and Hayatullah Tokhi, two brothers who are alleged to be the sources of Afghanistan hashish for the Brotherhood of Eternal Love. The Afghanistan Government has been advised of these indictments.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, where were they indicted?

Mr. SINCLAIR. In Orange County, Calif.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had they been in Orange County?

Mr. SINCLAIR. Yes, sir, they had.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right.

Mr. SINCLAIR. Other drugs and articles seized were 104 grams of peyote, 8 pounds of amphetamine powder, 13.64 pounds of cocaine, 2 marihuana canning operations, "Orange Sunshine" pill press, 7 vehicles, 546 acres of property in southern California, and over \$1.8 million cash either seized or located in foreign banks. The Internal Revenue Service and the California Franchise Tax Board have assessed the Brotherhood of Eternal Love corporation for over \$70 million in back taxes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Which would indicate that the brotherhood according to the IRS, must have made something over \$200 million in its illicit operations.

Mr. SINCLAIR. That is right, yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead.

Mr. SINCLAIR. On September 23, 1973, the State Department publicly announced that a tougher screening process would be used in the issuing of passports due to the Brotherhood of Eternal Love. State Department officials working with Operation BEL agents uncovered 120 cases of passport fraud within the period of 1 year.

With these astonishing statistics, one might get the impression that the brotherhood organization is a thing of the past. Nothing could be further from the truth. Out of the 52 brotherhood members indicted by State and Federal grand juries, 22 are fugitives, including the No. 1 man in both hashish and the LSD operations.

Brotherhood members continue to operate from outside the United States. On September 15, 1973, 923 pounds of hashish concealed in false bottom commercial sound speakers was seized in Las Vegas, Nev. It is now known that this hashish shipment was enroute to southern California components of the Brotherhood of Eternal Love.

No doubt, the brotherhood organization was dealt a severe blow by Operation BEL, but not a terminal one. At the moment, it remains disorganized and severely crippled. Hopefully, continued enforcement effort can be brought to bear until this complex drug distribution system is completely eliminated.

In concluding my remarks, Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer for the record a copy of an interview with Jennifer Dohrn, sister of Weathermen leader, Bernardine Dohrn, describing her meeting with

Timothy Leary and Eldridge Cleaver in Algiers in October of 1970. The article appeared in the Underground publication, Good Times, for January 8, 1971. I believe it is interesting because of the light it throws on the lifestyle and motivations and associations of these people.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to suggest that this item be incorporated into the record as an appendix.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

[The article referred to may be found in the appendix, p. 80.]

Mr. SOURWINE. If I understand your figures correctly, however, is it not true that the brotherhood in terms of its operations and its power and its financing is now several times as strong as it was 10 years ago from which it built up to \$100 million operation within the space of less than 10 years.

Mr. SINCLAIR. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, I do not know whether this is the proper place to raise this question, but the committee is in possession of a flyer put out by the California Department of Justice giving the photographs and descriptions of 26 members of the Brotherhood of Eternal Love. Have you gentlemen seen it? I presume you have.

Mr. SINCLAIR. Yes, sir. We furnished the committee with that flyer.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, now, I think it would be very useful, if the Chair agrees, if these pictures and descriptions could be put in our record but we cannot reproduce them from this. Can you furnish us with glossies of these pictures that we can use to reproduce in our hearing record?

Mr. SINCLAIR. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. May that be the request, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

[The photographs follow:]

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
BUREAU OF NARCOTIC ENFORCEMENT

WANTED

The individuals shown below are active members of the BROTHERHOOD OF ETERNAL LOVE. This is a pseudo-religious organization responsible for the importation and sale of large quantities of hashish and manufacture and distribution of LSD on a worldwide level.

On August 3, 1972 the Orange County Grand Jury indicted these individuals, charging them with a variety of narcotic violations and 182.1, V Penal Code (Conspiracy to Violate California State Narcotic Laws).

Since these fugitives extensively utilize false identification, every effort should be made to notify California Department of Justice of their fingerprint classification as soon as possible, to obtain a positive identification before releasing subject.



MAY, Edward Joseph

AKA: EDWARD JOSEPH
W.M.A. dob 2-22-34 5'4 200 lbs
Blond hair blue eyes
Fingerprint Classification
L 15 - 111 19
L 15 - 111 19



PADILLA, Gerald James

W.M.A. dob 8-13-47 5'11 155 lbs
Brown hair brown eyes
Narcotic No. N028 LTS OCSO
Statewide No. N031 APB OCSO
Fingerprint Classification 0 5 - 0 212 12
L 17 - 101 18



ANDRIST, Robert Lee

W.M.A. dob 11-24-51 5'10 280 lbs
Brown hair green eyes
Narcotic No. N016 LTS OCSO
Statewide No. N031 APB OCSO
Fingerprint Classification 11 - 0 400 15
L 11 - 0 400 15



ACKERLY, Robert Dale

W.M.A. dob 12-28-32; 6'2 175 lbs
Brown hair brown eyes
TT Liu Rise. Bob upper left arm
USN and anchor upper right arm
Statewide No. N034 APB OCSO
Fingerprint Classification 0 23 - 000 15
L 19 - 010 13



BECKER, Dale Andrew

W.M.A. dob 12-28-32; 6'2 175 lbs
Black hair brown eyes
scar left side of mouth and on forehead
Narcotic No. N028 LTS OCSO
Statewide No. N039 APB OCSO
Fingerprint Classification 27 L 1 - 0 001 8
L 1 8 - 100 7



STANTON, Mark Patrick

AKA: STANTON
AKA: FULLER LESTER SAMUEL
W.M.A. dob 9-20-46 5'9 140 lbs
Brown hair blue eyes
TT - M - hair left wrist
web dot on left hand 1 5 - 1 8 100 8
M 1 8 - 100 8



SMITH, Brenice Lee

AKA: NICKELSBURG LEE ALAN
W.M.A. dob 8-8-45 5' - 175 lbs
Blond hair blue eyes
TT dot and no 13 right inner forearm
blue dot web left hand 0 4 - 0 110 18
L 17 - 0 100 14



DAW, John Robert

W.M.A. dob 10-10-43 5'6 130 lbs
Brown hair blue eyes
TT left shoulder a scar with Johnnie
Digger right leg 1 17 - 280 21
Heart left leg 5 17 04 0 21
Fingerprint Classification



BEVAN, Rick

W.M.A. dob 11-20-38 5'4 160 lbs
Brown hair brown eyes
10 inch scar right side chest
Narcotic No. N018 LTS OCSO
Statewide No. N031 APB OCSO
Fingerprint Classification 20 L 17 - 001 9
L 1 7 - 001 11



SIMMONS, Peter David

W.M.A. dob 1-8-46 5'9 145 lbs
Brown hair blue eyes
Narcotic No. N023 LTS OCSO
Statewide No. N038 APB OCSO
Fingerprint Classification 0 29 - 028 13
L 4 - 105 11



PRATT, Jill Barnett
 W.M.A. dob 3-10-45, 5.6, 125 lbs.
 Brown hair, blue eyes.
 Nationwide No. N028 L75 OCSO
 Statewide No. N048 APB OCSO
 Fingerprint Classification 10 3 W 190 5
 7 11 100 10



ASHBROOK, Travis Grant
 W.M.A. dob 1-9-45, 6.1, 150 lbs.
 Brown hair, hazel eyes.
 Nationwide No. N025 L75 OCSO
 Statewide No. N040 APB OCSO
 Fingerprint Classification 21 L 1 U 108 8
 5 1 M 111 5



CASERTA, Daniel Phillip
 W.M.A. dob 8-9-47, 5.10, 150 lbs.
 Brown hair, blue eyes.
 Nationwide No. N030 L75 OCSO
 Statewide No. N035 APB OCSO
 Fingerprint Classification 0 21 - 100 8
 1 17 100 17




SCOTT, Charles Fredrick
 AKA. DESERT CHUCK
 W.M.A. dob 12-28-41, 6.1, 160 lbs.
 Brown hair, hazel eyes.
 Fingerprint Classification 21 L 1 U 114 8
 W 1 T NR 10



TOKHI, Hayatullah
 W.M.A. approx 35 years, 5.10
 155 lbs. Brown hair, Brown eyes.
 Nationwide No. N030 L75 1H 50
 Statewide No. N045 APB OCSO



SAND, Nicholas
 AKA. HASHMAN, NICHOLAS
 W.M.A. dob 5-10-41, 5.10, 150 lbs.
 Brown hair, hazel eyes.
 Fingerprint Classification 0 32 - 102 19
 1 17 100 17



HARRIGAN, Russell Joseph
 W.M.A. dob 8-19-40, 6.0, 165 lbs.
 Brown hair, brown eyes.
 Fingerprint Classification 16 M 1 U 000 16
 W 1 U 000 15



BEVAN, Ron
 W.M.A. dob 9-19-46, 5.9, 145 lbs.
 Blond hair, Blue eyes, wavy planes.
 Fingerprint Classification



TIERNEY, Robert Edward
 AKA. STUBBY
 W.M.A. dob 8-22-47, 5.8, 235 lbs.
 Brown hair, Brown eyes.
 Fingerprint Classification 0 13 - 100 11
 L 19 - 001 11



TOKHI, Amanullah Salam
 W.M.A. approx 35 years, 6.0
 160 lbs. Brown hair, Brown eyes.
 Nationwide No. N124 L75 OCSO
 Statewide No. N123 APB OCSO



SEXTON, Gordon Albert
 AKA. NIXTON, GORDON ALBERT
 W.M.A. dob 1-29-46, 5.6, 145 lbs.
 Brown hair, Brown eyes.
 Fingerprint Classification 16 L 9 U 000 20
 W 1 U 001 11




HALL, David Alan
 AKA. LOIN, DAVID ROBERT
 W.M.A. dob 10-8-42, 5.11, 170 lbs.
 Black hair, Brown eyes.
 Fingerprint Classification 0 1 A, 100 17
 L 17 10 100 14



PRATT, Stanford Leon
 W.M.A. dob 8-6-45, 6.2, 155 lbs.
 Brown hair, brown eyes.
 Nationwide No. N027 L75 OCSO
 Statewide No. N042 APB OCSO



DRURY, Donald Karl
 W.M.A. dob 3-18-27, 5.8, 135 lbs.
 Blond hair, blue eyes.
 Nationwide No. N030 L75 OCSO
 Statewide No. N041 APB OCSO
 Fingerprint Classification 00 1 U 000 18
 W 1 KR 100 15



HARRINGTON, John Joseph Jr.
 W.M.A. dob 9-18-42, 5.11, 140 lbs.
 Brown hair, blue eyes.
 Fingerprint Classification 0 26 - 104 17
 W 12 - 101 17



GERMAN, Lyle Paul
 AKA. ADLE LYLE PAUL
 W.M.A. dob 3-7-39, 5.10, 170 lbs.
 Brown hair, Blue eyes.
 Fingerprint Classification 11 L 1 W 111 11
 W 1 U 001 12

The Orange County Sheriff's Office holds Superior Court Bench Warrant Number C 28976 for the arrest of these individuals. If you have any information concerning the location of these persons, please contact:

WARRANT DETAIL - ORANGE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE - (714) 834-3061
 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ORGANIZED CRIME AND CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE BRANCH, SACRAMENTO
 (LARRY D. MILES) (916) 322-2438 - 24 HOUR NUMBER

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, I think we have one more prepared statement, have we not?

Mr. SINCLAIR. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, then, it may be proper to ask some of these questions now.

You made it pretty clear that the brotherhood case is an illustration of the inadequacies of existing criminal justice procedures in coping with contemporary high level drug violators. This is interesting to us because it is one of the central points that was made by Gen. Lewis Walt in his report to the subcommittee last September on the world drug situation and its impact on security.

Among other things General Walt recommended that Congress consider the imposition of new restraints on the granting of bail to drug traffickers. Would you gentlemen have a recommendation in that area?

Mr. BARTELS. Yes, we do. There is a bill presently before the Senate, S. 1300, which would provide for pretrial detention pending trial in heroin cases, under certain circumstances.

Mr. SOURWINE. The facts given us here certainly underscore that need.

Now, you mentioned one brotherhood member who apparently was arrested on four consecutive occasions and posted bond on each occasion and finally fled the country. Who was that, Randall?

Mr. BARTELS. No, sir. Donald Drury.

Mr. STRANGE. He is now in custody.

Mr. SOURWINE. May we then go back to you and get the Randall story, the rest of it, and then you can tell us about the others.

Mr. STRANGE. As I stated earlier, Michael Boyd Randall was indicted on December 6, 1972, by the Orange County grand jury. He was arrested in San Francisco, Calif., on December 31, 1972, and taken to Orange County where his bail was set at \$250,000 pursuant to the grand jury indictment.

He retained counsel and over a period of time had his bail lowered to \$25,000.

In the month of March we came up with some information revealing that a primary figure in the LSD operation was unknown to us. We had a name but we did not know who it was. The name was that of Michael Thomas Garrity. This name appeared on shipping documents where a Jaguar had been shipped from the LSD laboratory in Brussels, Belgium, to New York and it appeared on several other legal documents concerning the purchase of property in Riverside County, in southern California.

Just as a chance, agent Elliot submitted this name with agent Keel to the passport office and it turned out that Michael Thomas Garrity was in fact Michael Boyd Randall.

This greatly strengthened our case against Randall and it also gave us an additional charge, under 18 U.S.C. 1542, 1544, for obtaining a passport fraudulently.

On March 9, when we got the passport application from Washington, we filed that charge with the Central District of California and we arrested Randall that night at the beachfront home of his two attorneys.

He had marihuana in his possession at the time of the arrest and we filed local charges for that also. We had the \$25,000 bail in California court, and it appeared later we had \$10,000 bail for the passport charge and then \$1,000 for the marihuana possession for a total of \$36,000 bail which on approximately April 20 he fled and we do not know where he is.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is Randall. The bail forfeited?

Mr. STRANGE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where he is now?

Mr. STRANGE. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. He is a fugitive from justice.

Mr. STRANGE. Yes, sir. He was indicted April 25 by the Federal grand jury in San Francisco but by that time we believe he was already out of the country. He is probably traveling under another assumed name under a false passport. Some of these individuals have as many as four passports, four complete sets of identification, which is an interesting story itself. It includes driver's license, social security card, selective service card, University of California Irvine student ID card, and birth certificate.

Mr. SOURWINE. And birth certificate?

Mr. STRANGE. That is the key.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is an interesting package of identification but who carries a birth certificate?

Mr. SINCLAIR. Members of the brotherhood.

Mr. STRANGE. That is one way you know—this thing was a learning process, and that is one characteristic that enabled us to put together a profile of this organization. We arrested people who ordinarily do not have anything on them, much less a complete package of identification, and we said who are you and he said my name is so and so and we say, really? What have you got to show? And he pulls out a birth certificate, social security card, driver's license, in the neatest set of identification that you have ever seen and it just did not fit with the person. After checking on several of these we found out they were not correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you ran into one you knew it was phony.

Mr. STRANGE. A lot of times.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does that conclude your statement?

Mr. STRANGE. About Randall.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are going to tell us about the other fellow.

Mr. SINCLAIR. I think Mr. Strange will also tell you about Mr. Drury.

Mr. STRANGE. Mr. Drury had posted and fled on a total of \$125,000 in bonds from 1970 up until approximately 6 months ago when we arrested him in Hawaii. Each time he was arrested under a different set of identification and it was just a—

Mr. SOURWINE. Four sets.

Mr. STRANGE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Four arrests.

Mr. STRANGE. When we arrested him again he had another one, so that makes five.

Mr. SOURWINE. Five. The new one was in Hawaii.

Mr. STRANGE. Yes, sir, and we were not aware of that one at the time we arrested Mr. Drury on the last occasion. The problem with the

brotherhood organization, and what took law enforcement so long to catch up with it, was their high degree of mobility. It is virtually impossible to keep up with their pace of international travel.

For instance, he was arrested in August of 1972 in Berkeley, Calif. He had a complete set of false identification. They booked him there, and set bail at \$22,000. An individual still unknown to us appeared that night with \$22,000 cash, bailed him out and by the time his finger prints had come back revealing that he was a fugitive on three other warrants, it was too late because he was already out. So they stay one jump ahead of the game by using that procedure.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, does that explain why the courts kept letting him out on bail? In each case they did not know he was a bail jumper?

Mr. STRANGE. In each case they did not know who he was.

Mr. SOURWINE. He jumped each bail separately.

Mr. SINCLAIR. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, now, you have got him out on bail on the fifth charge.

Mr. SINCLAIR. No, sir.

Mr. STRANGE. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Let the record show that two witnesses answered that question in unison. Where is he now?

Mr. STRANGE. He is in the Orange County jail.

Mr. SOURWINE. Any indication the courts are going to admit him to bail or have you been able to defeat that?

Mr. STRANGE. I have been at one bail reduction motion on his part and I do not think there is any chance.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, I think we have covered the point of the brotherhood operating in a virtually untouchable manner between 1966 and 1971. Would you have anything to add, Mr. Strange?

Mr. STRANGE. Only that the reason for this is that they built up a reputation as being an untouchable organization. This is a hard thing to overcome on our part. We could not get any information out of these people we were arresting because they were firmly of the opinion that we would never get the higher echelon members of the brotherhood.

That was our greatest difficulty to overcome. The statistics we have given you and the facts on seizures and resource information are extremely well documented. We now have approximately five high-ranking or moderately ranking members of the brotherhood who are Government witnesses and when we tell you we know 4,000 pounds of hashish were smuggled out of Lebanon, we know that because he told us he personally smuggled 4,000 pounds out, and when we tell you the first batch of "Orange Sunshine" LSD was around a million, we know that because our informant was in that laboratory which produced that first batch.

Mr. SOURWINE. You told us, Mr. Sinclair, that Leary escaped with the help of Weathermen and there was a \$50,000 payment for the escape operation. Is your operation on that point as firm as what Mr. Strange has talked about?

Mr. SINCLAIR. Yes, sir. Yes, sir, absolutely.

Mr. STRANGE. We have been fortunate enough to have the right people in the right places as far as our witnesses and—

Mr. SINCLAIR. Also, our witnesses have corroborated each other unknowingly.

Mr. SOURWINE. I do not want to interfere with your case as you are building it, but if your case permits, would you insert for the record at this point in correcting your record the sources of your information about this \$50,000 payment?

Mr. STRANGE. One of the Government witnesses was asked to contribute funds to this prior to Leary's escape. That is one way we know it. The individual who collected the money, to pay the Weathermen, was Randall, whom I mentioned earlier.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Bernardine Dohrn of the Weathermen involved in either the planning or execution of Leary's escape?

Mr. STRANGE. That information comes to us by way of an informant who lived with Timothy Leary since he escaped and he says that Leary told him that.

Mr. SOURWINE. That Dohrn was involved.

Mr. STRANGE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. In what way, both in the planning and the execution?

Mr. STRANGE. She was reportedly in the car that picked him up after he climbed over the high tension wire.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, you mentioned Robert Lowe Andrist as the No. 1 man in the brotherhood hashish operation. Where is he now?

Mr. STRANGE. He is a fugitive. He has four false sets.

Mr. SOURWINE. He also jumped four bonds?

Mr. STRANGE. No, sir. He has never been arrested.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Sinclair, I think you told us that a total of six hashish oil factories were seized along with 30 gallons of hashish oil and some 6,000 pounds of solid hashish. Could you give us for the record, a tabulation of those seizures, show the date, place, the amount seized in each case?

Mr. HAISLIP. Can you do that research?

There are several cubic feet of files. I do not know if you can do that without a great deal of labor. Is it possible?

Mr. SOURWINE. I do not want to put you to a great deal of labor.

Mr. HAISLIP. We, of course, do not have our file organized to respond to that.

Mr. SOURWINE. I just want to identify each seizure and get maybe a short paragraph about the essential facts and the amounts involved, the value.

Mr. HAISLIP. Could we confine that to the major or principal seizures instead of—

Mr. SOURWINE. Sure. I would think so. Set your own figures as to what is important. We just want the big ones.

Mr. Sinclair, I understand you said that Michael Boyd Randall, whom you considered the No. 1 in the LSD operation, was first arrested on December 31, 1972?

Mr. SINCLAIR. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. And is currently a fugitive wanted on four separate narcotics and false passports warrants, or is that five now?

Mr. SINCLAIR. No. It is still four.

Mr. SOURWINE. Four.

The subcommittee has been informed that after his first arrest Randall retained the services of two attorneys, Michael Kennedy and Michael Tigar, both of whom have a long record of involvement in the

defense of left wing militants including Angela Davis and the Chicago 7 and the Seattle 9. Is our information accurate in that respect as far as you know?

Mr. SINCLAIR. Yes, sir, it is.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are these men still representing him?

Mr. SINCLAIR. To the best of my knowledge, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could you or Mr. Strange add anything to what you have told us about the circumstances under which Randall became a fugitive? Did you cover that as fully as you think it needs to be?

Mr. STRANGE. I would just like to say that Mr. Kennedy now represents Nicholas Sand in the Federal indictment in San Francisco.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does he or Tigar represent any of the other brotherhood members?

Mr. STRANGE. No, sir. He went back to France.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who did?

Mr. STRANGE. Mr. Tigar returned to France after Randall fled.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, Mr. Strange, we understand that you were in charge of the arrest of Michael Boyd Randall for a second time on March 6 of this year: is that right?

Mr. STRANGE. March 9.

Mr. SOURWINE. March 9. Can you tell us something about the circumstances leading up to that arrest and about the arrest itself?

Mr. STRANGE. Yes, sir. We obtained an arrest warrant from the Central District of California, Federal District, earlier that day for the 18 U.S.C. 1544 passport violation which we were to execute for the State Department, Secretary of State, and we attempted to locate Mr. Randall that afternoon and that night at his home, his parents' home, and were unable to do so. We then went to Laguna Beach thinking that he might be in that area. We saw him in his vehicle with his wife pass us where we were parked in the street and we pursued him.

We lost sight of him and we went on down the Pacific Coast Highway there and could not catch up with him. So we assumed he turned off in the area of the beach house of Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Tigar.

Mr. SOURWINE. They were living together.

Mr. STRANGE. Yes, sir. We went to that address and his car was there, still hot, of course, leading us to believe he had just arrived, and we were faced with the delicate situation of arresting the defendant in the attorney's home.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had an arrest warrant for him?

Mr. STRANGE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Wherever found.

Mr. STRANGE. Yes, sir. So, to be sure, we called the Chief of the Superior Court Division of Orange County and advised him of the circumstances and our advice from counsel was that you have a valid arrest warrant for him. You have to arrest him. So we had a meeting outside the house, myself and the other Federal and local and State agents that had played such a great part in this investigation, and we decided that under no circumstances were we to approach that house without either badge and credentials or both clearly shown.

So we went to the front door en masse and knocked on the door. Mr. Kennedy opened the door. We could see Randall standing in the kitchen through the window, so we knew at this time that he was in

there. Mr. Kennedy opened the door and, of course, he recognized myself and State Agent Barnes. We all had our credentials out and we advised him that we had a warrant, who we were, what we were there for, and he slammed the door and bolted it and refused us entry into the house.

A forced entry was required and Mr. Randall was taken into custody and those six marihuana cigarettes were found on his possession at the time and he was also charged with possession of marihuana in the State court.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, did Mr. Kennedy resist you any further after you forced entry?

Mr. STRANGE. Just through verbal abuse and——

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean he cussed at you?

Mr. STRANGE. Sir?

Mr. SOURWINE. He cussed at you?

Mr. STRANGE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Used vile language, did he?

Mr. STRANGE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, I will not ask you to repeat it for this record, then.

Now, what happened then? Did you take Randall down and book him?

Mr. STRANGE. Yes, sir. We took him to the Laguna Beach Police Department where we removed his shirt, took photographs of him without a shirt on so that we could answer any charges later that he was beaten, and——

Mr. SOURWINE. You felt that was necessary.

Mr. STRANGE. Yes, sir. And it proved to be.

Mr. SOURWINE. They made such charges?

Mr. STRANGE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then your forethought paid off.

Mr. STRANGE. Yes, sir.

[In the remarks that follow, 113 lines of the typewritten testimony given in executive session were deleted for security reasons, at the request of the Drug Enforcement Administration.]

Mr. SOURWINE. So you put him in jail?

Mr. STRANGE. Sir?

Mr. SOURWINE. You put the prisoner in jail?

Mr. STRANGE. Well, we fingerprinted him and photographed him but we had no recourse but to release him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, did he come up with the \$50,000?

Mr. STRANGE. He did not have to. The Federal district judge ordered him released on his own recognizance.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then, what happened?

Mr. STRANGE. Then we went back through the system and tried to get a bail hearing on our part and we did and bail was finally set in the amount of \$10,000.

Mr. SOURWINE. Pretty low bail for a man with his record of skipping; would you not say?

Mr. STRANGE. He had no record of skipping up to that point.

Mr. SOURWINE. He did not have. But he did skip that bail.

Mr. STRANGE. Yes, sir; and two others.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who put up the bail for him?

Mr. STRANGE. We do not know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know of any other members of the Brotherhood of Eternal Love defended by either Michael Kennedy or Michael Tigar?

Mr. STRANGE. Just Michael Boyd Randall and Nicholas Sand.

Mr. SOURWINE. Those are the only ones?

Mr. STRANGE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, when you said that brotherhood members had false passports, do you mean each had one false passport or did some of them have several?

Mr. STRANGE. Some have none, others have as many as four or five.

Mr. SOURWINE. I thought the indicia of these people was they all had a complete ID package. That did not include passports in all cases?

Mr. STRANGE. That is almost exclusively true of the hashish smugglers; but some who worked internally with the distribution of LSD did not need a false passport.

Mr. SOURWINE. So the passports were on a need-to-use basis.

Dr. STRANGE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could you provide us with a list of brotherhood members as far as you are informed who have operated or have had in their possession multiple false passports or multiple passports in false identity?

Mr. STRANGE. Yes, sir.

Mr. HAISLIP. We could provide a list of those who have been indicted on such charges easily. Would that be sufficient for the record?

Mr. SOURWINE. I would rather leave it on the basis of the information available to you than on the basis of the indictment. We might get a few more names that way, I do not know.

Mr. BARTELS. We will do our best to get you them.

[The information requested may be found in the appendix, p. 83.]

Mr. SOURWINE. That is all that anybody can do.

Can one of you gentlemen tell us briefly for the record, the Rick Bevans story?

Mr. SINCLAIR. It will have to be Mr. Strange.

Mr. STRANGE. Mr. Bevans was arrested in May of 1972, in Kabul, Afghanistan. Excuse me. Let me rephrase that. He was taken into custody by the local authorities at Kabul, Afghanistan, in that period of time pursuant to a brotherhood photograph at the airport there at Kabul. They realized who he was from the photograph. They notified our agent there and he sent a teletype to Los Angeles informing us that Mr. Bevans was there traveling under the name Rodney Parks and had a passport to support that. Based on that we got a complaint again out of the central district. And Agent Burke escorted Mr. Bevans from Kabul back to the United States in custody and he was arraigned and bail was set at \$10,000, which he promptly forfeited.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, I show you and your colleagues several charts. Did you provide these for the committee's information?

Mr. BARTELS. Yes, we did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any objection if they are put in the record?

Mr. HAISLIP. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. May that be the order, Mr. Chairman, that they be inserted in the record?

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

[The charts referred to may be found in the appendix, p. 87.]

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, you have touched upon the escape of Timothy Leary, although not in great detail. He tells the story quite fully in his recently published book, "Confessions of a Hope Fiend." Have any of you read it?

Mr. STRANGE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have read it. As far as you know, did he tell the truth?

Mr. STRANGE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may a passage from this book telling how he shimmied across a telephone cable and above the level of the prison lights and climbed down a pole, and so forth, be put in the record at this point?

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

[The information referred to follows:]

[From Confessions of a Hope Fiend, Bantam Books]

(By Timothy Leary)

Slowly picked my way to the roof end looking down over road, fence, compound, and way below car lights on the highway. I sat down and laced the right sneaker.

The socks in my pocket. I put on the left sock and tied the sneaker. Pulled on handball gloves. I lay down on the angled roof just under the cable. Grabbed it with hands and hooked ankles. I reached my hands above my head and pulled out on the wire.

It was hard going. The cable had wire looped every ten inches holding a telephone cord below. My legs bumped and tangled in the wire. There were no smooth easy sweeping pulls. Reach hands. Pull body ten inches. Pull leg. Hands up. Pull body. Haul legs. The cable bouncing and swinging. A strain to hang on. Wrenched my hands. Strain legs. Weird wrestling motions, my body clinging to the swaying wire. Sweating. Heaving awkwardly. After fifty pulls—a pause. Horrid discovery. Completely exhausted. Lungs gasping. Arms drained of energy. Body limp and weak. Can't go another foot. Only one-third across the wire. Hadn't even reached the road. The wire was longer than expected. Two-thirds to go. Exhausted. My hands can't hold the weight of my body. With desperate sexual writhing I embraced the cable with elbows and knees. Rested. The cable was slowly swinging. Nightmare thoughts. What are you doing this time? Inefficient wizard dangling from a cable twenty feet high escaping from life imprisonment in full view of two gun trucks? Once again the little experiment has gotten out of hand, Professor. Turned my head horizontal toward the gun truck. The interior light snapped on. He's seen me. Put on light to sound alarm. The word is flashing. I'm pendant waiting for patrol cars to scream up. Will they poke me down like a wild raccoon with sticks? Dangling, I had to laugh.

Dangling from a swinging wire I start squirming toward life. Five more wrenching feet. Stop. Wrists and arms exhausted. Panting. I should have quit smoking. I should have pushed more iron. It seemed so easy. Now I know why no one has escaped this way. Olympic gymnastics on a high wire in the gun-sights. I should have waited until the winter fog. Maybe they leave the cable strung over the fence as a trap? They're hunters waiting in trucks, rifles cradled on knees, waiting for wild animals to blunder into the ambush? The slaughter hole. My hands trembling could hold no more. With desperate lunge I hooked elbows over the wire, with clumsy crablike grabs pulled body along by elbows. Stop to rest. Look down at macadam road sixteen feet below and over into TV rooms where cons watch the shadow tube.

A sudden glare of light. Forty feet away a patrol car slowly turns from the compound road toward me. I'm captured. The auto rolls closer, a soft crunch of tires on gravel. My blue denim arms turned yellow in the headlight. I looked down directly at the guard leaning over to crush his cigarette in the ashtray. Car rolled by to the corner and disappeared.

Now tumble into some delirious trance. Arms crossed, elbows hooked to wire inching caterpillar crawl. All hope of escape given up. My only goal to reach the fence so I'd fall to freedom outside the perimeter. I must remember when I fall to let feet go first. My hand kept getting tangled in the phone wire loop. A compulsive wrench to free my hand sets the cable bouncing wildly. Mouth gasping, face bulging, glasses twisted, sweat dripping, face grimacing. Another skin of the teeth. I wanted Errol Flynn and out came Harold Lloyd. I felt very alone. Forty-nine years and 325 days of this life built up to this moment of ordeal. My life hung on a needle point. In trance of Sun Dance initiates whirl suspended by hooked burning pain in the chest muscles. There was no fear only a nagging embarrassment. Such an undignified way to die, nailed like a sloth on a branch! Other men and women in prison would be pained by my failed escape. My fall would please the guards. See we told you. You can't escape. There is no escape.

No more thoughts. From some inner reservoir of LIVE! LIVE! LIVE! SURVIVE! came an energy flow and a curious erotic lightness. Hands reached up in easy strong pulls, legs kicking, body wiggling, arms flailing, shoulders pushing propelled by uterine squeeze. My glasses fell but my arms smoothly reeled cable. Thus I butted head first dripping wet into this New Life.

Hand over hand till fingers hit the pole. Hanging by my legs (I'd practiced it a thousand times in my bunk) I reached right hand over head, grabbed metal spike, dropped legs, twisted body, wrapped legs around splintery wood, slid down. Exultant feet hit liberated ground FREE!

* * * * *

I was swaying sweating panting. I saw the glasses lying on ground outside of fence. I adjusted them on my nose, funny professor gesture. I looked around. All silent. Electric lights shining on the steel fence and the green grass. Cell-blocks forty feet away shining still in the night. No motion.

I staggered to the wall, slid down, lay head against the stone, drained, deeply breathing, listening. Alert fox hiding from hunters, waiting for pursuit cars to scream down road. Silence. I started down the bank. The barracks of the open-prison compound lay scattered below. Lights were on. Watch for fire patrol. Steep decline. My first steps dislodged a rock avalanche. I slipped and slid, stones rattling around me. Hit the hill bottom and started loping carefully, probing, wary like a kickoff return.

* * * * *

Up ahead I saw the dim outline of trees next to the highway. Climbed out of the culvert and ran to the first tree. Standing five feet from highway at the base of the second tree, I saw three trees joined at the root trunk. Well, they have the symbols right.

A long wait for the pickup. Scanning the cars roaring by. Two minutes. Five minutes. Ten minutes.

A car is coming. Right blinker flashing. It pulled up in front of the tree. I ran from the shadows. The car door swung open. A girl with long dark hair leaped out. Code words swapped.

—Kelly!

—Tino!

We embraced. I ducked into the back seat grabbing the hand of the blond girl behind the wheel. Kelly jumped in slamming the door. Motor gunned we roared off.

—I'm Maru, said the driver.

—Where is She?

—In Denver waiting for you. You'll see Her Monday.

I had mixed feelings. I hoped She was out of the country safe but exultant we'd meet in two days.

Kelly was talking fast.

—Brother, we're glad to see you! We made two passes by the pickup spot. We were worried. You were late. I was going to start walking back the tracks to look for you. In case you were hurt.

Kelly pointed to the back seat.—There's a new set of clothes. Change. I started stripping off prison denim.

—Give them to me, said Kelly.

—I'd like to save them. For Barker and Horowitz the archivists.

—No. We're going to transfer your clothes to another car. They'll drive south near L.A. and leave them in a gas station restroom. To make the pigs think we're heading south.

—How many cars do you have operating tonight?

Four. You'll only be in this car for five minutes. We have a camper in Morro Bay to take you to Oakland. A third car goes south. And the fourth has the shortwave set to monitor police calls. How much of a lead do we have?

—I don't think I was seen leaving. So we have two hours before they discover I'm gone.

Maru was driving smooth and easy. In four minutes we reached a road by the beach. Car stopped. Maru turned back grinning. —OK brother. You get out now. I'll see you in Oakland.

I pulled the knit ski cap over my head and followed Kelly out of the car over the sand dunes down the beach. It was still a B movie, spy thriller, World War II.

After a hundred yards Kelly turned away from the sea, over dunes to a parked camper. A beautiful woman waited. We kissed. A sturdy gray-haired man came around the side of the camper and we shook hands.

—Welcome.

Kelly motioned me in back of trailer.

—I'm going to dye your hair now. A strange trailer just pulled up. They look suspicious. We don't want to pull out suddenly. We'll hang around here for a few minutes and then hit it.

I sat on the edge of the bunk bed. Kelly standing at the sink filling a pail of water. She squirted spray-can hair dye on my scalp and began massaging. After a while she stopped and smiled.

Kelly is my code name, not my real name. I'm not always a beautician. My father is Senator ——— and the name of our tribe is the Weathermen Underground.

I began to laugh. It all figured. The maniac reckless guerrilla tribe. Scourge of the FBI.

—We had to keep it secret. We hope it's all right with you.

I suddenly flashed on the meshing of underground energy systems. Dope dealers raise twenty-five thousand dollars to finance the breakout. And the bread goes to the maniac guerrillas.¹

—The twenty-five thousand went to buy dynamite? Kelly laughed.

—Dynamite, hair dye, and fast cars.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know the names of all of the individuals including those other than Bernardine Dohrn, who were in the car when he was picked up?

Mr. STRANGE. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know of the names of any of them?

Mr. STRANGE. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Just Bernardine Dohrn.

Mr. STRANGE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, the man who you said lived with Leary in Algeria and in Switzerland, was he an undercover agent?

Mr. STRANGE. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who was he?

Mr. STRANGE. His brother is married to Timothy Leary's daughter.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is his name?

Mr. STRANGE. Dennis Martino.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where is he now?

Mr. STRANGE. He is in Los Angeles.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is he in jail?

Mr. STRANGE. No, sir. He is a Government witness.

Mr. SOURWINE. He is a Government witness? That might keep him out of jail.

You do not know whether he knows the identities of all of the Weathermen who were in the car?

Mr. STRANGE. No, sir.

¹ See footnote on p. 20.

[In the remarks that follow, 20 lines of the typewritten testimony given in executive session were deleted for security reasons, at the request of the Drug Enforcement Administration.]

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I have no more questions to ask of these witnesses. I note that we have arrived at a point later than 1 o'clock. I would respectfully suggest that we inquire of Miss Knight whether she wants to go ahead without lunch, or whether she wants a recess for lunch.

Miss KNIGHT. It is up to you entirely, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, maybe we could break until 2 o'clock for luncheon and come back here to hear Miss Knight and the people from her office.

I think we should say we are extremely grateful to you, sir, and the men you brought with you. It is obvious that you have been doing a very fine job with respect to the Leary—at least the Leary family.

Mr. BARTELS. Thank you, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And it heartening to hear your recommendations. I would like to ask just this one question before you leave the stand.

Are you getting the money you need? Are you getting appropriation support you need and other congressional support you need for the job you are trying to do?

Mr. BARTELS. Yes, sir. Yes, we are.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer for the record a clipping from the Washington Post of Friday, August 24, 1973, being the Washington Merry-Go-Round column by Jack Anderson and Les Whitten under the caption "U.S. Losing Drug Smuggling War." I would like to ask this go in the record, and I would like to ask you, sir, if you will, when you are correcting the testimony, to insert for the record any comments you have on this or any information you can give us in this area that would be helpful.

[The article referred to may be found in the appendix, p. 90.]

Mr. BARTELS. Thank you.

Mr. SOURWINE. We do thank you for coming.

The CHAIRMAN. I also want to express my appreciation to you for coming here to testify. I think you have performed a real public service, and I want to congratulate you on the effective work your agency is doing and on the remarkable successes you have had in your drive against the Brotherhood of Eternal Love.

Mr. BARTELS. Thank you. We are honored.

[Whereupon, at 1:15 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m., this same day.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The CHAIRMAN. Miss Knight, we thank you and Mr. Duggan, and I apologize for running beyond the time set for resumption of this hearing.

As I think you have been told, the committee wants to bring its records up to date on the status of passport frauds. We are considering legislation in this area and want to be sure that we have the latest and up-to-date information.

We are, of course, particularly interested in the Leary family passport fraud case, and we look to you to tell us about that.

Your previous testimony recorded your deep concern about the fraudulent documentation and identification used by criminal elements to obtain passports. Would you like to make a formal or semiformal statement bringing up to date this fraud situation as it affects passports?

TESTIMONY OF FRANCES G. KNIGHT, DIRECTOR, PASSPORT OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY WILLIAM E. DUGGAN, CHIEF, LEGAL DIVISION, PASSPORT OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AND JOHN O'DOWD, ATTORNEY-ADVISER, LEGAL DIVISION, PASSPORT OFFICE (previously sworn)

Miss KNIGHT. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I have such a statement, and I hope it will be helpful. It really is more of the same except that the situation is worse now than it was 1 year ago or 6 months ago.

Mr. William E. Duggan, Chief of the Passport Office Legal Division, is with me today because he is thoroughly familiar with the fraud cases and the seriousness of the substantial increase in document fraud.

If you agree, I would like to read my statement prior to Mr. Duggan's discussion on fraud cases.

The CHAIRMAN. Go right ahead, Miss Knight.

Miss KNIGHT. Thank you, sir.

Fraud is usually discovered after the fact. In other words, while the fraudulent act occurs at the point where an individual submits fraudulent documents in the form of a fraudulent birth certificate, or baptismal certificate, fraudulent social security card or driver's license, the Passport Office detects the fraud only upon scrutinizing and adjudicating the application for a passport. If the passport application is accepted by a facility other than the Passport Office, the personal evaluation of the applicant is lost to us.

In other words, we detect fraud in the documents submitted with the passport application. We may attempt to contact the applicant. If he is an experienced criminal, he will not give us a specific address but will indicate a post office box or even indicate that he "will call" for the passport within a reasonable period of time. If the criminal gets any notion that we question the authenticity of his credentials, he disappears—we see neither hide nor hair of him. Undoubtedly, he will try again, elsewhere, by assuming another identity.

We use clerks of court in Federal and State courts and a few probate courts. A total of approximately 2,800 courts cooperate with the Passport Office in accepting passport applications. However, the courts are so backlogged with cases that in the past few years, they have been bowing out of this work.

Currently, we have 819 post offices accepting passport applications, and while such a spread is convenient to the public, and adjudication of these applications require much closer review than those applications received by the Passport Office and its agencies or from the clerks of court who are more inclined to question an individual's identity than a post office employee.

Mr. SOURWINE. At that point, if I may interrupt, Miss Knight, is it not true that there is a substantial difference in the quality of training of the employees who as employees of a court receive applications, and those who as employees of the Postal Service receive them?

Miss KNIGHT. I think that is true, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. They are much better paid than the Postal Service.

Miss KNIGHT. I do not know what the pay is, now that it is an independent organization.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead.

Miss KNIGHT. As a matter of fact, it is the consensus of our security-minded staff that if a criminal wanted to get a dozen passports under a dozen different identities, he would choose to do so through a postal facility and not through a passport agency or clerk of court. But we have no way of checking this obviously less than secure method of accepting passport applications. Our own trained passport agents in their eyeball confrontation with the applicant have detected fraud on the spot. We have only one such detection from a post office employee.

The Postal Service through its 819 facilities accept approximately 30 percent of our total application workload. Under an agreement made by the Department of State, the Postal Service, now a private enterprise, is reimbursed \$2 per application accepted, or a total of \$1,633,366 in the past fiscal year. The Post Office workload has developed to a great extent from the Federal courts which could no longer cope with the volume. The Passport Office, however, continues to adjudicate all applications, contact applicants when errors occur, process the passport, and mail it to the bearer.

One other point I would like to make because it is directly related to our concern with security: As the post office program evolved, we in the Passport Office sought to educate postal officials on the urgent need to check the accuracy of the passport application and accompanying documents. We prepared an analysis form for each post office sending in applications, and indicated on this form the errors made—dividing them into serious errors and not-so-serious errors. The workload resultant was horrendous. In a period of 10 months, we forwarded 1,398 correction sheets covering a total of over 8,000 errors. We finally gave up this educational program because we did not have the necessary personnel to render such service. Correction sheets are now being sent out to post offices by passport field agencies when time and workload permit. Statistics indicate that for the period of January 1 through August 1973, a total of 31,770 letters of notification were sent to post offices, advising them of over 73,000 errors. Those are the ones we caught. I have no idea of how many we missed.

The extent of fraudulent documentation presented to the post offices and to the clerks of courts is unknown. We only know what we discover in the course of our careful adjudication of the passport applications after they are received in the Passport Office. When there is no person-to-person contact by trained Passport Office personnel, there obviously is a lesser chance of observation and detection of fraud.

In 1968, the International Civil Aviation Organization composed of delegates representing 126 countries, established a panel of passport experts representing eight member nations to study the development of a new passport document with the aim of facilitating travel across the international frontiers. Represented on this panel are Australia, Canada, France, Germany, India, Kenya, Sweden, and the United States. I was selected to represent the United States.

The first meeting of the panel took place in June 1969 at Montreal, Canada. Subsequent meetings took place at Paris in May 1970 and at Montreal in January 1972. Work of the panel is presently being continued by correspondence, with possible further meetings in mid-1974.

There was premature enthusiasm among several members of the passport panel for a "passport card"—similar to a credit card in size with identifying data. We did not share in the enthusiasm because of some very specific drawbacks to a "card passport" and our concern to meet the expectations and requirements of our citizens by providing them with a secure document; tamperproof identification as well as convenience.

In the discharge of my responsibilities, both as Director of the Passport Office and as a member of the ICAO Panel, I appointed on January 10, 1969, an internal study committee within the Passport Office composed of knowledgeable passport officers. This committee was charged with studying the passport card which had been proposed by several European members of the international panel and about which we held grave reservations. Subsequently, the card passport was considered a questionable substitute for the traditional book format.

It should be remembered that the U.S. Passport Office issues more passports in 1 year than all the other countries represented on the Panel combined, so our arguments on the deficiencies of the card concept carried some weight, especially with the security advisers to the Panel, such as the representative from INTERPOL. Informal consultations with the U.S. security community indicated their wholehearted support of the Passport Office position.

In connection with this study, the Passport Office on August 4, 1969, requested the inclusion of \$55,000 in its fiscal year 1971 budget, subsequently upped on August 28 to \$75,000, to begin the research and development of a new and improved passport document. Unfortunately, this modest initial request for funds to begin this essential work was denied by the Department on the recommendation of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs of which we are a component office. The Passport Office was not permitted to address its request to higher authorities since I was advised that the Bureau's denial of funds was supported by the Department.

Thus, the research of the internal Passport Office Committee was forced to proceed without funds, depending entirely upon the gratis cooperation of private companies in the identification and documentation field. Over a 3-year period, the committee discussed existing technology in identification documentation with 80 companies, all of which cooperated with us for free.

On May 28, 1970, the Passport Office once again requested \$75,000 for research and development of a new passport be included in a supplemental budget for fiscal year 1971. Again this request was not supported by the Bureau nor approved by the Department's Budget Office. Frankly, we were talking into a vacuum, because we only have access to persons totally devoid of any basic knowledge or concern with travel documents. The project was essentially dead and the members of the ICAO Panel expressed astonishment that our Government

was so disinterested in a matter which merited top level concern and support in all high volume tourist countries.

In desperation I wrote to the President in December 1970, asking for an appointment. This was promptly arranged for December 14, 1970, and I discuss our security, fraud, and project problems with him. The President showed enthusiasm for the project of researching and developing a new passport, especially since I thought it could be developed in time for the Bicentennial. He asked me how much I needed for this project and I cited the figure of \$75,000. The President indicated his approval and it is a fact that the White House communicated the President's personal interest in and support of this project, but despite this, 6 months elapsed before any action was taken by the Department.

Finally, the project was expanded and with the President's support \$150,000 was appropriated in the fiscal year 1972 budget to let a contract for the research and development of a new passport and improved methods of issuance. These funds became available to the Passport Office on July 22, 1971, 23 months after the Passport Office requested them.

The committee within the Passport Office began to draft a comprehensive statement of the work to be included in the solicitation for bids on the contract. The request for proposals was released on January 5, 1972. Deadline for bids on the contract was February 11, 1972.

Bids were received from over 20 companies and research organizations. A review panel of experienced passport officers was constituted to read, study and evaluate each proposal against the criteria set forth in the request for proposals. On the basis of technical evaluation and within the funds' restrictions imposed by the Department, the field was finally narrowed down to two bidders. A series of negotiations followed and the contract was awarded to Computer Sciences Corp. on May 15, 1972, 33 months after the Passport Office asked for funds and 17 months after the President had expressed his interest in and support of the project to the Department.

So much, Mr. Chairman, for the background on how we finally managed to get moving on the program to develop a new concept for a travel document.

[The following articles were ordered into the record on p. 76.]

[From the New York Times, May 17, 1972]

U.S. ORDERS A STUDY OF PASSPORT SYSTEM

WASHINGTON, May 16.—Frances G. Knight, director of the United States Passport Office, announced today a \$150,000, one-year research award to determine what passport improvements might be made in these days of growing travel abroad.

In announcing the study contract with Computer Sciences Corporation of Los Angeles, Miss Knight made plain she does not believe a simple identification card passport would suffice for travel by United States citizens all over the world "in the foreseeable future."

Segments of the travel industry and the passport panel of the International Civil Aviation Organization have recommended adoption of a card type of passport.

Passports of the United States and most other governments include identification of the passport holder and pages for insertion of visas and stamped notations of entry into other countries.

More than 140 countries now require visas for United States travelers. An identification card passport would have little space for stamping a visa.

[From the Washington Star, May 21, 1972]

PASSPORT CHANGE IS UNDER STUDY

Director Frances G. Knight of the U.S. Passport office has announced awarding of a private research contract to study the creation of a new and better "international travel document."

Miss Knight, generally acclaimed for having "revolutionized" the passport office since she became director 17 years ago, said she was proud of the progress but wanted to see if a new document to replace the three types of American passports now being used would serve travelers better.

She said that while the present operation is "described internationally as the most efficient passport operation in the world," she and her staff still were looking for "constructive change" to provide better and more efficient service.

The office in 1971 issued 2.3 million passports.

It took in about \$22 million, while the direct cost to the government for the operation was between \$8 million and \$9 million.

The research contract, awarded to Computer Sciences Corp., calls for the expenditure of \$150,000.

CONTRACT AWARDED FOR PASSPORT STUDY

U.S. Passport Director Frances G. Knight announced yesterday a \$150,000, one-year research award to determine what U.S. passport improvements might be made in these days of mushrooming travel abroad.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you want to turn over to Mr. Duggan now?

Miss KNIGHT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, Miss Knight, that is fine. Mr. Duggan may proceed but I wish you would stand by because the committee is very much interested in this matter of passport security. As you know, we have taken testimony on it before. We knew of the award of the contract which was a matter of public record and we just cannot let this record stop back in May 1972. We have got to know more about it.

I will ask you when Mr. Duggan is through, and you may make notes in the meantime if you want to, but we would like to have a statement from you that will bring this whole subject up to date.

Miss KNIGHT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Right down to where we are now when Mr. Duggan finishes his presentation.

Miss KNIGHT. Yes, sir.

Mr. DUGGAN. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, I will be glad to answer any questions you may have to the best of my ability. In my 33 years with the Passport Office, I have been exposed to most of our legal and security problems. Therefore, I can speak from years of experience and personal involvement in my area of work. I believe you may be interested in the overall passport fraud situation as it now exists.

The overall passport fraud picture shows that, during the fiscal year 1973, we detected 449 fraudulent domestic applications. This is an increase of 149 over the previous fiscal year, when we detected 300 fraudulent applications filed in the United States. This is an increase of 158 percent. This increase is indicative of some of the evils which beset our society, namely, the drug trafficking problem and the illegal alien problem. Since most of our frauds are perpetrated by persons falling within an identifiable age group it is realistic to put this fraud percentage in practical terms. In fiscal year 1972, we issued 921,260 passports to persons within this age group. During the same period, we uncovered 300 domestic frauds within that age group. This amounts to one fraud discovered for each 3,070 applications.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think that is all the fraud cases there are or are you missing some?

Mr. DUGGAN. I do not think there is any doubt but we are missing some. I think fraud detection is similar to the iceberg—where the greater proportion is well concealed and undetected.

In fiscal year 1973, we issued 945,080 passports to persons within the age identifiable age group. In fiscal year 1973 we discovered 449 domestic frauds within that age group. This amounts to one fraud for each 2,104 applications. In addition to the frauds perpetrated by drug traffickers and illegal aliens, we also have frauds perpetrated by militant groups, confidence men and fugitives.

Examples of the various types of frauds will be cited later in the statement. Reduced to simple terms, passport frauds and those frauds relating to passport frauds are symbolic of other fraudulent activities in the United States. Reduced to basic terms, it concerns what might be termed "the mystery of identification in our present open society."

With regard to drug-related passport frauds, the greatest problem we now have is caused by the activities of the group called the Brotherhood of Eternal Love. We became involved in this activity in June of 1972. The activities of this group were discussed briefly by Miss Knight when she testified before this committee on September 15, 1972. Pertinent information is contained on pages 5 and 6 of the report of the hearing. Information on the Brotherhood and related passport fraud information was updated in Miss Knight's communication to Senator Strom Thurmond which was inserted in the Congressional Record on June 28, 1973. That information is now outdated.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask that the letter to Senator Thurmond be placed in this hearing record in an appendix and identified at this point in the record?

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

[The letter referred to may be found in the appendix, p. 91.]

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead, sir.

Mr. DUGGAN. Therefore, I would like to submit a revised table to the committee bringing the information on the Brotherhood frauds up to October 1, 1973.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is fine. Now, when Miss Knight testified on September 15, 1972, I believe she told us that 40 cases of passport fraud had been sent to the Office of Security for investigation in connection with the Brotherhood of Eternal Love and that another 10 or 12 cases previously sent for investigation had been tentatively identified as members of the Brotherhood. By April 27, 1973, the number of passport frauds detected in connection with the Brotherhood of Eternal Love had risen to what?

Mr. DUGGAN. 73.

Mr. SOURWINE. By June 1, 1973, how many was it?

Mr. DUGGAN. 120.

Mr. SOURWINE. As of August 1973, how many?

Mr. DUGGAN. August 1973, I will have to refer to my notes. I have a figure for July 12, 1973.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, give us July 12.

Mr. DUGGAN. July 12, 1973, 124.

Mr. SOURWINE. And how many now?

Mr. DUGGAN. 130.

Mr. SOURWINE. 130. Do you think you have them all yet?

Mr. DUGGAN. We again relate to the iceberg theory pertinent to all fraudulent activities.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you not know how many more there may be?

Mr. DUGGAN. No, I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. In connection with this one organization.

Mr. DUGGAN. No. The fraud is hidden, as Miss Knight stated.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead, sir, you have a table you want to put in the record.

Mr. DUGGAN. That is the exhibit.

Mr. SOURWINE. May this be received, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

[The document referred to follows:]

BROTHERHOOD FRAUDS

	April 27, 1973	June 1, 1973	July 12, 1973	October 1 1973
Number of frauds.....	73	120	124	130
Type of fraud:				
Alteration of passport.....	2	2	2	2
Fraudulent use of passport.....	2	2	2	2
Identifying witness.....	9	17	19	20
False statement.....	60	99	101	106
Place passport application filed (false statement viola- tions):				
Los Angeles.....	22	31	32	32
San Francisco.....	13	24	24	25
Miami.....	0	6	6	6
Chicago.....	4	4	4	4
Post Office.....	4	5	5	5
New York.....	3	5	5	5
Kabul.....	3	3	3	3
Clerk of court.....	2	6	6	8
Other.....	9	15	15	18
Year fraudulent application filed (prior to 1969) (false statement violations)				
1969.....	3	5	5	6
1970.....	10	11	11	12
1971.....	11	20	20	21
1972.....	21	35	35	36
1973.....	13	23	23	24
1973.....	2	5	7	7
Detected before issue (1972-73):				
San Francisco.....	4	4	4	4
Seattle.....	1	1	1	1
Miami.....	1	1	1	1
Los Angeles.....	1	1	1	2
Hawaii.....	0	0	1	1
Lookout system.....	1	1	1	1
New Orleans.....	0	0	1	1
Total.....	8	8	10	11
Referred U.S. Attorney.....				45
Indicted.....				25
Convicted.....				2
Declined:				
1—No reason.....				3
2—Charged other offense.....				
Counterfeit birth certificates detected.....	27	45	48	51
Purported issuing authority:				
Hospital.....	5	6	6	6
Nebraska.....	0	8	8	8
Missouri.....	4	5	6	6
Chicago.....	14	4	4	4
Colorado.....	2	2	2	2
Utah.....	2	3	3	3
North Carolina.....	0	3	3	3
New York.....				2
Ohio.....	0	2	2	2
California.....				4
Other (Less than 2 apiece).....	0	12	14	11

Mr. DUGGAN. This table shows that as of October 1, 1973, we had detected 130 passport violations connected with the Brotherhood of Eternal Love.

Of this number, 42 have been submitted to the U.S. Attorney for prosecution, 25 have been indicted, and five have been convicted. In three cases, prosecutions were declined by the U.S. Attorney, since persons were charged with other offenses. You will note that, of the total number of frauds, 31 concerned passport applications which were filed during the years 1972 and 1973. The majority of the violations concerned applications which were filed prior to 1972. Of the 31 fraudulent applications filed in 1972 and 1973, 11 or over 35 percent were detected before issuance.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean two-thirds of the fraud cases now known, the passports were issued?

Mr. DUGGAN. That is correct. We will get into that problem.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead.

Mr. DUGGAN. This effectiveness in detection is largely due to an intensive fraud training program directed at passport office agents throughout the country which we initiated in the Spring of 1972.

At this point I would like to correct the statement made by Mr. Sinclair this morning. On page 10 of his statement he states:

On Sept. 23, 1973, the State Department publicly announced that a tougher screening process would be used in the issuing of passports due to the Brotherhood of Eternal Love.

So far as I know, the State Department did not issue any such statement on that particular day or at any other time. Our training program began in the Spring of 1972.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is the date in question now?

Mr. DUGGAN. It is on page 10 of Mr. Sinclair's statement. He said:

On Sept. 23, 1973, the State Department publicly announced that a tougher screening process would be used in the issuing of passports due to the Brotherhood of Eternal Love.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, I call your attention to the fact that the Philadelphia Sunday Bulletin of Sunday, September 23, 1973, in its travel and resorts section, had a special feature article advertised in the front of the resort section as "Inside Report on America's Passport Lady," purporting to be an interview with Miss Barbara M. Watson, Administrator of the Security and Consular Affairs, by reporter Edward Neilan of the Philadelphia Bulletin, or at least labeled "Special to the Bulletin" with a Washington dateline. Have you seen that?

Mr. DUGGAN. I have not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. I do not know whether I should ask you to comment on it or ask Miss Knight to comment on it.

Miss Knight, have you seen this Philadelphia Bulletin story I refer to?

Miss KNIGHT. Yes, sir. I received a copy of it yesterday in my office. [The article referred to may be found on p. 76.]

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, then, I will wait until Mr. Duggan is through and ask you to comment on it, I will say, to me, as counsel for the committee, what is said here is inherently incredible and if it is true, I think we certainly want to know about it. You are moving back into the dark ages if this is true.

Go ahead, Mr. Duggan.

Mr. DUGGAN. In 49 of the cases, counterfeit birth certificates were submitted. The States involved are listed.

Mr. SOURWINE. 49 of what cases? I lost you.

Mr. DUGGAN. I am sorry. I refer to the table I submitted regarding the brotherhood frauds.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead.

Mr. DUGGAN. In 49 of the cases counterfeit birth certificates were submitted. The States involved are listed on page 5 of the chart herewith submitted. The city of Chicago seems to be a favorite target of the drug traffickers since 14 cases involving false claims of birth in Chicago have been uncovered.

One of the founders of the brotherhood, Timothy Francis Leary, obtained a passport on a false identity on September 22, 1970, 10 days after his escape from a State prison at California on September 12, 1970. With his fraudulently obtained passport, he left the United States and ended up in Algeria as a guest of Eldridge Cleaver, one of the leaders of the Black Panthers. Ultimately, Leary left Algeria and successfully fought an extradition order in Switzerland. After being "requested" to leave Switzerland, in December 1972, he ultimately appeared in Kabul on January 14, 1973, where he was apprehended and returned to the United States on January 18, 1973. He is now back in prison in California.

In a book entitled, "Timothy Leary—Confessions of a Hope Fiend," published in July 1973, the author described the methods by which he and his wife obtained U.S. passports in false identities. I think the best method of revealing the basic facts is to quote from the book.

The author attempts to cloud the circumstances by the use of code names, false names, and false locations. Despite this tactic the methods used, as well as other facts, are quite evident.

With regard to the methods used by Mrs. Rosemary Leary to obtain the passport in a false identity the author quotes his wife on pages 97, 98 and 99 as follows:

We had a heavy schedule. Wig, makeup, photographs, license bureau, library, social security card.

Getting a new head took the most time. I never knew there could be so many kinds of wigs.

Looking at myself in the mirror I saw the faces of my midwestern cousins. Oh, Lord, must I look this way? Fresh from the beauty shop plastic lady. The longer I looked the less I liked her. But have a little sympathy. What's her story? Twenty-eight. Single. She needs makeup, her skin is too sallow. What's her name? Margaret Ann McCreedy. Lived with her parents until last month, got her own apartment in Berkeley. Supersecretary for an insurance firm.

Let's see what emerges after some makeup. Department store cosmetics. Orange-pink lipstick. Dark brown eyebrow pencil. False eyelashes. Need help there. The salesgirl was obliging.

OK, Pam. Behold Margaret Ann McCreedy. I felt weird. What a change.

Next morning to the passport office in the cold-steel Federal building. I filled out forms using national holidays for my parents' birthdays. My occupation is student.

I was worried about the driver's license so I held up my right hand and pledged allegiance, smiling and thanking him. He told me I could come back and pick it up that afternoon.

A fat woman clerk was talking on the phone with an index file in front of her. A long wait and she asked me my name. I couldn't remember it! I flushed and dropped my bag. I prayed. I stood up and said Margaret Ann McCreedy. I took the passport and fled back to hotel. That night we flew back to San Francisco. I wish you could see my passport picture. It's so funny.

With regard to his own obtention of a passport in a false identity, the author quotes his companion as follows:

There's a wallet and set of IDs in the pocket. Your name is William McMillan. Your birthday is November 14, 1929. Your address is 2925 Northridge Road, Salt Lake City.

I'm going to dye your hair now. A strange trailer just pulled up. They look suspicious.

The person dyeing Leary's hair says:

Kelly is my code name, not my real name. * * * and the name of our tribe is the Weathermen Underground.

The escape of Leary from the United States is then discussed by the group as follows:

Let's use a simple plan. We're having a set of IDs made here. Use a faraway city address. Tucson, Arizona, or Atlanta, Georgia. Friday you go down and get a Utah State driver's license. There won't be time for a picture but your description will be on the temporary license. Sunday you fly to New York, Monday apply for a passport. You can get it in a day. Monday night you fly to the Third World. Surface with Eldridge Cleaver in Algeria.

How the Learys leave the United States is discussed on page 150.

Apply for a passport or hijack a plane?

They'll be looking for me to dress up or hide behind a beard. The strategy is to take off my hair. Bald. Who's the barber? Kelly—

the person he was riding with at the time—

Kelly snipping my top hair close to the scalp. It was a slow process.

"Not bad. Now let's shave it clean."

"Take it easy, bloody gashes will betray."

I walk to the bathroom and peer in the mirror at a high-domed, chicken-plucked moose-faced baldpate stranger.

Then we turn to page 157 when he describes going into the Passport Office.

A nice Detroit policeman directed us to the Federal Building. I recalled coming to testify for John Sinclair and the Seven in Judge Hoffman's court as Pam guided me up the elevator to the door of the U.S. State Department Passport Division.

I pulled out the ID cards and paper with my personal history. My name and birth date. Now create a father's name and date and invent a mother's name and date and a wife named Sylvia and two lovely children.

A large sign above the counter listed the requirements for a passport. Birth certificate. OK. Photos. OK. Personal identification with picture. That's the problem.

I flash a slight smile of understanding—

to the clerk.

You'll have no bureaucratic trouble from W. J. McMillan, a fine upstanding Catholic businessman with two lovely children. Her eyes twinkled. Birth certificate. That's fine, Mr. McMillan. Personal ID? Driver's license? No. I'm afraid I don't drive. Will Social Security card do? She frowned in concern. No it has to have your picture or identification.

Ah, I do have something here. Aunt Bridget took my hunting license in her plump hand.

Yes, Mr. McMillan, I can accept this. It has your description.

You or your friend can pick up your passport in three hours at the counter over there.

Later in the afternoon:

The plane was to leave for Madrid at 5:30 and we had to be at the airport at 4:30. At 4:00 I looked down to see Pam and Kelly leaping out of the cab. They breezed into the hotel room flashing the ink-wet passport.

I would like to submit to the subcommittee for observation photographs of Dr. Leary and Mrs. Leary as they normally appear, and photographs as they appeared after physical changes were made. I think you will agree that the differences in appearance are most striking.

Mr. SOURWINE, Mr. Chairman, may these go in the record if they can be satisfactorily reproduced?

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

[The photographs referred to follow:]


Timothy Francis Leary - Rosemary Leary

Before and After

Timothy Francis Leary

AKA

William Mc Millan



Rosemary Leary

AKA

Margaret Ann Mc Creedy



Mr. DUGGAN. The question obviously comes to mind, is the method used by Leary the only method used to obtain U.S. passports fraudulently?

In our experience, the answer is emphatically no. A more complete story is told in an underground pamphlet entitled "The Paper Trip." It is, in effect, a brazen "how to do it" manual giving extensive information on methods of obtaining bona fide birth certificates as well as identification. The recommended procedure is called the obituary method or the obtention of birth certificates of children who die in infancy.

Mr. SOURWINE. We are familiar with that document, and I respectfully suggest to the Chair that no useful purpose can be served by having us reprint it in this record. We do not want to give it any more circulation than it already has.

Mr. DUGGAN. I appreciate that. I think the more circulation given to this underground pamphlet, the more problems we are going to have.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is a handbook on how to commit fraud on passports.

Mr. DUGGAN. Right.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are telling us you are familiar with it, and from your experience people practice what it preaches.

Mr. DUGGAN. As a matter of fact, that is so, and we will submit proof to show that one of our passport frauds actually used that particular pamphlet to get a passport.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right. Go ahead. That would interest us.

Mr. DUGGAN. Well, I will provide documentary proof that the booklet, "The Paper Trip," is used by persons to obtain U.S. passports. I submit to the subcommittee a letter dated July 8, 1973, from a person in Los Angeles who admitted that she and her husband used the instructions in "The Paper Trip" to assist them in obtaining passports in false identities.

Mr. SOURWINE. May this be received, Mr. Chairman? I notice portions of this have been blocked out. The purpose of it is to protect the identity of the writer?

Mr. DUGGAN. Yes. To protect the identity of the writer, and since it is in the process of prosecution and investigation, I think it is best to delete all names.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you are not protecting the writer from investigation or possible prosecution.

Mr. DUGGAN. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you are proceeding.

Mr. DUGGAN. Yes. It is merely proof to show that "The Paper Trip" has in fact been used as we have suspected.

Mr. SOURWINE. I ask that this may go into the record, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

[The document referred to follows:]

JULY 8, 1973.

U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT,
Passport Agency,
Lawndale, Calif.:

This letter is in regard to two passport applications filled out in September and November of last year. I recently contacted the passport office in Los Angeles and explained my situation and have been advised to write this letter.

In September, 1972, I filled out a passport application under the name of _____, which is my maiden name. I was married at the time and my legal name was _____. On the passport application I stated that I wasn't married. The reason I filled out the application in my maiden name was because I had separated from my husband a month before and when we got back together I used my maiden name because I no longer considered myself "married" to him. I had started divorce proceedings while we were separated which were stopped when we reconciled. Also, my husband had numerous bill collectors hounding him because of debts incurred before we were married. By using the name of _____, I would not have the hassle from the collectors who were looking for my husband for something that I had nothing to do with. On the application I gave a post office box address for the passport to be sent to.

Shortly thereafter a passport application was filled out by my husband, _____, who I was living with at the time. For this passport he tried to change his name to _____, I do not know how this was done. I later learned that he put _____ as the person to notify in case of emergency. A few days later I received a letter at _____, where we were living at the time. The letter was in regards to the _____ application and was the first time I knew of such an application. Then there were phone calls to my relatives in regard to my whereabouts plus questions about "_____". This scared me because I thought I was going to be in trouble about having lied on the _____ application (during this time the _____ passport had been sent to the post office box address and had been returned by the post office to your office.) I was also afraid I would be tied in to the _____ application which I didn't have any thing to do with. Unfortunately instead of being rational and smart, I had already planned to leave Los Angeles to drive across the United States, so I left as planned. I had seen a book entitled, "The Paper Trip" in the Los Angeles Free Press claiming to tell you how to change your ID "legally". I thought this was a solution, not fully realizing the seriousness of the situation.

The drive across took a week and was made by myself and my husband. We arrived in Miami and stayed with relatives for a week. We then left for Pennsylvania where we stayed for a month in a house we rented. In Pennsylvania is where we received "The Paper Trip" and started gathering the necessary things to obtain the passports (birth certificates and other identification). In "The Paper Trip" it is fully explained how to do this: find the name of someone deceased, in old newspapers obtainable in any large library, who is close to the age you would like to be, obtain the death certificate, from the death certificate you get the information necessary for the birth certificate. For \$2.00 you can obtain the birth certificate.

Once I obtained the birth certificate, I left for New York still without the necessary identification. In New York a printer printed school identification cards with all the necessary information; with a picture attached and laminated it looked like a regular school ID card.

In New York the time for receiving passports was too long, so we drove to Philadelphia to fill out the application. This was November 27, 1972. I filled out and received a passport (enclosed) as _____ on this day. On December 5 we left for Europe; staying in London for two months, while trying to get a business going importing guitars. When this was unsuccessful we returned.

It took me three months to get the money to take the trip back to Los Angeles. I was in New York for two weeks with friends and in Pennsylvania for two and a half months. I separated from my husband in Pennsylvania and I'm in the process of obtaining a divorce. I'm now living with my parents and my only wish is to correct my records. I realize now that I only made matters worse by not clearing it up in the beginning, but I was young (19) and very foolish at the time. I feel that things went far enough and that now is the time to have things corrected. If there are any further questions, I can be reached at:

I hope things can be straightened out and I'm very sorry.

Thank you.



NEED NEW ID?

GET IT RIGHT...GET IT STRAIGHT
 READ "THE PAPER TRIP" NOW
 the ONLY underground guide that tells how to:

GET OFFICIAL! CHANGE NAME-AGE/BEAT BUSTS
 COVER ARREST AND JAIL RECORDS
 ALTER FINGERPRINTS/DISAPPEAR/CHANGE CITIZENSHIP
 END BAD DEBTS-CREDIT RECORDS/GET NEW CREDIT
 GET DIPLOMAS-DEGREES-BETTER JOBS/CHEAT THE COMPUTER

HERE'S MY \$ **5⁹⁵** FOR "THE PAPER TRIP"

NAME: _____

ADDRESS: _____

CITY: _____ STATE: _____ ZIP: _____

FREE
 DETAILS

*SPECIAL COMBINATION OFFER...

- SAVE \$5. "THE PAPER TRIP" PLUS "BEAT THE BILL COLLECTOR"
 AND "100 WAYS TO DISAPPEAR AND LIVE FREE" A \$12⁹⁵ VALUE
 ALL FOR ONLY \$ **7⁹⁵**!

EDEN PRESS · P.O. BOX 866 · WESTMINSTER, CA. 92683

GET UP TO
 \$3000. ! NO QUESTIONS ASKED!

WANT CREDIT CARDS?

GET NEW CREDIT WITH NO INVESTIGATION!
 NOW EXCITING NEW BOOK "CREDIT?"
 HELPS YOU GET "AAA" CREDIT IN 30 DAYS!

A 100% LEGAL PLAN THAT REALLY WORKS!
 EVEN IF YOU HAVE BEEN BANKRUPT - HAVE POOR
 CREDIT - ARE ON WELFARE - NEW IN AREA, ETC...

FREE DETAILS!

NAME: _____

ADDRESS: _____

CITY: _____ STATE: _____

\$ **7⁵⁰**
 PPD

EDEN PRESS · P.O. BOX 866 · WESTMINSTER, CA.

Mr. DUGGAN. Now, on page 15 of "The Paper Trip," reference is made to the "U.S. Driver's License Guide" issued by a private company in California.

Now, this book contains reproductions of every driver's license issued by every State in the Union. I was concerned that the booklet in the wrong hands would add to the problems of law enforcement agencies. I drafted a letter to the firm expressing my concern. Copies of my letter and reply are offered for the information of the subcommittee.

Mr. SOURWINE. May these go in the record, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

[The documents referred to follow:]

SEPTEMBER 26, 1972.

Mr. KEITH DOERGE,
President, *Drivers License Guide Co.*,
Redwood City, Calif.

DEAR MR. DOERGE: I refer to your letter of September 13, 1972, forwarding a courtesy copy of the 1973 edition of the Drivers License Guide.

In reviewing the 1973 edition, I have noted that there are many changes from the original edition. For this reason, I am recommending that a number of copies of the 1973 edition be obtained for our organization. I would like to make one observation. Your guide is designed to help prevent fraud and it is very helpful in this regard. However, it would appear that there are no controls placed upon persons who can obtain this manual. For this reason, persons who wish to perpetrate frauds by obtaining drivers licenses fraudulently find their efforts greatly eased by resorting to your manual.

I would appreciate being informed personally what efforts, if any, your organization makes to endeavor to keep this manual in the hands of persons using it for the law-enforcement purpose for which it was created.

Sincerely,

W. E. DUGGAN,
Chief, *Legal Division, Passport Office.*

DRIVERS LICENSE GUIDE Co.,
October 5, 1972.

Mr. W. E. DUGGAN,
Chief, *Legal Division,*
Passport Office, Department of State,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. DUGGAN: Thank you for your help in recommending the Guide for use.

I can understand your concern with the proper distribution of the Guide, and we do try to maintain control.

Originally, this was discussed with Department of Justice personnel and various police forces. The conclusion reached was as follows:

Criminal elements counterfeiting licenses do so by reference to a real, valid license from that state. These are not difficult for him to obtain.

Law enforcement and business operations are forced to detect those counterfeit licenses with no reference at all or with the reproductions in the Drivers License Guide.

The conclusion was that the counterfeiter wasn't gaining much by having a Guide if he could get one, but that the detection of counterfeits would certainly be helped.

I hope that this explains the position taken. While we screen requests and control locations where it's available, we do want valid law enforcement and business interests to be protected.

Thanks again for your interest.

Sincerely,

KEITH DOERGE, *President.*

Mr. DUGGAN. The obituary method is being used as of this moment. I might state that during the first week of September, we received

information that two individuals posing as insurance actuaries obtained permission to review State vital records on an Eastern State. After these individuals had been engaged for some time in their activities, the suspicion of one of the experienced employees was aroused. It was ascertained that the two individuals were checking death records as well as birth records for deceased children. A short time later, requests were being received from individuals for copies of the very records which were reviewed by these two persons. The Passport Office is taking appropriate action to forestall the issue of passports in the names involved. How many times similar procedures are being used or have been used to get into vital records, one can only hazard a guess.

Steps have been taken by the Passport Office to detect persons fraudulently applying for U.S. passports using the techniques expounded in "The Paper Trip." In all frauds detected, the Passport Office is recommending vigorous prosecution.

There is no mystery as to why persons engaged in criminal activities desire U.S. passports and will go to any lengths to obtain them. In most cases, these individuals are already known in their true identities by law enforcement agencies, and some of them are being sought as criminals by law enforcement agencies. To continue their illegal activities, they need new identities. Since the U.S. passport is considered one of the best, if not the best document of identification that exists, the carefully laid plans and persistent efforts of the criminal element to secure U.S. passports in false identities is understandable.

The basic problem underlying most of our passport frauds reduces itself down to the question of identification. How is the identity established of an individual who applies for a U.S. passport? How is the identity established of any person who applies for a driver's license, a credit card, a social security number, or any other document?

There is no single document issued in the United States available to the general public which conclusively establishes identification. The United States has no national registration, and there is no coordination between birth and death records. There are millions of people in this country who are unidentifiable by any documentary standards.

Drivers' licenses issued by the various States are the commonly accepted documents of identification in obtaining credit cards, cashing checks, and so forth. However, a close look at the methods by which the various States issue drivers' licenses makes one thing crystal clear: There is no effort on the part of the issuing authorities to establish the identification of the person appearing before them for a driver's license.

In a newspaper article appearing in the Washington Post of August 28, 1973, it is stated in the headlines that "identity proof" will be required of a person applying for a driver's license in the District of Columbia. In reading the article carefully, however, it becomes evident that what the District is requiring is the submission of a birth certificate to establish the age of the applicant. But it is a fact that a birth certificate is not evidence of identity. It is merely evidence that the person named in the certificate was born in the United States, and that is all.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, have you ever researched the question of whether it is a violation of any Federal law to get a birth

certificate issued to any person with a view to using it fraudulently in order to procure a passport or other Government document?

Mr. DUGGAN. Yes. It would be part of the violation of 18 U.S.C. 1542.

Mr. SOURWINE. On what theory?

Mr. DUGGAN. On the theory that this is part of your corpus.

Mr. SOURWINE. I do not think you understood me. I do not mean to cut you off short. It is perfectly clear that if I obtain a birth certificate issued for my brother and presented it as my own birth certificate and apply for a passport, I am committing an offense because that is fraud. But when I write to the Bureau of Vital Statistics in my hometown and ask for my brother's certificate or the birth certificate of any other named individual, I am not committing any fraud even though I may intend thereafter to use it fraudulently.

Mr. DUGGAN. There is no Federal statute violated.

Mr. SOURWINE. No violation.

Mr. DUGGAN. To my knowledge, there is no Federal statute which would cover that situation. That would have to be covered by State law since a State document is involved. Some States do have such laws. But Federal Government, no.

Mr. SOURWINE. There is no Federal statute in this area at all.

Mr. DUGGAN. Right.

Mr. SOURWINE. In your judgment, would it be helpful if we had one?

Mr. DUGGAN. It certainly would be helpful if we had one.

Mr. SOURWINE. Forgive my interjection. Go ahead.

Mr. DUGGAN. We have found, in fraud case after fraud case, that the procedure outlined in Leary's book works. Obtain a birth certificate using one of the methods described in "The Paper Trip"; submit the birth certificate to the registrar of motor vehicles; and it is accepted at face value that the applicant is the person named in the birth certificate. It is a cycle of fraud begetting fraud. It is a known fact that driver's licenses of many States have been counterfeited. It is also a fact that genuine blank forms of driver's licenses have been stolen from registrars' offices, thus permitting persons to insert in the blank spaces any personal data they may wish. It is a fact that a driver's license, regardless of the sophistication of the card itself, is not secure evidence of identity since it is so easily obtainable.

Mr. SOURWINE. There is a great tendency to accept Social Security cards as evidence of identity and, of course, they are not in any sense of the word, are they?

Mr. DUGGAN. They are not and they so state on the face.

Mr. SOURWINE. I know. And I can get a Social Security card under any name I want to and get another one tomorrow and I am not even committing an offense when I do it. As long as I do not use the card to misrepresent myself for a fraudulent purpose as being some person other than what I am. I can even go to work under that false name and if I am not defrauding anybody there is no offense committed, is there?

Mr. DUGGAN. Not so far as I know.

Mr. SOURWINE. No part of the Social Security law prohibits a man from having, two, three, five or any other number of Social Security cards under any name he wants, is there?

Mr. DUGGAN. Only if you try to collect benefits under each one.

Mr. SOURWINE. Only if he tries to collect—he cannot use them for that purpose but they are not in any sense a violation.

Mr. DUGGAN. Not unless they try to collect benefits under different identities.

Mr. SOURWINE. And yet the Internal Revenue Service uses social security numbers for identification. There is a great move in the direction of giving everybody a number. And the number is no identification at all. A man has a number and that number is no more identification than the name or a phony birth certificate or a phony passport.

Go ahead.

Mr. DUGGAN. Now, we get into the area of fraudulent birth documents. If the committee so desires I will be glad to submit a number of counterfeit birth documents.

Mr. SOURWINE. May these be received, Mr. Chairman, subject to the order that if they can be accurately reproduced, they may be printed in the appendix of this hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

[The documents referred to may be found in the appendix, p. 97.]

Mr. DUGGAN. Now, these kinds of documents are produced by companies which advertise in newspapers. They can also be produced by criminal underground groups with printing equipment and through photographic processes. Any black and white document can be reproduced easily with equipment that is generally available to the public.

Mr. SOURWINE. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead, sir.

Mr. DUGGAN. The easy reproduction of black and white is one of the reasons we encourage State registrars to use safety paper or other features that would make it more difficult for counterfeiting. This is also why we insist on an embossed raised seal on a birth certificate.

There are some ways in which counterfeit documents can be readily ascertained. These techniques are fully developed during our fraud training seminars.

While we have many cases showing the effectiveness of our training program, I will refer to one fairly recent case which uncovered a fugitive who was associated with illegal drug activities.

On July 10, 1973, a female applied for a passport in the Washington Passport Agency. The agent handling the case, using techniques which we have developed in the past 2 years, sensed that there was something which did not ring true in the application. Since the applicant claimed to have lived in Akron, Ohio, a telephone call to the Akron police resulted in the information that the applicant was a parolee. She was subsequently arrested by the Metropolitan Police of the District of Columbia. Later developments showed that a substantial sum of money was found in the car she was using and she was connected with a large drug operation. The police authorities in Washington and Ohio are now investigating the activities of the applicant.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that an unusual case of acuity on the part of your employee who made the discovery or became suspicious, at least, of fraud or are all of your people trained in such a way that you expect them to do this?

Mr. DUGGAN. At the present time, our people are trained to look for precisely what this agent looked for in this particular case.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, how about the postal clerks who handle passport applications? Do they have this training?

Mr. DUGGAN. No. The postal clerks do not have it nor do the clerks of court have it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have the postal clerks caught any phony applications as far as you know?

Mr. DUGGAN. I think one case.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have the clerks of court caught any?

Mr. DUGGAN. The clerks of court have caught, I think, three cases during the past year.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any figures or can you give us a figure proportionately what proportion of all passport applicants your own people have detected to be fraudulent and what proportion of applications handled by them, respectively, have been detected as fraudulent by either the clerks of court or the Postal Service?

Mr. DUGGAN. Yes, I can furnish those.

Mr. SOURWINE. May that be furnished for the record, Mr. Chairman, to be inserted when the record is corrected by the witness?

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

[The material referred to follows:]

COMPARISON OF DOMESTIC FRAUDS DETECTED BEFORE ISSUE IN PROPORTION TO PERCENTAGE OF EXECUTED APPLICATIONS SUBMITTED BY SOURCE—FISCAL YEAR 1973

Source	Percentage of executed applications submitted	Number of frauds detected before issue	Percentage of frauds detected before issue
Post office.....	30	1	0.7
State clerks of court.....	30		
Passport agencies.....	21	67	47.9
Mail-in applications.....	10		
Federal clerks of court.....	5		
Military passport agents.....	4		
Legal division passport office.....		72	51.4

Domestic passport frauds, fiscal year 1973

Total frauds detected before issue.....	140
Total frauds detected after issue.....	309
Total domestic frauds detected.....	449

Frauds detected before issue

Frauds detected by post office.....	1
Frauds detected by clerks of court.....	0
Frauds detected by other law enforcement agencies.....	12
Frauds detected by Legal Division Passpore Office.....	60

Frauds detected by passport agencies

Frauds detected on applications executed by agencies.....	29
Frauds detected by agencies during adjudication of applications executed by post office.....	15
Frauds detected by agencies during adjudication of applications executed by clerks of court.....	23
Total detected by agencies.....	67
Total frauds detected before issue.....	140

Frauds detected after issue

Frauds detected by post office-----	0
Frauds detected by clerks of court-----	0
Frauds detected by other law enforcement agencies-----	182
Frauds detected by Legal Division Passport Office-----	119

Frauds detected by passport agencies

Frauds detected on Applications executed by agencies-----	3
Frauds detected by agencies on applications executed by post office-----	2
Frauds detected by agencies on applications executed by clerks of court--	3
	<hr/>
Total detected by agencies-----	8
	<hr/>
Total frauds detected after issue-----	309

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead, sir.

Mr. DUGGAN. Now, with regard to the activities of militants in obtaining passport by fraud, I refer to the news item concerning the shooting of a New Jersey policeman by a militant group on May 2, 1973. In the automobile the militants were driving, there was found a quantity of blank birth certificates, identity documents and one U.S. passport. Investigation disclosed that the passport had been obtained fraudulently through the submission of a counterfeit birth certificate. The militant group is known as the Black Liberation Army. I would also like to furnish the news item concerning the arrest by the FBI of Herman Bell—one of the 10 most wanted criminals—in New Orleans.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have a number of items of this general nature that you want to submit?

Mr. DUGGAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may they be received en bloc for insertion in the record?

Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

[The material referred to may be found in the appendix, p. 104.]

Mr. DUGGAN. The potential use of the lost or stolen U.S. passports by foreign militant groups is a constant source of worry. When the Arab guerrillas blew up the three planes in the African desert in 1970, we found a number of U.S. passports belonging to the U.S. citizens who were on board the planes were missing. We have, of course, taken appropriate action to prevent illegal use of these passports.

To this date, I am happy to say, we have not been faced with the use of any of these passports in any hijackings or guerrilla activities. Whether such passports have, in fact, been used in crossing international borders abroad cannot, of course, be ascertained. It would be naive to assume that such groups would not realize the value of such documents to cover their activities.

We also live with the ever-present potential of the use of U.S. passports by foreign intelligence agencies.

The use of U.S. passports by Colonel Abel, the convicted Soviet espionage agent and his coworker, Mr. Hayhanen, are now of public record. I think it is also known that Colonel Abel had in his possession two or three birth certificates in different names at the time that he was arrested. It is a well known fact that, in just about every espionage

case throughout the world, fraudulently obtained passports are involved. In most cases, they do not involve U.S. passports.

It has recently come to my attention that Mr. J. Bernard Hutton, who is identified as "Former Czech Communist Official" has written a book entitled, "The Subverters." On page 57 of this book, he relates how one Soviet subverter was provided with a U.S. passport to enter the United States from Canada. Prior to her assignment in the United States, she had undergone 10 years of training in the Soviet Gaczyna Spy School. On pages 79 and 80, the following statement appears:

The Gaczyna Spy School provided 15 master-subverters to be transported to the United States of America in 1961. Every year after that, until 1966, another 15 joined the team. In 1967, 1968, and 1969, the number of master-subverters was stepped up to 18—and in 1970, to 20. This formidable army of professionals has at its disposal many widespread networks of native-born hard-core undercover subverters who obey orders unquestioningly. These men and women work ceaselessly to provoke strikes and work-to-rule, riots, bomb explosions, arson, kidnappings and killings.

It is reasonable to assume that U.S. passports were used to get these subverters into the United States. It is not improbable that the ability of these subverters to get a U.S. passport to enter the United States may be the final test of his passage of the training in the spy school.

Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Now, bearing in mind these interlocking criminal factors on the outside, what is the Passport Office doing to combat fraud? The Passport Office, in its internal fraud seminars, has emphasized its philosophy that identity is a composite of a number of factors: it cannot be compressed into a single document or even two or three documents. A person's identity is factually as unique as his fingerprints. The basic document or documents of identity submitted by an applicant, such as a driver's license or other document with his physical description, constitute merely a starting point to be considered along with all the other information furnished by the applicant. Careful evaluation of discovered frauds has enabled us to come up with 10 to 15 points of reference which must be analyzed by the person adjudicating a passport application. This takes time, experience and alertness. It also takes personnel as well as additional facilities to reduce the pressure on our agents.

My memorandum of April 27, 1973 to Miss Knight—which was inserted in the Congressional Record of June 28, 1973, by Senator Thurmond—clearly states my position on this point.

I would like to close on a personal note, if I may. We must get out of the horse and buggy budget harness of productivity and realistically look at the problems which are tearing at the very fibers of the integrity of the U.S. passport and the passport system. If we do not, we will become second best rather than the leader. When that happens, we will have a more and more unmanageable security problem. After 33 years, I call the shots as I see them. Our fraud training is off to a good start but it is only a start. We must permeate the entire system of passport issuance here and abroad with the program. At the present time, discussions with others interested in the identity field indicates that we are leaders in our new approach, but we must do better.

Mr. SOURWINE. If our security is inadequate it is not because we are not the best. But if the best is not good enough: we have got to be better.

Mr. DUGGAN. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead.

Mr. DUGGAN. We are the best, but the best is not good enough.

We have to do better or we will be victimized in the future by the opposition as represented by the examples given in this statement. Unless I get the staff I need for fiscal years 1974 and 1975, I will be as effective as the little Dutch boy using his fingers to plug the many holes in the dike.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you made your request of the Appropriations Committee?

Mr. DUGGAN. Yes. We have made repeated requests for additional personnel to the Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is what I am trying to cover now. Has your request gone through and been submitted to the Congress or is it still with the Department?

Mr. DUGGAN. It is with the Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Many times we come up against a situation, some program is curtailed, there are serious results. Congress is blamed because they did not provide the appropriation. If it never cleared the Department, was not presented to the Congress, you cannot blame the Congress, can you?

Mr. DUGGAN. I agree.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, is there any law that would prohibit you from putting in this record a statement of what you asked your Department for?

Mr. DUGGAN. I do not know of any law that would prohibit it.

Mr. SOURWINE. If there is no law against it, I would like to ask the Chair that that be the order, that you furnish us with a statement with respect to what you have asked for in this area for the past several years and the coming fiscal year.

Mr. DUGGAN. All right.

[The material referred to follows:]

STATEMENT OF LEGAL DIVISION PERSONNEL REQUESTS OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS

To put in proper perspective the manpower picture for the Legal Division of the Passport Office the following points should be made:

(a) Passport Office annual budget submissions to the State Department include requests for new personnel positions. Sometimes these requests are denied in total at Departmental level or are reduced in quantity before the submissions reach the Congress.

(b) Although these positions are justified by indicating in what functions of the Passport Office they are to be utilized, once approved, they are granted in total to be employed wherever most needed. Personnel positions are not earmarked to be used in specific segments of the Passport Office.

(c) Because of the increase in passport fraud cases over the past few years, there has also been a great demand for increases in personnel in the Legal Division. As a matter of priority, however, emphasis has been given to filling Legal Division personnel requirements first at the expense of other activities if necessary even though all other workloads in the Passport Office have also been increasing steadily.

(d) Because of the tremendous expansion in fraud control workload, the normal means of requesting increases in manpower, namely the annual budget cycle, has not proven sufficiently successful in supplying the Legal Division

increased personnel requirements in a timely manner. Consequently, diversions of manpower from other lower priority functions of the Passport Office to the Legal Division have been necessary from time to time. This has created acute manpower problems throughout the Passport Office particularly when total increased manpower requests made by the Passport Office have been denied or reduced before they reach the Congress.

(e) Even when personnel positions are authorized for hire the various restrictions, limitations and procedural obstacles which must be surmounted such as Assistant Secretarial approvals for outside hire, stringent quotas on clerical hire, and security clearance backlogs have prevented bringing new personnel on board anywhere near as rapidly as desired.

The following table graphically illustrates the above points :

INCREASES IN LEGAL DIVISION PERMANENT PERSONNEL REQUESTS AND AUTHORIZATION COMPARED TO PASSPORT OFFICE TOTALS

	Fiscal year—			
	1972 (actual)	1973 (actual)	1974 (projected)	1974 (budgeted)
Total passport Office increases requested.....	35	49	36	102
Legal division increases requested.....	3	4	4	7
Total Passport Office increases authorized or proposed...	35	1 29	2 7	3 18
Legal division increases authorized or proposed.....	3	4 5	5 7	7

¹ Passport Office request reduced from 49 to 29 by the controlling bureau in the State Department.

² Passport Office request reduced from 36 to 7 by the controlling bureau in the State Department.

³ Passport Office request reduced from 102 to 18 by the controlling bureau in the State Department.

⁴ Increased by one by Internal Passport Office reprogramming.

⁵ Projected to be increased by 3 by Internal Passport Office reprogramming.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right. Do you have anything else to offer us voluntarily? I have a few questions I want to ask if that is the case.

As you know, we were particularly interested in the Brotherhood of Eternal Love, the so-called Leary family. We have heard testimony here that this is probably the largest and most sophisticated organizations of its type in the world. We have been told that some 750 brotherhood members and criminal associates have been identified throughout the world.

Now, are you and the State Department aware of who these 750 brotherhood members are?

Mr. DUGGAN. Do we have that list?

Mr. O'DOWD. We have a list, sir, of approximately 550 members with aliases. We have searched all the names through the passport records. We have come up with over 300 passport files relating to these people. We have then checked the birth and when possible the identity of each of these individuals.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am going afield a little bit but I am following what you just said. Can you provide us with a statement that will show year-by-year beginning in 1970 the number of passport fraud cases detected which involved or were subsequently identified as involving members of the brotherhood?

Mr. DUGGAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And then show us for each year how these were detected? They are detected in the passport office or by BNDD or in the legal division or office of security or FBI or however.

Mr. DUGGAN. Correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. And then tell us in how many of those cases each year there were counterfeit birth certificates.

Mr. DUGGAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And in how many of each of those years there were actual birth certificates fraudulently presented.

Mr. DUGGAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you do that?

Mr. DUGGAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you will do that for each of those years, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973 as far as it has gone, it will be very helpful.

Mr. DUGGAN. We will be glad to.

[The material referred to may be found in the appendix, p. 109.]

Mr. SOURWINE. We can run the totals up. You need not total it if you can give us that information.

Now, the question I asked specifically was whether, if it is true that 750 brotherhood members and criminal associates have been identified throughout the world, shouldn't you know the identities of the whole 750 and shouldn't you have some way to flag them? Do you have a computer system for flagging them?

Mr. DUGGAN. That, we do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, shouldn't these people be in your computer system for flagging?

Mr. DUGGAN. They should.

Mr. SOURWINE. Just to be sure you do not issue passports to any of them? That will not be—it will not completely insure it because if a man comes in with a new identity and supporting documents and gets by the persons that he applies to he is going to get a passport before you ever have a chance to stop it.

Mr. DUGGAN. May I make one statement, Mr. Sourwine? Since 1969 we have been working with BNDD and, of course, DEA has just been created, to try to further our liaison so that we could cooperate, and we have extended to them our lookout facilities.

Mr. SOURWINE. What do you mean by "them"?

Mr. DUGGAN. And we are furnished with the ones they feel should be furnished.

Mr. SOURWINE. What do you mean by "them"?

Mr. DUGGAN. BNDD.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do this with others. You will accept warnings from anybody that has information that will be useful to you.

Mr. DUGGAN. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Any Government department or agency. How about warnings from cooperating police departments, State, and Federal?

Mr. DUGGAN. Absolutely.

Mr. SOURWINE. You receive them.

Mr. DUGGAN. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you get a good deal of it, do you not?

Mr. DUGGAN. We get a good deal of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, specifically with regard—I am not trying to go into your computer system. I am trying to get at this brotherhood. We were told there are 750. You say you know about 550 of them. Who is holding out on you? Where are the other 200?

Mr. O'Dowd. With the 550, sir—we have had a number of aliases. We have had a number of parties who will give us a name where we have not located the passport file which means this might be a local distributor purely operating in California or he may have a passport in a name they are not yet aware of and we are not yet aware of. But we have searched well over a thousand passport files altogether.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, you have searched well over a thousand but I am trying to get down to the point of whether this Government agency which tells us they have identified 750 brotherhood members and their criminal associates has given you the list of the 750 or they have only given you 550.

Mr. DUGGAN. The answer is no, they have not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you sought it?

Mr. DUGGAN. We have a meeting scheduled for Friday with a member of the new organization and this I will take up with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any doubts you are going to get it?

Mr. DUGGAN. I do not think there will be any doubt that I will get it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask that the witness be instructed if he does not get it or make satisfactory arrangements for getting it, if he will so indicate when he is correcting his testimony.

Mr. DUGGAN. I certainly will.

OCTOBER 16, 1973.

On October 5, 1973, I had a meeting with Mr. George Belk, Chief, Intelligence Operations of the Drug Enforcement Agency. During this meeting I made arrangements to have Mr. Daniel Casey, Chief of Domestic Operations for DEA, to meet with me for the purpose of obtaining the list of all the members of the Brotherhood. We also agreed that during this meeting all possible avenues of cooperation be explored.

Mr. Casey and I have tentatively agreed to meet the latter part of this week or the first part of next week.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right.

Now, we had a figure—I think it is a little out of date—of 85 members of this brotherhood who have been arrested and charged with violations relating to drugs, income tax, or fraudulent passports. Does this vary from your figure? Do you have a different figure?

Mr. DUGGAN. Well, our figure was only related to passport violations and our figure indicates that we have referred 42 cases to the U.S. Attorney with regard to the brotherhood. Twenty-five of these have been indicted, five convicted, and three declined.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well now, where do I have it from in my mind that there were 240 false or fraudulent passport cases involved with members of the Leary family, that is, these brotherhood members?

Mr. DUGGAN. Well, there are 130 that we know about. Again, there may be a lack of communication. I heard this morning that some one person got as many as five passports.

Mr. SOURWINE. I think that is a point. Did we not have testimony from you or from someone or a figure, a chart from someone in the Passport Office for 240 fraudulent passport cases involved with the brotherhood? That would include the duplications if there are four or five in one person?

It would be in effect if that figure were that of 140 people involved whom you knew to be involved, you had 240 individual passports. Some of them have two, three, four or more.

Mr. DUGGAN. Our figure is 130.

Mr. SOURWINE. Not 240.

Mr. DUGGAN. No; our figure is definitely 130.

Mr. SOURWINE. Either persons or passports?

Mr. DUGGAN. These are passport violations.

Mr. SOURWINE. Passport violations, involving how many persons?

Mr. DUGGAN. How many persons? I think the figure is 106.

Mr. SOURWINE. 106 persons?

Mr. DUGGAN. We get some duplication because in some cases there are more than one violation of the passport statutes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are way ahead of us there because the figure we had, I think, was 85 brotherhood members arrested and charged, for all violations including passport violations.

Mr. O'Dowd. We do not have that many who we know have been indicated for passport fraud.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, what is the figure you just gave me?

Mr. O'Dowd. We have only had 25 indictments that we are aware of.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, you have got 140—you said your figure was 130.

Mr. DUGGAN. These are violations.

Mr. SOURWINE. 130 violations. That means individual passports were fraud cases.

Mr. DUGGAN. Right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Only 25 people involved.

Mr. O'Dowd. No, sir. There are more people involved. The U.S. Attorneys have not returned indictments on some of them. Others are so recent we have not had a chance to evaluate and record them.

Mr. SOURWINE. To clarify this, can you furnish when you correct your testimony, the most up-to-date possible chart showing how many members of the brotherhood known as such have been involved in passport fraud cases, How many total passport fraud cases have been uncovered that are connected with the brotherhood? We are not asking you to say how many passports in each case but that will give the committee an idea. That is just two figures. Will you do that?

Mr. DUGGAN. Yes.

Mr. O'Dowd. Certainly.

[The figures referred to may be found in the table on p. 45]

Mr. SOURWINE. I have no more questions to ask of you gentlemen. I would ask you, Mr. Chairman, in line with what you said previously, that if these gentlemen have finished, that Miss Knight come back because we do have some questions to ask her. We will hear her presentation in response to the earlier request and then I have some questions to ask.

Miss KNIGHT. Well, sir, do you wish me to bring the record up to date on the contract?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, please.

Miss KNIGHT. As I said, the contract was awarded to Computer Science Corp. on May 15, 1972. The contract, which ran for 1 year, required the contractor to identify all of the problems and requirements associated with international travel documents, and on the basis of an analysis of these problems and requirements to recommend a new passport document and new and improved methods for its issuance.

Present status.—On the basis of all of the information gathered and analyzed by the contractor working with the staff of the Passport Office, the Government Printing Office and various segments of private industry, concepts of the new passport were developed and prototypes manufactured. The final report from the contractor with the problems and requirements identified, as well as recommendations, were delivered on May 15, 1973. After a careful review by members of the Passport Office Task Force, the document was referred to the Undersecretary for Security Assistance for consideration. The details in the

final report and recommendations are currently held on a "need-to-know" basis in order to preclude misinformation, misrepresentations and other guesswork from those who have no basic knowledge of the criminal conditions which give this project a sense of urgency. Security of the document, as well as its mission to establish the citizenship and unalterable identity of the bearer are the basic guidelines to which we have adhered.

If a new passport document is developed, possessing the required security and international acceptance for which the Passport Office strives, a target date should be set. As of January 1973, the Passport Office considered July 4, 1976 as a possible starting date for the issuance of a new and improved document. Over a 5-year period, the old passports would be phased out through expirations. This timetable would coincide with the President's program for the Bicentennial. However, thanks to delays over which we had no control we are now quite far behind in our schedule.

The next 12 months will be critical in the development of the document. A pilot project will have to be established and operated in order to eliminate the bugs. Personnel will be required not only to bring the Passport Office up to its present staff requirements but an in-house technical staff will have to be hired to work with outside contractors on the project. Currently, the Passport Office has one technician on its staff. We have no researchers and no technical employees available to man the pilot project.

I have no idea, and I hesitate to make any prediction, regarding the reception of our 5-year effort to develop a passport which I believe could become the model for a standardized international travel document adopted by scores of countries who seek and approve of standardization in size, format, and content.

One more thought, if you please. The U.S. passport is a document belonging to the Federal Government and it attests to the citizenship and identity of the individual to whom it is issued. Any legislation that will help enhance the security and integrity of this valuable document is of tremendous importance to us at this time.

Documentation fraud is rampant in this country not only in those documents which are submitted with passport applications but those submitted for social security, for health benefits, for pensions, for almost any service or financial profit which can be chiseled out of the Federal Government. The Immigration and Naturalization Service has had a horrendous fraud problem for years, and no one knows this better than the immigration lawyers who admit it, off the record, of course.

Mr. SOURWINE. Miss Knight, I might interject to say that perhaps this committee knows it almost as well as the immigration lawyers. We have been making a record of these problems since 1942 to my knowledge under this committee and under the Immigration Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee, and it has always been a serious security problem and it has always been a mess.

Please go ahead.

Miss KNIGHT. Thank you, sir.

Visa frauds also need a microscopic examination.

Scores of Washington hostesses are hiring full-time domestic help who came in on student visas but who never set foot in a classroom.

As one very prominent socialite in our Capital pointed out "I do not want to know how they get into this country."

There is a thriving business in the marriage racket whereby a U.S. citizen will marry an alien for a substantial down payment, bring the alien into the United States as a dependent, apply for citizenship, apply for a passport, get a social security number, get a job and finish the farce by getting a divorce, thus freeing the U.S. citizen for another marrying project.

There is also a substantial baby racket, details of which can only be pieced together with the cooperation of other governments. Phony hospital records can be provided for a price and a child brought into the United States only to be farmed out again for a fee to a childless couple who do not wish to go through legal adoption channels.

Years ago document frauds were estimated to cost the U.S. Government a half billion dollars annually in the loss of taxes. Today, the cost may be doubled, maybe trebled. The hidden total is anybody's guess—and this tremendous drain of revenue must be made up by every American who conscientiously pays his taxes.

Mr. SOURWINE. If I understand you correctly, you are saying that document frauds today in your opinion, are costing the U.S. Government between a billion dollars and a billion and a half dollars annually.

Miss KNIGHT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead.

Miss KNIGHT. The appalling fact is that most of our citizens are abysmally ignorant of the facts. They are constantly being diverted to other matters, relatively unimportant when placed in juxtaposition to the existing strata of crooks and criminals operating in American society.

If firm and stern corrective action is taken nationally perhaps the States will get busy and tighten up access to their birth and death records. Other countries have had national registration for years—birth and death records are married—and while there will always be some fraud attempted—I doubt that there is another country as lackadaisical in protecting the integrity of its vital records as we are. Only Congress has the key to flushing out this nationwide racket in fraudulent documents.

Mr. SOURWINE. That, of course, has to be recognized. You had spoken earlier of the States getting busy to relate their birth and death records. I am sure you realize, as your last sentence indicates, that the States cannot do this because it is of no value if the State of Alabama shows you everybody born there and everybody who died there when two-thirds of the people who were born there died somewhere else and two-thirds of the people who died there were born somewhere else, which may or may not be the fact. There would have to be a complete correlation, a national registration, or else the project of the computerization and correlation of all the birth and death records of all the States which would be a stupendous task.

Miss KNIGHT. Yes, sir; but it may pay off in less document fraud.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you recommending that this be done or only that we start a national registration and try to achieve a national record of everybody?

Miss KNIGHT. Well, I think it should be looked into and all the facts assessed. At the present time there is no area in the Federal Govern-

ment, there is no area in any of the State governments, that is bringing all these facts together so that they can be studied.

Mr. SOURWINE. No. You have a birth certificate of an individual. You have no way of knowing if the individual is still alive unless you have personal knowledge. You have a death certificate. You have no way of knowing that the person was born under that name or where.

Miss KNIGHT. You are right.

Mr. SOURWINE. This is perfectly true. All you are asking is that something be done about it.

Miss KNIGHT. Yes, sir. Some effective coordination is essential.

Mr. SOURWINE. That it be recognized as a threat to security, not only in the passport area, I take it, but in other areas as well.

Miss KNIGHT. I also think, sir, that we owe a system of identity with integrity to our citizens.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right. Go ahead. I am sorry I interrupted you.

Miss KNIGHT. There is no use denying the fact that those of us who are exposed to the machinations of the criminal element in this country, are frustrated and discouraged by the lack of action on our repeated warnings to the dangers of fraudulent documents submitted to the Federal and State governments for the purpose of supporting false identification. As I pointed out in my September 15, 1972, testimony, the Passport Office has been ringing the alarm on passport and identification fraud for 43 years. I can testify to the fact that in the past 15 years, while I have been Director of the Passport Office, we have tried every known method to get someone in the Department of State to pay some attention to this very serious problem. The only result of our persistent efforts has been that the situation has deteriorated almost beyond description and redemption within the past decade.

It is a fact on record that I have repeatedly requested personnel to combat the growing workload and attendant fraud situation. We have spent a great deal of time attempting to get our message across and making recommendations to the Department of State through budget presentations, through conferences and reports and memoranda which are rarely, if ever, favorably acted upon. There has been little or no evidence of support or even a casual interest in our problem. The cost of this neglect cannot be overestimated.

If we ever could get effective support, there are, in my estimation, some immediate and long-term remedies. For instance:

1. The enactment of legislation which would make it a criminal offense for any organization or individual to apply for or procure any identification pertaining to another person for the purpose of establishing by such identification a false identity. This would cover the current misuse of birth and baptismal certificates, driver's licenses and other identifying documents for the purpose of obtaining illegally passports and other benefits from the Federal Government.

2. It should be remembered that passport applications come to us through the mail and any legislation contemplated should take note of the fact that the Postal Service is thus involved in the transmittal of the fraudulent documents.

3. The Passport Office must be supported in its staffing requirements. We cannot go through another year of mounting workload, directly and indirectly related to the issuance of passports. Meat-axe cuts of essential security and public services, which pay for themselves many

times over, are not justified at any time, but they are especially obnoxious when compared to the waste of time and manpower in the duplication of effort and unessential paperwork which we see at the echelons above us.

4. The Passport Office must be supported in its requirements for prompt and thorough investigation of the fraud cases which presently we forward to the Department's Office of Security. In my opinion, we cannot and should not be forced to wait 6 months or a year or 2 years for investigations of violations of passport criminal statutes. I want to make it clear that I am not blaming the Office of Security for the long delays. That office is understaffed according to its Director. The Office of Security has felt the axe as has the Passport Office. Now, if the Department of State cannot handle these investigations promptly, I suggest that the investigative process on passport frauds be transferred to some other area of Government which can do the job expeditiously and professionally.

5. The Passport Office services to U.S. citizens must be expanded through new field agencies and facilities. I have been recommending this solution to our situation for 5 years and for 5 years it has been denied—not by the Congress but within the bureaucratic machinations of the annual intradepartmental budget hearings. In these exercises everybody acts as an expert and seer on the matter under discussion and arbitrary decisions are made by officials who have little or no experience in the problems of a line operation. We have now spent close to a quarter of a million dollars on research and development contracts to get independent confirmation of many of the recommendations made by the passport office over the years. We know what is needed. Our recommendations are based on facts, experience and precedence. But our warnings and recommendations and suggestions have fallen on deaf ears. We seem to be operating in a "Let them eat cake" atmosphere.

That is about all I have to say, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOURWINE. Miss Knight, I have just a few questions, if the chair will permit.

Can you furnish us for the record, with a statement tabulating your budget requests in the passport security field and what the Department submitted to the Congress and what the Congress gave you?

Miss KNIGHT. I can—I would be very glad to submit the Passport Office budget requests.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Miss KNIGHT. But when you specify security field, there is an Office of Security in the Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. I understand that, but I am talking about—if you want to submit your total budget, that is all right, but I was only asking for what you had requested that bore on this area of passport security.

Miss KNIGHT. Yes, sir; we can furnish that. Virtually every phase of our operation has a security aspect.

[The material requested may be found in the appendix, p. 111.]

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, that would be in some instances personnel. In some instances it will be equipment. In some instances it will be field security. And then, you requested several times before you got it, money for this passport study and I do not know, you may have in

your budget now money to implement the passport study. We want to know what you requested up to this coming fiscal year, what the Department has cleared insofar if they have cleared anything, and what the Congress gave you.

Miss KNIGHT. We can supply that.

[The material requested may be found in the appendix, p. 114.]

Mr. SOURWINE. We will see if you are being shorted and who is doing the shorting, whether it is the Congress or somebody else.

Now, you spoke of the Office of Security. What have you done in the way of calling on them for help?

Miss KNIGHT. Well, I think Mr. Duggan can answer that because he has had contact with the security office. We have sent memoranda to the Office of Security and I think the latest go around has been initiated in Mr. Duggan's shop.

Mr. DUGGAN. Previous communications are in Miss Knight's testimony of September 15 before the subcommittee. On May 11, 1973, a memorandum was sent to SY in which we stated as follows.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have a copy of that memorandum?

Mr. DUGGAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Furnish it to go in at this point.

Mr. DUGGAN. Yes.

[The information referred to follows:]

U. S. GOVERNMENT, MEMORANDUM

MAY 11, 1973.

To: A/SY—Mr. Donald D. Daley A/SY/I/PVB.

From: PT/L—W. E. Duggan.

Subject: Passport fraud, fugitives.

The Passport Office is seriously concerned with three categories of passport fraud cases which have been pending in the Office of Security for two or more years with no end in view.

These categories are:

1. Cases referred to SY for investigation over two years ago and on which no substantial inquiries have been made by your agents;

2. Cases in which all investigatory leads have been unsuccessfully explored without locating or identifying the applicants or witnesses necessary to prove violations of passport laws; and

3. Fugitive cases—a case in which prosecution has been thwarted because the perpetrator's whereabouts is unknown.

In the interest of both Offices, it is requested that all special agents be instructed to immediately close out and returned the passport files with closing reports to the Passport Office in categories 1 and 2 which have been pending in SY for more than two (2) years. The closing report may cite this memorandum as authority for closing the investigations.

Cases in category 3—prosecution is not possible because the perpetrator is a fugitive or the U.S. Attorney has not acted on the case within a period of one year due to a heavy workload. These cases should be returned to the Passport Office with a closing report *only* if a federal felony warrant for the fugitive's arrest has been secured and is outstanding. A copy of the warrant should be submitted with the case.

If warrants of arrest have not been obtained in such cases, it is essential and it is urged that your agents *personally* visit the United States Attorneys assigned to prosecute the cases and explain to them that:

1. Under the provisions of 51.70(a), of Title 22, Code of Federal Regulations, the Passport Office has authority to deny a passport to the subject of an outstanding federal felony warrant of arrest. Section 51.71 of Title 22 provides for the revocation of passports obtained by applicants in false identities. Thus, in the absence of a felony warrant of arrest, the Passport Office cannot lawfully refuse to issue a passport based on an application executed by a fugitive in his true identity.

2. In order to record the fugitives' names with the National Crime Information Center, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Center requires that the felony warrants of arrest be outstanding.

3. The Passport Office records the names of violators of passport and other federal laws and sends appropriate notifications to all diplomatic and consular posts abroad. This procedure often results in locating such fugitives.

4. The revocation of a passport based on an outstanding federal felony warrant of arrest and the notification to a foreign government of the reason for the revocation generally immobilizes a located fugitive and hinders any further criminal activities by him. In addition, when the fugitive returns to the United States, a U.S. Marshal may be alerted and have the authority to apprehend the fugitive on arrival.

5. The issuance of a warrant of arrest for a fugitive would toll the statute of limitations. (18USC3291)

Your agents should urge U.S. Attorneys to secure the issuance of warrants so that all prosecutions involving fugitives which have been pending more than one year may be closed out on or before June 30, 1973. The agent should assure the United States Attorney that when the fugitive is apprehended, the case will be immediately returned to him for prosecution.

Your cooperation in instructing Special Agents-in-Charge to review cases under their jurisdiction to comply with the foregoing, will be appreciated.

Enclosures: 100 copies for distribution to your special agents.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you get a reply?

Mr. DUGGAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is there any subsequent interchange of memoranda?

Mr. DUGGAN. Yes. I have about four memos.

Mr. SOURWINE. May we have the whole set?

Mr. DUGGAN. We will be glad to furnish the whole set.

[The memoranda follows:]

SEPTEMBER 18, 1973.

A/SY—Mr. G. Marvin Gentile

PPT—Frances G. Knight

- (1) Passport Fraud Case of Timothy Francis Leary alias William John McNellis and Rosemary Leary alias Sylvia Edith McGaffin.
- (2) Delinquent Passport Fraud Investigations

On February 8, 1973, Mr. William E. Duggan of the Passport Office's Legal Division sent a memorandum to A/SY, Mr. Robert L. Berry, requesting a prompt investigation looking toward the prosecution of Dr. Timothy Francis Leary. Mr. Duggan attached to his memorandum a comprehensive summary of the case including an analysis of the information adduced from a manuscript of a book which Leary allegedly intended to publish. SY has to date failed to forward any report written or verbal to the Passport Office in this matter.

The international importance of this notorious individual in the illegal drug field hardly needs any explanation. Nor does the urgency of our request for investigation into his passport activities need further justification. The failure of the Office of Security to pursue this investigation is, to put it mildly, inexcusable.

The manuscript attached to Mr. Duggan's memorandum was extensively evaluated and an analysis prepared by the Passport Office. This manuscript was originally obtained by SY at the request of PPT. The manuscript with minor changes has now been published in an edition entitled *Timothy Leary—Confessions of a Hope Fiend*. The book was published in July 1973 by Bantam Books, Inc. As expected, this book outlines in detail the circumstances under which Leary and his wife obtained United States passports in false identities. Given this fact, the failure of the Office of Security to conduct the investigation requested in Mr. Duggan's memorandum of February 8, 1973 is, in my mind, a clear case of negligence in the administration of the passport criminal statutes. The onus of such negligence falls directly on the Office of Security. While I am aware of the personnel shortages in the Office of Security, I cannot and will not permit any criticism for the failure to pursue this important passport fraud case to be placed on the Passport Office.

I refer to my memorandum to you of June 16, 1972, which was published as an attachment to my testimony of September 15, 1972 at a hearing held by the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act

and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session. I also refer to my memorandum to you of August 9, 1972 which was also published as an attachment to my testimony of September 15, 1972. In your reply of August 17, 1972, you stated:

"I can assure you that SY will make every effort to reduce the current delinquency during the upcoming fall months when the applicant case load is normally lighter."

It is over a year since your reply and I must state that the results of your "effort to reduce the current delinquency" in passport cases are hardly stimulating.

In response to a request from Senator Strom Thurmond, I informed him that the investigation backlog as of April 24, 1973 was 501. As of August 8, 1973, there were 582 passport fraud investigation cases pending in SY. These workload figures break down as follows:

	Apr. 24, 1973	Aug. 8, 1973
Cases opened in 1973.....	165	249
Cases opened prior Jan. 1, 1973.....	336	333
Total pending.....	501	582

These figures will differ in minor respects from SY figures. This difference is caused by the hiatus between the time cases are actually received and documented as opened or closed in SY and the time they are actually received and documented as opened or closed in PPT. This is a normal "pipeline" difference.

While I could go on indefinitely with horrible examples of delinquent cases, let me just refer to one additional item. On May 11, 1973, Mr. Duggan sent a memorandum to Mr. Donald D. Daley, A/SY, the purpose of which is stated as follows:

"The Passport Office is seriously concerned with three categories of passport fraud cases which have been pending in the Office of Security for two or more years with no end in view.

These categories are:

1. Cases referred to SY for investigation over two years ago and on which no substantial inquiries have been made by your agents;
2. Cases in which all investigatory leads have been unsuccessfully explored without locating or identifying the applicants or witnesses necessary to prove violations of passport laws; and
3. Fugitive cases—a case in which prosecution has been thwarted because the perpetrator's whereabouts is unknown."

One hundred copies of this memorandum were given to SY for your convenience for distributing them to your special agents. It was requested that this review of old cases be completed by June 30, 1973. On July 26, 1973, Mr. Robert D. Johnson, Deputy Director, Passport Office, sent a memorandum to Mr. Daley extending the due date to July 31, 1973. This was done at the specific request of Mr. Raymond Scroggs of your office. On July 30, 1973, Mr. Scroggs telephoned Mr. James Ritchie, Passport Office, and stated that SY could not comply with the extended due date of July 31, 1973, due to other commitments. On August 2, 1973, Mr. Johnson sent Mr. Daley a memorandum requesting the Office of Security to submit a memorandum within ten days stating the reasons for the failure to comply with the due date for this review. On August 8, 1973, Mr. Daley sent a memorandum to Mr. Johnson giving the following explanation:

"Please be advised that a continuing effort is being made to comply with your request of May 11, 1973. The delay in obtaining full compliance with your request has been unavoidable. Over the past few months, we have had to align our priorities to the unusual demand for protective services, and urgent personnel investigations. Also, we have had retirements of key officers, which resulted in several disruptive transfers.

"On July 30, 1973, Mr. Ritchie was advised of the above by Mr. Scroggs. At which time, Mr. Scroggs told Mr. Ritchie that every effort would be made to complete the requested action by September 1, 1973."

As of this date, September 17, 1973, while some progress has been made, the project has still not been completed. I think you will agree that any comment on this item from me would be entirely superfluous. The facts speak for themselves.

Despite authorization from PPT to terminate old investigations, as of September 1, 1973, SY was further behind in pending investigations than at the beginning of the year. For the first eight calendar months of 1973, PPT sent 292 cases to SY for investigation. During this same period, SY completed 210 cases. This is an increase of 82 pending cases.

In the light of the facts, I must demand an immediate explanation. If the Office of Security is unable to take positive action within the next thirty days to perform its responsibilities to investigate known and suspected violations of the passport criminal statutes promptly and effectively, I see no alternative but to recommend to the Acting Deputy Under Secretary, Dr. Curtis W. Tarr, that the passport fraud investigation function be turned over to the Passport Office. In view of the success of the field agents of the Office of Security in investigating passport frauds in the past when they were permitted to do so, I am most reluctant to take this action. You must understand that, by reason of my position as Director of the Passport Office, I must ensure that the integrity and security of the United States passport is constantly maintained by swift and efficient detection, investigation, and indictment of persons violating the passport criminal statutes. On the basis of the facts at hand, I see no other recourse.

Please let me know before September 24, 1973, what action you intend to take.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D.C., September 24, 1973.

Memorandum

To: PPT—Miss Frances G. Knight
From: A/SY—G. Marvin Gentile
Subject:

- (1) Passport Fraud Case of Timothy Francis Leary alias William John McNellis and Rosemary Leary alias Sylvia Edith McGaffin
- (2) Delinquent Passport Fraud Investigations

Reference is made to your memorandum of September 18, 1973 regarding the indicated Subject. As defined in previous responses, SY has not been in a position to respond to service requests from your office because of overall priority requests from other areas of the Department.

As you were previously advised on August 17, 1972, the SY delinquency in the investigation of passport fraud cases has been caused by such factors as the heavy deluge of applicant cases received by SY during the early part of the year (these include summer hires, interns, and Passport Office peak cases) and several high priority security requirements in other aspects of the total security program. SY lost twenty one positions in the personnel cut effective June 30, 1972. In April 1973 this office was authorized to fill existing vacancies, and recruitment was immediately started. Processing foreign service candidates is most difficult, and it will take several months for SY to reach its authorized manpower structure. We have the pipeline established, and officers are finally being placed in positions, but there is training time involved, perhaps 12 to 18 months, when the criminal nature of Passport Fraud investigations is concerned.

SY has been intimately concerned with the problems of terrorism to include hi-jackings, letter bombs, kidnappings and murders of principal officers pre-dating the Khartoum tragedy. This problem, as you know, must take first priority. SY has also been heavily engaged in the protection of foreign visitors, particularly those from the People's Republic of China.

The Leary case was first brought to the attention of SY by an oral request from PPT/Duggan on October 7, 1970. Mr. Duggan requested that SY verify birth records in names used by the Leary's when they obtained passports which they used to flee the United States. The information was obtained on an urgent basis and oral reports were made to Mr. Duggan on October 30, 1970 and November 6, 1970. These oral reports were followed by formal written reports.

The first written request from PPT office concerning Dr. Leary was dated September 17, 1971 which requested that SY obtain a copy of a manuscript allegedly prepared by Dr. Leary. The attempts to obtain the manuscript from the publishers proved unsuccessful, however, the Department's interest in the manuscript was reported in New York Times of October 10, 1971. A detailed report on SY's efforts to obtain the manuscript was sent to the Passport Office on October 10, 1971.

On October 18, 1971 the Passport Office requested SY to verify Leary's driver's license and to interview the real McNellis (name used by Leary). On October 22, 1971, the San Francisco Field Office reported on this request.

On January 14, 1972 the New York Field Office received an unsolicited call from a person who had read of the State Department's interest in Dr. Leary's manuscript. This person volunteered to turn over a copy of the manuscript to SY. The manuscript was obtained by SY and forwarded to the Passport Office on January 19, 1972.

On March 1, 1972 the San Francisco Field Office closed the case and except for Subject's connection with the "Brotherhood" investigation, our interest in Dr. Leary was terminated.

On January 18, 1973 Dr. Leary, who had escaped from state prison near San Luis Abispo, California on September 12, 1970 and had fled the United States using a false passport, was returned to the United States in custody of BNDD agents and was arrested on arrival in Los Angeles, California.

On February 8, 1973 almost one year after receiving the manuscript, the Passport Office returned the manuscript to SY and requested an investigation "in order to prepare a foundation for prosecution of 18 USC 1542", with additional instructions that the manuscript of Dr. Leary be submitted to the "Strike Force", Orange County, California for their information, analysis and evaluation.

On April 3, 1973 Dr. Leary was convicted on the escape charge by the State of California and is presently incarcerated. There has been a premise in the past, that when a passport violator is incarcerated, the need for urgent investigation is somewhat lessened. The passport memorandum of September 18, 1973 was the first indication SY had received suggesting that the Leary case had reached a critical stage.

Reference is made to your May 11, 1973 memorandum concerning the review requested for closing three categories of Passport Fraud cases which have been pending for more than two years. Although the Passport Office requested review of several categories of investigations, PPT did not define a total number of pending cases. The criteria for closing such cases was left to the discretion of SY.

The requested procedure involved complete case studies by SY, and primarily involved a direct study by Special Agents in Charge at New York, Los Angeles and San Francisco, where the greatest volume of work existed. Because of personnel shortages, work demands, and SY requirements, this study was necessarily delayed on several occasions. However, SY has been able to close 55 investigations in these categories, primarily at New York and Los Angeles, and has requested the Special Agent in Charge at San Francisco to give the matter priority attention, consistent with constant service requests from other segments of the Department. SY will make every effort to complete this project by October 15, 1973.

Despite manpower shortages and priority requirements levied upon SY, it should be noted that SY closed 557 passport fraud investigations during FY 72, 342 during FY 73, and 71 during the first two months of FY 74.

For your information, the Department has presented a FY 74 budget amendment to the Congress to provide SY with positions to combat terrorism overseas and in the United States. We are hopeful that this legislation will be approved which will properly staff SY to handle its additional tasks, and release its regular components to handle the very important passport investigations emanating from your office.

OCTOBER 11, 1973.

A/SY—Mr. G. Marvin Gentile

PPT—Frances G. Knight

- (1) Passport Fraud Case of Timothy Francis Leary, Alias William John McNellis and Rosemary Leary, Alias Sylvia Edith McGaffin.
- (2) Delinquent Passport Fraud Investigations

I refer to your memorandum of September 24, 1973 concerning the subject matter. I have read it carefully and, unfortunately, I cannot regard it as a constructive answer to my memorandum of September 18, 1973. It reiterates your personnel problems, to which I am sympathetic. It reiterates the priorities which you assign to investigative work loads. It is apparent that passport investigations still have the lowest priority in your current operation. As I have stated before, I am sympathetic to your problems, but your systems of priorities places the Passport Office in an untenable position. Passport fraud cases must be investigated promptly and effectively, and it is my responsibility to see that such action is taken.

I note your attempt to excuse the lack of action by SY in the Leary case (since Mr. Duggan's memorandum of February 8, 1973) by referring to the lapse be-

tween the time PPT received the manuscript of "Confessions of a Hope Fiend" and the return of the manuscript to SY. Your inference is that no action has been taken by the Passport Office in the interim. This is definitely not true. Since SY is an investigative agency, I think it is fair to state that this office was justified to assume that an investigative agency would realize the potential significance of the manuscript and make some effort to utilize, or at least to ascertain, whether it had any investigative leads even though this was not expressly requested.

Since the Passport Office received the manuscript, it has been reviewed and its contents analyzed. This review and analysis required going over the material many times and checking numerous other documents and files. Extra care was taken because of the author's obvious efforts to becloud facts, circumstances, and locations in which activities occurred. The evaluation necessitated the review of many lists of names in passports issued as well as passport files in order to identify the application upon which passports were fraudulently obtained by Dr. and Mrs. Leary. A careful evaluation was also necessary in order to obtain investigative leads to the followed since SY had taken no initiative in the matter.

In addition to this activity, the Passport Office initiated communications with a number of foreign service posts in an effort to locate information which would be helpful in the hoped for investigation as well as trying to keep a lookout on the whereabouts of the subject. As you know, these efforts culminated in the successful return of the subject on January 18, 1973.

Your memorandum of September 24, 1973 indicates that no action has been taken by your office in the matter since it was sent to you on February 8, 1973. A review of Mr. Duggan's memorandum of February 8, 1973 reveals that the requested investigation to be pursued by SY to obtain the successful prosecution in this case could have been accomplished by experienced investigators in the local offices involved within two weeks.

Let me call your attention to one more item regarding the Leary case. In your memorandum, you state that, on March 1, 1972, your San Francisco field office *"closed the case and except for subjects's connection with the 'Brotherhood' investigation, our interest in Dr. Leary was terminated."* There is no indication in any of the memorandums which you have sent to the Passport Office that your Security Office has ever considered this case closed. As a matter of fact, this case, according to your records, have been, and still is, considered "pending". A review of the file reveals that we made a written request for investigation on September 21, 1971 (5 days prior to the receipt of your latest memorandum dated September 24, 1973) to establish a foundation for possible criminal prosecution under 18 USC 1542. *This investigation was never completed.*

Another statement in your memorandum of September 24 which merits attention is that *"the passport memorandum of September 18, 1973, was the first indication SY had received suggesting that the Leary case had reached a critical stage"* simply ignores what is obvious to most people that Dr. Leary is a notorious criminal. Leary returned to the United States within direct reach of our criminal procedures. This, in and of itself, should normally indicate the urgency of the situation. You state there has been a premise (of which I am not aware) *"that when a passport violator is incarcerated, the need for urgent investigation is somewhat lessened"*. The failure to investigate the case of a notorious individual for more than eight months violates, beyond any comprehension, even the premise you created.

In summary, the record shows that, during the year the Passport Office had the manuscript, it performed hundreds of hours of work in the case, something of a miracle considering our chronic shortages of employees. The record shows that, since the matter was referred to you on February 8, 1973, the Office of Security has either done nothing or failed to report any action.

I regret the necessity of going over the chronology in the Leary case in rebuttal to your memorandum. Obviously, this does not get the work accomplished.

The statement in your memorandum of September 24 that Mr. Duggan's memorandum of May 11, 1973, concerning the review requested for closing three categories of passport frauds *"left the criteria for closing such cases to the discretion of SY" is not a fact.* These criteria were repeated in my memorandum to you of September 18. *There is no discretion to be exercised; the specified criteria were to be applied to the cases already assigned to your agents.*

The reason the Legal Division did not indicate which cases to close is that PT/L has not been kept informed about the current status of the individual cases because SY/I does not regularly submit pending or closing reports. Further,

PT/L's requests for such reports go unanswered or generate excuses rather than substantive data. Under these circumstances, the SY agent assigned to the case is the only person in a position to know the current status and *to apply the criteria stated in the May 11 memorandum.*

If PT/L possessed current reports on the status of the pending fraud cases, that office would have applied the criteria and transmitted a list of cases to close. As you know, some cases closed by your agents, citing the May 11 memorandum, have been returned to your office for investigation because specified criteria were not met. It is therefore self-evident that the cited memorandum did not contemplate that special agents exercise their discretion and close passport fraud cases.

Before leaving this point, let me stress that the cited criteria do not reflect on the probability of fraud; they reflect only on the probable availability of witnesses and/or evidence because the investigations are stale.

In the penultimate paragraph of your memorandum, you refer to the fact that SY closed 557 passport fraud cases during FY 1972, 342 during FY 1973, and 71 during the first two months of FY 1974. The decline in the efforts of SY in passport fraud investigations is evident in your own memorandum. I believe it is accurate to state that, of the 71 completed during the first two months of FY 1974, many of them fell within the closing authority contained in Mr. Duggan's memorandum of May 11, 1973.

It is a matter of record that the passport fraud problem has been the subject of considerable concern by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee and the Passport Office has committed itself to expanding the staff of the Legal Division to combat the situation. This is a matter of record in the Department budget hearings. The failure of SY to give investigative support will, if permitted to continue, further detract and ultimately nullify the effects of the passport fraud program. I would be lacking in integrity and frankness if I did not bring to the attention of the officials of the Department considering the budget and the passport fraud problem the results of the present position taken by the Office of Security. Therefore, as I indicated in my memorandum of September 18 to you, I am sending you copies of our correspondence to Dr. Curtis W. Tarr. I am attaching a copy of my memorandum to Dr. Tarr, which is self-explanatory.

U.S. GOVERNMENT, MEMORANDUM.

October 11, 1973.

To: M—Dr. Curtis W. Tarr, Acting
 From: PPT—Frances G. Knight
 Subject: Delinquent SY Passport Fraud Investigations

We continue to have a serious problem in securing prompt and effective investigation in passport fraud cases which we refer to the Office of Security. The Passport fraud problem becomes increasingly serious with the passage of time. You are, no doubt, aware of the concern and interest in passport frauds by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee and their recent call to have me testify on the subject on October 3, 1973.

You will recall that, on August 9, 1973, at the Department's Budget Hearing, we were requested to submit further data on the fraud problem so that it could be determined what effect it would have on the work load of the Office of Security. On August 21, 1973, this additional information was furnished to Miss Barbara Watson, SCA, and I hope that it was, in turn, forwarded to the proper authorities; however, we have had no indication of what action was taken on the material we provided.

Because of the long delays and backlog of cases, I sent a memorandum to Mr. Marvin Gentile, SY, on September 18, 1973 (copy attached) requesting a statement from him advising this office what steps he intended to take to insure prompt and effective investigations of passport fraud cases. In his reply to me, Mr. Gentile failed to present any positive program showing that he would take action to implement prompt and effective passport fraud investigations. (Copy attached).

I have indicated to Mr. Gentile that the Passport Office has a duty and responsibility to present to Congress and to OMB, at their request, the facts and the seriousness of the apparent lack of action within the Department of State. Absent immediate action to overcome the present dormant position of the priorities given to passport fraud investigations in SY, I must request that the investigative responsibility be transferred, along with personnel, to some other area of

government. It has been suggested that the Passport Office assume these duties but the uncooperative and indifferent attitude of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs is not conducive to support or promote action on any matter dealing with national security.

The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee has made some very pertinent inquiries into the passport fraud situation; the lack of support for our program; the obvious lack of interest in and action on our previous warnings; the mounting incidence of fraud; and the inordinate and inexplicable delays in the investigation process.

I would, indeed, appreciate your thoughts on this very serious matter as soon as possible. I know how very busy you are. I know that one crisis has followed another in rapid succession, but I have been waiting for years to get an attentive and sympathetic ear within the Department and some support for the Passport Office efforts in this area, only to receive the yearly meat-axe approach in personnel and budget cuts, as well as the general sabotage which is the by-product of SCA's continual harassment of the Passport Office staff.

I am attaching for your information copies of the interchange of communications with the Office of Security.

Mr. SOURWINE. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, I have just two more things.

Mr. Chairman, I spoke earlier of the newspaper reports with respect to the awarding of the research contract in connection with the new and secure passport. I have two of these reproductions of newspaper clippings here. I would like to ask that they be inserted in the record at the appropriate place.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, Miss Knight, here is the story from the Philadelphia Bulletin about Mr. Edward Neilan's interview with Miss Barbara Watson. He starts out by saying:

The passport of the future could look more like a credit card than the present version of the standard passport which has pages for stamping of entry and exit visas. "Studies are underway to create a streamlined passport", said Miss Barbara M. Watson, Administrator to the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs which directs visa and passport matters for all American citizens. Miss Watson, known among her colleagues in Washington as "the passport lady" suggests that one version of the passport of the future might be a plastic IBM type card with certain data pre-punched in coding.

That is archaic, Miss Knight. They were prepunching and coding data when I came to Washington 40 years ago. Computers were not even invented yet. I find this thing preposterous.

[The article referred to follows:]

[From the Philadelphia Bulletin, Sept. 23, 1973]

MEET THE PASSPORT LADY: SHE WORRIES ABOUT YOU

(By Edward Neilan)

WASHINGTON.—The passport of the future could look more like a credit card than the present version of the standard passport which has pages for stamping of entry and exit visas.

"Studies are under way to create a streamlined passport," said Miss Barbara M. Watson, administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, which directs visa and passport matters for all American citizens.

Miss Watson, known among her colleagues in Washington as "The Passport Lady," suggests that one version of the passport of the future might be a plastic IBM-type card with certain data prepunched and coded.

When a person arrived at a foreign border he would produce his "computerized" data card and the border officials would run it through a machine. Anyone whose card wasn't properly punched would be detained for questioning.

"Can you imagine how many man-hours of laborious hand-stamping and scribbling in passports this would save?" asked Miss Watson.

With more Americans traveling around this summer than ever before, the State Department's worldwide network of consular offices is swamped with applications, requests, complaints and visitors who "just dropped by to say 'hello'".

Miss Watson presides over the some 250 American consular offices in 127 countries. The offices are staffed by about 2,000 local and American workers.

The number of Americans going overseas this year will be well over eight million.

That compares to fewer than five million in 1968.

Adding to the consular duties of the State Department is the fact that about a million and a half Americans now reside abroad—although devaluation of the dollar has sent thousands scurrying back "home".

Miss Watson said that consular services rendered have more than doubled in the last decade, going from 450,000 in 1962 to 929,068 in 1972.

Some 2.6 million passports were issued last year and the demand is seen as growing steadily in coming years. One important step toward facilitating issuance of new passports was the recent decision to use the U.S. Post Offices as receiving points for passport applications. This has provided more than 700 points across the country where citizens may apply.

Miss Watson is the daughter of a one-time judge of the New York Municipal Court.

An attorney, she joined the State Department in July, 1966, as special assistant to the deputy undersecretary for administration.

In 1968 she was sworn in as administrator of the passport and consular office, with the rank of assistant secretary of state. That made her the first black person ever to hold a position at that level in the Department of State.

Miss Watson, who said her hobby is "people," noted that with so many more Americans traveling to foreign countries; "it is not surprising that more and more are getting into trouble of one sort or another abroad."

She said "in many cases this is due to nothing more than a lack of knowledge of local customs, mores and languages."

One of her department's most serious problems, she said, is assisting Americans who are arrested in foreign lands.

"It comes as a shock to many Americans who feel that all they have to do—when arrested in a foreign country—is to say they are Americans and they will be let free, or, at worst, will be tried under American law. Of course, this is not the case at all.

"It is tragic," said Miss Watson, "but the number of young Americans 'busted' in drug raids overseas has become very serious. The number is dipping slightly now but there are still 1,084 young Americans in jail in foreign countries on drug charges. Three of every four are under 25 years of age."

Miss Watson advised Americans who live abroad and plan to purchase property in foreign countries to check with their local American consular offices. "There are legal intricacies that the unwary buyer must know about or he might someday lose the property because of clauses in the fine print."

Visits by foreigners to the United States have increased by 200 percent in the last 10 years, she noted.

Nonimmigrant visas issued rose from 775,027 in 1962 to 2,290,576 last year. Immigrant visas issued increased from 273,190 in 1962 to 293,966 in 1972.

Miss Watson said that current immigration laws may be changed to give persons born in the Western Hemisphere a better chance to immigrate to the United States if they can qualify under certain "skills" criteria.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say you had a chance to read it. Now, will you comment on it? Is there a vestige of truth in it? What is the situation?

Miss KNIGHT. Mr. Chairman, a marked copy of the article was mailed to me from a Philadelphia source and I received it yesterday. My only comment is that I was appalled by the statements reported regarding passports which are totally inaccurate, incorrect, and irresponsible. I can only regard these efforts to mislead the press and the public as a deliberate and unconscionable attempt to sabotage the tremendous effort which has already been invested in our long search for an effective, efficient, secure, and machine-readable passport, ac-

ceptable to other countries which require now and in the foreseeable future visas for U.S. citizens. Currently there are 147 countries that require visas on U.S. passports. In my opinion the statement made by the official quoted in the story, regarding a plastic card passport, is so stupid, in the light of our research and detailed analysis that any person with a minimal knowledge of world travel requirements and a grade-school understanding of national security would promptly dismiss it as a hoax or figure that it was a misprint.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I will ask that the full text of the newspaper story in question go into the record at the point where I asked Miss Knight about it so that her comment thereafter may follow logically.

I have no more questions, Miss Knight. Thank you very much for coming up here and waiting so patiently and answering our questions so fully.

The CHAIRMAN. Miss Knight, we are always glad to have you here and we know you for an earnest and dedicated and mighty hard-working public servant and we sure do thank you.

Miss KNIGHT. Thank you, sir.

[Whereupon, at 3:55 o'clock, the hearing was concluded.]

APPENDIX

LIST OF BROTHERHOOD OF ETERNAL LOVE INDICTEES

CLASS I

1. Druce, Charles, England.
2. Friedman, Lester, Dr., DOB 9/14/28, 3618 Concord Drive, Beachwood, Ohio.
3. Hitchcock, William Mellon, DOB 9/6/39, Box 503, Millbrook, N.Y.
4. Leary, Timothy Frances, DOB 10/22/20, in custody, California State Prison.
5. Randall, Michael Boyd, DOB 8/27/43, fugitive.
6. Scully, Robert Timothy, DOB 8/27/44, San Francisco, Calif.
7. Stark, Ronald Hadley, DOB 4/9/38, fugitive.
8. Mantell, David Leigh, DOB 4/25/40, fugitive.
9. Sand, Nicholas, DOB 5/10/41, in custody.

CLASS II

1. Ackerly, Robert Dale, DOB 1/23/44, in custody, Federal prison.
2. Andrist, Robert Lee, DOB 11/3/45, fugitive.
3. Ashbrook, Travis Grant, DOB 1/9/45, fugitive.
4. Bevan, Rick C., DOB 11/20/48, fugitive.
5. Crittenden, James Leroy, DOB 8/14/42, Mariposa County, Calif.
6. Drury, Donald Karl, DOB 3/18/37, in custody.
7. Gale, John Charles, DOB 8/4/47, Las Vegas, Nev.
8. Johnson, Gordon Fred, DOB 3/25/45, in custody, California State Prison.
9. Lange, Edward Jeffrey, DOB 11/26/47, Orange County, Calif.
10. Scott, Charles Frederick, DOB 12/28/41, fugitive.
11. Tokhi, Hayatullah, DOB 1939, fugitive, Afghanistan.
12. Sexton, Gordon Albert, DOB 1/29/46, fugitive.
13. Smith, Brenice Lee, DOB 4/6/45, fugitive.
14. Tierney, Robert Edward, DOB 4/22/47, in custody, Panama.
15. Tokhi, Amanullah Salem, DOB 3/15/33, fugitive, Afghanistan.
16. Bevan, Ronald, DOB 9/19/46, fugitive.
17. Caserta, Daniel Phillip, DOB 8/9/47, fugitive.
18. German, Lyle Paul, DOB 3/7/39, fugitive.
19. Hall, David Alan, DOB 10/6/42, fugitive.
20. May, Edward Joseph, DOB 2/1/33, fugitive, San Francisco.
21. Padilla, Gerald James, DOB 8/13/47, fugitive.
22. Stanton, Mark Patrick, DOB 9/20/46, fugitive.

CLASS III

1. Allen, Linda Pohl, DOB 3/15/47, Laguna Beach, Calif.
2. Arthur, David Alan, DOB 1/8/43, fugitive.
3. Becker, Dale Andrew, DOB 12/28/42, fugitive, Australia.
4. Bidwell, Thomas Blake, DOB 2/18/45, San Diego, Calif.
5. Clay, James Henry, DOB 11/28/45, in custody, California State Prison.
6. Crawford, Ronald Ray, DOB 4/15/43, Hawaii.
7. Daw, John Robert, DOB 10/10/43, fugitive.
8. Delaney, Calvin Larry, DOB 10/31/42, Hawaii.
9. Harrigan, Russell Joseph, DOB 8/19/40, fugitive.
10. Harrington, John Joseph, Jr., DOB 9/18/42, fugitive.
11. Lynd, Glenn Craig, DOB 3/23/42.
12. McAdams, Brian Kendall, DOB 4/9/46.
13. McAdams, Yonica Menne, DOB 4/9/47.
14. Otto, Jimmy Gregg, DOB 2/14/45, Laguna Beach, Calif.

15. Palma, Franklin, DOB 1/18/46.
16. Pohl, Gerald, DOB 6/11/48, fugitive.
17. Pooley, Michael Lee, DOB 2/22/49.
18. Pratt, Jill Barnett, DOB 3/16/45, fugitive.
19. Reddy, David Mark, DOB 8/10/48, in custody, California State Prison.
20. Pratt, Stanford Leon, DOB 8/6/45, fugitive.
21. Bowyer, Chester Allen, DOB 8/3/39, in custody, Federal prison.

[From Good Times, Jan. 8, 1971]

GETTING HIGH WITH JENNIFER

(Sister Jennifer Dohrn recently returned to the United States after visiting political exiles Eldridge Cleaver and Timothy Leary in Algeria, and accompanying Leary on an attempted meeting with Al Fatah in Lebanon. Last week, she visited Good Times and told us:)

In October I got the opportunity to go to Algeria with five other people. Timothy had been out about three weeks when I arrived. It's really a trip to get on an airplane and get off a day later in Africa and there's Timothy Leary and Eldridge Cleaver to greet you, two men I'd never met, but really important, beautiful people. The first week I spent just getting to know the people there, the Panthers and Rosemary and Timothy, building up a kind of trust, getting close to people so that we could have a friendship.

The Panthers in Algiers . . . Eldridge and Kathleen, two Panthers from the New York 21, both of them underground in this country for a year and a half. The Panthers have been granted the status of a national liberation front and been given an embassy and they've established diplomatic relations with people like the North Vietnamese and the North Koreans. When you're there, the first feeling you get is that you're a diplomat.

Algiers is a good place to be right now. One reason for this is the easy access of this country. You can fly right there. Another thing is that every national liberation front in the world has a center there, which I don't think happens in any other city. The Panthers have the opportunity to set up what they call a people's embassy and they really see themselves as an international part of this movement, setting up relations for all of us. We found that out on the trip to the Middle East because of a whole series of communications. We were in Cairo and all the lines between Cairo and Algiers were down. It took four days to send a wire. We found out that Eldridge had the Chinese, Koreans and the North Vietnamese looking for us. In fact at one point the Koreans wired Kim Il Sung and he sent a wire to Cairo saying that they should find us because we were their comrades. And that position is because of the work Eldridge has done in establishing diplomatic relations with other countries. At the same time, it's very contradictory in Algiers now because the government is beginning to negotiate diplomatic relations with the U.S. and if that does happen it's certainly going to have an effect as far as that being a sanctuary.

I think the impression that I've had of Eldridge is that he's one of the warmest, most open revolutionaries that I've met, very direct, very brilliant. He has the ability to perceive relations. He really has an understanding of youth culture, understands that it's a revolutionary force in this country. One of the biggest problems for the Panthers in Algiers is that they're very isolated from the movement here, very cut off. People in this country think they're on the moon or something and think that they can't call them or write them. Because of that people don't take the time to send them papers regularly, send them letters and tapes.

GT: Doesn't the U.S. government hold back a lot of the stuff that's sent to them?

Sure, a lot of it gets ripped off. But they should have a paper every week because it's their only way of really being a part of this movement . . . for us to relate to them.

One of the things that struck me over and over was how hard it is to be in exile. One of the first things Eldridge would say is how much he wanted to be back because fighting in one's own country is really important and necessary to a revolutionary. When we were there we had a birthday party for Tim and Bobby Seale. We had a really nice celebration for Tim's birthday and freedom and for fighting for Bobby's freedom.

GT: What about reports that the Algerian government is hostile to the U.S. political refugees?

It's not true at all. There was never a question about Timothy's getting political asylum; it was granted as soon as he was there. The Panthers wouldn't have been given an embassy and invited to all these meetings and affairs unless they were in a very good position there.

I think the whole image was perpetrated to make it seem like we couldn't go anywhere. The Algerian government sponsored a trip for four of us to go to the Middle East to meet with the Palestinian guerrillas. Field Marshall D. C. and Marty Kenner, who's chairman of the Panther Defense Fund, and Timothy and myself went to the Middle East. What happened was that when we arrived in Beirut we were supposed to be met by members of Al Fateh, who were then going to take us into Damascus or Aman, depending on how heavy the fighting was in Aman that week.

When we arrived in Beirut there was no one there to meet us. At this point we weren't too upset because we didn't know anything about Beirut at the time, so we thought we'd just go to a hotel for the night and wake up and make contact the next day and that everything would be fine. So we went off and the Lebanese government put us up in this hotel and we went to sleep thinking everything would be fine the next day. Well, we didn't know a couple of things. One was that a UPI reporter had identified Timothy on the plane from Cairo to Beirut and put it out over the wire the first night that we were there in the city. The second thing was that the hotel that the Lebanese government had recommended turned out to be the headquarters for Western press in Beirut. So after two days we found out that CBS had the room next door, Newsweek and everyone was in this hotel. So we get up the next morning thinking that we'd just have breakfast and go out and meet the people from Al Fateh. So we stepped out on this little balcony on the hotel room and find reporters on top of cars with telescopic lenses. Every time I opened the door, men would grab me and try to drag me into the hall to make a statement.

This incredible situation developed that the Western press in their determination to get a story on Tim Leary completely endangered our safety and caused such a stir that Al Fateh in Beirut, who hadn't received the proper communications from Algiers, didn't know what was happening and the CIA was beginning to try and move on us. There's no extradition treaty in Lebanon so the Lebanese government couldn't arrest us, but they were being put in a position of going to have to ask us to leave. It was a very complicated situation, mainly because Beirut is like a completely open city where anything goes. For Timothy and D. C. it was like being in O'Hare Airport . . . it was that serious.

What finally happened on the Middle East trip is that the press situation in Beirut made it necessary to return to Algiers. At one point we had a car that was going to take us to Damascus, but without the proper contacts with the guerrilla forces it would have been very dangerous to go further in. So we decided to return to Algeria until that whole problem straightened up. We went back through Cairo and Egyptian authorities checked us out and were very warm to us. While we were in Cairo we went to the Algerian embassy and the ambassador came in and was very happy to see us and arranged for our flight back.

To fly from Cairo to Algiers is really complicated. You have to go through Tunis and Tripoli. Tunis is another open city so we couldn't go through customs and get off the plane, especially at this point because everyone in the world knew where we were every minute. So they arranged for our flight back so that we would never have to get off the plane and we were with Algerians the whole way back.

While we were in Cairo we met with the Middle East press and talked to a lot of people there. The three things they knew about were the Black Panther Party, the bombings in this country and Muhammed Ali. Mostly they wanted to talk about him because he's a big hero to them. It was really sad that we couldn't meet with the Palestinians because the people in the Middle East are such beautiful people.

I found out a lot about what the pig press is like. We tried to take an attitude that said, like our security, our safety is the first thing and as soon as we're in a safe place, we'll talk to the press, but our first concern is to get out of here alive. And they, for very definite reasons could only print the most outrageous kinds of things, like headlines saying "The High Priest of Hashish" is in town. It's really amazing, people will ask me questions like, "How was Tim Leary received in places in Algeria and the Middle East?" He's received very well and it's because of this human consciousness that he has about explaining about

drugs. Reporters would say, Dr. Leary, could you tell us what LSD is? and he'd explain what the whole movement has been about in this country, explaining that dope is a very important part of our culture and that it's very revolutionary, and what it's meant in this country in the last ten years. You know, dropping out of this society's values, turning out, the whole political movement that's developed from that. He'll explain that and at the same time say, but I understand that in other cultures, in different societies, and even in the same culture at a different time, dope can play a very different role—like it's certainly different in the ghetto in this country than in the youth culture.

In Algeria and in the Middle East dope has been used as a very oppressive thing and the revolutionaries have all had to fight against it, but the attitude that Timothy has and we all had was to be very open and understanding, and asking about the history of it in their own revolutions meant that he was received very well. He was respected and he really wanted to learn about the revolution in other places, so there was never any problem to our meeting with revolutionary groups about Timothy Leary's position in the movement.

We mostly were going to meet with Al Fateh. It's not a revolutionary organization . . . it's more like a loosely knit nationalist organization. They are the ones who have relations with the Algerian government. There are posters for Al Fateh all over the Cairo airport and the rest of the city. The thing about the people, like in Cairo, is that they really look to the movement, to the black struggle, to the youth movement. They really see a revolution in this country and it's totally connected with their own freedom. They really look to this country for leadership. There's an incredible sense that this is the real heart.

I want to say that my sister, Bernadine, was never in Algiers. It's really an important thing to understand because when I got back and found out the whole story that had developed about her being there, I found that people were really depressed and shaken about it. It had the effect of people saying that it really wasn't like the picture we get of how it is to be underground. Like maybe it wasn't true and maybe they couldn't make it. It is a defeating kind of feeling that people had about it. It's important for people to understand that she is here.

Let's talk about Timothy.

People ask all the time why did he change and how he has changed and what he's like now. I think there are a couple of things that caused his development to wanting to become a revolutionary. One is that he saw in the whole youth movement that developed around him—the dropping acid and dropping out—that you find internal freedom . . . he saw that the people who took only that road ended up with very self-indulgent totally degenerate lives, totally ignoring that there's an imperialist state that's oppressing people all around the world. That we need two kinds of revolutions together . . . they're not separate . . . they're all about being a revolutionary. Which is like fighting to build new men and women, trying to build new structures, new ways of living. That's what we're really about . . . that we're trying to live it as we're also fighting to build new men and women, trying to build new structures, new ways of living. That's what we're really about . . . that we're trying to live it as we're also fighting a revolution. And you can't have one without the other.

Timothy said in this tape I brought back that a political revolutionary who isn't turned on is a political robot, and the system which he seeks to build is no better than the one he's destroying. So he really began to see that you just can't go off and find a nirvana when you can walk into Harlem or Watts and be hit with the genocidal war against blacks and people all over the world being oppressed. You can't just go off and think that you can find a new kind of internal freedom.

Going to jail and being in prison . . . I guess it was nine or ten months . . . certainly changed him. He says that he really began planning his escape from the moment he entered prison. He was very careful about not having press conferences, about not being a public figure, he convinced Reagan and all the state authorities that he was a very harmless man who should be put in minimum security. In fact the day before he escaped, he cleaned out his locker and taped inside the door a newspaper clipping that said that Gov. Reagan says Timothy Leary was a completely harmless man who could be put in minimum security. He just under lined it in red and taped it to the inside of his locker, knowing that they would find it a day later when he was free. He worked out a lot when he was in prison and he's very strong.

The day of his escape two pigs came to the prison . . . I don't know if they were FBI or what. But they were going to take him to New York where he was going to be tried on some other charges and these pigs knew him because they had been

chasing him and busting him for years. So they called him into the warden's office and said, "Timothy, we have to take you back to New York. We can either leave today and drive or wait 'til Monday and fly back." So he said, "Why don't you take the weekend off and we'll fly in on Monday. That's fine with me." He had this great image that they'd go off and get drunk for the weekend and wake on Monday and find these headlines that Timothy Leary had escaped.

In his actual escape he found that he couldn't go out of the prison as he had actually planned. He in fact had to climb over a part of the wall that was under floodlights with guards walking back and forth. He got halfway up this wall and his hands were all cut from the wire . . . he was just hanging there, not knowing if he could make it. He said that the thought he had was if they shoot me I want to fall over the wall to let people know I was trying to be free. He also carried out a statement he had written in prison that was later released. It shows he was in a good place before he escaped.

The week that he spent with the Weather underground [after his escape] was a really incredible experience for him. The first night he was taken to a house in the city and found everything he could have wanted while he was in prison. He had a bubble bath and there was a refrigerator full of food, lots of dope. And the next day he was out on the streets walking around. He said he was terrified of this image that you're going to be taken to some basement or to some mountain top, but that we're certainly not going to be around people. But he was in disguise and had a new i.d.

He said he was with Weather brothers and sisters who are so confident, who are part of the youth culture in this country and so they can move around anywhere. They're us. And because they are, they can move in so many places. They can go wherever we go. And they've developed a real strength and confidence which he couldn't help but feel. So he learned this whole new way of moving.

They got in a car the first day and were driving down the street when this carload of freaks drove by, started honking the horn and waving, causing all this commotion so Tim panicked that someone had recognized him, but he kind of smiled and waved back and then a Weather sister sitting next to him said, "That was Mark Rudd who just waved to you. Another thing Tim did during that week was the day Jimi Hendrix died . . . he was a very good friend of Timothy's . . . he and Rosemary and Bernadine and Jeff Jones got stoned and went to see "Woodstock", which was a very meaningful thing for him.

I won't compare Eldridge and Timothy but they're two of the most brilliant people I've ever met. They have a real respect for one another and they have a lot to learn from one another. There's a real sense of friendship between them. Eldridge's whole understanding about acid and dope is really right on. When we went to Algiers we found out that his favorite records are by Bob Dylan and Leonard Cohen so we bought him a whole bunch of their records. But he's been learning a lot from Timothy.

And Timothy and Rosemary . . . you go into their room and it's this totally psychedelic room with all these bright colors and incense and warmth and you see copies of all Kim Il Sung's works that Timothy's reading. He's tripping on reading it. It's like this whole new thing that really fits in. His becoming a revolutionary is something that some people view as just another trip or that he's mouthing words that he doesn't believe like he's been brainwashed or something, but I found by being with him that it's a natural process, that he's struggling through things and finding that his progression toward wanting to become a revolutionary is a very natural thing.

On page 34, Special Agent Strange was asked to provide a list of brotherhood members who are believed to have obtained multiple passports falsely identifying themselves. A list of brotherhood members believed to have obtained one or more passports under assumed names follows:

THE BROTHERHOOD—MASTER LIST (PASSPORT) APRIL 18, 1973

ACKERY, ROBERT DALE

Secured PPT # K696983 at San Francisco 5/26/69 (in true name).

Secured PPT # K157638 at San Francisco 11/21/69; in name of Christopher, Robert John.

Secured PPT # B2081110 at San Francisco 9/9/71 (in true name).
Status.—Complaint 18 USC 1542—Secured by SFFO 4/18/73.

ANDRIST, ROBERT LEE

Secured PPT # N1239807 at Los Angeles 10/16/68 (in true name).
 Secured PPT # A1787934 at Los Angeles 8/19/70; in name of Schmitt, Carl
 Felix.
Status.—Complaint 18 USC 1542—Secured 7/25/72.

ARTHUR, DAVID ALAN

Secured PPT # E042802 at Los Angeles 1/9/64 (in true name).
 Renewed at Los Angeles 12/20/66.
 Secured PPT # H 046053 at Los Angeles 2/13/67; in name of Levine, Jonathan
 David.

ASHROOK, TRAVIS GRANT

Secured PPT # H 1215898 at Los Angeles 10/18/67 (in true name).
 Secured PPT # K725942 at Los Angeles 5/26/69; in name of Bliss, Michael
 Eugene.
 Secured PPT # B388181 at Los Angeles 3/10/71; in name of Mooney, Richard
 Alan.
Status.—Complaint 18 USC 1542 2/22/73.

BATES, ROGER

Secured PPT # Z 746300 at Seville, Spain 12/27/67 (in true name).
 Secured PPT # K 657198 at New York 5/9/69; in name of Jacobs, Paul Irvin.
Status.—Pending prosecution in New York.

BEVAN, RICK

Secured PPT # J 043040 at Los Angeles 2/6/68 (in true name).
 Secured PPT # K 1079844 at San Francisco 7/2/69; in name of Crockett, Ira Lee.
 Secured replacement PPT # K 1494385 at Los Angeles 10/2/69; in name of
 Crockett (Claimed K 1079844 lost).
 Secured PPP # A 1804757 at Los Angeles 10/1/60; in name of Parks, Rodney.
 Applied for PPT at Portland, Oregon on 12/18/72; in name of Haul, Jason Emile
 (not issued).
 Applied for PPT at San Francisco on 2/28/73; in name of Hyatt, Bobby Joe
 (not issued).
Status.—Indicted two counts 18 USC 1542 on 7/3/72. Fugitive—no bail. Bench
 warrant outstanding.

BOWYER, CHESTER ALLEN, JR.

Secured PPT # K 029312 at Los Angeles 1/6/69 (in true name).
 Secured PPT # A 1706031 at San Francisco 8/18/70; in name of Hanson, John
 Walter.
Status.—Under investigation.

CASERTA, DANIEL PHILLIP

Secured PPT # K 693981 at San Francisco 5/20/69 (in name of Strickland,
 Albert Lee).
Status.—Presented to U.S. Attorney, San Francisco, May 1972.

CLAY, JAMES HENRY

Secured PPT # K 808064 at New York 5/22/69 (in name of Greer, Jason
 Andrew).

CONNOLLY, MICHAEL STEPHEN

Secured PPT # J 1360950 at Los Angeles 12/9/66 (in true name).
 Secured PPT # B 2219108 at Los Angeles 11/1/71 (in name of Ruggles, Michael
 Duncan).
Status.—Indicted one count 18 USC 1542 on 1/22/73. Pled guilty 3/26/73—to be
 sentenced 5/7/73.

DALE, JAMES HOWARD

Secured PPT # A 1789701 at Los Angeles 8/24/70 (in that name).
 Secured PPT # B 412460 at Honolulu 3/26/71 (in name of Gibson, Richard Gerald).
Status.—Under investigation.

DE JARETTE, JON JAY

Secured PPT # B 1574311 at San Francisco 7/7/71 (in name of Jacobs, Paul Michael).
Status.—Complaint 18 USC 1542 at San Francisco 11/15/72. Placed as hold with San Bernardino Sheriff's Office.

FRIEND, JOHN CHRISTOPHER

Secured PPT # B 1347656 at Los Angeles 7/9/71 (in that name).
 Secured PPT # B 1753065 at Los Angeles 7/29/71 (in the name of Gates, Ronald Thomas).
Status.—Under investigation.

FULLER, LESTER SAMUEL

Secured PPT # J 498838 at Los Angeles 5/1/68 (in name of Stanton, Mark).
 Secured PPT # A 200927 at Los Angeles 2/25/70 (in true name).
Status.—Under investigation.

GARRISON, GARY ALLEN

Secured PPT # B 843252 at Los Angeles 5/12/71 (in name of Cromwell, Gary Travis).
Status.—Complaint 18 USC 1542 secured 7/25/72.

KIMBALL, ROBERT RICHARDSON

Secured PPT # B 188729 at Los Angeles 6/5/61 (in true name).
 Secured PPT # Z 336608 at Leopoldville 7/27/64 (in same name).
 Secured replacement PPT # Z 706672 at Paris 12/21/64. Claimed Z 336608 lost.
 Secured PPT # A 1866965 at New York 9/3/70 (in true name).
 Secured PPT # B 2020957 at Los Angeles 10/27/71 (in name of McFerr, Malcolm Coyne).
Status.—Under investigation.

LANGE, EDWARD JEFFRY

Secured PPT # K 030398 at Los Angeles 1/9/69 (in true name).
 Secured PPT # K 1562638 at Los Angeles 11/17/69 (in name of Turner, Paul Gene).
 Secured PPT # Z 1603319 at Costa Rica 7/7/72 (in name of Robertson, Henry Alan).
Status.—Indicted two counts 18 USC 1542 1/22/73.

LEARY, TIMOTHY

Secured PPT (number unknown) at Chicago 9/22/70 (in name of McNellis, William John).
Status.—Under investigation.

MARTINO, DAVID RUSSELL (LEARY'S SON-IN-LAW)

Secured PPT # (?) at Los Angeles 11/21/69 (in true name).
 Secured PPT # B 399506 at Los Angeles 3/25/71 (in name of Carter, Joseph Aaron).
Status.—Complaint—18 USC 1542 7/25/72.

MARTINO, DENNIS JOHN

Secured PPT # J 049406 at Los Angeles 2/26/68 (in true name).
 Secured replacement PPT # K 1561436 at Los Angeles 11/12/69 (in true name).

Secured PPT # B 1224710 at New York 6/21/71 (in name of Viertel, Richard Lon).

Status.—Under investigation.

MILES, STEVEN LOUIS

Secured PPT (number not legible) at San Francisco, November 1972 (in that name).

Note.—No birth record in that name.

Status.—Under investigation.

MORRELL, WALTER DAVID

Secured PPT # B 2136275 at Seattle 10/22/71 (in that name).

Secured replacement PPT # Z 1422924 at Tokyo, Japan 12/30/71. Claimed B 2136275 lost.

Status.—Under investigation. Identity unknown. No birth record in that name in Colorado.

NEWMAN, JAMES CARROLL III

Subject's twin brother, Jeffrey Clark Newman secured PPT # J 1239252 at Los Angeles 10/14/68. When subject was arrested in Amsterdam 3/9/72, he had it in his possession and admitted using Jeffrey's passport which Jeffrey had reported lost.

James secured PPT # B 2298987 at San Francisco 11/17/71 (in name of Parker, Jeffrey Alan).

Status.—Prosecution declined by U.S. Attorney San Francisco.

NICHOLS, LEE ALLEN

Reportedly secured PPT # H 1215905 at Los Angeles 10/18/67 (in name of Lynd, Glen).

Status.—PPT record search requested.

PRATT, STANFORD LEON

Secured PPT # K 1608803 at Los Angeles 12/8/69 (in that name).

Secured PPT # B 2082142 at San Francisco 9/13/71 (in name of Wideman, Jesse Stanford).

Status.—Presented to U.S. Attorney, San Francisco, May 1972.

RANDALL, MICHAEL BOYD

Secured PPT # B 801984 at Los Angeles 4/21/71 (in name of Garrity, Michael Thomas).

Status.—Complaint 18 USC 1542 secured 3/9/73. Indicted six counts 3/26/73—Failed to appear 4/24/73. Bench Warrant outstanding.

SMITH, BRENICE LEE

Secured PPT # J 498837 at Los Angeles 5/1/68 (in name of Nicklesburg, Lee Alan).

Status.—Under investigation.

STEVENS, JAMES ROBERT

Secured PPT # 1890248 at New York 10/15/70 (in name of Gleason, Graylin Robert).

Secured replacement PPT # A 1981937 at Los Angeles 12/21/70. Claimed A 1890248 (lost in same name).

Secured replacement PPT # Z 1429835 (?) at Madrid, Spain, 7/16/71. (in same name).

Probable true name: McGuire, Francis.

Status.—Under investigation.

STONE, JOHN LEROY

Secured PPT # C 021145 at San Francisco 1/19/70 (in last name).

True name.—Blackmun, Darrel David.

Status.—Under investigation.

THURSTON, CRAIG DON

Secured PPT # G 893288 at Los Angeles 8/9/66 (in true name).
 Secured PPT # A 202115 at Los Angeles 2/26/70 (in name of Drew, Sean).
 Secured PPT # B 880488 at Honolulu 9/30/71 (in true name).
Status.—Complaint—18 USC 1542 2/22/73.

WALTERS, SAUL

Secured PPT # B 1862111 at San Francisco 8/24/71 (in that name).
 True name—Anthony "Tony" Sage.
Status.—Under investigation.

WILENCHIK, MITCHELL ALLEN

Secured PPT # B 3900545 at Los Angeles 3/15/71 (in name of Phillips, Mitchell Allen).
 Secured PPT # B 1757044 at Los Angeles 8/3/71 (in name of Allen, John Carl—a joint PPT with wife (?) Pamela Jean Allen).
Status.—Complaint 18 USC 1542 on 7/25/72. Indicted two counts 18 USC 1542 on 10/11/72. On 1/4/73 pled guilty to one count of PPT fraud (2nd count dismissed) and one count Selective Service violation. Sentenced to 3 years on each count, concurrent.

WILSON, ROBERT DAVID, JR.

Secured PPT # B 116571 at Honolulu 7/15/71 (in name of Black, Jacob Martin).
Status.—Indicted one count 18 USC 1542 at Honolulu 10/6/72. Fugitive.

HASHISH REMOVED

[In pounds]

	Calendar year—					1973 through June
	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	
Domestic (DEA).....		239	234	882	1,151	73
Ports and borders (customs and INS)...	132	1,602	3,811	6,900	8,754	4,447
DEA/foreign cooperative.....	402	406	3,211	14,406	20,189	6,630
Total.....	534	2,247	7,256	22,188	30,094	11,150

MR. GENE R. HAISLIP, ACTING CHIEF, CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS SECTION,
 ACTING CHIEF, SCIENTIFIC SERVICES DIVISION

HASHISH AND "HASHISH OIL" STATISTICS

The total number of marihuana exhibits and percent of the total workload over the past three fiscal years are as follows:

TABLE 1

	Fiscal year		
	1971	1972	1973
Number of marihuana exhibits.....	7,298	9,319	15,163
Percent of total workload.....	25%	27%	34%

Note: A further breakdown of the above totals into drug codes is listed below.

TABLE 2

Drug code and item	Fiscal year—			1974 (July and August)
	1971	1972	1973	
7360—Marihuana.....	1,693	2,364	4,264	1,031
7361—Extract of cannabis.....	652	605	348	47
7362—Fluid extract of cannabis.....	13	17	19	0
7363—Tincture of cannabis.....	28	13	3	0
7364—Marihuana (granulated, powder, etc.).....	4,072	5,334	9,394	2,038
7365—Marihuana plant.....	617	286	266	21
7366—Marihuana seeds.....	217	197	301	68
7367—Marihuana resin (hashish).....	(1)	(1)	409	117
7368—Marihuana oil (hash oil).....	(1)	(1)	63	18
7370—THC (synthetic).....	1	0	0	0
7371—THC (organic).....	5	3	15	5
7372—Cannabinol.....	0	0	0	0
7373—Cannabinol.....	0	0	0	0

¹ Not reported as hashish or marihuana oil per se for the fiscal year 1971 and 1972 periods.

The above data can be broken down into refined (prepared) and non-refined (non-prepared) general categories.

TABLE 3.—REFINED

[Number of exhibits]

	Fiscal year—			1974 (July and August)
	1971	1972	1973	
Extract cannabis.....	652	605	348	47
Fluid extract cannabis.....	13	17	19	0
Tincture cannabis.....	28	13	3	0
Marihuana resin (hashish).....	—	—	490	117
Marihuana oil (wash oil).....	—	—	63	18
THC (synthetic).....	1	0	0	0
THC (organic).....	5	3	15	5
Total, (prepared exhibits).....	—	—	—	—

TABLE 4—NONREFINED

[Number of exhibits]

	Fiscal year —			1974 (July and August)
	1971	1972	1973	
Marihuana.....	1,693	2,864	4,264	1,031
Marihuana (granulated, powder).....	4,072	5,334	9,394	2,038
Marihuana plant.....	617	286	266	21
Marihuana seeds.....	217	197	301	68
Total, (non-prepared exhibits).....	—	—	—	—

On the basis of the most recent complete year reported above, the range of tetrahydro cannabinol (THC) content of those exhibits reported specifically as "Marihuana Resin (Hashish)" and "Marihuana Oil" are as follows:

[In percent]

THC content	Minimum	Maximum	Average
Marihuana resin (hashish).....	0.1	33	10
Marihuana oil.....	.6	90	46

As indicated in table #3, the laboratory analysis data did not separate "Marihuana Resin (Hashish)" or "Marihuana Oil" into individual categories before FY-1973. However, inspection of this table reveals that the "hashish" exhibits were probably previously (FY-71 and 72) reported as Extract of Cannabis.

Marihuana oil was first encountered in February of 1972. Following subsequent encounters, it was assigned a specific drug code during the first part of FY-73. "Marihuana Resin (Hashish)" was also assigned a specific drug code at this time as indicated above.

As regards the total quantity of "Hashish" removed from the domestic market. The following data are presented from the Statistical Report on Federal Performance Measurements for FY-73.

DOMESTIC REMOVALS (DEA)

Fiscal year	1971	1972	1973
Hashish (in pounds).....	1,054	127	1,148

To date the amount of "Marihuana Oil" encountered is as follows:

	Fiscal year—	
	1973	1974 (July and August)
Marihuana oil (pounds).....	49.3	15.1

It should be pointed out that the concentration of THC in "Marihuana Oil" is continuing to increase. The first few exhibits reported had concentrations of THC no higher than 30%. Some of the latest exhibits reported have concentrations of THC up to 90%.

Following is additional information on marihuana in general. This information includes all types of marihuana exhibits encountered in the laboratory system during Fiscal year '73.

MARIHUANA EXHIBITS

Laboratory	1st quarter	2d quarter	3d quarter	4th quarter	Lab totals
Chicago.....	602	609	338	594	2,144
Dallas.....	586	555	707	657	2,505
Miami.....	380	395	300	440	1,515
New York.....	303	283	235	273	1,094
Special testing.....	14	24	39	24	101
San Francisco.....	306	213	258	216	993
Washington.....	1,662	1,759	1,999	1,391	6,811

Total exhibits.....	15,163
Total workload exhibits.....	44,619
No. DEA Marihuana exhibits (includes DALE).....	3,241
No. State, local, and other Federal marihuana exhibits.....	11,922

Percentage of total workload (all exhibits examined)

	Percent
DEA.....	07
Other.....	27

Percentage of total marihuana exhibits only

	Percent
DEA.....	21
Other.....	79

[From the Washington Post, Aug. 24, 1973]

U.S. LOSING DRUG-SMUGGLING WAR

(By Jack Anderson and Les Whitten)

The government's war against drug smuggling, trumpeted as one of the major domestic successes of the Nixon administration, is losing the battle to fleets of small private planes and fast boats.

Classified documents from the Customs Bureau made available to us demonstrate the extent of the government's failure. They flatly state that the narcotics agents cannot compete with the ingenuity of the smugglers.

The dope runners have organized the most important small boat operation since the evacuation of Dunkirk, and the government's fragmented narcotics forces are unable to cope with them.

"We must undertake a program to provide Customs control of small boat traffic entering the United States," one of the documents asserts. "Smuggling of narcotic drugs by small boats is a serious problem. At present, we have no means of effecting interdiction of drugs entering the United States by this means."

The high flying dope peddlers operate with equal freedom, hauling their cargo of white powder from Mexico and Canada with virtually no opposition.

"Smuggling by means of private aircraft has grown in a situation where control of this commerce, for technical reasons, was not possible," the documents said.

In short, the situation is so out of hand that Mafia and free-lance traffickers have virtual carte blanche to haul their wares across the United States borders.

Federal anti-narcotics officials have made elaborate plans to increase their efficiency in the air and on the water, but budget conscious bureaucrats have cut out this capability. For this fiscal year alone, the Office of Management and Budget has sliced the Customs budget for these plans from \$11.4 million to \$3.3 million.

This penny-wise policy is preventing narcotics agents from acquiring sophisticated tools, including aircraft with special tracking equipment, boats fast enough to catch smugglers' craft, and sensors to seek out the dope runners.

The drug fighters are using some electronic sensors borrowed from the military, but find them virtually worthless.

The heavily publicized seizures of millions of dollars worth of narcotics are largely the work of old-fashioned customs and narcotics agents at ports or elsewhere, based on leads from painstakingly nurtured informants. Arrests of smugglers through random checks of small planes or boats have been few and infrequent.

Presently, the air-sea fight against drugs is badly fragmented between Customs at the Treasury Department and the new Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) at the Justice Department. A memorandum describing a meeting last month between Customs' air intrusion coordinator and George Brosan, a top Customs enforcement official, makes clear that neither agency knows what the other is doing.

There are about 50 planes of various kinds available at any one time to the two agencies for air and boat surveillance. But without cooperation between them through use of informers who signal the departures of a shipment from some lonely harbor or airport, the planes are useless. They cannot "picket-line" the entire border.

DEA, which may wind up with the whole program eventually, is too busy reorganizing to take on any new duties, particularly ones as complicated as the "Air Intrusion" operation.

The overall mess is best summed up by Brosan:

"Both the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Immigration and Naturalization Service have token programs. Neither can compare with the present Customs effort, and possibly some thought ought to be given to combining the three programs."

CIA Pig-Sticker—The men who work for the Central Intelligence Agency are traditionally regarded as closemouthed characters who spend their waking hours tracking spies and tapping telephones.

Angus MacLean Thuermer, the agency's "public information officer," defies tradition. He is one of the nation's foremost "pig stickers," and he doesn't mind talking about it.

He became addicted to the exotic sport of "pig sticking" nicely underplayed British term for "hunting wild boar on horseback with a spear"—while serving with the Foreign Service in India.

Last year, Thuermer went back to India for another hog hunt. When he returned to the States, he broke CIA tradition and published his memoirs of the hunt in an obscure weekly newspaper called the "Piedmont Virginian."

Although Thuermer rarely has anything to say to reporters about CIA affairs, he waxes poetic about pig sticking.

Footnote: So proud of his pig-sticking prowess is Thuermer that he keeps his spear in his office. He invited us over to see it, but we politely refused when he added that "it isn't every day that you get to stick an Anderson man."

FRANCIS G. KNIGHT, DIRECTOR, PASSPORT OFFICE, JUNE 8, 1973

On September 15, 1972, I testified before the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee concerning passport fraud, particularly as it relates to the world narcotics traffic. At that time, I also testified concerning passport fraud in general and the problem the Passport Office faces in combating this criminal activity.

The passport fraud statistics I submitted on September 15, 1972 are sadly out of date now. The statistics available today show that passport fraud committed within the United States continues to increase in volume. I would like to submit, for the record, a chart (number 1) setting forth the fraud statistics for fiscal years 1970 through 1972 and for the first 11 months of fiscal year 1973. The chart also gives a month-by-month breakdown of fraud statistics for the first 11 months of fiscal year 1973.

As you will see from the chart, the number of frauds totaling 622 detected thus far in fiscal year 1973 already exceeds the total for fiscal year 1972, which was 614. Perhaps of greater significance is the increase in the number of domestic frauds, that is, those frauds committed within the United States detected thus far in fiscal year 1973. During the entire fiscal year of 1972, we uncovered 300 domestic frauds. During the first 11 months of this fiscal year, we uncovered 362 frauds. This is an increase of 62. Averaging out the frauds for the entire year shows that we have an increase of over 31% this fiscal year over last fiscal year. Also, it is startling to note that the number of domestic frauds detected in the first 11 months of this fiscal year, which amounts to 362, in more than double the number of domestic frauds detected for the entire fiscal year 1970. Since every passport fraud is perpetrated for the purpose of covering another illegal activity, this enormous increase in domestic passport frauds from 1970 to the current time disturbs me greatly. One of the principal reasons for my concern is the fact that persons involved in domestic passport frauds, especially at this time, are engaged in trafficking in narcotics. For this reason, I should like to direct this statement to the domestic fraud picture.

A vivid example of the currency of the narcotics-connected passport fraud problem is shown by the apprehension by Customs agents on May 12, 1973 in Boston of John, Kathy, Richard, Peter, and Dennis Murray for importing 1.5 million dollars worth of hashish. It was discovered that the Murrays had been traveling as John, Paula, Richard, Kathy, and Christopher Mosley on United States passports obtained by fraud.

Investigation thus far conducted by the Passport Office with the assistance of the Division of Vital Statistics, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, and officials in New Jersey disclosed that, in each instance, counterfeit Nebraska birth certificates and counterfeit New Jersey drivers' licenses were used as evidence of birth and identity to obtain these five passports. In addition, Peter and Dennis Murray had obtained two other passports using counterfeit documentation. To add to the problem, it has been ascertained that the Murrays' father and uncle had passports obtained in false identities using counterfeit documentary evidence. Thus, in connection with this one recent drug seizure, nine fraudulent passport applications have surfaced.

The Murrays have been identified with the Brotherhood of Eternal Love, an international narcotics smuggling ring, originally founded by Timothy Leary and referred to in my testimony of September 15, 1972.

At that time, I stated that 91 passport files had been located which related to the Brotherhood: that 40 cases had been documented and sent to the Office of Security of the Department of State for investigation as passport frauds; and that another 10 to 12 cases previously sent for investigation had been tentatively identified as members of the Brotherhood.

Today, almost 250 files have been located and 120 passport frauds established. I would like to submit, for the record, a chart (number 2) showing the growth

of our investigation of passport frauds connected with the Brotherhood. Although the Brotherhood is the largest narcotics organization perpetrating passport frauds uncovered to date, it is but one of several groups which are committing passport frauds for the purpose of facilitating the international trafficking of narcotics. Page 2 of the chart also reflects the growing trend toward the use of counterfeit birth documents. These documents are of a high quality, which makes their detection very difficult absent a referral to the state which purportedly issued the documents. This fact illustrates the sophistication of the fraud perpetrators which confronts the Passport Office at the present time.

Another reason for my concern is the use of United States passports obtained fraudulently by illegal aliens in the United States. This type of illegal activity has been the subject of Congressional concern for some time.

In my testimony of September 15, 1972, I submitted background information concerning Dominican and Mexican nationals illegally in the United States who were using birth certificates issued for persons born in Puerto Rico or the several states bordering Mexico for the purpose of obtaining United States passports. This type of fraud is not limited to nationals of Mexico or the Dominican Republic.

On October 6, 1972, the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Department of Justice received information that a group of Philippine nationals illegally in the United States had obtained United States passports in false identities. To date, investigation by both the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Department of State's Office of Security have documented 23 such cases.

In each case, the Philippine national was approached by a so-called "broker", an individual dealing in fraudulent citizenship, travel, and identity documents. For a fee of \$2,000, the broker provided the alien with documentation showing birth in the United States. The alien applied for a passport using the birth certificate provided by the broker. In most cases, the broker served as the alien's identifying witness when the alien applied for the passport in his false identity.

In at least 12 cases, the "broker" identified the aliens when they applied for loans in order to pay the broker's \$2,000-fee. In addition to the \$2,000-fee, investigation indicates that these Philippine nationals subsequently were subject to blackmail or extortion by the "broker".

This case illustrates the type of "brokerage" operation through which aliens who obtain United States passports in false identities for the purpose of remaining in the United States illegally are then victimized by the "broker" who made the aliens' frauds possible.

A significant factor in the statistics for the first six months of fiscal year 1973 is the fact that, of the 135 domestic frauds detected during that period, 54 were discovered in the application stage before a passport was issued. This compares with the figure of 25 discovered in the application stage for the same period in fiscal year 1972.

In my opinion, the dramatic increase in the detection of frauds in the application stage is a direct result of fraud seminars being conducted by attorneys of the Legal Division of the Passport Office. This program was initiated by the Passport Office in 1972 when it became apparent that domestic passport fraud was on the increase. To date, all permanent Passport Office personnel in the United States who accept or adjudicate passport applications have attended at least one of these seminars. This program continues with the goal of extending fraud training to all persons taking passport applications.

You may be interested to know that enterprising persons involved in illegal activities have written a "manual" on how to get documents to assume a false identity. The "manual" describes how the documents necessary to substantiate the false identity can be obtained from official government sources. It also describes in detail how to get birth certificates and identity documents. The "manual" pays the Passport Office a left-handed compliment by emphasizing the fact that the United States passport is the single most valuable document which an imposter can have to substantiate a false identity. Possession of a valid passport in a false identity gives the alien, narcotics trafficker, fugitive, or criminal a freedom of movement which would otherwise be denied to him.

A few days ago, the Passport Office was informed that the manual had been revised. Although a copy is not available, it is believed that those portions of the manual describing how to obtain a valid passport in a false identity have been the subject of much of the revision.

While the fraud seminar program has proved successful, as demonstrated by the dramatic increase in the number of frauds detected in the application stage,

it is, at best, only a partial solution. I believe that more frauds would be detected in the application stage if the pressures on Passport Office personnel are reduced to realistic levels.

These pressures are especially acute in the passport field agencies where the majority of all United States passports are issued and where, as a result, the greatest fraud potential exists. In this regard, I would like to submit for the record a copy of a memorandum of April 27, 1973 (number 3) sent to me by Mr. William E. Duggan, Chief of the Passport Office Legal Division. This memorandum vividly portrays some of the problems the Passport Office confronts in combating passport fraud. Comment number one on page two of this memorandum is significant with regard to the detection of passport fraud in the application stage.

The acceptance of passport applications by non-Passport Office personnel has relieved to some degree the pressure on passport field agency personnel working day-after-day under the stress and strain of handling hundreds of passport applicants pushing and arguing for expeditious service. It has done little to reduce the other pressures since each application must be examined and adjudicated by Passport Office personnel for the purpose of establishing the applicants citizenship and identity. It has in fact increased the pressure in applications where there is an identity and possibly a fraud question. The question which might easily be resolved by a trained person in a face-to-face confrontation cannot be resolved with mere documents in front of you. Thus more paperwork is engendered.

The Passport Office has been drowning in paper work involved in management studies, reports, statistics, time-studies, manpower utilization studies, productivity analysis, and other such matters which seep down to us from upper echelons of management and administration.

However, the passport field agencies are not the only areas experiencing acute pressures. The Legal Division of the Passport Office, with many responsibilities other than fraud detection and processing, has at present 35 permanent employees of whom only 9 are attorneys. This staff will be decreased by the retirement of one attorney on June 30, 1973. To give you a better understanding of the law enforcement procedures, I would like to submit for the record a copy of a memorandum (No. 4) which describes the procedural steps involved when a fraud is uncovered or when a fraud is suspected in a given case. Given the increasing number of passport frauds, the limited number of personnel available to process these cases in the Legal Division, and the many other responsibilities of the Legal Division, it is obvious that the fraud seminars conducted by Legal Division attorneys, as valuable as the seminars are proving, imposes tremendous strains, physically and operationally, on the legal staff.

Without adequate staffing, the pressures on the Legal Division continue to increase and an exorbitant amount of costly overtime is the only answer. In due course, a point will be reached this patchwork remedy will become counter-productive.

Even when fraud cases have been expeditiously processed through the Legal Division, the Passport Office is frustrated by long delays by the Department's Office of Security in investigating such cases. This was explained in considerable detail in my testimony of September 15, 1972. To update this data, I would like to submit, for the record, a copy of a chart (No. 5) which shows the number of cases pending investigation by the Office of Security as of April 24, 1973.

The explanation given by the Office of Security for the number of delinquent investigation cases continues to be a "shortage of manpower," as well as "several high priority requirements in other aspects of the total security program."

I do not take exception to the explanation furnished by the Office of Security. I am reasonably sure that the office is interested in endeavoring to meet our requirements and, I might say from personal observation, the local field agents are intensely interested in helping us combat passport frauds. I think I can state without fear of contradiction that this interest stems from the fact that passport fraud cases, as a category, offer real challenges to a professional investigation.

It seems eminently clear that the Office of Security does not have sufficient manpower to meet our passport fraud problems and that the "delinquency" is due, in good measure, to greater priority given to other "security requirements."

By now, it should be obvious, as illustrated by the Brotherhood of Eternal Love, the Philippine alien cases, and the "manual" on fraudulent identities which I have described, that the individuals committing passport fraud are becoming increasingly more knowledgeable in methods of obtaining fraudulent birth and identity documentation. We are endeavoring to meet this increased knowl-

edge on the part of our "opposition" by making our personnel more alert and knowledgeable in detecting symptoms of fraud. It is an established fact that careful and thorough examination by trained personnel of passport applications and their accompanying documents will result in the detection of many frauds in the application stage. A face-to-face confrontation increases the possibility that such frauds will be detected before the passports are issued and used in the furtherance of illegal activities. At the present time, while we are doing our best, our efforts are diminished and frustrated by the inadequate facilities and insufficient personnel furnished to the Passport Office.

Passport fraud as it pertains to narcotics and to illegal aliens is only one phase of a serious problem which we, in the Passport Office have struggled with for years and called to the attention of anyone who would listen. Frankly, I am very discouraged about the whole situation and I don't believe that a piecemeal approach to the problem will be successful. One hole in the dike may be plugged up, but two others will develop.

The Passport Office has been fighting, for years, this battle of fraudulent documentation to protect the integrity of the United States passport as well as the ensuing evils to society, such as illegal drug activity, which flows from the use of such a valuable document. However, this evil is not restricted to passports; it also involves credit cards, social security cards, welfare and pension payments, birth records, drivers' licenses, and the list goes on *ad nauseam* into the very fabric of our society.

In summary, I think it is plain that the problem of the effects of fraudulent documentation and impersonation are not restricted to the passport area. It is symptomatic of one of the serious ills of our society at the present time, and it is time we work together and say a vigorous "no" to the enemies of our society.

It is with considerable regret that I advise you that in my opinion no action will be taken by the Executive Branch of our Government until such time the Congress steps in with clear language legislation to make the use and presentation of fraudulent identifying documents to any Government Department or Agency or unit thereof a very expensive, unprofitable and unpleasant experience for the perpetrator. Furthermore, the Congress should insist upon swift prosecution of these cases for two valid and relatively simple reasons. Swift prosecution by the Department of Justice would engender second thoughts by criminals engaged in the practice of deceiving Government Agencies by the use of false identity documents and this, in turn, would help put the producers of such documents out of a very lucrative business which is presently flourishing around the United States. The second reason is that the salutary effect of swift and stern government action will save millions of dollars now wasted or irretrievably lost by such Federal and private operations as the Passport Office, Social Security, Insurance Companies, Banks, Health Services, Pension Funds and even extend to the world-wide credit card racket. It is a known fact that the United States Passport is used the world over as an instrument of identity. Therefore, it makes sense to see to it that it is protected by law and that the Passport Office is given financial and administrative support in its role to maintain the integrity of the document.

In my considered opinion, it has been proven impossible to obtain from the Executive Bureaucracy the required support, consideration and protection which the Passport Office requires to carry out its statutory functions to provide efficient and effective passport and citizenship services to United States citizens both here and overseas.

ATTACHMENTS

Exhibit

1. Fraud Statistics—fiscal year 1970 through May fiscal year 1973 and fraud statistics breakdown—fiscal year 1973
2. Brotherhood fraud table
3. Memorandum of April 27, 1973 by Mr. Duggan
4. Procedures used in the processing of passport fraud cases
5. Cases pending SY investigation as of April 24, 1973

FRAUD STATISTICS, FISCAL YEAR 1970 THROUGH MAY FISCAL YEAR 1973

Fiscal year	1970	1971	1972	1973 (through May)
Domestic.....	174	288	300	362
Foreign.....	327	316	314	260
Total.....	501	604	614	622

FRAUD STATISTICS BREAKDOWN, FISCAL YEAR 1973

	Domestic	Foreign	Total
July.....	21	10	31
August.....	30	19	49
September.....	14	18	32
October.....	13	38	51
November.....	34	21	55
December.....	23	13	36
January.....	34	27	61
February.....	58	19	77
March.....	59	28	87
April.....	19	39	58
May.....	57	28	85
Total.....	362	260	622

	Apr. 27, 1973	June 1, 1973
Number.....	73	120
Type fraud:		
Alteration.....	2	2
Use.....	2	2
Identifying witness.....	9	17
False statement.....	60	99
Place filed:		
Los Angeles.....	22	31
San Francisco.....	13	24
Miami.....	0	6
Chicago.....	4	4
Post Office.....	4	5
New York.....	3	3
Kabul.....	3	3
Clerk of court.....	2	6
Other.....	9	15
Date filed prior 1969.....	3	5
1969.....	10	11
1970.....	11	20
1971.....	21	35
1972.....	13	23
1973.....	2	5
Detected before issue.....	5	8
San Francisco.....	4	4
Seattle.....	1	1
Miami.....	1	1
Los Angeles.....	1	1
Lookout system.....	1	1
Counterfeit birth certificates.....	26	45
Hospital birth certificates.....	5	6
Nebraska.....	0	8
Missouri.....	4	5
Chicago.....	14	4
Colorado.....	2	2
Utah.....	2	3
North Carolina.....	0	3
Ohio.....	0	2
Referred United States attorney.....	34	41
Indicted.....	17	19
Prosecution declined.....	3	3
Convicted.....	2	4

Note: 1 each from Iowa; Albion, New York; San Diego County; Los Angeles County; New York State; Wisconsin; Seattle County; Syracuse, New York; Orange County, California. In addition counterfeit birth certificates were picked up in a brotherhood raid from Missouri (2); Nevada; Seattle-King County; Washington; Newark, New Jersey and Ohio.

APRIL 27, 1973.

To: PPT—Miss Frances G. Knight
 From: PT/L—William E. Duggan.
 Subject: Observations regarding counter work at New York

The team of attorneys observed that the number of persons applying for passports in the New York Agency began to accelerate about 9:45. The number of applicants continued to increase until about 2:30 to 3:00 in the afternoon. At that time there were in the neighborhood of 20 to 25 or possibly 30 applicants in front of each station. The number of applicants gradually diminished until about 4:00 when there were about 10 applicants in front of each station. With the closing of the Agency doors, the agents were able to complete the work about 4:45 or 5:00.

Observations indicated that each agent took about 3 to 5 minutes per applicant. The average time an applicant stood in line during the peak period of 11 to 3 was about 45 minutes. Obviously, persons are not in the best frame of mind after being required to stand in line for this length of time. This factor is mentioned because it exerts further pressure upon the agent in performing his job. Given the number of persons in line, it is a practical impossibility for the agents to spend more than 3 to 5 minutes with each applicant.

The following conclusions must be stated in fairness to the agents concerned as well as our fraud prevention program:

1. Given the number of factors which must be considered, a period of 3 to 5 minutes is totally inadequate to do a thorough job of taking a passport application;
2. The constant pressure of applicants in front of an agent also creates barriers which make it difficult for the agent to detect fraud;
3. The physical limitations of the reception room are inadequate and create at times a sense of turmoil. This also lessens the effectiveness of our agents;
4. From a fraud point of view, I feel it is necessary to state that except for the most obvious frauds, it is totally unfair to the agents concerned to hold them accountable for such frauds as may filter through;
5. Some action must be taken to reduce the pressure on agents taking applications in New York if we are to expect an acceptable standard of fraud detection in that Agency;
6. The "melting pot" population situation in New York is peculiarly conducive to fraud potential.

COMMENTS

1. It seems obvious to me that the current program of having a number of Clerks of Court and Post Offices accept applications has not solved the counter problem at New York City although it has helped to a certain extent. The apparent reason for this seems to be that individuals wish to go to the Agency responsible for issuing the passport rather than to a Post Office or Clerk of Court whenever it is possible to do so.

2. Since New York is the most important overseas departure airport in the United States, the Agency has an exceptional load of emergency cases which must be handled at the counter.

SUGGESTED SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM

Despite the views of the upper echelon in the Department of State that increase of Passport Agencies is a "bureaucratic" maneuver, I recommend as strongly as I can, that we establish several sub-agencies in the New York area to accept applications. One obvious area is in the so-called Financial District of New York. The other areas can be determined by a review of counter applications to determine the areas from which the counter applications are coming. During my trip to New York I tentatively made arrangements to have counter applications segregated and sent to Washington for a survey to obtain statistics which would support a rational basis for establishing sub-agencies in New York.

APRIL 24, 1973.

To: PPT—Miss Frances G. Knight.
 From: PT/L—William E. Duggan.
 Subject: Current procedures used in the processing of passport fraud cases.

When information appearing on a passport application, or received subsequent to the issuance of a passport, raises the possibility that a person has perpetrated a fraud, the case is referred to the Legal Division of the Passport Office. An

attorney in the Legal Division reviews the entire file in order to determine what evidence is available to establish a prima facie case of fraud or what additional evidence may be required to establish such a case.

The attorney then prepares a detailed memorandum outlining the facts involved and the investigative action necessary to establish a prima facie case of fraud. This memorandum and the case file are forwarded to the Office of Security of the Department of State which has investigative jurisdiction in passport fraud cases. Upon completion of the requested investigation, the file is returned to the Legal Division of the Passport Office along with whatever evidence and information was developed in the course of the investigation.

If the concerned Passport Office attorney is satisfied that the investigation has developed sufficient admissible evidence to establish a prima facie case of passport fraud, he prepares a "Criminal Prosecution Summary." The "Summary" along with the file, then is forwarded to the appropriate U.S. Attorney through the Office of Security of the Department of State. This procedure is designed to offer the U.S. Attorney with as much personal assistance and contact as possible with the Department of State.

After receipt and, in due course, review of the case, it is the responsibility of the U.S. Attorney to decide if prosecution should be initiated or declined. If prosecution is declined, the case is returned to the Passport Office, through the Office of Security, with a statement from the U.S. Attorney giving his reasons for not initiating prosecution. If the U.S. Attorney accepts the case for prosecution, he initiates the necessary procedures to bring the case to trial.

Cases pending by investigation as of April 24, 1973

Cases opened in 1973-----	165
Cases opened prior to January 1, 1973-----	221
Cases opened prior to January 1, 1972-----	78
Cases opened prior to January 1, 1971-----	20
Cases opened prior to January 1, 1970-----	17
Total cases pending-----	501



SAMPLES OF FRAUDULENT DOCUMENTS OF IDENTIFICATION OBTAINED AND USED BY MEMBERS OF THE BROTHERHOOD OF ETERNAL LOVE

1. COUNTERFEIT BIRTH CERTIFICATES

[Note: The four birth certificates that follow are all counterfeit. As will be seen by the chart on page 83, fraudulent Brotherhood birth certificates were more or less evenly divided between outright counterfeits and valid birth certificates fraudulently obtained by individuals professing to be the persons described in the certificates. Applicants for such valid but fraudulent certificates almost invariably employ the technique of applying for a birth certificate of a deceased person whose age, if alive, would approximate their own. The Passport Office felt it would be inappropriate to provide samples of such birth certificates for reproduction, out of consideration for the feelings of surviving family members.

It is interesting to note that both of the birth certificates issued to "Ruth Ellen Simms," one in Seattle, Washington and the other in Newark, New Jersey, were complete counterfeits (see page 101).

As examples of how widespread the printing of counterfeit birth certificates is, we reproduce on page 98 copies of counterfeit certificates of birth duplicating the certificates issued by the city of Elizabeth, New Jersey and by the Tennessee Department of Public Health. The Tennessee certificate is accompanied by an investigative report to the Special Agent In Charge, Los Angeles, describing the seizure of certificates and of the counterfeiting ring involved, by the Dallas Police Department.]

AUGUST 28, 1972.

Chief, Division of Investigations
SAC—Los Angeles
Counterfeit birth certificates

Sgt. J. W. Heard, General Assignments Unit, Dallas Police Department was interviewed on 8/22/72 by S/A E. A. Vina. Source stated that his office apprehended three individuals in a counterfeiting operation. Seized at that time was

a quantity of counterfeit Tennessee Birth Certificates which were alleged to command a price of \$150.00 apiece on the market. According to Source, the error discovered on these certificates (a Xerox copy is attached) is the printed legend on the left border reading "By Courtesy of Tennessee Department of Public Health. This Reproduction Should Be Carefully Preserved." Also the letter "R" in "Civil District" is blurred.

A sidelight on this matter is that Heard stated that the three apprehended are all homosexual.

This information is forwarded to you for the possible information of the Passport Office.

BY COURTESY OF
TENNESSEE DEPT. OF PUBLIC HEALTH
THIS REPRODUCTION SHOULD BE CAREFULLY PRESERVED

CERTIFICATE OF LIVE BIRTH			
DIV. OF VITAL STATISTICS—STATE OF TENNESSEE—DEPT. OF PUBLIC HEALTH COOPERATING WITH DEPT. OF COMMERCE BUREAU OF THE CENSUS			REG. NO. LIC. DIST. NO.
1. FULL NAME OF CHILD		2. DATE OF BIRTH	
FIRST	MIDDLE	LAST	MONTH DAY YEAR
3. PLACE OF BIRTH		4. USUAL RESIDENCE OF MOTHER	
A. COUNTY CIVIL DISTRICT		A. STATE	
B. CITY OR TOWN		B. COUNTY	
C. NAME OF HOSPITAL		C. CITY OR TOWN	
D. LENGTH OF MOTHER'S STAY BEFORE DELIVERY		D. STREET ADDRESS	
IN HOSPITAL IN THIS COMMUNITY		7. NUMBER MONTHS OF PREGNANCY	
(SPECIFY WHETHER YEARS, MONTHS OR DAYS)		8. ARE PARENTS MARRIED?	
5. SEX		MOTHER OF CHILD	
A. TWIN OR TRIPLET?	IF SO—BORN		
	1ST 2ND 3RD		
6. FATHER OF CHILD		18. FULL MAIDEN NAME	
9. FULL NAME		19. COLOR OR RACE	
10. COLOR OR RACE		17. AGE AT TIME OF THIS BIRTH	
11. AGE AT TIME OF THIS BIRTH		18. BIRTH PLACE	
12. BIRTH PLACE		19. USUAL OCCUPATION	
13. USUAL OCCUPATION		20. INDUSTRY OR BUSINESS	
14. INDUSTRY OR BUSINESS		I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I ATTENDED THE BIRTH OF THIS CHILD WHO WAS BORN ALIVE AT THE HOUR OF _____ ON THE DATE ABOVE STATED AND THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN WAS FURNISHED BY _____	
15. CHILDREN BORN TO THIS MOTHER		WHO IS RELATED TO THE CHILD AS _____	
A. HOW MANY OTHER CHILDREN OF THIS MOTHER ARE NOW LIVING?		ATTENDANT'S OWN SIGNATURE _____	
B. HOW MANY OTHER CHILDREN WERE BORN ALIVE BUT ARE NOW DEAD?		ADDRESS _____	
C. HOW MANY CHILDREN WERE BORN DEAD?		ADDRESS _____	
16. MOTHER'S MAILING ADDRESS FOR REGISTRATION NOTICE.		DATE BORN _____	
DATE RECEIVED BY LOCAL REGISTRAR _____		MIDWIFE _____	
REGISTRAR'S SIGNATURE _____		DATE BORN _____	

CITY OF ELIZABETH, NEW JERSEY
BUREAU OF VITAL STATISTICS



Certificate and Record of Birth

This Certifies, that a certificate and record of birth has been filed with the Bureau of Vital Statistics of the City of Elizabeth, New Jersey, bearing the name of _____

who was born on _____, at _____

Professional Attendant _____

Father _____ Mother _____

Patrick P. Keenan
CITY CLERK

STANDARD CERTIFICATE OF LIVE BIRTH			
LOCAL REGISTRAR'S NUMBER 544		STATE OF OHIO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH COLUMBUS OHIO	BIRTH NO 4765 DATE RECEIVED 5-21-42
1. CHILD'S NAME (Type or print all entries in block in full)		First JOHN	Middle PETER Last LANE
2. DATE OF BIRTH 6:15 AM 5-17-42		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> A THIS BIRTH <input type="checkbox"/> B IF TWIN OR TRIPLET WAS CHILD BORN IN OHIO <input type="checkbox"/> C IF BORN IN OHIO <input type="checkbox"/> D IF BORN IN OHIO	
3. PLACE OF BIRTH A. COUNTY Stark		B. MOTHER'S US. AL. RESIDENCE (Where is Mother born?) A. STATE Georgia B. COUNTY Stark	
B. CITY, TOWN, VILLAGE OR LOCATION Canton		C. CITY, TOWN, VILLAGE OR LOCATION Canton	
C. HOSPITAL OR INSTITUTION WHERE BORN Canton Community		D. STREET ADDRESS, RURAL ROUTE, ETC	
7. FATHER OF CHILD First Henry Paul Lane Middle Last		8. MOTHER OF CHILD (Maiden name) First Ann Middle Last Miller	
B. COLOR OR RACE White C. PRESENT AGE 27 YRS		B. COLOR OR RACE White C. PRESENT AGE 25 YRS	
D. BIRTHPLACE (State of Birth's Country) Michigan		D. BIRTHPLACE (State of Birth's Country) California	
E. OCCUPATION Foreman F. KIND OF BUSINESS OR INDUSTRY Construction		10. ATTENDANT'S CERTIFICATION (Type of medicine used was born alive on this date and time stated below)	
9. INFORMANT'S CERTIFICATION I CERTIFY THAT THE ABOVE INFORMATION IS ENTIRELY CORRECT		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <i>J. H. Johnson</i> Signature TITLE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MD <input type="checkbox"/> DO OTHER SPECIFY _____ Address 762 N. Emory Av. Date Signed 5-19-42	
11. DATE RECEIVED BY LOCAL REGISTRAR 5-27-42		12. REGISTRAR'S SIGNATURE <i>P. C. Herman</i>	
19. THIS SPACE RESERVED FOR REGISTRAR'S USE			
Date	Description	Evidence	Signature

DAYS AFTER BIRTH

I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing copy has been compared by me with the original document and is a true, full and correct copy of the original certificate as the same appears on file in the vital statistics section of the Ohio State Department of Health and in my official care and custody.

Alfred P. Yeager
Alfred P. Yeager
Director of Public Health

Certificate of Birth

Pomona, Kansas

This Certifies that JOHN WALTER HANSEN

WAS BORN IN THE POMONA COMMUNITY HOSPITAL

AT 5:01 A.M. NOVEMBER 24 1942

In Witness Whereof THE ATTENDING PHYSICIAN HAS HEREUNTO SET HIS HAND, AND SAID HOSPITAL HAS CAUSED THIS CERTIFICATE TO BE SIGNED BY ITS DULY AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE AND ITS OFFICIAL SEAL TO BE HERETO AFFIXED.

Alfred P. Yeager
ATTENDING PHYSICIAN

W. S. ...
M. D.

PLACE OF BIRTH

CERTIFICATE OF BIRTH

STATE OF MISSOURI

Bureau of Vital Statistics

County of Adair

Township of _____

Village of _____

Registration District No. 47 FILE NO. 38City of KirkvillePrimary Registration District No. 592 REGISTERED NO. 493No. Comm. Hosp.If birth occurs in a hospital or other institution,
give name of same, street address and numberFULL NAME OF CHILD Laura Marie MadockSEX OF CHILD Female LEGAL MATE? Yes TWIN TRIPLET OR OTHER? Sgl. AND NUMBER IN ORDER OF BIRTH _____ DATE OF BIRTH Nov. 25, 1948
(Month) (Day) (Year)FULL NAME FATHER Richard David Madock FULL MAIDEN NAME MOTHER Laura Ann VarnerP. O. ADDRESS FATHER 699 S. Oakwood P. O. ADDRESS MOTHER SamsCOLOR OR RACE White AGE AT LAST BIRTHDAY 29 (Years) COLOR OR RACE White AGE AT LAST BIRTHDAY 26 (Years)BIRTHPLACE FATHER El Paso, Texas BIRTHPLACE MOTHER Joplin, MissouriOCCUPATION FATHER Fireman OCCUPATION MOTHER HousewifeNumber of child of this mother 1 Number of children, of this mother, now living 1 Born at full term (This Child) yes

CERTIFICATE OF ATTENDING PHYSICIAN OR MIDWIFE

I hereby certify that I attended the birth of this child, and that it occurred on Nov. 25, 1948 at 7:25 A.M.

If for these uses no attending physician or midwife, then the father, mother, nurse, or other, should make this return

(Signature) P. J. Fagan

GIVEN NAME ADDED FROM SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT _____

Address 723 N. 8th St. KirkvilleFiled 12-7, 1948 d. J. Peterson Registrar

SEATTLE-KING COUNTY

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH
VITAL STATISTICS SECTION

1100 Public Safety Building, Seattle 4, Washington

CERTIFIED COPY OF BIRTH CERTIFICATE

DISTRICT NUMBER	625	REGISTRAR'S NUMBER	17321	CERTIFICATE OF LIVE BIRTH	STATE FILE No.	3025
1. CHILD'S FIRST NAME		3. MIDDLE NAME		12. LAST NAME		
RUTH		ELLEN		SIMMS		
2. SEX	4. MARRIAGE STATUS	5. DATE OF BIRTH		6. MONTH	7. DAY	8. HOUR
Female	Single	June 2, 1945		June	2	4:21 P.
9. PLACE OF BIRTH (CITY, TOWN OR VILLAGE, COUNTY AND STATE OF BIRTH)				10. COUNTY		
Seattle				King		
11. FULL NAME AND ADDRESS OF HOSPITAL OR INSTITUTION (IF NOT IN HOSPITAL OR INSTITUTION GIVE STREET ADDRESS OR LOCATION)						
University of Washington Hospital						
3821 East 55th Street						
13. CITY OR TOWN				14. STATE		
Seattle				Washington		
15. FATHER'S FIRST NAME		16. FATHER'S LAST NAME		17. COLOR OR RACE OF MOTHER		
Susan		Ray		White		
18. TAG OF PORT OF ORIGIN				19. MAILING ADDRESS OF MOTHER (IF DIFFERENT FROM USUAL RESIDENCE)		
23 years, Portland, Oregon				SAME		
20. NAME OF FATHER'S FIRST NAME		21. FATHER'S LAST NAME		22. COLOR OR RACE OF FATHER		
Anthony		James		White		
23. AGE OF FATHER (IN YEARS)		24. BIRTH PLACE (CITY, STATE OR COUNTRY)		25. USUAL OCCUPATION		26. KIND OF BUSINESS OR INDUSTRY
22 years		Tacoma, Washington		Psychology, Inst.		U. of Wash.
27. ENERGY TEST (THIS FIELD IS TO BE FILLED BY THE REGISTRAR)						
REGISTRATION IN THIS STATE IS CORRECT AND COMPLETE. THE CHILD IS THE CHILD OF THE MARRIED MOTHER AND FATHER.						
28. DATE OF BIRTH						
June 2, 1945						
29. HEALTH CENTER (HOSPITAL, CLINIC, HOME AND WHETHER CHILD WAS BORN AT HOME) AND NAME AND ADDRESS						
Kedron Blaine, MD, U. of W. Hosp.						
30. DATE RECEIVED BY LOCAL REGISTRAR						
June 11, 1945						

I HEREBY CERTIFY, That the foregoing is a true, full and correct copy of the original Certificate of Birth on file in this office.

S. P. Lehman, M. D.
Seattle-King County Registrar
By: *William J. Fletcher*

City of Newark, New Jersey		No 50920	
BUREAU OF VITAL STATISTICS, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, NEWARK, N. J.			
This is to Certify that the following is correct as copied from a record of Birth in this State.			
DO NOT ACCEPT THIS CERTIFICATE UNLESS THE RAISED SEAL OF THIS BUREAU IS APPLIED HEREON.			
NAME OF CHILD	SEX	PLACE OF BIRTH	DATE OF BIRTH
Ruth Ellen Simms	Female	NEWARK, N. J.	June 2 1945
NAME OF FATHER		NAME OF MOTHER	
James Edward Simms		Donna Ellen McCoy	
In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of Bureau of Vital Statistics, Newark, New Jersey, this <u>11th</u> day of <u>February</u> , A. D. 19 <u>72</u> .			
		A. Haskin	
My date will appear upon the "Date Filed" line below unless the birth was reported later than one year after it occurred.			
Filed within 20 days of birth, 1945			

2. Other counterfeit identification documents:

COUNTERFEIT OPERATOR'S LICENSE

STATE OF OHIO - DEPT. OF HIGHWAY SAFETY

OPERATOR'S LICENSE NO.

DUPLICATE
U214532

SHOULD BE CARRIED WHILE DRIVING

EXPIRES ON LICENSEE'S BIRTHDAY IN 1974 ←

PREV. LIC. NO. - - - S. S. NO. 853-71-8441

NAME LAURA M. MADOCK

ADDRESS 173 S. Clark Ave.

P. O. Akron

OHIO 361

DATE OF BIRTH	MO.	DA.	YR.	SEX	WGT.	HGT.	COLOR HAIR	COLOR EYES
	11	25	48	F	115	5'5"	Brn.	Blu.

DEP. REG. Akron

DATE ISSUED 3-26-71

A1

FRED RICE, REGISTRAR
BUREAU OF MOTOR VEHICLES

SIGNATURE OF LICENSEE

BLANK COUNTERFEIT SELECTIVE SERVICE FORM

SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM
NOTICE OF CLASSIFICATION

This is to certify that

(First name) (Middle initial) (Last name)

Selective Service No.

--	--	--	--

is classified in Class _____

until _____
by Local Board unless otherwise
checked below:

- by Appeal Board
vote of _____ to _____
- by President

JAN 14 1980
(Date of mailing)(Member, Executive Secretary, or clerk of
local board)

(Registrant's signature)

SSS Form 110 (Rev. 5-25-67)
(Previous printings are obsolete)
(Approval not required)

(Fold along this line)

The law requires you to have this Notice in addition to your Registration Certificate, in your personal possession at all times and to surrender it upon entering active duty in the Armed Forces.

The law requires you to notify your local board in writing within 10 days after it occurs, (1) of every change in your address, physical condition and occupational (including student), marital, family, dependency and military status, and (2) of any other fact which might change your classification.

Any person who alters, forges, knowingly destroys, knowingly mutilates or in any manner changes this certificate or who, for the purpose of false identification or representation, has in his possession a certificate of another or who delivers his certificate to another to be used for such purpose, may be fined not to exceed \$10,000 or imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or both.

LOCAL BOARD NO. 32
271 Cadman Plaza East
Brooklyn, New York, 11201

(LOCAL BOARD STAMP)
SEE OTHER SIDE

BLANK COUNTERFEIT OPERATOR'S FORM

DRIVER LICENSE NUMBER									
STATE OF NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES DRIVER LICENSE									
EXPIRATION DATE					ISSUE DATE				
SIGN HERE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>									
<i>Ronald M. Heyman</i> DIRECTOR									
LS-147 A (R2/70)									
DRIVER LICENSE NUMBER									
REQUEST TO CHANGE DRIVER LICENSE									
If the information on the attached license is incorrect or should change, please print the correct data <u>only</u> below and mail to the N. J. Division of Motor Vehicles.									
New NAME									
New STREET ADDRESS									
New CITY, STATE, ZIP CODE									
DATE OF BIRTH			EYES			SEX			
MONTH		YEAR							
WEIGHT			HEIGHT			RESTRICTION			
			FT.		INCHES				
SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR INSTRUCTIONS									
LS-147 B (R2/65)									

[From the Washington Post, May 3, 1973]

TROOPER, MILITANT DIE IN N.J. CLASH

EAST BRUNSWICK, N.J., May 2: A state trooper was killed and another wounded in a pre-dawn shooting on the New Jersey Turnpike today after they stopped a white Pontiac carrying three persons, including a woman sought in the slaying of two New York City policemen, police said.

The woman, identified as a member of the Black Liberation Army, was wounded and a male companion shot to death. He was identified as Zayd Malik Shakur former deputy prime minister of the Black Panther Party.

The third occupant of the car fled on foot in the direction of nearby Milltown. State Police Superintendent David B. Kelly said the shooting began after trooper James M. Harper, stopped the auto for "speeding slightly." Before approaching the car, Harper radioed for a backup patrol car.

Trooper Werner Foerster arrived, and the two troopers approached the stopped auto. Foerster questioned a man and a woman who were passengers in the car, while Harper talked with the driver at a patrol car, authorities said.

Kelley said there was a discrepancy in the driver's license and registration. He said the woman, later identified by fingerprints as Joanne Deborah Chesimard, 25, pulled a gun and fired at Foerster. The troopers and the two other men pulled guns and about 30 rounds were fired, he said.

"As we put it together, the girl fired from within the car. Harper retreated, there was a firefight and all people involved were shooting," Kelly said.

Harper, wounded in the shoulder, managed to walk 300 yards to the Turnpike Administration building to summon help. Other troopers arrived and found Trooper Foerster dead of gunshot wounds.

The auto was gone. Shortly after that, Trooper Robert Palentchar spotted the car five miles to the south, and saw a man fleeing into the woods.

Palentchar ordered him to halt and opened fire when the command went unheeded. The man, later identified as the driver of the car, disappeared into the woods.

The trooper found the wounded Miss Chesimard at the car. The other passenger, identified as James Costan, 32, of New York City, was dead of bullet wounds, Kelly said.

Miss Chesimard was listed in satisfactory condition under guard at Middlesex General Hospital in New Brunswick.

(She was recently named by former New York City Police Commissioner Patrick V. Murphy as one of six persons being sought for questioning in a series of attacks on policemen believed to have been carried out by members of the black militant organization. The two policemen who were killed were Gregory Foster and Rocco Laurie, shot on New York's Lower East side in January 1972.)

Kelley said four handguns were found near the scene of the turnpike shootout. He also said troopers found a "whole carload of false identification," including passports, birth certificates and Social Security and credit cards.

[From the Washington Star-News, Sept. 3, 1973]

MAN ON MOST WANTED LIST CAPTURED IN NEW ORLEANS

NEW ORLEANS: Herman Bell, 25, one of the FBI's 10 most wanted fugitives, has been captured on a New Orleans street.

Bell, wanted in the killing of two New York City policemen, offered no resistance when arrested yesterday.

Bell went before a U.S. magistrate in New Orleans and was put under a \$500,000 bond.

The FBI said Bell had been sought in connection with the killing of the two police officers on May 21, 1971, and also with the robbery of a branch of the Bank of America in San Francisco, Calif., on Sept. 20, 1971.

Bell was arrested by FBI agents, New Orleans police and New York City police detectives.

U.S. Magistrate Morey Sear set a Sept. 12 date for a removal hearing at which time Bell could be sent back to New York for trial.

Robert Tanenbaum, an assistant district attorney from Manhattan, said he anticipated that extradition proceedings would be started in state court here tomorrow.

Both Tanenbaum and U.S. Atty. Gerald Gallinghouse of New Orleans asked that Bell be held without bond. Gallinghouse cited the "vicious crimes" involved and said Bell was extremely dangerous.

Sear ruled that Bell was indigent and appointed New Orleans attorney Martin E. Feldman to represent him.

At Bell's apartment police said they confiscated \$3,800 in cash, two .12-gauge shotguns, a .308 lever-action rifle with a telescopic sight, a .9-millimeter automatic pistol and a .38-caliber revolver. Police said one of the shotguns was a sawed-off, slide action type.

Police said they also seized several blank birth certificates, a marijuana plant, ammunition, a machete, medical supplies such as bandages and hyperdermics, and knives.

Bell said that he had not worked in the past six months, but had saved money. He gave a New Orleans address as his most recent residence and several San Francisco addresses.

Bell said his only prior conviction was second-degree robbery in Oakland, Calif. He said he had attended Oakland College there for a time.

Tanenbaum said he and three New York City detectives had been in New Orleans since Thursday after receiving information a week ago that Bell was in the city.

Bell's wife was also booked by the New Orleans police on charges of harboring a fugitive and possession of stolen property. Their children, Jonas Bell, 2½, and Richard Keith Hanna, a stepson, 5, were placed in the care of juvenile authorities.

[From the Miami News, Dec. 22, 1971]

11 ARRESTED IN PHONY-ID RAIDS IN DADE

(By William Tucker)

Metro officers rounded up 11 persons, including a recent candidate for Hialeah mayor, in synchronized raids early today tied in with the printing of thousands of bogus draft cards and driver's licenses.

Narcotics, burglary and robbery also were involved in the three-month investigation, Metro police said.

The crackdown focused on the Centur Inc. printing firm at 401 NW 1st Ct. which was first raided on Dec. 1. Then, police seized 1,500 counterfeit voter registration cards and 2,000 counterfeit selective service cards, they said.

Raided again today, the firm was found back in operation, agents said, Centur Printing is not to be confused with the Center Printing Co. Inc., at 1044 NW 54th St., a respected business here since 1944.

Among those arrested was Hialeah Attorney Alden Sanford Tarte, 45, who finished last in a field of six in the recent Hialeah election for mayor.

Tarte, of 1015 W. 51st Pl., Hialeah, was charged with conspiring with the alleged operator of the printing firm, Robert Verne Schaffer, to burglarize the home of a former member of the firm to obtain corporate records. Tarte also was charged with one count of robbery in connection with the same incident.

Ralph Page, Metro public information spokesman, said the complex investigation started Oct. 6 when North District vice squad detectives tried to make a cocaine buy from a suspect. Instead, the suspect offered to sell them a set of stolen identification papers including a draft card, driver's license social security card and travelers checks.

From that point, Page said, the investigation led through "an entangled web of stolen property, narcotics and counterfeiting."

Informed counterfeit as well as stolen IDs were available, the undercover agents ordered and paid for 10 draft cards, 10 notice of classification cards, 10 blank Florida driver's licenses, and 10 auto registration forms, all counterfeit. The Highway Patrol called them the best job of counterfeiting licenses it had ever seen.

The undercover probe also bought up a number of business firm checks reported stolen in various burglaries.

At one point in the undercover work, they reported, they saw a suitcase "containing at least a half-million dollars worth of stolen checks."

As police moved into the ring, the undercover men obtained the names of various salesmen and printers. They bought \$2,000 worth of narcotics and pretended to fence \$20,000 worth of jewels and other stolen goods.

With enough evidence to raid the printing firm, agents obtained a federal search warrant from the FBI because bogus draft cards were involved.

In the Dec. 1 raid with that warrant, agents picked up a number of blank driver's licenses as well as hundreds of draft cards and voter cards allegedly printed right at the plant. Photo-engraving negatives for the printing also were seized.

In the meantime, agents heard about the burglary of the home of James Milgram at 525 NW 73rd Ave., on Nov. 6 which turned into a robbery when the Milgrams came home to find the intruders.

Page said that Milgram formerly was associated with Schaffer in the Centur firm and the purpose of the breakin was to obtain records. The various investigations were now "dovetailed," Page said.

For today's raids, the agents obtained warrants to arrest 11 individuals and to search the house of the alleged chief salesman, Walter O. (Buddy) Bowers, and the Centur plant for the second time.

At Bowers' home, agents said they found two stolen checks worth \$11,000. They were issued by the William Lehman automobile firm.

They kicked in the door at Centur Printing and found new photoengraving negatives for draft cards, driver's licenses, birth certificates and voter cards. They also found three camera lenses reported stolen in the Milgram burglary.

Schaffer, 33, of 4315 W 2nd Ave., a photographer by trade was charged with one count of possession of a counterfeit driver's license; one count of possessing counterfeiting plates for such licenses; one count of forgery, one count of robbery, one count of burglary, one count of conspiracy to commit burglary, and one count of buying, receiving and concealing stolen property.

Bowers, 28, of 18911 NW 39th Ct., was charged with five counts of forgery and two counts of buying, receiving and concealing stolen property.

Others arrested, all in connection with the same investigation, and the charges against them, were:

Michael Holland, 34, of 6400 W. Okeechobee Rd., Hialeah, one count of robbery.

Robert Lewis Daniels, 33, of 206 SW 29th Pl., Fort Lauderdale, breaking and entering with intent to commit grand larceny.

Carl Edward Purvis, 23, 390 Fisherman St., Opalocka, two counts sale of marijuana, two counts possession of marijuana, one count of breaking and entering with intent to commit grand larceny.

Tiffany Uргуarte, 25, a woman, same address as Bowers, one count of possession of narcotics.

Anota Mara Lombard, 25, 18820 NW 44th Ave., one count possession of marijuana, two counts of possession of the drug THC, one count possession of hashish, one count of possession of central nervous system stimulant, one count of contributing to the delinquency of her baby, whose diaper pail contained marijuana.

Dana Gene Lombard, 23, her husband, same address, two counts possession of marijuana, one count possession of hashish, two counts possession of THC, one count sale of THC, one count of contributing to the delinquency of a minor.

Joe Smith, 29, 420 Seaman St., Opa-locka, two counts breaking and entering.

Jacob Decker, 34, of 15401 NW 32nd Ave., one count of armed robbery, one count of buying, concealing and receiving stolen goods.

All the arrests were made between 1:30 and 2 a.m. today by teams totaling 35 to 40 men. Several Hialeah officers joined the raids in their jurisdiction.

[From the Washington Star, Jan. 9, 1972]

SLAYING OF INFORMER LINKED TO LATIN PASSPORTS FRAUD

(By Jeremiah O'Leary)

When two gunmen pumped three .45-caliber bullets into "Chocolito" in a West Side New York hotel room four days before Christmas, officials could only speculate on whether the murder was an act of revenge by the Caribbean underworld.

Whatever it was, the slaying took place just eight days after State Department security agents broke up a fraudulent passport ring that had brought scores of illegal aliens into the United States. "Chocolito" (Little Chocolate), whose real name was Carlos Ramon Batista-Castro, was an ex-Dominican police-

man who informed for a variety of U.S. law enforcement agencies. He played an important role in the three-year passport fraud case.

It was almost an anti-climax when the mastermind of the ring, Francisco Familia-Tobal, 45, like "Chocolito" a Dominican citizen, pleaded guilty last week in federal court in New York to 5 of 39 counts against him. Familia was in jail in default of \$20,000 bail at the time "Chocolito" was killed.

The murder of Batista-Castro took place about midnight Dec. 20. The clerk at the Park Plaza Hotel at 50 West 77th St. told police two men of black-Spanish appearance came to the hotel and went to the 12th floor where "Chocolito" lived. They left 10 minutes later and nobody heard anything, even though a .45 makes a noise like a cannon.

At 4 a.m. on Dec. 21, a Dominican girl named Amelia who had been sharing Room 1222 with "Chocolito" found his body on the floor. There were bullet holes in his head, arm and back. There was no sign of a struggle. Police said Amelia was hysterical but she didn't know anything either.

Nobody wasted time asking Familia about the end of "Chocolito." He was in the House of Detention, and a man couldn't have a better alibi than that.

If "Chocolito" was slain crudely, there was nothing crude about the case in which he played such a key part as a man who knew where to find Dominicans either in Santo Domingo or New York. Security agents say the ring was able to slip at least 100 illegal aliens into the country before the case was broken.

The loopholes in the system of obtaining U.S. passports have now been closed and the technique will no longer work, officials said. This is how it operated for three years:

To obtain a fraudulent passport, Familia had to know the name, birthday and birthplace of a Puerto Rican or other American with a Spanish name. He used to hang around the Hotel Victoria and other places in New York where Spanish-speakers can be found and pretend to be a reader of horoscopes.

For example, he would learn that Juan Miranda Torres (an invented name), an American citizen, was born on April 22, 1930, in Caguas, Puerto Rico. Familia or others in his ring would find a Dominican "customer" of about that age. The customer had to pay his \$150 to get the operation started and subsequently up to \$1,000 to complete it.

The customer also had to furnish him with passport-sized photos. Familia collected these between New York, Santo Domingo, Haiti and Puerto Rico. Back in New York, he would write to Puerto Rico under Juan Miranda Torres name and say that he had lost his birth certificate and needed another one. Puerto Rican authorities have taken steps to see that this kind of request is no longer filled automatically, but for three years it worked.

Then Familia would find look-alike for the photo of the Dominican client, and the look-alike would use the birth certificate to obtain some other form of identification under Miranda Torres name, such as a New York driver's license.

Having obtained the fraudulent U.S. passport, Familia would go to the Dominican Republic and have his client obtain a legitimate Dominican passport under his real name. Familia and his client would then travel to Port au Prince, Haiti.

The reason for this move, officials speculate, was so Familia would violate no Dominican laws. In Haiti, he would receive the rest of the money from the client and hand the client the U.S. passport. The last step was to put the client—now known as Juan Miranda Torres—on the next plane for the United States.

The frauds began to be suspected by consular employees at the U.S. Embassy in Santo Domingo four years ago. More definite information involving Familia was obtained, probably with the help of "Chocolito," and he was arrested by Dominican officials at the request of the United States in December 1970. But by the time a grand jury of the U.S. District Court for Southern New York indicted Familia on three counts of passport fraud, Familia had trickled out of Dominican custody and disappeared.

He was finally arrested Dec. 13 in New York City. He appeared before Judge Edward C. McLean the next day and bail was set at \$20,000. Familia could not make the bail.

Officials indicated agreement was reached between the U.S. attorney and counsel for Familia for the prisoner to plead guilty to five of the counts. The others will be dropped.

The penalty for passport fraud is five years or \$2,000. Familia's sentence will depend on the probation report and the disposition of the court.

As for "Chocolito," the detective handling the case said he had no leads last week. It would come as a surprise to the Caribbean underworld if the murder is ever solved.

[From the Chicago Sun-Times, Apr. 20, 1972]

THREE ARRESTED IN BREAKUP OF FAKE DRIVER LICENSE RING

(By Art Petacque)

A five-month investigation has resulted in the arrest of three men and the breakup of a ring geared for widespread sale of fraudulent driver's licenses, the Illinois secretary of state's office disclosed Wednesday.

Asst. Sec. of State Edmund J. Kucharski also revealed that a warrant has been issued for a fourth suspect in the case, a man believed to have fled to Canada.

Kucharski said that almost 200 stolen blank drivers' license cards—the type carried by drivers in wallets or purses—have been recovered as a result of the investigation, which involved several undercover agents and informants from Cook County Jail.

Those arrested so far were identified as Kenneth Formanek, 32, of 309 S. Oakwood, Willow Springs, apparently the ringleader, investigators said; Daniel Otto, 26, who gave various addresses, and Fred Nigro, 29, of 14230 S. Palmer, Posen. The man being sought was identified as Daniel Nelson, 29, of 4611 N. Hermitage.

Kucharski said the investigation began last Dec. 28, when Rafael Garcia, 38, of 1420 W. 50th, a restaurant owner, was stopped for a minor traffic offense.

He showed a driver's license on which his name apparently had been typed—a variation from the usual computer-printout cards issued to Illinois motorists, Kucharski said.

FAKE USED AS BOND

A check proved the license to be fraudulent, investigators said. The investigators learned further that Garcia's own license had been revoked. They said he told of buying the fraudulent license for \$400, but said he couldn't identify the seller.

At about the same time, a similar case popped up, Kucharski said. A man was arrested in Benton, Ill., for driving an auto without state license plates. His typewritten driver's license identified him as Ronald Anderson, 36, of 4942 N. St. Louis, Chicago.

The man surrendered the fraudulent driver's license as bond, but failed to show up for a court appearance.

FIND CAR LEASED

Investigators couldn't locate Anderson at the Chicago address. Next, they checked on the sales of hundreds of new Chevrolets, without success.

Finally they determined that "Anderson" had leased the auto from a Northwest Side firm. Further checking determined that Anderson actually was Arden Smith, an AWOL soldier who had been sentenced to one year in County Jail on a grand theft conviction.

Smith, interviewed at the jail, admitted buying a blank driver's license card for \$65 from the owner of a Southwest Side auto body shop. Riding with investigators, he pointed out Formanek's shop at 2659 S. Springfield as the one in question.

BUYERS SOLICITED

A surveillance of Formanek's shop ensued. He was arrested as he drove from the shop in a car without license plates. He was charged with driving with a fraudulent driver's license; driving when his license was revoked, and theft of state property. The latter charge related to the theft of 200 blank license cards from a state supplier, Eveready Business Forms Division of Safeguard Industries Inc., 3159 W. 36th.

Kucharski said Otto was arrested after investigators learned he was offering to sell driver's license blanks from the same stolen lot. Investigators posing as truck drivers met him at Montrose and Kedzie with \$900 in marked money and bought 51 blanks, Kucharski said. Another 140 blanks were recovered later at his residence, according to the state official. Otto was charged with selling fraudulent licenses.

Investigators said Otto named Formanek as the source of the stolen blanks. Both Formanek and Otto have prison records, according to investigators.

The third man arrested, Nigro, also was charged with selling fraudulent licenses.

SUMMARY OF PASSPORT FRAUDS COMMITTED BY BROTHERHOOD OF ETERNAL LOVE

	<i>Table</i>
Number and type of frauds.....	1
Place application filed.....	2
Year application filed.....	3
Frauds detected before issue.....	4
Source of passport application fraud detected.....	5
Fraudulent birth certificates detected.....	5
Single and multiple violations.....	7
Counterfeit birth certificates detected.....	8
Prosecutive action.....	9

BROTHERHOOD FRAUDS

TABLE 1

	Apr. 27, 1973	June 1, 1973	July 12, 1973	Oct. 1, 1973
Number of frauds.....	73	120	124	130
Type of frauds:				
Alteration of passport.....	2	2	2	2
Fraudulent use of passport.....	2	2	2	2
Identifying witness.....	9	17	19	20
False statement.....	60	99	101	106

TABLE 2

Place passport application filed	Apr. 27, 1973	June 1, 1973	July 12, 1973	Oct. 1, 1973
False statement violation:				
Los Angeles.....	22	31	32	32
San Francisco.....	13	24	24	25
Miami.....	0	6	6	6
Chicago.....	4	4	4	4
Post office.....	4	5	5	5
New York.....	3	5	5	5
New York.....	3	3	3	3
Kabul.....	2	6	6	8
Clerk of court.....	9	15	15	18
Other.....				

TABLE 3

Year fraudulent application filed	Apr 27, 1973	June 1, 1973	July 12, 1973	Oct 1, 1973
False statement violations:				
Prior to 1969.....	3	5	5	
1969.....	10	11	11	12
1970.....	11	20	20	21
1971.....	21	35	35	36
1972.....	13	23	23	24
1973.....	2	5	7	7

TABLE 4

	Apr 27, 1973	June 1, 1973	July 12, 1973	Oct 1, 1973
Detected before issue (1972-73):				
San Francisco.....	4	4	4	4
Seattle.....	1	1	1	1
Miami.....	1	1	1	1
Los Angeles.....	1	1	1	2
Hawaii.....	0	0	1	1
Lookout System.....	1	1	1	1
New Orleans.....	0	0		1
Total.....	8	8	10	11

TABLE 5.—SOURCE OF PASSPORT APPLICATION FRAUD DETECTION

Detected by—	Year detected—				Total detected
	1970	1971	1972	1973	
Customs		2	7	17	26
BNDD			4	8	12
Task force				3	3
Legal Division, Passport Office	3	7	15	18	33
Agency			2	8	10
Other ¹	3		16	3	22

¹ Federal Bureau of Investigation and other law enforcement agencies.

TABLE 6.—COUNTERFEIT BIRTH CERTIFICATES AND VALID BIRTH CERTIFICATES FOR YEARS 1970, 1971, 1972, AND 1973

Year detected	Counterfeit birth certificates	Valid birth certificates presented fraudulently
1970	2	4
1971	5	4
1972	21	23
1973	23	24

TABLE 7.—SINGLE AND MULTIPLE VIOLATIONS

	Violations	Persons
Single violations:		
Fraudulent applications	60	
Fraudulent alteration (photo substitution)	2	
Subtotal	62	
Multiple violations:		
4 passports 1 identity, 1 passport 2d identity	5	1
3 identities	6	2
2 identities	26	13
Identifying witness	20	20
3 applications same false identity	3	1
2 applications same false identity	6	3
Fraudulent use by 2 persons of passport issued to another couple	2	1
Subtotal	68	41
Total	130	103

TABLE 8

	Apr. 27, 1973	June 1, 1973	July 12, 1973	Oct. 1, 1973
Counterfeit birth certificates detected	27	45	48	51
Purported issuing authority:				
Hospital	5	6	6	6
Nebraska	0	8	8	8
Missouri	4	5	6	6
Chicago	14	4	4	4
Colorado	2	2	2	2
Utah	2	3	3	3
North Carolina	0	3	3	3
New York	0	0	0	2
Ohio	0	2	2	2
California	0	0	0	4
Other (less than 2 people)	0	12	14	11

TABLE 9.—PROSECUTIVE ACTION AS OF OCTOBER 1, 1973

Referred U.S. Attorney-----	42
Indicted-----	25
Convicted-----	5
Declined: 1—no reason, 2—charged other offense-----	3

————— ◆ —————

PASSPORT OFFICE BUDGET DATA

It is a fact that virtually every position in the Passport Office relates directly or indirectly to the public service rendered to U.S. citizens in the field of passport issuance and citizenship determination. In addition, every job also relates directly or indirectly to maintaining the integrity of the passport document as one which identifies the citizen to be the individual named and described in the passport document. In our concentration to maintain passport integrity, the positions of passport agents, adjudicators, file searchers and reviewers, legal researchers and attorneys, recorders, and even our mail clerks are all related to an intensive office-wide fraud alert. In directing a function such as the Passport Office, one cannot segregate one phase of the operation, such as fraud, from all the other functions. Each is an integral part of the other.

The following Table shows the Passport Office budget requests in total dollars from FY 1970 through FY 1974 inclusive :

Fiscal year (a)	Passport office initial budget requested (b)	State Depart- ment budget submission for passport (c)
1970-----	\$2,593,000	\$2,391,155
1971-----	3,215,000	3,034,600
1972-----	4,838,600	4,500,400
1973-----	6,326,100	5,995,300
1974-----	8,305,300	7,293,500

Note: The above amounts do not include pay of permanent personnel since these funds are managed centrally by the State Department-

In each fiscal year, Column (c), the budget amount submitted to the Congress by the State Department for the Passport Office, is less than the amount requested by the Passport Office, Column (b).

Although the Congress had never disapproved on the record any amount requested by the State Department for the Passport Office during these years, the Passport Office is unable to ascertain what exact amounts the Congress allowed the Passport operations since these are never specified. Unfortunately, Congressional enactment of State Department appropriations do not specifically earmark funds approved for the Passport Office.

Mrs. Ruth B. Shipley, former Director of the Passport Office, stated in writing that she had never received the full amount of the funds allowed the Passport Office by the Appropriations Committees since a portion of the Passport Office allotment was always withheld by the Department for other unspecified purposes.

There are many items which have caused the reductions noted in Column (c). Several of the most significant reductions or deletions of Passport Office requirements are depicted below. One significant reduction by the State Department is not reflected in the above table. This involves the Passport Office requests for permanent personnel authorizations. The Passport Office includes requests for increases in permanent personnel and related funds in its annual Budget Submissions, but as indicated above, these funds are retained and managed centrally at the Departmental level.

PASSPORT OFFICE, PERMANENT PERSONNEL BUDGET REQUESTS AND SHORTAGES

Fiscal year	Type of request	Number requested	Date of request	Department of State approval/denial/ date	Congressional action
1970.....	Annual budget.....	24	September 1968.....	Denied September 1968..	Never presented.
1970.....	Passport office supplemental	24	August 1969.....	Denied October 1969.....	Do.
1970.....	Proposed Congressional amendment	24	December 1969.....	Not applicable.....	Initiated on Senate floor but denied in joint committee.
			February 1970.....	24 provided from within State Department resources.	Never presented.
1971.....	Annual budget.....	29	August 1969.....	Approved September 1969 for President's budget.	Enacted.
1972.....	do.....	35	August 1970.....	Approved October 1970 for President's budget.	Do.
1973.....	do.....	49	August 1971.....	20 denied October 1971, 29 approved for President's budget.	Reduction by State Department enacted.
1974.....	do.....	36	July 1972.....	10 denied October 1972, 26 approved in President's budget (19 more denied October 1973, leaving 7 approved)	Pending enactment of reduction by State Department.
1975.....	do.....	102	July 1972.....	84 denied, 18 approved..	Not yet presented.

The Department's cuts in Passport personnel were so deep and arbitrary that at an OMB Hearing on October 5, 1973, this Budget was returned to the Department for more practical consideration. Not readily evident in the above table are the long and inexplicable delays experienced by the Passport Office in securing the authorized positions, even as reduced by the Department (it took 18 months to get the 24 positions requested for FY 1970). Not evident to the outsider are the lengthy delays experienced in getting personnel on board to man the positions authorized. The Passport Office routinely has a chronic shortage of personnel; the year round average of 60 vacant permanent out of its current authorization of 572, and at times this has climbed to 82 vacancies as it did in April of 1972 which is the height of the travel season. These unreasonable delays become particularly damaging when urgently needed attorney positions remain unfilled in the face of constantly mounting fraud cases requiring their efforts. Outside hire restrictions, as well as other limitations, such as quota restrictions on clerical personnel aggravate these continuing personnel problems.

All reviews, interminable conferences and meetings, procrastinations, delays in action, arbitrary decisions by so called management experts who have no practical experience or knowledge of the Passport function mitigate against even minimal safeguards on document fraud. Indeed, the criminal community, domestic and foreign, could ask for no greater support or assistance than the harassment received by the Passport Office from the current upper echelon.

The following Table depicts Passport Office requests for new facilities to adapt to increasing workloads.

NEW PASSPORT FIELD AGENCIES AND ACCEPTANCE FACILITIES

Fiscal year	Type of request	Number and description of request	Funds requested	Date of request	Department of state action	Congressional action
1970.....	Annual budget.....	3 new agencies.....	\$204, 000	September 1968...	Denied.....	Never presented,
1970.....	PPT supplemental.	do.....	240, 000	August 1969.....	do.....	Do.
1970.....	Senate amendment.	do.....	110, 000	December 1969....	NA.....	Proposed on Senate floor denied in joint committee.
1971.....	Annual budget.....	do.....	240, 000	August 1969.....	Denied.....	Never presented.
1972.....	do.....	do.....	240, 000	August 1970.....	do.....	Do.
1973.....	do.....	do.....	240, 000	August 1971.....	do.....	Do.
		1 acceptance offer..	30, 000	do.....	do.....	Do.
1974.....	do.....	3 new agencies.....	255, 000	July 1972.....	do.....	Do.
		1 acceptance offer..	85, 000	do.....	do.....	Do.
1975.....	do.....	3 new agencies.....	270, 000	July 1973.....	do.....	NA.

JUSTIFICATION: Substantially the same justification is applicable to each budget submission and is repeated below:

This request provides funds for the establishment of three new agencies at Houston or Dallas, Detroit and a city in Connecticut. It is necessary to relieve

the pressure of the ever increasing workload in some of the larger agencies where it is difficult to obtain additional space and to recruit additional staff personnel. By further decentralization the areas covered by the present agencies will be realigned and the workload volume redistributed. Funds for all items except rent will be required in the full amount regardless of when the agencies are opened. The funds for rent will be reduced proportionately. Personnel to staff the new agencies will be provided for within current authorizations.

The FY 1973 and FY 1974 Budgets also included requests for Acceptance Offices apart from the Agency in New York.

The continuing need for expanding facilities is exemplified by our experience at the Los Angeles Passport Agency. In 1970 an acceptance facility was opened on Wilshire Avenue in addition to the downtown Los Angeles Passport Office location. In February 1973, the Los Angeles Agency was moved out of town to a public building in Hawthorne and the Wilshire facility ordered closed by the Department. Because of the public outcry, emphasizing the need for a downtown application acceptance facility, the Department was forced to authorize the re-establishment of an acceptance facility in downtown Los Angeles. A new Annex Office was opened on June 11, 1973, at the U. S. District Court and Federal Building.

In addition to the above budget requests, the Passport Office requested authority to establish from within its own resources new acceptance facilities at various locations in the United States. For example, on September 30, 1968, the Passport Office requested the controlling bureau to establish a Passport Services Office in Houston, Dallas and Detroit. This request was denied.

A statement was made at the Hearing that the FY 1975 Budget submitted by the Passport Office may include a request for funds to implement a developmental study, completed in May 1973, on a new travel document and processing system. This study is currently being considered for approval at the State Department Under Secretarial level. If approved, implementation funds will be requested as a separate project.

Following is a Table showing past budgetary actions concerning this study:

PASSPORT OFFICE REQUEST FOR FUNDS TO STUDY THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW TRAVEL DOCUMENT

Fiscal year	Type of request	Date of request	Amount of funds requested	Department of State action approval/denial/date	Congressional action
1971.....	Annual budget.....	September 1969.....	\$75,000	Denied October 1969.	Never presented. Proposed on Senate floor as amendment to supplemental but denied in joint committee.
1970.....	Amendment.....	December 1969.....	75,000	Not applicable.....	
1972.....	Annual budget.....	August 1970.....	75,000	\$150,000 approved in October 1970 for inclusion in President's budget. ¹	
1974.....	do.....	July 1972.....	\$ 350,000	Denied August 1972.	Never presented.

¹ Amount was doubled by the Department of State to include both document development and development of improved processing system. Research and development contract for an international travel document, \$75,000. A study applying computer or other processing techniques to accelerate the issuance of passports, \$75,000.

² Implementation of travel document study.

For several years the Passport Office has requested funds for a badly needed training film. Our experience with this budget item is depicted below:

PASSPORT OFFICE REQUEST FOR FUNDS TO DEVELOP A TRAINING FILM

Fiscal year	Type of request	Funds requested	Department of State action	Congressional action
1971.....	Annual budget.....	¹ \$25,000	Approved.....	Enacted.
1974.....	do.....	35,000	Denied.....	Never presented.
1975.....	do.....	35,000	Denied in preliminary reviews.	Not applicable.

¹ This item was approved in August 1970. Bids were received from several film production companies and a selection recommended to the Department. Subsequently, we were advised that one of the original bidders had changed the amount of his proposal making him the lowest bidder. Since it appeared that procurement procedures may not have been properly applied, it was decided in the best interest of the Department not to award the contract. Time did not permit a new advertisement for a contract before the funds lapsed.

JUSTIFICATION: An operation such as the Passport Office cannot function economically and effectively unless provided proper training tools—one of which is a *training film*. A training film for the Passport Office is urgently required to improve fraud detection, to improve and expedite training of new employees and to help reduce error in passport issuances. In the opinion of professional training officers, a training film is an outstandingly effective tool of management.

One of the important points to be covered in any training film would be an introduction to the "points of reference" or items which would assist in detecting the presence or potential presence of frauds in adjudication work. This film would be an important first step for new employees in becoming aware of the fraud problems involved in passport work. The failure to have such film requires all of this preliminary work to be done in personal fraud seminars. While the fraud seminars have been effective, they have been diluted by the necessity of covering preliminary aspects which could appropriately be included in a training film. The training film would thereby make it possible to concentrate the personal fraud seminars on the more sophisticated aspects of fraud detection.

The Passport Office is years behind other federal agencies in realizing benefits that can be derived from a training film. INS, IRS, USIA, VA, AGRICULTURE, FAA, POST OFFICE, CUSTOMS, AID AND PSI *make wide use of training films*. The Passport Office program is not dissimilar to these agencies. IRS, the Post Office and Customs have a special orientation film for all new employees. Most of the agencies listed above also use training films dealing specifically with the job functions, area of assignment, etc., which are shown to selected groups of employees as part of the orientation and refresher training programs. Additionally, these agencies use either a slide tape or video tape or both presentations to supplement film showings.

PASSPORT OFFICE LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS AND BILLS INTRODUCED IN CONGRESS FOR THE RELIEF OF THE PASSPORT OFFICE 1956-1973

Since 1956 the Passport Office has consistently supported legislation which would provide more efficient and expeditious service to the public while maintaining the reputation of the U.S. passport for integrity and security.

The most consistent and important piece of legislation of this nature has been a proposal to establish a semi-autonomous United States Passport Service obtaining policy guidance from the Department of State; operating with a revolving fund which would permit the Passport Office to use some of the revenue which it returns to the Treasury each year to finance its operational and administrative requirements.

The first such legislation was S-3340 introduced by Senator Hubert H. Humphrey in the 84th Congress on March 1, 1956. Senator Humphrey, as a member of the Government Operations Committee, had just participated with the Director of the Passport Office, Miss Frances Knight and other areas of the Executive Branch of Government in the complete modernization of Passport Office operations. New equipment and modern personnel and management procedures were introduced. This modernization moved the Passport Office from the 19th to the 20th Century. Senator Humphrey recognized that in order to keep up with the ever increasing volume of passport services required by U.S. citizens the Passport Office must be in a flexible position to update and modernize its procedures to meet the challenge and requirements of the times.

S-3340 contained provisions for a U.S. Passport Service and a revolving fund. The Passport Office fully supported this proposed legislation, but the Department of State bitterly opposed it on grounds that it interfered with their organizational structure and their budgetary flexibility.

Similar bills, S-2095 and H.R-5455, were introduced on June 3, 1959 and March 9, 1959 by Senator Karl Mundt and Congressman Thomas L. Curtis of Missouri in the 86th Congress.

A short version Passport Service Bill, S-718, was introduced by Senator John L. McClellan in the 87th Congress on January 31, 1961. In the same Congress,

Congressman Thomas L. Curtis of Missouri reintroduced his Service Bill on July 6, 1961 as HR-4077 and again in the 89th Congress on January 13, 1965 as HR-2596.

In its preliminary legislative program for 1969, the Passport Office proposed a number of measures to the Department of State. One was an omnibus passport bill including the establishment of a semi-autonomous U.S. Passport Service, a revolving fund, establishment of self-supporting Passport Field Agencies when and where needed and numerous other urgently needed procedural and management improvements. Additional proposals included various pieces of the omnibus legislation touching on such matters as criminal penalties for violation of geographical restrictions, an increase in the fee for execution of a passport application acceptance function and a long overdue reclassification of the positions of Director and Deputy Director of the Passport Office commensurate with their responsibilities. All of these proposals were arbitrarily rejected by the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, and to the best of our knowledge deleted from any reports and papers bucked on to the upper echelons of the Department.

In 1970 the Passport Office submitted a preliminary legislative program to the Department substantially similar to its 1969 proposals. These were again rejected by the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs. The Passport Office recommendations died at that Bureau level.

In 1970 in the 91st Congress, Congressmen Robert N. Giaimo and Lowell P. Weicker, Jr. of Connecticut cosponsored HR-13123 which, while it did not provide for a U.S. Passport Service, did provide for the establishment of Passport Field Agencies when and where they were needed and a revolving fund for the Passport Office. Seventeen identical companion bills were introduced, sponsored by over 40 Congressmen. Hearings were held before a subcommittee of the House Foreign Relations Committee. The Director of the Passport Office, Miss Frances G. Knight, testified before the committee in support of the legislation but again the Department of State opposed it offering stop-gap substitute measures such as night shifts in some agencies and the acceptance of passport applications by Post Offices. As a result, all these bills died in Committee. Time has proved Passport Office predictions that these jury rigged measures were not a solution to the overall problem. Indeed, they were nothing more than sugar-coated pacifiers. Increasing acceptance facilities and temporary night shift measures are not the type of long range solutions required for the management and production problems of the Passport Office.

On April 7, 1970 in the 91st Congress, the late Senator Thomas Dodd, recognizing the problems more clearly, introduced S-3684. This was an omnibus act similar to previous U.S. Passport Service proposals with some additional refinements in the management area. The Department again opposed this legislation for the same reasons it had given in the past.

In 1971 the Passport Office again submitted to the Department a preliminary legislative program including an omnibus passport act and other proposals to increase the passport fee and to provide criminal penalties for violation of geographical area restrictions. The Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs again deleted these proposals from the Department's program. No effort was ever made to discuss these proposals with the Passport Office.

However, recognition of Passport Office problems and effective solutions, similar to those in previous bills and Passport Office proposals, came during the 92nd Congress in the form of two bills: S-1812 introduced by Senator John G. Tower on May 10, 1971 and S-2769 introduced by Senator Hubert H. Humphrey on October 28, 1971. These bills once again proposed the establishment of a U.S. Passport Service and solutions similar to or identical with those spelled out in former bills. The Department of State was consistent in its adamant opposition to all these salutary measures.

In 1972 the Passport Office again submitted proposals to the Department for omnibus passport legislation and these were again deleted by the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs without consultation.

Finally, in the 93rd Congress, four more U.S. Passport Service Bills were introduced by legislators who recognized the urgency of problems and correctly

devised the solution. Senator Hubert H. Humphrey reintroduced his bill on March 26, 1973 designated as S-1363. Congressman Samuel L. Devine, for himself and Congressman Donald D. Clancy, introduced a similar bill, HR-9186 on July 11, 1973. Senator Strom Thurmond followed with S-2331 on August 2, 1973 and Congressman Devine introduced HR-9873 on August 3, 1973 for himself and 10 other colleagues.

While there are some minor differences in these bills, they are basically similar in that they continue to propose a semi-autonomous U.S. Passport Service, a revolving budget, establishment of Passport Field Agencies when and where necessary and other management reforms.

The Passport Office in submitting its legislative proposals in 1973 endorsed S-1363, HR-9186, S-2331 and HR-9873 as providing the best possible solutions to the problems of the Passport Office. These problems deliberately ignored by the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs and adroitly side-tracked from higher level consideration, have increased over the years and have now entered the crisis stage in terms of national security and well-being.

It is of considerable significance that the basic U.S. Passport Service proposals beginning in 1956 and continuing in the present Congress have been supported by every spectrum of both major political parties in both the House and the Senate. It has been a truly remarkable bipartisan recognition of the problems which have beset the Passport Office.

PASSPORT OFFICE—YEAR END REPORT—WORKLOAD AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS—FISCAL YEAR 1972

PASSPORT OFFICE WORKLOADS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS—FISCAL YEAR 1972

In Fiscal Year 1972 the Passport Office issued a total of 2,605,321 passports. This volume of passports issued represents an increase in workload of 12.7% over the passports issued the previous year. Personnel utilization increased by 12.0% in FY 1972 from 702 man-years utilized in FY 1971 to 786 man-years utilized in FY 1972.

During FY 1972 the Passport Office collected an estimated \$25,955,783 in passport fees, an increase of 14.2% over FY 1971. Direct operating funds for FY 1972, including pay for permanent personnel for which funds are not allocated to the Passport Office, amounted to approximately \$11,380,000, resulting in a surplus of collections in excess of direct operating funds amounting to approximately \$14,570,000.

In addition to the basic workload of processing and issuing passports, the Passport Office also furnished numerous other services and performed many other significant and important work functions, studies and projects not directly related to the processing and issuance of passports. These seldom discussed, but nonetheless significant and substantial workloads, are summarized on the following pages to provide a more detailed disclosure of the services performed, and the multitude of work projects imposed on the component Divisions of the Passport Office in FY 1972.

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION WORKLOADS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS—FISCAL YEAR 1972

The Administrative Division is primarily responsible for providing personnel and administrative support, technical services, equipment and supplies to all the operating areas of the Passport Office. The Division's work functions are generally service oriented and, in the main, are not directly related to passport processing. In several significant functions, however, such as mail processing, filing of applications, accounting, and name clearances the workloads performed in this Division are closely associated with passport processing.

During Fiscal Year 1972 the Administrative Division experienced increases in all categories of support work, as well as increases in nonmeasured workloads involving budget submissions, data for other agencies of government, special studies, projects and services.

The following table lists the various categories of work performed by the Division which are either directly or indirectly involved in the processing and issuance of passport books. The great increase in each work category must be weighed in all future considerations of personal and budget requirements.

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION WORKLOADS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS, FISCAL YEAR 1972

Work category	Fiscal year—		± Percent fiscal year 1972 over fiscal year 1971
	1971	1972	
Incoming mail handled.....	2,694,862	3,074,574	+14.1
Outgoing mail handled.....	109,533	116,134	+6.0
Correspondence section ¹	31,074	29,977	-3.5
Documents retrieved.....	252,966	258,978	+2.4
Documents processed and filed.....	3,444,254	3,902,761	+13.3
Passport books distributed.....	2,711,666	2,889,393	+6.6
Forms, brochures, etc., distributed.....	16,528,579	19,007,865	+15.0
Total items of printing ordered.....	11,444,267	20,363,018	+77.9
Clearances processed, foreign.....	111,440	94,334	-15.3
U.S. insular clearances.....	13,820	17,460	+26.3
File searches and Federal records center phone requests.....	55,031	50,913	+10.5
Computer updates.....	28,737	28,295	-1.5
Requests for birth and marriage records.....	7,307	7,881	+7.9
Employer interviewing and counseling.....	NA	1,044	-----
Training of personnel.....	110	210	+91.0
Personnel actions.....	1,448	1,656	+14.4
Peak season employment.....	271	374	+38.0
Checks returned.....	2,700	3,050	+13.0
Checks recovered.....	2,382	2,593	+9.1
Waivers.....	1,720	2,392	+39.1

¹ Includes only measured correspondence prepared by a special activity whose principal function is to answer letters from the public.
Revised.

DOMESTIC OPERATIONS DIVISION WORKLOADS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS, FISCAL YEAR 1972

The Domestic Operations Division is primarily responsible for the issuance of passports in the United States and for the operations of the ten Passport Field Agencies and the National Office in Washington, D.C.

In addition to its normal workload of issuing passports to the general public, the Division is also involved in numerous services and work functions as well as staff and management duties which are not directly related to the processing and issuance of passports to the general public. These significant and substantial workloads are summarized in the following table. Diplomatic and Official passports are listed as additional workloads performed by the Domestic Operations Division since they are handled as a special service for other government agencies.

DOMESTIC OPERATIONS DIVISION CASEWORK COMPLETED

	Fiscal year		± Percent fiscal year 1972 over fiscal year 1971
	1971	1972	
Amendments, extensions, renewals, etc., Washington and agencies.....	279,514	94,361	-66.2
Telephone inquiries:			
Washington.....	144,033	131,727	-8.5
Agencies (estimate).....	1,086,014	1,091,014	+0.5
Locater and status cards filed:			
Washington.....	687,945	791,519	+15.9
Agencies (estimate).....	2,200,000	2,400,000	+9.1
Correspondence, Washington and agencies (estimate).....	151,988	167,187	+10.0
Visas obtained for diplomatic and official travel (Washington only).....	10,434	9,918	-5.0
Diplomatic passports issued.....	5,214	4,994	+4.2
Courtesy diplomatic passports issued.....	14	28	+100.0
Official passports issued.....	72,916	67,451	-7.5
Air crew certificates (Washington only).....	2,021	2,032	+0.5
Duty officer services (Washington only).....	6,337	7,739	+22.1
Requests for validation of passports for travel to restricted areas.....	989	464	-53.1
Special expedited passport applications:			
Congressionals.....	86,295	91,807	+6.4
Washington.....	(46,295)	(64,405)	-----
Agencies (estimate).....	(40,000)	(27,402)	-----
General.....	400,104	404,714	+1.2
Washington.....	(115,785)	(80,032)	-----
Agencies.....	(284,319)	(324,682)	-----
Post adjudication of insular applications (Washington only).....	22,514	(1)	-----
Review of post office applications (Washington only).....	53,895	399,244	+604.8

¹ Not yet received.

FOREIGN OPERATIONS DIVISION WORKLOADS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS, FISCAL YEAR 1972

During FY 1972 the Foreign Operations Division received a total of 46,844 cases from the Foreign Service Posts and other areas throughout the world which required action or advisory opinion. This represents an increase of 12.4% over the 41,689 cases received from the same sources during FY 1971. In FY 1972, 45,965 cases were completed as compared to 40,208 in FY 1971, an increase of 14.3%.

The Foreign Operations Division performs a multitude of services and support activities which are both directly and indirectly involved in the processing and production of passports issued overseas.

The following table lists the various categories of work performed by the Division and the percentage of increase or decrease in work experienced in FY 1972 over FY 1971.

FOREIGN OPERATIONS DIVISION—CASEWORK COMPLETED

Casework category	Fiscal year—		± Percent fiscal year 1972 over fiscal year 1971
	1971	1972	
Fraudulent naturalization.....	45	115	+156.0
Certificates of loss of nationality.....	1,834	1,967	+7.3
Registration applications.....	3,779	3,017	-20.2
Passport applications.....	8,848	11,431	+29.2
Consular reports of birth.....	2,986	2,863	-4.1
Correspondence and consular letters.....	5,506	8,435	+53.2
Reactivated cases.....	395	268	-32.2
Appeals.....	87	66	-24.1
Advisory opinions.....	4,571	3,397	-25.7
Lost and found.....	12,157	14,406	+18.5
Total.....	40,208	45,965	+14.3

LEGAL DIVISION WORKLOADS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS, FISCAL YEAR 1972

The Legal Division performs mainly service oriented work of a legal and quasi-legal nature. These activities and services are not directly related to the processing and issuance of passports.

The following table lists the various categories of work normally performed by the Legal Division which are not related to passport issuance.

LEGAL DIVISION—CASEWORK COMPLETED

Casework category	Fiscal year—		± Percent fiscal year 1972 over fiscal year 1971
	1971	1972	
Travel control cases.....	1,594	2,589	+62.4
Discretionary actions.....	105	357	+240.0
Fraud cases.....	604	614	+1.7
Domestic.....	288	300	+4.2
Foreign.....	316	314	-.6
Criminal prosecutions.....	87	120	+37.9
Submitted.....	90	69	-23.3
Closed.....	53	37	-30.2
On hand.....	124	152	+22.6
Passports lost.....	1 20,620	22,902	+11.1
Passports found.....	3,458	3,968	+14.7
Mental cases.....	85	116	+36.5
Child custody cases.....	483	369	-23.6
Miscellaneous cases.....	1,584	1,986	+25.4
Circular outlooks.....	426	887	+108.2
Civil actions.....	2	3	+300.0
Total.....	29,919	34,788	+16.3

1 Revised.

INDEX

(NOTE.—The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance to the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or organization in this index.)

A	Page
Abel, Colonel (Soviet spy)-----	58
Ackerly, Robert Dale-----	21, 26, 79, 83
Afghanistan -----	4, 5, 7, 13, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24
Government -----	24
Akron, Ohio-----	56
Al Fatah-----	80, 81, 82
Alabama, State of-----	66
Algeria-----	37, 47, 48, 80-82
Algiers -----	20, 25, 80-83
Allen, Linda Pohl-----	79
Aman -----	81
Amelia (Dominican girl)-----	107
Amsterdam -----	19
Anderson, Jack-----	38, 90
Anderson, Ronald-----	108
Andrist, Robert Lee-----	21, 26
Andrist, Robert Lowe-----	31, 79, 84
Appropriations Committee, Senate-----	60
Arthur, David Alan-----	79, 84
Ashbrook, Travis Grant-----	27, 79, 84
Atlanta, Ga-----	48
Australia -----	40
B	
Bank of America-----	104
Barnes, State Agent-----	33
Bartels, John R-----	2-38
Basel, Switzerland-----	18, 19
Bates, Roger-----	84
Batista-Castro, Carlos Ramon (Chocolito)-----	103, 107
Becker, Dale Andrew-----	26, 79
Beirut -----	81
BEL Task Force-----	22, 23, 73
Belgium -----	7
Belk, George-----	63
Bell, Herman-----	58, 104, 105
Bell, Jonas-----	105
Berkeley, Calif-----	18, 30, 47
Berry, Robert L-----	70
Bevan, Rick C-----	26, 34, 79, 84
Bevan, Ronald-----	27, 79
Bidwell, Thomas Blake-----	79
Black Liberation Army-----	58
Black Panther Party-----	104
Black Panthers-----	47, 80, 81
BNDD (Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs)-----	3, 61, 62
Boston -----	91
Bowers, Walter O. (Buddy)-----	106
Bowyer, Chester Allen-----	80, 84
Braenden, Dr. Olav-----	1

A

	Page.
Brosan, George-----	90
Brotherhood of Eternal Love-----	1-4,
6, 8, 9, 12-14, 18-26, 29, 34, 38, 44-47, 61, 63, 64, 73, 74, 91-93, 97	79
Brotherhood of Eternal Love Inditees List of-----	45
Brotherhood Frauds (chart)-----	83
Brotherhood, The—Master List (Passport) April 18, 1973 (List of Brother- hood members believed to have obtained one or more passports under assumed names)-----	17
Brotherhood "Orange Sunshine" LSD Laboratory (photography)-----	22, 28
Brussels, Belgium-----	9
Bureau of Security-----	41, 76, 115, 116
Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs-----	3
Burke, Terry-----	55
Bureau of Vital Statistics-----	

C

Cairo-----	80, 81, 82
California-----	3, 6, 7, 18-24, 29, 47, 53
California Department of Justice-----	25, 26
California Franchise Tax Board-----	24
Canada-----	20, 40, 59
Caserta, Daniel Phillip-----	27, 63, 79, 84
CBS (Columbia Broadcasting System)-----	81
Central America-----	20
Central District of California-----	28, 32
Centur Printing-----	105, 106
Chastain, Eric-----	21
Chesimard, Joanne Deborah-----	104
Chicago 7-----	32
Chicago Sun-Times (newspaper)-----	108
China, People's Republic of-----	72
CIA (Central Intelligence Agency)-----	81
Clancy, Congressman Donald D-----	116
Clay, James Henry-----	79, 84
Cleaver, Eldridge-----	25, 47, 48, 80
Cohen, Leonard-----	83
Computer Sciences Corp-----	42, 64
Comparison of domestic frauds detected before issue in proportion to per- centage of executed applications submitted by source—Fiscal year 1973 (chart)-----	57
"Confessions of a Hope Fiend" (book)-----	20, 35, 47, 70, 74
Congressional Record-----	44, 59
Connolly, Michael Stephen-----	84
"Contract Awarded for Passport Study" (newspaper article)-----	43
Cook County Jail-----	108
Cosa Nostra-----	6
Costa Rica-----	7, 23
Costan, James-----	104
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit-----	11
Crawford, Ronald Ray-----	79
Crittenden, James Leroy-----	79
Curtis, Congressman Thomas L-----	114, 115
Customs-----	10, 12, 18, 90

D

Dale, James Howard-----	85
Daley, Donald D-----	69, 71
Dallas Police Department-----	98
Damascus-----	81
Daniels, Robert Lewis-----	106
Davis, Angela-----	32
Daw, John Robert-----	26, 79
Decker, Jacob-----	106
DeJarette Jon Jay-----	85

III

	Page.
Delaney, Calvin Larry-----	79
Denver-----	6
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Division of Vital Statistics-----	91
Department of Justice-----	2, 53, 90, 94
Department of State-----	2,
8, 9, 32, 39-41, 42, 46, 48, 50, 60, 61, 67, 72, 73, 75, 77, 92, 97, 106, 111, 112, 114, 115	41
Budget Office-----	116
Devine, Congressman Samuel L.-----	54, 56
District of Columbia-----	115
Dodd, Senator Thomas-----	53
Doerge, Keith-----	24, 31, 37, 82
Dohrn, Bernardine-----	24, 80
Dohrn, Jennifer-----	92
Dominican Republic-----	53
Drivers License Guide Co.-----	23, 24, 79
Druce, Charles-----	2, 3, 7, 8, 20, 22, 33, 38, 62, 63, 90
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)-----	27, 28, 29, 79
Drury, Donald Karl-----	2, 38, 39, 43-50, 53-64, 69, 70, 73, 93, 96
Duggan, William E.-----	15, 18
Dutchess County, N.Y.-----	83
Dylan, Bob-----	

E

Eastland, Senator James O.-----	1-78
Eden Press-----	52
"11 Arrested in Phony ID Raids in Dade" (newspaper article)-----	105
Elliot, Gary-----	3, 28
Escanaba, Mich.-----	5, 15, 16
Europe-----	24, 51
Eveready Business Forms Division of Safeguard Industries, Inc.-----	108

F

Familla-Tobal, Francisco-----	107
FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation)-----	37, 61, 70, 82, 104, 106
FDA (Food and Drug Administration)-----	14
Federal Government-----	3
Feldman, Martin E.-----	195
Foerster, Werner-----	104
Folsom Prison-----	23
Formanek, Kenneth-----	108
Foster, Gregory-----	104
France-----	7, 32, 40
Fraud statistics (chart)-----	95
Friedman, Lester-----	23, 79
Friend, John Christopher-----	85
Fuller, Lester Samuel-----	85

G

Gaczyna Spy School, Soviet-----	59
Gale, John Charles-----	79
Gallinghouse, Gerald-----	105
Garcia, Rafael-----	108
Garrison, Gary Allen-----	85
Garrity, Michael Thomas-----	28
Geneva, Switzerland-----	1
Gentile, G. Marvin-----	70, 72, 73, 75
German, Lyle Paul-----	27, 79
Germany-----	40
"Getting High With Jennifer" (newspaper article)-----	80
Gaiimo, Congressman Robert N.-----	115
Golden Triangle-----	18
Good Times (newspaper)-----	25, 80

IV

	Page.
Government Operations Committee-----	114
Government Printing Office-----	64

H

Haiti-----	107
Haislip, Gene R----- 2, 12-15, 18,	31, 34
Hall, David Alan-----	27, 79
Hambarian, Donald Alexander-----	20, 21
Hanna, Richard Keith-----	105
Harper, James M-----	104
Harrigan, Russell Joseph-----	27, 79
Harrington, John Joseph, Jr-----	27, 29
Harvard University-----	18
Hashish and hashish oil statistics (chart)-----	87
Hashish removed (chart)-----	87
Hawaii----- 20, 22,	23, 29
Hayhanen, Mr-----	58
Heard, Sgt. J. W-----	98
Hendrix, Jimi-----	83
Hiialeah, Fla-----	105
Hitchcock, William Mellon----- 15, 18,	79
Hoffman, Judge-----	48
Holland, Michael-----	106
Honduras-----	7
Hotel Victoria-----	107
Humphrey, Senator Hubert H-----	114-116
Hutton, J. Bernard-----	59

I

Immigration and Naturalization Service-----	65, 90, 92
Increases in Legal Division Permanent Personnel Requests and Authoriza- tion Compared to Passport Office Totals (chart)-----	61
India----- 5, 19,	40
"Inside Report on America's Passport Lady" (newspaper article)-----	46
Internal Revenue Service (IRS)-----	22, 24, 56
International Civil Aviation Organization-----	40, 41
Interpol-----	41
Italy-----	6, 18

J

Johnson, Gordon Fred-----	21, 79
Johnson, Robert D-----	71

K

Kabul----- 4, 7, 22,	34, 47
Keel, agent-----	28
Kelly (code name)-----	36, 37, 48
Kelly, David B-----	104
Kennedy Airport-----	19
Kennedy, Michael----- 31, 32,	33, 34
Kenner, Marty-----	81
Kenya-----	40
Khartoum-----	72
Kim Il Sung-----	80, 83
Kimball, Robert Richardson-----	85
Knight, Frances G----- 2, 38-43, 46, 64-70, 72, 73, 75-78,	91, 96
Koreans, North-----	80
Kucharski, Edmund J-----	108
Kuehl, Douglas-----	3

L

Laredo, Tex-----	10
Laguna Beach, Calif----- 18, 20,	21, 32
Police Department-----	33
Lange, Edward Jeffrey-----	79, 85

	Page.
Las Vegas-----	19, 24
Laurie, Rocco-----	104
Leary family-----	6, 21, 38, 61, 63
Leary, John-----	10
Leary, Mrs. Rosemary-----	47, 49, 70, 72-74, 80, 83
Leary, Susan-----	10, 11
Leary, Timothy-----	2,
3, 9-11, 15, 18-20, 22, 23, 25, 30, 31, 35, 37, 47-50, 55, 70, 72-74, 79-83, 85, 91	
Lebanon-----	5, 19, 20, 30, 80, 81
Lehman, William-----	106
Lombard, Anota Mara-----	106
Lombard, Dana Gene-----	106
London-----	51
Los Angeles-----	3, 9, 22, 34, 37, 50, 73
Los Angeles Free Press (newspaper)-----	51
Lynd, Glenn Craig-----	19, 79
Mc	
McAdams, Brian Kendall-----	79
McAdams, Yonica Menne-----	79
McCarran Airport-----	19
McClellan, Senator John L.-----	114
McCreedy, Margaret Ann-----	47, 49
McGaffin, Sylvia Edith (alias of Rosemary Leary)-----	70, 72, 73
McKelvey, William-----	3
McLean, Judge Edward C.-----	107
McMillan, William-----	48, 49
McNellis, William John (alias of Timothy Francis Leary)-----	70, 72, 73
M	
Madrid-----	48
Mafia-----	6
"Man on Most Wanted List Captured in New Orleans" (newspaper article)-----	104
Mantel, David Lee-----	23
Mantell, David Leigh-----	79
Marihuana or Hashish Oil Laboratory (photograph)-----	16
Marihuana Tax Act-----	11
Martin, David-----	1
Martino, David Russell (Leary's son-in-law)-----	85
Martino, Dennis John-----	37, 85
Maru (code name)-----	36, 37
May, Edward Joseph-----	26, 79
"Meet the Passport Lady: She Worries About You" (newspaper article)-----	76
Memorandums concerning passport fraud case of Timothy Francis Leary alias William John McNellis and Rosemary Leary alias Sylvia Edith McGaffin; delinquent passport fraud investigations-----	70, 72, 73, 75
Memorandum concerning passport fraud, fugitives-----	69
Mexico-----	4, 7, 10, 18, 92
Mexico City-----	7
Miami-----	51
Miami News (newspaper)-----	105
Middle East-----	80, 81, 82
Miles, Steven Louis-----	86
Milgram, James-----	106
Millbrook, N.Y.-----	10, 18
Monier, Donald-----	3
Montreal, Canada-----	41
Morrell, Walter David-----	86
Morro Bay-----	37
Mosley, Christopher-----	91
Mosley, John-----	91
Mosley, Kathy-----	91

VI

	Page.
Mosley, Paula	91
Mosley, Richard	91
Muhammed Ali	81
Mundt, Senator Karl	114
Murphy, Patrick V.	104
Murray, Dennis	91
Murray, John	91
Murray, Kathy	91
Murray, Peter	91
Murray, Richard	91

N

National Crime Information Center	70
National Institute of Mental Health	14
Nebraska	91
Neilan, Edward	46, 76
Nelson, Daniel	108
New Jersey	58, 91
New Jersey Turnpike	104
New Orleans	58, 104, 105
New York	10, 19, 22, 28, 51, 73, 80, 82, 83, 96, 104, 106, 107
New York Municipal Court	77
New York Times (newspaper)	42, 72
Newman, James Carroll III	86
Newsweek (magazine)	81
Norpel, John R., Jr.	1
Nichols, Lee Allen	86
Nigro, Fred	108
Nixon administration	90

O

Oakland, Calif.	37, 105
O'Dowd, John	2, 39, 61, 62, 64
Office of Security	9, 44, 68-72, 74, 75, 91-93
O'Leary, Jeremiah	106
Oliphant, George	20
OMB (Office of Manpower and Budget)	75, 112
"Operation BEL"	21-24
Orange County, Calif.	21, 22, 26, 30, 73
Orange County grand jury	28
Oregon	22
Otto, Daniel	108
Otto, Jimmy Gregg	79

P

Pacific Coast Highway	32
Padilla, Gerald James	26, 79
Page, Ralph	105
Palentechar, Robert	104
Palma, Franklin	80
Panther Defense Fund	81
"Paper Trip, The" (book)	50-55
Paris	7, 41
Park Plaza Hotel	107
"Passport Change Is Under Study" (newspaper article)	43
Passport Office	2,
9, 39-42, 48, 50, 53, 54, 59, 53-65, 67-71, 73-76, 91-94, 96, 111-116	
Budget data	111
Legal Division	39,
53, 70, 74, 92, 93, 96, 97	
Legislative Proposals and Bills Introduced in Congress for the Relief of the Passport Office 1956-73	114
Task Force	64
Year-end report	116

VII

	Page.
Pennsylvania	51
Petacque, Art	108
Philadelphia	77
Philadelphia Sunday Bulletin (newspaper)	46, 76
Playboy magazine	9
Pohl, Gerald	80
Pooley, Michael Lee	21, 80
Port au Prince, Haiti	107
Portland, Oreg	21
Postal Service	39, 40, 57
Pratt, Jill Barnett	27, 80
Pratt, Stanford Leon	27, 80, 86
President, the	42
Puerto Rico	92, 107
Purvis, Carl Edward	106
R	
Randall, Michael	23
Randall, Michael Boyd	21, 22, 28, 29, 31-34, 79, 86
Reagan, Governor	82
Reddy, David Mark	80
Redwood City, Calif	53
Ritchie, James	71
Riverside County, Calif	28
Rudd, Mark	83
S	
St. Louis, Mo	6, 15, 17
Salt Lake City	48
Samples of fraudulent documents of identification obtained and used by members of the Brotherhood of Eternal Love	97
San Francisco	19, 22, 23, 28, 29, 32, 47, 72, 73, 74, 104, 105
San Luis Abispo, Calif	73
Sand, Nicholas	6, 13, 23, 27, 32, 34, 79
Sandoz Chemical Works	18, 19
Santa Cruz, Calif	23
Santo Domingo	107
Schaffer, Robert Verne	105, 106
Scott, Charles Frederick	27, 79
Scroggs, Raymond	71
Scully, Robert Timothy	79
Scully, Timothy	23
Seale, Bobby	80
Sear, Morey	104, 105
Seattle 9	32
Secretary of State	32
Sexton, Gordon Albert	27, 79
Shipley, Mrs. Ruth B	111
Shakur, Zayd Malik	104
Sicily	6
Sifly, Raymond	1
Simmons, Peter David	26
Sinclair, John	48
Sinclair, Loyd	2-4, 7-14, 18-25, 28-32, 34, 46
"Slaying of Informer Linked to Latin Passport Fraud" (newspaper article)	106
Smith, Bernice Lee	26, 79, 86
Smith, Joe	106
Sourwine, J. G	1-78
Southeast Asia	7, 18
Springfield, Mo	11
Stanton, Mark Patrick	26, 79
Stark, Ronald Hadley	14, 22, 79
Statement of Legal Division Personnel Requests Over the Past Several Years	60

VIII

	Page.
Strange, Ernest Donald	2, 3, 8, 9, 12, 19, 22, 28-35, 37, 83
Stevens, James Robert	86
Stone, John Leroy	86
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS)	20
"Subverters, The" (book)	59
Summary of Passport Frauds Committed by Brotherhood of Eternal Love (chart)	109
Superior Court Division of Orange County	32
Supreme Court	11
Sweden	40
Switzerland	20, 47

T

Tanenbaum, Robert	104, 105
Tarabochia, Alfonso	1
Tarr, Dr. Curtis W.	72, 75
Tarte, Alden Sanford	105
Tennessee	98
Texas	10
"Three Arrested in Breakup of Fake Driver License Ring" (newspaper article)	108
Thurmond, Senator Strom	44, 59, 71
Thurston, Craig Don	87
Tierney, Robert Edward	27, 79
Tigar, Michael	31, 32, 34
Tokhi, Amanullah	24, 27, 79
Tokhi brothers	4
Tokhi, Hayatullah	24, 27, 79
Torres, Juan Miranda	107
Tower, Senator John G.	115
Treasury Department	10, 90
Trioli	81
"Trooper, Militant Die in N.J. Clash" (newspaper article)	104
Tucker, William	105
Tucson, Ariz.	48
Tunis	81
Turkey	7, 18

U

U.N. Narcotics Laboratory	1
Union Corse	6
Unione Siciliano	6
United States	2,
4, 6, 7, 10, 13, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 40, 42, 44, 47, 48, 50, 51, 54, 58, 59,	
65, 66, 68, 70, 78, 80, 81, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 106, 107, 113	
Attorney	46, 63, 64, 70
Government	66, 67
University of California	29
UPI (United Press International)	81
"U.S. Driver's License Guide"	53
"U.S. Losing Drug Smuggling War" (newspaper column)	38, 90
"U.S. Orders a Study of Passport System" (newspaper article)	42

V

Vancouver, British Columbia	21
Vietnamese, North	80

W

Walt, Gen. Lewis W.	1, 28
Walters, Saul	87
Washington	9, 28, 46, 65, 76
Washington Merry-Go-Round (newspaper column)	38
Washington Passport Agency	56
Washington Post (newspaper)	38, 54, 90, 104
Washington Star (newspaper)	43, 106

IX

	Page.
Washington Star-News (newspaper)-----	104
Watson, Miss Barbara M., Administrator of the Security and Consular Affairs -----	46, 75-77
Weather underground-----	83
Weathermen -----	20, 24, 30, 31, 37, 48
Weicker, Congressman Lowell P-----	115
White House, the-----	42
Whitten, Les-----	38, 90
Wilenchik, Mitchell Allen-----	87
Wilson, Robert David, Jr-----	87
World War II-----	37

Y

Yrguarte, Tiffany-----	106
------------------------	-----

BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY



3 9999 05995 244 8