



HEARINGS RELATING TO H.R. 352, H.R. 1617, H.R. 5368,
H.R. 8320, H.R. 8757, H.R. 10036, H.R. 10037, H.R.
10077, AND H.R. 11718, PROVIDING FOR CREATION OF
A FREEDOM COMMISSION AND FREEDOM ACADEMY

Part 1

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
EIGHTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 18 AND 19, 1964
(INDEX IN PART 2)

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COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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PUBLIC LAW 601, 79TH CONGRESS

The legislation under which the House Committee on Un-American Activities operates is Public Law 601, 79th Congress [1946]; 60 Stat. 812, which provides:

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, * * **

PART 2—RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

RULE X

SEC. 121. STANDING COMMITTEES

* * * * *
17. Committee on Un-American Activities, to consist of nine Members.

RULE XI

POWERS AND DUTIES OF COMMITTEES

* * * * *
(q)(1) Committee on Un-American Activities.

(A) Un-American activities.

(2) The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcommittee, is authorized to make from time to time investigations of (i) the extent, character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, (ii) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and (iii) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation.

The Committee on Un-American Activities shall report to the House (or to the Clerk of the House if the House is not in session) the results of any such investigation, together with such recommendations as it deems advisable.

For the purpose of any such investigation, the Committee on Un-American Activities, or any subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such times and places within the United States, whether or not the House is sitting, has recessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, to require the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, and to take such testimony, as it deems necessary. Subpenas may be issued under the signature of the chairman of the committee or any subcommittee, or by any member designated by any such chairman, and may be served by any person designated by any such chairman or member.

* * * * *

RULE XII

LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT BY STANDING COMMITTEES

SEC. 136. To assist the Congress in appraising the administration of the laws and in developing such amendments or related legislation as it may deem necessary, each standing committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall exercise continuous watchfulness of the execution by the administrative agencies concerned of any laws, the subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of such committee; and, for that purpose, shall study all pertinent reports and data submitted to the Congress by the agencies in the executive branch of the Government.

RULES ADOPTED BY THE 88TH CONGRESS

House Resolution 5, January 9, 1963

RULE X

STANDING COMMITTEES

1. There shall be elected by the House, at the commencement of each Congress,

(r) Committee on Un-American Activities, to consist of nine Members.

RULE XI

POWERS AND DUTIES OF COMMITTEES

18. Committee on Un-American Activities.

(a) Un-American activities.

(b) The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcommittee, is authorized to make from time to time investigations of (1) the extent, character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, (2) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and (3) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation.

The Committee on Un-American Activities shall report to the House (or to the Clerk of the House if the House is not in session) the results of any such investigation, together with such recommendations as it deems advisable.

For the purpose of any such investigation, the Committee on Un-American Activities, or any subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such times and places within the United States, whether or not the House is sitting, has recessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, to require the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, and to take such testimony as it deems necessary. Subpenas may be issued under the signature of the chairman of the committee or any subcommittee, or by any member designated by any such chairman, and may be served by any person designated by any such chairman or member.

27. To assist the House in appraising the administration of the laws and in developing such amendments or related legislation as it may deem necessary, each standing committee of the House shall exercise continuous watchfulness of the execution by the administrative agencies concerned of any laws, the subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of such committee; and, for that purpose, shall study all pertinent reports and data submitted to the House by the agencies in the executive branch of the Government.

FOREWORD

Nine bills to establish a Freedom Commission and Academy were referred to the Committee on Un-American Activities during the 88th Congress. They are H.R. 352, introduced by Mr. Herlong on January 9, 1963; H.R. 1617, by Mr. Gubser on January 10, 1963; H.R. 5368, by Mr. Boggs on April 2, 1963; H.R. 8320, by Mr. Taft on August 30, 1963; H.R. 8757, by Mr. Schweiker on October 8, 1963; H.R. 10036, by Mr. Ashbrook on February 20, 1964; H.R. 10037, by Mr. Clausen on February 20, 1964; H.R. 10077, by Mr. Schadeberg on February 24, 1964; H.R. 11718, by Mr. Talcott on June 24, 1964.

All of these bills, though they vary somewhat in detail,¹ have the same purpose—to provide for the establishment, under Federal auspices, of a cold war educational and research institution which would be run by an independent seven-man commission, whose chairman and members would be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the Senate, and which would operate under the general supervision of the Congress in the sense that it would have to report to it regularly and would be dependent upon it for its appropriations.

The purpose of the Academy would be to improve the ability of the United States, and the free world generally, to wage the cold war in which it is presently engaged with the international forces of communism. It would accomplish this in two ways: First, by instructing its students on the subject of communism generally, its strategy and tactics, and the weapons and devices it is using in all parts of the world to subvert free nations and replace them with Communist dictatorships; secondly, by conducting research to develop new techniques which the United States and other non-Communist nations can utilize in resisting and defeating all types of Communist “cold” warfare.

The cold war, as waged by the Communists, in the view of advocates of the Freedom Academy concept, has many different aspects. It includes traditional military or “hot” warfare and guerrilla warfare (i.e., Korea and South Vietnam) and also conventional diplomatic maneuvering. But it also includes economic, political, and psychological warfare; subversion; and numerous other unconventional forms of conflict.

The free world, according to the Freedom Academy concept, is doing a more or less adequate job of study and training only in the traditional fields of military operations and diplomacy. Little or no training and research is being undertaken in the various unconventional aspects of cold warfare which are just as important as, and may be more decisive in the long run than, traditional military operations and conventional diplomacy.

The Communist bloc, on the other hand, beginning with the establishment of the Lenin School in Moscow in the twenties, has been training specialists in all forms of cold or unconventional warfare for

¹ See Appendix A, pp. 1111–1174.

almost 40 years. At the present time, scores of such schools exist in all parts of the Communist world—not only behind the Iron Curtain, but in Red China, in Cuba and, on a limited and covert scale, even within the borders of free nations. Many thousands of graduates of these schools, professionals in varied forms of unconventional warfare, are daily working in all parts of the globe to undermine non-Communist nations and promote Communist aims. The free world does not have a trained counterforce on all levels of public and private life to engage and defeat these Communist “troops.”

Advocates of Freedom Academy legislation believe that the free world needs such a force and that their Academy proposal offers an effective means for developing one.

The bills referred to the committee provide that a broad range of students would attend the Freedom Academy. They would fall into three general categories:

1. Officials of the U.S. Government whose agencies are in any way involved in the U.S. effort to resist communism.

2. Leaders from all walks of civilian life in this country (broad comprehension of the nature of the conflict in which we are engaged—and also citizen participation in it—are essential to the U.S. effort to preserve and strengthen freedom and resist communism).

Students in this category would come from the ranks of management and labor, education, religion, the arts and sciences, and also civic, veterans, women's, fraternal, professional, and similar groups.

3. Leaders and potential leaders from all walks of life, governmental and private, from foreign countries. They would include representatives of our NATO and SEATO allies, as well as the newly independent nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, where the knowledge of the real nature of communism and the cold war is essential if the United States is to be successful in resisting further Communist encroachments and thus the weakening of freedom and its own position in all parts of the world.

The Freedom Academy would be purely a research and educational institution. It would not engage in operational activities of any kind. Its students, however, whether citizens of this or foreign countries and whether Government officials or privately employed, would utilize the knowledge gained at the Academy to improve measures now being utilized to resist communism and to develop new operations, governmental as well as private, to aid in this effort.

HEARINGS RELATING TO H.R. 352, H.R. 1617, H.R. 5368, H.R. 8320, H.R. 8757, H.R. 10036, H.R. 10037, H.R. 10077, AND H.R. 11718, PROVIDING FOR CREATION OF A FREEDOM COMMISSION AND FREEDOM ACADEMY

Part 1

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1964

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D.C.

PUBLIC HEARINGS

The Committee on Un-American Activities met, pursuant to call, at 10:10 a.m. in the Caucus Room, Cannon House Office Building, Washington, D.C., Hon. Edwin E. Willis (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Representatives Edwin E. Willis, of Louisiana; Joe R. Pool, of Texas; Richard H. Ichord, of Missouri; George F. Senner, Jr., of Arizona; Donald C. Bruce, of Indiana; Henry C. Schadeberg, of Wisconsin; and John M. Ashbrook, of Ohio.

Staff members present: Francis J. McNamara, director; Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., general counsel; and Alfred M. Nittle, counsel.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will please come to order.

The committee is meeting today to consider certain bills referred to it which would establish a Freedom Commission and Freedom Academy as an independent agency of the United States Government.

The purpose of the Academy would be to conduct research to assist in the development of the methods and means which we in the free world can employ, in both the Government and private sectors, to defeat all forms of Communist political warfare, subversion, and insurgency, while seeking to preserve and build free and viable societies, and to provide training in this area for Government personnel, private citizens, and foreign nationals.

There are five bills before the committee: H.R. 352, introduced by Mr. Herlong on January 9, 1963; H.R. 1617, introduced by Mr. Gubser on January 10, 1963; H.R. 5368, introduced by Mr. Boggs on April 2, 1963; H.R. 8320, introduced by Mr. Taft on August 30, 1963; and H.R. 8757, introduced by Mr. Schweiker on October 8, 1963.

These bills are substantially the same in relation to their purpose and provisions, with one significant exception. H.R. 352, H.R. 5368, and H.R. 8320 make provision for an Advisory Committee to the Freedom Academy composed of representatives from executive agencies concerned with the Academy's objectives, to insure cooperation between the Academy and these agencies, as well as to review the opera-

tions of the Commission and report its findings annually to the President and the Congress.

H.R. 1617, on the other hand, provides for a Joint Congressional Freedom Committee to supervise the activities of the Commission and to study and hold hearings on matters related to its objectives. H.R. 8757 provides for neither an Advisory Committee nor a Joint Congressional Freedom Committee.

The establishment of a Freedom Commission and Freedom Academy was first proposed by Mr. Herlong when he filed the bill H.R. 3880 on February 2, 1959. H.R. 3880 was referred to this committee, which asked the Departments of State and Justice for their views on the measure. In a letter dated July 23, 1959, the Department of State advised the then chairman of this committee that although it was in agreement with the basic objective of the bill, to increase knowledge and understanding of the international Communist menace, the Department felt there was no need to create a new agency to accomplish this objective. It stated that existing agencies could be used with less risk of confusion, overlapping of responsibilities, and duplication of effort. The Department of Justice expressed the same view in a letter dated May 18, 1959.

On April 15, 1959, S. 1689, a companion bill to H.R. 3880, was introduced in the Senate by Messrs. Mundt and Douglas. The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings on this bill in June of that year. The bill was subsequently reported out by the Senate committee and passed the Senate on August 31, 1960, with no opportunity for action on the bill in the House, in view of the adjournment of Congress 1 day later.

Several Freedom Commission and Freedom Academy bills were introduced in the 87th Congress and referred to this committee. The Department of State was again requested to present its views. On June 7, 1962, the Department advised the committee that plans were currently under way to expand the Foreign Service Institute and to broaden its training responsibilities to meet the needs of the changing times and that, for this and other reasons set forth, it opposed the Freedom Academy bills.

As has been noted, five bills have been offered in the House during the 88th Congress to create a Freedom Commission and Freedom Academy. In addition, S. 414, with provisions identical to H.R. 5368, one of the House bills we are now considering, was introduced in the Senate on January 22, 1963, by Mr. Mundt, for himself and Messrs. Douglas, Case, Dodd, Smathers, Goldwater, Proxmire, Fong, Hickenlooper, Miller, Keating, Lausche, and Scott.

In April and May of 1963, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, to which S. 414 was referred on request of its chairman, held consolidated hearings on the bill and on S. 865, a bill to establish a National Academy of Foreign Affairs. No report on these bills, however, has been made.

This committee has requested the views of various agencies of the executive branch on the Freedom Academy bills now pending before it. The executive departments have been unanimous and uniform in their response. The Department of State, in a letter of April 8, 1963, the United States Information Agency, in a letter of April 19, 1963, and the Department of Defense in a letter of March 29,

1963, all opposed the establishment of a Freedom Commission and Freedom Academy, on the new ground that the proposed creation of a National Academy of Foreign Affairs is, in their opinion, the most practical and realistic approach to the basic purposes of H.R. 352. These views and the views of others will be explored in the course of these hearings.

As a matter of information, the proposed National Academy of Foreign Affairs would be an institution for, and limited to, the education and training of officials engaged in the conduct of this country's foreign affairs.

I now direct that the bills, H.R. 352, 1617, 5368, 8320, and 8757, and that all letters received from the various executive agencies expressing their views on the Freedom Academy bills be printed in full in the record.¹

We are very fortunate, indeed, to have with us this morning the gentleman who introduced the first bill on this subject and who has been the sparkplug in its consideration and we will be glad to hear from him. Mr. Herlong, of Florida.

Syd, we are very glad to have you. We know of your deep interest in this.

**STATEMENT OF HON. A. SYDNEY HERLONG, JR., U.S.
REPRESENTATIVE FROM FLORIDA**

Mr. HERLONG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee.

I want to first express my appreciation to you for holding these hearings and tell you that I think you are doing a real service to our country in holding hearings, which I hope will result in some action on this legislation. I appreciate the review that you gave to the committee of what has happened up to now.

To refresh the memory of the members of the committee, and I hope not to be too repetitive, I would like to say that originally, Dr. Judd, our former colleague from Minnesota, and I introduced this legislation on February 2, 1959. In that same year, Senator Mundt and Senator Douglas, joined by a number of other Senators, introduced a companion bill in the Senate. The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee held extensive hearings on the bill and finally, in 1960, actually passed the bill, but it was too late to do anything about it in the House, and no hearings were held, and no action was taken in the House.

The Senate did, in its consideration of the bill, amend it in a number of respects, which did not change the substance of the bill at all, but it did greatly improve the language, and we supported those improvements.

(At this point Mr. Schadeberg entered the hearing room.)

Mr. HERLONG. Now, in the 87th Congress, I introduced the bill again and instead of using the original version that I had used, I used the version that passed in the Senate. And nothing was done, either

¹Since the date of these hearings, four additional bills regarding establishment of a Freedom Commission and Freedom Academy have been introduced. They are: H.R. 10036, introduced by Mr. Ashbrook February 20, 1964; H.R. 10037, introduced by Mr. Clausen February 20, 1964; H.R. 10077, introduced by Mr. Schadeberg February 24, 1964; and H.R. 11718, introduced by Mr. Talcott June 24, 1964. For all of these bills and letters, see Appendix A, part 1, pp. 1111-1190.

in the House or in the Senate, in the 87th Congress. In the 88th Congress, I have again, along with my colleague from California, Mr. Gubser, introduced the same bill that passed the Senate in 1960.

Prior to our introduction in the 88th Congress, there was extensive work done on revision of this bill, and the new copy was not available for me at the time I introduced H.R. 352 in the 88th Congress, but shortly thereafter it was available and was introduced in the House by my colleague from Louisiana, Mr. Boggs, as H.R. 5368 and by my colleague from Ohio, Mr. Taft, as H.R. 8320.

These are two of the bills that the committee has before it at this time, and I want at this time to make it crystal clear to the committee that there is no conflict between any of us who have introduced these bills. The ones which Mr. Boggs and which Mr. Taft have introduced, we think, are very much the best bills of the lot. They are stronger and better worded and they are the bills which I intend to support and they are the ones which I hope the committee will start on in an effort to work out some legislation in this field.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, this is further proof of your deep interest in this thing. You are not playing around with pride of authorship; what you want is sound, good legislation.

Mr. HERLONG. Mr. Chairman, I have always tried to operate under the theory that there is no limit to how much good you can do, if you do not care who gets the credit.

H.R. 8757, which was introduced by Mr. Schweiker, the gentleman from Pennsylvania, was the original bill. It was the same bill that was introduced by Dr. Judd and me on February 2, 1959. There is still no conflict between the various concepts or between the Members who have introduced these bills. We just think that more work was done on these latter two bills and we think that you can find them a better version on which to work than either of the other three bills.

Mr. Chairman, before I get into a discussion of the bill, there are several important witnesses who are not scheduled for appearances before the committee this week because they could not adjust their personal schedules in order to be present. And I believe if these people could be afforded an opportunity to either present statements for the record, or to testify in person at a later date, it would add a great deal to this committee's understanding, not only of this particular measure, but, in fact, of the whole area which is under discussion. Among these persons I would like the committee to hear are our former colleague, Dr. Judd of Minnesota, who introduced the original bill with me; Herbert Philbrick, who I am sure needs no introduction to the members of this committee; Dr. Leo Cherne, executive director of the Research Institute of America and former chairman of the International Rescue Committee; and Admiral Arleigh Burke, who now heads the Center for Strategic Studies at Georgetown.

I hope it will be possible that the record of these hearings be kept open for a sufficient length of time in order that these and several other important witnesses might submit written statements. It would even be better, Mr. Chairman, if they could testify in person at a later date, so that the members of this committee might have the opportunity to question them.

Now, I realize that your committee is already heavily burdened, but I would hope, because of what I feel is the paramount importance

of this proposed legislation, that you will make it possible for these people to be heard at a later date or, if you cannot do that, certainly see that their statements are included in the record of the hearings.

The CHAIRMAN. I might mention that we discussed this very question this morning in executive session and we were advised along the lines you indicated, that other people scheduled to appear this week could not come. I am quite sure that what you request is the course we will follow because we do want all the information we can possibly get on this subject. And we want to have the views of the best minds in the country interested in the objectives of all these bills before we come to a final conclusion.

Mr. HERLONG. I thank the chairman very much.

Now, Mr. Chairman, only a short distance off the shores of my own State of Florida, on the island of Cuba, Communists are operating. They are also operating in Cuba a number of schools, teaching the many strategies and tactics of subversion and revolutionary warfare. Thousands of Communists from all of the countries of Latin America, as well as from a number of the new African nations, have been intensively trained in these schools.

In addition, thousands of Latin Americans have attended advanced training schools in Prague, Moscow, and elsewhere behind the Iron Curtain, where they have received up to 3 years of training in all of the arts of nonmilitary warfare. The graduates of these schools are now engaged in a massive program designed to subvert all of Latin America and bring it within the Communist orbit.

Where, Mr. Chairman, can Latin Americans obtain training in their countries, or in this country, to prepare them to understand Communist subversion and political warfare and methods and means of defeating it, as well as trying to help them strengthen their own free institutions and society? The answer is, of course, nowhere, because nowhere is this training available in any significant degree. The result is that the Communists are having great success in penetrating and manipulating all sorts of institutions and organizations throughout Latin America because we and our Latin American friends have not trained our people to fight back with equal skill, with equal know-how, or dedication.

Mr. Chairman, the Soviets and their allies have for more than four decades now operated a very large system of basic, intermediate, and advanced training centers which have graduated tens of thousands of dedicated and well-trained cadres who are now operating with great skill in every area of the free world. It would be an understatement to simply say that this was a great advantage to the Communists.

Unless Latin Americans, Africans, and Asians as well as Americans can be trained and motivated to fight back with equal skill and dedication, using our methods and means, many more areas of the free world will be lost in the coming years. I believe that the greatest single task which we now face is the establishment of a training program which can prepare not only Government foreign affairs personnel, but also private citizens and foreign students, to understand Communist political warfare and subversion and to give them the capacity to organize all of the methods and means which free men can properly employ to defeat Communist subversion and political warfare, while seeking to build and preserve free and independent countries.

The bill before you, the Boggs-Taft bill we will call it, is the first comprehensive proposal to establish this type of training program. I believe that if the Freedom Academy had been established many years ago, the course of the cold war would have been much different than it has been. It is now late in the ball game. And I urge that this committee move forward with a sense of urgency and produce a bill which will help us to close this vital gap in our cold war defenses.

I hope you will permit me, Mr. Chairman, to quote briefly from the report of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on the Freedom Academy bill. This report was later adopted by the full Judiciary Committee of the Senate, and they said, and I quote:

The committee considers this bill to be one of the most important ever introduced in the Congress. This is the first measure to recognize that a concentrated development and training program must precede a significant improvement in our cold-war capabilities. The various agencies and bureaus can be shuffled and reshuffled. Advisory committees, interdepartmental committees, and coordinating agencies can be created and recreated, but until they are staffed by highly motivated personnel who have been systematically and intensively trained in the vast and complex field of total political warfare, we can expect little improvement in our situation.

This one lone Freedom Academy, costing a fraction of the Cuban sugar subsidy, can lay the foundation for a major breakthrough. Properly staffed and funded, it will stand as a symbol of our determination to win the cold war. It will give courage to our friends and dismay our enemies. It is a practical, fundamental approach to our national survival. The committee recommends the enactment of the Freedom Commission bill at the earliest possible time.

You can see from the above, Mr. Chairman, that it would be difficult for anyone to write a stronger endorsement of a plan than that committee wrote.

Mr. Chairman, I would like at this time to ask permission of the committee to include in the record of the hearings following my statement the following documents. First, an article from the May 1963 edition of *Reader's Digest*, which is entitled "Let's Demand This New Weapon for Democracy."¹ This article is written by Eugene H. Methvin. And in this article he describes the remarkable 13-year effort made by a group of central Florida citizens, which has become known as the Orlando Committee for a Freedom Academy. The work of this dedicated group of men has been acclaimed by many of the foremost authorities in this field, and I commend this inspiring article to you and the committee for your thoughtful reading.

Mr. POOL. Can I interrupt right there, Mr. Chairman?

Can you tell us more about the committee, the Orlando Committee?

Mr. HERLONG. I can tell you more about it. The next witness, Mr. Pool, is going to go into that in some detail, because he is the originator of this committee, and he will tell you about it in a few moments.

The CHAIRMAN. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. On the record.

Mr. HERLONG. The second article I would like to have included is an article entitled "Why the U.S. Needs a Freedom Academy,"² which is an article that appeared in the September 1963 issue of the IBM house organ *Think*. This article is written by Dr. Sidney Hook,

¹ See pp. 948-954.

² See pp. 955-961.

who is chairman of the Department of Philosophy of New York University. Dr. Hook is a top authority on communism and Soviet political warfare, and he has been a supporter of the Freedom Academy plan since 1955.

This article is especially significant because it points out the urgent need to provide Freedom Academy training to foreign students.

The third article is an editorial from the February 16, 1959, issue of *LIFE* magazine,¹ supporting the Freedom Academy bill. I will have to supply that for the committee. I didn't have it available as I left the office this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. The material referred to will be inserted in the record in the order listed.

Mr. HERLONG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Next I would like to have an editorial from the February 18, 1961, edition of the *Saturday Evening Post* entitled "The Freedom Academy Bill Should Pass!"² So, if you would—

The CHAIRMAN. All of these will be inserted in the record following your statement, in the order you listed them.

Mr. HERLONG. I thank the chairman.

Now, Mr. Chairman, it has not been my purpose in this brief statement to attempt to make any dramatic appeal to you in urging that you approve this legislation along the line that has been introduced. As I have said, I am simply, along with you, a vehicle to help to get this ball started rolling.

While I yield to no man in my intense interest in this subject matter, I am not a technical expert on these bills. I have worked very closely during the last 5 years with this Orlando Committee. We have burned many gallons of midnight oil together and we are fortunate to have with us, however, today the originator of the Freedom Academy concept, Mr. Alan Grant of Orlando, Florida.

Mr. Grant is an expert in this whole area which is the subject of these bills, and if the committee has any questions dealing with the technical aspects of the program or any background material, I would suggest that you can get better answers by addressing them to Mr. Grant at the conclusion of his statement.

Again, I want to thank you for the privilege of appearing before you and this distinguished committee. In my judgment, as I said at the outset, you are doing a great service for our country in holding these hearings.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I certainly want to commend you for the work you have done on this proposal. I like the way you presented the argument for it. I will defer making a judgment until we hear from everyone, particularly the Government agencies, but I was impressed with the fact, of which I am aware, of how little we do in this area of fighting the cold war as compared to our enemies, the Communists.

It has been my experience, and I have so stated many times, that we have tended too much, in the past, to fight back on the basis of intuition and emotion rather than on knowledge. Whatever happens to this bill, it is a fact, I think, that knowledge of any problem is the

¹ See p. 962.

² See pp. 963, 964.

first essential step in trying to lick it, and this is a very serious problem.

Even the teaching of communism becomes controversial, because there are some who talk about indoctrination and place overemphasis on the idea that we should have no indoctrination, that we should merely recite the facts. But sometimes, you know, unless you have some teaching of the problem in a principled way, the student just becomes confused. Unless the adults can teach principle, unless parents are willing to discuss these things and to make both sides of the coin available, the student is confused—and by “student” I mean adults as well as youth, all people who want to know.

I don't know whether this bill is the solution, but I am deeply impressed with the fact that these hearings are important, and we should listen to the testimony and try to come to grips with the problem and find a solution. Here in America, the very word “propaganda” is a dirty word. Therefore, we tend to shut our eyes to that problem, whereas that problem is a hammer mill, hitting every minute, every second of the day, across the world.

We are glad to have had you appear and look forward to the appearance of the others, particularly, I will say, Admiral Burke and those who are in a position to know that something needs to be done. We certainly are going to try to make a record, to analyze what this thing is all about, and try to provide a solution.

Mr. HERLONG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would say this, if you please: that we don't have anything to fear as long as our people know the truth, but too often they don't get the truth, and the purpose of this is to supply an instrument by which our people and our friends can get the truth, get it objectively, and then we will be well on the way, as you said so well, to winning the battle.

The CHAIRMAN. Now we are not going to go into detail with you as to the structure of the Academy and the courses and so on, but I take it from what you have said that your idea would be that this institution would be available to key leaders in Government and business and labor, across the board, for the general information of those interested in fighting these problems.

Mr. HERLONG. This is correct. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Any questions?

Mr. POOL. I want to congratulate Congressman Herlong for his endeavor in this field. I have been dubious about whether or not we can, but I think it is a fact that, as the chairman said, we should make every effort to try to arrive at a proper vehicle to do this job; and, of course, there are lots of pitfalls, as you know, that we have to worry about in setting up something like this.

Some people have said that it will probably do more harm than good, but we just have to dig into it, and that is what I intend to do. I don't have any opinion on it.

Mr. HERLONG. Well, let me ask the gentleman this question, in view of his statement there. Could we be much worse off than we are today? Aren't we losing the cold war pretty rapidly?

Mr. POOL. That is why we certainly should look into it, and we will, but we have those problems, and I am going to try to keep my eye on that through all these hearings.

Mr. HERLONG. Thank you, sir.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Chairman, I want to commend Congressman Herlong for his efforts in establishing this means of fighting communism abroad. I, like the chairman, however, have considerable question in my mind as to whether this is the right approach.

However, I have studied the reports of the Department of State and the Department of Defense in opposition to the bill. I consider those reports very weak arguments against the bill. I think they attack the bill as being—they say that your objectives are praiseworthy and unexceptionable, but they feel that the Academy of Foreign Affairs is the right approach.

I would like to ask you, Congressman, when did this Academy of Foreign Affairs come into the picture, as proposed by the Department of State?

Mr. HERLONG. Mr. Grant has that information, and he will give it to you in just a few minutes.

Mr. ICHORD. I am wondering whether this was proposed by the Department of State after the Freedom Academy was proposed.

Mr. HERLONG. It is my understanding that it was, years later.

The CHAIRMAN. Considerably after.

Mr. HERLONG. Yes, sir.

Mr. ICHORD. Thank you.

Mr. HERLONG. Yes, sir.

Mr. ICHORD. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Senner?

Mr. SENNER. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman, but I thank my colleague for his appearance here this morning.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. I, too, would like to thank Mr. Herlong for coming here. It is a real privilege to have you before the committee and to have you as our colleague, and we all feel a little bit taller.

I, too, like your statement that we have nothing to fear with the truth, because fear is the only thing that keeps us from making progress, and we only fear what we don't know. If you want to put it in the words of the Scripture, it says, "Know the truth, and the truth shall make you free," and this is what we are after very much.

Mr. HERLONG. Thank you, sir.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you this question, because it has been bounced around, and I am not pointing a finger at either side on this issue. I have heard it said that perhaps the reason for the new objection to your and other proposals on the part of the Department of State and other agencies desiring, in lieu of your approach, to create a National Academy of Foreign Affairs, is perhaps sort of a counter-movement to halt yours.

Have you any thoughts on that?

Mr. HERLONG. Well, Mr. Chairman, I don't want to point my finger at anyone, of course, but I just know that there is no single agency in this Government today where all of this information can be coordinated. We have a number of agencies going out in different directions and doing a part of the job, but there is no coordinated assault on the research and training problem, and until the cold war research and training gap is closed, we cannot develop our full national capacity to defeat the Communist attack.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, of course, these agencies would not be ignored under your proposal; would they?

Mr. HERLONG. They would not be ignored, but there would be a coordinating agency—for a coordinated attempt to close the research and training gap.

The CHAIRMAN. Exactly, and the executive agencies would be consulted in connection with the development of a program, would they not, under the general structure of the bill?

Mr. HERLONG. I think there is no question but what they would be consulted, and they certainly should be, but at the same time we are going around sending amateurs to do a man's work in a professional field.

The Peace Corps has done a fine job, as far as it goes, but here we have amateurs dealing with professionals, and we need more trained professionals. I think the Peace Corps has done a fine job as far as it has gone, but we need people who are trained in the art of recognizing Communist subversion and the many countermeasures, not just in the arts of helping people.

This is wonderful, as far as it goes, but it doesn't go far enough.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the same could be said with our AID program; could it not?

Mr. HERLONG. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, as I catch what you have in mind, we can and do meet, and probably can overwhelm, our enemy in the military, in the force end of this struggle, if force comes, but we are lagging in ammunition so far as education and knowledge of the non-military part of the problem is concerned.

Mr. HERLONG. Mr. Chairman, those people who advocate conventional methods of continuing with our program in educating the people of the world lose complete sight of the fact that we are losing by using conventional methods, and so many of these people—and the State Department is among them—seem to think, based on their action, that the answer to all of our problems is spend a little more money. What we are asking for can be done with a fraction of the cost of the rest of the programs that they are doing, and a very minute fraction of the cost. In my judgment what we are asking for will be immensely more valuable.

Mr. SENNER. Mr. Chairman, if I may ask my colleague—

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SENNER. —I understand also that the John Birch Society is opposed to this legislation, and it is not usual that you find the John Birch Society and the State Department on the same side.

Could you give us your opinion of why the John Birch Society is opposed to this legislation?

Mr. HERLONG. I don't know, unless it would be that they might be afraid that they couldn't control who was named to the Commission, maybe something like that. I don't know. They are against communism, they say. I am not familiar with the organization, so I don't know too much about it, but they say they are against communism; and if I am against something, I am going to use every tool that I have to fight it, and this is a tool that we don't have that I want us to start fashioning right away. I don't know why they would be opposed to it.

You have mentioned the State Department and the John Birch Society. Can I mention also the fact that Senator Mundt and Senator Douglas were the first two in the Senate to introduce the bill? Now this is a liberal-conservative coalition on both sides.

Mr. SENNER. But apparently you haven't received any correspondence indicating their displeasure or reasons for opposing it?

Mr. HERLONG. I have not; no. Or their reasons why they are opposed to it.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me suggest along the same lines that Mr. Senner developed, we find some opposition at the other end of the line, the *Washington Post* is against this, the *New Republic*, *The Reporter* magazine. So it seems that the opposition, thus far at least, comes from perhaps extreme views.

Mr. HERLONG. Extremes of the left and right.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it is better for you to say it than for me, but you do have authors of these bills, and you named two of them. Here we find Douglas, Lausche, Mundt—

Mr. HERLONG. Mr. Proxmire and Mr. Goldwater.

The CHAIRMAN. —Proxmire and Goldwater. So the proponents of this legislation are in pretty good company from the point of view of conservatism and liberalism in our society, and this is to the good. In other words, it is not any particular group's pet project. There is a wide range of support from all sides, and I am curious to know exactly what the views of the Government are.

We received a number of letters. One agency defers to another, another agency defers to another, another agency defers to a fourth, and it looks like they are all depending on the State Department to carry the ball in opposition, and we will gladly hear what they have to say.

Mr. HERLONG. I will be glad to hear it myself.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Chairman, the State Department has criticized your bill, Mr. Herlong, as tending to create confusion resulting from overlapping of duties and duplication of functions. Just what do you intend to do?

Now definitely, there is going to be some type of duplication. The State Department is already performing these functions. Are you going to replace the State Department?

Mr. HERLONG. This is the question, Mr. Ichord. The State Department is not providing cold war training in depth. This is what Mr. Grant is going to discuss and show you where they are not performing these research and training functions; and if you think there is overlapping and duplication in this, there is more overlapping and duplication, and no coordination, today.

Mr. ICHORD. And the work is scattered around various agencies of the State Department.

Mr. HERLONG. That is right, and it couldn't be any more confusing than the situation as it is today, and certainly it will be more effective, once we get this operating.

Mr. ICHORD. Then your desire is to coordinate the work of the various agencies, rather than duplicating the work of the State Department?

Mr. HERLONG. We don't intend to do away with the State Department, or anything like that. The Freedom Academy is a training and research institution, not an operational agency. It will provide ideas, not make policy. State operates in conventional diplomatic fields. They don't operate in many cold war fields. While the Defense Department came out with a statement in opposition to this, I would suggest, respectfully, to the gentleman that there is more support for this bill than the Defense Department acknowledges, right in the Defense Department itself, because some of those people see the need. They see a real need for some coordination in exploring the many new things we can do to win the nonmilitary part of this struggle.

There is no provision for teaching people of foreign countries the type information they will acquire at the Freedom Academy under any of the existing plans that we have, and this definitely needs to be done. You can't send Americans over to another country and have them think with the mind of the people of the other country and convince them that someone else of another country is trying to take them for a ride down the road to communism. You can't do that.

You have got to have some of their own people tell them, people in whom they have more confidence than they do in us. We are suspect in a lot of areas of the world.

Mr. ICHORD. Well, I want to reserve the technical questions for the next witness, but I think it would be appropriate at this time if you would briefly explain the difference in the approach of the Academy of Foreign Affairs and the Freedom Academy.

Mr. HERLONG. As I said a while ago, Mr. Grant is going to explain that, and I have not gone into this because I knew I wasn't going to discuss it.

Mr. ICHORD. I will reserve those questions. Thank you.

Mr. POOL. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask about the cost question. Is somebody else going to testify to that?

Mr. HERLONG. They are going to testify about the cost. I think it is some \$35 million.

Mr. POOL. You think that would be effective, though, is what I am asking you.

Mr. HERLONG. I would hope that the Congress would spend whatever is necessary in order to do an effective job. Goodness knows, it is going to save billions of dollars, plus it will put us on the way to

winning the cold war. It doesn't make any difference what you spend—if you lose, it is all wasted.

The CHAIRMAN. I think some of the bills contemplate that the directors, or whoever might head this institution, would have to be confirmed by the Senate.

Mr. HERLONG. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. And that periodic reports would have to be made to Congress and to the President.

Mr. HERLONG. This is a part of the bill.

The CHAIRMAN. And I think some of the opposition stems, let's face it, from the fear or concern that this thing might be "taken over" by the State Department, and so on. Certainly in the establishment of existing academies—Naval, Air Force, West Point—Congress has found ways to make them respectable institutions, among the finest in the world, and I don't know that that objection has much merit. How do you feel about it?

Mr. HERLONG. I am in complete accord with the chairman on that statement. I don't think that there is any question but what the Congress could maintain control of this, and I would think that also, if the State Department thought they were going to maintain control of it, or take it over, as you suggest, that they might, that some people might object to it on that ground.

I would say that possibly we wouldn't have as much opposition from them if they thought they could take it over.

The CHAIRMAN. On the other hand, we must understand, in respect to ideas—be devoted to the idea that the State Department is concerned with foreign policy, and certainly they wouldn't be ignored in any plan that we would be party to in the functioning of this institution.

Mr. HERLONG. Right; I couldn't agree with the gentleman more.

Mr. POOL. Mr. Chairman, I have one more question.

What is your opinion of the State Department trouble? Why are they having trouble in getting things done?

Mr. HERLONG. You are getting into an area now that is going to take all the rest of the day, Mr. Pool, for discussion.

Mr. POOL. You don't have a short statement on that?

Mr. HERLONG. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

Thank you ever so much.

Mr. HERLONG. Thank you.

(Documents submitted by Mr. Herlong follow:)

(The Reader's Digest, May, 1963)

For 13 years a group of private citizens and legislators has battled to establish a Freedom Academy for training leaders in cold-war techniques. You will be inspired by their dedicated efforts, dismayed by the frustrations that still—incredibly—beset them

Let's Demand This New Weapon for Democracy

BY EUGENE H. METHVIN

LATE ONE afternoon in March 1954, a lean young man named Alan Grant walked into the post office in Orlando, Fla., and stood fingering a hefty brown envelope. He looked at the address label with the boldly typewritten words "THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, D.C.," and wondered whether anyone would read what was inside. Then, with a shrug, he dropped it into the box.

When the packet from Orlando was sorted out from the mounds of White House mail and routed to Brig. Gen. Robert T. Cutler, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, he looked skeptically at the accompanying letter. Its letterhead said unpretentiously: "The Orlando Committee." Yet

as he read the enclosed 51-page study, he began to get excited. Few ideas as fresh and stimulating as this Orlando Plan had ever come across Cutler's desk in Washington.

With clarity and force it analyzed Moscow's political-warfare machine and showed how communism was assaulting freedom with an arsenal of weapons perfected in 60 years of revolutionary experience. Then in detail it proposed a new counter-weapon for democracy: a national academy where top experts could instruct free-world representatives, from labor leaders to diplomats, in communist strategy and techniques. The goal: to teach men and women how to defeat communism's destructive tactics and how to build strong free societies. This "Freedom Acad-

emy," the proposal made clear, was to be privately financed, but obviously it needed official backing by Washington.

For 13 months Cutler had fought a losing battle to overhaul our creaky cold-war machinery and install more effective policies to stop Moscow's many-sided offensive. Now he was astounded to find grass-roots Americans laying a finger on the heart of complex problems.

He fired back a letter whose White House seal made Alan Grant's heart thump. "There is no doubt that you have identified and clearly analyzed a most important aspect of the Soviet threat," Cutler said. Would the Orlando Committee send a representative to Washington to explain the Freedom Academy plan to a selected group of government officials?

Would they!

For more than three years they had worked constantly—studying, researching and formulating the Freedom Academy concept. Now at last they, ordinary small-town Americans concerned about their country's future, were to have a hearing in the nation's highest councils.

THE ORLANDO Plan had a modest beginning back in September 1950. Alan Grant, then a 28-year-old attorney just months out of Harvard Law School, paid a visit to Orlando's high-school principal, Joseph Boone, and asked him if his school was giving its students any courses about communism and its tech-

niques. "I'm afraid we aren't teaching a thing on communism," Boone replied. "Why do you ask?"

Grant explained that before he became a World War II paratroop commander, he had organized and taught a course in guerrilla warfare at Harvard based on writings of Mao Tse-tung, then an obscure communist guerrilla. This experience had taught Grant to respect the tactics and leadership if not the principles the communists were applying around the world. As he watched their progress after World War II in Czechoslovakia, China and elsewhere, he grew more worried. Now, in 1950, every day's headlines carried news of U.S. soldiers dying in Korea to keep Red armies from pushing them into the sea.

"It looks as if we're in for a long-term struggle with communism," Grant said. "Don't you think we ought to be teaching our young citizens what they're up against?"

Boone agreed. So Grant persuaded the school board to sponsor a series of "Know-Your-Enemy" lectures. Next he hand-picked 17 young lawyers, businessmen and educators as speakers. But before any public announcement was made, he resolved, they must all know absolutely what they were talking about.

For six months he and his recruits met nightly in Grant's cluttered law office. Dividing themselves into five research teams, they pored over case histories of communist coups, analyzed Red riots,

strikes and guerrilla movements. Each man had to read 15 to 50 carefully selected books on communist strategy, history, Party organization, recruiting and training methods. Finally, in February 1951, Grant felt ready to unveil the program to Orlando's high-school students. What they received was one of the most comprehensive presentations on communism to be found anywhere in the country.

At one point in the lectures the speaker assigned to cover Lenin's life was called out of town. Grant lined up a University of Florida political-science professor to pinch-hit. To everyone's dismay, after only a few words about Lenin, the professor launched into a flag-waving speech full of emotion but empty of information. When he finished, he apologized to Alan. "I sat down last night to write my speech and after three sentences realized I'd run out of gas. I hate to admit I know so little about the most influential political leader of the 20th century!"

Grant was appalled. Like most Americans, he had always assumed the universities were centers of expertise about such vital matters as the history and techniques of communism. But on investigation he was shocked to find the nation's entire educational system being run as if the communist challenge did not exist. He could find only two colleges in the United States that offered even one course on communist subversion methods.

Slowly an idea began to crystal-

ize in Grant's mind. Why not a school to train our people in unconventional warfare and nonmilitary conflict, just as we train military men in the arts of conventional war at the service academies and advanced war colleges? On October 3, 1952, Grant made a speech to the Junior Chamber of Commerce in Sanford, Fla., proposing such a school—a Freedom Academy.

"Military weapons are not enough," Grant said. "Man is the ultimate weapon—and nobody understood it better than Lenin. When he and his followers captured Russia, they immediately established a training system that today numbers 6000 special schools in the tactics of espionage, subversion, infiltration, agitation and propaganda. Today graduates of these schools staff 75 communist parties throughout the non-communist world.

"But where," he asked, "can a young African, Asian or Latin American learn how to organize a democratic political party or labor union, draw up and execute effective social reforms and fight back against the disruptive tactics of the trained communist professionals? Worse yet, there is nowhere our own officials and students can go for a thorough course in the tactics of communism, let alone the sophisticated techniques for defeating it."

Grant's idea struck his listeners as so urgent that his friends pressed him to develop it, and volunteered to help. He assembled a four-man team; for 18 months they labored

putting together the 51-page study that so impressed General Cutler.

WHEN Grant arrived in Washington on July 22, he went to the headquarters of the Operations Coordinating Board across from the White House. In the second-floor conference room, seated around a long table, the 25 top officials Cutler had called together from the Pentagon, State Department and other cold-war agencies greeted Grant stiffly and extolled his "patriotism" and "interest" in coming to Washington to "help." Grant sensed a patronizing attitude.

Undaunted, he gave them the details about the proposed Freedom Academy. The Orlando Committee's thorough study, Grant explained, convinced them the program must encompass two levels. One would give career officials in government two full years of training in cold-war strategy through advanced study of democratic methods and communist tactics. The other would brace up democratic anti-communist defenses outside of government, by offering basic short courses to labor leaders, journalists, agricultural technicians, civic and school leaders, from the United States and abroad.

When Grant finished, he felt hostility in the questions that followed. "Won't foreign governments resent the idea of their citizens being trained in a school run by the United States?" one official objected.

"Dozens of nations have been

sending their own citizens into Annapolis and West Point for years," Grant replied. "We also have 7500 foreign students from 70 countries in our numerous nonmilitary schools right now, and they'd send more if we'd let them."

"But Soviet propaganda is bound to brand this an 'imperialistic plot' for training spies," said another.

"They tried to do the same thing to the Marshall Plan and it didn't stop us," said Alan. "I don't think the time has come when we must give communist propagandists a veto power over the U.S. government, do you?"

For four hours the questioning continued. After the meeting one intelligence official, Dr. Stefan T. Possony, an internationally known authority on psychological warfare, introduced himself. "Mr. Grant, the government will turn down your proposal, brilliant as it is. Have you ever heard of that obscure bureaucratic disease, NMH?"

Grant admitted he had not.

"It's shorthand for 'not made here.' To ask an agency to adopt a new idea it didn't think up is to ask it to confess its own shortcomings."

Weeks dragged by until August 20, 1954. Another letter bearing the White House seal arrived in the morning mail. Grant tore open the envelope. His eyes widened in disbelief. "You are aware, I am sure, that ideas of this nature sometimes generate a wide divergence of opinion within government circles," said Operations Coordinating Board

executive officer Elmer Staats. "The variance of opinion with respect to your plan prohibits any concerted effort" by the government!

But as Grant and his group reeled from this brush-off, an astounding thing happened. A delegation of Pentagon and National Security Council officials, indignant over the rejection of the plan, flew to Orlando. Grant's team learned that the rejection letter had actually been written by senior State Department officers who had blocked a favorable recommendation by persuading Staats to reject the plan.

"Don't quit now," the Orlandans were told. Heartened, the Orlando Committee launched an alternate attack. They wrote 160 organizations and prominent people, representing many viewpoints, who had shown responsible interest in cold-war problems, appealing for help. The response was overwhelming, particularly from the academic world, and in the spring of 1955 it looked as if the Freedom Academy might open for the fall term.

Then came a shattering blow. President Eisenhower announced he would meet with Stalin's successors, and the euphoric "Spirit of Geneva" enveloped the nation. The word went out from Washington: Stop all activity that might irritate the communists. Suddenly prospective financial support for the Freedom Academy disappeared.

IN 1958 the Red-managed stoning of Vice President Nixon in South

America jolted the nation. New members joined the Orlando Committee, and Grant tried again, this time through Congress. In 1959 Rep. A. Sydney Herlong (D., Fla.) introduced legislation to establish a Freedom Academy. Rep. Walter Judd (R., Minn.) enthusiastically co-sponsored the bill. On the Senate side Karl Mundt and Paul Douglas enlisted a dozen co-sponsors for a comparable bill.

All Orlando pitched in to launch a national drive. Letters from the Orlando Committee for a Freedom Academy went to every one of the nation's 1745 daily newspapers. Members of the Orlando Business & Professional Women's Club wrote and phoned other clubs across the nation, and brought their national officers to Orlando for briefings. Result: the national federation, representing approximately 175,000 members in all states, endorsed the bill. The Orlando Jaycees won national endorsement of the U.S. Junior Chamber of Commerce convention representing 50 states and 215,000 members. The national AFL-CIO added its backing. Support for a Freedom Academy swelled across the nation.

One Friday early in June 1959 the news hit Orlando that the Senate Judiciary Committee would hold hearings on the Freedom Academy bill with several other anti-communist measures. By the following Monday morning Grant and his team had such an imposing array of witnesses waiting to testify that

the Senators set aside three days for hearings on the Academy alone.

The Senate overwhelmingly passed the bill on August 31, 1960. Then, tragically, late in the session it bogged down in the House. This meant starting all over again with a new Congress in 1961.

Meantime, behind the scenes, State Department officials were trying to sell the idea that our cold-war training was adequate. They answered citizens' letters urging an Academy by claiming existing federal and private institutions were doing the job. But when pressed for evidence, State admitted that one official who signed such letters "doesn't know anything about the bill."

WITH the new administration installed in Washington, the Orlando group redoubled its efforts. Circumstances favored them, for the New Frontier was soon facing dismaying cold-war realities. When Attorney General Robert Kennedy returned from a trip around the world he reported, "In every country well-organized and highly disciplined [communist] cadres concentrate their activities in universities, student bodies, labor organizations and intellectual groups. Against this, as I saw repeatedly, there is no one to question their positions, their facts. There is no organization. There is no cadre. There is no disciplined and calculated effort to present the other side. And so it is that a small, able and well-trained unit can take

over a meeting or an organization or even a government."

Gradually, the vital need for the Orlando Plan gained wider recognition. A Gallup Poll showed that the American people supported the Freedom Academy bill 4 to 1. In Latin America 17 liberal political parties from 14 countries joined under leadership of former Costa Rican president José Figueres and started an Institute of Political Education at San José, Costa Rica. In May 1962 the Asian People's Anti-Communist League, representing 21 nations, appealed to Congress to pass the Freedom Academy bill even as the league went ahead without U.S. help to found its own "Freedom Center" in Seoul, Korea.

Finally President Kennedy appointed his own White House committee, headed by Dr. J. A. Perkins, now president of Cornell University, to look at the situation. Last December the White House reported its findings: "Existing public programs of training, education and research in United States foreign affairs fall dangerously below" what the country should be doing and must be renovated by creation of a "National Academy of Foreign Affairs" independent of any department, paralleling the Orlando Plan in significant detail.

President Kennedy immediately accepted the recommendation and promised to "move forward with this basic idea as soon as possible." Then the drafting of legislation was turned over—to the State Depart-

ment! Not surprisingly, the draft finally sent to Congress was a lame substitute for the Orlando Plan. It proposed to train primarily government career men in the same old conventional diplomatic techniques.

Advocates of the Freedom Academy idea are frankly dismayed by the State Department substitute. The proposed Academy of Foreign Affairs, they argue, makes no solid provision for developing the whole new range of policy tools, governmental and non-governmental, nor for training non-American specialists for the common struggle, as originally envisioned. The State Department plan, they believe, might well kill the chance of establishing a genuine graduate-level "West Point" of political and psychological warfare. Some critics, indeed, charge that official opposition to the Freedom Academy reflects policies geared to stalemating the cold war rather than "winning" it.

Despite covert State Department efforts to dissuade them, the original

sponsors, eight Republican and five Democratic Senators,* have therefore introduced their own Freedom Academy bill again. "With White House backing, some plan for a cold-war research and training program may be enacted at long last," says Senator Dodd. "At stake is whether Congress will shape the legislation so that the new institution will actually pioneer new democratic methods for defeating communism and strengthening freedom, or whether it will be watered down into a propaganda center for more foreign aid and conventional methods."

Today, thanks to the sacrifice, bold thinking and unremitting efforts of Grant and his Orlando colleagues, the nation is vastly more alert to the education gap in the free world's cold-war defenses. Their dedication is heartening reinforcement to the sagging principle that individual citizens can and must participate in the vital process of government, even in the face of overwhelming odds and a massive and lethargic bureaucracy. Their performance presents a clear challenge to Congress and the American people to see that the Freedom Academy opens its doors—and soon.

*Republicans Mundt of South Dakota, Fong of Hawaii, Goldwater of Arizona, Hickenlooper and Miller of Iowa, Keating of New York, Scott of Pennsylvania, and Case of New Jersey; Democrats Dodd of Connecticut, Lausche of Ohio, Proxmire of Wisconsin, Smathers of Florida, and Douglas of Illinois.

(Think, September, 1963)

Why the U. S. Needs a Freedom Academy

by Stacey Hook

There is now before Congress a bill proposing the establishment of a Freedom Academy in the United States. Such an institution, designed to counter Communist propaganda, would be open to private citizens, government officials, and students of foreign nations. The author, head of New York University's philosophy department, explains how it would work and why we need it.

ANYONE WHO MAKES A CANDID ASSESSMENT of the prospects of freedom in the world today will find them dispiriting. By "the prospects of freedom" I do not mean the future of the American business system. Although Messrs. Khrushchev and Mao charge the U.S. with attempting to impose this system on the recipients of American aid, Tito, Gomulka and Sukarno, who have benefited immensely from American largesse, know how false that charge is.

By "the prospects of freedom" in this context I mean respect for liberal institutions which enable those who live and work in their communities to express their needs and exercise their uncoerced choice. Only a "liberal center" can be relied upon to introduce the necessary

social reforms which both bankrupting a country economically and at the same time destroying whatever conservative institutions of democracy exist. For a "liberal center" cannot arise without liberal institutions.

One of the sad facts of the contemporary world scene is the disproportion between the massive economic and educational aid which the United States gives the relatively undeveloped countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and the prospects of freedom in these countries. It would require volumes to present an adequate account of why this is so. The responsibility of certain native vested interests, whose social philosophy is limited to the preservation of the *status quo* at all costs, is often heavy. Although they

do not explicitly announce, "*Après nous, le deluge,*" this attitude is a consequence of refusing to recognize that there is no *status quo* in a world of vast technological and political change, and that either the legitimate aspirations of the people will be met by a dynamic expanding economy, or else Communist demagoguery and terror will triumph.

But the tragic facts are that even in countries where attempts are being made to achieve progress towards a liberal center, the obstacles and setbacks to the cause of freedom are many. Among the prime reasons for this is the skillful political warfare being waged by strategically placed Communist groups in almost every sector of their national life. The ultimate strategy of these groups is the conquest of political power. But their day-by-day tactics is to demoralize the efforts made by liberal groups and governments to achieve stability and progress. They set out to frustrate, sometimes by intimidation and sometimes by violence, movements of reform. They make special efforts to capture the allegiance of the idealistic elements in a culture, particularly the youth and professional groups. They seek to narrow the choice before the country between what they call, on the one hand, a "Fascist solution" identified with the existing government or any other group friendly to the West, and what they call, on the other hand, the truly nationalist or "revolutionary" solution. The latter is the thinly disguised program of initial demagoguery and ultimate total political terror, wielded "in the interests of the masses" by the Communist Party.

Long before the Communists become a menace in the military way, they conduct full-scale political cold war against communities which are woefully ill-prepared to defend themselves or even to recognize accurately the nature of the struggle being waged against them. Any knowledgeable American who has traveled extensively abroad, will find striking evidence of the activity and success of these sustained cold war campaigns against the principles of freedom and the solutions based upon them. One will find the evidence in student movements as well as peasant movements, in trade unions and in cooperatives, in peace organizations and cultural societies, in schools, theaters, the press, and sometimes even in churches.

Three things account for their success.

First, having learned from experience that they are rejected when they straightforwardly present the real party program, the propaganda of Communists today is based on the tactical appropriation and exploitation of the rhetoric and slogans of democracy, and the skillful use for ultimate Party purposes of the language and ideals of social reform. Communists not only win a hearing but a considerable following by posing as partisans of peace, or as knights of national independence, defenders of civil rights, or fighters for progress.

Second, Communists have mastered the techniques of organizational penetration and capturing of control. In hardly any of the organizations in which they have won control do the Communists constitute a majority. On the contrary,

they are comparatively few in number. Nonetheless, they are ensconced in strategic posts of command, in a position to mobilize mass sentiment, able to organize demonstrations, organize riots, and manipulate public opinion in accordance with instructions received from their masters abroad. They are adept in the use of an entire repertoire of stratagems in capturing meetings, planting key personnel in executive posts and directing committees, and seeding schools, newspapers and other media of communication with trusted agents.

Third those liberals and democrats who are opposed to them have no corresponding know-how in combating these techniques. They lack experience, and by the time they acquire it, it is too late. For all their sincerity and dedication, they do not know how to expose incisively and persuasively the Communist "degradation of the word," how to prevent parliamentary rules from being used by the Communist caucus to forestall key votes pending against them, and, finally, how to use in the interests of decency counter-techniques to Communist infiltration which have been developed over the years.

Is this picture of Communist activity and success in mobilizing public opinion, and channeling it for their own political purposes, overdrawn?

We have the eyewitness testimony of one formerly doubting Thomas who visited several Asian countries and was appalled at what he found in Japan, Indonesia and elsewhere. Attorney-General Robert Kennedy, upon his return from Asia, said:

"In every country, well organized and highly disciplined Communist cadres concentrate their activities on universities, student bodies, labor organizations and intellectual groups. Against these there is no one to question their position, their facts; no organization, no cadre, no disciplined and calculated effort to present the other side. And so it is that a small, able and well-trained unit can take over a meeting or an organization or even a government."

What can we do to counteract this formidable arm of the Communist movement whose activities are paying such rich political dividends — with more of the same in sight?

"If we do not meet the problem head-on," says Attorney-General Kennedy, "if we are not ourselves imaginative, tough, dedicated . . . the struggle will be lost by us."

One thing should be clear at once, if Attorney-General Kennedy is right. We cannot combat the activity of Communists in foreign countries by American nationals, whether they are American Foreign Service officers, exchange professors, visiting dignitaries, or businessmen. Even with the best will in the world, this would be construed by non-Communists in those countries as interference. I have found in most foreign countries I have visited that when an American official says that twice two is four, the statement is greeted with suspicion and distrust. After all, the Soviet Communists do not play a conspicuous public role in these countries. It is exclusively the native elements, indigenous to the culture, idiom and language, who are the banner-bearers for the Communist idea.

Native Communist propaganda and subversion must be resisted by native non-Communists, liberal elements. What the United States should do is to establish an educational training center — a Freedom Academy — in which those who wish to preserve the freedom of their country from a Communist takeover can master the techniques of ideological and organizational defense and offense. Without this kind of help to the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, all our other forms of aid may prove ineffectual.

Under Secretary of State George B. Ball, testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, properly stressed the fact that "the Communist powers have devised a whole new system of aggression — the subversion of men's minds by subtle means of propaganda, employing the most sophisticated methods of communication; the corruption of governments; the employment of new techniques of infiltration and espionage; the exploitation of weakness; systematized terrorism and urgency; utilization of economic warfare."

Freedom from Within

It is difficult to understand how diplomatic activity, even if supplemented by private American agencies, could combat these tactics with any hope of success. Freedom cannot be brought to a country from without. It must be won and defended by those who live there. At most, the U.S. can prevent invasion and overt aggression by Com-

munist powers. But over the long run, only those who are willing to fight for freedom in their own country can win it or keep it. But they must know *how* to fight for it. This the Freedom Academy should undertake to teach them — openly and proudly and before the eyes of the world. The Communists are compelled to conceal the character of their schools of subversion and the curriculum within them. We need not conceal what we teach.

Where will the students of the Freedom Academy come from?

There will be some American citizens among them, but mainly they will be individuals nominated and recommended by non-Communist student groups, free trade unions, co-operatives, peasant unions, liberal political associations and a multiplicity of other organizations whose non-Communist bona fides have been established. They will receive fellowships adequate to cover transportation and costs of residence at the Freedom Academy.

Who will teach the students?

Fortunately, there exist in the United States men and women who have had intensive experience in combating Communists in schools and universities, trade unions and co-operatives, peace organizations and social clubs. Many have studied Communist techniques of subversion, and have developed effective measures of defense and offense against them. They know how to prevent, for example, a cell of 10 Communists in a university from manipulating democratic rules, and sending all 10 as delegates to the central student body as presumably

representatives of 10 different organizations, thus taking over the central student office, including the student newspaper. They know how to expose, say, extreme demands of a Communist faction in a peasant organization, demands presented not because they are viable, but to discredit the democratic leadership. Members of the staff can also be drawn from various countries in which Communist strategies have been repelled by resolute and intelligent leadership.

The chief objection which has been raised against the Freedom Academy is that its alumni, who return to their own countries, will be marked men, subject to the derogatory epithets of "American agent," or something equally unsavory. Undoubtedly, the Communists will seek to discredit those who have studied at the Freedom Academy and will watch their behavior closely.

This, however, will be far from fatal, providing only that the partisans of freedom have been properly trained. First of all, it is not to be expected that most of the students will be public figures coming from the limelight of political life and returning to it. They will be drawn primarily from those social, cultural and educational areas in which Communists are always active in recruiting support for their political spokesman of the moment. As a rule, those who come to the Freedom Academy will be members of groups and associations of a broad democratic range. Normally, nominations will be made by the student, farm, cooperative, cultural, philanthropic, trade union or business organization with which the individ-

ual is affiliated. To some extent, therefore, the organization which nominates the candidate for the Academy will have a vested interest in his activity. He will have a natural audience on his return, an audience with whom he can remain in some communication while at the Academy. The Communist charge, "American agent!" will have to be implausibly directed against the organization to which he belongs.

Upon his return to his own country, the graduate of the Freedom Academy may at first resume his original employment. If there is a continuing need in the organization which nominated him, for the services of someone thoroughly sophisticated in his understanding of communism, he will be a logical person for the post. Presumably, he will have ideas and plans about how to further the prospects of freedom which he will lay before the membership.

Nor is this all. The alumnus of the Freedom Academy is a potentially valuable asset to a newspaper or magazine of general interest. He knows how to spot political crises in the making — if the Communists are behind them. He can become a commentator for radio and television stations. The field of education is wide open to him, and here he will have some of his toughest battles. Indeed, any agency or medium of communication which recognizes its responsibility to keep public opinion informed and alert might use his services. Different situations will suggest to the returning alumni of the Freedom Academy different opportunities for action. If they have been properly trained, they will cre-

ate their own opportunities.

The foreign alumni of the Freedom Academy will be encouraged to feel free to criticize the United States if, in the interests of our common ideal of freedom, they conscientiously believe it is necessary. Such criticism should not be resented by us, even if it seems a bit exaggerated. It will be proof that the alumni are not wearing the collar of any government, and when they speak up for the common ideal of freedom, their voice will have greater weight and authority.

Occasions for criticism of some American policies will not need to be manufactured. After all, Americans themselves at home engage in such criticism vigorously. There is still sufficient disagreement among free men and among the free nations of the world to make such critical discussion, now and then, not only inescapable but healthy. One sure sign of the Moscow-trained Communist who will probably be shouting, "American Agent!" is his eloquent refusal to criticize any of the policies of the Kremlin (or, if he has been trained in Peking, of Red China). This is a situation made to order for a well-trained alumnus of the Freedom Academy.* The Communist curriculum of studies, of stratagems and deceptions, cannot be made public without becoming self-defeating. But the more

publicity about the methods of countering Communist stratagem, the greater its educational effect.

The time has come to expand our horizons in the struggle for the survival of freedom. It is not enough for us to know the truth about communism. Other countries must know it, too, and learn how to use the truth effectively. The general staff of the Communist movement no longer believes that it will win the world by military conquest, for in the mushroom cloud of the hydrogen bomb, it sees intimations of its own mortality. That is why it has redoubled its efforts everywhere to take over the countries of the world, piecemeal, from within, with a combination of stealth and daring.

The historical evidence shows that it is making gains on every continent—including North America, if Cuba is considered part of our continent. It is aided almost as much by those who fear it without understanding it and who fight it with wrong weapons, as by those who, tender-minded and sentimental, ally themselves in a common or popular front with Communists, brashly confident, in their total ignorance of Communist ideology and history, that they can control the Communists. There is no program or curriculum of studies which adequately explores the relevant problems posed by the advance of communism, or which seeks to develop the appropriate measures to meet them. This is the task of the Freedom Academy which Senate Bill S. 414 seeks to establish.

In the nature of the case, to perform this function well, the Freedom Academy must go beyond it. It

*Founding of the Academy has been proposed in the Freedom Commission Act, now before Congress, with bipartisan legislative blessing, in Senate Bill 414. This is not to be confused with the National Academy of Foreign Affairs, an organization proposed in another Bill, S. 865. The latter merely broadens present educational programs of the Foreign Service Institute.

must continue research and experiment to discover new means of meeting the new techniques of attack which the Communists are sure to launch as their old methods and stratagems are exposed.

The Freedom Academy must also explore the entire gamut of positive democratic proposals to meet the problems the Communists exploit. We live in an age in which the global political revolution, the universal technological revolution, and the revolution of rising expectations, with its psychological paradoxes, have all converged. Even if there were no Communist movement, the free world would have many grave problems to settle. But it is the presence of the Communist movement which seeks to convert these problems into mortal dangers and threats to democratic survival. That is why the Communists must be repelled on every front of the cold war as the democratic community develops viable solutions to its problems.

A Vital Investment

The United States is making an investment in order to safeguard not only the freedom of other countries but also its own freedom. It is making an investment also to safeguard its vast philanthropic investments. In some countries, we provide the means

to build schools, and the Communists staff them; in other countries, we send food to sustain life, and sometimes the Communists get the credit; in still other countries, we help domestic programs to abolish illiteracy, and then the Communists move in with simple, very cheap, political-propaganda reading material on a massive scale. Situations of this kind cannot be corrected from the outside. Only the foreign nationals who believe in freedom can effectively combat the foreign nationals who do not.

For these and many others reasons, I am convinced that the organization of a Freedom Academy is an experiment worth trying. At present, no matter how innocent a person's studies in the United States, he is sure to be denounced as "an agent of American imperialism" by Communists on his return home. This has been true of physicians, agriculturalists, even men of the cloth. The victims are politically untrained and sometimes become demoralized. Communist denunciations will not cease when graduates of the Freedom Academy return home. But those attacked will be well-trained, capable not only of making effective retort but of taking the offensive. This may result, in some countries, in changing the political complexion of things. ●

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FOR A POLITICAL WEST POINT

There slipped quietly into the congressional hopper last week a bill which deserves long, loud and public debate. We hope it survives this debate and in some form becomes law. Its sponsors, Representatives Herlong of Florida and Judd of Minnesota, are trying to close a gap—larger than any missile gap—in the range of weapons with which we are fighting the cold war.

The gap lies between our military preparedness at one end and our conventional diplomacy at the other. On this wide and surging central front we presently deploy a few smidgens of propaganda, economic aid and covert intelligence activities. To the Communists, on the other hand, this is the most important front of all. Throughout it, and in depth, they deploy all those techniques of political warfare, both overt and covert, which are the day-and-night work of the world's Communist parties and which were known to Lenin, its inventor, as "the organizational weapon."

This weapon, with and without the help of military threats, is chiefly responsible for all the gains the Communists have made since World War II. It becomes more potent with their rising capacity for economic, technical and cultural exports. Neither the Red army nor straight Marxist propaganda, with all their power, could alone have created student riots in Venezuela, frustrated the parliamentary system of Italy, won an election in the most literate state in India (Kerala), retained key footholds in the British and American labor movements, ridden the street whirlwinds of Baghdad to the edge of power, dazzled the opening mind of Africa, or poisoned strategic corners of press and university opinion from Paris to Tokyo. These are *organizational* successes, the fruit of long and rigorous training of dedicated individuals in a conspiratorial technique.

Lies and terror, as well as bribery and argument, are parts of this technique. But that is not the reason the free world has failed to counter it. Apathy and ignorance are the reasons. Given the will, the Communist political war can be countered by open and ethical methods which will uphold the values as well as the institutions of freedom.

The Herlong-Judd bill attempts to focus and organize this potential counteraction. It sets up what is tentatively called a Freedom Academy but what is really a West Point of political war. To selected candidates from the U.S. and all free countries, it would offer intensive courses in Communist political techniques and how to reverse or resist them. A graduate—whether American oil man, Indian peasant leader, African nationalist, Mexican labor boss, Japanese mayor or Indonesian bookseller—would be thus better equipped to meet the Communists, technique for technique and argument for argument, on his home ground. It sounds

like a tall order. It is. The Soviets have scores of academies for training Communists in this operational science. They are way ahead of us. But the makings of a counter-science exist.

Among the first on our academy's faculty, for example, could be some U.S. and British labor leaders, who, since Marx and Lenin made unions a prime Communist target area, are veterans of many years of front-line Communist-fighting. In a recent *New Leader*, John Herling describes Mikoyan's recent lunch with Walter Reuther, James Carey and other U.S. unioners and quotes the irritated Soviet deputy as saying: "The American trade union leaders are more antagonistic toward the Soviet Union than were the American capitalists whom I have met." To which Reuther replied that they understand the Communists better.

A similar sophistication is not beyond our grasp in other target institutions which need defending. A national academy would at least be cheaper and quicker than the very dear school kept by experience.

The Herlong-Judd proposals were not just dreamed up overnight. The gap in our armor has been long evident. The chief spark plugs behind the present bill, four dedicated young citizens of Florida, have been working at their plan since 1952. Besides an academy they propose a commission to act as a source of public intelligence on the political war, and to develop other forms of counteraction, both public and private, which are now neglected.

It will be objected that "counteraction" is too negative and static a concept for the cause of freedom. But it is surely not a negative act to collect and disseminate what knowledge we have about political infighting. Moreover, while diversity of belief is a hallmark of free man, a closer knowledge of their common enemy is bound to result in wider areas of free agreement and more constructive policies to promote freedom.

The Communist challenge does not confine itself to conventional arenas. As one good textbook puts it (Philip Selznick's *Organizational Weapon*), it tries to make all our institutions political and fights not only at the top but "everywhere in the social structure, wherever an increment of power can be squeezed from control of an institution or a portion of it." The big problem in meeting this total challenge is to avoid innocence on the one hand and hysteria on the other. An official academy would be the best guardian of a cool perspective. Thus the debate on the Herlong-Judd bill should certainly not divide the country along partisan or liberal-conservative lines; men of every political color except one can unite behind this proposal. It should be supported by all who take the Communist threat as seriously as the Communists intend it.

(Saturday Evening Post—Feb. 18, 1961)

Editorials

The Freedom Academy Bill Should Pass!

Nowadays many people say, "The problem of how to resist world Communism is so complicated, I just don't know what we should do about it." Yet there is one simple thing that we, collectively, can do about it right now. We can provide training for public officials and others in the nature and purposes of the Communist conspiracy.

A bill to this end has been introduced by three senators—two of them Democrats, Paul H. Douglas of Illinois, and Thomas J. Dodd of Connecticut, and the other a conservative Republican, Karl E. Mundt of South Dakota. In the House substantially the same bill has been introduced by Rep. Walter Judd (Rep.) of Minnesota and Rep. A. S. Herlong (Dem.) of Florida. Unanimously the Senate Judiciary Committee has approved the bill, calling it "one of the most important ever introduced in the Congress."

It should be adopted in this Congressional session without delay. Its object is to lessen one of our chief weaknesses—our amateurism in the struggle against the enemy's professionals. The statements of many national leaders indicate woeful ignorance in high places.

We don't have amateur military officers. Nor do amateurs manage our huge industries. Yet we have thousands of amateurs who are trying their untrained best to resist the attacks of the highly trained professional Communists. If you wish to know what a

professional Communist is, take a look at the No. 1 example—Khrushchev. In his youth he went through Lenin's colleges of Bolshevik leadership.

Against that training system we need one of our own, and therefore Congress should pass the Freedom Academy bill. The President would then appoint a commission of seven members, approved by the Senate. They would establish an advanced training and development center, the Freedom Academy, which would educate leaders about Communism.

Certain Governmental employees and other key men and women, including some from abroad, would be chosen as students. They would be taught something of the know-how that Khrushchev has—the strategy and tactics of political warfare—of influencing and organizing large numbers of people. The 500,000 members of the Teachers Union of Japan are managed by 1500 professional Communists, who give all their time to that work. We have no idea of managing the masses in the same way, but it is important to know the symptoms of Communist mass management—as in the San Francisco rioting at the hearing of a Committee of Congress.

It was estimated in the Senate committee hearings that more than 100,000 Reds from all over the world have been graduated from political colleges and postgraduate universities in the Soviet Union, Red China, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and other Communist realms. Many a professional Red operator in Cuba and the Congo received training in Moscow, Leningrad, Prague or Peking. Our commission of seven members will have no simple task. On the contrary, the commission must develop complex systems of training to offset the many Communist educational institutions that have decades of experience. And,

as time passes, the commission will need vigilance to prevent infiltration by the Communists themselves!

Sixty years ago, when he was only the leader of a small, power-hungry sect, Lenin originated the fundamental organizing rule for sabotaging and conquering Russia and all the world. It was that the party must be as professional and disciplined as an army. It must be staffed by persons who would give to the revolution "not their spare evenings but the whole of their lives." They would be professional revolutionaries. Lenin began organizing such a staff at once. A few years later, while still living outside Russia, he set up three training schools in Italy and France. After the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia, thousands of Reds from other countries—including the United States—went to Moscow for years of training in the "Lenin School."

Today one of the chief Communist political universities is the one in Prague, Czechoslovakia. It specializes in teaching Latin Americans how to unsaddle their home governments. Hundreds of Latin Americans have also gone to Red China for training as conflict managers. They learn the niceties of sabotage, propaganda and blackmail.

Some of the ablest American experts on Red strategy testified before the Senate Committee for the Freedom Academy bill. One of them is Prof. Stefan T. Possony, author of a brilliant article in the *ADVENTURES OF THE MIND* series, published in *The Post* on July 9, 1960, showing how the Communists successfully use a rubber vocabulary to fool us, foster wishful thinking and slow us down while they prepare history's greatest knockout blow. Professor Possony told the Senate committee that the Freedom Academy is urgently needed. We think he is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Our next witness is the gentleman referred to by Mr. Herlong, Mr. Alan G. Grant, Jr., an attorney, of Orlando, Florida, who is the initiator and prime mover of the Freedom Academy concept. He represents the Orlando Committee for a Freedom Academy, a group which has been promoting the Freedom Academy idea, originally as a privately financed institution, since way back in 1951.

I might mention that I had the privilege and honor of appearing in his great State to address the Committee on Cold War Education of the Governors' Conference, presided over by Governor Bryant of Florida, and I found this gentleman to be not only interested, but very knowledgeable on this subject.

So, Mr. Grant, we are glad to have you testify.

Would you please, first of all, tell us a bit about your background—educational, and so on—and about the Orlando Committee.

STATEMENT OF ALAN G. GRANT, JR.

Mr. GRANT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You want the history of the Orlando Committee in?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir, and of yourself.

Mr. GRANT. Well, I hate to go back quite that far, but I became interested in communism—

The CHAIRMAN. Just a thumbnail sketch.

Mr. GRANT. Well, just briefly, in the fall of 1950, we organized a group of Orlando citizens to teach a course on communism in our local high schools. We got a broadly representative group of citizens together, just as we have gotten a representative group of Senators together on the bill, because we knew the problem of getting communism in the classroom would present all sorts of problems, but anticipating this, we had a leading member of B'nai Brith, a member of the Knights of Columbus, a member of the Ministerial Association, a prominent Democrat, a prominent Republican, the chairman of the principal labor organizations in town, and so forth, were all brought in on this, so I think the general public decided if all these people could agree this was a proper approach to the problem, it would be acceptable, even if not the best.

This developed into a 17-lecture course which covered the history of communism in 2 hours; 4 hours on the Soviet Union, covering agriculture, the secret police, the slave labor camps, the arts and sciences in the Soviet Union, etc.; 2 hours on the satellite countries, concentrating particularly on Poland; 7 hours on Communist strategy and tactics generally; and 2 hours on the general Soviet threat, military, industrial, scientific, and so forth, and the duties and responsibilities of the individual in the challenging years ahead.

During the course of that program, it became painfully apparent to us that nowhere could we turn for help and assistance in this sort of thing. There wasn't even a bibliography back in those days. A great deal of material is available now. From this start we became interested in the Government training programs and we began checking on what was being taught and not taught at the War Colleges, the Foreign Service Institute, and the university centers, and we were amazed at the superficial training at these centers in the new forms of struggle. There wasn't even an adequate explanation of opera-

tional communism, much less the whole new range of things we would have to do to meet it, plus all of our other problems. In 1953, we discontinued this school program so several of us could go to work full time on this Freedom Academy concept. We originally thought of this as a private—

Mr. POOL. Can you name some names right along about there, who some of the people were?

Mr. GRANT. They were all local citizens in the Orlando-Winter Park area: Dwight Devine, a West Point graduate, who was Hap Arnold's original contact with the Rand Corporation; Charles V. Silliman, a former law professor of the University of Florida, who was an attorney in Orlando; Rex Huffman, an insurance man in the area.

We were later joined by a number of other people, primarily business, professional, service people in the Orlando-Winter Park area.

Mr. POOL. Can you give us a brief thumbnail sketch on yourself, now? I think we have gotten something on that.

Mr. GRANT. Yes, sir, I am a graduate of Harvard College and Harvard Law School. The last 14 years, now, I have been practicing law in Orlando, Florida.

World War II, I served with the 515th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 13th Airborne Division.

I taught probably the first guerrilla warfare school in this country during my sophomore year at Harvard University and wrote my thesis on the subject of "Guerrilla Warfare, Revolutionary Warfare," trying to advance the art as developed by T. E. Lawrence. By the time I was 20, I had read the principal works of Mao as they were available in this country at that time, Lenin, and fortunately several strongly anti-Communist works like Eugene Lyons' *Assignment In Utopia* and William Henry Chamberlain's *Russia's Iron Age*.

After World War II, knowing something of Communist operational thinking, I frankly felt that we faced a decisive test, that the Soviet Union, if it played its cards correctly and did not make the mistakes that Hitler made, might win.

To my way of thinking, Soviet operational technique was much more sophisticated than the Nazis'. In fact, the Nazis borrowed quite a bit from the Communists, but they never developed their operational thinking to the degree that the Communists did. I then decided to devote the rest of my life to the problems of stopping Soviet penetration into the free world, that is, all of my time outside of my profession of law.

This is what led me to form that group in 1950 to teach a course on world communism in the high schools, and it led to the development of the Freedom Academy concept.

Let me say that we spent 2 years developing the Freedom Academy concept, from 1952 to 1954. We reduced it to a 51-page report. We sent this report up to Mr. Robert Cutler, who was then head of the Planning Board of the National Security Council, and Mr. Cutler circulated it among the various agencies. In July 1954, a conference was set up by the old Operations Coordinating Board, across the street from the White House, which all these agencies attended to discuss the Freedom Academy proposal. There was a wide divergence of opinion.

Dr. Possony, one of the witnesses this morning, was at that conference as the Defense Department representative—one of our supporters there, I might add.

But unfortunately, we ran into the usual defensive, inhibited, do-nothing State Department attitude, and we did not get the type of action report we wanted. We had strong support from the Defense Department, the Planning Board of the NSC, and the OCB.

Following our turndown in Washington, we revised our proposal and sent it to about 150 persons, including leading experts on communism and nonmilitary conflict. In the winter and spring of 1955, we held three conferences in New York City, attended by a representative group of conservatives, moderates, and liberals who had shown special interest in the problem of stopping Soviet political warfare. Considerable progress was made toward activating the Academy as a private institution, but it fell through because the foundations and other financial sources had no interest in the new forms of struggle.

By the fall of 1958, the Orlando Committee felt the research and training gap had been neglected so long that it would take heroic efforts to close it—that anything short of a major national effort headed by the Federal Government was unrealistic. We then drafted the original Freedom Academy bill. I believe the history of our committee and the bill during the last 5 years is most informative, but I will not go into that now unless the committee wants me to.

I hope a reading of the "Green Book"¹ will convince you the Orlando Committee has done its homework and is entitled to be heard.

Mr. POOL. Are any of the people in that group former State Department employees, or anybody like that in there, who were disenchanted with the way that it is run, and joined your group?

Mr. GRANT. No member of the Orlando Committee is, but we have cooperated with many experts around the country, some of whom were formerly with the State Department, with the Operations Coordinating Board, or the old Psychological Warfare Board; USIA; AID; and so forth. We have also had assistance and advice from persons who are presently members of the agencies.

Mr. POOL. I believe that is all.

Mr. GRANT. That summary is set forth much more coherently—at the beginning of the hearings in 1959 before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.

Mr. Chairman, I wish to thank you and the committee for giving me the opportunity to appear before you this morning on the subject of the revised Freedom Academy bill, H.R. 5368 and H.R. 8320, introduced by Congressmen Boggs and Taft, as well as the earlier versions of the bill, H.R. 352, H.R. 1617, and H.R. 8757, introduced by Congressmen Herlong, Schweiker, and Gubser.

Our committee has been the principal organizational center for the development of this idea in the intervening years. We have been assisted by many leading experts on political warfare and related subjects from all parts of the country. The three versions of the bill presently before the committee were drafted in my law office.

Mr. Chairman, the Freedom Academy bill presents your committee with a great challenge and opportunity—perhaps the greatest in the committee's history.

¹ "The Freedom Academy Bill," a 118-page exposition on proposed Freedom Academy legislation prepared by the Orlando Committee.

Today the Soviet Union, Red China, and the whole international Communist apparatus are employing an extraordinary variety of conflict instruments which enables them to outflank, envelop, or smother the more limited and hesitatingly applied instruments of our policy. In many arenas of the cold war—in peasant villages, classrooms, marketplaces, in labor unions, intellectual groups, student organizations, and in mass communications systems—the Communists are able to move ahead without substantial opposition because the free world lacks the means to oppose them.

We lack the means because in this, the 19th year of the cold war, we have yet to establish a research and training program which can give us the operational knowledge and the trained, motivated people we will need to master the new forms of struggle.

The Freedom Academy bill presents this committee with an unusual opportunity—because in this bill, for the first time, the nature of this research and training gap is clearly defined and a realistic proposal is made for closing it.

This gap is something no House committee has investigated in depth until now. During the years I have been coming to Washington on the Freedom Academy, I have found Members of Congress have little knowledge about the nature and extent of this gap—in fact even those who are well informed about communism and foreign affairs have seldom looked into this part of the problem.

Mr. Chairman, the members of this committee and its staff are in for some hard work and study if they are to master this legislation. For example, you will need to know the substance of the training programs at the Foreign Service Institute, the War Colleges, and at our university centers in order to understand how superficially we train our foreign affairs personnel in the new forms of struggle. You will need to acquire some understanding of the whole new range of policy tools that can be made available to us with proper research and training; and you will need to understand the major role the private sector could play in the global struggle, with adequate research and training, and the magnificent opportunity we have for training foreign nationals.

To assist the committee, I respectfully ask the Chair to have the following documents inserted in the record following my statement:

1. The foreword and parts I, II, III, IV, and V of the "Green Book." This was prepared 2 years ago by the Orlando Committee to get the essentials of the Freedom Academy concept between two covers. Part I summarizes the Soviet research and training program in political warfare. Since this was written, additional information has come to light on the Cuban schools for guerrilla warfare and subversion. Part II summarizes the U.S. cold war research and training program. I believe this is the first analysis of the training programs at the Foreign Service Institute, the War Colleges, and our university centers in terms of how well they prepare the student to understand nonmilitary conflict. I depart from my prepared statement here to say there have been studies in the past, but these went into such collateral matters as how good language training was, for example, but did not inquire into how well the student was prepared to understand political warfare and nonmilitary conflict.

Part III is a brief explanation of each section of the bill. This was written before the bill was extensively revised and reintroduced in the 88th Congress by Congressmen Boggs and Taft. Over the years the Orlando Committee has acquired some definite ideas about the type of research and training program the Academy should foster, and we have set out some of our ideas in part IV. Part V answers some of the objections which had been raised as of 2 years ago. Of course, new objections have come up since then.

2. Supplement No. 1 to the "Green Book." Prepared a year ago by the Orlando Committee, this is an analysis of the principal differences between the Freedom Academy bill and the administration's grossly inadequate proposal to establish a National Academy of Foreign Affairs. While the latter proposal is not before the committee, I believe this paper will prove helpful in deepening the committee's understanding of the Freedom Academy concept. I certainly hope that the questions that were raised earlier with Congressman Herlong as to the difference between the National Academy approach and the Freedom Academy approach will be asked me, because we have spent a great deal of time precisely on this, in analyzing the very critical differences.

3. The favorable report of the Senate Judiciary Committee on the Freedom Academy bill of June 30, 1960, in which the committee calls this legislation "one of the most important bills ever introduced in the Congress."

4. Gallup Poll on the Freedom Academy dated May 4, 1962, which, incidentally, showed overwhelming support for the idea; and the favorable opinion was almost evenly divided among Republicans, Democrats, and independents, which I thought was quite interesting.

If the committee is interested in the long and frustrating history of this proposal, an outline can be found in my testimony before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on June 17, 1959, pages 10 through 22, in the foreword to the "Green Book," in the first section of Supplement No. 1 to the "Green Book," and in the May 1963 *Reader's Digest* article entitled "Let's Demand This New Weapon for Democracy."

Perhaps the best approach to the Freedom Academy bill is to examine our present research and training programs dealing with the nonmilitary part of the global struggle to understand what is being done and, more important, not done.

Last September, Senator Young of Ohio, in a floor speech, pointed out we already have a Foreign Service Institute, five War Colleges, a Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, a Russian Research Center at Harvard, and various area study programs at our universities—so why do we need a Freedom Academy? He felt the Academy would simply duplicate what is already being done. The Senator's arguments sound reasonable and convincing until you examine what these schools and universities are in fact doing, as well as the wide range of research and training attuned to our global operational needs which they are not covering and are not adequately organized or staffed to cover.

For some years now the Orlando Committee has kept abreast of training programs offered at the schools mentioned by Senator Young, as well as the intradepartmental training at USIA and AID (and its ICA and FOA predecessors). Some of our findings are listed in part II of the "Green Book."

In substance we found :

1. In general—and you will pardon me, Mr. Chairman, I will get more specific later on, but I have to cover this in very generalized language first. In general, the training, especially as it deals with nonmilitary conflict, tends to be skimpy, superficial, or nonexistent and provides the student with little motivation. Nowhere is there true professional training in depth which can produce rounded experts, conflict managers, if you will, who not only understand the spectrum of Soviet political warfare, insurgency, and subversion, but also are familiar with the many policy instruments potentially available to us in both the Government and private sectors and are capable of organizing and programing these instruments over long periods in an integrated strategy to achieve our twin objectives of defeating all forms of Communist attack while seeking to build and preserve free and viable nations.

2. Not only is this type of upper level professional training unavailable, there is inadequate intermediate-level training to produce the operational personnel who can implement an advanced, integrated strategy.

3. We were unable to find a single Government or university training program that deals with the difficult and sophisticated subject of Communist political warfare, insurgency, and subversion in depth, much less the means of defeating it.

4. Nowhere is there a centrally directed research effort to explore the wide range of new instruments the Government might utilize in the global struggle and the manner of interrelating and programing these in a farsighted strategy. Bits and pieces of the problem are being worked on in the agencies and at university centers. But a broad range of organizational forms and operational techniques which we must master, if we are to solve the unprecedented problems raised by the Sino-Soviet penetration of the free world, the newly emerging nations, and the chaotic conditions in Latin America and elsewhere, are not being studied at all, or in an inadequate fashion.

5. There is little interest in, or understanding of, the major role the private sector could be playing in solving our global problems—especially the defeat of Communist political warfare, subversion, and insurgency and the building of free and viable nations.

a) Nowhere is there a comprehensive research effort to explore, develop, and catalog the many things the private sector could be doing—not just the things corporations, businessmen, labor leaders, students, or journalists living or traveling overseas might do, but the major role that our great civic organizations and private citizens in this country might play in achieving our global objectives.

b) Nowhere is a training program available to private citizens to show them these many things or how to go about them intelligently, systematically, and discreetly, or to motivate them to do so.

6. Nowhere, with a few limited exceptions, have we developed in or out of Government an educational program for foreign nationals to provide them with the knowledge and motivation necessary to understand and defeat all forms of Communist political warfare, subversion, and insurgency, while building free and viable institutions and societies.

7. No existing center or combination of centers in or out of Government has the necessary staff, research facilities, including library, or clear directive to fill these gaps, so even if the necessary motivation was present at the State Department and elsewhere to close the gap, we lack the organizational means to do so.

Most disturbing to the Orlando Committee has been the bland indifference of some Government officials, especially at the Department of State, when the above research and training gaps are pointed out.

Perhaps nowhere can we see more plainly the failure of the Government training program to adjust to the whole new set of problems we have faced since the beginning of the cold war than at the Foreign Service Institute. Established in 1947 under the Department of State to give in-service training to foreign affairs personnel, FSI was to be the professional training center for the various departments and agencies dealing with foreign affairs.

The Foreign Service Institute is divided into a language school, which gets about 60 percent of the \$5.7 million budget, and a foreign affairs school. By and large, the language school is well run though it was inexcusably slow in emphasizing the hard languages of the underdeveloped areas. By contrast, the offerings at the foreign affairs school are remarkably superficial and there has been only a minimal effort to reorient training to meet the new challenges we have faced since 1945.

Let me be more specific.

A newly appointed Foreign Service officer, fresh from an undergraduate campus, takes the A-100 Basic Officers Course at FSI. Usually this is his only training, other than languages, before assignment to his first post. This is an 8-week course mainly concerned with general orientation—history of the Foreign Service, relation of State to other agencies, how a consulate is run, trade promotion, administration, and the do's and don'ts for Foreign Service officers and their wives overseas.

Just 6 hours, less than 1 day out of 8 weeks, is given to study of the Communist enterprise, and in this time they try to cover everything—the Communist bloc, as well as Soviet external political warfare, subversion, and insurgency. This is a joke. One would suppose that at the beginning of his career an officer should receive serious training concerning the nature, strategy, and tactics of the principal enemy of the United States and the method we intend to employ to defeat that enemy. State apparently has great faith in virgins.

On reaching the rank of FSO 4 or 5, the career officer, then in his thirties or forties, becomes eligible for the A-200 Mid-Career Course in Foreign Affairs at the Institute. In going over this course in 1961, I could find only 6 hours which seemed to relate directly to Communist strategy and tactics. Other parts had an indirect relation, but they presume an understanding of the problem which no prior training at least provided. So even in mid-career, FSI is careful not to compromise the amateur standing of its graduates. I think we can assume, Mr. Chairman, that after 15 years in the field, their cold war maidenheads have been rended here and there; but by and large, nowhere in the training programs have they had serious training in this area.

On reaching the late forties or early fifties and the rank of FSO 1 or 2 (occasionally 3), the officer becomes eligible for the Senior Officers

Seminar in Foreign Policy. This is a 9-month course at FSI and, for the first time, there is time for serious professional training. Again taking just one facet of training, the course provides only 1 week on Communist strategy and tactics. In this week these are just four hour-and-a-half lectures, each given by a different expert. The rest of the week is taken up by round-table discussions, optional films, and some reading. This does not begin to approach professional-level training in a difficult and complex subject.

In June 1962, FSI inaugurated the A-700 Interdepartmental Country Team Seminar. This is a 5-week quickie course supposed to develop better coordinated team operations among the various agencies operating under an ambassador in "modernizing" societies and countering insurgency in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Five weeks isn't enough time, regardless of the caliber of instruction, to give in depth understanding of the range of Communist subversion and insurgency, the wide range of countermeasures potentially available to us or to acquire truly professional-level ability to organize and program these many instruments. Countering a Mao-type revolutionary movement is a serious, complex business and one of the great challenges we face. But the training at FSI is designed for dilettantes, and we are seeing the results in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and elsewhere.

For some years now, FSI has offered a 2-week seminar on communism. The Orlando Committee has interviewed a number of graduates of this course, and all have made the same comment in almost the same words—"Just as we are really getting interested and starting to understand a little about the subject, the course ends." All agreed the course is well run, but superficial. For example, such an involved, encyclopedic subject as subversion is covered in a single hour-and-a-half lecture-discussion period. In June 1962 I made myself unpopular at FSI by telling the Director this course would be about right for the good ladies of the DAR *before* they got down to some serious reading, but for our career professionals it is ridiculous. And, of course, it deals with explaining communism, not what to do about it.

FSI also runs several 3-week area study courses. Again this is not serious, professional training in the new dimensions of struggle.

In short, Mr. Chairman, FSI runs a number of quickie courses designed for the amateur or dilettante. Nowhere is there serious, in-depth, professional-level training concerning the spectrum of Communist political warfare, the range of countermeasures potentially available to defeat it, and the building or preserving of free and viable nations. Yet this would appear to be the greatest single task of our foreign affairs personnel.

The programs at the War Colleges and our leading university centers are summarized in part II of the "Green Book" and, in the interest of time, I will not go into them now. I will simply point out they do not fill the gaps which I have mentioned.

In sharp contrast, the Soviet Union, Red China, and the world Communist enterprise have operated an extensive system of basic, intermediate, and advanced schools covering the whole spectrum of nonmilitary conflict in depth. In addition they have a remarkable research program attuned to the requirements of nonmilitary conflict,

which the Orlando Committee has summarized in part I of the "Green Book."

What it boils down to is that the Communists have systematically prepared themselves to wage the type of global struggle we are now in, while the United States has not.

The Freedom Academy bill provides the most logical means for closing the research and training gap.

First, the Academy is taken out from under the smothering influence of the State Department and placed under the direction and control of an independent, full-time Commission. State has had 17 years to adjust Foreign Service Institute training to the new forms of struggle and failed. State has shown a gross lack of imagination in seeking solutions to our global problems, especially as they relate to nonmilitary conflict, and the whole system at State discourages initiative in seeking new approaches. Furthermore, State has been openly hostile to the idea of providing Academy-type training to private citizens and foreign nationals or of researching the possibilities here.

The CHAIRMAN. Why?

Mr. GRANT. Sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Why?

Mr. GRANT. I would like to answer that in depth. I am going to get to that very shortly, Mr. Chairman.

To subject the Freedom Academy to this atmosphere would insure its ultimate defeat. It may fail under the Commission, depending on the appointments, but at least it would have a chance.

Second, the Freedom Academy bill, in section 2, clearly defines the nature of the research and training gap and sets out specific goals for the Academy program. These pretty well cover the gaps I have outlined. The bill states the need to close these gaps in urgent language and gives the Commission a clear directive to get on with the job. This is what the Foreign Service Institute Statute (22 U.S.C.A., section 1041 et seq.) notably fails to do. While the mere presence of this language does not insure that the Freedom Academy will be properly implemented, it puts the Commission on notice of congressional intent and provides a yardstick to measure performance. In view of the history of the Foreign Service Institute and the attitude at State, I suggest any bill establishing an Academy may be sadly defective if it does not contain similar strong and specific congressional findings of fact and statement of policy. A glorified version of the Foreign Service Institute will not do.

Third, the Academy provides a center where, for the first time, we can bring together in permanent association the necessary range of experts to make an organized assault on the problems of nonmilitary conflict. Up to now, strategy and tactics have usually been devised by ad hoc task forces set up in response to specific crises or problems. Research in the departments and agencies has been limited by parochial attitudes and jurisdictional walls. Nowhere could nonmilitary conflict be considered as a whole. Each agency was wrapped up in its own limited problems. Whole areas of vital cold war operational knowledge were ignored, because they didn't fall squarely within the jurisdiction of a particular agency or because they went beyond the conventional, traditional way of doing things. One result has been the gradual expansion of manageable problems into major crises

and setbacks all over the world, because over the years we have lacked the operational tools which might have been employed systematically and in time.

For example, for many years we permitted Communist cadres to move into the villages of Southeast Asia and gradually expand and consolidate their hold, while we did almost nothing. Only recently, after the situation developed to crisis proportions and we faced the loss of all Southeast Asia did we begin a crash program to develop counter-insurgency; and even this program, which I am generally familiar with, is far too limited.

Mr. Chairman, 10 years ago I came to Washington to plead the case for the Freedom Academy before an interdepartmental committee composed of representatives from State, USIA, FOA (AID), Defense, and CIA. One of my principal arguments for the Academy was that here, at last, we could develop the operational knowledge and train the personnel and provide them with the intense motivation necessary to go into the villages, or train others to go into the villages, and win the peasants and so surround the Communist fish with an unfriendly sea. I pointed out that conventional forms of village development work—simple engineering, sanitation, and agricultural assistance—were not enough. The villagers must also be won over politically and organized to prevent Communist penetration by having their own intelligence network and protective arrangements. Otherwise, dedicated and highly trained Communist cadres, through terror and superior agitational and organizational techniques, would surely win out. And I went on to point out that a peasant program alone was not enough. There must also be a program to win, hold, and activate on our side student groups, intellectuals, religious groups, labor unions, and others in the cities and to convince friendly governments of the need for all this. I emphasized this would require a whole new range of operational thinking and organizational forms and a new type training program.

Of course this cut across the areas of responsibility of a number of agencies and did not readily fit in with our traditional instruments of economic aid, military assistance, and diplomacy, conventionally applied, and it ran head on into the inhibited, defensive attitude at State. So nothing was done, and today the problem has grown to where this Nation faces the possibility of a major political, as well as military, defeat.

Another example is the massive Communist penetration and manipulation of the university and student organizations in Latin America. This has been going on for many years and is a serious, long-range problem for the United States. Yet today this Government has only limited means available to deal with this problem.

A USIA library in Caracas does not compete successfully with scores of well-trained and well-financed Communist organizers in the Central University—nor does a Voice of America broadcast or government-to-government diplomacy or even the Peace Corps, which is sent nowhere near this highly explosive political center. So the problem is swept under the carpet, and each year thousands of new students are indoctrinated with hatred for the United States, and we will reap the harvest for decades to come. Yet over the years there are a thousand and one ways we could have successfully countered the Com-

munists in the Latin universities. I hope to get to this in the question-and-answer period. Again, this would require a whole new range of operational thinking and planning and was outside the traditional policy channels and beyond the research and planning functions of any one of the agencies.

At the Freedom Academy, at least, we can consider nonmilitary conflict as a whole. The various substrategies in the political, ideological, psychological, economic, and organizational spheres can be considered together with a maximum exchange of ideas among many experts working in close association. There will be no artificial barriers inhibiting new lines of operational thinking. Their time and energy will not be dissipated by working on the day-to-day problems and crises which plague the agencies. They will have the necessary research tools at hand, particularly a large and specialized library—and I know Dr. Possony will go into that—and Government files on past operations. The latter, incidentally, should prove a major drawing card in attracting top research talent to the Academy. They will have a clear directive to get on with the job. And most important, they will be stimulated by the knowledge they are attacking some of the most vital and perplexing problems of our times and by the expectation that the results of their labors will be made known at the highest levels of Government.

Mr. Chairman, I am sure we will be deeply impressed by the results. We are going to find there are answers to cold war problems which have defied solution until now.

Fourth, the Freedom Academy bill recognizes the private sector can play a major role in the global struggle between freedom and communism. A number of our more difficult problems, like the Communist penetration of Latin universities, are more susceptible to solution through programs initiated by the private sector than by Government action. Actually, there are unlimited possibilities for private participation, but today many of our great service organizations and most of our citizens are unaware of these things. Every day unique opportunities are slipping by, some lost forever.

Let us be realistic. There are three preconditions to systematic, large-scale private participation:

1. A research program with the necessary staff and funding to think through the full range of possibilities for private participation.

2. A training program where private citizens can be motivated to participate and can learn about these things and how to go about them systematically and discreetly.

3. A recognized information center where private organizations and individuals who want to help, say in Latin America, can readily obtain information in the most usable form on what they can do.

The Freedom Academy bill explicitly meets these three preconditions. It thereby makes it possible for a huge reservoir of ingenuity, talent, and organizational strength in the private sector to be effectively mobilized and directed toward solving the life-and-death problems of global struggle.

Mr. Chairman, I hope I will be given an opportunity in the question-and-answer period to give specific illustrations of the truly exciting possibilities for private action; what is being done; and, more

important, the things that could be done. There is almost no understanding of these possibilities in the Congress, within the administration, or even among many experts on communism or nonmilitary conflict.

Fifth, the bill recognizes the need to train foreign nationals and provides the means to do so. Regardless of how well we train our foreign affairs personnel, regardless of the extent of private participation, the main burden of the struggle in Latin America, Africa, and the East will be borne by the nationals of those areas. Today the greatest single advantage of the Soviet Union and Red China, as Congressman Herlong pointed out a few minutes ago, is the existence of an indigenous Communist Party in each country whose members have been intensively trained in all of the arts of subversion and insurgency.

Attorney General Robert Kennedy summarized the problem on his return from a world tour in 1962:

In every country well-organized and highly disciplined Communist cadres concentrate their activities in universities, student bodies, labor organizations and intellectual groups. Against these there is no one to question their positions, their facts; no organization, no cadre, no disciplined and calculated effort to present the other side. And so it is that a small, able and well-trained unit can take over a meeting or an organization or even a government.

Today Army Special Forces is providing counterinsurgency training to Latin American military personnel, policemen, and a few others. This is a good thing, and when I was at the Army Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg last December, I was impressed by the dedication and drive of some of our officers there. What we need even more, however, is a center where we can give some in-depth training to peasant leaders, labor leaders, newspapermen, politicians, businessmen, and intellectuals so they can prevent subversion from developing to the point of open insurgency. Certainly we want no Vietnam in Latin America, but where is this training available? This is the type of problem State sweeps under the carpet, or meets only superficially, as in the case of our mobile training teams in Latin America, the training at Fort Gulick in the Canal Zone, and so forth.

For years now State has been openly hostile to the idea of training foreign nationals in a Freedom Academy. The Department has become quite skilled in explaining all the things that could go wrong—Academy graduates would be branded CIA agents on their return and would be effectively isolated, etc.

Of course, as one AFL-CIO official with 9 years' experience in Latin America said to me, every Latin student who comes to this country is branded an agent of Yankee imperialism on his return, if he shows any pro-Western sentiments—whether he attends Georgetown, Harvard, or LSU. The trouble is that he gets tarred and feathered with this, but he has not received the training.

Thousands of Latin Americans have now traveled to Havana, Prague, or Moscow for training. But this hasn't caused them to be isolated. They have a simple answer—"Don't judge me on where I was trained, but on what I do." And ultimately Academy graduates will be judged on their performance. Certainly there are problems, but with wise planning and foresight most of them can be overcome. Furthermore, Academy graduates will be trained to answer Communist charges.

In any event, the absence of trained, dedicated people to oppose the Communists in so many parts of the free world is a problem we have to lick, regardless of the difficulties. At the Freedom Academy this problem will no longer be swept under the carpet. There will be an intensive, comprehensive effort to research the possibilities and provide the most effective type of training. You will note the bill specifically provides the conditions for admission of foreign students and authorizes the Commission to pay their expenses, where desirable.

Mr. Chairman, this statement is already too long. The subject before you is an involved one. There are dozens of additional points I would like to cover and which should be covered in detail, but perhaps it would be better to stop here, so the committee can inquire into those matters which it finds of greatest concern.

I will be most happy to answer your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I have quite a few questions I would like to propound.

There has been some intimation, or expression of apprehension, that this Academy could develop into a cloak-and-dagger institution, might lead to a revival of so-called McCarthyism, and so forth. We have to face that situation. What do you have to say about that?

Mr. GRANT. Well, Mr. Chairman, of course the opposition can always dream up all sorts of things that can go wrong, but I think that this bill provides as good protection as you are going to find.

First of all, let me point out that the Freedom Academy and Commission are not involved in operations. The Freedom Academy is entirely a research and training institution. The Freedom Academy and the Freedom Commission are not going to be part of the country team operating in Vietnam or India, or Venezuela or Brazil. They are not going to be making policy or implementing policy. It is entirely a research and a training effort. So the possibilities of developing into a cloak-and-dagger operation, since they are not in operations at all, I would say was most minimal.

But secondly, what do we have here?

Look at the control. We have a Commission, appointed by the President, with the usual advice and consent of the Senate. I have sufficient faith in the President to believe he is not going to appoint the type of people who would cause this to be turned into that sort of an institution. We also have a clear policy statement and a directive from the Congress. Each year, the Freedom Commission will have to come before Mr. Rooney, I presume it would be, in appropriations, and reading the way he goes over the State Department budget each year, I would presume he would give the Freedom Commission an equally careful going over or raking over. In the extremely unlikely event there was some unauthorized inclination to turn the Freedom Academy into that sort of institution, the mere thought of having to justify this to Mr. Rooney and his subcommittee should end the matter.

We also have an Advisory Committee, section 13 of the bill, to keep the Congress aware of the activities of the Commission and Academy.

Those who relate the Freedom Academy to a cloak-and-dagger institution simply have not read the bills or the considerable literature prepared by the Orlando Committee and other supporters. Actually, this is another red herring to avoid a debate on the real issues raised by this legislation.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like you to go into that a little bit, the function of the advisory group to the members of the Commission.

Mr. GRANT. Well, the Freedom Commission itself is, of course, independent of any one existing agency. We thought it would be a great mistake, for the reasons I have already indicated, to put this under the State Department alone or under the Department of Defense alone or AID alone, because the jurisdictional walls, the parochial attitude of one of those agencies might predominate.

The CHAIRMAN. The Commission itself would be an independent agency.

Mr. GRANT. Right. We thought it should be an independent agency so as not to be inhibited or tied down with what any one agency was doing. But we also thought that the Freedom Academy and the Freedom Commission should be made aware, on a continuing basis, of the concrete operational needs and training which the various agencies and departments of Government think will be necessary for their personnel at the Academy. So we think that the Advisory Committee gives the necessary linkage with the operational agencies. But by putting the Freedom Academy under a separate Commission, it will not be dominated by any individual agency or department of Government, and above all, we get it out from under the smothering influence of the Department of State.

I might add, Mr. Chairman, that I think that the extent to which the Peace Corps has been successful is because Mr. Shriver had a knock-down, drag-out fight with the Department of State. You know, the Department of State wanted to put the Peace Corps under State, and Shriver said, "No, you will smother and bureaucratize a very forward-looking, idealistic concept." He was successful in that fight, and I think a large part of the Peace Corps' success is because it didn't go under an Assistant Secretary of State, but went under Mr. Shriver and an independent setup.

The CHAIRMAN. But there would be a linkage between the Commission and the agencies?

Mr. GRANT. Very much so.

The CHAIRMAN. And that is proper, is it not?

Mr. GRANT. It is very much so; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now distinguish between the Academy and the Commission.

Mr. GRANT. Well, the Commission is the group which actually will operate the Academy. Now you have six commissioners and a chairman appointed by the President with the usual advice and consent of the Senate. The part of the Freedom Academy bill setting up the Freedom Commission was adopted from the old Atomic Energy Act and follows it also almost verbatim, because that Act apparently has worked out quite well. Policy control and direction of the Freedom Academy would be in the hands of the Freedom Commission.

Now if I may go beyond your question a little bit, Mr. Chairman, I think it is very important that policy direction and control not be placed in the hands of a part-time board of trustees as has been proposed for the National Academy of Foreign Affairs. Because these research and training problems are so new, they are so complex, that if policy control is put in the hands of a part-time board of trus-

tees headed by an over-extended person like the Secretary of State—
The CHAIRMAN. Well, the Commission would be a full-time function.

Mr. GRANT. That is right, a full time Commission, because a part-time board of trustees simply does not have the time to give the policy guidance which is going to be necessary in exploring this whole new range of operational knowledge.

The CHAIRMAN. Now the Commission, I take it, then, would have the authority, necessarily, to staff the Academy.

Mr. GRANT. Yes, sir, that is right.

The CHAIRMAN. What would be your idea as to staffing?

Mr. GRANT. Well, let me say this, Mr. Chairman: If you mean in terms of specific individuals to appoint—

The CHAIRMAN. Individuals, the number and the range and the course and so on.

Mr. GRANT. We have to keep in mind we have a double function. One is a research function. The other is a training function. For the research function—

The CHAIRMAN. Well, speak on one at a time.

Mr. GRANT. All right, I will cover the research function first.

In order to cover research, we are going to have to bring together at the Academy a very wide range of expert knowledge. For example, we will have to have experts on propaganda or information programs, experts on the village development, experts on mass communications, experts on communism, experts on psychological conflict, ideological conflict, political conflict, and so forth. A wide range of experts will have to be brought together at the Academy, if we are to really explore all the possibilities, Government and private, for meeting the full range of Communist subversion and insurgency in these countries and, of course, strengthening free societies in these various areas.

So I think we are going to have to have a fairly large research staff, but we don't want to make the mistake that the CIA did when they were originally set up. They set up too rapidly, and time-servers from the other agencies who were out of jobs after the war flocked in, and I think it took them years to get quality instead of quantity, and we must have quality at the Freedom Academy, but there still has to be a rather wide range of expert knowledge to consider nonmilitary conflict as a whole.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now it seems to follow that the research department or section would put out literature, documents, and so on. Is that right?

Mr. GRANT. Yes, sir; and of course we have the information center. There is no point in carrying on all this research, Mr. Chairman, unless the results of the research are made known.

Now, of course, the research in the Government area, much of this will be kept confidential.

The CHAIRMAN. I was leading to that very question. How would it be possible, if it is advisable, to have the publications not part of our Government policy?

Mr. GRANT. Well, you understand, Mr. Chairman, as I stated, the Freedom Academy will not be making or carrying out policy, but the result of its research has to be made known to the agencies that would benefit from it. The Commission will make policy proposals, sugges-

tions to the agencies about new operational techniques which they can employ, but it is going to be up to the President or the National Security Council or a particular agency involved to decide whether or not they will, in fact, adopt these suggestions. The Freedom Commission can simply pass on these suggestions.

The CHAIRMAN. I am glad to hear that. In other words, their product would not, could not, be accepted by foreign governments as being United States foreign policy.

Mr. GRANT. Certainly not. Furthermore, much of this would be confidential communications from the Commission and Academy to the agencies.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I wish you would develop that, because the question is bound to bother some people.

Mr. GRANT. Well, Mr. Chairman, when you said publications, there is publication—

The CHAIRMAN. Or the material?

Mr. GRANT. There is publication in two senses. Number one, publication for general distribution and, secondly, merely the printing of reports, often confidential, which would go to the President, to the National Security Council, to the various agencies, making specific suggestions for them. I think there is a distinction between the two.

Now in terms of private citizens and the private sector and what they can do, these publications will not be dealing primarily with Government policy or making statements about Government policy. As I indicated, what we need for the private sector is to research and catalog all the possibilities for private participation in the global struggle and then to print this and make it available, on request, to private institutions and organizations and individuals who want to become involved in these things, but don't know what they can do or how to go about it intelligently and systematically and discreetly.

The CHAIRMAN. Now go on with the other function. You discussed research. You said there would be two functions. One research and the other training.

Mr. GRANT. Training.

The CHAIRMAN. What would be the course of training? Let me ask two or three questions in one, and then you can develop your thoughts.

Who would be prospective participants?

What educational background would be requisite? Would they be under scholarship? Would they be paid like people attending the other academies? Who would they be?

Mr. GRANT. All right, Mr. Chairman, we are dealing with three types of students: Government foreign affairs personnel, private citizens, and foreign nationals. Let me take them in order.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. What about military?

Mr. GRANT. Yes, just as the State Department sends people to the National War College—on a much too small quota basis, in my opinion—I am sure the Department of Defense would send people to the Freedom Academy also. It is very important that our military personnel become aware of the wider aspects of national security.

First of all, Government employees. These would come from all the agencies and departments that have some relationship to the cold war and our foreign operations. The State Department, USIA, AID,

even the Department of Agriculture has important overseas functions, as you know, Mr. Chairman.

These students, of course, would be paid by their particular department or agency when they were there. And they would be assigned on a regular quota, just as the departments and agencies assign their officers and employees to the National War College, the Foreign Service Institute, or one of the university centers.

Now as to the type of training they would receive, there would be basic-level training, intermediate-level training, and advanced training. At the advanced level I am thinking of up to 2 years of very intensive, professional training to produce rounded experts or conflict managers for our side in the new forms of struggle. This would be a prestige course. At this level, the Academy would be roughly a National War College for nonmilitary aspects of the problem or nonmilitary conflict.

It might be helpful to read a few short paragraphs from the "Green Book" describing the general nature of this advanced-level training.

The CHAIRMAN. By the way, I didn't rule on your request to make the material you suggested part of the record. That material will be received temporarily for our files, and then we will use our judgment as to what, if any, portions will be printed as part of the record.¹

Mr. GRANT. Yes, sir.

May I quote from the "Green Book" on that training:

At advanced levels, we would be seeking to train a rounded cold war strategist—a conflict manager for our side in the new forms of struggle. This is going to take considerable time, and the curriculum will be inadequate until we begin to get some results from the research side. At this level, the students will be mature individuals, many of whom already have considerable operator experience in some phase of the cold war. Two years is probably a minimum estimate of training time, with three years preferable for at least some advanced students. This may be cut down later when the basic material is given more adequate treatment at our universities and other government training programs.

This should be a prestige course. At this level, the Freedom Academy will be operating as a National War College for non-military conflict. The graduate in the breadth of knowledge attained to non-military conflict should be well ahead of almost any one we now have.

The CHAIRMAN. You are going pretty fast.

Mr. GRANT. All right.

He should have deep knowledge of Communist conflict doctrine, a thorough understanding of political, ideological, psychological, sociological, economic conflict in all its dimensions; a knowledge of the wide range of tools in the government and private sectors which can be developed and utilized; a conceptual framework for non-military conflict—

And this is extremely important—

—so that these many tools can be employed flexibly yet systematically with clearly understood purpose; a grasp of the infinite variety of organizational forms and operational techniques inherent in a global struggle between Freedom and Communism; a grasp of the systematic revolution sweeping the world and an understanding of the range of programs, many still to be researched and developed, which can be programmed and coordinated over long periods to assist the new nations toward freedom, national independence and self government. No existing training program or combination of training programs can even approximate these objectives.

¹ For material submitted by Mr. Grant and made a part of this record, see Appendix B, part 1, pp. 1191-1242.

Let me further state here, Mr. Chairman, that the training at these advanced levels should cover the spectrum of foreign policy, but it will be directly related to the central problems of nonmilitary conflict, it will be brought within a conceptual framework for nonmilitary conflict attuned to winning this global struggle we are now in with the Soviet Union and Red China and the problems of creating free and independent and viable countries. So much of what we are presently doing, our aid program, for example, is often operated as though we weren't in a global struggle with communism and is often ineffective or even counterproductive because it is not attuned to the conflict environment.

Now below the top-level courses, we would have intermediate-level courses, 6 months to a year in length. We can't train rounded cold war professionals in that length of time, but the student can acquire a working knowledge of operational communism; a conceptual framework for multidimensional, multidirectional strategy in nonmilitary conflict, an eye-opening exposure to the exciting range of measures potentially available to us, and practical, operative, usable knowledge in a wide range of conflict situations with some detailed case studies.

The CHAIRMAN. It is now about 10 minutes to 12. The bells have rung for the convening of the House, and I think it is a good time to give the reporter a break. We will recess at this point.

Mr. GRANT. May I have the permission to get back to finish this question? It is a very vital one you just asked me.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, but we will come back to it. I know it is important. We will come back to it.

Mr. GRANT. I know in the Senate hearings we were promised 3 days. They cut us to 2 days and then they took up half of our time to go into the administration's bill, and there was no time to get to the really important questions, and we were cut off in our answers before we really got to the gist of it.

The CHAIRMAN. We will try to squeeze all the juice out of your lemon before we let you go.

Mr. GRANT. All right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We will stand in recess until a quarter to two.

(Whereupon, at 12 noon, Tuesday, February 18, 1964, the committee recessed, to reconvene at 1:45 p.m. the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION—TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1964

(The committee reconvened at 2 p.m., Hon. Edwin E. Willis, chairman, presiding.)

(Committee members present: Representatives Willis and Ichord.)

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will please come to order.

Mr. Grant, before the noon hour we were talking, first, about the research function of the institution it is proposed we create, then the course of studies, the type of people who would participate, and so on.

Will you pick it up from there, please?

Mr. GRANT. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

STATEMENT OF ALAN G. GRANT, JR.—Resumed

MR. GRANT. AS I recall, I just finished mentioning something about the types and lengths of courses for Government foreign affairs personnel. I mentioned the advance courses up to 2 years in length, the intermediate-level courses of 6 months to 1 year, as well as some basic training, and indicated the content.

In addition to that, we will be bringing private citizens to the Freedom Academy. These private citizens and the type of training we want to give them, in many instances, the emphasis, particularly, will be quite different from that of Government foreign affairs personnel. I would rather suspect that you might very well end up with three schools under the Freedom Academy: One school concentrating on U.S. Government foreign affairs personnel, one specializing on research and training in the private sector, and one upon foreign nationals' training.

(At this point Mr. Bruce entered the hearing room.)

MR. GRANT. In the Government training program, heavy emphasis would be at intermediate and advanced levels. In the training of private citizens, I believe we would be bringing in a large number for short courses of 2 weeks or 1 or 2 months in length.

THE CHAIRMAN. They will come from management?

MR. GRANT. They will come from across the board, and particularly those institutions and organizations which are in the best position to play an important role in winning the global struggle. There will be no limitation. People from the Kiwanis Club, the League of Women Voters, Rotary, the universities, labor, business, and so forth. There would be a wide cross-section of Americans who have a role to play, who will be trained.

THE CHAIRMAN. You said that those you would draw from Government agencies would retain their status as Government employees and draw pay, regular pay. What about those you now talk about? Did you envisage their tuition being paid by the Government, or at least their receiving a stipend of some kind, to take the course?

MR. GRANT. It will vary. Some of the most desirable foreign students and private citizens we will want to bring to the Academy for training will not be able to come unless we provide some sort of per diem and pay their expenses while at the Academy.

THE CHAIRMAN. I see nothing wrong with that, but I want the record to reflect your thinking on it.

MR. GRANT. Let me point out that the National Defense Education Act of 1958 authorizes summer training for high school teachers. They recognized that few high school teachers can afford to attend summer school, even with tuition paid, unless living expenses are also provided. So specific provision is made for this.

The Freedom Academy bill does not make the payment of per diem mandatory, because many private citizens can come at their own expense. After all, the Freedom Commission will want to get the maximum mileage out of every dollar which Mr. Rooney and the Congress give them, so the bill simply authorizes grants to students and payment of expenses at the option of the Commission to get desirable people to come to the Academy.

In the case of foreign students, this can cover travel expenses to and from the Academy, as well as living expenses while here.

The CHAIRMAN. Foreign students?

Mr. GRANT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean by that?

Mr. GRANT. Well, any non-national of the United States. For example, students or labor leaders, businessmen, student leaders, peasant leaders might want to come up here from Venezuela or Colombia to take training at the Freedom Academy.

One of the things the Freedom Academy research will delve into will be the type of training which will be most effective for these people in order to go back and achieve our twin objectives of defeating the Communist wrecking operation, Communist insurgency and political warfare, and subversion, while helping to strengthen their own free institutions and societies.

Many of these foreign students would not be able to attend unless we provide some help and assistance.

The CHAIRMAN. That would be true also of American nationals, wouldn't it?

Mr. GRANT. Yes, sir. I didn't intend to limit my answer. I meant that the Freedom Commission can provide financial assistance for American nationals wherever it is necessary, but many will be able to attend without that assistance. The bill does not make it compulsory. It merely gives the Commission authority to extend assistance if it finds it is necessary in order to get desirable students to attend the Freedom Academy.

The CHAIRMAN. Not only expenses, but they might have to be paid enough to support their families; wouldn't they?

Mr. GRANT. They would. Let me add something.

The CHAIRMAN. Again, I want to know the plan. Let me give you this illustration: Just last week, a few days ago, we passed a bill that I was opposed to, the Civil Rights Bill. One feature of that bill contemplated training of teachers or experts to inculcate the idea of integration.

That bill authorizes summer courses for teachers. The word used was "stipends," that they be paid something, their expenses to these institutions, plus some kind of a salary. This would be along that line, I take it.

Mr. GRANT. It would, except that everybody who attends does not automatically get the stipend. Whether to give them help financially will be up to the Commission and can be considered on an individual student basis.

The National Defense Education Act has every high school teacher, regardless of whether a millionaire or pauper, getting \$75 a week plus \$15 for each dependent. I don't think that is the correct approach for the Freedom Academy. Many of these people will be able to attend the Academy without financial help. On the other hand, many desirable people will not be able to come without some help. It will have to be worked out on an individual basis. That is the way the bill leaves it to the discretion of the Commission.

The CHAIRMAN. I know you can't go—or can you—into the details of the educational and other background requisite to attendance in the first place, to be a student or a participant in the Academy? I

don't know how much you have thought about it. In other words, if this bill hits the floor, those are things that we should be prepared to answer. You might as well put that into the record.

Mr. GRANT. The bill does not specifically list the requisites and requirements which we would want in a student. I think this would be almost impossible to spell out in legislation. This is something that we have to leave to the good sense and judgment of the Freedom Commission in view of the problem.

We do say in section 7, Academy students, other than Government personnel, shall be selected, insofar as is practicable and in the public interest, from those areas, organizations, or institutions where trained leadership and informed public opinion are most needed to achieve the objectives set forth in section 2(a) (7) IV and V.

You will recall that, in the congressional statement, section 2, are set forth five specific objectives for training—four and five dealing with the private sector. So this is the general directive which the Congress has given, and I think it is going to be very difficult, Mr. Chairman, to be any more specific than that in instructions from the Congress in the general legislation insofar as it concerns the selection of private students.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. Mr. Chairman, who makes the selections?

The CHAIRMAN. I suppose it would be the Commission.

I will turn the question over to Mr. Grant.

Mr. GRANT. Yes, sir; it would be the Freedom Commission. Please let me modify that to prevent a confusion here.

The Commission, I am sure, will make the selection as to private citizens and foreign students, but they obviously will be assisted by many Government agencies operating overseas and other places who come across people who would like to attend the Freedom Academy. In terms of training Government cold war personnel, obviously the agencies themselves, on an annual quota basis, will select who will attend the Academy and whether they take the basic, intermediate, or advanced courses.

The CHAIRMAN. I can easily follow you as far as Government agencies involved in the cold war, subversion, and all the rest of it are concerned. They will select the numbers and the quality and everything else. But I was talking about the private sector. I suppose that is what Mr. Schadeberg has referred to.

Mr. GRANT. The bill gives the Freedom Commission specific directives for the private sector in the congressional statement of policy and findings of fact. I think within this general authority they have specific goals to aim for in the selection of private citizens.

The CHAIRMAN. We are talking in terms of the Freedom Academy. To me, the people there must be related to things that you can see or visualize. We talk about West Point, about housing, about buildings, and so on. We have created, since I have been in the Congress, the Air Force Academy, for which we built suitable quarters out West. What do you visualize the Academy being like? What do you have in mind?

Mr. GRANT. Well, Mr. Chairman, we have given a lot of thought to the question of location.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, location plus facilities; what facilities are involved? I know it is a tough question, but if we create an Academy,

people are going to relate it to an academy they know about, the Air Force, the Naval Academy, West Point, and so on.

What we are talking about is physical facilities, its size, number of students or participants. You must have been thinking about it. Those questions have just come into my mind. If we adopt the bill, we must settle it. Most of all, we must know about it, the members of this committee.

MR. GRANT. Mr. Chairman, next month I have to go to the University of Florida at Gainesville and sit on an evaluation board of the architectural school because one of the students there has selected the Freedom Academy as his architectural thesis. I have been in consultation with him and I wish I had some of his drawings with me today. Let me say, first of all, that I think that the Freedom Academy should be located in the Washington, D.C., area. This is, I think, almost mandatory, because one of the major sources for research will be the operational files of the U.S. Government on past operations.

If the Freedom Academy is established in any other part of the country, it is going to be very inconvenient and cumbersome to do this type of research. I have heard the Atomic Energy Commission made a big mistake when they went out 25 or 30 miles in the country and find they are spending half of their time now commuting back and forth to Washington.

As to physical plant, the most important central thing we have to have is a library. Dr. Stefan Possony, who is with the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, at Stanford, which has the best private library in the country dealing with this whole area of communism and nonmilitary conflict, has many thoughts on the library and he is going into that as your next witness. But it has to be a specialized library and a substantial library.

In addition to that, we will have to have administration buildings for the Commission. In addition to that, we will have to have conference rooms, lecture halls, dining halls.

As far as dormitories go, I think most of the Government students will be able to find housing in the Washington area, just as Government employees do who attend the Foreign Service Institute.

But for private citizens brought in for 2 weeks or 2 months, it may be desirable to have what is called in the Army a BOQ setup, where they can stay at the Freedom Academy temporarily while attending some of the shorter courses.

Most of the faculty will not require residences at the Academy because they can live in the general Washington, D.C., area.

The main things are the library, the central place for the Commission to meet, and offices, the necessary research facilities, conference rooms, lecture halls, and so forth.

If you would like me to hit budget at this point, Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to.

THE CHAIRMAN. In talking about facilities and all, you are talking about money. You might as well go ahead.

MR. GRANT. We have kicked budget around for years.

THE CHAIRMAN. Let me say that the cost doesn't bother me. Security doesn't come cheap. If you do it cheaply, you are not going to have anything worthwhile. We might as well be perfectly frank and generous as to what we are talking about.

You are talking about annual appropriations?

Mr. GRANT. Yes, sir; the annual operational budget, not the budget for plant. It will take time for this Academy to get started. If we really have a sense of urgency here, I think within 6 months of the time this bill is passed we can begin some training, but on a limited scale. I think it will be the beginning of the third academic year before the Freedom Academy really hits its stride and begins to require its maximum sustaining annual operational budget.

We estimate this at \$35 million. We consider this a minimum satisfactory budget. Under this, we could bring in up to 10,000 private citizens a year for the short courses. We could have approximately 500 Government personnel, plus 500 from the foreign and private sector combined taking the advanced courses, and a sizable number for the intermediate-level courses, and still have sufficient for a substantial research effort. Thirty-five million dollars is the figure arrived at by the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1960.

If these figures sound a little bit upsetting, let me read something to you. I have in front of me a press release from the Agency for International Development on the subject of the recent appointment of Robert W. Kitchen, Jr., as chief of AID's International Training Office. Let me read you one paragraph from this AID release:

In his new assignment, he [Mr. Kitchen] will be responsible for supervising the AID central office which specializes in training citizens of friendly foreign nations. The participants training program, as it is called, involves the annual expenditure of some 40 million dollars and ties directly into the Agency's efforts to provide the trained manpower needed to achieve the goals which U.S. assistance seeks in these less developed countries. In the year ending on June 30, 5,766 participants from overseas were trained in the U.S. and 2,127 were trained in other developed nations under AID auspices.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you say that again?

Mr. GRANT. The figures?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. GRANT. 5,766 participants from overseas were trained in the U.S.

The CHAIRMAN. About 6,000 people being trained under the AID program in the United States—

Mr. GRANT. In this country and about 2,000 at overseas posts.

The CHAIRMAN. So 2,000 foreign nationals plus about 6,000 foreign nationals are trainees under this AID program, meaning some 8,000 are being trained to do something with reference to our foreign aid; is that right?

Mr. GRANT. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. In what are they trained? How to give away our money or how to conserve it or what?

Mr. GRANT. On the AID program or the type of training at the Freedom Academy?

The CHAIRMAN. What you were reading from there.

Mr. GRANT. What I was reading from was a press release of the Agency for International Development, showing that they alone spend \$40 million on training foreign nationals, mostly in the U.S.

The CHAIRMAN. Read the sentence again about some 5,700 people doing what? Read that passage.

Mr. GRANT. That AID is bringing 5,766 foreign nationals to the United States every year for training.

The CHAIRMAN. For training in what?

Mr. GRANT. Well, it covers a whole long line of things, everything from how to run an Internal Revenue Service to agricultural matters, to technical matters in relation to engineering and village development; a whole line of technical things.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not being facetious, but I think it is an interesting comparison. Close to 6,000 people, foreign nationals—or are they foreign nationals? Is that what it says?

Mr. GRANT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. They are brought into this country to learn and to be taught how, according to our Government, to efficiently distribute aid under our foreign aid program, meaning, I suppose, that if we sent some funds for agricultural improvements in a foreign country, we want to know that the technicians are over there who understand the operation of tractors, fertilizing, and farming practices, and so on.

If the aid is extended to another purpose, then they must understand how, as economically as possible—and giving them the benefit of the doubt—to spend our dollar. I am a bit inclined to say how to give away our dollar, but we will forget that. That is what this bulletin is all about?

Mr. GRANT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you take the position, therefore, that I shouldn't be shocked, and I am not, about the fact that perhaps we should spend \$35 million, all told, on this Academy each year and have an equal number of foreign nationals coming to this institution to learn about our side of this cold war. Is that the general idea?

Mr. GRANT. Yes, sir. May I add at this point, Mr. Chairman, that on the proposed budget for the State Department's bill, the administration's bill, to establish a National Academy of Foreign Affairs, they say by the 5th year—it will take them 5 years to reach their maximum operation—they plan to spend only \$6.7 million. I think you can see what an inadequate effort that will be just in terms of their budget. I will get into that later on, I hope, in some of the other questioning.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't want to monopolize the questioning.

Mr. Ichord?

Mr. ICHORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have several questions.

Mr. GRANT, first of all, I would like for you to elaborate on the differences between the Freedom Academy and the National Academy of Foreign Affairs. First I would like to ask you: Did the National Academy of Foreign Affairs proposal come into being after the proposal was made for the creation of the Freedom Academy?

Mr. GRANT. Long afterwards. I would like to give you a little history on that, if I may.

Mr. ICHORD. I would like to have that.

Mr. GRANT. In the spring of 1961—of course, this was 2 years after the Freedom Academy bill was originally introduced in the House and Senate—just after we had reintroduced it in the 87th Congress, I heard reports that the State Department was attempting to—

Mr. ICHORD. This was in the spring of 1961?

Mr. GRANT. 1961. I heard reports that the State Department was attempting to scuttle the Freedom Academy bill with the new administration by putting out word that all the training we proposed here was being adequately covered at the Foreign Service Institute, at the

War Colleges, and our university centers, or could be with just a little more money being spent on those institutions.

To overcome this, in May 1961, the Orlando Committee sent to the White House a 31-page letter. I have the office carbon copy with me. In this letter, for the first time—and mind you, this is the first time this had been done and a small group in Orlando, Florida, had to do it—we went through, with considerable help from the Library of Congress, the training programs, course by course, at the Foreign Service Institute, the War Colleges, the intradepartmental training programs of USIA and AID, as well as what was going on in our principal university centers like Johns Hopkins, MIT, which are concerned with international affairs.

Mr. ICHORD. Were they conducting training in political warfare?

Mr. GRANT. It was to show just how little of what we are talking about for the Freedom Academy, what we want to give at the Freedom Academy, is in fact presently being given either in Government training programs or in our universities.

We sent this to the White House. The White House apparently was impressed, from what they told me. They wanted to do something, but there were so many problems this was pushed to the back burner. Finally, in the spring of 1962 the President appointed a panel under the chairmanship of Dr. James Perkins, then the executive vice president of the Carnegie Foundation and now the new president of Cornell.

This five-member Presidential panel was directed to investigate the Government foreign affairs training programs at FSI, the War Colleges, and so forth, to see how effective they were. In November 1962 the Perkins panel reported back and they confirmed, as far as they went, everything the Orlando Committee had been saying for these many years, but their inquiry only concerned the training of Government foreign affairs personnel. They did not go into private-sector training and foreign nationals' training, nor did they have much to say about research. The report was generalized, not specific. Also, no member of the panel, to my knowledge, was an expert on Soviet political warfare or nonmilitary warfare. They failed to contact anyone closely connected with the Freedom Academy bill, though I understand each panel member was furnished with a copy of the "Green Book." To me, the report reflected too much the attitude of the professional educationist—rather than those deeply immersed in the problems on nonmilitary conflict.

In mid-December, the White House issued a statement saying the President approved of the report and legislation would be prepared.

The job of drafting the bill and organizing the presentation to Congress was then turned over to the Department of State and assigned to Mr. Orrick. Mr. Orrick from 1946 to 1961 was a San Francisco lawyer with one of the larger firms out there, specializing in corporate matters and municipal bonds, and, as far as I know, had no special interest in foreign affairs or the cold war.

At the beginning of the new administration in 1961, he was brought into the Justice Department as an Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil Division, and I don't know how you can get much further from the cold war than that. Just a few months before getting the

assignment to draft the bill, he was sent to the State Department to become Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration.

One of the first things dropped in his lap was preparing the administration bill to establish the National Academy of Foreign Affairs. This legislation was introduced in the Congress in February 1963.

Now, to get down to your main question: What are the primary differences between the bills? The Orlando Committee in February 1962 prepared this 27-page briefing paper in which we made a detailed comparison between the Freedom Academy bill and the National Academy bill. Mind you, this was prepared before any hearings were held before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

But I think everything we said in here was quite accurate and turned out to be quite true at the hearings. Let me briefly summarize what we think are the main differences.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you yield at that point?

Mr. ICHORD. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the point you are trying to make, or maybe should make from your point of view, is that the very fact that the President appointed the commission and the very fact that the commission made a report and suggested a new approach is an acknowledgement that something should be done, that there were deficiencies from agency to agency in this broad field. Is that the point?

Mr. GRANT. And completely repudiated the State Department's position, up to that time, that everything was being adequately handled at the Foreign Service Institute, the War Colleges, and the university centers, something we knew was completely wrong. For the first time, we got somebody's attention higher up.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, up to that point, the position of the State Department with reference to the bills introduced in the Congress was: "You don't need it. The thing is being adequately handled"?

Mr. GRANT. "Everything is under control. We don't need this."

The CHAIRMAN. And then there was at least an acknowledgement that there has been a certain amount of deficiency in cold war training and, as a result of the Presidential commission's findings, a suggestion was made that something should be done, and therefore their first and totally negative position was demolished.

Mr. GRANT. Yes, sir. You see, Mr. Chairman, when we sent this letter on May 10, 1961, to the White House, this was the first time anybody had analyzed these schools in terms of nonmilitary conflict. I mentioned earlier today that Dr. Wriston, president of Brown, investigated the Foreign Service Institute in 1954, but he is a professional educator, not an expert on nonmilitary conflict. He looked at the school in terms of what kind of language studies they offer, area studies, and so forth.

He didn't analyze the Foreign Service Institute in terms of the new forms of struggle. The Orlando Committee's letter gave the White House facts with which to talk back to the State Department: "Is it true that, in the basic officers course, FSI only devotes 6 hours to Communist strategy?" and so forth.

I still haven't gotten to the differences between the two bills, the principal question asked.

First of all, the administration has made it very clear that at the National Academy of Foreign Affairs they are going to concentrate solely on training Government foreign affairs personnel.

Mr. ICHORD. And they would also conduct research?

Mr. GRANT. Right. And while there is authority in the bill to train private citizens and foreign nationals, they made it very clear they have no interest in that and that this authority is just an escape clause. Furthermore, they didn't put in the administrative authorizations in terms of paying the expenses of these people, and so forth, to make it possible to train private citizens and foreign nationals in substantial numbers. So, number one, the great function which the Freedom Academy can perform in activating the private sector and training foreign nationals is entirely out in the National Academy of Foreign Affairs. That is the first point I want to make. The second point is—

Mr. ICHORD. You emphasized the private sector in the Freedom Academy.

Mr. GRANT. We emphasize it, but no more than professional training of Government foreign affairs personnel. The State Department has tried to confuse the record on that.

Secondly, when it comes to giving professional training to Government foreign affairs personnel, the Freedom Academy bill goes way beyond their bill. I have carefully read everything that Mr. Rostow has said, that Mr. Perkins has said, what Mr. Rusk and Mr. Ball have said, the executive communications on this; and, as far as I can determine, all they intend to do is simply give more people the same inadequate courses presently offered at the Foreign Service Institute that I was telling you about this morning. More people are going to take that little 12-week mid-career course, the 5-week quickie course in interdepartmental training, and so forth. But I cannot find any indication that there is going to be a major revision in the courses. Simply more people are going to take what is already being offered.

Mr. ICHORD. Then you are testifying that it is not only desirable and necessary to have a new approach to fighting the cold war, but also to get some new blood into the game; is that correct?

Mr. GRANT. Well, some new blood and a whole new range of training programs brought in so that, for the first time, we can give really professional training in nonmilitary conflict. That is not what you will get at the National Academy of Foreign Affairs, as I understand the bill and the State Department's interpretation of the bill. It is still far from training cold war experts. Even Government foreign affairs personnel will not get that, and the private sector and foreign students are completely left out.

Mr. ICHORD. Does the National Academy of Foreign Affairs contemplate doing research? I didn't understand your answer.

Mr. GRANT. They say it does. But look at their proposed budget. Look at the current budget for the Foreign Service Institute. For many years the FSI budget has run between \$5 million and \$6 million. It is currently \$5.7 million. What is the proposed operational budget for the National Academy of Foreign Affairs? It is \$6.7 million.

And keep in mind the National Academy of Foreign Affairs will absorb and replace the Foreign Service Institute. The Freedom Academy will not, because we thought it shouldn't be tied down or

its efforts diffused by being responsible for such intradepartmental training as the basic or mid-career officers course or the language school. Let State keep control of the conventional, diplomatic training, and since the language school is well run, let it continue where it is.

By 1968, and once again this shows a very casual, leisurely approach, they propose to increase the budget to \$6.7 million. Let me be completely fair. The \$5.7 million budget of the Foreign Service Institute includes the salaries of the instructional staff. The proposed \$6.7 million budget of the National Academy of Foreign Affairs does not include that. So it is really an increase of from about \$4 million to \$6.7 million, roughly, a 40-percent increase. Mr. Rostow, in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, made it very clear that most of this 40-percent increase is going to be used to pay for the additional step-up in training, so there will only be a very small amount of money left for research. They talk about setting up a center there for Communist studies, and so forth. But obviously, this is going to be small potatoes in view of the budget, and they can't possibly bring in the wide range of expert knowledge which we are talking about for the Freedom Academy to really do an expert, comprehensive job on this whole, vast, neglected field of nonmilitary conflict.

And their proposed operational budget does not even begin to provide the funds necessary to maintain the type of library which will be required to consider the problems of communism and nonmilitary conflict as a whole. I believe you will understand this better after you hear the next witness, Dr. Possony.

Mr. ICHORD. Does the National Academy contemplate taking in foreign students?

Mr. GRANT. There is authority, but they have made it very clear that they have no interest in that and do not intend to do it, and there are no funds in that \$6.7 million budget for this. They have made that very clear. Mr. Rostow answered that way in answer to a specific question from Senator Symington, who introduced the National Academy of Foreign Affairs bill in the Senate.

Mr. ICHORD. You have three functions of the Freedom Academy, or of the Commission—training, research in the Freedom Academy, and also this function of channeling information to the public. I didn't quite understand how they were going to perform that function.

Mr. GRANT. Congressman, excuse me, but can I go back to your previous question and hit one or two more main differences between the Freedom Academy bill and the National Academy?

Mr. ICHORD. Yes.

Mr. GRANT. You just asked an extremely important question, but I would like to go back to the other for a moment.

Mr. ICHORD. All right.

Mr. GRANT. There are several additional points. On the matter of control, the National Academy of Foreign Affairs bill places control in a 10-man, part-time board of trustees, half of whom will be private citizens—and they are obviously talking about VIP's, like college presidents or George Meany—and half Government officials, with the Secretary of State as chairman. With a part-time board

of trustees and as the chairman one of the most over-extended men in this town, you can see how little time they will be able to devote to policy planning and guidance in this whole new complex area that they will have to go into.

They will be fortunate if they can obtain a quorum of these VIP's two or three times a year. The result is that the trustees will not have time for the in-depth study required for dynamic policy guidance and control of the Academy. There will be a strong tendency, I am afraid, to follow the traditional, conventional way of doing things both as to research and training. Such a board of trustees works fine for a university where there is already a consensus as to the general outlines of what a university should be. But the Freedom Academy, especially in the beginning, faces a long list of tough questions as to the nature and extent of the research and training program, and there is no precedent in the free world, and we do not want to copy Communist training programs for obvious reasons.

Furthermore, I think for all practical purposes, this puts the National Academy right back under the State Department where the Foreign Service Institute has been. I think the most you are going to get is a modest extension of the Foreign Service Institute.

The Orlando Committee, in preparing legislation for the Freedom Academy, reviewed all existing cold war legislation, and one of the things we studied very carefully was the sections at 22 U.S. Code Annotated, 1041 et seq., setting up the original Foreign Service Institute. When we read the new bill setting up the National Academy of Foreign Affairs, the wording seemed familiar. On checking, we found the key operational language in the National Academy bill had been copied, without hardly changing a word from the old Foreign Service Institute statute. Where is a whole new approach? We have made a comparison in Supplement No. 1 to the "Green Book," comparing the language of the old Foreign Service Institute statute, which has been on the books since 1946, and the new bill, and showing—of course, there is a lot of window dressing and administrative detail—that, in the key language setting up the research and training functions and the duties of the chancellor, they have, for all practical purposes, copied verbatim the old Foreign Service Institute statute.

We say that even this might be satisfactory if, at the beginning of this bill, they had included a hard-hitting, comprehensive, specific statement of policy by the Congress such as we have in section 2 of the Freedom Academy bill. After all, the old language of the Foreign Service Institute was rather generalized, and it can cover anything or nothing, depending upon the person who administers the program and carries it out. But to reincorporate that same language and once again have a very wishy-washy statement, congressional statement and findings of fact at the beginning, to us is completely unacceptable.

I can go on and talk about this for a long time, but I think I have hit here some of the principal reasons why the Orlando Committee has been unable to accept the administration's bill. Let me say this: You heard this morning Congressman Herlong's testimony, in which he is now going to refer to this as the Boggs-Taft bill, even though he was author of the original bill in 1959. We feel the same way in Orlando. If the administration would come up with an acceptable

bill and a realistic budget, we would forget all about the Freedom Academy bill. This is a matter of life and death for this country and should be above partisan politics or pride of authorship. We were hoping the administration would write a bill we could support. But, for the reasons I have indicated, we think their bill is grossly inadequate.

Mr. ICHORD. Now I would like for you to elaborate on the function of channeling information to the public, and particularly in light of the criticism of the State Department that this would overburden the Commission by having to carry on both the function of training and research and also disseminating this information to the public.

Mr. GRANT. Your question, I gather, is directed to section 8 of the bill, which provides for an information center.

Mr. ICHORD. Yes, right.

Mr. GRANT. The opponents of the Freedom Academy bill, and particularly the State Department in its communications and Mr. Rostow in his testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee, snatched out one or two phrases from section 8 where the Commission has authority to publish textbooks and training films and disseminate them, to try to make it look like the Freedom Commission would be interfering in public education. Of course, there has been a long-standing policy in the Congress that the Federal Government should not overinject itself into public education at the State level. Taking advantage of that, they tried to indicate that the whole purpose of the information center was to indoctrinate the American public. They keep throwing out this dirty word "indoctrination" again and again in their discussion. Just read the Freedom Academy bill and then read the administration's bill. Why you have to apply the dirty word, particularly among educators, "indoctrination," to our bill and not to their bill is totally beyond me. But they have taken this one little sentence and tried to twist it so that they can throw the expression "indoctrination" at us. Incidentally, the Senate sponsors of the Freedom Academy bill agreed to change "textbooks" to "educational materials" to avoid this charge, or even to drop that one sentence altogether, and I would agree if for no other purpose than to force the State Department to discuss the real issues.

Let me set forth the real purpose of the information center and what the Orlando Committee had in mind, which I think I have already indicated in previous testimony. The big thing is to make the private sector effective in the global struggle. There are major projects which the citizens of Florida, the citizens of Missouri, and the citizens of Louisiana can undertake which can have a major impact in Latin America, in Africa, the Middle East, and the Far East. But we have to make information available to these citizens so they know what they can do. This is not indoctrination. This is not Federal interference in the private sector. Here Academy research will simply show them many things the private sector can do, and upon request the information center will furnish this information to interested groups in the private sector.

If the Commission is adequately staffed and funded, I cannot see why the information center would be such a burden. Nothing would be more frustrating to the research staff than to develop the possibilities for private participation and then have no outlet.

Mr. ICHORD. You are indirectly going to make that information available to them when you pick up the private citizens and send them through school for the period of time outlined?

Mr. GRANT. That way also. But many organizations who cannot send people for training will also want to become involved. There are many types of projects which can be carried out even though the persons in that particular organization have no specialized knowledge. For example, last month I received a letter from an electronics engineer in Bombay, India, in response to the *Reader's Digest* article inserted in the record by Congressman Herlong. This article is now appearing in the overseas editions. First I got letters from the Philippines and Japan and then Africa. Now they are coming from India, Ceylon, and Pakistan.

This man is urgently seeking information about communism, the organization of the party, its operational methods, history, etc. Books on this are unobtainable in Indian libraries, and USIA libraries have little that is helpful. He wants to organize a Freedom Academy for India. From his letter, he appears intelligent and well motivated. The question of internal security and the degree of danger in this country is a subject, as this committee knows, of great disagreement among people. But I don't think anybody would claim that communism is not an internal threat or major threat in India today. Private citizen groups could work up an excellent library and send it to this man. This is the type of project that they can carry out, even though no one in their club has any expertise in this matter, if they only knew about this man and there was an information center to supply a list of books. I have been told the number one expert on communism in India today is a railroad porter working, until recently, at a station in New Delhi. He doesn't even own a pair of shoes. He has been hounded out of the universities by planned Communist agitation. Here is a man who could put a little money and a little organizational support to good use, and I am sure some private group in this country, if they were made aware of the problem, would jump to help him, and a few dollars here might get more mileage than any Government action.

The public too often doesn't know about these things, the great opportunities which exist. But the information center will make this information available to the private sector in the most usable form.

That is the main thrust of the information center, not to inject itself into public education in the private sector at the State level. However, we can be sure the State Department will continue to ignore this main purpose and instead will continue to shout "indoctrination."

The issue before the committee is this: Do we take a complacent attitude toward the unlimited possibilities for private participation? Do we say, as Mr. Rostow said at the Senate hearings, that the private sector, the foundations, universities, mission groups, and labor are already carrying on many intelligent and sophisticated projects overseas and, therefore, there is no need for a major new effort to activate the private sector? Or do we say that the successful projects so far initiated, like the AFL-CIO training school in Washington for Latin American labor leaders, merely scratch the surface—and having said this, do we then provide the three preconditions of research, training, and an information center which can make intelligent, organized, large-scale private participation possible?

The Orlando Committee is appalled by the complacent attitude at State as reflected in Mr. Rostow's statement.

Mr. ICHORD. But I take it the most important function of the Commission will be to set up, direct, and operate the Freedom Academy.

Mr. GRANT. Yes, sir.

Mr. ICHORD. I believe it was the Department of State which criticized the Freedom Academy by saying that here you are establishing an open institution and an institution such as this, providing training in political warfare and subversion, should be conducted in secret. I would like for you to comment upon that criticism.

Mr. GRANT. Well, I think there are actually two aspects of that, two parts to the criticism. One part of the criticism was to the effect that we can't train foreign nationals at a Freedom Academy, because they would be trained with Government foreign affairs personnel and many of the classified things we would want to go into we couldn't go into, if foreign students were present. They say, for example, "Handling Charles de Gaulle is one of our toughest problems. Do you mean to say we are going to have a confidential briefing by the Secretary of State at the Freedom Academy, advising our people on strategy and tactics for handling de Gaulle, and there are four or five French citizens sitting in?" State always assumes we will go about it in a foolish, instead of a wise, way.

I indicated earlier there would be three schools at the Academy, one for Government personnel, one for private citizens, and one for foreign nationals. Obviously, foreign students wouldn't attend these classified briefings for Government personnel. There will, however, be many joint seminars and lectures where the training program would be enriched by bringing Government students in close association with these interested foreign nationals from all over the world.

As to the overt versus the covert part of the problem, the Central Intelligence Agency is primarily responsible for covert operational programs of the United States Government as distinguished from intelligence gathering. I just hope, as a result of the Bay of Pigs and all the other things they have been hit with in the last few years, that they don't become so inhibited that they refrain from doing many things they should be doing. The Communists seem to be in the midst of a major propagandea effort right now to inhibit CIA thinking in terms of covert operations. However, the Freedom Academy will emphasize the overt part of the problem, in terms of training and research. It is the overt aspects of nonmilitary conflict or political warfare which have been even more neglected by this Government than have the covert aspects of the problem, which CIA is working on overseas or the FBI in terms of internal security.

So this business about having to do all of this secretly and everything, I think, is a red herring by those who have not thought through the problems or want to confuse Members of Congress who they think have not thought through the problems or read the bill.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Grant, so many people in the world and in the United States particularly view the battle against the spread of communism over the world as purely a battle between democracy and communism. I think to really understand the successes of communism, the successes that they have had, you have to compare what, for example, the Russians, the Russian people, have under communism

today with what they had under the Czar; with what the people in Communist China have today under the Communist regime with what they had under Chiang Kai-shek; and, getting closer to home, with what the people in Cuba have today under Castro with what they had under Batista. That is, it is not a matter of choice between good and bad, in many instances, but it is a choice between evil and less evil.

I notice one of the statements referred to Cuba by saying that if we had this Freedom Academy we would have had people trained who would have seen what was going on in Cuba. I believe reference was made toward perhaps staging a revolution in Cuba against Batista before the Castro revolution came along. There is no doubt about it, Castro wouldn't have been successful in Cuba if it had not been for at least the very friendly and tolerant attitude of people in the United States and even our administration, at the time. You don't contemplate any cloak-and-dagger activity conducted by the Freedom Academy, do you?

Mr. GRANT. Absolutely not.

Mr. ICHORD. You are only dealing with training of people to fight political warfare.

Mr. GRANT. As I emphasized this morning, the Freedom Commission and the Freedom Academy are entirely in the area of research and training, except to the extent where, upon request by private citizens and groups who want to participate in this area, in overt type programs, the information center will provide information.

Mr. ICHORD. I will yield, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. I have a few questions to ask you.

Assuming, and I am going to very frank and I hope we can be—assuming that the State Department policy has been, through the years, through Republican and Democrat administrations, anything but successful in effectively combating the spread of communism, due probably to its adherence to traditional diplomatic procedures, how could we prevent this irritation or difficulty that would exist between the State Department personnel or Government personnel that were taught in the Freedom Academy and then proceeded to carry out the policies of the State Department?

There would be a conflict.

Mr. GRANT. That is a very good question, very perceptive, Mr. Schadeberg. We have thought about that. I suppose it could even get to the point where you had one attitude at the Freedom Academy and another at the State Department, and I suppose some career-wise or career-building individuals might consider it contrary to the interests of their career to even go to the Freedom Academy. That is possible. I think you understand this.

But I think that what we are going to have at the Freedom Academy, what it is going to bring about, is a gradual change in the operational thinking of the United States Government, particularly if the Freedom Commission and Freedom Academy go about their functions wisely and diplomatically, particularly in relation to the White House, the State Department, and so forth. I have been rather tough on the State Department today, because I think it is about time somebody was very blunt in their testimony in this area, rather than trying to soften some of these points.

But I think the Freedom Academy is going to do its best to try to work with these existing agencies and departments in every way it can. I believe the President would appoint people to the Freedom Commission who would attempt to create a friendly liaison back and forth.

Again, as to Academy research, when we begin to realize that many of these seemingly insoluble cold war problems that we have had—like the massive penetration and takeover of the student organizations in Latin universities where we have almost no instruments to presently deal with the situation—when the Freedom Academy starts coming forward with concrete proposals to solve these problems which tie into all the rest of our programs, I think gradually the Commission is going to get a more and more receptive attitude at State. And I should think that the White House would be tremendously interested in these things and seeing that these types of programs are carried out. But, initially, you may have people at the Freedom Academy who are so far ahead of some people at the State Department in the area of nonmilitary conflict that there might not be a complete meeting of the minds. That can be a problem. The Academy will be up against a built-in prejudice toward new operational ideas. However, I believe the President will eventually lean toward proposals which give us real hope of victory even if it means setting aside some of the comfortable, conventional ways of dealing with cold war problems.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. I think it would go without saying that there would be some difficulties which would have to be ironed out.

Mr. GRANT. I might add here that I think Mr. Henry Mayers has made a very excellent comparison or analogy between Billy Mitchell and the battleship admirals in the 1920's, and the Freedom Academy supporters and the State Department in the 1960's, in which he said that many of the battleship admirals probably understood almost instinctively that this new upstart aerial warfare was about to make them obsolete, and they had spent their careers learning to operate a line of battleships. Here this fellow comes up with an aviation theory which can make them obsolete, and they resent it.

I think in the area of nonmilitary conflict, many of the people in the State Department realize that they have not been trained in this area as they should have been and that they do not have the background in this area they should have, with many new operational techniques and organizational forms now coming to the fore in which they have not been adequately trained or prepared, and they worry about becoming a little bit obsolescent in their field or specialty. I am an attorney at law, and many people are moving in on that profession right now. We have a smaller and smaller area in which we have exclusive practice. It makes us feel a little obsolete sometimes. I can understand that feeling at the Department of State, which I am sure exists, with relation to nonmilitary conflict and Freedom Academy-type training.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. Another question, which deals with an area which is hard to define. I think some of us know well enough that when the committee does a particularly good job in combating subversion, immediately the propaganda wheels start moving to blacklist it and blackmail and blacken at least its reputation. This we would have to face also with the Freedom Academy doing its job. Just how could we counteract this sort of counterpropaganda?

Mr. GRANT. Do you mean attacking the Freedom Academy itself?

Mr. SCHADEBERG. Yes, not as a legitimate institution of the Government.

Mr. GRANT. Well, I certainly hope that the President will appoint to the Freedom Commission not just scholars and professional educators, but experts on nonmilitary conflict and persons who are sufficiently good politicians to know their way around and how to handle that sort of situation. I think it can be handled, but I think it will depend very much upon the caliber of appointments to the Commission.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. That brings me to the next question. I realize you said the Commission would select these, but is there anything that would prevent infiltration, for instance, in the area of teaching in the Academy? Who would be responsible?

Mr. GRANT. This committee is more expert on security legislation than I am. However, the Freedom Commission bill has one rather lengthy section dealing with the security checks which will be made upon members of the faculty and staff and, permissively, upon students where it is desirable. Part of that was copied from the Atomic Energy Commission Act, which has rather stringent security regulations. I have gotten some kickbacks from some liberals, because they think that the security provisos we have in this bill are too stringent. I don't think so. I think the Communists and the Soviet Union will recognize that this Freedom Academy represents the greatest threat to the expansion of world communism they have faced up to this time, and I think they will make every effort to discredit this school and, if they can't completely discredit it, to infiltrate it. If they didn't do that, I would be insulted, because it means that we haven't set up as effective an institution as we should have.

I think the Freedom Academy might even rate a higher priority for infiltration than, for example, the CIA.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. What about the students? Would you invite a student—let's assume, for instance, one of the Cuban students who was involved would wish to attend the school?

Mr. GRANT. Well, as I say, the security check on students is permissive. We did it for this reason. If you are bringing in 10,000 private citizens a year to give them a 2-week quickie course, you can't run a full FBI field investigation on each of them, obviously. It is administratively impossible. Most of these people, even if there are a few sour apples who get a few weeks of training, are not in a position to hurt us very much anyway. On the other hand, if you bring in people for 2 years of training, I think they should be given a very careful security check.

There will be no problem as to Government employees and private citizens in this country. I presume we will run into something of a problem here in training foreign nationals. I will not attempt to spell this out, but I think it is something we have to leave up to the good sense of the Freedom Commission. I think we have plenty of authority there for them to run a stringent security check to the extent they feel it is necessary.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ICHORD. Let's take a hypothetical case as to how you envision fighting the cold war against communism in a given country X. Of

course, in the battle against communism, there may be some of our allies who might not have what we consider the most desirable form of government. And this, I think, is oftentimes the case.

In country X, where they have a rather despotic regime, the Communists are threatening to take over. How are we going to go about fighting political warfare in such a country? It does not do any good to go down and tell the people, "Look at it from our side. You want freedom, liberty, dignity of the individual." They do not even have that to begin with. It is a matter of choices that they are making, right there on the spot, between, let's put it this way, evil and less evil.

How do we go about fighting political warfare in such a country?

Mr. GRANT. How do we or how do the nationals of that country?

Mr. ICHORD. Well, how do we help the nationals? Are we going to sell them on the idea of supporting their own government? Most of the people might not be behind their own government. Now, we do have situations like that, you will agree; do you not?

Mr. GRANT. I think so, and since this record will be printed, I would not mention specific illustrations. I am sure the members of the committee could.

To make your question even more explicit, country A in Latin America is ruled by a man we consider a dictator, or at least a benevolent dictator. Now, what do we teach students who come from that country, first of all, at the Freedom Academy?

Mr. ICHORD. Yes.

Mr. GRANT. First of all, we teach those students all about world communism and, particularly, Communist conflict doctrine. No problem there.

Number two, and now mind you I am expressing my personal opinion—and what the opinion of the Freedom Commission will be if the bill goes through, I don't know—is that we teach them the operational techniques and the organizational forms to prevent the Communists from taking over all sorts of organizations—student organizations, peasant organizations, intellectual groups, and so forth—and to counter the effects of Communist propaganda and psychological warfare. And in those instances where the Communists have already captured these organizations, we teach them the operational devices, the operational techniques, by which they can be recaptured.

Now, we can still go into that without necessarily running head on into your problem here as to whether we are going to do anything that in effect would be implied as deliberately undermining the head of state who is friendly to us, although we are not completely in agreement with the form of government.

Number three, I think that we would teach them about free institutions, free labor unions, peasant organizations; how to set up and run a student organization; and certain things, ideas which could be specially significant in strengthening the economy of their country, like setting up of a savings and loan association. There are endless possibilities.

We can go into many of these things without running head on into your problem. I think it would be very poor policy at the Freedom Academy to carry on training where we consciously set out to overthrow an existing head of state in a particular country—especially one

who is friendly to the U.S. We must also recognize that in some underdeveloped areas the people do not seem ready for democracy as we know it in this country.

Now, this is going to be something that is going to have to be worked out, and a great deal of thought is going to have to be given to it, but I think that the very fact that this training is available and some of the dictator's own people can be brought in, we can do much to make sure this is a benevolent form of dictatorship which has the best interests of the people in mind, rather than an extremely repressive dictatorship which does not have the best interests of the people in mind. There is all the difference in the world between a benevolent, autocratic ruler and a Communist ruler. There is the difference between daylight and darkness for the people who live there. I think the very presence of the Freedom Academy and the type of free institutions we propose will tend, I think over the long haul, to cause some autocratic rulers to gradually modify their rule and bring in more and more free institutions and to carry out significant land reform while frustrating attempted Communist leadership of peasant groups, students, etc. I think that the Freedom Academy will lead in that direction.

Finally, the student, being thoroughly familiar with Communist-conflict doctrine, will know how to prevent the leadership of reform movements or revolutions from falling into Communist hands as happened in Cuba, and he will be motivated to act.

There is a problem as to what extent we should discuss at the Academy an ideology of freedom. Frankly, I feel we have been too defensive and inhibited about this. Ours is a pluralistic society, but there is a rather broad underlying consensus. I believe this should be thoroughly argued out in the seminars without any attempt to impose a school solution. This is already being done at the War Colleges. And I believe foreign students should have ample opportunity to go into this also. Again, I believe this will lead toward a peaceful evolution in the case of your Latin dictators.

This is an involved question, and I am only projecting a few ideas.

Mr. ICHORD. Now, in your statement, you referred to three versions of the bills before the committee being drafted in your office. We have five bills before the committee, and I see that Mr. Boggs' bill and Mr. Taft's bill are identical.

Mr. GRANT. That is the bill I am supporting today, sir.

Mr. ICHORD. You are supporting Mr. Boggs and Mr. Taft?

Mr. GRANT. The Boggs-Taft bill, that is correct, and that is the bill that Congressman Herlong is supporting.

Mr. ICHORD. You drafted the Herlong bill? The Herlong bill was drafted in your office, too?

Mr. GRANT. Yes, sir. And also most of the language in the other bills. When Congressman Schweiker last October decided to introduce the Freedom Academy bill, inadvertently then, I suspect, but I cannot speak for the Congressman—it may not have been, but I believe inadvertently somebody sent him the original bill introduced back in 1959 and he reintroduced that, which is the identical bill which Herlong and Judd introduced in 1959; and Mr. Herlong explained that this morning, but I think the language has been greatly improved and strengthened in the intervening time, and the final bill, the final revised bill, is the Boggs-Taft bill.

Mr. ICHORD. Now, in the Boggs-Taft bill, you do have foreign students being trained in the Freedom Academy only with the approval of the Secretary of State.

Mr. GRANT. Yes, sir.

Mr. ICHORD. That is where you get into the broad policy matters there.

Mr. GRANT. That is in the Boggs-Taft bill. By requiring the approval of the Secretary, we get away from the idea of the Freedom Commission making policy.

Mr. ICHORD. The Herlong bill did not provide for a security check on the members of the Commission. What kind of security check do you have in the Boggs bill?

Mr. GRANT. None of the bills do, and for this reason: I could not find any legislation where any commission appointed by the President, where the members of the commission, by the specific provisions of the bill, have to have a security check. That is always done for the employees, but not, for example, for a Commissioner of the ICC or member of the CAB; nor for any of the boards and commissions we have in Washington is that required, but I understand that it is automatic procedure that every Presidential appointee to a Federal board or commission gets a full FBI investigation.

If we had provided for a mandatory investigation here, it would have been the only existing legislation that did that and we thought that might have subjected us to a lot of criticism and would have been an indirect reflection upon the President himself. Now, this committee may think that is necessary, and I had one member of this committee who is not here today tell me back 5 years ago he very much wanted that in there.

Mr. ICHORD. Well, it was my thinking that when I came to the committee that we would probably be hearing principally the Herlong bill and I did not read the Boggs bill in its entirety.

Mr. GRANT. You will find the security is identical in both bills.

Mr. ICHORD. In the Boggs bill, whom do you have making reports to Congress? I know in the Herlong bill the Advisory Committee makes the report to Congress.

Mr. GRANT. It is the same in the Boggs bill.

Mr. ICHORD. Why do you have the Advisory Committee making the report to Congress rather than the Commission itself?

Mr. GRANT. Well, the Commission itself will be reporting to Congress every year at appropriations time anyway. We thought if the Advisory Committee reported to the Congress that would be somebody independent of the Freedom Academy or of the Freedom Commission, but thoroughly familiar with their work and they could make an independent, critical analysis of what the Commission and Academy are doing to Congress every year. I think it is much better to have an independent, critical analysis made than have an evaluation prepared by people who, in effect, are evaluating themselves, which I do not think is too satisfactory.

As I say, when the Freedom Commission goes before appropriations, there is going to be a very thorough inquiry anyway, and the Commission and Academy will be making continuing reports, I imagine, all the time, if requested by the Congress and the White House.

Mr. ICHORD. Now, the only control that Congress is going to have over the Commission is through the appropriation process. The Gubser bill sets up a joint committee of the Congress to act pretty much as a watchdog of the Commission. What do you think about the Gubser bill provision?

Mr. GRANT. I think that is very desirable, but I understand that the Republican and Democratic leadership was very much opposed to setting up any more of these joint committees of the Senate and House and, therefore, we left it out of the bill because we thought it would be a millstone around the bill's neck.

Mr. ICHORD. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand you will be around during the rest of these hearings.

Mr. GRANT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. The chances are we will be calling on you some more.

Is Dr. Possony with us?

Dr. Possony is director of the International Political Studies Program, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, at Stanford University. It happens that in 1959 this committee had a consultation with Dr. Possony which was subsequently published under the title *Language as a Communist Weapon*. We have quite a biographical account of you, Doctor.

Dr. Possony is the author of *A Century of Conflict, Tomorrow's War, Strategic Air Power, Lenin, International Relations* (with Dr. Robert Strausz-Hupe), and *Geography of Intellect* (with Nathaniel Weyl, and a contributor to *A Forward Strategy for America*).

He was on the faculty of Georgetown University from 1946 to 1961. He was born in Austria, educated there and in Germany and holds a Ph. D. degree from the University of Vienna.

After the Anschluss, he made his way to Paris and worked for the French Foreign and Air Ministries. He came to the United States in 1941, and joined the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton on a Carnegie Fellowship. He later served with the Psychological Warfare Branch, Office of Naval Intelligence, where he headed the German and Italian Sections.

In 1952 he served on the faculty of the National War College in Washington, D.C., and in 1955 he became an associate of the Foreign Policy Research Institute at the University of Pennsylvania. He has taught courses on communism, psychological warfare, geopolitics, political philosophy, and on strategy and revolution in the 20th century.

He has served as a trustee of the American Military Institute and a member of the editorial board of *Air Power Historian*. He is a member, editorial board, of *Orbis*, a quarterly on world affairs published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania.

This is quite a sketch, Doctor, that we have in our record and with that background, we welcome you.

STATEMENT OF STEFAN T. POSSONY

The CHAIRMAN. Where are you located now, Doctor?

Dr. POSSONY. In Stanford, California. I am director of International Political Studies at the Hoover Institution.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Chairman, do we have prepared copies of the doctor's statement?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. I have, however, only one copy and I had to give it to the reporter for the record.

Dr. POSSONY. Mr. Chairman, I do not propose to read the entire statement. To save time I will summarize it.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that is most satisfactory with us, as a matter of fact.

Dr. POSSONY. The first few pages say that both political parties in the country have not, in my judgment, taken the Communist threat seriously enough and usually throw out a few arguments during election time, but otherwise consider the threat as a relatively minor problem. In my judgment, the extremism we have at the present moment, both on the right and the left, is in part attributable to the fact that the country basically remains quite poorly informed about communism.

It is very difficult to inform the average American citizen or the busy decision-maker about communism because learning about communism is a full-time job. Certainly we do not want to transform every American suddenly into a full-time student of communism. It would be a fast way to lose the struggle.

On the other hand, part-time students are handicapped. I think one of the main features of the Freedom Academy would be to make it possible for the man who has other obligations to acquire the information that he needs as a citizen and as a person who may be called upon to defend this country in battle.

The understanding of communism on the part of the American people is not going to improve by itself. The Communists are doing a great deal of work in what they call misinformation. At the same time, the world Communist movement which no longer has the simple setup that it had in the period when Moscow was the only controlling center of monolithic communism is a matter of the past. We have a "split" of sorts, or several "splits," throughout the Communist world movement. I do not mean to imply that this split will lead to conflict between the Communist states, but we certainly have a divergence of view among at least three wings in the Communist world movement. We have a left radical wing; we have a center wing, which is the one located in Moscow; and we have reformist parties in the Communist movement; and these people—

The CHAIRMAN. That would be what country?

Dr. POSSONY. Poland and Yugoslavia, for example. I think there are some elements in the Soviet Union, too, which would be reformist. There is a strong reformist wing in Hungary, for example.

So we no longer have the old, simple, and single monster we had under Stalin. It becomes, of course, much more difficult to study all these variations.

I think at the present moment you have a major attempt by the Soviets to convey the image that they are engaged in what is known as peaceful coexistence. This is a term which is very easily misunderstood by Americans. We consider coexistence to be a program of peace in our time, peace in the American style. According to the Soviets, coexistence is a strategy; the term has been chosen to deceive. Yet there are many complications about peaceful coexistence inside the Communist camp. The Chinese are attacking the Soviets for "reformism." It is certainly true that the peaceful coexistence strat-

egy is a long way from the more militant strategy which Lenin proposed and which Stalin pursued at critical junctures.

The long and short of it is that, at the present moment, the enemy has succeeded in creating confusion in the minds of many Americans and throughout the Western alliance. We also suffer from intellectual weakness and laziness. The study of communism for the survival of all of us is just about as important as the study of physics or medicine. If you were to organize our study courses on physics like we have conducted the study of communism, we would hardly have running water in our homes. We would still be in the caves, and faucets, of course, would not be "cost effective," according to the present nomenclature of the Defense Department. But we also would have no cars, no planes, and no spacecraft.

If the study of medicine were organized like we have organized the study of the greatest threat this Nation and world freedom have ever been facing, the Black Death of the Middle Ages still would be with us and our life expectancy would be that of the Troglodytes.

Now, I would like to turn to two specific points in the Freedom Academy bill. First, I would like to talk about the library.

In my judgment, the Freedom Academy should include a library, collecting the materials that are indispensable to the study of the Communist threat. It will surprise many Americans to learn that such an adequate repository of documentation does not exist. By the end of World War I, Herbert Hoover, who later became President of the United States, was one of the few men who correctly diagnosed the Communist danger. He foresaw the impact of communism on world peace and he also realized that university and public libraries do not have the materials needed for the study of revolutionary movements.

Accordingly, he established what was later to become the Hoover Institution for War, Revolution, and Peace. The institution possesses the country's foremost collection of the required documentation. I may add that the present value of Hoover Institution holdings is estimated at something like \$25 million. If we at the institution were to put our holdings on the market we would probably fetch this much. Of course, it never cost that much to acquire, but it took over 40 years to collect these holdings.

We are very proud of our collections, which are continuing to grow. We are also proud of the fact that we were the academic institute which pioneered the systematic study of communism, not just in this country but, if I am not mistaken, anywhere in the world. There are, naturally, other libraries such as the Library of Congress and a few European libraries and archives which possess substantial holdings, but the total number of such libraries is small and access to archives leaves much to be desired. Documentation has great and serious gaps and valuable source materials are lost every day because many knowledgeable people do not know how to preserve their own private collections for the purposes of the researcher and historian.

A case is known of an ambassador of a country which became a satellite—this man did not know what to do with his collection and file and turned the documents over to a village priest. The village priest did not know what he had in hand, and one fine day this invaluable material was sold as old paper.

Library capabilities have not been keeping pace with the growth of research requirements. Let me illustrate with one example. There is in this country no complete set of Latin American newspapers and magazines. In fact, we do not have in all the American libraries put together a complete run of just Communist newspapers published in Latin America, a far smaller requirement. Only a few of the important South American newspapers are to be found in U.S. libraries and frequently, of those Latin American papers that are being bought, only random issues are available.

(At this point Mr. Ashbrook entered the hearing room.)

Dr. Possony. My judgment would be that over the last 30 years we obtained nationwide, at best, 10 percent of the newspapers published in Latin America. The Castro catastrophe must in part be ascribed to our dearth of documentation. Needless to say that with respect to African and Asian newspapers, brochures, and books, the situation is even worse.

It is quite clear why these gaps exist. The average library does not have the funds to buy large groups of papers nor the incentive to do so, nor the funds to microfilm or house these bulky holdings. There is little interlibrary coordination in acquisition programs. There are, I know, purchasing organizations through which materials that are hard to acquire can be obtained, but the efforts are small. A worldwide newspaper acquisition program, even a more limited program for the acquisition of Communist periodicals, the establishment of a complete library of Communist materials, is beyond the resources of private libraries as presently funded.

Although better coordination of library acquisition programs is feasible and desirable, a special institution with ample finances seems required.

Given our present library resources, the study of world communism is not easy. Sometimes it is quite impossible. Only last week two of my students had to change their topic. One was unable to find documentation on the present disputes between the Soviet and Chinese wings in the Communist Party of India. The other student did not have enough data to determine the French Communist Party line with respect to the Spanish Civil War.

There is no doubt that several weeks of library research might have provided considerably more information. The point is, however, that 2 weeks of bibliographic research in three major libraries on the West Coast, plus the Library of Congress catalog, plus the Union catalog, did not yield a supply of primary source materials that would have been adequate for a good study.

If documentation is to be of use in decision-making, it must permit fast research. Only an adequately supplied library facility will permit both fast work and research in depth. Hence, the Freedom Academy needs a library of a special type.

The function of this library would not be to duplicate existing holdings although, of course, it must acquire a substantial number of books and brochures. The primary function of this library, as I see it, should be:

(a) to establish a specialized U.S. and NATO-wide catalog of **pertinent materials**;

(b) to supplement existing library holdings with materials for the collection of which funds usually are lacking in universities—for example, newspaper series;

(c) to enable persons who have had experience in operations, including refugees and former Communists, to write down their experiences;

(d) to engage the services of a whole battery of translators, so that foreign language materials can be exploited effectively;

I don't suggest translators for the major European languages, but there are many exotic languages which have to be handled in one way or the other, and you just simply do not have the language facilities on any campus or in the Government. You have to have this translating staff.

(e) to provide cleared researchers—this would be Government security-cleared persons—both classified and unclassified documentation.

One of the great difficulties I found when I was in the Government is that the classified is kept separate from the unclassified documentation. There is a perfectly good reason why you separate the classified information; but if you look for data and you are restricted by the geography and regulations of your place to using, by and large, only classified information, you do not really get the whole story.

This library should become a national research center where non-Government people can do research work and some people are able to integrate the various types of information. It should support private research organizations which presently are grappling with these problems.

On this point, I would add that we have in this country about a dozen or so academic institutions and another dozen operations analysis groups which, in terms of library logistics, are hanging in thin air. That is, they all, in one way or the other, rely on the Library of Congress and some of the libraries in the New York and Boston areas, plus the Hoover Institution. Much of the data which they really need in order to make valid findings on such things as Communist strategy, for example, just are not available, certainly not available in an easily accessible manner.

The library, perhaps in cooperation with the National Archives, could assume the function of organizing the gradual declassification of pertinent information held by the Government. There is a large amount of information which is 10 to 20 years old and which would have an enormous bearing on the understanding of current operations. But it is not being declassified, largely because there is no proper mechanism, that is, there is a procedure but no machinery to get the work done in the proper quantity and speed. I am sure you gentlemen know all about this.

A not inconsiderable fund is needed to assure that adequate resources will be available to the library as soon as the Academy starts functioning. The library ultimately will handle enormous masses of materials, classified and unclassified, in many languages, pertaining to all countries, operational techniques, and ideologies, and will cooperate with an international network of libraries. It would be a waste of time and money to have the students search endlessly for books and reports, but precisely this would happen if there were an

old-fashioned catalog. Therefore, I propose that the bill provide for an electronic data-handling system and for substantial reproduction facilities.

There should, for example, be a file on case studies, a file on special techniques, and a biographic file, among others. If you want to go today and start researching on a subject like defeatist propaganda, or something like that, you will have to spend 6 months getting a satisfactory bibliography together. There is no need for this inefficiency in 1964.

If the data are properly catalogued and you tie the titles and descriptions into any of a number of electronic data-handling systems, you can get the material out fast and you are really able to "interrogate" the system. There are quite a number of specialized libraries in Washington today which use data-handling systems most successfully. If you do not have such a capability, essentially what you do, you pay something like three quarters of a researcher's salary for having him search library stacks. This is one of the greatest wastes of money imaginable. A researcher should spend 90 percent of his time researching, that is, reading and writing.

In order to work up speedily the enormous historical and documentary backlog, provisions should be made for a research staff which, initially and temporarily, must be fairly large in size. Research findings must be made promptly available to ensure the effective functioning of the Academy.

This, of course, is a matter of publications. There are many ways in which we can publish. I think that if you have researchers, many will publish through the normal, private book-publishing arrangements. Others will have access to magazines. I think the library of the Academy might do well to publish a sort of a magazine, or a set of monographs which can be reproduced in one way or the other. Of course, publications that are of a classified nature would not be put on the market. But it is important that there be a stream of written materials coming out of the Academy.

I now want to go to the next point and discuss teaching and curriculum. I would like to suggest that the Academy pattern its instructions after the medical model; that is, premedical in basic sciences, specific medical education, practical training and internship, and, ultimately, specialist training.

The preparatory education to be provided by the Freedom Academy should include such subjects as modern history, geography, physical and cultural anthropology, economics, government, sociology, political philosophy, political psychology, international law, elementary technology, and so forth. These subjects should be taught generally in the normal academic manner, except that all the sciences that relate to freedom and strategy would be taught according to an integrated plan. Thus, the Freedom Academy's curriculum would list the totality of the politically relevant sciences, not just isolated portions of individual sciences.

If you look over the curricula of most universities today, you will find that in one way or the other they intimate that they teach all the sciences, but, unfortunately, most curricula have wide gaps. Many subjects are just presented in survey courses.

If you deal with strategy seriously, there is no science which at one time or the other you will not have to tackle and use at some depth. The problem is about the same for a Congressman or a patent lawyer, but strategy really is the broadest of all universal disciplines. A person may be a specialist in economics, but this does not mean that he would know anything about strategy. A few economists may be fine strategists, but every strategist must know about economics. Strategy is a universal encyclopedic science, and the curriculum and the basic instruction of the Academy must be responsive to this fact.

An important difference between a normal college and the Academy would be that the various interpretations of the different schools of political thought should be brought out sharply, rather than being fuzzed over. For example, economics should be studied with a clear realization that there are free enterprise, interventionist, and collectivist schools and models, with subgroups in each category. It is particularly important if you deal with communism that you understand the various assumptions and interpretations that are at the bottom of these cleavages. There also should be instruction in the rules of evidence, in political nomenclature and semantics, in the techniques of critical interpretation of political texts, and in scientific methodology.

On the critical interpretation of political texts, I would add that lack of interpretative skill is one of the great failings we have in this country. For example, Mr. Khrushchev makes a speech. That speech makes headlines in the American press, and you can be fairly certain that one line will be pulled out of context and it will be mostly that line which the United States likes to hear most. That is, if that line were the total meaning of the Khrushchev policy, America would be in excellent shape, there would be "lasting peace."

But unfortunately, there are in most of these speeches a few other lines which break into print only very rarely. This sort of selective reading creates the wrong impression. Many of the key passages that the press leaves out should be memorized by Americans. Those texts are more important than happy news.

In order to study Communist speeches, you have to apply a technique like they used to do in the Middle Ages when there were specialists in the exegesis of the Scripture. The Communists are great masters in the use of language. They have a specific vocabulary of their own. The vocabulary changes; different terms are used depending on the audience; meanings vary with the position in the text, the type of argument, the type of quotation, and the historical reference. So all this has to be understood. Communist semantics are not particularly difficult once you apply yourself to the problem. The so-called Aesopian language is not fundamentally different from the normal way in which diplomatic notes are written and which, incidentally, whenever the State Department receives one, are carefully analyzed. But this interpretative skill is not acquired by osmosis, but results from training and practice. A great deal of attention must be given to precisely this type of challenge.

Now, all this still is introductory training. Then follows the main instruction course, which I will not bother to read from my prepared statement. I have broken this course down into 10 major areas. I will just read the headings. They are: History, ideology, organiza-

tion, states, conflict techniques, capabilities, strategy and tactics, counterstrategies by the freedom systems, vulnerability patterns, and improvements of freedom strategy.

Now, all this instruction would be instruction on operational matters. For example, to read you a few items under conflict techniques: Intelligence, propaganda, diplomacy, political warfare, economic warfare, subversion, technology, terror, guerrilla, insurrection, disarmament, limited war, blackmail, war, and countermeasures to all of these techniques.

Let me read the items under strategy and tactics. It is a shorter list. We would study the doctrines of strategy and the tactical doctrine and undertake case studies. We would have case studies on special techniques like terror or case studies in an integrated operation like, well, the second front in World War II or the war in Korea.

Now, this would not be cloak-and-dagger, but it would be strictly instruction. The operating art or the art of strategy, or the facts of strategy, or the history of war, history of conflict, all of those are subjects suitable for study. In fact, this is nothing particularly new, except that during the last two or three generations, the study of war has been eliminated, by and large, from university curricula. Lately, the topic has encountered renewed interest. Certainly, you can study conflict like any other subject. Actually this is a subject which must be investigated by all alert citizens. Study does not imply that you prepare yourself for operational assignments. This is a matter of knowledge. The Academy is designed only to provide the knowledge necessary for, and prerequisite to, the proper conduct of operations within the framework of a strategy of freedom.

When we study vulnerability patterns, I suggest that we study the vulnerabilities both of the Communist states and parties and of the democratic states and parties. It is important to balance these respective vulnerabilities, which are a little different in each case, and understand them properly. There is no particular reason why we should live with unnecessary vulnerabilities. Many of them are perhaps intrinsic to our or any democratic system, others are not and could be eliminated.

We should devote a great deal of attention to the improvement of freedom strategy. For example, the proposed curriculum includes the study of internal security. This committee certainly is the most knowledgeable about this subject. I am sure I do not tell you a secret if I say that the country at large, and the academic community in particular, does not understand the internal security problem. In fact, it behaves like Ulysses when he passed the dangerous waters and plugged up his ears. When it comes to a point where a President of the United States is assassinated, I think it might perhaps be useful to open our ears and eyes and consider internal security realistically.

There is a great deal of argument in the country today whether you can avoid war, or must or should surrender. Well, I think this discouraging debate in part is derivative of the fact that we do not really understand the operational arts. I am not implying that it is exactly clear that communism can be superseded by peaceful means, but I do mean to say that there is a great possibility that this could be done. It certainly does not serve the national interest to discuss what everybody knows is not going to evaporate as a threat—one fine morning,

communism will be gone—to discuss this continuing threat like high school students would discuss a cure of cancer: “Resolved that the disease of cancer is detrimental to human welfare.”

On strictly logical grounds, three denouements are conceivable: One is war, which none of us wants. The other is surrender, which none of us wants either. So you are confronted with the conduct of the cold war which means, essentially, that we would be aiming at the peaceful superseding of communism.

Now, whether that can be done or not, I do not know, but this strikes me as being the foremost problem of the world today. A problem of that complexity and significance will have to be studied objectively, thoroughly, and on a very advanced level.

The curriculum I indicated here looks very full and it is very full, but the actual instruction time can be cut down considerably, for example, through effective textbooks, which would have to be put together in the Academy, and a flow of case study materials.

Furthermore, students who are accepted by the Freedom Academy could be selected on the basis of achievements in a preliminary correspondence course.

Since I mentioned a correspondence course, I would make the suggestion that full use be made of this flexible technique. The Industrial College of the Armed Services has pioneered in this within the Government and it has been extremely successful. It is not absolutely necessary that the student take a long vacation from his job, repair to a particular facility, and sit through a large number of lectures. A great deal can be done in a correspondence course.

After mastering the subject matter, the student could be assigned to the special study of problems that are of professional concern to him. For example, a newspaper man might analyze the contents of the paper with which he is connected and formulate an improvement plan. A business man might analyze how his export trade is related to the cold war. A priest might reread his sermons and a Congressman might reevaluate his speeches and votes. All might contemplate how the flow of information through the country, the business world, the universities, the public opinion media, and the Government could be improved. We need a larger stream and one that is less polluted.

Graduate, postgraduate, and refresher study should be tailored to meet the specific requirements of the individual. But provisions should be made to develop special skills in all the major topical areas, both among instructors and graduates.

I may add at this point that the Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, has pioneered in developing an installation which I think could very well serve as a model for the Freedom Academy. The Air University comprises many parts, many different schools, including schools for “generalists” and “specialists.” It has a fairly large body of students, in fact, a very large body, and it operates both for American citizens who are in the Air Force as well as in the other services and in the State Department. It also handles, under various arrangements, foreign students. It does operate at different levels of classification.

In other words, you have an organization at Maxwell which several years ago had to face problems similar to those which we are facing today with the Freedom Academy. The subject matter to be taught is

extremely complicated and voluminous. It cannot be *in toto* imparted to any one student and should not be. Hence, we have to split up this complex and tailor the study courses to the specific needs of specific types of students. A mission of this sort requires substantial staff work and readjustments of academic and governmental routines. But the feasibility of such an undertaking, in my judgment, is beyond any doubt.

I wholeheartedly recommend the establishment of the Freedom Academy at the earliest practical moment.

This concludes my formal statement, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, doctor. I would like to ask you just two or three questions.

I can see very well the attitude of the State Department, of the Government, toward this bill. I do not want to imply or impute any bad motives to the State Department in its opposition to this bill. I am trying to develop information. So let me ask you two or three questions.

In a totalitarian state—let's say in the Iron Curtain countries—they are specialists in propaganda and they have propaganda ministries; but there the schooling, the teaching, the indoctrination, the knowledge set out for whoever attends these seminars and schools is given under government control.

Now here, this bill—and I am being very frank and I am taking the other side of the issue—in a way, would divorce the institution from government. How can that be done, in a democracy? To have this Commission and Academy not part of government, how can that work? I am taking the other side of the coin. You taught political philosophy. Do I make myself plain?

Dr. POSSONY. Yes, I think so.

The CHAIRMAN. How can that work?

Dr. POSSONY. Well, it should not be a divorce *a vinculo* or even *a mensa et thoro*.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I am not talking about ending matrimony now, but sort of a separation from bed and board here.

Dr. POSSONY. Separation of policy and knowledge. Well, I don't see that this is any more difficult than the establishment of a State university. It is a specialized university, certainly, but it is a university which is autonomous, and the Government comes in essentially on two points. One is that the resource question has to be handled through the Federal purse, unfortunately. Maybe this is not entirely true. Maybe there can be other arrangements, such as private grants and endowments, but most of it certainly will have to come through the Federal purse. The second is that much of the information would come from Government sources.

The CHAIRMAN. Would the provision of the bill dealing with the Advisory Committee be a partial answer to that, that there would be a link with government agencies? Would that be a partial answer to my worry-wart question?

Dr. POSSONY. Well, the Advisory Committee should include private people, I would think, and would consist both of public and private individuals—Government experts, private experts, and academic persons.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the committee as explained would be composed mostly—and if I am wrong, I wish somebody would correct me—of people from Department of State, Department of Defense, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, International Cooperation Administration, United States Information Agency. The advisory group, the group advising the Commission, would come from these agencies, and therefore there would be a link with the Government. Would that answer this criticism which probably will be advanced by the Government agencies against this bill?

Dr. POSSONY. I don't know whether it answers the criticism. I have no doubt that a strong—

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we have been told, and we have letters, that the Government agencies, for lack of a better word, are against this bill.

Dr. POSSONY. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. And assuming that they are against this bill on the sincere premise that you can't divorce, you can't separate an agency of this kind from the Government, they will advance the argument, I expect, and I want to be able to examine them just as I am examining you.

Dr. POSSONY. I don't see the argument being too valid. Let's look at the Department of Defense and the service academies. Or the Department of Health, which certainly does not run all the medical schools.

In other words, you have in such areas as Defense, a college-type institution, Annapolis or West Point. Those are training organizations exactly like the Freedom Academy. There are many more schools at a higher level. These schools do not make policy and they don't carry out military operations and, to a large extent, they are academically autonomous. They do not, and certainly should not, teach a "party line." They train people, and the trained men go into the service, where they participate in operations and policy-making.

In the Department of Health, there is the reverse situation. The Health bureaucracy needs physicians, and they get the doctors from the private sector and from the universities.

The CHAIRMAN. I know I haven't made my point clear. Apparently, the Government agencies, those I have named, particularly the State Department, take the position that instead of having a Freedom Academy and a Freedom Commission, as proposed here, there should be instead an Academy of Foreign Affairs—

Dr. POSSONY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. —under the domination, let us say, of the State Department. Because I suspect they will say, "You can't deal in these sensitive areas without the Government being at the head or centrally involved in it."

What I was asking was: Would the fact that—though this would be separated from the Government and would be a Freedom Academy and a Commission extending out as an independent agency—would the fact that part of that Academy or Commission, that they be obligated to have an advisory group connected with Government, be an answer to their opposition—that is the point I am trying to make—or a partial answer?

Dr. POSSONY. Well, the only answer I can give to that, Mr. Willis, is that I should certainly hope so. It is, after all, a fact that unless you do have the support by the Government in terms of information, in terms of experience, in terms of lectures, this Freedom Academy isn't going to be very successful. Conversely, a significant and perhaps the most significant part of the student body will be Government people who have to be trained, or given additional training.

So the fact is that there has to be a very close link between the Government and the Freedom Academy, and that link could be provided in this fashion.

The CHAIRMAN. Through this advisory group.

Dr. POSSONY. Through this advisory group. Furthermore, it can be provided through many other links. But there should not be Government domination, and there should be no party lines and no censorship of nonconformist viewpoints. There must be broad exposure to various interpretations and ideas.

The CHAIRMAN. Now let me ask a few questions along that line, and they are sensitive questions. I am assuming that the agencies of Government, the State Department, will send one or more witnesses here, and say, "We are opposed to this approach. We think the right approach is the National Academy, under the closest supervision"—I call it domination—"of the State Department."

And I have asked you whether a partial answer to that rigid position of opposition would be the fact that we can say, "Well, now hold on. We are not snubbing you. You are to be part of this, you are to have an advisory group from State. You are to have, probably, lecturers among this Academy faculty."

I expect that they will still maintain a position of opposition. Can you suggest any other means to sell this institution, somewhere down the line, so it will be acceptable? Because, you see, you are reasoning as a philosopher, and on the idea that this Academy must be, that we should have it. But our problem is that we have to try to sell it. There are some people in this country who—let's be rough about it—don't want the National Academy, because they don't trust, let's say in quotes "trust," the State Department, and they won't buy it, though they feel that something should be done.

Therefore, they want this Freedom Academy approach, and they even have some distrust of this approach.

Now, how do we resolve that? How do we work out something? If you can become a politician now, instead of a philosopher, do you have any thoughts on that?

Dr. POSSONY. Yes, sir. This philosopher has been in Washington for 18 years.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you catch what I mean.

Dr. POSSONY. Yes. The point, I think, is this: The State Department, as a service, has a requirement for an upper level school for their own people. I would not dispute this for one minute. In fact, they do have this Foreign Service Institute, which is modeled, to some extent, after the National War College and the service colleges. Now what they are proposing is essentially an enlargement of this upper level Foreign Service Institute. This is their substitute for the Freedom Academy.

But these are two entirely different animals. The Foreign Service man ought to get his training on the broad problems of the State Department. The experience, of course, has been that training was given short shrift in the State Department. The curriculum of the Foreign Service Institute is quite weak in the areas which I think must be studied most if we are not to lose the cold war. The same weakness exists in the National War College. When I was there, we had one 6 weeks' course dealing with the Soviet bloc, largely a matter of political structure, economics, geography, and current events. Operational questions were discussed, but treatment was short and superficial and not based upon adequate documentation.

Now, one point the State Department, I think, does not even contemplate, which I think is one of the most important elements here, is the need for fundamental research.

What you get in the service colleges and in the State Department school is the elder statesman, the higher ranking officer, the "super-grade" telling the student body what is on his mind now—current problems, with very little depth. Twelve years ago I listened to a State Department representative telling before the Christmas vacation that we had won the cold war already. You need time out for comic relief, but the serious study is not serious enough.

You would have to get at an entirely different type of research, with a great deal of output in terms of textbooks. I discussed this when I talked about the library. The Freedom Academy will be an entirely different operation, to start out with.

The other point which the State Department does not cover: you can't put private citizens into the State Department school. You can certainly not put foreign citizens there. The Freedom Academy is based on the philosophy that the country at large has to be trained, must understand this Communist threat as a nation, and our allies, together with us, have to understand it better. Well, let's take a specific case. I think that one of the primary type of students should be the congressional assistant. A lot of people who work here in Congress, who do a lot of your staff work, should go to a school teaching the facts of international life.

Where could they go today? There is no school for them. Can you send them over to the State Department? Of course, you can't. It wouldn't work. Furthermore, the facilities are much too small for that. You have quite a number of assistants in Congress today who would be qualified for, or should be given, this training, certainly several hundred people. The State Department has barely enough slots for their own people.

Now there are many additional types of prospective students. Priorities will have to be defined, but I would not exclude anyone from participation in the Freedom Academy. We are talking about a big institution.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, just a couple of more questions, and I asked almost the same thing of Mr. Grant a while ago. You envisage quite a library that will put out a wealth of informed material. That material will be printed. It will be distributed. It must be, or it would be useless.

Now, as a matter of international relations, if this Academy is set up, could our Government say to foreign countries, "Now look,

this material comes out of this Academy, but it must not be read as foreign policy material." How can that be done? And if it is foreign policy material, why should we telegraph our punches in public documents?

Dr. POSSONY. There are three questions. One is you do not publish foreign policy papers, unless they are released, like, let us say, George Kennan's piece in *Foreign Affairs* more than 15 years ago. Such release would be a deliberate decision by the State Department. Here is this piece written, it goes into *Foreign Affairs* for a particular purpose in foreign policy.

The second case would be a paper written by, let's say, a Foreign Service officer, a student of the Academy or by a military officer student, and this paper would be written for the internal uses of the Government. The paper is classified. The writer, whether a student or not, just uses the facilities of the Academy. The paper remains classified. The bill reads:

Nothing in this Act shall authorize the disclosure of any information or knowledge in any case in which such disclosure (1) is prohibited by any other law of the United States, or (2) is inconsistent with the security of the United States.

The third case is a scholarly piece written by a student or instructor or which was prepared by the research staff. This would be a historical or background paper, not a classified operational plan, for example. It would be an academic piece, albeit of topical interest. If it is a good piece of work, it will be released, for example, as a textbook or a case study. The Academy might not bother with the whole subject, but the individual authors are their own masters—provided no security is involved.

Would other powers complain? If the academic information is accurate, well, if anyone complains about what he does not like—of course, they complain—there's nothing you can do about this. If a quotation is alleged to be wrong, let us know, Mr. Communist, what the correct quotation is and please give us the original source. If the quotation is correct, why do you object to our side interpreting what you say? Show us where the interpretation is wrong. This sort of dialogue might be quite useful.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, would it be true, also, as indicated by Mr. Grant, that these publications would be, to a large measure anyway, suggestions made to agencies for improvement of techniques and so on in a large measure, rather than position papers?

Dr. POSSONY. Well, there are two types of suggestions you can make. One is classified, and the other one is unclassified. When we discuss today the Freedom Academy, this is a suggestion made to the Government of the United States from the American people to improve our capabilities to fight the cold war. This is the sort of suggestion that would never be classified. There should be no obstacles to release, either.

The CHAIRMAN. So it would be just in that sense.

Dr. POSSONY. In that sense, only. Operational matters remain classified.

The CHAIRMAN. You think the Commission, the work of the Commission could be sold as, oh, the work of so many other commissions we create, appointed by the President. They make recommendations

and the world seems to understand that these commission reports are not acts of Congress, and are not binding. Do you think we could get by with that?

Dr. POSSONY. Even if they were binding, even if you follow through with the proposal here, the proposal to establish the Freedom Academy, there is no particular reason to keep it classified. It would be entirely different if the Commission recommends a new method to apply in Vietnam tomorrow. That would be classified.

The CHAIRMAN. You understand that the questions I am asking now are not a criticism of the bill, because I suspect that that is what the opposition witnesses will be telling us, that it won't work, for these reasons. I am trying to get the benefit of your views as to why it will.

Dr. POSSONY. The code of classification is perfectly plain. Anyone who ever sat in the Government knows what classification you put on a paper. There is a clear-cut definition of what is confidential, secret, and so on. The paper has to be classified according to the rules. If it is an unclassified paper, it is unclassified.

Now, there is another point. The Academy, as an academy, is not really in the publication business. It is Mr. Student X or Mr. Student Y or Professor X or Professor Y who is publishing something, and it is his personal work. It is his personal by-line which goes on the product.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought, though, that a while ago you were stressing the fact—unless I missed your point—that in researching a problem the great difficulty was that we had so many classified documents. Now, nothing can be done about that?

Dr. POSSONY. Except if the information is subject to declassification, you use it as we do it in normal research practice. When you want to write a story, let us say, of events in 1938, then you go to the National Archives. You get permission to go through the file, you find classified documents, you go through a declassification procedure. If declassification is accomplished, the scholar will footnote his piece by referring, for example, to a communication from the Ambassador to Berlin to the State Department. Some papers that cannot be declassified, may be used as background information. There is a clear-cut routine in all this. It will not be necessary to depart from the established routine.

The only difference, I hope, which would come out of it is that the declassification procedures would be speeded up and that much relevant material would become usable.

The CHAIRMAN. Would it be a valid objection to this proposal to say that these studies could—studies of Communist policies, techniques, and aggression—be undertaken through universities and libraries, instead of this way?

Dr. POSSONY. The answer to that one is, theoretically they could; but, as a matter of practicality, you do not have in any university the resources needed to undertake this precise sort of a study effectively and thoroughly.

Furthermore, the average university does not have a staff that is adequate in terms of training, teaching, library management, and so on. Hence even a very good student would be unable to give the best account of himself. Thirdly, you don't really have in the average university the sophistication and knowledge of the Communist threat that would be necessary to do this sort of study properly. The difference is one of quality, of better access to the information, and, I would say, of judgment.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, some of the product, studies, of this Academy, this establishment, if established, could be channeled through universities. Would that improve the position of universities to go into teaching of communism?

Dr. POSSONY. Well, one of the points I made with respect to the libraries, for example, but the point is generally valid—is that the Academy should be a support agency for the academic community. This is particularly necessary in library and microfilm exchange and all that sort of thing, but certainly this is also true with respect to—well, I am being helped here with the language of the bill. This is in section 6, paragraph 3:

To provide leadership in encouraging and assisting universities and other institutions to increase and improve research, educational, and training programs attuned to the global operational needs of the United States.

So this point is quite well taken. However, there is an obverse to it.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the reality of the apprehension that the Academy might fall into “wrong hands”?

Dr. POSSONY. May I just finish with the previous question? The obverse to this point is that the Freedom Academy should, must, and will rely on resources that the private universities make available. This system has been in force at the National War College and in the other War Colleges. You pull in suitable academic people to serve on what you call, loosely, the faculty, and as advisers on the academic advisory boards, and certainly as speakers. The War Colleges can't fill their quotas of speakers from the Washington area and the Government. They could, if they really tried to, but it is unnecessary and it is not desirable. It is necessary to bring in different viewpoints, and of course, many of these different viewpoints blossom forth in the universities, sometimes on the right side, sometimes on the left side. So the task is, above all, to improve the total academic potential of the United States in the area of communism, of political warfare, and of freedom strategy.

Now with respect to the “false hands,” I wrote a few lines and maybe I can read those.

Some have feared that the Academy could fall into the wrong hands. The Presidency also could fall into the wrong hands and so could every Cabinet post and every elected and appointed position, but we do not abolish our public offices, not only because we need them but because also we are confident that we are able to handle and control the misuse and abuse of power. Certainly, we are not always successful, but we are successful most of the time. As the French say, “The better is the enemy of the good.” The French poet, Alfred de Musset, was right when he said that the desire to possess perfection “is the most dangerous kind of madness.”

Now, the Academy bill has many provisions to handle this particular problem. The subject should be considered at great length and with great care. It is not a matter, I would say, of security clearances, because the man can be the wrong choice despite the fact that he was given all the security clearances in the world and there is nothing whatever wrong with him. Yet he might be a very bad chancellor if he lacks motive, will power, realism, academic probity, administrative ability, and so on.

The bill calls for Senate confirmation. This certainly is a good provision. It is one element of control.

I think we should make reasonably certain—I don't know that you put this into the bill, but you might be well advised to do so—that there should be bipartisan selection of the lecturers. I think you should have provision so that the research staffs are rotated.

The CHAIRMAN. Are what?

Dr. POSSONY. Rotated. Bringing new people, very frequently.

I think that the Advisory Committee, perhaps supervisory board would be a better term, should include people who are appointed, not just by the President, but perhaps also by the congressional majority and minority leaders. I don't know whether there is precedent for such a solution, but it certainly is not unfeasible. In any event, the appointees would have to be examined and interrogated by the Internal Security Subcommittee or some other committee. I think your committee also should have a voice in this.

It might be very useful to have a structure where visiting firemen are passing through quite frequently, to talk to people, including staff, instructors, and students, not just to receive the red carpet treatment. Also, a debriefing routine may be instituted, whereby the students or some of the professors can be regularly debriefed as to whether the school is moving in the right direction.

Now, having said all this, and we could think of other elements, I will make another point: I think it is not conducive to good conditions in an academic institution when you have too many mutual supervisors. Academic institutions are known to be among the worst nests of intrigue, and I don't think you would help the situation with this type of an arrangement. Supervision is necessary to some extent, but the point I want to make is this: That the Freedom Academy, under our philosophy of Government, essentially ought to offer an opportunity for self-study. It is the individual who goes there. This individual may be working for the Defense Department or for the State Department or for a university, but it is still he himself who goes there and who puts the documentation he obtains to his use. Similarly, a man can draw his own conclusions, but I don't think you want to interfere with his freedom to think for himself. The chance you take is that most people will learn something and will put it to good use.

Now, the Freedom Academy is not, and should never be, an indoctrination outfit. I don't think it would work, I don't think indoctrination is a good academic procedure, and I don't think you get, really, the most mileage for your money from this approach. It is much better to consider the Freedom Academy as a supersophisticated, well-financed, well-organized facility for the individual to study in.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, two questions in one. Whom did you envisage the student body to be, and the teachers to be?

Dr. POSSONY. The student body should consist of people in the Government, who would be selected in approximately the same manner, with perhaps a little bit more voluntarism thrown in, as people are selected at present for the staff schools and for the War Colleges. There could be repeated attendance on the several levels of the Academy, just like a regular officer attends the service academy, the Command and Staff School, possibly several technical schools, and the War College.

The CHAIRMAN. You mentioned, perhaps, congressional help, too, as members of the student body?

Dr. POSSONY. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. People in management, and in labor.

Dr. POSSONY. That is outside the Government. As a matter of fact, the judiciary is a part of the Government, and perhaps some troubles we are having are caused by the fact that the judiciary is not too sharp with respect to the internal security threat. Attendance by jurists and legal assistants might help. I don't know how well this suggestion would sit.

The CHAIRMAN. I will go along with it.

Dr. POSSONY. It is a hopeful possibility.

Now, management and labor, certainly; newspapers certainly. In what way do you select these people? I do not really know, because I don't want to suggest that you go, let's say to the National Association of Manufacturers, and say, "All right, give me 10 students." I don't think this would work, but you keep slots open for voluntary enlistment, so to speak, and send out invitations. There are all kinds of postgraduate courses given to business leaders by the various business schools, so the same type of arrangement would be feasible.

In Washington, I think it would be very important that a large portion of the instruction be given in evening classes. At the local universities, Georgetown, for example, the graduate school used to teach only, or predominantly, evening classes. When I taught there, practically every student was a Government person. I always considered this one of the greatest advantages of Washington, and one of the great strengths of the U.S. Government, that you had so many people voluntarily attend the university.

Now, a lot of the instruction, however, suffers from the fact that you have a young instructor—let's say he instructs on India, and a student who sits in his class was the last naval attaché or the air attaché to India. The attaché knows more than the professor about the subject. It happens all the time at Washington universities. If the instructor is a wise and reasonable person, this is a great advantage. I'd anticipate that students in the Academy occasionally will be very knowledgeable, but their knowledge will be partial.

Another group of people who should attend our summer courses is the academic people. Professors need a great deal of instruction on these operational areas, because they are quite innocent about these subjects.

With respect to foreign students, I will put it this way: evolutionary growth is probably preferable to a sudden blossoming forth with a very large administrative problem. You can't have at once thousands of foreigners coming in. I would set up priorities, and I would start out with NATO, plus one or the other major countries outside the NATO area, and then branch out from there. I would not restrict the foreign students to those appointed by their governments. Because—

The CHAIRMAN. Say that again.

Dr. POSSONY. I would not restrict foreign attendance to students appointed by the foreign government. Let us say Mr. Nkrumah appoints his boys, and perhaps we want precisely those boys he would not appoint.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, there you go into some security check.

Dr. POSSONY. Well, with respect to security checks, I will say this: I would be extremely clear on the classified area: without security check, no access to sensitive materials. With respect to the unclassified part, I would not be too particularly finicky, because—

The CHAIRMAN. Well, they would find out about that part, anyway. I mean, those who would want the information as to the unclassified part, democracies such as ours being what they are, they would know all about it anyway; wouldn't they?

Dr. POSSONY. The foreign students at our military and civilian schools don't gain access to the classified areas and materials. Suppose you have a Communist from, I don't know, from some unfriendly country. One of his reasons for attending the Freedom Academy might be to spy on it and find out what is going on. There is no doubt that this will happen.

At the same time, this informer student may pick up something which he didn't know beforehand. I am not sure which opinions he will be carrying back. I would not be defeatist about this. If the man is at all endowed with intelligence, when he sits through these classes with open ears he may cease being a very good Communist. I don't think the Communists will particularly trust him—they can't be sure what happened to his convictions. In other words, we must see to it that security provisions will not be self-defeating.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I might have some disagreement with you on that score.

Finally, who would the teachers be? Lecturers?

Dr. POSSONY. I think they would fall into three broad categories. One would be the Government and military person who has had experience, who knows and who has been through some phases of this conflict. Many of these people are academically qualified, so it is no problem finding good instructors in the foreign and military services.

The second category would be the academic person with background and specialized knowledge. The third type would embrace operational persons, let us say, the ex-Communist with operational experience, but he doesn't necessarily have to be an ex-Communist, either; if you have a union man who fought the Communists in Africa or South America, he should be among the instructors. If you have a newspaperman who—or, well, a reporter who went through a harrowing experience like some of our newspapermen who didn't quite catch what was going on in Vietnam, and today they may know better. I would put these people on and let them tell their stories. Some might be a little bit embarrassed, but others will be big enough to report their experiences for the benefit of all.

I would also put on the newspaperman who had a scoop. For example, Max Eastman, an American newspaperman and writer, was handed the secret testament of Lenin. That was almost 40 years ago. When he returned to this country, he published the secret testament of Lenin; of course, it was immediately branded as a forgery. Naturally, it wasn't a forgery and now is printed in Lenin's *Collected Works*, and Khrushchev authenticated it. Max Eastman was honest and right, and the academic community—or that part of it which declared this testament a forgery—was wrong and had fallen for propaganda.

Well, that is the type of experience I would make very sure to make available to the Academy. There are dozens of cases of this sort.

These men should be brought in to cure the professors from the overdose of abstract thinking which sometimes passes as academic objectivity.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, my final question: What do the participants, the students, quote "students," do with the knowledge they gain?

Dr. POSSONY. This is the same question we always get. I am sure you gentlemen get it very frequently; give a speech somewhere, and people come up and ask, "What am I supposed to do to save the country?" My pet answer to this one is, "Well, there are two parties in this country. I don't care which one, go in there and make sure that the facts of life are known to the local organization of your party and that, accordingly, policies are being decided upon."

This usually floors them. They don't understand that we have a two-party system which is more than a vague abstraction, that one can work with it, and that the person interested in security and progress should work with it.

In amplification of this, what the man does depends upon where he is and who he is. If you have a newspaperman, and he has been through the Academy, well, the next time he goes into the field, I am sure he is going to be considerably more attentive to some little tricks that the Communists are going to play on him. If you have a businessman, he will understand that perhaps the Soviet Union isn't going to offer him the great market he thinks is his for the asking. If he is a security official, he might be able to make a little bit less mechanical decisions as to who is or is not a security risk. Wherever the man is, he will do a better job and he will strengthen our security.

I think one of the most important changes would occur in the universities. One of the greatest weaknesses we are suffering from today is that the academic youth which is being brought up is kept in complete ignorance about the foremost security problems besetting our country and the free world.

Mr. ASHBROOK. I have a couple of questions.

Two basic questions, one relating to policy and one relating to personnel. I think it is going to be awful hard on a new Commission like this to avoid policies which the Government is obviously trying to set out in the foreign policy field. Take this example. If we had a Freedom Commission or a Freedom Academy of this type 2 years ago, when the effort was being put forth by the State Department, the so-called muzzling the military, and the policies were handed down, and George Ball was telling the Freedom Academy in opposition to Arleigh Burke and the military that the use of the word "victory" denotes a militaristic range and has a sense of fatality which rules out all possibility of accommodation, and this is a very basic policy for a country to take, how are you possibly going to gear an overall effort like this into a Freedom Academy, which, if it is to operate freely, and we hope it will, would certainly have to go in direct contradiction to this type of policy? Because if we have a Freedom Academy to tell people the dangers of world communism and how the forces of freedom are going to combat it, then it would seem to be impossible to have yourself tied, in effect, by a policy which would say, "Well, talking in terms of winning or victory is certainly bad."

And this is just one area of policy that probably would come into conflict with this, and undoubtedly some of the reason for this opposi-

tion. How can an independent agency like this operate completely free of these overall policies and be meaningful and do its own job?

Dr. POSSONY. I think the answer to that one is academic freedom. Let's assume you have this "no winning" policy or "no victory" policy. In the first place, this would be a matter of reporting upon it in the courses and in the instruction materials, and so on, as an input into the documentation. It is a matter of reporting, of absorbing, and also of discussion.

In the second place, insofar as the instruction, the seminars, and the study papers are concerned, there must be the Golden Rule that the various viewpoints will be presented objectively and fairly. No censorship, not even censorship "for lack of time or space."

Mr. ASHBROOK. Equal time for appeasement, in other words.

Dr. POSSONY. Not necessarily that. I would think that—if any person tries to argue at great length without showing real comprehension of the problem, I don't think it would go over too well.

He may have a good point at a given period. Let's not be too dogmatic about it. In other words, the idea of an accommodation at one point in the historical continuum may be exactly the type of policy you want, and this should be brought out. I wouldn't hesitate about that. The students should know the whole spectrum of possible policies. But, on the other hand, if a man runs counter to a large body of evidence, and if the evidence just doesn't support his type of policy, I don't think it hurts when he makes his point. And it may help the speaker to learn about valid objections.

I remember very vividly a scene in one of the Government's great institutions of learning. A member of the Cabinet made a little speech and got flustered by a question—which wasn't meant maliciously—but he got trapped into a wrong answer. This was a perfectly nonpolitical question—it dealt with finance and private investment. Everyone in that room knew from personal experience that the Secretary was wrong, and assumed he wanted to be funny. They burst out laughing, and the Cabinet member got quite a little irritated, but in the end he saw the light. Sometimes these incidents serve a useful purpose.

Mr. ASHBROOK. I think we all agree that we should have all viewpoints presented, but the point I make, which I think you answered well by "academic freedom," is that it is going to be very hard in many areas to present a point of view which may be in direct conflict with some of the overall policies of the country.

Dr. POSSONY. That, Congressman, if I may say so, is of course one of the greatest troubles we have in the academic community today, that we are operating under a phony academic freedom which is violated every day, for example, through appointments. Likes appoint likes. In some schools and departments, everybody is representing the same line, and not always through the scientific method. That is the one real danger, more important, I think, than the danger of the chancellor of the Academy falling into the wrong hands. He is, after all, an administrator, and he will make wrong decisions and good decisions, but the diversity of the instruction materials, the free discussion, and the completeness of the libraries, those are key items. You find concealed censorship frequently in the university and public libraries. "We don't order this sort of a book. No one reads it."

Who determines who reads it? Or "It isn't important." Who says so?

The librarian tends to exclude materials he or she doesn't like. The budget always offers a good excuse. That is the danger we must avoid.

Mr. ASHBROOK. I think that is a good answer to my first question. My last question, of course, I think you have probably already answered it in effect, in the fact that it really is impossible at any time, even though the concept is good, to make sure the right people will be on the faculty, and so forth. I can't help but think, for example, of a speech I heard by supposedly—at least he is said to be—the Russian expert of the USIA, and in this speech, his direct statements—and I have the speech—were to the effect that, on the whole, Americans make the mistake of misunderstanding the Russians because many of their seemingly aggressive moves are really motivated by defensive fear of what we are going to do. And then at one other point he said that, on the whole, the United States is more democratic than the Soviet Union, and at the same time we are less imperialistic than they are, and I couldn't help but think, because I have always believed in this Freedom Academy concept and the inability of people throughout the country to go some place and learn about communism, if you were to take that approach, I wonder what kind of graduates you would have of your Freedom Academy? Who would go home and say, "Well, on the whole, we are more democratic than the Soviet Union, we are less imperialistic than they are. We must look more carefully at what they are doing, because a lot of times we have got to recognize that what seems aggressive is really motivated by the defensive fear of what we are going to do in being the aggressor."

And I guess you have got no safeguard on that, but as one person who favors this bill, I am certainly thinking of this approach.

Dr. POSSONY. Well, you have got a safeguard. Let me put it this way: This may have been a correct though probably incomplete statement. The average Russian citizen may very well be afraid, I don't know and I am unconvinced. But after all, he is a victim of propaganda, and these fears are being carefully instilled. If the speaker was talking about the Kremlin, this is something else.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Or talking about the political leader.

Dr. POSSONY. That is silly. But if you had ample documentation, you had a fair number of excellent and knowledgeable lecturers, and you had enough time to press the speaker on such a point, I think it would come out very clearly what is correct about it, and what is not correct about it.

Let me point out one fact which perhaps has not been brought out, but I lived through it and I think it is important to stress it.

By the time you attend a War College and sit daily through the lectures and debates, every day, listening to lectures—and the War College is handling just one lecture—and then you have a discussion in the main room and then another discussion in the seminar room—by the fourth month you are becoming almost clairvoyant. The nonsense that speakers dish out becomes easily noticeable. The windbag is recognized without trouble. In fact, after this period, even the most excellent speakers are confronted with a very tough assignment. The audience is too sophisticated. These are all men of maturity, they are colonels and captains, who have been around and who know that things aren't quite rosy and can't be solved by magic.

Twelve years ago, we had one high-ranking speaker from an important agency telling us how the cold war could be won by socio-economic reform alone, but it soon became obvious he didn't know his own subject; he confused Sweden with Switzerland—and it was painful. Kremlinologists often have a difficult time—even a reasonable systematic course is like a vaccination against intellectual smallpox.

So the point is, if you have an institution like the Freedom Academy, you can draw on the foremost experts in the country plus experts from NATO or India or any country, any discipline and all different viewpoints. You also could set up academic discussions.

If, in addition, you back all this up with adequate research materials and active research, I wouldn't be worried. This country has the capability of establishing and running the Freedom Academy most effectively. We need the Academy for our intellectual rearmament.

MR. ASHBROOK. Thank you.

THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, sir.

Anything else?

DR. POSSONY. No, sir. Thank you very much for your attention.

(Dr. Possony's prepared statement and letter to Chairman Willis dated March 2, 1964, follow:)

STATEMENT OF STEFAN T. POSSONY

The usual practice in election years is for the administration to claim that the United States is winning the cold war, that the Communist threat is receding, that soon defense expenditures can be allowed to level off, and that those who still are doubting that peace has descended on this dreary earth are negativist belly-achers that ignore the blessings of current leadership. One wonders why the triumphs of our cold war strategy remain hidden from the scrutiny of the world.

The opposition takes the exactly opposite line and argues that the United States is just about to collapse, that we cannot possibly escape unscathed from the ordeal, and that if one looked carefully enough, one would realize that the administration is plotting to betray this country to the enemy.

Following a change of administration, the party lines would be reversed, shortly after the elections.

The United States is neither winning the cold war, nor are the Soviets about to take over the United States. It does not speak highly of our political mores that national security challenges are being treated with less than the utmost objectivity.

Both parties have been insincere in their attempts to master the Communist threat. Both parties have their own chorus of Pollyannas and alarmists. Neither party has made a serious attempt, except by means of occasional oratory during an emergency, to inform the electorate on the nature and strength of the threat we are facing. In both parties—and also in the defense, intelligence, and research communities—the tendency has been to single out specific aspects of the overall threat and to suggest isolated counteractions. There is scarcely any discussion about the whole spectrum of the threat, let alone a discussion about how this total threat could be met. I am convinced that both parties lack a genuine comprehension of the struggle the electorate desires the United States to win.

The right and left extremists, about whom we hear so many complaints, are, for the most part, people who sense that something is basically wrong, who have never been given the benefit of a correct diagnosis, and who therefore volunteer with their own improvised therapies. The most unfortunate result of extremist thinking has been that the democratic debate has been diverted from the real issues.

It could be argued that this intellectual disarray is due to our laziness: it takes work and diligence to learn about the basic facts of communism, and how many Americans really are making the effort? I believe that the reproach of mental laziness can indeed be substantiated, notably our national penchant for simplifi-

cations and oversimplifications. "Of making many books there is no end; and much study is a weariness of the flesh." (*Ecccl. XII, 12*)

At the same time, it would be most unfair to let the matter rest with this identification of this one American failing. To study communism is a full-time job. We are dealing with close to 50 years of Soviet and world history, with more than 100 years of social history, and with 200 years of ideological history. We cannot wish that our citizens give up their normal activities to devote themselves to a life of study; we would lose to communism immediately.

Nor can part-time students be expected to master several languages, to obtain the required documentation from the five corners of the earth, and to develop sound judgments on a subject of encyclopedic scope with constantly changing specifics.

The student, full- or part-time, is beset by special difficulties: pertinent information is not being printed—the publishers can't sell hard-to-read books; other information is kept away from the broad public or is never written up in digestible form—congressional hearings, which undoubtedly are among our best sources of information, are a good illustration; every book the student reads, every evaluation, and every single fact are targets of propaganda, aspersion, discreditation, and disorientation.

The Communist agencies specializing in misinformation are working overtime. The American voter and most American politicians and professors do not even know that there is a technique of misinformation and that it is being applied systematically by our enemies.

We no longer must deal only with Communist strategy that is formulated in Moscow. The Communist world movement no longer is as monolithic as it used to be. It begins to split into a cautious "opportunistic" wing that is responding to the dangers of the nuclear age and an activist and "adventurist" wing which frequently relies on terror and audacity. Enormous changes are taking place in the Soviet Union, and it is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish between the recasting of Communist orthodoxy; retreat and a gradual liquidation of communism; deception and self-deception; and preparations for future offensive experiments.

Most Americans erroneously believe "peaceful coexistence" signifies that the Soviets have opted for peace in our time and for our type of peace. A minority detects in coexistence a strategy designed to entrap us and weaken us for the kill. Very few even suspect that the reality could be far more complicated and that the so-called peaceful coexistence strategy, whatever the precise definition of the current Kremlin strategists, may not merely be directed toward discovering the most convenient manner of burying us, but also may be a strategy directed against internal and bloc opponents of Khrushchev and his group, and may be connected with an ideological subversion within the Soviet Union.

Suppose the Chinese are right and there were such "reformist" subversion: would we be really in a position to decide whether it suits our interests best if we entered into the coexistence scheme or if, for example, we adopted a strategy of relentless pressure? I doubt that many Americans even understand this sort of question, let alone are they able to give sophisticated consideration to additional alternatives.

Add to the strictly Communist complex the facts and challenges of nuclear weapons and of the continuing technological revolution—modern-day Communists know that the ultimate success of the world revolution depends on their nuclear victory. Add further the bewildering problems of disarmament and "arms control"—an area in which Washington and Moscow have been "cooperating" for years to confuse mankind. Add the traumatic fears that presently enslave the American public and preclude any effective strategy. Add all this, and it becomes clear that the enemy has won a decisive battle: he has succeeded in creating confusion, sowing mutual distrust, engendering anxiety, and paralyzing will. But the enemy's most endurable single advantage lies in our intellectual inability to recognize the plight we are in. There is one line in the Bible which our Nation seems to accept with enthusiasm: "He that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow." (*Ecccl. I, 18*)

If we were to organize our study of physics like we conducted the study of communism, we hardly would have running water in our homes—we would still be in the caves, hence, faucets would not be "cost-effective"—and we certainly would have no cars, no planes, and no spacecraft. If the study of medicine were organized like we have organized the study of the greatest threat this Nation and world freedom has ever been facing, the Black Death of the Middle Ages still would be with us and our life expectancy would be that of the troglodytes.

Let me now turn to two specific aspects of the Freedom Academy.

1. In my judgment, the Freedom Academy should include a library which collects the materials that are indispensable to the study of the Communist threat. It will surprise many Americans to learn that a truly adequate repository of such documentation does not exist.

By the end of World War I, Herbert Hoover, who later became President of the United States, was one of the few who correctly diagnosed the Communist danger. He foresaw the impact of communism on world peace. He also realized that university and public libraries do not have the materials needed for the study of revolutionary movements. Accordingly, he established what was later to become the Hoover Institution of War, Revolution, and Peace. The Hoover Institution possesses the country's foremost collection of the required documentation. We are very proud of our collections which are continuing to grow. We also are proud of the fact that we were the academic institute which pioneered with the systematic study of communism.

There are, of course, additional libraries, such as the Library of Congress and a few European libraries and archives which possess substantial holdings. But the total number of such libraries is small and access to archives leaves much to be desired. Documentation has many gaps, and valuable source materials are lost every day.

Library capabilities have not been keeping pace with the growth of requirements. Let me illustrate with one example. There is in this country no complete set of Latin American newspapers and magazines. In fact, we do not have, in all American libraries put together, a complete run of Communist newspapers published in Latin America—a much smaller requirement. Only a few of the important South American newspapers are to be found in U.S. libraries; and in most instances, of those papers that are listed in the few libraries that buy South American materials, only a few random issues are available.

My estimate would be that of the last 10 years, we obtained, nationwide, at best 10% of the newspapers published in Latin America. The Castro catastrophe must in part be ascribed to our dearth of documentation.

With respect to African and Asian newspapers, brochures, and books the situation is even worse.

It is quite clear why these gaps exist. The average library does not have the funds to buy large numbers of papers nor the incentive to do so, nor the funds to house or microfilm these bulky holdings. There is little interlibrary coordination in acquisition programs. There is no purchasing organization through which materials that are hard to acquire can be obtained. Finally, a worldwide newspaper acquisition program, even a more limited program for the acquisition of all Communist periodicals, is beyond the resources of private libraries. A special institution with ample finances is required.

Given our present library resources, the study of world communism is not easy. Only last week two of my students had to change their topic. One was unable to find the documentation on the present disputes between a Soviet and a Chinese group in the Communist Party of India, the other student did not have enough data to determine the "line" of the French Communist Party vis-à-vis the Spanish Civil War. No doubt, several weeks of library research might have provided considerably more information. The point is that 2 weeks of bibliographic research in three major libraries, plus the Library of Congress catalogue and the Union Catalogue, did not yield a supply of primary source materials that would have been adequate for a good study. If documentation is to be of use in decision-making, it must permit *fast* research. Only an adequately supplied library facility permits both fast work and research in depth.

Hence the Freedom Academy needs a library of a special type. The function of the library would not be to duplicate existing holdings, although, of course, it must acquire a substantial number of books. The primary function of this library, as I see it, should be (a) to establish a specialized U.S. and NATO-wide catalogue; (b) to supplement existing libraries with materials for the collection of which funds usually are lacking in universities, e.g. newspaper series, pamphlets, and leaflets; (c) to enable persons who have had experience in operations, including refugees and former Communists, to write down their experiences; (d) to engage the services of a whole battery of translators so that foreign language materials can be exploited effectively; and (e) to provide to cleared researchers *both* classified and unclassified documentation.

This library should become a national research center where nongovernmental people can do research work. It should support other research organizations which presently are grappling with these problems.

The library, perhaps in cooperation with the National Archives, could assume the function of organizing the gradual declassification of pertinent information held by the Government.

A not inconsiderable fund is needed for the library to ensure that adequate resources will be available as soon as the Academy starts functioning.

Since the library ultimately will handle enormous masses of materials—classified and unclassified, in many languages, pertaining to all countries, operational techniques, and ideologies—and will cooperate with a whole international network of libraries and since it would be a waste of time and money to have the students search endlessly for books and reports, I propose that the bill provide for an electronic data-handling system and for substantial reproduction facilities.

In order to work up speedily the enormous historical and documentary backlog, provisions should be made for a research staff which, initially and temporarily, must be fairly large in size. Research findings must be made promptly available to ensure the effective functioning of the Academy.

2. I now want to discuss teaching and curriculum. I would like to suggest that the Academy pattern its instruction after the medical model: premedical education in basic sciences, specific medical education, practical training and internship, and, ultimately, specialist training.

The preparatory education to be provided by the Freedom Academy should include such subjects as modern history, geography, physical and cultural anthropology, economics, government, sociology, political philosophy, political psychology, international law, elementary technology, etc. These subjects should be taught generally in the normal academic manner, except that all the sciences that relate to freedom and strategy would be taught according to an integrated plan. Thus, the Freedom Academy's curriculum would list the totality of the politically relevant sciences, not just isolated portions of individual sciences.

Wherever important, the different interpretations of the various political schools of thought should be brought out sharply, instead of being fuzzed over. Example: Economics should be studied with a clear realization that there are free enterprise, interventionist, and collectivist schools, with subgroups in each category. There should also be instruction in the rules of evidence, in political nomenclature and semantics, in the techniques of critical interpretation of political texts, and in scientific methodology.

The main instruction courses should be devoted, *inter alia*, to the following topics:

History:

- The Communist movement and related movements locally and worldwide
- The development of freedom systems
- The struggle between communism and the free world
- Related questions (e.g. neutralists)

Ideology:

- The main Communist thinkers and their differences
- The party lines and resolutions
- The communication of the ideology
- Related ideologies
- Freedom ideologies

Organization:

- The organization of Communist parties and subordinate groups
- The world movement
- Front organizations
- Communist-non-Communist coalitions
- Techniques of indirect control, penetration, and disorganization
- Organization of freedom groups

States:

- The Soviet Union
- China
- The bloc
- The conflict machines of Communist states
- Strengths and weaknesses of Communist states
- The United States
- NATO states
- Other states
- Defense arrangements of democratic states
- Strengths and weaknesses of democratic states
- Decision-making

Conflict Techniques :

- | | | |
|-------------------|---|-----------------|
| Intelligence | } | Countermeasures |
| Propaganda | | |
| Diplomacy | | |
| Political warfare | | |
| Economic warfare | | |
| Subversion | | |
| Technology | | |
| Terror | | |
| Guerrilla | | |
| Insurrection | | |
| Disarmament | | |
| Limited war | | |
| Blackmail | | |
| War | | |

Capabilities :

- Economic-technological
- Psychological-political-moral-ideological
- Subversive
- Military
- Soviet Union and United States compared
- Soviet bloc and NATO compared

Strategy and Tactics :

- Doctrines
- Case studies
- Special techniques
- Integrated operations

Counter-Strategies by Freedom Systems :

- Doctrines
- Case studies of successes and failures by freedom systems
 - Special techniques
 - Integrated operations
- Major differences between Communist and freedom operations

Vulnerability Patterns :

- Vulnerabilities of Communist states (e.g., ideology, economy, organization, political arrangements, etc.)
- Vulnerabilities of Communist parties
- Vulnerabilities of democratic states and parties

Improvement of Freedom Strategy :

- Methods of analysis
- Usable techniques
- Purposes and goals
- National and international organizations
- Internal security
- Freedom strategy and war
- The challenge of war avoidance
- Superseding communism by peaceful means
- Building a free and prosperous world

This curriculum looks very full, and it is. But actual instruction time can be cut down considerably through effective textbooks and a flow of case-study materials. Furthermore, students that are accepted by the Freedom Academy could be selected on the basis of achievements in a previous correspondence course.

After mastering the subject matter, the student could be assigned to the special study of problems that are of professional concern to him. For example, a newspaperman might analyze the contents of the paper with which he is connected and formulate an improvement plan. A businessman might analyze how his export trade is connected with the cold war, a priest might reread his sermons, and a Congressman might reevaluate his speeches and votes. All might want to contemplate how the flow of information through the country, the business world, the universities, the public opinion media, and the Government could be improved—we need a larger stream, and one that is less polluted.

Graduate, postgraduate, and refresher study should be tailored to meet the specific requirements of the individual. But provisions should be made to develop specialists in all the major topical areas.

Democracy, to paraphrase Walt Whitman, is not "only for elections, for politics, and for a party name." It is the system we are using to defend our-

selves and to enhance our liberties. It is the only system that is compatible with freedom. But democracy may fail in this country, as it has failed in other countries. All democracies that failed to defend themselves effectively—at least all the failures I had the misfortune to observe—confirmed the younger Pliny's remark: "As in men's bodies, so in government, that disease is most serious which proceeds from the head."

We cannot seriously assume that the institutions we possess to make freedom prevail over Communist dictatorship are perfect. If they were, how could freedom—since 1914, since 1939, since 1945, since 1959, since last month—have suffered so many setbacks? But if these institutions and the men behind them are not perfect, what do we do to improve them? Is it enough to sit "like patience on a monument, smiling at grief"? (Shakespeare)

The critics of the Freedom Academy have found many faults with the proposal, but they have suggested few ameliorations and even fewer alternatives. They have singled out a few technical details, as though it really mattered how precisely technicalities are handled. They have argued that we know enough about communism and its ways, but those who make this point, usually know very little about communism and its wiles.

Some have feared that the Academy could fall into the wrong hands. The Presidency also could fall into wrong hands, and so could every Cabinet post and every elected and appointed position. But we do not abolish our public offices, not only because we need them, but also because we are confident that we are able to handle and control the misuse and abuse of power. Surely, we are not always successful, but we are successful most of the time. *Le mieux est l'ennemi du bien*. The French poet Alfred de Musset was right when he said that the desire to possess perfection "is the most dangerous kind of madness."

The Freedom Academy is conceived as just *one* step toward the intellectual rearmament of our Republic, but it would be the first major step on a new road. "Long is the way and hard, that out of hell leads up to light." (Milton, *Paradise Lost*, Book II, 1.432)

THE HOOVER INSTITUTION ON WAR, REVOLUTION, AND PEACE,
Stanford University, Stanford, Calif., March 2, 1964.

The Hon. EDWIN E. WILLIS,
*Chairman, Committee on Un-American Activities,
U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR CHAIRMAN WILLIS: During my testimony, I stated that I do not think security clearances would be necessary for foreign students attending the Freedom Academy. You indicated disagreement with this point of view, but did not pursue the matter further.

I would like to explain my viewpoint. In suggesting that foreign students do not need security clearances, I based myself on the assumption that the Freedom Academy would consist of several subsidiary schools. One of these schools would teach the basic information on the conflict between democracy and dictatorship and offer courses which, though they would be streamlined and more complete and realistic than normal social science curricula in American colleges, nevertheless would be entirely unclassified and strictly "academic" in orientation. In other words, these courses would impart relevant knowledge that is publically available, except that this knowledge would be "packaged" differently.

It is my thought that these courses should be attended by a considerable number of foreigners, especially natives from countries where this sort of knowledge is not easily accessible and where, therefore, most people remain hazy about the most elementary facts and the important stakes of the cold war.

If we were to insist on security clearances for those people, we would have to spend considerable money on investigations and, in addition, be forced to establish an investigative corps of considerable size. I am doubtful that meaningful investigations can be conducted by Americans into the background of people hailing from Africa, Asia, or even Latin America. On the contrary, I would presume that some routine investigative techniques could be easily turned against us. Thus, even if we conducted a security investigation on a prospective student, we could or should not have too high a confidence in our findings.

Moreover, frequent investigations in foreign countries would lead to political trouble. Governments that do not like the Freedom Academy could easily disrupt the operation by refusing to allow the investigations.

I also would like to stress that a requirement for security investigations prior to the attendance of a nonoperational social science course might easily backfire politically, whereas lack of such a requirement could be used by ourselves to political advantage.

Furthermore, I am inclined to believe that political traditions in many countries are so different from our own that many security categories do not really apply. More specifically—and this is based on my personal experience overseas—I would expect that many prospective students have a “socialist” orientation. Quite a few of those people would not even know what “socialism” is, let alone “capitalism,” but in a number of cases these vague predispositions facilitate Communist recruiting. At the same time, it is precisely those individuals whom we should try to reorient. I for one would be quite willing to take the chance that a well-conceived teaching program would disabuse not only hazy self-styled “socialists,” as you meet them all over Africa, but also convinced Communists.

Naturally, the Academy’s program cannot be successful in every single case, but we certainly should not deprive ourselves of the opportunity to convince a substantial number of foreigners who, prior to attending the Academy, may be inclined to embrace ideologies that are hostile to freedom.

Under the circumstances, I think the money earmarked for investigations would be spent better by either increasing the number of students or improving the facilities of the Academy.

Within this general philosophy, I would like to state the following exceptions and specific points:

1. I do not believe that we should concentrate on the socialist or semi-socialist groups. On the contrary, I believe that we should open the Academy to students of *all* political orientations. But I do want to stress that we must not exclude prospective students from the left.

2. Should a few hard-boiled Communists appear among the student group, and should they, in addition to making trouble, be utterly resistant to absorbing new knowledge, the Academy in cooperation with our security agencies would be free to repatriate such disturbing individuals.

3. No student who has not been cleared by security would attend courses dealing with operational matters.

4. Attendance at the basic courses and class participation would provide information that could not be secured through investigations in a foreign country.

5. Only U.S. and select NATO students would be given access to classified information; in conformity with existing regulations that control such access.

In closing, I would like to suggest that consideration be given to the establishment, within the Freedom Academy, of a special course for Russian exiles and exiles from other Communist countries.

Very sincerely yours,

(S) Stefan T. Possony.
STEFAN T. POSSONY.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clausen, our colleague from California, is here and I wonder if he would like to make a short statement or insert something in the record.

STATEMENT OF HON. DON H. CLAUSEN, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA

Mr. CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have been listening with great interest, of course, during this hearing, and actually I have spent a number of hours with Mr. Grant. I simply wanted to endorse very vigorously all of the comments that he has made.

I would further like to have, possibly, another opportunity to come back and appear as a witness, and testify before the committee.

At this particular time I would like to request permission to insert in the record some of my remarks that were made during the debate

on the Peace Corps, and I would like to have them inserted in the record at this particular time.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be done.
(Mr. Clausen's remarks follow :)

[From the Congressional Record, Nov. 13, 1963]

Mr. DON H. CLAUSEN. Mr. Chairman, the subject of the Peace Corps is receiving much attention here today as it has since its inception. The primary reasons for its acceptance, in my opinion, are twofold. First, the American people have recognized the failure of other types of foreign aid programs which have created a damaging image of America and are looking for a program that will have a longer range, more productive effect. Second, our people are beginning to realize the urgency of establishing a program that will initiate an ideological offensive of our own—an offensive designed to set the stage for winning the cold war against the U.S.S.R. and other advocates of the Communist doctrine.

There are, however, a few observations that I would like to make. Since 1955, I have participated in a program that provides various missionary services throughout the world—a program designed to promote self-sufficiency. This program is carried on with no tax support from the Federal Government. It has been our experience, throughout the years, once a mission station is established and the native staffing is completed—the service continues to expand but the financial requirements of the sponsoring organization tend to decrease. In effect, the mission programs carried on by many denominations can be appropriately identified as private peace corps.

Where I strongly believe in the principle of the Peace Corps, I feel it is pertinent to point out that the requests for additional funds here today suggest an increasing financial commitment to the sponsor—the U.S. Government—the American taxpayer. With this in mind, I believe we should give more incentive and recognition to the efforts of organizations willing to carry out and expand the private peace corps concept—it would appear to be more efficient and truly provide the motivation for people best equipped to carry on the presentation of the American image.

The great struggle between ideologies continues on and will be with us for years to come. The ideological offensive of the Soviet Union advocates a program where the public sector—I repeat, the public sector—provides all services to their population, directs their destinies, and controls their opportunities. The American way of life is just the opposite—at least, it has been in the past—bringing this country to its present plateau, where we enjoy the highest standard of living. The American way of life advocates a minimal intervention in the life of the individual by Government. Our federal system of government was designed to provide the guidelines, under constitutional law and to create the environment for the private sector to advance and flourish, with a minimum of restrictions.

Quite frankly, I do not believe the full potential of our Peace Corps effort will be realized until the Committee on Foreign Affairs reconsiders the underlying philosophy of the program. Our philosophy should be reflected in all of our foreign aid programs—more emphasis in the private sector and less emphasis in the public sector. Let me make myself perfectly clear. I am for the Peace Corps concept—and will continue to support the cause. However, it will be my intent to do everything within my power to promote the philosophy that reflects the American system. In addition to current programs, I want to vigorously recommend that the leaders of our private enterprise system recognize a new responsibility of providing for our security. They must take the lead in projecting an ideological offensive truly representative of our private enterprise system—it is they who are the most qualified to lead. The Congress might consider broadening tax incentives to expedite the formation of such a program. Further, the creation of a Freedom Academy, sponsored by our private sector, staffed by qualified graduates of our private enterprise system is, in my judgment, the type of program we should advocate as the answer to the Soviet ideological offensive. A defensive posture, by itself, is no longer adequate to provide for our security in these rapidly changing times. The American people can be proud of their accomplishments thus far in history—let us show the developing nations throughout the world the American way—a program that positively reflects the American image—peace, security, and freedom with justice, under law.

Mr. CLAUSEN. And in passing, Mr. Chairman, I certainly want to urge the committee to give very serious consideration to what is being presented to you, because I am personally of the conviction that we must come forth with something that relates to the Freedom Academy concept in order to combat the ideological offensive of the Soviet Union, and I am very pleased with the manner in which you are hearing these various witnesses, who I think are probably among the most sincere and most dedicated Americans that we have. I thank you for participating now, and I would like the opportunity of coming back and testifying later on, if I may.

The CHAIRMAN. We will be delighted.

The committee will stand in recess until 9:30 tomorrow morning. (Whereupon, at 4:40 p.m., Tuesday, February 18, 1964, the committee recessed, to reconvene at 9:30 a.m., Wednesday, February 19, 1964.)

HEARINGS RELATING TO H.R. 352, H.R. 1617, H.R. 5368, H.R. 8320, H.R. 8757, H.R. 10036, H.R. 10037, H.R. 10077, AND H.R. 11718, PROVIDING FOR CREATION OF A FREEDOM COMMISSION AND FREEDOM ACADEMY

Part 1

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 1964

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D.C.

PUBLIC HEARINGS

The Committee on Un-American Activities met, pursuant to recess, at 9:55 a.m. in Room 356, Cannon House Office Building, Washington, D.C., Hon. Edwin E. Willis (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Edwin E. Willis, of Louisiana; William M. Tuck, of Virginia; Joe R. Pool, of Texas; Richard Ichord, of Missouri; August E. Johansen, of Michigan; Henry C. Schadeberg, of Wisconsin; and John M. Ashbrook, of Ohio.

Staff members present: Francis J. McNamara, director; Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., general counsel; and Alfred M. Nittle, counsel.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will please come to order.

We were scheduled to hear from an author of a Freedom Academy bill, Congressman Hale Boggs, but since he is not here yet, if agreeable, I will ask Mr. Mayers to take the stand, with the understanding, Mr. Mayers, that when Mr. Boggs comes he will take the stand. I understand it will not be long, after which you may resume.

Mr. MAYERS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We are glad to have you, sir. Will you start out by giving a thumbnail sketch of your background for the record?

STATEMENT OF HENRY MAYERS

Mr. MAYERS. Yes. I have been engaged in the operation of an advertising agency, and have a number of other businesses in Los Angeles, since 1915. In the last several years I have been a member of the U.S. Information Agency's Executive Reserve.

(At this point Mr. Johansen entered the hearing room.)

Mr. MAYERS. This has given me a pretty good insight into what goes on in the field of information and propaganda. After writing on this subject for some advertising publications, I got enough response from the people in the fields of public relations and broadcasting and communications, generally, to feel that there was possibly a place for an

organization of people in those fields who are concerned, as I am, about the inadequacies of the "political communications" between the United States and the rest of the world.

I might say that I have traveled on every continent and visited about 18 USIS posts and discussed with the very dedicated men in these posts the problems that they meet in getting over the American story. The Cold War Council was formed for the purpose of recruiting the support of other people in the communications professions in bringing the propaganda problem to the attention of Government. We are not trying to tell the Government how to run the propaganda operation, but we want to call attention to the inadequacies of present results and some of the reasons for it. That is the pertinent aspect of my background. I have appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and another congressional committee in behalf of the Cold War Council. I am here today because the council is concerned with this U.S. neglect of propaganda and political warfare in the confrontation between free nations and global communism.

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask you this question? I believe you mentioned that you are a member of the U.S. Information Agency's Executive Reserve.

Mr. MAYERS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What is that organization?

Mr. MAYERS. A part of the civil defense setup which was established several years ago. The USIA Executive Reserve consisted of about 50 men around the country, many of them newspaper editors or heads of broadcasting companies. Some of them are in universities. Theoretically they were supposed to be in a position to take over the executive handling of the Information Agency should anything happen to it in Washington, D.C.

We had a secret place to go to, as part of the civil defense plan. It never involved anything more than an occasional briefing. We would come to Washington and hear the problems of the Agency. We would get practically all the literature that Agency produced, and it was a good source of information for me. I do not think we contributed very much, except an occasional letter of comment about what they were doing.

In my case, it was mostly critical comment.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that did put you in a position of receiving reports from USIA about its general operations?

Mr. MAYERS. Yes; I would get about three pieces of mail a week, anything from press releases to booklets, and so on, and I would write and get specific information that I wanted, very often.

Now, we feel that U.S. neglect of political and propaganda warfare is directly related to today's problems in Cuba, in Panama, in Southeast Asia, Zanzibar, and Cyprus, in fact, wherever the United States is on the defensive with people of other nations. We believe that the Freedom Academy concept is at least a partial answer to such problems.

HOPEFUL SIGN

The Cold War Council is in touch with specialists in geopolitics, in propaganda, and other aspects of nonmilitary warfare, who are working on strategic studies in this field in various parts of the United States and throughout the free world. All such authorities more or less agree that there is an urgent need for what might be called greater professionalism in official U.S. efforts at political communication with the people in other parts of the world.

These cold war specialists view the Freedom Commission or Freedom Academy legislation before this committee as a step toward such greater professionalism. They consider a congressional hearing like this as a hopeful sign that the U.S. is at last awakening to the essentially political nature of the cold war.

An important and vital aspect of the Freedom Academy legislation before this committee is the broad scope of persons who would receive cold war training. It is to be given not only to Foreign Service personnel of the United States Government and some private citizens, but also to Government personnel and citizens of other free world nations. The latter need better understanding of how to defend freedom from Communist subversion at least as urgently as Government employees and private citizens of the United States.

The cold war is not merely a confrontation between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. as the Soviet propagandists would like the world to believe. It is a war between communism and every nation outside the Red bloc. And it is a war that must be fought by citizens of all nations of the free world who want to stay free.

POLITICAL WARFARE

It is above all a political war. Although the battlefronts of the cold war include the arms race and the competition in space and in trade and in other areas, the political battlefronts are the most serious. They are the ones on which the Communists pin their greatest hopes of victory. They are the fronts on which they are the strongest and we are the weakest.

The United States Government, in its efforts to stem the Communist tide, has poured out billions of dollars annually in military aid, in economic aid, and in technical aid to foreign nations. Yet what many of these nations need most of all is political aid—political aid of the kind that could be made available to the present and future leaders of those nations through a U.S.-sponsored Freedom Academy.

A Freedom Academy could train such native leaders in techniques for counteracting the propaganda of the Communists in their midst. It could show them how to conduct positive propaganda in behalf of legitimate progressive government, freedom of thought, and other basics of the free society, as opposed to the totalitarian state.

COSTA RICAN EXAMPLE

The concept of a free world political academy has already been tested. In 1958 the former President of Costa Rica, Jose Figueres, established there an Institute of Political Education. It attracted students from all other Latin American nations and trained them,

according to its literature, "for political action through instruction in strategy and tactics to attain and maintain power for the purpose of defending and developing democracy."

The Costa Rican undertaking has received praise and congratulations from many prominent U.S. officials. But it has received not one penny of support from the U.S. Government. After a few years of operation, it had to close its doors for lack of funds. The Costa Rican institute was never more than a successful test-tube demonstration of what could and should be done on a significant scale by a U.S.-sponsored free world Freedom Academy.

A GLOBAL APPROACH

How would the Freedom Commission, established under the proposed legislation, go about developing the research program, the curriculum, and the faculty necessary for the operation of an effective Freedom Academy? One source of guidance would be found in the large number of American specialists in propaganda and political warfare working today in leading educational institutions that maintain centers for strategic studies in nonmilitary warfare. These include universities such as Columbia, Georgetown, Johns Hopkins, Pennsylvania, Notre Dame, Stanford, and U.S.C.

In addition, a U.S.-sponsored free world Freedom Academy would attract the support and cooperation of outstanding anti-Communist political leaders in other nations. It would be hailed by men who have proved, in their own practical political experience, that they know how to meet and defeat Communist machinations in their own countries. Dr. Figueres of Costa Rica is but one of them. Romulo Betancourt of Venezuela is another Latin American example. In Asia there is the Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew who fought the Communists politically for 10 years and successfully prevented a takeover in Singapore and the Malaya peninsula.

A great potential cooperator in a Freedom Academy would be George Papandreou, former Prime Minister of Greece. Through his sheer political skill, he saved his country from an attempted takeover by armed Greek Communist partisans after the Nazis fled. Willy Brandt of Berlin is another European figure who could contribute much to the Academy.

In the Near East there is Charles Malik of Lebanon, one of the free world's most articulate and inspirational spokesmen in behalf of Western political ideals. Those ideals are also forcefully expounded by Spain's great political writer and former diplomat, Salvador de Madariaga. He could have tremendous influence on Latin American political trainees at a U.S.-sponsored Freedom Academy.

The CHAIRMAN. In what way could the gentlemen you have referred to make a contribution to the Academy?

Mr. MAYERS. The first requirement of the Freedom Commission is that they engage in research as to how to build a curriculum, what they are to teach in the Academy; and these men, I believe, would be, first of all, great consultants on that subject. They could help determine what should be taught and how it should be taught.

I believe, in addition, that they would be glad to come as visiting lecturers. Dr. Figueres has been in Cambridge, just up until recently,

at the School of Politics there. Mr. Papandreu of Greece, of course, could not come now, having just been elected Prime Minister again. When I met with him a couple of years ago, he told me that he would love to come to America. He was never paid any attention by our Government since he was no longer the Prime Minister, yet he told me he had received five invitations from Khrushchev to come to Moscow. Of course he was not interested. Even though he is the most hated man by the Communists because he prevented Greece from going behind the Iron Curtain, Khrushchev's invitation shows what political realists the Communists are, and how unrealistic we have been in Greece.

The CHAIRMAN. You said a while ago that some prominent U.S. officials, as I recall, had praised the work of the Costa Rican Institute of Political Education. Who are some of those?

Mr. MAYERS. I have a list. I have the literature of the institute here.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, just name a few.

Mr. MAYERS. A most interesting aspect of the list was its bipartisan-ship. I remember John F. Kennedy, Nelson Rockefeller, Mr. Keating, Mr. Schlesinger, a remarkably bipartisan political list. They all sent telegrams to the Costa Rican school after it graduated its first class, telegrams of congratulations.

The CHAIRMAN. How was the institute financed?

Mr. MAYERS. It was financed largely by a labor group in the United States, which in turn, I believe, was financed by a foundation, but it was inadequately financed.

They never graduated more than 50 students, as I recall, in one session.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Do you recall what the labor group was?

Mr. MAYERS. I have a record of it. I can get it for the record.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Would you supply that?

Mr. MAYERS. Yes; I can supply it for the record.¹

Mr. JOHANSEN. Could you recall, or could you supply the name of the foundation?

Mr. MAYERS. I believe it was called the Kaplan Foundation. I think there was more than one foundation involved, but I remember that name.

Mr. JOHANSEN. May I, Mr. Chairman, just ask one or two questions at this juncture?

Unfortunately, I was not able to be with you yesterday, and this point may already have been raised. Am I correct in the impression that establishment of this type of Freedom Academy or Commission presupposes the fact that communism is an internal threat within the United States as well as it is in other free countries?

Mr. MAYERS. The instruction that would be given under the law would certainly include very extensive opportunity for instruction to citizens of the United States which would be applicable to the internal threat. But, by and large, the Freedom Commission concept is to train our overseas personnel, plus people who might be operating in the private sector, and Government employees and private-sector

¹ Mr. Mayers subsequently informed the committee that the labor group in question was the Institute of International Labor Research, Inc.

people of other nations. This recognizes the global threat and is not limited to the domestic threat.

Mr. JOHANSEN. But not excluding the domestic threat.

Mr. MAYERS. Oh, no, by no means. There is a provision in the bill for the publication of textbooks and preparation of motion picture films and other educational material purely for use within the United States. There is a great dearth of responsible official information about the Communist menace, and this material would be a contributor toward that end.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Now, that leads me to the second question. Then I will not interrupt further at this juncture. The makeup of the Commission and the makeup of the faculty or personnel responsible for the execution of this program would pretty well determine the effectiveness and the success of this operation, would it not?

Mr. MAYERS. Yes.

Mr. JOHANSEN. And in some measure, at least, the makeup of this Commission and of the personnel would be governed by the premises of those making the appointments, both of the Commission itself and those appointments made by the Commission, so that the thing that happens—let me just lay it right out on the table—we hear a great deal of criticism of the State Department, for example, in certain areas, alleged softness in some of the middle echelons, softness apropos of Communists. What are the safeguards in the setup of this Commission and of the operating personnel against that type of weakness or fault?

Mr. MAYERS. I would say there are four distinct safeguards. The first, and most important one, is that all of these bills remove from the State Department the kind of jurisdiction that you are concerned with. The Freedom Commission would be a bipartisan, independently appointed agency. While it would cooperate with the State Department and the CIA and the Defense and other departments, it would not be under the domination of the State Department.

Now, on the question of bipartisan appointments, as you know, the President makes the appointments and the Senate approves.

I have had considerable contact with many of the 13 Senators who sponsor S. 414, which is the corresponding legislation. I have discussed this with them and I believe it must be assumed that the President would not make appointments which would, in a sense, antagonize those Senators by defeating the purposes for which they have worked so hard to get this bill passed. They would certainly have good recommendations for the appointments and they would definitely resist approval by the Senate of anybody who was questionable on the subject that you suggested, of softness towards communism. Hardness towards communism is the number one essential.

Mr. JOHANSEN. The mention, and I do not want to single him out particularly, of Mr. Schlesinger caused me some concern because I am not sure just how soon he would think the Commission would start engaging in McCarthyism.

Mr. MAYERS. He probably just thought it was politic to add his name to a list of people who were congratulating the Costa Rica school. Maybe he did not know what it was. It so happened that I once had quite a discussion of the Freedom Academy idea with Mr. Schlesinger. He does not seem to understand the bill. On the record of that

conversation, which was reported in newspapers throughout the country, Mr. Schlesinger clearly disqualified himself as a possible member of the proposed Freedom Commission.

Mr. TUCK. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Boggs has arrived.

Mr. MAYERS. Shall I withdraw for the moment?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir. [To Mr. Boggs.] We will be glad to hear you. We know you are not going to be long and it was the understanding when we put Mr. Mayers on the stand.

STATEMENT OF HON. HALE BOGGS, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM LOUISIANA

Mr. BOGGS. Mr. Chairman, I shall only take a minute. I appreciate the opportunity of appearing before your distinguished committee. I would have been here yesterday, but we are in the middle of the tax conference, as you know.

Mr. TUCK. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say we are greatly honored to have such a distinguished gentleman from Louisiana and a leader of the House to appear before our committee.

Mr. BOGGS. Thank you very much.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Mr. Chairman, I want to set the bipartisan tone here by saying that I associate myself with the Governor in those sentiments.

Mr. BOGGS. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. You gentlemen have relieved me of the need of complimenting my good colleague from Louisiana.

Mr. BOGGS. I must say, thank all of you.

I am very happy to appear in behalf of this legislation. As you gentlemen know, I am one of the cosponsors of the bill pending before you. My dear friend and colleague, Congressman Herlong, if I remember correctly, was the first person to sponsor this idea.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I would just like to make a few observations on why I think this legislation would serve a most salutary purpose in the world as it now exists.

I think that we have been very fortunate in arming our country to such a point that our offensive superiority over the Communist world is so great that it makes the prospect of nuclear war somewhat remote, at least at this time.

And I think as long as we maintain that superiority—and it exists, if my information is correct, in almost every field: in the field of manned aircraft; in the field of nuclear-powered, missile-equipped submarines; in the field of missiles, both short range, intermediate range, and intercontinental range; in the field of economics and technology, particularly in the field of agricultural production, and so on.

As a matter of fact, probably the greatest confrontation in history occurred a year or so ago over the missile installations in Cuba—so I think that as long as the American people are willing to continue to make the tremendous sacrifices required—we will be considering this week the authorization for the Armed Forces of the United States, where we will continue to spend \$50 billion a year on armament alone. I think what this points up in many ways is that the doctrinaires in the Kremlin, in Cuba, in China, and elsewhere are convinced that if they are to succeed, it is in the field of ideology. We have seen a great deal of this. I think there has been more of it than has come to the public attention, particularly in Latin America.

The threat of Castro is a double threat, in that Cuba is today being used as a base for the training of Communists or subversives who infiltrate the Latin American nations. We have seen a demonstration of that in recent weeks in Panama. Prior thereto, the situation in Venezuela was very acute, as you gentlemen know.

There are other dangerous spots in Latin America, in countries as large as Brazil, for instance. In this, the biggest nation in this hemisphere, there has been an infiltration of Castro agents.

(At this point Mr. Pool entered the hearing room.)

Mr. Boggs. Now, it is incumbent upon us to counteract this type of thing. It is just as important that we do this as that we win the military battle, because we could win militarily and lose in other ways, as you gentlemen well know.

I have always said that the greatest revolution in the history of mankind was the American Revolution, because the American Revolution actually freed people. It made it possible for men and women to utilize their abilities in a free society. Until the American Revolution and the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights, all of which followed therefrom, mankind had really never lived in that kind of free society.

And this is still the most revolutionary society on the earth. It is fantastic to me that it is possible to export the autocratic, dictatorial, repressive society which is called communism as an appeal to idealism and not to be able to explain the American ideal and the tremendous impact of the American free system to the rest of mankind.

Now, there is a great yearning on the part of people throughout the world to know something about what our system is all about. I think one of the reasons the Peace Corps has been such a remarkable success is because it has demonstrated the basic idealism of Americans. We have had these young people—and some of them have not been so young, I have had some middle-aged and even some old people come to me and interest themselves in that operation—but we have had those people dedicating themselves principally to what we call the genuine American ideal.

So, Mr. Chairman, as I see it, what this legislation would—and as all of you know, it has strong bipartisan support in this body and in the other body as well—it would provide the opportunity for us to channel these abilities that are innate in our society to fighting the greatest threat that mankind has ever faced.

Now, in saying this, I do not want to derogate anyone. I think that the work done by our security agencies, the FBI particularly, on the domestic scene, the CIA elsewhere in the world, is by and large the highest type of activity on earth. But what is proposed here is something else. This is not intelligence work. It is not checking on subversives—all of which is vital and important to the security of this country and the security of free men everywhere. This is the use affirmatively of the great reservoir of talent that we have in the United States to show what the free system and what a free society can do. I have no preconceived notions of how this Academy should be set up, but I would expect it to bring to its cause the best educated, the most talented people in our country.

The CHAIRMAN. I might mention that, yesterday, your friend and mine, Congressman Herlong of Florida, made a splendid presentation

and said that perhaps it was a good thing we have not moved too fast in this area because your and Congressman Taft's bill are currently, in his opinion, the two superior bills because they have been brought up to date on the basis of Senate hearings, and so on.

Mr. Boggs. Well, I appreciate Congressman Herlong's saying that, but I would certainly want to amend his statement by saying that, had it not been for his initial action in this field and his willingness to spend a great deal of time, maybe the effort would not have been possible at all.

The CHAIRMAN. I know; I know you feel that way.

Number two, your development of the idea of our superiority in the military field, as compared to the ideological field, is a thought that permeated the record yesterday.

Finally, you referred to the Peace Corps. Some witness yesterday mentioned that one of the reasons—perhaps he said the major reason—for the success of the Peace Corps was the insistence that it would not be under the “complete domination” of the State Department. It was a new effort, a new approach, and for freedom of action, more freedom of action by that agency, independence was needed. That is an argument for this Freedom Academy being an independent agency, though of course with the provisions in the bill, with full contemplation, that all agencies will have advisory capacities in the operation of this contemplated institution.

We appreciate your appearing.

Mr. TUCK. I have no questions. Thank you very much.

Mr. POOL. Mr. Chairman, I want to also compliment the gentleman and also tell you that I brought a bunch of your neighbors in here a while ago from east Texas, in Dallas.

Mr. Boggs. Well, good.

Mr. POOL. Mr. Boggs is the majority whip of the House and he joins us in Louisiana, so I am especially glad that they were here today to attend this session.

Mr. Boggs. Well, all I can say, Congressman, is that I hope that they appreciate you as much as I do, and that's a lot.

Thank you, gentlemen, very much. Thank you. I would like to leave this statement for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be incorporated in the record at this point. (Congressman Boggs' prepared statement follows:)

STATEMENT OF HON. HALE BOGGS, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM LOUISIANA

It is indeed a pleasure for me to have the opportunity today to testify before this distinguished committee, which is so ably chaired by my good friend and colleague from Louisiana, Edwin Willis.

Today I am happy to speak on behalf of my bill, H.R. 5368, and its companion measures sponsored by my colleagues in the House and the Senate, which call for the establishment of a Freedom Academy and a Freedom Commission, as a separate agency of our Government.

However, before I begin my comments on this proposed legislation, I would like to pay tribute to my colleagues in the House, the Honorable A. Sydney Herlong, Jr., of Florida, and the Honorable Richard Schweiker, of Pennsylvania, for being the pioneer sponsors of this bill to establish a new arm for our Government's anti-Communist offensive—that is, a Freedom Academy to train Government personnel, American citizens from all segments of our society, and young, educated citizens from other nations throughout the free world.

I am particularly gratified that Mr. Herlong told this committee yesterday that he is pleased with the newest version of this bill, as sponsored by a bipar-

tisan group of 13 Senators and by myself and Congressman Robert Taft, of Ohio. Because Congressman Herlong was a pioneer in sponsoring this proposed legislation, I am particularly flattered about his announcement that he will support my bill and those companion measures before the House and the Senate.

My opening remarks would not be complete without my paying tribute to Mr. Alan G. Grant, Jr., of Orlando, Fla., for his tireless and diligent efforts for more than a decade to realize the establishment of a Freedom Academy as a separate agency of our Government. As you know, Mr. Grant was a charter member of the dedicated Orlando Committee for a Freedom Academy, and he and his coworkers are deserving of great praise for their work on behalf of our country.

I know that a great deal already has been said on the need for establishing a special training center or academy to counter Communist nonmilitary tactics around the world. Facts have been cited by Mr. Grant and other private citizen specialists on the thousands of Russians and citizens of other Communist countries who have been trained in all manner of nonmilitary conflict techniques in a host of Soviet schools, both military and nonmilitary. Mr. Grant and other specialists in this field—in testimony before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee in 1959, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1963, and now this week before this committee of the House—have pointed out that the Soviet Union is operating an estimated 6,000 special schools to train Russian Communist Party members and Communist agents from the bloc countries and other nations of the world in the tactics of agitation, infiltration, propaganda, subversion, sabotage, and other nefarious techniques. It also has been estimated that the Soviet Government is spending something like \$5 billion a year to provide this highly specialized training to their agents and to those of Communist nations around the world. These agents from other countries then return to all parts of the world and begin fomenting revolution, either in their own countries or in neighboring ones. Particularly are the uncommitted, emerging nations ripe for overthrow of their infant governments and Communist takeover.

Mr. Grant, Congressman Herlong, and others also have pointed up the United States apparent lack of any central training center or academy specifically designed for the purpose of conducting research and the training of our public and private citizens, as well as citizens of other countries of the free world, in all kinds of political, nonmilitary techniques which can be used to counter the Soviet and Red Chinese propaganda offensive. Not only do we not have an agency designed for this specific purpose, but also we do not have, in any of the existing departments or agencies of our Government, an extensive course in nonmilitary counteroffensive techniques for our Government personnel alone!

Of primary concern to all Americans is the existence of a Communist-controlled country just 90 miles from the coast of Florida—Cuba. In testimony last year before the Inter-American Affairs Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Mr. John McCone, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, noted that some 1,500 agents from other Latin American nations went to Cuba “to receive,” as he put it, “ideological indoctrination or guerrilla warfare training, or both.” Mr. McCone said that many more such agents probably would get into Cuba in 1963, despite the curtailed facilities for reaching Castro’s island.

In the years which have passed since the Korean war began, if we were never before concerned about the need for training our own people in the necessary political warfare tactics to counter the Communist offensive, we should well be concerned now! At the edge of our shores is a Communist-held training base, now teaching agents from throughout Latin America how best to export violent or nonviolent revolutions into their own countries—some of which are ripe for Communist takeover. If we did not think previously that the establishment of a Freedom Academy was necessary, surely we should do so now.

Mr. Chairman, in thinking on the need for this legislation, I was reminded of our late President’s magnificent words in his historic inaugural address: “And so, my fellow Americans: Ask not what your country can do for you—ask what you can do for your country.”

These words came to mind because, to me, they emphasize the unique advantage that this proposed Freedom Academy would have over any existing governmental training schools. What I am saying is that this Academy would provide specialized training not only to our Government personnel, but also, more importantly, to our private citizens from all segments of our society and to citizens from nations throughout the free world. Students at the Freedom Academy would be trained not only to defeat Communist offensives of all kinds, but also

to replace their tactics with positive substitutes designed to obtain our own political objectives and to establish free societies wherever possible.

To my mind, the establishment of a Freedom Academy provides our people with an imaginative avenue in which to answer our late President's call to service. One of President Kennedy's greatest contributions in his all-too-short term was his sincere effort to make the American people aware of the complexity of the many problems which face our country, both at home and abroad, and to show us that the solutions to these problems are not to be found in simple, "pat" answers. In looking at this proposal to create a Freedom Academy, one of its most important assets is its recognition of the need to make the American people more aware of the dangers of communism—to give us a greater understanding of the goals and the modus operandi of communism, so that we can be fully prepared to meet their challenge. Further, the Freedom Academy would utilize the much neglected private sector of our country's extensive human resources. Like the \$11.6 billion tax cut bill, which soon will become law, this bill provides a fine way to engage actively the private citizens of our country in direct participation against the worldwide Communist conspiracy. In the private segment of American society, there is a large reservoir of unused talent, ingenuity, and wisdom which can and should be harnessed for active service in the continuing cold war.

A prime example of making productive use of private citizens in the ideological and psychological struggle against communism is to be found in active operation today in my home city of New Orleans, La. I speak of the Information Council of the Americas, directed by Mr. Edward S. Butler III of New Orleans. Dr. Alton Ochsner, a world-famous surgeon from my home city, is doing a fine job as president of this information council.

Under the leadership of Mr. Butler as executive director, INCA was established in New Orleans in early 1961, with the aid and support of some of the city's leading citizens, including Mayor Victor H. Schiro. Since then, INCA has waged an incessant campaign of anti-Communist and prodemocratic information to the peoples of Latin America through all types of communications media—radio, television, newspapers, magazines, speeches, leaflets, and so on.

Particularly have INCA's "Truth Tapes" radio programs been effectively directed to the peoples of Latin America. Today members of INCA include businessmen, professional men, educators, farm leaders, journalists, and others from 17 different States in our country. These citizens have provided solid support for the "Truth Tapes" programs, which feature Cuban refugees who have escaped from the oppression of Castro's dictatorship. These Americans present in these broadcasts proof of the lies to be found in Communist propaganda and in Communist actions.

After 3 years of intensive effort, INCA now sends regularly its "Truth Tapes" programs to 129 radio stations in 16 different Latin American countries. Mr. Butler has told me that a total of 17 stations in Venezuela used these "Truth Tapes" prior to the recent general election as a means to help counteract the agitation of Communist agents, who were trying to terrorize the people and keep them from the polls. These tapes were played over and over again, on and before election day, and the Venezuelan broadcasters told Mr. Butler that they were most effective in countering the terrorist tactics of the Communist agents. As you know, about 97 percent of the electorate voted in that election, despite the attempts to frighten them by Communist agents.

In his work, Mr. Butler has utilized the services and talents of journalists, entertainers, engineers, technicians, and others in INCA's efforts against the spread of communism in Latin America. He has received cooperation and support from both the governmental and private sectors of our society, and he has proved the validity of using the energy and talents of private citizens of our country to combat communism.

At this point, I would say that INCA and Mr. Edward Butler and his staff are doing a fine job—but the task in Latin America alone is herculean, and INCA and other similar such organizations cannot do it alone. They need the assistance and the direction for a broader, nationwide, anti-Communist training program to come from the National Government—to come from the Congress and the Executive, but, at the same time, to be established on the basis of utilizing to the fullest possible extent the wealth of human resources from all segments of American society.

When I say such organizations as INCA cannot do this massive job alone, I have only to point out that today there are in Latin America an estimated

285,000 to 300,000 members of the Communist Party—most of them trained in all manner of nonmilitary and military conflict techniques, then sent back to their own countries to foment revolution.

Against this formidable array, our own United States Information Agency has less than 1,000 officers and staffers in all of Latin America!

I would sum up by stating that the establishment of a Freedom Academy as proposed in my bill provides a splendid avenue for Americans from all walks of life to join directly in the cold war battle with vigor and imagination. It provides our countrymen with the direct opportunity to answer this call to service enunciated so well by President Kennedy. It will give them a constructive and positive way to do—to act—in the service of our country and of free men everywhere.

It is true that we have signed a nuclear test ban treaty with the Soviet Union, but this treaty should not lull us into any false sense of security or into a sense of maintaining the "status quo." The leaders in the Kremlin know full well the devastating power of destruction locked in the nuclear weapons which we and they have for instantaneous use. But these men are still bent on world domination, and they can be expected to increase their political warfare around the world. The test ban treaty by no means will lessen the Communist offensive in the cold war. On the contrary, I believe their tactics of agitation, subversion, propaganda, espionage, and others will be stepped up.

Thus, the United States should expect and prepare for an intensified drive of total political warfare by the Communist movement. What is needed in our country to counteract and drive back this Communist offensive, and also foster the establishment of democratic societies, is a *totality of effort* by our National Government, with the aid of private citizens, as well as Government personnel, from all segments of our society. The Freedom Academy will provide the best avenue, the best means, to engender this *totality of effort* against communism—a *totality of effort* by citizens from both the public and private sectors of American society.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Mr. Mayers, will you resume the stand?

STATEMENT OF HENRY MAYERS—Resumed

Mr. MAYERS. During the rest I had, I found that information you requested concerning the Costa Rican school. It was underwritten by the American Institute for Free Labor Development. Some of the other people, or the many who congratulated are: Mr. J. W. Fulbright, Mr. George Meany, Mr. C. D. Jackson of *Life* and *Time*, Mr. Jacob Javits, Mr. Clifford P. Case, and Mr. Wayne Morse.

Mr. Johansen, I said there were four safeguards of the kind which you have wisely inquired about. I mentioned, first, the fact that the Commission would not be under the State Department domination; second, the fact that the appointments have to be bipartisan and approved by the Senate; and, third, that the Senators who sponsor the bill—and there are 13 of them—would vigorously resist any questionable appointment.

A fourth point I would like to make is that since the Cold War Council has spent so much time on the Freedom Academy bill, some people ask us, "What are you going to do when it's passed?" We are going to be a citizens' organization that sees that the Commission carries out the real intent and purpose of the writers of the bill and that it is not subverted by weak appointments or weak administration, once the bill is on the books.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, too, you might add two more safeguards. One is that it will have to meet the Appropriations Committee every year.

Mr. MAYERS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And, two, under the bill, annual reports will have to be made to the President and to the Congress.

Mr. MAYERS. Thank you.

Now, I mentioned possible foreign consultants to the Commission only to emphasize that this is a *world challenge*. We are the presumed leaders of the free world. These men could help shape the Freedom Academy to make it the nucleus of a free world "popular front" against the global Red peril. From personal and correspondence contact with several of the world political figures that I have mentioned, I have learned that even men with strong differences on domestic issues will join hands in a united free world effort to defeat the common political enemy—communism.

I mentioned Mr. Papandreou in Greece. I also met there Mr. Spyros Markezini, who is his diametric opposite, politically. Both men told me the same thing. When I told them about the bipartisan ideals of the Cold War Council they said, "That is the only answer: a *united front*. No matter what our domestic differences, we will unite against Communists."

Such men are deeply concerned over global communism's capacity for nonmilitary warfare, a capacity that has spread Marxist control over almost a third of the earth's area. They find little comfort in the fact that some of the native Communist cadres seeking to expand that area are guided and financed by Moscow, while others get their instructions and inspiration from Peking. The split in the bloc does not reduce its overall political threat to every free nation.

How does our Government face up to the awesome nonmilitary challenge of global communism? Our major nonmilitary opposition in the area of political and propaganda warfare is through the USIA, an agency whose strategy has not changed since it was established in 1948—*before even China went Communist!*

The CHAIRMAN. How do you support that statement?

Mr. MAYERS. Well, I have studied Public Law 402, which is the original law establishing the USIA. It was later amended to take it out of the State Department and make it an independent agency. I have checked all of the several subsequent Executive orders to the Information Agency. The fact is, Mr. Chairman, that the law instructs the Agency to promulgate United States foreign policy and the American way of life to other countries. That is not political warfare, as I think I can develop later.

There has been no change in that basic directive to the USIA. The Agency still operates under Public Law 402.

THE MADE-IN-U.S. HANDICAP

I have mentioned that I have visited USIS posts around the world and on these travels have tried to learn why our Information Agency's conscientious efforts to communicate our political ideology and to expose the deceptions and the fallacies of Marxist ideology have had so little political impact in the target countries. I discovered that our ideological propaganda is often misunderstood or distrusted merely because it is disseminated under a made-in-the-U.S.A. label.

It is poor psychology to try to sell such ideas as democracy, freedom of thought, the dignity of man, the necessity of a middle class,

etc., as though these were U.S. inventions or U.S. monopolies. It is even more unwise to attempt to expose Marxist fallacies and Communist crimes through American spokesmen, or even through natives who are employees of the U.S.A.

(At this point Mr. Johansen left the hearing room.)

Mr. MAYERS. That is why it is important that truths about the dangers of communism be explained to the people of a developing country by their own fellow men—by native patriots whose only concern is the security and progress of their own nation and who are not involved in furthering the foreign policy of the United States—which may not always be a very welcome policy, from another country's point of view.

But such native patriots are up against highly trained Communist cadres who are thorough professionals in political warfare. They cannot be expected to fight their Communist enemy effectively unless they are inspired and trained through "instruction in strategy and tactics to attain and maintain [political] power for the purpose of defending and developing democracy," is advocated in the Costa Rican school's literature. They would get such training at a U.S. Freedom Academy.

Now, we might speculate on what might have been the history of the cold war if a U.S.-sponsored Freedom Academy had been in operation 10 or more years ago.

The CHAIRMAN. Before you go on to that point, you imply, as I understand, that the USIS has not had much political impact. I understand that they do have libraries in various countries, and they are reportedly well patronized. What is your information on that?

Mr. MAYERS. They are very well patronized; I have seen many of them. But the amount of *political* impact that any library has is very limited. The Soviets do not even bother to set up libraries in these countries. They achieve a tremendous political impact through trained propagandists who influence the press, the radio, all mass communications media. Also through the word of mouth.

I might raise the question of how much "political impact" do American libraries have? Propaganda is a much more serious undertaking than merely the running of a library, although I do not belittle USIS libraries.

WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN

If we had had a Freedom Academy 10 or more years ago, there would have been not only an anti-Batista movement in Cuba before the revolution, but inside that movement there would have been an alert anti-Communist group. The Cuban Communist underground would have had less opportunity to infiltrate and steal the legitimate anti-Batista revolution from the Cuban patriots and from the middle class that innocently financed Castro.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, do you think Batista would have permitted Cubans to attend the Academy?

Mr. MAYERS. Well, wherever there is a totalitarian regime, there is an underground and the underground has ways of getting information, if it is available. There would have been other Latin American countries to whom these Cubans could go, and they would get their information that way. They would have seen publications by the

Latin American anti-Communists that would have been smuggled into Cuba.

I do not think that Batista would have been enthusiastic about sending Cuban Government employees to the Freedom Academy, but the potential for getting the "know-how" to prevent Red infiltration of the July 26 revolution would have been there to prevent what happened to the Castro forces. The anti-Communists in these forces would have been alerted.

What about Panama? If there had been a Freedom Academy 10 years ago, there might today be more moderation in the campaign for President down there, which appears to be nothing but a competition as to who can be the most anti-American candidate. And there probably would have been less serious rioting over the flag incident, because the rioting was obviously Communist incited and there was no group alert enough to recognize it, or strong enough to warn the rioters how they were being manipulated.

Mr. POOL. Mr. Chairman. I personally discussed this with a group of Methodists at breakfast this morning. They are here today and they are from Texas and they are constituents of mine. Do you have any suggestions as to how you would combat this nationalist propaganda in these countries? How would this Academy teach that?

Mr. MAYERS. Well, there is nothing in the Academy instruction, as I see it, that would in any way contradict nationalism. It would only direct nationalism into healthy, progressive government channels. The Communists have been able to steal the nationalist movements because there has been no anti-Communist leadership of the nationalist movements sufficiently strong to frustrate Communist infiltration.

Mr. POOL. The big problem there in these countries is that one politician will be anti-United States, and then he may get us to give a little bit, and then the next will ask for more, and it keeps on, just a vicious cycle there.

Mr. MAYERS. Knowing how to handle these politicians, how to divert their direction, or how to defeat them, if necessary, by having candidates who are more patriotic and less self-seeking—this is a part, I think, of what any Freedom Academy student would learn. What we are talking about teaching them, are the principles of sound, democratic government. Not that ours is perfect, but we have the nearest thing to that on the face of the earth. Many Latin Americans are hungry for constructive information on self-government. It is surprising how little they understand about how to go about creating the kind of government they would like. Many of the things that we take for granted in our political activity, such as opinion research and simple statistics and finding out what the people really need, such things are hardly known to tomorrow's Latin American politicians.

It would not be a swift process, but they would gradually learn what makes the American system tick and they would be fortified in their efforts to counteract the amoral politicians who lean toward the Communist cause or who think that their only chance of success lies on being anti-American campaigners.

Mr. POOL. Of course, the Communists are going to push a "hate America" campaign to offset any good that these students who go back might try to do.

Mr. MAYERS. Well, they are pushing it to the full right now. What we are talking about is offsetting the Communists' hate campaign.

Mr. POOL. It is going to take a lot of imagination and a real smart curriculum to offset that.

Mr. MAYERS. Mr. Pool, I am glad you used the word "imagination" because that is one of the biggest things lacking in our whole approach to this problem.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, of course, the student body of this Academy, in addition to being made up of newspaper people, church people, labor people, management people, Government people—that is, people of our Government stationed abroad, as well as stationed here—would also include foreign students.

Mr. MAYERS. Yes, foreign citizens.

The CHAIRMAN. Which, as you say, could have included Cubans under Batista and could now include Panamanians.

Now, we covered that a little bit yesterday, but let me ask you this question: What are your ideas about their selection and security? One man expressed a thought that we should not go for letting the government of a country sponsor, or be solely responsible for sponsoring, students from that country.

Mr. MAYERS. I quite agree.

The CHAIRMAN. There would be pitfalls in that. What are your ideas? You see, we are plowing a brand new road now, and I do not know where it is leading and we have to make a record that will answer as many questions as possible.

Mr. MAYERS. Well, there was considerable discussion yesterday about the security check, which we need not go into again. But assuming that you have an adequate security check, there should be no limit to how many carefully selected foreign students might receive training within the financial limits of the appropriations for the Academy. Those admitted could include university students, labor leaders, journalists, and other professional men with strong desires to learn more about how to fight communism. We must not forget that for every Communist in any one of those countries there are 10 anti-Communists, maybe 100. But as long as they are *not trained* the Communists with very limited cadres can take over unions and organizations and governments.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you are right, that that is our problem as members of the Committee on Un-American Activities.

Mr. MAYERS. I am sure this committee knows that, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I was pleased to hear someone say yesterday, Governor, that the student body could well be composed of employees of Members of Congress, and someone even suggested that maybe we should draw some from the judiciary.

Mr. TUCK. I think you are right.

Mr. MAYERS. Well, it seems to me that the security check and appropriations should be the only actual controlling factors.

The CHAIRMAN. Now of course, we will meet with stooges, we will meet with plants. There is no question about that. But as someone said, there is a counter to that. There will be some courses that will be limited and if the plants come to hear ideas, our own ideas, why then we are at least educating them on what we propose. In an open

society it is pretty hard to control those things absolutely, and I suppose we have to take those risks.

Mr. MAYERS. It is not beyond possibility that a Communist would come to subvert and stay to pray.

The CHAIRMAN. They are everywhere else, so I guess they would be there, too.

Mr. MAYERS. I have been talking about if there were a Freedom Academy 10 years ago. In places like Laos and Cambodia and Vietnam there might be today more stable political elements there, and better leadership. Those governments might have been nudged more in the direction of a viable democracy if some of their leaders had been trained in the Freedom Academy.

Our Government continues to be surprised by Communist political strategy in today's trouble areas.

(At this point Mr. Schadeberg entered the hearing room.)

Mr. MAYERS. The record of our neglect of political warfare is shameful. Yet we find strong opposition to the Freedom Academy comes from the one U.S. department most responsible for that shameful record. That is the Department of State. Mr. Chairman, I would like to refer here to something that was said yesterday, to the effect that all of the departments, the CIA and the Defense Department and the rest, are all opposed to the Freedom Academy. I have watched very closely the attitudes of those departments. When the State Department was first asked by Senator Fulbright in February of 1960 to send him its opinion or its position on the Freedom Academy, he sent the same question to the Defense Department and to the other departments. State did not answer for a long time—15 months. Not one of the other departments answered, until the State Department answered. Very soon after the State Department answered, in came the answers from the others. The USIA reply repeated, almost word for word, whole paragraphs of the State Department letter. The Defense Department letter did not say that they were opposed to it. They merely said they felt it was out of their sphere and they *had no objection to it*. That was the record at that time, anyway.

The CIA also said that they would defer to the State Department. The Attorney General's Office did not answer at that time. I called there and talked to one of Mr. Kennedy's assistants. The Attorney General is emphatically on record in a book he has written about the need for the very thing that we are talking about—it was quoted in Mr. Alan Grant's testimony yesterday. Robert Kennedy went over to Southeast Asia and ran up against trained Japanese students and Indonesian students who would hardly let him talk. He saw the operation of those Communist cadres within the student body, and came home and wrote that we had better do something about it. That may be one reason why his Department did not follow the others in deferring to the State Department, out of courtesy, because they were asked to do so, although not really opposed to a Freedom Academy. There are any number of men in the armed services who are very strong for cold war training programs such as we are considering here today.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the position of the State Department initially was one of opposition. In the most recent, a matter of months, I

guess—however, they are now proposing a separate academy. What is it, the National Academy?

Mr. MAYERS. The National Academy of Foreign Affairs.

The CHAIRMAN. The Academy of Foreign Affairs which would be under the domination—and I imply no evil—of the State Department. And, of course, there is some feeling abroad that that is a subtle way of neutralizing the bill we are now considering. But in any event, this is an acknowledgement of deficiency, and no one can shake that away from our mind.

(At this point Mr. Ichord entered the hearing room.)

The CHAIRMAN. The fact that they are sponsoring a bill is an acknowledgment of a deficiency in the present system. I think that is important.

Mr. MAYERS. Yes, of course, Mr. Chairman, as Mr. Alan Grant indicated yesterday, they rather reluctantly wrote that bill under instructions from President Kennedy. Two months before the Perkins report came out, highly critical of what the State Department was doing in the area of training with the Foreign Service Institute, I had a meeting with Mr. Walt Rostow, in which he assured me there was absolutely no need for any academy. The Department wrote the NAFA bill only under instructions from the President.

The CHAIRMAN. That was after the President's commission made a report.

Mr. MAYERS. Yes, after the Perkins report said that there has to be something done and the President asked to have it done.

The bill they wrote was what you would expect from a reluctant department that had been opposing the Freedom Academy idea for years. It is a weak bill that merely renames and expands the existing Foreign Service Institute. It does not increase its budget much, except that it asks for an \$18 million building to house it. Without going into too many details here, I assure this committee it is nothing but a straw man compared to the Freedom Academy bill. I might add that many State Department officials do not want that bill passed. They are just using it as a sort of roadblock to the Freedom Academy bill.

On January 21, a story appeared in the *New York Times* reporting on a letter from Dean Acheson, now an adviser to the State Department and to the President, denouncing the National Academy of Foreign Affairs bill in no uncertain terms.

Senator Jackson's Committee on National Security has recently been interviewing many people in the diplomatic service. Every one of them is opposed to the NAFA bill. No State Department people are pressing for action on the NAFA bill. They refer to it in these hearings presumably to divert attention from the real issue we are discussing here today, which is the Freedom Commission concept.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, proceed, because we have quite a list of witnesses today.

Mr. MAYERS. I would like to dwell just a little longer on a point that you, Mr. Chairman, raised yesterday—the question, “Why does the State Department oppose the Freedom Commission bill?”

DIPLOMATS VERSUS POLITICAL WARRIORS

We in the Cold War Council have given considerable thought to why this is so. Our conclusion is that our foreign policymakers are experienced in conventional diplomacy, in global conflicts, and in other aspects of the international relations picture, but they have little skill in the arts of communicating with the political leadership of other countries on the people-to-people level. They are not only inexperienced in propaganda and political warfare, they are hostile to it. They prefer to ignore the fact that the propaganda and political warfare has been largely responsible for the Communist expansion ever since the end of World War II. C. D. Jackson of *Time* magazine says:

One of the reasons why the Eastern European satellite countries have become the forgotten theater of the cold war is that the West's diplomats have won out over the psychological warriors. There is a great difference between political warfare and diplomacy. Although they both pursue the same ends, they are different sides of the street.

The resistant attitude of the diplomats toward political warfare somewhat parallels the attitudes of the generals and admirals of World War I who resisted the development of air warfare. The Army and Navy brass of that day had built their own careers on land and water strategy. They instinctively opposed Gen. Billy Mitchell because air power, a new concept of military operations, threatened the supremacy of the only type of warfare with which they were familiar.

Political and propaganda warfare today represents a new power concept in international relations. It is not surprising that some State Department careerists instinctively oppose the idea that the U.S. should develop this new power in a field for which they are not equipped by either training or temperament.

The authors of Freedom Academy legislation recognize that political warfare guidance is not a logical field of activity for the U.S. diplomatic corps. They wisely propose an independent Freedom Commission which would cooperate with the State Department, but build a corps of experts in an area in which the diplomats have few qualifications and many limitations.

Mr. Chairman, I have several more pages, but I would just as soon insert them in the record in the interests of saving time. And thank you very much for this opportunity.

(The balance of Mr. Mayers' statement follows:)

HIGH LEVEL MISUNDERSTANDING

Examples of such limitations are seen in the official behavior of State Department spokesmen in their opposition to Freedom Academy legislation. In May 1962, Assistant Secretary of State Frederick Dutton replied to a letter from Senator J. William Fulbright requesting the Department's views on Freedom Academy legislation. Mr. Dutton offered three pages of reasons why the Department opposes a Freedom Academy. Roscoe Drummond, an exceedingly responsible journalist, then wrote in one of his columns, "the Dutton letter is based on a misreading and a misunderstanding of the Freedom Academy Bill."

The Drummond comment suggests the Dutton letter may have been hastily written. The fact is, however, that it took the Department of State 15 months to formulate an answer to Senator Fulbright's request.

When the Cold War Council asked Mr. Dutton why he took so long, he explained that considerable research and study had to go into the preparation of the State Department's position on Freedom Academy legislation. Several months later, I had occasion to discuss that position with Dr. Walt W. Rostow,

chairman of the State Department's Policy Planning Council. I was amazed to discover that Dr. Rostow, whose office is about a hundred yards down the hall from Mr. Dutton's, did not know about the letter the Department had taken 15 months to prepare.

STATE DEPARTMENT SEMANTICS

In my discussion with Dr. Rostow, he failed to recognize the difference between the political education to be provided by a Freedom Academy and the Pentagon's "counterinsurgency" military training programs. Assistant Secretary of State Roger Hillsman, the State Department's specialist on Southeastern Asia, engaged in similar semantic confusion last summer when he addressed a Cold War Education Conference in Tampa, Florida. He told an audience, "what is going on in Laos today is political warfare." His listeners laughed. They were well aware that where American soldiers are dying, as in Southeast Asia, the situation cannot be called "political warfare." Tens of thousands of American troops are engaged there today because we are 10 years too late in Southeast Asia for true political warfare.

Last June, when I had an opportunity to discuss the Freedom Academy concept with Secretary of State Dean Rusk, I discovered still another facet of the Department's concept of the words "political warfare." Referring to the thousand or more cables received by the Department every day, Mr. Rusk told me "everything we are doing here is political warfare." I learned from that conversation that the Secretary of State had practically no previous knowledge of the nature and purpose of the Freedom Academy legislation.

NSC OBJECTIVES

The administrative body that should be most directly concerned with the fate of Freedom Academy legislation is the National Security Council. There is a close relationship between the bills under consideration and NSC policy objectives. A recent NSC paper on objectives calls for "mounting a systematic effort for the timely identification of points of crisis and forehanded action to resolve them." The Freedom Academy legislation is based on recognition of the need for forehanded U.S. action along political training lines. It provides such action long in advance of the kind of crisis situation to which the NSC paper refers. Training leaders of the developing nations in political strategy and propaganda for democracy would certainly forestall the growth of Communist political power to a crisis point in those nations.

We are, of course, much too late in Cuba, Panama, Southeast Asia, and other points of the globe. But we are not too late in many other areas. The American ideals of representative government are still widely admired in the developing countries, where many present and future political leaders appreciate our ideology and would like to move their people toward our political concepts. But their desires represent only a frozen asset of the free world unless they can acquire what the Costa Rican institute refers to as "instruction in strategy and tactics to attain and maintain power for the purpose of defending and developing democracy."

NATIONWIDE EXPECTATIONS

Political analysts throughout the free world wonder *when* the United States Government will wake up to its opportunities and its obligations as a global ideological leader. The same question disturbs American *voters*, both Democrat and Republican. This committee is aware of the innumerable magazine articles and newspaper columns written in recent years favoring the Freedom Academy idea. Intense bipartisan public interest in the subject is also revealed in the current mail received by the Cold War Council.

More than a year ago, a group of citizens in California launched a drive for signatures on a petition to the President and Congress, urging action on Freedom Academy legislation. Thousands of such petition signatures were turned over to the Cold War Council. However, the council didn't encourage the continuance of the drive because at that time the Gallup Poll announced results of a nationwide public opinion survey on the subject. The poll revealed that almost 9 out of 10 American citizens queried as to the desirability of a "cold war academy" had definite opinions on the subject and that 5 of every 6 of those citizens favored the idea of a Freedom Academy.

Such public opinion will presumably be reflected in the Congress when the House of Representatives and the Senate are given an opportunity to vote on

Freedom Academy legislation. As this committee knows, that was the result when the issue came before the Senate of the 86th Congress, which overwhelmingly passed the Freedom Commission bill by a voice vote.

The Cold War Council believes it is reflecting the wishes of most informed citizens, as well as of most U.S. cold war specialists outside of Government, when it urges this House committee to render a report on Freedom Academy legislation similar to the one made by the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee and approved by the whole committee, stating the committee "considers this [Freedom Commission] bill to be one of the most important ever introduced in the Congress."

Mr. POOL. I do have one question, Mr. Chairman. It is a very short one. Do you have any comment to make about the John Birch Society's opposition to the bill?

Mr. MAYERS. Well, it is very strange that they and the State Department should be in the same camp.

Mr. POOL. That is what brought the question up.

Mr. MAYERS. I believe that their opposition is based on unreasonable fears. It is a defeatist attitude toward the American system of government. We should not oppose a sound piece of legislation for fear it may be subverted by bad appointments or by mishandling. What would be our position today if we had taken that attitude toward the Atomic Energy bill? It might have been opposed by somebody who said, "The President might put somebody in charge who will be soft on communism," then we wouldn't have had the development of the H-bomb. To approach the Freedom Commission idea from that standpoint is a defeatist attitude.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I am glad to say that this legislation has bipartisan support and, for lack of better words, both conservative and liberal support in the Congress. Here are some of the Senators who sponsor the bill: Senator Mundt, Senator Douglas, Senator Case, Senator Dodd, Senator Smathers, Senator Goldwater, Senator Proxmire, Senator Fong, Senator Hickenlooper, Senators Miller, Keating, Lausche, Scott. That covers a pretty large, composite segment of all of our political thinking, and I think that is a wholesome thing.

Mr. MAYERS. It is definitely bipartisan. The Cold War Council is bipartisan. We never get into partisan politics, and that is why we are behind this bill.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you know, we opened these hearings with a completely open mind, and I am going to try to have my mind remain in that condition until we hear everybody, but you are making a pretty strong case.

Mr. MAYERS. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Our next scheduled witness is Mr. McDowell. Mr. McDowell is the director of the Department of Civic, Educational and Governmental Affairs, the Upholsterers' International Union of the AFL-CIO, and is also executive secretary of the Council Against Communist Aggression.

You might expand on your background for the record here, Mr. McDowell.

STATEMENT OF ARTHUR GLADSTONE McDOWELL

Mr. McDOWELL. Mr. Chairman, I would, in the interest of expediting the hearings, file my copy of my formal statement which is before the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. It is more impressive to us, if you could do that, and speak from it.

Mr. McDOWELL. And then make allusions to the essential points there.

(Mr. McDowell's prepared statement follows:)

STATEMENT OF ARTHUR G. McDOWELL

My name is Arthur Gladstone McDowell. I reside at 574 West Clapier Street, Germantown, Philadelphia, Pa. I am employed as director of the Department of Civic, Educational, and Governmental Affairs of the Upholsterers' International Union of North America, which is affiliated with the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations. I also function, since 1948, as director of International Labor Relations for the purpose of handling all correspondence with the International Federation of Building and Woodworkers, with headquarters in Copenhagen, Denmark, with which our union is affiliated, and with all other labor organizations and personnel abroad. Also, with the approval of the Upholsterers' International Union, my employer, with whom I have been identified for nearly 19 years, I serve, without salary, as executive secretary of the Council Against Communist Aggression, founded in Philadelphia in February 1951 and additionally titled since December 1961 as the "Alexis de Tocqueville Society." The principal offices and headquarters of both organizations are located at 1500 North Broad Street, Philadelphia, Pa.

I appear before your committee in urgent support of the Freedom Commission and Academy legislative proposal embodied in substantially similar bills, most recently introduced in the 88th Congress by Representative A. S. Herlong, Jr., of Florida; Representative Richard S. Schweiker, of Pennsylvania; Representative Charles S. Gubser, of California; Representative Hale Boggs, of Louisiana; and Representative Robert Taft, Jr., of Ohio. The most up-to-date form of this legislation is that introduced by Representative Boggs and one or two others, corresponding in most respects to the similar bill, S. 414, on which public hearings were held by the Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Senate on April 29 and May 1 of 1963, last year. There is only slight variation between these various versions of the bill and that passed by the U.S. Senate, without opposition, on August 30, 1960.

The Council Against Communist Aggression has been in active support of the Freedom Academy proposal since its circulation as a proposal for a private training and research institution with governmental consent and approval through the executive department in 1955. The Upholsterers' International Union, by convention action at San Francisco in June 1959, endorsed the proposed bills to legislate the Freedom Commission and Academy as introduced in the 86th Congress by Congressmen Sydney Herlong and Walter Judd in the House of Representatives, and Senators Douglas and Mundt in the Senate, and I appeared before the Internal Security Subcommittee of the U.S. Senate on June 18, 1959, in official support of passage, following the filing of statement of similar support by Andrew J. Biemiller, director of the Legislative Department of the AFL-CIO, on their behalf on June 17, 1959. The bill, subsequently reported by a unanimous Senate Judiciary Committee and described by them as "one of the most important ever introduced in the Congress," and subsequently passed by the Senate, is substantially the same as subsequently reintroduced in both houses in 1961 and again in 1963 and now before your committee, and no reiteration of these formal labor endorsements was believed required in Senate hearings last year.

I have, however, requested permission to appear and add fresh testimony before this committee, both because of the urgent necessity, nay, the indispensability of this legislation for the hopes of freedom of ourselves and our children, borne in upon us by every new ill wind that brings bad news for freedom's cause, from Cuba and Panama to Southeast Asia and Zanzibar, and because this committee, by its long historic, but often misunderstood and unacknowledged, service to the vigilance of the American people, is especially well equipped to understand the need, the urgency, and the relevance of this legislation.

To qualify the organizations for whom I speak in this field, may I note that the Upholsterers' International Union of North America, founded in Philadelphia in February 1882, is one of the oldest continuous national and international unions in America. Predating the AFL itself, it became affiliated with AFL

only in 1900, after surviving unassisted the divisions growing out of the early Knights of Labor and the disruptions and attempts at domination by external political radicalism represented by Daniel de Leon and his Socialist-Labor Party, remarkable for their similarity and precise contemporary date with early experiences of Lenin, evil genius of modern communism and his later Bolshevik Party. It was not a mere historical curiosity that, when Lenin hurriedly assembled his originally ramshackle and improvised First Congress of the Communist International in Moscow in March 1919, it was a delegation from the minuscule Socialist-Labor Party who belatedly turned up to claim title as the true American Bolsheviks. Samuel Gompers and his close associates sharpened their understanding of would-be elites who aspired to take over the trade union movement as a tool of their Marxist revolutionary fanaticism in their contest with de Leon's Socialist Trade and Labor Alliance in the 1890's, and were rehearsed and prepared well in advance when Lenin disdainfully announced his intent to take over the U.S. trade union movement of the AFL, whose principle of voluntarism, to him, was "a rope of sand" against the militarily disciplined and centrally directed Communist forces Lenin proposed to create and put to the task of boring from within established trade union ranks. Gompers died in 1924, within the same year as Lenin, but there was no doubt of Gompers' victory in the contest, a victory which lasted unquestioned until a self-willed and politically ambitious labor leader, by the name of John Lewis, in 1935, for his own purposes, swung wide the doors Gompers had so successfully barred.

After 40 years of continuous existence, the Upholsterers' International Union published its first monthly official *Journal*¹ in June of 1922. In the third issue, that of August, the Upholsterers' *Journal* editorially reviewed the history of radical minorities, who beginning with de Leon and coming down to the official Moscow created and dominated Communist Party, just then emerging from underground existence of years since 1919, under the name of the Workers Party, had sought to take over the trade unions for their special devious purposes. The editor, under the title of "Our Nemesis," stated the issue simply as follows: "The question resolves itself into whether the American labor movement will permit these friends of the payroll of Soviet Russia to scuttle the ship, or whether it(we) will make them walk the plank."

In all successive years, in our union we made the scuttlers crew "walk the plank," including the late 1930's when the powerful John L. Lewis, who never relaxed his own rules permitting him to expel the loneliest, most ineffective Communist rank-and-file member from membership, his job and the industry in his own United Mine Workers, nevertheless made his deal to turn over whole union formations, such as office workers, farm workers, furniture workers, Government employees, longshoremen to exactly this Communist pirate crew. It was the Upholsterers who first stood their ground and licked outright deals to deliver their organization and membership to the leftwing forces invited into the CIO organization. It was these forces which the CIO was ultimately driven to belatedly expel from its ranks 12 years later (along with their nearly million members, whose affairs a small entrenched Communist clique dominated and had used as a base to entwine a third of the American trade union movement, along with almost all the Social-Democratic-led unions of Western Europe, with the Moscow-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions. It was the timely affiliation and aid of the Upholsterers' International Union which in 1948 enabled the International Federation of Building and Woodworkers, including furniture workers of Western Europe to join with other of the international trade secretariats in resisting final incorporation into the World Federation of Trade Unions' trap and started the counter trend which enabled the CIO and free trade unions of Western Europe to pull out of the embrace of the Communist WFTU 2 years later and join with AFL in forming the present International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.

In 1950 when the Upholsterers' International Union and its president, who had, in 1947, joined the other AFL and liberal forces and later some sections of the CIO in founding the Americans for Democratic Action to demolish the attempt of the Communists to establish a mass political party in America under the misleading Progressive label and behind the face of the bemused former Vice President Henry Wallace, found our associates in ADA involved in the incredible confusion and appeasement of advocating the U.N. entry and diplomatic recognition of Red China in the midst of the Sino-Soviet Communist

¹ U.I.U. *Journal*.

aggression in Korea, the Upholsterers' Union and its officers withdrew from the ADA in defense of the strongly opposite policy of AFL, which we supported.

In February 1951 the Upholsterers' Union appealed to a leading officer of one of its largest employers, Fred McKee of Pittsburgh (now deceased), who after lifelong service as treasurer of the old League of Nations Association and its successor, the Association for the United Nations, had just resigned from the latter organization on the same issue, to form a new center of anti-Communist, common-sense information and correspondence. Out of this labor and management initiative, a gathering held in Philadelphia on February 10, 1951, rallying behind the militant, antiappeasement speech in the U.S. Senate by Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois of that January, formed the Council Against Communist Aggression, for whom I also speak today, as its chief executive officer. All of our study documentation and correspondence of the intervening 13 years has crystallized since 1959 in our concurrence with the Senate Judiciary Committee's unanimous report of 1960 that the Freedom Commission and Academy is the most important piece of legislation to come before the Congress in our lifetime, and that it is a proper subject for legislation and not mere executive department or private initiative.

Beginning in 1903, the evil, political genius, Nicolai Lenin, combined an embittered and hate-filled German exile's distillation of a theory of historical progress by class war and dictatorship, drawn from two German philosophers, Hegel and the renegade theologian and materialist Feurbach, with his own experience and roots in the long night of Russian absolutism, and produced what we know today as Marxism-Leninism, which has already claimed as many victims as Hitler's equally evil and powerful racist theory. It is interesting to note that both Marx and his class-war theory of progress and the Frenchman Gobineau, who in his *Essay on the Inequality of the Races* laid basis for Hitler's theory of race as basis of progress, were contemporaries and both had as their youthful philosophical source the same two philosophers, the dialectician Hegel and the materialist Feurbach. Ironically, it was in Philadelphia that the only English edition of Gobineau's racist theory of history was published in 1859, and it was to Philadelphia that Marx in the 1870's sent his First International (International Workingmen's Association) to die rather than be captured by his enemy, the Russian terrorist Bakunin. It was scarcely mere coincidence that in 1913-14, when European civilization stood on brink of the abyss of world war for the first time in 99 years, the only two voices recorded as welcoming the prospect, and that for its inevitable furtherance of their political hopes and schemes, were respectively Nicolai Lenin and Adolph Schicklegruber (Hitler), both men to enter history under assumed names, under which they will ever be execrated by civilized man.

As Americans should above all remember, since their Declaration of Independence and the idea of government by consent of the governed and all men are created equal and endowed by their Creator with unalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness has toppled vast empires once spanning the earth, ideas and not material things are the most powerful forces on earth. This goes for bad ideas like the class-hatred ideas of Marx-Lenin and the race hatred of Hitler, as well as for the best ideas. Actually today we seem to have in many cases adopted in action the materialism of Marx and are failing, with all our material success, while the enemy, using the power of an outworn and discredited by every event 19th-century idea, is succeeding in spite of all their daily material failures, which we do solicitously try to repair for them with food and credits, to the despair of the oppressed and imprisoned peasants, whose sabotage weapon against their oppressors we strike from their hands.

Lenin invented a genuinely new idea and instrument of tyranny. It was the idea of a professional revolutionary elite dedicating the whole of their lives, under a centralized, military-type discipline, to the acquiring and holding of power, total power for the recasting of the whole human race and its society, in the long run, not one whit less grisly and costly in blood practice than Hitler's. It is not the single idea of conspiracy and secrecy, the unlimited use of violence as needed, the concept of a self-chosen elite, the ethic which uses assassination of character and deception as the first, and not the last resort, or anyone of these precepts alone, but their blending into a whole, which brought the Communists from a tiny group of backbiting exiles to rulership over a third of the world's peoples and territory in 61 years. The 75-mile gun with which Germany dismayed the French in World War I shelling was not a new gun. They simply took an old one and reduced the size of the barrel, leaving the powder chamber of larger bore. Lenin's genius did something of the same thing.

It is the combination of the appearance of civilian conduct of affairs, using such Western peaceful, democratic terms as the very word "party," with the actuality of the waging of a struggle for power at every level and in every and any social formation by the most rigorous of military methods and tactics. Lenin avidly studied the works of the German, thoroughgoing, military genius Von Clausewitz as much or more than he did Marx. High on his list of maxims, as on that of every follower of his, down through Khrushchev and Mao, is that which says:

"The political aim determines the strategy, the tactics and the outcome of war," and that "war is the mere pursuit of diplomacy by other means."

There is not a single Western, free world statesman—whether President, Premier, Secretary of State, Information Officer—in this generation who now understands or ever grasped this principle of world Communist procedure, save perhaps Churchill in his prime, and none who is prepared to act upon it in free world terms. Lenin went on to perfect, in control of his first state, Russia, a new and modern despotism in which there is the appearance of distinct institutions such as parliament, army, bureaucracy, judiciary, etc., but only one power reality, the newly invented Communist Party. He understood the newly decisive importance of money on the scale available to a national state, as compared with any private formation, because it was German General Staff funds that not only took Lenin across war lines into confused, Czarless, and suddenly theoretically democratic but totally inexperienced Russia, but we now know that it was German Government funds that in the summer of 1917 kept his party growing steadily over all others in organization and position in Petrograd and Moscow and enabled it by armed coup to seize power without the country even realizing it.

The proposed Freedom Commission and Academy is the first proposal to actually establish equality between the free world, led of necessity by the United States, and the Communist slave world, still led by Soviet Russia, as Alex de Tocqueville, as true a prophet for democracy as Marx was a false one for his dictatorship, actually foresaw would inevitably be the case, 130 years ago. Failure to act on this measure and its concept means that we, with the best ideas and the most magnificent of resources, will see an enemy with some of the worst and most outworn and discredited ideas in history, and most blundered, stunted, and mismanaged economic organization and resources known to man go on to one political and diplomatic victory after another, in one spot after another, simply because they are in a political war with us and we are at political peace with them or, at best, are spasmodically trying to end the political war we call cold, and ease tensions, the decisive ones of which they will not relax one inch or one ounce, save to renew them in another quarter, where to relax tension is simply to let the other fellow pull you across the line into his arms, as we have already done in Laos and may yet be persuaded or blundered into doing in neighboring South Vietnam.

The U.S. labor movement has grown tired of waiting over the 5 years which have elapsed since the basic idea of the Freedom Academy—to train our forces to win the political wars instead of losing by default, to meet an idea with a better idea, the only way any idea, however false or evil, has ever been defeated—first was introduced in the Congress and referred to the Senate Judiciary and to this committee in the House. In frank and effective collaboration with American management interests, the American Institute for Free Labor Development was created 2 years ago by AFL-CIO to train their fellow trade unionists in Central and South America in the techniques of free trade union leadership and the destruction of totalitarian infiltration. True to its character, Government bureaucracy has come in on the tail end of the procession and used what good efforts private forces in our society were putting forth as an excuse for not doing anything in the vast exposed student, university, and, above all, the agricultural area where 80% of the population in most exposed and politically weak and unstable nations live. Lenin, Stalin, and Mao have developed a sure-fire way of attaining power in predominantly peasant countries, starting with Russia and climaxing with China, and moving now on to Brazil, British Guiana, Vietnam, Indonesia, and you name it. Tune up the hatred of the landlord and the moneylender by the small peasant, set the landless peasant and farm laborer, who can only be absorbed and made useful by growth of industry in the towns, against all of them, and it is no trick to take over. They (the Communists) can't make it work, but when the peasant finds that out it is too late for any machinery for political change. If you have a modern country like Czechoslovakia or a relatively modern one, with a middle class, like Cuba, the quasi-legal coup, well learned from Hitler and his Nazis in

Germany, will do, and Castro has brought new tricks of student terrorism to bear.

If there is any university or Government agency currently preparing civilian trainees on the strategy of the enemy and helping research and accumulate data on how freedom fighters can wage political warfare on even slightly even terms, I defy State or any executive department to name it or show a curriculum that would do anything to a hard-boiled Communist training school instructor, except reduce him to helplessness by laughter. The last time I looked, there was not a university or library in the United States which could produce a set of the collected works of our shrewdest enemy in history, Nicolai Lenin, in English. We are in no position to poke fun at Chamberlain and his umbrella for his refusal to read *Mein Kampf*, or listen to those who had, until it was too late and England had declined to where it could not save or aid what weakened allies it had after appeasing away the others.

There is another great jest which must make Khrushchev's evenings merry even in the midst of the 38th year of agricultural failure and stagnation. That is the distinction between the external Communist danger and the internal one solemnly discussed by what Lenin called "the useful idiots" in non-Communist societies, which he planned to subvert. This distinction may be given momentary reality in a college classroom or in a very high and remote pulpit on a very calm and fine Sunday morning. To a practical trade union like ours, whose October 1942 *Journal* stumbled on the American trade union cover for Stalin's refusal to admit U.S. lend-lease to Russian people, the distinction is a fantasy. To the men in the Kremlin today or those in Peiping's palace tomorrow, there is no such distinction.

The decision of the Communist closed societies in 1960, in congress assembled, to persuade the open societies of the West, and, above all, the United States, that the dead Hitler and Mussolini and their dispersed legions and their surviving adolescent and paranoid sympathizers in our time were more of a danger to our peace, democracy, and freedom than Khrushchev and Mao and all their divisions, armament, bombs, and worldwide apparatus, this fantastic idea was not sent out in Russia or by courier, but by 1962 a bishop in the pulpit of my church declared that fascism, and not communism, was the menace of today and misquoted Huey Long of 1934 as an authority. When I corrected his quotation and asked him if he could remember where he got it, he, being an honest man, said no he could not remember and promised to stop using it, but it had been spread across a continent before he reached Philadelphia.

Thousands of U.S. clergymen publicly protested and last summer attested to the supposed fact that the head of a government allied with us against the Communist military and murder attack in Southern Asia, in which Khrushchev only yesterday says he is as enthusiastic as that so-and-so Mao, was persecuting the religion of a majority of his countrymen. The anti-Communist government invited the United Nations to send a commission to investigate. It has made its report, under date of December 7. It failed to find the religious persecution and talked freely to supposedly murdered monks, but none of the great daily newspapers, whose superficial and hasty reporters had reported the alleged religious persecution, destroyed pagodas, and supposedly spontaneous suicides of protest, even mentioned the fact of the report until an indignant Costa Rican Ambassador member of the U.N. Commission spoke up, 20 days later, through a religious press service. After all, alarmed by the agitation of American opinion over the nonexistent and obviously insane religious persecution of a majority of a country under military attack, our Under Secretary of State Harriman and Assistant Secretary of State Hilsman had called for overthrow of that government; and by the time the U.N. Commission reported the actual facts, the government had been overthrown, the anti-Communist President assassinated, and the rejoicing street mobs permitted to selectively wreck not only all strongly anti-Communist newspapers, which may or may not have been connected with the overthrown anti-Communist government, but also the international headquarters of the Asian People's Anti-Communist League, which was not connected with the overthrown government.

Actually, the whole formula of falsehood and exaggeration and demand for destruction of the then allied, anti-Communist government in South Vietnam was set forth in a paid ad in the *New York Times* of April 12, 1962, signed by a group of notorious Communist fellow travelers familiar to this committee and, of course, some innocents. I wrote one of the innocents, my old college professor in history, in protest and correction, and his name and that of two of his col-

leagues at Yale disappeared from subsequently published copies of the ridiculous Communist-Party-line, lying ad on South Vietnam, which, in our country, without a political warfare trainee in clergy or State Department, became the utter truth for thousands of clergymen. An old and often-fooled friend of mine, who organized his campaign a year after the fellow travelers' ad appeared, was totally taken in himself by press reports. In a case in a Communist-ruled country, where he knew firsthand of religious persecution, he kept quiet for personal reasons and the difficulty of getting any attention from a press that believes that Communist oppression is a case of "dog bites man" and is therefore no news, while oppression by an anti-Communist government is a case of "man bites dog" and is news, even if untrue.

The newspapermen who misled the American people and all those clergymen were, of course, ignorant of the religious, cultural, political, and every other kind of history of the remote Asian country to which the newsmen were assigned, and from which the clergymen got their news, with assists from conveniently appearing Buddhist students and exiles here. Small surprise. Only a minority of American States require even the study of history of the United States. A bright young man can get a bachelor's degree from Princeton or Harvard, in turn, without ever having had an hour in American history, and become a Foreign Service officer or correspondent for a great U.S. daily newspaper or television chain. There is small chance of this supposedly educated man bothering about, or even being able to grasp, the history of the country to which he is assigned if he doesn't know the history of his own country. It is doubtful if any single newspaperman cabling the phony story of religious persecution in invaded and civil-war-torn South Vietnam had ever heard that Lincoln and Halleck had had to order General Grant to withdraw General Order No. 11 expelling all Jews from his Department of Tennessee, an action Grant stoutly insisted had no religious significance or that Stanton, with little interference from Lincoln, in the course of the war arrested and held 15,000 U.S. civilians without charges, bail, or habeas corpus.

Our Communist enemy does not send out an Embassy porter without political training. Their thousands of political warfare trainees are recruited from every country of the earth, and have been for a generation and a half now, and are sent back drilled and prepared for action. There are many backward and swampy areas of the earth; but as science has now established, contrary to old wives' tales, it is not the swamps that breed and breathe out malaria, but that little parasite carried by the malarial mosquitoes, who do live happier in swamps, but can breed and bite from less favorable areas.

In the last 35 years in these United States I have been either in uneasy, and always subject-to-cancellation-without-notice, "peaceful coexistence" with Communists or at open war with them as student, in union, in religious, press, welfare, community, minority and majority political party, civil liberties and sports organizations, in each and every year.

There is no substitute for concrete experience with the Communist operation, and its political aim of power is so uniform that any item of concrete experience with them has eventually some usefulness, but there must be a complete, systematic training in the political inspiration and methodology of the foe. This is completely lacking from top bureaucrats in the State Department to politically untrained businessmen and students going abroad. It is reflected in the present coat of arms of our key Department of State, which should be two eyebrows raised in perpetual surprise. In 1959 the State Department's respected press officer was "surprised" that a Communist delegation had used the International Olympics Committee meeting in Chile for a political cold war maneuver, although to my personal knowledge the Communists in the United States, through an international agent in Chicago, were using the Olympics for political propaganda purposes as long ago as 1932 and the principal personal target then was the American businessman, then head of the American Olympics Committee, as he is now head of the International Olympics Committee, who has never studied communism and, therefore, never caught on, in 32 years.

Cuba was a surprise, Panama and its students were a surprise, and Cuba's Castroites in far away African Zanzibar were a surprise. Eventually, the free world could die of surprises.

It is time to stop the surprises. Once, in early days, they were inevitable. Thirty-five years ago, as the campus political radical at my university, I was asked to become the new head of the campus Liberal Club. Faculty advisers and incumbent officers cleared it, but a young professional Communist student,

whose father was a Soviet textile factory boss in Leningrad, was actually elected at a routine and poorly attended meeting. One of the faculty advisers was a party sympathizer and worked secretly with the Communist nucleus. Nineteen years later, I last heard of the professor in action. He was an economist and was leading a batch of American university students in Prague shortly after the 1948 coup and explaining that the new and growing shortage of food since Communist takeover was purely temporary and would soon be followed by Communist guaranteed plenty.

That, my first experience, was in 1929; the Communist International was barely 10 years old. Student operations of Communists were underestimated and little understood, as against today when we know the second man in line in Communist China, the first man in North Vietnam, the top banana in British Guiana, in left-leaning Ghana, and a score of other places were recruited to Communist and revolutionary purpose as college students, as indeed was Lenin himself, and, in a sense, Marx and Engels.

In 1929 it remained for me to get expelled from the university for Liberal Club activity on a club board on which I was minority and a professional Communist was chief with a majority. The chancellor of the university later told my older brother, who graduated the usual way, that the fight over our expulsion, which went to court, cost the university a million dollars in cash contributions and put his building program back 3 years.

Three of us were thrown out, the Communist club president, now number three on the Attorney General's list of leading Communist officials in the U.S.A., your witness, and a young philosophy teaching graduate assistant, Frederick Woltman. I went out of the university to lend a hand the following week to a group of striking milk wagon drivers, and found my erstwhile Communist fellow student on the outskirts of my street meetings, distributing scurrilous leaflets attacking the union on strike and me and, in effect, urging the strikers, whose union I was trying to help, "to shoot their captain and bore from within."

Exasperated and half amused, I set out to find what made this new kind of gink, the Communist, click. In 35 years of tense maneuver and occasional bitter, open conflict I never ceased to be exasperated, but I quickly ceased to be amused. Fred Woltman, the other expellee, won a job on the *New York World Telegram* and there won the Pulitzer Prize for his articles exposing the Communist attempts at takeover of unions.

In a way, when I sum up my personal arguments for the Freedom Academy and Commission, I think of it in terms of the boyhood score as it stands today. The Communist trap broke its teeth on the two non-Communists in that student flap at the University of Pittsburgh, but the third operator is still a vigorous top professional in the Communist Party, U.S.A., a William Albertson. Fred Woltman, of Pulitzer fame, is out of the writing game forever with a multiple stroke and aphasia, and yours truly must do a part-time job in this main fight. We continue to rely on amateurs like myself in the decisive private sector. The enemy recruits systematically and sends against us trained professionals. In the long run, there is no question of which ball team will win most of the games. We either apply the good old American way of education of teachers and fighters and developing technical training to overcome, at home and abroad, nearly 40 years' lead time that the Communists have on their side, or we default and at late last send raw and inexperienced troops into this political war to "fall, one by one, in an unpitied sacrifice in a contemptible struggle."

I could give some, in fact an almost endless list of summary examples of the ease with which tiny groups of Communists of small capacity per individual, but with political training and military-type organization, took over originally even anti-Communist mass movements of unemployed, of church-sponsored organizations; held for 20 years the minority control of a key labor press association; planned use of American unions to cover up their failure to acknowledge lend-lease in 1943; once gave instructions by Moscow cable on how to retain control of a Duluth, Minnesota, cooperative; etc., etc. But also there are the many examples of small, determined, anti-Communist individuals and groups who, with experience, routed the Communist operation. There is no defeatism where there is training and preparation on the free world side. Until we found and place in operation a functioning Freedom Commission for research and accumulation of political warfare intelligence and an Academy for training our own and our allied sons and daughters, our side will still on balance put up only a "contemptible struggle."

Mr. McDOWELL. I think it should be clear, sir, that I have no expertise from foreign travel, since my folks came here from Ireland and Scotland in the beginning of the 18th century, and I don't know of any members of the family that have traveled abroad except at the immediate invitation of Uncle Sam in certain emergencies. Therefore, I speak from the point of view and from the background of experience of a person who has dealt with the Communist operations, toe to toe, over a period of the last 35 years, purely in its domestic manifestation. And yet, since 1934, I have had organizational responsibilities in various organizations in the labor movement concerned entirely with international affairs.

I have not found this a complete disability, because I have never found a single item of foreign news of the Communist operations in virtually any country which is not matched by an item of experience with the operations of this particular conspiracy in its domestic manifestations. Any attempt to draw a distinction is one that can only be drawn in a classroom, and that only very briefly and in fugitive terms, because we are here dealing with a unity and a whole, not with some artificial distinctions within a conspiracy that operates from without and within all national borders.

I might point out that in appearing before the committee in urgent support of the Freedom Academy bill, I speak for both the Upholsterers' International Union, an affiliate of the AFL-CIO, and I appeared before the Senate Judiciary Committee in the initial hearings on the first form of this measure in 1959, only following the filing of an official statement by the legislative representative of the AFL-CIO, indicating their support of this measure. This was filed by Mr. Andrew Biemiller, the—

The CHAIRMAN. I am sorry. Whose support are you referring to?

Mr. McDOWELL. The Upholsterers' International Union. I first appeared for them before the Senate Judiciary Committee in support of this same measure.

The CHAIRMAN. You are going beyond that, now?

Mr. McDOWELL. Subsequent to the filing of the official statement by the AFL-CIO, of which we are an affiliate, in support of the principles of this measure. And, therefore, I appear here more in the lines of a policy, which has been authenticated not only by action of my international union, in successive conventions, but by the AFL-CIO's legislative department as well.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the whole AFL-CIO organization?

Mr. McDOWELL. That is right.

I might call your attention to the fact that that statement is in the public hearings of the Senate indicating the AFL-CIO position.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, proceed.

Mr. McDOWELL. This bill, of course, at that time was submitted both to the educational departments and to the international affairs departments of the AFL-CIO; and after their study, the authorization for approval by the AFL-CIO was then put in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. What record?

Mr. McDOWELL. Into the record of the Senate Judiciary on the first hearings on this bill, held in 1959.

The CHAIRMAN. Does counsel know whether we have that statement?

Mr. NITTLE. Yes, sir, we do.

Mr. McDOWELL. I think it might be relevant, with the committee's permission, to preface my formal remarks by the insertion of that statement, which is still the standing policy of the AFL-CIO.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I wish it to be incorporated in your testimony. That statement of the AFL-CIO will be incorporated at this point in the record.

(Mr. Biemiller's statement follows:)

STATEMENT OF ANDREW J. BIEMILLER, DIRECTOR, LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT,
[AFL-CIO], ON S. 1689

We have examined the purpose and contents of S. 1689, a bill to create a Freedom Commission and a Free World Academy.

The AFL-CIO concurs in the general aims of this bill and urges its passage at the earliest possible moment.

The AFL-CIO has been among the first that have consistently pointed to the threat posed to the free world by the attempt of world communism to conquer and dominate the world. The Communist conspiracy works on every level and works 24 hours a day. Its agents are hard-working fanatics who have been especially trained at their jobs of infiltration and subversion. The necessary effort of defense and counterattack on our part cannot be successfully achieved by hit and miss, uncoordinated efforts. Our country needs a coordinated effort on all levels, using men well grounded in knowledge of all aspects of Communist ideology and endeavor, and skilled in countering its agents all over the world in their moves on the economic, political, social, religious, moral, cultural fields.

For these reasons we favor the passage of this bill whose aim is exactly to provide the means whereby the training of this necessary personnel will be achieved.

Mr. McDOWELL. In evidence of the interest and concern of our organization, I speak in this case of the Upholsterers' International Union. It is one of the oldest unions in the United States, founded in Philadelphia in 1882. It became affiliated with the AFL only in 1900, having survived the storms of various types of radical attempts to dominate that organization and its purposes from without by an individual who in many respects—an American, by the way—who in many respects duplicated the same rather devilish concepts of external political domination of a basic institution of American life subsequently represented by Lenin and his ilk. I speak of Daniel de Leon, the head of the Socialist Labor Party, who in the 1890's created the Socialist Trade and Labor Alliance, which was an organization whose main purpose was to create a high command which would direct the trade union movement without, although still lacking the essential Communist elements of secrecy, deception, and militant conspiracy.

This was then challenged by Samuel Gompers, who had here a valuable preliminary experience with elements of the philosophy represented by Lenin and his procedures on the American scene, as early as the 1890's. When, therefore, in 1919 Lenin created his Communist International and declared the AFL one of his major targets and his major enemy to be Samuel Gompers and the philosophy of the American trade union movement, they of the AFL were not unprepared for the issue, and I might say that one of the most neglected documents in American diplomatic history is the memorandum filed by Samuel Gompers with President Wilson at the conference in Versailles, in which he pointed out that American postwar foreign policy in Europe was basing itself upon a foundation of sand, namely, the possibility in the existing situation in Europe of creat-

ing a democratic Germany, because, he pointed out, if we founded our policy on this assumption, as it was evident that we were going to do for the next decade, we would base it upon a rather fragile force in German society, which was unable to even maintain public order against the Communist attack, except by the invocation of the aid of the next most undemocratic force in German society, which was the German General Staff and its military force and tradition; and he pointed out that, beginning in 1917, there were elements in that General Staff which had a weakness for playing ball with the Bolsheviks and that this would recur in subsequent periods, as of course it did.

Now this warning was, I might say, completely disregarded, but Samuel Gompers was a person whose comprehension ran far beyond the problems merely of the trade union movement. He comprehended the problems of the free society and the nature of the challenge to it of the totalitarian conspiracy and procedure which Lenin had created. And it is, as I pointed out in the statement, necessary for comprehension of the purposes of such a bill as those before you to realize that in 1903 and thereafter, and based upon his thinking before that time, Lenin created something new in international operations and affairs, and that was the creation of a new type of organization known as a "party," a deceptive word to those who use the term in the Western sense, but a new type of organization which applies existing principles in a combination never before achieved. This is, to create an organization which ostensibly operates in the civilian area, among peaceful and more normally democratic groups in any society, but is itself actually military in its form, in its method of operations, and therefore is facing a group of people who are completely unprepared to carry on an equivalent operation.

I point out that the equivalent of this was in the case of the development of artillery by the German Army in 1915 to 1918, in which they developed the long-range gun—the so-called 75-mile gun—which was able to bombard Paris from the other side of the German lines. This was not done by creating a new piece of ordnance. They merely took a piece of ordnance that previously existed, reduced the size of the bore, left the powder capacity in its same proportion as it existed before, and brought to bear a new and more effective weapon.

This, essentially, is what Lenin created.

The CHAIRMAN. That was the Big Bertha.

Mr. McDOWELL. The Big Bertha. And I would offer it, I would offer the observation that, up to this present moment, we have not devised, or even set out to devise, an instrument to counter this new political invention, an evil invention, but nevertheless an effective invention, which Lenin created.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I touched on that idea yesterday, except, of course, I used a different comparison—that they created the Ministry of Propaganda. To us, that word is a dirty word, and therefore we shy away from it and we have never sought to be experts in that very field in which they use most potent "artillery" against us.

Mr. McDOWELL. I might point out, sir, that there are two elements here. Propaganda was not initially a dirty word.

The CHAIRMAN. It was not intended to be, philosophically.

Mr. McDOWELL. Historically it comes from a church institution, the Institute for the Propagation of the Faith.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, the Propagation of the Faith.

Mr. McDOWELL. But this word was given a very nasty connotation because of the obvious abuses that were used by various sides in the propaganda war which emerged in World War I, and since that time, I might say also that it is not merely in propaganda. It might be esteemed to be a fair statement that we do engage in propaganda in such an institution as that created in the Voice of America and the Information Agency. What we do not engage in, and a field where the Communists are absolutely undisputed, is in the field of agitation, which is the taking of two or three ideas at the most, and the constant reiteration and organization around those ideas for their disruptive power and purpose.

Now in this field, there is nothing that we are doing at the present. It is not a question of whether we do it better or worse than the enemy. It is a question of something that we do not do at all.

We do constantly receive, for example, elements suitable for our counteruse in this contest. I have here, and I would like to leave with the chairman for incorporation in the record, an item coming out of an African paper published in Nairobi under date of February 9 of this year. (See pp. 1079-1081.)

(At this point Mr. Clausen entered the hearing room.)

Mr. McDOWELL. This relates the terrifying experiences of an African student in Communist China, in which he comes back to give—as the newspaper headline puts it—“as Red China woos Africa, a timely warning by a young African who went to China and came away afraid . . . afraid for Africa.”

Now here is a complete item of the most valuable propaganda, and it happens to be also the truth. Yet I dare say that this, which comes to me from a young labor correspondent who is attempting to help unions in these new countries of Africa organize on a trade union basis, on the basis of the experience of the American trade union movement applied in their different circumstances, that this will not be picked up. It could be reiterated, it could be repeated over and over again. This is agitation, based upon a propaganda truth, but unless it is used and is used by the people who are most concerned, that is, not by Americans, but by those who are directly confronted with the type of experience that this young African had in Red China, it will of course be a one-shot item. It is reproduced, a few people read it, and then it is forgotten.

Given this sort of a statement based on flimsiest of facts, the Communists would be using this statement for the next 10 years. It would reappear in every type of publication in every part of the world, as of course items relating to the difficulties in American life are made to do.

I would also point out that we are not any longer in the field of theory, as far as the operation of a Freedom Academy is concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. Field of what?

Mr. McDOWELL. We are not in the field purely of theory. There is some practice now to go upon. The American labor movement gave its official support to the principle of the Freedom Academy in 1959 but, not seeing any action, undertook to actually enter the field. It created, after consultation in a good, sound basic American tradition, consultation with American management and business interests that

are concerned with Latin America, the American Institute for Free Labor Development, and this institute, in less than 2 years' time, has proceeded to create training agencies for Latin American unionists in Washington and, what is more important, in a dozen countries of Latin America itself, where this training is given to these people in the essential techniques of democratic procedure which enable them to carry on an effective organization for their own purposes, which is at the same time a solid obstacle to Communist penetration and victory in those countries. Therefore, this program, I might say, was not supported by any Government bureaucracy until it was in operation and showing its effectiveness under labor-management auspices. The bureaucracies then moved in to support it, but as is tragically true in so many instances, they then used the progress that was made in this private institution as an argument that nothing effective should be done in the even wider area involving the vast and ever-increasing student population in which I have been familiar with the Communist operations since 1929, the whole area of agricultural life, which is the framework of life of 80 percent of the population in most of the key countries in exposed positions, such as Brazil, Vietnam, and almost any area of any society and any conflict that you may mention.

The CHAIRMAN. May I interrupt at this point? And I want to make out of you the Devil's advocate that I made out of Dr. Possony yesterday. I assume that the representative of the State Department will appear in opposition to this bill. He is scheduled to appear Thursday and he will argue, I guess, to the effect that the Propaganda Ministry of the Soviets is under the dominance of the government and, therefore, the two go hand in glove.

Now, I want to ask you, How in a democracy can we separate the two? By that I mean, this bill proposes an independent agency, separated or divorced, loosely, from the foreign policy makers, and they will probably say that is difficult or impossible. They will probably say that the material, reading material, pamphlets, study courses, will be interpreted abroad as being foreign policy and that great confusion will result. I imagine they will argue along those lines. What is your answer?

Mr. McDOWELL. The answer on that is that, of course, we are two completely different societies. The Communist state—and I might say to a lesser extent the Russian state which preceded it—proceeds on the concentration of all power and all functions in a single arm, which is the state. The contrary general usage of American society is the team operation between private citizens and their organizations, working with their Government, but not as a completely dominated part of that Government, to carry out part of almost every purpose of which Government is capable, with the possible exception of military operations itself.

Now therefore, the philosophy and thinking behind the Freedom Academy bill is that of an institution that is engaged, let us remember, in teaching and in research and in information accumulation and coordination, not in operations. This is a training institution, it is a research institution, it is an information center.

(At this point Mr. Pool left the hearing room.)

Mr. McDOWELL. And its influence would, of course, be felt all along the line, because you would have, for the first time, specifically knowl-

edgeable people there at all levels, and there is no distinction today in our affairs between international affairs and national affairs when we come to this area. The line between Communist operations, nationally and internationally, is only, as I say, an artificial one which can exist in a classroom for the purposes of discussion. It does not exist in action.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, too, let me say this. I don't view this bill, and I hope nobody does, as a deliberate slap at the State Department or as an indication of wholesale mistrust, and I think that under the structure of the bill linkage with the Government is there. First, you have the Commission appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and it will run the institution. And, under the bill itself, there will also be an advisory group, drawn from all these agencies—Defense Department, the USIA, State Department, and all others—so that they would not be ignored at all, although the overriding character of the Academy would be that of an independent agency. So this is not a slap at State or other executive agencies.

You don't view it that way, do you?

Mr. McDOWELL. In no sense as a slap or reproach to any department of Government. The United States Department of State is charged with a multitude of functions, with a multitude of operations that almost defy the human mind's capacity for keeping track through one man, a Secretary of State, of what is going on, even in those things which are clearly his responsibility.

The flexibility in these Freedom Academy bills comes from the yoking of the private resources of society, which is possible through simply the furnishing of an educational and research institution. It is a combination of these factors, and the peculiar genius of the American life that you can involve the citizens' private organizations in the carrying out of functions in this area which vitally aid, without being directed specifically by, the department of Government that is charged with official functions and a series of relationships which would prevent them effectively from using such an institution for policymaking purposes that are lodged elsewhere in official Government hands.

(At this point Mr. Pool reentered the hearing room.)

The CHAIRMAN. Now, do you regard the training of personnel in the private sector, such as people in the business world and the labor field or students, and so on, here and abroad, as equal in importance with that of training professional representatives of Government in this field of anti-Communist political warfare?

Mr. McDOWELL. Yes; I believe that actually, that if you were to make an analysis of our relationships with other nations and other peoples, you would find that the majority of those relationships and connections are in the private sector, and not through the official representatives of Government.

For instance, in the area of propaganda, we realize that material, however valid, however beautifully prepared, which has the stamp of official diplomatic agencies of a government lands in the "round file" of almost any editor in almost any place on the face of the earth. That is where the most beautiful official material is consigned.

But if this material comes from a private source—let me give you, sir, an example of an incident where private citizens could deal with matters that your State Department could not enter upon.

At the time of the report of the U.N. Special Commission for investigation of the Hungarian events, this report had been completed and was prepared for submission, but an immense amount of Soviet pressure was then assembled on the various governments and their representatives who were on the Commission, and there was an agonizing delay. The Commission's report seemed to be in danger of being suppressed for lack of sufficient signatures. Now, at this critical moment, the key person in the Commission was a person who was not under such pressure but faltered for other reasons; he came from a free nation, from Australia. Faced with this difficulty, a member of our organization who had a friend in the Australian labor movement asked him what could be done. He, the Australian labor leader, simply called up his senator, who then rose on the floor of the Parliament at Canberra the next day and called attention to this situation. The government was then in a position, which it would not have been otherwise, to reiterate its strong position in favor of the submission of that report.

This was read, not in an official cable, but was read in the newspapers by the weak person at the United Nations, and in a matter of 48 hours, the Commission's report was signed by a majority of the Commission and the report was in.

Yet, I do not believe that our official diplomatic agencies could have done this sort of a thing. It would have been improper for them to do and it was only possible because there was a trained person who understood this, who had a friend in the Australian labor movement who was also trained from long and bitter experience in battling the Communists on the waterfront in Australia, who had gone to the same school, and who was, therefore, able to get the picture immediately and take action.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I have two more questions, and then I want to yield to the members.

What, do you think, is the central weakness in the past and current conduct of the defense of the free world and the defeat of communism which you believe will be repaired by the proposed legislation? What is the central weakness that this would repair?

Mr. McDOWELL. The central weakness is that we have not, as yet, an understanding of the concept of political warfare as it has been waged since Lenin secured control of a national economy and the resources of a great imperial state; and, however, ramshackle that economy may be, the resources of a government are simply of no comparison with those that any private political organization can assemble, and he put this to work on a vast, worldwide program of political warfare directed against every free country.

Now, this concept of political warfare has as yet no opposing concept in the American structure, private or public, that is responsible for defending the interests of the United States and of the free world.

What is done in this bill is a declaration of policy that explicitly sets, for the first time in a public declaration of policy, a concept of effective research and training of relevant means of opposition to the

political warfare operation which has been waged against us, with no comparable operations in return, all of these years.

Now, this actually, in the legislation, is the most effective thing, and I might cite the evidence of recognition of it on the part of all those concerned. This bill was almost ready at the Senate Judiciary end for a report in August of 1959, but when the invitation and all of the futile attendant attempts at arrangement of a standstill agreement with the Soviet Government came into existence with the Khrushchev visit, it was officially and unofficially requested that this bill not be reported at that time, because it set forth a concept which Khrushchev would recognize as a declaration of equivalent preparation to wage war in the political field, in the nonmilitary field, where he at that moment was undisputed. The bill was, therefore, held up by diplomatic representations to shelter from reality a hope that could and was always found to fail, because this declaration is so explicit and so clear in recognizing the situation and providing, for the first time in the history of this 47-year-old struggle, for an equivalent response on the part of the leader of the free world, which of necessity is the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, let me ask you a final two-pronged question. First, do you believe that more and better *private* institutions—universities—engaged in this anti-Communist operational research and training can meet the need and, second, would enactment of the Freedom Academy undercut or discourage such efforts?

Mr. McDOWELL. I do not believe that this would, in any case, be the result. The various institutions which are set up are in their nature academic. They can't put forth working instruction as to how this political warfare battle is to be carried on. Furthermore, they are like the blind man and the elephant. Each one tends to grasp hold of a different part, and academic pride being what it is, the tendency is to say that this is the whole elephant.

What is required here is a coordination, which I do not believe is now possible at this late hour, except through legislative initiative. This whole proposal, as worked out with such painful detail by the Orlando group over a period of years, was originally conceived of more than 10 years ago as something that could be done as a private operation with the gracious assent and approval of the executive department of Government, supplemented by some such governmental assistance as is now given to the proven American Institute for Free Labor Development.

In 1959, after a period of a better part of a decade, the conclusion was reached—and I believe it is a sound conclusion—that unless there is legislative initiative, and the involvement of decision on the basic policy of creating equivalents to the enemy in this political warfare operation, we can't meet the situation in time; there will not be the centralized center of information every one of these institutions could draw upon and would benefit by, and, in turn, the personnel that they both would be developing would be available for an increasing mutual support.

I might just make one reference, because I understand that, at a later date, there will be a witness discussing the matter of education in a secondary level of our public school system, something that we have been interested in through our Council Against Communist

Aggression since 1956, and I live in the State of Pennsylvania, sir, whose State Department of Public Instruction has adopted this as a policy. Superintendent of Public Instruction Boehm is a personal friend of mine. I see him about once a year and have since 1956, and each year I say to him, "What progress have you made?" And he says, "We haven't made any progress, because we haven't trained any teachers in this subject who can and will teach it," and this essentially is true at the present time, in spite of the fact that there are now 25 institutions of higher learning involved in one phase or another of this subject, a very recent and sharp increase mostly since 1959, and partly as a result of stimulation from Freedom Academy discussion and Senate passage, Gallup Poll results, etc.

There is, as yet, no place where teachers in this subject are being prepared systematically, given access to the data; and until there is this centralization and the declaration of legislative intent and purpose, which is the essential part of this measure, before it goes to implementing it in terms of institutional arrangement, until that is done, I do not think that the problem of Superintendent Boehm and other people in the departments of public instruction in the States, in the basic instructing for survival of our population in what they are dealing with, at the secondary school level, this will not be met, because you will just have the same thing, public statements of policy like that of Pennsylvania in 1956, but no teachers, no teaching, no trained pupils.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I had a similar experience, and I will relate it off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. McDOWELL. May I summarize, possibly, another point, and that is to say that in these general declarations of policy in this legislation as introduced, particularly as up to date with bills of Mr. Boggs and Mr. Taft, there is the statement of something that Americans are constantly forgetting, because the simplicity of its truth permits it to slip through their minds, namely, that the most powerful thing on the face of the earth in human affairs is ideas. These ideas need not be good ideas, sound ideas, or historically based. Neither Hitler nor Marx, who have remarkable affinities, by the way, in their origins—the philosophers of these two movements were contemporaries; they drew their philosophic inspiration from the same sources, but we do not know this or accept such facts as important. We, who put forth the Declaration of Independence, the most disturbing set of ideas that has ever been let loose on the face of the earth, which has caused more political changes and is causing more political changes today than anything that has ever been set going by the reactionary type of philosophy and of the hate organization for its promotion which is represented by Marxism-Leninism, we have forgotten this.

We are constantly forgetting it. If you call people's attention to it, they will admit for the moment that it is right, and then forget the next moment.

My friend, Rebecca West, the English novelist, when visiting my home a number of years ago, said to me in this respect, because she had done some reporting in depth on the trial of traitors in England in her book on *The Meaning Of Treason*, and she said, "We are not losing progress for mankind because truths of the fundamental sort

are too difficult for common minds, but because the important truths are so simple that we are constantly forgetting them." And today we have forgotten, and in our appropriations for all the vast panoply of foreign aid and even of military appropriations, we have forgotten that these are never effective, only except as they have an idea which they carry on.

On the other hand, the other side, which asserts in its theory that only material considerations are important, act upon the premise, which is a sound one, that ideas are the things that sway human minds and human events.

The CHAIRMAN. Governor Tuck?

Mr. TUCK. Mr. Chairman, I have no questions, but I would like to take this opportunity of commending Mr. McDowell on his very excellent and, I must say, interesting and informative and, indeed, convincing statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Pool?

Mr. POOL. I want to add to that and would also point out that I congratulate the labor movement, in general, for their patriotism. They have stayed with democratic principles through all the years. You have had some real heroes in the labor movement and, although they have been in a vulnerable spot, they have done a remarkable job. I want to make that comment.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ichord?

Mr. ICHORD. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do want to commend Mr. McDowell for the part of his statement that I have heard. I am sorry I was called out and was not able to hear the entire statement.

I would like for you to comment on a criticism of this bill by the Department of State, and I read from State's report on the bill:

Another proposed purpose of the Academy is to train operational cadres in countering Soviet Communist techniques and methods for use abroad. This is not something that can properly be done by Americans alone, and its very nature should not be a publicized operation. Publicity of the type suggested in the Academy Bill, in our view, would defeat this purpose of the program before it had begun. Soviet training of foreign communists in the techniques of organization, subversion, etc., is conducted, for example, in the highest secrecy.

This, of course, will be an overt institution. Would you comment on that, Mr. McDowell?

Mr. McDOWELL. My first comment would be that it seems to be an indication of a situation which we lament, namely, that most of these statements coming from the State Department are by people who have not read the bill, and this imposes an initial difficulty on them in making these statements.

This, in the nature of things, is not intended to be an operational procedure with all the considerations of high security and secrecy.

My own observation is that the most effective things that have been done in this field of political warfare have been done in many cases by private citizens and organizations, and there has been no secrecy about it. The last thing we wanted was secrecy. They wanted the world to know what the facts were and who stood on what side of those facts. Therefore, this, as I say, is a criticism based upon either a misreading or a reading into the bill of something not there.

Mr. ICHORD. Now, another objection was on the ground that the institution would be overburdened with duties; that it would not only have the duty of training and performing research but also in-

volutioning the activity of operating the information centers. Would you comment on that?

(At this point Mr. Tuck left the hearing room.)

Mr. McDOWELL. These functions are complementary in the sense that one serves the other. The accumulation of a centralized information center. I point out, for example, that not a single institution in the United States can refer a student to the collected works of Lenin in English. It is not available.

Now, here is a man who—whatever we may estimate his evil influence on the history of the world and its affairs—was a political genius. Let nobody deny that to a man whose method of procedure, whose devices, have enabled a group of penniless and rather contemptible-appearing exiles to build their power to the place that, in 61 years from the formal enunciation of it by Lenin at a gathering of less than 60 people in Brussels and London in 1903, has proceeded to dominate a third of the world's population and its area. This man was a genius, and yet if you are to refer a student today, you will not find, unless he reads Russian, you will not find available to him the source material on the presiding genius of the enemy—the thing which makes understandable the conduct of a Khrushchev. It is not possible, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, a very eminent bishop now told me a number of years ago that the greatest weakness of American and Western society is the decline of our respect for the importance of belief as influencing action. This was most tragically shown in the case of England confronting the totalitarian menace of Hitler in the years 1931 to 1939.

(At this point Mr. Johansen entered the hearing room.)

Mr. McDOWELL. In this time, the leaders of English thought, Mr. Dawson, the decisive editor of the *Times* of London, and Mr. Chamberlain not only had not read *Mein Kampf*, but they refused to listen to the scholars who had read it. This was literally true, and on the date that war was declared, it was also literally true that key people in the Foreign Office raced down to the library to open *Mein Kampf* for the first time in their careers, and I do not make any question that there are key people in our diplomatic operations who today, in case of contingency, would have to crack their first book on this subject, and yet the vast literature that exists is here.

Might I just simply cite one example, which was timely at the time that I appeared before the Senate Judiciary Committee? That morning, the State Department's press officer, a very competent and high-grade officer, was reporting in answer to queries what was our position on a question that had been raised before the International Olympics Committee. And his comment was the most devastating of all. He said, "We are surprised." I might say that our diplomacy's coat of arms should be two perpetually raised eyebrows in surprise.

Now, we can die of surprises. The British society almost died of surprises in 1939 when they found out what Hitler proposed, and yet which he had written out plainly all along the line.

I, therefore, pointed out that to my own personal knowledge, as early as 1932, an agency, an international Communist agency, was in Chicago, engaged in organizing propaganda around a counter-Olympics, because the Soviet at that time did not compete and, therefore, organized a propaganda operation dealing with the Olympics. Its main target was a man by the name of Avery Brundage, at that

time chairman, a businessman—a very competent, successful businessman—chairman of the American Olympics Committee. This propaganda operation against the “capitalist” Olympics was carried out in Chicago in 1932. I got involved before I knew it, and we even had a respected figure like Carl Sandburg, who was sucked in as a sponsor, and so on; but Avery Brundage is now the international chairman of the Olympics and 27 years later, neither the State Department nor Avery Brundage, who was the target of this Communist operation in 1932, knew that Communists would use an International Olympics Committee for a political maneuver.

Now, it seems overdue to give some instruction in this operation to influential businessmen who operate in private organizations as well as press officers of the State Department, who are competent in their field, but have complete lack of knowledge or interest in acquainting themselves with this background, which is the only thing which enables them to know what their chief enemy is now engaged in doing and to make sense and not perpetual surprise out of each morning's news.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Chairman, when will we hear the State Department?

The CHAIRMAN. Tomorrow.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Mr. Chairman. I am sorrier than I can tell to be late, but I want to say two things to you, sir. One is in the nature of an apology, and the other is to say something I wanted to say a long time. I apologize to you because I haven't availed myself of the privilege of getting to know you earlier. I have been an avid reader of your bulletin for a long time, and the other thing I want to say to you is that I have an immense admiration for you and the job you have been doing, and I welcome this opportunity to say so to you and to say it on the record. But I recall the fact, if memory serves me right, that the first authentic, thorough documentation of the Communist threat in this country presented to our Government was done under the aegis of Mr. William Green, president of the AFL, back about 1933.

Mr. McDOWELL. 1933.

Mr. JOHANSEN. And I want to acknowledge and pay tribute to that fact.

Mr. McDOWELL. Thank you.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. Mr. McDowell, I do not know exactly how to proceed, because I know you probably don't want to make a judgment on the matter, but I think that what is at the base of all this is a basic difference in philosophy. Would you suggest that those who would propose the Freedom Academy had a philosophy that stated that you can't do business with Communists, or that you can't coexist peacefully with them?

Mr. McDOWELL. Well, I might say, as I indicated in my statement, that I have 35 years in which I have watched every type of well-intentioned citizen, some of the best educated, some of the most finely endowed that I would ever meet, trying on various occasions, in various forms of organization or various purposes to coexist with the Communist operations, and I have seen universal disaster overtake those people individually, intellectually, and every other way. Therefore, from the basis of domestic experience, and as I warned the chairman, I am not going to compete with the experts of the State Department on firsthand knowledge of the details of the society in Zanzibar,

but I do know what the Communist operation amounts to, and there is no possibility of peaceful coexistence with them in the sense that we use it.

We must remember that this is a phrase which the Communists designed, and they give their content to it, and peaceful coexistence is now clearly defined by the most authoritative persons, namely, Mr. Khrushchev and his associates, as the most unrelenting political, economic, propaganda, and every other kind of warfare, including brush-fire wars wherever they can bring to bear military force, the exception to this relentless, constant warfare being a resort to atomic warfare.

There has been no single subtraction—except possibly since the confrontation in Cuba—there has been no subtraction from the unrelenting 100 percent warfare purpose behind every phrase and every move that the Communist international operation carries out. We are not the people who are first in formulating the ideas around this Academy, and I must point out that we came to its support when it had been almost completely developed by the painful thoughts and research and consideration of a group of patriotic young Americans who just wanted to know, initially, one thing—that group in Orlando, Florida—why 5 years after a world war, which was supposed to have destroyed totalitarianism as a force on the face of the earth, they and their comrades were being called back into service, and in some cases, in many cases, to give their lives in a new war against totalitarian aggression.

And they set out to find out. They did, and their research was so effective that their contribution drew the support, wherever, Mr. Chairman, this measure was submitted, as you will see in the sponsorship, now possible under the Senate Rules, where the same names can, of course, appear on the same bill, you will see here an amazing range of acceptance of this basic fact, based on experience. The experience is conclusive that there is no possibility of doing any business with a totalitarian regime in which, by its nature, the very existence of any free society of the most completely recumbent character in international affairs cannot be tolerated, because its very existence is a threat at any moment to their continued total rule over their own people.

It is not because they are more vicious than anyone else, but because their philosophy, their guiding and controlling belief, is such that they can't relax that desire to conquer because they would fall off their bicycle. Their total power can't be maintained unless they maintain sufficient forward movement of their totalitarian extension of power, so that they can stay on their bicycle of political power.

Once they are stopped, as Hitler could have been stopped in the spring of 1938 by the refusal of further concession of any kind and backing-up by effective British military power and the building of the Royal Air Force. We now know that a group of people who subsequently lost their heads under the most terrifying of circumstances of execution in 1944, in an attempt to assassinate and clear Hitler out of the picture, in 1938, ostensibly making a survey of British public opinion for Hitler, came to Britain and passed to the key people in government at the same time this message, "Stand fast. Give this dictator no single more concession, and announce at the same time that the Royal Air Force will be built as rapidly and as effectively as possible, and we will pledge our lives and our fate on an attempt to overthrow this demon." Chamberlain sent back word that

he wanted to deal with the "real Germans," not with such elements as this. So he dealt with them at Munich in the fall, in September of 1938, and we know the results: World War II.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. And this is the next question which I was going to ask, but you may not want to answer it, and you don't have to, if you don't wish. I am going to ask it when the State Department is here. What do you think our policy has been toward communism? Has it been one of accommodation, or not necessarily of embracing it but one of feeling that we can coexist?

Mr. McDOWELL. I think that from the beginning of the Kennan memorandum, the most advanced position that our diplomacy has ever attained was the concept of containment. That is, the containment within the existing lines to which it had attained by the overthrow beyond the level of its actual military control of the Czechoslovakian Republic in 1948. This policy actually, for a period, was fairly successful, although it had to be carried out in the case of Korea by meeting military aggression as military alone can be met, by effective, overwhelming force.

But specifically, that policy collapsed, I would say, since the capture of Cuba by the Communist force, by new devices, because they are constantly working out new devices. I might say, Mr. Chairman, that I asked the representative of the AFL-CIO in Latin American affairs in August of 1959, while the *New York Times* was still carrying reinsurance that Castro was no Communist and no Communist was in any influential position in the Castro government, I asked Mr. Serafino Romualdi to describe to me what was happening in Cuba. Mr. Romualdi, because of his knowledge and background, was singled out by the Castro government in its first months by a special order February 7, 1959, which forbade him to enter Cuba. Unfortunately he previously suffered a heart attack, and the significance of his barring was never developed in terms of the public press, nor was there anyone in the regional desk of the State Department who could understand or care about the meaning of this exclusion order.

Anyhow, the public press isn't interested. The press has a concept of news based on the old concept of "man bites dog." Now, when Communists oppress and attack, this is not news, this is their character, because this is a case of dog biting man. Therefore, by definition, it is not news. Only that is news which appears to be news in the other direction. Therefore, there was no press attention to this, and they didn't have a correspondent in a carload who would have understood its significance in any case.

Mr. Romualdi said to me very quickly, "What we have in Cuba is black communism." I said, "What do you mean by 'black communism?'" He said, "It is a Communist operation which does not initially openly attack the church, for example. It awaits its time; it prepares to destroy the middle class, which is the sole major source of possible future opposition activity to challenge it and overthrow it when its real nature becomes obvious, and it quickly paralyzes or seizes the labor movement. When it has destroyed in Cuban society, all of the elements, either by execution or by exile, those elements who by their nature and training and equipment are in a position to be the source of opposition, it will then declare itself in its full panoply of color, but it now is what we call 'black communism,' communism which conceals its purpose, evades the conflict, for instance,

with the main religious institutions, but the character of it is, of course, the same color all along.”

Now, this analysis was given to me up at Unity House, Pa., during the course of an executive council meeting of the AFL-CIO, by Mr. Romualdi, in August 1959 before the labor movement of Cuba was seized. Therefore, we know that the people who understand and have the relevant experience across the years are relatively few, of which of course there is a high proportion of people in the trade union movement, because we were the first major target. From the beginning, Lenin, as early as 1895, from his observation of even the fragmentary unions that had taken form and had led a very precarious, semilegal life in Czarist society, declared in his private writings, of which there is no English translation, that the trade union movement, if left to itself, would concern itself with the improvement of its members' conditions and would become an obstacle to his revolutionary purpose, and, therefore, the trade union movement in any society in which his militarily disciplined Communists moved in must be subverted and taken over and completely dictated to and controlled by his political clique, the Communist Party. Otherwise, the trade union movement, if it is left just to follow its own devices, would, of course, refute both Marx and Lenin and become the major obstacles to revolutionary enterprise.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. I just close, Mr. Chairman, by saying that while I certainly would see no reason for not having the Academy because of this, there still would be a basic need for an adjustment between two very separate points of view, one teaching the facts about communism, the other that would be the official policy of the Government, which would state that we can do business with them.

Mr. McDOWELL. I might say in further comment, sir, that I can't mention his name, because it would be a breach of confidence, but the Ambassador from a very important allied country, which has the largest Communist Party in Europe, after 5 years in Washington, met the president of my union and myself just as he was about to leave the U.S.

He had been his country's envoy, the first envoy to Soviet Russia after the war. He had had firsthand observation and experience and, as he shook hands with us in farewell on that day in Philadelphia, he said: "We can only survive, not with the creation of some vast, secret, or impressive apparatus to match the Communists, but only insofar as we create and teach more people like ourselves, tough-minded and informed, who know each other, who realize that our understanding of the foe is fundamental, and who can therefore communicate as free men do in free societies and take those simple actions which frustrate the purpose of this totalitarian foe, who is not 10 feet tall, but whose method of procedure gives us no chance at the old-fashioned diplomatic level, because he has devised a method of military-type operation against which we are essentially in civilian formations. And until we repair that by training personnel, not only here—and it must start here—but wherever free men reside and desire to struggle for their freedom, until that time comes, we will continue to lose unworthily, because we are fighting a bad idea, a discredited idea, we are fighting an economic order that is a ramshackle one that is constantly having to be propped up by our resources at critical points, but we are losing because outside of your new chief of protocol I meet

no one who really has studied and comprehends the special and peculiar nature of the Communist foe.

"And it is not always bad to lose. Defeat is possible in the best of causes. But to lose when the resources on your side are in every sense of ideas and of economic organization, to lose there, that indeed is shameful and frustrating, and that's what we are doing at the present time."

Mr. JOHANSEN. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SCHADEBERG. Yes, I will yield.

Mr. JOHANSEN. The greatest area of my concern, and I welcome your comment on it—and my colleague has, I think, come very close to it—is it your judgment that it is possible, and how is it possible, to set this up as an independent agency, doing the very necessary job, and yet keep it free of control by official foreign policy considerations? In other words, can this agency be set up in a fashion that it will be doing a job perhaps opposite to the stated policy of the United States Government, if that policy is one of peaceful coexistence or of relieving or avoiding tensions?

Mr. McDOWELL. Well, let me say in the first place, to come back to the point that this is not an operational agency. It is to provide personnel with the information and the understanding that enables them in their individual capacities to do work without being coached, directed, or dominated. Now, this can only be done—and we have a tradition, sir, of a certain amount of respect for the integrity of educational institutions created for this purpose. The Congress even created an institution such as Howard University, early in its history, and this university serves a purpose which public policy agreed to, but it is not run by the Government in that sense. Therefore, I think that it is possible. We have sought the analogies wherever we could find them in such things as the Atomic Energy Commission, and I might point out that in that Commission there was a time when the most vital questions of policy, which certainly involved the State Department, had to be fought out between points of view, and fortunately the realistic policy triumphed, and I remember the expression of an individual who has strayed down some strange paths in his individual political operations since, but I remember Harold Urey got up and told a group of very astonished liberal people in January 1950 that he had been for the development of the H-bomb, and he said, "If you ask me why I was for it, I will give you the simple answer: That knowing what would be the consequences if we did not develop it, and the totalitarian power did, we know the consequences," and he said, "I happen to be a simple, corny believer in Patrick Henry's formula which says, 'Give me liberty or give me death.'"

(At this point Mr. Pool left the hearing room.)

Mr. McDOWELL. And that is an answer on this.

The CHAIRMAN. It is now a couple of minutes to 12. I know the reporter's fingers must be twitchy. And so we will stand in recess until quarter to 2.

Thank you very much, you have been very impressive, indeed.

Mr. McDOWELL. Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 12 m. Wednesday, February 19, 1964, the committee recessed, to reconvene at 1:45 p.m. the same day.)

(The article submitted by Mr. McDowell follows:)

[Time Off, Nairobi, Kenya, Feb. 9, 1964]

IMPERIALISTS COME IN ALL COLOURS

EMMANUEL John Hevi is a 31-year-old African who went to China in search of all the answers.

He found none. But he found the cruellest racial discrimination.

He found awesome waste, inefficiency and a relentless exploitation of the people by the State machine. So, with 118 other African students who spent 18 months in Peking, he packed and left.

Now his book, *An African Student in China* (Pall Mall Press), is a warning to all Africans — a timely one when President Nkrumah is staging a referendum to secure a one-party State, and President Nyerere appoints a commission to study the same panacea.

Hevi and his friends found China's racialism worse than any in the West because it was NOT spontaneous, but imposed by the party.

Tried

They had only to dance with a Chinese girl to ensure she would be "packed off to prison or commune farms for hard labour." They tried to meet in parks — but how do you disguise a black skin among the yellow?

Hevi publishes a declaration by Zanzibar students: "We are

not allowed to make friends of both sexes here in Peking. The Chinese authorities' excuse has been that they do not allow prostitution."

They added: "We are looked down upon; we are regarded more as animals than as human beings. It is a crime for Africans to enter some hotels and shops here in Peking."

The showdown came in March 1962. A Zanzibari student was refused service in the Peace Hotel. He argued. Porters began beating him. Two other Zanzibaris, a man and wife working for Radio Peking, heard his screams and investigated. They, too, were beaten.

Hevi holds no brief for Western capitalist criticism of Communism. He stands solely on the conviction that the individual is supreme. . . . The kind of system I saw practised in China is an insult at once to the body and mind of a people supposed to be free and sovereign."

The African students found the Chinese people reduced to the status of "weak animals brutally tamed by boss animals." They were appalled at the sight of everyone in blue cotton — a device, they concluded, to eliminate individualism.

And they discovered that China is no classless society, but one divided into:

FIRST, the Boss Class, Government leaders who could get anything they desired which was obtainable in the country;

SECONDLY, the Gentry, mostly party members running universities or factories, with cars, allowances, better food, the right to special shops;

THIRDLY, the new Middle Class, rank-and-file party members (16 million);

Finally, the Masses, everyone not in the party — "underfed, ill-clothed, it is for them that the most back-breaking tasks are reserved in the name of that Communist system which is supposed to have been adopted for their special benefit."

Constantly exhorted to collective action and thought, the Africans never felt they belonged to a corporate life. No debating clubs — only the Communist Youth League. And hygiene so bad most of them walked miles to sedge a bath from their respective Embassies.

Miserable

The miserable Chinese students lived eight to a room, shared one bath-house between

5,000, were always hungry. The cloth ration — a mere two feet a year — was wholly inadequate against Peking's winter.

The Africans found the people's communes a flop, the most prized possession a foreign import. They left feeling it was "we Africans who must civilise the Chinese, not vice versa."

And the only memory they took with them — after going on hunger strike to get out — was the enduring image of the State's exploitation of the individual.

Hevi and his friends may not have found all the answers but they did learn what they do not want for Africa.

"God forbid that the people of any part of Africa should ever have to suffer the abject humiliation which is now the lot of the masses in China," he warns.

"We must defend our continent against imperialists. But we need to bring our definition of 'imperialism' up to date. We have to realise that imperialists come in all colours: white, yellow and black; yes, even black!"

As Red China woos Africa, a timely warning by a young African who went to China and came away afraid . . . afraid for Africa.



AFTERNOON SESSION—WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 1964

(The committee reconvened at 2:30 p.m., Hon. Edwin E. Willis, chairman, presiding.)

(Committee members present: Representatives Willis and Pool.)

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

I think it has been understood among the witnesses that we might call Dr. Atkinson at this time.

Doctor, I wish you would give some background information about yourself and the capacity in which you appear.

STATEMENT OF JAMES D. ATKINSON

Dr. ATKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I am associate professor of government at Georgetown University and I have been a member of its faculty since 1946. I am also a research associate in the Georgetown Center for Strategic Studies, which is headed by Admiral Arleigh Burke.

From 1950 to 1954, I served as director of the psychological warfare course, a special course conducted, under contract with the Department of Defense, for the Armed Forces by the Georgetown Graduate School.

In the past, I have served, for example, during the latter part of the Truman administration, as a consultant to the Psychological Strategy Board and, at various times, to the Research Analysis Corporation, formerly Operations Research Office, the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and to other Government agencies.

During the summers of 1959 to 1960, I was a member of the faculty of the National War College for the Defense Strategy Seminars.

I have also lectured at various times at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, the Army War College, the Air War College, the Strategic Intelligence School, the Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, and also at the National Defense College of Canada, for 2 different years.

I have had a large number of articles published in professional and service journals, and I have contributed to the following books: *Soviet Total War*, which was a publication of the House Committee on Un-American Activities and to which a large number of scholars throughout the United States contributed; *Seemacht Heute*, which was published in Germany a few years ago; *American Strategy for the Nuclear Age*; *National Security: Political, Military, and Economic Strategies in the Decade Ahead*; and other books.

My own book, *The Edge of War*, has recently been translated and published in Germany under the title *Bis Zum Flammenrand des Krieges*.

I am currently president of the American Military Institute, a member of the board of visitors of the Freedoms Foundation at Valley Forge, of the editorial board of *World Affairs*, and a fellow in the Company of Military Collectors and Historians.

From 1955 to 1960, I served as a member of the advisory board of directors of the Association of the United States Army.

I am also a member of the American Political Science Association and other scholarly organizations.

My military service is as follows: I was commissioned in the Infantry in 1940, following which I served in the Military Intelligence Division of the Army, in the European theater, through World War II, and I am currently a colonel in the Intelligence Reserve and have commanded a Strategic Intelligence unit since 1947 to the present time.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you proceed with your statement?

Dr. ATKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. Chairman, I have no formal statement to read, as such, but I do have a few points which may be of interest to you, and I would like to begin by reading for the record some quotations from the Soviet press and from the official Soviet news agency Tass to illustrate the point that not only in the past, but very currently, the Soviet Union and other Communist states with which it is associated, such as Castro's Cuba, view the situation that we are in now as a state of neither overt war nor yet of actual peace.

Rather, they look at it as a kind of ill-defined gray area, in which there is a constant conflict in the political sphere, in the psychological sphere, in the economic sphere, in the diplomatic sphere.

In other words, they look at this as an unceasing form of struggle with all the non-Communist states in the world, especially the leader of those states, the United States.

I think this is very germane to your committee, sir, because it seems to me that the proposal for the Freedom Academy is aimed at meeting—certainly not meeting alone, of course, but aimed at meeting in an important way—one of the things which has been raised by this new kind of struggle, which is neither war nor peace, but a mixture of the two.

And it seems to me that in the past, perhaps—I may be quite wrong—the United States has tended to suffer from the fact that we have approached this kind of psychopolitical struggle, which is going on in the form, let's say, of economic struggle in various parts of the world, of penetration and subversion, as the recent takeover in Zanzibar, as riots and demonstrations, as we saw the hand of the Communists in the Panama incident, as guerrilla warfare in Vietnam, et cetera—that this entire spectrum of neither war nor peace, this new kind of struggle, has tended at times to take Americans at a disadvantage because we have not really any organized body to develop the kind of professional competence to which the Communists, whatever their faults may be—and I certainly view them as large—but whatever their faults may be, I think if we are wise, we can also learn from them. They have approached this struggle from the standpoint of developing cadres who are professionally competent to carry out all these multiform activities of neither war nor peace.

And this, it seems to me, is why it is germane to make a few of these remarks with respect to the Soviet and general Communist approach to this kind of struggle and to relate it to the bill which is before your committee to establish some kind of professional organization for training that would attempt to develop American assets to counter this.

Let me begin by reading a quotation from Suslov. Mr. Suslov is a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. And some writers in this country give him credit for

masterminding the Zanzibar coup. Certainly, he has a long record of professional competence in the field.

Speaking in Moscow, February 5, 1962, Mr. Suslov, who is the chief theoretician for Premier Khrushchev and for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, said, and I quote:

Any reconciliation or compromise, even temporarily, with bourgeois ideology, either in internal or external spheres, is impossible.

Now, the translation of that from the jargon of communism is that the Communists intend to carry on an unceasing struggle with the non-Communist countries, and of course principally with the one they have denominated the No. 1 target, the United States, in all forms of political, economic, psychological, social, et cetera, struggle, everything short of overt nuclear war, which of course they want to avoid, because they realize quite well that our American society is structured in such a way that we usually face up to an overt situation of war, an open, declared kind of situation.

Our society, our whole democratic processes are structured so that we can meet that pretty well, as our enemies in the past have testified. Our society, however, is less well structured—and here I think, again, one may say it is germane to indicate that the bill before your committee for the creation of this kind of training organization, Freedom Academy, would help—it would not be a panacea, but it would help—better to structure our society to meet this kind of less-than-overt war challenge.

Let me quote secondly, if I may, from a recent statement of Anastas Mikoyan, the Soviet leg-man, as you know, of Mr. Khrushchev, who came to Cuba during the missile crisis, et cetera. On January the 2d, 1964, at a reception in the Cuban Embassy in Moscow, Mr. Mikoyan said:

The Cuban revolution is important for all countries of Latin America. It testifies to the great force of the ideas of Marx, Engels, Lenin.

Here, again, he is giving you, I believe quite clearly, the pattern of unconventional warfare, that is, of subversion, of intelligence operations, of sabotage, of propaganda, of stirring up social unrest, rioting, and so on, of which we have already seen an indication in Panama, and unfortunately I fear that we are to see many other indications before we are much older.

Finally, let me quote from Premier Khrushchev himself. Speaking in January in an important address, which was published in *Pravda*, the newspaper, the official paper, indeed, of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, published as an editorial in *Pravda*, January 24, 1964—Khrushchev said, and I quote:

Although Cuba and the Soviet Union are in different hemispheres and the distance between them is measured by thousands of kilometers, our people march along the same Leninist road in the common ranks of the socialist states. We all have common aims and common interests, which unite and bring together the people of socialist countries.

Again, to translate from the jargon of communism, what he is saying, of course, quite clearly, is that the Soviet bloc, in cooperation with Castro and in cooperation with Communists throughout the world, will use every device they can, front organizations such as the World Federation of Trade Unions, front organizations such as the

World Federation of Teachers Unions, which, incidentally, is currently very active in Latin America, attempting to discredit the United States in every way. These organizations, saboteurs, espionage operations, both overt and covert propaganda, psychological operations, all of these things, of course, in a grand design gradually to whittle away at the power of the country that is most capable of resisting them, that is, the Soviet Union using this approach toward the United States in an attempt gradually to isolate, to whittle away, to reduce its power, and perhaps most of all to reduce its will; in other words, its guts, its determination, to carry on this struggle.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for the privilege of being able to give these few remarks.

(At this point Mr. Schadeberg entered the hearing room.)

The CHAIRMAN. And you view the Academy proposed by this bill as an answer to this gap in our policy in this cold war period, or this period between cold and hot war? You believe the Academy would be a step in the right direction?

Dr. ATKINSON. Yes, sir; I think that is well put, what you have said, that it would be a step. In fact, I think one might almost say that it would be a decisive step in the right direction, to organize and train the kind of professional expertise that I think we badly need to give a focus for this.

It seems to me this would be one of the principal contributions which the Freedom Academy would make, that you would have there people who could give the proper focus, the right kind of training, above all, the understanding, of how to meet what is essentially a new kind of warfare.

So often in the past, we Americans—perhaps it is one of the defects of our qualities—have associated warfare with overt fighting, with an overt declaration of war. And I think many of us have taken a long time to come to understand that what the Communists are carrying on now is a rather new kind of warfare, but that it is just as real, just as deadly.

If you organize a mob, let's say, to tear down the American flag in Panama, to burn the automobiles of American citizens, to stone Americans, to discredit Americans, really you are carrying on acts of warfare which, if you can keep the momentum going successfully around the world, will just as surely bring down your adversary as though you dropped nuclear weapons on him.

The CHAIRMAN. The point is that you think that the bill before us is a vehicle upon which we can ride the crest of this trouble, that the present U.S. mechanism for conducting this period of cold war is defective, and that the Academy would be a better approach?

Dr. ATKINSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We can all agree on what you and I have been saying, but now we propose to build a bridge, to build a structure, to devise a procedure, to create an instrument, to do the job. And you think the bill would do it?

Dr. ATKINSON. Mr. Chairman, as I said earlier, I certainly do not view the bill as a panacea, as an honest opinion, but I do believe that it would be a very distinct contribution to building this bridge.

May I take a little of your time to point out to you something that I think is relevant?

On page 7 of the bill, you have :

The private sector must understand how it can participate in the global struggle in a sustained and systematic manner.

That is, how to bring the private sector, which is always important in America, into the struggle which we have not chosen, but which the Soviets have chosen, to conduct and which we must, of course, meet and win.

Now, if I may use a little illustration of how valuable something like the Freedom Academy could be: Here is a coloring book. It is called the *Sing Along With Khrushchev* coloring book. And you may like to take a look at it.

This little book was put out on a shoestring by a few Hungarian emigres, people who had to flee their own country at the time of the Soviet crushing of the Hungarian people's uprising in 1956. It was put out on a shoestring with their own money, illustrated by a Hungarian emigre artist, the text written by Dr. Fabian.

This is one of the things. It is a very tiny thing, although it makes you very proud, I think, to be an American, to realize that people are sufficiently devoted to their country that they will take their own resources and just a little bit of effort on their own, a mere shoestring, to try to do something to make the country realize what kind of warfare, what kind of situation, we face.

Now, if this represents a tiny effort, and of course it does, a very minuscule one, it seems to me that it is very relevant to indicate the point made on page 7 of the bill, about the importance of the private sector and how it can be brought into the struggle, to illustrate how, if you had an organization such as the Freedom Academy and the Freedom Commission to coordinate research, it would assist various parts of the private sector that are doing things of this kind.

And I cite this, as I say, deliberately, as a very tiny example. It seems to me that here alone, if you did nothing else, you would be creating a service.

I think that you would be doing much more than this, certainly. In, for example, the teaching profession, I can see that the Freedom Academy and Freedom Commission could do a very important work in helping to combat such organizations as the World Federation of Teachers Unions, which is a Communist-front organization operating out of headquarters in Prague, Czechoslovakia, and could aid the private sector, teachers in this country and elsewhere, in combating organizations of this kind.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. We appreciate your appearance.

Dr. ATKINSON. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is Mr. Cunningham with us?

I understand Mr. Cunningham is a high school teacher from Naples, Florida, who has been engaged for several years in teaching about communism. That is the kind of a witness I think we need for the record at this time.

Glad to have you, Mr. Cunningham. We want to hear from you.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM J. CUNNINGHAM

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen of the Committee: I consider it an honor and a privilege to appear here today in order to testify on behalf of the Freedom Academy bill.

My name is William J. Cunningham, and I am a high school teacher from Naples, Florida.

I am here, not as an expert on any of the numerous facets of the cold war, but as a private American citizen who is vitally concerned about the future of his country.

Although I have studied the contents and background of the major Academy bills and although I am fully aware of the variety of opinions concerning the specific characteristics of each bill, I shall confine my presentation to the support of that provision in the Freedom Academy proposal with which I am most directly concerned: namely, section 2, article (a), paragraph (7), subsections IV and V, which relate to the participation of the private sector in the Freedom Academy proposal.

As I studied the statements of those who testified last spring before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, I became very much concerned over the doubts expressed by several witnesses concerning the wisdom of including the private sector in the Freedom Academy's proposal.

I am firmly convinced that the potential contributions of this element to the comprehensive effectiveness of our Nation's efforts to reverse the tides of the cold war should not, *must* not, be ignored.

Much of the preceding testimony has dealt with the pros and cons of the various aspects of the Freedom Academy on general terms. I would like to discuss the merits of private-sector participation from a somewhat different perspective, that of a participating individual.

With your permission, I would like to submit a statement based upon my own experiences and observations of the past 2 years as a teacher and as an American citizen. I hope that the ensuing remarks will, in some way, substantiate the convictions held by those who maintain that we can no longer ignore the capacity of the private sector to contribute to our total cold war effort.

In September of 1962 I accepted a teaching position in Immokalee High School in Collier County, Florida. As a history teacher, I was asked to participate in an instructional program authorized by the Florida Legislature in the fall of 1962.

This program requires that every graduate of a public high school in Florida receive a minimum of 30 hours of instruction in a course entitled "Americanism versus Communism." The key objectives of this course are: to recreate an awareness and respect for American history, patriotism, and tradition; to develop an understanding of the true nature of communism; and to encourage the development of an intellectual renaissance related to the unique characteristics of both Americanism and communism.

(At this point Mr. Ashbrook entered the hearing room.)

When I accepted this teaching assignment, I knew that before I could feel competent as an instructor, I would have to do a considerable amount of research and study in order to expand my previously acquired knowledge about this topic.

I soon found myself immersed in a research project which consumed an average of 3 to 4 hours daily. As is frequently the case in such situations, the more I learned, the more I realized how much I did not know.

I became increasingly interested in the subject matter, and also in the philosophy and reasoning behind the enactment of this law by the State legislature. In New Jersey, where I had taught for 5 years, many schools, fearing public censure or misunderstanding, conscientiously avoided the subject entirely. I discovered that Florida was actively participating in a rapidly expanding program designed to eliminate the stigma attached to instructional, informative education about communism.

Furthermore, emphasis was to be placed upon the numerous rights, privileges, and traditions of our people, the same rights, privileges, and traditions that are frequently taken for granted—or worse, ignored.

The persistent and insidious challenge of communism, particularly toward the young, makes it both imperative and mandatory that we, as a nation dedicated to democratic concepts and the inherent rights of the individual, invoke measures capable of dispelling the apathy which permeates our society.

A year ago I agreed with these ideas in principle, but I could not be totally convinced of their validity without exposing them to the realities of the classroom. Today, after a variety of related experiences, skepticism has vanished.

I introduced the subject in my American and world history classes by commenting upon various international situations that were appearing daily in newspapers and in other news media. The students complained that newspapers were scarce in their relatively isolated community. To insure the availability of a daily news source, they wrote to the *Miami Herald*, 120 miles distant, and explained their problem. The following Monday, and on every school day thereafter, 57 copies of the *Herald* were delivered to the high school for my history students.

They began to study the newspapers, to listen to expressed opinions on radio and television, and to seek additional viewpoints from a variety of responsible sources. Gradually, individual opinions emerged as they critically accepted or rejected statements expressed in the news media. They were beginning to fulfill the responsibilities incumbent upon citizens of a free democracy.

The most impressive example of this newly acquired interest in international affairs was their reaction to the highly controversial Cuban issue of the fall of 1962. Before President Kennedy's nationwide address, the two history classes had become deeply interested in the problem and the variety of proposed solutions. Many had begun to formulate their own opinions, others had espoused one or another of the publicized viewpoints, most were able to justify their positions intelligently.

The morning after the President's address, I was greeted by a group of students bursting with opinions and questions. They were proud of the fact that they knew and understood the developments which led to this crisis.

As I listened to their comments, their questions, their differences of opinions, and their individual reactions, I experienced a glow of satisfaction that perhaps only other teachers could fully understand. This is the kind of intellectual and enthusiastic response that lent strong impetus to my own desire for further knowledge and comprehension of these problems.

As the year progressed, study intensified, and these youngsters eagerly responded to the challenge. They struggled to understand strategy and tactics foreign to their natures, and the traditional concepts of American democracy gained new and increased significance as they probed and questioned and sought answers to the world problems facing our Government and our people. It was working and learning with these youngsters that led me to consider graduate work in this field.

Teaching Americanism versus Communism in Immokalee High School initially aroused and strengthened my interest in this area of cold war education, but there have been two subsequent events which have served to sustain and further my efforts.

In June of last year, the Naples Civic Association asked me to attend Governor Bryant's Conference on Cold War Education as an educator representing Collier County. This conference held in Tampa, Florida, June 12, 13, 14, and 15, 1963, was sponsored by the Florida Center for Cold War Education and, acting as secretariat, the Institute of American Strategy.

Brought together for participation in this conference were key leaders from colleges, universities, secondary schools, State boards of education, labor organizations, businesses, and private, civic, and religious groups from all sections of the country.

As I listened to each of the 68 speakers contribute to the central theme of the conference, I was impressed by the degree of representation attained during the 4-day conference and by the extent to which this concept had been endorsed by leaders in so many diversified areas. Intellectual growth and the renewed enthusiasm engendered by this experience provided the impetus for the third contributing factor in my own progress.

After listening to several approaches to the problem of educating adults in this field, I suggested to Lewis Predmore, the director of adult education in Collier County, that I would like to organize and conduct an adult class in Naples.

As a result of his cooperation and encouragement and the support of several civic leaders, this idea has become a reality. I feel that the interest and concern expressed by those adults who attend this class are indicative of the gradually increasing public interest in foreign affairs and other related problems.

The participation of these people in this pilot program has provided me with an additional incentive to increase my qualifications as an instructor.

A further opportunity to contribute to the concept of cold war education resulted from the establishment of this class. The manager of our local radio station asked me to appear as a guest on his program in order to discuss the details and objectives of the course and to comment on its content.

At the conclusion of this program, he offered to allocate a weekly half hour of his programming time if I would present the various aspects of cold war education to his listeners as a public service. I consider his recognition of the importance of this topic to be indicative of the increased concern of many leading citizens over the absence of public reaction to these provocative issues. I have willingly accepted the responsibilities incumbent upon the presentation of such a program because of my desire to contribute to the dissemination of knowledge vital to the purposeful existence of our society.

I might add that partially as a result of these efforts, several leading citizens in Naples, upon hearing of my proposed trip to Washington to appear at these hearings, were interested enough to contribute to a fund established by one or two individuals in order to defray the expenses which this trip incurred.

In spite of this encouraging response from some of our local citizens, I believe that our community is just beginning to gain momentum in its increased awareness of the significance of these cold war issues and, although circumstances and my own interest have led to my present involvement with these problems, I am acutely aware of my shortcomings.

My knowledge has been painfully gleaned from a combination of self-study, observation, analysis, and experience. In an attempt to fill the gap resulting from a lack of formal training, I have applied for a fellowship which would permit me to expand my limited training in this field. The list of selected fellows will be released some time this month. May I say that, as a representative of the private sector, I would certainly welcome an opportunity to attend the Freedom Academy.

As a result of my experiences and contacts with young people and adults, I have drawn a number of conclusions which I would like to submit for your consideration.

In working with high school students in this area of Americanism versus Communism, two facts became obvious. First, the students displayed an immediate and sincere interest in learning about communism. Motivation was no problem, because they wanted to know.

Second, as they learned the realities of communism, they began to see their own way of life in a brand-new perspective. They became vitally concerned over the ignorance and apathy of many adults. They became indignant at reports of limited voter participation in any kind of an election.

In short, they recognized the value and importance of a free and democratic government, but more important, they realized that maintaining it is the full-time responsibility of each individual citizen.

Isn't this the kind of attitude that must be developed among our youthful citizens? I believe that an intelligently administered program of education about communism is an excellent means of blunting the sharply honed instrument of Communist propaganda as well as strengthening the internal structures of our own democratic way of life.

I believe, further, that if we, as a nation, make a concerted effort to disseminate accurate and vital information concerning the true nature of the threat posed by Communist ideology, that we will not only strengthen our cold war capabilities, but we shall also disperse

much of the public apathy which seemingly permeates our society.

Previously, others have spoken about the importance of educating Government employees in this area of political warfare. They have discussed the value of educating foreign nationals. I believe that both of these programs are important. But how can our Nation afford to bypass or ignore the very source of its strength and endurance?

The United States was founded by citizens from the private sector. Its entire history of progress and accomplishment is proudly based upon the worth of the individual. In World War II the Government immediately began to mobilize the resources of the private sector, because it was obvious that the total resources of our Nation would be needed for victory.

Men, women, and children responded, and the tremendous impact created by this unity of purpose astounded the world. Americans have always been willing to come to the aid of their country, but they must know that their aid is needed and they must know more about what they can do.

There has been considerable criticism directed at our society because of its apparent apathy and preoccupation with individual problems. It seems to me that the quickest way to unify our Nation and strengthen its democracy is to stop lulling people into a false sense of security by assuring them that things are really well under control.

Our Nation must develop a sense of national urgency and must convey this attitude to its people. If we are going to compensate for 19 years of blissful inactivity and unawareness, then we need the aid and cooperation of all Americans. Our Government must show that it has not lost confidence in our people and their wisdom, their strength, their resourcefulness.

If the people were anxious and willing to accept Government coordination and assistance to preserve their freedom in World War II, isn't it logical to assume that the same source of strength and enthusiasm can be tapped again?

Private citizens such as myself are fighting an uphill battle. We must constantly overcome the lack of concern fostered by platitudes, assurances, and inaction. It is difficult to generate enthusiasm when the great majority of Americans do not even understand communism, let alone its potential danger.

If, through the Freedom Academy, enough interested Americans can learn how to impress their fellow citizens with the magnitude and significance of the cold war struggle, and if they can learn how to assist the numerous elements of the private sector in constructively utilizing their vast potential, then our Nation will be efficiently and effectively operating in its best democratic traditions.

Many Americans want to know what they can do to help. Many others, like myself, are helping as much as possible in isolated areas, in projects large or small. But combating such a complex concept as communism is not something that can be done on a spur-of-the-moment, part-time basis.

When to this already herculean task you must add the problems of widespread ignorance and misunderstanding and the ensuing indifference which follows, the task appears overwhelmingly difficult. Without the national endorsement and encouragement of our Federal Government, those who speak up become mere voices in the wilderness.

The dominant reason for this lack of concern stems largely from the fact that people feel if Congress, the State Department, and other Federal branches and agencies are not concerned enough to do something, why should they have to worry about it? It becomes extremely difficult to refute this kind of logic.

I mentioned earlier that many individuals and organizations are trying to help. Even many State governments are encouraging and supporting cold war education projects. But consider the scatter-gun effectiveness of such an approach, and temper the evaluation with the knowledge that these projects are suffering from one or all of the following deficiencies: lack of financial support, a lack of competent personnel, a lack of material and informational resources, and an audience which is frequently apathetic, occasionally antagonistic.

Under these circumstances, the total effectiveness of such efforts cannot be commensurate with their potential.

I believe that the very existence of the Freedom Academy will generate a realistic and determined reaction on the part of the private sector, simply because it will be impressive evidence of our Government's recognition of the dangers of political warfare, as well as tangible proof of a dedicated and sincere effort to do something about it.

I believe it will encourage existing programs to increase their efforts and, even more important, I believe it will help not just our people, but people everywhere to realize that our Nation understands, finally, that all is not well with the world and that we intend to do something about it.

If, on the other hand, such an academy ignores the private sector and fails to provide for such students in its program, I believe that it will not only fail to capitalize on a significant source of talent and strength, but it will be indirectly undermining its whole program.

Is it reasonable to assume that we can successfully cope with cold war issues abroad if the very heart of our Nation remains uninformed, confused, misled, or generally indifferent? Isn't it axiomatic that the true strength of our Nation has always been derived from its people?

Certainly conditions in the world today would seem to demand that now, more than ever, our Nation should let the world know that our form of government still relies on the wisdom and participation of its basic component—the average American citizen.

Time and again in our sometimes turbulent history, this Nation has successfully answered the most awesome of challenges. Time and again its victories have resulted from the invaluable cooperation of its private citizens.

The challenge which faces our Government today is perhaps greater than any of the others, but let us not forget that in a nation whose Government has never been divorced from the people, they must face the challenge together. This unique combination has never lost a contest, and as long as each element respects the ability and wisdom of the other, our Nation cannot fail.

Therefore, I believe it is incumbent upon the one to display its confidence in the other. I sincerely hope that any academy proposal will reaffirm our Government's faith in our people by providing adequately for the participation and cooperation of the private sector.

Thank you, gentlemen, for your kind attention.

This concludes my prepared statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, sir, you have provided one of the most inspiring statements that has come before us thus far.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I am aware of the work of you people in Florida. In fact, I attended the Cold War Conference that you spoke about.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. I realize that you did, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You have confidence in our ability to do something in this area, and yet your words indicate a certain sense of frustration, that I myself share, frankly.

We live in an age of shortcut, rigid expressions. Our minds are half made up before we hear the evidence. Sometimes we do not care about what the evidence is going to be. We have a feeling about what should be done and we pay little attention to the record. I do not propose to act that way.

I have heard statements that the State Department is honeycombed with Communists. "Investigate that source." That is one way to look at it. Then, from the State Department's point of view, emanate such expressions as: "Well, the State Department is the only instrumentality of Government that knows anything about this thing, and everyone who wants to get into it is after publicity headlines and wants to reincarnate McCarthyism."

Then you have some who say: "Well, the only way to do it is to fight it out, just the way we have conducted our wars in the past. Therefore let's get it over with."

Almost every approach that I have run across contains this idea: Our minds are made up. We know better. So why listen to the evidence?

I was glad to hear you talk about confidence and faith and the partnership with the private sector. Let's try to cope with it.

Those are not questions, but now I want to ask you a few questions.

I want to reiterate that I share your unexpressed sense of frustration, because you are trying to cope with this thing and meet it without preconceived notions. Obviously, you have gone out of your way to study this problem.

I said this morning, off the record, and I am going to repeat it now, that in Louisiana we have a statute requiring a course of study entitled "Democracy versus Communism" which is essentially the same as the course you have in Florida, "Americanism versus Communism."

Let me ask you this: What problems have you run into in preparing yourself to teach Communist ideology, strategy, tactics?

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. First of all, let me preface my answer by saying that I believe these problems which I face could be most adequately and efficiently handled by the Freedom Academy proposal which is before your committee at this time.

Let me follow along with that by saying this: The primary problems which I encountered were:

No. 1, even though a relatively recent graduate of a State university, there was nothing in my curriculum, although I was a social studies major as well as an English major, which would even remotely relate to this problematical area. Therefore, upon being asked to teach in this field, I was left with a tremendous blank, a tremendous gap, in my own educational background.

In seeking some kind of assistance or some kind of source of information, there was relatively little available, gentlemen. And as a teacher, as a family man, I could not afford to take time off to study in any great depth, even if an opportunity presented itself.

But the nucleus of the whole problem is simply that I had to train myself in this field. I had to obtain the literature, the books, the information, and not only obtain it, but teach myself to discriminate and discern so that I would know the good from the bad.

The CHAIRMAN. And then did you not feel like I do, and probably still feel, that you still do not know the kind of books that would give you the background to teach?

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. That is true, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that not disappointing? Is that not frustrating?

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Very much so.

The CHAIRMAN. Obviously, you have excelled in this. You have pioneered in this new concept or approach to the cold war.

What about the normal teacher in Florida, or, I could say, in Louisiana, who, by act of the legislature, is ordered to teach a course on Americanism versus Communism or Democracy versus Communism? If you are a pioneer, how do you evaluate the qualifications of the others to go into this area?

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. In defense of Florida's approach to this problem—and I feel that basically they did a pretty good job—they only failed to provide one very important thing, and that was for the mandatory instruction of these teachers before they sent these teachers into the classroom.

But they did try to help the situation, because I heard in September of the year that I began teaching that some counties, some areas, had had some sort of workshop for the teachers who knew they were going to be in this field. I do not know exactly how adequate they were, or how efficient their program was, but they did make something of an honest attempt.

Along with this, if I may, I would like to quote from the results of a survey taken by the Florida State Department of Education. At the close of the last school year, which was the first year this course was in operation, they sent out a 39-question questionnaire to each teacher in this field and asked them to complete it.

I have before me a synopsis and a summary of the reactions of the teachers to this questionnaire and I would like to, if I may, read a couple of these items off, to give you an idea of how this program went in its first year.

Approximately three out of four teachers reported that they needed further preparation prior to teaching the unit.

Approximately seven out of ten teachers enrolled in a formal course at a college, a university, or a junior college for a county workshop, but in spite of that, three out of four still said that they needed further preparation.

Nine out of ten indicated that they would like to have further preparation.

Nine out of ten reported that they would like to continue teaching the unit.

Seven out of ten teachers taught the unit for a 6 weeks' period, but only five out of ten reported that they planned to spend only 6 weeks on the unit during the ensuing school term.

In other words, this indicates they did not feel that they had enough time and they would like to devote more than just the minimum 6 weeks to this instructional unit.

These are just some of the reactions of the 464 teachers of this course who replied to this Florida State Department of Education questionnaire. I was one of those teachers.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, aside from your own research, helter-skelter as it might be, were you given a set of instructions or an institution where you could go to get the answers to these things right away? Is there such a thing in America?

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. There is no such thing in America today.

I have investigated the possibility of doing graduate work in this field, as I mentioned in my testimony. I have applied for a fellowship. But in seeking the answers to these types of questions among the people who know more about it than I, I have been convinced that the opportunity to gain the type of knowledge and the kind of instruction that I am seeking is a relatively difficult thing to do today, and the proposal which again is before this committee provides the only comprehensive answer to this kind of a problem that I have yet encountered.

And I would like to reemphasize that once more for your consideration, gentlemen.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. Well, now, let me ask you this question: What is your appraisal of the reaction of the students to this course? Their interest? Are they hungry for it? Are they interested? Or are they lost? Would they like to know? Or are their minds made up? Are they willing to listen? And so on. What is the student reaction?

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. To answer that question, sir, if I may, I would like to take it in two parts.

One, to lend validity to my own appraisal, I would like to refer to this survey that was taken at the end of the year.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that survey is absolutely informative, as far as I am concerned.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. One of the questions was based on student reaction, and the summary of the survey states that 9 out of 10 teachers reported that in their opinion this unit was effective in developing in their students a greater appreciation of the American way of life, and, two, that the major criticism of the instructional program by the teachers, as determined by their observation of the students, was the lack of time to devote study to this unit.

The survey indicates that student reaction was most positive, most interested, and certainly my own personal experiences would back this up. I had students who had never been exposed to this kind of an instructional program before. They were blank slates as far as information about communism is concerned.

But it was only a matter of a mere introduction to the study of this unit before they became absolutely enthusiastic in their thirst for further knowledge. Their questions at first perhaps were not too perceptive, but at least plentiful. As they gained in their own knowledge, their questions, of course, became more perceptive and more pointed.

The end result of their enthusiasm and their interest, I believe, was almost as frustrating as my own, because as the course approached its end, almost every day one or more of them would say, "Well, Mr. Cunningham, if all of this is factual and all of these things have happened, why don't we do something about it?"

Now, here we have stimulated a group of high school seniors to learn and acknowledge the problems in this field of cold war education. They have a very fundamental background in this area. They recognize the significance of the issues and the problems. And they are primed, as only young people can be, to go forth and do something in this area.

And what can they do? They go to one of our university centers, which in many cases do not supply even superficial information on this topic. They have no recognition from the Federal Government that this problem is as imperative or as major as they say it is now, or as they have come to believe it is.

And then we put the damper on this kind of youthful enthusiasm, which, I might add, the Communists are only too quick to exploit and capitalize upon whenever they have the opportunity.

If there were a Freedom Academy for these youngsters, if they had the idea that this thing would be possible for them, I think the Freedom Academy in 10 years would be swamped with applications.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, sir. It has been very enlightening testimony, and I am glad to have someone who has gone through this experience and ordeal of trying to enlighten the youth of America in this very disturbing area. What to do is hard to say.

Anyway, you think the Freedom Academy approach is something that should be at the very least seriously explored and considered?

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. At the very least, yes, sir.

Mr. POOL. Mr. Chairman, along the same lines that you were discussing: The students would be interested in going to this Freedom Academy. I have heard some people express this interest to me since these hearings started, and before they started. Of course, I realize that all of this testimony has proven the need for this institution in training our own and foreign students and others.

But they think of this as being an academy similar to a military academy, West Point or Annapolis, with a 4-year curriculum and a commission on graduation. That is some people's concept of the thing. What about that phase of it?

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Well, sir, in studying the Freedom Academy, I am aware of the fact that this proposal does not provide for any kind of a degree-granting university. And I perhaps am not qualified to expound upon this particular answer to your question, but I would say this: I do not believe, personally, from my experiences with these students, that an undergraduate school would be the answer to this problem. It would be too specific and geared only to one phase of a multifaceted problem.

I believe that these youngsters who would be encouraged to attend this school would understand that and would realize that the background of the initial parts, at least, of a college education would be instrumental in their being able to continue along this specific line of educational development later on.

Mr. POOL. One other question, and it is strictly information for me. I am not being argumentative at all.

You have studied the Communist system of training their propaganda experts?

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Yes, I have.

Mr. POOL. Along the line of this Academy, what do they have similar to that? What would be similar to that? Would there be anything close to it?

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. You mean the Communist situation comparable to what we are talking about here?

Mr. POOL. Yes.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. I believe that would be most completely answered in the first parts of the "Green Book," which was prepared by the Orlando Committee, as they intensively studied the Soviet political research and training program.

Perhaps not to try and dodge your question, sir, but to answer it very quickly, it is stated there that there are many political warfare training centers throughout the Communist-bloc world. And certainly that would be in line, perhaps, to some extent, with your question, the fact that they are well ahead of us in this area.

Mr. POOL. What I am thinking of: When we start drafting legislation, I want to see what we need to do. The testimony so far has been very favorable as far as I am concerned. I have not heard the other side. Like the chairman, I want to hear from both sides.

But now I am looking ahead, trying to figure out what we are going to do when we decide to do something. That is why I ask the question. I am going to talk to Mr. Grant further about this.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. I am sure he would be eminently better qualified than I to discuss this with you, sir.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. Would your concept of the Academy, then, be that it would be more informative and patriotically inspirational for our people who are interested, not just for teachers but for the average citizen?

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. I believe you are referring to part of my statement in which I made this remark. If I may enlarge on that just a little bit. The meaning there was simply that the very existence of this Freedom Academy, endorsed and recognized by our Federal Government, would be an incentive to the private American citizen to become better informed and help him realize the importance and significance of these issues. Just the existence of it would do this much, which I think would be of tremendous benefit to the entire country.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. Let me ask a question which may seem a kind of queer question to ask: Suppose they are aware of it. What good will it do? Where will they carry it from there?

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Well, let's assume, since we have gone this far, that the Freedom Academy is a reality, that they are motivated in this fashion. If I may go back to my own experiences, as a partial answer to your question: I would not have to contend with the almost dominant apathy among the private citizens, who do not believe that this problem is so significant that they should have to worry about it, simply because they feel that since the Government has not indicated any specific concern over the problem, then it is certainly not in the realm of their responsibility to get upset about it.

So, initially, it would tend to wake people up to the significance of these cold war factors and make them realize that they cannot afford to ignore these problems any longer.

This in itself would give tremendous aid to any private endeavor, whether it is my little operation down there in Naples or anything else.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. Would you not consider this an effort on behalf of the average citizen, for instance, who was going into the Army or the Navy or whatever it was, into the service, to make him better qualified, to better understand his job?

I do not mean insofar as the military man is concerned, but I mean the purpose for which he is serving this country.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. This is a specific question, but if you will permit, I would like to try and answer it in general terms.

I believe that this kind of cognizance of these problems and their crucial importance would be of tremendous help in helping almost any American in any capacity to do a job which would, on a long-range basis, ultimately benefit the entire free world, and our Nation in particular, whether it was the armed services or business or education or whatever it might be.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. They would be more capable if they were able to recognize any possibilities of infiltration in a church or a labor organization or business community or club?

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir, very much.

Is Mr. Kintner with us?

Mr. GRANT. I do not know just where he is, Mr. Chairman. He apparently has been slowed up by that snowstorm up there.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, is he coming?

Mr. GRANT. Yes, sir, he is supposed to be here, and he was to be here by 3:15.

Mr. MAYERS. Mr. Chairman, since I didn't quite complete my statement, could I make a couple of additional points?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MAYERS. In connection with the discussion that was just held on education, I would like to call your attention to how Mr. Walt Rostow, at the Senate hearings, described what this legislation is attempting to do to help American educators by publishing textbooks and other educational material. He referred to that as "Federal control of education." This, of course, is an alarmist phrase which is pretty much of a red flag.

Every agency, including the State Department, publishes educational literature. When the Department of Agriculture provides farmers with information that they would like to have, it is not "controlling" the farming of this country or controlling the education of farmers. When the Department of Commerce issues material for businessmen, it is not "controlling" them.

The CHAIRMAN. Or when the Federal Reserve Bank puts out statements, they are not controlling banking, either.

Mr. MAYERS. Yes. The effort that Mr. Rostow made to somehow associate this legislation with "*Federal control of education*" was based wholly on a misrepresentation of the legislation.

Another unfair use of words in Mr. Rostow's testimony has recurred often when State Department spokesmen discuss Freedom Commis-

sion legislation. We have the phrase in the bill, "research and training."

The same phrase appears in the State Department's NAFA bill.

The CHAIRMAN. What bill was that?

Mr. MAYERS. The National Academy of Foreign Affairs bill, the one the State Department sponsored.

But when they refer to exactly the same phrase in the Freedom Academy bill, they used the word "indoctrination."

There is no difference between the phraseology in the bills. This is an effort to read into the Freedom Commission legislation a concept that does not belong there.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, as I understand you, in the bill to establish the State Department's National Academy of Foreign Affairs, the same words are used in describing the course of study?

Mr. MAYERS. In describing the object of the bill.

The two objects of the bill are research and training. First, research to determine *what* to teach, and then the teaching. There is no difference in the language in this respect.

But they inject the word "indoctrination" only in their description of the Freedom Commission bill. "Indoctrination" is no more a part of the Freedom Commission bill than it is a part of the National Academy of Foreign Affairs bill.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

My colleague, here, Mr. Pool, raised a question, if I can rephrase it, while you are on the stand: He said that there could be an understanding on the part of the American people that we are setting up just another academy, such as West Point, the Naval Academy, or Air Force Academy, leading to a degree, a set course of study, with specialized graduate work, and so on, and wonders whether or not this should be of the same type, and if not, why.

Was that about what you had in mind?

Mr. POOL. That is about it—as to whether or not we should specialize and go on and get specialists as a result of it, and not a hodgepodge where one fellow has 2 months, another fellow has 6 months, and another person 2 years.

What should be our purpose?

Mr. MAYERS. Our purpose should be to have as many courses as fit the needs of the various types of students. Some of them might be short courses. Some of them would be longer.

I believe that the most important aspect of the legislation is the fact that it provides for *research* to determine what to teach. It would be a little presumptuous for the writers of the bill at this point to be very specific about the length of the course, the nature of the curriculum, or anything which could be criticized as a detailed program, when all they are fighting for is the principle that "cold war training" is essential.

Mr. POOL. At a later date, after the Commission sets up a division of research, you might have an academy where they did give a degree?

Mr. MAYERS. That I think would be up to the Commission. But research comes first.

Mr. POOL. I mean that could be developed later on?

Mr. MAYERS. Yes. The Commission would have the authority to develop the courses, and perhaps there might be degrees on some of them.

But it is not comparable to West Point. That is a 4-year course to train a man to become a professional military man and comprehensively educated. That is not what the Freedom Academy would be aiming to do.

Mr. POOL. Well, let me ask you this question, then: Do we need professional soldiers of propaganda? Do we need professionals to go out into the world and sell these ideas and to direct the propaganda effort of this country?

Mr. MAYERS. I would like to answer it in this way. There is urgent need of professionals to fight Communist professionals in the field of propaganda and political warfare. Now, whether these professionals all need be Americans, or whether many of them should be native political figures who would learn how to counteract Communist propaganda with their own—

Mr. POOL. Professional anti-Communists. Let's put it that way.

Mr. MAYERS. It is a way to put it; yes. But we certainly need professional skill in meeting this threat.

Now, the question was asked of me after my recent testimony as to what I meant by saying that we needed greater professionalism in our political communications with the other countries. I was asked, "Do we not have professional journalists and broadcasters and moving picture men and others right in the USIA today?" The answer is yes, but they are not professional *political warriors*. They are professionals in a very limited sense.

Mr. POOL. Do we need people like that representing the United States and representing the other free countries?

Mr. MAYERS. Absolutely. You raised the question, Mr. Pool, before, about what the Russians have. They have all kinds of schools, from mere propaganda to organizing riots to devices for assassination.

A Freedom Academy need not ever get beyond anything which is overt. There is nothing about the Freedom Academy instruction which would have to be concealed or hidden.

Concerning the proposed training, there has been criticism by the State Department that political warfare training must be done in secrecy—there need be no secrecy about selling concepts of progressive government and the ideology of a free people in an open society. There is nothing secret about that.

Mr. POOL. Well, let's lay our cards on the table. If we are going to get serious about really doing a job, in my opinion we are going to have to fight fire with fire and we are going to have to get just as professional as they are, or more so.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. Will the gentleman yield?

I think that this analogy would be possible: that there are two kinds of wars, your hot war and this cold war. And you have a set of armaments that you fight one with, and your academies, West Point and so on, teach our men how to use these weapons.

Could not this Academy be one in which we give them the tools of the cold war, and how to use them?

Mr. MAYERS. *Absolutely*. Nonmilitary warfare of all kinds.

But a Freedom Academy can only develop the tools, not use them. I do not think we should be confused to the point where somebody could say, "Well, the CIA is doing that, and you are overlapping."

The proposed training does not overlap that given today by any department of Government.

The big danger, here, is that we can be brushed off as charging that we are overlapping existing governmental activities. But we are not.

Mr. POOL. Well, of course, I am just a Congressman and I can say what I want to, and I realize that when you pass a bill sometimes everything is not laid out. But I am looking away into the future. I would like to see us doing what is really practical and productive, and I think eventually we are going to have to do something like that if we are going to be successful in fighting what I think is not a cold war but a hot war.

I think we are right in the middle of it, as if we had declared war.

Mr. MAYERS. When you talk nonmilitary warfare in Soviet terms, it means everything short of shooting and even includes brushfire wars. Free world citizens should be equipped completely to respond on every level.

We do respond to brushfire wars with our guerrilla training. Mr. Rostow, with whom I had a talk about this, has the notion that because there are counterinsurgency programs by the Pentagon, that is all that is needed.

He will not recognize that political warfare, which is mostly nonmilitary, nonviolent, is the thing that we are also in need of.

Mr. POOL. We do not have anything along that line at the present time?

Mr. MAYERS. Political warfare, as distinguished from both diplomacy and guerrilla warfare, is nobody's business in the American Government today. It is not the Department of State's, not the Pentagon's, not the CIA's. It has gone by default, and that is the reason for the Freedom Commission bill.

Mr. CLAUSEN. Mr. Chairman, I realize that I am not a member of the committee, and you were very kind to let me listen in, but there is a point I would like to make here in response to Mr. Pool's point of view.

The real key here is to recognize the tremendous flexibility in the private sector that the public sector, under no circumstances, will ever have available to them.

In other words, if someone is going to be working in some of these countries, they must have the flexibility that is only available to the private sector, because if the public sector is going to be doing this, then they run the risk of being labeled as an intervenor or an aggressor. And I think this is the basis of our objective.

Mr. MAYERS. There is certainly a big, wide area which a Freedom Commission would have to investigate to finally determine what priorities to give what kind of activity. We are about 45 years late in recognizing the very thing which the Communists have used to make the tremendous progress that they have made. It has been largely through political warfare.

Mr. POOL. I visualize that in some countries we could actually use professionals and go in there and do the job. In other countries we could not; it would not be allowed. That is a problem, too; is it not?

Mr. MAYERS. The Freedom Commission plan is to give the training to the natives of the countries to do the job themselves, wherever possible. We cannot, as the United States, do the whole political job. We can only be giving aid.

Our whole concept in the Freedom Academy is to give political aid, in addition to the financial and military and technical aid which we give these countries. Today we give them no political aid. The Freedom Commission concept is a way to start giving them political aid.

The CHAIRMAN. I think what the gentleman from California was suggesting was that if this proposal were enacted into law, there would be danger that participants, graduates, of this Academy would be charged with being "agents" of the Government, whereas, if this were done on a privately financed plan, we would not have that danger. I am not sure that you agree with that.

Mr. MAYERS. Mr. Chairman, that danger exists even without a Freedom Academy. Any student who studies in this country the Communists may label "a tool of the imperialists." The trouble is that he does not know how to answer the charge. He is not able politically to stand up to those charges and explain the difference between the kind of country in which his accusers were trained and the kind of country he received his training in.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McDowell, would you address yourself to the question I asked?

Mr. McDOWELL. Mr. Chairman, this point has been specifically raised. We have within the institutions of higher learning in excess of 50,000 foreign students per year. For instance, there is Cheddi Jagan, the Communist who got his training and indoctrination, and his marriage, which cinched the thing, for his Communist operation in British Guiana, at the University of Chicago, on American soil. He went back, a prepared and hardened Communist operator, a very clever one, with a wife along to see that he was kept in line.

Now, this is what occurs in the positive sense. Every student who goes back who is not politically committed to the Communists finds himself faced in that country, where there is an active Communist group, with the charge in just the crudest form: "He is a CIA agent." Any person who is not pro-Communist has a wall of suspicion built around him by the Communist operation in the country to which he returns.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not want to make an odious comparison, but I notice that Oswald's mother is trying to portray her son as a CIA agent.

Mr. McDOWELL. And this, of course, is a straight formula off the Moscow radio. The general development of this philosophy began within a matter of hours after the assassination.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Pardon me. I did not really want to go into that area.

But as I understand from you and from Mr. Grant and maybe somebody else, at first, the originators of the Freedom Academy idea, those who gave birth to it, toyed, played, conceived the idea of this Academy being run as a private institution, and then discarded it.

Is that right? And if so, why?

Mr. McDOWELL. The original concept psychologically I think was under the title, "The Lincoln University." It was a calculated phrasing in terms of the fact that in terms of personalities—and I do not want to take in the issue of 1860, although I am perpetual secretary to the Lincoln Civil War Society in Philadelphia—the Lincoln person-

ality happens to be identified on the basis of opinion tests as the personality most appealing in terms of sentiment abroad. And this was the term, therefore, that was originally used.

It was to be privately managed, but it would, of course, involve executive department consent, approval, and clearance, because there were certain areas in dealing with foreign students.

For instance, we cannot bring foreign students here on the scale that we do for our private universities, except with the cooperation of Government agencies, the State Department, the Immigration Division of the Department of Justice.

There is no such thing as the absence of that, of governmental agencies, in the movement of these students back and forth and the arrangement for their education. We, for instance, in our union are subsidizing a student from Kenya, Africa, in a private university in America, simply because we were concerned so that we had some contacts and we made this exertion on our private part. There is nothing political in this. There is no connection with our union activity at all. But, of course, we had to work through agencies, including agencies of the Government, in so doing.

But the major point which has to be made—and this will be raised by critics of this—is that any foreign student trained here will be termed an agent of the imperialist interests of this Government, of the United States.

And the overwhelming answer, again, is that this is exactly what occurs to any student who returns to a country where there is an active Communist operation, if he is not already in the classification of a Cheddi Jagan, who is on the other side.

And the only difference is: He is not prepared. There is no provision. These students go back and in many cases become highly defensive. It has got to the place effectively that the head of the African State of Guinea, conferring with one of the individuals who has been associated with him, associated with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, said, "Our students whom we send to the West come back either defensive or pro-Communist, and the only students that become anti-Communist are the students we send into the Communist countries. They get a bad dose and come back, and these are the anti-Communist students we get."

The CHAIRMAN. The point is, as I understand, that you thought about this idea, or this creation or establishment, of a privately financed university and discarded that idea in favor of the approach contemplated by this bill.

Mr. McDOWELL. We came to the conclusion, may I say rather sorrowfully, that the concept of victory in the political warfare struggle was so completely absent at the cooperating executive department of Government that it could not be communicated to the private citizens and to the private agencies which were capable of raising the funds that were necessary to put a significant operation into effect.

In other words, we found ourselves bound by the ill compulsion of the fact that the absence of governmental recognition of legislative intent to provide such a purpose meant that it was not accepted as an American purpose, and therefore it could not communicate itself.

The foundations, for example, veered away from any such idea. The sources of finance just were not available. And therefore we

finally realized, as the young teacher said this afternoon, the attitude of the people is that if there is no declaration of this as a strategic and important matter on the part of that agency which by their votes they have charged with the responsibility of the promotion of our interests abroad—then obviously private citizens need not exert themselves in that respect.

And we just came full stop before that obstacle.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. Mr. Chairman?

Would there be any reason, any objection, for people who believe in freedom to admit that they were agents, speaking for the free world? We ought not to be ashamed of that. In cases where we send a student out, and they say, "You are an agent of the CIA," we should not back away from it. I think we ought to be proud of it.

Mr. McDOWELL. This is the answer of the Communist student, because there is not a single one of these countries that are most exposed and vulnerable where there are not scores of students being recruited for Iron Curtain universities and training schools.

They go and they return, and their answer, when they are queried—they are drilled and prepared before they go back to give the answer, and the answer is, "This is a lot of malarkey, this idea that I am an agent of Moscow. Look, judge me by the things I advocate. These are the things in your interest and in the interest of the common welfare."

And this has been completely effective. But the only difference is that the foreign student here, the uncommitted student returning, has no opportunity of access to any training resource which would prepare him with a reasonable and proper answer such as you give.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. I would hope, just getting off that subject a little bit, that in some way, if and when the bill comes up and we are discussing it, there will be the opportunity for the private sector to cooperate financially as well as otherwise, so that we do not have this entirely Government.

Mr. MAYERS. It is not precluded by the bill. On the contrary, the bill gives every encouragement to the private sector.

Mr. McDOWELL. May I give a specific instance?

I have been in touch with a group known as "Fight Communism" in Western Europe. There is an attempt to carry on an institute annually which draws students from Western Europe for the purpose of giving them at least a week's institute training, with the presence of qualified speakers.

This institute failed last year for the lack, I found out at a later date, of a sum which amounted to \$250, because students here do not have pocket money such as American students have.

The whole thing fell flat.

Now, the institute is again preparing for this year. There was one large deficiency on their program, and that was information to these students in Western Europe who were coming to this institute on the question of Cuba, because there is no question on which we are as uniformly misrepresented, not in the Communist countries, but in the free countries of Western Europe, led off by Britain, for example.

Now, this difficulty required that they drop that part from their program, because they could not find a person with the resources that could be made available to them at that time.

So this May they will have their institute, but with this gap in the program. And yet it is the most strategic gap, because even the conservative press of Europe takes a position in relation to our problem of Castro's communism in Cuba which is absolutely incredible in terms of its distortion, misrepresentation, and the portraying of the entire public opinion of America and its Government as a bunch of "nervous Nellies," exaggerating something that has no real danger, because it is so remote.

Now, this is an example of where you have voluntary action on the part of a group of students, but they cannot get the resources.

You could not get, under the present setup—you could not get an American information officer made available to this student group for this purpose, under this title, because you run again into this lack of declared policy.

I should imagine just what would be the reaction if any of these agencies were asked to supply a speaker for a group entitled "Fight Communism."

Now, this is a group of students voluntarily putting money out of their own pockets, which are very poorly supplied. There is a gap.

Now, this occurs in more countries than one.

The CHAIRMAN. Let's get down to my question. Do I understand, then, that you did consider that approach and you dropped it?

Mr. McDOWELL. We did, because we found in practical experience that without the declaration of interest on the part of the public agency, the agency of Government that is charged with this responsibility by the American people, there was not sufficient rallying ground to get the resources which would be necessary to make this a significant operation.

It would be again a shoestring operation, like these inadequately supplied students at the University of London. They have done excellent work, but—

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand it, if there is validity—and I am not discarding it—to the argument that there should not be an injection of the Government into this Academy and that it should be done through some private plan of financing, then we should not pass a bill, because if we financed the private institution, the Government would still be in it. So that would be the end of these hearings, if we go that route.

Is that not right?

Mr. McDOWELL. That is correct.

Mr. MAYERS. Mr. Chairman, may I comment on this reference to the fact that this is a private institution, or a separate institution from Government?

It is not separate from Government. It is only separate from the State Department. The State Department attempts to convey the impression that anything that has to do with foreign affairs that is not under its control is automatically "out of Government."

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I come back to what I have said a number of times. As I understand the structure of this bill, you would have the Commission as an independent agency separated from the State Department or the Government, but, at the same time, you would have a link with the Government in the sense that all these agencies would

have an advisory group consulting, although not overriding and running the Commission.

(At this point Mr. Ashbrook left the hearing room.)

Mr. MAYERS. Mr. Chairman, over and above the Advisory Commission.

The CHAIRMAN. But is that right?

Mr. MAYERS. Yes; but it is not right to the extent you say it is the only link with Government.

When you have commissioners appointed by the President and approved by the Senate, and their salaries and staff salaries are paid by the Government, why should anybody say that it is "outside of Government," any more than the Atomic Energy Commission is outside of Government?

It is not outside of Government. The impression that it is outside of Government has been created by the State Department in line with its erroneous assumption that anything that has to do with foreign affairs that they do not handle is outside of Government.

The CHAIRMAN. While waiting for Mr. Kintner—and if he does not come, we will have to adjourn—I wonder if Mr. Grant would have some observations, without repeating the question—short observations on the issue we have now been discussing.

Mr. GRANT. I will have certain observations, Mr. Chairman. I wonder if we could turn to one particular aspect of this that I did not get to in my previous testimony. As you recall, we had to cut it off so that Dr. Possony could make his presentation.

I want to have a chance to be more specific in terms of what the private sector can contribute.

The CHAIRMAN. No. No. I know they will contribute. I know this will aid them in contributing. We are not talking about making a choice.

Shall we have this Academy as a privately financed institution by a foundation or philanthropic contributions, or must we have a Government supported Freedom Academy? These are the choices.

I know it will spill over and aid private institutions and private efforts and private sectors. Let's face the choice.

And I understand you have made that choice. If you did, why?

Mr. GRANT. Yes, sir, we did; and let me explain exactly why.

I testified earlier we are going to need a budget of \$35 million per year, an operational budget, not endowment, but an operational budget, to conduct this thing upon the scale on which it is going to have to be conducted if we really are serious about closing the biggest gap in all of our defenses against the Soviet drive for world domination.

Few universities in this country have \$35-million-per-year operational budget. Maybe the American Red Cross can raise that kind of money annually, but I seriously doubt that it would be possible and I believe it would be impossible, under present circumstances and conditions, to raise \$35 million per year to operate this thing on that scale in the private sector.

This is so serious, it is so late in the game, that only the Federal Government itself, at this late date, has the resources and prestige to operate the Freedom Academy on the scale it is going to have to be operated, if all aspects of this research and training problem are go-

ing to be covered as I indicated they should be in my previous testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. I know my friend from California is deeply interested in the private approach, so I would gladly yield to him for questions on this point.

Mr. CLAUSEN. Getting down to the nub of the question, if it was possible to raise the money in the private sector, this is the sort of approach you would like to have, so as to retain the flexibility, but you have concluded that, with the late date that we have here today, you have to come through the Government in order to raise the funds?

Mr. GRANT. Yes, but money is only part of the problem. The second is a question of prestige, Mr. Chairman.

Let me give you an example. Every year, the Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island, at the end of their 10 months' training program has a global strategy conference in which they bring in about 100 VIP's from around the country. These are top-drawer executives. They have to give up a week of their time to come up there at their own expense, and so forth. But they get about 95 percent of those who are invited to attend that come.

If Harvard University, for example, was running a foreign affairs seminar or something and they asked the same group of executives to come up, they would be lucky to get 10 percent.

It is a prestige factor.

If this is going to be a major national effort, and is so shown to be, we are going to develop this prestige, and it will be a great prestige factor to be invited to the Academy. But I wonder if we can ever develop that type of prestige around a private institution.

Mr. CLAUSEN. If I may ask this: What about the possibilities that might be available if we could establish the Freedom Academy concept, a very solid concept, by an endorsement from this committee, by an endorsement from the Congress?

The CHAIRMAN. By an Act of Congress?

Mr. CLAUSEN. By an Act of Congress.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, then the Government is in it.

Mr. CLAUSEN. I think here may be a significant point. I think the gentleman earlier—the gentleman from the union organization—made the strong point that what was needed here was legislative initiative to recognize that a problem exists.

I believe this was your point. And it is simply now a question of how it is going to be financed. And I think that there is a possibility, for instance, of initiating legislation in the tax field, for tax incentives for some of these people to be motivated to participate.

This is just one of the possibilities. But I think the real key, here, is that we consider a very strong endorsement of this Freedom Academy concept, and then work it out from there.

Now, these are points that I think are very pertinent.

But I think there is flexibility here, sir, that can be incorporated into legislation.

Mr. GRANT. May I further add, though, Mr. Chairman, that this is a critical area of national defense, and the most basic purpose of all Government is defense. Can we afford to take an area of defense which can be just as crucial as military defense, because this is a struggle in which we can freeze as well as burn—

Mr. POOL. Right along at that point, I voted for \$50 billion, I believe, for national defense, and I did not even look back. I have got a pretty conservative voting record in this Congress. And as far as this idea is concerned, if we can work out the idea—and I have not said we can, but if we can—I do not think you will get to first base on \$35 million.

I would be in favor of doing a really good, practical job and appropriating the money that is necessary to do it right.

Mr. GRANT. I hope I made it clear in my earlier testimony that \$35 million was minimal.

Mr. POOL. I understand; yes.

Mr. GRANT. But, Mr. Chairman, I ask you this—

The CHAIRMAN. Do not ask. Tell us.

Mr. GRANT. Certainly we would not turn over our entire defense establishment, and preparation for it, to the private sector. But I think that this is such a critical area of national defense, which is the No. 1 responsibility of the United States Government—that this is something we cannot shuck off and tell the private sector to play this major role of research and training, because this has to be major training for Government foreign affairs personnel, as well as private citizens and foreign nationals.

Mr. CLAUSEN. Will you yield, sir?

The point that you are making is that the stimulation to the private sector must come from the Congress of the United States, to motivate these people to come into this field.

Mr. GRANT. Let me make this point, Mr. Chairman. Once the Freedom Academy is in operation, it will be a major stimulant to our private universities to begin offering graduate training, seminars, as well as undergraduate instruction, in the type of subject matter which the Freedom Academy will cover.

The CHAIRMAN. That will spill over into the private sector?

Mr. GRANT. That is right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But you do not think you can start it that way—through a private academy—you have to have this central agency called the Freedom Academy? Is that your opinion?

I am developing the record. I am asking for your opinion.

Mr. GRANT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And your Orlando Committee, the initiator of this idea, thought about it and discarded the private-sector plan of an institutional setup. Is that correct?

Mr. GRANT. Yes, sir.

Mr. Chairman, I feel sure that in the present day and age we might be able to go out and raise a \$5, \$10, or \$15 million endowment, and set up some kind of a private training institution in the Academy, but this would be small potatoes in terms of what we need. And it could not begin to carry on the extensive research or training program which we would have to have.

Mr. McDOWELL. Might I inject one matter of import?

I referred this morning to the American Institute for Free Labor Development. This program had scarcely begun, under private auspices, which included substantial business support as well as substantial support from union treasuries, which had been expending a

great portion of the income of the AFL-CIO that now goes exclusively to foreign affairs activities.

When they ran against the matter of cost, for example, when you draw students, workmen, from countries as poor as the Latin American countries are, you cannot ask them to take an unpaid vacation. They have no funds. Therefore, immediately there came the fact that you have to have the stipend to support the student over this period of 90 days to 6 months in which this training takes place.

It was at this time—it is not a matter of too much advertising, it is true—that it became essential that governmental funds were required on the scale necessary, and it was at this point that the AID was tapped, because they had a program going.

It was welcomed by the governments, for example, that these people were returning to. The strongest kind of endorsements came in the case of a country such as Honduras, who said that 3 months after the return of one of the graduates the almost complete dominance of one section of Honduras by the Communists was broken, simply because they had two knowledgeable people conducting the fight there and knowing what the issues were and knowing how to do the very mechanical things.

Now, they therefore came up against the fact that in this area, a vital area of national defense, there is no such thing as private financing. When it comes to the scale even of the American Institute for Free Labor Development, it started on labor-management initiative, a partnership, with real resources of the major labor organization and of groups represented by the type of Mr. Grace of the Grace Lines.

They nevertheless came along to providing actual students, and this was beyond the capability of private financing, and even though this agency is operating as predominantly a private agency, it would have been stopped in midcareer if it had put itself within the limitations of its original private financing.

May I add this: that in terms of the ideal, it is probably described, in a free enterprise society, by a friend of mine, who at the end of World War I found himself, without any preparation in Government or military affairs, the Governor of Transylvania in Hungary. He had on his hands 21,000 cavalry horses. The tonnage of fodder required for the support of those horses was fantastic, calibrated over a week's time. There were no railroads. There were no good roads. There was no communication. But at that time he made known that a vital thing such as horses was freely available to farmers who needed horses.

He had no telegraph. He had no radio. But by the ordinary process of the peasant's telegraph, within 10 days he had no horses, no logistics problem, no forage problem, or anything of the sort.

Now, this is ideal in the sense of a description, of making available the things that are to be had, in this case, the most precious thing, making available knowledge, data, and information. And when this is made available on the scale, there will be people who will come.

But, of course, it cannot be on the short scale, when you are bringing people all the way from Asia and from Africa and Latin America. They cannot travel these days on foot. It requires finance. And this is the plain and simple fact of what you are up against.

This is a fundamental struggle of the forces, led by the United States; and if the U.S. Government is not going to make available those resources, it will be a pitiful struggle, backed by brilliant successes, here, there, and the other place, but not sustained by the even and guaranteed support that comes following a legislative declaration of intent and support.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, has Mr. Kintner come yet?

Any more questions?

(Discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. We will stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., Wednesday, February 19, 1964, the committee recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Thursday, February 20, 1964.)

APPENDIX A

PROPOSED BILLS FOR CREATION OF A FREEDOM COMMISSION AND FREEDOM ACADEMY AND LETTERS FROM CERTAIN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES CONCERNING SAME

88TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 5368

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

APRIL 2, 1963

Mr. Boggs introduced the following bill: which was referred to the Committee on Un-American Activities

[*H.R. 8320*, introduced by Mr. Taft on August 30, 1963, and *H.R. 10037*, introduced by Mr. Clausen on February 20, 1964, are identical to *H.R. 5368*, with the exception that they omit paragraph (1) of sec. 11.(a) of *H.R. 5368*.

[*H.R. 11718*, introduced by Mr. Talcott on June 24, 1964, is also identical to *H.R. 5368*, with the following exceptions: (1) *H.R. 11718* omits sec. 8 of *H.R. 5368*, which provides for the establishment of an "information center," and (2) as in the case of *H.R. 8320* and *H.R. 10037*, omits paragraph (1) of sec. 11.(a) of *H.R. 5368*.]

A BILL

To create the Freedom Commission and the Freedom Academy, to conduct research to develop an integrated body of operational knowledge in the political, psychological, economic, technological, and organizational areas to increase the non-military capabilities of the United States in the global struggle between freedom and communism, to educate and train Government personnel and private citizens to understand and implement this body of knowledge, and also to provide education and training for foreign students in these areas of knowledge under appropriate conditions.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3

1 in student organizations, peasant villages, labor unions, mass
2 communication systems, in city and jungle, and institutions
3 and organizations of every description, as well as in the
4 world's chancelleries. Recognizing that nonmilitary conflict
5 makes extraordinary demands upon its practitioners, the
6 Communists, for several decades, have intensively trained
7 their leadership groups and cadres in an extensive network of
8 basic, intermediate, and advanced schools. The Sino-Soviet
9 conflict capacity has been immeasurably increased by the
10 mobilization of research, science, industry, technology, and
11 education to serve the power-seeking ambitions of Com-
12 munist leaders rather than the needs of their people.

13 (3) Second, the problems of the United States are
14 complicated by the emergence of many new nations, the
15 unstable or deteriorating political, social and economic con-
16 ditions in many parts of the world, the revolutionary forces
17 released by the rising expectations of the world's people,
18 and other factors, all of which increase the difficulties of
19 achieving our national objectives of preventing Communist
20 penetration while seeking to build viable, free, and inde-
21 pendent nations.

22 (4) The nature of the Sino-Soviet power drive, the
23 revolutionary and fluid world situation, the emergence of
24 the United States as the major leader of the free world and
25 the need to deal with the people of nations as well as govern-

4

1 ments, has compelled the United States to employ many new
2 instruments under the headings of traditional diplomacy,
3 intelligence, technical assistance, aid programs, trade devel-
4 opment, educational exchange, cultural exchange, and
5 counterinsurgency (as well as in the area of related military
6 programs). To interrelate and program these present in-
7 struments over long periods already requires a high degree
8 of professional competence in many specialties, as well as
9 great managerial skill.

10 (5) However, the United States has fallen short in
11 developing and utilizing its full capacity to achieve its objec-
12 tives in the world struggle. Not only do we need to improve
13 the existing instruments, but a wide range of additional
14 methods and means in both the Government and private
15 sectors must be worked out and integrated with the existing
16 instruments of our policy. Otherwise, the United States will
17 lack the means to defeat many forms of Communist aggres-
18 sion and to extend the area of freedom, national independ-
19 ence, and self-government, as well as to attain other national
20 objectives. However, this will require an intensive and
21 comprehensive research and training effort first to think
22 through these additional methods and means, and, second, to
23 educate and train not only specialists, but also leaders at
24 several levels who can visualize and organize these many
25 instruments in an integrated strategy, enabling the United

1 States to approach its national objectives along every path
2 in accord with our ethic.

3 (6) There has been a tendency to look upon strategy as
4 a series of discrete problems with planning often restricted
5 by jurisdictional walls and parochial attitudes and too much
6 piecemeal planning to handle emergencies at the expense
7 of systematic, long-range development and programing
8 of the many instruments potentially available to us. While
9 there has been marked improvement in such things as
10 language training at agency schools, and while university
11 centers have made significant progress in area studies,
12 nowhere has the United States established a training pro-
13 gram to develop rounded strategists in the nonmilitary area
14 or even certain vital categories of professional specialists,
15 particularly in the area of political, ideological, psycholog-
16 ical, and organizational operations and in certain areas of
17 development work. Nor has the United States organized
18 a research program which can be expected to think through
19 the important additional range of methods and means that
20 could be available to us in the Government and private
21 sectors.

22 (7) In implementing this legislation the following re-
23 quirements for developing our national capacity for global
24 operations in the nonmilitary area should receive special
25 attention:

6

1 I. At the upper levels of Government, the United States
2 must have rounded strategists with intensive interdepart-
3 mental training and experience who understand the range of
4 instruments potentially available to us and who can or-
5 ganize and program these instruments over long periods in
6 an integrated, forward strategy that systematically develops
7 and utilizes our full national capacity for the global struggle.

8 II. Below them, Government personnel must be trained
9 to understand and implement this integrated strategy in all
10 of its dimensions. Through intensive training, as well as
11 experience, we must seek the highest professional compe-
12 tence in those areas of specialized knowledge required by
13 our global operations. Government personnel should have
14 an underlying level of understanding as to the nature of the
15 global conflict, the goals of the United States, and the vari-
16 ous possible instruments in achieving these goals to facilitate
17 team operations. We should seek to instill a high degree
18 of elan and dedication.

19 III. Foreign affairs personnel at all levels must under-
20 stand communism with special emphasis on Communist non-
21 military conflict technique. It is not enough to have experts
22 available for consultation. This is basic knowledge which
23 must be widely disseminated, if planning and implementa-

7

1 tion are to be geared to the conflict we are in. (The present
2 two weeks seminar offered at the Foreign Service Institute
3 is entirely too brief for even lower ranking personnel.)

4 IV. The private sector must understand how it can par-
5 ticipate in the global struggle in a sustained and systematic
6 manner. There exists in the private sector a huge reservoir
7 of talent, ingenuity, and strength which can be developed
8 and brought to bear in helping to solve many of our global
9 problems. We have hardly begun to explore the range of
10 possibilities.

11 V. The public must have a deeper understanding of
12 communism, especially Communist nonmilitary conflict tech-
13 nique, and the nature of the global struggle, including the
14 goals of the United States.

15 (8) The hereinafter created Freedom Academy must be
16 a prestige institution and every effort should be made to
17 demonstrate this is a major effort by the United States in a
18 vital area.

19 (b) It is the intent and purpose of the Congress that
20 the authority and powers granted in this Act be fully utilized
21 by the Commission established by section 4 of this Act to
22 achieve the objectives set forth in subsection (a) (7) of this
23 section. It is the further intent and purpose of the Congress

8

1 that the authority, powers, and functions of the Commission
2 and the Academy as set forth in this Act are to be broadly
3 construed.

4

DEFINITIONS

5 SEC. 3. As used in this Act—

6 (1) The term “Commission” means the Freedom Com-
7 mission established by section 4 of this Act; and

8 (2) The term “Academy” means the Freedom Acad-
9 emy established by section 6 of this Act.

10

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FREEDOM COMMISSION

11

12 SEC. 4. There is established in the executive branch of
13 the Government an independent agency to be known as the
14 Freedom Commission which shall be composed of six mem-
15 bers and a chairman, each of whom shall be a citizen of the
16 United States. The Chairman may from time to time desig-
17 nate any other member of the Commission as Acting Chair-
18 man to act in the place and stead of the Chairman during
19 his absence. The Chairman (or the Acting Chairman in
20 the absence of the Chairman) shall preside at all meetings of
21 the Commission, and a quorum for the transaction of business
22 shall consist of at least four members present. Each member
23 of the Commission, including the Chairman, shall have equal
24 responsibility and authority in all decisions and actions of the
25 Commission, shall have full access to all information relating
to the performance of his duties or responsibilities, and shall

1 have one vote. Action of the Commission shall be deter-
2 mined by a majority vote of the members present. The
3 Chairman (or Acting Chairman in the absence of the Chair-
4 man) shall be the official spokesman of the Commission in
5 its relations with the Congress, Government agencies, per-
6 sons, or the public, and, on behalf of the Commission, shall
7 see to the faithful execution of the policies and decisions of
8 the Commission, and shall report thereon to the Commission
9 from time to time or as the Commission may direct. The
10 Commission shall have an official seal which shall be
11 judicially noticed.

12 MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMMISSION

13 SEC. 5. (a) Members of the Commission and the
14 Chairman shall be appointed by the President, by and with
15 the advice and consent of the Senate. Not more than four
16 members, including the Chairman, may be members of any
17 one political party. In submitting any nomination to the
18 Senate, the President shall set forth the experience and
19 qualifications of the nominee. The term of each member
20 of the Commission, other than the Chairman, shall be six
21 years, except that (1) the terms of office of the members
22 first taking office shall expire as designated by the Presi-
23 dent at the time of the appointment, two at the end of two
24 years, two at the end of four years, and two at the end of

1 six years; and (2) any member appointed to fill a vacancy
2 occurring prior to the expiration of the term for which his
3 predecessor was appointed shall be appointed for the re-
4 mainder of such term. The Chairman shall serve as such
5 during the pleasure of the President, and shall receive com-
6 pensation at the rate of \$20,500 per annum. Each other
7 member of the Commission shall receive compensation at the
8 rate of \$20,000 per annum. Any member of the Commis-
9 sion may be removed by the President for inefficiency,
10 neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.

11 (b) No member of the Commission shall engage in
12 any business, vocation, or employment other than that of
13 serving as a member of the Commission.

14 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FREEDOM ACADEMY; PRINCIPAL
15 FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMISSION AND ACADEMY

16 SEC. 6. The Commission shall establish under its super-
17 vision and control an advanced research, development, and
18 training center to be known as the Freedom Academy. The
19 Academy shall be located at such place or places within the
20 United States as the Commission shall determine. The prin-
21 cipal functions of the Commission and Academy shall be:

22 (1) To conduct research designed to improve the
23 methods and means by which the United States seeks its
24 national objectives in the nonmilitary part of the global
25 struggle. This should include improvement of the present

1 methods and means and exploration of the full range of ad-
2 ditional methods and means that may be available to us in
3 both the Government and private sectors. Special attention
4 shall be given to problems of an interdepartmental nature
5 and to problems involved in organizing and programing the
6 full spectrum of methods and means potentially available in
7 the Government and private sectors in an integrated, forward
8 strategy that will systematically develop and utilize the
9 full capacity of the United States to seek its national objec-
10 tives in the global struggle, including the defeat of all forms
11 of Communist aggression and the building of free, inde-
12 pendent, and viable nations.

13 (2) To educate and train Government personnel and
14 private citizens so as to meet the requirements set forth in
15 section 2 (a) (7) of this Act. The Academy shall be the
16 principal Government interdepartmental, educational, and
17 training center in the nonmilitary area of the United States
18 global operations. Authority is also granted to educate and
19 train foreign students, when this is in the national interest
20 and is approved by the Secretary of State.

21 (3) To provide leadership in encouraging and assisting
22 universities and other institutions to increase and improve
23 research, educational, and training programs attuned to the
24 global operational needs of the United States.

25 (4) To provide leadership, guidance, and assistance to

1 the training staffs of Government agencies handling United
2 States global operations, including training programs con-
3 ducted at oversea posts.

4 (5) To provide a center where officers and employees
5 of Government agencies, as well as private citizens, can meet
6 to discuss and explore common and special elements of their
7 problems in improving United States capabilities in the global
8 struggle.

9 STUDENT SELECTION; GRANTS; ADMISSION OF FOREIGN

10 STUDENTS

11 SEC. 7. (a) Academy students, other than Government
12 personnel, shall be selected, insofar as is practicable and in
13 the public interest, from those areas, organizations, and insti-
14 tutions where trained leadership and informed public opinion
15 are most needed to achieve the objectives set forth in section
16 2 (a) (7) IV and V. Persons in Government service com-
17 ing within the provisions of the Government Employees
18 Training Act may be trained at the Academy pursuant to
19 the provisions of said Act. All agencies and departments
20 of Government are authorized to assign officers and em-
21 ployees to the Academy for designated training.

22 (b) The Commission is authorized to make grants to
23 students and to pay expenses incident to training and study
24 under this Act. This authorization shall include authority
25 to pay actual and necessary travel expenses to and from the

1 Academy or other authorized place of training under this
2 Act. The Commission is authorized to grant financial as-
3 sistance to the dependents of students who hold no office or
4 employment under the Federal Government during the time
5 they are undergoing training authorized under this Act.
6 Grants and other financial assistance under this Act shall be
7 in such amounts and subject to such regulations as the Com-
8 mission may deem appropriate to carry out the provisions
9 of this Act.

10 (c) Foreign students selected for training under this
11 Act shall be admitted as nonimmigrants under section 101
12 (a) (15) (F) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8
13 U.S.C. 1101 (a) (15) (F)) for such time and under such
14 conditions as may be prescribed by regulations promulgated
15 by the Commission, the Secretary of State, and the Attorney
16 General. A person admitted under this section who fails
17 to maintain the status under which he was admitted, or who
18 fails to depart from the United States at the expiration
19 of the time for which he was admitted, or who engages in
20 activities of a political nature detrimental to the interest
21 of the United States, or in activities in conflict with the
22 security of the United States, shall, upon the warrant of the
23 Attorney General, be taken into custody and promptly
24 deported pursuant to sections 241, 242, and 243 of the
25 Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1251, 1252,

1 and 1253). Deportation proceedings under this section
2 shall be summary and findings of the Attorney General as to
3 matters of fact shall be conclusive. Such persons shall not
4 be eligible for suspension of deportation under section 244
5 of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1254).

6 INFORMATION CENTER

7 SEC. 8. The Commission is authorized to establish an
8 information center at such place or places within the United
9 States as the Commission may determine. The principal
10 function of the information center shall be to disseminate,
11 with or without charge, information and materials which will
12 assist people and organizations to increase their understand-
13 ing of the true nature of the international Communist con-
14 spiracy and of the dimensions and nature of the global
15 struggle between freedom and communism, and of ways they
16 can participate effectively toward winning that struggle and
17 building free, independent, and viable nations. In carrying
18 out this function, the Commission is authorized to prepare,
19 make, and publish textbooks and other materials, including
20 training films, suitable for high school, college, and com-
21 munity level instruction, and also to publish such research
22 materials as may be in the public interest. The Commission
23 is authorized to disseminate such information and materials
24 to such persons and organizations as may be in the public

1 interest on such terms and conditions as the Commission
2 shall determine.

3 DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION

4 SEC. 9. Nothing in this Act shall authorize the dis-
5 closure of any information or knowledge in any case in which
6 such disclosure (1) is prohibited by any other law of the
7 United States, or (2) is inconsistent with the security of
8 the United States.

9 SECURITY CHECK OF PERSONNEL

10 SEC. 10. (a) Except as authorized by the Commission
11 upon a determination by the Commission that such action is
12 clearly consistent with the national interest, no individual
13 shall be employed by the Commission, nor shall the Com-
14 mission permit any individual to have access to information
15 which is, for reasons of national security, specifically desig-
16 nated by a United States Government agency for limited or
17 restricted dissemination or distribution until the Civil Serv-
18 ice Commission shall have made an investigation and report
19 to the Commission on the character, associations, and loyalty
20 of such individual, and the Commission shall have determined
21 that employing such individual or permitting him to have
22 access to such information will not endanger the common
23 defense and security.

24 (b) In the event an investigation made pursuant to

1 subsection (a) of this section develops any data reflecting
2 that the individual who is the subject of the investigation is
3 of questionable loyalty or is a questionable security risk, the
4 Civil Service Commission shall refer the matter to the Fed-
5 eral Bureau of Investigation for the conduct of a full field
6 investigation, the results of which shall be furnished to the
7 Civil Service Commission for its information and appropriate
8 action.

9 (c) If the Commission deems it to be in the national
10 interest, the Commission may request the Civil Service Com-
11 mission to make an investigation and report to the Commis-
12 sion on the character, associations, and loyalty of any indi-
13 vidual under consideration for training at the Academy, and
14 if the Commission shall then determine that the training of
15 such individual will not be in the best interest of the United
16 States, he shall receive no training under this Act.

17 (d) In the event an investigation made pursuant to
18 subsection (c) of this section develops any data reflecting
19 that the individual who is the subject of the investigation is
20 of questionable loyalty or is a questionable security risk,
21 the Civil Service Commission shall refer the matter to the
22 Federal Bureau of Investigation for the conduct of a full
23 field investigation, the results of which shall be furnished to
24 the Civil Service Commission for its information and appro-
25 priate action.

1 (e) If the President or the Commission shall deem it to
2 be in the national interest, he or the Commission may from
3 time to time cause investigation of any individual which is
4 required or authorized by subsections (a) and (c) of this
5 section to be made by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
6 instead of by the Civil Service Commission.

7 GENERAL AUTHORITY OF THE COMMISSION

8 SEC. 11. (a) In addition to the authority already
9 granted, the Commission is authorized and empowered—

10 (1) to establish such temporary or permanent
11 boards and committees as the Commission may from
12 time to time deem necessary for the purposes of this
13 Act;

14 (2) subject to the provisions of subsection (b) of
15 this section, to appoint and fix the compensation of such
16 personnel as may be necessary to carry out the functions
17 of the Commission;

18 (3) to conduct such research, studies, and surveys
19 as the Commission may deem necessary to carry out the
20 purposes of this Act;

21 (4) to make, promulgate, issue, rescind, and amend
22 such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry
23 out the purposes of this Act;

24 (5) to make such expenditures as may be necessary

1 for administering and carrying out the provisions of
2 this Act;

3 (6) to utilize, with the approval of the President,
4 the services, facilities, and personnel of other Govern-
5 ment agencies and pay for such services, facilities, and
6 personnel out of funds available to the Commission under
7 this Act, either in advance, by reimbursement, or by
8 direct transfer;

9 (7) to utilize or employ on a full-time or part-time
10 basis, with the consent of the organization or govern-
11 mental body concerned, the services of personnel of any
12 State or local government or private organization to
13 perform such functions on its behalf as may appear
14 desirable to carry out the purposes of this Act, without
15 requiring such personnel to sever their connection with
16 the furnishing organization or governmental body; and
17 to utilize personnel of a foreign government in the same
18 manner and under the same circumstances with the
19 approval of the Secretary of State;

20 (8) to acquire by purchase, lease, loan, or gift, and
21 to hold and dispose of by sale, lease, or loan, real and
22 personal property of all kinds necessary for, or resulting
23 from, the exercise of authority granted by this Act;

24 (9) to receive and use funds donated by others, if
25 such funds are donated without restrictions other than

1 that they be used in furtherance of one or more of the
2 purposes of this Act;

3 (10) to accept and utilize the services of voluntary
4 and uncompensated personnel and to provide transporta-
5 tion and subsistence as authorized by section 5 of the
6 Administrative Expenses Act of 1946 (5 U.S.C. 73b-
7 2) for persons serving without compensation;

8 (11) to utilize the services of persons on a tem-
9 porary basis and to pay their actual and necessary
10 travel expenses and subsistence and, in addition, com-
11 pensation at a rate not to exceed \$50 per day for each
12 day spent in the work of the Commission.

13 (b) The personnel referred to in subsection (a) (2)
14 of this section shall be appointed in accordance with the
15 civil service laws and their compensation fixed in accord-
16 ance with the Classification Act of 1949, as amended, ex-
17 cept that, to the extent the Commission deems such action
18 necessary to the discharge of its responsibilities, personnel
19 may be employed and their compensation fixed without re-
20 gard to such laws. No such personnel (except such per-
21 sonnel whose compensation is fixed by law, and specially
22 qualified professional personnel up to a limit of \$19,000)
23 whose position would be subject to the Classification Act
24 of 1949, as amended, if such Act were applicable to such
25 position, shall be paid a salary at a rate in excess of the rate

1 payable under such Act for positions of equivalent difficulty
2 or responsibility. The Commission shall make adequate
3 provision for administrative review of any determination
4 to dismiss any employee.

5 GENERAL MANAGER OF THE COMMISSION

6 SEC. 12. The Commission is authorized to establish
7 within the Commission a general manager, who shall dis-
8 charge such of the administrative and executive functions
9 of the Commission as the Commission may direct. The
10 general manager shall be appointed by the Commission,
11 shall serve at the pleasure of the Commission, shall be re-
12 movable by the Commission, and shall receive compensation
13 at a rate determined by the Commission, but not in excess
14 of \$18,000 per annum.

15 ADVISORY COMMITTEE

16 SEC. 13. (a) To assure effective cooperation between
17 the Freedom Academy and various Government agencies
18 concerned with its objectives, there is established an advisory
19 committee to the Freedom Academy (referred to hereinafter
20 as the "Committee"). The Committee shall be composed of
21 one representative of each of the following agencies desig-
22 nated by the head of each such agency from officers and em-
23 ployees thereof: The Department of State; the Department
24 of Defense; the Department of Health, Education, and Wel-

21

1 fare; the Central Intelligence Agency; the Federal Bureau
2 of Investigation; the Agency for International Development;
3 and the United States Information Agency.

4 (b) Members of the Committee shall elect a member
5 to serve as Chairman of the Committee. The Chairman shall
6 serve for such a term of one year. The chairmanship shall
7 rotate among the representatives of the agencies who com-
8 prise the membership of the Committee.

9 (c) No member of the Committee shall receive compen-
10 sation for his services as such other than that received by him
11 as an officer or employee of the agency represented by him.
12 Each member of the Committee shall be reimbursed for ex-
13 penses actually and necessarily incurred by him in the per-
14 formance of duties of the Committee. Such reimbursements
15 shall be made from funds appropriated to the Freedom Com-
16 mission upon vouchers approved by the Chairman of the
17 Committee.

18 (d) The Committee shall—

19 (1) serve as a medium for liaison between the
20 Freedom Commission and the Government agencies
21 represented in the Committee;

22 (2) review from time to time the plans, programs,
23 and activities of the Freedom Commission and the Free-
24 dom Academy, and transmit to the Commission such

1 recommendations as it may determine to be necessary or
2 desirable for the improvement of those plans, programs,
3 and activities;

4 (3) meet with the Freedom Commission periodically,
5 but not less often than semiannually, to consult
6 with it with regard to the plans, programs, and activities
7 of the Freedom Commission and the Federal Academy;
8 and

9 (4) transmit to the President and to the Congress
10 in January of each year a report containing (A) a com-
11 prehensive description of the plans, programs, and activi-
12 ties of the Commission and the Academy during the
13 preceding calendar year, and (B) its recommendations
14 for the improvement of those plans, programs, and
15 activities.

16 (e) The Committee shall promulgate such rules and
17 regulations as it shall determine to be necessary for the
18 performance of its duties.

19 (f) The Commission shall furnish to the Committee
20 without reimbursement such office space, personal services,
21 supplies and equipment, information, and facilities as the
22 Committee may require for the performance of its functions.

APPROPRIATIONS

1

2 SEC. 14. There is authorized to be appropriated, out of
3 any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, such
4 sums as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this
5 Act.

88TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 352

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 9, 1963

Mr. HERLONG introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Un-American Activities

A BILL

To create the Freedom Commission and the Freedom Academy; to research and develop an integrated, operational science to win the nonmilitary part of the global struggle between freedom and communism; and to train Government personnel, private citizens, and foreign students in this science.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 SHORT TITLE

4 SECTION 1. This Act may be cited as the "Freedom
5 Commission Act".

6 CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS AND STATEMENT OF POLICY

7 SEC. 2. (a) The Congress of the United States makes
8 the following findings:

I—O

1 (1) The international Communist conspiracy is waging
2 a total political war against the United States and against
3 the peoples and governments of all other nations of the free
4 world.

5 (2) Unlike the free world, the Communist bloc has
6 systematically prepared for this total political war over sev-
7 eral decades. Drawing on the experience of previous con-
8 querors and upon their own elaborate studies and extensive
9 pragmatic tests, Communist leaders have developed their
10 conspiratorial version of political warfare into an operational
11 science in which all methods and all means in the political,
12 ideological, psychological, economic, paramilitary, and or-
13 ganizational spheres have been integrated and are used
14 against us in a carefully patterned, many directional strategy.
15 Recognizing that political warfare is a difficult art or science
16 making unusual demands on its practitioners, the Commu-
17 nists have established an extensive network of training
18 schools, within and without the free world, in which have
19 been trained large numbers of skilled cold war professionals
20 who have mastered all forms of conflict in the nonmilitary,
21 as well as military areas. These professionals continue to
22 receive intensive training throughout their party careers.

23 (3) In this total political war the Communists permit
24 no neutrals. Every citizen, every economic, cultural, re-
25 ligious, or ethnic group is a target and is under some form

1 of direct or indirect Communist attack. The battleground
2 is everywhere, and every citizen, knowingly or unknow-
3 ingly through action or inaction, is involved in this con-
4 tinuous struggle.

5 (4) Since the end of World War II, the Communists,
6 taking full advantage of their better preparation and often
7 superior organizational and operational know-how, have
8 inflicted a series of political warfare defeats on the free
9 world. The total sum of these defeats is nothing less than
10 a disaster for the United States and the free world and
11 the continuation of this total political warfare by the Com-
12 munist confronts the United States with a grave, present,
13 and continuing danger to its national security.

14 (5) The United States can and must develop the
15 methods and means to win the nonmilitary part of the global
16 struggle between freedom and communism. A vast array
17 of methods and means are potentially available to us, not
18 only in the public sector, but also in the private sector.
19 However, it will require an intensive concentrated research,
20 development, and training program, first to think through
21 these methods and means and to intermesh and integrate
22 them into an operational science especially designed to meet
23 the needs and requirements of the United States and the
24 free world, and second, to educate and train leaders at all
25 levels who can understand the full range and depth of the

1 Communist attack and can visualize and organize the vast
2 array of interrelated methods and means needed to meet and
3 defeat this attack and to work systematically for the preser-
4 vation and extension of freedom, national independence, and
5 self-government.

6 (5) It is fitting and proper that the United States,
7 which won its independence in the first great anticolonial
8 struggle, should take the lead in developing the ways and
9 means of defeating the ruthless new Communist imperialism
10 and in extending the area of freedom and justice, so that
11 all nations can preserve or attain governments which are
12 observant of the individual rights of their people and re-
13 sponsive to their will. The United States can provide the
14 ideals and knowledge which can assist the liberty-seeking
15 forces at work in much of the world in attaining freedom
16 and an open society and rejecting the organized tyranny
17 and closed society of the Communist bloc.

18 (7) In order to meet and defeat the Communist politi-
19 cal warfare offensive (including the full range of methods
20 and means being used against us in the nonmilitary area),
21 to manifest and reemphasize to the peoples now made cap-
22 tive by the imperialistic and aggressive policies of communism
23 the support of the free world nations for their just aspirations
24 for individual freedom and national independence, and to
25 preserve the integrity and independence of the nations of the

1 free world, as well as to work systematically for the preserva-
2 tion and extension of freedom, national independence, and
3 self-government, it is imperative--

4 (A) that the knowledge and understanding of all
5 the peoples of the free world concerning the true nature
6 of the international Communist conspiracy and of the
7 dimensions and nature of the global struggle between
8 freedom and communism be increased as rapidly as is
9 practicable;

10 (B) that we develop with all practical speed an
11 advanced, integrated, and operational science and strat-
12 egy for the nonmilitary area of the global conflict that
13 will mobilize and utilize our full strength in the public
14 and private sectors to win the worldwide struggle be-
15 tween freedom and communism;

16 (C) that Federal Government personnel engaged
17 in this worldwide conflict increase their knowledge of
18 the international Communist conspiracy and of the di-
19 mensions and nature of the global struggle between free-
20 dom and communism, develop a high esprit de corps and
21 sense of mission and a high degree of operational know-
22 how in counter~~ing~~ing the international Communist conspir-
23 acy and working for the preservation and extension of
24 freedom, national independence, and self-government;
25 and

1 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FREEDOM COMMISSION

2 SEC. 4. There is established in the executive branch of
3 the Government an independent agency to be known as the
4 "Freedom Commission" which shall be composed of six mem-
5 bers and a Chairman, each of whom shall be a citizen of the
6 United States. The Chairman may from time to time desig-
7 nate any other member of the Commission as Acting Chair-
8 man to act in the place and stead of the Chairman during his
9 absence. The Chairman (or the Acting Chairman in the
10 absence of the Chairman) shall preside at all meetings of the
11 Commission, and a quorum for the transaction of business
12 shall consist of at least four members present. Each member
13 of the Commission, including the Chairman, shall have equal
14 responsibility and authority in all decisions and actions of the
15 Commission, shall have full access to all information relating
16 to the performance of his duties or responsibilities, and shall
17 have one vote. Action of the Commission shall be deter-
18 mined by a majority vote of the members present. The
19 Chairman (or Acting Chairman in the absence of the Chair-
20 man) shall be the official spokesman of the Commission in
21 its relations with the Congress, Government agencies, per-
22 sons, or the public, and, on behalf of the Commission, shall
23 see to the faithful execution of the policies and decisions of

1 the Commission, and shall report thereon to the Commission
2 from time to time or as the Commission may direct. The
3 Commission shall have an official seal which shall be judi-
4 cially noticed.

5 MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMMISSION

6 SEC. 5. (a) Members of the Commission and the Chair-
7 man shall be appointed by the President, by and with the ad-
8 vice and consent of the Senate. Not more than four mem-
9 bers, including the Chairman, may be members of any one
10 political party. In submitting any nomination to the Senate,
11 the President shall set forth the experience and qualifications
12 of the nominee. The term of each member of the Commis-
13 sion, other than the Chairman, shall be six years, except that
14 (1) the terms of office of the members first taking office shall
15 expire as designated by the President at the time of the
16 appointment, two at the end of two years, two at the end of
17 four years, and two at the end of six years; and (2) any
18 member appointed to fill a vacancy occurring prior to the
19 expiration of the term for which his predecessor was ap-
20 pointed shall be appointed for the remainder of such term.
21 The Chairman shall serve as such during the pleasure of the
22 President, and shall receive compensation at the rate of
23 \$20,500 per annum. Each other member of the Commis-
24 sion shall receive compensation at the rate of \$20,000 per
25 annum. Any member of the Commission may be removed

1 by the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or mal-
2 feasance in office.

3 (b) No member of the Commission shall engage in any
4 business, vocation, or employment other than that of serving
5 as a member of the Commission.

6 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FREEDOM ACADEMY

7 SEC. 6. The Commission shall establish under its su-
8 pervision and control an advanced research, development,
9 and training center to be known as the "Freedom Acad-
10 emy". The Academy shall be located at such place or places
11 within the United States as the Commission shall determine.
12 The principal functions of the Commission and Academy
13 shall be—

14 (1) to carry on a research program designed to
15 develop an integrated, operational science that benefits
16 and bespeaks the methods and values of freemen and
17 through which the free world will be able to meet and
18 defeat the carefully patterned total aggression (political,
19 ideological, psychological, economic, paramilitary, and
20 organizational) of the Communist bloc, and through
21 which we, as a nation, may work in a systematic man-
22 ner for the preservation and extension of freedom, na-
23 tional independence, and self-government. To achieve
24 this purpose the full range of methods and means is to

1 be thoroughly explored and studied including the meth-
2 ods and means that may best be employed by private
3 citizens and nongovernmental organizations and the
4 methods and means available to the Government other
5 than the methods and means already being used. This
6 research program shall include the study of our national
7 objectives and the development of proposals for inter-
8 meshing and integrating the full spectrum of methods
9 and means into a coordinated short- and long-range
10 strategy for victory, seeking the utilization of our full
11 potential in the public and private sectors; and

12 (2) to educate and train Government personnel,
13 private citizens, and foreign students concerning all
14 aspects of the international Communist conspiracy, the
15 nature and dimensions of the global struggle between
16 freedom and communism and the full range of methods
17 and means that freemen should employ to meet and
18 defeat the entire Communist attack in the nonmilitary
19 areas and to work systematically for the preservation
20 and extension of freedom, national independence, and
21 self-government.

22 TRAINING PROGRAM

23 SEC. 7. (a) Academy students, other than Government
24 personnel, shall be selected, insofar as is practicable and in
25 the public interest, from the diverse groups within and

1 without the United States where trained leadership and
2 informed public opinion are most needed. Persons in Gov-
3 ernment service coming within the provisions of the Govern-
4 ment Employees Training Act may be trained at the Acad-
5 emy pursuant to the provisions of said Act. All agencies
6 and departments of Government are authorized to assign
7 officers and employees to the Academy for designated
8 training.

9 (b) The Commission is authorized to make grants to
10 students and to pay expenses incident to training and study
11 under this Act. This authorization shall include authority
12 to pay actual and necessary travel expenses to and from the
13 Academy or other authorized place of training under this
14 Act. The Commission is authorized to grant financial as-
15 sistance to the dependents of students who are nationals of
16 the United States and who hold no office or employment
17 under the Federal Government during the time they are
18 undergoing training authorized under this Act. Grants and
19 other financial assistance under this Act shall be in such
20 amounts and subject to such regulations as the Commission
21 may deem appropriate to carry out the provisions of this
22 Act.

23 (c) Foreign students selected for training under this
24 Act shall be admitted as nonimmigrants under section 101
25 (a) (15) (F) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8

1 U.S.C. 1101 (a) (15) (F)) for such time and under such
2 conditions as may be prescribed by regulations promulgated
3 by the Commission, the Secretary of State, and the Attorney
4 General. A person admitted under this section who fails to
5 maintain the status under which he was admitted, or who
6 fails to depart from the United States at the expiration of
7 the time for which he was admitted, or who engages in
8 activities of a political nature detrimental to the interest of
9 the United States, or in activities in conflict with the security
10 of the United States, shall, upon the warrant of the Attorney
11 General, be taken into custody and promptly deported pur-
12 suant to sections 241, 242, and 243 of the Immigration and
13 Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1251, 1252, and 1253). De-
14 portation proceedings under this section shall be summary
15 and findings of the Attorney General as to matters of fact
16 shall be conclusive. Such persons shall not be eligible for
17 suspension of deportation under section 244 of such Act (8
18 U.S.C. 1254).

19

INFORMATION CENTER

20 SEC. 8. The Commission is authorized to establish an
21 information center at such place or places within the United
22 States as the Commission may determine. The principal
23 function of the information center shall be to disseminate,
24 with or without charge, information and materials which will
25 assist people and organizations to increase their understand-

1 ing of the true nature of the international Communist con-
2 spiracy and of the dimensions and nature of the global strug-
3 gle between freedom and communism, and of ways they can
4 participate effectively toward winning that struggle. In
5 carrying out this function, the Commission is authorized to
6 prepare, make, and publish textbooks and other materials,
7 including training films, suitable for high school, college, and
8 community level instruction, and also to publish such re-
9 search materials as may be in the public interest. The Com-
10 mission is authorized to disseminate such information and
11 materials to such persons and organizations as may be in the
12 public interest on such terms and conditions as the Com-
13 mission shall determine.

14 **DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION**

15 **SEC. 9.** Nothing in this Act shall authorize the disclosure
16 of any information or knowledge in any case in which such
17 disclosure (1) is prohibited by any other law of the United
18 States, or (2) is inconsistent with the security of the United
19 States.

20 **SECURITY CHECK OF PERSONNEL**

21 **SEC. 10. (a)** Except as authorized by the Commission
22 upon a determination by the Commission that such action
23 is clearly consistent with the national interest, no individual
24 shall be employed by the Commission, nor shall the Com-
25 mission permit any individual to have access to information

1 which is, for reasons of national security, specifically desig-
2 nated by a United States Government agency for limited or
3 restricted dissemination or distribution until the Civil Service
4 Commission shall have made an investigation and report to
5 the Commission on the character, associations, and loyalty of
6 such individual, and the Commission shall have determined
7 that employing such individual or permitting him to have
8 access to such information will not endanger the common de-
9 fense and security.

10 (b) In the event an investigation made pursuant to sub-
11 section (a) of this section develops any data reflecting that
12 the individual who is the subject of the investigation is of
13 questionable loyalty or is a questionable security risk, the
14 Civil Service Commission shall refer the matter to the Fed-
15 eral Bureau of Investigation for the conduct of a full field
16 investigation, the results of which shall be furnished to the
17 Civil Service Commission for its information and appropriate
18 action.

19 (c) If the Commission deems it to be in the national
20 interest, the Commission may request the Civil Service Com-
21 mission to make an investigation and report to the Commis-
22 sion on the character, associations, and loyalty of any indi-
23 vidual under consideration for training at the Academy, and
24 if the Commission shall then determine that the training of

1 such individual will not be in the best interest of the United,
2 States, he shall receive no training under this Act.

3 (d) In the event an investigation made pursuant to
4 subsection (c) of this section develops any data reflecting
5 that the individual who is the subject of the investigation
6 is of questionable loyalty or is a questionable security risk,
7 the Civil Service Commission shall refer the matter to the
8 Federal Bureau of Investigation for the conduct of a full
9 field investigation, the results of which shall be furnished to
10 the Civil Service Commission for its information and ap-
11 propriate action.

12 (e) If the President or the Commission shall deem it to
13 be in the national interest, he or the Commission may from
14 time to time cause investigation of any individual which is
15 required or authorized by subsections (a) and (c) of this
16 section to be made by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
17 instead of by the Civil Service Commission.

18 GENERAL AUTHORITY OF THE COMMISSION

19 SEC. 11. (a) In addition to the authority already
20 granted, the Commission is authorized and empowered—

21 (1) to establish such temporary or permanent
22 boards and committees as the Commission may from
23 time to time deem necessary for the purposes of this
24 Act;

16

1 (2) subject to the provisions of subsection (b) of
2 this section, to appoint and fix the compensation of such
3 personnel as may be necessary to carry out the functions
4 of the Commission;

5 (3) to conduct such research, studies, and surveys
6 as the Commission may deem necessary to carry out
7 the purposes of this Act;

8 (4) to make, promulgate, issue, rescind, and
9 amend such rules and regulations as may be necessary
10 to carry out the purposes of this Act;

11 (5) to make such expenditures as may be necessary
12 for administering and carrying out the provisions of this
13 Act;

14 (6) to utilize, with the approval of the President,
15 the services, facilities, and personnel of other Govern-
16 ment agencies and pay for such services, facilities, and
17 personnel out of funds available to the Commission under
18 this Act, either in advance, by reimbursement, or by
19 direct transfer;

20 (7) to utilize or employ on a full-time or part-time
21 basis, with the consent of the organization or govern-
22 mental body concerned, the services of personnel of any
23 State or local government or private organization to
24 perform such functions on its behalf as may appear
25 desirable to carry out the purposes of this Act, without

1 requiring such personnel to sever their connection with
2 the furnishing organization or governmental body; and
3 to utilize personnel of a foreign government in the same
4 manner and under the same circumstances with the
5 approval of the Secretary of State;

6 (8) to acquire by purchase, lease, loan, or gift, and
7 to hold and dispose of by sale, lease, or loan, real and
8 personal property of all kinds necessary for, or resulting
9 from, the exercise of authority granted by this Act;

10 (9) to receive and use funds donated by others, if
11 such funds are donated without restrictions other than
12 that they be used in furtherance of one or more of the
13 purposes of this Act;

14 (10) to accept and utilize the services of voluntary
15 and uncompensated personnel and to provide transpor-
16 tation and subsistence as authorized by section 5 of the
17 Administrative Expenses Act of 1946 (5 U.S.C. 73b-
18 2) for persons serving without compensation;

19 (11) to utilize the services of persons on a tempo-
20 rary basis and to pay their actual and necessary travel
21 expenses and subsistence and, in addition, compensation
22 at a rate not to exceed \$50 per day for each day spent
23 in the work of the Commission.

24 (b) The personnel referred to in subsection (a) (2) of
25 this section shall be appointed in accordance with the civil

1 service laws and their compensation fixed in accordance with
2 the Classification Act of 1949, as amended, except that, to
3 the extent the Commission deems such action necessary to
4 the discharge of its responsibilities, personnel may be em-
5 ployed and their compensation fixed without regard to such
6 laws. No such personnel (except such personnel whose
7 compensation is fixed by law, and specially qualified profes-
8 sional personnel up to a limit of \$19,000) whose position
9 would be subject to the Classification Act of 1949, as
10 amended, if such Act were applicable to such position, shall
11 be paid a salary at a rate in excess of the rate payable under
12 such Act for positions of equivalent difficulty or responsi-
13 bility. The Commission shall make adequate provision for
14 administrative review of any determination to dismiss any
15 employee.

16 GENERAL MANAGER OF THE COMMISSION

17 SEC. 12. The Commission is authorized to establish
18 within the Commission a General Manager, who shall dis-
19 charge such of the administrative and executive functions of
20 the Commission as the Commission may direct. The Gen-
21 eral Manager shall be appointed by the Commission, shall
22 serve at the pleasure of the Commission, shall be removable
23 by the Commission, and shall receive compensation at a rate
24 determined by the Commission, but not in excess of \$18,000
25 per annum.

1 dom Commission upon vouchers approved by the Chairman
2 of the Committee.

3 (d) The Committee shall—

4 (1) serve as a medium for liaison between the
5 Freedom Commission and the Government agencies rep-
6 resented in the Committee;

7 (2) review from time to time the plans, programs,
8 and activities of the Freedom Commission and the Free-
9 dom Academy, and transmit to the Commission such
10 recommendations as it may determine to be necessary
11 or desirable for the improvement of those plans, pro-
12 grams, and activities;

13 (3) meet with the Freedom Commission periodi-
14 cally, but not less often than semiannually, to consult
15 with it with regard to the plans, programs, and activities
16 of the Freedom Commission and the Federal Academy;
17 and

18 (4) transmit to the President and to the Congress
19 in January of each year a report containing (A) a
20 comprehensive description of the plans, programs, and
21 activities of the Commission and the Academy during
22 the preceding calendar year, and (B) its recommenda-
23 tions for the improvement of those plans, programs,
24 and activities.

25 (e) The Committee shall promulgate such rules and

1 regulations as it shall determine to be necessary for the per-
2 formance of its duties.

3 (f) The Commission shall furnish to the Committee with
4 out reimbursement such office space, personal services, sup-
5 plies and equipment, information, and facilities as the Com-
6 mittee may require for the performance of its functions.

7 APPROPRIATIONS

8 SEC. 14. There is authorized to be appropriated, out of
9 any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, such
10 sums as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this
11 Act.

88TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 1617

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 10, 1963

Mr. GUBSER introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Un-American Activities

[*H.R. 10036*, introduced by Mr. Ashbrook on February 20, 1964, and *H.R. 10077*, introduced by Mr. Schadeberg on February 24, 1964, are identical to H.R. 1617.

[*H.R. 8757*, introduced by Mr. Schweiker on October 8, 1963, is substantially the same as H.R. 1617, with the exceptions that it omits the provisions which would establish a Joint Congressional Freedom Committee and would place a representative of the State Department on the Freedom Commission.]

A BILL

To create the Freedom Commission for the development of the science of counteraction to the world Communist conspiracy and for the training and development of leaders in a total political war.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 SHORT TITLE

4 SECTION 1. This Act may be cited as the "Freedom
5 Commission Act".

6 CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS AND STATEMENT OF POLICY

7 SEC. 2. (a) The Congress of the United States makes
8 the following findings:

9 (1) The Soviet Union and Communist China are wag-

1 ing a total political war against the United States and
2 against the peoples and governments of all other nations of
3 the free world.

4 (2) Unlike the free world, the Soviet Union has sys-
5 tematically prepared for this total political war over several
6 decades. Drawing on the experience of previous conquerors
7 and upon their own elaborate studies and extensive pragmatic
8 tests, the Soviet leaders have developed their conspiratorial
9 version of political warfare into a highly effective operational
10 science. Recognizing that political warfare is a difficult
11 science making unusual demands on its practitioners, the
12 Soviet Union and Communist China have established an
13 elaborate network of training schools, within and without the
14 free world, in which have been trained large numbers of
15 highly skilled activists. These activists continue to receive
16 intensive continuous training throughout their party careers.

17 (3) In this total political war the Soviets permit no
18 neutrals. Every citizen, every economic, cultural, religious,
19 or ethnic group is a target and is under some form of direct
20 or indirect Communist attack. The battleground is every-
21 where, and every citizen, knowingly or unknowingly,
22 through action or inaction, is involved in this continuous
23 struggle.

24 (4) Since the end of World War II, the Soviets, tak-
25 ing full advantage of their better preparation and often supe-

1 rior organizational and operational know-how, have inflicted
2 a series of political warfare defeats on the free world. The
3 total sum of these defeats is nothing less than a disaster
4 for the United States and the free world and the continua-
5 tion of this political war by the Soviets confronts the United
6 States with a grave, present, and continuing danger to its
7 national survival.

8 (5) In order to defeat the Soviet political warfare
9 offensive and to preserve the integrity and independence of
10 the nations of the free world, it is imperative—

11 (A) that the knowledge and understanding of all
12 the peoples of the free world concerning the true nature
13 of the international Communist conspiracy be increased
14 as rapidly as is practicable;

15 (B) that private citizens not only understand the
16 true nature of the international Communist conspiracy,
17 but that they also know how they can participate, and
18 do participate, in this continuous struggle in an effective,
19 sustained, and systematic manner;

20 (C) that Government personnel engaged in the cold
21 war increase their knowledge of the international Com-
22 munist conspiracy, develop a high esprit de corps and
23 sense of mission and a high degree of operational know-
24 how in counteracting the international Communist
25 conspiracy.

1 (b) It is the intent and purpose of the Congress that
2 the authority and powers granted in this Act be fully utilized
3 by the hereinafter created Commission to achieve the objec-
4 tives set forth in the preceding subsection (a) (5) of this
5 section. It is the further intent and purpose of the Congress
6 that the authority, powers, and functions of the Commission
7 and the Academy as hereinafter set forth are to be broadly
8 construed.

9

DEFINITIONS

10 SEC. 3. When used in this chapter—

11 (1) The term "Commission" means the Freedom Com-
12 mission;

13 (2) The term "Academy" means the Freedom Acad-
14 emy; and

15 (3) The term "joint committee" means the Joint Con-
16 gressional Freedom Committee.

17 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FREEDOM COMMISSION; COMPOSI-
18 TION; CHAIRMAN AND ACTING CHAIRMAN; QUORUM;
19 OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN; SEAL

20 SEC. 4. There is established in the executive branch
21 of the Government an independent agency to be known as
22 the Freedom Commission which shall be composed of six
23 members and a Chairman, each of whom shall be a citizen
24 of the United States. The Chairman may from time to
25 time designate any other member of the Commission as

5

1 Acting Chairman to act in the place and stead of the Chair-
2 man during his absence. The Chairman (or the Acting
3 Chairman in the absence of the Chairman) shall preside at
4 all meetings of the Commission and a quorum for the trans-
5 action of business shall consist of at least four members
6 present. Each member of the Commission, including the
7 Chairman, shall have equal responsibility and authority in
8 all decisions and actions of the Commission, shall have full
9 access to all information relating to the performance of his
10 duties or responsibilities, and shall have one vote. Action
11 of the Commission shall be determined by a majority vote
12 of the members present. The Chairman (or Acting Chair-
13 man in the absence of the Chairman) shall be the official
14 spokesman of the Commission in its relations with the Con-
15 gress, Government agencies, persons, or the public, and,
16 on behalf of the Commission, shall see to the faithful execu-
17 tion of the policies and decisions of the Commission, and
18 shall report thereon to the Commission from time to time
19 or as the Commission may direct. The Commission shall
20 have an official seal which shall be judicially noticed.

21 MEMBERS; APPOINTMENTS; TERMS; COMPENSATION;

22 EXTRANEIOUS BUSINESS

23 SEC. 5. (a) Members of the Commission and the Chair-
24 man shall be appointed by the President, by and with the
25 advice and consent of the Senate. Not more than four

1 members, including the Chairman, may be members of any
2 one political party. In submitting any nomination to the
3 Senate, the President shall set forth the experience and quali-
4 fications of the nominee. The term of each member of the
5 Commission, other than the Chairman, shall be six years,
6 except that (1) the terms of office of the members first tak-
7 ing office shall expire as designated by the President at the
8 time of the appointment, two at the end of two years, two at
9 the end of four years, and two at the end of six years; and
10 (2) any member appointed to fill a vacancy occurring prior
11 to the expiration of the term for which his predecessor was
12 appointed shall be appointed for the remainder of such
13 term. The Chairman shall serve during the pleasure of the
14 President. Any member of the Commission may be removed
15 by the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or mal-
16 feasance in office. Each member, except the Chairman,
17 shall receive compensation at the rate of \$20,000 per annum;
18 and the Chairman shall receive compensation at the rate of
19 \$20,500 per annum.

20 (b) No member of the Commission shall engage in any
21 business, vocation, or employment other than that of serving
22 as a member of the Commission.

7

1 AUTHORIZATION TO ESTABLISH THE FREEDOM ACADEMY;

2 FUNCTIONS

3 SEC. 6. The Commission is authorized and empowered
4 to establish under its supervision and control an advanced
5 training and development center to be known as the Freedom
6 Academy. The Academy shall be located at such place or
7 places within the United States as the Commission shall
8 determine. The principal functions of the Academy shall
9 be—

10 (1) the development of systematic knowledge
11 about the international Communist conspiracy;

12 (2) the development of counteraction to the inter-
13 national Communist conspiracy into an operational
14 science that befits and bespeaks the methods and values
15 of freemen, and to achieve this purpose the entire area
16 of counteraction is to be thoroughly explored and studied
17 with emphasis on the methods and means that may best
18 be employed by private citizens and nongovernmental
19 organizations and the methods and means available to
20 Government agencies other than the methods and means
21 already being used;

22 (3) the education and training of private citizens

1 concerning all aspects of the international Communist
2 conspiracy and in the science of counteraction to that
3 conspiracy;

4 (4) the education and training of persons in Gov-
5 ernment service concerning all aspects of the interna-
6 tional Communist conspiracy and in the science of
7 counteraction to that conspiracy to the end that they can
8 be more useful to their Government in defeating the
9 international Communist conspiracy.

10 ACADEMY STUDENTS; SELECTION; GRANTS AND EXPENSES;
11 ADMISSION AS NONIMMIGRANT VISITORS; DEPORTA-
12 TION

13 SEC. 7. (a) Academy students shall be selected, insofar
14 as is practicable and in the public interest, from a cross
15 section of the diverse groups, within and without the United
16 States, in which the total political war is being fought.
17 Before accepting any student for training who is an officer
18 or employee of a Government agency, the Commission shall
19 first obtain the concurrence of that agency. Persons in
20 Government service coming within the provisions of the
21 Government Employees Training Act may be trained at the
22 Academy pursuant to the provisions of said Act. All other
23 agencies and departments of Government are authorized to
24 aid and assist the Commission in the selection of students.

9

1 (b) The Commission is authorized to make grants to
2 students and to pay expenses incident to training and study
3 under this chapter. This authorization shall include au-
4 thority to pay travel expenses to and from the Academy
5 or other authorized place of training under this chapter, and
6 authority to give financial assistance to the dependents of
7 students during the time they are undergoing training au-
8 thorized under this Act. Foreign students selected for train-
9 ing under this Act shall be admitted as nonimmigrants under
10 section 1101 (a) (15) of title 8, United States Code, for
11 such time and under such conditions as may be prescribed
12 by regulations promulgated by the Commission, the Sec-
13 retary of State, and the Attorney General. A person ad-
14 mitted under this section who fails to maintain the status
15 under which he was admitted, or who fails to depart from
16 the United States at the expiration of the time for which
17 he was admitted, or who engages in activities of a political
18 nature detrimental to the interest of the United States, or
19 in activities in conflict with the security of the United States,
20 shall, upon the warrant of the Attorney General, be taken
21 into custody and promptly deported pursuant to sections
22 1251-1253 of title 8, United States Code. Deportation
23 proceedings under this section shall be summary and findings

1 of the Attorney General as to matters of fact shall be con-
2 clusive. Such persons shall not be eligible for suspension of
3 deportation under section 1254 of such title 8.

4 NON-ACADEMY TRAINING OF ACADEMY STUDENTS

5 SEC. 8. The Commission is authorized to provide stu-
6 dents selected for training at the Academy (either before,
7 after, or during Academy training) with such additional edu-
8 cation and training at colleges, universities, or technical
9 schools other than the Academy, or with such on-the-job
10 training in industry and business as the Commission shall
11 determine to be in the public interest.

12 AUTHORIZATION TO ESTABLISH AN INFORMATION CENTER

13 SEC. 9. The Commission is authorized to establish an
14 information center at such place or places within the United
15 States as the Commission may determine. The principal
16 function of the information center shall be to disseminate
17 with or without charge information and materials which will
18 assist persons and organizations to increase their under-
19 standing of the true nature of the international Communist
20 conspiracy and the ways and means of defeating that con-
21 spiracy. In carrying out this function, the Commission is
22 authorized to prepare, make, and publish textbooks and other
23 materials, including training films, suitable for high school,
24 college, and community level instruction. The Commission
25 is authorized to disseminate such information and materials

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1 to such persons and organizations as may be in the public
2 interest on such terms and conditions as the Commission
3 shall determine.

4 RESTRICTIONS ON DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION

5 SEC. 10. Nothing in this chapter shall authorize the dis-
6 closure of any information or knowledge in any case in which
7 such disclosure (1) is prohibited by any other law of the
8 United States, or (2) is inconsistent with the security of the
9 United States.

10 SECURITY CHECK OF PERSONNEL

11 SEC. 11. (a) Except as authorized by the Commission
12 upon a determination by the Commission that such action is
13 clearly consistent with the national interest, no individual
14 shall be employed by the Commission until such individual
15 has been investigated by the Civil Service Commission to
16 determine whether the said individual is a good security risk
17 and a report thereof has been made to the Freedom
18 Commission.

19 (b) In addition to the foregoing provisions, the Com-
20 mission may request that any individual employed by the
21 Commission, or under consideration for employment by the
22 Commission, be investigated by the Federal Bureau of In-
23 vestigation to determine whether the said individual is a good
24 security risk.

1 GENERAL AUTHORITY OF THE COMMISSION

2 SEC. 12. In addition to the authority already granted,
3 the Commission is authorized and empowered—

4 (1) to establish such temporary or permanent
5 boards and committees as the Commission may from
6 time to time deem necessary for the purposes of this
7 Act;

8 (2) to appoint and fix the compensation of such
9 personnel as may be necessary to carry out the functions
10 of the Commission. Such personnel shall be appointed
11 in accordance with the civil service laws and their com-
12 pensation fixed in accordance with the Classification
13 Act of 1949, as amended, except that, to the extent the
14 Commission deems such action necessary to the dis-
15 charge of its responsibilities, personnel may be employed
16 and their compensation fixed without regard to such
17 laws: *Provided, however.* That no personnel (except
18 such personnel whose compensation is fixed by law, and
19 specially qualified professional personnel up to a limit
20 of \$19,000) whose position would be subject to the
21 Classification Act of 1949, as amended, if such Act were
22 applicable to such position, shall be paid a salary at a
23 rate in excess of the rate payable under such Act for
24 positions of equivalent difficulty or responsibility. The
25 Commission shall make adequate provision for admin-

1 istrative review of any determination to dismiss any
2 employee;

3 (3) to conduct such research, studies and surveys as
4 necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act;

5 (4) to make, promulgate, issue, rescind, and amend
6 such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry
7 out the purposes of this Act;

8 (5) to make such expenditures as may be necessary
9 for administering and carrying out the provisions of this
10 Act;

11 (6) to utilize, with the approval of the President,
12 the services, facilities, and personnel of other Govern-
13 ment agencies. Whenever the Commission shall use the
14 services, facilities, or personnel of any Government
15 agency for activities under the authority of this Act, the
16 Commission shall pay for such performance out of funds
17 available to the Commission under this Act, either in
18 advance, by reimbursement, or by direct transfer;

19 (7) to utilize or employ on a full- or part-time basis,
20 with the consent of the organization or governmental
21 body concerned, the services of personnel of any State
22 or local government or private organization to perform
23 such functions on its behalf as may appear desirable to
24 carry out the purposes of this Act, without said person-
25 nel severing their connection with the furnishing organ-

1 ization or governmental body; and further to utilize per-
2 sonnel of a foreign government in the same manner and
3 under the same circumstances with the approval of the
4 Secretary of State;

5 (8) to acquire by purchase, lease, loan, or gift, and
6 to hold and dispose of by sale, lease, or loan, real and
7 personal property of all kinds necessary for, or resulting
8 from, the exercise of authority granted by this Act;

9 (9) to receive and use funds donated by others, if
10 such funds are donated without restrictions other than
11 that they be used in furtherance of one or more of the
12 purposes of this Act;

13 (10) to accept and utilize the services of vol-
14 untary and uncompensated personnel and to provide
15 transportation and subsistence as authorized by section
16 73b-2 of title 5, United States Code, for persons serving
17 without compensation;

18 (11) to utilize the services of persons on a tempo-
19 rary basis and to pay their actual and necessary travel
20 expenses and subsistence and in addition compensation
21 at a rate not to exceed \$50 per day for each day spent
22 in the work of the Commission.

23 **GENERAL MANAGER; APPOINTMENT; COMPENSATION**

24 **SEC. 13.** The Commission is authorized to establish
25 within the Commission a General Manager, who shall dis-

15

1 charge such of the administrative and executive functions of
2 the Commission as the Commission may direct. The Gen-
3 eral Manager shall be appointed by the Commission, shall
4 serve at the pleasure of the Commission, shall be removable
5 by the Commission, and shall receive compensation at a rate
6 determined by the Commission, but not in excess of \$18,000
7 per annum.

8 ESTABLISHMENT OF JOINT CONGRESSIONAL FREEDOM
9 COMMITTEE; MEMBERSHIP

10 SEC. 14. There is established the Joint Congressional
11 Freedom Committee hereinafter referred to as the "joint com-
12 mittee" to be composed of seven Members of the Senate to
13 be appointed by the President of the Senate, and seven Mem-
14 bers of the House of Representatives to be appointed by the
15 Speaker of the House of Representatives. In each instance
16 not more than four Members shall be the members of the
17 same political party.

18 AUTHORITY AND DUTY OF JOINT COMMITTEE

19 SEC. 15. The joint committee shall make continued
20 studies of the activities of the Commission and of problems
21 relating to the development of counteraction to the inter-
22 national Communist conspiracy. During the first sixty days
23 of each session of the Congress the joint committee shall
24 conduct hearings in either open or executive session for the
25 purposes of receiving information concerning the develop-

1 ment and state of counteraction. The Commission shall keep
2 the joint committee fully and currently informed with re-
3 spect to all of the Commission's activities. All bills, reso-
4 lutions, and other matters in the Senate or House of
5 Representatives relating primarily to the Commission shall
6 be referred to the joint committee. The members of the
7 joint committee who are Members of the Senate shall from
8 time to time report to the Senate and the members of the
9 joint committee who are Members of the House of Repre-
10 sentatives shall from time to time report to the House, by
11 bill or otherwise, their recommendations with respect to mat-
12 ters within the jurisdiction of their respective Houses which
13 are referred to the joint committee, or otherwise within the
14 jurisdiction of the joint committee.

15 CHAIRMAN AND VICE CHAIRMAN OF JOINT COMMITTEE;

16 VACANCIES IN MEMBERSHIP

17 SEC. 16. Vacancies in the membership of the joint com-
18 mittee shall not affect the power of the remaining members
19 to execute the functions of the joint committee, and shall be
20 filled in the same manner as in the case of the original se-
21 lection. The joint committee shall select a chairman and a
22 vice chairman from among its members at the beginning of
23 each Congress. The vice chairman shall act in the place
24 and stead of the chairman in the absence of the chairman.
25 The chairmanship shall alternate between the Senate and the

17

1 House of Representatives with each Congress, and the chair-
2 man shall be selected by the members from that House
3 entitled to the chairmanship. The vice chairman shall be
4 chosen from the House other than that of the chairman by
5 the members from that House.

6 POWERS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

7 SEC. 17. In carrying out its duties under this chapter,
8 the joint committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee
9 thereof, is authorized to hold such hearings or investigations,
10 to sit and act at such places and times, to require by sub-
11 pena or otherwise, the attendance of such witnesses and the
12 production of such books, papers, and documents, to admin-
13 ister such oaths, to take such testimony, to procure such
14 printing and binding, and to make such expenditures as it
15 deems advisable. The joint committee may make such rules
16 respecting its organization and procedures as it deems neces-
17 sary: *Provided, however,* That no measure or recommenda-
18 tion shall be reported from the joint committee or by any
19 member designated by him or by the joint committee, and
20 may be served by such person or persons as may be desig-
21 nated by such chairman or member. The chairman of the
22 joint committee or any member thereof may administer oaths
23 to witnesses. The joint committee may use a committee
24 seal. The provisions of sections 192-194 of title 2, United
25 States Code, shall apply in case of any failure of any wit-

1 ness to comply with a subpoena or to testify when summoned
2 under authority of this section. The expenses of the joint
3 committee shall be paid from the contingent fund of the
4 Senate from funds appropriated for the joint committee upon
5 vouchers approved by the chairman. The cost of steno-
6 graphic services to report public hearings shall not be in
7 excess of the amounts prescribed by law for reporting the
8 hearings of standing committees of the Senate. The cost of
9 stenographic services to report executive hearings shall be
10 fixed at an equitable rate by the joint committee. Mem-
11 bers of the joint committee, and its employees and consult-
12 ants, while traveling on official business for the joint com-
13 mittee, may receive either the per diem allowance authorized
14 to be paid to Members of Congress or its employees, or their
15 actual and necessary expenses provided an itemized state-
16 ment of such expenses is attached to the voucher.

17 STAFF AND ASSISTANCE; UTILIZATION OF FEDERAL
18 DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES; ARMED PROTECTION

19 SEC. 18. The joint committee is empowered to appoint
20 and fix the compensation of such experts, consultants, and
21 staff employees as it deems necessary and advisable. The
22 joint committee is authorized to utilize the services, informa-
23 tion, facilities, and personnel of the departments and
24 establishments of the Government.

19

1 CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION BY JOINT COMMITTEE

2 SEC. 19. The joint committee may classify information
3 originating within the committee in accordance with stand-
4 ards used generally by the executive branch for classifying
5 restricted data or defense information.

6 RECORDS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

7 SEC. 20. The joint committee shall keep a complete
8 record of all committee actions, including a record of the
9 votes on any question on which a record vote is demanded.
10 All committee records, data, charts, and files shall be the
11 property of the joint committee and shall be kept in the
12 offices of the joint committee or other places as the joint
13 committee may direct under such security safeguards as the
14 joint committee shall determine in the interest of the com-
15 mon defense and security.

16 APPROPRIATIONS

17 SEC. 21. There is authorized to be appropriated, out of
18 any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, so
19 much as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of
20 this Act.

By way of general summary, all of the bills have in substance the same purposes and objectives, but differ on the following major points:

	<i>Information Center</i>	<i>Advisory Committee</i>	<i>Joint Congressional Freedom Committee</i>
H.R. 352 (Herlong)-----	Yes	Yes	No
H.R. 1617 (Gubser)-----	Yes	No	Yes
H.R. 5368 (Boggs)-----	Yes	Yes	No
H.R. 8320 (Taft)-----	Yes	Yes	No
H.R. 8757 (Schweiker)-----	Yes	No	No
H.R. 10036 (Ashbrook)-----	Yes	No	Yes
H.R. 10037 (Clausen)-----	Yes	Yes	No
H.R. 10077 (Schadeberg)-----	Yes	No	Yes
H.R. 11718 (Talcott)-----	No	Yes	No

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
Washington, D. C.

May 18, 1959

Honorable Francis E. Walter
Chairman, Committee on Un-American
Activities
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in response to your request for the views of the Department of Justice concerning the bill (H.R. 3880) "To create the Freedom Commission for the development of the science of counteraction to the world Communist conspiracy and for the training and development of leaders in a total political war."

The bill would create a Freedom Commission with responsibility for training Americans and selected foreign students to better understand the nature of the international Communist conspiracy and for developing effective methods for combating it. The Commission would function, to a large extent, through a Freedom Academy and information centers which it is authorized to establish. A Joint Congressional Freedom Committee would also be established, to make continued studies of the activities of the Freedom Commission and of problems relating to the development of counteraction to the International Communist conspiracy.

The Department of Justice is wholly in accord with the view that a greater awareness throughout the free world of the extent and operations of Communism and methods of combating it is most desirable. However, there would seem to be no need to create a new agency in order to accomplish this objective. Rather, existing agencies, for example, the United States Information Agency, and others in the security field, could be utilized with less risk of confusion, overlapping of responsibilities, and duplication of effort.

Accordingly, the Department of Justice is unable to recommend enactment of this bill.

The Bureau of the Budget has advised that there is no objection to the submission of this report.

Sincerely yours,

SIGNED

Lawrence E. Walsh
Deputy Attorney General

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington

July 23, 1959

Dear Mr. Walter:

Your letter of February 12, 1959, requested comments of the Department of State on H. R. 3880 which would establish a Freedom Academy whose principal functions would be the development of systematic knowledge about the international Communist conspiracy, the development of counter-action to the conspiracy into an operational science, and the education and training of private citizens and Government employees of the United States and other countries in these matters.

As you may know, the Department sought in its appropriations request for Fiscal Year 1960 funds for additional personnel to strengthen the Department's ability to cope with world Communist political and economic activities. The challenge of international communism requires that we discern and fully understand the various facets of the Communist menace and correctly evaluate its every move and thrust. For this purpose, it is the Department's belief that it must increase the number of its personnel who are experts in this field and whose full time can be devoted to observing the maneuvers of international Communism on a global scale and in formulating policies, devices and tactics to meet these maneuvers. In this connection, the Department of State is currently considering ways and means by which the training of Foreign Service officers on this subject can be improved.

Accordingly, the Department is in agreement with the basic objective of H. R. 3880 to increase knowledge and understanding of the international Communist menace. However, there would seem to be no need to create a new agency in order to accomplish this objective. Rather, existing agencies could be used with less risk of confusion, overlapping of responsibilities, and duplication of effort.

We have been informed by the Bureau of the Budget that there is no objection to the submission of this report.

Sincerely yours,
For the Acting Secretary of State:

SIGNED

William B. Macomber, Jr.
Assistant Secretary

The Honorable
Francis E. Walter, Chairman
Committee on Un-American Activities
House of Representatives

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Washington 25, D. C.

23 May 1962

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in reply to your request for the views of the Department of Defense on H.R. 1845, H.R. 2708, and H.R. 6207, 87th Congress, a proposed "Freedom Commission Act."

The bills would establish a Freedom Commission and a Freedom Academy to counteract the international Communist conspiracy.

The broad objectives of the bills are entirely praiseworthy and unexceptionable. However, the need for the creation of new agencies for their accomplishment is questionable. In most of their functions, the proposed agencies would duplicate the work of existing Federal agencies and private organizations concerned with policy formulation, research, education, indoctrination and information programs.

Whether there is need for the establishment of a Freedom Commission and Academy to accomplish the objectives of H.R. 1845, H.R. 2708 and H.R. 6207 is a matter outside the purview of the Department of Defense and with respect to which we defer to the State Department and other interested agencies more directly concerned.

The Bureau of the Budget advises that, from the standpoint of the Administration's program, there is no objection to the presentation of this report for the consideration of the Committee.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

Cyrus R. Vance

Honorable Francis E. Walter
Chairman, Committee on Un-American
Activities
House of Representatives

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington

June 7, 1962

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Secretary has asked that I reply to your letter of September 13, 1961 in which you asked for the Department's view on Bill H.R. 8936 proposing "To create the Freedom Commission and the Freedom Academy."

As you are aware, the proposals contained in this bill involve almost every major area of the Department and those of several other agencies. I sincerely regret that the necessary lengthy discussions and studies long delayed a reply to your letter. After careful study of the various thoughtful proposals in H.R. 8936 and a comprehensive review of the Department's and other agencies' programs for research, training and information programs on communism, there are summarized below, in some detail, our views on the proposed legislation. In general, I would say that, while the Department fully appreciates the deep concern for the security of the United States which motivates the sponsors of the proposed legislation, and recognizes that certain aspects of it have considerable merit, on balance we believe that it would not serve as a useful instrument of national policy.

The sponsors of H.R. 8936 and the various other Freedom Academy Bills urge, correctly, in the Department's view, that in our struggle with the forces of tyranny - and communism in particular - we must employ not only military strength but also all of the political, psychological, economic and other non-military means at our disposal. The President has given to the Department of State a primary role in marshalling all of our resources in these fields which cut across many broad areas of government responsibility. The integrated efforts of the foreign affairs and security agencies are as vital in developing the overall strategy and tactics of the "cold war" as in carrying them out. Expertise and operational experience are as important in the formulation of policy as they are in its execution. For this reason,

the Department

The Honorable
Francis E. Walter, Chairman
Committee on Un-American Activities
House of Representatives

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the Department seriously questions whether comprehensive and realistic plans for dealing with the infinitely complex problems of U.S. Foreign Affairs can be developed by a new, separate government agency, especially one without operational responsibilities, as contemplated by S. 822. Furthermore, we would be seriously deluding ourselves if we believed, as S. 822 suggests, that the strategy for waging our struggle against communism could be formulated into an "operational science."

The Department agrees that intensive research into the nature and techniques of the communist movement is necessary to our cause. As you are aware, our intelligence community has built up a large reservoir of talent and material in this general area and their efforts are complemented by the large volume of excellent studies being conducted by private individuals, foundations and institutions. As the Bill correctly points out, however, more work is needed in research on the appeals, techniques and organizations of World Communism. We have submitted requests to Congress in the Department's budget for increased research in this area.

Another purpose of the bill is to instruct public officials and private citizens in the techniques and methods of communist infiltration and organization. Instruction in this area is provided government officials through the National and Service War Colleges, the Foreign Service Institute and training assignments at private institutions. For example, the Foreign Service Institute emphasizes communist methods and organization in all its substantive courses and conducts twelve special two weeks' seminars each year on communist strategy. During the last five years, 2,750 students from many departments and agencies of the Government attended these seminars. Plans are currently underway to expand significantly the Foreign Service Institute and broaden its training responsibilities to meet the needs of the changing times. For example, a special course is soon to be added to the Foreign Service Institute curriculum designed specifically for senior officers of the Department and other government agencies assigned to newly developing countries. The course at its inception will concentrate on problems peculiar to Southeast Asia and Latin America where Communist efforts at subversion and other activities have a potentially disruptive influence. Additional ways of improving the Institute, particularly with respect to the Communist threat, are under active consideration.

In addition, educational opportunities are available at any one of the excellent Russian research or international studies centers throughout the country. The number of university programs and courses on Soviet studies on "Communism" has increased greatly in the last few years. Only a few years ago Soviet and Chinese Communist specialization was available

at only

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at only three or four universities, now such specialization is offered by over 25 American universities and colleges.

Another proposed purpose of the Academy is to train operational cadres in countering Soviet Communist techniques and methods for use abroad. This is not something that can properly be done by Americans alone, and by its very nature should not be a publicized operation. Publicity of the type suggested in the Academy Bill, in our view, would defeat this purpose of the program before it had begun. Soviet training of foreign communists in the techniques of organization, subversion, etc., is conducted, for example, in the highest secrecy.

With reference to the idea of enrolling foreigners in this Academy for training as operational cadres, it is extremely doubtful if the governments of many countries or public opinion abroad would support a United States program of this nature and the reaction in these countries to a highly publicized institution of this kind would bring almost certainly a negative response. The Freedom Academy would be regarded abroad, and immediately characterized by Soviet propaganda, as a "Cold War Institute," which would be regarded as a training course for espionage and would give a completely incorrect connotation to the world of the U.S. concept of "freedom."

While existing programs and facilities for other types of training and research are impressive and are continually expanding, the Department believes that more rapid expansion and improvement of them is essential. Various steps in this direction are under consideration. One is proposed in the foreign aid legislation, which calls for a new authorization to finance an intensive program of research in the problems of economic and social development in less developed countries. Another is the previously mentioned program to expand the Foreign Service Institute.

In the Department's view, however, the best research and training for meeting our international responsibilities will not come from the establishment of a single, government institution like the proposed Freedom Academy. As with our society as a whole, the genius of American research and education lies in its pluralism, and to depart from this tested approach at a time when we face the most difficult international problems in our history would, in the Department's view, be most unwise.

Finally, we believe that positive programs aimed at furthering the cause of freedom represent the best means of fighting communism. Abroad, in a world in flux, the peoples of the less-developed areas yearn for national and individual dignity, for a better life for themselves and

their

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their children. To align ourselves with these aspirations, the Administration initiated such new programs as the Peace Corps, the Alliance for Progress and a reoriented and reinvigorated program of foreign aid that will provide economic and social development where it is most needed and will do the most good. At home, we can all join together in building a stronger United States not only by conducting ourselves at all times as responsible citizens but also by working for improvements such as a stronger economy and a modernized and reinvigorated educational system.

The Department has been advised by the Bureau of the Budget that from the standpoint of the Administration's program there is no objection to the submission of this report.

Sincerely yours,

SIGNED

Frederick G. Dutton
Assistant Secretary

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Washington 25, D. C.

29 March 1963

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Reference is made to your request for the views of the Department of Defense with respect to H. R. 352, 88th Congress, a bill "To create the Freedom Commission and the Freedom Academy; to research and develop an integrated, operational science to win the nonmilitary part of the global struggle between freedom and communism; and to train Government personnel, private citizens, and foreign students in this science."

The purposes of the bill are as stated in the title.

The broad objectives of the bill are entirely praiseworthy and unexceptionable. However, as you are aware, the President, on February 11, 1963, transmitted to the Congress a legislative proposal to provide for the establishment of a National Academy of Foreign Affairs designed to provide a center for Government-wide training and research in international matters. The proposal has been introduced in the House as H. R. 3668.

The President's proposal was based primarily on the recommendations of the Perkins Panel and was coordinated, in draft form, with the Department of Defense.

Establishment of a National Academy, as the President indicated in his message of February 11, 1963, is not intended to affect the interdepartmental support for and participation in the joint professional schools of the Department of Defense or in the War Colleges of the military departments. It is expected that other departments and agencies will continue to support and participate in these schools just as the Department of Defense will support and participate in the National Academy.

For the foregoing reasons, it is the belief of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the proposed National Academy of Foreign Affairs will provide a valuable complement to the existing military schools and is better suited to that purpose than the Freedom Academy proposed in H. R. 352.

. Accordingly, the Department of Defense strongly recommends the establishment of the National Academy of Foreign Affairs as proposed in H. R. 3668 in lieu of the proposal included in H. R. 352. With respect to the other provisions of the bill, the Department of Defense defers to the Department of State.

The Bureau of the Budget advises that, from the standpoint of the Administration's program, there is no objection to the presentation of this report for the consideration of the Committee.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

John T. McNaughton

Honorable Francis E. Walter
Chairman, Committee on
Un-American Activities
House of Representatives

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington

April 8, 1963

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on H.R. 352, a bill "To Create the Freedom Commission and the Freedom Academy," which you forwarded to us with your letter of January 31, 1963.

H.R. 352 is similar to a bill on which the Department commented to you in a letter dated June 7, 1962. We expressed appreciation of the purposes of the sponsors and recognized the merits of certain aspects of the proposal, but expressed the conviction that the bill as a whole would not serve as a useful instrument of national policy.

While the Department continues to have serious objections to the machinery proposed by H.R. 352, it is deeply aware of the acute need for more adequate training and research in the vast and complex field of foreign affairs. As you know, the President recently proposed the creation of a National Academy of Foreign Affairs, to provide advanced training and research for the benefit of more than a score of different Federal departments and agencies now actively engaged in various foreign operations. The President's proposal was the outgrowth of an intensive reexamination of current requirements and facilities for training and research, conducted by the Department of State in cooperation with other agencies; and supplemented by the Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel, chaired by Former Secretary of State Herter, as well as the Report of a special Presidential Advisory Committee, chaired by Dr. James A. Perkins of the Carnegie Corporation.

While the President's plan for a National Academy of Foreign Affairs is based primarily upon the findings of the Committee headed by Dr. Perkins, it includes ideas from other sources. Special attention, of course, has been given to past and current proposals for a "Freedom Commission and Freedom Academy," including H.R. 352.

The President's

The Honorable
Francis E. Walter, Chairman,
Committee on Un-American Activities,
House of Representatives.

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The President's plan incorporates some of the most constructive features of this bill. Thus it appears that the most useful way to explain the Department's views on H.R. 352 is to compare it with the legislation recently proposed by the President:

1. The Department shares most of the basic objectives expressed in H.R. 352. We agree fully as to the magnitude of the communist threat and the diverse forms it has taken, and agree that the protection of our national security and the extension of human freedom demands a titanic and protracted effort by the United States--that our nation must, to use the words of President Kennedy, "intensify our efforts for a struggle in many ways more difficult than war." The Department agrees that a "wide range of additional methods and means...must be worked out and integrated with existing instruments of policy" and that American officers involved in foreign affairs must attain the "highest professional competence in those areas of specialized knowledge required by our global operations." Finally, we agree that a new institution for advanced research and training is needed. The proposed National Academy for Foreign Affairs is designed to gather and combine the best available talent, knowledge, experience and other facilities from public and private sources alike, and to use these capabilities for the more effective prosecution of the cold war and for the pursuit of the entire range of America's international interests.

2. By its very nature, the struggle against communism permeates all aspects of American foreign affairs, and is inseparable from other international activities. Our Government cannot fight communism in a vacuum. It must be opposed at specific times and places by specific means, including a wide variety of resources and techniques.

Because of the very diversity of the communist threat, many varieties of knowledge and skill are essential. The struggle requires expertise in diplomacy, intelligence, political analysis and action, negotiation, cultural affairs, economic development, international trade, social reform, technical assistance, informational techniques, psychological warfare, investment opportunities, liaison with special segments of foreign populations, general and localized military operations, the functioning of international organizations and many similar fields. It requires specialized knowledge of the language, history, culture, economics, politics, resources and attitudes of all countries and regions of the world. It requires knowledge of the specific nature of the communist threat in each locality, the apparatus employed, its masquerades, its relations with other groups, its immediate and long-term aims, its shifting tactics, its sources of strength, its vulnerabilities, et cetera.

Thus,

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Thus, it is impossible to develop and sustain an effective strategy for opposing communism and promoting freedom unless this strategy embraces the whole spectrum of foreign affairs. This is the concept underlying the President's plan for a National Academy.

3. The research and training conducted by the proposed National Academy, of course, would not be limited exclusively to "cold war" problems. While it is true as Secretary Rusk has said, that "global struggle for freedom and against communist imperialism is our main business at the State Department," it is also true that the American people have other important interests in the international sphere. We would have an enormous stake in world affairs even if communism had never existed. It is essential that the foreign affairs personnel of our Government be aware of the totality of America's international interests and be equipped to protect and promote all these interests.

4. While the National Academy of Foreign Affairs, like the institution envisaged by H.R. 352, would have essential autonomy in structure, administration and operations, the National Academy would be designed to assist personnel of all the departments and agencies of the Federal Government in the practical problems of foreign affairs and thus would be linked to the substantive operations of these agencies. Comprehensive training, research and planning in the field of foreign affairs cannot be wholly divorced from operational responsibilities. The National Academy would be subject to direction by the President and to policy guidance by a Board of Regents, in order to make sure that the Academy's programs are realistically geared to the actual problems, needs and policies of our Government.

5. Unlike the institution proposed by H.R. 352, the National Academy of Foreign Affairs would not be given major responsibilities for channeling information to the general public. While it is highly desirable that the whole American people gain a better understanding of the global communist menace, the Department doubts the value of any effort to centralize and standardize the dissemination of information on this subject, which is now being provided by various Federal departments, by members of the Congress and other political leaders, by numerous publications, by private organizations, by private academic institutions, et cetera. While the research programs of the Academy will produce new material for dissemination through these diverse sources, the Department sees little value and considerable risk in burdening the Academy with a massive public information function, thus dissipating the energies and complicating the functions of conducting intensive, modern training and research programs for professional personnel under carefully designed security safeguards.

In view

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In view of the foregoing considerations, the Department is convinced that the President's proposal for a National Academy of Foreign Affairs is the most practical and realistic approach to the basic purposes of H.R. 352, along with other important foreign policy objectives. Therefore, we hope that the sponsors of H.R. 352, who have demonstrated their keen awareness of the need for advanced training and research and who deserve commendation for the valuable work they have done, will give active support to the President's proposal.

The Bureau of the Budget advises that from the standpoint of the Administration's program there is no objection to the submission of this report.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

Frederick G. Dutton
Assistant Secretary

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

Office of
The Director

Washington

April 19, 1963

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Reference is made to your request for the views of the U. S. Information Agency with respect to H.R. 352, 88th Congress, a bill "To create the Freedom Commission and the Freedom Academy, to conduct research to develop an integrated body of operational knowledge in the political, psychological, economic, technological, and organizational areas to increase the nonmilitary capabilities of the United States in the global struggle between freedom and communism, to educate and train Government personnel and private citizens to understand and implement this body of knowledge, and also to provide education and training for foreign students in these areas of knowledge under appropriate conditions."

The Agency is in general accord with the objectives of the bill. However, as you are aware, the President transmitted to the Congress a proposal for the establishment of a National Academy of Foreign Affairs for training personnel of foreign affairs agencies (H.R. 3668). The President's proposal was based primarily on the recommendations of the President's Advisory Panel headed by Mr. Perkins, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel headed by the Honorable Christian A. Herter.

In our judgment the President's proposal for a National Academy of Foreign Affairs presents the most practical and realistic basis for training and research programs for foreign affairs personnel. Accordingly, the Agency recommends the establishment of the National Academy of Foreign Affairs as proposed in S. 865 in lieu of the Freedom Commission and Academy proposed in H. R. 352.

The Bureau of the Budget advises that it has no objection to the submission of this report from the standpoint of the Administration's program.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

Edward R. Murrow
Director

The Honorable
Francis E. Walter
Chairman
Committee on Un-American
Activities
House of Representatives



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

February 12, 1964

Honorable Edwin E. Willis
Chairman, Committee on Un-American
Activities
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter of February 5, 1964, advising of your intention to hold public hearings on February 18-20 on bills to create a Freedom Commission and Freedom Academy.

Although your offer to receive testimony of Department of Defense witnesses is appreciated, it is believed that this Department has nothing to add to the views expressed in Mr. McNaughton's letter of March 29, 1963. Except for the general comments included in that letter, the Department of Defense defers to the Department of State as to the detailed provisions of the bills in question.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "David E. McGiffert".

David E. McGiffert
Assistant to the Secretary
(Legislative Affairs)



OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
WASHINGTON

February 17, 1964

Dear Mr. Willis:

Your letter of February 5, 1964 to Carl Rowan, Director Designate of the U. S. Information Agency, has been referred to me for reply. We appreciate your thoughtfulness in inviting the Agency to testify at your Committee Hearings on the Freedom Commission and Academy Bills.

As you are aware, the Executive Branch has proposed the establishment of a National Academy of Foreign Affairs, based primarily on the recommendations of the President's Advisory Panel, headed by Mr. Perkins, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel, headed by the Honorable Christian A. Herter. We support that proposal as set forth in H. R. 3668.

As you know, our views on this matter have previously been conveyed to the Committee, in a letter from Mr. Murrow dated April 19, 1963. For that reason we hope you will permit us to decline your kind invitation to testify at this time.

We have conveyed the substance of this letter to Mr. McNamara, Director of the Committee, so as not to delay plans for your hearings.

Sincerely,

Donald M. Wilson
Acting Director

The Honorable
Edwin E. Willis
Chairman, Committee on
Un-American Activities
House of Representatives

APPENDIX B

EXCERPTS FROM THE "GREEN BOOK" REFERRED TO IN TESTIMONY OF
ALAN G. GRANT, JR.

PART I

THE SOVIET RESEARCH AND TRAINING
PROGRAM IN POLITICAL WARFARE

Despite the great outflow of books on the Soviet Bloc and Communism, insufficient attention has been given to the long range research and training program which underlies Communist capabilities in political warfare. This program is not the only reason for their very great capabilities in non-military conflict, but it is an important one and must be understood, at least in outline, before we can fully understand our own deficiencies. It involves thousands of training schools, large and small, on both sides of the Iron and Bamboo Curtains and a very large, conflict oriented research establishment. Nothing quite like this has existed before, and it can be the key to eventual Soviet victory. It is well worth reviewing.

Lenin and his successors are above all specialists in power. They have studied and mastered the many methods and means by which a small elite can acquire and maintain power in all its forms. From the beginning Lenin recognized that many avenues lead to revolution and that revolution is a complex and serious business requiring the services of highly trained professionals.

In his first important book, What Is to Be Done? (1902), Lenin accused his fellow Social Democrats of being amateurs using primitive methods of political conflict. If the revolution was to succeed, Lenin argued, it must be lead by trained professional revolutionists who alone would be capable of "maintaining the energy, the stability and continuity of the political struggle," who alone would be capable of traveling all roads that lead to revolution and "guiding the whole proletarian struggle." (Emphasis Lenin's).

The most imperative task was to train professional revolutionists. And in case anyone might conclude this was a quick or easy task Lenin warned, "professional revolutionists must be trained for years." And he added, "we are training ourselves, will train ourselves and we will be trained!"¹

1. Lenin, What Is to Be Done, Selected Works, Vol. 2, especially pp. 115-168.

Lenin was tactically and strategically uninhibited. Much of his writing consists of critiques on the acquisition of power in which he excoriates his associates for their sometimes narrow approach to political struggle. He urged the mastering of all forms of struggle and complete tactical flexibility:

"The revolutionary class must be able to master all forms or sides of social activity without exception . . . (and) must be able to pass from one form to another in the quickest and most unexpected manner.

"Everyone will agree that an army which does not train itself to wield all arms, all means and methods of warfare that the enemy possesses or may possess is behaving in an unwise or even in a criminal manner. This applies to politics to a greater degree than it does to war. In politics it is harder to forecast what methods of warfare will be applied and be useful for us under certain future conditions. Unless we are able to master all means of warfare, we stand the risk of suffering great and sometimes decisive defeat if the changes in the position of the other classes, which we cannot determine, will bring to the front forms of activity in which we are particularly weak. If, however, we are able to master all means of warfare, we shall certainly be victorious, . . . But revolutionaries who are unable to combine illegal forms of struggle with every form of legal struggle are very poor revolutionaries . . . Only one thing is lacking to enable us to march forward more surely and more firmly to victory, namely, the full and completely thought out appreciation by all Communists in all countries of the necessity of displaying the utmost flexibility in their tactics."² (Emphasis Lenin's).

Where there were strong trade unions, as in Great Britain, Lenin sneered at sectarian comrades who employed the sterile and self defeating strategy of organizing narrow Communists unions rather than penetrating and manipulating the existing labor organizations. Where parliamentary

2. Lenin, Left Wing Communism, An Infantile Disorder, Selected Works, Vol. 10, pp. 139, 140, 145.

forms of government were well established, he blasted comrades who boycotted the parliaments as hopelessly tainted bourgeois institutions and instructed them to form a combat party within the parliaments and exploit the existing contradictions. He emphasized that Communists must be able to master the widest "revolutionary experience . . . a variety and rapidity of shifting forms in the movement -- legal and illegal, peaceful and stormy, open and underground, embracing small circles and large masses, parliamentary and terrorist . . . a multiplicity of forms, shades and methods of struggle, embracing all classes of modern society."³

" . . . it is our duty to carry on our preparatory work in such a manner as to be 'well shod on all four feet,' . . . We do not know and we cannot know which spark -- out of the innumerable sparks that are flying around in all countries as a result of the economic and political world crisis -- will kindle the conflagration, in the sense of specially rousing the masses, and we must, therefore, with the aid of our new, Communist principles, set to work and 'stir up' all, even the oldest, mustiest and seemingly hopeless spheres, for otherwise we shall not be able to cope with our tasks, we shall not be all-sided, we shall not be able to master all arms and we shall not be prepared for victory over the bourgeoisie. . . ."4

TRAINING

Lenin meant what he said about training. Prior to 1917 he established three political warfare training centers in Western Europe -- one on the Isle of Capri outside Naples, one at Bologna, and one in a Parisian suburb.⁵ The graduates of these schools played an important role in undermining and weakening the Kerensky government. One cannot help being impressed by the ruthless yet sophisticated and professional way in which Lenin and his small but well trained group of Bolsheviks laid the ground work and created the organizational forms and the propaganda climate for the November seizure of power. Their skillful selection of slogans, the penetration and capture of key institutions, the

3. Quoted by Frank S. Meyer in The Moulding of Communists, (1961), page 22.

4. Left Wing Communism, Ibid., pp. 140-143.

5. 1959 Senate hearings on the Freedom Academy Bill, page 81. .

manipulation of opponents from positions of power, the coordination of all methods, the expert timing, the flexibility in tactical approach. This was not the work of amateurs. It could only have been carried out by experienced, well trained professional revolutionaries.

Lenin and his successors looked upon world revolution as first of all a research, development and training problem. The strategy and tactics which had worked so well in Russia would have to be sophisticated and specialized for the quite different conditions in other countries ranging from backward, colonial societies to advanced industrialized nations. They would need indigenous cadres in all countries capable of carrying out a complex strategy, flexibility, yet with clearly understood direction and purpose. They would need to know all about the cultures, the areas of tension and conflict, the decision making machinery and the points at which it could be influenced in each target nation. At the top they would need conflict managers capable of orchestrating the revolution at every level in every dimension.

To train the leadership groups for worldwide revolution, the Communists established several top level training centers at Moscow. The best known of these was the famous Lenin School (Lenin Institute of Political Warfare) which opened its doors in 1925, graduating its first class in 1928. The four thousand students came from many countries and were given an unusually intensive three year course designed to train them in all of the arts of a total power struggle. Guerrilla warfare, armed uprising, agitation and propaganda, legal and illegal methods, as well as advanced indoctrination in Marxism-Leninism, were all in the curriculum.⁶ The importance attached to these schools can be seen in the list of lecturers which was a who's who of world Communism beginning with Stalin and including such leading party figures as Manuelsky, Bukarin, Molotov, Kuusinen, and even Trotsky before he was forced to flee.

Another important school was the Sun-Yat Sen

6. For a description of the training program at the Lenin School during this period, see Gitlow, The Whole of Their Lives, (1948), chapter 10, Schools for Revolution; statement of Joseph Z. Kornfeder, a graduate of the Lenin School, 1959 Senate hearings on the Freedom Academy Bill, pp. 115-118; testimony of William Odell Nowell, another Lenin School graduate, before UnAmerican Activities Committee, Nov. 30, 1939, Vol. 2 of Committee's hearings on HR 282, pp. 7020-7022.

University, sometimes called the Far Eastern University, which trained Communists from Asia including many of the present top leaders of the Chinese Communist Party. A third school, the Academy of Red Professors, which is now disbanded, had the special function of teaching the teachers and top theoreticians.

Today the higher party school in Moscow conducts a three year training program for an estimated 1500 students, of whom about 900 are from outside the Soviet Bloc. This is only one of a number of upper level schools in the Soviet Union giving intensive training in political warfare.^{6(a)}

Even during the darkest days of World War II, the Kremlin continued the large scale training of foreign Communists. A former member of the German CP, Wolfgang Leonhard, who was taken to Russia in 1935 by his Communist parents, has given us a detailed and fascinating description of a Comintern school operated at Ufa during 1942 and 1943 for training young foreign Communists (mainly in the 18-25 age group though many older, more experienced Communists were included). The students came from France, Spain, Italy, Korea, and the various Balkan and Central European countries.⁷ This was originally a two year course.

Below the top schools are a whole complex of intermediate and lower level schools. Prague has become a principal center for training Communists from Latin America and Africa. Daniel James, a leading authority on Communism in Latin America, describes one of these Prague schools as follows:

"The institute has an enrollment of 750 students * * * The great majority of them are Latin Americans, the rest Europeans. The purpose in having Communists from Latin America and Europe study together is to train them as teams. Upon graduation, the Latin Americans return to their native countries and are later joined by European

6(a). 1959 Senate hearings, *Ibid.*, pp. 80-88. This testimony by Dr. Stefan Possony, given without notes, is perhaps the most complete listing of Soviet political warfare research and training centers available outside classified government files.

7. Leonhard, *Child of the Revolution*, (1958), pp. 195-296. Also see pages 462-471 for a description of the Karl Marx Academy in East Germany.

graduates, who may be former classmates. The latter are usually assigned to Iron Curtain diplomatic or trade missions in Latin America -- hence the stress being laid by Communists everywhere in Latin America upon establishing diplomatic and trade relations with the Soviet sphere. (It is quite possible that the Iron Curtain envoys in Mexico who visited Guatemala were trained at Prague.)

"Subjects taught at the Institute for the Study of Latin American Relations include the history, culture, politics, law, and languages of the Latin American countries, all rendered from a Marxist viewpoint. Special attention is devoted to the theory and tactics of revolution, espionage, and sabotage.

"The institute's primary aim, however, is not to turn out spies and saboteurs but experts at infiltrating non-Communist organizations and institutions and at leading or influencing mass movements, in accordance with the general strategy of exploiting and channelizing the dominant trend in Latin America: Nationalism. The trainees are handpicked from Latin America's Communist Parties and their labor, intellectual, peace, and youth fronts. These facts underscore the significance of the increasing flow of Latin Americans to Communist centers in Europe; there is scarcely any doubt that a great many of them find their way to Prague."⁸

There are reports of a school at Tashkent, Russia, training Communists from the Islamic areas.

Father de Jaegher, a Belgian missionary, who spent many years in or near Communist controlled areas of China prior to 1948, has given us a description of the seven levels of training schools from village to Moscow, in which the upper cadres of the Chinese CP were trained before they conquered China. He describes the end distillate, the Moscow trained man:

"These Chinese returned to China apparently unchanged outwardly, in so far as their physical appearance was concerned, except for their eyes,

8. James, Red Design for the Americas, (1954), page 202.

whose expression reflected the transformation of the inner man. . . . So complete was their alteration of self that they burned themselves out fast. Communists I knew admitted there were many deaths and losses among these men from tuberculosis and heart disease, even though they ate well and lived on a higher, better scale than they would have as less privileged, non-Communist Chinese."⁹

Each Communist Party runs its own system of training schools.¹⁰ J. Edgar Hoover has given us this description of party schools in the U. S.:

"Most people don't think of the Communist Party as an educational institution. Yet year after year the Party operates a school system of vast proportions: theory schools; orientation schools; specialized schools in current events, history, economics, social problems; schools in Party techniques: how to collect dues, recruit new members, serve as a club chairman, be a better public speaker; and, of course, schools on revolutionary tactics and procedure."¹¹

In addition to the centers within the Soviet Bloc and within each party, there are important regional centers (usually secret) where cadres from several countries receive months of schooling. One such center was accidentally uncovered by the Argentine police on September 25, 1958.¹²

This particular school was located in a villa in a wooded rural area in the Province of Buenos Aires. The course was six months (divided into a two and four months course) and the 25 students, averaging about 30 years old, boarded at the school. In addition to Argentina there were students from Colombia, Venezuela, Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador. The teachers were leading figures in the Argentine CP and certain mysterious individuals known only by their party names.

9. de Jaegher & Kuhn, The Enemy Within, (1952), pp. 165-169.

10. For mention of the hundreds of schools run by the French CP, see Einaudi, Domenach and Garosci, Communism in Western Europe, pp. 94-95. For a helpful summary of Communist training schools, see The Moulding of Communists, *Ibid.*, chapter 9 and the footnotes.

11. Hoover, Masters of Deceit, (1958), chapter 12. This is one quote from a more detailed description.

12. Big Red School House, *Time*, October 13, 1958.

The students from outside Argentina included two lawyers, a university professor, a school teacher, an employee of a farmer's association, a dressmaker, a tailor, two white collar workers, a chauffeur and a worker. Argentine students included two labor leaders, a fourth year law student, a journalist, an electrician, and three metal workers. This was obviously an important cadre school, since some of the students already held responsible party positions and the arrest records of others for Communist activities went back some years.

The school was operated under conditions of extreme secrecy. Windows in the principal classroom were covered to prevent direct observation and the students were under strict security discipline. Of course, there was no mention of the school in the party press. The curriculum included the usual combination of theoretical indoctrination and practical organizational work, and was so intensive the students showed signs of fatigue. There was a substantial library ranging from the writings of Marx, Lenin and Stalin to pamphlets and books written by leading Latin American Communists dealing with practical political-organizational problems.

Reports filtering out of Cuba indicate various types of political warfare schools have been established there and it is in the nature of things that Cuba will become (and probably already is) a major base for training cadres for all of Latin America.

In addition to schools giving general training in Marxism-Leninism and revolutionary strategy and tactics, there are numerous specialist schools for training, among others, of organizers, agitation and propaganda experts, specialists in military questions and penetration of military forces, specialists in labor unions, race specialists and guerrilla-political specialists.¹³ There are also specialists schools for specific regional groups. For example, there is (or was) a school for African labor leaders at Warsaw; while from 1953 to 1955 another school for Latin American labor leaders was operated at Budapest.¹⁴

As to length of training, in general district (roughly

13. 1959 Senate Hearings, *Ibid.*, page 81.

14. Testimony C. P. Cabell to Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, November 5, 1959.

state) level schools run one to three months; national level schools six months to a year; international courses two to three years. Thus, upper level cadre have often received four or more years of actual schooling in addition to the continuing training which is part of every party unit.

In preparation for the intensified drive into Latin America and Africa the training of cadres from these areas was significantly increased in 1956 and in that year Red China began operating its own training system for Latin Americans. On November 5, 1959, General Cabell, deputy director of CIA, gave this important testimony before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee:

"The training of Latin American Communist Party leaders at the higher party school of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has been going on continuously since 1953, with an increase noted since 1956.

"The usual curriculum is based on a 2- or 3-year course of training, and the students are active party leaders and functionaries who have been selected by their parties and approved by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

"It is probable that most of the Latin American Communist Parties now have a number of leaders who have received this special training. Beginning in 1956, the Communist Party of China also undertook to give training to Latin American Communist Party leaders.

"They emphasize, among other subjects, the special contributions of the Chinese party in the field of clandestine work, agrarian reform and peasant affairs, guerrilla warfare, and the manipulation of the bourgeoisie and other elements in the 'anti-imperialist struggle.'

"Since 1956, there is evidence that the organization of such training has been improved, and that the Chinese Communist Party is now giving regular courses specifically for Latin American Communist students, thereby paralleling the Soviet effort.

* * * * *

"Chinese Communist revolutionary instruction is well received by Latin American Communist students who find it practical and well suited to the conditions

in which they operate in Latin America. They especially appreciate the fact that the Chinese Communists pay even their travel expenses.

"In February and March of 1959, Latin American Communist representatives received specific advice and guidance from Mao Tze-tung and other leading Chinese Communists concerning international Communist policy and effective methods of carrying on clandestine activities."

Since all party schools are modeled after the higher schools in Russia, the training materials and methods used in Prague, Buenos Aires, New York, or New Delhi, depending on the level of instruction, are almost interchangeable, with the result the cadre, wherever they are, have a common understanding of theoretical and operational problems and a common methodology and can move in unison in carrying out generalized instructions in detail. This is of tremendous importance in global operations.

Of course, schools are only one part of the process by which the cadre is moulded. Life in the party is a continuing and most intensive and practical education in political warfare. Each party unit is itself a form of training school, with each member loaded with homework and engaged in a never ending stream of revolutionary action ranging from the organization of street mobs to the most subtle forms of subversion.

Indoctrination in Marxism-Leninism never ceases, but becomes more intensive as the party member rises in the cadre. Indoctrination serves the double purpose of insulating the party member from non-party influence and ridding him of any trace of bourgeois mentality in conflict with the world-view of Marxism-Leninism, while providing a constant guideline to political action. The Communist, at the cadre level, is always oriented.

Marxism-Leninism may be a straight jacket for a Soviet artist or writer, but it encourages initiative and imagination at the tactical level of political warfare. The Communist must submit to an iron discipline, but he must also display imagination, initiative and flexibility in implementing the party line.

Reading the biographies of former Communists, one

is struck by the variety of party work entrusted to them. It is plain the party makes a serious effort to expose its developing cadre to the widest range of revolutionary action so they can master all arms. In the Soviet Union it is common in recent years to assign future conflict managers to serve successively in the KGB, the Army, the AGITPROP and the foreign service. Within these organizations he obtains a broad and rich experience in political warfare involving operational methods and organizational forms which, taken together, exploit every type of conflict situation at every level.

The nature of party training causes the party member to politicalize everything. To him a non-political event is unheard of. Everything that happens has relevance in terms of the global struggle. This constant seeking out of the political significance in events makes the Communist aware of political meaning and suggests lines of revolutionary action which would escape the uninitiated. To the Communist "all social or human activity is understandable and from the Marxist-Leninist viewpoint manipulable."

Frank S. Meyer describes this remarkable concentration on control thus:

". . . meaning and reality are drained out of all aspects of life not concerned with control. Enjoyment, the satisfaction of curiosity, meditation, intellectual achievement, art, and certainly all spiritual awareness are empty except insofar as they derive a secondary meaning, positive or negative, from the essential reality of human existence regarded as control of the universe. "This subsuming of all the complexities of life under the single rubric of action directed towards control is so complete that it becomes in time an invisible and unrecognized condition of existence. . . . If something happens in China or in Bulgaria, in England or in Venezuela, in New York or Chicago, in his own section of the city or another section, he must immediately have an attitude towards it, and not merely an informed attitude or one of judgment. Like a fireman sleeping next to an alarm bell, all his faculties must be stimulated into action. What should be done? Is there anything

in this situation which, in his organization, his trade union, his neighborhood, he can do? This is the way a Communist must learn to react at all times."¹⁵

This passion to politicalize everything and to turn all human activity to the party's advantage has led to the working out of the many organizational possibilities inherent in a global power struggle so that every increment of power can be squeezed out of every developing situation. One of the best books on Communist strategy and tactics is called, "The Organizational Weapon."¹⁶ The developed cadre Communist is above all else an organizer in the fullest sense of the word, keenly aware of all the organizational forms and devices by which he can openly or secretly control and manipulate his fellowmen. Dual power tactics, the united front from above or below, the power caucus, the front organization itself are some more common reminders of the advanced state of the party's organizational-operational art. Today the party and the Soviet underground are skillfully deployed throughout the fabric of each nation to make the best use of the organizational weapon in agitation and propaganda, subversion, policy misdirection, disintegration and demoralization tactics and para-military methods, all carefully coordinated with Soviet global strategy. To a remarkable degree student organizations, labor unions, peasant leagues, intellectual elites, newspapers, and institutions and organizations of every description in Latin America, Asia and elsewhere have been penetrated and manipulated.

The matured member of the cadre is a completely committed individual immersed in the intricacies of the struggle for power. He is dedicated to an extent which is difficult for the non-member to comprehend. While the rank and file in uncounted thousands have been in and out of the party, only a handful of the matured cadre have defected. Frank S. Meyer states:

"In the American Party I do not know of a score of cadre Communists who have broken within the last twenty years and this despite the serious crises which beset it in 1945 and 1956. It seems to require

15. The Moulding of Communists, Ibid., pp. 38, 39.

16. Philip Selznick, The Organizational Weapon, a RAND study (1952).

a most unusual set of circumstances to penetrate the powerful defenses of the Communist personality at this level of development."¹⁷

There may be many time servers within party ranks in the Soviet Union, Poland and Hungary, where many have joined the party for opportunist reasons, or have become disillusioned by over exposure to Utopia, but within the Free World, the party by and large, has been able to sustain the driving force and elan of its cadre.

Schools must be seen in relation to the whole process by which the cadre is developed. They are, as Meyer points out, forcing beds where under conditions of great pressure students are raised to higher levels of sophistication and Communist consciousness in preparation for more important positions. As such they are essential to the full development of the cadre.

RESEARCH

Soviet research relevant to political warfare can be roughly divided into two parts. The first deals with knowledge that has direct application to the organizational-operational techniques of non-military conflict. The second consists of more general research aimed at interpreting all knowledge from a Marxist-Leninist viewpoint. Both are important to political warfare.

Published information about the Soviet research effort, especially the first part, like the reports on their training establishment, is scattered and inadequate. However, what there is strongly indicates the Soviets have engaged in the greatest concentrated research program with a predetermined objective in all history. That objective is to discover, develop and systematize all knowledge obtainable from history, the sciences and social sciences and from the operational experience of the party, which may be useful in expanding the spheres of Communist influence and control.

This unprecedented research effort apparently got underway on a large scale in the early twenties. Joseph Z. Kornfeder, who attended the Lenin School from 1928 to 1931, states by that time there was already a central library in

17. The Moulding of Communists, Ibid., page 156.

Moscow serving the various training and research centers comparable in size to our Congressional Library, but unlike the Congressional Library, stressing materials useful for political warfare purposes.¹⁸ Even assuming Kornfeder's comparison was overdrawn, it still shows a remarkable effort by the Soviet government during a period of extreme dislocation and hardship.

As part of their program an exhaustive analysis has been made of various revolutionary movements and conflict situations, past and present, to determine their dynamics, the correct and incorrect use of various tactics under varying conditions, and so forth. This has undoubtedly produced a wealth of operator usable knowledge enabling the Soviets to respond quickly and consistently to a variety of changing conflict situations.

Certain of the sciences which the West seldom considers from the viewpoint of political warfare have been systematically explored.

Cases in point are physiology and psychology. At the time of the November counterrevolution, Ivan Pavlov, the great Russian physiologist, was 68 years old. For many years he had been engaged in basic research on the conditioned reflex in animals. Communist leaders, Lenin in particular, saw possibilities. If the repetitious use of scientifically controlled external stimuli could so condition the brain and nervous system as to produce a predetermined reaction, this might open unlimited horizons to Soviet propaganda -- both for external conflict and internal control of the Russian people, including shaping of the "New Soviet Man."

Pavlov was not a Communist, and prior to the Revolution there is no indication he anticipated his findings would be turned against the human mind. Soviet leaders did not permit Pavlov's known reservations about Communism to stand in their way. They built extensive laboratories and the equivalent of a college town in Pavlov's home village of Koltusky twenty miles from Leningrad, and Pavlov was installed in a villa. His experiments received extraordinary support. The extent to which these politico-medical laboratories have assisted Soviet conflict managers in working out the techniques of creating neuroses and special behavior in

18. 1959 Senate hearings, *Ibid.*, page 114.

target individuals, elites, or entire nations may be the subject of differences among experts. The point to note is not the success or failure of this particular research effort. Rather, it is the consuming interest of the Soviet government in any area of the sciences or social sciences which shows promise of contributing to their revolutionary expertise and the all out effort to master this knowledge. The continuing popularity of Pavlov in Russia and China, and an objective study of the available evidence, indicates the conditioned reflex, as well as a whole array of theories and techniques from physiology and psychology, have become important tools in Communist external political warfare and internal manipulation and control of the Russian people.

These many tools, as well as special techniques from other areas of the behavioral sciences, together with the cumulative experience of the Party, have been used to work out a total form of psychological warfare which is so far beyond what has been attempted by our side that the very term has quite a different meaning to Soviet leaders and our people. While American efforts are limited and affect only a small segment of the human psyche, the Soviets attempt a total psychological impact and their objectives for external conflict include:

" . . . the creation in the ruling, upper and intellectual classes of non-Communist societies of frustration, confusion, pessimism, guilt, fear, defeatism, hopelessness, and neurosis (in short the psychological destruction of anti-Communist leadership); the splitting of non-Communist societies into many competing and mutually hostile groups and the sapping of the spirit of loyalty, community, mutual helpfulness, positive expectation, and willingness to take risks and to act; the creation and stimulation of an all prevailing sense of fear and anxiety whether it be fastened onto the dangers of nuclear war, or physical terror, or professional, social and human ruin; the semantic domination of intellectual, emotional and socio-political life, as well as the semantic control of all political arguments; the capture of the time dimension in the sense that an expectation of cataclysm and no-progress under 'capitalism' is established and paried with the affirmed expectation that the future

belongs to Communism; the promise of relief from all troubles by means of an infallible, as well as inevitable solution; the weakening and destruction of national consciences in the Free World and the inculcation of bad conscience about firm opposition to Communism and the ideals usurped and distorted by it." 19

There are a number of institutions in the Soviet Union with names that give them a surface similarity to like named institutions in this country. However, the *raison d'etre* for the Soviet institutions is the exploration of areas for knowledge that have significance in terms of revolutionary action. Thus, their Institute of World Economics had the function of analyzing economic situations in other countries to determine how economic difficulties might be exploited for the benefit of the Communist movement. The newly formed (1956) Academy of Social Sciences has impressed the social sciences, especially the behavioral sciences, into the service of political warfare. The important Academy of Sciences which operates directly under the Council of Ministers is devoting a significant part of its efforts to political warfare. 20

Beginning in 1956 the Soviets made new efforts to coordinate and intensify their research attuned to the needs of political warfare. A case in point is Africa. Dr. William R. Kintner of the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania, in a forthcoming book calls our attention to the New Council for Coordination of Scientific Work on Africa:

"The new and more sophisticated efforts being made in the direction of improving Soviet plans and programs for influencing and penetrating foreign areas is the creation of the 'New Council for Coordination of Scientific Work on Africa.' This relatively innocuous sounding title cannot hide its true purpose, for the first priority given members of this Council is to conduct 'profound and comprehensive study of the modern political and economic problems of the African continent.'

19. Communist Psychological Warfare, Orbis, Vol. I. Reprinted as an appendix to Protracted Conflict, Strausz-Hupe, et al, (1959). This is an excellent description of Soviet uses of psychology in their political warfare.

20. 1959 Senate hearings, *Ibid.*, pp. 85, 86.

This is further specified as the study of 'socio-economic processes in the emergency of new social forces opposing colonialism in Africa, disintegration of the colonial system of imperialism, the national liberation struggle of enslaved peoples, the workers and peasants movement in African countries, (and) contradictions between imperial powers.' Nothing could, of course, be more explicit in restating the familiar and precise Communist objectives in Africa.

"It may be conjectured that the Council on Africa will be followed by similar new coordinating organizations to assist Soviet policymakers and planners in programming Soviet propaganda and infiltration of other areas, such as Latin America, the Middle East and the Far East."²¹

Two years ago General C. P. Cabell in a little noticed speech gave some of the details about Soviet research and training programs preparing the way for penetration of Africa:

"The Soviet Union is clearly preparing for action in Africa. Since 1950, considerable study and research has been underway in various academies and institutes of the Soviet Union and bloc countries. An increasing number of publicized studies on Africa, some of real scientific value, have been forthcoming from Soviet Government study programs. Introduction of a wide range of university courses and the stepped-up preparation of instructors in African subjects have been underway at Moscow, Leningrad, and Prague universities. Language training in such languages as Youraba, Congo, and Luba, has become a fixed part of the curriculum. The aim is clearly to create a nucleus of Soviet experts on Africa and to equip Communist engineers and scientists with the necessary knowledge for work in Africa. Standard among such training is included the techniques and methods of propaganda and subversion."²²

21. William R. Kintner with Joseph Kornfeder, The New Frontier of War, (1962), chapter X. Tentatively scheduled for publication in June, this book contains probably the best description of Soviet political warfare to date. It also breaks new ground in terms of countermeasures.

22. Speech of C. P. Cabell to the National Guard Association, November 8, 1959.

Communists being Communists, the central purpose of all area studies is, of course, political. Area knowledge -- economic, historical, social is important to the extent it can be attuned to the needs of the Communists all encompassing concept of political warfare. We can be sure that Soviet study of African tribal lore is for the purpose of adjusting their agitation and propaganda to the local psychosocial terrain. Further, the Soviets seek to dominate many of the sciences and social sciences, and interpret them from a Marxist-Leninist viewpoint to impress Afro-Asian elites and so create a favorable propaganda climate. The factor to remember is that Communist scientists and academicians are sensitive to the needs of political warfare, are frequently reminded of the ultimate political purpose of their work, and the areas of concentration are the ones most likely to yield relevant results.

Alvin Z. Rubinstein has given us an appraisal of the Soviet effort in Asian studies and their essential political purpose in his article on the Twenty-fifth International Congress of Orientalists held at Moscow in 1960:

"Behind this comprehensive program of scholarship lies an ambitious political objective: the interpretation and dissemination of all knowledge -- whether in the natural sciences, the arts, or the social sciences -- from a Marxist-Leninist perspective, with the aim of gaining acceptance for these views among non-Western nationalist elites. No subject is regarded by Moscow as too obscure or as too peripheral for cultivation and research as it strives to become the recognized cultural-ideological mentor of the underdeveloped countries. Moscow has undertaken, in addition to the traditional instruments of diplomacy and the manipulation of compliant international communist movements, a vast, well-financed and multi-faceted program designed to project a favorable image of the Soviet Union and its achievements, and to gain the ideological allegiance of the educated elites of Afro-Asia. Its commitment to these ends is total."²³

1956 also marked the year when Soviet scientists and

23. Scholarship & Cold War in Moscow. Orbis, Vol. IV, Winter 1961,

academicians were given a relative new freedom and in which Soviet mathematicians, physiologists, psychologists, economists and engineers officially and ardently embraced the new science of cybernetics (the science of control in man, machine and society) which had previously been denounced as a capitalist device. Cybernetics has now been declared in harmony with dialectical materialism and it appears the Soviets believe they have found a new scientific rational for the moss-covered old dogmas.²⁴

This interest in cybernetics also evidences the strong trend to Leninist flexibility in strategy and tactics and indicates Khrushchev will use the most advanced methods his scientists and social scientists can devise in programming his infiltration of the Free World.²⁵ This is further underlined by the New Draft Program of the Communist Party, "submitted" to the 22nd Party Congress, which refers to the Social Sciences by name and emphasizes, in only slightly veiled language, their political warfare goal:

"There must be intensive development of research work in the Social Sciences which constitute the scientific basis for the guidance of the development of society . . . The investigation of the problems of world history and contemporary world development must disclose the law-governed process of mankind's advance toward Communism, the change in the balance of forces in favor of Socialism, the aggravation of the general crisis of capitalism, the break-up of the colonial system of imperialism and its consequences, and the upsurge of the national-liberation movement of the peoples. . . . The social sciences must continue to struggle with determination against bourgeois ideology,

24. The New Frontier of War, Ibid., chapter X. Cybernetics is mentioned by name in the New Draft Program, though only in relation to automation.

25. Cybernetics, the so-called crossroads of the sciences, is so new and some of its theories so tentative and speculative that its applicability to political warfare is still unknown. The illustration is used solely to demonstrate the new freedom and flexibility in Soviet research -- a flexibility and imagination which we can assume will be increasingly applied to their political warfare. For an example of Soviet interest in this new field, see The Human Element in Automation Systems, Oshanin & Panov, Soviet Survey, December, 1961.

against right Socialist theory and practice and against revisionism and dogmatism. They must uphold the purity of the principles of Marxism-Leninism." 26

The alarming development for the future is Khrushchev's obvious determination to make a massive, coordinated assault on those areas of the sciences and social sciences which can be of the greatest assistance to Soviet leaders in achieving world control. There is evidence of excellent long range planning. It is most significant that all of this is being directed at the highest levels by experienced conflict managers who understand power in all of its dimensions and know the types of knowledge and trained personnel they will need at each stage of their massive penetration and manipulation of the non-Communist world.

Further, Soviet research is no longer crippled by the narrow and extreme dogmatism of the latter Stalin years. The already mentioned areas of physiology and psychology are illustrative. From 1950 to 1953 Stalin dictated an extreme neo-Pavlovian party line for Soviet psychology in which man was viewed as a hollow shell without spontaneity or inner sources of activity, whose character and conduct are determined solely by the reflex mechanism which the state could completely control through indoctrination and propaganda. Under Khrushchev this extreme position has been revised. Soviet psychologists now admit the existence of a subjective psyche and there is increasing recognition that propaganda can't do everything.²⁷ Pavlov and the conditioned reflex continue to hold a place of honor, but psychologists are now showing deep interest in the new and sophisticated theories of cybernetics (which seem to tie in nicely with some of Pavlov's findings).

It is sometimes asserted that philosophy, psychology, the social sciences, history, etc. in the Soviet Union have made few important discoveries because of limitations on freedom of inquiry and freedom of thought, or that there is no such thing as sociology, social psychology, philosophy, political science as we understand these disciplines in the

26. Reprinted under title, Khrushchev's Mein Kampf, Belmont Books, page 164.

27. Robert C. Tucker, Stalin and the Uses of Psychology, World Politics, Vol. VIII, No. 4, (July, 1956).

West.²⁸ From the viewpoint of Western academicians, there is considerable truth in these assertions. The point, however, is that Communists being primarily concerned with power and control and already possessing the dialectic, have a different criteria for their research. Research, as Cantril points out, is given practical tasks that can assist the leadership in achieving predetermined Communist objectives and all research is judged in the final analysis according to its contribution toward achieving the final goals of Marxism-Leninism. The absence of important new contributions (in Western eyes) to the social sciences in published reports does not mean their social scientists have not made significant progress on the practical, politically oriented tasks assigned by the leadership.

Further, the difficulties being encountered in developing the New Soviet Man and in obtaining not merely passive acceptance of ideology but enthusiasm among the masses and the questions thereby raised as to the ability of the Soviets to achieve their internal indoctrination goals, does not mean their organizational-operational theories and methods for external conflict are incorrect or faltering (i. e. young Soviet social scientists may be chafing under the restraints of dialectical materialism, but Communist guerrillas in Viet Nam are displaying a fanatical devotion to duty).

The elimination of the last "vestiges of capitalism" from the attitudes of Soviet citizens by methods which presume that all human behavior is determined by controllable social-economic factors calls for one system of techniques which may prove grossly inadequate. The splintering and manipulation of Afro-Asian and Western societies by Marxist-Leninist methods calls for a different system of techniques which are proving quite adequate.

The validity of Marxism-Leninism in terms of the construction of a Communist society is one thing. The correctness of Marxism-Leninism as a conflict theory for the destruction of non-Communist power is quite another. The Soviet Union's heralded transition from Socialism to Communism may prove the flop of the century. In the meantime, Krushchev or his successors may complete the isolation of the United States and a few of its allies.

28. Hadley Cantril, Soviet Leaders & Mastery Over Man, (1960), pp. 61, 102.

The systematic, cold blooded use of the sciences and social sciences for the purpose of world conquest is so foreign to the traditions of American academic thought, we have been slow to grasp the nature of the Soviet research effort. There has been too much emphasis on why the Soviet system is failing or succeeding internally and entirely too little emphasis on their development of the methods and means of total political war.

CONCLUSION

The long range Soviet research, development and training program beginning with Lenin's three small schools, together with many decades of revolutionary experience, has given the Communists three advantages which they believe are decisive:

First, at the top are a group of superbly prepared conflict managers with years of intense schooling and operator experience in every phase of power acquisition. They are conductors who understand all instruments and can orchestrate the cold war in all of its dimensions. Subversion, propaganda, blackmail, guerrilla warfare, culture, trade and diplomacy, as well as hot war, are tools to be integrated in carefully calibrated aggression. Their first hand operator experience, extending over decades, ranges from the techniques of penetrating and capturing a labor union, or turning a student riot into a march on the nearest USIA library, to the sophisticated techniques of programming the multitude of devices which can shape and manipulate the revolutionary forces at work on an entire continent. True professionals, they can respond quickly and consistently to the unanticipated in a fluid world conflict where a variety of revolutionary forces are at work. They have a developed conceptional framework for political warfare and the long view of strategy which enables them to program research over decades and then to utilize quickly the output of this conflict oriented effort. They know that many roads lead to revolution and they can dominate developing situations by flexible tactics and inflexible purpose. Most important they have fixed objectives, ultimate and intermediate, which are clearly understood. They are the end product of Lenin's command that the cadre master all arms, be all-sided.

Second, Soviet conflict managers can implement a

a thousand pronged aggression, because below them are the trained, professional cadres of the party deployed in each target area. The cadre, wherever it is, shares a common theoretical background and a common fund of operational knowledge enabling it to respond in unison to general instructions from above. Experienced in all forms of political warfare, they are showing exceptional initiative, imagination and finesse in implementing their instructions and are combining and coordinating a variety of organizational devices and operational techniques which exploit the full range of possibilities at each level. Sharpened and disciplined by years of struggle and intense schooling, they are the ideal instrument to implement Soviet indirect aggression.

Third, because Soviet research has had a clearly understood political goal and has been systematically organized to attain this goal, the Soviets have accumulated a huge fund of knowledge attuned to the special needs of their global operations. The better coordinated and more intensive program beginning in 1956 promises even greater dividends.

The Soviets are winning the cold war precisely because Lenin understood sixty years ago that political warfare is an incredibly complex and difficult art and science and as such should be conducted by highly trained professionals -- and then acted on this belief by inaugurating a comprehensive training and research program which systematically created capacity for total political war.

The large scale training of foreign cadres, which began forty years ago and has been accelerating ever since, has created a global cadre sufficient in number and know-how to carry out any combination of strategy and tactics the Kremlin may dictate. This makes possible an orchestration in which a guerrilla-political struggle in Indo-China is supported by systematic sabotage of war material shipped from France, defeatism systematically spread in French newspapers, TV, radio and within the parliament, and even the cruel undermining of fighting morale by the stoning of hospital trains returning French wounded to their home towns.²⁹ In Latin America it makes possible the simultaneous organizing of guerrilla warfare in the Andes, the take over of student organizations in almost every university, the large scale

29. Bernard F. Fall, Street Without Joy, (1961), page 237.

organizing of peasant leagues in the northeastern provinces of Brazil, the deep penetration of the state government of Rio Grande do Sul, the infiltration of army units in Peru, the preparation and systematic distribution of hundreds of party line newspapers and periodicals, the winning of a free election in British Guiana, the winning with the Peronistas of an election in Argentina, the manipulation of a sizable segment of intellectuals, the systematic intimidation and isolation of anti-Communists, the capture of major segments of organized labor, the near frustration of parliamentary government in country after country, and finally the partial neutralization of the OAS itself by the combined effect of all these methods and means.

This flexibility of the global cadre, this highly developed capacity to use all arms like the trained professionals they are, gives the Soviets an incalculable advantage. It enables Soviet leaders to approach their strategic objectives, not down a few well worn avenues, but from every point of the compass using a whole network of crisscrossing superhighways, roads, trails and footpaths, all leading directly or circuitously to the final objective. With stunning rapidity they can shift from one form of attack to another.

Without the global cadre, the range of methods and means available to Soviet leadership for indirect aggression would be comparatively narrow, and conversely, if Soviet leaders were not developed conflict managers, they could not fully utilize and orchestrate the wide range of non-military weapons and weapons systems which the experience and training of the global cadre makes possible.

The New Draft Program is above all an arrogantly confident statement of Khrushchev's belief that the Communists can complete the isolation of the U. S. without big hot war. In assessing Khrushchev's chances, we must keep in mind the Communists have captured nearly a billion people during a period when their sphere was markedly inferior in industry, technology, science and overall military capabilities -- in fact, inferior in almost everything except power seeking know-how.

The great push forward seeking domination of the natural sciences, the burgeoning of Soviet technology and industry, the training of engineers and technicians in

numbers far beyond internal needs, the great increase in language training, the rising standard of living -- all of this also has a tremendous impact on political warfare capabilities.

It is no longer a case of the cadre aggravating the crisis of capitalism almost exclusively through superior agitation, propaganda, subversion, guerrilla warfare and organizational technique. The existing methods may now be heavily reinforced by large scale economic warfare and export of Soviet science and technology, by the Soviet Union becoming a Mecca for Afro-Asian and Latin American students and scientists, by greatly expanded aid and cultural programs -- all carefully calibrated with the existing methods and all further reinforced by the impression that Communism is succeeding in the Soviet Union and that Marxism-Leninism can do the same for other underdeveloped nations.

At the same time the Communists are demonstrating an increasing sophistication and flexibility in the use of the older methods.³⁰

The most disturbing aspect of the New Draft Program is the decision of Khrushchev to out Lenin Lenin in the flexibility and range of methods and means he will use against us. This is especially evident in Part I, chapter 5, The International Revolutionary Movement of the Working Class.³¹ Confident we will not risk a major military reposte, he is pulling out all of the stops on the Communist organizational weapon. The Party Program brags, "The great objectives of the working class can be realized without world war. Today the conditions for this are more favorable than ever."

And in a paraphrase of Lenin's, "Left-wing Communism" it instructs the cadre:

"The success of the struggle which the working class wages for the victory of the revolution will depend on how well the working class and its party master the use of all forms of struggle -- peaceful and non-peaceful, parliamentary and extra-parliamentary -- and how well they are

30. The New Frontier of War, Ibid., chapter 10.

31. Khrushchev's Mein Kampf, Ibid., pp. 63-73.

prepared to replace one form of struggle by another as quickly and unexpectedly as possible." 32

The clearest statement of the Soviet blueprint for world domination is contained in Khrushchev's speech of January 6, 1961, to a combined meeting of the Higher Party School, the Academy of Social Sciences and the Institute of Marxism-Leninism. This is an affirmation of Khrushchev's belief that the Communist Bloc's superiority in political warfare, combined with their rapid scientific, technological, industrial expansion, assures Communist victory. This speech is so frank, for example in its cynical definition of peaceful coexistence, its release was an expression of Communist contempt for our countercapabilities in non-military conflict. To add insult, English translations were delivered to the press in Moscow on January 17, 1961. In effect Khrushchev was saying -- look you decadent bourgeoisie, this is what we are going to do to you and you are incapable of developing a successful defense or offense. Our continuing neglect of non-military conflict, as will be developed in Part II, makes Khrushchev's contemptuous estimate seem dangerously close to reality.

A third of the world is being systematically organized for conquest of the remainder. It seems clear, in the words of the Senate Committee report, that "the traditional methods of the past which could only partially contain a weak Soviet will have to be revised."

32. Khrushchev's Mein Kampf, Ibid., page 69.

PART II

THE LIMITED NATURE OF THE U. S. RESEARCH AND TRAINING PROGRAM IN NON-MILITARY CONFLICT -- THE FIVE REQUIREMENTS AND OUR FAILURE TO MEET THEM.

The very great capabilities of the Communist enterprise in political warfare makes our problems of defense and offense extremely difficult. The more or less conventional methods of diplomacy, economic and military aid, student and cultural exchange, the limited informational activities of USIA, together with certain covert intelligence operations and limited efforts by private organizations, are proving inadequate, as presently formulated and implemented, to contain, much less defeat, Soviet indirect aggression. Undoubtedly some of the things we are doing are causing the Soviets more difficulty than is generally realized, but overall the existing methods and means, as they have been employed since the end of World War II, have only succeeded in slowing the Soviet push.

Again and again our methods have proven inadequate, because the enemy has mastered all arms and is employing an extraordinary variety of conflict instruments which enables him to outflank, envelop or smother the more limited and hesitatingly applied instruments of our policy. Thus an aid program, even when well conceived, may achieve nothing toward improving the economic or political conditions in the recipient nation, if it is more than offset by Communist economic sabotage and superior agitation and propaganda capabilities. A USIA library in India is simply overwhelmed by a Soviet translation and publication effort which distributes millions of books and periodicals each year in many tongues and dialects, the large scale buying up of publishing houses and intimidation of book stores, the massive penetration and manipulation of the mass communications system -- and it hardly competes at all with trained Communist organizers operating in universities, unions, peasant villages, classrooms and various fronts.

The rapidly expanding Soviet capacity in non-military conflict and the dangerous developments beginning in 1956, now confirmed by the New Draft Program, make it imperative for the U. S. and its allies to develop, and rapidly, a

far greater capacity in the area of non-military conflict.

The question is -- what are the conditions, the requirements, which must be met before this nation can realize its full capacity to engage in the type of global struggle which has been forced upon us? It is rather remarkable that with all that has been written and said about the cold war, so little thought has been devoted to thinking through these requirements and how best we can meet them.

Only by understanding these requirements and the wide margin by which we have failed to realize them, can the present legislation be understood. Most of our failures to date can be traced to our central failure to take the necessary organizational measures to meet these needs systematically.

It is submitted the principal requirements are as follows:

REQUIREMENT NO. 1: At the upper levels of government we must have conflict managers on our side who understand the full range of methods and means by which this nation and its allies can meet the entire Communist attack and work toward our global objectives systematically. This means they will have to master a broad range of non-military measures which have yet to be thought through and systematized. It means they must be able to organize and orchestrate these measures in an integrated strategy in which our national objectives are approached from many directions, using every promising means in accord with our ethic.

REQUIREMENT No. 2: Below these conflict managers, agency personnel must be trained to understand and implement this integrated strategy in all of its dimensions. Unless these people share a substantial common fund of knowledge about the nature of the enemy, the global conflict, and the vast array of positive and negative measures potentially available to us, there cannot be the close team play necessary to carry out a complex strategy with vigor and elan against a skilled and dedicated enemy.

REQUIREMENT No. 3: (Implicit in above, but listed separately to facilitate subsequent analysis.) Policy makers and cold war personnel at many levels must understand Communism, with special emphasis on Communist conflict technique. It is not enough to have experts available for

consultation. This is basic "battle knowledge" which must be widely disseminated in the agencies, if planning and implementation are to be geared to the conflict we are in.

REQUIREMENT No. 4: The public must have greater understanding of Communism, especially Communist conflict technique, and the nature of the global struggle. This is necessary to maintain the will to victory and to overcome apathy in a long and tedious struggle. It is necessary if the public is to support wholeheartedly the difficult and often distasteful things we must do in the coming years. In a free society, policy, to be effective, must have support. A widening fissure between public knowledge and policy can spell disaster. For defensive purposes alone this knowledge is essential, if public opinion is not to be confused and manipulated by the deceptions and blandishments of skilled propagandists who understand us and our desire to be left alone too well.

REQUIREMENT No. 5: The private sector must know how it can participate in the global struggle in a sustained and systematic manner. There exists in the private sector a huge reservoir of talent, ingenuity and strength which can be developed and brought to bear in helping solve our cold war problems. A wide range of interrelated programs can be implemented, if certain preconditions are met. Whether these things are done or not done can be the difference between victory and defeat in a close contest in which the enemy has mobilized his entire society to win the cold war, as well as to prepare for hot war.¹

It is submitted these requirements cannot be met without a large scale research and training program directed by exceptional men who have a clear understanding of these needs.

Unfortunately, it is still being argued that existing research and training is adequate for our cold war needs, or can be made adequate with a little beefing-up. It is true that many things are being worked on within the government that the general public is not aware of, and that institutions like the War Colleges and the Foreign Service Institute have adjusted their curriculums to some degree to meet new situations created by the Communist enterprise and the revolutionary forces at work in Afro-Asia and Latin America.

1. There are other requirements, but the above are basic in fixing goals for our research and training program. Of course, we want our friends and allies to develop a similar capacity.

It is also true that various Russian research centers and centers for international and area studies have been established at a number of universities since the end of World War II, and that the government has available to it certain research organizations like RAND.

Yet, it is equally true that the existing programs have failed to achieve to a substantial degree any one of the above requirements. Further, I can find no evidence that anyone in government has thought out the overall research and training program which would be necessary to fill systematically and adequately these five fundamental requirements, or if anyone has done so, that he was able to make any impression on his superiors. Rather, the research and training problem has been considered in bits and pieces and the programs instituted met bits and pieces of the problem. This should be self-evident, but there is a built-in ability within the agencies to resist these facts and the conclusions to be drawn.

It seems it will be necessary to summarize the existing programs in relation to these requirements before proceeding to an examination of the Freedom Academy Bill. This will help define the nature of the gaps to be filled.

For a starting point, take Requirement No. 3, the need for wide understanding of Communism and especially Communist conflict technique in the agencies. This is the most obvious and fundamental requirement and should have been recognized and systematically approached at least fifteen years ago. Yet, even today there is little evidence of a comprehensive, organized effort to fill this need.

Before reviewing the present programs in relation to this requirement, two points should be emphasized. First, Communism, especially Communist conflict technique, is not a quick and easy subject to learn.² It requires a considerable

2. A minimum curriculum would have to include the historical development of Communism; the principal theoretical works of Marxism-Leninism, including Mao; the Communist Bloc from 1917 to the present. This would be background. The most important part of the curriculum would be a study of Soviet external political warfare which is an encyclopedic subject requiring the reading of many books, the study of numerous operational case histories, and a well organized course of study. I am appalled that some still seem to believe this is an easy subject to grasp or can be covered in a few days or weeks of training. They are displaying gross ignorance of the subject matter.

amount of systematized study. Training courses lasting a few days or weeks simply cannot give the student more than a superficial introduction, regardless of how well they are run.

Secondly, there is the distinction between area studies of the Communist Bloc dealing with such things as agriculture, the transportation system, the new managerial class, internal indoctrination, the arts and sciences and Kremliology, on the one hand, and studying Communist strategy and tactics for external political warfare. To a remarkable degree our university centers have concentrated on the former and ignored the latter.³ Both subjects are important, but our cold war strategists and operational personnel will need months of intensive schooling, in addition to a range of operator experience, before they can begin to master Soviet political warfare.

With this in mind the inadequacy of the present programs becomes apparent.

The War Colleges⁴ may devote two weeks to a month to coverage of the Soviet Bloc. Within that period the specific treatment of Communism and Communist conflict techniques rarely exceeds two or three days. It is true, of course, that the rest of the instruction is related to the Communist threat. But this is an indirect tie which in many cases presupposes a more complete understanding of Communist operations than the student actually possesses.

The Foreign Service Institute⁵ has a two-week seminar on Communism and the Soviet Union. This is a broad survey course which can give only light treatment to Communism and Communist conflict techniques. By trying to cover everything in ten days of actual training, the course is necessarily superficial. For example, it provides 1 1/2 hours of lecture-discussions each on Communism in the Far East, South Asia, Africa, Southeast Asia, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and the United States. There is one lecture-discussion on such involved, encyclopedic subjects as subversion and "coordination of forces to stop the Communist advance." Considering the very few points even

3. This can be seen by glancing through their journals.

4. Army War College, Naval War College, Air University, National War College, and The Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

5. Established in 1947 under the State Department to provide in service training to the Foreign Service and other agency personnel.

a first-class teacher can get across in one hour, the superficiality of the course is self-evident. This is no criticism of the teachers -- they just don't have enough time.

The Basic Foreign Service Officer's Course (9 weeks) required of all junior officers on appointment and the Mid-Career Course in Foreign Affairs (13 weeks), which are the mainstay of FSI training (outside language training), offer almost nothing. The Basic Course has six hours of lectures by CIA experts "covering" the Soviet Union, the international Communist movement, the organization and strategy of Communism, Soviet global propaganda, and how to answer criticisms abroad originating from Communists. (In Orlando we considered seventeen hours on the same subjects too skimpy for high school seniors.) The Mid-Career Course includes only a two-hour lecture on Communist doctrine and practice, two hours on the role of behavioral sciences in Soviet strategy, and two hours on Soviet political organizations. There is time, however, for five hours on "Philosophy of Administration" and four hours on "Origin and Diffusion of Myths and Rites."⁶

In 1958 FSI inaugurated the Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy, a nine months course, for about twenty senior officers at a time which appears to be the FSI counterpart to the War Colleges. This devotes five days to "Communist Strategy," and a good part of this time is spent in discussion groups or attending optional films. Actually there are just five lectures by four guest lecturers, who are, however, top men, and several short training films. Thirty-one books are recommended to the students, together with certain classified material, but this lengthy list must have been drawn up with tongue in cheek for a five-day course. Again, much of the remainder of the course relates to the Communist threat, but as in the case of the War Colleges, this is an indirect tie which presupposes more knowledge about Communism than the student usually possesses.

The USIA training program has no course on Communism, but makes use of the two week FSI Seminar. The FBI, I am told, has a one-week course for its internal security people.

In summary, I do not know of a single government

6. Figures are based on the 1960-61 academic year.

operated school which gives coverage in any real depth to Communism and Communist conflict technique.⁷ Without detracting from the general value of the War Colleges and agency trade schools, it cannot be seriously argued these schools provide an adequate coverage. There is indeed a coverage in broad outline, but no intensive study in depth. It can hardly be otherwise under present conditions, since there are no textbooks covering the necessary range of material between covers, and the student who wants to be knowledgeable about Communist political warfare must read dozens of books and such an undertaking is simply not in the cards within a ten months course (length of war college courses), most of which deals with other subjects, let alone courses lasting only a few weeks. Further, literature dealing with Communism shows large gaps.

The answer sometimes given by government spokesmen is that government operated schools were not intended to provide this coverage. Instead, agency personnel are sent to leading universities for graduate work. However, an examination of these graduate studies, insofar as they are concerned with Communism, reveals that practically all of them are of the area study type devoted to the internal study of Soviet Russia or China rather than study of Communist external political warfare.⁸

Further, the various Russian research centers are not suitable for instruction, but are devoted to research, and again this is overly academic and mostly of the area study type. Research on specific operational problems is rarely done. This should be obvious from the literary output of these institutions.

Last fall Columbia University announced it was establishing a Research Institute on Communist Affairs. The most interesting part of this announcement was Columbia's opinion this was believed to be the first institute in any American university devoted to intensive study of relations and comparisons of Communist states and movements

7. A partial exception may be a CIA school about which I have little information.

8. Diligent inquiry may uncover a rare seminar giving more coverage to non-military conflict problems. I understand such seminars have been held by Kissenger at Harvard and Possony at Georgetown. This does not change the general picture.

throughout the world.^{8(a)} In other words, for the first time an American university was departing from internal area studies to take a serious, scholarly look at Communism outside the Sino-Soviet Bloc and relations between members of the Bloc. Coming in the sixteenth year of the cold war, that is an appalling admission of the lack of interest in the academic community in some of the most fascinating and involved problems ever to face mankind and on the solution of which this nation's security depends.

The Orlando Committee congratulates Columbia, but we hope policy planners in Washington will not be misled. This is a research center, not a training center. And it is concentrating on Communism, not developing our methods and means of non-military conflict. To the extent it may deal with countermeasures, this will apparently be almost entirely at the diplomatic level (i. e. what diplomacy can do to increase the rift between the Soviet Union and Communist China). If this institute runs true to form, we can expect its output to be overly academic.

How many more years will slip by before an American university will announce it is establishing an institute that will take a serious interest in researching non-military conflict for our side; and how many years after that will an American university announce it is offering training in this area?

REQUIREMENTS 1 and 2: Speaking generally there is no existing training program or combination of programs which can produce conflict managers for our side. Even if Requirement No. 3 is fully met, we will still be a long way from realizing Requirements 1 and 2. Studying Communist political warfare is a necessary prerequisite to becoming an expert in non-military conflict for our side, but expert knowledge about Communism does not make an expert in our methods.⁹ We can learn a great deal from the Soviets, but we must develop our own art and science of non-military conflict that meets our special needs and is in accord with our ethic.

Our training programs are a reflection of our whole limited approach to the cold war. Sixteen years ago, when

8(a). The Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 3, 1961, page 14.

9. It is remarkable how many people assume that an expert on Communism is also an expert on non-military conflict for our side.

the agencies realized we were entering a protracted cold war, our policy planners formulated some rather minimal ideas and programs for meeting the non-military part of the challenge. As the crisis deepened and the massive nature of the Soviet assault on our civilization became evident, various research projects were instituted at our universities and within the agencies; there was an increase in language training at the Foreign Service Institute and greater emphasis was placed on the non-military area at the War Colleges. But our policy planners did not seem to comprehend the new areas of knowledge, especially operationally attuned knowledge, we would have to explore and the range of subjects our policy level people and operators would have to master before they would be able to compete globally with the superbly prepared conflict managers and cadres directing and implementing the Soviet effort.

The result has been a grossly inadequate approach to the research and training problems posed by the Soviet political warfare challenge. While the Communists recognized that political warfare is at least as difficult as any of the arts and sciences and that those who lead it must be intensively and specially trained professionals, the way we prepared our people seemed to reflect a belief that a liberal education gave our policy makers and operators most of the actual schooling they needed, other than on the job experience.

This attitude is seen most clearly at the Foreign Science Institute where newly appointed Foreign Service officers, fresh from the campus, are given only nine weeks of general orientation training before being committed to the global conflict of systems.¹⁰ Only as they are entering mid-career do they qualify for thirteen more weeks at the Institute, and this training is not only inadequate as regards Communism, it fails to give the student even a superficial survey of the range of measures potentially available to us. Only when he becomes a senior officer is he qualified for a nine months course, and here the training in non-military conflict, as will be developed later, is still most inadequate.

This would seem to reflect an attitude that non-military conflict is really not so complex and that one can pick up the essentials on the job. Or it can reflect a general resistance to going beyond the traditional instruments of foreign policy

10. This is not an argument for an undergraduate foreign service academy. We agree this might take students out of the main stream of American life at too early a stage in their development.

conventionally applied, which leaves the Communists unopposed on much of the political-ideological terrain.

Lacking an adequate training program, our cold war strategists and operators have had to learn on the job, with tragic consequences. Furthermore, and this is an important point, the conceptual thinking and experience of careerists is often limited to one agency. While they may serve on various inter-agency boards and even attend one of the other agency schools, they are short on operator experience outside their agency. There are exceptions -- non-careerists, like Robert Lovett and Gordon Gray come to mind, who have moved around quite a bit.

As previously noted, this stands in marked contrast to the preparation of Soviet conflict managers who have often rotated through the KGB, Army, AFITPROP and Foreign Service.

Henry Kissinger, in his useful study, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, commented on this (page 434):

"Whatever the qualities of Soviet leadership, its training is eminently political and conceptual. Reading Lenin or Mao or Stalin, one is struck by the emphasis on the relationship between political, military, psychological and economic factors, the insistence on finding a conceptual basis for political action and on the need for dominating a situation by flexible tactics and inflexible purpose. And the internal struggles in the Kremlin ensure that only the most iron-nerved reach the top. Against the Politburo, trained to think in general terms and freed of problems of day-to-day administration, we have pitted leaders overwhelmed with departmental duties and trained to think that the cardinal sin is to transgress on another's field of specialization. To our leaders, policy is as a series of discreet problems; to the Soviet leaders it is an aspect of a continuing political process. As a result, the contest between us and the Soviet system has had many of the attributes of any contest between a professional and an amateur. Even a mediocre professional will usually defeat an excellent amateur, not because the

amateur does not know what to do, but because he cannot react with sufficient speed and consistency. Our leaders have not lacked ability, but they have had to learn while doing, and this has imposed too great a handicap."

C. D. Jackson, who has been closely associated with our political warfare efforts, such as they are, for two decades as Deputy Chief of Psychological Warfare at SHAEF, later president of the Free Europe Committee, and finally President Eisenhower's special assistant on cold war planning, made these pertinent observations at the 1959 Senate hearings on the Freedom Academy Bill (pp. 60, 61):

"If there is a single common denominator running through these different experiences -- military, civilian, governmental, and private -- it is the difficulty of finding Americans who have not only an instinct or a flair for political warfare, but also the elementary knowledge and training on the nature of the conflict and how to go about our end of the conduct of this very real and continuing warfare. "To be a Communist is to make political warfare a full-time job and a life commitment. For Americans it is at best a part-time aspect of some other job, conducted intermittently and with grossly inadequate training. There are far too few Americans who are both dedicated enough and knowledgeable enough to combat communism effectively on a full-time basis. If the Communists are scoring steady political gains -- and we know they are, in all corners of the world -- it is because they take their political warfare seriously and we do not. Our greatest danger, it seems to me, is that we may let the victory go by default, simply because too few of us realize the nature and understand the weapons of the struggle.

"Now, Mr. Chairman, if I may repeat and paraphrase, I am sure that there is a general impression that adequate instruction places exist where this art or this profession can be studied. Actually, sir, there is no existing place where the whole problem is pulled together and taught in con-

centrated form and not in bits and pieces. That is why I think this is a good idea."

During the past decade, the nearest thing we have had to a training program taking note of the new forms of struggle has been at the War Colleges. Originally designed to emphasize military subjects, the Colleges have reoriented their courses to give to national and international affairs something approaching a co-equal role. Their primary purpose is to give the officer, often insulated from non-military matters prior to World War II, a grasp of the broader aspects of national strategy. Tiny quotas are also assigned from State, USIA, CIA, ICA, Treasury and Commerce.

Many factors which go into formulating national policy are considered. In terms of providing a broad survey of our cold and hot war machinery, an understanding of the interplay between existing programs, and a survey of current political, economic, military matters around the world, the War Colleges do a reasonably good job and they enjoy considerable prestige.

However, the War Colleges, despite their excellence, fall far, far short of training rounded conflict managers. Their purpose is more modest. They were designed as finishing schools for military officers -- not as training centers for conflict managers in the new forms of struggle. Such central subjects as Communist conflict doctrine are, as noted, given only the lightest coverage. The all important subject of psycho-political warfare is mentioned, but not studied in depth, and so forth. The same is true at the Senior Officer's Seminar at FSI. They hardly begin to open the students' eyes to the whole new range of operational methods and organizational forms which we must develop and master, if we are to successfully resist Communist protracted conflict from the student organizations of Latin America to the jungle villages of Viet Nam.

In the spring of 1961, the writer asked Dr. Stefan Possony¹¹ to list some of the important subjects not being

11. Dr. Possony, author of the pioneering book, A Century of Conflict, (1953), and co-author of A Forward Strategy for America, (1960), has devoted much of his adult life to a study of Soviet conflict methods. He is a professor at Georgetown, past faculty member at the National War College, occasional lecturer at FSI and adviser to the Defense Department on Soviet Affairs.

covered in government cold war training programs. Here is part of his reply:

"If we look at specific gaps, we find that there is nowhere any instruction on political warfare. Some times the word is used, but the speaker usually has no solid background of information nor is documentation handy. Nowhere, to my knowledge, is the subject treated comprehensively, and even if one agency does devote some attention to this, I doubt that there is enough competence throughout the government. Hence not only our own operators, but also those large segments of the U. S. Government who are the very target of political warfare, are left in ignorance about the matter.

"Similarly, there is no place where ideology is being studied. Ideologies are studied in universities, of course, but only in terms of Hegel, Marx, etc. In a deeper operational sense, notably in view of offensive or defensive manipulation, ideology is not on the instructional map. I would go so far as to say that there is no instruction throughout the government designed to protect us against hostile propaganda. It is naively taken for granted that our people understand propaganda techniques and have no trouble distinguishing propaganda from genuine communications.

"Going beyond propaganda, I am unaware of any government effort dealing with psychological warfare including such important features as motivation, will, perseverance, conversion, anxiety neuroses, and other factors from the area of psychology and personality.

"There is unquestionably some pragmatic experience in economic warfare, but there is no agency where this problem is studied comprehensively.

"With respect to technological warfare, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces has been making some progress, but, essentially, this school continues to deal with economics in the traditional sense.

"The inter-relationships between psychological and technological warfare such as they manifest themselves in the test-ban agitation are studied

nowhere. The many scientists who are called upon to advise the U. S. Government on technological matters are kept in blissful ignorance about the most essential points on which their advice has a bearing.

"Academic instruction is one thing and operational training another. The operational training the U. S. Government has been providing, even in its trade schools, is quite inadequate, partly because operational records are kept highly classified and are withheld from instruction. Once a particular operation is terminated, the data and the lessons learned could be incorporated into the instructional materials, but this is not done, possibly with the occasional exception of one trade school.

"There are several efforts to acquaint reserve officers and civilian leadership groups with communism and other strategic problems (Strategy Seminars). But these programs are intermittent, improvised, and have too broad or narrow an audience base. No effort is really made to give the facts to such key segments of the American people as the communications industry. Nor is a real effort made to acquaint public opinion with the facts of life. Add to this the unfulfilled or largely unfulfilled need to increase the knowledge on communism in allied countries, and to give a proper instruction to exchange people and foreign students, and you have good list of the many things we are not doing."

These gaps in political warfare and its substrategies of economic, psychological, technological warfare and propaganda, as well as operational Communism, could hardly be more critical, for they are in the very subjects which are essential to an understanding of the conflict we are in.

Without intensive, systematic study of these subjects, how can a cold war strategist possibly hope to develop strategy attuned to the world conflict? To say that specialists are available to advise him on these matters is like saying experts on strategy and tactics are available to a field commander who has never gotten around to studying these things himself. Washington advised Braddock about those uncon-

ventional Indians and well before the ambush. Unless the policy maker has himself mastered these central subjects and can think conceptually about the non-military conflict, the availability of specialists will not make a strategist out of him.

When these grave deficiencies are pointed out, the stock answer is, we know government training programs are inadequate, but this is supplemented by sending regular quotas to the better schools of international studies at our universities. As one State Department official put it to me, "We like our people to get the Harvard viewpoint, the John Hopkins viewpoint, the MIT viewpoint."

The point is that our universities are concentrating on language and area studies and not on developing or teaching non-military conflict. Whoever heard of a course in political warfare? Yet it is total political war in which we are engaged.

I do not argue against the desirability of exposing agency personnel to many viewpoints. I do say that when these training programs, in sum, skim over or bypass subjects essential to an understanding of the war we are in, they are in no sense a substitute for the Freedom Academy. Language studies and area studies are essential. But until the strategist has also studied in depth Communist conflict doctrine and political, ideological, psychological, organizational, economic conflict from our viewpoint, as well as the Soviets, he cannot relate the other knowledge to the world struggle -- he cannot "reorient our forces of all kinds" in the new forms of struggle.

The urgent need is for rounded cold war strategists. Our universities are attuned to developing scholars and specialists. The urgent need is for operational-organizational know-how in the new dimensions of struggle. Our universities are attuned to language and area studies, or to international law and diplomacy in a more conventional context.

There is another most important reason why our universities fall short. This has to do with motivation and the will to victory. Motivation is the most essential element we must instill in our people at all levels. We are

constantly told that the Communists work harder with more dedication than their opponents. This is true because the Communist training program, the whole process by which they mould their cadre, concentrates on achieving a complete personal commitment. We naively assume motivation. Our armed forces understand its importance. Paratroop, Marine Corps, and Special Forces cadres have it, and it has been carefully cultivated in training, because their tough combat missions require it. Yet non-military conflict tests the human will in more subtle and deadly ways than military combat, and the will to win is crucial. The university atmosphere is simply not conducive to developing a complete personal commitment. Sometimes it will, but this is by accident rather than by design.

Many of the programs which are potentially available to us are conditioned on highly motivated as well as trained personnel to implement them. Men and women ready to accept any financial sacrifice or physical rigor, if it contributes to victory; who will not permit themselves to be affected by the apathy of their associates or the psychological pressures of the enemy.

Our training program is, of course, severely handicapped by the grossly inadequate research and development program in non-military conflict. This has kept us from understanding our potential capacity and instituting a training program oriented to this capacity. It has kept our training programs confined to the comparatively narrow scope of our present knowledge.

Much work has been done at our universities on area research, especially on the Soviet Union. The Russian Research Center at Harvard and the Russian Institute at Columbia have produced a number of books going into many facets of the Soviet state. There is an increasing awareness of the need for African, Latin American and Eastern studies, and many area studies are underway at our universities. Language training is being stepped up. Hundreds of books have been published on Communism.¹²

12. In many of these books, the author in the closing chapter feels the need to suggest countermeasures. Usually they have little to offer. This is most revealing as to our low level of knowledge in the area of non-military conflict.

Yet, we must keep constantly before us the distinction between studying Communism and the languages, institutions, economies and histories of foreign countries on the one hand and researching and developing the operational-organizational know-how and the conceptual framework for non-military conflict. Only the latter makes it possible to understand the conflict we are in in all its dimensions and to apply the full range of methods and means potentially available in an integrated, sustained and consistent fashion.

It is this operational-organizational knowledge and a realistic conceptual framework for a global struggle between Freedom and Communism which is neglected at our universities. I do not mean that nothing is being done about these things at our universities. Here and there an individual professor or small group is doing useful work. This does not change the general picture. There seems to be a feeling that the operational problems of non-military conflict are not a suitable subject for the campus.

The Soviets also engage in extensive area and language studies, and in African studies they are probably ahead of us. But it is not this which gives them their great advantage. Rather, it is the systematic way in which they have thought out and mastered all the organizational forms and operational techniques which are possible in a total power struggle and the way in which they apply these flexibly yet systematically and consistently with clearly understood purpose within an all encompassing conceptual framework. This gives them the capability of using the production of their area studies to best advantage.

The government research effort in non-military conflict has been a bits and pieces affair. There has been considerable ad hoc inquiry into specific, limited operational problems as they arise. There has not been an organized, comprehensive effort to think through the full range of methods and means potentially available to us. The emphasis has been on meeting the day to day problems, rather than a long range research and development effort to systematically develop our national capacity to engage in the new dimensions of struggle. Furthermore, the existing operational knowledge and research has not been assembled at one place so that we can determine what has already been done, define the gaps to be filled, and then set about in an

organized way to fill these gaps.

The result of this research and training failure is that our policy makers simply do not know what our national potential is in the global struggle. A whole range of means which could be available to us do not enter into our planning, because our policy makers have not been prepared to understand these things, our operators have not been trained to implement them, and our research has not been attuned to finding out what they are.

Therefore, in seeking our national objectives we employ only a fraction of the methods and means potentially available. Again and again an objective is approached along a few well worn avenues when a whole complex of access roads lead directly or indirectly to the same objective. Ours has been a limited approach to strategy, while the Communists employ all arms.

Our greatest weakness is that we continue to plan too much in terms of present capacity rather than in terms of systematically developing capacity in the new dimensions of conflict by instituting a research and training program organized to fill the five requirements I have listed.

Consider Requirement No. 4 -- adequate public knowledge about Communism and the global struggle. Again there is no evidence of an organized effort which can hope to fill the gap.

It should be emphasized once again that adequate generalized knowledge about Communism and Communist conflict technique can only be obtained through a systematic training program or a heavy amount of organized reading. It is no answer to say that our news media give excellent coverage of world events. They present a hodgepodge of uncorrelated facts which leave the untrained individual with a blurred image of Communism. Nor is it any answer to say there are many good books about Communism in our libraries, when no significant number of people are reading these books, or reading them in sufficient quantity.

It should be kept in mind there is little in the experience of our people to prepare them to understand the present

struggle. The type of enemy we face, the confusing array of methods and means used against us, the skillful deception, the ambiguous nature of enemy moves, the misleading vocabulary, the slow and often concealed erosion of our position, the seemingly disconnected events in all parts of the globe, subversion raised to the level of a science, the staggering long range implications of the Soviet industrial, technological, scientific effort, are all foreign to our experience.

Our secondary schools and universities are an obvious place to make a beginning. Yet by and large they offer almost nothing. Allen Dulles, in his August 1960 speech to the VFW commented:

"In our schools and colleges we can find many courses in ancient history, in philosophy, courses on the great movements of the past, the conquests of ancient times from Alexander the Great to Napoleon. Courses on Communist theory and practices are few and far between.

"By and large, however, in our educational institutions, except in the graduate field or in specialized schools and seminars, these subjects are not generally taught.

"There is a real urgency to build up our knowledge on the entire background of the Communist thrust against our civilization.

"The people of this country are and will continue to be basically opposed to Communism in general, This opposition is based more on instincts than on knowledge. This is not enough. Our people should be sufficiently educated in all of the ramifications of communistic intrigues and its historical background, its purposes and programs adequately to contribute toward an effective answer.

"The initiative for new knowledge comes more often from those of us who want to learn than from those who teach. But let us also call on our educators, and on those in authority who have influence over the development of our educational system to begin to expand the realistic teaching of the history and policies of Communism."

Mr. Dulles was overly generous in his reference to

the graduate field. One expert recently advised me, "I do not think there are more than half a dozen courses in the entire country that cover Communism as such and, if so, discuss operational technique rather than political philosophy and history. If there are more such courses they would be outside regular degree curricula." A course covering political philosophy in the 19th and 20th centuries in which the student reads the Communist Manifesto and State and Revolution, does practically nothing to prepare him to understand the conflict we are in. Nor do a few chapters on Russia since 1917 in a Modern European History course. Yet this is about all that many colleges offer.

As Dulles emphasized, this instruction should begin in our secondary schools. Here the gap is almost complete. Actually some public pressure is developing to institute courses on "Communism versus Democracy" in our high schools. However, even if our schools wanted to do this, and some now do, they are stymied because no teachers have been trained to give such courses, or to include the subject in adequate form in social science and history courses.

Nothing demonstrates our research and training failure better than this failure to teach the teachers. Again and again civic organizations, the American Bar Association for example, have urged such instruction. And each time they run up against the same roadblock. There is little evidence our teachers' colleges and state universities are doing anything to remedy the situation or that they have instructors themselves, in many instances, who are prepared to teach these things. It is unrealistic to expect our busy teachers to educate themselves in this difficult subject. Under mounting pressure, courses will begin to appear in our high schools, but their quality, in the absence of systematically trained teachers, will leave much to be desired.

There are a few bits and pieces, small scale attempts to overcome public ignorance. The War Colleges bring in a few private citizens, mostly reserve officers, for one or two week Strategy Seminars. These range over such a wide area they can provide only the skimpiest coverage of Communism. Some private groups have initiated schools on Communism, usually of one to five day duration. Sometimes these have been well run. Sometimes they have been

unnecessarily partisan. There is seldom any follow up. Last fall the University of Southern California received a \$350,000 gift to establish a school on Communist strategy and tactics. Presently it is offering six weeks of night classes. This event was so unique in the academic world, it received wide press coverage. It is a small, but hopeful beginning.

It is when we come to Requirement No. 5, however, -- not merely understanding Communism and the nature of the global struggle between systems, but knowing how the private sector can contribute to winning this struggle, that the extent of the research and training gap really becomes apparent.

The very idea of the private sector playing a large role in the cold war may seem novel. The Orlando Committee, after years of considering the problem, is convinced that many of our most difficult cold war problems are susceptible of partial solution, at least, through a wide range of method and means which can be implemented by the private sector -- provided our private institutions and civic organizations have among their members some who have received at least a little systematic training about Communism, the global conflict, and what the private sector can contribute. Without such trained and motivated people, what the private sector can do is limited. With them, even in comparatively small numbers, the range of activities, as will be developed in Part IV, is almost unlimited. Yet, as in the case of school teachers, we have neglected to provide anywhere a training program which would enable any significant number of private citizens to learn about these things.

Today the private sector wants to participate. From personal experience, and this has been confirmed by others I have talked with, I can testify a marked change has occurred in the public's attitude toward the cold war. Responsible citizens who showed little concern even a year or two ago, are now crowding forward to ask "what can we do?" They are worried. They sense that the business as usual civic projects now engaging their time, are a little remote in terms of the present world situation. Many display eagerness to involve themselves and their organizations in worthwhile projects that have some real bearing on winning the

cold war. These are responsible civic leaders, who understand the battle must be won in Latin America and Africa as well as Hoboken, and by a combination of positive as well as negative programs.

By and large, however, this increasing desire to participate has been frustrated by lack of trained leadership at the community, state and national levels and advanced knowledge on what the private sector can do.

This is disturbing, because every day important opportunities are slipping by, some never to reappear. But our civic leaders lack the training to enable them to visualize these opportunities or the methods and means their organizations could employ to take advantage of them.

The little training that is available, like the Strategy Seminars, has one common failing. It gets the student all stirred up and then suggests little or nothing he can do. There is a good reason why. In this tough and complex struggle the things the private sector can do are not as obvious as some imagine. Knowing something about the enemy is not sufficient preparation for making an effective contribution. It will require a concentrated, systematic research program involving a broad cross-section of experts with a maximum cross fertilization of ideas and experiences to think through the many methods and means the private sector can employ -- if the private sector is to participate on a sustained and systematic basis.

A number of private organizations are making some contribution here and overseas. Certain foundations are spending substantial sums overseas on a range of projects that sometimes have at least an indirect bearing. The AFL-CIO has done considerable work in Latin America, Africa, Europe and Asia attempting to build up free labor against the Communist onslaught. If you go through the whole list of private participation, at first glance it appears impressive.

In fact, it is not. Only a tiny fraction of the ingenuity, talent and strength that could be brought to bear here and overseas is being utilized. The great majority of our civic organizations are uninvolved. Much of what is being done is mediocre in terms of what it could be, if we had trained,

motivated people to carry out these programs.

To my knowledge, there is no comprehensive, organized effort going on anywhere to research and think through the full range of methods and means the private sector can properly employ. Nor does any existing center have the staff, funds or directive to undertake this enormous and challenging job. Yet, until the problem is considered whole, until a wide range of expert knowledge is focused on the problem, we can never know what the true capacity of the private sector is.

In planning our strategy in the non-military area, we tend to down grade the role of the private sector and this is realistic, considering its present limited capacity. The point is that we can very likely develop a very large capacity to participate with the type of research and training program envisioned for the Freedom Academy. Instead of bemoaning the lethargy, indifference and seeming incapacity of the private sector, we should recognize these are the natural and expected results of our neglect to institute an adequate research and training program.

The President's speech of April 20, 1961, to the American Society of Newspaper Editors indicates the Administration may have turned a corner in its comprehension of the inadequacy of our strategy and the means of implementation in non-military conflict. I was particularly struck by these words:

" . . . it is clear that the forces of communism are not to be underestimated in Cuba or anywhere else in the world. The advantages of a police state, its use of mass terror and arrest to prevent the spread of free dissent, cannot be overlooked by those who expect the fall of every fanatic tyrant.

"If the self-discipline of the free cannot match the iron discipline of the mailed fist in economic, political, scientific, and all the other kinds of struggle as well as the military, then the peril to freedom will continue to rise.

" . . . it is clearer than ever that we face a relentless struggle in every corner of the globe that goes far beyond the clash of armies or even nuclear armaments.

" . . . We dare not fail to see the insidious nature of

this new and deeper struggle. We dare not fail to grasp the new concept, the new tools, the new sense of urgency we will need to combat it . . . And we dare not fail to realize that this struggle is taking place every day without fanfare in thousands of villages and markets day and night and in classrooms all over the globe.

". . . Too long we have fixed our eyes on traditional military needs; on armies prepared to cross borders; on missiles poised for flight. Now it should be clear that this is no longer enough; that our security may be lost piece by piece, country by country, without the firing of a single missile or the crossing of a single border.

"We intend to profit from this lesson. We intend to re-examine and reorient our forces of all kinds; our tactics and our institutions here in this community. We intend to intensify our efforts for a struggle in many ways more difficult than war . . ."

These are hopeful words. Whether the corner has been turned will depend in good measure on the training and research effort we now inaugurate to prepare us to understand and master "the new concepts, the new tools" which will enable us to "re-examine and reorient our forces of all kinds, our tactics and our institutions."

For many years I have felt that one of the best indicators of future Soviet intentions is their immediate research and training effort. No one who noted the stepped up training of Latin Americans at Prague beginning in 1954 would have been misled by Khrushchev's protestations of peaceful co-existence.

By the same token I will remain unimpressed by talk about new methods and means until an adequate research and training program is inaugurated to provide them.

The question is this. Will the Administration take the position that the existing research and training program is adequate, or can be made adequate with a little more emphasis on non-military conflict? Or will the Administration admit that we have not even come close to an adequate research and training effort in the new dimensions of conflict -- and then set about systematically creating national

capacity for the long haul in the new forms of struggle?

The President is on record that we can lose everything if we fail to master the new forms of struggle. As of today there is not a single center in or out of government where this vast subject is pulled together and taught in concentrated form.¹³ Yet, only when it is considered whole can we understand the nature of the challenge and generate an adequate response.

13. The Senate Judiciary Committee in its June 1960 report on the Freedom Academy Bill made this finding:

"1. No concentrated, systematic effort is being made to develop an integrated operational science for our side which will meet the entire Soviet attack and work toward our long-range national objectives in a coordinated manner, utilizing every area of potential strength in the public and private sectors. We have not thought through all of the short- and long-range methods and means which free men can properly use when faced with a Soviet-type challenge, and we have not integrated these methods into a broad strategic plan. This is especially true in the field of political and economic warfare. Bits and pieces of the problem are being worked on within the Government and at some universities, and part of this development work is of a high order, but the total effort falls far short of seeking an integrated, operational science and does not begin to develop our true potential.

"2. Nowhere today can Government personnel or private citizens receive broad spectrum training in cold war, especially in the large and highly complex field of political and economic war. Not only do we lack top level schools, we do not even have intermediate or lower level schools. There is no place where the bits and pieces are pulled together and taught in concentrated form."

Gallup Poll on Freedom Academy Bill

Orlando Sentinel

Friday, May 4, 1962

General News

7 Of 10 Favor Strategy School**New Appeal Building
For Freedom Academy**By **GEORGE GALLUP**Director, Institute of
American Affairs

PRINCETON, N. J. — The establishment of a "Freedom Academy" to train Govt personnel and private citizens in cold war strategy would have great appeal to the American people.

Such an academy — which would be the U. S. counterpart of Russian political warfare schools already in existence — is seen by Americans as answering a definite need in the presently ideological struggle between communism and democracy.

Plans for the Freedom Academy are called for in a bill, under the leadership of Sen. Karl Mundt of South Dakota, now being considered by committees of both the Senate and the House.

Emphasizing what he felt to be the need for the Academy in a recent speech at a Princeton University Conference on International Communication, Senator Mundt said:

"In the theater of the Cold War, we still operate with far too many amateurs who have the desire to win but who completely lack the needed training and background with which to succeed."

Mundt said that while we are training military people are the "hot war" that we are not fighting, we are failing to train people to operate in the cold war conflict in which we are presently engaged.

To see how people across the nation react to the idea of the proposed Freedom Academy, Gallup Poll reporters asked a cross-section of adults this question:

"A proposal now before Congress would establish a special academy to train men in cold war strategy and to give them a better understanding of communist propaganda and political warfare methods. Would you favor or oppose establishing such an academy?"

The results from interviews with citizens in big cities, towns, villages and rural areas in all major regions of the nation:

Favor	69 Pct.
Oppose	14
No opinion	17

The proposed cold war training school — which is sponsored by 12 Senators from both political parties — also meets with bipartisan approval at the grass roots level.

Roughly the same size majorities of Republicans (68 per cent), Democrats (70 per cent), and Independents (71 per cent) favor establishing an academy to train people in propaganda warfare.

Linked to the majority support is recognition that the U. S. is sometimes lacking in what Mundt has called "cold war know-how" in fighting a shrewd adversary who has made such political warfare a specialty.

The minority who oppose the Freedom Academy proposal, however, do so chiefly



because they feel our present training facilities are adequate.

The present findings are but further evidence of a public desire to "do more" in a struggle which many citizens admit we are currently losing.

Since World War II, the public has favored various measures designed to sell the U. S. point of view to the world. A teacher-exchange program, U. S.-sponsored universities in Africa and Asia, the Peace Corps — to cite but a few examples — have all had the backing of public opinion in Gallup Poll surveys.

The public, moreover, has been willing to spend the money needed to get such projects underway. A little over a year ago, for example, two out of three persons favored the U. S. spending as much money for propaganda purposes as the Russians do — or an estimated twenty times as much as we do now on our U. S. Information Agency.

In back of this willingness is the concession — recorded earlier this year — that Russia is now ahead of us in the "propaganda war" — that is, doing the better job of winning people around the world to its point of view.



