So ee ee alice Soe NATIONAL OCEANOGRAPHIC PROGRAM—1969 PART 2. HEARINGS _ SUBCOMMITTEE ON OCEANOGRAPHY OF THE COMMITTEE ON | MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETY-FIRST CONGRESS FIRST SESSION ON A report by the Commission on Marine Science, Engineering, and Resources entitled “Our Nation and the Sea” AND H.R. 13247, H.R. 14089, H.R. 14418 BILLS TO AMEND THE MARINE RESOURCES AND ENGI- NEERING DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1966 TO ESTABLISH A COMPREHENSIVE AND LONG-RANGE NATIONAL PROGRAM OF RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TECHNICAL SERVICES, EXPLORATION, AND UTILIZATION WITH RESPECT TO OUR MARINE AND ATMOSPHERIC ENVIRONMENT AUGUST 5, 6, 7, 12, 183, SEPTEMBER 16, 18, 23, 24, 25, OCTOBER 1, 9, 14, 21,. 1969 Serial No. 91-13 Printed for the use of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries ae Ea ) 0 2Thb9O0 TOEO. O Wu uN 0 0 IOHM/1a8IN NATIONAL OCEANOGRAPHIC PROGRAM—1969 PART 2 HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OCEANOGRAPHY OF THE COMMITTEE ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETY-FIRST CONGRESS FIRST SESSION ON A report by the Commission on Marine Science, Engineering, and Resources entitled “Our Nation and the Sea” AND H.R. 13247, H.R. 14089, H.R. 14418 BILLS TO AMEND THE MARINE RESOURCES AND ENGI- NEERING DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1966 TO ESTABLISH A COMPREHENSIVE AND LONG-RANGE NATIONAL PROGRAM OF RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TECHNICAL SERVICES, EXPLORATION, AND UTILIZATION WITH RESPECT TO OUR MARINE AND ATMOSPHERIC ENVIRONMENT =~, AUGUST 5, 6, 7, 12, 18, SEPTEMBER 16, 18, 23, 24, 25, i? OCTOBER 1, 9, 14, 21, 1969 oe ee Serial No. 91-13 Printed for the use of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries ae U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 26-563 O WASHINGTON : 1969 COMMITTEE ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES EDWARD A. GARMATZ, Maryland, Chairman LEONOR K. (MRS. JOHN B.) SULLIVAN, WILLIAM S. MAILLIARD, California Missouri THOMAS M. PELLY, Washington FRANK M. CLARK, Pennsylvania CHARLES A. MOSHER, Ohio THOMAS L. ASHLEY, Ohio JAMES R. GROVER, Jr., New York JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan HASTINGS KEITH, Massachusetts ALTON LENNON, North Carolina G. ROBERT WATKINS, Pennsylvania THOMAS N. DOWNING, Virginia HENRY C. SCHADEBERG, Wisconsin JAMES A. BYRNE, Pennsylvania JOHN DELLENBACK, Oregon PAUL G. ROGERS, Florida HOWARD W. POLLOCK, Alaska FRANK A. STUBBLEFIELD, Kentucky PHILIP E. RUPPE, Michigan JOHN M. MURPHY, New York DANIEL E. BUTTON, New York WILLIAM L. ST. ONGE, Connecticut GEORGE A. GOODLING, Pennsylvania JOSEPH E. KARTH, Minnesota WILLIAM G. BRAY, Indiana WILLIAM D. HATHAWAY, Maine PAUL N. McCLOSKEY, Jr., California WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina LOUIS FREY, JR., Florida RICHARD T. HANNA, California JACK H. McDONALD, Michigan ROBERT L. LEGGETT, California MICHAEL A. FEIGHAN, Ohio FRANK ANNUNZIO, Illinois SPEEDY O. LONG, Louisiana MARIO BIAGGI, New York ROBERT J. ABLES, Chief Counsel BERNARD J. ZINCKE, Counsel NED P. EVERETT, Counsel ROBERT J. MCELROY, Chief Clerk RICHARD N. SHAROOD, Minority Counsel SUBCOMMITTEE ON OCEANOGRAPHY ALTON LENNON, North Carolina, Chairman PAUL G. ROGERS, Florida CHARLES A. MOSHER, Ohio THOMAS L. ASHLEY, Ohio THOMAS M. PELLY, Washington THOMAS N. DOWNING, Virginia HASTINGS KEITH, Massachusetts JOSEPH E. KARTH, Minnesota HENRY G. SCHADEBERG, Wisconsin WILLIAM D. HATHAWAY, Maine JOHN DELLENBACK, Oregon FRANK M. CLARK, Pennsylvania HOWARD W. POLLOCK, Alaska WILLIAM L. ST. ONGE, Connecticut PHILIP E. RUPPE, Michigan WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina GEORGE A. GOODLING, Pennsylvania RICHARD T. HANNA, California WILLIAM G. BRAY,! Indiana ROBERT L. LEGGETT, California LOUIS FREY, Jr.,? Florida MICHAEL A. FEIGHAN, Ohio Tuomas A. CLINGAN, Jr., Counsel 1 Resigned subcommittee effective September 18, 1969. 2 Appointed to subcommittee effective September 18, 1969. (II) CONTENTS Hearings held— August’ 5,1 969s ee eee hie opted EE sin AUSUStHOw LOGOS ska, “OTR EICANE LN We AM NA EERE | ER pe Augusta LOGO is te ye oe eA ee eR Ae eae Aupustal2 VLOG ay ane 8 ein Sako! aap hb peng x, Ueyaiye OF. GEE. pepe ATIBUST VS OLOGO ye 8 et Ee ere ye A Peers t he pepe dle September TG, pL9G92 sO lage Mies A eee a BS his September’ 18,1969 eo. as a ne ree Be yates 4 ee yeh epg E eters yey September 23 (1969-1 ees eye) mieten ae eeeripia oF Saeege hk gepe September 24, O69 mer vt s Heaps Lett en) aren ph oem ley eeel) Ip September;25) lOGQ2e eS" Soca te ne ON and. pend Sao E eu cin Octobertt, VOGO es eV SRee seree FS. SVU cet fa aE Lp ays A BOS pple get Og ‘October *9i' 1969 yo ke Aye fy et abe phe PE OE SEE OU RATA October®14, 19692 44~ bn ge & ex taerhe b meritenH- laorpsen -Towdtegy’D one October 21,1969 2). 42 [ga meny fosnaum prpisigyy scpoq!) FL oll Reports of— Atomic’ Energy Commission... —< 4epo794)774901) 86 aeelutdest sgnket Budget Bureau. +>, Vioteoscr Uh ie VAR VeTaRy Oe Wa wat he OF Commerce? Department». 23-20 86 S443 SABO be) adel iL aa ite Defense: Depart ment,,(Navy) 24.25) -eeriedte cael atl _asede Health, Education, and Welfare______________________-__-_------- Interior Department..." 2s AeU. ee ab ape’ National Science Foundation_______________________-_---__------ Office of Science and Technology_________________--_------------- Smithsonian Institutions. .2 980 Ee) SOPe oy a reninaien State/Department} 7! Pha riiha st eee fone t orer ad dete Statement of— Abel, Dr. Robert D., head, Office of Sea Grant Programs, National Science: Foundationy2 200 2 ee ee WARN oe a ee ac Austin, Dr. Thomas S., Director, National Oceanographic Data Center. VIC. Bae Arathi aaron Aire ‘wares yt vapnuty! Biography e522) Waste hae b> a abieone gai 3 oF) esglol ao. o Barrow, Dr. Thomas D., president, National Oceanography Associa- TAtiONY Sateen! A ie A Tosi re Leben NESS bes LR Rd ae Blaustein, Jacob, cofounder and former president, American Oil Co--- Brooks, Douglas L., president, the Travelers Research Center, Inc., Hartford) 'Conno).2 322-3... oe) a AR TOP Rae. bk Carr, Braxton B., president, the American Waterways Operators, Biography os. oe Tet SMC Ae ER Ee i ans ten OE PERS CT SIRS AEE EDU EL Christy, Dr. Francis T., Jr., Resources for the Future, Inc_----_----- Biography iejeso!) srl) o_orargo7F nop Nee rh SURE eM. 8 Clewell, Dr. Dayton H., chairman, NSIA Ocean Science and Tech- nology Advisory Committee and senior vice president, Mobil UMC cepted ily: wren yer Laie Ruch ek OP MOR IGT T0. DuBridge, Dr. Lee A., Director, Office of Science and Technology, Pxecutive/Otice ofthe Presidente 2-0) 22222 ee eee eee Elder, Scott H., general counsel, Lake Carrier’s Association-_------- (ITT) (IV) Statement of—Continued Page Ellert, Robert, assistant general counsel, Department of Commerce__ —_ 893 Ely, Northcutt, on behalf of the American Bar Association and its sectionvof naturallresources law2=------ 2-22-2242 3=—- = = = 575 BIO eta ply ae eee er ee ee See Se ee ee 593 Flipse, John E., Deepsea Ventures, Inc., Newport News, Va-_------- 780 IBiogra pliyser ete ene: 2 aoe a Nee ee 779 Frosch, Dr. Robert A., Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research and Development _ 0452. Vivi 5 #4 SAA... ___.. See Galler, Dr. Sidney R., Assistant Secretary, Science, Smithsonian Tan's GiGi GOT Sa = ey i ree ole ae ee 1028 Griffis, Dr. Levan, vice provost of Southern Methodist University_. 714 Haddock, Hoyt S., executive director, AFL-CIO Maritime Com- MUA: G Gash at fe i aw glinlohll eOESALa 1239 Jones, Dr. E. Walton, acting dean, North Carolina State University. 697 Keim, Dr. Russell, executive secretary, Committee on Ocean Engi- neering, National Academy of Engineering------_---------_------ 714 Koisch, Maj. Gen., F. P.. director, Civil Works, Office, Chief of Engineers, Department of the Army_-__-__---_----------------- 986 Lane, Amor L., chairman, Executive Committee, NSAI Ocean Science and Technology Advisory Committee (NSIA/OSTAC)__________- 1216 Lyman, Dr. John, head, Office of Marine Science, Consolidated Winiviersitiya Of NiOrtlg© Aro Lira eee ee aia eae ee eee 697 McElroy, Dr. W. D., director, National Science Foundation _- --_-_- 1005 May, Timothy J., counsel, Boating Industry Association__________- ey ZBI Miller, H. Crane, assistant general counsel, Smithsonian Institution__ 1028 Pell, Hon. Claiborne, a U.S. Senator from the State of Rhode Island__ 548 Pollack, Hon. Herman, representing the Secretary of State__________ 1077 Reinecke, Hon. Ed, Lieutenant Governor, State of California_______ 1045 Ripley, Hon. 8. Dillon, Secretary, Smithsonian Institution_________ 1029 Schaefer, Dr. Milner B., Director, Institute of Marine Resources, Scripps Institution of Oceanography __________________________-_ 752 Biography 222200020 cece. 22 ee. oe ee a a ee 751 Scott, Hon. Robert, Governor, State of North Carolina____________ 697 Seaborg, Dr. Glenn T., chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission_ 1228 Todd, Dr. Edward P., Deputy Associate Director, National Science Foundation... =... 222.2) 22.20 be-2sL 22 = eo, Sone 1005 Train, Hon. Russell E., Under Secretary, Department of the Interior. 939 Tribus, Dr. Myron, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Science and Technology.2 oe oe Se 893 Trimble, Adm. Paul E., assistant commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, Department of Transportation. 52-4 4525. “6.25285 .0 =e 865 Wallen, Dr. I. Eugene, director, Office of Oceanography and Limnol- ogy,. Smithsonian Institution__=._-.-.-—_.__ soi eee 2 ee 1028 Wenk, Dr. Edward, Jr., executive secretary, National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Development_______________- 820 Wheaton, Elmer, P., vice president, Lockheed Aircraft Corp__-___- 728 Biography aseicaset) leqathe Vl a etre Mi Aen 1806 18 MO A OY 2g Ay i 727 White, Dr. Robert M., administrator, ESSA, Department of Com- IMCrCer er} 3a. Sea cee mre E SoWedoprss nin SSRs CE NT seig eta ieee 893, 911 Wilkey, Malcolm Richard, general counsel, Kennecott Copper Corp., on Res. 33 before the Subcommittee on Ocean Space, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate___________________________-- 564 Additional material submitted by— Chapman, Dr. W.M.: “The Ocean Regime of the Real World’ by W. M. Chapman____ 1175 “Toward a more effective use of food from the sea by the United States and man,” article by W. M. Chapman______________ 1110 Commerce Department— Report from the Offshore Technology Conferences entitled, “The Marine Resources Program of the Coastal Plains Regional Commissions; = apes ss AVe A. seppaoeniie, aint Ath Tea 897 DuBridge, Dr. Lee A.: Contribution to the gross national product from the resources of CHENOA 4s ie in pail ey ee a eT TOR a Sub) at ee 1206 (V) Additional material submitted by—Continued Ely, Northeutt— Biography. sess 2. we sees ape ee ee ah ee oe Committee on Deep Sea Mineral Resources of the American Branch of the International Law Association, Interim Report __ Miscellaneous communications: 9+ _2.-s5i@t __L eee _ ivi ie! Non-living resources of the sea______________________________ Frosch, Dr. Robert A.— Résumé of USNS: Davis? 2525368 eeeet) Suehicewy bxaW ee Interior Department— Budget for Marine Affairs, table___________-_____-____________ Koisch, Maj Gen., F. P.— Great Lakes Basin comprehensive framework study_________- Organization matrix of work group members, table_____________ Suggested amendment to H.R. 13247_____________-_-_______. Lennon, Hon. Alton: Partial reprint of document entitled, ‘Effective Use of the Sea’’ dated; Junesh9663-4 S20 Py sh fai Sea alt OM mat ope Smithsonian Institution: Proposed changes to H.R: 13247 222 2) 22.9 Levee e_ceiee lies Transportation Department: Letter dated October 22, 1969, signed by John A. Volpe and Adm. P. E. Trimble in reference to request by Congressman Schade- Cer ea se ee, Ress eee ee ees esata ee SyUuae > Uae Wenk, ne Edward, Jr.: Coastal Zone Task INOTCE LOSLCE rates Sette eae ae ae ae eee Marine abs) Task Korce;roster222. 225 2 Te Pee Ss Communications supplied by— Agnew, Hon. Spiro, T., aiStters dated: VIET CL 2 (ew G Giese oak ent aie eee eo any ee een a es Sg April 10, (OGgYeME, FIRS HUCMANI MITES “i Teiktee h Series Burke, William T., professor of law, University of Washington, letter dated September 15, 1969, enclosing a paper entitled, ‘‘Law, Science, andethey@cedin? pak! NEE a ele am yee re Ph he Callison, Charles H., executive vice president, National Audubon So- ciety, letter dated November 14, 1969_____-___-_-___________-_- Chapman, W. M., chairman, California Advisory Commission on Marine and Coastal Resources, letter dated September 16, 1969, en- closing the proceedings of the fifth meeting, California Advisory Commission on Marine and Coastal Resources___________-_-_-_- Clapper, Louis S., conservation director, National Wildlife Federation, letter dated November 14; 1969. ____---_--2+1---.-_-1---_----- Clotworthy, J. H., president, Oceans General, Inc., letter dated Sep- Commerc Ol OO Oem ee ot en ng nap ee een aan er ae Comarow, Murray, executive director, Executive Office of the Presi- dent, letter dated September 11, 1969_________________________- Ely, Northcutt, letter dated October 7, 1969, enclosing 2 letters______ Frey, Hon. Louis, Jr., letter dated October 28, 1969, enclosing a memo from George Websterto, Ron Ringe 2). 2 ee ee Fye, Paul M., Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, letter dated AUBUSHRIS I OGGHe Mie = NE _ COREE: CBSE ES Oe EEE WE Sey Humphrey, Hon. Hubert H., letter dated August 27, 1969___________- Interior Department: Train, Russell E., letter dated September 23, 1969, reflecting Department position on H.R. 18247______________-___----- Kirkbride, Chalmer G., Sun Oil Co.; letters dated: Anuigusts26;2 L969 sss eet Bye eee ae senna wal |b poy Sieber September 8.1969) .wath attachments.48 22. eae 2 ee Pane, AY LE, American Machine & Foundry Co., letter dated August nO) Ae Ree The Neer RED, «hart nenaNee VaNal” WELL. VLG Aire Aer atte an Lennon, Hon. Alton: Letter to Hon. Spiro T. Agnew dated March 20, 1969_--___-_----- Letter to Hon. Richard M. Nixon dated May 8, 1969. esc Markel, Arthur L., letter dated September 15, 1969______-_-_------- Mullen, J. G., manager, advertising, RCA Defense Electronic Prod- ucts, letter dated October 10; 19692. 2 eee ee Sn ee (VI) Nierenberg, William A., University of California, letter dated August ZO M1969 setae wee Ue OL ee cease eee ae A Nixon, Hon. Richard M., memorandum to Mr. Ash dated May 19, Padelford, Norman J., professor of political science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, letter dated August 9, 1969, enclosing an article entitled, ‘‘Alternatives for Ocean Policy’’________-_---_--_-- Paine, F. Ward, president, Ocean Science Capital Corp., letter dated SeptembersS; W969 a ea aun er Es Penfold, J. W., conservation director, Izaak Walton League, letter dated November 17,1969. {2 jcc 22208 0 eee ea EL Do Ly Pickett, George E., director, North Carolina Department of Water and Air Resources, letter dated October 24, 1969________________--_ Pierce, Roger J., Hydro-Space Systems Corp., letter dated September Timmons, William E., Deputy Assistant to The President, letter dated May 15.) 19695. 2 koe el ee eo may Webster, George, memo to Ron Ring dated October 20, 1969_________ Wenk, Edward, Jr., letter dated May 29, 1969_____________________- Yeiter, M. Ross, vice president and general manager, E G & G Inter- national, Inc., letter dated September 4, 1969_______-_-_-_______- NATIONAL OCEANOGRAPHIC PROGRAM TUESDAY, AUGUST 5, 1969 Hovst or REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OCEANOGRAPHY OF THE CoMMITTEE ON MercHant MarINE AND FISHERIES, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met at 10:15 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room 1334, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Alton Lennon (chair- man of the subcommittee) presiding. Mr. Lennon. It is my pleasure this morning to recognize the chair- man of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries for a state- ment relating to the subject matter that we are now about to consider. Mr. Chairman. Mr. Garmatz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In April of this year, this subcommittee initiated a series of 12 pape hearings on a proposed national oceanographic program. To- ay’s hearing is a continuation of our examination of that proposed program—which is embodied in the comprehensive report of the Com- mission on Marine Science, Engineering, and Resources. But I think it should be emphasized today that we are not simply embarking upon a resumption of hearings on this proposed national oceanographic program, which is now referred to as the “Stratton Re- port.” You might say that this subcommittee has moved into a second phase of activity. That phase started when—on July 31, 1969—Con- gressman Lennon, the distinguished chairman of this subcommittee, in- troduced a bill which bears the number H.R. 13247. I think this bill will become a piece of landmark legislation, because I Dee it will mark the turning point in our national oceanographic effort. Basically, this bill is designed to implement two of the Stratton report’s recommendations: the establishment of an independent na- tional oceanographic agency, and the simultaneous establishment of a National Advisory Committee. Both of these recommendations are already well known, but what I want to stress today is the significance of Congressman Lennon’s bill. First of all, it was cosponsored by every member of the Subcommittee on Oceanography; as chairman of the full committee, I am proud to say that I am also a cosponsor. Second, this bill was not introduced in haste: it represents a congressional conviction, and this conviction was reached only after a comprehensive series of hearings documented the need for congressional action. (513) 514 Other bills to establish a so-called NOAA have already been intro- duced—this is true. But all these earlier bills propose to do is to transfer present Government functions from existing agencies to a newly cre- ated agency. The bill introduced by Congressman Lennon represents the first legislative attempt to cope with the total organizational prob- lem; it would do this by establishing both an NOAA and a National Advisory Committee. Both of these are essential ; one complements the other, and they should be considered together—as an integral package. Finally, I would like to welcome to our committee the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island, the Honorable Claiborne Pell. He is a recognized authority on oceanography, and I am sure his testimony will add a valuable contribution to these important hearings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lennon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Today we are resuming our public hearings on the report of the Commission on Marine Science, Engineering, and Resources entitled “Our Nation and the Sea.” In doing so, we are continuing the initiative, begun in May and June, in receiving the opinions of the best-informed oraue the Nation can offer on the subject of a coordinated national policy for the utilization of the oceans and their resources. . The subcommittee places special emphasis on the importance of these hearings and upon the need to give careful and serious consideration to the recommendations of the Commission—recommendations made after more than 2 years of dedicated efforts on the part of the extremely distinguished and well-qualified Commissioners. We feel a special responsibility to carry forward this work set in motion by the Marine Resources and Engineering Development Act of 1966. Accordingly, on last Thursday, it was my pleasure to introduce a bill that has as 1ts purpose the implementation of. the Commission’s recommendation for the establishment of a National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency and a companion National Advisory Committee for Oceans and Atmosphere. I am particularly pleased that I was joined in this endeavor by Mr. Garmatz, under whose leadership the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries has moved progressively forward, and all 20 members of the subcommittee. I hope that this bill will provide further focus for discussion that will lead to the formulation of effective national policy. ‘During this week and the next, we shall continue to hear from distin- guished experts from various disciplines, primarily in the private sec- tor. Beginning in September, we shall be pleased to hear the testimony of prominent members of those branches of the Federal agencies most affected by the recommendations of the Commission’s report. Without objection, a copy of the bill and agency reports will be inserted at this point in the record. (The bill, H.R. 18247, and agency reports follow:) 26-563 O15 “tate AL, R. 13247, H.R. 14089, H.R. 14418 BILLS To amend the Marine Resources and Engineering Development Act of 1966 to establish a comprehensive and long-range national program of research, development, technical services, exploration and utilization with respect to our marine and atmospheric environment. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa- tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Marine Resources and Engineering Development Be GC bo - Act of 1966 (33 U.S.C. 1101-1108) is amended to read as an follows: =>) Ne} (e.9) -] 516 2 “TITLE I—NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOS- PHERIC PROGRAM “SHORT TITLE “Sno. 101. This title may be cited as the ‘National Oceanic and Atmospheric Program Act of 1969’. “DECLARATION OF POLICY AND OBJECTIVES “Src. 102. (a) The Congress declares that it is the policy of the United States to encourage, develop, and main- tain a comprehensive, coordinated and continuing national program in marine and atmospheric science, technology, and technical services for the benefit of mankind through the enhancement of commerce, transportation, and national security ; the protection of health and property; the rehabili- tation of our commercial fisheries; and the increased utiliza- tion of these and ther resources. Such national program should be conducted so as to contribute to the following objectives: “(1) The accelerated development and utilization of the resources of the marine environment. 7 (2) The expansion of human knowledge of the marine and atmospheric environment. (3) The encouragement of private investment enter- prise in exploration, technological development, marine com- merce, and economic utilization of the resources of the marine environment. i=) 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24. Oo momoanyngen a -, wo bw - 517 3 (4) The development and improvement of the capabil- ities, performance, use, and efficiency of vehicles, equipment, and instruments for use in exploration, research, monitoring and prediction, surveys, the recovery of resources, and the transmission of energy in the marine and atmospheric environment. ““(5) The advancement of education and training in marine and atmospheric science, technology, and technical services. 7 “(6) The advancement of capability to observe and predict environmental changes, and ultimately to modify the environment, in order to enhance the safety and welfare of the public and to permit more efficient use of the oceans and the atmosphere. “(7) The effective utilization of the scientific and engi- neering resources of the Nation, with close cooperation among all interested agencies, public and private, in order to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort, facilities, and equip- ment in marine and atmospheric programs. “(8) The preservation of the role of the United States as a leader in marine and atmospheric activities and in marine resource development and conservation. ““(9) The cooperation by the United States with other nations and with international organizations in marine and 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24. 20 CO CO Cdl Pa Goss oN it atmospheric activities when such cooperation is in the na- tional interest. “(b) The Congress further declares that such a compre- hensive national program can only be achieved through the establishment of a new agency of the United States Govern- ment which is given the requisite authority and support to administer and coordinate the Nation’s civil marine and atmospheric endeavors. “NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC AGENCY “SEC. 103. (a) There is established, as an independent agency within the executive branch of the Government, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency (hereafter re- ferred to in this title as the ‘Agency’). The Agency shall be headed by an Administrator, who shall be appointed from civilian life by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Under the supervision and direc- tion of the President, the Administrator shall be responsible for the exercise of all powers and the discharge of all duties of the Agency, and shall have authority and control over all personnel and activities thereof. “(b) There shall be in the Agency a Deputy Adminis- trator who shall be appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and shall perform such functions, powers and duties as the Administrator shall from time to time prescribe. The Deputy Administrator shall act oOo Md on ke wD LY He no Ms hoo eee ee Oe eet ot St mice ise i= iS ti oo a G a £ G& we EF SS 519 5 for, and exercise the powers of, the Administrator during the absence or disability of, or in the event of a vacancy in the office of, the Administrator. “(c) There shall be in the Agency a General Counsel who shall be appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and shall perform such functions, powers and duties as the Administrator shall from time to time prescribe. | “FUNCTIONS OF THE AGENCY “Siro. 104. (a) The Agency, in order to carry out the purposes of this title, shall plan, direct, conduct, and support— “(1) the advancement of fundamental understand- ing of the biological, physical, geological, and chemical characteristics of the marine environment and of the atmosphere ; (2) the development of fundamental technology, including equipment, techniques, and facilities, necessary to achieve more effective use of the marine environment and to operate with greater efficiency and safety in the atmosphere ; (3) the rehabilitation of United States fisheries through the research, development, and encouragement of the use of improved management practices and har- ea COs G0) eC Ol See (Cone IDS 520 6 vesting techniques and new concepts of search, detec- tion, transportation and processing ; “(4) the implementation of manpower programs to strengthen education and training at all levels and in all specialties appropriate with respect to marine and at- mospheric sciences and engineering ; “(5) the acquisition, analysis and widest practicable and appropriate dissemination of information relevant to marine and atmospheric science and technology, includ- ing the development of a national system for monitoring and predicting the state of the oceans and the atmos- phere; “(6) surveys to identify, locate, and eee living and mineral resources of the marine environment; ““(7) exploration of the marine environment, in- cluding the development, construction, testing and op- eration of vehicles and associated equipment; ““(8) the advancement of aquaculture; “(9) the development of techniques for evaluating and undertaking planned modifications of the marine and atmospheric environments, including field experiments; “(10) the provision of technical and operating services, including the mapping and charting of the marine environment, marine navigation, safety at sea, © 0 Sf Cf GC DS —-- ke S) 521 7 policing and enforcement in marine areas, and instru- ment testing and calibration; and “(11) programs to provide information and serv- ices to Federal, State, regional and local agencies with respect to problems concerning multiple uses of the marine environment. “(b) The Agency shall carry out the functions specified in subsection (a) in a manner to encourage private invest- ment enterprise in the exploration, development, and utiliza- tion of marine resources. “(c) (1) The Administrator shall, among his respon- sibilities, exercise leadership under the direction of the Presi- dent in all Federal civil marine and atmospheric matters, make recommendations concerning such matters to the President and the Congress for their consideration and imple- mentation, and consult with the heads of other Federal de- partments and agencies on the marine and atmospheric activi- ties of the Government in order to encourage a vigorous and coordinated attack on common objectives. (2) The Administrator, under the foreign policy guid- ance of the President, may engage in a program of inter- national cooperation in work done pursuant to this title, and | in the peaceful application of the results thereof, pursuant to Cre Ts CY as) TL 25 522 8 agreements made by the President with the advice and con- sent of the Senate. “(d) The Administrator shall cause a seal of office to be made for the Agency of such device as he shall approve, and judicial notice shall be taken of such seal. “(e) The Administrator shall, as soon as practicable after the end of each fiscal year, make a report in writing to the President for submission to the Congress on the activities of the Agency during the preceding fiscal year. “POWERS OF THE AGENCY “Src. 105. In the performance of its functions under this title, the Agency is authorized— “(1) to make, promulgate, issue, rescind, and amend rules and regulations governing the manner of the operations of the Agency and the exercise of the powers vested in it by law; ““(2) subject to the civil service and classification laws, to select, appoint, employ and fix the compensa- tion of such officers and employees as are necessary to carry out the provisions of this title and to prescribe their authority and duties; except that (A) to the extent the Administrator deems such action necessary to the discharge of his responsibilities he may appoint not more than of the scientific, engineering, and administra- tive personnel of the Agency without regard to such 523 9 1 laws, and may fix the compensation of such personnel 2 not in excess of the maximum rate for GS-18 of the 3 General Schedule under section 5332 of title 5, United 4 States Code, and (B) to the extent the Administrator 5 deems such action necessary to recruit specially qualified 6 scientific and engineering talent, he may establish the 1 entrance grade for scientific and engineering personnel 8 without previous service in the Federal Government at a 9 level two grades higher than the grade provided for such 10 personnel under such General Schedule and fix their i compensation accordingly. Notwithstanding any provi- 12 sion of this title or other law, a member of the Coast 13 Guard on active duty may be appointed, detailed, or 14 assigned to any position in the Agency other than 15 Administrator or Deputy Administrator; 16 “(3) to acquire (by purchase, lease, condemnation 17 or otherwise) , construct, improve, repair, operate, and 18 maintain laboratories, research and testing sites and 19 facilities, marine and atmospheric vehicles, quarters and 20 related accommodations for employees and dependents -- of employees of the Agency, and such other real and 22 personal property (including patents), or any interest 23 therein, as the Agency deems necessary within and 24 outside the continental United States; to acquire by oo 26-563 O - 70 - pt.2 - 2 Ee WD bb 524 10 lease or otherwise, through the Administrator of Gen- eral Services, buildings or parts of buildings in the District of Columbia for the use of the Agency for a period not to exceed ten years without regard to section 34 of title 40, United States Code; to lease to others such real and personal property; to sell and otherwise dispose of real and personal property (including patents and rights thereunder) in accordance with the pro- visions of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949; and to provide by contract or otherwise for cafeterias and other necessary facilities and services for the welfare of employees of the Agency at its installations and purchase and maintain equipment therefor; “(4) without regard to section 529 of title 31, United States Code, to enter into and perform such con- tracts, leases, cooperative agreements, or other trans- actions as may be necessary in the conduct of the work of the Agency and on such terms as he may deem ap- propriate, with any agency or instrumentality of the United States, or with any State, territory, or possession, or any political subdivision therof, or with any public or private person, firm, association, corporation, or educational institution ; “(5) to accept, hold, administer, and utilize gifts o a Nd om FP CO DO = Tw) NS) IDO) Se te ee et es = ee cp et pe Ree Sees Snes ees acs Stee Eke Eas cess fone wis Sooo chop Gia GS bo oO 525 11 Me bequests of property, both real and personal, for the purpose of aiding or facilitating the work of the Agency and such gifts and bequests of money and the proceeds from sales of other property received as gifts or bequests shall be deposited in the Treasury in a sepa- rate fund and shall be disbursed upon order of the Administrator. Property accepted pursuant to this para- graph, and the proceeds thereof, shall be used as nearly as possible in accordance with the terms of the gift or bequest. Upon the request of the Administrator, the Secretary of the Treasury may invest and reinvest in securities of the United States or in securities guaranteed as to principal and interest by ‘the United States any moneys contained in such fund and the income accruing from such securities, and any other property held by the Secretary under this paragraph, shall be deposited to the credit of the fund and shall be disbursed upon order of the Administrator; (6) to obtain the services of experts and consult- ants in accordance with section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, but at a rate not to exceed $100 per diem per individual unless otherwise specified in an appro- priation Act; | “(7) with the approval of the President, to enter into cooperative agreements under which members of Soo: tao ie tov He ce i Ge fae ase i gets ote ge ee tm fy aS aN SS eS OC CUS ES «ter ER eo Cf bo oO 526 12 the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps may be detailed by the appropriate Secretary for services in the performance of functions under this title to the same extent as that to which they might be lawfully assigned in the Department of Defense; “(8) to establish a working capital fund, to be available without fiscal year limitation, for expenses necessary for the maintenance and operation of such common administrative services as he shall find to be desirable in the interest of economy and efficiency in the Agency, including such services as a central supply service for stationery and other supplies and equipment for which adequate stocks may be maintained to meet in whole or in part the requirements of the Agency; central messenger, mail, telephone, and other communi- cations services; office space, central services for docu- ment reproduction, and for graphics and visual aids; and a central library service. The capital of the funds shall consist of any appropriations made for the purpose of providing capital (which appropriations are hereby authorized) and the fair and reasonable value of such stocks of supphes, equipment and other assets and in- ventories on order as the Administrator may transfer to the fund, less the related liabilities and unpaid obliga- tions. Such funds shall be reimbursed in advance from oo wo rn ao FF HO HW - pA Ap oy Sey SIN SSS 527 13 available funds of the Agency, or from other sources, for supplies and services at rates which will approximate the expense of operation, including the accrual of annual leave and the depreciation of equipment. The fund shall also be credited with receipts from sale or exchange of property and receipts in payment for loss or damage to property owned by the fund. There shall be covered into the United States Treasury as miscellaneous receipts any surplus found in the fund (all assets, liabilities, and prior losses considered) above the amounts transferred or appropriated to establish and maintain said fund; “(9) to appomt such committees as shall be ap- propriate for the purpose of consultation with and ad- vice to the Agency in performance of its functions. Mem- bers of such committees, other than those regularly em- ployed by the Federal Government, while attending meetings of such committees or otherwise serving at the request of the Administrator, may be paid compensa- tion at rates not exceeding those authorized for indi- viduals under paragraph (6) of this section, and while so serving away from their homes or regular places of business, may be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in the same manner as the expenses authorized by section 5703 (b) of title 5, 14 United States Code, for persons in the Government service employed intermittently ; (10) to use, with their consent, the services, equip- ment, personnel, and facilities of Federal and other agen- cies with or without reimbursement, and on a similar basis to cooperate with other public and private agencies and instrumentalities in the use of services, equipment, and facilities. Hach department and agency of the Fed- eral Government shall cooperate fully with the Agency in making its services, equipment, personnel, and facili- ties available to the Agency, and anv such department or agency is authorized, notwithstanding any other pro- vision of law, to transfer to or to receive from the Agency, without reimbursement, ships, submersibles and other vehicles, and supplies and equipment other than administrative supplies or equipment; and (11) to establish within the Agency such offices and procedures as may be appropriate to provide for the greatest possible coordination of its activities under this title with related scientific and other activities being car- ried on by other public and private agencies and organi- zations. 529 15 “NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR OCEANS AND ATMOSPHERE “SEc. 106. (a) There is hereby established a committee of fifteen members to be known as the National Advisory Committee for Oceans and Atmosphere (hereafter referred to in this title as the ‘Advisory Committee’) . “(b) (1) The members, who shall not be full-time offi- cers or employees of the United States, shall be appoited by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, and shall be drawn from State and local government, industry, science, and other appropriate areas. ‘“‘(2) Except as provided in paragraphs (3) and (4), members shall be appointed for terms of five years. “(3) Of the members first appointed— “(A) three shall be appointed for a term of one year, ““(B) three shall be appointed for a term of two years, ““(C) three shall be appointed for a term of three years, “(D) three shall be appointed for a term of four years, and G00 fa 90> iG SS ico NO 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 20 530 16 “(E) three shall be appointed for a term of five years, as designated by the President at the time of appointment. (4) Any member appointed to fill a vacancy occurring prior to the expiration of the term for which his predecessor was appointed shall be appointed only for the remainder of such term. A member may serve after the expiration of his term until his successor has taken office. “(c) Hach department and agency of the Federal Government concerned with marine and atmospheric matters shall designate a senior policy official to participate as ob- server in the work of the Advisory Committee and to offer necessary assistance. “(d) The President shall designate one of the members of the Advisory Committee as the Chairman and one of the members as the Vice Chairman. The Vice Chairman shall act as Chairman in the absence or incapacity of, or in the event of a vacancy in the office of, the Chairman. “(e) The Advisory Committee shall provide continuing review of the progress of the Nation in achieving objectives set forth in section 102 (a), and shall advise the Adminis- trator in carrying out his activities under this title. The Ad- visory Committee shall submit a camprohencive biennial re- port to the President and to the Congress on the status of the Nation’s marine and atmospheric activities and may submit o oa nnseawnk fF wo NS - 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24. 531 17 other reports from time to time on such matters as it deems appropriate. “(f) Members of the Advisory Committee shall, while serving on business of such Committee, be entitled to receive compensation at rates not to exceed $100 per diem, includ- ing traveltime and while so serving away from their homes or regular places of business, they may be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in the same manner as the expenses authorized by section 5708 (b) of title 5, United States Code, for persons in Government service employed intermittently. ““(g¢) The Administrator shall make available ie the Ad- visory Committee such staff, information, and other assist- ance as it may require to carry out its activities. “DEFINITIONS “Src. 107. As used in this title— “‘(1) the term ‘marine environment’ includes— ““(A) the oceans; “(B) the Great Lakes; ‘““(C) the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas thereof; and “(D) the resources thereof; «(2) ” Src. 2. (a) (1) The Coast Guard is hereby transferred ono nt fof oO e © BD ee ee aS bo on 532 18 to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency (hereafter referred to in this section as the “Agency”), and there are hereby transferred to and vested in the \dministrator of the Agency (hereafter referred to in this section as the “Admin- istrator’’) , all functions, powers, and duties, relating to the Coast Guard, of the Secretary of Transportation and of other officers and offices of the Department of Transportation. (2) Notwithstanding the transfer of the Coast Guard to the Agency and the transfer to the Administrator of, the functions, powers, and duties, relating to the Coast Guard, of the Secretary of Transportation and of other officers and offices of the Departinent of Transportation, effected by the provisions of paragraph (1) of this subsection, the Coast Guard, together with the functions, powers, and duties re- lating thereto, shall operate as a part of the Navy, subject to the orders of the Secretary of the Navy, im time of war or when the President shall so direct, as provided in section 3 of title 14, United States Code. (3) Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, the functions, powers, and duties of the General Counsel of the Department of Transportation set out in chapter 47 (Uniform Code of Military Justice) of title 10, United States Code, are hereby trausferred to and vested in the General Counsel of the Agency. (b) The Environmental Science Services Administra- No) [e/2) J] oO > (ve) 1) -— RO eto SN Sho 8S Sto se ga cet set ae Set ge cet ae ne GU gs do) BRS) Ge SO) =O) S00) sal Eo) aC GH ECO Gh Bet Go 533 19 tion is hereby transferred to the Agency, and there are here- by transferred to and vested in the Administrator all func- tions, powers, and duties, relatmg to the Hnvirommental Science Services Administration, of the Secretary of Com- merce and of other officers and oflices of the Department of Commerce. (c) The Bureau of Commercial Fisheries is hereby transferred to the Agency, and there are hereby transferred to and vested in the Administrator all functions, powers, and duties, relating to the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, of the Secretary of the Interior and of other officers and offices of the Department of the Interior. (d) There are hereby transferred to and vested in the Administrator all functions, powers and duties of the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, and of the Secretary of the Interior and of other officers and offices of the Bureau, under the Act of August 8, 1956 (70 Stat. 1119, 16 U.S.C. 742), with respect to marine and anadromous fisheries programs. (e) The mission (except with respect to catographic compilation work for the Army Map Service) assigned as of July 1, 1969, to the United States Army Engineer Dis- trict, Lake Survey, Corps of Engineers, Department of the Army, is hereby transfered to the Agency; and there are hereby transferred to and vested in the Administrator all = So © 22 te te ve fe ff Se = fe eae gs SS = eS © fo SS 5 co HR fo w HS © Mm I G2 oc co 534 20 functions, powers and duties, relating to such mission, of the Secretary of the Army and of other officers and offices of the Department of the Army. (f) There are hereby transferred to and vested in the Administrator all functions, powers and duties of the Secre- tary of the Navy, and other officers and offices in the Depart- ment of the Navy, with respect to the operation of the Na- tional Oceanographic Data Center. (g) So much of the positions, personnel, assets, liabili- ties, contracts, property, records, employed, held, used, arising from, available or to be made available in connection with the functions, powers, and duties transferred by this sec- tion and section 8 of this Act as the Director of the Bureau of the Budget shall determine shall be transferred to the Administrator. Any personnel engaged in functions, powers, and duties transferred under this section and section 3 of this Act shall be transferred in accordance with applicable laws and regulations relating to transfer of functions; except that the transfer of personnel pursuant to such sections shall be without reduction in classification or compensation for one year after such transfer. (h) In exercising the functions, powers and duties transferred to him under this section, the Airnind Saito shall give full consideration to the need for operational continuity of the functions so transferred. ao F WO DO -& 535 21 Src. 3. (a) (1) Section 203(a) of the National Sea Grant College and Program Act of 1966 is amended by striking out “National Science Foundation (hereinafter in this title referred to as the ‘Foundation’)” and inserting in lieu thereof “Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency (hereafter in this title referred to as the ‘Administrator’) ”’. (2) Paragraph (1) of section 203 (b) of such Act is amended by striking out “Foundation” and inserting in lieu thereof “National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency”. (b) (1) Subsection (a) of section 204 of such Act is amended by striking out “Foundation” and inserting in lieu thereof “Administrator”, by striking out “(1)”, and by striking out “, and (2) seek advice” and all that follows thereafter and inserting in lieu thereof a period. (2) Subsection (b) of such section 204 is amended by strikmg out “Foundation shall exercise its authority” and inserting in lieu thereof “Administrator shall exercise his authority”’. (3) Subsections (d) (1), (d) (2), (e), (h), and (i) (4) of such section 204 are each amended by striking out “Foundation” each place it appears and inserting in tien thereof “Administrator”. (4) Subsection (d) (3) of such section 204 is amended by striking out “Foundation” the first place it appears and oo F Ww DO Fe eo ao nN 536 22 inserting in lieu thereof “Administrator”, and by striking out “Foundation” the second place it appears and inserting in lieu thereof “National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency”. (5) Subsection (f) of such section 204 is amended by striking out “its functions under this title, the Foundation” and inserting in lieu thereof “his functions under this title, the Administrator”. (6) Subsection (g) of such section 204 is repealed. (c) Section 205 of such Act is repealed. Sec. 4. (a) Subchapter II (relating to executive pay schedules) of chapter 53 of title 5, United States Code, is amended as follows: (1) Section 5313 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following: “(20) Administrator, National Oceanic and Atmos- pheric Agency.” (2) Section 5314 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following: “(54) Deputy Administrator, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency.” (3) Section 5315 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following: “(92) General Counsel, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency.” (b) Paragraph (1) of section 801 of title 10, United o FF CO wb FE oe wo NN FD 537 23 States Code, is amended by striking out “the General Counsel of the Department of Transportation” and inserting in lieu thereof “the General Counsel of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency”. Sec. 5. (a) All orders, determinations, rules, regula- tions, permits, contracts, certificates, licenses, and privileges— (1) which have been issued, made, granted, or - allowed to become effective— (A) under any provision of law amended by this Act, or (B) in the exercise of duties, powers, or func- tions which are transferred under this Act, by (i) any department or agency, any functions of which are transferred by this Act, or (ii) any court of competent jurisdiction, and (2) which are in effect at the time this Act takes effect, shall continue in effect according to their terms until modi- fied, terminated, superseded, set aside, or repealed by the Administrator or General Counsel (in the exercise of any authority respectively vested in them by this Act) of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency (hereafter re- ferred to in this section as the “Agency’’) , by any court of competent jurisdiction, or by operation of law. o anryreon air wo wpe s& oe ee = wet 8 & Se S SG a BEO Reabes 23 538 24 (b) The provisions of this Act shall not affect any pro- ceedings pending at the time this section takes effect before any department or agency (or component thereof) , the func- tions of which are transferred by this Act; but such proceed- ings, to the extent that they relate to functions so transferred, shall be continued before the Agency. Such proceedings, to the extent they do not relate to functions so transferred, shall be continued before the department or agency before which they were pending at the time of such transfer. In either case, orders shall be issued in such proceedings, ap- peals shall be taken therefrom, and payments shall be made pursuant to such orders, as if this Act had not been enacted; and orders issued in any such proceedings shall continue in effect until modified, terminated. superseded, or repealed by the Administrator or General Counsel (in the exercise of any authority respectively vested in them by this Act), by a court of competent jurisdiction, or by operation of law. (c) (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2)— _ (A) the provisions of this Act shall not affect suits commented prior to the date this section takes effect, and (B) in all such suits proceedings shall be had, ap- peals taken, and judgments rendered, in the same man- ner and effect as if this Act had not been enacted. No suit, action, or other proceeding commenced by or against any officer in his official capacity as an officer of any depart- i Co! Soe tet On 539 25 ment or agency, the functions of which are transferred by this Act, shall abate by reason of the enactment of this Act. No cause of action by or against any department or agency, functions of which are transferred by this Act, or by or against any officer thereof in his official capacity shall abate by rea- son of the enactment of this Act. Causes of actions, suits, actions, or other proceedings may be asserted by or against the United States or such official of the Department as may be appropriate and, in any litigation pending when this section takes effect, the court may at any time, on its own motion or that of any party, enter an order which will give effect to the provisions of this subsection. (2) If before the date on which this Act takes effect, any department or agency, or officer thereof in his official capacity, is a party to a suit, and under this Act (A) such department or agency is transferred to the Administrator, or (B) any function of such department, agency, or officer is transferred to the Administrator, then such suit shall be continued by the Administrator (ex- cept in the case of a suit not involving functions transferred to the Administrator, in which case the suit shall be contin- ued by the department, agency, or officer which was a party to the suit prior to the effective date of this Act). (d) With respect to any function, power, or duty trans- 26-563 O - 70 - pt.2 - 3 So © 2 & an - ww ww a ee ow ea 6S 14 540 26 ferred by this Act and exercised after the effective date of this Act, reference in any other Federal law to any depart- ment or agency, oflicer or oflice so transferred or functions of which are so transferred shall be deemed to mean the officer or agency in which this Act vests such function after such transfer. Sec. 6. The Administrator of the National Oceanic and Aamean ions Agency is directed to submit to the Congress, within two years from the effective date of this Act, a pro- posed codification of all laws that contain the powers, duties, and functions transferred to or vested in the Administrator or the Agency by this Act. SEC. 7. (a) This Act shall take effect ninety days after the Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency first takes office, or on such prior date after enact- ment of this Act as the President shall prescribe and publish in the Federal Register. (b) Any of the officers provided for in this Act may (notwithstanding subsection (a)) be appointed in the manner provided for in this Act, at any time after the date of enactment of this Act. Such officers shall be compensated from the date they first take office, at the rates provided for in this Act. Such compensation and malted expenses of their offices shall be paid from funds available for the func- tions to be transferred to the Agency pursuant to this Act. 541 U.S. Atomic ENERGY COMMISSION, October 9, 1969. Hon. Epwarp A. GARMATZ, Chairman, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, House of Representatives. Deak Mr. GARMATz: The Atomic Energy Commission is pleased to respond to your letter of August 4, 1969, requesting our views on H.R. 13247, a bill “[t]o amend the Marine Resources and Engineering Development Act of 1966 to estab- lish a comprehensive and long-range national program of research, development, technical services, exploration and utilization with respect to our marine and atmospheric environment.” We note that H.R. 3848, H.R. 4838 and H.R. 11240, introduced in the current session, are similar in that they propose the establishment of a “National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency” (or a “National Oceanographic Agency’) to achieve the objectives described in H.R. 13247. H.R. 13247 is directed towards ‘‘a comprehensive coordinated and continuing national program in marine and atmospheric science, technology, and technical services.” The objectives of the program would relate to the exploration, ex- ploitation, control and utilization of the marine and atmospheric environments, including the development and advancement of technology, private investment, technical devices, education and training, and the utilization of national scientific and engineering resources. For this purpose, and to effectuate the objectives en- visaged by the bill, there would be established as an independent agency, a “National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency,” headed by an Administrator. To this new agency there would be transferred the functions of various existing agencies, including the Coast Guard, the Environmental Science Services Admin- istration, the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries and the National Oceanographic Data Center. The new Agency would be assisted in the performance of its statu- tory functions by a “National Advisory Committee for Oceans and Atmosphere,”’ to be established under the bill. We agree that it is desirable to have effective coordination of Federal activi- ties in this field. We believe the bill reflects a feasible legislative implementation of the recommendations made by the Commission on Marine Sciences, Engineer- ing and Resources in its recent comprehensive report covering a two-year study of the Nation’s marine science activities. However, in my statement concerning this report, furnished to your Subcommittee on Oceanography on July 28, 1969, I indicated that “[t]he recommended reorganization of Federal marine-related activities . . . needs to be examined carefully in the broad context of Federal organization and program priorities.’’ As you know, the President has asked his Advisory Council on Executive Organization to conduct such an examination. Accordingly, we believe that reorganization of marine science activities would be inappropriate at this time. In regard to AWC’s programs, we believe that Section 2 of the bill is consistent with the following statement in the Commis- sion’s report: “In considering the composition of the proposed National Oceanic and At- mospheric Agency, the Commission rejected the idea of consolidating all Federal marine and atmospheric functions into a single, massive organization. Some such functions which will remain outside NOAA are integral to the agency which performs them. Although they should be strengthened and should be fully utilized by NOAA, they are best left where they are. The National Aeronautics and Space A‘dministration’s (NASA) oceanography-from-space program and the Atomic Energy Commission’s (AEC) various marine-related nuclear energy programs are examples, as are the strong marine programs of the Navy, the Corps of En- gineers, the National Science Foundation, and the marine-related water manage- ment programs of the Department of the Interior.” (p. 232) The Bureau of the Budget has advised that there is no objection to the presen- tation of this report from the standpoint of the Administration’s program. Cordially, GLENN T. SEABORG, Chairman. 542 EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUREAU OF THE BUDGET, Washington, D.C., October 27, 1969. Hon. Epwarp A. GARMATZ, Chairman, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. DeEaR Mr. ‘CHAIRMAN: This is in response to your request for the views of the Bureau of the Budget on H.R. 13247, a bill which would amend the Marine Re- sources and Engineering Development Act of 1966. The principal provisions of the bill are for the establishment of a new independent agency, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency, and a National Advisory Committee for Oceans and Atmosphere. This bill would implement the recommendation of the Commis- sion on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources with respect to Federal organization. As you may know, the Administration has been carefully reviewing the Com- mission’s recommendations for new and expanded programs in marine sciences. In addition, the President has asked his Advisory Council on Executive Organiza- tion to examine carefully the Commission’s organizational proposals in the con- text of broader Federal organizational requirements. The President also asked that the Commission’s proposals be compared with alternative ways of coordi- nating and advancing national] development of the marine sciences. We believe that action should not be taken to implement the Commission’s organizational proposals until organizational requirements extending beyond those that could be considered by the Marine Commission are taken into account. In view of the President’s assignment to his Advisory Council on Executive Organization, we will not be in a position to comment substantively on the Commission’s organizational proposals at this time. Accordingly, we recommend against enactment of H.R. 13247 at this time. Sincerely yours, WILFRED H. ROMMEL, Assistant Director for Legislative Reference. GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, Washington, D.C., October 6, 1969. Hon. Epwarp A. GARMATZ, Chairman, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. DEAR Mk. CHAIRMAN: This is in further reply to your request for the views of this Department concerning H. R. 13247, a bill ‘to amend the Marine Resources and Engineering Development Act of 1966 to establish a comprehensive and long- range national program of research, development, technical services, exploration and utilization with respect to our marine and atmospheric environment.” On September 23, 1969, Assistant Secretary of Commerce Myron Tribus testi- fied before the Subcommittee on Oceanography of your Committee with respect to H.R. 13247 and the Report of the Commission on Marine Sciences, Engineering and Resources. A copy of his testimony is enclosed.* The views expressed by Dr. Tribus at that hearing set forth the position of the Department of Commerce with respect to H.R. 13247. We have been advised by the Bureau of the Budget that there would be no objection to the submission of this letter to your Committee. Sincerely, JAMES T. LYNN, General Counsel. *See testimony of Mr. Tribus. 043 ‘DEPARTMENT OF THE NAvy, OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS, Washington, D.C., September 24, 1969. Hon. Epwarp A. GARMATz, Chairman, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. DeaR MR. CHAIRMAN: Your request for comment on H.R. 13247, a bill “To amend the Marine Resources and Engineering Development Act of 1966 to estab- lish a comprehensive and long-range national program of research, development, technical services, exploration and utilization with respect to our marine and atmospheric environment,” has been assigned to this Department by the Secre- tary of Defense for the preparation of a report thereon expressing the views of the Department of Defense. The bill would establish a new independent agency to be known as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency. This Agency, under the direction of the Presi- dent, would undertake the leadership for the planning, direction, conduct and support of all federal civil marine and atmospherie affairs, including the Great Lakes as well as the oceans. ‘Several federal organizations would be transferred from their present locations to form the Agency. The proposed transfers most immediately affecting the Department of Defense would include the National Oceanographic Data Center under the administration of the Department of the Navy and the Lake Survey of the Corps of Engineers, Department of the Army. In addition, the bill would establish a fifteen member Presidentially appointed National Advisory Committee for the Oceans and Atmosphere. The Advisory Committee would provide a link between federal, state and local governments, industry, and university components of the national ocean-oriented community. The Advisory Committee would review the progress in achieving the nation’s oceanic and atmospheric objectives, and report to the President and the Congress, while at the same time being primary advisor to the National Oceanic and At- mospherie Agency. Provision is also made for the representatives of other gov- ernment agencies concerned with oceanic and atmospheric affairs to act as observers on the Advisory Committee. The bill focuses upon the reorganization of the Federal Government’s civil responsibilities for oceanic and atmospheric affairs and embodies many of the organizational recommendations of the report of the Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources entitled ‘Our Nation and the Sea.” On 19 May 1969, the President referred the Commission report to the President’s Ad- visory Council on Executive Organization and asked the Council to review the organization recommendations made by the Commission. In light of the above Presidential action, it would be inappropriate at this time for the Department of Defense to express a position for or against enact- ment of the bill. However, the Department does subscribe to the following gen- eral views on the matter and offers them for the consideration of the Committee. The Department of Defense has viewed the proposal in terms of four major domains in which the new organization is proposed to operate—the World Ocean, the World Atmosphere, the Coastal Zone and the Great Lakes. Although the Department of Defense believes a new agency is not required for the coastal zone, should a new agency be created to meet the needs of the World Ocean and the World Atmosphere it would have an obvious interest in the coast. The Department believes that the best way for such an agency to influence coastal decisions, would be for it to join, not duplicate or displace, the Water Resources Council and the Federal-interstate field organizations now working actively with it. The Department has considered the essentially inland character of these lakes and the role of the principal Federal-interstate mechanism existing there—the Great Lakes Basin Commission. Regardless of the decision establishing the pro- posed agency, an oceanic agency should not have a primary role on the Great Lakes. These problems are not primarily oceanic in character. In their hydraulic, biologic, water quality and legal aspects they are much more closely related to rivers and inland lakes than they are to the World Ocean. Thus, with respect to the U.S. Army Engineer District, Lake Survey, the proposed transfer to the new oceanic and atmospheric agency would not appear to be advisable considering the basic inland nature of these lakes. Should some form of reorganization of the Federal civil oceanic and atmos- pheric effort be acomplished, it is of paramount importance that a maximum 544 degree of cooperation and coordination be maintained with all ongoing efforts in this area including those of the military services. It would certainly be the inten- tion of the Department of Defense to continue to work with any new agency established, just as actively as has been done in the past. The proposed transfer of the National Oceanographic Data Center to the National Oceanic Agency by the bill is noted. The National Oceanographic Data Center is currently under the administrative management of the Naval Oceano- graphic Office and is supported by funds from 10 departments and agencies. Its technical programs and policies are established and reviewed by an interagency advisory board consisting of ‘the representatives of these sponsoring agencies. The Data Center serves as a central repository for the nation’s unclassified oceanographic data. In addition to its chartered mission, the Data Center is also designated as an oceanographic information and analysis center for the Depart- ment of Defense to provide service to users within the Department of Defense. The importance of the Data Center as an adjunct to the military mission is evi- denced by the major role Navy has played to support the Center, and by the fact that Navy and Navy contractors are the major users. The Department of Defense would not object to the transfer of the Data Center if the new organizational arrangement was supportive of its national charter. We believe the Data Center would be expected to continue to provide data services to all users, government and private, civilian and military, in keeping with its basic mandate as a national data repository. With regard to the National Advisory Committee for Oceans and Atmosphere proposed by the bill, there are two features concerning which the Department of Defense has serious reservations. The first is that the mechanism suggested for the Advisory Committee would appear to put the proposed operating agency, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency and its advisory group, the Advisory Committee for Oceans and Atmosphere, in an effectively controlling position over other operating agencies with their own special mission requirements. This ap- pears likely to generate conflicts that would tend to give the Advisory Committee an unwarranted amount of bias toward the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency as opposed to the equally vital interests of other federal agencies. Second, the bill provides for participation by federal agency representatives on the Ad- visory Committee only by relegating them to observer status. The Department of Defense believes that such an arrangement could severely jeopardize the Ad- visory Committee’s effectiveness as the principal governmental advisory group for the nation’s marine and atmospheric activities. It is noted that the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency would function in the conduct of mapping and charting, encompassing the world oceans. The Department of the Navy has statutory responsibility for the provision of ac- curate charts, sailing directions and manuals for the use of all vessels of the United States and for the benefit and use of all navigators generally, although its primary concern is with defense requirements and in the deep oceans around the world. The U.S. Army Engineer District, Lake Survey, has a generally similar role on the Great Lakes. The Environmental Science Services Administration, a proposed component of the new National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency, would be concerned primarily with civil mapping and charting activities which are confined largely to the U.S. territorial waters and the continental shelf areas. Care should be exercised to insure that mapping and charting responsibilities are clear in order to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort. Also, care should be exercised to insure that the lines of responsibility or function between the proposed National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency and the Department of Defense would be clearly delineated. H.R. 13247 proposes further that the testing and calibration of instruments are functions assigned to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric ‘Agency. This would appear to duplicate work being done by the Navy’s National Oceanographic Instrumentation Center. The ‘Center is under the administrative control of the Commander, Naval Oceanographic Office and guided by an advisory board repre- senting fifteen interested agencies. The Center’s mission is to serve as the na- tional focal point for knowledge of technology related to testing, evaluation, and calibration of sensing systems for ocean use, to enhance the quality of such systems by the dissemination of operational results and technical information, in order to serve the national oceanographic community. However, broader national benefits might result from incorporation of this Center into the proposed Na- tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency. 045 The bill would transfer the U.S. Coast Guard from the Department of Trans- portation to the proposed agency with the proviso that the Coast Guard shall operate as a part of the Navy in time of war or when the President shall so direct. However, it is the concern of the Department of Defense that the Coast Guard may not be maintained in an adequate state of readiness as a member of the Armed Forces of the United States if its forces are “combined” with the other elements of the proposed agency as recommended by the Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources. The requirement to so maintain the Coast Guard as provided by 14 U.S.C. 2 for transfer to the Department of Defense as provided by 14 U.S.C. 3 is mandatory. This report has been coordinated within the Department of Defense in accord- ance with procedures prescribed by the Secretary of Defense. The Bureau of the Budget advises that, from the standpoint of the Administra- tion’s program, there is no objection to the presentation of this report on H.R. 13247 for the consideration of the Committee. For the Secretary of the Navy. Sincerely yours, MEANS JOHNSTON, Jr., - Rear Admiral, USN, Chief of Legislative Affairs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, October 14, 1969. Hon. Epwarp A. GARMATZ, Chairman, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is in response to your request of August 4, 1969, for our views on H.R. 13247, a bill ‘“To amend the Marine Resources and Engineering Development Act of 1966 to establish a comprehensive and long-range national program of research, development, technical services, exploration and utiliza- tion with respect to our marine and atmospheric environment.” This bill would provide for a new independent agency in the Executive Branch to be known as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency. The bill prescribes the functions and powers of the new agency and in addition provides for estab- lishment of a 15-member National Advisory Committee for Oceans and Atmos- phere. The following government departments and agencies and their functions would be transferred to the new agency : The Coast Guard ; The Environmental Science Services Administration; The Bureau of Commercial Fisheries; The Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife; the mission of July 1, 1969, assigned to the U.S. Army Engineer District, Lake Survey, Corps of Engineers, Department of the Army (respecting deterioration of the quality of Lake Erie and the other Great Lakes) ; and the duties of the Secretary of the Navy with respect to the National Oceanographic Data Center. While the bill provides for activities in the atmospheric sciences area, it does not relate directly to air pollution control or other environmental health pro- grams administered by the Department. Accordingly, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare defers to the views of those departments more directly concerned with the subject matter of H.R. 13247. We are advised by the Bureau of the Budget that there is no objection to the presentation of this report from the standpoint of the Administration’s pro- gram. Sincerely, Rosert H. Fincu, Secretary. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, Washington, D.C., September 23, 1969. Hon. Epwarp A. GARMATZ, Chairman, Committce on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. Dear Mr. CHAIRMAN: Your Committee has requested the views of this Depart- ment on H.R. 13247, a bill “To amend the Marine Resources and Engineering 546 Development Act of 1966 to establish a comprehensive and long-range national program of research, development, technical services, exploration and utilization with respect to our marine and atmospheric environment.” We recommend that the bill not be enacted. H.R. 13247 would provide for the creation of a new Federal agency, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency, to serve as a principal instrumentality in the Federal Government for administration and coordination of civil marine and atmospheric programs. It would also provide for an advisory commission, the National Advisory Commission for Oceans and Atmosphere, to review continu- ously and make recommendations to the President and Congress on the status of these programs. This proposal follows closely the recommendations contained in chapter 7 of the January 1969 publication, Owr Nation and the Sea, a report of the Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources. With respect to the report’s organizational recommendations, President Nixon on May 19, 1969, requested the Advisory Council on Executive Organization to examine carefully the Commission’s proposal in the broad context of Federal orga- nization. Part of President Nixon’s request to the Advisory Council on Executive Organization was to compare the Commission’s proposals with alternate ways for coordinating and advancing national development of marine sciences. Therefore, we believe that any attempt to create a new independent agency that would include all civilian marine and atmospheric activities is premature at this time. No such legislation would seem appropriate until the Advisory Council on Execu- tive Organization has completed its study and presented its findings to the President. The Bureau of the Budget has advised that there is no objection to the presentation of this report from the standpoint of the Administration’s program. Sincerely yours, ‘RUSSELL FE. TRAIN, Under Secretary of the Interior. NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR, Washington, D.C.. October 21, 1969. Hon. Epwarp A. GARMATZ, Chairman, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. Dear Mr. CHAIRMAN: This is in further reply to your letter of August 4, 1969, for comments on H.R. 13247, “To amend the Marine Resources and Engineering Development Act of 1966 to establish a comprehensive and long-range national program of research, development, technical services, exploration and utilization with respect to our marine and atmospheric environment.” The comments of the National Science Foundation are set forth in my testi- mony on the bill, delivered to the Subcommittee on Oceanography cf the Com- mittee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries on October 1, 1969. Sincerely yours, W. D. McE roy, Director. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, Washington, D.C., October 20, 1969. Hon. Epwarp A. GARMATZ, Chairman, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, U.S. House of Repre- sentatives, Washington, D.C. DEAR Mr. GARMATz: I very much appreciate the opportunity to present my views on H.R. 13247, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Program Act of 1969. As you know, I shall testify on this bill before your Committee on October 21, and will provide you with a full presentation of my opinions on that occasion. A copy of my prepared statement is attached. The central feature of the bill is the proposed establishment of an independent agency in the Executive Branch to carry out a broad range of functions affecting the marine and atmospheric environment. The bill would implement the organiza- tional recommendations of the report of the Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources, 5A The Commission’s proposal for a new organization has important implications for Federal organization for objectives other than marine science. The President has requested his Advisory Council on Executive Organization (the Ash Council) to consider the Commission’s proposal for a new agency in the context of broader Federal organization requirements. Pending the results of this review, I would recommend against enactment of H.R. 13247. The new Administration has devoted considerable thought to the wisest ways to employ the resources of the Federal Government to deal with the environ- mental problems. H.R. 13247 is concerned with Federal activities and capabilities in the marine and atmospheric environment, which are important but limited parts of our physical and biological environment. As I will explain in greater detail in my personal appearance before you, it is quite possible that the existence of a National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency would limit the flexibility needed to pursue other kinds of regroupings of agency functions to pursue environmental objectives, or could adversely affect the capa- bilities of Federal agencies to carry out existing statutory responsibilities in other areas. Moreover, from a scientific standpoint, while there is a sound argument for linking together the oceans and the atmosphere, there is an equally sound argu- ment for linking the solid earth and the oceans together, or the solid earth and the atmosphere together. Weather is modified in equally important ways by the ocean-atmosphere interaction and by the accidents of locations of continental land masses and their topography. I think it would be unfortunate if in linking together the Federal scientific activities embracing the oceans and the atmosphere. they were to be placed in competition with those involving land based science. I would like to underscore my belief that the oceans represent a great oppor- tunity for this country. They are an important element in our national security and a vital part of our human environment. Thus, it is important that we make the most effective use of those monies spent on marine resources and development so that our marine science and technology activities move vigorously to enlarge our understanding of the marine environment. While there has been considerable growth in these activities in recent years, much remains to be done. I will con- tinue to direct my efforts toward supporting vigorous efforts in the marine sciences as an integral part of our general effort to improve the quality of the human environment. The Bureau of the Budget has advised that there is no objection to the sub- mission of this report from the standpoint of the Administration’s program. Sincerely, LEE A. DuBRIDGE, Director. SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION, Washington, D.C., October 1, 1969. Hon. Epwarp A. GARMATZ, Chairman, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. Deak, Mr. GaRMatTz: Thank you for your request to comment on H.R. 13247, a bill to amend the Marine Resources and Engineering Development Act of 1966 to establish a comprehensive and long-range national program of research, de- velopment, technical services, exploration, and utilization with respect to our marine and atmospheric environment. To fulfill such a program, the bill would establish an independent National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency and a National Advisory Committee for Oceans and Atmosphere. The bill incorporates the reorganization recommendations of the Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources, in whose report there is a call for “a new central focus of strength” for national marine programs. The Commis- sion’s report also singled out the Smithsonian as one of the establishments that “should maintain their identities and be strengthened further as essential con- tributors to the national marine effort.’”’ We agree fully with the Commission’s comments about the Smithsonian and have consistently attempted to strengthen our oceanic programs. Inasmuch as the Smithsonian is a scientific organization, we are not in a position to comment on the proposed agency reorganization, particularly in light of the pending review and recommendations of the Ash Council. 348 Thank you for this opportunity to comment on the bill. The Bureau of the Budget advises that there is no objection to this report from the point of view of the Administration’s program. Sincerely yours, S. Ditton RIPLeEy, Secretary. DEPARTMENT OF ‘STATE, Washington, D.C., October 10, 1969. Hon. Epwarp A. GARMATZ, Chairman, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. ‘DEAR Mr. CHAIRMAN: Your letter of August 4, 1969, forwarded a copy of H.R. 13247, “A Bill to amend the Marine Resources and Engineering Development Act of 1966 to establish a comprehensive and long-range national program of research, development, technical services, exploration and utilization with respect to our marine and atmospheric environment” and asked for our views and recommendations on this proposed legislation. (he Administration has requested M. Roy Ash, Chairman of the newly estab- lished Advisory Council on Executive Organization, to place high on the Council’s agenda of matters to be studied the proposal for the creation of a new, independ- ent oceanographic and atmospheric agency. This is to be examined carefully in the context of broader federal organizational requirements. In studying this mat- ter the Council will consider related environmental and natural resource problems and compare the proposal for the establishment of a new agency with alternative ways of coordinating and advancing national development of the marine sciences. Pending completion of the Council study, the Department would prefer not to comment or suggest recommendations on the proposed legislation. {The Bureau of the Budget advises that from the standpoint of the Administration’s program there is no objection to the submission of this report. Sincerely yours, H. G. TorBeERtT, Jr., Acting Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations. Mr. Lennon. Today we are honored to have with us two most dis- tinguished gentlemen—our distinguished colleague from the Senate, the Honorable Claiborne Pell, and Mr. Northcutt Ely, of Ely & Dun- can, Washington, D.C., who has been most active with the bar asso- ciation and International Law Association in these matters. We will be pleased to hear first from our distinguished colleague, Senator Pell, who, as we know, is chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Sub- committee on Ocean Space, and has maintained an interest in all phases of ocean activity. Senator, if you will come forward, we are delighted and honored to have you, knowing of your long-time interest and concern in the matters that we are now faced with. You may proceed, sir. STATEMENT OF HON. CLAIBORNE PELL, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND Senator Pett. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for letting me come over here and expose some of my own thinking and views. Congressman Garmatz, the chairman of the full committee, thank you for being here, and members of the committee. I am particularly glad to be here because I think we all are working together in trying to move ahead in this field of oceanology in developing our national abilities and potentials. _ The current hearings that you are conducting, which are of great interest to all of us on our side of the Hill, on the report of the Com- 549 mission on Marine Sciences, Engineering, and Resources are a very valuable contribution. I would like to make it clear at the outset that I consider the report of the Commission to be in itself an outstanding accomplishment. I am glad, for instance, that the House of Representatives has reprinted the basic Commission report. I regret that the panel reports are be- coming scarcer than hen’s teeth to get, and we find on our side that it is very difficult to secure them. I have been thinking of having one or two of them printed as Senate documents if we can. It would be exceedingly difficult, I think, to find another study commission that has executed its assignment in such a thorough and comprehensive manner. This is not to say that I would agree with each and every recom- mendation of the Commission. But in general I do give it my hearty support and congratulate you, Mr. Chairman and the members of your committee, on your legislation which seeks to move ahead in the direction of the Commission report and translate its recommendations into specific legislative proposals, an intellectual exercise that is much needed. We in the Congress are considering this report in the midst of a renewed public interest and enthusiasm in the exploration of outer space, prompted by the dazzling success of Apollo. I, too, have been deeply impressed, even awed, at this magnificent achievement. I would not venture to enter the competition in seeking for appro- priate adjectives to describe the first extraterrestrial visit by man. I would simply say it is historic. But I was struck recently by the historic context in which the space program was placed by Mr. Peter F. Drucker in his very perceptive book, “The Age of Discontinuity.” Searching for historical precedents, Mr. Drucker recalled that an- clent Egypt some 7,000 years ago produced two truly historic achieve- ments—the building of the first pyramid, and the invention of the plow. The building of the pyramid had a profound philosophical impact on man, but it was the invention of the plow, by increasing agricultural productivity, that vertually restructured human society. And then Mr. Drucker expressed the opinion that in our age, “space exploration is our ‘pyramids’ and the exploration of the oceans our 6 low.’ ep) And I would hope that we would not only continue but expand our emphasis on the “plow.” I believe that the Marine Sciences Commission has provided us with a plan as to how we can best move ahead. Perhaps the most impressive recommendation of the report is that a single agency what- ever its name, and whatever existing agencies of the Government are included, is obviously necessary. Some of you may be familiar with the book that Mr. Harold L. Goodwin and I wrote a couple of years ago in which, by a strange co- incidence, we said that an agency called NOAH, although we had different actual initials than the NOAA recommended by the com- mission, should be developed, and your committee is doing a great deal in moving ahead, in this direction. I think there can be no question that, as the Commission recom- 550 mended, we must increase our funding of our national oceanologic programs. The only question in my mind is whether the Commission’s proposal for a doubling of present expenditure levels during the next decade is not too modest. Personally I think it is. As the coauthor with Congressman Rogers of the Sea Grant Col- lege Act of 1966, I am gratified at the recognition given to the pro- gram in the Commission report. Specifically, the proposal for estab- lishment of coastal zone laboratories, under the administration of the Sea Grant College program, is, I believe, an excellent one. T must add here that, speaking personally, I have some reservations concerning the thought of moving ahead too hard on the regional centers which can tend to dominate the various smaller centers of excellence we want to see developed around the country. Mr. Chairman, I cannot attempt here to comment on each of the Commission recommendations, including the Sea Grant College bills on which Congressman Rogers and I have been working together. But I would note two recommendations that would be implemented by legis- lation now pending in the Senate. First, I have introduced in the Senate S. 2230, removing the existing restriction on use of foreign-built fishing vessels by our commercial fishermen, as recommended by the Commission. Needless to say, this is not a bill popular in shipbulding States or areas, but it would seem to me a worthwhile bill since it would reduce the capital costs for many of our fishermen by a third to half in getting their basic vessels. Second, I have cosponsored S. 1588, introduced by Senator Warren G. Magnuson, who has in our body always taken the lead in every- thing to do with the oceans and is most interested in them and has helped me tremendously in what small work I have done in this re- gard. This bill would establish an Institute of Marine Pharmacology in the National Institutes of Health, an action also recommended by the Commission. Both of these actions, I think, are worthwhile steps which could help move us along and need not wait on any overall action in con- nection with the broad thrust of the Commission’s report. Now turning to the report of the international panel, with which as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee I have been particu- larly concerned, the Commission said basically that this country’s national interest in terms of the development and utilization of the ocean space environment demands that we take the lead in (1) limit- ing coastal State jurisdiction over the natural resources of the Con- tinental Shelf to a depth of 200 meters or a distance of 50 nautical miles, and (2) defining a multilateral legal and political framework for purposes of mineral resource exploitation beyond the regime of the Continental Shelf. In addressing this later issue, the Commission recommended that such a framework encompass the following provisions: an interna- tional registry authority, with limited policing functions; an inter- national fund to be used for agreed-upon worldwide community objec- tives; an agreement as to the powers and duties of registering nations; an arrangement for the settlement of disputes; and provision for an intermediate zone, over which the adjacent coastal State would have a veto power as to who may exploit the resources of the zone, 551 In making these recommendations and in urging that the United States take the lead in trying to resolve these very intricate and com- plex issues, the Marine Commission issued a warning to the effect that: Unless a new international framework is devised which removes the legal uncertainty from mineral resource exploration and exploitation in every area of the seabed and subsoil, some venturesome governments and private entrepreneurs will act to create fait accomplis that will be difficult to undo, even though they adversely affect the interests of the United States and the international com- munity. Mr. Chairman, having devoted a good deal of my own time and effort over the last several years to attempting to grapple with the Outer Continental Shelf boundary issue and the question of an inter- national legal and political framework for the exploitation of deep- sea mineral resources, I firmly believe that the recommendations of the Marine Commission strike the proper sense of urgency with re- gard to U.S. policy requirements, and in our national interest. As this committee knows, and in fact I took the liberty of sending each member a copy, I have reintroduced in the Senate legislation, Senate Resolution 33, calling upon the President to have tabled before the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed, which begins its next meeting August 11, a specific set of legal princi- ples for governing the use of ocean space, and I am pleased to note that a companion resolution has been introduced in the House by Congressman Gallagher, chairman of the Subcommittee- on Inter- national Organizations and Movements of the Foreign Affairs Com- mittee. I would hope that the members of this subcommittee, being familiar with this subject, would look with a favorable eye upon this legislation. While this proposed legislation differs in some detail with the sug- gestions made by the Marine Commission, its general thrust and orientation are precisely in accord with the Commission’s observa- tions and recommendations: The United States can no longer delay in facing up to the tough political decisions involved in the ocean space question. The most urgent of these decisions relates to the Outer Continental Shelf boundary, or the extent of coastal State jurisdic- tion over offshore mineral resources. In discussing the boundary issue, Mr. Chairman, I hope this com- mittee will keep in mind two very important considerations: (1) the United States has but 10 percent of the world’s Continental Shelf area; 90 percent of it is outside the shores adjoining or adjacent to the United States; and (2) our country is the recognized leader in the field of applied marine technology. To me both of these factors mean that it is very much to our own national interest to limit coastal authority, in order to take advantage of our technological superiority and to be able to apply it to the largest international zone possible. I am convinced that such an arrangement would be acceptable to the international community, so long as the United States and the other developed countries agreed to the kind of international fund recommended along the lines of the Marine Commission. For the benefit of this committee, I think it should be noted that the Senate Subcommittee on Ocean Space, of which I am chairman, has 502 just concluded 4 days of rather intensive hearings on these interna- tional issues. The subcommittee heard from ‘a variety of witnesses, in- cluding representatives from the oceanographic, mining, fisheries, and petroleum industries; we also listened to experts in the fields of arms control, international law, and foreign relations. Here I think it important to point out that, with the single excep- tion of the petroleum industry, all of the subcommittee’s witnesses testified that the United States must do everything in its power to secure as soon as possible a meaningful multilateral agreement on the ocean space issue. With some of our Government agencies acting as lawyers on behalf of particular interests, with Commerce and Interior following the interests of the oil industry, and with the Defense Department having its problems, it is interesting to note that the State Department is really without a policy on this issue at present, and 1s even reluctant to state categorically that this matter must be settled by an international arrangement. In fact our present policy today is a no-policy policy. I might point out, however, that Dr. G. Warren Nutter, Assistant Secretary of De- fensé for International Security Affairs, testified before the Subcom- mittee on Ocean Space that such an arrangement 1s mandatory and that the United States must proceed with all deliberate speed on this matter. My best guess is that this whole question, having proved a little too hot to handle by the Department of State, is now on its way for decision by the White House or the National Security Council. In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I hope that this committee will use its power and influence to see to it that President Nixon’s administra- tion lives up to its promise of providing leadership in defining a regime for the deep ocean floor. In the meantime, I fully endorse the sug- gestion that, through the United Nations, this country should seek a moratorium on claims of national jurisdiction beyond the 200-meter isobath. Now, there are two further points here that I would like to leave with this committee, and I am sure that they are self-evident, but one has to look at what the reasons are for a particular policy or viewpoint. The mining industry, and by this I mean the hard minerals industry, came before our subcommittee and argued strongly for some form of international regime. Mr. Wilkey, the general counsel of Kennecott Copper, had very specific testimony in this regard. I have been trying to analyze in my own mind why the petroleum industry is so adamant- ly opposed to this idea and want national jurisdiction over the whole Continental Shelf all the way down to the ocean deep. In this regard, the petroleum industry has done a wonderful job of semantic development in the last few years. When most of us went to college, the Continental Shelf was described as the surface of the land mass extending out into the oceans. But, in recent years we have gradually seen this concept, I think, transformed, perhaps through a repetitive process, into a much broader concept; namely the entire submerged portion of the continental land mass extending to the abysmal deep. I firmly believe that the petroleum industry and industry in general would be much better off with an international authority in which we would probably play a very strong role, such as we play in the World 503 Bank, and in this way would then be in a position to look after our interests, including those of our businessmen. Concerning the position of the petroleum, I must confess that the thought which goes through my mind, and I think it is very important to be laid on the table and I hope you will follow this thought in your line of questioning, is that I do believe the tax aspects play an im- portant role. When a U.S. petroleum company operates in Saudi Arabia, for example, the total costs to the company are about 50 per- cent, of which, say, 15 percent is in royalties, and 35 percent in taxes to the Government of Saudi Arabia. Under our tax codes the 15 percent is the normal expense taken for the cost of doing business. The other 35 percent which really is also a fee or a royalty 1s actually treated as a tax under our laws and is taken off as a credit, which means the U.S. taxpayer is financing either the oil company or the Government of Saudi Arabia, and I think that when you look at the fees that are charged, the total of 50 percent is in- ordinately high. During our subcommittee’s hearings, I expressed the thought that our industry was being raped, which the industry considered too strong, but 50 percent is a great deal to pay unless the major portion can be written off against their U.S. tax liability. If we had an inter- national authority, I think 15 percent or 20 percent or 10 percent would seem about right and would be in accord with the fees that are charged by our own Interior Department, and if we had an interna- tional authority, we could make sure that this kind of fee would be established because we would have the muscle, the money, and the know-how that would make the authority work, just as we have con- siderable say in the policies of the World Bank. If the time comes when we are not a world power, which I hope is long after all of us are gone, but history changes, my analysis would change accordingly. But I would think for the foreseeable future that we would be able to dominate any international authority, and it would be to the interests of our industry to have greater access to 90 percent of the world’s continental shelves. There are other tax considerations which I know you who are law- yers are more familiar with than I am, such as doing business through subsidiary corporations in which dealing with a particular nation the rules are all laid out under our tax code, and largely because these rules are established, I think there is a basic apprehension on the part of business, particularly the petroleum industry, to do business with an international authority. ; They know how to do business with nations, but they are a little worried about inefficiency, and they have every right to be, based on the record of the United Nations. They don’t know just what to expect. Peitipe if between both our bodies we removed some of the tax preferences which the petroleum industry enjoys already, you would find also objection to the idea of such an authority. However, I would hope—and I am sure they hope that these preferences are not re- moved—we can still move ahead in formulating plans for an interna- tional authority. , i ; There is another question here and that is the relationship between industry and individual nations, particularly the developing nations. 504 Because of the apprehension about dealing with an international body, some businessmen, I think, would prefer to deal with individual coun- tries. Also, the officials of the developing countries in particular are sometimes more easily persuaded than officials of an international organization. In addition, businessmen are more accustomed to deal- ing on this basis. Yet businessmen have dealt with international au- thorities be it the IBRD, be it IMCO, or be it some other international agency. I think overall we have found that relations have worked out pretty well and that U.S. national and business interests have pros- pered, and this would happen in my view if we moved ahead in the direction which I have outlined. Here I would like to bring in another point with regard to limita- tion of the Continental Shelf. I have recommended the idea of 550 meters or 50 miles. The reason for 550 meters is that, with the know]- edge we have today, the edge of the shelf is not known to occur at a depth greater than 550 meters. As the committee knows, the edge of the Continental Shelf is the dividing line between the shelf proper and the continental slope. With regard to the continental shelves of islands, I have sought to place a limitation on the size of any one shelf by stipulating that the total shelf area may not be larger than the land mass to which it apper- tains. This strikes me as a fair and reasonable limitation, and it elim- inates the problem which might arise of continental shelves were de- limited on the median-line approach, which would mean that a small island, such as San Pietro or the Falkland Islands, could claim a conti- nental shelf area many times greater than its own size. This is a commonsense thought or idea that I think makes so much sense that if repeated sufficiently might secure a degree of interna- tional acceptance. I would welcome any questions. Mr. Lennon. Thank you very much, Senator, for an informative and a most interesting statement. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Mosher. Mr. Mosuer. Mr. Chairman, I don’t think any of us is surprised at the tenor of the Senator’s remarks today because we have all known for a long time his profound interest in this subject, but it is great to have him here in person to say what he has said, and I think his com- ments that have just gone well beyond the printed testimony before us are particularly fascinating. However, I suppose that this matter of the need for a new regime of the seas, even though this committee has to be extremely interested in this, Is really outside our jurisdiction and a little bit beyond our ee concerns in these hearings which have to do with H.R. 13247. Therefore, to bring it back to that bill, I am delighted to have the Senator indicate his support for the creation of a new agency, whether it is NOAA as described in the Commission report or some modifica- tion of that. It is good to know of your support for that, Senator. Is it a fair question—and maybe it isn’t fair—to ask whether in the support you have indicated in your testimony here this morning for an organization such as NOAA, do you think you speak for a con- siderable sentiment over on your side? Do you think that if and when we os ulti proposal over there, it is going to have a friendly, positive reaction ? 555 Senator Petu. Two comments on that. First as to my own support, as I said, I would not want to pin myself down to specifics. It is a general support of the concept of a single agency. I have not yet made up my own mind, for instance, on whether the Coast Guard should be included in NOAA. I think it probably belongs in the new agency, but my support for a new agency is general, and I am sure that as you move ahead in your hearings you will be refining the bill and adding amendments to it and improving it as you go. I personally am strongly in support of the general approach that you have. Now, will my colleagues in the Senate be interested ? The tragedy, I think, in this whole area is that nobody is really in- terested in the problem except the concerned people and those of us who have made a special study of it. I can remember 2 years ago hav- ing a hearing in the Foreign Relations Committee and trying to get people to come up and testify on the question of an international regime. I do not mean to get off the subject, but it is of interest. We couldn’t get industry to take a position. We couldn’t get the Govern- ment to take a position. You go around the world and talk to people and find that the interest in this area is not as great as it should be. I think that the proposals you have been making, your legislation suggestions, make so much sense that once we focus on them I don’t see how we could help but move ahead. I can’t make a prediction now because I think very few people have thought about it. Mr. Mosuer. I certainly agree with you that we who are interested in the oceans need a much larger and stronger constituency. I am in- clined to think it is stronger than most people think. After all, I repre- sent an inland congressional district, although it fronts on Lake Erie, and I consider that a coastal zone to some extent. But it is Midwest, and yet I am surprised at how popular this whole matter is, this whole interest in the oceans is great, even there. It has a lot of romance to it, and I think, as you suggest, when you talk about the pyramids and the plow, there is a readiness to believe out there in the Midwest that in the seas there is a potential return in terms of earthly uses and the strug- gles that man is going through to make a greater future, there is a much greater and more immediate return in the oceans than there is in space. Sabir is a lot of enthusiasm growing, and I think there is a con- stituency growing for the oceans. Senator Pexu. I pray that you are correct. I think many people feel exactly the way you do but, from the viewpoint of the media, I noticed that in the 4 days of hearings we conducted and it may have been a reflection on my own position in the community, we didn’t get one mention in the national press, the New York Times, AP, UPI. I think you are doing better over here in getting it press attention, but so far the press does not find this a very sexy or exciting subject. I would hope they change because when they change, I think that my colleagues will themselves become more seized with the issue. _ Mr. Mosuer. I have been a smalltown newspaperman all my life and I don’t think my profession necessarily always knows what the public is interested in. With that comment, I will return the floor. 26-563 O—70—pt. 24 506 Mr. Lennon. Thank you, Mr. Mosher. Mr. Rogers. Mr. Rogers. Of course, I am delighted to see our good friend and colleague from the other side here. Your leadership in this field has certainly contributed greatly to the entire advancement of our move- ment into the sea. I share your concern about the lack of interest that we have seen develop in many areas. I am concerned ‘about the lack of the capture of the vision of what we could do, I think, by the administration and I realize it is still early, but I am concerned that this has not really been grasped. It is a great potential for development and it has not gone as far as the administration. I know my colleagues on this side are doing ‘all that they can to try to encourage this because I think they see the potential of it and have since the beginning. I think it is a first step. I wonder if you share this view that we should form this organization, but as a first step don’t you think it is important for the Congress to go ahead and move without waiting for the executive in the organization of the ocean-related agencies into a single agency ? Senator Petit. I would agree with you. I think far more than we realize actions are taken as a result of congressional initiative. In the bill that you and I initiated, the sea grant college bill, we had, as you may recall, zero encouragement from the executive branch of Government and now it is one of the pearls in the diadem, a small pearl, a tiny pearl, of the past administration. I would agree with you, ‘and I think also by moving ahead we force the executive to focus on these problems themselves, and this is, I think, the basic point here. If they do not come up with a decision, we must. I read with great interest the priorities that the Vice President as Chairman of the Marine Council enunciated, I think, in your district. They are excel- lent priorities, and I think we should keep going in those directions and, if it takes the Hill to implement those recommendations, then we must move. Mr. Roesrs. This is my feeling. I think the Congress must. go ahead with the initiative here and try to hold this together. I think that is what the intention of this committee is, as the chairman has said. Senator Prt. There is a basic jurisdictional problem here as we are all aware because the subject impinges on different committes. In our body, the Interior and the Foreign Relations and Defense and Com- merce are interested. That is what you have here. _ Mr. Roesrs. Yes. That is why I think we need to go ahead and move it and get it organized. I think that what you are doing in focusing on the international field is important. Here again there has been no real initiative, I think, from the Executive, not only in this administration but in prior administrations, and here again I think the development of the idea and the position this Nation must take ought to be initiated by the Congress again. The comments that you have made and the line of direction, I think is encouraging in setting certain criteria for a be- ginning of the development of the Continental Shelf and an interna- tional organization. 5o7 Is it your thinking that it should be the United Nations itself that we should work through? Senator Prix. No. My thought is the least government, the best government, which has always been a pretty good idea, and I would like to see an international ocean space regime set up under general U.N. auspices, but not under the day-to-day control of the United Nations. I think it best that we keep some aspect of the National Security Council involved because that gives the United States a veto power. I think any international authority involving the seas is going to have to concern the United States, the Soviet Union, and probably France, Britain, and Japan. They should all have a virtual veto on any long- ranging, lasting decisions affecting their national interests, but once these five can agree—and I am substituting Japan for China—it seems to me we could go ahead. The authority itself, as you know and I know, and each of you nas a copy of my proposal, would then move ahead granting licenses on a first-come-first-serve basis; when there is disagreement, the authority would refer it to an adjudicating body. There would also be set up an International Sea Guard along the lines of the Coast Guard; it would enforce the regulations set forth in my proposal. As you all know, anarchy now prevails beyond the territorial waters. For example you may have read of the murder committed on one of the Texas towers off the coast of Great Britain; no law applied in that case. By the same token, a mineral company or an oil company could be exploiting some resources beyond the ‘Shelf, and somebody else could steal them, in which case no law applies as of now. This must be changed, I think, to encourage industry. Mr. Rogers. Thank you very much. Again I want to say that I know the members of this committee ap- preciate the interest and the leadership that you have exerted in the Senate in this whole matter. Thank you. Mr. Lennon. Thank you, Mr. Rogers. May we go off the record for a moment ? (Discussion off the record.) Mr. Lennon. I will recognize our chairman, Chairman Garmatz. Mr. Garmarz. I have just this point. Senator, on page 5 you say you cannot comment on each of the Com- mission’s recommendations but that you have two specific proposals, and one of them is that you have introduced Senate bill, S. 2230, “re- moving the existing restriction on use of foreign-built fishing vessels by our commercial fishermen, as recommended by the Commission.” The House has a bill before it now, and we hope to pass it out soon, that we think will be helpful to the fisheries. I wonder if Congressman Pelly from the State of Washington will elaborate on that bill for just a second for the benefit of the Senator. : Mr. Peniy. Mr. Garmatz, it is pretty obvious that the role of the Congress has been to upgrade our fishing fleet which has some 18,000 old and obsolete vessels, and I presume that Senator Pell’s objective is to do just that by enabling the fishermen to obtain their fishing vessels, as he has said, at about a third or 50 percent of the cost. 508 On the other hand, we have legislation on the books which provides that the Government will pay the difference which has completely failed in its objective. Since 1964 we have succeeded in building only 31 new fishing vessels and most of those were built by people who had never been in the fishing business before. I don’t say most of them, but the major part of the money went into those. We have failed. Now, if your bill was passed and the fishermen of this country were enabled to have their fishing vessels built in Canada or Japan or some other country, I doubt very much whether they would take advantage of that because the facts are in this case that imports of foreign fish have so affected the market in this country that there are not enough profits for the fishermen it seems to me to want to replace their older vessels. I would like your comment on that. I appreciate Mr. Garmatz’ bringing it up. What I want to know is why. Senator Pru. I had a session with the fishermen in my home State who were very upset, as your fishermen are, Congressman, at the close- ness of foreign fishermen, and they were not, as you point out, particu- larly enthused by the idea of buying foreign vessels as my bill would permit when I suggested it to them, but I think that if they actually could buy their vessels at this reduction, you would find normal eco- nomic incentive would cause them to overcome their prejudice against buying a foreign vessel. Mr. Prtiy. They can buy a vessel at that very cost now and have the Government pay the difference. Senator Pern, They can, but as the Commission on Marine Science said, on page 97 of its report: Rather than remove the vessel registration limitation, Congress enacted a vessel construction subsidy act. But the subsidy has not achieved its objectives. That is somewhat along the lines of what you said : A provision requiring a finding that the grant of subsidy not cause economic hardship to others in the fishery has resulted in denial of subsidy to those parts of the industry most in need of aid to modernize their fleets. Generally speaking, if you have a free market, I think those that are most efficient will take advantage of it, and I think that instead of piling one artificial support on top of another, which is what the Ves- sel Subsidy Act does, to try to balance the law of 1794, if we can get rid of both, then those fishermen with the most chance of competition would buy a vessel on the free market. As of now they are, as you point out, very distressed. About 70 percent of the fish: coming here is from foreign ports. I agree with you that the present act has not done the job. Mr. Pruuy. I think the members of the Commission were anything but knowledgeable of the fishing business as far as I know. I talked to a lot of people who are interested in the business, both the small fishermen and the large fishing people, and they haven’t even wanted to replace some of their older vessels with a subsidy because they didn’t feel that it would be profitable. We have reported out a new bill which would allow a subsidy for the rebuilding of older vessels, and for the reconstruction of vessels. As it has been, the millions of dollars that have been spent have gone to a very few new and some old fishing operators and only 31 559 boats have been built since 1964. So I don’t believe that your bill would meet the goal that we have of upgrading and benefiting our existing fishing industry. I wish it would. Senator Pet. It would certainly be to the interest of our taxpayer because it would relieve two balancing subsidy programs. Mr. Pretiy. I must say that it would benefit the taxpayer but it would not do the same to the shipbuilding industry which looks to these construction jobs for its livelihood. IT wouldn’t like to see that business go abroad. Mr. Garmatz. Will the gentleman yield ? Mr. Lennon. You have the floor. Mr. Garmartz. I would be happy to send the Senator a copy of our bill and a copy of our hearings. We don’t want to take up the time of the oceanographic people here this morning on fishing vessels. Thank you very much. Mr. Lennon. Here is specifically a recommendation of the Com- mission. ‘Senator, when did you introduce your bill, S. 2230? Senator Pett. On May 23. Mr. Lennon. Do you have any reason to believe that your sub- committee or your full committee will report out a bill to the Senate which will provide for removing the existing restriction on the use of foreign-built fishing vessels ? Senator Pett. Absolutely none. I don’t think it will get through. Mr. Lennon. That is what I would assume. Senator Pett. It’s referred to the Commerce Committee, not to my own committee. Mr. Lennon. But it will not pass there just as it would not here. Senator Pet. No. Mr. Lennon. Even though it is a recommendation of the Commis- sion, and I would like generally speaking to follow the recommenda- tions of the Commission, because I know they made a study in depth. I think we must recognize that if this would come to pass then the next proposal would be the construction of merchant vessels in foreign yards. That would be the subsequent step and the plea, that we had to do that too to avoid the ship-construction differential subsidy. So we are impaled on the horns of not one but two dilemmas. All right, the next gentleman is the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Downing. Mr. Downtne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, want to add my compliments, Senator, to you for the state- ment which you brought to us, and I must say that you don’t lack for courage in advocating allowing fishermen to buy foreign-built vessels. Also on page 10 you make the statement, “To me both of these fac- tors’—that is the fact that the United States has 10 percent of the world Continental Shelf and the fact that we are the leader in the field of applied marine technology—“To me both of these factors mean that it is to our advantage to limit coastal authority.” — I wonder if you would mind expanding a little bit on that. What do you mean by “limit coastal authority” ? Rin * Senator Perx. I should have spelled that out further. My point 1s that it is not in the interests of the United States to permit an unlim- 560 ited extension seaward of coastal State authority. As you know the conflict that is going on now is that the petroleum industry—with its advocates, the Department of Interior and Commerce—wants coast- al State jurisdiction over offshore mineral resources extended to at least the landward portion of the continental rise or the beginning of the deep ocean floor. On the other side, the Defense Department would probably like to see the Continental Shelf doctrine eliminated. So what we have to do is to try to reach a meaningful compromise, and my view is that the narrower the exclusive coastal State zone the better off we are because so much of the continental shelves around the world are out- side the United States. This is the best approach not only from a security standpoint and an industry standpoint, but, indeed, from a national] standpoint. Mr. Downtne. And you advocate, I believe, the 550 meter depth which is, you say, the lowest depth of the Continental Shelf. Senator Peri. Exactly. The edge of the Continental Shelf is not known to occur at.a depth greater than 550 meters. Mr. Downtne. And I believe that you advocate that the depth beyond that be settled by an international treaty arrangement. Senator Prix.’ That is correct. An international regime to apply beyond the limits of national jurisdiction must be established by a multilateral convention. Mr. Downtna. Do you have any ideas in mind just how this would be done? Senator Petx. Not too specific because I wanted to leave it open, but int he last 3 years we have refined some of these ideas, and it would be an authority, as I said earlier, set up not under the United Nations but in association with the United Nations, The nearest analogy would be the World Bank which has proved very successful, very helpful to our national interest and very helpful to the world. It would be set up along those lines, but with the added factor of providing for adjudicating and enforcement agencies as well. Mr. Downtne. Would this conflict with our defense interests ? Senator Prix. The defense interests may be decided in the next few weeks at Geneva. There are disarmament talks going on now with regard to the Soviet and American draft seabed disarmament pro- posals, and it looks as if there is a possibility of agreement in the next few months. The Defense Department would prefer complete freedom, no regula- tion whatsover, kut I think if you would look through the testimony that they offered to the Subcommittee on Ocean Space, you would find that they would prefer, and you must ask them for themsevles, the kind of approach which I suggested, as versus the approach of the National Petroleum Council. Mr. Downtne. Thank you very much, Senator. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lennon. We will return to the gentleman from Washington who had not completed his questioning. Mr. Prizy. I have my own questions that I would like to ask you S you know, Senator, ir e Convention on the Law of the Hea Gave tne Coast MUALe SOVETeloNnty Over the Wontinental Shelf and 561 beyond, where they could exploit it, and you said that is very vague. To me it is not vague. It is our sovereignty, and we have it now. We might want to yield under your program some of that to an interna- tional body. My question to you is: If we decided to do so, could the great body of which you are a member do it by treaty or could the President of the United States do it by agreement or would it take a joint legislative document of the House and Senate? My understanding is that to give away any property that is under the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the United States, action by both the House and Senate is required. Senator Pruu. I think we have started from different premises, Con- gressman, because I don’t start from the premise that we own the total continental terrace down to the abysmal deep. I agree with you that an argument could be made stating that on the basis of the 1958 Convention. Mr. Pretty. Presume then that we have ownership in some Con- tinental Shelf regardless of how far it goes, some territorial sover- eilgnty. Senator Pexu. If we have ownership then it would be done, I would think, by regular treaty, the treatymaking process, the same way we acquired sovereignty over Alaska by treaty. It would seem to me that this would be the case. Mr. Petty. We bought Alaska, and on the other hand, it seems to me that it would require an act of both the Senate and the House to yield any of that acquisition. Senator Prxt. If it belongs to us, if somebody wanted to give away my State of Rhode Island or yours of Washington, it would seem to me that it would take an act of Congress. But we did not start from that premise that it already belongs to us, and I think we are discussing an “iffy” question. Mr. Petry. I am thinking in terms of the Panama Canal Zone, for example, and I wish that the American Bar Association would, when it becomes their turn, address themselves to that because I would feel a lot safer as far as our possessions and our sovereignty is concerned, if it took the action of both Houses than if it did just the Senate. I don’t say that in a derogatory way about the Senate, but we represent I think more in this body the nationalistic viewpoint in some cases than the international sovereignty that you sort of envision. Senator Pex. I am absolutely sure, as I said earlier. If I had a “y” on the end of my name and were sitting where you are, I would com- pletely agree with you. Mr. Petty. This is a very unusual situation. Senator Pex. But I am not. f Mr. Prtuy. Well, I do think that some of us on this committee have been thinking in terms of yielding some sovereignty to the United Nations and we feel that we should have some say about it here, and I don’t ask you to agree with me, but I do raise it here because I think some of us should be thinking about that as we move forward. ' Senator Peru. It’s a very valid point, and one that some constitu- tional lawyers, I would think, would be boring in on pretty hard. Mr. Petuy. I have consulted the Library of Congress and some others. I want the American Bar Association to address itself to this 562 question and get some concensus. All I get are answers from our State Department that everything is very fuzzy. I want to say that we own this or we don’t own it, and if we do own it then it would require the acquiescence of both bodies to give it away. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lennon. Mr. Karth. Mr. Kartu. Mr. Chairman. Pursuing that line, Senator, you expressed great concern about this Continental Shelf limit business, and I think properly so. After all, our somewhat authoritative State Department is involved, the Depart- ment of Defense is involved, private industry, literally all nations I guess, and therefore there seems to exist a substantial conflict between the settlement of that question and passage of this legislation or any other since a good part of the total field of oceanology involves exploi- tation of the oceans in terms of mineral wealth and whatnot. Are you really saying to us that in your judgment until such time as these Continental Shelf limit questions are resolved that we probably will not get legislation to deal with this problem ? Senator Prrz. No. I don’t think there is any relationship between the idea of NOAA and the regime or the limit of the Continental Shelf. I don’t see a conflict there. Quite honestly I do not believe that we will reach a decision on the Continental Shelf boundary until we know what sort of regime will come along because the two are absolutely intertwined. If the regime is one that we don’t like, we will then go along with the National Pe- troleum Council’s definition and maintain the continental territories right down to the abysmal deep. If it is a regime along the lines of the World Bank, one in which we play a role and in which we believe we can work and be helpful to it and it to us, then we will accept a narrower definition. Mr. Kartu. I am happy to have that clarification. I can see in the future somebody probably opposing the bill on the basis that we might well hold this in abeyance until that other rather knotty question is resolved, but I agree that it need not be in conflict with that. Senator Prix. Personally, as you know, I am moving ahead as far as I can because I think there is the necessity for some force, some pres- sure to move from the dead center position we are on. It is not only in the United States that we have a no-policy policy. You find around the world that the same thing happens. I don’t mean to drop names, but in going around the world I sought to lobby some of these ideas a bit, too. I talked to members of the British Government; to Mr. Kosygin: to Mr. Rebré in France; and I found that the leaders around the world have not focused on these problems as much as we have, and one of the reasons that we have focused on this problem is due to the kind of discussions which we are having here today, discussions which on the Senate side we have had for a couple of years. Mr. Karru. Thank you very much. Mr. Lennon. Thank you. Mr. Dellenback ? Mr. Drtienzpack. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I join in welcoming you, Senator. May I follow a little bit on your colloquy with Mr. Karth. 563 Not only do you not see any objection to passage of this bill so far as vour own concerns as you express them are Senator Prtu. Excuse me. In general I have not. In detail I want to reserve some positions. For instance, regarding the position of the Coast Guard, I have not yet reached a conclusion myself. Mr. Drtiensacx. It is the sort of thing that I would like to pursue just a little bit with you, Senator, if I may. Do I understand you as saying that you don’t of necessity see any conflict between your con- cepts relative to the Continental Shelf, et cetera, and the concept of the United States moving forward with an oceanic atmospheric pro- gram? Am I correct in that ? Senator Petz. I see absolutely no conflict. Mr. Detienseck. Would you then take the next step and say that not only would there be no conflict but subject to some details where you might be in disagreement you feel it would be affirmatively de- sirable that we have the United States move forward with this type of a developmental program ? Senator Prey. Very, very much, indeed, and I strongly support the whole thrust of the Commission report in that direction. Mr. Dertienzack. This I feel is important because, again as Mr. Karth pointed out, as we proceed in this program and hopefully the House will be able to act successfully in this program, I hope there are no misunderstandings about your opinion because you are one who has given attention to this. So again while we don’t ask you to agree with the bill, with every “t” crossed and every “i” dotted, you have made your position clear, and I am glad to hear it, and you think it is not only necessary to move forward, but support our view ? Senator Pet. Very, very strongly, and that is why I am so honored that you are willing to have me here to express these views. Mr. Detiensack. Thank you very much. Senator Prti. One question in connection with moving ahead on the Commission report is that I think there ought to be a decision with regard to a moratorium on claims beyond, say, 200 meters from the viewpoint of permanent ownership until this question can be decided at a future date, and I believe this is in line with the general approach of the Marine Commission report. Mr. Lennon. Thank you. Mr. Hanna? Mr. Hanna. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, am glad to see you again, Mr. Pell, on this very important sub- ject matter which I think you and I have discussed before. You will recall, Mr. Chairman, that I was particularly concerned about the actions of the U.N. on the Continental Shelf some time back. I am glad to hear the statement from the Senator as to his ideas of how we might be able to proceed in that matter. : I am concerned that we as a nation pursue as constructively as we can the idea of some more clear definition of the Continental Shelf than is presently available. I think we should also be pressing for some broader agreement than we now have. It is a matter of continuing con- cern to us, and I think a problem for particularly myself and some others along the Pacific coast that some of the nations are claiming jurisdiction out as far as 200 miles. 564 I think there are some eight or nine nations that have present decla- rations in national policy that would indicate that they have claims which most of us would not support. So that I think there is a need to keep the pressure on and keep our position being pressed. f : | Senator Prey. In response to your point and in line with the exchange with Congressman Pelly concerning whether two adverse points make a right, I am struck here by the fact that it was the Tru- man Proclamation of 1945 which firmed up the notion of coastal State jurisdiction over adjacent Continental Shelf resources, This proclama- tion contained no preuse limit for the Continental Shelf boundary ; then a couple of years later this action on the part of the United States caused those countries which simply have no Continental Shelf to come out with their own claims. Some including jurisdiction over the water column and extending seaward for 200 miles. I think there is a direct relationship between these actions. I would hope in this connection, Mr. Chairman, you might see fit to have your staff look at the statement of Mr. Wilkey, the general counsel of Ken- necott Copper. He wrote a technical paper on this issue which explains the problem more clearly than anything else I have read. Mr. Lennon. Do you have a copy of that that you could furnish our counsel ? Senator Prut. I will submit it for the record. (The statement of Mr. Wilkey follows. The technical paper was placed in the files of the subcommittee. ) STATEMENT OF MALCOLM RICHARD WILKEY Senator Pell’s Senate Resolution 33 postulates in the Preamble: “. . . progress towards international cooperation in the exploration and exploitation of ocean space and its resources and the development of the rule of law in this area of human endeavor is of comparable importance to that achieved in the field of outer space.” It is therefore timely that these hearings on ocean space take place after our astronauts have completed the first human landing on the moon and returned to earth only yesterday. I am particularly grateful to have been asked to present a private industry viewpoint on Senate Resolution 38, because, while so far mankind’s launch into outer space has been entirely accomplished by government propulsion, it has not been so for man’s venture into the ocean deep. Historically the oceans have been the broadest highways of commerce. Historically the oceans have been a principal source of food. Other private uses of the deep sea are rapidly assuming im- portance today, for example, recreation. Activity in oceean space has been and is largely private, individual activity, and will doubtless continue to be so. It is essential, then, that “basic principles” seeking to govern the activities of both nations and private persons and organizations in ocean space should recognize this fundamental fatt. Otherwise the “basic principles,” if in conflict with existing fact, will have difficulty of acceptance. Senator Pell is to be congratulated for his foresight in placing this Declaration of Principles before the Senate for analysis and discussion. Foresight and preplanning many years ahead to match technological development with legal, political, and economic progress are required if we are to make the most of our opportunities in ocean space. Y In the interest of both time and space, I shall spend far more time pointing out sections of Senate Resolution 33 which in my judgment should be changed, rather than endorsing in detail those sections on which I have no suggestions. I don’t want this to indicate an overall criticism of the Declaration of Principles, but this procedure is I think necessary and desired by this Subcommittee. This Res- olution gives thoughtful consideration to many noncontroversial aspects which easily could be overlooked in the drafting of an overall approach to ocean space, 565 and many of these non-controversial sections are equally important with those on which I shall have some suggestions for change. The fundamental principle of this Declaration is found in Part I, Article 3: “Ocean space is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.” It is not essential to have sovereignty, or fee simple title of ownership, to encourage a ‘development of min- eral resources. Article 3 does not rule out the necessary security of tenure to encourage natural resource development. _ The portions of this Declaration which give me the most concern, and which appear to need a reorientation, are found in Part I, Articles 5 and 6, and Part III, Articles 1 and 3. Let’s examine these four Articles together. Article 5 of Part I refers to “The activities of States in the exploration and exploitation of ocean space and its resources. .. .’’ There is no mention of the nationals of states here, while it is obvious that private enterprise historically has had the greatest role in the oceans and probably will so continue in the future. Again, in Article 6: “States bear international responsibility for national activities in ocean space. .. .” Article 6 goes on to say that the activities of non- governmental entities and nationals of states in ocean space “shall require au- thorization and continuing supervision by the State concerned.” Here again is the idea of the State either doing it all or being responsible for it, which is con- trary to both the existing legal and economic situation. Again, in Part III, Arti- cle 1, “States shall engage in such exploration or exploitation only under 1li- censes. . . .”’ There is no reference to “States or their nationals.” Again, in Ar- ticle 3 of Part III is a reiteration of the required authorization of the State for any activity by the nationals of that State in ocean space, comparable to Article 6 of Part I. CONSIDERING THESE FOUR ARTICLES TOGETHER 1. The whole philosophy of Articles 5 and 6 of Part I and Articles 1 and 3 of Part III is that the States are going to do it all in ocean space. This is con- trary to previous history and contrary to what I think a reasonable prognosti- cation at this time would be. If the Declaration of Principles started at this point with the idea that most meaningful economic activities have been and are likely to be carried on by free private enterprise, at least by the Western- non-Socialist world, the Declaration of Principles would be drafted differently here and in several subsequent sections. This would not only avoid certain diffi- culties which I foresee, but would also actually work to accomplish the objec- tives of the Declaration, that is the development of ocean space for the benefit of all mankind, in a much more expeditious manner. 2. With particular regard to Article 6 of Part I, “States bear international responsibility for national activities in ocean space, whether carried on by gov- ernmental agencies or non-governmental entities or nationals of such States,” this appears to broaden greatly State responsibility under existing law. To my mind, such an unqualified principle has never applied to maritime transport, to fishing, to recreation, to oil drilling, or to exploration or scientific experiment in the deep ocean. Would this make the U.S. Government liable in a case of a collision between a U.S. flag ship and the ship of another country in international waters, if the U.S. flag ship were at fault? Could a lone scuba diver, if operating in the deep ocean, implicate the United States? The objects of Article 6 appear to be to avoid conflicts in ocean space and to pin responsibility on parties big enough to shoulder the responsibility, ie., Governments. I submit that the same objectives can be achieved with existing legal principles and a much simpler mechanism, such as the Notice and International Claim Registry recommenda- tions of the President’s Commission. 3. Further under Article 6, “The activities of non-government entities and nationals of States in ocean space shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the State concerned.” This would impose on each nation the exertion of an authority which probably few countries in the Western world exert at the present time. Surely each nation should be left to decide for itself what degree of supervision it will exercise over its own nationals. ; ; 4, If there is set up either a licensing authority or an international claim regis- tration agency as recommended by the President’s Commission, surely minimum supervision over the nationals of an individual country should be sufficient. Com- pliance with the rules and regulations of the international claim registry (dis- 566 cussed later as preferred to the licensing authority set forth in the Declaration ) should be enough. ; : 5. Many practices in ocean space, for example, recreation, require no supervision at all. 6. There is built in here a “flag of convenience” problem. Which State, the State in which the particular persons involved have citizenship, or the State whose flag the vessel or enterprise is flying, shall be required to exert supervision? Are we going to require “a genuine link” between the persons engaged in activities in ocean space, or take the flag of convenience at face value? And what about such international entrepreneurs as Aristotle Onassis, generally thought of as a Greek, usually but not always operating through Greek corporations, but who happens to be a citizen of Argentina? Which nation will be required to exercise supervision over Mr. Onassis’ enterprises? 7. Part III sets up an international licensing authority for exploration or ex- ploitation of ocean space. I respectfully submit that all of the purposes of this Declaration of Principles for ocean space could be accomplished by an interna- tional claim registry of the type recommended by the President’s Commission in its Report in February 1969, and that the creation of a licensing authority will in- troduce many complications and problems which would be avoided by the type of an international claim registry authority recommended by the President’s Com- mission. On pages 147-149 of the President’s Commission Report this international registry authority organization and functions are described in detail. In essence, the internationa] claim registry authority represents an international courthouse, at which mining claims could be filed on a first-come, first-recorded basis. This, I believe, would be acceptable to the mining industry. So long as the international registry authority goes no farther than this, it would be helpful in bringing order, regularity, and certainty into the mineral development of the deep ocean. In comparison with e claim registry system, a leasing or licensing system always interposes a government agency between the individual entrepreneur and his ac- tions, it lessens incentive, and restricts maximum and efficient development. Li- censing systems almost universally entail prior permissions, as Senate Resolution 83 does, operating controls, and if deficient in the clarity of standards for resolv- ing disputes, as S. Resolution 33 may be, it interjects uncertainties which are not conducive to the undertaking of high risk, complicated mining ventures. From the point of view of the mining industry, the international claim registry authority proposed by the President’s Commission Report, “Our Nation and the Sea,” is to be preferred to any prior licensing requirement such as is set out by Senate Resolution 33. Furthermore, such a claim registry on a first-come, first- registered basis would accomplish all of the purposes apparently intended by the licensing authority proposed, and in a much simpler fashion. 8. The whole approach reflected in Articles 3 and 1 of Part III is that States only can make application to the international licensing authority on either their own behalf or on behalf of their nationals. This reliance on the States only stems from the previous provisions that the States will exercise supervision over all activities of their nationals in international ocean space, which is a departure from existing law and will introduce some new complications. There are also some positive drawbacks to having any national government intervene between private enterprises and the international registry (or license) authority. For example, the offices of half a dozen mining companies are only a few blocks from the United Nations. If we were required to forward a mining claim to a Washing- ton bureau to pass on before it could be registered, there could be unfortunate delays and complications. If at any time while a mining claim, or a petroleum claim, was sitting on some Washington official’s desk, waiting for approval to be sent to the international registry or licensing authority and the Russians or the French filed ahead of it, there would be a justifiable howl from any American company. Why any government agency, for example, the Interior Department would want to assume this responsibility of filing claims on behalf of private companies is obscure. The persons or companies who explore and discover such mining claims are the most competent to draft and most interested in seeing that they are filed. Of course, the Department of the Interior might very well demand a record of such mining claims filed by U.S. nationals, and this would be a sensible provision. Or, there might be a provision for simultaneous filing with the inter- national registry authority and the national government in order to validate the claim. In order to discourage international speculators from claiming vast areas for the purpose of peddling, not development, perhaps endorsement by the claim- ants’ national government could be made a condition subsequent to validation. 567 But why put in the chain or process a U.S. Government bureau? And why (other than to swell the bureaucracy) would such government department want to assume the responsibility of filing mining claims on behalf of U.S. companies? This introduces an entirely unnecessary step in the process, and might very well be susceptible to political abuse, or equally bad, be suspected of being politically abused. If licensing instead of simple claim registry on a time-priority basis is used, we have two places, the national government and the international agency, where discretion and authority may be abused or suspected of being abused. 9. Since this Declaration of Principles is to be introduced in the Committee at the United Nations, it perhaps appears logical that the licensing authority, or the international claim registry as many would prefer, would be “designated by the United Nations.” However, this licensing authority to be designated by the United Nations should be clearly an agency independent of the United Nations after it is created, e.g., the parallel of the World Bank. The composition and authority of this independent agency must be spelled out and agreed upon before it will become acceptable to a great many nations—possibly including our own. Let me turn now to Article 4 of Part III, which spells out how licenses are to be issued and on what considerations. 1. This whole provision illustrates the undesirability of having a licensing authority in contrast to a simple claim registry as recommended by the Presi- dent’s Commission. When an office is to issue a license, in contrast to filing a claim, it must have certain criteria on which to issue the license. These criteria must be simple of application, beyond dispute, and not subject to abuse or pos- sible corruption. It is difficult to prescribe such criteria and even more difficult to administer them fairly afterwards, as we see by the very simplest kind of licenses, for example, for a liquor store or a taxicab in New York City. 2. By illustration, the requirement of Article 4 that the licensing authority “shall give due consideration to the potential impact on the world market for each resource to be extracted or produced under such license,” has the poten- tiality of setting up an international cartel in any given natural resource, beyond the power of the Antitrust Division of our Department of Justice to do anything about. This would require the licensing authority to judge between the needs of consumers for supply available at the very lowest price and the needs of the producers to make a “fair” return on their investment. This is the kind of regulation which is difficult to apply even on one product like electricity, much less on the raw material resources of the world. It will be quite a job for any licensing authority. 3. It is really difficult for any regulatory agency to regulate and license (a) intelligently, (b) without political bias—and here we would have an inter- national political bias interjected—and (c) without corruption. Given complete honesty, great intelligence, the good will of all nations, this international licens- ing authority is really being asked to do an enormous job. 4, It is an enormous job which is not necessary to be done. An international claim registry system, as recommended by the President’s Commission, could apply the same specific criteria which are listed under Article 4 with far better results, and with far less chance of being subjected to international criticism from all sides. 5. The validity of the criticism just made of the first part of Article 4 of Part III on the licensing criteria is substantiated by the fact that, if two or more States apply for a license for the same ocean space, there are no criteria (except to benefit developing States) set forth whereby the licensing authority shall determine which State shall receive the license. The licensing authority must have clear criteria given to guide it, otherwise it is subject to criticism no matter what it decides. The simplest criteria, of course, would be on the basis of priority in the time filed. This is customarily the basis on which mining claims are governed, and the basis which the President’s Commission recom- mended be taken in their international claim registry, subject, of course, to the applicant being responsible. The provision in Article 4(b) as now written is an open invitation to “claim jumping” problems on an international scale. Going further to Article 4(c), this states: “A coastal State has a special interest in the conservation of the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil of ocean space adjacent to its territorial sea and continental shelf... .” Exactly what follows from this “special interest” and in what way would this “be taken into account by the Jicensing authority”? Would this give applicants under the flag of the coastal State a priority in getting a license ahead of some other applicant which had applied first or had other superior qualifications? What is 568 the extent of “ocean space adjacent”? How far beyond the continental shelf is “adjacent’’? In Article 4(d) immediately following, the words “in that area’’ apparently refer to this “adjacent” area. To avoid disputes as to whatever follows from these provisions, “that area” and the consequences of being in “that area” should be defined more clearly. Under Article 4(e) an effort is made to reconcile exploitation of natural resources of the seabed with other possibly conflicting economic uses of the sea. Yet there is no attempt made here or in other parts of the Declaration to recon- cile the exploitation of natural resources with military use. There should be, even if it is contemplated that a separate treaty will proscribe permanent military installations on the deep sea bottom. There will always be mobile military uses which should be recognized. With reference to Article 7 of Part III, the power of the licensing authority to suspend, modify, or prohibit the projected activity or experiment which on the allegation of another State might cause potentially harmful interference with its activities, could be used to stymie exploitation and development for years, or to block military activity perhaps. This kind of power really does not need to be vested in the licensing authority itself, but should be part of an overall settlement of disputes mechanism connected with the Principles regulating ocean space. Again, the placing of this type of power in the licensing authority might be considered a logical outgrowth of the concept of licensing itself. If the basic con- cept were an international registry authority, a much simpler mechanism, then probably this type of power would not even be thought necessary, another illustra- tion of the advantages of a simple claim registry system as compared to a licensing authority. Under Article 8 of Part III, I would suggest some provision in regard to the safeguard of proprietary information after any inspection either by the licensing authority or the Sea Guard. I note that under Article 9 there has been an insertion of the right of the license owner to correct any failures of compliance, which had been recommended in regard to the Draft Treaty introduced by Senator Pell. Also, under Article 16, the tribunal for the adjudication of disputes is required to render a decision within a period of ninety days, which is a great improvement over the Draft Treaty. In regard ‘to the review of disputes provisions in Articles 12 through 16, how- ever, I would say this. A review authority is needed. It should insure prompt, fair, and respected adjudication. The provision for ultimate compulsory review by the World Court may cause some States 'to shy away from the whole concept of this Declara'tion of Principles. If this Declaration of Principles were modified in the ways suggested, a great amount of the political overtones of the Declaration of Principles would be elim- inated, and it would stand as the enunciation of Principles for the economic development of ocean space, which along with the reduction of chances of conflict appears to be the basic purpose of this Declaration of Principles. It would also be wise, whatever review tribunal is set up, to permit private parties to litigate on their own in the appellate form. This illustrates again the wisdom of allowing private parties to be the original applicants for either licenses or claim registry. This will serve to de-escalate disputes, which inevitably will arise in regard to deep ocean mineral resources, to private commercial arguments, instead of major political issues between sovereign States. Turning now to Part IV, Use of the Seabed and Subsoil of Ocean Space for Peaceful Purposes Only, I submit that the logical purpose of preserving the sea- bed for peaceful purposes only can best be accomplished separately, not in a Declaration of Principles primarily devoted to the regulation of the seabed for commercial purposes. You will recall that the military provisions were separately considered in the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee, and I believe are now being taken up as part of the general disarmament negotiations. In the U.N. Ad Hoc Committee the United States introduced two separate resolutions, one dealing with the economic development of the deep ocean, and the other dealing with the purely military considerations. You will also recall that the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf gave the coastal state “sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources.” This was a limited extension of the coastal states’ powers for a limited purpose. It is sufficient to insure the development of the mineral 569 resources of the continental shelf under the aegis of the coastal state, to the extent that the coastal state desires and is capable of so developing. A limited purpose regime can similarly encourage and secure the development of mineral resources in ocean space. The linkage of this purpose with military considerations will result in less than the optimum which is obtainable in either the economic or military sphere. In other words, the Declaration of Principles should envisage an international mechanism for administration on as strictly a commercial and economic basis as is possible. It will work better that way. It will be simpler to administer, it will be easier to get adopted, and disputes arising out of it can be settled on ‘a much lower plane. Military and other not necessarily related considerations can and should be dealt with in separate instruments on separate bases. For the moment I will pass over Part VI, Limits of the Continental Shelf, and turn to Part VII, the Sea Guard. I have mixed feelings about the proposal for the Sea Guard. The existence of it would reduce the dangers of an armed clash of national forces arising out of conflicting claims in ocean space. The develop- ment of an international sea force is a step in the direction of creating an inter- national force to reduce the chances of national conflict, which is generally to be applauded. On the other hand, in consideration of the overall objectives of this Declara- tion of Principles, the rationale for the Sea Guard largely disappears if mili- tary use restrictions are deleted from the proposed Declaration of Principles. It may be useful to create the U.N. Sea Guard if political and military issues are to be dealt with in this Declaration. But if we deal with clearly economic and commercial matters, then the Sea Guard does not appear necessary. If the Sea Guard is compared in power to the naval forces of any national fleet, proportionally it probably is reduced simply to an observer force anyway. To police compliance with commercial restrictions relating to the licensing or claim registry, an observer force without the military connotations of the Sea Guard could be utilized for commercial inspection purposes, and would fulfill all required functions. Turning now to Part VIII, Crimes in Ocean Space, I think this is a highly useful and necessary provision. It is a good example of various provisions scat- tered throughout this Declaration of Principles on which I have not commented, which are laudable and probably non-controversial, and might be overlooked without Senator Pell’s having introduced Senate Resolution 33. I have deferred discussion of Part VI, Limits of the Continental Shelf, until the last, because the problems raised by this are illustrative of the interrelationship of the boundary location and the legal regime governing ocean space, are a dem- onstration of the degree and source of the urgency to create the detailed legal regime for ocean space, and discussion of this logically leads into the overall pro- cedure which I believe we should follow to secure the objectives of this Declara- tion of Principles. First of all, in regard to the limits of the continental shelf and the recom- mended boundary at a depth of 550 meters or a distance of 50 miles from the base line of the territorial sea, remember the history of all negotiations con- nected with boundaries in the deep sea. At every international conference it ap- pears that the other nations wait to see the position of the United ‘States on the boundary of the territorial sea, the continental shelf, or whatever is up for dis- cussion, and then take the U.S. position as the narrowest and proceed from there to enlarge it. An enormous part of nite discussion of the boundary of the continental shelf has come from advocates of a so-called broad shelf, who appear to be animated by a fear that other nations will not accept a claim by the United States to a broad shelf, and that there is some immediate requirement that the United States assert such a claim. All history of similar negotiations show just the opposite. We have no difficulty getting accepted however broad a claim we make, the others have always gone us several miles better. Now what is the urgency of creating this international legal regime, and how does this urgency derive from the interrelationship of the boundary location and the character of this new international legal regime governing ocean space? I must say that I agree with Senator Pell that there is some urgency in develop- ing a more detailed public order for the oceans, although I would not call it exactly a “threat of anarchy’, since there is no legal void existing in the deep ocean. The long recognized principles of freedom of the seas apply to the use of 570 international waters and the taking of mineral resources of the deep ocean seabed and subsoil. In a nutshell, the use of the ocean surface and the water column beneath belongs to everyone, and can therefore be appropriated by no one; the fish and other living organisms, the mineral resources of the deep ocean seabed and subsoil, belong to on one, and can therefore be appropriated by anyone; anyone engaged in the use of the seas and utilization of its resources in accord- ance with these rules is entitled under international law to be undisturbed in his exercise of such rights. However, the present legal rules may not envisage a United States national merely staking a claim on the ocean floor, then leaving the area unoccupied returning to it without challenge by an actual occupant. Nor is there the other certainty and specificity of mining rules necessary to justify a large-scale invest- ment in a fixed location mineral development at the present time. - Exactly when such specific rules will be needed is impossible to predict at this time; it depends on the march of technology now proceeding at a rather rapid pace. Within a decade we probably will be testing a system of “harvesting” nodules. Whether it will be commercially profitable is another matter. Mining the ocean bottom, if it comes at all, will be much later. ‘Since the large-scale development of any mineral resources in the deep ocean may require a detailed specific regime which does not now exist, and the articula- tion of this detailed legal regime is interlinked with the location of the boundary of the continental shelf, it is not too soon to be thinking seriously about where the poundary should be and of what the international legal regime and organizational structure should consist. For the mining industry this interrelation of location and legal regime accelerates the need for boundary location. ‘ The seabed and subsoil of these international ocean areas, on all present knowl- edge, contain much the greater part of the resources attractive to the hard mineral industry. In terms of both industry and national interest, an international legal and poli- tical framework applicable to these resources is therefore a matter of immediate concern. It will take time to do this, thus working out an acceptable international legal regime is an important part of our planning today. In this planning, we are fully justified in carefully balancing our potential but not yet realized continental shelf claims against the kind of international legal regime we want. 'The President’s Commission recommended a formula for establishing the bound- ary between the area of national jurisdiction and the international zone, and simultaneously recognized that there is an important interrelation between the boundary location and the characteristics of the legal regime on either side of the boundary. Obviously, if a detailed international legal regime and organizational structure can be worked out that is highly encouraging to free private enterprise in the development of the mineral resources of the deep ocean, a narrow continental shelf would be acceptable. In such a situation a narrow continental shelf would mean that U.S. private industry would have access to mineral resources on favorable terms, whether on the U.S. continental shelf or in the international zone, and most importantly would have the advantage that the continental shelves of other coastal states around the world would be narrow. We thus would have unrestricted access to vast areas of the deep ocean which otherwise could be locked up by coastal states, and even on the shelves of the coastal states, the availability of favorable terms in the international area would put competitive pressure on the coastal states to grant reasonable terms on their continental shelves. On the other hand, if either an international legal regime and organizational structure unfavorable to free enterprise development is worked out, or no legal regime with the requisite certainty and specificity of rules is formulated at all, then the argument will be irresistible for a broad Treaty Continental Shelf in order that American industry have the certainty of operating under known and established rules. Hopefully, these would be favorable to private industry on the U.S. continental shelf and on the continental shelves of at least some other coastal nations around the world. _ The President’s Commission cautioned that its “major recommendations are interrelated.” I submit that so are the Principles embodied in Senate Resolution 33. Whether in regard to these or other proposals in negotiation, this illustrates U.S. bargaining in the international arena must be extremely careful not to commit ourselves to one essential element until all essential elements are safely under control. o71 I submit that, thinking in terms of United States long-term strategy in ocean space, basic to this truly complex development of deep ocean mineral resources is the imperative need the synchronize and coordinate diplomacy, domestic legis- lation, and administrative practice with the acquisition of knowledge and the ereation of technology in the deep ocean. We need more even rudimentary knowledge of the ocean depths and the re- sources which may or may not be there. We are only beginning to create a tech- nology which will lead first to knowledge and ultimately—we hope—to com- mercial exploitation. A genuine need exists to educate the governmental officials of all nations as to the realities of life in ocean space. Great expectations of immediate wealth have been fostered ; these must be quietly, patiently exposed as drastically overdrawn. At this stage of our knowledge we cannot prepare a final draft of a detailed legal regime for ocean space. We should not assert that the boundary between the coastal state continental shelf and the international ocean space should be here and nowhere else, irrespective of the shape of the reciprocal pieces in this puzzle. Nor is it yet time to call another conference on the Law of the Sea, or to promul- gate a U.N. resolution at this moment, although that might become appropriate later. This does not imply inaction. We have a tremendous amount of work to do educating ourselves and the other nations as to how best to attain and utilize, under what rules and which governmental entities, the resources of ocean space. Our ideas as to the legal regime should develop coordinately with the progress of technology. In furtherance of the objectives of this Declaration of Principles, S. Res. 33, I submit that we can and should do the following: 1. Create a U.S. mining claim law for our own continental shelf. This we should be able to draft now, realizing that domestic legislation or administra- tive rules are much easier to change than an international treaty. 2. Gain operating experience under this mining claim law and the Con- tinental Shelf rules of other nations. 3. Continue exploration and research in the deep ocean, under the present general rules of international law, supplemented as time goes on by informal codes of conduct agreed to by the great maritime powers. 4, Work out interim arrangements in limited areas with the few nations directly concerned on a reciprocal basis, fixing the shelf boundary and ele- mentary detailed rules for the limited international area; gain experience working on and off the shelf under the applicable coastal state and inter- national rules. 5. Set up a simple international claim registry office, where notice can be given of intent to work or actual working of a particular area of the deep ocean seabed or subsoil. 6. As technological capabilities expand, develop concurrently from avail- able working experience in all areas a body of detailed rules for mineral resource exploitation of the international deep ocean. Despite reliance for a number of years on currently established international law, unquestionably some day new detailed rules will be needed. Some industries and some nations may have little interest in establishing an international. legal regime in detail. But for a Great Power like the United States, particularly for its hard mineral industry, the need may be paramount in little more than a decade. AS we learn, we must think, write, create these rules. 7. As the body of the detailed international legal regime slowly develops, with the concurrence of the great maritime powers and the most important coastal states, on the basis of general satisfaction with and adherence to these international rules, create the simplest appropriate international ma- chinery to secure compliance with this international legal regime. 8. At the same time, when we know generally what the rules and their enforcement machinery will be like in the international zone, delineate spe- cifically and finally the boundary between the Treaty Continental Shelf and the international area. 9. Throughout this process, not in an arrogant spirit but as a realistic rec- ognition of the capacity of the United States in international negotiations, keep in mind the strong bargaining position of the U.S. : —Without Agreement, there can be no new detailed international legal regime; 26-563 O—70—pt. 2——5 572 —Without a New International Legal Regime, there can be no reve- nue from Ocean Space for the Less Developed Countries ; —In the absence of an overall international Agreement, operating ar- rangements on. a reciprocal basis between a few Great Maritime Powers could probably be worked out, and as a practical matter would likely provide the requisite certainty to encourage the min- eral development of the Deep Ocean. 10. The United States has an important stake in World Public Order, his- torically in the “Public Order of the Oceans’, and it should not hesitate to use its strong bargaining position to secure Public Order in Ocean Space on fair and reasonable terms. I am grateful to Senator Pell and this Committee for the opportunity to present these views. Mr. Hanna. Then it seems to me that there is one other point that needs some attention in terms of our approach and that is that as I read it there are different attitudes toward sovereignty and how you are willing to break off your sovereignty in some of the leading na- tions. I think that the attitude of some people in the United States has been a little more liberal than you could claim for some other places in terms of their willingness to be subjected to decisions made outside our country. - [ think that a narrow approach would be that although you might have an international authority that its encroachment on your sov- erelgnty would not go any further than specific treaties and agree- ments spelling out very definitely where their operational lines were. I doubt that you would go very far if you didn’t spell that out very strongly. I can’t see the World Bank, for instance, as being a law- maker. It operates on the basis of its ‘swat which is cash which is a pretty big swat, and you can get the conduct and response of parties predicated not upon the fact that this is law but predicated on the fact that you have something they want and if they don’t do what you tell them you withhold the thing desired, which is another way to get conduct ironed out, but it isn’t predicated on law. Maybe you have some idea of putting this kind of swat into the international authority. Senator Peri. The problem is that there are so many inevitable con- flicts. For instance, an oil rig might be constructed in a fishing ground ; some law or some authority must determine who has what rights and where. What I find so hard to believe is that we have a body of law gov- erning outer space as to the discoveries made on the moon; while it has not been spelled out, there is some body of law that covers the resources of outer space, ‘but we don’t have any such body of law to cover the resources of inner space or ocean space. Mr. Hanna. Well, Mr. Chairman, T think that there is a distinction to be made in terms of expressions that are called law that are barely general in their coverage and those things that are real active law which in my judgment don’t come into being at all until you have created a situation in which there is a power on the part of one party and a duty on the part of another party and an enforcement agency in between to be sure that the party with the power can wield it and the party with the duty has to assume it and if you haven’t got to that pont, it seems to me you have got a rather weak situation to be calling it law. . 573 In that regard, Mr. Chairman, I hope that at an appropriate time we might be able to include in the declaration of policies and objectives in your section 102 a positive statement about the encouragement of the advancement of the law of the sea because I think that you are going to run into this every turn you make, and I don’t think that we have had a sufficient attention to that in the past. Now, in the immediate present, I think that there has been lots more awareness, for instance in the American Bar Association. Since you are working in oceanography, Mr. Chairman, I think they have become tremendously alert and more actively engaged in constructing the posi- tive law of the sea, but I think we are a long way from the mark that we have to hit before we are going to be in a good posture, Senator, to do some of the things that you have in mind both within and without the country. ; Senator Prexy. The tragedy is that if we keep waiting and this is, I think, what the petroleum industry would like to see happen, if we keep waiting, national claims will have been laid to the total continen- tal terrace and it will be too late because you can never roll the carpet back. You can only roll it ahead. Mr. Hanna. I join you in the concern, but I would say that that is only an added reason for us to make a very strong statement of policy and objectives relative to establishment of more effective positive posture for the law of the sea. That is all, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lennon, Thank you. Do you have any additional questions, Mr. Chairman ? Mr. Kerrn. I have just one question. Mr. Lennon. Off the record. (Discussion off the record.) Mr. Kerru. I was involved this morning at the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Mr. Lennon. Senator, in your opening remarks you decry the fact that the whole spectrum of oceanology and oceanography and marine sciences was not getting through the news media any attention and unfortunately, although we are grateful that they are here, practically the only press media that attend hearings related to this sort of subject matter are people who are editors and writers for magazines and periodicals related to the subject matter. It just simply doesn’t attract attention. I am struck with what you say here, and I think this judgment is shared by a lot of people, and I quote you from page 3: ‘While detracting not in the least from our building of pyramids in space, I believe our national oceanologic program has far greater potential for enriching the life of man here on earth. Recognizing that you are a person who is tremendously interested and concerned with the subject matter, that is worthy of a headline in all of our news media, but if that isn’t sufficient to attract attention, I think we can requote the statement made by Mr. Drucker: * * * we are about to tackle systematically the development of the oceans as the greatest economic resource to be found on this earth. Now, those quotes should get into the news media at all levels, the press, television, the radio, the dissemination where one dissenter can 574 get out here and be interviewed on any subject matter and get publicity on every news media in the land but things that are vital and essential to the welfare of people don’t get that kind of attention. I say that hopefully that the representatives of the news media here will requote the distinguished Senator and requote Mr. Drucker’s state- ment. In connection with a matter that has been discussed so much in detail, the international law of the sea and its implications, I am going to ask something of our new counsel who is making his first appearance, and I did not take the time to introduce him since most of you have had the pleasure of meeting him, the former distinguished professor of law at one of our great universities, a person who is a graduate of the Coast Guard Academy and who had a very distinguished career in the Coast Guard, and then when he left the Coast Guard after serving with dis- tinction and honor in that great organization, he pursued the course of his desire, law, especially in the field of international law. I am going to ask him to take your statement, particularly that latter part of it and try to study it and get the information from the statement that you said that you would secure for us made by someone before your committee. We are going to put you on this board and make a wit- ness out of you. We are going to want you to redevelop what has been said here this morning so that we can go into that in some special session. Thank you very much, Senator. Did you want to ask a question ? Mr. Kerru. I want to apologize for my inability to get here sooner. I have been as interested in the subject as anybody. Mr. Lennon. You just go right ahead, sir. Mr. Kerrn. Not having been here for your statement and not having heard the discussion that has been provoked by your comments, I have only one question. First, however, I would like to compliment the Sen- ator on the progressive role that he is playing in developing a discus- sion of this subject and a widespread knowledge of it. My one question is: Have you solicited, by chance, the opinion of the eminent scientist Dr. Paul Fye at Woods Hole as you developed your views on this subject ? Senator Prix. I know Dr. Fye. We have exchanged correspondence, and I have not specifically asked him for his comment on Senate Reso- lution 33, no. But I have addressed meetings in which he has been a participant. Mr. Kerrn. Thank you. I will be glad to ask Dr. Fye for his com- ments. He has been before this committee on many occasions. Senator Pett. He would make an excellent witness. Mr. Lennon. Thank you, Mr. Keith. Thank you, Senator. Senator Peri. Thank you. Mr. Lennon. We are very honored this morning to have the gentle- man whose name I mentioned earlier, Mr. Northcutt Ely, who is the chairman of the Committee on Deep Sea Mineral Resources of the American Branch of the International Law Association, and a mem- ber of the Council of the Natural Resources ‘Section of the American Bar Association. Mr. Ely, will you come forward ? 575 STATEMENT OF NORTHCUTT ELY, OF WASHINGTON, D.C., ON BE- HALF OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND ITS SECTION OF NATURAL RESOURCES LAW gis Lennon. Let me ask you, sir, your statement will take about how ong ? . Mr. Ery. I shall accommodate myself to your convenience, Mr. Chairman. I would suggest that if it suits you, my statement be printed in full as though read, and I will summarize it. Mr. Lennon. I would appreciate that under the circumstances, be- cause I am advised we will have an early quorum call. Without objection the gentleman’s full statement will be printed in the record at the appropriate place, and then you take as much time as you like, sir. Mr. Exy. Thank you. (The documents may be found at the close of Mr. Ely’s testimony.) Mr. Kry. My name, ‘Mr. Chairman, is Northcutt Ely. I am a mem- ber of the law firm of Ely and Duncan, of Washington, D.C. I am a member of the Council of the Section of Natural Resources Law of the American Bar Association, and appear here by direction of the chair- man and council of that section. I annex as appendix A a resolution (No. 73) of the House of Dele- gates of the American Bar Association, adopted at its August 1968 meeting. This is incorporated in a Joint Report of the Sections of Natural Resources Law and International and Comparative Law and the Standing Committee on Peace and Law Through United Nations, recommending that resolution. Only the resolution itself states official policy of the American Bar Association. The balance of the annexed 1968 joint report states the supporting argument of the sections which recommended the adop- tion of the resolution. The resolution, and the supporting report, deal with two major subjects : 1. The seaward limit of the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States with respect to exploration and exploitation of submarine min- eral resources; 2. The international arrangements which should control the explo- ration and exploitation of submarine mineral resources seaward of the limits of national jurisdiction of the coastal nations. In discussing these I shall refer to a pending draft report of these same sections which will come before the councils of the respective sections next week, and I must therefore for the moment refer to it as a draft report.* : cane First, as to the submarine mineral resources within national juris- diction: The character, and the geographical limit, of the rights of coastal nations are controlled by the Convention on the Continental Shelf with respect to those nations which are parties to it, as our country is. Some segments of the convention have been construed by the International Court of Justice as stating customary international law, which is generally applicable even in the absence of agreement. 1 This report was approved by the sections of Natural Resources Law and International and Cooperative Law and the Standing Committee on World Order Under Law at the August 1969 meeting of the American Bar Association. The full text is annexed. 576 The articles of the convention which are pertinent to today’s discus- sion are articles 1, 2, and 3. Article 1 defines the term “continental shelf” as referring “to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or”—and here is the crucial point—“‘or beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural re- sources of the said areas.’ Article 2 of the convention states in section 1, paragraph No. 1, that “the coastal State exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources.’ Paragraph 2 of that article is frequently overlooked. It says: The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this article are exclusive in the sense that if the coastal State does not explore the continental shelf or exploit its natural resources, no one may undertake these activities, or make a claim to the continental shelf, without the express consent of the coastal State. Article 2 goes on in paragraph 3 to say : The rights of the coastal State do not depend on occupation, effective or notional, or on any express proclamation. Article 3 stipulates that : The rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf do not affect the legal status of the superjacent waters as high seas, or that of the air apace: above those waters. On this subject, that is to say, the geographic extent and the char- acter of the jurisdiction of the coastal nation, the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association in 1968 adopted a resolution, its full text is annexed. It recommends: That the United States consult with other parties to the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention with a view to establishing, through the issuance of parallel declara- tions or by other means, an agreed interpretation of the definition of the boundary between the area of exclusive sovereign rights with respect to natural resources of the seabed and subsoil and the deep ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. The House of Delegates’ resolution went on to recommend: That within the area of exclusive sovereign rights adjacent to the United States, the interests of the United States in the natural resources of the sub- marine areas be protected to the full extent permitted by the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf. The supporting report of the sections that underlay this resolution, and was before the house of delegates when it adopted it, said this: The Convention’s definition of the seaward extent of the coastal State’s juris- diction has been subjected to a number of interpretations. Some argue that the factor of exploitability would carry the coastal nation’s exclusive mineral jurisdiction to mid-ocean. We disagree. Others argue that it should be restricted to waters as shallow as 200 meters or 12 miles from shore. We disagree with this, too. The better view, in our opinion, is that the “exploitability” factor of the Con- vention is limited by the element of “adjacency.” The exclusive sovereign rights of the coastal nations to the exploration and exploitation of the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil encompass “the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea.’”’ According to this view, therefore, the exclusive sovereign rights of the coastal nations with respect to the seabed min- erals now embrace the submerged land mass of the adjacent continent down to its junction with the deep ocean floor, irrespective of depth. 577 In a footnote to my prepared statement I point out that in our 1969 draft report, which will soon be submitted to the respective councils, we say that there may well be a difference of opinion as to whether the 1958 convention should be construed as saying that the jurisdiction of the coastal nations now, underscoring “now,” embraces the area down to this junction with the deep ocean floor, or whether, on the other hand, it should be construed simply as carving out and protecting the ex- clusive right, the exclusive option, of the coastal nation to extend its jurisdiction out to that limit progressively as technology permits ex- ploitation at greater and greater depths. Many of us feel that it does not matter greatly whether the outer limit of exclusive sovereign rights of the coastal nation is characterized as a boundary of rights hereto- fore vested in the coastal nation, or as a limit on jurisdiction to be acquired in futuro by exploitation at greater and greater depths, be- cause in either event article 2 of the convention stipulates that occu- ation and exploitation by any other state of the area within this outer na is prohibited. This outer limit, as I shall develop in a moment, is, we think, the junction of the continental landmass with the deep ocean floor, far beyond the 200-meter depth line. Out to this limit, we are dealing with an area which is now within the exclusive field of interest of the United States. Whether or not it is characterized as being territory in which the sovereign rights of the United States are now vested, it is clearly an area from which all other nations are excluded, and which is reserved exclusively for exploita- tion under the authority and license of the United States, as the ad- vance of technology makes such exploitation possible. I continue now with the quotation from the report of the sections in 1968 as to why the maximum rights under the Coatinental Shelf Convention should be asserted and defended by our Government. I quote : If the minerals underlying the seabed adjacent to our coasts remain under American control, as they now are under the Continental Shelf Convention as we construe it, they continue to be resources available for national defense, es- sential components of the American economy, and important elements of the Federal and State tax base. We do not believe that it is in the interests of the United States that negotia- tions for the creation of an international regime to govern mineral development of the ocean floor should proceed on the assumption that this new regime will have authority to take over the administration of, or the governmental revenues derived from, the development of the minerals or any part of the submerged segments of the American continent. In our opinion, the United States should stand on its rights under the Con- vention as heretofore ratified. If legal uncertainties are believed to constitute an impediment to utilization of undersea mineral resources, such uncertainties can be eliminated by uniform declarations of the coastal nations which are parties to the Convention on the Continental Shelf, identifying their claims of jurisdiction with the submerged portion of the continental land mass, and reciprocally restricting their claims accordingly. No new conference to amend the Continental Shelf Convention iS necessary to accomplish this. I referred earlier to the 1969 draft report of these same sections, which will go before the respective councils next week. In this draft report, the lawyers who have been studying this matter exhaustively for the past several months say this: We reaffirm our opinion that the concept of adjacency contained in the present Shelf Convention should properly be interpreted to include the submerged con- 578 tinental land mass. In the view widely held among our members, all of the sub- merged continental land mass is subject to national jurisdiction over its natural resources. In the view of a significant number of our members any part of this land mass will come within national jurisdiction as soon as it becomes accessible to exploitation. dw ieark We reaffirm our opinion that it would not be desirable, in terms of overall United States interests, to seek a formal international conference for the pur- pose of fixing a precise boundary for the legal shelf. We believe it both preferable and proper to achieve this aim through parallel declarations by interested states announcing a uniform interpretation of the criteria embodied in the 1958 Convention. We reaffirm our opinion that the United States should assert to the full rights over adjacent submarine areas now vested in it by the Shelf Convention and by general international law. We reaffirm our opinion that claims to rights in excess of those recognized in the Shelf Convention (such as rights over the superjacent waters, non-sedentary fisheries, or airspace) are invalid extensions of the continental shelf doctrine, and should be so regarded by the United States. The position stated in these comments necessarily leads us to disagree with rec- ommendations of the Commission on Marine Science Engineering and Re- sources “. .. that the United States should take the initiative to secure interna- tional agreement on a seaward limit for the legal shelf at the 200-meter line (or 50 miles offshore, whichever is greater). Both these limits have now been ex- ceeded in practice, and they must be regarded as obsolete. We also disagree with the proposed initiative to seek international agreement if this means the convo- eation of a formal conference for that purpose.” Now, Mr. Chairman, I turn to the second subject of discussion ; namely, mineral resources seaward of the limits of national jurisdic- tion. Beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, what international ar- rangements should govern mineral] development ? On this point the House of Delegates’ recommendation in 1968 said this: That on the basis of the information now available, the most desirable long- range goal for a regime to govern exploration and development of the mineral resources of the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil beyond the limits of national jurisdiction is not the creation of a supersovereignty with power to grant or deny mineral concessions, but rather agreement upon norms of conduct designed to minimize conflicts between sovereigns which undertake such exploration and development. That the resources of the bed and subsoil of the deep sea, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, be the subject of a study and consultation with a view to formulating rules and practices to be observed by common restraint or by other arrangements which will assure, inter alia, freedom of exploration by all nations on a nondiscriminatory basis, security of tenure to those engaged in producing the resources in compliance with such rules, encouragement to discover and de- velop these resources, and optimum use to the benefit of all peoples ... The Marine Science Commission report recommends an Interna- tional Registry Office, in which nations shall register their claims to the deep sea bed, on a first in time first in right basis. On this, our 1969 joint report says: Our 1968 Report (pp. 12-13) suggested consideration of a registry scheme as a long-range objective in contrast with proposals for vesting jurisdiction in a supranational agency to grant or deny mineral concessions in the areas beyond national jurisdiction. We consequently approve the Commission’s similar con- clusion, which avoids vesting of title to deep-sea resources in the United Nations (p. 147) and which seeks to create an administrative organ of limited but useful scope. In varying degrees, however, we have misgivings over specific details of the Commission’s proposal, including the following : (1) The structure of the Authority. Its organization must reflect the realities of ocean capabilities, and must be insulated from caprices of the moment in the General Assembly. avg (2) The power of the Authority to veto claims and to fix their size and duration. In order to avoid the abuses which can arise from monopoly power, the rights of claimants in all essential respects should be established in the treaty creating the regime. (3) The denial of any re-registration preference to a state which had developed the area concerned. Such a policy could seriously impair incentive to exploit. (4) The provisions that claims must be registered by a state or states. This presents problems in situations where private enterprise has invested in preliminary exploration and seeks to perfect its rights in an area before claim-jumpers can take advantage of its work. It should be made certain that the principle of first-come, first-registered” would apply as of the date the applicant gave proper notice to the Authority that it had filed with a member state an application that it register on the applicant’s behalf. (5) The standard of an adequate return. This is a difficult and unrealistic concept to apply to the extractive industries, where risks are high and many unsuccessful attempts have to be paid for out of the small percentage of successful ventures. (6) Scientific research. Care must be exercised to prevent the registration system from being used to impede genuine scientific research. (7) The concept of ‘paper claims,’ ie., speculative registrations. A specu- lative race to the registry office, a ‘race to grab,’ is inevitable if the reward for being first in line, without any prior exploratory effort, is to receive a power to exclude all others from a large area for a period of several years. Experience with mineral laws on land has proven this. ‘Under the 1968 Resolution of the House of Delegates, the American Bar Asso- ciation is committed to support the development as soon as practicable of inter- national arrangements to govern the exploitation of deep-sea resources beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. Such arrangements, the Resolution affirms, must assure, inter alia, “. . . freedom of exploration by all nations on a nondiscrimina- tory basis, security of tenure to those engaged in producing the resources in com- pliance with such rules, encouragement to discover and develop these resources, and optimum use to the benefit of all peoples... .” \Except for the intermediate zone proposal, and subject to the various caveats expressed in the foregoing comments, we believe that the Commission’s recom- mendations for a deep-sea regime are broadly in harmony with the principles of the Resolution. We would reiterate our belief, however, that the details of the Commission’s proposed registry plan need careful attention before being submitted as a basis for international discussions. There are, in our opinion, too many loose ends and loopholes which might permit abuse in connection with the requirements for the registration, maintenance and vacating of claims. We are all against a race to grab. It is difficult at present for anyone to grab the deep seabed physically but the concept of registration of paper claims would for the first time create the mechanism to make such a grab possible. Obviously safeguards against such a possibility must be drawn with the utmost care, but the factual data necessary for meaningful draftmanship are not yet available. Many of our members strongly believe that the first step, in setting up a deep sea regime, should not be the establishment of a system which recognizes paper claims or purely speculative registrations, but should be, instead, agreement on norms of conduct to be observed by the nations capable of carrying out deep-sea mineral exploration. Such norms would be designed to minimize interference between expeditions or operators, and to preclude jumping of areas which are under actual exploration or development, plus reasonable protective margins. This, they believe, may well evolve into a more formal system of registry of claims. put only after enough information has been acquired to make possible an agreement on criteria with respect to areas, duration, diligence requirements, and other factors historically associated with mining rights. Such consensus on norms of conduct should be without prejudice to any agreement to dedicate some portion of the value of production from deep-sea- mineral resources to agreed international purposes. The Commission also proposes an “Intermediate Zone.” Our 1969 report contains the following description and comment : 1 This concept was referred to in our 1968 Joint Report. 580 In the Commission’s view, mineral resources of the deep sea do not in fairness or law belong to the coastal states to the exclusion of other states from their benefits. However, the Commission recognizes that some coastal states may regard themselves as having preferential rights to resources of a reasonable subsea area beyond the treaty shelf and also have a national security interest in adjacent offshore areas. For these reasons, some coastal states might be reluctant to agree to a narrow treaty shelf without recognition of their particular interests in the area immediately beyond. As a compromise of the foregoing opposing views, the Report recommends the creation of an intermediate zone of seabed, seaward of the treaty shelf as defined by the Commission, to the 2,500 meter isobath or 100 nautical miles from the baseline of the territorial sea, whichever gives the greater area. The boundary would be permanently fixed as in the case of the shelf. The Commission assumes that the 2,500 meter isobath is the average depth at the foot of the geological continental terrace or slope and 100 miles is the average width of the shelf and slope or terrace. (Geologists do not all agree that these assumptions are true or relevant). Only the coastal state or its licensees would be authorized to explore and ex- ploit resources therein. It need not do so, but if it does so, its claims must be registered with the Authority and would come under the other terms and condi- tions of the international regime. Comment This proposal is essentially an effort by the Commission to propitiate the pro- ponents of a broad treaty shelf. Many of the arguments summarized earlier with regard to the proper limit of the shelf are also applicable, pro and con, to this intermediate zone concept. If the Commission’s intermediate zone proposal were adopted, in conjunction with a narrow shelf, foreign coastal nations would have exactly the Same power to exclude American companies, or to demand burden- some concession terms, as they would have if their jurisdiction were commen- surate with a broad shelf extending to the 2,500 meter isobath or other outer limit of the proposed intermediate zone. Such a zone has, however, other draw- backs, of which the most weighty is perhaps its sheer awkwardness. Areas sub- ject to divided responsibility are rarely viable, as the history of condominia and internationalized zones in international law indicates. ‘On balance, we are opposed to this proposal. An alternative proposal which has been put forward would call for complete coastal state authority over the zone but would provide for some kind of pay- ments to the International Fund. Such an arrangement would be less objection- able, but it might lessen the incentives to the coastal state and its licensees to push on with development. It is also possible to foresee administrative difficulties under this system as well. In closing, I want to say, Mr. Chairman, that I appreciate this oppor- tunity to present the views of the American Bar Association and of cer- tain of its sections and committees. I again caution that the bar associ- ation speaks only through resolutions of the house of delegates. The additional items that I read to you from reports represent the views of the sections. What I have interpolated, and shall say in answer to your. questions, represents my own views. I do ask leave to include as part of my statement three appendices. Appendix A is a resolution of the house of delegates which is in- corporated in the report of the sections. Appendix B is a legislative history of the 1958 convention on the Continental Shelf which has been prepared under my direction but is not a part of the American Bar Association resolution or reports. Appendix C is another memorandum prepared under my direction, captioned “Coastal State Mineral Jurisdiction and the Contintental Margin: A Survey of National Practice.” This is adapted from appen- dix F to the National Petroleum Council report but is not a part of the resolution or reports [ referred to, 581 If I may add one personal comment, Mr. Chairman, I wish to say that this is not a case of a simple line dividing the views of the Marine Science Commission on the one hand from those of the National Petro- leum Council on the other. Those who believe that the exclusive sovereign rights of the United States encompass the continental landmass down to the deep ocean sea- bed include committees of the American Bar Association and of the International Law Association. They are entitled to respect for their opinions. I know those lawyers and they are not motivated by selfish interests. They are motivated by the interests of our country. I say here, as I have said on other occasions, that perhaps there is something to the argument that oil companies or mining companies would be better off if they operated under a lenient international re- gime off the coast of foreign nations than under licenses granted by that particular country. But that argument, in my opinion, is irrelevant. What we are con- cerned with is not the good of individual oil companies or mining companies. What we are concerned with is the welfare of our country. I believe that it is not in the interest of the United States that any portion of the American mineral] estate, the exclusive right to explore and exploit the whole submerged continental landmass adjacent to our coasts, should be surrendered or put on the bargaining table for any reason whatsoever, and particularly not merely to obtain advantages for American companies operating overseas. In saying that, again I repeat, I am voicing the opinion of the com- mittees that have considered this matter and of myself and I am not purporting to represent to you that such a resolution is adopted by the house of delegates. But you are entitled to a comprehensive view and I have attempted to give it to you. If your record permits I should like to incorporate the interim re- port of the American branch of the International Law Association, which reached the same result as the American Bar Association sec- tions. That committee is made up not only of practicing lawyers, but some of the most eminent academic figures in the United States. Mr. Chairman, I thank you. Mr. Lennon. Thank you for a very fine statement, and without ob- jection the request made to insert in the record the documents referred to by the gentleman will be acknowledged and they will be inserted in the record. : (The documents may be found at the, conclusion of Mr. Ely’s testimony. ) : Mr. Lennon. The gentleman from Washington. Mr. Petry. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say for myself that I greatly appreciate the testimony that we have had. I think it is going to be a valuable contribution and I wonder, Mr. Ely, whether you would comment on the question I raised with Senator Pell; namely, under the Constitution, to give away or yield any of the property or rights or sovereignty of the United States, would it require an act of both the Senate and the House, or do you think it could be done by Executive agreement or a treaty ? Mr. Ety. I can give only my personal opinion. I believe article IV, section 3, of the constitution controls. It says: 582 The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State. It is not necessary to characterize the property rights of the United States in its continental margin as the equivalent of territorial sov- ereignty, to bring them within the scope of article IV, section 3, of the constitution, as constituting the subject matter of an exclusive delega- tion of authority to the Congress, not to the executive. What is the nature of those rights ? The submerged portion of the American continent adjacent to the United States is the “prolongation” of its territory (to borrow the ex- pression of the International Court of Justice in the North Sea case). This area is, and has been “ab initio” (to again borrow that court’s expression), subject to the exclusive sovereign rights of the United States with respect to exploration and exploitation of the resources of those submarine areas. But the convention on the Continental Shelf controls the geographical extent, and the character, of those rights. Article 1 and article 2 must be read together. Article 1 establishes a geographical limit on the rights of coastal nations in natural resources of the submarine areas beyond territorial waters, in the form of (1) a minimum related to the 200-meter isobath, and (2) a maximum related to “adjacency” (which, in the light of the legislative history of the convention, I equate with the continental margin, the continental land mass, down to its junction with the abyssal ocean floor, irrespective of depth). If article 2 paragraph 1, stood alone, it would be arguable that the extent of the coastal nation’s jurisdic- tion at any given moment, between these two limits, would be deter- mined solely by the criterion of “exploitability,” the capability to oc- cupy and put to use. But article 2, paragraph 2, adds another and controlling factor. Article 2, paragraph 2, of the convention permanently excludes all other nations from the area between these two limits, whether or not occupied by the coastal nation. The vastly important right of the United States, under article 2, paragraph 2, of the convention to exclude all others from exploration and exploitation of the mineral resources of the continental margin is sometimes overlooked, but it is clear and unequivocal. The twofold rights of the United States to (1) exclude others from this territory, pending exploitation by the United States, and (2) to exploit, exclusively, this same submerged territory, constitute, in con- junction, highly valuable property rights now owned by the United States. These exclusive rights of the coastal nation, as article 2, para- graph 3, says, are not dependent upon occupation. They do not lapse with time; they are permanently protected, pending the advances in technology required for their exercise. The value of the minerals of the continental margin, of this com- ponent of the American mineral estate thus protected by the conven- tion, is beyond price. Our national survival may be dependent on the control of that asset adjacent to our shores. But, if a value of this Federal property is to be set in money, it can only be estimated in tens, or perhaps hundreds, of billions of dollars, Over $4 billion has 583 been received by the Federal treasury from less than 1 percent of the continental margin so far explored. I am of the opinion that the treaty-making power, which article IT, section 2, delegates to the Executive (for exercise with the advice and consent of the Senate), does not override the clear mandate of the property clause of article IV, section 3, so as to delegate to the Execu- tive the power (even with the advice and consent of the Senate) to dispose of property or territory of the United States, a power which article IV delegates to the whole Congress. Similarly, the dedication by treaty of the royalty revenues from the American continental mar- gin to an international organization, as some have proposed, would be subject, in my opinion, to the mandate of article I, section 7, that all bills for raising revenues (hence for appropriating such revenue) shall originate in the House of Representatives. But the contrary opinion on these points is entitled to respect. It is conceivable that, as a matter of international law, a treaty which re- linquished the claim of the United States to the mineral resources of the American continental margin, or dedicated American royalty or tax revenues from this source to an international agency, would be enforceable against this country by other parties to the treaty, even though, as a matter of domestic law, the making of that treaty vio- lated article IV, section 3, and article I, section 7, of the constitution, because the House of Representatives was bypassed. The very possibility of a constitutional uncertainty of this magni- tude adds weight to Congressman Pelly’s point that any proposed re- linquishment of United States jurisdiction over the maximum area of the continental margin to which we may fairly lay claim, subject to the limitations on that jurisdiction imposed by the convention on the Continental Shelf, should be considered and decided by both Houses of Congress. Why not? At stake is possibly the most valuable property still remaining in Federal possession. National policy, as well as the language of the Constitution, requires the concurrence of the House in its disposition. Mr. Petty. Is it too much to hope that maybe the American Bar Association through its appropriate committee would study that problem and maybe pass a resolution expressing its thoughts on that matter ? Mr. Exy. The Bar Association functions through committees that report to sections, and the sections submit recommendations to the House of Delegates, and only the House of Delegates speaks for the American Bar Association. , : I would certainly be happy to recommend to the appropriate section that they study this question. What happens beyond that is totally beyond my control. : Mr. Petty. I can only say that I think I express the feelings of the members of this committee that they would like to fortify their own feelings with regard to the importance of the House of Representatives and their own responsibilities, that we could have such a study and in turn possibly a resolution at the appropriate time. — Mr. Ey. Before I leave, may I call your attention to my appendix B, which deals with the legislative history of the convention. Since you gentlemen deal with legislative history every day, let me point out the 584 support that it gives for the position of the sections of the American Bar Association that the exclusive sovereign rights of the United States include the entire continental terrace down to its junction with the deep ocean floor, and are not limited to the geological Continental Shelf. Some time ago the United Nations created the International Law Commission, which is designed to simplify and codify international law. In 1949, the assembly referred to the Commission the question of the codification of the law of the sea. In 1951, the Commission submitted a partial report in which it recom- mended that the jurisdiction of the coastal nations should extend to “. . . the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas contiguous to the coast, but outside the area of territorial waters, where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil.” This contained no 200-meter depth limit at all. In 1953, the Commission proposed new language which said instead, “, . the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas contiguous to the coast, but outside. the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters,” saying nothing about exploitability. This about-face of the Commission was totally unacceptable to the Organization of American States. The 20 American nations, including the United States, met at Ciudad Trujillo in 1956 and adopted a resolu- tion which insisted there will be added to the 200-meter limit the con- cept of exploitability, and this was referred back to the International Law Commission, which agreed with it in 1956. In 1958 the Conference on the Law of the Sea adopted the Commission’s recommendations, which included this language of exploitability, and it had before it the report of the Commission, saying it was doing so in response to the malstenee of the Ciudad Trujillo declaration of the 20 American tates. To refer back to the Ciudad Trujillo declaration, it stated that “The American States are especially interested in utilizing and conserving the existing natural resources on the American terrace (shelf and slope), and that the exploitation of the continental terrace should be included as a possibility in the declaration of the rights of the American States. Thereafter, the Convention on the Continental Shelf was referred to the Senate and the President by the State Department and in so doing, the State Department made it clear that the convention did indeed incorporate in its exploitability concept the objective insisted upon at Ciudad Trujillo. The chairman of the American negotiating team at Geneva was Arthur Dean, and he told the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: The clause which protects the right to utilize advances in technology at greater depths beneath the oceans was supported by the United States and was in keeping with the inter-Amedican conclusions at Ciudad Trujillo in 1956. It was included in the I.L.C. 1956 draft. While no legislative history is conclusive, as you gentlemen know better than I do, this comes as close to it as any I have seen. Our Gov- ernment has won cases on much weaker legislative history, and ought not to surrender this one. 585 Mr. Petyy. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank the witness for a very splendid statement. Mr. Exy. Thank you. Mr. Lennon. Mr. Karth. Mr. Kartu. Mr. Chairman, I merely want to say that Mr. Ely has cleared up in my mind at least this question of national or international jurisdiction as it relates to the exploitation or exploration of mineral resources on the so-called Continental Shelf. Mr. Exy. Thank you. Mr. Kartu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lennon. Thank you, sir. Mr. Keith? Mr. Kerru. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have been most impressed, as have my colleagues, with your grasp of this subject. I am glad that you referred to the legislative history within the bar association deliberations. I represent Woods Hole, and there appears to be in the scientific fra- ternity there a strong sentiment for the internationalization of prac- tically everything. I have wondered with reference to these bar association deliberations, whether there is anything in the written record which is not before us, and which would shed light on the opposite point of view ? Mr. Exy. I am not familiar with the Woods Hole record, Mr. Keith. The Marine Science Commission report itself takes issue with the con- clusions I have stated. They single out the National Petroleum Coun- cil as though it alone advocated a broad shelf, and I have endeavored to make clear today that this is not so. The commission’s panel on inter- national law presents its argument for a narrow shelf and for the so-called intermediate zone. That panel report is written by competent lawyers, and I think is a fair statement of the opposing view. Mr. Kerrn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lennon. Thank you, Mr. Keith. Sir, the resolution that is attached to this file that you submitted for consideration of the committee, made by the sections of natural re- sources law, international and comparative law, and the Standing Committee on Peace and Law through the United Nations, has that been submitted to the House of Delegates of the American Bar Asso- ciation ? Mr. Ey. Yes. This is the document with the number 73 at the top of it? Mr. Lennon. Yes. Mr. Exy. That is the document which went to the house of delegates at the August 1968 meeting and the resolution there incorporated was adopted. r. Lennon. As we have it here? Mr. Ey. Yes, sir. You will note that this piece of paper incorpo- rates, as the bar association format requires, the recommendations of the sections for the resolution, followed by the resolution, then the re- port of the sections in support of it. Mr. Lennon. The gentleman from California. Mr. Hanna. I thank the chairman. 586 ‘Mr. Ely, I greet you once again as a legislator. I have been long an admirer of your presentations. You will recall our meeting in the State legislature, when you represented our water interests, and I must say that you bring to this new subject all of those fine qualities I found so admirable in your previous work. Mr. Exy. Thank you very much indeed, sir. : Mr. Hanna. Mr. Ely, would you care to comment on my suggestion that we ought to go to some extent to emphasize the importance of the development of the law of the sea equally as we have continued to em- phasize the development of science and engineering ? It seems to me that we must keep in tandem with the development of science and engineering, this whole area of the law of the sea. Would you care to comment on that ? Mr. Ety. I think you are quite right, Mr. Hanna. As far as the Amer- ican Bar Association is concerned, within the past several years its activity has been stimulated. We have two sections whose committees have been at work on this general problem of the law of the sea, plus a standing committee. They have concentrated so far, on the problem of submarine mineral resources. In the past they have devoted considerable attention, as Mr. Pelly may recall, through Mr. Ned Allen’s chairmanship of the Committee on Oceanography, to fisheries problems. They are beginning to take up the question of pollution of the sea from onshore sources. This is being considered also by a committee of the International Law Association on which I serve. We don’t deal with a situation of anarchy, of absence of law. There is, of course, a tremendous body of the law of the sea. The admiralty courts of the civilized nations have recognized maritime liens for cen- turies. The rules of the road at sea are recognized internationally. There is a vast body of well-settled law governing surface opera- tions. The Convention on the High Seas and the other conventions that resulted at Geneva deal in various ways with the use of the water column. We are just beginning to grapple with this question of the seabed, and I agree with you that a great deal remains to be evolved. I think that many of us feel that the law ought to move cautiously and in tandem with scientific knowledge, to follow, not precede, the develop- ment of factual information. Many of us are concerned by the efforts to blueprint law for the future that we are really not yet equipped to write. We have, as to the seabed minerals, a confrontation between two very large and unwieldy bodies of law. One is the principle of the freedom of the seas, treating the trackless oceans as available for everyone. The other is the prin- ciple of the mining law that security of tenure is essential. But I agree with you that all phases of this problem need evolution. Mr. Hanna. I appreciate your comments and I certainly have no point of departure with you in terms of the caution with which we develop law. I think if you look back at some of the statements that I have made, it sounded as if you and I were reading out of the same chapter and verse. Mr. Exy. Iam sure that is true. Mr. Hanna. T think it is an observation of most practicing lawyers that the law tends to develop out of practical experience, and that is 587 the best way for the law to develop. I agree with you that if you try to blueprint too much into the future, what is going to effectively control the meeting of peoples and the meeting between peoples and conditions not yet tried, you are on a very unsound foundation. Mr. Exy. In these bar association reports and that of the American Branch Committee of the International Law Association, you will find the theme developed that for the next 10 or 20 years, perhaps, what is needed to preserve good order is agreement among the major nations which are in fact capable of carrying out operations in the very deep sea that they will operate as good neighbors and not jump each other’s claims, or interfere with each other. Out of that, bit by bit, you will be able to develop formal law. Mr. Hanna. Wouldn’t it help if we were able to put into expression in a little more understandable way and to make more readily available some of the great body of existing law of the sea, which many people who are now becoming interested are completely unaware of and there- fore come in and create problems that would not exist if they were made more aware of what really exists? Mr. Exy. I think you have made a very good point. Mr. Hanna. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lennon. Mr. Ely, in what you have stated here today you find yourself in disagreement with that part of the Commission’s report which suggests an international organization such as we had recom- mended in IRA, I believe it was, and also you differ with the Senator who was here this morning with respect to the international owner- ship of certain areas of the sea. That is a general way of stating it, but that is in substance true; is it not ? Mr. Exy. If I might respond first as to NOAA, as I understand, that is intended to be a wholly domestic reorganization. I have not testified as to that. Mr. Lennon. I used the wrong word. The recommendation of the witness who preceded you was that in substance he agreed with the governmental structure at the domestic level as well as the Commission aspect, but his statement with respect, and the Commission’s report with respect to the ownership by an international organization of some of our seabed beyond the Continental Shelf—you differ with that. don’t you? Mr. Exy. I respectfully differ from Senator Pell’s presentation here today in two respects: First, as to what the United States now has; second, as to the wisdom of negotiating a new convention restricting our claims on the continental margin. ‘ First, as to what we now have: In my opinion, the existing national jurisdiction of the United States, in the dual sense of (1) the power to exclude others from exploitation of seabed resources per article 2, paragraph 2, of the convention, and (2) the possession of exclusive sovereign rights to explore and exploit seabed resources, per article 2, paragraph 1, of the convention, now encompasses the whole continental landmass adjacent to our coasts, down to the junction of the con- tinent with the abyssal ocean floor. I base this conclusion on the lan- guage of the convention and its legislative history. Some, reading article 1 only with the first paragraph of article 2, not paragraph 2. 26-563 O—70—pt. 2-6 588 argue that the sovereign rights of the coastal nation do not come into existence until, and as, exploration and exploitation proceed at greater and greater depths. But the question of whether those “sovereign rights” of the coastal nation come into existence in futuro, or encom- passed the whole area ab initio, is reduced to an exercise in semantics by article 2, paragraph 2, which says that the rights referred to in paragraph 1 of that article “are exclusive in the sense that if the coastal State does not explore the Continental Shelf’’—defined in arti- cle 1 as the submarine areas adjacent to the coast to a depth of 200 me- ters, or, beyond that limit to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the the exploration of the natura] resources of the said areas—then “no one may undertake these activities.” To clinch this, article 2, paragraph 3, says that these exclusive rights of the coastal nation to exploit that area, and to exclude others there- from, are not dependent upon occupation. These are permanently pro- tected rights, no matter how long a time may elapse before exploitation becomes technologically feasible, and they encompass the whole conti- nental margin. This is what the Ciudad Trujillo Declaration meant when it proclaimed the jurisdiction of the American nations over the submarine resources of the whole continental terrace, “from the edge of the shelf to the greatest depths.” When the Senate gave its consent to the Convention on the Continental Shelf, it had before it the repre- sentation of the State Department that the exploitability language of article 1, “the clause which protects the right to utilize advances in tech- nology at greater depths beneath the oceans was supported by the United States and was in keeping with the inter-American conclusions at Ciudad Trujillo in 1956.” This is the present limit on, and interna- tional recognition of, exclusive American jurisdiction, and it has no relation to depth of water. This limit is controlled only by the identifi- cation of the area as a prolongation of the territory occupied by the United States. This, in short, is what we now have, and it is valuable beyond all estimate. Any new agreement which would establish a limit on American “sovereign rights” to seabed minerals at a line which is landward of the submerged edge of the continent would give away a priceless asset of the American people. Second, I disagree with proposals for a new convention. If I under- stand Senator Pell correctly, he does not find in this existing Conti- nental Shelf Convention any limit on coastal jurisdiction. The Com- mission didn’t find any. As 'I understand Senator Pell, and perhaps I misunderstood him, he would write a new limitation, by a new con- vention at 550 meters, or some distance from land. The Commission proposes a new agreement—an agreement, presumably to be brought about by a new convention or protocol, at 200 meters or 50 miles from land. I disagree with both those recommendations for two reasons. First, I think it would be fatal to the interests of the United States to con- voke a new conference to replace the existing convention with a new one. We have not the slightest idea what could come out of Pandora’s box if it were opened in this way. Second, I believe that the existing convention does give us rights which these two proposals would surrender, and accomplish nothing in return. If the deep sea regime, beyond the line of national jurisdic- tion, as proposed by Senator Pell or as proposed by the Commission— 589 and they are not the same, as I understand them—would be good for us, it would be good for everybody, and we don’t have to bargain away any interests of the United States or its own continental margin to secure the acquiescence of other countries in a new deep sea regime that is said to be good for all nations. I would look upon the deep sea regime as a problem quite separate from whether or not we should give up a portion of the area now within our national jurisdiction. We know that it extends now beyond 200 meters, and beyond 550 meters of depth and beyond 30 miles or 50 miles of linear distance from shore. When it comes to structuring the deep sea regime the Commission recommends that an organization be created in which shall be lodged power to register claims by nations to specific segments of the seabed, on a basis of first-in-time, first-in-right. Each nation would then de- velop that area under its own laws and subject to diligent requre- ments, which, if not met, might forfeit the claim. In the alternative, other schemes have been brought forward. Mr. Lennon. How does the American Bar Association feel about that special recommendation that you just referred to? Mr. Ety. The feeling of our sections in general is that this is on the right track, that the RES objective might very well be a registra- tion scheme for national claims as distinguished from the creation of a supersovereignty with power to deny seabed concessions, or grant them on bargaining terms. Mr. Lennon. Right at that point, how does the American Petroleum Institute feel on this particular point with respect to an international organization such as the United Nations controlling certain areas of our seabed for the use or exploitation for the benefit of undeveloped nations ? Mr. Ey. You are speaking of the National Petroleum Council ? Mr. Lennon. Yes. Mr. Exy. Although I don’t appear for the National Petroleum Council, I did serve on the subcommittee of the National Petroleum Council’s Committee on Petroleum Resources Under the Ocean Floor, by invitation. I believe it is fair to say that the National Petroleum Conte did not favor the creation of a supersovereignty with the power to grant or deny concessions. I believe it fair to say that it, too, looked toward a registry scheme as the ultimate pattern that should be encouraged. For the record, this is how the National Petroleum Council Report summarized the Council’s position on the two questions of the extent of national jurisdiction, and the regime seaward of national jurisdiction (pp. 10, 11, 12) : In construing the language of this Convention, the National Petroleum Council concludes that the ultimate jurisdiction of the coastal nation with respect to mineral resources under the ocean floor clearly extends by virtue of the exploita- bility and adjacency criteria outward to encompass the submerged continent down to its junction with the abyssal ocean floor. The Convention’s criterion of adjacency is a limitation upon the exploitability criterion which serves to exclude the abyssal ocean floor from the exclusive resource jurisdiction of the coastal nation, regardless of how exploitable the deposits seaward of the continental block might become. The drafters of the Convention also specifically intended, in fairness to the nations concerned, and used language sufficiently broad to pro- vide that, where the continent drops abruptly to the abyssal ocean floor, their natural resource jurisdiction extends to the nearby portions of the deep ocean to 590 the extent permitted by the dual criteria of exploitability and adjacency. This interpretation, both for the general and the special case, is supported by the findings of many qualified bodies which have studied the matter, by the history of the negotiation of the Convention, by its legislative history in the U.S. Senate. and by the subsequent practice of coastal nations, including the United States in granting concessions or leases in progressively deeper waters. While the matter does not appear to have been specifically discussed in the preparatory works leading to the Convention, the language selected would also appear broad enough to permit the United States and other coastal nations, in appropriate cases, to claim natural resources jurisdiction to the median line of semienclosed seas, regardless of their depth, under the same twin criteria of of exploitability and adjacency. * s & * s s s The 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf clearly confirmed the rights of the United States, and other coastal nations, to jurisdiction of the seabed and subsoil mineral resources of the submerged portion of the continent adjacent to their shores. Thus this jurisdiction extends over the continental shelf, the con- tinental slope, and at least the landward portion of the continental rise. The United States should promptly and forthrightly assert these rights, while recog- nizing similar rights of other coastal nations. Not to do so—in the light of our present and future energy needs—is risking our vital national interests and se- eurity and that of our allies as well. Certainly no consideration should be given to the relinquishment of any of our legitimate rights to offshore areas confirmed to the United States by the Con- vention on the Continental Shelf. The petroleum potential of this submerged region is largely unknown, but in many areas it may be substantial. If it is, then the region is of critical importance with respect to this Nation’s future energy requirements. Any attempt now to restrict the area of U.S. mineral jurisdiction to less than that already recognized under the Geneva Convention would be patently a needless and dangerous give-away of a vital segment of the American mineral estate, which this Nation cannot afford to relinquish. It is desirable that the United States and other parties to the 1958 Conven- tion, with such additional nations as care to join them, promulgate parallel uni- form declarations along the lines recommended herein, stating the extend of their rights (and the limitations on those rights) under the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf. * * * * *% * * Beyond the bounds of national sovereignty and the limits of exclusive coastal- nation jurisdiction over subsea mineral resources lie the deeper or more remote oceanic areas constituting more than 80 percent of the total ocean-covered area of the world. International law imposes no prohibition upon the freedom of a state or its nationals to explore or exploit the resources of the bed of the high seas, if this freedom is exercised with reasonable regard for the interests of other states in their exercise of high-seas freedoms. Although general rules of international law may not be sufficiently detailed to provide the necessary certainty for long-range mineral exploitation in this deep-ocean region, these rules will constitute the legal framework for any introductory activity that may occur for some years to come. * * * * * * * Even though existing international legal principles are sufficient to govern pre- liminary deep-seabed activities, national regulation in matters of state jurisdiction and national consideration of long-term arrangements concerning the seabed should reflect policies which will encourage rather than deter production, recov- ery, and use of deep-ocean minerals. These include policy objectives such as (a) encouraging exploration for and production of resources at reasonable con- sumer cost consistent with a fair return to the investor; (b) encouraging max- imum efficient recovery through the use of proper conservation practices; (c) facilitating responsible mineral development on a nondiscriminatory basis; and (d) reconciling competing uses of the environment and minimizing adverse effect of mineral operations on that environment. In harmonizing competing uses in deep-ocean areas, each use should be consid- ered upon its own merit and significance, and no particular use should be considered as having any per se priority over another use. * * * ¥ * * * 591 As previously indicated, it is believed that the greatest immediate interest in offshore petroleum activity will be in areas now under the exclusive mineral jurisdiction of the coastal nations. Thus the assurance that the seaward limits of rights now possessed by coastal nations will continue to be respected is of major current concern to the nations of the world. Over 80 percent of these are coastal states. ‘Nevertheless, it is appropriate to appraise alternatives as to how exploratory or exploitative activity in deep-ocean areas beyond coastal-state jurisdiction should be legally structured. In this regard there is an inadequacy of knowledge about the natural resources and environment of the deep-ccean floor. Much more infor- mation and data will be required before realistic arrangements can be concluded for the promotion of long-range development. Therefore, the National Petroleum Council fully endorses the concept of the International Decade of Ocean Explora- tion, cooperative international research on the resources of the deep-ocean floor, and cooperative international study leading toward an eventual decision on the most appropriate and effective arrangements. Meanwhile, present consideration regarding legal arrangements for deep-ocean areas could well be focused upon the formulation of standards of conduct for individual nations and persons engaging in activity pursuant to national license. A step which might follow would be the establishment of an international registry, to serve as a public record of exploratory activity. It seems permature to move toward the establishment of an international agency with licensing authority. Mr. Lennon. I note in the last page of this resolution that you say was adopted by the House of Delegates: ce. Establishment of (i) reasonable payments to be made, preferably to the World Bank, by the nation which undertakes mineral development, in areas seaward of coastal mineral jurisdiction, in the nature of registration fees Mr. Ey. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. I should straighten this out at once. The resolution of the House of Delegates begins on page 1 of exhibit A, annexed to my prepared statement, and ends on page 5. It is fol- lowed by the report of the sections, beginning with the word “Report”. Mr. Lennon. I am reading from what you have identified as 73, on page 13 of what you identified earlier as 73, as the recommendation from a committee. Mr. Exy. Yes. That is correct. Page 13 is not a part of the resolu- tion of the House of Delegates but is a part of a supporting report of the sections. You are correct that the sections did regard favorably the principle of the establishment of reasonable payments to be made by the nations which undertake mineral development in the deep seabed seaward of national jurisdiction into some agency like the World Bank for international purposes, which might be agreed upon, including those for aid to the less-developed countries. Mr. Lennon. Would you identify for the record the gentlemen whose names are signed to what I understand from you are the conclusions or the recommendations of this panel or section? Mr. Jesse P. Luton, Jr., chairman of the Section of Natural Resources Law—what firm is he a member of and where is he located ? Mr. Ety. Mr. Luton is chief counsel of the Gulf Oil Corp., United States. He is located in Houston, Tex. Mr. Lennon. How about Mr. Joe C. Barrett, the chairman of the Section of International and Comparative Law ? Mr. Eny. Mr. Barrett, I believe, is a lawyer in general practice. Mr. Lennon. Where is he located ? Mr. Ety. I will supply that for the record. 592 (The information follows :) Mr. Joe C. Barrett is a member of the law firm of Barrett, Wheatley, Smith & Deacon which has offices in the Citizens National Bank Building, Jonesboro, Ark. Mr. Lennon. Thank you. How about Mr. Eberhard P. Deutsch, chairman of the Standing Committee on Peace and Law Through the United Nations? Mr. Ety. Mr. Deutsch is a New Orleans lawyer in general practice. Mr. Lennon. The chances are he is identified with the petroleum in- terests, isn’t he, if he is in New Orleans? What do you think? Mr. Ety. He has a well-known and distinguished practice. I don’t know who his clients are. Mr. Lennon. The reason I brought that out is that I got the im- pression that at least one member of the commission who has also been identified with the petroleum interests and a very dedicated and fine gentleman, Mr. Blaustein, with Standard Oil Co., gave me the impres- sion in conversations with him that he thought that they ought to be in some international organization such as the United Nations or some part of the United Nations, an organization that you could deal directly with and wouldn’t be under the pressure from the coastal States with which they do business. I wondered if that view was shared by the petroleum industry gen- erally. Apparently it is not, is it? Mr. Exy. Let me make this very clear. I don’t appear here for the petroleum industry. As to what Mr. Blaustein is describing as being in the interests of the petroleum companies he may well be right, but if that premise is adopted, my position is that it would be against the interests of the United States to sacrifice our existing rights in our own continental margin in order to obtain that kind of advantage for oil companies anywhere. The National Petroleum Council, to its great credit, stated the same position at page 72 of its report. Mr. Lennon. After the actions in the United Nations a year or so ago with respect to this proposal, and I cannot recall off the top of my head how it was identified, didn’t the State Department sort of take that position and sort of lean that way? It seems to me that before either this committee or another subcommittee that I attended, I got the impression that the State Department was sort of leaning gen- erally in that direction. What is your view on that ? Mr. Ety. I hesitate to attempt from memory to give you an account of the State Department’s position. It really would not be fair. Mr. Lennon. I can certainly say that this committee is grateful to you for your appearance here today, but it seems obvious to me that we would sacrifice much of what we ultimately hope to do unless we called on you frequently for advice and counsel, because this does re- flect the thinking of the American Bar Association and particularly related to the particular question with which we are involved here now. Mr. Exy. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I assure you that the members of these committees and of these sections are devoted and dedicated people who struggled with this question and who will at- pone to respond to your inquiries in the future and will be honored to 0 SO. 593 The thing that must be borne in mind, Mr. Chairman, is that we are dealing with an asset that is priceless. If a value in dollars is to be attached to the American continental margin’s minerals, it is measured in the tens of billions of dollars, and there are some values that are beyond all price. National survival may depend upon having immediately accessible under American control, and not international control, the minerals of the American continental margin. We welcome the fact, Mr. Chair- man, that this committee is engaged now in safeguarding this resource. I thank you deeply for the courtesy shown us today. Mr. Lennon. We are appreciative and honored by your presence. I am sure that we will utilize your good offices in the future. Mr. Exy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lennon. Thank you very much, Mr. Ely. Tomorrow, gentlemen, the committee will have the Governor of North Carolina as a witness. Some of you will recall, those of you who represent coastal States, that some year or so ago I suggested to you that you suggest to your Governors and your respective legislatures that they establish by legislative action a Marine Science Council to coordinate the activities in your respective States, and at that time I called on the predecessor of the Governor who appears here tomorrow to do that. He named the council and upon my recommendation the Legislature of North Carolina made it a statutory provision. They have asked for an opportunity to testify tomorrow and I would appreciate very much if you gentlemen can find an opportunity to visit with us early in the morning and spend as much time as you can. Thank you so much. Mr. Ety. Mr. Chairman, before we leave, might I have permission to place in your record the 1969 Report of the Sections of the American Bar Association, assuming that they are approved next week at the annual meeting ? Mr. Lennon. We would be delighted to have them. Without ob- jection it is so ordered. (The 1969 report referred to appears at the close of Mr. Ely’s pre- pared statement, supra.) Mr. Ey. May I also place in the record the interim report of the American branch, International Law Association, on this subject ? Mr. Lennon. Thank you, sir. Without objection it is so ordered. Mr. Exy. Thank you, sir. . Mr. Lennon. With that, the committee will stand adjourned until tomorrow morning at 10 o’clock. (The documents mentioned follow herewith :) NortHcuTt ELy SENIOR PARTNER, ELY AND DUNCAN, WASHINGTON, D.C. Member of the bars of California, New York, District of Columbia, U.S. Supreme Court, Court of Appeals of 2nd, 5th, 9th, and D.C. Circuits. COUNSEL TO GOVERNMENTAL AND PUBLIC AGENCIES Executive assistant to the Secretary of the Interior, 1929-33 ; Chairman of the Technical and Advisory Committee, Federal Oil Conservation Board, 1930-38 ; Special Assistant Attorney General, State of ‘California, 1953 to date; Special 594 Counsel, Colorado River Board of California, Department of Water and Power of the City of Los Angeles, Coachella Valley County Water District, Imperial Irrigation District, East Bay Municipal Utility District, with respect to water and power supply problems; counsel to California water interests in interstate negotiations for regional development of the Colorado River (1963-date) ; Gen- eral Counsel, American Public Power Association ; United States delegate to the United Nations Conference on the Application of Science and Technology for the Benefit of the Less Developed Areas, Geneva, February 1963; member of the Legal Advisory Committee, Federal Power Commission National Power Survey, 1963; Advisor to the Governments of Saudi Arabia (1962-63), Malagasy Repub- lic (1962), Turkey (1963-65), Thailand (1967), Ethiopia (1968), on drafting of mineral legislation (and Algeria with respect to petroleum agreements with France (1966-67) ) ; to the Governor of Oklahoma (1935) in negotiation of the Interstate Oil Conservation Compact; consultant on conservation matters to various Committees of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Science Foundation, Smithsonian Institution, and Interstate Oil Compact Commission. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES Chief counsel for State of California and California parties in Arizona v. California, et al., 373 U.S. 546 (1963) (Colorado River apportionment) ; Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 357 U.S. 320 (1958) (power development on Columbia River tributary) ; American Public Power Association v. Power Authority of the State of New York, 355 U.S. 64 (1957) (effect of legislation on prior judicial decision) ; Washington Public Power Supply System v. FPO, 387 U.S. 428, 18 L. ed. 2d 869 (1967) (Snake River license controversy) ; Madruga v. Superior Court, 346 U.S. 556 (1954) (admiralty case) ; of counsel in Wilbur v. U.S. ex rel. Krushnic, 280 U.S. 306 (1930) (oil shale) ; Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931) (Hoover Dam injunction case) ; Arizona v. California, 292 U.S. 341 (1984) (perpetuation of testimony); U.S. ex rel. McLennan v. Wilbur, 283 U.S. 414 (1931) (closing of public domain to oil prospecting) ; United States v. Arizona, 295 U.S. 174 (19385) (martial law injunction) ; amicus curiae in New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946) (taxation) ; United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950) (reclamation development on San Joaquin River). PROFESSIONAL COMMITTEES Member of the Council of the Section of Natural Resources Law, American Bar Association ; formerly Chairman, Committee on Water Resources of that Sec- tion; Committee on Law of the Sea, Section of International and Comparative Law, American Bar Association ; Chairman, Committee on Deep Sea Mineral Re- sources, American Branch of the International Law Association ; member of (In- ternational) Committees on Deep Sea Mining and on Water Resources of that Association; member, Technical Subcommittee of National Petroleum Council’s Committee on Petroleum beneath the Ocean; Legal Committee, Marine ‘Tech- nology Society. PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS American Bar Association, International Law Association, American Law Institute, American Society of International Law, Inter-American Bar Associa- tion, American Judicature Society, Mining and Metallurgical Society of America, Marine Technology Society. BOOKS Summary of Mining and Petroleum Laws of the World (U.S. Bureau of Mines, 1961, 2d ed. in preparation) ; Oil Conservation Through Interstate Agreement (Fed. Oil Conservation Bd., 1933) ; Oil and Gas Conservation Statutes, Anno- tated (Fed. Oil Cons. Bd., 1983) ; The Hoover Dam Documents (H. Doc. 717%, 80th Cong., 1948). ; CHAPTERS IN BOOKS Legislative Choices in the Development of Mineral Resources (United Nations Conference on the Application of Science and Technology for the Benefit of the Less Developed Areas, Geneva, 1963, Vol. II of U.S. papers, Mineral Resources) ; Mineral Titles and Concessions (ch. 3 of Economics of the Mineral Industries, A.I.M.E., 1st ed. 1959, 2d ed. 1964); Administration of International River Basins (ch. 4 of Law of International Drainage Basins, Institute of Interna- 595 tional Law, New York University, 1967) ; Trends in National Petroleum and Mining Laws (ch. 3 of The Role of National Governments in Exploration of Mineral Resources, Princeton University Conference, 1963) ; The National Gov- ernment and the Conservation of Oil and Gas (Part IV of Conservation of Oil and Gas, A.B.A. and Interstate Oil Compact Commission, 1948 and 1958) ; Oil Reserves Seandal (U.S.) (in Encyclopedia Britannica) ; The Conservation of Oil (in Readings in The Social Control of Industry, American Economic Society, 1942, reprinted from 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1209 (1938) ) ; chapter on U.S. Petroleum Laws in World Petroleum Legislation (1968). SELECTED ARTICLES AND PAPERS The Laws Governing Exploitation of the Minerals Beneath the Sea (Marine Technology Society, “Exploiting the Ocean,” 1966) ; The Limits and Conflicting Uses of the Continental Shelf (Law of the Sea Institute, University of Rhode Island, 1966) ; The Administration of Mineral Resources Underlying the High Seas (American Bar Assn. National Institute on Marine Resources, 1967) ; The Oil Shale Industry’s Water Problems (Fourth Oil Shale Symposium, Denver, 1967) ; American Policy Options in the Development of Undersea Mineral Re- sources (A.B.A. program, “Developing the Resources of the Sea,” 1967, reprinted in Vol. 2 International Lawyer, Jan. 1968) ; Policy Trends in Modern Mineral Legislation (Conference on Conservation of Natural Resources, University of Puerto Rico, 1967) ; Legal Problems in Development of Water Resources (Prince- ton University Conference on Engineering and World Water Resources, 1963) ; Taxation of Interest Paid on Municipal Securities, and Income of Publicly Owned Utilities (House Ways and Means Committee, 1958) ; Light on the Mexican Water Treaty from the Ratification Proceedings in Mexico (S. Doc. 249, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.) ; The Relationship Between the Laws Governing Water Rights and Those Governing Other Natural Resources (A.B.A. 1962); America’s Water Budget (Investment Bankers Association, 1964) ; Political Controls of the Quan- tity and Quality of Water Supply (Southern Water Conference, 1967). Chapters on Federal mineral legislation and decisions in annual reports of Interstate Oil Compact Commission and of Section of Natural Resources Law, American Bar Association. Hon. ALTON LENNON, Chairman, Subcommittee on Oceanography, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. Dear Mr. CHAIRMAN: In accordance with your kind permission, I enclose, for your record, a copy of the 1969 “Joint Report of the Section of International and Comparative Law, the Section of Natural Resources Law, and the Standing Com- mittee on World Order Under Law of the American Bar Association,” adopted by those Sections and that Committee at the August 1969 meeting of the American Bar Association. In my prepared statement, dated August 5, 1969, I referred to this as a draft report, and I am pleased to advise you that it was adopted the following week without substantive change. Respectfully : NoRkTHCUTT BLY. 596 STATEMENT OF NORTHCUTT ELY Ely and Duncan Attorneys at Law Washington, D. C. On behalf of the AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION and the SECTION OF NATURAL RESOURCES LAW OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (with respect to Joint Reports of that Section, the Section of International and Comparative Law, and the Standing Committee on World Order Under Law, and the Joint Reports of certain Committees of those Sections) | 597 My name is Northcutt Ely. I am a member of the law firm of Ely and Dees of Washington, D. C. Iama member of the Council of the Section of Natural Resources Law of the American Bar Association, and appear here by direction of the Chairman and Council of that Section. .I annex as Appendix A a Resolution (No. 73) of the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association, adopted at its August 1968 meeting. * This is incorporated in a Joint Report of the Sections of Natural Resources Law and International and Comparative Law and the Standing Committee on Peace and Law Through United Nations, recommending that Resolution. Only the Resolution itself states official policy of the American Bar Association. The balance of the annexed 1968 Joint Report states the support- ing argument of the Sections which recommended the adoption of the Resolution. The Resolution, ‘and the supporting Report, deal with two major subjects: 1. The seaward limit of the ee jurisdiction of the United States with respect to exploration and exploitation of submarine mineral resources; 2. The international arrangements which should control the explora- tion and exploitation of submarine mineral resources, seaward of the limits of national jurisdiction of the coastal nations. I will discuss these points in the same order. In so doing, I shall make *The Resolution "authorizes representatives of the Sections of Natural Resources Law and International and Comparative Law and the Standing Com- mittee on Peace and Law Through United Nations to express the foregoing as the views of the American Bar Association to agencies of the Government of the United States and to the Congress of the United States."' 598 reference to a 1969 Draft Report which will be submitted at the August 1969 meeting of the American Bar Association to the Councils of the Sections of Natural Resources Law and International and Comparative Law by the Com-- mittee on Marine Resources of the former and the Committee on Oceanography of the latter.*** At the moment (Aug. 5, 1969) this has the status of a Section Committee report. It deals primarily with the recommendations of the Marine Science Commission. 1. Submarine mineral resources within national jurisdiction The character, and the geographical limit, of the sovereign rights of a coaster nation with respect to the exploration and exploitation of the mineral resources of the seabed are determined by the Convention on the Continental Shelf if that nation is a party to that Convention. The United States is one of 39 nations, 35 of them coastal, which are parties to that Convention.* Some features of the Convention may be regarded as embodying customary interna- tional law, recognized by many nations which are not parties to the Convention, ** The articles pertinent to this discussion are Articles 1, 2 and 3, which read as follows: "Article 1 "For the purpose of these articles, the term 'continental shelf’ is used as referring (a) to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural re- *The legislative history of the Convention on this point is summarized in Appendix B. : **See Appendix C, which summarizes national practice with respect to claims of national jurisdiction over seabed resources. ***The 1969 Joint Report here referred to was approved by the respective Sections and Standing Committee Aug.ll-12, 1969 at the Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association at Dallas,Texas, and appears in this record, infra, 599 sources of the said areas; (b) to the seabed and subsoil of similar sub- marine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands. "Article 2 "], The coastal State exercises over the continental shelf sov- ereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources. "2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this article are exclusive in the sense that if the coastal State does not explore the continental shelf or exploit its natural resources, no one may under- take these activities, or make a claim to the continental shelf, with- out the express consent of the coastal State. "3. The rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf do not depend on occupation, effective or notional, or on any express proclamation. "4, The natural resources referred to in these articles con- sist of the mineral and other non-living resources of the seabed and subsoil together with living organisms belonging to sedentary species, that is to say, organisms which, at the harvestable stage, either are immobile on or under the seabed or are unable to move except in con- stant physical contact with the seabed or the subsoil. "Article 3 "The rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf do not affect the legal status of the superjacent waters as high seas, or that of the air space above those waters. '! Recommendation of the House of Delegates On this subject, the Resolution of the House of Delegates recommends: "(1) That the United States consult with other parties to the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention with a view to establishing, through the issuance of parallel declarations or by other means, an agreed interpretation of the definition of the boundary between the area of exclusive sovereign rights with respect to natural resources of the seabed and subsoil and the deep ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. "(2) That within the area of exclusive sovereign rights ad- jacent to the United States, the interests of the United States in the 600 natural resources of the submarine areas be protected to the full ex- tent permitted by the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf." 1968 Report of the Sections The 1968 Section Report says this: "Interpretations of the Convention "The Convention's definition of the seaward .extent of the coastal state's jurisdiction has been subjected to a number of interpretations. "Some argue that the factor of exploitability would carry the coastal nation's exclusive mineral jurisdiction to mid-ocean. We dis- agree. Others argue that it should be restricted to waters as shallow as 200 meters or 12 miles from shore. We disagree with this, too. "The better view, in our opinion, is that the 'exploitability' factor of the Convention is limited by the element of 'adjacency.' - The exclusive sovereign rights of the coastal nations to the explora- tion and exploitation of the natural resources of the seabed and sub- soil encompass 'the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but out- side the area of the territorial sea.' According to this view, there- fore, the exclusive sovereign rights of the coastal nations with respect to the seabed minerals now embrace the submerged land mass of the adjacent continent down to its junction with the deep ocean floor, ir- respective of depth. ''* *This whole matter has been under further and exhaustive review in 1969 by the Committee on Oceanography of the Section of International and Comparative Law, and the Committee on Marine Resources of the Section of Natural Resources Law. A Draft Joint Report has been prepared for sub- mission to the Councils of the respective Sections at the August 1969 meeting of the American Bar Association. It reaches the same general conclusions as the 1968 Report, but, with respect to the cited sentence of the 1968 text, says: "The quoted conclusion, which reflects the ‘continental margin’ interpretation of the Convention, represented and continues to repre- “sent an opinion widely held among our members. — "Since the 1968 Joint Report, however, a number of our mem- bers have stated that this formulation did not accurately reflect their views. Inthe opinion of these members, the physical concept of ‘ad- jacency' can persuasively be construed to embrace areas to the foot of the continental margin; but the 'exploitability' concept in the Con- (Footnote continued next page. ) 601 The reasons for retaining in the United States jurisdiction over the widest band of adjacent seabed resources consistent with our international com- mitments were summarized as follows in the 1968 Report of the Sections to the House of Delegates: (Footnote continued from previous page.) vention extends sovereign rights over the seabed beyond the 200-meter line only as technological progress makes exploitation in that area pos- sible in fact. Since exploitation techniques still cannot reach the foot of the continental margin, these members believe it erroneous to say that sovereign rights now embrace that area. To this extent they are unwilling to perpetuate what they regard as a misunderstanding of their position in the 1968 Joint Report. "Those who take the view that sovereign rights now embrace that area answer that under the existing Convention on the Continental Shelf {1) the coastal State's exclusive sovereign rights encompass any exploitation on the adjoining continental margin, whether that exploita- tion is effected by its national or by a foreigner; /Article 2 provides that "if the coastal State does not explore the continental shelf or ex- ploit its natural resources, no one may undertake these activities, or make a claim to the continental shelf, without the express consent of the coastal State, ' and these rights ''do not depend on occupation, ef- fective or notional.'"'/ (2) a change in the Convention which would re- tract this boundary of the area of the coastal State's exclusive interest to a line which is landward of the submerged edge of the continent would deprive the coastal nation of rights now recognized in that State by the existing Convention. This being so, they say that it does not matter greatly (with respect to exploration and exploitation of seabed resources) whether the outer limit of exclusive sovereign rights of the coastal State is characterized as the boundary of rights heretofore vested in the coastal nation, or the limit on jurisdiction to be acquired in futuro by exploitation of successively deeper areas, since, in either event, occupation and exploitation by any other State of the area within this limit is prohibited." 602 "Importance of the 1958 Convention to the United States "If the minerals underlying the seabed adjacent to our coasts remain under American control, as they now are under the Continental Shelf Convention as we construe it, they continue to be resources avail- able for national defense, essential components ef the American LORE p and important elements of the federal and state tax base. "We do not believe that it is in the interests of the United States that negotiations for the creation of an international regime to govern mineral development of the ocean floor should proceed on the assump- tion that this new regime will have authority to take over the adminis- tration of, or the governmental revenues derived from, the develop- ment of the minerals of any part of the submerged segments of the American continent. "In our opinion, the United States should stand on its rights under the Convention as heretofore ratified. "If legal uncertainties are believed to constitute an impediment ‘to utilization of undersea mineral resources, such uncertainties can be eliminated by uniform declarations of the coastal nations which are parties to the Convention on the Continental Shelf, identifying their claims of jurisdiction with the submerged portion of the continental land mass, and reciprocally restricting their claims accordingly. No new conference to amend the Continental Shelf Convention is necessary to accomplish this." 1969 Draft Report The draft 1969 Joint Report, after reviewing the arguments for a "nar- row shelf" versus those for a "broad shelf, '' arrives at these conclusions: "(1) We reaffirm our opinion that the concept of adjacency con- tained in the present Shelf Convention should properly be interpreted to include the submerged continental land mass. In the view widely held among our members, all of the submerged continental land mass is subject to national.jurisdiction over its natural resources. In the view of a significant number of our members any part of this land mass will come within national jurisdiction as soon as it becomes accessible to exploitation. "(2) We reaffirm our opinion that it would not be desirable, in terms of overall United States interests, to seek a formal inter- national conference for the purpose of fixing a precise boundary for 603 the legal shelf. We believe it both preferable and proper to achieve this aim through parallel declarations by interested states announcing a uniform interpretation of the criteria embodied in the 1958 Conven- tion. "(3) We reaffirm our opinion that the United States should as- sert to the full the rights over adjacent submarine areas now vested in it by the Shelf Convention and by general international law. "(4) We reaffirm our opinion that claims to rights in excess of those recognized in the Shelf Convention (such as rights over the superjacent waters, non-sedentary fisheries, or airspace) are in- valid extensions of the continental shelf doctrine, and should be so regarded by the United States. "The position stated in these comments necessarily leads us to disagree with the Commission's recommendation* . . . that the United States should take the initiative to secure international agree- ment on a seaward limit for the legal shelf at the 200-meter line (or 50 miles offshore, whichever is greater). Both these limits have now been exceeded in practice, and they must be regarded as ob- solete. We also disagree with the proposed initiative to seek inter- national agreement if this means the convocation of a formal con- ference for that purpose." ; *Report of the Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Re- sources, ''Our Nation and the Sea,'' U.S. Govt. Printing Office, January 1969. : In the next part of this statement we refer to the Commission's recom- mendations with respect to a deep sea regime, seaward of national jurisdic- tion. As to other recommendations of the Commission our 1969 Draft Joint Report says: "Other parts of the Commission's Report contain proposals of significant legal interest which are not discussed here. In par- ticular, the Commission's elaborate proposals for the adminis- trative reorganization of oceanographic activities within the Federal Government have not been dealt with. The omission of any of these matters from the present Joint Report should not be taken as indi- cating either approval, disapproval, or lack of concern with respect thereto on the part of any of the sections or committees participating herein, "' 26-563 O - 70 - pt.2-7 604 2. Mineral resources seaward of the limits of national jurisdiction Beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, what international arrange- ments should govern mineral development ? House of Delegates' recommendation On this subject the 1968 Resolution of the House of Delegates recom- mended: "(3) That on the basis of the information now available, the most desirable long-range goal for a regime to govern exploration and development of the mineral resources of the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil beyond the limits of national jurisdiction is not the creation of a supersovereignty with power to grant or deny mineral concessions, but rather agreement upon norms of conduct designed to minimize conflicts between sovereigns which undertake such ex- ploration and development. "(4) That the resources of the bed and subsoil of the deep sea, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, be the subject ofa study and consultation with a view to formulating rules and practices to be observed by common restraint or by other arrangements which will assure, inter alia, freedom of exploration by all nations ona nondiscriminatory basis, security of tenure to those engaged in pro- ducing the resources in compliance with such rules, encouragement to discover and develop these resources, and optimum use to the benefit of all peoples... ." 1968 Joint Report of the Sections The supporting 1968 Section Report said, on this subject: "The Seabed Seaward of National Jurisdiction "With respect to the minerals of the deep seabed beyond the exclusive jurisdiction of the coastal nations, three observations are in order: First, the problem is less pressing in point of time be- cause most mineral development will continue to take place first in the shallower waters which are within coastal jurisdiction; second, less is known about the abyssal deeps and therefore about the type of regime that would best effectuate their utilization; third, the nego- tiation of an international agreement to establish a wholly new regime will consume an extended period of time. Based on the 605 information now available, it appears that the most desirable long- range goal for a mineral regime to govern exploration and exploita- tion of the mineral resources of the ocean bed and subsoil seaward of the coastal jurisdiction will not be the creation of a supersover- eignty with competence to grant or deny mineral concessions. In- stead, the desirable goal appears to be an agreement upon norms of conduct by sovereign parties, in order to minimize conflicts between the nationals of the respective sovereigns which sponsor such developments. "While there were some early comments supporting the idea that the United Nations should step in as a supersovereign of the ocean depths, it would appear that there is no official support for this in the United States. At the same time there also appears to be general agreement, both in and out of government here and abroad, that no state should be permitted to acquire territorial sovereignty over any portion of the deep ocean floor outside the limits of national jurisdiction, but that such ocean floor should be open for exploration and exploitation by all nations. There is also general agreement that a nation which undertakes the exploration and exploitation of mineral resources on and under the deep seabed should be protected in the exclusive right to occupy the areas involved, with due regard to other uses of the marine environment, and without im- pairment of the high-seas character of the overlying waters. "We strongly endorse the principle that the ocean floor be- yond the limits of national jurisdiction should be open for explora- tion and exploitation to the nationals of every country in accordance with accepted principles of international law. '! Marine Science Commission Recommendation As previously noted, the Marine Science Commission report ("'Our Nation and the Sea,"' January 1969) proposes a narrow limit on coastal juris- diction (the 200-meter isobath or a line 50 miles from shore, whichever line encompasses the greater area), proposes a new international agreement to fix this limit, and proposes a moratorium on claims beyond that limit. Our 1969 Draft Joint Report strongly disagrees with all three of these recommen- dations. Beyond the areas of national jurisdiction, the Commission's report proposes a claim-registration scheme, under which only a state or an associ- 606 ation of states would be eligible to register a claim but the registrant may choose anyone to do the work or transfer its claim to another state. All states rohia be free to engage, or authorize, preliminary investi- gations todecide whether to register a claim to explore. An exclusive right to evplore or exploit would be acquired by registry with an International Registry Authority. The membership of the Authority and manner of choosing its governing body would be specified in the ge eigen, embodying the new framework. ''The Authority should find its place in the family of the United Nations but should be as autonomous as the World Bank"! (p. 149). The Authority would be required to eBEUSe claims on a "first-come, first-registered"' basis, without discretion to deny it except on the ground that the explorer or exploiter is not able and willing to develop the claim. _ Upon proof of discovery the Authority would be required to register a claim to exploit for a large enough area and for a long enough time (fixed by the Authority) oo suaibyg economic operation and assure the producer time to recover his investment and an "'adequate return thereon." Failure to comply with work requirements would be ground for revocation. Upon expiration of the registration period, further exploration and exploitation of the subject resources or area should be subject to the regime as it then exists, without any re-registration prefe rence. To cover the AUeNoEiCg's administrative costs, it should be empowered to fix registration fees. x Royalties and like revenues would be paid into an autonomous fiscal 607. agency, such as the World Bank, separate from the registration agency, * and would be available for pemigtanee to the less davelened countries. The Commission report also recommendsthe creation of an "inter- mediate zone'' of seabed, seaward of the treaty shelf as defined by the Com- mission (the 200-meter isobath or the 50-mile line), to the 2, 500-meter jeobath or 100 nautical miles from the baseline of the territorial sea, whichever gives the greater area. The boundary would be permanently fixed as in the case of the shelf. The Commission assumes that the 2, 500-meter isobath is the average depth at the foot of the peplogicel continental beteace or slope and 100 miles is the average width of the shelf and slope or terrace. (Geologists do not all agree that these assumptions are true or relevant. ) Only the coastal state or its licensees would be authorized to explore and exploit resources therein. It need not do so, but, if it does, its claims must be registered with the Authority and would come under the other terms and conditions of the international regime. Comments on the Commission's recommendations for an intermediate zone Our 1969 Draft Report comments on the intermediate zone scheme as follows: "Many of the arguments summarized earlier with regard to the proper limit of the shelf are also applicable, pro and con, to this intermediate zone concept. If the Commission's 'inter- mediate zone' proposal were adopted, in conjunction with a 'nar- row' shelf, foreign coastal nations would have exactly the same power to exclude American companies, or to demand burdensome *Our 1969 Draft Report says: ''We endorse the principle here recog- nized, that the agency concerned with production should be separated from the agency distributing the proceeds," 608 concession terms, as they would have if their jurisdiction were commensurate with a 'broad' shelf extending to the 2,500 meter isobath or other outer limit of the proposed intermediate zone. Such a zone has, however, other drawbacks, of which the most weighty is perhaps its sheer awkwardness. Areas subject to divided responsibility are rarely viable, as the history of con- dominia and internationalized zones in international law indicates. "On balance, we are opposed to this [intermediate zone / proposal, "' Comments on the Commission's recommendations for a registry scheme However, with respect to the general concept of a registry scheme for international claims, our 1969 Draft Report says this: "Under the 1968 Resolution of the House of Delegates, the American Bar Association is committed to support the development as soon as practicable of international arrangements to govern the exploitation of deep-sea resources beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. Such arrangements, the Resolution affirms, must assure, inter alia, ' . . freedom of exploration by all nations on a non- discriminatory basis, security of tenure to those en- gaged in producing the resources in compliance with such rules, encouragement to discover and develop these resources, and optimum use to the benefit of all peoples... .! "Except for the intermediate zone proposal, and subject to the various caveats expressed in the foregoing comments, we be- lieve that the Commission's recommendations for a deep-sea regime are broadly in harmony with the principles of the Resolution. "We would reiterate our belief, however, that the details of the Commission's proposed registry plan need careful attention be- fore being submitted as a basis for international discussions. There are, in our opinion, too many loose ends and loopholes which might permit abuse in connection with the requirements for the registra- tion, maintenance and vacating of claims. We are all against a 'race to grab." It is difficult at present for anyone to 'grab' the deep sea- bed physically but the concept of registration of paper claims would for the first time create the mechanism to make such a 'grab! pos- sible. Obviously safeguards against such a possibility must be drawn with the utmost care, but the factual data necessary for 609 meaningful draftsmanship are not yet available. "Many of our members strongly believe that the first step, in setting up a deep sea regime, should not be the establishment of a system which recognizes paper claims or purely speculative registrations, but should be, instead, agreement on norms of con- duct to be observed by the nations capable of carrying out deep-sea mineral exploration. * Such norms would be designed to minimize interference between expeditions or operators, and to preclude ‘jumping' of areas which are under actual exploration or develop- ment, plus reasonable protective margins. This, they believe, may well evolve into a more formal system of registry of claims, but only after enough information has been acquired to make pos- sible an agreement on criteria with respect to areas, duration, diligence requirements, and other factors historically associated with mining rights. Such consensus on norms of conduct should be without prejudice to any agreement to dedicate some portion of the value of production from deep-sea mineral resources to agreed international purposes. "' Conclusion I thank you for this opportunity to appear before your Committee on behalf of the American Bar Association. In closing, let me repeat that only the Resolutions of the House of Delegates become official policy of the Asso- ciation. The 1968 Joint Report of the Sections represents the views of those Sections. The 1969 Draft Report of the Sections, as of this writing (August 1, 1969), represents the views of the Committees of those Sections which are charged with responsibility in the matters covered by that Draft Report. I personally subscribe to the views stated in the House of Delegates Resolution and the majority views stated in the two Reports. I shall answer your questions to the best of my ability, but, in so doing, am expressing only my personal opinions with respect to subjects not explicitly covered in the Resolution or Reports to which I have referred. * This concept was referred to in our 1968 Joint Re ort. 610 Annexed to this statement are the following: Appendix A. Resolution (No. 73) of the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association, together with the 1968 Joint Report of the Sections of Natural Resources Law, International and Com- parative Law, and the Standing Committee on Peace and Law Through United Nations. Appendix B. Legislative History (or "travaux preparatoires"') of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf. This memorandum was prepared under my direction, and is submitted for the informa- tion of the Committee, but is not a part of the Resolution or Reports referred to. Appendix C. Coastal State Mineral Jurisdiction and the Continental Margin: A survey of national practice. This is adapted from Appendix F to the National Petroleum Council report, "Petroleum Under the Ocean Floor," (1969). It is not a part of the Resolution or Reports referred to, but is submitted for the Committee's information. 611 B alae CAUTIONARY NOTE : sp Only the RESOLUTIO2(S) presontsd heroin, whan approved by the House of Delogctes, become official policy H of the American Bar Association. These ere iistod under the heading RECOMMENDATION(S). Comments and Supe ' f porting data_listed under the sub-heeding REPORT aro not approved by the House in its veting and repressn} only A : the views of the Section or Commitize submitting them. Roports containing NO recommendstions (resolutions) for f specific action by the House ere merely infermative and likewise represent only the views of the Section or Commilice. i i AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION JOINT REPORT OF SECTIONS OF NATURAL RESOURCES LAW, INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW, AND THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON PEACE AND LAW THROUGH UNITED NATIONS RECOMMENDATION The Sections of Natural Resources Law, International and Comparative Law, and the Standing Committee on Peace and Law Through United Nations, recommend that the following resolution be adopted by the House of Delegates: WHEREAS, the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil under the high seas are becoming, through techno- logical progress, increasingly available to mankind in ways until recently unforeseen; and WHEREAS, a Committee of the United Nations General Assembly is presently considering "practical means to promote international co-operation in the exploration, conservation 2nd use of the seabed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, . . .and of their resources"; and 612 WHEREAS, the United States, as a member of that United Nations Committee, has propesed that the exploration and use of the deep ocean floor be open to all states and their nationals without discrimination and in accordance with international nee and as a corollary of this that the exercise of poueres one or sovereign rights over any part of the deep ocean floor be ruled out; and WHEREAS, the treaty known as the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf in force between 37 nations, including the United States, recognizes that —— coastal state has "Eselusdwe soveréign rights for the purpose of" exploring and exploiting the natural resources of "the sea-bed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast . . . toa depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to where the depen of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas"; and WHERFAS, it is generally recognized that the defini- tion in the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf of the boundary between the area of exclusive sovereign rights and the deep ocean floor needs to be-:clarified by an agreed interpretation; and WHEREAS, the House of Delegates, by its Resolution of August 9, 1966, stated that "prior to framing a policy ... 613 the United States Government .. : review thoroughly the issues at stake in consultation with representatives of the American Bar Association and others competent in the field of internaticnal law, with scientific and technical experts and with leaders cf American industry in oceanic development"; NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, that the American ‘-Bax Association SUPPORTS the efforts being made in ee out of the gcvernments of interested states to protect the seabed and subsoil of the deep ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction fzom claims of sovereignty or rights of discre- tionary contrel by any nation or group or organization of nations; *. Be SUPPORTS the call by the United States Government for internationally agreed arrangements governing the exploitation of natural resources cf the deep ocean floor beycnd the limits of national jurisdiction to be established as soon as practicable; RECOMMENDS (1) That the United States consult with other parties to the 1958 Continental Shelf Conventicn with a view to establishing, through the issuance of parallel declarations or by other means, an agreed interpretation of the definition 614 of the boundary between the area of exclusive sovereign rights with respect to natural resources of he seabed and subsoil and the deep ocean floor beyond the limits of national juris- diction. (2) That within the area of exclusive sovereign rights adjacent to the United States, the interests of the United States in the natural resources of the submarine areas be protected to the full extent peraeted by the 1958 Conven- tion on the Continental Shelf. (3) That on the basis of the information now available, the most desirable long-range goal for a regime to govern exploration and development of the mineral resources of the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil beyond the limits of national jurisdiction ge not the creation of a supersov- ereignty with power to grant or deny mineral concessions, but rather agreement upon norms of conduct designed to minimize conflicts between sovereigns which undertake such exploration and development. (4) That the resources of the bed and subsoil of the deep sea, beyond the limits cf national surmeaieeen mee the subject of study and consultation with a view to formula- ting rules and practices to be observed by common restraint or by other arrangements which will assure, inter alia, 615 freedom of exploration by all nations on a nondiscriminatory basis, security of tenure to those engaged in producing the eepouxees in compliance with such rules, encouragement to discover and develop these resources, and optimum use to the benefit of all peoples; and AUTHORIZES representatives of the Sections of Natural Resources Law and International and Comparative Law and the Standing Committee on Peace and Law Through United Nations to express the foregoing as the! views of the American Bar Aeseeteion to agencies of the Government of the United States and to the Congress of the United States. REPORT The House of Delegates of the American Bar Associa- tion, on August 10, 1967, adopted Report #97 of the Section of Natural Resources Law which constituted an offer through the Section of the Association's "services and assistance" to the National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Develop- ment and the Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources and an authorization and instruction to the Section "to establish and maintain a continuing liaison with the Council and the Commission to the end that the Section shall prepare and submit to the House of Delegates, for approval, recommenda- tions with respect to the report or reports proposed by the Council or the Commission." The resolution required that the Section collaborate with the Section of International and Comparative Law and the Section of Administrative Law "with a _ view towards developing joint recommendations and policies" with regard to matters within the official purview of interest of these sections. 616 The Section assigned responsibility for implementing this resolution to the Chairman of the Section's Committee on Marine Resources. Subsequently, a Consulting Committee on Marine Resources was formed, consisting of representatives of the named sections as well as the Association's Standing Committee on Peace and Law Through United Nations and the Committee on World Peace Through Law. In the fall of 1967 liaison was established with the Council and the Commission which resulted in the Commis-—- sion's making inquiry as to a number of subjects affecting the interest of the United States in offshore lands. Work with the Council and Commission is continuing toward the end of assisting in the formulation of a United States policy in these matters. The Council and the Commission have not as yet made any reports or recommendations on these Subjects except of the most preliminary nature. This report discusses some of the issues involved in developing a regime for exploration and exploitation of the mineral resources on and under the floor of the ocean. It also discusses the question of the extent of the area of exclusive mineral resource jurisdiction of the adjacent coastal states. The matter has taken on some urgency owing to a number of factors. One is the fact that the Convention on the Continental Shelf, to which reference is made later, is, by its terms, subject to amendment after June 10, 1969. O€£ more immediate concern, however, is the motion submitted to the Twenty-Second Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations by the delegate from Malta. This apparently contemplated establishment of an international agency which would regulate, supervise and control activities on the deep ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. Implicit, of course, is the threshold problem of establishing | the line between the area of exclusive seabed jurisdiction of the coastal nations recognized by the Convention on the Con- tinental Shelf, and the deep ocean floor seaward of that jurisdiction. This problem is of grave importance to the United States as a coastal nation engaged in major development of the minerals of the submarine continent. 617 The General Assembly recognized that so far-reaching a suggestion called for profound study and by resolution decided to establish an ad hoc committee "to study the peaceful uses of the seabed and the ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction." This committee was requested by the resolution to prepare a study for consideration by the General Assembly at its next (Twenty-Third) session. The committee .was asked to include in its study "an indication regarding practical means to promote international cooperation in the exploration, conservation and use of the seabed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof." The resolution was adopted on December 18, 1967, by a vote of 99 to 0. The United States voted for the resolution and is one of the members of the ad hoc committee consisting of thirty-five nations. The Convention on the Continental Shelf The threshold question, vital to the United States, is the geographical extent of the exclusive rights now vested in the coastal nations, as recognized in the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf. The relevant articles of this Convention read: "Article 1 "For the purpose of these articles, the term ‘con- tinental shelf' is used as referring (a) to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit. to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas; (b) to the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands. "Article 2 "], The coastal State exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources. : "2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this article are exclusive in the sense that if the coastal State does not explore the continental shelf or exploit its natural resources, no one may undertake these 618 activities, or make a claim to the continental shelf, without the express consent of the coastal State. "3. The rights of the coastal State over the con- tinental shelf do not depend on occupation, effective or notional, or on any express proclamation. "4. The natural resources referred to in these articles consist of the mineral and other non-living resources of the seabed and subsoil together with living organisms belonging to sedentary species, that is to say, organisms which, at the harvestable stage, either are immobile on or under thé~seabed or are unable to move except in constant physical contact with the seabed or the subsoil. "Article 3 "The rights cf the coastal State over the continental shelf do not affect the legal status of the superjacent waters as high seas, or that of the air space above those waters." Interpretations of the Convention ° . The Convention's definition of the seaward extent of the coastal state's jurisdiction has been subjected to a number of interpretations. Some argue that the factor of exploitability would carry the coastal nation's exclusive mineral jurisdiction to mid-ocean. We disagree. Others argue that it should be restricted to waters as shallow as 200 meters or 12 miles from shore. We disagree with this, too. The better view, in our opinion, is that the "“exploitability" factor of the Convention is limited by the element of “adjacency." The exclusive sovereign rights of the coastal nations to the exploration and exploitation of the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil emcompass "the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea." According to this view, there- fore, the exclusive sovereign rights of the coastal nations 619 with respect to the seabed minerals now embrace the submerged _land mass of the adjacent continent down to its junction with the deep ocean floor, irrespective of depth. Importance of the 1958 Convention to the United States : If the minerals underlying the seabed adjacent to our coasts remain under American control, as they now are under the Continental Shelf Convention as we construe it, they continue to be resources available for national defense, essential components of the American economy, and important elements of the federal and state tax base. We do not believe that it is in the interests of the United States that negotiations for the creation of an international regime to govern mineral development of the ‘ocean floor should proceed on the assumption that this new regime will have authority to take over the administration of, or the governmental revenues derived from, the develop- ment of the minerals of any part of the submerged segments of the American continent. In our opinion, the United States should stand on its rights under the Convention as heretofore ratified. If legal uncertainties are believed to constitute an impediment to utilization of undersea mineral resources, such uncertainties can be eliminated by uniform declarations of the coastal nations which are parties to the Convention on the Continental Shelf, identifying their claims of juris- diction with the submerged portion of the continental land mass, and reciprocally restricting their claims accordingly. No new conference to amend the Continental Shelf Convention is necessary to accomplish this. The Seabed Seaward of National Jurisdiction With respect to the minerals of the deep seabed beyond the exclusive jurisdiction of the.coastal nations, three observations are in order: First, the problem is ‘less’ pressing in point of time because most mineral develop- ment will continue to take place first in the shallower waters which are within coastal jurisdiction; second, less is known 26-563 O - 70 - pt.2 - 8 620 about the abyssal deeps and therefore about the type of regime that would best effectuate their utilization; third, the negotiation of an international agreement to establish a wholly new regime will consume an extended period of time. Based on the information now available, it appears that the most desirable long-range goal for a mineral regime to govern exploration and exploitation of the mineral resources of the ocean bed and subsoil seaward of the coastal jurisdic- tion will not be the creation of a supersovereignty with competence to grant or deny mineral concessions. Instead, the desirable goal appears to be an agreement upon norms of conduct by sovereign parties, in order to minimize conflicts between the nationals of the respective sovereigns which sponsor such developments. While there were some early comments supporting the idea that the United Nations should step in as a supersov-—- ereign of the ocean depths, it would appear that there is no official support for this in the United States. At the same time, there also appears to be general agreement, both in and out of government here and abroad, that no state should be permitted to acquire territorial sovereignty over any portion of the deep ocean floor outside the limits of national juris- diction, but that such ocean floor should be open for exploration and exploitation by all nations. There is also general agreement that a nation which undertakes the exploration and exploitation of mineral resources on and under the deep seabed should be protected in the exclusive right to occupy the areas involved, with due regard to other uses of the marine environment, and without impairment of the high-seas character of the overlying waters. We strongly endorse the principle that the ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction should be open for exploration and exploitation to the nationals of every country in accordance with accepted principles of international law. Members of the Committees of the Section of Natural Resources Law and of the Section of International and Comparative Law concerned with the subject of submarine mineral resources, together with memoers of the Standing Committee on Peace and Law Through United Nations and members of the Committee on Deep Sea Mineral Resources of the American Branch of the International Law Association, have agreed on the following conclusions: 621 CONCLUSIONS Ns With respect to the gathering of factual information Full support should be given to the International Decade of Ocean Exploration, now being formulated, and to the continuance of the maximum international cooperation in the acquisition and exchange of information about the ocean floor. There should not be any embargo on or prohibition of exploration of deep sea mineral resources pending the negotiation of an international agreement relating thereto. To the contrary, all possible exploration, research, and exchange of knowledge should be encouraged. There is no need to prohibit this desirable progress because of uncertainties as to who shall control production, if minerals are discovered. 2. With respect to the area within the exclusive jurisdiction of the coastal nations over submarine mineral resources Since exploration and exploitation of undersea minerals is likely to occur earlier in the shallower waters of the oceans adjacent to the continents than in the abyssal depths, it follows that if jurisdictional uncertainties arise to impede such operations during the next several decades, such problems will be primarily related to the scope of the mineral jurisdiction which is already vested exclusively in the coastal states by the “exploitability" and "adjacency" criteria of jurisdiction which now appear in the Continental Shelf Convention. This uncertainty, if necessity for its resolution occurs, might be removed by consultation among the major coastal nations which are capable of conducting deep sea mineral development, looking toward the issuance by those states of parallel ex parte declarations. These declarations might appropriately restrict claims of exclusive seabed mineral jurisdiction, pursuant to the exploitability and adjacency factors of the Continental Shelf Convention, to (i) the submerged portions of the continental land mass, or (ii) to a stated distance from the base line, whichever limitation encompasses the larger area. These declarations might appropriately recognize special cases. Two such classi- fications suggest themselves: (i) in the case of states whose 622 coasts plunge precipitously to the ocean floor (e.g., on the west coast of South America), the limit on seabed mineral ‘jurisdiction would automatically operate on the deep ocean floor; (ii) in the case of narrow or enclosed seas, the principle of adjacency might appropriately carry coastal mineral jurisdiction to the median lines, even though these are beyond the continental blocks. This proposal should not necessitate any amendment of the text of the Continental Shelf Convention. That Con- vention's differentiation between the coastal state's exclusive rights in seabed minerals, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the non-exclusive status of the seabed with respect to research and other uses not related to mineral exploitation, would be retained. So also with the Convention's preservation of the high-seas status of the overlying waters. It would, however, be both appropriate and desirable to reiterate these understandings in the recommended declara- tions. In the instance of scientific research, which is being increasingly impeded by the requirement of coastal consent for research undertaken on the continental shelf, these parallel declarations might be employed to secure greater pro- tection for this vital activity. £36 With respect to the. regime which should be applicable to the minerals in and under the seabed, seaward of the limit of the coastal state's exclusive jurisdiction (1) On the basis of the information now available, we do not think jurisdiction should be vested in the United Nations or in any other international organization to administer an international licensing system with power to grant or deny exploration and production concessions with respect to these resources. (2) We think there should be created an international commission (including adequate representation of the maritime powers now engaged in oceanic research and mineral exploration), or vesting responsibility in an existing commission so con- stituted, with instructions to draft a convention (subject, of course, to ratification) which shall have as its objectives: 623 a. Creation of an international agency with the limited functions of (i) receiving, recording, and publishing notices by sovereign nations of their intent to occupy and explore stated areas of the seabed exclusively for mineral production, notices of actual occupation thereof, notices of _ discovery, and periodic notices of continuing activity, together with (ii) resolution of conflicts between notices recorded by two-or more nations encompassing the same area. b. Establishment of norms of conduct by sovereign nations with respect to the recording of the notices proposed in the preceding paragraph, and in the occupation of the seabed and exploration and production of minerals therefrom. The drafting commission could appropriately recommend for inclusion in the resulting convention, among other things, standards (or a mechanism to establish standards) relating to permissible areas for inclusion in exploration and produc- tion phases, periods of exclusive rights of occupancy, requirements of diligence as related to tenure, conservation, avoidance of pollution, accommodation with competing uses of the marine environment, etc. The instructions to the negotia- ting commission should stipulate that the resulting convention shall contemplate that the actual production and marketing of minerals discovered shall be controlled by the laws of the recording nation, and that that nation shall be held account- able for the conduct of those operating under its flag in the exploration and exploitation of minerals. @o5 Establishment of (i) reasonable payments to be made, preferably to the World Bank, by the nation which under- takes mineral development, in areas seaward of coastal mineral jurisdiction, in the nature of registration fees, and develop- ment fees or royalties, and (ii) the purposes to which such revenues, when received, shall be applied. These purposes should be restricted to international activities on which wide agreement can be reached, such as oceanic research, programs aimed at improved use of the sea's food resources to alleviate protein malnutrition, and the development of the natural resources of the less developed countries. Jesse P. Luton, Jr., Chairman Section of Natural Resources Law Joe C. Barrett, Chairman Section of International and Comparative Law Eberhard P. Deutsch, Chairman Standing Committee on Peace and Law Through United Nations 624 APPENDIX BTO STATEMENT OF NORTHCUTT ELY THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (OR 'TRAVAUX PREPARA Com OF THE 1958 CONVENTION ON THE CONTINENTAL SHELF— The background and history of the Convention comprises primarily these events: 2/ On September 28, 1945, President Truman signed a proclamation— whose operative language read: ", . the United States regards the natural resources of the subsoil and the sea bed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas but con- tiguous to the coasts of the United States, as appertaining to the United States, subject to its jurisdiction and control."' _ The reasons he gave were these: ".. . the exercise of jurisdiction over the natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf by the contiguous nation is reasonable and just, since the effectiveness of measures to utilize or conserve these resources would be contingent upon cooperation and protection from the shore, since the continental shelf may be regarded as an extension of the land-mass of the coastal nation and thus naturally appurtenant to.it, since these resources frequently form a seaward ex- tension of a pool or deposit lying within the territory, and since self- protection compels the coastal nation to keep close watch over activ- ities off its shores which are of the nature necessary for the utiliza- tion of these resources. "' President Truman's proclamation did not relate these reasons to any specified depth of water. At that time, except for wells drilled from piers off California, no offshore well was in production in this country. The first one was brought in, in 50 feet of water, in Louisiana, in 1947. . Some two score nations quickly followed suit with proclamations of offshore jurisdiction. 1/ The writer is indebted to Luke W. Finlay, Cecil J. Olmstead, and Oliver L. Stone for access to their research materials in preparing this appendix on legislative history, and the following appendix on national practice. A more complete account appears in the Report of the National Petroleum Council's Committee on Petroleum Resources Under the Ocean Floor, March 1969. 2/ The Truman Proclamation of September 28, 1945, titled ''Policy of the United States with respect to Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Seabed of the Conti- nental Shelf, '' 10 Fed. Reg. 12303. 625 2. In 1951 the International Law Commission, which had been estab- lished by the Assembly of the United Nations to promote the development and codification of international law, submitted a report on the high seas after its third session. This 1951 report recommended that the coastal nations should have control and jurisdiction over the natural resources of a "continental sheif, '' defined as referring to ". , . the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas contiguous to the coast, but outside the area of territorial waters, where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil,"' 3/ 3. The same Commission, in 1953, following its fifth session, produced another report. In this 1953 report the Commission reversed itself, and defined coastal jurisdiction solely in terms of water depth, using 200 metres as the outside limit, as follows: ".. . the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas contiguous to the coast, but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of two hundred metres. ua The exploitability criterion was dropped. oft This new limitation proved unacceptable to the Organization of American States. In March 1956, the 20 American nations convened at Ciudad Trujillo to consider the Commission's 1953 draft. These 20 nations were wholly dis- satisfied with the International Law Commission's about-face, They unani- mously adopted a resolution reciting that: "The sea-bed and subsoil of the continental shelf, continental and insular terrace, or other submarine areas, adjacent to the coastal state, outside the area of the territorial sea, and to a depth of 200 meters, or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent 3/ International Law Commission (ILC) Yearbook (1951), Vol. I, p. 141. 4/ ILC Yearbook (1953), Vol. Il, p. 212. The Commission's records make it clear that the motivation for this action was not the conclusion that the coastal nations had no rights beyond the 200 metre depth, but rather that there was no urgency for allowing exploitation beyond that depth, and that a 200 metre depth limit had a desirable element of certainty. 626 waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the sea-bed and subsoil, appertain exclusively to that state and are subject to its jurisdiction and control."' (Emphasis added.) 5/ The conference's report, underlying that resolution, explained "continental terrace'' as meaning this: ". ,. . 'Continental terrace’ is understood to be that part of the submerged land mass that forms the shelf and the slope." = In turn, it defined the ''slope'' to mean this: "., . Scientifically, the term 'continental slope,' or ‘inclination,' refers to the slope from the edge of the shelf to the greatest depths. "' (Emphasis added. ) The report made explicit just what the 20 American nations were objecting to in the International Law Commission's proposed restriction of their national jurisdiction to a water depth of 200 metres. It said: "I, The American states are especially interested in utilizing and conserving the existing natural resources on the American terrace (shelf and slope). % OK % "III, The utilization of the resources of the shelf cannot be technically limited, and for this reason the exploitation of the con- tinental terrace should be included as a possibility in the declaration of rights of the American states.'' (Emphasis added. ) The American representative concurred in this report and resolution, with the concurrence of the Department of State. a 5/ Resolution of Ciudad Trujillo, Inter-American Specialized Conference on Conservation of Natural Resources; The Continental Shelf and Marine Waters, Ciudad Trujillo: March 15-28, 1956. 6/ Committee I Report, Inter-American Specialized Conference, Conferences and Organizations Series No. 50, Pan American Union, at 34 (March 1956). ul Whiteman's Digest of International Law, (Department of State 1965) Vol.4, Pp. 837. } 627 Ba In 1956 the International Law Commission convened its eighth session, a few weeks after the close of the Ciudad Trujillo conference. The American position won. The Commission added to its 1953 defi- nition (200 metres) the language proposed by the American nations, which extended coastal jurisdiction ''beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources" of said areas. The spokesman for the 20 American nations, having won his point, dropped his request for specific reference to the continental ter- race. The official report of the session states it this way: ", . . He did not wish to press the part of his amendment intro- ducing the concept of the continental terrace, since the adoption of the second point relating to the depth at which exploitation was practical would automatically bring that area within the general concept. "' 8 Professors McDougal and Burke, in their definitive work, ''The Public Order of the Oceans," report the 1956 debate in the International Law Commission in this fashion: "Some controversy attended the suggested elimination of the continental shelf term and the references to the ‘continental and insular terrace,' but this became muted when it was realized that a criterion embracing both a 200-meter depth and the depth admitting exploitation would embrace such areas if they were in fact exploitable or came to be." (p. 683. ) The International Law Commission's 1956 report accordingly re- commended to the United Nations Assembly draft articles for a convention which would recognize coastal jurisdiction not only to 200 metres (about 100 fathoms), but, as proposed by the American nations, ''beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas." The full text of the language recommended by the Commission to the General Assembly on this subject was contained in Article 67 of a proposed treaty dealing with other phases of the Law of the Sea as well as the conti- nental shelf. It read: 8/ ILC Yearbook (1956), Vol. I, p. 136. 628 "For the purposes of these articles, the term 'continental shelf' is used as referring to the seabed and subsoil of the sub- marine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the ter- ritorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres (approximately 100 fathoms), or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters . admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas. u9/ This final report of the Commission to the Assembly emphasized that this was in response to the Ciudad Trujillo declaration of the American states. The Commission said: "At its eighth session, the Commission reconsidered this provision /i.e., the 200 metre limit agreed on by the Commission in 1953/. It noted that the Inter-American Specialized Conference on 'Conservation of Natural Resources: Continental Shelf and Oceanic Waters,' held at Ciudad Trujillo (Dominican Republic) in March 1956, had arrived at the conclusion that the right of the coastal State should be extended beyond the limit of 200 metres, 'to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural re- sources of the seabed and subsoil.' Certain members thought that the article adopted in 1953 /the 200 metre limit/ should be. modified. . . . . While maintaining the limit of 200 metres inthis article as the normal limit corresponding to present needs, they wished to recognize forthwith the right to exceed that limit if exploitation of the sea-bed or subsoil at a depth greater than 200 metres proved technically possible. . .. Other members contested the usefulness of the addition, which in their opinion unjustifiably and dangerously impaired the stability of the limit adopted. The majority, of the Com- mission nevertheless decided in favor of the addition. "' 10/ The Commission went on to say: "While adopting, to a certain extent, the geographical test of the 'continental shelf' as the basis of the juridical definition of the term, the Commission therefore in no way holds that the existence of a continental shelf, in the geographical sense as generally understood, Agi ILC Yearbook (1956), Vol. II, p.296. 10/ ILC Yearbook (1956), Vol. II, pp. 296-97. 629 is essential for the exercise of the rights of the coastal State as defined in these articles. . . . Again, exploitation of a sub- marine area at a depth exceeding 200 metres is not contrary to the present rules, merely because the area is not a continental shelf in the geological sense,""—-’ (Emphasis added. ) 6. The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea convened in Geneva in February 1958 to consider the recommendations of the Inter- national Law Commission. Representatives of 82 nations attended. The conference separated out the Commission's articles into four conventions, one on the High Seas, another on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, another on the Living Resources of the Sea, and the Convention on the Con- tinental Shelf. In support of the language recommended by the Commission, with respect to coastal nations' jurisdiction beyond the 200 metre isobath, a member of the American delegation told the Conference: "The definition of the rights of the coastal State to the continental shelf and continental slope adjacent to the mainland proposed by the International Law Commission would benefit individual States and the whole of mankind. 112/( Emphasis added. ) The Conference approved the recommended language of Article 67 of the Commission draft, as Article 1 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf, after eliminating the parenthetical reference to 100 fathoms as equivalent to 200 metres, and adding language making the convention ap- plicable to submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands. In one of the final acts of the Conference, in plenary session, a motion was made to cut coastal jurisdiction back to the 200 metre isobath, ‘as recommended by the Commission in 1953. It was rejected by the Con - ay) ILC Yearbook (1956), Vol.II, p. 297. 12/ Official Records of the U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, Vol. VI: Fourth Committee, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/42 (1958), p. 40. 630 13/ ference by a vote of 48 to 20, with two abstentions, — Representatives of our Nation and 45 others then signed the Con- vention. 7. Article 11 of the Convention provided that it should come into force on the 30th day following deposit of the 22nd ratification or ac- cession with the United Nations. This required until June 10, 1964. 14/ The State Department submitted the Convention to the President on September 2, 1959. It told him that the Convention "combines both the depth and exploitability tests as did the International Law Commission's draft. '' —= In submitting the Convention to the Senate in 1960 the Department was even more explicit. Its spokesman was Arthur H. Dean, who had been chair- man .of the United States delegation at the 1958 conference. He told the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: "The clause which protects the right to utilize advances in - technology at greater depths beneath the oceans was supported by the United States and was in keeping with the inter-American con- clusions at Ciudad Trujillo in 1956. It was included in the I,L.C. 1956 draft. ''+°/ (Emphasis added. ) The Senate accordingly gave its consent, and the President ratified the Convention March 24, 1961. L2/ 13/ Official Records of U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, Vol. Il: Plenary Meetings, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/38 (1958), p. 13. 14/ See Proclamation of President Johnson so stating, May 25, 1964; T.1.A.S. .5578, p.55. Article 13 provides that after expiration of five years from the date on which the convention enters into force, a request for revision may be made by any contracting party by notice in writing to the Secretary General of the United Nations. This date is thus June 10, 1969. 15/ Letter of Acting Secretary of State Dillon transmitting the Convention to President Eisenhower, September 2, 1959. 16/ Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, ''Conventions on the Law of the Séa, '' 86 Cong., 2d Sess., Jan. 20, 1960, pp. 108-09. I?/ See T.1.A.S. 5578. 631 Conclusion Article 2 (1). of the Convention on the Continental Shelf states that the coastal State exercises over the ''continental shelf" sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources. Article 1 defined the term "continental shelf'' as referring: ", . . to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, toa depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural re- sources of the said areas. . . . '(Emphasis added. ) It is clear that the emphasized language (1) was added on the demand of the 20 American states; (2) was in response to their insistence that ex- clusive coastal jurisdiction should encompass the continental terrace, both shelf and slope, "to the greatest depths"; (3) was concurred in and advocated by the State Department in the 1956 Ciudad Trujillo conference of the American states, with the interpretation that this language accomplished that result; (4) was accepted by the International Law Commission in 1956 as recognizing exclusive jurisdiction in the coastal State in adjacent waters to whatever depth is exploitable; (5) was recommended by the State Department to the 1958 con- ference which produced the Convention on the Continental Shelf with the ex- planation that it encompassed both "shelf and slope"; and (6) was represented by the State Department to the President and Senate as being ''in keeping with the inter-American conclusions at Ciudad Trujillo in 1956."' 632 APPENDIX C TO STATEMENT OF NORTHCUTT ELY COASTAL STATE MINERAL JURISDICTION AND THE CONTINENTAL MARGIN Survey of National Practice To date, 102 nations, 1/ including 98 coastal nations, have recognized the principle of the coastal state's jurisdiction over adjacent offshore mineral resources. Thirty-nine nations (35 of them coastal) have asserted this principle by ratifying the Convention on the Continental Shelf. 2/ The other countries have done so by one or more of the follow- ing methods: (1) by domestic legislation, (2) by agreement with other nations, or (3) by granting offshore concessions. 3/ Of the 98 coastal nations which have asserted their general juris- diction over offshore minerals, at least 37 have done so with respect to specific submarine areas which, according to available information, ap- pear to be beneath waters deeper than 200 metres. In most cases, this has been done by the issuance of deep-water leases; 4/in others by de- cree, agreements with neighboring states or offers of such agreements, 5/ or announcements of national policy. 6/ Atleast 14 coastal nations have if These 102 are identified in Parts I, II, and III of this Appendix. To these 102 nations may be added 5 territories which are partially self- governing, making a total of 107 jurisdictions. See note 9 infra. ei These 39 are identified in Part I of this Appendix. ims These 63, plus 5 territories which are partially self-governing, are identified in Parts II and III of this Appendix. 4/ 31 nations which have apparently authorized or undertaken development in water deeper than 200 meters are identified in Part IV of this Appendix. 5/ Decrees or international agreements or tenders of international agree- Ments have been found to include water deeper than 200 metres in instances which involve eight nations, in addition to the 31 nations which have issued deep-water leases. These eight are: Chile (200 miles); Dahomey (100 miles); East Germany (Baltic Sea Decree); Ecuador (200 miles); El Salvador (200 miles); Poland (Baltic Sea Decree); Saudi Arabia (Red Sea Decree); U.S.S.R. (Baltic Sea Decree). See also Soviet announcement in the U.N. of drilling in ~ Caspian Sea at depths of 300 to 600 metres (Press release GA/3929, 13 March 1969, p.4). 6/ For example, Canada. 633 granted leases which include areas beyond both the 200-metre isobath and 50 nautical miles from shore. 7/ A summary of this national practice appears below. Compilation: of this information is complicated by (1) the variety of ways in which as- sertions of offshore seabed jurisdiction have been made, (2) apparent in- consistencies between law and practice in several nations, and (3) the fact that some nations have asserted seabed jurisdiction by more than one method. This. summary is not limited to the practice of members of the United Nations. ANNEXED LISTS I. Parties to Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf (39) II. States, not parties to the Convention, which have made declarations or enacted legislation concerning jurisdiction over the continental shelf (49) Adopted the Convention's definition (8) Adopted the exploitability criterion (3) Adopted other definitions (15) Adopted shelf concept in general legislation or proclamation, but no precise definition (23) OO be III. Other states and territories, not parties to the Convention, which have granted offshore concessions in apparent absence of general legislation (19) IV. States (whether or not parties to the Convention) which have granted offshore concessions for areas in which waters deeper than 200 metres have been provisionally identified (31) V.. Practice of the United States 7/ These 14 are identified in Part IV of this Appendix. 634 / I. Parties to Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf (39) 1. Albania 21. Netherlands 2. Australia 22. New Zealand 3. Bulgaria 23. Poland 4. Byelorussian SSR 24. Portugal 5. Cambodia 25. Romania 6. Colombia 26. Senegal 7. Czechoslovakia 27. Sierra Leone + 8. Denmark 28. South Africa 9. Dominican Republic 29. Sweden 10. Finland 30. Switzerland 11. France 31. Thailand as 12. Guatemala 32. Trinidad and Tobago 13. Haiti 33. Uganda 14. Israel 34. Ukrainian SSR 15. Jamaica 35. USSR 16. Madagascar 36. United Kingdom 17. Malawi 37. United States 18. Malaysia 38. Venezuela 19. Malta 39. Yugoslavia 20. Mexico II. States, not parties to the Convention, which have made declarations or enacted legislation concerning jurisdiction over the continental shelf (49) A. Adopted the Convention's Definition (8): 1. Argentina: National Executive Power, Law No. 17, 094-M. 24 of 29 Dec. 1966 (U.N. Doc. A/AC 135/11 at p. 10)., 2. Germany: Federal Republic: Proclamation on the Continental Shelf, 20 Jan. 1964. 3. Honduras: Congressional Decree No. 21 of the Constituent National Assembly, 19 Dec. 1957. 4. India: Petroleum and Natural Gas Rules, 1959,Art. 3 , (U.N. Doc. A/AC 135/11/Add.1 at p. 13). 5. Italy: * Act No. 613 of 21 July 1967, Law for Exploration and Production of Liquid and Gaseous Hydrocarbons in the Territorial Sea and Continental Shelf (U.N. Doc. A/AC 135/11 at p. 38). 8 / U.S. State Department, Treaties in Force, January l, 1969 (Publication 8432). 6. Morocco: heme PATER: 8. Uruguay: 635 Petroleum Code, Dahir No. 1-58-227, 21 July 1958. Decree on the Continental Shelf, 3 Sept. 1958 (54 Am. J. Int'l L. 497 (1960)). Decree, 16 July 1963. B. Adopted the exploitability criterion (3): 1. Brazil: 2. Norway: 3. Philippines: Boletim Especial #196, 20 Oct. 1967, Embassy of Brazil. Provisional Act of 21 June 1963 relating to the Exploitation and Exploration of Submarine Natural Resources (U.N. Doc. A/AC 135/11 at p. 46). Proclamation No. 370 of 20 Mar. 1968 (U.N. Doc. A/AC 135/11 at p. 47). C. Adopted other definitions (15): 1. Canada: Statement of Canadian representative before U.N. Ad Hoc Committee on March 11, 1968 (U.N. Doc. A/AG 135/peatepse>) confirmed by Canadian Embassy, Washington, D.C. ("at least to the abyssal depths"'). 2. Chile: Presidential Declaration Concerning the Continental Shelf, 23 June 1947 (U.N. Doc. A/AC 135/11 at p.26); Declaration Over the Maritime Zone, Santiago, 1952, ratified by Decree 432, 23 Sept. 1954 (200 miles). 3. Costa Rica: Article 1 of Decree-Law No. 803 of 2 Nov. 1949 and Article 6 of the Constitution (''submarine shelf and continental base"’). 4. Dahomey: Decree No. 74 of 7 March 1968 (100 miles) (U.N. Doc. A/AC 135/11/Add. 1 at p.11). 5. Ecuador: Art. 630, Civil Code, 20 Aug. 1960 (U.N. Doc. A/AC 135/11 at p.30){200 metre isobath), but compare Declaration of Santiago, 1952, ratified by Executive Decree No. 275, 7 Feb. 1955 (200 miles), and Supreme Decree No. 1542 of 10 Nov. 1966, amending Art. 633 of Civil Code (200 miles). (Inconsistency in article numbers appears in U.N. and P.A.U. documents). 26-563 O- 70 - pt,2-9 10. ll. V2 WS} 14, 15) 636 El Salvador: Arts. 1 and 8, Constitution of 1962 (200 miles). Germany: Democratic Republic: Declaration on the Conti- nental Shelf of the Baltic Sea, Moscow, October 23, 1968 ('the surface and subsoil of the bed of the Baltic Sea as a shallow sea are a continuous continental shelf"). Ghana: Act No. 175, The Territorial Waters and Continental Shelf Act, 19 April 1963 (U.N. Doc. A/AC 135/11 at p. 34) (100 fathoms). - Indonesia: Government Regulations substituting Law No. 44 of 26 Oct. 1960 on the Mining of Petroleum and Natural Gas (Continental Shelf of the Indonesia Archipelago).’ Ivory Coast: Offshore Law, Decree 67-334 of 1 August 1967 (200 metres). Nicaragua: Declaration in May 1949 under Constitution of 1948 (200 metres). Executive Decree of 5 April 1965 (200 miles) appears to apply only to living resources. The Constitution of 1 Nov. 1950 states that the National Territory includes the "continental shelf'' and ''submerged foundation. "' Panama: Law No. 31 of 2 Feb. 1967 (200 miles) Pakistan: U.N. Legis. Series ST/LEG/SER.B/6, Dec. 1956, at 38 (100 fathoms adopted in 1950). Peru: Presidential Decree No. 781 of 1 Aug. 1947 (200 miles); Petroleum Law No. 11780 of 12 March 1952 (200 miles). South Korea: Presidential Proclamation of Sovereignty Over Adjacent Seas, 18 Jan. 1952 (Continental Shelf regardless of depth of water). Adopted shelf concept in general legislation or proclamation, but no precise definition (23): Ie (ag Bahamas (U. K.): Bahamas (Alteration of Boundaries) Order in Council No. 2574, 26 Nov. 1948. British Honduras (U.K.): Oil Mining Regulations, 2 Sept. 1949. Brunei: The Petroleum Mining Enactment, 1963. Burma: Concession Rules, 1962. a 13: 14, Eye 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. (asic 22. (45 }e 637 Greece: Petroleum Law (Law 3948) of 10 April 1959. Iran: Law of 19 June 1955. Iraq: Proclamation of 24 Nov. 1957 (U.N. Doc. A/AC 135/11 at p. 36). Jamaica: Jamaica (Alteration of Boundaries) Order in Council (No. 2575) of 26 Nov. 1948. Kuwait: Proclamation of 12 June 1949 (U.N. Doc. A/AC 135/11 at p. 39). Libya: Petroleum Law of 1955. Nigeria: Mineral Oil (Amendment) of 17 Dec. 1959. Saudi Arabia: Royal Pronouncement of 28 May 1949; Regulations for the Ownership of Red Sea Resources, Royal Decree No. M/27 of 1 October 1968. Spain: Hydrocarbons Act of 26 Dec. 1958. Persian Gulf States: Bahrain: Proclamation of 5 June 1949. Muscat & Oman: Offshore activity, Petroleum Press Service, June 1968 at 204. Qatar: Proclamation of 8 June 1949. Trucial States: Abu Dhabi: Proclamation of 10 June 1949. Ajman: Proclamation of 20 June 1949. Dubai: Proclamation of 14 June 1949. Fujairah: Offshore activity, Petroleum Press Service, July 1966 at 274, Ras al Khaimah: Proclamation of 17 June 1949. Sharjah: Proclamation of 16 June 1949. Umm al Qaywayn: Proclamation of 20 June 1949. 638 IIl. Other states and territories, not parties to the Convention, which’ have granted offshore concessions in apparent absence of general legislation: (Data from announcements and press reports) 9 / _1. Angola (Portugal): Boletim Oficial Sept. 12,1964. See also Petroleum Press Service, June 1968 at 204. (The jurisdiction of Portugal outside of its territorial seas is set forth in Law 2080 of March 21,1956. This law applies to all overseas ter- ritories of Portugal. Basis II limits concessions to the 200- : metre isobath, except "when a special law otherwise disposes. "') 2. Cameroon: Petroleum Press Service, June 1968 at 204, 3. Cuba: Concession map of October 1957, reproduced in Barrows, Petroleum Legislation. Presumably expropriated. 4, Equatorial Guinea (Fernando Poo, Rio Muni): See Decreto 1043/ 1968 of 2 May 1968 re: Rio Muni (published 27 May 1968); Petro- leum Press Service, June 1968 at 204. '5, Ethiopia: Several offshore concessions are in effect. 6. Gabon: Decree No. 375 of July 5, 1968. 7. Guyana: Two offshore concessions are in effect. 8. Japan: Petroleum Press Service, August 1968 at 305. Two off- shore concessions are in effect. “9, Mauritania: Two concessions are in effect; "Oil & Gas Discoveries, "' February 1968, at 33-34. 10. Mozambique (Portugal): Petroleum Press Service, Nov. 1967 at 420. See Diario do Governo 11 Oct. 1967, ''Bases Anexas ao Decreto, "' No. 47,990. 11. Somalia: Concession granted 29 May 1961. 12. Spanish Sahara (Spain): Petroleum Press Service, Nov. 1966 at 427. 13. Sudan: Exploration licenses have been granted for deep-water metal-containing brines in the Red Sea. 14. Surinam (Netherlands): Petroleum Press Service, July 1966 at 275. 15. Timor (Portugal): Petroleum Press Service, June 1968 at 204. 9/ Of the 19 pesicaerion: listed here, 5 are territories (Angola, Mozambique, Spanish Sahara, Surinam and Timor). 639 16. Togo: Petroleum Press Service, June 1968 at 204. 17. Tunisia: Petroleum Press Service, Jan. 1967 at 33. 18. Turkey: Three offshore concessions were in effect in 1966. 19. Yemen: One offshore concession was granted in 1961. . States (whether or not parties to the Convention) which have granted offshore concessions, or undertaken development, in areas pro- visionally identified as including waters deeper than 200 meters Note a: This listing is based in part on examination of published concession agreements, concession maps, decrees, etc., and in part on unpublished information from sources be- lieved to be reliable. Note b: In countries marked with an asterisk (*), the seaward boundary of concessions appears to approximate the 100- fathom isobath, but lies beyond that isobath in one or more areas. The 14 Note c: In countries marked (#), the seaward boundary of at least one concession appears to be beyond the 200 metre isobath and more than 50 nautical miles from shore, 1. Australia # 16. Malaysia # 2. British Honduras * 17. Mauritania * 3. Canada # 18, Norway # 4. Cuba (concession out- 19. Oman # standing in 1957) 20. Panama * 5. Denmark * 21. Peru * # 6. Equatorial Guinea 22. Philippines * 7. Ethiopia * 23. Senegal # 8. Gabon # . 24. Spanish Sahara 9. Ghana 25. Sudan 10. Guyana # 26. Surinam # 11. Honduras * #° Cn ee ninidad 12. Indonesia * # ° 28. Turkey 13. Italy 29. United,Kingdom 14. Jamaica * # 05 AOGiDs rg 15, Japan # OG Wo tio Slo 185 . On March 13, 1969, the U.S.S.R. representative stated in the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction that, "In the Soviet Union drilling was being carried out in the Caspian Sea at depths of from 300 to 600 me- tres. . . .'' (U.N, Press Release GA/3929, 13 March 1969, at p. 4). 640 V. Practice of the United States The Department of the Interior, in 1961, granted a phosphorite lease off the California coast in water depths ranging from 240 to 4, 000 feet (1, 340 metres). This lease was subsequently surrendered. 10/ In 1963 and 1964, the Department issued oil and gas leases in wa- ter depths ranging up to 1, 500 feet (457 metres). 11/ In 1968, oil and gas leases issued in Santa Barbara Channel included an area in 1, 800 feet of water (550 metres). In 1968, a United States oil company drilled a well in 1, 299 feet of water (395 metres), penetrating rock to a depth of 13, 622 feet. This well was plugged and abandoned. The Department has published leasing maps for areas off the California coast as far as 100 miles from the mainland, at depths as great as 6, 000 feet. 12/ In 1967, the Department granted a permit to Humble Oil and Refin- ing Company to drill 2] coreholes beneath the Atlantic Ocean in water ranging in depth from 650 feet to 5, 000 feet on ''the continental slope be- yond the continental shelf off Florida and northward to points seaward of Cape Cod and Georges Bank.'' The areas in which drilling was authorized lie as far as 300 miles from the coast. The permit was not exclusive, and does not include rights to any mineral leases. 13 / s 10/ Interim Report on the United Nations and the Issue of Deep Ocean Resources, | by the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, H.R.Rep.No. 999, 90th Cong., lst Sess. (1967) at 151. The memorandum opinion of the Associate Solicitor, Department of the Interior, dated May 5, 1961, concerning the application of the Outer Con- tinental Shelf Lands Act to the lease area, is printed in the Interim Report at 165-68. 11/ These leases are listed in the Interim Report at 164. 2/) Barny, The Administration of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, a Natural Resources Lawyer 38, 47 (July 1968). 13./ Geological Survey Release, ''Core Drilling to Begin on Continental Slope Off Atlantic Coast, ' (No. 94, 229-67) May 26, 1967. 641 The United States has asserted jurisdiction over resource development on the Cortes Banks about 100 miles from the California mainland, separated from the mainland by a trench about 1, 500 metres deep. 14/ 14/ Barry, note 12 supra, at 47. 642 Non-LIVING RESOURCES OF THE SEA A Summary and Critique of Chapter 4, Part III of the Report of the ‘Marine Science Commission Joint Report of the Section of International and Comparative Law, the Section of Natural Resources Law, and the Standing Committee on World Order Under Law of the American Bar Association, August 1969 NotTre.—This Report was approved by the Section of International and Comparative Law, by the Section of Natural Resources Law, and (with the qualifications noted on pp. 6 and 56) by the Standing Committee on World Order Under Law at their meetings in Dallas on August 10-11, 1969. It is not to be construed as representing the opinions or views of the American Bar Association. Introduction On January 9, 1969, the Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Re- sources, created pursuant to Public Law 89-454 enacted June 17, 1966, sub- mitted its Report to the President and Congress. This report, entitled Our Nation and the Sea, is a document of major significance in the formulation of United States policy with regard to all aspects of the sea, its resources, and its uses. The Commission Report, together with the supporting papers from the Com- mission’s various panels and consultants, is not only a comprehensive study but a positive program for future action. Many of its proposals are controversial, but all represent serious efforts to solve difficult and often novel problems. They merit careful attention from all concerned about national ocean policy. The present Joint Report is confined to those legal and institutional aspects of the Commission’s Report which are of common concern to the Sections and Com- mittees joining herein. It deals with that part of the Commission’s Report (chapter 4, part III) which relates to non-living marine resources beneath the sea. In particular, it examines the Commission’s proposals regarding an inter- national legal-political framework for the development of such resources in the light of the Resolution on this subject adopted by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association at its meeting in Philadelphia in August 1968 and the Joint Report submitted to the House of Delegates.* Other parts of the Commission’s Report contain proposals of significant legal interest which are not discussed here. In particular, the Commission’s elaborate proposals for the administrative reorganization of oceanographic activities with- in the Federal Government have not been dealt with. The omission of any of these matters from the present Joint Report should not be taken as indicating either approval, disapproval, or lack of concern with respect thereto on the part of any of the sections or committees participating herein. I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF NONLIVING RESOURCES (P. 121)? The Report of the Marine Science Commission divides non-living marine resources into four categories: oil, gas, hard minerals and fresh water. Recov- éry of each of these has its unique problems. All have common problems, such as a need for reconnaissance surveys, the role of Federal agencies, and a national and international legal framework. A. Petroleum (p. 122) The Report notes that investments of the U.S. offshore oil industry now run more than $1 billion annually and will grow about 18% per year for the next ten years. Offshore sources on a world-wide basis will probably produce at least a third of world production in ten years. It is unlikely that oil exists in com- parable quantities in the deeper ocean basins beyond the foot of the continental terrace or slope. 1. Technical considerations (p. 123) Regarding technical considerations applicable to petroleum, the Report con- tains this recommendation (p. 124) : “that appropriate mechanisms be established to assure timely exchange of scientific and technological information among the Federal Government, the petroleum industry and the scientific community consistent with security and proprietary considerations.” 1 The text of the resolution appears in the appendix to the present Joint Report. 2 Page numbers in parentheses refer to the printed Commission Report, 643 We agree generally with this recommendation, but feel that it should be broadened to include other mineral industries as well as the petroleum industry. Moreover, special attention should be given to the phrase “consistent with secu- rity and proprietary considerations.” Private industry should not be required to make public highly confidential information which it has assembled at high cost, such as interpretations of, and certain classes of, geological and geophysical information. To do so would retard research, development and exploration. 2. U.S. legal and regulatory considerations (p. 124) In discussing legal and regulatory considerations applicable to petroleum, the Report contains this recommendation (p. 127) : “The Commission recommends that leasing and regulatory policies for offshore oil be geared to a rate of development reflecting all aspects of national interests. Strong support should be given to accomplishing the analysis necessary to pro- vide a basis for decisions on development rates. In scheduling its Federal lease sales the Government should give adequate consideration to industry’s need to plan its exploration and development programs in an orderly and effective fashion. For example, it is recommended that longer periods of advance notice be provided for Federal lease sales.” We agree generally with this recommendation. However, as to rate of devel- opment, private industry, which will undertake this development, should have a significant voice in the decisionmaking process. With respect to the scheduling of Federal lease sales, we agree that longer periods of advance notice should be provided, but flexibility should be retained so that when companies have ex- pended huge sums of money in conducting geological and geophysical surveys in the offshore areas, they should be afforded the opportunity of bidding on the acreage for the purpose of acquiring leases. We believe, moreover, that the Federal leasing for oil and gas should have as its principal objective not the short-run maximizing of Federal income, but rather the long term objective of finding and developing adequate petroleum re- serves within this nation’s control. Experience under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act does not indicate that development of oil and gas on the U.S. con- tinental shelf has been too rapid. Because of the declining reserves to produc- tion ratio for both oil and gas on the land areas of the United States, a contin- uing and accelerated effort to discover petroleum reserves in the offshore areas under the jurisdiction and control of the United States is needed in our national interest and security. B. Natural gas (p. 127)* The Report points out that offshore gas is chiefly explored for and produced by oil companies, Transportation (in pipelines) is regulated by the Federal Power Commission, and distribution to consumers is regulated by State or local governments. Sales are predicted to increase about 4% per year for the next ten years, and with declining reserves on land it is important to encourage a greater rate of exploration and development. To this end FPC policies should be modi- fied in two respects. First, with respect to new natural gas pipeline construction, the Report states that the Federal Power Commission should reexamine its policies to determine the extent to which efforts to establish proven reserves result in disclosures ad- verse to a company, and the FPC should devise methods by which such impact, if any, might be legitimately minimized (p. 128). We agree with this suggestion. Second, with respect to wellhead price regulation, the Report recommends (p. 128): oe the Federal Power Commission reexamine its differential price policies for natural gas and make such adjustments as it deeems advisable to reflect adequately the increased cost of offshore production.” We agree with this recommendation. With respect to the regulation of interstate natural gas pipelines, the Report also recommends (p. 129) : “that in order to encourage innovative research and development activities, the Federal Power Commission review its accounting regulations relating to research and development to determine whether such regulations are consistent with the 3 The Standing Committee on World Order Under Law is of the opinion that this section should be deleted on the ground that it largely involves matters beyond the appropriate scope of this report. 644 legitimate need of the gas transmission industry for clear and realistic guidelines.” We agree with this recommendation. C. Hard minerals (p. 130) World demand projections for many key minerals are such that the U.S. must ensure itself an adequate and dependable supply by increasing the rate of dis- covery. The Commission finds that the present supply outlook does not raise an urgent necessity to develop seabed minerals at maximum speed regardless of cost. However, an early start in offshore exploration and technology development is warranted, and in the Commission’s view it is proper for government to play a large role because of the lead time required, the very great costs involved and the diverse nature of the benefits. 1. The Seabed as a Potential Source of Hard Minerals (p. 130) The Report affirms that for the foreseeable future the economics of extracting metals—other than salt, bromine and magnesium—from sea water are such that there is little likelihood of commercial production. A more promising source is placer deposits, which are confined mainly to the inner edge of the continental shelf. It is unlikely that significant placer deposits exist on the continental slope or beyond. The Commission states that serious reconnaissance is warranted of the placer prospects off U.S. coasts. Very little is known about the mineral potential of buried consolidated rock deposits in the substrata of the Continental Shelf and slope. Unless accessible by tunneling from shore or artificial islands, exploration of these deposits lies well in the future. As to the abyssal ocean floor, the only deposits which now seem to the Com- mission to have potential economic importance are nodules, crusts and oozes on the ocean floor. The rocks beneath the abyssal ocean floor are far beyond present technical capacity to explore. We agree with this general estimate of potentialities. 2. The State of ocean mining (p. 132) The Report notes that the marine mining industry is in its infancy. World- wide there were in 1967 about 300 marine mining operations of all types. All were near shore; almost all were outside the United States. However, U.S. Govern- Ment agencies and private firms are engaged increasingly in exploration and technological development. But further progress toward commercial exploita- tion involves overcoming certain economic, technological, and institutional (legal and regulatory) obstacles. 3. Economic Considerations (p. 133) The Report takes note of the fact that basic economic differences between off- shore oil and hard minerals have important government policy implications. Geo- logical structures controlling the distribution of oi] deposits generally extend seaward from land. This keeps down the cost of reconnaissance for exploration and of seaward extension of existing technology. This is not so with hard min- erals. ‘Also, mineral exploration techniques are more expensive because the horizontal dimensions of mineral deposits are smaller. The steps from discovery to production of minerals involve more effort and more costly technology. 4. Technological Considerations (p. 133) The steps from discovery to production of minerals offshore involve much effort and novel technology. The lack of operating experience increases the risks of ocean mining ventures. The present practical depth of ore recovery in calm water is 150 feet. Beyond that depth technological activities are thus far ex- ploratory. Technological developments will be very costly. The Commission antici- pates that industry will wish to develop mineral recovery technology if the risks against an acceptable rate of return are not excessive; its recommendations are designed to encourage industry to do so, with Government help to the extent required. To this end the Report recommends (p. 135) : “that strong Federal support be provided for a program to advance the fundamental technology relevant to marine minerals exploration and recovery. Government and industry should work in close cooperation to develop more rapid geophysical exploration tools and improved marine sampling equipment. 645 The Government should have the function of testing new tools and equipment developed mainly by private industry and in cooperation with industry should be responsible for setting standards for the mining industry.” We understand that some companies in the mining industry agree with this recommendation. The petroleum industry, on the other hand, feels generally that industry, not the Government, should test new tools and equipment which that industry has developed. 5. Legal and Regulatory Considerations (p. 135) Domestic legal and regulatory considerations are matters of either State or .Federal jurisdiction. The Commission recognizes that exploration and develop- ment of seabed hard minerals will be a very high risk speculation for the fore- seeable future and will require strong State and Federal policy incentives. The Commission suggests (p. 136) the following guidelines for an offshore min- ing legal and regulatory regime: (1) Encouragement of exploration. (2) Maximizing net economic return to the nation rather than maximiz- ing near-term income from rents, royalties or bonuses. (3) Recognition that favorable mining laws of other nations compete for U.S. industry investment dollars. We agree with these general principles. The Commission refrains from taking a position on the claim-staking system versus the leasing system for hard minerals. But it states that since important questions have been raised before the Public Land Law Review Commission as to the desirability of continuing claim-staking on public lands ashore, it hesi- tates to recommend extention of this system offshore. At the same time it observes that the procedures established under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act “have worked well . . . and should not be lightly abandoned” (p. 1386). The Re- port concludes that diversified situations will call for diversified policies, even if a leasing system is followed offshore. It recommends (p. 187) that “when deemed necessary to stimulate exploration, the Secretary of the In- terior be granted the flexibility to award rights to develop hard minerals on the outer continental shelf without requiring competitive bidding.” We agree with this recommendation, although we reach it from a different direction. Contrary to the Commission’s view, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act has not worked well in promoting hard mineral development offshore, largely because of the economic burden imposed by its competitive bidding requirements. But regardless of approach, if the legal framework is to promote development, some flexibility in the terms for acquiring rights is highly desirable. D. Fresh water As to fresh water resources, the Report recommends that the Department of the Interior continue an aggressive and diversified desalination research and development program (p. 139). We agree with this recommendation with the observation that cooperative effort between Government and private industry should be encouraged. E. Preinvestment surveys The Report recommends that the proposed National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency undertake reconnaissance surveys and prepare maps of the geological configuration of the continental shelves and slopes adjacent to the United States, such surveys to be conducted by the Government and by industry and universities under contract with the Government (p. 140). The objectives of this recommendation have merit. Existing technical agencies, particularly the Geological Survey (as the Report notes at p. 141), should be fully utilized in any such effort. II. AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL-POLITICAL FRAMEWORK FOR SEABED MINERAL RESOURCES (p. 141) A. Objectives Under the heading “An International Legal-Political Framework for Exploring and Exploiting the Mineral Resources Underlying the High Seas,” the Report cites (p. 141) as a principal objective of such a framework the principle, first offi- 646 cially stated by President Johnson, that an international “race to grab and hold lands under the high seas’’ must be avoided. This declaration of the President, as the context clearly indicates, referred to the ocean bottoms beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. Thus under- stood, the objective accords with the paragraph in the 1968 ABA Resolution which supports efforts to protect the deep ocean floor from claims of sovereignty by any nation or group of nations. Any such framework should also be judged, in the Commission’s view, by the extent to which it achieves the following additional objectives (pp. 141-143) : (1) Encourages scientific and technological research, and capital invest- ment for exploration and exploitation, by making it possible for these activi- ties to be carried on in an orderly and economic manner. (2) Affords a fair chance to all states to engage in minerals exploration and exploitation. (3) Minimizes the ‘creation of vested interests that will inhibit changes” in the framework which may be deemed desirable in the light of unfolding experience. (4) Promotes avoidance of international conflict. We agree with the first, second, and fourth of these statements. We find the third unclear. If it means that the international framework would result in leases and concessions being subject to revision because of some future change in the regime, we are opposed to it. If it merely means that caution should be ex- ercised in the creation of an immutable legal framework, it is less objectionable. The Report states that in order for the international framework to achieve the desired objectives it “must provide means to recognize exclusive claims to explore and exploit the mineral resources of large enough sub-sea areas for long enough periods of time to furnish the incentive to undertake this activity. It must protect recognized claims and at the same time require the relinquishment of claims that are not properly explored or developed within fixed reasonable periods of time. It also must provide for the peaceful settlement of disputes that arise” (p. 143). These principles are unexceptionable. B, Adequacy or inadequacy of the existing regime The Commission concludes (p. 143) that the objectives summarized above can- not be achieved within the existing international framework. In essence, this framework is described as providing that each coastal state presently has ex- clusive access to the non-living resources of its territorial sea space. It has “sovereign rights” over its treaty continental shelf “for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources,” but it must not interfere unduly with other uses of ocean space. Beyond the legal shelf, only general principles of law apply, and these are declared to ‘‘abound with uncertainty.” The chief areas of uncertainty which deter development are seen by the Com- mission as two: (1) the seaward boundary of the continental shelf under the 1958 Geneva Convention, and (2) the fact that beyond that line existing prin- ciples are insufficient to assure security and protect important national and in- ternational interest (p. 146). These will be discussed in turn below. C. Boundary of the treaty Continental Shelf 1. Text of Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention. The articles of the Convention on the Continental Shelf particularly relevant to this discussion are Articles 1 and 2, which provide: Article 1 “Kor the purpose of these articles, the term ‘continental shelf’ is used as referring (a) to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas; (b) to the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands. Article 2 “1. The coastal State exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources. 647 “2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this article are exclusive in the sense that if the coastal State does not explore the continental shelf or exploit its natural resources, no one may undertake these activities, or make a claim to the continental shelf, without the express consent of the coastal State. “3. The rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf do not depend on occupation, effective or notional, or on any express proclamation. “4, The natural resources referred to in these articles consist of the mineral and other non-living resources of the seabed and subsoil together with living organisms belonging to sedentary species, that is to say, organisms which, at the harvestable stage, either are immobile on or under the seabed or are unable to move except in constant physical contact with the seabed or the subsoil.’ 2. The Commission’s position The Commission’s conclusion (p. 144) is: “We do not think that there is any reasonable way to interpret the Conven- tion’s definition that would place a precise outer limit on the existing legal ‘con- tinental shelf’.” Indeed, the Report goes so far as to indicate that the shelf jurisdiction of the coastal state “up to the 200-meter isobath is not entirely free of doubt because in some parts of the world, the geological continental shelf extends to a depth less than 200 meters yet to a distance so far from the coast that at some point, it may reasonably be argued, it is no longer ‘adjacent’ to it and, therefore, not within the Convention’s definition.” * To resolve the problem which it thus finds to exist, the Commission recom- mends (p. 145) : “That the United States take the initiative to secure international agreement on a redefinition of the ‘continental shelf’ for purposes of the Convention on the Continental Shelf. The seaward limit of each coastal nation’s ‘continental shelf’ should be fixed at the 200-meter isobath, or 50 nautical miles from the baseline for measuring the breadth of its territorial sea, whichever alternative gives it the greater area for purposes of the Convention.” We disagree. The reasons for our view can best be stated after a brief examina- tion of various arguments advanced by those who support and those who oppose the Commission’s position. 8. Previous Bar Association reports and the NPC report The Commission refers generally to other suggested interpretations of the shelf definition contained in the Convention but deems it important (p. 144) to single out and differ especially with the Interim Report of the National Petroleum Coun- cil (NPC) dated July 9, 1968. It would be inappropriate, however, to characterize this as a difference of views solely as between the Commission and the National Petroleum Council. The Joint Report to the House of Delegates of the Sections of Natural Resources Law and International and Comparative Law and the Standing Committee on Peace and Law through United Nations (August 1968) said (pp. 8-9) : “Mhe Convention’s definition of the seaward extent of the coastal state’s jurisdiction has been subjected to a number of interpretations. “Some argue that the factor of exploitability would carry the coastal nation’s exclusive mineral jurisdiction to mid-ocean. We disagree. Others argue that it should be restricted to waters as shallow as 200 meters or 12 miles from shore. We disagree with this, too. “The better view, in our opinion, is that the ‘exploitability’ factor of the Con- vention is limited by the element of ‘adjacency.’ The exclusive sovereign rights of the coastal nations to the exploration and exploitation of the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil encompass ‘the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea.’ ” The 1968 Interim Report of the Committee on Deep Sea Mineral Resources of the American Branch of the International Law Association said (p. IX—X) : “For reasons seldom made explicit, some find difficulty with the boundary defi- nition in the Convention, particularly in terms of the reach of the exploitability criterion in light of the principal of adjacency. ‘Accordingly, a number of alter- natives are now being advanced in various quarters for revising the Continental Shelf Convention in order to place a firm limitation on coastal control. The Com- 4It seems clear to us that areas out to a depth of 200 metres, regardless of distance from shore, are within the shelf jurisdiction of the coastal state subject to the corresponding rights of other states with which the shelf may be shared. 648 mittee believes that this assumption of a need to revise the Shelf Convention is unwarranted in terms of projected technological progress in offshore mineral exploitation. Reasonably interpreted, the Convention definition of the shelf extends, and limits, coastal control to adjacent marine regions of sufficient extent that the outer limit of control will not be reached fer a very long time. “As a general rule, the limit of adjacency may reasonably be regarded as coin- ciding with the foot of the submerged portion of the continental land mass. There is strong support for this view in the drafting history of the Convention, although other interpretations have been advanced.” Our own report, and that of the Committee on Deep Sea Mineral Resources of the American Branch of the International Law Association, joined in substan- tially identical Conclusions and Recommendations. The Commission’s report does not take specific cognizance of the reports of these Bar groups, but refers exclusively to the NPC report. The NPC 1968 Interim Report took the position that under the Convention’s adjacency and exploitability criteria, coastal nations are vested with exclusive sovereign rights over the natural resources of the submerged continental land mass seaward to the point where the submerged continent meets the deep ocean floor, including the geological continental shelf, continental borderland, conti- nental slope, and at least the landward portions of the continental rise. It further proposed that this interpretation of the Convention be proclaimed through unilateral declarations by the United States and other coastal nations as their understanding of the text. A more precisely defined boundary based on this principle could be determined later as required. The Commission Report rejects the 1968 NPC position on both legal and policy grounds. With respect to the NPC’s suggested reading of the Convention, the Report observes (p. 144) : “On the basis of the studies of its International Panel, the Commission con- cludes that the NPC position is not warranted either by the language of the definition of the ‘continental shelf’ or its history.” 5 Subsequent to the Commission Report, the NPC in March 1969 published its final re- port, entitled, ‘“Petroleum Resources under the Ocean Floor.” On this point the text of the final NPC report said (pp. 56—57.) : “For the purpose of determining the outer limit of coastal-nation jurisdiction, the defi- nition of the ‘continental shelf’ as set forth in Article 1 of the Convention is controlling. The key words in this definition, in turn, are: “1. ‘Submarine areas,’ i.e., not just the continental shelf in its strict geomorphic sense, pot ee, submarine areas lying off the coast and otherwise meeting the requirements of rticle 1; “2. ‘Adjacent to the coast,’ i.e., not to mid-ocean, but in sufficient proximity or appur- tenance to the coast to qualify as ‘adjacent.’ Adjacency is, of course, a relative concept and what is proximate or appurtenant must be determined in the context of the vast expanses of the oceanic submarine areas of the world and not in a narrow sense ; “3. ‘To a depth of 200 metres,’ i.e., this far presently and unconditionally, without regard to the existence of a capability to exploit ; “4. “Or beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas,’ i.e., as much farther beyond the 200 meters depth, within the outer limit of adjacency, as developing technology can be shown at any particular time to make such exploitation possible. In other words, this is not a static limit, conditioned upon exploitability as of a specific point in time, but is an elastic one, expanding with developments in technology. “Tt is thus apparent as noted in point 3 immediately above that the coastal nations have (a) a present and unconditional jurisdiction to the depth of 200 meters without regard to the existence of a capability to exploit, and (b) a further jurisdiction over the submarine areas specified in point 4 above whenever developing technology admits of the exploitation of said areas. Article 2, par. 2, of the Convention preserves the exclusive rights of the coastal nations throughout whatever period of time is needed to permit the art of exploitation to achieve its ultimate depth capability within the limits of adjacency. As seems apparent, in light of technological advances to date, there wll be an eventual capa- bility to exploit any submarine area. Thus the test of adjacency alone determines the ulti- mate limit of national jurisdiction of coastal nations under Article 1 of the Convention and hence it is this test that fixes the boundary between national and international jurisdiction. “Accordingly, it is the outer limit of adjacency which will now be considered. “When the four key phrases, which have been analyzed above,.are considered in light of the deliberations that led to their inclusion in the definition of the term ‘continental shelf’ in Article 1 of the Convention, it can reasonably be concluded that the coastal nations’ exclusive jurisdiction over the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil was intended to, and does, encompass in general, the continental mass seaward to where the submerged portion of that mass meets the abyssal ocean floor (including the continental shelf, con- tinental borderland, continental slope, and at least the landward portion of the continental rise overapping the slope). “In addition, it is clear that in particular locales where the continent drops off abruptly from near the coastline to the abyssal ocean floor, it was intended that this exclusive juris- diction should include an area of that floor ‘adjacent to the continent.’ ” 649 It then goes on (p. 144) to state the Commission’s judgment that the NPC proposal would be ‘contrary to the best interests of the United States.” The differences of opinion which currently exist over the proper limit of the continental shelf are well brought out by this conflict between the position of the Commission and the positions taken in the 1968 reports of the A.B.A. sec- tions, the I.L.A. Committee, and NPC. The issue is controversial and complex. Because of its importance, we think it may be informative to review (in necessarily abbreviated form) some of the considerations advanced by the opposing sides and then to indicate the bases of our position. These considerations may be conveniently divided into those relating to the construction of the present Convention language, those involving the question of what is desirable policy, and those concerning the manner in which a more precise definition of the treaty shelf might be obtained. 4. Construction of the convention text It is common ground between the Commission, the positions of the Bar groups, and the NPC positions that the language of the Shelf Convention does not sup- port the so-called “national lake” concept—that a coastal state may extend its claims indefinitely over the deep-sea floor until it reaches some mid-ocean median line with another state. The differences between them relate to the proper location of a seaward limit for national jurisdiction which is acknowledged to exist.® One body of opinion takes the view that the shelf definition in Article 1 of the 1958 Convention properly interpreted means that the limit of adjacency may be regarded as coinciding with the foot of the submerged portion of the continental land mass. Evidence from the drafting history is cited in support of this interpre- tation, with particular emphasis being placed on the conclusions of the Inter- American Conference at Ciudad Trujillo in 1956. At that conference a resolution was adopted specifically affirming the exclusive appurtenance to the coastal state of “The continental shelf, continental and insular terrace, or other submarine areas, adjacent to the coastal state . . . to'a depth of 200 meters, or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources .. .’”7 Since this resolution was an important precursor of the Shelf Convention, it is said that Article 1 of the Convention should be read as embracing the same con- cept even though Article 1 omits all reference to the “continental terrace.” 8 Those adhering to this view cite the explanation given to the Senate by the Chairman of the U.S. delegation which participated in the Geneva Convention conferences : “ “The clause which protects the right to utilize advances in technology at greater depths beneath the oceans was supported by the United States and was in keeping with the Inter-American conclusions at Ciudad Trujillo in 1956. It was included in the I.L.C. 1956 draft.’ ” 9 Reliance is also placed on the recent holding by the International Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases that under the continental shelf doctrine as it exists in customary law a coastal state is entitled to “all those parts of the continental shelf that constitute a natural prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea.” *° [Emphasis supplied. ] Opposed to this view is a second body of opinion, exemplified in the Reports of the Commission and of its International Panel, that the drafting history of the Convention does not support this broad interpretation. This group relies, inter alia, on the facts that no express reference was made in Article 1 to the con- tinental Terrace or slope, that an effort to include such a reference was voted down in the Conference, and that the drafters retained throughout the basic term “continental shelf.” ®It has also become clear in the UN debates on this subject that there is a wide con- sensus favoring the principle that there is some such limit of coastal state jurisdiction 74 Whiteman, Digest of International Law, 836-837. The United States voted for the resolution, which was adopted unanimously. 8 The full arguments about the drafting history advanced by the proponents of this view are set forth in detail in the 1968 and 1969 NPC Reports. A contrary view is expressed in Oxman, “The Preparation of Article 1 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf’ (a study prepared for the Marine Science Commission). 7s ® Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate on Conventions on the Law of the Sea, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., Jan. 1960, p. 108—09. : 10 Judgment of February 20, 1969. I.C.J. Reports, 1969, p. 3, at 53; 8 International Legal Materials 340, at 384 (1969). 650 There are considerable intramural differences within this second group, but the weight of opinion within it views the language of Article 1 as setting a mini- mum limit of 200 meters and an ultimate limit in terms of adjacency. Between these extremes the actual jurisdiction of the coastal state at any given time is governed by the limit of exploitability at that time—i.e., by the state of the art. This view, its proponents claim, is essentially what was intended by the authors of the Convention. The ultimate limit defined by adjacency, they say, may well be equivalent to the foot of the continental slope, but until exploitability reaches that point the jurisdiction of the coastal state remains in futuro. With regard to the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, this group finds the holding of the International Court to be of limited significance in the present context. The Court was there dealing with the allocation of areas entirely within the 200-meter line and with the inequitable results produced by equidistant lateral boundaries under certain geographical circumstances. It had no reason to consider or pass upon problems relating to the continental terrace or slope. 5. Policy considerations Distinct from the question of the proper construction of the Convention text is the question of what is a desirable limit for the legal shelf in terms of the broad national interests of the United States. The Commission Report, as noted above, concludes that a shelf claim of the kind advocated in the NPC Report, would not promote these interests. Among the arguments which have been ad- duced to support this view, in the Report and elsewhere, are the following : (1) A broad shelf doctrine would benefit other nations proportionately more than the United States, subjecting large areas to national jurisdictions which could. then exclude or impede U.S. access to such areas. ; (2) Enterprises based in developed countries can compete advantageously in the areas adjacent to their shores, making a broad treaty shelf unnecessary for them. But a broad shelf in the rest of the world could effectively exclude activities by American enterprises or expose them to the same hazard of expropriation as exists on land. Looking at the world as a whole, enterprises interested in explor- ing and exploiting the resources of a sea bed stand to gain by a narrow shelf provided a satisfactory regime for the deep sea is established without undue delay. Such a limited regime would be preferable to national regimes in many parts of the world. (3) A wide shelf doctrine would encourage enlarged national claims to the superjacent waters and their resources and to the airspace above. This could be detrimental to U.S. fishing interests. The excessive claims of this kind made by some states after the Truman Proclamation of 1945, and the troubles ensuing therefrom, are cited as a warning of what can be expected. (4) A wide shelf doctrine would run counter to the U.S. policy to maintain the traditional maximum freedom of the high seas in the interest of the multiple uses, including military uses, which the United States makes of the oceans. (5) Persons concerned with scientific research favor a narrow shelf, believing that a broad shelf could result in national interference with research expeditions. (6) To the extent that a policy of import quotas is warranted to protect the domestic oil extraction industry, a narrow shelf is required to prevent nullifica- tion of that policy. Leading points made in reply to these contentions may be summarized as follows: (1) If the “broad” interpretation of the Shelf Convention is correct, the United States already possesses vested rights to the foot of the continental slope. - To surrender these rights to an international regime would be an abandonment of potentially vast resources and revenues which no imaginable quid pro quo could justify. (2) The “disproportionate benefit” argument is beside the point. The important fact is the great amount of resources, in and under the United States’ own con- tinental margin, which are brought under direct U.S. control on this “broad” theory. These nearby reserves could be of immense economic and strategic value to this country. : (3) The argument that a broad shelf claim will encourage excessive claims of other kinds by other states is also misdirected. The Convention expressly protects the high seas status of waters above the shelf. Those coastal states which have made or intend to make further claims to the superjacent waters or to exclusive fishery rights are not likely to retract their present claims or refrain from future ones merely because the U.S. opts for a narrow shelf. 651 (4) Some states (the Soviet Union for one) are so strongly opposed to any supranational deep-sea regime and to the concept of common ownership that any early agreement appears unlikely. That being so, the area of national juris- diction should be as wide as the 1958 Convention can be construed to permit. Practical working arrangements on this basis should not be difficult to reach with the Soviet Union. (5) Assuming for the sake of argument that agreement is possible, it would have to be On a compromise basis and of necessity would involve some kind of international administration. Past experience suggests that this could lead to a system of rationing and possible discrimination against American companies. Furthermore, the time lag before any international regime can come into effect means continued uncertainty and consequent discouragement to exploitation. (6) If small U.S. producers on land need protection against an influx of new off-shore oil, there are better ways to accomplish this particular purpose than by giving up potential U.S. resources. (7) Scientific research is already being impeded off some coastal states even under a “narrow” shelf doctrine. If it is to be adequately protected and encour- aged, the necessary rights and obligations should be dealt with in separate international arrangements made specifically for that purpose. (8) The seaward edge of the continental margin is a natural dividing line and hence a much more logical choice for a jurisdictional limit than a purely arbitrary line somewhere on the slope. 6. Methods of defining a more precise shelf limit The Commission recommends (p. 145) that the United States should “take the initiative to secure international agreement on a redefinition of the ‘con- tinental shelf.’’’ It is unclear from this language whether the Commission is proposing a formal international convention to this end, or whether the “inter- national agreement” envisaged is to be read as an “international consesus” reached through less formal means. A substantial sentiment exists among informed persons in this country that under present circumstances a new UN Conference on the 1958 Geneva pattern would not be advantageous for United States interests. Such a conference might well fail to reach agreement, for political reasons unconnected with the legal merits of the various proposals which would come before it. A result of this kind could weil convert present uncertainties into complete chaos. Alternatively, an agreement carried by a majority of small states might embody principles unac- ceptable to the United States, yet which would be difficult to disregard if for- mally adopted by such a conference. In either event, no real legal gain would result and quite possibly a retrogression would occur which could undo even some of the progress made in 1958. To avoid these hazards, another way to secure a common understanding as to the limit of the Convention shelf has been suggested in our 1968 Joint Report, in the NPC Report, the Interim Report of the Committee on Deep Sea Mineral Resources of the American Branch of the International Law Association, and elsewhere. This proposes that like-minded maritime states should issue unilateral but concerted declarations announcing their intent to observe a particular limit as the boundary of their shelves under the 1958 convention and to decline recognition of any claims by other states to a greater limit.11 From such a pro- ceeding a pattern of common practice under the Convention could emerge and might well come to receive general acceptance by the world community. In this connection advantage might be taken of the International Court’s recognition of the coastal state’s sovereign rights over the natural prolongation of its land terri- tory under the sea.!2 . 7. Previous ABA action on a shelf limit A number of the considerations noted above as affecting the boundary of the treaty shelf have already been the subject of study, recommendation, and action 1 The 1968 ABA Joint Report stated this point as follows : “If legal uncertainties are believed to constitute an impediment to utilization of undersea mineral resources, such uncertainties can be eliminated by uniform declarations of the coastal nations which are parties to the Convention on the Continental Shelf, identifying their claims of jurisdiction with the submerged portion of the continental land mass, and reciprocally restricting their claims accordingly. No new conference to amend the Con- tinental Shelf Convention is necessary to accomplish this.” 12 In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1.C.J. Reports, 1969, at 31. 26-563 O—70-—pt. 2 10 652 within the American Bar Association. In the Resolution adopted by the House of Delegates at its August 1968 meeting, it was noted that “the boundary be- tween the area of exclusive sovereign rights and the deep ocean floor needs to be clarified by an agreed interpretation.’ The Resolution then recommended that such an interpretation be sought by the United States through the ‘parallel declarations” method or by other means, and that within the area of exclusive sovereign rights off its coasts the interests of the United States be protected to the full extent permitted by the 1958 Shelf Convention. In the Joint Report which accompanied this Resolution, the contention that the Convention definition permitted extension of national jurisdiction to mid-ocean, and the contention that it restricted it to the 200-meter line, were both rejected The better view, the Report said, was that the “exploitability” factor of the Con- vention was limited by the element of “adjacency.” The Report then continued: “According to this view, therefore, the exclusive sovereign rights of the coastal nations with respect to the seabed minerals now embrace the submerged land mass of the adjacent continent down to its junction with the deep ocean floor, irrespective of depth.” The quoted conclusion, which reflects the “‘continental margin” interpretation of the Convention, represented and continues to represent an opinion widely held among our members. Since the 1968 Joint Report, however, a number of our members have stated that this formulation did not accurately reflect their views. In the opinion of these members, the physical concept of “adjacency” can persuasively be con- strued to embrace areas to the foot of the continental margin; but the “‘exploita- bility”? concept in the Convention extends sovereign rights over the seabed be- yond the 200-meter line only as technological progress makes exploitation in that area possible in fact. Since exploitation techniques still cannot reach the foot of the continental margin, these members believe it erroneous to say that sovereign rights now embrace that area. To this extent they are unwilling to perpetuate what they regard as a misunderstanding of their position in the 1968 Joint Report. Those who take the view that sovereign rights now embrace that area answer that under the existing Convention on the Continental Shelf (1) the coastal State’s exclusive sovereign rights encompasses any exploitation on the adjoin- ing continental margin, whether that exploitation is effected by its national or by a foreigner;* (2) a change in the Convention which would retract this boundary of the area of the coastal State’s exclusive interest to a line which is landward of the submerged edge of the continent would deprive the coastal nation of rights now recognized in that State by the existing Convention. This being so, they say that it does not matter greatly (with respect to exploration and exploitation of seabed resources) whether the outer limit of exclusive sov- ereign rights of the coastal State is characterized as the boundary of rights here- tofore vested in the coastal nation, or the limit on Jurisdiction to be acquired in futuro by exploitation of successively deeper areas, since, in either event, occu- pation and exploitation by any other State of the area within this limit is prohibited. 8. Comments and conclusions regarding a shelf limit In the light of the discussion above and the previous actions in the ABA which have been described, we submit the following comments and conclusions regarding the points reviewed in this section : (1) We reaffirm our opinion that the concept of adjacency contained in the present Shelf Convention should preperly be interpreted to include the submerged continental land mass. In the view widely held among our members, all of the submerged continental land mass is subject to national jurisdiction over its natural resources. In the view of a significant number of our members any part of this land mass will come within national jurisdiction as soon as it becomes accessible to exploitation. (2) We reaffirm our opinion that it would not be desirable, in terms of overall United States interests, to seek a formal international conference for the purpose of fixing a precise boundary for the legal shelf. We believe it both preferable and and proper to achieve this aim through parallel declarations by interested states announcing a uniform interpretation of the criteria embodied in the 1958 convention. 13 Article 2 provides that “if the coastal State does not explore the continental shelf or exploit its natural resources, no one may undertake these activities, or make a claim to the continental shelf, without the express consent of the coastal State,” and these rights ‘“‘do not depend on occupation, effective national,” 653 (3) We reaffirm our opinion that the United States should assert to the full the rights over adjacent submarine areas now vested in it by the shelf convention and by general international law. (4) We reaffirm our opinion that claims to rights in excess of those recognized in the Shelf Convention (such as rights over the superjacent waters, nonseden- tary fisheries, or airspace) are invalid extensions of the continental shelf doctrine, and should be so regarded by the United States. The position stated in these comments necessarily leads us to disagreee with the Commission’s recommendation, already quoted, that the United States should take the initiative to secure international agreement on a seaward limit for the legal shelf at the 200-meter line (or 50 miles offshore, whichever is greater). Both these limits have now been exceeded in practice, and they must be regarded as obsolete. We also disagree with the proposed initiative to seek international agreement if this means the convocation of a formal conference for that purpose. D. The regime beyond the treaty shelf The Commission Report recommends (p. 147) “that the United States seize the opportunity for leadership which the present situation demands and propose a new international legal-political framework for exploration and exploitation of the mineral resources underlying the deep seas, that is, the high seas beyond the outer limits of the Continental Shelf as redefined in accordance with the Commission’s recommendations.” It then proposes that new international agreements be negotiated to embody six main provisions (each of which is described and discussed below). The Report emphasizes (p. 147) that these proposals are interrelated, and that rejec- tion of any one ‘would raise serious questions in the minds of the Commission as to the advisability of continuing with the others.”’ Before proceeding to examine the Commission’s specific proposals, we would note that a preliminary question exists as to the urgency for creating an inter- national regime for resources beneath the deep sea. Many of our members feel that it is premature to seek establishment of such a regime at this time. They stress that technology for deep-sea exploitation on a significant scale is not yet available, that not enough is yet known about the character or extent of deep-sea resources, and that an ill-conceived regime can smother development indefinitely. On the other hand, other members point out that the question of a deep-sea regime is inevitably entangled with the question of the shelf limit. Since it is bound to arise, it should not be disregarded. Further, particularly with respect to hard minerals, the advent of adequate technology to reach deep-sea resources may not be as remote as some think. Finally, the creation of an international framework will require several years of negotiation at least, and the result may be ready none too soon. During the same period great advances may be expected in our knowledge of the oceans, and these can be taken into account as negotia- tions proceed. : Whichever view is preferable in the abstract, the fact remains that active efforts looking toward an international regime are now under way in the United Nations. The United States must have a policy and position with respect to these efforts. If only for this reason, the proposals for such a regime made by the Commission ¢all for careful scrutiny now. 1. International Registry Authority (p. 147) The Commission’s Report proposes a claim-registration scheme, under which only a state or an association of states would be eligible to register a claim but the registrant may choose anyone to do the work or transfer its claim to another state. All states should be free to engage, or authorize, preliminary investigation to decide whether to register a claim to explore. An exclusive right to explore or exploit would be acquired by registry with an International Registry Authority. The membership of the Authority and manner of choosing its governing body would be specified in the agreements embodying the new framework. “The Au- thority should find its place in the family of the United Nations but should be as autonomous as the World Bank” (p. 149). The Authority should be required to register claims on a “first-come, first- registered” basis, without discretion to deny it except on the ground that the explorer or exploiter is not able and willing to develop the claim. ; Upon proof of discovery the Authority would be required to register a claim to exploit for a large enough area and for a long enough time (fixed by the 654 Authority) to enable economic operation and assure the producer time to re- cover his investment and an “adequate return thereon.” Failure to comply with work requirements would be ground for revocation. Upon expiration of the registration period, further exploration or exploita- tion of the subject resources or area should be subject to the regime as it then exists, without any re-registration preference. To cover the Authority’s administrative costs, it should be empowered to fix registration fees. Comment: Our 1968 Report (pp. 12-13) suggested consideration of a registry scheme as a long-range objective in contrast with proposals for vesting jurisdic- tion in a supranational agency to grant or deny mineral concessions in the areas beyond national jurisdiction. We consequently approve the Commission’s similar conclusion, which avoids vesting of ‘title’ to deep-sea resources in the United Nations (p. 147) and which seeks to create an administrative organ of limited but useful scope. In varying ‘degrees, however, we have misgivings over specific details of the Commission’s proposa', including the following: (1) The structure of the Authority. Its organization must reflect the realities of ocean capabilities, and must be insulated from caprices of the moment in the General Assembly. (2) The power of the Authority to veto claims and to fix their size and dura- tion. In order to avoid the abuses which can arise from monopoly power, the rights of claimants in all essential respects should be established in the treaty creating the regime. (3) The denial of any re-registration preference to a state which had devel- oped the area concerned. Such a policy could seriously impair incentive to exploit. (4) The provision that claims must be registered by a state or states. This presents problems in situations where private enterprise has invested in pre- liminary exploration and seeks to perfect its rights in an area before claim- jumpers can take advantage of its work. It should be made certain that the prin- ciple of “first-come, first-registered’’ would apply as of the date the applicant gave proper notice to the Authority that it had filed with a member state an application that it register on the applicant’s behalf. (5) The standard of an “adequate return.” This is a difficult and unrealistic concept to apply to the extractive industries, where risks are high and many un- successful attempts have to be paid for out of the small percentage of successful ventures. (6) Scientific research. Care must be exercised to prevent the registration system from being used to impede genuine scientific research. (7) The concept of “paper claims,” i.e., speculative registrations. A specula- tive race to the registry office, a “race to grab,” is inevitable if the reward for being first in line, without any prior exploratory effort, is to receive a power to exclude all others from a large area for a period of several years. Experience with mineral laws on land has proven this. 2. International Fund (p. 149) This proposal is intended to compensate the world community as common owner of the resources by using the ‘economic rent” for purposes that the world com- munity agrees will promote the common welfare. The Commission wisely declares that these purposes must be other than general purposes of the U.N. The International Registry Authority would fix a rate of payment (not so high as to kill incentive) of a portion of the value of production which it would turn over to the Internatidnal Fund. The Authority should have no voice in the Fund’s management. The membership of the Fund should be determined by the U.N. General Assembly. Comment: We endorse the principle here recognized, that the agency con- cerned with production should be separated from the agency distributing the proceeds. It is probably the best way to give practical recognition to the proposi- tion that the resources are the legacy of mankind and to the fact that all states should be entitled to participate in the benefits. However, the question arises whether it is justifiable discrimination to require royalty-type payments from the mineral extractive industries when other users of ocean space (e.g., fishing and merchant marine) are not so burdened. Our other comments are: (1) If there are to be royalty-type payments, the Commission is to be com- mended for the formula ‘a portion of the value of production” rather than “net return on investment.” Cf. Comment (5) on the Registry, above. 655 (2) It is questionable whether the Authority should have unrestricted power to fix the rate of payment to the Fund. We believe that this should be settled in the basic agreement creating the regime, or at least that the agreement should set limits to the Authority’s discretion. Clearly the Fund should not have power to set the rate. (3) Determination of the membership of the Fund should be made by the parties to the proposed convention and should not in any event be delegated to the U.N. General Assembly. 3. Powers and duties of registering States (p. 150) Each state registering a claim must enact domestic legislation to assure com- pliance with the terms and conditions of the international regime, payments and protection of exploration and exploitation activities. Failure to do this should be a ground of registry revocation by the Authority. The registering state would be free to apply its domestic law not inconsistent with the international regime, €.g., concerning working conditions, marketing of production and taxation. Comment: We agree in principle. 4. Policing functions of the registry authority (p. 150) The Report does not recommend that the Authority have any general policing functions. However, since the Authority would have the power to cancel regis- tered claims for cause, it should have the power, according to the Report, to inspect and hold hearings. Comment: We agree, subject to provisions for review of possible arbitrary action by the Authority, as provided for in the next proposal. 5. Dispute settlement (p. 150) The Report recommends that the International Registry Authority should initially settle disputes arising under the international regime. However, at the request of any party to a dispute, the Authority’s initial decision, including its revocation of claim registration, should be subject to review by an independent arbitral agency. Comment: We agree. We would note that the possibility of recourse to the International Court of Justice should not be ruled out. 6. Intermediate Zone (p. 151) In the Commission’s view, mineral resources of the deep sea do not in fairness or law belong to the coastal states to the exclusion of other states from their benefits. However, the Commission recognizes that some coastal states may regard them- selves as having preferential rights to resources of a reasonable subsea area beyond the treaty shelf and also have a national security interest in adjacent offshore areas. For these reasons, some coastal states might be reluctant to agree to a narrow treaty shelf without recognition of their particular interests in the area immediately beyond. As a compromise of the foregoing opposing views, the Report recommends the creation of an intermediate zone of seabed, seaward of the treaty shelf as defined by the Commission, to the 2,500 meter isobath or 100 nautical miles from the baseline of the territorial sea, whichever gives the greater area. The boun- dary would be permanently fixed as in the case of the shelf. The Commission assumes that the 2,500 meter isobath is the average depth at the foot of the geological continental terrace or slope and 100 miles is the average width of the shelf and slope or terrace. (Geologists do not all agree that these assump- tions are true or relevant). Only the coastal state or its licensees would be authorized to explore and exploit resources therein. It need not do so, but if it does so, its claims must be registered with the Authority and would come under the other terms and condi- tions of the international regime. : Comment: This proposal is essentially an effort by the Commission to propi- tiate the proponents of a “broad” treaty shelf. Many of the arguments summar- ized earlier with regard to the proper limit of the shelf are also applicable, pro and con, to this intermediate zone concept. If the Commission’s “intermediate zone” proposal were adopted, in conjunction with a “narrow” shelf, foreign coastal nations would have exactly the same power to exclude American com- panies, or to demand burdensome concession terms, as they would have if their jurisdiction were commensurate with a “broad” shelf extending to the 2,500 meter isobath or other outer limit of the proposed intermediate zone. Such a zone 656 has, however, other drawbacks, of which the most weighty is perhaps its sheer awkwardness. Areas subject to divided responsibility are rarely viable, as the history of condominia and internationalized zones in international law indicates. On balance, we are opposed to this proposal. An alternative proposal which has been put forward would call for complete coastal state authority over the zone but would provide for some kind of pay- ments to the International Fund. Such an arrangement would be less objection- able, but it might lessen the incentives to the coastal state and its licensees to push on with development. It is also possible to foresee administrative difficulties under this system as well. 7. Conclusion with respect to areas beyond national jurisdiction. Under the 1968 Resolution of the House of Delegates, the American Bar Asso- ciation is committed to support the development as soon as practicable of inter- national arrangements to govern the exploitation of deep-sea resources beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. Such arrangements, the Resolution affirms, must assure, inter alia, “Kreedom of exploration by all nations on a nondiscriminatory basis; security of tenure to those engaged in producing the resources in compliance with such rules, encouragement to discover and develop these resources, and optimum use to the benefit of all peoples... .” Execpt for the intermediate zone proposal, and subject to the various caveats expressed in the foregoing comments, we believe that the Commission’s recom- mendations for a deep-sea regime are broadly in harmony with the principles of the Resolution. We would reiterate our belief, however, that the details of the Commission’s proposed registry plan need careful attention before being submitted as a basis for international discussions. There are, in our opinion, too many loose ends and loopholes which might permit abuse in connection with the requirements for the registration, maintenance and vacating of claims. We are all against a “race to grab.” It is difficult at present for anyone to “grab” the deep seabed physically but the concept of registration of paper claims would for the first time create the mechanism to make such a “grab” possible. Obviously safeguards against such a possibility must be drawn with the utmost care, but the factual data necessary for meaningful draftmanship are not yet available. Many of our members strongly believe that the first step, in setting up a deep seas regime, should not be the establishment of a system which recognizes paper claims or purely speculative registrations, but should be, instead, agreement on norms of conduct to be observed by the nations capable of carrying out deep-sea mineral exploration. Such norms would be designed to minimize interference between expeditions or operators, and to preclude “jumping” of areas which are under actual exploration or development, plus reasonable protective margins. This, they believe, may well evolve into a more formal system of registry of claims, but only after enough information has been acquired to make possible an agreement on criteria with respect to areas, duration, diligence requirements, and other factors historically associated with mining rights. Such consensus on norms of conduct should be without prejudice to any agreement to dedicate some portion of the value of production from deep-sea mineral resources to agreed international purposes. KE. Relations between Government and private enterprise, and the international registration system (p. 153) The Commission points out that the relations of the United States, as a reg- istering nation under the international regime, with the business entities on whose behalf it will register claims are a matter of purely domestic concern. The recommendations which it makes for U.S. domestic procedures to deal with these relations are summarized below. 1. Policies applicable to all registered claims The Report recommends that the Department of the Tnterior be the U.S. agency which would register U.S. claims with the International Authority. Companies would apply to the Department of the Interior, paying to it the fees specified by the international regime to be forwarded to the Authority. The companies’ royalty-type payments for exploitation should take the place of both the annual 14 This concept was referred to in our 1968 Joint Report. 6957 rent and the royalty now paid for mineral leases on the Outer Continental Shelf. We agree in general, but would recall our comment in regard to the Authority about the danger of delay in domestic registration channels which could lose an applicant his “first-come” position before the Authority. 2. Additional Intermediate Zone policies The Report recomends (p. 154) that the Secretary of the Interior should have power to award mineral rights without requiring competitive bidding, on the same basis as it recommended such procedure for the Outer Continental Shelf. This problem only arises if the intermediate zone proposal is adopted. 3. Additional policies beyond the intermediate zone If the United States uses competitive bidding to select the companies to explore and exploit claims registered by it with the International Authority, U.S. companies would have an incentive to request states which charge less to register claims on their behalf. This would create a “flag of convenience” problem unless the United States prevented its nationals from applying to other states. The latter would be undesirable. Therefore, the Report recommends (p. 155) that the United States follow the “‘first-come, first-registered”’ policy in selecting the companies on whose behalf it registers claims with the Authority. We agree with this recommendation. F. A Course of Interim Action The Report observes (p. 155) that it will take years to arrive at a new framework. In the meantime, it is important to seek early agreement on princi- ples to guide states in interim exploration and exploitation of deep-sea resources. The Commission therefore announces its support for the principles proposed by the United States in the United Nations in June 1968," which it summarizes as follows: (1) A “redefinition of the outer limits of the continental shelf.” * (2) Exclusion of any claims to national sovereignty or sovereign rights over the deep-sea floor beyond the shelf limit. (3) Dedication to international purposes of a portion of the value of the resources recovered. (4) Call for a new international regime to be established as soon as prac- ticable. (5) Exploitation prior to the establishment of a shelf limit to be without prejudice to the eventual location of that limit. To implement this last principle, the Commission recommends a U.S. pro- posal that in the interim, no nation should claim sovereign rights beyond the 200-meter line. Exploration and exploitation should, however, be permitted to continue beyond that line, provided that the authorization therefore ‘explicitly states that such exploration or exploitation shall be subject to the new inter- national framework agreed upon” (p. 156). Recognizing the uncertainties which such a rule would create for the private entrepreneur who would not know when his landlord and the terms of his lease might be switched, the Commission recommends (p. 156) : “That Congress enact legislation to compensate private enterprise for loss of investment or expenses occasioned by any new international framework that re- defines the continental shelf so as to put the area in which it is engaged in mineral resources development beyond the shelf’s outer limits.” ‘A final recommendation from the Commission (p. 156) is that the Outer Conti- nental Shelf Lands Act be amended to require permission from the Secretary of the Interior: “To engage in mineral resource exploration or exploitation in any subsea area beyond the 200-meter isobath upon such terms and conditions as the Secretary deems appropriate. The amendment should make clear that this requirement is not intended to constitute a U.S. claim to exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any subsea area beyond the 200-meter isobath.” In exercising this authority, the Secretary of the Interior should be guided by the Secretary of State’s judgment as to foreign policy implications (p. 157). It is 165 UN Doc. A/AC. 135/25; also in 59 Dept. of State Bulletin 152 (August 5, 1968). 16 We do not read the U.S. proposal this way. It did not, in our view, propose a “redefini- tion” of the outer limits of the continental shelf, but merely proposed that the limit be fixed 1n accordance with the existing Convention on the Continental Shelf. 658 our understanding that the scope of this proposal would not be confined to areas off the U.S. coast; it would apply to activities by U.S. nationals off any coast, in order to assure Government control of the evolving worldwide situation pending adoption of the new international framework. On these interim measures proposed by the Commission, we agree in part and disagree in part. Of the five principles put forward in the United Nations, we find the first four acceptable (on the understanding, with respect to the first, that redefinition of the shelf limit be taken as equivalent to arriving at an agreed interpretation of the Convention definition rather than a new convention). These principles are also in harmony with the 1968 ABA Resolution. We disagree with the fifth principle and with the recommendations for imple- menting it (except insofar as these recognize the importance of not suspending deep-sea exploration and exploitation activity).17 These proposals, calling in effect for a moratorium on claims beyond the 200-meter line, are in our opinion retrogressive, impractical, and not in the best interests of the United States. The principal reasons for our conclusions may be summed up as follows: (1) The 200-meter line is out of date. Activities now exist beyond that line, undertaken in justified reliance on the exploitability concept of the Shelf Con- vention. These are now clearly within the national jurisdiction, and their status should not now be cast in jeopardy. (2) Under our view of the Shelf Convention and its interpretation by parallel declarations, there is no need for a moratorium on claims. National rights simply extend or will extend to the limit of adjacency and stop. (3) The possibility of shifting regimes and responsibilities will assuredly dis- courage the large investment needed to develop resources in deeper and deeper waters. The adverse effect on U.S. interests is obvious. (4) The proposal for compensation is unrealistic. Even if Congress were pre- pared to enact such legislation, the suggested measure of compensation is wholly inadequate for the risks involved. The device thus fails to supply the inducement needed to overcome the uncertainties noted in point 3. APPENDIX Recommendation The ‘Sections of Natural Resources Law, International and Comparative Law, and the Standing Committee on Peace and Law Through United Nations, recommend that the following resolution be adopted by the House of Delegates: Whereas, the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil under the high seas are becoming, through technological progress, increasingly available to mankind in ways until recently unforeseen ; and Whereas, a Committee of the United Nations General Assembly is presently considering “practical means to promote international co-operation in the explora- tion, conservation and use of the seabed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, .. . and of their resources’; and Whereas, the United ‘States, asa member of that United Nations Committee, has proposed ‘that the exploration and use of the deep ocean floor be open to all states and their nationals without discrimination and in acordance with international law, and as a corollary of this that the exercise of sovereign rights over any part of the deep ocean floor be ruled out ; and Whereas, the treaty known as the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf in force between 37 nations, including the United States, recognizes that each coastal state has “exclusive sovereign rights for the purpose of” exploring and exploiting the natural resources of “the sea-bed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast ... to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas’; and Whereas, it is generally recognized that the definition in the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf of the boundary between the area of exclusive sovereign rights and the deep ocean floor needs to be clarified by an agreed interpretation ; and Whereas, the House of Delegates, by its Resolution of August 9, 1966, stated that “prior to framing a policy ... the United States Government ... review 17 The Standing Committee on World Order Under Law takes no position with respect to the fifth principle here discussed, for want of sufficient qualification to do so. 659 thoroughly the issues at stake in consultation with representatives of the Ameri- can Bar Association and others competent in the field of international law, with scientific and technical experts and with leaders of American industry in oceanic development” ; Now, therefore, be it resolved, that the American Bar Association Supports the efforts being made in and out of the governments of interested states to protect the seabed and subsoil of the deep ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction from claims of sovereignty or rights of discretionary control by any nation or group or organization of nations; Supports the call by the United States Government for internationally agreed arrangements governing the exploitation of natural resources of the deep ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction to be established as soon as practicable ; Recommends (1) That the United States consult with other parties to the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention with a view to establishing, through the issuance of parallel declarations or by other means, an agreed interpretation of the definition of the boundary between the areas of exclusive sovereign rights with respect to natural resources of the seabed and subsoil and the deep ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. (2) That within the area of exclusive sovereign rights adjacent to the United States, the interests of the United States in the natural resources of the sub- marine areas be protected to the full extent permitted by the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf. (3) That on the basis of the information now available, the most desirable long- range goal for a regime to govern exploration and development of the mineral resources of the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil beyond the limits of na- tional jurisdiction is not the creation of a supersovereignty with power to grant or deny mineral concessions, but rather agreement upon norms of conduct de- signed to minimize conflicts between sovereigns which undertake such explora- tion and development. (4) That the resources of the bed and subsoil of the deep sea, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, be the subject of study and consultation with a view to formulating rules and practices to be observed by common restraint or by other arrangements which will assure, inter alia, freedom of exploration by all nations on a nondiscriminatory basis, security of tenure to those engaged in producing the resources in compliance with such rules, encouragement to discover and de- velop these resources, and optimum use to the benefit of all peoples; and Authorizes representatives of the Sections of Natural Resources Law and In- ternational and Comparative Law and the Standing Committee on Peace and Law Through United Nations to express the foregoing as the views of the Amer- ican Bar Association to agencies of the Government of the United States and to the Congress of the United States. 660 Committee on Deep Sea Mineral Resources OF ? THE AMERICAN BRANCH OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION Interim Report JULY 19, 1968 661 MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMMITTEE ON DEEP SEA MINERAL RESOURCES OF THE AMERICAN BRANCH OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION WOODFIN BUTTE LUKE W. FINLAY Alternate: CARLos J. ANGULO STANLEY N. FUTTERMAN WILLIAM L. GRIFFIN G. W. HAIGHT BRUCE HARLOW Louis HENKIN RALPH JOHNSON DouGLas M. JOHNSTON JOHN G. LAYLIN JOHN E. MCCRACKEN MyreEs McDOuUGAL JOSEPH W. Morris CEcIL J. OLMSTEAD OscCAR SCHACHTER RICHARD YOUNG WILLIAM T. BuRKE, Rapporteur NorTHCUTT ELy, Chairman (Mr. Henkin dissents to this report. See p. XXI. Mr. Finlay, for opposite reasons, dissents in part. See p. XII. Messrs. Schachter and Futterman, because of their official positions, ask that their names not be included as sponsors. ) 662 I. INTRODUCTION 1. Subject Matter of this Report Heightened interest in and concern over the availability of new sources of ocean minerals, both fuel and non-fuel, are common around the globe. It is clear that a serious, and probably prolonged, process of interna- tional debate and decision is now in its initial stages and that states are moving to clarify their common interests in ocean resources develop- ment. The purpose of this Report of the American Branch Committee on Deep Sea Mineral Resources is to discuss considerations relating to the exploration for, and the exploitation of, mineral resources beneath the world oceans, and to make recommendations concerning the legal framework for such exploration and exploitation. 2. I.L.A. Action at Helsinki (1966) The International Law Association is indebted to the foresight of the Executive of the Netherlands Branch in taking the initiative of establish- ing a committee to study the legal regime of deep sea mining, whose report at the Helsinki Conference brought to the attention of all the looming importance of this subject. Thereafter, the Executive Council on 12 November 1966 set up a working group on “Deep Sea Mining,” with the late Rear Admiral M. W. Mouton (Netherlands) as Chairman, for the study of this subject.* The American Branch Committee pre- sents this Report in furtherance of that inquiry. 3. Current Activities (1) United Nations On the international level marine science affairs engage the attention of at least 100 different public and private organizations, but most public attention is devoted currently to the events taking place in the United Nations itself, including especially the General Assembly and the Eco- nomic and Social Council. The latter in 1966 adopted Resolution 1112 (XL) which requested the Secretary-General: (a) to make a survey of the present state of knowledge of these resources of the sea, beyond the continental shelf and of the tech- niques for exploiting these resources. . . ; (b) as a part of that survey, to attempt to identify those re- sources now considered to be capable of economic exploitation, especially for the benefit of developing countries; * Admiral Mouton was succeeded by Prof. D. H. N. Johnson, of Great Britain. 663 (c) to identify any gaps in available knowledge which merit early attention by virtue of their importance to the development of ocean resources, and of the practicality of their early exploitation. (Pursuant to this request the Secretary-General in early 1968 released two reports dealing with mineral resources and living resources other than fish.) In 1966 the General Assembly also adopted Resolution 2172 (XXI) endorsing the ECOSOC Resolution, requesting a compre- hensive survey of activities in marine science and technology around the globe, and further requesting the Secretary-General in cooperation with UNESCO and FAO to formulate proposals for: (a) Ensuring the most effective arrangements for an expanded programme of international cooperation to assist in a better under- standing of the marine environment through science and in the exploitation and development of marine resources, with due regard to the conservation of fish stocks; (b) Initiating and strengthening marine education and training programmes, bearing in mind the close Lea between marine and other sciences;... . In implementing this request the Secretary-General appointed a Com- mittee of Experts and his report and proposals are at this writing ex- pected to be released momentarily. Most recently, in December of 1967, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 2340 (XXII) entitled “Examination of the question of the reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes of the sea-bed and ocean floor, and the sub-soil thereof underlying the high seas beyond the limits of the present national jurisdiction and the uses of their resources in the interest of mankind.” The Resolution established an Ad Hoc Committee on the Oceans which was to prepare for the 23rd General Assembly a study which would include: (a) A survey of the past and present activities of the United Nations, the specialized agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency and other inter-governmental bodies with regard to the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and of existing international agree- ments concerning these areas; (b) An account of the scientific, technical, economic, ears and other aspects of this item; 664 (c) An indication regarding practical means to promote inter- national co-operation in the exploration, conservation and use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and the sub-soil thereof, as con- templated in the title of the item, and of their resources, having regard to the views expressed and the suggestions put forward by Member States during the consideration of this item at the twenty- second session of the General Assembly; .... This Ad Hoc Committee, on which 35 nations are represented, has constituted two working groups. One deals with technical and economic matters, one with legal matters. The plenary Committee and the two working groups have held a number of meetings, but, as of this writing, their reports are not yet available. (2) U.S. Government The Congress of the United States has devoted several years of in- creasingly closer study to the requirements of a national effort to harness the resources of the sea to the benefit of the United States and mankind. The culmination of this Congressional activity came with the adoption of the Marine Resources and Engineering Development Act of 1966. The major significance of the Act lies in the creation of a cabinet- level body, called the National Council on Marine Resources and Engi- neering Development, charged with the responsibility, inter alia, of de- veloping a comprehensive program of marine science activities. Of equal, if not more, importance the Act called for the establishment by Presidential appointment of a Commission on Marine Science, Engi- neering and Resources which was to “make a comprehensive investiga- tion and study of all aspects of marine science in order to recommend an overall plan for an adequate national oceanographic program that will meet the present and future national needs.” The Commission is composed primarily of private citizens; only five of the fifteen members may be from the Federal Government. In addition to stimulating intensive activities within the many federal agencies involved in marine science affairs, an important effect of the creation of these two bodies has been both to provide a much sharper focus upon marine science affairs in the United States and to establish a means by which new ideas can be generated and important initiatives identified and set in motion. Thus far in its two annual reports the Council has devoted predominant attention to this latter task, in each instance selecting programs deserving priority and designating the lead 665 federal agency for implementation. The Report of the Commission is formally due in January 1969, and is expected to be available late in 1968. Among the most important results thus far of the Council’s work is the concept of the International Decade of Ocean Exploration (IDOE) which was initially proposed by President Johnson in March 1968. A White Paper on the Decade issued by the Council in May offers the following elaboration: The Decade is envisioned as a period of intensified collaborative planning, development of national capabilities, and execution of national and international programs of oceanic research and re- source exploration. Knowledge of the ocean and its resources is exceedingly limited. Because of the very size, complexity and var- iability of the marine environment, scientific investigations of vast scope will be necessary if knowledge of this environment is to in- crease within a reasonably short interval. At the same time excel- lence, experience, and capabilities in marine science and technology are shared by many nations. Hence, a broad program of ocean exploration can be carried out only through a cooperative effort by many nations. The success of such an endeavor will depend in large measure on the extent to which various nations contribute their particular expertise and capabilities, assume a share of re- sponsibility for the program, develop their manpower and facilities, and disseminate to others the results of scientific discoveries. (3) Bar Association and other groups Paralleling this greatly intensified governmental activity are numerous private groups whose activities include technical, economic and legal consideration of marine resources. Among these are the Committee on Oceanography of the Section of International and Comparative Law of the American Bar Association, the Committee on Marine Resources of the Section of Natural Resources Law, and the Standing Committee on Peace and Law through United Nations, of that Association, and the National Petroleum Council’s Committee on Petroleum Resources under the Ocean Floor. Each of these has published, or circulated, drafts of important reports. (4) Questions Discussed These various events on the international level, and within the United States and in governmental and private bodies within other countries, 666 set the framework for this present Report of the American Branch Com- mittee. These activities emphasize that there are great deficiencies and gaps in basic knowledge of the marine environment and its resources which must be remedied if wise decisions are to be made. In all inter- national and national considerations and expressions thus far made, overwhelming emphasis is placed upon the need for intensified scientific and technical research and legal analysis. In light of these considerations the Committee’s Report and recom- mendations deal both with the procedural question of when to attempt revision of the law of the sea and with the two substantive questions now most frequently discussed: (i) the limit of the exclusive jurisdiction of the coastal states with respect to the exploration and exploitation of the natural resources of the sea-bed and sub-soil of submarine areas adjacent to their coasts, pursuant to the principles recognized in the 1958 Con- vention on the Continental Shelf, and (ii) the choice of regimes best adapted to the development of the natural resources of the deep ocean floor seaward of the areas encompassed by the jurisdiction of the coastal states. This report does not discuss military and security questions because we assume that the deep sea floor, by common accord, will be re- garded as not subject to acquisition of territorial sovereignty, and will be reserved for peaceful purposes. Il. NEED FOR FURTHER STUDIES AND EXPERIENCE BEFORE CONVENING AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE TO REVISE LAW OF THE SEA RELATING TO MINERAL DEVELOPMENT After careful review of developments in ocean use, the Committee believes that it is not in the common interest immediately to seek inter- national agreement, by means of an international conference, on the issues of the limit of the continental shelf and of a regime for the deep ocean regions beyond the limit on the rights of coastal states. Rather, the present need is for the careful studies and inquiries required in prep- aration for negotiation of such agreements as may eventually be required as we gain knowledge of, and experience in, the marine environment. A number of major considerations indicate that to attempt legal regula- tion for mineral exploitation through a large multilateral conference would probably hamper rather than promote wise use of ocean resources. 667 These considerations include: 1. There is widespread misunderstanding or lack of knowledge of the extent and distribution of ocean resources and of the conditions re- quired for their productive use; 2. There is resultant inability to identify anticipated legal and political problems with useful precision; 3. Many, if not all, states are unable presently to determine their na- tional interests in the development of ocean mineral resources and associated issues; 4. Provision of an adequate jurisdictional and regulatory framework for management of ocean mineral resources is dependent upon a major international effort at research and exploration in the oceans; 5. Satisfactory accomplishment of a comprehensive program in scien- tific research and exploration requires an intensive effort on the part of many states over a period of many years. In sum, these factors strongly urge that states refrain from any imme- diate action toward convening a new law of the sea conference or toward revision of the Geneva Conventions. It is, however, conceivable that the required majority of states does not or will not similarly weigh these factors and that an international conference on the law of the sea will again be convened in the near future. The Ad Hoc Committee of the United Nations may or may not recommend such a course. It is also quite conceivable that means other than formal treaty revision may ap- pear desirable for clarifying certain problems, particularly concerning the continental shelf. In either event, it is incumbent upon those concerned with the pro- tection of the common interests of the states to offer their views on the legal areas which will best provide for those common interests. Accordingly, the remainder of this Report is devoted to the system of law which, in our view, does or should govern the exploration, develop- ment, and production of the mineral resources underlying the high seas (for this discussion, the term “high seas” refers to the oceans beyond the territorial sea). The choice of a legal regime involves two groups of problems: 1. What geographical restrictions, if any, ought to be imposed on the exclusive jurisdiction which the Continental Shelf Convention rec- 26-563 O - 70 - pt.2 - 11 668 ognizes in the coastal nation with respect to the mineral resources in and beneath the adjacent bed of the sea? 2. Seaward of the exclusive jurisdiction of the coastal state, determined by the Convention on the Continental Shelf, is it necessary at this time to establish any formal regime to govern mineral exploration and production? If so, what should be the objectives and structure of such a regime? II. CRITERIA FOR OPTIMUM MINERAL DEVELOPMENT 1. Objectives of mineral legislation Our principal concern in this Report is to identify the requirements for bringing into productive use the minerals located beneath the oceans. The mineral deposit which remains undiscovered, or, being discovered, remains undeveloped, is as useless to man as though it did not.exist. The world-wide experience of nations has demonstrated that a suc- cessful system of mineral development laws, whether operating on land or under the sea, should have these objectives: (1) To encourage the discovery and putting to work of the world’s minerals at the lowest cost to consumers consistent with a fair return to the investor and with the maximum ultimate recovery of those minerals, having in mind the needs of future generations as well as our own. (2) To bring about maximum ultimate recovery by encouraging con- servation—in the sense of wise use—both of the minerals themselves and of the natural forces, such as reservoir energy, which are required for their production; conversely, to deter the physical waste of the world’s mineral estate. (3) To facilitate access to minerals, on a non-discriminatory basis, by all responsible interests. (4) To reconcile competing uses of the environment and minimize the adverse effect of mineral operations on that environment. 2. The essentials which a mineral regime must offer to bring about development To accomplish the objectives that we have identified, it is not enough to articulate them in statutes or conventions. 669 Men must be induced to risk life and treasure to find and win min- erals. The business of discovering and producing them is hazardous enough on land. Under sea, it is much more costly and risky, both financially and physically. Capital must be attracted to the deep sea mineral business in competition with other demands upon it, and in competition with safer mineral investments on shore and in shallower waters. Successful mineral laws offer three general types of inducement to attract capital and talent: (1) The mineral regime must offer encouragement to look for min- erals, that is, to undertake reconnaissance or prospecting in the hope of finding areas promising enough to justify later expenditures on concen- trated exploration. (2) Security of tenure is essential. The enterprise which drills wells or sinks shafts in search of minerals is gambling large sums, with the odds heavily against the finding of a mineral deposit of value justifying the amount of money invested. It requires the exclusive right to occupy a stated area for exploration and the exclusive right to produce minerals discovered in that area, and to do so for an assured period of time— both the area and the time being commensurate with the character of the risk taken and the amount hazarded. (3) The mineral venture must have a reasonable prospect that, in the event of success, the exactions of the granting authority, in royalties and taxation, will not be so oppressive as to stifle the undertaking or discourage its continuance. 3. The application of the foregoing principles to undersea mineral development It does not appear to require argument that if the foregoing principles for the protection of the public interest and the recognition of the miner’s necessities are essential to a successful mineral regime on land, they must be essential elements of a successful regime undersea, where risks are immensely greater. At sea, the geology is hidden, no outcrops are visible; the expenses in all phases of exploration are much larger; if minerals are discovered, the costs of development, production, lifting, and transportation are enormously increased. The undersea mineral venture is even more capital-intensive than a comparable venture on land, and, if a mineral deposit is found, it must therefore have greater producibility or higher unit value than need be shown by the economi- cally producible onshore deposit. 670 The problem to be considered here, therefore, can be restated as fol- lows: What kind of undersea mineral regime will best encourage pros- pecting, guarantee security of tenure, and fairly balance governmental financial exactions with the risks of the enterprise, while bringing about the maximum ultimate recovery of minerals at the lowest ultimate cost to the consumer, and with an acceptable level of dislocation of other uses of the marine environment? The problem, as indicated earlier, divides itself into two phases: one related to the jurisdiction of the coastal state, the other to the regime (whatever it may be) seaward of the coastal state’s area of competence. IV. THE AREA OF COASTAL STATE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION The jurisdicion of coastal states with respect to the natural resources of the sea-bed and sub-soil areas under the high seas is determined by the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf. By that instrument the community of nations has decided that the interests of mankind are best served by reserving to coastal states exclusive sovereign rights in the natural resources of the sea-bed and sub-soil of the submarine areas adjacent to their coasts, not only to the 200 meter depth, but beyond that depth “to where the depth of the superjacent water admits of the exploitation of the natural resources.” The basis for this recognition of exclusive mineral jurisdiction is twofold: the predominant interest of the coastal state in the bed of the sea adjacent to its shores, and the neces- sity for certainty as to what law is applicable to that sea-bed. To date, some three-score nations have given recognition to the principles of that Convention, 36 by ratifying it, the others by adopting major provisions of it in domestic legislation or regional agreements. From the wide acceptance of the principles set forth in the Convention, even by states which are not parties, it is clear that they constitute part of customary international law. However, for reasons seldom made explicit, some find difficulty with the boundary definition in the Convention, particularly in terms of the reach of the exploitability criterion in light of the principle of adjacency. Accordingly, a number of alternatives are now being advanced in vari- ous quarters for revising the Continental Shelf Convention in order to place a firm limitation on coastal control. The Committee believes that this assumption of a need to revise the Shelf Convention is unwarranted 671 in terms of projected technological progress in offshore mineral exploi- tation. Reasonably interpreted, the Convention definition of the shelf extends, and limits, coastal control to adjacent marine regions of suffi- cient extent that the outer limit of control will not be reached for a very long time. As a general rule, the limit of adjacency may reasonably be regarded as coinciding with the foot of the submerged portion of the continental land mass. There is strong support for this view in the drafting history of the Convention,* although other interpretations have been advanced. From the geological standpoint, this interface at the submerged conti- nental margin is a profound natural boundary. Characterized by a marked change of structure between the continental mass and the crust of the deep ocean basins, it is generally to be found at a depth of from 2,000 to 3,000 meters. As stated recently by the United States repre- sentative in the Technical and Economic Working Group of the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee: “The composition of the continents, including their submerged parts, is basically different from that of the oceanic crust of the deep ocean basins. The boundary between the two is one of the most profound natural interfaces. It is gradational. in many places and not easily established by direct observation, but generally oc- curs near the base of the continental slopes at a depth of about 2500 meters. 6 ‘... The gradational interface between the submerged parts of the continents and the ocean basins naturally fixes the seaward limit of any continental feature, and is from the scientific point of view the conceptual boundary between continental and oceanic sea- bed resources. It is important to recognize, however, that neither this nor any other geologic or topographic boundary is sufficiently distinct and consistent to serve by itself as the means of defining a precise juridical boundary.” In view of the fact that this feature is thus often difficult to locate from direct observation, it would seem reasonable and convenient to equate it generally, for the time being at least, with the 2,500 meter isobath. This would be in approximate accord with the geological realities. * See Appendix to this Report. 672 We are advised informally by scientists of the U. S. Geological Survey that about 7.5 percent of the area of the ocean floor is encompassed by the 200 meter isobath. Similarly, about 16 percent of the area of the ocean floor is included within the 2,000 meter contour. While no com- parable estimates are available for the 2,500 meter isobath, adjacent to the continents, an estimate has been made for the 3,000 meter isobath (world-wide, not merely adjacent to the continents), and the percentage of the area of the world’s ocean basins found to be included by that iso- bath is about 25 percent. It would appear, therefore, that if coastal state mineral jurisdiction is equated geographically with the submerged con- tinental land mass (the continental margin, including the geological concepts of the continental shelf, the continental slope, and the landward portion of the continental rise), and if this, in turn, is equated provi- . sionally with an average water depth of 2,500 meters, adjacent to the continents, the result is that substantially less than 20 percent of the area of the world’s sea-beds is within the exclusive mineral jurisdiction of the coastal states, and more than 80 percent of the total sea-bed area is outside the coastal regime with respect to mineral development. In particular instances, as where there is a very narrow or ill-defined continental margin, it may be equitable to regard the limit of adjacency as extending beyond this line. In such situations, the adjacency concept gives the coastal state exclusive mineral jurisdiction in an area of deep ocean floor which is reasonable with regard to all relevant circum- stances. In general, a reasonable measure of this jurisdiction might well be the average width of the continental margins of the world’s oceans, or approximately 100 miles, though there might be situations, as in the case of some of the smaller seas, in which a different standard would be more appropriate. Special problems may also occur with respect to islands. On the view proposed above, a sufficiently definite seaward limit for the exclusive jurisdiction of the coastal state may be persuasively derived from the language of the Convention as it now stands. Any doubts or differences can be resolved on an ad hoc basis as they arise. Hence there would seem to be at this time no need to consider possible changes in the Convention in anticipation of the time when it becomes open to proposals for revision in June 1969. Likewise, it does not now seem desirable to urge the convening of a.new international conference, which might well raise more problems than it would settle. Nevertheless, in view of current debate over the limit of coastal state jurisdiction under the present Convention, it may be desirable that this 673 limit be explicitly clarified. Rather than attempt such clarification through an international conference, it would appear preferable to deal with the matter by means of parallel ex parte declarations in which the states concerned would voluntarily recognize limits on their exclusive jurisdiction along the lines suggested in this Report. Such declarations might well contain not only an express recognition of the proposed defi- nition of adjacency, but also an affirmation of intent not to recognize more extensive claims by others—e.g., to the middle of the great oceans. By such means it would be possible to build up a pattern of concordant state practices by which the meaning of the existing Convention language may be authoritatively determined. In connection with the ex parte declarations above mentioned, states may also wish to give serious consideration to provision, in accordance with internal law and constitutional procedures, for allocation of a por- tion of the revenues derived from part of the area of coastal control to an international fund earmarked for expenditure for generally approved international purposes. Different conclusions might be reached by dif- ferent states depending upon current levels of foreign aid expenditures and policies relating to dedication of revenues derived from specific sources for specific purposes. In the United States, such policy decisions must be made by the Congress.* V. THE DEEP OCEAN FLOOR BEYOND THE AREA OF COASTAL CONTROL 1. The need for a sound beginning We turn now to consider the deeper ocean areas, those seaward of the coastal regime established by the Convention on the Continental Shelf. Inasmuch as the coastal regime controls mineral development on the continents, including the submerged continental land mass, and this, gen- erally speaking, extends to depths of the order of 2,500 meters, it seems valid to expect that the opportunities in the areas under coastal control (contrasted with the formidable technical and economic problems at- tending mineral development beneath deeper water) will occupy the creative and productive energies of scientists and engineers for several decades to come. Mineral developments will move out to very deep * Mr. Finlay dissents with respect to this paragraph, saying: “I see no more reason for a nation’s allocating a portion of the revenues derived from offshore operations than for allocating a portion of the revenues from onshore operations to international purposes and the very making of the suggestion casts an implied cloud on the title of the coastal states to the mineral resources of their con- tinental margins.” 674 waters only when net costs of exploration and production there will com- pete favorably with like costs for obtaining those minerals on land or beneath shallower waters, or with the costs of obtaining acceptable sub- stitutes. The hard minerals most frequently mentioned as deep sea resources are those found in so-called manganese nodules (i.e., manganese, copper, nickel, cobalt). The known onshore deposits of manganese superior to the average grade found in the nodules exceeds 100 years of supply of the world’s consumption at present rates. The known onshore deposits of the other components of the nodules is less, in terms of years of con- sumption, but is still measured in four to ten decades, and these metals are not immune to competition from substitutes—aluminum for copper, for example. This is without reference to the formidable technical prob- lems involved in mining beneath water depths nearly twice as great as that which crushed the submarine “Thresher”; delivering the ore in very large daily tonnages; receiving it on board a floating smelter or beneficiating plant which must operate in the open stormy sea in fixed positions (or lose contact with the submarine hoisting device); and processing it by metallurgical techniques not yet available, but which must be devised if these metals are to be separated from the highly refractory material containing them. With respect to oil and gas, the geologists believe that the major op- portunities lie in the sediments of the continental margin—the areas which are now subject to coastal jurisdiction—and not in the floor of the deep oceans, which is of quite different geologic origin. Aside from this, it is valid to expect that development of petroleum resources be- neath the oceans will first take place in the shallower areas, for eco- nomic reasons. Experience to date has shown that the outlay for moving out into deeper water has risen almost in geometric proportion, as re- lated to depth. Competition of non-conventional onshore substitutes, such as tar sands, oil shale, and hydrogenation of coal, as well as other energy sources, such as nuclear fission (and, potentially, nuclear fusion) will impose limitations on incentives for petroleum production from the deep océan floor. For example, it has been estimated by Chair- man Seaborg of the United States Atomic Energy Commission that: “|, . fusion of the atoms of heavy hydrogen available in the oceans of the world will open up an energy resource equivalent to 500 Pacific oceans filled with high grade petroleum.’’* * Dr. Glen T. Seaborg, “The Proliferation of the Peaceful Atom,” before the American Public Power Association, May 11, 1967. 675 This is not to say that the development of the minerals of the deep ocean floor beyond the continental margins will not occur. But the as- sertion,* frequently repeated, that some six billion dollars of gross annual income from undersea mineral development could accrue by 1975 to the United Nations or other international agency which might control access to the ocean floor is a wholly unsupported factual assumption, and an unacceptable premise for urgency in devising a regime to govern the deep ocean floor. It is significant that this estimate was based in part on the assumption that the sovereign rights of coastal nations should terminate at the 200 meter isobath, or at 12 miles from the nearest coast. As we have indicated, this would require agreement of the coastal nations to relinquish their exclusive rights in the minerals of the sub- merged continental land mass seaward of the 200 meter isobath, now recognized in them by the Convention on the Continental Shelf. As coastal nations comprise five-sixths of the membership of the United Nations, this does not seem a viable premise, quite aside from the illusory amount associated with it. While it thus appears that there is no precipitate necessity for the structuring of a regime to govern the development of the minerals beneath the oceans seaward of the existing mineral jurisdiction of the coastal states, it is appropriate to recognize the necessity for studying and agreeing on a formulation of international legal principles based on existing customary international law which will encourage exploration and protect exploitation of the resources of the deep sea floor. In the meantime, such initial mining operations as may occur in the deep ocean are unlikely to be the occasion for conflict which can- not be disposed of satisfactorily by available international legal prin- ciples and institutions. Deferment of attempted alteration of the regime has also the great virtue, surely to be considered an important objective, of delaying action until the dimensions of the problem are far more clearly apprehended than is presently the case. Experience gained with exploitive operations within the area of coastal control may well furnish us with the guidelines by which problems in the deeper regions beyond may be resolved in accord with the common interests of all. 2. Possible regimes or arrangements to control mineral development of the deep ocean floor In view, however, of the very long time which will be required, or should be required, for negotiating a new international agreement for * Statement of the Ambassador of Malta, H. E. Dr. A. Pardo, United Nations General Assembly, November 1, 1967. 676 the deep sea-bed (if such agreement is believed to be required), it is appropriate to investigate various alternatives. Three major choices are most frequently suggested. (1) The flag nation concept One concept is essentially that of laissez faire: let the appropriation and development of the minerals of the deep sea-bed continue to be undertaken by any nation willing to risk its treasure and the lives of its nationals to win those minerals. (2) Creation of an international licensing mechanism At the opposite end of the spectrum is the proposal for establishment of an international licensing authority. This presupposes the creation in some supranational agency of a new competence, not now existing, to grant or refuse reconnaissance permits, exploration licenses, and pro- duction concessions just as sovereigns now do within their national jurisdiction on dry land and on the continental shelf. Presumably the new supranational agency would, or could, control or prohibit produc- tion, set prices, control repatriation of capital and profits, and fix and collect taxes and royalties, as some sovereigns do. Neither the United Nations nor any other international entity now has competence to exer- cise such powers. Presumably the nations of the world, collectively, do have that competence, but they have not, singly or collectively, delegated it to the Assembly of the United Nations. (3) Registry and code of conduct A third and intermediate solution is the ultimate establishment of “norms of international conduct,” to be obeyed by every nation whose flag is flown by an exploratory expedition. Coupled with this, the establishment, by international convention, of a central registry system, has been suggested as a refinement of the flag-nation concept. A two- fold concept seems indicated: registry of national claims, and a code of national conduct in the occupation and use of the areas claimed. These concepts find analogies in the existing mineral laws of many countries. If such arrangements evolved on the pattern of existing national laws, notice would be recorded in an international registry office by the flag nation of the expedition, stating the intended occupation of specified areas, of predetermined permissible size. An exclusive right of occu- pancy, secured for a known time, would accrue to the recording nation, for the benefit of its licensees, with respect to the published area. The 677 right would remain exclusive, however, only so long as work continued in conformity with specified criteria. If minerals were found, their pro- duction would be governed by the laws of the nation which had regis- tered the original notice of intent. In addition, it has been suggested that the availability of areas for mineral development, under the registry scheme, particularly the requisite distance offshore from adjacent states, would be determined by international convention and not by the registry office. Recognition of previously acquired rights is an essential of the scheme, as is the recognition of competing interests in the use of the marine environment, e.g., for fishing and navigation. It would be appropriate in the development of a treaty covering these provisions to give consideration to the recommendation advanced by the United States Representative on June 20, 1968, to the Legal Working Group of the U.N. Ad Hoc Committee to Study the Peaceful Uses of the Sea Bed and Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Juris- diction for the “dedication as feasible and practicable of a portion of the value of the resources recovered from the deep ocean floor to world or regional community purposes.” The algebraic form in which the registry concept is here stated is de- liberate. Some of the difficulties, including the problems of competing notices of claims, priorities, areas, duration, work required to keep claims alive, and so on, are self-apparent. No one knows as yet how to put numbers into any of these concepts. No one will know how to do so until after a great deal of deep sea exploration and discovery of min- erals has taken place. This exploration, in our view, should be encour- aged, not retarded. While we prefer the intermediate solution (No. 3 above), we decline to characterize the flag nation concept (No. 1 above) as one that invites “anarchy” or “chaos” or “race to grab,” as some have contended. This approach is not one characterized by the absence of law. On the contrary, we are of the opinion that under existing law a state has competence to establish limited rights of jurisdiction and control over minerals of the sea-bed by effective use of the area encompassing them. We are of the further opinion that, in the event of conflict between the mineral development projects of two or more nations, there are established principles of international law, now applicable to the high seas, which would be available to resolve such conflicts on an ad hoc basis. Nevertheless, we recognize that these existing principles may not provide an adequate basis for long-term development of these resources in an orderly manner. If a comprehensive legislative solution can be 678 designed in advance for this purpose, that possibility should be carefully explored. We recommend against any attempt at a solution through the creation of an international licensing mechanism (No. 2 above), in the fore- seeable future. To create and define the powers of such a supranational authority would be an enterprise rivaling in magnitude the creation of the United Nations itself. It could not be self-created by resolution of the Assembly. It presupposes that the maritime nations of the world would delegate to a super-sovereign the power to prevent their own exercise of powers, now possessed, to occupy and use the bed of the deep sea beyond national jurisdiction. There is no reason why use of deep sea mineral resources should be made contingent upon the solution of political problems of such magnitude, or why exploration of the deep ocean floor should be prohibited pending the accomplishment of that solution (as some have suggested). It is enough to say that any scheme which adds costs, delays, and international politics to the formidable obstacles which already confront the would-be explorer of the deep sea-bed bears the burden of proving the necessity for its existence. VL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS * 1. With respect to the gathering of factual information Full support should be given to the International Decade of Ocean Exploration, now being formulated, and to the continuance of the max- imum international cooperation in the acquisition and exchange of infor- mation about the ocean floor. There should not be any embargo on or prohibition of exploration of deep sea mineral resources pending the negotiation of an international agreement relating thereto. To the contrary, all possible exploration, research, and exchange of knowledge should be encouraged. There is no need to prohibit this desirable progress because of uncertainties as to who shall control production, if minerals are discovered. 2. With respect to the area within the exclusive jurisdiction of the coastal nations over submarine mineral resources Since exploration and exploitation of undersea minerals is likely to occur earlier in the shallower waters of the oceans adjacent to the conti- * Members of the Committee have exchanged views with members of similar Committees of the American Bar Association, in preparation of these Conclusions and Recommendations. 679 nents than in the abyssal depths, it follows that if jurisdictional uncer- tainties arise to impede such operations during the next several decades, such problems will be primarily related to the scope of the mineral juris- diction which is already vested exclusively in the coastal states by the “exploitability” and “‘adjacency”’ criteria of jurisdiction which now ap- pear in the Continental Shelf Convention. This uncertainty, if necessity for its resolution occurs, might be removed by consultation among the major coastal nations which are capable of conducting deep sea mineral development, looking toward the issuance by those states of parallel ex parte declarations. These declarations might appropriately restrict claims of exclusive sea-bed mineral jurisdiction, pursuant to the exploit- ability and adjacency factors of the Continental Shelf Convention, to (i) the submerged portions of the continental land mass, limiting this provisionally to a depth of, say, 2,500 meters, or (ii) to a stated distance (say 100 miles) from the base line, whichever limitation encompasses the larger area.* Such declarations might appropriately recognize special cases. Two such classifications suggest themselves: (i) In the case of states whose coasts plunge precipitously to the ocean floor (e.g., on the west coast of South America), the suggested 100-mile limit on sea-bed mineral jurisdiction would automatically operate on the deep ocean floor. (ii) In the case of narrow or enclosed seas, the principle of adjacency might appropriately carry coastal mineral jurisdiction to the median lines, even though these are beyond the continental blocks. This proposal should not necessitate any amendment of the text of the Continental Shelf Convention. That Convention’s differentiation be- tween the coastal state’s exclusive rights in sea-bed minerals, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the non-exclusive status of the sea-bed with respect to research and other uses not related to mineral exploita- tion, would be retained. So also with the Convention’s preservation of the high-seas status of the overlying waters. It would, however, be both appropriate and desirable to reiterate these understandings in the recommended declarations. In the instance of scientific research, which is being increasingly impeded by the require- ment of coastal consent for research undertaken on the continental shelf, these parallel declarations might be employed to secure greater protec- tion for this vital activity. * Mr. McCracken, while joining in the report, would prefer not to suggest figures. 680 3. With respect to the regime which should be applicable to the minerals in and under the sea-bed, seaward of the limit of the coastal state’s exclusive jurisdiction (1) We do not consider it admissible under present circumstances to vest jurisdiction in the United Nations or in any other international organization to administer an international licensing system with power to grant or deny exploration and production concessions with respect to undersea minerals. (2) We think there should be created an international commis- sion (including adequate representation of the maritime powers now engaged in oceanic research and mineral exploration), or vesting re- sponsibility in an existing commission so constituted, with instructions to draft a convention (subject, of course, to ratification) which shall have as its objectives: a. Creation of an international agency with the limited functions of (i) receiving, recording, and publishing notices by sovereign nations of their intent to occupy and explore stated areas of the sea-bed exclusively for mineral production, notices of actual occupation thereof, notices of discovery, and periodic notices of continuing activity, together with (ii) resolution of conflicts between notices recorded by two or more nations encompassing the same area. b. Establishment of norms of conduct by sovereign nations with re- spect to the recording of the notices proposed in the preceding para- graph, and in the occupation of the sea-bed and exploration and produc- tion of minerals therefrom. The drafting commission could appropri- ately recommend for inclusion in the resulting convention, among other things, standards (or a mechanism to establish standards) relating to permissible areas for inclusion in exploration and production phases, periods of exclusive rights of occupancy, requirements of diligence as related to tenure, conservation, avoidance of pollution, accommodation with competing uses of the marine environment, etc. The instructions to the negotiating commission should stipulate that the resulting conven- tion shall contemplate that the actual production and marketing of min- erals discovered shall be controlled by the laws of the recording nation, and that that nation shall be held accountable for the conduct of those operating under its flag in the exploration and exploitation of minerals. c. Establishment of (i) reasonable payments to be made, preferably to the World Bank, by the nation which undertakes mineral develop- ment, in areas seaward of coastal mineral jurisdiction, in the nature of development fees or royalties, and (ii) the purposes to which such rev- 681 enues, when received, shall be applied. These purposes should be re- stricted to international activities on which wide agreement can be reached, such as oceanic research, programs aimed at improved use of the sea’s food resources to alleviate protein malnutrition, and the devel- opment of the natural resources of the less developed countries. Respectfully submitted, WOODFIN BUTTE LUKE W. FINLAY (Alternate: CARLos J. ANGULO) WILLIAM L. GRIFFIN G. W. HAIGHT BRUCE HARLOW RALPH JOHNSON DouGLas M. JOHNSTON JOHN G. LAYLIN JOHN E. MCCRACKEN Myres McDOuGAL JOSEPH W. Morris CECIL J. OLMSTEAD RICHARD YOUNG WILLIAM T. BURKE, Rapporteur NORTHCUTT ELy, Chairman (Two members of the Committee, Messrs. Oscar Schachter, Director of Research, UNITAR, and Stanley N. Futterman, Legal Adviser for Special Political Affairs, Department of State, have asked that, because of their official positions, particu- larly in relationship to the work of the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee, their names not be included as sponsors of this report. The Chairman, nevertheless, wishes to acknowledge, with appreciation, the contributions made to the Com- mittee’s discussions by Messrs. Schachter and Futterman, as well as by Prof. Henkin, whose dissenting views are printed herewith.) 682 Dissenting Statement by Louis Henkin I cannot subscribe to the Committee’s report. In my view, its focus is narrow, its concerns parochial, and its proposals short-sighted. The laissez faire philosophy which permeates it is a dangerous anachronism. ‘The positions its recommends would lead to a “grab” by the coastal states, especially the highly developed states, of resources which the President of the United States has declared to be “the legacy of all human beings.” They would seriously damage other interests of all nations, including the coastal states, and eventually end “the freedom of the seas” in principal parts of the oceans. I am particularly troubled by the proposed extension of the doctrine of the continental shelf to an area more than three times that originally contemplated. That recommendation is without foundation in the 1958 Convention, either in its language or in its history. It would grab for the coastal states the resources of one-quarter of all the ocean bed, and the area in which the principal mineral resources are believed to lie. Even in its narrow concerns, I believe this recommendation to be mistaken; the implication that it is better for entrepreneurs to deal with national governments without international regulation or inter- vention is a misreading of recent history and extremely short-sighted. But the most serious consequences of a magnified continental shelf are not even mentioned. For while the doctrine of the continental shelf formally gives the coastal state sovereignty only for the purpose of exploiting mineral resources, exclusive jurisdiction for one purpose tends to expand to sovereignty for all purposes. The Committee’s proposal would mean that, increasingly, one-quarter of the ocean—and in many ways the most important quarter—would tend to become territorial sea. Surely, it would soon be effectively barred to many other uses by other nations, including much navigation, scientific research, and defensive measures at sea that are important to national security and world peace. Comments by the Rapporteur and Chairman on Professor Henkin’s Dissent 1. As to the jurisdiction of the coastal states: Professor Henkin apparently construes the Convention as though the exploitability cri- terion were not there; otherwise, his assertion that the submerged portion of the continental land mass encompasses “an area more than three times that originally contemplated” is irrelevant, because this is a comparison of the areas included within the 200 meter and 2,500 683 meter isobaths. But the exploitability criterion is there; it explicitly takes coastal jurisdiction “beyond that depth” of 200 meters; and if it is not limited to the continental land mass by the criterion of adjacency, as the Committee construes the Convention, then what other limit is to be found in the Convention? Professor Henkin does not tell us. The Committee proposes to limit, not extend, the exclusive coastal jurisdiction. Of course, we decline to limit it to the 200 meter isobath, since the Convention itself says coastal jurisdiction extends “beyond that depth,” just as we decline to extend it to the median lines of the oceans, as some have construed the Convention. 2. As to the contention that the Continental Shelf Convention, con- strued as encompassing the seabed of the continental margin, would tend to expand coastal sovereignty over the superjacent waters: History does not support this assertion. The claims of the Latin American countries to 200-mile wide territorial seas antedate the Convention. The Convention’s explicit dissociation of coastal control of the seabed from territorial sovereignty over the superjacent waters has been respected, so far as we know, irrespective of the width of the seabed area under coastal control. The Committee proposes that this be reaffirmed in declarations of coastal states limiting their seabed juris- diction to the continental margin. 3. As to the deep ocean floor beyond coastal jurisdiction: It is strange to characterize as an “anachronism” the application of the principles of freedom of the sea to the bed of the sea, in order to maintain access to the world’s submarine minerals for all mankind without discrimination. These principles have served mankind well for three centuries. It is curious to call “parochial” the Committee’s call for international agreement on enlightened standards of national conduct which will assure that this accessibility continues, accom- panied by recognition of one another’s investments in undersea mineral development, and is not replaced by claims of exclusive territorial sovereignty. It is odd to call “narrow” our proposal that the nations which take the whole risk of developing the minerals of the deep ocean floor seaward of the coastal jurisdictions shall dedicate a portion of their gains, if any, to the welfare of other countries. WILLIAM T. BURKE NORTHCUTT ELY 26-563 O - 70 - pt.2 - 12 684 APPENDIX After the preparation of the foregoing Report, a report of the National Petroleum Council, dated July 9, 1968, entitled “Petroleum Resources under the Ocean Floor,” became available. It contains the following Appendix, prepared by Oliver L. Stone, Chairman-Designate of the Committee on Marine Resources of the Section of Natural Resources Law of the American Bar Association. It is reprinted here not as a part of this Report, but as a matter of information, because of its relevance to the interpretation of the Con- vention on the Continental Shelf. REVIEW OF BACKGROUND AND NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO EXECUTION OF 1958 GENEVA CONVENTION ON THE CONTINENTAL SHELF The 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf encompasses the “continental margin.” * The Convention, in article 1, defines the term “continental shelf” as follows: “For the purpose of these articles, the term ‘continental shelf’ is used as referring (a) to the seabed and subsoil of the sub- marine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas; (b) to the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands.” ** The definition, read in light of its history, may reasonably be inter- preted as encompassing the “continental margin.” *** * The term “continental margin” is used herein as it is defined in the report to which this appendix is a part. ** The text of the definition and the preparatory work leading to its adoption indicate clearly that the exploitability test was not intended to extend the shelf regime to tmhid-ocean, but rather was intended to have some limitation to submerged areas reasonably “adjacent” to the coast. Evidence of this is revealed in the International Law Commission’s (ILC) Report of its 8th Sess. (U.N. A/3159), pages 76-77, 81-82, hereafter cited as ILC Report; and in Fourth Comm. (Cont. Shelf), Off. Records, Vol. VI, U.N. A/Conf. 13/42, pages 3-4, 8-12, 15, 21, 24, 27, 33-35, 40, 42, 53, 55, and 88-92, hereafter cited as Fourth Comm. Report. : *** Since the exploitability criterion and the adjacency test potentially permit extension of the shelf regime to the outer edge of the “continental margin,” that fact precludes all nations other than the littoral nation from asserting rights to shelf natural resources in this area. 685 1. The history of the Convention’s definition of the term “continental shelf” In the International Law Commission’s (ILC) first draft of the definition (1951) the “continental shelf was defined as covering: “the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas contiguous to the coast, but outside the area of territorial waters, where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil.” At its 1953 session, however, ILC changed the definition and defined the shelf solely in terms of water depth, using 200 meters as the outer limit. At its final session in 1956, the ILC again changed the definition of “continental shelf.” This time the shelf was defined in substance as it appears in Article 1 of the Convention, embodying the alternate criteria of water depth (200 meters) and exploitability. The ILC explained its final definition as having been prompted by action taken by the Inter-American Specialized Conference on Conservation of Natural Resources: Continental Shelf and Oceanic Waters, held at Ciudad Trujillo (Dominican Republic) in March 1956. That con- ference had concluded that “the right of the coastal State should be extended beyond the limit of 200 metres, ‘to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil’. (ILC Report, p. 41.) In its final report on the definition, ILC makes clear that its definition departs from the strict geological concept of the shelf, stating (ILC Report, pp. 41-42): “« , . the Commission therefore in no way holds that the existence of a continental shelf, in the geographical sense as generally under- stood, is essential for the exercise of the rights of the coastal State as defined in these articles.” And (id.): “Again, exploitation of a submarine area at a depth exceeding 200 metres is not contrary to the present rules, merely because the area is not a continental shelf in the geological sense.” Further light is shed on the definition of the shelf, particularly the phrase “the submarine area adjacent to the coast,” by ILC’s com- mentary on its draft Article 68, which provides that the coastal State exercises over the shelf “sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting its natural resources.” The ILC points out that once 686 the seabed and the subsoil become an object of active interest to coastal States with a view to exploitation of their resources, “they cannot be considered as res nullius, i.e., capable of being appropriated by the first occupier. It is natural that coastal States should resist any such solution.” (ILC Report, p. 43.) And then the com- mentary proceeds (id.): “Neither is it possible to disregard the geographical phenomenon whatever the term—propinquity, contiguity, geographical con- tinuity, appurtenance or identity—wused to define the relationship between the submarine areas in question and the adjacent non- submerged land. All these considerations of general utility provide a sufficient basis for the principle of the sovereign rights of the coastal State as now formulated by the Commission. As already stated, that principle, which is based on general principles corresponding to the present needs of the international community, is in no way incompatible with the principle of the freedom of the seas.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, the ILC left no doubt that the “adjacent” areas to which the Convention relates includes the submarine areas having “propinquity, contiguity, geographical continuity, appurtenance or identity” with the continental land mass. The “continental margin” meets all of these criteria, although any one would suffice. It is, therefore, clearly encompassed by the Convention. Additionally, the Ciudad Trujillo Conference of 1956 is of particular significance in construing the Convention’s definition because it was the outcome of this Conference which prompted ILC to incorporate the exploitability test in its final (1956) draft of the definition. The Trujillo Conference (Committee I Report) reported: 1. “The continental shelf is from the point of view of geology, structure and mineralogical characteristics, an integral, although submerged, part of the continents and islands.” 2. “There is no uniformity as regards the width, depth, and geological composition of the shelf, even in a single sea.” 3. “The shelf is and constitutes a valuable source of natural resources, which should be exploited for the benefit of the coastal state.” 4. “The extent of these resources is not known exactly, but it is believed ire they bear a relation to the extent of the American shelf. =) “Scientifically the term ‘continental slope’, or ‘inclination’ refers to the slope from the edge of the shelf to the greatest depths.” 687 6. “Technical progress has been made [in exploiting the resources of the shelf] and there are exploitations at depths of nearly 1000 meters.” 7. “The term ‘continental terrace’ is understood to be that part of the submerged land mass that forms the shelf and the slope.” From the foregoing points the Committee concluded: “The American States are especially interested in utilizing and conserving the existing natural resources on the American terrace (shelf and slope).” (Words in parentheses appear that way in original. ) And: “The utilization of the resources of the shelf cannot be technically limited, and for this reason the exploitation of the continental terrace should be included as a possibility in the declaration of rights of the American States.” The Conference * unanimously adopted a Resolution (Document 95) which reads: “1. The sea-bed and subsoil of the continental shelf, continental and insular terrace, or other submarine areas, adjacent to the coastal state, outside the area of the territorial sea, and to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the sea-bed and subsoil, appertain exclusively to that state and are subject to its jurisdiction and control.” At the 1958 Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea, the fourth Committee considered the draft articles on the Continental Shelf. In commenting on the definition, particularly the exploitation test, the spokesman for the United States delegation (Miss Whiteman) observed that (p. 40): “The definition of the rights of the coastal State to the continental shelf and continental slope adjacent to the mainland proposed by the International Law Commission would benefit individual States and the whole of mankind.” (Emphasis added.) This expression of understanding of the definition by the United States made during the course of the debates, together with the fact that the United States had shortly prior thereto joined in the Ciudad Trujillo resolution of March 28, 1956, proclaiming that “the continental shelf, continental and insular terrace” appertain to the coastal nation, * Twenty nations including the United States participated in this Conference. 688 places it in a uniquely strong position to announce its interpretation that the shelf regime encompasses the “continental margin.” Dr. Garcia-Amador, a delegate to the Ciudad Trujillo Conference, served thereafter as Chairman of ILC during its eighth session at which the definition of “continental shelf’ was revised to include the exploitability test along with the 200 meters criterion. His views undoubtedly were significant in bringing about this change. He writes (Garcia-Amador, The Exploitation and Conservation of the Resources of the Sea (2nd ed., 1959, at p. 108): “As we have indicated, the geographical configuration of the bed of the sea contiguous to the coast of continents and islands is sometimes so irregular that it cannot be defined in terms of the shelf or terrace concepts. When this is so, as in the case of some countries in the American continent and elsewhere, the coastal State may exercise the same exclusive rights now enjoyed by those which have a continental or insular shelf and terrace, provided ‘the depth of the superjacent waters admit of the exploitation of the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil and that the submarine areas be adjacent to the territory of the coastal State.” (Emphasis added.) And continuing (id., p. 130): 66 . . States enjoy present legal powers when the submarine area adjacent to their territory has the configuration of a shelf, defined by the limit of the 100-fathom line. Potential or future powers would be enjoyed by them, for example, according to the system adopted by the International Law Commission, with respect to the slope and the corresponding part of the terrace, and by all coastal States with regard to the other submarine areas adjacent to their territories. . . .”. (Emphasis added.) At ILC’s eighth session (1956) at which consideration was being given to changing the definition of the continental shelf as it appeared in the 1953 draft (out to the 200-meter water depth line), Dr. Garcia- Amador proposed a definition substantially the same as that in the Ciudad Trujillo resolution of March 28, 1956. McDougal and Burke comment on this proposal as follows (The Public Order of the Oceans, by McDougal & Burke, p. 683): “Some controversy attended the suggested elimination of the continental shelf term and the references to the ‘continental and insular terrace’, but this became muted when it was realized that a criterion embracing both a 200-meter depth and the depth admitting exploitation would embrace such areas if they were in fact exploitable or came to be.” 689 A somewhat similar proposal by Panama was rejected by the Fourth Committee, no doubt for the same reason and also because the Panama proposal would not have automatically vested Convention rights to the 200-meter water depth contour (Report of Fourth Comm., pp. 32-33, 127). Within the Fourth Committee the United Kingdom proposed an amendment to the definition to confer sovereign rights in the coastal nation for exploring and exploiting the natural resources “over the submarine areas adjacent to its coast but outside the territorial sea, up to a depth of 550 metres” (Report of Fourth Comm., p. 132). It was stated that “the continental slope ended in most places at that depth [550 meters]” (id., at 36). The reasons underlying the rejection of this proposal are not specified, but it would appear that the delegates did not want to restrict the Convention’s exploitability coverage to the specified depth limit. 2. Subsequent action by nations Since the Convention went into effect in 1964, the United States by action taken by the Interior Department, has clearly evidenced its construction that the definition extends far beyond the 200 meter water- depth line. In 1961, the Associate Solicitor of the United States Department of Interior issued a memorandum concluding that the Secretary’s leasing power under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, read in light of the Convention on the Continental Shelf, extends to an area lying about 40 miles off of California in water-depths ranging up to 4,020 feet with the greater part being in excess of 600 feet. The Secretary has also issued oil and gas leases in water- depths up to 1,500 feet. Moreover, the Secretary of Interior announced, in June 1965, that he had authorized approval of plans of a company to conduct a core drilling project on the Continental Slope in the Gulf of Mexico off the coasts of Texas, Louisiana and Florida in waters ranging in depth from 600 to 3,500 feet. This “permit” or authorization is not to be confused with the grant of an oil and gas or other mineral lease. It appears that this permit was issued pursuant to § 11 of the Outer Shelf Act and the Secretary made clear in the permit that “No rights to any mineral leases will be obtained from these core drilling programs.” Also, on May 26, 1967, the U.S. Geological Survey announced approval of plans for another company or group of companies to conduct a core drilling program on the Continental Slope beyond the 690 continental shelf “off Florida and northward to points seaward of Cape Code and Georges Bank.” The release states that “No rights to any mineral leases will be obtained from these core drilling programs”. The release indicates that about 21 core holes will be drilled beneath the floor of the Atlantic Ocean in water ranging in depths from 650 feet to 5,000 feet. The depth of penetration in each core test is limited to a maximum of 1,000 feet. In a letter opinion of February 1, 1967, from the Deputy Solicitor of the Department of Interior to the Corps of Engineers, it is made clear that the Department is of the view that Cortez Bank is an area under United States jurisdiction under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act and the Convention on the Continental Shelf. Cortez Bank is located about 100 miles from the California mainland and is separated from the mainland by ocean floor trenches as much as 4,000 to 5,000 feet deep, although the Bank itself is covered oy shallow water.* At the March 11, 1968, meeting of the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee to Study the Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, the spokesman for Canada said (A/Ac. 1357/1, D959): “In the view of the Canadian authorities, the present legal position regarding the sovereign rights of the coastal States over the resources of submarine areas extending at least to the abyssal depths is not in dispute.” (Emphasis added.) And, according to the U.N. press release of the March 21, 1968, meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee (U.N. Press Release GA/3585), the Canadian spokesman’s views are reported thus (p. 2): “The [Ad Hoc] Committee should define the limits of the area covered by the resolution [Gen. Ass. Res. 2340 (XXII)]. In his view, the areas over which coastal States had sovereign rights included, without doubt, the continental shelf and its slope.” (Emphasis added. ) In view of the foregoing, the United States would be fully justified in asserting that the Convention on the Continental Shelf encompasses the continental margin. * Barry, “Administration of Laws for the Exploitation of Offshore Minerals a oe United States and Abroad”, ABA National Institute on Marine Resources, /67, p. 12. [End of Appendix by Mr. Stone.] 691 ELY AND DUNCAN, COUNSELLORS AT Law, Washington, D.C., October 7, 1969. THOMAS CLINGAN, Esquire, House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. Dear Tom: I enclose some material which I would appreciate having added to your record, following my testimony. It consists of a letter of inquiry from Luke W. Finlay, addresed to Dr. Garcia Amador, asking clarification of some frequently quoted remarks of Garcia Amador, during the negotiation of the Continental Shelf Convention in 1958. Dr. Garcia Amador’s reply is most illu- minating. I think it would be important to have this material available, in a place where we can all cite it, when necessary. With kind personal regards, Sincerely, NorTHCUTT ELyY. STANDARD OL COMPANY INCORPORATED IN NEW JERSEY, New York, N.Y., February 24, 1969. Dr. F. V. Garcia AMADOR, Washington, D.C. Dear Dr. Garcia AMADOR: Some of the people favoring a narrow interpre- tation of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf are making what I believe to be an improper use of a statement attributed to you, and I would greatly appreciate your assistance in clarifying the matter. As you know, the Inter-American Specialized Conference on ‘Conservation of Natural Resources: The Continental Shelf and Marine Waters’, held at Ciudad Trujillo in March of 1956, at which you served as Chairman of the Cuban Delegation, unanimously resolved to submit the following conclusion for con- sideration by the American states: “To submit for consideration by the American states the following conclu- sions: “1. The sea-bed and subsoil of the continental shelf, continental and insular terrace, or other submarine areas, adjacent to the coastal state, outside the area of the territorial sea, and to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the sea-bed and subsoil appertain exclusively to that state and are subject to its jurisdiction and control.” The report, attached as an appendix to the final act of the Conference, defines “continental terrace’, as used in this resolution, as being “that part of the submerged land mass that forms the shelf and the slope”. In turn, these two terms are defined as follows: “(m) Scientifically, the term ‘continental shelf’ is undestood to be that portion of the continent or island which is covered by the waters up to the point of declivity of the slope or edge of the shelf. “(n) The limit of the shelf, the point of declivity of the slope or edge, varies according to the depth at which it occurs (from 120 to 365 m.). “(o) Scientifically, the term ‘continental slope’, or inclination, refers to the slope from the edge of the shelf to the greatest depths.” The report goes on to add the following conclusions : “TJ. The American states are especially interested in utilizing and conserving the existing natural resources on the American terrace (shelf and slope). “TI. As the edge of the continental shelf varies in depth, it is advisable to describe it conventionally as the submerged part of the continents or islands to depths of 200 meters (100 fathoms, more or less). “III, The utilization of the resources of the shelf cannot be technically limited, and for this reason the exploitation of the continental terrace should be included asa possibility in the declaration of rights of the American states. “TV, Adequate technical precautions should be taken in the laying of cables, oleoducts, and gas pipelines, in order to prevent accidents and avoid impediments to navigation and fishing. “VY. Governments should be urged to promote a better knowledge of the terrace (continental shelf and slope) and its resources.” A few weeks later the International Law Commission (ILC) of the United 692 Nations convened for its eighth session and, after electing you as Chairman, pro- ceeded to consider, among other things, the term to be recommended for inclusion in what eventually became the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf. The proceedings of this session are set forth in Volume I of the Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1956, and subsequent references will be to the pages of that volume. 2 At the outset of the discussion on the continental shelf, you proposed (p. 181) the inclusion of the following language in the convention : “Article 1 “1. As used in these articles, the expression ‘submarine areas’ refers to the soil and subsoil of the submarine shelf, continental and insular terrace, or other submarine areas, adjacent to the coastal State outside the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas. “9 Likewise, as used in these articles, the expression ‘natural resources’ refers to the mineral riches of the soil and subsoil of the submarine area, as well as to the living resources which are permanently attached to the bottom. “3 In the other articles of the draft, the expression ‘submarine areas’ would be substituted for the expression ‘continental shelf.’ ”’ You then referred to definitions of the continental shelf, continental slope and continental terrace, adopted by the International Committee of Scientific Experts at Monaco in 1952, which were generally similar to those used at Ciudad Trujillo. After some discussion of the pros and cons of your proposal to substitute the term ‘submarine areas” for the term “continental shelf’, you made remarks which are reported (at p. 1386) as follows: “6. He did not wish to press the part of his amendment introducing the con- cept of the continerftal terrace, since the adoption of the second point relating to the depth at which exploitation was practical would automatically bring that area within the general concept. He would, however, request the Commission to take a decision on the right of ‘States to exploit the natural resources of the sea- bed in adjacent waters to whatever depth was practicable. With that addition, the article could be referred to the Drafting Committee.” After further discussion, your proposal for incorporation of the exploitability concept was summarized and favorably acted upon (p. 139) as follows: “45, Mr. Padilla-Nervo pointed out that what in fact the Commission had to vote on was the Chairman’s proposal to incorporate in article 1 the concept con- tained in the words ‘or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas’.” * It seems perfectly clear to me from this record that the language actually accepted by the ILC and later incorporated into the Geneva Convention was in- tended to be entirely equivalent in legal effect to the language adopted at Ciudad Trujillo. However, some of those who are attempting to limit national juris- diction of the coastal states to the 200-meter isobath seek to gain support for their position from a statement of yours which is reported at page 135 as follows: “95. The Chairman, in reply to Mr. Scelle, pointed out that the words ‘adjacent to the coastal State’ in his proposal placed a very clear limitation on the sub- marine areas covered by the article. The adjacent areas ended at the point where the slope down to the ocean bed began, which was not more than 25 miles from the coast.” I have great trouble with this statement on two counts. In the first place, the definition of “continental terrace” utilized both at Ciudad Trujillo and at the FKighth Session of the ILC made it perfectly clear that it was your intention that the exploitability test should extend national jurisdiction not to “the point where the slope down to the ocean bed began”, but to the lower extremity of “the slope from the edge of the continental shelf to the greatest depths.” In the second place, there are parts of South America off Argentina where the continental shelf extends several hundred miles before it even reaches a depth of 200 meters, so that you could not possibly have intended to impose a 25 mile limitation on the extent of coastal nation jurisdiction over natural resources under the con- vention. As I read the official text of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, it fully supports the position adopted at Ciudad Trujillo and advocated by you at the Highth Session of the ILC; namely, that coastal nation jurisdiction over *This proposal was adopted by 7 votes to 5, with 3 abstentions, 693 the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil of adjacent areas extends over the entirety of the continental terrace to the point where the outer edge of the submerged continent meets the oceanic crust of the abyssal ocean floor and also makes provision for the special case of those nations whose coasts drop abruptly to great depths. I am unclear in my own mind whether the statement reported at page 135 of the ILC proceedings was an incorrect transcript of what you actually said, or whether there is some other explanation of its apparent inconsistency with the basic scope of the convention for which you were pressing. Whatever the answer is, I am satisfied that it has no juridical significance in undoing the inter-American conclusions at Ciudad Trujillo, but I would be most grateful to you for any clarification that you could give me. I apologize for the length of this letter, but as I am asking for your recollection on a matter some thirteen years in the past, I felt it only fair to give you a reasonably complete background. Sincerely yours, LUKE W. FINLAY. ‘PAN AMERICAN UNION, Washington, D.C., March 12, 1969. Mr. LUKE W. FINLAY, Manager, Government Relations Department, Standard Oil Co., New York, N.Y. DEAR Mr. FINLAY: I take pleasure in referring to your letter of February 24 concerning the doubts caused by the cited paragraph from the Summary Record of the International Law Commission (p. 135 of the ILC Yearbook, 1956, Vol. I). In the first place, I must admit that as this paragraph stands it makes me appear as saying that the submarine areas never have an extension greater than 25 miles. This is clearly a case of an error of interpretation on the part of the précis-writer and of my own negligence in failing to review the draft summary record and make the correction. However, this is simply an error since I could never have made a statement that presupposed an extremely restrictive position at the very time when I had taken the initiative to propose the broadest, most flexible formula yet know, i.e., the formula approved by the Inter-American Specialized Conference which had been held in the capital of the Dominican Republic scarecely two months prior to the ILC session. I ean only reiterate my statement, made when proposing the use of the expres- sion “submarine areas’, to the effect of requesting ‘“‘the Commission to take a decision on the right of States to exploit the natural resources of the sea-bed in adjacent waters to whatever depth was practicable” (p. 136). It seems that it was with this unrestrictive, flexible criteria, most favorable to the coastal state’s spe- cial interest in the exploitation of the resources of its adjacent submarine areas, that both the ILC and later the first Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea approved the definition that appears in Article 1 of the Continental Shelf Convention of 1958. Sincerely yours, F. V. Garcia-AMADOR, Director, Department of Legal Affairs. (Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m. the committee adjourned, to reconvene for further hearing at 10 a.m. Wednesday, August 6, 1969.) Jah , % pyeo rp ei SER EAS HF oy ; ‘ ied Ov ee Pa a 5 RECENTER ret ee ott PERN: in iy YR a ar AT guest eae ¥ ie Fae ae niehg des wh es RO when Vee he ih hy ee ty ie CPLEAK be Wael RE Ege TNR Se NATIONAL OCEANOGRAPHIC PROGRAM WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 6, 1969 House or REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OCEANOGRAPHY OF THE COMMITTEE ON MrercHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met at 10:15 a.m., pursuant to recess, in room 1334, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Alton Lennon (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Mr. Lennon. The committee will resume its hearings for the con- sideration of the legislation that is before the committee, jointly spon- sored by the chairman of the full committee and the 20 members of the subcommittee, as well as for the purpose of the consideration of the Commission’s report. Weare delighted and honored this morning, gentlemen, to have with us a very distinguished North Carolina citizen, the Honorable Robert Scott, Governor of North Carolina, whose father served North Caro- lina in a splendid manner as the Governor of North Carolina and a former U.S. Senator, rendering yeoman service to his State and his Nation. I want to recognize, if I might, at this moment the chairman of the full committee, Mr. Garmatz, for any remarks that he might care to make. Mr. Garmatz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to take this opportunity today to wecome the Honorable Robert Scott, the distinguished Governor of North Carolina. It is a pleasure for me to personally extend greetings to Governor Scott. I would like to say that my pleasure is doubled by the fact that another distinguished North Carolinian, my good friend and colleague, Congressman Alton Lennon, is chairman of the subcommittee. I think it is appropriate to note that in addition to serving so ably as chairman, Congressman Lennon is also the ranking majority mem- ber on two other important subcommittees. These are the Subcommit- tees on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation, and the Subcommittee on Coast Guard, Coast and Geodetic Survey and Navigation. I certainly do not want to embarrass Congressman Lennon; how- ever, I think it is important to point out the vital role he plays in all these activities, besides serving so capably on the House Armed Serv- ices Committee. 4 In welcoming Governor Scott, I just want to let him know that we on this committee really value the talents and energy of Congressman Lennon. Besides being an active and dependable member of my full 695 696 committee, he is constantly on the alert regarding legislation and issues affecting his home district and his home State of North Carolina. I am also pleased to note that still another Representative from North Carolina—Congressman Walter B. Jones—is serving this sub- committee with distinction. Mr. Jones was elected to represent the same congressional district in North Carolina that was so ably repre- sented by our former chairman, the late Honorable Herbert C. Bonner. I am happy to see that he is following the outstanding example set by our former chairman, Herb Bonner. So. Governor Scott, we want you to know that you are most welcome here today. And I would also like to say that, if you have any more legislative talent hidden in North Carolina (that is not already serving here in Congress) do us a favor—send them to Washington, and we will welcome them with open arms. I might add one last sentence: As long as they are Democrats. Mr. Prtiy. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman yield ? Mr. Lennon. Would the gentleman yield to the gentleman from the State of Washington ? Mr. Garmatz. One minute, yes. Mr, Petty. I just want to say for our side of the aisle that we share your feelings of pride in our chairman and welcome his Governor and the first citizen of North Carolina here today. As for any other state- ment, I don’t wish to make any comment. Mr. Mosner. Will the gentleman yield ? Mr. Garmartz. I yield. Mr. Mosner. I think the fact that the Governor is here indicates the good regard that he and his fellow citizens of North Carolina have for our chairman. It is one that we share on both sides of the aisle. Having seen Mr. Lennon in action, I would be ready to assume that any addi- tional Republicans that come from North Carolina, also thinking in terms of the high quality of the Republicans we already have from there, would be very welcome in this body. Mr. Lennon. Gentlemen, I guess I will have to declare time off limits. I am grateful for the generous and gracious remarks of the chairman. In connection, gentlemen, with the appearance of our distinguished visitor and witness this morning, some of you gentlemen will recall my having referred to this earlier because I called upon the members of the subcommittee individually where I could and in general con- versation and suggested to them that they, representing coastal areas or any areas bordering on any waters, estaurine or otherwise, take the action that the three members from North Carolina, Congressman Henderson and Congressman Jones and I did on October 10th of 1967. We jointly wrote to the then Governor of North Carolina and sug- gested that, even though it could not be done by legislation, that he appoint an ad hoe committee which we thought he would refer to or designate as the Marine Science Commission to coordinate marine activities of our State. We learned approximately a year later, to be exact October 30, 1968, that Governor Moore had appointed such a Marine Science Commis- sion for the State of North Carolina. We had a very pleasant visit in January of this year by Dr. Walton Jones, who is here this morning, the executive secretary of the Marine Science Council of our State. He 697 was accompanied by Col. James Smith of the Research Triangle, and at that time some of us from North Carolina suggested to him that he recommend to the Governor of North Carolina that the General As- sembly in its then-sitting session this year give this Council statutory authority or basis. This was done. and we are grateful for that because we think it will be effective. Now, Governor Scott, if you and those witnesses who will partici- pate with you will have a seat at the witness table, we will be delighted to hear from you. I think each member has been provided with a copy of Governor Scott’s statement, and he has indicated to me that he prefers that you tell him a question rather than ask him one, and he has competent experts with him who can respond to any questions posed by the gentle- ment of the subcommittee. Mr. Garmatz. Mr. Chairman, will you yield for a moment ? Mr. Lennon. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Garmatz. I wonder if the chairman would be so kind as to introduce the members of the committee personally to the Governor. Mr. Lennon. Well, I will be delighted to do that. I will let you do that yourself, starting with my friend from the First District of North Carolina on the right. Go ahead for the record. Introduce yourself to Governor Scott since you have known him all your life and are a close friend of his. Mr. Jones. Congressman Jones of North Carolina. Mr. Lennon. Congressman Dave Henderson, who is not a member of our committee but a great member of two important. committees with respect to North Carolina, the Post Office and Civil Service Committee and the Public Works Committee. Congressman Karth of Minnesota, a very distinguished member of this Committee and also of the Science and Astronautics Committee. Congressman Tom Downing of Virginia, also a member of the Science and Astronautics Committee. Congressman Charles Mosher, the ranking minority member of this subcommittee, from the State of Ohio. Congressman Tom Pelly from the State of Washington. Congressman Hastings Keith from the great State of Massachu- setts; and Congressman Schadeberg, who is a dedicated and fine mem- ber of this subcommittee. Now, gentlemen, we would be delighted to hear from you. STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT SCOTT, GOVERNOR OF NORTH CARO- LINA; ACCOMPANIED BY DR. E. WALTON JONES, ACTING DEAN OF UNIVERSITY EXTENSION, NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIVER- SITY, AND EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, GOVERNOR’S COUNCIL ON MARINE SCIENCES; AND DR. JOHN LYMAN, HEAD, OFFICE OF MARINE SCIENCE, CONSOLIDATED UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA Governor Scorr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Chairman Garmatz, and members of the subcommittee. First of all, if I may, Mr. Chairman, I would like to respond to the comments by the committee chairman and say that we are grateful 698 for the service rendered by our distinguished Congressman as mem- bers of your committee, and I was pleased to note that you recall our beloved Congressman Herbert Bonner, a man whose name is still revered in North Carolina for his long tenure in the Congress and for the great service he rendered not only to his District but, indeed, to the State and to the Nation. We are pleased, of course, with the comments you have made with respect to the service of our Congressmen. I would suggest, sir, how- ever, that when you commented about anyone else’s coming, that it would be probably not in their place but in the event that they should not choose to come later. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I do appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the report of the Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources. The Com- mission’s report and the hearings of this subcommittee are of particu- lar interest to me because of the commitment that North Carolina has made to develop the full potential of its marine resources. The General Assembly, which only recently adjourned, and to which the chairman referred in his opening remarks, passed several pieces of legislation, upon my recommendation, to help the State realize this potential. A bill was passed to continue, on a permanent basis, the Governor’s Council on Marine Sciences, and this has now become a statutory agency. This Council will help pull together the efforts of all agencies and institutions and permit us to concentrate on specific objectives. The Council will help relate research, educational and regulatory functions to the practical needs of our marine industries. It will also keep me apprised of how State government can be of greater assistance in bringing about full and wise usage of our marine resources. The same General Assembly appropriated $1.8 million to help carry out plans that the Council is developing with our agencies and educa- tional institutions over the next two years. These plans are tied closely to the program now being administered by the Office of Sea Grants and that of the Coastal Plains Regional Commission. Another significant act of this General Assembly should be men- tioned in that it indicates something regarding the philosophy of our State as we proceed to develop our marine resources. An appropriation of $500,000 was made to purchase estuarine lands to preserve the qual- ity of the marine environment. We do not intend to exploit our valuable resource base for the sake of short-term gains. The nursery grounds for marine life must not be permanently damaged by commercial develop- ment. I would like to take just a few minutes, Mr. Chairman, to highlight some of the significant facts regarding marine resources in North Carolina. The State of North Carolina ranks fifth among the 50 States in its length of general tidal shoreline. This tidal shoreline of just over 1000 miles represents almost 10 percent of the shoreline of the 48 contiguous States. Only Florida (by slight margins), California and Texas exceed North Carolina in the length of the general tidal shoreline. The State also has more than 2,500 squares miles of saltwater bays and sounds. The State thas over 15,000 square miles of Continental Shelf offshore with some 1,130 square miles of it included within the State’s legal boundaries, A 267-nautical-mile section of the Intracoastal 699 Waterway, with a project depth of 12 feet, traverses the State. Major seaport complexes exist at Morehead City and in the Cape Fear River, including the Port of Wilmington, which, of course, is the home of the chairman. The estuarine and coastal areas of North Carolina are currently being used for commercial fishing, sport fishing, other seashore recreation, mineral recovery, scientific research, waste disposal, wildlife protec- tion, water transportation and communications. Some of these uses are incompatible with others. Conflicting claims for marine resource use represent some of the most serious problems facing the State. It is for this reason that we endorse the Commission’s recommendations con- cerning the creation of coastal zone authorities and coastal zone laboratories. Commercial fishermen of North Carolina harvest annually around 20 million pounds of foodfish, some 20 to 30 million pounds of shellfish, and close to 200 million pounds of menhaden and related types of fish for processing into oil and meal. Sport fishermen catch an estimated 10 million pounds of saltwater fish annually in North Carolina. From the point of view of scientific research relating to the ocean, North Carolina provides a broad variety of habitats. North Carolina offers an unusual number of diversified areas in which to conduct research. In most of its estuaries, tides and tidal currents are almost nonexistent. Therefore, these estuaries constitute a habitat in which conditions can be contrasted with these of other waters where intense tidal agitation is present. Onslow Bay provides a 100-mile stretch of coast that receives virtually no river runoff. Therefore, its waters are more free of silt than any other comparable stretch of the Atlantic seabord. Not so far off- prea coral reefs exist farther north than anywhere else in the world. The cold wall of the North Atlantic meets the warm waters of the Gulf Stream at Hatteras and hence the North Carolina coast is both the southern limit of such northern forms as the lobster and cod and the northern limit of tropical species like the sailfish and dolphin. In order to take advantage of this wide variety of habitats available nearby, the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries and Atomic Energy Commission located the Radiobiological Laboratory at Beaufort, N.C. The Bureau of Commercial Fisheries already had a biological labora- tory in Beaufort devoted to study of the regional fisheries. In addi- tion Duke University has a marine laboratory located in Beaufort. This laboratory is the recipient of a grant from the National Science Foundation which enables it to operate a 117-foot biological research vessel known as H'astward, in a cooperative research and training pro- gram for the entire Southern Atlantic region. The University of North Carolina has located its institute of ma- rine science at Morehead City. It operates a 48-foot research vessel. Adjacent to the institute is the laboratory of the State Department of Commercial Fisheries, with its 70-foot exploratory fishing ship, the Dan Moore. Farther south, at Wilmington, the Cape Fear Technical Institute has an advanced program of training in marine technology whose 185-foot training and research vessel has just returned from participation in the BOMEX project. 26-563—70—pt. 2 13 700 The Wilmington area also has the Wrightsville Beach Biomedical Laboratory, a joint project of North Carolina’s three medical schools, which conducts research on the physiology of deep diving. Wilmington College, which on July 1 became the Wilmington Campus of the! Gon- solidated University of North Carolina, has a ‘oreat interest in the area of marine science and marine resource development. Nearby is the F. J. LaQue Laboratory, where a large nickel company conducts fun- damental studies of the effect of the marine environment on the be- havior of materials, as well as a pilot desalination plant of the Office of Saline Water. Mr. Chairman, this listing by no means exhausts the catalog of ma- rine research activities making use of the favorable settings along the North Carolina coast. The Pamlico Marine Laboratory of North Caro- lina State University, at Aurora, is engaged in a broad program of investigating the possible effects ‘on estuaries of resource utilization, such as power production and phosphate mining. At Hatteras, North Carolina State University has a fisheries laboratory. East Carolina University is developing a marine science facility at Manteo. In the well known triangle, Duke University at Durham, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and North Carolina State Univer- sity at Raleigh all have on-going programs of research and graduate education in the marine sciences. The two campuses of the Consoli- dated University of North Carolina have strengthened their programs im oceanography by adding faculty to augment existing programs in marine ecology, ocean engineering, food science, marine geology and geophysics. Duke University offers training in marine biology and geology, as well as in ocean engineering and in programs related to its unique fa- cility for measuring the ability of persons to live and perform under extreme temper ature and pressure conditions prevalent in deep water. The Research Triangle Institute is also concerned with problems of the ocean. Some of its scientists currently are engaged in the Bomex ex- periment. This brief inventory of the ongoing marine research and develop- ment activities in the State emphasizes the strong existing strength of our marine science program in North Carolina. We are fortunate in possessing academic institutions fully capable at the present time of serving as the nuclei of one or more coastal zone Laboratories of the kind visualized by the Commission in the second chapter of its report. My administration likewise is prepared to move rapidly in the estab- lishment of a coastal zone authority for North Carolina as soon as the appropriate guidelines can be established by the Federal Government, as recommended on page 57 of the Commission report. Now, Mr. Chairman, let me turn to consideration of some of the specific recommendations of the Commission. It seems to us that the recommendations of the Commission can be divided into three main categories. One of these categories concerns the recommendations of the International Panel of the Commission, which deal primarily with the International legal-political framework of exploring and utilizing the oceans. The second category of recom- mendations involves the restructuring of the Federal Government to create a National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency. 701 The third, and by far the largest category, is a series of specific recommendations for administrative or organizational action designed to correct shortcomings in the present national oceanographic program as they were identified by the Commission. We urge the Congress to recognize that the Commission’s recom- mendations can be logically separated as indicated above. We recog- nize that many different groups in the United States have ideas con- cerning the optimum legal-political international framework for the oceans and that some of these ideas conflict directly with the Commis- sion’s recommendations. We recognize also that it may take years of negotiation, within or without the framework of the United Nations, to bring about an international consensus on the legal-political regime for the oceans. However, we strongly urge the Congress not to delay action on the Commission’s recommendations that concern purely in- ternal matters until these international affairs are finally settled. Action on domestic matters, in our view, can easily be separated from action on ternational matters, and domestic legislation can be pursued quite independently while the international matters are untangled. Turning now to the recommendations concerning creation of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency (NOAA), we again recog- nize in these the seeds of controversy. It 1s not realistic to expect the administrator of a government agency to willingly give up part of the mission, functions or staff of his agency. However, it is apparent that a more coordinated program in oceanography is needed. For a decade, Government witnesses before congressional commit- tees have maintained that adequate Federal coordination of oceano- graphic matters existed. For example, in March 1959 the Special Subcommittee on Oceanography of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee was informed that “coordination among inter- ested Government agencies is accomplished informally through the Coordinating Committee on Oceanography established by the Office of Naval Research in 1956 * * * this group will insure that a national program in oceanography is properly managed and well coordinated throughout the Federal agencies concerned.” (Oceanography in the United States, 1959, p. 135.) Yet within a year the White House found it necessary to create, on a more formal basis, the Interagency Committee on Oceanography under the Federal Council on Science and Technology. In June 1961, there was testimony from its Chairman, and I again quote: The Interagency Committee on Oceanography has, I sincerely believe, demon- strated that it can effectively coordinate the oceanographic programs of the various Federal agencies.” (Oceanography 1961, phase 3, p. 150.) This statement, incidentally, was made at hearings on a bill that would have created a National Oceanographic Council, a body that did not come into existence until 5 years later as a result ‘of grow- ing national dissatisfaction with the Interagency Committee on Oceanography as a means of effectively coordinating a national program. These references emphasize the difficulty of recognizing the need for and the means of bringing about effective coordination of programs of this type. The Commission, composed of disinterested individuals, 702 should have been able to examine the problem of national organization for marine science and marine resource development in its true per- spective. We urge that the Congress give due weight to the recommendations of the Commission in the matter of governmental reorganization. Turning now, Mr. Chairman, to the third category of the Commis- sion’s recommendations, we wish to draw the attention of this com- mittee to those that we believe are of most interest to the State of North Carolina. These recommendations relate to the coastal zone. They appear in detail in part III of volume 1 of the panel reports of the Commission. The most important of these recommendations is that Federal legis- lation establish State coastal zone authorities whose functions shall include planning, regulation (including zoning where necessary), funding, acquisition, development, and enforcement. We strongly urge that the Congress take immediate action to implement this recom- mendation. The broader problem of the overall structure of the Federal Government for marine affairs is not of equal urgency. For the present, the Federal operations concerned with coastlands acquisition, marine sanctuaries and shoreline boundaries can all ade- quately be handled within the framework of existing Federal agencies. Legislation concerning the establishment and operation of the coastal zone authority program should be drafted to set it up initially under an existing agency with an understanding that the function could be trans- ferred later if an overall Federal agency is created. We fully concur with the recommendations concerning creation of coastal zone laboratories under the national sea grant program. Again, we strongly urge prompt congressional action in implementing this phase of the Commission report. We likewise concur generally with the Coastal Zone Panel recom- mendations on the need for Federal surveys and projects, on systematic approaches to waste management, and on other problems in the coastal zone that were identified by the Commission as requiring immediate action. The recommendations of the Commission are important and in gen- eral the State of North Carolina endorses the report. In closing, let me eall attention to the need, however, for a strong national commitment to ocean exploration. This will take money—more than this country has been willing to devote in the past. The State of North Carolina has enough faith in the potential of the ocean to become a full partner with the Federal Government in launching an all-out effort which would benefit all the people of this Nation and the world. Mr. Chairman, the State of North Carolina through the leadership of my administration and with the support of the general assembly has made its commitment to developing the potentials found in what we like to call the new frontier of marine science and found right at our own back door. We ask the Federal Government to do likewise. Mr. Lennon. Thank you, Governor Scott, for an interesting and informative statement. This is the kind of statement for North Caro- lina that I am delighted is in the record, because it indicates the in- terest and concern and the motivation and the progress which the State is making. 703 It is my judgment that all Coastal States and all States affected by the Commission’s report should take similar action to implement and coordinate its activities in this field. Now, the genteman from Ohio, Mr. Mosher. Mr. Mosuer. Mr. Chairman, I must say that Governor Scott’s tes- timony this morning is an eye opener for me. Frankly, I had not rec- ognized the variety and extent of oceanographic opportunnities that exist in your State and the variety and extent of the activities already underway there. I certainly salute you and I can certainly understand our chairman’s energetic interest in this whole field when I realize what an important role your State is playing. Alsc Iam impressed with your strong support for the recommenda- tions of the Stratton Commission, and I especially note at the top of page 8 that you seem to suggest that our top priority for Federal legis- lation should be legislation which would authorize the establishment of State Coastal Zone Authorities. You put that even ahead of reorga- nizing and coordinating the Federal executive agencies in this area. Also I was interested on page 2, at the bottom, in your recognition that some of the activities in this area are incompatible with other activities, where you say there are conflicting claims for the marine resource use and this creates some serious problems, and it is for that reason that you endorse the commission’s recommendations concerning the creation of coastal zone authorities and coastal zone laboratores. Then on page 5 you indicate what steps you are already taking to implement those recommendations. Do vou want to say just a little bit more, Governor. about how in practice the establishment of these coastal zone authorities and coastal zone laboratories would solve the problem of incompatibility and con- flicting claims? Governor Scorr. Yes, I would be happy to elaborate briefly on that. In North Carolina, of course, as I suppose is to be found in every coastal State, there obviously are conflicting uses of marine resources. For many years in our State we have had running battles between the commercial fishing interests and the sports fishing interests. Also we have had a conflict of interest in those who would wish to provide dredging in certain areas to open up channels into areas and whether or not this would disturb the nursery areas for marine life, and a number of conflicts. In North Carolina, recognizing that there were a number of indi- vidual activities going on some by State-supported institutions of higher learning and some by private institutions, we have established the Marine Sciences Council as a statutory agency to try to pull all of this together to provide a coordinating approach. We feel that with the establishment of the coastal zone authority, then we will be in a stronger position to move to bring about the neces- sary coordination, to bring together the varied interests and resolve some of these conflicts and further with the establishment of the lab- oratories we can move, I think, more effectively into the whole broad area of research. This is really one of the keys to the proper develop- ment of this whole marine resource use. Mr. Mosurr. You conceive of these Coastal Zone Authorities as 704 having very substantial authority, I judge, to really, in case of neces- sitv, knock heads together ? Governor Scott. Yes, sir. I would say that if the authority is going to be effective, it would of necessity have to have teeth. Mr. Mosuer. It would have to be an umpire that really could say, “You do this and you do that,” and that sort of thing. Governor Scott. Yes, sir. I do believe that because, as I say, this age- old conflict with some of the varied interests has been with us for a long time and the matter of voluntary arbitration and getting together has not necessarily worked every time. Consequently an authority could bring about some of the needed action that we have been unable to bring about thus far. Mr. Mosuer. Now, the type of authority that you are talking about would be established by State law? You refer at the top of page 8 to, “The most important of these recommendations is that Federal legis- lation establish State coastal zone authorities,” but could the type of authority that you are talking about so far as North Carolina is concerned be established by State legislation ? Governor Scort. I think it would depend upon the overall broad type of program that would be implemented. If it were going to be some- what of a piecemeal program, then perhaps the individual States could do it. Obviously we could. But if this is to be a national program with all the States participa- ting, then it would seem to me that the Federal legislation would be needed. Otherwise some States might implement an authority, others might not. T think to be really effective as far as the national program would be concerned that we would need this type of thing all up and down the seashore. Mr. Mosuer. Mr. Chairman, I think we should take note of the Gov- ernor’s strong feeling that there is need for national legislation at this point and give serious consideration to that. Mr, Lennon. We certainly shall. Thank you, Mr. Mosher. The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Rogers. Mr. Rocers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Governor, your statement certainly shows the interest of North Carolina which we have known about, of course, through our chairman. I am sure you are aware of his leadership and the effort he has put forth to try to get this Nation moving into the sea. He has done a mag- nificent job here in the Congress and I know that North Carolina is proud of him, and the delegation are proud of you and what you are doing in Carolina. Do you have any difficulty getting your State Assembly to go along with appropriating funds for marine activities ? Governor Scorr. No, sir. We found them receptive and there was no real quarrel about it, even the appropriations therefor. Mr. Rocers. This is what we need to learn from you because we have difficulty getting the executive branch up here, as well as the Congress, to give enough funds. I would agree with you that I think when people adequately understand the benefits that will come from developing the resources of the sea and handling our natural resources properly, then we can generate enough interest. 705 Your State certainly is an example of what is happening, and my State, too. I think they have grasped the importance of this. I was interested in your suggestion that rather than tackle the Gov- ernment reorganizational plan immediately, it would be well to move into the coastal zone authority as well as coastal zone laboratories. I would agree with you that this probably could be done and started although I would hope we would not hold back at the same time on the governmental reorganization. T don’t know why it cannot be done concurrently. We will have, I presume, a balancing for funds that we are going to have to consider, but I would think, if we can at least initiate the legislation to allow the States to proceed, that this would be helpful. I think your suggestion will be helpful to the committee in placing priority on action. I commend you for your interest and for what your State is doing, and I hope that we can move the Congress likewise. Governor Scorr. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, may I just comment to the gentleman’s statement that I think one of the reasons that we in North Carolina were able to enact the legislative measures which I mentioned here in my pre- pared statement was the fact that people are becoming more conscious in our State of the potential we have in the marine science area. There has been a lot of discussion about this in government and in the private sector in recent months. They have seen a lot of these individual activities going on that I referred to. With reference to the money, of course, obviously the administration would have used any amount the General Assembly would have seen fit to appropriate on beyond, but we were very pleased with this initial effort, and I think we are now committed to an aggressive program of developing our marine resources. I would say that there is a prevailing spirit of excitement in North Carolina about this potential that we have. We have very obviously seen what the State of Florida has done and the State of Texas and California, and some of these other areas that have been in this field for some time, and we look right here at our back door and see that we have the same opportunity and think: Why not make use of this potential? So that it is catching fire and we are very excited by it in North Carolina. Mr. Rogers. That is encouraging. I think many people here in Washington have not realized the broad base of support that the de- velopment of the seas will bring. This has not yet been grasped by some. I hope we can encourage this interest so that they will see the purpose of the development and the need for support. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lennon. Thank you, Mr. Rogers. Mr. Pelly. _ Mr. Petry. First, Governor Scott, I want to thank you for mention- ing the contributions by our late Chairman and great friend, Herb Bonner. I don’t think many people recognized what a tremendous record he had for the Nation, and I, for one, was very happy that you haven’t forgotten that. When some of us were singled out and introduced to you, mention was made that some of us were on the Science and Astronautics Com- 706 mittee. I wonder if you would agree with me, and this is my own view, that these great scientific achievements in going to the moon have demonstrated one thing, and that is that we have to look more to the frontiers in our own globe for finding food and minerals against the growing population of this country. I don’t think we are going to find a, refuge or resources in the moon or Mars or anything else. Now, If that same spirit of achievement is translated into a new agency in government to explore our own sea and seabed, it is going to provide what maybe the last source of protein and other needs for the people. Haven’t you come to the conclusion that to watch men walk on the moon points up the fact that right here is where we have to start plowing where we haven’t plowed before ? Governor Scorr. Yes, sir. You have expressed my sentiments very clearly. I think all of us are proud of the accomplishments of our space program and the men who participated. We have a great national pride in this, and I think we look forward to further exploration of the universe, but I think we must be conscious that all of our frontiers here at home have not been fully explored and this is what I was re- ferring to a moment ago about the State of ‘North Carolina coming to realize that we have an unexplored frontier right with us and it is something that is tangible to us, is right there, and we have the potential and we want to get on with developing this resource that will benefit the population here in the United States and in the world, as I see it. Mr. Petry. Well, I would certainly like you to know that our chair- man has patiently and persistently worked and tried to get legisla- tion and get as far as we are today. It has been a ereat pleasure for me to work with him. It wasn’t easy because we didn’t always have those in the executive branch that agreed with the approach of the legislative branch, and we didn’t have any unity between the other body and ourselves at the time, but Mr. Lennon has really done a yeoman job in carrying this forward. I am sure you know of that, but I think you should know that some of us who work with him appreciate him and his very fine work and respect and admire him and enjoy working with him. We certainly appreciate the fact that you have come here today and made this very fine statement. Thank you. Mr. Lennon. Thank you, Mr. Pelly. Mr. Downing. Mr. Downrtne. Senator Scott, it is a real honor to have you before our subcommittee today. I hope by now you know how much we appreciate North, Carolina’s contribution in Alton Lennon. He has done a terrific job in bringing this thing to fruition. As a neighbor of yours I have witnessed your progress and, believe me, it has been great. J remember when I was a young boy I used to say about North Carolina there were two classes of people there, dead rich and dead poor. Mr. Lennon. Are we still on the record ? Mr. Downrnc. But now, through some great Governors, you, Terry Sanford, you have really got North Carolina going. I am interested in this council that you formed. You have marine science outlets in North Carolina, but in addition to that you formed the Governor’s Council on Marine Sciences. Tell us a little bit about that and a little bit more about the purpose of this council. 707 . Governor Scorr. This council is composed of private citizens who are interested in the development of our marine science potential, and it is primarily a coordinating agency to bring together all of the activi- ties going on in the State-supported and privately-supported endeavors in order that our thrust might be of the same general direction. The council, itself, does not have any great authority in terms of what it can say to any specific agency, “You can or cannot do this.” But it is more or less a coordinating agency and just that, a council where the views of these various institutions and the programs that are going on can be expressed hopefully to prevent a lot of duplica- tion and any potential conflicts that might arise. Mr. Downtnc. How many people are on this council Governor Scott. Twenty-one. Mr. Downtine. Are they paid? Governor Scorr. No, sir; they are not. We have an executive director. Mr. Downine. How often do they meet ? Mr. Jonus. There is no set time at this point in time of the activities. The council and the technical committee that has been serving with it to date have been more or less devoting themselves to putting to- gether a statewide long-range plan for the development of marine sciences and marine resources. We meet when we have had enough planning to call the council together to advise with them and advise the Governor. Governor Scorr. This is Mr. Walton Jones, who is the executive di- rector of the council. Mr. Downine. That is most interesting. When and if the coastal zone concept becomes law, would you need this council then ? Governor Scorr. I think it would depend upon how the coastal zone, itself, was established and its makeup and the governing body. It could very well be that the council, itself, would be absorbed into the govern- ing body of the coastal zone. Again recognizing that the marine sciences program going on in North Carolina involves both private and State sectors and it involves, of course, research in our institutions of higher learning, it involves both basic and applied research, it involves the coordination with the sea grants program and all of this, unless the coastal zone would incor- porate the type of coordination that we anticipate having under this council, then I would think that maybe there would be a place for the council to continue particularly in the development of long-range plans and what itis we hope to accomplish. Mr. Downrne. The Council has no authority ; does it? Governor Scorr. It has no real teeth in it; no. It is a planning and coordination agency. Mr. Downine. And advisory ? Governor Scorr. That is correct. May I ask Mr. Jones to comment further on that. He is familiar with it and has been working with it since it was established. Mr. Jones. Let me say that when you say it has no teeth, it has the teeth to the extent that we can convince the Governor as an advisory body to the Governor that this should be done and then it has the full backing of the Governor, and we have no authority except that we advise the Governor and he says this should be done and then this has a tremendous amount of authority. ° 708 Governor Scorr. That is debatable. Mr. Downtnc. Is your 21 members somewhat unwieldy, Mr. Jones? Mr. Lennon. Mr. Jones, will you come up next to the Governor and then you may have the use of the microphone. I didn’t mean for you to leave. I meant just bring up another chair and shift the mike be- tween you. Thank you, gentlemen. Mr. Downtne. Do you find that rather large number to be unwieldy ? Mr. Jonss. No, sir. This is not really a problem in that we break ourselves down into subcommittees and task forces to work on specific aspects of the problem and then we bring it back before the full coun- cil and get their reflection and their study of the recommendations of these task forces. Mr. Downrne. And this council I suppose could coordinate the Fed- eral legislation with State legislation and so forth ? Mr. Jonzs. Yes, sir. Our objective here is to put it all together into one package so that no one is working in conflict with another, that we allocate functions among institutions and agencies so that they complement rather than to contradict, and this is the function of it. IT might say that we have a technical committee that works along there. with the council at the present time because this is a technical area and many of these people on the council have a genuine interest and are people with analytical minds that can make judgments as to whether it is good or bad, but we do need people like John Lyman, who is an oceanographer and the man who can really get down to the science matters of it. Mr. Downtnce. How much money did North Carolina appropriate to establish this council ? Mr. Jones. It didn’t necessarily appropriate any money to estab- lish the agency. What it did was to appropriate money to support and back up the plans of the council that, in turn, would give support to the institutions that are being tied in through this council to carry forward with their plans and programs that the council is helping them to put together. A lot of this money, the $1.8 million that was referred to, would be money that would back up the Office of Sea Grants, the programs we might get through them, the Coastal Plains Commission’s program. It would match the contribution that we hope that we would get from the Federal Government to carry out the plans that the council is putting together. Mr. Downine. I think it is an excellent idea. Thank you very much. Thank you very much, Governor. Mr. Lennon. Mr. Schadeberg. Mr. Scuapgperc. Governor Scott, I have no questions, but would like to state that it looks very much like you have rolled up your sleeves and gone to work. I want to thank you for your testimony. Mr. Lennon. Thank you. Mr. Karth? Mr. Kartu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. IT want to join my colleagues, Governor, in extending a welcome to you here before the committee. I must confess that Minnesota, being as landlocked as we are and not having the benefits of such a coastal zone as you have, undoubtedly has not contributed nearly as much as your great State through you and your predecessors and the members 709 of this committee, including the distinguished chairman of the subcommittee. But, nonetheless, it does not indicate a lack of interest in the im- portance of the marine sciences and oceanology and marine resources. I want to extend my thanks to you for a very able contribution. Thank you very much. Mr. Lennon. Thank you, Mr. Karth. Mr. Ruppe? Mr. Rurre. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no questions, Governor Scott, but I certainly would like to commend you on a very excellent report. It is rather obvious that your State has done everything possible to assure future study and utiliza- tion of the ocean resources in your State and I trust that we on the Federal side do as well in forthcoming years. Thank you. Mr. Lennon. Thank you. Mr. Jones? Mr. Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to commend Governor Scott on what I consider one of the most concise and fine statements of its knd that this committee has received. Along with the other members of the delegation, as you stated here, as a North Carolinian I am extremely proud of what you have done, and I am convinced that under your leadership we will accomplish much in the next three years. Mr. Lennon. Mr. Chairman, do you have questions ? Mr. Garmartz. No questions. I don’t like to be repetitious, but surely I must join my colleagues in commending you, Governor, for the ex- cellent statement and especially for the keen interest that your State and you as Governor have shown in this overall program. The fact that your assembly has appropriated $1.8 million for this and also $500,000 for the purchase of estuarine lands shows that you go have what we might call real local interest in the legislative bodies there. Surely that is a good sign when you can get your local assemblies to cooperate and get money out of them. I think that is great progress, and I personally want to congratulate you for an excellent and fine job. Governor Scorr. Thank you, sir. Mr, Lennon. Thank you. Gentlemen, I want to ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from North Carolina who represents a great deal of the coastline in his district may speak. Do you have questions ? Mr. Henverson. I have no questions, but I want to make two points that [ think would be helpful for the record. I want to commend you, Governor, for a very fine statement. In your statement you pointed out what the State of North Carolina is doing by way of commitment to legislation and by way of appropri- ations. I would like to think that the people of North Carolina would recognize that the commitment of the State of North Carolina to spend some State tax funds will be of great benefit not only to our State but to the entire Nation. Perhaps with the new taxes that the State legislature found it appropriate to levy, our people will recog- 710 nize that certainly in this area we can expect great public benefit to be derived from the expenditures of those taxes in the future. Secondly, as a member of the House Public Works Committee, I certainly would fee] remiss if I didn’t point out that the chairman of that committee, Mr. Fallon of Maryland, who is a very close friend of the chairman of this committee, is tremendously interested in this entire area because the jurisdiction of that committee is also very much concerned with coastal problems. Some of the conflicts that you talked about with regard to dredging, flood control, navigation, and so on, will fit into the problems that are in the jurisdiction of this full committee and the subcommittee. T think that it would be well to recognize that Chairman Fallon and Chairman Garmatz, both from the great State of Maryland, cer- tainly are performing a great service in trying to improve and de- velop the marine resources and the water resources of our Nation and as a member of the Public Works Committee, Mr. Chairman I wanted to recognize that the chairman of your full committee, as well as Chair- man Fallon of the Public Works Committee, have contributed much to the State of North Carolina and to the Nation. IT am delighted to have had an opportunity to sit here this morning. Mr. Lennon. Thank you, Mr. Henderson. Yesterday we had the pleasure of having Senator Claiborne Pell as one of the witnesses before the subcommittee. He made this statement, with which I find myself in total agreement. Tn speaking of the sensational landing of human beings on the surface of the moon, he made this statement : While detracting not in the least from our building of pyramids in space. And he was there referring to a recent article by Mr. Drucker, he goes on to say— I believe our national oceanologie program has far greater potential for en- riching the life of man here on earth. Then he goes on to quote Mr. Drucker’s statement in his article: ... we are about to tackle systematically the development of the oceans as the greatest economic resource to be found on this earth. T don’t see how any fair, reasonably informed, and knowledgeable person can disagree with those two basic statements. I think they are part of our future. Governor, you have stressed, and I think appropriately so, in the light of your own experience and in the light of the formation by your predecessor of the State Marine Sciences Council and the subsequent recommendation of yours which resulted in its being statutorily formed and based, and I certainly agree with that, the need for legis- lation that would implement that part of the Commission’s report related to the coastal zones and laboratories. T would like at this time to ask the gentlemen of the committee to go back and review again, if you will, since all of you have copies of the Commission’s report in your respective offices, pages 56 through 60 of the Commission’s report. Then I am going to ask counsel to confer with the legislative draftsmen and to try to develop a separate piece of legis- lation that would include the Commission’s recommendation with respect to this part of the report that I have just noted, pages 56 to 60, speaking of the Coastal Management Act. 711 I may take the liberty, and I want you gentlemen to participate in it if you like, to introduce that legislation for which there is no com- mitment on anyone’s part except to use it as a vehicle for our coming hearings. Sys Niki We have, as you gentlemen know, and all of you participated 1n its sponsorship, the legislation which from here on out will be considered as well as the Commission’s report by the witnesses who appear in the future, but it occurs to me that when we get into the September hear- ings, at which time we expect to have the various agencies and depart- ments and bureaus of the Federal Government who might be affected by this particular legislation, it might be well to have a vehicle here related to the coastal management recommendations made by the Com- mission for which they might be called on to testify. I will ask counsel to do that and try to have by Tuesday of next week, draft legislation that would in substance be a forward step in the consideration of the implementation of this part of the Commis- sion’s report. Now, there are other recommendations that Governor Scott placed emphasis upon in addition to that. Governor, would you refresh my memory quickly about the other specific recomendations that you had in addition to the question of the coastal zones, the coastal management? I think you had one other that you laid some stress upon in your statement. Governor Scorr. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I was looking for the exact statement. Mr. Lennon. Is that coastal zone laboratories ? Governor Scorr. The coastal zone laboratories; in addition to the coastal zone authority, the establishment of the laboratory, itself, which, of course, would necessitate some funding. These are the two priority items that we are concerned with. Again, as I stated, feeling that any question of reorganization might properly come later, we think the urgency of getting on with the actual development of these resources can be met within the existing frame- work and later on if it is determined that the program can best be operated under a separate agency or another coordinating council, it can be done. Mr. Lennon. In connection with that recommendation, I would like to suggest, too, that counsel review that part of the Commission’s re- port relating to its suggestion or recommendation for the establish- ment of the coastal laboratory. I am of the opinion that in a piece of legislation that will be used for consideration only by the committee that perhaps there should be one single piece of legislation. That doesn’t commit us at all, gentlemen. If someone gives us a vehicle to base the testimony on, it will remind us to ask questions of the witnesses who appear in the future not only on the legislation we now have pending before us but on this legislation as well. I think it is interesting, Governor Scott, that you called our atten- tion rather dramatically to the position of the administration that took place back shortly after the first report came out, not from this committee, but from an independent committee, and the experience this committee had with the so-called Interagency Committee on Oceanography. 712 We found much to our surprise in our hearings that the agencies and departments which had a role and mission in the iaarine sciences did not participate as members of this Interagency Committee on Oceanography. So we stopped the proceedings long enough to request that that particular agency come before the committee and explain why it was not invited to put a person from that agency on the Interagency Com- mittee on Oceanography. We went through that sort of traumatic ex- perience over a period of time. Now, coming back specifically to the Commission’s report with re- spect to, number one, the establishment of a Government structure, in the hearings in 1965 and in 1966 which lasted over an extended period of time, we found a wide variety of views and recommendations made to the committee. We had strong recommendations from a number of members of Con- gress on the wet NASA. We had other people who bitterly opposed it. So that is the reason why in the drafting of the legislation which resulted in the Presidential Commission and also in the national coun- cil we mandated in that legislation the Commission to make a study in depth and recommend to the Congress, number one, if there should be a new central government structure and, number two, if they did make such a recommendation, the type of structure and what agencies would be involved. In our communication to the President in consideration of the ap- pointment of the Commission, we urged him not only to get the people for that Commission who had the background in science and teclnol- ogy related to oceanology and oceanography and all the marine sci- ences, but to get the men for that Commission who could give the time, and those of use who were privileged te serve, Congressman Mosher and myself, as the congressional advisers to the Commission, think they did a magnificent job. We were privileged to meet with them on many occasions, not to in any way influence them with regard to the type of report that they ultimately submitted to the President and the Congress, but simply to advise them in what we understood the congressional intent to be, we having been the two members of the committee that were present at all of the hearings, Congressman Mosher and myself, having been on the conference committee to write the conference report and the subsequent legislation that was adopted both by the Senate and the House, and also to attempt to interpret for the members of the Co- mission the congressional intent as reflected in the debate both on the House floor and the Senate floor. I do believe that it is the consensus of the preponderant majority of the members of the Commission that we ought to move in the direction that you have laid stress upon, and I think it is evidenced by the fact all 20 members of the subcommittee joined in sponsorship along with the chairman of the full committee. I think you would be interested, Governor, in knowing that while most of our witnesses have been from the pr ivate sector of our economy as well as the university and in the private laboratory sector, there has been a unanimity of agreement among all of our witnesses that we ought to create the national advisory committee. J am not talking about the Government structure. There was no 713 difference among any of the witnesses. There was some difference with respect to the Government structure, but not enough to give us any great concern. You put your finger on it when you said that agencies, departments, and bureaus which have substantial operational func- tions within those agencies which are engaged in the marine sciences, whatever type it may be, look with a little bit of disdain upon giving up any meaningful part of their governmental structure. We recognize this. Frankly, we had hoped that by mid-June, we were almost assured that by mid-June, the administration witnesses would be ready to testify, but they have asked that their time be extended to September, and we are going to conform to their request. Now if you or anyone who is here from North Carolina, your staff or associates, would like to add anything to what you said, we would be delighted to hear from you now or, if either you, Governor Scott, or anyone here from North Carolina would like to add a supplemental statement to what you have said or answer any questions more in de- tail that may have been raised, the record will be kept open for a reasonable period of time for that purpose. Mr. Garmatz? Mr. Garmatz. If the gentleman will permit, I was interested in the statement that Senator Pell made yesterday and you mentioned part of it. If I may read part of his statement for the Governor, he goes on to say: Mr. Chairman, we in the Congress are considering this report in the midst of a renewed public interest and enthusiasm in the exploration of outer space, prompted by the dazzling success of the Apollo mission. I, too, have been deeply impressed, even awed, at this magnificent achievement. I would not venture to enter the competition in seeking for appropriate ad- jectives to describe the first extra-territorial visit by man. I would simply say it is historic. But I was struck recently by the historic context which the space program was placed by Mr. Peter F. Drucker in his very. perceptive book, “The Age of Discontinuity.” Searching for historical precedents, Mr. Drucker recalled that ancient Egypt some 7,000 years ago produced two truly historic 'achievements—the building of the first pyramid, and the invention of the plow. The building of the pyramid had a profound philosophical impact on man, but the invention of the plow, by in- creasing agricultural productivity, virtually restructured human society. And then Mr. Drucker expressed the opinion that in our age, “space explora- 999 tion is our ‘pyramids’ and the exploration of the oceans our ‘plow’. That is all, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lennon. The reason I didn’t do that is because you know Gov- ernor Scott comes from long forebearers of agricultural people in Durham, and if I got him into a discussion of what the plow meant to civilization, we would be here for a week. Mr. Garmatz. I thank the chairman. Thank you. Mr. Lennon. We appreciate your appearance here this morning and look forward to seeing you on at least another occasion this evening. Mr. Garmarz. I also wish to tell the Governor that we have two other staff members from the great State of North Carolina, Mr. Winfield who has been with us for almost 18 years, and Mr. Ned Everett who was here just a moment ago who is counsel for the Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation. I want to say that they are doing an excellent job on the overall committee, 714 Mr. Lennon. The gentleman is suggesting that North Carolina is pretty well represented on this committee and on the staff. Mr. Garmatz. A little more so than Maryland. Mr. Lennon. Thank you, gentlemen. Governor Scorr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing us to participate. Mr. Lennon. It was our great pleasure. Our next witness is Dr. LeVan Griffis, who is the vice provost of Southern Methodist University, and chairman, Panel on Research, Education and Information Dissemination, Committee on Ocean En- gineering, National Academy of Engineering. Doctor, if you and your associate will come forward and have a seat at the witness table, we will look forward to hearing from you, sir. IT ask unanimous consent that immediately preceding Dr. Griffis’ statement that there be inserted in the record at this point a bio- graphical sketch and résumé of his splendid activities in the field which he speaks to this morning. (The biographical sketch and résumé follows :) Dr. LEVAN GRIFFIS LeVan Griffis obtained BS (1987), MS (1988), and Ph. D. (1941) degrees in engineering from the California Institute of Technology. He became professor and chairman of engineering mechanics at the Illinois Institute of Technology (1945) and directed the mechanics research division, Armour Research Founda- tion in Chicago until 1953. After serving as director of American Machine and Foundry’s ‘Chicago research division, he accepted the post of manager and di- rector of the Borg-Warner Corporation Research Center, which post he held until 1959. He became the first dean of engineering at Rice University (1959- 1963) and then accepted the position of vice-president, Southwest Research In- stitute, Houston. Joining the staff at Southern Methodist University in 1965, as professor of engineering and director of grants and contracts, he became vice provost in 1967, which position he now holds. He serves presently as a director, LTV Electrosystems, Inc. ; advisor to South- eastern Drilling, Inc.; chairman of the panel on Research, Education and Infor- mation Dissemination for the National Academy of Engineering Committee on Ocean Engineering; member of the Advisory Panel for Sea Grant Institutional Support; member of the Naval Research Advisory Committee’s Laboratory Ad- visory Board for Naval Ships. He was a member of OEC Mission 84 to Austria for R & D in 1962; advisor to the Ship Structures Committee and to the Com- mittee on ‘Ship Steel of NAS-NRC for preparation of monographs in “Brittle Fracture of Engineering Materials’; and on ‘Residual Stress”; a director of Reed Roller Bit Co., Houston; and a director of LTV, Ine. A registered professional engineer in Illinois and Texas, he is a member of American Society for Engineering Education, Tau Beta Pi, Sigma Xi, and Society for Experimental Stress Analysis. STATEMENT OF DR. LEVAN GRIFFIS, VICE PROVOST OF SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY, DALLAS, TEX., AND CHAIRMAN, PANEL ON RESEARCH, EDUCATION, AND INFORMATION DISSEMINATION, COMMITTEE ON OCEAN ENGINEERING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING; ACCOMPANIED BY DR. RUSSELL KEIM, EXECU- TIVE SECRETARY, COMMITTEE ON OCEAN ENGINEERING, NA- TIONAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING Dr. Grirris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the Sub- committee on Oceanography. Let me take this opportunity to present Dr. Russell Keim, the Ex- é15 ecutive Secretary of the National Academy of Engineering Committee on Ocean Engineering. Dr. Keim is sitting on my left. Itisa privilege to appear before this committee to express my views on the report “Our Nation and the Sea” by the Commission on Marine Science, Engineering, and Resources. My interest in our national com- mitment arises because of my responsibilities as vice provost of Southern Methodist University, and also as chairman of the Panel on Education, Research, and Information Dissemination of the Na- tional Academy of Engineering Committee on Ocean Engineering. In the latter capacity, I am preparing a detailed presentation on these three topics, as part of the engineering report of that committee, to the academy. In addition, as a member of the Advisory Panel for Sea Grant Institutional Support, I am mindful of the opportunities for educational and research related to the oceans which Sea Grant programs envisions. And as a member of the Naval Research Advisory Committee’s Laboratory Advisory Board for Naval Ships, I see the effect of mission requirements in shaping policy for support of research and education by U.S. Government agencies. My presentation is as an individual concerned about the position of the United States in regard to its potential exploitation of the seas. My remarks do not necessarily reflect the position of Southern Meth- odist University, the National Academy of Engineering, the National Science Foundation, or the Naval Research Advisory Committee. The commission’s report “Our Nation and the Sea” is one of the most comprehensive documents ever prepared on the importance of our national posture relative to the world ocean. I concur in the national marine program recommended in the report as a major contribution to national planning, and believe that sufficient national engineering and scientific requirements are included in that program to “make it. very effective. I support the conclusion that there is a need within the U.S. Government for a reorganization in marine affairs. The commission recommendation for the establishment of a National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Agency (NOAA) and an associated advisory group (NACO) is one possible and useful method for imple- menting the Government’s current functions in the marine environ- ment, which will, in addition, strengthen its activity in other appropri iate marine functions, as well as supplement a national marine program. In the case of my specific interests, this proposed coordination of Government activity seems to be a very effective way in which to sup- plement a national effort to improve long- -range engineering develop- ment and our fundamental technology in the ocean, and to assess and maintain the Nation’s research and manpower needs for support of a national marine commitment. More specifically, it seems to me that the following major recom- mendations of the commission outline a framework of national goals required for effective monitoring, controlling, and utilizing of the ocean : (1) To establish increased understanding of the oceans as a ui ies goal (page 23) ; (2) "To establish univ ersity-national laboratories (page 27) ; (5) To undertake a comprehensive fundamental technology program (page 27) ; 26-563—70—pt. 2 716 (4) To establish coastal zone laboratories (page 29) ; (5) To establish national projects (page 37) ; and (6) Toexpand the Sea Grant Program (page 44). SOME SPECIFIC ISSUES REQUIRING RESOLUTION FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF BROAD NATIONAL OCEAN GOALS Within the framework outlined by these recommendations there are activities and procedures that will require a great deal of innovation especially at the interfaces among universities, government, and in- dustry. Many alterations in our programs of research, education, and information dissemination will be required; and the following com- ments are submitted to clarify some of the problems and to delineate some of the issues which may be important in this process. ENGINEERING RESEARCH AND LONG-RANGE ENGINEERING DEVELOPMENT— UNIVERSITY, GOVERNMENT, INDUSTRY Let me first turn to some of the problems at the interface between university and Government in the pursuit of the university’s educa- tional and research function relative to the oceans. One important group of problems arises from the growing require- ment for cost-sharing with nonfederal funds—matching funds” as they are usually called. The concept of cost sharing is opposed in many academic quarters as a device to generate further taxes for imple- menting a policy established by Congress in support of education and research. On the other hand, the concept is often justified by the belief that these programs are of sufficient Importance to the institution that they would be carried out, at least in part by the institution even in the absence of Federal support. Whatever one’s point of view, it appears that the cost-sharing requirement provides the logical justification to enlist support from the other necessary partner in this utilization of the seas—namely private industry which can benefit from the ocean- related program. There seems to be some problem, however, in enlist- ing this source of support. Another problem related to cost sharing is the establishment of the proper and clear definition of scope for which the agency sponsor is providing a contractual commitment. Is it the total program scope, including that funded by the matching funds, or is it only the scope funded by the agency? And if the institution is already pursuing re- lated work under its own funding, is the cost of this segment of the total program scope eligible to be counted as matching funds? Equally important is the question of what privileges, what pre- rogatives, and what authority over the total program does the party hold which provides the matching funds? Should he not have a pro- portionate share of responsibility for determining project scope, and for evaluating program progress and quality, and for sharing in the patent rights? Another concern is the matter of maintaining quality of perform- ance and of project effectiveness in programs of long duration which have been promised stability and financial continuity over several years. Institutions cherish and even demand this funding stability, but are not always able or willing to provide full accountability for the 717 use of funds. Operational review procedures, compatible with the academic environment, are required to a greater extent than hereto- fore and must be encouraged. In making a commitment to provide educational facilities and to conduct research aimed at utilization of research results, at develop- ment of techniques, and at design of equipment applicable to develop- ment of resources, a university sometimes finds itself unable to complete the transfer to an appropriately competent industry, or it finds its faculty unwilling to make the transfer as soon as it should be made. Greatly improved management methods need to be developed to im- prove the success of this transfer process, or to avoid making the com- mitment in the first place if, indeed, it is not to be fulfilled. The entire process relating engineering (or mission related) research to economic development is one deserving great attention. Over the past decades, a highly effective means of communication has been developed between sponsoring agencies and the administrative and academic personnel in educational institutions. It is not so clear that an equally effective mode of communication exists between the Federal agencies and the policymaking bodies of our educational in- stitutions. In many cases, these policy bodies are composed of repre- sentatives of industry and business who should be as close to the sponsoring agency as the faculty, but who often are not. At a time when national policy is being made affecting the ability of educational institutions to meet new national goals, and which policy should include the private sector as a partner in the enterprise, it would seem that new and radically improved communications need to be established among the policymaking bodies—the boards of trustees of educational institutions and the Federal agencies. Again, over the past decades, grant and contracting arrangements have been developed whereby the great majority of engineering and scientific talents within universities have been made available to fur- ther the national engineering scientific goals. An additional reservoir of engineering and scientific talent exists within our industrial research laboratories which can cooperate with, and supplement, and increase the research output performed by the university sector, especially in applied research. Some of this coopera- tion exists now, although there is frequently a more competitive than cooperative feeling between industrial and university laboratories. This suggests that new policy and a new framework for joint industry- university research might be developed, that new methods of grant and contract participation by industry might be encouraged by the Con- gress, in order to stimulate more cooperative relations between indus- try and university activities. I believe that the prime grantee (or contractor) responsibility should occasionally be placed within suit- ably chosen industrial laboratories, where this action can be expected to speed up the process of technology transfer. In reviewing the broad institutional proposals submitted by uni- versities under the encouragement of the present sea grant program, the engineering elements and technological scope within these pro- posals sometimes appear lacking in imagination, in definiteness of objectives, in realism of techniques, and in realism of costing to pro- duce anticipated results, compared to the scientific components of these proposals. 718 This problem seems to me to be general enough, and to be evident even at outstanding institutions, to warrant investigation to determine whether it is related to institutional salary policy, to the outdating of curriculum and of faculty competence, to excessive teaching loads, per- haps to inadequate motivation from the sponsor, to the national policy framework or some other. The resolution of these questions is a matter of concern for the Congress as well as the sea grant program. Cost sharing, contract definition, motivation of industry to become a partner with universi- ties, quality control in education and research, effective use of research for economic growth, communication with university policymakers, the utilization of industrial research and educational talents—all these matters—represent problems whose solutions have their roots in the legislative objectives for the support of higher education. Such ob- jectiv es would take into account how to prov “ide the resources for edu- cational institutions in meeting first the goals of education and then the goals of mission-oriented agencies. The investigation and resolu- tion of these issues will be essential to the realistic implementation of the broad national ocean goals. It is a conservative statement that realistic funding of the sea grant program must be provided before the goals of the sea grant lecisla- tion can be achieved. The goals of the sea grant program are excel- lently conceived in gener: al to provide a flexible master plan for en- gineering, scientific, and related education and research in ocean- related disciplines. I urge that this program be implemented with adequate funding. ENGINEERING MANPOWER EDUCATION A few remarks seem to be in order concerning manpower planning for the oceans and its relationship to university functions. The universities presently stand at the interface where graduate engineers and scientists move out into industry, where research results become available to industry and to government, and where continuing education can be joined with industr y to serve ‘the needs of updating the professional engineering, technical, and scientific capability. At the same time, university administration is under criticism in some areas; research—especially apphed research—is similarly under attack. Faculty are reproached for their real or imagined “flight from teaching.” University financial matters are generally a cause for grave concern. It may be noted’that the number of university students entering engineering has remained approximately constant for over 10 years; and engineering graduates—the key to technology utilization—have numbered about 35,000 per year for the same period of time. During the near "future, when the Nation initiates a large new tech- nological program, aimed at the oceans, it 1s important that new proj- ects, new curriculums, new facilities provide a motivation which helps—not hinders—the national growth of the university and espe- cially of graduate education. We must be careful not to expect too much of universities, and to insure that the concept of university-national laboratories does not become a base for campus disorders, for disparate geographical Federal 79 research and development support, for further “flight from teaching,” for for other ills often ascribed to mission-oriented | university activity. In order to avoid such pitfalls, means must be devised to relegate the initiative for utilization of research results to specially equipped institutes or to applied research centers. The responsibility of industry to share the cost and effort in this program by new cooperative ar- rangements should be established and motivated. In summary, the encouragement of students and graduates to enter ocean-related fields should come from the excitement and from the motivation of expanding the horizon of land-based science, engineer- ing, and technical specialties into the marine environment and not from establishing new areas of glamor or superficiality. Engineering infor mation dissemination : Let me comment briefly on the subject of ocean engineering information centers. In studying the requirements for information dissemination related to the oceans, it seems desirable to distinguish clearly between the process of data man- agement and the problem of disseminating engineering information. The former is receiving major study and support : the latter problem is not so clearly understood and may need special identification con- cerning its value. Dissemination of engineering information imphes engineering anal- ysis or design procedures, the compilation of handbooks or design manuals, the conduct of engineering studies, and consulting engineer- ing activities. It connotes data interpret ation and the application of resulting information to timely solution of engineering problems. A few organizations exist which specialize in this type of activity on a national scale. It is believed that such a function should be assured as part of the growing national activity for utilizing the ocean. Generally speaking, the effective management and operation of any of these existing engineering information centers seem to depend upon three broad requir ements : (a) Yet Prose. laws lack a sound scientific basis. No one is sure whether these codes serve the public in- tereat or simply discourage mineral] explora- tion and modern fishing. Academic institu- tions and public agencies in the states are improving their capability to perform necded research, and the Commission intends to help them. Technological advances are worth ble until they are exploited by entrepreneurs. The states are expanding existing extension services and creating new services where necessary. The Commission intends, to help hem. The Commission's Industrial Developmen Program is designed to attract high techno- logy industry. The Region offers more than level land and ample ground water. It has almost 600 miles of coastline and 3 million acres of estuarics. It has over 30,000 square miles of continental shelf, and it is adjacent to the Blake Plateau. The Commission intends to promote the creation or research and devclopment centers 904 of excellence which will be attractive locations for industries specializing in marine science and technology. In 1966, the people of Chatham County (Savannah), Georgia voted nine-to-one favor of a $3.6 million bond issue to build a bridge to Skidaway [sland where the state planned to develop the Ocean Science Center of the Atlantic. Today, the bridge and the center are taking shape. In 1968, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill instituted a Curricul in Marine Sciences leading to the M. S. and Ph. D. degrees, jointly with North Carolina State University. The Commission intends to foster and augment these activities. The Region has numerous Department of Defense installation=. st most of them are basic training camps which have a re- latively small impact on the Regional economy Although the Navy spends more than half of the Federal Marine Science funds, little of this money is spent inthe Region. By exploit- ing favorable environmental characteristics and using public funds as » =atalyst, the Com- mission intends to demonstrate to private enterprise and to the Federal government that much more of the nation's essential marine research and development should be performe in the Coastal Plains Region. it could be done there as well as anywhere else, and doing it there will spur the economy of a lagging re- gion. All of these activities will be accom- panied with s&pcialized training programs and public information activities, so that the people of the Region will have a greater appre- ciation of the marine environment and will be able to acquire the skills they will need to exploit it more fully. The Commission on December 19, 1968 approved a Resolution on Marine Resources which the Advisory Committee had recommend ed. Two of these actions concerned this re- search and development effort. The other two concerned a Marine Use Profile of the Region anda study of ite mineral potential. The Commission granted $39, 090 to each state for a comprehensive marine ro- sources development study. These studies consist of two phases. The first is an inven- tory of the personnel, prossrams, and facilities now employed in marine research and develop ment. Vhe second phase is a set of recorn- mendations for the improvement and expan- sion of these programs and facilities. More than twenty marine research laboratories already exist in the Region. Most of them are small and little coordination exists among them. The Coastal Plains Regional Commission decided to create an Institute for Marine Development Services in order to: o Facilitate communications among the Region's scientists and institutions engaged in research and educational efforts relating to marine resources , o Communicate the results of marine research and development activities, in order to increase the technological proficiency of the private sector of the Region's economy, o Maintain constant liaison between the Commission and the work that is tak- ing place in marine research and development, o Assess periodically the effectiveness of the Region's research and develop- ment programs and activities in marine resources, and o Advise the Commission concerning actions required to close the income gap by exploiting marine resources, In carrying out these functions, the Institute will conduct conferences, seminars, and workshops and publish relevant materi- als. Consulting services are provided to institutions in the Region in the process of devdloping research and education programs. 905 The Commission's Marine Resources Advisory Gommiitec will act as a Board of Trustees for the Institute. This Committee will assist the Director in developing and implementing annual programs of work. The Institute - 51 technical committees to help guide its pro- These technical committees will be composed of professionals in the different ‘Iso have several pram. sub-specialtics in marine resources drawn from the Region a> «cll as from other parts of the country. Land and Water Use Plarninn was selected for special emphasi= * ° aac Resources Advisory Comse'': : mission is charged with preparing, |onp-range, comprehensive economic development plans. The need for systematic planning is most obvious in the Coastal Zone. The economic conflicts are most intense there, and the social and political considerations most com- plex. Competition for these resources will grow more intense, and many decisions, once carried out, can never be undone. The Commission wants to raise the per capita income of the Region by attracting industries that will create high-wage job opportunities. it wants to achieve this goal as soon as possible. However, it does not want short-term gains that wil] destroy the long-term potentials of the environment. The state and local governments need sound advice for making land use decisions. The Commis- sion intends to help them by sponsoring a study which will produce a Marine Use Profile. This study will include: © collection of data concerning the present utilization of Coastal Zone resources and the social and eco- nomic ends served, o analysis of the effectiveness of past and present measures for deter- mining this utilization, so identification of the potential of these resources, o evaluation of new or different meagured for encomraying or requiring optitnum utilization of the resgonreca, oO preparation of maps depicting exiating resources, existing uses, and optimum uses, and 9 recommendations concerning, imple- mentation, including, model codes for resource manasrement. The Commission has requested the U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development to assist in funding this study. The purpose of this study is to identify the cconomic potentiaJ of the Coastal Zone resources and to provide those with the responsibility for decisions with an analytical framework for evaluating cach potential use in terms of particular goals and objectives. Minerals and Chemicals The need for a Marine Use Profile is most evident when considering the development of minerals and chemicals industries in the Region. The Advisory Committee and Com- mission staff have been trying to obtain a definitive evaluation of the Region's mineral] potential. A considerable amount of infor- mation has been compiled from published sources by the State geologists as well as by consultants. This effort will be continucd by the Marine Use Profile Study. It will develep maps depicting geologic strata and will devclop model codes designed to foster exploration and exploitation in ways that will cause minimal long-run damage to the environment. The Com mission has also urged the appropriate Federal] officials to conduct the needed bathymetric and geological surveys of the adjacent continental shelf. In trying to evaluate the mineral potential of the Region, the Commission has repeatedly been advised that commercially extractable concentrations of petroleum probably exist off-shore. Exploration thus far has not re- sulted in a producing well; however, there has been very little exploration. 906 Several years aro a relatively cx- fensive phosphatic recovery operation began onthe Pamlico River in Beaufort Gounty, North Carolina. Within the past year, a concentration of phasphate which may be the The effort to lease the marshlands which overlay part of this largest in the world was discovered near Savannah, Georpia. phosphate bed led to a public crisis and the lease was not pranted. This crisis re- emphaized the need for the Commission's Marine Use Profile and for model codes for resource management. The present value of the Region's mineral production is leas than $300 million No one, of courac, can estimate the potential production. There has been a close correlation between exploration and discoveries, Perhaps the prospectors have been looking only the right places, or per- haps the Region has vast mineral wealth that will not be found until someone looks for it. per year. The Marine Resources Program of the Coastal Piains Regional Commission can be the means of accomplishing two important national goals simultaneously: o Increasing the utilization of these resources and oo DeveJoping: the econamy of a lasscing resjou, of the Offshore Vech- nolosy Conference would serve our nation The members well by suggesting improvements in this program. Jn particular, how can the Com- mission find out whether diamonds Jic bur- ied in its backyard? fJow can the Gommis- sion encourage and assist private enterprise to explore for these potential resources? Acknowledgment The author, although accepting full responsibility for the views expressed, nevertheless owes a debt of gratitude te other members of the Commission staff who in numerous conferences have helped develop the information and philosophy presented here. In sucha case it is difficult to deter- mine clearly where any one person's thoughts begin and end. Thus much credit for this article is due to Mr. Charles W. Coss, Executive Director; Mr. F. L. Parnell, Assistant Director, Dr. E. Waltgn Jones, former North Carolina Field Director; and Mr. Joseph Gabbard, Program Officer. The author also acknowledges the assistance of the members of the Commission's Marine Resources Advisory Committee, particularly its Chairman, Mr. Clyde Eltzroth. 907 MARINE RESOURCES Dr. Trisus. Now, as to Marine Resources, the Department of Com- merce plays a supporting role in the development of marine resources— both through the encouragement of the private sectors of our economy, and through continued cooperative efforts with the Department of the Interior. In this latter regard, our Department intends to continue to cooperate in the preparation of maps of our Continental Shelf and slopes by conducting the necessary surveys and by providing existing data for these regions in conjunction with our own on-going survey program. This we consider to be in keeping with the intent of the Commission. GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT The global environment is a continuing and first priority concern of the Department. Our Department participates with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in seeking the solution to problems of air pollution. We also are a member of the recently formed Council on Environmental Quality which is concerned with the total environment. This requires that our knowledge of the environment be improved. Programs of global exploration, monitoring, prediction, and deter- mining the feasibility for modification of the environment contribute to this objective. The capabilities of our agency, ESSA, have been developed according to this concept. ESSA already has in operation the principal elements which would be required for the “National Environmental Monitoring and Predic- tion Service” proposed by the Commission. Many of these activities are performed in collaboration with other nations. The recommendations of the Commission would involve expansion of ESSA activities. This Department has lead agency responsibility for the U.S. weather watch program and more recently the civil focus for the coordination of marine environmental prediction. We are vitally interested in the implementation of these programs. ESSA also works with agencies outside of the Government in planning national or worldwide atmospheric activities. The global atmospheric research program, for example, GARP, is one which is planned with full collaboration and leadership of ESSA. Just the other day I spent about an hour and a half with the leading experts in meteorology who were gathered in conference with Dr. White and others from ESSA to plan this Nation’s participation in the global atmospheric research program. ESSA has long been a cham- pion of the principle that the prediction of the weather requires a global approach. TECHNICAL AND OPERATING SERVICES Technical and operating services are discussed in the Commission report. We are also pleased to note that the Commission has endorsed our efforts for providing mapping nad charting services, environmen- tal data services, and standards for instrument development to the many and diverse user groups. The Commission, however, has recommended that we accomplish our mapping and charting schedules in a shorter period of time than we, 26-563 O—70—pt. 22 908 ourselves, had planned for the Continental Shelf and coastal waters. To accomplish this would require an acceleration of our current plans and additional resources would be needed. With regard to the Commission’s concern for standards, calibration, and test facilities for instrument development, I am please to report that the National Bureau of Standards has recently assumed the role of providing primary standards for the National Oceanographic In- strumentation Center. We believe this will be an important contribution. I have here a report from the National Oceanographic Instrumen- tation Center which describes the kind of projects now being carried out by the Nationa] Bureau of Standards in cooperation with NOIC. There is work on the calibration of flowmeters. There is work on sound velocity measuring systems. There is work on time standards development. her is a development. of a shallow water environmental facility. Strange as it may seem, it is extremely difficult to measure very, very low velocities of flow and the Bureau of Standards cooperates in the development of new techniques for measurement and also for the procedures for tying these kinds of measurements into the rest of the national measurements system so that measurements made at sea can be made to square with those that are made on land. I will make this report available to the recorder if the chairman wishes. Mr. Lennon. We would like to have it, and we appreciate it, sir. Dr. Trisus. Thank you. Before turning to the organizational recommendations of the Com- mission and those contained in H.R. 13247, I want to state a few words about the role of the Maritime Administration in ocean engineering. At this point, also, I would like to observe that I think that Dr. Keim of the National Academy of Engineering was correct when he said we ought not talk about ocean engineering as something very special; we ought to talk about engineering in the ocean, because what is most needed is to treat the engineering problems of the ocean in the modern manner that we treat other engineering problems and to apply to the problems of the ocean the appropriate techniques of engineering that we have developed in other areas. This is one of the things that the Maritime Administration can and does do. A major marine transport capability is required to explore the oceans and to utilize their resources to enhance our national commer- cial transportation and our national security. Such a capability cur- rently exists in the Maritime Administration as a result of its current mission to promote waterborne commerce and as the national agency concerned with all aspects of marine transportation and technology. In the conduct of its programs, the Maritime Administration has devel- oped capabilities for economic analysis, research and development, ship design and construction, and ship operation in conjunction with the maritime industry. The current Maritime research and development program is based on the recent Woods Hole Maritime Conference of Government and industry. The conference recommended projects covering a broad spec- trum of advanced marine programs. A total of 110 specific program elements was selected from the hundreds that were considered. 909 I have here a copy of the Woods Hole Conference that was held under the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences and MarAd. In this conference we had representatives from industry, from labor, from engineering, and from science. We brought them all together and asked them to discuss with us what are the technological needs and how they interrelate. This report I will make available to the recorder, and we have sufli- cient copies to give one to each member of the committee if you so desire. Mr. Lennon. We thank you for them. Dr. Trisus. I would also like to say in passing that this is the way I think one has to go about developing the relationship between Gov- ernment and industry. The total amount of money that private indus- try is going to invest in the ocean will be many times greater than the amount the Federal Government will invest in these kinds of enterprises. At least that must be true if we are going to be successful. Therefore, it is very important that we learn how to develop the governmental pro- gram in coordination with industry so that we help rather than hurt the development of these enterprises, I think the Woods Hole Confer- ence is an excellent example of how to do this. The recommended spectrum of research projects ranges from near- term improvements in the 20-knot ships in operation today, to the high- speed (30-40 knot) unitized cargo ships of the 1970’s. The Maritime R. & D. program includes basic advanced systems en- gineering and technology, as well as major advanced marine ship systems, terminals, and related support. An example of the Maritime R. & D. program is the development and operation by Maritime (in conjunction with the Atomic Energy Commission) of the world’s first nuclear-propelled commercial ship (NS Savannah). Maritime performs this program jointly with the Navy and has utilized Navy capability and laboratories cooperatively in other areas. Maritime has established and proposed programs in port terminals and cargo handling areas including various aspects of offshore terminals, deep-sea mooring, semisubmersible and submersible ship- ping systems, offshore cargo systems and feeder networks. The rela- tionship of sea transport with other modes of transport (intermodal) has been considered in the development programs and economic analysis. Other programs under way at Maritime include research on pollu- tion and joint programs with universities and other national labora- tories. Other joint programs include efforts with Navy on mobile and emergency porting systems and close liaison with the marine industry to catalyze and promote industry-sponsored developments of all types. Further, Maritime has been responsible for the design of and pro- curement of fishing vessels and nautical charting and oceanographic survey vessels under requirements initiated by the Department of the Interior and the ESSA’s Coast and Geodetic Survey. Maritime has initiated a scientific and technical aae information exchange program (SIS), and in conjunction with the National Academy of Sciences is currently exploring means of expanding ocean 910 engineering and marine graduate level programs with the maritime universities. In summary, the Maritime Administration provides a major na- tional resource in the technology, design, and procurement of com- mercial maritime transportation systems, and has demonstrated its ability to interface effectively with commercial developments. ORGANIZING A NATIONAL OCEAN EFFORT Now I want to come to the matter of how to organize a national ocean effort, and I would like to comment on the recommendations of the Marine Commission for an organization to carry out its proposed national ocean program and also to comment on the organizational aspects of H.R. 13247. The Commission proposes that there be established a new independ- ent agency to be known as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency, commonly called NOAA, as the principal instrument within the Federal Government for administration of the Nation’s civil marine and atmospheric program. It is proposed that there be included within NOAA the Coast Guard, the Environmental Science Services Administration, the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, the national sea grant program, the U.S. Lake Survey and the National Atmospheric Data Center. There is no doubt in our minds that the competence in ESSA which was created by the Department of Commerce to serve as a national focus for our efforts to describe, understand, and predict the state of the oceans, the lower and upper atmosphere, and the size and shape of the earth, would be invaluable to such a new agency. I must state, however, that I have serious doubts as to whether the Commission’s recommendation to establish NOAA i is, in fact, the best organizational method for marshaling our national efforts in the oceans. For example, a look at the composition of NOAA leads to the conclusion that it is primarily oriented to science and technology. That is as it is set forth in the Commission’s report. I concur with the statement of Dr. Kavanagh, chairman of the Com- mittee on Ocean Engineering, National Academy of Engineering, in his testimony before your committee. He stated : I believe that the ocean engineering effort in resource utilization must be inter- faced with the economic and social goals of the Nation. To repeat an often quoted phrase, engineering and science are not ends in themselves, but tools to achieve our national goals. Therefore, we believe any agency undertaking a national marine program must also have the additional capability to act as a sort of “entrepreneur” for the Nation in exploiting opportunities in the marine area. Accordingly, while we regard the Commission’s concept of NOAA as imaginative and thoughtful, it may not be the best vehicle for the Nation’s effort in the marine environment. From others who have testified, I am sure you are well aware of the action taken by the President on the Marine Commission report, and that both re pro- gram and organizational recommendations are being seriously studied. Therefore, it doesn’t seem proper for me to comment further at this time on this aspect. 911 Now, Dr. White, the Administrator of ESSA, will focus on those recommendations of the Commission which bear directly on ESSA. If you wish, I am ready to answer questions now or we can proceed to have Dr, White give his testimony which is keyed to mine. Mr. Lennon. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Now we will go off the record for a minute. (Discussion off the record.) Mr. Lennon. Dr. White, will you proceed, please. STATEMENT OF DR. ROBERT M. WHITE, ADMINISTRATOR, EN- VIRONMENTAL SCIENCE SERVICES ADMINISTRATION—Resumed Dr. Wuirr. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to appear again before this committee. In my last appearance I testified in my capacity as a member of the Commission on Marine Science, Engineering, and Resources. Today I come before you as a representative of the Department of Commerce in which I serve as the Administrator of the Environmental Science Services Administration. As you know, as a Commissioner, along with other Commissioners from the Federal Government, I reserved my position on the pro- posals for reorganization of the Federal Government. ae Lennon. Just at that point, Dr. White, for the record, the other members of the so-called Stratton Commission who were rep- resentatives of the Government in addition to yourself, are who, from what agencies? Dr. Wuirtr. There was Mr. Baird, the Under Secretary of the Navy. Mr. Lennon. Mr. Baird. Dr. Wuitr. B-a-i-r-d. Mr. Frank Diluzio, Assistant Secretary for Water Pollution Control in the Department of the Interior. Mr. Lennon. Thank you. You may proceed. Mr. Mosuer. Mr. Chairman, I thmk we might mention that Mr. Baird since leaving the Navy has taken a personal position, an out- spoken position in support of the Commission’s NOAA recommenda- tion. That might be pertinent information at this point. Mr. Lennon. I thank the gentleman for the comment. That is the reason why I wanted to get it in the record at this time, because if somebody else didn’t come back to that, I was going to do so. Mr. Kerru. Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lennon. Yes? Mr. Kerru. Mr. Chairman, I regret that I have to leave for a White House meeting on shoe imports; but I will be back. Mr. Lennon. While you are down there, you might do a little mis- sionary work in the field. I believe you have the capability. Mr. Kerrru. Thank you. Mr. Lennon. Thank you, sir. We are sorry you have to go. Dr. Wuirr. As Dr. Tribus has just mentioned, the F ederal Govern- ment is still studying the Commission recommendation as to organization. Tn my testimony which follows, I will focus on those Commission proposals which directly affect ESSA. These proposals encompass many of the objectives of H.R. 13247. ESSA naturally takes the strong view that the problems of the physical environment are so closely related that it is no longer possible 912 to deal effectively, either in the provision of services or with the out- standing unsolved scientific problems except by consideration of many aspects of the total physical environment. Ocean and atmosphere are bnt different phases of the earth’s fluid envelope and their interactions with the solid earth are in many cases critical. It is well recognized that the hurricane is a creature of the oceans and the movement of ocean waters is a response to the winds of the atmosphere. The meteorologist needs ocean observations to predict the weather and the oceanographer needs weather observations to predict the state of the oceans. The technology for acquiring and processing such data is expensive and has large elements of commonality. ESSA is the only civil organization in Government that has the breadth of capabilities and authorities to cope with most of the prob- lems of description and prediction of the marine environment. Our major functions include the mapping and charting of the bathymetry and geophysics of the ocean floor; the description and prediction of water masses and currents; the observation and prediction of the weather, wherever it is—at sea and on land; the operation of real time global warning systems for the hazards of nature; and the acquisition, storage, archival, and dissemination of geophysical data. We also conduct extensive programs of research and development to improve our services and achieve a basic understanding of environ- mental processes. The systems we operate are global in character. Our satellite observing system, our survey and research operations, and our weather, seismic, “and tidal stations are worldwide in character, and in many cases they are integral parts of international systems linked to similar systems operated by other nations. Our charge is to provide environmental data and services to serve our national interests whatever they may be—defense, agriculture, in- dustry and transportation, and wherever they may be—on land and sea and in the atmosphere. We agree with the Commission that the touchstone of our marine future lies in the development of our national] scientific and techno- logical capabilities. We believe it is essential that a national commit- ment for the advancement of understanding of the planetary oceans be made a major goal of our national ocean program. We also believe that our Nation’s technological capabilities must be advanced in parallel. We recognize, of course, that marine science and technology is but one of a number of national problem areas and that is must compete with other pressing demands for the commitment of additional Federal resoures. The Commission has proposed mechanisms for achieving greater capabilities—through our academic institutions via university national laboratories and coastal zone laboratories; through industry via the establishment of national projects; and through Federal laboratories, which the Commission correctly points “out need substantial strengthening. My organization and the Department of @alinette would expect to play an important role in such an endeavor, and we look forward to the challenge with excitement. The Commission has raised fundamental questions about the man- 913 agement of our land, sea, and air environment. These concerns of the Commission are manifest in their recommendations concerning the coastal zone and the global environment. It may very well be that these concerns and the recommendations that stem from them will be of greater importance to our Nation and mankind than even the recommendations dealing with the oceans’ resources, important as they may be. While other organizations within the Department of Commerce are more directly concerned with economic development and the manage- ment of the coastal zone estuaries, ESSA now has, and will continue to have, a significant role in providing the necessary physical environ- mental information required for the proper management and control of coastal activities. For example, the management and development of the shoreline and continental shelf require that State and shoreline boundaries be pre- cisely determined. ESSA traditionally has assisted both Federal and State Governments in boundary determinations and is currently en- gaged in such determinations. The coastal mapping, tides, and geodetic programs of ESSA have been assisting the Bureau of Land Management to solve Federal juris- dictional boundary disputes with the States of Texas, California, and Louisiana. We have just launched a 5-year cooperative program with the State of Florida to determine shoreline boundaries needed by that State for its land management, conservation, and offshore resources development. : We expect such requests from States to grow as the potential for the development of their coastal regions increases, and we are accelerating our program to meet these needs. The Commission has proposed that Congress establish a National Seashore Boundary Commission to fix baselines from which territorial seas and areas covered by the Submerged Lands Act of 1953 may be measured. The objective of this proposal is sound, and it is essential to resolve jurisdictional disputes. ESSA is the Federal agency responsible for determining the tidal datum planes and conducting the hydrographic and geodetic surveys necessary for establishing baselines. It is the logical agency ‘to assist in providing physical and cartographic descriptions on which legal coastlines and baselines can be delimited. The Commission also recommended that necessary monitoring in- strumentation be developed for the coastal zone. ESSA presently mon- itors the coastal environment and has the observing and communica- tions networks and facilities that can be used as a nucleus from which to develop the expanded system required to meet growing local, State, and Federal needs. We now maintain tidal stations and certain of the hydrologic net- works used to forecast river water levels, and we conduct tidal and circulatory current surveys in estuarine and coastal regions. ESSA also has recently acquired a unique national facility, the survey ship Ferrel with its “TICUS” buoy system, for conducting tidal current surveys for safety and efficiency of navigation. These tidal current surveys also provide circulatory data in estuaries useful in determining flushing rates to assist pollution abatement con- trol. The Ferrel is being deployed during this year in Penobscot Bay, 914 Maine, where it is acquiring the environmental data necessary for predictions of flushing rates needed by State, local, and Federal agen- cies and private industry. We expect to expand this program into other estuaries as resources become available. As for our overall task in marine pollution control in the coastal zone, we believe that it parallels our effort in air quality control. ESSA now provides specialized meteorological forecasts and services, includ- ing daily air pollution potential advisory forecasts, to assist air pollu- tion control agencies in five major cities throughout the country. ESSA, as the Federal environmental service organization, considers its task as one of providing Federal, State, and local agencies who are responsible for regulation and control with necessary environmental descriptions and predictions upon which control and regulation can be soundly based. The Commission also was concerned with what man with his present and foreseeable technology might be able to do to modify and control environmental processes. It also was concerned with what man is now doing inadvertently to cause changes in the atmosphere and oceans. These are indeed formidable problems. In our view this Nation has been long overdue in organizing itself to cope with such problems in a rational and systematic manner, but the recently formed Council on Environmental Quality is a significant step forward in attacking this problem. In meteorology we are on the verge of learning how to control weather processes on a substantial scale. Recent developments point clearly to capabilities in a few years which will enable us to manipu- late certain kinds of atmospheric processes and more importantly to do this with predictable results. While we have not progressed as far in modification of the marine environment, the parallel capability should be developed, and the understanding necessary to accomplish this must be developed. With regard to the global dimensions of the marine environment, the Commission proposed a global monitoring and prediction system and recommended the establishment of a national environmental moni- toring and prediction system, to be called NEMPS, by this Nation. In my view few things recommended by the Commission deserve more serious consideration. All who would go down to the seas to operate in or under them require such environmental data and fore- casts. They are essential to the protection of life and property. A monitoring and prediction system would benefit the farmer in Iowa, the cattle rancher in Texas, and the forester in Montana as well. The oceans cover approximately 70 percent of the earth’s surface and interact with the overlying atmosphere through the exchange of heat and moisture. The results of this interaction do not stop at the shore. The atmosphere transports the effects far inland. They also influence the daily operations of our land, sea, and air transport. Such a system will provide the environmental forecasts of the hazards of nature, the hurricane, tornado, seismic sea wave, and floods. The effects of the oceans are ubiquitous. In one sense, this 1s what ESSA is all about. It is the national focus for environmental monitor- ing and prediction. It maintains unique and farflung observational networks on land and at sea and in space. 915 Through its forecast centers, such as its National Meterorological Center, its National Hurricane Center in Miami, its National Tsunami Warning Center in Hawaii, its National Severe Storms Forecast Cen- ter in Kansas City, and its operational meteorological satellite system with its global coverage of weather conditions on a 24-hour-a-day basis, ESSA works to detect and give warning to the Nation of the hazards of nature. Internationally, a major effort is underway to monitor fully the global atmosphere and oceans. The atmospheric system is called the world weather watch. There is also emerging the oceanic counterpart, the integrated global ocean station system (IGOSS). These systems are being coordinated through the joint efforts of the Intergovern- mental Oceanographic Commission of UNESCO and the World Meteorological Organization. When viewed in conjunction, the world weather watch and IGOSS truly form the foundation for a global environmental monitoring and prediction system. ESSA has been assigned the national lead responsibility for the world weather program by the President. The planning stage for IGOSS is getting underway, and ESSA is contributing, nationally and internationally, to this effort. We believe that the recommendation by the Commission that the proposed national environmental monitoring and prediction system (NEMPS) should be planned and developed on a global basis in con- cert with the world weather program has much merit. This has been proposed to assure a well-coordinated and nonduplicative global ocean- atmospheric monitoring and prediction system. One of the critical components that will be required for NEMPS, in the judgment of all who have looked at the need to acquire global observation of both the oceans and the atmosphere, is an operational environmental satellite system capable of global measurements as well as capable of interrogating platforms either in the oceans or the atmosphere. Over the past 10 years ESSA and its components have developed, in collaboration with NASA, a capability unique among Federal civil agencies. We are the only civil agency responsible for the management of an operational satellite system. This weather satellite system has yielded remarkable new assistance in forecasting the weather for data Sparse areas over the oceans as well as the land. In the last 3 years since the formation of ESSA, we have moved to broaden the capabilities of this operational satellite system to en- compass a wide spectrum of environmental measurements. In addition to weather measurements, we will shortly be using our infrared measur- ing devices to map the global sea surface temperatures. This demonstrated capability on the part of ESSA would be indis- pensable for successfully carrying through the concepts of the pro- posed national environmental monitoring and prediction system. The Commission has recommended a wide range of research activi- ties needed to support such a system. I will not go into a comprehensive discussion of our related research on ocean current systems or the mathematical modeling of oceanic circulation, but I would like to comment on the Commission’s recommendations for the study of air- sea interaction processes. 916 We believe that ESSA should continue to give high priority to air- sea interaction reasearch and use its capabilities in cooperation with other Federal agencies, universities, and foreign scientists to mount needed major field experiments. ESSA was assigned such lead agency responsibility for Federal air-sea interaction programs by the Federal Council for Science and Technology. The Barbados oceanographic and meteorological experiment (BOMEX), the largest and most complex experiment of this type ever undertaken, is an excellent example of interagency cooperation in the pooling of resources so as to accomplish a task that no single agency could undertake alone. We in ESSA are confident that the experience gained from BOMEX can be applied to similar experiments in other areas. In any national move to explore and develop the seas the sine qua non will be an adequate description of the physical and geophysical characteristics of the ocean floor. We must map and chart not only the areas adjacent to our shores but also the deep ocean. ESSA, as the civil focus for ocean mapping and charting, sees this as an urgent first step. ESSA annually distributes more than 2 million nautical charts, of which nearly 300,000 are small craft charts for boatowners. ESSA now provides over one-half of all its nautical chart products to the Navy. ESSA has begun the systematic mapping of the deep ocean and has mapped over 1 million square nautical miles in the North Pacific. To accomplish these mapping and charting tasks, ESSA-Coast and Geo- detic Survey operates a fleet of 14 modern vessels from marine centers on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts and two aircraft. At the present rate of effort our mapping and charting activities, extensive as they are, are almost overwhelmed by the present and grow- ing needs for our products. We have not been able in the past few years to meet the national needs for adequate maps and charts of the oceans. The Commission has accurately highlighted the problems and needs of ESSA to insure up-to-date charts of the U.S. coastal waters. Our present plans for additions to the ESSA hydrographic survey fleet and supporting facilities, particularly automated methods for data collection and construction of charts, need to be accelerated. The Commission also has recommended that ESSA undertake the systematic mapping of the bathymetry and geophysics of the U.S. near-shore waters and the continental shelves and slopes in order to provide 1 :250,000 scale maps of these regions within 10 years. We are engaged in producing such maps. Our own schedule has called for a more moderate rate of survey to accomplish this task by the late 1980’s. We have already begun both the production of maps from existing survey data and a program to accomplish the additional field surveys required. I am pleased to report that ESSA and the Geological Survey, through joint field operations in Norton Sound, Alaska, have developed a cooperative mode of operation that can serve as the example for con- ducting the recommended bathymetric, geological, and geophysical surveys of our Continental Shelves. The Geological Survey’s capabilities in geological exploration com- plement our capabilities in bathymetric, geophysical, and oceano- graphic surveys. Together the combined capabilities provide for the 917 complete geological and geophysical survey of our Continental Shelves as outlined by the Commission. There is one other service the Commission studied besides mapping and charting which ESSA now provides in part. This is the provision of environmental data services. The Commission has recommended that the National Weather Records Center (NWRC) and the National Oceanographic Data Center (NODC) be operated as a coordinated activity. Steps have already been taken to improve the coordination between these and other centers for geophysical data. We expect that these steps will assist in satisfying the many user groups. There are many more specific recommendations of the Commission that affect the Environmental Science Services Administration. I have only addressed the most immediate ones. In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that ESSA will enthusiastically participate in the im- plementation of any recommendations of the report of the Marine Commission which may be adopted. Thank you. Mr. Lennon. Thank you very much, Dr. White. Mr. Mosher ? Mr. Mosuer. Well, gentlemen, this committee has heard it argued that it doesn’t work in experience, it doesn’t work to mix the admin- istration of day-to-day action programs with the function of scientific research and development, and this has been one of the arguments we have heard against the creation of NOAA as perceived by the Com- mission, that in the administration of NOAA there might be so much emphasis on science and research that the day-to-day operations of some of the agencies involved would suffer. I don’t think this has been said before this committee, but I person- ally have heard it alleged that ESSA is an example of this. I have heard it alleged that in the last 3 years since the creation of ESSA, that some of the day-to-day practical operations that ESSA pursues, some of the coastal survey’s data gathering work and the weather observa- tions work, and so forth, that some of these practical day-to-day oper- ations have suffered because of the scientific orientation of ESSA, in ESSA’s top management. Do you want to comment on those allegations ? Dr. Trizus. I certainly do. Dr. White and I will both comment. on that. I would like to speak broadly on the matter and I would lke Dr. White to speak specifically regarding ESSA. It certainly does not have to follow that if you put research activities and operating activities together, that one is going to wash the other out. This is all a matter of the kind of management you have. Mr. Mosuer. So that you would not say that is an important argu- ment against the creation of NOAA ? Dr. Trisus. No; I certainly wouldn’t use that against the NOAA concept. I think there are other arguments that might be raised, but I don’t think that is a good one. You will recall, Congressman Mosher, that when I testified before the Daddario committee I spoke at length on research and the manage- ment of research and development and ongoing operations, and I think in ESSA we have a very good example of how it ought to be done. 918 In the first place, all of the research in the atmospheric sciences is not concentrated in ESSA. The research is carried out in ESSA, but also research is funded by the National Science Foundation. So. we see the principle that I spoke of at the Daddario committee being, I think, carried out properly there. The research is not central- ized but ESSA is able to carry out its mission-orlented research and to enage in fundamental research and development which will lead to improvements m operation. Dr. White can fill in some of the details but I am enormously im- pressed with some of the things that have come out of ESSA’s research which have affected the operations, and I don’t think they would have happened if they had been separated. For example, the Nimbus-3 satellite, which contains an infrared sensing system, is now producing data from around the world in places where we have not had the capa- bility to make observations, particularly over the oceans, and this information is now being fed into the operating network, and the fore- casts that we see on a day-to-day basis have been substantially im- proved by the addition of several thousand observations of upper air soundings where before we only had 600 or so. You just have to have people who are in operations talking to people who are doing research, if the research is going to be relevant. On the other hand, as I said, you also have to have an opportunity for people to do research on things that don’t seem relevant at the moment the research is undertaken. I think if we were to take the entire budget of ESSA that is devoted to research, and throw it into operations, it would only amount to about 15 percent, and this wouldn’t make a significant change in the overall capability of the operation compared ‘to the loss we would sustain by not having this constant feeding-in of improvements. Mr. Mosuer. You are saying that the danger that some other people before this committee have pointed to can be avoided simply by good management ? Dr. Trisvus. That is right. That is a good point at which I should turn this over to Dr. White and have him talk a little more about the specifics of the management. Dr. Wurte. I will be very brief, Mr. Mosher. First, I have a general comment. T believe very strongly that unless research and development is closely responsive to the needs of opera- tions and services, you will not get the maximum out of research and development, and, therefore, there are significant advantages to having a very close relationship between research and development activities and service activities. Mr. Mosuer. In other words, it is an advantage rather than a disadvantage. ~ Dr. Wuirte. In my view it is, sir. Mr. Mosner. If well managed. Dr. Wuite. In my view it is, sir. Secondly, with regard to your comment about whether ESSA’s operational and service activities have suffered.as a result of a con- centration on scientific and research activities as against a concentra- tion on service activities, this as I see it is just not true. The problem is that both in our research and development activities and in our service activities, we have been under very stringent 919 budgetary constraints over the past 3 years and there has not been a shift in emphasis from services to research. There just has not been additional money being appropriated to improve our services in the manner which we would like. But this is also true of our research. We carry out the programs that are approved by Congress through its appropriations process. Over the past 3 years the moneys that it has given us for research and development have been significantly lower than those that they have given us for our operating services. During these 3 years our requests to Congress for funds have similarly been heavily weighted in favor of services. We carry out the programs as approved by the Congress, sir. Mr. Mosuer. Mr. Chairman, one other question, or comment. Certainly, these gentlemen have presented us with a very impressive and perhaps optimistic outline of the activities and programs that the Department of Commerce already is conducting and intends to con- duct in support of the many goals and priorities established by the Stratton commission. Now, in presenting that impressive list of the jobs that you are already doing and your capacities to do these things, Mr. Tribus, are you implying that perhaps the Department of Commerce itself is the agency which might take the lead and coordinate this whole effort and obviate the necessity for the creation of NOAA ? Dr. Trisus. That is a very good question. As I said at the conclusion of my testimony, there were some aspects of this that it did not seem prudent for me to comment on now, and I think you are getting awfully close to the limits of prudence for me. Certainly, we have a number of things going on which we think would make a good basis for an expansion of our activities to meet many of the activities that should be carried out under the NOAA concept. How far one ought to go in that direction requires consideration of many issues that go beyond those that are put on my desk, and there- fore I would like to say just at this point that you have correctly inter- preted our enthusiasm for going into this area and for working in this area, but beyond that I guess I will have to wait until I hear from the decisions that are being made now in offices that are somewhat above me. Mr. Mosuer. Okay, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lennon. Thank you, sir. Mr. Rogers? Mr. Rocers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, it is good to see you and, of course, Dr. White, whom the committee holds in high regard also. We have had an opportunity to work with him. I think what you have outlined as the activity of ESSA has im- pressed the committee. Since we have followed it over the years, they have done an excellent job. Has the decision been made in the Department to oppose the forma- tion of a separate oceanographic agency, independent ? Dr. Trisvus. I don’t think that would be a good way to characterize the position of the Department. The position of the Department, as the Secretary transmits it on up to the President, and I am not always there, of course, when he does this, is that we are ready to-help in any way we can in this mission. 920 We think that the question of a separate agency is one alternative, but it is not the only way to meet it, and here are the capabilities we have to offer. Here is the best assessment we can make of what would result from various transfers. These are things that certainly must be in this agency if it is to do its mission. Here are things that are mar- ginal for consideration. And that is about where we would have to leave it, at that point. Mr. Rogers. I see. So, at least you have not come to a departmental position either in favor of or in opposition to a separate oceanographic agenc Dr. Micous I think our whole approach has been to say that this involves things that go beyond the Department of Commerce. It has to do with the spirit with which the administration wants to organize, the effectiveness of various approaches, and then stop at that point. Mr. Rocrrs. Yes. Well, I commend you for that. I think at least you have not come out in opposition toa new idea. Of course, as I am sure you know, the whole thrust of what we are trying to aim at is to put emphasis on the development of the ocean. Dr. Trisus. Yes; and this is the point that I have tried to make in this testimony : that i is, to develop a civilian activity in the ocean that contributes to the economy. It goes without saying, that a lot of private investors must be encouraged to go into the ocean and spend their money to do something because they think they can provide a service and make a profit. Now, the fostering of that activity requires that the agency that does it have the capability of dealing with industry in such a way as to bring this about. Such an agency ; should not set itself up as an agency that 1s going to start all over again and either learn how to do economic development or assume somehow or other that economic development will occur over there somewhere without their active participation. Mr. Rocers. Well, I see the point you are making, but I must say I have some concern when I look at the American merchant marine and what has happened to that. Dr. Trius. Yes; I think you have a right to be concerned. Mr. Rogers. Perhaps a new agency with new, fresh ideas, not im- peded by the formula of asking so much for this activity and not where they have such timidity in asking for sufficient funds to do the task, maybe this is what we need, and I think the Commission thought that. Dr. Trisus. Yes. That is a way to go at it, but it is not the only way. Another way is to say, “We have a good beginning in an agency such as MarAd, and now let’s build it into what we want,” and this is what the present administrator is doing. I think his program at the Woods Hole Conference is very imaginative. I didn’t mention in my prepared testimony the work that is going on with the surface effects ships program. This is very impressive. There is a lot of new activity going on. Mr. Rocerrs. I am sure that is so, and this has come about in the last 5 or 6 months, but in looking at the history of the development, it is not too impressive. Dr. Trius. I tend to agree with that. Mr. Rocrrs. I am concerned, too, at this. For instance, what is your construction budget for ESSA ? Is it $3 million ? 921 Dr. Trisus. I don’t have that offhand. Just a moment. I will get the information. Dr. Wuirr. The fiscal year 1970 budget had about $3 million for construction items in our budget. Mr. Rogers. Here is an agency that needs to build some laboratories, needs to build facilities, and I hope that you, Mr. Secretary, will impress your Secretary and the head of the Bureau of the Budget that ESSA/’s construction budget, for instance, is vital in the knowledge on hurricanes. Here we just had Camille, where it would have been helpful if we had an accelerated program in being able to know more, and we have a program trying to get started in Miami on this, and now they are talking about delaying again the building of your laboratory. But I don’t hear anybody in Commerce saying, “These are essential things for this Nation to do.” This is just an example of what I am talking about. We have to have someone to speak out and not just put it in a category of “Well, we are talking about it and we are planning about it.” This is what this Nation has been doing for the last 20 years. We want to see someone come out and do something and say, “We not only are going to plan and we are doing the planning, but we are going to have some action.” That is what I think this committee wants and is concerned with. I understand your feelings and I think you make some very legitimate points, but I am not sure that this gets to the root of the problem i in that we want something new to come forth and with great vigor and vitality to excite this Nation as to what really is in the oceans for the economic development of our people. Dr. Trisus. Let me speak to that point, because I think sometimes the achievements occur and they are not related to some of the spec- tacular things that are said. I was in Miami the other day and I was much impressed by what I saw in the development of oceanographic activity along near where the University of Miami has its facilities. Now, one of the ways that came about is the decision on the part of ESSA to consolidate various kinds of its research activities and put them near a university so that there would be encouragement for the university to put different activi- ties together. The Bureau of Commercial Fisheries is down there and this provided a nucleus, and then the people down in Miami got busy and they started promoting. I think after a while you are going to see a lot more activity out of these rather quietly made decisions, as quietly as could be made, because it 1s enough trouble to figure out where to put a laboratory without making too big a thing of it. Mr. Rogers. It was not too quiet, I might add. I was very aware of it. Dr. Trisus. What I am getting at is that the seed effect of this is enormous and in terms of budgetary implications it goes far beyond coming to the Congress and asking for several millions more when you see what happens in the private sector. Let me give you another example of what I mean. In the special task force that I am heading, where we are looking into our capability in the ocean, I am very much impressed when the people from Ocean 922 Science and Engineering tell me that they joined together with Alcoa to put up $5 million of their own money to make the Sea Probe, or when the people at Westinghouse tell me they built the Deepstar with $20,000 of their own funds. Mr. Rocrrs. And their Ben Franklin, basically on their own funding. ; : Dr. Trisus. That is right. And when I see what Ocean Science and the Fluor Corp. have done together to develop a new approach to an oil rig to take them to 2,500 feet when the record up to now is 340 feet, that is a real achievement. T ask these people: What do you need to get on with your business? What do you need from the Government? T am quoting now. They say : We need better weather prediction. We need better prediction of the sea state. We need better and more extensive mapping and survey of the ocean bottom. We need agreed-upon standards for the measuring system. We need agreed- upon techniques of measurement, because we rely on other people’s measurements, and we don’t know what they mean because they haven’t taken them in a standard way. That is what we need help on. Then they say to us, quoting again: We find it easier to contract with developing countries for offshore activities than we do with the United States because the institutional arrangements are such that it is harder to deal with the States. What I am getting at is that quite often the thing that needs to be done to promote development is a lot less spectacular sounding than some project for which you ask for umpteen million dollars and promise to do great things. The things that are required to cause the flow of private capital are often not so spectacular, but equally important, and that is why in my testimony I emphasized these things we were doing. I didn’t make a fuss over the surface effects ship. I didn’t make a fuss over the things we have done to promote containerization. The emphasis in the Maritime Administration today is on the use and deployment of technology to get us out of the position where we are merely funding the building of minor variations of ships that already exist and get the American shipping industry into the ships of tomorrow. Mr. Rogers. Yes. I don’t see much application from the Savannah, though. You mentioned the Savannah briefly, and I haven’t seen much come out of the Savannah. Dr. Tripus. Well, there are two or three things that can come out. Mr. Rocers. Can, but haven’t. This is what I am talking about. Dr. Trisus. Well, we are talking about the new team that we are putting together in MarAd, and what you are saying is you don’t be- lieve in the new team because the old team did not do a good job. Mr. Rocers. I would say I am more prejudiced that the new team won’t do as much as they might have because of the old team. Maybe that is what T said. Dr. Trisus. Give usa chance. We have a lot of programs. Mr. Rocers. I am willing to give you a chance and I hope vou will. Of course this committee will cooperate and I am sure the Congress will, in doing everything we can. 923 I don’t want to impose much longer on the committee’s time. I realize that the new team must be given time, and properly and cer- tainly will be given it, and I was hopeful that the new team would come in with such a fresh idea that they would say : This Commission has studied the problem set up for a two-year study. It has gone into this and recognized that we need a new organization and we are willing to go with them. rather than taking the old team’s attitude of saying: Well, we better keep everything in these departments just like they are. So that I hope the new team will come in, and I think your Depart- ment is beginning, I hope, to move in the area of a fresh idea, to say: Well, if it is the best thing for this Nation to have separate organization, we will go for it. I think you are saying this to me, or I hope so. Are you ? Dr. Trisus. Yes, but let me give you some evidence to help you have more confidence in the things T have said. We have already re- leased a program by MarAd fora ‘standardized multiship program. Mr. Rogers. What is your budget request to the Congress ? Dr. Tripus. I don’t have that number. Mr. Rogers. Well, I think you will find the budget request is less than this committee approved, much less, and much less than the Senate approved. This is the point I am making, that of course I realize there are many implications. I want some emphasis placed in the area, and I know you do too. What we need to get, is some action. Instead of always talking about planning and what we are going to do in the future, we need some action and that is what this committee is interested in. Your testimony has been most helpful, Mr. ‘Secretary, and I appre- ciate it and T think your attitude has been more encouraging than that of other Departments. Thank you. Mr. Lennon. Mr. Schadeberg. Mr. Scuaprperc. Mr. Chairman, I apologize for being late. I was unavoidably delayed. It would be presumptuous for me to ask any questions because T did not hear the presentation. T yield my time. Mr. Lennon. Mr. Downing. Mr. Downtne. Mr. Secretary, I was at another committee and didn’t listen to your testimony. I have read it, though. When do you think we could expect the views of the Department of Commerce on this matter of a proposed NOAA? Dr. Trrsus. Well, I am not sure quite how to answer that question, because the views Of the Department regarding NOAA to a very large extent are contained in my testimony. The only area in which we have not felt free to be quite explicit has to do with organizational aspects, because we are making recommendations and comments to the adminis- tration, but until the pros and cons of the various organizational prob- lems have been resolved, it does not seem proper for me to make those available. Mr. Downine. I didn’t ask you what the position was, but when are you going to let us know what your position is ? AEE er ( Ue ear 924 Dr. Trisvus. I really cannot answer that question. I wish I could. I don’t know the answer to that. Mr. Downrne. Your statement says, “It may not be the best vehicle for the Nation’s effort in the marine environment.” Let me put it this way. Will we have somebody tell us what the posi- tion of the Department of Commerce is, or will we just go on willy- nilly ? DE Trisus. Well, if you are asking me whether you are going to get a departmental position which is separate from the administration position, I guess the answer to that is that that does not seem to be the way we ought to do it, and I don’t think we will. I think it is proper for us to defer to the President in this matter, as to what his wishes are. He and his associates are actively studying and I look forward to hearing the result. Mr. Downtne. I imagine that the President will ask for recom- mendations from you. ; Don’t you think so? Dr. Trreus. Yes. He will ask for comments from us. We have com- mented on the various alternatives. Mr. Downtne. I sort of hoped that we would have some statement from the Department of Commerce. Dr. White, while I have you here, in Camille was there any way of predicting that Camille would dump 31 inches of water in 5 hours over the northeastern section of Virginia ? Dr. Wurire. Our present knowledge of the ways in which precipita- tion occurs and the ways in which these storms work would never have allowed us to predict an amount of water of the kind which was dumped by Camille on Virginia in a very, very small area. Some of the readings there indicated that amounts of 27 inches fell ina 12-hour period, far exceeding anything on the record in that area. There have been one or two occasions in the record in other parts of the country and other parts of the world with the intensity of down- pour exceeding that, but this was most, most unusual and anomalous, and my personal assessment is that the status of our science is such that we could never have predicted that amount of precipitation. Mr. Downtne. Thank you, Dr. White. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lennon. Thank you. The gentleman from Oregon, Mr. Dellenback. Mr. Detienpack. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. T join the other members of the subcommittee in welcoming you, Mr. Secretary and Dr. White. T have listened carefully to the testimony that each of you has given, and, Dr. Tribus; I have read carefully also the testimony that you have given, and I am not really sure that I understand the nature of your expressed concern about NOAA, because after commenting on the background recommendations and what is being done in Commerce, you end up making a comment on the Commission’s report in saying: I have serious doubts as to whether the Commission’s recommendation to es- tablish NOAA is, in fact, the best organizational method for marshalling our national efforts in the oceans. Then you devote one paragraph at the bottom of page 12 of your 925 testimony to the objection to the proposed NOAA, and make a comment on the study which is going forward. I would like to get at the reasons why you apparently have some concern about NOAA as the best instrumentality. Is it because you feel that the elements which it is proposed have their efforts coordi- nated, which are listed at the top of page 12 of your testimony, namely, the Coast Guard, the ESSA, the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, the national sea- -evant program, the U.S. Lake Survey, and the National Atmospheric Data Center, should not be coordinated ? Dr. ‘Tripus. Oh, not at all. I think the concern goes more along the line of what I spoke of earlier. That is, that we are concerned with the development of a capability in the ocean that involves more than just the U.S. Government. It involves the encouragement of industry to participate, to develop activities. A separate agency which is not primarily oriented to the develop- ment of the economy is going to find it somewhat more difficult to ful- fill its role. I am not saying it is impossible. I am not saying a separate agency is an impossible way to do business. It may well be a way to do it. I am just saying that when you shift your focus from saying, ‘There is that big ocean, let’s all get in it and do things,” to, “There is that yesource that needs to be developed,” and if you think of the total development processes not just the science and technology, but the science and technology plus financing, organization, personnel, the development of viable enterprises, you may shift your sights a little bit, and when you take that into account, a separate agency may not be the west way. But I am not saying that it is an impossible way, or that there is something inherently wrong about it. I am just saying there are more alternatives to be considered. Mr. Detirenzack. Would you then please make a brief comment on what alternative you personally feel would be superior to this cen- tralized agency ? I recognize that Mr. Mosher’s earlier question was reaching in the direction of the Department of Commerce. I think this 1s no time for modesty on your part. I would like to know what your opinion is since you are one who is deeply involved in this fleld, because I really don’t understand whether you are being delicate ‘and modest, or whether you are really saying to us that you don’t think it ought to be coordinated in a single agency. T would like to know, as one member of the subcommittee, what you are saying. Mr. Trisvs. I am awfully glad this is on the record. Very few times in my life have I ever been accused of excessive modesty. I would like to consult with my attorney here for a moment. Well, I am afraid that the best I can say now is that we can consider hy pothetical cases of various sorts, but I just don’t want to get into the position of discussing what this administration ought to do, ‘because I think that takes on matters that go beyond my province. I don’t like the people who work for me usurping my authority, and I don’t want to do this to the people above me. Mr. Detienpack. Please, Mr. Secretary. 926 Dr. Trreus. Within that limitation, let me make a few comments concerning alternatives, and their pros and cons, and I can perhaps get at what you would like to hear from me. Mr. Dernenpack. Please let me make my question clear. IT am not seeking to embarrass you. I am not seeking to embarrass the President. I am not seeking to embarrass anybody about this. I am just deeply concerned about this problem, as are other mem- bers of the subcommittee, so that we are reaching for ideas. Here is a specific suggestion which has been made, I suspect. not a perfect suggestion, 1.e., the creation of NOAA. If we are going to abandon this proposal ‘which has been recommended by a very, very prominent Commission, I would like to know what alternatives there are available. Dr. Trisus. Let me make some statements relative to that, which I hope will be helpful. We have already said in our testimony that ESSA is an essential part of a NOAA concept. We have not said in the NOAA concept where it would be, which I think by implication means, however, if a NOAA is set up, if we mean business about the NOAA mission, and the missions as I have defined them, then it necessarily includes ESSA. That is clear. Tf someone decides that there is going to be a separate agency, and if that separate agency is really separate, then I suppose the Depart- ment of Commerce has lost ESSA, but if that 1s what it takes to do this mission, that is what it takes. All right. We attempted to go through the list of organizations that are essen- tial. Some are more essential, and some not so essential. Let us take the program which Interior has in the Office of Saline Water. I think no matter how you examine that, that could or could not be in a NOAA, or whatever we are going to call this agency. It is clear that you could look at that in several ways. On the one hand, it does have some impact, perhaps locally, on the seacoast, on the sea, with the intake of water and exhaust. It has a lot of materials problems. On the other hand, it really is a power problem, and a water prob- lem, and perhaps ought to be looked at more in terms of the fresh water supply of the Nation, and perhaps it belongs more in Interior than it belongsin NOAA What Iam talking about is that we have to go point by point to every agency that is proposed for transfer, and ask some hard questions about how essential are they to the NOAA concept, and what impact they would have on the other programs to which they relate. Now, it is in,that context that I have hesitated to say exactly how it ought to be, because as soon as I start talking about our programs, and other people’s programs, you known as well as I do the implica- tions of such remarks, and I am just simply trying to stay away from them until the decision has been made at a higher level. Mr. Derrenpack. Again, I am not seeking to force a recommenda- tion from the Department of Commerce, but I am interested in at least knowing the theoretical objections to the NOAA concept. You have indicated, as I read your testimony, that you do not feel that these various elements which would embrace at least those listed at the top of page 12 of your testimony should be kept separate and independent each from the other. Is that correct ? 927 Dr. Trreus. No, I think there has to be a way of coordinating this, and I think some things will have to be put together. For example, MarAd was ignored in the Commission report. There is no ship organization included. Mr. Detitensack. Is it your opinion that that should be? Dr. Tribus. Yes, I think they have to be put together. Mr. Detitensack. Are there any others like this that you feel should be put together ? Dr. Tripus. You can go both ways. It is not clear what the role of the Coast Guard ought to be in this, because on the one hand they are an agency whose ships carry armaments, and they do have a police force activity. It is going to take a lot more study to decide whether you can get better international cooperation in research and development if you carry this out with an agency that is also doing police work. Maybe that has to stay where it is, but be coordinated in its activities and use. For example, ESSA has now the lead agency responsibility in the buoy program, but Coast Guard, because it has the ships and the people, carry out a portion of it, and it may well be that we will dis- cover as we explore the activities that the NOAA employs—as we ex- plore them in detail, we are going to find that certain things may be pulled together in one agency, or through some special type of co- ordination, and at this moment those are the matters that are under review. That is why I am again hesitant to say exactly how they ought to be. Excuse me. I was in error. The Coast Guard has the lead agency responsibility, and we coordinate, which means we state the require- ments, and of course that information is put into our computers for the forecasting, so we obviously have to say what it is we want out of the buoy system, but the Coast Guard deploys them, maintains them, and services them, and so on. But you can see that there are issues here that are not simply organizational, but they have to do with matters that the Commission probably did not have time to go into. I think they have done a magnificient job, but they still could not do everything. Certainly the MarAd is one question. Another is the question of whether you can have an armed force type group and go out and say: “This is a research agency, and we want to engage in friendly research with you.” There is an application there that you have to work your way through. Mr. De.ienpack. On this question of independent agencies whose efforts are coordinated versus a single agency, which would be the agency primarily responsible for the operation of component elements, do you feel that it is not imperative that they be kept independent, and merely have their efforts coordinated, but you are not prepared to say, because of individual constituent agencies, that they should be blended together in a single organization ? Is that correct ? Dr. Trrevs. I think I would say it a little differently, but it is almost what I am saying; namely, that just coordination of things as they stand now seems to be a pretty difficult task. Mr. Drtienpack. So you would go beyond coordination ? 928 Dr. Trisus. I certainly would go beyond mere coordination, but the question of where this agency reports, and all that it includes, it seems some still is open to question. Mr. Detienpack. But you would go beyond the present interrelation- ship between independent agencies which merely share information ? Dr. Trizus. Yes. Let me say one of the reasons for that. It just has to do with whether you get a critical mass, whether you have enough things going together. I have been reviewing this as part of this task force on national programs. As part of that work, every agency in the Federal Govern- ment that is doing anything in the ocean is presenting its program. Now, you listen first to the Navy present its program, and there is a real powerhouse of engineering talent. They present the things they are doing, and you see how they have studied their needs and require- ments, and are then going back to make sure that the basic research and development is adequate to enable them to carry out their various missions. Then you have a report from MarAd, and it is a pretty good report, but not anything like Navy, because MarAd is down in numbers of people and dollars. When you talk to other agencies about their programs, the only word that I can use, and the most charitable one, is pitiful. We really have to do more, and bring this expertise together. As an engineer, I am worried that good judgment comes from bad experience. Tam worried about where that good judgment is now being stored, When you go to make an improvement in a ship, you go where there are people with a long history of involvement with the equipment, and with the facilities, and with the procurement problems, and with the labor problems, and all the rest. J think we have to pull our efforts together to be able to consolidate our lessons, particularly in the development of technology. I don’t question that. The only question I have is where this should report, and how it gets its funding, and its relations to others. Mr. Detiensack. I think that is extremely important. Dr. Trrsus. Yes, sir. Mr. Detiensack. You are then emphasizing the vital importance of improving the presentation and bringing together a much more co- hesive organization to blend together actions and available data, et cetera. Is that correct? Dr. Trrsus. Yes, sir. Mr. Derrenpacs. And you feel it is important that there be a blend of the operation of Government and the operation of private industry ? Dr. Trius. Yes, sir. Mr. Dettenpacs. And you feel it is important that there be a blend of the operation of research and the operation of application of research ? Dr. Tripus. Yes, with the one limitation that not all the research should be funded out of this agency in order to provide the multiplicity of approach. Mr. Detrensack. Then if we include this vastly improved coordi- nation of operation, that is one goal, if we include the goal of blending of research and application, the goal of blending of Government and 929 private sector operation, and if we assume as another important goal a method of getting major, substantial, increased emphasis on all of this, you would accept these as goals? Dr. Tripus. Yes. Mr. De~iensacn. And you are not saying that the creation of an independent agency could possibly not be the best way to bring about these goals. You stop short of saying that that is the best way of reach- ing these goals. Dr. Trisus. Iam not sure when you throw enough negatives together what the affirmation is. Mr. Detirenpack. Do you accept those as the goals? Dr. Trizus. Yes. Mr Detiensack. Would you add any other goals as desirable goals? Dr. Trisus. I guess I would have to. As you went down the list, I think it was an exhaustive list, but I may not have caught everything. But you seem to be hitting the principal lines and I agree with those. Mr. Deciensack. Those would be major goals. You might have some peripheral ones. Dr. Trieus. That is right. There are areas of manpower, for exam- ple. If you are going to have an industry that is centered around the ocean, you are going to have to produce people to get into it. In your remarks you did not speak to the issue of encouraging the development of research and development in education to support this activity. If you are going to introduce change in industry, you have to come to grips with the fact that change involves the workingman and you have to deal with him. That was an issue that it seems to me needs to be brought out. I am not so sure, because I just don’t remember whether you put in your list the same emphasis I would on the need to develop the eco- nomic ties so that you create viable industries as opposed to creating something that has to be continually subsidized. But the main thrust is that to do this will require something stronger than the coordination of a group of Federal activities spread thin across the Government. Mr. Detienpack. Excellent, and it will also require major change, then, over that which is now existent, forgetting for the moment what form the change will take. Dr. Trizus. I don’t know how major it would turn out to be because in many cases we are talking about adding things that don’t exist now, and if addition is change Mr. Dretienpack. Addition is change. Dr. Trigus (continuing). Then of course it is. There will have to be major additions if we start to do all of these things. There is no ques- tion in my mind that, as I said, the engineering capability outside of the Navy, and certainly if you don’t include MarAd, can only be called pitiful. We have to do a great deal more. That is an addition. In many cases, I think, if you take existing operations and group a few of them and then fund them and add the people, the result will be as though it had been a major transformation, when in fact 1t may not be. Mr. Detienpack. But insofar as results are concerned, you think there should be a major transformation from that which is now existing. i 930 May I ask one more question, Mr. Chairman, and then T will stop? I don’t know whether you really want to speak directly to this ques- tion or not, Mr. Secretary. Let me ask it. As you evaluate the relative national and international importance of major steps in the field of the oceans and the atmosphere versus major additional steps in the field of space, how would you evaluate these from the criteria of national and international importance, one in relationship to the other ? Dr. Trisvs. This is an extremely difficult question to answer. I chink I tend to agree with Dr. Paine, who has said that in many things these just aren’t comparable. There is, first of all, the whole question of our approach in this country to spending money. Sometimes we make investments and some- times we spend money, and it doesn’t seem to me we always distinguish between them. Sometimes we proceed toward goals which have a quality that every- one agrees it’s a good thing to do because that is just in tune with our character. Other time we do things which people don’t even know that we are doing which enhance our economic capability. I am not ducking your question entirely, but I find it an extremely difficult one to answer simply because it seems to me that there is implied here an either-or quality which I am not sure is essential or is inherent in the situation. Some of the things we can do have a multiplying effect. A certain amount of money spent in standardizing instruments, a certain amount of money spent in mapping and charting may produce enormous dividends. Then in the space program it may be that you have to spend a lot of money before you realize your dividends. Certainly what is going to happen to this Nation in the field of communications, what is going to happen in better monitoring in the atmosphere that has come out of the space program in many ways is going to be extremely difficult to calculate. Iam sure we are going to get breakthroughs with respect to meteor- ology, particularly “with respect to things” like the hurricane which would be impossible without our weather satellite, and we wouldn’t have had our weather satellites without the space program. So that, in a certain sense, we are talking about a program that is very expensive 1n the space program but which has potentialities which boggle the mind, and then we talk about another program which is of lesser order of magnitude of expense which has return which is significant, and at this point I am just unable to make a good contrast. “Mr. Denten BACK. Thank you. Mr. Lennon.‘ Mr. Karth. Mr. Kartu. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secretary, contrary to what some of my colleagues might imply, IT am encouraged by your testimony. I think I agree > with you. You are not excessively. modest. Dr. Trius. Iam glad you qualified. Thanks for that, sir. Mr. Kartu. I would rather suggest that you are one who gives very serious consideration to the definition of the word “authority” and the responsibility that goes with it insofar as it relates to judg- ments made or not made at this point by those who are superior to you in the echelons of Government. 931 The reason I say I am encouraged by your testimony is became of what you have not said. The Commission report is the best proposal that has been made up to this point, and I think most thoughtful people agree that it is the best approach that has been suggested to date, Years hence and in retrospect it may not have been the very best, and I think over a period of time we will make some modifications. I might just digress momentarily and say that the language you used on the last page, and I will quote, “It may not be the best vehicle for the Nation’s effort in the marine environment,” doesn’t really bother me because you are saying, “It may not be the best program.” So that statement is a very cautious one. I don’t think it is a negative one at all. Again I say that I was encour- aged because I think the rest of your testimony is rather positive in nature. I think theoretically your statement does support in great part the Commission’s recommendations pertaining to an NOAA agency. I was encouraged, Mr. Chairman, also because the Secretary feels so strongly that research and development moving along together has many advantages over research and development moving along sepa- rately, particularly when they are separated by agencies of Government. NASA, I think, is the best illustration of what fantastic success you can have with this. Never in the history of our country has major re- search and technological development and progress been so successful, particularly when none of their programs had ever been done before by man in all of our history. That is because the research and the development went hand in hand, the people who did the research followed through and also carried out some of the development. They didn’t have to talk to dif- ferent people. All they had to do was to continue to pursue what they found during the course of their research activities throughout the development of the program. Well, I agree with you. I say that is the reason I am encouraged. I might say to my colleague, Mr. Dellenback, that because of what you said, Dr. Tribus, I think that for all practical purposes you have given indirectly at least an endorsement to the Commission’s report. T am not going to ask you whether or not that is true. I am not even going to ask you to comment on that statement. What you have said relating to research and development moving along simultaneously, side by side, within one agency under the same authority and good management, I think pretty much does what we are asking you to do, beyond which I am confident you cannot go at this time or possibly even in the future. But I want to thank you very much for your testimony. I find it most encouraging, and I think you have done a yeoman’s job here in convincing this committee that they are on the right track. Thank you. Mr. Lennon. I thank the gentleman from Minnesota for the com- ment, and I thank the gentleman from Oregon for the very precise, incisive questioning that developed the testimony on which the gentle- man from Minnesota is able to make those comments. It has contributed a great deal. It is certainly obvious, isn’t it, Mr. Secretary, and Dr. White, that if there is such a Central Govern- 932 ment structure as NOAA brought into being, that ESSA would be an essential and necessary part of the same ? Dr. Trrsvs. I think that is true. Dr. Wuire. Yes; I would agree with that, sir. Mr. Lennon. Now, in the testimony of last week by the Under Secretary of Transportation he was talking about the Coast Guard and the reasons for the Coast Guard being in the Department of Trans- portation, because it was related to transportation, and the question was asked in what manner, in what way primarily was it related to transportation, and of course he immediately replied “The Maritime Administration.” We couldn't help but comment, “Now, you justify the Coast Guard being in the Department of Transportation because of its relationship to the Maritime Administration, but the Maritime Administration is not in the Department of Transportation. Tt’s in the Department of Commerce.” Then the question was asked by me, “Would you gentlemen like to see the Maritime Administration moved over into the Department of Transportation?” And you know what the obvious answer was, human nature being the same. So we find ourselves in these situations so frequently. I have been privileged to read over your statement, Mr. Secretary, prior to coming to the meeting, and I have questions, but I think most of them have in substance been answered. Time will not permit us to go into any great detail of them this morning. The question was asked as to whether the time will come that the Department of Commerce would make a specific recommendation or submit a definitive alternative to the Commission’s recomendation. Tam reminded that back in 1961 when the Honorable George Miller was chairman of the Subcommittee on Oceanography and it had just come into being a couple of years before that time, this being the 87th Congress, the first session, there was legislation introduced oriented in the direction of some of the Commission’s recommendations with re- spect to a Government structure. I was reading again this morning to refresh my memory a letter received by me in January of 1962 which was the second session of the 87th Congress, signed by the then acting chairman of the Subcom- mittee on Oceanography, Mr. John Dingell, in which he pointed out that the committee had wrestled with this problem all during the first session of the 87th Congress, more specifically calendar year 1961, and expressed the view as to whether or not we could ever get the adminis- tration to go along in bringing together the various spectrums of oceanology, marine science, oceanography out of the 11 departments and agencies of the Federal Government. To make a long story short, we were unsuccessful. Now let’s assume that the administration had supported this com- mittee in its efforts to make a start then. There is no doubt but what when ESSA came into being it would have moved into this agency, the central agency. Where would we be today if the committee had not met with the resistance of the administration in our efforts to take some forward step in this field ? 933 So then we came back after many years and brought into being the act which mandated the Commission. We didn’t say “find and recom- mend a Government structure.” We said: “If there is a need for a Government structure, will you tell us so, and if you make the deter- mination that there is a need for a Central Government structure, ind1- cate and tell us what type of Government structure. Now, why should we just continue as we have in the past having this lack of dialog with the administration? You perhaps don’t now it, Mr. Secretary, but Dr. White knows, that even when the act was passed and enacted into law creating the Commission, we felt the necessity at that time to create a national council because it was ob- vious to us from testimony that the Interagency Committee on Ocean- ography did not have the sufficient policy-level height necessary to be a determining factor in making these decisions related to the various Government agencies that were involved. We met the resistance of the administration on that, too, but we went ahead anyhow and said nothing can be lost and everything can be gained, and it was embraced by the administration when it came into being as the best thing that could ever happen. As early as February of this year the President called on the Vice President as the chairman of the National Council to make some gen- eral recommendations in this field, and the Vice President went to the agencies and departments for their comments. “But what I am concerned about is that the President called on the Ash Commission on May 19, on May 19 and today is September 23, and the Ash Commission is not even organized yet and doesn’t have a staff, and on the 11th of September of this year they so advised us that within the next month or two that they hoped to be able to launch this study, within the next month or two. Yet it was on the 19th of May of this year, and we have it in our file, and it is in the hearing record, that we had the President’s request to the Ash Commission. We assumed that they would be in position to give us some general ideas. We called them on September 10, and they responded the next day, and said, “We hope to launch a study within the next month or two. After we get into the problem, we will be in a better position to estimate how long it may take.” In other words, it will be 2 months before they get ready to start to begin to commence a study, and at that time perhaps they can esti- mate how many more months it would take them to review the Com- mission’s report and make their recommendations. Now, that in somewhat discouraging because that is the experience we have had in the past. Both Mr. Mosher and I were privileged to meet occasionally with the Commission, although we had no part in the decisions except to try to point out to them what was the congressional intent based on the hear- ings in this committee room and based on the statements made on the floor, and we participated to that extent. Appr opriately Dr. White refrained from participating in the de- cision of the Commission with respect to a Government structure. I don’t know what he might say if he disassociated himself with the administration as the Under Secretary of the Navy has done since 934 being a member of the Commission, and he now wholeheartedly en- dorses the concept. Of course the Navy is not involved. I realize that. There again you have the human element. I do appreciate your testimony. I agree with the gentleman from Minnesota that you have given us some encouragement, and I am so grateful for the very incisive way that you were examined by the gen- tleman from Oregon to develop these things. I am much more encouraged than I was by the testimony of the distinguished Under Secretary of the Department of Transportation. But there again the Coast Guard is the biggest part of the Department of Transportation, I guess, when it comes to manpower, and budgetary funding, too. We can expect that. We do appreciate it. The gentleman from Massachusetts. I am so glad you are back. You may proceed. Mr. Kerrn. [ was ona provincial mission. Mr. Lennon. Do you want to give us a report? Mr. Kerrn. Jimmy Burke said that there were 22 members of the Ways and Means Committee that had shoe manufacturing establish- ments in their districts. Mr. Lennon. I though you were going to tell us that you had been down there to talk about this. Mr. Keirn. That will come at a later date. I am sorry that I couldn’t be here, but I have a case in point which underlines the philosophy expressed by the chairman. In what agency is the national buoy program now ? Dr. Trisus. Dr. White will respond to that. Dr. Wuire. The Coast Guard is responsible for the development of the national buoy program. Mr. Kerru. In what agency does the Weather Bureau function ? Dr. Wuite. The Department of Commerce. Mr. Kerrn. If NOAA was in existence, would not this be a means of liaison? Would this not be much more effective than to have these responsibilities dispersed ? Dr. Wurrte. I would not want to leave the impression, Mr. Keith, that we do not have very good coordination on the buoy program with the Coast Guard today. It is excellent. They are responsive to all the requirements of all the Government agencies. On the other hand, I also could not honestly say that if they were in the same agency such coordination wouldn’t be very much simplified. Mr. Kerrn. We had, as you know, a hurricane a couple of weeks ago which prompted, once again, please on the part of Members of Con- gress for a weather ship which would keep track of these storms. They cause millions ofdellars of loss from what you might call false alerts, people closing their stores and so forth because the hurricane was lost, because we lost track of it. It is the opinion of a great many people at the Weather Bureau that a weather ship would make this job much easier, that is, keeping track of the hurricane and the forecasting of the weather in that area. Now there is a buoy program that has an ability to function to a large degree in the same way as the weather ship. Are you familiar with that buoy program ? Dr. Wuire. Yes, I am, sir. 935 Mr. Kerrn. They have a monster buoy up about 40 feet in elevation. Dr. Wutre. Forty feet in diameter, sir. Mr. Kerra. And how tall? Dr. Wurrr. Well, that can go to various heights depending on the functions the buoy is going to be used for, but it is not excessively tall. Mr. Kerri. Would the buoy to a large extent accomplish the pur- poses of the weather ship ? Dr. Wurrtr. Only limited functions of a weather ship, sir, the point being that a weather ship has the capability for taking upper air soundings which is the critical piece of information that you need in forecasting coastal storms, whether they be hurricanes or north- easters. Mr. Kerrn. You mean by met messages ? Dr. Wuire. No, I am talking about upper air soundings. You release a radiosonde by a balloon from the ship. Mr. Kerr. You call them met messages, I believe, in the trade, meteorological messages. Dr. Wuirr. Yes, the data is transmitted as a meteorological message. The buoy at the present time and in the foreseeable stage of develop- ment as we see it would only be able to give you surface weather observations. I would like to take this opportunity, Mr. Congressman, and I think you are referring to Hurricane Gerda which went up the coast. re- cently and fortunately spared your district in Cape Cod and just glanced it with gale winds, to say that you mentioned that we lost track of Hurricane Gerda. I don’t know where that information comes from. Hurricane Gerda was under excellent reconnaissance at all times. We knew where the storm was at all times. It was not lost at all. Mr. Kerru. Well, the news which I listened to at 6 o’clock on that day couldn’t make ‘any reference to the path of the storm. The news which T listened to at 7 o’clock had great details and according to the people with whom I talked—Don Kent, the Boston weather forecaster, and Oscar Tannenbaum—there was a period of time when the aircraft in the eye of the hurricane found the turbulence so great that they had to leave the storm and for a period of 6 hours it was lost. Dr. Wurirte. Hurricane reconnaissance, Mr. Keith, is carried out to provide six hourly readings of the location of the eye of the storm and its intensity. In this particular case the Air Force was asked to make additional reconnaissance flights, which they did. Their crews were operating 18 hours a day. They did a magnificent job in the reconnaissance of Hurricane Gerda. They gave us more information than we would normally request or require from a hurricane, so that I would say that the hurricane position was quite well tracked by reconnaissance. This does not say that there 1s not a need for additional weather observations in the ocean south of New England to enable us to predict New England storms better. I think this is also a correct statement. Mr. Kerrn. Well, the New England press indicated in a story dealing with this, that the hurricane was lost for a period of approximately 6 hours, and during this time the radio stations and the press were publishing as fact the forecast that had been made the evening before. 936 So that down here in Washington we heard about 3 feet of water in the main streets of Hyannis at midafternoon of the following day because that was what was forecast the night before. Of course, a resort community relies on patronage, and I know that people were discouraged from coming up by reason of the reports that were actually not at all substantiated by the weather pattern that followed. It is not your fault, certainly, that the newspapers do this. I know of one radio station in Springfield that called the newspaper in Falmouth to find out what the true facts were, and then went ahead and broke the false story anyway. If we are off on a tangent, I do think that there is a point to be made here. If you had a national agency of this sort—the coordination, the research, the development, the availability of men and equipment, a stronger chain of command—it might be of real value. Dr. Wurtre. I will agree with that statement. Mr. Kerrn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lennon, Let me ask you this. You say that “The concept of NOAA ... may not be the best vehicle for the Nation’s effort in the marine environment.” Would you say, Mr. Secretary, that the commission in its 214 years of study gave every possible consideration to all other alternatives other than the NOAA concept that they recommended ? What would be your judgment before the member of the commission comments on that, if he cares to comment ? Dr. Trrpus. With all due respect to the commission, I think that the commission’s thrust was not as strongly along the line of economic development and the promotion of viable institutions, as it was along the line of promoting activity in the ocean and seeing what it would take to fund that activity, and to taking the view that if we had all this activity that the economic development would probably proceed with- out really focusing on what it takes to make it occur. Mr. Lennon. But you have not ‘answered my question. I asked you if you did not have the judgment now that the members of the com- mission gave some serious consideration to other alternatives other than NOAA as they recommended. Dr. Trisus. Well, if they did, it is certainly not in the report. I wasn’t there and I can’t answer that question because you are asking me about things that are not of my knowledge. Mr. Lennon. What would you say about that, Dr. White? Dr. Wurre. Mr. Chairman, of course, I cannot speak for the com- mission. I can only speak for myself. Of course, I did not take a stand on the organization proposals. It is certainly clear that the commission did consider other alternatives in their deliberations. Mr. Lennon. I understood you to say what? Dr. Wurrs. The commission did consider many other alternatives in its deliberations. Mr. Lennon. All right, sir. Now let me return to you, Mr. Secretary. I am sure that you are well aware of the action taken by the Presi- dent on the Marine Commission report and both his program and orga- nizational recommendations are being seriously studied. When did you prepare this statement that you gave -here today, Mr. Secretary ? ant 937 Dr. Tripus. Well, this material has been in preparation now I guess for about a month. Mr. Lennon. From the time this was being prepared and to the time you gave it here today, you did not know that the Ash Commission to which the President had referred the Marine Commission report had advised us on September 11 that they hoped to begin their study within the next month or 2? Dr. Trizus. I was unaware of that Mr. Lennon. When you say that “its program and organizational recommendations are being seriously studied,” by whom did you mean it was being seriously studied ? Dr. Trisus. Well, I was under the impression that it was being seriously studied by the Ash Committee. Mr. Lennon. We were, too, Mr. Secretary. That is the reason, having been advised that the President issued the memorandum and having i in our files the memorandum of the President to the Ash Commission requesting their study on May 19, we thought it reasonable to assume that they would at least look at this matter casually because you can certainly read this report in 4 months. So that when we called them on September 10 in anticipation of your testimony and testimony of the other gentlemen representing the other agencies. We thought they would tell us something, and we were a little shocked when they : advised us that they hoped to. begin this study within the next month or 2. We hoped after they got ready to start to begin to commence the study in the next month or 2 that at that time they would be in a better posi- tion to say how long it might take to do this serious study that you have said flatly here in your statement they made. It is certainly not your fault because you believed actually what we did. If we had not done what we did, we would have accepted your state- ment in absolutely good faith because you made it in absolutely good faith, so that you see when statements are made before this committee just as statements are made by Members before the House and Senate, they are not always factual because they just don’t have the facts. That disturbs us a little. We would like so much if you would help us get this study moving down there. We don’t know what the problem is, but we can’t just sit here and wait until next January for the Ash Commission to tell us, “Well, we hope to get the report back to the President and from the President back to the agencies and back to you sometime next spring.” We did that in 1961 and 1962 and it never came about. I believe it is the concensus of the majority of the members of this subcommittee, I am almost sure it is, to move along in this direction. We want to move in concert with not what is in the best interests of the Depart- ment of Transportation or the Department of Commerce or the De- partment of the Interior, or any other agency of the Federal Government, but what is in the national interest. That is what we are concerned with. We rather believe, and you agree, that generally speaking the Com- mission’s recommendations are in the national interest in this field. We do appreciate your appearance here, gentlemen. You have been a great help to us as has been indicated by other members of the subcommittee. 938 Tomorrow morning we shall be privileged to have as our principal witness the Honorable Russell Train, the Under Secretary of the In- terior, You gentlemen remember the Secretary when he testified here on other matters. We will recess until tomorrow morning at 10 o’clock. (Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Wednesday, September 24, 1969.) NATIONAL OCEANOGRAPHIC PROGRAM WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 1969 House or REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OCEANOGRAPHY OF THE ComMItreE oN MercHant Martne AND FIsHERIEs, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met at 10:15 a.m., pursuant to recess, in room 1334, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Alton Lennon (chair- man of the subcommittee) presiding. Mr. Lennon. We are delighted to have again with us the Under Secretary of the Department of the Interior, the Honorable Russell E. Train. Mr. Secretary, is it your intention to follow the context of the statement furnished to the committee this morning, sir? STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL E. TRAIN, UNDER SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR Mr. Train. That is correct, Mr. Lennon. Mr. Lennon. Will you proceed ? Mr. Tratn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee on Oceanog- raphy, I am glad to have this opportunity to testify on the report of the Commission on Marine Science, Engineering, and Resources, and on H.R. 138247, “To amend the Marine Resources and Engineering Development Act of 1966.” The marine environment is of great interest and importance to the Department of the Interior as well as to Secretary Hickel personally. This Department is responsible for the stewardship and wise man- agement of most of the natural resources of the Nation. These include valuable and generally underexploited marine resources: Fisheries, oil, and gas, other minerals, water, and recreational opportunities— together, of course, with the environmental problems attendant with such exploitation. The Commission report is an important document which will help guide Congressional and executive branch action for some time to come. It recognizes that the ocean is a source of raw materials for im- proving our domestic economy and furthering our foreign policy. It is especially valuable in identifying deficiencies and gaps in the present national program, such as the need to develop new technology for marine resource research and development and to put more effort into broad-scale national laboratories and projects. (939) 26—-563—70—pt. 2——_28 940 Designation of an Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife, Parks, and Marine Resources, and the creation of an Office of Marine Re- sources to provide him with staff support, was an important response by the Department of the Interior to the recognized need for better internal coordination of its diverse marine resource activities, and for better liaison with the Marine Resources Council. Tn addition, Secretary Hickel’s personal interest in marine resources has given impetus to oceanic research and development in Interior. Mr. Lennon. Excuse me, Mr. Secretary. Right at that point for the record when in point of time was the official designation of an As- sistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife, Parks, and Marine Resources made by the Department of the Interior ? Mr. Trarn. It was prior to this year, Mr. Chairman. I am told Octo- ber 1968 is the correct answer. Mr. Lennon. And the name of the individual, for the record ? Mr. Tratn. At the present time it is Dr. Leslie Glasgow. Mr. Lennon. Now, the creation of an Office of Marine Resources by the Assistant Secretary, for the record in point of time when was that, Mr. Train ? Mr. Train. believe that was exactly at the same time, Mr. Chair- man, October of 1968. Mr. Lennon. October of 1968? Mr. Tratn. Yes, sir. Mr. Lennon. That was approximately 3 months before the Com- mission’s report. Mr. Train. That is correct. The Commission’s report came in January. Mr. Lennon. And there was on the Stratton Commission an Assist- ant Secretary of the Department of the Interior. He was on the Commission at that time ? Mr. Tratn. I believe so, sir; Mr. Frank Di Luzio. Mr. Lennon. The Assistant Secretary for Water Pollution Control of the Department of the Interior. Thank you. You may proceed. Mr. Tratn. And I was going to add at this point, Mr. Chairman, that in addition to the two matters to which I referred, there has been a substantial reorganization within the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries which was undertaken early this year, and I also believe that there has been some reorganization within the Geological Survey with respect to the Office of Marine Geology and Hydrology which also bears upon the same general statement. Mr. Lennon. I think it would be interesting at this point in the record, Mr. Secretary, considering the creation in October of this posi- tion of Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife, Parks, and Marine Resources and the creation of an Office of Marine Resources, that a speech was made in April of this year by one of the staff people of this very organization to the effect that at that time the office staff con- sisted of two individuals and that the budget allocation for this great responsibility created in October last year was a total of $39,000. Would you comment on that? Mr. Tratn. I believe those figures and that statement are substan- tially correct. Mr. Lennon. Thank you. Now you may proceed. Mr. Train. I would also add, although I do not have the exact figures, that the 1970 budget submitted by the present administration 941 included funds for some strengthening of the Office of Marine Resources. : i I regret to say that the action on the other side last week in the Appropriations Committee deleted those increases. : Mr. Lennon. What was the budget request and the ultimate budget approval for this particular Office of Marine Resources to back up and support the staff of the so-called Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife, Parks and Marine Resources for 1970 ? Mr. Train. Subject to permission to submit any correction to the record later, it is my understanding that the existing budget for the Office of Marine Resources is $32,300 and the Nixon administration 1970 budget requested a $75,000 increase in that budget. Mr. Lennon. That is approximately the figure that I have in front of me. Thank you. I thought it appropriate to get this in the record at this point. Mr. Tratn. Creation of the Commission was in part an expression of the view that marine affairs in the Federal Government were diffuse and Jacked adequate coordination. Development of marine resources and protection of the environment also were matters of general concern. Recently, the Department published a brochure describing its inter- ests and responsibilities in the ocean. Copies of this report, “Marine Resources Development—A National Opportunity,” have been made available to the committee. The report describes the breadth and variety of Interior’s marine activities. Interior is the major civilian agency in the Federal Government in oceanic affairs. A conservative estimate of our budget for marine programs is about $80 to $100 million, which is 35 to 40 percent of the total civilian budget for oceanography. Mr. Lennon. Now, Mr. Secretary, at that point would you provide for the record a breakdown, a definitive explanatory breakdown, of the budgeting of the approximately $80 million to $100 million on an annual level which you say is directly related to the civilian budget for oceanography at this point in the record ? Would you furnish that so that it can be inserted in the record at this point? Mr. Train. I will be happy to doso, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lennon. Thank you. Mr. Tratn. We may have it right here. Mr. Lennon. If it is not too lengthy, I think it would be interesting to the members who are present for you to repeat it. If it is going to be too lengthy, we will just submit it. Mr. Tratn. No, sir; it is quite brief, and if I may just read the totals and then put the entire document into the record, I think it will give a good picture. The overall total on this document for the Department of the Interior 1970 budget for marine affairs is $78.2 million. Now, the breakdown of that total _ Mr. Lennon. That differs a little bit from your statement of $80 mil- lion to $100 million, but I am sure you can explain the difference between $78 million and $100 million. Now you bring it down to $78 million, which is less than the lowest figure you gave. Ma. Trary. I think actually there is probably a little disagreement 942 as to exact allocations to marine programs. There are differences of opinion. Mr. Lennon. All right. Go ahead. Mr. Train. Within the total of $78.2 million the following is the breakdown : The Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, $45.4 million; Federal Water Pollution Control Administration, $10.7 million; Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, $9.4 million; Geological Survey, $4.7 million; National Park Service, $4 million; Office of Saline Water, $2.6 million ; Bureau of Mines, $0.9 million; Bureau of Land Management, $0.5 million; Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, $4 million; the Office of Ma- rine Resources, $0.1 million, which as you will note when those two are added, brings the figure up to something over the $80 million which T earlier mentioned, actually $82.3 million. Mr. Lennon. Now, could you recapitulate the figure you gave us for the Office of Marine Resources which was established in October of last year according to your statement? That was $1 million what? Mr. Trarn. The figure that I gave for the Office of Marine Resources for the fiscal year 1970 is $0.1 million, $100,000. Mr. Lennon. Well, I find that difficult to understand when we have just been told that your present expenditure was $39,300 and the present administration for fiscal 1970 approved that figure for Marine ~ Resources up to, I believe you said, approximately $132,000. Mr. Petuy. $75,000. Mr. Lennon. Now you say it is over a million. Mr. Tratn. No, sir. I think if I may start over again rather than trying to explain what perhaps I said, the present budget for the Office of Marine Resources is $39,300. The administration 1970 budget submission to the Congress included an increase in that figure of $75,- 000 so that the total would be, for 1970, $75,000 plus $39,300; and the $100,000 figure which I read to you as the 1970 budget for that office is the result of rounding. But I think those figures are consistent. Mr. Lennon. I misunderstood you. I thought you used a figure of $1.2 million for the Office of Marine Resources. Mr. Tratn. If I did, I did not mean to, sir. It was $0.1 million that T said, $100,000. Mr. Lennon. I am sorry. Please excuse me. Mr. Trarn. Then for the record at this point I will offer the full table. Mr. Lennon. Thank you, sir. (The table follows:) DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR FISCAL YEAR 1970 BUDGET FOR MARINE AFFAIRS [In millions of dollars] Bureau or office R.&D. Investment Operations Total Bureau of Commercial Fisheries___.____.-_------------------- Ze 3.2 15.1 45.4 Federal Water Pollution Control Administration. _--.....:--.---- 2.8 4.0 3.9 10.7 Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife._.......-._---.._-_-.-_- 1.8 Qa 4.9 9.4 Geological’Survey 2st ee ee Oa ee TS er 3.1 a2: 1.4 4.7 NationaliPark’Senvicetc 2 Senge i aie Eel elie BUENA ad tu) ah aaa at aeons eno 4.0 4.0 Officeiof Saline; Water ee eRe ee La ey ed VA Ve desi ope keene MBE RSL 2.6 Bureautofy Mines cece reer rg ies Le ee .6 Bee Hs is aie Ub J 9 Bitreauotgliandi Mama perme tiscccry eases a NOR a aU Ua a ee Wel Te Leal a) a) BurjeauomOutdoors Recreations teeter acs en aoe cmtcranik peak si a ee semester LO sepia ms et a eS Ya OfficevofiMarine Resourcess cee es ea UIs AS CEN EN ee ae 0 NE ea a fh Res --- 943 Mr. Lennon. I would ask you this question. So many people have argued, including some in the Department of the Interior, that the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries which takes, I believe, approximately $45 million of this total figure, somewhere in the neighborhood of two-thirds or almost three-fourths, was not directly related to oceanography, but in your judgment it is? Mr. Trarn. We consider it a very important element in oceanography. Mr. Lennon. You charge off, in your general statement, this amount to the oceanography program. Mr. Tratn. That is correct, sir. Mr. Lennon. So that it is your belief and judgment that the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries is inextricably related to the broad spectrum of marine sciences and oceanography ? Mr. Train. Yes. Mr. Lennon. Thank you, sir. Mr. Tratn. We consider the appropriate heading more that of marine resources than oceanography. Going back again to our budget figures, if seashore land acquisition for public recreation is included in addition to all activities of the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration that relate to the marine environment, the Department’s total marine resources budget is at least twice the amount quoted. More than a dozen bureaus and offices in the Department have direct marine resource responsibilities. These very broad and diverse responsibilities require close coordina- tion. Differences can arise between commercial and sport fisheries. Development of marine oil and gas resources, if not carefully planned and managed, can create conflicts with fisheries and recreation. Water pollution threatens other uses of the marine environment. Interior’s experience in resolving such conflicts, and in coordinating its diverse interests in the environment, has made this Department especially qualified to resolve resource-use conflicts. We are learning to anticipate the problems so that measures can be taken in advance to avoid or alleviate them. We have had a long and successful record of cooperation with other Federal agencies, the States, universities, industry, and public groups. Our relationships with the Navy and the State Department have been especially close. The Department of Transportation, through the Coast Guard, has been extremely helpful in monitoring foreign fishing opera- tions off our coast and in enforcing fishery regulations. The Department of Commerce and the Department of the Interior have many joint marine programs which reinforce the capabilities of both agencies. We cooperate with NASA, AEC, NSE, Smithsonian Institution, and other specialized Federal agencies, and our close working relationships with the States are well known. Altogether, In- terior has been a leader in marine affairs for many years. Mr. Lennon. Mr. Secretary, I am going to interrupt you again. Your $45 million for Bureau of Commercial Fisheries is impressive. Internationally where do we stand with respect to the production of edible fish for the American population as compared with other nations? Are we somewhere in either sixth or seventh place? Is that not true? Mr. Traty. Are you asking what. proportion of the total world production of commercial fish is produced by the United States? 944 Mr. Lennon. Yes, sir. In other words, the worldwide catch of fish has risen from 20 million tons to 60 million tons in 40 years, but in that same period when they have increased at the international level from 20 million to 60 million tons in 40 years the U.S. production has remained essentially unchanged. Is that a fair statement ? Mr. Train. I believe it is, sir. Mr. Lennon. And we import today approximately 70 percent of our edible fish ? Mr. Trarn. That is correct. Mr. Lennon. That would lead some of us to believe that the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries does not appear to be as dynamic as we would like it to be, which is a matter that concerns all of us and especially the Department of the Interior which has jurisdiction over the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, I am sure. Do you want to comment on that? Mr. Tratyn. We certainly share your concern. In answer to your first question, it is true, as I understand it, that the United States stands sixth. Mr. Lennon. But you say you have been a leader in marine affairs for many years. Now, how do you equate your leadership in the vigorous area of expenditures when we have remained unchanged for 20 years in the production of edible fish, whereas the international production has increased from 20 million tons to 60 million tons in that 40 years, and we have stood at sixth place and import 70 percent of our fish? Where is the dynamic leadership that the Department of the Interior is pro- viding in this important field for which you get $45 million a year, which represents almost two-thirds of the moneys expended by your Department in the so-called marine environment or the marine production ? That does concern us. I know it is not your responsibility, because you are new in the Department. Well, I have a lot I could say about this, but I do not want to in- terrupt you more. You goright ahead. _ Mr. Train. Turning to the specifics of the report of the Commis- sion, the organizational recommendations in chapter 7 have attracted widespread attention. The Commission report abounds with references to the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Agency (NOAA), as if the Com- mission had in fact decided that creation of a new agency was impera- tive. Actually, Dr. Stratton has said several times that the Commission recognized that the responsibility for civilian ocean affairs might be delegated to an existing agency, but that this solution would require major reorganization, and that reorganization of any existing agency which had statutory responsibility for nonmarine matters was beyond the terms of reference of the Commission. Mr. Lennon. Right at that point, Mr. Secretary, for the record, let us get into the record the names of the three Government representa- tives appointed by the President as members of the Commission. They were the Honorable Charles F. Baird, the Under Secretary of the Navy, the Honorable Robert M. White, Administrator, Environmental Science Services Administration, and the Honorable Frank Di Luzio, 945 Assistant Secretary for Water Pollution Control of the Department of the Interior. It is a fact, as we have been reminded in the testimony we have had from the Government agencies at the Cabinet level, that these gentle- men took no part in the recommendations with respect to a so-called Government structure, and appropriately so. It is, however, interesting to note that the Honorable Charles F. Baird, the Under Secretary of the Navy, since he severed his connection with the administration, is now of record as approving and recommending the so-called Govern- ment structure referred to as NOAA. It was interesting yesterday in the colloquy between the Chair and the Assistant Secretary of the Department of Commerce and also Dr. White, the Administrator of ESSA, that the Assistant Secretary made this comment, and I am reminded of the fact that the Assistant Sec- retary of Commerce took a like position as you are taking in your state- ment today. J read your statement early this morning. He made the comment, Mr. Secretary, that he could find nothing in the Commission report that indicated that the Commission had considered the alternatives in the approximately 214 years that they made their study, the ultimate findings and conclusions and recom- mendations. Fortunately, Dr. White was present. So I asked Dr. White yester- day, and have it on the record, that while he did not participate in the actual casting of the vote with respect to the recommendation of the Government ‘structure, he would have to say for the record that the Commission considered all the alternatives, all the alternatives before they came up with this recommendation. Now, fortunately we had both of them here yesterday. I think it is interesting for you to keep in mind the other departments, and the people representing the Federal agencies which are involved in the field. Certainly it is good that we have it in the record from one of these Government representatives on the Commission that the Com- mission did consider all the alternatives. I thought it appropriate to get it in the record again this morning in connection with your statement. I hope I won’t interrupt you any more, but I may. Thank you. Mr. Train. I think it wise to ‘consider whether a new agency is really necessary. To us it appears to separate resource programs and thereby inhibit comprehensive environmental management. If this Nation is to be successful in solving the complex problems of the en- vironment, its organizational structure and program ele must be directed toward managing the environment as a totality complex, inextricably related natural system. Separating the ocean and the atmosphere from the land and fresh waters ignores this fact. Furthermore, I think it is proper to defer action on the organizational recommendations of the commission until the President’s Advisory Council on Executive Organization has had an opportunity to view ocean affairs in the full context of Federal organization as a whole, and to consider all alternatives. Mr. Lennon. To get continuity, if I can, at this point in the record, we are talking about the Ash Commission, Mr. Secretary ? Mr. Train. Yes, sir. 946 Mr. Lennon. When did the President request the Ash Commission to include in its study the recommendations of the so-called Stratton Commission ? Mr. Trary. I do not know the answer to that question, sir. I have been informed by the Bureau of the Budget that such a referral has been made. Mr. Lennon. Specifically, on May 19. We have a copy of that memo- randum for the staff, signed by the President, in this hearing record. Now, today is September 24 I believe or thereabouts. On September 10th of this year, having in our possession the memorandum for Mr. Ash by the President, of May 19, we called the Commission to ask them if they were in a position to give us their views with respect to this request made upon them by the President onMay 19. I say this because I was surprised to find out that the gentlemen who preceded you, representing, respectively, the Department of Transportation and the Department of Commerce, did know about it. We asked the Commission if they could give us their views. They advised us by letter dated September 11 that, “We hope to launch this study sometime within the next month or two.” Now, let’s see if we can put a timetable on that. May 19 to September 11, and they advise us that they hope to launch the study within the next month or two. That would put us up in November at the earliest, a month or two. They said, “After we get into this problem, we will be in a better position to estimate how long it may take after that time.” Now, you didn’t know that. The Under Secretary of Transporta- tion who spoke for the Secretary of Transportation didn’t know that. The Assistant Secretary of Commerce didn’t know that, but we knew it, and how long do we have to wait on these things, do you suppose? I say how long do we have to wait on these things, do you suppose? Mr. Trary. Well Mr. Chairman, I am sure that the so-called Ash Committee will get at this as expeditiously as it can. Mr. Lennon. Well, are vou specifically recommending that not only we defer it, but, speaking for the Department of the Interior, that you are opposed to the enactment of the legislation that is now a vehicle for the consideration of this committee which provides for the implemen- tation of the Commission’s report to the degree of establishing a Goy- ernment structure as recommended by the Comission and the creation of a national council as recommended by the Commission ? Are you saying that officially you all oppose it? Mr. Tratn. I would prefer to break that down a bit, sir, because I believe the Department would wholeheartedly support the estab- lishment of the National Advisory Council. Mr. Lennon. ‘Are you recommending that the bill not be enacted ? Are you recommending that ? : Mr. Train. We recommend deferment of action on this bill on the proposal to establish NOAA until such time as the Ash Committee has reported. That is our position at this time. Mr. Lennon. Well, at this point I ask that there be inserted in the record a letter addressed to the Honorable Edward A. Garmatz, Sep- tember 25, 1969, signed by you, where you recommend that the bill not be enacted. 947 T ask unanimous consent that this letter be inserted in the record at this point. I guess you knew we had that. Mr. Tran. Yes, sir. Ras Mr. Lennon. I don’t know whether we were supposed to get it after you testified today or not, but we got it this morning. (The letter follows:) DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, Washington, D.C., September 23, 1969. Hon. Epwarp A. GARMATZ, Chairman, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, House of Representa- tives, Washington, D.C. Drar Mr. CHAIRMAN: Your Committee has requested the views of this Depart- ment on H.R. 13247, a bill “To amend the Marine Resources and Hngineering Development Act of 1966 to establish a comprehensive and long-range national program of research, development, technical services, exploration and utiliza- tion with respect to our marine and atmospheric environment.” We recommend that the bill not be enacted. H.R. 13247 would provide for the creation of a new Federal agency, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency, to serve as a principal instrumen- tality in the Federal Government for administration and coordination of civil marine and atmospheric programs. It would also provide for an advisory com- mission, the National Advisory Commission for Oceans and Atmosphere, to review continuously and make recommendations to the President and Congress on the status of these programs. This proposal follows closely the recommenda- tions contained in chapter 7 of the January 1969 publication. Our Nation and the Sea, a report of the Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources. With respect to the report’s organization recommendations, President Nixon on May 19, 1969, requested the Advisory Council on Executive Organization to examine carefully the Commission’s proposal in the broad context of Federal organization. Part of President Nixon’s request to the Advisory Council on Executive Organization was to compare the Commission’s proposals with alter- nate ways for coordinating and advancing national development of marine sciences. Therefore, we believe that any attempt to create a new independent agency that would include all civilian marine and atmospheric activities is premature at this time. No such legislation would seem appropriate until the Advisory Council on Executive Organization has completed its study and pre- sented its findings to the President. The Bureau of the Budget has advised that there is no objection to the pres- entation of this report from the standpoint of the Administration’s program. Sincerely yours, RUSSELL EH. TRAIN, Under Secretary of the Interior. Mr. Petty. Mr. Chairman, would you yield? Mr. Lennon. Yes. Mr. Prtiy. I have been listening to your questioning, and I sympa- thize with your patience, but I was thinking back to the Hoover Commission on reorganization of the Federal Government and how long that took. I hope you will be a little understanding about this administration and its desire to reorganize on a sound basis consider- ing all the various departments of Government that are concerned. I just hope that you will be a little easy on this witness because he hasn’t anything to do with it. Mr. Lennon. I will say to my distinguished friend that if the mem- bers of the former administration would be here taking the position that the members of the new administration are taking, I wouldn't be half as tolerant or as dispassionate as I have been this morning. I think I would really try to chew them out, and I think they would deserve it. 948 Mr. Prexiy. I think you chewed out the former administration for delaying 7 year’s on the maritime program so that I really think you are very understanding. ; Mr. Lennon. I try to be fair. Go ahead, Mr. Train. Mr. Trarn. I suppose I would say that this would indicate that there are many blessings in having a new administration. Seriously, Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that this discussion and the letter of the Ash Commission highlights the fact that a major reorganization of the marine responsibilities of the Federal Government really cannot be carried out or implemented without careful attention to the overall total organization of the Federal Government. It cannot be just sepa- rated out. I think this is the major reason why the administration’s consider- ation of this very important matter is taking some time and doubtless will take some little time. I really do not believe that any delay is based upon dilatoriness or a desire to create a delay, but simply is in recogni- tion of the fact which T have just stated, a marine reorganization can- not be undertaken in separation from a total look at the overall organi- zation of the Federal Government. It is obviously impossible to comment here on the more than 100 recommendations in this report, nor is it necessary. Many of them are for guidance rather than for immediate action. Some will require detailed scrutiny to determine how best they may be implemented. Some of the most important recommendations of the Commission are presented in chapter 2, “National Capability in the Sea.” Tt recommends establishment of university-national laboratories and coastal zone laboratories, and the strengthening of Federal marine science laboratories. The Department of the Interior has had considerable experience with such broad enterprises. It has been our policy, whenever possible, to establish our laboratories on university campuses, or closely asso- clated with universities. We also have a long history of close working relationships with the States. In Federal marine affairs Interior has worked in concert with Navy and the National Science Foundation in a three-way effort to consolidate civilian, military and fundamental research and development in marine affairs. It would be well to build on these foundations as much as possible, rather than to establish new centers. Chapter 2 also includes other proposals important to the Department of the Interior. It recommends development of capabilities to operate on the seabed and subsoil of the Continental Shelf and deep sea by the year 2000. Tt recommends that the Federal Government support a dynamic program of fundamental technology to develop the resources of the sea, an objective of particular interest to this Department. With passage of the 1953 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, the Depart- ment was given direct statutory responsibility for management of the resources of the Outer Continental Shelf. I have brought along a few copies of a set of charts and reports produced by Interior’s Geological Survey recently, depicting the mineral resources of the seabed around the world. Produced by this Department for the August 1969 session of the United Nations Seabeds 949 Committee, these documents give a comprehensive view of worldwide seabed resources and how much, and how little we know about them. Tt has been our stated policy to cooperate with industry to develop techniques when it is impossible for industry to do it alone, but to step aside when industry no longer needs help. Chapter 3, “Management of the Coastal Zone,” is also of especial interest to Interior. In terms of environmental problems, this is where the action is. The coastal environment is a rich breeding and/or nursery ground for most of our marine commercial and sport fisheries. Its natural habitat also provides substantial support for a variety of waterfowl and other wildlife. It is the location of most our marine oil and gas and other mining activities. But except for our lakes and inland waters, it is the place where the aquatic environment is most threatened by man’s activities. Some 75 percent of this Nation’s population lives in the coastal States. Tt isa recreational area of rapidly growing importance and desirability. Tt is the place from which most of our growing needs for water must be satisfied. It is the arena of conflicting interests and uses of the environment. The Commission rightly recognized that management of the coastal zone is a shared responsibility of Federal Government, States, local governments, universities, and industry. It properly realized that a variety of mechanisms would be necessary for successful management, depending on local conditions and needs. Here again, Interior’s existing mechanisms for cooperation with the States, and our considerable experience in these matters will be valu- able. The role of the Department of the Interior in the coastal zone was recognized by Congress when it authorized the National Estuarine Pollution Study under section 5g of the Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966, and the National Estuary Inventory Study under Public Law 90-454. When they are completed, these studies should provide an important source of information for considering further actions with respect to the coastal zone. Mr. Lennon. Mr. Secretary, I don’t know whether or not you have been advised, but the Subcommittee on Oceanography expects to con- vene here in Washington on October 28 and October 29 a symposium to which we invited the 30 coastal States and Great Lakes States to participate in a 2-day forum relating directly to the recommendations of the Commission on the so-called coastal zone management. This leads me to ask you when is the National Estuary Inventory Study to be made available ? Mr. Train. That particular study, sir, is due by the 30th of January of next year. That is the statutory date. The other study, the National Estuarine Pollution Study which is under the statutory direction far broader in scope than simply a pollution study and calls for a com- prehensive plan for coastal zone management is due, I believe, on the 3d of November of this year. Those are the statutory dates. Mr. Lennon. To what degree has the study progressed where the report is due under the statute, I believe you said January 30 of 1970? Do you know about that ? Mr. Tratn. The study is underway, Mr. Chairman. The funding for the study only became available, as I recall, in this current fiscal year, so that contracts really have only recently been let for the various 950 studies involved. It is well underway and we are hopeful that the January 30 date can be met. But it would be premature for me to really give a complete status report. Mr. Lennon. The Deputy Under Secretary, Mr. Gibbons, has agreed to participate as a panel member and hopefully those who come here from the States can receive some really helpful information since you state here, as the other Secretaries did, representing Transportation and Commerce Departments where they said they were involved in this, too, in depth. That is what they both said in their statements. Based on their wide knowledge that they have of the subject matter according to the statement, they are going to be asked to come and present a position paper on this question. In their statements they say that they are experts in the matter, and hopefully the Department of the Interior, because of its interest and concern and previous involve- ment and the dialog with the States, that you say you have in your statement, can also make a substantial contribution to the understand- ing by the representatives of the States and the departments that we all have together. Tam sure your Department will do that. Go ahead, sir. Mr. Train. J think that you will find that Mr. Gibbons’ participa- tion will be very valuable in meeting your objectives. Chapter 4, “Marine Resources,” is also an important chapter to Interior. It demonstrates that, despite the importance of the coastal zone, the United States has important international responsibilities for development of the resources of the high seas. These problems are extremely complex, and they can be resolved only after very careful consideration of all possible alternatives. There are no simple answers to the questions of limits to national jurisdiction over the seabed and its resources or to the fishery resources of the superjacent waters. The same can be said about the forms of international machinery that might best apply to the deep sea. The solutions proposed by the Commission are not the only solutions, nor necessarily the best solutions. The answers must be found only after very careful deliberation. Interior has been working closely with the Departments of State, Defense, and other Federal agencies on this matter. Chapter 5, “The Global Environment,” and chapter 6, “Technical and Operating Services,” deal with exploration and monitoring of the environment, mapping, safety at sea, and policing, among other matters. These subjects are just as important to resource development and management as they are to man’s direct interests in weather predic- tion, erosion control, or transportation. The environment of living resources cannot be understood if it is studied apart from the resources themselves. Exploration of sea bottom topography should not be divorced from minerals exploration and technology. Design and testing of scientific and technical equipment must be coordinated closely with scientific studies of the resources themselves. This requires close liaison between the agencies performing these vari- ous functions. Expanded exploration should be planned in connection with improved coordination. Nearly all of the services described are services that Interior must use, or which we can provide. Thus they require close coordination with other Federal agencies. We are pre- 951 pared to work with other agencies, and indeed have been doing so for years, to insure maximum use of environmental and technical skills. And finally a word about funding. In chapter 8 of the report the Commission has estimated that the national budget for marine affairs should approximately double in 10 years, making due allowance for changes in the value of the dollar. We believe that environmental problems, including problems of the marine environment, require prompt attention. We recognize, however, that the executive and legislative branches will have to consider these requirements in relation to other important programs that need to be carried out and which are competing for Federal funds. That completes my prepared statement, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lennon. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I want to say it is my judg- ment that the Department of the Interior has perhaps responded more to the creation of the Commission and its recommendations than any other agency or department of the Federal Government. The Depart- ment of the Interior has attempted to move. T think that was, in some degree, due to the fact that they had on the Commission a gentleman who was privy to the information and the studies that the Commission made and who must have carried back to the Department of the Interior the suggestion that “We ought to start. moving in this direction,” because the Department of the Inte- rior has moved in this direction. They have shown a great deal more interest in the marine sciences in the Department of the Interior in the last 18 months or last 12 months than there has been in the several years that I have been around this Congress. I think it has stimulated a number of the Gov- ernment agencies, particularly the Department of the Interior, to get involved. I won’t say what motivated it, because you had that responsibility all the time, as you have indicated, but I think it is an indication of the feeling on the part of the people in the Department of the Interior that “This is a good way tio show what we are capable of in the event the Congress should move in that direction.” Mr. Mosher? Mr. Mosuer. Mr. Secretary, on page 4 of your statement you indi- cate that it is wise and necessary to consider whether a new agency is really warranted. That certainly is true. In fact, I assume that that is what this committee is attempting to do. Now, in your letter to Chairman Garmatz dated September 23 you recommend that H.R. 13247 not be enacted. Is that recommendation based on your decision or a decision in your Department that a new agency is not necessary ? In other words, is that recommendation an indication that you are now decisively opposed to any such new agency, or is this recom- mendation that the bill not be enacted based on merely a matter of timing? Are you saying definitely right now that we should not create anew agency or are you merely saying that we should postpone this decision ? Mr. Tratn. The final position of the Department for or against NOAA on the merits would, of course, require close coordination with all the other agencies of the Federal Government and the Bureau of 952 the Budget. I am not in a position to state a position on the merits at — this time because there has not been such an overall consideration as yet within the Federal Government. Mr. Mosurr. Your opposition to the bill, then, at this time, does not indicate that you are unalterably opposed to the creation of any such new agency as NOAA ? It merely extends the statement made on page 4 that this needs to be considered further ? . Mr. Train. No, sir. I think it fair to say that, looking at this pro- posal from the standpoint of the Department of the Interior and its responsibilities, and I am trying to be careful to identify what I am about to say as a view simply from one department uncoordinated and without resolution of any interagency differences of opinion, but from the standpoint of the Department of the Interior, we would view with very grave concern an approach to the management of marine resources which was predicated upon a formal organizational sepa- ration of the marine environment from what we consider to be the very closely and intimately associated land and coastal zone. Mr. Mosnuer. Nevertheless, in the Department of the Interior, accord- ing to your testimony, you do recognize the validity of many of the deficiencies in our present uses of the seas and our policies and or- ganization for the use of the seas. You do recognize the validity of many of the deficiencies to which the Commission pointed 4 Mr. Traty. Absolutely, sir. Mr. Mosuer. And, therefore, in order to meet those deficiencies you certainly recognize that if we don’t create a new agency to coordinate the job and to meet those deficiencies, then we have to consider alter- natives. The chairman of this subcommittee earlier today indicated our belief that the Stratton Commission did consider many alternatives before they recommended creation of NOAA. Now, that leads us to a question as to what alternative or alternatives the Department of the Interior proposes. Tn your testimony you mention designating an Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife, Parks and Marine Resources, underlining the words marine resources, and by the creation of that new Office, the designation of that new Assistant Secretary, are you suggesting that that is a sufficient alternative to the creation of NOAA ? Mr. Trarn. No, sir. I think very clearly not. I think within the Department we consider that that step was just that, simply a step, a beginning step to evidence, symbolize, if you will, the increased em- hasis which the Department believes should attach to marine affairs. T think that leaving that particular question, the Department of the Interior, and [ know the Secretary, feels this way, very strongly is convinced that far stronger emphasis must be placed upon ocean mat- ters. This means a whole variety of things, better programs at the State and Federal levels, better opportunity for the private sector to be involved in oceanic development, better funding, better research. There does need to be a much greater national commitment. Mr. Mosner. And you are suggesting that the Department of the Interior is the logical agency to take this lead and to provide the coor- dination that is necessary as an alternative to NOAA ? Mr. Tratn. I don’t believe that we are ready as yet to propose cate- gorically an organizational structure to you. I would like to say this 953 in amplification. The need for better organization for management of the marine environment is part of a larger problem which is better organization within the Federal Government for the management of the total environment and all resources. I cannot speak for the administration because I do not know its views on this, but I think that within the Department we are not satis- fied with our existing organizational arrangements, insofar as our own resources and environmental responsibilities are concerned. The Department, and indeed all of the resources and environmental responsibilities and organizations within the Federal Government have sort of grown over the years, without any particular logic to shape that organization has taken. I think most of us recognize that. So what I am saying here, I guess, is that I think there is a great deal of sense in only acting upon a reorganization of marine affairs as part of a look at the overall organization within the Federal Government for organization of all of its environmental and resource responsibili- ties. Now, assuming that further there are a number of alternatives, we could, I suppose, within Interior, suggest an Assistant Secretary sim- ply for marine affairs. There are all sorts of different organizations. I have even heard it suggested that there should be a new super depart- ment of resources and environment with perhaps subsidiary depart- ments, one of which could well be for marine affairs. These are some of the alternatives that I have heard suggested. Like all alternatives, or most alternatives, there is much to be said for most of them and also there are drawbacks to most of them. Mr. Mosuer. Mr. Secretary, on page 1 and on page 5 of your state- ment, you point, I think rightly, to a serious deficiency in our present national program in the lack of any defined responsibility within the Government for the development of civilian technology in marine resources. The Stratton Commission report repeatedly referred to this de- ficiency in our present setup. Now, if the Department of the Interior were to take the leadership in the field as an alternative to NOAA, are you suggesting that you could assume this responsibility, the respon- sibility of administering the research and development of new tech- nology that no other department seems to be doing now, and that desperately needs to be done? Mr. 'Trarn. I see no reason why we couldn’t do it just as well asa new agency. We are involved in marine technology. These have not been large leaps forward, but in small ways. We have been involved as you know, in the Tektite program which we are hoping to carry forward, this time under the full leadership of the Department of the Interior. So I think that we are learning our way in this field. Mr. Mosumr. You really are intimating that the Department of the Interior could do the job that needs to be done. One more question, Mr. Chairman. We have had testimony before this committee recently indicating that it is perhaps always very unwise to try to administer science and development programs at the same time and in the same department or agency that is conducting intricate and extensive day-to-day action operations. Do you feel that that is true, in your own experience in the 954 Department of the Interior? Certainly you are involved in these mat- ters. Do you think it is unwise to create an agency such as NOAA which would have very important missions in terms of scientific re- search and development and yet at the same time would be an operat- ing agency in many areas? Do you think this is impossible? ‘Mr. Trary. I don’t think it is impossible at all, and in fact I think it probably is the way it should be, whether in NOAA or in the Depart- ment of the Interior or some place else. Now, there are all kinds and shapes of research and I suppose basic fundamental research should be kept considerably far away from day to day operating responsibilities, but I would say generally speaking, that operations and research should go pretty close together. Mr. Mosuer. Whether or not they work together is a matter of good administration, rather than any basic defect, is that what you are saying ? Mr. Trarn. [ think that is a fair statement. Mr. Mosner. And perhaps the interdependence of research and operational activities is so real that good administration had best put them in the same agency, or department? Mr. Train. Yes, sir. That ismy view. Mr. Mosuer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lennon. Thank you, Mr. Mosher. Mr. Rogers? Mr. Rocers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, it is good to see you before the committee again. I think you make some ood points on the capabilities of the Interior Department as we have also had from the Department of Commerce, the Department of Transporta- tion and so forth. I think this is natural, and this is what we would expect—that each department would stress their own capabilities and particularly what they have been doing. But the report that took 2 years to make and which we are now covering has as its gist, and what this committee is concerned with really, putting emphasis on the development of our marine resources. Now, we do have a Department of the Interior for land resources. We have a space agency for outer space, and now we are thinking about going into inner-space and the resources of the water. If we felt it was so necessary to develop the great resources of the land with the Department of the Interior, if we “felt that it was significant and added emphasis needed to be placed to create a separate agency for the department of space, it is somewhat in line in my thinking, to put emphasis on the development of the resources of the sea. When we compare our activity and what we have done under the present arrangement, it causes me even more concern to leave the operation in its ‘present jurisdictional bounds. For instance, look at fishing. What has been the history of our fishing industry of this Nation? Has it gone down or up ? Mr. Train. It certainly has not gone up Mr. Rogers. Mr. Rocers. I think we could really say It has | gone down—dramat- ically. For instance, we are now importing into this country $600 or $700 million wor th of fish products. Mr. Tratn. Some 75 percent of our total consumption. Mr. Rocers. And it is something like two out of every three fish in the frying pan ora little more, are foreign products. 9595 This causes me concern. I don’t think we have put emphasis there. You can go right down the line on all of these developments and that is why the Congress has become concerned about this. That is why we created a Presidential Council, to take it out of just an interagency arrangement, to give emphasis. That is why we formed the Presi- dential Commission to study this for us and that is why we hope the agencies are going to look at it with a little more imagination and enthusiasm, rather than thinking in a parochial way where we just want to protect our jurisdiction here. I hope that this committee in these hearings can encourage this in the executive branch. What would you say are our present moneys coming from the resources of the sea, for instance, that your depart- ment has jurisdiction of, your royalties that you have, and so forth? Mr. Tran. Referring to my statement ? Mr. Rocers. I was thinking of the figures. Mr. Tratn. I am sorry. This is an estimate f have to give this after- noon on the other side. I beg your pardon. I testify on the seabeds this afternoon and the total that the Federal Government has received from mineral development on the Outer Continental Shelf, and of course most of that has been fairly recently, has totalled $4.5 million and that is from mineral resources alone. Mr. Rocers. And what do we have coming in, would you think, this year, as sort of a total sum, $600 million? I realize this is an estimate. You may supply the correct figure. Mr. Tratn. I understand that the royalty figure will be a minimum of $300 million for this fiscal year, and that bonus and other payments which cannot be estimated with quite that accuracy could bring the total up to around $500 million or so. Mr. Rogers. And I understand your budget goes from $80 million ? Mr. Tratn. In the marine resources field, I have used a figure of from $80 to $100 million. That is of a total budget within the Depart- ment of, I think, about $1.9 billion. Mr. Rogers. So that you see this causes us concern because you have many activities of $1.9 billion and yet $100 million is allocated for the development of the resources of the sea and yet it is bringing in half a billion dollars already. This is just on royalties. We just don’t know anything sufficiently about the resources there or the techniques to harvest them. Mr. Tratn. Of course, you understand that while the Department has very substantial receipts, in fact I thing that outside of the Treas- ury we are the most important revenue producing agency in the Fed- eral Government, these revenues do not go into the budget of the Department. They go into the general revenues of the Treasury. Mr. Rogers. I understand. Mr. Tratn. I was hoping maybe you would suggest otherwise. Mr. Rocrrs. Well, as a matter of fact, I wouldn’t mind saying, and J think this committee has felt this way, that we are benefitting from the development of the resources of the sea already and some of these funds ought to be plowed back in. I don’t think the departments, not just yours, but any of them, have taken this position strongly enough and this holdback of the departments is what has brought this situa- tion to the fore today. 26-563—70—pt, 229 956 We want some emphasis placed on it and not just an assistant secre- tary somewhere. We want a proper emphasis placed in an agency that 1s going to say, “This is our purpose, to develop the resources of the sea and from the income that we can get from the resources of the sea, think what that can do for the economy of the Nation.” I was glad to hear you say that you had not come to a departmental position of opposition to any reorganization, and I think if we keep an open mind this can be helpful. Thank you. Mr. Tran. Thank you. Mr. Lennon. Thank you, Mr. Rogers. At this point in connection with your questioning, Mr. Rogers, according to the Department of the Interior’s own figures in the 8-year period from the beginning of 1960 to 1967, commercial fishery landings did grow from $350 to $438 million in that 8-year period. That is approximately one-third, while petroleum production increased by almost 350 percent, from $423.6 to $1,404.8 million. That is petroleum, natural gas, fuel oil. That does not include mag- nesium and other compounds which also have had a significant growth at that time. . Mr. Rocrrs. I know there has been some slight increase in com- mercial landing, but I think you will find our standing among the Se nations of the world is that we have dropped to about what now ? Mr. Train. Sixth. Mr. Lennon. And pushing seventh, I might say. Mr. Roerrs. So that I wouldn’t want to give the impression that we are making progress in fisheries. I think we are not. Mr. Lennon. We discussed that with the Secretary before you came in and got into the record the international increase compared with our national increase, if any, and it was way, way out of proportion. The Secretary has indicated that we are importing a little better than 75 percent of all edible seafood. Mr. Trarn. Mr. Chairman, could I make a comment at this point in the record, because I think it bears upon Mr. Rogers’ questions and remarks ? Mr. Lennon. Yes, sir. Mr. Tratn. I am not sure that my statement is clear on this. As you look at the Commission’s proposal for NOAA, it is very clear that NOAA as proposed does not, in fact, take all of the marine activities of the Federal Government and put them into one agency, because I think we all recognize that this would be impossible. So we are talking about a matter of degree and looking at the activities for example of the Department of the Interior, the same eight to 12 bureaus are very much involved in marine matters and yet the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries would be the primary loss to NOAA. I think this also is one of the things that troubles us about the NOAA approach. It does create the opportunity for greater emphasis, certainly much greater public visibility. But at the same time in achieving that there are also going to be some major losses in an organizational sense. We will find the marine affairs, for example, of Interior split almost down the middle, as far as budget is concerned, keeping about $40 mil- lion in Interior and $40 or so going over to NOAA. 957 This is just a comment I wanted to add for the record. Mr. Rocrrs. Then it would be your idea if we did decide to shift, that you think all of the marine activities should be combined in NOAA? Mr. Tratn. Neo, sir. I don’t think that is possible. Mr. Rogers. Well, it is possible. I think we could shift it if the Congress decided to put those activities in NOAA. I think this is possible. Mr. Tratn. It is possible. Mr. Rocers. I don’t know how practical it would be as a first step. It may be that we would want to set the agency up with some of the constituent agencies and then as it grows tie them in as it develops. Mr. Trary. There would be a great deal of duplication of effort, I think, as the committee recognizes. For example, in the geological survey, many of the scientific techniques and knowledge and tech- nologies which are applicable to marine geophysical exploration are applicable to the land. I am sure we have the same people involved in much of this. It is very difficult to try to cut this down the middle as between salt water and land. Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lennon. Would the gentleman permit me to ask a question while I think about it. Yesterday the Assistant Secretary of Com- merce and Dr. White, the administrator of ESSA both emphati- cally stated that if NOAA was established as a Government structure that then there is no question, but what ESSA should be a part of the new Government structure. Now, is it your judgment that if NOAA comes into being that it should not include what you have defined and described as a part of oceanography, the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries ? Mr. Train. I think it would depend on what NOAA was designed to be in the final legislation, because if we look at commercial fish as primarily a resource responsibility, then I believe it should remain im the resource agency. But if commercial fish had some broad re- sponsibility, say, for marine biology, for research into the life systems of the oceans, not necessarily related directly to commercial fish applications, then perhaps that kind of thing ought to move over to the type of agency you mentioned. Mr. Lennon. I am sure as the former head of the Conservation Foundation you know the capability and background of a number of the members of the Commission, and wouldn’t you agree with the Commission which spent a great deal of time and did some real soul- searching to arrive at the conclusion that they did, that the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries ought to be a part of this so-called new Gov- ernment structure, if one did come into being ? Mr. Train. Well, I certainly give them great credit for much broader competence certainly than I have. They are a very fine. group of people and certainly Dr. Stratton is an outstanding individual and any recommendation made by that Commission is entitled to the very careful consideration and attention of this Congress and the executive branch. , Mr. Lennon. Where in the past have you had a council or com- mission created for a special purpose that has before given the time 958 and the thought and who had the technology and skills and back- ground to reach the conclusions and recommendations that they have had. Have we had that in the past ? Mr. Trarn. I don’t know of that, sir, but I really do not know how to answer your question. I just don’t have the information. Mr. Lennon. I am reminded that in the first session of the 87th Congress which would be in 1961, that this committee had before it legislatiton which is in substance in many degrees like we have before us today. The committee wrestled with it and the committee reached no conclusion because the administration then opposed it. So we finally resolved to try to move in the direction of creating a commission with a broad spectrum of membership from private sec- tors of our economy, the laboratories, the universities, the Federal Government and scientists in general to make this determination for us. We thought we ought to bring into being the National Council at a high level policy level as a sort of an interim body. The administra- tion opposed that. We finally virtually rammed it down its throat and in 6 months they were the most enthusiastic supporters of the accom- plishment of the National Council, and they have done a great job. Now, here we are 8 years later confronted to a degree with the same problem, how should we move, what should we do 2 I have just read again the memorandum to Mr. Ash from the President, and I know that the gentleman has seen that memorandum and it was directed to Mr. Ash to consider this very thing that we are talking about now. Here we get this letter back on September 11, “In about 2 months we will begin to consider it and.then at that time we can tell you how long before we will be able to say what we are going to say if we say anything at all.” ; . Now, yesterday the Washington Post had a story that the Presi- dent was creating a special task force on oceanography. Are you familiar with that? : Mr. Trartn. I am not familiar with the details. I read something in the paper about it. Mr. Lennon. How is that related to the so-called Ash Commission ? Will we withdraw from the Ash Commission the memorandum of the President for them to make a study and come up with the recom- mendations, or alternatives to the Commission’s report, or should we have to wait another 3 months for this new task force to get ready to start to begin to commence to study. . Q What is the relationship of the creatiton of the special task force on oceanography to the Ash Commission’s mandate to study this thing? Mr. Tratn. I can’t answer with any authority, Mr. Chairman. It is my understanding that the Ash Commission has been directed to study organizational matters and I would guess, and it is a guess, that the new task force on oceanography would be looking at substantive program matters. ii Mr. Lennon. I imagine you will be perhaps one of the members of that task force. If so, we will get in touch with you. Mr. Pelly ? I don’t quite know what the latter part.refers to because I have never found that we had any particular excess fishing from domestic 959 fisheries, but rather it all came from abroad, and I don’t know how we are going to curb that. But in this term I have been particularly worried about leaving it where it is because of the inadequacies that you yourself spelled out in your testimony, the failure in the past to come up with a dynamic program which you have indicated you hoped can result either in the Department of the Interior or elsewhere. I remember one time when we had the then director of the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, Mr. McKernan and he was testifying on a bill I think for fishery research, and the chairman of this subcommittee said “Doesn’t the authorization that is in that bill already exist in the sport and recreation legislation?” Which I think the chairman au- thored, and he said, “Yes, but we thought we would come in with an- other bill because this way we probably could get a little more money.” Tt was really pathetic because the Department has wanted to do a better job and just hasn’t had the money from Congress or the ability to sell Congress on a program for the necessary research. Mr. Trarn. I think that our budget within the Department in this area has been a substantial limiting factor in our capacity to develop the kind of dynamic fishery program that you want, and we want. We are trying in this area. We are trying in our 1971 budget planning and submissions. As you know, I am not at liberty to talk about those. All I can say is that we share this concern and within the Department certainly are doing everything we can to strengthen our domestic fisheries. Mr. Petxiy. Well, I would support the delay that you seek if I thought that only by that means we could achieve what I would like to see achieved for the commercial fishing interests of this country. In one respect I could tell you if some of my commercial fishermen had been on the Stratton Commission, what they would have said. “Start with a cabinet level secretary as head of any agency that is responsible for fisheries. That is what they want. They would want somebody that could stand up against the State Department, which has caused prob- ay by their support of certain policies much of the problem of the shery. In other words, they opposed any increase in tariffs and supported the free flow of foreign fish to be dumped onto our markets and they have supported foreign aid legislation to build up foreign fisheries and even today, of course, you have a man right now in Peru on fishery research, I believe, trying to help them develop their fishery. These are the problems I get from our State Department. No one has ever been able to really stand up for the fishing industry. I would like to see it in a new agency if it would be more effective in promoting the restoration of our fishery back from sixth pushing seventh place to first place, where it ought to be. I certainly am not satisfied with the program we have now. Mr. Tratn. We are not, either. Mr. Petiy. Well, let me mention this while I think of it, because you mentioned in your testimony that you had a map of the world’s seabeds which was prepared, I believe you said for the United Nations Seabed Committee. Well, I think some of us here are a little concerned for fear the management of the marine resources, as far as the seabeds are con- cerned, is going to be turned over to an international organization. SiG . ae Trarn. I will send you a copy of my afternoon statement, Mr. elly. Mr. Petziy. I know there are some Members of Congress who feel that we should give up our sovereignty over part of the Continental . Sheif or beyond, where we think we can exploit it for the benefit of humanity. I happen to think we have the technical ability in this country to exploit it for humanity better than any other nation that I know of, or certainly the United Nations. I simply come back to the point that I hope that whether it is in the Department of the Interior or in the new agency, that it will have a more prominent place, more money, and be able to do a much better job and particularly be able to stand up against those interests that seem to be more interested in developing fisheries abroad than at home. Mr. Trarn. In that connection, Mr. Pelly, you may be interested to know that in the latter part of July, I think it was, I participated as a U.S. member of the joint Cabinet meeting in Tokyo on trade and economic matters, I think is the title, and my particular effort there was to open up, or enlarge rather, the Japanese market for American fish products so that while we are importing here 75 percent or so of our fish products for domestic consumption, there is a very real opportunity to enlarge foreign markets abroad for American fishery products. Weare pursuing that aggressively. Mr. Petty. We have a resource called dogfish that we would be very happy to have caught and exported abroad and I think the Japanese may be the one area where they can use that resource. I appreciate your testimony here today. You are not in an easy position because the administration has not as yet taken any position on this particular bill. I do hope it will be forthcoming and that we ean have the help of the administration in trying to come up with legislation which we, who have studied it over a long period of years, think is absolutely essential. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Tratn. We know that much of the expertise lies right here in the committee. We certainly will attempt to work closely with you. Mr. Lennon. I appreciate that statement, Mr. Secretary. That leads me to say that this committee has been involved in this matter now for a period of a great many years. We have some of the most. knowl- edgeable and dedicated men on both sides of the aisle in this com- mittee in this area. I would suggest that it would be well for the administration to listen to the counsel] and advice of a number of the members of this committee, particularly my distinguished friends, Mr. Charlie Mosher, Mr. Tom Pelly and Mr. Hastings Keith, and all along the line. I wish you could have been here yesterday and heard the ques- tions by the distinguished gentleman from Oregon, a member of the minority side of this committee. His questions of the Assistant Secretary of Commerce reflected a splendid job, and I hope that the members who were not privileged to hear that will have the opportunity to read it in the record. T wish he was here today to ask you those questions. I am delighted to yield to a gentleman who has long been interested in this field and knowledgeable in this field, Mr. Keith. 961 Mr. Kerru. I have been particularly impressed with the comments of my colleagues on the committee. There isn’t much left for me to say except to fill in the chinks. As you perhaps know, I am on the Commerce Committee too, and initially sought membership on this committee primarily because I saw more of an opportunity to help my constituents here. Fish protein concentrate perhaps triggered my interest because that was in a way related to the Commerce Committee. The laws regula- ting the sale of food that contains filth came out of that committee. I have been terribly disappointed in what has not been done in the past, and so I thought that the report of the Commission was an extraor- dinarily valuable document. It deserves much more response than it has had, by being referred to yet another agency or another commis- sion which isn’t ready to tackle the problem. Tam just going to list some of the things that have been in my baili- wick. I have here some clippings that I brought in this morning from newspapers I read at my home over the weekend. These are from papers in my district, and relate to the problems we are discussing. “The fishing industry faces extinction.” This is an editorial] talking about what the Russians are doing in violating our 12-mile fishery zone. “Oil cleanup cost in bay estimated at $100,000.” “Pressure from big brother’—Uncle Sam—trying to get the Continental Shelf re- sources that Massachusetts and Maine claim are their own. Here is an article on the grounding at Chappaquoit, where a tug, unlicensed, towed a barge onto a reef 2 miles off course. The barge had 140.000 barrels of oil. “Oil shiek hits.” “Oil damage to shell fishes seen.” Keith, we need more rules. “Oil slick hits Falmouth business. Protection for ships and water fowl. World fisheries rivalry shifts. Oil company wants harbor lands,” I could go on and on. Here is an- other paper with three such articles on the front page. So let’s look at some of the areas where an agency such as is con- templated under the Commission report could be helpful. First, it would seem to coordinate joint efforts where an interrela- tionship of existing agencies is required. When I came back from the Torrey Canyon disaster, I furnished the Department of the Interior and the Coast Guard with material that I had brought back, about the way the towns handled the oil slick in England. I couldn’t even convince the agencies to get together and meet with me to establish a standing operating procedure for dealing with such an eventuality, should it occur on our own shoreline. I personally had to send to each of the towns in my district a standing operating procedure for the use of booms and other methods, which only now are becoming avail- able. I might add that in this latest instance, it would appear that things were well handled but it was mostly because of luck. The barge that went aground came free as they were tightening the lines, so that it wouldn’t slip further onto the shore, and they floated it off. Oil floats, as you know, on top of the surface of water, so the barge wouldn’t sink. Booms would have been no good in the seas that existed in this particular area, because the oil would slop over the booms; it was a No. 2 grade and very thin. So, although it came out nicely in the end and the damage was rela- tively small, had it been crude or residual it could have been a very, 962 very tragic thing. If it had happened in summertime, it would have cost me a lot of political support. Mr. Train. If I may interject, I think you were the first one to alert me of that particular accident and spillage and the national contin- gency plan was involved immediately as I recall. Mr. Kerrrn. Yes. You see in that case the lack of an SOP showed clearly. I called you at around 1:10. The tugboat captain came to see me and said that he spoke from the stranded vessel to the harbormaster on shore in Falmouth at around 11:30 p.m. and the harbormaster in turn was reported to have advised the Coast Guard, whose response was that they would come by at 7:30 in the morning, at dawn. I don’t know what the true facts are, but this has been related to me. There ought to be a standing operating procedure. Another incident that raised this question was the oil-leak case in the Catalina Channel. The Coast Guard was not eager to send people out there to learn at firsthand how to handle this, so that there could be available a res- ervoir of personnel that knew how to handle such cases. At Chapaquoit, the two officers that were on the beach at 12 o’clock at night when I got there had had very little experience in this matter, although the press indicated that a team with some expertise had gone out from the Federal Water Pollution Control] Administration in your department. The Coast Guard, I think, is the lead agency in handling the seaward aspects of such spills. I would say that the State of Massachusetts and your agency did seem to be functioning very well. I think this incident shows that we do have a great responsibility as to the licensing of tugboat operators, and: perhaps inspection as well. I don’t believe this particular tugboat had a depth finder. Its radio was not functioning and there was no- body on the barge. These are the practical matters which we, as Congressmen, have to consider. Besides dealing at the policy level, our constituents really expect us to do something about these problems after we have done all this talking. A recent editorial indicates that Keith had said this could happen ever since he went to the Torrey Canyon in 1967, 1968, and 1969—but nothing has been done. It is not very complimentary to me, to this committee, to the Con- gress or to the agencies. Now, here are just a few other things. Your department has talked about the fisheries problem. Inciden- tally, the increase in dollar volume of of a catch is deceptive. When I first came down here scallops were 27 cents a pound. Now they are $1 a pound. So that increase in dollar volume doesn’t necessarily mean a thing. é Tavcenavional affairs have been mentioned. As Paul Rogers said, the space agency has forged ahead. The cost-benefit ratio in the field of oceanography as contrasted to space, it seems to me, should be our saving grace. We can point to a much greater possibility of reward to our Nation and to the world from the sea than from the planets. - Another point is the Weather Bureau. Our fisheries are dependent upon that, and so are our resort industries as are many others. Yester- day we had a spokesman from Commerce, which has the Weather Bu- 963 reau in it, and the Coast Guard, which has the ships, has appeared separately. If we were to have NOAA they would be coordinated. So it seems to me that there are an awful lot of arguments that can be advanced, but I don’t think the Nixon administration has really evidenced any sense of urgency. I am particularly concerned that at this late date they would plan to form yet another commission. I would have thought, a la Jack Kennedy, that they would have had those commissions back in October and November and December. They knew they were going to win. They ought to have been ready for the job. With that I will close my comments. Mr. Tratn. Mr. Keith, this isn’t particularly relevant I suppose, but I will say this. As some evidence of an effort within the Depart- ment to give proper emphasis to this field, I would suppose that since I have been in the Department personally I have spent more time on marine resource matters than on any other single subject, by far. Now, I mention that for what consolation it might be, perhaps none, but I think it does indicate the interest within the Department and the reality of our commitment. Mr. Kerru. I know that you have. I have been in touch with your office and I think that the reason you are forced to is that the situa- tion is in such a quandary. This committee has recognized these prob- lems for years. We pleaded with the Johnson administration to do something about it. We passed legislation on this subject which Presi- dent Kennedy pocket vetoed back in 1961, I believe. T had a bill which would have provided $50 million for on-the-job training in the use of these resources of the sea. That was my ap- proach—stop fooling around with more plans and commissions. Sub- sidize, to some extent, industries’ efforts on the offshore shelf and make it a joint effort. What we would learn and gain in the way of revenues would have compensated for the cost. It was just as simple as that. This was one of the packages that was taken into consideration, but we finally came up with a. bill in 1961 which would have established some more specific action. That was pocket vetoed. So we know in this committee, probably better than any place else in the country, about the problems that you have had to face. But we do feel that they have been built up long enough—that there has been enough research done, with enough good minds devoted to the prob- lem, so that you should be able to look over the list of people who served on this commission and find one of them as your coordinator. Sam Lawrence has gotten away from you and gone perhaps to a Canadian position, but there are people who could have provided con- tinuity. Maybe you have them. I wish I had one on my staff. These people could have done all the thinking that you are having to redo, because of this new assignment. T certainly do appreciate that Secretary Train has spent a great deal of time on all of these matters that I have discussed. There are just too many and they are too detailed and difficult. Mr. Tratn. Thank you, Mr. Keith. Mr. Lennon. Thank you, very much. Let’s go off the record a minute. (Discussion off the record.) 964 Mr. Lennon. Back on the record. I recognize the gentleman from Florida. Mr. Frey. I recognize the time is running out, Mr. Chairman. I would just like to say, Mr. Secretary, that it is good to see you again. I also appreciate the directness of your testimony. I had the op- portunity over the last few days as a newly appointed member of the committee to review the testimony and from my other subcom- mittees it is obvious that no matter how we have tried, it is a mess and is not working. I note from a lot of the testimony that there are a great many reasons why this Commission won’t work, but I find very little ex- cept from those in support of the committee as to what we should do in the alternative. T recognize that you are not going to be able to correct the prob- lems that have been created over the last number of years over- night, and I sympathize with you. Your point of putting this in an overall context has made a great deal of sense to me, but I think, as has been indicated from my distinguished colleagues who have been involved for more years than I have, but for as many years as I hope to be, that we don’t want to be sitting here a year or 2 or 3 years from now saying, “Let’s do something about it.” The situation is getting so bad, and our fishing is so bad and we want to do something about it. I personally would be willing to wait and see if something is going to be done, but an open end is not what I think any of us want and I think, as you can gather from the comments here, we want to do something. We want to do something for the good of the country and do it as quickly as possible. I think that message came through loud and clear today. Again, I have some questions, but I will get the answers later. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lennon. Thank you, Mr. Frey. Mr. Secretary, on page 12 of the brochure you speak about animal protein. This is a subject on which the Stratton Commission and the Fish and Wildlife Subcommittee have this committee particularly has held extensive hearings. I am sure that you are aware that the Congress authorized $1 million for a fish protein concentrate plant with a daily capacity of fish assigned. The Bureau of Commercial Fisheries have already let a $300,000 contract for the design of a fish processing plant. Now, that is true, isn’t it? The contract has been let and the Fed- eral Government is obligated to this extent. Mr. Tratn. That is right, sir. T would like to say that I considered this one of my few budgetary successes to date. Mr. Lennon. In getting the $300,000? Now when was the contract let for the design of the process and the physical plant ? Mr. Trarn. I would have to supply that for the record, Mr. Chair- man. Mr. Lennon. You don’t have any idea off the top of your head and no one with you has any idea? Mr. Tran. Let me consult for a moment. T am informed that the contract for design was let on October 21, 1968. Mr. Lennon. That was before the actual physical change of °4- ministration, wasn’t it ? 965 Mr. Tratn. That is correct, sir. Mr. Lennon. Of course that money had to be on hand in order to let that contract. I am not suggesting that someone took the contract to do the work with no money appropriated. Mr. Train. As I understand, some million dollars had been appro- priated and some $900,000 additional was required in order to com- plete the plant. Mr. Lennon. Is it my understanding that the land was donated by the Port of Grace Harbor in the State of Washington ? Mr. Trarn. I believe that is correct, sir. Mr. Lennon. Now you have the land. Now you have the funding sufficient for the process design and the physical plant and another $900,000 is needed and is authorized, but yet unfunded ? Mr. Tratn. I believe we have our appropriations not yet completed sit. Mr. Lennon. In the fiscal 1970 budget was there an item for $900,000 to complete this job ? : Mr. Train. I am trying to recall the details of this, Mr. Chairman, and IT am not sure that my memory is too good, but I think that $900,000 may not have been in the budget in the form submitted, but there was subsequently a partial add-on of a portion of that amount by the House Appropriations Committee and later by the Senate Appropriations Committee. The total amount added was $0.7 million. Mr. Lennon. Mr. Secretary, this might not be relevant to the De- partment of the Interior. Perhaps it should be in the Department of Agriculture or HEW. Do we have presently now a study that is com- pleted or about to be completed on malnourishment in the United. States? Would you know about that? Mr. Trarn. I do not know the answer to that. Mr. Lennon. It is my understanding that both HEW and the De- partment of Agriculture have been involved in the study of malnutri- cae the United States for the last year, but we haven’t seen any results. On May 8, I wrote to the President calling his attention to the possibility of using FPC in the fight against malnutrition, both at home and abroad. I suggested that this product could be used as a part of a program for which Mr. Nixon proposed a billion dollars a year to fight hunger and malnutrition. Last year the appropriations for AID was $1.7 billion. This year the administration is asking for $2.7 billion. So in my letter to the President I raised the question, if we had moved forward sufficiently into the determination that the FPC could be used, why not allocate some of these funds to this purpose. Do you know what the present administration is doing now to get such a proposal off the ground? My response was, “Thank you for your May 8 letter to the President concerning malnutrition. We appreciate having your suggestion to use fish protein concentrate as a food additive and your comments are now receiving careful consideration.” That was on May 15. That is the last thing I have heard from the President. Mr. Kerru. Will the gentleman yield ? Mr. Lennon. I will be delighted. Mr. Kerry. This is where we really need a lead agency because 966 the problem doesn’t rest primarily with Interior. The rulings of other agencies of Government require that hake or hake-like fish be used. You can’t buy hake today at a price anywhere near the projected price that was given to us when we first talked about fish protein concen- trate at 14 cents a pound. They now can’t make it at 40 cents a pound, because of the high cost of hake. The firms involved are hoping that something can be done about their contracts. They just can’t get the hake at a price that will en- able them to break even. What you have to do is get the Food and Drug Administration or the Federal Trade Commission to change their standards and not require just hake or hake-like fish, because it simply isn’t available at an acceptable price. Mr. Lennon. I would like to ask unanimous consent to include in the record at this point my earlier letter of March 20 of this year addressed to the Vice President on this subject matter and I like- wise ask unanimous consent to include in the record at this point the Vice President’s response to me of April 10, 1969, and also include in the record my letter of May 8, 1969, to the President and the White House response to me of May 15, 1969. (The correspondence follows :) MarcwH 20, 1969. Hon. Sprro T. AGNEW, The Vice President, The White House, Washington, D.C. DEAR MR. VICE PRESIDENT: The Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Con- servation of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries conducted hearings on Fish Protein Concentrate (FPC) last summer at the request of the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries for the need of additional funding to construct a research pilot plant to develop new and less expensive processes for producing FPC. For years, we have been told how FPC can be used to fight hunger and malnu- trition throughout the world. At this time, we are in the process of sending $900,000 worth of FPC to fight malnutrition in Chile. However, here in the United States. FPC cannot effectively be used to combat malnutrition because Food and Drug Administration regulations require that FPC be marketed in one-pound packages lor less. Testimony developed before our Subcommittee revealed that Dr. James L. Goddard, the then Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration, had indicated a willingness to waive the one-pound packaging restriction on FPC if the food additive were used in a Government sponsored program to combat malnutrition. Like you. I am keenly interested in the fight against hunger and malnutrition in this country. We now have a plant in New. Bedford, Massachusetts, that can produce FPC that will meet the quality standards of the Food and Drug Admin- istration. This product could be used here to help alleviate the malnutrition we are told exists in our country. Several federal agencies would be involved in any developed feeding program using FPC as a food additive. It seems. to me that you, as Chairman of the National Marine Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Development, could best coordinate and further such a worthwhile program. I will be glad to assist and cooperate with you in this proposed program. With kind regards. Most sincerely, ALTON LENNON. 967 'THE VICE PRESIDENT, Washington, April 10, 1969. The Honorable ALTON LENNON, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. Dear Mr. LENNON: Your letter of March 20 expressing your interest in the fish protein concentrate program is greatly appreciated. The contribution of food from the sea—and particularly KPC—in combatting malnutrition at home and abroad is high on the agenda of the National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Development. The Marine Sciences Council is reviewing the entire FPC program, including the one-pound packaging restriction on 'the sale of FPC in the United States. I therefore have asked Dr. Hdward Wenk, Jr., the Council’s Excutive Secretary, to keep you informed of developments. May I ttake this occasion to say how much I appreciate how your interest and support in marine science affairs has contributed to progress so far, and that I look forward to talking with you personally about future advances. Sincerely, Spiro T. AGNEW. May 8, 1969. The PRESIDENT, The White House, Washington, D.C. DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Like you, I am keenly interested in the fight against hunger and malnutrition in this country. As a member of the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, I have been most interested in the development of fish protein concentrate (FPC) as a food additive in the fight against malnutrition. As you know, FPC is still in its formative state and last year Congress author- ized funds for the construction of a pilot plant ion the West Coast. The sum of $300,000 is being expended for the design and construction plans of this facility, and the Bureau of the Budget is holding $675,000 of the project funds in reserve pending an additional $900,000 to complete the plant. This last item is not in your Budget. : Our national needs are varied and great, I realize, but I simply wanted to call your attention to the possibilities of using FPC in the fight against malnu- trition both here and throughout the world. Perhaps this resource could also become a part of your proposed fight to combat hunger and malnutrition. With kind regards. Most sincerely, ALTON LENNON. THE WHITE HOovsE, Washington, May 15, 1969. Hon. ALTON LENNON, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. DraR Mr. LENNON: Thank you for your May 8 letter to the President con- cerning hunger and malnutrition. We appreciate having your suggestion to use fish protein concentrate as a food additive and your comments are now receiving careful consideration. With cordial regard. Sincerely, WILLIAM F.. TIMMONS, Deputy Assistant to The President. Mr. Lennon. I understand, Mr. Secretary, that there was a con- tract let with Alpine Geophysical Co. for the manufacture of the FPC in April of this year and this contract called for 1,000 tons of FPC. Are you familiar with that ? 968 Mr. Trarn. Only in a very general way, sir. I know there is such a contract. Mr. Lennon. Do you happen to know as of this date, how many tons, if any tons, have been delivered for the AID program? Mr. Train. Ne. sir, I do not. Of course, the contract is an ATID contract. I would be very glad to try to get the information for the record if you wish. Mr. Lennon. Of course, we have that answer here, and I will fur- nish it for the record. It is less than 1 ton to date. Now the next ques- tion, what is the problem, shouldn’t be directed to the Department of the Interior, but should be directed more specifically to AID, I guess. Mr. Tratn. I would like to know the answer myself, sir, but I don’t lave it. Mr. Lennon. I think, Mr. Keith, the Food and Drug Administra- tion finally approved the formula for this, did they not? Mr, Kerru. But the formula is just impossible to comply with in quantity. Mr. Lennon. Why was the contract let for this company then, for 1,000 tons of that particular formula ? Mr. Kerrn. The Russians have been catching the hake, to a large extent, and there is a shortage, yet the Government has been un- willing to modify the requirement to less than 75 percent hake. They simply can’t get the hake. AID wants 10 tons to go to Biafra, and they are hopeful about delivering it. This is the most immediate need and the most immediate prospect. I have been down to that plant and it isn’t very busy. It is in my district. Mr. Lennon. The Alpine Geophysical plant ? Mr. Kerra. Alpine’s Marine Division. I believe it is called Marine Concentrate Division. Mr. Lennon. But the contract was for 1,000 tons. Mr. Kerra. The contract with Alpine, I believe, was for $900,000 and it was probably about 42 cents a pound. Mr. Lennon. That would average out about 1,000 tons, wouldn’t it ? Mr. Kerru. It is approximately a thousand tons. Mr. Lxnnon. The thing that gives me some concern and I know it gives you concern, is that we didn’t have the capability of getting the hake and yet we let a contract based on the use of hake. Mr. Kerru. Exactly my point. Mr. Lennon. So that you are suggesting that if we had a single agency to coordinate these things, it would be helpful. I have been in- volved in trying to get the Food and Drug Administration for sev- eral years to reach a conclusion as to approving this formula. They finally did, and we thought we were moving. Now we find we are stalemated even though we have obligated ourselves under this contract to the design of the process, that is the Government prototype plant or pilot plant. We have the land and now we can’t get the money to go ahead. I am reminded of the fact that in relationship to malnutrition in Biafra, we did take that up with Alpine and suggested that they try to utilize fish protein concentrate to help the Biafrans. 969 We took it up directly with the president of Alpine and also at the same time with the vice president. _ Mr. Secretary, we are grateful for your appearance here this morn- ing. I won’t repeat it but I call your attention to the suggestion I made when we were off the record. We are on the record now. I have found that in our efforts to establish a national council that we had to have some round table discussion outside the committee room with the executive branch of the Government and with the Bureau of the Budget and others to reach agreement finally on the national council which the administration opposed and which 6 months later they told us they were happy that they accepted our mandate that we had to have that sort of setup as a minimum body until the Congress would consider the Commission report. when the report came to us. I think that 1s something which ought to be explored. Our next meeting will be tomorrow morning. The witness will be the Honorable Robert Frosch, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research and Development and Brig. Gen. F. P. Koisch, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Mr. Tran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. (Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m. the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Thursday, September 25, 1969.) 4 - NATIONAL OCEANOGRAPHIC PROGRAM THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1969 Housst or REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OCEANOGRAPHY, OF THE ComMITTEE ON MrrcHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met at 10:25 a.m., pursuant to recess, In room 1334, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Alton Lennon (chair- man of the subcommittee) presiding. Mr. Lennon. The committee will come to order. We are pleased and honored to have as our witnesses this morning Dr. Robert A. Frosch, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Re- search and Development, and also accompanying him we have Maj. Gen. F. P. Koisch, U.S. Army, Office of Chief of Engineers, De- partment of the Army. Gentlemen, both of you have furnished the committee statements which I assume that you will follow this morning. Regrettably we only get our copies, I think to be exact, at 10 minutes to 9. We have not had a chance to review them as we would like to have had. I know it is difficult for you gentlemen to try to get clearance from some other level before you submit your statements. There should be a rule that witnesses who agree to appear before legislative committees be required to submit their statements at least 48 hours before, so that members of the committee, and particularly Counsel, will have an opportunity to review the statement, and relate it to previous statements, and to the record. I wish that could be done, and will Counsel remind me to insist upon it in the future. If we don’t, we will just have to cancel out these hearings as sched- uled and reschedule them again, and not at the convenience of the witness. Dr. Frosch, will you come forward ? Are you gentlemen going to present your statements together or will they be separate statements ? STATEMENT OF DR. ROBERT A. FROSCH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT Dr. Froscu. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would pro- pose to go ahead with my statement. Mr. Lennon. Yes. Thank you. (971) 26-563—70—pt. 2——30 972 Dr. Froscu. I am delighted to be invited to come before your com- mittee to speak on the Commission report and the companion legisla- tion H.R. 13247. Mr. Lennon. Now, Mr. Secretary, since you are before the commit- tee officially, am I correct in my statement to the effect that we did not receive copies of either your statement or Major General Koisch’s state- ment until this morning ? IT am now advised that we received General Koisch’s statement yes- terday afternoon. And am I advised correctly that we received your statement at 10 minutes to 9 this morning ¢ Dr. Froscu. I think that is correct, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lennon. When did you submit your statement to the Bureau of the Budget ? Dr. Froscn. I can check that, but it was originally submitted to the Bureau of the Budget on August 8. Mr. Lennon. On August 8? Dr. Froscu. Yes. Mr. Lennon. When did you get clearance from the Bureau of the Budget ? Dr. Froscu. We resolved the final wording of the statement yester- day evening. Mr. Lennon. That is par for the course with respect to the agencies. I wish you would direct a communication, Mr. Counsel, to the Bureau of the Budget, and I will jointly sign it with the chairman of the committee. I am sure that he will join with me in our insistence that there is on the part of the Bureau of the Budget a little cooperation with the agencies of the Government who work so cooperatively with the legislative committees who have an equal responsibility. Sometimes I am concerned about this philosophy of the three inde- pendent branches of the Federal Government, the executive, legis- lative, and judicial. There needs to be cooperation between them. It has not worked out that way. We are getting the results of the lack of it this morning. Now you may proceed, sir. Dr. Froscu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On May 19 the President referred the Commission report to the President’s Advisory Council on Executive Organization. He asked this Council to review the organization recommendations made by the Commission on Marine Sciences, Engineering, and Resources in the context of broader organizational requirements. He asked that the Commission’s proposal be compared with alternative ways of coordinating and advancing national development of marine science. | In light of this Presidential action it seems inappropriate to take action on the proposed Commission organizational recommendations until alternatives have been studied. Mr. Lennon. Mr. Secretary, would you identify for the record the President’s Advisory Council on Executive Organization that you referred to, to which you state that on May 19 the President referred the report? What advisory commission on executive organization ? Dr. Froscu. I believe this is the group that is referred to as the Ash Commission. Mr. Lennon. Just to keep,thé record straight, as we have in the past, we have in our files, and it has been introduced in the record, 973 the memorandum from the President to the Ash Commission in which he specifically and definitively asked them to review the Commission’s report, and particularly as it related to the recommendation of the Commission for a central Government structure which is referred to as NOAA. To continue the continuity of the record so that you will see how we are so often frustrated, as we were with the opportunity of con- sidering your statement before you testified today, this was the 19th of May. On the 10th of September, this month, we asked the Commission if it had considered the President’s request and asked them to con- firm our request for this information by letter. The gist or the guts of the letter is that “We hope to launch a study at the request of the Presideit sometime within the next month or two.” That would put it into October or the 11th of November. Then they go on to say: “After we get into the problem, we will be in a better position to estimate how long it may take.” What are we talking about, Mr. Secretary? Here they received a specific request by the President on the 19th of May. Witness after witness has alluded to it and referred to it, that that is the reason for your failure to take any definitive effort. This is typical of the Department of Commerce, the Department of Transportation, and the Department of the Interior, the affected agencies. They have all relied upon: “Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, the President requested on May 19 the Ash Commission * * *,” The Ash Commission says on September 11 that in the next month or two they may get organized so that they can consider it and after they get organized, perhaps then they could project the time it will take. T just want you to get it in the record. You may think you are frustrated with the Bureau of the Budget. We are frustrated with the Bureau of the Budget and with the people who have the responsibility to respond to the request of the Chief Executive, it seems to me. I will tell you what I would do with the Ash Commission if I were President. Well, we can’t exactly say what we would do, but I would say what I would try to do. Now you may proceed. Dr. Froscu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Your letter to Mr. Laird of April 25 requested his attendance at hearings as well as his general views on the report. This letter was referred to me and my answer forwarded my personal views on the report at that time. Those views represented generally the Depart- ment of Defense view of the report which I will explain shortly. I must emphasize that the views I am expressing today are those of the Department of Defense and not necessarily the same as the position being developed by the administration as a whole. Since the Commission report pertains to civil functions to such an extensive degree, a substantial number of comments pertain to some of the civil marine missions of the Department of Defense. As you 974 know, this responsibility within the Department of Defense resides almost entirely with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. I have asked General Koisch to be present with me today. He has a prepared statement and is prepared to answer questions on the civil side of marine sciences. The appropriate staffs in the Department of Defense have reviewed the Commission report in great detail. While there are a variety of views on many of the detailed items discussed, there is a general view that the Commission report represents a careful and responsible analysis of the civilian-oriented portion of the national program, and that it makes a number of valuable detailed recommendations. Even where individual commentators have reservations about par- ticular recommendations, it is clear that all agree that the ideas put forward are imaginative and useful in stimulating a great deal of new thought about various possibilities. As the Commission states in its report, it did not specifically ex- amine the national security aspects of marine matters, nor does it comment on these programs as such, other than endorsing and empha- sizing the importance of the Navy’s research and development in this area to its operations, and noting the importance of continuing this work. We concur in this view and it is our intention to continue these pro- grams and to strengthen them in appropriate areas. It should be emphasized that our national security is heavily dependent on the marine environment and that civil programs interface significantly in this environment with military operations and resources. The general tenor of the Commission report is that military and civil functions in the ocean should be coordinated but separated. We concur in this concept, but wish to note explicitly the importance that “spinoffs” from Navy technological programs have had for the devel- opment of the civilian side of national marine science development. It is our hope that coordination and cooperation between the military mission and civil-oriented programs will continue to make this pos- sible. It is certainly desirable. Since the national security program is not directly discussed, the man issues of DOD concern deal with the interactions of DOD pro- grams (including the major civil responsibilities of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers) and civilian programs as these may be affected by the organization of the civilian side. The Navy has played a major role in building the marine science resources of the country by supporting research programs in universi- ties and research institutions. Our requirement for this kind of re- search support as background and esesntial support to our mission- oriented programs continues and, in fact, is increasing. _ The DOD wishes to continue to support some large marine institu- tions since we believe that only thus can we maintain a strong contact with these civil institutions and support the kind of research results necessary in the subject areas peculiar to our concerns. We believe that our support dovetails well with NSF support of these areas. As in the past, the major agencies involved, principally the Office of Naval Research and National Science Foundation, can work together to support a well integrated research program in marine science. As regards possible organizational modes for the civil side, 975 - the proposed establishment of NOAA and NACO must both be con- sidered. The Department of Defense feels that some form of consolida- tion of marine functions leading to a somewhat smaller group of Fed- eral organizations with major interests in the field would be highly advantageous to the national program, both from the point of view of coordination and of critical size of the elements. We see several prob- lems that need to be taken into account in determining the final form of the organization. The Commission report discussion of the proposed incorporation of the Coast Guard in NOAA refers to, but does not deal adequately with, the question of its continuation as a specifically identified armed force of the United States, to function as a component of the Department of the Navy in a national security role in time of war. Maintenance of this identity would somewhat detract from the advantages of consolidation of the Coast Guard with the other fleet operating entities, particularly those of ESSA and the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, proposed for NOAA. The Commission report also does not take sufficient account of the large proportion of the Coast Guard’s work occupied with search and rescue, and with marine safety matters not closely allied to the other functions assigned to NOAA, and the effect of this rather separate work on its participation in the mainstream purposes of the proposed agency. Mr. Lennon. Just at that point, Mr. Secretary, what was the reac- tion of the Navy when the Coast Guard was moved from the Treasury Department, which it had been in historically, to the Department of Transportation ? Dr. Froscu. I was not with the Navy at that time so that I am not sure in detail, Mr. Chairman, but I think the principal point was that it was moved as an operating entity into a department in which it was to continue to function as an independently designated entity and as a designated armed service so that its capabilities to do its operations and the required operations in time of war could clearly be maintained. Mr. Lennon. Is there any reason why it couldn’t maintain its iden- tity hee (anes purpose if it were put in a Government structure such as NOAA? Dr. Froscu. Certainly not, but one of the implications and indeed explicit suggestions in the Commission report is that one of the virtues of its incorporation in NOAA would be, and I don’t remember whether the term was “merged,” but closely associated with, the implication is a form of merger, with the BCF fleets and with the ESSA fleets. Even that could be carried out, I believe, without denigrating the po- sition of the Coast Guard, but it would have to be done administra- tively, very carefully. Mr. Lennon. How does the Coast Guard relate to transportation ? Dr. Froscn. It relates to transportation, I believe, with regard to its responsibility for safety at sea which is closely allied to some transportation safety. Mr. Lennon. What kind of safety ? Dr. Froscu. Maritime safety. Mr. Lennon. Where do we find Maritime? Dr. Froscu. That is in the Department of Commerce. 976 Mr. Lennon. Why ? Dr. Froscu. I am unable to say. It was there originally and was never moved. Mr. Lennon. Here now you move the Coast Guard into the Depart- ment of Transportation on the philosophy that it is inexorably tied to the Maritime interests related to transportation, but we keep Mari- time over here in still another department. Why? Dr. Froscu. Iam unable to say, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lennon. Thank you, sir. Neither am I. Go ahead. Dr. Froscrr. It also seems clear that the large number of functions assigned to NOAA would require more resources than will be brought to it by the organizations that will come together to form it initially. The matter of additional staff strengthening is not addressed ade- quately in the Commission report. It is probable that a natural recruit- ing ground for initial staff augmentation might be from the Navy program, particularly in the area of ocean engineering and technology Some such assistance to founding the civihan program in this field might well be wise, but unless carefully thought out and accomplhshed the result might really be to cripple a Navy program that the Com- mission wants preserved, rather than to increase the national program and capability. This point should be examined carefully in light of our comer com- ments on the usefulness of Navy technological programs and the need for Navy research programs in this field, and the necessary detailed planning to avoid unnecessary difficulties accomplished before pro- ceeding with the proposed NOAA, I would like to digress a moment and just say that what we ar highlighting here are things that concern us, that might form diffi- culties within the Government or for the national security interests in the course of establishing NOAA if it were to be established. I don’t in any sense want to imply that these are insuperable diffi- culties but only that they need to be carefully handled or we will find some problems that we didn’t look for on our hands. Mr. Lennon. That leads me, Mr. Secretary, you having raised the probability that “a natural recruiting ground for initial staff augmen- tation might be from the Navy programs,” to say that right at this point the Navy has announced its plans to mothball some of its ocean- ography and other types of vessels of that kind such as the Zee and the Aeller, haven’t they ? Dr. Froscu. We have some problems with oceanographic ships certainly. Mr. Lennon. Let’s talk about the new ships that you are planning now to mothball. What type of vessel is the Gillis? Dr. Froscu. The G//is is an ocean research ship. Mr. Lennon. What about the Davis? Dr. Froscu. That is an oceanographic ship. Mr. Lennon. That is a new ship ? Dr. Froscw. That isa relatively new ship. Mr. Lennon. What are your plans now for that vessel ? Dr. Froscn. I would have to supply that for the record, Mr. Chairman. (The information follows:) USNS “Davis” The USNS Davis (T-AGOR-5) is a civilian manned oceanographic ship op- erated by the Commander, Military Sea Transportation Service for the Oceanog- rapher of the Navy. Since being placed in service as new construction in 1963, as a Pacific “pool” ship, it has supported oceanographic projects at West Coast Navy Laboratories and the Naval Oceanographic office, and the education of Navy officers in oceanography at the Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, California. The USNS Gilliss (T-AGOR-4) is of the same class, and has an identical mission except that since entering service in 1962 it has been assigned to a pool of support ships in the Atlantic. Two new AGOR class ships, the USNS Desteiguer (T-AGOR-12) and the USNS Bartlett (T-AGOR-13), now completing their shakedowns, are being assigned in similar fashion, and would bring the total number of pool ships to six. While Navy requirements are suf- ficient to utilize all six ships full time, funding constraints demand a com- promise in the services provided and a continuation of the 4-ship pool level of prior years. It has been found necessary to reprogram operating and overhaul costs ap- proximating two million dollars annually by ordering immediate inactivation of Davis and Gilliss, the two oldest pool ships. Their reactivation will be considered during the apportionment of FY 71 funds next spring, in relation not only to other Navy-wide urgent requirements but also to the needs of the total Navy oceanographic program. Until then, and possibly through FY 71, the ships will remain in caretaker status. It is currently intended that funds for operating both the Davis and the Gilliss will be requested in the FY 72 budget. Mr. Lennon. As a matter of fact, you raise the question that the Navy might be drained off if this new organization were established, and yet you find yourself in a position that you are mothballing your oceanographic and hydrographic vessels, not your old ones, but ihe two new ones, 1s that right ? Dr. Froscu. Yes, we have such problems. Mr. Lennon. Why? Dr. Froscn. We have fiscal problems in supporting all of our ves- sels and there gets to be a competition between supporting operational fleet vessels, removing them or supporting research vessels or remov- ing them, and we are trying to make the best compromise for the Navy’s programs. ) Mr. Lennon. Have you ever thought about transferring these ves- sels now that you have to mothball, these vessels that the taxpayers of America paid for at your request ? Dr. Froscu. We have authorized the use of these ships or the trans- fer at least for a period of time to other agencies in the Government, but they have not been able to support them either. Mr. Kerru. Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lennon. Yes. Mr. Kerru. Aren’t there some institutions in the private sector or semiprivate sector that could use these ships? Ut ie Tn fact, don’t you have some ships of this sort assigned to such insti- tutions as Woods Hole? Dr. Froscr. Yes; we do, Mr. Keith, but there too, the support of the programs which pay for the operation of such ships is principally from Federal moneys so that the transfer of a ship or the bailment of a ship alone is of no use to the institution unless there are program funds available for its support and, in the same sense that we do not have the funds in the budget to continue to operate the ships for Navy purposes directly, we do not and apparently the other agencies do not 978 have the funds available to support additional ships at the research institutions. Mr. Mosner. Mr. Chairman, could I make a comment? Mr. Lennon. Mr. Mosher. Mr. Mosuer. I think it is the feeling of the members of the House who generally support NOAA, or the NOAA concept, that this con- centration and coordination of effort in the new agency would attract support for these oceanic functions such as Congress has never offered before. Jt would attract new impetus, new enthusiasm, and would provide the opportunity for the supplying of resources such as efforts in the oceans have not had before. I think you are absolutley right on page 6 where you say that clearly: The large number of functions assigned to NOAA would require more resources than will be brought to it by the organizations that will come together. We all recognize that, but I think we who support it feel very strongly and confidently that Congress would soon give this priority attention and supply these added resources. Mr. Lennon. Thank you, sir. What happens to the crews of these vessels, these new vessels and old vessels in the hydrographic and oceanography field that you are mothballing now ? Dr. Froscx. The crews of the vessels that are operated under MSTS are employees of MSTS, and I would presume that they are employed on other ships if MSTS has the budget and resources to employ them. Otherwise, they would be likely to be caught up in a reduction of force as is happening elsewhere in the Navy civilian organization. Mr. Lennon. Let me ask you to comment on this: Now that Congress has authorized and funded the construction of these vessels to conduct what you have persuaded the Congress to authorize and construct them for, that is to conduct important marine surveys. Is it sound management practice to tie up these vessels when the administration is insisting upon the IDOE and the importance of charting our continental shelves ? They say in one breath, “We must chart our Continental Shelves. We must move forward in the IDOE.” This is the administration position. But at the same time you are tying up and mothballing these im- pore: vessels which would be related to this type of survey, aren’t you! Dr. Froscu. Mr. Chairman, this is an important mission and some- thing we want to carry out, but the basic strength of the Navy is also an important mission which this administration and previous admin- istrations have emphasized. Faced with fiscal stringency, we have to balance the places in which we take cuts in budget, and frequently the choice almost comes down to the distinction between the number of fighting ships in the Navy and the number of research ships in the Navy. We don’t cut either one completely at the expense of the other. We try to balance and cut both when we must. Mr. Lennon. Let me ask you this question: What was the figure for fiscal 1970 for ship construction for the Navy, this year? 979 Dr. Froscu. It was about $2.4 or $2.5 billion. Mr. Lennon. Yesterday afternoon about 5 o’clock the House Armed Services Committee added a billion dollars. Are you going to the Budget and going to the Appropriations Committee, assuming that this procurement bill is passed by the Congress, and make your fight for a viable Navy, or are you going to capitulate to the Bureau of the Budget, knowing, as you have indicated, the essentiality of moving forward with the construction of new vessels to replace many which are obsolete? What are you going to do? Dr. Froscu. The Navy will certainly be in favor of fighting for a strong Navy, but I am unable to say what the resolution between the Department of Defense and the Bureau of the Budget will be. Mr. Lennon. I know what it will be. You will fall back to $2.4 bil- lion when you go before the Appropriations Committee, instead of staying with the authorization bill which would provide $3.2 billion for the Navy. Go ahead. All right. Dr. Froscu. The relationships between the Department of Defense program and that of NOAA would need to be carefully coordinated both to prevent unnecessary duplication and to insure that the exis- tence of either program could not be used as an excuse to cut the other unwisely. The form in which National Advisory Committee on Oceanog- raphy is proposed seems to us to be unwise on several counts. The mechanism suggested would appear to put one operating agency (NOAA) and what amounts to its advisory group (NACO) in an effectively controlling position over other operating agencies with their own special mission requirements. This nearly guaran- tees petty conflict arising from the neutral tendency of NACO to regard NOAA jobs as more important than those of other agencies. The Department of Defense believes that an interagency group of representatives from the concerned organizations at, for example, the Assistant Secretary level, assisted by a group of outside advisers working with them, would be preferable to the NACO proposal. These groups might work throughout the year, but report to a more senior policy group like the present council, meeting annually to review the subject and report to the President. An alternative to a special senior policy group for annual review would be an annual review by the Federal Council on Science and Technology. None of these organizational schemes is perfect, and all seem some- what cumbersome, but the organization of a field that is principally defined by an environmental subject and area, although it does include some specific missions in it, in a government that otherwise tends to be principally functional and mission-oriented cannot be easy. It might also be noted that establishment of another independent agency reporting to the President may not be entirely wise. _ On the other hand, the Department of Defense believes that if an independent agency were created there might be legitimate objections to the subordination of it to any of the existing departments. Mr. Lennon. Mr. Secretary, you are suggesting that the members of NACO couldn’t rise above petty jealousies in the Department. That is what you are saying, isn’t it? ISL Dr. Froscu. I don’t say that I am suggesting that they could not. I am saying that on the basis of a good deal of history they are unlikely to, and I don’t think that this is a prejudgment of the character or the stature of the people. Tt is simply the case that in all of the advisory committees that I have dealt with that have a responsibility to a particular department or agency there is a natural tendency for them to be most familiar with the virtues of that department or agency and to tend to support it particularly against other departments with which they are not completely familiar. Mr. Lennon. Now let me ask you a question about your comments in the last paragraph on page 8. _Do you question the background and the capability and the dedica- tion of the members of the so-called Stratton Commission in their judgment, with respect to a centrality of the Government structure such as they recommend ? Dr. Froscu. No, but I think that by reading the Commission report, and with my knowledge of many of the Commission members, and from some of the discussions with them that I was asked to participate in, it is clear that they were not completely satisfied that they had a perfect organization. They were trying to use their judgment on what might be a good organizational scheme. An additional comment, I think, may be contained in the fact that the Federal Government members of the Commission rather tended to abstain from comment on the organizational recommendations. Mr. Lennon. You had three governmental agencies with representa- tives as members of the Commission. Dr. Froscu. Yes. Well, there were four Federal Government em- ployees who were members. Mr. Lennon. The fourth was the MSC. Dr. Froscu. Yes. Mr. Lennon. The Navy was represented by whom ? Dr. Froscu. First by Mr. Baldwin, then by Mr. Baird, both when they were Under Secretary of the Navy. Mr. Lennon. Both when they were Under Secretary of the Navy. We do know that the representative of the Navy on the Commission and Dr. White from the Department of Commerce, the administrative head of ESSA, and the representative of the Department of the In- terior refrained from taking part in any vote on the question of estab- lishment of NOAA. 7 : Since the distinguished Under Secretary of the Navy, a member of the Commission, left the Navy, what has been his position as a private citizen and at the same time a knowledgeable member of this Stratton Commission ? Dr. Froscu. He has been generally in favor of the recommendations of the Commission. That is Mr. Baird, I presume, you are talking about. Mr. Lennon. Yes. It is interesting to quote his statement made before this committee: : Since January 201 have been a private citizen. That is true of quite a few people. 551 I have made several speeches on the Commission report and I have made it a particular point, and I would like to make it a matter of record here, that as a private citizen and as one who participated in the work of the Commission I support wholeheartedly the organization recommendation of the Commission. Now, are you saying that there is anyone in DOD or anyone in the Navy who is in a better position to make a judgment than your rep- resentative on this Commission ? Dr. Froscu. Well, our representative Mr. Lennon. Was any man in DOD or in the Navy subject to the opportunity to participate in the panel discussions and to consider all the alternatives that might have arisen in the panel discussions and in the full Commission in its determination as to what it should recom- mend to the Congress and to the President ? Who in the DOD and the Navy is in a better position to speak to this subject than the person the President appointed from the Navy to represent the Navy on this Commission ? Dr. Froscu. Well, I don’t think any of us is as privy to the dis- cussions in the Commission as Mr. Baird has been. I hate to quote some- one who isn’t present, or to attribute something to him, but I don’t think he would disagree with the statement that the organizational recommendations of the Commission were merely the best that they could arrive at. Tn don’t think he would say that they are perfect, and certainly in my conversations with him he never suggested such a thing. [ have not, I believe, in this statement said they were impossible. I said they looked cumbersome, but I also said I think that it is very difficult to arrive at something which does not look cumbersome, because this is something which by its character is somewhat different than other organizations in the Government. Mr. Lennon. We will await your statement as to a definitive alter- native. Go ahead. Dr. Froscu. I don’t believe I recommend any specific alternative. I have tried to point up some difficulties. Mr. Lennon. Don’t we have a right to expect you to present some alternatives ? Go ahead. Mr. Kerru. He wouldn’t be inclined to say that the existing struc- ture in the Navy, or any other department of Government, was any less cumbersome than the one we are proposing here, would he? Mr. Lennon. He might be suggesting that it might not have been well to organize DOD, but just let the Navy remain as a separate department. Go ahead, Mr. Secretary. Dr. Froscu. With respect to H.R. 13247, the proposed transfer of the National Oceanographic Data Center to the National Oceanic Agency by the bill is noted. The National Oceanographic Data Center is currently under the administrative management of the Naval Oceanographic Office and is supported by funds from 10 departments and agencies. Its technical programs and policies are established and reviewed by an interagency advisory board consisting of the representatives of these sponsoring agencies. 982 The data center serves as a central repository for the Nation’s un- classified oceanographic data. In addition to its chartered mission, the data center is also designated as an oceanographic information and analysis center for the Department of Defense to provide services to users within the Department of Defense. The importance of the data center as an adjunct to the military mission is evidenced by the major role Navy has played to support the center, and by the fact that Navy and Navy contractors are the major users. The Department of Defense would not object to the transfer of the data center if the new organizational arrangement was supportive of its national charter. We believe the data center would be expected to continue to pro- vide data services to all users, Government, and private, civilian and military, in keeping with its basic mandate as a national data repository. With regard to the National Advisory Committee for Oceans and Atmosphere proposed by the bill, there are two features concerning which the Department of Defense has serious reservations. The first is that the mechanism suggested for the advisory commit- tee would appear to put the proposed operating agency, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency and its advisory group, the Ad- visory Committee for Oceans and Atmosphere, in an effectively con- trolling position over other operating agencies with their own special mission requirements. This appears likely to generate conflicts that would tend to give the advisory committee an unwarranted amount of bias toward the Na- tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency as opposed to the equally vital interests of other Federal agencies. Second, the bill provides for participation by Federal agency repre- sentatives on the advisory committee only by relegating them to ob- server status. The Department of Defense believes that such an ar- rangement could severely jeopardize the advisory committtee’s effec- tiveness as the principal governmental advisory group for the Nation’s marine and atmospheric activities. It is noted that the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency would function in the conduct of mapping and charging, encom- passing the world oceans. The Department of the Navy has statutory responsibility for the provision of accurate charts, sailing directions and manuals for the use of all vessels of the United States and for the benefit and use of all navigators generally, although its primary con- ee 2 with defense requirements and in the deep oceans around the world. The U.S. Army Engineer District, Lake Survey, has a generally similar role on the Great Lakes. The Environmental Science Services Administration, a proposed component of the new National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency, would be concerned primarily with civil mapping and charting activities which are confined largely to the U.S. territorial waters and the continental shelf areas. Care should be exer- cised to insure that mapping and charting responsibilities are clear in order to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort. Also, care should be exercised to insure that the lines of respon- sibility or function between the proposed National Oceanic and Atmos- 983 pheric Agency and the Department of Defense would be clearly delineated. H.R. 13247 proposes further that the testing and calibration of instruments are functions assigned to the National Oceanic and Atmos- pheric Agency. This would apear to duplicate work being done by the recently established National Oceanographic Instrumentation Center. The Center is under the administrative control of the Commander, Naval Oceanographic Office and guided by an advisory board repre- senting 15 interested agencies. The Center’s mission is to serve as the national focal point for knowledge of technology related to testing, evaluation, and calibra- tion of sensing systems for ocean use, to enhance the quality of such systems by the dissemination of operational results and technical infor- mation, in order to serve the national oceanographic community. How- ever, broader national benefits might result from incorporation of this center into the proposed National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency. Mr. Lennon. Right at that point, Mr. Secretary, when was the National Oceanographic Instrumentation Center established ? Dr. Froscu. Tt was established formally as a national group some- time last spring, if I recall correctly, but 1t had been in existence as a Navy instrumentation center which was fully providing services to the oceanographic community at large for some number of years. Mr. Lennon. Who established this, the National Council ? _ Dr. Froscu. Originally it was established by the Navy. The Nation- al Council recommended that it be converted into a national center and suggested that the agencies that had an interest could get together to establish it, and that is what was done. The agencies themselves agreed upon a mechanism for designating it a national center and agreeing on the funding arrangements. Mr. Lennon. Did the Navy go along with that recommendation of the National Council ? Dr. Froscu. Yes, indeed, it did. Mr. Lennon. Or did it prefer to continue it as it was before? Dr. Froscu. No, we went along with it, and in fact I was in favor of it at the time and saw some considerable advantages in doing it that way. Mr. Lennon. You are saying that the Nay at every level was en- thusiastic about it? Is that what you are saying ? Dr. Froscu.: It is impossible to say of any proposal that the Navy at every level is enthusiastic about it, but at the senior level, sir. Mr. Lenyon. I have information to the contrary. Dr. Froscu. There were certainly people opposed. One can pick any given proposal and say that of it. Mr. Lennon. All right. Go ahead. Dr. Froscu. The bill would transfer the U.S. Coast Guard from the Department of Transportation to the proposed agency with the pro- viso that the Coast Guard shall operate as a part of the Navy in time of war or when the President shall so direct. However, it is the concern of the Department of Defense that the Coast Guard may not be maintained in an adequate state of readiness as a member of the Armed Forces of the United States if its forces are “combined” with the other elements of the proposed agency as rec- 984 ommended by the Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources. Mr. Scuapeperc. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman yield there? Mr. Lennon. Yes. Mr. Scuaprsperc. Can you say why you feel that it couldn’t be? Dr. Froscu. I am not saying that it couldn’t be. What we are saying is that there really is a problem, and the problem is that we are tak- ing a designated armed force which has military command lines which are adaptable to its become a fighting force in time of war and there is a not very precisely defined suggestion in the commission report that it be combined with the Coast and Geodetic Survey, which is a uni- formed force but not a military force and with the Bureau of Com- mercial Fisheries fleet, which is a civilian force. One would have to be rather careful to see that the arrangements of line of command and the arrangements for training, for military train- ing, and so on, the Coast Guard were maintained in this combination. For example, if the way of combination were to make all three of the groups uniformed but not military or civilian, then there might be a problem. It is a question of how the combining operation is to be carried out and what the final combination looks like. It could certainly be done, but that would have to be done carefully. Mr. Scuapesere. That is the point I want to make. It doesn’t say that it can’t, but that problems probably exist now and will exist no matter what is done. Certainly the Navy would be interested in having them serve in time of war. It would have an eye on the Coast Guard in the new agency and be alert to the fact that it wasn’t being taken care of. I am sure that the various interested committees in Congress certainly wouldn’t want that to happen either. Dr. Froscu. I merely point it up as a problem that would have to: be watched. Mr. Lennon. Counsel for the committee is a former Coast Guard officer and a distinguished professor of law. He has asked me to ask you a simple question: Can the Coast Guard be any busier in the future than it is now ? Dr. Froscu. It would be hard for that to happen I think. They are certainly very busy now. Mr. Lennon. It has about as many roles and missions for a rela- tively, comparatively small agency, and is busy all the time. Dr. Froscu. There is no question about that. Mr. Lennon. Go ahead, sir. Dr. Froscu. The requirement to so maintain the Coast Guard as provided by 14 U.S.C. 2 for transfer to the Department of Defense as provided by 14 U.S.C. 3 is mandatory. Returning to the commission report, 1t proposes a Nationa] Lab- oratory System and National Projects with the objective of forming a comprehensive set of organizations and programs which could serve to stimulate the whole field. Establishment of the university/national laboratories, however, should not be used to prevent or to make impossible forever the entry of major new organizations into the field, since the formation of new groups is frequently a powerful stimulus to progress. 985 The consideration implies the necessity for the importance of the availability of support to research and development entities other than the national laboratories. The national projects proposed by the Commission are interesting and might stimulate further progress. It must be recognized, however, that some of them are already underway in several forms and to vari- ous degrees and thus the selection of what to do next must take detailed account of the current status. This matter is incompletely treated in the Commission report. In addition, before proceeding, a careful reexamination of the costs to be expected for the various pr ojects should be undertaken since the Commission’s costing was admittedly crude, as it had to be consider- ing the dimensions of their task and the time and staff available. We should note that these recommendations as well as other Commission proposals are also being reviewed by the administration. As for the international legal-political framework for seabed resources, the DOD position, briefly, is the following: First, a narrow Continental Shelf regime coupled with a clear affirmation of the con- tinued freedom of the superjacent waters and airspacce beyond the. limit of the territorial sea would be the most compatible with our national security interests. The national security interests of the United States would be best served if the territorial seas and straits questions were settled before: any international agreement is reached on defining the outer limit of the Continental Shelf. As indicated previously the DOD attaches great importance to the settlement of the territorial sea question prior to submitting any initia- tive on the seabed problem. The main reason is because the limited jurisdiction of the coastal States, insofar as seabeds are concerned, might be extended unilaterally to include other rights if there is no firm prior international agreement on the extent of total sovereignty. In consonance with this quoted position, the DOD generally sup- ports the rationale contained in pages 141-157 of the Commission report and considers the detailed recommendations worthy of further study. However, no national decision should be made on such matters with- out full consideration of the vital national security interests which could be significantly affected by them. The important caveat repre- sented by the Commission’s qualifications on page 147 must be empha- sized, and I would like to quote it here: We also would like to stress that our major recommendations are interrelated. Rejection of any one of these recommendations would raise serious questions in the mind of the Commission as to the advisability of continuing with the others. Mr. Chairman, that completes my statement. I am now ready to try to answer any further questions the committee may have. Mr. Lernnon. Let us go off the record for a minute. (Discussion off the record.) Mr. Lennon. Back on the record. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Go ahead, sir, General Koisch. 986 STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. F. P. KOISCH, U.S. ARMY, DIRECTOR OF CIVIL WORKS, OFFICE, CHIEF 0F ENGINEERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY General Korscu. Mr. Chairman, the statement I am about to give has been cleared by the Bureau of the Budget. Mr. Lennon. Thank you. Mr. Keirn. I take it it is entirely negative. Py General Korscu. I am Maj. Gen. F. P. Koisch, Director of Civil Works of the Office, Chief of Engineers. I am very pleased to appear before you today in connection with our Nation and the sea, the report of the distinguished Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources, and your bill H.R. 18247, which would implement some of the Commission’s important recommendations. Mr. Lennon. General, at that point I want to correct the record. When you addressed me as Mr. Chairman, you referred to my bill. This bill is a bill submitted by the full membership of the subcom- mittee on Oceanography. Now go ahead. General Korscu. The Commission’s report is a tremendous contribu- tion. Its views on our Nation’s stake in the oceans merit the careful attention of everyone at the Federal, State, local and private level who is concerned with formulating oceanic policies and programs for the future. The Commission’s chapter on the coastal zone and the Great Lakes is of particular interest to the Army. The Army Corps of Engineers involvement in these areas began in the infancy of the Nation and has grown es the Nation has grown. In the beginning, national survival was so clearly dependent on the security of the Atlantic and Great Lakes coastlines that the Army Engineers early centered on coastal fortifications and problems beset- ting construction at the land-sea interface. This attention soon quick- ened because some of the earliest acts of Congress involved navigation improvements. Over the years, the Corps’ interest in protecting and improving the use of the coastal zone has broadened as the Congress has added responsibilities. Today the Corps is engaged in a $200 million annual program of researching, planning, designing, constructing and/or maintaining coastal harbors, intracoastal waterways, interoceanic canals, hurri- cane barriers, and shore and beach stabilization programs. The Corps also issues permits for all construction in navigable coastal waters. Other Corps programs, physically located inland, have an impor- tant influence on the coastal zone. Inland harbors and waterways feed the coastal ports and form part of the complex waterborne transpor- tation system which moves a substantial part of our interstate and international commerce. Flood control programs on rivers that dis- charge into the oceans involve the coastal zone because of the river- ine interaction with shore, littoral and tidal processes. Over the years, the coastal zone missions of the Corps have grown ever more sophisticated. Some of the current assignments that par- ticularly illustrate this sophistication are the Atlantic-Pacific Inter- oceanic Canal Studies, the comprehensive Chesapeake Bay investi- 987 gation and mode} study, and the in-depth study of San Francisco Bay. ey These studies and investigations are multi-agency and multi-dis- ciplinary. The involved fields include topography, geology, hydrol- ogy, meteorology, oceanology, ecology, biology, hydraulics and economics. The planning of public works in the coastal] zone today is not simple, if indeed it ever was. Increasing sophistication demands increasing research effort and the knowledge gained from research further increases sophistication. The pattern is circular and endless. The Corps is heavily committed in the research area. The Coastal Engineering Research Center and the Waterways Experiment Sta- tion are respected worldwide for their contributions to knowledge of the coastal zone. Our Great Lakes Research Center is equally known and respected by users of the Great Lakes for its continuing research into the problem unique to those great inland waters. Currently, research efforts are looking into such diverse matters as saline intrusion, energy transfer at the air-water interface, spoil disposal effects, effects of construction activities on the ecology of the coastal zone, ice cover distribution, littoral processes, computer simulation of estuary behavior, wave generation, propagation, and attenuation, dune stabilization and many others. With respect to the Commission’s proposals for changes in Fed- eral organization in the coastal zone and on the Great Lakes, it is our general belief that the reorganizational proposals need to be ex- amined carefully in the broad context of Federal organization and the broad environmental and developmental context in which marine affairs must find their place. The Commission’s recommendations must be weighed carefully in the light of alternative mechanisms. I will illustrate this need in my remarks on the coastal zone and the Great Lakes. In the coastal zone, H.R. 13247 would have a new oceanic agency exercising leadership in planning, directing, conducting and sup- porting Federal civil activities on the waterward side. In our experience, for comprehensive consideration of the values and problems in the coastal zone, it is very desirable to have an integrated treatment emphasizing both landward and seaward components of this very complex area. The landward importance of this important geo- graphic area is illustrated by the fact that over 40 percent of our people and 12 of our 13 largest cities are located in counties which touch the ocean or the Great Lakes. The problem involves a multiplicity and diversity of resource, urban, economic, environmental and other people-oriented considerations. It seems unlikely to us that a single Federal agency can satisfactorily take all these factors into account. It seems to use that some type of interagency coordinating mechanism will be required to provide the necessary multidimensional, comprehensive consideration to the zone’s water and related land resource problems. One of the existing interagency mechanisms which should be eiven careful consideration in the necessary weighing of alternatives, is the Water Resources Council. The Council, organized under Public Law 89-90, consists of the De- partments of Agriculture; Army; Health, Education and Welfare; Interior; and Transportation; and the Federal Power Commission. 26-563—70—pt. 231 988 The Departments of Commerce and Housing and Urban Develop- ment are associate members and the Department of Justice and the Bureau of the Budget are observers. Federal-interstate river basin commissions, established at the request of the State Governors, are now functioning in 15 of the 30 coastal States and alternative Federal- State planning coordinating mechanisms are active in the remaining coastal States. The Federal agencies of the Water Resources Council are working with the States in these mechanisms, under the general leadership of the Council, in various stages of incipient or active comprehensive planning for the Nation’s water and related land resources, both coastal and inland. The planning projects population, economic and environmental considerations to the year 2020 and proposes coordinated measures to satisfy the projected needs. Notwithstanding the need to consider alternatives such as the one T have just illustrated, we recognize that if a new independent Federal agency is created to meet broad oceanic needs, such an agency would have an obvious interest in the coast. A good way for this agency to influence coastal decisions might be for it to become a member of the Water Resources Council and the Federal-interstate field organiza- toins now working activity with it. The problems of the Great Lakes are of major national and regional importance, but placing them primarily under the leadership of an oceanic agency may not facilitate their solution. These problems are not basically oceanic in character. The lakes form one large, interconnected river basin system. In their hydraulic, biologic, water quality and legal aspects they are much more closely related to rivers and inland lakes than they are to the world ocean. Most approaches to their eutrophication problems envision the control of pollution on their tributary rivers and the use, as pilot models, of smaller eutrophying inland lakes to provide a practical base for needed experimentation. The Great Lakes Basin Commission, under the leadership of the Water Resources Council, is currently engaged in a major, long-range, coordinated, interagency, Federal-interstate program of compre- hensive planning considering both the landward and lacustrine prob- lems of this basin as a unified system. T would like to provide for the record an extract from the Great Lakes Basin Commission’s plan of study to illustrate the scope of its framework investigation and the integrated Federal and State mem- bership on task forces which are now carrying out this work. See attached exhibit 1. The members of this Commission, both Federal and State, have the requisite, basic functional authority to implement the joint plan. — Mr. Lennon. General, would it be your desire to have the exhibit you referred to incorporated into the record immediately following that paragraph ? General Korscn. Yes, sir. Mr. Lennon. Without objection, it shall be done. 989 (The document follows :) GREAT LAKES BASIN COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK STUDY The attached “Organization Matrix of Work Group Members” has been repro- duced from the plan of study for the Great Lakes Basin Comprehensive Frame- work Study currently in progress under the Great Lakes Basin Commission. The titles of the 26 work groups named in the left column illustrate the scope and comprehensiveness of the study. The 18 States and agencies identified as participants show the extent of the coordination and cooperation involved. Note, for example, that every State and Federal agency is actively participating in the key Plan and Program Formulation Work Group (line 26). Also note that every State has assigned personnel to the Work Group on Fish (line 8). Michigan, with 6 members, chairs this Work Group. 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With respect to the U.S. Army Engineer District, Lake Survey, the proposed transfer to the new oceanic and atmos- pheric agency would not appear to be desirable considering the basic inland nature of these lakes. Should such a transfer nevertheless be made it, would be advisable to allow more executive flexibility in its implementation than H.R. 1-3247 now allows. In summary, we believe that the Commission’s proposal for a new oceanic and atmospheric agency needs to be tested against alterna- tives within the broad context of Federal organization and the broad environmental and developmental context in which oceanic affairs must find their place. Alternatives which should be considered include (1) an inter- agency approach which comprehensively interrelates the many com- plex aspects of the coastal] zone’s landward and seaward components and (2) a reflection on whether the important problems of the Great Lakes can better be resolved by an agency or interagency group with _ an oceanic or inland orientation. I appreciate this opportunity of appearing before the subcommit- tee and shall be happy to answer any questions you may have. Mr. Lennon. Thank you, General. Before I move to the other members, in connection with your state- ment in the last two lines on page 5, “Should such a transfer never- theless be made, it would be advisable to allow more executive flex- ibility in its implementation than H.R. 13247 allows,” we would ap- preciate your furnishing to counsel for the committee, after confer- ring with your legal staff and the legislative draftsmen staff, any suggestion that you might have asa vehicle. I am not implying that the committee is running headlong into this, but we would like to have for the consideration of the counsel and members of the committee any alternative revisions of what is projected into this. You are one of the first witnesses who has indicated that you don’t like what you see but, if it comes, consider this. That is what you are saying in so many words. General Kotscn. Yes, sir. Mr. Lennon. We like that approach. If you would have your legis- lative counsel furnish to the counsel of this committee any suggested changes that you would like this committee to use as a vehicle in its deliberations, we would appreciate it. (The information follows :) SUGGESTED AMENDMENT TO H.R. 13247 We suggest that needed executive flexibility could be assured by revising the paragraph of H.R. 13247 relating to the Lake Survey (beginning on line 20, page 19) to read: “So much of the mission assigned as of July 1, 1969, to the United States Army Engineer District, Lake Survey, as the President may direct, is hereby trans- ferred to the Agency; and there are hereby transferred to and vested in the Administrator all such functions, powers and duties, relating to such mission, as the President may direct, of the Secretary of the Army and of other officers and offices of the Department of the Army.” This approach would keep the bill clean of cumbersome legislative detail and allow the President the necessary flexibility to tailor a transfer in such a way as to produce the best overall organizational solution—considering the responsibilities of both the receiving and the losing agency. 992 The role of the Lake Survey District relates very closely to the overall mission of the Corps of Engineers on the Great Lakes. This mission is carried out by the U.S. Army Engineer Division, North Central and its five Great Lakes districts— Buffalo, Detroit, Chicago, St. Paul, and Lake Survey. The mission includes basin planning, design, construction, operation and maintenance of improvements for navigation, flood control, and beach erosion; and also participation in joint U.S.-Canadian investigations and regulatory operations related to the Great Lakes system. The Lake Survey District also provides engineer consulting serv- ices to the international boards and committees directing the use of Great Lakes waters and, as part of the Corps of Engineers, participates in cooperative investi- gations with other U.S. and Canadian agencies. The Lake Survey District pro- vides a considerable amount of project level support to the Corps of Hngineers Districts committed to the Great Lakes and conducts much of the research related to the Corps’ overall mission on the Lakes. The highly skilled civilian cartographic technicians employed by the Lake Survey District provide an immediately available, flexible capability to meet sharply increased demands for maps to support military commitments around the world. Specific and detailed identification at this time of those functions of the Lake Survey District that could appropriately be transferred to NOAA might be legislatively cumbersome and the resultant inflexibility might well handicap both NOAA and the Corps of Engineers. Deferral of such identification until missions can be examined in the full context of final alignments and organiza- tional mechanisms seems both proper and prudent. A few examples of some of the impacts of mission transfers illustrate the types of interface problems that require detailed consideration. The Lake Survey District’s responsibilities in surveying for, and compiling and publishing, navigation charts are not confined to the Great Lakes but also include New York State Barge Canals, Minnesota-Ontario border lakes, Lake Champlain, and outflow rivers. Imposition of these responsibilities on NOAA seems inconsistent with the role assigned it by H.R. 13247. The research mission of the Lake Survey District focuses primarily on appli- cations. Unless NOAA is to have a navigation, beach erosion, and flood control project mission, transfer of the research mission would separate the Corps from the applied research on which its project development depends and thereby intro- duce a need for a coordinative mechanism where none is now required. The Lake Survey District provides consulting engineer services to international boards and committees operating on the Great Lakes. Much, but not all, of this mission derives from Corps’ membership on these boards and committees. Staff engineers consulting for these boards and committees also support other Corps of Engineers Districts with project missions on the Great Lakes. Transfer of the consulting engineer service mission to NOAA would probably cause NOAA and the Corps of Engineers to maintain some duplicate staff. Mr. Lennon. Mr. Keith. Mr. Kerru. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lennon. It might be well, Mr. Secretary, if you would just come forward and join the general at the witness table and then the members may identify the witness to whom they direct the questions. Mr. Kerrn. The observations of the witnesses that we have had here are most enlightening and most provocative. There is only a limited time that most of us, with our varied responsibilities, can give to this. So we are very grateful for the in-depth research and recommendations that you gentlemen are making. T feel very inadequate, particularly as T am somewhat handicapped by a bursa that has been requiring codeine for the last week. But I would like to ask you, general, just to show how provocative I can be, who killed Lake Erie? : General Korscr. I think, sir, in terms of who killed Lake Erie, I would have to say the people. I would also like to point out, however, that even if there were no people, in time, Lake Erie would die. Mr. Kerrn. What I have in mind in asking this question is that had there been a NOAA, in addition to the Engineers and the River Basin 993 Commission or the Great Lakes Basin Commission, plus perhaps this Environental Council in which we have been so interested here, it is possible that we would have been a better nation. There might have been talents, in such agencies to gage the impact of that tremendous development in the Great Lakes, the St. Lawrence Canal and also the impact that it had all along that route. I have been very impressed as I have met with the Commission that has been studying this under Dr. Stratton. I have a great admiration for the depth of their study and their conclusions. The cumbersome nature of the existing agencies dealing with our environment leads me to believe that it couldn’t help but be improved— at least as far as the oceans are concerned—by a development such as the Commission proposed. In Dr. Frosch’s statement he said on page 15, referring to the terri- torial sea question : As indicated previously the DOD attaches great importance to the settlement of the territorial sea question prior to submitting any initiative on the seabed problem. The main reason is because the limited jurisdiction of the coastal states, insofar aS seabeds are concerned might be extended unilaterally to include other rights if there is no firm prior international agreement on the extent of total Sovereignty. Representing as I do, the State of Massachusetts, and with our great interest in the sovereignty of the that coastal zone, how does your statement relate to that ? Dr. Froscu. Well, I think “States” in this statement of course refers to national States. I think the fear here is that, if the boundaries of some form of jurisdiction were to be established, for example, by some form of individual nation’s assertion of its control, even if that na- tion’s attempt to establish it by assertion were rather circumscribed and sort of responsible and narrow, this might well be followed by a number of assertions by other countries which were entirely in terms of their self-interest so that we might end up with a large collection of individual assertions which would then be acted upon unilaterally and we would find ourselves in a situation where it would be extremely difficult to negotiate anything. It seems to us to be much preferable to try to negotiate a general agreement on what reasonable boundaries for various kinds of jursidic- tion and particularly for coastal waters and sovereignty would be. We have seen this happen in the past. Some counties have made unilateral assertions of fishing rights boundaries and others have followed with various distances. We are in favor of attempting to negotiate some kind of a general international agreement on what the boundaries ought to be; really as a protection against getting into a chaotic situation in which the attempt to make boundaries is by individual assertion. Mr. Kerru. Wouldn’t NOAA be the best agency to reflect the national interest as it developed a point of view for our Government in dealing with other nations ? Dr. Froscn. If established, from our point of view it would be one of two agencies that would have major interests in the sea that would contribute toward formulating a U.S. position, the Department of Defense with its peculiar responsibilities for national security being the other one. 994 In any case presumably the negotiating authority and the details of international organization and negotiation would remain with the Department of State in the final analysis. Mr. Kerrirn. We find that insofar as fishing interests are concerned, the State Department, although it has been better in recent years, has not. been too cognizant of our problems vis-a-vis the Russians and othre vessels off our New England shoreline. They might have been more attentive had there been in existence, a prestigious agency such as NOAA rather than the Bureau of Commerical Fisheries. On page 14 you state: We should note that these recommendations as well as other Commission proposals are being reviewed by the Administration. Who in the administration is reviewing these proposals now ? Dr. Froson. Well, the National Council has had a continuing exami- nation of various of these proposals since the Commission report came out. As you know, there was some reconstitution of the Cuncil’s struc- ture with the new administration and various of the proposals are be- ing looked at by the new structure. Mr. Kerrn. You are not referring to the Ash Commission ? Dr. Froscu. No; this would be separate from the Ash Commission which is looking only at the organizational part. Mr. Kerru. And it is fair to say that the agencies affected are re- viewing them as they relate to their operations ? Dr. Froscu. Oh, yes. Mr. Kerrn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rocers (presiding). Mr. Secretary, it 1s good to see you before the committee again, and you, too, General. We appreciate your being here. I am glad to see that a man with whom this committee has dealt greatly is here with you, the oceanographer of the Navy, Admiral Waters, with whom this committee has dealt in work with oceanography. In your statement you have raised some flags, but not many as such. You said it wouldn’t hurt if the data center were changed as long as it serves its function. Also I believe you said that maybe instrumenta- tion, the testing, it would not be hurtful to change that. As to the Coast Guard you want to make sure that it has its mili- tary functions delineated. You are not much in favor, as I understand it, of NACO. You think an interagency setup would be preferable be- cause you don’t give the constituent agencies a direct voice but simply an observed position. I think really the Commission’s idea on the advisory committee was to bring in the outside people and to have an outside view where it would not be dominated by the agencies and I think your fears are not well founded regarding the assumption that it would necessarily direct all of the programs. _ It would simply be an advisory body to see what is happening to the civilian effort, the private sector, as well as governmental effort. I think that was the idea of the Commission report and in reading that again Iam substantiated as to its idea in that field. The most that I see that you are concerned with is whether we should have a new agency that would report to the President in effect. whether there would be sufficient coordination. This seems to me to be one of your great concerns, and you bring that out on page 5 that you do feel: 995 That some form of consolidation of marine functions leading to a somewhat smaller group of Federal organizations with major interests in the field would be highly advantageous to the national program. Well, of course, this is what we are trying to do, and this is the effort to accomplish what you basically agree with in principle. You talk about what is going to happen, how can we coordinate, and on page 7 you Say: The relationships between the DOD program and that of NOAA would need to be carefully coordinated both to prevent unnecessary duplication and to in- sure that the existence of either program could not be used as an excuse to cut the other unwisely. Well now, presently how do you coordinate? Dr. Froscu. We coordinate with the other agencies in two ways: One by a great deal of direct personal contact on programs which we know are of mutual interest, and we coordinate via the machinery of the National Council. Mr. Rocrrs. And the National Council of course this committee set up. Dr. Froscu. Yes. Mr. Rogers. And it took the place of an interagency committee. Dr. Froscu. The Interagency Committee on Oceanography. Mr. Rocrrs. Now when you go to ESSA you presently have to go through Commerce to ESSA, right; under your present setup ? Dr. Froscu. For a formal matter of interagency agreement we would, of course, go through the secretarial chain. For matters of interchanging program information and agreeing on mutual things that don’t require formal interagency agreement, we go at the ap- propriate directorate level in the staffs of the two organizations. Mr. Rocers. And I presume you do that with Coast Guard. You either go through the Secretary or direct ? Dr. Froscu. We do this in the same manner with all of the agencies. Mr. Rocers. And with the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries? | Dr. Froscu. Yes, and of course an important and strong one 1s direct work between the Office of Naval Research and the National Science Foundation. Mr. Rocers. The point I am trying to make is that presently you must coordinate now and wouldn’t it be easier if we were pulling three of these groups under one operation? Wouldn’t that lessen your coordination and operation problem to have these combined? Dr. Froscn. Certainly it would. h Mr. Rogers. That is what we are trying to do. Certainly. I agree with you. AH Dr. Froscn. As a matter of fact if the organization were to be set up immediately, I think one of my first tasks would be to call on the director and begin to set up that arrangement. Nay Mr. Rogers. And I am sure that he would cooperate. This is what I believe this committee is going to try to help you do, to coordinate more easily with the rest of the Government in setting up an or- ganization. I think we recognize and the Commission recognized that the Navy oceanographic effort is a distinct program from the civilian. I think in many areas there could be better cooperation and better coordination. For instance on this use of personnel perhaps and equip- ment, we have just gone into that. They were trying to get a new 996 oceanographic vessel or two, and if it had been coordinated early enough, maybe they could have worked it in their budget. This is a matter of conjecture of course as we don’t know. Dr. Froscu. The difficulty there, Mr. Rogers, is the matter of timing. We did not know that we were going to be hit with the budget pres- sures until they were already hit with the budget pressures, too. Mr. Roesrs. I understand. Mr. Chairman, I hope that we can have before this committee some of the Bureau of the Budget, perhaps the individuals in the Bureau of the Budget, for instance, that handle the oceanography program for each department. These are the men I want to talk to because evidently they are overruling all of our experts who make the recommendations, and I know for a while there in Defense I think they had a former captain and maybe somebody else who was overruling the Joint Chiefs of Staff. So I hope before our hearings are over, Mr. Chairman, we can get these individuals who seem to be telling every agency just what you can do and what you can’t to come before this committee. We can then find out some of that background and how these decisions are made because obviously they are the most important decisions made in these ongoing programs. I think your testimony has been most helpful. You have brought out some points that I think we need to consider, and I am glad that the Navy really is fairly openminded about this and has made some very constructive points. Thank you. Dr. Froscu. Thank you, Mr. Rogers. Mr. Lennon (presiding). Thank you, Mr. Rogers. Mr. Dellenback. Mr. Detiensack. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have appreciated this testimony, as has been expressed by other members of the committee, from both you, Dr. Frosch, and from you, General Koisch. Sometimes the very best way that one can examine a suggestion made is when one isn’t sitting down with somebody who says what a great suggestion it is, but rather one who says, “We think this has weaknesses and these are the weaknesses.” I think probably each of you would be subject to crucifixion within your Departments if you stepped out here and said, “This is great and far better than what we have at the present time.” I am neither surprised nor at all concerned adversely by these comments that you have made. I consider much of it as highly constructive testimony. I would ask either of you this because in both instances there is partly a thrust of talking in terms of both testing against alternatives, which you both spoke of, and you have also talked in terms of possi- ble, not certain, but possible desirability of an interagency approach rather than to create a new agency like NOAA. Dr. Frosch, let me ask you this. Do you think that the present co- ordination in this field is ideal, excellent, good, fair, poor? How would you rate it? Dr. Froscy. I think if I may chose another word, I would rate it as workable. It is operating. It is certainly dealing with the severe problems. I would certainly not rate it as ideal or excellent, and I think it is true that with the number of agencies that have mission responsi- 997 bilities in the area it is hard to see how one could produce an ideal coordination pattern because so many of the individual problems in- volve the missions of more than one agency. Mr. Detienpack. Recognizing the difficulties, recognizing also the importance and recognizing the split responsibility of the Navy be- tween the military and the civil because the Navy’s reach is broad in this field, do you feel that that which is workable at the present time should be improved ? Dr. Froscu. Oh, yes. Mr. Detienpack. Do you feel it can be improved ? Dr. Froscn. Yes, I think it can be improved. Mr. Dretitenspack. Do you feel that it would be desirable that we make a major change or major improvement at least in the emphasis in the area of national priorities directed to the broad sweep of what is involved in this general subject under consideration, or would you make peripheral, relatively minor additional emphasis attached to it ? Dr. Froscu. I think we need some considerable improvement in emphasis in order to do the jobs that are clearly already important. It is not clear to me that we should attempt to make the oceans a major, or the major national priority. I think this would be a little like push- ing on a string. Mr. Detienpack. Are you making a distinction between a major and the major ? Let’s not say the major. Do you say that you would not make the oceans and the atmosphere a major project ? Dr. Frosci. It is hard for me to put this in my own mind on a list in terms of where major begins. It is clear that we have important jobs to do and important dependencies on the ocean and the atmos- phere. I think it is clear that over the next decade the ocean is in many ways going to become more important to us than it has been in the past. I think what I am trying to wonder about a little bit is at exactly what rate we should try to expand the priority and the nature of work in this area. Mr. Detrenpack. Would you make the expansion an implemental one or would you make it a great leap forward ? Dr. Froscu. I think at this point I would be most concerned about improving the organizational arrangements and the efficiency of what we are now doing with some incremental increase, but I think until we do that and get ourselves sorted out by some mechanism or other so that we understand where we want to go that an attempt to make a great leap forward might lead us into considerable difficulty. Mr. Detrenpack. This is important because I am not sure, you see, that we are really then seeing eye to eye on this because if I read correctly what you are telling us, then I think that I as one member of the subcommittee may have a real, basic, fundamental, underlying point of disagreement with you. If what you are talking about is really business as usual on this broad-sweep area with all its complexity, and maybe improvement of a peripheral nature, advance of a peripheral nature, revising that which is but not really fundamentally changing it, then I am not persuaded that we can really effectively accomplish great results in connection with the ocean and atmosphere in this manner. 998 I think we are going to have to make some significant leap forward. I would put a question to you, and yet I suppose it is unfair. Don’t answer it if you would prefer not to. I may still put it. Would you rank in the area of major national priorities further great strides forward in the area of space exploration? Would you rank that above a major effort in the field of exploration and research and movement forward in the area of the atmosphere and the ocean ? Dr. Froscn. If I may express a personal opinion. Mr. Detienpack. Please. Dr. Froscu. I would not personally rank a major space effort above a major effort in the oceans and atmosphere. but please Mr. Dettenpack. You would rank the ocean and atmosphere above that ? Dr. Froscu. Yes, I would rank the ocean and atmosphere above that, but please understand that I don’t mean this to imply that either one of them should necessarily be zero or close to zero. Mr. Drettenpack. My question was deliberately aimed at not put- ting them at zero. I was concerned with ranking of a personal nature because this is obviously not a departmental opinion. But you in those circumstances would put a major effort in the atmosphere and oceans ahead of a further major effort in space ? Dr. Froscu. Yes, I would, but I think it is only fair to point out that as a professional I have been engaged most of my professional life in the ocean. Mr. Dettenpack. The Chairman didn’t really ask this question, but he made a comment on it in response to what was said by another com- mittee member. I don’t think this is the forum to develop it, but, the relatively recent attempt to amalogmate the Navy, Army, and Air Force under the Department of Defense was analogous because at the time this great leap forward was made there was great debate whether there would not be great injury to the individual component services in carrying out their functions. I won’t ask any of the professional officers present to comment as to whether the solution has been ideal today or whether they feel there are not still rough edges to the amalgam. TI think if we had private conversation with each branch of the serv- ice represented, there might be a minor issue or two, but that doesn’t mean that the totality of service to the nation has not been improved y this. a I think there is a real analogy, you see. It was a major step in the military field to do this. The decision was to do it. I think probably the concensus of opinion would be that the Nation has benefitted by this, with all the rough edges and all the difficulties. I think the problem we are facing now in the committee is the ques- tion of whether in the field of the oceans and atmosphere the same sort of nonperipheral great leap forward is not essential. Frankly, I was a former Navy man, but for a relatively short, time of 4 years. I feel very warmly toward the Navy and its concerns. I am very sympathetic. As one who works closely with the Army Corps in my district where they are involved with a great number of projects, I have great praise for the Army Corps in what is in many ways a civi- lian function, General, that the Army Corps serves instead of a mili- tary function. I think the Corps itself bridges very well this gap be- 999 tween the military and civilian with all sorts of concomitant again, rough edges and problems. So that none of these things come easily, but let me ask you, Gen- eral, the same thing as I just asked the Secretary. Where do you feel that the present coordination is on this ranking of perfect or ideal or excellent, good, fair, and poor? Where would you put the present type of coordination of ocean and atmosphere ? General Korscn. In the subject that we are discussing I think you have to recognize that our experience in what you might call the deep ocean as against the coastal zone and Great Lakes is relatively nil, so that I can only speak in terms of the coast zone and the Great Lakes. We find the coordination essentially to be excellent and yet you must realize also that there are a great many conflicts involved. Some of the things that we are doing are in direct conflict with Interior’s aims in life, and yet there is coordination. We do talk to each other. We discuss the problems, who is going to fund for what things for study. Mr. Detienpack. There is a great deal of cooperation as well as coordination ? General Korscu. I repeat again that I am talking only in terms of the coastal zone and Great Lakes. I have no experience in the deep ocean as such. Mr. Dewiensack. But you find it to be good at the present time? General Korscu. And there are other checks on us. The final check you might say comes out at the Bureau of the Budget. So there is no duplication in that sense. Who is suggesting to pursue what. program comes out from discussions among agencies. In the things that go to the Marine Council and the programs that are pushed, we find some lack of what one might call a truly positive statement of the national goal in this area. Mr. De.ienpack. I question whether that might not be forthcoming more readily under a coordinated agency than under the present ag- glomeration of more or less many agencies. May I close, Mr. Chairman, by backing very strongly the request you made earlier that we ask both the Army Corps, if we may, and also the Navy to supplement testimony, if they would do so, against what you, General, put as your basic choice would be perhaps not to do this, but if we did it, what specific changes or what specific sugges- tions would you make relative to the plan that is set forth in the bill that is under consideration? While there is some of that involved in your testimony, I think it would be valuable to us to get an amplifica- tion if we can do it both from the Department and from the Corps, if you will give us that additional help. General Kotscu. We would be happy to doit. Mr. Detienpack. Thank you very much. (The following information was supphed by the Department of the Navy:) Under the circumstances that the question was asked, which I understand to be that if there is to be a NOAA, what changes in H.R. 13247 should be made, the following is submitted : (1) Page 6 line 24 after the words ‘marine environment” insert “(as deline- ated by the provisions of the act of August 6, 1947 ch 504, as amended (33 USC 883a et seq.) )” 1000 Reason: This is necessary in order to clarify respective areas of mapping and charting responsibilities, to avoid an unnecessary duplication of effort be- tween the Navy and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency, and to be in consonance with the considered recommendations of the Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources. (2) Page 7 line 6 add section (12): “Department of Defense atmospheric and oceanographic research, development, information, surveys, forecasting, mapping and charting and other related services not specifically transferred to the Agency remain the responsibility of the Department of Defense.” Reason: This is in order to clarify lines of responsibility or function between the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency and the Department of Defense as was suggested by the Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources in its report. (3) Page 8 line 21, delete ‘‘(A)”’. Page 9 line 4 through 11, change comma after “Code” (line 4) to a period and delete the remainder of the sentence. Reason: NOAA personnel should not receive better treatment than that af- forded civilian personnel in other departments and agencies in the Federal government. The proviso in the bill is not compatible with the principles of classification under title 5, U.S. Code. (4) Page 8 line 24. The maximum number of personnel who may be appointed without regard to civil service and classification laws is left unspecified. Obvi- ously, there is a small number which would be appropriate. There is, on the other hand, a large number which would provide NOAA with an unfair advantage in the competition fer competent talent. This number should be carefully chosen to insure a proper balance between NOAA’s need and the needs of other agencies. (5) Page 16, line 22 through 25, page 17 lines 1 and 2. Delete the sentence “The Advisory Committee ... as it deems appropriate.” Reason: The function of NACOA is to advise NOAA. The provision in the bill for NACOA to submit reports provide NACOA with a degree of authority which is incompatible with its responsibility. It is noted that the Administrator of NOAA makes a report at the end of each fiscal year to the President for sub- mission to the Congress. (Sec. 104(e)). It would be improper for NOAA’s ad- visory body to be submitting additional reports. (6) Page 18 line 18, add the sentence “The Coast Guard shall be maintained in an adequate state of readiness as a member of the Armed Forces of the United States, as specified in 14 USC 2.” Reason: Inasmuch as the Coast Guard fleet will be combined with those of ESSA and BCF, some statutory provision for maintaining the Coast Guard in a state of readiness for transfer to the Navy is deemed appropriate. (7) Page 20 line 8 add “and the National Oceanographic Instrumentation Center.” Reason: The NOIC is inadequately treated in the bill. NOAA would appear to have some of the NOIC missions, and the bill as written would automatically create unnecessary duplication. Mr. Lennon. Mr. Downing. Mr. Downtne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary and general, I think it fairly obvious that you all are less than overenthusiastic about this proposal, and I agree with Mr. Dellenback that much the same arguments against it could be found when the Armed Forces were consolidated under the Depart- ment of Defense.. But, you know, although I disagree with you, I must begrudginegly admit that you have submitted an excellent report and some of your points have to be taken into consideration. I find myself reluctant to admit that, but I think you have made a contribution here today. General, your answer to Congressman Keith’s question as to who killed Lake Erie was both interesting and provocative. I understood you to say that the people did, and did I understand you to say it would have died anyway ? General Korscu. Yes, sir. 1001 Mr. Downine. Why? General Ko1scu. Iti is the natural life cycle of a lake. It would even- tually eutrophy, dry up, and disappear. Mr. Downtne. Is that true of the other lakes? General Korscu. Yes, sir. This is the normal life cycle of a lake. Mr. Downtne. Thank you very much. Mr. Lennon. Thank you, Mr. Downing. I think it was in the first ses- sion of the 87th Congress that this subcommittee considered essen- tially what we are considering now. Suppose, gentlemen, Mr. Secretary and general, that in substance there had been enacted into law what we propose here in the Commis- sion’s recommendations back in, say, the second session of the 87th Congress which would have been 1962 I should judge. Where do you think we would have been today with respect to a program for ocean science and environment ? Mr. Secretary, would we be further advanced now than we are today ? Dr. Froson. Predicting past history is always a difficult thing to do, but I think that from the point of view of the national marine program we would have probably a better consolidated program and very likely a program which had settled on some specific directions more than the current program and was carrying them out. I think the real question that Mr. Dellenback asked and that is whether from the overall point of view of national aims strengthening the ocean program would be generally nationally good and whether it would come at the expense of other mission-oriented things. For example, while such an agency might have strengthened, let’s Say, sea bottom mineral resource exploration and exploitation, one has to ask the question whether this would have left exploration and ex- ploitation on the land alone, whether it would have given it a stimulus or whether the exploration and exploitation at sea might have come at the expense of exploration and exploitation on land; and, having esti- mated the answer to that question, we would then have to decide whether that was a net gain or a net loss for the country. I have no way of doing that, but certainly from the point of view of marine affairs as such there would bea strengthening. Mr. Lennon. Suppose that in 1958 there had been nine Federal agencies involved in programs related to space. Do you think we would have put a man on the moon if we continued those nine agencies inter- ested in various aspects of the space program ? Dr. Froscu. No, I don’t think so, if for no other reason than it would have been impossible to assemble the budget capable of doing it if there were nine agencies working on the problem. Mr. Lennon. That is one of the points we have here, to get the na- tional impact budgetary- wise. General, on page 3 of your statement you enumerate what you say the problem involves and more specifically you say: The problem involves a multiplicity and diversity of resource, urban, economic, environmental and other people-oriented considerations. It seems unlikely to us that a single Federal agency can satisfactorily take all these factors into account. It seems to us that some type of interagency coordinating mechanism will be required. 1002 Was it in approximately 1899 that the Rivers and Harbors Act gave the Corps of Engineers the statutory authority respecting the issuance of permits for dredging in so-called navigable waters ? General Kotscu. Yes, sir. Mr. Lennon. The words “navigable waters” have been interpreted in many ways by the courts. I think you all got along pretty well until when ? General Kortscu. About 3 years ago, sir. Mr. Lennon. Under an Executive order in 1967, wasn’t it, in about August or September of 1967, you entered into a memorandum of understanding with the Secretary of the Interior? General Korscu. Yes, sir. It is about 2 years old. Mr. Lennon. You said in response to a question that that had worked out real well. General Korscu. Insofar as the mechanism of attempting to, let’s say, resolve the problem which comes up. The answers that come out of it are not always satisfactory. Mr. Lennon. It places the burden on the district engineer, does it not? General Koiscu. The proper answer is that it does not place the burden on the district engineer. The burden comes to rest in the Office of the Chief of Engineers and the Secretary of the Army. — Mr. Lennon. Ultimately it does. Let me see if I can recollect a specific example of it. I am thinking of a certain group who applied for a permit to dredge in the coastal area of southeastern North Caro- lina some 2 years ago. There was no opposition by the State and there has yet been no opposition in writing by the State. That particular case has been at the level of your office for some little time. General Korscu. Yes, sir. Mr. Lennon. And in the exchange of correspondence which I have had with your office, sir, and with the Department of the Interior there have been as much as 90 days where you couldn’t get an answer from the Department of the Interior. If you don’t believe that, I will bring you the letter. General Koriscu. Sir, I remember the case. Ninety days, I might say, in some of these cases is fast. Mr. Lennon. That is fast? That is to acknowledge the letter, I might say. So it does seem to me that as to the procedural aspect of this memorandum of understanding, I don’t know how it can be car- ried out. It hasn’t in this case. Literally it can be carried out with respect to the hearing and so forth putting it back down to the regional director of the Department of the Interior to make this report to the Secretary and then it goes back to you and back to the Secretary and back to you and back to the regional director. I am just wondering if you had a central government agency which liad the total responsibility if these problems could not be better solved. When we get involved in coastal zone questions that were raised by the Commission, we do get impaled on the horns of not one but more than one dilemma. I think you know, General, that this committee is starting something that I don’t know has been attempted before, and that is to convene here in Washington on the 28th and 29th of October, through the respective Governors of some 30 coastal and Great Lakes States, their representatives from their respective marine | 1003 science councils. I might say that this committee 2 years ago sug- gested they form such marine councils. We are inviting these representatives here so that people like you, who have wrestled with this problem for years, can make your views known. I am going to ask counsel to discuss with you at some length the possibility of getiing a position paper by the Department of the Army through you at. this forum. These forums will be moderated by men lke Dr. Edward Wenk, just to mention one, and many others. The panelists will represent a broad spectrum of people who are interested in the recommendations of the Caiienicsion, and we are seeking a way to tell these people how far the Federal Government should go under the recommendations of the Commission and to what degree the coastal States and Great Lakes would be willing to come in and participate in an overall program such as you gentlemen have discussed here today. I would like very much for you to give us the benefit of your experi- ence because I know it has been wide, and particularly in the area of eivil works which is in this category. We will be back in touch with you because I think it has been indi- cated that this committee has been involved in this thing for years, General and Mr. Secretary. We have met with frustration in trying to even pass the law that we did which created the Commission and the National Council. The administration resisted the creation of the Na- tional Council saying we didn’t need it and it was repetitious, and within 6 months Vice President Humphrey as Chairman and the other members of the Council were enthusiastic about what it was moving toward and what it was accomplishing. We know that based on the composition of that Commission and the time, effort, and study they put forth in making their recommenda- tions that we have a responsibility. We are mandated in my judgment to at least give attention to these matters and try to come up with some solutions. We want you to help us and want you to understand our problem. Most witnesses say that the Commission report projects the national interest. We want you to help us find out how to do that. Counsel, do you have questions ? Mr. Frey ? Mr. Frey. Sir, I was in the Navy, and I think at this point I would be referred to as a “tail-end Charlie,” Mr. Chairman. I would just like to say, gentlemen, that I read your statements. I was in a meeting of the Space Committee, of which Iam a member also. Mr. Secretary, your remarks seem a little out of context to me be- cause you are saying that the program with the ocean should be at least equal to or greater than that of space. Yet we have been consider- ing a special task force report on the next 10 or 20 years in space with funding and emphasis that are considerably different than we look at in oceanography. f Again, coming last, most of the questions have been asked. One of my questions is: Where would we be in the space program if we had not taken this type of action and put national emphasis on it? I think your answer was direct and to the point, and I think this is the problem we face in oceanography. Is it as important as the space pro- 26-563—70—pt, 2 32 1004 gram and, if so, can we really accomplish it by just “beefing up” an agency, by coordinating a little better than we have been doing? I think this is really the key question. I agree with my colleague, Mr. Dellenback, in that I just don’t see how you can do it this way. I would be most interested to see something constructive, not just against the suggestions of this committee, but something constructive as a positive way to accomplish this goal. T think I have used up my 5 seconds, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lennon. I will yield to you any time. Mr. Frey. Yes, sir. That is fine. Mr. Lennon. Thank you, Mr. Frey. The hearings will resume next Wednesday morning in this hearing room at 10 a.m. At that time the witnesses will be Mr. W. D. McElroy, the Director of the National Science Foundation, and Mr. Sidney R. Galler, the Assistant Secretary for Science of the Smithsonian Institution. Gentlemen, we thank you very much for your appearance here today. Dr. Froscu. Thank you very much. General Ko1scu. Thank you. (Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m. Wednesday, October 1, 1969.) NATIONAL OCEANOGRAPHIC PROGRAM WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 1, 1969 Houses or REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OCEANOGRAPHY, OF THE COMMITTEE ON MercHant MARINE AND FISHERIES, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met at 10:15 a.m., pursuant to recess, in room 1334, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Alton Lennon (chair- man of the subcommittee) presiding. Mr. Lennon. The subcommittee will come to order. This morning we are delighted to have Dr. W. D. McElroy, Director of the National Science Foundation, and Dr. Sidney R. Galler, As- sistant Secretary for Science of the Smithsonian Institution. Gentlemen, we are delighted to have you. It is my understanding that Dr. McElroy will present his statement now. Doctor, if you will come forward, we hope to get underway. Doctor, do you have anyone with you that you wanted to identify and sit at the witness table with you? STATEMENT OF DR. W. D. McELROY, DIRECTOR; ACCOMPANIED BY DR. ROBERT D. ABEL, HEAD, OFFICE OF SEA GRANT PROGRAMS; AND DR. EDWARD P. TODD, DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR (RE- SEARCH), NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION Dr. McExroy. Yes; with your permission, I would like to have Dr. Abel, who is head of our sea grant programs. Mr. Lennon. We are delighted to see you. Dr. McEzroy. Mr. Chairman, I have a written statement to submit for the record. I prefer not to use the statment or read it, but rather to talk informally about some of the highlights. Mr. Lennon. All right. Without objection, immediately following your informal summary statement, there will be inserted in the record the full text of your statement as presented to the committee. Dr. McEzroy. Thank you. I should preface my remarks by indicating to you, Mr. Lennon, and to other members of the committee that I am a strong advocate of oceanography, having worked in that field myself for 15 years and having served on the President’s Science Advisory Committee on Oceanography. We studied this whole problem of Federal relation- ships over a period of a year between 1965 and 1966 and we prepared a report called “Effective Use of the Sea.” (1005) 1006 We studied many problems, and I think basically we arrived at the same position as the Commission’s report with regard to effective science, that is, the scientific objectives. However, we differed with the Commission with regard to govern- mental organization. Mr. Lennon. You are speaking when you make this statement as the Director of the National Science Foundation and as a representa- tive of the administration ? Dr. McEtroy. No, sir. I am speaking personally now. Mr. Lennon. I see. Thank you. Dr. McE roy. I have not, even after studying the Commission’s report, changed my original views with regard to the organization. I personally think that a different organization would be much more effective, less disruptive and probably less costly. I would like to take this opportunity to divide marine science ac- tivities up into four broad categories as we originally did in our study back in 1965 and 1966. These are four basic areas which I think are covered roughly on page 4 of my prepared statement. Mr. Lennon. Let’s get the record straight since you are putting your statement in. You make the statement on page 2, beginning on line 6, “I believe that an organization of the scope envisaged by the Commission would become too unwieldy and perhaps provide more problems than it would solve.” You are speaking to this? Dr. McEtroy. Yes. Mr. Lennon. All right, sir. Go ahead. Dr. McExroy. I think if we look at the marine environment, we can see four categories: The environmental forecasting and services; resource development, scientific research and education; and civilian technology development. Those are the four broad categories which cover all principal activi- ties of marine sciences that we were able to identify. I do not believe that has changed over the past few years. Now, when one considers marine science and oceanography from that viewpoint, I think it follows logically that existing agencies might be directed to take on the additional responsibilities that the Commission has indicated. For example, I think Commerce with ESSA could expand its activi- ties to undertake the problems with regard to environmental forecast- ing and services, and particularly to establish a national environ- mental monitoring and prediction program which is one of the high- priority recommendations. In effect, ESSA is carrying out at the present time most of the activities identified in the Commission’s report in this regard. Tn the case of resource development, I think that interior, given additional direction, could effectively carry out the missions identified by the Commission’s report including the expansion of the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries and undertaking other resource activities. The civilian technology development could logically be assigned to interior, and in this case I think with cooperation from the Navy with their technology knowhow, it would make a significant contribution to civilian purposes, augmenting that which has actually been carried out over the years. 1607 Scientific research and education should reside with the National Science Foundation which, I think, and I can say without prejudice since I was not here at the time, has done an outstanding job in ad- vancing scientific research and development in the oceans. The Commission did not disagree on this as a matter of fact. The Commission identified the National Science Foundation as the leader in ocean research and education, and I think, frankly, it would be a critical and almost disastrous mistake to remove this area from the rest of the educational components of the universities and colleges and give the responsibility to another organization. Ocean research and education are the critical underpinnings of all the other three activities that I have mentioned above, and this, I sub- mit, must be kept intact. The Foundation also is affected greatly by a number of other recom- mendations in the Commission’s report. For example, it would remove the Antarctic program. It would remove NCAR. It would remove the institutional support that we now give to a number of large oceano- graphic institutions, and it would remove the National Sea Grant and College program. All of these programs are in direct support or closely related to the research and graduate training conducted in the universities and colleges. A new agency, that, by tradition or experience, has not worked in these areas, would be asked to take on, these responsibilities, and I say when you have a good thing going, as we have now, I question whether it should be disturbed, but rather it should be improved to meet the national growing needs of the additional research and education in the oceans. One area, though, that I am particularly concerned about is the Sea Grant College program, that I hope Mr. Abel will have a chance to answer questions on. NSF has made a large investment in the support of oceanographic institutions For example, the Commission recommends a system of federally supported university national laboratories. Mr. Lennon. Let’s return for a minute, doctor, to interrupt you when you said that you wanted Mr. Abel to speak to the national sea grant program. Dr. McEnroy. I would be happy to have him answer any questions or to make a statement 1f you desire, Mr. Lennon. Mr. Lennon. One of the difficulties in having a statement made off- the-cuff or a summary of your statement is that it does not give the committee an opportunity to follow your statement and to subse- quently question you in connection with your statement. If you summarize and then put your statement in the record, which we have agreed to do because we want to accommodate you in the interests of your time and the committee’s time. It does put the com- mittee at a disadvantage however, unless, while you are summa- rizing, they can go back and read your statement. Dr. McErroy. I understand. Mr. Lennon. I bring this to your attention because I have read your statement hurriedly, standing out in the hall a few minutes ago, but I doubt if other members have had that chance. I quote: “I am deeply concerned with the report’s recommendation regarding the National Sea Grant program.” 1008 Then you make a confession which few people do: I must confess that, personally, I had earlier entertained doubts as to the feas- ibility of such a program as it was originally proposed. However, the Sea Grant Program has made significant and rapid progress. Then you go on to tell what a great job it has done. Yet you opposed it at the time? Dr. McEtroy. Originally. Mr. Lennon. As you are opposing now the Commission’s recom- mendation ? Dr. McExroy. I opposed it as it was originally put forward prior to passage of the act, and I submit that the innovations that the Na- tional Science Foundation has made in carrying out the program have resulted in a significant contribution from what I envisioned from the original proposal. IT am in complete agreement with the present sea grant program. Mr. Lennon. You may proceed. Dr. McEtroy. At the present time we are block funding, and have been since 1966. The ship operation support for the oceanographic in- stitutions, as for example, Woods Hole, Scripps, Lamont, “Miami, Washington, Oregon State, Hawaii, and others. This “block funding” and the oceanographic research conducted by these institutions al- re eady carry out some of the recommendations that are in the Com- mission’s report. We recognize this as a very important activity, and I am prepared to say that the sea grant program itself has added significantly to these research activities. I will close this informal statement, and we can go back to the prepared statement, if you would like. Mr. Lennon. You go ahead, Doctor. Dr. McEnroy. I would like to add that at the present time the sea grant program has extremely close relationships with Interior, ESSA, the Agricultural Extension Service, and the Army Enginers, and we think the program is moving ahead most significantly. We would hate to see the program disturbed. This concludes my very informal summary of what T think are the highlights of the points I wanted to make in my formal state- ment, and “if you would like to go over the formal statement page by page I would be glad to take the time to do that, Mr. Lennon. (The prepared statement follows:) STATEMENT OF Dr. W. D. McHitroy, Drrector, NATIONAL ScIENCE FOUNDATION Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee on Oceanography, it is a pleasure to appear here this morning to discuss the Report of the Commission on Marine Sciencés, Engineering and Resources, entitled Our Nation and the Sea, and H.R. 13247. I have followed the Commission’s activities with considerable interest since my participation in the activities of its predecessor, the President’s Science Advisory Committee’s Panel on Oceanography. As you are aware, our published report, titled Effective Use of the Sea, was used as a reference docu- ment by Dr. Stratton and his Commission members. Since becoming Director of the National Science Foundation on July 14, 1969, I have read the Commission report and the panel report on Science and Environ- ment. I greatly admire the comprehensive and thorough efforts of the Commission members, and your own foresight in establishing the Commission. The Commis- sion has made a great contribution toward analyzing and defining our national goals in the marine environment and in pointing out the programs needed to accomplish these goals. 1009 The Commission report presents excellent guidance for further development of oceans sciences. Oceanic development can contribute to our economic growth, in- ternational cooperation, and our prestige among the nations of the world. Most of the attention of your Committee and the scientific community has focused on the Commission’s recommendations regarding governmental organiza- tion. It is in this regard that speaking for myself, and not for the Administration, I must express certain reservations regarding the advisability of following the Commission’s recommendations. I beieve that an organization of the scope en- visaged by the Commission would become too unwieldy and perhaps provide more problems than it would solve. I recognize, of course, the breadth and depth of the Commission’s deliberations. However, I am not persuaded that all aspects of marine science can be welded into one agency without some of its components drastically suffering. I would be particularly concerned about the health, well- being, and advancement of our national scientific research and scientific educa- tion potentials in the marine sciences. The Commission concluded that additional effort should be given to civilian marine technology so that methods of exploiting resources of the sea can be brought to the point of commercial application. The National Sea Grant Program now focuses on this area, but does not fully satisfy this need. With respect to civilian marine technology I should add that I often have wondered how thor- oughly the Navy’s vast, longstanding and expert technological efforts in the oceans have been analyzed to determine just how much they can contribute to our national oceanographic effort. Perhaps such an analysis would reveal infor- mation and developments that are useful for civilian purposes. The Commission has noted that the marine and atmospheric environments are intimately related, particularly in regard to world-wide weather condi- tions. The scientific research and resulting technology in weather prediction and monitoring must be continued on a high priority, perhaps more for our activities on land than at sea. Therefore, I would be somewhat apprehen- Sive about assigning the responsibility for scientific research and technology relating to the atmosphere to an agency whose primary role is in the oceans. If this should be done, I fear that our existing and future progress in atmos- pheric monitoring, prediction, and control over our land masses will be ad- versely affected and that our programs in agriculture, air pollution, and weather prediction will suffer. I recommend further study in this area. From my experience on the PSAC Panel on Oceanography, I am personally concerned over the Commission’s failure to present alternatives to its proposed organization. Certainly, many alternatives were considered. It is not my inten- tion to assess the Commission’s work in a negative manner, but I believe there are alternatives that would be much less costly and disruptive and if employed would accomplish our national objectives. One alternative that re- quires additional consideration is the concept of having an appropriate Federal agency responsible for each main category of marine-related areas of activity corresponding to the Nation’s interests in civilian marine affairs. (Military affairs and international affairs should be considered, of course, as separate categories.) These main categories are (1) environmental forecasting and services; (2) resource development; (3) scientific research and education ; and (4) civilian technology development. Such categorization is not only compre- hensive and logical, but would suggest, almost by definition, the proper nuclei for assignment within the Federal Government. A substantial nucleus for environmental services already exists within the Department of Commerce’s Environmental Sciences Services Administration (ESSA). ESSA is already conducting most of the services recommended by the Commission in weather and sea-state forecasting, charting, and develop- ment of related technology, including space related activities. ESSA, for in- stance, could implement the Commission’s recommendations for establishment of a national environmental monitoring and prediction system. Similarly, it is not too difficult to envision the Department of the Interior as being responsible for marine resource development. Rather than remove fisheries affairs from Interior as proposed by the Commission, it seems to me at least as appropriate to reconstitute the Department of the Interior so that it would be responsible for natural resources development. adding smaller programs as necessary rather than removing the Bureau of Commercial Fish- eries and elements of the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife. As the Com- mission has proposed, the Interior Department would still be left with re- sponsibility for mineral resource recovery in the ocean (Bureau of Mines) and 1010 its responsibilities for aquatic recreation activities (as for instance in the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation and the National Park Service). By the same token, it appears logical to continue and possibly expand the Department of the Interior’s responsibilities associated with the coastal zone. Responsibility for civilian ocean technology might logically be assigned to the Department of the Interior because of its responsibilities in resource devel- opment. Certainly, the extensive marine technology from the Navy’s programs should be utilized to the fullest extent for civilian purposes. If you will pardon my natural bias, I should like to refer to the President’s Science Advisory Committee’s 1966 report, Effective Use of the Sea. The PSAC report deliberately centralized responsibility and authority for general purpose ocean research and education in the National Science Foundation. Scientific and engineering research and the education of people to conduct such research is the critically necessary underpinning to both environmental services, resource devel- opment, and ocean technology. The Foundation has always been heavily involved in supporting such research. It is for this reason that the Commission’s recom- mendations affecting the National Science Foundation concern me in several ways. The Foundation is affected in the recommendations respecting the United States Antarctic Program, the National Center for Atmospheric Research, oceanographic facility support to institutions, and the National Sea Grant and College Program. These programs are in direct support of, or closely related to, research conducted in the Nation’s universities and colleges. The National Science Foundation is a major supporter of such academic research; indeed, the academic setting is the principal locus of nearly all Foundation support. In contrast, most of the other agencies and bureaus suggested for reorganization in the proposed agency have little or no tradition of, or experience with, support of programs that have as their main purpose the strengthening of academic science resources. To maintain and to assure the future stability and growth of this Nation’s scientific and technological posture, and to be sure that we have the trained manpower necessary in the future to conduct the scientific research te help solve the relevant problems of our society, I strongly believe the Foundation must expand its leadership and increase its support to the academic community in all scientific fields to assure the scientific health of our country. Since all sciences are interdependent, and multidisciplinary efforts are paramount, separating such marine-related programs from other Foundation sponsored activities and isolat- ing them in a new agency would adversely affect this Nation’s scientific research and education capabilities. Moreover, I am deeply concerned with the Report’s recommendation regarding the National Sea Grant Program. I must confess that, personally, I had earlier entertained doubts as to the feasibility of such a program as it was originally proposed. However, the Sea Grant Program has made significant and rapid progress. This program has great potential for accelerating the development of the ocean in our national interest. And it has this potential since it has become so highly complementary and catalytic to our long-standing oceanographic re- search programs. I know you are aware of the Foundation’s leadership over the years in building our national oceanographic research program, the large invest- ments we have made in establishing and supporting oceanographic institutions and universities, and the initiaton and support of major natonal and interna- tional programs. With the Sea Grant Program becoming such a capping to our marine scientific research and education programs, our potential has been sig- nificantly enhanced. I know you are, well aware of the Sea Grant Program’s primary objective of marshalling the academic and industrial science capabilities to serve the best interests of the country: (a) through conduct of applied research coordi- nated in many fields and directed in programs having as their aim the develop- ment of marine resources: (b) through direct edrcation and training programs to build the Nation’s scientific engineering and technical manpower resources for such exploitation; and (c) through the transfer of scientific and techno- logical information from the developers of such information to the practical users. The Office of Sea Grant Programs has established strong but flexible working arrangements with the Interior Department. ESSA, Agricultural Exten- sion Service, and the Army Engineers. I can assure you that I shall take all feasible steps to enable the Sea Grant Program to reach its full potential in as short a time as possible. 1011 In regard to our responsibility for the health of the Nation’s scientific research and the educational activities required to advance our research potential, the Foundation has in the past, and plans in the future, to carry out its responsibili- ties in this area with all the resources that can be allocated to well-balanced national scientific research programs. The marine programs in the Founda- tion are substantial and we are making every effort to implement those Com- mission recommendations that we are not already accomplishing. The Foundation has substantial programs covering the fields of physical, chemical, geological, and biological oceanography, and we have fields of marine-related engineering, including hydrodynamics, sediment processes, materials development, and instru- mentation. These programs could be expanded if the national interest required it. I believe that one of the major reasons for the Commission’s recommendations with respect to ‘“University/National Laboratories” was to assure greater sta- bility and flexibility in Federal funding. In this connection, I would point out that the Foundation has, since 1966, provided “block funding” for ships and facilities at major oceanographic institutions. With respect to the Commission’s recommendations concerning coastal zone laboratories, I am pleased to relate that the Foundation’s National Sea Grant Program has initiated activities in that form, without being so titled, are in fact coastal zone laboratory-types of operations. The concept of multidisciplinary approaches to the coastal zone problem is inherent in the Sea Grant mission, and the program moved in this direction well before the Commission recommenda- tions were formulated. Some institutions receiving Sea Grant support are already de facto coastal zone laboratories. Some of the Sea Grant multidisciplinary project grants were made for this exact purpose. I might also be noted that the Sea Grant Program is already funding basic engineering studies consistent with the Commission’s recommendation for fundamental technology development and is heavily involved in the aquacultural research recommended by the Commission. With respect to extension services, the Sea Grant Program is entering into agreements with the Departments of Agriculture, Interior, and Commerce, to further expand and improve existing extension services in the marine area. I firmly believe that the Commission’s organizational recommendations must be considered in the context of the total Federal structure for the future, par- ticularly with regard to science, technology, and education. Scientific research and education rank high in our national priorities, and our government must. be efficiently and logically organized to serve all areas, not only marine-related areas, for our future well being. Therefore, at least for the short term, I believe that organizing around our strongest existing marine-related areas of strength would quickly serve our national need without disruption of on-going activities. The programs of the lead agencies in the categories I have outlined could be co- ordinated easily with the Departments of Defense and State. We recognize the oceans as one of Man’s great resources. We recognize our responsibility for developing a better understanding of the oceans; we have pur- sued this responsibility vigorously in the past; and we are pursuing this respon- sibility now with well outlined plans for the future. We recognize your responsi- bility and applaud the action you have taken to render our extension into the sea more effective. I offer you my utmost cooperation, and desire to work with you to assure that our Nation makes effective use of the sea. This concludes my prepared statement, Mr. Chairman, and I shall be pleased to answer the questions that you and your Committee have. Mr. Lennon. Doctor, on page 1 of your statement, in the last three lines you say: Oceanic development can contribute to our economic growth, international cooperation, and our prestige among the nations of the world. To what degree, doctor, do you think that this oceanic develop- ment can contribute to our prestige among the nations of the world, to what degree related to other efforts that we are in now? Dr. McEtroy. I speak to this from a somewhat prejudiced view- point. I happen to believe that if we can take the leadership in food resources and food development in the ocean by trying to demonstrate how we can increase the production from the ocean in regard to fish and other edible foods, we can make a contribution to other countries. This increases our prestige. 1012 Mr. Lennon. This fish protein concentrate has not done so well so far, has it ? Dr. McErroy. Unfortunately not. I hope it will start moving now. IT am sorry the production has not been great enough. Mr. Lennon. You let the contract for how many thousands of tons? Dr. McEtroy. I forget the exact figure on that. Mr. Lennon. We have had a delivery of less than 1 ton. We had to go to the Food and Drug Administration, waiting to give its con- sent, a little over a year ago now, to the formula. Thinking in terms of prestige of this program related to other nations of the world, and I am thinking about the $642 million that was spent to develop the SST, the supersonic transport, and now they are going to spend $660 million more because of the prestige, do you want to relate those two ? Dr. McEtroy. Of course, again I say, that personally I am preju- diced. I wish I had that kind of money for oceanography. Mr. Lennon. Yousay in your statement : I believe that an organization of the scope envisaged by the Commission would become too unwieldy and perhaps provide more problems than it would solve. How would it be unwieldy, doctor, in your judgment? What prob- lems would it create that it didn’t solve, for the record ? Dr. McEtroy. Let me make a few statements with regard to what I think oceanography is. I think many people think of oceanography as a science. Oceanog- raphy is a multidisciplinary science. You cannot just be trained in oceanography per se. You have to be a good physicist, a good chemist, a good biologist, or a good geologist to begin with in order to be a good oceanographer. I think that if you separate oceanography from the rest of the educa- tional process, that is, the process of research training from the rest of the academic community, then oceanography is going to be in isolation, and that would be disastrous for the science of oceanography, in my opinion. As soon as you combine basic research and education in an agency that is highly oriented toward practical applications, the first thing that falls between the slats, when a budget cut comes, is graduate re- search, I think that if that happened, such would be disastrous for the future of oceanography. Those would be two principal reasons against putting them together in one agency. I think experience shows that in the Government this is what happens. When DOD gets a cut, the first thing cut is basic research. When an agency gets cut in authority to do essential things, the first things that are cut are basic research and graduate education, which are the lifeblood of the program we are talking about. The weather forecasting cannot be stopped. It has to be kept for the farmers and other people in this country. If it is cut, the first thing that goes is basic research. So that is fundamentally the reason I am against putting these together. Mr. Lennon. Doctor, you state on the last four lines on page 2, and lines 1 to3 on page3: I often have wondered how thoroughly the Navy’s vast, long-standing and ex- pert technological efforts in the oceans have been analyzed to determine just how 1013 much they can contribute to our national oceanographic effort. Perhaps such an analysis would reveal information and developments that are useful for civilian purposes. We had the ICO with the Navy participating and the other agencies, I am talking about the Interagency Committee on Oceanog- raphy, and then we had the National Council, and yet no one at any level has insisted that the Navy have an analysis made of the data that has been accumulated by the Navy that could be used for civilian purposes. Why, doctor? Because you have not had any single agency charged with this sole responsibility to do what you say ought to have been done years ago. Is that a fair statement ? Dr. McEtroy. As far as I understand you, it sounds like a fair statement. Mr. Lennon. Put it in your own words. You are the one who is tell- ing me that you have often wondered why the Navy’s vast, longstand- ing and expert technological efforts in the oceans have not been ana- lyzed to determine how they can be used for civilian purposes. Why has that not been done? Dr. McEtroy. I cannot answer that. Mr. Lennon. Who would have the responsibility to do it? Who would have the responsibility to continue the proliferation of this program in 11 agencies? You raised the questions, but you don’t give any answers. Dr. McEnroy. I have not had an opportunity to answer that partiec- ular one but I will be glad to try. I would say if the Navy is directed to do this, it would do it if is given the funds. Mr. Lennon. Doctor, I am reminded that on the Stratton Commis- sion there was an Assistant Secretary of the Interior. There was an Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and there was Dr. White, the Admin- istrator of ESSA. T can understand the unwillingness and proper restraint on these gentlemen to join in the Commission’s recommendations with respect to a particular Government structure. But since one of those three has left the administration and is a private individual, he has stated em- phatically and categorically and definitively that in his judgment this was the way to move. Now, in addition to that, Dr. White gave us this reply, and I think it was a little embarrassing to the Assistant Secretary of the Depart- ment of Commerce who appeared before this committee, who was say- ing, “Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, you ought to con- sider many, many alternatives.” He said: “The Commission’s report does not show that they have considered many alternatives.” I said, “Well now, Mr. Secretary, let’s turn to the gentleman sitting right at your left, Dr. White, who was a member of the Commission, and ask him if they did go into substantive detail as to what other alternatives there were.” T said, “Dr. White, what is your answer ?” Dr. White said, “Yes, sir. We considered all the alternatives.” Yet the gentleman representing the Department of Commerce in- ferred that there were no alternatives considered by this Commission, but fortunately Dr. White cleared the record on that. 1014 Don’t you believe, Doctor, that this Commission in the 2 years that they gave to the study of this problem, studied the alternatives with respect to Government operation or organization ? Dr. McExroy. I am sure they did, but they arrive at a different posi- tion than a previous study did. Their position differs from a previous study on this. Mr. Lennon. Doctor, what did the administration do to try to m- plement the results of the previous study that you said was made in what years ? Dr. McExroy. In 1965 and 1966. Mr. Lennon. What did you do about those recommendations ? _ Dr. McExroy. Well, as a matter of fact, I would say that the fund- ing had increased tremendously until a couple of years ago, and then the budgets were cut. I would like to mention that we requested, be- fore the House of Representatives, increased funds for our oceano- graphic programs which were cut in previous years. Asa matter of fact, the NSF budget was cut by almost one hundred million dollars last year, but we maintained the Sea Grant College program at the level we requested even so. Mr. Lennon. Now yousay who cut it ? Dr. McEtroy. The House of Representatives first, and then the Congress. Mr. Lennon. You mean below the authorization figure? Dr. McEtroy. Yes. Mr. Lennon. And below the budget authorization ? Dr. McEtroy. And below the President’s budget that was sub- mitted, yes, sir. Mr. Lennon. What period are you talking about? Dr. McEtroy. This was the NSF budget in its totality that was cut one hundred million dollars. As I say, we asked for $6 million for sea grant and maintained it as $6 million. Mr. Lennon. I noted in your statement your concern about the proposal in the Commission’s report to remove from the Department of the Interior and move to the new Government structure the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries and certain elements of the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife. You say that in your judgment rather than remove these particular affairs from the Department of the Interior, “ . it seems to me at least as appropriate to reconstitute the De- partment of the Interior so that it would be responsible for natural resources development.” Haven’t they had that authority all these many years? Hasn’t the Department of the Interior had this authority to move forward in the very direction you stated all these years, and now I ask you to sum that up by saying how effective has the Department of the Interior been when we are now in sixth place in the commercial fisheries in the world and we import, I think, in round figures 70-odd percent of all the edible seafoods that we consume in this country ? How effective have they been? You say they ought to be more effective. Dr. McEtroy. I would say in answer to the first part of the question, sure. they have had the authority, but unfortunately they haven’t had the funding to do the job that J think the Commission has asked to be done. It has been a few years since I have looked into the activities of the fisheries. 1015 I have visited many of the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries pro- grams and was very much impressed with what they have done with the money they have had, as a matter of fact. I think some of their original research on salmon is some of the best that has ever been done in the world. I would hope that one would have an opportunity to look into the science that they have carried out over the years. I do not think they have done a bad job with the resources that they have. Surely, there is always room for im- provement, just as there is room for improvement in the programs of the National Science Foundation. Mr. Lennon. I will have to concede that the Department of the In- terior has been stimulated by the report of the Commission, especially in the field of marine sciences, especially by the fact that the Assistant Secretary of the Interior was a member of the Commission, and I am sure as a member of the Commission he was pushing the Department of the Interior to get moving because something was about to happen. T am afraid that is what motivated them because they have shown an entirely different attitude with respect to the marine sciences in the last 6 months of the Commission’s life and especially since the Com- mission report came out. Dr. McExroy. Well, I think, Mr. Lennon, it is hearings like this, which I admire very much, that will give strength and direction to these programs. They indicate the interest of Congress, and I think when that is done and we make the commitment, the commitment not only in authority but the commitment in funds, that you will see these places move. I Jook again at the amount of money that is going into oceano- graphic program, and we were in a logarithmic increase phase up to 2 years ago. We were really getting shored up and ready to move. One of the big problems was that we did not have manpower to man the programs we were talking about, and the universities responded to this, not only in training more people but responding by requesting the National Science Foundation for money to support these people. Mr. Lennon. Doctor, I get the impression that you are satisfied with the progress at all levels of marine science. Dr. McEtroy. No, sir. I didn’t say that. I hope I did not infer it. Mr. Lennon. I am reminded that back in 1961 and 1962 this com- mittee was considering legislation which was oriented in the general direction of what the Commission has recommended. Each and every department and every bureau that had any facet of the marine science or oceanology or oceanography opposed it, saying, “We are doing a good job, but we think we can do it better than the other agencies.” And the administration opposed it, and then finally we decided we would go outside the area or realm of government to try to get some professional advice, and that is the reason we came up with the legis- Jation which established the Commission and mandated it to make the study and report to the President and to Congress. We sought to try to get a high level of coordinating policy when we moved in the direction of the National Council. Of course, you know who fought that, the administration. They opposed that. They said, “We have an ICO. We don’t need it.” We said, “We think we ought to have it.” Six months after we es- tablished it, they organized under the leadership of Vice President 1016 Humphrey and it became a viable organization and made a great con- tribution. But if we followed the recommendation of the powers that be in the power structure, as you call it, at the Washington level, the executive branch of the Government, we wouldn’t have had it. We wouldn’t have had anything. They wanted the status quo. Dr. McExroy. I think it is interesting that it was about that time that I was on PSAC, and I modestly say that I was instrumental in trying to get this study underway. I have a copy of that study here today. If you want to see the report I will send it to you. It does not disagree with the Commission in regard to the science and what we need to be doing in science. Mr. Lennon. Now, you say on page 10, the last paragraph : I firmly believe that the Commission’s organizational recommendations must be considered in the context of the total Federal structure for the future, par- ticularly with regard to science, technology, and education. Who do you suggest ought to consider this other than this commit- tee? Are you talking about the Ash Commission ? Dr. McEnroy. No, I am talking about this committee. I think it is very important for this committee to consider this. Mr. Lennon. Do you know anything about the Ash Commission ? Dr. McExroy. I only know it by name. I have had no contact with it. Mr. Lennon. We know that the President mandated the Ash Com- mission on, I think it was, May 19 to make a specific study of the Com- mission’s report particularly as it was related to government struc- ture, and we have in the file a photostatic copy of the memorandum from the President to the Ash Commission, so that we assumed that by approximately mid-September that the Ash Commission would have at least given some thought to the matter. So we calied them on September 10 and they said, no, they hadn’t even organized yet, and on September 11 they advised us that: We hope to launch a study within the next month or two. After we get into the problem, we will be in a better position to estimate how much longer it may take to consider the study. Dr. McEnroy. I will say, Mr. Lennon, what I have said earlier, that I think that the science, from the studies going back 15 years ago at the National Academy of Sciences, followed on by the PSAC study, followed on by the Commission’s report, is clearly identified, and I think we are ready to move and, even more, move more vigorously 1n support of the scientific component of the marine environment. Mr. Lennon. Doctor, what is your judgment and evaluation of the members of the Stratton Commission ? Dr. McExroy. Evaluation of what? Tam sorry. Mr. Lennon. What is your judgment and evaluation of the indi- viduals who compose the Stratton Commission, starting with Dr. Stratton ? Dr. McEtrroy. The people I know I think very highly of. Mr. Lennon. How many did you know? Dr. McExory. I know Dr. Stratton. I think very highly of him. I know Dr. Geyer from Texas A. & M., an outstanding person. I know Mr. Blaustein, he lives in Baltimore where I formerly lived. Dr. Crutchfield, an economist, I know and think very highly of. John 1017 Knauss I know as a friend and, particularly, since I was consultant to his committee on the Stratton report, | worked closely with him on the basic science part of it. Mr. Lennon. Could you get him to write in your individual views? Dr. McEtory. We were dealing only with the basic science and edu- cation. We were not involved in ‘the organizational structure. Mr. Lennon. He was a member of the Commission ? Dr. McEnory. Yes. Mr. Lennon. Who ultimately had to make a decision ? Dr. McEnxory. I didn’t talk with him about that, no. Mr. Lennon. I see. Dr. McExory. I know Dr. White, of course. I think very highly of him. Of course, I have just met Mr. Lennon, and I think he is very perceptive in asking g questions on this program. I know Senator Mag- nuson, whom I knew a long time ago because of our interest in ocean- ography, and I have recently met Mr. Mosher, whom I regard very highly. Mr. Lennon. The congressional members took no part, as you know, in anything except trying to relate to the commission con- gressional intent with respect to what we hoped to accomplish. Now, the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Mosher. Mr. Mostier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. McElroy, this committee has heard conflicting testimony and has had conflicting advice concerning this matter of the wisdom and the practicality of putting responsibility for day-to-day action in the operations in Government, mission-oriented, putting that type of ac- tivity together with responsibility for research and development in one agency or under one administrative head. You have raised that question in your testimony. Now, we have had two or three witnesses that have rather urgently encouraged us to do that, to put research and operations in the same agency, ‘based on their practical experience. They tell us that science, research, and particularly applied research and the action programs nurture each other and that there is good reason to have them ad- ministered together and functioning together. On the other hand we have had at least one important witness argu- ing that it doesn’t work, and I think he specifically referred to ESSA as an example where the administration was so science-oriented that the action programs suffered, were neglected. Now, you have given us an opposite point of view today. You have said that where these are put together in one department at least so far as funding is concerned, and I think that 1s where you put the emphasis, inevitably the research and the science suffers and the action programs are sustained. So we have conflicting points of view here. Dr. McErroy. Mr. Mosher, I would say that one could look at the history for the last 15 years in this country and look at mission- oriented agencies and what happens when their funds get cut. T happen to have been on the other end and know this very clearly. Mr. Mosner. Could you cite an additional example? Dr. McErroy. Let’s take the Navy. When the Navy’s funds are cut, the first thing that gets cut is the Office of Naval Research, and in turn the support of investigators in graduate education research will get cut. 1018 I think you will have a witness who follows me who was formerly with the Navy who can validate this statement. That is the reason I picked this out of the hat as an example. Mr. Mosuer. Of course we are talking about civilian agencies. There might be some compulsions in the military field in the defense area that would make this more true there than in some other cases. Dr. McEnroy. Let’s take AEC. That is another example. They are on a ceiling now and they have a responsibility to do certain things that they cannot cut. When their overall budget gets cut, the first thing that has to go is basic research. I think you will also find that this is true in weather forecasting, as I said. It almost would be inconceivable to think that you could cut out weather forecasting in this country in order to support basic re- search for a year or two until you recover. I think the same thing would happen there, as an example. I think it is a bad mix anyway. I think the argument of putting basic research and graduate training into what I call civilian technology, let’s say, has never been a happy mix. There has always been good interaction between responsible agencies as far as I am aware, and I think Mr. Abel can give you some good examples of what is going on in the sea grant program right now. There has always been good interaction, and this is true even in industry. Even in the best industries where they have a basic science component and a production component, when things get tight, the first thing that is cut is the basic science component because their imme- diate livelihood depends on marketing and getting the product out. Even in your best industries you will find that this is true. Mr. Mosuer. We certainly would all want to emphasize that the interaction is extremely important ? Dr. McEtroy. This I agree with one hundred percent. Mr. Mosner. We want to achieve the most effective arrangements for encouraging that interaction ? Dr. McE roy. That I have no objections to. If we can find arrange- ments to improve that interaction, which I submit is improving tre- mendously in a lot of areas, then I am all for them. Mr. Mosner. Well, we do have really very conflicting testimony before this committee on that subject. Dr. McEtrroy. I know you do. Mr. Mosuer. As the chairman has emphasized, it is important that we consider all the alternatives. Dr. McEtroy. Yes. Mr. Mosuer. On page 2 of your prepared testimony you say: I recognize, of course, the breadth and depth of the Commission’s deliberations. However, I am not persuaded that all aspects of marine science can be welded into one agency without some of its components drastically suffering. IT am sure you recognize that the proposed NOAA does not by any means include all aspects. Dr. McEtroy. Yes. : Mr. Mosner. The Commission considered and rejected, and I believe that this committee has considered and implicity at least has rejected, the idea of a so-called wet NASA, a really all-over concentration of activities of the oceans such as we have in activities in space con- centrated in NASA. 1019 We all recognize that that can’t be done, for a variety of reasons. So I do want to emphasize that in our consideration of NOAA we certainly are not considering that all aspects of the marine sciences would be welded into one unit. Dr. McExroy. I submit that that is correct. Yes, sir. Mr. Mosurr. Now, in the Commission report one of the things emphasized most frequently was the lack presently, the lack of any center of support and responsibility for the development of civilian technology in the oceans. This is a serious lack at the present. There is no one Government agency that is given the job of developing the basic technology that is so needed. I judge from your testimony that, since you are not in favor of NOAA, where the Commission would put it, you would put that re- sponsibility in the Interior Department. Is that what you are saying ? Dr. McEnroy. Yes, sir. I might add, Mr. Mosher, and if you would like to ask Mr. Abel in detail about this, you may, that although it is a modest program, I think we are moving significantly along that line in the sea grant college program where we are trying to get industry and the univer- sity people concerned with marine technology together. We have made some very interesting starts along this line, and I think Interior in effect could take off from there and move ahead. I think at the same time they would be wise if they made use of certain aspects of the Navy’s great technology capability in the ocean. Admittedly there has been some coordination in this area in making use of that capability. I think if Interior were directed and given the funds to do this, I have confidence that they could do it. I do not believe they have been given that directive yet. Mr. Mosuer. I think private industry, itself, has taken a lot of very interesting, commendable initiatives in the development of basic technology, but obviously the capital costs involved, the investments involved m some technology that is needed are not going to be risked by private industry. The Government is going to have to do the job. Now, turning to your assistant there, Bob, I certainly didn’t under- stand that you were given a mission nor the sea grant program was given the mission to do that job. It must be in a very miniscule and primitive way that you are moving in that direction because you certainly don’t have the funds. Tah ESS I don’t think you were given that responsibility or that mission. I don’t think you have the authority or the responsibility that was contemplated in the Commission’s report, and that we consider im- portant, to enter into contracts with private laboratories and with Government laboratories or with private industry, to enter into con- tracts for the development of hardware and that sort of thing. You aren’t in that business at all, are you? Dr. Aner. According to the act, Mr. Mosher, we are theoretically permitted to work with public and private organizations. In actuality, of course, there are certain problems attendant upon such arrange- ments, and the National Science Foundation has refined the role of the sea grant program toward implementation of applied research working primarily with the universities and colleges. This 1s, after all, 26-563 —70—pt. 2 —33 1020 the national sea grant college program. We encourage the develop- ment of consortia between industries and universities and colleges for the purpose of making the most effective use of the talents, com- petencies, and facilities ‘of both. The industrial input to the program is normally through the uni- versity, who is our direct grantee. With respect to your question about the intrusion of the sea grant program into development, I would rather emphasize our respon- sibility for applied research, and we are encouraging applied research in fields such as agriculture, aquatic reaction, marine pharmacology, or drugs from the sea and programs relating to location and develop- ment of mineral resources. We do not, however, deal with heavy civilian technology in perhaps the sense that is implied in the Commission’s report; that is, dealing W a Hark engineering. Mosumr. Mr. Chairman, f wish the gentleman from Florida, Mir. osens was here to refresh our memory a little bit about the his- tory of the creation of the sea grant program, but I think it is good to have it in the record at this point. As I remember it, the Members of Congress most interested in establishing the sea orant program were anxious from the start that it be part “of an agency in which there was coordination of ocean activities. There was a great deal of discussion with the Bureau of the Budget and among our selves, although I wasn’t one of the prime movers here, but among the members of the committee, a great deal of discussion with the Bureau of the Budget as to where it belonged, even in advance of creating any organization like NOAA, which, of course, many members of this committee favored as long ago as 1964 or 1965. Even in advance of that there was a desire to get the sea grant program going and so the « question was where to put it tentatively at least. or tempora rily, and on the advice of the Bureau of the Budget and with, I think, the unanimous agreement of all of us, it finally was placed in the National Science Foundation, at least temporarily and tentatively. There was always that temporary and tentative emphasis. It was placed there because we all recognized and acknowledg ed that the National Science Foundation had developed a very effective sys- tem for recognizing excellence and defining the certain scientific needs and selecting the people who should receive grants and the universities that should receive grants. We all recognized that the National Science Foundation has an ex- eelent procedure for this, and so that is really why the sea-grant college program,landed in the National Science Foundation. But just for the record, historically, it should be recognized that Congress always thought of this as a tentative and temporary assignment. Dr. McErroy. Yes, sir. I think that is a correct statement, Mr. Mosher. I was in on that discussion. Mr. Mosuer. Mr. Chairman, that is all I have. Mr. Lennon. Thank you, Mr. Mosher. Mr. Lennon. Doctor, I have here in my hand the report of the panel, of which you were a member, headed by Dr. Donald Hornig, which was submitted to the White House, I assume, since it is so dated, June 1021 17, 1966, submitted for the acceptance of it by President Johnson. You were a member of the panel. I am going to ask unanimous consent to have inserted in the record at this point that part of the report that begins on page 87, designated as “Organization for the Future,” and to be concluded on page 91, lines 1 and 2. (The pages mentioned above follow herewith :) [From the Report of the Panel on Oceanography, entitled “Hffective Use of the Sea,” dated June 1966, for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office. ] 2 Pa ey # * * & 10.4 ORGANIZATION FOR THE FUTURE If one examines present agency activities against the four governmental fune- tions defined in section 10.2 quite clearly the Government is doing very well in meeting its responsibilities in supporting programs of research and educa- ton. NSF and ONR have developed strong support for academic activities in oceanography, although these need to be broadened beyond oceanographic in- stitutions (see secs. 4.11, 5.4, 9). On the whole the Panel believes that both NSF and ONR have discharged their duties well. Beyond the provision of ships, laboratories, and the National Oceanographic Data Center, the Fed- eral Government has done little to provide technical services and facilities. We see an increased need for such facilities, and we expect the Navy to play a much more important role in the future than it has in the past. Some progress in describing the environment has been made, but our abilities to predict are still minimal (see sec. 6). Responsibilities for description and pre- diction are scattered throughout the agencies. The Navy supports a large survey program, as does ESSA, while smaller survey programs are found within Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, Geological Survey, and Coast Guard. The Navy, Coast Guard, and ESS& are all involved in the prediction problem, but the techniques remain primitive and do not reflect substantial advances in theoretical oceanography. Fostering development of biological resources of the ocean is the responsibility of BCF, while the Bureau of Mines, and Geological Survey have statutory re- sponsibilities regarding mineral resources. No single agency has prime responsibility for developing and advocating na- tional policy, although each agency on occasion develops programs of oceanog- raphy which further the particular agency’s mission. We could recommend continuation of the present organizational framework with words of caution regarding the importance of coordinated efforts. We do not believe this to be the wise course. For example one of our major recom- mendations is to develop the technology for improved use of marine food re- sources. Such actvity naturally falls into the domain of BCF. A cursory exami- nation of the required program, however, reveals that it would depend very heavily on physical oceanography. For example, thorough studies of upwelling and turbulent fluxes are required for proper implementation of certain phases of the program. Prediction of the environment is important. Would this mean that BCF should develop its own capabilities in physical oceanography, turn to HSSA or engage the Navy? ESSA is primarily charged with development of prediction techniques for fur- therance of commerce. Its rightful emphasis is on prediction of storms and re- search undertaken within the agency has little to do with problems of improving marine food technology. BCF could seek help from universities or industrial concerns, but again this would duplicate efforts of other environmental agencies. This brief example illustrates some of the problems the Panel foresees in imple- mentation of its major recommendations within the present administrative structure. The Panel recommends a major reorganization of non-Navy governmental activities in oceanography. The recommended reorganization would place in a single agency all those Federal activities related to description, prediction, and attempts to develop capabilities of modifying the environment (ocean, atmos- phere, and solid earth) and those activities concerned with managing and de- veloping resources of the ocean. The proposed reorganization emphasizes the unity of environmental science and observational technology.” This unity is one of the themes of this report and has been discussed at length in sections 2, 3, 4, 6, and 9. For example, progress in description and prediction of the ocean environ- ment. Exploration of mineral resources on the Continental Shelf requires the coupled system, each affecting the other in important ways. The second basic motivation for reorganization is the fact that the ability to work within the oceans, to develop the oceans’ resources and to use the oceans depends very heavily on our proficiency in describing and predicting the environ- ment. Exploration of mineral resources on the Continental Shelf requires the ability to work not only along the sea bottom, but in the water column above as well. Prediction of sea-bottom conditions and conditions in the waer column will be as important in the next 20 years as the prediction of weather and wave heights at the surface. In summary the reasons for the proposed reorganization are: 1. Unity of environmental sciences and observational technology. 2. Dependence of oceanic development for industry and commerce on our ability to predict the environment. 8. Clearly establishing responsibilities for executing national objectives and nondefense missions for the oceans. In broad ouline the reorganization would combine activities of the Environ- mental Science Services Administration, the Geological Survey (both its land and ocean activities), oceanographic activities of the Bureaus of Commercial Fisheries and Mines, and a portion of the Coast Guard’s oceanographie activities. Such grouping would provide an agency competent to deal with the four func- tions of government listed in section 1. The Panel does not make any recom- mendations as to whether the new agency should be independent or part of an existing agency. : With the creation of a new agency oceanographic activities of the Nation would be supported in five ways: 1. By the NSF in its traditional role in support of fundamental studies through grants and fellowships with special emphasis on aspects that con- tribute to manpower education for ocean science and technology. 2. By the new agency in carrying out its responsilibity for management of the environment and ocean resources and for providing description and prediction services through a balanced program of direct participation and support of industry and universities. 3. By the Navy in carrying out its mission of national security through its laboratories and industry and through ONR support of civilian institu- tions, aS well as by its supporting role in the development of undersea tech- nology and provision of national test facilities. 4. By agencies such as AEC and HEW in earrying out their missions. 5. By the Smithsonian Institution in fulfilling its unique obligation to systematic biology. In summary the proposed new agency would be an operating agency whose mis- sion is to provide for effective use of the sea by man for all purposes to which we now put the terrestrial environment. The agency’s responsibilities would be broader than just the quest of new knowledge and understanding. In addition, in the provision of prediction and description services the agency would be respon- sible for the atmospheric and solid-earth environment. The creation of a mission-oriented agency with major responsibilities for ocean development of science and technology does not by itself provide a clear mech- anism for coordination, planning, and budgeting. Several agencies, the Navy and NSF in particular, will continue to have major responsibilities in ocean- oriented activities. The need for information interchange and dissemination now discharged. by ICO will continue and we recommend formation of an interagency group under the Federal Council for Science and Technology to provide services now rendered by ICO and the interagency Committee on Atmospheric Sciences. This group should also have responsibilities for information interchange involv- ing the solid-earth sciences. This group would thus link the activities within the new agency with those in other agencies for all the environment sciences. Budget allocations between the new agency, NSF and the Navy would be on a competitive basis, recognizing the mission responsibilities of the new agency and the Navy. The Federal Council, the Bureau of the Budget, and Congress would all participate in the budgeting process. Though the proposed agency does 2 See app. V for a note on the testimony of J. W. Powell who recognized the same unity and recommended roughly the same reorganization to Congress in 1884. 1023 not solve all problems of budgeting, it does provide a centralized authority with major mission responsibility for the oceans. The proposed reorganization will create a multitude of political and social problems. However, at present a unique opportunity exists to develop an organ- ization capable of assuming major responsibility for the national goal of the ef- fective use of the sea by man. Achieving this capability will be worth the problems. Mr. Lennon. I think it might be interesting to quote from a little of it, even though we will put the whole thing in the record. The panel of which you were a member recommends: * * * 9g major reorganization of non-Navy governmental activities in oceano- graphy. The recommended reorganization would place in a single agency all those Federal activities related to decryption, prediction, and attempts to develop ca- pabilities of modifying the environment (ocean, atmosphere, and solid earth) and those activities concerned with managing and developing resources of the ocean. I shall not attempt to read all that we are going to put into the record. In other words, as you say: In broad outline the reorganization would combine activities of the Environ- mental Science Services Administration the Geological Survey (both its land and ocean activities), oceanographic activities of the Bureaus of Commercial Fish- eries and Mines, and a portion of the Coast Guard’s oceanographic activities. * * * The Panel does not make any recommendations as to whether the new agency should be independent or part of an existing agency. But in the very next line you say, however: With the creation of a new agency oceanographic activities of the Nation would be supported in five ways— And then you enumerate them. Then you say: In summary the proposed new agency would be an operating agency whose mission is to provide for effective use of the sea by man for all purposes to which we now put the terrestrial environment. The agency’s responsibilities would be broader than just the quest of new knowledge and understanding. Now, actually, Doctor, this organization, this new Government structure that you recommended back in 1966 as a panel member, how does it basically differ from the Government structure recommended by the Stratton Commission, so far as its bringing into this composite organization the fragmentation of the agencies that are now existing ? How does it differ ? You bring in the Environmental Science Services Administration, which the Stratton Commission recommends. You bring in part. of the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, which they bring in. You bring in part of the Coast Guard, which they bring in. You bring in part of the Geological Survey, which they bring in. How does your recommendation in 1966 basically differ from the recommendation of the Stratton Commission 4 If anybody reads this, I think any fair, reasonable-minded person reading it would get the impression that what the Commission of which you were a panel member recommended is basically, in sub- stance, what the Stratton Commission recommended. Dr. McEtroy. What we did not say at the time, as you correctly read, is that we did not identify an agency to accomplish these functions. 1024 I said earlier that I thought Interior, Commerce, and the Founda- tion could logically serve as Federal areas of strength in their respon- sible categories of marine science. I seem to remember that in 1965 ESSA was just getting underway, and since then I think ESSA has demonstrated a capability which at this time I would say I would not disturb by removing it from Commerce. Mr. Lennon. You say, “The Panel does not make any recommenda- tion as to whether the new agency should be independent or part of an existing agency,” then in the very next line, “With the creation of a new agency . . .” And then you go on and talk about the advan- tages of a new agency. You say you make no recommendation, but you point out the advan- tages of a new agency. Dr. McEiroy. I think the new agency in our mind was a renaming and redefining of the responsibilities of Interior at that time. Also, you must admit that in the Commission’s report the National Science Foundation’s role in this program is greatly affected, and the PSAC Panel did not recommend that it be disturbed. The Commis- sion report removes from the Foundation the Antarctic program ; NCAR; institutional support for our big oceanographic institutions, that is well established and ongoing; and the national sea ‘grant pro- gram, that is flourishing and that is moving ahead. Mr. Lennon. I gather from your statement that what you are recommending is that the agencies that are recommended to go into the new NOAA Government structure now be put into the Depart- ment of the Interior, with a separate agency or bureau within the Department of the Interior. Dr. McExroy. I say in the Department of the Interior, except now I will back off and not say what we said earlier with regard to ESSA. J think ESSA has a unique responsibility of its own. Mr. Lennon. Did it have the unique responsibility when you signed this report? Dr. McEtroy. ESSA was only about a year and a half or 2 years old at that time, sir. Mr. Mosner. May I interrupt? Mr. Lennon. Yes, sir. We will get a dialogue here which will get what we all are trying to seek to do. Dr. McEnroy. I understand. Mr. Mosner. I am interested in the 1966 recommendation. I read it at that time, but I had forgotten it in this detail. Do I sense that even then you figured, and this report figured, a separation of the research and development function Dr. McE troy. Yes, sir. : Mr. Mosuer (continuing). From the other operational functions? Is that your memory of the 1966 recommendations? Dr. McEtroy. Yes, sir. That is correct. Mr. Mosner. And that is the emphasis, the basic emphasis so far as organization is concerned in your testimony today ? Dr. McEtroy. That is correct. Mr. Mosrmr. That there should be a separation of the science and research functions and that they should remain in the National Science Foundation ? 1025 Dr. McEtroy. That is correct. That was before I was associated with the National Science Foundation. Mr. Mosuer. On page 90 of the 1966 report, where it says: “In sum- mary the proposed new agency would be an operating agency,” that is what you would emphasize. Is that right? Dr. McEtroy. Yes, sir. Mr. Lennon. Thank you, Doctor. IT am compelled to ask just a closing question. Suppose that was true in our space program. Suppose you had over here in two or three agencies of the Federal Government: the scientific development, and over in another agency of the space program we had operations or practical appliances of science in administrative capa- bility. Do you think we would have a man on the moon before the next two or three centuries ? IT don’t think so. Dr. McEnroy. I don’t either, but that was one specific mission. If you say to the Navy, “Here is $3 billion. I want to put a man at 20,000 feet below the surface of the ocean in 10 years in order to walk around Hie look at it,’ I would be willing to bet my hat that the Navy would ao it. Mr. Lennon. Speaking of that, I was reminded this morning that down in Mississippi they have a complex in relation to the space agen- cy, costing I think around $300 million. I am told it is being utilized now by NASA only 20-30% of its capability. This is not off the top of my head. I will not repeat the gentleman’s name who gave me that information, but he is in NASA, and he called it to my attention. They want their part of the action. He was calling my attention to some of these other complexes we have around the Nation related to the space program that are not being utilized except to a very small percent. They have the capability, and he said, “Why not use us? We want to follow this action. We think this is the next step.” Dr. McErroy. At a time when we have to cut our ship operations by 20 percent Mr. Lennon. That is the way organizations work in Government. Those that get the national image get the money, get the funding. The gentleman from North Carolina. Mr. Jones. No questions. Mr. Lennon. Counsel, do you have questions ? Mr. Crincan. Doctor, on page 3 of your statement you talk about weather, and I quote: The scientific research and resulting technology in weather prediction and monitoring must be continued on a high priority, perhaps more for our activities on land than at sea. Are you taking issue with the Commission’s position that the sea and the atmosphere should be considered as an environmental envelope ? Dr. McEtroy. No, not by any means. I am saying that they em- phasize that an agency that is more land oriented tends not to look at the sea. I would argue that an agency that is sea oriented would not tend to look at the land, and I submit that weather prediction, rain and so 1026 forth, at the present time, is one of the most important environmental activities for a land operation. Mr. Cuinean. Are we getting adequate data, do you believe from the sea to support weather prediction for the land ? Dr. McExroy. No, sir. No, sir. Mr. Cuincan. How could we improve that ? Dr. McErroy. I think the big buoy system that has been proposed earlier, even back in 1966, would be one step forward towards getting that information, and it is true that at NCAR they are getting to a point where they think they are going to be able to write out a for- mula, in effect, that would give long-range prediction. I think they need additional data, though, from all over the world, over the water as well as the land. You cannot separate these in the sense of the weather in its broadest sense. After all, it is an interaction with the energy from the sun from an altitude of 80 kilometers right down to the oceans, and over the land, so that you need information from all over. What I am saying is that I would use the Commission’s argument that, if you get a sea-oriented agency, that would tend to forget about weather prediction on the land, where it is most important for the farmers right now, and other people, of course, including aviation, the cities and so forth. Mr. Crurncan. You mentioned the data buoy program. Is that not a national program project in the Commission’s report? Did they give major emphasis to that ? Dr. McErroy. Yes, they did. That is right. Mr. Crincan. How much has the Coast Guard appropriated over the past 2 years for the National Data Buoy program ? Dr. McE roy. I don’t have any idea. Mr. Crincan. Do you know whether it is considerable, or small? Dr. McEnroy. I don’t have that information. We can look it up for ou. fh Mr. Lennon. What was the funding in fiscal 1968 for the National Science Foundation? I mean the actual appropriation. Dr. McEtroy. $495 million plus the $10 million for the Sea Grant program; $505 million. Mr. Lennon. Would you repeat that ? Dr. McEtroy. Could I ask Dr. Todd to answer this question ? Mr. Lennon. I would appreciate it, Dr. Todd. What was the actual funding for fiscal 1968, not related to the Sea Grant program, and then the figure for the Sea Grant program ? Dr. Topp. The actual appropriation for the National Science Foun- dation in 1968 was $495 million, as compared to the Presidential budget request of $526 million. I may have to correct these by 1 or 2 percent, because I don’t have a recollection of all the little carryovers. Mr. Lennon. The Sea Grant part of that figure that you gave for fiscal 1968 was what ? it ; ‘ Dr. Topp. The Sea Grant part of the figure in the Presidential budget request was $4 million, and a sum of $4 million was provided out of the appropriation for Sea Grant, with no reduction. Further- more, a sum of $1 million was carried over from fiscal year 1967. Mr. Lennon. That was an infinitesimal part of your overall appropriation. 1027 Dr. Topp. It was a brandnew program. Dr. McEnroy. It was a brandnew program then. We are budgeting more as the program moves ahead. Mr. Lennon. I think you did well to move cautiously. Do you have the figures, Doctor, for the fiscal year 1969? Dr. Toop. For fiscal 1969, the Presidential budget request for the Foundation was $500 million, which included $6 million for the Sea Grant program. Mr. Lennon. And the appropriation ? Dr. Topp. The appropriation was $400 million, and to that was added $2614 million of reserve funds released by the Bureau of the Budget. We provided for the Sea Grant program that year the same amount we requested in the Presidential budget; a figure of $6 million. Mr. Lennon. The fiscal 1970 budget ? Dr. Topp. The request for the Foundation was again $500 million, and this included $10 million requested for the Sea Grant program. The appropriations process is, of course, not yet complete. Mr. Lennon. I believe the House has passed the appropriation bill, has it not ? Dr. McE troy. $420 million. Mr. Lennon. $420 million. That was subject beth in fiscal 1969 and 1970 to the agreement worked out between the Bureau of the Budget and the Office of the President and the Congress with respect to a level of funding. That is reflected in that reduction in the budget level, and what was ultimately appropriated, the arbitrary ceiling that was imposed. Dr. McErroy. But I point out that we kept the Sea Grant program where we originally budgeted it, and we are emphasizing it as a high priority program. Mr. Mosner. Mr. Chairman, I cannot resist expressing my own concern and alarm at the action of the House in appropriating for fiscal 1970 for the National Science Foundation at a level that is, as T remember, around $70 million less than the Science and Astronautics Committee’s recommended authorization figure. Also I cannot resist expressing my concern, or I don’t know what the right word is, over the fact that we have already appropriated in the House when we have not even voted on the authorization bill. It is a very peculiar situation. From the testimony we have just heard, I judge that for the last 2 years the National Science Foundation has actually allocated to the Sea Grant program more money than was really proposed in the actual appropriation bills, in other words, has maintained the National Sea Grant program at a level of their requested authorization, even when Congress appropriated less. You have had to transfer funds from other programs ? Dr. McEnroy. That is right. Mr. Mosuerr. This does show your emphasis on the National Sea Grant program asa high priority, and I must say that I think this committee is pleased by that. Dr. McEtroy. Mr. Lennon, I want to make sure I understood. Did you say that the President agreed to the reduction in the funds? 1028 Mr. Lennon. I am speaking about the ceiling that was put on. Dr. McExroy. The expenditure ceiling ? Mr. Lennon. The expenditure ceiling, the resolution. Dr. McEtnroy. I am sorry. I thought you meant the actual amount appropriated. Mr. Lennon. That was a joint action on the part of the President and the Congress. Dr. McEtroy. Yes, I understand that. Mr. Lennon. Gentlemen, we appreciate your attendance here this morning. I think it has been very confrontative, which I guess is as good a word as anything else. We have hammered out some views here. I say to you, as I said to the other gentlemen, this is not an easy thing to do. It was the consensus of Congress that we should have the Commission make this study, and we have a responsibility of hearing it in depth to determine the consensus here. What we will do, I don’t know. Mr. Mosuer. Mr. Chairman, I am going to be on a college campus this weekend, and maybe If will have a chance to use that new word you just coined, ‘“confrontative.” Dr. McE roy. I can say, Mr. Lennon, I appreciate very much having the. opportunity to appear for the first time as a greenhorn, so to speak, in the National Science Foundation, and I can assure you that we are going to do everything possible that we can to move our respon- sibilities forward with regard to the oceans. We are excited about it. We think we have good people, and we think we know how to get the job done. Mr. Lennon. Thank you. Tt has been our pleasure to work with the distinguished gentleman to your right, Dr. Abel, who has appeared before the committee a number of times. We appreciate the fine job that all of you are doing. We appreciate it. Thank you, gentlemen. Dr. McEnroy. Thank you. Mr. Lennon. Dr. Galler, do you have someone with you, sir? Per- haps if they come forward with you, we can hear your statement. It is our understanding that you will, Dr. Galler, present the state- ment of the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution. Is it your intent to read it in its entirety, or to summarize it, or what is your pleasure ? STATEMENT OF DR. SIDNEY R. GALLER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, SCIENCE, SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION; ACCOMPANIED BY DR. I. EUGENE WALLEN, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF OCEANOGRAPHY AND LIMNOLOGY; AND H. CRANE MILLER, ASSISTANT GENERAL COUNSEL, SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION Dr. Gautier. To summarize it, Mr. Chairman, in the interests of con- serving time, and with your permission, I would like my associates, Dr. Wallen, the Director of the Office of Oceanography and Limnology of the Smithsonian Institution, and Mr. Crane Miller, the assistant general counsel of the Smithsonian Institution, here with me. 1029 Mr. Lennon. It is always good to have a lawyer with you. T welcome you gentlemen. I am delighted to have you. You may proceed, Doctor. Dr. Gautier. First, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of this committee, the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution wishes to express his deep appreciation at the opportunity to deliver a statement before the committee, and his sincere regret that he was unable to appear in person, and asked me to deliver his statement for him. With your permission, I would like to summarize it. STATEMENT OF S. DILLON RIPLEY, SECRETARY, SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION, AS PRESENTED BY DR. SIDNEY R. GALLER, ASSIST- ANT SECRETARY, SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION Dr. Gatier. This is a statement of Dr. S. Dillon Ripley, the Sec- retary of the Smithsonian Institution, presented to the Subcommit- tee on Oceanography of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, October 1, 1969, on bill H.R. 13247. Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee on Oceanography, my name is S$. Dillon Ripley, Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution. I am very pleased to have the opportunity to comment on the proposed bill and to propose ways in which the Smithsonian Institution could contribute to its purposes. First, I wish to commend the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries and this subcommittee in particular for their many years of guidance in the field of oceanography leading to the evolution of a truly national program of ocean science and technology. This subcommittee has identified the advantages of accelerating the development of a wide-ranging program coordinating all as- pects of the national interests represented by the governmental agen- cles as well as the broader interests of academic science, industry, and the public at large. In addition, I would like to commend the Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources on the excellence of its report that has served as the basis for H.R. 13247. I have watched closely the activities and deliberations of the Com- mission and have valued very highly my association with Dr. Strat- ten and the members of the Commission. I consider them to be highly competent, dedicated individuals who have approached this report with careful study and devotion to duty. I hope the Subcommittee on Oceanography will continue its ex- cellent efforts to enhance the national program, recognizing as did the Vice President when he mentioned in his February 24, 1969, speech in New York, that: f “We intend to use the science of oceanology to serve the pressing needs of society. The knowledge of the seas must be used to serve the cause of world peace.” The bill, H.R. 13247, is put forth to amend the Marine Resources and Engineering Development Act of 1966 to establish a comprehen- sive and long-range national program of research development, tech- nical services, exploration, and utilization with respect to our marine and atmospheric environment. 1030 I believe in the importance of such a program, and in the im- portance of making the program most effective by insuring the close coordination of our Nation’s activities in ocean science and technology. T understand that the President has asked his Advisory Council on Executive Organization to consider the Commission’s organiza- tional recommendations in the context of broader Federal organiza- tional requirements, and to compare the Commission’s proposals with alternative ways of coordinating and advancing the national develop- ment of the marine sciences. I would like to point out that we should recognize the inseparability of our planetary environment, which includes not only the sea, but the land and the atmosphere above both. All three contribute directly to the quality of the oceanic environment, and an improved under- standing of their separate and collective contributions may lead us closer to the solutions to problems of environmental degradation and marine resource utilization. I suggest, therefore, that in developing operational guidelines for the development of national goals, the Federal agencies consider not only the shorelines which are directly involved, but also the contri- butions of the interior land to the marine environment. A number of witnesses who have testified before this subcommittee have emphasized the need for more work in basic science. As the representative of an agency whose mission is basic science rather than tangible resources, I want to emphasize the basic science implications of this bill in the context of the Commission report. The Commission report states: A full realization of the potential of the sea is presently limited by lack of scientific knowledge and the requisite marine technology and engineering. Also: Support of basic marine research is vital if we are to understand the global oceans, to predict the behavior of the marine environment, to exploit the sea’s resources, and to assure the national security. J believe that increased funding for basic research is essential to achieve the national goals for studies of the oceans. These goals have been described, but I might simplify the descriptions. We require more food from the sea. We must maintain full access to the oceans for transportation of goods. The harvest of oil, gas, and mineral resources from the shallow seabed is essential for our civiliza- tion to advance. Continuing exploration will certainly identify addi- tional resources of great value to us. It appears possible to achieve some control of oceanic forces to influence weather. Pollution of the sea, however, must be controlled. While we have learned a good deal about food production and the husbanding of cattle and other food animals from the land, our management of sea life is in a very elemental state. The commercial fisheries are based almost entirely on habit and accident. Our “number one crop” from the sea is the wide-ranging ocean tuna. We have no way of knowing how close we are to depleting this population. We also know very little about what substitute fishes might be used for building auxiliary fisheries. Many so-called trash fish are quite edible and nutritious. If we are to expand these probably available and probably useful sources of 1031 food, we need to know a great deal more about their biology, geo- graphic and seasonal distribution, as well as their ecological inter- relationships with other species and the environment. Experimental breeding over the last 100 years, helped by the land grant college system, has produced fine herds of dairy and beef cattle. We have hardly begun such experiments in the sea. A bright light is the work on experimentally induced changes in size, growth, reproductive effectiveness and time of return of the Pacife salmon, and similarly in the rainbow trout, effected by Dr. Lauren Donaldson of the University of Washington. Dr. Donaldson talks about the north Pacific Ocean as his “fish pasture.” The worst world food shortages, however, are in the tropics. The milkfish of Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia are being grown in ponds. However, the normal environment for reproduction is not known. Larval fishes from somewhere appear in shallow water and are captured each year to form the base of the hundreds of mil- hons of dollar food industry. The marine mullet lives in the same region of the world, but cannot be raised to the adult stage. It is raised for food after it passes the critical stages in the ocean. With few exceptions, we do not know which marine tropical fishes can be farmed. There are 600 familes, and at least 15,000 species of fishes known to occur in the ocean. Our systematists find new species almost every time they conduct field studies. Some of these may be suitable for man. Our knowledge of the full life cycle of commonly harvested tuna species is incomplete, let alone the other less used species. As an example of the return of benefits from the proper culture of sea organisms, may I mention the oyster? Long claimed and con- trolled by so-called farmers of the sea, oyster beds may be protected from predators and poachers for a full growing period of 3 to 4 years, and produce up to 400 pounds of meat per acre. Recently in Japan a new technique has been developed of suspend- ing oysters on long ropes from the surface through 300 feet of water into an active plankton-rich current flowing through the farm. Under such conditions, oyster production has been achieving a yield of 50,000 pounds per acre. This 100-fold increase has been based on culture methods alone. What could happen if breeding experiments were successful in pro- ducing an improved stock? No one knows. Mr. Chairman, I mention the above facts to introduce the role of the Smithsonian Institution in studies of the sea. Since the opening of our western frontier over 100 years ago, our scientists have accom- panied the explorers in order to collect and study the plants, animals, and minerals of our great land. They have contributed immensely to our understanding of the natural history and ecology of our country. Now we are engaged in studies to “open” the last great frontiers of our planet—the ocean. We continue to gather and to disseminate basic knowledge about the biology, behavior, and distribution of the thousands of species that form the populations of the world. In this way, our scientists in the Smithsonian contribute towards the achievement of our national goals in oceanography. 1032 The identity of species of marine organisms and adequate knowl- edge about their biological, behavioral, and ecological characteristics is essential for the development of a rational basis for the nondestruc- tive exploitation of man’s oceanic resources. si) Be The Smithsonian Institution has been providing this kind ot knowledge for many years. We are building up our national marine study collections to gain the basic knowledge about the plant and animal populations of the oceans needed by scientists and technolo- gists alike in achieving their mission-oriented objectives. — * This is a very exacting task, one which requires a specialized train- ing in systematics and many years of experience. By utilizing the basic knowledge about the inhabitants and conditions of life in the sea accumulated by Smithsonian scientists, the mission-or1ented Fed- eral agencies are in a much better position to carry on with their operations. Be If the Department of the Interior, for example, is interested in mtro- ducing a species into a new environment for that species, our scien- tists may be in a position to provide information about the predators or parasites that may be encountered. If scientists at the NIH wish to screen certain marine plants and animals in a search for antibiotics or other biologically active sub- stances, our scientists may be able to provide both specimens and knowledge of relationships between populations that may serve as clues to the discovery of new pharmaceutical agents. On broader ecological questions, our scientists are often called upon to define the scientific problems and search for the basic knowledge upon which to construct solutions. Recognizing the fundamental biological importance of solar radia- tion to sustain life in the sea and on the land, scientists at the Smith- sonian’s Radiation Biology Laboratory are investigating the ecologi- cal and physiological effects of changes in spectral distribution of solar radiation resulting from atmospheric pollutants both over land and over sea. Scientists at our Smithsonian Tropical Research Institute are study- ing the behavior and ecology of tropical species of terrestrial and marine organisms under natural conditions and how the tropical environment could be affected by man’s intervention, as, for example, by constructing an interoceanic sea level canal. The National Museum of Natural History in the Smithsonian is one of our Nation’s great scientific centers for research in systematics. Our scientists and their study collections provide knowledge that is essential for understanding the biodynamics of the oceanic environment. The Smithsonian Oceanographic Sorting Center serves as a research support organization for marine scientists throughout the world. Assuring adequate financial support for systematics research is a matter of deep concern to me, especially in view of the rapidly in- creasing demands for basic knowledge derived from systematic and ecological investigations required in achieving our national goals in marine resource utilization. In this connection, I wish to reiterate the statement made by Dr. Sidney R. Galler when he testified before this subcommittee earlier this year: 1033 The information gap between taxonomy and the programmatic marine sciences is widening in inverse proportion to the increase in support of oceanography and the related marine sciences. This incongruity can be understood only if one measures available resources in taxonomy against the growing demand for taxonomic data. The increase in oceanographic activity within the last decade, including the increase in the number of collections of marine organisms made from oceanographic ships, has resulted in a tremendous and still growing back- logue of specimens waiting to be identified and classified. At the same time, our national resources for taxonomy have not increased to any appreciable extent. Today the front line of taxonomists is a thin one indeed. Even within the Smithsonian Institution, with its relatively large concentration of competent taxonomic scientists as well as with its Oceanographic Sorting Center, it is not possible to keep up with the demand for taxonomic information. As a con- sequence, our country is unable to derive the benefits it should from the very substantial investment in terms of dollars and manpower in the acquisition of collections and oceanographic data. Indeed, the world situation with regard to taxonomy is not an encouraging one. Until such time as we recognize taxonomy’s essential role and provide the necessary resources commensurate with its high priority, we will find it ever more difficult to achieve some of our important objectives in marine science and technology * * * Increased support, for the urgently needed training of addi- tional taxonomists as well as for taxonomical research, both in the Smithsonian Institution and in universities around the country, is the only reasonable solu- tion to a most serious but little understood problem. The Smithsonian Institution as one of the remaining bastions of systematics research has been emphasizing the need for its own staff to educate its successors. We are fortunate in having graduate students in residence for work on degrees to be awarded by various universities. The problem of financial support for graduates is, how- ever, a real one, deserving of national attention. I might add parenthetically, Mr. Chairman, that the Secretary has seen fit to reiterate the statement that I had the honor of making as a private citizen before this subcommittee earlier this year. I don’t think that I need to reread it at this particular juncture, but merely to emphasize again, in connection with the question that was raised earlier this morning by the chairman relating to the long lead time in working up data that had been collected in the Navy (and I might say this extends to other agencies as well), that we must rec- ognize that one reason for that long lead time is the very few sys- tematists that are available today to work up the tremendous mass of material that is increasing constantly as we get more and more in- volved in oceanic exploration and technology. Mr. Chairman, I can summarize the Smithsonian Institution’s com- mitment to increase our knowledge of the oceans by quoting from President Nixon’s speech delivered in Miami on October 10, 1968: * * * three questions must be answered before we can realistically begin the exploration of inner space: First, what can we expect to find there? Second, how much of what we find there can we realistically expect to exploit for man’s use? Third, what policies must we pursue ot carry out best a program of exploitation and investigation? The answer to the first question is as complex as it is exciting. The President went on to say: * * %* the benefits of the sea will come to us only from sustained and precise investigation of this complex and hostile environment. The Smithsonian is hoping, in seeking answers to the first question, to assist in finding the answers to questions two and three. That, Mr. Chairman, is the prepared statement. Mr. Lennon. Thank you, Doctor. 1034 Doctor, that was a most appropriate speech, and even a more ap- propriate place for now President Nixon to have raised those ques- tions, and to give the answers to those questions which he did. He could not have done it at a more effective time, or a more effective place. I think it moved on up to my State, too, the State of North Carolina. I recognize the distinguished gentleman from Oregon. Mr. Detienpacn. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I join the Chairman, Dr. Galler, in expressing appreciation for your coming. The more I learn about the Smithsonian, the more I realize how much I don’t know about it, and the more impressed I become at its broad range of contributions. There are two things that I would ask you about briefly. You commented directly on this also in the Secretary’s full testi- mony. On page 8, he commented on the inseparability not only of the atmosphere in the sea, but of the land. You talk in terms of the full planetary environment. So far as the legislation which is before this subcommittee is con- cerned, what impact would this feeling about the inseparability of the entire planetary environment be, so far as this bill is concerned? Do you have any comments on this idea of NOAA, in view of what you have now testified to ? Dr. Gatier. The principal comment that I can offer, sir, is the ex- pressed hope of the Secretary that either this bill or any bill that Con- egress sees fit to pass and the President to sign will take note of the inseparability of the environment and the atmosphere, including the atmosphere both of the land and sea, and encourage a closer coordi- nation of both the science and the technology that today tend to be somewhat separated in many agencies both in and out of Government. Dr. Dretrenpack. Do you view that to be desirable, to take what is oftentimes today quite fragmented research in individual aspects of the land, individual aspects of the sea, and individual aspects of the atmosphere, and to a degree bring together the work that is being done in these fields? Would it be beneficial if they were working more closely together ? Dr. Gautier. Undoubtedly, sir, it would be highly beneficial, and in the best interests of our country, and in the best interests of mankind. We are encouraged by the establishment by the President of the United States of this Council on Environmental Quality. I believe that is in recognition of the need to draw these pieces together, and to plan a coherent national policy and program. Mr. Detienpack. Recognizing that if we really took the entire planetary environment and tried to wrap up in a single package every conceivable aspect of the entire environment, it would become a tre- mendously complex thing that would embrace a great deal more than the bill which is before this subcommittee embraces, could you see advantage to going as far initially as NOAA proposes to go to bring together at least some aspects of this; not going as far, certainly, as we might ultimately go, and in any way thinking about departmentaliza- tion that will cut it off from that which is not within the grouping, but do you see value in the type of amalgam which NOAA consists of ? - Dr. Gatier. With your permission, sir, I would like to respond in a somewhat circumferential way. 1035 Mr. Detiensack. The question was somewhat in that strain. Dr. Gauter. I think that there is advantage in any action taken either at the Legislative level or the Executive level that focuses at- tention on the need to bring together our knowledge and our interests on the central problem of maintaining the quality of the total environ- ment. To the extent that any piece of legislation does encourage that pulling together of what today are diverse and separated interests, yes, sir, there is advantage. Mr. Detitensack. Although the Smithsonian has apparently de- voted most of its efforts in this field to searching out basic knowledge from which applications will flow—and I am not suggesting changing the Smithsonian’s operations at all—is there any great advantage in separating research for basic knowledge and applications of that knowledge? Or might not there be under some circumstances desir- ability to at least some overall blending of basic research and applied research ? Dr. Gatier. Mr. Chairman, may I respond to that question on a personal basis, venturing a personal opinion, not as a representative of the Smithsonian Institution? Do I have your permission ? Mr. Lennon. Yes, sir. Dr. Gauter. It has been my experience, sir, that there is not neces- sarily a direct correlation between the acquisition of new knowledge and the application of that knowledge in technological advances, and the juxtaposition of basic research and applied research. Let me clarify that, if I may, and I fall back on my previous ex- periences in the Navy, especially my associations with the Office of Naval Research, and I should say immediately very happy and very challenging associations. I would like to submit that the Office of Naval Research was en- gaged in the support of fundamental investigations among many aca- demic institutions throughout the United States. It was fundamental research, but it had a mission-oriented objective. It was to acquire knowledge to advance the Navy’s mission. In the course of my years of being associated as the head of the biology branch of ONR, and in that capacity being in charge of what we called the hydrobiology program, involving biological research, we came up with a number of potentially important technical ad- vances based on fundamental science that the Navy had paid for that never really saw the light of day, and I want to emphasize that here we had in my view, at least, an organization that on the charts at least showed a smooth communication flow from the very basic level up to the wet Navy application. But in practice, there were many cases where for admittedly ob- scure reasons, the technical advances could have played an important role both in facilitating applied research and in actual applications, never saw the light of day. For example, I had the privilege of being associated with this sub- committee, and with a number of distinguished confreres, some of whom are in the room today, particularly Dr. Wallen and Professor Bauer, in developing the concept of research ships of opportunity. I think the fact that the research ships of opportunity concept led to three demonstrably successful field experiments is a credit more to 26-5683—70—pt. 234 1036 the efforts of this subcommittee than those who were directly con- nected in the Navy at the time. We absolutely were able to demonstrate the great economies both in time, manpower, and monies that could be effected by making use of our merchant marine to carry research vans, enabling scientists to collect oceanographic information while the ship was under w ay on a not-to-interfere basis, giving us intensive patterns of data that to- day we still do not have. So we proved it, and it has yet to be accepted as an important technical tool for research and application, Another example was the development of what we now call remote sensing clever, the establishement of the world’s first underwater audio-video observatory, that enabled scientists to sit im a laboratory and see what was going on in the oceanic environment, and to listen to what was going on, and to record those events, and to actually have the means for controlling the hydrophones and the underwater video to concentrate on sectors of the oceanic environment. That was a terribly important tool for studying such practical things as the effectiveness of sharp repellants, the effectiveness of certain kinds of marine antifouling devices and substances, et cetera. That was demonstrated to be feasible, valuable. It has yet to find its way into the armory of technical tools for research and application. This is a long way of responding to your question, sir, but I merely vish to point out that w hether the research is in the same organiza- Hoh as the application, or in a separated organization, organiza- tional juxtaposition does not necessarily insure that there will be an orderly and expeditious transfer of basic discovery and application. Mr. Derienpack. I read you as saying at the same time, Doctor, that it would be desirable, viewed from our overall national interest, to have increased coordination between the pure research and the application. Dr. Garrer. Absolutely. Mr. DELLENB. \ck, That the present system is failing to achieve the ultimate desirable potential, and in the examples you alluded to some specifics Dr. Gauuer. In my personal opinion, yes, sir. Mr. Dettensack. Would you say also that there is desirable poten- tial in a blend over and above that which is existent at the present time between that which Government does and that which the private sector of the economy does, either in research or at least coordination between what is done in some governmental units and what private industry is doing? Would you say also, moving into this field of ap- plication, that there could be value derived from i improving the blend of governmental input and private enterprise input? Dr. Gatien. My personal strong “Yes.” Mr. Detiennack. And you would feel, also, I gather from a com- ment that was made in the remarks you made on your own behalf and on behalf of Secretary Ripley, that increased funding is an essen- tial both for basic research, and I suppose beyond basic research, for the application. Dr. Gauuer. Sir, I can state both personally and officially yes, indeed. Mr. Detitenpack. Without asking you, then, to make any more direct comment on the NOAA concept per se, I am pleased, Mr. Chair- 1037 man, that this very able witness has eloquently alluded to the bene- fits with which flow from NOAA in this increased coordination between the study of areas, between basic research and the application of research, between Gov ernment work and private sector work, and then the increased emphasis that would be placed on this whole pack- age, which is an essential to leading to the increased funding necessary to accomplish that which we seek to y accomplish. Task for no comment on that. That is my summary of what I think has been very helpful and very eloquent testimony. Thank you very much, Doctor. Dr. Gautier. Thank you, sir. Mr. Lennon. Thank you, Mr. Dellenback. I commend you. I wish it had been possible for you to have been here to question our dis- tinguished Director of the National Science Foundation, Mr. McElroy. I recognize the distinguished gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Ruppe. Mr. Rupre. I have no questions, but I wish to commend the gentle- man for a most excellent and informative statement. Dr. Gatter. Thank you, sir. Mr. Lennon. Doctor, you heard my question to Dr. McElroy con- cerning funding for fiscal 1968 and 1969 in the budget request. I know we are dealing with an entirely different type of organiza- tion in the Smithsonian, but there is Federal funding to the Smith- sonian Institution ? Dr. Gatter. Yes, sir. Mr. Lennon. Could you or either of the gentlemen with you give us the actual Federal funding for fiscal 1968 ‘and 1969, and the budget request for fiscal 1970 for the Smithsonian Institution ? Dr. Gatier. May I ask may colleague, Dr. Wallen, to respond to that ¢ Mr. Lennon. You can submit the figures for the record, but can you approximate it ? Dr. Watten. Mr. Chairman, I can give only an approximation, but I will be glad to furnish it for the record. Mr. Lennon. If you would, please. (The information was not supplied. ) Dr. Watuen. Perhaps before I say this I should preface it with the remark that the Smithsonian has quite a number of bureaus, and that the budget which I wish to report to you is an additive budget, which is not ‘entirely identified as the separate budget of the Office of Oceanography, but funds that are contained within the bureaus. Mr. Lennon. Talking about the Smithsonian Institution as a whole? Dr. Wauten. Yes. As a whole, the total amount requested, approximately, in 1968 and 1969 and 1970 was essentially the same, approximately $2.8 million. The amount of money : appropriated in each of the first 2 years was approximately $2.5 million. The amount of money requested from the Congress in 1970 was approximately $2.6 million. Mr. Lennon. The reason I asked that is that while you just could not find it in figures related to the National Science Foundation ap- proximation of anywhere from $450 million to a half billion dollars, is there any possibility that there is an overlapping or duplication in the 1038 contribution that the Smithsonian Institution makes in its scientific studies and those being made by the National Science Foundation ? Dr. Gauier. May I respond to that, Mr. Chairman ? Mr. Lennon. I don’t think there is, but I want the record to show it. Dr. Gautier. There is no duplication, and I can say that as a matter of fact we very frequently invite the National Science Foundation to associate itself in helping to support some of the research activities in the various sciences sponsored by the Smithsonian. Mr. Lennon. Thank you, sir. The gentleman from Florida. Mr. Rocers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lennon. Off the record. (Discussion off the record.) Mr. Rocrrs. Dr. Galler, it is good to see you again. You have been most helpful to this committee over the years in consideration of legis- lation in this field. I will read your statement. It is my understanding from dialog already on the record that, although you are not coming out specifically recommending the or- ganizational setup as the Commission has so recommended, neverthe- less you can see the advantage of centralizing some of our activity. Dr. Gatier. May I respond ? I think that there is not only an advantage, but an urgent require- ment for a more careful, closer coordination of the activities that our Nation engages in both at the Federal level and in the private sector in the field of marine sciences. Mr. Rogrrs. Thank you very much. It is very helpful. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lennon. Thank you. Dr. Galler, with your background and your association with the Smithsonian Institution and before that with the Navy, I would like your evaluation and judgment on the capability of the gentlemen who composed the Commission, beginning with Dr. Stratton, to make the study that they made, and the evaluation and the findings and conclu- sions and the ultimate recommendations they made in the Commission. I think it is a very splendid Commission. I am not a scientist. I never knew any one of these gentlemen before they became members of this Commission, but I was greatly impressed with the time and effort and concern they gave this study. I think you heard me say before that as soon as the bill was signed into law, I requested Mr. Mosher to join with me in a letter to the President asking him, whatever time it took, to find the men who had the background and who could give the time and would give the time, and I suggested to him even before he made the appointments of these people, that he make the decision that these people be contacted to see if they would be willing to give the time. We knew it would take at least 2 years, or a good part of that 2 years. Do you have anything you would like to say for the record about your judgment of these men who made this study and this report ? Dr. Gatiter. Mr. Chairman, what I am about to say is really a redundancy, but I am delighted at being able to restate that, and I say this not only for myself but also for Secretary Ripley. The Commission and its individual members were outstanding. In addition, I would say that not only was the outstanding performance 1039 a consequence of the competence and diligence of the individuals, but also by virtue of the bringing together of what had been separated points of view from science and industry, from Government and uni- versities, and the Federal agencies that were mission-oriented and non- mission-oriented. It provided a magnificent oportunity that was fully realized for melding these divergent views and opinions and forging a report that is truly an outstanding contribution to the country in the marine sciences. Mr. Lennon. Would you agree with me that they have stimulated a number of our Government agencies in the direction that we all hope to go in the national interest related to the oceanic environment ? Dr. Gauurr. No question that that is true. Mr. Lennon. Regardless of what may be done as a result of the legislative and executive action? Dr. Gatirr. I might say that my colleague, Dr. Wallen, just noted sotto voce, that the Smithsonian was one of the groups that had been stimulated. Mr. Lennon. You don’t need any motivation or any inspiration or any suggestion that you be moved into some agency, but I think it has stimulated a lot of agencies to move in this field. Dr. Gatier. It has, sir. Mr. Lennon. I get the word every day. Thank you, gentlemen. Mr. Counsel. Mr. Crrnean. Have you, Doctor, and your associates, had an oppor- tunity to examine H.R. 12347 ? Dr, GatiEr. Yes. Mr. Curnean. Have you any suggestions or comments to make as to specific recommendations ? Dr. Gatter. Yes, sir, Mr. Clingan. May I defer to my colleague, Crane Miller, who has examined the bill in its specifics. Mr. Crrnean. Mr. Miller, have you reduced these comments to writ- ing In any way ? Mr. Mintzer. Yes, I have, which I would like to offer at this time. Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer some personal comments on cer- tain social and environmental research implications of the Commis- sion’s report, and to propose some changes in H.R. 13247, which I feel might strengthen it. The Commission report, as well as this bill, called for a comprehen- sive, coordinated, and continuing national program in marine and at- mospheric science, technology, and technical services for the benefit of mankind. The report, and the Commission’s panel reports, were organized and written not only with science and technology in mind, but also the so- cial problems inherent in man’s use of resources and the use of the marine and atmospheric environments. Thus, legal, economic, political, and other social implications, in addition to science and technology, permeate the report. Mr. Lennon. Right at that point, Doctor, can you separate these things? I don’t see how they can be separated. Do you? 1040 Mr. Mitter. No, sir. I don’t and this is one of the points that I want to make here, that it does not clearly come through in the bill, with its emphasis on science and technology, that there are economic, legal, and political considerations. Mr. Lennon. Go ahead with your recommendations. Mr. Mirrer. Section 104(a) (1) authorizes the advancement of fun- damental understanding of the biological, physical, geological, and chemical characteristics of the marine environment, and of the atmosphere. Section 104(a) (2) authorizes the development of fundamental tech- nology to achieve more effective use of the marine environment and to operate with greater efficiency and safety in the atmosphere, I feel that there is a concomitant need to advance our understanding of social processes related to the marine environment and the atmosphere. By “social processes” IT am speaking of the values men apply, the institutions we create, the resources we use, and the resulting impacts or residual effects we have on these environments. The commission’s report was concerned with a large percentage of the earth’s total environment. It was not simply addressed to a special interest group to promote the ocean and atmospheric industries, nor did it equate the benefit of mankind solely with scientific or tech- nological research and industrial development. The report addressed the need to understand the marine and atmos- pheric environments, to understand the impact of man’s technology and activities upon those environments, and his interaction with ae Clearly, the commission was talking about an environmental agency in a dynamic sense of the term—an agency concerned with the use of the marine and atmospheric environments with understanding and appreciation of our relationships with these environments and the con- sequences of our use of them. Thus, I would like to offer and submit for the record some proposed changes i in the language of the bill, that would clarify an intent here. Mr. Lennon. Are you full- time counsel for the Smithsonian Institution ? Mr. Miuuer. Yes, sir, and was also on the staff of the commission. Mr. Lennon. I just wanted to get that in the record. My understand- ing was that you were. You may proceed. Mr. Miniter. I have prepared here and submit for inclusion some proposed changes that would indicate the explicit need for concern with the social processes much the way that Dr. Carl Auerbach was concerned with mternational political institutional problems, that Dr. Crutchfield was concerned in the use of resources and brought in his vast knowledge of the economics of resource consery ation, and Dr. Knee in his panel report on the coastal zone also had concern here for not only the science and technology involved, but also the social and political concerns. (The material follows :) PROPOSED CHANGES TO H.R. 13247 Section 102(a) The Congress declares that it is the policy of the United States to encourage, develop, and maintain a comprehensive, coordinated and continuing national 1041 program in the marine and atmospheric environments for the benefit of mankind, including the scientific, technological, technical services, and social processes related thereto, through the enhancement of commerce, transportation, and ha- tional security; the protection of health and property; the enhancement of our commercial fisheries; and the increased wse and management of these and other resources. Such a national program should be conducted so as to contribute to the following objectives: ! “(1) The accelerated development and use of marine resources, consistent with sound management practices and in knowledge of the effects of such de- velopment and use on the marine enviromment. “(4) The development and improvement of the capabilities, performance, use, and efficiency of vehicles, equipment, and instruments for use in exploration, research, monitoring and prediction, surveys, the recovery of resources, and the conversion, transmission, and residual effects of energy in the marine and atmos- pherie environments. “(5) The advancement of education and training in marine and atmospheric sciences, technology, technical services, and social studies related to the marine and atmospheric environments.” Section 104(a@) [New] (8) The advancement of understanding of the social processes by which man uses marine and atmospheric resources and interacts with the marine and atmospheric environments. [Old] (8) The enhancement of United States fisheries * * * (4) * * * to marine and atmospheric sciences, engineering, and social processes related to the marine and atmospheric environments. Section 105(2)(B) * * * to recruit specially qualified scientific, engineer- ing, end other professional talent, he may establish the entrance grade for scien- tific, engineering, and other professional talent, he may establish the entrance grade for scientific, engineering, and other professional personnel * * * Section 105(5) * * * to accept, hold, administer, and utilize gifts, devises and bequests of property, both real and personal, for the purpose of aiding or facilitating the work of the Agency and such gifts, devises, and bequests of money and the proceeds from sales of other property received as gifts, devises, or bequests shall be deposited in the Treasury in a separate fund * * * Mr. Lennon. One of the things that has concerned the members of the committee with respect to the recommendations of the commission as to the so-called establishment of coastal zones is that it is not very clear or they don’t suggest very clearly how we should proceed. The commission did not have on their staff that I knew about a legislative draftsman counsel. I might say that the legislation that counsel here referred to was the consensus of every member of this subcommittee. We had to take the only specific recommendation that they gave with respect to the Government structure, the national council and so forth, and we would be delighted to have you work with the counsel of this committee by reason of your background and your association with the commission if we need your assistance. We went to the point, as I believe you gentlement know, that we have scheduled here for October 28 and 29 a 2-day symposium to which we have invited, through the respective Governors of those el . . . 4 . . . . States at least two individuals representing the marine science council or the department of conservation and development, or both, to come here and participate in the forum to see if we can’t relate to them or have them relate to us just how they feel about the commission’s report, particularly in this area regarding the coastal zones and re- gional laboratories as to just how it should be treated or oriented. 1042 We don’t know whether or not it should be done on the basis of a regional coastal zone or regional laboratories, whether it would have to be done with an interstate compact approved by the Congress or just how. That is what we are trying to explore. . I want you to know again how much we appreciate your doing what you have oifered to do here today in the suggested language. You go right ahead. We have a few minutes. Mr. Miter. I can close here very quickly, Mr. Chairman. One of the administrative legal tools that I think would be very useful, if the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency were created, would be be explicit authorization to make grants, contracts, loans, and other arrangements for fundamental scientific technological and social research. With the exception of the National Sea Grant college program which has authority to initiate programs and make grants in various fields relating to the development of marine resources, each of the agencies proposed to be included in the NOAA has authority to make grants for basic scientific research under Public Law 85-934. But the authority under Public Law 85-934 is not sufficiently broad to cover an expanded range of concern that includes the advancement of fundamental studies of technology and social processes related to the marine and atmospheric environments, so that I would like to suggest adding a section to the bill to insure that the agency does have that authority, which might read something as follows: The Administrator is authorized and directed to initiate and support funda- mental scientific, technological, and social research related to the marine and atmospheric environments, and is authorized to make contracts and other ar- rangements (including grants, loans, and other forms of research assistance) to support such research. That is the end of my comments, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Lennon. On page 242 of the report, and it is related, of course, to the testimony of the preceding witness, Dr. McElroy, the Com- mission has this to say: The transfer of the Sea Grant Program to NOAA would not impair the Na- tional Science Foundation’s (NSF) capabilities to perform its normal functions of research and science education support. However, it would enable NOAA in conjunction with its other functions to sponsor a wide range of highly useful applied marine science and training activities in cooperation with universities and industry. * * * i The Commission would place responsibility for institutional support of Uni- versity-National Laboratories in NOAA. This should free NSF to use its limited funds to support project research activities. Now, If don’t suppose you would be willing to comment on the first quote that I made from that report, or would you be willing to com- ment on it? You heard the testimony of Dr. McElroy. I have every reason to believe he is supported in this by Dr. Abel, although I didn’t pin him right down. Would you comment on that, or would you rather not comment on either of these two excerpts from the Commission report related to the transfer into NOAA of the Sea Grant college program? 1043 If you would rather not do it, I am not going to insist. I know you have to work together. Mr. Mitier. I would generally prefer not to comment directly on Dr. McElroy’s testimony, but would like to say this. Mr, Lennon. Comment on the Commission’s report, not on what Dr. McElroy said. Mr. Mirier. I am in general agreement with what is contained in the report of the Commission. Mr. Lennon. That is some support. Mr. Deviensacn. We will settle for that. Mr. Lennon. Do you want to ask a question ? We are delighted to have had you gentlemen here today. You may be assured that the subcommittee and the counsel will not take di- rectly what you said, but if you would hand him your statement, I would appreciate if you would have lunch together and kick this thing around. Mr. Miter. It is always a pleasure to have lunch with Tom. Dr. Gautier. Thank you very much. Mr. Lennon. The committee will resume its hearings tomorrow at 10 a.m. in this room when our prime witnesses will be representatives of the National Security Industrial Association and the National Oceanography Association. We look forward to having them. (Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, to recon- vene at 10 a.m., Thursday, October 2, 1969.) NATIONAL OCEANOGRAPHIC PROGRAM THURSDAY, OCTOBER 9, 1969 Howusr or REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OCEANOGRAPHY OF THE CoMMITTEE ON MercHant MarrNeE AND FISHERIES, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met at 10:10 a.m., pursuant to call, in room 1802, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Alton Lennon (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Mr. Rocers (presiding). The subcommittee will come to order, please. First of all, I would like to say that the chairman, Al Lennon, asked me particularly to express his regrets for not being here at the begin- ning of the meeting because of a Medal of Honor ceremony at the White House. He plans to be here as soon as that ceremony 1s over because he particularly wanted to hear the views of this witness. The committee is delighted to welcome back the distinguished Lieu- tenant Governor of California, a former member of this committee, and one of our colleagues who took an active interest in this commit- tee and its activities and who has made a real contribution in this field. We are particularly honored to welcome you, and I know that all of the members of the committee share my feelings, not only as Lieu- tenant Governor of California but as our good friend and former colleague. We are honored to have you, Lieutenant Governor Ed Reinecke. STATEMENT OF HON. ED REINECKE, LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN OF THE CALI- FORNIA ADVISORY COMMISSION ON MARINE AND COASTAL RESOURCES Mr. Rernecke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Needless to say, it is a new experience for me to sit on this side of the table. It is kind of spooky as a matter of fact, but I am very, very pleased to be back and to have this opportunity to see you gentlemen and hopefully to contribute a little bit to something that I know we all share with a great deal of interest and enthusiasm. I guess I should start by apologizing. I don’t know that everybody has a copy of my statement. Mr. Rocrrs. Yes, I think we do. Mr. Rernecxe. I am glad you do because I understand that some of the people in the room did not get their copies. They were mailed a while ago, but it seems that the Wells Fargo Express is still carrying the mail out of Sacramento. (1045) 1046 My name is Ed Reinecke. I am presently Lieutenant Governor of the State of California, and just previous to this I was a member of the House, and in fact was a member of this subcommittee which I now have the privilege to address. As a member of this subcommittee, I had the good fortune to ob- serve the rise in interest in fields related to the ocean and coastal zone, and have had the opportunity to meet with many of the leaders in Government, industry and education concerning the role of the United States in properly conserving and managing these precious resources of our Nation and coastal States. I appear before you today primarily to discuss H.R. 13247, but be- cause of the background of this bill, I wish to comment briefly upon the monumental publication, “Our Nation and the Sea,” the report of the Commission on Marine Sciences, Engineering and Resources to the President and Congress—stimulating and realistic in its outlook; im- aginative and forceful in its recommendations. This document has been reviewed and reported by many individuals and California State agencies in far more detail than I am able to provide. However, I wish to state briefly that the resources agency, in particular, has found this a remarkably important document and has strongly endorsed many of the commission recommendations which bear upon problems of special interest to California. I would like to commend Chairman Lennon and certainly my col- league Charlie Mosher for the contribution that they made to the re- port and to this commission, It was a very notable thing. This very important and significant bill, H.R. 13247, is a direct and timely result of the recommendations in “Our Nation and the Sea,” so it perhaps is fitting then to comment with respect to the extent that these recommendations are implemented. California has, for some time, actively supported marine-oriented programs. In particular, the State has called for intensive efforts in the field of ocean-oriented planning and in the review of existing pro- grams with the intent to provide for the wise use and development of marine resources, Several State agencies have been producing single interest plans for fish and wildlife, for shoreline recreation, for small craft harbors, and so forth, and have recently joined with the Interagency Council for Ocean Resources (ICOR) to assist in the preparation of a Com- prehensive Ocean Area Plan in which all of California’s interests in the ocean area will be represented, differences recognized and recon- ciled where possible, and integrated programs recommended for im- plementation. ICOR was established by order of Governor Reagan, following passage of legislation calling for the preparation of a Comprehensive Ocean Area Plan (COAP) and for the establishment of a new com- mission made up of representatives of the private sector and State leg- islators to advise the Governor on marine and coastal matters, includ- ing a review of the COAP as it was prepared by ICOR. ICOR is composed of the five Cabinet Secretaries and myself from the executive branch of State government. It operates to approve de- velopment of the Comprehensive Ocean Area Plan which is presently funded by State and Federal planning money ($170,000). The plan- ning team is composed of professionals in resource management and 1047 planning with supporting staff. As chairman of ICOR I have a per- sonal interest in the development of all ocean-oriented matters. The new California Advisory Commission on Marine and Coastal Resources continued the activities of the former nonstatutory Gov- ernor’s Commission on Coastal Resources (GACOR), but because it is now funded and charged with specific responsibilities by law, it has become much stronger and more influential in reviewing and guiding California’s marine and coastal activities. It is funded by State money. Governor Reagan has also taken a first step towards the establish- ment of a coastal zone authority, by calling for a reorganization of State government which was approved by our legislature this year. This would provide for an enlargement of the responsibilities of the Department of Harbors and Watercraft to include other, and I might say all, marine matters. This new department, named Navigation and Ocean Development, would also be charted with implementing the COAP. California is alert to the national developments, and is ready to work with the Federal Government in facilitating the coordination of the activities of NOAA with California, and looks forward to Federal legislation which will provide for such coordination. Creation of a NOAA along the lines suggested by this bill will re- sult in great strides towards solution of marine and coastal problems. However, attention should be given in this bill to the mechanism by which NOAA can coordinate with the coastal States in the planning, management and implementation phases of the many programs which must be carried out jointly by Federal, State and local agencies and the private sector in the coastal zone. The major objectives to be accomplished by this legislation are (a) establish the Federal organizational pattern for ocean matters; (b) establish the means by which the States and the Federal Government can work to the mutual benefit of ocean science; and (c) to provide adequate funding to get the national program in motion. _ ‘The Commission report called for a Coastal Management Act which would provide policy objectives for coastal zone functions of the State government and authorize Federal grants-in-aid to facilitate the establishment of coastal zone authorities (CZA) empowered to man- age the coastal water and adjacent land. We would consider this very essential to the legislation in order to make NOAA viable, and strongly recommend that this bill include provision for a coastal management act together with adequate funding. From the State’s viewpoint, a coastal zone authority would offer the opportunity to plan and implement programs designed for opti- mum utilization and conservation of the coastal zone resources. The new California Department of Navigation and Ocean Devel- opment, when fully organized, could very well serve as the CZA and would implement the California Comprehensive Ocean Area Plan now being prepared. As this plan, partially funded by grants from Housing and Urban Development, proceeds, California will have identified numerous coastal zone problems together with recommended action programs to solve these problems. It will be at this point that State and Federal cooperation is vital to accomplishment of the plan’s objectives. 1048 This bill, H.R. 13247, speaks directly to the major problems which face the United States in the conservation and use of the ocean re- sources. Properly, the bill emphasizes those policies and objectives which will provide a framework for action programs, at both the national and State levels. California endorses these policies and objectives—their iumplemen- tation will go a long way to insure U.S. leadership in marine resource development and conservation. Perhaps, with reference to the term “conservation,” it might strengthen the bill to make specific reference to conservation and wise use of the ocean’s resources, and to the main- tenance or enhancement of environmental quality, on page 2, line 15, and again on page 4, as a further objective of the bill. This is implied in the present language; however, in view of the major emphasis on these points in the Commission report, and the high level of public concern for legislative action with respect to prob- lems of recreational and environmental quality, we feel that some ex- plicit reference and stronger emphasis should be in this bill concerning these points. One of the major areas of discussion in the report, “Our Nation and the Sea,” had to do with the quality of the environment in which we live. The report considered pollution from all sources, and the problem was seen to be so staggering that a recommendation was made for a total integrated approach to the problem of air, land and water pollution, including the establishment of a national commission. The marine pollution problem is, of course, part of a larger prob- lem—the distribution through water and air of pesticides, lead com- pounds, sewage, combustion products and other effluvia, will result ultimately in the degradation of the marine environment. California calls for specific effort to maintain and improve the qual- ity of this marine environment. Creation of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency, as proposed, is not in itself an adequate recogni- tion of the special importance of the ocean as the ultimate cumulative repository for the waste of every human and industrial act, wherever conducted. Consider that in particular the activities of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency (NOAA) itself, through its charge of development and use of resources in the ocean, may lead to a major por- tion of potential environmental degradation. Therefore, we recom- mend that a special provision be included in this bill which will direct the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration (FWPCA) to review and approve all actions of NOAA which may involve environ- mental modifications. This is not inconsistent with a present executive order requiring FWPCA review of Federal projects, and it may be well to further emphasize the role of the FWPCA in this bill. Perhaps there could be a restructuring of the FWPCA—the creation of an Office of Marine Pollution, similar to the Office of Saline Water now in the FWPCA, a review body to specifically focus attention and effort toward solving marine pollution problems in cooperation with NOAA. The FWPCA review and approval process should be coordinated with the coastal States in such a way that the States own processes of review and approval of marine-oriented projects are included and en- hanced, not diminished. 1049 The area of recreation is of course closely tied to environmental qual- ity—yet there are problems here, other than pollution, which have to do with esthetics or with simple access and availability with which the proposed NOAA has apparently little direct concern. In this case, as in the ease of pollution mentioned earlicr, NOAA will be a major modifier of the environment, and as such should clearly be directed to consider environmental quality. NOAA should have its programs specifically reviewed and approved by agencies such as the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation (BOR), or the Department of Housing and Urban: Development (HUD), to insure that modifica- tions, particularly coastal, do not conflict with Federal, State, or local planning objectives. In fact, NOAA should be specifically charged with furthering the Commission’s recommendation that public recreation and access to water be included in urban planning, with Federal grants to be con- tingent upon such provisions. The inclusion of the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries and the marine and anadromous segments of the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife wisely places in NOAA the agencies responsible for the conservation and management of our Nation’s living marine resources. Control of the nonliving resources is somewhat more complex, but it does appear essential that Federal programs having to do with marine mineral resources development be included in NOAA. Specifically, we recommend that the marine minerals programs of the Bureau of Mines be transferred to NOAA. These efforts would be particularly important within the NOAA framework, and would be of special importance to California. I might note at this point our great concern in California that the marine minerals program of the Bureau of Mines, based at Tiburon, has been greatly reduced to the detriment of our needs in this area. The problems of oil and gas exploration, leasing, and development are tied to so many Federal agencies, that is, the FWPCA, Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Geological Survey Branch of Oil and Gas Exploration, and others, with a major orientation toward Jand-based operations, that some consideration should be given to including within this bill provisions for coordination between NOAA and these agencies regarding the use of offshore oil and gas resources. One way this might be done would be to give NOAA the authority to write or approve the offshore drilling regulations which should be developed in cooperation with the CZA, and of course be consistent and compatible with the master plan of the contiguous States. Such an approach may very well help reduce the chances of another “oil spill” such as occurred earlier this year in the Santa Barbara Channel. Most of these matters involve both State and national interests, going far beyond boundaries of a single State. Federal funding must be made available to the operation of NOAA, and in a large propor- tion to the funding of the CZA. The CZA, managing programs in- separably bound to Federal planning and implementation, must as a consequence receive some Federal support. This funding, of course, is essential and I am concerned that, if the only funds available are those which transfer with each agency into NOAA, then there will truly be no room for imaginative, vigorous 1050 new approaches to the solutions to marine problems. In fact, the sepa- ration of certain functions from their parent agency without an in- crease in funding could precipitate disaster. Substantial funds will be needed to support coastal zone authorities. Accordingly, it is strongly recommended that specific provisions be included in this bill to fund NOAA as a separate budget item. The appropriation hopefully will include a significant increase in the fiscal support of each agency concerned, in order that NOAA may work ef- fectively. Funds could be appropriated from income received from marine activities, 1.e., mineral and oil leases and royalties from tide and submerged lands and the like. The great research effort exerted by the Department of Defense in the marine environment, and the relatively small amount expended by Federal nonmilitary agencies in the same area is an area of concern. We suggest that a straightforward support and funding o fnon- military agency research efforts in the marine environment would go far faster to the heart of the matter and further the national interest in the sea to an extent greater than the purely military approach. We depend too much on spinoff from military oriented research with the accompanying timelags. Why not, for example, even though the private sector has pro- vided valuable contributions, further support the private sector re- search on submersibles, underwater construction, deep water trans- portation, navigation aids, electronic fish finders, mineral location and recovery, improved environmental prediction systems and pollution abatement. Department of Interior research programs would appear to be vital to our Nation, and certainly may be oriented toward the special needs of coastal States much more readily than military activities. In order to place the proper planned emphasis and priority on marine research, it is firmly recommended that the authority for mak- ing marine research grants be transferred from NSF to NOAA or, at. the very least, that NOAA be represented equally on any NSF dis- cussions of research funding in this area. Ocean effort is not truly to be compared with that of space. Certainly there are massive ocean projects requiring sophisticated equipment in many ways similar to space projects; however, the ocean and coastal zones afford innumerable opportunities for small enter- prises. This very nature of the coastal zone—including, as it does, eradual changes in water depths and coastal configurations, provides for an infinite variation in the uses to which the resources in this tran- sition zone may be put, with a corresponding opportunity for small as well as large enterprise to participate. This concept calls then for a program of fragmented research, not necessarily a few large-scale special-interest programs but projects directed specifically to ways in which the small operator may parti- cipate, i.e., culture and harvest of marine organisms, new ways to mine inshore waters, to clean up harbor oil spills, to improve naviga- tion, to find fish, to provide public opportunity to observe and parti- cipate in marine-oriented activities, through provision of access, facilities, equipment, and so forth. } At this point I would like to say that you have had testimony from the National Academy of Engineering, and I would like to strongly 1051 endorse the statements that these gentlemen have made to you in terms of mission-oriented research, as well as purely the scientific research. I think it is important that we recognize the difference and imple- ment both to the extent possible. Projects such as these may be initiated and carried out in large part by private enterprise in cooperation with appropriate governing bodies. These potential activities of private interests should be con- sidered in Government planning, and any private development or use should of course be compatible with the comprehensive ocean area plans of the CZA. The State and private enterprise must have an opportunity to par- ticipate also, and I suggest that here again is where the CZA may serve in an important capacity by giving the Federal Government the opportunity to provide advice and liaison to all interests. The great U.S. highway systems linking our urban areas, and the complex urban transportation systems themselves, all lead ultimately to the air and to the sea. We would take this opportunity to recom- mend that NOAA specifically be charged to coordinate with the De- partment of Transportation and with planning groups in HUD con- cerning the transportation aspects of land-sea or air-sea interface. However, significant programs in marine science education are also sponsored by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare and by the Smtihsonian Institution. Specifically, special training by other departments (Commerce, Defense, Interior and Transportation) are also conducted. We therefore suggest that the marine science educa- tion and training functions of all of these non-NSF departments be reviewed and, where feasible, transferred to the jurisdiction of NOAA, or at the very least coordinated with NOAA’s determination of needs. Tt occurs to us that, generally, whenever an agency with ocean oriented activities is not included within NOAA, yet there is a need for its research and administrative functions, that NOAA should be required to contract with the appropriate agency, e.g., FWPCA, BOR, Bureau of Mines, branch of Oil and Gas, NSF, and so forth, con- cerning a pollution control operation. In this way one can insure that the potential of the agency with the special research talents and facilities is realized, and that close coordination is maintained between NOAA and agencies with allied or overlapping interests. This concept could result in a greater awareness of the special prob- lems in the marine area, and can lead to a review mechanism by which marine research programs may be coordinated between NOAA and the appropriate agency, and reduce the possibility of duplicating research effort. Considering the tremendous complications now inherent in the sit- ine of powerplants, particularly nuclear, but with problems of ther- mal effects, esthetic impact, and actual or potential air and water pol- lution common to all, I firmly recommend that the CZA be given the _ authority to participate in the selection of powerplant sites, and that in applicable cases no AEC license would be valid without CZA ap- proval. This would provide the best mechanism to insure that State and lo- cal interests are considered when nuclear plants are to be located, and 26-563—70—pt. 235 1052 would appear to effectively insure that the Federal role in promoting health and safety, as well as in conserving and managing areas of the environment and living resources as assigned to NOAA, would be maintained as well as coordinated with the State position. This of course presupposes that the Coastal Zone Authority would be so constituted so as to fairly represent the position of all State in- terests concerned with powerplant siting within the coastal zone. — California presently has a powerplant siting committee represent- ing a number of State departments. This committee, working with the utilities and conservation groups, has assisted in locating powerplants with a minimum of adverse environmental effects. The activities of this committee will be coordinated through the new Department of Navigation and Ocean Development, which in Cali- fornia would function as the Coastal Zone Authority implementing the master plan. Both living and non-living resources are presently, or soon will be, taken in offshore areas where many problems of Federal, State and in- ternational jurisdiction remain to be solved. In fact the problems of jurisdiction and management which exist appear to have hindered de- velopment in some cases. Reviews and studies of the legal problems arising out of the man- agement and use of the marine environment, and of the national poli- cles with respect to the outer continental shelf, are being conducted by the National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Devel- opment and by the Public Land Law Review Commission. The establishment of a cohesive national policy in this complicated and internationally very important area involves the coordination of many branches of the executive department and, certainly, the Con- ress. 5 NOAA should conduct this coordination and function as the cata- lyst for suggesting and bringing about creative changes to existing laws and policies to permit further offshore development. The final question then is to whom does this agency report ? Whether as an independent agency directly to the President or to a Cabinet Secretary, or finally to a council of interested Cabinet Secretaries, may best be resolved in terms of the political necessities of life and full support from the administration. The challenge facing this proposed new agency is tremendous, yet it is apparent that action must be taken to provide the opportunity for the United States to take and maintain leadership in marine af- fairs. This bill certainly will go a long way toward providing that opportunity. California endorses wholeheartedly the concept of NOAA and the need to coordinate with the State planning agencies through a CZA, and urges swift passage of the necessary legislation. We hope that, after hearing all of the testimony with respect to this bill, you will consider some of our suggestions here today and incorpo- rate them where possible. It has been a pleasure to have had this opportunity to be here today, and I would like to simply make one additional comment emphasizing California’s recognition for planning. Our population today is ap- proximately 20 million people. We are told by conservative pro- 1053 jections that by the year 2000, which is only 30 years away, we will have a population of 38 million people. Tt is obvious that we have some massive planning problems in terms of every function of life, and the ocean, since it is almost an untouched natural resource, comes at the top of my list. That is the reason I am here today. That is the reason we are all so very interested in doing an effective job to be sure that whatever the direction the Federal Gov- ernment in the wisdom of this committee goes, it will be adequately coordinated with the State government. Thank you very much. Mr. Rocrrs. Thank you very much, Governor Reinecke. Your state- ment is excellent. It has many, many good points, and I know this committee will want to consider placing them in the legislation. I hope also that you will make your views known to the administration di- rectly. I think it would be most helpful to the Council, to the Vice President, and to the President, to know that California is not afraid of reorganization. I see you have done it in your own State and evi- dently you have done it in spite of some parochial interests of depart- ments that we are facing here in the Federal Government. We have had some of the departmental witnesses come up and—as is natural and I am sure you saw it when you were here— indicate they are afraid to let any constituent agency get out of their control. I think your statement is excellent and will be most helpful to the committee. Mr. Mosher ? Mr. Mosurr. Well, Mr. Chairman, I want to echo what you have just said. I think that Governor Reinecke’s statement is certainly one of the most significant that we have had here. It sparkles with specific suggestions that are going to be very helpful and that are going to deserve our very active consideration. I think it is especially significant because of the Governor’s own background of experience on this committee, itself, which has given him perspective, because of the fact that he is the Lieutenant Governor of the largest State in the Union with tremendous problems in this area, because of his own Navy background and his experience at sea and because of his own personal career background in engineering and science and his successful experience in those areas. All of these experiences give Mr. Reinecke a very special perspective on the problems that this committee faces on the legislation that we are considering, and therefore it is very hopeful that he endorses the bill so completely. I join you, Mr. Chairman, in hoping that he will speak directly to the administration and seek the administration’s support for the ef- forts that this committee is making. Mr. Rogers. If the gentleman would yield there. Mr. Mosuenr. I yield. Mr. Rocers. I would hope that when the President gets out to San Clemente that you would get him in the ocean there and talk to him and forcefully let him have your views because I think they are great, and I share Mr. Mosher’s feelings. Mr. Mosuer. Well, Mr. Chairman, there are so many useful recom- mendations and suggestions for strengthening the bill contained in this testimony that I am at a loss to know where to begin in trying to 1054 discuss it or ask questions, and therefore I don’t think I am going to get into specifics. I think it is great, Ed. Mr. Retnecke. Thank you. _ Mr. Kerrs. Will the gentleman yield? I ask you to do so because I have to go back to the Coast Guard Subcommittee hearing and I would simply like to echo your sentiments, and those of the acting chair- man of this committee. Let me say personally, Ed, that I thought when you went back to California that you probably were going to have a more leisurely existence as Lieutenant Governor. At times I have thought of that position as an appendix to the corporate body of California, but obviously you have done a lot of homework in the job. I think it has established quite a precedent. I hope that others of ‘us, when we leave this committee, can carry into our later assignments the enthusiasm and the interest that you have shown. So thanks very much for your journeying across the country to give us the benefit of your advice and counsel. It has been very nice to see you. ~ Mr. Retnecke. Thank you very much. Mr. Mosuer. Mr. Chairman, let me make one more comment. T think one of the most discerning comments that the Governor makes is on page 7 where he points to the need for growth in funding that will result from NOAA or any other reorganization we have and that the funding has to be substantially larger than merely those budgetarv amounts that are represented in what the various existing offices will bring into the new agency. Mr. Retnecke. May I respond to that. Mr. Mosuer. Yes. Mr. Retnecke. I would like to add that that is one of the very major points that we are concerned with also, to be sure the bill enables free and open activities on the part of the States in conjunction with the Federal program. There is so much resource in terms of money that will be available from the private sector and from State programs providing we have some sort of an effort that allows the whole system to flow. This is why we want to see increased and enhanced activity at the Federal level, but at the same time in such a manner that will encourage the development at the State and private sector levels as well. Mr. Mosuer. Governor, I am sure you are aware of the conference that this committee is sponsoring later this month with representatives of the various coastal States. Certainly that is going to provide a wonderful opportunity to do what you suggest on page 3, where you point to the need for an effective mechanism by which NOAA would coordinate with the coastal States in planning and activities. IT am sure that California will be well represented at that confer- ence, and I would hope that it might be you who would be the representative. Mr. Rernecke. I would hope so, too, and I would be delighted. The only opportunity the State has right now for Federal participation is simply through planning grants under the Department of Housing and Urban Development. This does not seem to me to be the proper place to go for marine or ocean oriented planning or program development. This again is the reason we want to see this under NOAA. Mr. Rocers. Thank you. Mr. Downing. : Mr. Downrne. Governor, I can’t begin to tell you what a genuine pleasure it is to have you back on the Hill. You were a valuable mem- ber of this committee and a valuable Member of Congress, and I value our personal friendship. You have made a significant statement, I think one of the best we have received in these hearings. Certainly it will be studied and where possible implemented. That is all. It is good to see you. Mr. Rernecke. Thank you. Mr. Rocers. We are honored to have with us today the ranking member of our full committee, Mr. Maillard. _ Mr. Mailliard, we are pleased to have you with us, and you may want to make a comment. Mr. Martirarp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to echo what the other members of the committee have said. T am only an ex officio member of this subcommittee, and I have a great admiration for the members of this subcommittee in the way they have gone into this tremendously complicated and very important problem, and your testimony is, as everyone has said, very helpful. I would like to ask one specific question, though. While you indicate in your statement the support of this bill, and I confess my own lack of knowledge of the detailed provisions of the bill, it seems to me that you have stressed a very important thing and that is the essential degree of coordination that is going to be required to really utilize all of the potential resources that we have to attack these problems. Would you have the resources within the State government to make some specific amendment suggestions because I get the impression that you don’t think the bill as written really does provide the degree of coordination that is desirable. Mr. Rernecke. Well, frankly, yes, that is right. I don’t feel that it goes far enough. I believe the bill should make it possible for particu- larly this development of the coastal zone authorities that can work with NOAA or whatever the Federal agency turns out to be. In the case of California our new department of marine and ocean development is already funded. It is an ongoing program that has been there for years, and as such it is in the budget and will be enhanced continually as we can develop meaningful programs to go along with it, but we need this in conjunction with the funding of NOAA, the planning of NOAA, the coordination with NOAA, the granting of research and development. grants through NOAA in order to make the overall program a comprehensive one, one that recognizes the national goals as well as the state goals. Mr. Mairiiarp. We have had some experience in this committee with the difficulties of framing proper legislative language to accomplish some of these objectives, such as during the extensive hearings we had on the Motor Boat Act some years ago, trying to figure out how to get the States in their proper role and the Federal Government in its proper role. If any of your staff people or technical people have the time to help us with legislative language to accomplish these objec- tives, we would appreciate it. 1056 Mr. Retnecke. Without trying to talk to the specifics, many differ- ent Federal bills, laws, require certain State planning to comply or to qualify for Federal grants, and I think this is the motivation to re- quire States to develop their own master plans. They can come back to HUD and get the money to help them plan, but at least the plan is then launched and as soon as it is completed in a matter of 2 or 3 or 4 years, then there will be a plan effectively to begin to generate eee enaien at both State and Federal as well as the private sector evels. I will look for some technical language. I don’t have it right now. (The information was not received by the time the hearing was sent to the printer. ) Mr. Mairiiarp. May I also say that I am glad you raised the point that there seems to be a desire to starve to death financially the installa- tion at Tiburon. You mentioned that some valuable work has been going on there. I am in the process of seeing that that is not starved to extinction at least. Mr. Rernecke. I wish you would because that laboratory serves not only California, but also Alaska. They have done some very significant practical work in the developing of manganese nodules off the shelf in Alaska so that it is not just truly State oriented. Mr. Mariurarp. [ thank you. ; I have two other committees. I will see you later in the day. Mr. Retnecxe. Thank you. Mr. Rocrrs. Mr. Leggett. Mr. Leceerr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to see that we have this totally bipartisan approach to oceanography in California. It doesn’t surprise me to see you come here and give this bipartisan contribution. The recommendations that you have expressed in a constructive way as to the bill before us is in a way the other side of the compromises that were made in order to get the current bill before this House. You point up the Nation and the sea in your testimony. I am sure you are familiar with that, and of course that points out all of the things that you have alluded to, recreation which is not in this bill, the water pollution which is not in this bill, the navigation from the Corps of Engineers which is not in this bill, and of course, ad infinitum. The point is that we are left in the bill then with four agencies, the Coast Guard which doesn’t really have as a primary objective the ex- ploration of the ocean bottom, the environment weather bureau which really has the air, I guess, as its primary element of review; then we have the Great Lakes Agency which is part of the Corps of Engineers which is rather.geographically limited, and then we have the Bureau of Sport Fisheries from the Department of the Interior. i I think those are the four agencies that are merged in this bill, We don’t include Commercial Fisheries from the Department of the Inte- rior, and of course what we end up with is the budgets from these agen- cies which is about $200 million, and I know a lot of us that have frolicked in the idea of a new oceanographic agency who have thought of $1 billion or $2 billion magnitude. I share your views, and I hope that we can get into fundamental ocean discovery and not limit ourselves to what we have done in the past, but really take on a new scope and have all of these agencies jell — 1057 together and build some enthusiasm and programs which can inter- relate with the great States of California and North Carolina that want to do things in ocean development and discovery. Mr. Rernexke. I might say, Congressman Leggett, that we recognize the difference between the bill before us and the bills that were pre- sented earlier this year. Rather than trying to capture totally all of the agencies that you mention that are not included in the present bill, in this testimony we are recommending a liaison preferably, even of a contract type, to be sure that it is there, but a strong liaison between these other departments and agencies that were not specifically in- cluded in the present bill. But I feel it is very essential that all of those agencies be well rep- resented and well tied-in by whatever means and if the political prac- ticality is such that we just can’t do it at this time, then at least we should have a contractual relationship that will guarantee the services and the advice and technology that is known by these other agencies and by that I think we can then accomplish the objective that we are really looking for. Mr. Leecerr. I think your testimony is outstanding. Rather than just coming before the committee rubberstamping what we have laid down as a kind of a pilot bill, you have given us some constructive thoughts, and I think it is going to be very helpful. Thank you very much. Mr. Rocers. I share those thoughts, and I think it might be interest- ing to note that I know Chairman Lennon has two drafts of proposals for coastal zone operation that can be incorporated in the bill. I do, and I am sure other members know that too well. I think the points you have made are excellent. Mr. Dellenback. Mr. Detienpack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I intended, Governor, not to join in the love feast and to say some- thing irreverent, but I suppose it would break the mood of the morning. On the bipartisan basis I will resist my temptation. Your contribution was material to the House when you were a member and not only to this committee but to the subcommittee. I think that that which was probably a sound decision from a standpoint of the people of California and your own personal standpoint, to leave this body and take your present position, was one that some of us from a selfish standpoint regreted because California’s gain was our loss. Relative to your testimony this morning, do I find running through it the clear feeling that here is a great challenge which faces us which is not being met by present practice ? Mr. Rernecke. Very definitely. No question about that. Mr. Detiensack. This is clearly what I culled from the testimony, | and I wanted to make this point clear because some of the witnesses who have appeared before us have talked in terms of what appears to me to be facelifting of the present situation. They sort of say, “Well, we are getting along pretty well. We are doing these things now.” And I read your testimony as—without be- ing unduly critical of any specific agency at the present time—saying that the massive challenge which we face is just not being met ade- quately by that which is being done at the present time. This is cor- rect, is it? 1058 Mr. REINECKE. Yes, it certainly is. Mr. DotrtEensack. I think we tend sometimes to reach for analogies that hold up only partly. I think one of the analogies that we face, those of us who are concerned about the ocean and the atmosphere, is that we think in terms of the space effort. I think there are strong similarities and you point out some of them in your testimony about the need for a clear Federal pattern and a clear involvement of the Federal and the State and this point to which allusion has been made earlier about the vital imperative of major increases in funding. I think you have done another thing that needs to be done in this in your testimony when you do point out the dissimilarities. You, on page 8, make clear that, in your words, “Ocean effort is not truly to be compared with that of space.” . I don’t see what we are doing here or what we are proposing to have done in this bill as being a mirror of what has happened in the space effort at all because that can be coordinated in a way that this cannot be. Do I read you correctly again that, while tracing the analogy to a certain point on such things as the need for a massive infusion of funding, for a clear coordination of effort, a clear blending of the Federal effort with the State effort, you also are soundly pointing out some of the points of distinction which have to be different between the ocean and atmosphere ? Mr. Rernecke. There is no question about that. We have a whole different set of circumstances, particularly the fact that the States will each individually be involved as opposed to the space effort which was primarily almost a single agency type of constructive effort. That is why we need to establish not only additional funding and recognizing the limitations that we are are all facing on funding do the best we can, but certainly let’s establish the organization that will allow for this funding to increase as these plans develop and as the future becomes more important to us in the oceans. So it is the funding and the organization, the legal aspects that we are So very interested in. Mr. Detienpack. We appreciate this. I join with my colleague Mr. Mosher in hoping that, as we move forward with this conference later this month that chairman Lennon has called for, California will be well represented and, if it so works into your duties, that you can be back. I am sure there is nobody or very few in the State of California that can bring a sounder approach to this and give us of your own background. Thank you so much for coming. Mr. Rernecke. Thank you. Mr. Leecerr (presiding). Thank you very much, Mr. Dellenback. Did you say in your testimony, Governor, the monetary expenditure that California has currently involved in this program ? Mr. Rernecre. I am afraid I don’t have the total program. We are spending $170,000 on the planning phase. We are spending another $55,000 on the funding of the California Marine Advisory Commis- sion. In addition to that there are many agencies that have ocean oriented programs such as fish and game, such as our water pollution, such as our Department of Water Resources. There are numerous agencies 1059 that have marine oriented programs. I do not have the total budget as broken down to specifically marine orientation. I will be glad to get that figure for the committee if you would like. (The information was not received by the time the hearing was sent to the printer. ) Mr. Lxeccerr. Do you think this would be a proper area for returning funds to the State? Mr. Rernecke. It certainly sounds good to me. I can think of no better application or area of greater interest on my part. Mr. Leceerr. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Feighan. Mr. Ferenan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Governor, I just wanted to say that your exceptional testimony re- emphasizes my firm belief that the House of Representatives’ loss was California’s gain. I am very happy that you are here with us today. IT was very much impressed by your comprehensive recommenda- tions, and I just hope that you will have time this afternoon to visit the floor and see members on both sides of the aisle, all of whom have a high regard for your ability and friendship. Mr. Retnecke. Thank you very much, Mike. Mr. Leccerr. Thank you very much. Mr. Ruppe from Michigan. Mr. Ruppr. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. IT am certainly glad that the Lieutenant Governor of California is here and that, after making such a fine contribution in the House, he leads the same fight for a stronger oceanographic program in the State of California. I might ask in view of the specific references and program sug- gestions you have made for this legislation, is it your intention or has the State of California gone forward with a program encompassing the same elements as you suggested for us here today ? Mr. Rernecke. Very much so, yes. California has the Marine Ad- visory Commission which advised and oversees from the private sector and the legislative point of view all of the planning that is done. Legislatively we now have passed a bill which has made law the Interagency Council which is now doing the planning and which sub- sequently then will develop this plan and turn it over to our new Department of Navigation and Ocean Development. This new department is the real crux, the real thrust of the future as far as California is concerned. This department will be our CZA. and we will have that department in operation whether the Federal Government does it or not because that is the way we are going to have our State organized. It is done. It is not in effect. It is an accomplished fact. What California is now waiting for is recognition of this concept of ocean development by the Federal Government so that we can move together to accomplish national goals with a little of your money. Mr. Ruppr. So this State agency will have the responsibility and the direction of creating programs, and coordinating the various State responsibilities. Mr. Retnecke. Yes, indeed, with all of the overlapping and inter- facing of jurisdictions of estuarine control, of pollution, of marine development whether it is pure science, whether it is applied tech- 1060 nology, whether it is gas and oil development, powerplant siting, sew- age effluent problems, anything of this nature this one department now has the entire responsibility for the development and the coordina- tion and the compliance with these plans. Mr. Ruppr. Do you, on a State level feel that you will be in a much better position to fund this agency at a higher level than you would the piecemeal groups involved in this direction ? Mr. Reinecke. There is no question about it. This has been de- veloped. Through the reorganization plan the legislature had the opportunity to look at this and to turn it down if they wanted to. They recognized the wisdom and, gratefully, they passed the bill so that we do have this in effect at this time. Mr. Rupre. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I would say that if we could pass legislation like this, there would be bipartisan support for the multimillion dollar programs suggested by the committee. Mr. Lececertr. I am glad that something unlocks your liberalism. T recognize the gentleman from Alaska now. Mr. Potiock. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ed, we are all delighted to see you back here visiting. It seems very interesting for me, having spent so much time with you on the com- mittee, to read your presentation. I think it is excellent. I am sure you did touch on this, but I came in late and I am not sure I understand the relationship of the Interagency Council for Ocean Resources, ICOR, which I presume is a State agency Mr. Retnecke. Yes, sit. Mr. Potiock. And your Department and your California Advisory Commission on Marine and Coastal Resources. Are they in conflict in any way ? Mr. Rerneckn. No, they work very much together. The ICOR is strictly a high-level, such as the National Council on Oceanography. Tt is made up of the five Cabinet Secretaries and myself. As such 1t is an in-house executive operation whose function is totally planning. At such times as the California Ocean Area Plan is developed, ICOR will cease to exist, and we will turn the product of that over to the new Department which is then a departmental operation for imple- mentation of navigation and ocean development. But CMC, the Marine Advisory Commission, is principally a re- view body, private sector primarily, with some legislative input as well. Mr. Potiock. An advisory commission ? Mr. Retneckn, Advisory to the legislature and to the Governor. Mr. Pornock. And will they be advisory also to the Department? Mr. Retnecke. Yes. Any agency that would be advisory to the Governor would be passed on to the appropriate departinent. — Mr. Pottock. Did I understand your response to Congressman Mail- liard to be that you could come up with specific recommendations for amendments to the bill? Mr. Rernecke. I think we could, ves. We would be glad to. Mr. Pottocr. That would be very helpful. Mr. Rervecke. I didn’t want to assume the prerogative of the com- mittce and establish specific language. Mr. Porroce. T understand that, but I think from yonr point of view, representing a State and being very much involved in its per- 1061 sonally, and with your background and knowledge of both the com- mittee’s responsibilities and those of your own State, it could be most helpful. You have obviously taken quite a lead in California over the other States in the development of a system or organization for utilizing the resources of the sea. Mr. Rerneckr, We feel we have moved ahead very fell. We are going to move ahead. We are moving now and we would just like a lot of company. Mr. Potiock. I am delighted with a lot that you had to say and would like to tell you that if I again address the Alaska Legislature early in the year, as I have done each year since I have been in Con- gress, I will certainly bring out for consideration some of your Calli- fornia activities in this area. It is nice to have you here, Ed. Mr. Retnecke. Thank you. Mr. Lecerrr. Thank you very much, Mr. Pollock. Now Florida would like to cross-examine California. Mr. Frey. Mr. Frey. It is a pleasure. I would like to welcome you. There is very little to add, but I would like to join my colleagues. Running through this testimony there is, it seems to me, a recogni- tion by you that certainly the present bill is much too narrow. Is this true ? Mr. Rernecke. I am not sure that narrow is the word. Mr. Frey. Limited in scope. Mr. Rernecke. It is limited, yes. It appeared to me to be a reaction perhaps to testimony from the bills introduced earlier this year that were too broad. So some of the proposals were withdrawn probably for good and practical political reasons. I am trying to extend the dimension of the bill out somewhat now even if only by contractual relationships to these other agencies. I do feel that it is necessary to establish this total concept at this time because I doubt very much that we are going to make significant organizational amendments to it for some time to come after the bill is passed. Mr. Frey. From what you said previously, I understand that when you faced this situation in California in essence trying to establish a department that would be involved with oceanography, you went ahead and did it as an independent department or agency. Mr. Rernecgke. That is correct. Mr. Frey. On page 11 you sort of leave up in the air your personal preference or the State’s personal preference regarding this bill. I wonder. You said, “* * * independent agency directly to the President or to a Cabinet Secretary, or finally to a Council * * *” Do you have a preference personally ? Mr. Reinecke. I would like to see this an independent agency but also, having served time on this and other committees, I recognize the practical problems, and I felt that you gentlemen not only on this side of the Capitol, but those on the other side of the Capitol would prob- ably have something to say. Mr. Frey. You have made this concept work in California by setting up a department ? 1062 Mr. Rernecke. We have set up a separate department within the Resources Agency. We have a little different structure in California. We have a Natural Resources Agency that encompasses everything concerning the natural resources of the State. Mr. Frey. This was the one further question I was going to ask in talking about the scope of this. Throughout your remarks ran the problem, which really exists, of coordination which so many other ~ bureaus and departments. I was a little bit surprised when you were answering Congressman Pollock on this. I thought for a minute that your agencies were two levels within a coordinating agency which you are going to keep, composed of you and the various secretaries that you are going to keep for coordination, but you are going to do away with that ? Mr. Rernecke. That is right. This will be a departmental function. Tt will, however, be counseled or advised by this private sector and legislative group known as the Marine Commission. Mr. Frey. I just was thinking out loud from that idea as to the problem of coordination. Do you think that there would be any merit at all in what we are doing to have a two-step affair, for instance, a council on environment for the planning stage which could be com- posed of the various under secretaries and then an action agency as far as this agency goes? Mr. Retnecke. I look at it this way. We have studied this problem for a long time. Our Nation and the sea report is a prime example of how this investigation was done. I think we are far enough along now that it is necessary for the Federal Government to make specific organizational changes to facilitate the planning at lower levels of Government, namely, State and perhaps some county, and for that reason I would like not to see this go into a planning stage again but to develop specific organizational form. Mr. Frey. I didn’t mean in a planning stage. What I meant is the problem, once we get this going, of coordination, for instance the problem with the Bureau of Mines and with them Bureau of Roads. Mr. Retnecke. This will be more of a problem at the Federal level than in California because we have simply transferred those functions to the Resource Department under this new Department of Naviga- tion and Ocean Development. There are very few conflicting agencies or departments now that are not already incorporated into this one heading which is under the Secretary of Resources so that we have done it all at once. Mr. Frey. Thank you. I see the chairman walked in so I will yield back the balance of the time. : Mr. Leacerr. I want to thank you very much, Governor, for your outstanding presentation here this morning. We have the chairman of our subcommittee back who has pioneered the current bill before the committee. I might state parenthetically in those synopses of comments on the Governor’s testimony that he has done a very good job of pointing up some of the things that we would have liked to have had in our bill but we kept out because we felt that there might be further conflagration by trying to put them in. 1063 I think he has made some very constructive recommendations which I know are appreciated by the members of the committee who are here. Mr. Lennon (presiding). Thank you, sir. I want to welcome any personal, good friend and a friend of this program and tell him how much we have missed him since he has been at home, so to speak, in his new capacity as Lieutenant Governor of California. We are delighted, Governor, that the State of California has taken this initiative. I won’t say they took it first because we did have the Governor of North Carolina here some several weeks ago, who ad- dressed himself to many of the things that you have. I did have the opportunity last evening to read your statement, and I am sure you understand why I wasn’t here this morning to extend a personal as well as official welcome to you. We certainly intend to keep in touch with those representatives of the coastal States and the lake States who have a vital concern and interest in this matter, and we know that the State of California or a least we have been advised that the State of California will participate in the forum that we intend to conduct here on October the 28th and 29th, this month, related pri- marily to some of the things that you have stressed : coastal zone man- agement and the laboratory system which has been suggested. I might say to you that we need your counsel and advice and active support in persuading the administration to move forward in this direction. We can certainly understand that being called upon in January of this year or certainly last November, to make a definitive judgment with respect to the Commission’s report, that they have been delayed looking at the total picture of Government reorganization. But we believe and I think you know, Governor, that this legisla- tion, as the gentleman from California, Mr. Leggett, has just com- mented, that we have reached a consensus with respect to two specific recommendations of the Commission concerning a Government struc- ture, NOAA, and also the National Advisory Committee. We did not hope to obtain a consensus with respect to the other aspects of the Commission’s report at the time we introduced this bill. Now, subsequent to that time there has been a bill introduced that is headed in the direction of trying to implement the Commission’s sug- gestions or recommendations with regard to the coastal zones. Now, the recommendations are not very definitive in the Commis- sion’s report with respect to that. That is the reason we thought it appropriate to bring to Washington representatives of the some 30 States who have a vital interest in this program and who would help us arrive at some sort of a conclusion as to the direction we should go related to the areas that they are particularly interested in, every coastal State and of course every Great Lakes State having a vital in- terest in this commission report. I might say to you that early this year we started the hearings and, as a former member of this subcommittee, you will be interested in and perhaps already know that we found on the part of industry and on the part of the university level and private laboratory level an almost complete agreement with respect to the complete implementa- tion of the Stratton report as you know it so well. 1064 With respect to the Government structure, naturally we found as we expected to find, some hesitancy to move along in this direction. We found on the other hand that this Commission’s report has done a great deal to stimulate the various agencies, especially the Depart- ment of the Interior and even the Department of Commerce and Department of Transportation, to try to enlarge their scope of par- ticipation in the marine sciences. _ They all now seem to indicate to us that they have the capability in their respective departments to take over the suggested tasks laid down to us by the Commission. _ We expected that. As a matter of fact, I think some of them moved in this direction before the report came out. I saw signs of it. _As you know, the Commission included a Government representa- tive at the Secretary level or at least assistant secretary of the Navy, Assistant Secretary of the Department of the Interior, and of course Dr. White who is the Administrator of the Environmental Science Services Administration in the Department of Commerce. We noted that quite early this year before the Commission report came out that there was a movement in the Department of the Interior in this direction. We commend them for it and question why they have not done it before. So that with your influence that you have with the present ad- ministration, we hope that we can get from the administration some definite recommendations that will at least put us in a position that we won’t have a fight on the floor when we hopefully bring this bill to the floor before the conclusion of the first session of the 91st Congress. I know you are interested in it. In my judgment there has never been a more sincere man than you, I say as a dear friend, who worked harder as a Member of Congress and of this committee. I do know you are doing a good job out in California, and we are very happy to have you here as a witness. Mr. Retnecke. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I can assure you that I will make these views known to the administration. Again, frankly, I had not done so until I had first exposed them here to this committee, but I shall do so. ! Mr. Lennon. I think the gentleman knows that the bill was intro- duced simply as a vehicle, as a feeler, and was sent out, and every member of this subcommittee on both sides of the aisle is a cosponsor of that legislation. We are proud of the fact that this committee has always been one that was not interested in anything other than that we hoped to do what was in the national interest without regard to any partisan politics at all. This is an area in which we shouldn't have partisan politics in my judgment. LACE Mr. Retnecne. I certainly have admired the work and inspiration which you have provided for this committee, Mr. Chairman. I cer- tainly want to work with you now as I did several years ago. Mr. Lennon. Thank you very much, Governor, for your appearance. Mr. Retnecke. Thank you i Mr. Lennon. Now we are delighted to have with us Dr. T. S. Austin, the director of the National Oceanographic Data Center. 1065 Doctor, we are honored to have you here today because of your long interest and participation in the field in which we have a common interest. You go right ahead, sir, with your statement. We are delighted and honored to have you. (Dr. Austin’s biographical sketch follows :) CURRICULUM VITAE OF THOMAS S. AUSTIN Education : BA Biology, 1938, Grove City College. MA Zoology, 1940, University of Buffalo. MS Limnology, 1942, Yale University. DSc (Hon.), 1965, Grove City College. Experience : _ 2 years—Instructor, Naval Training School, Grove City College. 3 years—Oceanographer, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution. 6 years—Oceanographer, Naval Oceanographic Office. 9 years—Oceanographer, Bureau of Commercial Fisheries (BCF) Labora- tory, Honolulu. 3 years—Assistant Director, BCF Laboratory, Honolulu. 2 years—Assistant Director, BCF Laboratory, Washington, D.C. 2 years—Director, BCF Laboratory, Washington, D.C. 3 years—Director, BCE Laboratory, Miami. Present—Director, National Oceanographic Data Center and World Data Center A for Oceanography. Publications : 36. Scientific Organizations: The Society of the Sigma Ni. American Meteorolcgical Society (Associate Member). New York Academy of Sciences. Marine Technology Society (Charter Member). American Society of Limnology and Oceanography. American Society for Oceanography (Charter Member). Gulf and Caribbean Fisheries Institute. American Geophysical Union. Special Assignments Include: International Coordinator, Intergovernment Oceanographic Commission, In- ternational Cooperative Investigations of the Tropical Atlantic, 1962-. Deputy Chairman, Panel on International Programs and International Co- operative Organizations, 1967-. Chairman, Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, Working Group on International Oceanographic Data Exchange, June 1968-. Member, National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Develop- ment, Committee on Ocean Exploration and Environmental Services, August 1968-. Participant, Steering Committee Workkshop on International Decade of Ocean Exploration, Woods Hole, Massachusetts, September 3-13, 1968. Chairman, Editorial Committee for the Cooperative Investigations of the Caribbean and Adjacent Regions, January 1969-. STATEMENT OF DR. THOMAS S. AUSTIN, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL OCEANOGRAPHIC DATA CENTER Dr. Ausrrx. Thank you, sir. I am especially honored to be here this morning and hear the state- ment from the Lieutenant Governor of California. When those of us in marine sciences think of California, we think of the Scripps Institution of Oceanography in California, the State fish and game department, and the other organizations in the State from whom the National Oceanographic Data Center receives significant contribu- tions of high quality, and to whom we respond to requests. 1066 I appreciate the opportunity of appearing here this morning to dis- cuss the role of the National Oceanographic Data Center and to ex- press some of my personal views in the hight of the recommendations of the Commission report and H.R. 13247. As this is the first time I have had the pleasure of appearing here, sir, I have provided the chairman and each of the members of the committee with a résumé of my education and experience. I shall not comment on that. Mr. Lennon. Without objection it will be inserted in the record im- mediately preceding the doctor’s statement. Dr. Austin. I have also furnished each of you with a copy of last year’s annual report of the National Oceanographic Data Center called Highlights and a little brochure that describes the activities of the Center. I believe each of you has a copy of my statement that I would appreciate having in the record, and I will speak from it only. Mr. Lennon. All right, sir. Without objection the full text of your statement will follow your comments. Dr. Austin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will keep it brief. I no- ticed you looking at your watch earlier. Mr. Lennon. That is all right. Go ahead, sir. Dr. Austin. The National Oceanographic Data Center was estab- lished by an interagency agreement in December 1960. The Center’s basic mission is to receive, compile, to process, to preserve, and dis- seminate the oceanographic data it receives. As a personal aside, I consider the data as a national resource. I con- sider the problems of compilation processing, and archiving of oceano- graphic data are extremely important since they range the full gamit of the marine sciences. Like some other data perhaps, oceanographic data do not grow old. The oceanographers, the people concerned with the fisheries and in- dustry are interested in the compilation of the data over decades. They are interested in the changes that are going on in the oceans with time, as these changes may influence the distribution and abundance of the fisheries, the gloval weather, and so forth. The operations of the Center are funded by reimbursements from 10 agencies participating in the support of the Center. The manage- ment and partial financial support of the Center are furnished by the Naval Oceanographic Office as amplified by the policies and proce- dures established by the Advisory Board. The Advisory Board was established to provide an effective means of formulating, expressing, and transmitting the joint policy and technical direction of the Center. The Board consists of representatives of the sponsoring agencies. These ayencies now are the Navy, the NSF, the BCF, the AEC, the Coast Guard, the Coastal Engineering Research Center, Geological Survey, the HEW, the ESSA, and the FWPCA. In addition, two nonvoting members are appointed by the National Academy of Sciences and are always scientists in their own right, and three observers, one from industry, one from the National Council, and one from the new National Oceanographic Instrumentation Center. Each of the supporting activities provides a pro rata share of the estimated costs for the operation of the Center, the acquiring, the compiling and the preservation of the oceanographic data. 1067 A summary of the funds available is shown in table 1. It should be noted that the funds are for the operation of the Cen- ter. The contributing agencies like other users are charged. This type of funding has not resulted in any severe limitations on the operation of the Center, but it is a clumsy method, and it is awfully difficult to plan ahead in that we never are sure of the level of the funding. The agencies have not always found it possible to contribute at the level the Advisory Board recommends. A single agency line item funding has been suggested. During the 86th Congress bills were introduced that would have included in the NODC certain types of marine environmental data which we do not now store, specifically the fisheries, the hydrographic, the bathymetric, meteorological, coastal, and certain kinds of geo- physical data. In keeping with the mission-oriented aspects, however, other agen- cies have been designated as repositories of these types of data: The Naval Oceanographic Office and the Coast Geodetic Survey, the bathymetric; the Weather Bureau, the meteorological and climato- logical records; and the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, the fishery statistics. The geophysical data now reside in several agencies. The Commission did not undertake a detailed proposal for the na- tional marine data service activities. It deferred to the ongoing study funded by the Council to the System Development Corp. Unfortunately this study is not complete. However, within the framework of the present hearings, I would like to comment on some aspects of marine data management. I would like to emphasize that the views are essentially my own. (Juite possibly program managers and representatives of agencies performing missions that generate or require the marine data will have different views. The oceans are a potential source of protein and mineral resources. Our knowledge and experience dictate that these resources are not unlimited and that we should develop sound management policies. This requires the use of existing data and information and requires adequate planning for the continued generation and analysis of such data. Although oceaography is a relatively new science, man is becoming increasingly aware of the necessity to consider the oceans, or segments of the oceans in their totality. Discovery, assessment, harvest, and the management of the fisheries, for instance, demand knowledge of the physics, the chemistry, the geology, and the biology of the marine environment. The petroleum industry requires the geological, the geophysical, and the biological data from the surface and the deep sediments on the ocean floor and information concerning the physical, the chemical, and the biological properties of the water column above these sediments. These are but two examples of the users that would benefit from having one marine data center from whom the data could be obtained. The problems now resulting from the storage of the marine environ- mental data in more than one center have been cogently expressed by Dr, White, administrator of ESSA, in an article that he recently. published and I quote in part: 26—565—70—pt. 2 36 1068 There is no single focus for geomagnetic, gravity, bathymetric, or other ocean survey data. E Not only is there no one place to go to obtain marine data, there is not even one mechanism which will tell you what exists. But more important is the problem of collating the information. In too many areas—of which air-sea inter- action is an outstanding example—scientists and engineers must deal with simul- taneously processed data from different environments, with computers which are in separate centers, with differing formats, programs, procedures and goals. As I previously mentioned, the data from many marine disciplines are not stored in the National Oceanographic Data Center. Part of this is due to restrictions of our charter which prohibits the duplication of the functions of other official repositories such as the Weather Bureau, the Coast and Geodetic Survey, the Naval Oceanographic Office, and so forth. The National Oceanographic Data Center does interact with each of these activities to obtain the data for the customers. Separate storage can be troublesome to the users; for instance, if you wish to correlate the sediment transport with the subsurface cur- rents or to establish the relationship between the climatological events and the wind driven currents. 3 In the first instance the user would have to go to three sources, the Coast and Geodetic Survey, the Naval Oceanographic Office, and the National Oceanographic Data Center. For the second, the NWRC and the National Oceanographic Data Center. , Further, these data are all too frequently not processed in the same manner and could be in incompatible formats. I propose that a solution to these types of problems would be to es- tablish two data centers in a single agency, one for meteorological and climatological, and the other for all other types of marine data. Compatability among the data bases would be nominally assured. The administrative costs would be considerably reduced. I think within the state of the art and the computer technology either of the data bases could be rapidly accessed. The Commission stated: “ * * * the already overloaded general- purpose data centers should avoid involvement to the extent possible in any aspect of the data problem which might have logical affiliation with existing mission agencies.” I do not agree with this conclusion. I believe that a general purpose marine data center—a concept en- dorsed by our advisory board—would not detract from the missions of the agencies or organizational components of a NOAA. I believe that the center would be of value for a number of efforts, for instance, the Navy. For example, bathymetric data, once they were used to produce and update navigational charts, could be accessioned by the marine data center and be available for all other uses. Certain fisheries statistics that are environmentally related—for example, catch per unit of ef- fort as opposed to total landings—and which are Bureau of Commer- cial Fisheries mission oriented could be included. . Gravity and magnetic data after the preparation of the charts and reports could repose in the center. Some data could and should be excluded; for example, certain of the research data that have a one-time application. However, these 1069 data should be carefully inventoried, in case any other scientist is interested. The classified probably would also be excluded, but close liaison should be maintained to insure compatibility. I do not believe that the data should be acquired in realtime by the proposed center. Again, the realtime utilization is a mission oriented aspect fer the develop- ment and promulgation of forecasts. However, after the data are used in the preparation of the fore- casts, they are of climatological interest, historical interest, and should go to the national center. We now exchange the classical types of oceanographic data directly with the foreign national and regional centers through the mechanism of World Data Center-A, Oceanography, which is collocated with the National Oceanographic Center. I believe that this exchange on the international level would be facilitated if there were a single national center holding the data for all the marine disciplines. The procurement of the data from foreign nations yields high returns with a low investment. As an example, more than three- quarters of the data in our station data file, consisting of over 300,000 stations, contains foreign data that our scientists, our Federal activi- ties, and our industry use over and over. I believe that a national marine data center should continue the concept of an interagency advisory board. Such a board provides the mechanism for the responsiveness to all segments of the user com- munity-government agencies, the academic and private research in- stitutions and industry. As I indicated, the Commission recommended that there be more than one data center. To quote again: “The great variety in quantity, quality, and uses of these data suggests that total environmental data cannot be handled readily by a single center.” I believe that with advances in computer and communications tech- nology, a monolithic national environmental data center seems in- evitable, but it should be approached cautiously and within the frame- work of a phased development. The merging of data functions at too early a stage could generate adverse impacts on a data system for the marine sciences. I believe in summary, Mr. Chairman, that whatever the future Federal framework for oceanography, the following proposals should be considered with respect to the management of marine data: 1. Data management functions be merged to create a single identifiable national marine data center. 2. Data generated as part of mission oriented activities, especi- ally geophysical data, be transferred to the national marine data center once they have served their primary use. 3. The national marine data center would coordinate closely with the national weather data center to achieve compatibility. 4. The concept of an interagency advisory board, functioning essentially as a board of directors reviewing budget, policy, and progress, should be continued. 5. Finally, from my viewpoint and experiences as Director of NODC, I believe that funds should be provided to the National Marine Data Center from a single agency. That completes my statement, sir. I should be happy to answer questions. 1070 (Dr. Austin’s complete statement follows :) STATEMENT OF THOMAS S. AUSTIN, DirREcTOR, NATIONAL OCEANOGRAPHIC Data CENTER Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, I appreciate the opportunity of appearing before you today to discuss the National Oceanographic Data Center (NODC) and some of my personal views in light of the recommendations of the Commission on Marine: Science, Engineering and Resources and H.R. 13247. The NODC was established by an interagency agreement on December 23, 1960. The Center’s basic mission is to receive, compile, process, preserve and dissem-- inate appropriate oceanographic data submitted to it. The Center’s operations are funded by reimburesements from participating agencies. Management and partial financial support of the NODC are furnished by the Naval Oceanographic Office as amplified by the policies and procedures es-- tablished by the National Oceanographic Data Center Interagency Advisory Board. The Interagency Advisory Board was established to provide an effective means: of formulating, expressing and transmitting joint pelicy and technical direction to the Center. The Board consists of representatives of the Sponsoring agencies. These agencies are: Navy, National Science Foundation, Bureau of Commercial: Fisheries, Atomic Energy Commission, Coast Guard, Coastal Engineering Re-. search Center, Geological Survey, Health, Education and Welfare, Environmental Science Services Administration, and the Federal Water Pollution Control Ad- ministration. In addition there are two non-voting members appointed by the- National Academy of Sciences and three observers, one from industry, one from the National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Development, and one from the National Oceanographic Instrumentation Center. As provided for in the charter, each supporting activity provides a pro rata share of the estimated cost for acquiring, compiling, and preserving oceanographic: data by the Center. An amendment of the pro rata shares was made to the NODC charter in FY 1964; the pro rata shares are now reviewed annually. A summary of funds available to NODC for F'Y’s 1968-70 is shown in Table 1. It should be noted that the funds provided are for the operation of the Ganges the contributing agencies, like other users, are provided services at cost. Although no disastrous limitations in funding have occurred, I feel that the current method of budgeting is clumsy and has negated efficient planning. Agen- cies have not always found it possible to contribute to the Center at the level recommended by the Advisory Board. Single-agency, line-item funding has been: suggested. During the 86th Congress, bills calling for the establishment of a National Oceanographic Data Center were introduced in the Senate (S. 2692) and in the: House of Representatives (H.R. 12018). These bills would have included in NODC certain types of marine environmental data that we co not store: specifically : fisheries, hydrographic and coastal survey, meteorological, and geophysical data. But in keeping with their missions other agencies have been designated as re- positories for these data. The Naval Oceanographic Office and the Coast and Geodetic Survey retain hydrographic (bathymetric) data; the Weather Bureau, meteorological and climatological records: and the Bureau of Commercial Fish-. eries, fisheries statistics. Geophysical data reside in several agencies. The Commission has not undertaken to prepare a detailed proposal for national marine data service activities. Instead it deferred to a study by the System De-- velopment Corporation. Unfortunately, this study is not yet completed. However. in the framework ofthe present hearings I would like to comment on some of the aspects of marine data management. I should emphasize that the views I am: about to express are substantially my own, tempered by years of involvement in marine sciences. Quite possibly, program managers and representatives of agen- cies performing missions that generate or require marine data will have different views. ; The oceans are a potential source of protein and mineral resources. Knowledge: and experience dictate that these resources are not unlimited and that sound management policies should be developed. This requires the use of existing data and information and adequate planning for the continued generation and anal-. yses of such data. Although oceanography is a relatively new science, man is becoming increasingly aware of the necessity to consider the oceans, or segments thereof, in their total- 1071 ity. Discovery, assessment, harvest, and management of fishes require knowledge of the physics, chemistry, geology, and biology of the marine environment. The petroleum industry requires geological, geophysical, and biological data from the surface and deep sediments on the ocean floor and information concerning the physical, chemical, and biological properties of the water column above these sediments. These are but two examples of users that could benefit from having one marine data center to query for data. Problems resulting from storage of environmental data in more than one cen- ter have been cogently expressed by Robert M. White, Administrator of the Environmental Science Services Administration (ESSA) in an article in “Computers and Automation” (April 1969) : “Data from the ocean’s surface up—sea surface temperature, waves, swell, and the physical measurement of the atmosphere above the sea—are handled by ESSA’s National Weather Records Center in Asheville, N.C. Our organiza- tion has also begun a very limited service concentrating on magnetic, gravity, seismic reflection, and bathymetric data, but this involves mainly ESSA-gen- erated observations. There is no single focus for geomagnetic, gravity, bathy- metric, or other ocean survey data. “Not only is there no one place to go to obtain marine data, there is not even one mechanism which will tell you what exists. But more important is the problem of collating the information. In too many areas—of which air-sea interaction is an outstanding example—scientists and engineers must deal with simultaneously processed data from different environments, with computers which are in separate centers, with differing formats, programs, procedures, and goals. The ultimate consequences of this situation are apparent.” As I previously mentioned the data from many marine disciplines are not stored by NODC. Part of this is due to restrictions of the charter which prohibit duplication of the functions of other official repositories, such as the Weather Bureau, the Coast and Geodetic Survey, the Naval Oceanographic Office, the Smithsonian Institution, and similar agencies. The NODC does interact with these centers to obtain data for consumers or for purposes of referral. From the viewpoint of a data center manager, this is inefficient. Separate storage can be troublesome to some users; for example to someone who wishes to correlate sediment transport and sub-surface currents or those who wish to establish the relationship between climatological events and wind driven currents. In the first instance he (or the NODC) would probably have to use at least three sources: The Coast and Geodetic Survey, the Naval Oceano- graphic Office, and the NODC; in the second: The National Weather Records Center (NWRC) and the NODC. Further, these data are all too frequently not processed similarly and thus may be in incompatible formats. I propose that a solution to these types of problems would be to establish two data centers in a single agency, one for meteorological and climatological data and the other for all other marine data. Compatibility between data bases would be more likely. Administrative costs would be considerably reduced within the state of the art in computer technology, either of the data bases could be rapidly accessed through remote terminals by the other or for that matter by remote terminals located practically any place in the Nation. The Commission stated “* * * the already overloaded general-purpose data centers should avoid involvement to the extent possible in any aspect of the data problem which might have logical affiliation with existing mission agencies.” I do not agree with this conclusion. I believe that a general purpose marine data center (a concept endorsed by our Advisory Board) would not detract from the missions of present agencies or organizational components of a NOAA. In- stead, I believe such a center would be of value for important National efforts, such as the Navy. For example, bathymetric data, once they were used to produce and update navigational charts, could be accessioned by the marine data center and therefore be more readily available for other uses. Certain fisheries statistics that are environmentally related (e.g., catch per unit of effort as op- posed to total landings) and which are Bureau of Commercial Fisheries mission oriented could be included. Gravity and magnetic data pertaining to marine areas could also be in the center. However, some data could be excluded; for example, certain esoteric data having a one-time use in research projects, purely experimental data, or data unique to one or a few scientists and of limited use to others. Such data, how- ever, should be inventoried, primarily for referral purposes. Classified data would also be excluded ; however, close liaison should be maintained with the gatherers and holders of classified data to ensure compatibility with the holdings of the National center. Even at present, there may be a serious problem from the standpoint of merging classified with nonclassified data in times of a National emergency. I do not believe that data should be acquired in realtime by the proposed na- tional marine data center. Such data should flow to the center after the primary use; namely, forecasting had been satisfied. Ultimately it may prove desirable to merge realtime and historical centers. In the meantime, however, the activities of both should be closely coordinated, possibly by being structured within the same agency. We now exchange the classical types of oceanographic data directly with for- eign national and regional centers and through the mechanism of World Data Center-A, Oceanography which is collocated with NODC. I believe that exchange of data on the international level would be further facilitated if there were a single center for all marine data disciplines. Procurement of foreign data yields high returns for a low investment. As an example more than three-quarters of the data in the NODC station data file contains foreign data which are used over and over again by U.S. organizations. The Scientific Committee on Oceanic Research (SCOR) of the International Council of Scientific Unions has even suggested that there be an expansion of the functions and capabilities of one or more national centers, with increased international support and responsibility. This recommendation is based on the expected ‘“‘flood of data’ which could result as international programs are expanded. I believe, Mr. Chairman, that a national marine data center should continue the concept of an interagency advisory board. Such a board provides the mech- anism for responsiveness to all segments of the user community-government agen- cies, academic and private research institutions and industry. As previously mentioned, Mr. Chairman, the Commission recommended that there be more than one data center. To quote again from their report: “The great variety in quantity, quality, and uses of these data suggests that total environmental data cannot be handled readily by a single center and that a number of centers will be necessary for the foreseeable future. At the same time, overall policy direction of the different centers is needed to define clearly their responsibilities and relationships in order to prevent redundancies and gaps in the system and to determine priorities.” I do believe, with advances in computer and communications technology, that a monolithic National environmental data center seems inevitable. But it should be approached cautiously and within the framework of a ‘phased development.” Merging of data functions at too early a stage could generate adverse impacts on a data system for the marine sciences. Oceanographic interests could be sub- jugated by demands from more pressing priorities. Mr. Chairman, in summary, I believe that whatever the future Federal frame- work for oceanography, the following proposals should be seriously considered with respect to the management of marine data: 1. Data management functions be merged to create a single identifiable national marine data center. F 2. Data generated as part of mission oriented activities, especially geo- physical data, be transferred to the national marine data center once they have served their primary use. 3. The national marine data center would coordinate closely with the national weather data center to achieve compatibility and to monitor dupli- cation, especially for surface layer oceanographic data required for air-sea interaction and climatological studies. 4. The concept of an interagency advisory board, functioning essentially as a board of directors reviewing budget, policy, and progress, should be continued. 5. From my viewpoint as Director of NODC, I believe that funds should be provided from a single agency. I think this would more likely result in a higher level of funding for NODC than it now receives through agency con- tributions and would certainly simplify administrative handling of funds. Mr. Chairman, that completes my statement. I will be pleased to answer any questions the committee might have. 1073 TABLE 1.—ODC SPONSORS AND CONTRIBUTIONS Fiscal year Fiscal year Fiscal year 1968 1969 1970 Organization $238, 000 $250, 000 $275, 000 167, 000 200, 000 218, 000 32, 000 32) 000 35, 000 42) 500 85, 000 400, 000 24, 000 33, 000 35, 000 20, 000 20, 000 22/000 5, 000 5, 000 5, 000 768, 000 863, 000 771, 200 259, 000 259, 000 259, 000 13, 000 13, 000 15, 000 Tatallbudgetttere ce teats cst URNA... haat rein aoe 1,568,500 1, 760, 000 2, 035, 200 LEVEL OF FUNDING RECOMMENDED BY ADVISORY BOARD Fiscal year Organization 1968 1969 1970 INS Reiter ele aan Sie ore Mae eis od a ee Me MI $238, 000 $250, 000 $275, 000 BG Raa Ae Ee Pe2 Sale ORs Per SOR Pe 167, 000 275, 000 250, 000 EC Reeae eS Ns Ris aL sR aI di 32, 000 32, 000 35, 000 © GAS EAG ty eyelets NE TENS ey NST CU eee eae 42, 500 85, 180 400, 000 (Oe so Fh ee re aE pb ts ee eR SE rn Re OL eA ee ee Seen te Oye 24, 000 33, 080 35, 000 GeOlOgiCalES UiVey see ce en Eas EL ST Rea eee 20, 000 20, 000 22, 000 WERT Nea Nl pl SRI SRE MR OA a ENE AS CE Be Nae 5, 000 5, 000 5, 000 ERY a eo ET GA aa te te et GO Re A 2 695, 300 769, 000 1, 153, 000 ESS AE REE NRSC a BE TDN oie eh WC Ta a 309, 000 309, 000 310, 000 La IUPAC Ne So RS Rey ee ge ORD eae eyelet ITY 10,010 ne es 15, 000 MOtalWDUd Bete tees pity ck ne Se LER Nas a ee he ee SS 1, 545, 800 1, 778, 260 2, 500, 000 Mr. Lennon. Thank you, Doctor. Your testimony is both pertinent and helpful to the problems that the committee faces. You do not say in so many words that you oppose a Government structure such as recommended by the Stratton Commission, as I understand your statement, sir. Do you or do you not believe that that is the way that we should take our first small step ? Dr. Austrry. I do believe, sir, that a consolidation of a number of the aspects of the marine activities of the Federal Government is in order. As to the exact type, I reserve judgment. Mr. Lennon. As to what was the last, sir? Dr. Austin. As to the exact configuration of such a consolidation, I reserve judgment. Mr. Lennon. What would you suggest, Doctor, should be the first step in a new Government structure? In other words, which com- ponents of the several agencies of the Federal Government which are involved in the broad spectrum of the marine sciences should be brought together in a Government structure? You know what the Commission has reported. How do you differ from the Commission’s report as to which components of the various Government agencies should be put in the new Government structure referred to as NOAA? Dr. Austin. It would seem that the most efficient consolidation would be those agencies, those activities that have a commonality. Mr. Lennon. Well, Doctor, with your broad background, suppose you, for the record, specifically identify them, if you could, in general terms for the benefit of the members of the committee and the benefit of counsel, particularly, and myself. 1074 Dr. Austin. I think, sir, I would rather speak only for the consoli- dation of the marine data management functions, which is, of course, one of the aspects of the Commission’s report and one of the aspects of your bill. Mr. Lennon. Well, of course, as you know, Dr. White, the Adminis- trator of the Environmental Science Services Administration, served on the Commission as a representative of the Department of Com- merce and, of course, did not participate in the final findings and conclusions and recommendations with respect to a Government struc- ture, but he made the very flat statement here before the committee that if there was a Government structure, or at least that is the way T recall it, that ESSA should be a part of it. This statement was made in the presence of his cowitness who was sitting alongside of him, the Assistant Secretary of Commerce. How do you react to that as to whether ESSA should be a part of such a structure ? Dr. Austin. If there was a consolidated government structure, I think I would have to coneur with Dr. White because ESSA’s con- cern with the marine environment certainly crosses all disciplines, the air-sea interaction, the pelagic waters, the coastal waters. Mr. Lennon. That is the only thing within the Department of Com- merce that 1s recommended to go into the new government structure. Tt is interesting, Doctor, that in the colloquy between members of the committee and the Assistant Secretary of Commerce he raised the question that if the Commission considered other alternatives with respect to where these various components were taken from other structures, they didn’t so state in the report. T said, “Well, Mr. Secretary, we have Dr. White who served on the Commission here with you, and let’s get his views as to whether or not the Commission considered many alternatives other than the ones they ultimately recommended.” I had no previous commitment from Dr. White as to what his an- swer would be, but he said quite frankly that the Commission explored many, many alternatives other than what they ultimately came up with in the form of a recommendation. That sort of placated the As- sistant Secretary. Now let’s move over to the Department of Transportation. The single subagency or agency, or really it is the prime agency in a way, of the Department of Transportation is the Coast Guard. The Commission recommended that the Coast Guard be put in the new NOAA. I asked the Assistant Secretary of Transportation who opposed that, “What is the basis on which the Department of Trans- portation exercises and has within its jurisdiction the Coast Guard?” He said, “Of course transportation is related to the maritime industry.” T said, “Yes, I agree, but unfortunately you don’t have jurisdiction of the maritime industry. That is over under another department and not under the Department of Transportation.” He was justifying the Coast Guard being in the Department of Transportation because of its relationship to the Maritime Adminis- tration. Yet the Maritime Administration is not under the Department of Transportation, but under the Department of Commerce. Well, that sort of stalled that argument. 1075 Now, what is your rationale or reasoning with respect ‘© the pro- posal of the Commission to put the Coast Guard in the New NOAA structure keeping in mind that it has primarily oriented missions relating to search and rescue of course as well as many other roles and missions ? Why do you object to that proposal 4 Dr. Ausrin. I think the key is your comment about the diversity of the missions of the Coast Guard both in the time of peace and in the time of a national emergency. f Undoubtedly the Coast Guard because of their oceanographic interests would be involved in some type of a Federal structure 1f there was a consolidation. I don’t believe that I am in a position, sir, to state either pro or con about the Coast Guard in toto being moved out of the Department into whatever the Federal structure would be. Mr. Lennon. I would say to you, Doctor, that to a degree the ques- tion was raised by the Assistant Secretary of Transportation as to the Coast Guard’s roles and missions related to a national emergency. — The question was raised, “Then why wasn’t that question raised when they moved them from the Department of the Treasury to the Department of Transportation?” No one raised the question that it could be utilized as a national defense component regardless of where it was located by a simple declaration of the need by the Commander in Chief, the President. The proposal to move out of the Department of the Interior the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries and certain aspects of the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife concerns the Department of the Interior. They say they have the capability of absorbing the agencies recom- mended to go into the new agency into the Department of the Interior. That is the substance of their contention. Like the other agencies, they sav, “We are ready now to take on these jobs and roles.” I have in mind that back as early as 1960 that there was a study made and the gentleman who appeared before us the other day was a member of that study commission, and they recommended a govern- ment structure and they recommended that part of the Coast Guard be put into this new government structure. They recommended before they finally wrote their report and just before KSA A came into being they put in their report that what is now ESAA should be in this new government structure, but now they say it 1s doing too good a job in the Department of Commerce to be taken out and should be left there. But the same argument was made by this same group that it ought to be in the new Government structure. So that the committee finds itself impaled on not one, but on a number of horns of a dilemma as to which way we should go. What do you know, Doctor, about the composition of the so-called Stratton Commission as to their background? Do you have a high professional judgment of those men ? Dr. Austr. I knew a number of the gentlemen on the Commission, sir, and on the panels, and I have the highest respect for each of them that I have known and worked with for many years. Mr. Lennon. I don’t think there has ever been a Presidential com- mission appointed which really gave more of their time trying to come up with a viable national interest report. The men were dedicated and sincere. They worked hard for two and a half years. 1076 We passed an authorization bill on the floor yesterday, the National Science Foundation, $462 million in round figures, as I recall it. When you read that report you find out how much they are involved in the field of oceanography. They spend in round figures $19 million a year in grants to colleges, to Woods Hole where you were at one time, and others in the field of oceanography. Should that aspect of what ‘they are doing related to the ocean sciences and oceanography be put into a central oceanographic and atmospheric agency? I know they won’t like it. But here it is. Here we find that certain agencies, as soon as an oceanographic vessel is launched, finally commissioned and ready to sail, they have to dock it. Where do we go from here? It just seems to me that they ought to get the management that we need so badLy. When the space organization was brought into being, suppose we had about eight Federal agencies trying to get to the moon? We wouldn’t have gotten to the moon. Fortunately the only people who were interested in it was one branch of the Armed Services, the Air Force, and that is about all. We would never have gotten anywhere. I think that is generally accepted. Counsel, do you have questions to ask of the Doctor? Mr. Curnean. I have no questions. Mr. Lennon. We are grateful to you for your appearance here today and apologize for the fact that so few of the members could attend the entire session. As you know, most of us serve on several subcommittees and we are just running from one to the other. Dr. Austtin. Yes, sir. Mr. Lennon. Let me make the announcement that on Tuesday of next week in the regular committee hearing room, 1334, Mr. Herman Pollack, the Director of International Scientific and Technological Affairs of the Department of State, and Dr. W. M. Chapman, director of marine resources of the Ralston Purina Co., will be our witnesses. We appreciate the attendance of all of you who continue to maintain the interest. Thank you again, Doctor, for your helpful advice. We will be calling on you to give us some more advice. I want you to think as a scientist, as a person who has been involved and as a dedicated indi- vidual, as this summary of your education and experience and publica- tions anal membership in organizations certainly is an indication of your intense interest and dedication, and if you have any ideas as we move along in these hearings feel free to contact us and we will be grateful to you. Dr. Austin. Thank you kindly, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lennon. The hearings will now conclude until next Tuesday morning at 10 o’clock. ( Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Tuesday, October 14, 1969.) NATIONAL OCEANOGRAPHIC PROGRAM TUESDAY, OCTOBER 14, 1969 Hovusrt or ReEpresENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OCEANOGRAPHY OF THE COMMITTEE ON Mercuant Martneé AND FISHERIES, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met at 10:15 a.m., pursuant to recess, in room 1302, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Alton Lennon (chair- man of the subcommittee) presiding. Mr. Lennon. Gentlemen, the subcommittee will resume its hearings. This morning we are delighted to have with us the Honorable Her- man Pollack, representing the Secretary of State, and as the second witness after that time, the Honorable W. M. Chapman, director of marine resources of the Ralston Purina Co. Mr. Pollack, I understand, sir, that you do have a prepared state- ment. The members of the subcommittee have the statement in front of them. You just proceed as you may desire. STATEMENT OF HON. HERMAN POLLACK, REPRESENTING THE SECRETARY OF STATE Mr. Potiack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. ~ I think it might be simplest, since my statement is brief, if I run through it quickly. Mr. Lennon. All right, sir. Thank you. Mr. Potuack. I welcome the opportunity to testify on behalf of the Department of State on the report of the Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources, “Our Nation and the Sea.” The Commission has shown a deep appreciation of internationally agreed solutions to issues emerging from the exploration and exploita- tion of ocean resources which will avoid conflict and encourage co- operation among the nations of the world. For the past 2 2 years the executive branch has been engaged in exam- ining these problems in consultation with industry, legal groups, the interested segments of the public, the marine science community, and the Congress. We have done this with an awareness of the direction in which the Commission was moving, and in the light of this Government’s par- ticipation in the international debate on the subject of seabed issues in the United Nations. Mr. Chairman, I will not be commenting on the organizational rec- ommendations of the Commission report, since, as you know, the (1077) 1078 President has referred these recommendations to his Advisory Council on Executive Organization for consideration in the context of broader Federal organizational requirements. The Department of State has found the mechanism of the Marine Council useful in assisting us in carrying out our responsibilities with respect to international marine affairs. Mr. Lennon. Mr. Pollack, I am going to take the liberty to inter- ject a question at this point. You say, “The President has referred these recommendations to his Advisory Council on Executive Organization for consideration in the context of broader Federal organizational! requirements.” Specifically what council are you referring to by name or identifica- tion as an organization 4 Mr. Potiack. This is the council that is headed up by Mr. Ash, and I was under the impression, sir, that the proper title was the one I used in this text. Mr. Lennon, I just wanted you to identify it. You referred to it as a commission, I believe. Mr. Potxiack. That is right. Mr. Lennon. When did the President by a written communication request the so-called Advisory Council on Executive Organization, known as the Ash Commission, to consider the Commission’s report, particularly that related to a proposed Government structure such as NOAA Mr. Potiack. Sir, I do not have the answer to your question with me. I would have to check on that. Mr. Lennon. Just for the record, let us put that in. It was on May 19, 1969. I have a copy of it here. Now, what consideration since May 19, since it is now October 14, has the Ash Commission given to the President’s specific request that they explore the recommendations of the Commission report ? Mr. Portiack. Mr. Chairman, I am afraid again J cannot answer that question. Mr. Lennon. Let us again get the record straight. On September 10, or more specifically about 4 months after the President by written communication to the Ash. Commission had made this request, we inquired of the so-called Ash Commission if it had had an opportunity in that approximately 4 months to give any consideration to the Commission report, as requested by the President. They responded to us on September 11, the following day, that, “We hope to launch a study within the next month or two,” quoting from their communication. “After we get into the problem, we will be in a better position to estimate how long it then may take to study the President’s specific request of May 19.” So that you see here now, from May until October, 4 months later, that the Commission has said. “We are not ready yet to begin to com- mence to think about the study, but sometime in 2 or 38 months from now we can estimate how long it might take to study the President’s specific proposal.” Ts that anyway for the executive branch of the Government to respond, or a Commission to respond to a specific request of the Presi- dent ? Do you agree with that ? 1079 Mr. Ponxack. Sir, not being familiar with the total assignment that has been given to the Ash Commission, I am not really in a posi- tion to judge. _Mr. Lennon. There has been some criticism, and it has been on both sides, in the last few days, with respect to the administration brand- ing the Congress, and the Congress branding the President about inaction. ‘ If I have ever seen or heard of inaction, I cannot imagine having asked a commission to make a study, and then 4 months after they have been specifically requested to do something, they come up with the idea that, “In 2 or 3 months from now we will begin to commence to see how long it will take to start the study.” a This is an indication of inaction between the President and his Advisory Commission. I don’t see how anybody in the Congress can be critical of the President, and the President can be critical of Con- gress. Here we have an instance of where the President ought to be critical of the Commission which he appointed. I cannot imagine anybody being President calling on the Com- mission to do a specific job, and 5 or 6 months later they say, “We will get to it sometime.” I did not mean to interrupt you, but I just wanted you to know that we knew that this thing has been delayed now for around 5 months. If this is the sort of cooperation we get, or the sort of co- operation the President gets from his own Commission, I wonder what he gets from the other branches of Government. Go ahead. I did not mean to interrupt you for so long. Mr. Pottack. I will address my remarks today to the Commission recommendations on the international legal-political framework for the seabeds, which is of main interest to the Department of State. The Department has kept in close touch with the Marine Commis- sion in the course of their study, and I would like to take this op- portunity to compliment its members and staff for the thoroughness and diligence of their study of very complex problems. After receiving the Commission’s report, we have continued to re- view and study it with great interest. We consider the Commission’s study of the question of a legal-political framework for the ocean floor as constituting a valuable contribution to a better understanding of the many factors bearing on the problem. The Commission has made thorough analyses and careful recom- mendations. The Commission’s report has usefully and_ effectively raised important issues and posed major recommendations which are receiving very careful study within the U.S. Government, and internationally as well, as policies regarding the seabed are developed. The range of subjects involved before us is extremely broad. It would be impossible to address any of them in detail at this time. I will, however, briefly review the history of our international efforts and outline our approach to current problems. You will recall that after Ambassador Pardo of Malta raised in 1967 the question of the peaceful uses of the seabed and ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, the United Nations Gen- eral Assembly established an ad hoc committee to look into the matter. The United States played a leading role in this committee, intro- ducing at its June, 1968, meeting a draft statement of principles con- 1080 cerning the deep ocean floor. The United States, noting the need for further scientific and technical knowledge, has also proposed an International Decade of Ocean Exploration. The 23d General Assembly adopted three resolutions last Decem- ber cosponsored by the United States. The first created a committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, composed of 42 States. The new permanent committee was instructed to study the elaboration of the legal principles and norms to promote international cooperation in the exploration and use of the seabed and ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. The second resolution welcomed the adoption by States of appro- priate safeguards against the danger of marine pollution. The third resolution supported the International Decade of Ocean: Exploration proposed by the United States. A fourth resolution, on which the United States abstained, re- quested the Secretary General to undertake a study on the question of establishing in due time appropriate international machinery for the exploration and exploitation of the seabed resources. The United States abstained on this resolution because it had made no decision as to the desirability of such international machinery, and felt the resolution, which called for a study on the question by the Secretary General, in effect prejudged this issue. The Secretary General has now completed his report, which sets forth a wide range of possibilities with respect to a possible interna- tional regime. This report, among other subjects, was discussed dur- ing the August 11-28 session of the Seabed Committee. Among the many political and economic forces at work facing the Seabed Com- mittee debates, the following four now stand out clearly: 1. Recognition of the importance of the seabed, covering three- fourths of the earth’s surface, from political, economic, and other points of view ; 2. The desire of the lesser developed countries to play a sub- stantial role in the development. of seabed policies and to insure that the seabeds be exploited in ways which will benefit all coun- tries, and not merely the technologically advanced countries; 3. The question of where the boundary of the area beyond national jurisdiction should be located : and 4. The demand of many countries that the seabeds be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. Thus, the recent meeting of the UN Seabed Committee, even though it did not produce any specific, agreed recommendations, yielded a deeper understanding of the issues among its members, and useful work was accomplished. The report drafted by the committee for the General Assembly re- flected an increasing sophistication with respect to this complex subject. A The two major subjects discussed at this meeting were, first, prin- ciples governing the exploration and exploitation of the seabeds be- yond national jurisdiction, and, secondly, the sort of international machinery and regime which might govern exploration and exploita- tion of the seabed. On the matter of principles, this discussion was a continuation of debate at previous meetings. We were disappointed that the commit- 1081 tee was not able to agree on a set of general principles to be presented at the Twenty-Fourth General Assembly this fall for its approval. Nonetheless, some progress was made. The prior debate was fur- ther synthesized, and the effects of the discussion at this committee meeting will be useful in the on-going debate on this matter. The committee will meet next in March of next year, and another meeting is scheduled for August of next year. For our part, we continue to favor principles along the lines which we presented to the ad hoc seabed committee in June of 1968, and those formulated by the western powers at the ad hoc committee meet- ing at Rio in August of the same year. In essence, the most important provisions of these principles were: 1. That an internationally agreed precise boundary be estab- lished dividing that part of the seabed subject to national juris- diction over natural resources and the deep ocean floor, which would be beyond the limits of national] jurisdiction, and 2. That internationally agreed arrangements be established governing the exploitation of the resources of the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, including dedication of a por- tion of the value of the resources exploited to international com- munity purposes. One of the most difficult problems in the debate on principles is the question of a boundary to be established between the offshore limit of national jurisdiction and the area beyond which is to be governed by these principles. As this committee well knows, there is a wide divergence of views in the international community as to whether or where such a boundary should be located. Some of the Latin American countries would prefer not to include any reference to a boundary, for fear this will ultimately prejudice their 200-mile and other extensive maritime claims. On the matter of international machinery and regime, the discus- sion at this recent meeting was the first serious debate on this subject. This discussion proceeded in the light of the study prepared by the Secretary General, which I have already mentioned. It did not pro- duce any agreed recommendations, but did afford an opportunity for our delegation and others to expose their preliminary views on this matter. Our representatives made clear that, consistent with the principles which we have already tabled as a proposed resolution, the regime must be of a character : To assure orderly development of seabed resources ; To promote exploration and exploitation of the deep seabed; To enable, as feasible and practicable, a portion of the value of the resources recovered from this area to be dedicated to interna- tional community purposes; and To assure accommodation among commercial and other uses of the deep ocean floor and marine environment. Our representatives also suggested that a regime for the deep seabed which would be consistent with these broad purposes should include at least provision for: Individual countries to authorize the exploitation activities of its nationals and to be responsible for assuring adherence to the criteria established for exploitation; and international registry for claims: procedures to verify compliance with the criteria estab- 1082 lished for exploitation as well as procedures to settle international dis- putes; liability for damages arising from the exploitation of resources on the deep seabed; and avoiding unreasonable interference with the exercise of the freedom of the high seas, or with conservation of the living resources of the seas, or any interference with fundamental scientific research. By “criteria for exploitation,” as I have used the term, we mean guidelines as to the types of resources to be exploited, the size of the claim, the duration of the claim, the circumstances for termination of a claim, the eligibility and capability of a claimant to exploit the resources, certain minimum performance requirements, a clear rela- tionship between exploration rights and exploitation rights, and agreed standards relating to conservation, pollution, and danger to human life. We realize, Mr. Chairman, that these suggestions and these criteria are as yet not precise as to their content or application. Nonetheless, you will recognize that our proposals have many elements in common with the recommendations of the Marine Commission, and that a great’ deal of discussion, both in this country and with other countries, will be needed before they can be converted into precise international un- derstandings and arrangements. These arrangements will not be effective, in our opinion, if they fail to provide adequately due protection for the integrity of investments, if they are not based upon broad confidence in their stability, and if they do not provide a clear opportunity for a reasonable return on risk investments, as well as a reasonable assurance of meeting the interests of all parties concerned, both among the developing nations and the developed nations of the international community. Several members of the U.N. Seabed Committee have at times urged a freeze on exploitation. We oppose any such suggestion, believing that exploitation is necessary for mankind to enjoy the benefits of the re- sources found in the seabeds. We share the view of the Marine Commission that any international framework for the conduct of minerals exploration and exploitation must give the United States and all other countries a fair chance to engage in such activities. The Stratton Commission is certainly correct in asserting that what- ever framework is created must seek to avoid and not provoke inter- national conflict. At the same time, we believe that new exploitation should not prejudice the eventual location of the boundary. We agree with the Commission that the existing international framework does not provide the necessary means to achieve these ob- jectives. This view is shared by the other members of the U.N. Seabed Committee. ; With the early introduction of a set of principles, and by present- ing our preliminary view on the nature of the regime, the United States has achieved a position of leadership in the development of international law for the ocean floor. The recommendations of the Stratton Commission report have been helpful to us in the development of our policies on these many dif- ficult and complex problems. Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions which you and the members of the subcommittee may have. 1083 Mr. Lennon. Thank you, Mr. Pollack. Mr. Mosher. Mr. Mosuer. Mr. Pollack, going back to pages 7 and 8 of your testi- mony, where you have recognized the difficult problem of establishing a boundary between the offshore limit of national jurisdiction and the area beyond it which is to be governed by the international regime, you recognize that there is a wide divergence of views. Has the State Department formulated any precise recommendations that you are making? Are you definite in your thinking as to what po- sition this country should take on that difficult question ¢ Mr. Potiack. No, sir. At this point in time, the State Department has not arrived at an agency position with respect to that question. Mr. Mosuer. As I remember it, the Stratton Commission did make a precise recommendation, did they not ? Mr. Potuack. Yes, sir. They did. Mr. Mosuer. I don’t have the report here in front of me, and I don’t have in my head precisely what that recommendation was, but does the State Department has some doubts, some questions as to that recommendation ? Do you want to point out what the weaknesses may be in that rec- ommendation by the Stratton Commission ? Mr. Potnack. The recommendation of the Stratton Commission was a proposal for an intermediate zone, and the proposal for an interme- diate zone is certainly among the leading contenders for serious con- sideration as to what position the United States and the international community might ultimately adopt with respect to this question of a boundary. I would say simply that any proposal that 1s made gives rise to choices between alternatives. The question of the distinction between the rules that will relate to an intermediate zone and to the area clearly within national jurisdiction and the area that clearly will lie beyond, as well as the separation of the manner in which behavior of the explorers and exploiters will take place in this area, is one on which there is not so much a question of defects in a proposal, but questions of whether the balance that would be arrived at under the Stratton Commission proposal is the one that would be most desirable from the total viewpoint of the United States’ interests. Mr. Mosuer. Do you think there will be any consensus at all in the international community in the next year on this subject ? Mr. Potiack. My own judgment will be that it will be a longer process than that, sir. Mr. Mosuer. Longer than a year ? Mr. Pottack. Yes. We have contemplated, and I have seen nothing that will alter judgment on this, that we have begun a discussion sev- eral years ago that could take many years to bring to a conclusion. Mr. Mosuer. Do any of the more sophisticated nations involved, sophisticated in terms of their technology and their interest, have precise positions that they are pushing and sticking to? Mr. Potxiack. No nation has, at this point. None of the advanced nations has revealed any clarity on that. Mr. Mosuer. Russia’s position would be essentially the same as ours at this point, in terms of “Wait and see” ? 26—563—70—pt. 2——37 1084 Mr. Potiack. At this point the Soviet Union clearly is reserving its position and its judgment on this matter. Mr. Mosner. Mr. Chairman, I don’t think I have any other questions. I regret that I am going to have to leave. I regret particularly that I am going to miss Mr. Cl hapman’s testimony. There i is a Republican conference going on right at this time, and that is the main reason for the Re publica n attendance being so low this morning in this committee. It is not a lack of interest. Mr. Lennon. Thank you, sir. Off the record. (Discussion off the record.) Mr. Lennon. Back on the record. T recognize the gentleman from Virginia. Mr. Downrnc. Mr. Pollack, 1 take it obv iously that the State De- partment is not prepared at this time to either endorse or reject the Stratton Commission report. Mr. Poutack. That is correct, sir. Mr. Downine. At what point in time do you think you will be able to give s some position ? Mr. Potiack. I would hate to be tied down to a firm prediction. We are ore on this, not only within the State Department, but throughout ‘the executive br anch, and I think I would be best advised to say ‘that we will come to a conclusion as soon as we possibly can. Mr. Downtne. Could you name a year? Mr. Lennon. Would the gentleman yield at this point ? Mr. Downing. I yield. Mr. Lennon. I am delighted that some of the agencies of the Fed- eral Government have been since January of this year giving con- sideration to the Stratton Commission report. I call you attention again that the specific commission that the President asked for a definitive position with respect to the Govern- ment structures recommended it in have not even considered it yet, ae he asked them on May 19. This is a Commission or Advisory Council on Executive Organiza- tion that you referred to, that would make the decision for the ad- ministration, likely, but if this is any indication of what is going on with respect to the other Government departments and agencies, as to when it can take a position, I don’t expect you ever to take one, be- cause the one that was selected to make the study and recommenda- tion has not started yet in its consideration of the recommendation, according to their own written statement, and they hope t to get ready to start to begin to commence sometime in the next 2 to 3 months. That 1s nothing less than ridiculous, it would seem to me. Mr. Kerrn. Mr. Chairman Mr. Lennon. If the gentleman will permit me. Mr. Downine. I yield to my friend. Mr. Kerru. I wonder if that Commission is sufficiently interested and staffed to have a representative here this morning. Mr. Lennon. I would think no. Mr. Ketrn. I would, too. Mr. Lennon. Mr. Karth. Mr. Karru. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no questions. 1085 Mr. Lennon. Mr. Keith. Mr. Kerrn. Living up to my promises, I have no questions at this time. I do appreciate your outlining for us the situation as it exists with reference to the Malta resolution and other aspects of the problem. Thank you. Mr. Lennon. Mr. Karth. Mr. Karr. Mr. Chairman. Do you need additional people within the State Department to put their minds en this problem, so that you can come to some determina- tion within this decade ? Mr. Potuack. The State Department probably can always make use of additional staff, but that is net the problem. Mr. Karrn. I suggest that we may pass a foreign aid bill this year that should relieve a considerable number of State Department people, and I don’t know what could be better served, Mr. Chairman, than to have them work on this problem. Mr. Potnack. The complexity of the problem, both in trying to as- certain the balance of considerations that would dictate where the U.S. interests lie, as well as the very many diverse views that are held on this question internationally, is the basic reason for the pace at which we are moving now. Mr. Karrn. It just seems to me that the United States might offer some leadership occasionally, and take a position. If somebody does not agree with it, at least you have a start, and you have a position from which you can negotiate. Tf nobedy ever moves or takes a position, we wait with great inter- national intrigue. The Chairman is right, that a decision will never be made, and a position will never be taken, and the one thing that the Commission recommended we be careful of is the thing that is going to happen. That is, we are going to get involved in serious contro- versies that will lead to international incidents. That is what will happen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lennon. Thank you, Mr. Karth. Mr. Pollack, the main thrust and interest of the Department of State, of course, is the international legal-political framework of the seabeds. I am sure that you gentlemen have reviewed in depth the Commission’s recommendations related to the Continental Shelf. Incidentally, what page in the report is that found on, without look- ing it up, because I know you know ? Mr. Potiack. Toward the middle of the report. Mr. Lennon. That is a pretty good guess. It starts on page 145. Of course it goes through the seabeds. It is about possibly five pages of the Commission’s report which relate to the things that you all are interested in. I understand, and rightly so, that the United States refrained from the introduction of the resolution of June of last year, 1968, concern- ing the deep ocean floor, but nevertheless, in spite of the abstinence from the resolution by the United States, the resolution was adopted in this respect, and the first report I believe came out or was discussed, T believe you said, in August of this year. 1086 Mr. Potuack. Yes, sir. This is on the international machinery. Mr. Lennon. It is interesting to note what came out of that report. There was more or less of a consensus recognizing the importance of the seabeds out of this resolution, which you indicate covers three- fourths of the earth’s surface, both from the political, economic, and other points of view. It became apparent, according to your statement, that the so-called Malta Resolution got back into this study and it was the desire of the lesser developed countries to play a greater role in the development of seabed policies and to insure that the seabeds be exploited in ways which would benefit all countries, and not merely the technologically advanced countries. ene is In substance what the Malta Resolution was all about, was it not ? Mr. Potuack. Yes, sir. Mr. Lennon. So that what you have here is a recapitulation or a reaffirmation through this study created by this resolution, from which our Government abstained, of the same position taken by the Malta Resolution. Is that generally a fair statement ? Mr. Poriackx. The resolution, Mr. Chairman, from which we ab- stained was one which called upon the Secretary General to prepare a report on international machinery. This resolution did carry. That report was prepared by the Secretary General, and it was considered at the recent August meeting by the Economic and Technical Sub- committee, and, as a matter of fact, was the principal subject of discussion. Now, that discussion, as all other discussions, reflects the interests of the developing countries for a'substantial voice in the decisions that are going to be taken with respect to the ocean floor and its resources. Mr. Lennon. Now, as a result of this resolution that we referred to, “for the Secretary General to undertake a study on the question of establishing in due time appropriate international machinery for the exploration and exploitation of the seabed resources,” did they come forward with any specific recommendations, or only the general things that you referred to on page 5 of your statement ? Mr. Potiack. The Secretary General’s report itself simply explored the alternatives, tending to group them into three major possibilities. One would be a registry. One would be a licensing authority, and the third would be an operational authority. It was these three alternatives that formed the focus for the dis- cussion in the subcommittee this past August. The most accurate way to summarize that discussion is to say that the various countries exposed their preliminary views on this subject. Our representatives made, I think, a very excellent case in their statements as to what the deficiencies and shortcomings of an oper- ational international authority would be. The summary that was prepared by the subcommittee itself of its activities pretty accurately reflects that practically every side of this question was exposed, and that no consensus at this point is in sight, except possibly the fact that almost everyone agrees that there ought to be at the minimum a registry of some kind. Mr. Lennon. Mr. Pollack, this country does not recognize the terri- torial waters of any nation beyond the historic 3-mile limit, do they ? Mr. Potuack. I believe that is correct. 1087 Mr. Lennon. You say we don’t recognize beyond the historic 3-mile limit ? Mr. Potrack. We do not recognize it. Mr. Lennon. We do not recognize it, but when one of our fishing vessels is seized 190 miles at sea off the coast of Ecuador or Chile or Peru, we immediately capituate—the gentleman is shaking his head— and pay the fines and forfeitures for the seizure of those vessels, even though they are frequently seized by vessels built in the United States and given free, in many instances, to these nat*ons. They are Navy vessels that have been turned over to Ecuador and Chile. Is that a fair statement ? Mr. Poriack. I don’t think I would put it that way, sir. Mr. Lennon. How would you put it ? Mr. Potiack. I wonder if you might permit me to put this question to someone who has followed this problem much more intimately than I have. Mr. Lennon. You are here representing the State Department. Mr. Potuack. Yes, Iam. Mr. Lennon. You say this Nation does not recognize the territorial sea of any nation beyond the 3-mile limit. Yet, when our fishing ves- sels were seized 190 miles off the shore of the three Latin American nations that I named, we immediately do what ? Do we withdraw diplomatic reCoe nition of those nations for the violation of the international waters, which you say we recognize, or do we pay the fines and forfeitures or penalties’ y Mr. Pottack. We have been confronted, as you know Mr. Lennon. I get real frustrated by this sort of a philosophy, that we do not recognize beyond the territorial limit of 3 miles, and yet our State Department, in the image of good relations with our Latin American neighbors, has to do these things. People don’t understand it. They don’t under stand why. Mr. Potzack. It is a frustrating problem, if I may say so, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lennon. What is the answer to it? Mr. Potxack. I really, at this point, do not know. Mr. Lennon. I think somebody is giving you a suggestion as to how you could answer. Mr. Pouiack. I am aware of what I am being told to say here. Mr. Lennon. Go right ahead. Mr. Potiack. The question of what sanctions the United States is going to employ any time there is a violation of our rights anywhere, be it on the high seas or elsewhere, is a question, as you well under- stand, which requires very, very careful consideration of a whole host of factors that are pertinent. We have protested the action of the Latin American countries that have interfered with our fishing vessels. We have sought a means of accommodation on this. Mr. Lennon. At numerous conferences. Mr. Potrack. We have recessed the first session of our conference and we have all gone home to our respective capitals to consult on the statements and positions that have been put forward at that meet- ing, and we will continue this process until we work out a solution that is equitable and fair. 1088 Mr. Lennon. Now, at this last conference, the net result was that you agreed to have another conference ? Mr. Potiack. That is right. At least the subject is still alive, still being discussed, and at some point I hope we can work out a proper solution to it. Mr. Lennon. I can appreciate how the State Department is impaled on the horns of not one but several dilemmas, but the average citizen just does not understand our bold statement that we recognize only to the 3-mile limit, and yet so frequently these seizures are experienced, and they read where the fines and penalties are paid, and we go happily on our way. 1 just wonder sometimes if that encourages respect by other nations around the world for the United States. I don’t know what the alternative is. I think nobody knows. But I am just inclined to believe that the average citizen today believes that the time has come for us to take some positive and definitive stand with respect to what we are told are our rights. Are there any other questions? Does counsel have questions ? Mr. Cuiinean. I have one or two, Mr. Chairman, if I may. Mr. Pollack, is there general accord among the agencies of Govern- ment on the policies with respect to ocean beds ? Mr. Poriack. There has been general accord on the part of the agencies of the executive branch with respect to the positions that we have taken at the U.N., so that in this regard the answer to that question would be in the affirmative. Of course, there are different interests on the parts of the agencies with respect to seabed policies, and there is a divergence of views with respect to some of the problems that confront us. Mr. Crrnean. On September 24, before the Senate Commerce Com- mittee, Mr. Train from the Department of the Interior said— Leases have been issued offshore California for submerged lands in waters up to 1,800 feet deep. Some of these have been drilied and oil has been found in substantial quantities. It is our position that in mapping these areas, and issuing leases thereon, the Department has proceeded in full accord with both national and international law governing the rights and interests of the United States in its Outer Continental Shelf. Does the State Department agree with that position? Mr. Pollack. At this point, we are supporting the rights which we have under the Continental Shelf Convention and international law, and the authority of the Department of the Interior to administer the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. Mr. Crrxean. On page 11, Mr. Pollack, you say you favor a freeze on exploitation. Do you favor a moratorium on claims of sover elenty ? Mr. Poriack. That is one of the questions which we have had under consideration in the executive branch, and on which there has not yet been developed an executive branch position. We are very anxious that no country at this point make any asser- tion to jurisdiction with respect to rescurces which-is not well founded in international law. Mr. Curnean. Beyond what point would you freeze exploitation ? Mr. Pornack. We would not freeze exploitation. Our position is in the negative on that. Tam sorry. I did not hear your first statement. 1089 Mr. Crinean. I see. You mentioned that in formulating policy that you found the Na- tional Council useful, I think was the word that you used. Could you give us a little idea of what role the Council plays in helping to co- ordinate agency policy with regard to seabeds? Mr. Potuack. The Marine Council has served as the principal forum in which the various agencies of the Government have met both at the Cabinet level, at senior policy level, and at working level on a wide range of matters relating to the seabed. It has been, among other things, a forum in which this Government’s examination of what its role might be in the international decade has taken place. It has reviewed the questions of policy with respect to management of the coastal zone. We have examined from time to time questions of international co- operation in oceanographic activities independently of the decade, and we have occasionally made presentations to the entire Council which covers a broader governmental spectrum than is involved actually in the international field of the positions, and developments that have taken place in the international arena. So that it has served both as a vehicle of effective communication and development of coherent understanding, but it has also served as a stimulus for action on these matters. Mr. Curneéan. I will not ask you to state any position which has been developed there, but has there been a consensus among the Coun- ceil with respect to limitation of the Continental Shelf or regions be- yond that point ? Mr. Potrack. No, sir. That question has not been put to them. Mr. Crincan. The Commission did come up with a recommendation. Mr. Potiack. But that question has not been put to the Council in a form that would lead to development of a consensus. Mr. Crincan. The Commission has formed an opinion on that. Has, to your knowledge, the National Petroleum Council formed an opin- ion on it? Mr. Pottack. Yes, the National Petroleum Council has issued a report. Mr. Crincan. Has the American Bar Association formed an opinion ? ! Mr. Potiacn. Yes, the American Bar Association has addressed it- self to that. Mr. Crryean. Has the Marine Council formed an opinion ? Mr. Poritack. The Marine Council has not. Mr. Lennon. Mr. Pollack, how many civilian agencies of the Fed- eral Government do you happen to contact from time to time related to matters concerning the ocean bed, or the Continental Shelf, or many of the other things that we are concerned with here ? Mr, Poriack. There are about five or six that have a principal in- terest in the question of the seabed boundary and regime, the ques- tions that are under discussion at the U.N. There are another half dozen that have inputs and would be consulted, depending upon the specific question. If, for example, we would concern ourselves with the question of scientific research, then the National Science Foundation, the ESSA side of the Department of Commerce, even the Smithsonian Institution 1090 would have a legitimate interest in the question, and a contribution to make to it. Mr. Lennon. Do you think it would be helpful, then, if many of these were combined in a single independent Government structure that was answerable only to the Chief Executive? Would it be helpful to the State Department if these were brought together in a single agency ? Mr. Potrack. The principal interest of the State Department in the orientation of the Government in this and in other fields is with respect to developing a coherent approach to our international obligations, and to the international community. We are interested in having the Government so behave that regard- less of who happens to be the ; spokesman for it, we speak with more or less a single voice when we speak to the rest of the world. It seems to me that there is more than one way in which this might be brought about. The organization approach is certainly one of the ways in which this might be done. Mr. Lennon. Did the Department of the Interior confer with you, or someone in the State Department, with relationship to the contracts or leases that it gave that were referred to by Assistant Secretary Train of the Department of the Interior read a few minutes ago? Mr. Potiacr. The Solicitor’s Office of the Interior Department and the Legal Adviser’s Office of the State Department have arranged for consultation on a continuing basis with respect to such matters, sir. Mr. Lennon. You mentioned the Marine Science Council, headed up by the Vice President, in which there are a number of Cabinet officers, officers of Cabinet level. Would you say that that has been helpful in coordinating these activities ? Mr. Potiack. In my opinion, it has been helpful. Mr. Lennon. Could you tell us why the administration fought or re- sisted the efforts of Congress to etablish the Marine Science Council ? Mr. Potuack. Well, that goes back several years. Suffice it to say that I congratulate the Con gress for the initiative it took in that regard. Mr. Lennon. They took the position that it would simply be an extension of the cold Interagency Committee on Oceanography. We took the position that it ought to be a higher level policy group, but the administration opposed that We finally insisted upon it, a ue within 6 months they were the first to acknowledge that it was 2 fine move on the part of Congress. But if we had followed the insistence of the administration, there would have been no National Marine Science Council such as we have today, that you‘have just commended, as well as every other witness. It is just an indication that sometimes the Congress is right. Mr. Potiack. J think they are right quite often. Mr. Lennon. Let us hope they will be right in this. regardless of whether we have to wait forever on the position of the administration OLMNOt: ; Are there any other questions, gentlemen ? Thank you, Mr. Pollack. I appreciate your candor and frankness. I for one, and other members of the committee, recognize the tur- bulence that you have to face in making known the position ot our country on the part of the State Department, which does speak for our country to the other nations of the world. 1091 Mr. Potnack. Thank you. Mr. Lennon. Our next witness, gentlemen, has already been introduced. Dr. Chapman, will you come forward, and if you have anybody with you, Dr. Chapman, we will be delighted to have him sit with you at the table. Without objection, I request Dr. Chapman’s biography appear at this point in the record. (The biography follows:) BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH OF W. M. CHAPMAN AS OF JULY 1969 1. Born, Kalama, Washington, 1910. Raised in the Columbia River Salmon Industry. 2. Married, Mary Hlizabeth Chapman, 1935, Children Lewis M.; Alan B.; Jane E.; Thomas M.; dec., Jonathan H.; and Kathryn A. 3. Educated, School of Fisheries, University of Washington, B.Sc. : 1932; M.Sc. 1933 ; Ph.D. 1987. 4. Professional Occupation : (a) Biologist, International Fisheries (Halibut) Commission 1933-85 (Ocean Research). (6) Biologist, Washington State Department of Fisheries, 1985-41 (herring, clam, salmon, Grand Coulee and sardine research). (c) Biologist, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 1941-42 (Fur Seal Research). (d) Biologist, Washington State Department of Fisheries, 1942-43 (Oyster Research). (e) Curator of Fishes, California Academy of Sciences 1948-47 (Ichthyology ; Steinhart Aquarium). (f) Fishery Development Officer, Central and South Pacific theaters of war; Board of Economic Warfare (establishing subsistence fisheries at advanced island bases) 1943-44. (yg) Director and Professor, School of Fisheries, University of Washington, 1947-48 (Fishery Education). (h) Special Assistant to the Under-Secretary for Fish and Wildlife, Depart- ment of State, 1948-51 (Law of the Sea; Fishery Diplomacy; International Fishery Commissions and Oceanography ). (i) Director of Research, American Tunaboat Association, 1951-59 (Law of the Sea; Fishery Development; Ocean Research Application). (j) Director, The Resources Committee, 1959-61 (application of science and technology to fishery development). (k) Director, Division of Resources, Van Camp Sea Food Company; 1961 to 1968 (application of science and technology to fishery development on a world- wide basis). (1) Director, Marine Resources, Ralston Purina Company (of which Van Camp Sea Food Company is now a Division) 1968 to date (staff advisor in Ocean Affairs to Chairman of the Board and Chief Hxecutive Officer). 5. Current extra-curricular professional activities : (a) Member and Vice-Chairman, Advisory Committee for Marine Resources Research, Food end Agricultural Organization of the United Nations. (6) Consultant from time to time, Special Fund of the United Nations. (c) Member, Joint Working Party on the Scientific Aspects of International Ocean Research of Advisory Committee on Marine Resources Research of the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations; Scientific Committee on Ocean Research of the International Council of Scientific Unions; and World Meteorological Organization (Advisory Group on Ocean Research). (d) Member, Panel on International Marine Science Affairs, Committee on Oceanography, National Academy of Sciences. (e) Member, Committee on Marine Protein Concentrate Development, Food and Nutrition Board, National Academy of Sciences. (f) Member, Committee on Space Programs for Harth Observation Research, National Academy of Sciences. (g) Member, Board of Directors, Living Marine Resources, Inc. (h) Member, Marine Research Committee, California Department of Fish and Game. (i) Commissioner and Chairman, California Advisory Commission on Marine and Coastal Resources, State of California. 1092 (j) Wlember, Board of Directors, Marine Technology Society. (i) Member, Advisory Committee, Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission. (¢) Member, Legislative Committee, American Fishery Research Biologists Institute. (mm) Consultant, National Council on. Marine Resources and Hngineering Development. (vn) Member, Natural Resources Committee, National Association of Manu- facturers. : (0) Member, Board of Directors, National Oceanography Asscciation. (p) Member, Board of Consultants, U.S. Naval Oceanographer. (a) Member, Visiting Committee, College of Fisheries, University of Wash- ington. (r) Member, Advisory Council, Law of the Sea Institute, University of Rhode Island. (s) Member, Oceanographic Advisory Committee, Department of State. (t) Member, Fishing Industry Advisory Committee, Department of State. (w) Member, U.S. delegation to international conferences and meetings from time to time in ocean science and law (Intergovernmental Oceanographic Com- mission; Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations; U.N. Law of the Sea; United States-Japan Tuna Trade; FAO Working Party on Rational Utilization of Atlantic Tuna; Indian Ocean Fisheries Commission; Indo-Pacific Wisheries Council; West African Fisheries Commission, ete. ). (v) Member, Steering Committee, Pacem in MULE DURS, Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions. (w) Member, Working Party on Indicative World Plan for Fisheries, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. (#) Consultant Sea Grant College Program, National Science HOuderiont 6. Recent (past decade) but concluded, professional assignments : (a) Participant, Symposium on West African Tuna, convened by Commission for Science and Technology in Africa South of the Sahara, Dakar, Senegal (1960). (0) Survey of fiishery development opportunities in Western Region, Nigeria, for Special Fund of the United Nations (1960). (c) Participant, Symposium on Indian Ocean Tuna, convened by Marine Bio- logical Society of India, Mandapam Camp, South India (1961). (d@) Survey of fishery development opportunities of Hast Africa from Aden to Cape Town for Van Camp Sea Food Company (1961). (ce) Chairman, Working Party on Fishery Oceanogrophy. Scientific Com- mittee on Oceanic Research, International Council of Scientific Unions (1961-62). (f) Survey of fishery development opportunities in Indonesia, for Government of Indonesia (1962). (7g) Survey of fishery development opportunities in Aden and Hastern Aden Protectorate for Governments of Federated Arab Amirates of the South and of the Qaiti State (1962). (h) Survey of fishery developemnt opportunities in India, for Government of India and USAID (1963). (i) Survey of fishery development opportunities in Cape Verde and Madeira Islands, for Portuguese firms (1963). (7) Survey of fishery development opportunities in Philippines for Van Camp Sea Food Company (1963). (k) Survey of fishery development opportunities in West Africa for Van Camp Sea Food Company (1964). (1) Rapporteur, 1st session, FAO Working Party for the Rational! Utilization of Tuna Resources in the Atlantic Ocean, Rome (1963). (m) Participant, First International Congress on Oceanography of Western Latin America, convened by UNESCO. Lima, Peru (1964). (n) Survey of fishery development opportunities of Lesser Antilles and Netherlands, West Indies for Van Camp Sea Food Company (1964). (0) Member. Panel on Marine Sciences, Latin American Science Board, National Academy of Sciences (1964). — (p) Member. African Science Board. National Academy of Sciences (1964-69). (7) Field trip through West and North Africa for African Science Board (1965). (vr) Rapporteur, 2nd session, FAO Working Party for the Rational Utilization of Tuna Resources in the Atlantie Ocean (1965). (s) Chairman, Panel on Marine International Science Affairs, Committee on Oceanography, National Academy of Sciences (1965). 1093 (t) Chairman, Fishery Panel, National Security Industrial Association, Ocean Science and Technology Advisory Committee (1965-67). (uw) Survey of fishery development opportunities in New England and Nova Scotia for Van Camp Sea Food Company (1965). (v) Member, Advisory Council, Institute of Marine Resources, University of California (1965-69). (w) Member, Governor’s Advisory Commission on Ocean Resources, State of California (1964-67). (7) Member, Study Group cn National Fishery Center and Aquarium, Depart- ment of the Interior (1965-68). (y) Survey of fishery development possibilities in Chile, Argentina, and Brazil for Van Camp Sea Food Company (1966). (2) Participant, VII International Congress of Nutrition on request from Government of Federal Republic of Germany, Hamburg, Germany (1966). (aa) Invited speaker, Committee on Fisheries, 2nd session, Food and Agri- cultural Organization of the United Nations, Rome (1987). (60) Member, Joint Working Party on International Ocean Affairs of ACMRR(FAO)/SCOR(ICSU) WMO(AC) at Helio Cabala, Italy (1967). (cc) Member, Workshop on Fisheries and Oceanography in the Philippines, jointly organized by U.S. Nationai Academy of Sciences and Philippines National Science Board, Manila (1967). (dd) Consultant, Resources for the Future (1967). (ee) Member, Group of Experts Advisory to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on Marine Science and Technology pursuant to General Assembiy Resolution 2172 (xxi) 1966 (Resources of the Sea )— (1968). Center, University of Hawaii, Honolulu (1968). (7f) Consultant to Government of Iran on fishery development (1968). (gg) Member, Study Group on Indo-Pacific Fishery Development, East-West Center, University of Hawaii, Honolulu (1968). (hh) Participant, American Assembly on Uses of the Sea, Columbia Univer- sity. New York (1968). (ii) Participant, Symposium “Toward a Better Use of the Ocean: A Study and Prognosis’, International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research (SIPRI), Stockholm, Sweden (1968). (jj) Member, Steering Committee on the International Decade of Ocean Hxploration, National Academy of Sciences/National Academy of Engineering (1968-69). (kk) Consultant, Presidential Commission on Marine Sciences, Engineering and Resources (1968-69). (li) Member, Study Group on National Data Buoy System, U.S. Coast Guard (1969). (mm) Chairman of Panel, Occidental College—American Assembly Uses of the Sea Symposium, San Diego (1969). (nn) Member, Advisory Committee on the Disposal of Chemical Warfare Weapons, Department of State (1969). (00) Chairman, Panel on Fisheries, National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering (1967-69). (py) Consultant, National Planning Association (1969). 7. Professional honcrs: (a) Fellow, John Simon Guggenheim, Jr., Foundation. (b) Fellow, California Academy of Sciences. (c) President, Van Camp Foundation. (d) Man of the Year, National Fisheries Institute, 1966. (e) First Sea Grant College Award, 1968. 8 Publications—Upwards of 250 papers on ichthyology, fishery development. Law of the Sea, fishery economics, ocean science, and book “Fishing in Troubled Waters”. 9. Guest lecturer from time to time—University of California, Los Angeles: University of California San Diego: University of Rhode Island; Rutgers Uni- verstiy: University of British Colunnbia; University of Washington; Stanford University; Long Beach State College; San Diego State College; Oregon State University; San Francisco State College; Fullerton State College: Gordon Re- search Conference; American Chemical Society: American Management Associa- tion ; Fishery Council of Canada ; National Visheries Institute ; ete. 1094 STATEMENT OF W. M. CHAPMAN, DIRECTOR OF MARINE RESOURCES, RALSTON PURINA CO. Dr. CuapmMan. No, sir. lama lone wolf. Mr. Lennon. Most private industries have become lone wolfish. Mr. Downine. Mr. Chairman, I regret that I have an appointment with people waiting in my office. I would like to say that I have read this statement, and I concur 100 percent with what he has to say, and the way he said it. I think you will concur with what I have said. Mr. Lennon. Thank you. Do yon want to stay with your statement? You have time to stay with it, if you want to. Dr. Cuapman. Perhaps I can moderate between the two points of reading fully and skimming and hit the highlights. Mr. Lennon. Without objection, immediately following your off- the-cuff statement, your full remarks will be inserted in the record. Dr. CuapMan. Thank you, sir. My name is W. M. Chapman. I have given my curriculum vitae cur- rent to July of this year. IT am very pleased that you asked me to comment on H.R. 13247. I think it to be an excellent bill, and one of very great practical impert- ance not only to the United States, but to the world, as I shall develop below. This notion is not a very new one, and I have given some of the ante- cedents, meluding the fact that I recommended similar legislation to this committee in testimony in 1965, upon which Senator Muskie on behalf of himself and I think 19 other Senators submitted compre- hensive legislation to this effect to the other body in 1965. That effort died through opposition that came almost entirely from within the executive branch of the U.S. Government Mr. Lennon. That is sort of par for the course, is it not, Dr. Chapman ? Go ahead. Dr. Cuapman. The ideas which I expressed in testimony on this subject before the committee in 1965 were not original on my part. They arose out of the scientific and Government community dealing with marine affairs duri ue the course of the broad studies which led to the NASCO 1967 report. Kssentially, the ICO had done such excellent work in the short years of its existence that the nation’s marine affairs had grown beyond the capabilities of that mechanism of Government to move them further at the pace the Nation required them to move. The reason why I presented those views in 1965, and that they were not presented then by NASCO or others associated with it, was that these views had drawn criticism from elsewhere within the Federal governmental structure, and I was the only one then involved whose independence of position made it practical for me to present them to your committee, and not fear any criticism that would arise. The opposition in the Federal structure to such a consolidation of civilian marine affairs in 1965 came from four main sources, which you will immediately recognize, being still the ones you have. First, the Bureau of the Budget; second, the Office of Science and Technology, i in the President’s Office : third, the several Departments 1095 who would lose functions to the new agency; and forth, the Depart- nent of the Navy. it ment say that at that time there was also modest opposition from within the academic scientific community, but mostly from those ele- ments which drew considerable funding support from the Navy at that time. The Bureau of the Budget opposition was, and perhaps still is, simply that it did not wish constructed another large entity like NASA that would have so much congressional support that the bureau could not control its funding support with suitable ease. With the civilian ocean establishment split between several Depart- ments, the bureau could, and did, and does, control, or stiffe, growth in ocean-orjented activity with considerably oreater e ease, on the tried and true basis of divide and conquer. The Office of Science and Technology opposition was the effective surface one in 1964 and 1965, when that office delayed by effective lobbying the passage of the Marine Resources and omg tnsen ag Act of 1966 as long as it could, and set up the Panel on Oceanogr: aphy of PSAC, and so forth. The motives of the President’s Science Advisor were not clear at that time, but it seemed to be not wishing the sphere of marine affairs to ship out of the grasp of his office, as it cer tainly would do with the creation of a National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency. This was ridiculous parochialism, because oceanography had already broadened into what we now call ocean affairs in the minds of Congress and the public, and OST had aiready lost the control of the action. They cannot get it back. It has broadened beyond them. Perhaps with the new administration and the new Science Advisor this moti- vation will have mitigated. I know nothing about that. Mr. Lennon. I wish we could be optimistic about it. Dr. CHapman. In 1965, the Departments of Government which would have lost functions to a NOAA were uniformly opposed to such a NOAA concept on strictly empire-protection grounds. Each of them thought it could de the job better than any new agency, and really that it should have the whole job. So far as I know, that is still the vigorous position of each of the departments affected, except that one of the departments has changed in the interim, from ‘the Department of the Treasury to the Depart- ment of Transportation. IT predict that the Congress will simply have to walk over the top of Interior, Commerce, Transportation, and Bureau of the Budget, if it is going ‘to form a NOAA, because each of those wants to keep ‘all it presently has, plus getting ‘the other fellow’s part, if possible, and also the forces are so equally balanced in the executive that I am not sanguine of even this rather modest bill becoming law. The view of the Department of the Navy has seemed to be different than that of the other departments, and in my mind, more serious. I don’t think that anybody pushing fora NOAA, ora similar agency, has ever seriously proposed taking away any N avy function to give to Hie except the National Ocean Data Center, which is really outside the Navy anyhow, and working under conditions pretty satisfactory to the Navy. The Nanay S opposition, or faint and damning praise, seem to derive from an unspoken fear that a strong NOAA would weaken the ability 1096 of the Navy to fund the specialized and general ocean research and engineering work that it required for its own particular needs. This could be a serious problem. In my view, the Navy must be able to fund scientific and engineering ocean research and development on a substantial scale, of a nature not quite that required for civilian ap- plications, if it is to fulfill rts mission effectively. I think that is a quite general view, and it might be well to state that in this bill, to reassure the Navy, as was done in 1 Senator Muskie’s 1965 bill. The one thing that has changed steadily in favor of NOAA in these recent years has been opinion at the working level in the affected Gov- ernment agencies. This is not an opinion which the Congress can get in open testimony, because working level people in government cannot testify contrary to departmental position without fear of disciplinary action, Neverthe- less, the working level opinion on the need for this consolidation has strengthened sharply during the past 5 years, as Professor Clingan and ie who circulate around amongst these circles, know very well, People tell us one thing, and they cannot tell that to you. The same is true of positions in the academic scientific community, although ordinarily no two scientists ever agree on precisely how such a reorganization should be done. I know of no objection to the concept of a new agency on ocean affairs in the scientific community. The backing and filling 1s concerned with what functions should go into it. My view on what components should go into NOAA, and how the congressional committee assignments should reflect this, is also differ- ent than expressed in H.R. 18247. Tt still remains what I told the com- mittee in 1965, and as was subsequently expressed more cogently than I did by Senator Muskie in his bill of that year. I do not consider those differences, however, to be consequential, or even very pertinent. NOAA, as expressed by the National Commission, and as incorporated in H. R. 18247, is, in my view, the most important step the Congress can take in enhancing the posture of the United States in respect of the ocean, and I support its adoption unequivocally. I find no fault with either the rationale, the analysis, or the recom- mendations the Commission made in this aspect of its work. : The elements included in NOAA by the Commission’s recommenda- tions, and in H.R. 13247, encompass the key agencies and functions to provide a viable and desirable core to which other activities could be added from time to time, if further consideration showed such addi- tions to have merit. T think, myself, and have for a long time, that the merchant marine functions ‘of government, at least, should be added to NOAA, and as soon as politics permit. As a matter of fact, | am surprised that the maritime unions are not demanding this action, and expect that in due course they will. IT am aware that large sections of the Federal structure are under serious study from the standpoint of reorganization, and I am sure that the whole structure lel benefit from substantial stirring up and modernization. This, however, will take a considerable amount of time, and we are already SO delayed in getting a suitable Federal ocean structure that 1097 T do not believe we can safely wait longer. I view this urgency not only from the national, but from the State and international viewpoints. In the State of California, I am chairman of the California Advi- sory Commission on Marine and Coastal Resources. You have heard very much the same as I am going to tell you now from Lieutenant Governor Reinecke, who is chairman of our Interagency Council on Marine Resources in the State government. Our main problems are connected with the Coastal Zone. Population, industry, and all social and economic forces in California concentrate steadily and intensively on the interface between land and water. With each month, those pressures become more critical within the band a few miles te sea and a few miles inland from that interface. We are getting our State activities into fairly good order, and in this are perhaps somewhat more fortunate than some of our sister States. Progress at our State level has been particularly good this year, since Lieutenant Governor Reinecke has taken a firm hold, and we now seem to have up a pretty good momentum, but we must deal with so many agencies in the Federal structure that it makes our State work all the more difficult. At the State level we very badly need a strong ocean- oriented agency in the civilian area of the Federal Government that ean help us with our problems, instead of a clutch of diverse agencies who at times seem to be more trouble than they are worth, simply because one needs to spend most of one’s time in liaison and communt- cation with them rather than all hands getting on with the necessary work. I believe that almost everyone professionally acquainted with ocean matters agrees with me that the most urgent problems the Nation has with the ocean are those centering in the coastal zone. Here are the estuarine, pollution, multiple-use, aesthetic, industrial, recreation, social, and economic problems that are so complex, difficult, and inter- digitating as to try the patience of Job and the wisdom of Solomon. I believe, also, that most believe these can only be dealt with effec- tively at the local level. At least that is my experience. To do this effectively, the State people must have the help of a strong and coherent Federal entity such as NOAA. For a good many years I have been Vice Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Maritime Resources Research of the Food and Agri- cultural Organization of the United Nations. ACMRR advises the Director General of FAO on the activities of its Fisheries Depart- ment on a worldwide basis, and has the separate additional duty of being one of the two official advisory bodies of the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission of UNESCO. We work very closely with the other advisory body of IOC, the Scientific Committee on Ocean Research, SCOR, of the International Council on Scientific Unions, ICSU, and over recent years with appropriate advisory groups from the World Meterorological Organization, WMO. In these connections, we have also had advisory relations with the Secretary General of the United Nations in his responses to various ocean initiatives that have arisen in the General Assembly of the United Nations over the past few years. I have just returned from ACMRR and IOC meetings in Paris. When I had written this, I had just returned from ACMRR and IOC meetings in Paris, but since then I have been in Africa for the 1098 United Nations Development Program, and stopped off in Rome for sessions at FAO last week. I must say that amongst international servants in these international bureaucracies it is a widespread feel- ing, that we cannot move ahead much more rapidly in the effective organization of international ocean activities at the UN and special- ized agency level until a major nation like the United States straightens out its own governmental ocean organization inside. This is felt rather broadly in the international community to be a necessity. From this international viewpoint, where I and my colleagues work in our capacities as independent experts from the scientific commu- nity, and not as representatives of the U.S. Government, the policies and postures of the U.S. Government appear at times to be almost incredible. The Department of State has undertaken repeated initiatives through the General Assembly and ECOSOC over recent years that have had the most profound effect on marine affairs, but the working level people in the Federal structure dealing with these problems have had the greatest difficulty in even communicating with our delegation at the United Nations. The United Nations development program, for which the United States puts up about 40 percent of the funding, has inaugurated a massive, and successful, program of fishery development on a global basis, executed by FAQ. FAO policy in the United States is estab- lished by an interagency committee dominated by the Department of Agriculture, which has little or no interest or expertise in ocean affairs. USAID ocean development activity goes on almost oblivious to these other activities by which the U.S. attempts to assist the develop- ing nations In marine matters. The actions of the IBRD and the re- gional banks (Asian, African, and Latin American) now are becom- ing important in world fishery development, and seem to be unrelated to any U.S. activity in this field. The world weather watch and global atmospheric research pro- gram of the World Meteorological Organization is beginning to have an ever broadening relationship with marine affairs, as it is learned that the ocean and atmosphere are really only different parts of one interconnected heat engine. Responsibility for WMO affairs in the U.S. Government lies with the Environmental Sciences Services Administration, ESSA, of the Department of Commerce. IMCO, the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, has its U.S. liaison with the Department of Commerce, and this is very sparingly related to anything else the U.S. Government does in the ocean affairs field, although IMCO itself is beginning to coop- erate very nicely with its sister agencies, FAO, UNESCO, WMO, WHO, and IAEA, and so forth, in the international field. NASCO, in its 1959 report, set out clearly the need for a more unify- ing agency in the ocean affairs field of the specialized agencies of the United Nations family. It did so again, even more clearly, in its 1967 report. Every independent advisory group studying this problem since has done so, including the International Joint Working Party of SCOR/ACMRR/WMO(A.C.) in its “Helio Caballa” report “Inter- national Ocean Affairs”. The key block to establishing a world oceanic organization has been the incoherent state of the organization of ocean affairs in the U.S. 1099 Federal structure. Our allied nations and friends are not going to move ahead of the United States. If the U.S. prefers a chaotic orga- nization of its ocean affairs, they think there must be some devious reason for it, that is good, and that they have not discovered yet. One consequence is that the U.S. delegations to [OC meetings con- sist of a dozen to 20-odd members, among which there has been a decreasing number of scientists in recent years. Hach ocean agency in the U.S. Government must have at least one representative on the U.S. delegation to protect the interest of that agency vis-a-vis the other agencies, and the Department of State must have three or four members, so each can guard his interest against other interests within the Department of State. That is not a harsh statement at all, but just flat-out truth. Mr. Lennon. It is a rather scathing indictment of our whole Gov- ernment structure, and I might comment at this time that I can see how the gentleman from Virginia, who said he read your statement before you made it, complimented you the way he did, and I share his feeling 100 percent. Tam ashamed to say that I have to share them, but i do Dr. Crrapawan. Iam very sorry to have to make the santenians, si. Mr. Lennon. I am sure you must be. Go ahead. Dr. Coapman. There is no room for industry-oriented experts on the delegation. Most of the U.S. scientific representation comes from Amer- ican scientists attending in other capacities, representing other en- tities, for there 1s no room for more than one or two independent sci- entists on a U.S. delegation any more. It 1 is a standing joke that the diversity of interest in a U.S. delege - tion is so broad that almost anything an entire U.S. delegation can agree to within itself will bring a vote of at least two-thirds of the dele- gations of other nations present. There was a good deal of kidding of us at this last [OC meeting, when it was found that Italy had fielded a larger delegation than the United States had. Of course, with our hangers « on, like me, outside our delegation, we still had much the largest group, every one of which was protecting his interest. The specialized agencies, the scientific COMMMMILY, and even the U.S. Government took a considerable fright 2 years ago, when the Gen- eral Assembly took an active interest in ocean affairs and began to move sharply on them. This increased with the formation of the Seabed Committee by the General Assembly, and the vigorous pattern of work it began to follow. This was actually probably the best thing that ever happened to- ward the improvement of international cooperation in marine affairs. The diplomats who work in the United Nations net only are not knowledgeable about ocean affairs, but, as within the U.S. Govern- ment, delegations of all nations to the United Nations are hardly ac- cessible to ocean scientists and technologists in their own Govern- ment and national scientific communities. Delegations to the United Nations come from Foreign Offices, and the Foreion Offices of all nations are notoriously insensitive to other branches of their own government, just as the Department of State normally is to ours. 26—563—70—pt. 2 38 1100 Mr. Lexnon. Iam so sorry the Department of State representatives mee , CrrapmAn. Since I once worked for the Department of State, Ta am ia being hypercritical. That is where I learned my diplomacy, sir. It is a good school. But all Foreign Offices work the same way. They are more sensitively tuned to each other than they are to their own nations. Thus, all of a sudden, one had a group of very able and energetic diplomats at the General Assembly orating and adopting resolutions about ocean affairs in a very vigorous manner, on the basis of a very modest amount of knowledge about ocean problems or the ocean. They did not like what they discovered. They did not think international ocean affairs were being run very well. They did not hesitate to say so, or to start reforming them. This threw the fear of God into the specialized agencies, and the ocean scientists and technologists, both inside and outside the national governments. It was plainly apparent that the scientists and technolo- oists were going to lose control of ocean affairs to the diplomats if they did not stir “their stumps and get organized to do their work more effectively. Pere was another surge of activity to create a world oceanic organi- ation, but this foundered as had previous ones. The specialized agen- cies were startled by this unwonted ocean activity in the General Assembly, but not frightened enough to be stampeded into giving up some of their empires to a new specialized agency. Hardly any agency at any level of government gets that frightened ‘about anything. The shock was sufficient, howe ever, that they realized that they had to band together a little tighter for mutual protection against the United Nations mother organization, which had some eager bureau- erats itching to get control of international ocean affairs. The upshot has been that UNESCO, FAO, WMO, and IMCO have formally agreed to coalesce behind strengthening and broadening the Inter governmental Oceanographic Commission to help them all, and to contribute even some money and personnel to it for that purpose. IOC will still stay in UNESCO administratively, but its affairs will be jointly governed by an interagency committee. This 1s strong medicine for any bureaucracy, and the international ocean bureaucracy appears to be responding to pressure and reality much more effectively than the United States ocean bureaucracy, each large element of which still thinks it has a winning hand in the United States ocean game. If the Gener al Assembly diplomats will just keep the pressure on for another 2 or 8 years, which I think they will do, we will end up with a tighter, more effective organization for international ocean affairs than we apparently could get in any other way. It will not be as effective or as efficient as a world oceanic agency would be, but it will be considerably better than anything we had previously. Fortunately, the General Assembly « ‘diplomats seems to be just getting the bit in their teeth and settling down for the long grind. Nothing better can be expected in the international ocean affairs field until the United States gets its ocean house in order through the establishment of a National Owauie and Atmospheric Agency, or some reasonable facsimile thereof, and can set the example other na- 1101 tions expect from a nation so huge in scientific, technological, and economic power as is the United States. The United States has now come out well in the space race, and we began doing so the moment we put our mind to it, set up the organiza- tion to do the job, and anted up the money. a) It is not doing well in the ocean race, and it will not do so until it makes up its mind to do so, organizes to do so, and puts up the money to do it. H.R. 13247 would mark a great step in that direction, and I think a vitally necessary one. One can see the military need for the space program, and even the social need for the exhilirating discovery and adventure that it pro- duces. I have never opposed the space program, and do not now. _ The trouble is the ocean is even more important from a security standpoint, the adventure and discovery elements are equally intrigu- ing, but people can make money out of the ocean, and not out of space. The Bureau of the Budget seems to frown on this sort of thing. To put it bluntly, humanity and its governments are composed of two sets of people—the land people, and the sea people. The two are basically different. The sea tries out people who go upon it from all races, and casts back ashore the people it cannot tolerate. The sea people from different races have more in common with each other intellectually, psychologically, spiritually, and socially than each has with the land people of their own race. They are a breed apart. But the land people are the numerous sort. They control all govern- ment agencies at all levels of government, and as long as they continue to do so, the sea people will continue to be whipsawed between them. This sort of thing, bureaus of the budget in all governments like and support. They can then control things better. In the California State government, we now have formed the new Department of Navigation and Ocean Resources, whose sole preoccu- ation will be the ocean and immediate coastal zone. This is a rarity. Ve expect it to prosper. It can do this best if there is a sea agency in the Federal Government to match and support it, a National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency. Who knows, if we can take that momentous step, we may even be able in time to obtain a world oceanic agency and be able to get on effec- tively with bending the ocean a little toward man’s will, and making efficient use of its vast resources. That is the end of my statement, sir. (Dr. Chapman’s prepared statement follows :) STATEMENT OF W. M. CHAPMAN My name is Wilbert McLeod Chapman. I am Director, Marine Resources, Ralston Purina Company and member of the Board of Directors, Living Marine Resources, Inc. I also act in an advisory or consulting capacity on numerous public Boards, Commissions, Panels, Working Groups, etc., concerned with marine affairs at the international, national, and state (California) level, and have done so for a good many years. My curriculum vitae, employment record, present, and recent past, connections are set out in the attached biographical sketch as of July, 1969. I am very pleased that you have asked me to comment on H.R. 13247. I think it to be an excellent bill and one of great practical importance not only to the United States, but to the world, as I shall develop below. The notion of consolidating the major civilian agencies concerned with marine and atmospheric affairs into a single agency in the Federal structure is not a new one. The need has been recognized on an ever broadening basis for a decade, 1102 since the basic 1959 report of the National Academy of Sciences Committee on Oceanography (NASCO) which, in a sense, initiated the inquiry in which the Committee is engaged today. It was set out, and adopted, in legislation origi- nating in this committee in 1961 and vetoed by the President. The need was made evident in the Long-Range National Oceanographie Plan, “Oceanography—the Ten Years Ahead” published by the Interagency Committee on Oceanography (ICO) in 1968, and in several internal reports of ICO over the next two years. I recommended similar legislation to this committee myself in testimony on the National Oceanographie Program Legislation in 1965 (Serial no. 89-18, pp. 407-488). Senator Muskie submitted comprehensive legislation to establish such a machinery on behalf of himself and a number of other Senators in 1965. The need for reorganization was given a strong push by the Report of the Panel on Oceanograply of the President’s Science Advisory Committee in 1966 “Effective Use of the Sea,” and in the 1967 report of NASCO “Oceanography 1966. Further strength has been added to the need in the three annual reports of the National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Development in 1967, 1968S and 1969. Finally it was recommended in essentially the form expressed in H.R. 13247 in the report “Our Nation and the Sea” of the Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources, 1969. Testimony in favor of this general concept before this Committee, and in the literature on the subject, has been strong, broadly-based and copious for the past five years. In particular, broad sectors ort the United States industry, the State Governments and the scientific com- munity have proclaimed for it. Opposition has come almost entirely from within the Executive Branch of the Federal Government. The ideas which I expressed in testimony on this subject before this Com- mittee in 1965 were by no means original. They arose out of the scientific and government community dealing with marine affairs during the course of the broad studies which led to the NASCO 1967 report “Cceanography 1966”. The ICO had done such excellent work in the short years of its existence that the nation’s marine affairs had grown beyond the capabilities of that mechanism of government to move them further at the pace the nation required them to move. The reason why I presented those views to the committee in 1965, and that they Were not presented then by NASCO or others associated with it, was that these views had drawn criticism from elsewhere within the Federal governmental structure and I was the one involved whose independence of position made it practical for me to present them to your committee. The opposition in the Federal structure to such a consolidation of civilian marine affairs in 1965 came from four main sources (a) the Bureau of the Budget, (b) the Office of Science and Technology, (c) The Departments that would lose functions to the new agency. and (d) the Department of the Navy. Because of the latter there was modest opposition also within the academic scientific community, especially from those elements which drew considerable funding support from the Navy. The Bureau of the Budget opposition was (and perhaps still is) simply that it did not wish imposed on it another large entity like NASA that would have so much Congressional support that the Bureau could not control its funding support with ease. With the civilian ocean establishment split between several Departments the Bureau could (and did, and Gces) control (or stifie) growth in ocean-oriented activity with considerably greater ease, on the tried and true basis of divide and conquer. The Office of Science and Technology opposition was the effective outward one in 1964 and 1985, when that office delayed by effective lobbying the passage of the Marine Resources and Engineering Act of 1966 as long as it could, set up the Panel on Oceanography of PSAC to study the matter (an action which back- fired. because the Panel convinced itself during its study of the need for a more vigorous United States ocean affairs stance), and intervened at the National Academy of Sciences by use of the Academy’s Committee on Science and Public Policy (COSPUP) to delay the completion of the NASCO 1967 report until after the PSACPOO report could be published, and the National Marine Commission established. The motive of the President’s Science Advisor at that time were never quite clear, but seemed to lean in the direction of not wishing marine affairs to slip out of the grip of his office, as it would do with the erection of a National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency. This was ridiculous parochialism because oceanography had already broadened to ocean affairs in the minds of Congress and the public, 1103 and OST had already lost control of the action. Perhaps with a new administra- tion and a new Science Advisor this motivation will have mitigated. In 1965 the Departments of Government which would have lost functions to a NOAA were uniformly opposed to such a NOAA concept on strictly empire-pro- tection grounds. Hach thought it could do the job better than any new agency and, really, that it should have the whole job by it self. So far as I know that is still the vigorous position of each of the Departments affected, except that one of the Departments has changed in the interim. I predict that the Congress will simply have to walk over the top of Interior, Commerce, Transportation, and the Bureau of the Budget to form a NOAA, because each of those wants to keep all it pres- ently has, plus getting the other fellow’s part, if possible. The forces are so equally balanced in the Executive that I am not sanguine of even this rather modest bill becoming law. The view of the Department of the Navy has seemed to be different than that of the other Departments, and more serious. Nobody involved in pushing a NOAA, or a Similar agency, has ever seriously proposed taking away any Navy function to give to it, except the National Ocean Data Center, the policy control of which has been outside the Navy for some years anyway under conditions pretty satis- factory to the Navy. The Navy’s opposition, or faint and damning praise, has seemed to derive from an unspoken fear that a strong NOAA would weaken the ability of the Navy to fund the specialized and general ocean research and engi- neering work that it required for its own particular needs. This could be a serious problem. In my view the Navy must be able to fund scientific and engineering ocean research and development on a substantial scale, of a nature not quite that required for civilian applications, if it is to fulfill its mission effectively. That is a quite general view and it might well be stated in this bill, to reassure the Navy, as was done in Senator Muskie’s 1965 bill. The one thing that has changed steadily in favor of NOAA in these recent years has been opinion at the working level in the affected Government Agencies. This is not an opinion which the Congress can get in open testimony because working level people in government cannot testify contrary to Departmental position with- out fear of disciplinary action. Nevertheless the working level opinion on the need for this consolidation has strengthened sharply during the past five years. The same is true of positions in the academic scientific community, although ordinarily no two scientists ever agree on precisely how such a reorganization should be done. I know of no objection to the concept of a new agency on ocean affairs in the scientific community ; the backing and filling is concerned with what functions should go into it. My view on what components should go into NOAA, and how the Congressional Committee assignments should refiect this, is also different than expressed in H.R. 13247. tt still remains what I told the Committee in 1965, and as was subse- quently expressed more cogently by Senator Muskie in his bill of that year. 1 do not consider those differences, however, to be consequential or even very pertinent. NOAA, as expressed by the National Commission, and as incorporated in H.R. 13247, is, in my view, the most important step the Congress can take in enhancing the posture of the United States in respect of the ocean, and I support its adoption unequivocally. I find no fault with either the rationale, the anlysis, or the recommendations the Commission made in this aspect of its work. The elements included in NOAA by the Commission’s recommendations, and in H.R. 13247, encompass the key agencies and functions required to provided a viable and desirable core to which other activities could be added from time to time if further consideration showed such additions to have merit. I ‘think, myself, that the merchant marine functions of government, at least, should be added to NOAA, and as soon as polities permit. I am surprised that the maritime unions ure not demanding this action, and expect that in due course they will. I am aware that large sections of the Federal structure are under serious study from the standpoint of reorganization, and I am sure that the whole struc- ture would benefit from substantial stirring up and modernization. This, how- ever, will take time and we are already so delayed in getting a suitable Federal ocean structure that I do not believe we can safely wait longer. I view this ur- gency not only from the national, but from the state and international view- points. In the State of California J am Chairman of the California Advisory Commis- sion on Marine and Coastal Resources. Our main problems are connected with the Coastal Zone. Population, industry, and all social and economic forces in California concentrate steadily and intensively on the interface between land and water. With each month those pressures become more critical within the 1104 band a few miles to sea and a few miles iniand froin that interface. We are get- ting our State activities into fairly good order, and in this are perhaps somewhat more fortunate than some of our sister states. Progress at our State level has been particularly good’ during this year, and we now seem to have a good momentum up. But we must deal with such a diversity of agencies in the Wederal structure that it makes cur State work ali the more Cifficult. At the State ievel we very adly need a strong ocean oriented agency in the civilian area that can help us with our problems, instead of a clutch of diverse agencies who at times seem to be more trouble than they are worth simply because one needs to spend most of one’s time in liaison and communication with them rather than all hands get- ting on with the necessary work. I believe that almost everyone professionally acquainted with ocean matters agrees with me that the most urgent problems the naticn has with the ocean are those centering in the coastal zone, a few miles either side of the interface between sea and land. Here are the estuarine, pollution, multiple-use, aesthetic, industrial, recreation, social and economic problems so complex, difficult, and interdigitating as to try the patience of Job and the wisdom of Sclomon. I be- lieve, also, that most believe thiese can only be dealt with effectively at the local level. At least that is my experience. To do this effectively the State people must have the heip of a strong and coherent Federal entity such as NOAA. For several years I have been Vice-Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Marine Resources Research of the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations. ACMRR advises the Director General of FAO on the activities of its Fisheries Department and has the separate additional duty of being one of the two official advisory bodies of the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Com- mission of UNESCO. ACMRR works very closely with the other advisory body of LOC, the Scientific Committee on Ocean Research (SCOR) of the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU), and over recent years with appropriate advisory groups from the World Meterological Organization (WMO). In these connections we have also had advisory relations with the Secretary General of the United Nations in his responses to various ocean initiatives that have arisen in the General Assembly of the United Nations over the past few years. I have just returned from ACMRR and JOC meetings in Paris. From this international viewpoint, where I and my colleagues work in our capacities as independent experts from the scientific community and not as rep- resentatives of the United States Government, the policies and postures of the United States Government appear at times almost incredible. The Department of State has undertaken repeated initiatives through the General Assembly and HCOSOC over recent years that have had the most pro- found effect on marine affairs, but the working level people in the Federal struc- ture dealing with these problems have the greatest difficulty in even communicat- ing with our delegation at the United Nations. The United Nations Development Program (for which the United States pro- vides 40% funding) has inaugurated a massive (and successful) program of fishery development on a global basis executed by FAO. FAO policy in the United States is established by an inter-agency committee dominated by the De- partment of Agriculture, which has little or no interest or expertise in ocean affairs. USAID ocean development activity goes on almost oblivious to these other activities by which the United States attempts to assist the developing nations. The actions of the IBRD and the regional banks, now becoming important in world fishery development, seem to be unrelated te any United States actiivty in this field. The World Weather Watch and Global Atmospheric Research Program of the World Meteorological Organization is beginning to have an ever broadening rela- tionship with marine affairs as it is learned that the ocean and atmopshere are different parts of one interconnected heat engine. Responsibility for WMO affairs in the United State’s Government lies with the Environmental Sciences Services Administration (ESSA) of the Department of Commerce. IMCO, the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, has its United States liaison with the Department of Commerce and this is very sparingly related to anything else the United States does in the ocean affairs ‘field, although IMCO itself is beginning to cooperate very nicely with its sister agencies (FAO, UNESCO, WMO, WHO, and [AHA) in the international field. NASGO, in its 1959 Report, set out clearly the need for a more unifying agency in the ocean affairs field of the specialized agencies of the United Nations family. 1105 It did so again in its 1967 report. Every independent advisory group studying this problem since has done so, including the Joint Working Party of SCOR/ACMRRE/ WMO (A.C.) in its “Helio Caballa” report ‘International Ocean Affairs”’. The key block to establishing a World Oceanic Organization has been the incoherent state of the organization of ocean affairs in the United States Federal structure. Our allied nations and friends are not going to move ahead of the United States. If the United States prefers a chaotic organization of its ocean affairs they think there must be some reason for it that is good and that they haven’t discovered yet. One consequence is that the United States delegations to Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission meetings consist of a dozen to 20-odd members, among which there has been a decreasing number of scientists in recent years. Haeh ocean agency in the United States Government must have at least one repre- sentative on the U.S. delegation to protect its interest vis-a-vis the other agencies, and the Department of State must have three or four members so each can guard his interest against other interests within the Department of State. There is no room for industry-oriented experts on the delegation. Most of the United States scientific representation comes from American Scientists attending in other capacities, representing other entitities, for there is no room for more than one or two scientists on a U.S. delegation any more. It is a standing joke that the diversity of interest in a U.S. delegation is so broad that almost anything an entire U.S. delegation can agree to within itself will bring a vote of two-thirds of the delegations of other nations present. There was a good deal of kidding of us at this last IOC meeting when it was found that Italy had fielded a larger delegation than the United States had. Of course with our hangers on outside our delegation (of which I was one) we had much the largest group, every one of which was protecting his interest. The specialized agencies, the scientific community, and even the United States Government took a considerable fright two years ago when the General Assembly took an active interest in ocean affairs and began to move sharply on them. This increased with the formation of the Seabed Committee by the General Assembly, and the vigorous pattern of work it began to follow. This was probably the best thing that ever happened toward the improvement of international cooperation in marine affairs. The diplomats who work in the United Nations not only are not knowledgeable about ocean affairs but, as with the United States, delegations to the United Nations, are harly accessible to ocean scientists and technologists in their own government and national scien- tific communities. Delegations to the United Nations come from Foreign Offices, and the Foreign Offices of all nations are notoriously insensitive to other branches of their own government, just as the Department of State is in ours. Thus, all of a sudden, one had a group of very able and energetic diplomats at the General Assembly orating and adopting resolutions about ocean affairs in a very vigorous manner on the basis of a very modest amount of knowledge about ocean problems or the ocean. They did not like what they discovered. They did not thing international ocean affairs were being run very well. They did not hesitate to say so, or to start reforming them. This threw the fear of God into the specialized agencies, and the ocean scien- tists and technologists both inside and outside the national governments. It was plainly apparent that the scientists and technologists were going to lose control of ocean affairs to the diplomats if they did not stir their stumps and get organized to do their work more effectively. There was another surge of activity to create a World Oceanic Organization, but this foundered as had previous ones. The specialized agencies were startled by this unwonted ocean activity in the General Assembly, but not frightened enough to be stampeded into giving up some of their empires to a new specialized agency. Hardly any agency at any level of any government gets that freightened about anything. The shock was sufficient, however, that they realized they had to band together a little tighter for mutual protection against the United Nations mother organi- zation, which had some eager bureaucrats itching to get control of international ocean affairs. The upshot has been that UNESCO, FAO, WMO, and IMCO have formally agreed to coalesce behind strengthening and broadening the IOC to help them all, and to contribute even some money and personnel to it for that purpose. IOC will still stay in UNESCO administratively but its affairs will be jointly governed by an inter-agency committee. This is strong medicine for any bureaucracy, and the international ocean bureaucracy appears to be responding ‘to pressure and reality much more effec- 1106 tively than the United States ocean bureaucracy, each large element of which still thinks it has a winning hand in the United States ocean game. If the General Assembly diplomats will just keep the pressure on for another two or three years we will end up with a tighter, more effective organization for international ocean affairs than we apparently could get in any other way. It will not be as effective or as efficient as a World Oceanic Agency would be, but it will be considerably better than anything we had. Fortunately the General Assembly diplomats seem to be just getting the bit in their teeth and settling down for the long grind. Nothing better can be expected in the international ocean affairs field until the United States gets its ocean house in order through the establishment of a National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency, or some reasonable facsimile thereof, and can set the example other nations expect from a nation so huge in scientific, technological and economic power as is the United States. The United States has now come out well in the space race and we began doing so the moment we put our mind to it, set up the organization to do the job, and anted up the money. It is not doing well in the ocean race and it will not do so until it makes up its mind to do so, organizes to do so, and puts up the money to do it. H.R. 13247 would mark a great step in that direction, and I think a vitally neces- sary one. One can see the military need for the space program, and even the social need for exhiliarating discovery and adventure. I have never opposed the space pro- gram. The trouble is that the ocean is even more important from a security stand- point, the adventure and discovery elements are equally intriguing, but people can make money out of the ocean and not out of space. The Bureau of the Budget seems to frown on this sort of thing. To put it it bluntly, humanity and its governments are composed of two sets of and people and the sea people. The two are basically different. The sea tries out people who go upon it from all races and casts back ashore the people it cannot tolerate. The sea people from different races have more in common with each other intellectually, phychologcially, spiritually, and socially then each has with the land people of their own race. They are a breed apart. But the land people are the numerous sort. They control all government agencies at all levels of government and as long as they continue to do so the sea people will continue to be whipsawed between them. This sort of thing Bureau of the Budget like and support. They can then control better. In the California State Government within the month we will finally have one Department, the new Department of Navigation and Ocean Resources, whose sole preoccupation will be the ocean and immediate coastal zone. This is a rarity. We expect it to prosner. It can do this best if there is a sea agency in the Federal Government to match and support it, a National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency. Who knows, if we can take that momentous step we may even be able in time to obtain a World Oceanic Agency and be able to get on effectively with bending the ocean a littie toward man’s will, and making efficient use of its vast resources. Lennon. Thank you very much, Dr. Chapman. ve only regret is that every single member of the Subcommittee on Oceanography could not have been here to hear your challenging remarks. Mr. Karth, do you have any question: Ss? Mr. Karra. [have no questions, Mr. Chairman. I think that any I might have had have been answered by this very precise statement. My additional regret to yours is that certain other committee chair- men, and subcommittee chairmen, were not here to listen to this. We have a little infrastructure problem within the Congress, too, sir. I congratulate you for your statement. Mr. Lennon. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Jones. Mr. Jonns. Mr. Chairman, I apologize for getting here late. I think itis my loss to have not heard the gentleman. T want to commend the gentleman on the very forthright manner in which he presented this, and particularly on his choice of words. Dr. CHapman. Thank you. 1107 Mr. Lennon. My distinguished friend from Ohio, Mr. Feighan. Mr. Frerenan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My presence at another subcommittee enabled me to be here only for the second portion of your prepared statement, and I want to tell you that I was very gratified to be here for that very short period of time, and I am going to read the entire statement. And I wart to congratulate you for yeur absolute honesty and in- teority and forthrightness, which I think is something that we need not only in Congress, but everywhere in this country. Thank you. Dr. CHapman._Thank you, sir. Mr. Lennon. Thank you, sir. Dr. Chapman, how many copies of this statement did you furnish the committee ? Dr. Cuarman. I furnished one, and Professor Clingan was kind enough this morning to run off a larger bunch, and I think that now counsel has all of them except one or two. Mr. Lennon. And you could run off more, if you had to? Mr. Curnean. Yes, sir. Mr. Lennon. Let me request you to send a copy of this statement to each member of the subcommittee, with a letter of transmittal, to be signed by me, in which I state that this was one of the most challenging and effective statements that we have been privileged to hear since we started these hearings. Asa personal favor I want each member to read it in its entirety, and to respond to me in writing that they have read it in its entirety. Dr. Cuapman. Sir, you know, this response from the committee is very gratifying, but it is also defeating. I thought I would stir up some controversy, and they would ask me a lot of questions. Tam loaded with answers. Mr. Lennon. We have not gotten to that yet. Dr. CHapman. I see. Mr. Lennon. In addition, counsel, I want you to send to the Di- rector of the Bureau of the Budget, and to the Vice President, and to the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Transportation, the Sec- retary of the Interior, and any other agency of the Federal Government that might be affected to any degree by the structure, such as in NOAA, a copy of this statement, over my signature, in a letter of transmittal in which I request that they respond to me in writing that they have read this statement, and asking for their comments, and telling them that is the least that I expect they can do, out of courtesy to this com- mittee and the Congress. Mr. Karru. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest the President’s Science Adviser, also ? Mr. Lennon. And to Dr. DuBridge. Mr. Jonrs. Mr. Chairman, I suggest HE W. Mr. Lennon. The Chairman of the so-called Ash Commission. Has anybody any other suggestions? Mr. Jonzs. I think HEW should receive one. Mr. Lennon. And also the head of the National Science Foundation, and just say that I expect them to read it and give me their comments, and I want a flat statement that they have read it in its entirety, and will not accept less. 1108 If you come up with any other individual that it ought to be sent to, do so. Mr. Crinean. Yes, sir. Mr. Lennon. I find so little to question, here. It is difficult for me to question a person that I find myself in such total agreement with. Dr. Cuapman. I will tell you what my difficulty is. I thought you would probably question me on “The Ocean Regime of the Real World,” which I ask might be included for the record. Mr. Lennon. Yes, sir. Without objection, your full statement, although you covered it almost completely, will be inserted in the record following your summary of the same, and the other paper that you have prepared is what, Dr. Chapman ? Dr. Cuapman. “The Ocean Regime of the Real World,” and a paper entitled “Toward a More Effective Use of Food from the Sea by the United States and Man.” Since I am really a fisheries expert, I ought to say something about fisheries. Mr. Lennon. That should be included in the record, and inasmuch as you referred to the Department of Agriculture, send a copy to the Secretary of Agriculture, with the same request, and to the Secretary of State, with the same request. Dr. Caapman. You will fix me up real good. Mr. Lennon. I was coming to that. T will think of others to whom this statement should be sent, with the insistence that they read it in its entirety, and when they respond say that they have personally read it. Suggest to them that 1f we don’t hear from them within a period of 10 days that I shall go on the floor of the House and make known to all the Members of Congress that these people that this communication has been sent to do not have the time or the interest or the concern sufficient to respond to the letter. That will be an indictment of their lack of cooperation and understanding. Are there any other questions you want to tell me ? Dr. Coapman. No, sir. You have honored me greatly, sir. : Mr. Lennon. I would much rather have somebody tell me a question than ask me one. I don’t know how else to comment on what you said. This is the sort of testimony that I think we can effectively use to generate the interest that we ought to have. I anticipate that we are going to have the problem that you have indicated already with respect te the administration again. As a matter of fact, T have axlunchecn engagement today where I am supposed to get the word about the administration with respect to what its position will be. I have a feeling that it will not be what I had hoped. Let’s include Dr. Wenk in this, too. Let us include the Secretary of the Navy in this, too. Dr. CHapman. If there are any reactions that come from your distribution of this that you think I might be able to help with, Professor Clingan may get ahold of me, and I will be most happy to help. Mr. Lennon. We might ask you to draft a letter in response to the responses that we get. I think that you can do it very effectively. 1109 A little over 2 years ago, now, I requested the Governor of North Carolina, where the legislature was not then in session, to establish a Marine Science Council in North Carolina to coordinate the marine science activities, and I requested the members of this subcommittee to in turn request their respective Governors, if they were coastal or lake States, to establish such a Marine Science Council, comparable, hopefully, to what you have done in California. Incidentally, you know that the distinguished gentleman that you referred to a few minutes ago, Lt. Governor Ed Reinecke, is a former very active member of this subcommittee. Dr. Cuaprman. He is a distinguished graduate of your excellent school who is doing us much good in California. Mr. Lennon. And heisa fine gentleman. The Governor responded to that, and I do know that the Governors of some of the other States have responded to the request of the mem- bership of this committee to do the same thing. Subsequently, when the legislature of our State convened, I asked that it be made a statutory body, and it is now a statutory body, as a result of the action of the last session of the General Assembly of North Carolina, and it has been very effective, in my judgment, at least, in the short time it has been a statutory body, in coordinating the activities of private individuals as well as the universities and coastal zone areas. Another thought comes to me, Mr. Counsel. In connection with the convening here on 28 and 29 October, as you may know about, we have invited the Governors of some 30 States to send their rep- resentatives here for a two-day conference, to explore how we can do what you suggested, maintain the integrity of the State or local level with respect to the coastal zones, but at the same time provide the Federal leadership which we recognize must be a part of this whole picture. Tf you could find time, Mr. Counsel, I would like for the statement of the gentleman, Dr. Chapman, to be read at this symposium that is going to be here on the 28th and 29th of October, that this committee is sponsoring. Would you object to this? Dr. Cuapman. I would not. Thank you. Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, would you yield ? Mr. Lennon. I will yield. Mr. Jonus. If Dr. Chapman can make himself available, I suggest that we let him read his own statement. Mr. Lennon. If Dr. Chapman can be here on either of those days, we would find time to inject you into the program. Even though the program has already been set up for speakers and moderators, | am sure that we can find time for you to read this statement. Dr. Cuapman. We have made provision for our staff men from our California Council and Commission to be here. I am a little squeezed for time, but suppose I talk with Professor Clingan and see what we can work out. Mr. Lennon. All right, sir. If you cannot, you designate someone to do it. It will not take more than 15 or 20 minutes, but I think it ought to be read. I think it will be a challenge, particularly as related to the coastal zone problem that we are trying to explore. 1110 Going back to the recommendations that were made earlier, I will ask counsel to go back and take the Muskie bill and take the other bill that was considered by this subcommittee back in the 89th Congress, T believe, and see in what particular we could add to or consider the bill that we have now as a vehicle to consider some of these other recommendations that were incorporated in the Muskie bill, and the other bill considered by this subcommittee several years ago. I asked this question the other day of some of the Government witnesses who were here. I called their attention to this legislation and asked them where would we be today, if Congress had enacted and the President had signed into law this legislation that was proposed several years ago. They had to admit that likely we would be further advanced than we are now. Dr. Cuapman. You know, the thing I have not much noted this morning, Mr. Chairman, is that I feel very intensely about the competi- tion between ourselves and Russia on the use of the seas, and I think you could extend that to say that had we taken the action in 1965, we would at least be pulling even with Russia, and we surely are not doing so now. They are moving lots faster than we are in marine affairs. Mr. Lennon. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, we had comparable legislation to this in HOGI, considered by the committee, Dr. Cuarman. There is nothing original about it. It is Just hard to put across. Mr. Lennon. It is just a rehash of everything that has happened over the years, so that we come back to that same basic problem of Dr. Cuapman. Empire protection is what you come back to. Mr. Lennon. That is a genteel way of putting it, but it is the proper way of putting it. Counsel, do you have any questions 4 Mr. CLINGAN. No, sir. Mr. Lennon. Do you have any questions ? Mr. Jonzs. No questions, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lennon. If you find time to carry out my request in this respect, the harsher you make that letter, the more delighted I will be to sign it. Thank you very much, sir. We appreciate your coming. Dr. CHapman. Thank you, sir. I will leave these two documents here. Mr. Lennon. Thank you, sir. (Reports, “Toward a More Effective Use of Food from the Sea by the United States and Man,” and “The Ocean Regime of the Real World,” to be furnished, follow :) TowARD A More EFFECTIVE USE OF Foop FROM THE SEA BY THE UNITED STATES AND MAN (Wilbert McLeod Chapman, Ralston Purina Co. ) TABLE OF CONTENTS Recommendations. Conclusions. Chapter I: United States Ocean Policy and its Flag Fisheries : A. United States Fishery Activity. B. Contrast with situation of the Soviet Flag Fishing Fleet. woe C. et The General Fish Business: (a) Peru. (6) Japan. (c¢) China (Mainland). (d) Russia. (e) Norway. (f) United States. 4. Chapter Il: The Nature of the United States Fish Business: A. B. C. D. United States Use of Fishery Products: (a) Fish meal and Related Products. (6) Shrimp. (c) Tuna. (d@) Frozen Groundfish, Fillets and Steaks. (e) General Comments. Changing Consumption Patterns for Fishery Products in the United States. Changing Organization of the Fish Trade in the United States. The Resource Base Available to United States Flag Fishing Vessels. - 5. Chapter IIL: Specific United States Flag Fisheries : DO OTA OR . The Pacific Sardine or Pilchard. . Menhaden. Oysters. Atlantic Ocean Perch. Atlantie Cod. Haddock. Pacific Mackerel. . Jack Mackerel. . Pacific Herring. . Salmon. . Tuna. . Shrimp. . Crabs. . Flounder and the Trawl Fisheries for Groundfish. 5. Discarded fish. . General Comments Arising from the Consideration of Specific Fisheries. 6. Chapter IV: The Nature of Living Marine Resources, Jurisdiction over Them, and Concepts for Managing Their Use: A. B. Cc: The Nature of Living Resources. Jurisdiction over Fisheries. Concepts of Management for the Use of Common Property Wild Fish Stocks in the High Seas. D. Domestic Concepts of the Use of Common Property Fishery Resources in the United Sta'tes. 7. Chapter V: The Organization and Conduct of Fishery Affairs by the United States: A. B. The General Situation. The Federal Fishery Function. Policy. . Recreational Use Domestically. Environmental Research and its Application. . Central Intergovernmental Oceanic Organization. . Responsibility for Diplomatic Aspects of the International Ocean Affairs of the United States Government. . Responsibility for the Technical Aspects of International Fish- ery Activities of the United States Government. . Management of the Use of Living Aquatic Resources. . Development of the Full Use of Resources. . Resource Assessment. 10. Economic Research. 11. Change in Thrust of Effort. 12. Animal Protein for Nutritional Value. 13. Incentives to Development of U.S. Flag Fishing. 14. Use of Academic Community. 15. Hstuarine Problems. CHA D TARWNE 1112 16. Aquaculture: (a) Oysters, Clams and Mussels. (6) Salmon and Trout. RECOMMENDATIONS 1. Major civilian agencies dealing with aspects of ocean affairs of the U.S. Government should be grouped together in one Depariment of the Ocean | This should include, at least, the National Ocean Data Center, National Ocean Instrumentation Center, Hnvironmental Science Services Administration, Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, fisheries section of Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, and United States Coast Guard. 2. The U.S. Government should seek the prompt establishment of a central inter- governmental oceanic organization within the United Nations family authorized and equipped to deat with all international aspects of ocean investigations and the uses of the sea This should include, at least, the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commis- sion of UNESCO, the Department of Fisheries and Committee on Fisheries of FAO, the International Hydrographic Bureau, the marine activities of the World Meteorological Organization, the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Com- mission, and the marine activities of the Resea™ch and Transportation Division of ECOSOC. 3. There should be formed within the Department of State an Office of Special Assistant to the Secretary for Ocean Affairs which would have lead respon- ‘sibility for attending to the diplomatic aspects of the U.S. Government's inter- national ocean affairs This office should be formed upon the nucleus of the present Office for Special Assistant to the Secretary for Fisheries and Wildlife with the functions and purview of the new office being broadened to include all international aspects of ocean affairs in which the United States is involved. 4. Within the new Depariment of the Ocean there should be established as an agency, bureau or other entity, the Federal fishery function which would have lead agency responsibility for ali Federal activities related to fishery science, development, trade, management, technology, engineering, and administration The Federal Fishery Function should include the functions and personnel pres- ently in the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries and the fisheries section of the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife of the Department of the Interior. 5. The Federal fishery function should operate within the terms of @ policy adopted by the Congress setting out criteria under which the use of living aquatic resources would be managed and developed to provide for rational muttiple use, and particularly for recreational and commercial purposes A suggested formula for such a policy is set out on page 57. 6. The Federal fisheries function should have lead agency responsibility in all technical aspects of international fishery activities of the United States Such responsibility should include the Food from the Sea program: bilateral fishery technical assistance; activities of the United Nations and its specialized agencies involving fisheries; budgetary support for United States participation in International Fisheries Commissions; activities of regional international agen- cies involving fisheries; activity with international credit agencies involving fisheries; and be as responsible and responsive to United States fishing industry activity in the foreign as in the domestic field. It should follow and promote the technical fisheries interests of the United States as freely and actively in the external as in the internal field. 7. The Federal fishery function should have established by new law clear au- thority and responsibility for the management of the use of living aquatic resources within the jurisdiction of the United States in accordance with the policy set out in recommendation While it is appropriate to continue handling fishery management on as local a level as practical, both the development and conservation of living resources must be conducted in the national, rather than ‘the local, interest and clear respon- sibility for doing ‘this must be lodged at the Federal Government level. 1113 8, The Federal fishery function should concentrate its domestic activities at least for the next decade on increasing the production of fish and shelifish by U.S.- flag vessels, primarily from the underutilized resources of the U.S. Conti- nental Shelf and slope regions General goals should be established which the Congress and others could keep in pod as objectives to be met. These should be to double production by U.S. flag vessels within the next decade, and to quadruple it by 2000. 9. The Federal fishery function should broaden and strengthen vigorously its entire program (resource assessment, exploratory fishing, gear development, processing technology, economic research, etc.) aimed at bringing to harvest the very abundant organisms of lower trophic level and smaller size that can be caught in bulk cheaply and manufactured into fish meal, fish oil, fish solubles, fish protein concentrates, and other low cost, high nutritive value protein and other products The most abundant underutilized resources in United States coastal waters, and in the world ocean, are these small, densely schooling, lower trophic level animals. The largest demand for fish in the United States and in the world is in the form of fish meal. This is likely to change into demand for fish protein concentrate for direct human consumption if processing and distribution problems with such products can be solved. Making these enormous resources useful for man is one of the most important contributions the United States could make to the harvest of the sea, both for itself and the world in general. 10. The Federal fishery function should be provided with funds and authority to mount a concentrated drive for a 10- -year period to building the ground fish fisheries of the United States This program should include for this period of time authority to provide vessel construction subsidies and other supports fully equivalent to Canadian supports in these fields. 11. The Federal fishery function should be provided with authority to give tax incentives, under appropriate criteria, to particular U.S.-flag fisheries which it is wished to develop No general incentive would more quickly stimulate production by U.S. flag fishing vessels than appropriate modification of the industry’s tax base along the line of the depletion allowance granted petroleum producers, and land taxes granted farmers. 12. The fishermen’s loan and vessel mortgage insurance programs should have sufficient level of funds authorized to mect all demands upon them These two programs have been very useful to the fishing industry at nominal cost to the government, and little adverse comment from the private banking business. Vessel operators steadily need better access to capital than private business can make available on suitable terms. 13. The Federal fishery function should have a line item in its budget devoted to the support by it of academic research on fishery problems, both in the natural sciences and the social sciences, through grants and contracts, using the normal procedures of having such proposals reviewed by a committee of peers This procedure, so valuable to NASSA, NSF, Navy, AEC, and other govern- ment agencies has been very lightly used in fisheries for a variety of reasons that need correction. 14. The Federal fishery function should strengthen materially its support of developing the production of fish and shellfish for direct consumption by aquaculture. In particular attention should be given to the elimination of institutional barriers preventing the econonvric production of shellfish, salmon and sea-run trout by private enterprise In particular, experiments should be conducted to apply existing knowledge, technology, and private business methods to the production of Pacific salmon and sea-run trout for commercial private purposes by experimentation with runs in small coastal streams entirely on land within Federal control. 15. The Federal fishery function should particularly strengthen materially its economic research and statistical reporting capabilities There is hardly any aspect of the federal fishery function so weak and so badly needed as its economic research and statistical reporting capabilities. 1114 16. The Federal fishery function should pursue a vigorous policy of exploring, assessing the extent and establishing the commercial and recreational pos- sibilities of harvesting, of the particular living resource on the Continental Shelf and slope adjacent to the United States, or available to harvest by citizens of the United States on the high seas The previous system of dividing the fishery work into technology and biology research has been long out moded but not yet discarded. The Federal Fishery Function needs to attack problems before it by a systems approach using what- ever scientific and technical skills the solution to that particular problem needs in a proper mix suited to yielding results, not “in-house” happiness over bureaucratic support. 17. The Federal fishery function must play a much strengthened role in dealing with the estuarine problems of the Nation The marine aquaculture program must depend largely on the estuarine area for its production, and much world living resource production is also dependent upon this area. If it cannot be kept free enough from pollution, silting, and ecological damage to support the animals forming these resources great damage will be done the living aquatic resource base of the nation. 18. The Federal fishery function, in consultation with the sea-grant college pro- gram, should establish an effective mechanism for getting the results of science and technology into the hands of the fisherman in timely fashion and in forms useful to him CONCLUSIONS 1: The production of fish and shellfish from the world ocean, excluding whales, has approximately tripled from 1948 through 1966, coming from about 18 million short tons to 53 million short tons (FAO Statistics). Production has continued to increase for the past two years at about the same rate, but full statistics are not yet available. Total world fish and shellfish production from all waters was 64 million metric tons in 1968 (FAO). 2. There is every reason to think that the world market for fish and shellfish will continue to increase at about the same rate (about triple the rate of human population increase) for the foreseeable future because of the steadily increasing demand for high-grade animal protein with increasing affluence, and the pent up demand in the developing world. 3. There is reasonable concensus among world experts that known reserves of underutilized resources of the kinds now harvested will permit, on a conserva- tive estimate basis, a world-wide production of 200-250 million tons per year on a sustainable basis, given rational management of individual resources by appropri- ate regulation of fishing effort on them. Thus a continued increase of production to a sustainable level 4 to 5 times that presently is had is attainable from known resources of the kinds now used. 4. If technology is improved to harvest economically smaller sized animals (in the range of 1 to 5 inches total length) added reserves can be in the range of 1,000 to 2,000 million tons per year from wild stock. Additional substantial food can be produced from aquaculture, which is already extensively practiced with certain kelps, shellfish and fish. 5. The total value of fish and shellfish production in the world was reckoned by FAO to have been $9 billion in 1966 of which about $7.5 billion came from the ocean. This is considerably more value than the production of all minerals from marine sources (petroleum, gas, and others) which was perhaps as much as $5 billion in 1966, most of which was fossil fuels. It will be a good many years before the value of petroleum and other minerals produced from marine sources equals the value of fish and shellfish harvested from the world ocean. 6. The production of fish and shelifish by United States flag vessels was a little more than 2 million short tons in 1967 (BCF statistics). It had been that high in 1934 and in that 33 years has never exceeded 2.7 million tons (1962). 7. The use of fish and shellfish in the United States has increased from 2.9 million short tons (round weight) in 1948 to 7.1 million‘tons in 1967. The United States has thus become one of the largest users of fish and shellfish in the world. Having 6% of the world’s population it used more than 12% of the world’s production of fish and shellfish. Both total and per capita consumption are rising, have been for twenty years, and there is no sign of leveling off. Present per capita consumption at 70 pounds per year in 1967 is one of the higher in the world, and rate of use in 1968 is above that of 1967. 1115 8. Known resources adjacent to the coast of the United States are capable of yielding about 22 miilion tons per year on a sustainable yield basis, and the United States thus has the largest underutilized marine food resources in the northern hemisphere directly off its coast. It is this which has attracted four- teen countries of Europe and Asia to fishing off the coast of the United States with substantial internal political, and external diplomatic interaction. 9. Thus the production of coastal fishery resources of the United States can be expanded, on the basis of sustainable yield, by a factor of 10 from the level produced by U.S. flag vessels over the past 30 years, and currently they are capable of producing annually 3 times the amount now used by the United States; and market for the production is available in the United States. The projected domestic market for fish and shellfish in the United States for the year 2000 (Marine Science Affairs, 1968 p. 88) is about 15 million short tons per year, which is 6-7 times the present level of production by U.S. flag vessels, but well within the ability of known resources adjacent to the United States to produce. 10. The difference between use of fish and shellfish in the United States and production by U.S. flag vessels has been met by steadily increasing imports. In terms of round weight the proportion of fishery products used in the United States that arose from imports has risen from 20% in 1948 to 71.4% in 1967. It is running higher in 1968 than in 1967. 11. Substantially all of the imports of fishery products into the United States has been imported and marketed, by U.S. fish firms, who have added more or less processing to the imports after arrival and before marketing. For instance, tuna is imported frozen and canned in the United States; shrimp are imported largely in the frozen green headless form and further processed before marketing; frozen fish are largely imported as blocks of frozen fillets which are further proc- essed before distribution; etc. The value of added processing in the United States exceeded $1 billion in 1966. 12. United States fish firms have set up extensive collecting networks for fishery raw material or semi-processed products on a world-wide basis extend- ing through more than 30 countries, primarily in the developing world. This has been accomplished through a variety of methods; wholly owned fishing and processing firms in those countries ; joint ventures either with local entrepreneurs or firms in other fishing countries; the provision of risk capital for vessel or plant construction to local entrepreneurs; the provision of technical assistance for transfer of technology and quality control; the provision of guaranteed market to local entrepreneurs ; etc. 13. One consequence of this has been that U.S. fish firms have been, and are, a substantial factor in the development of the fisheries of the developing world. This has led not only to exports to the United States, but the building of exports to other countries as well both in ‘the industrialized and developing world. It has also led to increased use of fishery products in the country where the de- velopment took place. 14. A second consequence has been an increase in the taxable earnings of U.S. fish firms to a degree not reflected in the statistics of catch of U.S. flag vessels. 15. A third consequence has been a growing dichotomy within the U.S. fish business between the processors and distributors on the one hand, whose business has grown and thrived during the post World War II period both foreign and domestically, and the domestic fisherman and vessel owner whose volume of production has been stagnant for 30 years and whose general earnings have been unsatisfactory in comparison with other United States industry. 16. The rapid increase in use of fishery products in the United States has been in terms of both volume and value. In 1967 the value of the catch to U.S. fish- ermen was $438 million; the declared value of imports was $686 million; the value at the processor level in the United States was $1,193 million; the value in the United States at the wholesale level was $2,151; and the retail value of fishery products sold in the United States was $2,578 million. Nearly half of the latter values ($1,220 million) arose from imports. (BCF statistics. ) 17. Four classes of products comprised nearly 80% (in round weight terms) of the fishery products used in the United States in 1967 (fish meal and soluables, frozen fish, tuna, and shrimp). Hach of these main classes of products (all growing steadily in usage) represent varying problems with relation to capa- bility of being supported by coastal United States resources. 18. Fish meal is overwhelmingly the largest, using about 64% of the round weight equivalent of fish consumed in the United States in 1967. 81.6% of this was imported. This is the product for which very large resources exist in coastal 39 26—563—70—pt. 2 1116 U.S. waters (thread herring, anchovy and various other fish in the Gulf of Mexico and Southeastern states; anchovy and other fish off southern California ). 19. The lack of growth in total production of fish and shellfish by U.S. flag vessels for the past 35 years is a statistical non-sequitur covering over an ex- ceedingly complex and dynamic industry whose parts have varied greatly in productivity and from a variety of causes. Fifteen of the major fisheries are reviewed in some detail. 20. While the fish trade, composed of processors, distributors and brokers have thrived and require no further governmental attention than other manufacturing and marketing industries, the highly diverse fishing end of the business requires the same sort of preferential treatment given other primary producers (such as petroleum and farmers) in order to thrive. It has not had this and this is why it has not thrived. A number of specific problems are described and remedies recommended. 21. In general the production of food and other commodities from living aquatic resources, especially from the ocean, has not been supported by the United States Government. This is the reason why United States production of food from the sea has slipped from second to sixth place in the world since the end of World War II, at the same time consumption of fish by the United States has been increased sharply, and large resources off the continental United States have gone unused. : CHAPTER I—U.S. OCEAN POLICY AND ITS FLAG FISHERIES Policy of the United States in respect of ocean fishing by vessels wearing its flag must be an integral part of the general policy and strategy of the United States, and particularly that for the total use of the ocean. Organic materials provide the sinews of the society—its food and much of its clothing, fiber, energy, drugs, shelter, and a great deal more. Organic matter comes trom living things. They are used from three sources: things that grow on land (agriculture and forestry) ; things that have grown on the land and in the sea and have been fossilized in deposits (petroleum, natural gas, coal, oil shale and tar sand) ; and the living resources of the sea. The living resources of the land and sea are renewable resources which, if properly husbanded and harvested, will provide crops indefinitely, and if properly bred and nurtured can bring forward crops larger and more varied than nature originally provided. Selective breeding, fertilization and husbandry have increased crops from particular areas and resources on land prodigeously in recent generations, and the main barrier to further increase is the amount of solar energy that falls on the land and can be stored by plants in the alchemy of their growth. This process of selective breeding, fertilization and husbandry has barely begun with the living resources of the sea, which are naturally more abundant than those of the land because more solar energy strikes the sea than does the land, living matter thrives in the sea to depths of tens of meters instead of tens of inches as it does on land, and the fertilizers it requires are much more abundant and all pervassive in the sea than on the land. Because of its sophistication, high rate of economic activity, and affluence United States society uses all of these organic materials from all of these sources at rate levels substantially higher than does any other society, and there is no indication that this rate of increased use will do anything but continue to increase for the foreseeable future. The disproportionately high use by United States society. in relation to the rest of the world, of energy and chemicals from fossil fuels and of food, fiber, wool and drugs from agricuiture and forestry is well known. It is not so well realized that the United States, with about 6% of the world’s population, uses about 18% of the total world production of fish and shellfish. that its per capita use of these products at about 70 pounds per year is one of the highest of any country in the world, that this high absolute and per capita use of ocean food products has been increasing sharply and steadily since the end of World War II, and gives every sign of continuing to do so. It is obvious that United States policy must promote access by its society to all of these sources of organics in the abundance, stability of supply, and cheap- ness of cost that will best strengthen the posture of the nation. It has long been bipartisan policy of the United States to increase the abundance, stability of supply, and cheapness of cost of these commodities to other societies in the world, well recognizing that social unrest and its final outburst as war, can most prac- tically be restrained by ease of access, lack of imbalance, and cheapness of cost of food, fibers, fuel, shelter, and drugs 1117 The promotion of agriculture and forestry has been a prime activity of govern- ment since the foundation of the republic and before. Beginning a hundred years and more ago the promotion of such use of the land by the homestead acts, the land grant college act, and the provision of many other incentives to settlers, permitted the settlement of the west. The whole matter of improving agricul- tural production was much stimulated by heavily increased selective subsidies, expanded research, support prices, and many other incentives to the farmer since about 1932. The total Federal contribution to this effort is epitomized by the appropriations to the Department of Agriculture which have been in excess of $7 billion per year in recent years. The individual State of the Union provide other large funds to these purposes. The budget of the U.S. Bureau of Commercial Fisheries runs at only about $50 million a year. Despite all of the outeries about cost, subsidies, and special benefits to agriculture it is obvious that the worth of these activities to the nation has been much greater than their cost. The percentage of income which the United States citizen pays for food is less than that in any other country, and the least in history. The United States can be, and has been (under extremity), the granary of the world and the food support of its allies. The agricultural tech- nology it has thus developed is being transferred steadily to other parts of the world to relieve hunger, want and disease. The contribution of this to the posture of the United States and the welfare of itself and the world has been out of all proportion to its cost. Similarly great incentives have been provided to the fossil fuel industries by the Government, and this has been particularly true of the petroleum industry for many years. The 27% tax depletion allowance has provided enormous incen- tive to development of these resources on a world-wide basis, and this has been expanded by import controls (as with agriculture), close integration with both foreign and domestic policy, and the ability to combine and act together in certain situations in manners not permitted other enterpreneurs. Again ‘there have been continuous outcries about the cost of this, and the preferential benefits to that industry. Again the benefits to the nation have grossly outweighed the cost in the simple facts that the United Sates petroleum industry dominates this branch of industry in the world, has had the ability to provide the United States and its allies with abundant energy in times of peace and war, has had the strength to conduct the research which has spun off the great new petro-chemical industries whose products now pervade our society, and the ability to continuously explore for, discover, and bring into economic production enormous reserves of resources in all parts of the world, both on the land and under the sea. All this has been done while keeping the cost of energy and the other products from these resources at such a low level that the social and economic benefits to society far outweigh the costs. The third large source of organic material, the living resources of the sea, has been very nearly ignored by the United States for the past two generations. Expenditures and activities to promote production from these enormous resources have been kept at low level; incentives have not been provided for domestic fishermen to go upon the sea; basic and applied research on ocean resources has been poorly funded; management of their use has been generally left to the 50 State Governments; incentives and aids have been provided to foreign ocean producers to compete with national industry ; tariff and other barriers to imports have been lowered to encourage the products of foreign fishermen to enter the domestic market; stringent application has been made of the anti-trust regula- tions which prevent cooperation among business entities normal to the agricul- tural and petroleum fields; world wide operations of United States firms have not been integrated to foreign policy as with either agricultural or petroleum firms; incentives have not been provided for fishing firms to explore, develop and produce. The detail and results of this inattention are treated below but can be summed up by saying that the catch of U.S. flag vessels was a little less in 1967 than it was in 1934; 71.4% by original weight of the fish and shellfish used by the United States in 1967 was imported at a cost of $687 million (a fair percentage of the foreign exchange imbalance) ; and that known living resources in coastal waters are so underutilized that production from them could be increased by a factor of 10. The attraction of these large underused resources is so great that fishermen of 14 nations in Europe and Asia come to these coasts for these harvests and take from them each year somewhat more than half as much as do U.S. flag fishermen, which results in considerable political and diplomatic interaction. 1118 There is a trenchant difference between obtaining access to, and managing the use of, living resources of the land and fossil fuels on the one hand, and the living resources of the ocean on the other. Substantially all land resources, including those of the continental shelf, are the property of some person, entity, or group of people organized into a government. In contrast the living resources of the high seas (which cover more than 3% of the earth surface by any definition now used) are the common property of all sovereigns, and first become private property only when reduced to possession; This characteristic of marine living resources, plus their highly migratory nature, gives rise to economics of activity respecting them, national and private policies toward their management and use, international implications growing out of their management and use, and aspects of access to them quite different than those applying to land resources. Aside from maintaining continuing access to this major primary source of organic material for the nourishment of its industry and people, the international character of these high seas resources require that the general policy and strategy of the United States respecting the use of the ocean must take their use by it into account. Such a general policy will require to include the following as major goals at the present stage of history : 1. To use the ocean to stabilize world order by providing for food and other natural resources, by keeping the oceans open to navigation by all, by preserving the seas as a source of recreation, and by using the ocean to mount ventures with truly international objectives, particularly in advancing the frontiers of planetary knowledge; 2. To promote the economic and social interests of the United States by pro- viding the means and safeguards to profitable investments and a more effective use of the ocean ; 3. To use the ocean in manners designed to maintain the validity and credibility of a nuclear deterrent so long as that is needed for promoting peace; and 4. To provide the capability of effectively deterring any attempt by other nation states, jointly or severally, to enlarge their sphere of influence by sub- version, or wars of liberation, in manners substantially threatening world order. Within such general ocean policy goals a fishing industry can contribute to the support of the domestic economy and its food desires, to enlarging foreign trade, to balancing the foreign exchange flow, to providing programs of technical assist- ance, and, at least in times of stress, to conduct auxiliary functions useful to the military. A. U.S. fishery activity 1. In terms of volume of production the catch of fish and shellfish by U.S. flag vessels was about 2 million short tons in 1967. This was a little less than produc- tion in 1934 and 1947, and there has been no persistent trend up or down in total catches during this thirty-five year period. In terms of round weight the proportion of supply of fishery products to the United States provided by U.S. flag vessels has dropped steadily. In 1948 it was 80%, in 1957—_67%, and in 1967—28.6%. 2. The export of domestic fishery products was valued at $82 million in 1967. This was a little more than double the annual level during the previous decade. This was about three-tenths of 1% of total exports by the United States in 1967. 3. In terms of value the cost of imported fishery products was $687 million in 1967. This was second only to 1966, and 1968 record will be higher than either. This value has increased steadily in the post-war period and sharply in recent years (1965—$601 million). They were valued at $198 million in 1950 and $299 million in 1957. The value of fishery product imports has grown to a ponderable proportion of the United States negative balance of international payments, and provides about 3% of the value of all imports. 4, The United States gave bilateral technical assistance in fishery development in terms of tens of millions of dollars in the period directly after World War Ii, but in the last decade this has tapered off to nearly nothing. U.S. flag fishing vessels have not been used in such work for a number of years, nor have fisher- men. Such bilateral technical assistance in marine fishery development as now exists in United States policy is pretty well restricted to modest scientific, admin- istrative and advisory services, and training and travel grants. The U.S. fishing industry is little involved with this remnant. The United States provides budgetary, moral and advisory support of a modest nature to multilateral fishery technical assistance projects of consequential im- . 1119 portance on a world basis through the United Nations Development Program and FAO Department of Fisheries. There is beginning to be substantial support for fishery development projects in the developing world by the World Bank, and associated international credit organizations, and in this the United States pro- vides its proportion of investment funds. These projects now involve expendi- tures by all concerned of about $25 million per year. It supports in a similar manner, and on a lesser scale, related scientific work through the Intergovern- mental Oceanographic Commission of UNESCO and the World Meteorological Organization. It is a member of nine intergovernmental fishery conservation commissions, whose scientific and managerial work it supports with an annual budget of somewhat more than $2 million. The U.S. flag fishing industry is little involved in any of this except as an object of the work of the fishery commissions. FAO Department of Fisheries draws little upon fishing masters or nonscientific personnel trained in the U.S. fishing industry for its staff in these matters. The processing and marketing segments of the United States fish business is involved to a greater or less extent in the active development of the fisheries of upwards of 30 countries and is one of the more important factors in fishery development in the developing world. It uses personnel trained in the United States flag fisheries rather extensively in these wide spread activities. This is not related in any direct way to United States policy or official technical assist- ance programs, and is little known of by officials responsible for the latter. It is not supported in any consequential manner by the United States Government. The sum of it is unrecorded. 5. At times in past history U.S. flag fishing vessels have provided support of greater or less importance to naval activities, particularly in times of stress, from the standpoint of vessel and crew strength and intelligence. The last such occa- sion was the Pacific War when a considerable segment of the tuna fleet was taken into Navy service, and other fleets of smaller individual vessel size performed coastal patrol duty for periods of time. The growing technological specializa- tion of the U.S. Navy since that time, and the relative stagnation in growth of the U.S. flag fishing fleet in the intervening time, have divorced the two interests so that at the present time little consequential relationship exists between the two. Thus from the standpoint of five major fields in which a national flag fishing industry can contribute to the posture of a major sea power, that of the United States is of little consequence to it. The U.S. flag fishing fleet has been stable as to overall physical productivity for thirty years, it provides a decreasing share of fishery products used by the United States economy (which is now below 30% of such use), and its contribution in value to the Gross National Product is inconsequential; the value of export products for which it provides the base is growing, but they amount to less than half of 1% of the value of total exports; the contribution to the foreign exchange balance is substantial and negative, the costs of fishery imports exceeding those of exports by about $605 million in 1967, with the gap growing between value of fishery imports and exports rather steadily; the contribution of the U.S. flag fishing fleet either to governmentally sponsored technical assistance or military and diplomatic posture is negligible. B. Contrast with situation of the Soviet-fiag fishing fleet It is valid to contrast the contribution of Soviet fishing strength to Soviet posture with that of the United States, as noted above, because these two nation states are the principal present elements in the world power structure and are competing on many fronts. 1. In terms of volume of production the catch of fish and shellfish by Soviet flag vessels was 5.8 million short tons in 1966. The current five year plan antici- pates production to be about 10 million short tons in 1975. It had been 1.7 tons in 1938, and 2.8 million tons in 1957. The accurate value of the 1966 catches are not at hand, but can be reckoned at not less than $1 billion at dockside. 2. As of 1967 fish and fish products made up 34.2% of the animal protein sup- ply of the U.S.S.R. The per capita consumption of fish products in U.S.S.R. was 5.2 kilograms in 1913, was 13.5 kilograms in 1966, and is planned to be 20 kilo- grams in 1970. Three billion rubles ($3.2 billion) have been allocated to improving the capital structure of the fish business during the current five year plan. While full statistics of imports and exports are not at hand it is known that imports of fish products have declined relative to production and absolutely, and that the export of fish products has expanded steadily. 3. Fishery development forms a prominent part of Soviet technical assistance. Group fellowhip tours, seminars and studies in fishery development and tech- 1120 nology in cooperation with FAO, and involving fishery students from Asia, Africa and Latin America, have become a recurrent and important source of such assist- ance to countries in those regions. Bilateral fishery development schemes of im- portant size and continuing benefit have been, or are being, implemented with Cuba, Senegal, Ghana, United Arab Republic, Yemen, Sudan, Somalia, Tanzania and Indonesia. Assistance of lesser, but consequential extent, has been rendered to South Yemen, India, Pakistan and Burma. The incidental sale of fish from Russian vessels has yielded substantial amounts of currencies, as well as render- ing nutritional benefit, to such countries as Congo, Nigeria, Ghana, Dahomey, Togo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Yemen, South Yemen, and Tanzania. 4. Russian-flag fishing vessels work in all seas: Arctic, Antarctic, Pacific, Atlantic and Indian Ocean. They fish regularly off Alaska, Washington, Oregon, California, in the Gulf of Mexico, off Florida, the middle Atlantic States, and New England. The foreign bases established for their use in Cuba, Senegal, Hgypt, Yemen, Somalia, Tanzania, and Indonesia are conveniently located rela- tive to important channels of merchant marine travel, and possible future naval action. Well instrumented Soviet fishing vessels are ubiquitous where there are United States or NATO naval maneuvers, space or special weapons shots in prospect, or regular military activities by the United States being conducted (such as Guam, Rota Bay, California, ete.). The military consequence of Rus- sian fishing activity on a world wide basis is not known, but it is certainly in a different order of magnitude than the contribution of the United States flag fishing fleet to United States military posture. C.. The general fish business There are some general movements in the fish business that are useful to look at in a consideration of the situation of U.S. flag fishing. Among these are: 1. World Production.—W orld production of fish and shellfish was 23 million short tons in 19388; 23.2 million tons in 1950; 34.6 million in 1957 ; 44 million tons in 1960; and 62.5 million tons in 1966. While the complete figures for 1967 are not yet available they were higher than those for 1966. It is likely that world produc- tion will be close to 65 million short tons in 1968. Total value in 1966 at fishermen level was about $9 billion, well more than twice the value of all minerals (includ- ing petroleum) taken from the Six nations out of the approximately 138 in the world presently caught about 57% of seabed the world total in 1966. These were, in production rank, Peru, Japan, Mainland China, U.S.S.R., Norway, and the U.S. The statistics for Mainland China are open to serious doubt since about 1957. The situation of each of these national fisheries is quite different. (a) Peru.—The Peruvian fishery is supported almost entirely by one species, anchovetta, which is made into one product, fish meal (and oil). Total landings were 26,400 short tons in 1988, still only a half million tons in 1957, and then were 9.7 million short tons in 1966 (having been a little higher in both 1964 and 1967). All of the fish are caught off the coast of Peru and within a few mile of shore. Although the per capita consumption of fish in Peru trends upward, substantially all of the product of the fishery is exported, on a world wide basis. The fishery is conducted on a profit basis by private industry. The chief national interest in the fishery is in support of the domestic economy and in the earning of foreign ex- change. It provides the largest export item for Peru in terms of both volume and value. (b) Japan.—The Japanese fishery, unlike that of Peru, has been a major national industry for many years. Both pre-war and post-war, Japan was the top fish producer in the world. It remained so until Peru surged ahead of it in 1963. The value of the Japanese catch is much higher than that of Peru. The average value of the Japanese catch is just under $250.00 per ton, whereas that of Peru is just under $10.00 per ton. The Japanese fishery is in the hands of private industry and operates fully on a profit basis, but with much policy guidance and support from Government. In the post-war period the national policy under which it was directed included maximization of physical yield from the fishery, maximization of the accu- mulation of capital through the fishery, and maximization of use of labor in the fishery. In recent years the tightening labor situation domestically has relaxed the third objective. Fishery products are the prime animal protein content of the Japanese diet and prime earner of foreign exchange. The resources around the home islands are heavily and fully used but since about 1952 the Japanese fisheries have spread out actively to world wide extent. and are still increasing both in productivity and geographic range. In the last two 1121 or three years Japan, despite increasing catches, has become a substantial net importer of fish, buying what its market demands and selling that for which it can get a better price abroad. In the first few years after the war Japanese fishermen had difficulty in obtaining fishing bases around the world. In the past decade this has substantially changed and much Japanese fishing now works out of foreign bases as well as operating in a long-range manner from the home islands and in local fisheries out of the home islands. From almost any viewpeint the Japanese flag fishing industry, except for total volume of catch, is the most broadly based, generally expert, experienced, and productive in the world. While operating at high levels of private initiative it is integrated at all levels from indivdual fishermen through vessel owners, proc- essors, marketers, trading firms, Fishery Agency and Foreign Ministry and Ministry of International Trade and Industry in a most effective and generally efficient way that renders the industry as a whole most responsive to the vagaries of the fish business and innovative to the point of daring in its response to stress. (c) China (Mainland).—The production of fish and shellfish in Mainland China is unknown within broad range of error. In 1938 it was purportedly a half million tons and in 1957 it was rated at 3.3 million short tons. The last reported figure was 6.4 million short tons in 1960, but how much this is composed of fish and ‘how much of propoganda is uncertain. The bulk of production is purported to be from fresh waters and Chinese fishermen do not operate far off shore the China mainland. There appears to have been little modernization of ocean fish- ing and there is no long range fleet. (ad) Russia.—Prior to the middle 1950’s the production of fish by Russia was chiefly from internal and coastal waters. It was 1.7 million short tons in 1938, 1.7 million tons in 1950, and 2.2 million tons in 1953. Beginning about 1954 Rus- sia began a solid push toward developing its existing fisheries and extending them out into distant waters. Under the pressure of succeeding five year plans it has developed its high seas fisheries in a spectacular manner. Without the easy availability of enormous coastal resources (as with Peru), or long high seas tradition (as with Japan and Norway), or technologically sophisticated indus- trial background (as with the United States), or the climatic and socio-economic prediliction to pond-raising of fish (as with China), it has forged steadily ahead by brute strength, national purpose, and the application of major amount of capital and labor to become a major fishing nation of the high seas. Some further details are treated below. This is a fully State owned enterprise carried out by massive application of capital, specialized labor and elaborate planning. It is a fully integrated industry beyond the seale even of Japan. It is fully an instrument of national policy. Strategically it forms, with naval and merchant marine expansion, a major part in the thrust to break out of the encirclement strategy of the free-world coalition by obtaining full access to the world through use of the free highways of the ocean. Diplomatically it has been an instrument of consequence in the technical assistance field. Economically it has filled the internal desire and need for animal protein in the Russian diet which could not be filled so quickly or cheaply through land based internal animal husbandry. Increasingly it has reduced the necessity to spend foreign currency to buy fish (formerly done on a substantial scale from Scandinavia and England in particular), and has begun to become a net earner of foreign exchange. Hach million ton increase in landings equates to a saving in foreign exchange of somewhat more than $200 million. Catches have inclined steadily upward to reach a total of 5.8 million short tons in 1966. They are scheduled to reach 10 million short tons by 1975, at which time it is anti- cipated that they will be yielding $100 million per year in foreign exchange aside from their contribution to the domestic nutrition and economy. This tremendous tour de force has not arisen out of Russian technology. There has been liberal application of foreign exchange to buy the best technology from whereever it could be had. Danish, English, and West German shipyards produced most of the first classes of high seas vessels, and this purchasing prac- tice has since spread to France, Poland, Japan and East Germany in a substan- tial manner. Processing machinery and modern instrumentation and gear was similarly purchased abroad and adapted to Russian conditions. It is estimated that $4 billion was invested in expanding the fish business between 1946 and 1965. The current five year plan has allocated $3.2 billion for this purpose. ‘Although high initial dependence was placed upon adaptation of foreign tech- nology to Russian fishery needs in these formative years, great emphasis is now being given quite successfully to strengthening Russian technology in this field. 1122 A massive educational and training program has developed particularly for the needs of the fishing industry at all levels from oceanographic science of consider- able sophistication to the training of fishing crews for action in all oceans and under all climatic conditions. The Russian fishery expansion has been noted for its successful inaleveksons in the application of science and technology, together with carefully integrated planning, to the problems of fishery development and production. In this it is without a current peer in the world. With substantially no natural advantages or tradition of high seas enterprise Russia has become in fifteen years time tne fourth (and probably actually the third) largest fish producer in the world, and is headed toward being the first in less than five years. It operates anywhere in the world where marine living resources are found in economically harvestable quantities. It searches out the location of such resources with more energy and competence than any other nation currently exerts. (e) Norway.—Norway has always lived by the sea and depended heavily on cod and herring for the bulk of its fish production. Aside from whaling in Antarctica and elsewhere, its fishing has been, and is, largely restricted to the North Atlantic and the adjacent Arctic. Its current surge forward in produc- tion is attributable mainly to a successful adaptation of scientific scouting and search procedures, sonar location procedures, and power block plus synthetic webbing in purse seine procedures, to increasing production of herring, mackerel and capelin from the Northeast Atlantic, and chiefly for the production of fish meal. Production was 1.1 million short tons in 1938, 1.9 million tons in 1957 and 3.1 million short tons in 1966. Norwegian fishery development is not spectacular or explosive as with Peru, Japan and Russia, but it is solid. Although conducted on a profit basis as free enterprise there is a much higher level of governmental guidance and support than in Peru, the United States, or probably even Japan. Although an important part of the internal economy, and basic to the nutritional requirements of the nation, the chief emphasis is on producing fish products for export and the earning of foreign exchange. The fish- ing industry has filled an important role in Norwegian technical assistance. This has been particularly successful in India, and is becoming so in Ghana, but has also been helpful in Burma, and to a limited extent elsewhere. (f) United States.—Unilike the situation in Peru, Japan, Russia, and Norway the United States fiag fishing industry has had little to contribute to United States strategy, veneral posture, policy or social purpose in the years since the end of World War Ti, although United States Government and academic scien- tist’s have contributed in a major way to world-wide fishery and ocean science, and the United States fish business aside from U.S. flag fishing has had a power- ful effect on world wide fishery development in other nations. In some respect in fact, U.S. flag fishing has been a nuisance to United States policy and foreign relations. Krom the end of World War II until about 1965 the United States not only did not need any extra food but had embarrassing surplus, of which it had great diffi- culty in disposing. This was the case with animal protein (dairy products and eggs particularly) as with cereals and edible oils. The production of the fisheries, if increased, would only have added to this surplus of animal protein and edible oil. For at least the period 1945 to 1955 (and actually continuing longer in a more passive way) the United States had a strong policy objective of building up the economies of allied countries and creating conditions so they could earn dollars. A strong need was felt to redress foreign exchange balance in favor of foreign countries. Politicalxpower in this field in the United States lay with exporters and not with domestic fish producers. After the first surge of enthusiasm for re- building and the economies of war torn countries and world trade, substantial enthusiasm and political force arose to aid in building the economy of the develop- ing world. All this applied particularly, at first, to Canada, Mexico, Japan, and the countries of Western Europe. It more recently has been applied to countries of the developing world. These objectives could be rather quickly served in fisheries by assisting initially with development funds and materials. and providing mar- ket for the product. This policy has worked quite successfully, but to the dis- advantage of U.S. domestic flag fishing whose production was in the direction of impeding the rapid application of this policy, and whose political power inter- nally was small, and continuously shrinking during the period. The development of the strategies and technologies associated with the nuclear deterrent policy brought a quite rapid divorcement between the United States 1123 Navy and U.S. flag fishing fleet after 1945. There was simply not much of im- portance that the U.S. flag fishing industry could do for the Navy that the Navy could not do for itself better, cheaper, and more quickly. For the first five years after the war elements of the fishing industry were of considerable value in assisting the application of technical assistance in Western Europe, Latin America and Asia. After this short period this sort of bilateral technical assistance by the U.S. tapered off rather sharply and for the past decade has been at a low level and desultory, to the point where it has scarcely existed for the last five years. The domestic U.S. flag fishing industry thus has had no vital national role to play in the post war period as it has had in the other leading fish producing countries of the world. It has been almost exclusively without government guidance outside the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, and with as little govern- mental support as the Executive Branch of the Government could contrive and keep domestic controversy within reasonable limits. The Bureau of Commercial Fisheries has not had high level support either in the Department of the Interior or in the Bureau of the Budget because domestic fish production was not critical to the objectives of the Executive Branch of the Government. Agriculture had the votes and the political power in the food field, not the domestic fishermen. The United States fish business has thus become exclusively profit motivated in an exceedingly competitive millieu, in which the policies of its government increased the competitive stress rather than relieved it. Asa matter of fact the U.S. flag fishing business has been more a nuisance than a benefit to the policies of the Executive Branch of the National Government over the past twenty years. Fighting for places in the internal market the ground fish industry, the tuna industry, and the shrimp industry have taken vigorous actions seeking tariff or quota protection that have been difficult for the Executive to fight off, and which have repeatedly caused embarrassment to it with such allies and friends as Japan, Peru, Mexico, Canada, Norway, ete. Fighting for protection to fish in the high seas off Latin America the shrimp and tuna indus- tries have kept the Department of State in hot water continuously in Latin America, and in respect of the whole Law of the Sea on the broad international front. Fighting for protection against fishing ground competition from Asian and Huropean fishermen in coastal waters of the United States, from Maine to Nome, Alaska, has caused continuous embarrassment to the Executive Branch of the United States Government in the Congress and with the Foreign Offices of affected nations. In these struggles to survive a dichotomy of purpose and thrust has developed between the domestic distant water fishermen and the coastal fishermen of the United States that has frequently disturbed the govern- ment and decreased the political influence of both sorts of fishermen with it, to their mutual disadvantage. Curious side effects have arisen. By 1955 a marked schism had developed be- tween the U.S.-flag fishing industry and the domestic processors that purchased their product and marketed it. This has continued to grow. This was particularly the case in the ground fish and tuna industries, where the processors and dis- tributors became increasingly dependent upon foreign supplies and increasingly disinterested in the socio-economic problems of the domestic fishermen. In the competitive struggle to keep alive, the processors and distributors centered their activities increasingly on their particular problems to the extent that the large industries related to fish meal, shrimp, salmon, tuna, and ground fish became in- creasingly compartmented away from each other. Decreasing profit and frag- mentation of effort diminished the taking of innovative risk and destroyed such national representation as the industry had emerged from the war with. Inter- action among the fragments became more evident than cooperation. The result was that both the Congress and the Executive Branch were increasingly impor- tuned by highly specialized interests within the overall industry to attend ‘to their specific problems as specialized interests, rather than as national problems of importance to large segments or the whole, of United States society. The fishing industry as a whole, instead of being an instrument of the society in this field, became an annoying, squabbling group of special interests, none of which was able to secure the attention of the society or government to the real problems that required solution if it was to become a socially useful instrument in this field. In the past decade the processors and distributors of fishery products have continued to prosper and grow as the internal market for fishery products de- veloped. They increasingly have searched for product and raw material to fill their needs on a world wide basis. In the past decade this series of branches of 1124 the United States fish business had become increasingly effective in stimulating fishery development on a world-wide basis, particularly in respect of shrimp, tuna, fish meal and ground fish. They have paid continuously a less amount of attention to the product of domestic fishermen as the proportion of fishery prod- ucts consumed in the United States has dropped from the 80% dependence on domestic supplies that existed in 1948 to the 28.6% dependence that existed in 1967 (it will be less in 1968 than it was in 1967). Accordingly the U.S. flag fishermen have become increasingly less important to their direct customers as they have become to the several aspects of United States policy and strategy noted above. In these frustrating circumstances the the fishermen from the particular coastal area have importuned their particular Senators and Congressmen for increased federal attention to their specific problems and this has resulted in further fragmentation of remedial measures, couched in terms of regional and specific palliatives rather than as solutions to problems having national importance and scope. In consequence of the absence of any national policy, or recognition of any national need, some fisheries have thrived (tuna, shrimp, king crab) on perse- verance and economic opportunity, others have vanished or diminished through lack of conservation measures (California sardine, Pacific mackerel, oysters, and now menhaden), or stagnated from lack of opportunity (ground fish), and some have just wasted away or held level by effects outside their control (oysters, clams, and the other products of polluted estuaries). In overall per- spective United States flag production has held about level for 30 years, having been 2.8 million tons in 1938, 2.8 million tons in 1957, and 2.1 million tons in 1967. It will be a little less in 1968 than in 1967. CHAPTER II—U.S. USE OF FISHERY PRODUCTS THE NATURE OF UNITED STATES FISH BUSINESS The use of fishery products in the United States for all purposes has increased steadily over the years in both absolute and per capita terms. In 1948 this use (in terms of round weight) was 2.9 million short tons, in 1957 it was 3.7 million tons, and in 1967 it was 7.1 million tons (14,187 million pounds). It will be higher in 1968 than in preceeding years. The per capita annual use in 1967 was about 70 pounds. This is one of the higher statistics of per capital consumption of fishery products in the world. The effect has been to make the United States the largest importer of fish in the world, one of the most lucrative fish markets in the world, and user of about 138% of the total production of fish and shellfish in the world, in spite of having only about 6% of the world’s population. The rapid increase in use of fishery prod- ucts in the United States has been in terms of both volume and value. In 1948 the value of U.S. catch at the fishermens level plus the value of fishery products imported was $428 million in 1957 it was $652 million, and ten years later (in 1967) it had nearly doubled to $1,125 million. It will be higher in 1968 than in previous years. (a) Fish meal and related products—U.S. use of fishery products In terms of volume of product used, and increase in use, the overwhelming item has been the category called industrial fishery products by the Bureau of Com- mercial Fisheries. In terms of round weight this use amounted to 1.8 billion pounds in 1948, 3.1 billion pounds in 1957, and 9.1 billion pounds in 1967 (or 65% of the total supply of fishery products to the United States). In 1968 the volume, and percent of total use, will be higher than in previous years. This category is primarily composed of fish meal and it is this commodity which has experienced the Spectacular rise in use. It is used in animal husbandry and primarily in chicken nutrition. The use of fish for pet food has been steadily in- creasing too. The increase in supply of this commodity has come chiefly from imports. In 1948 imports supplied 23.1% of the total; in 1957—26.1%; and in 1967—81.6% of the total. In 1968 the supply, and the percentage of it supplied by imports, will be higher than in preceding years, with 1968 the highest on record. Use of fish meal alone will be nearly 850,000 tons in 1968 which would be the round weight equivalent of about 4.7 million tons of fish, or more than double the total catch of fish and shellfish by United States vessels in terms of physical volume. Most of the imports of fish meal come from Peru. The imports non-edible fish products to the United States in 1967 were valued at $155 million, or 23% of the total value of fishery imports. 1125 (6) Shrimp The single crop of greatest value to United States flag fishing vessels is shrimp. In 1967 this yielded United States fishermen a little more than $100 million at dockside (nearly a fifth of their total income). In 1948 the total supply of shrimp to the United States in terms of heads-off weight, was 121 million pounds; in 1957—191 million pounds—and in 1967—395 million pounds, which is the equivalent of about 600 million pounds round weight. The United States market for shrimp continues to increase at a fairly steady rate, which is greater than the rate of population increase, and there is every reason to believe that this will continue for the foreseeable future. It needs to be kept in mind that there are two main kinds of shrimp presently sold in the United States, the Penaeid and the Pandalid shrimp. Most of the market has been built on Penaeid shrimp, which come from the lower latitudes (tropics and sub-tropics around the world). These form the predominant part of United States caught shrimp (chiefly from the Gulf of Mexico, Southeast Atlantic States and Caribbean area). There are not enough resources of this sort of shrimp in United States coastal waters to much more than half fill the present United States market. Accordingly United States proc- essors have stimulated fisheries for this kind of shrimp all around the world to provide raw material for their markets here, and they are still doing so. Re- sources of this sort in coastal United States waters are producing about at maxi- mum sustainable yield level (which varies a good deal from year to year, de- pending upon environmental changes). On the other hand the underutilized resources of Pandalid shrimp in coastal United States waters are very large. The best present estimate is that this resource off Alaska alone will eventually produce about as much Pandalid shrimp as the Gulf of Mexico produces Penaeid shrimp when the fishery there is fully developed. This sort of shrimp also occurs in commercial volume as far south as Northern California on the Pacific Coast and the Gulf of Maine on the Atlantic coast. Mature Pandalid shrimp on average are much smaller than Penaeid shrimp and they do not occupy quite the same market in the United States. In fact it is questionable that the growing market for Pandalid shrimp is even very strongly competitive with that for Penaecid shrimp. The chief thing that has held back the production and sale of the small Pandalid shrimp has been the technology of peeling them economically and preparing them for market. This problem is now in the process of solution and their catch is going up sharply on the Pacific coast (chiefly Alaska). Production was 15 million pounds as recently as 1964, and 59 million pounds in 1967. It is estimated that this will continue to grow quite rapidly as least to the 300 million pound per year level. The total United States flag catch of all kinds of shrimp, while varying from year to year, has increased slowly over the years. The increase in supply for the past twenty years has come chiefly, however, from imports. These yielded 18% of the total supply in 1951, 36% in 1957, and 51% in 1967 (having been 57% in 1966, but reduced in 1967 by the extraordinarily large crop of Penaeid shrimp that year in the Gulf of Mexico plus the sharply growing Pandalid production in Alaska). The United States now imports shrimp from upwards of fifty countries, of which Mexico is the most important supplier. In many of these countries the product is from fisheries established by United States firms, sometimes as wholly owned subsidiaries using in some cases U.S. flag vessels with U.S. skippers, some- times as joint ventures with local entrepreneurs, sometimes foreign owned ven- tures supported by U.S. private industry loan capital, and sometimes wholly foreign ventures stimulated only by guaranteed markets in the United States. The value of shrimp imports to the United States in 1967 was more than $150 million, or somewhat more than a fifth the total value of all fishery imports. (c) Tuna Substantially all tuna used in the United States is used in the canned form. It provides much the largest volume and value of canned sea food used in the United States. United States canned tuna production in 1967 was about 20 million standard cases, or about half the total canned fishery products produced in the United States. The canned weight of the total supply of tuna to the United States was 454 million pounds, of which 14.4% was canned imports and the rest canned in the United States. The wholesale value of the canned tuna supply in 1967 was above $350 million or about 12% of the total value of fishery products at the wholesale level in that year. 1126 The consumption of canned tuna (as with shrimp) continues to grow at a more rapid rate than the population. In terms of canned weight the supply of tuna to the United States was 140 million pounds in 1948, 277 million pounds in 1957, and 454 million pounds in 1967. The percentage of this supplied by imports was 7.57% in 1948—49.4% in 1957—and 45.2% in 1967 (having been 52.8% in 1966, but reduced in 1967 by extraordinarily heavy landings by U.S. flag vessels). The actual catch by U.S. flag vessels has held reasonably level for the past twenty years, having been 329 million pounds in 1948, 304 million pounds in 1957—332 million pounds in 1966—but going up sharply to 427 million pounds in 1967. In the past two years approximately $30 million worth of new long-range tuna clippers has been added to the fleet, mostly from private financing, and the yield from this larger U.S. flag tuna fleet is beginning to be felt. As with shrimp, there are not enough tuna off the coast of the United States to fill the market. As a matter of fact most of the production by U.S. flag vessels (as noted in more detail below) is caught south of the United States off western Latin America and West Africa (chiefly the former). There are supplies avail- able off Northeast United States, in the Atlantic, but so far they have not proven large enough, or stable enough in occurrence, to support much of a regular commercial fisheries. In consequence the U.S. tuna producers have steadily increased their imports of frozen tuna for canning for twenty years, buying tuna from foreign catches in the tropical world ocean everywhere, not only the Pacific, but the Atlantic and Indian Ocean, and establishing production bases outside the continental United States to advance this purpose. They use well more than one-third of all the tuna caught in the world. The value of tuna imports in 1967 was approxi- mately $100 million, with a little more than one-half (about $55 million) being in the frozen form for canning in the United States. The value of all tuna imports was a little less than one-fifth the total value of all fishery imports in'1967. (ad) Frozen groundfish, fillets and steaks The supply of frozen ground fish, fillets, and steaks to the United States was 256 million pounds in 1948, 358 million pounds in 1957, and 541 million pounds in 1967. This equates roughly, in round weight, to 845 million pounds in 1948, 1,181 million pounds in 1957; and 1,900 million pounds in 1967. As with shrimp and tuna, the United States market for these commodities increase at a more rapid rate than the population increase, and there is no reason to believe this will not continue to be the case for a long time. These commodities provide the raw material for fish portions, fish sandwiches, fish sticks, fish chips, and a number of other new products which continue to proliferate and attract new demand throughout the United States in sharp contrast to the condition of a generation ago when these sorts of fish were rarely attainable very far inland from the sea-coast or Great Lakes. The popularitly of fish in these new frozen forms continues to increase at a more rapid rate than population as quality at the customer level, means of distribution, and familiarity with the products, in the interior in particular, continues to increase. This can be expected to continue into the foreseable future. The supply of these fishery commodities to the United States in 1967 was about 523 million pounds in terms of round weight. The imports were 369 million pounds, or about 70% of the total. The value of the imports are hard to calculate from existing published figures because the products come in in different forms, but largely in semi-processed forms as frozen slabs or block of dressed fish. Per- haps a valuation of $80 million for the actual imports in 1967 would be in reach of the proper value at this level. The situation of the groundfish industry from which these products is re- ceived is complex, and will be treated in greater detail below. At this point it is sufficient to say that there are large supplies of fish suitable for these products in United States coastal waters. Some of these (particularly in the Northwest Atlantic) are fully utilized, or in some cases, overfished by both United States and foreign fishermen. Some of these (particularly in Alaska and down along the Pacifie coast) are fairly fully utilized by domestic and foreign fishermen. Some of these (particularly along the Pacific coast and off Alaska, and to some extent in the Gulf of Mexico), are substantially underutilized. The trawler fleet of United States flag vessels which produces this sort of fish has been the part of the U.S. flag fishing fleet most seriously influenced by inattention, invasion of market by foreign fish with U.S. Government assistance, and by the subsidization of foreign competitive fleets. 1127 (e) General comments The purpose of singling out these four classes of fishery products for particular identification is to note their combined importance in the total United States fishery product market. Together they used just short of 90% of the total fish supply used in the United States in 1967, in terms of round weight, and in terms of value at the wholesale level the products made from them (from imported as well as U.S. flag fishing vessels) was about half of the total for the United States ($1.2 billion). These are the four classes of fishery products for which the market in the United States has been increasing for the past twenty years at a rate greater than that of the population. Obviously, these are the four prime categories of fishing products in the United States when considered from the viewpoints of growth and demand, volume of use, value of product, and total effect on United States flag fishing. In the case of two of these commodity classes (tuna and shrimp) physical volume production by U.S. flag vessels has held reasonably constant over recent years and in both instances now seems to be inclining upward slightly. The share of these two markets provided by imports has crept up to slightly over 50% of the total. United States processors and distributors of these two product classes have grown rapidly in volume of their business, have generally prospered, and have expanded broadly in foreign as well as domestic ventures. Still the two domestic fisheries providing raw material are in reasonably sound economic con- ditions, if not prosperous. Both are now in a period of growth. The tuna fleet is expanding into larger, longer-ranging vessels that are beginning to penetrate the West African, as well as the more familiar Western Latin American, grounds in a substantial manner. The shrimp fleet in the Gulf of Mexico, after a number of years of experimenting with the technology, is beginning to move successfully into larger, longer-range, vessels equipped to freeze product aboard, which is resulting in geographic expansion of the U.S. flag fishery in the Caribbean area. The Alaska shrimp fleet, an entirely different business, working on differ- ent resource base and producing for a substantially separate market, is just beginning substantial growth which should persist for several years. It may atso be noted that the tuna and shrimp fisheries have been less plagued by State reguiations than is normal in the United States fisheries. In the other two classes of commodities (fish meal and frozen fish blocks primarily) production by United States fiag vessels has trended down absolutely as well as relatively. The share of the market provided by imports has crept above 70%, and the two domestic fisheries supporting them are not in reasonably sound economic condition. In both cases market is sound and steadily growing, and resources to support U.S. fisheries are ample in U.S. coastal waters. Accord- ingly a more detailed examination of these two fisheries is made below. B. Changing consumption pattern for fishery products in the United States The Department of Agricuiture (followed by the Bureau of Commercial Fish- eries) has a statistic of fishery consumption which it has used for a long while in keeping track of the per capita consumption of various food products in the United States. Defined by its terms the per capita consumption of fish in the United States has varied between 7.9 to 12.2 pounds of edible meat per year since 1916. The high point of 12.2 pounds was in 1927 and the low point of 7.9 was in 1943. The series shows no long term trend of consequence in this 51 year period. If there is any trend, it is a slight drop-off over the past 10 years. The per capita consumption of edible fish meat was 11.0 pounds in 1916 and 10.6 pounds in 1967. This series of statistics probably deserves recalculation because of the changing product composition over the years, but it is the series that is available and ordinarily quoted. It is obvious that the series has inconsistencies in it if one divides the statistic of supply of edible fish to the United States per year (also published by the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries) by the population of the United States. Within the series there have been sharp long term trends in several major products. The per capita consumption of canned salmon has declined rather steadily from 3.0 pounds in 1936 to 0.8 pound in 1967. In canned sardine the statistic has gone down rather steadily from 1.8 pounds in 1936 to 0.3 pound in 1967. Cured fish of all sorts went from a high point of 2.8 pounds per capita in 1916 rather steadily down to 0.5 pound per capita in 1967. On the other hand three other products have gone up steadily in per capita use during the period. Canned tuna was at 0.4 pound per capita in 1986 and rose to 2.4 pounds per capita in 1967; shrimp was at 0.385 pound per capita in 1936 1128 and 1.28 in 1967; groundfish and ocean perch fillets and blocks were at 0.74 pound per capita in 1936 and rose to 1.79 pounds per capita in 1967. The decrease in relative and total use of saimon ean be attributed to failing supply. There just was not as much salmon available in 1967 as there was in 1936. On the other hand the trend away from cured fish and the trend toward canned tuna, shrimp of all sorts of preparations, and frozen fish sticks and portions represents definite changes in food habits. How much of this is attribut- able to convenience in form, convenience in price, changing packaging and mer- chandising patterns, is not known. For the most part those fishery products that are increasing sharply in use are new product forms which have been developed by innovative entrepreneurs, catch on, and are merchandised hard. Tuna started out as really a scrap fish for which there was no consumer’s market in the United States in any form. It still has no consequential sale in the United States in any other form than canned, although in Japan it is consumed in large volume in many other forms (raw, dried, half-dried, as an ingredient in fish sausages, cakes, etc.). Canned tuna has been sold hard in the United States from the very start. There have always been heavy advertising, promotional and field selling costs relative to product price. Over the 60 years of the trade it has moved steadily from more or less regional sales by small canners to more and more consolidations into regional and then national sales by a few larger firms, to take advantage of national advertising, ete. More than 50% of total tuna sales are now in the hands of three firms, and more than 75% in the hands of six firms. The marketing budget is high and merchandiz- ing is still by the hard sell. The industry spends not less than $30 million per year in marketing cost. Many attractive new tuna products have been developed over the years and also sold hard at much cost—such as tuna pies, tuna and noodles, tuna spreads, spiced tuna, dietic tuna, tuna baby food, etc. One by one they have been tried, bloomed, wilted, and either died or dropped to a steady low level of acceptance—with chunk-style light meat canned tuna staying in the lead, and the more costly canned white meat tuna keeping a fairly steady pace in the market. It is obvious that when a housewife wants a can of tuna she wants it straight, and will then fix it up into some other dish to her taste and not that of a salesman. Tuna in brine has been merchandized very heavily for fifteen years and has a marked tariff differential over tuna in oil. Nevertheless, tuna in oil has continued to dominate the market and in recent years tuna in brine market has been shrinking. Despite extensive merchandizing it is obvious that most American housewives want tuna canned in oil. Shrimp sales have gone through something of the same pattern as tuna but more so. Up until quite recently shrimp sales were heavily institutional (restau- rants, ete.,) and production and sales were in the hands of many firms. Such sales are not much affected by brand or advertising, and market promotion has been more on an industry wide basis for a long time than has been the case with tuna. In recent years there has been a good deal of consoiidation into larger pro- duction units and a greater development of direct consumer sales. Just recently quite large firms have begun to enter the field, advertise national brands heavily, and thus move toward national distribution. This is being accompanied now by a flurry of introduction of new products using shrimp as a component. The growth in consumption of ground fish in the United States has been truly astounding. In 1939 the whole product weight available to the United States market (ground fish, ocean perch, and other fillets and steaks) was 141 million pounds and by 1967 it was 522 million pounds. If this is multiplied by 3.3 to convert it back roughly into round weight equivalents, the increase in dock side weights needed to supply the market with these preducts would have been 465 million pounds in 1939 and 1,723 million pounds in 1967. This market is still growing steadily and 1966 was its year of record to that time (as it was with canned tuna and shrimp). There was a slight drop off in 1967 due to temporary market perturbation. Once again this growth has been marked by the development and hard selling of innovative products reasonable in price, constant in quality, convenient to the user, and widely distributed. The sharp freezing of fish started the ball rolling and permitted the flow of good quality merchandise into the interior after Worid War I. The sharp freezing of fillets came next, reducing shipping costs and improving convenience. Then came the standard frozen fish block, where the skinned and boned fillets were sharp frozen in blocks that could be shipped con- veniently ito anywhere, stored conveniently until needed, and then sawed (still- 1129 frozen) into consumer size pieces, packaged and sold. This development made ground fish a fully world product with a world market (as with frozen tuna for canning and frozen shrimp). In 1953 began the merchandizing of fish sticks, frozen raw or cooked, or breaded in either condition. These were fish-blocks cut into convenient sizes of about one ounce each with width about one third of length. This brought this sort of fish conveniently to the housewife, and it sold like hot cakes. Production was 7 million pounds in 1952 and 63 million pounds in 1955. The market then dropped slightly for two years, started back up and by 1960 was over 65 million pounds. In 1967 it was 74 million pounds. In 1958 fish portions started. This was simply a piece of fish block sawn to the thickness of a fish stick but not cut into strips. This fish portion was a convenient size for a home or restaurant meal, or a sandwich (and fish sandwiches are particularly good sellers in the mid-west). 22 million pounds were produced in 1958 and 60 million pounds in 1960. It has continued to increase sharply and was 158 million pounds in 1967. The individual frozen and packaged steaks or portions of larger fish such as salmon, halibut, turbot, snapper, etc., have added to this general product line. In the last few years there have also been consolidations in this trade with larger firms entering it and merchandising on a regional, and more recently national, basis. With all the changes in form and style that has taken place in the marketing of fish for human consumption, and no upward trend shown in per capita con- sumption of edible fish meat in the Department of Agriculture’s statistic, the amount of fish used in the United States for direct human consumption has trended steadily upward, and is still doing so. In 1947 it was 3,662 million pounds round weight, and in 1966 (a record to that date) it was 5,422 million pounds, or about 4% of all of the fish and shellfish caught in the world. In 1967 it declined slightly to 5,068 million pounds, but will be up again in 1968. With all the talk about the United States not being a fish eating country, it is important to note that the per capita consumption of edible fish by direct human consumption is higher in the United States than the world average. 2. Animal feeding.—The domestic animals with which modern man has sur- rounded himself for his use or pleasure have roughly the same dietary needs as he has. Man feeds his animals with much greater attention to balanced nutrition than he does himself. Fish are used in many ways in this process. Fish meal is used on a large scale in chicken, pig and similar animal nutrition. It is used in calf starters and mink feed. Ground frozen fish is also an ingredient of mink feed, of fish being raised for market, in dog food, cat food, etc. The amount of fish thus used in the United States is enormous and is growing even more rapidly than that used for human consumption. In 1947 the amount used for this purpose was 1,414 million pounds round weight (less than half the amount used for direct human consumption). In 1967 it was 9.119 million pounds, or nearly 6% of all of the fish and shellfish produced in the world. Consumption for these purposes was higher in 1967 than in 1966, and will be higher yet in 1968. In this respect the United States has followed (or led) world trend. In 1948 1.5% of the world’s fish catch was reduced to fish meal and oil, and in 1964 15.5%. O. The changing organization of the fish trade in the United States As recently as 1960 there was no firm in the United States engaged in the fish trade (except the California Packing Corporation) that did as much as $100 million dollars with of all sorts of business per year, there were not a handful who did $50 million dollars of business per year, and most firms in the fish trade of the United States did $10 million per year of total business per year or less. At about that time there began a considerable amount of diversification of firms in the fish trade by buying up or amalgamating with other fish firms to have a broader and stronger base. This has been followed by these firms being bought up by much larger firms so that today principal positions in the fish trade are held by firms whose total business is from a half a billion dollars to a billion and a half dollars or more a year in all their activities. Examples includes the follow- ing—Castle and Cooke bought Bumble Bee Inec.,—Heinz bought Star-Kist Foods, Ine.—Consolidated Feods bought Booth Fisheries and some other things ; Ralston- Purina bought Van Camp Sea Food Company and some other things; —W. R. Grace Company bought Trade Winds and Seapak ; General Mills bought Gortons, which had recently been expanding and diversifying by acquisition ; New England Fish Company—Whiz Fish Company and San Juan Fishing Company to its already large fleet and canning operations, as well as diversifying into many other lines. 1130 This is bringing a different character to the fish trade in the United States. These firms have adequate access to capital—which was always a bottleneck to growth in the fish trade. They think in national terms in selling and in interna- tional terms, for the most part, in overall business. For the most part (and especially those in the food business) they are merchandizing oriented and not production oriented. They are accustomed to thinking and dealing in large terms ard in the impersonal basis of the family owned business which formerly domi- nated the United States fish trade. It has not been customary for a rather long time for large fish firms in the United States to be much involved in the ownership of fishing vessels, although practice differed in different sections of the trade. All sections of the trade, how- ever, practiced, on a mcre or less extensive basis, the giving of credit to fishermen for seasonal operations, for vessel acquisition, for new vessel construction, ete. With the changing character of the fish trade this practice is diminishing and is likely to pretty well vanish. Finance Committees of large corporations keep a close weather eye on returns of assets employed, or a related auditing statistic, and do not care to have capital tied up where it is not turning over fairly frequently and showing an appropriate earning rate. Fishing vessel capital does not turn over very rapidly and the pay out is likely to be rather longer than Finance Commit- tees or Bank Examiners like. This is becoming all the more the case as fishing vessels become larger, more sophisticated, and more costly to acquire and operate. Thus, instead of the consolidation of the fish trade into larger and stronger hands being a direct and immediate boon to the U.S. flag fishing industry the contrary is more likely to be the case. Up until recently the fish trade has had a certain paternalistic relationship to its fishermen-boat owners. in any event when the going got tough enough the boat owners could go directly to the top man in the firm he supplied with fish and state his case to a sympathetic person who knew his end of the business, and if he was a good fisherman he could expect to get as much relief from the person from whom all power in the firm fiowed as seemed reasonable and could be given. It also has not been unknown, in the tuna trade at least, for boat-owners to group together and help a firm that they fished for over a tight credit spot by loan, deferment of fish payment, or decrease in fish price by one means or another. This sympathetic give-and-take between processing firms and their fishermen suppliers has been a convenient shock absorber in this volatile and uncertain business. It is rapidly disappearing. Many of the large firms now coming into controlling position in the fish trade have extensive holdings in other countries, or extensive holdings outside the fish trade in this country. They will buy raw material to their quality standards from wherever in the world it is in the steady supply they require at the cheapest price, and sentimentality or paternalistic feeling will have little to do with it. Those who deal otherwise in the same market with them will do likewise or they will fall by the wayside. There is much talk among national planners, not much acquainted with the fish trade, that the incursions of these firms into the U.S. fish trade will lead to an integration of the fish business from the ocean to the consumer’s plate with much emphais on system analyses, etc. There is nothing in recent history to indicate such a trend, and much to indicate a contrary trend toward further divorcement of fishing vessel ownership and operation from processing and merchandizing of fishery products. The only exception apparent to this is a trend to integration, automating, and systems planning in the fish meal industry of the Gulf of Mexico. Another tendency noted in this changing picture is the trend to emphasis on products having national distribution capable of being obtained in large volume with broad customer acceptance, with resource base some place in the world adequate to permit substantial market growth, and products having stability of supply. Indicated is a further trend to such products as tuna, shrimp, fish blocks. and its products, and fish meal. Should fish protein concentrate ever develop as a commercial product it would fit in this category. Another factor of major importance is that these iarge firms by and large are opposed to trade controls, tariffs, ete., because of the international nature of their total business. Thus domestic fishermen can anticipate more opposition from fish processors to barriers to the flow of fish products in international commerce than, even, has been the case in the past twenty years. Another trend would appear to be the impracticability for fishermen’s coopera- tives to break into these major fish commodity fields in a consequential manner because of the strength of brand in the market, and capital back-up in the business. Lastly, a continuation is anticipated in the already existing trend toward weaker national and regional trade organizations in the fish trade. Very large 1131 firms tend to rely on their own activities to a greater extent then small and medium sized firms, and place less reliance on day to day activities of trade organizations except in major and rather general fields of activity. All of this is not to say that these large firms will not improve the status of the United States flag fishing industry. They very likely will do so by providing increase in total market, stability in supply—demand relationships, and the enforcement of efficiency on those suppliers who survive. It is very likely that the final elimination of the padrone relationship between processor and boatowner will be a positive long term boon to the latter. But it will be different, and tthe adjustments will be considerable, with some being painful. D. The resource base available to United States flag fishing vessels Of course, strictly speaking, any fishery resource in the high seas of the world ocean that is available to Russian, Japanese, or other, fishermen is also available to U.S. flag fishing vessels. Expert opinion on the extent of underdeveloped resources of the world ocean is variable both because of inadequacy of precise information, and because of different criteria as to the size and character of the animals to be harvested. Generally speaking there is fair agreement among experts that the sustainable yield of the world ocean of the kinds and sizes of animals now harvested, without any major technological change, would be in the range of 200-250 metric tons per year, or 4 to 5 times that now harvested. If reasonable management practices are used, reasonable progress in technology is continued, and economics permit the use of smaller animals (in the range of 1 to 5 inches length) for fish meal and fish protein concentrate as well as for more traditional fish and shellfish uses, estimates range from a sustainable annual harvest of 1,000 to 2,000 million metric tons. More extensive acquaculture could expand both of these sorts of estimates. Neither of these estimates are very precise yet, because of limited knowledge of the ocean and its resources. It is safe to say, however, that reasonably good manage- ment of the harvest of known resources of a traditional nature will permit an expansion of world fish and shellfish production by 4 to 5 times the present levels, which should provide for expansion needs for the next twenty years at least, and perhaps forty. While these are mostly legally open to U.S. flag fishing, practical circumstances. limit this in most high seas fisheries and will continue to do so unless there is marked change in United States policy and actions in this field, which is not realistically capable of expectation in the near future. Hssentially the reason for this is that if the United States Government does decide to broaden and strengthen the ability of its marine fishermen to produce in any small measure of the way it has provided incentives to its farmers and petroleum producers, there are such large underutilized resources available in U.S. coastal waters that increased production efforts would center there for a generation to come. Tuna and shrimp provide exceptions to this to some extent, which are treated elsewhere in this report, as do trawl-caught groundfisheries of the North-west Atlantic, but the above statements are generally true. Another reason is that the situation of Russian, Japanese, and United States fish business in the outside world is quite different. Both Russia and Japan have as major objectives of their world-fishing policies the conservation or earning of foreign exchange. Thus they wish to use their own labor and their own flag-vessels as far as possible so as to maximize the area of the business within their own cur- rency. This has not been a factor with the United States at least since 1945, and really not for more than 100 years. It has preferred, and particularly for the last twenty-five years, to have fishery earnings bolstering the economies of foreign currency areas. Additionally Japan and Russia have had trouble steadily in getting foreign bases out of which to operate close to the fishing ground. United States fish firms, in contrast, have not been under United States urging (or provided with incen- tives) to keep production for the United States within the U.S. currency area, to use United States labor in foreign ventures, or to export capital to invest in for- eign ventures. Consequently United States industry has been broadly welcome to come in and develop fisheries in foreign countries, using native flag vessels, native labor, and involving native capital with equity either in joint venture firms, totally U.S. owned firms, or totally native owned firm. This pattern seems likely to con- tinue for the near future, so that U.S. firms will be stimulating fisheries out of foreign ports rather than those using U.S. flag vessels for wide-flung operations: in the geographic term. 26—563—70—pt. 2——40 1132 Accordingly, it is useful to examine most closely the estimates of marine living resources suitable for supporting fisheries supplying United States markets that are available in U.S. coastal waters, or close thereto. The knowledge respecting such resources has been reviewed recently by appropriate experts for the “Confer- ence on the Future of the U.S. Fishing Industry,” held at the College of Fisheries, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington, in late March, 1968. A tabulation summary of this information is given in Table 12. This can be summarized further as follows. 1. In the shelf and slope area adjacent to the United States there are known resources of the sorts of fish used in the United States that are conservatively estimated to be capable of supporting annual harvests on a sustainable yield basis (if properly managed) of about 22 million tons of fish and shellfish per year. These estimates can be divided roughly into 8 million tons per year of demersal (bottom) fish, 10 million tons of pelagic fish, and 4 million tons of shellfish. 2. The largest blocks of underutilized fish and shellfish resources exists in the Gulf of Mexico, with some along the South Atlantic coast of the United States. These may be able to support annual fisheries of 13 million tons per year. 3. Pelagic resource potentials suitable for making fish meal, fish protein con- centrate, ete., in addition to those now used, are particularly large in the Gulf of Mexico and off Southern California (6 million tons per year). 4. Demersal (bottom fish) potentials in the Pacific Northwest, Alaska, and New England are large (4 million tons per year), but much of the potential is currently being harvested by foreign fishermen. 5. Pink shrimp, tanner crab, and scallop show particular promise in the Alaska area, as do clams. Calico scallops and clams are in large underutilized supply in the Gulf of Mexico and along the South Atlantic sea bed (4 million tons per year). 6. In essence. these reviews indicate that there are resources of fish and shell fish available on the continental shelf and slope, of the sorts capable of being marketed in the United States, that can support on a steady, sustainable basis (if their harvest is rationally managed) annual yields in physical volume about &+910 times that now produced by U.S. flag vessels. A little more than 2 million tons per year of these is now taken by U.S. flag fishing vessels and at least half that amount is taken now per year, in addition, by foreign fishermen. Straight arithmetic would indicate the possibility of increas- ing yields by a factor of 6 or 7 from present levels without interaction between fisheries or nations, but the siutation is by no means so simple. Some of these resources are presently fully utilized and under international or other conservation regulation (Pacific salmon, Pacific halibut, Alaskan king crab, Maine lobster, Pacific yellowfin tuna, etc.). Generally speaking these are the resources of higher individual value where scientific information is good enough to permit rational regulation of effort. Some of these resources are a little, some, or have been heavily, overfished and are not under rational management procedures yet, either because of lack of scientific knowledge as to what to do, or lack of agreement or machinery therefore to do what is needed. Included are Atlantie haddock, Atlantic silver hake, Pacific mackerel, Pacific sardine, ete. Some of these resources have just had their harvest and environment so badly managed that they do not produce well any more (oysters, many clam resources, Atlantic shad, Atlantic salmon, ete.). Some are so heavily regulated for no resource justi- fication at all that a fishery cannot be economically initiated on them (Gulf of Mexico thread-fin herring, California anchovy, Alaska Herring, etc.). These various situations are so complex, and so different one from another that a number of them,are discussed separately in the following chapter. Nevertheless it can be stated flatly, and without fear of contradiction, that there are very large underutilized living resources on the continental shelf and slope of the United States, easily available to United States harbors and flag vessels which are of the kind required by the United States and the world market. It is not contended that all U.S. fishery market needs can, or will, be filled from them, because of the variety of U.S. market requirements, some resources of which do not occur off the United States in sufficient quantity for that market. What is contended is that if the United States followed a general policy along the lines followed by Japan of providing incentive to domestic fishermen to more fully utilize coastal resources, the living resources in U.S. coastal waters are more than adequate in size to fill the equivalent of the total U.S. market for fish and shellfish products (about 7 million short tons per year) and provide more than twice that much in surplus for export. 1183 Some of the situations of the specific United States fisheries are discussed in the following chapter. CHAPTER III.—SPECIFIC U.S.-FLAG FISHERIES Table I contains the annual catch of U.S. flag fishing per year from 1926 through 1967, their annual value, and the average price per pound paid the fishermen in the particular year. Table 2 gives the relative volume of the catch by species, or species groupings, in 1966, (the last year of full published record) as well as the year (and amount of catch) which contained the highest yield for that species or grouping. Table 3 arranges these data for 1966 in terms of value. These three Tables illustrate in a bare bones manner the recent history of U.S. flag fishing and its current status but the data thus unadorned do not illu- minate history, nor describe status adequately to form the basis for policy or to idicate the elements of a strategy which would improve the current status. While the annual total catches given in Table I describe an almost static condition in the U.S. flag fisheries for the thirty year period from 1934 to 1967 the fishery, to the contrary, has been, and is, exceedingly dynamic. Species, and species groups, have come into the fishery from time to time. Some have continu- ously grown in the fishery. Some have waxed and waned over the years. Some have grown great in production and the faded out of the fishery entirely. Only by an understanding of what has happened to the major warps and woofs, and the reasons for these occurrences, can the existing fabric be understood or a more perfect one designed. Some of the more important elements of these exceedingly dynamic movements are briefly set out below. (1) The Pacific Sardine or Pilchard.—The first species to be considered illus- trates one of these points well. The Pacific sardine began to form the basis of a commercial fisheries in southern California after the turn of the century. Under the stimulus of World War I it grew in size, chiefly to provide canned food for the then existing emergency. It reached a high level of 161 million pounds of yield in 1918. After a brief recession at war’s end the fishery grew again under the residual stimulus of the canned sardine market that had developed, and the new stimulus of the chicken industry that had found fish meal to be an efficient additive to chicken feed to produce eggs and meat cheaply. The fishery grew steadily, became important in British Columbia, was started in Oregon and Washington in 1935, and in 1936 reached the peak of its production, when it contributed 1,502 million pounds to the United States fish catch and 1,593 million pounds to the entire Pacific coast catch including Canada. It was the largest single species fishery developed by the United States to that time . The catch decreased each year from that date. In 1948 the British Columbia fishery (which had begun in 1918) ceased completely. 1949 was the last fishing season for sardine in both Oregon and Washington. The Northern California (San Francisco) fishery stopped in 1951. The Monterey fishery, which had har- vested as much as 500 million pounds in the war season of 1941-42 (and sup- ported famed “Cannery Row’’) was out of business completely by 1960, having subsisted for the last few years on fish trucked from Southern California. The Southern California fishery dragged on yet for a time, gravitating down to a harvest of less than one million pounds per year, taken incidentally to other fisheries. At last in 1967 a five year moratorium was legally placed on any landings of this species in California aside from those caught accidentally in other catches. A fishery yielding in the neighborhood of 30 million pounds per year remains in nearby Mexico, mostly supported by a southern race that had not been much affected by the California and other west coast fishery. It is probably now being over fished by Mexico. There was no managerial system available with which to apply the available scientific knowledge and there still is not. The Federal Government assumed, nor asked for, no regulatory responsibility. Regulatory responsibility in the State of California was split between the California Fish and Game Commission and the State Legislature, and it still is. The Pacific States Marine Fishery Commis- sion, whose establishment was strongly motivated by the crisis in this: declining coastal fishery, had no regulatory power. By 1946 the situation was so critical, and somewhat puzzling, that the remaining industry sought increased research on the problem by the Federal and State of California Governments and the University of California, includ- ing new taxes on the fish catches to help support the research. The expanded research program began in 1948 and has continued every year since in exemplary 1134 fashion. A favorable ocean climate regime in 1957-58 produced a good year class that revived the fishery to yield a high of 207 million pounds in 1958, but in the absence of any regulative machinery the remaining fish effort was large enough to drive the stock right on down again. Thus the largest U.S. flag fishery in terms of volume existing in 1937 had completely disappeared from the record of United States fish catch in 1967. As will be noted further on, scientific evidence is now adequate to provide means of relief and recovery, but the political machinery with which to put this new - knowledge into effect does not yet exist at either the State or Federal level. (2) Menhaden.—Menhaden occur in commercial quantities from the Canadian border to the Mexican border on the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico coasts. They are not used for direct human consumption. They are used for producing fish meal and oil. There has been a fishery on them since colonial days which has: been of substantial size since the 1870’s. The fishery along the Atlantic coast, particularly in the middle region from New Jersey to North Carolina, developed steadily since World War I to be the largest volume fishery of that region. With the decline in the Pacific sardine fishery (with whose products it was in partial competition) the fishery grew sharply and since 1945 has been the: largest fishery of the United States in terms of volume of production. The fishery spread to the Gulf States on an important scale after World War II. It reached its peak of total U.S. production in 1961 with a yield of 2,290 million pounds (round weight). The menhaden fishery is now following the same down hill path as did that for the Pacific sardine. The annual production on the Atlantic coast has been falling off steadily during this decade and is still doing so. The incoming year classes ‘are smaller. The five year average (1959-63) of production on.the At- lantic coast was 1,406 million pounds and for the Gulf coast 927 million pounds. In 1967 Atlantic coast production was 466 million pounds, and Gulf production was 700 million pounds. Thus overall landings were off by more than 40% from 1961 and Atlantic production is down even more proportionately. 1968 production, pariteularly from the Atiantic, will be down further, although Gulf production appears to be holding about even. The menhaden industry stands high among the fish meal industries of the world in application of science and technology to catching and processing of fish. Plants, vessels and gear are kept modernized and in good shape. Profits, until very recently, have been relatively good and capital availability has not been a substantial problem. The use of its product, fish meal, has been soaring in the United States during recent years. The problem of the industry has been almost solely a decrease in abundance of the resource upon which it depends. World market surpluses have been a temporary nuisance, decreasing earnings for a time in 1959-60, and again in 1966-67. but it was decreasing resource in the last down swing in world price that realiy hurt the past three years, because it raised cost per ton of production. The research situation on decline of menhaden is not as clear even as it was on California sardine. The several east coast and Gulf States involved do not have strong ocean research arms and the Federal Government has not had a sufficient menhaden research program to set the scientic record clear. Accordingly the cause of decline in menhaden cannot be stated clearly even as could have been that for the Pacific sardine. There may be adverse ocean climate conditions on the Atlantic. There may be an adverse effect on eggs and young from estuary pollution. But the best bet is that overfishing is to blame. It is of no consequence what the reason is. As with the Pacific sardine there is no regulatory machinery so that modern resource management methods could be applied if it was known for sure what was to be done. The individual states are not equipped to handle such a problem. The Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission and the Gulf States Marine Fisheries Commission are not from the management viewpoint. The Atlantic Marine Fisheries Commission was recently given regulatory power over the menhaden fishery in the Atlantic area by its member States, but only on the grounds that management decisions be taken by unanimous agreement. So far Virginia has not agreed to suitable regulations to stop the decline in resource. The Federal Government does not have regulatory jurisdiction nor management responsibility, nor has it very avidly sought it because of the political implications. As a consequence the second major ocean fishery resource of the United States is headed down the spout with no relief in sight. The collapse of the Pacific Sardine resource set up interactions between conservationists and commercial. 1135 fisheries which have not yet been possible to overcome in California, and a second occurrence of the same nature with respect to menhaden will set back fishery development possibilities in coastal United States waters by another generation. It seems certainly to be on the way. (3) Oysters —There are three sorts of oysters harvested in the United States, the eastern oyster, the western Oyster, and the introduced Pacific (or Japanese) oyster. The total production of oysters in the United States in 1987 was 57.7 million pounds. This is about 1% the recorded production of 1880 (152 million pounds), for the east and Gulf coasts alone, or for the whole U.S. im 1908 (152 million pounds) which was the first year of complete national survey, or about half the catch (117 million pounds) recorded for Chesapeake Bay alone in 1880. The eastern oyster has always been the largest producer. It was even farmed on the Pacific Coast with modest success for some years in San Francisco Bay before it became too polluted (2.5 million pounds having been produced in California in 1899). The decline in its production has been quite steady since records began to be kept. The clearest case is in Chesapeake Bay where the catch has gone quite steadily down hill from 117 million pounds in 1880 (the first year of record) to 21 million pounds in 1965 (the last). The Middle Atlantic catch shows much the same course, having been 28 million pounds in 1880, 29 million pounds in 1887, and then declined rather steadily to 756 thousand pounds in 1965. The New England catch shows the same picture but on a slightly different scale. Production was 4 million pounds in 1880, rose to 27 million pounds in 1910, and then (except for a small revival in 1935-37) declined steadily to a third of a million pounds in 1965. The causes have been various. Over harvesting of wild stock and destruction of native shell beds is undoubtedly the largest single cause. Regulation of this in the several states still ranges from odd to weird. The colonies of Maryland and Virginia were arguing over the proper way to harvest oysters from the Potomac River estuary before the Revolutionary War, and they still are. Estuarine pollution has been a major problem, ranging from human wastes from the cities rendering the oysters inedible from the health standpoint to in- dustrial pollution killing the oyster beds outright. Waves of disease have depleted wild beds and damaged farmed beds. It is not certain that these epidemic diseases are not related to estuarine pollution. There is no general tideland tenure program in the East coast and Gulf States favoring the farming of oysters as practiced in Japan, Western Hurope and the Pacific Northwest, although such practices have been introduced with success in a few places. The history of United States resource use has produced few instances of natural resource wastage more flagrant than that of the eastern oyster. Even San Francisco Bay (where its cultivation was introduced after gold rush) is too polluted and changed to warrant its cultivation there any longer. The delicious small western oyster was never a big producer (3 million pounds in 1892) and it was quickly cleaned out of most of its natural habitat. It has not been seen in Willapa Bay, an original large producer, for thirty years. It also suifered greatly from pollution, silting and other changes in its estuarine environ- ment. For fifty years it has been the object of small scale, but lucrative, farming in southern Puget Sound, which waged continuous battle for thirty years with pulp mill pollution to survive. Production runs at less than 40 thousand pounds per year in recent years. When the pulp mill at Shelton, Washington, shut down from general economic causes, only then did that damage repair. The Pacific oyster was introduced for farming in the State of Washington after World War I, and into Oregon and California within ten years later. Production has been as high as 13 million pounds per year (1946) and was 5.9 million pounds in 1967. There is great talk about the future of mariculture (and particularly oyster culture) in the United States, and the need for research to stimulate its growth. Sophisticated oyster culture has been practiced in the United States for fifty years. American oyster farmers and scientists are in close touch with their Japanese colleagues and quite aware of the most modern technology and its economies. ‘The oyster market in the United States is strong. Decrease of natural harvest and lack of substantial growth in farmed production is not due to lack of science or technology. It is due to estuarine pollution, silting and other changes; to lack of appropriate land tenure rules in most states to favor mariculture;: and lack of good resource management techniques, well known, in regulating the harvest from remaining wild stocks. Governmental mechanism in the United States simply is not suited to the use of modern aquatic resource management methods and techniques, 1136 (4) Atlantic Ocean Perch.—The landings of Atlantic perch illustrate most clearly a fishery coming into prominence and then dying away in a relatively short term of years. The species was largely ignored for economic reasons prior to 1930 and only began to come into prominence with the inception of the market- ing of frozen fish fillets in the United States. The landings exceeded a million pounds first in 1934 and grew steadily and rapidly to a high level of 238 million pounds in 1948. It then declined steadily to a new low of 81 million pounds in 1966. The decline in catch came during a steady growth in the market for frozen fish fillets in the United States. It arose from two factors. Atlantic Ocean perch is a slow growing fish that reaches considerable age. The growing fishery creamed off the standing stock as well as the annual growth increment in its early years and reduced the available stocks in waters aGjacent to the United States. Although some overfishing probably took place, this was not the serious problem that existed in Pacific sardine or is growing in menhaden. The more important reason for decline in production after 1948 was competi- tion in the market from the same or similar product produced in the Canadian Maritime provinces from essentially the same resources. Growing support for the Canadian fisheries from the Canadian Federal and provincial governments, and slackened market protection and support for the New Engiand fishermen from the United States Government, made it possible for Atlantic Ocean perch fillets to come into the U.S. market and increasingly take it away from the New Hngland fishermen. (5) Atlantic cod.—The Atlantic cod contributed 128 million ‘tons to domestic landings in 1938 and only 48 million pounds in 1967. This is not the whole story with cod, and its story is different than that of the other major, or formerly major, species in the landings of U.S. flag vessels. Cod was the mainstay of the New England fishery during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The highest recorded catch (294 million pounds) occurred in 1880, the year of the first general fishery census in the United States. Although cod were, and are, commercially abundant off New England, its center of abun- dance and ease of catch is eastward on the Nova Scotia Banks, the Grand Banks, around New Foundland and up north and east. In these early days cod fishermen out of New England ranged as far east as Iceland on occasion, as far north as Labrador rather normally, and fished most actively on the Grand Banks. The catch was almost all salted and dried and, besides being an important item of the domestic diet, was a valued item in the export trade of New England. The gradual decline in favor of salt cod in ‘the United States led to catch de- clining from its average U.S. catch level of about 170 million pounds per year during the 1890’s to an average yield of about 140 million pounds per year up to the outbreak of World War I, and an average of perhaps a little less than 100 million pounds per year from its end up through the depression of the early 1930’s. From 1933 to 1939 landings ‘increased to 'an average of 120 million pounds per year under the stimulus of the beginning frozen and fillet production. In only two years after 1939 did the catches exceed 100 million pounds, and these were the war years. The landings of cod by U.S. vessels has declined rather steadily since war end and is still doing so, having reached 43 million pounds in 1967. This decline bas nothing to do with market for cod in the United States. Cod has become a standard ingredient of the rapidly growing frozen fish block business. These are imported from Canada, Iceland, and Norway especially in large volume. The United States eats the round weight equivalent of at least 400 million pounds of cod per year presently, and probably more. It is a prominent part of the fish sticks, fish portions, fish sandwiches, and fish steaks that are so popular presently in the United States. The decline in harvest has not been materially affected by decline in resource abundance, although some has been apparent in the last few years. There are presently caught about 1 million short tons of cod per year in the northwest Atlantic, and the United States fishery has become eighth or ninth in size among the nations fishing there, instead of first as it was during the eighteenth and nineteenth century. It is simply that other nations, and particularly Canada, can catch cod, fillet them, freeze them into blocks of fillets, and ship them into the United States cheaper than New England fishermen can economically survive at doing the same. (6) Haddock.—Haddock have also been caught in the New England area since colonial days. Unlike cod they were mostly used for the fresh market in the early years of the fishery, and the catch did not reach a level of 100 million pounds per year until 1919. The initiation of filleting and packaging of haddock, 1137 and the increased use of refrigeration after World War I, led to a rapid increase in the landing of haddock as its sales became more nation wide. They reached a top level of 294 million pounds in 1929. This appeared to be somewhat more fishing pressure than the stocks would stand and landings, but not market, fell off rather steadily during the following fifteen years, to level off at about 150 million pounds per year. Haddock did not suffer from the influx of frozen fillets and blocks that began after the end of Worid War II as did the cod fishery. Haddock, while found commercially to eastward, has its center of abundance on George’s Bank off New England. This is not quite as easy for the Canadians to get at as for the New Englanders. Haddock had the market for fresh fish in the New England and Middle Atlantic area which stayed more or less steady. Consequently haddock became the income mainstay of the otherwise distressed (except for scallop) New England ground fish fishery and catches have vacillated in a fairly narrow range of 130 to 160 million pounds per year for the past twenty years, the vacil- lations being as much a matter of varying strength of year classes entering the fishery as anything else until the last few years, when a new factor entered. Beginning in the early 1960’s the Russians began to fish very heavily on Georges Bank and the Canadians to fish more heavily there. There has been definite and heavy over fishing in the last few years. This has been accompanied by poor incoming year classes for the past four years, possibly connected with the over- fishing. The machinery of the International Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Com- mission has not yet been able to dea! with this overfishing problem effectively. Consequently the population is in poor condition and the economics of the New England fishery are bad. The New England catch in 1967 was only 98.5 million pounds. (7) Pacific Mackerel.—The Pacific mackerel has been fished commercially in Southern California since the turn of the century. It has been subject to rather wide fluctuations in abundance associated with changes in ocean climate and their affect on the size of year classes entering the fishery, not unlike the Atlantic mackerel. The fishery reached a peak of production in 1935 when 146 million pounds were landed. There were two years since that (1936 and 1941) when landings equalled or exceeded that level. Otherwise there has been a rather steady decline in production in spite of a decrease in total amount of fishing effort avail- able in the area. In the last three years, in particular, the decline has been sharp, and in 1967 only 2 million pounds were taken. The decline appears rather clearly to be of a biological nature and related to a fishing pressure possibly too great for the existing stock to sustain. It is not clear, however, that competition at young stages from the enormously increased anchovy population has not been a factor of critical importance. For the same reason as noted above under Pacific sardine nothing is being done about this. In the State of California the regulation of marine fisheries is split between the legislature and the Fish and Game Commission, with the result that there is no mechanism available for managing the fishery in accordance with the scientific evidence and well known modern management procedures. The Fed- eral Government has no managerial responsibilities in the area, chiefly because it has not asserted it. Almost all mackerel fishing is done outside the 3-mile limit of State waters. (8) Jack Mackerel.—The situation of Jack Mackerel in California is quite different than that of Pacific mackerel in the same area. The stock is known to be quite large in relation to the fishery and to be underutilized. Nevertheless the eatch has shrunk from a peak landing of 146 million pounds in 1952 to land- ings of 41 million pounds in 1966. The reasons for the decline are economic and they are several. The main one is the decay of the Pacific sardine fishery and the gradual disappearance of the large fleet of local purse seiners that lived on it. This fleet formerly caught jack mackerel as a side-line seasonally, and as a side line they could afford to catch it rather cheaply. With the decline of the sardine resource these vessels required to live more and more on their jack mackerel catches. Because of this they re- quired a higher price for their mackerel catches. At the same time that this rise in price of raw material for canning was going up the market for cheap canned fish in the United States was decreasing. The consequence of the two movements in opposite directions were that jack mackerel have just been priced out of the only market they have except for fish meal and present raw fish prices are far too high for that. An economic factor of perhaps even greater importance is that there is wide variation in availability of jack mackerel to the remaining fishing 1138 vessels, which arises from environmental variation. The remaining vessels are too weakened economically to range further from port for catch, or to equip themselves with modern search and capture gear with which to follow the fish when they move out, or down, from their accustomed area. There is presently some resurgence in demand being felt from the growing market for pet food, but so far it has not had a material effect on landings be- cause the fishermen have not been able to supply existing market on a regular basis. The vessels left in the mackerel fleet are few, old, and small. They are not very effective catching instruments anymore. (9) Pacific Herring.—Pacific herring is another fishery that has jnrorialk sharply in production in the past 30 years. It reached its peak of production in 1937 when 263 million pounds were landed (almost all in Alaska). The yield from the fishery has declined steadily from that time until in 1967 only 16 mil- lion pounds were landed. As with the jack mackerel the reason for the decline is economic and not resource connected. Changing taste patterns removed the original salt herring market this fishery originated to fill. The fishery was always marginal economically in the fish meal business through problems associated with high labor costs, transportation costs to market, and cylic variability in herring availability near plants. The massive incursion of Peruvian fish meal pro- duction into the world market after 1958 finally put an end to the fish meal business in Alaska for the time being. The major factor, however, has been regulations placed on herring fishing for reduction by the salmon trollers who mistakenly believed that the herring fishery adversely affected the landings of their fishery, because Chinook and Silver salmon eat herring. They also eat any kind of fish available and there is no shortage of food available to them aside from herring. Nevertheless state regulations in California, Oregon, Washington and Alaska were obtained which eradicated the herring reduction fishery. There was not enough strength in the reduction industry to fight off these nonsensical State regulations. (10) Salmon.—The Pacific salmon fisheries are supported by five different species of fish. They have different life histories and biological characteristics. They have different texture, taste and appearance characteristics and thus differ- ent markets. Chinook and silver salmon take lures readily and are among the most famous and favorite of sport fish; chum and sockeye salmon more rarely do and are not much the object of sport fishing; pink salmon sometimes take lures readily and sometimes do not. The five species are caught in different propor- tions by different types of commercial gear. They make long migrations in the sea and have been persistent causes of interaction among Russia, Japan, Canada and the United States. They migrate up rivers to spawn and create problems with power dams, irrigation diversions, and other fresh water uses. Everything connected with the Pacific salmon and the fisheries based upon them is complex and controversial. There are few groups of animals that have been so long the object of detailed biological research at such a level of intensity, yet their behavior and population dynamics are still so uncertainly known that conservation management is still earried out as much by hunch and empiric observation as by scientific deduction. There are no other kinds of fish which have been for so long so fully under conservation management as these. The conservation management is so tight in all aspects of the salmon’s range as to create many economic wastes. Much of the regulation is quite frankly for social rather than biological reasons, for there is no sort of fish that rouses emotions in the electorate such as these. In spite of every sort of maltreatment of the resource that multiple use of waters can devise, and every economic abuse that can be thought of to apply ta an industry by four state governments, two international commissions, one in- terstate commission, the Federal Government and scores of biologists and admin- istrators, all five species of salmon persist throughout their entire original range, keep up volume of production fairiy well, and alternate with tuna from year to year as the second most abundant fish landed by U.S. flag vessels after menhaden, and the second most valuable after shrimp. For many years taxes on their production formed 80% of the revenues of the Territory and State of Alaska, and they are still of crucial importance to that State’s revenue and of substantial importance to Washington, Oregon and California. Kor many years the primary use of salmon in the United States market was for canning, and canned salmon dominated the United States canned fish market as well as being an important export item from the standpoint of value. Canned salmon has declined in production rather steadily for the last thirty years as canned tuna production has increased. In 1953 canned tuna overtook canned. 1139 salmon in terms of volume consumed by the United States, and has gone on to # level where it presently is about double that of canned salmon. The canning of salmon is still decreasing, and it will probably continue to do so far some time yet. This is not attributable to lack of plant efficiency or market- ing effectiveness, but mostly to changing transportation patterns. All of the Pa- cific salmons, especially when caught in the sea, are among the most delicious of fishes, are relished in the fresh or frozen form, and command much better prices in those forms than in the canned form. The general rule of the thumb in the salmon business is to never can fish that can be sold frozen, and never freeze salmon that can be sold fresh. Like everything about salmon even such a general rule of thumb is contentious and not always correct. Both air shipment and containerized refrigerated shipment are rather rapidly changing the pattern of salmon use by making it possible to get the product from the ocean to the consumer at a price and in a condition that will demand higher value. Air shipments of fresh fish from even as far north as Nome, Alaska, and particularly from Anchorage, are becoming more common both to Hurope (where demand is very strong), and to the United States both Hast, West and Cenitrai, where well taken care of salmon selis at high value with strong demand. Air shipment of ocean fresh salmon from Seattle to Hast coast markets has begun, and will undoubtedly increase steadily. This air shipment of salmon in the fresh form from catching location to luxury market is already substantial and can be con- sidered ‘to be only in its initial stage. The use of refrigerated vans to ship frozen salmon from isolated catching lo- cations to more centralized locations for further processing is affecting the salmon trade even more profoundly than is air shipment because of the larger volumes involved. It is also resulting in a more effective use of the salmon resource for the reason that it makes possible the effective use of runs of salmon into many small coastal streams (particularly in Alaska) whose salmon runs were too small and too sharply peaked seasonally to support a steady salmon cannery. These changing trends in the salmon trade do not mean a demise in salmon canning because in several places (such as Bristol Bay, the Fraser River, Cook Inlet, Prince William Sound) the large salmon runs coming into spawn peak so sharply that they cannot be handled effectively in any manner except by cau- ning. It does, however, mean continued shrinkage in the relative importance of canned salmon in the fish business and this will continue to create social and economic readjustments that will be troublesome politicaliy in the affected states and with the Federal Government as well, in both the domestic and international policy spheres. These changing trends have, despite changes in physical volume of salmon produced, kept value up. The record vear of catch of salmon was 1936 when 791 million pounds were landed, but the record year of value was 1965 when only 327 million pounds were landed. Quite aside from inflationary effects, there has been a rather steady upgrading in end use of salmon which has increased the value of his eatch to the salmon fishermen. This seems likely to continue. There is considerable scope for increasing the total catch of salmon from wild stock. This will not be through the discovery of new stocks. All stocks of Pacific salmon are known and most are fully utilized, as well as a few being overutilized. Improvements in resources management practices are becoming practical with advancing research, and these are being made slowly. Rectification in access by salmon to spawning beds by removal of obstacles, and even improvements in spawning area, are possible and being practiced. Improved practices by the In- ternational Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission on the Fraser River, and by the Canadian Department of Fisheries on the Skeena River, have been par- ticularly rewarding and are slowly being applied elsewhere, particularly in Bristol Bay rivers, with what appears to be some success. Increased total production from these activities is unlikely to be spectacular but it can be substantial. It is not beyond reason to speculate that the total sustainable yield of salmon from wild stock could be increased by a half through such means, and a doubling is not entirely ruled out. The scientific, technical, political, economic and diplomatic problems to be overcome in doing this are substantial, as are the social problems of simply keeping encroaching civilization, and other water uses, from further destroying the necessary fresh water habitat of the salmon. With all of the loose talk now being heard about the possible benefit of aqua- culture on food production it is probable that there is nowhere that this could be applied with quicker and more spectacular results than in the artificial prop- agation of salmon, and steelhead and sea run cut-throat trout as well. Seventy 1140 years of practical experience in salmon and trout hatching and rearing has been had, which, in the last thirty years in particular has been on a large scale and on a continually increasing solid base of both science and technology. Nutritional, disease, and handling problems are well in hand. Enough experience has been had with selective breeding to know that these fishes are genetically plastic and that improved breeds can be developed. The market is so strong that it would accept a doubling of production sooner than it could be had through this means. Increased salmon yields could be a good foreign exchange earner both in Japan and Western Europe for any surplus that the United States market would not accept. The economics even appear to be practical for private enterprise to do this in some places, if legal impediments could be removed. This does not appear to be likely in the near future. Salmon are deeply engrained emotionally in the social structure of the Pacific Northwest. The most efficient means of harvest have been legislated out of existence in order to spread the wealth among inefficient small scale fishermen. In all the states the waters are public and by law cannot be diverted to private use in the manner required for such fish farming. Steelhead trout, which show particular promise for such large scale fish farming, are reserved jealously for recreational fishing. Competition between remaining commercial gears keeps the political fires so hot that none of these matters seem practically capable of change. This is a pity. Of all the fisheries none is so ripe for the application of limited entry, or reversion to private ownership, lease of resource control, or other similar device to improve net economic yield. The case of salmon gill-netters in the Frazer River and Puget Sound is particularly in point. No Director or Minister of Fish- eries in Washington or Canada has quite the political bravura to tie the bell on this eat. In any event there is no reason to expect that the value yield of the salmon fisheries will do anything except trend upward, and it is likely that the volume yield will do so slowly also. If even reasonabe economic efficiency could be restored bit by bit through slight modification of the existing maze of regulations covering the salmon fisheries the net economic yield from them could be increased enormously and quickly. There is scope for substantial increase in volume of yield through improved resource management practices, and this could be quite large if modification in socio-economic legislation would permit the initiation of privately managed fish farming of salmon and the sea-run trouts. (11) Tuna.—Five species of tuna support the tuna fisheries of the United States. They are yellowfin, skipjack, albacore, bluefin and big-eye. Albacore are caught off the west coast of the United States from Baja California to British Columbia during the summer and fall by small vessels. They provide 30 to 50 million pounds per year. Bluefin tuna are caught off Southern California and Baja California. They provide 20 to 30 million pounds per year. Big-eye are eaught to a modest degree in the eastern tropical Pacific and until recently all included in the yellowfin statistics. Small quantities of skipjack and yellowfin are landed in Hawaii, and of skipjack and bluefin on the east coast. The rest consist of yellowfin and skipjack landed almost entirely in Southern California and Puerto Rico, and caught mostly in the eastern tropical and sub-tropical Pacific. The commercial tuna fishery started in Southern California in 1907 with a small amount of albacore canning. There was no market for it and a new one had to be created. This has gone on steadily. By 1935 the catches required for this purpose exceeded 100 million pounds for the first time. In 1967 they exceeded 400 million pounds (412) for the first time. This fishery has,been in economic trouble for most of its life and yet it has grown in this period to be ordinarily next to manhaden in volume of U.S. land- ings and next to shrimp (or salmon) in value of U.S. landings. It has long been the largest in volume and value of canned fish items. In 1925 albacore disappeared from Southern California and the industry had to shift to canning the tropical tunas (yellowfin and skipjack), which did not even come as far north as Cali- fornia in commercial quantities in most years. This led to the construction of larger vessels which by 1928 were fishing as far south as the equator. This brought spoilage problems which ice would not solve and means of freezing at sea had to be developed. By 1988 this problem was satisfactorily solved, and the fleet kept increasing in size and range. In 1941 the Navy took over most of the large vessels for service in the Central Pacific. At the end of the Pacific War the fleet surged ahead again and soon encountered two new problems. From then on to the present time it has been molested by 1141 Latin American countries claiming wide areas of the high seas as territorial sea and attempting to prevent U.S. flag vessel fishing off those coasts, or charging large fees for the privilege. From 1950 on, imports of tuna from Japan caused material economic distress for ten years that not only prevented growth in the fleet but caused some retraction. The Carruthers pack shaper reduced the labor cost of canning tuna so sharply after the end of World War II that American canners gained a good advantage on Japanese canners who still use hand labor for canning tuna. The use of the Puretice Power Blend and synthetic webbing, beginning in 1959, revolutionized the economics of the fishing end of the industry by 1961, and put it again in a competitive position with imported fish. Both branches have so far survived Japanese competition and are strong today. It is not yet certain that the battle for access to resources on the high seas has yet been won by the fishing end. Nevertheless large new investments are being made by owners in new vessels. From about 1955 on the paths of the canners and boat owners in the tuna industry began to part, with the canners placing increasing emphasis on imported frozen tuna, establishing bases for collecting this in various parts of the world, and stimulating the development of tuna fisheries by South Koreans, Taiwanese, Eeuadorans, etc., as well as by Japanese, on subtantially world-wide basis. By 1953 tuna canning by Southern California packers (mostly on imported fish) was well under way in Puerto Rico and this has continued to grow in a solid manner. Some U.S. flag vessels followed the canners to Puerto Rico immediately until in 1967 these landed about 100 million pounds, and will exceed that in 1968. For some odd reason the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries did not, until this year, include these Puerto Rico landings by U.S. flag vessels in the figures given in Tables 2 and 3, which are therefore low. They are now, for the first time this year included in the tables of total supply of tuna to the United States. By 1958 U.S. flag vessels were exploring the West African coast out of Puerto Rico, as far south as Angola. The growth of this branch of the fishery has been desultory until in 1967 four vessels made successful trips from there. Hight ves- sels are there as this is written in August, 1968 and it is likely that more will follow before this year is out. Vessels out of Puerto Rico have also explored the late summer tuna fishing as far north as New England and in 1963 the catches for that region Were upwards of 14 million pounds, although they have not been maintained at that level. It is likely that there will be renewed interest there this year. This fishery for tropical tunas (yellowfin and skipjack) has developed into the one real distant water fishery that the United States has. It ranges comfortably and normally throughout the whole range of yellowfin and skipjack from Southern California to Northern Chile and has explored the Atlantic from Angola to New England. The purse seine technique it has evolved is far the most efficient way of catching tuna that any nation has in ocean regions where there is a sharp, shallow thermocline underlain by an oxygen deficiency zone. It is fully competi- tive economically when fishing in such regions, with any other tuna fishermen in the world, and only Japan catches more tuna than does the United States. The fleet was quite thoroughly modernized after the purse seine revolution in 1960 put it on its feet economically again. It is presently undergoing further renovation and a very sharp expansion. Fifteen new vessels are under construc- tion or on order and it is likely that this will increase to twenty before this expansion boom is over. The whole fleet is capable of freezing its catch at once at sea and carrying its frozen cargo in undeteriorated condition for weeks, or even months. The new vessels entering the fleet are all substantially larger, and with greater range, than the fleet average just ten years ago. Five of the new vessels are giants capable of freezing and carrying more than 900 tons. Most are over the 500 ton range. Such vessels are equipped to stay at sea for two or three months. There is one easy way to tell whether a fishery is prospering or not. If it is the fishermen build new boats, if it is not they do not. The individual tuna clippers that have recently been built, or are on order, cost $1.5 to $1.8 million each. Thus the total new investment in the tuna fleet now going on will approxi- mate $30 million. This is all being undertaken by individual fishermen or groups thereof, and canners are involved not in ownership but backing of partial costs in several instances to provide credit for the owners. Some of the vessels have applied for and got Fishing Vessel subsidies from the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, but more than half have not, on the grounds that it is more trouble 1142 than it is worth. The earning in this fleet is good enough to attract and keep: both young and old men. One of the skippers of a large new vessel is 27, and many are in their 30’s. This fleet is presently encountering one old problem and one new one, either one of which can cause serious perturbations in its economics, and both of which could cause serious damage. This has not dampened enthusiasm for new construction, which will increase the fishing effort of the existing fleet by a quarter. The old problem is jurisdiction by coastal states over fishing in the high seas. adjacent thereto. Hcuador, Peru and Chile claim the adjacent high seas to a minimum distance of 200 nautical miles as their sovereign territorial waters. All three have attempted to enforce these extravagent claims from time to time in the past, and Heuador is making a particularly vigorous effort to do so just now. There is not much the tuna fishermen can do about this. They fish on the high seas not in accordance with rights pertaining to them but in the exercise of rights pertaining to their sovereign, the United States Government. Fishermen are frequently the objects of international law but only sovereigns are its subject. The Department of State has tussled with this problem off Latin America now for twenty years, with varying success. It is renewing its efforts presently, and the issue is in its hands. The Congress in 1954 enacted legislation shifting much of the economic burden of this battle over national rights in the high seas from the back of the fishermen to that of the Federal Government, where it belonged in the first place. The Congress in 1968 has broadly strengthened this economic protection, and stimulated the Department of State to strengthen the diplomatic part of the protection. The new problem is conservation regulation. Yellowfin tuna stocks in the eastern Pacific will support an annual yield on a sustainable basis of only, 180-200 million pounds per year. The available fishing effort is able to catch this much in six months or less. The skipjack population in the same area is large enough to support a much larger annual fishery than now exists on a sustainable basis (it yielded 260 million pounds in 1967). The Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission has these probelms within its purview. Regulation of the yellowfin catch began in 1966 rather too late in the season to be very effective. In 1967, yellowfin fishing (aside from incidental catch) was closed to vessels leaving port after 24 June. The economic effect on the fleet was masked by the excep- tional availability of skipjack in 1967. The fleet is reasonably dependent upon fishing both species for economic success. Skipjack are subject to wide annual fluctuations in availability from natural causes not associated with the fishery. They are normally more available in the second half of the year. Two big years of skipjack availability have never yet occurred together, and a bad skipjack year is not unknown after a good one. The fleet has not yet, until this year, experienced a bad skipjack year with yellowfin regulation. 1968 is one. This is causing a substantial shift of larger and newer tuna clippers from the eastern Pacific to the Atiantic in the last half of 1968. This will create many problems. The industry has had enough experience with such problems that it will very likely survive these. There is scope in the United States tuna market for substantial increased production by U.S. flag vessels. Imported frozen tuna now supply a little more than half the market. The albacore part of these imports cannot be caught off the United States nor by U.S. tuna clippers, but the bigger half (for light meat tuna) can be caught in the tropics by U.S. flag clippers. Accordingly if U.S. flag’ tuna vessels can deliver tuna to U.S. canners of equal price and quality with that available from imports there is scope for the fieet to increase in size by another quarter or half under present market conditions. There is no reason to believe that the United States tuna market will not continue to grow. Perhaps the key thing to watch in the tuna fishery is whether the United States Government is able, or willing, to protect its right for its tuna vessels to fish on the high seas. If it is, the fleet appears to be able and willing to expand on substantially a world-wide basis. In any event this is a large, strong, expanding part of the U.S. flag fishing industry. (12) Shrimp.—The fishery for shrimp parallels in some ways that of tuna. The United States market for shrimp has grown steadily. The fishery is inter- national. It has been bothered by molestation in fishing on the high seas and by imports. It has continued to grow and prosper. It is the most valuable crop to 11.9. fishermen, as tuna is the most valuable fishery product at the processed level in the United States. 1143 Shrimp are caught commercially in nearly all seaboard states of the Union but for the past twenty years the fishery has been particularly concentrated on both coasts of Florida, Georgia, and the entire Gulf of Mexico coast. In the Gulf of Mexico has been developed the type of vessel, gear and methodology for shrimp eatching that has led the way in the world—the double-rigged Gulf otter-trawler. The fishery has increased steadily in production since the turn of the century, exceeded the 100 million pound level in 1936, the 200 million pound level in 1952, and the 300 million pound level (about 324 million pounds heads-on) in 1967. The Gulf fishery exists mostly on three species of Penaeid shrimp, the white, brown and pink. These have the common characteristic of living only a year to eighteen months so that, substantially speaking, there is no conservation problem as exists with most of the fish referred to above. It is very nearly an annual crop, like cereal, and if not harvested it dies and is wasted. The only thing about this kind of shrimp is that they are found throughout the Caribbean area, and the same species of brown shrimp is commercially abundant off Northern Brazil and in the same latitudes, off West Africa. Smaller species of shrimp (sea bob) are available in large volume in the same region and will support much larger catches than now taken. The large Royal Red (or carabinero) shrimp is found in deeper water (particularly abundantly off West Africa) but is not yet fished heavily. Most shrimping is done on the continental shelf and in relatively shallow water (mostly less than 50 fathoms). This has brought the shrimp fishermen a differ- ent set of international problems than the tuna fishermen have had. Where the continental shelf was broad and reasonably close to American Gulf ports a means of long range fishing developed even with relatively small vessels using ice. A vessel going out to the grounds would take ice for others, and one coming home would carry shrimp for others. In this manner the fishery off eastern Mexico (especially on Campeche Bank and along Tamaulipas State) was developed by vessels out of West Florida, Texas and other Gulf ports. Instead of exhausting the shrimp stock by increased fishing effort the effect, under normal circumstances, is to reduce the catch by the average vessel. As this goes on the more adventurous fishermen move on experimentally to new and more distant grounds. So long as they are within reach of home port and ice they operate out of home port. When the grounds are too distant to permit this bases are established as possible, in countries closer to the fishing grounds, and freezing plants are erected so the catches can be frozen and shipped home or to market elsewhere in the United States. In this manner the shrimp industry has developed another sort of international character different than that of the tuna industry. Guif, and other, shrimp operators have, by this means, spread throughout the Caribbean, down the northeast slope of Brazil (out of bases in Barbado’s and he Guianas), and U.S. firms have established shrimp fisheries in the eastern Pacific from Guatemala to Ecuador. Probing extensions are going on further south in Brazil and off the West African coast. By providing market, sometimes credit, sometimes other incentives, sometimes through joint ventures, United States firms have been important in establishing shrimp fisheries in the Persian Gulf, off India and Pakistan, and in Indonesia. This has tempered the attitude o fthe shrimp industry toward imports because in a good many instances leaders in the Gulf shrimp fishery had one or more hoats fishing out of a foreign port whose catches when they reached the United States were classed as imports. Furthermore the efficiency of American shrimp- ers has always stayed at a level where, except for short periods of time occasion- ally, they could compete economically against imports. Accordingly the line between international, foreign and domestic shrimping has never been so clear as in the tuna fishery. Since most shrimping is done within i2 miles of shore there has not even been much of a jurisdictional problem, ex- cept with Mexico. The shrimp business has not been without its ups and downs. As a matter of fact there is a regular cycle of about 31% years duration where the price of shrimp, number of vessels and catch goes up steadily until there is too much production at too high price. The price, new vessel construction and production then drop for a six month or so period, and the cycle starts all over again, Over the past eighteen or twenty years of this the trend line both of price and con- sumption has been steadily upward, and it still is. There is no top yet apparent to the shrimp market in the United Sates. Con- sumption double on about a fifteen year basis and does not seem to slack off. As with canned tuna the per capita consumption rate also continues upward. 1144 There is not expected to be a substantial increase (or decrease) in the land- ings of Penaeid (Gulf) Shrimp off the coast of the United States. The resources are quite well surveyed and are felt to be producing about as much as they ¢an. There is steadily developing a larger sized vessel, and freezing at sea has been experimented with extensively (it is used extensively in the Persian Gulf on vessels built for that fishery in Texas) but it is not clear yet that long range shrimp fishing plus freezing at sea can compete economically with ice boats working out of foreign ports where catches can be frozen and shipped by common carrier (or flown). Nevertheless a trend toward larger long-range freezing vessels has looked as if it is starting over the past two years. ; (18) Crabs.—Crabs have been a delicacy in sea coast towns forever. With the coming of refrigerated transport facilities, and frozen food counters in every super-market type grocery store in every village and town of the interior as well as the coast, the common taste for good shellfish continued to build market in what seems an almost insatiable manner. This is much forwarded by modern packaging, marketing and merchandizing methods, and the rapidity of transport from catcher to consumer, including by air. Crab have participated fully in this expansion of market with shrimp. In 1965 they were second only to menhaden in volume of landing by U.S. flag vessels. (with a total catch of 335 million pounds), and fourth in value (behind shrimp,. salmon and tuna) at $31 million. Both volume and value were new records. In 1966 new records were set with a catch of 372 million pounds valued at $33. million. The catch was off somewhat in 1967, but will be up again in 1968. The big volume of production is derived from blue crab, which are found in commercial quantities on the east and Gulf coasts from southern New Hngland to the Mexican border. There is a problem with this kind of crab of the great amount of hand labor in picking meat which keeps production costs up. Catching is by small vessels inshore. Progress is being made in mechanization of processing. Catch has been going up rather steadily. It exceeded 100 million pounds in 1957, and reached 171 million pounds in 1965. There is ample resources base, particu- larly in the South Atlantic and Gulf States, for major expansion still in the yield. King crab is caught commercially in Alaska from Kodiak Island to Bering Sea (by Japanese and Russians, to westward, as well as Americans). The American fishery is conducted by large pots on the continental sheif fairly near to shore, but the seas and weather are rough and it is a hardy operation requiring sound, and fairly expensive, vessels to tend the pots. The American fishery was twenty years getting started and as late as 1959 yielded a little less than 9 million pounds. It then took off like a sky rocket and a veritable gold rush developed. Catches went from 9 million pounds in 1959 to 87 million pounds in 1964, and a top of 159 million pounds in 1966 (almost equaling the blue crab catch of that year). The catch fell to 126 million pounds in 1967 because of resource scarcity but there is not a feeling among experts that the top has yet been reached. Expansion of the fishery in this last eight years has been heavily concentrated close to Kodiak Island, and the stocks in that vicinity have probably reached their maximum level of productivity or sur- passed it. There is much stock left that is not fully fished further westward along the Alaska peninsula and out along the Aleutian chain, as well as in Bering Sea. The fishery is expanding out in that direction. The United States. Government has jurisdiction over most production, which lies outside the 3 mile limit, but, as is normal, does not exercise it except in negotiations with other countries. Again, as is customary, the State of Alaska fills the management of use void to the limit of its ability. king crab (as with tuna, brown and pink shrimp) is an example of a marine resources for which no market existed in the United States and for which a market was deliberately created by advertising and skilled merchandizing. It makes a fine canned product but in this form was expensive and directly competitive with the same product from Japan and Russia, where production costs are cheaper. It was not until a solid marketing program was put afoot to sell the product frozen, either in sections or as picked meat, that costs got in line and market expanded so that the fishery could grow. At once a rather large number of fairly good vessels were needed, and sooner than they could be built. The fishery accomplished its rapid growth by attracting in a conglomeration of vessels, poorly suited to the fishery, from all other fleets on the coast, from tuna clippers, sardine seiners, and salmon seiners to halibut schooners. A good many of them were overage, ald none of them were designed for this specialized and rugged fishery, operating under such harsh work and climate conditions. A bad vessel under a good master 1145 however, will accomplish miracles, and this fishery was sufficiently lucrative to attract good skippers. Now that the fishery is becoming mature good vessels newly constructed to its needs are coming off the ways and joining the fleet. In the interim a good many vessels and lives were lost, and a good deal of money was made. A major fishery was developed quickly. There is another sort of crab in approximately the same area, and experi- mental fishing results indicate it to be more wide spread and totally abundant than the king crab. It is the Tanner crab (of several species) which the Canadians (who have recently begun the harvest of a similar species on the Atlantic coast) call the Queen crab. Its meat is roughly the same as that of the King crab. It can be caught by the same means as King crab but perhaps will be more cheaply caught by trawl, bottom tangle net, or a redesigned pot. It has not been worked commercially in Alaska until very recently (although long an article of commerce with the Japanese and Russians) because of low return and the fact that the meat was more difficult (and expensive) to pick. There was more tendency in the picking process for meats to be broken, and thus be degraded in value through damage in appearance. With the decline in abundance of King Crab around Kodiak Island last season the catching and marketing of Tanner crab began in earnest. Sufficient effort is being put on the technoiogical problems of catching and preparation for marketing that these problems are coming to solution. The product is coming on the market in substantial volume in 1968 and it is obvious that the fishery for this sort of crab is going to grow rapidly in Alaska. Dungeness crab is the third sort (after blue and king) of substantial com- mercial importance in the United States. It is delicious and commands a good market in west coast cities. it is the crab that Joe DiMaggio’s father caught, and that made Fishermen’s Wharf in San Francisco famous. Its annual produc- tion has averaged in the range 30-40 million pounds for a good many years. This rather localized western market used reasonably the full available resource off Northern California, Oregon and Washington. It provided a price high enough to prevent the extensive canning of this crab but too low to warrant the expan- sion of the fishery for it to southeast and central Alaska where the large unused resouzce of this sort of crab exists. Like the Tanner crab, this crab does not yield as high a ratio of picked meat to live weight as do King crab, and the meat is more difficult and costly to pick than with King crab. As with the Tanner crab, King crab has now created such a national demand for frozen crab meat that with the leveling off of its production Dungeness crab is being seriously worked in the Kodiak area and will undoubtedly assist in keeping the crab gold rush going. There are substantial underfished resources of this crab available in the Gulf of Alaska. The flourishing of the King crab fishery in central and western Alaska injected a whole new breath of life (and a good deal of money) into the U.S. bottom fish (demersal) fishery of the Pacific Northwest. As is always the case, when fisher- men make money they pioy it back into new and better boats; when there is a market that will show a profit dealers, processors and marketers move in with speed, capital and marketing know how; and when there is better meoney to be made at sea than ashore vigorous young men recruit to the fishery and give it life. All of these things the King crab fishery has done to the Northeast Pacific ground fisheries, and the effects are now beginning to spin off to other large resources in the area, such as Alaska pink shrimp, scailop, Tanner crab, Dunge- ness crab, etc. It will eventually infect the major resources of demersal fin-fish that only the Russians and Japanese are fishing heavily in the area now. (14) Flounder and the Trawl Fisheries for Groundjish.—Flounder is the name given to a large and varied family of fiat fish that are common to the continental shelves of the North Atlantic and Pacific. Some species are so particularly deli- cious that they have generated their own trade names (English sole, Dover sole, black back or yellowtail flounder, fluke, rex sole, etc.). For the most part, how- ever, they appear on restaurant menu’s in the United States as fillet of sole. The larger species (common halibut) are often steaked and find a ready retail market for home use as well as in restaurants. The price of flounders is kept high enough by this restaurant and home trade that they seldom can form the raw material for the burgeoning market for “fish blocks” from which are made fish sticks, portions, chips, sandwiches, ete. This caused extreme dissatisfaction among Pacific Northwest fishermen, in particular, where there are quite large underutilized resources of most ground fish, including a number of species of flounder that are hardly used at all. The fishermen are 1146 kept on quotas by the processors in relation to the amount of product that can be sold in this rather limited flounder market at existing prices. Nevertheless the market for flounder and the landings of this commodity continues to grow. 'The value of the catch continued to grow until recently. It will be noted from Tables 2 and 3 that the record volume of landings, and value as well, was in 1965. The volume was a little down in 1966 but the value was up to a new record. The volume in both years was well above the five years (1960— 64) average. Flounder is in about seventh place in respect of volume and eighth place in value among U.S. flag fish landings. The long range outlook is for a steady increase in both volume and value, although catch and volume was down again in 1967. In spite of what would look on the surface to be a reasonably satisfactory con- dition of growth in both volume and value in the flounder fishery it is from pre- cisely the trawl fisheries that produce flounder as well as other groundfish in New England, Oregon and Washington whence comes the most vigorous and steady political complaints about their sorry lot. It is the trawl fishery which mostly forms the basis for judging that the United States flag fishery is decadent, declining, and composed of overaged, inefficient, obsolete vessels and men. It is this fishery whence comes the vigorous and continuing political whine that the Russians are catching up all their fish and crowding them off their own fishing grounds. The reason for this anomaly are not hard to find but they are in somewhat different quarters than the complaints illuminate. Fiounders are produced by otter trawls, the same gear (and kind of vessels) that produce cod, hake, haddock, pollack, ocean perch, and most of the other numerous sorts of ground fish. As noted above it is precisely this conglomeration of fish which has come to form the raw material for the most rapidly growing edible fish commodity in the world—the frozen fish block from which is made fish sticks, portions, sandwiches, chips, etc. The drive for building this market, and its technology, originated in the United States. It is in the United States that the market for this sort of fishery product has grown so rapidly in recent years, having come from 256 million pounds in 1948 to 576 million pounds in 1966. In fishermen’s terms (round weight at the dock) this increase has been from about 850 million pounds in 1948 to 1,900 million pounds in 1966. The raw material required for this trade in the United States alone exceeded in 1966 even the catch of menhaden for fish meal. In 1967 both market and use were down slightly from 1966 records, but are going up again in 1968. These otter trawlers, as a group, have not participated in the market growth for this product. Their share of that market was 74% in 1948, 44% in 1957, and 30% in 1967. It is just precisely the sorts of fish that fill this market that they are able to catch on the grounds where they now fish, or where they did fish in the experience of the men still active in the fieet. Their government scientists tell them quite truthfully that there are resources available in coastal waters of the United States and Canada, which they are accustomed to fishing adequate to not only fill this market completely but to provide a substantial surplus for ex- port, and they know this. Their processor customers tell them that if they will produce fish from which good quality fish blocks can be made at competitive prices with imports (say 25¢ per pound) they will buy from them. These otter- trawlers cannot do this profitably so they have had to shrink back to the pro- duction of higher value flounders rather than grow into this fabulously growing new market in their own home country. Even flounder resource abundance problems are appearing in New England the last two or three years. The New England otter trawlers at the end of World War II were the strongest and most vigorously growing branch of the United States flag fishing industry. United States Government policy reduced them deliberately to a posi- tion of economic weakness and shrinking in a very few years. It did this by making the United States market freely and purposely open to ground fish from other North Atlantic countries (particularly Canada and Scandinavia) to in- crease their dollar earning capabilities. The policy was enunciated by the Presi- dent of the United States who, after the otter-trawlers of New England had exhausted remedies available to them under law and won their case, overruled the U.S. Tariff Commission ruling on the grounds of supervening national interest which existed at that time. The effect of this has been to shrink the geographic range of the New England ground fisheries back from the entire Northwest Atlantic pretty well to George’s Bank off Massachusetts and to inshore waters, to remove the economic possibility 1147 of joining the shrimp, tuna, and king crab fishermen in tooling up with modern new vessels, to limit the possibility of attracting vigorous young men into the fleet, and to restrict their activities pretty well to high-grading the higher priced resources of flounder and scallop which they could reach with the smaller vessels with which they were left, whose rather restricted (if more lucrative) markets the foreign fishermen could not reach quite so easily as could they. The net, and humiliating, effect was to be shrunk back from first place in the Northwest Atlantic fishery to eighth or ninth place, and become the butt of study team after study team from Washington, D.C. who held them to be inefficient, overage and outmoded because policy established in Washington, D.C. had been successful and had knocked their economic feet out from under them. In the last few years the final ignomy has been added by large, modern fleets of Russian trawlers appearing even on George’s Bank and putting sufficient added fishing effort on haddock and silver hake resources so that these have become heavily overfished, which has brought additional economic hardship to the New England trawlers. To the humiliation and economic distress was added the excessive irritation of losing their markets in the United States primarily to Canadian fishermen who received increasing and lavish vessel construction subsidies and much related sensible and effective support, from both the Canadian Federal and Provincial Governments, to the extent that it has been stated that a new vessel could be built in Nova Scotia with modest investment and generate a cash flow without leaving the dock. Under this pressure by the Canadian Government to develop its maritime fish- eries not only did Canadian production on these grounds grow (and fill the American market) but under various Canadian incentives the most vigorous United States processors and marketers moved their facilities and operations from New England to the Maritime Provinces. Rail transport to the actively growing market of middle United States was better from Canadian than New England ports and substantially the whole of this market was removed from those who remained in New England. Icelandic and Norwegian firms moved into the fish stick and portion manufacturing business in New England, but used frozen fish blocks imported from home, not of New England provenance. While private in nature they were so closely supported by the Icelandic and Norwegian Governments as to appear to the New England ground fishermen to be at least semi-governmental. This story is not at an end yet. Canadian fishermen in their heavily subsidized vessels have increasingly moyed into the scallop beds off George’s Bank, which were a chief remaining source of income to the Massachusetts ground fishermen, and into the United States market. As the supply of scallop meats to the U.S. market from Massachusetts fishermen shrunk from its high point of 22 million pounds in 1961 to a low of 11 million pounds in 1966, imports from Canada grew from 9 million pounds to 17 million pounds. Under the increased fishing pressure the stock collapsed and is being heavily overfished. The fishery lies entirely in international waters. The Canadian Government is much more interested in creating economic conditions which will cause European fishermen to retreat from the Northwest Atlantic fisheries than it is in conserving particular stocks of fish or shellfish in that region at the moment. Accordingly a chief remaining support of the Massachusetts ground fishermen is removed through circum- stances beyond their control, and for which they have no remedy. Their remaining support was from inshore flounder and from George’s Bank haddock. They retained this chiefly because they have better transport access to the megalopolis from Boston to Washington, D.C., where most of these products are consumed, than do the Canadians, whose access is best to the mid-West markets. The New England ground fishermen see this last vestige of protection disappearing as the Canadian freeway system joins up with the New England extension of the Federal freeway system and gives the Lunnenberg, Nova Scotia, processing plants easy truck access to the New York market. The Canadians are already fishing the haddock resource off George’s Bank vigorously as are the Russians. Now the three chief groundfish resources (haddock, silver hake, and scallop) still available to New England groundfishermen are substantially overfished. The New Bngland fishermen therefore look forward to being pushed back even more upon the inshore flounder resources which can be sold fresh and locally, and these are not large enough to permit much, if any, expansion. It is not a pretty prospect and they cannot be expected to like it. 26-563—70—pt. 2——41 1148 Pacific Northwest otter-trawlers have never been as large in production as those of New England although the groundfish resources available to them are larger than those adjacent to New England. The entire production of trawl fish by American and Canadian fishermen, together, from the Northeast Pacific ranged from 125 to 140 million pounds in the decade 1955-1964. This has increased somewhat in the last few years. The Alaskan trawl catch was a quarter of a million pounds in 1966. British Columbia catches were at a record high in 1965 at 44 million pounds, but have gone up since. The Washington State fleet also had a record high to that time of 53 million pounds in 1965. The Oregon catch is on a smaller scale yet. and provided less than 20 million pounds per year. The California trawl catch amounts to something less than 40 million pounds per year. The most vociferous otter trawlers politically on the national level have been those of Oregon and Washington who, between them, scarcely produce 75 million pounds of fish per year. A large proportion of what they do produce is sold very cheaply for animal (principally mink) feeding. Their substantial revenues come from their landings of flounder for direct human consumption (much is landed for mink feed also). They are customarily limited by the buyers of five or six species of these out of the twenty-odd available to them. Even for these they are ordinarily put on weekly or other quotas. Among the most abundant other fish available to them are Pacific perch. There are thirty-odd species of these. They are limited by the buyers to fishing for two or three species of these and are ordinarily under buyer’s quota’s of a weekly or other nature even for these. The catch of ocean perch in Oregon and Washing- ton in 1965 was 28 million pounds. All of this contrasts with estimated resources of demersal fishes available in the Northeast Pacific suitable to support sustainable fisheries off California of 600 million pounds per year, off Oregon, Washington and British Columbia, of 800 million pounds per year, in the Gulf of Alaska of 900 million pounds per year, and in Eastern Bering Sea of 3 billion pounds per year. This makes a poten- tial sustainable yield of demersal fishes in the Northeast Pacific of 5.3 billion pounds per year (above the average of all landings by all U.S. flag fishing vessels per year in all fisheries over the last 30 years), as contrasted with the actual yield of less than 200 million pounds per year by all American fishermen from the area, and the somewhat less than 75 million pounds per year for the trawlers of Oregon and Washington. The complaints of Oregon and Washington trawlers are at several levels, and include these: 1. Their large market for demersal fish is the booming fish block business of the mid-west and eastern seaboard. This is substantially in the hands of Canadian, Icelandic and Norwegian fishermen. They can seldom compete in this market even in the metropolitan areas of Los Angeles, San Francisco Bay area, Portland and Seattle-Tacoma, much less the mid-west or east coast. Historically they could not compete in the latter two areas against New England fishermen because of transportation costs, and they get frozen out of those markets before the New Englanders do. 2. Their flounder and ocean perch production is pretty well limited to the restricted restaurant and home trade of the west coast area and that is not large enough to handle any considerable portion of the resources available to them. Also production from British Columbia trawlers (having the normal Cana- dian governmental supports that United States fishermen do not get from their government) competes directly with theirs in these western metropolitan markets. They submit to conservation regulations on two of their most important cash resources (English sole and Petrale), off the Washington coast arranged through the Pacific States Marine Fisheries Commission. Canada is not a member of the latter and while it coordinates its regulations fairly well, the Washington fisher- men are not exactly sure that the Canadian fishermen fishing along side them are submitting to the same regulations they are. 4. The Canadian fishermen are pressing their Government to declare Hecate Straits, Queen Charlotte Sound, and intervening waters which provide State of Washington trawlers some of their best fishing, as internal waters of Canada, which would eliminate those grounds from their fishing area. The Canadians say that the Americans will be given their historic rights to fish in those waters still, but being given rights, and having them naturally, are two different things. 5. They cannot land halibut, which is the most valuable ground fish (and flounder) in the region, because of regulations of the International Pacific Halibut 1149 Fisheries Commission which do not permit the catching of any except incidental halibut by otter-trawl. 6. A very large Russian fleet of largp trawlers moved into the coastal area where the Americans fished off Oregon and Washington in 1966 and in the first year of almost experimental fishing caught about 300 million pounds of fish against their 75 or so million. Adding insult to injury the press and the public immediately assumed the Oregon and Washington trawlers to be hopelessly incompetent, inefficient and backward because they did not have large vessels like the Russians. The truth was, as noted further below, they could not afford to have operated as large a trawler as the smallest Russian vessel in their fishery if it were given to them, and in catch per man hour, ship-ton, or other measures they were far more efficient than the Russians. They just did not have market for what they could catch, or much support and comfort from their own government. Quite aside from 'the general uproar they cause politically these otter trawlers of the Pacific Northwest and New England are the vociferous exponents of declaring the fishery limits of the United States to be co-extensive with the con- tinental shelf, or 200 miles broad whichever is greater. This would not necessarily have any beneficial effect on their market or economics, but it would get the Canadian, European, and Asiatic fishermen out of their remaining accustomed fishing grounds, and out of sight. This would be satisfaction enough for most U.S. flag otter-trawlers. The impact of this on the military posture of the United. States (as noted below) could be considerable, and adverse. It is obviously confusing to try and discuss in one brief space and at the same time, the general problems of the New England and Pacific Northwest trawl fishermen; flounder, ocean perch, cod, haddock, scallop, and hake resource prob- lems; import policies of the United States; foreign aid policies; subsidies in other countries; the flow of ground fish into several parts of the United States fish market. The trouble is that all of these things are inter-tied with the trawl fisheries and cannot be separated out and dealt with in neat units. The statistics of the flounder fisheries, which reflect generally increased land- ings and values, also partially hide the most painful running sores of the United States flag fishing industry because flounder are caught by the ground fish fisheries which are the worst off of the United States flag fisheries generally. A ray of hope is the presently booming shrimp and scallop fishery of the Gulf of Alaska which may give strength to the trawl fishery in that region needed to spark production from other very large ground fish resources available in the region and fishes substantially now only by Russian and Japanese trawlers. (15) Discarded fish.—The most productive fishery of the United States, well larger than menhaden, is for fish that are discarded at sea and never brought to port. It is reckoned that these discarded amount to at least 1,300 million pounds in the Gulf of Mexico shrimp fishery alone. A substantial amount arises from most of the trawl] fisheries elsewhere around the rim of the country. Nearly all of this fish dies when returned to the sea. Intensive effort is required to turn this major waste into economic use. (16) General Comments Arising from a Consideration of Specific Fisherics.— In the above discussion brief attention is paid to fifteen of the principal fisheries composing a substantial part of the value and volume of U.S. flag landings. The purpose has been not to be comprehensive but to illustrate that the statistical stagnancy of the U.S. fisheries over the past thirty years is satistical and not real. A blanket statistical approach to this subject merely cloaks from view a great variety of dynamic situations, most of them having quite different origins, and a large number of compiex problems requiring, for the most part, slightly or quite different solutions. If nine of these resources (Pacific sardine, menhaden, Pacific salmon, cod, haddock, Atlantic perch, jack mackerel, Pacific mackerel and oysters) were pro- duced at the peak point that they ever reached (a thing not possible on a sus- tainable level) the annual catch from these alone woud be 5,892 million pounds: (or greater than the annual average catch for all U.S. fisheries over the past 30 years). In matter of fact these nine resources produced less than half that amount in 1967. Between these two levels proper management of the use of the resources: could at least have kept them producing at a much higher level than they do today. Furthermore there is no pattern to the time at which the peak in these major crops were taken. Cod and oyster production were at their recorded peak of U.S. production in 1880 when the first U.S. fishery census was taken. Pacific 1150 mackerel reached its peak in 1935 and Pacific sardine in 1936, as did Pacific salmon. There may be some relation between the peaking of the two predomi- nantly southern California fisheries (although nobody has attempted to demon- strate one), but there would not appear to be any climatic, economic, or other relation between the drop off in those two fisheries and the one for Pacific salmon. It may be noted. however, that the drop off in production from these three resources which produced 2 billion pounds more in 1936 than they did in 1967 amounted to better than 40 percent of what was produced in 1936, but that this drop off had been just about evened out by production from other resources by 1967. The peak of production in haddock was in 1929, but this was related to a series of good incoming year classes and a strong market for scrod, not to the market crash of 1929. The high point in Atlantic perch production was reached in 1951, and of jack mackerel in 1952, but in each case the drop off since was related to factors not at all common to the two, or the general fish market. The high point in menhaden production was 1962, but the drop off since then is not related to market, which has grown sharply since then, but to lack of fish, which is almost certainly a factor of overfishing, although variations in environmental factors may be operating too. The declines in Pacific sardine, menhaden, and Pacific mackerel which has been, in toto, about 2,250 million pounds (or most of that total) seem to be quite clearly attributable mostly to overfishing. In sardine and mackerel the course is run and the fisheries are done; in the case of menhaden the decline has just nicely started. It has continued since 1965 when the catch was 1.726 million pounds. In 1967 it was 1,170 million pounds (about half its peak of 1962). Nothing has been learned. The State of California still has no effective machinery with which to bring modern management methods to bear on its ocean resource affairs and neither do the Atlantic coast or Gulf States. The Federal Government still accepts no responsibility in such matters. It has no machinery to deal with them if it did. Because of touchy Federal-State relations the Federal Government is even reluctant to mention these matters publicly, although in both areas it is the one that has had the research information from which overfishing and decline could be detected, and it has the jurisdiction, if it would only assert it, over the ocean area from which most fish and shellfish production comes. The decline in oyster production results from a combination of almost all of the mismanagement methods so far devised by the United States for its natural re- sources—overfishing, pollution (both domestic and industrial), silting of estuaries through poor land management, economic regulations of the fishery aimed at decreasing its efficiency (sail boats and rakes on parts of Chesapeake Bay), in- terstate fighting over comon resources (Maryland and Virginia in the Potomac), lack of economic incentive to farm (no tide land tenure rules in most states), ete. It is about as sorry a picture as the passenger pigeon, buffalo, and whooping crane, with no relief in sight on either a State or Federal level. The drop off in cod, Atlantic perch and haddock are not related to market con- dition, because the use of these three in the United States has continued directly upward. In the case of haddock and perch some overfishing is probably repre- sented, and in haddock this is presently serious. In cod there is no such effect. The major drop-off in the three is attributable to conscious action by the United States Government in letting the New England ground fish fishery decay since 1948, and in not providing conservation management to haddock and perch re- sources lying in the high seas, a matter fully within its competence under the 1958 “Convention on Fishing and the Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas”. Tt is not certain that the drop off in Pacific salmon since 1986 is much attribu- table to any partictlar thing that one can put a finger on. All five resources are being used fully. Perhaps one or more is being used too fully but not because of lack of regulatory intent or machinery. Furthermore the present low level is not necessarily a permanent feature. Market is strong and economic incentive could be improved quickly by repeal of a few of the more stupid state laws. The drop-off in jack mackerel landings is not related to resource strength, or to imports, or to bad management. The economice causes of this drop-off appear to be related to the decay of the sardine and Pacific mackerel fishery around it which has not left a fleet strong enough to subsist on jack mackerel alone at prices which will fit the product into any available market. 1151 CHAPTER IV.—THE NATURE OF LIVING MARINE RESOURCES, JURISDICTION OVER THEM, AND CONCEPTS FOR MANAGING THEIR USE A. The nature of living resources The basic factor in dealing with living resources, as differentiated from non- living, is that they are continuously renewing themselves. They do this in re- lation to general laws of nature, and in accordance with special conditions that are not only specific to each individual species, but frequently differ among the races or homogeneous stocks within a species. In general a male and female from one generation will produce at such a rate that in a state of natural equilibrium the result will be just exactly one male and one female in the following generation. Different sorts of resources react to the vicissitudes of their environment by providing different reproductive surplus’ to counter the different mortality rates the stock has encountered historically. For instance, fur seals produce one pup (more rarely two) per year after the adult stage is reached, and such a slow rate of reproduction is typical among elasmo- branchs (sharks, skates and rays). For instance the dog fish shark will produce six or eight young every two years. In the fin fishes the reproductive rate is highly diverse but generally more liberal. The viviparous perch will produce a few dozen young per year; the salmons, trouts, herrings, anchovies, etc., will produce a few thousand young per year; the ocean perch will produce a few tens of thousands of young per year; and so on up to the tunas, cods, etc., that will produce a few million young per year. This range, roughly speaking, is char- acteristic also of the wide range of invertebrate resources normally called shellfish. But the general rule holds. Nature anticipated expected mortality rates for the stock by producing sufficient young so that in a state of balance two animals beget two in one generation, and no more or less. Man may (and does) intervene in this process in various ways. This can be done to his benefit or harm. Whether the intervention will be harmful or bene- ficial depends absolutely upon knowledge of the species of animal, the principal characteristics of its specific life history, the rates of natural mortality, the rate of growth of the individuals in the stock, the rate of recruitment (reproduction), the effect of addition of artificial (fishing) mortality on the stock, and the effect of variations in the environment on these factors. There are no short cuts. A great deal of expensive and time consuming research of a high order of sophistication must be done to have the ingredients for know- ing how to manage the use of a resource to any effect, either beneficial or harmful. Research done on such a population dynamic problem for one species of animal is of very little use in dealing with another species of animal, because its vital processes will be different. This is frequently the case for separate homogeneous populations within a particular species. Generally speaking, when animals are removed from the population by fishing or gathering the total number of animals in the population decreases, the average size (age) of individuals in the population decreases, the catch per unit of effort decreases, and the reproduction efficiency of the population as a whole in- creases (so that two ean still beget two under these additional stresses and the population still survive). As the rate of fishing pressure (mortality) increases the amount of the catch increases, while the abundance (numbers) and weight of the remaining popula- tion decreases. This condition continues to exist up to a certain point where the added rate of artificial mortality (fishing) plus the natural mortality inherent in the stock and its relations to its environment, begins to exceed the total pos- sible reproductive capability of the population. This is called the point of maxi- mum sustainable yield (MSY), a phrase often encountered in dealing with fishery management. Beyond this point of MSY, if fishing effort is still increased, the catch will either level off (under conditions where there is enough reproductive surplus escaping the fishery to provide all the young the environment will support) or drop more or less sharply (depending upon the dependence the reproductive rate of the population has on the number of reproducing adults left by the fishery in the population). Under the latter condition that total rate of mortality can get so high in relation to reproductive capabilities that it, possibly aided by adverse environmental conditions, can extinguish the stock and species (the case of the passenger pigeon and the saber-toothed tiger), or drive it below the threshold of commercial importance (the case of the Pacific sardine). Under either situa- 1152 tion the catch per unit of effort goes steadily (and perhaps sharply) down, and the cost per unit of production goes up. This concept of maximum sustainable yield is basic to fishery management but it has a great many pitfalls. Variations in the environment (and these may be in the biological as well as the physical environment) may cause wide ‘swings in the level of maximum sustainable yield available from a particular population through changes in survival rate attributable to natural conditions. These changes may come in succeeding years Or move in more or less a cyclic manner. The point of maximum sustainable yield is always difficult to estimate with the best of scientific data and understanding, and must often be a well educated guess based on the best data and understanding available. In the case of animals of temperate regions (where most fishery population dynamics research has been done) a rough rule of thumb is talked about by fishery scientists, but not very strongly relied upon because of continued uncertainty and doubt. That is to the effect that the point of maximum sustainable yield is reached about where the stock is half as abundant as it was in the state of nature, and that at this point of lowered abundance about half of the remaining popula- tion can be removed by the fishery each year without causing gross further perturbations in population levels. The above very generalized suggestions applies to temperate stocks where a number of year classes are available at any one time to the fishery. Some re- sources supporting major fisheries are, however, almost annual crops, and this condition is more common in the tropics where life cycles tend to move more swiftly than under boreal or arctic conditions. For instance, most of the Penaeid shrimps that support most present ‘shrimp production in the world live only fifteen to eighteen months in a state of nature. The anchovy that support the mammoth fishery of Peru live only two or three years in a state of nature. The tropical tunas (yellowfin and skipjack) at least come to maturity and adult size in two or three years, etc. In the case of the shrimp (and probably many other tropical resources) if the crop is not taken in the year it dies, like the field of wheat, and is not available for harvest the next year. The great variety in the nature of success or failure among the various com- merical fisheries of the United States has been noted. There is just as great variety in the natural capability of particular resources to support fisheries. Some (most mammals and sharks) will support only a very light relative fishing mortality without the population going downhill until it is eliminated as a commercial proposition, or is eradicated entirely. Others (such as tuna, cod, ocean perch, anchovy) have such enormous natural reproductive resilience that ordinarily the population gets below the level of commercial practicability in harvest before the stock is in much danger. The fishery goes broke before the population does. In other cases (salmon, fur seal, oysters, clams, Penaeid shrimp) a characteristic of the life history of the species may make it particularly liable to being damaged by man’s activities. All salmon, for instance, must come into fresh water to reproduce (pink salmon may be a partial exception under par- ticular circumstances) and if access to their fresh water range is cut off by ob- structions the population is killed off entirely. The specificity may be more detailed. Most races of sockeye salmon must spawn in relation to a lake so that their young can spend a year or so in the lacustrine habitat, or the race dies. Fur seal require a hauling out ground that is cool for reproductive activity which means in practice, fog enshrouded. These locations are few in the world. The young of most commercial Penaeid shrimp must have a brackish water habitat for a few months or they will not survive in good number. The number of such criteria of living resources are legion, and must be learned about (and heeded) to provide the basis for management of the use of the resource. B. Jurisdiction over fisheries Man may (and does) intervene in these complicated natural situations of living resources in order to make the particular resource produce what he wants in the manner he wants it. To do this in a conscious, regular, and continuous manner some entity must have jurisdiction over the resource and its use, whether this is called ownership, sovereignty or just jurisdiction. This situation is just as compjex in fisheries as the natural conditions of the resources and the variabil- ity in economic success of their commercial harvesting. Under international law there are four sorts of waters juridically, from the standpoint of fisheries. 1153 Internal waters are those within a nation over which it has the same total sovereignty, and rights of exclusive use, as it has over its land territory. The territorial sea is that body of water between the outer boundary of internal waters and the inner boundary of the high seas. The breadth of this band of water is not agreed upon by nations, but there is general agreement that it is not more than 12 marine miles (the United States claims three). Within this band the contiguous nation has full jurisdiction over the use of resources, and exclusive right to their exploration and use. Sovereignty is total for most pur- poses except the right of innocent passage by foreign vessels through the terri- torial sea. The contiguous zone is measured 12 marine miles out from the outer boundary of internal waters. In it the contiguous coastal nation has jurisdiction for pur- poses of protecting its internal security, customs, health, etc. There is a growing tendency (to which the United States has recently adhered) for the coastal state to claim (and have the claim honored by others) rights of exclusive jurisdiction and use over the living resources in this 12 mile zone. Thus the United States claims exclusive jurisdiction and use over the living resources within both its territorial sea (3 marine miles broad outward of internal waters) and its con- tiguous zone (another 9 marine miles seaward of the territorial sea). Outside the contiguous zone is the high seas. Among other freedoms of the high seas generally agreed to is freedom of fishing. The result is that high seas living resources (with the exception of those which at their harvestable stage are in constant physical contact with the continental shelf) are the common prop- erty of all people. Put another way, they are the property of him who first reduces them to his possession. It should not be taken that the individual fisherman or fishing vessel has any individual right to fish on the high seas. Fishermen and vessels are frequently the objects of international law, but only sovereign nation states are its subjects. The fisherman and his vessel works on the high seas (or traverses the contiguous zone and territorial sea of another nation in innocent passage) only under rights that pertain to his sovereign, and not to him. His vessel while on the sea is a part of the territory of the nation whose flag it wears for juridical purposes. It is responsible to the international community for his acts on the high seas. The management of the use of specific (or total) resources of the high seas, when that is arranged for at all, is arranged among the affected sovereigns in accordance with agreements, treaties and conventions made among them. These are rather numerous, highly varied as to nature, and can be of short or indefinite duration. The United States for instance, is a party to nine international fishery conventions (of which eight are presently operative) having specific responsibil- ities among the signatory nations for the conservation management of a partic- ular high seas fishery resources, or of the fisheries in a specific region of the high seas. It also has a number of bilateral agreements with nations where fish- ermen fish in, or near, its contiguous zone. The United States is also a party to the general “Convention on Fishing and the Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas” whose provisions are in effect with respect to the nations which have adhered to it. These are 25 out of the 138 sovereign nation states, and many of them are not very important fishing countries. International law also contains concepts on the jurisdiction over fishing in the high seas growing out of the practice of nations and treaty law. These are of modest effectiveness at the present stage of history because of the lack of any international enforcement agency beyond public opinion, or of a court of resort before which the sovereign nations can be hailed without their consent. Within the United States jurisdiction over the fisheries is left to the State Governments, with certain prominent exceptions. Where the United States is a party to an international conservation convention the Federal Government has jurisdiction over United States interest in the fisheries covered by the convention and these regulatory authorities are lodged in the Bureau of Commercial Fish- eries, Department of the Interior. In enacting the legislation establishing the Fishery Contiguous Zone the Congress deliberately left undisturbed for further decision the question of whether State or Federal jurisdiction applied in fisher- ies in the contiguous zone outside the limits of the territorial sea. There is no question but what the Federal Government has jurisdiction over fishing ves- sels flying its flag on the high seas, but in general this right has not been asserted or acted upon. In practice the States have exerted jurisdiction, and still do, over their own fishermen fishing in the high seas where they wished to do so, and by 1154 means they felt to be appropriate. In California, for instance, fishermen can land in the State of California only those fish taken in accordance with California State regulations, wherever they are caught. Although these jurisdictional situations are all somewhat in dispute they do provide the juridical framework within which fisheries are conducted. Both the fish and the fishermen make practical jurisdiction over fisheries for conservation management purposes complex and difficult because of their migratory, and other, habits. : Many of the most important marine resources make longer or shorter migra- tions during their life which are of vital importance to them. Prevented from doing so they die or do not thrive. Diadromous fish like salmon, sea-run trouts, some smelts, alewives, river her- ring, freshwater eel, shad, some sturgeons, etc., regularly and necessarily pass through all of these four juridical zones regularly in the course of their life history. If they are prevented from doing so they die. Consider, for instance, the Columbia river chinook salmon spawned in the Salmon river of Idaho. Dur- ing its life it passes twice through the jurisdictional waters of Idaho, Oregon, Washington and the United States 12 mile contiguous zone. It is subject to being fished on in the high seas off Oregon (occasionally California), Washington, British Columbia, and Alaska. Only treaty undertakings between Japan, Canada and the United States prevent it being fished upon by Japanese fishermen as well, and if it migrates west of 175° KE. longitude those prohibitions vanish. Tunas migrate across oceans. Bluefin tuna tagged off Baja California have been recaptured in the Sea of Japan; skipjack tuna similarly tagged have been recaptured southeast of Hawaii; albacore similarly tagged have been recaptured north of Hawaii and off Japan; bluefin tuna tagged in the Bahamas have been caught in the North Sea and the Bay of Biscay. Fur seals from the Pribilov Island herd migrate down along the coast of Japan and along the coast of North America to Baja California. Whales mi- grate over hemispheres. Even with the large coastal populations of fish that support major fisheries and are reasonably stable as to migrations, migrations during the natural spawning, feeding and growing cycles are sufficiently extensive that it is not possible to settle major jurisdictional problems or attend to the conservation Management of many major resources within one area of political jurisdiction. Most resources supporting major fisheries on a world-wide basis either occur solely or mostly in the high seas outside even a 12-mile contiguous zone, or move out of the terri- torial sea to there at some stage of their life history, and become available for capture on the high seas. By far the bulk of living resources now utilized or known about live on the continental shelf or reasonably close to shore. Prominent exceptions like tuna, salmon, whales, cod, ocean perch, etc., can be caught well offshore in many areas of the world ocean, but the general statement still holds true. Although these coastal large resources tend to migrate along coasts, there are major resources that stay pretty well within 50 to 100 miles of land, and, in countries like the United States, Norway, Chile, Argentina, India, China, Canada, Peru, and others with long coast lines, a good many large resources could be pretty well managed by a single country if its jurisdiction were broader. Some countries like Chile, Ecuador, Peru, and Argentina in this category have attempted to establish 200 miles zones of fishery jurisdiction to accomplish this purpose, and they have been followed by smaller countries like Panama and El Salvador. This has not been accepted generally by the nations as legitimate international practice. A principal reason for this is that with improved technology the fisher- men have become even more migratory than the fish. Japanese and Russian fishermen already fish customarily almost all of the world ocean. Where they can secure bases near particular fishing grounds at reasonable cost they fish out of them. When they cannot they fish out of home bases supported by motherships, carrier vessels, fueling vessels, hospital ships, ete. Fishermen of South Korea and Taiwan are not far behind those of Japan and Russia in the geographic scope of their distant water fisheries. Norway. Germany, Denmark, Faroe Islands, East Germany, Poland, Roumania, Netherlands, Bul- garia, Greece, Israel, United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Kuwait, France, United Kigdom, Iceland, Ghana, United States, Cuba, Venezeula, and Canada possess distant water fisheries of importance to them. and such are developing in Mexico, Ecuador, Senegal, Thailand, Ceylon, and West Pakistan. As other nations develop their fishing strength the same long range fishing ten- . 1155 dencies will develop, and the development programs of the United Nations Development Program and World Bank, executed by FAO Department of Fish- eries, are rather rapidly becoming effective in many parts of the world. Thus there arises the classic dichotomy between the distant water and the coastal fishermen which is such a factor in fishery jurisdiction problems on a world wide base, not only among nations, but among groups of fishermen within a nation. In these days of rapid application of science and technology to fishery development the political basis of this dichotomy has a disturbing habit of shift- ing while the problem is in process of solution. Some examples will illustrate. When the Truman Proclamation was issued in 1945 the only fishery people in the United States who were interested in it were the salmon and halibut people of the Pacific Northwest who hoped to use it to keep Japanese, particularly, but also Russian fishermen out of the Northeast Pacific. When they learned of this possible effect the tuna people of California, the shrimp people of the Gulf of Mexico, and the New England trawl people were opposed to it because the Cali- fornia tuna fishermen made almost all of their catches off Latin America, the shrimp fishermen were expanding rapidly into the offshore waters of Mexico in the Gulf of Mexico, and the New Englanders were still expanding their trawl fisheries of the Maritime Provinces of Canada and Newfoundland. The other fish- eries people around the rim of the country had little interest in the problem because they worked close to the coast, there were no foreign vessels fishing where they did, and they expected no such competition to arise. It was out of the salmon-halibut, tuna-shrimp—New England trawl interaction that the Office of the Special Advisor to the Secretary for Fish and Wildlife arose in the Department of State. By the time of the 1958 conference on the Law of the Sea the New England trawl fishery position had eroded to the point where they did not fish on the Grand Banks any more, did not fish on the Nova Scotia banks, had pretty well forgotten about Labrador and the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and were mostly fishing by themselves on Georges Bank off New England, so they were reasonably neutral on the subject and politically weakened in the United States. The shrimp people had reached a moderately good modus vivendi with the Mexicans in the Gulf of Mexico, on the basis of the Mexican 9-mile territorial sea, and only the Cali- fornia tuna people were left in sharp opposition to the salmon and halibut. Now, a decade later, if a vote were taken in the United States fishing industry it would be heavily in favor of a 200 mile fishery limit for the United States. The whole Atlantic seaboard would be in favor of it because the New Englanders no longer fish substantially off Canada and want the Canadians and Russians who fish on Georges Bank and further south along the Atlantic coast to be thrown out of those fisheries. The menhaden fishermen fear Russian fishing on the Cen- tral Atlantic Seaboard. The southern people fear Cuban’s, Russians and Japanese fishing from the Carolinas to Key West. On the Pacific coast the situation is much the same as far down as southern California because Russians fish in the coastal waters of this whole region, and the Japanese fish south to Oregon. The salmon and halibut people have been joined and strengthened by the crab fishermen and trawlers along the whole coast. The Gulf shrimp people really have no problem since the United States and Mexico have agreed on a 12 mile fishery zone. The California tuna fishermen alone in United States fisheries are in strong favor of a narrow fishery jurisdiction zone, bringing to their side Puerto Rico which has become importantly involved as a tuna canner in the interim, and the State of Washington that has become importantly involved in building new tuna clippers for both these places. The pendulum may be beginning to swing back again in the Gulf States as the new longer-range freezing vessels are entering the shrimp fleet. It may even be beginning to swing back again in New England because the few new trawlers that have been built under the Vessel subsidy act are doing quite well financially. The situation found in the United States is found in some degree in other coun- tries where coastal fishermen with small, often antiquated, vessels and techniques wish to do away with the competition from the distant water fishermen, ordinarily equipped with larger and more modern vessels. Thus Canadian long-liners for a long while were able to keep Canadian trawlers 12 miles off the Nova Scotia coast : the Japanese coastal fishermen fight to keep the Russians out of the saury and squid fishery, and the South Koreans out of the salmon fishery off Japan ; the Finmark cod fishermen fight to keep Norwegian trawlers out of the Lofoten and other inshore cod grounds; the coastal fishermen of West India prevent the modernization of the offshore sardine and mackerel fisheries, the yield of which 1156 India so badly needs; the coastal fishermen of Malaysia have fought bitterly the building of a Malaysian trawl fishery; etc. The old and inefficient fights steadily around the world against the new and efficient. On the international scene another sort of shift has been taking place on a national, instead of a fishermen level. At the time of the 1958 Law of the Sea Conference the fisheries jurisdiction issue was rather clear cut between the indus- trialized countries who were the strong fishing countries, and the developing countries who were the coastal fishermen traditional inshore type disliking dis- tant water fishermen. In the ensuing decade this particular dichotomy had become less clear because of the number of developing countries which with various kinds of assistance and drives are becoming rather strong fishing countries (such as Ghana, Cuba, Chile, Roumania, Senegal, Poland, Thailand, Kuwait, South Korea, Taiwan) with increasing distant water fleets, while a good many of the indus- trialized “fishing” countries of 1958 (United Kingdom, West Germany, France, United States, Canada) really have not been improving their fishery posture much. Another force of a natioual nature bearing on these jurisdictional questions is the national purposes for which nation states protect and seek to extend their sea fisheries. A decade ago these discussions were put in the framework of pre- venting the fishing countries from killing off the resources of the sea and depriv- ing developing countries of food resources they would need in the future. In general this type of argument has new been subordinated to another—the desire of nations to protect their foreign exchange balance by harvesting the commonly owned resources of the high seas. It is conceived that this can be done by catching fish and shellfish by their own vessels and fishermen within their own currency area so as to avoid paying out currency to buy animal protein for the nation’s nourishment, or to earn foreign currency by exporting catches so made to hard currency countries. This would appear to be a dominant drive among nation states currently in fishery development, and it leads often to non-economic prac- tices of subsidies, control of international trade, and interaction over fishery jurisdictional problems on the high seas that are complex and confusing. Although the jurisdictional framework for the management of the use cf the living resources of the sea is as stated above, it is a fragile structure. There are strong forces on the one hand who desire, for a variety of reasons, to fully inter- nationalize all high seas resources and turn their control and management Over to a United States agency: there are strong forces on the other side equally pressing for an extension outward of the seaward boundaries of national juris- diction so that the ocean becomes, for this purpose, a series of national lakes. From the standpoint of United States policy with respect to its fisheries it is desirable to look a litthe more closely at current concepts of management for the use of common property wild fish stocks in the high seas and domestic concepts of the use of common property fishing resources in the United States. C. Concepts of management for the use of common property wild fish stocks in the high seas Having in mind the natural and juridical factors noted above the questions arise: (1) What should be maximized in the management of common property marine living resources ; and (2) What will the sovereign joint owners agree to maximize. The two questions are important because maximizing the physical yield (max- imum sustainable yield) from any resource can be demonstrated to be possible at a different population level at which the maximum net economic yield can be made. It can also be demonstrated that the two objectives are mutually exclusive (although the population levels corresponding to both may be within the probable error range of each other because of the sizeable probable error usually attach- ing to both parameters). Also it can usually be demonstrated that at the popu- lation level corresponding to maximum sustainable physical yield from any particular resource the net economic yield is at. or near, zero. and that the population level corresponding to maximum net economic yield is always at ant a little higher than that corresponding to the maximum sustainable physical, vield. : Arguments surrounding the choice between these two conservation objectives have gone forward in the fishery science profession for forty years. and have been propounded vigorously by professional economists, especially during the post fifteen vears. It is not very hard to demonstrate that when fishine pressure on a particular resource nears the point of maximum sustainable yield the sen- sible thing to do is limit it to that level corresponding to the maximum net 1157 economic yield. By doing so it has been clearly demonstrated that in major mature fisheries, millions, and tens of millions, of dollars could be saved per year. As an example it is generally agreed by the scientists of all countries involved in the very large and valuable Barents Sea cod fishery that if the fishing effort were cut in half the physical yield would increase by perhaps 10%, with a net earning increase to remaining fishermen per year of some tens of millions of dollars. The trouble is that the social, economic, political and diplomatic consequences that flow from taking such a decision are so complex and vexing that individual nations seldom, if ever, take such a decision in managing common property fisheries within their exclusive jurisdiction and no general formula has been found which permits such a decision to be agreed upon among nations that jointly operate on a particular fishery resource. The grounds for such a general formula is being sought by groups of scientists and economists working together especially in the framework of the Northeast Atlantic Fishery Commission, the International Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Commission, with the cooperation of FAO Department of Fisheries. At the heart of this problem is the fact that soverign nations manage the use of their common property fishery resources, when they pay any attention to the problem at all, in such a manner as to maximize the net social return to it from such use, and not the net economic return. The objective may be to maximize physical yield from its fisheries, or employment of its citizens, or foreign exchange earnings, or foreign exchange savings, or the accumulation of capital, or the contribution to defense, or the accomplishment of technical assistance, or to improve the nutritional quality of the national diet, or to support the national posture generally, or some mix of these objectives. Examples can be provided for all of these situations and mixes including most of them. Nations not only do not attempt to maximize the net economic yield from their use of the common property resource of the ocean but they normally move to the contrary in a most flagrant manner by giving subsidies to their fisheries to increase effort on common property resources, even those known to be beyond the level of fishing effort corresponding to maximum sustainable yield. Numerous examples of this can be cited. Since it is the sovereign nation states who are the joint owners of the living resources of the high seas it is not possible to move on such policy decision until they are in agreement to it. The diplomatic consequences of such a decision are almost as difficult, and arise from the same source. If one is going to maximize the net economic yield from the use of a fishery resource one must limit entry to the fishery. To do this one must have jurisdiction over all fishermen wishing to participate in the fishery, ability to enforce exclusion, and a court of law in which to prosecute violators. The international mechanics does not exist to do this. The only available mechanism upon which to build such a structure is the United Nations or one of its specialized agencies. The prospective violators (sovereign nation states) make up their membership, and will not delegate their sovereign authority to such a body at this stage of history, or finance its operations. What the nations have done as a group is adopt the objective of maximizing the sustainable physical yield from common property fishery resources, with a polite, but ineffective, bow in the general direction of maximizing net economic yield. The first two articles of the “Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas” read as follows: “ARTICLE I “7. All States have the right for their nationals to engage in fishing on the high seas, subject (a) to their treaty obligations, (b) to the interests and rights of coastal States as provided for in this Convention, and (c) to the provisions contained in the following articles concerning conservation of the living resources of the high seas. “2. All States have the duty to adopt, or to cooperate with other States in adopting, such measures for their respective nationals as may be necessary for the conservation of the living resources of the high seas. “ARTICLE IT “As employed in this Convention, the expression “conservation of the living resources of the high seas’? means the aggregate of the measures rendering pos- 1158 sible the optimum sustainable yield from those resources so as to secure a maxi- mum supply of food and other marine products. Conservation programmes should be formulated with a view to securing in the first place a supply of food for human consumption”. The word optimum in Article 2 is the oblique bow in the direction of maximiz- ing net economic yield. While it is not yet possible to get nations to work jointly even closely in the direction of maximizing net economic yield from the use of common property living resources, these same economic problems also lie at the root of the difficulty of getting them to follow in practice the high resolve of paragraph 2 in Article 1 (cited above), by the criteria agreed to in Article 2. rogress in this is far slower than the rate of development of fishing effort in the high seas. A sensible compromise would be to divide up the quota that is the result of maximizing the sustainable yield when the resource and fishery on it come to that balance among the nations on the basis of proportions then existing, with a portion set aside for new entrants and annual adjustments among the partic- ipants. Then each participating sovereign could maximize his net economic re- turn from his part of the quota in any manner most suitable to his socio-economic needs ‘and desires. There is no indication that such a formulation, or any other, is being seriously considered by the soverign owners of the common property liv- ing resources of the sea, who seem to prefer a laisser-faire approach to the problem. D. Domestic concepts of the use of common property fishery resources in the United States. The United States has an enviable reputation for promoting the conservation of common property fishery resources in the international common of the high seas stemming from sixty years and more of practice. It is bound by the concepts noted in the section above in its actions, in the international field as adherrent to the conventions in which they occur. It has, however, additional concepts to give attention to in the management of the use of marine living resources within its sole jurisdiction. These grow out of demands related to multiple use of the same resource, or related resources, by different sectors of United States society. The above noted concepts are not disagreed to by any of these internal sectors but they do not go far enough to suit some. Recreation is a principal other user of marine living resources in the United States aside from commercial fishing. In the United States the economic interests involved in the recreational use of the near coast resources is not less than the commercial interest, and the social interest is enormous. Furthermore it grows as the population grows and becomes more congested in metropolitan aggregations along the coast. The “party boat” industry that caters to taking sport fishermen to sea for fishing is a large business in itself. Associated with the recreational users often, but of quite a different nature, are the conservationists and nature lovers who do not necessarily wish to catch fish or dig clams, or use any of these resources in an extractive manner. They are interested in knowing that the natural habitat in which they live is being preserved as intact as possible without extractive use, or if the latter is neces- sary that the extraction be done wisely in the interests of preserving the ecologi- cal balance of nature as well as possible. Among these are those who just like to watch nature and to them seals, sea-lions, sea-otters, porpoise, whales and the like have an especial attraction. Providing services for whale watching in season in southern California, for instance, is a considerable economic enterprise, and a drawing card for the lucrative tourist trade. Also there are the educational users who wish to have segments of coastal flora and fauna preserved as nearly intact as possible in natural reserves under their jurisdiction to be used for teaching, research and other educational pur- poses. In case this is not thought to be a problem it can be noted that the Cali- fornia State Lands Commission, which has jurisdiction over the use of tidelands in that state, has before it more formal application from such educational in- stitutions for such natural preserves in southern California than there is coast- line from Point Conception to the Mexican border. The requests overlap and in some instances nearly duplicate. Most of these non-commercial users of these resources would prefer that they not be used commercially at all, and some sportsman’s groups wish actively to do away completely with all commercial fishing. The destruction of the Pacific sardine population, the decimation of the Pacific mackerel population, and the oncoming decline of the menhaden are cited as examples of destruction of re- sources by un-principled commercial interests. 1159 Some wiser heads in all these various user groups realize the desirability of the states and the national government getting the maximum social benefit out of the use of these natural resources that are the common property of all, and there is much sincere work devoted to finding a formula for this that may draw agree- ment from all or most of these multiple users, and be in the total public interest. One such formula has been developed in California. It originated with a group of professional conservationists acting as consultants to the California Depart- ment of Fish and Game in its planning for the wise use of all such resources in California, both marine and upland. It was adapted to the marine situation by a group of experts from the University of California acting under the administra- tion of its Institute of Marine Resources for the California State Office of Plan- ning. It was slightly modified and adopted by the California Governor’s Ad- visory Commission on Ocean Resources. In this form it has been agreed to by the major elements in the California commercial fisheries and by a number of con- servation leaders in the State. The formula has now been approved in the follow- ing form unanimously by the California Advisory Commission on Marine and Coastal Resources and recommended by it to the Governor (through the Inter- agency Council on Marine Resources) and the Legislature. The formula might be useful on a national level and is as follows (written in California State terms) : “The Commission recommends that the State Government through cooperation between its executive and legislative branches, should establish policy concern- ing the conservation and utilization of the living resources of the sea under its jurisdiction and influence, which will encourage their maintenance and full utilization for the benefit of all of our citizens, which will promote the develop- ment of local fisheries and of distant water and overseas fisheries based on California, and which will be in harmony with the internatonal law respecting fishing and conservation of the living resources of the high seas. This policy should include the following objectives : (a) To maintain sufficient populations of all species of marine organisms to insure their continued existence. (6) To recognize as important the aesthetic, educational, scientific and nonextractive recreational uses of the living resources of the California Current. (c) Where a species is the object of sport fishing, to encourage the main- tenance of suffiicent resource to support a reasonable sport use, taking into consideration the necessity of regulating individual sport fishery bag limits to the quantity that is sufficient to provide satisfying sport. (d) To encourage the growth of local commercial fisheries, consistent with aesthetic, educational, scientific and recreational uses, to foster the utiliza- tion of un-used resources, taking into consideration the necessity of regulat- ing the catch within the limits of maximum sustainable yield, and to encour- age the development of distant water and overseas fishery enterprises. (e) To manage, on a basis of adequate scientific information promptly promulgated for public scrutiny, the fisheries under the State’s jurisdiction and to participate in the management of other fisheries in which California fishermen are engaged, with the objective of maximizing the sustained harvest and decreasing costs of commercial production”. CHAPTER V.—THE ORGANIZATION AND CONDUCT OF FISHERY AFFAIRS BY THE UNITED STATES A. The general situation In previous chapters some note has been taken of the relationship of fishery affairs to general United States ocean policy, the present nature of the United States fish business, a number of specific United States flag fisheries, and the nature of living resources, jurisdiction over them, and concepts for the manage- ment of their use held at different levels of government. In this chapter will be considered what might properly be the oragnization and conduct of fishery affairs by the United States under these circumstances. It may be humiliating to some for the United States to have dropped from sec- ond place to sixth place in the world sweepstakes as the prime fish catcher, but nobody is foolish enough to pay for catching fish simply for the purpose of getting: into first place. It would be absolutely wasteful for the United States to emulate Soviet or Japanese activities in the high seas fisheries. It was quite a different set of problems than those two have. For instance, the United States miiltary is perfectly competent to catch by itself all of the submarines it needs to catch. What with earth-orbiting satellites, 1160 high-flying aircraft, electronically equipped vessels of its own of all sizes, and other modern methods of intelligence gathering, there is not much practical other help that it can ever expect to get from its flag fishing feet in the overseas area. If better and more numerous domestic fishing fleets are developed this might well produce home useful warning service in coastal and nearby offshore waters, but hardly enough to warrant extra expense for that purpose not capable of intrinsic justification on the basis of improving this element of the United States economy. The United States clearly has more fish and shellfish in its nearshore waters than it can use in the reasonably near future. It will never catch all the fish cand shell fish it wants from these resources, because it wants a good deal of many Kinds that do not occur off its coast, or do not occur there in the volume it wants. On the other hand it has such riches of living resources near its coast that it -can have a surplus of them to export to earn foreign exchange sufficient to more than pay for what it wants to import. This is not the case with either Japan ‘or Russia. The United States has a strong, varied and dynamic fish trade. By this term is meant those in the chain above the fishermen and fishing vessel owner, such as the processor, distributor, broker, marketer, etc. An examination of the foregoing material and the state of the art does not indicate any serious problem in this aspect of the fish business requiring elaborate governmental attention to bolster its economic situation. There are internal instabilities in it but those are primarily attributable to changing food habits, shifting raw material bases and slowness to change. Overall it is growing at a good rate and prospering. It has available to it, with little or no effective tariff or other barrier to trade, the ocean resources of the world. Its total market in the United States is the most lucrative, largest, and most rapidly growing and varied market for a fish and shellfish in the world. It has shown itself to be innovative and progressive in developing new products to fill new market needs, and in developing merchan- dizing methods to peddle the products. In saying the above it is assumed that present Congressional activity directed toward bringing fish plant and product inspection practices in line with similar standards in the poultry, dairy, and meat industries will emerge soon in practical legislation in this field being adopted. Fish and shellfish, being particularly delicate raw material, need such standards and inspection programs particularly and such legislation is another logical step in securing the safety, wholesomeness, and stability of the nation’s fish trade. In the international field the United States fish trade does not seem to require any assistance from the government other than would flow normally from the government tidying up its own activities to attend better to its own interests in this field, some of which have been mentioned above and others of which will be treated below. AS a matter of fact the shoe may well be on the other foot, in that the government might be able to obtain considerable benefit from the activities of the United States fish trade in various foreign areas if it chose to integrate those activities toward its general objectives in this field somewhat more closely. A considerable amount of emphasis has been given in the past by the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries to ‘treating problems of the domestic fish trade as defined herein. This has been chiefly a result of its representatives being more vocal and ubiquitous than those of the fishing business, sensu strictu. There is no need for it to have any attention from the United States Government more than is given normally to other domestic manufacturing and merchandizing fields. For instance, the marketing assistance which the Bureau of Commercial Fish- eries now gives in this field is not of any considerable consequence to the trade as a whole and could very well be tapered off to permit transfer of funding and personnel to problems more directly associated with the development and managment of fishery resources and the extractive phases of the industry they support. It is in the field of the United States flag fishing industry, and primarily that portion of it operating in United States coastal waters, where the domestic problems of the fish business lie and it is to this field that United States remedial measures affecting the fish business should be shifted, concentrated, broadened and strengthened. By concentrating on developing its domestic fisheries on its continental shelf and slope it can strengthen its domestic economy, broaden its readily avaliable food base, reduce its foreign exchange loss, and broaden its expertise in the use of the ocean in manners that will improve its posture among the nations and its ability to help others do the same. 1161 It is reasonably obvious from the above examination of the history of current status of the United States market for fish and shellfish, and the review of the underutilized resources in United States’ coastal areas, ‘what opportunities are the best for domestic fishery development. Given prices competitive with imports, market demand is strong and steadily growing for fish meal; shrimp and crab; tuna; ground fish as fish blocks, sticks, portions, sandwiches, steaks and as fresh or frozen fillets (as well as for whole flounder, or ‘‘sole’’), clams, scallops and oysters ; and salmon. Underutilized resources in coastal waters are particularly large for fish suit- able for fish meal production (as well as pet food and fish protein concentrate), small shrimp, crab, ground fish in great variety, and clams and seallops. Vast estuarine areas are admirably adapted by nature to the cultivation of oysters, and presently largely unused. Oysters, clams and salmon all lend themselves to increase in production from coastal waters by application of improved resource management methods and aquaculture. While such an account would seem to leave out tuna, one of the most important elements of the U.S. fish trade, it does not. The United States tuna fleet is modern and economically in good shape. It is expanding. It is already a capable long-range fleet. If the United States maintains its rights for its fishing vessels to fish on the high seas more than 12 miles from shore, and with its fellow soverigns supplies appropriate conservation methods to keep high seas tuna resources in good productive condition, there seems to be no reason to expect that the U.S. flag tuna fleet cannot keep productive and in good economic condition. As has been noted above, and will be dealt with further below, the needed development activities for the domestic fisheries does not seem to need any mas- sive injections of new money, subsidies, or supports. A more rational approach to the management of the use of these common property resources, an elimination of the more outstanding institutional barriers to development, a more effective use of the vast research potentials of the United States, and a more rational organiza- tion of the conduct of United States fisheries seems to be needed more than large amounts of new money. The United States has numerous and large responsibilities in the international field that can be forwarded by the development of fisheries by other countries by their flag vessels. Some of these interests are unique to the humanitarian policies of the United States; some are related to the general posture desirable for it to keep in the comity of nations; some relate to its need for understanding and pre- diction of planetary forces; some relate to its own food supply; etc. These have been treated somewhat above and will be dealt with below to further extent. These include the following : 1. Improving the nutritional base of countries in the developing world having protein deficiency problems. 2. Assisting the growth of the economies of other countries. 3. Developing resource bases for supplies of raw material to United States industry. 4. Securing longer range diplomatic advantage through establishment of good will in countries whose friendship is advantageous to the United States. 5. Protecting from overfishing the resource base supporting fishing industries in the particular countries, and supplies for United States industry, by the establishment of appropriate research and management facilities for conserva- tion purposes. 6. Improving the scientific basis for predicting events in ocean climate and atmospheric weather. 7. Providing auxiliary back up strength for United States posture in time of stress, either of a regional or total nature. 8. Establishing a workable regime of the Law of the Sea to assure the peaceful increased use of the sea by all, and to maintain public order on the sea. In furthering the conduct of these international fishery and oceanographic activities that fall out of its general diplomatic policies it is highly desirable that the United States Government integrate its domestic with its international fishery activities as closely as is possble. This is from the standpoint of efficiency and effectiveness and follows from the experience of the large United States firms who have found it quite impracticable to conduct their fish activities in separate international and domestic departments, because the interdigitation between the two is too intimate and detailed to render such an approach practical. At the present stage of history, as noted both above and below, the prime need in the international aspect of this field is to organize the international activities in 1162 this field more effectively, organize more effectively, the United States ocean use apparatus to interact better with the improved international ocean use apparatus, and to reduce barriers to the full interaction between these two apparati at all levels. While his will require substantial new funds in the long run the chief present need is to tidy up policy and the machinery for its implementation with only modest amounts of new money. The special needs of the United States fish trade can be safely ignored in this because if the United States attends to its general responsibilities in this international field more effectively the special needs of the United States fish trade will be attended to adequately. It is doing pretty well by itself under present conditions. B. The Federal fisheries function Substantive responsibility for commercial fisheries affairs in the United States Government presently rests in the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries of the Depart- ment of the Interior, pursuant to the Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956 and other acts. This is entirely too restricted a frame of reference in which to conduct United States policy and its implementation in the management of the use of living aquatic resources at the present date, and it will be quite impossible as new developments in the use of the ocean and the fresh water environment come under the inexorable pressure of new science and technology, new aspirations of United States citizens and humanity in general arise, new pressures on world food supply arise from increasing population, and new pressures from changing world power adjustments develop. The Federal Fishery Function must be broadened and strengthened to a degree that does not fit present or past organization if it is to perform its role in United States society with reasonable effectiveness. The Federal Fishery Function should be equipped with the following author- ities and abilities, for reasons set out both above and below: 1. Policy.—There should be a Congressionally adopted policy to cover the total needs of the United States in respect of the multiple use of aquatic resources. The one cited on pages 57 is recommended. 2. Recreational use domestically.—The fisheries (aquatic resources) func- tions presently residing in both the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife and the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries of the Department of the Interior, should be combined into one organization, here called the Federal Fishery Function. As noted in the policy referred to above the recreational use of aquatic resources, and their commercial use are both so important in the United States, and so closely interact in all areas of the nation and at all levels, that it is necessary for their administration and governmental support to be much more closely inte- grated than it is at present. 8. Environmental Research and its Application.—Fishing has been conducted heretofore pretty well on the basis of experience and aptitude of the individual fisherman or skipper. The chief reason for this has been that the state of environ- mental and biological research has been so primitive that predictions that were very useful to the fisherman could not be made. Natural processes were not well enough understood to make this possible. There was little in the way of effective governmental machinery available to transmit what was known in useful and timely fashion to the only person who could use it, the fisherman (or other resource user) at sea. This situation is changing rapidly as more is learned of the interrelationship of energy flow between sea and air, and the effect of these changes on the bio- logical resources. It will change more rapidly with the implementation of the World Weather Watch of the World Meteorological Organization, the Global Atmospheric Research Program of the WMO, the International Global Ocean Station System of the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, the World Resources Appraisal of the FAO Department of Fisheries, the International Decade for Ocean Exploration now proposed by the United States, the Expanded Program for International Cooperation in Ocean Affairs now being proposed by the Secretary General of the United Nations, and the varied scientific and technological inputs from dozens of other international, intergovernmental, non- governmental, and national agencies and institutions dealing with the ocean and the atmosphere. : The National Sea Grant College Program now in the National Science Founda- tion is beginning to bring a whole new look to means of translating the input from these new sources of science and technology to the users at sea in timely manner and in form they can readily understand and use. The environmental and biological numerical data from all these multiple new sources are arriving at the National Ocean Data Center in enormous volume and 1163 for their efficient archiving and retrieval for use the most intimate relationship must be established between such data centers and their users. The United States Coast Guard in the Department of Transportation is becom- ing an important originator of ocean information as well as a protector of life at sea and an enforcer of public order at sea. The environmental services of the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, the U.S. Weather Bureau, the Sea-Air Interaction Laboratory, and some related func- tions of the Bureau of Standards were recently joined together in the Hnviron- mental Sciences Services Administration of the Department of Commerce. There is so much community of need and function among these civilian activities related to the ocean now situated in other parts of the Government and the Federal Fishery Function described above, that all of them (together with some other activities, such as the Beach and Erosion Board) should be combined in the same Department of Government so that there would be a more efficient division of labor among them, and so that they could more effectively serve the civilian needs respecting ocean affairs. Whether this be a new Department of the Oceans, a new Independent Agency, or be lodged in an existing Department of Government (such as Commerce, Interior, or Transportation) is not so important as the need to group these elements and functions into a single overall agency where the full impact of the civilian aspects of ocean use can be focused. 4. Central Intergovernmental Oceanic Organization.—For ten years the ocean science community of the United States has strongly recommended the estab- lishment of a World Oceanographic Organization as a specialized agency of the United Nations in which could be focused all the international aspects of ocean science and technology, In the last two years this strong recommendation has been broadened in international as well as domestic support of the concept of a Central intergovernmental Oceanic organization within the United Nations framework to deal with all international aspects of ocean investigations and the uses of the sea. Strong support for this broadened concept has developed among the affected agencies of the United States, within the United Nations structure, in the governments of other nations, and in the international scientific community. It is obvious that such a specialized agency respecting the ocean will be estab- lished in the fullness of time, and probably rather sooner than later, because of pressing need among the nations to deal more effectively with rapidly growing international aspects of ocean investigations and use. The argument grows as to whether this should be created along disciplinary lines or along functional lines. If the former were adopted there would be, in the first place, a junction between the Intergovernmental Oceanographic commission of UNESCO and the oceanic parts of the World Meteorological Organization. If the latter were fol- lowed there would be a merging of IOC with FAO’s Department of fisheries and Committee on Fisheries. It is quite obvious that the world has passed the point where such a central intergovernmental oceanic organization will be formed to attend only to inter- national aspects of science, and that when this is all shaken out such an organi- zation will be concerned with the international aspects of ocean use as well. In such an event it is equally obvious that the international fishery function will be transferred from FAO to the new agency if only because the fish and shell- fish production from the ocean is so much more valuable than all other resources produced from the ocean, is of much more wide spread practical interest to United Nations members than other resources, and is growing so rapidly. This new step in international oceanic organization will not be taken for an indeterminant time yet. In the meantime the international ocean science function is centered in the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission. I't is in the process of being broadened and strengthened. The international fishery function is lodged in Department of Fisheries of FAO. It has been in the process of being broadened and strengthened since 1965. In this interim the Joint Civilian Ocean Agency recommended above for the United States Government should have lead agency responsibility in dealing with the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, in consultation with the Department of the Navy, the National Science Foundation, and the Department of State. The Federal Fishery function described above should have lead agency responsibilities, in consultation with the Department of Agriculture and the Department of State, in dealing with the Department of Fisheries and Com- mittee on Fisheries of FAO. It is in the Federal Fishery Function, as described, that the professional governmental expertise in fishery science, development, management and administration will reside. 26—563—70—pt. 2: 42 1164 5. Responsibility for Diplomatic Aspects of the International Ocean Affairs of the United States Government.—The function and purpose of the Department of State is to translate into foreign policy and its implementation the technical competence in particular fields of other agencies of the Federal Government. It has diplomatic expertise and competence but is not provided with technical competence in depth, for which it must rely on other appropriate government Departments and agencies. The international aspects of United States ocean activities have been more confused and generally ineffective even than the domestic aspects. The brightest spot has been the Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary for Fisheries and Wildlife within its narrow lead agency field, which is the field of negotiating conservation agreements and other international activities relat- ing to disputes over fishery jurisdiction. It does not have lead agency responsi- bility in dealing with fishery or ocean matters with the United Nations and its specialized agencies (United Nations Development Program, Resources and Transporation Division), (which is lodged in the Legal Advisor’s Office) ; trade matters (which is lodged elsewhere in the Department) ; ocean science (which is partially handled by International Science and Technical Affairs) ; ocean transportation (which is handled otherwise) ; etc. It is recommended that the Office of Special Assistant to the Secretary for Fisheries and Wildlife in the Department of State be broadened and strengthened with duties assigned commensurate with a new title “Office of the Special Assist- ant to the Secretary for Ocean Affairs”’. 6. Responsibility for the Technical Aspects of International Fishery Activities of the United States Government.—Technical assistance internationally in fish- eries is handled by USAID, and it has been assigned responsibility for the Food from the Sea Program. The Department of Agriculture has lead responsibility in dealing at a technical level with FAO. Various other parts of the United States Government have lead responsibility in dealing with other parts of the United Nations and its specialized agencies, the Organization of American States, the Organization for African Unity, the European Economic Community, and other regional international organizations and agencies. The Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, from its present location in the Department of the Interior and under its present statutory authority is hesitant to involve itself with United States fishery firm activities abroad. Professional expertise in fishery science, development, management, technology, and administration rests now in the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries in the Federal Government and will reside in the Federal Fishery Function as defined above. It is recommended that the Federal Fishery Function, in consultation with the Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary for Ocean Affairs in the Department of State, be given lead agency role in all technical aspects of inter- national fishery activities of the United States, including the Food from the Sea Program. It should be as responsible and responsive in dealing with United States fishing industry activity in the international and foreign field as it is in the domestic field. It should deal for the United States on technical fishery matters before FAO, IOC, UNDP, World Bank and related agencies, and regional international bodies. It should follow and promote the technical fisheries interests of the United States as freely and actively in the external as in the internal field. 7. Management of the use of Living Aquatic Resources.—The Federal Fishery Function must have the clear authority and responsibility in the ultimate instance for the management of the use of living aquatic resources within the jurisdiction of the United States in accordance with the policy set out in point 1 above. The United States can have no policy for the management and use of living aquatic resources so long as authority for this is split between fifty inde- pendent state governments and the Federal Government. Note has been made of the major resources of Pacific sardine, Pacific mackerel, and menhaden where the commercial fishery has been eliminated or severely reduced in production because there was no clear governmental authority or responsibility for applying existing scientific understanding and modern resource management practices to the resource. This condition cannot continue. There is no marine living resource too large to suffer the same fate. The enormous Peru- vian anchovy population was at the point of maximum sustainable yield within ten years of the time the fishery began. The State Governments now have this authority but have not accepted the responsibility in all cases when needed. Where several states are involved in 1165 the same fishery there is normally paralysis of management activity. The formula should be adopted like that of the water poliution act where initial authority for living aquatic resource management lies with the State, but in case agreement cannot be reached, or insufficient action is taken, the Federal Fishery Function can assume paramount authority under the criteria laid out in point 1 above. The first objective of management should be to assure that fishing effort on a stock must not exceed the level corresponding to the maximum sustainable yield. The second objective should be, in fisheries reaching this stage, to manage the fishery in such a manner as to maximize the net economic yield therefrom as fully as is practical. The regulation of fisheries for social purposes to spread the wealth—should be eliminated whenever politically possible, and emphasis given to taking permissible volumes of fish and shellfish from particular stocks by the most economically efficient methods possible. 8. Development of the Full Use of Resources—The Federal Fishery Function must have the clear authority and responsibility in the ultimate instance for the development of the full use of living aquatie resources within the jurisdiction of United States, in accordance with the terms of the policy in point 1 above. Again initial responsibility can reside in the state governments, as in the water pollution act, with final responsibility in the Federal Fishery Function. 9. Resource Assessment.—The Federal Fisheries Function should pursue a vigorous policy of exploring, assessing the extent, and establishing the commer- cial and recreational possibilities of harvesting, of particular living resources on the continental shelf and slop adjacent to the United States, or available to harvest by citizens of the United States in the high seas. It should do this by a combination of biological, environmental, exploratory fishing, gear development and vessel development research. It should do this through its own efforts, and by stimulation of companion research in the other appropriate federal agencies (such as the Navy, Maritime Administration, Atomic Hnergy Commission, National Science Foundation, etc.), the fishery agencies of the State Govern- ments, and the academic community. It should also pursue its own research programs, while cooperating with international efforts along the same lines, of making better estimates of total food production possibilities, both regional and ocean wide, together with ex- ploring new techniques for the rapid preliminary assessment of stock size and potential yield where new fishery developments are contemplated. The results of all such research should be promptly promulgated not only as completed research projects but as preliminary results from time to time in form useful to the interested public. 10. Economic Research.—The Federal Fishery Function must strengthen mate- rially its economic research capabilities. Present statistical data on the fisheries of the United States are inadequate for biological, technological, and economic research needs. There is no realistic system for obtaining the production statistics of recreational fishing, estimating its economic (and dietary) value, or estimating the fishing pressure. The economic theory underlying fishery management practices is very imper- fect. The detailed knowledge of economic forces at work in particular fisheries is rudimentary. Accordingly, at the present time, neither the application of aids to promote development, nor constraints to provide for conservation, can be done in a sensible, efficient manner. More frequently than not, heretofore, constraints adopted for conservation purposes have created more economic damage than they have conservation good. The relation of costs in Untied States flag fisheries with those in competing fisheries and nations is known in such a fragmentary way that it is generally fruitless to attempt gaining international agreement to constraints required for conservation regulation in international fisheries for lack of undertsanding of relative economic impact of such constraints on different parts of the fishery. For the same reason it is not possible to know what aids may be needed, for what period of time, to counteract foreign moves to make their fishery economi- cally more competitive. Lastly, for lack of economic research it is not possible to plan very efficiently what domestic fisheries can be developed most economically to fill United States market desires. The economic research program of the Federal Fisheries Function should reach into all branches of its activities, and particularly, use academic economic research capabilities as fully as possible by grants and subsidies. 11. Change in Thrust of Effort—The Federal Fishery Function should limit its service functions to the processing, distributing and marketing section of the 1166 domestic fish trade to government services normally given other segments of the food trade (such as statistical services. inspection services to protect wholesome- ness of product, ete.), and divert the chief thrust of its domestic program to as- sisting the development of fisheries by U.S. flag vessels, and the improvement in profitability of those existing. The main thrust of such development work should be centered on those fisheries for which there is ample supply in U.S. coastal waters and ample market in the United States. Attention should be given to stimulating use of underutilized resources for which there is growing market both domestic and foreign. Liberal funds should be made available for pump priming activity in the initial years of development of such fisheries. Major resources now known which merit such attention are anchovy, thread herring and calico scallop in the South Atlantic- Gulf of Mexico area; anchovy, jack mackerel and squid off southern California ; hake, saury and ocean perches off southern California, Oregon and Washington ; pollack, ocean perch, flat fishes, cods, pink shrimp, scallop, and crabs in Alaska. 12. Animal Protein for Nutritional Value.—tinterest in fisheries in the United States has centered historically, and still does, on fish for direct human con- sumption and values at high level because of taste, texture and appearance. In the meantime the market use of fish in the United States has gravitated con- trarily to products sold for their nutritional (chiefly well rounded protein) value, and more than half of the fish used in the United States is now consumed in that form. The first sort of fish are normally carnivores rather high up in the trophic scale and naturally of low abundance relatively in any particularly habitat. The sort of fish and shellfish used for the latter purpose are those lower in the trophic level, naturally more abundant in any habitat, and normally under- utilized because of the intense effort to catch higher priced fishes for direct human consumption. Since the proteins of substantially all fish and crustacea have substantially identical nutritional value and a well balanced amino-acid profile containing those nutritional elements required by all animals, advantage is taken of these most abundant lower trophic animals by reducing them to a form that can be economically used in animal diets as protein sources on the basis of nutritional value rather than the subjective and costly values of texture, taste and appearance. Although the most common form of doing this is making fish meal, fish solubles and minced frozen fish are other important presently utilized forms. Although such products are chiefly used in the United States presently for animal feeding (fish, poultry, swine, fur bearers, pet and bait) such products as minced frozen whole fish are increasing sharply in use for direct human consumption in Japan, fish sauces are widely used as a condiment in Southeast Asia, and fish protein concentrate has enormous potential in the United States and on a world basis as an additive for nutritional values to formulated foods made from cheaper materials higher in calories content but deficient in one or more essential amino- acids. The Federal Fishery Function should vigorously strengthen its entire pro- gram (resource assessment, exploratory fishing, gear development, processing technology, economic research, etc.) aimed at making these very abundant and cheaply caught resources in United States coastal waters available for as broad a spectrum of uses as possible, not only in the United States but in foreign mar- kets. It is in this field that aids of a pump priming sort should be concentrated in order to assist in bringing the use of these underutilized resources into the economy. 13. Incentives to Development of U.S. Flag Fishing.—Fishermen fish for money not for fish. When profits are good in a fishery new vessels flow into it automatically unless artificially restricted, fleets and gear and methods are auto- matically updated and modernized, vigorous young men are attracted into the trade, skills are constantly improved, and length of time at sea becomes less im- portant. When profits are poor vessels and men in the fleet become overage. obsolete, and less efficient, and crews will not stay at sea to work. Almost nobody goes to sea to work if he can make as much income at some other job ashore. No firm makes money from the activities of poor fishermen: only rich fishermen make money for themselves, the firms that use their product. and the community. There must be economic incentive if compentent men are going to go to sea and work the fisheries. Sea fishing has a bad connotation economically in the United States so that capital is difficult of access even to prosperous fishermen. 1167 Risks are high because of uncertainities of weather, sea state, resource availa- bility, competitive thrusts from imports, the common property nature of most of the resources, and governmental regulation of the activity, or the lack of such regulations. These risks look particularly high to bankers not acquainted with the sea and accustomed to providing capital for the development of resources that are privately owned. To the extent that the United States wishes a particular fishery, or the entire U.S. flag fishery, developed it must provide economic climate and economic in- centive favorable to the purpose. The most immediately effective and constant economic incentive is relief from taxes. This has been, and is, broadly used to increase petroleum and mineral ex- traction, and despite complaints from other sectors of the economy it has been efficient from the standpoint of the total economy and effective for the public purpose. The United States has the strongest petroleum industry in the world and the beneficial effects of this on the posture of the United States in the World, and the strength of the energy base for its whole economy, well replaces the loss in tax base. No general incentive would more quickly stimulate production by U.S. flag fishing vessels than appropriate modification of the industry’s tax base along the line of the depletion allowance granted petroleum and mineral producers. A principle purpose of environmental and biological research as applied to the fisheries is to increase ability to predict resource availability and by doing so diminish economic risk in the enterprise. The state of the art in these research fields does not permit very precise such predictions and this is a principal reason why access to capital for vessel con- struction and gear acquisition is so difficult for fishermen. Efficiency in catch by modern vessels is continuously requiring higher capital investment per fish- -erman, or per ton of production. Fishermen must have capital to improve their efficiency. The Fishermen’s Loan Program and the Fishing Vessel Mortgage Insurance program have been both very effective in improving incentives for U.S. flag fishing and at nominal cost to the government. Not only have these programs enabled fishermen to modernize their equipment, it has relieved bankers of often onerous requirements of State Bank Examining codes inimical to the fishing busi- ness, and has removed the fishing vessel owner from dependence for capital on his customers, thus eliminating beneficially certain bad aspects of the padrone system in some fisheries. These programs are used so much and so effectively that they sometimes run out of authorization for funds. As one of the most effective means of providing economic incentive to U.S. flag fishing at cheapest cost to government the authorization limits for these programs should always be kept higher than demand. Experience on a broad and long basis in United States fisheries indicates that there is no judge of what sort of vessel and gear is needed in a particular fishery, and will work to best economic advantage in it, than a fisherman-operator-owner who derives a fair part of his total earnings from profit on the use of the capital in the vessel and gear. That is a main reason why these programs have, worked so well. These programs have operated on a tight credit basis designed to yield a slight profit. One of the most efficient ways to stimulate vessel modernization in a particular fishery that it is desired to develop would be to relax these controls somewhat in that particular fishery. The Federal Fishery Function should be authorized to do this differentially in fisheries under appropriate criteria. An apparently effective tool in pump priming to get a fishery started toward profitability is to provide incentive payments to fishermen to cover the difference in his costs and the processor’s ability to pay in the experimental phases of a fishery’s development. This has been used experimentally in the hake fishery off Washington and the fish meal business in the Gulf of Mexico, but on too limited a time basis to explore fully the methodology or effectiveness of such a tool. The Federal Fishery Function should be provided with substantial funds for such purpose, and authority to use it in this manner under appropriate criteria. The ground fish fishery of the United States was deliberately written off by the United States Government shortly after World War II for supervening na- tional reasons. These reasons were the necessity to quickly revive the econo- mies of war torn allies or friends. Those supervening reasons no longer obtain. This policy should be revised and restitution made. At the same time some of these countries (and particularly Canada) have instituted heavy subsidization of their own ground fisheries which gave the product of those, fisheries a prefer- 1168 ential position in the United States market not growng out of natural competi- tive forces or abilities. The market for ground fish in the United States has grown rapidly, even to the extent of exacerbating the United States’ problems of balance of payments. Ground fish resources off the coast not possible of use by U.S. flag fishermen are increasingly fished by foreign fishermen with the product frequently coming into the United States market. The Federal Fishery Function should be provided funds and authority to mount a concerted drive for a ten year period to revive the ground fish fisheries of the United States. This program should include for this period of time autkor- ity to provide vessel construction subsidies and other supports fully equivalent to Canadian supports in these fields. 14. Use of the Academic Community.—Other agencies of the United States Government (NASA, NAVY, AEC, NSF) have used the academic community with great success, and tremendous benefit to the nation, through grants and contracts. This has been so successful that it has materially affected the entire higher educational system in the United States and the economy and posture of the nation. This enormously valuable tool has been very sparingly available to the U.S. flag fisheries for two reasons. The National Science Foundation has interpreted its mandate for the support of basic research in such a manner that research program proposals from the academic community related to commercial fisheries were referred by it to the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries. Most of the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries funds were tied to particular projects, Bureau labora- tories did not appreciate competition from academic laboratories for these funds, and the directives under which the Bureau operated were somewhat uncertain in this field. (a) Oysters, Clams and Mussels—Oysters, clams and mussels are excellent vectors of human disease bacteria and viruses. These are ingested in the normal feeding process if available in the environment, and ordinarily carried by the animal with no damage. Oysters and clams in particular thrive where there is some pollution by human wastes. Very large areas of excellent mollusc farming lands are removed from use by these public health problems. The public Health Service and the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries are well advanced on the de- velopment of depurating methods. Industrial pollution is often more damaging to the sensitive molluscs than buman waste pollution. Copper and other high molecular weight metals are par- ticularly poisonous to them in exceedingly slight concentration. It is not at all certain that the waves of epideime diseases that have affected broad areas of mulluse producing areas are not induced by the weakened condition of the animals deriving from pollutants in undetectable amounts. Silting and the destruction of shell beds have destroyed the possibility of molluse culture in broad coastal areas by eliminating clean cultch for the embryo’s to set on (oysters) or smothering them before they can grow. Farming is not practiced where the farmer does not have control over and ownership of the product and land. Tideland tenure laws do not permit this in many states with excellent aquaculture possibilities. The Federal Fishery Function should work toward eliminating these and other barriers to the farming of oysters, clams and mussels. (b) Salmon and Trout.—Salmon and sea-run trout form particularly fine sub- jects for aquaculture and this is held back almost entirely by institutional barriers. The Federal Fishery Function should be given authority and funds to experi- ment with the aquaculture production of salmon and sea-run trout on a com- mercial basis involving private control of a whole river system, full authority to harvest the result by any method (including lease of sport fishing rights), and encouragement to selectively breed efficient stocks. This could readily be initiated and explored with light social interaction on small coastal streams, especially in Alaska but also is the other west coast states, and particularly on streams all, or mostly, included within federally owned lands. (a) Oysters, Clams and Mussels.—Oysters, clams and mussels are excellent vectors of human disease bacteria and viruses. These are ingested in the normal feeding process if available in the environment, and ordinarily carried by the animal with no damage. Oysters and clams in particular thrive where there is some pollution by human wastes. Very large areas of excellent molluse farming lands are removed from use by these public health problems. The Public Health Service and the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries are well advanced on the devel- - opment of depurating methods. 1169) Industrial pollution is often more damaging to the sensitive mollusc than human waste pollution. Copper and other high molecular weight metals are par- ticularly poisonous to them in exceedingly slight concentration. It is not at all certain that the waves of epidemic diseases that have affected broad areas of molluse producing areas are not induced by the weakened condition of the animals deriving from pollutants in undetectable amounts. Silting and the destruction of shell beds have destroyed the possibility of molluse culture in broad coastal areas by eliminating clean cultch for the embryo’s to set on (oysters) or smothering them before they can grow. Farming is not practiced where the farmer does not have control over and ownership of the product and land. Tideland tenure laws do not permit this in many states with excellent aquaculture possibilities. The Federal Fishery Function should work toward eliminating these and other barriers to the farming of oysters, clams and mussels. (b) Salmon and Trout.—Salmon and sea-run trout form particularly fine sub- jects for aquaculture and this is held back almost entirely by institutional barriers. The Federal Fishery Function should be given authority and funds to experi- ment with the aquaculture production of salmon and sea-run trout on a com- mercial basis involving private control of a whole river system, full authority to harvest the result by any method (including lease of sport fishing rights), and encouragement to selectively breed efficient stocks. This could readily be initiated and explored with light social interaction on small coastal streams, especially in Alaska but also in the other west coast states, and particularly on streams all, or mostly, included within federally owned lands. TABLE |.—CATCH OF FISH AND SHELLFISH, 1926-67 Average price per pound Catch for Catch for industrial Million Year human food ! products 1 2 Total 1 dollars Cents SHOTS 9 Ce ae a 2, 198 673 2,871 @) (3) TAPE ch IIR A id at Ae ee 2,172 634 2, 806 @y (3) FIG PAS 2D CET a ee a 2, 370 691 3, 061 @) Q) 192.9 RE Neate! POS eS oe 2,601 890 3, 491 (3) (8) 193 OMI BURSON DEAE Mee oi 2,478 746 3, 224 109 3.39 193 RAE Pant aG SN 2,129 501 2, 630 77 2.94 LOS ORES NOE EIS NE Me en Ma 1, 864 748 2, 612 56 2.13 OSB ea ae Sey Bg 2, 086 911 2,997 (@) @) OS ARS fee area CUE Ve Pe 2,434 1,670 4,104 (8) () OSS Woe Swe ae aE 2, 583 1, 552 4,135 (3) (8) LO 3G Remar POT STN Se eT es 2, 854 1,972 4, 826 @) (8) 193 Be EN ee ee ee ee 2,703 1, 650 4, 353 101 2.32 IOS REMaE pe aL iE Bink ANS a 2,639 1,615 4,254 94 2. 20 TCC AS) ae ae se OE ca ee 2,713 17382 4,445 97 2117) GAD MRE te oaths i tem ee 2,675 1, 385 4, 060 99 2. 44 TST ga a gt 2 ae eet 3, 062 1, 838 4,900 129 2.63 DOA DB pes mnie SA ola 2, 683 1, 192 3, 875 170 4. 40 TIES cos BAN a RR 9 CN Rie Sa 2,737 1, 425 4, 162 204 4,90 9 AAT EMER e ii oe UT 2, 865 1, 668 4,533 213 4.79 TIGA Boe Sell A Se a 3, 167 1, 431 4,598 270 5. 87 TIRE a I Le 3, 049 1, 418 4, 467 313 7.01 TG YEET Ps SiR 3 2 a ie ye 3, 020 1, 329 4, 349 312 7.16 GA Mee nema b hae Soy oe elt 3, 146 1, 367 4,513 371 8. 22 NYAS OES ESI as 10 ee ree ee 3, 305 1, 499 4, 804 343 TNS 195 Oe AR a 2 43, 307 1,594 4,901 347 7. 09 WCHL: joes Eee ey I eS Sipe ee 3, 048 1, 385 4, 433 365 8. 23 ICIS 22 Se a a eee aes 2,778 1,654 4, 432 364 8.20 1953 ewe Se ee Sie he a 2,519 1, 968 4, 487 356 8.94 GAMER Db eri Se a Ne 2,705 2, 057 4,762 359 7.55 1S Ga) SS Sa | Lal eo 2,579 2, 230 4, 809 339 7. 05 NG bGwaemlin eins or Pe 2, 690 2,578 5, 268 372 7. 06 O57 Raia es 2, 475 2,314 4,789 354 7.39 TERR oe Sa I Te pe age ea eee 2,651 2, 096 4,747 373 7.86 1959 Beis ne 5) 2 A ee 2, 369 2,753 5, 122 346 6.76 196 ()MRIEMER RRR rr Sa hal 2, 498 2,444 4,942 354 7.15 TIGL aE Pos 2 ele BS Tanda ee 2, 490 2, 697 5, 187 362 7.98 NOG 2 Mra OS ce lh oe 2, 540 42,814 45,354 396 7. 40 LOGGER ERE Dyin Tee oa all 2, 556 2,921 4, 847 377 7.78 SSG Aa RUE Ge ee haa i 2,497 2, 044 4,541 389 8.57 TS RR ae ratty NC Ss 2 LN at 2, 587 2,190 4,777 44 9. 33 SG Gt ee eS CE i) A Ae 2,572 1,792 4, 364 4472 410.82 BS Gea eee IS Py Pay NE 2, 385 1,677 4, 062 438 10.79 1!n million pounds. : ‘ P 2 Processed into meal, oil fish solubles, homogenized condensed fish, shell products, and used as bait and animal food. 3 Not available. 4 Record. Note: Does not include data on the Hawaiian catch prior to 1946. 1170 TABLE I!.—RELATIVE VOLUME OF THE CATCH, BY SPECIES, 1966 Record catch ; 3 Percent of $= ——_——__— Species Quantity total Year Amount Mearihad ences ba AMie Cala) 0) yield DE Sa A Ree aa dE 1, 307, 710 30.0 1962 2, 347. 944 SATIRIC eee NE IE Re See UN ice tea PS Ease 387, 749 8.9 1936 790, 884 Crabstee nO Rae Ae EE ee ee 372, 425 8.5 1966 372, 425 TARA Ae eNO Etch RAPE tae Ee aie pepe ate ate ew 269, 180 6.2 1950 391, 454 SH pee ea ULE RO ee ae 239, 046 5.5 1954 268, 334 TAC HVES TAPS See eee ee ee ee oe 196, 318 4.5 1965 265, 438 ENOUTTC Sere in HRSA EA DENY Sear OA ONES a 174, 520 4.0 1965 180, 121 Ley LO ee a ENS Ste Mic a het eta 132, 288 3.0 1929 293, 809 Herring, sea GAA 2 A EN uno a Ura eH 72, 229 oa 1902 200, 598 Pare lfc URC DINO RO OND es Tan cu Sue ko 24,107 Ab 1937 263, 200 FL ICOY 2] [pao Ue SOR IE a Tt en A ee 96, 408 2520 a eee 2 ES nals ak eae SWNT EL cy gee sate nhc Neste aoa es 90, 408 Dak 1957 133, 041 INT WAVE SEU eae NE Tie SAT ITA eS ee 87,445 2.0 1908 89, 978 Ocean’ perch; Atlantic.___-_---_2-.------------------- 81, 552 1.9 1951 258, 320 COU Waa SUG ATA RR EE i es 72,751 Wed 1966 72, 751 TINTRETOV IGS Coe eet seers RN DREAD A LS Re tetas 62, 284 1.4 1953 86, 044 @ystensem un ana A eee 51, 223 12 21908 152, 046 Cod: I NCTE yet {eR rR NR AL SS 37, 576 9 1880 294, 351 Pacificg eee Ue NC Eevee ye ee eT = 9, 983 2 1915 32, 681 Ee ens 2TH LO US eI Total eee es ie LEE tee oe bes 2 47, 559 Weld, ooo oe ee VT USS CLASH Ve LES ee eee ae ec eclede eerer 46, 361 ils al 1908 - 81, 869 Wace ac ere aera ee ree ee 41,119 .9 1952 146, 522 Halibut Pac tic ween ne mel seen am Nee eel eee 40, 326 of) 1915 66, 696 YL Nex Be eed NO AU IRA SES ee TE IR rele ek 38, 026 5S) 1902 43, 385 iCatfishrandsbullhieadst= sass e tae ane eee Eee 34, 656 .8 1963 38, 614 Car pee NER ee ae eter nee eee er 32, 348 all 1908 42,659 Ligbstermnonthennmaee semeae ene ene deel 29, 541 oll 1960 31, 168 SCUDLOMMDONEY Eee tena eee eee ee eee ee 28, 359 a6 1960 49,229 BROCK FISI ES eee eee eA Ws a a ea A IRIN re 25, 529 .6 1945 57, 686 Mackerel sien e Wil Ra air Rela SIU ola Ma uae te ee 24, 630 .6 (3) @) OceantperchPacifics. 2.5 22 ete ee ee ee ee 21, 864 45 1965 28, 352 Squid ee ea 21,735 .5 1946 40, 266 BTR aU SRT IUD ey Saas eet ly aes aah 19, 271 A 1966 19, 271 Buttalofishys ues eae 18, 034 4 1950 25, 873 Scallops, sea 15,975 4 1961 27, 461 Snapper, red 13, 317 28 1902 23, 457 Hake, Pacific 11, 833 68} 1966 11, 833 GRUB Site Ua ei SUSAN eas 10, 149 52 1960 16, 854 Sinipedsbassas -saaes se ee eee 9,124 of 1961 9, 495 Pollack cee eek Som oe Sel ho 2 EN aa 9,018 ne: 1938 40, 694 SS Well Fis e Oa e E S 8, 658 n2. 1965 13, 403 Groupens eee eee erie 8, 358 ae 1965 9,570 Disco Aaa TTS De See ba 7,959 2. 1944 14, 262 Sheppheadsaiia ne ee 7,355 W2. 1959 13, 644 Ce ea sa aD COUN eG a Sot a ee ett 7, 305 M2: 1890 43, 000 SET EELS I ea yt DINED LSU Bc AEE ee 6, 931 s2 1945 17,750 Yellow Perch 6, 741 of 1934 16, 282 Sea Trout or Weakfish, spotted 6, 401 all 1936 8, 800 SO a nO ee Ee Peele 5,973 oil 1952 15, 863 BR CHES rit SPS A oles inte iC ol IM ay ste 5,928 ol 1939 17, 151 Lainey, Simliyse Se ee eee 5, 844 oll 1965 6, 237 BaTUneel S Fumes coronas age a aL CS a ets A 5, 484 mall 41897 22, 673 King Whiting or Kingfish____....._------------------- 4,997 nil 1965 5,708 SeaiBass, Black CAtlantic)_-2 2) 2222 222 ee oe ee 4, 859 ol 1952 21,997 Witalel prod tcts| smi in i init eek DENNEN 4, 689 all @) Y Herrin galiakem: (mien Mie RDS NiANRUE BETO eee eee 4,575 Sil 1899 59, 914 Cia] | le ace Pos UN So DE AR aR Pe ea A 4, 384 ait 1958 13, 303 [ist IGS cease ee Ba ra NN SEPA AE eS 4,100 wilh 1961 6,995 UST TASS IFLA lee US EE PL A SSD Bes WES 93, 489 DY oo ht ee A US Haye [npestauta an ema hoe! NNR SH a pap oh 4, 364, 106 POO! Or Se Uy ele eae Renee 1 Unclassified species for bait, reduction and animal food. 2 First year in which an oyster was made in all regions. 3 Data not available. : 4 Includes data on New England catch in 1898. 3Since data are not available on the poundage of whales taken, statistics on the yield of these mammals represent the weight of the whale products which include meals, meat, and oil. 1171 TABLE II1.—RELATIVE VALUE OF THE CATCH, BY SPECIES, 1966 Record value and year Value Value : (thousand Percent of (thousand Species dollars) total Year dollars) STOTT Ds Sea ee eas eS ay 96, 296 20. 4 1966 96, 296 SHIMON 25 ss54-0h8 Saas Ie eee eS et ees 73, 595 15.6 1966 73, 595 LIEN ieee MN oe a 44, 841 9.5 1950 61, 342 Gb Sm enone tS RIE et BON Sy IL Ae UE AN A 33, 027 7.0 1966 33, 037 (ONY ASE I Ee ele A ye 27, 373 5.8 1961 33, 204 ToD Ste rSeeasee aie het ert 5 eh ols ee 22, 266 4.7 1966 22, 266 Menhad cia yaaa teen ieee econ LUE A. Tee 21, 767 4.6 1956 28,425 ROUT CCTs metre Se A ER ee ee 20, 170 4.3 1966 20,170 Claim sma smementsesinne ees sul nc Ua a ee 18, 551 3.9 1966 18, 551 Had dor Keene mnaneietien OSA ei eC core, 13,943 3.0 1966 13, 943 HalibutePacificsema ean: Sle CEES oe ee 9, 708 725 1 1962 11,579 Scallopsseasamascee aaa rsh ee Se 7,625 1.6 1965 13, 182 Catfishiandibullheadsaeeaenean an ne Sere ania 6, 941 185 1966 6, 941 SINE N ys UCES ea S eS aera ll are ee ee eR 4, 334 9 1966 4, 334 WW Fiiti ho eeemen en as eR ann! ERD aN ee 3,955 8 1951 2,903 Musselgstiellssqamtane ise lyk rie Oe ei bt ie ee 3, 737 8 (Q) () Cod: PN TENIN Aa Ses ashy Na ea A en as ee i 3, 196 7] 1948 4,742 Raciticuaaeeniara wii tener ei rac Shek MOS eae 518 1 1959 664 i Otal emanate ou ee BOE SS ae a ai 3,714 Bissun oe eee ag Se vere tle Oceanhperch aAtian ti casesscs sau mm enpensurahc anmelden 3, 425 7 1951 12,597 SCUDIOMMPONLY semana ro mue un ANN DEL al ah ee 3, 326 7 1966 3, 326 Eobsteraspinymomietaeeen ee ieee s (eee Say lier 2, 882 6 1965 3, 626 lindustrialafishawact sfe 2222 0 ee ae 2, 606 6 1963 3, 044 Mulleteetss osu Sean OPO ey ASN ee at 2,577 6 1945 4,647 Mackerelstaecternn sof (OR eee 2, 404 5 Q) 1 Buttalofishita=saninranee sale in eC) eae oRe 2, 213 5 1952 3, 564 Herring, sea: Atlaniticumeeeee ee eerie AN a aie 1, 434 3 1948 3, 798 Racificee cnet meiiunel: Das le se es sere Noe 591 5 ih 1947 2,152 sO ta lew mrenparee nine ell ly Ue oe My 2,025 ca tadig Sac ce eae Chu DS Meee tetantea Ra oe OR ee te 1, 880 4 1958 2, 564 Scallopssibayseeammeibente. she ae LE ALY oo Pet a 1,672 4 1966 1,672 Stripedybasssmstmetet Sit SN AOE ede 1, 654 4 1966 1, 654 Sea trout or weakfish spotted_..____________._________ 1, 633 3 1952 1, 781 acktmackercleaeeenie deri ome 1 SCS 1512 3 1952 4,759 ROCKFSteS ae need eit Mtn Dit ie ie ca el 1,412 3 1945 2, 648 FTE Wives emcees eee in ah ARE SN il gfe ee 1, 328 3 1966 1, 328 Oceahtperch4Pacificumumens: Neneel Mai Ie) TOSI Te aas 1,105 2 1965 1, 334 Groupenssaewe ne Oe UNC INCL SI TR Ui yas. ae me 1, 078 2 1966 1, 078 Cay p aan nae he ee BS ae ie | I 1, 028 2 1951 2,007 Winnie, Common esse Se ee 986 2 1948 3, 784 Shad meee Cag a Moe PLR Sea ai 920 2 1945 2, 680 Abal One a Menrnm isn Male tea Cig MSN ete an aw ONE 920 52 1966 920 Wellowaperchsaeo ee mame Sel 0 NE e ce oe 812 a2 1958 1,540 SWONTISH Mee ee iment Sk ie SRN Ts ae 804 we 1946 1, 435 ROmpanO sammy Sele abie el Tat ST ME eS 2 Ey Sioa 801 2 1966 801 Bonitones ae tae Roba piano) Alene. SI. oe oe 771 2 1947 1, 636 BloodWotmscmee eee en oe RE Se ee 735 2 1964 804 Sealbass blacki@Atlantic)nauesu uns ean OOS MODS ee Ns 709 1 1952 5, 206 S Ui ee meter ie paren Ue ka CRN DOS ekg 680 1 1947 1,370 Sab etishmemeeanen een ees oh wean 669 1 1946 1, 834 Bluetishesmemeee nara: Crh e iy aie Se OPTS 647 1 1951 760 INiichovicsememen ene rates Mire yet af ee 645 1 1933 1,712 Sand worm Sac aeaennes nies Ts TG Tb te ee ees 596 1 1966 596 Bitterfishimermeannss ce have te l/s Se TS Bie oe 541 1 1962 1,005 NEHOWsDKicmee eae O Te RRC Onis | Se i eRe 541 1 1951 2,152 CHENTTED HICI UA soak ea 539 1 1965 1,039 KOKO OK KGS VL kee me ite EN 511 1 1945 1,819 OXON Ke mn icra eS RU ee ee ee 498 1 1946 1,014 Winclassifiedmemea ee ire 4 So EE ee 11, 390 DS is epee es SBOE. URI Siete 1172 TABLE IV.—IMPORTS OF FISHERY PRODUCTS, 1950-67 [In thousands] Edible Nonedible Total Pounds Value (value) value 639, 725 158, 414 $39, 882 $198, 296 646, 668 158, 363 54, 094 212, 457 705, 118 183, 121 57, 308 240, 429 726, 195 195, 869 49,611 245, 480 804, 054 203, 722 48, 687 252, 409 780, 185 208, 973 49, 896 258, 869 801, 655 234, 699 48, 031 282, 730 900, 227 252, 788 46, 487 299, 275 1, 020, 326 283, 822 46, 959 330, 781 1,141, 114 314, 650 55, 467 370, 117 1, 095, 014 310, 596 52, 685 363, 281 1, 087, 175 339, 318 61, 301 400, 619 1, 255, 532 405, 832 83,975 489, 807 OG SEEN ae RS Were ee ee ee 1, 196, 977 399, 928 100, 784 500, 712 TOG ARS ven Reser tee eee Renee ne 1, 318, 099 433, 674 130, 569 564, 243 LOGS sts eleees Se EE eR SS 1, 398, 778 479, 412 121, 492 600, 904 OG 6 i Sear ee ere ee eS 11,593, 359 1568, 216 152, 231 1720, 447 1967 ee ee NE a eS tee () 3 531, 900 3 155, 300 3 687, 200 1 Record. 2 Not available. 3 Preliminary. Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. TABLE V.—EXPORTS OF DOMESTIC FISHERY PRODUCTS, 1950-67 [All amounts in thousands] Edible Nonedible Total Year Pounds Value (value) (value) 11950 eee RIE Fae Tues. SU cee 121, 623 $18, 856 $8, 618 $27, 474 IIgs Yoh et ee is nV ees a aE as SO eee 165, 624 27, 072 8, 659 35, 731 G5 PUA UAL SRE eT ae See ee each 62, 056 15, 511 6, 436 21,947 15 Siete eee Slee Boke eI Se ee 69, 308 17, 084 10, 794 27, 878 1954 SEN Rea e ne he. ip Te eee ee 62, 724 16, 238 15, 289 31, 527 [Ob Sasa ino pee ee AES ewe eae 109, 750 24, 923 15, 054 39, 977 101, 918 22, 939 16, 564 39, 503 85, 221 20, 549 15, 403 35, 952 65, 468 19, 440 11, 564 31, 004 80, 688 26, 747 17, 495 44, 242 61, 454 25, 622 18, 543 44,165 40, 137 19, 594 15,116 34,710 56, 530 22, 470 13, 258 35, 728 64, 745 30, 376 26, 229 56, 605 94, 835 42, 878 21, 326 64, 204 96, 444 49, 308 20,175 69, 483 109, 604 62, 882 21, 931 84, 813 107, 939 67,525 14, 684 82, 209 Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. 1173 TABLE VI.—SUPPLY OF FISHERY PRODUCTS, 1957-57 [Round-weight basis] Domestic catch Imports os Total Million Million million Year pounds Percent pounds Percent pounds IG eee eee mer meee antl ok H DN 4,789 66. 8 2,375 33.2 7, 164 ISTE Gs SS es De erie eee 4,747 63.1 2,779 36.9 7, 526 1959 Meese eee SR hs 2 5, 122 60.5 3, 338 39.5 8, 460 196 CORRE EE eee Aa ee eee LEN Nae 4,942 60.1 3, 281 39.9 8, 223 TSS a lB Oy A 5, 187 54.2 4, 383 45.8 9,570 L9G 2 ee ne) a 25,354 51.4 5, 054 48.6 10, 408 LOG 3 eeepc ee USE Ince eee ae = 4, 847 42.4 6, 587 57.6 11, 434 JI ey NS as Uo ap 4,541 37.7 7, 490 62.3 12, 031 9G RRS ees Svein FR EE ey 4,776 45.3 5, 758 54.7 10, 534 IS GG mane eee oe ea N a aN 4, 364 35.0 8, 103 65.0 12, 467 AS Gmetad de ee ee 4, 062 28.6 210,125 71.4 214, 187 aeauiaes imports of cured cod into Puerto Rico, but included landings of foreign-caught tuna in American Samoa. ecord. TABLE VII.—SUPPLY OF INDUSTRIAL FISHERY PRODUCTS, 1957-67 [Round-weight basis] Domestic catch Imports Million Million Total, million Year pounds Percent pounds Percent pounds SEY fe eos aa Se penne es Se I 2,314 73.9 818 26. 1 3, 132 9 5G Meee anne Se NL a eS i 2, 096 65. 3 1,116 34.7 3, 212 TG eS oe ie US See a ee 2,753 65.7 1, 437 34.3 4,190 196 (ees ee SE 2,444 61.7 1,515 38. 3 3, 959 1S 6 Re ees Ute EN 3,697 51.5 2, 538 48.5 5, 135 TGS RE ie et See BES oT eee te 12,814 48.9 2,939 51.1 5, 793 BUS Gy See SE Oe Eas BEES ON 2,291 34.5 4,340 65.5 6, 631 19 G4 eae eS Velo Se eer hae A 2, 044 28.6 5,114 71.4 7,158 TGS fa a CUR 2,190 40.8 3, 182 59. 2 5,512 TUS SEY Ee Sas ali 7 eae a 1, 792 25.5 5, 244 74.5 7, 066 SG emer s Serres BP ee 2 1,677 18.4 17, 442 81.6 19,119 1 Record. Note: The weights of the domestic catch and imports represent the live (round) weights of all items except bivalve mol- lusks (conchs, clams, oysters, scallops, etc.) which are shown in the weight of meats, excluding the shell. TABLE Villa—SUPPLY OF GROUNDFISH AND ATLANTIC OCEAN PERCH FILLETS, 1957-67 U.S. production Imports t Total Thousand Thousand thousand Year pounds Percent pounds Percent pounds 96, 650 40.7 140, 678 59.3 237, 328 99, 074 40.3 146, 589 BON, 245, 663 91,133 33.0 184, 837 67.0 275, 970 93, 818 37.6 155, 550 62.4 249, 368 93, 039 32.3 195, 099 67.7 288, 138 93, 625 29.7 221, 420 70.3 315, 045 83, 419 26.5 231, 768 73.5 315, 187 75, 166 23.4 246, 569 76.6 321, 735 77, 180 20.7 294, 954 79.3 372, 134 75, 418 19.3 2 315, 097 80.7 2 300,515 71, 032 20.0 283,570 80.0 334, 602 1 |ncludes imports of frozen blocks of groundfish. ; 2 Record. (The record U.S. production amounted to 148,786,000 pounds in 1951). 1174 TABLE VIIIb.—SUPPLY OF FILLETS, STEAKS, ETC., OTHER THAN GROUNDFISH AND ATLANTIC OCEAN PERCH, 1957-67 U.S. production Imports Total Thousand Thousand thousand Year pounds Percent pounds Percent pounds ATE Fa (BS eee ws eed Pe een Bar ioe at Oar eee 57,815 | 47.7 63, 300 52.3 121,115 QS ere ATs See Ae shies OUT ae eet oes 56, 801 47.5 62, 688 52.5 119, 489 AUC Fah) eS ea PS 56, 104 46. 4 64, 802 53.6 120, 906 QE Ost ee ay PS ee ee leeks ON 59, 348 49.0 61, 713 51.0 121, 061 AUC TS a A a eee 65, 073 49.2 67, 167 50.8 132,.240 NOG 2a cee CAIN Ce Oh ee eed 76, 361 50. 0 76, 443 50. 0 152, 804 UG Seep SUT A NC leaks alee Ue 82, 565 54.5 68, 869 45.5 151, 434 HUGS Ta Te RSS SR OOS remy em St 85, 955 53.9 73, 554 46.1 159, 509 UGG Die eh ds 2a Ses oceaeae s 191, 652 bbw! 74, 724 44.9 166, 376 TO GG RPE ae SER A ake i Ree ee 90, 472 49.4 192,708 50. 6 1183, 180 AIG 7E ees PUN cir eaes eee a Re 82, 108 49.2 84, 859 50.8 166, 967 1 Record. TABLE 1X.—SUPPLY OF CANNED TUNA 1960-67 [Pounds in thousands] United States pack United States pack from domestic from imported fresh catch ! and frozen tuna 2 Imported canned Total —- Total, ————____—_ supply Year Pounds Percent Pounds Percent pounds Pounds _ Percent pounds 142, 638 40.4 158,750 45.0 301, 388 51,755 14.6 353, 143 163, 853 44.4 146,759 39.7 310,612 58, 663 15.9 369, 275 147, 586 37.6 187,920 47.9 335,506 56, 719 14.5 392, 225 160, 822 41.8 165,890 UB 72 SY) 7/2 57, 494 15.0 384, 206 154, 208 38.1 195,626 48.4 349, 834 54, 647 13.5 404, 481 161, 515 39.5 196, 890 48.1 358, 405 50, 961 12.4 409, 366 153, 231 3.36 3241, 037 52.9 3% 394, 268 61, 960 13.5 3455, 828 LOG TRE Seesnihe sua sate eS) ee 3 183, 382 40.4 25, 463 45.2 388,845 365, 319 14,4 454, 164 1 Includes pack from the United States catch landed in Puerto Rico. 2 Includes tuna canned in America Samoa. 3 Record. TABLE X.—SUPPLY OF SHRIMP 1957-67 [Thousands of pounds] U.S. Catch Imports Percent Import Percent Total Heads-on Heads-off of total weight Heads-off of total Heads-off NG 5 ie oe cle NGI a oar ie UN Abie ll ea 203,882 121,358 64 69, 676 69, 676 36 191, 034 IS Sa Sr a A de 218,842 127,287 60 85, 394 85, 394 40 212, 681 G5 Oat urs ae eee ne ee anniek 240,182 142,965 56 106,555 111,704 44 254, 669 IIS 6 (pa ees ams Ur ree er Aa edi 249,452 148, 483 Ho HISFATC ESO ESS 45 267, 623 TI [Se eS A er pa oc tye ep ar 174,580 103, 865 44 126,268 134, 564 56 238, 429 HI GG 2S Fees, See its ONE TE rl ae a ess 191,105 119,154 44 141,183 132, 504 56 271, 658 UGGS Site Wiens Sey ae Bile Ee EN 240,478 150,737 47 151,530 167,344 53 318, 081 GGA eases NE els aE iN ASLAN oh ie RATT UE 211,821 133,113 44 154,577 169, 510 56 302, 623 ANG Year ON eG eae SA epi ea a eee eure ar yt 243,645 152,346 46 162,942 178,955 56 331, 301 BOGS RSet hs can Sener ae ee 239,046 148,255 43 178,549 194,946 51 343, 261 TOG 7 Rea a ie e ee oe ES 2 312,200 2192, 000 49 2186,073 2266, 639 51 2394, 681 1|mports for 1957 and 1958 were considered to consist entirely of heads-off shrimp. Those for the following years were converted to heads-off weight on the basis of available date on the actual conditions of the imports. 2 Record. 1175 TABLE XI.—SUPPLY OF FISHMEAL AND SOLUBLES, 1957-67 U.S. production ! Imports Year Tons Percent Tons Percent Total, tons NG SY Peep ieee MI Ake DEL 2 325, 221 79.0 86, 414 21.0 411, 635 NOs i LN ia ee ee Ce eee 313, 228 74.3 108, 167 25.7 421, 395 GIES) ag JSS Se al A coe 2 389, 231 72.5 147, 392 27.5 536, 623 HUGG (ane ake gente Le EI ie is 339, 601 71.8 133, 349 28.2 472, 950 NOG ieee eee a Ee ee ene ee a ee 367, 392 62.3 221, 923 Sye7/ 589, 315 119 6 2a eee soe ike S28 Meant ee 374, 583 59.4 256, 320 40.6 630, 903 19639 Sees ae a eS ees 309, 608 44.9 380, 132 59. 1 689, 740 ING (GY SE ay ae RR a 281, 900 38.9 443, 154 61.1 725, 054 GY) = 22 See oe a ees eee 301,471 5282) 275, 804 47.8 577,275 LOG Geert: ERT EE er ee eae ee 265, 541 37.0 452, 091 63.0 717, 632 19 G7 ere hs sh PRN he Eee ee 248, 842 27.5 2655, 155 72.5 2903, 997 1 Includes homogenized condensed fish for 1957-63. 2 Record. Note: Wet weight of solubles and homogenized condensed fish have been converted to dry weight by reducing their pound- age ls. TABLE XII.—SHELF AND SLOPE AREA ADJACENT TO VARIOUS REGIONS AND FORECASTED YIELD POTENTIALS (ALL VALUES IN THOUSANDS) ; Slope Demersal/ Shellfish Pelagic Demersal Pelagic Region area (N.M.) area (N.M.) fishes(T) (tons) (tons) CSA CSA New England___________ 77.6 22.5 S200 he sae 1, 000 11585 12.9 Middle and South Atlan ticueenn eee 79.0 143.0 +1, 400 +1, 740 +1, 440 17.7 18. 2 Gulf of Mexico_________- 112.0 45.0 2,500 1, 900 4, 160 22.3 37.1 Eastern Bering Sea______ 145.0 14.0 1, 500 1 200 750 10. 3 5.2 Gulf of Alaska 60. 0 15.0 450 1 250 750 75e) 12.5 Transitional___ 27.9 12.2 400 @) 400 14,3 14.3 Californias nee een 23.0 5.6 300 (@) 1,500 13.0 65. 2 Hawaii see e eee 3.9 4.3 () @) DEA SOS Es Gila RUC Sees Ota eee ate 528. 4 261.6 8, 540 4,090 10, 000 16.2 18.9 1 Crustaceans only. 2 Unknown. THE OCEAN REGIME OF THE REAL WORLD (By Wilbert McLeod Chapman, Ralston Purina Co. ) This Panel deals with the National Interest in the Ocean. Except for a narrow rim around its edges the ocean is international and free for use by all nations, subject to international law. Accordingly the nature of this international millieu will affect materially, if not determine, the accomplishment of the National interest in the ocean. It will be my purpose to examine some of the more widely mooted points said to require change in the governance of the use of the ocean in the light of new developments in the application of science and technology to the ocean’s use, and in the light of the international political and juridical structure in which those applications are taking place, and will take place, in the near term. Public speculation on these questions has been rife in the past few years. It will not be my purpose to trace in any detail the origins of this speculation, nor the activities of its promotors (although that would be a fascinating subject for a thesis in Political Science). I will only indicate some of the highlights along the recent trail for purposes of orientation. In 1965 there was a White House Conference on the subject (1). In 1966 the 17th Report of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace treated the issue of the sea-bed in considerable detail (2). In 1967 Arvid Pardo, Ambassador of Malta to the United Nations, made far reaching proposals on this subject to the First Committee of the General Assembly (3) which led, in course, to the establishment by the General Assembly of an Ad Hoc Committee to Study the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction (4). In 1968 U.S. Senator Claiborne Pell proposed before the United States Senate a “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 1176 Exploration and Exploitation of Ocean Space” (5). Later in the same year the United Nations Committee of the World Peace through Law Center published a study, incorporating a “Proposed Treaty Governing the Exploration and Use of the Ocean Bed” (6). This will be referred to herein as the Danzig Treaty,. after the Chairman of the Drafting Committee which produced it. In October, 1968, there was published by the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, under the authorship of Elisabeth Mann Borgese, a study (The Ocean Regime) (7) incorporating a third form of such a treaty “Draft Statute of the Inter- national Regime for the Peaceful Uses of the High Seas and the Seabed beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction’. In January 1969 Senator Pell filed a revi- sion of his former draft treaty in the U.S. Senate (8). In March, 1969, there was. published “Our Nation and the Sea,’ Report of the U.S. Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources, which contained recommendations on this subject (9).This has been followed by the publication of three volumes oc Panel Reports (10). For brevity I will refer to these as the Auerbach recom: mendations, recognizing them to be the joint efforts of a good many people pulled together and made coherent by Professor Auerbach. Also in March, 1969 was published the 19th Report of the Commission to Study the Organizatior of Peace entitled “The United Nations and the Bed of the Sea” in which are in. corporated far-reaching recommendations on this subject to the General Assembly of the United Nations (11). During these few years a very large literature on this subject has arisen which I will make no attempt to review. I have pointed out the above actions as examples from the work of a relatively small but vigorous group of individuals, . and private and public organizations, who seek to change international law and the organization of international affairs for a variety of purposes and are em- ploying the use of the ocean as a vehicle for seeking this accomplishment. It will be my purpose only to discuss some of the main points that have arisen in the ensuing debates. 1. Lack of Regime for the Deep-Sea Bed.—It is often implied, and sometimes: stated, that there exists no regime of law to cover the exploitation of the min- erals and other resources of the deep-sea bed. This, of course, is untrue. There has been, as yet, no general division for juridical purposes in international law between the water column of the high seas, the air column above it, and the solid earth column below it. They remain maritime expanses that appertain to no one. The high seas means all parts of the sea that are not included in the terri- torial sea or in the internal waters of a State (Convention on the High Seas, Article 1) (12). The high seas are open to all nations, both coastal and non- coastal, and no State may validly purport to subject any part of them to its sovereignty (Article 2). Freedom to use the high seas under rules of international law shall be exercised by all States with reasonable regard to the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas. (Article 2). To be specific, there is no reason why the United States cannot license a firm to mine anything on the deep sea bed anywhere under existing international law in the same manner that it licenses vessels wearing its flag specifically to engage in the mackerel trade. By such a license it can regulate the activity of- that firm in those operations in any manner that accords with its municipal law, as it does the vessels of others of its firms licensed to do various other things on the high seas. It can do this without purporting, or implying. any claim to sovereignty or jurisdiction over the nationals of other States similarly engaged in the same geographic area. Similarly, the United States can license any firm within its jurisdiction to- mine in this fashion within a particular geographic area, by particular means. by particular amounts, by particular time intervals. etc. With respect to firms within its jurisdiction it can grant these rights exclusively to it, or partially to- several such firms, or allocate general rights to all such firms, as it chooses. It can assess whatever charges against such firms it chooses to do, and it can allocate funds so received entirely to its own treasury, or to the United Nations, or to a particular fund for the underprivileged, or for other purposes. The problem is not in international law. If any exists it is in the absence of specific legislation in the United States Code, and this is subject to rectification by the United States Congress. What I have said with respect to the United States, of course, is true of other nations. 2. Disputes over the Use of Deep-Sea Bed Resources.—Disputes over the use- of Deep-Sea Bed resources falling within the purview of international law arise~ 1177 between sovereigns, not among their citizens or between the citizens of one sovereign and another sovereign. While citizens and firms are frequently the ob- jects of international law, only sovereigns are its subjects. The citizen on the high seas operates under rights pertaining to the sovereign whose flag he wears, not under rights pertaining to him as an individual under international law. There is a wide range of procedures available for the peaceful settlement of such disputes among sovereigns (13) and they are in use steadily in the prac- tice of nations. The normal way to settle such disputes is by ordinary diplomatic communica- tion. Not infrequently this leads to an agreement between the sovereigns to limit the activities of their citizens on the high seas in a manner that is mutually agreeable, and eliminates the dispute. This may be an agreement for a short ‘period of time, say a year, open to renegotiation at the end of that time. There are a number of such agreements which have worked well over a considerable span of years. The agreement may last for a stated period of years, and many such agreements provide for an international commission appointed as among the nations party to the agreement to attend to these affairs, jointly, in the in- terim, within terms laid down by the convention establishing it. By such agree- ment the allocation of the use of particular resources as between the citizens of the nations party to the agreement can be, and sometimes is, made. (14). Other procedures include arbitration or referral to the International Court of Justice. Admittedly there can be situations arise where the interests of sovereigns are so incompatible that there is a refusal to reach agreement through these nor- mal peaceful channels, or that it takes a number of years of intensive dispute be- fore this is done. An example is provided by the dispute among the United States ; Ecuador, Peru and Chile over the claim by the latter three to exclusive jurisdic- tion over the sea, the seabed, and their resources to a minimum distance of 200 marine miles from shore. The three claiming countries have repeatedly refused to join the United States in taking the case to the International Court of Justice (15). Peru and Ecuador from time to time seize a United States vessel under this claim. United States vessels have continued to operate in the disputed area. The United States has attempted to protect its citizen in exercising its rights in the disputed area not only by vigorous diplomatic activity but by general legisla- tion designed to mitigate the economic effects on its vessels of seizure or molesta- tion on the high seas under claims not recognized by the United States. It needs to be pointed out that the Pell, Danzig, Borghese, or other proposed draft treaties alluded to above, will not prevent or solve disputes of this nature. Treaties are not binding upon sovereigns under international law unless accepted by the particular sovereign. The International Court of Justice has recently once more laid out the limitations of such conventional law in its decision on the North Sea case involving Netherlands, Federal Republic of Germany, and Den- mark (16). The International Court of Justice does not have jurisdiction in such cases unless the particular sovereign has accepted its jurisdiction generally or will stipulate this for the particular case. The General Assembly of the United Nations cannot enact legislation (no matter what it is called) which is binding upon sovereigns unless the sovereign in question agrees that it is. 3. The Outer Edge of the Continental Shelf.—A. driving worry expressed re- peatedly by the proponents of change noted above, is that there was going to be a mad “Colonial” scramble by the nations of the world to extend their sovereignty out over the sea-bed in order to obtain exclusive jurisdiction over the rich re- sources lying there. This fear was successfully inserted in a speech by President Johnson (17). What needed to be done rather quickly to stop this, they felt, was to prohibit expropriation of the sea-bed. To do this it was necessary to define what the present bounds of sovereign territoriality were so that what lay beyond national jurisdiction could be defined. This demanded a more precise definition of the outer boundary of the continental shelf. There are several points in this complex idea that need to be dealt with. They include: (a) As set out clearly by the International Court of Justice in its recent decision in the North Sea Cases, the Continental Shelf of a nation constitutes. a natural prolongation of its land territory in and under the sea ipso facto and ab initio. It is so by inherent right. It is exclusive. It cannot be disposed of by others to others except by agreement of the sovereign. (b) The doctrine of the continental shelf is a recent instance of encroach- ment on maritime expanses which, during the greater part of history, apper-- tained to no one. The principle is applied that the land dominates the sea. 1178 The doctrine arose only since the Truman Proclamation of September, 1945. It follows that where the land no longer dominates the sea, the continental shelf ends and beyond are maritime expanses appertaining to no one. No nation may validly purport to subject any part of them to its sovereignty. - (c) Boundaries of nations do not require precise definition and often, even as to land boundaries, are not precisely defined for long periods of time. This does not detract from their existence. (d) Neither the Conference of Plenipotentiaries which negotiated the Convention on the Continental Shelf in 1958, nor the International Law Commission which in 1956 drafted the concepts generally included therein (18), felt that either the practice of nations, knowledge of the resources and structure of the continental shelf, or methodology of profitable extract- tion of such resources was sufficiently clear to permit a useful definition of an outer boundary to the continental shelf that would be agreeable to the nations that was any more precise than “the adjacent land to the depth of 200 meters or beyond that to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the harvesting of the natural resources of the said areas.” Knowledge of the seabed has advanced spectacularly in the ensuing decade and this is one of the most rapidly advancing fields of ocean research, but it is still highly fragmentary as respects the location of seabed resources that can be practically exploited. There is still no economic extraction of resources from the seabed where the depth of the water is much greater than 200 meters, and technology is not advancing those depths rapidly (this will be alluded to further below). As noted by the International Court of Justice in its decision on the North Sea Cases, the practice of nations in this field has not crystallized further than it was in 1958 to any marked degree. Accordingly there does not appear to be any strong reason in current human activity respecting the seabed that did not exist in 1958 which requires, or makes beneficial, any more precise definition of the outer boundary to the continental shelf than was given in 1958. There is no mad rush to colonize the deep-seabed. The claims in Latin America occurred before 1958, and are no more valid now than when made (19). As noted above, the International Court of Justice states that such rights as each nation holds in its continental shelf are inherent to it and do not require to be asserted by it to be valid. The obverse is equally true. 4, The Wealth of the Seabed.—As normally happens with hoaxes if you have the forebearance and strength to wait out their original thrust, the stories of the billions of dollars of wealth to be had each year in the reasonably near future from the seabed outside national jurisdiction are now bouncing back to haunt the tellers as unbiased economists and experts bring in their testimony and this is evaluated by competent bodies, including the Economic and Technical Sub- Committee of the General Assembly Committee to Study the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction. The truth is that there are no billions of dollars worth of annual profit (excess of value over cost) to be had from the very deep-seabed. There are great quantities of manganese nodules on the deep-seabed that con- tain other metals as well, such as cobalt, nickel, etc. There is no technology presently available by which they can be economically harvested and their com- ponent metals refined to sell in the market against the same metals from land deposits (20). This applies so far even to shallow, large deposits discovered in the Great Lakes area and the substantial deposits rather well known in moderate depths on the Blake Plateau. The one company actively working on developing the technology is investing some millions of dollars in doing so and does not anticipate the technology will be ready for full scale testing before the mid-1970’s. Neither it nor any other company is presently planning actual seabed mining activities for manganese nodules, although work is going on by several entities to delimit and classify deposits against the day the technology and markets are ready. In view of the massive geographic scale on which these nodules appear to be distributed, the major amount of capital that will be required to mine them when the technology is available, and the abundance of land sources of the metals, there is no evidence whatever that disputes among nations arising from conflicts hetween their citizens while mining the seabed for manganese nodules beyond national jurisdiction will perturb the international scene to a detectable degree within the lifetime of those worried about this problem. It is quite likely that there are petroleum deposits at several points under the deep seabed, Such as the Sigsbee Knolls of the Gulf of Mexico, north of the Cape IY) Verde Islands, in the Mediterranean, ete. But it is well known that there are extensive such deposits on the continental shelf in many parts of the world in much shallower waters that are cheaper to get at, and as geological exploration goes on there is continuous location of new deposits. The problem is not finding oil and gas, it is getting it out of the ground and to market at costs competitive with other sources of energy. Practical recovery from the continental shelf is now not going on much where the depth of water is greater than 400 feet. Hvery- body agrees that to be continental shelf, and within national jurisdiction. Costs go up sharply as depth of water increases beyond that, and technology is just as hard and actively at work lowering the cost per unit of extraction from tar-sands and oil-shales, shipping to market from land sources in the arctic, and in develop- ing the generation of competitive energy from nuclear sources, as it is in getting petroleum out cheaper from under deeper water (21). If there is any one thing illustrated by the deba'tes in the General Assembly on this subject over the past couple of years, it is that neither developing nor indus- trialized countries (with the possible exception of the United States) have the slightest intention of allocating to the United Nations or any other entity any re- sources of the seabed which may be inherently its own either under customary international law as interpreted by the International Court of Justice, or by in- terpretation of the Convention on the Continental Shelf (22). Petroleum deposits on continental shelves now appear to be sufficiently more ubiquitous than they did in 1958, or even 1967, that the nations which may have workable deposits in reasonable depths off shore appear to be more numerous than those who do not. Other minerals resources such as diamonds, phosphorite nodules, tin, gold, plat- inum, and other heavy metals, as well as practicably extractive sand and gravel, all appear to be quite exclusively things of the continental shelf even as nar- rowly defined, and therefore subject to national jurisdiction. Thus six billion dollars per year revenue for the poor of the world and the sup- port of international government free from strings imposed by national govern- ments appeared suddenly in the oratory at the United Nations in the fall of 1967, but by the spring of 1969 it had disappeared without a shovel being turned or a dollar emerging. This is about the length of time required to explode the South Sea Bubble of the previous century. Some technologies do not advance as rapidly as others. 5. Increasing the Use of Marine Resources.—It is one of the frequently ad- vanced reasons for need to radically revise the governance of the use of the sea that the disposal of social surplus in the world between the rich and the poor needs to be done in a more equitable manner. No reasonable person doubts the validity of that thesis. It has been the prime social and economic problem of world society since the cultivation of two-eared wheat began in the Middle East perhaps ten thousand years ago. It is only the relevance of the use of marine resources to this thesis that is questionable. The reason why marine resources are not more used than they are at present is primarily because competitive products can be obtained from land sources and got to market cheaper. The obverse of that statement is that if marine resources are to be used to a greater extent than at present the cost of getting them out of the ocean, processing for marketing, and distributing them to market must be made cheaper. This applies equally to fish and shellfish, manganese nodules, phosphate nodules, petroleum, tin, gold, diamonds and platinum (as well as sand and gravel). The people (or organizations) who perpetrated the hoax on Ambassador Pardo that there would soon be six billion dollars of new revenue available per year with which to support the United Nations, or to divide out among the devel- oping nations, or to fill other good purposes, could not have been so economically naive as to have believed any such nonsense, and their motives are not clear to me. By their activity they have damaged the support of much good work by United Nations specialized agencies that has been aimed productively at assist- ing the developing nations to a greater use of the ocean. I refer to the work of the United Nations Development Program, FAO, UNESCO, WMO, ECOSOC, ECAFH, IBRD, Asian Development Bank, African Development Bank, ete. (23). The reason they have damaged this support is that there is a sufficiently strong reaction against their fanciful schemes to internationalize the ocean in the name of the United Nations or a new international body that these other quite useful, and in some cases long standing, activities of the United Nations agencies are beginning to be seen in national legislatures (whence originate all funds sup- porting the United Nations and its specialized agencies) as a sinister plot by internationalists to destroy the foundation of sovereign national government. 26—563—70—pt. 2 43 1180 This does not sit much better with socialist than with capitalist, or mixed, na- tional governments and casts an added aura of doubt about the United Nations and its bodies, which was not needed. The Pell Treaty calls for the establishment of a Licensing Authority; the Danzig Treaty, for a Specialized Agency, Authority, or Ocean Agency; the Borghese Treaty for an elaborate Ocean Government of Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Character; the Hichelberger (Commission to Study the Organiza- tion of Peace) recommendations include the establishment of an International Authority for the Sea; the Auerbach recommendations include those for an International Registry and an International Fund. Each contemplates a con- siderable new machinery of government in the international field, not to grow with need out of established international machinery, but as new creations to perform new duties not now being carried out. None of these persons or organizations appear to have attempted to calculate the amount of new money that will be needed to run the new machinery. They have rather naively assumed that it will come from the normal national sources: now supporting international activities, or from the sea by taxing newly the use of the resources of the sea. If it is going to come out of national treasuries by traditional means it appears: obvious that other useful activities of the United Nations will require to be curtailed, because national legislative bodies in all parts of the world are becoming increasingly reluctant to provide added funds to the United Nations and its specialized agencies. If it is going to come as new revenue from taxes on new ocean-based industry two things may be said: (a) These will be taxes on the operations of national companies which ‘will not come into national treasuries, and the number of nations who are likely to vote for such a thing in the General Assembly are not many; and (6) These will be added financial burdens on new industry in the ocean, further decreasing its competitive ability against land industry, and thus delaying further the initiation of new use of ocean resources. Because of the presumed (but not evident) great mineral wealth of the seabed all of these schemes are aimed first, and most heavily, at mineral wealth, but all of them either directly or indirectly assume functions respecting living resources. The difficulties that would arise from such new taxation schemes: ean be summarized as follows: (a) Petroleum resources have been, to date, the spectacular providers of new income from the sea to governments, chiefly arising from bids for rights to drill on the United States Continental Shelf. Practical extraction of oil from the seabed is now limited to somewhat less than water depths of 200 meters. Drilling and extraction under greater depths is technologically feasible now, but not economically feasible. The economics of the oil industry are too complex for an outsider to fathom, but the fact that production is not moving deeper backs up the: statements by oil people that not only have economic levels been reached, but that the oil companies presently using seabed resources have not got that produc- tion, even, to a profitable level. The people who informed Ambassador Pardo about the billions of dollars of profit available for picking up on the seabed appear to have reasoned from this. syllogism: The United States has collected a few billion dollars from its petro- leum people for rights to drill on its continental shelf; there is petroleum and other resources beyond the 200 meter isobath or 50 mile from land (whichever is greater) limit; therefore the revenue which an international agency could collect for rights to drill or mine out beyond that limit could run into many billions of dollars:per year net profit. This syllogism conveniently overlooks some vital facts, among which are: 1. The United States petroleum business is protected by tax allowances and quota provisions in this enormous market to the extent that crude sells here for about twice the world price (roughly $3.00 versus $1.50 per barrel). This. enables it to pay the United States Government these phenomenal costs for the right to drill on its Outer Continental Shelf. These screw-ball economies do not obtain for other petroleum production outside the U.S. customs area, and are not necessarily a permanent condition here (24). 2. The cost of drilling production wells for petroleum goes up exponentially with depth of water (25) and that is why production lags so far behind explora- tion as to water depth. New technology presently in sight, but not yet applied, does not mitigate this problem much. Cost goes up with depth of water. At the 1181 same time technology in the recovery of petroleum from oil-shales and tar-sands advances in the direction of bringing cost per unit of production down on that source. Additionally the technology and economics of producing energy more cheaply from nuclear fuels moves forward slowly but steadily and massively. ‘3. It is impractical to exploit oil off the coast of a country without having the permission and good will of that country, no matter what the legal situation is. The main cause is not the fear of harassment but is the necessity for logistic support. An oil firm company can afford to pay to one governmental body for permission to operate, but not to two (25). 4. Whether one considers the Convention on the Continental Shelf, or the decision of the International Court of Justice in the North Sea Cases, or the re- port of the National Petroleum Council, or the report of the National Marine Commission, or the proposals referred to herein as the Pell Danzig Borghese, Auerbach, and Hichelberger recommendations, the continental shelves of most countries in the world are now terminated at a depth more or less greater than 200 meters. Thus the economics of producing oil from the sea floor has to improve enough to at least double the depth from which recovery is pos- sible before a problem will arise under the narrowest width of the shelf presently contemplated. This looks to be a long time off. Even then the nations can license their own firms to operate beyond their national jurisdiction under existing international law. 5. A scanning of the General Assembly debates does not indicate a willingness of nations who have the possibility of petroleum deposits near their coasts on the shelf, as broadly defined by the National Petroleum Council, to turn over their putative rights to any international body. Such nations would appear to make up a majority of United Nations members, or very close thereto, which makes the possibility of General Assembly action ratifying such a policy unlikely. If the General Assembly did take such action it would not apply to an unwilling sov- ereign. Thus the amount of revenue such an international body could expect from such sources in the foreseeable future would certainly be far short of its own costs of operation, let alone any excess to devote to good works. The syllo- gism stated above appears to have no basis of reality. 6. In the reports of the prophets of change referred to above much is made of the phrases “use of their resources in the interest of mankind” for the bene- fit and interest of all mankind’, and ‘‘the common heritage of mankind”. While these are what are called ‘“O.K.” words in the argot of the day, what they have meant heretofore in international law is that resources of the high seas belong to him who first reduces them to his possession, and they were the common heri- tage of mankind in the sense that anyone competent to harvest them was free to do so within the usages of international law and the practice of nations. 7. Harvestable phosphate nodules, heavy metals, sand and gravel, diamonds, ete, are, so far as known, on the continental shelf within national jurisdiction and not available for international revenue raising without the consent of the sovereign. Even at present it is not economical to harvest many of these shallow water resources. To put added taxes on deeper deposits which may be outside national jurisdictiion (and at present unlocated) would delay further the be- ginning of their harvesting. No revenue is in sight from these sources for an in- ternational agency. 8. Manganese nodules, and the economics of harvesting and marketing their components, have been studied intensively and recently. Everyone concerned agrees that with existing technology these cannot be harvested profitably. They are clearly abundant beyond the limits of national sovereignty. To add new reyenue raising burdens to their harvesting will clearly slow down further the beginning of their harvest. 9. Living Resources are the most valuable present crop had from the ocean and, in fact, the annual crop of them is valued higher than that of all other re- sources presently harvested from the ocean put together (including petroleum from the continental shelf). (26). Furthermore they are harvested broadly outside the limits of national sovereignty. The current efforts of national governments and international agencies in respect of living resources harvest from the ocean are uniformly directed toward lowering the cost per unit of production of fish and shellfish from the ocean, and substantial governmental funds (at least a half billion dollars per year in toto) are used for this purpose. The reason is to increase the yield of protein food from the sea. The means used are research to provide conservation, to explore for new resources, to perfect technology, and quite frequently to subsidize fishermen to in- 1182 crease their ability to harvest. This results in an increase in production of from 6% to 8% per year. Resources are available to permit a substantial annual yield of food from the sea somewhere between 4 and 40 times present levels (27), (28). The difference between 4 and 40 is chiefly in economic estimates and not in natural history estimates. The need for animal protein in the world is such that the nations are not going to reverse their present activities in this direction by permitting a raising of costs of production to support a new machinery of government which will be of doubtful utility. One could go on criticizing the suggestions of Pell, Danzig, Borghese, Hichel- berger, Auerbach and their associates in a negative manner for some time and in considerable detail. Their proposals invite such extensive negative criticism because they are not built on the real and extensive practice of nations in these matters, and the substantial progress in the increased use of the sea being made along these lines. To legislate for space, or for Antarctica, where there is not much history of human activity, or many resources available for use, is one thing; to revolutionize the governance of the ocean where there has been a long history of human utilization, and where there are many additional resources for use, is another. To revolutionize the relationship of nations among themselves, and to Support the substitution of international government for international cooperation among national governments on the sole excuse that better governance is needed for the ocean is patently impossible. The reed is too slender to support so large a bloom. Yet everybody dealing seriously with the ocean realizes that there is need for much additional international cooperation respecting the use of the ocean, and a steady improvement in the governance of that use as it grows more intensive. Accordingly I propose to discuss a few of the main problems that, exist in the real world and suggest some approaches to their solution. There will be no sur- prises by way of suggested solutions. 1. Freedom of Commerce.—The key problem respecting the ocean is to keep free the flow of commerce among nations over, through and on the ocean so that this can be exercised by all nations with reasonable regard to the interests of ether nations in their exercise of the freedom of the seas. Few, if any, nations are entirely self-supporting within their boundaries and those who are nearest to being so self-supporting are among the poorest. The very real hope that now exists in the world for the extinction of poverty and the liberal provision of needs and desires for existence to all is dependent absolutely upon the flow of ocean commerce. Land trade routes are not able to handle the level of commerce among nations required to support the present human popula- tion of the world at present economic levels, much less larger human populations at improved social and economic levels. To the extent that ocean commerce is re- tarded or prevented from growth, the economic situation of the human popula- tion will be degraded, or the population will require to shrink, or both (depending upon the severity of interference with commerce). 2. International Straits and Narrows.—The key problem in keeping ocean commerce open is at the choke points where the land narrows the sea-passage. Under the three-mile rule for the territorial sea the present channels of com- merce grew. Under a 12-mile rule for the territorial sea many of these straits and passages disappear as channels of traffic of an international character and come under national sovereignty. Under a 50 mile rule for the territorial sea most international straits would disappear. Under a 200 mile rule for the territorial sea the major existing channels of sea commerce would mostly pass through territorial waters at some point or another. Although customary international law permits of the innocent passage of ocean commerce through the territorial sea, the granting of that privilege by a sovereign is a quite different thing in practice than a sovereign exercising a right pertaining to him under international law. The temptation of the sovereign own- ing the territory through which a trade channel passes is to interfere with that passage to his own advantage (80). This has been evidenced repeatedly through history. Also the situation in times of war changes the power of both the belli- gerent and non-belligerent sovereign, under customary international law, mate- rially. To the extent that the territorial sea is broadened the free flow of commerce among nations, over, under, and on the sea is threatened. The real problem here, however, is that the 1958 Convention did not clearly provide for warships and military aircraft to transit in innocement passage inter- 1183 national straits or those that had formerly been international. A new lot of naval strategists wish to reopen the law of the sea again to attend to this. They haven’t got enough votes on their side to elect a dog-catcher, much less get such a measure adopted by a two-thirds majority of a new conference of plenipoten- tiaries on the Law of the Sea. By the time they will have found this out, in mid-conference, we will all be worse off than if they had not brought up the subject. 3. Marginal Seas.—Another part of this sea commerce problem is the attempt by Russia to limit the full international character of marginal seas (31). The attempt is in progress with respect to the Barents Sea, the White Sea, the Baltic Sea, the Chuckchee Sea, the Ohkotsk Sea, the Black Sea, and presumably even- tually with the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, South China Sea, Red Sea, and Mediterranean. The Canadian desire in respect of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, Hud- son’s Bay, and the Northwest Passages are not comforting on this aspect. The Indonesian and Phillipino contentions in respect of the Archipelago envelope theory are also still around. 4. The Flow of Military Power.—It is nasty to talk about military power because, like some other necessary human activities, this is supposed to be treated of in private. The difficulty is that free commerce on, over, and under the sea has never existed in the absence of military power to enforce that freedom, in the same way that freedom to peacefully use the streets of cities, and the highways of land, has never existed for any considerable period of time in any particular place in the absence of police force. We all hope, and believe, that the millenium has come with the United Nations charter and that this is all dead history. There is nothing in the practice of nations, or of human being generally, since 1945 that gives any credence whatever to such optimism. Military force is national. International military force is inconsequential and could not fight its way out of a paper bag. There is no reason to think that sit- uation will improve. It has actually degraded in the past decade. Unless military force pledged to protect international law can flow where commerce flows, commerce is unlikely to flow there indefinitely. Broadening the territorial sea, making international straits and narrows into national straits and narrows, and modifying the international character of marginal seas are all measures directed toward limiting first the flow of military power, and only secondarily the flow of commerce. But the two are inseparable, and the latter cannot long exist without the former. 5. Military Security.—A major selling point of the people interested in revolu- tionary change in the Law of the Sea has been the desire to demilitarize the ocean. It has yery large public appeal because everybody wishes to decrease the possibility of war, and the arms budget. The net effect of this gambit to date, however, has been only to give the Russians a small public relations ploy to make in the 18 Nation Disarmament Group. It is well known that a major factor in the present strategic balance of power in the world is the opacity of the ocean to most of the electro-magnetic wave spectrum and the short-term defense advantage this has given the United States, with its nuclear powered submarines equipped with ICBM missiles. It is equally well known that the United States has been long employed in improving its capa- bility to make transparent the ocean, particularly in the audible range of the spectrum. The first steps in this process, as is well known, has been the deploy- ment of listening devices broadly over the deep-seabed as well as over the con- tinental shelf (32). Other steps are in progress. It would be ridiculously foolish for the United States to terminate or lessen this effort to eliminate the hiding capability of weapons systems within the ocean, and no sensible person or nation in favor of maintaining world order is in favor of it. Aside from this opacity feature of the ocean, and some slight additional pol- lution risk, the use of the continental shelf and the deep seabed for the deploy- ment of weapons systems is no more wicked than their deployment elsewhere. The purpose of weapons systems, whether on the seabed, in the ocean, on the ocean, on land, in the atmosphere, or in space is to kill people and destroy property to the net advantage of the possessor of the weapons system. Where it is deployed is not of much consequence to the peace of the world unless it is in the hands of a possessor wishing to change world order by force and gives him sufficient advantage to lure him into the attempt. All of this is appropriately a part of the general disarmament problem, and the general world peace-keeping problem, so intimately that it cannot be dealt with practically and separately therefrom as an ocean problem. 1184 6. Living Resources Competition.—Most of the actual, as contrasted with the fanciful or future, interaction among nations over the use of the ocean arises from friction among them and their citizens over the harvesting of living resources from the sea. This has been the case for the past three hundred years and more, and is likely to be for the next three hundred years. The old and long term problem initiating fishery disputes is competition for the use of the resource in the high seas. No general formula has been capable of being devised yet to settle this major cause of friction among nations and it is unlikely that one will be so long as human beings remain what they are and are governed by human sovereigns. The basic causes are cupidity, mistrust, and jealousy. The lack of general formulation to solve this problem is not for lack of trying. More diplomatic effort has been put into the attempt over the years than into most international activities. No such formula could be devised at the 1958 and 1960 conferences on the Law of the Sea, for instance, and in the end the success of those two conferences turned on that aspect. The only saisfactory way to settle a fishery dispute of this nature is for the nations whose citizens are involved to negotiate out an agreement, or agree to have this done for them by an arbitral tribunal or the International Court of Justice. All of these systems have been successfully employed in the recent past. The numerous fishery agreements (33) negotiated annually or frequently among Russia, United States, Canada, Poland, Japan, Australia, Norway, Iceland, England, etc., in different combinations, are proof that the system is a useful one, aS are the several major arbitrations of the 19th century, and the Anglo- Norwegian Fishery Case before the International Court of Justice after World War II. As an example of why this works the following anecdote is related. I met a Russian colleague of mine in Rome a year or so ago and congratulated hira on the successful negotiations recently completed between U.S.S.R. and U.S.A. over the fishery for king crab in the Northeast Pacific Ocean. He smiled wryly, and said as follows: “Before leaving for Washington the Russian delegation was called in to be personally instructed by Mr. Kosygin. Mr. Kosygin said he wanted us to understand that if and when Russia went to war with the United States it would not be over crabs”. Until sovereign national governments, or the high seas, are done away with there is unlikely to be any way to prevent disputes among them over fisheries lying in the high seas. The disputes will require to be settled by peaceful means or by force. 7. Living Resource Conservation.—The Conservation of Living Resources is a different matter. It is agreed among the nations that “conservation of the living resources of the high seas” means the aggregate of the measures render- ing possible the optimum sustainable yield from those resources so as to secure a maximum supply of food and other marine products; and that all nations have the duty to adopt, or to cooperate with other nations in adopting, such measures for their respective nationals as may be necessary for the conservation of the living resources of the high seas (33). That convention goes on to provide a suitable international mechanism for the settlement of disputes arising out of fishery conservation problems. It is in force. Furthermore its principles are in use even as among nations which for one reason or another have not yet ratified it (as for instance the Russian-Japanese fishery arrangements in the Northwest Pacific). There is a wide variety among the twenty-three international fishery bodies and commissions currently dealing with fishery conservation problems in the world, and a body of experience in such matters extending over the past sixty years (34). I suggest that in this body of experience and practice are examples that will be more practically useful among nations dealing with joint problems arising from harvesting the minerals of the deep-seabed than in any formulation put forward in the Pell, Dantzig, Hichelberger, Borghese, and Auerbach papers. SUMMARY In my view the people who have seized upon the ocean as a vehicle for reform- ing the social, economic and diplomatic conduct of the human race have done, and are doing, great damage to the cause of improving the use of the ocean as a means for bettering mankind. They have held forth, to the poor nations, and the uninformed, promises of great wealth from the ocean that does not exist. The expensive international 1185 machinery they have proposed, if put in train, would use up more money than it would take in and this would be subtracted from the financial support of the good works now done by the United Nations and its family of specialized agencies. They have held forth promises of peace and good will that would result from making militarily neutral the seabed while well knowing that in the arsenals of the world are weapons of several types stored in sufficient volume to wipe out the human race several times over, with delivery systems in the hands of more than one nation, and that sweeping the seabed clean would contribute inconse- quentially to the balance of power, or the peace, of the world. They have attempted by clumsy subterfuge, and quickly detected indirection, to substitute international government for international cooperation by sSov- ereign national governments, and by so doing have set rich against poor, strong against weak, and developing against industrialized to the end that progress in achieving international cooperation among governments and peoples has been slowed down. They have stated a lack of a regime for the deep-seabed when one fully suit- able to present needs is available, and they have demanded an urgent definition for the outer boundary of the continental shelf more precise than the vague one deliberately adopted by the comity of nations in 1958, on the basis of rapidly deepening technological needs that do not exist. With their alarums and excursions they have excited even more vividly the normal greed of the ignorant, and with their pseudo-science and existentialist economics have confused the national legislatures who provide the funds for international assistance and cooperation as to the difference between mutual as- sistance through international channels and international government, with the result that sources of funds for the former, always ‘hard to get, are becoming even more difficult to extract from national budgets. By their actions they have set back the International Decade of Ocean Ex- ploration and the Long Range Expanded Program of Ocean Research by some years at best, and with it damaged seriously the possibility of actually making the ocean more useful to man until the confusion they have introduced about the ocean and its affairs can be washed away by the rising tide of desire by all to know and use the ocean more wisely. If the amateurs, dilettantes and reformers who have fastened upon the ocean as a vehicle to make humans less human, and more saintly, could be caused to switch their attention from the ocean to the moon, or Mars, or Venus, or nearby space, the cost of the space program to both Russia and the United States would have been money well spent. ; CONCLUSIONS By way of conclusion I make the following recommendations for action by the United States Government : 1. Hold fast to the contention that the breadth of the territorial sea is three miles.—There is no better protection for small nations than freedom for their commerce to use the sea with the minimum possible interference from coastal or other nations, and this rule will prevail as they experience that truth (35). It was ‘true when Thomas Jefferson, as the Secretary of State of a very weak and new nation, set it down in 1794. It was true when Elizabeth I, as the sovereign of a very Small nation, which turned out not to be so weak, set it down nearly 200 years before that. (36). It will be even more true for small and weak nations a hundred years from now. 2. Keep open international straits and marginal seas to the flow of peaceful commerce and the mitilary force required to keep the flow free from unreasonable impedance.—Tests of strength will be necessary from time to time to accomplish this as it was near Matsu Island, in the Gulf of Tonkin, and during the Cuban missile crisis. From time to time forebearance for a period of time may be the better part of valor, as in the attempted passage of U.S. Coast Guard vessels north of Russia, overflights past Ecuador and Peru, and the use of the Red Sea. But over the long run ocean trade routes must be Kept open to preserve the peace, even if it takes war to do it, as it has in the past. 3. Cease agitating for a precise definition to the outer boundary of the conti- nental shelf.—Agitation for a revision of the Convention on the Continental Shelf will, if successful, lead inevitably to another general Conference of Plenipo- tentiaries on the Law of the Sea. In the present unstable political situation of the world it is unlikely that decisions would be reached in this field as satisfac- 1186 tory to United States general interest as existing customary and conventional international law. There is no need arising from new technology for a more pre- cise definition to the outer boundary to the continental shelf that is more intense now than it was in 1958, and there is even less likelihood of a more satisfactory such boundary being agreed ‘to than the one in the Convention on the Continental Shelf. Agitation for new boundaries for the continental shelf brings increased pressure on the breadth of the territorial sea, and the accompanying international straits and marginal seas problems. : 4. Adopt such domestic legislation as is required to permit the licensing of min- ing and well drilling by U.S. firms in the seabed beyond national sovereigniy, and to implement the four conventions arising from the 1958 conference, to which the United States is a party.—There is no reason why the United States should not take advantage of its, or any other, technology to mine ‘the deep-seabed when that technology develops. There is no conflict likely to arise out of such mining in the foreseeable future that cannot be handled satisfactory by the same dip- lomatic methodology used repeatedly and successfully in the settlement of fishery disputes. There is no resource to be mined on the deep-seabed known of yet, the mining of which is retarded by lack of unique use rights to the resource in a particular geographie area. Statements to the contrary are reflective of a psychological attitude toward property ownership by businessmen accustomed to land operations, and their bankers, and not warranted by presently known conditions at sea. 5. Move forward on a broad front in the scientific investigation of the atmos- phere, the ocean, its boundaries and its contents by plowing important new money into this activity. This should involve at least $100 million of new money on average per year for the neat decade.—The general plans for doing this have been set out by the National Academy of Sciences—National Academy of Engi- neering for the domestic phase (37), and by the Joint Working Party of ACMRR/SCOR/WMO for the international phase (38). What is needed now is new money. 6. Strengthen the civilian establishment in the United States Executive by the creation of a body resembling the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency proposed by the National Marine Commission.—Outside the United States Goy- ernment it is generally agreed that this is the strongest step forward the United States could take in marine affairs. It is the several warring factions in the United States Executive, each of whom wants a bigger share of the ocean appro- priation dollar, who oppose this action. (39) 7. Strengthen the international establishment for ocean research and tech- nology by supporting the action now afoot among the specialized agencies of the United Nations to build the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission into an ocean agency useful to all of them.—Eventually there will need to be 2 World Oceanic Agency to handle the scientific and technological aspects of expanded use of the ocean. So long as the political agitation in the General Assembly, fomented heretofore by the United States, remains so strong the possibility of getting an international scientific and technology agency established in this field appears to be remote. The best interim alternate available that can be presently achieved appears to be the strengthening of the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission. (40). 8. Strengthen with adequate funds and national support the World Weather Watch System and the Global Atmospheric Research Program of the World Meteorological Organization and the companion Integrated Global Ocean Station System and Global Ocean Research Program. of the Intergovernmental Oceano- graphic Commission.—iIn these cooperative international activities lies the possi- bility of understanding the air-sea environment adequately to materially improve the economic and social conditions of mankind as a whole. (41). 9. Strengthen with adequate funds and national support the Department of Fisheries of the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations and its Convmittee on Fisheries.—These are the bodies through which assistance is actually (rather than fancifully) being given to the developing countries for improving their production of food from the sea, and through which the moni- toring of the world ocean to see where overfishing problems may be developing, and the framing of means to prevent them, is actually going forward. (42). 10. Broaden the role of the Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Fisheries and Wildlife into an Office of Ocean Affairs in the Department of State.—This is the office that actually has the suceessful experience over the years in negotiating agreements and treaties with other nations respecting ocean use, and the handling of such problems on the practical diplomatic level. 1187 If these ten recommendations were followed through on vigorously by the United States Government we would be in a much better condition respecting the use of the sea than we are now, or than we would likely be if we plugged ahead promoting the concepts included in the Pell, Danzig, Borgese, Eichelberger, or Auerbach, approaches to the subject. REFERENCES AND NOTES 1. The White House conference on the Uses of the Sea held in 1965 is a con- venient starting point to consider for these affairs in the United States because it served as a rallying point for a number of individuals and organizations con- cerned with these matters in this country. The United Nations Committee of the World Peace Through Law Center, the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, Resources for the Future, and various other organizations and indi- viduals connected with them had been active in this field for several years previously, and at least since 1957. 2. Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, New York, Seventeenth Report, 1966. 3. Ambassador Pardo spoke before the General Assembly in September, 1967 with sufficient eloquence to get this item placed on the agenda of the First Com- mittee for 1967. He spoke extensively again on the subject before the first com- mittee on 1 November, 1967 (General Assembly A/C.1/PV.1515, 2-68). 4. General Assembly A/Res/2340 (xxii), 28 December, 1967. 5. Pell, Sen. C. ‘Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration of Ocean Space” (1968). 6. Danzig, A. “Treaty Governing the Exploration and Use of the Ocean Bed.” Pamphiet Series no. 10, World Peace Through Law Center, Geneva, Switzerland, 1968. 7. Borgese, Elisabeth Mann. “The Ocean Regime” Center Occasional Paper vol. 1, no. 5, October, 1968, Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Santa Barbara, California. 8. Peil, Sen. C., “Declaration of Legal Principles Governing Activities of States in the Exploration and Exploitation of Ocean Space” in 8. Res. 33, 91st Congress, ist session, 21 January, 1969. 9. U.S. Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources, Report, “Our Nation and the Sea, A Plan for National Action”, U.S. Govt. Printing Office, Washington, D.C. January, 1969. 10. U.S. Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources, Panel Reports, vol. 1 (Science and Hnvironment), vol. 2, (Industry and Technology) vol. 3 (Marine Resources and Legal Political Arrangements for Their Develop- ment), 91st Congress, 1st session, House Document no. 91-42, parts 2, 3, and 4 respectively. 11. Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, “The United Nations and the Bed of the Sea”, Nineteenth Report, March, 1969. 12. “Convention on the High Seas” a U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. no. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 11 (effective Sept. 30, 1962). 13. “Charter of the United Nations” Everyman’s United Nations, United Na- tions, New York. 14. “Treaties and other International Agreements Containing Provisions on Commercial Fisheries, Marine Resources, Sport Fisheries, and Wildlife to which the United States is a Party’ 89th Congress, 1st session, Committee Print for Committee on Commerce, January, 1965. 15. “Santiago Negotiations on Fishery Conservation Problems, Santiago, Chile, September 14-October 5, 1955’’ Public Services Division, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 1955. 16. “North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Den- mark/Netherlands)” volume III, Court Decisions, 1969, International Court of Justice, The Hague, Netherlands. 17. President Lyndon Johnson “President’s Remarks at the Commissioning of the New Research Ship, the ‘Oceanographer’ ” July 138, 1966, 2 Weekly Compila- tion of Presidential Documents 930,931 (1966). 18. United Nations, General Assembly, 1956 “Report of the International Law Commission Covering the Work of its Highth Session, 23 April4 July, 1956”; Gen. Ass. Off. Rec. Eleventh Session; Suppl. no. 9 (4/3159). 19. MacChesney, B. 1957, “International Law Situations and Documents” 1956, Navy War College, Navpers 15031, vol. II. 1188 20. Much new and definitive information on the economics of seabed mining: was set out in various papers and discussions at the Offshore Technology Con- ference held in Houston, Texas, April 1969 and at the annual meeting of the Marine Technology Society, Miami, May, 1969, and will be available when the Proceedings of those two sessions are printed. Particularly pertinent are eco- nomic studies made by Prof. Walter J. Meade, University of California, Santa Barbara; papers presented by the President of Deep Sea Ventures, Inc., and discussion comments by Willard Bascomb, by representatives of Kennecott Copper Co., and other persons actually involved in these ventures and explorations. 21. “Petroleum Resources Under the Ocean Floor” National Petroleum Council, Department of the Interior, March, 1969, Washington, D.C. 22. United Nations General Assembly, 28d session, “‘Report of the Ad Hoc Committee to Study the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction’, A/7230, United Nations, New York, 1968. 23. United Nations Economic and Social Council, Forty-fifth Session, ‘““Marine Science and Technology: Survey and Proposals” Report of the Secretary-General E/4487, 24 April, 1968, United Nations, New York. 24. Meade, Walter J. “The System of Government Subsidies to the Oil In- dustry’, paper presented before the U.S. Senate Sub-Committee on Anti-Trust and Monopoly, March 11, 1969. 25. While these statements are given concrete backing by the report of the National Petroleum Council (21 above) they were set out in greater detail by Dr. F. Gilman Blake, Chevron Research Corporation, in the course of panel dis- cussions at the Law of the Sea Institute, Kingston, Rhode Island, 26 June, 1969,. and will be printed in the Proceedings of that session. 26. Fye, P. M., Maxwell, A. E.; Emery, K. O., and Ketchum, B. H., 1968, in “Uses of the Seas”, editor Edmund A. Gullion, the American Assembly, Prentice- Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J. FAO gives the value of the world catch of fish and shellfish, at the fisherman’s level as about $9 billion in 1966 (Roy Jackson, personal communication). It has increased to about $10 billion in 1968. 27. Schaefer, M. B. “The Potential Harvest of the Sea’, Trans. Am. Fish. Soc. (1965). 28. Chapman, W. M. “Food from the Ocean” Proc. Fourteenth Annual Meeting,. Agric. Res. Inst., NAS/NRC, Washington, D.C. (1965). 29. While controversies over international straits and passages are numerous. in history (see Heinzen, ref. 36 below), the recent controversies respecting the Suez Canal, the Panama Canal, the Gulf of Aquabba, the Straits of Malacca, the Cuban incident, the great tension in South Arabia, etc., serve to note that these same forces and inclinations by sovereigns are equally alive today. 30. Barabolya, P. D., Bakhov, A. S.; Ivanashchenko, L. A., Kolesnik, D. N., Logunov, V. D., Molodtsov, S. V., and Nasinovskiy, Ye.N., “Manual of Inter- national Maritime Law”, Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, Moscow, 1966. 31. Frosch, R. “Military Uses of the Ocean” in Papers Presented at the Second Conference on Law, Organization and Security in the Use of the Ocean, 7 Octo- ber, 1967, Mershon Social Science Center, The Ohio University. 29. “Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas”, 1 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.8. no. 5969, 559 U.N.-T.S. 285 (effective March 20, 1966). a “Analytical Compendium of International Sea Fishery Bodies” FAO, Rome,. 1969, (in press). L 34. Dean, A. H. “Second Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Fight for Freedom of the Seas” 54, Am. Jour. Int. Law, 751 (October, 1960). 35. Heinzen, B. G. “The Three-Mile Limit: Preserving the Freedom of the Seas”, Stanford Law Rev. 11, 597-664 (1959). 36. “An Oceanic Quest: The International Decade of. Ocean Exploration”, NAS/NRC, Washington, D.C. 1969. 87. “Global Ocean Research” Report of a Joint Working Party of the Advisory Committee on Marine Resources Research, the Scientific Committee on Oceanic Research, and the World Meteorological Organization, Ponza and Rome, 1 June, 1969, La Jolla, California. 28. Statement of Congressman Bob Wilson before the Sub-Committee on Oceanography of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, June, 1969 (in press). 1189 39. The Directors General of FAO, UNESCO, and WMO entered into formal agreement late in 1968 to establish a joint interagency committee to ensure cooperation among their agencies through IOC. 40. Report of First Session of Executive Committee Panel on Meteorological Aspects of Ocean Affairs, World Meteorological Organization, Geneva, 17-22 February, 1969. 41. “Work of FAO and Related Organizations Concerning Marine Science and its Applications”, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper no. 74, FAO, Rome, 1968. Mr. Lennon. The hearing will stand in recess until the call of the chair. (Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.) NATIONAL OCEANOGRAPHIC PROGRAM TUESDAY, OCTOBER 21, 1969 Housrt oF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OCEANOGRAPHY OF THE CoMMITTEE ON MercHant Marrne AND FISHERIES, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met at 10:15 a.m., pursuant to call, in room 1834, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Alton Lennon (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Mr. Lennon. The committee will resume its hearings, and we are delighted and honored to have with us today Dr. Lee A. DuBridge, Director of the Office of Science and Technology of the Executive Of- fice of the President. Will you come forward, Doctor. We have your prepared statement. J assume everyone has it in front of him. Is it your intention, sir, to go through your statement, or summarize it and then put the statement into the record following your summarization of your statement? Which is your preference, sir ? STATEMENT OF DR. LEE A. DuBRIDGE, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT Dr. DuBrince. It is a fairly brief statement. I can go through it if you would like. If you would prefer, to save time I will summarize it. Mr. Lennon. Do whatever you want to do. Dr. DuBriper. I will go through it briefly. First let me say I am delighted to be here today to express my views particularly on the report of the Commission on Marine Science, En- gineering, and Resources, and to present some general views on the marine sciences program. I must express my admiration for the Stratton report, as it is called “Our Nation and the Sea,” which the Commission submitted last Janu- ary. Dr. Julius Stratton and several other members of the Commission are well known to me personally, and I have high regard for their abilities and opinions. The Commission has done a thoughtful and commendable job by bringing together in this one report an account of many of our problems and opportunities in the marine environment. Anyone who has ever lived, as I have, in a coastal area cannot help but be moved by the vast mysteries of the ocean. Its role in our Nation’s history is clear and its potential for resources, commerce, recreation, as well as its potential for degradation through pollution and unwise de- velopment concerns everyone. (1191) 1192 In the discussions which have proceeded before this subcommittee, within the executive branch, and in the public press about the Com- mission proposals the question of Government reorganization has re- ceived a great deal of attention. I will therefore address myself to the question of organization, and return to some of the more important substantive programs later. Needless to say, I am not an expert on Government organization and there are very few remarks I need to make on this subject. The Strat- ton report, as you know, proposes some quite sweeping changes in the organization of the Government in the areas of marine and atmos- pheric sciences through the creation of a new agency designated a Na- tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency (NOAA). In this new agency it is proposed that many existing bureaus and activities scattered among various departments be coalesced into a single unit. Such a move would have a major impact on the depart- ments concerned, and yet even so NOAA would not include all of the activities of Government encompassed within the area of the oceans. and the atmosphere and especially would not include many of the problems and activities related to the earth’s environment generally. As you know, many proposals have been made by other individuals and groups for changes in the organization of Government to accom- plish various purposes. President Nixon, recognizing the complexity of many of these proposals, has formed a Council on Executive Orga- nization headed by the distinguished industrialist, Mr. Roy Ash. It would clearly be improper for a member of the administration to make specific proposals about NOAA until the Ash Council has completed its organization studies. The proposals relating to NOAA will be care- fully considered by the Ash Council. Mr. Lennon. Could I interject at that point ? Dr. DuBrincr. Yes. Mr. Lennon. “The proposals relating to NOAA will be carefully considered by the Ash Council.” The question is: When ? Dr. DuBriper. I think they are at work on it now, sir. Mr. Lennon. I won’t comment on it further. I won’t take your time. Go ahead. Dr. DuBriner. I can only say that it is very tempting when one considers any broad national problem to raise the question of whether a new Government agency or department should be created to deal with the problem. There are, of course, important precedents for such action. One thinks immediately of the Atomic Energy Commission and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration which have done such an outstanding job in their respective areas. It should be pointed out, however, that these agencies do not necessarily consti- tute a precedent in other areas. Atomic energy and space were wholly new areas of science and technology which at the time of their creation had not become the responsibility of other departments or agencies of Government. A brandnew area of human endeavor resulting from recent research and development stimulated each of these two independent agencies and they were created by the Congress in response to the very evi- dent urgent national need for large-scale activities in these fields. 1193 The subject of marine and atmospheric science and the general subject of environmental science and technology generally are not, however, brandnew areas of endeavor. There is a long history of national interest and activity in regard to the oceans and in regard to the weather and the atmosphere and with regard to other environ- mental matters. Many departments and agencies of Government have naturally been assigned important responsibilities in these areas, some of which have been carried forward actively and effectively for many, many years. There are, in fact some 22 bureaus in 11 departments and agencies which now have responsibilities in the marine science effort, in each case the effort being closely related to the overall mission of the agencies or departments concerned. It happens there are also 22 bureaus in nine departments and agencies engaged in water resource activities and 16 bureaus in 13 departments and agencies involved in atmospheric science. At first sight this appears to be an undesirable fragmentation of effort, and consolidation of Federal efforts appears to be a very attractive goal. However, it must also be kept in mind that reogani- zation of agencies to consolidate activities related to one objective or area of endeavor may, at the same time, result in fragmenting activ- ities that are concerned with another objective. As just one example, the Department of Transportation would have no link to marine transportation without the Coast Guard. It is quite clear that there is no easy solution to the problems of Federal organization in the case of broad areas such as marine science, atmos- pheric science, or water resources. I understand that the Stratton Commission, in its recommenda- tions, sought to consolidate those activities that it regarded as not being integral to the basic mission of the departments and agencies from which they would be transferred. It is not clear, however, whether this rationale does in fact extend to the recommendation for including the Coast Guard in the pro- posed new organization, and there are other examples. In any case, it must be recognized that the surgery which is required to extract bureaus and agencies from existing departments with long tradi- tions of work in the field may constitute more disruption than coordination when one attempts to fit these agencies with different traditions and different purposes into a single unit. I am reminded of the many suggestions which have been made that the government create a new Department of Science to coalesce all the multifarious activities of our Government in the science and engineering fields. I have opposed such a proposal, at least in any form so far suggested, since I think it is very proper that many agencies be concerned with scientific and engineering matters. This is not to say that some reorganization of our efforts in marine science is not desirable, and I am sure that this matter will be given careful consideration by the Ash Council, and of course by the Congress. I would only remark, finally, that even the NOAA proposal! does not include all of the governmental work in either the oceans or the atmosphere, and of course it does not pretend to include many closely related problems of the environment and the relations between the 1194 ocean and the atmosphere on the one hand and the solid earth on the other. Thus, from one point of view NOAA is a radical proposal because of the disruptions it would cause within present Government struc- ture, and at the same time it is too conservative a proposal in that it does not include many of the scientific and technological areas which are closely related to each other and to the marine and atmospheric problem generally. ; However, let me turn now to the substantive proposals made by the Stratton Commission. These proposals exhibit the thoroughness and care with which the Commission did its work. The report makes more than 100 program- matic recommendations covering all phases of marine science, resource development, and engineering. The Commission report and its supporting documents outline many of these programs in con- siderable detail. We have tried, ever since the beginning of this administration, to review these many.programmatic proposals with the care which they deserve. Agencies of the Federal Government have submitted com- ments, task forces set up under the Marine Science Council have commented on the Commission proposals and offered their own conclusions. This review and evaluation is continuing. It is a tremendous:subject. The expertise of the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering has been drawn on, as appropriate, to obtain further opinions. Finally, we have attempted to set priorities and to pick out those items which will receive initial emphasis in the marine science and engineering areas. The President has made it clear on many occasions that he intends to move forward in the marine science field and we are now ready to take the first steps. Before detailing these priority areas I would like to mention one unpleasant fact which I am sure will come as no great surprise to you gentlemen. The budget for the next year (fiscal year 1971) does not appear to permit many programs that we would like to institute to meet various needs and opportunities for our nation. The many demands on Federal funds taken together with the Pres- ident’s desire to curb the present inflation have dictated more selec- tivity than we may have wished for. These are simple facts and not: what any of us would like but they must be faced at the same time we seek to take advantage of our opportunities. As just recently announced by the Vice President in his role as Chairman of the Marine Council, five areas have been selected for in- creased emphasis this year : 1. Increased efforts to assist States in planning for and man- aging rational development of the coastal zone and the Great. Lakes; 2. Organization of coastal-zone research laboratories to con- tribute to the definition and solution of coastal-zone problems; 3. A pilot program to assemble, extend, and test our knowledge so that we may reverse the increasing pollution of our lakes, look- ing toward restoration of the Great Lakes; 4. Programs that would be a part of the U.S. contribution to. an International Decade of Ocean Exploration; and 1195 5. Expanded research on the Arctic environment. In regard to No. 1, the coastal counties of the United States, includ- ing those counties bordering the Great Lakes, presently contain more than 40 percent of the Nation’s population and less than 10 percent of the land area. We expect that this concentration of population in the coastal areas will increase in the future. The amounts of land and water in these coastal! zones will, however, remain constant and the pressure of multiple use will become ever more difiicult to manage. The growth of activity in our coastal zones has been truly astonishing—far exceeding the relative population growth. We are all aware also of the growth in recreational activities, private boating, commercial shipping, sport and commercial fishing, offshore oul production, and onshore industrial development. All of this growth must be accommodated in an area which is fixed in size. Hence, con- flict in purpose inevitably arises. One man’s beneficial development is. another man’s degradation. The growing problems of pollution, accelerated erosion, silting,. and ecological damage have been brought forcibly to our attention both in the Great Lakes and in the coastal areas. From a technical point of view we do not know how to solve all of these problems. But we do know how to solve some of them and we: certainly should improve management techniques to reduce the multi- ple-use conflicts as well as to anticipate difficulties before they over- whelm us. At an appropriate time legislative proposals will be submitted to. the Congress to establish policy objectives for the development of coastal areas and to authorize a Federal-State matching grant pro- gram that will assist States in development of planning and regula- tory mechanisms. This program together with its supporting legisla- tion should contribute to sensible use of land and water resources in such a way that damage to the ecology is minimized and the need and wishes of the people who live, work, and play there are fully represented. Federal assistant grants are anticipated for initial development of appropriate planning and regulatory mechanisms and support of the Government’s role as a partner in managing these important regions. Even these first steps will not be easy. The coastal zones, estuaries, and the Great Lakes are already the focus of many conflicting and. overlapping authorities. More than merely erecting a new manage- ment mechanism, the planning and regulatory mechanisms should serve as a link between the various authorities and jurisdictions within the coastal zone, with the States of the region being encouraged to take the lead to deal with their own regional problems. The second of the priority programs is the establishment of coastal laboratories. As I have already said, we do not know how to solve many of these problems and research is essential. This project, therefore, is intimately related with the coastal-zone problems I have just discussed. Considerable attention has been drawn by the Commission report. and by its backup documents to the similar problems in the coastal zone and in the Great Lakes, but these problems also exhibit signfi-. 26-563—70—pt. 244 1196 cant differences from region to region. Pollution is a problem in most of the coastal zones but the pollutants and their sources are frequently different from area to area. The ecology of the gulf coast, the Gulf of Maine, the Chesapeake Bay, and Lake Michigan and Lake Erie are widely different and solu- tions to the ecological problems must also be quite different. These and the many other regional differences require that the problems be studied and solved region by region. The contribution that can be made by coastal laboratories that focus on these regional needs should be of assistance in assuring the wise use of our coastal zone. Such laboratories should be able to draw upon resources from industry and universities as well as State and Federal Government laboratories. In most cases we do not believe that the establishment of wholly new laboratories is required. In almost every region there are some efforts under Federal, State, or other auspices separately studying wildlife, natural resources, pollution, industrial development, and a host of other problems. Laboratories focused on coastal problems should attempt to draw upon these existing facilities and augment them as necessary so that the problem may be studied not just from its specific disciplinary sub- divisions but with all of its complexities considered together. The solutions to certain specific problems must avoid creating new problems. : It is our hope that, by coordinating the activities of existing facil- ities and augmenting them, a pool of talent will be created to enable us to anticipate and assess the effects of new developments before we encounter the problems that may accompany changes. Our attention has been drawn repeatedly to the deterioration of the Great Lakes. Unfortunately, we do not now possess all the answers we need to enable us to solve all the problems of the Great Lakes. ‘There are, however, many presently existing problems for which we do know what needs to be done. The Government will continue to work with State and local gov- ernments to reduce water pollution. We need to test existing knowl- edge and technology in a demonstration program. This might include an intensive program on a lake of manageable size. By choosing a particular lake we can isolate the problem and conduct in a sense a controlled experiment on it. This would provide a test and an illus- tration of how far we are able to go with cleanup activities now, as well as to learn new solutions to problems as yet unsolved. We think this program will be a real step forward in the under- standing of the Great Lakes pollution problems as well as to indicate the new directions research should take. Some of the techniques learned in demonstration projects should also apply to many thou- sands of other lakes in our country. These initial priority points that I have mentioned deal with the coastal zone primarily because the coastal zone an the oceans and our lake problems are closely related. Coming now to the problems which deal with the oceans more spe- cifically, the International Decade of Ocean Exploration was proposed by the United States and welcomed by the United Nations General Assembly as a part of a long-term program of ocean exploration. 1197 Members of this committee already share the views that our nation has much to gain through a national interest in the oceans. It is also necessary that we join forces with the other peoples who share this planet with us to broaden our understanding of the oceans. The earth is sufficiently small that at some time in the future we must find ways to live together in peace and share the use of the oceans widely. Our participation in the International Decade of Ocean Explora- tion reflects the U.S. interest in understanding the ocean environment, improving our ability to forecast those hazards to life and property which are prominent in the oceans, and learning more about the nat- ural resource potential of the oceans. We know that many other nations are willing to commit some of their resources to this increased understanding of the oceans and the United States should join with them in specific scientific studies and in the sharing of data obtained. I recently returned from a trip to six European countries discussing scientific problems, and in every one of them the marine science problem was high on their list of priorities. These international cost-sharing programs should enhance both our efforts and theirs. Finally, we have placed Arctic environmental research high on the list of priorities. The oil discoveries in the Arctic have been much in the news in recent months. Also, after four centuries of vain hopes, a commercial ship has finally opened the Northwest Passage, not to transport the gold of the Indies, but to utilize the resources of the Arctic itself. It is too early to forecast the full extent of our stake in the Arctic environment but it is already known to be substantial. In comparison with other nations facing the Arctic the United States has been slow to acquire the basic scientific information upon which sensible devel- opment and preservation of the Arctic environment may proceed. Additional research efforts will therefore be focused on the polar icepack, the geology and earth resources of the Arctic, the balance of the environment and the ways in which it may be preserved. These, gentlemen, are the initial high priority activities which the administration has selected from the wealth of recommendations made by the Marine Science Commission, Federal agencies, the President’s Science Advisory Committee, the National Academies of Science and Engineering, and other interested groups and individuals. As most of you know, a task force has also been set up under the able chairmanship of Dr. James Wakelin to look further into the range of suggestions and programs available. We hope that, among other things, they will indicate to us what some of our next priorities should be, the ways in which we can get on with the substantive job of making progress in our understanding, use, and preservation of the marine environment. j In addition, the mangement structure for execution of these pro- grams will be strengthened. Under the general aegis of the Marine Science Council, lead agency assignments will be made for each of these programs such that the management capabilities of the oper- ating agencies may also be drawn into the leadership of our marine science programs. 1198 These lead agency assignments will be regarded as interim measures pending the outcome of the current consideration of reorganizational matters and should provide us with the effective management neces- sary to get on with the job now. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lennon. Thank you, Dr. DuBridge, for a very thoughtful and challenging statement. The gentleman from Ohio. Mr. Mosuer. Well, Mr. Chairman, I hope that I speak for all the members of this committee when I express my own enthusiasm for those five initiatives that were announced Sunday by the Vice President. Dr. DuBridge, I think you have made an excellent selection of priorities there, and I hope I am right in assuming that this was not only a decision of the Marine Council, but that the announcement of the Vice President carries the full weight and support of the White House, the President, and of your office. Dr. DuBriner. Certainly. Mr. Mosuer. I assume that the initiatives and the decisions were White House decisions. Dr. DuBrines. Certainly. There was an administrationwide study of this. Naturally the Marine Council, of which the Vice President is Chairman, took a very important part in it, but the entire adminis- tration was involved. I think you can assume that the Vice President’s statements have full Presidential approval and support, and that he will use his influence to move forward in each of these areas promptly. Mr. Mosuer. Some of us, I must admit, were a little fearful when we first heard of these initiatives last week. We were a little fearful, and I hope you will forgive us for the suspicion, that this might be a sort of diversionary tactic, a red herring, to divert our attention from the organizational question. Can you assure us that this is not true? | Dr. DuBrince. This isan attempt to get on with the job, Mr. Mosher. I think it is important, whatever organization is adopted, that we move forward on some of these important areas in the marine and coastal zone area, and there are many things that can be done now without awaiting any major change in the organizational structure of the Government. Mr. Mosner. I think all of us would agree with that. In fact, in 1966 when we created the Marine Council, we charged it with doing exactly that job, an interim job, but to get the momentum going and to take the initiatives that are so necessary. So, I for one, certainly congratulate you and the Marine Council for this initiative. ° Now, on page 10 you say that these “five areas have been selected for increased emphasis this year.” Dr. DuBrincr. Yes. Mr. Mosnuer. Actually, of course, this emphasis is going to have to continue well on beyond this year, into fiscal year 1971 in fact. To give these programs real movement, would require some additional funding in fiscal year 1971; is that correct ? Dr. DuBriver. Certainly, yes. Mr. Mosuer. You also on page 12 say that there will be some legis- lative proposals at an appropriate time. OS: Can you give us some idea as to when this appropriate time is likely to be? Dr. DuBrinen. These priority areas were only finally identified within the last 2 or 3 weeks within the administration and the legisla- tive proposals are now being worked on. I hope they can be submitted promptly, but I am afraid I can’t give a specific date on that. Sorry. Mr. Mosuer. Within the next month or so ? Dr. DuBrince. I would hope so, yes. Mr. Mosuer. Before the end of this session we will probably know what your recommendations are ? Dr. DuBriner. We will want to get those as promptly as we can, yes. May I say in connection with these points that. we must not forget that the U.S. Government is investing a half billion dollars a year in marine activities of one sort or another right now. All of these pro- grams are going forward and are budgeted and presumably will be in the President's budget, and there may be in many areas increased funding which will be requested in 1971 for existing activities of various existing Government agencies. I do not know just how the fiscal 1971 budget will treat these areas, but certainly most existing activities will continue. These five things are over and above the great mass of existing activities and programs now within the various agencies of the Federal Government, and are designed to take initiative in getting new starts this year on these programs. All of them of course are continuing programs that will go on for many years. Mr. Mosuer. I think it was clearly shown in the Stratton Commis- sion report that if this Nation is to do the job that it needs to do and live up to the opportunities that exist in the oceans, we are going to have to contemplate substantial increases in funding. Dr. DuBridge, on page 2 2 you use the phrase “the more important substantive programs.’ You are referring there to the more important programs among the 100 or so recommended by the Commission ? Dr. DuBrincz. Yes. Mr. Mosner. You are not saying that the substantive programs are more important than the organizational question ? Dr. DuBriwer. No. Just as I was reading that I realized that that was an unfortunate wording. I think in my actual statement I changed it shghtly, “I will return to some of the more important substantive programs later.” Not that the substantive programs are more important than the organizational ones. Mr. Mosuer. In terms of the immediate interest and immediate re- sponsibility of this committee, certainly the organizational question remains extremely important despite our admiration for the new initiatives that the administration has taken. Now, going to that organizational question, I judge from the gen- eral tone of your statement today that you don’t close the door at all to reorganization legislation. Dr. DuBrice. No, certainly, not. Mr. Mosuerr. And by initiatives of the Congress, 1200 I certainly respect your position that as a member of the adminis- tration you are bound to wait until the Ash Committee makes its recommendations. I judge from something you said that you have knowledge of the fact nat the Ash Committee is actively considering this matter right now. Dr. DuBrincz. Yes, I talked with Roy Ash the other day. He is an old friend of mine, and I chatted with him about it and he assured. me that this was on their agenda and they were getting at it. Mr. Mosuer. I had hoped from the tone of the President’s request to the Ash Committee that this matter of reorganization in the ocean efforts would be a matter of priority consideration by the Ash Com- mission. Do you think that that is true? Dr. DuBrines. I think that that is true, but I am afraid that there are several other priority matters, too, and I don’t know how this one stands with respect to others. Mr. Mosusr. Now, to get back to your own statement, you definitely assure us that the administration has not closed the door, has not taken any firm position at all, negative or affirmative, on the NOAA recommendation. You have expressed, of course, some doubts and you have pointed to some considerations that have to be made and I certainly respect that, but the administration has not closed the door ? Dr. DuBrincr. No, there is no firm proposal or attitude from the administration which has yet evolved. I think all of us can see problems in the particular NOAA structure which has been proposed by the Stratton Commission, at least problems in doing it suddenly and in a revolutionary sort of way. There are very severe problems, political, organizational, structural, financial, and so on, but these are problems and not necessarily barriers to constructing some kind of a new organization. I am sure these are the problems ‘that you will be considering as you think about this matter. Mr. Mosuer. In your remarks on page 3 and in several other places you even suggest that we should be considering a larger reorganiza- tion to bring in even other elements, and so I “judge you don’t close the door at all on reorganization. Dr. DuBriwwer. That 1s right, but I made that point only to express my feeling that this is an enormous problem and is widely spread throughout the whole Federal structure and there are many related problems. You can’t stop at the beach line and say, “The ocean begins here and the land ends here,” because the two interact so intimately and in so many ways. The pollution that comes into the ocean comes from the land and the land activities and the erosion and so on. The atmosphere interacts very intimately with the ocean as well as the land. Therefore, if you are going to include everything related, you could include the whole world. You would include the whole prob- lem of the environment. Therefore, a line has to be drawn, and it is going to be an arbitrary line, and I simply wanted to point out the difficulty that there is no logical line at which to say we will include these and exclude those. This has to be a matter of political judgment, of organizational feeling, as well as of the scientific and technological factors that are involved. 1201 Mr. Mosuer. At the conclusion of your testimony you say, “the management structure for execution of these programs,” and you are referring to five programs and programs in general, “will be strength- ened,” and you talk about the fact that this will be under the aegis of the Marine Science Council. Of course, we all recognize the problem that results from the fact that the Marine Science Council by statute will die as of June 30 next year. This certainly puts on the Congress a very important deadline concerning these organizational decisions. Dr. DuBriweer. That is correct. Mr. Mosuer. Is there any inclination on the part of the adminis- tration at this point to recommend to us that the Marine Council be continued beyond the June 30 deadline? Dr. DuBrince. I am afraid, Mr. Mosher, I can’t give you a firm administration position on this. I can give you my personal opinion. I believe that the problems of creating a wholly new organization are very great and that the creation of it will take a little time. Even if we were agreed in principle on how it ought to be done, setting it up and bringing it together and so on is not a thing that can be done overnight. In order to avoid a possible gap in organizational management of marine problems, one option that might be considered would be to extend the life of the Marine Science Council for a period so that it can make sure that the lead agencies which will be designated in each of these areas are designated, that the necessary coordination is established between the lead agency and other agencies having re- sponsibilities, and so that there can be a continuing overview of these proposals as well as others which may come along later. Mr. Mosuer. I can assure you that the members of this committee have a high regard for the job that the Marine Council has done and is doing, and I think you are right that we would hesitate to just create a vacuum by having it disappear without any new organization ; but at the same time I think I speak for the rest of the committee when I think that we are going to move ahead rather energetically in attempting to produce some legislation for a more permanent organization. On your next to the last page you refer to Dr. Wakelin’s appoint- ment and the appointment of the new task force by the administration in this field, and it is an impressive talent that you have appointed to that commission. Dr. DuBrincr. Yes. Mr. Mosuer. Now, however, I think we are very much aware of Dr. Wakelin’s testimony before this committee where he said: There is no doubt that a unified managerial framework such as NOAA must be established if we are to pursue the recommended program. Will the task force that Dr. Wakelin now heads for the administra- tion be considering this organizational question parallel with the Ash Committee’s consideration ? Dr. DuBriwcr. The Wakelin Task Force is intended to give by the end of this calendar year to the administration some suggestions for next steps in the marine field. This is a group of really great ex- perts, as you pointed out, and they are being asked to look at the Stratton report, to look at the other reports and recommendations 1202 from various people, and suggest to the administration moves that ‘can be taken beyond these first five moves that I referred to today. To what extent they will consult with the Ash Council on the orga- nizational problems I don’t know. I think they probably will discuss with them some of the problems and no doubt make some remarks, but I think their main thrust will be what can the administration propose to the Congress for next year’s program to make substantive progress in the marine field. Mr. Mosuzmr. So the Wakelin Task Force will be considering orga- nizational matters as well as programmatic matters ? Dr. DuBrince. They will certainly have to think about how these things are implemented through the organizational structure, but they are not to replace the Ash Council in its definitive recommendation to the administration as to the organizational structure of the ‘Government. Mr. Mosuerr. And the recommendations of the Wakelin Task Force are likely to show up in administration policy possibly as soon as the President’s state of the Union address next January ? Dr. DuBrincr. That is the intention of all these task forces, to provide the President material for his messages early next year. _ Mr. Mosuer. Mr. Chairman, I have taken more time than I should, but I would like to ask one more question. You have borne down rather heavily on the problem of the Coast Guard and where it should be placed and have sug egested that placing it in NOAA would be a very disruptive influence in the Department of Transportation. Is that the only example or is that the most horrible example? Dr. DuBriner. Well, that was one example that occurred to me as illustrative of the point I was trying to make. The Coast Guard has many functions other than just looking at the oceans. It regulates transportation and shipping and does many other things, and does some research in the ocean field. It is the one agency of the Department of Transportation which has to do with marine transportation. It would seem that some link to the seas, to marine transportation, is an essential activity and responsibility of the Department of Transportation. If one were to remove the Coast Guard, the Department would have to create some new organization I would think to work on the problem of ocean and lake “and river transportation. But there are other situations. The ESSA organization is pretty heavily imbedded in the Department of Commerce and has many links to the industrial world and the activities of the Department of Commerce. ‘ T think you will recognize the Stratton Commission didn’t suggest extracting the various marine activities from the Department of the Navy, but within the Navy Department are some of our biggest and most important marine activities and clearly it’s a little difficult to extract those from the Navy. That really wasn’t suggested, but is another example of how marine activities are imbedded 1 In many departments and activities. There are many activities in the Department of the Interior which are difficult to segregate out simply because they happen to deal with the ocean as related to water supplies and water problems generally. 1203 Mr. Mosner. Mr. Chairman, I submit that, despite the doubts enun- ciated by Dr. DuBridge, his testimony very clearly shows that the administration has not as yet made up its mind for a firm recommenda- tion either way on NOAA and that it does consider this question a high priority question within the administration, and that we can hope for some recommendations at an early date. I hope that I have correctly interpreted the gentleman’s remarks. Mr. Lennon. Thank you, Mr. Mosher. Dr. DuBrince. Yes, I will subscribe to your statement. Mr. Lennon. Mr. Rogers. Mr. Roerrs. Dr. DuBridge, the committee does appreciate your being here, of course, and giving us the benefit of your testimony. I share the concerns that my colleague Mr. Mosher has expressed that the administration will look more closely and try to move more rapidly on organization. I realize the five programs that they have set for priority are im- portant and although some of us might change some of those priori- ties, nevertheless it is an indication that the administration is moving in this area somewhat. I certainly commend them for doing this. May I ask you do the recommendations of the Marine Council come to your office ? Dr. DuBrivce. Not in any official way. The recommendations of the Marine Council go directly to the President. Mr. Roerrs. I understand that that would be so with any President. Dr. DuBrines. As a member of the White House staff we obviously are asked to review all of the scientific recommendations that are made. Mr. Rocrrs. As a matter of practical handling they would come to you and get your views before they go to the President ? Dr. DuBrincr. Referred to us for comment; yes. Mr. Mosuer. Will the gentleman yield ? Mr. Rocrrs. Yes. Mr. Mosuer. Does Dr. DuBridge as the science advisor to the President sit in on any of the meetings of the Marine Council? Dr. DuBriner. Yes. Mr. Rogers. Then that report is given to you before it is given to the President. What about the Wakelin report ? Is the Wakelin committee working out of your office ? Dr. DuBriper. No; all the task forces in principle are working out _of the office of Arthur Burns, who is the coordinator for all the task forces, but I have already had discussions with Mr. Wakelin and one or two members of his task force as to the general problems they are facing so that we will be in close touch. Mr. Rogers. Will his report be made to you before finalized ? Dr. DuBrince. It will be submitted to Dr. Burns, but I am also sure it will be at the same time submitted to us for study and comment. Mr. Rogers. Now, I am concerned, Dr. DuBridge, that departmental witnesses that we hear, administration witnesses that are coming up, keep, for example, repeating to us how vital to the Department of Transportation the Coast Guard is. Mr. Mosher has mentioned it. We think of the name of the Depart- ment of Transportation as being all encompassing, but is it actually ? 1204 Dr. DuBriwwer. I don’t think any agency of Government has all encompassing responsibility over any field. Mr. Rogers. As a matter of fact, it doesn’t have very much when you analyze it; does it? Dr. DuBrinee. It does have to do with ground, air, and sea trans- portation. Mr. Rogers. What does it have to do with sea transportation? We haven’t put any of the merchant marine under it. It doesn’t have the Navy functions under it. Dr. DuBrivcez. No. Mr. Rogers. Does it control railroads? The ICC is the body that gives direction there. Trucks are under ICC, the barge lines are under ICC, and the ICC is not a constituent agency of the Department of ‘Transportation. _ Airline routes are not under it. CAB is not a part of it This has become almost a fiction that is continued in testimony to say that the Department of Transportation to be effective must have some link with a third area of transportation which is marine, and I don’t think in analyzing this that this really holds up. Dr. DuBringz. You may be right. Mr. Rogers. Yes. Dr. DuBrinee. It is a problem to be considered. Mr. Rocrrs. Yes, and I wonder as to the value of the argument made then if this is the case, and I would hope you would review your feelings on this. Now, let me ask you about this. [ noticed the statement on page 5: Many departments and agencies of Government have naturally been assigned important responsibilities in these areas Ocean development, environment, and so forth, but oceanography is mainly what you are trying to tell us I think. Some of which have been carried forward actively and effectively for many, ‘many years. This is another thing we get from all the departments, what a grand job they are doing, and then we look at our development in fisheries resources and what do we find there ? IT am sure you are familiar with the fact that we are having to im- port 70 percent of fish products in this country every year—70 percent. ‘This doesn’t bespeak a very aggressive policy, I think, in developing the fishery resources of our Nation. Would you agree ? Dr. DuBriner. Well, this is a commercial matter having to do with many things like labor, technology Mr. Rocrrs. No matter what. Dr. DuBrince (continuing). And many other things. Mr. Rocrrs. And lack of modernization, lack of research, lack of many things. I would agree that it is not just one but this doesn’t indi- cate a very aggressive policy there in that area. That is the point I am trying to make. Would you agree? Dr. DuBriper. Yes; I think so. Mr. Rocrrs. And the Department agreed in 1956 when we went into it in some degree. Now, also I would think we see this when we are told that our mer- chant marine is so great and then we look at the facts, and our mer- 1205 chant marine is deteriorating very rapidly. I know the administration is concerned about this because the President has stated that something must be done. Yet we insert all this timidity about trying to move in this area and put some emphasis on the ocean because you say, “Well, everything is connected with the air and the ocean and the sea, and it is hard to divide.” But how much of the world is made up of the seas? Dr. DuBripcr. Three-quarters. Mr. Roczrs. Seventy-five percent. So there must be some connection between air and water that is fairly important, that we really have not put emphasis on. What this committee is trying to do, I think, Dr. DuBridge, is to emphasize through this legislation that we need to do something in developing the resources of the sea, and we have not done it. Now, there are 10,000 roadblocks as to why Coast Guard ought to be with the Department of Transportation, Fish and Wildlife may be with Interior, but this is a first step. We realize that it may take a little time to bring all the functions together, and I think you have pointed out very effectively that proba- bly NOAA as presently constituted in the legislation and in the Com- mission’s report is not broad enough. I agree, but we may want to get it started as a first step and then as you say, because it is difficult sometimes to set up a new agency, bring in these agencies. Do you think that would be wise? Dr. DuBripcr. Or one could even go back a ways and say that NOAA is too great a first step and one should have a more restricted idea of the new agency and then broaden it later. I think it might be an evolutionary thing. One could start with a ‘partial approach and then go beyond the first NOAA if this works out. There are various ways to do it. Mr. Rogers. Yes, but I think we are at a point in the development of the nation where we need to do something a little more dramatic than just a gradual step and this is what we are hoping to develop here. You mentioned ESSA. How aggressive really is the Department of Commerce in this area ? They have a construction program for laboratories and now you are putting great stress on coastal laboratories, one that I know of. Do you know what the entire construction program for the Department of Commerce is? Dr. DuBriper. No, I don’t happen to. Mr. Rocers. Three million dollars. Think of that. Two and a half million for a laboratory. And do you know what they are going to have to do with it now because of our great problem of inflation, and we certainly havea problem? They have to cut it. This is the great emphasis we are putting on laboratories. I think we should have it in an agency where we would put some emphasis and build some public support. The public support is there if it is just directed, and I don’t think they have grasped in many areas of the administration this vast public support for doing something in the area. Then when we look at the economic benefit. You may not have this presently, but you might submit for the record, if you could, what you 1206 suppose all of the income to this nation is from the current develop- ment of the resources of the seas. Dr. DuBriver. I wouldn’t have any idea. Mr. Rocers. I would guess it probably would be one and a half billion to two billion dollars. We get about a half billion dollars a year from royalties on leases. of oil and sulphur alone, a half billion dollars. You mentioned we are putting a half billion dollars into our pro- gram, but that comes back to the Government immediately from resources. Now, that doesn’t count fish products, all of those other resources of the sea. So I would hope you could take a message back to the administration for a review of the economic benefit that can come and the importance of really doing something, moving ahead and not being timid. This is what we want to get at, really doing something, and IT think with your help and some leadership in the office which you hold, which is most important to this activity, that we can move even more rapidly. I admit there will be some problems, but I think with some firm leadership we could do something, and I would hope that you can give some personal attention as I know you will to this particular problem, Doctor. Dr. DuBriwer. I certainly will. Mr. Rocers. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. (The following was suppled in response to the above:) CONTRIBUTION TO THE GROSS NATIONAL PRopUCT FROM THE RESOURCES OF THE SEA The total contributions to the gross national product of all oceanic resources has been estimated as of June 1969 at about twenty billion dollars or about 2% of the gross national product itself. This is the monetary contribution to the gross national product and of course does not include such non-monetary values as recreation, boating, sporting activities and aesthetic beauty. The direct yield to the Federal Treasury from bonuses, rents and royalties of outer continental shelf lands for 1969 was seven hundred and fourteen million dollars or a little less than one-half of one percent of the total Federal income from all sources. This brings the total yield to the Federal Treasury from outer continental shelf receipts to four and one-half million dollars since 1955. Most figures are expected to increase in the future. Mr. Lennon. The gentleman from Washington. Mr. Petty. Dr. DuBridge, I think your statement is very helpful, at least as helpful as it can be. Your colloquy with Mr. Mosher pointed up that it is impossible to clarify any further at this time the position of the administration on this legislation. I am not going to pass over one thing that you said however, and that is that the development of NASA, which has been so successful, involved only new programs, but a lot of those programs, of course, were in the Department of Defense and were transferred over into civilian agency rather than have them promoted by the military. Dr. DuBriner. That is true. There was a transfer and a consolida- tion there, but it still was a brand new area of technology, civilian space exploration which nobody was handling at that time. 1207 The Department of Defense was not really doing space exploration except in the very tiny little Vanguard project. Mr. Petty. You expressed a fear of fragmentation under NOAA. Actually isn’t NOAA a creature to avoid some of the fragmentation that now exists under the present organization of the Government ? Dr. DuBriwer. I know that is the purpose, but my point here was that as you remove one activity from a particular agency you may fragment its efforts if one is not very careful. Mr. Penny. Well, I thought there is so much fragmentation now that that is the reason why so many feel there should be one agency set up to house rather similar research and development activities. Dr. DuBrincr. Yes, there are so many activities in the field of at- mosphere, water, as well as marine and lakes and rivers and so on that are spread throughout the Government that just a transfer of these to a single agency may not completely remove the fragmentation. In fact it may increase some of it in certain particular areas or functions. Mr. Petiy. Well, I, too, am delighted that the administration seems to want to move forward in this field and in these particular five endeavors that you enumerated, particularly coastal zones. Of course, that is part of the contemplated organization of the proposed NOAA. Dr. DuBriwex. Yes. Mr. Petry. I think there is very widespread support for that, and I know in my own State I talked to my Governor and he feels that it is essential. We will look forward to these proposals. Just exactly how they tie in with the plan of this committee to proceed with legislation, I don’t know. I presume you have your own ideas, but I wouldn’t be surprised if this committee might decide that after 8 years it should report a NOAA organization and it might want to put these proposals under it. This isa very difficult decision we must make. Anyway, I think, as I say, your colloquy with Mr. Mosher did clarity about as far as we can get it now the ideas and intentions of the administration. I think your presence here has been very helpful in that respect. Thank you. Mr. Lennon. Thank you. Mr. Schadeberg? Mr. Scuapeserc. Doctor, would you suggest that with the fragmen- tation that we have had or even without it as far as that is concerned, we have made as much progress as we should have made in marine science considering the effort in so many different agencies through the past years ? Dr. DuBrincr. No, I think more coordination of the effort is very clearly needed and you are very much aware of that. Tt is a question of how to make this coordination most effective. I think it is very clear that coordination of effort is very desirable in this field. Mr. Scrrapeserc. Looking at it from the outside and looking in, because I am not that deeply involved in it, I feel that probably we have had too many agencies or too many efforts with too little sup- porting them financially so that we have not made the progress we intended. Possibly what we need, and I feel we do, is not necessarily 1208 an agency that takes it over in toto but to coordinate the effort. I think this is the direction in which we ought to be facing. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lennon. Thank you, Mr. Schadeberg. Dr. DuBridge, I don’t know if you have ever had the opportunity to read the testimony given before this subcommittee back during a good part of the calendar year 1965 and at least 414 months of 1966 when it was considering just in substance what we are considering now. Many Members of Congress appeared before the subcommittee, and the private sector of the economy interested in the marine sciences, our university laboratories, our States, but particularly the Members of Congress insisted that the committee, back in 1965 and early 1966, should move directly to the question of establishing a government structure such as has been recommended by the Stratton Commission, and some of them said, “Now we must move and establish what was referred to then asa wet NASA.” I find your statement which begins on line 1 of page 5 and runs through the middle of line 4 on page 6 almost verbatim, almost exactly the language that I used in counseling those Members who appeared before the committee and who wanted action then. It brings it back to me so forcefully that that 1s exactly what I argued with them as the chairman of this committee at that time. They answered me by saying, “Mr. Chairman, don’t you know that two different commissions in the past, even a presidential commission as early as 1962 recommended this?” I said, “Yes, but the Executive turned down the recommendations of its own appointed commission with respect to establishing a govern- ment structure.” I said, “Let’s try again.” I insisted that we try again. So this committee and subsequently the Congress moved on to the enactment of Public Law 89-454, which became law on June 17, 1966. I say this because I don’t know how you were involved at that time or whether you even knew anything about it. Dr. DuBripvcr. I was not involved then. Mr. Lennon. That is my understanding. I want to get the record clear that you were not, so that you do not have the history of how we have been involved with this very question. I give it to you because I think you are open minded about this whole related matter that we are discussing this morning. We insisted that the President find in his selection and appointment to this Commis- sion men of the technical background, the knowledge, the skill, the experience and particularly the dedication and especially those people who could give the time, the consuming time to make a study in depth and recommendation, and I might say to you, sir, and the gentleman from Ohio has commented on the splendid work done by the national council, that the administration resisted the inclusion in Public Law 89-454 of the establishment of a national council to do what? To coor- dinate the various civilian agencies involved in the marine sciences and to project programs in the interim until such time as the Congress received the Commission’s report. If we had capitulated to the administration’s position, we would have had no national council, and within 6 months after the law was enacted the administration was the first to admit what a grave mistake would have been made if we had not insisted upon the establishment of the council. 1209 Now we see the Vice President moving in the direction in which we mandated him in that legislation, to coordinate and to project pro- grams, not structure but programs. So I was struck by the language you used because it recalls to my mind that that was the specific language that I used as the chairman of the committee in responding to the witnesses who appeared before this committee in 1965 and in the first 4 months of 1966 insisting that we do then what we are considering now. I am historically a moderate or a conservative. I want to move care- fully. I want to be sure. So that I wanted you to have that background. Dr. DuBriner. It is very interesting. Mr. Lennon. Now, you are very commendatory in your appraisal and judgment and evaluation of members of the Commission. I recall so vividly that 2 weeks ago tomorrow, I believe it is, that in the appearance here of the Assistant Secretary of Commerce, who was ac- companied at the witness table by Dr. White, the Administrator of the Environmental Science Services Administration, and this dis- tinguished witness who is new, too, I might say. Dr. DuBrince. Dr. Tribus. Mr. Lennon. Yes. He said that, “There are bound to be alterna- tives to the recommendation relating to the governmental structure, but I can’t find them in the report.” I said, “Fortunately we have with you, Mr. Secretary, at your left as one of the cowitnesses appearing for the Department, a gentleman who served on the Commission and should be in position to tell us whether or not the Commission explored many, many alternatives.” I said, “Dr. White, did you or did you not or can you say whether or not the Commission explored the many alternatives that the dis- tinguished Assistant Secretary has indicated are not found in the Commission’s report ?” He said, “We did in depth.” And Iam sure that they did. Dr. DuBrincs. Surely. Mr. Lennon. I happen to know that of my own personal knowl- edge, but of coure it was not generally known because the gentleman from Ohio and myself were privileged to be advisory members of the Commission—to do nothing except to point out to them the congres- sional intent, to keep them constantly advised based on the colloquy and debate and the testimony before the committee as well as the de- bate on the House and Senate floor. Of course we were likewise privileged to have two Members of the Senate as congressional advisory members of the Commission. So that is the background, and I think you would be interested too that it was conclusively stated by Dr. White and then subsequently at the same hearing agreed to by the Assistant Secretary of Commerce that if a new Government structure was brought into being that it was fundamental and essential that the Environmental Science Service Administration be placed in that agency. Now, you have talked about the Coast Guard. We were also privi- leged to have the Assistant Secretary of Transportation, and he was articulating rather eloquently about the essentiality of the Coast Guard as related to Transportation. I said, “Well, how is the Coast Guard related to Transportation ?” He said, “The merchant marine, of course.” 1210 IT said, “But where is the Maritime Administration? Is that in the Department of Transportation 2” Of course, it isn’t. It’s in another department. Now, the argument is made that the Coast Guard should be kept in the Department of Transportation because of its relative position with the Maritime Administration, and the Maritime Administration is, of course. in still another agency or department of the Federal Government. So, we just sometimes wonder if the right hand in Government, as is true in personal life and corporation life, too, knows what the left hand is involved in sometimes. Now, you go on to say here on page 8, speaking of the specific sub- stantive proposals that you directed your attention primarily to: “These proposals exhibit the thoroughness and care with which the Commission did its work.” Could you say with any less degree of certainty that the Commission did not exhibit thoroughness and care with respect to their recom- mendation of a Government structure ? Dr. DuBriver. No; I didn’t intend to imply that. Mr. Lennon. I know you didn’t intend to imply it, but you lay emphasis on these pr oposals and give great credit to the Commission for the thoroughness with which the Commission did its work in these particular. proposals, and I do not think that you intend, and you clearly stated that you did not intend to imply that they did not give the same degree of care and study and thoroughness to the question of a Government structure. Now, I think just for the record, since Dr. Wakelin has been ap- pointed as head of the task force by the President—and I assume that that is true. Dr. DuBriner. Yes, sir. Mr. Lennon. To make a study in the field of oceanography. Dr. DuBrincr. Yes, sir. Mr. Lennon. He appeared before this committee on Tuesday, May 20, 1969, and I quote from his prepared statement. Now, this was not something that he just agreed with. This is from his prepared statement, and I quote: I coneur in and support the recommendations of the Commission—meaning the Stratton Commission—in regard to the national ocean program and the organizational structure to implement it. To continue: There is no doubt that a unified managerial framework such as NOAA must be established if we are to pursue the recommended program. And I continue to quote : There is also no doubt that, to obtain the advice and counsel of the States, re- gions, industry, and the academic community, we require the establishment of the National Advisory Committee for the Oceans. This is a pretty strong statement and if anybody has been involved in this field longer than Dr. Wakelin, when he was Assistant Secretary of the Navy, I don’t know who it was. You mentioned the Navy. I think you should be reminded of the fact that there was a distinguished Assistant Secretary of the Navy as a member of the Commission and as soon as he left the administration 1211 for which he was the spokesman—and of course I appreciate the fact that neither he nor Dr. White or the Assistant Secretary of the In- terior who were members of the Commission participated in writing the report related to the Government structure and that was proper, but he sat before this committee and said—since he left the former administration—as an individual: I give my unqualified support to the recommendations of the Commission re- garding the Government structure and also the Government commission. That is something for us to relate to; isn’t it? Dr. DuBriwcr. Yes; certainly. Mr. Lennon. I don’t want to be and I am not going to be critical. T was a little concerned about a speech recently made by the Assistant Secretary of Transportation, Mr. Paul W. Cherington, and I may yet ask him to appear before this committee. You deferred to the administration with respect to making a cate- gorical, flat statement with respect to the governmental structure. You deferred. Do you think Mr. Cherington was courteous enough to the administration to defer to the administration when in this recent speech he castigated the Commission report so far as it related to the Department of Transportation as it affected the Coast Guard? I say, frankly, I was not happy with the Secretary of Transporta- tion’s public utterance on this subject some time ago. He didn’t wait until even the President sent the letter to the Ash Commission on May 19. He spoke out and said, “No.” That is human nature. It is the same all over the world. It is inherently selfish and because of the human nature we have to live with it and accept it. No agency or department wants to lose anything that it has ever attained. I was disappointed that in adhering to tradition you let the ad- ministration speak officially but the assistant Secretary of Transporta- tion or even the Secretary did not await the administration, but that is because they had the Coast Guard in the agency and had to protect their own. You say on page 12, on line 7, with respect to the programs that have been recommended by the National Marine Science Council at the press conference of the Vice President : “At an appropriate time legislative proposals will be submitted to the Congress to establish policy objectives for the development of coastal areas,” et cetera. When is that “appropriate time” in point of time? Dr. DuBrincr. Well, as soon as we can possibly get them together. As I said to Mr. Mosher, I don’t know what the schedule is on that. Tn fact, I think the schedule has not been established yet. Mr. Lennon. Based on the experience we have had with the Ash Commission I just wonder what point of time we are talking about. Dr. DuBrincr. This is our legislative proposals for this particular coastal zone problem. This ought to be much easier to bring to you than the Ash Commission study. Mr. Lennon. The reason I asked this question, sir, is that you know or you may not know, that next week the committee is having convened in Washington a symposium, forum, or conference in which all the coastal States and all the lake States have been invited to send repre- sentatives to Washington to see how the recommendations of the Com- WE aii, Pt 1212 mission could be implemented with respect to the coastal zones and the regional laboratories. Therefore, I would like to know if you all have seriously thought about this or if it is just something that you are saying that you intend to do sometime in the future because you are talking about the thing that they are going to meet here on next week. Mr. MosHer. Would the gentleman yield ? Mr. Lennon. Yes. Mr. Mosuer. I think Dr. DuBridge in response to a question from me indicated that he would certainly hope and expect that this legisla- tion would be recommended to us well before the end of this session of Congress. I hope he is right, but I would think that the legislation could well consider the outcome or the recommendations that may come out of this very timely meeting that you have called next week. I hope that the administration will be participating in that meeting aud very genuinely observing the advice we get from the coastal tates. Dr. DuBriper. I will certainly report back your sense of urgency on this and see what can be done to accelerate it. Mr. Lennon. I thank the gentleman for calling that to my atten- tion because there are a number of people at the executive level in the departments participating either as panelists or as moderators on this very subject. . Dr. DuBringr. Yes, sir. Mr. Lennon. I got the impression from you, sir, that perhaps this legislation was expected shortly after the turn of this calendar year. But now you are reassuring the gentleman from Ohio that it will be sent up to Congress in some reasonably definitive form or at least as a vehicle which the committee can consider in this calendar year. Dr. DuBrincr. The intention is to try to act promptly on this, but I am sorry that I cannot guarantee you a schedule. I do not know in what state the legislative proposal writing now is, but I will carry back your message of urgency and see if it cannot be accelerated. Mr. Lunnon. Now, the same thing of course you say on page 13, line 9, “The second of the priority programs is the establishment of coastal laboratories.” Which is related, of course, to your first legislation. Doctor, someone suggested the other day that suppose there had been SLx, Seven, eight, nine, 10, 11 agencies which were interested in space some 10 years ago. It is not likely that that would have been, but assum- ing it had been so, is it likely that we would have had a man on the moon with 11 departments desiring to continue their efforts? Dr. DuBriner. This took a coordinated effort. I certainly agree. The point is not that it isn’t desirable to have concentration of respon- sibility in one agency. The reason I mentioned the difference between NASA is that it was not only desirable but easy to do because there were no conflicting governmental responsibilities and traditions of long standing. In the ocean area you face the organizational] difficulty that no matter how desirable one might think a coordinated wet NASA might be, the task of creating it is far more difficult, politically, from the point of view of the conflicting interests of various committees of the Congress, the conflicting interests of the various agencies and departments of Government, that the task is very much more difficult and will re- 1213 quire very much more painful surgery, will require much more care- ful consideration of other related interests. So that Iam only saying that the organizational problem is far more difficult than it was in the case of NASA. I am sure you must realize that. Mr. Lennon. The Secretary of Transportation said in essence that the Coast Guard must remain in Transportation to keep its essential functions intact. Well, now, what essential functions did the Coast Guard acquire sub- sequent to its move from the Department of the Treasury to the De- partment of Transportation? Do you know of any? Dr. DuBriner. Iam sorry. I can’t answer that. I don’t know. Mr. Lennon. Well, I happen to be a member of the Coast Guard subcommittee and have lived pretty closely with the Coast Guard in the last 12 or 13 years. I don’t know of a single function that they have acquired since they moved from the Department of the Treasury, where they had historically been, to the Department of Transportation. I know how the Coast Guard feels about this proposal. They have talked to me rather strongly about it. I was delighted to have their personal views. Off the record. (Discussion off the record.) Mr. Lennon. Are there any other questions, gentlemen ? Mr. Mosuer. Will the gentleman yield ? Mr. Lennon. Yes, sir. Mr. Mosner. Just in comment, in talking to the Coast Guard people, I think they have not yet grasped the concept that is inherent in NOAA and in the considerations and recommendations of the Strat- ton Commission, the concept of a Coast Guard with a really vastly expanded role in government. I think if they caught the vision that is there, that they would be more enthusiastic about this role. Dr. DuBriner. Doesn’t this suggest one of the problems which the chairman has hinted at? The proposed NOAA has a wide variety of functions. Some of them are straight scientific research, exploration. Others are technological development, new technologies, new ways of doing things in the sea, deep diving equipment, for example. Others have to do with development closely related to commercial problems and still other have to do with the commercial problems themselves, the actual commercial operations of fisheries or of the merchant marine, and so on. It may be that what is worrying some people is this wide range, this wide spectrum of responsibilities going all the way from rather basic research which scientists are doing and want to do on up to how do you get a more profitable merchant. marine or a more profitable fish- ing industry. en These are widely separated kinds of activities, and I think this is where you will find some questions raised in regard to putting all of these into a single package. : Mr. Mosner. The span of responsibility is always a question of administrative skill to some extent. Dr. DuBripcr. Yes. Mr. Mosner. Dr. DuBridge, we have conflicting testimony before this committee on the question of whether it is wise or practical to put 26-563—70—pt. 246 1214 under the same administration day-to-day operational functions and scientific research and technology development functions. We have had people say that it is very good to put them together because they nurture each other and there is an interrelationship that is very im- portant and therefore it is good. We have had also advice that if you put operating functions with science functions, and the example given to us was ESSA, the opera- tional functions tend to be neglected because there is too much em- phasis on science. I think this again is strictly a matter of admin- istrative function. Then we have had the other advice that if you put them together inevitably the science function will suffer in terms of funding ‘when- ever the budget gets tight. So we certainly have a lot of conflicting evidence on this subject. Do you want to offer your wisdom ? Dr. DuBrwer. I think I would rather leave the organizational problem right here. Mr. Lennon. Thank you, Mr. Mosher. It has been suggested by counsel that if there are any additional supplemental remarks of any of our previous witnesses we would get the word to those who wanted to add to the record that it is his desire to end this present phase of this hearing record by November 1, in order that it will be sent to the printer. The next meeting of the subcommittee will be held on October 28 at 9:30 a.m., for the purpose of convening the coastal zone manage- ment conference. This meeting will be held in room 345, the large con- ference or caucus room, in the Cannon House Office Building. T would urge the staff of the committee to contact all of the members of the subcommittee and urge them to be present for at least 10 minutes of that. conference that morning as it 1s my desire to introduce them to some of their constituents and to the people attending the conference from some 30-odd States who have been invited. Dr. DuBridge, we appreciate your continuing interest in this matter and your splendid presentation and fair approach to the matter this morning. Thank you so much, sir. Dr. DuBriner. Thank you very much, sir. Mr. Lennon. The meeting will now adjourn. (The following was supplied for inclusion in the printed record :) STATEMENT OF Dr. Dayton H. CLEWEUL, CHAIRMAN, NSIA OcEAN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, ADVISORY COMMITTEE AND SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, MoBinL OIL Co. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: We appreciate very much this opportunity to appear on behalf of the National Security Industrial Association and its Ocean Science and Technology Advisory Committee to present our views on the Government organization recommendations contained in the report of the Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources, “Our Nation and the Sea” and H.R. 13247. I will begin by reporting briefly on the salient features of the National Secu- rity Industrial Association. The Association was founded in 1944 as a result of the encouragement of James Forrestal, then Secretary of the Navy and later the first Secretary of Defense. It is’a non-profit association of approximately four hundred American industrial, research and educational organizations of all types and sizes, representing many segments of industry in all parts of the United States. Its primary function is to provide effective communication be- tween industry and the Government in matters relating to national security. It operates in two major ways: first, through a structure of twelve standing advisory committees, including anti-submarine warfare, ocean science and tech- 1215 nology, food, distribution, international, maintenance, procurement, quality and reliability assurance, research and development, technical information and train- ing. These committees provide advice and technical assistance to the govern- ment—either on request or on the Association’s own initiative. The other means through which NSIA performs its communications role is a program of national activities, embracing professional symposia, conferences, industry briefings and visits to defense and other government installations. It was the lack of such an organized communications medium between govern- ment and industry in World War II that prompted the formation of NSIA. The problem inherent in the oceans in regard to anti-submarine warfare promoted NSIA’s Oceanography Subcommittee to be established in 1962. At its founding, Dr. James H. Wakelin, then Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Re- search and Development, predicted that before too long, that small subcommittee would grow to full Advisory Committee status. He was surely correct, for in 1965, the Hxecutive Committee of NSIA established our Ocean Science and Technology Advisory Committee (OSTAC). Ever since its formation OSTAC has provided a mechanism for productive exchange between Government agencies and industry groups on oceanic matters that appears to have filled an essential need. The summary of one of its reports, which was submitted in early 1966, “Industry and the Ocean Continental Shelf”, was incorporated in its entirety as Appendix III of the Report, “Effective Use of the Sea’’, written by the Panel on Oceanography of the President’s Science Advisory Committee. A second and more detailed report on the same subject was submitted in November, 1967, to the Stratton Commission and to the National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Development. In the late fail of 1967, a special study was performed by the Committee in response to questions directed to it by Dr. Robert A. Frosch, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (R&D) and the Chairman of the Committee on Research, Education and Facilities of the Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Development. The results of this study were subsequently transmitted to the Commission. The subjects encompassed the following: Goals of the National Ocean Program as seen by industry ; Delineation of the proper roles of the Federal Government vis a vis industry ; and Recommendations concerning the advisability of a statutorily recognized Advisory Committee which would permit inputs from those not in the Federal Government Sector. The Commission’s recommendations reflect many of our guidelines for proper Government-Industry roles. Specific reference is made to our contributions to the Commission on pages 282 and 284 of the Commission Report. To indicate our continued interest, I call attention to the committee’s 1969 annual meeting, which had as its main theme—‘“After the Stratton Commis- sion Report, What?” Copies of the proceedings of that meeting have been made available to each of you and to the conference participants. With me today is Dr. Chalmer G. Kirkbride, who testified before you previously in a personal capacity. Dr. Kirkbride is the Vice President (R&E) of Sun Oil Company and until April of this year, Chairman of OSTAC, and I might add, he is also a trustee of NSIA. It is now my pleasure to introduce the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the NSIA Ocean Science and Technology Committee, who will present our prepared statement. Mr. Amor L. Lane of American Machine and Foundry Company, and while on extended leave from AMF, was a full time member of the Stratton Commission Staff. Thank you. BIOGRAPHICAL DATA Dayton H. Clewell is a senior vice president of Mobil Oil Corporation and president of Mobil Research & Development Corporation. He is a native of Berwick, Pennsylvania. He received his B.A. degree in 1933 and his Ph. D. degree in physics in 1936—both from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He was employed as a physicist by the C. K. Williams Company in Easton, Pa., from 1935 to 1938 and worked on the optical properties of pigments. In 1938 he joined the Magnolia Petroleum Company (formerly the Southwest afiil- iate of Mobil) in the geological department, and worked on the development of oil prospecting instruments. 1216 In 1942 he was transferred to the company’s field research laboratories in Dallas, Texas as supervisor of physical research. From 1946 to 1952 he was assistant director of the laboratories, and on March 1, 1952 he became director. In October, 1956 he came to New York as general manager of the research de- partment, and on January 1, 1962 he became general manager of research and engineering. In February, 1964 he was elected senior vice president for research and engineering. Dr. Clewell is the author of several papers in the fields of experimental physics and geophysics and on the general subject of petroleum research. He is a member of the General Committee on Air and Water Conservation of the American Petroleum Institute, Society of Automotive Engineers, American Association of Petroleum Geologists, American Physical Society, Sigma XI, Society of Exploration Geophysicists, New York Academy of Sciences, and a Fellow of the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers. He is also a member of the Directors of Industrial Research and the Industrial Research Institute. He is a member of the M.I.T. Corporation—the Governing Board of the Massa- chusetts Institute of Technology—as well as a member of the Visiting Com- iittees for Sponsored Research and Nuclear Engineering of M.1.T. He is a member of the Science and Technology Advisory Council to the Mayor of the City of New York. Dr. Clewell is a resident of Darien, Connecticut, and a member of the Board of Directors of the Darien Historical Society. STATEMENT oF Amor L. LANE, CHAIRMAN, EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE NSIA OcEAN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMMITTEE (NSIA/OSTAC) Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee on Oceanography : Dr. Dayton Clewell, Chairman of the Ocean Science and Technology Advisory Committee of the National Security Industrial Association, has just reviewed briefly the purpose and history of the NSIA and some of the key activities of our Advisory Comunittee. It is recognized that industry has a responsibility to contribute its views on the optimum use and development of ocean resources. In view of this and our past and continuing involvement in recommendations concerning the National ocean program and the need for Government reorganization, we are especially honored to have the privilege at this time of making several specific comments on the Government organization recommendations found in the Report of the Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources. These comments on organization represent the views of the Executive Com- mittee of NSIA’s Ocean Science and Technology Advisory Committee (OSTAC). T speak to you today in my role as Chairman of this Executive Committee. A list of the members of the Hxecutive Committee is enclosed. In reaching our conclusions, we attempted, whenever time permitted, to consult with the full membership of our five industry panels of OSTAC. These panels include those of the petroleum, mining, fishing, recreation and chemical industries. However, the views presented here do not necessarily coincide in every detail with those of all of the individual members or companies they represent. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT RECOMMENDATIONS: NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE, NATIONAL OCEAN AGENCY AND THE INTERAGENCY MECHANISM % First, we will discuss the three fundamental recommendations concerning the Executive Department: (a) a National advisory committe, (b) a National ocean agency, and (c) a Federal interagency mechanism. A national advisory committee OSTAC agrees with the Commission’s recommendations that a National ad- visory committee for the oceans should be established. In our opinion, the major functions of the committee should be as follows: To advise the President, the Congress and a National ocean agency, along with other Government agencies, on ocean related activities: and To submit periodically to the President and the Congress on assessment of the National ocean program, including a review of the activities of a National ocean agency. 1217 The Commission Report recommended that fifteen members be designated by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate; this number seems like a reasonable one. The Commission also proposed that members “serve for fixed overlapping terms and be drawn from States, industry, science and other appropriate areas.” Coastal State voting representation and Federal observers representation were recommended by the Commission. OSTAC suggests, however, that State and Federal government representation on the advisory committee should be through non-voting participants. Each of the principal government agencies concerned with marine matters, such as the Navy, the National Ocean Agency, the Interior Department, the Corps of Engi- neers, AEC and NASA, should designate a senior policy official to participate and furnish information and opinions from his agency. State representatives should be from each of the coastal regions, including the Great Lakes. Representation and make-up of this advisory committee are most crucial. We believe all voting members should come from the private sector, including universities and oceanographic institutions. In view of industry’s conspicuous leadership in the utilization of the ocean, we also believe that a majority of the voting members should have extensive industrial experience and should be drawn primarily from companies involved in direct use of the sea. Those industries that supply hardware and services also should be represented. The National advisory committee should be provided with a full-time staff and, we would like to emphasize, this staff should be independent of that of any National ocean agency. The Commission Report cites the report of its Panel on Marine Engineering and Technology (page VI-24) where a number of more specific functions are listed which might be assigned to the National advisory committee. We endorse these functions with slight modifications, and believe they are important enough to call to your attention, OSTAC’s suggested modifications are in parentheses. They are as follows: Review and advise on updating the 10-year objectives of the National ocean program ; Assess current levels of activity in terms of accomplishing the 10-year objectives ; Identify deficiencies and recommend assignment of responsibilities to rectify them ; Recommend means to eliminate unintentional duplication of effort; Review and offer a national perspective to the plans and budget requests of the U.S. Government agencies by taking into account efforts outside the Government ; Recommend lead agencies for marine programs having multi-agency inter- ests, and recommend whether specific marine programs can best be under- taken by the Navy, by the new consolidation of appropriate existing agencies, or by an agency not included in the civilian consolidation ; Offer guidance and recommend important new ocean programs and facili- ties for the overall National program, making effective use of the competence of both private and Government organizations; Promote means for coliecting, processing and disseminating pertinent technical information. Recommend an adaquate level of programs and facilities for marine education and training. Anticipate, focus attention on, discuss and recommend (methods for) the resolution of multiple-user conflicts. Help to ensure that the National program has proper and continual visibility to State and municipal governments, private enterprise, the academic community and especially to the Congress and the public. (Serve, when appropriate, as the focal point and the source of informa- tion upon which the plans and arrangements for international programs should be based. ) Generate pertinent activities on its own consistent with its overall responsibilities. OSTAC does not represent a specific industry. Indeed, we have multiple industrial representation: petroleum, fishing, chemicals, mining, recreation, aerospace, etc. When our executive committee deliberates, we try not only to summarize the views of our individual industry panels, but also try to recon- cile any diverse viewpoints. In these deliberations, a more complete and factual understanding of a matter inevitably is developed, resulting in most cases in 1218 a consolidated viewpoint. Hence, our ultimate effectiveness, it is hoped, is greater than the summation of parts; that is, it is strengthened when a con- Sensus can be established which draws upon our diverse industrial representa- tion. OSTAC also has interaction with the Federal Government, States and ‘universities. Therefore, we have a great appreciation for the value of a National advisory committee in helping to guide a National ocean program and strongly support its formation. A National ocean agency Although OSTAC did consider at some length the need for a statutorily recog- nized advisory committee in its study submitted to Dr. Robert Frosch and to the Commission, it did not at that time, in February, 1968, make specific recommenda- tions concerning Federal agency reorganization except to say that the Govern- ment should “establish and maintain a system to provide for the planning and coordination of the National program.” The Commission recommended the establishment of a new independent agency to report directly to the President. Dr. Stratton, in his testimony to the House Subcommittee on Oceanography, on April 29, 1969, emphasized that the formation of such an agency, ‘recognizes the environmental unity of land, sea and atmosphere .. .” The Commission suggested that the agency might be called the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency (NOAA). The Com- mission further recommended that it initially be composed of the U.S. Coast Guard, the Environmental Science Services Administration, the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries (augmented by the marine and anadromous fisheries functions of the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife), the National Sea Grant Program, the U.S. Lake Survey, and the National Oceanographic Data Center. Other functions were suggested for later transfer, including the National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) and the Arctic and Ant- arctic programs. The recently formed National Oceanographic Instrumentation Center might also be a candidate for later incorporation into NOAA. Certain other functions, such as those of NASA, AEC and Navy, were specifically not recommended for transfer. Those departments from which these agencies would be withdrawn have generally objected. Comments have also been heard in testimony stating that an ocean oriented agency should not be separated from a “land” agency or that it would be preferable to create a larger agency organized around the environment. OSTAC believes that it is feasible and desirable at this time to consolidate certain civilian oceanic efforts into a National ocean agency. This consolida- tion and resulting leadership would provide a sufficiently large or critical mass to lead the Nation’s civilian ocean program and to promote the advance- ment of ocean science and technology. Some of its expected benefits include the following: Increased efficiency through the sharing of manpower, facilities and ships; Hnablement of the head of a National ocean agency to direct the efforts of the consolidated agencies rather than having to rely on pursuasion and coordination ; and The launching of new multipurpose science and fundamental technology activities. The rationale for consolidation is discussed at greater length on pages 227 to 230 of the Commission Report, and on pages V—2, V-18 and V—-19 of the Report of the Panel on Industry and Private Investment. OSTAC is not prepared, however, to comment on which Federal ocean func- tions and activities ‘should be consolidated because of the many factors to be studied and the many ccnsiderations to be reconciled within the Federal organizational structure. In this presentation, therefore, the term ‘National ocean agency” is used to describe the agency, however it might be established either as to function or reporting relationship, which will lead the civilian Federal ocean program. One example of a feasible approach that could accomplish what is needed is the consolidation of certain existing agencies along the lines of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency as recom- mended by the Commission. OSTAC believes that the main concern of the National ocean agency should be with programs of scientific research, fundamental technology and essential supporting functions, such as those necesary for expanding use of the sea, for 1219 monitoring and predicting the state of the total air-sea environment and for exploring the feasibility of storm control. The establishment of a National advisory committee and the consolidation of certain Federal ocean activities are most important recommendations, essential to the development of a coherent National ocean program. Together they would provide leadership, coordination and the opportunity to minimize wasteful duplication for great diversity of interests and activities in oceanic matters in Federal and State agencies, the many industries with marine interests and the universities and institutions. They would provide the Execu- tive Branch and the Congress with a better focus on the total program than the present dispersion of marine activities. As stated above, we have heard arguments that many ocean activities are intimately related to similar activities on land and that, therefore, an agency dealing with the ocean exclusively would not be warranted. However, we believe that it is in our national interest at this time to initiate a more comprehensive oceanic effort. The reasons have been stated quite eloquently in the opening paragraph of the Commission Report which are repeated here: “How fully and wisely the United States uses the sea in the decades ahead will affect profoundly its security, its economy, its ability to meet increasing demands for food and raw materials, its position and influence in the world community, and the quality of the environment in which its people live.” These are essentially, as Dr. Stratton pointed owt in his testimony, human problems requiring prompt attention. We are at the stage in our country’s - history where the ocean’s potential must be thoroughly examined to determine how it can best be used in order to help solve these problems. Only about 3 percent of the Federal Government’s annual expenditures for all research and development programs goes into oceanic R & D, where this figure also includes the classified portion of the R & D budget. The current rewards and future potential value of this nation’s ocean activities appear to justify a higher percentage. We believe that an agency concerned specifically with ocean programs would be better able to evaluate and justify the portion of the total R & D funds which should be allocated to oceanic programs. One question of immediate importance concerns the administration of ocean non-living resources. In reviewing the Commission Report on page 141, we note the statement that the, ‘““Department of the Interior should continue to assess the national interest in ocean minerals and decide whether the results of mineral investigation and technological developments warrant specific action to provide further encouragement to industry to mine the seabed.’ OSTAC concurs in this statement, and wishes to add the following comments. Governmental activities in the administration of non-living ocean resources should remain where they are because administration of such resources is not peculiarly related to the ocean as distinct from those resources on land. Moreover, the administration of all non-living resources—land and sea—under Federal Government jurisdiction must be conducted so that all the options available for assuring adequate low-cost supplies of energy and metals can be dealt with most advantageously. Although we are in agreement with the Commission Report on the foregoing matter, we do wish to cite examples of where the Commission Report would benefit from a further clarification of the functions of the proposed National ocean agency and the Department of the Interior. One example is the apparent anomaly on page 141 of the Report which assigned the responsibility to NOAA for funding and conducting recommended geological surveys and which stated that NOAA should also “work closly’” with the Interior’s Geological Survey. One question is what would the geological mapping group of the Interior’s Geological Survey be asked to do that would not be done by NOAA? The subject of ‘surveys of mineral resources” is addressed more explicitly in the bill H.R. 13247, page 6, lines 13 and 14. In our opinion, the management and funding of these surveys should remain the responsibility of the agency now performing this function. Assuming the creation of an effective Federal interagency mechanism, we believe that this approach is feasible and proper. A second example requiring clarification is the statement in the next paragraph that, “NOAA should develop the basic technology to assess the feasibility of seabed mining but should secure the assistance of the Bureau of Mines in this task.” A Federal interagency mechanism The Commission Report states on page 244 that major benefit of establishing a strong operating agency concerned with marine activities would be to permit 1220 the head of that agency, at the direction of the President, to assume responsibility for interagency planning and coordination of Federal civil marine programs. We believe that such a mechanism is the third important element of the Executive Department reorganization and that it should be statutorily created. We also agree with the words found on page VI-25 of the Commission Panel Report on Marine Engineering and Technology which states the following: “To complement and support the efforts of the agency and NACO and to recognize the fact that many marine activities would still be located outside any consolidation, it is recommended that an interagency coordinating mechanism be established and chaired by the head of the new civilian agency. This mechanism would ensure the inclusion of the interests of all Federal agencies with marine programs not included in the proposed consolidation.” This assignment to the director of a National ocean agency would be analogous to the role formerly played by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (R & D) in which he chaired the Interagency Committee on Oceanography (ICO). Hence, the director of the National ocean agency, wearing both hats, would be the true focal point for non-military marine affairs.* A major role of the interagency mechanism would be one involving information exchange which, as stated earlier, would facilitate planning and coordination. The role of the Director should include offering guidance, opinions and informa- tion about on-going and planned programs, seeking to avoid unintentional dupli- eation of effort, helping to insure the build-up of required competence and facilities, and seeking to maximize the utilization of existing capabilities. In his appearances before Congressional Committees. he should be the most knowl- edgeable in the Federal civilian agencies with respect to marine affairs. Accord- ingly, his opinions and testimony would presumably carry considerable weight in determining the priorities of civilian marine programs. No civilian agency will have marine R & D capabilities anywhere near those of the Navy within the near future. Moreover, the Navy Will undoubtedly con- tinue its strong oceanographic efforts primarily in response to its defense mission needs. Thus some means must be established to insure that our civilian ocean program utilizes the Navy capabilities. OSTAC believes that an interagency mechanism will provide this opportunity and that the role of the Navy in the interagency mechanism will be crucial. Hence, the director of a National ocean agency would be expected to rely heavily on the Navy’s capabilities. In fact, subject to security considerations, it would be expected that the Navy might be called upon to perform various services or permit use of its facilities by a National ocean agency on a cost reimbursable basis. As the agency capabilities are built up, the Navy should continue to be an extremely valuable source of information and services. Similarly, the role of the interagency mechanism can be quite important with several of the other agencies, such as Interior and the Army Corps of Engineers. In addition, as mentioned before, we have heard the comments which state that oceanic and certain land activities should be closely coordinated. We believe that such coordination can more readily occur through the Federal interagency mechanism as recommended by the Commission. SOME CONTROVERSIAL QUESTIONS ABOUT THE NATIONAL OCEAN AGENCY AND THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE There are those who have opposed the establishment of a National ocean agency at this time for two vital reasons: 1) no agency should be established until the Administration completes its current studies on overall Executive Department reorganization; 2) the current financial situation imiposes severe limitations on allocation of funds for new areas such as oceanic development. With respect to the first point, OSTAC notes the statement in the Commission Report (page 249) that the organizational recommendations‘ are believed to be consistent with any of the several fundamental reorganizations that might evolve over the next several years.” With respect to the second point,-the creation of a National ocean agency and a National advisory committee does not per se require any initial large expenditures. On the contrary, the creation of means for coordinating and con- solidating existing, as well as any new projects, and for eliminating unintentional *Page 231 of the Commission Report states that the National ocean agency should co- ordinate the civilian marine activities of the other Federal agencies. However, the bold print recommendation found on page 245 states that the agency director should have this coordinating responsibility. We believe it was the Commission’s intent to vest this coordi- nating responsibility in the hands of the agency director, not the agency. 1221 duplication of effort, would be a most effective step in insuring maximum benefit from whatever funds are allocated to this area of activity. If all that was done now was merely the enactment of a National ocean agency with an advisory committee and an interagency mechanism, this in itself would do much to get the nation to move in the right direction. The National Projects and requests for additional research and for funda- mental technology programs would require increased expenditures in the future. On the other hand, many of the Commission recommendations which deal with the removal of legal/regulatory impediments do not involve the expenditure of large funds and, in fact, can be implemented in a short amount of time. Finally, and of equal importance, many of the recommended new oceanic efforts are aimed at other national goals which encompass many social and economic prob- lems. These include health (the need to prevent further pollution and initiate restoration of our estuaries and Great Lakes) and the rebuilding of many of our port and harbor facilities which are simultaneously related to such nationally recognized priority areas as urban renewal and the need to rebuild our merchant marine. The recommended oceanic program is also directed towards related national goals as represented by more extensive recreation facilities that will benefit the underprivileged, food from the sea as a factor in the fight against hunger, and important contributions to our defense capabilities. Because of the reasons we just stated and the ones cited earlier, we favor establishment of a National ocean agency at the earliest possible time. The question has been raised by many as to whether or not an advisory com- mittee should be set up at the same time as a National ocean agency. We believe that the two entities should be created simultaneously. However, the point has been made that political difficulties may unduly delay the creation or designation of a National ocean agency, which suggests that the advisory committee should then be permitted to be established prior to the agency. On balance, OSTAC suggests that we not move too quickly to establish an advisory committee prior to a National ocean agency. We should try to get both established at the same time, whether created through Executive Order or by legislation, in order to reap the maximum advantages of the combination of an advisory committee, a National ocean agency and the Federal interagency mechanism. If an undue delay occurs in the creation of ia National ocean agency, then we suggest taking action towards the establishment of a National advisory committee to be attached to the Executive Office of the President. As mentioned earlier, OSTAC recommends that senior policy officials from key Federal agencies, as well as regional State representatives, should be requested to serve as non-voting participants on the advisory committee. If the Federal members were included as full voting participants, they might be constrained in their official votes by Administration policy, i.e., they might personally feel one way but would be obliged to vote in accordance with their department’s or the Administration’s official position. Also, since one of its duties is to assess the performance of Government efforts, Federal voting repre- sentatives would in effect be asked to grade their own efforts. This situation arose with the Commission where the Government members abstained in voting upon the recommendations concerning Government organization. However, the Commission did find it valuable to have Federal members avail- able to inject their knowledge and experience without the necessity of being required to register a formal vote. The State or regional representatives will be very important participants. However, as in the case of the Federal participants, we believe they can be most effective if they are not asked to vote on matters that might conceivably be in conflict with an official position of their State government. Continuation of the Council Pending determination of the question of organization of the Federal marine activities, it is suggested that the present Council remain in existence until its coordinating and related functions can be appropriately assigned to whatever merchanism is set up to handle a National ocean program. Focal Point in the Congress In OSTAC’s original study submitted to Dr. Frosch and the Commission in the fall of 1967, we urged that ‘consideration be given by the Congress to the establishment of overall House and Senate Committees on Marine Sciences that would have the responsibility of reviewing and approving programs recommended by the new Executive Department mechanism and providing for proper budget- ing within the overall budgets of the agencies assigned to execute the approved programs.” Accordingly. OSTAC was extremely pleased to note the section in the Com- mission’s Report dealing with this question. We endorse the statement on page 247, that— “Activities of the new agency now under the cognizance of several committees should. if possible. be the responsibility of a single legislative and appropriation committee in each house.” We also agree that the assignment of the Director of the National ocean agency to his second role of chairing the interagency mechanism would be very. helprul to the Congress. As stated earlier, he would be able to testify with expertise 0n matters pertaining to all civilian marine programs. Finally, as the Commission points out. the biennial report to the public by the National advisory committee should provide the opportunity for a broad review by the Congress of the progress in achieving National marine objectives. The Navy's Role in the Proposed Ocean Program Ti can be anticipated with assurance that the Navy will continue to make Iajor contributions te knowledge of the oceans and to ocean related technology as in the past. These contributions will have major value in the civilian sector and. by appropriate liaison with the agency responsible for civilian programs through the proposed Federal interagency mechanism, will continue to be a major factor in the overall national program. Other Commission Recommendations OSTAC does not at this time wish to comment on the recommendations in the Commission Report not related to Government organization except to empha- Size that many of them are of the utmost importance to the Nation. OSTAC is, however. reviewing these other recommendations and is presently preparing a more detailed critique. We suggest that a first step ahead for the Congress is to do what it can to expedite the implemeniation of a National advisory commitiee, a National ocean agency and the interagency mechanism. Once this is done, these groups can examine the Commission’s program recommendations in greater detail, prepare a plan of action and provide detailed cost estimates for its pursuance. To make this examination and properly prepare a plan (with realistic costs) for the initial projects of an expanded National ocean program will require some time (it could readily require up to two years). During this period that will be required before the National advisory committee and an ocean agency can become fully eizective, the expenditures for oceanic programs would be expected to be maintained near present levels. awaiting guidance from the advisory commitiee and the ocean agency to provide a sound basis for a future expanded program. SUAMIALARY We endorse the Commission’s recommendations with respect to the need for the following: (1) A National advisory commitiee for the oceans: however, its voting mem- bership should come entirely from non-government entities. State and Federal representatives should be non-voting participants. (2) A consolidation of certain key ocean functions and agencies of the Federal Governmeni, although not necesarily the specific ones recommended by the Com- mission. (OSTAC did not have sufficient time to study this problem thoroughly.) (3) Housing the proposed Federal consolidation in a National ocean agency. (4) A Federal interagency mechanism, to be chaired by the head of the con- solidated agency. to facilitate information exchange and to help insure the utiliza- tion of the capabilities of the Navy and other Federal agences not in the desig- nated National ocean agency. (5) Continuation of the present Council until organizational recommendations are resolved. (6) A focal point for civilian oceanic legislative and appropriation matters in each House of Congress. (7) An independent staff for the National advisory committee, separate from the National ocean agency. if and when the agency is established. OSTAC also offers the following observations: (1) The creation per se of a National ocean agency at this time does not necessarily create new demands for funds from an already hard pressed Govern- 1223 ment budget. Rather, it presents an opportunity to make more efficient use of funds already committed. (2) An intriguing aspect of increasing our commitment to oceanic programs at this time is that it is essentially an investment and not an irreversible expendi- ture. With the private sector becoming increasingly involved, the returns to the Government through increased GNP with its associated increase in revenue from corporate and payroll income taxes, royalties, etc., should far exceed the “seed money” it would be expected to invest in the near term. (3) As the Commission pointed out, a National ocean agency could readily be accommodated into any new fundamental Government reorganization in the Executive Branch, if such were desired at a later time. (4) The National advisory committee should be created simultaneously with the setting up of a civilian marine oriented agency; however, if the designation of the Federal agency is long delayed, we should renew action toward creation of the advisory committee. (5) The special competence of the Navy must be utilized in the future Govern- ment reorganization and in all future planning. We believe that the Commission did recognize this need by recommending the establishment of a Federal inter- agency mechanism and by assigning senior policy officials from key Federal agencies, such as the Navy, to serve as non-voting participants on the National advisory committee. NSIA/OSTAC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEMBERS Cawley, John H. Lane, Amor L. Chairman, OSTAC Platforms and In- Chairman, OSTAC Executive Com- strumentation Subcommittee mittee Arthur D. Little, Inc. American Machine & Foundry Company Clewell. Dr. Dayton H. LaQue, Dr. Francis L. Chairman, OSTAC Chairma n, OSTAC Mining Panel Senior Vice President Vice President Mobil Oil Company The International Nickel Company Coates, L. D., RADM, USN (Ret.) Larson, Howard F. - Vice Chairman, OSTAC Chairman, OSTAC Recreation Panel Lockheed—California Company Vice President Fulham, Thomas Outboard Marine Corporation Chairman, OSTAC Fishing Panel Shigley, C. Monroe President Chairman, OSTAC Chemical Panel Boston Fish Market Corporation Dow Chemical Company Kirkbride, Chalmer G. Siebenhausen, C. H. Past Chairman, OSTAC Chairman, OSTAC Petroleum Panel Vice President Shell Oil Company Sun Oil Company Walker, Carl L. Jorgenson, John H. Chairman, OSTAC Technology OSTAC Committee Executive Subcommittee National Security Industrial Assn. Western Electric Company, Inc. (Advisor to the Executive Committee) AMOR L. LANE Specialties: Over twenty years’ experience in oceanographic applications, including use of underwater acoustics in antisubmarine warfare; oceanographic instrumentation ; and analysis of industrial activities in National Ocean Program. Present Occupation: Director of Marine Planning Activities, Washington Operations, American Machine & Foundry Company. 1701 K Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. Residence Address: 9533 Lawnsberry Terrace, Silver Spring, Maryland. Birthplace, Date of Birth: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; February 16, 1926. Married: Anita Lane, two children. Degrees, Honors and Awards: Four-year Scholarship to University of Pennsyl- vania; B.S. in Electrical Engineering from University of Pennsylvania, 1949: M.S. in Electrical Engineering from University of Pennsyivana, 1962; Navy Department Civilian Meritorious Award, 1953; AMF Achievement Award. 1964. Honorary Fraternities: Tau Beta Pi, Sigma Tau, Eta Kappa Nu. Publications: Numerous technical papers on underwater acoustic transducers and use of underwater acoustics for oceanographic and offshore petroleum appli- cations; Editor of “Compilations of Industrial Oceanographic Capabilities,” an NSIA Report, 1964. 1224 Military Service: U.S. Navy June 1944-February 1946. Professional Career (in reverse chronological order): August 1967—February 1969—Staff Member of the Commission on Marine Science Engineering & Resources: specialized in Government-Industry Roles and means for insuring ‘continuing private sector inputs into the ultimate government organization to be recommended by the Commission. Staff member on the Panel on Marine Engi- neering and Technology and the Panel on Industry and Private Investment. _ June 1961—July 1967—American Machine & Foundry Company, Alexandria, Virginia; Program Manager for Underwater Systems. Also served as Charimar of the Oceanographic Steering Committee for five of the AMF operating groups. Previous Positions: Radio Corporation of America, Camden, New Jersey : Staff Member in Undersea Warfare Department; Technitrol Engineering Company, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania ; U.S. Naval Ordnance Laboratory, White Oak, Mary- land: Head, Ultrasonic Transducers Section, Torpedo Division. ee eae to President’s Science Advisory Committee Panel on Oceanography, 1965. Professional and Industrial Societies—Membership and Activity—National Security Industrial Association (NSIA) : 1961—Present ; National Security Indus- trial Association Ocean Science and. Technology Advisory Committee (NSTA/OSTAC): Acting Chairman 1965; Chairman, OSTAC Executive Com- mittee 1965-Present; Chairman, Second NSIA/OSTAC Government-Industry Continental Shelf Conference 1967; Chairman, Steering Committee NSIA—State of Oregon Sponsored Coastal States Conference 1968. NSIA Antisubmarine Warfare Advisory Committee: Member, Planning Com- mittee and Chairman, Oceanography Subcommittee, 1964-1966. Marine Technology Society, Inc. (MTS): Vice President for Publications and Member of MTS Council, 1966-1969. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) : Group Activities— Group on Sonics and Ultrasonics, Organizer and First Chairman 1953-1955, Member 1953-Present ; Group on Geoscience Electronics, Member 1965—Present. STATEMENT OF BRAXTON B. Carr, PRESIDENT, THE AMERICAN WATERWAYS ‘OPERATORS, INC. The American Waterways Operators, Inc. (AWO) is the national trade asso- ciation representing the barge and towing industry. Members of AWO operate towing vessels and barges, build and service such equipment and provide terminal services for waterborne commerce through the United States. The Association’s executive office is located at 1250 Connecticut Avenue, Suite 502, Washington, D.C. 20036. This statement is presented by Braxton B. Carr, president of The American Waterways Operators, Inc., under authorization given by resolution of the Asso- ciation’s Board of Directors at a meeting held September 11, 1969 at Jacksonville, Florida. As one of the nation’s developed and growing modes of transportation, the barge and towing industry has an interest in the overall proposition to establish a National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency. Most particularly with respect to the bil! under consideration to establish such an agency, AWO has an interest in the proposed transfer of the United ‘States Coast Guard from the Department of Transportation to the new agency under terms of the bill. The barge and towing industry is dependent upon the Coast Guard for a multitude of services, all designed to insure the safety of operations for this mode of transportation. The Coast Guard’s work in this respect covers a broad spectrum of essential transport services: (1) to safeguard personnel working aboard towing vessels and barges while in transit and during certain barge loading and unloading operations; (2) to safeguard the vessels themselves; (3) to safeguard the cargoes of certain barges, particularly tank barges, to insure against their loss as a protection to the personnel working aboard such vessels, at terminals, and the general public where the public might be affected by flammable, combustible, explosive, toxic and/or poisonous cargoes; and (4) to safeguard structures alongside, over and under waterways and adjacent shore lines. The importance of this mode of transportation is demonstrated by the fact that domestic waterborne commerce represents 20 percent of total U.S. com- merce, with barges performing 1114 percent of total U.S. commerce. While we 1225 are speaking directly to the point of the barge and towing industry’s interest in the transportation support services rendered by the Coast Guard, these services are rendered with respect to all domestic waterborne commerce. AWO believes that the nation’s domestic marine transportation services will be best served by leaving the United States Coast Guard in the Department of Transportation where the total mission of the department is directed toward improvement of the transport network as a whole, using the facilities of other agencies within the Department in addition to the Coast Guard. Transfer of the ‘Coast Guard to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency inevitably would reduce the Coast Guard’s services in the transportation field in rela- tionship to the other interests it would have in the new agency. Where the priorities of the Coast Guard’s work are now directed primarily to transporta- tion services, this would not be the case in the Coast Guard’s role within the new Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency. The priorities would change so as to inevitably downgrade Coast Guard work in the field of transportation. For this reason, The American Waterways Operators, Inc. urges against the proposed transfer. The downgrading of the Coast Guard’s priority for services to marine trans- portation would affect certain functions which we believe should be called forcefully to the attention of this subcommittee in this consideration of the proposed transfer. Great public concern has been expressed, and rightly so, with respect to the transportation of certain hazardous and dangerous cargoes, primarily liquid cargoes which are flammable, combustible, explosive, toxic and/or poisonous. Many millions of tons of such commodities are moved in bulk in barges over the inland waterways and over the coastal waterways of the United States. Similarly such cargoes are moved by rail and by truck. The Coast Guard formulates and administers rules and regulations governing such transporta- tion by tank barge and tank ship. These rules and regulations govern the specifications for the construction and operation inspection of such tank vessels. In certain instances they govern operational procedures. They govern the re- quirement for licensed personnel to handle the loading and and unloading of such commodities. It should be of interest to this committee to note that the marine transport industry, including the barge and towing industry, is the only mode of trans- portation that today has a well-developed and functioning system of safety control for the transportation of flammable, combustible, explosive, toxic and/or poisonous commodities. The reason for this is that the Coast Guard and the marine transport industry, working closely in cooperation with each other, recognized many years ago that a system of safety control was essential. And the Coast Guard working in cooperation with the inadustry developed an accept- able system which has worked extremely well. Anything which would tend to diminish or dilute the Coast Guard’s primary mission of transport services would inevitably be reflected in diminished work, interest, expertise, and knowl- edge in this most important safety activity, an activity which is not only of im- portance to the marine transport industry itself but to the general public welfare. The Coast Guard is responsible for formulating and administering Rules of the Road which govern the operation of marine vessels. These Rules of the Road not only govern the physical handling of vessels, but establish procedures for the lighting of vessels for recognition purposes during the periods when such vessels are in motion, when tied up, or at anchor. These rules govern moorings and anchorings to insure the safety of persons and property, both with respect to the moored and/or anchored vessels as well as other vessels that will be navigating in the vicinity. The Coast Guard is responsible for placing and maintaining aids to naviga- tion in order to insure safe operation of vessels. The agency at this time maintains over 44,600 such aids to navigation, approximately 24,000 of which are buoy markers on the inland waterways of the United States which serve as aids to both commercial vessels and pleasure craft. These inland channel buoys together with lighthouses, off-shore platform stations, lighted ships, radio- beacons, fog signals, day beacons, and long-range electronic aids are all primarily transportation services performed by the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard’s ice breaking responsibilities on such inland waterways as the Hudson River, the Upper Mississippi River, the Missouri River, Chesapeake Bay, the Potomac River. the TWlinois Waterway, and in certain other areas are all essential transport service functions. 1226 The Coast Guard has proposed to the Congress that legislation be enacted which would require VHF radiotelephone equipment aboard vessels as another aid to insure safe navigation. The administration and enforcement of this pro- gram, when the statutory authority is established by the Congress, will be a new responsibility in the field of transport services for the Coast Guard. AS an agency responsible for the formulation and administration of safety regulations governing the operation of vessels the Coast Guard has the added responsibility to investigate marine casualties. Such investigations, among other things provide information for use by the Coast Guard in improving the agency’s work with respect to transport safety functions. When the Coast Guard was transferred from the Treasury Department to the Department of Transportation in 1966, the agency was given the responsibility to make the determination with respect to the location and plans for bridges and other structures to be built across or adjacent to navigable waterways in order to determine their suitability from the standpoint of maintaining navigation. This is an important transport service function inasmuch as over- head structures across navigable waterways can create a limiting dimension if they do not provide adequate clearances. One final point should be noted in any consideration of a change in status of the Coast Guard which would relegate its transport service functions to low priority. That point is the comparative data on fatalities with respect to modes of transportation. Fatality rates are one measure of the efficiency of safety control systems such as the control system exercised by the Coast Guard for marine transport services. For the year 1966 the motor carrier industry experienced 10.77 fatalities per billion ton miles of truck transportation. The railroads experienced 2.64 fatalities per billion ton miles of railroad freight service. The barge and towing industry experience 0.274 fatalities per billion ton miles of freight service. This record speaks well for the Coast Guard’s role as the nation’s safety coordinator and administrator of marine transport services and should constitute a high recommendation to have the agency retain its priority in this field of work. The American Waterways Operators, Inec., believes that the Coast Guard should remain in and continue to operate within the Department of Transporta- tion where the nation’s major policy decisions for the various modes are made and where priority is placed on transportation services such as the barge and towing industry relies upon the Coast Guard to perform. We repeat: transfer of the Coast Guard to the proposed new National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency would inevitably relegate these transport service functions to low priority. In view of this, AWO believes the transfer of the Coast Guard, as proposed in H.R. 18247, is not in the public interest, and, in fact, very well might be detrimental to the national transportation interests. STATEMENT OF JACOB BLAUSTEIN, Co-FOUNDER AND FORMER PRESIDENT, AMERICAN O1L Co.; DrrEctorR, STANDARD OIL Co. (INDIANA) ; FORMER U.S. DELEGATE TO THE UNITED NATIONS—COMMENTING AS AN INDIVIDUAL AND NOT IN BEHALF OF TRESE ORGANIZATIONS Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the invitation to submit this statement to this distinguished subcommittee to comment upon the report of the Commission on Marine Science, Engineering, and Resources, and to have this opportunity strongly to endorse the enactment of H.R. 13247. Hnact- ment of this proposed legislation is the single, most important step which must be taken to prepare this nation in the decades ahead to make full and wise use of the surrounding seas. In my judgment, the nation’s needs and opportunities in relation to its marine environment are of such priority that action to establish a National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency (NOAA) would be remembered as one of the outstanding achievements of the 91st Congress. As with several other of our Commission members, I had had no special train- ing or involvement in marine affairs prior to being asked by the President in January, 1967, to participate with his Commission in a searching appraisal of our nation’s marine interests and activities. AS an oil man, I had noted our erowing dependence upon offshore sources to meet accelerating needs for energy fuels and had been impressed by the industry’s technological virtuosity in operating in this new environment. 1227 : Through my industry’s transport activities, I was at least aware of the explo- sion then occurring in the capacity of ocean-going tankers, of their requirements for improved port facilities, and of the significance which sharply lower costs might have for our industrial economy. Also, in long association with United Nations’ activities, I had learned that other nations shared our interests in the seas and that whatever programs were organized to develop marine resources beyond the limits of national jurisdiction must recognize these multiple inter- ests. Moreover, during our studies as members of the Marine Commission, I was coustantly impressed by the diversity and long-term significance of this nation’s stake in the uses of the sea. I believe that the range of national interest, and the implications which this condition have for national policy, were well expressed by the Commission in its report: “Like the oceans themselves, the Nation’s marine interests are vast, complex, composed of many critical elements, and not susceptible to simplicity of treat- ment. Realization and accommodation of the Nation’s many diverse interests require a plan for national action and for orderly development of the uses of the sea. The plan must provide for determined attack on immediate problems concur- rently with initiation of a long-range program to develop knowledge, technology, and a framework of laws and institutions that will lay the foundation for efficient and productive marine activities in the years ahead. Although the Commission has addressed its proposals principally to the Federal Government, the States, the scientific community, industry, and others will need also to exercise initiative in their respective areas and participate fully in order that there may be a genuine national effort.” And in concluding its proposed plan for national action: A time for decision is here. Multiple pressures force the Nation to turn to the sea, and multiple opportunities await the seaward turning .. . The ocean does not yield its food and mineral treasures easily; damaged environments are not restored by scattered attacks or the good intentions of a few; the planet’s dominant element cannot be understood, utilized, enjoyed, or controlled by dif- fuse and uncoordinated efforts. The Nation’s stake can only be realized by a determined national effort great enough for the vast and rewarding task ahead. Now to several specific points : The first point I should like to make is that the urgency of action now is real. It was not simply happenstance that a Commission on Marine Science, Engineer- ing and Resources was formed in January, 1967, or that legislation to establish a national marine and atmospheric program should be on the congressional agenda two years later. The proposal for a National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency grows out of more than a decade of expanding knowledge and use of the seas. Offshore development both here and abroad is proceeding apace. The land along our shores already is almost entirely committed to patterns of use which will be increasingly difficult to adjust to broad public interests. Pollution has already engulfed one of our Great Lakes and threatens others. The time for action is now. If deferred, it seems all too likely that we shall be condemned to another decade of study and delay. The Marine Commission recognized that times of adoption of the several ele- ments of its proposed program would have to be considered in the context of overall national priorities. However, we concluded also that immediate action could and should be taken on our proposal for government reorganization. It will involve little or no incremental cost. By drawing together closely-related activities, it can improve administrative decision-making, provide a sounder basis for public and private investments, and lend strength and power to the nation’s commitment to the seas. The second point I would like to emphasize is the Commission’s concern that our marine program be truly national in scope and involve industries, universi- ties, and state and local governments in a concerted effort to increase capabilities and to make more effective use of the seas. Federal leadership will be needed in order to give direction and stimulus to this broad base of activity. But the doing itself—the work of our scientists and engineers and of our great corporations in developing the sea’s resources—must inevitably be undertaken chiefly through private institutions, with public interest in mind. The Commission visualized a National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency as a focal point to such activity. Also, recognizing the paramount importance of harmonizing NOAA’s programs with non-Federal activities and needs, the Com- 1228 mission recommended the establishment of a National Advisory Committee for the Oceans. I am happy to see that H.R. 13247 would establish both of these agencies. They are intended to complement one another and should be established concurrently. Third, may I refer to the National Projects recommended by the Commission. Specific projects are identified at page 38 of our report. I feel that it will be important for the new marine agency, when established. to be mandated to undertake a limited number of concrete, definable activities which both offer promise of immediate reward and push forward the existing state of the art. The execution of the National Projects would mobilize a broad range of scientific and engineering talents in tasks which should gain wide public support and attention. I believe that American industry would also participate enthusiastically in the National Projects, which have been selected so as to offer practical pay- outs in developing capabilities in fields in which there are broad industrial inter- ests but whose development lies beyond the resources of individual firms. Ocean exploration sometimes is compared with space exploration. The two environments of course present quite different problems and our motives for effort in the two fields are almost wholly dissimilar. Yet we have learned in our space program the value of establishing a few, challenging targets as foci for the nation’s interest. A very small proportion of the resources applied to our landing on the moon, or prospectively to be applied to the exploration of Mars, would permit the initiation of both a dramatic and a useful program of National Proj- ects in the sea. Finally, I personally have been particularly concerned that, as phrased in Public Law 89-454, “the marine science activities of the United States... be conducted so as to contribute to... the cooperation of the United States with other nations and groups of nations and international organizations” (sec- tion 2(b) (8) ). In the conflict-ridden world of today, I consider it essential that we seize every opportunity to nurture the common interests which we share with other nations. Together with my fellow-commissioners, I have strongly supported the International Decade for Ocean Exploration. I believe it very important also that commercial exploration and exploitation of the sea’s resources proceed within an orderly framework of international law. The Commission’s recom- mendations in this area have proved controversial. This is to be expected. But the existence of divergent interests in my view simply highlights.the importance of coming to some agreement within this country and with our neighbors abroad as to what principles are to apply in future years as industrial development presses out into the area of present legal uncertainty. In holding these hearings, Mr. Chairman, I believe that your subcommittee is performing a great service to our nation. Our marine industries and research institutions await a sign that the Federal government recognizes the importance of the nation’s marine interests and is prepared to make the necessary invest- ment to safeguard our position as a great sea-nation. I firmly believe that a full review and public discussion of the stakes involved, such as has been under- taken by this subcommittee during the past six months, will bring the Congress and the nation as a whole to the same conclusion as that which we reached within the Marine Commission—that the time for decision is now and that the nation’s stake in.the seas can be realized only through a determined national effort great enough for the vast and rewarding task ahead. Thank you. STATEMENT BY Dr. GLENN YT. SEABORG, CHAIRMAN U.S. ATOMIC HINERGY COMMISSION Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to present the views of the Atomic Energy Commission on the report of the Commission on Marine Science, Engi- neering and Resources entitled “Our Nation and the Sea.” The Marine Commission’s analysis of benefits to be derived from more effective use of the sea is thorough and realistic. Its recommendations merit and will re- ceive our careful attention during consideration of AEC programs and priorities. The recommended reorganization of Federal marine-related activities, centered around the establishment of a new independent agency, would draw together ocean-related functions and organizations from several existing departments and agencies and needs to be examined carefully in the broad context of Federal organization and program priorities. In its analysis of the proposed 1229 reorganization, the Marine Commission rejects the idea of consolidating all Federal marine and atmospheric functions into a single organization. We agree that certain marine- and atmospheric-related programs are integral to the mis- sion of the agencies performing them and that these are best left where they are. The Report includes recommendations regarding (1) thermal pollution legis- lation, (2) submerged nuclear power plants and (3) the development of power systems for undersea operations and resource development. My comments on these recommendations, each of which bears directly on AEG programs, are set forth below. 1. THERMAL POLLUTION LEGISLATION The Marine Commission observes that the Department of Justice has agreed that the AEC lacks authority to consider thermal pollution as part of its licensing procedures. (More recently, this view was upheld in State of New Hampshire v. Atomic Hnergy Commission et al., 406 F.2d 170, cert. denied, 37 U.S... Week 3481 [U.S. June 16, 1969].) With this in mind, the Marine Commission recom- mends “that legislation be enacted to enable the AEC to consider the environ- mental effects of projects under its licensing authority.” (page 77) The Atomic Energy Commission alreadw has, and vigorously exercises, broad authority to consider environmental effects of radiation and radioactivity in licensing. Also under AHC’s developmental authority, as distinguished from its regulatory fune- tions, we have been conducting studies on environmental effects of thermal dis- charges. We strongly support the need for such studies as a basis for establishing controls on thermal pollution. Legislation along the lines recommended by the Marine Commission would address only a portion of the problem of thermal discharges produced by steam electric power plants. All such plants, whether employing nuclear or fossil fuels, must discharge heat into the environment and the AEC does not believe that legislation limited to nuclear plants in an effective way to deal with the problem. Provisions for control of thermal effects along the lines favored by the ABC are contained in H.R. 4148 entitled, “Water Quality Improvement Act of 1969,” which was recently passed by the House. Similar provisions are contained in a Senate bill (S. 7) introduced by Senator Muskie and currently under consider- ation. The approach of these bills is consistent with the provisions of the Fed- eral Water Pollution Control Act which assigns primary responsibility for control of water pollution to the states. It would require applicants for federal licenses to obtain advance certification from the appropriate state or interstate water pollution control agency that the proposed activity will comply with ap- plicable state water quality standards. Failure to provide such certification would preclude issuance of the federal license. Since all nuclear power plants and probably most of the nonnuclear power plants of similar size would require a federal license or permit of some sort, these bills would establish an effective and equitable procedure to cope with the total problem of thermal effects and their control. 2. SUBMERGED NUCLEAR PLANTS The Marine Commission report discusses the siting of nuclear power plants and recommends collaborative efforts involving the proposed National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency and the AHC. In particular, the Marine Commission recommends support for the development of technology for and construction of “an Hxperimental Continental Shelf Submerged Nuclear Plant... to pilot test and demonstrate the economic and technical feasibility of ... the underwater siting of nuclear facilities to provide power for coastal regions.” (page 162) There are several ways of obtaining the ecological advantages of ocean siting in addition to submerging reactors. These include coastal siting, island siting and floatings stations. AEC investigations of off-shore siting for large nuclear power plants make clear that submerging such large commercial facilities on the continental shelf is, at this time, several steps ahead of current state of the art from both an engineering and an economic standpoint. As a result, the AHC has directed its attention toward the use of existing islands, or the construction, in water depths of 20-60 feet, of man-made islands upon which the plant facil- ities could be located. Many of the advantages noted by the Marine Commission for submerged plants can be obtained by off-shore siting on islands with fewer technical difficulties and with far less economic penalty than would be associ-. ated with a submerged plant. 26-563—70—pt. 2-47 1230 We believe that during the next few years efforts should be focussed on the following: (a) detailed study of the environmental and nuclear safety advantages which can be obtained from island siting ; (bo) consideration of various engineering approaches to the construction or use of islands, including the trade-offs that could improve the economics of island siting as compared with typical on-shore siting (c) identification of legal and other encumbrances associated with island siting ; and (d@) demonstration of island siting, incorporating features leading to an eco- logically acceptable design. The Bolsa Island Nuclear Power and Desalting Plant project in southern California was designed to demonstrate the technological and economical feasi- bility of siting nuclear power plants on man-made islands. However, this proj- ect has been terminated and a suitable alternative demonstration of island siting has not yet been identified. As I have indicated above, preliminary studies of submerged sites for nuclear plants on the continental shelf have been completed. Some continued investigation of the technological aspects and comparative eco- nomics of this concept is contemplated, but no major AEC program effort on this subject is underway or planned at this time. (3) DEVELOPMENT OF POWER SYSTEMS FOR UNDERSEA OPERATIONS AND RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT, INCLUDING NUCLEAR SYSTEMS The Marine Commission recommends support by the proposed National Oceanic and Atimospheric Agency for “technology development of power systems neces- sary for undersea operations and resource development.” (page 162) In the March 1968 report of the National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Development to the President, the absence of reliable and self- sustaining power sources is identified as “Perhaps the most critical, unmet need of underwater technology . . .” (page 151) The Marine Commission report accu rately recognizes that the needs for reliable and self-sustaining power cannot bt met by any one single type of power source for all power level, endurance anc ambient pressure requirements associated with present and prospective underseé tasks. Present technological capability with respect to self-sustaining undersea power sources has been demonstrated to be inadequate to meet the requirements of many possible undersea missions and tasks. Without effective, reliable power sources, such missions cannot advance far beyond the concept stage. Since 1962 the AEC has, in keeping with its statutory responsibilities with respect to the peaceful applications of nuclear energy, pursued the development of self-sustaining and long-lived nuclear power sources for undersea and marine applications. The unique characteristics of nuclear reactor and radioisotope power sources in terms of their endurance capability, reliability, compactness and environmental capability are such that these characteristics may be profit- ably applied to meeting a large portion of deep ocean applications and tasks. Current AEC efforts involve the design, development and demonstration of radioisotope sources at electrical power levels up to 100 watts. This emphasis is to meet projected near-term applications involving ocean experimentation and exploration which, in general, will require long-endurance, low-power sources. Plans have been established to initiate the development of both large radioiso- tope sources (1-10 kilowatts) and oceanographic reactor sources at power levels of several hundred kilowatts that are being projected for manned undersea stations and other large oceanographic and continental shelf installations. This prospective need is,not, however, nearly as well defined nor close at hand as the need for low-power sources to warrant expenditure of AEC’s very limited resources. These latter programs will involve an extensive long-term research and development effort on the part of the AEC. In summary, the AEC believes that legislation along the lines of H.R. 4148 and S. 7 is desirable. Island siting of nuclear power plants appears more promising than submerged siting. We believe the development of suitable power sources is essential if undersea missions are to be accomplished, and plan to continue to work closely with other agencies in identifying possible priorities for the devel- opment of nuclear power sources for ocean missions. STATEMENT OF Scott H. ELpER, GENERAL COUNSEL, LAKE CARRIERS’ ASSOCIATION This Bill would amend the Marine Resources and Engineering Act of 1966 (33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101-1108) to establish an independent agency to be know as the 1231 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency, the primary mission of which could be to establish a comprehensive and long-range national program of research development, technical services, exploration and utilization with respect to the marine and atmospheric environment. To this agency would be transferred from the Department of Transportation, the United States Coast Guard. In essence, the Coast Guard would become the major component upon which the new agency would be grounded. As an association of vessel companies engaged in the transportation of bulk commodities upon the Great Lakes, we certainly are not opposed to any scientific endeayor which will bring about greater utilization of our marine and atmos- pheric environment. We do seriously question, however, the advisability of diffus- ing the present-day functions of the Coast Guard by transferring it from the Department of Transportation to a new Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency. H.R. 13247 makes the assumption that all marine endeavors can or should be con- centrated in a single agency irrespective of the nature of those endeavors. This we do not believe to be true, and the Coast Guard is a case in point. Lake Carriers’ Association is an organization comprised of 19 vessel com- panies owning and operating 198 bulk cargo vessels, all of which are of United States flag. The vessels of Association members transport nearly all of the bulk commodity commerce on the Great Lakes which moves by American flag vessels. In order to appreciate the magnitude of bulk commodity transportation on the Great Lakes, it is only necessary to point out that last year the Great Lakes bulk commodity movement totaled 204.8 million tons, comprised mainly of the commodities iron ore, coal, grain, limestone, sand, gravel, cement and petroleum products. The bulk commodity movement, so essential to the industry of the Great Lakes region, could not be accomplished without the services of the Coast Guard. That service contributes immeasurably to the rapid turn-around of the vessels, not only because of the excellent way in which they maintain aids to navigation and assist our vessels through ice in fall and spring, but also because of the cooper- ative manner in which they exercise their regulatory powers. The United States Coast Guard has always indicated a willingness to coordinate their activities and responsibilities in such a way as to maintain vessel opertions, thus assuring the continued movement of bulk cargoes without unnecessary delay. As indicated by the Act of August 4, 1949 (14 U.S.C.A. § 2) as amended by the Act of October 5, 1961, the primary duties of the Coast Guard are: 1. To enforce or assist in the enforcement of all applicable Federal laws upon the high seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States: 2. To administer laws and promulgate and enforce regulations for the promo- tion of safety of life and property on the high seas and waters subject to the jur- isdiction of the United States; 3. To develop, establish, maintain and operate, with due regard to the require- ments of national defense, aids to maritime navigation, ice-breaking facilities, and rescue facilities for the promotion of safety on and over the high seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; 4. To engage in oceanographic research on the high seas and in waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States ; and 5. To maintain a state of readiness to function as a specialized service in the Navy in time of war. Since its inception, the multiple missions of the Coast Guard have been pri- marily transportation-oriented. Basically, the Coast Guard’s responsibilities are enforcement of all federal laws on waters to which they have application, safety of life and property at sea, aiding navigation and readiness to function with the Navy. These various interdependent functions all relate to ships and shipping in one way or another. It was not until the Act of October 5, 1961 that the Coast Guard was given any responsibility in connection with oceanographic research. The legislative history of that Act (Conference Report No. 1194: U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, Page 3339) indicates that the Coast Guard was to conduct oceanographic research using necessary equipment or instruments and analyzing oceanographic data in cooperation with other agencies of the-government, or not, as the Secretary of the department in which the Coast Guard is operating deter- mines to be in the national interest. Thus, the Congress at that time was conscious of the need for safeguards to prevent a dilution of the traditional missions of the Coast Guard, and it achieved this by requiring that the Secretary of the department in which the Coast Guard is operating make the final determination as to public interest. 1232 The Coast Guard, like every other federal agency, does not operate with an unlimited budget. Our apprehension is that the new Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency will be so scientifically oriented and so bent upon enviornmental studies that the traditional missions of the Coast Guard, which it has carried out so well, will be neglected and possibly even abandoned. Our apprehensions in this respect are not unfounded. The Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency would be completely independent of any of the existing departments of the executive branch of the Government. The report of the Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources states that as an independent agency a freedom of action would be achieved which is difficult to obtain within an existing department. The report further indicates that the new agency would be composed of organizational elements concerned primarily with scientific, technical and service functions necessary for expand- ing planned use of the sea and its resources. The primary mission of the new agency would be to insure the full and wise use of the marine environment. Thus, it is clear that primary emphasis would be placed upon advancing the marine and atmospheric sciences. Concerning the Coast Guard’s role in the proposed new agency, the report of the Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources (Page 237) as- Sumes that only in Merchant Marine safety and inspection are the tasks of the Coast Guard solely related to transportation. The report admits (Page 238) that the needs of marine users, in addition to those of the Merchant Marine, often strain the facilities of the Coast Guard. Nevertheless, the report asserts that “changes in the Coast Guard and its mission should be encouraged and acceler- ated by bringing it within the framework of the national ocean program to be lead by NOAA.” The basic point the report attempts to make is that within a national oceanic and atmospheric agency the Coast Guard could be used to a much greater degree in a more broadly gauged role than is possible within a solely transportation context, and “that this can be achieved without curtailing its important transportation functions.” On this basic point we strong disagree. The report of the Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources (Page 237) makes an analysis of Coast Guard activity, the conclusion of which is that while most Coast Guard activities relate to transportation, they are similarly related to other uses of the sea. While it is probably true that provi- sion of aids to navigation, which require 28 per cent of the agency’s budget, is critical to the whole span of marine activities, it is essentially a service to ship- ping. Ice breaking, which the report classifies with oceanography, meteorology and other marine sciences, is essentially a service to commercial shipping and only incidentally related to the marine sciences. The Coast Guard is engaged in many diversified fields, but nearly all of its activities ; namely, ice breaking, ice patrols, search and rescue, aids to navigation, vessel inspection, port security and certification of Merchant Marine personnel, relate to shipping. When an organization such as the Coast Guard is performing multiple missions, priorities have to be established. The Commission on Marine Science and Engi- neering Resources would encourage and accelerate changes in the Coast Guard and its mission, despite the fact that the facilities of the Coast Guard are already often overstrained. It could not be clearer that under an independent agency such as that proposed by H.R. 13247, the transportation-related functions of the Coast Guard would have a low priority. Our Government is based on a system of checks and balances. When the legis- lation authorizing the Coast Guard to conduct oceanographic research was enacted in 1961, it was evident from the legislative history of the Act that oceano- graphic research was not intended to interfere with or take priority over other functions of the Coast Guard. Under present law, the Secretary of the depart- ment in which the Coast Guard is operating determines the extent to which the Coast Guard is to conduct oceanographic research, in the national interest, in cooperation with other agencies of the Government. Thus, the Secretary of Transportation is permitted to exercise his discretion so as to assure that the missions of the Coast Guard, directly affecting transportation and the Department of Transportation, will not be neglected. We recognize that there is a need for greater research in the marine sciences. We believe that the objectives of the proposed National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency are meritorious and worthwhile. We do not believe there is any necessity, however, for transferring the Coast Guard to the new agency. There is already ampie authority in law for the new agency to utilize the facilities of the Coast Guard, even though the Coast Guard is operating in the Department of Transportation. 1235 For these reasons, we earnestly urge that in the event H.R. 13247 is enacted, the Coast Guard not be transferred to the new National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency. STATEMENT OF Dr. THOMAS D. Barrow, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL OCEANOGRAPHY ASSOCIATION My name is Thomas D. Barrow. I am president of the National Oceanography Association and am appearing before you today in that capacity to present the consensus viewpoint of the board of directors of that organization on H.R. 13247. I am also an active member of several other oceanography organizations and am a senior vice president and director of Humble Oil and Refining Company, Hous- ton, Texas. The National Oceanography Association appreciates the opportunity to appear before the subcommittee to comment on H.R. 13247. As you know, the National Oceanography Association is a citizens’ organization representing industry, science, education and the general public desiring a strong national ocean program. We have approximately 500 corporate members which makes us the largest and broadest industrial-based oceanographic group. We also have some 1.700 individual members. For the record, I would like to submit as Exhibit Ia brochure listing our board of directors and their affiliations. Last May 22, 1969, then NOA president John H. Clotworthy appeared before this subcommittee to comment on the report of the Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources and to express the association’s support for the Na- tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency as recommended by the Commission. His statements were based on a resolution adopted on January 27, 1969, by the NOA board of directors approving the concept of both NOAA and NACO. On September 18, the NOA board of directors adopted a further statement of position. This statement, as do my other comments, reflects the consensus of opinions of our collective board for which I appear and am testifying today. The views expressed are those of NOA and are not necessarily those of any one direc- tor or company represented on NOA’s board, I will not read this statement but attach it as Exhibit II. The National Oceanography Association policy statement recognizes the need for a central agency in government to undertake and oversee innovative oceanic and environmental activities which are appropriate to government. Such an organization is essential to efficiency and the elimination of duplication of effort. H.R. 13247 and the report of the President’s Commission on Marine Science, En- gineering and Resources are both devoted to this end and are therfore in this principle endorsed by the National Oceanography Association. We also specifi- cally support the establishment of a National Advisory Committee for Oceans and Atmosphere. The Stratton Commission has been highly commended by NOA (and others) for the thoroughness of its review and the high professional quality of its report to the President. Its basic concepts are embodied in the declaration of policy and objectives of H.R. 13247, where it is stated that the policy of the United States is to “encourage, develop, and maintain a comprehensive, coordinated and con- tinuing national program in marine and atmospheric science, technology, and technical services for the benefit of mankind. ...” We think that this is an important delineation of the scope of the proposed law. Essentially, H.R. 13247 in concerned with the organization of government to conduct research and development activities and provide broad-based user serv- ices. As such, that instrument should properly be devoted to organizing the func- tions of government which are pertinent to government activity. It should not be a device to inject government into the historic activities of private enterprise. Certainly this bill could not obtain the widespread support of industry which it deserves if it were to violate the legitmate functions of private industry. We believe that in two important respects it does that. In section 104 deserib- ing “Functions of the Agency”, paragraph (a) (6) and (7) the NOAA is directed to explore and evaluate the living and mineral resources of the ocean environ- ment and to develop hardware essential to that end. This, clearly, is an activity best performed by private industry. We, therefore, suggest that section 104, paragraph (a) (6) and (7) be revised so as to read as follows: (our suggested revisions underlined) “encourage private enterprise to make surveys to identify, locate, and measuring living and mineral resources of the marine environment ;” 1234 and part (7) to “encourage private enterprise in the exploration of the marine environment, including the development, construction, testing and operation of vehicles and associated equipment ;”’. Within government, the essential function of a lead agency to conduct the national oceanic and atmospheric program should be to organize and coordinate activities devoted to the advancement of mankind’s knowledge and operational capability in the ocean spaces and environment. We concur in the Stratton Com- mission’s conclusion that “the new agency should be composed of organizational elements concerned primarily with scientific, technical and service functions necessary for expanding planned use of the sea and its resources, for monitoring and predicting the total air-sea environment, and for exploring the feasibility and consequences of environmental modification.” This statement is as important for what it does not include in the NOAA as for what it does include. It would properly vest the agency with a focus of purpose on expanding the frontiers of knowledge. However, we believe it was not the intent of the Stratton Commission nor flees it appear to be the intent of H.R. 13247 to transfer to the agency all of the Federal Government’s oceanographie affairs. We believe that careful consideration should be given to the principle espoused by the Commission of separating the innovative research, development and services activities from the management of statutory law and the regulation of commerce in the ocean spaces. We think this distinction should be noted and preserved, and that, generally, the regulation of commercial activity should remain the responsibility of the government agen- cies already charged with those responsibilities. It is not NOA’s intent to give the impression that we are experts in either government organization or reorganization. We are not. However, many of us have had experience in the organizational structures of business enterprises and the problems accompanying any reorganization. We have found that there is no final ultimate organizational format, but that it must continually be adjusted because of external developments. We have also found that at any one moment of time, there are innumerable considerations concerning the location, mix, and timing for a reorganization. We make our decisions based on the confidence that the long-term gains offset the short-term costs. The NOA joins the Stratton Commission and this subcommittee’s belief that ocean activities deserve a higher priority on the Nation’s agenda. There is still the acknowledged vital need today for a grouping of major civilian oceanic func- tions and we do not consider it necessary to await the results of the report of the President’s Advisory Council on Government Organization to see how oceanog- raphy fits into the broad context of the Federal organizational structure. NOAA, as contemplated in H.R. 13247, can certainly be made a component of whatever broader reorganization may be ultimately achieved. In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would like, on behalf of NOA, to thank you and the members of the subcommittee for allowing us to present our views on this important bill. Tuer NATIONAL OCEANOGRAPHY ASSOCIATION A CITIZENS’ ORGANIZATION FOR A STRONG NATIONAL OCEAN PROGRAM REPRESENTING INDUSTRY, SCIENCE, EDUCATION AND THE GENERAL PUBLIC Purpose The American public has a great stake in the optimum multiple uses of the oceans. For example, our national security, supply of mineral resources, recrea- tional opportunities, availability of low-cost protein from fish, quality of coastal and Great Lakes’ environments, knowledge about the earth’s formation and improved weather forecasting will all be affected by the strength of our national ocean effort. The National Oceanography Association’s purpose is to encourage develop- ment of a strong national ocean program to realize the potential of the seas. A strong national program will have maximum participation by private enterprise, appropriate governmental support and scientific and academic participation. The association, with its varied educational and legislative programs, fills the oceanography community’s need for a national voice representing a cross-section of interests. Program of action Association activities reflect its broad composition. The NOA program concen- trates on these principal areas: 1235 Educational—NOaA serves as a national clearinghouse for oceanographic infor- mation for: e Students and teachers—NOA publishes curricula and scholarship information and material helpful to persons interested in exploring oceanography as a career field. e The general public—NOA has distributed thousands of Oceanography Infor- mation Kits. The monthly NOA News containing information on industrial and government activities of general interest is distributed to members, major news- papers, scientists, Members of Congress and other opinion leaders. e News media—NOA encourages expanded coverage of oceanographic develop- ments as a direct sponsor, as a source of data about the oceanographic community and by bringing oceanographic activities to the attention of editors. e Businessmen—Periodic legislative bulletins pinpoint Washington events of Significance. Legistative-—NOA encourages appropriate governmental action to promote the interests of industry and the general public by : e Conferences with top government leaders to exchange ideas and views. e Testimony before congressional committees. e Development of positions on major guestions through NOA committees. e Distribution of questionnaries to members on national questions. e Reports on legislative matters to the members so that they may take action. National Voice.—NOA provides individuals and firms interested in promoting oceanography a means of making their views known to each other, to the public and to elected officials in such areas as: government reorganization, international law, education and manpower, fisheries, offshore petroleum, civilian technology and national defense. The association The National Oceanography Association was incorporated in 1966 in the Dis- trict of Columbia as a nonprofit corporation and is tax-exempt under section 501 (c) (6) of the Internal Revenue Code. NOA is a citizens’ organization whose membership and board of directors include representatives of industry, science, educational institutions and the general public. Policy is determined by the board of directors and implemented by the staff headed by the executive director in the association’s Washington, D.C. office. The association is supported by voluntary membership, both corporate and individual. OFFICERS AND BoARD OF DIRECTORS, NATIONAL OCEANOGRAPHY ASSOCIATION President: Dr. Thomas D. Barrow, senior vice president, Humble Oil & Refining Co., Houston, Tex. Vice president: Dr. William T. Burke, School of Law, University of Wash- ington, Seattle, Wash. Secretary : Harmon L. Elder, vice president, Wilson EH. Hamilton & Associates, Ine. Washington, D.C. Treasurer: Kenneth H. Drummond, director, program development, Teledyne, Inc., Washington, D.C. Vincent R. Bailey, executive vice president—Ocean Activities, Perry Oceano- graphics, Inc., West Palm Beach, Fla. Dr. Wayne V. Burt, associate dean of research, Department of Oceanography, Oregon State University, Corvallis, Oreg. Dr. W. M. Chapman, director, Ralston Purina Co., San Diego, Calif. John H. Clotworthy, president, Oceans General, Inc., Miami, Fila. Dr. Richard A. Geyer, head, Department of Oceanography, Texas A&M University, College Station, Tex. Dr. Theodor F. Hueter, vice president and general manager Honeywell, Inc., Marine Systems Center Seattle, Wash. Dr. Columbus Iselin, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, Woods Hole, Mass. . Dr. John A. Knauss, provost for marine affairs, Narragansett Marine Labora- tory, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, R.I. Gordon Lill, former director of Mohole project, Encino, Calif. Arthur L. Markel, vice president and general manager, Reynolds Submarine Services Corp., Miami, Fla. John D. Moody, senior vice president, Mobil Oil Corp., New York, N.Y. 1236 Dr. William A. Nierenberg, director, Scripps Institution of Oceanography, La Jolla, Calif. Dr. David S. Potter, director of research, AC Electronics Defense Research Laboratories, General Motors Corp., Milwaukee, Wis. Taylor A. Pryor, president, The Oceanic Foundation, Makapuu Point, Wa- imanalo, Oahu, Hawaii. Admiral Arthur W. Radford, U.S.N. (Retired), former Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C. C. M. Shigley, Government affairs department the Dow Chemical Co., Mid land, Mich. Dr. F. G. Walton Smith, director, Institute of Marine and Atmospheric Sci- ences, University of Miami, Miami, Fla. Richard C. Vetter, executive secretary, Committee on Oceanography, Na- tional Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C. Dr. James H. Wakelin, Jr., chairman of the board, The Oceanic Foundation, Makapuu Point, Waimanalo, Oahu, Hawaii. Executive director: Richard N. Rigby, Jr. Exuisir II STATEMENT ADOPTED BY THE NATIONAL OCEANOGRAPHY ASSOCIATION BOARD OF DIRECTORS AT A MEETING SEPTEMBER 18, 1969 I. Events since January emphasize the need for a concerted national ocean program consisting of maximum private enterprise participation, appropriate Federal governmental support (reorganized and better focused through estab- lishment of an independent ocean agency), scientific and academic participation and increased state-level involvement. The damage inflicted by Hurricane Camille in the Gulf of Mexico in August points to our inability to predict storm paths with accuracy. The unknown impact of waste disposal in the oceans and coastal zones shows our need for additional research. Recent reports of coral-eating starfish attacking Hawaiian reefs demonstrates our imperfect understanding of ocean phenomena. Growing public awareness of coastal environmental problems underscores our need to act to protect and improve our management of the coastal zone and Great Lakes for optimum multiple usage. The disappearance of traditional fishing stock, such as haddock from New England coasts, points up our need for improved fisheries’ research and management. Accomplishments this year, in deep-sea drilling, the Northwest Passage ex- periment, Project Tektite, the Gulf Stream drift mission and Barbados Ocean- ographic and Meteorological Experiment (BOMEX) to cite several, indicate how much more we could accomplish with a more concerted industrial, academic and governmental effort. II. The National Oceanography Association board of directors endorses the purpose of H.R. 13247 introduced by Congressman Alton A. Lennon and its Senate counterpart, S. 2841, introduced by Senator Ernest F. Hollings, establish- ing the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency (NOAA) and companion National Advisory Committee for Oceans and Atmosphere (NACOA). We believe establishment of these bodies are essential steps in developing a strong national ocean program which has as a principal objective: “The en- couragement of private investment enterprise in exploration, technological de- velopment, marine commerce, and economic utilization of the resources of the marine environment.” (Sec. 102(a) (3)). We are apprehensive that the language of section 104(a), paragraphs (6) and (7), conflicts with this basic objective and traditional private enterprise responsibiilty and strongly recommend the words “. .. encourage private enterprise to make...” before part (6) and “ _ . encourage private enterprise in the... .” before part (7) be inserted as amendments to the bills. III. The National Oceanography Association board of directors believes a high priority for NOAA and NACOA should be the problems of the Nation’s coastal zone and shores of the Great Lakes. The goal of managing the optimum multiple uses of these national resources 'to accommodate recreational, industrial, trans- portation, fishing and other desirable uses is a major challenge for NOAA and NACOA. 1237 It is our hope that legislation can be enacted and signed into law establishing NOAA and NACOA and charging these bodies with early study of coastal zone multiple-use problems involving extensive consultation with private and aca- demic resources and State and local authorities. We urge that the Nixon Administration recognize the broad public support for oceanographic advancement and back the establishment of NOAA and NACOA, thereby seizing the opportunity to support a step which as promise of immediate benefit, through better coordination of existing Federal effort, and the potential to help produce results of significance to generations ahead.” BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION Dr. THOMAS D. Barrow, PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL OCEANOGRAPHY ASSOCIATION Dr. Thomas D. Barrow, a senior vice president and director of Humble Oil and Refining Company, was born December 27, 1924, in San Antonio, Texas, and raised in Houston. He is a graduate of The University of Texas with a bachelor of science degree in petroleum engineering. He reecived an M.A. degree in geology from The Uni- versity of Texas and a Ph. D. from Stanford University in the same field. Dr. Barrow joined Humble in 1951 as a junior geologist, and has served sub- sequently as an area exploration geologist, regional geologist and regional ex- ploration manager. In 1964, he joined Esso Exploration, Inc., an affiliate of Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) as a director and executive vice president. He returned to Humble the following year as a member of the board of directors and two years later was named to his present post as a senior vice president. Among Dr. Barrow’s memberships in addition to his service as National Oceanography Association president for 1969-70 are the following: Director, American Society for Oceanography Member, Oceanography Advisory Committee for the Oceanographer of the Navy Member, Sea Grant Advisory Panel Member, Marine Technology Society Member, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Natural Resources Committee and Marine Resources Advisory Panel STATEMENT oF TIMoTHY J. May, COUNSEL, BOATING INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee : My name is Timothy J. May and I appear here today as counsel to the Boat- ing Industry Association (BIA). Because of its great interest in the lakes and waterways of our nation, and the oceans adjacent to our shores, BIA welcomes this opportunity to participate with the Subcommittee in this most significant area of oceanographic research. BIA is a non-profit national trade association representing more than 600 manufacturers of pleasure boats and boating equipment, and providing many services of an educational and informative nature to the entire industry and to the boating public. In addition, we work directly with boat owners in all parts of the country through our two consumer divisions, the Outboard Boating Club of America, serving members of affiliated boating clubs, and the Boat Owners Council of America, serving individual boat owners. Each year BIA conducts a study of the market for boats and boating equip- ment based upon consumer questionnaires received from purchasers of new outboard motors, boats and boat trailers. These questionnaires are part of a package of materials supplied to member manufacturers by BIA, and distributed with the products at the points of sale. In addition, BIA accumulates statistical information from the states based on the number of actual registrations of boats. From these accumulated data, BIA and the National Association of Engine and Boat Manufacturers (NAEBM ) make various statistical estimates. For example, it is estimated that more than 42 million persons participiated in recreational boating last year in the United States using nearly 9 million boats. More than $3 billion was spent at retail for new and used boats, motors, acces- sories, safety equipment, fuel, insurance, docking maintenance, launching, stor- age, repairs and club memberships. 1238 The Department of Transportation has as its main purpose transportation safety and efficiency. For this reason the Federal Aviation Agency and the Coast Guard were brought under the DOT. In addition, matters relating to automo- bile safety standards, highway safety, railroad safety, pipeline safety and safety of motor carriers were all placed in the Department. The latest figures suggest that over 70% ($296.1 million) of the Coast Guard’s budget is involved with purposes of transportation ; approximately 19.0% ($76.5 million) is expended for military matters; and 7%. ($29.4 million) is expended for oceanography. The Coast Guard has always played a vital role in boating safety. During the fiscal year 1968, the Coast Guard responded to nearly 30 thousand calls for assistance by private vessels. The total number of persons involved in assitance cases exceeded 117 thousand. Pursuant to the mission of the Coast Guard to promote safety it has recognized that construction safety standards by the boat building industry contribute greatly to safe boating. In this connection, close liaison is maintained with industry through several industry associations, including BIA. The Coast Guard provides and operates many aids to navigation. The majority of these have been established for commercial purposes but all are available for use by pleasure boatmen. In addition to the research and rescue work done by the Coast Guard, the U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary, a volunteer, non-military organization promotes safety in recreational boating. The Auxiliary carries out two basic programs. The first is courtesy motorboat examination. This includes a thorough safety examination. In Fiscal year 1969, approximately 167 thousand of these examina- tions were carried out. The Auxiliary also carries out a program of public instruction, and in 1969, more than 167 thousand recreational boats took part in classroom instruction in safe boating practices. Because of the vital role the Coast Guard plays in marine safety, it is difficult for us to support the recommendation in H.R. 13247 that the Coast Guard be transferred to the National Oceanic and Atomspheric Agency (NOAA), whose primary function is to be the “advancement of fundamental understanding of the biological, physical, geological, and chemical characteristics of the marine environment and atmosphere.” BIA feels that this purpose is not compatible with the Coast Guard‘s function as the nation’s principal maritime safety agency. Transfer of the Search and Rescue function to another agency would cripple a systems approach to maritime safety. The system has two essential elements, prevention of casulaties and re- covery when casualties occur. Because the Coast Guard’s orientation is over- whelming towards transportation, and more specifically, transportation safety, its transfer to another agency would probably cause the DOT to engage in costly duplicate efforts, or perhaps even result in the dismemberment of the Coast Guard to return its transportation functions to DOT. Dr. Robert A. Frosch, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research and Develop- ment, stated before the Subcommittee that the Commission Report failed to ade- quately consider the large proportion of the Coast Guard’s work concerned with search and rescue, and with marine safety matters not closely allied to the other functions assigned to NOAA. Because the Coast Guard is an operational agency, we also feel that its inclusion in NOAA would be further damaged by the fact that NOAA is a research organi- zation. The Coast Guard’s vast resources are not compatible with carrying out research and development programs as its main responsibility. Experience with NASA and with research and development departments in industry indicate that research-oriented programs tend to spin off operational responsibilities. In addition the Commission Report states, “the Coast Guard represents an enormously valuable national marine resource that is at present underutilized because of traditional constraints on its mission and lack of proper milieu for its operations.” This appears to be the basic premise on which the Commission Report builds its ease for transferring the Coast Guard to a new agency. It is our understanding that the Coast Guard is stretched to the limit in meeting its present operational workload. If the Coast Guard is transferred, we are concerned that without substantial increases in its budget, the proposed new direction for the Coast Guard could only be achieved by elimination or reduction of the vital transportation and safety services now being performed. The financial plan of the Commission Report does not project the increase in resources needed to 1239 continue adequate transportation and safety services and at the same time greatly expand the Marine Sciences program. In summary, BIA strongly supports the establishment of NOAA but we cannot support the recommendation of the Commission that the Coast Guard be trans- ferred to NOAA. We fear that such a transfer would gravely impair the vital role the Coast Guard now plays in marine safety and transportation, because of the essentially research oriented nature of NOAA. The BIA greatly appreciates the opportunity to appar before this Subcommit- tee, and compliments the Commission on Marine Science, Hngineering and Resources on its fine Report. One of our Board members played an active role in advising the Commission. STATEMENT OF Hoyt S. HaAppock, Executive Director, AFL-CIO MARITIME COMMITTEE My name is Hoyt 8S. Haddock and I am Executive Director of the AFL-CIO Maritime Committee. I am pleased to be able to present this statement to the Subcommittee on Oceanography of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, in support of the objectives of H.R. 13247, a bill to amend the Marine Resources and Engineering Development Act of 1966 to establish a comprehensive and long-range national program of research, development, technical services, exploration and utilization with respect to our marine and atmospheric environ- ment, which you are now considering. The United States must provide positive leadership in the development of the oceans for peace. The United States has pursued piece-meal and at times back- ward approaches to the nation’s ocean problems. Programs for a merchant marine, deepsea fishing, naval power and oceanographic programs have proceeded with- out an overall concept to inform and guide them. The result has been far short of success in any field except perhaps naval power. This obviously does not meet the nation’s needs. How fully and wisely the United States uses the oceans in the decades ahead will affect profoundly our security, our economy, our ability to meet increasing demands for food and raw materials, our position and influence in the world com- munity and the quality of the environment in which we all live. It is ironic that in this as in other fields we cannot proceed to meet our known needs by logical progressive programs. We seem only to be able to rise to the occa- sion when threatened from the outside. For example, it took “Sputnik” to put us into the space program with purpose. Today, the Soviets are well on their way to building a tool (their merchant navy) to carry the foreign commerce of the world; control the political and eco- nomic life of every country; take vast amounts of protein from the oceans to feed the peoples in underdeveloped countries. Yet we continue to stumble along as though we know nothing about a merchant fleet, a fishing capability, an ability to farm and mine the oceans and exploit their vast resources for the good of man. Must we await a “JETNIK” of the oceans to spur us on to do the jobs that we know must be done? Can we not proceed now with orderly programs to use the oceans in a great drive for peace for all mankind? Certainly we will not unless we proceed now in an orderly manner to rebuild our merchant marine to carry a substantial portion of our foreign commerce. Certainly not unless we proceed to farm the oceans and take from them literally millions of tons of addi- tional food protein through a modern fishing fleet and sea farm system. Certainly not unless we embark now on unlocking the tremendous mineral resources which lie in and under the oceans now. The nation has available a great and tried tool to achieve the goals which we all know must be achieved, if we are to survive as a nation. The “tool” is the nation’s policy of developing dual purpose programs. Certainly one of the greatest acts of Congress, if not the greatest, was the passage of the 1936 Merchant Marine Act. The greatness of this Act lies in its establishing a dual purpose program. A program which provided that the: 1. American merchant marine will be the tool to promote and protect our foreign commerce and serve the military in providing security for our nation; and 2. Government will provide the U.S. merchant marine (including ship- building) with economic parity with ships of foreign nations. The 1936 Act created the conditions for an American merchant marine. Neither industry nor government would have done this job alone. We are confident that 1240 if the executive branch had provided the administrative posture and climate called for by the Act, we would now have sufficient ships to meet the nation’s needs. Even with the half-hearted and interrupted administration of the Act, it is still a considerabie success. We are confident that every member of Congress recognizes that the great strides made in the space program would not have been possible without the fullest application of this dual purpose, cooperative principle between govern- ment and industry. The difference has been that the government gave every possible encouragement to the space program, while with the merchant marine and the oceanographic program there has been budgetary privation and discour- aging administrative effort. While we plunge headlong into space, from which the needs of mankind will not come, and while our great dual purpose merchant marine program is being scuttled and along with it a meaningful oceans program, the Soviets go ahead and imaginatively apply their own multi-purpose policy to the oceans. That is a program designed by the Soviets to provide them with “Seapower,” to control the oceans, their products and the commerce on them. A program which is well on its way. Unfortunately, we have not recognized this Soviet program as hay- ing equal or greater warning implications as “Sputnik’. We say this because it appears that our great nation cannot move meaningfully—except in fear. What we require apparently is some great progenitor of fear, to put us on a full scale program of exploration and development of the oceans. We will not have an oceans program until we have developed our merchant marine, our ocean fishing programs. We will not explore the oceans and provide our factories with the billions of tons of mineral and protein which lie in and under the oceans until we have an on-going multi-purpose program that has the complete backing of our government in full cooperation with American industry. With the merchant marine and fishing programs going forward properly with a multi-purpose oceans program we can unlock the secrets of the oceans and make them servants of mankind. For example, the Navy’s ocean programs for security must become multi-purpose. Thus, the knowledge already available to the military can be directed to the peaceful purposes of mankind. Thus the multi- purpose policy which Congress first announced in 1936 can and must be ‘the spring-board for ithe development of the ‘oceans. The government and industry can, through such multi-purpose programs, guarantee the people with their needs and strengthen the possibility of achieving peace,. which all mankind badly needs. In my preceding remarks I have emphasized the dual purpose that the Ameri- can merchant marine with which, until recent years, you gentlement and the industry of which I am a representative are most familiar. But through the dis- tinguished and outstanding efforts of the Congress and particularly this Com- mittee, we are being shown the way to further strength and perfection of our proper national posture in the oceans in the broadest possible sense. The fragmentation in the past of our ocean activities is now well on its way to being eliminated in favor of the words in the Declaration of Policy and Objec- tives in the Marine Resources and Development Act of 1966 in which it was. Stated : “Tt is hereby declared to be the policy of the United Sta'tes to develop, en- courage, and maintain a coordinated, comprehensive, and long-range na- tional program in marine science for the benefit of mankind to assist in pro- tection of health and property, enhancement of commerce, transportation, and national security, rehabilitation of our commercial fisheries, and in- creased utilization of these and other resources.”’ I believe the 1966 Marine Science Act will be a permanent monument to the patience and wisdom of its authors who worked so diligently for over seven years to establish a sound statutory base for an effective long-range marine program for the United States and indeed for all mankind. The National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Development, under the Chairmanship of the Vice President, has coordinated on-going programs . among the numerous agencies and sub-agencies of government concerned in any serious way with marine affairs. The Commission on Marine Science, Engineer- ing and Resources, created by the 1966 Act, labored diligently for two full years. with its distinguished membership and consultation and advice with all of the expertise in the nation. The landmark report, “Our Nation and the Sea,’ re- leased in January of this year, is indeed a plan for national action. 1241 The determined but careful approach adopted by this Subcommittee in its consideration of “Our Nation and the Sea” in the months immediately following its release is strongly commended. In the light of the twelve or more days of hearings held by your Subcommittee between January and June of this year, we feel that the objectives of the bill before you, H.R. 13247, are strongly supported by the record. The creation of a central agency of the United States government with requisite authority and support to administer and coordinate the nation’s several marine and atmos- pheric endeavors seems to us clearly an essential goal. This should eliminate the fragmentation and inefficiency of the present organizational arrangements. Full implementation of the basic recommendations of the Marine Science Com: mission’s report will provide an organizational focus for a total marine effort, an effort emphasizing the advancement of fundamental understanding of the characteristics of the marine environment and atmosphere, the development of fundamental technology to achieve more effective use of the marine and atmos- pheric environments, and the other equally significant functions set forth in Section 104 of the bill. We also strongly favor the creation of the National Advisory Committee for Oceans and Atmosphere to provide continuing review of the progress of the nation in achieving the objectives of the proposed legislation. Despite our strong approval and support of the Commission report and the bill H.R. 18247, we would prefer to see the combined agencies proposed in the bill create the new Department of Oceans. We are told by Congressional and administrative leaders that this is not possible for the foreseeable future. If this is the case, then these agencies should be brought together in the Oceans Commission for Economic and Advanced Natural Sciences, to be known as OCEANS, or if you prefer SEAS—Seas Environmental Agency Services. We also feel that the functions of the Maritime Administration should be incorporated in the newly organized Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency. This can simply and effectively be accomplished with a minimum of disruption of the existing bureaus proposed for incorporation into such a new agency. Notwithstanding the reservations just expressed concerning the Department of Commerce as the focus agency and incorporation of the Maritime Administration, we do not offer at this time specific amendmenits to accomplish these purposes and these reservations do not diminish our support of H.R. 13247 as it will, hopefully, soon be reported by your distinguished Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, followed by early and effective action in the House. Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer for the record a document prepared and widely distributed by the National Maritime Union of America, AFL-CIO, entitled “Frontiers Below.’* I think it will demonstrate to you and members of the Com- mittee as well or better than ‘anything I have said today ‘that we are fully appre- ciative of the vital importance of early and broad effective implementation of the policies stated in ithe Marine Science Act of 1966. Thus we look imaginatively ‘to exploitation of 'the oceans for mankind. Yet our reasoning is alarmed at the screech and howl of the gale, a gale which warns that we will not move without a “JETNIK” blasting us out of our mental doldrums. This is the doldrum of ‘complacency which only fear seems able to penetrate. Nevertheless, we intend to continue our hopes for mankind and ‘the oceans. In doing this, we intend to back up a bit with our projections into the future. Today we are going to talk in terms which are totally practical. Practical terms which we can undestand as necessary, and obtainable, in our time. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO, La Jolla, Calif., August 26, 1969. Hon. ALTON LENNON, 2 U.S. House of Representatives, Longworth House Office Building, Washington, D.C. Dear Mr. Lennon: Thank you for the copy of H.R. 13247. This letter is in response to your request for comments on the bill. I support the bill and its principal objectives. As far as possible, my support and detailed comments are distilled from the combined opinions of many years of experience of the senior staff of the Scripps Institution of Oceanography. On the whole, United States interests have historically been well served by such institutions as Scripps, Woods Hole, Lamont, the University of Washington, the Institute of Marine Sciences at Miami and the other dedicated institutions as well *The document was placed in the files of the subcommittee. 1242 as the involved government agencies such as ONR, the NSF and BCF. However, a great deal is lacking in terms of a really national effort and many opportunities have been missed in our failure to capitalize on important ideas that have emanated from the community. In order to understand this we only have to examine and admire the way the AEC has planned, coordinated and executed a truly national program in their area of responsibility. My letter is too brief to allow more than a summary extraction of the successful elements of the AEC program that are lacking in our oceanographic effort. Categorically, these are: 1. General capital budget. 2. Advanced specialized engineering. 8. Special capital budgets (ships and structures). 4, Manpower needs. Among the variety of planning functions that are required I have chosen these four because this is where the failures occur and this is just where a centralized agency is needed. Before detailing these items, I would like to explain how these failures come about. This is best understood via a counter- example and that is the operating budget. It has been my experience that a good proposal can be funded—if not one year then the next. The various agencies at present are geared to examine proposals critically and—if they pass—to vigorously prosecute the budget required to support them. This is very natural because a good administrator wishes to be associated with good pro- grams. However, the same administrator is not likely to act as vigorously for capital equipment such as buildings, ships and structures or for such long range, non-program associated projects such as specialized engineering. He would naturally prefer others to supply this service. If as in the case of the AHC, he is part of a specialized agency, he can reasonably expect that bureaucratic efforts to obtain the long range benefits will eventually pay off for his own. programs. I, personally, have been the beneficiary of this kind of excellent planning as a section leader in the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory of the AEC. I was im- pressed with how facilities which must have been years in the planning became available just as we needed them. The explanation of the items listed above is as follows: 1. The capital items referred to here form the normal capital equipment of most laboratories, i.e., mass-spectrometers, x-ray analyzers, gas chromato- graphs. The development of any national program depends heavily on this in- vestment being made regularly. My previous experience indicates that an investment of about fifteen per cent of the annual operating budget is required, perhaps nearer twenty per cent, to allow for the more rapid depreciation of a rapidly developing technology. We are by no means making this kind of investment today and because of recent cutbacks, the first effects were felt in just this area by the nature of the system. 2. The major oceanographic centers should have specialized advanced engi- neering groups who are funded independently of specific programs but who: concentrate on the special developments needed for oceanography in the period three to five years ahead. Suggested areas are seagoing computers and com- munications, remote power sources for benthic operations, mid-ocean platform technology, and so on. The AHC has maintained special groups for high speed electronics, accelerator design and special materials from almost its inception. 3. Ships and special offshore research structures are to oceanography what the cyclotron is to nuclear physics and a policy of supplying the ships and operating costs to the major centers on a continuing basis is required. Assuming 100% use is satisfied at such centers, greater freedom from the present patchwork support is essential. * 4. A more rational manpower program is required than the present situation provides. I see overstimulation in some areas and underdevelopment in others. A Single agency would be in better position to estimate these needs and assign its support on a priority basis. ft wish to emphasize that I have touched only on those deficiencies that a single agency could rectify. I do feel, however, that these are critical and are just the ones that have prevented a major national effort from getting underway. I am convinced that H.R. 13247 holds the basis for a successful solution to these problems. Very truly yours, WILLIAM A. NIERENBERG. 1243 AMERICAN MACHINE & FounpDRY Co., Washington, D.C., August 28, 1969. Hon. ALTON LENNON, House of Representatives, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Long- worth House Office Building, Washington, D.C. Dear Mr. LENNON: Thank you for sending me a copy of H.R. 13247, along with the cover letter asking for my personal views. In general, I personally agree with most of the contents of this Bill. However, in my opinion, there are two very important subjects deserving further comment: 1. The most important comment relates to the Advisory Committee staff as mentioned on page 17, lines 12 to 14. As stated in the Commission Report, “Our Nation and the Sea,” page 246, the Chairman of the Advisory Committee should choose his own staff. The proposed Bill, however, leaves it up to the Agency Administrator to furnish the staff. I believe this would be a glaring error since the Advisory Committee should operate independently of the Agency in order for it to be most effective. 2. Aithough this has rarely been discussed in public, the key to the Hxecutive Department reorganization hinges around three, not two, items. These are the proposed agency, the advisory committee, and also the establishment of a statu- torily established interagency committee to be chaired by the Agency Administra- tor. It is spelled out most clearly on page VI-25 of Volume 2, “Industry and Technology’ Commission Panel Report, and in earlier testimony to your sub- committee by Dr. Chalmer Kirkbridge. It is also discussed in the Commission Report on pages 244-245, although in much vaguer language. Only in this way can we help insure that the oceanographic programs of the Navy, Army, Interior and other key agencies will be coordinated with that of the proposed independent agency. Ample precedent for this is cited in the Commission Report. Also, as you know, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research and Development used to have a second duty, namely that of chairman of the former Interagency Committee on Oceanography. I believe that the language in paragraph ¢ of page 7 in your Bill is not nearly strong enough, nor does it imply the need for a statutorily created Federal interagency mechanism. Thank you once again for affording me the opportunity to comment on your proposed Bill. Sincerely yours, A. L. LANE. Hon. ALTON LENNON, Chairman, Subcommittee on Oceanography, House Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Longworth Building, Washington, D.C. Dear Mr. CHarrMAN. Thank you for your letter enclosing a copy of H.R. 13247. I favor a NOAA to bring together the many agencies of government involved in civilian ocean activities. I also favor a NACO to bring the industry, the states and the academic community views into the execution of a sound national program that has a strong federal input. I am concerned that there is a general lack of a sense of urgency in many areas with respect to the organization and administration of the ocean programs. I attribute this complacency to the failure of many to relate the ocean program to the “people” problems that are now pressing in this country. I believe that the most pressing ocean problems are those of the coastal zone and that these are closely related to our ‘people’ problems. NOAA and NACO would facilitate ocean contribute to the solutions of our ‘“‘people” problems. I think that the above point, if stressed, would increase the prospects for early enactment of H.R. 13247. I would welcome the opportunity to discuss this view point with you at your convenience. Sincerely, HH. C. STEPHAN, Rear Adm., USN (Retired). 1244 Sun Or Co., Philadelphia, Pa., August 26, 1969. Hon. ALTON LENNON, House of Representatives, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Longworth House Office Building, Washington, D.C. My Dear Mr. Lennon. I appreciate your sending me a copy of H.R. 13247 along with your recent cover letter. I found that this Bill contained the important things which I recommended in my testimony before your Subcommittee on Oceanography on May 8, 1969. Although I did not study the Bill in great detail, it impressed me as being a very good one. The only suggestion I found which gets down to what might be classified as nit-picking is in Line 12 on Page 2. I would recommend the insertion of “industry”’ between the word, ‘‘of’ and “commerce.” Then Line 12 would read, “. .. the enchancement of industry, commerce, transportation, and national... .” Thanks again for your kindness in letting me see the early version of this Bill. Sincerely yours, CHALMER G. KIRKBRIDE. Sun OIL Co.. Philadelphia, Pa., September 8, 1969. Hon. ALTON LENNON, House of Representatives, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Longworth House Office Building, Washington, D.C My Dear Mr. LENNON. Since my letter of August 26, I have had an opportunity to review more thoroughly Bill H.R. 13247. There are two points in this connec- tion which I would like to suggest. 1. Bill H.R. 13247 does not provide NACOA with its own staff. The ‘Bill pro- vides that NACOA shall get its staff from NOAA. 1 think this is a mistake because under these circumstances NACOA will not be operated as an independent advisory committee. 2. Although Bill H.R. 13247 touches upon what the Stratton Report called the interagency mechanism, it is not at all clear. In my testimony before your Subcommittee on Oceanography on May 8, 1969, I emphasized that, in my opinion, the recommendation of this interagency mecha- nism was the third most important thing recommended by the Stratton Report. i therefore think that the Bill could be strengthened if more emphasis were given to clarifying this situation. Otherwise, I think this is a very fine Bill and I hope that you can put it through at an early date. Sincerely yours, CHALMER G. KIRKBRIDE. COMMENTS—H.R. 13247 I have reviewed the Bill in detail and feel that it proposes to solve the most immediate problems which beset our national posture. The most pressing problem at present is the multiagency responsibility in the ocean and coastal zone. This creates multiple priorities, costly overlaps, duplica- tion, and, most important, a fragmented and confusing representation of funding needs and priorities to Congress. The second most urgent problem is the coordinated definition of the nature and scope of the elements, which contribute to effective use of ocean, coastal, and lake regions. With the element definitions completed, identification can be made of the real problems, which contribute to the mismanagement of our marine resources. This would allow a set of priorities to be established, solutions proposed, costed, and finally defended to the Congress in order to fund and solve those problems. The inclusion of the Atmospheric responsibilities is very logical, since the origin of the most significant weather phenomenon, its causes and control, is directly related to the ocean and the atmosphere above the ocean (over three- fourths of the global surface). The coordination and the resources should reside in a single agency to permit the Weather Bureau to most effectively achieve its responsibilities of measurement, prediction, and ultimately control of the forces of weather. 1245 The policies and objectives of the Proposed Agency, coupled with the Functions and Powers assigned, is a major step which would provide the Executive Branch with the tools with which to solve our most immediate ocean resource manage- ment problems. I am aware of, and support, the Administration’s objectives in setting up the Ash Committee to review and recommend a more modern and effective organi- zation of the Executive Branch. However, as one who has been intimately involved in the exploration and exploitation of the oceans’ living and nonliving resources, and who, through cooperation as well as competition, has been exposed to the Federal and industrial resources of foreign countries which have recog- nized the ocean’s potentials, I believe the time to act is now. An emphasis at the Federal level including a National Posture of words and a Wational Program of action is imperative. A two-year delay in starting the program will cost several billions of dollars more than starting now to restore many of our marine resources. It will aiso cause our balance of payments to suffer, for perhaps years, if we do not compete with the rest of the world in Research and Development in the ocean. Other countries will be in the ‘‘Production Stage” in the ocean while the United States is catching up on Research and Development. Surely U.S. fisheries and maritime industries alone provide an adequate example of what we can expect in the future. In fish products our balance of payments is a negative number of several hundred million dollars, and tariffs are not the answer. I strongly support this Bill and am urging my colleagues in industry to do so also. LIONEL 8S. JOHNS, Director of Corporate Marketing, Ocean Science and Engineering. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Washington, D.C., October 28, 1969. Hon. ALToN LENNON, Chairman, Subcommittee on Oceanography, Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, D.C. Drar ALTON: Pnclosed find a review of H.R. 13247 written by a member of my committee on Oceanography who is head of the Department of Oceanography at Florida Institute of Technology in Melbourne, Florida. I think his comments are cogent and would hope with your approval they could be placed in the record. Most sincerely, Lou Frey, Jr. Enclosure. Department of Oceanography Florida Insitute of Technology Melbourne, Fla. MEMO To: Ron Ring. From: George Webster. Date: October 20, 1969. Subject: Comments on H.R. 13247, a Bill to Establish a National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency. The passage of this bill would appear to do much for the promotion of the development of the oceans for the benefit of our citizens. The following benefits come to mind immediately : 1. There is an overall advantage to having most oceanographic research and development in a single agency. Although the proliferation of Government agen- cies is not to be encouraged, the advantages in this particular instance would seem to be similar to the advantages attained when various space activities of the Navy, Army, Air Force, and other Government agencies were transferred to NAGA to form the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The focus of effort relating to space in this instance was both dramatic and extremely productive, and it would not be surprising if a similar focus in NOAA would be equally productive, although probably not auite so dramatic. 1246 2. A single agency for oceanographic activity would concentrate the large amount of oceanographic information produced by the Federal Government into one place where a public or private orgainzation could turn for information. A real problem for a researcher, such as myself, is to keep informed of ocean- ographic information currently being uncovered in my field, so that I can both make decisions on work to be done, and translate current basic research results into information useful to our community. Presently, I must try to keep in touch with the oceanographic activities of the Navy, ESSA, the Bureau of Fish- eries, the Bureau of Sport Fishing, Public Health Service, Commission on Marine Sciences, and the National Science Foundation. Even then, I sometimes find in- formation has been produced by a Federal agency that I was not aware was doing anything related to oceanography. 3. A single agency could provide a badly needed point for consultation and advice for businesses wishing to evaluate the potential of some particular aspect of oceanic activity. This could result in a considerable increase in both interest and productive business activity relating to the oceans. Also, the probable award- ing of the small developmental contracts to industries would be a stimulus for further investment in oceanic development. 4. Probably most important to our present state of knowledge regarding the ocean, would be the encouragement a single oceanic agency would give to research on the oceans. If the oceans are to provide maximum benefits for our country, it is essential that we know what benefits can be obtained from the physical, chemical, and biological components of the ocean, and that this knowledge be translated into solid benefits for our people. It is asking a great deal for our industries to invest the large amount of money required for the basic research to uncover the many useful things in the ocean. Support for research, however, is split among so many agencies with differing policies on what they will support, that considerable effort is wasted in finding the agency interested in a particular problem. This contrasts with medical research, for example, where the Public Health Service has a clear mandate to provide research support. An agency such as is proposed here could pursue this basic research and translate it into the beginnings of development, both in its own laboratories, and through grants to university oceanographic institutes. Florida, which currently has a number of such university institutes and oceanography departments under development, could benefit greatly from this activity. The support of vigorous research programs in our Central Florida universities could provide considerable help for Central Florida industries which are interested in oceanic development. The provisions of the bill appear to be quite sound. The principal provision that has me puzzled is the transfer of the Coast Guard to this agency, since the Coast Guard is more of a regulatory and rescue agency while the other agencies that are proposed to be transferred to NOAA are research, development, and Service agencies. This point does not detract from the overall potential advan- tages offered by the bill. NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, Washington, D.C., November 14, 1969. Hon. ALTON LENNON, Chairman, Subcommittee on Oceanography, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. DEAR Mr. CHAIRMAN: We have been asked to transmit to you our observa- tions about H.R. 13247, “To amend the Marine Resources and Engineering Development Act of 1966.’ We understand that this bill is up for executive consideration before your Subcommittee next week. Our organization is in agreement with the general policy and objectives of the “National Oceanic and Atmospheric Program Act of 1969.” We believe that a comprehensive, coordinated and continuing national program in marine and atmospheric science, technology and technical services is necessary and advis- able if the U.S. is to keep pace with many of the other Nations. However, we would hope the accelerated development and utilization of the resources of the marine environment cited in Section 102(a) (1) can be done in accordance with established conservation principles which feature the concept of wise use. We agree that a “National Advisory Committee for Oceans and Atmosphere” would serve a beneficial purpose of giving worthwhile advice to the Administra- tor of the program. 1247 We are not in agreement with the proposal to transfer both the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries and the marine and anadromous fisheries programs of the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife to a new National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency. We recognize that many portions of the program of the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries are focused principally towards promotion of commercial aspects of marine resources and quite possibly could be trans- ferred to some other agency, although this might as well be the Department of Commerce as the new Oceanic agency. However, it is so difficult to separate the management of oceanic fisheries resources and fresh water resources, includ- ing anadromous species which migrate between the two that we believe it would be beneficial to keep these together in the Department of the Interior. These resources are involved intimately with other programs of the Interior Depart- ment, such as Water Resources Research, Federal Water Pollution Control Administration, Geological Survey, etc. Thank you for the opportunity of making these observations. Sincerely, Louls 8S. CLAPPER, Conservation Director. STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, DEPARTMENT OF WATER AND AIR RESOURCES, October 24, 1969. In general, the report emphasizes the need for a drastic increase in the scope of numerous activities now being performed in some measure by various Fed- eral and State agencies. We believe that the failure to provide necessary funds, either Federally or locally, will not be cured by the creation of new agencies and that the lack of progress on a series of programs is not in any way an automatic indictment of existing agencies. It is recognized that an agency to coordinate the pure marine science research work with existing Federal and State agencies who would continue to carry out the applied research and operational phase of oceanographic and other marine work is necessary. Such an agency should function very similar to the Water Resources Research Institute created by Public Law 88-379. This agency has performed in a very commendable manner in North Carolina and has filled a much needed role. The formation of such a Coastal Zone Research Coordinating Agency seems to be highly desirable as a focal point for State marine sciences research activ- ities. The Department of Conservation and Development appears to be the logical parent organization for such an agency inasmuch as it is responsible for many subjects that will be included in marine science research investiga- tion. The p-oblem to be considered is the determination of the functions and authority of such an agency. The scope of the “Plan for National Action” is so great that even a gener- ously financed State agency would have difficulty making its mark in the areas not now assigned to one or more other State agencies. Hence, it appears that the agency might be most effective in a combination coordination and research role; the first aimed to index, catalog and coordinate marine science research work being preformed by others (Federal, State, and private interest) ; second, to generate effective joint scientific research efforts for such departments as Water and Air Resources, Local Affairs, and Wildlife Resources Commission, and to apply direct effort to problems not encompassed by other agencies. I further recommend that the management of such a Marine Science Program be essentially as outlined in the National Esturine Pollution Study which was directed by the Clean Water Restoration Act P.L. 89-753. GEORGE EH. PICKETT, Director. RCA DEFENSE ELECTRONIC PRODUCTS, Moorestown, N.J., October 10, 1969. Hon. ALTon LENNON, Member of Congress, Subcommittee on Oceanography, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Room 1334, Longworth House Office Bldg., Washing- ton, D.C. DesR Mr. Lennon: Thank you for providing RCA Defense Electronic Products an opportunity to comment on H.R. 13247 while it is still pending before the House Subcommittee on Oceanography. 26—563—70—pt. 2——48 1248 We believe the policies and objectives set forth, and the new agency proposed,. will give desirable impetus to a long needed national program. Our only reserva- tion to the bill at this time is that the proposed shift of the Coast Guard from the Department of Transportation to the new agency may not prove to be neces- sary to the accomplishment of the objectives in Oceanie and Atmospheric programs, and could, if consummated, work to the disadvantage of the Depart- ment of Transportation in its efforts to rebuild our sea transport capability and maximize its integration with other transportation systems. We wish you success with the proposed Bill and thank you again for offering RCA Defense Electronic Products an opportunity to comment. Sincerely, J. G. MULLEN, Manager, Advertising & Customer Relations.. THE IZAAK WALTON LEAGUE OF AMERICA, GLENVIEW, ILL., November 17, 1969. Hon. ALTON LENNON, Chairman, Subcommittee on Oceanography, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. DEAR Mr. CHAIRMAN: We have been asked to express our views on H.R. 13247 “To amend the Marine Resources and Hngineering Development Act of 1966”, which we understand will be before your Committee shortly. The League can support the general policy and objectives of the proposed Act, but would oppose the transfer of the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries and the marine and anadromous fish programs of the BSFW to a new agency. While some commercial aspects of the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries program might be transferred out of Interior, we believe the marine and fresh water resources management programs should be kept together with other basic resource agencies. of Interior to which they are so closely tied. Your long time concern and effective leadership in all these matters are greatly: appreciated by the Izaak Walton League. Sincerely, J. W. PENFOLD, Conservation Director. SEPTEMBER 15, 1969.. Hon. Atton LENNON, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. DEAR Mr. LENNON: I am writing to you to comment on Bill HR13247 which. I recently reviewed. As a segment of industry, interested in the exploration and productive new uses of the ocean, I believe Bill HR13247 contains the essential features and required functions to equip a National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency to. provide world leadership in our ocean endeavors. I am, personally, very keenly aware of the amount of liaison, coordination, and management expertise which will be necessary in building a strong program. Oceanographie activities have progressed to-date but in a rather helter-skelter uncoordinated wasteful way. Sincerely yours, ARTHUR L. MARKEL, Vice President and General Manager. WASHINGTON, D.C. August 27, 1969. Hon. ALTON LENNON, Chairman, Subcommittee on Oceanography, House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Washington, D.C. DeEAaR Mr. CHAIRMAN: I am pleased to respond te your gracious invitation to comment on current U.S. Policy relating to oceanography and the marine sciences. I first took an interest in the importance of the ocean some ten years ago when the National Academy of Sciences called attention to our neglect in studying. the sea and its potential to serve human needs. The Congress sought to correct 1249 our feeble scientific efforts. Members of the House of Representatives and the Senate—with vision and dedication—set out to remedy our neglect. Good progress was made in fashioning the tools to study the sea—ships and laboratories and trained manpower began to match our needs. But the legislators who grasped the promise of the sea also saw that the gap in fulfillment had not been narrowed. In 1966, the Congress passed the Marine Resources and Engineering Develop- ment Act, and as Vice President of the United States I was assigned a statutory responsibility to preside over a Cabinet-level Council to carry out the mandate for more effective utilization of the sea. In advising and assisting President Johnson on marine affairs, the Council took note of marine science missions and capabilities spread among eleven Federal agencies, and endeavored to focus and strengthen their collective efforts. We then took deliberate steps to assess the social and economic concerns that beset our people and determine how the oceans—through modern science and technology—could contribute more fully to our welfare. We found many opportunities: The potential harvest of marine protein could help meet worldwide malnutri- tion, especially the permanent debilitation that is the fate of protein deficient children ; The need to manage our bays and estuaries so that the increasing solid and liquid wastes of a growing population are not unwittingly pushed further down- stream, there to pollute the nursery grounds of valuable shellfish, endanger human health, and deter water-related recreation sought by an urban-fatigued citizenry ; The uncharted expanses of seabed oil, gas and minerals that will be required to supplement continental sources for an energy and ore hungry world; The role of the coastal zone for an essential maritime trade, that in turn needs rehabilitation of our ports, harbors and merchant fleet ; The function of the sea as the source of rainfall and the generator of weather— even to the heartland of the continent—which, with increased knowledge, could afford improved storm prediction and, one day, weather modification ; The historic role of the seas as a highway for culture as well as commerce, now emerging as a potent locale for international cooperation among all nations who share in ignorance of the sea today but could share in its benefits tomorrow. The Council acted to meet this challenge, and I believe its record speaks for itself. It sorted out key goals, and began preparing a blueprint for action that involved a partnership among the Federal agencies, but also calling on the inno- vation of American industry, the knowledge-generating capacities of the univer- sities, the interests of our State governments, and the participation of other governments. With so great a task, and with so complex and fragmented a base of activities, the Johnson-Humphrey administration could do no more than begin. Its legacy of focusing new attention on the ocean is now on the agenda of the Nixon-Agnew administration. President Nixon wrote me just before taking office, stating his interest in further advances in marine sciences, and asking my assistance in gaining support for this area. Thus your invitation provides an occasion to speak out. First, I want to remind our leaders of both parties and our citizens that we have not yet fully realized the full importance to mankind of the 71 percent of our planet covered by oceans. And our level of efforts for exploration and re- source development are still seriously inadequate. We cannot delay in extracting protein for starving children. We cannot delay in diplomatic initiatives to recall that seabed resources beyond national sovereignty are a common heritage of all mankind, and that we must head off a squatter’s right approach. We cannot delay in committing support to the International Decade of Ocean Exploration which the United States proposed 18 months ago. We cannot delay in helping less developed nations that front on the sea realize fruits of marine development so that benefits will not accrue only to the tech- nologically advanced. We cannot delay in rational management of the coastal margin so that the seashore will serve our children and future generations. We cannot delay in maintaining our leadership as a maritime nation by strengthening our merchant fleet and fishing industry. We cannot delay in developing technologlical capabilities so that the high risks of marine engineering can be shared by government and industry. 1250 We cannot delay taking all possible steps to make sure the arms race is not extended to the seabed. This is an area I began to work on weeks after the Council came into being in 1966 and I am pleased to see the spadework of that era now developed by the administration in a draft treaty set before the Highteen Nation Disarmament Conference. In my view, however, the scope of the prohibi- tion of nuclear warfare in the oceans should be broader than that proposed in Article One of the U.S. draft. We should propose to cover in this treaty activi- ties and weapons, such as mobile nuclear bottom launchers, which may be under- taken by military planners to the fullest extent that existing and projected detection capabilities will permit. Fortunately, these and other marine science issues have never been partisan issues, and this same spirit must continue to prevail. The two branches of the Congress, however, must elevate this area to a more conspicuous level of atten- tion. For one thing, we now have the recommendations of the Stratton Commis- sion that was authorized by the 1966 Marine Sciences Act, and I commend this powerful and persuasive document, prepared by 15 distinguished citizens, to all who have interest in our nation’s future. I find myself in substantial agreement with their findings and recommendations. I want to comment particularly on the Commission’s recommendation for strengthening our governmental apparatus to meet the needs of the 1970’s and the 1980’s. They propose that a new independent civilian agency be created out of the fragments now spread among numerous departments having broad missions to which their marine science bureaus contribute only peripherally. I fully support this concept. I was pleased to see that the management capabilities of the Council war- ranted support for a one year extension by President Nixon, but no matter how effective it has been and continues to be as a policy planning unit to provide coherent guidance to this government’s program, it is no substitute for a strong operating agency. The Navy has shown us how to mobilize marine’ research and engineering to serve military objectives. We need the same approach on the civilian side for all the purposes I outlined earlier. The present efforts of the civilian agencies simply do not add up to a capability that would permit the U.S. to maintain its leadership in marine science and oceanography. We have just witnessed the dramatic extension of man’s presence to the sur- face of the moon—an event which satisfied the innate curiosity of all people about the world around us. We can do no less for the sea. And in gaining a greater comprehension of its potential, we can direct its utilization to practical benefit that would serve our nation well, and serve all mankind. Sincerely, Husert H. HUMPHREY. OCEANS GENERAL, INC., MIAMI, FLA. 33130, September 26, 1969. Hon. ALTON LENNON, Chairman, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Oceanography of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Longworth Building, Washington, D.C. DEAR CONGRESSMAN LENNON: I appreciated received from you a copy of H.R. 13247 and the invitation to submit comments to the Subcommittee. On May 22nd, 1969 I testified before the Subcommittee on Oceanography as a spokesman for the National Oceanography Association. At that time I was speaking to the Report of the Stratton Commission and I single out for particular note the recommendations with regard to Federal organization pertaining to the establishment of a responsive. National Ocean Program. I gave unqualified sup- port to the creation ‘of a National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Agency and a companion National Advisory Committee for the Oceans. It is quite natural then that I personally endorse most whole-heartedly HR 13247, a legislative em- bodiment of the recommendations of Dr. Stratton and his able Commissioners. With specific legislation to consider, I do feel obliged to comment on two sec- tions in which the language, but more particularly the possible interpretation of the language, leaves some question in my mind. However, I want to emphasize the fact that I have no reservations with regard to the philosophy espoused, the fundamental mechanism proposed for administrating a National Ocean Program or the constituent parts of NOAA. 1251 In earlier testimony before the Subcommittee on Oceanography in August of 1965, I made reference to the role of the Federal Government in establishing policy and fostering the acquistion of scientific competence in ocean science. At that time I said, “Now, to gain this scientific competence is not something that industry or the academic community can achieve for itself. The job is too big for private investment or endowment. More significantly, it is too closely linked to the formation of public policy to be entrusted to private direction. In brief, the problems faced by the ocean sciences are outside the ability or sphere of any private group. It is traditionally and most appropriately a major effort which requires action and coordination on the Federal level”. Later in answer to a ques- tion from Mr. Reinecke, I continued, “In my prepared statement I have tried to draw a clear distinction between the science and the technology. The technology is the applier of science. i feel that the private sector of our economy is amply motivated to exploit the ocean, to apply the science, to develop the technology, and that the natural forces at work in the economy are quite satisfactory and will provide impetus where impetus is needed.” I feel every bit as strongly committed to that position today as I did then and continue to see the role of the Federal Government as one of creating the cli- mate for private investment in the exploitative phase of oceanic resource develop- ment. Hence I do become concerned when in H.R. 13247, page 6, lines 16 and 17, J find the words “development, construction, testing and operation of vehicles and associated equipment”. To a zealous and energetic administrator in the pro- posed NOAA this is an open invitation to use Federal funds to accomplish tasks which are, in my view, best done within the private sector. These are not climate creating actions in a positive sense. In fact a contrary view can be defended, for if the Federal Government wiil undertake such research and development tasks with public money why then should the private sector make an investment? I have no objections to the Agency’s exploration of the marine environment but it seems to me that the latitude granted in the entirety of paragraph (7) on page 6 goes too far. Also on page 6 under paragraph (6) I am concerned that the latitude granted here might encourage an administrator to evaluate marine resources for the pur- poses of establishing minimum acceptable prices on bidding. The question is one of precision in the conduct of the surveys. If NOAA gets into the business of evaluating marine resources it is in effect second guessing a well established system which relies on the proven forces in the market place. The competitive system of bidding presently used relies on the judgment of one bidder versus an- other as to the worth and risk associated with a particular resource deposit and of it’s potential value to the company after the costs of extraction have been absorbed. For a Federal Agency to tinker in this part of the resource acquisition cycle, where economic value is so very speculative, would be dangerous. We have a recent incident of this in the rejection by the Department of the In- terior of bids on certain offshore sulphur leases. All bids were rejected because the Department did not feel that the highest price offered was adequate. The bidders know best the cost of developing the resource deposit and I can see no justification, given free and open bidding, for an administrator in the Department of Interior to reject the high bid as being inadequate. If this situation is left alone or further encouraged under the provision of HR 13247, I suggest that the next step is for the Federal Government to go into the exploitive phase of resource development in the absence of what an administrator considers an ade- quate bid from the private sector. The tired logic of the Federal Government having to do something that the private sector refuses to do will be advanced and another step may be taken in the expansion of Federal activities into fields well handled by the private sector in the past. In both paragraphs (6) and (7) I would much prefer words to the effect that the administrator take such action as may be necessary to encourage the private sector to accomplish the tasks. Asa citizen vitally concerned with the future of the United States vis-a-vis the world ocean and the seemingly endless ways in which it effects our economy, security and general well-being I want to acknowledge with sincere appreciation the leadership you have given the cause of establishing a National Ocean Pro- gram. I want to assure you as well of my continued support and the promise that I will do everything possible through personal and business associations to broaden and intensify the base of national support for HR 13247 and other legislation which will implement the Stratton Commission Report. Cordially yours, J. H. CLorwortHy, President. 1252 OCEAN SCIENCE CAPITAL CorP., Palo Alto, Calif., September 8, 1969. Hon. ALTON LENNON, House of Representatives, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Long- worth House Office Building, Washington, D.C. Dear Mr. LENNon: Thank you for the copy of your bill H.R. 13247, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Program Act of 1969. Speaking from my professional business viewpoint in the ocean science in- dustry, I endorse your bill to set up within the Federal Government a NOAA-type: organization along the general lines proposed by the Stratton Commission. I have enclosed a copy of a brief brochure describing our company’s operations and you can see our close association with approximately a dozen companies involved in ocean science enterprise. It is my belief shared by most of my business colleagues that coordinated action and purpose is required within the Federal Government structure before a meaningful oceanographic program is possible within the United States. The NOAA-type organization such as is pro- posed by your H.R. 13247 is the product of careful study and deliberation by very knowledgeable men in this field in whom I have faith and thus must represent the most rational and proper course of action for our Federal Government to take. As you are quite aware, there has been over the past five years major efforts put forth by the private sector to develop in the United States a strong oceano- graphic industrial capability. Of late, however, the pressures on government fund- ing caused by external needs plus other pressing internal economic requirements has left the budding oceanographic industrial capability in United States with little economic encouragement from our Government. This lack of Federal funding compounded by a vastly disorganized Federal “purpose” in oceanographic endeavor has caused much of the private sector oceanographic enterprise begun of late to pull back. Recognizing that major economic inputs by the Government into a national oceanographic program is an unlikely event in the near future, I think it highly proper for the Federal Government to do some proper house- keeping on the organizational status of its oceanographic program so that the country can rise to meet its ocean related needs when either the economic means are available or when such activity is forced upon the U.S. by outside factors not yet obivous (i.e. : an oceanographic sputnik). Thank you for the opportunity of commenting on your bill. Sincerely, F. WARD PAINE, President. NATIONAL AUDUBON SOCIETY, Publisher of Audubon Magazine, New York, N.Y., November 14, 1969. Hon. ALTON LENNON, Chairman, Subcommittee on Oceanography, House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, House Office Building, Washington, D.C. DEAR Mr. LENNON: I understand your Subcommittee may be acting soon in executive session to mark up and possibly to report H.R. 13247, your important bili that would, among other purposes, establish an independent federal agency to be called the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency. The National Audubon Society respectfully but strongly urges the Subcom- mittee, before reporting this bill, to delete subsections (c) and (d) on page 19. The ecological relationships between the resources regulated and administered by the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife and the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries are so close that it is essential the policies and programs of these two bureaus be closely coordinated. This is the reason why both are now lodged in the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, within the Department of the Interior, where common principles of conservation and management can be applied. It is an arrangement that also enhances coordination and economies in research. I believe that upon reflection the Subcommittee will see the advisability of keeping the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries and the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife together within the Department of the Interior. Sincerely yours, CHARLES H. CALLISON, Executive Vice President. 1253 EG&G INTERNATIONAL, INC., Waltham, Mass., September 4, 1969. Hon. Aton LENNON, Chairman, Subcommittee on Oceanography, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. GENTLEMEN: We welcome this opportunity to endorse H.R. 13247. EG&G is one of the early participants in oceanography, starting with the work of Dr. Edgerton in 1950. We are now a leading supplier of oceanographic instru- mentation; we provide scientific services in the ASW and meteorological fields, and provide marine geophysical services to the petroleum industry. We remain totally convinced of the importance and potential of marine and atmospheric sciences as stated in the declaration of H.R. 13247. We testified for and supported the legislation enabling the Commission on Marine Sciences. The report of that Commission was outstanding in its objec- tivity, insight and foresight. H.R. 13247 is an appropriate response. It is recognized that enactment of this legislation is not an easy step, but major steps forward seldom are easy. HG&G will welcome any opportunity to be of assistance. Yours very truly, M. Ross YEITER, Vice President and General Manager. eee (HyprRo-SpAcE SYSTEMS CORP., September 2, 1969. Hon. ALTON LENNON, Chairman, Subcommittee on Oceanography, House of Representatives, Longworth House Office Building, Washington, D.C. DEAR Mr. LENNON: I have received a copy of H.R. 13247 and have reviewed it in detail. T heartily endorse all provisions of this bill with no comment or suggested changes. As you know from the testimony I presented to your Committee, I feel the points covered in this bill represent the very best start we could make in a national ocean program. It is my hope that legislation will be passed to allow a start in this very challenging effort of ocean exploitation in the very near future. Sincerely yours, RocGeErR J. PIERCE. Woops HoLte OCEANOGRAPHIC INSTITUTION, Woods Hole, Mass., August 28, 1969. Hon. ALTON LENNON, Chairman, Subcommittee on Oceanography, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. My Drar CongRESSMAN LENNON: I appreciate very much your sending me a copy of the proposed National Oceanic and Atmospheric Program Act of 1969 (H.R. 13247). I am greatly encouraged to know that you and your colleagues have taken this important step. It is another of the many progressive steps that have been typical of your Subcommittee. As I testified before the Subcommittee on Oceanography last May, I believe the establishment of an independent agency is the most important single recom- mendation of the Marine Commission Report. Realizing that there are many different ways such an agency could be put together, I do believe that the plan outlined in H.R. 18247 is a good way and will work. My greatest concern in the establishment of such an agency is the combination in the same agency of operating and funding functions. With the outstanding exception of the Office of Naval Research in the Navy, I know ‘of no government agency which has successfully performed both these functions. When the in-house projects compete directly with a contracts program, the strength of the contracts program is constantly in jeopardy. Therefore, I would recommend that any Act establishing an independent agency for support of ocean activity require that the contracts research program be administered separately from the in-house research program. Through ONR and NSF support we have built an outstanding oceanography program in private 1254 and university-sponsored laboratories. It is important to insure the continued strength of these laboratories so that they may continue to provide the leadership in marine science in the United States. If the act could include legislative guidelines providing for the continued inde- pendence of the contracts research program, I would enthusiastically support its passage. Sincerely yours, PauL M. FYE. CALIFORNIA ADVISORY COMMISSION ON MARINE AND COASTAL RESOURCES, Sacramento, September 16, 1969. Hon. ALTON LENNON, Chairman, Subcommittee on Oceanography, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. DEAR CONGRESSMAN LENNON: At its Fifth meeting heid in Sacramento, Califor- nia, June 6 and 7, 1969, the California Advisory Commission on Marine and Coastal Resources undertook a review of the report “Our Nation and the Sea” of the President’s Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources. I attach hereto a copy of this report, which is extracted from pages 62 through 70 of the Proceedings of the Fifth meeting of the California Advisory Commis- sion on Marine and Coastal Resources. I would appreciate it if this were inciuded in the record of your Hearings on H.R. 13247, as being pertinent thereto. The California Advisory Commission on Marine and Coastal Resources is appointed by the Governor of California pursuant to Legislation adopted in 1967. The list of current Commissioners is attached hereto, being excerpted from pages 19 through 21 of the published reports of the Commission’s Fifth meeting. The Commissioners who attended the Fifth meeting and participated in these decisions are noted with an asterisk on this list. All other Commissioner’s had an opportu- nity to review these decisions before the proceedings of the Fifth meeting went to press. Several of these Commissioner’s (myself included pursuant to your invitation) will submit testimony on H.R. 13247 in their individual capacities, as will Lieu- tenant Reinecke, Chairman of the Interagency Council on Ocean Resources, on behalf of the Executive Branch of the California State Government. I thought, however, that it might be useful to you in your deliberations to have the com- ments adopted jointly by this Commission which is rather widely representative of industry and academic sectors of the California society. Sincerely yours, W. M. CHAPMAN, Chairman. PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIrTH MEETING CALIFORNIA ADVISORY COMMISSION ON MARINE AND COASTAL RESOURCES Appendix XI Commission Review of the Report “Our Nation and the Sea” by the President Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources I. Transportation and Trade.—A. Recommendations Approved All conclusions and recommendations respecting transportation and trade given in Our Nation and the Sea and in Volumes 1 and 2 of the Commission’s panel reports. CMC Comment.—California will be affected markedly if these conclusions and recommendations are implemented. Il. Living Resources—A. Recommendations Approved 1. Statement by the Commission that “U.S. interest in marine resource devel- opment must be viewed in terms of world needs and capabilities. The sea is a global source of goods and services for all mankind.” (Rpt. P. 83.) CMC Comment.—This statement plus the general policy of rejecting the idea that the United States should be self-sufficient in natural resources concludes that the United States is obviously benefited by maintaining the availability of all sources of raw material. From the point of view of the overall fish business this is an extremely important conclusion and clearly should be adopted as: national policy in order to maintain the environment of free trade that has always existed and which is essential to provide the United States with her total fish requirements. 2, Recommendation that “the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency (BCF) be given statutory authority to assume regulatory jurisdiction of endan- gered fisheries when it can be demonstrated that: 1255 A particular stock of marine or andromous fish migrate between the waters of one State and those of another, or between territorial waters and the contiguous zone or high seas, and The catch enters into interstate or international commerce, and Sound biological evidence demonstrates that the stock has been signifi- cantly reduced or endangered by acts of man, and The State or States within whose waters these conditions exist have not taken effective remedial action.” (Rpt. p. 97.) CMC Comment.—Very few fish understand state, international, political or regulatory boundaries, whatever arrangements are made among political entities and management of species crossing such boundaries must be based on the popu- lations themselves. CMC views this particular recommendation with keen interest and expects it to be a sharp spur to the State of California to undertake proper and competent management of those marine resources under its jurisdiction. B. Recommendations Disapproved 1. Recommendation that “fisheries management have as a major objective pro- duction of the largest net economic return consistent with the biological capabil- ities of the exploited stocks.” (Rpt. p. 92.) 2. Recommendation that ‘voluntary steps be taken—and, if necessary, Gov- ernment action—to reduce excess fishing effort in order to make it possible for fishermen to improve their net economic return and thereby to rehabilitate the harvesting segment of the U.S. fishing industry.” (Rpt. p. 93.) CMC Comment.in the management of a flow resource, such as fishery, the absolute minimum objective of management should be the protection of the resource against being so depleted that it is incapable of recovery when exploita- tion rate is decreased. In the case of most fisheries the socially and economically desirable level of fish population and average catch is above this level. Since most fisheries resources are not private property that would allow this level to be attained by the operation of the market system, it needs to be opera- tionally determined by constraints imposed by government. In most cases the appropriate constraint is the maximum sustainable physical yield. It is desirable in general to increase net economic return within the constraint of maximum sustainabie yield. In some cases, however, full employment or other social objectives may dictate some decreases in net economic return to attain such objectives. Increasing the net economic return involves creation of property rights in one form or another. It is important that this be done in a manner to increase, not decrease, the efficiency and capability of the fishing industry. 3. Recommendation that ‘‘the United States seek agreement in ICNAF to collaborate with NEAFC in fixing a single annual overall catch limit for the cod and haddock fisheries of the North Atlantic, including the whole ICNAF area and Region 1 of the NHAFC area (Hast Greenland, Iceland, and the Northeast Arctic). This single annual overall catch jimit should be designed to maintain the maximum sustainable yield of the fishery and, in turn, should be divided into annual national catch quotas. The overall catch limit should be adjusted regularly to take account of such factors as year-class fluctuations of the stocks, recovery of the stocks due to conservation measures, and errors in setting prior limits. “Every participating nation should be authorized to transfer all or part of its quota to any other nation.”’ (Rpt. pp. 105, 106.) CMC Comment.—One thing that is demonstrated both by theory and by exper- ience, especially with the Antarctic whales, is that separate species and separate population units have to be considered separately if there is to be rational man- agement of the fishery to maintain the various populations in that condition where they will be capable of providing the maximum sustainable yield. Other- wise, if all are treated as a single pot of fish, the most valuable, or most readily available species or stocks will be badly overfished, while others remain under- fished. 4. Statement that “the allocation of national catch quotas is not a problem of either biology economics, law or logic . . . .” (3 Panel Rpts., Marine Resources and Legal-Political Arrangements for Their Development, p. VIII—59. ) OCMC Comment.—It is doubtless true that other factors will need to be taken into account, but a rational solution cannot be determined by ignoring both biology and economics. For example, if the quota system is to maximize the economic yield, let alone take care of equity among nations, it will certainly be necessary to take into account the nature of the stock structure and migrations, the availability of fish from various stocks in relation to the running time from various ports. Much of this requires knowledge of the biological factors. 1256 5. Recommendation that “serious consideration be given to assuring coastal nations a reasonable opportunity to participate in the exploitation of fish stocks nearest their coasts. This assurance should take the form of an agreement to allocate national catch quotas whenever the coastal nation requests such quotas. The quotas should be allotted to guarantee the coastal nation a minimum amount or percentage of the catch.” (Rpt. p. 110.) CMC Comment.—This, apparently, has not been very carefully considered. What happens when there are a great many coastal states, such as, for example, along the west coast of Africa, or along the coast of Central America, and the coastal states are not all simultaneously ready and willing? The recommendation that each state having a quota is required to catch it with vessels carrying its own flag is inconsistent with the recommendation made in the case of the North Atlantic fisheries quotas for haddock and cod, which advocated that “every par- ticipating nation should be authorized to transfer all or part of its quota to any other nation.” III. Coastal and Tidelands.—A. Recommendations Approved. 1. All set forth in Chapter 3 on “Management of the Coastal Zone,” except as noted below: CMC Oomment. The Coastal Zone Authorities should be entirely a creature of the respective coastal States. It is noted that the Report defines the coastal zone “as including (1) seaward, the territorial sea of the United States and (2) landward, the tidal waters on the landward side of the low water mark along the coast, the Great Lakes, port and harbor facilities, marine recreational areas, and industrial and commercial sites dependent upon the seas or the Great Lakes. Hach coastal State, however, should be authorized to define the landward extent of its coastal zone for itself.” (Rept. p. 51.) The acquisition and management of the estuarine sanctuaries recommended (Rpt..p. 65) should be placed under the jurisdiction of the Coastal Zone Au- thorities of the respective States. In the areas of jurisdiction of Coastal Zone Authorities the powers of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers should be sub- ordinate to that of said authorities. CMC further recommends that the regu- latory authority of the federal government under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, as so amended, be transferred to the proposed National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency. IV. Continental Shelf and Deep Sea Bed—A. Recommendations Approved Generally all regarding the organization structure of the federal government with respect to non-living marine resources set forth in Chapter 4, except as noted below. CMC Comment.—The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency should not assume the mineral leasing or geologic functions of the Department of the Interior. B. Recommendations Questioned 1. Recommendation that “the United States take the initiative to secure international agreement on a redefinition of the ‘continental shelf’ for purposes of the Convention on the Continental Shelf. The seaward limit of each coastal nation’s ‘continental shelf’ should be fixed at the 200-meter isobath, or 50 nautical miles from the baseline for measuring the breadth of its territorial sea, which- ever alternative gives it the greater area for purposes of the Convention.” (Rpt. p. 145.) CMC Comment.—We urge that the entire subject of the continental shelf and the area beyond be approached by the Federal Government with great care and with full consideration to all national as well as international objectives. We find no evidence in the report justifying the proposed new definition of the continental shelf. 2. Recommendation that “the United States seize the opportunity for leader- ship which the present situation demands and propose a new international legal-political framework for exploration and exploitation of the mineral resources underlying the deep seas, that is, the high seas beyond the outer limits of the continental shelf as redefined in accordance with the Commission’s recommendations. “The Commission recommends that new international Bere CIC UEs be negotiated embodying the following provisions : An International Registry Authority An International Fund Certain powers and duties of registering nations Limited policing functions for Registry Authority 1257 Dispute settlement provisions Creation of an intermediate zone.” (Rpt. p. 147) CMC Comment.—The type of regime that is established for the area beyond the continental shelf will strongly affect thinking about the width of the con- tinental shelf and vice-versa. It is, therefore, presently impractical to consider either issue independently. Any regime that is established for the deeps should be able to improve the utilization of its resources. Many of the other statements and conclusions set forth on pages 141-157 of the Report were also questioned by CMC. V. Hconomics of Ocean Industry—A. Recommendations Approved 1. Statement that “an urgent need exists... for more comprehensive sta- tistics that will further identify the areas of redundancy, improve comparability, and take into account the statistics reflecting such factors as investment, sales, and contribution to GNP. The Government, working with industry, should develop a method to compile the data necessary to the periodic publication of the required statistics.” (2 Panel Rpts., Industry and Technology, p. V-8.) VI. Parks, Recreation and Aesthetics No review except as above noted. VII. Hducation and Research No review except as above noted. VIII. Interagency Council for Ocean Resources (ICOR) Comments on COMSER Report, Our Nation and the Sea. Mr. Bissell furnished the members with copies of comments and recommenda- tions on the COMSER Report that he had submitted to and were accepted by ICOR. The following is an extract from these comments: “The report by the Federal Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources, Our Nation and the Sea, has been reviewed by State Agencies through ICOR, and their comments received. Of the some 140 recommendations in the report, a few appear to be of special Significance to California, and it appears appropriate that a State position be presented to the Oceanography Subcommitte, House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, now holding the first Congressional hearings regarding this report. The Executive Secretary suggests that ICOR consider the report as a major accomplishment in the identification and investigation of marine oriented problems, and in the breadth and vigor of the recommendations to solve these problems. At this time, however, he feels it would be premature to make unqualified endorsements of the recommendations generally. There are many quite contro- versial areas, particularly on the subject of U.S., state and international ocean boundaries and uses. Rather he suggests that ICOR support the concept of a National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Agency (NOAA) and in particular endorse certain programs and activities which should be carried out by Federal and State joint participation. Specifically : 1. The creation of a major new Civilian Agency (NOAA). 2. The enactment of a coastal management act to provide policy objectives for the coastal zone and to facilitate establishment of State Coastal Zone Authorities. 3s. Increased emphasis by the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration on research into the identification of specfic pollutants and their effects. 4. Develop a total integrated approach to the problems of air, land and water pollution. 5. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency participate in major coastal surveys ete. All of the 15 recommendations endorsed by the Resources Agency (see en- closed Resources Agency Review) should probably be included in the ultimate State endorsements; however, until the details of specific State action, includ- ing funding, can be worked out. the Executive Secretary recommends that the initial statement to the Congressional Committee be limited generally to an endorsement of the specific five recommendations listed above.” CMC reviewed and approved the ICOR endorsement of the five specific actions outlined above subject to the following modifications : Item 1 should be reworded to read : 1. The creation of a major new Civilian Agency responsible for administering the Nation’s civil marine and atmospheric programs (but not necessarily identi- 1258 cal to NOAA); or the incorporation of these responsibilities into an existing agency. Items 2, 3, and 4—No change. Item 5—Delete as redundant. APPENDIX I—RosTER OF COMMISSIONERS, ADVISORS AND GUESTS COMMISSIONERS Dr. W. M. Chapman* (Chairman), Director, Marine Resources, Ralston Purina 739 Golden Park Avenue, San Diego, California 92106. Mr. Gordon Lill* (Vice Chairman), Senior Science Advisor, Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, P.O. Box 551, Burbank, California 91503. Dr. S. Russell Keim* (Secretary), Executive Secretary, Committee on Ocean Engineering, National Academy of Engineering, 2101 Constitution Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20418. Dr. F. Gilman Blake,’ Senior Research Scientist, Chevron Oil Field Research ‘Co., P.O. Box 446 La Habra, California 90631. Mr. John F. Bonner.’ Senior Vice President, Pacific Gas and Hlectrice Co., 245 Market Street, San Francisco, California 94105. Mr. Robert O Briggs, Vice President, Dillingham Corporation, P.O. Box 1560, La Jolla, California 92037. Mr. Richard M. Clare, Attorney at Law, P.O. Box 186, San Maria, California 93454. Mr. Robert Dawson,’ Consultant, 132 Stanford Lane, Seal Beach, Calfornia 97040. Honorable Ralph ©. Dills, Senator from Los Angeles, State ‘Capitol, Room 4047, Sacramento, California 95814. Mr. Thomas R. Gardiner, President, Gardiner Manufacturing Co., 2711 Union Street, Oakland, California 94607. Col. T. R. Gillenwaters,’ Secretary, Oceanic Research Institute, 6811 La Jolla Boulevard, La Jolla, California 92037. Dr. John P. Harville,| Director, Moss Landing Marine Lab., Moss Landing, California 95039. Mr. Wallace Holm,’ Architect, Wallace Holm and Associates, 1321 Monterey- Salinas Highway, Monterey, California 93940. Dr. Joseph Kaplan,’ Professor, Department of Physics, University of California, Los Angeles, California 90007. Mr. Joseph F. Knight,’ Vice President and General Manager, Kaiser Refrac- tories, 2238 Kaiser Center, Oakland, California 94504. Mr. Robert B. Krueger,’ Attorney at Law, Nossaman, Waters, Scott, Krueger and Riordan, 445 S. Figueroa Street, 30th Floor, Los Angeles, California 90017. Honorable Robert J. Lagomarsino, Senator from Ventura and Santa Barbara, State Capitol, Room 5080, Sacramento, California 95814. Honorable W. Don MacGillivray, Assemblyman from San Luis Obispo and Santa Barbara, State Capitol, Room 6003 Sacramento, California 95814. Honorable George W. Milias,? Assemblyman from Santa Clara, State Capitol, Room 4171, Sacramento, California 95814 Mr. J. Jamison Moore,’ Executive Director, Modern Management, 9015 Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California 90211. Dr. William Nierenberg, Director, Scripps Inst. of Oceanography, University of California, La Jolla, California 920387. Mr. Julius Von Nostitz, President (1967-68), California Wildlife Federation, 2131 35th Avenue, San Francisco, California 94116. Dr. Erman Pearson,’ Professor of Sanitary Engineering and Chairman of the Division of Hydraulic and Sanitary Engineering, Department of Civil En- gineering, University of California, McLaughlin Hall, Room 114, Berkeley, California 94720. Mr. John G. Peterson,’ President, Washington Fish and Oyster Co. of California, P.O. Box 3894, Rincon Annex, San Francisco, California 94119. Dr. David S. Potter,’ ® Director, A. C. Electronics, Defense Research Laboratories, General Motors Corporation, 6767 Hollister Avenue, Goleta, California 93017. Dr. Andreas B. Rechnitzer,’ Director, Ocean Sciences, North American Rockwell, 350 South Magnolia Avenue, Long Beach, California 90802. 1 Denotes commissioners present at Fifth Meeting of Commission. 2 Subsequent to this meeting Speaker of the Assembly Monagan appointed Assemblyman George W. Milias to replace Assemblyman James Haves as a member of CMC. 3 Dr. Potter submitted his resignation from CMC, He is moving out of the State. 1259 Mr. John D. Reilly, Vice President, Todd Shipyards Corporation, 260 California Street, San Francisco, California 94111. Mr. John E. Robb, Manager, Development Engineering, Bechtel Corporation, 50 Beale Street, San Francisco, California 94104. Dr. Milner B. Schaefer,’ Director, Institute of Marine Resources, University of California, P.O. Box 109, La Jolla, California 92037. Mr. Frederick C. Stanford, Management Consultant, Louis A. Allen Associates, Inec., 615 University Avenue, Palo Alto, California 94301. Dr. Richard B. Tibby,’ Director, Catalina Marine Science Center, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California 90007. Mr. Georg Treichel,’ Director, Center for the Study of General Ecology and En- vironmental Planning, San Francisco State College, San Francisco, California 94132. Dr. 8S. V. Wantrup,’ Professor of Agricultural eegpomies: 207 Giannini Hall, University of California, Berkeley, California 9472 Honorable James Q. Wedworth, Senator from Los ee State Capitol, Room 5046, Sacramento, California 95814. Prof. Robert L. Wiegel,’ Professor of Civil Engineering, Department of Civil Engineering, University of California, Berkeley, California 94720. Honorable Pete Wilson,* Assemblyman from San Diego, State Capitol, Room 4121, Sacramento, California 95814. EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE COMMISSION Mr. John H. Dolan, Executive Director, California Advisory Commission on Marine & Coastal Resources, 1320, K Street, Room 502, Sacramento, California 95814. UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, Seattle, Wash., September 15, 1969. Congressman ALTON LENNON, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Longworth House Office Building, Washington, D.C. DEAR Mr. LENNON: I am submitting herewith a paper entitled “Law, Science and the Ocean” for insertion in the record of the hearings on the recommendations of the Marine Science Commission. The comments in the paper are primarily di- rected at some considerations pertinent to parts of the Commission report dealing with international law and policy. It also is pertinent to the subject-matter to add my opinion that the highest importance attaches to the Commission recom- mendation of a National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Agency. A reorganiza- tion of the exeeutive branch similar if not identical to NOAA as recommended by the Commission deserves the strongest possible support. Sincerely, WILLIAM T. BURKE, Professor of Law. LAw, SCIENCR, AND THE OCEAN (W. T. Burke, Professor of Law, School of Law, University of Washington) Nearly everyone who can read or even watch television is by now aware that the ocean and the resources thereof, much being unknown, are today a subject of great interest, excitement, and hope. One of the reasons for this is that very frequently we are assured, virtually promised even, that in this vast region lie both enormous resources as well as great possibilities for international coopera- tion that will together solve many, if not all, our landbound problems of hunger, poverty, disease, and widespread violence. Most of this vision of a trouble-free future due to a bulging storehouse of ocean riches is an exaggeration if not a hoax. However the values that may be obtainable from the sea are surely large, despite these unfortunately magnified forecasts, and already scientists, econo- mists, lawyers, and others are under some pressure to use their knowledge and skills to improve the production and distribution of these values. Lawyers are now exercised about many issues, but principally with two ques- tions: the limit on coastal control and jurisdiction over the seabed and subsoil, i.e., the continental shelf, and the nature of the regulatory system for mineral exploitation beyond this limit. The following remarks are addressed both to the substance of recent recommendations on these issues and to some possible con- 1 Denotes commissioners present at Fifth Meeting of Commission. 1260 sequences of attempting soon to convene an international conference of states to dispost of these issues by agreement. In particular, comments are addressed to (1) recent developments in the decision process by which legal prescriptions are devised and projected to regulate ocean activities; (2) some of the pos- sible consequences of precipitate action to convene a new law of the sea con- ference; and (3) some of the substantive recommendations recently proposed by the President’s Commission on Marine Sciences, Hngineering and Resources. Currently a most interesting and significant aspect of the decision process is the split between the developed states (in the sense of marine science and technology) and the lesser developed states or countries (the LDC’s) that is becoming more and more apparent within international institutions. This split has special importance for ocean law in light of the method by which such law is, or has been, formulated. The last sustained effort to promulgate general international law for the ocean began in 1949 with the initiation of deliberations by the International Law Commission, a subsidiary organ of the United Nations General Assembly. The Commission eventually, in 1956, adopted a number of draft rules on mumerous aspects of the law of the sea which it submitted to the General Assembly as part of its report for that year. In submitting the draft the Com- mission recommended that the General Assembly convene a meeting of pleni- potentiaries to examine the law of the sea and to formulate conventions on the topic. In making this recommendation the Commission also made an observa- tion about the scope of the task before such a meeting that deserves special mention for it records an extremely important fact that is still pertinent but frequently overlooked today. This is the observation: “The Commission is of the opinion that the conference should deal with the various parts of the law of the sea covered by the present report. Judging from its own experience, the Commission considers—and the comments of Governments have confirmed this view—that the various sections of the law of the sea hold together, and are so closely interdepend- ent that it would be extremely difficuit to deal with only one part and leave the others aside.” * The General Assembly acted favorably upon the Commission’s proposal and invited “all States Members of the United Nations and States members of the specialized agencies” to a conference to be convoked in Geneva in March 1958. As a result of these actions and preparatory work, the representatives of 87 states gathered in Geneva in the spring of 1958 and over long weeks of negotiat- ing hammered out four treaties on the law of the sea. By agreement it was established that Conference decisions on matters of substance required a two- thirds majority vote of those present and voting. Thus a group of thirty states could block adoption of a particular provision by the Conference. This organized procedure whereby practically all the states of the world pre- scribed policies for ocean use, with each state having one vote, seems likely to be followed again if another law of the sea conference is held. Indeed the 1958 Conference virtually assured this pattern by writing in a provision in each of the four treaties that five years after the treaty came into force any contracting party thereto could request revision thereof, such request being addressed to the Secretary General of the United Nations and subject to action by the General Assembly. It seems highly unlikely that members of the Assembly will vote to deprive themselves of influence on decisions about the ocean. Whether other routes for change are feasible merits rather urgent study. _ The point of this historical reference is merely to lay a base for noting that the situation has changed radically since 1958 in several ways. First, the num- ber of players in the game has increased about 50%, there being 126 members of the United Nations at the end of the 23d General Assembly in December, 1968. Second, a conference held under the same rules as in 1958 would require a vote of 84 to adopt a provision and a biocking vote would require 43 votes instead of 30. Third, ‘the lareg increase in U.N. membership is accounted for entirely by developing states, especially African which now comprise about one-third. Fourth, since 1960 the developing states have become much more organized in presenting demands and while they may not yet as a body consti- tute two-thirds of a new sea conference they most certainly would be able to block any proposal not to their liking. Thus the voting situation at a new con- ference is likely to differ drastically from that prevailing in 1958. It is highly probable that many of the developing states will have very different views from the developed states about ocean management in terms of 1261 priorities in use, of allocation of authority between states, on the one hand, and international institutions on the other, and of some boundary locations. A divergence in these views is detectable in the debates in the First Committee of the 23d General Assembly in the fall of 1968 when the Committee considered the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee to Study the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction. A principal indication of the attitudes of developed and developing states is to be seen in the opposing conceptions of the desirable role and function of the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission. The IOC is a constituent element of UNHSCO, having been created in 1960, after the 1958 Geneva Conference. It is common knowledge that the activities and policies of the IOC are influenced pre- dominantly by the United States and the Soviet Union. The membership of the IOC is far smaller than that of the U.N. itself, now numbering about 60 with a noticeable increase in recent years. The LDC’s have had little influence on the course of events in the IOC. The reason for this is not an invidious one, but pri- marily arises from the nature of the activties IOC has been involved in and within the years since its creation. Essentially the IOC has served a coordinating function for scientific activities in the ocean and, as is well known, such activities are limited almost completely to the developed states and even to a small group of these. The IOC has thus far been largely a scientific and technical body, to which a minority of states belong, but this orientation may change and, indeed, in some quarters a change is being planned and promoted. It is this move to broaden the base and scope of the IOC, and to give it the key role in the implementation of the proposed International Decade of Ocean Exploration and in the long-term expanded program in international cooperation in marine science, that has at- tracted the opposition of some LDC’s or spokesmen therefor. They have a very specific apprehension. It is simply that the political issues arising out of the ocean and its multiple uses will in some fashion or other be removed from the General Assembly and disposed of, or subjected to the jurisdiction of, another international agency such as the IOC. The effect of this would be to locate the ball game in an entirely different park where the rules are not the same and where the players might have different influence than in the General Assembly. It is this kind of sentiment which underlies the suspicions evident in the following statement by Ambassador Pardo of Malta: We must, however, deprecate over-emphasis on exploration of the seabed and on the scientific aspects of the item before us and also clearly express our doubts on current plans which are being formulated with regard to IOC. The proposed international decade and the Secretary General’s expanded programme will produce a more rapid expansion of scientific knowledge. They will also result in a more precise evaluation of the mineral resources and of the military potential offered by the sea-bed and the ocean floor. They will, finally, considerably stimulate technological developments, which are already sufficiently rapid and which will make commercial and military exploitation easier. If, as we have every reason to believe, the ocean floor contains virtually inexhaustible mineral resources and if some areas of the ocean floor are of considerable strategic significance, the commendable scientific programmes pro- posed will inevitably intensify existing pressures for national appropriation and exploitation of some areas now universally recognized as being beyond national jurisdiction. Numerous scientific papers will no doubt be circulated by IOC to member Governments on the results of the projects undertaken under the Secretary- General’s expanded programme, thus contributing to the diffusion of scientific knowledge, and all countries will in greater or lesser measure benefit thereby ; but, in present circumstances where an equitable international regime for the ocean floor beyond national jurisdiction is completely lacking, where indeed internationally recognized norms are so few that this area can be used, abused and appropriated with minimal risk of incurring international responsibility and where only very few States have the financial resources to engage actively in the exploitation of the seabed beyond the continental shelf, who is likely to profit most in practice, that is, economically and militarily, from the scientific pro- grammes proposed to us? Not land-locked countries, not countries bordering on closed seas, not the developing world in general—and, I would add, not the goal of demilitarization of the ocean floor. Nor are we convinced that at the present stage there is real need to broaden the statute of IOC or to establish an inter-agency board for this body. Mem- 1262 bership of IOC is already open to all States Members of the United Nations and of other agencies within the United Nations system. That is in article 2 of the statute. The Commission already has the power to “consider and recom- mend international programmes for oceanographic investigation together with the necessary steps for their execution’; also, “the nature, forms and methods. of the exchange of oceanographic data’. That is in article 4 of the statute. The Commission, in short, has ample scope for fruitful activity within its present terms of reference. We also doubt that there is need to establish an inter-agency board for IOC; both the Secretary-General’s proposed expanded programme and the decade of ocean exploration can be effectively implemented - without this mechanism which is likely to lead to considerable bureaucratic proliferation. But our main objections to the establishment of the proposed inter-agency board are more far-reaching. We feel that such a board may contribute towards shifting the main focus of United Nations action from establishment of an international regime and of an agency empowered to administer such a regime in the interests and for the benefit of all countries to peripheral aspects of the question before us. Furthermore, a broadened and strenghtened IOC, eventually developing into an international agency on the pattern of the present specialized agencies, aS we have reason to believe is the intention in some quarters, would probably impede the creation of a body to administer the ocean floor beyond national jurisdiction, a body which we believe to be essential eventually if developing countries are to share equitably in practice in the benefits to be derived from the exploitation of sea-bed resources. Thus we view with considerable concern developments which, while not illogical on a purely technical or bureaucratic plane, may well endanger the long-term interests of many countries, the protection of which was the main purpose of the initiative taken by my Government. In short, the fear of some is that the developed states, acting in cooperation through the IOC, will mount an intensified exploration of ocean resources and an intensified program of scientific research and that the results of these pro- - grams, in the absence of deliberate actions to avoid them, will be to benefit solely the developed states, leaving the others to whistle. The issue of a regime, says Ambassador Pardo, must be kept alive in the General Assembly, for other- wise the IOC will be developed into a specialized agency and the regime, or lack thereof, will be frustrated by those who will be dominant in IOC. This same distrust of the developed states, irrespective of ideology, is to be seen in two other developments, the reception accorded the U.S. sponsored proposal for an International Decade of Ocean Exploration (IDOE) and the handling of the issue of disarmament in the ocean. With respect to the International Decade, which had originally been advanced in March, 1968, through a White House pronouncement, the U.S. sought General Assembly endorsement through a resolution. This effort was successful, but though no vote was recorded on this issue it is understood from qualified observers that this part of Resolution 2467, adopted in December, 1968, was subject to considerable reservation on the part of developing states. With regard to ocean military uses, it was quite clear from the very beginning of First Committee debate that both the U.S. and the Soviet Union were con- cerned that the question of specific disarmament measures might somehow be snatched out of the more-or-less comforting embrace of the Highteen Nation Disarmament Committee to be deposited in the more forbidding forum of the General Assembly. Although the U.S. and the Soviet Union might not, and prob- ably do not, yet share a common view on the scope of arms control measures in the ocean, it seems plain from their contributions to First Committee debate that they both preferred discussion of the matter be reserved primarily to the ENDC. Thus Ambassador Wiggins declared : The main danger of an arms race on the sea-bed lies in the possibility that it may become a new environment in which weapons of mass destruction are emplaced. Even though the general subject of sea-bed arms control is already included in the present agenda of the Highteen-Nation Committee on Dis- armament, we believé it would be useful for the General Assembly to give a more precise indication of its desires to the Disarmament Committee in Geneva. ( The United States strongly feels that the sea-bed and the deep ocean floor should not become an arena for an armaments race. We must work towards effective action, in conditions of mutual confidence, to enable States with the potential capability of emplacing weapons of mass destruction on the deep ocean 1263 floor to refrain from doing so in the secure knowledge that they will not thereby be placed at a military disadvantage. This will require painstaking technical study and negotiation. It is important that we undertake this effort in a qualified forum, and at an early stage. (emphasis added) The kind of expert analysis and negotiation which is needed for the discussion of specific agreements is to be found in the Highteen-Nation Committee on Dis- armament. We believe that this expert body should tackle the problem of arms control with respect to the sea-bed as soon as possible, consistent with its other arms control activities.* The Soviet Union’s observations are certainly not less suggestive than those of the United States. After general remarks which served to re-emphasize the Soviet view that the U.N. had no more than taken the first step in a long process of deliberation, the very first specific matter mentioned was that of military use of the ocean. In this intervention the Soviet Union succeeded in calling attention to the lack of agreement on the scope of a prohibition of military use, to the Soviet’s devotion to peaceful uses of the ocean, and to the belief that the subject should should only be considered in the ENDC. On the latter point the Soviet representa- tive commented : ‘ “It was quite logical in our view to include the question of the prohibition of the use of the sea-bed for military purposes in the agenda of the Highteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament as one of the partial disarmament measures. Tis is the most correct way to solve the problem of preventing the extension of the arma- ments race to the sea-bed and ocean floor. . . . May we express the hope that as a result of these debates the Highteen-Nation Committee will soon be able to. work out an international agreement on the question of the prohibition of the use of the sea-bed and ocean floor for military purposes.* (emphasis added) Developments in the ENDC since it convened in the latter part of March 1969, support very strongly the impression gained from the First Committee debates that the U.S. and the Soviet Union both are extremely determined that negotia- tions about military use of the ocean take place primarily outside the General Assembly. At the first meeting of the ENDC in 1969, the U.S. and the Soviet Union jointly proposed a treaty to ban nuclear weapons from the ocean floor and both President Nixon and Premier Kosygin sent messages to the Committee endorsing such an agreement. Even more significantly, for present purposes, press reports stated that it had been privately agreed by the two powers that this treaty was the number one objective at the present meeting. The importance at- tached to this issue is emphasized by later stories from Geneva about dissatisfac- tion amongst other members of the ENDC with the American-Soviet priority on this item. A New York Times report stated : Angry statements yesterday showed that many at the 17-Nation Conference feel that a ban on underground nuclear tests and on production of nuclear arms should be given priority over the U.S.-Soviet sponsored ocean-floor issue. Subsequently both the Soviet Union and the United States tabled drafts of a treaty forbidding certain military uses of the seabed beyond particular distances from coastal states. Although there are still very significant differences in the U.S.-Soviet views it seems reasonably clear that they both regard agreement, or the appearance of possible agreement, as highly desirable. In sum both the statements of the two states and press reports lend credence to the suggestion that both the U.S. and the Soviet Union prefer negotiation and formulation of agreements in the seemingly more secure arena of ENDC in Geneva than in the 120-odd member General Assembly in New York. (2) Recommendations of President's Comniission (a) Procedural aspects The foregoing observations concerning perceived difficulties in international disposition of the problem of allocating authority over, and managing uses in, the ocean environment may be given sharper focus in the context of those aspects of the recommendations of the President’s Commission which have to do with the international decision process. Among the most important Commission proposals are those which exhort the U.S. to “take the initiative to secure international agreement on a redefinition of the ‘continental shelf’ for purposes” of the Continental Shelf Convention and to “seize the opportunity for leadership which the present situation demands and propose a new international legal-political framework for exploration and exploitation of the mineral resources of the deep seas, .. .” The Commission also recommends the policies the U.S. should. seek in the exercise of this initiative and leadership. 26—563—70—pt. 2——_49 1264 At least two different aspects of these recommendations require appraisal; these may be termed procedural and substantive. By procedural I refer to the proposal that the U.S. take initiative and exercise leadership; this proposal refers to “when” something is done and the connotation is that the U.S. must act very quickly. By substantive I mean to refer to the concrete positions the Commission recommends for the U.S. on the shelf limit and the region beyond. The key point concerning the procedural aspect of the Commission recommenda- tions arises because it is presumably being suggested by use of the phrases “taking initiative” and “exercising leadership” for the “immediate future” that the U.S. should accelerate the international decision process. Apparently it is felt that. unless the U.S. initiates and leads, the situation will deteriorate to the disad- vantage of the U.S. or that somehow we are disadvantaged by the initiatives of other states. Assuming this view of the Commission’s procedural position is accurate, the question is whether it seems likely that the U.S. will suffer harm if international action is not taken immediately to redefine the shelf for the purposes of the Convention and to create a regime beyond. We are interested, first, in the evidence the Commission offers for its anticipation. Second, it is reasonable to ask whether thought was given to what costs might be incurred if the interna- tional decision process is accelerated and an international conference is convened soon. On the question of evidence the Commission offers relatively little. Regarding the shelf limit the Commission asserts that there is uncertainty about rights beyond 200 meters and that this is deterring investment because of a lack of assur- ance of exclusive access. But the Commission provides no indicia of this deter- rence (nor does the underlying International Panel Report) beyond asserting that ‘representatives of industry” agree on this deterrence theory. This lack of evidence should not be too surprising since the fact appears to be that private enterprise (or some enterprise) have now secured leases or con- cessions from 28 states for operation off their coasts beyond 200 meters. If this is an illustration of deterrence it is reasonable to wonder what would happen if there were real encouragement. In short so far as the interest in encourag- ing offshore exploitation is concerned those who are now voting with their dol- lars do not seem to be especially apprehensive about the situation. If there is un- certainty it does not deter investment. Beyond this rather brief and elementary discussion the Commission nowhere identifies trends that, unless halted immediately, threaten harm to U.S. interests. The Commission does offer criticism of a particular interpretation of the Shelf definition, that by the National Petroleum Council, but since it categorically rejects this interpretation as wholly unwarranted and without any support whatsoever it does not appear to regard the prospect of this interpretation as requiring urgent action by the U.S. in the form of taking initiatives to secure a redefinition of the shelf. More will be said on some of the Commission’s observa- tions regarding the NPC proposal when we examine the Commission’s substan- tive recommendations. Turning to the leadership the Commission recommends the U.S. take to secure a legal-political framework for mineral exploitation beyond the shelf, the Com- mission at no place seeks to establish the case for viewing this as an immediate problem. The Commission occasionally ‘asserts that “the present situation’ either “requires” or “demands” such a framework and also asserts that this ‘‘must be accomplished in the immediate future” and is needed in the “immediate future.” As near as a close reading permits, however, the “present situation” is nowhere defined by the Commission except perhaps in a preceding section dealing with the availability of mineral resources and this section by no means suggests that there is any immediate need to exploit high seas minerals. On the immediacy of the need for an international regime, the Commission is content to make unsup- ported assertion. In sum there is almost no discussion by the Commission of how the U.S. will be harmed or be denied benefits unless it now urges both 'the redefinition of the shelf and the ereation of legal arrangements for mining beyond the shelf. As noted, I can also find no discussion whatsoever of the possible costs of engaging in in- ternational negotiations at this time or in the near future. The Report of the Commission’s International Panel also does not examine the possible hazards of international negotiations in the near future but does attempt to make a positive case for immediate negotiations to amend the Shelf Convention. 1265 The Panel lists the arguments in favor of what it calls a “Wait and See Policy” and concludes that while these are “persuasive” in many respects, it would be unwise to accept them. The reasons for this conclusion are: (1) Legal planning and _ scientific-technological-economic planning are mu- tually reinforcing, hence the former should proceed immediately on the interna- tional level. (2) Actions may occur which cannot be changed though they affect the in- terests of the U.S. adversely and also the international community. (8) The U.S. cannot, on present policies, agree to a moratorium on exploring and exploiting beyond 200 meters nor could it adopt this stance unilaterally. (4) A wait and see policy cannot be a do-nothing policy else U.S. objectives will not be realized. (5) U.S. objectives require (a) a decision by the U.S. not to claim permanent exclusive access to resources beyond a certain depth and not to accept similar claims by other states, (b) a determination of a plan to promote exploitation beyond a certain depth if the U.S. is to lease rights beyond that depth. (6) The above factors, in sum, mean that even a wait and see policy requires the U.S. to decide what legal framework it prefers. (7) Since the U.S. must decide on its preferences on a framework it “might just as well take the initiative to seek that framework and thereby help to shape the future in a constructive fashion.” The difficulty with these conclusions and reasoning is that while a wait and see policy may require decisions by the U.S. it does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that we must or should take the initiative to urge immediate negotia- tions. Whether one does take the initiative may depend on other factors not related to this problem. Further, the actions taken as an initiative may differ from a call for immediate negotiation. The situation now does not call for the exercise of initiatives by the U.S. and while some leadership is required it should be exerted quite differently than the Commission suggests. The prime international problem we face is not that of securing a desirable international framework for deep ocean exploitation but rather one of seeing to it that U.S. and world community interests on a variety of issues are satisfactorily met. A framework for a type of ocean use which on the best available estimate (that of the Marine Resources Panel) is a quarter century away cannot be regarded as a priority question. It is quite possible that there will be some sporadic deep sea mining ventures in the period before the year 2000 but it is subject to considerable doubt whether the political difficulties resulting therefrom are likely to be so serious as presently to require the con- struction of a legal system. In contrast to the Commission’s recommendation of urgent action to deal with the immediate future, the critical point, it seems to me, is that the U.S. ought to urge both (1) the necessity for allowing ample time to states to prepare for international negotiations on the issues that are likely to be dealt with when the shelf limit and regime problems are dealt with in an international conference and (2) the interim measures by which there is reasonable assurance that alter- native arrangements are not precluded by the progress of technology and of selfishness. If this is what is meant (or is not incompatible with) the exercise of leadership and initiatve then I am all for the latter. For the situation we con- front seems to me to be amply clear. The general outlines of this situation have already been suggested in previous discussion, but more precise indication may. be useful. The key matter to understand is that neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union nor the two together is likely to be permitted to convoke a meeting which will dispose solely of certain limited issues selected because of their special concern and importance to one or both of such states. The International Law Commission ealled the Assembly’s attention to this general point over a decade ago in noting the interdependence of numerous issues in the law of the sea. If anything, a close relationship between seemingly unconnected problems of ocean policy is more pronounced today than a decade ago in Geneva. It may be recalled, for instance, that three of the four Geneva conventions on the law of the sea (those on the High Seas, Territorial Sea, and Continental Shelf) are all by their terms subject to calis for revision at about the same time (June and September 1969) and the fourth. on Conservation of Living Resources, is similarly subject in 1971, probably before a general conference on the law of the sea could be convened. What this means is that for the U.S. to take leadership and exercise initiative on the topics suggested by the Commission as immediately needed, in all proba- 1266 bility entails the submission of still other issues to international discussion and negotiation, at least unless this difficulty is anticipated and avoided. Thus if the U.S. pushes to reach international agreement on a narrow continental shelf as the Commission proposes and to secure agreement on a specific seabed regime (or on any other proposal concerning these topics), it seems to be only prudent to inquire what other issues will be considered and how these issues might have to be adjusted in order to secure the kind of agreement we seek on the shelf limit and the regime beyond. It certainly is not at all beyond anticipation that there will be a strong move by some states, perhaps a large number: (1) to secure agreement on a wide territorial sea ; (2) to make it entirely ciear (as it is not now) that warships do not enjoy a right of innocent passage through the territorial sea ; (3) to assure exclusive fishing rights in a wide fishing zone as a possible alternative to a territorial sea of a particularly wide sort; (4) to establsh new and more severe restrictions upon the conduct of scien- tific research ; and (5) to place special restraints on military uses of the seabed, the water column and the surface. In the proper exercise of prudence the U.S. and other states would each cer- tainly have to determine how their exclusive interests are affected by alternative disposition of these issues and would attempt to estimate how other states might vote to resolve these issues. In the process a decision must certainly be made concerning what of these and other issues deserves priority and how much weight is to be placed on this or that resolution of ‘an issue in relation to other issues. If this picture of the future is reasonably accurate, and certainly past experi- ence suggests this pattern of events is likely, it seems to me reasonable to wonder why the Commission did not address this problem specifically. It does not appear to me to be satisfactory to observe, as the Commission did, that its recommenda- tions are inter-related and that if one is rejected it “would raise serious ques- tions in the minds of the Commission as to the advisability of continuing with the others.” The point is that the issues involved are inter-related not only among themselves but with still other ocean issues such as fishing and military uses. In the end it seems to me unusually difficult to understand exactly what the Com- mission is recommending. If, as seems most likely, one or several of the Com- missions recommendations will be changed then apparently we are left without any Commission recommendations as to U.S. policies on these issues. It is not my purpose to suggest that the task of evaluating the interests of the numerous states concerned will always be so complex that the negotiating process is impossible in the sense that one cannot entertain reasonably reliable expectations about the outcome. It will some time be necessary to confront some very delicate issues in a large international gathering and to reach more or less realistic conclusions. At some time in the future this confrontation will be a reasonable proposition. My point is rather that we need time for thorough prepa- ration for such a meeting and this time should be sufficiently extended that we can get a better idea than anyone now has about the resources of the ocean floor including the geological shelf, slope, rise and beyond. I suspect this means that an international conference should not be convened before 1975 at the earliest and more likely 1980. Having said this it seems to me necessary to add that this preference is very unlikely to be realized. A far more reasonable prediction is that a general inter- national conference will be convened before 1975, perhaps even sooner, and that it will be essential for the developed states to have made as extensive preparation as is possible by that time. Thus, the urgent problem confronting policy-makers is how one prepares for negotiations in circumstances characterized by (1) a widespread ignorance of the marine environment and its resources; (2) a strong drive by developing states to secure a share in the “common heritage”; (3) an equally (at least) strong feeling on the part of these states of distrust of some or all of the developed states in their military use of the ocean ; (4) a widespread suspicion among LDC’s that the conduct of marine science research is prosecuted by the developing states primarily in order to obtain exclusive rights to valuable resources (which may not be there) ; (5) an international decision process which will be overwhelmingly dominated by developing states possessing little or no heme-owned capability in ocean use with the exception of fishing. 1267 (6) Substantive aspects The Commission’s substantive recommendations call for : (1) A definition of the continental shelf to fix the limit at the 200 meter isobath or 50 nautical miles from the baseline, whichever includes the greater area. (2) The creation of an intermediate zone out to the 2500 meter isobath or 100 nautical miles from the baselines whichever includes the greater area. In this zone Only the coastal state or its nationals would be permitted to explore or exploit, but the framework of regulation would otherwise be that which applies to the area beyond the intermediate zone. (8) The conclusion of an international agreement establishing a regime for the areas beyond the continental shelf. Basically the Commission proposes a registration scheme, with provision for collecting and distributing revenues. This framework the Commission recommends ‘for the immediate future’ but believes it will take years to arrive at such a framework. Accordingly the Com- mission recommends that the U.S. ‘propose the principle that no nation, in the interim, should claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part of the seabed or subsoil beyond the 200-meter isobath.’’ The U.S. should continue to authorize exploration and exploitation beyond the limit “provided such authori- zation states that any such expioration or exploitation shall be subject to the new inernational framework agreed upon.” Recognizing the deterrent effect of this, at least in part, the Commission further recommends that “Congress enact legislation to compensate private enterprise for loss of investment or expenses occasioned by any new international framework that redefines the continental shelf so as to put the area in which it is engaged in mineral resources develop- ment beyond the shelf’s outer limits.” Although labelled “interim”, the recommendation that the U.S. and other states refrain from claiming or exercising sovereignty or sovereign rights beyond 200 meters is for several reasons probably the most significant of these recommenda- tions for a legal framework. First, a principle of this kind, if not of the same detail, would seem essential if some definite limit is to be placed on outward expansion of coastal control over the seabed. Second, it is at least somewhat surprising that the Commission suggests 200 meters since ithe U.S. has already claimed rights beyond this limit, as apparently have numerous other states. Thus, the Commission is recommending that the U.S. and other states not only accept a shelf limit they rejected in 1958 but also that they now retract the extension of sovereign rights which were properly made in accordance with the limit agreed upon in the 1958 Convention. If the U.S. were to amend the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act to accord with this proposal, as the Commission pparently recommends, some outstanding leases would no longer be on the U.S. shelf although they would, for the time being, still be subject to U.S. control. Third, unless this interim limit were generally adopted, the prospects of accept- ance of the Commission’s long-term proposal, which seem none too sanguine anyway, would become virtually non-existent. Fourth, the Commission’s interim proposal is more restrictive of coastal rights than even Malta proposes. At the March 1969 meeting of the U.N. Seabed Committee, Malta originally offered a resolution which called for an interim limit of 200 meters or an unspecified limit in miles. Such a formulation at least anticipates that pre-existing claims might not be affected by a new international regime. The basic difficulty with the Commission’s interim recommendation appears to me to be that it both turns the clock back and has a high potential of frus- trating wholly legitimate expectations. The clock-turning-back goes to the prac- ticality of the Commission’s proposal, not its wisdom. It is at least difficult to anticipate that the large number of states who wished in 1958 to have a limit greater than 200 meters would now be willing to accept a lesser limit. Perhaps the perceived advantages of an international regime will be large enough to persuade states to accept the 200-meter/50-mile limit, but it is not unreasonable to incline to doubt this. ’ The more serious shortcoming appears to arise from the Commission’s sug- gested policy that leases now or in the future granted beyond 200 meters become subject to a future international regime. The Commission recommends that the loss private enterprise might incur, if such a regime is less favorable, be shared by the enterprise and the community. To protect private enterprise against “undue loss” “The Commission recommends that the Congress enact legislation to compensate private enterprise for loss of investment or expenses occasioned by any new international framework that redefines the continental shelf so as to 1268 put the area in which it is engaged in mineral resources development beyond the shelf’s outer limits.” It is in the first place questionable whether compensation ought to disregard legitimate expectations of return on investment which are frustrated by the new regime. Certainly if the investment itself is lost, the future returns on it, which may well be demonstrable, are also going to be lost. Secondly, it seems to me rather questionable whether all states can or will follow the policy here recom- mended only for the United States. It is one thing to suggest that the U.S. pro- vide compensation which it could more or less easily afford but it is an entirely different matter to make the same demand of Equitorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Malaysia, Mauritania, Panama, Peru, Philippines,, Senegal, Sudan, Suriam, and Trinidad, all of which have issued leases or con- cessions beyond 200 meters® and none of which occupy so favorable a wealth position as the United States. Since this Commission recommendation could not practicably be implemented in many instances, and since U.S. companies would therefore frequently be the losers, this particular episode of U.S. leadership could turn out to be costly to the United States. Moreover if fear should exist that other states could not adopt such compensa- tory policies, the consequence could be to deter the future investment the Com- mission says it wishes to encourage. If uncertainty does act as a deterrent to investment, as the Commission argues in another context, it may be that the Commission’s own recommendations will serve just such a function. At the very least it is less than clear that the policies the Commission recommends for the U.S. can actually be employed by many other states around the world. Turning, finally, to the Commission’s substantive recommendations on the shelf limit and the regime beyond, only brief appraisal is attempted here of some of the less technical but still significant elements. It deserves notice, initi- ally, that the Commission Report offers only very sketchy discussion of these issues, far less than is warranted by the Commission’s own estimate of their importance. Surprisingly even the International Panel Report offers but skimpy augmentation of the Commission text. The bulk of the discussion in the Commission Report is devoted to criticism of the position advocated by the National Petroleum Council in its Interim Report for the Department of the Interior. A key element of this criticism is. the conclusion that neither the “language” nor the “history” of the continental shelf definition warrants the interpretation that coastal rights extend to the entire continental land mass, i.e., to the geological shelf, slopes, and at least the landward portions of the continental rise. It seems difficult to establish that the Shelf Convention sets out any explicit limit on the shelf even though there was undoubtedly an intent to indicate there was a limit on coastal expansion. What the Geneva Conference apparently sought to do was to achieve both some certainty (hence the 200—meter limit) plus suffi- cient flexibility to take into account unpredictable technological and economic progress (hence the exploitability criterion in the alternative). It was very clearly anticipated that soveref#gn rights could extend beyond 200 meters when the requisite conditions came to exist. However it is also quite clear that the conferees in Geneva did not believe they had disposed of the entire ocean floor, i.e., they were aware there was a limit but did not seek to establish what it might be in advance of the social-political-economic-technological context which would eall for and permit more precise definition. In the meantime the limit was to move outward as exploitation moved outward, to the limit of adjacency, until the Convention could be revised. In this context the contention that the NPC position has no warrant in either language or history of the Convention is only a partial truth. The Convention definition can reasonably be interpreted to permit expansion of the shelf limit to the edge of the continental land mass (and a few believe even further) as exploitation becomes feasible so long as the limit is still “adjacent” to the coastal states. Accordingly the Commission statement, when coupled with its recom- mendation for imminent revision of the Convention definition. either mag- nificiently begs the question or is self-fulfilling, for unless the definition is revised the shelf boundary probably wold in time reach the submerged edge of the continental land mass. At the same time the NPC position also it not an acceptable interpretation of the Convention insofar as the NPC declares that the shelf definition now extends coastal sovereign rights to the continental margin. The Convention itself obviously does not explicitly define the shelf in terms of the continental land mass and it could have done so if a sufficient consensus to that 1269 effect then existed. The Panamanian proposal appeared to incorporate this posi- tion and was rejected in the Fourth Committee, receiving only four affirmative votes. While the Convention might be interpreted to anticipate the possibility of the shelf extending to the end of the continental margin, it does so only as Article 1 permits expansion of the boundary with advancing exploitation. Most significantly, the Convention also contains a provision, referred to earlier, which permits revision of the definition before exploitability has pushed the shelf boun- dary to the end of the continental margin. Hence it seems to me to be impossible to accept the notion that the Convention presently allocates sovereign rights to the extent the NPC suggests. In rejecting the NPC proposal for a shelf limit the Commission comments. that it would “create the danger’ that some states ‘“‘will feel justified in claiming exclusive access to the superjacent waters, the living resources in them, and the air above” their continental slopes and rises. The Commission then states that “The danger that rights of exclusive access for one purpose may extend to claims. of territorial sovereignty or exclusive access for all purposes materialized as an unforeseen and undesirable consequence of the Truman Proclamation of 1945.” If Dr. John Craven does not attain immortality in some other way, an outcome not lightly to be dismissed in view of his ingenuity, he may secure this in measure by virtue of the now common reference to ‘“Craven’s Law’, by which is meant the notion that jurisdiction claimed over the ocean floor will inevitably seep upward to control events in the space above. It is this apprehension which the Commis- sion sees as a danger in connection with the NPC concept of a relatively wide continental shelf. Craven’s Law, which has been much discussed but seldom: examined in light of the historical record, certainly deserves some investigation to see if, as I believe, these is less to it than meets the eye. The usual evidence cited to prove the existence of the Law consists of the extravagant action of a very few states—now eight out of over 100 coastal states—in asserting a claim to a very wide territorial sea of 200 or more miles, which claim some of them advanced in apparent reponse to the Truman Procla- mations of 1945. [It should be noted, in passing, that the Commission’s depiction of the past is somewhat selective. There were two Truman Proclamations in September, 1945, one dealing with fish beyond the territorial sea (and treating them differently than oil) and one dealing with the continental shelf. The Latin American states reacted to both proclamations and in so doing refused to distin- guish between shelf resources and resources in the waters above as the U.S. Proclamations did.] However, it is notable, but seldom mentioned by believers in Craven’s Law, that in a quarter-century only a small handful of states have reacted in this way and their positions are almost universally regarded as con- trary to international law. Except for these instances of extravagent behavior, there appear to be no other unusually extensive territorial claims resulting, even colorably, from narrower assertions by another state of certain limited jurisdiction and control. Another bit of assumed evidence consists of the recent difficulties experienced by foreign scientists in getting consent from coastal states to do certain research on the continental shelf. This is cited to show that having conceded the coastal state a measure of control over the seabed and subsoil these states: naturally extend the control upwards to interfere with the wholly different activity of research. The short answer to this “evidence” is that it bears an unfortunate lack of resemblance to reality. The fact is that these claims to affect research are not an unforeseen development involving unilateral expansion of authority but result from the firm agreement of numerous states, an agreement which was actively sought by the United States, the one state obviously likely to suffer the most from this control by other states over research. It was not at all inevitable that coastal states be given, or would claim, this control, especially since no one has ever demonstrated that the conduct of research with open publication of results, has any harmful effects on coastal states. It is perhaps ironic that this instance of alleged unilaterally expanded jurisdiction was in fact expressly authorized in a general international agreement at the apparent insistence of the United States Navy, yet this alleged expansion is now decried by a prominent member of the Navy scientific establishment whose name is commonly attached to this supposed phenomenon. Lewis Carroll would be quite at home here. In sum, as near as one can see from examining what states do in practice, in contrast to what some people say they do, Craven’s Law has no basis. If states are now expanding their exclusive authority, as they are, the phenomena 1270 requires another explanation. Similarly, the Commission’s more specific ver- sion of the Law has no general application. Immediately after these references to Latin American jurisdictional claims, the Commission offers the following pronouncements : “Such developments are obviously contrary to traditional U.S. policy to limit national claims to the sea in the interest of the maximum freedem to the multiple uses, including military uses, which the United States makes of the oceans. National Security and world peace are best served by the narrowest possible definition of the continental shelf for purposes of mineral resources development.” The latter sentence is, in my opinion, the most unfortunate and unwise to be found in the Commission Report. To cast virtually the entire argument for im- mediate revision of the sheif limit (else it won’t be the “narrowest possible’) in terms of “national security and world peace’, words of the highest level of -abstraction, virtually prevents rational response and surely inhibits an exchange of views. About the best one can do is make a general denial and ask for the ‘Commission or its members to offer some details about why world peace and national security require as the Commission says they do. Fortunately the time is rapidly passing when important international policy matters can easily be dis- posed of in the United States merely by waving the magic wand of ‘national security’, thereby summarily terminating discussion. At least insofar as accept- ance of a Commission recommendation is concerned it seems to be entirely proper to ignore the supposed military justification until such time as some more de- tailed pronouncement is forthcoming to clarify the bearing of national security on this matter. The opportunity for developing a reasonably clear statement of inilitary factors pertinent to the shelf question existed for the two-year life of the Commission. In view of this opportunity it seems now wholly unreasonable to ask for blind acceptance of a recommendation that appears to be based pri- marily upon undisclosed military considerations. The Commission’s recommendations of a shelf limit and its strong words about the NPC position on the shelf perhaps require some special consideration in light of the recent decision by the International Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases. The Court there rejected the position that Article 6 of the Shelf Convention was already part of customary international law and held that Germany, which had not ratified the convention, was not obliged to delimit its North Sea shelf in accordance with the equidistance principle. For present purposes the important part of the decision is the obser- vation by the Court that the most fundamental rule of law pertaining to the continental shelf is that this area comes within the soverign right of the coastal state because it is a natural prolongation of the land territory and that this area and rights over it inhere in the coastal state without need for proclamation or pronouncement or any act whatsoever. Obviously such rights do not arise from agreement—they exist independently of the Shelf Convention. At the same time the Court acknowledged that some provisions of the Conven- tion, especially Articles 1-3, were ones ‘‘which, it is clear, were then (in 1958) regarded as reflecting, or as crystalizing, received or at least emergent rules of customary international law relative to the continental shelf, amongst them the question of the seaward extent of the shelf; .. .”* Thus the Court states that all coastal states possess rights over the shelf because the latter is a natural prolongation of the land mass but that the extent of such rights is not (apparently) coequal with the prolongation because the customary law is that found in Article 1 of the Convention, i.e., 200 meters or to the depth admitting of exploitation. In this view all states have the same shelf limit irrespective of their adherence to the Shelf Convention. If we may take these statements by the Court as representing international law on the issue of the shelf limit, and no doubt we should however aptly they may be regarded as dictum, their effects upon subsequent discussion of the Commis- sion’s recommendations may be important. First, it is now apparent that in sug- gesting certain revision of the Shelf Convention, i.e., a shelf defined as extending to 200 meters or 50 nautical miles, the Commission is proposing a change in customary international law. This means that a new treaty definition, as con- trasted to present Article 1, will be effective only as to those states which accept the amended treaty at least until such time as the new definition becomes so gen- erally accepted that it becomes customary law, replacing the present “customary” limit. The Court makes it very clear in this connection that acceptance of the Shelf Convention by about 40 states is “hardly sufficient” by itself to convert a “conventional rule” toa “general rule of international law.” * 1271 The result of this new development is, therefore, that states could have a very clear choice. Unless satisfied with a new limit on the shelf, as contained in a revised treaty on the subject, states may continue to rely on the customary defi- nition in which the key terms are “exploitability” and “adjacency”. In practice some states have interpreted these terms to authorize extension of their shelf to points much deeper than 200 meters and more than 100 miles from their baseline. The United States, it should be noticed, is one of the leaders in this extension of the shelf, claiming areas more than 100 miles from the coast and at depths much greater than 200 meters. For these reasons the content of the customary law on the shelf limit is of special significance and the Court’s treatment of this matter is of particular interest. The decision contains pronouncements which appear to indicate that in the Court’s view the present shelf limit (200 meters or exploitability, as modified by adjacency) is a rather narrow one. Unfortunately virtually all these pronouncements are mere dictum and appear to have been made without any reference whatsoever to state practice. Moreover some of the Court’s observations appear to be contradictory of others, leaving it rather difficult to envisage precisely which views are predominant. The Court’s treatment of the concept of ‘‘adjacency” is especially significant since it is this term which establishes the limit on exploitability as a means of expanding the shelf limit. The Court referred to a number of terms used in State proclamations and in treaties—“near’, “close to its shores’, “off its coasts”, “opposite”, “in front of the coast”, “in the vicinity of’, “neighboring the coast”, “adjacent to’, ‘“contiguous’—and said they were all ‘‘terms of a some- what inprecise character which, although they convey a reasonably clear general idea, are capable of a considerable fluidity of meaning.” The Court examined one of these terms: i To take what is perhaps the most frequently employed of these terms, namely ‘‘adjacent to’, it is evident that by no stretch of imagination can a point on the continental shelf situated say a hundred miles, or even much less, from a given coast, be regarded as ‘adjacent’ to it, or to any coast at all, in the normal sense of adjacency, even if the point concerned is nearer to some one coast than to any other. This would be even truer of localities where, physically, the continental shelf begins to merge with the ocean depths. While these remarks were made essentially to demonstrate that ‘“‘adjacent” and “proximity” do not possess the same meaning in the context of a three- state delimitation problem, the suggestion is that the “continental shelf’ 100 miles from the coast, or even less than that distance. does not fall within the sovereign rights of any coastal state. Thus for all its reliance on the “natural prolongation” doctrine as the fundamental basis for the legal concept of the continental shelf, the Court apparently does not accept that the legal shelf is always coextensive with the natural prolongation. At some point, even “much less than” 100 miles, present customary law puts an end to coastal control. Or so the Court seems to say. Unfortunately the message is perhaps not so clear as these passages seem to suggest. The Court also states that the entire North Sea area is composed of continental shelf, being shallower than 200 meters, and appears to regard its pareelling out by the bordering states as permissible under the Convention and customary law. Yet there are parts of the North Sea that are much more than 100 miles from any of the surrounding states. Unless such parts are “adjacent” they could not be lawfully claimed as shelf by any of the states concerned. At no place does the Court suggest that the North Sea area is unique, calling for a different set of laws. Whatever the scope of the Court’s statements on adjacency, there is a very clear implication that in the Court’s view the present limit on the shelf does not necessarily embrace the slope and rise, i.e., if the slope and rise are part of the ‘natural prolongation” of the continental land mass, as they seem to be, it does not follow that they are part of the legal shelf. If any part of this “natural pro- longation” were automatically within the shelf there would be little of significance in the Court’s remarks about adjacency. On the other hand if the NPC position is not now the international law of the sea, the Court’s opinion may well provide strong support for the proposal that this position is to be preferred when states do finally establish a certain limit for the shelf. The Court’s rationale for the very existence of a legal shelf, i.e., it is a prolongation of territory over which an adjacent state exercises sovereignty, may now appear also to be a suitable rationale for locating the limit on such sovereign rights. Incidentally, in this connection, a few comments are pertinenc regarding the National Petroleum Council position that the shelf now extends to include all the submerged portion of continents. On this assumption the NPC Report casti- gates the Commission recommendation of a 200 meter/50 mile shelf as “patently a needless and dangerous give-away of a vital segment of the American mineral estate. .. .” Ido not agree with the Commission’s recommendation as to the U.S. final position on this point (although it might well be the starting point if nego- tiations must occur rather soon), but I do not at all share the assumption which underlies the NPC view. Further it seems to me that Professor Auerbach is com- pletely right in noting that what we are concerned with here is determining what the “American mineral estate” is and, accordingly, we are not much aided by such boot-strapping argumentation as the NPC advances. One final aspect of the Commission recommendations deserving mention are those which have to do with providing greater freedom than now prevails for the conduct of marine science research. The Commission devoted. special consid- eration to this important problem and devised a highly desirable set of pro- posals by which, if adopted, progress can be made. The only disturbing aspect of the Commission’s work in this regard derives from its recommendations for a political-legal framework beyond the continental shelf which appear largely to have been conceived without paying much attention to their impact on scientists. In recommending an intermediate zone the Commission does state that “scien- tific inquiry concerning the bed of the intermediate zone undertaken there will not require the coastal nation’s prior consent.” Unfortunately there is reason to doubt whether it will prove possible to conclude an agreement to this effect. The prin- cipal basis for this doubt is that the Commission proposes to require that all claims to explore for minerals beyond the continental shelf must be registered with an international registry authority. Within the intermediate zone only the coastal state or its licensees would be authorized to explore or to exploit mineral resources. Beyond this zone the first registrant receives the exclusive right to ex- plore in a particular area for particular mineral resources. The question this sys- tem will raise, probably inevitably, is how to distinguish between marine science research and mineral exploration. It is already painfully clear that no objective distinction can be discerned between these activities on the Shelf, hence there is ample reason for concern over the same problem beyond the shelf. If there is concern to protect exclusive rights of mineral exploration both in the intermediate zone and in the deep sea bed, it is not easy to See how a system an be established which will not interfere with research. Coastal states may merely extend their present apprehensions (though they have little foundation for them) about research in the shelf region to the zone beyond. In the enormous expanse of seabed outside the zone, the international authority would presumably have to do something to assure its licensees that exclusivity is protected. In either event it would not be surprising if the registry authority felt compelled to establish some administrative regulations and pro- cedures especially directed at marine science research. That these techniques would impede marine science can be taken for granted, unless scientists seek to use their influence to avoid this result. It is not reassuring to recall that from 1955 to 1958 scientists sought unsuccessfully to warn that the Continental Shelf treaty then under consideration would very probably interfere substantially with scientific research. On the other hand the sad experiences under the shelf treaty, which scientists had fully anticipated, may have taught state officials a lesson and perhaps similar future difficulties might be avoided. Unfortunately there is little evidence of sufficiently widespread concern over the shelf problems to cause one to have much optimism about heading off some new difficulties for marine science. x REFERENCES 1. IT 1956 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 256 (1957) (U.N. Doe. No. A/ON.4/SER.A/1956/Add.1). 2. 22 GAOR, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 1589th Meeting of the First Committee 18-16 (U.N. Doe. No. A/C.1/PV.1589) (1968). 2 292 GAOR. Provisional Verbatim Record of the 1590th Meeting of the First Committee 13 (U.N. Doc. No. A/C.1/PV. 1590) (1968). 4. 22 GAOR. Provisional Verbatim Records of the 1592d Meeting of the First Committee 7 (U.N. Doe. No. A/C.1/PV. 1592) (1968). ‘ 5. This information is derived from Appendix F of National Petroleum Council, Petroleum Resources under the Ocean Floor 100-01 (1969). 1273 ‘6. The text reference is to U.N. Doc. No. A/Conf.13/C.4/L.4: “For the purpose of these articles, the common expression ‘continental shelf’ is used as ref- ring to the seabed, soil and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, including both constituent parts of the continental terrace, namely the continental shelf proper and the continental slope with its gorges, valleys, depressions and ravines, as far as the further points at which the depth of the superadjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources and the said areas of the continental solpe, but excluding the great depths of oceanic basins.” 6 Official Records, United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 127 (U.N. Doe. No. A/Conf.13/42) (1958). 7. North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, para. 63, p. 39. 8. Id. at para. 73, p. 42. 9. Id. at para. 41, p. 30. MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, DEPARTMENT OF NAVAL ARCHITECTURE AND MARINE HNGINEERING, Cambridge, Mass., August 9, 1969. Prof. THomMAS A. CLINGAN, Jr., Counsel, Subcommittee on Oceanography, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. DEAR PROFESSOR CLINGAN: Word has just reached me of your appointment as Counsel to the Subcommittee on Oceanography in connection with the hear- ings on the Stratton Report. May I extend congratulations and all good wishes. The Subcommittee has important work cut out for it in bringing the results of the Presidential Commission’s recommendations into line with national policy. For what it may be worth, I take liberty in enclosing a review article on the Commission’s report just published in Zhe Technology Review under the title “Alternatives for Ocean Policy.” I should have appreciated an opportunity to present my views on the Com- mission’s recommendations to the Committee. This was out of the question with an early autumn deadline on a book. If you deem the observations worth com- municating to others, and if it would be in conformity with Committee policy, I should have no objection to the article being reprinted with the hearings. I feel sure the Hditor of the Review would share this position. I am particularly interested in getting across the views expressed with re- spect to the proposed international licensing authority. This impresses me as being unnecessary at this time and even possibly harmful to long-run American national interests. It would limit our freedom of action in an area that is vital to our security and tie our hands in the development of ocean resources. I expect to be in Washington in the middle of September and would be pleased to discuss matters with you if you would care to do so. Sincerely, NorMAN J. PADELFORD, Professor of Political Science. [From the 'Technology Review, July/August 1969] ALTERNATIVES FOR OCEAN POLICY (By Norman J. Padelford, Professor of Political Science, Emeritus, M.I.T.) Norman J. Padelford is Professor of Political Science Emeritus and Senior Lecturer in the M.I.T. Departments of Political Science and of Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering. Educated at Denison and Harvard Universities, he has worked with the Depart- ment of State and with the United Nations on problems of inter- national organization. Professor Padelford has specialized in studies of international political organization and, more recently, in work on ocean resources. He is the author of numerous books including Public Policy and the Uses of the Sea (M.I.T. Press, 1969). He is a founding member of the Board of Editors of a new journal entitled Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce. Multiple pressures are forcing nations to “go down to the seas” anew. The mo- tives are more pragmatic than the poet had in mind, however—more raw ma- 1274 terials, increased supplies of foodstuffs, new energy sources, and more effective defense. The oceans constitute 71 percent of the earth’s surface. Within the restricted land space left for man must be accommodated the needs of 3.5 billion people today. And somehow we must find room for the estimated 6.5 billion expected in the year 2000. Secretary of the Interior Walter Hickel has suggested, in hailing the aquanauts who lived for 60 days under the sea in Project Tektite, that in the future “whole new cities” may be constructed under water. The world yield of food per capita, almost stationary since 1950, strongly sug- gests that new supplies must quickly be found. The ocean is capable of producing much larger harvests than the fishing industry is now gathering if new equip- ment, better methods and careful cultivation replace the archaic means being used in many places. The world need for fish is expected to grow by an additional 40 million tons (67%) by 1985, according to latest estimates of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. The increasing depletion, and rate of use, of mineral resources on land suggest increasing demands on marine supplies (see David Brooks’ article in this issue). One result will almost surely be to aggravate the existent pollution problem. The condition of the ocean near principal cities makes us painfully aware of the quantities of noisome wastes being dumped into the sea. As more oil wells are drilled on the continental shelf and 300 to 500,000-ton super tankers become com- monplace, the risks of pollution will rise exponentially. All of these issues suggest the need for national and international discussion of the general direction in which ocean policy should be moving. Should the federal government mobilize an effort comparable to that employed in develop- ing nuclear energy to accomplish new missions in the ocean? Or should private enterprise be left to get what it can with the means at its disposal, as the oil industry has done, restricting the role of government to licensing, overseeing, setting quotas, insisting on competition, and possibly controlling prices? How far should the United States go in cooperating with others, inside or outside of the United Nations, in joint surveying, mining, and food production— or in the search for new laws? Should we support the creation of new interna- tional machinery to control the use of the sea beds in the interests of mankind? The issues at stake are complex. What is done on some of them now will affect the freedom of choice on other matters later, regarding not only our livelihood but our power and influence in world affairs as well. A time of decision is at hand. THE MARINE RESOURCES ACT OF 1966 Impetus for a new ocean policy in this country began with a recommendation by the National Academy of Sciences in 1959 for a 10-year national effort to extend research and knowledge of the seas, to draw additional manpower into marine science and engineering, and to develop new vehicles for underwater activity. 4 Portions of this program were advanced by Presidents Hisenhower and Ken- nedy. But it remained to the 89th Congress to pass the first comprehensive ocean legislation in several decades—the Marine Resources and Engineering Develop- ment Act of 1966. This placed the Congress on record in favor of federal support for education, research and technological improvements in marine engineering, and affirmed the intention that this country remain a leader in ocean science and engineering. It created the National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Develop- ment, under the chairmanship of the Vice President, to replace the ineffectual Inter-Agency Committee on Oceanography. To this Council the Congress gave the power to initiate programs, to integrate the activities of 27 government agencies, to assign responsibilities, and to advise the President. In its first three years, this Council has brought a measure of order into the national ocean picture. The task of fashioning a long-range ocean strategy has begun. The federal budget for spending on ocean research has risen from $20 million in 1960 to $400 million in 1968-69. The 1966 Act also made provision for the appointment of a Presidential Com- mission to formulate recommendations for a more “adequate” oceanic program, together with proposals for a permanent administrative structure within the fed- eral government. The report of this Commission on Marine Science, Hngineering and Resources (chaired by Julius A. Stratton, President-Emeritus of M.I.T., now chairman of the Ford Foundation), entitled Owr Nation and the Sea: A Plan for National Action, is now before the government for action. 1275 THE STRATTON COMMISSION PLAN President Nixon has yet to make his response to the Commission’s plan for action. Meanwhile, the Congress has begun hearings on the proposals. It is difficult to predict what will eventually issue from ‘the congressional mill. Much will depend upon the tenor of the President’s recommendations. Dr. ‘Stratton and his colleagues, draw from government, private enterprise, and academic life, have exercised care to keep key members of the Congress informed. Wisely, the Commission had a four-member, bipartisan, team of congressmen as advisers—Senator Norris Cotton, Senator Warren Magnuson, Congressman Alton Lennon, and Congressman Charles Mosher. Briefly, the Commission recommends that research in basic marine science be expanded with a diversity of support; that capability be sought to occupy the bed and subsoil of the territorial sea to 2,000 feet, and to explore to 20,000 feet by 1980; that undergraduate education in ocean engineering be broadened and support for graduate programs be expanded. At the same time the Commis- sion stressed the need for the country to have a few very strong national labora- tories for work in ocean science. For management of the coastal zone the Commission finds the present federal, state, local machinery inadequate, and favors a coastal management act. On pollution, it is recommended tht the Army Corps of Engineers be given power to refuse permission for the construction of new plants that would affect the purity of waters. Federal enforcement procedures should be reviewed. In the realm of fisheries the Commission recommends continuing federal sub- sidies for rehabilitating the U.S. domestic fisheries; encouraging conservation ; establishing priorities for the development of new species; developing better fishing technology ; expanding support for the production of fish protein concen- trate; and entering into stronger international arrangements to rationalize total sea catches. Shipbuilders may be horrified (while economists may be heartened) at the thought of opening the door to the use of foreign-built Shipping, which is generally cheaper, while allowing American industry to concentrate on other activities in which it excels, Such as packing and processing. Although it recommends support for advancing aquaculture, the Report does not give this the emphasis which the urgent needs of the world suggest, given what is known about Japanese, Chinese, Malay, and other Asian practices in intensive fish cultivation. As to marine minerals, “strong federal support” is urged for a program to advance the fundamental technology of undersea mining and recovery. Professional oceanographers, as well as the Navy and ocean engineers, are given emphatic support for a long-range program of research exploration, and advancement of technology. Activities visualized here include, among other things, expanding data networks; studying ocean systems and continental drift; major research efforts in marine biology; supporting studies of advanced deep ocean stations, man-in-the-sea projects, and stable off-shore platforms ; advancing knowledge and capability in deep ocean technology with new submersibles and instrumentation ; improving environmental prediction and studying the feasibility of modifying the global environment. The International Decade of Ocean Exploration, announced a year ago, should be helpful in furthering many of the activities mentioned, although specific agree- ments will be needed where coordinated endeavor is required. The recommendations have built solidly upon the foundations laid in 1959 by the Committee of the National Academy of Sciences. They give impressive backing to the pleas of the scientific community for strong leadership in oceanic affairs. They afford a blueprint for ocean policy for the decade to come, as envisaged by the 1966 legislation. The responsibility now lies with the Executive and the Congress. DEFINITION OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF There are two areas in which the Commission’s recommendations may be questioned. One of these is the suggested redefinition of the continental shelf. The Commission proposes limiting national jurisdiction on the shelf to the 200-meter isobath or 50 miles from shore, whichever gives the adjacent state the greater area. In the area between the 200- and 2,500-meter isobaths, or out to 100 miles from shore, the Commission would have an International Registry Authority give preferential treatment to the claims of adjacent state interests. This formula would deprive states of rights which they now enjoy under the 1958 Geneva Convention on the continental shelf—primarily, the right to control 1276 who shall work the seabed in front of their territories—and give an international’ body the right to make money by granting exploratory and exploitation leases— at fee rates of its own fixing—to nationals of the state itself, as well as to: foreigners, in vital security areas off their own shores. Historically the oceans have been viewed by international law as being the property of no one beyond territorial limits. The right of states to control the use of the offshore sea has been a prerogative of sovereignty. Assertions of jurisdiction in the territorial sea have for the most part been exercised with restraint. Most states have limited claims to three and 12 miles. A small handful have claimed exclusive rights for as much as 100 to 200 miles. Claims to resources lying on or beneath the floor of the continental shelf date to 1945. In that year President Harry S. Truman asserted exclusive title to the resources of the shelf surrounding the territories of the United States. This was motivated by a desire to ensure national possession of mineral] re- sources in the shelf, and by a fishing controversy which had existed with Japan prior to the war. Other states followed suit as more was learned of the potential importance of resources on the continental margins. Heuador, Peru, Chile, and some other Latin American states utilized President Truman’s proclamation—which ex- plicitly disavowed claims to jurisdiction of the waters and over navigation above the shelf—to advance territorial claims reaching out as far as 200 miles from shore. Few of the states had knowledge of the resources lying on or beneath their shelf. In the case of Argentina, this move afforded a convenient additional means of claiming title to the Falkland or Malvinas Islands occupied by Britain. For the states on the west coast of South America it gave grounds for restricting the operations of foreign vessels engaged in tuna fishing off their coasts. After a decade of intensive study by national authorities and international legal groups, the Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea, at which a majority of maritime nations were represented, agreed to a definition of the continental shelf which is incorporated in the Convention on this subject. This reads as follows: “ , the term ‘continental shelf’ is used as referring to the seabed and sub- soil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said area. . .” At stake in the difference between the Commission’s proposal and the text of the 1958 Convention is the exploitation of the slope and the rise in which the continental shelf typically terminates. It now appears possible that the slope and rise may be important areas for mineral and energy sources; indeed, the U.S. Department of Interior is reported to have issued leases extending on to the slope. Within a few years the petroleum industry will have the capability of working on the slope. One of the wells in the Santa Barbara Channel is said to have been drilled in water 1,800 feet deep. And the Glomar Challenger on her recent voyage in the South Atlantic is reported to have drilled corings of the ocean floor in depths up to 19,000 feet. To tie the hands of industry and government in those portions of the con- tinental margin lying beyond the 200 meter isobath by a redefinition of the shelf could take away valuable resources from national control. There is doubt to what extent it would be advantageous to reopen the Geneva Convention at this time. There are more parties with interests in the shelf today than there were in 1958. Also, a multiplicity of interests now focus in the boundary of the shelf—notably defense, navigation, fishing, mining, and foreign affairs. Each is interlinked with the others. The boundary at the continental margin cannot be settled according to histori- eal analogies on land. Considerations of geological structure, exploitation and competence to employ technology are more applicable. The most vital factor is that the slope and rise are an integral part of the land mass of a continent. There is no natural dividing line. Where numbers of nations border upon shallow seas that extend from shore to shore—as along the North Sea and the South China Sea—satisfactory ar- rangements have been arrived at. No serious international disputes exist over the boundaries of the continental margins of the United States. No nation is challenging United States rights to control the use of the resources lying within its continental margin. Discussions at the United Nations relate primarily to the seabeds of the high seas. 1277 Rather than reopeneing the laboriously negotiated Geneva Convention to try to reach a new generalized definition of the shelf, it would seem better to deline- ate the shelf on a pragmatic basis, instance-by-instance, as occasions arise—par- ticularly in view of the limited extent of today’s knowledge about the underlying character of the shelf in many parts of the world. The “intermediate zone” proposed by the Commission is also open to objection. Rather than holding national jurisdiction in the seas within strict limits, as United States policy has always tried to do, this idea would, in my opinion, encourage states to expand their claims to exclusivity toward the 100-mile line in order to obtain title or bargaining power over the maximum potential re- sources possible. The situation could end up more confused than it now is. More seriously, the “intermediate zone” idea would entitle an international body to interfere within an area which numerous states hold to be vital to na- tional security. The United States has an aircraft identification zone (A.D.I.Z.) that extends out several hundred miles into the Atlantic and Pacific, for exam- ple. Should an international body be given rights to inspect, police, and control leases within such areas, disputes could arise that would hardly be in the inter- ests of peace and security. It proved impossible between 1958 and 1960 to enlarge the area of agreement on the law of the sea beyond that incorporated in the Geneva treaties. There is no indication that the nations are prepared to go farther today. On the contrary, the area of agreement appears to be narrowing. In relation to national defense, the values of the slope and rise in particular are just beginning to be seen. As capability to work here becomes an accom- plished fact, use of this region for listening, detection, housing defense instal- lations, and other purposes will multiply in much the same way as outer space technology has opened up new vistas of concern for national security there. INTERNATIONAL LICENSING AUTHORITY A second area in which the Commission’s recommendations are open to chal- lenge is in relation to the proposed International Registry Authority. The Com- mission recommends that the United States take leadership in negotiating agree- ments that will establish an International Authority to register national claims for exploring and exploiting areas of the deep sea bottom beyond the redefined continental shelf. The nations would undertake not to engage in or authorize action without first registering a claim to a particular area. On a ‘first-come, first-registered”’ basis, registration would give “the exclusive right to engage in or authorize such exploitation in a large enough area and for a long enough time to enable the producer to operate economically .. . and to recover its original investment as well as an adequate return thereon. The size of the area covered by the claim and the term of years for which it is registered should be fixed by the Authority.” By alert maneuvering, foreign parties might succeed in laying claims to ex- tensive tracts of seabed on the outer edge of the continental shelf off the coast of Maine or off the South Atlantic states, where the shelf extends out more than one hundred miles. Should this occur, it would allow alien parties to become lodged on our doorstep regardless of local security or economic interests. It is desirable for the United States to take leadership in world affairs, but it is questionable whether this particular suggestion is in the larger national interest. An I.R.A. would be allowed to give away rights to resources in areas physically joined to the American land mass where these could be developed by American industry, and would require states to pay fees—which an Authority composed of a majority of the newer countries would be tempted to set high. It is difficult to believe that the Congress of the United States will favor such a give-away program, or support an international authority that will have the power to “inspect all stations, installations, equipment, and other devices” in claimed areas. This sounds close to an authority with supranational powers over states. The establishment of an international agency for settling conflicting claims on the abyssal sea floor or over midoceanic ridges or seamounts may eventually be in order. There is ample machinery now in existence, however, for settling such disputes whether by political means, or by arbitration or judicial settle- ment. Many states have bilateral arrangements with others for mixed claims procedures. Nearly all states are members of the Permanent Court of Arbitra- tion and of the international Court of Justice at the Hague. It hardly seems necessary to pile Ossa on Pelion further simply because there is increased 1278 , activity in the oceans. Each additional layer of authority multiplies the costs and red tape. FEDERAL ORGANIZATION At the national level, the Marine Science Commission has proposed a grouping of ocean activities under a National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency— N.O.A.A.—in place of the existing National Council on Marine Resources and Hngineering Development. By law the National Council will continue in being until the Congress passes new legislation creating some other arrangement. The National Marine Council has done a commendable job of initiation, coordination, and direction in the past two years under the leadership cf Vice President Humphrey. On the other hand, the Council is limited in its power to act. It is a poor competitor for funds and impinges heavily upon presidential staff time. Above all it is not an appropriate vehicle for a strong operating agency with mission tasks that stretch across a wide spectrum of concerns—scientific, engineering, industrial, govern- mental. The Commission on Marine Science is correct in saying that ‘‘a system relying upon coordination of organizationally dispersed activities’ is not a substitute for a “single operating agency having authority and capability commensurate with the scope and urgency of the national ocean program.” The suggestion of forming a new department of government has merit, but would involve surgical severance of numerous agencies from their present depart- mental ties. There is reason to believe this would be resisted within some of the more powerful departments, and might entail unhappy ties with other associates. The proposed National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency would initially en- compass the Coast Guard, the Environmental Sciences Services Administration, the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, the Sea Grant Program, the National Oceanographic Data Center, and some other bureaus. It would leave other ac- tivities where they are now located in the Navy, Interior, Transportation, State, and other departments, together with N.A.S.A., the Atomic Energy Commission, and elsewhere. This compromise would bring some related activities together leaving prob- lems of coordination still to be resolved with others. The arrangement will, if carried through, assemble under one roof approximately 55,000 employees, seme 320 vessels, numerous aircraft, the principal oceanographic laboratories, and other facilities. Such a team would command a strong leader and a good man- ager. Coordination of activities left under the responsibility of other agencies would be vested in the head of N.O.A.A. The same responsibilities now reside with the Executive Secretary of the National Marine Council but the head of N.O.A.A. would be stronger because he would have a large operating organization behind him. But the Congress must make it clear in its legislation, if it accepts this plan, that the head of N.O.A.A. is to have such a function, under the direction of the President, and that his role is to be supreme in this respect. With the precaution suggested, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency eould mark a constructive step forward comparable with N.A.S.A., the Office of Science and Technology, and the Atomic Energy Commission. The program recommended by the Commission would cost on the order of $650 million a year between 1971-75 and by 1980 approximately $1 billion a year. Taking the 10-year period the costs are estimated to come to a total of $8 billion. Given the squeeze that is now mounting on tax dollars in this coun- try and the competition of other major programs, there is serious question how much of a chance the Marine Science Commission stands of getting the dollars it is asking for. The delay of the Nixon administration in responding to the Stratton Commis- sion Report is deplorable. It may not fatally undermine congressional progress, for there is considerable steam within the Congress for action in this area, but it suggests that ocean engineers and oceanographers may have to settle for less than they would like. Hach nation must set its own house in order to establish consistent and ef- fective programs. The Report of the Marine Science Commission goes a long way in affording a comprehensive, logically consistent blueprint. At the same time, ali nations must recognize that adjustment of individual interests in the light of broader needs and a willingness to reach mutually advantageous arrangements afford the path to the maximum benefit of all. (Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to meet at 9:30 a.m.. Tuesday, October 28, 1969. ) O