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HEARINGS ON AMERICAN ASPECTS OF THE RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE

(Based on testimony of Mitsusada Yoshikawa
and Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby)

HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

AUGUST 9, 22, AND 23, 1951

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CONTENTS

	Page
August 9, 1951, testimony of Mitsusada Yoshikawa.....	1134
August 22, 1951, testimony of Maj. Gen. Charles Willoughby.....	1161
August 23, 1951, testimony of—	
Courtney E. Owens.....	1195
Maj. Gen. Charles Andrew Willoughby.....	1198

HEARINGS ON AMERICAN ASPECTS OF THE RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE

(Based on Testimony of Mitsusada Yoshikawa and
Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby)

THURSDAY, AUGUST 9, 1951

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D. C.

PUBLIC HEARING

The Committee on Un-American Activities met pursuant to call at 10:30 a. m. in room 226, Old House Office Building, Hon. Francis E. Walter presiding.

Committee members present: Representatives Francis E. Walter, Clyde Doyle, Bernard W. Kearney, Donald L. Jackson, and Charles E. Potter (appearance as noted in transcript).

Staff members present: Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., counsel; Courtney E. Owens, investigator; Raphael I. Nixon, director of research; John W. Carrington, clerk; and A. S. Poore, editor.

Mr. WALTER. The committee will come to order. Is the interpreter here, Mr. Kuroda?

Mr. KURODA. Yes.

Mr. WALTER. Will you stand and raise your right hand, please.

Do you solemnly swear you will truly and accurately interpret into the Japanese language the questions propounded by the committee, and that you will make a true and accurate interpretation in the English language of the replies made by the witness in the Japanese language, so help you God?

Mr. KURODA. I do.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, before swearing in the witness, may I suggest that the young lady there be sworn in as a monitor. Due to the difficulties in translation of finding the exact equivalent in English of the Japanese, it has been the general practice for a monitor to be present also, to give her interpretation in the event of a difference.

Mr. WALTER. I think she should be sworn as an interpreter.

Do you solemnly swear you will truly and accurately interpret into the Japanese language the questions propounded in English by the committee, and that you will make a true and accurate interpretation in the English language of the answers made by the witness in the Japanese language, so help you God?

Mrs. KATSUYO L. TAKESHITA. I do.

Mr. WALTER. Will the witness please stand. [To Mr. Kuroda.] Repeat this, please.

I swear that in answering all questions propounded to me in the course of this hearing. I will state the truth according to my conscience, adding nothing and concealing nothing.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA (through Mr. Kuroda). Yes.

TESTIMONY OF MITSUSADA YOSHIKAWA

(THROUGH THE INTERPRETER, ANDREW Y. KURODA, ASSISTED BY THE MONITOR, MRS. KATSUYO L. TAKESHITA)

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you state your full name, please?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yoshikawa, Mitsusada.¹

Mr. TAVENNER. Your name is Yoshikawa, Mitsusada?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Yoshikawa, you are at present in the United States on a mission of the Japanese Government, I believe; is that correct?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. You are a native of Japan?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. When and where were you born?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I was born in Tokyo on January 16, 1907.

Mr. TAVENNER. What position do you now hold with the Japanese Government?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I am the chief of the special investigation bureau of the attorney general's office.

Mr. TAVENNER. How long have you held that position?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. For about 3 years.

Mr. TAVENNER. What other official positions have you held with the Japanese Government?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I was a prosecutor and also an official in the Ministry of Justice. I was holding those offices concurrently.

Mr. TAVENNER. I notice that the translation given was prosecutor. Have you held the position of procurator under the Japanese Government?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes. It is officially translated as procurator instead of prosecutor.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, according to An Outline of the Japanese Judiciary, by Masataro Miyake, published in Tokyo in 1935, page 4, a procurator has the following function:

To conduct searches, institute prosecutions, and supervise the execution of judgments in criminal cases and to act as representative of the public interest in civil cases of public concern.

Mr. WALTER. It sounds like duties of the nature of those of the Attorney General and the head of the FBI.

Mr. TAVENNER. The duties are even broader than that. Procurators are attached to district and appeals courts in Japan, as well as to the supreme court. The Library of Congress likens a procurator to a district attorney in the United States, but having much more power than a district attorney.

I would like to ask the witness if that is his understanding of the duties of a procurator.

(Representative Charles E. Potter entered hearing room.)

¹ In Japanese, it is customary to give last name first.

Mr. KURODA. He says that what is written here is right. However, he is not quite sure what it means, having much more power than a district attorney.

Mr. TAVENNER. When you were procurator, were you attached to the criminal courts of Tokyo?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. For a certain period I was.

Mr. TAVENNER. What was that period?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I don't remember exactly, but from around September 1938 for about 8 years.

Mr. TAVENNER. During the period you were procurator, were you assigned to the case of Richard Sorge in the performance of your duties as a procurator?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you describe very briefly the nature of your assignment to the case of Richard Sorge?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. A group—

Mr. TAVENNER. Just a moment, please. May I suggest that from this point on the interpreter interpret in shorter passages.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. A group of procurators was organized to make search and prosecute this case under Mr. Toneo Nakamura. Mr. Nakamura was chief of a division of the Tokyo district criminal court, the prosecution bureau, and under Mr. Nakamura I was appointed as the one primarily in charge of the prosecution. There were two persons appointed, and I was one of the two, and I was in charge of the prosecution of this case, and I used several procurators and engaged in the search.

Mr. TAVENNER. When you speak of being engaged in search, do you mean engaged in investigation of the case?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I personally conducted the investigation, and also I appointed other procurators to help conduct this prosecution, and also I ordered the police to help in the investigation.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you state, please, what led up to the arrest of Richard Sorge?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I remember, I think it was around the spring of 1941, a woman called Tomo Kitabayashi came to Tokyo from America.

We received information that this woman Kitabayashi was doing some spy activities.

We ordered police to proceed in investigation.

Kitabayashi went to Wakayama.

We couldn't get any evidence against her.

But in October of that year—that is, 1941—I recall we received certain information, and therefore we arrested Kitabayashi.

Kitabayashi denied that she was a spy. However, she stated that a person called Yotoku Miyagi, who came from America, was doing some kind of spy activities.

Mr. TAVENNER. May I interrupt you at that point. Was Yotoku Miyagi an American citizen?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I am not sure, but I think he was an American citizen.

Mr. TAVENNER. Proceed, please.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. We arrested Miyagi and investigated him. He vehemently denied he was a spy. However, when we searched his house we discovered an odd object.

It was an English document.

It was a document conducted by the South Manchurian Railway Co., and it was regarded as secret material to the Japanese Government.

We thought it was strange that an artist had such kind of document.

Mr. TAVENNER. Miyagi was an artist; is that correct?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. He was an artist, and he had some reputation as an artist in Tokyo. He painted American-style paintings.

Miyagi continued to deny that he was a spy. However, a certain thing happened.

He was being investigated on the second floor of the Tsukiji police station in Tokyo.

He attempted to commit suicide by jumping out of the window.

He wasn't injured, nor he died.

Police jumped after him and captured him.

After this incident, Miyagi began to state.

He began to state about a very important spy group; he began to state about the activities of a very important spy group.

Then he described the person who had closest connection with Miyagi was Hidemi Ozaki, who was regarded as the brains of the Konoye Cabinet.

Mr. TAVENNER. Excuse me. I did not understand what he said about Ozaki's connection with the Konoye Cabinet.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Premier Konoye had around him a group of brain trusters or advisers, and they formed a society called Breakfast Club, and Ozaki was one of the most brilliant advisers of Konoye.

As an illustration of his brilliancy, this can be stated: When the Marco Polo incident occurred, Ozaki said that the incident would become larger, extend larger. At that time people were confused whether the incident would be localized or extended. However, the development showed that Ozaki's prophecy was right, and his reputation increased.

(Representative Bernard W. Kearney left hearing room.)

Mr. TAVENNER. Then I understand Ozaki was very close to Prince Konoye, who occupied what position at that time?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. But what position did Prince Konoye hold at that time in the Japanese Government?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. He was the Prime Minister at that time.

Mr. TAVENNER. Now if you will proceed.

Mr. KURODA. He asked if he may smoke.

Mr. WALTER. Yes, indeed.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. So we were very surprised when we found that Ozaki was involved in this case. We were not sure we could proceed in this case because of Ozaki's closeness to the Prime Minister. Then we found that behind Ozaki there were several foreigners also.

Moreover, among those foreigners we found there was Richard Sorge, who was the highest adviser to German Ambassador Ott, although he didn't have any official position.

My colleague procurator, Tamazawa, investigated Miyagi.

I examined the content of the investigation.

And finally we arrested Ozaki.

I investigated Ozaki personally.

I examined Ozaki at the Meguro police station, and he confessed the same day.

He disclosed the name of Shigeru Mizuno. Therefore we arrested Mizuno.

I began to examine Ozaki in detail.

We came to the conclusion we should arrest the foreigners, based on the examination of Miyagi and Ozaki.

The Konoye Cabinet was pushed into a difficult position and finally resigned.

It was before the forming of the Tojo Cabinet.

We were not particularly taking advantage of this situation, but we arrested Sorge and Klausen and Voukelitch.

I may correct my statement here. Tojo was scheduled to become the head of the Cabinet, and it was known that Mr. Iwamura, who was the Minister of Justice in the Konoye Cabinet, would stay in the new Cabinet; therefore, we received the approval of Mr. Iwamura and started arresting these people.

(Representative Clyde Doyle left hearing room.)

Mr. TAVENNER. With regard to the people who were arrested at that time, I want to be certain we have their names listed correctly. You spoke of Klausen. Is that Max Klausen, K-l-a-u-s-e-n?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. And the person referred to as Voukelitch was Branko Voukelitch, B-r-a-n-k-o V-o-u-k-e-l-i-t-c-h.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Branko de Voukelitch, yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. You mentioned the name of Mizuno. Is that the same person as S-h-i-g-e-r-u M-i-z-u-n-o.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. What is the first name of Ozaki?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. H-i-d-e-m-i.

Mr. TAVENNER. We have in the record of the Sorge trial the translation of Ozaki's first name as H-o-z-u-m-i.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I don't know, but we called him Hidemi.

Mr. TAVENNER. There was only one Ozaki involved in the Sorge case?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Very well. Proceed, please.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. We arrested Max Klausen, his wife, Anna Klausen, and Voukelitch, and conducted a house search of these people.

What we wondered most was whether we could discover a radio transmitter.

Fortunately, we could discover the radio transmitter, and we impounded it. And also we found coded messages and messages which were to be coded, and also a code book, which was a German statistical yearbook.

We were afraid that Sorge might shoot at us with a pistol. We put Sorge's house under surveillance for several days. That morning a person from the German Embassy visited Sorge. After that person left we went in and arrested Sorge.

When he was arrested, Sorge insisted that he was a Nazi and held a very high position as an adviser in the German Embassy.

Mr. WALTER. About when was that?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. In Tokyo.

Mr. WALTER. When? About what date?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I think it was November 1941.

Mr. WALTER. Did your investigation disclose that at that time both Germany and Russia knew of plans to make the attack at Pearl Harbor?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. It wasn't disclosed during the examination.

Mr. WALTER. Was it subsequently learned, as a result of these arrests and the investigation, that both Germany and Russia were informed of the plans for the attack?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. The Pearl Harbor attack did not come up.

I would like to mention about intelligence activities later.

Sorge was brought to the Toriisaka police station nearby.

After a physical examination, Sorge and Voukelitch were brought to a Tokyo detention house.

The following day the procurator started to investigate.

Mr. WALTER. May I interrupt at that point? Did the investigation disclose that the Japanese forces contemplated attacks and that this fact was known by the German and Russian Governments?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I am not sure exactly.

Since you asked me that question again, I will mention this. Sorge informed Russia 2 months before Germany attacked Russia about the German readiness of attacking. Sorge informed Russia that 150 divisions of the German Army were massed at the border, and the German high command was of the opinion that Petrograd, or Leningrad, would fall within 2 months.

Mr. TAVENNER. Proceed, please.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. In connection with the investigation of Sorge, Klausen, and Voukelitch, I personally investigated Sorge.

As I said, I was in charge of the investigation of Sorge, and Mr. Hiroshi Iwo was in charge of Klausen. Another procurator was appointed to investigate Voukelitch. When I started the investigation of Sorge he vehemently denied.

After one week, and I think it was Saturday evening, Sorge finally confessed.

He wrote on a sheet of paper in German that "I have been an international Communist since 1925 and I am still," and then he confessed.

By that time Klausen and Voukelitch also confessed. This is the process up to the prosecution.

If you have any questions.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was there any coercion of any character used in obtaining the confession?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. No.

Klausen first confessed that he was a spy for the Red Army.

And Voukelitch confessed that he was a spy for the Comintern. And so a very serious ensuing search took place.

We couldn't tell the nature of this spy group until Sorge confessed. I told Sorge that Miyagi and Ozaki confessed and showed evidence. While we were repeating this, he confessed himself.

I have an opinion why Richard Sorge confessed.

The first reason is this: He thought that his arrest was too late. Sorge and his group had almost finished their spy activities and they thought they were very successful. A few days before the arrest Klausen and Voukelitch met at the house of Sorge and they were wondering why Ozaki failed to show up. They were talking that since

their activities were almost through they were going to get out of Japan and by all means go to Germany to engage in spy activities there.

Mr. WALTER. Did he know of a radio message that was sent in October?

Mr. KURODA. Mr. Chairman, when you said "he" you mean Mr. Yoshikawa?

Mr. WALTER. Yes.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I don't remember very exactly.

Mr. WALTER. Does he know about this message as a result of his investigation:

The American-Japanese talks have entered upon their final stage. In Konoye's opinion they will end successfully if Japan decreases her forces in China and French Indochina and gives up her plan of building eight naval and air bases in French Indochina. If America refuses to compromise by the middle of October, Japan will attack America, the Malay countries, Singapore, and Sumatra. She will not attack Borneo because it is within reach of Singapore and Manila. However, there will be war only if the talks break down, and there is no doubt that Japan is doing her best to bring them to a successful conclusion, even at the expense of her German ally.

I think I had better show you the message and ask if you know about this message [handing message to the witness and Mr. Kuroda].

Mr. KURODA. He says that he recalls about this message.

Mr. WALTER. So that there is no doubt but that Russia knew in advance of the plans on the part of Japan for aggression?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes; and also, Russia would probably welcome a Japanese attack, instead of going north, going south.

Mr. WALTER. Exactly.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Along that line, Sorge was doing certain political maneuvering in addition to his spy activities.

Ozaki was also cooperating with Sorge.

Mr. WALTER. In other words, spies paid by the Russian Government were using whatever influence they had in order to promote Japanese aggression against the United States and the British?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. To a certain extent.

(Representative Clyde Doyle returned to hearing room.)

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. In August of that year, 1,300,000 soldiers were mobilized in Japan, and Sorge was very much interested in obtaining the information to which direction, in which area, this number of soldiers would be used.

Mr. POTTER. In other words, he was anxious, I assume, to have the troops go south rather than north toward the Manchurian border; is that right?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. He was very much anxious, and tried to get the information.

Miyagi frequented the eating and drinking places in Tokyo and tried to approach soldiers and tried to get information where they were headed. Ozaki tried to get the information from the higher echelon of the Government. However, the soldiers were wearing summer clothes instead of winter, so they thought the soldiers were headed toward the south instead of the north.

Mr. POTTER. Did Sorge, posing as a German or Nazi, use his influence on various policy makers in Japan to carry out the Communist wish to move the soldiers to the south as a threat to the British and

the United States, rather than to the north, which might be a threat to Russia? Did he use his influence to formulate that policy?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I think Sorge didn't have much connection with the high officials of the Japanese Government. What connection he had was rather with the army general staff of Japan.

Before the Russian-German war started high military officers came to Tokyo from Berlin.

And also an emissary of the German Admiral Canaries, who was in charge of antiespionage activities, came to Tokyo.

When those people came from Germany to Japan they met, of course, Ambassador Ott, and they also met Sorge.

And they went to the Japanese Army general staff, the Japanese Army high officials, to see them with Sorge.

Ambassador Ott went to the Japanese Army general staff showing the German plan of attacking Singapore, and told the Japanese that if they followed that plan Singapore would fall very easily. At that time Sorge was an assistant to the German Ambassador.

Mr. TAVENNER. And that plan was prepared in the German Embassy, was it not, by Von Kretchner, and at that time all the German attachés were recalled for the purpose of that study?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I haven't heard about it.

Mr. TAVENNER. The plan that was presented was a plan for overland attack, just as it did occur finally?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. According to Sorge's confession, the Japanese staff officers were not particularly eager to accept that plan right away.

Mr. WALTER. May I interrupt at that point? I would like to get clear in my mind the connection between some of these individuals. Sorge and Ozaki were very close, were they not?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Were more than close.

Mr. WALTER. They were both Communist agents; both agents of Russia; were they not?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Sorge started to use Ozaki as his assistant in Shanghai. At that time Sorge received approval from Russia. In Tokyo, too, when Ozaki was used in the spy ring in Japan, Sorge received the approval from Russia, and Ozaki was the closest assistant to Sorge. Ozaki was in a secret section of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party.

Mr. WALTER. And Ozaki was also at that time one of the leading Communists out there and was the political adviser to Prince Konoye?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. At the time Gen. Eugene Ott, German Ambassador to Japan, along with Richard Sorge, attempted to sell a plan of attack on Singapore to the Japanese general staff, do you know whether General Ott had taken that plan to Ribbentrop in Germany, where discussions were held between Ribbentrop and Matsuoka, the Japanese Foreign Minister?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I am not familiar with what you state. However, Sorge sent important messages concerning Matsuoka.

Before Matsuoka went to Europe, Prince Konoye told Matsuoka that it would be all right to conclude a commercial treaty with Russia, however, don't do anything in Germany.

That message was sent by Sorge, therefore Stalin was waiting for Matsuoka.

What Matsuoka got from Stalin in the form of a treaty was actually more than what Konoze was expecting, however.

That was the information which Sorge sent to Moscow in regard to the trip of Matsuoka.

And so Matsuoka had only a hearty welcome in Germany and nothing more.

So I heard.

MR. TAVENNER. The records of the conversations between Hitler and Matsuoka and Oshima were introduced in the trial of Tojo, were they not?

MR. YOSHIKAWA. I don't remember exactly.

MR. WALTER. Then, if I understand correctly, even after or at the moment that Germany attacked Russia, Russia was concerned with endeavoring to have the United States become involved in hostilities with Japan?

MR. YOSHIKAWA. Yes, from the fact that German Ambassador Ott showed plans of attacking Singapore even prior to the German attack on Russia.

MR. WALTER. They probably were still concerned in endeavoring to have us involved somewhere throughout the entire conspiracy?

MR. YOSHIKAWA. From these facts I could say that Sorge was primarily interested in spy work and secondarily he was engaged in political maneuvering, trying to divert Japanese attention to the south instead of to the north.

MR. WALTER. In other words, he was acting in a dual capacity?

MR. YOSHIKAWA. He was telling the Japanese that the Russian Army was strong, and also Siberia was rather barren, so Japan could not get anything from Siberia, but in the south Japan could get important resources, and also it is easier to attack the south. That is what he was trying to convince the Japanese people.

MR. POTTER. You stated that when the representatives of the German Government visited Japan with this plan to move the Japanese Army south, that there was some reluctance on the part of Japanese military officials to accept that plan. Do you know what the official position of the Japanese military was concerning what they should do with the troops? Did they envision sending their troops north?

MR. YOSHIKAWA. I haven't investigated the Japanese Army General Staff, so I don't know.

Either right before or right after the war between Germany and Russia started, a secret emissary came from Germany and, with Ambassador Ott, went to the Japanese General Staff to persuade the Japanese Army to attack Russia.

The Japanese General Staff replied that when the German Army reached the Danube line, the Japanese Army might attack Russia.

Information like this centering around the German Embassy was lost in fire.

MR. POTTER. Did the investigation you conducted bring out evidence to determine whose idea it was to strike at Pearl Harbor? Was that sponsored by Germany, or by the Communists, or was that the Japanese Army's own policy?

MR. YOSHIKAWA. That didn't come out in the investigation.

MR. TAVENNER. What was the relationship between General Ott and Richard Sorge after the arrest of Richard Sorge?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Ambassador Ott and Mrs. Ott were very surprised and became very angry and put pressure on Tojo.

Ambassador Ott asked, through the Minister of Justice, to let the Ambassador see Sorge.

We were very much embarrassed, because the investigation was continuing at that time.

Fortunately, in 1 week Sorge confessed, and so after his confession I told him that the Ambassador "is anxious to see you. Would you like to see him?"

Sorge replied first that he would not like to see him.

Sorge told me that though their political opinions were different, they were personally good friends, and so I told him, "If I were you, I would see him. A Japanese in this kind of situation would see him to say the last farewell." Sorge said, "Then I will see him."

So I told the Minister of Justice about that, and Ambassador Ott, with Marchiter, Stahmer, and others, came to see Sorge.

After a brief interview, Sorge told Ott that this would be the last time he would see him.

Ott was stunned and changed his countenance.

So we closed the interview and took Ott in another room. Ott said that he would not do anything concerning this case any more, but asked us to finish the investigation as quick as possible and let him know about the results.

However, it appeared that the German Embassy tried to put pressure upon us, using the Japanese left-wing people.

And so we made a copy of the first chapter of the investigation of the Sorge case and sent it to the German Embassy through the Minister of Justice.

Mr. TAVENNER. May I ask a question at that point before you go into a further discussion of that matter?

Did information come to you, in the course of this investigation, to indicate whether or not General Eugene Ott, the German Ambassador, knew of the Communist affiliation of Richard Sorge?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. No. Ambassador Ott was completely deceived.

Mr. TAVENNER. What was the result of General Ott being deceived by Sorge, with regard to his relations with his own government?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I think if Ott had gone home he would have been killed.

Mr. TAVENNER. He was immediately replaced by Stahmer as Ambassador to Japan, was he not?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. That is correct. And instead of going home, Ott went to Peking and stayed in China.

This is not very reliable, but we heard, we had information, that after the death of Ott, his wife went to Russia.

Mr. WALTER. Did Sorge at any time give you information concerning the extent of Communist espionage in the United States?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. He did not.

Sorge made comments on the American Communist Party.

Mr. WALTER. What were his comments?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. The American Communist Party, according to Sorge, his comment was that the American Communist Party had many people of different racial backgrounds, with different languages—Italians, Germans, and Japanese—and one language could not be used; but in the course of time it may become stronger.

Mr. TAVENNER. Prior to the time of obtaining the confession of Sorge, did you show him, and use in obtaining his confession, the German Statistical Year book which had been used as a code in the transmission of messages by Sorge?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I didn't show it personally, but I told him that Klausen confessed the fact that the German Statistical Yearbook was used as the code book.

Mr. WALTER. The committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock.

(Thereupon, at 12:25 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The committee reconvened at 2:10 p. m., Representatives Francis E. Walter and Clyde Doyle being present, Mr. Walter presiding.)

TESTIMONY OF MITSUSADA YOSHIKAWA—Resumed

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Yoshikawa, at the time of adjournment I was asking about the knowledge that Richard Sorge had of the code that was used in the transmission of secret messages at the time of his confession.

I now want to ask you whether he was also familiar with the existence of the radio equipment that had been used for that purpose prior to giving his confession?

Mr. KURODA. I didn't quite get the question.

Mr. TAVENNER. I will break the question down.

Prior to Mr. Sorge giving his confession, was he told about the seizure of the radio equipment, or was he shown the radio equipment which had been seized?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Before the confession we didn't show any material to him. Therefore, we didn't show the radio equipment which was impounded.

May I continue?

There was an argument among the procurators because he didn't confess, an argument that we should show the radio equipment to him; but before we came to the point of showing the equipment, he confessed.

Mr. TAVENNER. Had you advised him that you had seized and impounded the radio equipment?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. And that was before he made his confession?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you proceed now and tell the committee how the confession was given?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I gave the committee an account about it before, but I will speak to you a little further.

I told you before that they were almost finished their work in Japan, and they had a sort of sense of relief after the successful completion of their job.

Many people were arrested at the same time.

And those people confessed, one by one, before Sorge did.

Various evidences came up—radio equipment, code book, coded messages, and so forth.

As for the code book, it was found in a study of the house of Klausen.

It consisted of three volumes.

I happened to pick them up and I found that there was a mark of much use.

And the figures of general statistics were there.

I immediately figured that it was a source book for the code.

In order to make decoding difficult, they added the figures on that page on the coded message.

So after we impounded the German Statistical Yearbook we asked Klausen about it, and Klausen confessed it was the key book for the code. He confessed it before Sorge did.

I told Sorge about those facts and he finally confessed.

We had no program at that time. We were wondering whether Sorge was really a spy for Germany and using Communists in Japan but actually spying for the Nazi regime in Germany. That was one question.

The second question was whether Sorge was a double spy for both Berlin and Moscow.

The third question was whether he was really a spy for Moscow, pretending to be a Nazi.

Therefore, we examined Sorge without preconceived opinion.

We took a very cautious attitude.

There was another question. If he were a spy for Moscow, we didn't know whether he was a spy for the fourth section, as Klausen said, or whether he was a spy for the Comintern, as Voukelitch said.

MR. TAVENNER. When you speak of the fourth section, do you mean the fourth section of the Red army?

MR. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

MR. TAVENNER. That was the intelligence section of the Red army?

MR. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

MR. TAVENNER. Proceed.

MR. YOSHIKAWA. Therefore, I never crossed him to get his confession.

I asked his explanation as evidences came up.

So, finally, at the end of the first week, he confessed, but at that time I was not expecting that he would confess.

About 4 o'clock my colleague, prosecutor Tamazawa, and a policemen went to see if his health would stand any further investigation, since that was Saturday.

Thus he finally confessed. Before he confessed he asked for a piece of paper and pencil.

And, as I told you before, he wrote down in German that since 1925 he was an international Communist, and handed it to me.

And he took off his coat.

And he rose and cried: "I have never been defeated since I became an international Communist. This is the first time that I was beaten." he said.

MR. WALTER. At that time did he say that Ozaki was also an international Communist?

MR. YOSHIKAWA. Sorge was quite exhausted at that time, and so Mr. Tamazawa asked him whether he would continue investigation the following day. Sorge wanted to be continued on Monday. So

he didn't say that Ozaki was also an international Communist at that time.

Sorge, generally speaking, admitted that Ozaki and Miyagi and others were also international Communists.

And he consented that he would talk about it Monday.

(Representative Charles E. Potter entered hearing room.)

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. On Monday, from 9 in the morning until 3 in the afternoon, the police conducted investigation under my supervision.

However, Sorge asked to be investigated personally by Mr. Yoshikawa.

So from 3 o'clock in the afternoon until night I conducted the investigation by myself.

And Sorge responded to my questions.

The police talked to me before the investigation, and after the investigation they reported about the content of the investigation and received direction from me.

When the policemen were conducting the investigation of Sorge, Klausen, and Voukelitch, I went along and kept my eyes on the policemen on their way of conducting the investigation.

Before starting the investigation I talked with Sorge about the outline of the investigation.

I showed him the points I would cover in the investigation.

And Sorge also offered his wishes.

And when he offered any points, I adopted those points which were helpful in the investigation.

My German and English are both broken. I speak broken in German and English. It took time to conduct the investigation, but Sorge didn't want to have an interpreter. I asked him why, and he said an interpreter would make the story difficult.

So, whenever we came into difficulty in understanding, we used a sheet of paper and Sorge wrote on the paper and explained.

When we decided about the outline of the investigation, he took a piece of paper and, by means of the paper, he explained about those points. When I read what he wrote on the paper I asked him questions when I didn't understand; then he made further explanation on those points.

After several days, Sorge typed what we talked, in my presence. He corrected misprints. I read what he typed by aid of a dictionary.

At times the typing was not neat and not sufficient, so I asked him to retype. He offered to retype himself, since it was not neat and not sufficient. Thus the typed story increased.

Either March or April the investigation was completed.

On various important points I received special explanations from him. There were some points where I could not get full explanation. When the investigation was completed, Sorge took a sheet of paper and typed that this investigation was conducted by Mr. Yoshikawa, and signed his name.

Then an official interpreter was appointed. It was Professor Ikoma, of the School of Foreign Languages. Mr. Ikoma came to the detention camp and confirmed that the story Sorge typed was actually his.

After taking oath, Mr. Ikoma translated it into Japanese. A copy was made. And that copy, Professor Ikoma and I signed. And the translation and the typed story were put into a document.

The criminal bureau of the Ministry of Justice prepared the translation of his story into pamphlet form. Sorge asked me to make my own official document when he was talking about the activities centering around the German Embassy. He didn't want to type his own story when that story came.

After his typewritten story was completed and the translation was completed, I asked Professor Ikoma to come and investigate Sorge about that phase of his activities.

The official document of that investigation consists of about 38 volumes. At the end of each volume, Professor Ikoma translated it into German and asked Sorge whether there was any disagreement on it, and after he found it right he affixed his signature on each volume. Then Professor Ikoma and I signed on each volume, and also my secretary affixed his signature on it.

This is the official interrogation document based on law. Of the contents, I told you about a couple points in the morning session.

Therefore, Sorge's story consists of two parts. One is his typewritten story and the other is this official interrogation document.

There is another interrogation document which was made by a police officer, Ohashi. It took time for Ohashi to conduct his investigation. My recollection is that Ohashi's interrogation document was completed around April or May.

Mr. TAVENNER. Of what year?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. 1942. My official interrogation document was completed around June 1942.

The content of my official interrogation document contained information about the process by which Sorge approached the German Embassy.

I am going to expand about that now. I don't remember exactly the date, but Sorge came to Japan in 1934. At that time Ott was not the Ambassador. I think he was a colonel attached to a regiment in Nagoya.

At that time Sorge began to approach Ott.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was not General Ott at that time military attaché to Japan?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I don't know about it, but maybe he was an attaché.

It was about the period of Von Kretchner that Sorge approached the German Embassy. By his information and judgment he gained the confidence of the staff of the German Embassy.

He gave General Ott political information. He joined the Nazi Party too. Then Ott became the Ambassador. It presented a very good chance for Sorge.

He frequented the Embassy, and though he did not have an official position in the Embassy, he was one of the highest advisers of the Ambassador. He also cooperated in the intelligence activities of the Embassy.

While he was cooperating, he also drew information from them. And, as I told you in the morning, there were many political diplomatic military personnel coming from Germany to Japan, and Sorge

got acquainted with those people. They were talking informally on many important matters. Therefore, while in Japan, he could get the information of Germany. Ott consulted with Sorge on very important matters.

So the information Ambassador Ott could receive from the German foreign office and from the Japanese foreign office went to Sorge. Not only the German foreign office, but diplomatic circles in Japan.

Sorge got the military secrets within the German Embassy. Therefore, the more the Japanese military men approached the German Embassy, the more information Sorge got out of them.

I heard this story. This is contained in my official interrogation document.

A Soviet General Rushikoff fled from the Soviet into Manchuria. And he was rescued by the Kwantung Army of Japan.

Rushikoff gave the information of the military positions and military forces of the Far Eastern Red Army and also Mongolia and Siberia.

The Japanese general staff was delighted to have that kind of information.

Rushikoff was the leader of an anti-Stalin bloc in Siberia.

The Japanese Army was so jubilant about it that they talked about it to Ott. Ott was also glad and reported to Hitler about it. And he sent a staff officer to Japan.

And after the Japanese examined Rushikoff, the staff officer from Germany examined Rushikoff himself. And he made a very minute report. That staff officer showed that report to Sorge.

Sorge asked him to leave that document with him for study, and he took a picture of the document and sent the film to Moscow.

Later the so-called Nomonhan incident occurred. The Japanese Army lost several divisions. By the mass artillery and tanks the Japanese lost a heavy casualty.

Mr. TAVENNER. The casualty loss was reported at 45,000, was it not?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I do not remember. It was like putting Japan's hand in a charcoal brazier.

Sorge also said that the anti-Stalin bloc in Siberia was also eliminated. The second document, which was the official interrogation document, contained that kind of information.

Unfortunately, no copy was made of this document, and I am afraid that the document was lost by fire.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you mean lost as a result of the bombing of Tokyo?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Possibly.

This is the first time that I talk about this, 10 years after the incident. During that period, Ambassador Ott was very pleased with Sorge and offered him a high position in the Embassy. Sorge declined.

Because he declined, his reputation increased. However, he told me that if he had become a member of the official staff he would have been investigated about his past in detail, and he was afraid of that. He told me about that.

Thus the official interrogation document was completed.

Mr. TAVENNER. I hand you four pages in Japanese script and ask you to identify those and state whether or not your name appears in connection with it?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes. This is my seal.

Mr. TAVENNER. You are also pointing out, in addition to your signature, a seal placed beneath your signature?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. The seal also appears, half at the top of page 2 and half at the top of page 3, does it not?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

That is the way the Japanese official documents are made. They prove that the documents are official by putting the signature on the continuation pages.

Mr. TAVENNER. In other words, that is a method of identification, by placing what you call your "han" on the document?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. This document which has your signature and "han" attached is an affidavit, I believe, which you gave on February 19, 1949, is it not?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. The English translation is attached to your original Japanese affidavit?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. I desire to offer the document in evidence and ask that it be marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit No. 1."

Mr. WALTER. Let it be marked as an exhibit and received in evidence.

(The document above referred to, marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit No. 1," is filed herewith.)

Mr. TAVENNER. I would now like to read the English translation of the document, which was translated by Minoru Endo, an official translator of Japanese documents in the employ of general headquarters, Far East Command.

(Reading:)

STATEMENT BY YOSHIKAWA MITSUSADA, GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL BUILDING 1, DOJUNKAI AOYAMA APARTMENTS 1, 1 CHOME, AOYAMA ONDEN, SHIBUYA-KU, TOKYO-TO, FEBRUARY 19, 1949

I affirm that, according to my conscience, I will state the truth, adding nothing and concealing nothing.

I voluntarily declare as follows:

That in October 1941, I was a procurator assigned to the procurator's bureau of the Tokyo district criminal court; that on said date, in my official capacity I was assigned to conduct a procurator's examination on Richard Sorge who at the time was confined in the Tokyo detention house; that I did conduct that investigation until May 1942; that the investigation by me of Richard Sorge was conducted in the procurator's examination room in the Tokyo detention house; that during the proceedings Richard Sorge voluntarily made an offer to me to prepare and submit a statement on the general outline of his espionage activities; that as a result of this offer, Richard Sorge prepared such a statement in the German language in my presence and in the procurator's examination room; that the typewriter used by Richard Sorge for the preparation of said statement was his property which he used in his house before his arrest and had been confiscated as evidence; that after typing a chapter or a paragraph of said statement, Richard Sorge read the same in my presence and made deletions, additions, and corrections in my presence, and handed the same to me; that only one original copy of said statement was prepared by Richard Sorge; that because in said statement

the portion concerning his activities in Shanghai was not sufficient. Richard Sorge personally retyped said portion preparing anew said portion by supplementing that which was insufficient, and submitted said new portion to me; that I replaced said portion in the original statement; that the document attached hereto, consisting of 24 pages, is that portion which I deleted from the original document because I put in the original statement that portion which Richard Sorge later retyped as stated above; that said document is a portion of a statement which Richard Sorge first prepared and corrected in my presence in the procurator's examination room within the Tokyo detention house during October and November 1941 and handed to me; that said document does not bear the signature of Richard Sorge, the reason being that said document is no more than a portion of a statement prepared by Richard Sorge and that Richard Sorge affixed his signature at the end when the entire statement was completed and that he was not asked particularly to affix his signature on said document which was a portion of said statement; that said document has been in my possession from the afore-mentioned date until February 13, 1949, on which date it was turned over by me to Lt. Col. Paul Rusch, G-2, General Headquarters, Far East Command, United States Army, at said officer's request.

YOSHIKAWA MITSUSADA.

(TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.—A seal bearing the name "Yoshikawa" appears over the bottom part of the signature. The same seal is also affixed overlapping the first and second pages.)

FEBRUARY 19, 1949.

I certify that I am an official translator of Japanese documents in the employ of General Headquarters, Far East Command, and that to the best of my ability, skill, and judgment, the within and foregoing is a true and accurate translation in the English language in two pages of the photostat of the original document attached hereto consisting of four pages which is the affirmation of Yoshikawa Mitsusada.

MINORU ENDO.

Mr. TAVENNER. The statement which you gave at that time over your signature and seal was true; was it not?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Your statement under oath refers to 24 pages attached to your affidavit as being the document which Richard Sorge wrote on his own typewriter in German?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. That is correct.

Mr. TAVENNER. I will ask you to examine the 24 pages attached to your affidavit and state whether it is the document written by Sorge on his own typewriter in the German language.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. The paper and typewriter impounded were used by Sorge.

Mr. TAVENNER. And this is a photostat which he attached to the same document?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. That is right.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you examine the document and state whether or not the corrections appearing therein were made personally by Richard Sorge in your presence?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. That is true.

Mr. TAVENNER. I desire to offer this document for identification only at this time, and ask that it be marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit No. 2."

Mr. WALTER. Let it be marked for identification only.

(The document above referred to was marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit No. 2" for identification only.)

Mr. TAVENNER. I hand you now a document written in Japanese consisting of eight pages, and ask you whether or not your signature and seal appear on that document?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

I dictated this document, but the signature and seal are mine.

Mr. TAVENNER. This is a sworn affidavit which you gave over your signature and seal; is it not?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. And does it bear date of April 1, 1949?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. It does.

Mr. TAVENNER. Attached to your affidavit is the English translation; is that correct?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I desire to offer this document in evidence, both the Japanese and the English translation, and ask that it be marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit No. 3."

Mr. WALTER. For what purpose are they both offered?

Mr. TAVENNER. The main purpose is that it is really one exhibit. One is the translation of the Japanese. It is all one exhibit.

Mr. WALTER. It will be marked and received.

(The documents above referred to, marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit No. 3," are filed herewith.)

Mr. TAVENNER. I will read the English translation. [Reading:]

OATH

I hereby swear that I will state the truth according to my conscience, adding nothing and concealing nothing.

April 1, 1949.

/s/ YOSHIKAWA MITSUSADA. [SEAL]

STATEMENT

I, Yoshikawa Mitsusada, having taken the oath prescribed by Japanese law which appears on the attached sheet, do hereby make the following statement.

1. I am presently serving as Chief of the Special Investigation Bureau of the Attorney General's office. During or about 1941 and 1942, I was procurator in the procurator's office of the Tokyo District Criminal Court. I worked on the so-called international intelligence ring case involving Richard Sorge, Ozaki Hozumi et al., myself examining Richard Sorge, Kawai Teikichi, and others. Because of the serious nature of the case, and because of the implication of Ozaki Hozumi, a Japanese [of] comparatively high social position, and aliens like Richard Sorge, Max Klausen, and Branko de Voukelitch, ample consideration had to be given to its international repercussions. My investigations were conducted in strict secrecy, and I was careful not to libel the defendants and others involved. I exercised strict supervision over the judicial police who assisted me in the investigations, personally attending the investigations as a witness on frequent occasions to see that torture and other coercive methods were not employed. Of course, I never resorted to torture or other coercive methods in my own investigations of Richard Sorge and Kawai Teikichi, but assumed throughout as gentlemanly an attitude as possible.

At Sorge's request, I arranged to have the judicial police examinations in his case take place in the morning, and I myself examined him in the afternoon. At his suggestion, I investigated the broad aspects of the case, and I allowed him to type his statement in German before me. Following the completion of the judicial police investigations, I was with Sorge both in the mornings and in the afternoons. After he had finished the afore-mentioned statement, I examined him with respect to the concrete details of his intelligence activities, and, at his request, compiled the results into an interrogation record in the presence of an interpreter.

During the afore-mentioned investigations, Richard Sorge and Kawai Teikichi described the intelligence activities of Agnes Smedley in China, and Richard Sorge made a statement concerning the intelligence activities of Guenther Stein in Tokyo. No changes were made in the facts stated by Richard Sorge and Kawai Teikichi with regard to Smedley and Stein during the course of the investigations by the police and procurators, the preliminary examinations, and the public trials.

During the investigation, I realized that Smedley and Stein were key figures in the ring, but I was unable to arrest and indict them because they were not in Japan at the time. Had they been in Japan, I am convinced that, as a procurator, I would have arrested and indicted them.

The foregoing is a voluntary statement. I was notified before making it that it would be recorded and that it might be used as evidence.

April 1, 1949.

/s/ YOSHIKAWA MITSUSADA. [SEAL]

The translator's certificate is attached, which I will not read.¹

TRANSLATOR'S CERTIFICATE

I, Tadao Yamada, CWO, USA, W2141047, having been duly sworn, state that I am an official translator of the Japanese language employed as such by General Headquarters, Far East Command, since July 1947, and that the foregoing English translation of the statement executed by Yoshikawa Mitsusada, dated April 1, 1949, is a true and accurate translation to the best of my ability, skill, and judgment.

APRIL 19, 1949.

/s/ Tadao Yamada,
TADAO YAMADA,
CWO, USA, W2141047.

/s/ G. A. Hedley,
G. A. HEDLEY,
Captain (sic.), Infantry Summary Court.

That is a true and correct statement; is it?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. I now hand you a certificate over your signature and seal bearing date March 4, 1949, and I will ask you to identify that document and your signature and your seal.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. And to it is attached the English translation of the certificate, appearing over your signature and seal?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. I desire to offer the certificate, accompanied by the English translation, in evidence, and ask that it be marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit No. 4."

Mr. WALTER. It will be so marked and received.

(The documents above referred to, marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit No. 4," are filed herewith.)

Mr. TAVENNER. I believe your seal also appears under your signature on the English translation; does it not?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. I desire to read this certificate. [Reading:]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND.
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff.

CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that the two booklets listed below are printed reproductions prepared by the Criminal Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Justice of accurate Japanese translations made by Translator Ikoma Yoshitoshi of original German notes written by Richard Sorge, whom I examined in my capacity as a procurator of the Tokyo District Criminal Court, and incorporated together with the original notes into the official case records; and that the contents of the booklets are identical with the contents of the said translation.

1. "Sorge case materials (2)" (pt. 1 of translated notes of Richard Sorge), February 1942, Criminal Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Justice.

¹ Printed for the record, but not read.

2. "Sorge case materials (3)" (pt. 2 of translated notes of Richard Sorge), April 1942, Criminal Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Justice.

March 4, 1949.

I shall not read the translator's certificate.¹

/s/ YOSHIKAWA MITSUSADA. [SEAL]
Chief, Special Examination Bureau,
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,

TRANSLATOR'S CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I am an official translator of Japanese documents in the employ of General Headquarters, Far East Command, and that to the best of my ability, skill, and judgment, the above is a true and accurate translation in the English language of the attached document.

/s/ Tadao Yamata,
TADAO YAMADA,
CWO USA W2141047.

This certificate refers to two volumes [indicating another document]. I hand you a document in Japanese marked "Consecutive Exhibit No. 17," enclosure No. 2, and I will ask you if that bears the identification information of the first document which I read to you from your certificate?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. The original, which was sent to the court, did not have the table of contents and index. The table of contents and index were made by the Criminal Affairs Bureau. The rest is an exact document.

Mr. TAVENNER. I desire to offer that document in Japanese listed as the first document in Yoshikawa Exhibit 4 for identification only, and ask that it be marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit 5."

Mr. WALTER. Let it be so identified.

(The document above referred to was marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit No. 5" for identification only.)

Mr. TAVENNER. I hand you now another volume identified as consecutive exhibit 20-B, enclosure 2, which bears on the front certain descriptive data, and ask whether that is the same descriptive data as the second item in Yoshikawa exhibit No. 4?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. It is the same document to which you referred in your certificate?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Except that the table of contents and index were not in the original.

Mr. TAVENNER. I desire to offer this document for identification only, and ask that it be marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit No. 6."

Mr. WALTER. Let it be so identified.

(The document above referred to was marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit No. 6" for identification only.)

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Yoshikawa, did you prepare and furnish the material which went into the composition of those two documents?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes, I did; and Mr. Ikoma translated it.

Mr. TAVENNER. I want to ask you a very few questions relating to some of the individuals mentioned in the course of these reports.

You have previously referred to Miyagi. Do you know whether Miyagi was an American citizen? I believe I asked you that question before.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I don't have an exact recollection. However,

¹ Printed for the record, but not read.

Miyagi intended to go back after his mission was completed in Japan, therefore I thought that he was an American citizen.

Mr. TAVENNER. You mean back to the United States?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. He said before his death that he wanted to go back to America.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did your investigation disclose the circumstances under which Miyagi first came to Japan?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I didn't personally and directly investigate Miyagi. I only saw him several times.

Procurator Yoshioka was in charge of the investigation of Miyagi. Also, a policeman investigated him.

I received their reports and gave them direction.

I don't have a clear recollection since it was an incident of 10 years ago.

I recall that Miyagi belonged to the Japanese section of the American Communist Party.

I recall that Miyagi stated that he received an order from the higher echelon of his organization to engage in the world revolution in Japan.

Mr. TAVENNER. World revolution?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. To do some important activities in Japan for the sake of the world revolution.

Miyagi told me that he belonged directly to the Comintern doing espionage activities.

That is what he thought.

I do not have an exact recollection about how he came to Japan.

But I recall the names Yano and Roy who are involved in sending Miyagi to Japan.

I do not recall where Miyagi met those people, whether in New York or in Los Angeles.

I recall also that Miyagi mentioned in addition to those people he met an American Jewish person, but I don't have a clear recollection on that.

He went to Japan with instructions to meet a person who put up a newspaper ad saying "Ukiyo-e print wanted."

Mr. TAVENNER. Stating what?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. "Ukiyo-e print wanted."

According to Sorge's statement, he also had instructions to watch for the newspaper ad "Ukiyo-e print wanted," and he found that and found the person in Ueno.

Mr. TAVENNER. Ueno is a park in Tokyo?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

That is what I vaguely remember.

Mr. TAVENNER. In the course of the documents referred to there appears the name "Jacob." Did your investigation disclose who Jacob was or whether or not it was a name that was used as a code name?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I asked Sorge about it, but Sorge said, "I know him as Jacob," but he didn't say whether he knew him or not.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did your investigation disclose whether or not he was an American citizen?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Sorge said that he was an American newspaperman.

Mr. TAVENNER. Stationed where?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. In Shanghai.

When Sorge went to Shanghai from Moscow, he met Smedley, and with the help of Smedley he got the cooperation of three Caucasians, three foreigners.

When I heard Sorge saying that, I asked him who they were. Sorge said he got the cooperation of three foreigners and not more. He got the cooperation of the Japanese and Chinese and only three foreigners. When I asked who they were, Sorge told me Jacob was one of them.

Sorge didn't give any information about Jacob any further, and so I asked him what kind of cooperation he got from those people.

He wrote by typewriter, "These kinds of information."

I couldn't get any information out of him any further.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was any statement made as to what newspaper or newspapers the man identified as Jacob was a representative of or correspondent for?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. He didn't say.

Mr. TAVENNER. You spoke of three Caucasians, but you have told us just of the individual by the name of Jacob. Who were the other two?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Another person, he didn't disclose his name, but he was an American. He was a young person. He was on the staff of the American consulate.

Mr. TAVENNER. He was a member of the staff of the American consulate?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Located where?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. In Shanghai.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was any further description obtained of the individual on the staff of the American consulate?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. He didn't say anything about him, so I asked him what kind of information he got out of him.

(Representative Clyde Doyle left the hearing room.)

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. He told me that the person was quite brilliant and was giving him information concerning the American foreign policy toward China and the Nanking government.

Mr. WALTER. Did he give the name?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. No. He laughed and did not disclose his name.

Mr. POTTER. What was the date?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I don't remember exactly, but it was around 1931 and 1932 when Sorge organized the so-called Shanghai group.

Mr. POTTER. How long did this group work for Sorge?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. It was for about 2 years.

And Sorge's successor was receiving information from that group.

Mr. POTTER. From that same group?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. WALTER. This information from the American consular office in Shanghai was given to Sorge in 1931 and 1932; is that correct?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. You have given us information relating to two of these Caucasians whose assistance was given to Sorge. Who was the third one?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. He said that it was a German woman.

Mr. TAVENNER. Can you give us further information regarding her?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I didn't get any information about her other than expressed in his own story.

Mr. TAVENNER. The name "Paul" and the name "John" appear in the course of Sorge's confession. Did your investigation disclose any further identification of those two persons?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. The information I got concerning Paul appeared in Sorge's story, but when I instructed Procurator Iwo to investigate Sorge, he got further information about Paul; but, since I do not have the documents, I do not have a clear recollection.

While Sorge was working in Shanghai, Ozaki was recalled by a newspaper, Asahi.

Ozaki recommended his successor to Sorge, a Japanese man.

This Japanese was cooperating with Paul after Sorge left Shanghai.

This Japanese man was Finakoshi.

Mr. TAVENNER. You spoke of the giving of information, after Sorge left Shanghai, to Sorge's successor. Who was Sorge's successor?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Paul.

Mr. TAVENNER. The same person called Paul?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Paul was Sorge's successor.

Mr. TAVENNER. Can you furnish the committee with any identifying information as to the nationality, or any other information regarding Paul?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I do not know about the nationality of Paul, but he belonged to the fourth section of the Red army, and his rank was major general.

Mr. WALTER. Was he a German, do you know?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I am sorry, but I haven't conducted a full investigation about Paul.

Mr. TAVENNER. You spoke about the third Caucasian furnishing information to Sorge as being a German woman. Did your investigation disclose any connection on the part of a woman by the name of Regattenhein with the Sorge principals; that is, the principals in the Sorge ring?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. When Regattenhein appeared in Japan, she was in the Japanese group and not the Chinese group.

Mr. TAVENNER. In other words, this person by the name of Regattenhein had no connection with the Chinese phase of the Sorge spy ring?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I don't have any information about that. I didn't make any investigation of it.

Mr. TAVENNER. I assume from what the witness has said that Sorge knew of her presence in Japan?

Mr. KURODA. Regattenhein?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Sorge said so.

Sorge said that Regattenhein is the girl friend of Guenther Stein. She was very cooperative with Guenther Stein, and she went to Shanghai as a messenger of the group.

She gathered information also.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was she arrested in Japan in connection with your spy investigation?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. No. She wasn't in Japan when the arrests came. She left with Guenther Stein.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you have any information as to what country she traveled to when she left Japan?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I don't have any information about that. Since she disappeared, we lost interest in her. We heard Guenther Stein was going to Hong Kong, but really we didn't have any information about her.

Mr. TAVENNER. There is an incident related in the course of the confession by Richard Sorge regarding his traveling through the United States on his way to Tokyo.

It refers to the fact that while in New York an arrangement was made for him to go to Chicago, where he was instructed to meet a certain employee of the Washington Post at the Chicago world fair. Did you endeavor to ascertain the name of the individual whom Sorge was supposed to meet in Chicago?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I instructed Policeman Ohashi to get that information, and I recall that Ohashi gave me his report, and I tried to confer with Sorge about it when I talked to him. I also instructed Ohashi to find out who that person was. I also asked directly to Sorge who that person was, but Sorge did not disclose his name. (Representative Clyde Doyle returned to hearing room.)

Mr. WALTER. In discussing his trip through the United States, did Sorge give you the names of any Americans who escorted him or with whom he came in contact?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. He didn't disclose the names.

Before he formed a Chinese group and Japanese group, Sorge was vice chief of the information bureau of the Comintern.

Mr. WALTER. Did your investigation reveal any information with regard to an American named Willie Lehman?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. He was chief of the Lehman group in China.

Mr. TAVENNER. What do you mean by the Lehman group in China?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I don't have an exact recollection about it, but it was either a group belonging to the fourth section of the Red army or belonging to the Comintern.

Mr. TAVENNER. By that do you mean a separate group from the Sorge group?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. That is right.

I recall that Sorge told me that Sorge and Lehman were personally acquainted.

Mr. TAVENNER. What part of China was the seat of the activities of the Lehman group?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. In Shanghai; so I remember.

I don't have an exact recollection.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you have any recollection of the names of any American citizens who were connected with the Lehman group in addition to Lehman himself?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Concerning a group in which Americans had any connection, I recall the Harbin group in Manchuria.

This group existed as a mail box for Sorge while he was working in China, and this group belonged to the fourth section of the Red army.

Klausen was transferred to the Harbin group by order of the fourth section of the Red army.

I recall that Sorge himself also went to Harbin.

The radio transmitter was established in the American consulate in Harbin.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you mean the radio station that was used in the transmission of messages to Moscow?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Were those messages transmitted in code?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Sure; I think so.

Mr. TAVENNER. When did that occur?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. About 1931 or 1932 Sorge was using his Harbin group as a mail box.

Mr. TAVENNER. If a radio station in the American consulate in Harbin in Manchuria was being used to transmit messages to Moscow, who was it in the American consulate who permitted that use or himself engaged in the use of the radio for that purpose?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I don't remember the name.

I instructed Procurator Iwo, who was in charge of Klausen, to investigate that.

I recall that Mr. Iwo reported to me about the name of that American, but I don't recall exactly his name.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was there more than one American connected with the Harbin group of the fourth section of the Red army, as far as your investigation disclosed?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I don't have any recollection, so I cannot say.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you know whether the confession of Max Klausen will throw light on the identification of the American in Harbin who cooperated with the fourth section of the Red army?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I think so.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Yoshikawa, you were engaged for a long period of time in the investigation of international communism in connection with the Sorge case.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Have you any observations or suggestions that you would care to make to this committee, which is a committee of the Congress of the United States, with regard to investigations of international communism?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. The Sorge case revealed that the investigation of international Communist activities cannot be conducted successfully alone by any one country.

The free nations of the world should cooperate in helping each other to conduct the investigation.

Information should be exchanged.

National sectionalism is very harmful.

We have to keep secrets. However, we need cooperation; so I think.

My desire is that from now on, in the future, we would like to have cooperation and assistance from America.

The second point is: I have found that the spy network of Moscow covers all over the world.

On this point we would like to have American cooperation and assistance.

Mr. TAVENNER. Thank you very much.

I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WALTER. Mr. Yoshikawa, I trust that your visit here to the United States has been a pleasant one and a profitable one.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Thank you.

Mr. WALTER. And I do feel that there should be cooperation between the Government of the United States and other governments of the world so that we may exchange information that will aid all of the free peoples of the world to understand what this conspiracy means.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Thank you.

Mr. WALTER. And I express the hope that your visit here has provided some sort of basis for the cooperation you have spoken of.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Thank you.

Mr. WALTER. And I assure you that we appreciate very much your cooperation with this committee.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. As a person working in the Japanese Government, I would also like to express my appreciation to your committee.

Mr. WALTER. Mr. Doyle.

Mr. DOYLE. I wish to thank the gentleman also. It is very encouraging. May I ask one question:

You stated that Sorge had confessed before you expected him to. Why did he do it so early?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I was expecting that it would take a longer time, and if it had taken a longer time I thought I would be pushed in a difficult position because of pressure from the German Embassy as well as from the Japanese Army.

His collaborators were all rounded up, and also the evidences came up; so he realized that he had no chance.

Before he confessed we had this conversation:

I talked to Sorge and said to him that Klausen belonged to the Fourth Section of the Red Army. Voukelitch was of the Comintern. Ozaki and Miyagi were also members of the Comintern. And their statements were in discrepancy, and so I told Sorge, "I will explain to you about this question."

We were talking about this, and then he began to confess.

Mr. DOYLE. Thank you. May I ask this question: About 3 weeks ago four gentlemen from Japan visited this committee. You were one of them. May I ask, when you go back home do you think of having a committee such as this in your own legislative body, or are you going to recommend something like this committee?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. About the establishing of a committee similar to this, we are going to study that very carefully, but for us the most important thing is that the people of Japan realize the menace of international communism.

Mr. DOYLE. Thank you very much.

Mr. WALTER. Mr. Potter.

Mr. POTTER. Mr. Yoshikawa, I, too, wish to thank you for your splendid testimony.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Thank you.

Mr. POTTER. Your telling us the story of your efforts in the Sorge case has been a dramatic example of how international communism works; so we are most grateful to you for giving us the benefit of your knowledge.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Thank you.

Mr. POTTER. I would like to ask one question.

I noted your statement that the Japanese people are aware of the conspiracy as contained in international communism. Do you feel that due to the awareness of the Japanese people the Government of

Japan has taken all adequate precautions to expose and eliminate the conspiracy from the country?

Mr. KURODA. My translation was: I understood him to say the important thing was to make the Japanese people realize more fully about the menace of international communism.

Mr. POTTER. Do you feel the Japanese people do realize the menace of international communism?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. And also they are afraid of it.

Mr. POTTER. Do you have any Communist members in your Japanese Diet?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. POTTER. How many, in proportion of the total membership of the Diet?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Twenty-five in both Houses.

There are about 25 Communists in both Houses, but this number is after the purge by the SCAP [Supreme Commander of Allied Powers]. Before the purge there were more Communist members.

Mr. POTTER. Do you feel that the Communist members in your Diet will decrease rather than increase in the future?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. The number will decrease.

In Japan, members of the Communist Party, like members of other parties, have to register.

As of June last year, the members of the Communist Party registered were 110,000.

But the number decreased and now it is estimated at about 60,000.

In my estimation there are about 20,000 unregistered Communists in addition to those.

About 250,000 sympathizers are in Japan. They are not members, but are sympathizers.

Mr. POTTER. Do you have any trade-unions that are dominated by Communists?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes. There are trade-unions which are under the influence of the Communist Party.

Mr. POTTER. In what fields?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Metal and various industrial fields.

Also, the Communist Party has operatives operating secretly within the democratic organizations.

Once the Communist Party captured 2,500,000 votes, but now their following is dwindling.

The Communist Party membership is decreasing now.

Mr. POTTER. That is to the credit of the people of Japan, after a war when the Communists used that war to gain their end. That is a credit to the wisdom of the people of Japan.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Thank you, but the Communists are waiting for the next revolutionary wave.

Mr. POTTER. Both in Japan and in the United States.

Mr. WALTER. Anything further, Mr. Tavenner?

Mr. TAVENNER. No, sir.

Mr. WALTER. The committee will stand adjourned.

(Thereupon, at 4:25 p. m., an adjournment was taken.)

HEARINGS ON AMERICAN ASPECTS OF THE RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE

(Based on Testimony of Mitsusada Yoshikawa and
Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby)

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 22, 1951

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D. C.

PUBLIC HEARING

The Committee on Un-American Activities met pursuant to call at 10:45 a. m., in room 226, Old House Office Building, Hon. John S. Wood (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Representatives John S. Wood (chairman), Francis E. Walter, James B. Frazier, Jr., and Harold H. Velde.

Staff members present: Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., counsel; Thomas W. Beale, Sr., assistant counsel; Louis J. Russell, senior investigator; Courtney E. Owens, investigator; Raphael I. Nixon, director of research; John W. Carrington, clerk; and A. S. Poore, editor.

Mr. Wood. The committee will be in order, please.

Whom do you have?

Mr. TAVENNER. Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby.

Mr. WOOD. General Willoughby, will you stand and be sworn, please? Do you solemnly swear the evidence you give this committee shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

General WILLOUGHBY. I do.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. CHARLES ANDREW WILLOUGHBY

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you please state your name?

General WILLOUGHBY. Charles Andrew Willoughby.

Mr. TAVENNER. What is your present position?

General WILLOUGHBY. Major general, United States Army, awaiting retirement for partial disability and length of service as a veteran of several wars, namely, World War I, 1917; World War II, 1941; the North Korean war, 1950; and the Chinese Communist war, 1951.

Mr. TAVENNER. Where did you last serve and in what capacity?

General WILLOUGHBY. I served as MacArthur's chief of intelligence since 1939 throughout the campaigns of the Southwest Pacific and the occupation of Japan, and in the same capacity throughout the Korean conflict.

Mr. TAVENNER. I understand you desire to make a general statement as the basis for your testimony in this hearing?

General WILLOUGHBY. With the permission of the chairman, I would request the privilege of stating my position throughout this entire hearing as follows:

Recent newspaper reports have developed a tendency to attribute sensational qualities to my impending testimony before certain congressional committees, under normal subpoena. I am described as "threatening a brand-new ruckus," as being "sore at the Pentagon," as "vowing to jar the Capital with spy tales." Yet, another enfant terrible of the press charges me with "promises to redden faces and to set off explosions," and as being "a thorn in the side of the Pentagon." These are pure journalistic exaggerations.

I have no direct issue with the Army or the State Department. The Army is sound. It was put to a most cruel test in Korea, and it has passed *summa cum laude*, as on many other historical occasions. After 41 years' service, since 1910, I leave the Army with a feeling of regret. The Regular service is a hard taskmaster, but it is also a delightful fraternal organization.

As regards the State Department, I have served as military attaché for many years in our embassies of Caracas, Bogotá, and Quito, in the period 1920-30. The field personnel is first class. The American diplomatic posts abroad are maintained with the dignity commensurate with a great nation. They operate in an atmosphere of sharp competition, since foreign establishments are maintained on a more or less lavish scale. Tokyo is a most conspicuous example.

The real subject matter of my presentation to Congress is in a field of international danger, in which all political parties could meet amicably, on grounds of common interest. Consequently, my proposed statements are completely devoid of any political motivation or purpose.

There are recognizable historical factors, the dangerous impact of which is only now beginning to be felt. The dead hand of the past rests heavily on a precarious present. We are still in the shadow of Cairo, Yalta, Tehran, and Potsdam. Retribution has been swift and terrible. The victors of 1945 have created a Frankenstein that may yet slay them: the Red menace of international communism. It is only fair, however, to accept that the present administration is staggering under an intolerable burden which it inherited from its predecessors and did not itself create.

It fell within the purview of MacArthur's Intelligence Section to confront this menace in the Far East, and to unmask the grimacing face of the Red Medusa.

The story of Richard Sorge, Soviet master spy, became the vehicle of presentation. It has been covered initially by Drew Pearson, then by Walter Simmons and Alfred Kohlberg, and more recently, in its main features, by Newsweek and United States News & World Report. However, their stories merely scratched the surface. For a period of years, Tokyo has filed with the War Department a most extensive documentation on Sorge, contained in a number of consecutive exhibits, aggregating over a million words, with hundreds of plates, photostats, and illustrations.

While certain individuals emerge sharply in this report, they must be viewed against the sinister background of a world conspiracy, the

essential framework of which should be known to our legislators and to our people. In its unimpeachable and devastating evidence, this case should dispel carefully nurtured false notions on the responsibilities for the China debacle and place this controversial subject into proper focus. The real cause for the communization of China is the long-range subversive operation, over the last two decades, conducted by professional Communists under orders of the Kremlin-controlled Third Comintern.

The element which intrigued MacArthur's Intelligence was the immediate recognition that Richard Sorge's story did not begin or end with Tokyo, but was only a chip in the general mosaic of Soviet strategy.

An investigation was opened into the Shanghai period and the Third Comintern "apparatus." In Shanghai, in the early 1930's, we are not dealing with the period of uneasy alliance with the Soviet, 1941-45, but with the more significant prewar years of 1929-39, in the heyday of the Third Communist International, prelude to the infamous Stalin-Hitler Pact, sole factor that made World War II at all possible.

We are dealing here with a conspiratorial epoch in the history of modern China. Shanghai was the vineyard of communism. Here were sown the dragons' teeth that have ripened into the Red harvest of today—and the spadework was done by men and women of many nationalities who had no conceivable personal stake in China other than an inexplicable fanaticism for an alien cause, the Communist "jihad" of Pan-Slavism for the subjugation of the western world.

Most of the old wheelhorses of the American Communist Party appear to have been operating in Shanghai, in one period or another, the professionals of the clandestine fraternity, as well as mere acolytes and dupes, flirting moth-like with the Red menace: such as Earl Browder, Sam Darcy, Eugene Dennis, Harry Berger, Gerhart Eisler, and many others.

My cumulative reports contain over 180 identities, surnames, aliases, and code designations, derived from court records authenticated by American lawyers, or from the fabulous dossiers of the French and British sections of the Shanghai international police. In protection of innocent people, a sharp distinction has been made by us between the "operators" and the "bystanders"—the "joiners" who did not quite appreciate the character of the organizations they helped support.

The exact degree of relationship or association ranges from direct espionage by Comintern "agents" to the twilight zone of fellow-traveling dupes and befuddled liberals—apparently unaware that they have drifted into an international conspiracy for the sole benefit of an alien and hostile Government. While this case applies primarily to Japan and China, it represents a recognizable pattern that is working in the United States today.

I have filed detailed evidence with appropriate Federal agencies and certain congressional committees. They are now in a position to follow up these leads. I am not a prosecutor. I am only a policeman and investigator. It is thus that I discharge a moral obligation toward the United States, which has received me as an immigrant boy and given me shelter and citizenship as a man.

I have no doubt that the hue and cry will start again, as it did in 1949. I expect to be attacked by the Communist press, from the China Digest in Hong Kong to the Far East Spotlight in New York City.

Orders will go out from the shabby loft building on 35 East Twelfth Street, New York. The Red cells will disgorge their indefatigable little workers. The pinko columnists will sharpen their quills. The smear brigade will swing into action. Some Red mouthpiece will prostitute the law of the land and sue me for libel, as before, and I will accept, as before. Yet, in the cacophony of frenzied accusations, I am reminded of an ancient saying:

It is better to fail in a cause that must ultimately succeed, than to succeed in a cause that will ultimately fail.

This concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WOOD. Any questions, Mr. Counsel?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. WOOD. Proceed.

Mr. TAVENNER. General Willoughby, stating as you do that the Richard Sorge story was only a chip in the general mosaic of Soviet strategy, is it not your opinion that a full disclosure at this time of the ramifications of that story would be useful to the Congress and the people of this country in understanding the background and meaning of incidents which have occurred in this country and which likely may recur?

General WILLOUGHBY. I am in entire agreement with Mr. Counsel's opinion. There is no doubt that a disclosure or the development or tracing of links that exist between an international spy master and the present is of immediate practical value, and this committee is peculiarly appropriate to receive this testimony. Ten thousand miles away, while on duty in Tokyo over many years, I have followed with admiration the investigative work of this committee. Their record is unimpeachable, and I consider it a privilege to appear before you.

In this connection, I might pause to pay tribute to a similar committee which has taken its techniques and inspiration from the House committee, namely, the California State Legislature's Senate Committee on Un-American Activities, under the able Senator Jack Tenney.

Mr. TAVENNER. General Willoughby, the problem of putting before the Congress and the people of this country the Sorge story so that they may see and understand similar incidents which have occurred, or incidents of somewhat like character, in this country, and so that they may be on guard as to the recurrence of such things, is one of the purposes of the committee in conducting this hearing.

I should also add that it is the immediate purpose of this committee, in looking into the Sorge case, to ascertain the nature and extent of participation in that great conspiracy of persons of United States citizenship, and what place, if any, those persons have in the Communist conspiracy in the United States as it exists today.

Those are the two major purposes of our hearing.

General WILLOUGHBY. I shall attempt to comply with your outline, Mr. Counsel. In the course of this presentation we will establish the link between Sorge, on the one hand, and the Shanghai operations, perhaps much more important, on the other hand.

We will also develop the similarity of techniques in penetration of political and social fraternal organizations, so-called fronts.

As stated in general outline in my introductory statement, these relationships will be developed. In other words, we are not treating

the Sorge report as a historical incident or as a repetition of something that has already been told. I will show you that in Sorge's fragmentary reports there are enough descriptive data of certain organizations in Shanghai which are of paramount interest now because American citizens, especially members of the American Communist Party, were active then. Had we known this, I am sure that in the last few years we would have been less tolerant, less patient, with these people.

Therefore, the purpose, as I see it, of your inquiry, is exactly as you have stated, to link the past with the present, and I feel confident that the consecutive questions and answers that will be presented here will accomplish this purpose before a committee which, as I have said, is especially qualified and peculiarly appropriate for this type of inquiry.

Mr. VELDE. May I ask a question at this point, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Velde.

Mr. VELDE. General, there is a lot of sentiment in this country, and a lot of people have said, that this is merely water over the dam, something that has happened in the past, and the ramifications are no longer important to the American people at this time. What is your idea on that issue?

General WILLOUGHBY. May I refer to my introductory remarks, which were designed as an outline or program of what the committee—and I consider myself a collaborative agent of this committee—hoped to accomplish.

I have said that "The element which intrigued MacArthur's Intelligence was the immediate recognition that Richard Sorge's story did not begin or end with Tokyo, but was only a chip in the general mosaic of Soviet strategy." You will obtain a glimpse of Soviet international intrigue, the work of the Third Communist International, which is a tool of the foreign policy of the Kremlin. That will become crystal clear in the course of this presentation.

Likewise, you will find the activities of American Communists. The well-known Gerhart Eisler, who embarrassed the Justice Department through his escape, is present in Shanghai. He did the same thing then that he pulled on the *Batory*. There is your link with yesterday. Earl Browder and Eugene Dennis, the chief of the American Communist Party, appear in the Sorge Shanghai channel. So there is your connection. Your connection is a case history which presents certain operational details that were applied 15 years later, or 10 years later, by well-known Communist operators in the United States. Or, as I stated in my opening remarks, again—

Most of the old wheelhorses of the American Communist Party appear to have been operating in Shanghai, in one period or another, the professionals of the clandestine fraternity, as well as mere acolytes and dupes, flirting moth-like with the Red menace; such as Earl Browder, Sam Darcy, Eugene Dennis, Harry Berger, Gerhart Eisler, and many others.

Mr. VELDE. In other words, General, to simplify it a little bit, you feel that we have to study the manipulations of the Communist Party and the international Comintern over the past quarter century in order to get a clear picture of what their present manipulations might be?

General WILLOUGHBY. I feel that strongly, and I agree entirely with your view on that particular subject.

Mr. WALTER. You feel that the same forces at work then are still at work, toward the same objective?

General WILLOUGHBY. Indeed, I do.

Mr. TAVENNER. General Willoughby, during your tenure in Tokyo, did you have occasion to further investigate the Richard Sorge spy rings which were operated in China and Japan?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. A perusal of the Sorge reports, fragmentary or incomplete, indicated, nevertheless, and very plainly so, that his activities in Tokyo were connected with China, Manchuria, and the Siberian mainland.

Mr. TAVENNER. After looking into the Sorge case, were you led, as a result of this inquiry, to other localities?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. I became interested in Shanghai as a focal point of international intrigue and espionage, and specific data in the Sorge papers that the Soviet Third International, known as the Communist Third International, to be referred to hereafter as the Comintern, was operating in that city.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you subsequently determine that there was available in Shanghai information regarding the activities of Communist agents and sympathizers in Shanghai?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. I learned that the international police in Shanghai, especially the British and French political sections in the thirties, had developed a considerable volume of information regarding subversive activities of Americans and foreign nationals. In some instances these activities were connected with personnel of the American Communist Party.

Mr. TAVENNER. As one result of these investigations conducted by you, was there compiled by your command a group of 34 consecutive exhibits containing the records and results of the Japanese arrest, interrogation, and prosecution of Richard Sorge and other defendants?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Are there also included in these exhibits subsequent interrogations and legal opinions compiled by your command after the occupation of Japan?

General WILLOUGHBY. There are. May I give you a brief definition of this material? We use the phraseology "exhibit" as a matter of convenience. Actually, they are authenticated, notarized court translations, notarized by a battery of reputable American lawyers.

As this material is voluminous, aggregating hundreds of type-written pages, I felt it my duty to assist this committee or any other investigative body, to prepare personally a brief, rarely exceeding two to three pages. These briefs to these exhibits are referred to as G-2 comment, number so and so. They are in your possession.

This is roughly a description of the material and the dispatch of these exhibits, if that meets your requirements, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, I think I should state for the record that certified copies of the exhibits referred to by the witness were delivered by the Department of the Army to the staff of this committee at various times, the first delivery being made in March 1949 and the last delivery being made on the 15th day of February 1951.

I am advised that at substantially the same times, copies of the same exhibits were delivered to the FBI, CIO, and the State Department.

As a part of the investigation, the committee, on December 9, 1949, through one of its investigators, endeavored to obtain information as to the availability of Agnes Smedley, whose name appears throughout these reports, for the purpose of serving a subpoena upon her, and ascertained that Agnes Smedley left the United States for Great Britain on December 2, which was just 7 days prior to the making of that effort.

Now, the exhibits to which you and I have referred, General Willoughby, appear on the table next to you. I will ask you to examine them and state whether or not they are the exhibits which were prepared by your command and under your direction and supervision?

General WILLOUGHBY. I have examined these exhibits, Mr. Counsel, and identify them as being either originals or copies of the consecutive reports filed by us in Washington.

May I add a remark, sir? Your statement that you received these exhibits through the assistance of the War Department, I would heartily concur in, and say that the Intelligence Section, Department of the Army, under Major General Bolling, have been and are most cooperative in this entire enterprise.

What you said about Smedley and your attempt to summon her, before this committee is news to me, and indicates that you had been aware of the implication of this case for a long time.

Mr. TAVENNER. Each of the exhibits is numbered. I believe you have them numbered consecutively, from 1 to 34?

General WILLOUGHBY. I believe so. To refresh my memory—[after examining documents] yes, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer these exhibits, not in evidence, but merely present them to the committee at this time and ask that they be marked for identification only in the same manner and in accordance with the same numbers that they now have, for the sake of clarity and future reference to them. In other words, they would be numbered "Willoughby Exhibits 1 to 34, inclusive."

Mr. WOOD. There is no objection on the part of any member of the committee, and they will be so marked.

(The consecutive reports above referred to were marked "Willoughby Exhibits Nos. 1 to 34, inclusive," for identification only.)

Mr. TAVENNER. As a further result of your investigation of the Sorge case, which led to your travels to Shanghai, were there compiled by your command certain documents relating to Communist activities of numerous individuals in Shanghai?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, sir. May I amplify this, please?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes.

General WILLOUGHBY. I was able to track down and obtain a substantial portion—though not the complete file, a substantial portion—of the Shanghai municipal police files, with the assistance of British, French, and Chinese officials and the Central Intelligence Agency, with whom I had been on efficient and friendliest collaboration for a number of years.

Mr. TAVENNER. As a result of your efforts, you did obtain all of the files which were left intact?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. I refer you now, or show you, point out to you, two metal lockers. I would like for you to examine the lockers and their

contents and state whether or not they are the Shanghai police files to which you refer?

General WILLOUGHBY (after examining lockers and contents). Mr. Counsel, they are. In consideration of the extensive labor of this committee, and realizing that your research staff was probably limited, I have attempted to organize these files in the technique of a reference library in which the contents are systematically numbered, and alphabetical card indexes and cross-references have been prepared.

Mr. TAVENNER. I notice in the top of the trunk two typewritten lists. What are they?

General WILLOUGHBY. These are entitled "Indexes to Contents." They identify the contents both by title and reference number.

Mr. TAVENNER. These trunks were shipped to me, Frank S. Tavenner, as chief counsel of the Committee on Un-American Activities on May 7, 1951, from Tokyo, were they not?

General WILLOUGHBY. I concur.

Mr. TAVENNER. I desire to present to the committee the two trunks with their contents, and ask that they be marked "Willoughby Exhibits 35 and 36" for identification only.

Mr. Wood. So ordered.

(The two metal trunks above referred to, together with their contents, were marked "Willoughby Exhibits 35 and 36," respectively, for identification only.)

Mr. TAVENNER. General Willoughby, you will recall that this committee first contacted you relative to the subject of this inquiry in 1949. Subsequently, we requested you to prepare at your convenience a concise report on the Sorge case, embodying the essential parts of that case, particularly those of interest to the United States, in order that this matter might be presented more completely at a public hearing. Is that correct?

General WILLOUGHBY. That is correct.

Mr. TAVENNER. Were you able to fulfill that request?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, General Willoughby has filed a copy of his report with the staff. This report has been invaluable in the preparation of this hearing and in various investigations which the committee has from time to time conducted relating to these matters, and will be used consistently throughout the conduct of his hearing, both by the witness and by me as counsel.

General Willoughby, are you acquainted with Yoshikawa Mitsusada?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, I am, over a number of years. He is a brilliant Japanese lawyer, long in government service, and I congratulate the committee on having obtained his appearance here and his statement in the general premises.

Mr. VELDE. Would you spell his name, please, General?

General WILLOUGHBY. Y-o-s-h-i-k-a-w-a, surname, M-i-t-s-u-s-a-d-a; Yoshikawa Mitsusada.

Mr. TAVENNER. You are aware of the fact that he testified before this committee regarding certain affidavits which are included in the exhibits prepared by you?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes; I was very happy to obtain this information through press reports, and consider his contribution, that is, his authentication, of correlated Sorge data as important, perhaps

supplemental to the equally important authentication by a battery of American lawyers in Tokyo.

Mr. TAVENNER. These affidavits were executed by Mr. Yoshikawa in 1949 at the request of your command, attesting to the authenticity of the Sorge interrogations and confessions which he personally observed. That is true, isn't it?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, indeed.

Mr. TAVENNER. A perusal of the exhibits, which are in the possession of the committee, indicates a quite extensive and sincere effort on the part of American authorities since the occupation to establish beyond any question of a doubt the validity of the Japanese trials of Sorge and his co-defendants, and the validity of the police investigations in the Sorge case, and the authentic character of the records which you have produced here.

With reference to this aspect of your investigation, what did you do to establish the validity of the trials, according to our concept of trials, and the authenticity of the records?

General WILLOUGHBY. I am very glad to take advantage of your question, Mr. Counsel, because juridical authentication, if presented at this time to the satisfaction of the committee, appears to me essential for the entire range of documentation that is submitted. We felt in 1949, although the reports date back to 1947, that that authentication was desirable because a question had been raised—primarily by Miss Smedley at the time, utilizing all the facilities of publicity so generously placed at her disposal—and that we should go over this case again and have the material notarized in the approved technical manner prescribed by American law.

Without going into details, I would like to go on record with reference to so-called exhibit 12, including the G-2 comments previously described, as follows—

Mr. VELDE. Before you go into that I would like to ask you what you meant by the statement you made with reference to Agnes Smedley and her use of the press and use of the fact that these documents were not authenticated?

General WILLOUGHBY. I get your point, Mr. Velde. We will have to go back to comparatively ancient history as far as I am concerned, namely, that when the report was published by the War Department in 1949, in February of 1949, Miss Smedley, assisted by Mr. John Rogge, her attorney, protested the entire publication, charged the contents as being false, untrue or illegal, and obtained, shall we say, a generous allocation of radio broadcast time and the full support of that portion of the American press which has been ascribed by reference to the coloration pink, fellow-traveling, or pale rose, as the case may be.

That statement by her was given, as you recall, extraordinary publicity at the time. Our response to that was probably one of acquiescence and a desire to go over the evidence once more, this time with the support of competent American legal opinion, which is the purpose of my reading.

My reaction personally at the time was to accept Miss Smedley's threat of suit for libel which she flung into the airways and which I unhesitatingly accepted at the time. She did not press her suit, or rather, her lawyer, I believe a Mr. John Rogge, did not press this suit, for obvious reasons.

Mr. VELDE. Was any suit filed by Agnes Smedley at all for libel?

General WILLOUGHBY. No. My reference to this legal opinion of authentication is related to your question. We felt that a report by an investigative agency should be good enough, considering that this agency has a record of long service, but we also felt that since reputable American legal advice was available in Tokyo, that we should call on them, and they are: Messrs. J. Woodall Greene, member of the Maryland Bar; Joseph S. Carusi, member of the Connecticut Bar; Franklin E. N. Warren, member of the Oklahoma Bar and member of the New Mexico Bar.

These men occupied high positions in the occupation headquarters, and are on duty there now.

In addition to this American talent, we also employed, because of the language element, the services of an international Japanese-British firm: Messrs. E. V. A. de Becker and R. Usami, member, Middle Temple, London; member, Inner Temple, London; member, Tokyo Bar.

Upon examination, item for item, and notarization of the documents, these gentlemen made the following signed summation statement:

We, the undersigned, fully realizing that certain processes and procedures are necessary for the authentication or verification of documentary evidence before they may be introduced in courts of record in the United States, or be used as a basis for evidence, have examined the methods and procedures used for the authentication and verification of the documents listed, and after having duly considered the testimony of witnesses and having examined their written statements and interrogations, together with their seals and signatures appended thereto, have arrived at the conclusion that the authentication and verification of the documents, including the statements from witnesses, is in accordance with existing laws and procedures.

We, therefore, certify that it is our opinion that the authentication and verification of each of the several documents mentioned—

And I am now speaking of this entire collection, both here and in the Shanghai files—

is legally sufficient to give legal standing to their full use within the scope of the rules of civil procedures for the courts of the United States, or foreign courts adhering to Anglo-American jurisprudence.

If the committee desires, there is additional opinion by the Judge Advocate of General Headquarters, Tokyo, Japan. With your permission I will file an abbreviated extract, if I may. This is taken from exhibit No. 14, one of these folders. It is entitled, "Opinion of Legal Section, Far East Command, Opinion of the Judge Advocate General, Far East Command and Related Matter." [Reading:]

In further support of the opinions of prominent American, British, and Japanese lawyers, currently employed in various civil sections, Headquarters Tokyo, there is enclosed herewith the opinion of legal section, Far East Command.

In this opinion, legal section, Far East Command, supports the conclusions of the Sorge Spy Ring report of December 15, 1947, and attests to the value of the documentary evidence on hand in G-2, Far East Command.

In their brief, legal section, Far East Command, points out and concurs in the general appraisal of evidence in this report, viz:

- (i) The evidence has definite probative value.
- (ii) Ample basis and justification for the report.
- (iii) Evidence is considered to have a rational probative force.
- (iv) It is considered acceptable to reasonable men.
- (v) It is of type employed in congressional investigation committees.

Apparently, as of the date of this opinion, which is 2 to 3 years old, we had a feeling, in our correspondence with this committee, that

sooner or later this material might become of more than local interest.
[Continuing reading:]

- (vi) There is strong evidence of careful Japanese investigation.
- (vii) No indication of employment of force or manufactured testimony.
- (viii) Statements of various accused are mutually corroborative.
- (ix) The G-2 report December 15, 1947, was justified and properly made.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to offer in evidence the exhibit formerly identified by Yoshikawa Mitsusada and marked for identification only as "Yoshikawa Exhibit No. 2," and ask that it be marked "Willoughby Exhibit No. 37."

Mr. WOOD. Let it be admitted.

(The document above referred to, marked "Willoughby Exhibit No. 37," is filed herewith.)

Mr. WALTER. Is that the exhibit that was marked when Mr. Yoshikawa testified?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes. This exhibit, it will be recalled, consists of the first draft in German of the Sorge confession and its English translation. According to the testimony of Mr. Yoshikawa, this confession was not accepted on the ground that it was inadequate, and Mr. Yoshikawa, in his individual capacity retained possession of this draft. Subsequently, Richard Sorge completed his confession and as the contents of this document are embraced within the completed confession, it will not be necessary to allude to it further.

General Willoughby, I now call your attention to a document entitled "Sorge Case Materials, Part I of Translation of Statement of Richard Sorge," dated February 1942, and immediately following that document, "Sorge Case Materials, Part II of Translation of Statement of Richard Sorge," dated April 1942, which appear in your report under these titles. These two documents appear also in the consecutive exhibits as 20-A and 20-B. Will you tell the committee the genesis of this document and what it comprises?

General WILLOUGHBY. Identified as classified by you, its full and official title, translated from the Japanese, is known as "Sorge Case Materials." It consists of two parts: "Part 1 of Translation of Statement of Richard Sorge" and "Part 2 of Translation of Statement of Richard Sorge." It was published by the Ministry of Justice in its Criminal Affairs Bureau.

The foreword, I believe, Mr. Chairman, describes its content. The foreword is contained on the first page of a special number, No. 191, and marked "Top secret," top secret at the time as applied to the Japanese Government, a very interesting sidelight, if I may digress.

When this ring was discovered and the members of the ring arrested, a very leisurely investigative process ensued, because the Japanese Government at that time was in a state of neutrality with Soviet Russia and did not wish to disturb this by the implication contained in this case. For that reason, the publications were marked "Secret" and were handled with very considerable delicacy. It was some years later when it became apparent to the Japanese Government that the Soviet neutrality would soon end. Then they proceeded with more vigor in this case, to the extent of condemning the principals Sorge and Ozaki.

I now proceed with the reading of the foreword, to comply with the request of counsel.

Mr. VELDE. General Willoughby, can you fix the period of this neutrality between Japan and Russia a little more exactly?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. Our war entry is December 7, 1941. And, incidentally, Sorge will have something to say about this in his coded messages to Moscow. The Japanese Government felt it prudent, shall we say, or within the realm of their international purposes, to enter into a neutrality agreement with the Soviets.

Mr. TAVENNER. That was in April 1941 as Matsuoka was returning from Germany to Japan?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes; some months prior to our entry into the war.

Mr. VELDE. Approximately how long prior to our entry into the war was this period of neutrality, as you call it?

General WILLOUGHBY. Six months, roughly. Roughly 6 months would cover the period of negotiation, of weighing and balancing favorable and unfavorable factors and the decision to develop a neutrality pact with Russia.

Mr. VELDE. General, in your investigations did you find any evidence that the Russian Government was aware of the planned attack on Pearl Harbor?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, Mr. Velde; and, if I am permitted the liberty of suggesting, the counsel has provided for that in a later question.

Mr. VELDE. I withdraw the question.

General WILLOUGHBY. And I am sure he will call your attention to it. Your question is well taken and is an important historical element. They did get the information. We will read, probably, the contents of that message later on. In other words, they knew in advance what was going to happen, and I wish I had known it in advance, too. We were then sweating it out in the Philippines, knowing that the Philippines would be a very probable target.

Mr. WALTER. May I ask a question at this point, General?

General WILLOUGHBY. Certainly.

Mr. WALTER. The Ozaki you mentioned was the political adviser to Konoye, and Ozaki was a Communist agent?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. He was the closest right-hand man to Dr. Sorge. It is a sort of astonishing piece of information that an intimate of the Prime Minister of Japan, with access to the secrets of the Foreign Office of Japan, should also be an intimate of a Russian-controlled espionage identity.

Mr. WALTER. He was more than an intimate; wasn't he the political adviser to Konoye?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. I think we will cover that later on, but I will be glad to outline it to you. Ozaki belonged to a group of political experts. He was rated as an expert on China and the Manchurian Railway, and as such he was a consultant to the Foreign Office; that was actually his official position. But he was more than that, because he developed an intimate personal relationship with the Prime Minister, who had around him what was then known as a group of bright young men around the Foreign Office who met with the Prime Minister at irregular intervals in an informal fashion at breakfast, and sometimes at dinner, and became known as the Breakfast Club. The Breakfast Club meant something to the Japanese, although it meant nothing to us until the development of the Sorge story. We

found there a local related group of consultants and Foreign Office officials who were to some extent responsible for at least the drafting of foreign policy, and this man was a member of this powerful and influential group. What he found he immediately relayed to his boss and associate, Dr. Sorge, who put it on his radio station which he maintained, and it was relayed to Khabarovsk, the Russian official relay station in Siberia, and then onward to Moscow.

So, this extraordinary man, this Dr. Sorge, had access on the one hand to the inner councils of the Japanese Government, and on the other hand to the inner councils of the German Government, because he occupied the position of press attaché to the German Embassy in Tokyo. In other words, he got it coming and going.

MR. TAVENNER. Didn't he also have access to more or less a degree to the inner councils of the British Foreign Office?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. His ring involved an English subject, Guenther Stein, who was persona grata with the British Foreign Office in Tokyo.

He also had access at one time or another to American information through Smedley and her associates.

MR. TAVENNER. May I suggest, General, that to go into the details of this matter now, which you are doing in response to my question, may rather interfere with the orderly development of the testimony; and I suggest, if satisfactory to the committee, that we proceed more or less in chronological order.

General WILLOUGHBY. Very good. Needless to say, I am delighted to respond to a question by Mr. Walter, but I was aware—

MR. TAVENNER. Well, I asked the question about the British, and I realize we are getting deeply into testimony with which we will be concerned later.

General WILLOUGHBY. Indeed, sir.

In order to get back on the track, your last inquiry was the identification of Sorge Case Materials, and I suggested that the foreword of the document is self-explanatory. I will read this foreword, which should dispose of this important document:

The German Richard Sorge entered the German Communist Party in 1919, was sent to Comintern headquarters—

Russian headquarters—

in January 1925, immediately became a member of the Russian Communist Party, joined the staff of the Comintern intelligence department and engaged in espionage activities in the northern European nations, China and elsewhere. He was ordered to serve as a spy in Japan in 1933, went to that country as a correspondent for the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, organized a secret espionage ring, including the German Max Klausen, a member of the German Communist Party and radio technician sent out by the same Soviet intelligence authorities; the Yugoslav and member of the French Communist Party, Branko de Voukelitch, the United States Communist Party member Miyagi Yotoku, who had been sent to Japan by his party to perform espionage work—

I pause here to point out the significance of the international recruitment by which this man was furnished a member of the French Communist Party, a member of the American Communist Party, and a member of the German Communist Party as a part of his working staff. With reference to your question, Mr. Walter [continuing reading]:

the political adviser to the Chinese Communist Party Ozaki Hozumi, whom Sorge himself had recruited around 1930 in Shanghai—

In other words, Ozaki Hozumi, in the early part of the 1930's, irrespective of his future high official position with the Japanese Government, was also listed by Sorge as a political adviser to the Chinese Communist Party in 1930. There are many items I have either forgotten or that the detailed investigation has brought forth. [Continuing reading:]

and others, and directed and supervised the said ring in the collection and transmission to Soviet headquarters, either in writing or via radio, of information concerning military affairs, foreign relations, politics, economics, and other miscellaneous subjects.

The contents of the present printed document comprise part 1 of a translation of typewritten German notes prepared by Sorge in lieu of a statement at the direction of the Tokyo District Criminal Court.

Mr. TAVENNER. At this point, I desire to offer in evidence as "Willoughby Exhibit No. 38" the German notes and the English translation referred to as being a part of consecutive exhibit 20-A.

Mr. WOOD. It will be received.

(The document above referred to, marked "Willoughby Exhibit No. 38," is filed herewith.)

Mr. TAVENNER. All right; if you will proceed to part 2.

General WILLOUGHBY. Part 2 has an identical title. Its foreword merely consists of this description:

This document comprises the second and last part of a translation by the Procurator's Bureau of the Tokyo District Criminal Court of typewritten German notes prepared by Richard Sorge in lieu of a statement.

Mr. TAVENNER. I desire at this time to offer in evidence so much of consecutive exhibit 20-B, both in the German text and in the English translation, as conforms to the witness' description.

Mr. WOOD. It will be received.

(The document above referred to, marked "Willoughby Exhibit No. 39," is filed herewith.)

Mr. TAVENNER. General Willoughby, these two documents, marked "Willoughby Exhibit No. 38" and "Willoughby Exhibit No. 39," are what is known as the Sorge confession; are they not?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes; they are, though the correct title has been read by me now, namely, "Sorge Case Materials." We finally gave it a convenient title of our own out in Tokyo; namely, "Sorge's Own Story." Actually, it is a rather loose designation. They are not confessions; they are not really Sorge's own story; they are not a diary; but they contain elements of all three, and you are at liberty to refer to them as you choose. We have used those terms indiscriminately for some time.

Mr. TAVENNER. And the translation of the title of the document itself, the printed title which I read, is "Parts 1 and 2 of the Statement of Richard Sorge"?

General WILLOUGHBY. Sorge Case Materials.

Mr. TAVENNER. Let me put the question this way: There is no diary or confession by Sorge separate and apart from the document which I introduced a moment ago, previously marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit 2," and these two documents, "Willoughby Exhibit 38" and "Willoughby Exhibit 39," which have just been introduced?

General WILLOUGHBY. There is none.

Mr. WALTER. As I understand it, when Yoshikawa put the story together and reduced it to typewritten sheets, they were submitted to Sorge and he initialed them; isn't that correct?

General WILLOUGHBY. I think he made corrections. The original I have seen shows ink entries of a leisurely, editorial, corrective process.

Mr. WALTER. Did he initial each page?

General WILLOUGHBY. I don't recall that point, but I have accepted this particular document at full face value.

Mr. WALTER. It is just as much a confession as though the entire thing had been written by his own hand?

General WILLOUGHBY. I think your point is well taken. The man wrote it and filed it juridically, and I believe you could accept that classification, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. This confession or statement by Richard Sorge, comprising exhibits 38 and 39, is very long. They are very interesting, Mr. Chairman. They go with great detail into the history of the Communist Party and the Comintern in the East; but, as they are exhibits, we will not undertake to read the documents. I would like, however, to question the witness more or less in a chronological fashion regarding matters that are set forth in the diary.

General Willoughby, I call your attention to page 14 of part 1 of exhibit 38, in which there appears chapter 4, entitled "The Writer's Espionage Group and Activities in China Between January 1930 and December 1932." Will you please give the committee the benefit of the information contained therein relating to the organization of this group? In referring to "the writer," I was referring to Richard Sorge.

General WILLOUGHBY. I think extracts from this very voluminous exhibit, which is available in totality, will give the story. For example, when he speaks of the organization of the China group he has this to say:

I came to China with two foreign coworkers who had been dispatched on orders from the fourth bureau of the Red army.

That is a rather significant line. They had been dispatched on orders from the fourth bureau of the Red army. The fourth bureau of the Red army is the intelligence section of the Soviet army, and Sorge says he came to China with two coworkers who had been furnished him by the fourth bureau of the Red army. That indicates he was working for the fourth section of the Soviet army; he was an operator, an agent, an under-cover agent, so to speak, of the intelligence section of the Soviet army.

Now, he says:

The only person in China upon whom I knew I could depend was Agnes Smedley, of whom I had first heard in Europe. I solicited her aid in establishing my group in Shanghai and particularly in selecting Chinese coworkers. I met as many as possible of her young Chinese friends, making special efforts to become acquainted with those who volunteered to cooperate and work with foreigners for leftist causes.

Then later on, to pick another significant fragment, he said:

I used the same method in obtaining foreign coworkers for my espionage group. At first I selected people from among Smedley's friends, approaching them by asking Smedley to introduce me to them and then waiting until I could negotiate with them directly.

Then this will interest Mr. Walter:

It was in that way that I met Ozaki, and I think Smedley was the one who introduced us. After that Smedley and I met Ozaki frequently at Smedley's home.

He goes on in the same vein in this lengthy description of his operations.

Mr. TAVENNER. I call your attention to page 15 of this same exhibit 28, where there appears subtitle C, entitled "Methods Used in Collection of Information by Japanese Members; Methods of Contacting Japanese Members," and ask you to tell the committee what Sorge had to say about his contacts with Japanese members.

General WILLOUGHBY. Here again I make some selective references to his statements because they are descriptive of his work. He said:

My meetings with Japanese members took place at restaurants, cafes or Smedley's home * * *. I felt most at ease when we met at Smedley's home, and I took Ozaki and Kawai there on many occasions.

May I pause here to identify this man Kawai, K-a-w-a-i? Kawai is a member of Sorge's ring, arrested, tried, and convicted, whom we released under the political amnesty following the occupation of Japan. We released a lot of people under the casual classification of political prisoners. The fact that they included convicted espionage agents and a slight assortment of murderers was incidental. We were too busy with the occupation of Japan to go into case histories. Later we got those people.

Kawai became important because he is an actual living eyewitness of this association with Smedley and others, has said so, his affidavit is available, and were funds available he could have been brought before this committee.

Mr. TAVENNER. In that connection, General, is it not correct that he is one of the two individuals of whom this committee wrote you regarding the taking of his deposition by this committee during April 1950 when a subcommittee was in Hawaii?

General WILLOUGHBY. Quite. I am glad you reminded me of it, Mr. Counsel, and it shows that this committee has been actually working on this case over a long period.

This affidavit was prepared in lieu of a personal appearance, and it has the same probative value.

In other words, if Smedley and her lawyers in her days—and she had to defend herself, of course; I had no objection then or now to this attitude—if she maintained this was a typical forced Japanese disclosure, it has been supported by witnesses of high standing willing to make that statement before an American investigative group such as this one. Kawai is in a more important category than Ozaki because you can summon him if you want to, though he has made a sworn statement, notarized, and so forth.

Mr. VELDE. You have mentioned meetings between Ozaki and Kawai in Smedley's home. Can you place the time they were held and where was Smedley's home?

General WILLOUGHBY. These conferences were in the city of Shanghai. Smedley and Stein were never active in Japan, and reference to her is as to her work as Sorge's assistant in Shanghai. Later on—and I did not know it at the time—our interest in the Sorge file brought confirmation of that in the Shanghai police records. A Japanese court record of an espionage ring points to activities in Shanghai, and that is confirmed by a later investigation of collateral supporting information of identical quality by a reputable international policing body, the Shanghai municipal police, which at that time was an extra-territorial enclave in China.

Mr. VELDE. You think the evidence such that it would satisfy almost any American court?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. I would accept it.

Mr. VELDE. What was the period?

General WILLOUGHBY. 1929 to 1934. Am I correct about that, Mr. Counsel? As a matter of fact, the counsel to this committee has become much more expert than I am on these files.

Mr. TAVENNER. I think the interrogation will indicate that these particular conferences took place in 1932 and the last one in 1933, so far as Kawai is concerned.

General WILLOUGHBY. I was tempted to throw into the hopper the Shanghai police document.

Mr. TAVENNER. Before you do that, you referred to Guenther Stein not having been involved in Japan.

General WILLOUGHBY. I take that back.

Mr. TAVENNER. Wasn't that an error?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. That was a slip of the tongue, an error. Smedley was not in Japan, but Guenther Stein was there. In fact, he ran a radio station for Sorge for a long time.

As to the relationship between the Sorge report, a Japanese report, and the report of the British and French concessions of the Shanghai municipal police, the committee holds in the Shanghai files a typical dossier containing an elaborate report and a typical index card on Smedley. This is a 5- by 3-inch index card, and it fixes the date.

"Shanghai municipal police" is written in the upper left-hand corner; file number; date, August 1933; American; age, 23/2/1892; height, 5 feet 6 inches; hair, brown; eyes, gray; face, oval. I would say a rather slipshod description.

Antecedents: Agnes Smedley, alias Alice Bird, alias Mrs. Petroikos, American citizen born in Osgoo, Mo., United States of America, on February 23, 1892. Member of the following societies.

That is rather interesting. From 1933 to 1951 we have heard of such lists elsewhere, where fellow travelers and joiners join certain fronts. [Continuing reading:]

Friends of the U. S. S. R., Hindustan Association in Berlin, Berlin Indian Revolutionary Society, Noulens Defense Committee—

The "Noulens Defense Committee" is a forerunner of the Civil Rights Congress; it works in Shanghai on the same principle as the Civil Right Congress works in New York City now; namely, legal defense of Communists caught in the business.

Mr. WALTER. What is the American counterpart?

General WILLOUGHBY. The Civil Rights Congress. I will trace it from its noble birth to its American tendrils.

Mr. WALTER. Noble birth? I would say birth out of wedlock.

General WILLOUGHBY. I accept your fine genealogical nuance, Mr. Walter. [Continuing reading:]

All China Labor Federation, and the China League for Civil Rights. Speaks English, French, and German and is in possession of two passports—German and American.

I will show individuals with 15 passports. [Continuing reading:]

Arrived in Shanghai in May 1929 from Berlin as the correspondent of the German newspaper Frankfurter Zeitung.

That is the same cover Sorge had, who was also a correspondent for the *Frankfurter Zeitung*. [Continuing reading:]

She is in the service of the eastern branch of the central committee of the Communist International and is definitely known to have assisted local Indian seditionists on several occasions during the past few years. It is believed that her chief duties comprise the supervising of Communist organizations among workers and that she receives orders direct from the central committee of the Communist International in Moscow.

This is a statement by the Shanghai municipal police, who did not then know or have, of course, Sorge's record, known here as exhibit 38, but they had a fair knowledge of it. [Continuing reading:]

May 1929 to May 15, 1930—85 Avenue Dubail. May 15, 1930, to October 1930—Canton, and French concession, Shameen. October 1930—72 Route Groushy—A Shanghai street. [Continuing reading:]

January 22, 1931, to March 5, 1931—Nanking. June 16, 1931, to July 5, 1931—Canton. December 1931—removed to apartment 102, I. S. S. Apartments, 1552 Avenue Joffre.

On May 17, 1933, she left Shanghai by rail for Peiping. Unconfirmed information is to the effect that she intends to proceed to Moscow. October 23, 1934—returned to Shanghai—

A lapse of 2 years. [Continuing reading:]

from the United States, in the S. S. *President Coolidge*—

And so forth and so forth.

Behind this brief, typical index card maintained by the Shanghai police, there is a more extensive file, but here is a rough fixation of the time period, views of the British police, her aliases and her associations, in broad outline, of which a more complete record is going to be filed by the counsel.

MR. TAVENNER. Mr. Willoughby, I call your attention to section F, page 16, part 1, of the document referred to—that is, exhibit 38—which is entitled, "Persons Directly Attached to Writer's Chinese Group," and by "writer" I am referring to Richard Sorge.

Will you tell the committee what Richard Sorge had to say about this subject?

General WILLOUGHBY. With reference to foreigners, Mr. Counsel?

MR. TAVENNER. Yes. It is section F.

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, sir. I have it. Here, again, I act as an assistant counsel in protecting the limited time of the committee and picking out what I know from my long experience to be the high lights. This is the type of comment he makes on his foreign associates. He has one by the name of Seber Weingarten:

Weingarten, the man in charge of wireless operations in my group, remained in Shanghai after I returned to Moscow. He was a graduate of the radio school in Moscow who had been ordered by headquarters to work with me.

He has this to say about Agnes Smedley, though he has other things to say in other parts of this document:

She was an American and a correspondent of the German newspaper *Frankfurter Zeitung*. She was used in Shanghai by me as a direct member of my group. She worked for me very competently.

Then there are a number of code and surnames. Some we have identified; others we suspect; and others we don't know who they are. One was John:

John—He was sent to Shanghai to work for me by the fourth bureau of the Red Army in 1931. Although he acted as my proxy in a few liaison

duties, he was chiefly concerned with code and photographic work. He was a Pole, a former member of the Polish Communist Party.

Here we have an interesting one. By cross reference to Sorge and the Shanghai police, we have been able to establish his identity:

Paul—He was designated as my successor by the fourth bureau of the Red Army. While I was in Shanghai, he was chiefly concerned with military matters, on which he was an expert. He became the leader of the group after I left.

Here, while the matter is covered more extensively later on, I would like to pause and read to you again one of those police identities, and it is in line with the purposes of this committee. In a general manner, this is what I said in my correspondence with Washington:

The significance of this material of yesterday is that it carries into tomorrow. Time in its issue of April 25, 1949, featured Eugene Dennis. There is no point in repeating this terse, well-written story of the growth and world itinerary of a Soviet agent; important, however, are certain connecting links with the Sorge case.

Dennis, who used to be Francis X. Waldron, obtained a fraudulent passport as "Paul Walsh" and traveled via Europe, South Africa to China. The world-wide ramifications of the Third International, with Shanghai as the far eastern operating center, are reflected in the itinerary of this prominent American disciple. Paul Eugene Walsh, alias "Paul" or "Milton," suddenly appears in the records of the Shanghai police.

The Shanghai police had the same type of card on him as I read to you on Smedley.

Mr. TAVENNER. And a person designated by the name Paul is said by Sorge to have been his successor at Shanghai?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. Here I am quoting the Shanghai police report:

Name: Paul Eugene Walsh: alias Milton.

Date and place of birth: Unknown.

Address in Shanghai: 35-D, 643 Route Frelupt.

Particulars of passport: American Passport No. 331741 issued by the Department of State, Washington, D. C. on 12.12.1930.

When and how Walsh arrived in Shanghai are unknown, as are his previous activities. From December 1, 1933, until June 1, 1934, he resided at Flat 6, Gresham Apartments, No. 1224 Avenue Joffre. On May 30, 1934, the lease of Flat 34-D, Foncim Apartments, No. 643 Route Frelupt, was transferred to his name from Harry Berger—

This is important. Harry Berger is a well-known international Communist identity. [Continuing reading:]

with whom he was obviously on terms of good friendship. Walsh resided at the latter address from June 1, 1934, until October 9, 1934, when he secretly left Shanghai for Trieste on the S. S. *Conte Verde*. It has been established—

says the Shanghai police—

that Walsh was one of the master minds of the local machine of the Comintern, and as such was responsible for the collation of many important documents relating to the propagation of Communist ideas in the Far East.

Now, Sorge describes this particular Comintern machine, and we will read it shortly. Sorge does not always give complete identities. He was cautious, even in his story, because he hoped against hope, from 1941 to 1944, that the Soviets would intervene and rescue him from his predicament.

The cross-reference, Mr. Velde, is that this Comintern apparatus or machine with which the police associates him, and which is described fully by Sorge as to its purposes, was founded by Earl Browder,

the head of the American Communist Party. It was Dennis who took the place of Browder. That constitutes the value of this pseudo-historical tracing of fine lines of relationship which is one of the tasks of this committee and one of the tasks of the Tokyo intelligence system.

Mr. VELDE. Do I get you right that the corroboration consists of the Shanghai police reports, which mention the names of Browder, Dennis, and others, and they are also contained in the Sorge file?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes; either in code name or surname.

Mr. WALTER. General, you stated that some of the names you merely suspected. Have you pursued all avenues of investigation to determine who they were, and do you think we might well look further for the identity of these persons?

General WILLOUGHBY. We have done practically all we could in the Orient, but when you encounter identities of persons, then the local investigative agencies, including your committee, would pursue this, and it is my understanding this is being done. American investigative agencies have become interested in these clues or leads or references, and this case might still be said to be open, in that whenever such unidentified or partially identified individuals appear the investigative processes are in course now. These sources are not available to me, since I left my post under dramatic circumstances 60 days ago.

Mr. TAVENNER. I might add to what you have said that, where the identities of persons in Japan have been made available to the committee, this committee is endeavoring to ascertain where they are now and what they are doing.

General WILLOUGHBY. May I compliment the counsel and this committee. I was surprised at the amount of information this committee has on persons whose names appear in the oriental files. I am sure this will be brought out in the course of these hearings. I have a feeling that a number of these identities are already known and have been investigated on parallel lines by this committee.

Mr. TAVENNER. There are some names we do not desire to disclose at this time.

General WILLOUGHBY. The committee controls the subject matter.

Mr. TAVENNER. Have you completed your answer to the question relating to section F?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. I have picked a few of his comments.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you turn back to section F, page 17? I do not believe you have completed your testimony with regard to that.

General WILLOUGHBY. Your point is well taken, sir. Sorge lists a few more which are important, such as Max Klausen:

Klausen, who went to Shanghai before I did, handled wireless operations for his operator, a man known as Jim. He was attached to the Fourth Bureau of the Red Army in Moscow. I first met him in his role of wireless operator in Shanghai. He worked for me for quite a while at Canton, although not as an active member, after which he was transferred to a group in Manchuria. I knew he was an able man; so I proposed at Moscow in 1935 that he be sent to Japan.

Klausen, Sorge's radio operator, established radio stations both in Shanghai and Tokyo, used to relay messages to Khabarovsk, Siberia, which were then relayed to Moscow.

Klausen is well remembered by me because he was released in Tokyo under this political amnesty, and he disappeared. He disappeared with the assistance of the Soviet Embassy. That started me, actually, in tracking down this case. I felt if this individual, or any

individual of this crowd, was that important, that this thing was an international ease. We found later on, as will be developed by the counsel in connection with exhibit 17, that an attempt was made to get this Sorge case in the International Tribunal in Tokyo, where it met strong opposition by the Russian member; again, to any trained intelligence or investigative officer, indicative of the importance of this material.

We will come to that later.

Mr. TAVENNER. It appears that after a discussion of the paragraph relating to Paul in Sorge's statement, you omitted the next three paragraphs. When you returned to the records relating to Paul you failed to pick them up. So, will you go back to the paragraph beginning "A German woman"?

General WILLOUGHBY. Oh, yes. We find an entry:

A German woman who was called "Hamburg." She offered us the use of her home and engaged in various liaison functions, such as performing messenger duties and holding materials for us.

The next entry relates to Jacob:

Jacob—a young American newspaper reporter. For the most part he gathered various kinds of political information from foreigners.

I have not been able to obtain an identification on this entry.

Mr. TAVENNER. Have you been able to identify the newspaper for which the individual worked as a reporter?

General WILLOUGHBY. I am sorry to say, no.

Mr. WALTER. Does the record disclose his first name, his given name?

General WILLOUGHBY. Just "Jacob," which could be his code name or his surname. You find some names like "Hamburg," who is probably Miss Weitemeyer, and there is a great deal known about her. These were clues to descriptive activities, such as a spy-ring apparatus.

Mr. TAVENNER. There is still another paragraph.

General WILLOUGHBY. Which one?

Mr. TAVENNER. It begins with "A young employee."

General WILLOUGHBY. Oh, yes:

A young employee of the American consulate who brought in economic and political news.

Sorge then says:

I have forgotten his name.

Sorge hoped for 4 years that someone would "spring" him. He bragged to the Japanese: "I am an important Soviet operator; I hold the rank of colonel in the Soviet Army," and so forth. He played on the desire of the Japanese to have no friction with the Russians during the war years, the neutrality arrangement. So, we felt that his own statements were more or less influenced by this cautious, protective attitude. But the systematic interrogation of other members of his ring brought out other facts, and that shows the importance of your witness, Yoshikawa Mitsusada.

Mr. VELDE. As to this young employee of the American consulate, is there any corroborating evidence in the Shanghai police records?

General WILLOUGHBY. Our efforts were to try to grab the Shanghai files. Everything points to Shanghai as headquarters, with Tokyo an outpost. We tried to do that, but we were charged with the occupation of Japan, a nation of 80 million, and my job was not to pursue

these juicy morsels, but to keep a sort of FBI surveillance in Japan and to maintain tranquillity in Japan. So, we could not engage in activities in China.

I am continually charged with failure to obtain information elsewhere. It would be the same as if the FBI was giving you the records of the French Surété Nationale in Paris. We have done all we could to track down these "birds." Actually, I was less interested in getting the dope on Jacob than on Earl Browder, Eugene Dennis, and Gerhart Eisler. They were in the headlines, and I feel if that had been known Judge Medina's job would have been easier.

Mr. VELDE. Don't misunderstand me, General. I realize your jurisdiction was limited to Japan and the Philippine Islands, as I understand it.

General WILLOUGHBY. Quite.

Mr. VELDE. And you had no jurisdiction in Korea, either at that time?

General WILLOUGHBY. I did not. Of course, I had interest and picked up everything that was not nailed down.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Yoshikawa was asked the question whether or not effort had been made to identify the individual alleged to have been in the American consulate and furnishing information. His testimony was that they had been unable to establish his identity, but it is possible that the State Department has information that would lead to discovery of at least the names of persons in the consulate at that time, which is not your function, but probably our function.

General WILLOUGHBY. I feel that the committee is in a position to inquire from the State Department directly.

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes, sir.

Section J on page 23 of the same document, exhibit 38, is entitled "Other Groups in China." The first group listed thereunder is the "Jim" or "Lehman" group. What does Sorge report on this group?

General WILLOUGHBY. With an eye on Mr. Velde, now we come to a portion of Sorge's own story which, on perusal, led me, or us, the investigative intelligence groups, to try to obtain further data on the operations in Shanghai, and it is this portion of the Sorge story which, while cautiously worded, nevertheless gave us really the bird's-eye view of the international Comintern character of the organizations then in Shanghai. When you read this and put yourselves in our place, or my place, there was enough there—though Sorge, as usual, was conservative in his designations—enough of the purposes of these organizations to recognize a similar pattern in the United States. After we pursued this investigation which resulted in the Shanghai file and saw the picture that evolved from it, we felt that we then had a pattern recognizable in the United States.

For example, if we find Noulens is a type case of a protective legal defense of a captured convicted espionage agent which is an exact counterpart of the Civil Rights Congress, when we see that, we bring the report up to date.

When we find the same man—namely, Gerhart Eisler—operating in Japan, and find him later defended by—what is her name? Carol Wise?

Mr. WALTER. Carol King.

Mr. BEALE. Carol Weiss King.

General WILLOUGHBY. Then there develops a pattern which must be known by the legislators and the people so that they can understand and identify these things. For example, I notice Mr. Saypol—I am speaking as a reader of several papers, such as the New York Times—though I don't feel so kindly as to the Herald Tribune; as a matter of fact, I wonder why New York requires the Herald Tribune when it has the Times. Is the Times man here? And including that unmatched series of papers known as the Hearst papers, completely in favor for years, Mr. Sentner [addressing reporter].

When we see that Gerhart Eisler is defended by an organization headed by Miss King, and we find Eisler in Shanghai, and find Noulens defended in Shanghai in a similar manner to Eisler's defense in the United States, then we can trace the Kremlin-sponsored, Comintern-created so-called International Red Aid, which became the Labor Defense in the States, which became the Civil Rights Congress and the Association for the Defense of the Foreign Born; and that is a pattern which I think is of substance and value to the committee and the Congress and the people.

This is a departure from your question to introduce the importance of the description of these organizations. No doubt you will recognize them. They are operating in the States under some other name.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you read what Sorge had to say about the "Jim" or "Lehman" group?

General WILLOUGHBY. That will take us a bit of time.

Mr. TAVENNER. Then, Mr. Chairman, I believe this would be a good opportunity for a break.

Mr. Wood. The committee stands in recess until 2:30.

(Thereupon, at 12:40 p. m., a recess was taken until 2:30 p. m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Mr. Wood. The committee will be in order.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. CHARLES ANDREW WILLOUGHBY— Resumed

Mr. TAVENNER. General Willoughby, I refer you again to section J, on page 23, of exhibit No. 38. That section is entitled "Other Groups in China." The first group listed thereunder is the Jim or Lehman group. Will you examine the exhibit, please, and state what the Sorge statement shows on this unit?

General WILLOUGHBY. Mr. Counsel, I regard this section of the Sorge story as possibly the most important in this documentation, because it led us to believe that, while fragmentary, the descriptions of these international people then working in Shanghai for the purpose of communizing China were so descriptive in their functional outline that we might have something of value to the American people today. And, actually, as I read these, I would like to suggest that you put yourselves in our positions in Tokyo, groping with this uncrystallized information at the time, and at the end of the reading realize we would have had to go after the Shanghai record or to procure someone who would know about that activity.

Consequently, this represents a turning point in the process of investigation, in the sense that we had already disposed of Sorge, you might say, as an interesting specimen of international espionage somewhat in the manner of what was later disclosed in Canada; but these next two pages, written by an individual who was in the business, an expert in his line, gave us the clue to the existence in Shanghai of a number of bodies that looked very much like the Communist fronts everywhere in the world, including America.

Here, again, we go into that twilight zone of why and how a historical case, so to speak—because everything of 5 or 10 years ago is in the realm of historical research—can be linked to something that is of interest to the committee today.

I will link it, or the counsel, through his questioning, will develop it, and I will pause in one of these groups and trace it from 1935 until 1951, in a comparatively brief statement.

Mr. WALTER. Did your investigation develop a connection between that group and a group in the United States?

General WILLOUGHBY. It did, unmistakably and positively, and that is of value to your committee, to get that on the record.

Mr. TAVENNER. I suggest you read on page 23 the portion dealing with that group, that is, the Lehman group.

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, sir. This is a series of groups or apparatus or front organizations described by Sorge.

The first is the Jim or Lehman group, code name of the person in charge. He said:

The first group to work in Shanghai was the Jim group, also known as the Lehman group. I had never heard of it until I had arrived in Shanghai. Jim had been sent out from the fourth bureau of the Red army, arriving in Shanghai slightly before me. His chief duty was to establish radio communication between Shanghai and other parts of China and Moscow. * * * When I arrived in Shanghai, he had already succeeded in establishing radio communication between Shanghai and Moscow and was trying to establish contacts with other districts in a similar manner. However, it seems that he was unsuccessful in the case of Canton. Jim employed Klausen—

who became Sorge's radio operator—

as his subordinate. Further, he employed a White Russian called Mischa or Mishin in Shanghai.

We do not know too much about Lehman. Does he appear in your files, Mr. Tavenner, L-e-h-m-a-n?

Mr. TAVENNER. Whether it is the same Lehman or not, I am unable to say.

General WILLOUGHBY. Nevertheless, the sense of this description is that Shanghai is a radio-transmitting station or relay station en route to Khabarovsk and then Moscow. The operator who appears here first, Klausen, later on used himself in establishing his own station in Tokyo.

Mr. WALTER. When was that, approximately?

General WILLOUGHBY. In Japan in the period 1935 to 1941, roughly.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you proceed to the next group listed there, known as the Harbin group?

General WILLOUGHBY. Sorge says about this group:

The next group with which I came into contact in the course of my work was the Harbin group, which had also been sent out by the fourth bureau of the Red army.

You have this recurrent reference to his job description, namely, an agent of the fourth bureau of the Red army, the intelligence section of the Red army. [Continuing reading:]

Its duty was to gather military information in Manchuria. As a sideline, it gathered political intelligence as well. The Harbin group acted as a letter box for me; I forwarded letters and documents from Moscow to it, and it sent them on. Money sent to me by Moscow also came through this channel. Liaison with the Harbin group was established in the following way: To begin with, somebody from the group came to Shanghai to confer on the technique of the letter-box communication system, and thereafter members of my group and members of the Harbin group took turns in serving as mail carriers and traveling between Harbin and Shanghai.

Klausen acted as contact for me on numerous occasions. I believe it was in the spring of 1932 that I myself carried mail to Harbin.

The significance here is the carrier or mail delivery method which occurs throughout the technique of Sorge, that is, how such a ring operates in a foreign country. And some of the names he mentioned earlier, in the main, were the ones he used again in Japan; and some of the names occurring now you will find recurring elsewhere as this presentation proceeds.

The next group—

Mr. TAVENNER. I believe you still have another paragraph to read in connection with the Harbin group.

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes:

I met Ott-Gloemberg, chief of the Harbin group, for the first time in Shanghai. I called on him at Harbin to turn over the mail to him. I also met Frohlich, sometimes called Theo, who had formerly worked at Shanghai, at Harbin. I do not believe I met the radio technician, Artur, at Harbin, although I heard about him. Theo and Ott-Gloemberg left Harbin in 1932. I happened to meet them by chance and not in connection with my work in Russia in January 1933. My relationship with the Harbin group was strictly a letter-box affair. There was no administrative relationship at all.

The significance there is that these elusive names appear elsewhere. The Shanghai record will pick them up. They had them under surveillance. There is your bridge from Sorge to Shanghai today. I keep repeating that, but it is a very practical element in these proceedings.

Mr. TAVENNER. Now if you will describe the Frohlich-Feldmann group in Shanghai according to Sorge's statement.

General WILLOUGHBY. The next group reported on by Sorge is the Frohlich-Feldmann group in Shanghai. He said:

The Frohlich-Feldmann group was also operating in Shanghai in 1931. Like the others, it had been sent out by the fourth bureau of the Red army. Its duty was to make connections with the Chinese Red army and to gather intelligence concerning it.

Here Sorge reports on a staff, a group or front whose duty it was to do what? To make connection with the Chinese Red Army and to gather intelligence concerning it, an interesting sideline. [Continuing reading:]

It had its own radio connection with Moscow and therefore did not use our station. The chief of the group was Frohlich, also known as Theo, who held the rank of major general in the Red army. Feldmann was a radio technician and held the rank of lieutenant colonel. There was another man in the group, but I do not know who he was. Unable to fulfill their mission, these people left Shanghai during 1931. I had no working relationship with them and met them only by chance. Shanghai is such a small city that it was difficult to avoid such chance encounters. I did not receive instructions from Moscow to contact them. They had their own mission to perform and there was no formal connection between us.

All of this, fragmentary to some extent, nevertheless describes the mechanics of the operation, and describes their missions. The duty of the Frohlich-Feldmann group was to gather intelligence concerning the Chinese Red army. That is the same Red army which we are now fighting in North Korea. Therefore, any collateral relationship that will develop, as the case may be, may have found its origin in the reading of this, shall we say, slightly historical case known as the Sorge case. Without that we would never have been interested in Shanghai at all. After all, we had a lot of more pressing questions. But that development was enough to make Shanghai an irresistible target of investigation.

The next group is a key group. Always bear in mind that Sorge is not going to identify this group by name, he is not ready to do this when he writes this paper, but he tells enough about it that we are able to establish its identity later on.

MR. TAVENNER. What is the name of the group to which you refer?

General WILLOUGHBY. He calls it the Comintern group in Shanghai. I will give you the correct identity later. Sorge says:

I met the Comintern group in Shanghai by chance in 1931. It consisted of a political branch and an organization branch, the latter comprised of Noulens—a name to which I invite your attention—

who became famous after his arrest, and one or two assistants. Karl Lesse later came to Shanghai to assume the post left vacant by Noulens. The organization branch had various duties to perform, but it was primarily concerned with the maintenance of liaison between the Comintern, the Chinese Communist Party and the political branch of the Shanghai Comintern group. Liaison duty was of three different types: (1) Personnel work, i. e., the movement of personnel between Moscow and the Chinese Communist Party; (2) the transmittal of documents and letters; and (3) radio communication. The organization branch also assumed the duty of financial liaison between Moscow, the Chinese Communist Party, and the political branch; assisted in finding meeting places and houses for the organization branch and the Chinese Communist Party; rendered all kinds of technical and organizational assistance to illegal activities in China; took an active part in the exchange of secret materials between Moscow and China; and assumed responsibility for the safety of members of the political branch. In this last connection, it had the authority to issue orders to political branch members, restrict their movements, etc.

Now, this description of the job of this outfit is then later confirmed by the Shanghai files and other investigations which we conducted. Its name and personnel then is disclosed. Sorge did not disclose it except to refer to Noulens, which is a famous case quite similar to the defense of Gerhart Eisler, for the same reason and conducted by the same legalistic front which is used for such purposes, namely, the International Red Aid, a Communist-financed unit whose counterpart to the American organization will develop as we proceed.

Then Sorge describes the political branch:

The political branch consisted of Gerhardt—
Eisler; I will supply the last name—

whom I had known in Germany and worked with in my Comintern days, and one or two assistants. I did not meet the assistants.

Incidentally, Eisler's wife¹ appeared before this committee quite recently, I believe.

¹ Hede Massing, former wife of Gerhardt Eisler.

Mr. TAVENNER. That is correct.

General WILLOUGHBY. In her book, *This Deception*, she knew little about Eisler's China mission. I will put in a plug for Hede Massing's book, *This Deception*, published by Duell, Sloane & Pearce, because one of the Pearces of that company worked for me in Japan.

Sorge continues:

I chanced to meet Gerhardt [Eisler] in Shanghai and renewed our old acquaintance, but our work was absolutely unrelated. Gerhardt's duty, or rather that of the political branch, was to act as a spokesman for the political policy with respect to the Chinese Communist Party decided upon by the Comintern general conference. It also acted as an intermediary for the exchange of information between the Chinese Communist Party and the Comintern and submitted reports concerning all the social problems involved in the labor movement in China. The reports were forwarded to Moscow through the organization branch. I must state here that these reports were never sent through my radio facilities or my other liaison channels. With the arrest of Noulens, Gerhardt's status in Shanghai became precarious, and he decided to return to Moscow in 1931.

He skipped, just as he did on the *Batory*. He is an internationally skillful dodger.

I would like to pause here. Knowing that the essence of this presentation is linked with today, this is too tempting an opportunity. Of course, we are now all familiar with the elusive Gerhart Eisler. I call your attention to an article in the *Saturday Evening Post*, in its issue of February 17, 1951. I pause, in fact, to pay tribute to the *Saturday Evening Post*, as this article is brilliant. The author, Craig Thompson, unknown to me, is a most skillful investigator of Communist fronts.

The title of the article is "The Communist's Dearest Friend," and its lead photograph shows one Carol King, smiling amiably, I suppose, and leading by the hand her protégé and client, one Gerhart Eisler.

Mr. VELDE. General, is there any question in your mind that the Gerhart referred to by Richard Sorge is one and the same as Gerhart Eisler?

General WILLOUGHBY. None whatever. We know he was in Shanghai. The Shanghai police said he was. His wife said he was. He was not there for his health. Furthermore, the story of Sorge tells what he was doing.

Mr. TAVENNER. For the purpose of the record, I would like to refer to an interrogation which took place before this committee February 6, 1947, of Ruth Fischer, a sister of Gerhart Eisler:

Mr. RUSSELL. When did you next learn of the whereabouts of your brother and what country was he in?

Miss FISCHER. * * * Eisler had been in disgrace during 1928, 1929, and 1930, and everybody of the Communist Party in Berlin expected his expulsion from the Communist Party of Germany because of his rebellion against Stalin at that time.

Then he was sent to a mission in China, with the GPU delegation, to purge rebellious Chinese Communists. At that time Eisler's mission was not a very high one, in China; he was one of a group of men sent there to carry out orders. In these Chinese purges he behaved so cruelly and carried out the orders so well that the report about him in Berlin said that he was really the hangman of the rebellious Chinese Communists, who were sentenced by the decisions of Moscow.

After the Chinese trip, he came back in 1930 or 1931 to Moscow, where he then married his wife, and where his daughter was born, and where he remained until 1933. What missions he carried out between 1931 and 1933 I do not know, but I want to repeat that he has not walked on German soil in these years.

General WILLOUGHBY. That is a very interesting interview, not known to me, and would merely confirm me in my current understanding.

Mr. TAVENNER. You were proceeding to discuss the article of Craig Thompson.

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. This article, as of February 1951, covers the evaluation of organizations and the participation of Miss King in the development of a systematic legal defense for Communist agents that have run afoul the American law.

The article says in 1925, in association with one Brodsky, who was the United States receiver of party funds from Moscow.

Mr. WOOD. Who is that? Brodsky?

General WILLOUGHBY. B-r-o-d-s-k-y. Together they helped organize and launch the International Labor Defense.

The records in Shanghai and elsewhere will show, in an organization chart which is included in my studies, that the International Red Aid is the Kremlin mother unit of defense bodies in all countries for the defense of this type of clientele.

So it became known as the Labor Defense in this country, and this article, with which I am in complete agreement, so states. The author, who knows his business, also says:

This effort had been preceded by a meeting in Moscow at which a directive, binding on Communist parties everywhere, was issued. It demanded: "The proletariat must gather and organize those lawyers and learned barristers in various countries who sympathize with the liberation struggle." From this was born a world-wide Communist bar association called International Red Aid. The International Labor Defense was its United States section.

Without going into details which are in this file, the International Red Aid, Soviet-Comintern sponsored, becomes the International Labor Defense, and the American Labor Defense becomes the Civil Rights Congress. And, incidentally, again Weiss, as an organizer, develops other agencies, such as the American Committee for the Defense of the Foreign Born, and several other organizations, all of which have been analyzed and commented on adversely by Mr. Morris Ernst, a reputable New York lawyer, who resented, apparently, ever having been mixed up with this group.

The coincidence that Eisler and Noulens find legal counsel, one in China and one in New York, all connected with the International Red Aid, is so impressive that an investigative officer dare not ignore it.

Pausing again, in order to tie this thing into a recognizable pattern, you will find that what Sorge cautiously called the Comintern group, is reported by the Chinese police much more specifically. It will be covered later on, but I dwell on it now. It is the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat, abbreviated PPTUS, and its parent organization, the Shanghai branch of the Far Eastern Bureau. They were the most important and highly organized apparatus for Comintern labor activities in the Far East during the late 1920's and early 1930's.

The PPTUS, set up in 1927 at a conference in Hankow, was attended by several prominent Comintern leaders, including Lozovsky, who, incidentally, has risen to a high position in the Soviet labor movement. Another member of the Hankow conference who later became first head of the PPTUS was the American Communist Earl Browder, who was assisted in his work in China by an American woman. Other Americans prominent in the affairs of the PPTUS were James H.

Dolsen, a journalist, and one Albert Edward Stewart, and Margaret Undjus.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you identify Jim Dolsen as one of the individuals connected with this organization?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. He was connected with the organization in the thirties.

Mr. VELDE. Will you spell that?

General WILLOUGHBY. D-o-l-s-e-n, James H.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, Jim Dolsen is the person who has been identified as a member of the Communist Party by Matthew Cvetie in his testimony on February 21, 1950, and is one of those arrested on August 17, 1951, in Pittsburgh.

General WILLOUGHBY. That is news to me. It again shows the efficacy of this committee's work in tracking down these people. This is why the Sorge and related matters could not be ignored. Here you have the case of an individual, Dolsen, trafficking in a Communist front in the thirties in China; he recurs in Pittsburgh in the forties, and this committee picks him up and reports on him in this fashion. If you were pressed for time and decided to terminate this meeting now, you would still have made your case, because the reference to Dolsen is only one of many others, almost repetitive in their similarity.

Mr. TAVENNER. In describing Earl Browder as the head of the Far East bureau, you referred to a person as his assistant who was an American woman, but did not give the name of the American woman.

General WILLOUGHBY. Perhaps an instinctive gallantry which is not applicable in this kind of meeting. I will now fill the gap. Her name, said he reluctantly, is Katherine Harrison, "K" as in cat, "H" as in house. I am likely to misspell words in six languages, so I occasionally get confused on the subject.

Since this committee is taking me from one surprise to another—pleasant ones, I must say, as in the case of Dolsen—do you also have something on Miss Harrison?

Mr. TAVENNER. The committee is in possession of information that she was the wife at one time of Earl Browder.

General WILLOUGHBY. A very interesting social relationship, I should say.

I have strayed afar a bit. The point I made is, I became interested in Shanghai through the slightly reluctant Sorge in describing these people in Shanghai, and began to spend funds furnished me by the benevolent Federal Government to find out some more.

Mr. TAVENNER. I have some further questions to ask you about the Noulens group, but inasmuch as some Americans are tied up pretty closely with it in the Shanghai files, I will wait until we reach that.

General WILLOUGHBY. Very well. I will agree with you that the Noulens case is very interesting. It is a prototype of the Eisler case with respect to the abuse of legal defense.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you proceed with the Japanese group that Sorge established in Tokyo in 1933, and will you tell the committee what the Sorge report shows as to how he obtained the members for his group in Japan? You will find it on page 6 of exhibit 38.

General WILLOUGHBY. I take it you are interested in some individuals that Sorge recruited for his Japanese ring?

Mr. TAVENNER. That is correct, but in addition, those who were assigned to him by Moscow

General WILLOUGHBY. We will go back to Shanghai. This is a closing item of Sorge's activity. To go back to his work related to Shanghai, he has this to say:

When the orders came through, I asked for a technical aide (radio man), a Japanese collaborator and a competent foreign assistant, and the services of Klausen, Miyagi, and Voukelitch were made available. I was authorized to recruit other personnel as necessary in the place where I was working.

Is this the item you are interested in?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes.

General WILLOUGHBY. My idea of the significance of this comment is that Sorge, when he gets a job, applies to the head office and says, "I want certain technicians, a radio man, a Japanese collaborator, and a competent foreign assistant." If he were working for General Electric or some other reputable concern, they would look at their colored pins on the map of the world and say, "We will transfer our representative from Buenos Aires to some other place," and it would be done.

By analogy, the way the Kremlin-Moscow staff organization worked there was just as good. They pressed a button and summoned from a world-wide job distribution, Klausen—

Mr. TAVENNER. Where was Klausen obtained from?

General WILLOUGHBY. He had gone back to Russia, and they pulled him from there. The competent foreign assistant was Voukelitch, who was a French Communist in Belgrade at the time. They pulled him out, and these men converged and reported to their new jobs.

Mr. TAVENNER. From where did they get the Japanese assistant?

General WILLOUGHBY. They went to California and found a Nisei, a citizen technically but not in heart, and had him report to Tokyo.

Mr. TAVENNER. Does the report say Miyagi was a member of the American Communist Party?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. Here is what Sorge had to say about Miyagi:

Miyagi's position was identical with that of Voukelitch. He, too, was a member of a Communist Party (American), he, too, was ordered through Moscow to participate in my activities, he, too, was a Comintern member in the broad sense, he, too, was registered with and accepted by some major Moscow organization as a member of my group, and in his case, too, it made absolutely no difference whether the agency in question was the Comintern, central committee of the Russian Communist Party, or the Fourth Bureau of the red army.

Mr. TAVENNER. General Willoughby, does there appear as one of the 34 exhibits an interrogation of this individual, that is, Miyagi, relative to his knowledge of the American Communist Party?

General WILLOUGHBY. My recollection is that it does, and I believe you have custodianship of this exhibit.

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes. I have before me exhibit 25, marked for identification only, and, Mr. Chairman, rather than introduce the whole document in evidence, I would like to read what I consider the pertinent portions of it. I am doing this because of its length.

The following are extracts from interrogations of Miyagi Yotoku conducted in March and April of 1942. This is from volume 4 of the procurator's records on Miyagi.

Question 3. The accused will describe his activities for the Communist cause during his stay in the United States.

Answer. In about September 1926, I purchased a house facing Los Angeles station, and in November I opened a restaurant there. My three business partners (Yabe, Noritsugu; Matayoshi, Atsushi; and Nakamura, Koki), two other

acquaintances and I began to meet once a week in the dressing room at the rear of the restaurant to exchange personal views on social sciences, philosophy, and art. This Social Problems Study Group, as we called it, gradually absorbed new members, among whom were an anarchist and close friend of Kotoku, Shusui, an intimate Communist colleague of Katayama, Sen, and several clergymen. In the course of time, our liberal sessions gradually veered toward the left, becoming completely leftist when Marxists Herbert Harris, a Russian, and Fister, a Swiss, who had joined the circle through the introduction of Communists Yada and Takahashi of West Los Angeles early in 1927, volunteered to lecture to us on Marxian theory.

Both Yada and Takahashi had joined our circle hoping to prevail upon the members of the working class who attended it to form a Communist study group. Our meetings, therefore, were the scenes of incessant wrangling between the anarchists and the Communist members. Yada and about 20 others bolted the group eventually, leaving me and about 10 others behind, set up their own Marxist study group, and established a temporary office on Weller Street in the Japanese section of Los Angeles. Their official organ, *Class Struggle* (*Kaikyusen*), became the *Labor News* (*Rodo Shimbun*) in about 1928.

It was around this time that Japanese Marxists began to join the American Communist Party and to participate actively in its work. At this stage, the *Labor News* moved to San Francisco, where Tatemono, Teichi succeeded Yada as supervisor, and Post Street became more or less the headquarters of the Japanese division of the American Communist Party. I remained in Los Angeles and had no further association with that group.

In about 1929, I joined the Proletarian Art Society and the Japanese branch of the Red Relief Association (both organizations affiliated with the Japanese division of the Oriental People's Section of the American Communist Party). I lectured to the former on the history of fine arts, edited its magazine, and arranged exhibitions, while for the latter I helped collect money to aid Communists arrested by the authorities. When almost all the delegates to the party convention held in Los Angeles in 1930 were arrested, including seven Japanese who were served deportation notices, Hamakiyo, Yabe and I managed to gain asylum for our seven countrymen in the Soviet Union.

Toward the end of the 1930, I was visited in Los Angeles by a Communist named Yano who had just returned from Moscow with orders from the Comintern to build up an organization in the United States. Yano was on intimate terms with Sam Darcy, the organizer for District 13 (California). I kept in touch with him and in the autumn of 1931, he encouraged me to join the Communist Party. I objected on the ground that my previous record was sufficient reason for not doing so, but he said that I should be registered with the party, and that membership would facilitate my activities. I then agreed to join and assumed the party alias of Joe. Since I was not in good health, I was excused from party meetings and a number of other activities. My chief tasks were to study the distribution of Japanese farm workers and to analyze Chinese problems with the assistance of a party member named Yamada.

Though I went to assist the strikers when Yano informed me of the labor dispute at the Japanese-American News (*Nichibei Shimbunsha*) in San Francisco in about May 1933, my work was mainly invisible.

Question 4: Describe your current relations with the American Communist Party.

Answer: I do not think I am a member of the American Communist Party now. I said last time that Yano and a certain Caucasian approached me on the question of my returning to Japan toward the close of 1932. On that occasion, the Caucasian requested that I return within a month or so to the United States, my place of residence, which meant that I was being sent to Japan as a United States Communist Party member. He told me to contact Roy, a party member in Los Angeles whom I had known personally for some time.

Although I had consented to return to Japan, I continued to help strikers and roam about in search of suitable subjects for paintings. Roy urged me repeatedly to sail at an early date, and one day in September 1933, Yano and Roy called on me and informed me that I was to leave immediately. I embarked around the beginning of October with instructions from Roy to return in about a month, or 3 months at the latest. I left my baggage behind because I did not expect to be away for very long.

According to Mrs. Kitabayashi, Roy called on her and her husband several times after my departure to inquire about my whereabouts and my activities.

I believe he assumed that I was postponing my return indefinitely in order to engage in activities in Japan and arranged to have my name stricken from the register of the American Communist Party.

Question 5: The accused will describe his relations with the Comintern.

Answer: When I joined the United States Communist Party (i. e., the American branch of the Comintern) at Yano's request, I did not go through the usual formality of submitting a signed application; I entrusted all the details to Yano. Since he maintained direct contact with the Comintern as the party organizer in the United States, I am certain that he registered me with the Comintern under the alias of Joe, shortly after I gave him my acceptance. Since I have been engaged in espionage work for the Comintern as a member of the Sorge ring since my return to Japan, I believe my registration is still effective and that I am a member of the Comintern intelligence department.

Question 6: Were you given travel expenses and operating funds before you sailed for Japan?

Answer: Roy gave me \$200 to cover travel expenses just before my departure. In addition, he handed me a dollar bill which I was to use in contacting an agent in Japan. He told me that the other man, to whom I was to present the bill, would have in his possession a similar bill bearing a successive serial number. I carried it the first time I met Sorge, but we did not bother to make the comparison.

In describing further the Communist Party of the United States, Miyagi had this to say:

The headquarters of district 13 of the United States Communist Party, the California branch, is in San Francisco (organized by Levin Owen). Party organizations have been established in San Francisco, Los Angeles, Berkeley, Oakland, Sacramento, Fresno, San Jose, San Pedro, and other cities. Subordinate to the party organization are such unions, people's groups, and youth societies as the following:

1. Workers International Relief.
2. Friends of the Soviet Union.
3. Anti-Imperialist League.
4. Young Pioneers of America.
5. Young Communist League of America.
6. International Labor Defense League.
7. Marine Workers Industrial Union.
8. Trade Union Unity League.

Inasmuch as these organizations, as is the case the world over, are subject to Comintern policy and direction, I shall not discuss their activities.

Further, he stated:

Participation by Japanese in party activities.

Here he names several Japanese prominent in the Communist Party in the 1920's.

Then, the last I shall read in this interrogation is what occurred, according to his deposition, in 1930:

In this year, there were fresh developments in the party movement, the result of orders from American party headquarters calling for a new program of expansion and solidification and a more vigorous policy toward the masses. (San Darcy was made the organizer of district 13, the California branch.) In California, the party launched a campaign in the rural communities to enlist farm workers (particularly seasonal farm labor), sought to organize the marine workers, and work to strengthen the Young Communists League and Young Pioneers.

The Japanese division was absorbed by the Oriental Peoples Section and given the new mission of cooperating with the Chinese and Filipino membership.

In 1930 the Japanese division adopted the popularization of the party as its watchword and embarked upon a concrete program designed to organize farm and fishery workers. It fostered strikes in the Imperial Valley against such large capital concerns as the Gerard Co. and the Sun Fruit Co. and agitated among the fishermen and fishing industry workers in San Pedro. (Except in

isolated cases, these efforts ended in dismal failure because of the firm intervention of the authorities.)

A movement was also started to boycott Japanese celebrities visiting Los Angeles, specifically Bunji Suzuki, Totsudo Kato, Toyohiko Kagawa, Tenko Nishida, Tokuzo Asahara, Shunji Tabara, Ki Kimura, and Ikuo Oyama. (By arrangement with local Foreign Office officials and Japanese-language papers, these so-called celebrities made it a practice to defray their traveling expenses by charging admission to lectures at which they ostensibly enlightened the audience on the Japanese situation. To give a few examples, Bunji Suzuki collected several thousand dollars for three lectures delivered in Los Angeles while he was en route to an international labor conference, and Totsudo Kato and Toyohiko Kagawa each took from \$20,000 to \$30,000 from needy Japanese immigrants during a week of religious lecturing. These meetings were nothing but a cheap fraud.) Meanwhile, party members began campaigning on the streets.

The expansion of the party's sphere of activity to the streets merits praise in that it attracted public attention, but it was not without its adverse effects, one of the most noteworthy being the aggravation of the hostility of the local Japanese community toward the party. This blunder may be traced to lack of caution in evaluating the Japanese mind and the predominant position occupied by the traditional Japanese spirit.

As party activity started to get into full swing in May and June of 1930, the repressive hand of the American authorities tightened. In a mass arrest staged during a meeting of the Los Angeles branch in Long Beach, Comrades Hakomori, Fukunaga, Nishimura, Miyagi (Yosaburo), Nagahama, Shima, Matayoshi, Yoshioka, and Teraya were taken into custody, and the Japanese division, deprived of its leading members, was brought to the verge of collapse.

General WILLOUGHBY. May I raise a question, sir?

I take it, Mr. TAVENNER, that you established by these quotations that a bona fide member of the American Communist Party who was a Japanese linguist was requested by Sorge, and he got him as a push-button request in such organization, and this man has been identified as a member of the American Communist Party from district 13, the California branch.

Mr. VELDE. Do you have any information as to where Miyagi Yotoku is now?

General WILLOUGHBY. My recollection is he died of illness, either in prison or shortly after our political amnesty in 1945.

Mr. TAVENNER. I think he died in prison.

General WILLOUGHBY. He was tubercular, I believe.

Mr. TAVENNER. That is right.

General WILLOUGHBY. I read this many months ago.

Mr. TAVENNER. General Willoughby, to return to other members of the Japanese group, it would appear from Sorge's statement that other than the three individuals who he was advised would be available in Tokyo when he arrived there, the rest of his Japanese group was recruited in Tokyo by Sorge?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you know whether that is the way in which Guenther Stein was recruited into the organization?

General WILLOUGHBY. It was.

Mr. TAVENNER. What does the record disclose as to the extent of Guenther Stein's activities in Sorge's Japanese group?

General WILLOUGHBY. That is a very interesting figure, this Guenther Stein. I would prefer to read the summation of the three American lawyers who passed on this documentation, although the documentation, meaning statements to the court, on the subject of

Guenther Stein, are also in your possession. This is a matter of preserving the time of the committee. This is what the record says:

Guenther Stein, special correspondent for a London newspaper, was a regular member of the Sorge spy ring. A notebook confiscated from Sorge listed six members of this ring, together with their aliases, and Stein was listed among the six. An intercepted radio message to Moscow referred to his code name. There is testimony by Max Klausen and Sorge that Klausen, a wireless operator specialist, erected a wireless transmission set in Stein's residence to forward reports to Russia. Stein not only was living on the premises at the time, but gave his consent. Being a correspondent for a reputable English newspaper, he had various contacts which permitted him to secure valuable information. This information, passed on to Sorge, was forwarded to Russia. Stein also acted as a courier for Sorge and carried photographs and microfilm to Shanghai where they were delivered to a liaison agent from Moscow at the Metropole Hotel. On one occasion Stein was instructed to, and did bring back from Shanghai a smoking pipe of extraordinary design, a woman's shawl, and a brooch. These items, given to him by a liaison agent from Moscow, were later used by Anna Klausen for identification purposes when she was sent to Shanghai in 1937-38 to deliver 20 to 30 rolls of film to the Moscow agent.

These are high lights. Each of the entries I have read is supported by a direct reference to a sworn statement in the course of the court interrogation.

I will add to this, again to link Stein with yesterday, as it were: When the original report was published in 1949, and prior to the protestation by Agnes Smedley, Guenther Stein disappeared. In other words, not knowing exactly what the outcome or implication of this report might be on either the public or official action, he felt it prudent to vanish.

Personally, I would be interested in how fast one can vanish. Apparently he procured both passport and transportation facilities to Europe in 24 hours, something which I challenge anyone of legitimate purposes and identification to accomplish.

Then he was not heard from for a couple years, until he got himself arrested by the French Police, Surété Nationale, for espionage. He later went to Poland, where he holds citizenship.

Here you have the case of a man who disappears to Europe and gets himself arrested once more for doing business at the same old stand; namely, espionage.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did he leave Japan prior to the breaking of the Sorge case?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, he left, prudently, prior to the breaking of this case.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did the procurator in Japan state that if he had remained in Japan he would have been indicted?

General WILLOUGHBY. He did.

Mr. TAVENNER. I regret that we cannot go further this afternoon. It will be necessary to call you back again tomorrow.

Mr. WOOD. The committee will stand in recess until 10:30 tomorrow morning.

(Thereupon, at 4:30 p. m. on Wednesday, August 22, 1951, an adjournment was taken until Thursday, August 23, 1951, at 10:30 a. m.)

HEARINGS ON AMERICAN ASPECTS OF THE RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE

(Based on Testimony of Mitsusada Yoshikawa and
Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby)

THURSDAY, AUGUST 23, 1951

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D. C.

PUBLIC HEARING

The Committee on Un-American Activities met pursuant to adjournment at 10:45 a. m. in room 226. Old House Office Building, Hon. John S. Wood (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Representatives John S. Wood (chairman), Francis E. Walter, Clyde Doyle, and Harold H. Velde (appearance as noted in transcript).

Staff members present: Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., counsel; Thomas W. Beale, Sr., assistant counsel; Louis J. Russell, senior investigator; Courtney E. Owens, investigator; Raphael I. Nixon, director of research; John W. Carrington, clerk; and A. S. Poore, editor.

Mr. Wood. The committee will be in order.

Are you ready to proceed, Mr. Tavenner?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to recall General Willoughby as a witness this morning.

Mr. Wood. Very well.

Mr. TAVENER. It will facilitate the handling of the introduction of the testimony if I also have Mr. Owens, an investigator of the committee, sworn in, and introduce some of the documents through him, and then call upon the witness for his comments.

Mr. Owens, will you take the stand, please?

Mr. Wood. Raise your right hand and be sworn, please, Mr. Owens.

You do solemnly swear that the evidence you will give before this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. OWENS. I do.

TESTIMONY OF COURTNEY E. OWENS

Mr. TAVENNER. What is your name, please?

Mr. OWENS. Courtney E. Owens.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you hold a position with this committee?

Mr. OWENS. Yes, sir; I am employed as investigator.

Mr. TAVENNER. How long have you been so employed?

Mr. OWENS. Three years.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Owens, will you select consecutive exhibit No. 13 from the documents in front of you and examine it and describe to the committee its contents?

Mr. OWENS. Yes, sir. Consecutive exhibit 13, as compiled by G-2, Far East Command, is entitled "Foreign Affairs Yearbook, 1942." From October 1941 to October 1942, the Tokyo Metropolitan Police—

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you state again the nature of the document you have before you?

Mr. OWENS. This document is entitled "Foreign Affairs Yearbook, 1942." It was compiled by the Criminal Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Justice, of the Japanese Government.

From October 1941 to October 1942, the Tokyo Metropolitan Police compiled the formerly undiscovered records of the Sorge spy ring. Assembled from a great mass of official notes, interrogations, and so forth, the Japanese collated this material and included it in pages 398 through 600 of their annual publication of the Foreign Affairs Yearbook. That is to say, pages 398 to 600 deal exclusively with the Japanese results of their investigations and interrogations in the Sorge spy case.

Described by the Home Ministry officials, the Japanese Home Ministry officials, as a case "which may find no parallel in the history of espionage," the undercover system of the Sorge spy ring in China and Japan sought, found, and sent to Moscow over a period of 10 years top-secret plans and policies of the Japanese Government.

We have here the full English translation of that portion of the Foreign Affairs Yearbook.

Mr. TAVENNER. Now, this Foreign Affairs Yearbook of 1942 identified by you, pages 44 through 141 of the English translation, deals with the information accumulated by Sorge and other members of his ring and forwarded to Moscow. The first listing of his information is that obtained by Sorge through his connection with the German Embassy, I believe. The following paragraph precedes the information Sorge received through the German Embassy, which I will read:

In addition to the agents working under him, Sorge had a rich source of news in the German Embassy, where he enjoyed confidence and respect. Some of the information he obtained through the Embassy is listed below.

And there appears a considerable listing of material, and this is the general subject upon which General Willoughby testified early in the hearing yesterday.

Some indication of the accuracy of his information is contained in paragraphs 18 through 22, dealing with the Russian-German relations prior to the German attack on Russia on June 22, 1941.

Will you please read to the committee the messages relating to these negotiations?

Mr. OWENS (reading):

In March 1941, he was told by Ambassador Ott—

Mr. TAVENNER. When you say "he," you are referring to Sorge?

Mr. OWENS. Richard Sorge, yes. [Continuing reading:]

He was told by Ambassador Ott that Foreign Minister Matsuoka's trip to Europe was being made at Hitler's invitation, and that Matsuoka was authorized by the Japanese Government to give Germany certain informal guaranties.

That is the basis of one message.

In the beginning of 1941, he learned from Ambassador Ott and a special German envoy sent to Japan that the envoy's mission was to find out whether or not there was any possibility of Japan's starting a war against the Soviet Union.

In the middle of April 1941, Ambassador Ott told him that he was surprised by the Japanese-Russian Neutrality Pact, because German circles had been expecting a crisis between Japan and Russia. Sorge was not surprised; he had already informed the Soviet Government by radio that one of the purposes of Matsuoka's trip to Europe was to conclude a pact with Russia.

On the occasion of Hess' flight to England in May 1941, he was told at the German Embassy that Hitler intended to make peace with England and to fight Russia, and that he had sent Hess to England as a last resort. Sorge judged that, in spite of the Russo-German Nonaggression Pact, a German attack on Russia was inevitable and even imminent.

About June 20, 1941, he was told by Military Attaché "Schohl," who was proceeding from Germany to his new post in Siam, that Germany would launch a full-scale attack on Russia about June 20; that the main effort would be directed against Moscow; and that from 170 to 190 divisions were concentrated on the border. Colonel Kretschmar informed him that 175 divisions were concentrated on the Russo-German frontier.

Mr. TAVENNER. Just a moment. Kretschmar was the German military attaché attached to the German Embassy in Tokyo?

Mr. OWENS. That is correct.

Mr. TAVENNER. Then, as a result of that information, Russia learned of the impending attack by Germany on June 22, 1941.

Does that complete the messages that appear at that point?

Mr. OWENS. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. General Willoughby, you referred in the course of your testimony yesterday to certain messages that were received or sent to Moscow through this Sorge ring. But, before asking you to comment upon that, I want to ask Mr. Owens to refer to page 47, where there appears an interesting message dealing with the Japanese and German policies before the war with the United States. Do you have it?

Mr. OWENS. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you please read it?

Mr. OWENS. It actually involves four messages. The one you had particular reference to is the last one.

Mr. TAVENNER. And I would like for you also to read the message which was referred to in the testimony of Yoshikawa, when he testified here a week or two ago, so that we have the whole picture as complete as possible before General Willoughby comments upon it.

Mr. OWENS. Yes, sir. [Reading:]

In June 1941, he (Sorge) learned from the members of the German Economic Mission to Japan, Wohl "Voss" and "Spinsler," that the upshot of the German-Japanese economic discussions was that Japan would receive munitions from Germany in return for rubber and petroleum and that the two countries would collaborate in the establishment of factories in Japan.

The next message:

In the beginning of July 1941 he (Sorge) was told by Ambassador Ott and Military Attaché Kretschmar that it had been decided at a conference before the throne that Japan would push forward her policy of expansion to the south, but that, at the same time, she would prepare to declare war on Russia when the opportunity presented itself.

The third message:

In July 1941, he (Sorge) learned from Ambassador Ott, from the military attaché, and others that the Japanese armed forces were saying that they

would enter the Russian war if and when Germany captured Moscow and Leningrad and reached the Volga; that the enthusiasm of the Japanese Army and people for a Russian war was waning; that Ott had had an unproductive conversation with Tojo because the latter was not interested in military problems in the north; and that Konoye had resigned and formed a third cabinet in order to oust Matsuoka and open the way for a new agreement with America.

The fourth message:

During July and August 1941, after receiving information concerning Japan's large-scale mobilization from Ambassador Ott and the military attaché, he came to the conclusion that there would be no war against Russia that year. His reasoning was as follows: At the end of the mobilization, approximately 30 divisions were concentrated in Manchuria. This corresponds to only one-third of the newly mobilized forces. The divisions were sent out after August 15, which means that it is too late to start a war before winter. Therefore, Japan will not fight Russia but will challenge America and England in the south.

Now, the message you have reference to, that Mr. Yoshikawa testified about, was a radio sent in the beginning of October 1941, classified "State secret." Do you desire me to read that at this time?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes, if you will read it again. .

Mr. OWENS (reading):

The American-Japanese talks have entered upon their final stage. In Konoye's opinion they will end successfully if Japan decreases her forces in China and French Indochina and gives up her plan of building eight naval and air bases in French Indochina. If America refuses to compromise by the middle of October, Japan will attack America, the Malay countries, Singapore, and Sumatra. She will not attack Borneo, because it is within reach of Singapore and Manila. However, there will be war only if the talks break down, and there is no doubt that Japan is doing her best to bring them to a successful conclusion even at the expense of her German ally.

That was the message that Mr. Yoshikawa testified about.

Mr. TAVENNER. General Willoughby, will you care to comment upon the action of the Sorge ring and the transmission of these messages to Moscow?

Mr. WALTER. Before you go into that, may I ask the General a question, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Walter.

Mr. WALTER. General, as a result of your very careful consideration of these messages, are you of the opinion that when the attack came at Pearl Harbor it came as a result of a complete understanding between Germany, Italy, and Japan?

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. CHARLES ANDREW WILLOUGHBY— Resumed

General WILLOUGHBY. That is a very difficult question, Mr. Walter. The relationship with Italy and Germany at that time was initially directed against the Third Communist International. It was a Comintern political understanding rather than a military one, if I interpret this series of messages correctly.

The fact, however, remained that at some time during the summer, under the phraseology of these messages, the Japanese Foreign Office veered away from an open military attack against Russia. And again referring to the trend of these messages over several months, you cannot take a single one and conclusively select it. You have to follow the trend of all of them.

The trend shows that an attack via Siberia was contemplated, and certain military divisions were made ready for it.

Then public and official military opinion changed, possibly in August, and the trend toward a movement in the south became progressively apparent. When I say "progressively apparent," Sorge of course did not have any split-second service of information. He had to rely on Ozaki, who was his leg man, into the Japanese foreign office, to keep him advised. And I notice that there are time lags of 2 to 3 weeks, even. So we may assume, then, that Sorge's mission was to determine in broad terms: Are the Russians, are the Japanese, utilizing the Manchurian or Kwantung army to attack Siberia, or is the military power of Japan going to be shifted south? That is the strategic question, and that is the one that affects us immediately.

Once decided that the Japanese would move south in the direction of Indochina, Malaya, and so forth, a collision with the United States and England, of course, became inevitable. And had we known this in August or September or October, it is of course historically demonstrable that that would have been in the nature of advance warning of the war; not advance warning toward a specific date of a specific month, but the general feeling that there is going to be a collision between the Japanese Empire and ourselves.

(Representative Harold H. Velde entered the hearing room at this point.)

And it is that report or the series of reports that are reflected in this message exchange, that brought this question forward and solved it; namely, as late as October 15, Sorge positively relayed to Moscow a general statement that "it is decided to move south, and all military preparations of the Japanese Empire are to that effect for that purpose and that intent."

Now, I take advantage of Mr. Velde's entry now in an amicable point of correction. Mr. Velde's question yesterday was practically the same as yours, Mr. Walter, this morning, except that he put it in terms of Pearl Harbor. Well, Pearl Harbor is a fixed date in a fixed month. And that does not appear in the Sorge message, and it is comparatively unimportant that it did not appear. The important thing is: Is the trend of Japanese military operations in the summer of 1941 directed to the south, meaning toward collision with the United States and England, or is it directed toward the north, in other words toward Russia? That was so important to the Russians, and inferentially would have been so important to us had we known it, that the Russians did not dare to remove the divisions then stationed in Siberia and transfer them to the west front, where they were badly needed, until Sorge furnished that assurance. That is the historical interpretation on a broad basis rather than a specific-date basis.

I am not sure, Mr. Walter, if that is a satisfactory answer.

Mr. WALTER. Yes, that is exactly what I wanted.

General WILLOUGHBY. Historically we can say, without reference to December 7 or December 12, a specific date, that if we had that information in September or October that the Japanese decision was to move south, I think it would have constituted an enormous political, economic, and military warning, in which we might have gone on an alert basis or at any rate we might have been perhaps better prepared to meet the attack on the date it actually took place.

Mr. VELDE. General, where were you stationed at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor?

General WILLOUGHBY. I was stationed in Manila, in the same job that I have been holding for the last 13 years, namely, MacArthur's intelligence officer. So, of course, this type of information was of vital importance to us. We were the outpost of America, and we were seeking desperately every clue, every nuance of public or other repertorial opinion, in order to determine how close this menace would come. And therefore it is an acute perception in these particular months of the year or period of the year 1941 that I am talking about.

Mr. VELDE. But you had no idea at that time that Japan would attack Pearl Harbor?

General WILLOUGHBY. This cannot be answered by a clear-cut "yes" or "no." We had assayed, appraised, examined the position of Japan and their potential, and we knew that some movements had taken place on the Chinese mainland. But the final decisive report, like Sorge rendered to his master, Russia—he was not available to us, you see, in anything of that quality.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, to consider further Mr. Walter's question about the notice or knowledge that Italy and Germany may have had regarding the actual plans of attack on Pearl Harbor, I may say that that question was pretty thoroughly examined, and considerable evidence introduced in regard to it, in the trial of Tojo and others, and the actual message is in existence between the Japanese foreign office and its ambassador in Italy, calling upon Mussolini for his consent and approval of war with the United States, although Pearl Harbor was not mentioned in any way in connection with the message. And the documents also show that as early as December 2, conversations between the Japanese Ambassador, Oshima, with Hitler, indicated knowledge of the general plan, but no mention of Pearl Harbor.

If the committee is interested, I am pretty certain I can get the exact judgment and finding of the international military tribunal on those matters.

General WILLOUGHBY. I think Mr. Tavenner's remarks are of great importance, since he was associated with the international military tribunal in Tokyo. His work there, his superior work there, is of course well known to me as a member of the Tokyo staff. He is probably as well informed on the factors which this international tribunal searched for, as any man available at this time.

Mr. WALTER. Of course, it was more than a mere coincidence that Italy was ready to declare war the moment the attack came. That is the point. In other words, they had committed themselves to make war on the United States in advance of the actual attack made by Japan. And that was merely the signal to Italy and Germany to declare war on the United States.

General WILLOUGHBY. May I ask Mr. Tavenner on this point: That came up in the tribunal. What was their decision, their verdict, on that point?

Mr. TAVENNER. I would not undertake, I believe, to state what the verdict was, without consulting the record. I am not certain that I understood the question exactly.

General WILLOUGHBY. While I am not familiar with the European situation, since I am fairly integrated in the Far East since 1938,

I would agree with you, Mr. Walter, that the military commitments between Italy and Germany on the spot, you see, called for military action together in the European theater of war, regardless of what the Japanese might or might not do in the Far East. Actually, the Japanese did not attack Russia. As you know, they sought instead a painful neutrality, letting us fight it out alone until 5 days before the end of the war.

Mr. TAVENNER. There is no doubt but what the terms of the tripartite pact between the three nations committed all three to join in military force in the event of a war with the United States.

General WILLOUGHBY. Of a universal war? I believe that is so.

Mr. WALTER. That is exactly the thing I was directing my attention to. So that no matter which one of the three powers made the attack anywhere in the world, the others were committed at the same moment to make an attack with joint forces.

Mr. TAVENNER. And by reason of the document which was discovered, as I mentioned a moment ago, Mussolini was questioned in advance to ascertain whether or not he would abide by the terms of the agreement in the event of such a war. And my recollection is that he gave unqualified approval.

Mr. VELDE. Again, you have had a lot of experience, of course, in the intelligence field. And as far as I know, the only definite information you have that Russia knew that Pearl Harbor was to be attacked was the message of October 15 between Sorge and the Russian Government.

General WILLOUGHBY. I dislike to correct a member of this committee, of course. The message does not mention Pearl Harbor.

Mr. VELDE. I realize it does not.

General WILLOUGHBY. The message mentions that a collision with America and England had become inevitable; their move south. Now, whether they would attack Manila first or Pearl Harbor first was still in the realm of the next 8 weeks after October 15.

Mr. VELDE. Well, the question I was going to ask you, General, was on the basis of your experience in the intelligence field, and it is in the nature of an opinion. Do you, in your own mind, feel that Russia knew that an attack on Pearl Harbor or any of our other possessions or Territories was imminent?

General WILLOUGHBY. I sympathize with your query, because Pearl Harbor was such a dramatic incident. But, after all, it was only one of many war actions. The collision would take place somewhere in the Pacific once the Japanese had decided to move south.

So I go back again to the broad historical interpretation of this message, which does not mention Pearl Harbor. And I stated then that it is unimportant that it did not mention Pearl Harbor. But it mentioned the fact that they were on a political international decision that would bring them into collision with the United States. And the first target, in our opinion, then, was the Philippines.

Mr. TAVENNER. General Willoughby, in answer to these various questions, have you completed your comment as to the messages?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Yoshikawa, in his testimony before this committee, made it plain that in his opinion and from his study of the records in the Sorge case and his knowledge of Japanese affairs, the

Sorge spy ring not only performed its duties as an espionage group but it also acted in, at least in one instance, a political way.

This appears, I believe, from Sorge's own confession or statement.

I do not know whether you are well enough acquainted with it on the spur of the moment to refer to it or comment on it. Suppose that I read it first, and then you may make such comment as you desire.

General WILLOUGHBY. You have your fingers on it in the document.

Mr. TAVENNER. I read from exhibit 39 a section of the Sorge confession or diary or statement, as it has been variously called, as follows. It is section E:

The political work of my group. 1. General remarks. I was strictly forbidden by Moscow to engage in any nonintelligence activity, that is, to undertake any propaganda or organized functions of a political nature.

This appears on page 24.

This ban meant that my group and I were not allowed to make the least attempt to exercise any political influence on any persons or group of persons. We obeyed it faithfully, with one exception, that we worked actively on other people to influence their opinions of Soviet national strength. It was utterly impossible not to violate a general restriction which made no special provision for such cases. If Ozaki and myself as advisers, political experts and experienced advisers, had endorsed the prevailing derogatory opinion and underestimation of Soviet strength, our positions would have been directly endangered. It was for this reason that our group took a special stand in connection with the evaluation of Soviet strength. In doing so, we did not engage in propaganda on behalf of the Soviet Union, but endeavored to teach various persons and classes of society to evaluate Soviet strength with due caution. We encouraged individuals and groups not to underestimate Russian strength and to strive for a peaceful solution of the pending Soviet-Japanese problems.

Ozaki, Voukelitch, and I maintained this attitude for a number of years. When the cry for war with the Soviet Union became urgent, in 1941, I sent an inquiry to Moscow, prompted by conversations with Ozaki, in which he expressed the belief that he could successfully exceed the limits mentioned above and influence members of his group in favor of a positive peace policy toward the Soviet Union. He was confident that if he took a strong stand against a Soviet-Japanese war in the Konoye group he could turn Japan's expansion policy south.

The inquiry was very general, outlining the possibilities of positive action by Ozaki, myself, and other members of the group. The reply was negative, not forbidding such activities outright but labeling them unnecessary.

I want you to look at that particularly, that the reply was of a negative character, not forbidding the action but labeling it as unnecessary.

With tension ever mounting over the outbreak of the Soviet-German war in 1941, I felt that it was within my authority not to interpret the reply as a clear-cut prohibition. I imported a wider and more discretionary meaning to the word "unnecessary," refusing to construe it as an explicit ban on our participation in such activities. Accordingly, I did not restrict Ozaki's positive maneuvers within the Konoye group, nor did I hesitate to work on the Germans, particularly in view of the fact that my attitude had remained unchanged over the past several years. The maneuvers that my group and I attempted were confined to the scope and the political problems described on the two preceding pages. Not one of our members exceeded this restriction, because to have done so would have been to endanger our original and principal mission. I would like to emphasize this point thoroughly. What we did was not propaganda by any means.

The foregoing instance, in which we sent an inquiry to Moscow and received a negative reply, was the only one in which I learned of maneuvers on Ozaki's part. As far as I know, he began to work on his friends actively after our discussions. The argument which he employed was briefly as follows:

"The Soviet Union has no intention whatsoever of fighting Japan, and even if Japan should invade Siberia would simply defend herself. It would be a short-sighted and mistaken view for Japan to attack Russia, since she cannot expect

to gain anything in eastern Siberia or to wrest any sizable political or economic benefits from such a war. The United States and Britain would very likely welcome such a Japanese embroilment with open arms and seize the opportunity to strike at the nation after her oil and iron reserves were depleted. Moreover, if Germany should succeed in defeating the Soviet Union, Siberia might fall into Japan's lap without her raising a finger. Should Japan aspire to further expansion elsewhere than in China, the southern area alone would be worth going into, for there Japan would find the critical resources so essential to her war-time economy, and there she would confront the true enemy blocking her bid for a place in the sun."

Ozaki worked in this way to ease the tension in 1941. Whether he attempted any other maneuvers, I do not know, but I am sure that like myself he must have disagreed at times with superficial evaluations of the Soviet strength and the prevailing tendency to underestimate the enemy. In conversation he doubtless pointed out the lesson learned at Nomenheim and emphasized Hitler's miscalculation concerning the Soviet-German war.

That is Sorge's own story, or at least as much of it as he would tell, regarding the political effort made by his group, and leading Japan to the south instead of to the north.

General WILLOUGHBY. I take it, Mr. Tavenner, you would like my professional off-the-cuff comment on the value of this maneuver, as he termed it, Ozaki's maneuver?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes.

General WILLOUGHBY. I think it is very clearly put that regardless of his instructions, he permitted his right-hand man, who had exceptional facilities and an exceptional position within the highest official quarters of the Japanese Government, namely, the Foreign Office—he permitted him, he encouraged him, to exercise whatever influence he could develop toward keeping Japan from attacking Russia, and to encourage them, conversely, to move south toward a collision with England and the United States. By so doing, and Ozaki felt he was successful in it or felt confident that he could accomplish it, they of course rendered Russia, in her war situation, a tremendously vital service. The mechanics used, as you remember—that has already been developed, I believe, or is available in the files—were the intimacy of Ozaki with the Prime Minister, Konoye, and his position as a consultant of the Cabinet.

Mr. TAVENNER. This statement by Sorge also shows that the Soviet Government was fully advised of the purpose and desire of Sorge and his associates to use such a political influence.

General WILLOUGHBY. Quite.

Mr. TAVENNER. Sorge's own statement also shows that the Soviet Government in its reply was not specific and was, by its very nature, would you say, an invitation to Sorge to proceed on his own responsibility?

General WILLOUGHBY. I would concur in your view, Mr. Counsel. A tacit encouragement is the term.

Mr. TAVENNER. Earlier in the course of the hearings, you have referred to the fact that an effort was made to place information concerning the Sorge ring in the Tojo trials before the international tribunal. Do you have any further statement you desire to make in regard to that?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, Mr. Tavenner. Your intimate acquaintance, of course, with the international tribunal is an introduction to this incident which I, at least, attach considerable importance to. It is practically proof of the commitment or involvement of the Soviet

Government in this spy mechanism, because they objected strenuously and seriously to having their case introduced into the international military tribunal in Tokyo.

Mr. WALTER. May I interrupt at that point, General?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes.

Mr. WALTER. Is that because this spy mechanism, as you described it, is the same sort of mechanism that the Soviet has introduced into other nations all over the world?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, indeed, Mr. Walter.

Mr. WALTER. Including our own?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. And they are reluctant or were reluctant at such a dramatic public session as the international tribunal, to have this story brought to public attention. It would embarrass them.

Mr. WALTER. In other words, these Trojan-horse tactics have been and are being employed wherever it is possible, and it has been possible to employ them?

General WILLOUGHBY. That is my affirmative belief, sir.

Mr. VELDE. General, in that connection, I think you had a little difficulty, too, in introducing this evidence or getting the evidence reported to Secretary of the Army Royall. I understand that Secretary Royall repudiated the statements contained in your report. Would you care to comment on that?

General WILLOUGHBY. With your permission, may I comment on it later? Because, at the moment, to assist the counsel, I was about to cover the story of the international tribunal. But I will be delighted to defer to your wishes, of course.

Mr. WOOD. The question will be held for the time being.

General WILLOUGHBY. We will return to it, Mr. Velde. I have a definite thought on the subject.

I invite your attention, Mr. Chairman, to what is our exhibit No. 17. And the title is "The Sorge Case Before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East"—about as public a setting as could conceivably be devised. And the reaction to our proposal, meaning the tribunal proposal, is very significant, in my opinion.

Mr. Cunningham, one of the lawyers on the defense panel, attempted to introduce the Sorge espionage case (see case file No. 38456). In a record of 13 pages, there is a picture of an argument between Mr. Cunningham and the Russian General Vasiliev, a member of the court, on question of evidence.

Mr. WALTER. When was that, General?

Mr. TAVENNER. It was in September 1947.

And may I make a correction? General Vasiliev was the Russian prosecutor; not a member of the court. He was not a judge on the tribunal.

General WILLOUGHBY. A pertinent correction, sir.

Vasiliev entered 15 separate objections in keeping Mr. Cunningham's material out of the record. The Russian evidently could not afford to get this material in evidence. Mr. Cunningham would have brought out that Sorge worked for the Soviet Government.

Of course, this Russian high-ranking official would react as he did. But the inferential significance of this maneuver is that they just couldn't afford to bring this story out in their connection, which this committee has already clarified, namely, Sorge working for the fourth

bureau of the Soviet Red army. So they squeaked or killed the attempt to introduce it.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Owens, will you examine part 15 of the Foreign Affairs Year Book of 1942, pages 185 to 208, where there appears the notes or confession by Sorge as reported in that document?

On pages 201 and 202, a reference is made by Sorge to forged passports. We have at various times in this committee, in fact on many occasions, had testimony relating to forged passports, and this committee has made every effort to discover the sources of these frauds and how they have been set up. I would like you to read what Sorge says about fraudulent passports.

Mr. OWENS Yes. [Reading:]

When I went to the Soviet Union via the United States from Japan in 1935, the Communist Party contact man in New York gave me a forged passport. I used it to go to Moscow and destroyed it in Holland on my return trip. I used a forged passport because I did not want my real passport to show that I had been in Soviet Russia. Prior to that, when returning to Moscow from Scandinavia, I had also used a forged Scandinavian passport. In neither of these cases did I forge the passport; contact men gave them to me. I do not know, therefore, whether or not there is a special section in the Comintern which makes forged passports.

I used my real passport twice to go to Moscow; once when I first went there from Germany in 1924, and once when I returned from China via Siberia in 1933.

The passport I received in the United States was not new. It was an old one that had belonged to someone, but it bore my picture and description. The nationality was given as Austrian and the name was long and outlandish; I have forgotten it now. An Austrian visa had been stamped on it, so all I had to do in Paris was to get Czechoslovakian, Polish, and Russian visas. I had to go through the regular procedure just like any other traveler; I was not given any special privileges when I went to apply for my entrance and exit visas at the Soviet consulate.

When I was buying a ticket at a steamship office preparatory to going to Europe with the forged passport, I found that I had forgotten the outlandish name on it and had to take it out of my pocket to refresh my memory.

When I was leaving New York I had a suit tailored, giving the tailor my real name, and on my return trip I went to the same tailor and gave him the name in the forged passport. The tailor remembered me and noted that my name was different, but he was not interested in the change and made the suit for me. People in the United States do not think it strange if the same man uses two different names.

In this respect, the British are rather strict and their passport inspection is thorough. It is said that England knows more about spies than any other nation in Europe, but I am not in a position to make a definite statement, because I have made no special study of the subject.

I shall give an illustration of how loosely everything is done in the United States. I did not pay my exit tax and forgot to get a stamped receipt when I went on board the ship for Europe. Just as the ship was about to sail, a customs officer found out about it, and it looked as though he were going to take me off the ship, but I slipped him \$50, and the matter was dropped at once. Things are very flexible in the United States.

Mr. TAVENNER. In other words, according to Sorge's own statement, there must exist in this country a fraudulent passport mill from which he would receive the necessary assistance to accomplish his purpose.

Mr. OWENS. It would appear so.

Mr. TAVENNER. Since you have now gone into the subject of Sorge's itinerary through the United States, I would like at this time to present the results of the interrogation as to other experiences which Sorge had in the United States. I believe, Mr. Chairman, it will

facilitate matters if I were to attempt to read these excerpts, rather than to do it through question-and-answer form to the witness.

We have taken from the exhibits produced by General Willoughby, or rather through General Willoughby, an interrogation of December 21, 1941, of Sorge.

Question: Continue from where you stopped yesterday to your description of your mission to Japan.

Answer: As I stated yesterday, I left Moscow and went to Berlin. On July 14 or 15 I departed from Berlin for Paris, where, as previously arranged, I registered at the Nena Hotel. On the following day a contact man called me at the hotel, told me that a certain Voukelitch was already living in Tokyo in a large apartment house, and told me the passwords I was to use when meeting him. I might add here that back in Berlin I had been notified that a man was already in Tokyo. Voukelitch was that man.

The contact man instructed me to register at the Lincoln Hotel, East Forty-second Street, New York City. I stayed 4 or 5 days in Paris, sailed from Southampton, France, around August 1, 1933, arrived in New York—

apparently he has the geography mixed a little—

in about 5 days, registered at the Lincoln Hotel, and saw a contact man, who instructed me to meet a certain employee of the Washington Post at the Chicago World's Fair.

I spent around 8 days in New York, around 3 days in Washington, D. C., and around 4 days in Chicago. I met the man from the Washington Post in Chicago at the fairgrounds on the shore of Lake Michigan and he informed me that a certain Japanese would soon return to Japan, and told me how to get in touch with him.

I would like to turn to the interrogation of Miyagi also taken from the exhibits produced here, in which this question was asked:

Question 10. The accused will describe the circumstances leading to his participation in espionage activities.

Answer. As I have told the police officer during his investigation, Yano and a Comintern agent, a Caucasian, whose nationality I did not know, came from San Francisco to Los Angeles to see me sometime around the end of 1932, told me to return to Tokyo, said that I would learn the nature of my work when I got there. They said I should be back in about a month. I left America in about September 1933, and arrived in Yokohama in about the end of October. Using the method in which I had been coached by Yano, I was able to contact Sorge around the end of November.

Then, continuing again with Sorge's statement:

In December 1933 I called at the office of the Japan Advertiser, and as instructed by the American contact man inserted an ad in the Japan Advertiser and the Pan Pacific, its weekly publication, to the effect that I was collecting Yukioi and books on art and wanted interested persons to reply to the Japan Advertiser. I ran the ad twice for several days in a row, called at the office of the Advertiser to pick up the replies, had Voukelitch arrange a meeting with our man, and finally met Miyagi at the Yuno Art Museum and brought him into the group.

General Willoughby, in the course of your investigation, did any knowledge come to your attention as to the identity of this person referred to as an employee of the Washington Post, who gave instructions to Sorge as to how he was to contact the Japanese in Japan?

General WILLOUGHBY. No, sir; it is one of those cases where there is reference in the files, in the records, to individuals whose identities, in spite of our efforts subsequently, were not identified by us—meaning Tokyo. It is one of those points of which we have been officially apprehensive, in the sense that there was at no time a desire to embarrass people who are associated with these agencies, these subversive

agencies, by accident or physical location. And we have leaned over backward, and I will continue to do so here within my limitations, to protect individuals whose appearance may have been accidental. When, however, the evidence is positive, then of course we made an effort to develop this clue or lead, in police language, further.

In general terms, I believe it is the sense of this committee, too, that that protective distinction is made wherever possible, and regardless of what the files really show. After all, the Shanghai police files are just that. They are not an arraignment. They are a series of reports that we have attempted to piece together. We found astonishing coincidences here and there. And in many cases we have drawn a blank. In that case we will give the individual the benefit of the doubt.

Mr. TAVENNER. But as to this matter, this is not a matter relating to the Shanghai police files. It is a matter that appears from Sorge's own confession or statement.

General WILLOUGHBY. Your point is well taken, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. WOOD. But at the same time, as I understand from your statement, General, you have been unable to so far obtain sufficient data on the identity of this individual.

General WILLOUGHBY. In this particular case, sir.

Mr. WOOD. Sufficient to venture a statement as to who he was.

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. General Willoughby, you were not present, but Mr. Yoshikawa testified before this committee several weeks ago that he had endeavored to ascertain from Sorge the identity of this individual but had been unsuccessful in doing so. So the matter had been brought directly to Sorge's attention, as to the identity.

Mr. WOOD. For what reason had he been unable to do so? Because Sorge refused to give him the information, or professed he did not know a man by that name?

Mr. TAVENNER. My recollection is that a police officer by the name of Ohashe obtained this information, and that the witness who appeared here directed him to go back and ascertain the identity of the individual. And as far as the witness was able to go, we must say he had been unable to get it. The record is not clear as to whether Sorge failed in his memory to identify the individual or whether he would not disclose his identity. The record is not clear on that. There is no record on that subject, and that is really what I mean to say.

Mr. OWENS, will you turn again to the Foreign Affairs Year Book of 1942, part 16, which contains the confession or statement of Max Klausen, who was Sorge's radio operator in Tokyo? The portion of Klausen's notes dealing with his first experiences in Shanghai?

Mr. WOOD. Before going into that, Mr. Counsel, I would like for the record to have it appear at this point that all facilities available to this committee have been utilized and exhausted to determine the identity of this person. And so far this committee has been unable to proceed further with it than the information here disclosed.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. OWENS, the portion of Klausen's notes dealing with his first experiences in Shanghai contains an interesting reference to an American citizen. Will you examine that and read it to the committee?

Mr. OWENS. Yes, sir. [Reading:]

* * * Around July 1929, as I was about to leave for Harbin, Miss Reh Bennett, whom I shall discuss later, arrived in town. I believe she came to Shanghai from the United States. Lehmann taught her how to encode and decipher messages, and after I returned from Harbin she gave me messages to be transmitted and I gave her incoming messages. She left Shanghai for Moscow via Dairen and Siberia around November. To the best of my knowledge, she was a member of the American Communist Party; I believe that she had been ordered by the party to proceed to Moscow and that she stopped at Shanghai to assist Lehmann. She was about 25 years old, about 5 feet 5 inches tall, of medium stature, and beautiful despite a large nose * * *.

Mr. TAVENNER. What was the name, please?

Mr. OWENS. Reh Bennett.

Mr. TAVENNER. A portion of Klausen's notes deals with the 6 weeks that he spent in Harbin in July of 1929 on a mission to set up a wireless set for the Harbin Intelligence group, headed by Gloemberg-Ott.

Will you relate to the committee what Max Klausen writes about his experiences in Harbin on this particular mission?

Mr. OWENS (reading):

Nothing in particular happened on the trip to Harbin. The water police merely inspected our passports before we landed in Dairen. Like any other traveler, I bought a second-class ticket, boarded a train for Changchun (the present Hsing-king), changed trains at Changchun carrying two suitcases containing spare suits and other necessities, and arrived in Harbin in the evening.

I registered at the Priston Hotel Moderne as directed by Benedict in a letter to Lehmann, met Benedict 2 days later, and took custody of the transmitter, which had been brought in by the diplomat. Soon thereafter, I moved to a lodging house near the broadcasting station.

Benedict introduced me to Gloemberg-Ott, who took me to his home, but, perhaps because his wife was a White Russian, refrained from discussing secret matters. Several days later, I accompanied Ott to a cafe operated by a White Russian and then, for the first time, he asked me to install the wireless set and gave me several hundred Harbin dollars so that I could buy parts for a receiver and defray incidental expenses.

He told me about Lilliestrom several days later. Lilliestrom was a big fat six footer about 50 years old. His house was a villa-type, two-story gray tile brick building with a large yard enclosed by a palisade. He went to work at the United States consulate from there.

Soviet-Chinese relations were rather tense at the time, with the result that the Chinese police were busily making secret inquiries into the affairs of White Russians and Russians living in China. Ott realized that the best way of escaping detection was to use the private home of the American vice consul, which was conveniently located, and that, needless to say, the easiest way of getting information was to gain Lilliestrom's confidence. I believe it was for these reasons that he won over Lilliestrom as a sympathizer.

After spending the first 2 weeks idly with Ott and Benedict in conferences and at eating places, I went to inspect Lilliestrom's home and decided to use two rooms (both were vacant; one was about an eight-mat room) on the second floor, one as a wireless operating room and the other as a technician's room. I bought an antenna and parts to transform a receiver into a short-wave set—

Mr. WALTER. Does the record show when that was, Mr. Owens?

Mr. OWENS. 1929 (continuing to read):

began installation operations, completed the work in about 2 weeks, tested the set with Wiesbaden for 2 days and delivered it to Ott * * *.

Mr. TAVENNER. You referred, in the reading of those notes, to Max Klausen having received direction from Lehmann. On yesterday, General Willoughby described the Lehmann group, which was active in the promotion of Communist purposes. I will ask you to look at

page 225 of the year book and see if at that point or at some other point it fixes Max Klausen as a member of the Lehmann group.

First of all, can you establish the fact that Max Klausen became a member of the Lehmann group?

Mr. OWENS. I believe that part of his notes here will establish that.

Mr. TAVENNER. All right. Will you read it, please?

Mr. OWENS (reading):

* * * As a full-fledged member of the spy ring after my return from Harbin—

relating to the trip which I just read—

I now became its wireless technician. I still received coded messages from Lehmann and Miss Bennett and transmitted them. In contrast to the typed code messages that Sorge gave me in Tokyo, the messages I received from Lehmann and Miss Bennett were always written out in longhand. I am inclined to believe that the latter method is more accurate.

For 2 or 3 months after my return from Harbin, I used Lehmann's transmitter, but during that period I built and began to use a new Armstrong set. All of Lehmann's messages were short, consisting at the most of not more than 50-word groups. Up to the time I left for Canton, he sent a total of about 2,000 groups.

Meanwhile, I also took care of photographing documents and smuggling out the film. I photographed Intelligence documents written in English or Chinese (they were typed and there were no photographs or maps) that Lehmann brought in from somewhere, working in my room with a Zeiss camera which they had previously given to me. It was postcard size (3 by 4 inches). I was able to take six documents in one roll of film. I delivered the photographs chiefly to Lehmann, but at times to Miss Bennett when so ordered by him. I suppose they sent them to Moscow through some connection.

Mr. TAVENNER. Now, continuing with Max Klausen's notes, he states that in April of 1935 he returned to Shanghai, where he remained until September. He states that he was called in to department 4, where, in the presence of Sorge, "the chief of the Far East Department informed me that I was to accompany Sorge to Tokyo, and that as of that day I was assigned to the Far East."

Klausen further states that prior to proceeding to Tokyo he was authorized to rest up at Khimki.

On page 253 of the Yearbook, there appears a paragraph dealing with an association in Khimki. Would you turn to that page and read the portion that deals with the association?

Mr. OWENS. Page 253 of the Yearbook contains the following statement by Klausen, after he has dealt with having gone to Khimki to rest prior to his leaving for Tokyo. [Reading:]

I might add that at Khimki, Charlie, an American Jew, was my next door neighbor. He lived there with his wife and two children. I understood that he had served as wireless operator for a Shanghai espionage group for about a year around 1934. He was around 40 years of age, stood around 5 foot 6, and had dark hair; his only distinguishing feature was a big nose. I heard that before going to Shanghai he had operated a fair-sized amateur radio station in the United States, through which he had tried to contact the Moscow wireless school, but that his efforts, for the most part, were failures. Because of the distance between Russia and the United States, I believe that information is conveyed via the Russian Embassy rather than through radio contact.

Charlie presented me with a green buckskin belt with four pouches attached. I took it with me to Japan and used it for hiding film when I went to Shanghai on liaison missions.

Both Weingart and my wife were friendly with Charlie and his wife. I do not know what became of them, since I left for Japan shortly thereafter, nor do I know the names of Charlie's comrades in the Shanghai espionage group.

I understood that Charlie taught foreigners at one of the branches of the wireless school, but the location of the school and the nationalities of the students were kept secret. * * *

Mr. TAVENNER. General Willoughby, do you have any comment to make upon this American identified only as "Charlie"?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, sir. This is an interesting case, though spotty evidence, in which a reference by one of Sorge's group fits into a collateral possibly supporting evidence in the Shanghai files. I present this merely as an incident in the technique of investigation. The conclusions are not necessarily final. But with this vague description and the coincidence of the year, the Shanghai files, in its abbreviated card index, have the following to say about Leon Minster, as follows:

Leon Minster, Russian Jew, born 1898 at Selidovo, District of Ekaterinoslav, became an American citizen in 1919. Holds passport No. 7152, of April 13, 1933, Washington, D. C.; home address: 167 Maple Street, Bridgeport, Conn., U. S. A. Arrived in Shanghai from America 17, 10, 1934, in the S. S. *General Pershing*. In November 1934 took over flat No. 6, Lorient, on a lease expiring in 1935. On December 4, 1934, rented a shop at No. 4 Voylon and started a business known as the Ellem Radio Equipment, which was established as a cover for the installation of a long-range radio transmitter. In March 1935, left for Yokohama to meet his wife, children, and his brother-in-law, Harry Kahan, who came from America in the S. S. *Empress of Canada*. They arrived in Shanghai on April 9th. Mrs. Bessie Minster is a sister of V. M. Molotov, Chairman of the People's Commissariat of the U. S. S. R. They have relatives, Robert Minster and his wife Emma, nee Kantor, who were connected with naval espionage in the United States in 1932 and were connected with Mr. and Mrs. Switz, concerned in Soviet espionage in France, in 1934. Minster left for Japan on May 21, 1935, in the S. S. *Shanghai Maru*. It is definitely known that Minster was connected with a foreign Communist known as Joseph Walden, who was arrested by the municipal police on May 5, 1934. The connection there is in Klausen's sworn statement, referring to this code name "Charlie."

I understood that he had served as wireless operator for a Shanghai espionage group for years around 1934. In Shanghai he had operated a fair-sized amateur radio station, and so forth, which fits the Ellem Radio Equipment Shop, which is set up and which the Shanghai police classifies as "no doubt established as a cover for the installation of a long-distance radio-transmitting station."

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, this is a convenient place for a break, if you have completed your answer, General.

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes; I have completed it.

I believe you have some collateral reference to Switz and to the Kantors on naval espionage in 1932; also, the Switz in Soviet espionage in France in 1934, in your own record.

Mr. WALTER. Where was this naval espionage in 1932?

General WILLOUGHBY. That I don't know, Mr. Walter. I felt that possibly the committee had better American references than I had in Tokyo.

I recall personally from reading the current newspaper at the time that this couple, Mr. and Mrs. Switz, were picked up in France in 1934, and we had some trouble in getting them out of there, and the naval espionage case centers around Robert Minster and his wife, Kantor. That is as far as I know.

The Shanghai police, of course, picks up that kind of juicy collateral information and records it. I presume it could be determined by further research.

Mr. TAVENNER. We have information on the subject, General Willoughby, but it is executive session testimony.

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, sir.

I am prepared to answer Mr. Velde's question, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. TAVENNER. Due to another appointment that we have here in just 10 or 12 minutes, I believe that we had better wait until this afternoon for that.

Mr. WOOD. We will stand in recess until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:05 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m. this same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Mr. WOOD. Are you ready to proceed?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. WOOD. Let the committee be in order.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. CHARLES ANDREW WILLOUGHBY— Resumed

Mr. TAVENNER. General Willoughby, during the course of your testimony you have brought out various facts relating to the association of Agnes Smedley with Sorge and other members of the Sorge ring. I think it would be well if I make as a part of the record of this hearing some of the actual interrogations of members of the ring with relation to Agnes Smedley's participation. Rather than burden you with the reading of it, I will refer to these items myself.

In the interrogation of Ozaki on March 5, 1942, we find the following:

Question. Now describe your relationship with Agnes Smedley.

That is, Ozaki's relationship with Agnes Smedley.

ANSWER. I began to pay occasional visits to the Zeitgeist Bookstore on Soochow Creek around the summer of 1929, became friendly with Mrs. Wiedemeyer, the manager of the store, and through her met Agnes Smedley around the end of 1929 or the beginning of 1930. Smedley, the Shanghai correspondent of the Frankfurter Zeitung and a well-known American writer, was contributing many articles to the American leftist magazine New Masses at that time. She also worked on behalf of the International Relief Society in Shanghai and devoted a great deal of time to the famous Noulens incident.

Through Mrs. Wiedemeyer, I met Smedley for the first time at her residence in the British Settlement, and at her request agreed to exchange information with her. At the time, we traded information mainly as newspaper reporters, but the fact that both of us inclined toward the left caused our conversations to tend in the direction of exposures of internal conditions in the Kuomintang. Not only did my relationship with Smedley continue after this, but it was she who brought about the establishment of my contact with Sorge.

QUESTION. Describe the circumstances surrounding your affiliation with Sorge's espionage ring.

ANSWER. A man named Kito, Ginichi, began to come to see me around October or November 1930. He was connected with the American Communist Party and had come to Shanghai from the United States via Annam to engage in espionage activities. Soon after I became acquainted with him, he urged me to meet an American newspaperman named Johnson, but I did not yet trust him completely and felt that it might be dangerous to do so. I thought that I could find out about Johnson from Agnes Smedley; so I got in touch with her and told her what had happened. She looked extremely grave and asked whether I had discussed the matter with anyone else, to which I replied that I had not. She then said that she had heard of him but warned me strongly against mentioning the subject to anyone else. Shortly thereafter I met her again, and she told me that Johnson was a fine man; said that she herself would introduce me to him. She took me to a certain Chinese restaurant on Nanking Road and there presented me to the foreigner. This man who called himself "Johnson" was Richard Sorge.

Sorge asked me at that meeting to give him (1) the data on the internal situation in China which I was able to gather as a Japanese newspaperman and (2) information on the local application of Japan's China policy, and I agreed to cooperate in his espionage activities by doing so. Since I had originally been approached by Kito, Ginichi, a member of the United States Communist Party, and since I had been introduced by Smedley, an internationally famous leftist writer, I guessed at once that Sorge was a functionary of the International Communist Party engaged in espionage activities. My reason for deciding to cooperate with him was that, as I have stated, I believed in communism and had decided to become active as a Communist; I felt that I would be doing something of real importance by assisting Sorge in espionage work on behalf of the Comintern. From then until I left Shanghai in February 1932, I got in touch with Sorge about once a month at Smedley's room in a suburban apartment on Tsing-An-Szu Road, at Chinese restaurants inside Shanghai proper, and elsewhere, to turn over information and offer suggestions.

While my first assignment was as indicated above, after the outbreak of the Manchurian incident in September 1931, I was directed to take up such problems as (1) Japan's present and future Manchurian policy; (2) the effects of Japan's Manchurian policy on her relations with the U. S. S. R., and (3) Japan's present and future China policy, and was asked for information and opinions concerning them. I prepared reports on them, but I have forgotten most of the details now.

QUESTION. Describe the composition of the Shanghai Sorge spy ring.

ANSWER. While in Shanghai, I was not in possession of detailed information concerning the nature of the group with which Sorge was operating. I knew, of course, that Smedley was working with him, but I was not clear as to whose position was the higher, although I conjectured, from the manner in which they talked to one another and from the nature of the reports which were made, that Sorge was the superior.

Smedley was the only foreigner in Sorge's group with whom I was acquainted, but I knew that he had Japanese confederates. * * *

Another interrogation of Ozaki, taken on July 21, 1942, is as follows:

QUESTION. What was your impression of Sorge?

That question, of course, was asked of Ozaki.

ANSWER. Smedley introduced him as a reporter, but I was rather dubious about that. At the outset, I was inclined to believe that he was a member of Smedley's circle and associated with the Red Relief Association—

General Willoughby, I believe you will have something to say about the Red Relief Association a little later in your testimony. [Continuing reading:]

but his connection with the investigation of the Hankow flood damage in 1931 caused me to think it possible that he held a position of considerable importance within the Comintern. I therefore assumed that he was either connected with the International Relief Society or one of the top men in the Comintern's Far East section. Judging from the fact that Smedley was extremely respectful to him, I gathered that he held a position of considerable importance in the Comintern.

Then on July 27, 1942, this question was asked Ozaki and answer given:

Question. Did you investigate and report to Sorge on the new American activity in China; that is to say, on new investments by Americans in Shanghai and America's steadily increasing role in China?

Answer. That is correct. I recall having investigated and reported on the matter. In 1930 or 1931, a group known as the Kemmerer Committee was endeavoring to put the Nationalist Government's maladministered finances on a solid footing, and the relationship between China and the United States was becoming increasingly intimate. I investigated the committee's activities with Smedley's help and, at times, that of members of minority groups in the Nationalist Government, and submitted information to Sorge which was quite reliable.

Continuing with the interrogation of Ozaki, we find the following answer to a question propounded on August 12, 1942. The question related to Ozaki's leftist activities involving Smedley after he himself had returned from Shanghai. This is the answer by the witness Ozaki:

In the late autumn of that year (1932), I received a message from Smedley in Shanghai which contained her Peking address and said that she wanted to meet me in Peking to discuss certain matters. On a previous occasion, Smedley had asked me to come to China and I had replied that I would be able to go during my vacation in late December. Of course, that was the reason for the above proposal to meet me in Peking. I sailed from Kobe around December 25 without notifying my employers, arrived at Peking on December 31, got a room at the Te-Kuo restaurant, and at once asked Smedley to come there. It developed that, in view of the vital importance now attached to the North China problem, she wanted to establish a Sino-Japanese intelligence agency to operate in and around North China. I had kept in touch with Kawai concerning my trip to Peking, and I proposed to Smedley that he be made the keyman in the group. Inasmuch as she knew him she agreed, and I took him to see her at her Peking residence, a little rented cottage within a Chinese home.

At this point I would like to leave the interrogation of Ozaki. At this point the statement is made that Kawai was previously known to Smedley, so I want to turn now to the interrogation of the defendant Kawai relating to the earlier experience. In an interrogation conducted on November 9, 1941, in answer to a question relating to the witness' participation in espionage activities, Kawai replied as follows:

During the latter part of October 1931 I was, as previously stated, receiving instructions and training as a Japanese intelligence agent under the direction of Chiang of the Chinese Communist Party, which meant that I was a frequent visitor at Chiang's home. One day Chiang told me that he had some important work for me to do, and shortly thereafter he introduced me at his home to Ozaki Hozumi, Shanghai correspondent of the Osaka Asahi, whom I knew by sight. It was then that I first learned that Ozaki and Chiang were on close terms. It struck me as strange when I heard Ozaki, in making arrangements for this important task, tell Chiang: "Chiang, you're not going."

On the following day, I met Ozaki in front of the post office on North Szechuan Road. A caucasian lady was waiting in an automobile, and Ozaki and I got in. We got out of the car directly in front of a restaurant featuring Canton-style food in the neighborhood of Nanking Road, the name of which, as I recall, was the Hsiang Hua Low, entered it, and found a tall foreigner waiting.

The gist of the conversation between the tall foreigner and myself, which was interpreted by Ozaki, was as follows:

First, he asked: "I want you to go to Manchuria from North China. Can you do it?"

I will omit several paragraphs which appear unimportant from the standpoint that we are addressing ourselves to. After agreeing to undertake the mission, Kawai says:

Concerning the foreign woman—when I contacted Funakoshi Hisao, my superior during my Shanghai days, at Tientsin around January 1934, I was told for the first time that her name was Smedley.

Then there was presented to the witness a photograph of Richard Sorge, and the question was asked:

Is this the unidentified caucasian man to whom you referred?

Answer. Yes, it is. He is the one to whom Ozaki referred as Robinson Crusoe during my Shanghai days.

Question. What do you know about the spy ring identified with Sorge and his group?

Answer: I have already stated that when embarking on these spy activities in collaboration with Ozaki Hozumi, I felt it strange that there was no connection with Chiang, the man in charge of the intelligence activities of the

Chinese Communist Party. Later on, after being introduced by Ozaki to the Causasians Sorge and Smedley, and after working with Smedley and a Chinese in North China, I gradually realized that we were working for the International Communist Party (Comintern). Since I had already accepted communism, and since I supported the Comintern and believed in the desirability of an international Communist society, I approved of the spy organization and continued my activities in its behalf.

That is the testimony showing the connection between Kawai and Agnes Smedley prior to 1932.

Now, continuing with the testimony of Ozaki at the place I departed from the text, we continue:

We asked for the names of some persons whom he could trust absolutely, and he listed two or three, among them Kawamura, whom I knew and endorsed. I recall that I approved the others with the remark, "If you have absolute confidence in them, they are all right with me," and asked him to arrange to get all of them together without delay.

Parenthetically, I should explain that this was a conference between Smedley, Ozaki, and Kawai. [Continuing reading:]

Smedley asked me to stay until the organization was completed, but I declined on the ground that I had not told my employers about the trip and, therefore, did not have the time. On January 3 I left Tientsin for Japan.

I learned from Kawai in the summer of 1933, when he paid me another visit at my home in Inanomura, that he had rounded up two or three persons, including Kawamura, parted with Smedley, and engaged in espionage activities both in North China and in Manchuria. His reports had been submitted through a Chinese contact man, but he had lost touch with him in April or June of that year and was completely unable to resume the contact, with the result that their activities had come to a standstill and he had come to ask me to do something about it. At the time, however, my correspondence with Smedley had been cut off completely because, as was revealed later, she had gone to convalesce at a sanitarium in the Odessa area of southern Russia.

Mr. VELDE. Mr. Chairman, at this point I would like to ask the general a question.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Velde.

Mr. VELDE. In view of the evidence that has been produced by you and sent to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, concerning the connections of Agnes Smedley with Soviet Russia, it is a little difficult for me to see why Secretary Royall would repudiate the statements made in your report, General. Can you explain that?

General WILLOUGHBY. Mr. Velde, in a public broadcast on February 21, 1949, I objected to what might be termed an inferential repudiation by the Secretary. It might be said that I had a grievance then, in 1949, but I feel differently today, in 1951. World events have moved so rapidly, this Red menace confronts all of us. I am reluctant to revive what might be termed interdepartmental wrangling, and I am prepared to absolve the Secretary with my pontifical blessing.

Mr. VELDE. I would like at this point in the record to read an article that was written by a former statesman, now a columnist, Harold L. Ickes. It is dated March 16, 1949, and captioned "Army tricks cover general's mistakes." He says:

The nonchalance with which a high-ranking, shoulder-shrugging Army officer can smear a private citizen is truly alarming. I refer, of course, to the report given out recently by Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, who is chief of G-2 on General MacArthur's staff in Tokyo. This report, handed out "inadvertently," to quote Kenneth Royall, Secretary of the Army, charged that "Agnes Smedley (a native-born American citizen) is a spy and agent of the Soviet Government," still "at large." No facts; no opportunity to be heard; no right to cross-examine witnesses on charges that came unexpectedly hurtling through the air

against a woman who denied them specifically and categorically and at once demanded a retraction. Secretary Royall, on the Meet the Press broadcast on February 25, when questioned about this Tokyo spy report, said that it was an "inadvertence." Except for this, he side-stepped questions relating to the incident. Was it an "inadvertence" in the sense that Miss Smedley was unjustly charged? If so, common decency, as well as official responsibility, would seem to call for an explanation and something by way of an apology. After all, neither a Secretary of the Army, nor a high-ranking Army officer, should be allowed to get away with what, as a matter of fact, is a cowardly act.

Do you feel that Mr. Ickes, or any of the others who wrote along similar lines, had any influence on Secretary Royall in making him retract the report that you made?

General WILLOUGHBY. Mr. Velde, while I was very anxious to make fraternal concessions to a former Secretary of the Army, I am by no means prepared to acquiesce silently in Mr. Ickes' classification of the work of Tokyo intelligence regarding Miss Smedley. In fact, while you have made perfect extracts in your quotation, may I be permitted to add another comment by this writer, referring to me, namely:

The nonchalance with which a high-ranking Army officer can smear a private citizen is truly alarming. * * *

No one who knows Miss Smedley would ever suspect that this courageous and intelligent American citizen has stooped to be so low as to be a spy for any country—even for her own, to which she is deeply attached.

I presume the attachment of Miss Smedley is made in comparison to my own of 41 years of service, not without honor. He continues:

And who is this gallant soldier—

referring to your witness—

wearing two stars, who, without producing a scintilla of evidence, charges an American woman with being "a spy and agent of the Soviet Government" * * *.

And so forth, and so forth.

This fine flowering of American journalism is a classical example of reportorial Communist labor. Indeed, as I look upon my research, I am appalled at the thought to turning out a piece every 24 hours. I think this effusion has been amply refuted by Miss Smedley herself—may she rest in peace—by leaving her ashes to Chu-Teh, commander in chief of the Chinese Communist army with which the United States is now engaged in war in North Korea, and having her ashes placed, in a ceremonial gathering of the highest Communist hierarchy, in a special shrine in Peiping, the heartland of Asiatic communism.

However, if Mr. Ickes raised a historical question as to "No one who knows Miss Smedley would ever suspect that this courageous and intelligent American citizen has stooped to be so low as to be a spy," I would like to cite to this committee a letter by Harold L. Ickes, then Secretary of the Interior, to Robert Morss Lovett, dated April 25, 1941, on the subject of the League of American Writers:

The league is generally regarded as a Communist subsidiary. Its policies, of course, always parallel those of the Communist Party.

That letter was signed by Harold L. Ickes, who apparently was aware at that time, April 25, 1941, that Smedley served on the staff of the International Union of Revolutionary Writers, the forerunner of the League of American Writers quoted in this inquiry by Mr. Lovett.

Mr. Ickes' memory evidently failed in the period 1941 to 1949; it lapsed, with which I am to some degree in sympathy in view of my own growing age.

Mr. TAVENNER. General Willoughby, I believe you testified before another congressional committee regarding certain documentation affecting Agnes Smedley.

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. I do not want to repeat any testimony that you have heretofore given, unless it is absolutely necessary in our hearing, but I believe in connection with that you prepared a separate documentation entitled "Smedley and Associates: 1918-48."

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. I have it before me, and it is rather long, it is 17 pages in length, and I am inclined to offer it as an exhibit rather than ask you to read it, and make it a part of the hearing record. I introduce it in evidence and ask that it be marked "Willoughby Exhibit No. 40."

Mr. WOOD. Is that for reference?

Mr. TAVENNER. No, sir, that is introduction in evidence, and to be made a part of the record.

Mr. WOOD. Very well. It is so ordered.

(The document above referred to, marked "Willoughby Exhibit No. 40," is as follows:)

WILLOUGHBY EXHIBIT No. 40
SMEDLEY AND ASSOCIATES: 1918-48

The Truth and Agnes Smedley

Smedley was not juridically charged with anything. No one suggested trial or prosecution. G-2 Tokyo merely reported Smedley's historical association with a Soviet espionage ring and filed proof. Testimony of living eyewitnesses was available. Collateral sources and court records were listed and officially filed in photostat copies. A bibliography appended to the original report was significantly or inadvertently omitted from the Army release; it would have convinced the average reader that ample, numerous documentary evidence was, in fact, available; it might even have convinced the Department of the Army Public Information Chief or made him pause in his bland but meaningless generalizations.

There is nothing in Smedley's career to justify or explain the Army's strange repudiation of one of its faithful henchmen. In simplest terms—if the public were really that naive—the argument boils down to whom to believe! On this fascinating theme, Plain Talk found it necessary to editorialize and Congressman Judd considered the editorial appropriate for full insert into the Congressional Record.

Under the circumstances, one can hardly ignore a revealing bit of character tendency which Agnes Smedley herself admits with disarming frankness:

"* * * It has been one of the greatest struggles in my life to learn to tell the truth. To tell something not quite true became almost an instinct. * * *

This trend, if congenital, is also one of the most useful attributes of the clandestine fraternity and will have to be acquired by the undercover operator or espionage agent, in order to survive; it explains, in part, Smedley's smooth integration into all sorts of international intrigues.

Chronological organization of facts in Smedley's career show that throughout her adult life, she has thrown in her lot with social and political revolutionaries.

There is no specific evidence of Smedley's membership in the American Communist Party and she repeatedly denied it; however, her own writings contradict her habitual denials of Communist affiliations, the customary protective screen expected to be used by an experienced political agitator.

The Sorge report and Smedley's protestations

Agnes Smedley has dedicated her life to the political and geographical advancement of communism in China. It is one of the vagaries of Americana that this woman, born in the heartland of the United States, in Missouri, should have cast her lot with Mongoloid-Panslavism in the remote and alien Far East. Her intellectual evolution is an interesting "case history" of the development of a party worker and fellow traveler.

Life, in its issue of January 15, 1948, has published a brilliant and incisive essay that is like a flashlight beam in a darkened room: "Portrait of an American Communist" (with the disarming party name of "Kelly"). Agnes Smedley's career is more dramatic, more significant and colorful than Kelly's. As regards her public protests, coupled with the threat of a personal libel suit against MacArthur's Chief of Intelligence, it was inevitable that a noisy and highly publicized attempt at defense would be made because the issues accentuate the sinister ramifications of American communism in the international field, already brilliantly exposed by congressional investigations, particularly the House Un-American Activities Committee inquiry into the Whittaker Chambers case.

The fanatical beliefs of Communist converts permit no moral obligation to the State where they were born nor a grateful recognition of the civic protection and advantages they enjoy. Their ability to secure professional legal services, on call, is an index of the high moral order of American civilization, but it is also a symptom of the cynical arrogance of these ideological renegades, who are ceaselessly busy, termite-like, in destroying the foundations of the very order to which they scurry for legal shelter when the storm begins.

In the case of Agnes Smedley, her attorney is a former Assistant Attorney General, O. John Rogge, whose connection with the Department of Justice was abruptly severed. It is highly suggestive that Rogge demanded an end to the New York grand jury investigations into Soviet espionage activities. It is equally significant that he promptly appeared as the attorney of Anna Louise Strong.

Agnes Smedley has been one of the most active workers for the Communist cause in China for the past twenty-odd years. In her third book, *China Fights Back*, the dedication is "to my beloved brothers and comrades, the heroic dead and the unconquerable living of the Eighth Route Army of China" (the Chinese Red Communist army). This partisan vein runs through all her Chinese reports, revealing her as definite propagandist for the Chinese Communist Party, then with headquarters at Yenan.

Press reports from the United States have hinted at a link between Whittaker Chambers and Soviet espionage in the Far East in furnishing agents for Japan in the Sorge period. It is noteworthy that Whittaker Chambers served on the 1932 staff of the International Union of Revolutionary Writers, on which Miss Smedley also served in 1933. The IURW was founded in Moscow, is Soviet dominated, and held its second conference in Kharkov, November 15, 1930.

Miss Smedley has also served on the staff of the League of American Writers, an offshoot of the International Union of Revolutionary Writers. This league is classified by the United States Attorney General as communistic, and is cited in the House record of the Seventy-ninth Congress.

The second report of the Joint Fact-Finding Committee for the fifty-sixth California Legislature, Sacramento, Calif., lists Miss Smedley as a member of the National Council of the League of American Writers, an affiliate of the IURW. This league was established at the First American Writers' Congress in New York; the committee reported on this congress thus (pp. 121-122):

"The committee is in possession of a photostatic copy of the proceedings of the First American Writers' Congress. The most naive spectator and quarter-witted participant of this first writers' congress could not have been deceived as to its Communist revolutionary character.

"A report by Moissaye J. Olgin, author of *Why Communism?* (one of the most inflammatory and revolutionary pieces of modern Communist literature in existence), was read to the congress. The report was on the First All-Union Congress of Soviet Writers, and glorified Karl Radek and Nikolai Bukharin, old Bolsheviks who were 'liquidated' by Stalin's purge in 1937-38."

The league is repeatedly cited as a Communist front by the Special Committee on Un-American Activities.

"The League of American Writers is generally regarded as a Communist subsidiary. Its policies, of course, always parallel those of the Communist Party."

(State Department, quoted in a letter from Harold L. Ickes, Secretary of Interior, to Robert Morss Lovett, dated April 25, 1941.)

"The League of American Writers was founded under Communist auspices in 1935. The overt activities of the League of American Writers in the last 2 years leaves little doubt of its Communist control" (Attorney General Francis Biddle, Congressional Record, September 24, 1942, p. 7686).

As regards Smedley's association with Sorge, documentary evidence is available in the intelligence files of Tokyo in the form of authenticated extracts from official court proceedings against the three principals in the Sorge Ring. Their statements establish conclusively that Smedley was heavily implicated in the general activities of this ring. Numerous exhibits, in this series, have established these points ad infinitum et nauseam.

There is nothing vindictive in the Sorge report; it is an impartial recital listing court records, eyewitness testimony and related judicial evidence. Agnes Smedley is merely shown as caught in the web of a stupendous international intrigue, through her own choice or her own indiscretions. She cannot complain that her gown is spattered by the mud of her surroundings. She walked in the shadow of dangerous companions, in a milieu of her own choice.

A semichronological review of her life, her activities and associations should make this point crystal clear; it is not the story of an average, law-abiding American citizen, but that of a restless spirit, devoted to alien and subversive causes, roaming in far places in the service of predominantly foreign interests.

Agnes Smedley: Chronology and biography

1894: Born in northern Missouri, eldest of five children of Charles H. and Sarah (Rallis) Smedley. At an early age she moved to southern Colorado where her father was employed as an unskilled laborer and her mother kept boarders. She did not finish grade school and never attended high school.

1911: Student in the normal school at Tempe, Ariz., supporting herself by working as a waitress.

1912: Married an engineer, Ernest W. Brundin, on August 25. Subsequently divorced. In her early twenties she went to New York where she spent 4 years. Worked during the day and attended lectures at New York University at night. She became involved with a subversive, Indian nationalist group, Friends of Freedom for India, operating in violation of current United States laws. Smedley kept their correspondence, their codes and foreign addresses, a significant early trend.

1915: Attended summer school at the University of California.

1918: Smedley was arrested (March 18/19) with Salindranath Ghose, an Indian political agitator, on charges of acting as an agent of a foreign government and aiding and abetting such actions in violation of section 3, title 8 of the Espionage Act, and section 332 of the United States Criminal Code. She was released on bail May 7 and the case was never brought to trial. A significant facet of this case was the appearance of German funds, reaching Indian Nationalist groups. Smedley was aware of the nature of these funds. It must be recalled that in these critical war years the German General Staff was notoriously engaged in fomenting subversive political movements throughout the world to damage the allied war effort. Rebellions flared up from north Africa to India. German secret agents stirred up the Berbers, the Touaregs and Senussi, the Kurds and Afghans. Subversive, nationalistic movements were tailor-made for this purely military enterprise.

On June 11, parallel indictments were returned by Federal grand jury in San Francisco against Salindranath Ghose, Tarak Nath Das, Kulin B. Bose, William Wotherspoon, Agnes Smedley, of New York, and Bluma Zalnink, accusing them of attempting to defraud President Wilson through representations that they were on an accredited mission from the Nationalist Party of India. Smedley was not brought to trial in this action either. Wrote her first short stories, *Cell Mates*.

1919: She sailed from New York on a Polish-American freighter as a stewardess. Smedley jumped ship in Danzig and went to Berlin.

1920: In Berlin, she joined Virendranath Chattopadhyaya, an international agitator, with whom she lived informally for 8 years. They were never married. She characterized him as the epitome of the secret Indian revolutionary movement and its most brilliant protagonist abroad. He eventually became a Communist Party member.

1921: Smedley visited Moscow in June and attended a meeting of Indian revolutionaries held at the Hotel Lux. In commenting on this trip, she admits membership in the delegation from Germany. In October, Smedley was re-

ported to be in Geneva, Switzerland, and information was received that she was paid the sum of 5,000 marks by the Soviet Legation there for traveling expenses. In the same month, she attended the Congress of Syndicalists at Dusseldorf. At this meeting she used among several aliases that of Mrs. Petroikos.

1923: Left Chattopadhyaya twice to rest in the Bavarian Alps and later became very ill. She sought the help of an alienist who gave her psychoanalytic treatments for 2 years. Smedley then taught an English seminar at the University of Berlin and also lectured on Indian history. She entered the University of Berlin to study for her Ph. D. but lack of scholastic background forced her to drop this project before the end of the first term. Smedley wrote two works on Indian history which were published in German historical journals. She also joined a group of Republican, Socialist, and Communist physicians who were trying to establish the first birth-control clinic in Berlin.

1927: Smedley spent a number of months in Denmark and Czechoslovakia where she wrote her first book, *Daughter of the Earth*.

1928: Broke off her informal liaison with Chattopadhyaya and went to France. She later returned to Germany where she was hired as a correspondent for the *Frankfurter Zeitung*. Smedley made her way to China, stopping in Moscow and then traveling across Siberia. It is pertinent to note that the Soviet master spy, Richard Sorge, also used an assignment as a *Frankfurter Zeitung* correspondent as a convenient cover for his espionage activities.

1929: Smedley arrived in Harbin and after spending 3 months in Manchuria entered China through Tientsin. She spent some months in Peiping, visited Nanking and then went to Shanghai. It was here that she began to frequent leftist and Communist groups.

(a) *Arrival in Shanghai*.—Miss Agnes Smedley, also known as Alice Bird and Mrs. Petroikos, arrived in Shanghai in May 1929 as a correspondent of the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, the official organ of the German Social Democratic Party. She had traveled from Berlin via Moscow, Harbin, Mukden, Tientsin, and Peiping on United States passport No. 1266 issued June 27, 1928, by the United States consulate in Berlin; she was known to possess an alternate German passport in addition. During her trip across the U. S. S. R. she stopped in Moscow in the period of the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern, held in Moscow in July and August 1928. Shanghai police report that Smedley was in the direct service of the far eastern bureau (FEB) of the Central Committee of the Third (Communist) International (Comintern), receiving orders directly from the central committee (ECCI) in Moscow but maintaining no direct connection with the local Soviet Communists in order to camouflage her activities.

(b) *Organizations*.—Agnes Smedley arrived in Shanghai when international Communist activities were becoming prominent again after the 1927 split between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists and the subsequent rupture in diplomatic relations between China and the U. S. S. R. had caused a breakdown of the Comintern structure. The Comintern already had organized the Pan Pacific Trade Union Secretariat (PPTUS) as its major organ for agitation and propaganda in China, and a variety of collateral subversive organizations received support from this Comintern agency. The Shanghai municipal police soon placed Smedley under surveillance, on the grounds of being affiliated with the Far Eastern Bureau and of having been charged by the Comintern with the establishment of Communist organizations among workers, an undertaking similar to that of the PPTUS. Smedley's connections with Chinese radical movements, however, were considered more direct than those of the foreign-run PPTUS. Police considered her to be a member of the All China Labor Federation (Union Syndicale Pan Chinoise), an ostensibly Chinese labor group which received considerable aid from the PPTUS and its parent body, the Shanghai branch of the Far Eastern Bureau.

Smedley was an active member of the Shanghai branch of the notorious Noulens Defense Committee, a world-wide Communist-front organization set up by International Red Aid (MOPR) specifically to free Paul and Gertrude Ruegg, more commonly known as Noulens, the leaders of the Shanghai FEB, tried and convicted for espionage. With Harold Isaacs, she was a member of the China League for Civil Rights, and of the local Friends of the U. S. S. R., a Communist-front group, directed by the Comintern through local agents. When the Anti-War Congress, another front for the Comintern's League Against Imperialism, sent a mission to Shanghai in 1933, Agnes Smedley was listed prominently as one of the local supporters. As an erstwhile member of the Hindustan Association of Berlin and of the Berlin Indian Revolutionary Society, Smedley con-

tinned to devote considerable attention to the independence movement in India, a political agitation in which the Comintern took great interest. She was known to have been in touch with anti-British Indians in Shanghai, on several occasions to have edited anti-British propaganda on behalf of the Shanghai branch of the Indian Youth League, and to have given considerable financial support to Indian revolutionary organizations.

(c) *Publications.*—Agnes Smedley came initially to the attention of the Shanghai authorities through an article published in the Frankfurter Zeitung regarding alleged gigantic preparations taken by the Shanghai Municipal Council for the suppression of anticipated Communist disturbances in August 1929. The article was reproduced in Izvestia on December 8, 1929. In addition to acting as correspondent for the Frankfurter Zeitung, Smedley contributed articles to the China Weekly Review, a Shanghai publication with intermittent leftist trends. An article under her own name entitled "Philippine Sketches" was published in the June 1930 issue of New Masses, definitive American Communist Party organ, and an anonymous article was ascribed to her entitled "London Behind the Hangman Chiang Kai-shek," which appeared in Rote Fahne (Red Flag), the organ of the German Communist Party September 5, 1931. In 1933 she appeared under her own name in International Literature, the foreign-language organ of the Comintern International Union of Revolutionary Writers, in an account of the Communist uprising in Kinsai. Her book, China's Red Army Marches, an account of the Communist "Long March," was banned both by Chinese and Shanghai authorities shortly after its publication in 1934 because of its violently anti-Kuomintang tone.

(d) *Associations.*—Agnes Smedley was an associate of Harold Isaacs, and C. Frank Glass, locally classified as a card-bearing Communist. Isaacs was for some time the editor of China Forum, an English-language Communist periodical first published in 1932. She was also in close contact with the German woman, Irene Wiedemeyer (Weitemeyer), a secret Comintern agent and distributor of Communist publications, who was involved in the Sorge espionage case. Edgar Snow and his wife, who wrote under the name of Nym Wales, were associated with Smedley both in Shanghai and later in Peiping, where the Snows edited the publication, Democracy. Shanghai police authorities knew that she was closely connected with the Soviet propagandist, Anna Louise Strong, writing articles for her Moscow Daily News, and with known and suspected Shanghai Communists, often visiting Tass, the Soviet news and propaganda agency at their Shanghai offices. Her secret association with Sorge is not specifically covered here, as it appears in the Tokyo records elsewhere. Her house became the rendezvous of Sorge's ring; it was here that Ozaki and Kawai were given espionage missions and their reports were, in turn, received. The Shanghai police were on her trail, though they never caught up with either Sorge or Smedley though they came pretty close, through the Noulens case, which led straight into the heart of the Far Eastern Bureau (FEB).

Smedley came to the more serious professional attention of the Shanghai Secret Service when an arrested Comintern agent, Joseph Walden, was found to be carrying a typewritten document listing several local persons who were shadowed by detectives of the settlements, evidently a protective warning list. Agnes Smedley's name led a column of 12.

1930: She visited the Philippines and Canton where she professed to be concerned at the plight of workers in the silk industry. She was arrested in Canton at the insistence of the British secret police under a charge of traveling on a false passport and being a representative of the Communist International. Apparently she was released after protests were made by the German consul. Back in Shanghai, Smedley was introduced to Ozaki Hozumi, protagonist of the Sorge Spy Ring, by Irene Wiedemeyer (Weitemeyer), owner of the Zeitgeist Bookshop, a Communist front and mail drop for Comintern spies. At Smedley's request, Ozaki agreed to supply her with information. Later she became associated with Richard Sorge when he arrived in China and introduced him to Ozaki. Smedley became a member of the Soviet spy ring headed by Richard Sorge and became one of his principal and most trusted assistants. Her house was often used as a rendezvous for Sorge's agents.

1931: Active in aiding labor representatives in trouble with the Shanghai police. In this period the Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury branded her a "bolshhevik" and other publications openly charged that she was in league with the U. S. S. R. Local comments, based on intimate observations on the spot, are significant. The police records were simply confirmatory. She left the Frankfurter Zeitung, allegedly at the request of the British and other foreign interests

in China. She was introduced by Ozaki to Kawai Teikichi and Smedley persuaded him to become a member of the Shanghai spy ring. She joined the Noulens Defense Committee which was organized in behalf of Paul and Gertrude Ruegg (alias Noulens) who were jailed by Chinese authorities for espionage activities, and tried and convicted as bona fide Comintern agents. Associated with Smedley on the committee was Harold Isaacs, as well as many other prominent leftists.

Conversely, the leading agitators in the movement were under orders of Moscow. The frantic efforts in behalf of the Noulens were, of course, inspired by and with the intervention of International Red Aid, the Soviet agency for the assistance of secret operators in trouble. What looked like a humanitarian gesture by the foreign colony in Shanghai was a brazen rescue scheme ordered by the Comintern. In this period she also published an article on the Communist uprising in Kiangsi in International Literature, organ of the Comintern's International Union of Revolutionary Writers.

Even had Smedley not been professionally trained or skilled as an agent or associate of agents, her experiences in Shanghai with the police would have made her especially cautious in covering her tracks. Following is a digest of some of her experiences in this connection:

"* * * I had been arrested by the Chinese police of Canton, acting upon a secret official document sent them by the British police of Shanghai: the document had charged that I was a Russian Bolshevik, traveling on a false American passport. When the German consul general intervened, the chief of police showed him the document from Shanghai. The American consul general also saw it, but equivocated when I asked about it. * * * For weeks I lived under house arrest, with armed gendarmes wandering in and out of my apartment at will. If I went out, they followed. * * * This Canton Incident was really the setting of Woodhead's attack on me. * * *

1932: Smedley and Isaacs with a group of leftist sympathizers were members of the first League of Civil Rights in Shanghai. This organization seems to have been a failure. Smedley also became a member of the Society of Friends of the U. S. S. R., Shanghai Branch, whose roster included such Comintern agents as Irene Wiedemeyer. Smedley also became very friendly with a British Communist, C. Frank Glass, a suspected Comintern agent. With the aid of Ozaki, Smedley set up a spy ring in Peiping and Tientsin and put Kawai Teikichi in charge. This northern espionage organization operated until June 1933. She also enrolled Funakoshi Hisao and met Nozawa Fusaji in the Shanghai ring.

1933: In failing health, she went to the Soviet Union, where she was at the Workers' Rest Center at Kislovodsk, in the Caucasus, a concession not usually granted to foreigners. She mentions close associations with Soviet and American Communists. It was here that she wrote her book *China's Red Army Marches*. It seems unlikely that she could have ever gotten the manuscript out of the country if it had not had official Soviet approval. Her previous books had been translated into Russian and were widely circulated. Smedley remained in the U. S. S. R. for 11 months. She again met Chattopadhyaya in Leningrad, where he was connected with the Communist Academy of Sciences. At this time, Smedley served on the staff of the International Union of Revolutionary Writers, which had been founded some years earlier in Moscow. Whittaker Chambers had been on the organization's staff in 1933.

1934: Traveled through Central Europe and France and then returned to New York, where she unsuccessfully sought a correspondent's berth with an American publication. After visiting her family in the United States, she sailed for China. Her ship, the *President Cleveland*, stopped for a day (October 19) at Yokohama. She called on Ozaki at the Tokyo Asahi newspaper offices. He took her to see the Imperial Museum and dined with her. This was the period of Sorge's active operations in Tokyo.

1935: Smedley was back in Shanghai. Her name appeared on a list of 12 persons under Shanghai police surveillance. Amongst other incriminatory documents, the list was found in the possession of Joseph Walden (alias Maxim Rivosh), who was later sentenced to 15 years in prison for subversive activities.

1936: In the fall, Smedley went to Sian, and was there when Chiang Kai-shek was kidnaped. Apparently it was here that she made arrangements for her later trip through Chinese Communist territory.

1937: In August, she went to the Chinese Communist capital, Yenan, where she rapidly gained the confidence of top Red army leaders. Thereafter, Smedley gives every personal, intellectual, and literary evidence of supporting their

cause without reservation. She then went through Sanyuan to Sian, where she was treated for a back injury. In October she was in Taiyuan, where she met Chou En-lai. By late October Smedley was with the mobile headquarters of the Communist Eighth Route Army. It was there that she became friendly with Communist army leaders, Chu Teh and Peng Teh-hwei. She spent early November with units of Lin Pao's First Front Army of the "workers' and peasants' Red army from Kiangsi," a unit of the Eighth Route Army. Later in the month Smedley returned to Chinese Communist headquarters. At the end of November she was in Pingyanfu with fighting units. After another stay at Communist headquarters, she started back to Hankow just after the end of the year.

1938: During the early part of the year Smedley was in Tungkwan. Then at the request of Mao Tze-tung, head of the Chinese Communist Party, she went to Hankow to continue her work for the Communist cause. Here she did publicity for the Chinese Red Cross, lectured and wrote urging support for the Communist armies. She left the city before it fell to the Japanese (October 25) and started toward Chungking.

1939: Smedley visited units of the Communist New Fourth Army and made her way through Central China with various Communist guerrilla groups. She also visited certain Central Government units and finally rejoined the Communist irregulars in Hupeh Province toward the end of the year.

1940: In June she made her way to Chungking, where she lectured and worked for increased medical aid for the Communists.

1941: Flew to Hongkong, where she was treated for chronic illness and continued active in collaboration with leftist and Communist elements. She returned to the United States in midsummer.

1943: Smedley spent considerable time at Yaddo, Saratoga Springs, N. Y., a retreat for artists and writers. She left to lecture at Skidmore College.

1944: Smedley was working on a play about China and had in mind a revolutionary novel on the same subject.

1945-47: Lectured and wrote for periodicals, many of which were leftist. During this period she became active in the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, a Communist-front organization. Smedley became a member of the National Council of the League of American Writers, an affiliate of the International Union of Revolutionary Writers. The league has been branded a Communist-front organization by the congressional Committee on Un-American Activities and by the Attorney General's office.

1948: Moved to Palisades, N. Y. She published articles on China in the leftist New York Star. Smedley was one of the supporters of the National Writers-for-Wallace Committee formed under the auspices of the National Council of Arts, Sciences and Professions. Smedley also published an article in *The Protestant*, which is listed by the House Committee on Un-American Activities as a Communist-dominated publication.

1949: Embroiled in a controversy with the Chief, Military Intelligence, Far East Command, Tokyo, over release (by Washington) of a report, dated December 15, 1947, "The Sorge Espionage Case," she threatened to sue for libel, aiming at General MacArthur instead of General Willoughby, who was the responsible head of the department that compiled and prepared the report. Having gained the maximum amount of publicity from tying her name with that of the famous wartime commander, Smedley lapsed into discreet silence and made no motion to pursue her suit which would have brought to light the voluminous records of this case.

The Communist press, the world over, took up the case of Agnes Smedley. Her protest against the Army release appeared in the *China Digest*, March 1949, a mouthpiece for Chinese communism, published in Hongkong. At a distance of 10,000 miles, another Communist-front magazine, the *Far East Spotlight*, published in New York City, took up her cause on practically the same date. This perfect timing over vast geographical distances is an impressive example of split-second coordination of international communism. The propaganda efforts of the vacillating western democracies can hardly match this deadly precision. Inferentially, the solidarity of the Communist front in defense of Smedley speaks for itself.

Smedley's Red and pink associations

Not even a casual reader of Smedley's writings could fail to notice that she carefully omits reference to all of her Communist, fellow-traveling, and/or leftist associates whose work might be damaged by such publicity. Smedley did not.

fully realize, however, despite her overt and covert attempts to protect her friends and associates, that the "Red net" in China was closely observed and the actions of many of its agents recorded by a number of intelligence, police, and other agencies, particularly the special branch of the Shanghai municipal police; that such tracks as she did not cover furnished interesting leads into the maze of Communist operations in China which fit neatly into an unmistakable pattern. The following list of Smedley's associates can hardly be explained away on the basis of purely journalistic contacts. For convenience, names are grouped chronologically according to the approximate period during which Smedley was associated, in varying degrees.

1920-28, Virendranath Chattopadhyaya: Indian revolutionary and one of the founders of the League Against Imperialism, a Communist organization. Smedley herself leaves no doubt about the personal quality of their relationship.

1929-31, Max Klausen: Active member of the Sorge spy organizations both in Japan and China.

1930, Richard Sorge: Communist master spy who headed an intricate espionage organization in China and later operated an immensely successful spy ring in Japan. Smedley worked as an active member of his organization in China.

Ozaki Hozumi: Sorge's principal assistant and source of much information both in China and Japan. In Shanghai, Ozaki often reported to Smedley rather than Sorge.

1930-36, Lu Hsun: Leftist writer, called "Gorky of China."

1930, Mao Tun: Leftist writer, pupil of Lu Hsun. Jou Shih, pupil of Lu Hsun, executed as a Communist.

1931, Willi Muenzenberg: German Communist leader who organized the Noulens Defense Committee.

Harold Isaacs: Publisher of the China Forum in Shanghai. He was associated with Smedley on the Noulens Defense Committee and the Society of Friends of the U. S. S. R.

C. Frank Glass: British Communist.

Irene Wiedemeyer (Weitemeyer): Prominent Comintern agent who was the proprietor of the Zeitgeist Bookshop, which sold Communist literature. She was also a member of the Noulens Defense Committee.

Paul and Gertrude Ruegg (alias Noulens): Two Comintern agents who were apprehended, tried, and imprisoned by the Chinese authorities. Noulens was an official in the Pan-Pacific Trade-Union Secretariat, then headed by Earl Browder, the American Communist.

Oswald Doenitz: A Comintern agent who was in Shanghai briefly after the arrest of the Rueggs.

Victor Franz Nauman: Who was associated with Comintern agent, Oswald Doenitz.

Mizuno Shige: Member of the Sorge spy ring in Shanghai.

Yamagami Masayoshi: Member of the Sorge spy ring in Shanghai.

Kawai Teikichi: Member of the Sorge spy ring in Shanghai, who was a frequent visitor to Smedley's home.

Funakoshi Hisao: Member of the Sorge spy ring in Shanghai briefly after the arrest of the Rueggs.

1932, Edmond Egon Kisch: Agent of the Third International and organizer of the Society of Friends of the U. S. S. R.

Henri Barbusse: A member of the Comintern and publisher of the Communist journals L'Humanité and Le Monde.

Rolf Andouard: An associate of Edmond Egon Kisch.

K. A. Seeborn: Member of the Society of Friends of the U. S. S. R., known to have been in close touch with Edmond Egon Kisch.

Victor Mussik: Czechoslovakian journalist, a close associate of Edmond Egon Kisch.

Harry Berger: alias Arthur Ewert, Arthur Ernst Ewert, Braun (Brown), George Keller, Ulrich Dach and Arthur Korner, an important agent for the Third International in the Far East.

1933-34, Rudolf Herman Richard Konig: Associate of Paul Eugene Walsh (Engene Dennis). He acted as liaison agent for the Comintern Shanghai.

Fred Ellis: Staff artist for the Soviet newspaper Trud (Toil). He was also on the staff of the International Union of Revolutionary Writers with Smedley.

Harry Paxton Howard, alias Ivan Kuzlof, alias Frank Godwin: Communist reported to be an agent of the Third International.

Langston Hughes: American Communist and staff member of the International League of Revolutionary Writers.

Kawamura Yoshio: member of the spy group organized by Smedley and Ozaki Hozumi in Peiping.

Nozawa Fusaji: In contact with members of Richard Sorge's Shanghai spy group; was recruited by Funakoshi Hisao.

F. H. Schiff: Member of the Society of Friends of the U. S. S. R., and a close associate of Edmond Egon Kisch.

1933-38, Ting Ling: Communist writer.

1933, Chou Chien-ping: Commander of the Tenth Red Army Corps who lived for a time in Smedley's home in Shanghai.

1934-35, Leon Minster: Operator a radio-equipment business in Shanghai, cited in police records as a blind for a long-distance transmitting installation. His wife, Bessie, is the sister of Vyacheslav M. Molotov, Soviet Politburo member.

1937-38, Chu Teh: Commander in chief of the Chinese Communist forces.

Mao Tze-tung: Secretary general of the Chinese Communist Party.

Peng Teh-hwei: Commander of the Front Red armies.

Chou En-lai: Vice chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council and chief representative of the Chinese Communist Party in the United Front negotiations with the Chinese Government.

Jen Peh-si: Political commissar of the Eighth Communist Route Army.

Ting Hsiao-ping: Assistant to Jen Peh-si.

Kwang Keh-chin: Wife of Chu Teh and political worker with the Eighth Route Army.

Lin Piao: Commander of the First Division, Eighth Communist Route Army.

Nieh Jung-chen: Political director of Lin Piao's division.

Ho Lung: Commander of the Second Red Army Corps.

Liu Peh-cheng: Commander of the One Hundred Twenty-ninth Division of the Eighth Route Army.

Hsiao Keh: Political director of Second Red Army Corps.

Tso Chuan: Commander of the First Red Army Corps.

Chen Ken: Commander in Eighth Communist Route Army.

Chou Ping: Leader of the Communist guerrilla unit.

Mr. WALTER. General Willoughby, when was the authentication of the Sorge story completed?

General WILLOUGHBY. Mr. Walter, do you refer to the authentication by a battery of competent American lawyers and other technical assistants?

Mr. WALTER. Yes.

General WILLOUGHBY. It was done after the period in which Smedley's suit for libel would at least, if unchallenged, throw doubt in the public mind on the quality of this testimony. It was done—Mr. Tavenner, can you help?

Mr. TAVENNER. Offhand I am not able to state the date.

General WILLOUGHBY. I think I can find the date. The date is available.

Mr. TAVENNER. I think it appeared in connection with your testimony when you read the statement by the lawyers.

General WILLOUGHBY. May 18, 1949. Consecutive exhibit No. 14 is the opinion of the Legal Section, Far East Command, opinion of the judge advocate general, Far East Command, and related matter, and I think the three gentlemen of the bar, my benevolent collaborators at the time in this same time period.

Mr. WALTER. When did the Ickes article appear that you just read?

General WILLOUGHBY. I can find that for you, sir, though I did not find it necessary, as a literary gem, to keep it in my library.

Mr. WALTER. I was wondering if it was before or after the authentication.

General WILLOUGHBY. I have a photo offset of it. I must have been considerably annoyed, because I certainly would not keep it now. March 16, 1949. That is one, the one entitled "Army Tricks Cover

General's Mistakes." Then there are others, "Old Curmudgeon Thinks MacArthur Should Be Sued," and "Some Brass in Rather Than on Army Heads."

Mr. TAVENNER. You mentioned all this criticism in your report to the staff?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, indeed.

Mr. WALTER. It sounds like some of it might have been said by some of your junior officers?

General WILLOUGHBY. Quite possibly; quite possibly.

Mr. TAVENNER. General Willoughby, the references to the Shanghai police cards referred to before are based on the Shanghai police records which are in the possession of the committee, and have been produced for identification as Willoughby exhibits 35 and 36. Will you assist us in the appraisal of these files and their relationship to the Sorge case, if you feel you have not already adequately covered the point?

General WILLOUGHBY. Being very anxious to assist this meritorious committee at all times, I might give you my notes under exhibit 34, which give you a glimpse of the genesis of the Shanghai files, as follows:

AMERICANS UNDER SURVEILLANCE IN SHANGHAI

Communist subversive activities in China drew the attention of Shanghai municipal police (British and French division) in 1916. Police raids over a 10-year period resulted in confiscation of tons of subversive literature and in the arrest of many Communist agents. Until 1926 these agents were principally Russian and Chinese with a smattering of German, Spanish, and French nationals involved.

In 1927 Americans entered the subversive picture. Earl Browder, Gerhard Eisler, James H. Dolsen, W. A. Haskell, M. Undjus, and a German woman, Irene Wiedemeyer, along with many others, arrived in Shanghai in the late 1920's to join the Soviet's Far Eastern Bureau (FEB) or the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat (PPTUS). The German woman, Irene Wiedemeyer, was closely associated with Smedley, Sorge, and Ozaki in the Zietgeist Bookstore operation, a mail drop and rendezvous of Sorge spy ring members, agents and leftist fellow travelers.

* * * * *

Here again, the pattern of Soviet Third International action is apparent. Working through trade unions, bureaus and other professional or labor-connected fronts, the Soviet wedge again drove smoothly into the economic and local government systems of the Chinese Nation. The objective, of course, was the ultimate destruction of the Chinese Nationalist Government. Far-sighted, insidious and viciously efficient, its success was evident in the Chinese debacle of 1949. Another nation and 500 million people entered the Soviet orbit.

This is the information contained in collateral reports known as the Shanghai municipal police file. For your information, Shanghai was an extraterritorial enclave which maintained its own police and had French and British police in the French and British municipalities. These were high official police officers, and I had made it a point of having interviewed the past high-ranking officials of that police where they were available, with the assistance of their governments, as, for example, the former chief of the British political section who is in Hongkong.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you give the committee the benefit of your compilation so far as we are prepared to make it public at this time?

General WILLOUGHBY. I am prepared to read selective points—though the full text is available to the committee—or salient points to show the international character of this apparatus or mechanism

or machinery that was working toward the downfall of the Chinese Nationalist Government, as a sample or pattern of how they operate elsewhere.

Mr. DOYLE. And when you say "elsewhere" do you include the United States?

General WILLOUGHBY. I include the United States, because we have already developed the presence of operatives then in Shanghai still in our midst—Earl Browder, Eugene Dennis, Gerhart Eisler, Jim Dolsen—in this interplay between the counsel and myself, where I furnished the oriental information and the committee had in its possession, to my pleasant surprise, some very specific collateral data.

Mr. WOOD. Proceed.

General WILLOUGHBY (reading):

Miscellaneous records of the British and French Shanghai municipal police in the early thirties, open up an astonishing vista on a fantastic array of Communist fronts, ancillary agencies, and the vast interlocking operations of the Third International in China. It is in this particular period that the groundwork was laid for the Communist successes of today.

* * * * *

The role of Shanghai, a veritable witch's caldron of international intrigue, a focal point of Communist effort, is already apparent in the records of the Sorge trial and collateral testimony. The Zeitgeist Bookshop, rendezvous of Sorge and Ozaki, and its astute owner, Miss Wiedemeyer, appear again, viewed from a different angle, recorded this time by a reputable international police body.

* * * * *

There is more to the Shanghai municipal police files than an inferential accusation against Smedley. We are dealing here with a conspiratorial epoch in the history of modern China. Shanghai was the vineyard of communism. Here were sown the dragon's teeth that ripened into the Red harvest of today, and the farm labor was done by men and women of many nationalities who had no personal stakes in China other than an inexplicable fanaticism for an alien cause, the Communist "Jehad" of pan-Slavism for the subjugation of the Western World.

The greater design of the Soviet conquest of the east is already clear in the confession of Sorge, Soviet master spy. It is again recognizable in the intricate pattern of the Third International apparatus. Shanghai was the focal point of sabotage and subversion, and to this mecca flocked the Communist operators of the world for training, for experimentation, for career investments.

In 1927 a conference was held in Hankow under the auspices of the Third International and attended by Tom Mann (Great Britain), Earl Browder (United States of America); Jacques Doriot (France), Roy (India), and a number of others. It was decided that Communist work in this part of the world would be conducted by the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat, of which Earl Browder was made secretary (or chief). He soon afterward became active in this work in which he was assisted by Katherine Harrison alias Alice Reed, considered by the police as a convenient "menage-a-deux." Earl Browder and his female assistant continued their work in the following year (1928) and spent most of their time in Shanghai. They were joined in August that year by one W. A. Haskell who also was assisted by a woman named Emerson, presumably his wife.

Time in its issue of April 25, 1949, features Eugene Dennis, the boss of the American Communists, now on trial.

The language, of course, is a year old. The trial is past.

There is no point in repeating this terse, well-written story of the growth and world itinerary of a Soviet agent; important, however, are certain connecting links with the Sorge espionage case.

Dennis who used to Francis X. Waldron, obtained a fraudulent passport as Paul Walsh and traveled via Europe, South Africa to China. The world-wide ramifications of the Third Comintern, with Shanghai as the far-eastern operating center, is reflected in the itinerary of this American disciple. Paul Eugene

Walsh, alias Paul or Milton, suddenly appears in the records of the Shanghai police; his police card states:

"* * * From December 1, 1933, until June 1934, he resided at Flat 6, Gresham Apartments, No. 1224 Avenue Joffre. On May 30, 1934, the lease of Flat 34D, Foncin Apartments No. 643 Route Frelupt, was transferred to his name from Harry Berger, with whom he was obviously on terms of good friendship. Walsh resided at the latter address from June 1, 1934, until October 9, 1934, when he secretly left Shanghai for Trieste on the steamship *Conte Verde*."

This is the important abbreviated statement by the police:

It has been established that Walsh was one of the master minds of the local machine of the Comintern and as such was responsible for the collation of many important documents relating to the propagation of Communist ideas in the Far East * * *.

I pause here to establish the link in this police investigation. Sorge mentioned the Comintern group in Shanghai. This we pick up as the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat since Noulens was arrested. Obviously this man Walsh, or Eugene Dennis, and his subsequent connection with Browder, establishes the strongest inference that he was associated with him then.

Further relationship between what we have established in the Sorge records is covered in paragraph 24. Incidentally, I took the title "The Shadowy Men With Changeable Names," from the report of April 24, 1949, on Walsh, which is a very good report, indeed (reading):

In 1930 a large host of agents of the Third International came to Shanghai and became associated with the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat, and another important organ of the Third International, called the Far Eastern Bureau. The new arrivals included Hilaire Noulens—

I invite your attention to that name, as it will appear later, N-o-u-l-e-n-s [continuing reading]:

(or Paul Ruegg), and Mrs. Noulens, of unknown nationality, A. E. Stewart, Margaret Undjus, and Judea Codkind, Americans, and Irene Wiedemeyer—

Wiedemeyer spells her name sometimes W-i-e-t—

who was German.

Smedley was an associate of Irene's. Weitmeyer (Wiedemeyer) operated the Zeiteist Bookshop in Shanghai, rendezvous of leftists and mail drop for espionage agents. Ozaki, Sorge's right-hand man, was introduced by Smedley in Weitmeyer's place.

I have already read Sorge's testimony and will not repeat it. [Continuing reading:]

The police card on Smedley states:

"* * * Agnes Smedley alias Bird and Mrs. Petroikos * * * Member of the following societies: Friends of the U. S. S. R.; Hindustan Association in Berlin; Berlin Indian Revolutionary Society; Noulens Defense Committee; All China Labor Federation and the China League for Civil Rights * * * In possession of two passports, German and American. Arrived in Shanghai in May 1929 from Berlin as the correspondent of the German newspaper *Frankfurter Zeitung*. She is in the service of the eastern branch of the central committee of the Communist International and is definitely known to have assisted local Indian seditionists on several occasions * * * her chief duties comprise the supervising of Communist organizations among workers, and that she receives orders direct from the central committee of the Communist International in Moscow. * * *"

The Shanghai police observed and recorded these furtive men and women, often without direct accusations. Such things are a matter of cumulative surveillance, but dossiers are never opened without some reason. Somehow, these names are tainted.

The case of Hilaire Noulens (known as) Paul Ruegg is both interesting and typical: The clandestine fraternity, working under the aegis of the Comintern, or the Soviet Army, could always count on a variety of front organizations to rally to their defense, if they got into trouble. The principal agency for this defense was The International Red Aid (hereafter referred to as MOPR, the initials of its Russian name), created in 1922, known as International Labor Defense in America. Inferentially, whenever the defense swung into action it was a foregone conclusion that the chief protagonists were under orders of the Comintern. To the gullible outsider, the defense action might look like a legitimate civil liberty agitation even with some sentimental appeal; however, to the cognoscenti it was just another Red front mobilizing pink lawyers, agents, and fellow travelers.

Noulens arrived in Shanghai in 1930 under cover of a stolen Belgian passport as Fred Vanderercruysen to head the far eastern bureau. Fifteen months later, he was arrested for Communist activities linked with a French Communist, Joseph Ducroux also known as Serge LeFranc, then operating in Singapore. During the trial (and conviction) the authorities learned of his importance in the Comintern apparatus. This group operated on a very considerable scale; they maintained 7 bank accounts, rented 15 houses or apartments, a veritable political rabbit warren; Ruegg-Noulens used at least 12 names in Shanghai and carried 1 Canadian and 2 Belgian passports, while his wife used 5 names and 2 Belgian passports.

Here again, the Time article furnishes an interesting clue to identities. In a subparagraph headed "The Little Kremlin" it says—

I thought it was so good that I included it.

"* * * All but the most secret Communist operations in the United States were and still are, directed from the ramshackle, nine-story loft building, on 35 East Twelfth Street, not far from Manhattan's Union Square. To its top-floor offices came the Communists' international 'reps,' the shadowy men with the changeable names like P. Green, G. Williams, A. Ewert, H. Berger * * * which in a wink of the eye might become Drabkin, B. Mikhailov, Braun, or Gerhart Eisler. These were Moscow's agents. From the ninth floor the word which they brought from Moscow was passed along to the faithful, to the party hacks on the Daily Worker and Yiddish-language Freiheit, to the cultivators of organized labor's vineyards, to men like Christoffel in Milwaukee. * * *

The interesting thing about Time's shadowy men with the changeable names like A. Ewert, H. Berger, A. Steinburg, and Gerhart Eisler, is that these same names and identities appear both in the Sorge records and the Shanghai police files. Their crooked paths meander on into the forties and into the United States—

As we shall shortly develop. [Continuing reading:]

Most of the old wheel horses of the Communist Party appear to have been operating in Shanghai, in one period or another, the professionals of the clandestine fraternity as well as the acolytes and dupes, who are flirting with the Red menace. And somewhere in the bistros of the French concession, in the furtive rendezvous of the Shanghai conspirators, you can hear the metallic tinkle of 30 pieces of silver.

I would like to pause here, Mr. Chairman, to make one point clear of mutual interest. The reference to the Shanghai name cards, as far as Tokyo was concerned, did not represent an arraignment, not even an indictment. There are in the list of these names—and of course we are not disclosing all of them—there are undoubtedly a number of people who were present by accidental association rather than by design, and, as stated in my introductory remarks at the beginning of this hearing, a constant effort has been made to protect innocent people and gullible people, and to distinguish between the joiners who might not have realized the character of the organization to which they belonged.

The quotations are not evaluations by G-2. They are the statements by this reputable investigative body.

Mr. WOOD. I gather from your statement that you make a distinction between a fool and a knave?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, indeed. It is not a very flattering distinction, but a protective one. [Continuing reading:]

The Comintern apparatus and Shanghai affiliates—

"Apparatus" is their own word. They seem to take pride in that pseudoscientific term. [Continuing reading:]

Other individuals, in variable degrees of implication with or commitment to the Communist movement, are covered elsewhere. All of them are understandable only in terms of their subservience to a foreign master; this relationship requires a background examination of the formidable world-wide machinery of the Comintern apparatus, Machiavellian tool of the imperialist expansion of the Soviets, who have made progress beyond the wildest dream of Czarist ambition. In fact, it may be factually stated that the Soviets have taken up where the Czars left off and made further and more significant strides.

Comintern headquarters: The Moscow headquarters of the Third (Communist) International (Comintern) during the 1930's paralleled the organizational structure of the Soviet Government. Led by a world congress of Soviet and foreign Communists, who met at intervals between 1919 and 1935, actual control of the Comintern fell to the U. S. S. R. through its leadership of the world Communist movement and a Comintern organizational ruling which gave the largest representation to the nation playing host to the Congress—in every case the Soviet Union. The executive functions of the Comintern were vested in the executive committee of the Communist international (ECCI), which advertised several foreign members but was actually controlled by its predominant Soviet representation. Like the world congress, the ECCI met periodically, primarily to determine general lines of policy, but final control of the Comintern rested in the praesidium, which was made up, among others, of a politburo, several standing Commissions, and a political secretariat—

In the interest of time I will become selective. The material is here. [Continuing reading:]

"The Comintern was the nondiplomatic foreign arm of the U. S. S. R. Organized at Moscow in 1919, the Comintern was, until its alleged dissolution in 1943, a quasi-governmental body aimed largely at fostering Communist and Communist-front groups in the capitalist world in order to carry out such Communist strategy as the Government of the U. S. S. R. considered essential to the promotion of world revolution or, as conditions required, the protection of the Soviet Union.

There are also a number of auxiliary organizations I invite your attention to:

Only a few of the Moscow auxiliary organizations are of immediate concern here, although all of them, numbering about 13, had variable interests in Shanghai, operating through an extraordinary variety of channels:

Profintern: The Red International of Labor (Profintern) was created in 1919 in order to counteract the influence of the International Federation of Labor Unions of the Second (Socialist) International. The Profintern consisted of a headquarters apparatus controlled by the praesidium and of affiliated sections which in most countries outside the U. S. S. R. took the form of Red trade-union oppositions. In the field, the Profintern organized international propaganda committees for work among specific trades. In addition, the Profintern sponsored the creation of parallel labor union federations of which the Pan Pacific Trade Union Secretariat (PPTUS) and the All China Labor Federation were important examples.

Krestintern: The Red peasants International (Krestintern) was founded in 1923 to break the resistance to communism of the peasantry in various countries. Although it enjoyed far less success than organizations devoted to the laborer and the intelligentsia, it directed local Communist groups which organized so-called peasants' unions including the Chinese Peasant League.

VOKS: The Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS) was established in Moscow in 1923 to promote Soviet culture abroad as an instrument of political propaganda. The cultural attaché of each Soviet

Embassy abroad was in direct charge of VOKS and, as such, was charged with liaison with the ECCI in Moscow and with the formation of the so-called friendly societies. The activities of VOKS can be gaged from the sections of its headquarters:

Foreign relations; reception of foreigners; international book exchange; press; exhibitions, etc.—

I may say that personal observation of the embassy set-up in Tokyo recently revealed this trend. [Continuing reading:]

MOPR: International Red Aid (MOPR), created in 1922, has been characterized as the Red Cross of the Communist International, designed primarily to assist political prisoners, secret agents caught red-handed and other "victims of bourgeois reaction." International Red Aid, which functioned legally and illegally in 67 countries, was complemented by Workers International Relief, both directed for many years by the German Communist Willi Muenzenberg. Abroad not only International Red Aid itself but separate Communist-front groups organized for the defense of a particular case have played the leading role in assisting individual Communists jailed for subversive activities.

I pause here to establish the link. Gerhart Eisler was defended by an offshoot of International Red Aid. Noulens was defended by an offshoot of International Red Aid. And I previously called the committee's attention to a brilliant article in the Saturday Evening Post as of February 17, 1951, entitled "The Communist's Dearest Friend," by Craig Thompson. The lead picture shows Carol King escorting Gerhart Eisler, who later fled to Europe and became a high-ranking officer in Red Germany. This article traces International Red Aid into American Labor Defense, into Civil Rights Congress and other organizations in which Carol Weiss King has taken an active part.

Mr. Wood. I might interpose that she actually led him up the gangplank when he left the United States on the *Batory*.

General WILLOUGHBY (continuing reading):

The International Union of Revolutionary Writers was organized in 1925, probably under VOKS auspices, to enlist sympathetic literati abroad for the promotion of pro-Soviet and anti-Fascist and antiwar themes. In Moscow the IURW was responsible for the publication of the English-language *Moscow Daily News* and *International Literature*, a periodical devoted to the promulgation of Communist ideology abroad. At one time an American, Walt Carmon, was an assistant editor of *International Literature*.

Mr. TAVENNER. I would like the record to show that Walt Carmon was subpoenaed before the committee in recent weeks and refused to testify relating to alleged Communist activities.

General WILLOUGHBY. I take it with the usual phraseology, on advice of competent lawyer refused to testify on ground of fear of self-incrimination?

Mr. TAVENNER. That is right.

General WILLOUGHBY (continuing reading):

Langston Hughes, the American Communist poet, and Agnes Smedley were contributors. Anna Louise Strong for years was editor of the *Moscow Daily News*, while another American, Fred Ellis, was employed as a cartoonist on the staff of *Trud*, the official organ of the All Union Council of Soviet Trade Unions. The printing of these foreign-language periodicals was done by the State Publishing House in cooperation with the International Book Publishing Association, both Soviet Government enterprises.

I pause here to invite the attention of the committee to an offshoot of this International Union of Revolutionary Writers in the American scenery, the League of American Writers; and it was in this connection that Mr. Lovett inquired from Mr. Ickes if he knew any-

thing about this outfit, and he described it as completely Communist-dominated, as you recall, knowing, probably, that Smedley was on the staff. I believe she was chairman. So was Whittaker Chambers on the staff in that period.

In order to further bring you the picture of what these associations really mean—

Mr. WALTER. General, before you go into that, I would like to ask Mr. Tavenner, this Walt Carmon didn't testify before this committee, did he?

Mr. TAVENNER. He appeared before this committee, but declined to answer questions other than those of the most casual character.

Mr. WALTER. Is that the same Carmon?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes, sir; and the same one to whom Mr. Clubb took a letter of introduction allegedly from Agnes Smedley in July 1942.

Mr. WOOD. It wasn't alleged, was it?

Mr. TAVENNER. Alleged as to the character of the letter. There is no doubt that he took an envelope with a letter in it.

Mr. DOYLE. That was where the question was, of whether it was sealed or unsealed?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes, sir.

General WILLOUGHBY. I would cite the Second Report, Un-American Activities in California, 1945, Report of the Joint Fact-Finding Committee to the Fifty-sixth California Legislature, pages 119-120.

I have had occasion to refer to the California State Un-American Activities Committee, a brilliant example of what a State legislature can accomplish under the able direction of Senator Jack Tenney. Their reports are a must in the research library of investigative bodies.

In the report just cited, Langston Hughes is reported. Indicative of the character and membership of the International Union of Revolutionary Writers and its American offshoot, the League of American Writers, note the poem by Langston Hughes published in Literary Service, the monthly organ of IURW. I won't bore you with the entire poem. Its title is "Good-by Christ" and it begins:

Listen, Christ,
You did alright in your day, I reckon—
But that day's gone now.
They ghosted you up a swell story too,
Called it Bible—
But it's dead now.
The popes and the preachers've
Made too much money from it.

It is hardly worth while to take the time of the committee to read the rest of it.

Mr. DOYLE. On page 5 of your statement, under paragraph (4)—I think you read that paragraph?

General WILLOUGHBY. MOPR or IURW?

Mr. DOYLE. MOPR. In the last sentence you say:

Abroad not only International Red Aid itself but separate Communist-front groups organized for the defense of a particular case have played the leading role in assisting individual Communists jailed for subversive activities.

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, sir.

Mr. DOYLE. Because you were in the Far East so many years, I would like to ask you, what kind of subversive activities would cause

the arrest, say in China, of Communists? What would they do which would cause their arrest? What would be the evidence of their activities?

General WILLOUGHBY. That is an interesting question. To answer it, I would have to practically read an endless array of the material in the hands of your counsel. I will give you a brief of what they do: Public disturbances; public disorders; strikes; tie-ups of maritime and coastal traffic; aspersion of opposing or competing political organizations; disorder; subversions, political, fraternal, collective; the distribution of literature abhorrent to the existing government.

It is this cumulative picture which emerges from any study of their operations abroad. This, roughly, is the definition.

Mr. DOYLE. Then they would be arrested in China, in those days, the same as they might be in this country?

General WILLOUGHBY. Indeed.

Mr. DOYLE. And for the same causes?

General WILLOUGHBY. For the same causes. As an example, the police files of Shanghai are those of a highly organized political entity maintaining conservative business houses and an extraterritorial enclave. But their purpose was the same as any other, and it is this police upon whom I relied for the identification of subversives much more than the Chinese themselves.

We are not talking about the Chinese police, only incidentally. We are talking about a reputable police of prewar vintage composed of a French section and a British section, known as the international municipal police body. So their reactions, to me, viewed at this distance, are those of a law-enforcing agency maintained for the protection of the county or city in which they operate.

Mr. WALTER. Isn't it important to take into consideration also that the Nationalist Government was very sensitive to the things that were happening, and there were probably more arrests than was the case before the Nationalist Government was aware of what was going on?

General WILLOUGHBY. Your point is well taken. I do not attempt to disassociate the government at Shanghai and the Nationalist Government. They both worked against Soviet communism, not just communism.

In paragraph 26 I touch upon the types of Chinese organizations and Communist fronts. The indication is that the same thing happened in Czechoslovakia and Poland and Bulgaria. I describe them thusly:

On a national and sectional level the organs of the Comintern often began to lose their distinctive coloring, becoming Communist-front groups in a host of forms. However, each auxiliary organization of the Comintern was represented abroad, often by apparently unconnected groups, which ranged from outright Communist to pseudo-liberal movements, which were organized or infiltrated by Comintern agents. In many cases, these national organizations could be traced to more than one Moscow group as activities impinged on the different fields of the Soviet Praesidium. Often they were temporary organizations or local movements designed to gain popular or mass support for an immediate aim; just as often, however, they were serious long-term projects. As these groups touched the Shanghai scene during the period of Smedley's residence there, they form an interesting and often highly interconnected web which requires relatively detailed treatment.

The first one, given this priority because of its intrinsic importance, is the Pan Pacific Trade Union Secretariat and its parent organization,

the Shanghai branch of the Far Eastern Bureau. [Continuing reading:]

The Pan Pacific Trade Union Secretariat (PPTUS) and its parent organization, the Shanghai branch of the Far Eastern Bureau, were the most important and highly organized apparatus for Comintern labor activities in the Far East during the late 1920's and early 1930's. The PPTUS, set up in 1927 at a conference in Hankow, was attended by several prominent Comintern leaders, including Lozovsky, a Comintern agent who rose from secretary of the Profintern in 1928 to a transient position as leader of the Soviet labor movement. Another member of the Hankow conference who later became first head of the PPTUS was the American Communist Earl Browder, who was assisted in his work in Shanghai by an American woman, Katherine Harrison. Other Americans, including a journalist, James H. Dolsen, one Albert Edward Stewart, and Margaret Undjus, were prominent in the affairs of the PPTUS as was the German woman Wiedemeyer.

Wiedemeyer is the same person whose house was a mail drop and rendezvous for the Sorge ring. [Continuing reading:]

Richard Sorge himself was suspected by the Shanghai police of having come on a mission for the PPTUS when he arrived in Shanghai in 1930.

Mr. WALTER. General, may I interrupt you at this point?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes.

Mr. WALTER. Did you ever make an investigation, or was any made that you know of, of the files of the Shanghai police force for the purpose of determining whether or not they contained the names of members of the PPTUS?

General WILLOUGHBY. We took what we found, belatedly. The files were not complete but, roughly, 60 to 80 percent in some categories. This is not an apology for not having it, but actually the Far East Command is limited to Japan and the outlying islands. Where we were able without unusual exertions, we would either call on a sister intelligence agency to do something or grab it while grabbing was good.

On the whole, if we are able to pick up some prominent persons like Browder, Eugene Dennis, Dolsen, I think you have made substantial progress in tracing a pattern so that it will be picked up again when it makes its appearance. This is not a punitive enterprise for ultimate arrests, but rather a historical enterprise for educational purposes.

While your mind is on the PPTUS and Earl Browder, I would like to call your attention to the remarks of one of your colleagues, the Honorable Walter H. Judd, of Minnesota, made in the House of Representatives on Tuesday, July 18, 1950:

* * * The Daily Worker, September 7, 1937, reproduced three letters addressed to Earl Browder, who was then the head of the Communist Party of America; one was from Mao-Tse Tung, who signed himself as president of the Chinese Soviet Republic; one from Chu-Teh, leader of the Chinese Red army, and one from Chou-En-Lai, now prime minister of the Communist regime in China. Chou-En-Lai began his letter to Browder: " * * * Comrade, do you still remember the Chinese who worked with you in China 10 years ago? We feel that when we achieve victory in China, this will be of considerable help to the struggle of the American people for liberation * * *."

Then Mr. Judd asks:

What had Earl Browder been doing in China in 1927? He was there with other leaders of the Communist hierarchy from all over the world to help the Reds seize complete control of China, as the Bolsheviks had done in Russia in the October revolution, just 10 years before. Chiang Kai-shek in China was scheduled to be what Kerensky had been in Russia—an interim leader to be overthrown by the Reds as soon as he had defeated the war lords.

Here, Mr. Doyle, is your purpose, your plan, your fraternal relationship. The Shanghai police files fully confirm Mr. Judd's views. American Commies, in fraternal correspondence with Chinese Commies—who are now fighting the United States in North Korea. It is these considerations that make these old files so alive today.

Mr. DOYLE. I was directing my question to you because of the assignment this committee has. I call your attention, if you haven't had an opportunity to read it recently, to the assignment this committee has. We are assigned to make investigations of—

(1) the extent, character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States; (2) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle of the form of Government as guaranteed by our Constitution.

That is why I directed the question to you. I, as a member of the committee, am interested in getting into the record as much positive evidence as there is of the actual existence of a world-wide conspiracy to overthrow not only our constitutional form of Government, but the constitutional governments of all free peoples. That is the point of my question to you.

General WILLOUGHBY. The point is well taken, Mr. Doyle.

Mr. DOYLE. I feel it very important that the world-wide knowledge of men like yourself, who got first-hand the conditions in other parts of the world, be given to us as proof, if you have it.

General WILLOUGHBY. Your point is well taken, and I trust that I have been able to contribute something to the committee by perhaps not tracing the entire picture in its detailed ramifications, but building a brief on the basis of which your research staff may proceed with its investigations.

Mr. DOYLE. I am sure you are being very helpful. A few weeks ago we had an undercover FBI agent who testified before us, who was a member of a Communist cell in Massachusetts. He heard discussions in the cell of means by which arms might be obtained.

I wanted to ask you very briefly, do you believe and feel, from your own personal knowledge, that that is the sort of revolution that is aimed at our Nation if and when the time comes, and under what conditions could that come in this country, a revolution with the use of arms? What conditions could bring that about? Is it possible the international conspiracy could ever bring about such a hellish thing?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, Mr. Doyle, I firmly believe that there is an international conspiracy; that there is a mechanism for its accomplishment; that these perhaps fragmentary disclosures here are the early glimpses of the framework of the conspiracy. We have seen nation after nation fall in the past 5 years. I call your attention to Czechoslovakia, which fell through this type of intrigue. There is no doubt that the economic conditions following a defeat in war—unemployment and all other social tensions—furnish the soil in which this type of thing grows rapidly. Fortunately, the United States is not in that condition. But they try. The perversion is in full swing. We are fortunate that it has not taken hold here as it has elsewhere.

Mr. WOOD. Wouldn't we be very foolish to assume that the efforts are going to be relaxed?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, indeed. This committee is the watchdog duly appointed by Congress to recognize well in advance the trends, and I believe you have done a very good job. Here I come from the Orient with certain information, and find the committee has collateral, dovetailing information in the United States. I was very much impressed with this in the course of this presentation.

Mr. DOYLE. That should be pretty clear evidence of a proficient staff with an objective view of the whole thing.

General WILLOUGHBY. Indeed. You have heard me make complimentary remarks toward the California State Legislature. Of course, this committee is not only in a better position but its work has been much more far reaching from the standpoint of public knowledge than that of a State legislature.

Mr. DOYLE. I would like to ask you this question right at this point: Is there anything this committee should do, in your judgment, that it is not doing? For instance, part of our assignment is we are charged with recommending to Congress any necessary remedial legislation. Will you bear that in mind and tell us what, in your judgment, this committee should recommend in the way of remedial legislation. In other words, I have frequently asked the question, Should the Communist Party be outlawed?

General WILLOUGHBY. Your question is well taken; and, while it is presumptuous of me to advise the committee, I shall take this opportunity of making the following recommendations against the following background:

Japan is a nation of 80 million people. My section was charged with the organization in Japan of an organization something like the FBI. So, I am aware of the problems from the standpoint of density of population.

I had intended making those recommendations, by agreement with counsel, at the end of the session, but this is as good a place as any.

Mr. DOYLE. Then I will withdraw my question at this time.

General WILLOUGHBY. "Withdraw" means it will be cheerfully complied with at a later time.

Mr. WOOD. You will not withdraw it, but withhold it.

Mr. DOYLE. Yes.

General WILLOUGHBY. I have recommendations, and will present them with apologies, feeling I see eye to eye with this committee.

Mr. DOYLE. I was fearful, because I was not here yesterday, that point was not raised. I am on the Armed Services Committee also, and I was there all day yesterday; so I couldn't be here.

Mr. TAVENNER. General Willoughby, I am aware of the fact you are anxious to complete your testimony today if possible.

General WILLOUGHBY. Not necessarily, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. There are several sections of this document which I am very anxious for you to read into the record. We can then introduce the rest without reading it, if that is agreeable to you.

General WILLOUGHBY. I am entirely in your hands, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. May I suggest you discuss the Noulens Defense Committee, appearing under paragraph b on page 7, and on the next page the Friends of China section, entitled "d". If you will do that first, we will then desire to ask you other questions.

General WILLOUGHBY. You have selected the Noulens case. I consider it completely analogous to the legal assistance given Gerhart

Eisler. The defense was simply given in two different cases. Eisler skipped Shanghai, or he would have been in the same fix as Noulens.

Sorge describes the Comintern group. He mentions two subdivisions. One was in charge of Eisler and one in charge of Noulens. Noulens was caught; and Eisler, as soon as the heat was put on, vanished.

We say, speaking of the Noulens Defense Committee:

International Red Aid (MOPR), as stated, has taken various forms abroad. In Shanghai MOPR played its most spectacular role during the early 1930's in the defense of the head of the FEB, Paul Ruegg, alias Hilaire Noulens, alias Hilarie Noulens, alias Ferdinand Vandercruyssen, and a host of other names. When Paul and Gertrude Ruegg were arrested June 13, 1931, the International Red Aid took charge of their defense. Willi Muenzenberg, German Communist wheel-horse and one of the Comintern's most efficient organizers of both Communist and front groups, formed a defense unit first known as the Noulens Defense Committee, the Shanghai branch being led by Harold Isaacs and boasting among its members Agnes Smedley, Irene Wiedemeyer (or Weitemeyer) and Mine, Sun Yet-sen; the group continued efforts to free these Comintern agents for several years after they were finally sentenced.

The Rueggs, when arrested, posed as Belgian citizens named Herzsens, and had used many aliases, such as Vandercruyssen, although the man had previously been known in Shanghai as Hilaire Noulens. Their claim to Belgian protection was disapproved, and the couple was handed over to the Chinese authorities for prosecution as Communist agents.

The League Against Imperialism and other Comintern groups protested that Noulens, as he was then known, was merely the paid secretary of the PPTUS.

That is the Pan-Pacific Trade-Union Secretariat in which Browder took a leading part in its formation—

possibly a more easily defensible position than his actual post as leader of the FEB. Later in 1931 a collateral English defense group, apparently inadvertently, referred to him as "Ruegg." The ensuing investigation disclosed that Paul Ruegg was an active Swiss Communist who had been prominent a decade earlier in Switzerland and had come to police notice only sporadically after he had gone to Moscow in 1924. After the disclosure of Ruegg's identity, the international committee adopted his real name for their "Committee for the Defense of Paul and Gertrude Ruegg." The committee attracted or solicited known Communists, incidental sympathizers, and non-Communist humanitarians, listing Lion Feuchtwanger and Albert Einstein as German members of the committee—

probably without their permission—

and several sentimental Americans then at the height of their fame, including Floyd Dell, Sinclair Lewis, Theodore Dreiser, John Dos Passos, and Oswald Garrison Villard.

Despite MOPR efforts, the Rueggs were found guilty of seditious activities and imprisoned in Nanking. With the release of many political prisoners, when Nanking fell to the Japanese, the pair were liberated in September 1937 and have since disappeared. Ruegg is reported to have entered the United States in 1939 as Naum Katzenberg and another report claims that he again visited Shanghai in 1939, Chungking in 1940, and the Philippines in 1941.

You have a similar case in the movements of Guenther Stein. Guenther Stein was associated with Sorge. He disappeared. Suddenly he appears in France. He was arrested by the French police, who advised me of that fact.

Mr. TAVENNER. That is a very strong argument for continual watchfulness to follow up these people to see where they are and what they are doing and what part they are taking in communism today.

General WILLOUGHBY. Your point is extremely well taken, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. TAVENNER. Now will you turn to section d.

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. You have Friends of Communist Russia in the States. You have Friends of Communist China, also. Here is Friends of China. [Reading:]

Outside the original range of the friendly societies, but similar to foreign cultural groups for the support of countries presently within the Soviet orbit, the International Friends of China was a front organization which capitalized on western sympathy for China and its defense against Japanese aggression, in order to promote the ends of the Chinese Communists. Like individual fellow-travelers, the Friends of China, founded in 1934 with offices in New York, London, and Paris, gave sole credit for Chinese resistance to the Chinese Communists and attempted to divert normal sympathy to support of one party in China.

Here you have a glimpse of the political purposes of some of these movements. The Chinese Communists claimed for a long time to have fought Russian communism. They did nothing of the kind. Actually, to my knowledge, the Chinese Communist commanders in western China had a tacit agreement with the Japanese to allow free passage into Hankow. [Continuing reading:]

Although its stated aims were lofty, the society tipped its hand when it claimed to have "done much to expose the collaboration of Chiang Kai-shek with the Japanese, British and American imperialists."

We are now getting into language similar to that of the New York Spotlight. [Continuing reading:]

Although the London and Paris branches engaged in relatively little activity, European members then included such respectable fronts as the Labour Party's chief whip in the House of Lords, Lord Marley and Bertrand Russell, long known for his interest in China, as well as Edmond Egon Kisch, classified as an active Comintern agent, and other known Communists. The New York branch, the American Friends of China, which included Earl Browder in its membership, was the most active. Affiliated with the Communist-front American League Against War and Fascism, the American Friends of China published its own monthly magazine China Today which was pro-Communist. The American group also sponsored a Shanghai publication of similar nature, Voice of China, published by Max and Grace Granich. This paper published from March 1936 until the latter part of 1937, although not overtly a Communist publication, portrayed the Chinese Communist as the only defenders of China's independence and resistance to the Japanese. The magazine was suppressed after more than 18 months of existence and the Graniches returned to the United States December 21, 1937.

One could go on and on with the description of similar fronts. They all have their ancillaries in foreign countries, including the United States.

Mr. TAVENNER. The pattern as you have shown it in China is very similar to that we have found in the United States with reference to the use of book clubs.

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, indeed.

Mr. TAVENNER. You have a paragraph on that subject?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, indeed.

Mr. TAVENNER. I think it would be well for you to give us that at this time.

General WILLOUGHBY. The Attorney General, I see from reading the newspapers, has gone about a very laudable job, to classify certain organizations as Communist fronts. I suppose the committee had a hand in that. You have done a good job.

You find a number of book stores, Washington Book Shop, Cincinnati, and so forth. They are scattered from the east coast to the

west coast. You find these book shops 15 or 20 years ago. This is paragraph g, entitled "Zeitgeist Bookstore":

The Zeitgeist Bookstore, established by Irene E. I. Wiedemeyer (Weitemeyer) in November 1930, was part of a widespread and elaborate Comintern network operating from the International Union of Revolutionary Writers in Moscow.

You have had the quotation by our pal Langston Hughes which I threw into the arena. [Continuing reading:]

Prior to the advent of Hitler, the Zeitgeist Buchhandlung in Berlin, with a branch office of its own in Moscow, was an important Comintern cultural outlet, part of a syndicate headed by Willi Muenzenberg, who was also German head of the League Against Imperialism, of the Comintern's own bank in Paris, the Banque Commerciale Pour l'Europe du Nord, and a vast number of other Comintern organizations and enterprises until he was read out of the Comintern in 1938, 2 years before his suicide. The Shanghai branch of the Zeitgeist Bookstore was set as a focal distribution point of the International Union of Revolutionary Writers, stocking Communist publications in German and English as well as more legitimate literature, mainly in German. The amount of business transacted by the Zeitgeist Bookstore was small and the shop closed in 1933, ostensibly due to its poor finances. A more likely reason was the destruction of the legalized German Communist Party since, after a trip to Europe in the autumn of 1933, Irene Weidemeyer returned to Shanghai on September 9, 1934, to set herself up in the book business again, this time as the Shanghai representative of International Publishers, of New York. The latter organization has long been the publishers of American Communist Party writings and the American distributor of international literature.

Although Miss Wiedemeyer acted as the agent of International Publishers, another Shanghai group was also known as the authorized agents for international literature. Mrs. V. N. Sotoff (Sotov), the wife of the head of the Shanghai agency of Tass, operated the American Book & Supply Co., which sold international literature; it is significant, however, that the American Book & Supply Co. and Miss Wiedemeyer's agency occupied offices in the same building at 410 Szechuan Road.

Miss Wiedemeyer had had some background in the Third International although there are gaps in information on her activities in Shanghai. She had married Wu Shao-kuo, a Chinese Communist, in Germany in 1925 and had studied the principles of revolutionary movements in Asia at the Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow in 1926-27. In Shanghai she knew Agnes Smedley well and was a member of the Noulens Defense Committee and the Society of Friends of the U. S. S. R. She, as well as Smedley and Isaacs during 1932, were reported to have been in close contact with John M. Murray, an American correspondent for the Pacific News Agency, a Vancouver organization listed as an outlet of the Comintern and possibly a front for the League Against Imperialism and Colonial Oppression of Canada. In any event the particular role of the leftist book shop was to operate as an outlet for revolutionary literature, rendezvous of espionage partisans and fellow travelers. Wiedemeyer's (Weitemeyer) Zeitgeist Bookstore is covered elsewhere in the Sorge trial records. Ozaki, Sorge's right-hand man, was introduced by Smedley in Weitemeyer's book shop, rendezvous of Shanghai leftists, mail drop for espionage agents. Later on, during his imprisonment in Sugamo, he (Ozaki) wrote a pathetic letter on June 8, 1943:

"* * * I might say that, in a more profound sense, my meeting with Agnes Smedley and Richard Sorge had been predestined * * * my subsequent decision to follow the narrow road was determined by my encounter with them * * *."

The little bookshop had done its bit as a recruiting station for the Fourth Bureau (Intelligence) of the Soviet Army—but the narrow road led to Ozaki's gallows.

This is as good a description of the character, purposes and operational quality of the so-called bookstores as outlets for Communist printed matter as I can give.

Mr. TAVENNER. I offer in evidence the document prepared by General Willoughby from which he has been reading, and ask that it be marked "Willoughby Exhibit No. 41."

General WILLOUGHBY. May I amplify this, Mr. Counsel? There are footnote references which are not shown in the mimeographed copy. There is not a single statement in this mimeographed abbreviated summary that is not backed by documentation.

At random, paragraph 8 is supported by SMP (Shanghai municipal police) file D-6480, November 14, 1934, to February 13, 1935, page 5, and so on.

Mr. TAVENNER. The copy which has been introduced in the record contains the full documentation.

General WILLOUGHBY. It was really for the benefit of the correspondents that I made that remark.

Mr. WOOD. It will be admitted with the understanding it is adopted by the witness in toto as part of his testimony?

General WILLOUGHBY. I do.

(The document above referred to, marked "Willoughby Exhibit No. 41," is as follows:)

WILLOUGHBY EXHIBIT No. 41

THE SHANGHAI CONSPIRACY: 1929-49

22. *Shanghai police dossiers support Sorge records*

The element which intrigued MacArthur's intelligence research was the immediate and dramatic recognition that the Sorge story did not begin nor end with Tokyo, that it was no accident that Sorge served in Shanghai first, and that his later operations, localized in Japan, were only a chip in the general mosaic of Soviet and Comintern international design. An investigation was opened into the Shanghai period and the Shanghai personages.

Miscellaneous records of the British and French Shanghai municipal police in the early thirties, open up an astonishing vista on a fantastic array of Communist fronts, ancillary agencies, and the vast interlocking operations of the Third International in China. It is in this particular period that the groundwork was laid for the Communist successes of today.

As in the Japanese court records, Smedley now appears in these independent documents, associated with well-known Comintern agents, leftists, and sympathizers; affiliated with or assisting in activities, most of which were Comintern-directed for the ultimate strategic benefit of Soviet Russia.

The role of Shanghai, a veritable witch's caldron of international intrigue, a focal point of Communist effort, is already apparent in the records of the Sorge trial and collateral testimony. The *Zeitgeist* Bookshop, rendezvous of Sorge and Ozaki, and its astute owner, Miss Wiedemeyer (Weitemeyer), appear again, viewed from a different angle, recorded this time by a reputable international police body.¹ Smedley has attacked the Japanese court materials as "obtained under torture and duress"; this claim is, of course, a typical "red herring" and the customary smear-defense expected of a cornered individual. On the other hand, the files of the Shanghai international police can hardly be impugned as obtained under torture and duress, which Smedley slyly attributes to the "Japanese Fascists who were enemies of the United States." Communist strategic defense is often brilliant. This innuendo is a clever but futile defense maneuver. Smedley here manipulates both time and space. In Shanghai, in the early thirties, we are not dealing with the period of our uneasy alliance with the Soviets (1941-45), but with the prewar years of 1930-39, in the heyday of the Third International, prelude to the infamous Stalin-Hitler Pact, sole factor that made World War II at all possible.

¹ In early recognition that Shanghai was the focal point of Communist espionage and political subversion, F-2/Tokyo was lucky in acquiring substantial parts of these police records. Files had already been tampered with, especially reference to American personalities, but someone had bungled (or G-2 worked too fast): enough material remained to present an impressive continuity. Some of the Shanghai police officers were traced to Hong Kong, like Mr. J. Crichton, former chief detective-inspector, political intelligence group, Shanghai municipal police, who has a perfect recollection of Agnes Smedley, identified her as a Communist, working with the Communist Party in Shanghai, states she worked with the Noulens, and recalls that her police file was voluminous. His confirmation of the Shanghai files actually acquired by G-2 is collateral evidence from most authoritative quarters.

23. *Shanghai, focal point of Third International conspiracy*

There is more to the Shanghai municipal police files than an inferential accusation against Smedley. We are dealing here with a conspiratorial epoch in the history of modern China. Shanghai was the vineyard of communism. Here were sown the dragon's teeth that ripened into the Red harvest of today, and the farm labor was done by men and women of many nationalities who had no personal stakes in China other than an inexplicable fanaticism for an alien cause, the Communist "jihad" of Pan-slavism for the subjugation of the western world.

The greater design of the Soviet conquest of the East is already clear in the confession of Sorge, Soviet master spy. It is again recognizable in the intricate pattern of the Third International "apparatus." Shanghai was the focal point of sabotage and subversion, and to this Mecca flocked the Communist operators of the world for training, for experimentation, for career investments.

In 1927 a conference was held in Hankow under the auspices of the Third International and attended by Tom Mann (Great Britain), Earl Browder (United States of America), Jacques Doriot (France), Roy (India), and a number of others. It was decided that Communist work in this part of the world would be conducted by the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat, of which Earl Browder was made secretary. He soon afterward became active in this work in which he was assisted by Katherine Harrison alias Alice Reed, considered by the police as a convenient "menage-a-deux." Earl Browder and his female assistant continued their work in the following year (1928) and spent most of their time in Shanghai. They were joined in August that year by one W. A. Haskell who also was assisted by a woman named Emerson, presumably his wife.²

Time, in its issue of April 25, 1949, features Eugene Dennis, the boss of the American Communists, now on trial. There is no point in repeating this terse, well-written story of the growth and world itinerary of a Soviet agent; important, however, are certain connecting links with the Sorge espionage case.³

Dennis who used to be Francis X. Waldron, obtained a fraudulent passport as Paul Walsh and traveled via Europe, South Africa to China. The worldwide ramifications of the Third Comintern, with Shanghai as the Far Eastern operating center, is reflected in the itinerary of this American disciple. Paul Eugene Walsh, alias Paul or Milton suddenly appears in the records of the Shanghai police; his police card states:

"* * * From December 1, 1933, until June 1934, he resided at Flat 6, Gresham Apartments, No. 1224 Avenue Joffre. On May 30, 1934, the lease of Flat 34D, Fencim Apartments, No. 634 Route Frelupt was transferred to his name from Harry Berger, with whom he was obviously on terms of good friendship. Walsh resided at the latter address from June 1, 1934, until October 9, 1934, when he secretly left Shanghai for Trieste on the S. S. *Conte Verde*. It has been established that Walsh was one of the masterminds of the local machine of the Comintern and as such was responsible for the collation of many important documents relating to the propagation of Communist ideas in the Far East. * * *

The Shanghai police classification ties in neatly with related fragments in the Sorge case; Sorge's assistants operated habitually under aliases or codes, usually their Christian names, viz: Paul, Max, Alex, John, etc. Significantly, a Comintern agent, under the code name of Paul took over the Shanghai station after Sorge's transfer to Japan.⁴

24. *The shadowy men with changeable names*

In 1930 a large host of agents of the Third International came to Shanghai and became associated with the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat, and another important organ of the Third International, called the Far Eastern Bureau.

² G-2 Doc. No. 5: SMP File D-4825, May 2-10, 1933, p. 20. The presence of this prominent American Communist is significant.

³ Ibid., p. 22. "During 1929, W. A. Haskell and Miss Emerson left Shanghai, but the ranks of the foreign Communist agents were by no means reduced, for Gerhart Eisler who lived in Wong Ka Shaw Gardens between March 20 and November 30 and George Hardy and J. H. Dolsen also visited Shanghai one after another * * *."

⁴ There were plenty of other leads in the original G-2 report, converging on American Communists principally on the Pacific coast, the novitiate of Dennis. 18 names listing Communist agitators, agents, and suspects were reported as connected with the Sorge case and covered in the trial records (Ltr. to MID, Oct. 17, 1947).

⁵ Sorge: "Besides these two agents, Paul and John were dispatched from Moscow to work directly under Sorge." See also: G-2 Doc. No. 24: SMP File D-6227, June 15, 1933-August 5, 1936, pp. 8, 9.

Klansen: "I worked with Weingart. There were also Paul, Smedley, and Dr. Woldt, all of whom I met in Shanghai. Paul succeeded Sorge as leader of the ring."

The new arrivals included Hilaire Noulens (or Paul Ruegg), and Mrs. Noulens, of unknown nationality, A. E. Stewart, Margaret Undjus, and Judea Codkind, Americans, and Irene Wiedemeyer (Weitmeyer) who was German.⁵

Smedley was an associate of Irene's. Weitmeyer (Wiedemeyer) operated the Zeitgeist Bookshop in Shanghai, rendezvous of leftists and mail drop for espionage agents. Ozaki, Sorge's right-hand man was introduced by Smedley in Weitmeyer's place.⁶ Sorge testified:

"* * * As previously stated I first met Smedley in Shanghai, acquired her as a member, and through my recommendations, she was registered with Comintern headquarters. I do not know as to whether she was affiliated with the American Communist Party. Ozaki was also acquired in China. I reestablished contact with him after arriving in Japan, worked with him and recommended him to Comintern headquarters for registration. Thus I recommended both of them and offered myself as one of the two sponsors required for each new member. A member in Moscow consented to be the other sponsor on the strength of my recommendations and reports. * * *

The police card on Smedley states:

"* * * Agnes Smedley alias Alice Bird and Mrs. Petroikos * * * member of the following societies: Friends of the U. S. S. R.; Hindustan Association in Berlin; Berlin Indian Revolutionary Society; Noulens Defense Committee; All China Labor Federation and the China League for Civil Rights. * * *

In possession of two passports German and American. Arrived in Shanghai in May 1929 from Berlin as the correspondent of the German newspaper Frankfurter Zeitung. She is in the service of the Eastern Branch of the Central Committee of the Communist International and is definitely known to have assisted local Indian seditionists on several occasions. * * * her chief duties comprise the supervising of Communist organizations among workers, and that she receives orders direct from the Central Committee of the Communist International in Moscow. * * *

The Shanghai police observed and recorded these furtive men and women, often without direct accusations. Such things are a matter of cumulative surveillance, but dossiers are never opened without some reason. Somehow, these names are tainted.

The case of Hilaire Noulens also known as Paul Ruegg is both interesting and typical: The clandestine fraternity, working under the aegis of the Comintern, or the Soviet Army, could always count on a variety of front organizations to rally to their defense, if they got into trouble. The principal agency was The International Red Aid (MOPR), created in 1922, known as International Labor Defense in America. Inferentially, whenever the defense swung into action it was a foregone conclusion that the chief protagonists were under orders of the Comintern. To the gullible outsider, the defense action might look like a legitimate civil liberty agitation even with some sentimental appeal; however to the cognoscenti it was just another Red front mobilizing pink lawyers, agents, and fellow travelers.

Noulens arrived in Shanghai in 1930 under cover of a stolen Belgian passport as Fred Vandercruysen to head the Far Eastern Bureau. Fifteen months later, he was arrested for Communist activities linked with a French Communist, Joseph Ducroux (also known as Serge LeFranc) then operating in Singapore. During the trial (and conviction) the authorities learned of his importance in the Comintern apparatus. This group operated on a considerable scale; they maintained 7 bank accounts, rented 15 houses or apartments, a veritable political rabbit warren; Ruegg-Noulens used at least 12 names in Shanghai and carried 1 Canadian and 2 Belgian passports, while his wife used 5 names and 2 Belgian passports.⁷

⁵ G-2 Doc. No. 5; SMP File D-4825, May 8-10, 1933, p. 22.

⁶ Foreign Affairs Yearbook 1942. Sec. XV, par. 2-i (Sorge).

⁷ G-2 Document No. 30; SMP File ZCS-827, March 7, 1932. See also Sorge's Own Story (pt. I, ch. 4, sec. J, par. 4). He is quite specific. The Comintern group (FEB) consisted of two branches, the political branch (headed by Gerhart Eisler) and the organization branch (headed by Noulens); in the light of the current China debacle, the operational missions were significant: liaison between the Comintern (Soviet) and the Chinese Communist Party; political policy (decided upon by the Comintern) with respect to the Chinese Communist Party; exchange of information between the Chinese Communist Party and the Comintern; financial liaison between the Comintern and the Chinese Communist Party; the movement of personnel between Moscow and the Chinese Communist Party. Smedley's and Isaac's support of the Noulens Defense Committee or any other members must be viewed against the background of these international subversive missions.

Here, again, the Time article furnishes an interesting clue to identities; in a subparagraph heading: "The Little Kremlin," it says:

"* * * All but the most secret Communist operations in the United States were and still are, directed from the ramshackle, nine-story loft building, on 35 East Twelfth Street, not far from Manhattan's Union Square. To its top-floor offices came the Communists' international 'Reps,' the shadowy men with the changeable names like P. Green, G. Williams, A. Ewert, H. Berger * * * which in a wink of the eye might become Drabkin, B. Mikhailov, Braun, or Gerhart Eisler. These were Moscow's agents. From the ninth floor the word which they brought from Moscow was passed along to the faithful, to the party hacks on the Daily Worker and Yiddish-language Freiheit, to the cultivators of organized labor's vineyards, to men like Christoffel in Milwaukee. * * *

The interesting thing about Time's shadowy men with the changeable names like A. Ewert, H. Berger,⁸ A. Steinburg, and Gerhart Eisler,⁹ is that these same names and identities appear both in the Sorge records and the Shanghai police files. Their crooked paths meander on into the forties and into the United States.

Most of the old wheel horses of the Communist Party appear to have been operating in Shanghai, in one period or another, the professionals of the clandestine fraternity as well as the acolytes and dupes, who are flirting with the Red menace. And somewhere in the bistros of the French concession, in the furtive rendezvous of the Shanghai conspirators, you can hear the metallic tinkle of 30 pieces of silver

25. The Comintern apparatus and Shanghai affiliates

Other individuals, in variable degrees of implication with or commitment to the Communist movement, are covered elsewhere. All of them are understandable only in terms of their subservience to a foreign master; this relationship requires a background examination of the formidable world-wide machinery of the Comintern apparatus, machiavellian tool of the imperialist expansion of the Soviets, who have made progress beyond the wildest dream of Czarist ambition. In fact, it may be factually stated that the Soviets have taken up where the Czars left off and made further and more significant strides.

(a) *Comintern headquarters.*—The Moscow headquarters of the Third (Communist) International (Comintern) during the 1930's paralleled the organizational structure of the Soviet Government. Led by a world congress of Soviet and foreign Communists, who met at intervals between 1919 and 1935, actual control of the Comintern fell to the U. S. S. R. through its leadership of the world Communist movement and a Comintern organizational ruling which gave the

⁸ G-2 Document No. 24. SMP File D-6227, June 15, 1933–August 5, 1936: A man of many aliases, when Paul Walsh appeared, it was Berger who rented his Shanghai apartment to him. Flat 35D Foncim Apartments No. 643. Route Frelupt. Berger left Shanghai for Vladivostok July 19, 1934, on the steamship *Yingchow* due to police raids at No. 38 Race Road, which netted incriminating Communist documents.

He appears in the Canadian espionage case as an "agent in the United States"; Fred Rose, Communist member of the Parliament in Canada used Freda Lipshitz as go-between from himself (cover name Debouz) to Berger, and others in Washington.

⁹ Gerhart Eisler Sorge Material (Criminal Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Justice, ch. IV, sec. J-4): "The Comintern group in Shanghai consisted of a political branch and an organization branch. The political branch was in charge of "Gerhardt" (Eisler) whom I had known in Germany and worked with in my Comintern days.

With the arrest of Noulens, Gerhardt's status in Shanghai became precarious and he decided to return to Moscow in 1931 * * *

The tendrils of Mr. Eisler weave into far places. He next appears as Communist International representative in the United States in 1936. His first wife was Hede Gumperz. Eisler was later transferred to Europe. His second wife, Hede's sister, Elli whom he married in 1931 said she was still his wife in 1946. He returned to the United States with another woman, whom he apparently married in 1942. The amorous exploits of Comintern agents appear as complicated as their professional work. Hede Gumperz was in charge of an underground Communist apparatus in Washington. She broke with Stalin later on. She knew Alger Hiss and talked with him in an apartment of Noel Field, State Department official who was a member of her apparatus. Incidentally, she was not allowed to tell her story to the jury in the first trial of the Hiss case (Counterattack, July 8, 1949). The character of her former husband makes this story more than plausible.

An arriere pensee of slight comfort to the mothers of America: A considerable number of young American soldiers died in the war period 1941–45, so that "Gerhardt" Eisler could pursue his business of treason and sabotage in the comparative safety of the United States. It is noted that he found Europe too hot in 1941. Needless to say, there is no mention of a draft for service in the United States except perhaps to subvert some Government employees. Eisler's spectacular arrest in New York and subsequent escape to London recently, dovetail accurately into the general pattern of long ago. He left Shanghai in 1931 in just as much of a hurry and for the same reasons.

largest representation to the nation playing host to the Congress—in every case the Soviet Union. The executive functions of the Comintern were vested in the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI), which advertised several foreign members but was actually controlled by its predominant Soviet representation. Like the "World" Congress, the ECCI met periodically, primarily to determine general lines of policy, but final control of the Comintern rested in the "praesidium," which was made up, among others, of a "politburo," several standing Commissions, and a political Secretariat. Under the praesidium there were several training schools, sectional or regional secretariats and auxiliary departments, which were concerned with generalized work in specific fields and, finally, certain auxiliary organizations which worked directly and specifically with foreign Communist or Communist-front groups.

The Comintern was the nondiplomatic foreign arm of the U. S. S. R. Organized at Moscow in 1919, the Comintern was, until its alleged dissolution in 1943, a quasi-governmental body aimed largely at fostering Communist and Communist-front groups in the capitalist world in order to carry out such Communist strategy as the Government of the U. S. S. R. considered essential to the promotion of world revolution or, as conditions required, the protection of the Soviet Union.

(b) *Auxiliary organizations.*—Only a few of the Moscow auxiliary organizations are of immediate concern here, although all of them, numbering about 13, had variable interests in Shanghai, operating through an extraordinary variety of channels:

(1) *Profintern*: The Red International of Labor (Profintern) was created in 1919 in order to counteract the influence of the International Federation of Labor Unions of the Second (Socialist) International. The profintern consisted of a headquarters apparatus controlled by the praesidium and of affiliated sections which in most countries outside the U. S. S. R. took the form of Red trade-union oppositions. In the field, the Profintern organized international propaganda committees for work among specific trades. In addition, the Profintern sponsored the creation of parallel labor-union federations of which the Pan Pacific Trade Union Secretariat (PPTUS) and the All China Labor Federation were important examples.

(2) *Krestintern*: The Red Peasant International (Krestintern) was founded in 1923 to break the resistance to communism of the peasantry in various countries. Although it enjoyed far less success than organizations devoted to the laborer and the intelligentsia, it directed local Communist groups which organized so-called peasants' unions including the Chinese Peasant League.

(3) *VOKS*: The Society for Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries (VOKS) was established in Moscow in 1923 to promote Soviet culture abroad as an instrument of political propaganda. The cultural attaché of each Soviet Embassy abroad was in direct charge of VOKS and, as such, was charged with liaison with the ECCI in Moscow and with the formation of the so-called friendly societies. The activities of VOKS can be gaged from the sections of its headquarters: Foreign relations; reception of foreigners; international book exchange; press; exhibitions, etc.

(4) *MOPR*: International Red Aid (MOPR), created in 1922, has been characterized as the "Red Cross of the Communist International," designed primarily to assist political prisoners, secret agents caught red-handed and other victims of bourgeois reaction.¹⁰ International Red Aid, which functioned legally and illegally in 67 countries was complemented by Workers International Relief, both directed for many years by the German Communist Willi Muenzenberg. Abroad not only International Red Aid itself but separate Communist-front groups organized for the defense of a particular case have played the leading role in assisting individual Communists jailed for subversive activities.

(5) *IURW*: The International Union of Revolutionary Writers was organized in 1925, probably under VOKS auspices, to enlist sympathetic literati abroad for the promotion of pro-Soviet and anti-Fascist and antiwar themes. In Moscow the IURW was responsible for the publication of the English-language Moscow Daily News and International Literature, a periodical devoted to the promulgation of Communist ideology abroad. At one time an American, Walt Carmon,

¹⁰ With calculated skill international communism long ago subverted semantics to confuse the slogans and clichés of capitalist society; the universal sentimental appeal of the historical Red Cross and its protection of the weak and oppressed was bound to be exploited. In the United States the agency was known as International Labor Defense.

was an assistant editor of *International Literature*.¹¹ Langston Hughes, the American Communist poet, and Agnes Smedley were contributors. Anna Louise Strong for years was editor of the *Moscow Daily News*, while another American, Fred Ellis, was employed as a cartoonist on the staff of *Trud*, the official organ of the All Union Council of Soviet Trade-Unions.¹² The printing of these foreign language periodicals was done by the State Publishing House (Gosizdat) in cooperation with the International Book Publishing Association (Mezhkniga), both Soviet Government enterprises.

26. Chinese organizations and Communist fronts

On a national and sectional level the organs of the Comintern often began to lose their distinctive coloring, becoming Communist-front groups in a host of forms. However, each auxiliary organization of the Comintern was represented abroad, often by apparently unconnected groups, which ranged from outright Communist to pseudo-liberal movements, which were organized or infiltrated by Comintern agents. In many cases, these national organizations could be traced to more than one Moscow group as activities impinged on the different fields of the praesidium. Often they were temporary organizations or local movements designed to gain popular or mass support for an immediate aim; just as often, however, they were serious long-term projects. As these groups touched the Shanghai scene during the period of Smedley's residence there, they form an interesting and often highly interconnected web which requires relatively detailed treatment.

(a) *PPTUS*—The Pan Pacific Trade Union Secretariat (PPTUS) and its parent organization, the Shanghai branch of the Far Eastern Bureau, were the most important and highly organized apparatus for Comintern labor activities in the Far East during the late 1920's and early 1930's.¹³ The PPTUS, set up in 1927 at a conference in Hankow, was attended by several prominent Comintern leaders, including Lozovsky¹⁴ a Comintern agent who rose from secretary of the Profinintern in 1928 to a transient position as leader of the Soviet labor movement. Another member of the Hankow conference who later became first head of the PPTUS was the American Communist Earl Browder, who was assisted in his work in Shanghai by an American woman, Katherine Harrison. Other Americans, including a journalist, James H. Dolsen, one Albert Edward Stewart, and Margaret Undjus, were prominent in the affairs of the PPTUS as was the German woman, Wiedemeyer.¹⁵ Richard Sorge himself was suspected by the Shanghai police of having come on a mission for the PPTUS when he arrived in Shanghai in 1930.¹⁶

Set up for Comintern work in China, Indochina, Malaya, Japan, Formosa, Korea, and the Philippines, the PPTUS had no direct connection with the ECCI or the Praesidium in Moscow although a chain of liaison existed to the Profinintern and some instances of direct connection between Moscow and Shanghai were discovered. In that particular period and primarily for security, the PPTUS derived its authority from a Comintern subsidiary in Berlin, the Western European Bureau (WEB) and from the WEB through the Far Eastern Bureau (FEB) in Khabarovsk and Vladivostok.¹⁷

The Western European Bureau, largely an organ of the immensely powerful and well organized (pre-Hitler) German Communist Party, went far beyond its stated function of maintaining contact with the sections in Western Europe; in fact, the WEB appears to have been, for a time, almost a peer of the ECCI, operating often independently. From the WEB authority went to the Far Eastern Bureau in Shanghai. There was also an FEB (Dalburo) in Khabarovsk (later transferred to Vladivostok) which maintained direct contact with both the illegal FEB in Shanghai and the Praesidium of the Comintern in Moscow. Instructions and cash subsidies for distribution by the FEB were transmitted from the WEB in Berlin through courier channels to an import business in

¹¹ Editor: Walt Carmon is listed in the Fourth Report, *Un-American Activities in California*, 1948, p. 273, as a member of the League of American Writers and affiliated with its congress.

¹² G-2 Document No. 40: SMP File D-5834, April 25, 1934, p. 4.

¹³ G-2 Document No. 30: SMP File ZCS-827, March 7, 1932, p. 13.

¹⁴ G-2 Document No. 97: SMP File D-7884, May 10, 1927 to April 16, 1928. Editor, Solomon Abramovich Lozovsky, an old-time Bolshevik, was known as an expert on the Far East and has held important posts in the Dalburo (Far Eastern Bureau). His early connection with Sorge is worthy of note. *Sorge's Own Story*, ch. III, p. 35.

¹⁵ G-2 Document No. 5: SMP File 4825, May 8 to 10, 1933, pp. 20-22.

¹⁶ G-2 Document No. 18: SMP File D-3509, January 10, 1932, to August 31, 1933, p. 5.

¹⁷ G-2 Document No. 30. SMP File ZCS-827, March 7, 1932. Memorandum 17, October 29, 1947.

Shanghai dealing in wines, perfumes, and other luxury articles. Comintern agents in the import company passed on these funds and instructions to the staff of the FEB (Shanghai) which consisted of eight or nine Europeans and several Chinese. Funds of the FEB were deposited in no less than seven Chinese banks from which they then were withdrawn as needed. The FEB was a regional organ of the Comintern, responsible for the dispatch of students for training in Moscow and for payments to Chinese organizations led by the PPTUS.¹⁷ The size of the payments, at least \$500,000 annually, gives some indication of the importance attached to China alone by the Comintern strategists of the early 1930's.¹⁸

The operational unit of the FEB although preceding the parent body in date of formation in Shanghai, the PPTUS (also known as TOSS) was staffed largely by the same personalities although direct PPTUS work was done by three foreigners aided by Chinese translators. Two of the foreigners working for PPTUS during the early 1930's are known to have been Albert Edward Stewart and Margaret Undjus, while the third was reported to have been James Dolsen, all Americans.¹⁹

When Earl Browder left Shanghai in 1929 or 1930, Gerhart Eisler is reported to have taken his place as secretary of the PPTUS. It is certain that Eisler was in Shanghai in 1929 in connection with the PPTUS.²⁰ The interlocking evidence of the Sorge records settle this point beyond a doubt: the FEB was divided into an organizational section, under Noulens and a political branch under Gerhart (Eisler). When Noulens was arrested, Eisler fled and other operators went underground. Conversely, this fact puts the Noulens defense group in a proper light: Soviet agents staging a defense rally for another agent.

The most famous of the Comintern agents connected with the FEB (and PPTUS), were Paul and Gertrude Ruegg, more widely known as Mr. and Mrs. Hilaire Noulens. Noulens, traveling on a stolen Belgian passport as Ferdinand Vandereruyzen, arrived in Shanghai March 19, 1930, to head the FEB. Fifteen months later, on June 13, 1931, he was arrested for Communist activities as a result of a cable address found on a French Communist Joseph Ducroux, alias Serge LeFranc, when the latter was arrested in Singapore on June 1, 1930. Following Ruegg's arrest, trial, and conviction, authorities learned that he and other members of the FEB and PPTUS, in addition to seven bank accounts, had rented 14 or 15 houses and apartments while in Shanghai, seven of which were known to have been maintained concurrently. Ruegg himself used at least 12 names in Shanghai and carried 1 Canadian and 2 Belgian passports and his wife used 5 names and also carried 2 Belgian passports.²¹

¹⁸ Memorandum 17, October 29, 1947, p. 40ff. See also report by Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence in the French Municipal Police. Shanghai: Simultanément avec l'établissement du Bureau extrême-oriental de la III^{ème} Internationale, le Profintern (International Syndicate Rouge) installa, également à Shanghai, une branche du Secrétariat de l'Union Pan-Pacifique Ouvrière (organisation auxiliaire du Profintern, chargée de la direction du mouvement syndicaliste militant dans les pays du Pacifique et dont le siège se trouve depuis 1929 à Vladivostok). G-2 Document No. 104. (English translation supplied by the committee: Shanghai: Simultaneously with the establishment of the Far Eastern Bureau of the Third International, the Profintern (Red International of Labor) installed, likewise at Shanghai, a branch of the Pan Pacific Trade Union Secretariat (auxiliary organization of the Profintern, charged with the direction of the militant trade-union movement in the Pacific countries, and of which the headquarters have been since 1929 in Vladivostok).)

¹⁹ G-2 Document No. 30: SMP File ZCS-827, March 7, 1932, pp. 15, 29, 30.

²⁰ G-2 Document No. 5: SMP File No. 4825, May 8 to 10, 1933, p. 21. The records of these men as Communists and Comintern operators is beyond question and has become crystal-clear in recent years. Eisler is probably the more dangerous of the two. His recent flight aboard a Polish ship, his seizure and release by the British are all of a pattern. See also Sorge Story, pt. I, ch. 4, sec. J, pars. 4 and 5.

²¹ G-2 Document No. 30: SMP File No. ZCS-827, March 7, 1932, p. 19ff. The French report previously quoted bears out the Shanghai documents: Sur LeFranc on trouva deux feuilles de papier dont l'une portait l'indication, Post Office Box 208, Shanghai et l'autre: Hilonoul, Shanghai * * * Des descentes furent aussitôt opérées dans les autres maisons louées par Noulens sous différents noms. Elles amenèrent la saisie d'une quantité importante de littérature communiste et de nombreux documents en différentes langues, relatifs au mouvement communiste en Extrême-Orient et l'arrestation de la femme de Noulens connue sous les noms de Madame Vandereruyzen, Motte, Ruck, etc. (G-2 Document No. 104). (English translation supplied by the committee: On the person of Le Franc were found two sheets of paper, of which one carried the notation, "Post Office Box 208, Shanghai," and the other: Hilonoul, Shanghai . . . Raids were immediately conducted in the other houses leased by Noulens under different names. They led to the seizure of a sizable quantity of Communist literature and of numerous documents in different languages relative to the Communist movement in the Far East and the arrest of the wife of Noulens known under the names of Madame Vandereruyzen, Motte, Ruck, etc.)

The All-China Labor Federation, of which Smedley was a member²² was one of the recipients of the FEB subsidies, receiving \$1,800 monthly from the PPTUS.²³

(b) *Noulens Defense Committee*.—International Red Aid (MOPR), as stated, has taken various forms abroad.²⁴ In Shanghai MOPR played its most spectacular role during the early 1930's in the defense of the head of the FEB, Paul Ruegg, alias Hilaire Noulens, alias Hilarie Noulens, alias Ferdinand Vandercruysen and a host of other names. When Paul and Gertrude Ruegg were arrested June 13, 1931, the International Red Aid took charge of their defense. Willi Muenzenberg, German Communist wheel horse and one of the Comintern's most efficient organizers of both Communist and front groups, formed a defense unit first known as the Noulens Defense Committee, the Shanghai branch being led by Harold Isaacs,²⁵ and boasting among its members Agnes Smedley, Irene Wiedemeyer (Weitemeyer) and Madam Sun Yat-sen; the group continued efforts to free these Comintern agents for several years after they were finally sentenced.²⁶

The Rueggs, when arrested, posed as Belgian citizens named Herssens, and had used many aliases, such as Vandercruysen, although the man had previously been known in Shanghai as Hilaire Noulens. Their claim to Belgian protection was disapproved and the couple was handed over to the Chinese authorities for prosecution as Communist agents. The League Against Imperialism and other Comintern groups protested that Noulens, as he was then known, was merely the paid secretary of the PPTUS, possibly a more easily defensible position than his actual post as leader of the FEB. Later in 1931 a collateral English defense group, apparently inadvertently, referred to him as "Ruegg." The ensuing investigation disclosed that Paul Ruegg was an active

²² G-2 Document No. 10: SMP File D-4718, January 4 to May 20, 1933, p. 22.

²³ G-2 Document No. 30: SMP ZCS-827, March 7, 1932, p. 14. Editor: Like so many front organizations, this Prointern agency is difficult to trace in all its ramifications. As a Chinese labor organization it attempted to channelize laborers' grievance toward Communist ends. As a foreigner, Smedley's position is not quite clear, though as an outside adviser Smedley gave the All-China Labor Federation a direct connection with the Prointern in addition to its indirect liaison through the PPTUS, the FEB, and finally the WEB.

²⁴ Editor: In the United States MOPR has been known as International Labor Defense, headed for several years by Representative Vito Marcantonio. A more recent offshoot is the Civil Rights Congress, a postwar development, which drew heavy non-Communist support to make it a genuine front group. An important part of the technique of this and similar MOPR groups is to form in democratic countries so-called civil rights groups to defend individual cases. Characteristically, the Civil Rights Congress has formed an Eisler Defense Committee, or committees to protest the denial of public meeting privileges to known Communists, and others which can enlist the support of many Americans genuinely interested in the protection of civil rights (Union Calendar 575, H. Rept. No. 1115, 80th Cong., 1st sess., Report on Civil Rights Congress as a Communist-Front Organization, September 2, 1947. Fifth report, Un-American Activities in California, 1949, pp. 439, 446).

²⁵ G-2 Document No. 16: SMP File D-6628, April 1935, p. 4; G-2 Document No. 6: SMP File D-3956, August 18, 1932-May 23, 1935, pp. 10, 11.

²⁶ G-2 Document No. 12: SMP (French) Dossier No. III-A-3C, March 10, 1930-November 10, 1941, 2-C-16. J. M. Jobez, the former deputy commissioner of intelligence in the French municipal police, Shanghai, again provides collateral information on this notorious case: "Les 19 et 20 aout 1931. Madame Sun Yat-sen qui venait de rentrer de Berlin à Shanghai, recevait de differents organizations et groupes radicaux d'Europe, une serie de telegraphes lui demandant d'intervenir dans l'affaire Noulens et reclamant la liberation des inculpes. Parmi ces telegraphes, à noter ceux des ecrivains et des artistes allemands, des avocats allemands, de Clara Zetkin, membre de la faction communiste du Reichstag (decedee fin juin 1933, en URSS), d'un groupe de membres travaillistes du Parlement Anglais, d'ecrivains, d'artistes et de savants Espagnols, du Comité Central de la Ligue Contre l'Imperialisme, du Comité Central du Secours Ouvrier International, de Romain Rolland, d'Henri Barbusse, etc. * * * Au debut du mois de Septembre 1931 les milieux radicaux étrangers à Shanghai avaient formé, de leur côté, un comité de 'secours' au Secrétaire de l'Union Pan-pacifique Ouvriers.' Parmi les membres de ce comité se trouvaient Madame Agnes Smedley, anarchiste syndicaliste Americaine, bien connue dans les milieux radicaux de la Place, J. B. Powell, rédacteur du journal China Weekly Review, Edgar Snow, H. Isaacs, journalistes radicaux Americains (G-2 Document No. 104). (English translation supplied by the committee: August 19 and 20, 1931. Madame Sun Yat-sen, who had just returned from Berlin to Shanghai, received from various radical European organizations and groups, a series of telegrams demanding of her to intervene in the Noulens case and demanding the liberation of the defendants. Among these telegrams were noted those from writers, German artists, and lawyers: from Clara Zetkin, member of the Communist faction of the Reichstag (deceased the last of June 1933, in the U. S. S. R.); and from a group of members of the Workers Party of the English Parliament; from Spanish writers, artists, and intellectuals; from the Central Committee of the League Against Imperialism; from the Central Committee of the International Labor Defense; from Romain Rolland, Henry Barbusse, etc. . . . At the beginning of the month of September 1931, the intellectual radical foreigners in Shanghai formed, for their part, a committee for aid to the Pan Pacific Trade Union Secretariat. Among the members of this committee was discovered to have been Agnes Smedley, American anarchist trade-unionist, well known in the radical circles of Shanghai; J. B. Powell, editor of the paper, China Weekly Review; Edgar Snow and H. Isaacs, radical American journalists (G-2 Document No. 104).)

Swiss Communist who had been prominent a decade earlier in Switzerland and had come to police notice only sporadically after he had gone to Moscow in 1924.²⁷ After the disclosure of Ruegg's identity, the international committees adopted his real name for their Committee for the Defense of Paul and Gertrude Ruegg. The committee attracted or solicited known Communists, incidental sympathizers, and non-Communist humanitarians, listing Lion Feuchtwanger and Albert Einstein as German members of the committee, and several sentimental Americans then at the height of their fame, including Floyd Dell, Sinclair Lewis, Theodore Dreiser, John Dos Passos, and Oswald Garrison Villard.²⁸

Despite MOPR efforts, the Rueggs were found guilty of seditious activities and imprisoned in Nanking. With the release of many political prisoners, when Nanking fell to the Japanese, the pair were liberated in September 1937 and have since disappeared. Ruegg is reported to have entered the United States in 1939 as Naum Katzenberg²⁹ and another report claims that he again visited Shanghai in 1939, Chungking in 1940, and the Philippines in 1941.³⁰

(c) *Friends of the U. S. S. R.*—The Society of Friends of the U. S. S. R., Shanghai branch was founded in 1932 by Edmond Egon Kisch, a Czechoslovakian Journalist long known as a Comintern agent.³¹ The Shanghai branch of this pro-Soviet Communist front was one of a series of typical overseas societies for cultural relations between the U. S. S. R. and a given country, the autonomous and ostensibly independent branch in the United States being known as the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, the successor to the (American) Friends of the Soviet Union and the American Council on Soviet Relations.³² The purpose behind the formation of these groups is to gain support for Soviet foreign policy objectives through highly publicized participation in these front organizations of "liberal" elements who were presumed to believe sincerely in the altruistic nature of Soviet policy.³³

The names of some of the more important members of the Shanghai branch are known, listing among others in the early 1930's Agnes Smedley, Irene Wiedemeyer (Weitemeyer), and Harold Isaacs.³⁴ Communism unmasks boldly when successful. The character of this society is made plain by its sudden revival in our days in the wake of the Communist conquest of China. A new label appeared, "China-Soviet Friendship Association," and opening meetings were attended by Communist bigwigs like Chou En-lai and Liu Shao-chi. Madame Sun Yat-sen was listed as one of the sponsors of an organization which proclaimed its mission as "the establishment and consolidation of the cultural, economic, and other relations of China and the Soviet Union."

(d) *Friends of China.*—Outside the original range of the friendly societies, but similar to foreign cultural groups for the support of countries presently within the Soviet orbit, the International Friends of China was a front organization which capitalized on western sympathy for China and its defense against Japanese aggression, in order to promote the ends of the Chinese Communists. Like individual fellow travelers, the Friends of China, founded in 1934 with offices in New York, London, and Paris, gave sole credit for Chinese resistance to the Chinese Communists and attempted to divert normal sympathy to support of one party in China. Although its stated aims were lofty, the society tipped its hand when it claimed to have "done much to expose the collaboration of Chiang Kai-shek with the Japanese, British, and American imperialists." Although the London and Paris branches engaged in relatively little activity, European members then included such respectable fronts as the Labor Party's chief whip in the House of Lords, Lord Marley and Bertrand Russell, long known for his interest in China, as well as Edmund Egon Kisch, classified as

²⁷ G-2 Document No. 30: SMP File ZCS-827, March 7, 1932, pp. 21-22.

²⁸ G-2 Document No. 6: SMP File D-3956, August 18, 1932-May 23, 1935, p. 10.

²⁹ Memorandum 19, December 1, 1947, Third (Communist) International, Personnel, p. 43.

³⁰ G-2 Document No. 33: SMP File ZCS-638, October 9, 1947, p. 9.

³¹ G-2 Document No. 10: SMP File D-4718, January 4, 1933-May 20, 1933, p. 31.

³² DA Cir. 192, DA Washington 25, D. C., June 29, 1948.

³³ WDGS, The Soviet Union, p. 56. (Editor:) Membership in a Soviet friendship society is neither charge nor proof of Communist Party membership. Affiliation could be classified as misplaced sympathy. However, when association is combined with more obviously Communist groups, membership in a "friendly" society becomes a practical indication of strong support of Communist world objectives. Thus the imperceptible evolution of the fellow traveler.

³⁴ G-2 Document No. 31: SMP file cards, various: G-2 Document No. 10, SMP File D-4718, various.

an active Comintern agent, and other known Communists. The New York branch, the American Friends of China, which included Earl Browder in its membership, was the most active. Affiliated with the Communist-front American League Against War and Fascism,³⁵ the American Friends of China published its own monthly magazine *China Today* which was pro-Communist.³⁶

The American group also sponsored a Shanghai publication of similar nature, *Voice of China*, published by Max and Grace Granich. This paper, published from March 1936 until the latter part of 1937, although not overtly a Communist publication, portrayed the Chinese Communists as the only defenders of China's independence and resistance to the Japanese. The magazine was suppressed after more than 18 months of existence and the Graniches returned to the United States December 21, 1937.³⁷

(e) *League for Civil Rights*.—The China League for Civil Rights remained in a twilight zone of respectability en route to becoming a Communist-front organization. The group was initially organized by such liberal Kuomintang members as Madame Sun Yat-sen, who, despite her sojourn in Moscow and her acceptance by the CCP, was not then regarded as a Communist, Hu Shih, Lin Yu-tang, and Dr. Tsai Yuan-pei at the height of the Kuomintang persecution of dissident opinion.³⁸ As a Communist front during its comparatively short existence, it was a perfect example of such an organization. Obviously objected to by Kuomintang authorities, who closed its Peiping branch, the high position of the Chinese leaders of the parent organization in Shanghai precluded any direct action against the league by the Nanking authorities until the organization finally liquidated itself after complete lack of success in its objectives.³⁹

(f) *League Against Imperialism*.—The League Against Imperialism was a relatively early Comintern body, founded by German Communists and various colonial nationals as the League for Struggle Against Colonial Oppression. While it existed outside any of the auxiliary groups of the ECCI, its direct connection with Moscow was obvious and its basis was article 8 of the conditions of admission to the Comintern, obliging Comintern sections in countries with colonies to advocate and support the "liberation" of colonial populations. At a 1927 Congress in Brussels, the notorious Willi Muenzenberg formed the League Against Imperialism as a front or so-called innocents group which would serve as a rallying point for anti-imperialist national revolutionary movements and promote the U. S. S. R. as the champion of the liberty of colonial people.⁴⁰ Agnes Smedley, during her Berlin days, admits having been present when her Indian friends participated with the Communists in founding the league⁴¹ and took an active part, shortly after her arrival in Shanghai in May 1929, in organizing the China League Against Imperialism.⁴² The Chinese branch, along with its western counterpart, took an active part in attempting to agitate mass pressure in the Noulens case⁴³ and participated in several antiforeign movements, later becoming involved with the Antiwar Congress.

Typical of the Communist-front organization in seeking respectable stooges, the Antiwar Congress boasted Ellen Wilkinson, the Labor MP, and Lord Marley as leading names.⁴⁴ Following a congress in Amsterdam in August 1932, Lord Marley and a party of foreigners sailed for Shanghai to attend an Asiatic Congress Against Imperialist War. The Chinese Communists had no illusions about this group, despite its "liberal" front, often referring to it as the Barbusse Mission after one of its members, Henri Barbusse, a prominent member of the Comintern and publisher of the French Communist organs *L'Humanité* and *Le Monde*.⁴⁵

³⁵(Editor.) The World Committee Against War and Fascism, organized in 1932, was designed to direct public opinion against any aggressor against the Soviet Union and to promote noninterventionist pacifism. Although many members of the World Committee were non-Communists, its control was in the hands of such Communists as Willi Muenzenberg and Henri Barbusse. Memorandum 17, October 29, 1947, Third (Communist) International, Structure and Functions, p. 56.

³⁶G-2 Document No. 91: SMP File D-7356, April 16, 1936, p. 3.

³⁷G-2 Document No. 4: SMP File D-7298, March 3, 1936–December 30, 1937.

³⁸Editor: The presence of at least two foreigners, Smedley and Isaacs, is worthy of note. G-2 Document No. 31, SMP file cords, various.

³⁹G-2 Document No. 96: SMP File D-4455, February 2, 1933–May 14, 1935, p. 32.

⁴⁰Memorandum 17, October 29, 1947, Third (Communist) International Structure and Functions, pp. 7, 56 et al.

⁴¹Battle Hymn of China, op. cit., p. 24.

⁴²G-2 Document No. 4: SMP File D-7298, March 3, 1936–December 30, 1937, p. 55.

⁴³G-2 Document No. 19: SMP File No. D-3527, April 18, 1932–August 18, 1932, p. 4. G-2 Document No. 68: SMP File D-2554, October 12, 1933, pp. 10, 11, 15.

⁴⁴G-2 Document No. 59: SMP File D-4380, July 6, 1933–February 10, 1936.

⁴⁵G-2 Document No. 45: SMP File D-517, September 19–October 28, 1929, p. 12; G-2 Document No. 68: SMP File D-4380/5, August 25, 1933, pp. 90, 113, etc.

The Antiwar Congress presumably was to gather data on Japanese aggression, the Comintern having denounced the 1931 Lytton Mission as a "whitewash" by the "imperialist organ," the League of Nations. Madame Sun Yat-sen, China representative of the World Committee Against Imperialist War, headed the welcoming committee and a host of organizations in China promoted the mission, organizing mass welcome demonstrations but tying in the visit with the necessity for the "extension of the revolutionary struggle." Joined with these ostensibly Chinese problems were demands "to oppose the imperialist attack on the U. S. S. R." as well as to "celebrate the recent victories of the (Chinese) Red armies" and "to oppose Christianity and fascism."⁴⁶ On hand to welcome the mission were Agnes Smedley and delegates from America, Canada, and Australia. It appears, however, that the Antiwar Congress accomplished nothing: Lord Marley spoke at a few meetings, was shocked when taken through a colony of laborers' hovels, and departed Shanghai less than 2 months after his arrival.⁴⁷

(g) *Zeitgeist Bookstore*.—The *Zeitgeist Bookstore*, established by Irene E. L. Wiedemeyer (Weitemeyer) in November 1930, was part of a widespread and elaborate Comintern network operating from the International Union of Revolutionary Writers in Moscow. Prior to the advent of Hitler, the *Zeitgeist Buchhandlung* in Berlin, with a branch office of its own in Moscow, was an important Comintern cultural outlet, part of a syndicate headed by Willi Muenzenberg, who was also German head of the League Against Imperialism, of the Comintern's own bank in Paris, the Banque Commerciale Pour l'Enrope du Nord, and a vast number of other Comintern organizations and enterprises until he was read out of the Comintern in 1938, 2 years before his suicide.⁴⁸ The Shanghai branch of the *Zeitgeist Bookstore* was set up as a focal distribution point of the International Union of Revolutionary Writers, stocking Communist publications in German and English as well as more legitimate literature, mainly in German. The amount of business transacted by the *Zeitgeist Bookstore* was small and the shop closed in 1933, ostensibly due to its poor finances. A more likely reason was the destruction of the legalized German Communist Party since, after a trip to Europe in the autumn of 1933, Irene Weidemeyer returned to Shanghai on September 9, 1934 to set herself up in the book business again, this time as the Shanghai representative of International Publishers of New York.⁴⁹ The latter organization has long been the publishers of American Communist Party writings and the American distributor of International Literature.⁵⁰

Although Miss Wiedemeyer acted as the agent of International Publishers, another Shanghai group was also known as the authorized agents for International Literature. Mrs. V. N. Sotoff (Sotov), the wife of the head of the Shanghai agency of TASS, operated the American Book & Supply Co., which sold International Literature; it is significant, however, that the American Book & Supply Co. and Miss Wiedemeyer's agency occupied offices in the same building at 410 Szechuan Road.⁵¹

Miss Wiedemeyer had had some background in the Third International although there are gaps in information on her activities in Shanghai. She had married Wu Shao-kuo, a Chinese Communist, in Germany in 1925 and had studied the principles of revolutionary movements in Asia at the Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow in 1926-27. In Shanghai she knew Agnes Smedley well and was a member of the Noulens Defense Committee and the Society of Friends of the U. S. S. R. She, as well as Smedley and Isaacs during 1932 were reported to have been in close contact with John M. Murray, an American correspondent for the Pacific News Agency, a Vancouver organization listed as an outlet of the Comintern and possibly a front for the League Against Imperialism and Colonial Oppression of Canada.⁵² In any event the particular role of the leftist bookshop was to operate as an outlet for revolutionary literature, rendezvous of espionage partisans and fellow travelers. Wiedemeyer's (Weitemeyer) *Zeitgeist Bookstore* is covered elsewhere in the Sorge Trial Records. Ozaki, Sorge's

⁴⁶ G-2 Document No. 68: SMP File D-4380, July 15-August 18, 1933, pp. 161, 186.

⁴⁷ G-2 Document No. 68: SMP File D-4380/5, September 28, 1933, p. 93. G-2 Document No. 59: SMP File D-4380, July 6, 1933-February 10, 1936.

⁴⁸ Memorandum 17, October 29, 1947, Third (Communist) International, Structure and Functions, pp. 37, 41, 42, et al. (Editor:) This report presents an interesting picture of some of the activities of a remarkable Comintern agent.

⁴⁹ G-2 Document No. 23: SMP File D-6480, November 14, 1934-February 13, 1935, p. 5. SMP file card (Weitemeyer).

⁵⁰ G-2 Document No. 23: SMP File D-6480, November 14, 1934-February 13, 1935, p. 5.

⁵¹ G-2 Document No. 31: SMP file card (Weitemeyer).

⁵² G-2 Document No. 10: SMP File D-4718. January 4, 1933-May 20, 1933, pp. 29-32.

right-hand man, was introduced by Smedley in Weitemeyer's bookshop, rendezvous of Shanghai leftists, mail drop for espionage agents.⁵³ Later on, during his imprisonment in Sugamo, he wrote a pathetic letter on June 8, 1943:

" * * * I may say that, in a more profound sense, my meeting with Agnes Smedley and Richard Sorge had been predestined * * * my subsequent decision to follow the narrow road was determined by my encounter with them * * *"

The little bookshop had done its bit as a recruiting station for the Fourth Bureau (Intelligence) of the Soviet Army—but the narrow road led to the gallows!

(h) *Ancillary American contributory factors.*—The interlocking court records of the Sorge case and the files of the Shanghai municipal police show a very considerable traffic of shady international characters, over a long period of years. Their clandestine operations in the thirties have paved the way for the collapse of Nationalist China in recent years, under the cumulative impact of the Japanese occupation.

The recent State Department white paper throws some flickering light on this complex, general problem:

"* * * The combined force of overpopulation and new ideas set in motion the Chinese revolution, first under the leadership of Sun Yat-Sen and later Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. It should be remembered that Soviet doctrine and practice had a measurable effect upon the thinking and principles of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen particularly in terms of economics and party organization and that the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists cooperated until 1927, when the Third International demanded a predominant position in the Government and in the Army. It was this demand which precipitated the break between the two groups. * * *"

This is an oblique admission that the infant republic was weaned on Soviet doctrine and practice; it easily explains the widow Sun Yat-Sen as a front for many Communist efforts and it concedes naively, that the Chinese Communist Party came under the orders of the Third International, the recognized Soviet tool of internal sabotage and subversion, in its demands on the government and army in 1927—and thereafter.

The Shanghai police records contain many items in which American diplomatic and consular officers have attempted to stem the Red tide, by denying the protection of the International Settlement or American pseudo-citizenship to these operators; a classical case is the intervention of the American consul to stop the publication of *The Voice of China*.⁵⁴

While the white paper apparently skirts the conspiratorial underground, it confirms the impact of the Comintern apparatus, amply evident in the Sorge and Shanghai documents; it can at once be stated that individual propagandists and operators like Smedley and Stein, and the horde of saboteurs, agents, fellow travelers and dupes, unleashed by the Comintern, represent the major element in this Oriental disaster and their nefarious work must be considered a contributory and even decisive factor.

Mr. TAVENNER. I desire also to introduce in evidence a map tracing the connection of the various organizations concerning which you have testified with various Soviet Government agencies and divisions of the Comintern. I will hand it to you and ask you to identify it.

General WILLOUGHBY. It is so identified, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. I offer it in evidence and ask that it be marked "Willoughby Exhibit No. 42."

Mr. WOOD. It will be admitted.

(The map above referred to, marked "Willoughby Exhibit No. 42," is filed herewith.)

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you explain briefly to the committee what it purports to show?

⁵³ Vol. II of five volumes of procurator's examination of Ozaki, Hozumi; Interrogation No. 20, March 5, 1942, Question 14 et al.

⁵⁴ See footnote 36; pt. III; G-2 Doc. 4, SMP File D-7298, March 3, 1936-December 30, 1937.

General WILLOUGHBY. Intensive examination of the Shanghai records, plus other supporting evidence available to the G-2 section in Tokyo, made it comparatively easy to reconstruct the organizational family tree of the Third (Communist) International.

The upper part of this family tree is the Communist mother unit. The next part shows the foreign ancillaries, in this instance leading into China. The third part is devoted to Shanghai. The box International Red Aid leads to International Labor Defense (United States) and Civil Rights Congress. I again refer to the article by Craig Thompson in the Saturday Evening Post of February 17, 1951, which covers this specifically with reference to the United States. I covered it specifically with reference to Shanghai. That is the purpose of this chart.

Mr. TAVENNER. General Willoughby, in the course of your tenure in Tokyo, were you acquainted with a person by the name of Philip Keeney, or did you have occasion to look into the case of Philip Keeney?

General WILLOUGHBY. As a citizen, Mr. Counsel, I am very anxious to be of service to this committee, but as a Federal employee and functionary, I am expected to carry out to the letter the regulations of the Army and the Presidential directive of March 1948, under the terms of which I must respectfully decline to dwell on this individual, since he was a Federal employee and no reference to his files is permitted, derogatory or otherwise.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Keeney has appeared before this committee, but he did not cooperate.

I believe you were asked questions before another committee relating to several other Government employees?

General WILLOUGHBY. I was.

Mr. TAVENNER. Is your answer the same as to those as to Philip Keeney?

General WILLOUGHBY. My technical objection is the same, on account of the clear-cut regulatory orders.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, I believe that is all.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Doyle, do you have further questions?

Mr. DOYLE. I want to renew my question, then, if it is proper at this place to ask the general to give us the benefit of his recommendations as to remedial legislation to meet the problem facing this country with regard to subversive activities. If you have any suggestions or advice as to what further we can do in meeting the situation which originates domestically or is instigated from foreign countries, give us that.

General WILLOUGHBY. I have strong feelings on this entire field, and am delighted at this opportunity of submitting certain thoughts that might be termed recommendations.

First, the Federal Government should give full and unqualified support to this committee. Possibly a joint House-Senate committee is indicated, as they are operating in the same sphere of investigation.

Such committee should be supported financially in order that their research staffs may be increased. I have the impression that while these staffs are doing a first-class job, they obviously are limited both in time and personnel.

With reference to such expanded allocation of funds to support the research staffs of such committees as this, there should be established a central file or record system in which information of this kind ultimately finds its place, for future reference, or so that these interlocking relationships could be traced.

Second, the FBI should be vigorously supported. In my association over many years with the FBI, I hold the highest regard for the efficiency of that body. The authority should be extended from its present field to include the international relationships in the areas of subversion.

Third, their work should be made easier by the elimination of legalistic juridical objections. For example, to determine whether wiretapping under certain conditions is illegal. Wiretapping is in the same category as furnishing a pistol to a law enforcing agency combating crime. All law-enforcing agencies, with particular regard to the FBI, should be given free play in their fight against these subterranean forces of evil which have no such fine distinction as to whether or not wiretapping is or is not illegal. The law-enforcing agency combating them should be given complete liberty of action.

Fourth, having remarked once on the excellent work of the California State Committee on Un-American Activities, I would recommend that each State legislature form and maintain such a committee and that this network of proposed State un-American activities committees cooperate, on a correspondence or secretarial basis, with this congressional committee, so that the investigative process Statewide blankets the Nation.

I also would recommend that at least one State university, or universities, should at once institute special research courses leading to academic degrees, or acceptable under that classification, to study the mechanism of communism and to disseminate combative literature to that effect.

That, roughly, is my thought on the subject.

Mr. DOYLE. You didn't mention any legislation other than what we now have.

General WILLOUGHBY. I am glad you reminded me of it.

I think that any legislation that in your experience you have found to be deficient in your line of inquiry should be strengthened or new legislation provided, in order to satisfy the experience, for example, by this committee in its past dealings; in fact, legislation to make this committee permanent and not subject to, shall we say, an allocation of funds, so that if the funds are not forthcoming the personnel collapses. There is room for a permanent watchdog on a congressional and State level for the laudable purposes of this inquiry.

Mr. DOYLE. Thank you very much.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Velde, any further questions?

Mr. VELDE. General, I want to thank you for the very fine contribution you have made to this committee as a result of your very extensive and distinguished service as Intelligence Chief to General MacArthur.

It occurred to me while you were testifying that your hands were tied a little bit by this Presidential directive issued in April of 1948, and subsequent Presidential directives. I realize full well that it would be unwise for this committee to have available to it all of the files of the FBI, or all of the G-2 files, but it does seem to me that

certain files, especially the older files, personnel files, loyalty files, should be available to congressional committees for their examination and perusal.

I wonder if you agree with me on that?

General WILLOUGHBY. May I say that I am reluctant to criticize Presidential directives, but that the legislative liberty which is accorded to Congress would, of course, enable them to pursue their channels of inquiry according to the dictates of their conscience.

Mr. VELDE. With reference to your recommendation relative to the FBI and other investigative agencies, I happen to be familiar with the operations of the FBI, being a former FBI agent myself. I realize their hands are tied in certain investigations, especially those involving subversives, by the fact it is difficult to obtain the permission of the Attorney General in many cases to install wire taps or secret means of obtaining information. However, it may be done, with the authority of the Attorney General, and he only grants that authority, as I understand it, when there is other corroborative evidence of subversive activity in violation of the Federal laws. Do you think that procedure should be changed in any way?

General WILLOUGHBY. While I am anxious to be of assistance to you, Mr. Velde, of course my specialty has been in a slightly different category. I believe the Congress is in a position to effect such regulations as they see fit, and my opinion is practically worthless.

Mr. VELDE. When did you say that the Japanese intelligence were first aware of the fact that the Sorge spy ring was operating in Japan?

General WILLOUGHBY. They must have been aware of it for some time, because they intercepted Klausen's radio messages to the Siberian radio station. They knew by that token they were in contact with some foreign agent. But Klausen had domicile furnished by the British subject Guenther Stein, and shifted his station continually so that they were not able to catch up with him.

Mr. VELDE. Japan was on peaceful terms with Russia during the thirties?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. That was a contributing factor.

Mr. VELDE. Would you say the Japanese had intelligence of the Sorge spy ring as far back as 1935?

General WILLOUGHBY. That is not my impression; that is too far back; that is too far back. As a matter of fact, Sorge, as I recall, was in and out twice. I would have to look this up.

Mr. VELDE. Of course, it isn't too important. I just wanted to bring out the fact you have so ably brought out so many times, that we have a counterpart to the Sorge spy ring, or did have, and I suppose it is still functioning in the United States of America, and the first conclusive evidence that there was a Soviet spy ring operating in this country was adduced in March 1943, that late, although it was determined the spy ring had been operating sometime prior to that time, and probably back as far as 1934 or 1935. And I might say that the evidence that was produced was substantiated by highly confidential means such as you have been discussing.

The only difficulty that we have, as I see it, is the fact that after evidence is obtained by highly confidential means, it is not permitted as evidence in courts of law. I think our distinguished colleague, Mr. Walter, is considering a bill before the Judiciary Committee at this

time to make evidence secured by wire tapping and other confidential means admissible in courts of law.

Do you concur that that would be a good recommendation for legislation?

General WILLOUGHBY. I concur. I have already gone on record that all legalistic juridical objections in the way of law-enforcing and investigative agencies should be removed, without touching the individual liberty in its broad concept, in order to make their work both easier and more effective. I selected wire tapping. Perhaps there are other references possible. To be morally sensitive when you are dealing with a criminal strikes me as silly.

Mr. VELDE. Of course we all hate to have our rights of privacy violated. I know I do, and I am sure you do too. But in cases where we are liable to lose all our rights if we don't use such method, I think the method is justified.

General WILLOUGHBY. I assume it would only be applied against subversive and criminal groups. The average citizen of probity would hardly be exposed to it, and if he were, he could easily make his position defensible, I have a feeling.

Mr. VELDE. Thank you again.

Mr. WOOD. General, I join with other members of the committee in conveying to you the very deep appreciation that this committee feels for the effort you have expended, and the considerable sacrifice of your strength in the present condition of your health, as well as your time, to come here and give the committee and the American people the valuable information you have given.

After all, we only operate as the agents and representatives of the people. We have no power other than to make known to the American people, as best we can, what is going on that strikes at our liberty and way of life. I am particularly impressed with what you had to say, and appreciative.

I wouldn't be entirely human if I didn't also take this opportunity to express very great gratification for your feeling about this committee. This committee has been in existence a relatively short time. We operate under a limited budget. It is significant that this committee has in its employ only eight investigators, who have to cover a wide area. Every member of this committee, elected Member of the Congress itself, has other committee assignments besides this, in addition to the general work as Members of Congress in undertaking to study and pass intelligently on legislation that comes before the Congress, which makes it obviously imperative that we lean rather heavily upon our counsel and staff, and we are very fortunate to have a staff and counsel of which no one needs to be ashamed, and of which we are very proud.

It has occurred to me—not now but sometime at your leisure, today or tomorrow or some future time—you might find an opportunity to confer with the investigative staff and counsel of this committee and, out of the abundance of your wide knowledge and experience, you might make some suggestions, perhaps, to the staff that would be beneficial to them in the performance of the various and many duties piling in both day and night.

I happen to know that members of this staff work long hours. There is no clock-watching on this committee. Frequently they go for 24

hours at a time without sleep. I felt that perhaps you might be in a position to be of some assistance to them by making such suggestions as you might think would be helpful to them, out of the abundance of your experience.

Mr. Counsel, do you have any further questions you desire to ask the general?

Mr. TAVENNER. It is my thought that there is other testimony which is vital to the committee.

Mr. WOOD. I understood we wanted to have an executive session with the general, and if he can join us for an executive session we would be very grateful to him.

(Thereupon, at 4:50 p. m., the public testimony of General Willoughby was concluded, and a subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities proceeded to go into executive session.)

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